

THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA'S COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS:

1945 - 1960

By



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- " The Impact of the Commonwealth on Canada's Foreign Policy," CPSA Annual General Meeting-Proceedings 1973. London: May 1973.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to study the role that Canada played in the Commonwealth and to assess the impact that this association had on several aspects of Canadian foreign policy from 1945 until 1968 by selected studies of particular issues that have been important to the Commonwealth during these years. The method used for assessing the evolution of Canada's relations with the Commonwealth is historical. **In this historical study every aspect of the Commonwealth relationship was not surveyed, but our approach did permit a general assessment of changes in Canada's attitude and behaviour towards the Commonwealth and the impact that the association has had on Canadian foreign policy within the context of selected case studies.**

Indian membership in the Commonwealth, first as a Dominion in 1947 and then as a republic in 1949, transformed the association from one which was Anglocentric to one which was multiracial in composition. As a member, Canada was compelled to support principles which were fundamental to the new Commonwealth and embodied the aspirations of the non-white members. It was as a result of Asian membership that Canada became increasingly more tolerant towards admitting non-white immigrants, or at least those from Commonwealth countries, and furnished economic development assistance.

Indeed, the evidence indicates that the shape and content of our aid program in its early years was clearly influenced by our Commonwealth association.

By 1961 it had become evident that the continued existence of the Commonwealth, serving as a forum to promote closer relations between peoples of different races, was threatened by the presence of a member state which practised a public policy of racial discrimination, and a British territory which continued to be governed by a white minority in sharp contradiction to the principles of this multiracial association. In order to preserve the Commonwealth from dissolution over these racial problems, Canadian prime ministers took a leading part in compelling South Africa to depart and repeatedly played a "lynchpin" role during the Rhodesia issue.

In sum, there was an extraordinary transformation in Canada's attitude and behaviour towards the Commonwealth between the mid-1940s and late-1960s. Moreover, the case studies concluded that successive Canadian governments were subject to direct and indirect influences from various Commonwealth actors and from the institution itself. Yet, while Canadian perspectives were broadened or initiatives apparently taken in the best interests of the Commonwealth, Canada shared similar interests and values with its fellow members, and achieved its own policy objectives by preserving this institution as an instrument of foreign policy. Thus, Canada had broadened its conception of the Canadian "national interest" to embrace the Commonwealth. To this extent, the Commonwealth had an impact on Canadian foreign policy.

PREFACE

Canada's Commonwealth relations have been examined from the perspective of Canadian involvement in the development of the multiracial association. But in order to study more fully the evolution of Canada's relations with the Commonwealth, it is inadequate merely to account for the role this member state has played in the association. Some consideration should be given to what extent Canada's external behaviour was affected by its membership in the Commonwealth. Thus, the dual purpose of this study is to assess the transformation of Canada's attitude and behaviour towards the Commonwealth as well as the impact that this institution had on several aspects of Canadian foreign policy.

This inquiry is limited to an examination of Canada's Commonwealth relations from 1945 until 1968. Since Canada's relations with the Commonwealth are conducted on an official rather than a public basis and the Department of External Affairs permitted me access to selected classified Canadian documents and papers until the end of the Pearson administration, April 1968 became the cut-off date. The case studies on which Canada's foreign policy are assessed include those that have been important to the development and preservation of the Commonwealth. Chapter III examines Canada's contribution to the multiracial transformation of this association from 1945 until 1949. Chapter

IV investigates the development of Canada's bilateral aid programs during the period, 1950-1963. Chapters V and VI respectively consider the role which Canada played in forcing South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961 and preserving the association from dissolution over the Rhodesia issue from 1964 until 1969.

Selected files of the Department of External Affairs were made available on the condition that they would not be quoted, cited or otherwise referred to without departmental permission. For the latitude I was given in viewing departmental files, I wish to thank both the former and current Directors of the Historical Division, Mr. Fred Hart and Mr. Harry Carter. In addition, Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, then Director General of the UN Division (POL), enabled me to study preparatory documents of the Canadian delegation to the UN General Assembly. Mr. Ted Arcand and Mr. Ian Robertson, successive heads of the Commonwealth Institutes Division, granted me access to briefing materials of the Canadian delegation to the Commonwealth Prime Minister's meetings. For the assistance that I received in securing these documents, I am grateful to Historical Division's Dr. Donald Page as well as Mr. Dacre Cole and Mr. Gaston Blanchet.

I am indebted to Mr. Robert Gordon, Chief of the Manuscript Division (Public Archives of Canada), for making available certain of the King Papers on short notice. The Hon. Mr. Jack Pickersgill made the necessary arrangements for my viewing the St. Laurent Papers. I express my appreciation

to the source who made available to me the Diéfenbaker Papers, and to Mr. Geoffrey Pearson who enabled me to see some of his father's papers as well as agreeing to several interviews. Since these Prime Ministers' Papers were examined in confidence, they cannot be quoted or cited, but they were of infinite value in assessing the substance and the direction of Canada's Commonwealth policy.

Interviews with persons who are privy to policy documents or who researched, or participated in, the events under consideration were a considerable asset to this study and are gratefully acknowledged. Current or former parliamentarians who allowed me to discuss my research with them include: Mr. Andrew Brewin, Lord Caradon, the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker, Douglas Hurd, the Hon. Mitchell Sharp and Lord Tanlaw. There are numerous public servants who proved indispensable to my study by providing interviews, correspondence and, in some cases, opened their personal papers for my perusal: Dr. O.E. Ault, Mr. Arthur Blanchette, Mr. Ralph Collins, Mr. Evan Gill, Mr. John Hadwen, Mr. Ivan Head, Mr. Herbert Moran, Mr. H. Basil Robinson and Mr. Ross Francis. Academics who especially contributed to my understanding of Canadian foreign policy or the Commonwealth include, Professors Douglas Anglin, David Farr, John Munro and Arnold Smith. In addition, I profitted from conversations with Professor Edward Appathurai, Mr. Glyn Berry, Mr. Henry Borden, Professor

Robert Cox, Professor Jocelyn Ghent, Mr. John Harrington, Mr. J. King Gordon, Professor Douglas LePan, Professor Peyton Lyon, Professor Donald Munton, Mr. Escott Reid, Mr. Colin Robertson, Mr. Clyde Sanger, Professor Garth Stevenson, Mr. Bruce Therdarson, Professor Elisabeth Wallace and Mr. Bruce Williams.

To the staff in the Manuscript Division of the Public Archives of Canada and the Department of External Affairs library, I express my appreciation for their assistance during the course of my research. Dr. Ian McClymont and Mrs. Maureen Hoogenraad expedited my use of the St. Laurent and Pearson Papers. Mrs Alice Adams was singularly helpful in providing sources of information and, on one occasion, by mail order.

I have benefitted from the useful comments and suggestions of several people who were willing to read my thesis in whole or in part. Professors David Farr, John Kirton and John Munro offered helpful advice for developing the case study on South Africa before its acceptance for publication. Special thanks are due to my thesis advisers. Professor Robert Matthews helped to shape the direction my study would take and, towards this end, generously provided some of his own research material. This thesis bears the imprint of Professor John Holmes who has provided comments on numerable drafts, counselling me to deal with the ambiguities of the Commonwealth. The study also has been enhanced by the observations of Professor Cranford Pratt who has challenged this student to scrutinize thoroughly the motives

behind Canada's foreign policy.

For financial assistance, I owe a substantial debt to the Province of Ontario and to the University of Toronto for awarding me scholarships and fellowships throughout my PhD program. Thanks to the research grant awarded to me by the Centre for International Studies, enabling me to travel to Ottawa to conduct interviews and study private papers, I was able to complete the research necessary to the writing of this thesis.

I am indebted to my mother, Bernice Hayes, for the time and care taken in typing the entire thesis both in its original and final draft forms. I am also grateful to my wife, Carolyn, for her forbearance and understanding during the past four and one-half years.

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CHAPTER, I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of my thesis will be to study the role that Canada has played in the Commonwealth and to assess the impact that this association has had on several aspects of Canadian foreign policy from 1945 until 1968 by selected case studies of particular issues that have been important to the Commonwealth during these years. Specifically, this study will attempt to fulfill the following objectives in successive chapters:

- (1) to consider the significance of the Commonwealth in Canadian foreign policy and the research material pertinent to this investigation;
- (2) to develop a method for the purpose of assessing the role that Canada has played in the Commonwealth and the impact that this association had on Canadian foreign policy;
- (3) to examine Canada's contribution to the multiracial transformation of the Commonwealth and the effect Indian membership in the Commonwealth had on Canadian foreign policy;

- (4) to investigate the development of Canada's bilateral aid programs and to determine how Commonwealth membership may have affected Canadian external aid policy;
- (5) to consider the role which Canada played in forcing South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and its impact on the conduct of Canada's external behaviour;
- (6) to consider the role which Canada played to preserve the Commonwealth from dissolution over the Rhodesia issue and the impact of that association on Canada's approach;
- (7) to assess the evolution of Canada's attitude and behaviour towards the Commonwealth over this period in the light of these individual case studies.

Accordingly, the introductory chapter will first consider the significance of the Commonwealth in Canadian foreign policy, and discuss some of the published works dealing with Canada's Commonwealth relations. Secondly, there is a brief discussion of the primary source material used in carrying out this investigation.

Canada's Commonwealth Relations

The Commonwealth evolved from the British Empire as colonies of settlement gained self-government¹ and collaborated with Britain at successive colonial conferences.² Full membership in the Commonwealth was extended to former British colonies that had become fully self-governing whereas associated states and dependent territories were accorded only a

status of affiliation within the association. A Commonwealth of independent nations, which were to be freely associated as equal partners by a common allegiance to the Crown, was eventually recognized in the Balfour declaration³ and formally affirmed by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.

Canada, particularly, guarded its autonomy jealously, blocking the efforts of Britain and Australia to create a common Commonwealth policy.⁴ Prime Minister Mackenzie King wanted Canada to maintain a position as an independent nation working within several international organizations rather than restricting it to the policy of a single grouping of nations. The growth of a general preferential system in world trade, at least by those countries which participated in GATT, virtually undermined the rationale behind, and the implementation of, Commonwealth preferences and the practicality of the association representing a common trade area. In addition, the King government rejected a Commonwealth defence policy, in which the Dominions would assume responsibility for their respective regions of the Commonwealth because Ottawa regarded intergovernmental organizations other than the Commonwealth as more important for maintaining international security. Due to the reticence of Mr. King and the realization by other member governments that such an idea was impracticable the Commonwealth was not to develop a common policy, although it did function as a forum for collaboration in areas of common concern.

Yet while Canada's Prime Minister helped to shape a decentralized flexible association that would not encroach upon the sovereignty of its member states, he had in so doing helped clear the way for its multiracial transformation. It was because this association recognized the independence and equality of nations among its membership that India and other Third World countries joined the Commonwealth. Like the other Commonwealth members, Canada was anxious to keep India in the association as a measure towards building a bridge of understanding between East and West. Consequently, the Commonwealth's constitutional bond based on a common head of state, was altered to allow for Indian republican membership. There was some anxiety as to how the association would function in the future, but despite the infusion of Asian members there were no dramatic changes in the Commonwealth relationship during the next several years. Although there was some greater interest in the decolonization of the empire, the Commonwealth essentially continued to serve as a forum for collaboration in which member states met to discuss matters of mutual concern. Consultations were most often directed towards the creation of understanding, followed by cooperation in matters for which agreement could be reached. However, a guiding principle of the association was that there should be no discussions involving the internal affairs of members.

With the growth of Asian, African and Caribbean membership after the mid 1950s (see Appendix A), new expectations of the association developed. As a forum for consultation,

the Commonwealth provided a medium in which Third World members could influence the entire membership towards increasingly placing emphasis on matters which were of concern to the majority. Consequently, the multiracial Commonwealth worked towards the solution of racial and economic problems, and the concepts of racial equality and economic equity emerged as its foremost values. While "multiracial values" perhaps had taken precedence over the convention of non-interference, the purpose of the Commonwealth had not changed, only the values of member states trying to fulfill it. Before the advent of the multiracial association, its primary concern was the promotion of global understanding to secure world peace. This objective was perceived by the Commonwealth of the 1960s as best served by attempting to mitigate problems caused by racial inequality and economic disparities.

Canada's Commonwealth connection was the outgrowth of the decolonization of the British Empire. Canadian membership was retained because the ideals of the association were consistent with its own and because, as it evolved into the Commonwealth, it became increasingly useful to Canada as it sought to play an important role in the contemporary world. Since Canada is a leading trading nation, the aspirations of successive Canadian governments after World War II have been to help stabilize the interstate system within the context of international organizations. Ottawa, therefore, was prepared to utilize the Commonwealth, in conjunction with other intergovernmental entities, as an essential part of its foreign policy. As an association that was representative of a cross-section of the world's peoples

6.

(see Appendix B), the Commonwealth was considered to be particularly valuable to Canada in a world in which the non-white nations were coming to play an increasingly important role. Indeed, the association not only permitted Canada the opportunity for multilateral consultations within the Commonwealth setting, but it opened the door for Canada to develop closer bilateral relations with Third World countries. The personal rapport developed between Canadian leaders and those of India, Tanzania and Zambia, for example, rendered Canada greater influence in the world community. It did Canada no harm and much good to be perceived as the confident of leading spokesman from the Third World, a benefit not widely shared by other Western nations.

Though the Commonwealth had undergone a multiracial transformation, it still functioned as a forum for collaboration in which influence takes place. Certainly the association acted as a medium in which to discuss aspects of international cooperation, without imposing conditions on member states' policies. But, whereas the Commonwealth works by means of collaboration such that members may influence each other as to responsible approaches to achieve their common ideals, each member is also subject to the influence of the others. Therefore, Canada's participation in the association would compel it to accommodate its policy to some extent to the interests of the other members. On the other hand, Canada's interests and those of the Commonwealth as a whole were similar, and the association was moving in the direction

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that Ottawa wanted. Thus, the questions that prompt this thesis are, first, to what extent has there been a transformation in Canada's attitude and behaviour towards the Commonwealth and, second, what impact did that association have on Canada's external behaviour from 1945 until 1968?

Canada's Commonwealth relations have been studied from the perspective of Canada's involvement in the development of the multiracial association. Several of the studies contribute to a general understanding of the evolution of the Canada-Commonwealth relationship, and merit review.

Since the end of World War II a few single volume works have dealt, at least in part, with Canada's involvement in the Commonwealth. Robert Spencer's contribution (1959) to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs biennial series on Canada in World Affairs describes India's admission to the Commonwealth as a republic in the volume accounting for the years 1946-1949.⁵ A chapter in James Eayrs' Northern Approaches (1961) reviews Canada's position with regard to the multiracial Commonwealth, in general, and South Africa, in particular, up until the time of the Union's departure. His book, The Commonwealth and Suez (1964), examines the reactions of Commonwealth members to the Suez crisis. While revealing Ottawa's concern for, and contribution towards, relieving friction among the membership, Eayrs implicitly recognizes the effect of the association on Canada's behaviour. Two

volumes written by Richard Preston (1965) and Trevor Lloyd (1968) in Canada and World Affairs respectively provide for an understanding of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and Canada's participation in the Colombo Plan during the periods 1959-1961 and 1957-1959. A part of John Holmes' collection of essays, The Better Part of Valour (1970), discusses Canada's need for the Commonwealth, which fosters collaboration among a cross-section of the world community in the interests of global understanding. James Eayrs' third volume of In Defence of Canada (1972) contains an excellent chapter, essentially developed around primary sources, which describes the emergence of the Asian dimension in the Commonwealth. A chapter in The Forked Road: Canada, 1939-1957 (1976) presents another view on the transformation of the Commonwealth. In a provocative style, but without the use of official documents, Donald Creighton argues that the post-war Commonwealth had become an association without character or purpose.

Several essays which have dealt with Canada-Commonwealth relations have focused on the members' impact on the association. Alexander Brady's presentation, "Canada, the Commonwealth, and the World," to the American-British-Canadian Conference in September 1955 suggests that Canada's friendship with the United States has enabled the Commonwealth to benefit from American support for the Colombo Plan, and in the area of security where Washington has often backed the interests of member states. A paper entitled, "Canada and the Commonwealth,"

which was prepared in October 1958 by John Saywell for the sixth Commonwealth Relations Conference, describes Canada's influential role in preserving the Commonwealth during the Suez crisis. In a Romanes lecture given at Oxford in June 1961, entitled "Canadians and their Commonwealth," Vincent Massey described aspects of Canada's participation in the association. In "A Canadian's Commonwealth: Realism out of Rhetoric," The Round Table (October 1966), John Holmes expresses the view that the essence of the association is its service as a forum for collaboration and it is this feature which explains the support which it has received from successive Canadian governments. Writing in the same journal (November 1970), George Glazebrook and Alexander Brady note, in "Canada and the Commonwealth," the Canadian contribution to the symbiotic relationship existing within the Commonwealth. Richard Leach briefly surveys the Canadian influence on the association in "Canada and the Commonwealth: Assuming a Leadership Role," International Perspectives (May/June 1973). In a more recent article on "Canada and the Commonwealth," The Round Table (January 1975), Lorne Kavic reviews Canadian attitudes and behaviour towards the Commonwealth, and concludes that Canada will continue to influence the association in the future as it has done in the past.

Thus, Commonwealth affairs have largely been examined from the perspective of how Canada has contributed to the development of the association. This is creditable, but it is also

important to consider the reciprocal relationship or the ways in which Canada may have been affected by its membership in the Commonwealth. Arnold Smith has cast some light in this direction. In a Centennial Lecture to the University of Toronto in 1967, entitled "Canada and the Commonwealth," Smith stated that the association had influenced Canada's perception of world affairs by compelling it to respond to the North-South dialogue. It was the Commonwealth, claims Smith, that was responsible for initiating Canada's participation in the Colombo Plan, and provided incentive for Ottawa to take a responsible position on race-related issues. Without specifically examining Canada-Commonwealth relations, Robert Matthews has appraised Canada's membership in the association as having influenced this country to respond positively towards some world racial and economic problems in "Canada and Anglophone Africa," Canada and the Third World (edd. P. Lyon, T. Ismael, 1976). If influence has been asserted in the direction that Smith and Matthews have assumed, we might expect a study to provide some assessment as to the impact that the Commonwealth has had on Canada's foreign policy. Indeed, in order to attempt a complete study of the evolution of Canada's approach towards the Commonwealth, it is inadequate merely to account for the role that this member state has played in the association. Some consideration must be given as to what extent Canada's external behaviour was

identified as Canadian by virtue of our membership in the Commonwealth.

Research Material

Since Commonwealth relations proceed on the basis of collaboration, dialogue resulting from multilateral and bilateral consultations provide the most appropriate data for assessing the evolution of Canada's attitude and behaviour towards that association. Canada's relations with other Commonwealth members are on an official rather than a public basis and consultations are not recorded for public consumption. Inasmuch as the record of Commonwealth conferences themselves are closed to the public, a main source for this study has been classified files which have been approved by the Department of External Affairs. In addition to DEA reports, correspondence and briefing materials for the Canadian delegation to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meetings (see Appendix C), other important sources for this assessment of Canadian policy have been the private papers of former Prime Ministers and interviews with sources who are privy to policy documents or participated in the events under consideration.

With a 30 year restriction generally imposed on Canadian Government documents, the more recent record of Canada-Commonwealth interactions is closed to public scrutiny. But the External Affairs department permitted me

restricted access to classified files, including departmental reports, correspondence and memoranda, from 1947 until 1968.

In general, documents dealing with Commonwealth Finance Ministers', Consultative, Education, and Trade and Economic conferences as well as briefing materials for the Canadian delegation to the Prime Ministers' meetings and the UN General Assembly were invaluable for the development of this study. Files specific to providing an understanding of Canada's approach to the issue areas selected for examination include those on India's relations with the Commonwealth, the 1948 and 1949 Prime Ministers' meetings, Canada's bilateral aid programs to countries of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, South Africa's relations with Canada and the Commonwealth, and pre-UDI papers on Southern Rhodesia.

The private papers of former Canadian Prime Ministers were made available for this thesis. The King Papers, housed in the Public Archives of Canada which also serves as the custodian of the St. Laurent and Pearson Papers, were open to public scrutiny. Mr. J. W. Pickersgill authorized my examination of St. Laurent Papers that were pertinent to my study, but these were few and of marginal value. The source who permitted my perusal of selected Diefenbaker Papers must remain anonymous. Mr. Geoffrey Pearson allowed me limited access to his father's personal papers.

DEA files and Prime Ministers papers have been supplemented by interviews with a considerable number of current or former parliamentarians, public servants and academics.⁶

Interviews were conducted without the use of a questionnaire or tape recorder. Interviewing without a uniform series of questions permits the interviewer to devise questions that are specifically tailored to the experiences and knowledge of the interviewee. Interviews which are not recorded on tape seem to stimulate more intimate conversations which may cause interviewees to respond to questions with more candor than might otherwise be expected. These conversations have proved helpful in explaining motives or clarifying aspects of policy where insufficient information was available. Of course, attitudes and opinions are based on the memories and prejudices of the subjects. But such interpretive information can be collated and checked as to authenticity, and it offers a more balanced impression of issues and events. Indeed, often the thoughts behind the policy are not recorded in the official record, and the recollections of policy-makers can act, therefore, as an important adjunct to the public and classified record. Thus, in view of the primary source restrictions, oral accounts are considered a valuable asset in contributing to the understanding of Canada's relations with other Commonwealth members.

I was fortunate to hold interviews with sources who were privy to policy documents or who participated in the events under examination, but who have chosen to remain unidentified. In addition, I had access to classified files and private papers which cannot be cited. In order to

adhere to the various conditions under which I was permitted to see materials and to conduct interviews and, yet at the same time, to establish the credibility of this study, I have interpreted my research material as follows:

- (1) A "fact" has been noted only if it has been corroborated by another source and not contradicted by any other source.
- (2) The public record and biographies of Commonwealth statesmen have been cited whenever they were consistent with the classified material to which I had access.
- (3) Approval was granted for access to the classified record (selected files of the Department of External Affairs) on the condition that it would not be quoted, cited or reproduced without the permission of the Department. Since it has not always been possible to fully document this source, the Department has required that I use "DEA files" as the citation in chapters three and five. For the material in chapters four and six, which were presented to the Department after a change in the senior staff of its Historical Division, I have been asked to delete all references to DEA files which cover material from the late 1950s and 1960s because they relate to passages in the text which identify officials by name or describe the policies of other governments. In these cases, "research material" serves as the citation.
- (4) In instances where I have used interviews or private papers, they also are reported as "research material" without any further clarification of the source. I have quoted the observations of interviewees and attempted to summarize the substance of private papers by including dates and noting the actors involved wherever this has been possible.

Though I have qualified what is interpreted as a "fact" the whole procedure is necessarily subject to the author's assumptions. The author also realizes that there is an inherent bias even within the classified record. But a statement on

resource material is worthwhile if only to clarify what is considered to be an accurate accounting of events.⁷

With restricted access to Commonwealth meetings, there is a paucity of primary source material⁸ on the public record. Indeed, the very nature of such intimate discussions precludes their publication. Final communiqués issued from the conferences, summarizing the consensus that is reached on a broad spectrum of international events, are necessarily synoptic. Press statements by conference officials are few and intermittent. Consequently, the reports of the media can only present a brief overview of the meetings. The researcher, therefore, must depend on subsequent government papers or, after 1965, the bi-annual reports of the Secretary-General. British Command documents and reports of advisory Commissions are requisite to a study of Commonwealth relations. The Survey of Current Affairs and Commonwealth Secretariat publications and information papers also are useful.

Canadian publications pertinent to this study include the Department of External Affairs' Annual Report, the monthly bulletin External Affairs, the Canada and the United Nations series and its collection of official statements and reports. Those that proved most beneficial include Statements and Speeches, Reference Papers, Press Releases and the strategy papers of successive development assistance agencies. Attitudes of Members of Parliament on foreign policy are found in the House of Commons and Senate Debates. In addition, the statements on government policy and those of foreign policy experts are

recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

NOTES—CHAPTER I

¹ Lord Durham's Report of 1839 contributed to the founding of self-government by initiating the introduction of responsible Cabinet government and the separation of a colonies' internal affairs from imperial affairs: .cf. Gerald Craig, ed. Lord Durhams Report, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1963.

² Indeed, Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald has been identified as the founder of the Commonwealth concept since it was he who called and negotiated for conferences between Britain and the colonies which possessed self-government: Arnold Smith, "The Commonwealth as an Instrument of North-South Politics," an address to the CIIA, Toronto, 15 November 1976.

³ In terms of the Balfour Report, Britain and the Dominions were defined as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic and external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations": Cmd. 2768 Imperial Conference 1926, Summary of Proceedings.

An excellent examination of the events leading up to the Balfour declaration is found in Philip Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British Canadian Relations, 1917-1926, London, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

⁴ For a discussion of Canada's continued rejection of a centralized imperial policy, see the chapters dealing with the Commonwealth in James Eayrs In Defence of Canada, Vols. 1, 2, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1964.

The following overview of the Commonwealth in Canadian foreign policy from World War II until the end of the Pearson administration is intended to establish the relationship between the independent and dependent variables during the period under investigation. A thorough discussion of Canada-Commonwealth interactions is incorporated in the cases studies which follow.


⁵ Full documentation of the works cited in this bibliographic survey, as well as those writings referred to in the latter portion of this chapter can be found in the bibliography.

⁶In addition to information and direction from my academic advisers, the following persons provided interviews:

Douglas Anglin, Carleton University, 7 December 1976, 22 July 1977
Edward Appathurai, Glendon College, 19 November 1974
Ted Arcand, Ottawa, 21 July 1977
Dr. O. E. Ault, Ottawa, 27 July 1978, 1 August 1978
Glyn Berry, Ottawa, 27 October 1977
Arthur Blanchette, Ottawa, 3 August 1978
Henry Borden, Toronto, 7 December 1978
Andrew Brewin, MP, Ottawa, 4 August 1977
Lord Caradon, Toronto, 13 February 1975
Harry Carter, Ottawa, 19 December 1976, 10 January 1979
Ralph Collins, Ottawa, 26 July 1978
Robert Cox, York University, 4 October 1977
The Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker, Ottawa, 26 October 1977, 6 March 1978, 16 August 1978
David Farr, Carleton University, 15 August, 18, 25 October 1977, 11 August 1978
Jocelyn Ghent, Ottawa, 11, 12 August 1978
Evan Gill, St. Andrews, N.B., 24 August 1978
John Hadwen, Ottawa, 2, 8, 16 August, 12, 19 October 1977
John Harrington, Toronto, 23, 30 November 1976
Ivan Head, Ottawa, 26 July, 4 August 1977, 16 August 1978
Douglas Hurd, MP, Oxford, 11 July 1975
J. King Gordon, Ottawa, 18 July 1977
Douglas Le Pan, Toronto, 28 March 1979
Peyton Lyon, Carleton University, 23 March, 25 July 1977
Herbert Moran, Ottawa, 16 August 1977
John Munro, Ottawa, 2 August, 13, 26, 28 October 1977, 14 August 1978
Donald Munton, Dalhousie University, 26 October 1977
Geoffrey Pearson, Ottawa, 10 August 1977, 9, 14 August 1978
Escott Reid, Ottawa, 27 July 1978
Ian Robertson, Ottawa, 10 August 1978
Basil Robinson, Ottawa, 2 August 1977
Ross Francis, Ottawa, 21 July 1978
Clyde Sangar, Ottawa, 20 July 1977
The Hon. Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 21 July 1977
Arnold Smith, Toronto, 15 November 1976, Ottawa, 7 December 1976, 17 March, 18, 25 October 1977
Garth Stevenson, Carleton University, 25 July 1977
Lord Tanlaw, Oxford, 6 July 1975
Bruce Thordarson, Ottawa, 19 July 1977
Elisabeth Wallace, University of Toronto, 5 November 1974
Bruce Williams, Ottawa, 26 July 1977

⁷cf: John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton, 1973, pp. 182-183.

⁸See Appendix I for an overview of published works related to this study.



CHAPTER II

METHOD

In order to assess the evolution of Canada's attitudes and behaviour towards the Commonwealth, a conceptual framework must be devised. Accordingly, the conceptual contributions made in other studies will be discussed. First, there is an examination of the concept of influence to account for the various dimensions of the influence relationship. Second, methods for assessing influence in international organizations are reviewed, assuming that they may help overcome some of the methodological difficulties that might be anticipated in examining the Canada-Commonwealth relationship. Finally, a rationale is discussed for the use of the historical method as the most appropriate means to assess the role that Canada has played in the Commonwealth and the impact that association has had on Canada's external behaviour.

Concept of Influence

There is no dearth of writings on influence but there is a problem of knowing what it is. "Power" and "influence" are treated synonymously by C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter

as the ability to control others whether that ability (influence) is exercised or not.¹ Evidently, these elite theorists believe that holding the resources of influence precludes the necessity of showing whether influence is ever exercised. In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau differentiates between the concepts by stating that influence is a technique for exerting political power over others.² But he neither acknowledges that a relationship must exist among actors nor does he explain how influence is exercised. Citing Stanley Hoffman's observation that "the distinction between acts and verbal policies is losing its usefulness," David Bell defines influence as "advice" with the assumption that sophisticated advances in technology have made influence in world politics a form of linguistic communications.³ Though dialogue is an essential aspect of influence, and singularly important in Commonwealth interactions, Bell does not deal with the attitudinal or behavioural change that "advice" may have effected. Robert Dahl describes influence in Modern Political Analysis as a relationship between one actor and another in which behavioural change is realized.⁴ In order to assess the effect of one actor on another, James March proposed that the behavioural change incurred should be examined over a period of time within specified

activities.⁵

Apart from Bell's assertion that influence could be equated with advice, the character of the concept is thus far from clear. Professors Lasswell and Kaplan have described influence as an effect on policy which is enforced or expected to be enforced by sanctions.⁶ But Arnold Wolfers distinguished influence in more subtle terms as "the ability to [move others] through promises or grants of benefits."⁷ Talcott Parsons, in general agreement with Wolfers, conceives influence as lying somewhere between inducement and persuasion.⁸ Inasmuch as the focus for this study is on collaboration rather than confrontation, it is more appropriate to consider influence as persuasion. Not all forms of persuasion constitute friendly persuasion. Professor Holsti reminds us that in its capacity as persuader an actor may use threats or sanctions.⁹ Canada's Commonwealth relations generally are conducted at the level of frank and civil dialogue, but occasionally over the more volatile racial issues there were threats by African members to withdraw from the association if an approach that they

considered as unacceptable were taken. Therefore, persuasion could be considered in this study as an appeal, assurance or threat of one actor to elicit the response of another actor. The influence of either the opinion or behaviour of an actor could be gauged by estimating changes in attitudes or actions after interactions during a specific period of time.¹⁰

But "an adequate theory of influence must be more general than that implicit in a simple stimulus-response treatment," cautions James March, who claimed that "behavioural change over a given time interval and measured by overt motor or verbal activities [ignored] changes in the individual's latent readiness to act."¹¹ The perpetuation of an actor's behaviour which has initially changed, but which does not exhibit overt continued behavioural modification exemplifies another aspect of influence claimed David Singer.¹² The condition of "non-change" due to the reinforcement of an actor's behaviour by means of influence is similar to the "non-decision" that Bachrach and Baratz draw attention to in their study of the functioning of plural democracy, Power and Poverty.¹³ As in the case of a non-decision, a non-change may not always result in overt behaviour, but simply implicit attitude changes. Therefore, implicit attributes of influence deserve attention in order to develop a wider perspective of the concept of influence.

The range of possibilities for studying influence is almost infinite. In international relations, a study might focus "on perceptual elements in interpersonal relationships" among actors to help understand specific acts of influence.¹⁴

A full explanation of the perceptions of actors is not conceivable, but some understanding of them is required if we expect to account for the other "face" of influence.¹⁵

Indeed, implicit influence in international relations can be significant. As Arnold Wolfers put it, "enthusiasm for international organizations per se may lead a nation to support them irrespective of whether it gains or loses influence."¹⁶

It is possible, for example, that a nation's membership in an international organization could compel national policy to have been altered from a course that might otherwise have been taken if it was not a member of the organization.

Whether explicit or implicit influence is exercised, the concept of influence inherently requires "responsiveness," which Holsti defines as "the willingness to be influenced," such that an actor reacts or is perceived to react by changing its attitudes or behaviour in response to another actor.¹⁷

By examining responsiveness Singer found "that inter-nation influence is far from a one-way affair" and that in the international system "all [nations] are influencing all, directly or indirectly, merely by sharing the same spatial, temporal, and socio-political environment."¹⁸ Benjamin Cohen subscribes to the assumption that multiple reciprocal responsiveness exists in the United Nations as he assesses the

impact of that organization on United States foreign policy:

The existence of the United Nations has clearly caused the United States to justify and defend the exercise of its power within the framework of United Nations principles and purposes. This has undoubtedly affected the statement and presentation of American policy. But there is also evidence that the existence of the United Nations has affected American policy in re as well as in modo.¹⁹

But if interactions between nations and intergovernmental organizations exhibit multiple reciprocal responsiveness in which influence or influence attempts works both ways, the question arises as to why national policy-makers must be responsive to the organization that was expected to afford national influence. Cohen provides part of the answer:

The United Nations has caused American policy to be formulated with greater consciousness of wider interests which may profoundly affect American interest and which the United States as a world power cannot wholly ignore. The United Nations has broadened the scope of American foreign policy and made it more quickly conscious of and responsive to political, economic and social problems which sooner or later must affect the interests of the United States as a world power. The United Nations has also made the United States more quickly conscious of and responsive to the effects of its own foreign policy on world public opinion.²⁰

Louis Henkin treats this paradox further in How Nations Behave in which he maintains that nations act essentially as they would expect others to treat them.²¹ Nations are thus influenced by the potentiality of their counterparts breaking principles or guidelines established by international agreements due to the perception or reality of reciprocal responsiveness.

A subtler aspect of reciprocity is examined by integration theorists. By a nation maintaining an intergovernmental organization as an important part of its policy considerations, neo-functionalists presume that the organization develops influence by virtue of its serviceability.²² This argument may also be applied to the Commonwealth which, while it affords Canada the opportunity to influence other nations, may in turn subject Canada to indirect influence as it attempts to maintain the continuance of the international forum that it has found so useful. Consequently, attention must be given to the different modes of influence by trying to determine direct changes of Canadian policy due to the impact of other Commonwealth members or indirect changes insofar as Canada's respect for the Commonwealth itself could be perceived as causing continued Canadian support for the association.

In sum, influence incorporates three "faces" insofar as it may be explicit, implicit and reciprocal. Moreover, there may be different modes of influence involving direct or indirect changes. Thus, in this study influence will mean the act or perceived act of bringing about change, by means of persuasion, in one actor's²³ attitudes or behaviour due to the relationship with another actor within the context of selected issue areas.

Methods of Assessment

A method for assessing the evolution of the Canadian attitude towards the Commonwealth must account for each of the dimensions of the influence relationship. The method must, therefore, consider a relationship between an intergovernmental organization and a member state in which influence may be directed implicitly or overtly. In addition the method must consider that there are multiple, and often reciprocal, external influences affecting a nation state actor at any specific time. In determining a method of assessment, it is appropriate to comment on several means that have been developed, in other studies. A detailed description will not be attempted. The utility of discussing pre-theories will rather be in declaring their inapplicability to the study of Commonwealth relations.

Communications analysis provides an interesting method for assessing political power on the basis of information flows within the international system. Proponents of this pre-theory assume that the political process is based on information, and the structures (including a nation's decision-makers) which shape the information.²⁴ It is expected, therefore, that

information can be examined through the volume, intensity and the direction of transactions among nations to determine which ones exercise power by initiating change. A variant of communications analysis is the event data approach begun by Charles McClelland as an attempt to collate and measure information in the form of events.²⁵ The aim of event data analysis is to identify the results of decision-making, which are recorded in the public media; in order to ascertain actors' influence in the international system.

Transactional analyses permit researchers to collate, formalize and quantify masses of information about international interactions, and the methods account for explicit or "informed" decisions as well as "information feedback" or reciprocal responsiveness. This would account for the reciprocal relationship of mutual responsiveness that Benjamin Cohen suggests is inherent in interactions between an international organization and a member state.²⁶ However, the ability to collect and measure information is restricted by the assumptions on which the techniques are based, such as what information should be considered at all. Moreover, in

gaining quantitative capacity, the analyses ~~de~~-emphasize human behaviour since mathematical concepts are inapplicable for understanding human behavioural patterns or human perceptions.²⁷

Yet, communications theorists assume that transactions will reveal a nation's attitudes and behaviour because communications are not limited to written or verbal messages, but indicate diplomatic posture through actors' participation in international forums. Insofar as human thought processes and psychological phenomena involved in political international relations can ever be assessed, Hedley Bull argues that transactional data cannot consider influence that may be implicit in affecting the decisions recorded in events.²⁸

This is a strong condemnation of transactional analyses if one accepts Bull's argument that the qualities of human relationships are far more salient than quantities of information flows in political relations.

Since Commonwealth relations are based on collaboration, transactional analyses would appear to be a possible method to study interactions among its members. In fact, Robert Riggs has proposed the assessment of the communication of ideas and information as well as instrumental feedback in order to determine how international organizations influence members' policies.²⁹ But information on meetings between Commonwealth governments is withheld from the public aside from a communiqué (a generalized statement of the meeting's agenda), press reports, and occasional "leaks" of information from delegations. The very nature of intimate and candid executive discussions precludes their publication.

To the extent that a consensus is attempted on a broad spectrum of international events, the communiqué is necessarily synoptic. Thus, public access to information involving Commonwealth consultations is usually limited, superficial and speculative. Consequently, transactional analyses seem to be an impracticable approach for studying Canada's Commonwealth relations.

The analysis of voting has been considered as a means to assess relative influence among nations, particularly among those in the UN General Assembly.³⁰ As an inter-regional organization, the issues which involve the Commonwealth at various ministerial meetings are generally those that involve the world. Consequently, the UNGA is a forum in which issues of Commonwealth concern are usually put to a roll-call vote accompanied by an explanation of each country's position. A technique of voting analysis developed by Arendt Lijphart permits an examination of Canada's voting behaviour in the UNGA in comparison with all other Commonwealth states on any vote or series of votes over a specified time period.³¹ For example, the modified Index of Agreement (IA) could yield a numerical value representing the level of agreement between any particular state in comparison with all other nations on a complete issue. In this manner the IA could act as an index of cooperation to determine the extent to which Canada has agreed to cooperate with other Commonwealth members on matters of mutual concern, and effectively measure Canada's behaviour on selected issues.

Guttman Scaling is another technique of voting analysis which has been applied to roll-call votes by Leroy Rieselbach to analyze the behaviour of a group of nations on a series of related questions, and to determine those countries which share similar approaches.³² For instance, Canada's position with respect to each member of the Commonwealth could be established throughout a definite time period. As a result, any behavioural changes by Canada or the Commonwealth can be assessed as to degree and direction.

However, there are restrictions to voting analyses. Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett have applied voting behaviour analysis as a means for assessing relative influence.³³ The index of legislative effectiveness that they employ for indicating who initiates resolutions is inadequate for assessing how some states may be influenced by others or the UN as a whole because voting analyses cannot measure the attitudes of states during collaboration, which is essential for determining the nuances involved in the influence relationship. In order to assess who has been affected by whom, and in what manner influence may have been exercised, the interactions of individual actors must be examined. In addition, an analysis of voting cannot gauge the techniques employed by those who act as mediators which is a role often exercised by Canadians. Robert Keohane commends as a supplementary method a qualitative assessment of influence by means of interviews of national representatives and an examination of the official record.³⁴

Keohane contends that influence on national policies can be assessed on a range of issues by examining such techniques as "compromise," "log-rolling" and "mutual-understanding" in reciprocal relationships among nations, and "persuasion," "promises" and "pressure" in non-reciprocal relationships. This method may hold some promise, but a theoretical framework is not proposed for systematically examining influence even on individual issues. Although he distinguishes between various types of influence processes operating in the Assembly, the UN is a forum in which Commonwealth actors are likely to act differently than they would in an exclusive Commonwealth setting, if only because the organizations operate by different procedures and expectations.

Decision-making analysis is another method for assessing influence on the behaviour of decision-makers. Richard Snyder et al. developed a systematic framework to conceptualize the role of decision-making in the formulation of foreign policy within the international system.³⁵ The authors assume that inter-state interactions can be defined as sets of decisions, and aim at providing a description of the domestic and external inputs that influence the behaviour of national decision-makers. The main forces influencing decision-makers within the external and domestic environments include the actors' position and activities, the information available, and the personality (attitudes and perceptions) of the actors. What the conceptual framework amounts to is a categorization of data applicable to decision-making, but there is no assessment of the influence process or an analysis of the exercise of influence.

Seminal studies in community decision-making also required an examination of a series of decisions, but these studies assumed that an assessment of the decision-making process might explain how influence was exercised.³⁶ Issue areas were selected to observe changes due to decisions, and to determine where influence may have occurred. However, typologies of issue areas were handicapped by the assumptions on which they were compiled. For example, in deciding which issues should be included and which left out, Dahl excluded non-controversial and non-governmental issues from his analysis.³⁷ As noted above, Bachrach and Baratz have explained that these types of issues may be equally as important in assessing where influence lies.³⁸

But with the assumption that the decision-making process may record changes in the relations between actors, and indicate where influence has taken place, decisions are the focus for examination. However, decision-making analysts reach a dilemma even attempting to determine the scope of a decision. Agger, Goldrich and Swanson outline a multi-stage sequence of a decision which affords a systematic breakdown of the decision situation.³⁹ Yet, there is room for disagreement about what stage in the process an issue can be considered as decided. Hence, problems arise from attempting to ascertain the number of persons and resources involved as well as the final outcome in a decision-making situation.

In seeking to overcome this problem, Cox and Jacobson have conceived the decision "as a new starting point in a continuing process, a point at which those options that remain open and those that have been foreclosed become clear" assuming that "the legal or formal character and the content

of the decision is less important than the balance of forces that it expresses and the inclination that it gives to the future direction of events.⁴⁰ Consequently, the authors focus on influence techniques of the decision-making process in order to describe how influence is exercised by individual decision-makers in terms of patterns of interactions and alignments. Influence, it is contended, can be exercised in various ways depending upon the context of the interactions such as the structure and procedure of the international organization in which the actors operate. Roles which appear to be applicable to the Commonwealth are labelled "initiator" and "broker." Since the Commonwealth is a forum in which members try to win their points of view, "initiation" is a likely means of persuasion. The association also works towards consensus; and "brokerage" is a technique that is used, especially by Canada, to bring about modification in the behaviour of members. Of course, the act of influencing is not always overt so that actors' attitudes require critical inquiry. Within their concept of decision, Cox and Jacobson, therefore, have accounted for "non-decisions", or an actor's implicit decision not to act, which may also affect or support the existing relationship among actors. Yet, whereas their analytical framework provides a method for understanding the structure and process of influence in the organizations, it is not applicable for studying the consequences of decisions made in organizations or the impact of the organizations on national policies.

Inasmuch as the Commonwealth does not make decisions per se, but rather works towards a consensus of general expectations, decision-making analysis is not entirely appropriate for the study of Commonwealth relations. But the method does offer some perspective for studies of influence, particularly in the specification of various modes of influence.

The Historical Approach

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the Commonwealth is an intergovernmental organization of multiracial composition which attempts to achieve cooperation among its membership towards common values or principles by means of collaboration. As a forum for collaboration, its members try to reach an understanding or a consensus on issues of mutual concern rather than make decisions. Its purposes are understood in terms of expectations because the Commonwealth does not make policy. It functions by means of influence instead of resolutions or votes. Just as Commonwealth relations operate differently from those of other international organizations, the more rigorous empirical methods that have been devised for analyzing them are inappropriate means for developing a case study examining **the relationship between** Canada and the Commonwealth.

Thus, the method to be used in this study for assessing the evolution of Canada's relations with the Commonwealth is historical. It is

expected that a descriptive study will afford a clearer understanding of the complexities involved in Commonwealth interactions, and render greater explanations of attitudes and opinions. In a like manner, a chronological ordering of events might permit a clearer perspective of the behaviour or approach of national and international actors. In addition, the historical approach should provide for a less rigid form of analysis which is liable to account for the "non-changes" involved with "non-overt" influences or simply the paradoxes which inevitably arise when dealing with the concept of influence. The more formalized empirical methods, which are considered above, are often prevented by their basic assumptions from taking into account the contradictions of human behaviour or what empiricists call the "intervening third variables." Thus a loose conceptual framework will be used, indicating sources, types, and techniques of influence. But a pre-theory will not be adopted, and there will be no rigid empirical methodology employed.

The method that will serve this thesis will take into consideration those sources and techniques of influence which are most appropriate for assessing the transformation in Canada's Commonwealth relations. In order to explain the relationship existing between the association and its member, the investigation will be put into the context of

international relations.⁴¹ If Canada's attitudes and behaviour appear to have been altered in accordance with Commonwealth expectations, it is important to take into account the policies of other external actors which may have affected the approaches of Canada and the Commonwealth. It is also necessary to gauge the influences of relevant domestic actors⁴² on the selected issues to appreciate whether Canada had initiated the Commonwealth to reach a consensus, having taken the same position initially itself.

The influence relationship could be overt if one Commonwealth actor took an initiative to which Canada responded. It may be implicit to the extent that Canada's attitudes or behaviour were reinforced, or it may be reciprocal inasmuch as Canada was influenced by the very association it was trying to influence. An attempt will be made to distinguish the different modes of influence by trying to determine direct changes (such as expansion and retraction) of Canadian policy due to the impact of other Commonwealth actors or indirect changes insofar as Canada's respect for the Commonwealth could be perceived as causing continued Canadian support for the association.

If the Commonwealth is believed to have influenced Canada's foreign policy, an assessment of which Commonwealth actors exercised influence, the type and technique of influence, the forum in which influence took place, and the results will be discussed. For example, an attempt will be

made to ascertain whether membership in the Commonwealth has caused Canada's views or actions towards issues to change or become reinforced. This method of assessment may not be able to determine the extent of Commonwealth influence because it cannot account for all the actors' perceptions and the infinite number of variables that are associated with an actor's position. Moreover, it may not always be able to distinguish who influenced whom in the cyclical argument of reciprocal influence. But this study will attempt to assess changes in Canada's behaviour towards the Commonwealth and the impact that the association has had on Canadian foreign policy within the context of the selected case studies.

NOTES - CHAPTER II

¹ Cf. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford U. Press, 1956, p. 9; Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, Chapel Hill, North Carolina U. Press, 1953, pp. 2, 4.

² Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd Edition, New York, Knopf, 1963, p. 29.

³ David Bell, Power, Influence and Authority, Toronto, Oxford U. Press, 1975, p. ix.

The quotation is taken from Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1968, pp. 63-64.

⁴ Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 40.

⁵ James March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," American Political Science Review, June 1955, p. 433.

⁶ Harold Lasswell, Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1950.

⁷ Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore John Hopkins U. Press, 1962, p. 103.

⁸ Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," Political Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1963, p. 44.

⁹ K. J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, Englewood, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 167-169.

¹⁰ Small group studies are the most applicable to assessing the influence of individuals. Of course, an experimental situation is restricted as to the number of variables (attitude or action changes) that can be assessed, and clinical testing can not control for intervening variables of the real-life situation.

¹¹ March, loc. cit.

¹² David Singer aims at clarifying the meaning of power by applying an analytic model to the concept of influence in "Inter-nation Influence: A Formal Model," American Political Science Review, June 1963, p. 420.

One of the more interesting studies dealing with influence by means of reinforcement was R. Rosenthal and L. Jacobson's Pygmalion in the Classroom (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), in which it was hypothesized that

pre-conceived attitudes by teachers influence disadvantaged children to fulfill the teachers' expectations. Behavioural change was not realized because the children's progress was, as it always had been, directly related to a teacher's assumptions rather than to the students' abilities.

¹³P. Bachrach, M. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, New York, Oxford U. Press, 1970, p. 10.

¹⁴Jonathan Knight, "On the Influence of the Secretary-General: Can We Know What It Is?," International Organization, Summer 1970, p. 600.

¹⁵In foreign policy, the interaction of personality, role and organization variables is considered in: Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (edd), Foreign Policy Decision Making: an Approach to the Study of International Politics, New York, N.Y., Free Press, 1962.

¹⁶Wolfers, op.cit., p. 105.

¹⁷Holsti, op.cit., p. 202.

¹⁸Singer, op.cit., p. 421.

¹⁹Benjamin Cohen, "The Impact of the United Nations on the United States Foreign Policy," International Organization, May 1951, p. 280.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, N.Y., Praeger, 1968, pp. 45-64.

²²For example, Ernst Haas has examined whether the growth of mutual socio-economic pursuits among nations will yield greater influence and authority to a supranational organization as "pay-offs" become greater. Haas makes an evaluation of his studies on integration in "The Study of Regional Integration" in L. Lindberg, S. Scheingold, Regional Intergration, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 1971, pp. 3-45.

²³An actor could refer to an individual, group, organ, state or group of states which was involved in interactions within the selected issue areas, during the specified periods of time, and had some possibility of exercising influence.

²⁴Of political scientists who have derived conceptual designs from communications theory, Karl Deutsch's work, particularly Nerves of Government (NY Free Press, 1968), has been the most widely recognized. The actual theory of communications emerged from the study of the problems of electrical communication, and C.E. Shannon is credited by those in his field as its founder, cf: The Mathematical Theory of Communications, Urbana, U. of Illinois Press, 1959.

²⁵ Among Charles McClelland's numerous writings on event data analysis, "The World/Event Interaction Survey" (University of Southern California, 1967) is considered to be the seminal study.

²⁶ Cohen, op.cit., pp. 274-281.

²⁷ Oran Young convincingly argues that communications theorists may have lost in authenticity what they have gained in conceptual precision: Systems of Political Science, Princeton, Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 57.

²⁸ Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach." World Politics, April 1966, p. 374.

²⁹ Robert Riggs, "The United Nations as an Influence on United States Policy," International Studies Quarterly (March 1967), pp. 91-109.

³⁰ See especially Hayward Alker, Bruce Russett, "Who Initiates, with What Success?", World Politics in the General Assembly, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1965, pp. 167-190.

³¹ Arendt Lijphart, "An Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review, December 1963, pp. 902-917.

³² Leroy Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, #14, pp. 291-326.

³³ Hayward Alker, Bruce Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1965, pp. 167-190.

³⁴ Robert Keohane, "The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly," International Organization, Volume 21, No. 2, 1967, pp. 221-237.

³⁵ Snyder et al., op.cit.

³⁶ Robert Dahl is probably the foremost representative of community decision-making analysts: Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1963.

³⁷ On the assumption that only important issues reach the political arena, decision-making analysis assessed governmental issues: "Letter to the Editor," Administrative Science Quarterly, May 1963, p. 254.

³⁸ Bachrach and Baratz, loc.cit.

If one was to accept the argument of C. Wright Mills (op.cit., p. 266) that many important economic decisions rarely reach the government forum, but are reserved for "top-level" agreements, governmental issues cannot represent all significant issues.

³⁹ R. Agger, D. Goldrich, B. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1964, p. 40.

⁴⁰ Robert Cox, Harold Jacobson, edd., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1973, p. 3.

⁴¹ World politics is comprised of interactions among nation states, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental entities. But this study is essentially "state-centric" insofar as it has assumed that states are the principal units involved in Commonwealth relations, and transnational relations have been excluded from examination.

⁴² Influences on Canadian foreign policy are generated from both within and outside Canada's boundaries. In the context of political systems analysis, Canadian policy would be affected by domestic demands and constraints together with Canada's interactions within the international political system.

CHAPTER III

INDIAN MEMBERSHIP

This chapter examines Canada's contribution to the transformation of the Commonwealth, while at the same time it assesses the impact of the association on Canada's foreign policy. It focuses on Ottawa's approach to a common Commonwealth policy and a formula to accommodate republican membership, and describes the effect on Canada of Indian membership in the Commonwealth.

In the first part of the chapter, there is an examination of Canada's response to the British and Australian interests in moving towards increased Commonwealth centralization and institutionalization. The study focuses on Mackenzie King's attempt to develop an informal method of consultation in the areas of defence and trade which did not infringe upon the foreign policies of the member states. To a certain degree, it is argued, Canada's push for a less rigid Commonwealth to respect the sovereignty of its present members helped clear the way for its ultimate multiracial transformation.

Part two traces Canada's contribution in finding a formula which would permit India's continued membership in the Commonwealth without affecting the linkage subscribed to by the other members. The emphasis is on the reasons for Canada taking such a keen interest in retaining India as a member of the association, and the effect on the

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Commonwealth of the elimination of the former constitutional bond as a basis for relations between all members.

The conclusion provides an assessment of some of the domestic and external constraints which affected the shaping of Canada's Commonwealth policy. Whereas Canada may have helped to transform the Commonwealth into a multiracial entity to suit its own foreign policy objectives, the growth of Asian membership could hardly help but result in Canada's being influenced by the interests and expectations of these countries. Thus, this case study will assess the impact that the Commonwealth, and Indian membership in it, had on Canada's foreign policy.

A Commonwealth Policy?

Canada's post-war external policy was based on the premise that it must play an active role in international affairs if it were to contribute to maintaining world peace. The Canadian approach towards promoting world stability was perceived to be best served by participating in international organizations committed to sustaining global security by means of consultation and cooperation. The Commonwealth was one such institution, and Ottawa considered that it was in Canada's interest to continue to actively support it. Of course, there were strong cultural, political and economic reasons why the Commonwealth was to remain instrumental to Canadian foreign policy. Canada had historical ties with the association which were personified by a common monarch, and a substantial portion of the Canadian public

favoured continued association. The Commonwealth also served as an important counterpoise to the continental drift. But perhaps most important, the Commonwealth had been shaped into the kind of institution that fit comfortably into Canadian policy. It was an international forum for collaboration, promoting understanding among its members and cooperation in matters of common concern. But there was no Commonwealth policy common to all members. Member states were free to make their own policies, and agreement was reached wherever it was practicable.

The major tenets of Canada's Commonwealth policy were described by Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, in his Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto in January 1947:

Even though they are not precisely defined, the principles on which we act in regard to the Commonwealth may be clearly discerned. We seek to preserve it as an instrument through which we, with others who share our objectives, can cooperate for our common good in peace as in war. On the other hand, we should continue to resist, as in the past, efforts to reduce to formal terms or specific commitments this association which has demonstrated its vitality through the common understanding upon which it is based. We should likewise oppose developments in our Commonwealth relations which might be inconsistent with our desire to participate fully in the task of building an effective international organization on a wider scale.¹

Essentially, St. Laurent was underlining Canada's rejection of a common Commonwealth approach to international affairs. The Canadian government was quite reasonably reluctant to subscribe to a single-voice concept because it would likely

reflect British policy insofar as the United Kingdom was still primus inter pares within the Commonwealth. To follow a British approach to world problems would be retrogressive for a nation which had spent the past three-quarters of a century developing its autonomy in external relations. To argue that Canada could help formulate the policy would probably be an insufficient reason to convince Canadians, and especially Francophone Canadians, that it would be in their interests to make such a commitment. Moreover, Ottawa was clearly interested in full participation in global institutions rather than restricting its collaboration to a single grouping of nations. Cooperation with one institution would not preclude relations with others, but a commitment to a common Commonwealth policy would, unquestionably, inhibit Canada's relations with non-Commonwealth countries. Indeed, the Canadian government was concerned that the Commonwealth should not appear to be an exclusive power bloc. Rather, Ottawa hoped that it would work in unison with other countries and international institutions which had interests similar to those of the Commonwealth. In this way, Canada's Commonwealth commitment would not endanger its relations with the world at large.

From 1945 until 1947, the question of a common policy was to become the focus of Commonwealth discussions. As to whether a common approach should be taken towards defence and trade and whether or not procedures for collaboration should

be institutionalized, Canada was to take a negative view.

Commonwealth countries had cooperated in the disposition of combined Dominion forces and collaborated closely with Britain during World War II. However, post-war Canadian governments rejected a Commonwealth defence policy because such a policy would negate Canada's independent status in world affairs. Furthermore, a coordinated scheme of Commonwealth defence was unfeasible. Prime Minister St. Laurent recapitulated the Canadian position in an address to the Canada Club in London in January 1951:

The nations of the Commonwealth have repeatedly demonstrated that they can muster considerable strength in war, and we have co-operated effectively to resist aggression in the past. [But] we in Canada have never regarded the Commonwealth as such as an instrument for organizing our common security on the basis of our collective strength; we do not so **consider** it today. 2

It was evident that the defence of Canada had to be considered especially within the North American region as a whole. Naturally, Canada was to be primarily concerned with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (and eventually the North American Air Defence Command) and, subsequently, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The defence of these areas contributed to the security of the Commonwealth as well, but Canadian governments certainly regarded organizations other than the Commonwealth as more important for maintaining

security. In addition, Ottawa was insistent that the Commonwealth commitment should not interfere with Canada's relations with its southern neighbour. It was not only important that the Americans believe that the Commonwealth was not an exclusive group, preventing other countries from participating in its defence collaboration, but that the United States should be solicited to cooperate with the Commonwealth to enhance the prospects of world peace. As Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated in the House of Commons just after the war, the association of the two was "the surest guarantee of world security."³

In commercial matters during the post-war period Canada was committed to free world trade. In conjunction with the inter se conception of the Commonwealth Canada had formerly subscribed to the principles of imperial preference. But the extension of favourable tariff concessions to Commonwealth countries was inconsistent with the most-favoured-nation (MFN) arrangements worked out under the auspices of the UN and embodied in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. GATT provided for the gradual reduction of quantitative and tariff reductions and the universal extension of the MFN principle. This approach met the requirements of Canada's expanding economy as it provided a basis in principle for increasing our exports on a non-discriminatory basis to all countries. Ottawa considered that it was in Canadian interests to participate in GATT providing that the existing Commonwealth preferences could be maintained. Although there

was not a wholesale dumping of the preference system, Canada had shown its support for the universalist ideal of the UN. Perhaps more significantly Canada had resisted a common Commonwealth economic policy about which other countries, particularly the United States, were sensitive. A reaction by the Americans to devise their own preferential system, to the exclusion of the Commonwealth, would have been disastrous for Canada.

The third issue underlying Canada's reluctance to accept a common policy involved the creation of formal institutions. The Canadian government considered that its post-war collaboration with the Commonwealth should neither be institutionalized nor commit the membership to mutual obligations.

Contrary to other international organizations, such as the UN, which worked by resolution and vote to find a majority position, Commonwealth consultations were most often directed towards the creation of understanding, followed by cooperation in matters for which agreement could be reached. To facilitate this, governmental meetings were closed to the public, proceeded without formal rules and agenda to a general consensus, and released a communiqué to inform the public of common areas of agreement.⁴ Canada was one member which was neither interested in formalizing existing consultative arrangements nor developing a secretariat which might work to that end. The method of collaboration then in existence suited a country aimed at preserving its autonomy in international relations.

In sum, Canada was prepared to continue close and intimate consultations with other members of the Commonwealth so long as there was no attempt to formulate a common policy to post-war problems. Not only was Canada unwilling to compromise its sovereignty by making a Commonwealth commitment, but the government was aware that a common voice might conflict with its non-Commonwealth agreements. While Canada participated in Commonwealth discussions prior to international negotiations leading to the UN Charter and the peace treaties, as well as GATT, the principles of universalism and non-exclusivism still prevailed. This is not to suggest that the Canadian conception of Commonwealth relations was readily accepted by all member states. Canadians were to spend the next several years trying to win over the other members to their point of view.

With the war in Europe approaching a climax, the heads of Commonwealth governments met in London early in May 1944 to consider the progress of the allied forces. There was, however, another reason which necessitated what was to become the first prime ministers' meeting since the Imperial Conference of 1937. There had been a call for a common policy from all Commonwealth members with the exception of Canada and South Africa whose governments considered such a policy to be impracticable. In September and December 1943, Prime

Minister John Curtin of Australia advanced a proposal for regular meetings of heads of government or their designates in a permanent Commonwealth consultative body which he called the "Empire Council".⁵ A secretariat of Commonwealth personnel as envisaged as being able to service a continuing network of communications on matters of common concern. Notwithstanding this institutionalized process of collaboration, the Australian statesman maintained that it would not inhibit a member state's national policy, but rather enhance each member's influence by assuming a part in a collective policy.

Within a few weeks of Curtin's Press Statement, the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, made an address to the Toronto Board of Trade in which he declared:

...what is, I believe, both desirable and necessary, is that in all the fields of interests, common to every part of the Commonwealth - in foreign policy, in defence, in economic affairs, in colonial questions and in communications- we should leave nothing undone to bring our people into closer unity of thought and action...

Today we begin to look beyond the war to the re-ordering of the world which must follow. We see three great powers, the United States, Russia and China, great in numbers, areas and natural resources. In the company of these Titans, Britain apart from the rest of the Commonwealth and Empire, could hardly claim equal partnership...

If, in the future, Britain is to play her part without assuming burdens greater than she can support, she must have with her in peace the same strength that has sustained her in this war. Not Great Britain only, but the British Commonwealth and Empire must be the fourth power in that group upon which, under Providence, the peace of the world will henceforth depend.⁶

In sum, Lord Halifax was commending closer Commonwealth unity as a way for the association to measure up to the post-war, international power structure. Commonwealth cohesion was to be secured by collaboration "on vital issues" to "achieve a common foreign policy expressed not by a single voice but the unison of many."

These proposals for formalizing the process of Commonwealth collaboration and formulating a role for the association in world affairs were interpreted by the Canadian government as an attempt to centralize the policies of Commonwealth countries. When Parliament re-convened following its Christmas break, Mr. King criticized the assumptions of each of the Commonwealth statesmen. The Canadian Prime Minister intimated that an Empire Council conceived by Mr. Curtin was directed towards creating a common policy that would inevitably put Canada in a subsidiary position in matters dealing with its own affairs. King argued that it would be better to continue the existing form of consultation which permitted "a continuing conference of cabinet councils of the Commonwealth . . . dealing with matters of common concern."⁷ This system of collaboration was facilitated by communication between members' departments of external affairs, various Commonwealth conferences and the exchange of High Commissioners which had permitted the respective governments sufficient coordination to deal effectively throughout the war period. As to the "Titan" conception of global affairs, King declared that

such a conception runs counter to the establishment of effective world security, and therefore is opposed to the true interests of the commonwealth itself.

Collaboration inside the British commonwealth has, and will continue to have, a special degree of intimacy. When, however, it comes to dealing with the great issues which determine peace or war, prosperity or depression, it must not, in aim or method, be exclusive. In meeting world issues of security, employment and social standards we must join not only with commonwealth countries but with all likeminded states, if our purposes and ideals are to prevail. Our commitments on these great issues must be part of a general scheme, whether they be on a world basis or regional in nature.⁸

Although he was censured for exaggerating the single-voice issue as a threat to Canadian sovereignty in order to sustain Francophone and minority group support at home, King had pursued throughout his political life the objective of developing an independent foreign policy for Canada. Whether the Prime Minister was justified or not in reacting as strongly as he did to proposals for Commonwealth unity, he could hardly countenance a Canadian commitment to a common Commonwealth policy.

Yet there was some question among certain members of parliament as to whether the proposals of Curtin and Halifax for a collective Commonwealth policy would detract from Canada's influence in a wider international setting such as the UN. Mr. T. L. Church, a senior spokesman of the Progressive Conservative Party, did not see that an institutionalized Commonwealth body would inhibit Canada's independent role in world affairs, but rather considered that it would make more efficient the existing

means for collaboration.⁹ Howard Green declared that Canada's status as an independent nation would be enhanced "standing beside Great Britain and the other dominions in the British Commonwealth, a Commonwealth that will be the leader in preserving peace and justice among the nations of the world."¹⁰ Clearly, the Canadian government perceived a role for the Commonwealth in Canadian foreign policy, particularly as the association's objectives coincided with those of other international institutions working towards global stability. But increased centralization of the Commonwealth implied a power bloc concept of world affairs rather than a functional model which provided for the participation of independent national actors involved in promoting international understanding and cooperation. Consequently, it was the government's view that a common Commonwealth voice would neither serve the best interests of Canada nor the world as a whole.

Mackenzie King was able to put his government's position to the Prime Ministers' meeting, held in London from the first until the sixteenth of May 1944. That is not to suggest that the conference was entirely devoted to the Commonwealth's future role in dealing with post-war problems. But some heads of government wanted a re-organization of the Commonwealth in matters of defence, trade and its means of consultation.

Prime Minister Curtin indicated Australia's desire for defence collaboration within the Commonwealth, and presented a series of documents outlining improvements in machinery desired by his government. Apparently Curtin was somewhat

skeptical about the prospects of a world security organization and was fully committed to developing an Empire Council irregardless of Canadian opinion. In a Press conference on May 4, he declared: "If I cannot have four brethren, and can have three, well, three's better than none."¹¹ Churchill was equally interested in "Empire unity" insofar as member nations would speak with a single voice in the world's regional councils.¹²

In an address to both Houses of the British Parliament on May 11, King responded to these proposals for centralizing Commonwealth consultative procedures in matters of security. In essence, the Canadian Prime Minister recommended that methods for modifying the Commonwealth structure should not limit the autonomy of its members or be aimed at integrating the membership into a separate bloc. Referring to the Commonwealth's position in post-war international institutions, King stressed

that the way to maintain our unity is to base that unity upon principles which can be extended to all nations

The war has surely convinced all nations, from the smallest to the greatest, that there is no national security to be found in the isolation of any nation or group of nations. The future security of peace-loving nations will depend upon the extent and effectiveness of international co-operation.¹³

On May 15 when the prime ministers met to devise a final communiqué, King reiterated the Canadian attitude towards Commonwealth post-war defence cooperation. Whereas Lord Cranborne, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,

presented an argument for developing an Imperial Joint Board for Defence, King was reported to have stated that:

It would be unrealistic to consider defence arrangements between Commonwealth countries as in any way an alternative substitute for a strong world security organisation to which each of us will have to make our appropriate and proportionate contribution.¹⁴

Later that day, the Prime Minister would confidently make the following statement in a communication to his Minister of National Defence, James Ralston:

Preliminary discussion of proposals for world security organisation have, I believe, been valuable and have helped to make clear the impracticability of taking the Commonwealth as a unit with a single foreign policy.¹⁵

Whether the issue of a Commonwealth defence policy was finally settled was surely questionable at best, but King's position at the 1944 conference was respected insofar as the communique ignored any reference to it at all.

The approach that Commonwealth members would take to post-war commercial policy did not occupy much time at the prime ministers' meetings. Canada's attitude towards imperial preferences was noted in the briefing documents prepared for its delegation.¹⁶ Essentially the Canadian delegation was directed to favour the widest possible development of post-war international trade.

The basis for Canada's trade policy until then was governed to a large extent by the Commonwealth preferential scheme which had been originally conceived at the Ottawa Conference in 1932 when Canada joined with other Commonwealth countries in extending preferential tariffs on reciprocal

terms. There were few quantitative restrictions and the preferential rates were mutually advantageous to all participating countries. But the Ottawa Agreements constituted a limited trading system, designed to meet the problems of the Depression when tariffs (such as those restrictions under the United States Tariff Act of 1930) were the main obstacles to trade. This preferential system had extended relatively free access to markets within the Commonwealth area at the expense of other countries.

But after the war Canada expected to expand its trade preferences with countries other than those of the Commonwealth in a general agreement on international trade. Trade was a reciprocal proposition. In order for Canada to secure greater export opportunities, it was necessary to extend preferential access beyond a restrictive imperial trade system. The United States, in particular, attached considerable importance to the Commonwealth's approach towards prospective world commercial cooperation. During the Prime Ministers' conference, the Department of External Affairs reported to Canada's High Commissioner to Great Britain, Vincent Massey:

If Commonwealth solidarity was presented with emphasis on Imperial preference or on exclusive arrangements of any kind, they would have an adverse effect on the willingness of the United States to consider plans for international cooperation whether political or economic; and probably also the United States attitude towards lend-lease.¹⁷

The practical alternative to an overall reduction of protective tariffs was to extend the MFN principle to all nations participating in a global trade agreement. It was

evident to Commonwealth heads of government that a "universalist" approach to freer trade was required through a general commercial convention to ensure world prosperity and perhaps stability.

When Prime Minister Curtin proposed the establishment of an Empire Council in his Press conference on May 4, he also had in mind attaching a secretariat of Commonwealth personnel to the Council so as to furnish it with a professional support staff. Curtin may have been of the view that a Commonwealth civil service might help to entrench his initial proposal for formalizing consultative machinery on a permanent basis. Regardless of his intention, one Canadian diplomat who attended the conference recalled

that the Australian [Prime Minister] strongly put forward proposals for a Commonwealth secretariat, which proposals were just as strongly opposed by the Canadian delegation.¹⁸

Mackenzie King suspected that Canberra contemplated a centralizing agent "dealing with questions on programmes for all parts of the Empire, and attempting to settle matters there."¹⁹ Whereas Curtin advocated more frequent collaboration at every level through a secretariat, King believed that consultation and cooperation throughout the war by means of a "continuing conference of the cabinets of the Commonwealth" was indicative of efficient and "effective coordination of policies."²⁰ As a result of King's reticence, a consultative council and secretariat were deemed neither requisite nor expedient to facilitate Commonwealth collaboration. Although the prime ministers agreed to refer the idea for formalizing Commonwealth

consultative procedures back to their respective governments for consideration, Curtin's proposals were never implemented, at least during the next two decades.

Thus the single-voice concept was found unacceptable. This outcome was to be expected. Commonwealth consultations were, for practical reasons, intended to permit an exchange of ideas rather than to achieve binding agreements of all members on a common policy. It was unrealistic to believe that all members could reach agreement on different issues in which each member had its own interests and viewpoints. This was in keeping with the Balfour interpretation of the Commonwealth association. Each member was equal and independent, and part of any nation's sovereignty was complete freedom to establish its own policy.

A communiqué was issued at the end of the conference indicating the consensus that had emerged from consultations among a group of like-minded nations. This statement was neither a list of resolutions adopted (because the Commonwealth did not work by resolution and vote) nor was it an expression of common policy. In fact, when Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, and Prime Ministers Curtin and Fraser suggested that the communiqué should indicate some measure of Commonwealth cohesion by referring to "the principles which determine our foreign policy," King declared his opposition:

In our discussions, it was settled that our policies would converge. There was no agreement about there being one foreign policy. I took exception to that, saying that it was not true.²¹

The final communiqué issued on May 16 confirmed King's point of view inasmuch as it stated that the prime ministers were agreed on "the principles which determine our foreign policies, and their application to current problems."²² The expression of separate "foreign policies" in the communiqué forecast a bleak future for subsequent calls to recognize a single-voice concept in Commonwealth relations.

In sum, the 1944 Prime Ministers' meeting followed a Canadian perspective of Commonwealth collaboration without the need for closer integration or institutionalization. The essence of Commonwealth interactions was to be comprised of consultations to discuss issues of mutual concern, followed by cooperation in such matters for which mutually acceptable activities could be agreed upon. The communiqué noted that the membership could pursue similar policies in common, but whereas a convergence of separate policies was negotiable, there could be no common policy.

Although the British were interested in having a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in the spring of 1945 to discuss member states' perspectives on the forthcoming San Francisco talks regarding the development of international institutions, Mackenzie King was not very obliging. There was some concern in Ottawa that such a conference might be interpreted abroad as an example of the

Commonwealth coming together to formulate a common viewpoint. This was naturally unacceptable to Canada. Moreover, there was the feeling at External Affairs, to which at least one former official has attested, . . . that a "continuous series of functional conferences . . . accomplished the work with less fuss and better timing."²³ In the event, the Government agreed to be represented by the Canadian High Commissioner and the Associate Under Secretary of State for External Affairs at Commonwealth consultations in April.

Mackenzie King subsequently visited London in the autumn to meet with Prime Minister Attlee and members of the new Labour government. Commonwealth relations were not a topic for discussion, but the subject of shoring-up defence coordination of the Empire eventually came up in a private talk that King had with Attlee and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Lord Addison. King flatly stated that "we had not been represented on the Imperial Council [of Defence] at any time, nor was it of the slightest use during the war."²⁴ He added that the word "Imperial" connoted "centralization in matters of defence" and "our Government would not be favourable to Canada taking a different course at this time in regard to an Imperial Council of Defence than that taken on any previous occasion." Although King thought that he had made Canada's position clear with regard to a Commonwealth defence policy, this was not to be the end of the matter. Pressure from the British Press²⁵ and from members of the Conservative Opposition for a reorganization of the method of Commonwealth

collaboration to better serve its members in a post-war environment was to be an issue at the next Prime Ministers' conference.

A series of primarily bilateral consultations between Mr. Attlee and the other Commonwealth prime ministers was planned for the spring of 1946 just prior to the Paris Peace Conference. Press reports in the United Kingdom were treating the forthcoming meeting of heads of government as an attempt by the Commonwealth to institutionalize defence arrangements for the protection of the Empire. Though no British proposals for post-war security collaboration had been advanced, the United Kingdom had urged member states to discuss the possibility of developing defence research cooperation. Canada was reluctant to formalize defence arrangements with the Commonwealth without ensuring close cooperation in this regard with the Americans. Whereas a liaison between the United States and Commonwealth countries would be worthwhile, it was impracticable from Canada's point of view to risk the possibility of prejudicing Canadian-American relations by appearing to ignore its continental partner by working too closely with the Commonwealth.

It was also understood in Ottawa that the United Kingdom was interested in devising a system of Imperial Defence. Such a proposition was equally unacceptable to the Canadian government. The Secretary of State for External Affairs indicated as much in a telegram to the Canadian High Commissioner, Vincent Massey, in March:

We are, of course, deeply concerned that the security and strength of the whole British Commonwealth should be maintained but we cannot conceive this as being effectively safeguarded by exclusive Commonwealth arrangements. The strategic interests of the Commonwealth are so diverse that their protection requires the co-ordination of defence before [sic] individual Commonwealth countries and foreign states.²⁶

The Acting High Commissioner assured the department a few weeks before the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers that

Mr. Bevin, Mr. Attlee, Mr. Noel-Baker, and most of their colleagues belonged to the school of thought which placed its faith in international rather than Imperial institutions, and that these spokesmen are still looking forward to world federation rather than Imperial federation.²⁷

The Labour government, it was reported, was rather requesting the Dominions to share responsibility for sustaining Imperial defence by means of financing, extending personnel and associating more closely with defence planning. The Acting High Commissioner explained further that

those in charge of policy in the present Government have not shown any disposition to encourage the belief that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers would, or should, formulate tightly-knit plans for "Imperial defence".

It was the opinion of Canada House that these proposals were not intended to subordinate Canadian defence prerogatives to British control because the question of a common foreign policy had been settled. However, this was not Ottawa's point of view nor was it Whitehall's.

Mr. Attlee met the Commonwealth prime ministers from April 23 until May 23. Each leader was tackling the problems of post-war redevelopment but they were all able to come to London, although at different times, during this period. The topics for discussion ranged from economic matters, including the economic and political stability of the countries of southern Asia and the impact of the peace treaties on the future of the axis powers, to security questions such as Commonwealth defence responsibilities and liaison between respective governments on military affairs. Through the ensuing (primarily bilateral) consultations, heads of government were afforded the opportunity to consider those subjects which most concerned them. Though it was evident that Mackenzie King was not prepared to discuss defence coordination, Prime Ministers Nash and Chifley attended the meetings early and expressed their interests in closer security arrangements.

Two papers on Commonwealth defence were shown to the prime ministers upon their arrival in London. Vincent Massey reported to Ottawa that the Chiefs of Staff memorandum outlined four "main support areas," stipulating that "each member of the Commonwealth should accept responsibility for the development and defence of their main support area" as well as the "protection of the lines of communication between the main support areas."²⁸ The Chiefs of Staff further suggested the value "of co-operation in training and research" to the extent that "the Dominions would maintain their own training facilities" but be prepared to direct them "in times of emergency for Commonwealth purposes." Massey reported in

the same telegram that the Dominions Secretary's paper recommended that whereas "any Commonwealth defence organization must include" arrangements "for co-operation with other countries," the member states "should set up some [loose] system for co-ordination" such as maintaining "Joint Staff Missions in London and in any other Dominion capitals in which they consider they have sufficient interest." The High Commissioner added that "Nash indicated general acceptance provided there was assurance of adequate political consultation at all levels" while, ironically, "Chifley said he was anxious lest the proposal should involve centralized control of defence policy."

As was to be expected, King showed little enthusiasm for the British defence proposals. When referring to the Commonwealth consultations in the Canadian House of Commons on May 9, King declared:

I wish to make it perfectly clear that I am not going to attempt at any consultation to say what this government's opinion is with regard to questions of defence, questions of trade, preference and the like because I am not one of those who pretend to speak for the entire cabinet without the opportunity of conferring with its members. . . . I shall be careful to refrain from committing anyone in a manner that is likely to occasion embarrassment.²⁹

In a letter sent to Prime Minister Attlee the next day, King referred to his statement in the House:

Conditions here. . . have rendered it necessary for me to let Parliament know, before I leave, exactly the extent to which I may be expected to speak for Canada on any matters which may, in appearance or in reality, commit Canada to any so-called Commonwealth policy either on defence, trade preferences, international treaty obligations, or the like. I feel it may avoid, after my arrival in London,

embarrassment to all concerned were I, before leaving Canada, to be equally explicit towards yourself and the other Prime Ministers or their representatives as to the position I shall have to maintain in any consultations in which I may be expected to participate.³⁰

Mackenzie King attended the five final meetings of prime ministers from May 20 until May 23. In the last of these meetings, Foreign Secretary Bevin and Lord Addison expressed the British propositions with regard to Commonwealth defence. Essentially, they re-affirmed Britain's desire for the Dominions to assume the defence of their respective regions and to provide closer military liaison with the United Kingdom through permanent attachés.³¹

It was obvious to all member states that Britain no longer had sufficient resources or power to bear the full responsibility for the defence of the Empire. However, it was equally apparent that an integrated Commonwealth defence policy was politically and geographically unfeasible. A loosely coordinated regional association of defence which permitted the collaboration of non-Commonwealth countries was somewhat more practicable, but King was leery of making any commitments.

The prime minister was concerned about extending Canadian responsibilities to areas of its designated region in which Canada did not want to become involved. It was, therefore, reasonable for Canada to take time to consider defining the perimeter of any prospective strategic zone. Mr. King took a conservative position with regard to the subject of military liaison, as well. When questioned by the Dominions'

Secretary as to whether he "would object to having one of the Canadian military authorities at HQ Staff present [at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings in London] to listen to the discussion for the sake of getting information," King recorded the dialogue in his diary:

I said Canada was not in favour of a Commonwealth policy. In other words, a single foreign policy for the Empire. That we felt Australia might have one foreign policy; South Africa another; and ours would necessarily be based on our immediate neighbours, the Americans, for questions of defence and the like. . . Naturally we would all wish to harmonize our policies to the greatest possible degree. Addison said he understood this thoroughly. He then used the words "would we agree to someone coming in as an observer - give no expression of opinion - but simply to report the situation to the government. I said that I thought that as long as it was understood it was simply for the sake of information and that no commitments were to arise nor were we to be regarded thereby as being consulted as distinguished from being informed, I would be agreeable, to someone being present. X

Post-war commercial relations were not very thoroughly discussed during the prime ministers' meetings, but were treated rather in subsequent talks in June. The High Commissioner's Office reported that the question of trade policy was only considered briefly in the final session:

It was made clear ... that all Commonwealth Governments are agreed that Imperial Preferences might have to be reduced or removed in the interests of wider international trade, but that they would be surrendered only in exchange for appropriate tariff concessions on the part of the United States and other countries. 33

Such a formula coincided with the Canadian point of view. Despite the anxiety in some Commonwealth quarters to strengthen the Imperial preference system, Canada wanted to expand its

multilateral trade. This could be accomplished best by reducing tariff barriers to non-Commonwealth countries. However, we were not prepared to surrender the preferences without using them as a bargaining point with the United States.

In the same communication to Ottawa, the Canadian High Commission referred to an agreement reached among prime ministers regarding Commonwealth collaboration:

The final communiqué . . . made it perfectly clear that members of the Commonwealth consider the flexible methods now practised to be preferable to any centralised machinery which it was believed would not facilitate, but might even hamper, the effective co-operation which is the essential characteristic of the British Commonwealth.

The possibility for future improvements of the method of Commonwealth consultation was not precluded, but the prime ministers had concurred with the Canadian belief

that although one nation of the Commonwealth may inform the others concerning its policy, and listen to their opinions, that nation must have the right to decide for itself on its own responsibility what action it wishes to take.

What was perhaps even more significant was that Britain's Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Eden, accepted the Labour government's views on the impracticality of introducing centralized machinery to the Commonwealth.

The objective of having the Commonwealth develop a uniformity of view on questions of mutual concern, persisted after the 1946 Prime Ministers' meeting. The British Foreign Secretary suggested to Ottawa that the wedding of Princess Elizabeth to be held in November 1947 might be a fortuitous occasion for a meeting of the heads of government. However, the Canadian government was not interested in another conference in which the concept of a common policy might be promoted, Mackenzie King was of the opinion that there were sufficient functional organs in which to discuss questions of Commonwealth defence, trade, consultative machinery and outstanding constitutional issues. As usual the Canadian view prevailed.

Security arrangements were negotiated by intra-Commonwealth communications. Following the 1946 meetings of prime ministers, a White Paper on Central Organization for Defence had been prepared by the British Foreign Office. Mr. King was not pleased with all the proposals and, particularly with one paragraph that recommended the coordination of regional defence planning and establishment of liaison officers in respective Commonwealth capitals. In a telegram to Prime Minister Attlee, King pointed out two aspects that would require clarification:

In the first place the paragraph might read as implying an intention to organize regional

defence on a Commonwealth basis without the participation of other countries. In the case of Canada it is obvious that the defence of North America must, for the most part, be planned by the United States and Canada jointly, and your Chiefs of Staff are familiar with the plans now under discussion between ourselves and the United States. We think, therefore, that emphasis on the term "regional defence" is misleading as there will be great variety in the methods adopted by various Commonwealth Governments, involving close co-operation in some cases with foreign governments....

[Second,] the paragraph appears to imply that the liaison officers in each capital would regularly sit with the Chiefs of Staff concerned for the purpose of regional planning so that the Governments of each Commonwealth country would be furnished with joint advice. We consider that our own Service representatives to be appointed in London and and perhaps in other Commonwealth capitals should not be empowered to enter into commitments... Their functions would be to act as a channel of information and liaison. 34

In the event, the King Cabinet was to create four military liaison officers, one for each of the services and another from the Defence Research Board, to be attached to the Canadian High Commission in London. As was to be expected these military attachés were restricted solely to liaison activities and reported directly to the High Commissioner.

Canadian recalcitrance was a foregone conclusion. Ottawa obviously was concerned about any proposal which suggested Commonwealth exclusivity or entertained the idea of centralizing Commonwealth security relations in London. King was emphatic that there should be no hint of a common policy and so informed Lord Addison in November.

I thought that at the meeting of Prime Ministers in April and May last it had been agreed by all that... "all that was needed was Liaison Officers from the services to be appointed to the staffs of High Commissioners". . . .

I thought too, it was agreed by all, that... "nothing should be said which... might create at the present juncture of international affairs a wrong impression both in and out of the Commonwealth, as to a 'ganging up' against any possible future antagonist, or as to any lack of confidence in the United Nations" organization.

The secret of our security lies in close co-operation of a completely flexible character. Each nation of the Commonwealth must be free to contribute in its own way not merely on the basis of a particular group of countries, but in co-operation with all the others and with the United States, towards a general system of security throughout the world. Both within and without the Commonwealth, emphasis on what is called "Imperial Defence", with all the machinery of Imperial Conferences, combined staffs and centralized policy, will only, I believe, serve to create antagonisms in quarters where every effort should be made to further the utmost that may be possible in the way of co-operation. 35

Certainly, each member state had to be free to develop its own policy with respect to security, and this might entail coordination with other countries or with other international groupings of nations. In Canada's case, the United States could hardly be precluded from its defence arrangements. Moreover, Canada's regional security strategy would require Canadian cooperation with several other countries which had vested interests in the North Atlantic area. But it was perhaps unfair to conclude that Britain wanted to confine defence collaboration to the Commonwealth. In fact, Lord Addison subsequently explained in the British House of Commons that a plan for the defence of the Commonwealth would have to include foreign countries.³⁶ Mr. King seemed to have become somewhat paranoiac about the common policy business to the extent that he was interpreting British proposals for collaboration to mean much more than was actually intended.

Due to the "deteriorated economic position of the United Kingdom" after the war, new international agencies such as the

Trade Organization were expected "to provide for the international trading community a nerve centre comparable to that furnished by Britain for so many years." ³⁷ Consequently, the Imperial preference system had to be "brought into line with a multilateral trading system." In 1947 the King government made arrangements with other Commonwealth members by which each agreed to the right of any other to reduce or eliminate preferences. Canada then made use of this right to secure tariff concessions during the negotiations for GATT although we insisted on the right to maintain preferences where we deemed them appropriate. Eventually all Commonwealth countries were to participate in GATT which required the gradual removal of quantitative and tariff barriers, and the implementation of the MFN principle to stimulate post-war economic growth. Indeed, the development of a general system of freer world trade virtually undermined the rationale behind, and the implementation of, Commonwealth preferences.

Consultations among Commonwealth countries in matters of trade and defence continued, but in a manner which was sufficiently flexible not to raise questions of producing a common policy. The exchange of information through respective High Commissions was one such method of consultation. But by 1947 Lord Addison had indicated to the Canadian High Commissioner, Norman Robertson, that Britain would like to hold regular meetings of the High Commissioners in London. ³⁸

That Britain was interested in making greater use of Commonwealth consultative facilities was made more apparent when Addison further suggested the need for more frequent meetings of Commonwealth ministers on a fixed time table. In addition,

Australia had recommended the formation of a permanent secretariat to assist with the coordination of meetings of Commonwealth representatives in London.

The reaction of Ottawa with respect to regular meetings of High Commissioners was predictable. External Affairs' position had always been that they were required only when questions of joint interest occurred and not every member would want to attend, unless the subject for discussion was of interest. Consequently, irregular or ad hoc meetings were preferred to formalized agenda which could institutionalize such meetings into some form of consultative machinery. Canada chose discreetly to ignore a proposal regarding Cabinet Minister conferences until the idea was commended to the prime ministers at the 1948 meeting. After this conference, the Department conveyed to Mr. Attlee its reluctance to enter into any such agreement:

We regard as impracticable . . . any attempt to fix definite time tables for regular meetings of ministers who have to carry heavy responsibilities at home, particularly if all Commonwealth countries are to be represented at every meeting . . . Moreover, definite provision for regular meetings at fixed intervals might create the impression in certain quarters that the nations of the Commonwealth were being organized in order that some one of them might speak for the others. Such a situation would be as unacceptable as it would be unworkable

We believe that the system of responsible and representative government worked out over the years is the best system yet developed for the government of our people. Under that system decisions on major questions of foreign policy and defence are not made by military officers or by individual ministers or by representatives in another country; they are made by the Cabinet which is responsible through Parliament to the people.39

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Canada's attitude towards the suggestion that the Commonwealth should develop a secretariat to regulate the cooperation of its members was evident in the Secretary of State for External Affairs' Gray lecture at the University of Toronto. Canadians preferred, Mr. St. Laurent said, the present method of consultation which was without a system of centralized machinery.⁴⁰ This method preserves the principle that an exchange of views should be informal without giving the impression that there was one Commonwealth policy.

Commonwealth consultation was intended to be a means for keeping fellow members informed on matters of foreign policy without requiring commitments. The purpose was to gain understanding and to broaden viewpoints rather than to control members' policies. With their extensive contacts throughout the world, the British Foreign Office was able to keep the Dominions informed as to international affairs. In international institutions such as the UN heads of Commonwealth delegations were to hold regular informal sessions. Meetings were primarily designed to explain member state positions on various issues, and to provide an opportunity for members to consult with their colleagues prior to making decisions on questions which were of mutual importance. However, there was no requirement for any member to gain the approval of the others before making policy decisions. This form of consultation, at least insofar as Canada was concerned, seemed satisfactorily to meet the need for cooperation

and flexibility which were essential for collaboration among equal and independent nations.

Constitutional developments occurred in the post-war Commonwealth as Canada sought to reconcile its status as an independent nation with some of its colonial hangovers. Aside from the Dominions Office in Britain being persuaded to assume the more appropriate title of Commonwealth Relations Office in 1947, Ottawa began dropping the prefix from "British Commonwealth" and no longer used the word "Dominion" as a qualification of Canada in its official documents. The King government apparently believed that Dominion status implied subordination to the United Kingdom which was the antithesis of the Commonwealth relationship. By January 1947 a Citizenship Act defined the legal status of Canadians as distinct from other British subjects. This Act of the Canadian parliament had an impact throughout the Empire as other countries devised their own rationale to distinguish citizens of the Commonwealth from nationals. Along with these constitutional developments, there was an important change in the reservations made in the British North America Act when, in 1947, appeals from Canada to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were abolished. Modification of the royal title of the sovereign also emerged at this time as House debate indicated that it was necessary to amend the title to clarify the status of the Crown with respect to Canada.⁴¹ Canada was, in fact, reinforcing the independence of the other Dominions while emphasizing its own individuality and sovereignty.

The key question in Commonwealth affairs during the period from 1945 until 1947, thus, was whether the association should establish a common policy replete with centralizing institutions. Pressures from Australia and New Zealand with support in Britain from the Defence department, CRO and the Press had moved Downing Street to seek greater coordination in areas of defence and trade as well as additional consultative machinery. The Canadian concept of the Commonwealth was that it would be sustained only as long as it was decentralized. With a diversity of equal partners, each responsible for devising its own foreign policy, Commonwealth cohesion was a non-starter. It would only exist if too much integration was not forced upon it.

Possibly more than any other Commonwealth leader, Mackenzie King had been responsible for directing the development of the association in a manner which reconciled the sovereign equality of member states with the Commonwealth relationship. By arguing that increased centralization would be more apt to cause friction than to promote cooperation, Mr. King had rejected the idea of a common Commonwealth policy outright. Consequently, ideas for trade and security systems were reassessed with the result that member states were to find other organizations more suitable for their purposes. Certainly India, which did not wish to become politically aligned, could not realistically be expected to become a partner in Commonwealth defence or to remain exclusively within the Imperial system of preference. Formalization in terms of regularity and frequency of Commonwealth meetings and a permanent secretariat were impracticable, if for the only reason, as one Canadian scholar has noted, that the "genius of the Commonwealth has never

been in its rigidity."⁴² Nehru was no more likely than King to accept rigid rules in fostering Commonwealth relations because they were apt to defeat their purpose.

With the inclusion of new members in the post-war, it was evident that such proposals could not be put into effect. Not only was it impracticable to include at Commonwealth meetings all members at all times, but the different interests of member states militated against such a proposition. By keeping the more flexible arrangements for consultation, the Commonwealth maintained the Canadian point of view. In addition, Canada's leadership in the area of constitutional reform was compatible with prospective Asian membership. Defining national citizenship and dropping symbols and terms peculiar to the Empire relationship was reassuring to member states which required the explicit understanding that complete independence was the basis for their membership.

Thus, Mackenzie King had perceived the essence of the Commonwealth to be its flexibility. While the King government pushed for a less rigid Commonwealth to respect the sovereignty of its present members, it was to have a dramatic impact on the future of the institution. In John Holmes' words;

The Indians and the Pakistanis would never have stayed in an [inflexible] organization and the whole development and fulfillment of the Commonwealth idea since that time would not have taken place.⁴³

Ironically, King did not envision that in creating a more functional model for Commonwealth cooperation, he would facilitate its multiracial transformations.

Indian Membership

The eventual partition of India and the creation of independent Hindu and Moslem states were imminent by 1947.⁴⁴ It was expected that the United Kingdom would seek the assurance of existing Commonwealth members by preliminary consultation before the Asian nations were to assume membership. Although Prime Ministers Smuts and Chifley were intensely concerned about the proposed transfer of power, Mackenzie King interpreted it as a British affair. The Canadian prime minister had not overtly demonstrated any interest in enlarging the Commonwealth by admitting Asian membership, at least since the war. Certainly there is no evidence that King embraced a concept of a multiracial Commonwealth. Rather Mr. King had inadvertently fostered arrangements appropriate to a multiracial association while persistently pursuing those principles of Commonwealth cooperation which were consistent with Canada's best interests.

In the event that agreement could not be reached for a union, Prime Minister Attlee had informed each of the Dominions of his Cabinet's proposals for Indian independence. This was intended to afford the membership the opportunity to give their opinion. While Canada was interested in being informed, the government was chary of becoming involved with British colonial policy and declined to offer any advice on the matter. Mr. Pearson outlined the Canadian position in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in May 1947:

It does not . . . appear advisable to make comment on the proposals. The responsibility for the procedure to be adopted if it becomes necessary to divide India into two or more nations must rest with the United Kingdom Government and the leaders of the Indian communities

It has not, however, been the practice of the Canadian Government to offer comments on the policies of other Commonwealth governments except in so far as they affected Canadian interests.⁴⁵

Several weeks later, on May 28, Ottawa received another message from Mr. Attlee, informing the Canadian government that Britain anticipated that India would remain in the Commonwealth. Attlee was assuming that India was already a member by expressing in his telegram that Britain expected India to "remain" rather than "join" the Commonwealth. This expression constituted a dilemma for External Affairs as Pearson explained in a memorandum to his Prime Minister:

. . . the Commonwealth is composed of a number of fully self-governing states which are equal in status and in no way subordinate to each other. On this definition, India up to the present has not been a member of the Commonwealth and the question now is not whether India should remain in the Commonwealth but whether India should be offered membership in the Commonwealth and, if so, whether that offer can properly be made by one member of the Commonwealth acting alone. These India developments put us in a difficult position. If we comment on them, we may seem to be intervening in a matter which is the responsibility of the United Kingdom and Indian Governments, and on which Indian opinion itself is bitterly divided. If we do not comment, we appear to give the right to the United Kingdom to invite other States to join the Commonwealth association.⁴⁶

Consequently, in preparing a draft for Mr. St. Laurent to recommend to Cabinet as an indication of the Canadian attitude towards Indian independence within the Commonwealth, the department considered it necessary to express Canada's acceptance of the admission of India and Pakistan as full members of the association. Mr. Pearson took care to explain in his memorandum to the Prime Minister why the department's draft reply was so worded:

What I had in mind, in preparing a draft for the Minister, was not the Indian situation as such, but the principle which should govern additions to, or withdrawals from, the existing association of nations. . . . It seems to me, therefore, important that two principles should be established at some time:

- (1) there should be no new states added to the Commonwealth without the consent of the existing members; and.
- (2) new states should be fully independent.

However, Mackenzie King was not consulted in advance of St. Laurent's producing the draft reply to Cabinet on May 28. Before gaining the approval of his fellow Ministers for his draft, King "snatched it out of St. Laurent's hands" declaring

that the original communication must have been addressed to him as head of the government, and commented acidly that he was still Prime Minister and entitled to answer his own correspondence. He was horrified, he went on, at the thought of an Asian majority dominating the Commonwealth, and objected to Canada's offering advice on matters it knew nothing about.⁴⁷

Moreover, King "pointed out that India was a dependency of Britain. She should deal with the matter herself."⁴⁸

After the Prime Minister indicated to Cabinet that the Canadian reply to Mr. Attlee regarding Indian independence should be more non-committal, Pearson prepared the following draft on May 29:

I realize how difficult and complicated it is for future peace and prosperity in Asia, and indeed in the world, to find a solution which will meet the desire of the Indian people for self-government and make its contribution to the stabilization and progress of the East. You will not, I am sure, expect me to comment further on current developments in this matter except to assure you and the United Kingdom Government of the good-will and sympathetic understanding of the Canadian Government in your efforts to achieve the ends mentioned above.49

Even the Under Secretary's revised draft proved unsuitable. Whereas King considered that the addition of new members to the Commonwealth was a matter which concerned existing members, he wished to avoid even more the domestic situation in India which concerned solely the United Kingdom and Indian governments. He recorded in his diary on May 30 that

I did not think Canada should commit itself one way or the other to anything arising in the present situation beyond indicating that our attitude would be, as far as possible, helpful. We were not consulted about India's independence. We had nothing to do with negotiations, nor do any members of the Government or the people of Canada know anything about India.50

Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent was permitted tacitly to endorse India's forthcoming independent status, but the communication to Britain was to be authorized as a Canadian opinion rather than as advice. Mr. King made that abundantly clear to the House of Commons while referring to Canada's June 3 press statement on the advent of Indian independence:

The peoples of India may be assured of the sympathetic understanding and good will of the government and people of Canada in their efforts to achieve self-government.

It is of the utmost importance to the future peace and prosperity of other countries, as well as of India, that this end should be peacefully achieved.

It may be taken for granted that once the Indian people as well as their leaders, have reached agreement on their future political status, they will find Canada generously predisposed towards self-government. The result may be to enlarge the number of states within the British commonwealth. 51

Prime Minister Mackenzie King was clearly putting into practice the principle of non-interference. Unlike some of the senior officials in the Department of External Affairs who leaned towards Canadian involvement in assisting the decolonization of the Empire, Mackenzie King required that India first settle its own internal affairs before welcoming that nation as a Commonwealth partner. It was only after King was assured that India and Pakistan would secure their complete independence that the Prime Minister offered them his unrestrained congratulations. Yet sending his message through the Dominions Secretary Office perhaps underscored the reticence of the aging leader to fully acknowledge the Asian countries before their independence was formally recognized one week later:

It affords me much pleasure to extend to you, and through you to the government and people of India and Pakistan the most cordial good wishes of the government and people of Canada, on the occasion of the establishment of India and Pakistan as completely self-governing nations. 52

The admission of India into the Commonwealth on 15 August 1947 was attended by an understanding that a republican status would eventually be achieved in accord with the Constituent Assembly's Objective Resolution. The imminent problem was how a republic could be assimilated into an association which existed on the basis of a constitutional common denominator—member states owed allegiance to the Crown. In spite of this dilemma there was evidence that India was interested in continuing Commonwealth membership even as a republic. Canada's High Commissioner to India, John Kearney, had advised his Minister that Prime Minister Pandit Nehru, with the support of his Cabinet, favoured India's remaining in the association, particularly because it recognized all members as equal and independent.⁵³ If India's underlying concern was to ascertain that the Commonwealth operated on the principle of sovereign equality, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs was to render him some assurance. Mr. St. Laurent stated in the House of Commons that the principles of "equality and complete autonomy" were the essence of the Commonwealth relationship, and on that basis, he considered that India would "continue to find the Commonwealth a worthwhile club to which to belong."⁵⁴

Another concern for India was whether it could reconcile itself to the presence in the Commonwealth of South Africa which actively promoted racial discrimination against Indians within its own boundaries. Yet India had as much right as

the Union to remain in an otherwise racially tolerant association. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Sir Girja Bajpai had taken a pragmatic view:

Our differences with South Africa are vexing but they cannot influence our relations with the countries of the Commonwealth as a whole. One cannot afford to lose one's sense of proportion or to shape policy in relation to a false perspective.⁵⁵

Certainly Indians did not feel it was necessary to change their views to remain within the association. Speaking in the India Constituent Assembly in May 1949, after the membership question had been resolved, Mr. Nehru expressed his government's viewpoint:

I am often asked, how we can join a Commonwealth in which there is racial discrimination, . . . when we have entered into an alliance with a nation or a group of nations, it does not mean that we accept their other policies; it does not mean that we commit ourselves in any way to something that they may do.⁵⁶

Thus, India seemed to be prepared to de-emphasize its South African conflict, at least in a Commonwealth milieu, and consider the positive attributes of continued membership. In addition to the possibilities for development assistance, the Commonwealth was committed to decolonization, and participation in the Commonwealth did not conflict with India's neutralist international posture. However, the important consideration for India in its application for republican membership was, in the last analysis, its desire to have complete independence from the Crown.

The British government wanted to work out a formula suitable to all Commonwealth members that would accommodate

India's continuance in the association as a republic. With the Prime Ministers' meeting expected in October 1948, Whitehall was anxious to garner the opinions of the older members whose concurrence was required for any unprecedented arrangements for permitting republican membership. Consequently, Sir Norman Brook (Secretary to the British Cabinet) visited Ottawa in August to give the British assessment of the constitutional question and to try to determine Canadian views. In discussions with King, St. Laurent and Pearson on August 13, Sir Norman

said that the British Government felt that India might wish to become a republic. Give up association with the Crown. The question would come up whether India could be kept in the Commonwealth of Nations and how. The British Government thought every effort should be made toward that end. The first step would be to seek to have the Government of India appoint its own Governor-General by whatever name they pleased. Same for all the Dominions. ~~Could be called King's Representative or by whatever name they wished.~~ The main thing would be to allow same thing as in Ireland, of maintaining the King's authority in external relations. A third thought was to have the Prime Minister of India make a Privy Councillor.⁵⁷

Mackenzie King had no specific objections to the United Kingdom's willingness to find some constitutional link for Indian republican membership, so long as the Indian head of state was in some way representative of the King.⁵⁸ After all, the Crown was the common bond among all members, and without allegiance to it, India would no longer retain Commonwealth membership.

It was evident that the Canadian prime minister did not look favourably upon a reformulation of the Balfour

statement (which outlined the monarchical relationship among all Commonwealth members), but Mr. King was interested in keeping India within the Commonwealth on his terms. However, in spite of renewed Anglo-Canadian consultations when Brook returned to Ottawa in September, the Canadian government certainly was not committed to continued Indian membership on any terms. There were no illusions as to the difficulties that would be encountered over the membership question. Indeed, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Hume Wrong, may have accurately reflected sentiments in the East Block when he declared in a communication to his Minister that it was "very probable that we shall be unable to avoid some dissection of the Commonwealth relationship at the [Prime Ministers'] conference." 59

In October the Commonwealth Asian members attended their first Prime Ministers' meeting. One of the foremost questions in the minds of all statesmen in attendance was whether the 1943 conference would be India's last. Though no longer leader of the Liberal party, Mackenzie King was still prime minister and expected, at least formally, to represent Canada at the London consultations. King's ideas with respect to the acceptability of having a republic in the Commonwealth differed somewhat from those of St. Laurent who would be assuming the priministership within a month. The prime minister-elect seemed to feel, "that there must be something that would make the Commonwealth a unit. That it would become little more than a cluster of countries

if the Crown were not made the symbol of it all."⁶⁰

Whereas the possibility of India remaining in a Commonwealth that required all members to swear allegiance to the Crown was limited, by now Mr. King had conceived of a less rigid interpretation of the Commonwealth relationship. In conversation with St. Laurent on October 15, King offered his impressions:

I stressed my point of the symbol being secondary to the substance. That, in reality, there was no such thing as a Commonwealth—as an entity—with policies of its own. The whole plan here was to bring that to pass. In reality, there was a community of free nations held together by kindred ideas, etc. . . . The Crown was merely an outward symbol.⁶¹

At least one member of the Indian press shared a similar point of view. An editorial in the Hindustan Times declared with some foresight that

if the new Commonwealth is to have any binding force, it will have to be a belief in the democratic way of life, opposition to imperialism and exploitation in any shape or form and belief in human dignity and equality.⁶²

Due to illness, Mr. King was unable to participate in the meetings, and was compelled to simply hold a series of private consultations from his bed at London's Dorchester Hotel. But the senior Commonwealth statesman's perceptive appreciation of the association may have had some impact on the Indian prime minister. In conversation with Pandit Nehru, King's diary records:

I gave him my views on the emphasis being placed on Community of Free Nations, rather than having emphasis upon the Crown which would almost certainly be drawn into controversy if it were

made the main issue. He saw the point at once and said he regarded it as quite important.⁶³

Although little progress was made in discussions over a formula to permit Indian republican membership, Madame Pandit told the Canadian prime minister "how pleased her brother was with the talks we [Nehru and King] had together."⁶⁴ Furthermore, on October 22, the final day of the conference, New Zealand's Prime Minister Fraser

said he had learned from Mountbatten and someone else that my [King's] talk with Nehru had made a great impression on him, a greater impression than anything else except his talks, of course, with Mountbatten.

Indeed, King's opinion may have had some bearing on Prime Minister Nehru's subsequent Ten Points Memorandum as a basis for India's continued membership in the Commonwealth. This memorandum was worked out in London by Nehru in consultation with Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Stafford Cripps, shortly after the Prime Ministers' meeting. The essential point required that

the King, as first citizen of the Commonwealth, would be the fountain of honour so far as the Commonwealth as a whole is concerned.⁶⁵

Evidently Pandit Nehru was prepared to recognize the King as "first citizen" of the Commonwealth, and as a symbol of the Commonwealth community of equal and independent nations.

The problem for the Commonwealth seemed to be to devise a formula which recognized the King as head of the Commonwealth, but not as the sovereign of India. While at a UN

conference in Paris, Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson was present at a meeting on November 17 attended by Sir Girja Bajpai, then India's Secretary-General for External Affairs, and other Commonwealth ministers. He was informed that several Indian Cabinet ministers were unreceptive to retaining any link with a British crown beyond the "first citizen" proposal. However, Mr. Pearson was "dubious of the political and constitutional value of the suggestion that the King as 'first citizen' would continue to be the fountain of honour," and suggested that "some more definite link with the Crown as the symbol of the Commonwealth association" be considered.⁶⁶ In addition to the "first citizen" proposal, India was also recommending the common status of Commonwealth citizenship as a further connection within the association:

For the purpose of fulfilling the obligation of the Crown towards Commonwealth citizens other than nationals, the President of the Indian Republic may, at the request of the Crown, act on behalf of the King with the territories of India. A similar arrangement on a reciprocal basis will apply to Indian nationals in the rest of the Commonwealth.⁶⁷

On the eventuality that this link would affect Canada's immigration policy, restricting the admission of Asiatics, Ottawa was not interested in this proposal. Like Prime Minister Fraser and Australian Foreign Minister, Dr. Evatt, Pearson wanted India to remain as a full member of the Commonwealth, but he favoured a solution requiring additional monarchical linkages such as the delegation of the King's prerogative

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functions (in respect of accreditation) to the Indian head of government.⁶⁸

On the basis of the impression that he derived from the Indian press, the High Commissioner, John Kearney, reported to the department early in November that

a majority opinion [of the English-reading public] would probably support a continued connection with the Commonwealth, provided this was recommended by the national leaders of India and provided that allegiance to the King was not a requisite.⁶⁹

In subsequent communication, Kearney reiterated that Mr. Nehru could accept "no direct linkage to the Crown," inasmuch as the King could "not have any status in purely Indian affairs."⁷⁰ Yet according to Nehru's press interview on November 18, the Commonwealth prime ministers had unanimously agreed at their October meetings that there should not be two kinds of Commonwealth membership.⁷¹ If there was no likelihood of a membership of lesser status being relegated to India, then the viable alternatives appeared to be either determining a new kind of Commonwealth relationship or recognizing India as the sole exception to any Commonwealth linkage. Whatever alternative would eventually be pursued, it became increasingly evident that Britain was committed towards the acceptance of Indian republican membership. In fact, Lester Pearson could advise Prime Minister St. Laurent in January 1949 that Whitehall had considered not requiring a monarchical formula of any kind to retain India's full membership in the association:

I will say responsible opinion here attaches so much importance to the preservation, if at all possible, of India's membership in the Commonwealth that very serious thought is now being given to the possibility of proposing to the members of the Commonwealth some new basis of association in which recognition and use of the Crown would not be a necessary symbol of Commonwealth membership. 72

There were several reasons for Britain's positive approach towards India remaining in the Commonwealth. Undoubtedly there was a real concern about the preservation of western influence on the subcontinent, assuming that an India outside the Commonwealth might more easily succumb to communist encroachment. During 1948 communism had been steadily advancing in mainland China, and it was anticipated that the West would soon need a countervailing influence. If India could not be accommodated within the Commonwealth as a republic, "the likelihood was" in Nicholas Mansergh's judgment, "that she would become the leader of an anti-European Asiatic movement," whereas if India was to remain there was "a great possibility of building up in south-east Asia something analogous to Western Union." 73 Moreover, Whitehall was also conscious of the possibility that the Kashmir issue might become accentuated if India did not remain along with Pakistan in an association where the views of each could at least be heard, if only on an informal basis. Although the association was not a forum for negotiating among the differences between disputing members, India and Pakistan may have found fellow membership in the Commonwealth a sufficient deterrent temporarily to prevent an all-out war.

Close collaboration between London and New Delhi dominated the final weeks of 1948. Mr. Attlee emphasized in a letter to Pandit Nehru that Britain's objective was to keep India in the Commonwealth provided an acceptable basis could be found.⁷⁴ But Attlee was also looking for a formula to legitimize the Commonwealth preferential system in the eyes of the international community. Therefore, he was interested in retaining some sort of link between India and the Crown such as could be found in a declaration that all Commonwealth countries were bound to it by their special form of association and if India were to adopt relevant provisions of the United Kingdom's Nationality Act of 1948. In response, Nehru sent to Attlee an Eight Points proposal which represented a slight revision of the original Ten Points proposition. Essentially, Delhi was prepared to have the Indian Nationality Act follow the British one, making Indians Commonwealth citizens on a reciprocal basis. Consequently, the Indian government was prepared to defer to the King in fulfilling obligations towards Commonwealth citizens other than Indians while retaining complete sovereignty over Indian nationals.⁷⁵ Thus, Nehru maintained that the Commonwealth would be conceptualized as an association of free independent states on the basis of citizenship, and the MFN status would still be applicable.

Having been advised by Attlee that the Eight Points offered a weak connection for India's Commonwealth membership, and one which might not be recognized by the international community, Nehru replied by means of Krishna Menon's

aide-mémoire on December 11 that the Indian association with the Commonwealth was "not a legal problem but a political one."⁷⁶ Nehru further explained:

We are abandoning the conception of the King as "first citizen" to which we have been informed the Commonwealth countries have also objections. We had no desire to interfere with the relationship of the Crown with other Commonwealth states and therefore no question of repudiation or any express statement about the King arises.

On December 15 Pearson, Evatt and Fraser met with Attlee and three of his ministers to discuss the problem of Indian membership. A summary of their views was then sent to Nehru in an effort to reassure the Prime Minister that a relationship could be worked out to accommodate India:

Your proposals in their present form do not seem to us to be satisfactory as a basis for continuing the full degree of association within the Commonwealth through the nexus of the Crown [but] it was realized . . . that other countries now in the Commonwealth might prefer a newer and looser association [such as] de facto association without any allegiance to the Crown but with the important features of common citizenship and a declaration of desire to maintain close and friendly association.⁷⁷

Of course these views were conveyed without consulting the respective governments. The opinion in Ottawa was that the eight points did not differ substantially from the previous ten, and Commonwealth citizenship was a tenuous connection in view of Canadian immigration policy.⁷⁸ Canada, at least, did not look favourably upon a citizenship link. Moreover, Canada was not alone in emphasizing that India's continued membership in the association as a republic should not affect the linkage to which all other members subscribed.

The problem with India's suggestions, at least as described in the eight and ten point proposals, seemed to be in their circumvention of a relationship with the Crown which was the common bond among the membership. The Crown was the symbol of their free association as equal and independent nations secured under the Balfour declaration and confirmed by the Statute of Westminster. Based upon the principles of the unity and indivisibility of the Crown, and the common allegiance owed to it by member states, this symbol represented the hub of a network of Commonwealth relations:

The Crown in whose name (save in India) governments govern, parliaments legislate, officials and members of the armed forces act, and to which the individual renders allegiance, serves both as a master symbol of unity, and as a corporate link between the governments and peoples of the Commonwealth, and the vast community of individual British subjects or Commonwealth citizens.⁷⁹

Whereas it was unlikely that older Commonwealth members would accept a formula which would interfere with their traditional link (the Crown), it was also questionable whether Commonwealth citizenship or the delegation of the King's powers of accreditation could serve as an adequate means to permit India to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic.

Inasmuch as India was recommending that Commonwealth member states should establish a common citizenship as an alternative link to the Crown, the Canadian Government was concerned. The External Affairs department held that a scheme such as the one India proposed, using Commonwealth citizenship on a reciprocal basis, might prove impracticable.

in view of Canadian immigration policy on the admission of Asiatics.⁸⁰ Up to this point Commonwealth citizenship had varied in interpretation in different member countries. For example, in Canada a preferential position was permitted to American, French and British subjects but not Indians. Some non-Commonwealth citizens, therefore, were more privileged under Canadian immigration laws than were citizens of Commonwealth Asia. Sir Girja Bajpai had discussed the immigration issue with John Kearney in May 1948 and requested Canada to allow a token number of Indians to migrate on the basis that it "would deprive the anti-Commonwealth element in this country [India] of an effective weapon."⁸¹ While Canada's High Commissioner recommended that a quota system for the admission of Indians be adopted, no immediate action was taken by the Canadian government. A departmental memorandum explained why:

It would seem inevitable that we should find ourselves eventually in an embarrassing position regarding our immigration policy if we agreed to a scheme under which the essential feature of the Commonwealth connection would be the common status of Commonwealth citizenship. This would be a device without any real substance, a mere form which would not give any material concrete benefits to citizens from all parts of the Commonwealth. In fact a very obvious discrimination would continue to be enforced against Commonwealth citizens of Asiatic race.⁸²

Furthermore, the department was not convinced that Canadian immigration restrictions were crucial to India retaining Commonwealth membership.⁸³ Canada's immigration policy was tolerated by India which was willing to concede that states should be free to determine the composition of their own populations. For the present,

the Canadian government intended to continue its policy of immigration by proposing that Commonwealth citizenship be subject to the interpretation of each member nation.

In search of a common bond which would ensure that there was only one class of membership, Delhi had also shown interest in the delegation of the King's powers insofar as this did not conflict with Indian sovereignty. In a meeting with Sir Girja on December 29, Kearney pointed out that such a link

through the recognition and accreditation of diplomats had stood the test of time, and although the idea of the King permanently delegating some of his powers to the President of the Indian Republic made this link even more tenuous, it was a link . . . which would carry a lot of weight in a court of law, although factually it might not mean very much.⁸⁴

Sir Girja was personally in favour of linkage on the basis of accreditation with the assumption that it would not affect substantively the relationship amongst the older member states, but Sir Archibald Nye, the British High Commissioner to India, had doubts whether a link to the King through delegation of diplomats could be constitutionally possible.⁸⁵ Whether or not the delegation of royal prerogative was constitutionally feasible, it shortly became apparent that the proposal had been met with a closed door.

Canada's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Norman Robertson, reported as much to Pearson on 26 January 1949:

I am given to understand that the reason why the suggestion that the King might delegate his prerogative power of accreditation to the President of the Indian Republic has been allowed to recede into the background of current thinking about the possible forms and symbols of Commonwealth

association, is that the King himself was not at all receptive to the idea.⁸⁶

In a return telegram Pearson confided his prior knowledge of the King's attitude:

I should have told you before that when I saw His Majesty in London in December, he indicated that he had considerable personal uneasiness and some constitutional doubt about the suggestion that his prerogative power of accreditation might be transferred to the President of the Indian Republic as such.⁸⁷

Thus, early in 1949 it appeared as though neither Commonwealth citizenship nor the delegation of the King's power could adequately serve as a future common bond among the membership. All that remained of the Indian proposals was the suggestion that the King could act as the Commonwealth's "first citizen." The question inevitably arose as to what extent it was possible to alter the concept of the monarchy to accommodate a republican member. With such a question in mind, Kearney telegraphed External Affairs to propose that further thought be given to the "establishment of the King as the symbol of association of members of the Commonwealth."⁸⁸ The Canadian High Commissioner was commending an approach whereby all members, including a republican India, would recognize the King as the symbol of Commonwealth unity as constituting sufficient monarchical linkage. Those members who preferred to continue their old relationship could also give allegiance to the King as their constitutional head of state, but such allegiance would not be requisite to Commonwealth membership. Kearney was not proposing something new. He was recommending rather

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that the department re-examine the potentiality of an idea perhaps initially conceived by the British Parliamentary Under Secretary for Commonwealth Relations. In Mr. Gordon Walker's words:

I believe the first suggestion of this idea as a solution of the problem occurred in a letter that I wrote to Lord Mountbatten in July 1948 during a visit to India. In a memorandum to Mr. Attlee on my return from the Asian capitals in January 1949 I elaborated the idea and suggested that India's membership as a republic should be generally accepted and that all the members, including India, should recognize the King as Head of the Commonwealth.⁸⁹

Anglo-Canadian consultations over the Indian membership question reached a peak in March 1949. Sir Norman Brook visited Ottawa for nine days from 10 March 1949 during which time Canadian officials helped to prepare background documents for Mr. Gordon Walker as a basis for talks which he was to have with Prime Minister Nehru.⁹⁰ Their views coincided. Both believed that keeping India in the Commonwealth was mandatory on political and strategic grounds.

But there was some difference in the intensity of British and Canadian commitment. Gordon Walker recorded in his diary that in a Cabinet meeting on February 9, the Prime Minister expressed without reservation: "He wants India in; he realizes the value of time: but also the need to press forward now."⁹¹ In a telegram to Canada's new High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Dana Wilgress, External Affairs advised that although it was desirable for India to retain monarchical linkage,

they felt it was necessary to find the means of supporting Indian membership even though its constitution were republican in form.⁹² But the department also made it clear in this communication "that no solution would be acceptable which impaired Canada's traditional relationship with the Crown." In a message to Prime Minister Nehru at the end of March, St. Laurent made explicit Canada's position on the membership question.

The Crown is an essential element of our constitution and of our whole parliamentary system of government. We think that the Canadian public would have misgivings in accepting any fundamental change in the present form of Commonwealth association which would appear to weaken the position of the Crown.

The above considerations prompt me to express the sincere hope that you may see your way clear to retaining some link between the sovereign republic of India and the Crown. It seems to me that any alternative presents not only constitutional but real practical difficulties; for example we might be hard put to defend against foreign objections the continued exchange of trade preferences.⁹³

The Prime Minister's despatch continued:

you and your colleagues may be assured that the Government and people of Canada earnestly desire that a way may be found through which India can remain a full member of the Commonwealth. Please be assured also of our sincere good will and of our understanding of India's special situation in regard to this matter. I wanted you to know this before you left for London, as well as something of the problems involved from the Canadian point of view in regard to any action which might seem to require a fundamental change in the basis of the Commonwealth relationship.

Following consultations in March with each of the member countries with the exception of South Africa, Whitehall paused to diagnose Commonwealth opinion and prepare for the final

discussions with India before the Prime Ministers' meeting. Up to this point, Prime Minister Chifley was disposed to accept India without requiring a monarchical link, whereas Fraser and Ceylon's Senanayake preferred the existing constitutional framework.⁹⁴ Dr. Malan had informed London that the Union preferred to retain its own link with the Crown even if India were admitted without one. Liaquat Ali Khan was prepared to accept Indian republican membership on any reasonable grounds provided the formula could accommodate any subsequent republican aspirations of Pakistan.

Collaboration in the beginning of April between Gordon Walker and Nehru in New Delhi ended in a general accord. The Indian Cabinet appeared to favour a formula earlier subscribed to by the British, recognizing the King as head of the Commonwealth. Under this concept the Crown would still be "the symbol of the free association of the members of the Commonwealth" as expressed in the Statute of Westminster without India having to swear allegiance to the Crown.⁹⁵ Thus, the formula favoured to permit India republican membership was one that recognized the role of the King as "a common Head of Commonwealth rather than a common Crown in the sense of the single executive authority," Dr. Mackay explained in a memorandum to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Arnold Heeney.⁹⁶ The departmental memo seemed to concur with this metaphysical arrangement providing, at least for India, that the King should serve only as a symbol because the

Strength [of the Commonwealth] lies in the unity of ideals and purpose of the constituent members, not in identity of opinion in every aspect of that association or of the form and content of the constitution of each member nation. The King is the symbol of the unity, the sovereign freedom of its many peoples, the source of its strength.

Since the Canadian government did not intend to play a leading role in the question of republican membership, Mr. St. Laurent decided to have his Secretary of State for External Affairs attend the 1949 Prime Ministers' meeting in his behalf. Nonetheless, St. Laurent took care to explain in letters to the other heads of government that he wanted to be present in Parliament which was opening concurrently with the Commonwealth conference.

Before the first general meeting on Friday, April 22, Mr. Pearson took that opportunity to meet with the Secretary to the British Cabinet. Pearson recorded his conversation on April 19 with Sir Norman Brook who stated that "while Nehru is not willing to accept the Crown as the source of allegiance, he may be willing to accept the Crown as . . . 'Head of the Commonwealth'." ⁹⁷ In a subsequent discussion with Pandit Nehru, Pearson was told

that there could be no membership for India in the Commonwealth except on the basis of her Republican constitution but if that basis were accepted then India desired to continue the present association.⁹⁸

Possibly Nehru realized that Canada sympathized with India because a copy of the Indian position paper was given to

Pearson. Although no Commonwealth representative other than Prime Minister Attlee was to see this paper before the general meeting, the Canadian delegation was afforded a valuable opportunity to scrutinize the Indian approach to republican membership on Thursday, April 21. As perhaps was to be expected, India's position was not unlike the direction it had taken during the preliminary consultations in New Delhi. Their metaphysical argument was still intact, maintaining that a person (the King) rather than an institution (the Crown) could become a symbol of the association and he could also serve as the common head of the Commonwealth.⁹⁹ The Indians also stressed the importance of recognizing common citizenship on a reciprocal basis in order to emphasize the distinctiveness of Commonwealth peoples.

At the first general meeting of the Prime Ministers on Friday (see Appendix B), each head of government and Mr. Pearson were called upon by the chairman, Mr. Attlee, to make a general statement as to whether and on what basis India could remain in the Commonwealth as a republic. In his opening address, Prime Minister Nehru was reported to have elaborated on the Indian position paper:

There had been some discussion of Commonwealth citizenship as the basis of the Commonwealth association, but that had been thought insufficient. India wished to go as far as possible to meet the wishes of other Commonwealth countries. They had no desire or intention of suggesting that the existing relationship to the Crown of other Commonwealth countries should be altered in any way; but they did not desire a two-tier arrangement under which India's status in the Commonwealth would be less than that of other members. They suggested that

India's future association with the Commonwealth might be based upon: (i) Commonwealth citizenship, (ii) a declaration of India's continuing membership, and (iii) the unlimited acceptance by India of the status of the King as the symbol of the free association of the Commonwealth countries.100

The other prime ministers' statements differed very little from the attitudes their governments had expressed to the British Foreign Office in previous months with one exception. Mr. Seranayake, who had formerly just emphasized Ceylon's interest in retaining allegiance to the Crown as essential to the Commonwealth relationship, now wanted to defer the question of republican membership. To delay a decision on the issue would have been tantamount to pushing India out of the association because it had already announced its intention to assume republican status within the next several months. Indeed, it was Ceylon and Pakistan which seemed to be the least disposed towards India's retaining a place in the Commonwealth. Mr. Fraser had indicated Australia's attachment to the Balfour formula and New Zealand and South Africa were interested in maintaining their monarchical ties, but the older members, including Britain, seemed to be more prepared to find a way for India to remain in the association on the basis of Nehru's suggestions. Certainly Canada was prepared to negotiate over the Indian proposals. In his opening statement, Mr. Pearson said that he was encouraged by Prime Minister Nehru's suggestion that the King should continue to be the symbol of unity in the Commonwealth:

The question now before us was, did the freedom enjoyed by each member include its right to declare itself a Republic and remain within the family. I added that the nations of the Commonwealth also enjoyed a full equality of status which meant that there should be no inner or outer circle of membership. Canada, I said, was satisfied with the Crown and wished to maintain it, and it was important for us that no one should gain the impression from this conference that Canada's link with the Crown was being weakened or changed. This link reflected the history, sentiments and feelings of the member states and therefore it may vary in strength in the different countries. Heretofore it had been not only the source of common allegiance but also a symbol of the association of the nations which composed the Commonwealth. India although not wishing to be bound by allegiance, nevertheless desired to continue its close and friendly association with the rest of us and agreed to retain the Crown as the symbol of this association. The Canadian Government would welcome Mr. Nehru's statement to this effect because it hoped that India could remain in the Commonwealth. . . . I concluded by saying that I was confident that this conference would be capable of finding a solution which would permit India to remain as a Commonwealth member.¹⁰¹

On Saturday morning, Prime Minister Attlee circulated a joint declaration which was to be considered at the second general meeting on Monday, April 25. The British draft consisted of a statement by India recognizing the King as symbol of the Commonwealth, and a second by the other member states recording their acceptance of Indian membership and reaffirming their common allegiance with the Crown:

The Government of India should make a declaration in the following terms:

Whereas the new Constitution of India providing that India shall be a sovereign independent Republic, the Government of India hereby declare and affirm India's continuing membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, as now subsisting by the free will of its member peoples, and her

acceptance of the King, Head of the Commonwealth, as the symbol of the free association of the independent member nations within the Commonwealth.

The other Commonwealth Governments should, in reply to this, make a declaration on the same day in the following terms:

The Government of India, having informed the other members of the British Commonwealth of the impending setting up of a sovereign independent Republic of India under the new Constitution to be adopted by the Indian People and of India's desire to continue as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, and having made a solemn declaration of intention so to continue upon the condition set forth in their declaration of to-day's date:

All the other members of the Commonwealth of Nations . . . do themselves severally and jointly proclaim and declare their continued membership of the Commonwealth of Nations wherein they are bound in unity by their common allegiance to the King, who is also the symbol of their free association, and do accept and recognize India's continuing membership of the Commonwealth of Nations in accordance with the terms of the declaration of to-day's date by the Government of India.102

In addition, the British draft statement called for member states to provide legislation similar to the British Nationality Act, recognizing Commonwealth citizenship on a reciprocal basis. The Canadian delegation had reservations about both of Britain's proposals. They had doubts about the implications of having all the Commonwealth governments establishing Commonwealth citizenship. Moreover, the two part formula permitting Indian republican membership gave the impression that there was an "inner and outer circle of membership" that Pearson had warned about in his opening statement.

When Mr. Pearson talked with Liaqat Ali Khan later on Saturday, he found the Pakistan leader also was concerned about the divisive impact that the dual declaration might have on the future of the Commonwealth. India's reaction was expressed by Sir Girja Bajpai in a statement which called for a reformulation of the whole constitutional framework of the old Commonwealth relationship to provide for a "new Commonwealth of Republics and Monarchies."¹⁰³ Evidently Pearson was impressed with certain aspects of this statement because he brought it to the attention of the Canadian delegation who were at that time preparing a "single declaration" to propose at the next meeting scheduled for Monday, April 25. Cognisant of Indian attitudes, Dr. Mackay and John Kearney worked out over the weekend a single draft declaration allowing for Indian republican membership. Pearson then cabled to Ottawa early Monday morning the Canadian draft proposal which read in part:

Henceforth a member of the Commonwealth may remain a member notwithstanding that country's decision to adopt a republican form of government provided however that any country terminating in this way the allegiance owed by its people to the Crown will nevertheless continue to recognize His Majesty the King as Head of the Commonwealth and as a symbol of the free association of its member nations.¹⁰⁴

Prime Minister St. Laurent immediately approved Pearson's draft declaration with the exception of the word "however" which he wanted to have deleted.

A series of informal consultations took place between the leaders of the respective delegations preceding the second general meeting which began at 2:30 on Monday afternoon.

Mr. Pearson had explained to Prime Minister Attlee the reasons why the Canadian and some of the other delegations considered a dual declaration as unsuitable, and the chairman

had come to the view that it might be more generally acceptable if a single declaration could be devised to which all Commonwealth Governments could subscribe . . . 105

Pearson had proposed to remedy this problem by submitting the draft declaration which had been approved only that morning by St. Laurent. However, Attlee decided to rework the original British declarations by taking into account Pearson's proposed declaration. The working draft which finally emerged for discussion at the general meeting was, therefore, one which comprised a single declaration applicable to all members, including India:

The Government of India have informed the other Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations that India will shortly become a sovereign independent Republic under the new Constitution to be adopted by the Indian People. At the same time they have declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her membership of the Commonwealth and her recognition of the King, Head of the Commonwealth, as the symbol of the free association of the independent member-nations within the Commonwealth.

The other members of the Commonwealth, while making no change in the existing basis of their relations with one another and with the Crown, accept the declaration of the Government of India as the basis of India's continuing membership of the Commonwealth. 106

As would be expected, there were a number of problems with the working draft. Discussion initially revolved around the statement that the King should be recognized as "Head of

the Commonwealth." Dr. Malan was concerned that this phrase might suggest a centralization of the Commonwealth under one head and alter the former constitutional basis of the association as expressed in the Statute of Westminster.¹⁰⁷ Mr. Pearson, who had all along been somewhat reticent about using the expression "Head of the Commonwealth," suggested that it should be prefixed by "as such" to indicate that the King had no constitutional authority by this statement; he was rather Head by virtue of the fact that he symbolized the free association of member states. Nehru preferred "thus" as a more suitable insertion than "as such." Attlee questioned whether the term needed any qualification, declaring

that the adoption of the description "Head of the Commonwealth" need not imply the creation of some form of "super-state", nor need it cast doubt on the theory of the divisibility of the Crown. Indeed, any such implication was negated by the succeeding words of the suggested declaration, which emphasized "the free association of the independent member nations within the Commonwealth." The argument for including this description in the declaration was that, once the countries of the Commonwealth had ceased to be united by a common allegiance to the Crown, it was important to find some alternative form of words which would clearly relate the King's position to the Commonwealth as a whole.¹⁰⁸

The second paragraph of the working draft was also scrutinized. Prime Ministers Chifley and Fraser were emphatic that their countries' allegiance to the Crown be more explicitly recorded, whereas Liaqat Ali Khan and Prime Minister Seranayake asserted that they did not want this paragraph to intimate that Indian republican membership was to be the

sole exception.¹⁰⁹ The Asian members, joined by South Africa, were insistent that the word "Commonwealth" replace the words "British Commonwealth." In order to appeal to the sensitivities of Britain, New Zealand and Australia, Pearson suggested using "the words 'British Commonwealth of Nations' to refer to the present situation and 'Commonwealth of Nations' when referring to the new state of affairs."

There was some difficulty as well with Attlee's initial reference to Commonwealth citizenship and the maintenance of trade preferences. These issues were deferred and, subsequently, considered in an "Agreed Minute" put on record by the meeting. By this minute the member states agreed

to maintain the right to accord preferential treatment, as has been customary, to the citizens and trade of other Commonwealth countries but that each government should remain free to determine the extent of that preferential treatment and the precise method of according it.¹¹⁰

The minute of agreement conformed with the Canadian position which, on the one hand, enabled Commonwealth countries to permit each other preferential treatment, while, on the other hand, allowed each member country to interpret such preferences in accord with its own best interests. Thus, Canada could sustain its discriminatory immigration policy, and its trade relationship with the United States.

The talks continued throughout the afternoon in an attempt to reach some kind of consensus. It was expected that the draft declaration would not meet with everyone's complete approval and Mr. Attlee requested Sir Stafford Cripps

(Chancellor of the Exchequer), Sir Norman Brook and Sir Percivale Leisching (Permanent Head of the Commonwealth Office) of the British delegation together with Pearson to draw up a revised statement to submit to the third meeting to be held later that evening. The revised declaration went a considerable way towards disposing of the objections raised earlier in the day, and at least met with the chairman's approval. In fact, the four central paragraphs of this statement were to appear in much the same way in the final document:

- (1) The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, whose countries are united as Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and owe a common allegiance to the Crown, which is also the symbol of their free association, have considered the impending constitutional changes in India.
- (2) The Government of India have informed the other Governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Indian people that under the new constitution which is about to be adopted India shall become a sovereign independent Republic. The Government of India, however, declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth and her acceptance of The King as the Symbol of the free association of the independent member nations, and thus the Head of the Commonwealth.
- (3) The other members, the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth remains unchanged, accept and recognize India's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this declaration.
- (4) Accordingly, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare that they remain united and free as equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations which has proved its value as an instrument for free co-operation in the pursuit of peace, security and progress. 111

In the opening paragraph all members of the Commonwealth recorded the basis for their unity—the Crown—to which they owed common allegiance and which symbolized their free association. The second paragraph referred to India's future constitutional change. All members, whether republican or monarchical, would retain the King as the symbol of their unity, but that symbol would not interfere with any member's sovereignty. However, in the third paragraph the monarchies reaffirmed that their allegiance to the Crown would not change. A fourth paragraph was added to the proposed declaration to re-state the equal status of all member countries, and to indicate the purpose of their association. Though the delegations generally were agreed on this document, they required another round of discussion the next day to formulate a single declaration, satisfactory to all.

A fourth meeting on Tuesday, April 26, was sufficient for all members to negotiate the final changes to a settlement which would provide for Indian republican membership. After considering the revised draft declaration, Prime Ministers' Chifley and Fraser noted their concern for the inconsistency of using the prefix "British" with the "Commonwealth of Nations" in the introductory paragraph, but not in the remainder of the declaration.¹¹² It was Pandit Nehru's opinion that the revised terminology accurately characterized the new state of affairs. Pearson was in agreement, and explained that the new Commonwealth was different insofar as there was no longer a common allegiance owed to the Crown by all members, and that dropping the term "British" might

distinguish better the change that had taken place. In spite of the chairman's explanation the previous day that the King as "Head of the Commonwealth" had no constitutional authority by virtue of his position, Dr. Malan was dissatisfied with the use of this term in the second paragraph. Apparently the qualification "thus" which had been suggested by Nehru to better delineate the King's position was also unacceptable. The words "as such" which had been introduced by Pearson were eventually adopted as sufficient indication that the King was not owed allegiance in his role as Head of the Commonwealth. Subsequently, an Agreed Minute was formulated by the meeting to further clarify the King's functions.

Pearson further recommended that the wording in paragraph three be altered to read "the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth 'is not hereby changed'" which, while recognizing that members other than India would retain the monarchy, allowed for future changes in constitutional status by other members. Following the initiative of Pakistan and Ceylon, an Agreed Minute was devised, providing for all members to be accorded the same opportunity as India for republican membership. The final paragraph required editing insofar as Prime Minister Nehru was concerned. Rather than defining the purpose of the association in terms of maintaining "security," Nehru proposed that the Commonwealth should be described as "freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress." These suggestions were eventually accepted and the heads of delegations gathered on Tuesday

evening at a fifth meeting to approve unanimously the final draft of the declaration. 113

A consensus also was reached for approaching the King collectively on Wednesday noon, April 27 to report the constitutional formula, providing for republican membership, called the Declaration of London. Aside from a sixth meeting on Wednesday morning, dealing with the purpose of the Commonwealth and a non-productive discussion about changes to the King's title, the conference culminated in the delegates' visit to Buckingham Palace. The King commended the delegates' statement, and the declaration, in the form of a final communiqué, was released simultaneously in all eight Commonwealth countries that afternoon.

In a broadcast delivered to Canada from London over the CBC on April 27, Mr. Pearson presented the dilemma that the Commonwealth delegations faced at the 1949 Prime Ministers' meeting.

In a word it was this. Was our Commonwealth of Nations adaptable and elastic enough to include one nation, India, which was anxious to retain its full partnership in our group? 114

The significance of the Declaration of London was that it eliminated the allegiance to the Crown as requisite to Commonwealth membership, enabling India to remain in the association. In a statement issued at the conclusion of the conference, Liaquat Ali Khan deduced an additional proposition:

The very doctrine of the equality of members of the Commonwealth . . . predicates that if any other member of the Commonwealth chooses henceforth to frame a Constitution for itself which

involves an alteration of its relationship with the Crown, of a character similar to that which India has chosen to make and decides, nevertheless, to continue its full membership of the Commonwealth on the same terms as have been accepted on behalf of India, it would be open to it to do so.¹¹⁵

Yet the declaration was specific. The only exception made to the precedent of common allegiance was India. "Therefore," former Commonwealth statesman Jan Smuts concluded, "with the exception of India there is no change whatever in the situation. The change is made in regard to India and India alone."¹¹⁶ However, republicanism was accepted now as compatible with Commonwealth membership and where India had succeeded, others could follow.

Perhaps the most immediate impact of the Declaration was that it had succeeded as a formula for maintaining the unity of the Commonwealth. "In a world today where there are so many disruptive forces at work, where we are often at the verge of war," declared Pandit Nehru, in his statement to the Indian Constituent Assembly, "I think that it is not a safe thing to encourage the breaking up of any association that one has."¹¹⁷ The Prime Minister added that "it is better to keep a co-operative association going which may do good in this world rather than to break it." Lester Pearson, who undoubtedly contributed a good deal to the shaping of the Declaration, underlined the significance of the 1949 meeting of prime ministers succinctly in his CBC Broadcast:

We have, I think, strengthened our Commonwealth association, and above all, we have maintained a firm bridge, through that association between the east and the west.

Thus, the problem of Indian republican membership was solved, in terms of the declaration, by

the traditional capacity of the Commonwealth to strengthen its unity of purpose, while adapting its organization and procedures to changing circumstances.

The outcome was that the unity and indivisibility of the Crown, and common allegiance to it, were no longer a basis for relations between all Commonwealth members. But with the elimination of the former constitutional bond as a basis for relations between all Commonwealth members, there was some anxiety as to how the association would function in the future. In fact, a discussion about the purpose of the Commonwealth dominated the sixth meeting of the conference on Wednesday morning, April 27. Mr. Fraser

said that it would be appropriate if, before the Meeting concluded, the representatives of Commonwealth Governments could re-affirm their unity of purpose in pursuit of the positive aim of the Commonwealth association. The Commonwealth might now be starting upon a new phase of development, as an association of independent democratic nations; and he hoped that the bonds uniting them would be sufficient to give the Commonwealth, not only moral and spiritual strength, but material strength also. The Commonwealth connection was not merely a matter of constitutional forms; even more important were its methods of practical co-operation in the conduct of international relations. It was an essential feature of the Commonwealth connection that all Commonwealth countries should keep one another fully informed of their views and policies so that they might be able to help one another in matters of foreign policy, trade and defence.¹¹⁸

New Zealand had, by now, disposed of any interest in a common Commonwealth policy. In any case, it was clearly impracticable since the addition of the Asian members, particularly as one of them

had adopted a neutralist posture to international affairs. What Fraser seemed to be attempting to secure was a re-affirmation of the practice of Commonwealth consultation. Whereas such consultation need not impair a nation's sovereignty, member states could expect mutual sympathy and understanding towards securing cooperation in areas of common interest.

Fraser's suggestion gained the support of the conference chairman. But Mr. Attlee indicated the manner in which he believed cooperation could serve the interests of likeminded countries.

The conference recently convened by Pandit Nehru to consider how assistance would be given to Burma was an example of the method by which a group of Commonwealth countries could usefully co-operate in matters of common concern . . . Practical co-operation between Commonwealth countries was more than ever necessary to-day, when the free democracies of the world were threatened by communism.

Nehru agreed that the members of the Commonwealth should pursue consultation and cooperation with one another in a positive approach for preventing political and economic instability. In terms of Asia such an approach could take the form of removing the conditions which encouraged the growth of communism. The Indian Prime Minister perceived the solution to problems in Asia in this way:

Democracy was . . . threatened at the present time from two directions—first by a direct onslaught by communism; and, secondly, by an internal weakening, largely due to unfavourable economic conditions . . . policy should be directed against this second danger, for it was this which would create the conditions in which communism would flourish.

Prime Minister Chifley took a similar point of view.

Though he was concerned about future military and political aggression in southern Asia, he recognized that in the long term the real defence for democracies depended upon improving poor economic conditions. As Chifley put it,

the primary object of Commonwealth policy should be to create, in countries exposed to communist influence, social conditions in which it would be impossible for communism to flourish.

But to what extent could countries of such geographical, social and economic diversity be expected to work together in matters of foreign policy? The guiding principle of Commonwealth collaboration had been to respect the independence of member governments, and those governments made their own decisions in world affairs. In a most promising Minute of Agreement, the member states had declared that they would not regard themselves as foreign to one another, and would continue to maintain preferences with respect to citizenship and trade. Yet in a codicil to the minute, the delegates noted that each nation would be free to determine for itself how it would put the most-favoured-nation status into practice. As Prime Minister Malan explained in his report to the House of Assembly,

every member of the Commonwealth has the fullest right to decide for itself what the composition of its population will be and to what extent it is prepared to grant or to refuse citizenship to others.¹¹⁹

Of course this codicil was also compatible with the Indians who wanted to pursue their own course in world affairs.

Prime Minister Nehru explained his point of view in a speech to the Indian Constituent Assembly:

Apart from certain friendly approaches to one another, apart from a desire to co-operate, which will always be conditioned by each party deciding on the measure of co-operation and following its own policy, there is no obligation.¹²⁰

Consequently, the final meeting of the conference ended with a re-affirmation by all member delegations to continue the Commonwealth practice of consultation and cooperation without a commitment to a common bond, except for the King who was to represent the symbol of their association. If the nations of the Commonwealth were to have any commonality of values or ideals, it may have been best expressed by Mr. Pearson in his CBC address on the closing day of the conference: "The nations who compose it [the Commonwealth], remain joined by one common belief in democratic principles: in the liberty of the individual." Pearson then added:

Diversity of race and culture and tradition does not weaken the strength of the association of our new and larger Commonwealth. In diversity and in freedom and in the free will to co-operate lie its strength.

The next several years would reveal the accuracy of this prediction.

What was more evident in April 1949 was that the Commonwealth had found a formula which was flexible enough to accommodate both republics and monarchies. A Minute of Agreement was recorded the last day of the conference providing that applications on a basis similar to India's should be accorded comparable Commonwealth status. Within the next several years Pakistan, Ceylon and Ghana were to be granted republican membership.¹²¹

Thus, the Declaration of London had opened the door to a wider selection of future Commonwealth applicants.

The purpose and sense of unity of the old Commonwealth was undergoing a transformation. As it became increasingly comprised of Asian and then African members, the new association adhered less to common British institutions and had less interest in swearing allegiance to the Crown. Certainly the new Commonwealth still had the basic affinity of having derived from the Empire and carried on, in varying degrees, some of the British usages and institutions. After all, English remained as an invaluable lingua franca and British common law was employed in different ways after the colonies gained full sovereign status. These factors continued to have some cohesive influence. But the Commonwealth was not the same. It had become something more than a British club based on a network of collaboration in which Britain was the centrifugal force. The multiracial Commonwealth was far less a system of bilateral relationships with Britain or of simply member states' connections with the monarchy.

Yet the new association was to serve different members in different ways. The old Commonwealth countries' interest in the association appeared to lie in its provision of a network of contacts with the newly-independent nations of Asia. The Commonwealth was perceived, therefore, as a promising instrument for promoting mutual understanding between the East and West. In a broadcast to the nation in

January 1951, Prime Minister St. Laurent expressed the importance of the Commonwealth to Canada.

Within the Commonwealth, on the other hand, we are seeking, on a basis of complete equality and mutual respect, to establish and maintain friendship, understanding and co-operation between Asia and the west. If we succeed in making the Commonwealth a genuine bridge of understanding between the east and the west, the day may come when we will look back on the achievement of the freedom and independence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon as the greatest event in Commonwealth history. Freedom and independence for all the nations of Asia must be encouraged and supported if there is to be any hope of peace and security in our generation.¹²²

The newer Commonwealth members were interested in development assistance opportunities and the acceleration of the process of decolonization. Consequently, to these countries the Commonwealth was a means whereby they could influence the attitudes and approaches of the older members. This is not to imply that the association would serve as a channel by which a member state's foreign policy would be encroached upon. Respecting another member's values and interests was still an important principle for a continuing Commonwealth relationship. Certainly, Liaqat Ali Khan and Pandit Nehru were reluctant to place the Kashmir dispute before the Commonwealth or to move for the expulsion of South Africa because, like the old Dominions, they did not brook intervention.

Both old and new member countries were comfortable in this kind of Commonwealth. The close relationship between Canada and India that emerged in the 1950s was indicative of a Commonwealth which could provide sufficient likemindedness

between the old and the new for it to exist. One Indian scholar put it this way:

The Canadian view of the purpose, structure and functioning of the Commonwealth in its present form is in close harmony with the Indian view. Both have conceived it as a forum for consultation and cooperation on problems of mutual interest. Both are opposed to any Commonwealth policy as such on any matter or to the taking of any "decisions" by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences. . . .123

But how was such collaboration to be achieved among nations which were so diverse, at least in terms of ethnic and cultural background, geography, and their approach to international affairs? Consultation could be a constructive means for influencing the minds of members. In his address to the Canada Club in London in January 1951, Mr. St. Laurent referred to the meetings of prime ministers as

an opportunity to explain, in a friendly atmosphere, our real aims and the real motives behind our policies. They also give us the opportunity to learn from the Prime Ministers of the Asian members of the Commonwealth what are the real motives and implications of their aims and their policies.124

While consultation was a way to promote understanding among Commonwealth members, its ultimate purpose was to secure the cooperation of member governments towards common objectives. One such area of common concern was development assistance. At the 1948 Prime Ministers' Meeting aid was proposed as an operative dimension of Commonwealth cooperation, and aid preempted most other discussion at the Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Bigwin Inn, Ontario in the autumn of 1949.125 The Colombo Plan was considered as

one way to put some life into the new structure of the Commonwealth, and to strengthen the democratic régimes against the penetration of communism in south and southeast Asia. Colombo was to become a distinctive element of the new Commonwealth, and one which was not only to produce economic assistance through cooperative arrangements between developed and developing nations, but also to promote greater involvement with that part of the Third World. Thus, the concept of development assistance shaped the early interests of the Commonwealth after 1949.

The Declaration of London had been a watershed in Commonwealth affairs insofar as republican membership enhanced the association's attractiveness in the eyes of future Third World members. Inevitably, Commonwealth interests had to be commensurate with its increased multiracial composition. The new growth of membership gave impetus to the rising need for economic development assistance, particularly in South Asia. It was in the best interests of both old and new members to work towards fulfilling this need. For the newer members such a Commonwealth purpose provided reason enough for their continued membership. For the older members, aid was a functional means of inhibiting the advance of communism in Asia and paving the way towards closer East-West relations. In any event, the Commonwealth had changed by 1949, and it was to the credit of all members that they were to develop sufficient means for its continued existence.

Conclusion

Canada helped to transform the Commonwealth from one which was Anglocentric to one which could be described by both its composition and character as multiracial. The Canadian government responded to both internal and external influences as it attempted to reconcile Canada's total independence with the Commonwealth relationship, and maintain India in the association as a means to effect closer relations with the subcontinent. Yet, close consultations between Canada and newly emerging member states, particularly India, had an impact on Canada itself.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King played a leading role in shaping a decentralized flexible association that would not encroach upon the sovereignty of its member states, making the Commonwealth more compatible with Asian membership. By arguing that increased centralization would be more apt to cause friction than to promote cooperation, King rejected the idea of a common Commonwealth policy. The King Government wished to maintain Canada's international position as an independent nation working within many international organizations to foster world stability rather than restricting itself to a single grouping of nations.

Therefore, the Commonwealth was not to develop a common policy, although it did function as a forum for collaboration

in areas of common concern. Indeed, a pre-eminent authority on Commonwealth relations concluded that King "more than any other reconciled the practice of responsible parliamentary government in the dominions with the machinery of intra-Commonwealth consultation."¹²⁶ Aside from promoting informal and de-institutionalized collaboration, the King government took the lead in constitutional reforms such as enacting legislation to differentiate Canadians from Commonwealth citizens. Through its consultative and constitutional initiatives and its part in restraining aspirations by some members towards centralization in the areas of defence and trade, **Canada helped to shape** the Commonwealth into an association which would be attractive to the Asian members. Former British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Patrick Gordon Walker complimented Canada on its contribution:

[P]erhaps the greatest fact about the Commonwealth is that it had, owing to the triumph of the "Canadian view", already by 1947 been transformed into the sort of the Commonwealth into which these nations of Asia could fit easily and with spiritual comfort.¹²⁷

But Mr. King was not the impetus behind Canada's interest in India. It was St. Laurent who, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, initially wanted closer relations with India, and Pearson, who was responsible for developing rapport with the Indians at the 1949 Prime Ministers' meeting. In fact, there is little doubt that Pearson contributed substantively to the Declaration of London in a drafting capacity. A senior Indian participant claimed that "the major share of the credit for the successful conclusion of the Conference was

due to the Canadian delegation."¹²⁸ Several months after the conference Mr. Nehru confirmed this opinion by speaking to the Canadian Parliament of "the spirit of understanding" shown by the Canadian delegation at the London meetings.¹²⁹

Thus, Canada played an important role in the transformation of the post-war Commonwealth. Whereas St. Laurent and Pearson perceived some value for Canada belonging to an association which included India among its membership, it is unlikely that Mackenzie King was motivated to shape the Commonwealth in a way that would make it compatible with Asian membership. Regardless of the reasons for the approaches of Canada's statesmen, the Commonwealth evolved in accord with Canadian views. Therefore, Mr. St. Laurent would justifiably, although somewhat prematurely, claim in his Gray Lecture that "Canadians perhaps more than any other of its members, have contributed to its [Commonwealth] development."¹³⁰

Prime Ministers King and St. Laurent (together with the assistance of his Secretary of State for External Affairs) made Canada's Commonwealth policy during the years from 1944 until 1949. That is not to imply that the External Affairs department as a whole did not contribute substantially to Canadian external policy with respect to the Commonwealth. But Canada's approach towards Commonwealth issues took the perspective of the respective prime ministers with few constraints posed by either the Parliament or the Canadian public.

Policy formulation in foreign affairs naturally rested with the Department of External Affairs. Although many of the senior personnel were sympathetic towards Canada developing closer relations with India, "their diplomacy was hampered by their own anxieties over the political sensitivities of their masters."¹³¹ Among those most involved with Commonwealth affairs during the King administration were Vincent Massey, Norman Robertson and Lester Pearson. Whereas Massey's influence on the prime minister was almost non-existent, Robertson's opinion, in positions of Under Secretary and then as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, was highly regarded.¹³² Of course, Massey had been isolated from Ottawa for many years in the position of High Commissioner in London and was considered by King to be overly influenced by British attitudes, particularly those supportive of closer Commonwealth cooperation. Robertson and Pearson were not suspected by the prime minister as being inclined to cater to British policies, but they were interested in forging closer Indo-Canadian relations. Following the exchange of High Commissioners between these two countries in May 1947, closer collaboration was to develop. This course of events was due in no small measure to the Department's early interest in promoting a channel of communication between Ottawa and Delhi.

When the former Secretary of State for External Affairs took the reins of government in November 1946 to work with Pearson who had assumed St. Laurent's old job two months earlier, Canada was bound to have a more internationalist outlook on world affairs. St. Laurent's approach was based on the premise that it was in Canada's interests to work towards world stability through international involvement. He was prepared to utilize the Commonwealth, in conjunction with other international organizations, as a natural instrument to carry on Canadian external policy. Unlike King, St. Laurent was more prepared to have Canada become involved in Commonwealth affairs rather than assuming that the interests of the association were those of the United Kingdom.

Under the experienced guidance of Mr. Pearson, the Department of External Affairs was given sufficient latitude to promote Commonwealth interests as a means to **enhance** Canada's status abroad. As a former senior diplomat recalled, "the view of the new multi-racial Commonwealth as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy was dawning."¹³³ Pearson was convinced that the Commonwealth could act as a positive force by providing a forum for collaboration between peoples of

racial differences and economic disparities. Through its Commonwealth connexion, Canada could help foster understanding and provide economic assistance to help shore-up the countries of Asia to face the threat of communism. At the same time, it did Canada no harm and much good to be recognized throughout the world as a "friend" of India, which was fast becoming the leader of the Third World.

In sum, Pearson and his Department were given a free-hand to develop Canadian foreign policy. Though External Affairs' activities required the approval of cabinet, the Secretary had the confidence of his prime minister and consistent support for his approach to the Commonwealth.¹³⁴ Clearly there was additional input to Canada's Commonwealth policy from the prime minister's special assistant, Jack Pickersgill, the Clerk of the Privy Council, Arnold Heeney, and other senior officials of the public service. But External Affairs was the dominant influence, at least with regard to Commonwealth affairs during the years 1944 to 1949.

Parliament, on the other hand, offered few constraints to Canada's Commonwealth policy. After the 1944 Prime Ministers' conference at which King took an active part in holding back the forces of centralization, the government's approach to the Empire was not seriously challenged at home. Indeed, following the Prime Minister's initial report on the Conference to Parliament, "he was welcomed by all parties with vociferous applause and warm congratulations for the way in which he had represented his country."¹³⁵ It was

perhaps natural for some of the right-wing Tory members such as Howard Green and T. L. Church to advocate Canadian support for a common Commonwealth policy based on the premise that such policy did not exclude its members from participating freely in other international organizations.¹³⁶ Mr. Diefenbaker was not deterred by the prospect of an Empire Consultative Council which, he argued, might assist the membership in deriving a "policy for the Commonwealth, of the Commonwealth and by the Commonwealth."¹³⁷ However, much to the chagrin of some of his cohorts, Conservative House leader, Gordon Graydon, supported King's position by criticizing any institutionalization of the Commonwealth which might effect a common policy on the part of its members.¹³⁸ The leader of the other major opposition party, M. J. Coldwell, also subscribed to the approach of the government by commending constructive Commonwealth collaboration as an alternative to a Commonwealth bloc.¹³⁹

In some ways the leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation party took a more progressive view of the Commonwealth than did the government. Reflecting on the institution as a positive vehicle for the decolonization of the British Empire, Mr. Coldwell warmly supported Indian dominion status in 1947: "Canada would be pleased to do everything she can to welcome into the family of the Commonwealth the nation which we hope will now emerge in India."¹⁴⁰ The Conservative party was also a persistent supporter of the Commonwealth, most probably because it was a means for.

maintaining Canada's monarchical connection. India's republican membership did nothing to negate this connection, and may have enhanced the international status of the association by retaining a foremost Third World country within the fold. Consequently, Mr. Drew could declare his party's support of the formula permitting India to remain in the Commonwealth as "a great achievement of understanding and goodwill."¹⁴¹ It was perhaps fitting that Mr. Coldwell also applauded the St. Laurent government's contribution to facilitating continued Indian membership, but for a different reason. The CCF perceived the Commonwealth as a multiracial association which could stand against racial discrimination. "Canadians left-of-centre who had tended to be suspicious of empire," John Holmes pointed out, "now became the stronger supporters of this enterprise to build a bridge among the races—a concept which was in regular currency by 1950."¹⁴²

Yet public opinion was generally slow to realize the changing nature of the Commonwealth. Anglo-Canadians were possibly most committed to the monarchical connection, at least in the immediate post-war period. The other prominent cultural group, French-speaking Canadians, valued the attachment to the Commonwealth probably more as a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxon influence posed on Canada by the United States than out of loyalty to the Crown. Just as French Canadians were interested in maintaining their culture on the North American continent, Canadians who possessed neither British nor French cultural backgrounds also

preferred to retain their distinctiveness. Their expectations could best be realized in a country which respected cultural plurality, and one which was strong enough to assert its nationhood. Consequently, Canadian external policy had to reflect Canada's monarchical ties while gaining full recognition of its sovereign equality within the association.

Thus, if there were good reasons for Canada to remain in the Commonwealth, there were equally good reasons, by virtue of Canada's large non-British population, for its governments to be reluctant to surrender to any imperial influences. The King and St. Laurent administrations were to enjoy the predominant support of Canadian public opinion by rejecting a common Commonwealth policy or, as one Commonwealth scholar put it, establishing "an emphasis on Canada as a nation, consistent opposition to any centralization, and . . . reliance upon informal consultation and cooperation."¹⁴³ India's admission to the Commonwealth, first as a Dominion and then as a republic, secured the Canadian concept of the Commonwealth because India could neither accept less than complete sovereignty in the association nor a common Commonwealth policy. Whereas the Commonwealth had been transformed into a multiracial entity, its evolution had been along lines compatible with the views of the majority of the Canadian people.¹⁴⁴

There also were external forces affecting Canada's approach towards the Commonwealth. Aside from the member states themselves, regional security organizations to which Canada belonged and the United States were to have some influence on Canadian policy making.

Before the end of the war Canada had become involved in developing the United Nations to assume the maintenance of peace and promote prosperity in the world. It soon became apparent that this new organization would not act as a collective security system. But it was never in doubt, at least in the minds of most Canadians, that the Commonwealth could not function in a security capacity. In a broadcast to the nation in November 1948, Mr. St. Laurent explained the government's point of view.

It is enough to glance at a map of the world to convince oneself that the British Commonwealth by itself does not constitute a system of collective security.145

With the United Kingdom no longer a world power, its Commonwealth partners were to develop security relations with non-member states. Alone among Commonwealth countries, Canada had emerged from the war with permanent defence arrangements with the United States. In fact, the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was foremost among the reasons why Canada was reluctant to become involved in a Commonwealth defence policy. Though Canada was to maintain the Commonwealth in its policy considerations, Ottawa made it clear that relations with the United States constituted the most

important element of Canadian defence policy. Prime Minister St. Laurent's address to the Canada Club in London in January 1951 was equally as appropriate several years earlier:

The security of all parts of the Commonwealth obviously depends upon the right kind of relationships with other nations outside the Commonwealth: and very specially on our relationships with the United State.¹⁴⁶

By 1949, NATO had evolved as Canada's priority organization for security purposes as it was for Britain itself. But there was no incompatibility between their membership in this regional grouping of nations and the Commonwealth inasmuch as NATO aimed at contributing to global peace and security. However, Canada's membership in NATO and its close association with the United States precluded the need for Commonwealth consultative machinery although some cooperation in security matters could still be achieved by Commonwealth countries. To the extent that the multi-state membership of NATO could counteract the total dominance of the Americans in defence matters, Ottawa was sufficiently satisfied with Canada's regional security arrangements without entering into any additional Commonwealth plans.

Ottawa was equally reluctant to participate in a Commonwealth trading system. Canadian economic relations with the United States were close and it could hardly be expected for Canada to enter into formalized machinery and policy

commitments of an association of which the United States was not a member. However, resisting a Commonwealth trade policy did not inhibit Canada from participating in the Commonwealth preference scheme. Indeed, it was practicable for Canada to keep preferential tariffs open wherever it could, at least until a United Nations' trade agreement arranged for equivalent MFN arrangements to compensate for the loss of Commonwealth preferences. Eventually these preferences were worked into GATT, but the Commonwealth connection benefitted Canada during the interim.

In sum, a major consideration in the East Block was to coordinate Canadian foreign policy with that of the United States. It might even be argued that the success of the King and St. Laurent administrations was based on their ability to maintain the friendship and confidence of Canada's neighbour. Such an objective was not incompatible with Canada's membership in the Commonwealth since numerous member states were allied with the Americans in various economic and security organizations. Therefore, Canada's post-war governments avoided placing stress on their North American relationship by leaving little reason for the United States to suppose that Canadian policy was unduly influenced by Commonwealth countries, especially those

whose interests were less closely allied to those of the United States. On the other hand, the Commonwealth link served as a counterpoise to the one-sided pressure that could be exerted on Canada by a dominant continental partner.

The post-war global environment had resulted in Canadian defence and trade agreements with the United States which were believed in some quarters to be a threat to Canada's political identity. Close ties with the Empire had successfully preserved a Canada distinct from the United States until the second world war. It was reasonable to expect that Canadian sovereignty could continue to be preserved by maintaining the Commonwealth connection. Mr. Holmes explained the paradox of Canada's Commonwealth relationship in this way:

As it transformed from an unfashionable empire into a more fashionable association among peoples of different races . . . Canadian nationalists [were] no longer afraid the British were restricting their freedom [and] saw in the Commonwealth a counter force to threats to Canadian independence posed by the increasing dominance of the United States in world affairs. 147

Whether Canada's belonging to the Commonwealth or to other multilateral associations would act as a deterrent to continental integration, the counter weight theory seemed to give Canada more confidence in its approach to post-war world affairs.

Thus, Canada had sufficiently matured by the end of the war to realize that its sovereignty would not be affected by imperialist designs, and the Commonwealth represented a source of Canadian identity which might well be utilized as a means of promoting Canada's status abroad.

St. Laurent and Pearson were more prepared to look at the Commonwealth in terms of how it might be of use to Canada rather than how it might interfere with Canadian sovereignty. Membership in a multiracial association was viewed as an opportunity for Canada to promote international cooperation between nations that were rich and poor, white and non-white, aligned and non-aligned. If Canada was truly interested in promoting world peace and prosperity, the Commonwealth appeared to combine many of the ingredients of global diversities and disparities. It was, therefore, a natural forum for international collaboration; a valuable instrument for a foreign policy aimed at securing stability in a world which had suffered from two wars. Consequently, Canada was to take a more active and enthusiastic part in Commonwealth activities during the next two decades.

But closer relations which Ottawa developed with the Asian countries through the Commonwealth were to

have an impact on Canadian immigration policy. The prospects for continued friendly relations with India, for example, had persuaded the Canadian government to become more racially tolerant at home.

An expert in Canadian immigration policy summarized the essence of Prime Minister King's approach towards Asians as stated in the House in May 1947.

The people of Canada do not wish to make a fundamental alteration in the character of their population through mass immigration. The government is therefore opposed to "large-scale immigration from the Orient," which would certainly give rise to social and economic problems, which might lead to serious international difficulties. The government has no intention of changing the regulation governing Asiatics immigration "unless and until alternative measures of effective control have been worked out." -146

What this meant in practice was that Canada was not prepared to accept non-European emigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere. Although the King administration was guilty of discrimination against the admission of Asians into Canada, this policy generally was acceptable to Canadians at that time. But the transformation of the Commonwealth into a multiracial society changed the complexion of Canada's approach towards Asian immigrants or at least those from Commonwealth countries. As has been previously noted, soon after Canada and India

exchanged diplomatic representatives the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi proposed that Canada accept a token number of 100 Indian nationals each year as a means for improving Commonwealth and, specifically, Indo-Canadian relations.¹⁴⁹ But a quota system for Indian immigration was neither acceptable to the Canadian government in 1947 nor during the next several years. Although an Agreed Minute was adopted at the 1949 Prime Ministers' meeting by which member states would develop their own means to accord preferential treatment to Commonwealth citizens, Indian nationals were not immediately given favourable status.

If Indo-Canadian relations were to continue to develop smoothly, it became increasingly apparent that some mutually satisfactory provisions for Indian immigration had to be arranged. It was reasonable that External Affairs, which had been most involved with Indian affairs, wanted to initiate some liberalization of Canada's immigration policy. But equally strong pressure for change came from Parliament, and the CCF party in particular. Nonetheless, it was not until January 1951 that concessions were implemented. By individual agreement with the Commonwealth Asian countries, Canada amended its policy to permit the admission of 150 Indians, 100 Pakistanis and 50 Ceylonese each year as well as the immediate family (within certain specifications) of Commonwealth Asians already resident in this country.¹⁵⁰ The changes were modest but in the right direction. What was more significant was that Canada had been compelled to give at least this nominal acknowledge-

ment of its moral commitment to recognize Commonwealth citizenship. Indeed, a revised immigration policy was essential to a government that had intentions of fostering close relations with India.

The role Canada had taken in assisting India to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic was appreciated in New Delhi. As a consequence, a friendship evolved which was to be fostered further through their Commonwealth involvement and in bilateral relations. The Indo-Canadian relationship seemed to be directed towards developing communication between the East and West and promoting a new Commonwealth purpose inspired by values significant to a multiracial association.

In their initial encounters at the Prime Ministers' meetings—Nehru and St. Laurent were quick to realize that the two countries shared several similar objectives. Unquestionably, Nehru was impressed with Canada's efforts assisting India to gain republican membership in the Commonwealth on a basis equivalent to that of other members. In addition, Canadian and Indian viewpoints converged with respect to their opposition towards Commonwealth institutions and a common policy. In an address to the Canadian Parliament in October 1949, Prime Minister Nehru accounted for the similar approaches of the two countries as being a direct result of sharing a concept of the Commonwealth as a grouping of equal and independent nations.¹⁵¹ It was natural that their governments' attitudes would continue to coincide as the

Commonwealth moved away from a centrifugal concept of the United Kingdom at the hub of the wheel. Indeed, in the opinion of Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Jules Léger, by the 1950 s "it was Nehru's Commonwealth and the centre was moving from London to New Delhi."¹⁵²

Due to its government's positive approach towards developing close relations with Commonwealth Asia, Canada gained Pandit Nehru's respect and ultimately, his friendship. Undoubtedly, Ottawa showed understanding by keeping in close consultation with the non-aligned Eastern members and supporting their well-being through development assistance. But it was perhaps less Canada's attempts to promote world peace and prosperity than the novelty of the Indo-Canadian friendship which stimulated good relations between the two countries. Ottawa had reason to be pleased with Canada's Indian connection. The government was well aware of the growing importance of India as a leader of the Asian world. Close relations with such a country elevated Canada's status in the world community and provided a much needed bridge between Asia and the West.

Canada's Commonwealth link with India was particularly valuable to the West because it opened a flow of communication between Ottawa and New Delhi while feelings between the communist and non-communist world were hardening and while they were in open competition for the confidence of the Asian states. Canada was in a position to explain the views of its NATO partners, whereas India could reflect the attitudes of the non-Western world. An Indo-Canadian relationship was also important to Ottawa because it indicated that Canada did not fall exclusively into the bi-polar confrontation. Moreover,

this relationship had added a whole new dimension to Canadian external policy and was perhaps indicative of the government's initial attempt to develop for Canada a "Third Option."

An Ottawa-Delhi axis was in many ways sustained by Canada's approach towards the new Commonwealth. The multi-racial composition of the association was to cause a closer examination of the concept of human equality, and new values were to emerge that were more compatible with its multi-racial character. Interests in mitigating world problems caused by economic disparities and racial inequality became important considerations in most member states foreign policies. The future for continued close Indo-Canadian relations undeniably came to rest on these "multiracial" values. Such considerations did not contradict Canada's foreign policy aspirations inasmuch as Canadian interests were involved with world stability, and helping to prevent a cleavage between the rich and poor and the white and non-white nations of the world contributed towards this end. For India, the pursuit of economic equity and racial equality was concomitant with its approach to world affairs. To the extent that Indo-Canadian objectives converged, Prime Minister St. Laurent could confidently declare in his address to the members of the Indian Parliament that "the similarity of our outlook is striking . . . our paths are towards the same goals, and I trust we will always work towards that common goal with respect for and trust in each other."¹⁵³

Insofar as economic development assistance became a function of Commonwealth cooperation, India and Canada pursued similar goals but for different reasons. Whereas Nehru accepted Commonwealth aid as a means for securing India's

economic viability as a nation independent of any international alignments, Canada contributed under the Colombo Plan as a means to register Western influence in southern Asia. Both countries, however, were interested in developing conditions of economic and political self-reliance among the emerging Asian nations so that they would be in a better position to determine their own affairs. Notwithstanding Indo-Canadian motives for participating in the Colombo scheme or its long-term impact on overcoming political instability, Colombo was clear evidence of Commonwealth cooperation among developed and developing nations towards mutual objectives. Canada's contribution under Colombo exemplified its commitment to the values of the multiracial association which went a long way towards strengthening Indo-Canadian relations. Yet the mere fact that Canada contributed to the cooperative economic development of southern Asia at all was likely due to its membership in the Commonwealth.

The impact of the Commonwealth on Canada's approach towards racial questions would have less immediate results. Nonetheless it was inevitable that a multiracial grouping of nations would be forced to take a stand on issues that involved race discrimination. Though the Commonwealth would not have been expected to devise a common policy in the 50s (any more than it would have been possible in the immediate post-war period) by virtue of its multiracial make-up, the Commonwealth could be expected to promote better race relations, particularly among the membership. The Commonwealth's initial interests were with accelerating the process of

decolonization. But at the Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference at Lahore in 1954, South Africa was to be criticized by Asian participants for its racial policies which, they argued, were undermining the continuance of the multiracial society.¹⁵⁴ At the 1956 Prime Ministers' meeting, an Indian delegate, K. M. Panikkar, attempted to gain consensual endorsement for the principle of racial equality.¹⁵⁵ The proposal was not agreed to at that time, but it was indicative of the changing character and attitudes of the Commonwealth that such an agreement was to be reached within the next several years.

Thus, Canada's attitudes and approach towards the Commonwealth had changed during the period, 1944 until 1949. Canada was to mature as a nation and rather than suspect the Commonwealth of subverting Canadian sovereignty, it found the association to be a useful instrument in conducting its relations abroad. Yet membership in any international association compels a member to consider the interests of its fellow members. Changes in Canadian immigration policy to permit the admission of a modest number of Commonwealth Asian nationals was an indirect result of Canadian membership in the Commonwealth. Although the Canadian government was interested in greater international involvement and, in particular, bridging the gap between the East and West, that objective could hardly be realized without Canada showing some outward sign of understanding towards the Eastern countries. Consequently, Canada was to become one of the original contributors under

the Colombo scheme and increasingly more tolerant of Commonwealth Asian attitudes towards racial issues. In sum, the post-war Commonwealth had affected the direction of Canadian policy.

NOTES - CHAPTER III

¹Statements and Speeches (SS) 47/2, "The Foundation of Canadian Policy in World Affairs," an address by Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at the University of Toronto, 13 January, 1947 p.7.

²SS 51/1, "The Commonwealth and the World Today," Prime Minister St. Laurent's address to the Canada Club, London, 8 January 1951, p.2.

³Canada, House of Commons Debates, 19 November 1945, pp. 2275-2276.

⁴A good discussion of Commonwealth collaboration, which is almost as relevant to the organization today, is found in Nicholas Mansergh's Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, London, CASS, 1968, pp. 398-413.

⁵Prime Minister Curtin's statement to the Press (6 September 1943) and his speech to the Federal Conference of the Australian Labour Party (14 December 1943) were recorded in Mansergh, ibid., p. 563-565.

⁶Lord Halifax speech to the Toronto Board of Trade, 24 January 1944, in Mansergh, ibid., pp. 577-579.

⁷Canada, Debates, 31 January 1944, p. 40.

⁸Ibid., pp. 41-42.

⁹Ibid., 1 February 1944, p. 102.

¹⁰Ibid., 10 February, p. 353.

¹¹The Times: London, 5 May 1944, p. 4.

¹²J.W. Pickersgill, D.F. Forster, edd., The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 1, University of Toronto Press, 1970, pp. 678-679.

¹³Quoted in Mansergh, Documents, 1931-1952, I, op. cit., pp. 588-589.

¹⁴Memorandum for Prime Minister King from the Canadian delegation to the 1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting, 15 May 1944, Department of External Affairs (DEA) files

¹⁵Prime Minister King to Acting Prime Minister James Ralston, 15 May 1944, ibid.

¹⁶ A Position Paper on Commonwealth Commercial Policy, prepared for the Canadian delegation to the 1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting, May 1-16, ibid.

¹⁷ Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner, Vincent Massey, summarizing the British ambassador's (to the United States) impression of Washington's attitude to Commonwealth trade, 15 May 1944.

¹⁸ John Holmes' testimony to the Senate Standing Committee on External Relations, 26 May 1966, p. 31.

¹⁹ Canada, Debates, 11 August 1944, p. 6276.

²⁰ From Mackenzie King's speech to the British Parliament on 11 May 1944, quoted in Mansergh, Documents, 1931-1952, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 587.

²¹ This discussion occurred on May 15 during the consideration of the draft communiqué. cf: Pickersgill, Record. I, op.cit., p. 686.

²² The communiqué is reproduced in Mansergh, Documents, 1931-1952, I, p. 586.

²³ cf: John Holmes, "The Commonwealth: 1944-1947," unpublished manuscript, April 1974, subsequently revised for inclusion (chapter 5) in his forthcoming book, entitled, The Shaping of Peace, vol. I.

The meetings proved to be very productive inasmuch as they facilitated an exchange of views on the creation of a new world organization.

²⁴ Quoted in Pickersgill, Record, III, op. cit., p. 92.

²⁵ It is John Holmes' view that the editors of the Sunday Times, the Observer, the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail were among the strongest advocates of an imperial policy. Conversation with Mr. Holmes, Toronto, 13 June 1979.

²⁶ Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner, Vincent Massey, 23 March 1946, DEA files.

²⁷ Acting High Commissioner to the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 April 1946, ibid.

²⁸ High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Vincent Massey, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 May 1946, ibid.

²⁹ Canada, Debates, 9 May 1946, p. 1348.

³⁰ Mr. King to Prime Minister Attlee, 10 May 1946, DEA files.

³¹ The Canadian High Commissioner's cable to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 23 May 1946, ibid.

³²Pickersgill, Record, III, op. cit., p 242.

³³For quotations in this paragraph and the next, see: Acting High Commissioner to the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 3 June 1946, DEA files.

³⁴Telegram from Prime Minister King to Prime Minister Attlee, 3 October 1946, ibid.

³⁵Telegram from Prime Minister King to Lord Addison, 19 November 1946, ibid.

³⁶United Kingdom, House of Commons, Debates, Vol. 143, coll. 336-338.

³⁷For quotations and information in this paragraph, see: Douglas Annett, British Preference in Canadian Commercial Policy, Toronto, Ryerson, 1948, pp. 175, 178, 180.

³⁸High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Norman Robertson, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 February 1947, DEA files.

³⁹Department of External Affairs' telegram to the Canadian High Commissioner to be relayed to Prime Minister Attlee with copies forwarded to all Commonwealth governments, 5 November 1943, ibid.

⁴⁰SS 47/2, op. cit., p. 7.

⁴¹cf: The Secretary of State for External Affairs' speech in the Debate on the Royal Style and Title. Debates, op. cit., 30 April 1947. pp. 2641-2643. In essence, Mr. St. Laurent was calling for the recognition of the sovereign as the King of Canada.

⁴²John W. Holmes, "The Commonwealth and the United Nations," unpublished paper, 1943, p. 16.

⁴³John W. Holmes' testimony to the Senate, op. cit., p. 32.

⁴⁴An historical perspective on the transition of power in India, and particularly the role of Lord Mountbatten is admirably documented by Duncan Hall in Commonwealth, London, Van Nostrand, 1971, pp. 783-790. V. P. Menon, who was a former adviser to the Viceroy, describes India's partition and independence in The Transfer of Power in India, London, 1957.

⁴⁵Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 9 May 1947, King Papers.

⁴⁶Mr. Pearson to Prime Minister King, 30 May 1947, ibid. The word, "remain," is underlined in the original memorandum.

⁴⁷Dale Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, Toronto, Macmillan, 1967, p. 206.

⁴⁸Pickersgill, Record, IV, op.cit., p. 42.

⁴⁹Mr. Pearson to the Prime Minister, 29 May 1947, King Papers.

⁵⁰Pickersgill, Record, IV, op.cit., p. 43.

⁵¹Canada, Debates, op.cit., 4 June 1947, p. 3771.

⁵²Prime Minister King to the Secretary of State for Dominion Relations, 6 August 1947, King Papers.

⁵³John D. Kearney to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 May 1948, DEA files. Kearney also indicated that he believed the majority opinion in the Assembly was unfavourably disposed towards India's continued Commonwealth membership.

⁵⁴Canada, Debates, op.cit., 29 April 1948, pp. 3341-3342.

⁵⁵Canadian Ambassador to Turkey, Victor W. Odlum, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 October 1948, DEA files. Odlum quotes a portion of the letter which he received from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Sir Girja Bajpai.

⁵⁶India, Constituent Assembly Debates, 16 May 1949, vol. 8, p. 5.

⁵⁷Quoted in Record, IV, op.cit., p. 371.

⁵⁸Research material.

⁵⁹Hume Wrong's telegram to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in which he reports on his conversation with the Indian Ambassador, Sir Rama Rau, 20 September 1948, ibid.

⁶⁰King's recollection of his conversation with St. Laurent, 15 October 1948, quoted in Record, IV, op.cit., p. 408.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²The Hindustan Times, editorial, 26 October 1948.

⁶³Pickersgill, Record, IV, op.cit., p. 404.

⁶⁴Both Madame Pandit and Fraser's comments are quoted in ibid., p. 416.

⁶⁵The Memorandum was recorded in a telegram from Mr. Pearson to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 November 1948, DEA files.

66 Ibid.

67 Memorandum from Mr. Escott Reid to the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, 29 November 1948, ibid.

68 Ibid. Lord Jowitt (British Lord Chancellor) and Mr. Noel-Baker (Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations) who were also in attendance at this meeting concurred with the old Commonwealth members, and concluded that the Ten Points "provided a pretty frail and tenuous basis for Commonwealth membership."

69 John D. Kearney to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 5 November 1948, ibid.

70 Kearney to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 11 November 1948, ibid.

71 Kearney reported Nehru's press statement to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 18 November 1948. This report is contrary to the proposition advanced by Duncan Hall in Commonwealth, London, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, pp. 849-850. Hall stated that India could have had a second class citizenship imposed upon it.

72 Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson's telegram to Prime Minister St. Laurent (after a communication from Canadian High Commissioner to Britain Norman Robertson), 26 January 1949, ibid.

73 Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969, pp. 334-335.

74 Philip Noel-Baker so informed Lester Pearson while he was chairman of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations conference, 26 November 1948, DEA files.

75 Prime Minister Attlee sent a copy of the Eight Points proposal to Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson, 12 December 1948, ibid.

76 The Indian High Commissioner's Aid Memoire was given to Prime Minister Attlee on 11 December 1948, ibid.

77 A copy of this telegram from Mr. Attlee to Prime Minister Nehru was sent to the Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Escott Reid, 16 December 1948, ibid. The meeting at 10 Downing Street (which the telegram refers to) was also attended by Lord Jowitt, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. Noel-Baker.

78 Mr. Escott Reid to Lester Pearson who was in London, 17 December 1948, ibid.

⁷⁹H. Duncan Hall, "The British Commonwealth of Nations," American Political Science Review, December 1953, p. 1015.

⁸⁰Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson's telegram to John Kearney, 5 January 1949, DEA files.

⁸¹J. D. Kearney to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 May 1948, ibid.

⁸²James Eayrs (In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, Vol. 3, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 243) quotes from "India and the Commonwealth: A Preliminary Survey," 3 May 1949, DEA files.

⁸³Memorandum from A. J. Pick (Commonwealth Division) to Assistant Secretary of State for External Affairs, Dr. R. A. Mackay, 11 June 1948, ibid. There was some substance to this argument. See, for instance, A. Appadorai, "India's Foreign Policy," International Affairs, January 1949, p. 43.

John Hilliker thoroughly examines the Indian immigration question in a paper entitled, "The War, the Vote and Canadian Relations with India, 1939-1945," presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Society for Asian Studies, May 1976.

⁸⁴Kearney to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 29 December 1948, DEA files.

⁸⁵Noted in Kearney's telegram to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 13 January 1949, ibid.

⁸⁶Norman Robertson to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 26 January 1949, ibid.

⁸⁷Lester Pearson to the Canadian High Commissioner to Britain, Norman Robertson, 30 January 1949, ibid.

⁸⁸Kearney to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 13 January 1949, ibid.

⁸⁹Patrick Gordon Walker, The Commonwealth, London, Secker and Warburg, 1962, p. 183.

⁹⁰Research material.

⁹¹Gordon Walker, The Cabinet, New York, Basic Books, 1970, p. 137.

⁹²Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Arnold Heeney to Dana Wilgress, 22 March 1949, DEA files.

⁹³Prime Minister St. Laurent's message to Prime Minister Nehru, 31 March 1949, ibid.

⁹⁴Mr. Scott of the Canadian High Commission in London to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 April 1949, ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Mr. H. R. Horne of the Commonwealth Division initially prepared on 12 April 1949 an assessment of the tentative Indo-British formula for Dr. Mackay who forwarded a revised draft to the Under Secretary the same day.

⁹⁷John A. Munro, Alex Inglis, edd., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 1948-1957, Vol. II, University of Toronto Press, 1973, p. 99.

⁹⁸Recorded in Mr. Pearson's despatch to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 April 1949, DEA files.

⁹⁹Dr. R. A. Mackay, "Comment on Indian Proposals," 22 April 1949, ibid.

¹⁰⁰Research material that conforms with Mr. Pearson's recollection of the meeting on 22 April 1949. cf: Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 101. The views of the other prime ministers were also recorded in this research material.

¹⁰¹LBP Pearson's despatch to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 23 April 1949, DEA files.

¹⁰²Research material.

The design of this dual declaration may possibly have been initiated by Gordon Walker who recorded in his diary that on 9 February 1949 he put forward in Cabinet the idea of accepting Indian membership on the basis of two "simple declarations (i) by India, saying it wanted to stay in the Commonwealth, (ii) by all the other countries saying they agreed": The Cabinet, op.cit., p. 136.

¹⁰³Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 102.

¹⁰⁴Mr. Pearson to Prime Minister St. Laurent, 25 April 1949, DEA files.

¹⁰⁵Research material.

¹⁰⁶Ibid. This draft statement is recorded in Eayrs, In Defence, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 252.

107 From the approach taken by Malan, Pearson and Nehru see Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 104.

108 Research material. Corresponds with Eayrs account in In Defence, Vol. III, op.cit., p. 253.

109 The attitudes expressed by member countries are noted in Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, loc. cit.

110 Research material.

111 Ibid. The paragraphs have been numbered for the purpose of assessing the declaration in four parts.

112 Research material is used throughout the next two paragraphs.

113 The text of the final draft declaration, and the one incorporated in the communiqué, is recorded in Appendix E.

114 SS 49/20. Text of broadcast delivered by shortwave from London over the CBC by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on 27 April 1949, p. 2. This broadcast is subsequently referred to in the text of the thesis as Pearson's CBC address without the use of footnotes.

115 Statement issued by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the conclusion of the Prime Ministers' meeting, 27 April 1949, recorded in Mansergh, Documents, 1931-1952, Vol. II op.cit., p. 858.

116 Speech by the Leader of the Opposition, the Right Hon. Jan Smuts in the South African House of Assembly, Debates, 11 May 1949, vol. 68, coll. 1564-1565.

117 Speech by the Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, in the Indian Constituent Assembly, Debates, 16 May 1949, Vol. 8, p.7.

118 The description of the viewpoints of Commonwealth leaders in the next two paragraphs is based on research material.

119 South Africa, Debates, op.cit., 11 May 1949, Vol. 68, col. 1556.

120 India, Debates, op.cit., 16 May 1949, Vol. 8, p.2.

121 Pakistan became a republic in 1956, Ceylon deferred its republican status until 1972 and Ghana's request was granted in 1960.

122 cf.: Text of Prime Minister St. Laurent's broadcast from London on 10 January 1951: Ottawa, DEA, Information Division, p.2.

- 123 M.S. Rajan, "The Indo-Canadian Entente," International Journal, autumn 1962, p. 336.
- 124 SS 51/1, op.cit., p.6.
- 125 F. H. Soward, The Changing Commonwealth, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950, pp. 63-64.
- 126 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, op. cit., p.414.
- 127 Patrick Gordon Walker, "Canada Shapes the Commonwealth," New Commonwealth, 21 December 1953, p. 647.
- 128 Acting Canadian High Commissioner to Britain, Frank Scott, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 3 May 1949, DEA Files, The official is believed to be Sir Girja Bajpai.
- 129 Canada, Debates, 24 October 1949, p. 1103.
- 130 SS 47/2, op. cit., p. 7.
- 131 Holmes, "The Commonwealth: 1944-1947," op. cit.
- 132 Relations between King and both Massey and Robertson are described in Pickersgill, Record, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 230-234. p. 271.
- 133 Holmes, "The Commonwealth: 1944-1947," op. cit.
- 134 For comments on the relations between St. Laurent and Pearson see Eayrs, In Defence, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 15.
- 135 This was the interpretation of Cecil Lingard and Reginald Trotter (Canada and World Affairs, 1941-1944, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 303) who cite Canada, Debates, 22 May 1944, pp. 3181-3184.
- 136 Ibid., 4 August 1944, p. 5918, p. 5937-5938.
- 137 Ibid., 11 August 1944, p. 6268.
- 138 Ibid., 12 August 1944, p. 6416.
- 139 Ibid., 4 August 1944, p. 5950.
- 140 Ibid., 4 June 1947, p. 3771.
- 141 Mr. Drew and Mr. Coldwell's statements are recorded in ibid., 27 April 1949, p. 2655.
- 142 Holmes "The Commonwealth: 1944-1947," op. cit.

¹⁴³Nicholas Mansergh, "Dominion Conceptions of the Commonwealth," The Commonwealth and the Nation: Studies in British Commonwealth Relations, London, 1949, p. 73, quoted in Robert Spencer, Canada in World Affairs, 1946-1948, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 366.

¹⁴⁴Canadian support for the Commonwealth rose from 44 per cent in November 1947 to 70 per cent in November 1954. cf: Mildred Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961, table 16, p.74.

¹⁴⁵SS 48/59, "Canada and World Affairs", a radio broadcast by Mr. St. Laurent on 11 November 1948, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶SS 51/1, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁴⁷John Holmes, "Canadian External Policies Since 1945," International Journal, Spring 1963, pp. 142-143.

¹⁴⁸Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1972, p. 93. Hawkins paraphrases Mackenzie King's statement in the House of Commons, Debates, 1 May 1947, pp. 2644-2647.

¹⁴⁹High Commissioner Kearney to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 May 1948, op. cit., see footnote 53.

¹⁵⁰Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, op. cit., p. 99.

¹⁵¹Canada, Debates, op. cit., 24 October 1949, p. 1102.

¹⁵²Research material.

¹⁵³SS 54/14, Prime Minister St. Laurent's address to the Parliament of India, 23 February 1954, p. 7.

¹⁵⁴Nicholas Mansergh, The Multi-Racial Commonwealth, London, CUP, 1955, p. 107.

Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences permitted selected representatives from Commonwealth countries to participate in a series of meetings for the purpose of discussing the activities and approaches of their countries towards the association. These conferences had no official dispensation from Commonwealth governments to represent their policies. Rather it was an opportunity for persons from public and private life to discuss contemporary Commonwealth affairs.

¹⁵⁵J. D. B. Miller, The Commonwealth in the World, London, Duckworth, 1958, p. 281.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The impetus for a Canadian development assistance¹ policy can generally be attributed to the growth of multi-lateral aid schemes, created to provide relief and promote reconstruction for those that suffered from World War II. Among the relief projects sponsored by the United Nations, Canada contributed substantially to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and, subsequently, to the UN Children's Fund.² In terms of recovery, Canada initially funnelled its assistance through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the UN Technical Assistance Administration. But it was not until 1949 that international organizations began seriously to focus their concern on aiding developing countries. IBRD provided some loans to developing countries. In addition, the UN Development Program and Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) were founded with the objective of assisting less developed countries which were without even the infrastructure prerequisite to industrial development.

The most pressing need for development assistance was in the countries of South and Southeast Asia, which recently had gained their independence. Since Canada was one of the world's wealthiest nations, it was expected

that it would contribute to the development of this region. But Canadian aid allocations during the immediate post-war reconstruction period were principally directed to the North Atlantic area where Ottawa considered that Canada's most direct interests lay. Apart from a small measure of trade and some diplomatic missions in Tokyo, Delhi and Karachi, Canada had not been actively involved in that part of the world. Like his predecessor, Prime Minister St. Laurent was chary of extending aid commitments to a region with which the country did not keep close relations, and where it was impossible to project the limits to the need for economic assistance. Yet, world involvement was essential to a foreign policy that was aimed at world stability. Consequently, the St. Laurent Government was to approach Commonwealth consultations regarding economic cooperation with southern Asia with interest, but not without some reluctance as to the manner in which Canada might be expected to participate.

Despite its initial timidity at becoming involved in the development of an impoverished and "under-developed" region of the world, Canada was present at the creation of the first bilateral assistance scheme conceived at Colombo, and it was under Commonwealth related programs that Canada continued to assist developing countries. This chapter is aimed at investigating Canada's bilateral aid programs during the period 1950 until 1963 and assessing to what extent Commonwealth membership may have affected Canadian external aid policy. The paper will describe the founding of

the Colombo Plan, the Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program, the Special Commonwealth Africa Aid Program and the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan. An examination of domestic and external influences on Canadian foreign aid policy may help to determine those actors who were mainly responsible for shaping this policy as well as any constraints imposed upon it. Finally, an attempt is made to assess whether Canada's membership in the Commonwealth affected not only the direction of Canadian external aid, but also the Governments' attitudes and behaviour towards the concept of development assistance itself.

COLOMBO PLAN

Consultations with regard to the economic development of South and Southeast Asia began at the 1948 Prime Ministers' meeting which was held in London during the period from October 10 until 22. High Commissioner Norman Robertson reported to the Minister of External Affairs on the keen and widely held interest by various members in a cooperative Commonwealth approach to foster the economic and political development of the region.³ Although South African Minister of External Affairs Eric Louw did not consider southern Asia an area of South African concern, his attitude was evidently not shared by the representatives of some of the other member states. Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin, Australia's Minister of External Affairs Dr. Evatt and Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand essentially agreed

that there was a need for Commonwealth collaboration which might take the form of a permanent economic committee to consider a coordinated development of the region. Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, considered that a regional understanding between Commonwealth countries in southern Asia was desirable, and Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake of Ceylon suggested that a Commonwealth presence in the area might help preserve democracy. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, more specifically called for a Commonwealth committee which could assist in guiding the region's industrial and agricultural development, and coordinate the capital requirements of one part of the Commonwealth with the supplies in another.

Canada's attitude towards a permanent economic committee was put to the conference in the form of certain qualifications and recommendations.⁴ Mr. Robertson stated that Canada had made heavy aid commitments in the North Atlantic. Furthermore, Ottawa was concerned that additional consultative machinery would prove redundant by overlapping with the multilateral agencies of the UN and World Bank. Inasmuch as Canada was not a member of the Sterling Area, it was also hesitant about becoming exclusively involved in Commonwealth trade and economic cooperation. In view of these reservations, the Canadian delegation indicated Canada's probable willingness to accept membership on such a committee on two conditions: if it served in an advisory capacity without affecting bilateral consultation, and provided that trade should be promoted from without as well as within the Commonwealth.

In his report to Ottawa at the end of the conference Mr. Robertson summarized the interests expressed by member countries for closer cooperation within the Commonwealth towards the economic and political development of southern Asia.⁵ In pursuit of this objective, all members had agreed on the need of a Commonwealth presence, or as Prime Minister Fraser had put it in one of the earlier meetings, "a third force to stand together for democratic principles and progress."⁶ But perhaps the Indian press had expressed most clearly the underlying concern of all member states:

Apparently the recent Communist risings in the East have opened the eyes of the Western powers to the danger of neglecting the social and economic well-being of the masses of the Asian people. But whereas there is an economic recovery program for Europe there is no economic aid programme for Asia or even for the region of the Indian ocean.⁷

The United States also had an interest in the politico-economic situation in southern Asia because of the rise of the communist régime in mainland China. The Chinese situation seemed to raise some concern on the part of Washington about the approach the Commonwealth would take toward the changing political environment in the Far East. Canadian Ambassador Hume Wrong reported in December 1949 that Secretary of State Acheson was hopeful that the Commonwealth^b would assume some responsibility for the development and political stability of Malaya and Burma.⁸ The Americans seemed to be especially keen that Canada should be represented at the forthcoming Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' conference in Colombo, if only to submit a North American point of view.

Ottawa appreciated the State Department's position regarding Indo China, but Canada had another reason for assuring that a representative would attend. While the conference would be concerned with the international situation as a whole, it likely would concentrate on issues central to southern Asia. Ottawa considered it important that the Asian members of the Commonwealth believe that Canada had an interest in their problems rather than an exclusive interest in the North Atlantic area. With regard to the political implication created after the establishment of the new Chinese government, Robertson summarized the Commonwealth's attitude in a cable to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The security of this area [South East Asia] was a matter of great concern to all the members of the Commonwealth, and it was imperative that views should be exchanged and measures concerted on the best methods of resisting Communist infiltration and activity.⁹

Of course, Ottawa shared the concern about the extrusion of communist influence and this was an added stimulus on Canada becoming a willing participant at the Colombo conference.

At the Foreign Ministers' meetings, which began on 9 January 1950, discussion focused on the subjects of China, the Japanese Peace Treaty and Europe, leading up to a consideration of the situation in Southeast Asia. However, in the opening session, the Asian members spoke of the need for economic development assistance in their part of the world. With particular acumen, Prime Minister Senanayake "expressed the view that the fundamental problem of Asia was not political but economic."¹⁰ In his opening statement, Australia's new Minister of External Affairs, Percy Spender, elaborated

on the urgency for injecting capital and technical assistance into this region, exhorting those present "to formulate and lay down a common policy" so "that our deliberations would result in clear and specific proposals to governments."¹¹

Mr. Spender's statement seemed to stimulate the Ceylonese delegation to take some concrete action because on January 10 Finance Minister Jayawardene spoke on a draft resolution to strike "a committee of officials . . . of the underdeveloped countries of Southeast Asia—to obtain, and prepare a ten-year plan of development" in order that

other members of the Commonwealth could [consider] in what way assistance to carry out such a plan could be supplied by them by way of money, guaranteed prices, technical skill and machinery.¹²

The following day Australia submitted far more detailed proposals for the conference's consideration, including suggestions for creating consultative machinery and convening a meeting in Australia to deal with the subject of development assistance.¹³ The Ceylonese and Australian proposals were integrated subsequently into a combined draft resolution which was sponsored jointly (together with New Zealand) on January 12. Included among its recommendations was the need for a Commonwealth initiative to raise living standards in southern Asia by means of immediate technical aid to be followed by capital assistance. But the resolution was intended to evoke participation from countries other than the Commonwealth, as well, and to emphasize in international

forums the need for the whole region to receive priority consideration from the World Bank and EPTA. The recommendations to respective Commonwealth governments arising out of the resolution, and those approved by the conference, were expected to

have the result not only of strengthening the economies of the recipient countries and so of helping them to combat the spread of communism, but also of supplying the sterling area as a whole with a flow of dollars which might be expected to continue after the end of the European Recovery Programme. 14

The recommendations arising out of the Foreign Ministers' conference seemed to have been primarily the work of Australia's Percy Spender, yet most delegations had some interests at stake. Pandit Nehru supported the joint resolution but had reservations regarding the immediate need for a Consultative Committee as he considered the first step was for developing countries to draw up detailed plans of their own needs. 15 Pakistan was equally in need of some immediate source of financial assistance and supported the resolution. New Zealand's interest in the scheme was similar to Australia's, and this was primarily an interest in security. Mr. Spender described the inherent problems of the region:

The birth of new national states in Southeast Asia, the uncertainties and insecurity which faced them, the murmurings of political discontent and the emergence of the new régime in China, with its vast millions of people, all pointed in the direction of difficulty, danger and unpredictability in international affairs. 16

The implications were clear. Britain was also concerned about threats to the security of southern Asia, but it was interested more in the possibilities for funneling outside capital into this area. If their Commonwealth partners, international organizations and possibly the United States could be induced to share the problems of supporting economic growth in the region, it might have the effect of protecting the sterling balances. Financial assistance would ease the drain on the sterling area's reserves, and consequently reduce the financial burden on the British economy.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson sympathized with the proposals to assist development in the region, but doubted Canada's ability to make a major contribution due to the burden of its commitments under NATO. On the establishment of a Commonwealth Consultative Committee to study the economic conditions of South and Southeast Asia, the Canadian delegation had reservations. Mr. Pearson told the House of Commons that he had expressed concern about the possibility of redundant functional institutions:

Already in this field some useful work has been done by the United Nations in listing and analysing the economic needs of this part of the world. The United Nations four point program, as we call it, also has a bearing on this problem. The economic commission for Asia and the Far East, the international labour office and the food and agricultural organization are all working in this field. Therefore I think that we must be careful in setting up any new agency to avoid overlapping or duplication. We do not want a new committee merely because it looks like an attractive piece

of international furniture for an already cluttered-up home. 17

At the same time, the Minister for External Affairs explained to the House that the Consultative Committee should not be exclusive to the Commonwealth:

I do not conceal my own belief, however, that any such committee must have a broader basis than the Commonwealth; that unless the cooperation of the United States can be enlisted in its work, its accomplishments may prove to be meagre.

Canada's area of primary interest had been in the North Atlantic. Under the Marshall Plan, Canada had been working with the United States towards the reconstruction of war-devastated Western Europe. With heavy commitments to this area, Ottawa was interested in involving other nations from outside the sterling area in any future Asian assistance scheme. On 14 January 1950, Mr. Pearson telegraphed Under Secretary Arnold Heaney of his impressions of the conference.

My provisional view is that our proper course would be to suggest that we be represented on the Consultative Committee . . . [which] would be a purely Commonwealth body. It would include Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the United Kingdom. This nuclear group of countries would hold its first meeting in Canberra and would examine the possibilities of self-help and mutual aid. As the next step, invitations would be issued to the countries in the area, i.e., Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Indo-China and Thailand.

When such an expanded committee had become a reality, the hope is that the United States would agree to collaborate and to underwrite the initiative with new financial aid. 18

There was some reluctance on the part of the Bank of Canada and the departments of Finance and Trade and Commerce to have Canada participate as a full member at the the Commonwealth Consultative meeting in Sydney scheduled for May 15 to 19. In the event, however, the Inter-departmental Committee on External Trade Policy recommended to Cabinet that Canada accept membership on the Consultative Committee and approve the resolutions of the Colombo conference. 19 Following Cabinet's approval of these recommendations, a memorandum of instructions was given to the head of the Canadian delegation, Fisheries Minister R. W. Mayhew, advising him to

carefully avoid at this stage committing the Canadian Government in any way, either directly or by inference, to extending financial assistance to the countries of South and South-East Asia. It should be stressed that the Canadian Government cannot even consider this question until the basic elements of the problem have been carefully examined, until the possibilities of self-help, maximum utilization of local resources, and mutual aid among the under-developed countries themselves have been thoroughly explored and until procedures have been suggested to ensure that whatever external financial aid may be available will be put to effective use. 20

The delegation was authorized to indicate Canada's willingness to cooperate in "well-conceived" plans for technical assistance including the training of technicians or sending Canadian experts abroad. However, Canadian participation required that the Committee should make "full use of the resources of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the field of technical assistance" in order not to duplicate "existing UN programmes." In essence, the Canadian government was very chary about the prospects of the delegation becoming committed to any capital aid or technical assistance schemes at the Sydney conference.

Ottawa was dismayed, therefore, to receive on May 3 a cable from Mr. Spender advancing his expectation that

the delegations should agree at Sydney upon immediate establishment of a Commonwealth fund for technical assistance, emergency relief and credits for urgently needed imports, to be administered by a Commonwealth Council, secretariat and a small staff of seconded technical officers.²¹

Apparently the Australian government believed that setting up this Commonwealth machinery might convince the governments that the association had an effective organization to expedite specific objectives. However, Ottawa was concerned that purely Commonwealth institutionalization might preclude the possibility of the proposed aid program attracting participation and finance from countries outside the Commonwealth. Consistent with his government's reservations, Mr. Pearson notified Spender that Canada did not envision the immediate need for a Commonwealth fund or machinery but rather for a thorough assessment of the economic development requirements of the region to be

considered at the conference and commended to Commonwealth governments. "While we considered it desirable that the Commonwealth governments take the initiative in exploring ways to promote development in South and Southeast Asia," Pearson also indicated that

we did not want to see the United Nations aid and development programmes bypassed. . . We also stipulated that we did not want to see participation in the plan limited to the Commonwealth [because Canada] was particularly anxious to see US aid extended to Asia.²²

Clearly, Canadians regarded the Sydney meeting simply as a practicable way for countries, not drawn exclusively from the Commonwealth, to bring into focus the economic problems and potentiality of the region of southern Asia.

During the course of the Sydney conference, "Spender, with a characteristic lack of tact, brought great pressure on the other delegates to bring a concrete scheme into existence immediately"²³ by trying to secure agreement on specific aid proposals:

The first was to establish immediately a three-year technical assistance scheme to be financed by a Commonwealth fund of £8 million sterling [along with a] Bureau to carry out the scheme . . . established in Colombo under the guidance of a council

The second project . . . was for the establishment of a Commonwealth fund in the amount of £15 million to finance, principally by revolving credit, priority supplies to south Asian countries of simple agricultural equipment and materials as well as other urgently needed items, such as medicines.²⁴

The second Australian proposal proved to be a non-starter.

Apparently, the delegations from Canada, New Zealand and

India agreed with Britain's Lord Macdonald that "the

objectives of the Conference should be to lay the foundation for a report evaluating the needs and resources of the area."²⁵ The preponderant opinion was that the question of capital assistance should be deferred for consideration at the next consultative meeting in London. On the proposal for establishing a technical assistance fund, along with a bureau to serve as a coordinating agency, Australia's Minister of External Affairs was to achieve success. Although only the representatives of Ceylon and Pakistan had supported the proposal initially, Spender was able to hustle Lord Macdonald into requesting his government to contribute to the Commonwealth fund. Before the end of the conference, London agreed to bear with Australia the major portion of this fund.

On the basis of the United Kingdom's pledge to support the fund, and possibly also due to the practical arguments advanced by the Indians to negotiate assistance through bilateral arrangements between governments, Canada agreed to participate in the £ 8 million technical assistance program during the next three years. Cabinet's subsequent appropriation on June 12 of \$400,000 for the 1950-1951 fiscal year was approved on the basis that the program would supplement similar UN activities in southern Asia.²⁶ If this grant was repeated for each of the years, it would mean a total Canadian contribution of five per cent of the program whereas Britain and Australia had agreed to provide 70 per cent and India and New Zealand were committed to

allocations of ten and five per cent, respectively. Canada's contribution to the scheme was thus nominal and minimal. In the meantime, the Conference agreed that India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the British colonies in the region should prepare detailed statements of their expected development assistance needs by September.²⁷ These national programs were to be developed into a six-year plan commencing 1 July 1951, and examined at a meeting in London to which non-Commonwealth countries as well were to be invited, with a view to their eventual participation in the scheme. On the whole, Ottawa had reason to be satisfied with the results of the Sydney conference.

Between the conferences, Australia invited non-Commonwealth countries in southern Asia to participate in the next meeting. But there was hesitancy among some of these countries as to whether the acceptance of aid under the proposed scheme would require an ideological commitment which would detract from their sovereignty.²⁸ It also became apparent that countries in this region were reluctant to commit themselves for fear of losing a share of the \$60 million that the United States had allocated to Southeast Asia for the ensuing two years. Consequently, only Thailand, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia were to be officially represented at the London meeting. Burma and Indonesia were to send observers.

Before the meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee in London, Canada was informed by the United

Kingdom of its concern to sensitize Washington as to the importance of the development assistance scheme in order that American resources could be eventually secured. ²⁹ While External Affairs saw merit in this suggestion, it explained to Mr. Shannon, the British High Commissioner, on August 9 that

the formulation and timing of an approach to the United States is primarily a matter for the governments of those countries more directly concerned than Canada with the outcome of such an approach. ³⁰

The department also drew Mr. Shannon's attention to a statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons which cautioned that

although there is no limit to our good will in this matter and in other similar matters, naturally there is a limit to our resources. In expending those resources we have to take into consideration other commitments. However, that is the only reservation to our co-operation with other Commonwealth governments in this matter. ³¹

It was evident that the Canadian government was hesitant to become too financially involved with the Asian scheme. But it was also apparent to all governments connected with the plan that if it were to have a significant impact on the region a sizeable American contribution must be forthcoming. In fact, the State

Department was pleased with the Commonwealth's intention to share responsibilities for the development of the region and was, therefore, anxious

to receive informal Canadian opinion as to the best manner in which the United States contribution to the South Asian (particularly India) problem might be made. 32

At the London conference which began on September 26, the draft constitution for the bureau for technical assistance, and a council for technical cooperation to supervise its work, were endorsed and incorporated in the Consultative Committee report. The Committee then considered the six-year economic development plan which contained programs for the various Commonwealth countries in southern Asia. Their aspirations for development assistance included the expansion of agricultural and industrial production in India by means of irrigation and power projects, the expansion of communication services in Pakistan and the development of new areas of food production in Ceylon and Malaysia.³³ The Colombo Plan report estimated that the total amount of external assistance required over the six-year period would amount to £ 1,056 million, and that such contributions would help to foster stable growth:

The political stability of the countries of the area is possible only on condition of economic

progress, and a steady flow of capital from more highly developed countries is essential for this purpose.³⁴

Agreement was reached by all participant delegations that the less developed countries of Asia would provide the major proportion of the projected capital needs, while assistance would be contributed by the more developed members as well as from outside sources. Though the United Kingdom was interested in member delegations indicating in general terms what their governments' financial contributions might be, no commitments were immediately forthcoming. Instead, participating governments were asked to approve the draft report on economic development, the draft constitution for the Bureau on Technical Cooperation to be established in Colombo and to indicate what financial assistance they might be able to provide towards carrying out the six-year development plan.³⁵

Although South Africa was not prepared to participate in the Colombo Plan, ostensibly because it was too involved on the African continent, all other Commonwealth countries tentatively approved of its objectives. Canada was satisfied that, while the Plan was Commonwealth inspired, attempts would be made to have the United States become associated with the scheme. In fact, among the reasons why the nations of Southeast Asia were invited to participate in the Plan was to induce American involvement. The Colombo scheme also was to be coordinated with the UN and World Bank's efforts in the region after the Plan received formal approval from prospective member governments.

Canada's ratification of the Colombo Plan report was to be deferred, and six months were to elapse before Cabinet approved a Canadian financial contribution under the Plan. Evidently, the Cabinet was not anxious to commit itself unless it could be sure of U. S. participation, and the official American attitude towards the Report of the Consultative Committee was not yet forthcoming. Mr. Pearson was not pleased with the Cabinet's cautious reaction. However, during this period of time, Lester Pearson was chairman of the Canadian delegation to the UN and involved in negotiating a cease-fire in Korea. As a consequence, he was unable to commit his full energies towards convincing Cabinet to approve the recommendations of the London conference. On 2 November 1950, he wrote to Prime Minister St. Laurent concerning his belief that the current Commonwealth character of the Plan would not prevent the eventual participation of the United States and UN agencies. Pearson emphasized that the Colombo scheme was an important step towards strengthening ties between Asia and the West. In spite of the fact that the scheme was a Commonwealth initiative, the Plan was being broadened to include other countries (both donors and recipients) and yet it had acquired a Commonwealth character. In expressing his disappointment, Mr. Pearson offered the opinion that

I had very much hoped that it would be possible for the Cabinet at its meeting yesterday to approve the report in principle and, at the same time, to leave for further consideration the question of a possible Canadian contribution.³⁶

The question was discussed in Cabinet again on November 8. Mr. Pearson, who returned from New York for the meeting, had encouraging reports from Washington of the American views upon the value of the Report, and the United States had by this time

informed the Commonwealth countries that it supported the aims of the plan, and, although not yet making any financial commitment, asked to be associated with the Consultative Committee.³⁷

Mr. Mayhew, who was unavoidably absent from the meeting, had prepared a letter for the Prime Minister in which he urged that "we should view the problems and dangers in Asia with the same foresight and generosity as we do those of Europe."³⁸ External Affairs stressed the practicalities of maintaining relations between the East and West. However, the Department of Finance was concerned about the escalation of the Korean war and the concomitant effects on Canada's defence expenditure. With the prospects that the West's rearmament programs would have to be strengthened, Finance questioned whether it would also be possible to contribute capital assistance to that part of the world. Finance Minister Abbott was influenced by the vast defence expenditures involved in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and by the apparent unwillingness of the subcontinent to introduce population controls. The Inter-Departmental Committee on External Trade Policy had recommended that without knowing the views of the United States a decision would be premature. Though Cabinet concurred in publication of the Report, no decision was taken

on what financial contribution the government was prepared to make towards the scheme.

Marshalled against this reluctance was the United Kingdom's announcement of a £ 300 million contribution to the Colombo Plan over the next six years (mainly in the form of sterling releases), and Australia's commitment of at least £ 25 million during the same period. Backed by the positive reception of the Colombo Report from the Canadian Press, Mr. Pearson put his views to the Prime Minister again on December 29

urging that Cabinet make a decision by 15 January on the extent of Canadian support, and suggesting \$25 million a year for six years, with a firm commitment for only the first year.³⁹

Several days later, in a statement in the House of Commons, the Minister commended the Colombo scheme.

I believe that a Canadian contribution to those programmes even if it were to be smaller than we might be able to make if we were not bearing other and heavy burdens, would have a great effect, not only in doing something to improve the standard of living in that part of the world, but also in convincing the people there of our sympathy and interest.⁴⁰

Pearson's enthusiasm for Canadian participation in a Commonwealth effort in assisting the economic development of southern Asia was well received, at least by the leaders of the major opposition parties.

By February 7 External Affairs efforts were at last meeting with some success. In a memorandum sent to Cabinet, a new emphasis was put upon the aid India would receive:

We have regarded it as a matter of very special importance to ensure that our relations [with India] were as friendly and constructive as we could make them.⁴¹

Presumably if these close relations were to continue, Canadian development assistance should be forthcoming. As a result of these overtures, Cabinet approved Canadian membership on the Consultative Committee scheduled to meet at Colombo on February 12, and authorized Mr. Johnson (who was to lead the Canadian delegation) to express the government's willingness to provide \$25 million for the fiscal year 1951-1952 on the condition that the total member contribution was sufficient to achieve the objectives of the Plan.⁴² Thus, due in large part to the tenacity of External Affairs, and the receptiveness of the Report at home and abroad, Canadian participation in the Colombo Plan was finally made official.

The second Colombo Conference, which was underway within a week, laid the blueprint for the Colombo Plan although many of its details remained inconclusive. Since the technical assistance program was already in progress, the focus for the meetings was on capital development. Mr. Pearson reported on the outcome of the discussions to the House of Commons:

The Colombo Plan calls for a capital development programme in commonwealth countries of southeast Asia totalling about \$5 billion over a six-year period starting this year. Of this \$5 billion it is expected that about \$2 billion will be raised internally and about \$3 billion will come from external sources. Private capital is one source,

though in the present international situation it cannot be as important as it should be. We also hope that the International Bank will be another source for financing some of the larger projects.⁴³

Unfortunately, the United States was unable to make a financial commitment, though its representative indicated its intention to coordinate American development assistance projects in Asia with those under the Colombo Plan. The United States subsequently injected capital aid into the region through its Point Four Program. In addition, the International Bank and the specialized agencies of the UN were also to integrate their technical and capital assistance with the arrangements worked out under Colombo.

The Colombo Plan concept envisaged at the conference stressed the "cooperative" development of southern Asia. Development assistance was to be worked out through mutual arrangements between donor and recipient countries on a bilateral basis. Cooperation was, therefore, established on the basis of a partnership which was intended to respect the dignity of all participants. It was expected that bilateral consultation between individual member countries would result in the selection of projects by exchanging information on what was needed and what could be supplied, without political pressures. To expedite technical assistance, a small Bureau of permanent staff had been established in Colombo for informing members about what would be available and what was required. The heads of mission of participating countries accredited to Ceylon met as the Colombo

Plan Council to review the work of the Bureau. The Consultative Committee, which was scheduled to meet annually to assess and report on the economic progress in the region as a whole, provided the remaining structure to the scheme.

The Colombo concept was revolutionary. For the first time, the international community was presented with a scheme aimed at assisting a large proportion of the developing world through the provision of both capital and technical assistance. Moreover, the Colombo Plan was developed on the basis that the less developed countries would not only be encouraged to contribute to their own economic development, but also to assist their developing partners, particularly in the area of technical assistance.

Canada had reason to be pleased with the outcome. The Plan was to be free of elaborate centralizing machinery, and programs were to be worked out bilaterally between individual member countries. While governments of southern Asia were to be responsible for the formulation of their own development programs, proposals for aid were expected to be the result of consultation between the donor and recipient countries. Naturally, the projects were developed on the basis of what kinds of assistance were required and what contributing countries could most effectively supply. Following his announcement to Parliament of the government's intended contribution to the Plan, Mr. Pearson informed the House.

that we are immediately opening discussions with the Indian Government to see whether they would wish that some of the funds we provide this year under the Colombo Plan should be spent on Canadian wheat for their famine-stricken country. 44

Indeed, the Department of Finance had recommended that between 40 and 60 per cent of Canada's proposed bilateral aid should consist of wheat. It was assumed that India could raise local currency from the sale or distribution of the grain for financing capital development projects. Having initially urged that we could not contribute until the needs of the area were studied in a detailed fashion, we immediately sought to assure that our aid allocations consisted largely of surplus wheat.

Thus, in the first year of the Plan, the Canadian government allocated approximately \$15 million to India and \$10 million to Pakistan. While their governments were asked to provide some indication of their countries' requirements, Canada invited them to study its wheat proposal. Pakistan promptly accepted the offer. Upon discovering that Canadian low grade wheat might be unsuitable for Indian needs, New Delhi balked at Canada's wheat proposal. Ottawa, therefore, agreed to provide certain industrial raw materials such as copper, zinc, wood pulp, lumber and aluminium. These commodities could be sold by the receiving country at world prices. Its treasury

would tabulate the amount of the sales in a separate "counterpart" fund which would be used to finance capital projects that were ratified by the donor country. For example, Canadian commodity assistance contributed to the development of a large irrigation and hydroelectric project in India, and to the provision of men and materials for the building of a cement plant in Pakistan. 45

Under the technical assistance offered through the Colombo scheme, Canada provided experts both at home and abroad to solve technical and administrative problems and to offer professional advice and practical training. Initially it was found more practicable to assist in training personnel in Canada, and students and civil servants were invited from Commonwealth Asian countries to develop their knowledge and skills by working with government departments in such fields as agriculture, transportation, medicine and engineering. Eventually, technical and professional experts were sent to the Asian dominions to assist in areas such as fisheries, road construction, hydro-electric development and soil conservation. As a result, by 1951 Canada was actively participating for the first time in a program of economic development for Asian countries, though it was doing it in ways that maximized the economic advantage for Canada of the aid provided.

Since the UN Division of External Affairs was not equipped to handle bilateral assistance, machinery for the implementation of Canadian aid under the Colombo Plan

had to be developed. The Technical Cooperation Service in the Department of Trade and Commerce was created in September 1950 to administer Canada's initial assistance to southern Asia. Following Canadian participation in a capital aid scheme, an International Economic and Technical Cooperation Division was established in Trade and Commerce under the direction of Mr. Nik Cavell. Full administrative responsibility was not vested in this department, but distributed among several in two inter-departmental committees. Both the capital and technical assistance committees were under the chairmanship of the head of External Affairs, Economic Division and included: the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the IETCD; Comptroller-Secretary, Department of Trade and Commerce; Deputy-Governor, Bank of Canada; Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance; and Director, Trade Commissioner Service.⁴⁶ Additional representatives of the departments of Agriculture, Labour, Mines and Technical Surveys, and National Health and Welfare often served as technical experts. However, the principal departments involved in considering aid proposals were External, responsible for general policy, Trade and Commerce, responsible for day-to-day administration, and Finance which controlled expenditures. Ultimate approval of aid requests rested with Cabinet, but recommendations by the committee on the feasibility of projects were seldom rejected.⁴⁷

It is evident that external aid policy was subject to

various influences from almost every segment of the public service. In spite of this complex network involved in policy-making, certain general attitudes were to characterize Canada's approach towards development assistance. The Colombo Plan was initially perceived as a means to help the recently independent nations of southern Asia to achieve economic stability. If Canada and its Western allies failed to shore-up the economies of the countries of southern Asia, the social and political consequences would be disastrous. It may, therefore, be worthwhile discussing some of the Canadian governments' attitudes towards the Colombo Plan.

Douglas LePan, who served as a Canadian delegate to two of the formative meetings which resulted in the Colombo Plan, recalled in his memoirs: "I think that our principal motives must be found on . . . grounds that are usually called 'humanitarian'."⁴⁸ Indeed, humanitarianism is often presented by those responsible for it as the primary motivation in the formulation of Canadian external aid policy. Although moral principles defy objective analysis, humanitarianism might be regarded as the pursuit of economic equity to reduce the social and economic disparities existing between the rich and poor nations of the world. For example, at an address in Kuala Lumpur during his Commonwealth tour, Prime Minister Diefenbaker emphasized that:

each of [the Commonwealth members] regards the other as his brother's keeper . . . we do our part for the building of that strength and that unity which must be characteristic of the Commonwealth as such . . . [by the] raising of standards, the equalization of opportunity, and the assurance that men every where may have something of the better things in life.⁴⁹

As leader of the Opposition, Mr. Pearson told the House of Commons in September 1961 that,

we help these countries because it is a good thing for us to do, it is a good thing for the peace of the world and because the world is one.⁵⁰

The Director of Canada's Economic and Technical Assistance Branch, Dr. O. E. Ault, stated in an address to the Royal Commonwealth Society the somewhat exuberant opinion that

the name of no country stands higher in the minds and affections of those who have been the beneficiaries and those who have cooperated in these [Canadian] projects than the name of Canada. The reason, if we judge it fairly, is that there are no strings attached to our gifts.⁵¹

Despite these high-minded claims, in fact a substantial proportion of early Canadian development assistance was in the form of commodity transfers.⁵² Aside from a relatively small amount of emergency food aid, recipients were expected to distribute Canadian grain at local prices, and the funds were theoretically banked for development projects to be eventually worked out by the two governments. These counterpart-funds were intended to generate local currency which could be spent on local costs for other projects.⁵³ In this manner, Canada did not affect substantively international commodity markets while assisting developing countries with food grains which otherwise Canada

may have had to store. Moreover, Canadian food aid had a minimum adverse effect on agricultural produce in recipient countries because these transfers were mainly provided under a long term strategy that attempted to prevent, insofar as it was ever possible, an agricultural produce deficit after the temporary surplus was disposed.

However, with the birth of the bilateral aid program the practice had developed of providing food grains as a significant portion of Canada's development assistance contribution under the Colombo Plan. Although the entire Canadian aid commitment of \$25 million in the 1951-1952 fiscal year was intended to be composed of wheat, the Liberals had no compunctions about criticizing commodity transfers under later Progressive Conservative administrations as circumventing the intention of the Colombo scheme which called for capital and technical assistance.⁵⁴ Under the circumstances there was room for criticism. In the 1957-1958 fiscal year \$25 of \$34.4 million that Canada had allocated under the Plan consisted of wheat and flour transfers to the Asian dominions.⁵⁵ Canada, in effect, was unloading its grain surpluses and including them as a part of the total Canadian aid contribution.

During Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Commonwealth tour in November 1958, President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Nehru were critical of Canada for including food grains as substantial portions of its capital allocations. Under

Public Law 480 (Title 1), which provided for the sale of food stuffs in local currencies, the United States incurred all or part of the shipping charges, putting their food aid on a more concessionary basis than Canada's. "Consequently," Keith Spicer pointed out, "Canadian wheat given as a grant proved more costly to recipients, in terms of foreign exchange, than American wheat sold for the receiver's currency."⁵⁶ Under the circumstances, India and Pakistan more readily accepted American food shipments and were reluctant to accept Canada's proposals for allocating wheat and flour as the predominant proportion of its development assistance funds from 1957 to 1961. But Mr. Diefenbaker appealed to Nehru and Ayub to recognize that the full benefits of the Commonwealth relationship could not be realized unless recipient countries took account of the strengths and weaknesses of those countries offering assistance. On this basis the Prime Minister urged his fellow leaders to take a larger proportion of Canadian agricultural products.

I emphasized that public opinion in Canada would not understand if they continued to buy their wheat from the United States while Canada, with a large wheat surplus, contributed other forms of aid under the Colombo Plan. It seemed to me that given the \$15 million increase in Canadian Colombo Plan aid in 1958, the governments in question ought to be aware of Canada's surplus grain problems and should view with favour taking Canadian wheat as a part of Canada's Colombo Plan contribution.⁵⁷

Tying aid to Canadian commodities deferred its impact on the recipient economy until such time as

counterpart funds could be established and development projects coordinated between the donor and recipient governments. It seems inaccurate for Ottawa to have labelled this type of aid as economic development assistance for Professor Keith Spicer revealed

that almost two-thirds of the funds so vigorously defended as supporting development were lying idle in real or imaginary Asian accounts . . . [and] nearly one-third of Canada's total bilateral aid, including projects, commodities and technical assistance, had not been used for development at all. 58

Food aid might more legitimately have been referred to as subsistence transfers to relieve Canada's over-stocked granaries rather than post-dated capital assistance. Ironically, Canada had in the past criticized the American surplus commodities dumping program under Public Law 430 on the grounds that it contravened the spirit of the Colombo Plan. But under the Diefenbaker administration, Canada was itself committing the American heresy by disposing of grain surpluses in the place of development assistance. Thus, although many of those who became directly involved with Canada's aid program had humanitarian concerns, the hard evidence is that we got involved reluctantly and then used Colombo Plan aid to dispose of our surplus food grains.

Political considerations in Canada's foreign aid policy have not been immutable. But an important concern in the 1950s was to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideologies.

Canada shared the concern its Commonwealth partners had with respect to communist influence in southern Asia, and this outweighed the reluctance to take on additional aid commitments.

Communism was considered by the Western nations to pose a real threat to the stability of South and Southeast Asia in 1950, particularly after they had just witnessed the establishment of a communist régime in mainland China and the outbreak of war in Korea. Economic development assistance was perceived as an approach by which the economies of southern Asia might be strengthened, and as a means to deter the infiltration of radical ideologies. Inasmuch as world stability was equated with the preservation of western oriented governments, Canadian development assistance was also extended in order to foster democracy in less developed societies. Lester Pearson recalls in his memoirs pointing out to the assembly of Foreign Ministers at Colombo in January 1950 that "the best defence against communism . . . was a domestic policy of sound economic development."⁵⁹ The Colombo Plan Report had the combined purpose, as one External Affairs official put it, to "contribute very materially to the major task of sustaining the standard of living, and with it the democratic way of life, in the new democracies."⁶⁰ Consequently, Canada's early bilateral aid was conceived in the context of the Cold War, and as a contribution to the Western effort of supporting western oriented, democratically minded

governments against the spread of communist ideology.

Following the first Colombo conference, Mr. Pearson was most forthright in expressing to the House of Commons the need to prevent:

Communist expansionism [which advances] by aligning itself with the forces of national liberation and social reform . . . If South-East Asia and South Asia are not to be conquered by communism, we of the free democratic world . . . must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress.⁶¹

For Canada world involvement also meant promoting closer relations with Commonwealth Asia. The Commonwealth, more than any other intergovernmental organization, provided a forum for intimate collaboration between Canada and this part of the Third World. In a statement to the House, Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson explained the value of the association:

This new Commonwealth is providing not only a link between the Asian and the other nations that comprise it, but also a very valuable link between the east and the west.⁶²

In the early 1950s, however, the Commonwealth was perceived less as a vehicle to be used for lessening economic disparities than an organization to counter the wrong ideology. "We must find a way to give our Commonwealth partners, in Southeast Asia particularly, a sense of really belonging to our free world," Canada's Colombo Plan Administrator told the Empire Club in Toronto in December 1952.⁶³ Mr. Cavell continued by stating that if Canada

seeks, whilst there is yet time, to lay plans for a free world which will attract and not repel our free brothers in Asia, we can become so strong that the Communist world will not dare to attack us. The Commonwealth has a great part to play in expanding and holding together the free world.

By the end of the decade, however, explicit references to political motives for giving aid occurred less often.

Development assistance, it was usually emphasized, was a means to reduce social and economic discontent rather than a means to draw developing countries towards Western points of view. Leader of the Opposition Lester Pearson told the House in September 1961:

I do not believe we can keep Cold War considerations entirely out of economic assistance. I do not believe we could be expected, in Canada any more than in any other country, to give assistance to countries if that assistance is likely to be used against us politically. However, we cannot expect to get any results from economic assistance which is given to countries because we hope that by giving that assistance they will line up with us in the Cold War.⁶⁴

Thus, as Canadian external aid policy matured, it became more apparent that Ottawa had taken a more balanced perspective towards giving aid. The functional concept of Canada's foreign policy had evolved, and External Affairs was not reticent about extending international contacts to southern Asia. Canada's aid programs were considered as a practical method for winning goodwill among these Third World nations. If Canada was able to develop mutual understanding through bilateral assistance, and thereby enhance its

respect abroad, its special interest was certainly with Commonwealth Asian countries. The Colombo Plan was a means to ensure the vitality of the Commonwealth. Particularly under the Diefenbaker administration, there was an emphasis on Commonwealth affiliations to strengthen ties between members and to give increased meaning to the multiracial association. Indeed, Canada appeared to be fairly successful in conveying a sincere concern for the developing member countries, and in shoring-up the association. The Canadian-Indian relationship was clearly a positive expression of consultation and cooperation between Commonwealth partners. To the extent that mutual understanding and respect were fostered, at least one of Canada's motives for extending aid may have been realized.

In sum, Canada had become involved in a development assistance scheme in a part of the world with which it had little previous communication. Canada entered the Colombo Plan reluctantly and cautiously and was anxious, in particular, to secure the participation or at least the cooperation of the United States and world aid programs. Nonetheless, Canada was among the original members of the scheme, and Canadian enthusiasm gained momentum as the Plan evolved. Ottawa was attracted to Colombo for a variety of reasons, but the government essentially wished to

help check the spread of communism and to preserve world peace by assisting economic development in South and Southeast Asia. Evolving from this motive was Canada's concern to develop a closer relationship with the East. The Commonwealth had an important part in providing an opportunity to build a bridge between the East and West. Canada was interested in using this vehicle to foster closer collaboration with its fellow Asian members, an interest which will be considered in the latter portion of the chapter.

Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program

Just prior to the end of the initial six-year phase of the Colombo Plan, Canada was considering the possibility of participating in a similar scheme in the West Indies. Canada had some traditional ties with the Commonwealth Caribbean which shared a common language and institutional similarities as a product of their mutual tutelage under British suzerainty. Historical relationships had also been developed through trade between the Maritime provinces and the British dependencies. Canadian exports consisted especially of industrial goods from small entrepreneurs in eastern Canada, constituting an important share of its total business. The Aluminum Company of Canada had a substantial investment in Jamaica and British Guiana which were the chief sources of its bauxite, essential to the production of aluminium. Direct Canadian investment included manufacturing firms, banks, insurance companies and

real estate holdings. In sum, Canada had a significant economic interest in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and it was interested in any scheme aimed at promoting the economic development of the region.

The United Kingdom's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, suggested the idea of providing development assistance along the lines of Colombo to the region at the British Caribbean Federation Conference in February 1956. In the report on the conference:

Mr. Lennox-Boyd [pointed] out how Federation would facilitate the eventual achievement of self-government within the Commonwealth, [and] he drew attention to the implications of that status. Self-government meant . . . that a country must be able to stand on its own feet economically . . . Mutual help was one of the great principles of the Commonwealth and there was no reason why one member or group of members should not help other members with their economic development, perhaps on the lines of the Colombo Plan.⁶⁵

Since the proposed Federation appeared as though it would become the second Commonwealth nation in the western hemisphere, the Canadian Government was prepared to support any practicable plans for regional assistance that might ensure the prospects for its success. Indeed, Canada had previously provided aid to the Caribbean in the form of emergency relief from hurricane disasters, and technical assistance under the UN Expanded Program. But there was some concern in Ottawa about whether direct aid to a non-sovereign nation would be interpreted as assisting British colonial development. The United States, however, seemed

to be particularly keen on a Commonwealth regional development scheme. Ottawa was aware as early as August 1956 that Washington expected Canada would assume some responsibility for the archipelago due to its Commonwealth membership.⁶⁶

The Department of External Affairs was charged with the task of devising a plan for assisting economic development in the Commonwealth Caribbean. With the premise that Canada would be willing to strengthen the proposed West Indies Federation, the Department realistically suggested that Canadian aid should be confined to the Federation although some residual funds might be maintained for other Commonwealth countries in the region. A bilateral Canada-West Indies program was considered as the most effective way to assist the political and economic stability of the Federation, and promote close relations between the two "countries". The Colombo model seemed to be regarded as less beneficial for two essential reasons. Canadian aid in association with the United Kingdom and the United States might submerge Canada's distinctive contributions, and British Guiana and British Honduras might be excluded from a trilateral plan.

With these recommendations and reservations, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, submitted a program of technical and capital assistance to the Minister on 1 April 1957.⁶⁷ The program

was to include \$10 million of assistance over a period of ten years, and consist primarily of grants in the areas of shipping, communications, education, agriculture and fisheries. External Affairs further proposed that the building of two ships be included in capital appropriations due to strong West Indian interest in an inter-island transportation service. Canada's Commissioner to Trinidad had informed Ottawa in March 1957 that the members of the Federation Committee wanted such ships in full knowledge that their \$500,000 operating costs would require about one-tenth of the West Indies' budget.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the Committee was aware that the Canadian built ships would reduce the capital assistance allocation by one-half. However, the cargo-passenger vessels were considered by West Indian officials as requisite to the success of the Federation which covered a distance of 1800 miles from one end of the archipelago to the other. Under the circumstances such an expenditure could be justified insofar as Canada's proposed assistance program aimed at alleviating the costs of integration by helping to improve intra-regional transportation and supporting common services.

With the election of a Progressive Conservative government on 10 June 1957, and its well known sympathy towards the Commonwealth, greater interest in a Canadian-Commonwealth Caribbean aid relationship was to be expected. External Affairs was well aware of Prime Minister Diefenbaker's

wish to strengthen Commonwealth ties. The following day a meeting of senior public servants to consider aid for the West Indies took a distinctly Commonwealth perspective by concluding that Canadian assistance should not be extended beyond the Commonwealth parts of that region.⁶⁹ Finance Minister Donald Fleming soon indicated his government's stake in stimulating the Commonwealth connection by commending to the Prime Minister in June that an allocation of \$10 million over a five rather than a ten year period was more appropriate for Canadian interests in the Caribbean.⁷⁰ Indeed, the Canadian delegation to the 1957 Prime Ministers' meeting in London was instructed to indicate the importance that Canada gave towards extending aid within the Commonwealth and to associated territories. At this meeting Mr. Diefenbaker also urged that Commonwealth Finance Ministers, who were to attend a meeting that autumn in Quebec, consider ways to promote closer economic relations within the association. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the Prime Minister was concerned about Canada's growing dependence on the American economy which he hoped might be lessened if Canada stimulated its Commonwealth involvement.

Concern for the imbalance of Canada's economic relations with the United States was evident at the Mont Tremblant conference in September. Mr. Diefenbaker had earlier stated that his government proposed to shift

about 15 per cent of Canadian purchases from the United States to the United Kingdom. As a consequence, Mr. Fleming was sounding out the idea of increasing Canada's Commonwealth trade. There was ample reason for Canadian concern. The Department of Trade and Commerce had surveyed Canadian trade relations with the Commonwealth in July and found exports to have fallen from about 40 per cent of the total in 1947 to 20 per cent over the past decade while imports had declined from 14 to 12 per cent.⁷¹ Canadian imports from the United States during the same period had increased from 10 to 70 per cent of Canada's total trade whereas exports to the United States had risen to 60 from 37 per cent of total exports. When questioned at the conference by Mr. Blair Fraser as to why the Diefenbaker government was attempting to encourage closer Commonwealth economic relations, Finance Minister Fleming indicated two main weaknesses in Canada's trade position:

For years now, 73 per cent of all of Canada's imports have come from the United States and 60 per cent of all Canada's exports have gone to the United States. In other words, two-thirds of all Canada's trade is conducted in one channel. . . . The other aspect of the Canadian trade position which has given us concern is the very heavy trade deficit. In its trade with the United States last year Canada imported \$1,298 million worth of goods more than she sold. We would like to see that imbalance righted and we could help to achieve that by increasing our imports from the United Kingdom and reducing to that some extent our imports from the United States.⁷²

Another means, perhaps more psychological than functional, to de-emphasize Canada's interdependence with

its dominant North American neighbour was pursued at the Tremblant conference. With the premise that the Colombo Plan concept was a constructive way in which to develop closer Commonwealth interactions, Mr. Fleming expressed the Canadian government's interest in assisting the Commonwealth Caribbean:

The time has now arrived when there are emerging other Commonwealth nations who might logically wish to obtain assistance in their economic development. We are prepared to help such countries by increasing our contribution to the Colombo Plan or by providing separate arrangements. We have particularly in mind providing some special assistance to the new Caribbean Federation when it is formed, as Canada for years has had special trade and other ties with the British West Indies and we desire to see a viable Federation established there.⁷³

In fact, preliminary discussions with West Indian officials had taken place in Ottawa on September 17. The outcome of consultations was that the Federation had requested a bilateral connection with Canada assisting in the development of inter-island communications.⁷⁴

Although the American Consul General in Trinidad had approached the Canadian Commissioner in October 1958 with the idea of Canada joining the United States in association with Britain in the establishment of a development loan bank that would be administered by the Federation, Mr. Smith indicated that Canadian Development assistance to the Caribbean was expected to be in the form of grants and that he did not think that we would be interested in any co-operative development loan bank.⁷⁵ Moreover,

Ottawa was well aware that American interest was in Latin America as a whole rather than in the Federation in particular. Thus, due in no small measure to its interest in preserving close Commonwealth ties, the Diefenbaker Government announced in January 1958 the creation of a Canada-West Indies Aid Program which would be exclusive to the Commonwealth.⁷⁶ Plans called for a \$2.5 million allocation for the 1958-1959 fiscal year with further aid arrangements to be considered at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference scheduled to be held in Montreal in September.

Accordingly, at the 1958 Commonwealth Trade Conference Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced the proposed construction of two Canadian built ships for West Indian island services, and the intent of his Government to request the appropriation of a \$10 million aid program to extend over the next five years.⁷⁷ The Canadian aid was to be directed towards infrastructure development including a residence for the University of the West Indies, the development of public school and port facilities, and the technical training of West Indian civil servants. An official statement of the aid program was sent to the Prime Minister of the West Indies, Sir Grantley Adams, in October promising that

goods and services supplied by the Government of Canada to the Government of The West Indies will be designed to strengthen and support the Federation. To that end priority will be given to projects which make the most effective contribution to the Federation as a whole.⁷⁸

Thus, Ottawa had taken a special interest in West Indian integration, and intended to work towards the eventual emergence of the Federation as the second Commonwealth country in the Americas. Economic support³ for common services and, particularly, intra-regional transportation were considered appropriate ways for Canada to assist the Federation in achieving independence.

The two passenger-cargo vessels to be built for the Federation were to absorb more than one-half of the entire assistance program while their operating costs (approximately \$500,000 annually) would place a serious strain on its budget. As previously noted, both donor and recipient governments were aware of the projected construction costs, and of the deficit that would be incurred. But they were also cognizant of the general inapplicability of such large and sophisticated ships for use in West Indian waters. Commissioner Guy Smith had informed Ottawa in November 1958 that smaller cargo boats were needed for the frequent service to the shallow island ports of the Leeward and Windward islands, and had detailed a practical alternative to the large ship proposal before they were under construction.⁷⁹ Mr. Smith had proposed the building of two smaller ships without passenger accommodations for the Leeward and Windward islands using Antigua as a collection and distribution point for linking the area with Jamaica. Since the run to Jamaica handled more passengers, but was used less frequently, it might justify

the service of an additional charter vessel. But three smaller ships could be practicably employed, and they would require less deficit operational expenses and a smaller capital outlay.

However, the Federation was concerned with political as well as economic values, and its government believed that the twin ship concept was essential to the political and economic integration of the islands. The West Indies confidently projected that future economic growth and expected port development would justify the larger vessels. As the Minister for External Affairs Sidney Smith pointed out to the House of Commons, the Federation perhaps conceived that:

These ships should represent to the West Indies what the building of the railroad meant to Canada in helping our nation to become more united.⁸⁰

Whether or not the Canadian Government believed the West Indies was too optimistic in forecasting its eventual use of the ships, Ottawa evidently felt responsible only for explaining the anticipated difficulties, and leaving it for the recipient to make the final decision. In this way, Canada avoided any charges of neo-colonialism which might have been laid if it had dictated what size of vessel was most suitable. Ottawa was more open to criticism for requiring that the building of the ships should take place in Canada despite the fact that they could have been built at an estimated \$300,000 each in Venezuela.⁸¹ However, the Federation did not appeal Canada's policy of requiring

aid. A comprehensive survey of the ramifications of the project, which would have included a detailed feasibility study of the gift ships' ability for port entry, was not provided but then none was requested. Yet port facility development was discussed prior to reaching an agreement between donor and recipient, and arrangements were underway before the ships were completed for developing deep water ports in the Little Eight. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it was clear that Federation officials were strongly attached to the twin ship concept which was considered by the West Indians to involve the political prestige of the Federation. Perhaps to the chagrin of both donor and recipient, the passenger-service proved to be financially unfeasible for most West Indians, and the ships (completed by July 1961 at a total cost of \$5.7 million) too large for effective trans-island cargo service.

In the meantime, it had been expected that the Federation would achieve independence and become a Commonwealth country within a year following a constitutional conference and a referendum in Jamaica planned for sometime in 1962. British Guiana had held an election in August 1961, and its new leader, Dr. Jagan, anticipated early independence. It was questionable whether Jagan would be disposed to joining the Federation or whether British Guiana would even remain in the Commonwealth. The Castro revolution in Cuba had a profound impact in the Latin American area, and Britain and the United States were evidently concerned

that British Guiana might seek closer ties and development assistance from the Soviet Union. On the assumption that aid from the Commonwealth might be a positive influence towards moving British Guiana in a pro-Western direction, there was renewed interest in London and Ottawa with respect to their Caribbean development programs. Moreover, with the British territories assuming full self-government, they would no longer qualify for Colonial Development and Welfare Funds so that it was essential that Britain consider future aid arrangements. Since Canada's aid program to the West Indies continued only until 31 March 1963, Ottawa was also concerned with the prospect of considering a continued assistance program.

In August 1961 External Affairs again studied the prospects for implementing a scheme similar to the Colombo Plan.⁸² The Colombo concept had been favourably received by the developing nations of southern Asia because it comprised a cooperative approach to the provision and utilization of economic assistance. The underpinning idea was one of helping the developing Asian countries to help themselves, and it was likely that the Caribbean countries would find a similar scheme just as appealing. A Colombo Plan for the Caribbean would mean that development assistance would be arranged on a bilateral basis, but that non-Commonwealth countries (both donor and recipient) would be invited to participate within a multilateral framework. External assumed that loose consultative machinery could

be established to exchange ideas and information along the lines of Colombo. Such machinery was effective in Asia in helping the donor countries become more familiar with the needs of the developing area and plan more effective assistance programs. Multilateral collaboration also helped recipient countries become more aware of the overall application of aid programs in the region. In sum, the department considered that the newly emerging federation of Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean and the West would both benefit from a Colombo Plan initiative in the West Indies.

The Canada-West Indies Aid Program had been administered for about two years by the Economic and Technical Assistance Branch, under the directorship of Dr. O. E. Ault, which had replaced the IETCD in December 1958. This program came under the supervision of the more centralized, semi-autonomous External Aid Office in September 1960. The interdepartmental policy committees were replaced by an External Aid Board composed of the most senior representatives of the departments most concerned with aid (External Affairs, Trade and Commerce and Finance), the Bank of Canada, Executive Director of the World Bank and the Director General of the External Aid Office.⁸³ As Director General, Mr. Herbert Moran was permitted considerably more latitude in determining aid projects since he was chairman of the Board, and reported directly to the Minister for External Affairs, who, together with the Cabinet, was responsible for policy. It

was the EAO that was charged with the responsibility of considering renewed aid arrangements for the Caribbean under a Colombo umbrella.

There were several advantages to the Colombo concept. The Director of the External Aid Office believed that such a scheme could be a valuable Commonwealth initiative which might demonstrate the vitality of the association.⁸⁴ As a distinctly Commonwealth arrangement, at least in its origin, and directed mainly towards a Commonwealth region, it was considered that Canada might appear more justified in confining its assistance to Commonwealth countries. Although such a scheme would not necessarily be Commonwealth exclusive, it would permit Ottawa to funnel Canadian contributions at least to an area in which it might have some impact, without necessitating a full-scale involvement in Latin America. It was expected that the Colombo analogy could also complement American plans for Latin American development if the United States were to decide to participate in such a scheme. Of course, one of the important purposes of a collective approach to the region, which was not relevant in southern Asia, would be to encourage the Commonwealth countries and territories of the Caribbean to cooperate better amongst themselves, at least in economic matters. In view of the Federation's uncertain future, however, the Canadian government seemed to be prepared to continue its development assistance to the West Indies under the existing arrangements. Nonetheless,

Ottawa was amenable to participating in a Caribbean Colombo Plan.

Due to substantial differences and distances between the islands and a weak supranational bureaucracy, 1962 was to mark the year of West Indian disintegration rather than its federated independence.⁸⁵ The two strongest members, Jamaica and Trinidad, withdrew from the Federation, and gained independence and Commonwealth membership in the same year. But the defection of these two countries and the imminent dissolution of the Federation provided increased incentive for preserving some cooperation in the Caribbean through a Colombo type of operation. Consequently, British and Canadian senior officials met in London in June to discuss the prospects for assistance to the Commonwealth Caribbean. Mr. Moran reported to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs that the Foreign Office with some equivocation supported the idea of establishing a Colombo scheme.⁸⁶ Whereas such a scheme might be perceived as an appropriate way to funnel assistance to the region while respecting the recently acquired autonomy of recipients, it also involved the United Kingdom in a program to assist independent and relatively wealthy Caribbean countries in addition to the dependent territories for which it had sole responsibility. Canadian officials considered that Canada had an interest in the political and economic stability of the Caribbean, and viewed favourably the possibility of developing the Colombo scheme within the confines of

the Commonwealth. Indeed, in September the EAO communi-
cated to the Secretary of State for External Affairs its
opinion that it would be appropriate for Canada, as the
senior Commonwealth country in the Western Hemisphere,
to take the initiative in suggesting a joint Commonwealth approach.⁸⁷

However, prospective donors were to have some reser-
vations about becoming associated in a Caribbean Colombo
Plan. Among potential Commonwealth participants, Australia
and New Zealand had little direct interest in the region.
If the United States was to be included as a donor, there
would be pressure to extend the Plan to non-Commonwealth
recipients as well. In fact, development assistance would
likely be available only under President Kennedy's Alliance
for Progress program to assist countries in Latin America.
Furthermore the United States had been withdrawing its
operations in the Commonwealth Caribbean, assuming that
the responsibility for aid provision should rest with the
developed countries of the Commonwealth. The only other
country contributing significantly to the Caribbean area
was Britain, and its aid efforts to the independent
countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean were largely
limited to technical assistance, directing its capital aid
to the poorer Commonwealth countries in southern Asia.

As a consequence, Canada's aid program to the West
Indies was to continue after the break-up of the Federation
in the same manner and at about the same rate (\$2.1 million
per annum) as it had before a Caribbean Colombo scheme had been

envisaged. Undoubtedly, an independent and strictly bilateral program would have an equivalent Canadian impact on the Caribbean as a coordinated "Colombo Plan" approach. The objective had not changed. Ottawa's policy appeared to continue to be directed towards inducing the countries in the region to work together. Neither had the focus changed significantly. Canada's capital aid was concentrated on the newly or soon-to-be independent nations in order not to become involved in British colonial policy. By the summer of 1962, the Canadian government had established diplomatic missions in Kingston and Port of Spain, and was considering a relatively substantial allocation of capital assistance to British Guiana, which eventually gained independent status in May 1966. Thus, Canada continued to contain its West Indies assistance program within the scope of its initial interests - the Commonwealth Caribbean.

As in the case of the Colombo Plan, there were various motives underlying Canada's development of an assistance program for the West Indies. Humanitarianism was a contributing factor in view of the concessional nature of the assistance offered. However, Canadian commercial interests were certainly served inasmuch as capital grants and technical aid were tied to those goods and services which Canada could provide. Indeed, development

assistance became considered as a way to provide a stimulus to Canada's economy, and one which would have a long-term beneficial impact on Canadian-West Indies trade. In addition, Ottawa was concerned about the prospects for maintaining political stability in the Caribbean region particularly after the success of Castro-styled communism in Cuba. The Canadian government perceived the West Indies Federation as being one means of supporting the economic and political viability of a group of British colonies and territories which were expected to gain independence as the second Commonwealth country in the western hemisphere. Consequently, it was in Canada's best interests as a trading-nation to promote commercial ties with these developing countries and help to preserve democracy wherever possible. In the process, it was probably not the least among Ottawa's considerations that an aid program would enhance Canada's image in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

From 1958 until 1963, Canadian aid to the Caribbean consisted entirely of grants, and the rule-of-thumb was that a minimum of 80 per cent of the content of allocations had to be acquired in Canada,⁸⁸ while the recipient was expected to bear the responsibility for local costs. Under these circumstances, the basic requirement of the Canada-West Indies Aid Program was that projects had to be developed with Canadian goods and services rather than local ones. However, the program was not completely inflexible, as Prime Minister Diefenbaker conveyed

in a statement of principles sent to Sir Grantley

Adams:

The Government of Canada will endeavour to supply such goods and services as are normally available in Canada, and as would not otherwise be available to The West Indies either locally or from other sources abroad, whether of a public or a private character. However, if the West Indies assigns a high priority to a project and will affirm that the goods and services for that project cannot be provided in any other way, consideration will be given to the financing of local costs and to the provision of goods and services not available in Canada which are essential to projects under the Canadian aid programme or associated with it.⁸⁹

Notwithstanding this concession the East Block undoubtedly believed that external aid would contribute substantially to employment and production, and promote the purchase of Canadian exports. The aid program being initiated, the government did not resist the temptation to use the program to supplement Canadian manufacturing and advertise Canada's products abroad. It is questionable, however, to what extent economic pay-off could be realized when aid was virtually free. While aid may be an important subsidy for certain sectors of the economy which are uncompetitive in world markets, investing this capital directly into Canadian industry would be a more efficient method of developing domestic production. All that is certain about giving aid, Professor Grant Reuber stated, is that:

This comprises loss in giving goods and services free or on privileged terms rather than selling them at market prices; slightly increased inflation and balance of payments problems; and profit sacrificed by not allocating aid funds to some other investment assuring a still higher return.⁹⁰

The tying of Canadian development assistance had the additional disadvantage of reducing the value and effectiveness of Canadian aid because it was not always tailored to the needs of the Caribbean countries, but rather towards what Canada could supply. The negative impact of imposing tied aid regulations was explained by Mr. Pearson in a study that he headed for the World Bank after he had retired from public office:

Aid-tying imposes many different costs on aid-receiving countries. It requires them to purchase goods from donors at prices often substantially above those in competitive world markets. Tying of shipping and insurance in some cases adds further to such direct costs. Estimates of direct costs vary, but individual country studies indicate that they frequently exceed 20 per cent.⁹¹

Even technical assistance which required generally higher costs for Canadian education and expertise were subject to the negative impact of aid-tying. Although Canadian industry might supply technological goods which were competitive in international markets, the selection was not necessarily appropriate to the needs of developing countries. Moreover, there would have been little need to require a content rule at all if Canadian goods and services had been generally internationally competitive. Unfortunately, by insisting on tied aid the Canadian Government may not have been achieving the interests of either the donor, who would find it difficult to determine the economic benefits accrued with aid, or the recipient who accepted assistance which was not always relevant to its economic needs. Moreover,

focusing on development projects that most effectively stimulated the Canadian economy worked against the need of the Federation to develop industrially and expand its exports.

As a world trading nation, it was believed by the government and in business that Canada had an important stake in the expansion of world trade which would, in the long-term, be improved by international economic growth. Development assistance was perceived as a means to expand markets for Canadian exports based on the assumptions that its increased development would eventually effect increased demand for Canadian goods and services while the aid program itself would promote familiarity with Canadian suppliers. Implicitly rejecting that "Canadian trade" with developing countries would expand even without foreign aid transfers, Prime Minister Diefenbaker explained Canada's economic interests in extending development assistance.

Those who question the value of expenditure on external aid should not overlook the commercial dividends inherent in the creation of expanding markets. In material terms, aid today can mean increased trade tomorrow. Through generous co-operation we can help ourselves as well as others. 92

But Caribbean demand for the Canadian export market would only continue if the goods were competitive on the world market. Furthermore, the benefits of providing aid to attract Third World customers was a questionable proposition. Inasmuch as development assistance might be directly injected into the Canadian economy, more immediate benefits and secure investments could be realized. Even

the cost-benefit of advertising Canadian goods in the developing countries is suspect. Doubtless, Canada wanted a share in the markets of the Caribbean, but international trade promotionalism would more practicably be aimed at developed countries which were in the best position to buy.

The premise that Canadian foreign aid benefits Canada in the long-run and in the short was perspicaciously challenged by Professor Stephen Triantis who concluded:

that Canadian foreign assistance does not seem, in the main, to serve national economic purposes or interests, and that, if it does, it does not serve them as well as alternate uses of the same funds might. If aid is desirable, that is, if the cost of it is justified for other reasons, it might incidently yield a very modest economic benefit.⁹³

It might be more realistic to assume that, to the extent Canada's aid is tied, it does not provide as great a loss to the Canadian economy. "Further," Mr. Moran explained to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs,

untied aid funds subsidize the exports of trading rivals . . . Why should Canadians, for instance, finance competing German or Japanese products - and thereby aggravate the problems of Canada's own balance of payments?⁹⁴

By prohibiting aid from being used by host countries to purchase our competitors products, Canadian development assistance policy may have evoked support from the public and industry. While taxpayers may at least be assured that development assistance consists of Canadian goods and

services, a greater measure of popular support might be secured than would otherwise have been possible.

But Ottawa also assisted the Commonwealth Caribbean for political reasons. Canada had a strategic interest in promoting the welfare of people who were expected to form the next independent Commonwealth nation of the Americas. The Cuban revolution had had a profound impact on Latin America. With the potentiality for communism spreading throughout this region, it was considered important in the East Block to develop a strong base for democracy, particularly where Canada had commercial interests. In fact, Canadian investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean comprised the primary portion of its total investment in the areas of banking, insurance and aluminum production. Professors Levitt and McIntyre estimated that in 1967 total Canadian investments in this region amounted to

about \$550 million (Can.), of which at least half are located in Jamaica. The remainder are split about evenly between Guyana and the rest of the eastern Caribbean An estimated industrial distribution of the total \$550 million Canadian investments might be \$310 million in bauxite-alumina; \$100 million in mortgages, government securities, loans and other assets held by banking and insurance companies95

Consequently, the Canadian government had a concomitant investment in the political stability of the area and an interest in providing aid initially to the West Indies Federation and, following its demise, to the individual

countries and territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Furthermore, foreign aid seemed to offer a constructive way to induce the independent countries to develop close ties with the Commonwealth, after achieving self-government rather than with the Eastern bloc.

In sum, Canada dispensed aid to the Commonwealth Caribbean to support its traditional trading relationship with that region. The government was also interested in promoting the economic viability and political stability of this part of the western hemisphere. Besides, extending assistance to the West Indies was intended to produce future export opportunities and influence with Canada's closest Third World neighbours. Not the least important of considerations, however, was the Diefenbaker administration's concern for strengthening the Commonwealth connection in a part of the world where Canada had historical ties. In the final analysis, directing aid to the Caribbean may have been a practicable means to serve Canadian self-interest while helping to provide renewed justification for the Commonwealth at a time when new members were questioning the value of its existence.

Special Commonwealth African Aid Program

Africa had not gone unnoticed by Canada, particularly as the continent represented the only remaining power vacuum in the world. By the mid-1950s, Canada had speculated about plans for development assistance appropriate

to the newly independent African countries. Aside from aid funds from associated European powers, assistance had been extended through the Special UN Fund for Economic Development and the International Bank. But after independence, colonial funds became inapplicable, and the former colonies were in need of economic support wherever it could be acquired. It was important that Western nations should be prominent among those which offered assistance to the essentially non-aligned countries.

Among the potential benefactors, Canada may have been assessed as a more favourable source by young nations that still remained sensitive to economic subordination. Having evolved from colonial roots, Canada was considered less likely to have neo-colonial interests. On the other hand, Canada had a close working relationship with the rich Western powers and, in particular, the United States. Consequently, "Canada's principal usefulness in the eyes of Africans," Douglas Anglin insists, "is her special influence in Washington."⁹⁶ It was important, as well, that Canada was on good terms with India, a Third World leader, and looked benevolently toward political non-alignment. No doubt Canadian membership in the Commonwealth also placed Canada in good light, at least among the Anglophone countries of Africa. But good standing in the association required some evidence of a member's interest in the lot of its new Commonwealth partners.

Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) was the first among Commonwealth African countries to achieve its independence, and there was some question as to whether or not it would gain membership in the Commonwealth itself. Whereas Britain was responsible for granting any particular colonial area the degree of self-government which would permit it to be recognized as a sovereign state, the admission of new members to the Commonwealth was subject to the general consent of the existing members just as in the case of any other grouping of nations. Before the admission of the Asian dominions, the United Kingdom sought the approval of the other members by means of preliminary consultation. However, as there was some degree of automaticity involved, the Commonwealth Relations Office was expected to seek the assurance of the membership before granting complete self-government to a dependency. On the basis of this precedent, South Africa felt it proper to indicate to Whitehall that the Gold Coast's advancement towards independence was somewhat premature and questioned the prudence of admitting black African states as full Commonwealth members.⁹⁷

Ottawa was concerned that the Union might attempt to veto the Gold Coast's application for Commonwealth membership although it was questionable whether Pretoria had any such power. Although a consensus had been reached in accepting India and Pakistan's requests for republican membership, it was entirely moot as to whether unanimity was required for admission into the association. In any event, it seems as though Ottawa was prepared to support

the Gold Coast's membership with or without South African approval. A former senior official in the Department of External Affairs recalled that as early as 1954 Ottawa believed that the multiracial character of the Commonwealth ought to be extended to include black African states as full members even if this resulted in the withdrawal of South Africa.⁹⁸ This potential problem over membership did not arise because Mr. Strijdom, by then Prime Minister, had taken a different approach to black Africa than had his predecessor. By promoting an "outward African policy" to maintain friendly relations with non-European governments on the continent, Strijdom indicated that South Africa was prepared to practise "co-existence" with the Gold Coast and affirm its Commonwealth membership.⁹⁹ Apparently, the new leader of the Nationalist government believed that independence for black African countries would be consistent with the doctrine of apartheid. An approach towards separate development at home could work just as effectively abroad. So long as the Union could develop separately and collaborate on its own terms with other countries, Ghanaian independence and Commonwealth membership were not expected to have a detrimental effect on South African race policy. Thus, whereas multiracialism was understood by other Commonwealth members to mean respecting equality among races, South Africa interpreted it in terms of apartheid.

The Gold Coast applied for Commonwealth membership because the Nkrumah government perceived in it certain advantages such as gaining diplomatic support from some of the older

members and maintaining a link with the West. In addition, there was political currency to be made by just strengthening ties with Britain, Canada and India. More obvious benefits from membership in the association were economic. Ghana was interested in maintaining Commonwealth preferences and probably hoped to attract capital and technical assistance which were essential to the country's development. For these reasons, Prime Minister Nkrumah appeared to be committed to close relations with the Commonwealth. It was evident that he accepted the view that the rewards of membership outweighed the embarrassment of being associated with the West and, in particular, South Africa.

Ghana's independence and Commonwealth membership in March 1957 required the St. Laurent government to make decisions as to whether Canadian assistance was to be forthcoming and, if so, what kind of aid should be allocated. If the Commonwealth was to justify itself to the emerging Third World members in more than just terms of a consultative institution, it was inevitable that development assistance had to be extended by the more wealthy nations. Dr. Nkrumah, in outlining plans for his country's development, had emphasized the need to draw upon the educational and technical capabilities of older Commonwealth countries. Some responsibility obviously laid with its Commonwealth partners to provide this assistance rather than having Ghana seek technical expertise from the Soviet-bloc countries. Consequently, Canada's High Commissioner in Accra, Evan Gill, was charged with assessing the immediate

needs of the Commonwealth's first African member. By September, the Secretary of State for External Affairs had received a despatch from Mr. Gill outlining Ghana's assistance needs as existing primarily in the area of technical training.¹⁰⁰

A more comprehensive outline of Ghana's prospective aid requirements was discussed at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec from September 28 until October 1. In addition to a request for technical assistance, the Ghanaian delegation was interested in capital investment in infrastructure development, including such essentials as roads, railways and schools. Finance Minister Donald Fleming expressed Canada's interest in assisting Ghana's economic development by either extending the scope of the Colombo Plan or the formulation of some other scheme modelled on it. Specifically, he indicated that Canada was considering the allocation of technical assistance, supplemented by some capital outlays.¹⁰¹ Mr. Fleming expected that with our new High Commissioner in Accra, the two countries would be able to devise a program before the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference scheduled for September 1958.

Several months after the Tremblant Conference an interim aid program was announced by the Progressive Conservative government. The Minister for External Affairs, Sidney Smith, told the House of Commons on 30 January 1958,

that he was recommending the appropriation of \$150,000 to temporarily provide educational and technical assistance to Ghana and the West Indies Federation.¹⁰² With a Canada-West Indies Aid Program in sight, however, the Department of External Affairs was searching for a more permanent aid arrangement to serve Ghana and Commonwealth African territories. Technical assistance was most prominent in the Department's proposals since the general low standard of formal education and a lack of technical expertise made the provision of capital grants impracticable. External Affairs was probably correct in this assumption. After extending bilateral assistance to Commonwealth Africa for two years, the Director of the External Aid Office testified before the House of Commons Standing Committee dealing with economic development that "little purpose is to be served in giving capital projects to countries before they have people who are competent to operate and maintain them."¹⁰³ By August 1958, External Affairs was in a position to recommend a Commonwealth Mutual Aid Plan consisting of \$1 million per annum for a two to three year period to be considered at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in Montreal.¹⁰⁴ The PC government was receptive to an identifiable Commonwealth scheme which would provide a focus for Canadian aid activities in Africa. The government may also have considered that a Commonwealth program was needed in order to justify African participation in the association. Under the circumstances, a

Positive response to the emerging countries of Commonwealth Africa would serve to strengthen the viability of the association in the minds of the new members.

An imaginative step towards encouraging the progressive character of the Commonwealth was initiated by Canada's Prime Minister before the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference which was scheduled to be held in Montreal from September 15 until 26. During Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Ottawa in June, Mr. Diefenbaker proposed the establishing of a Commonwealth Bank or Development Loan Fund, but Prime Minister Macmillan was reluctant. Mr. Diefenbaker believed that such a fund might be useful for providing development assistance, beyond the contributions of world institutions, for Commonwealth projects and technical assistance requirements.¹⁰⁵ Apparently, Mr. Macmillan considered the mobilization of contributions from the merchants of Hong Kong and the Indian Maharajahs for investment funds to be impracticable. However, seeking support from sources in developing Commonwealth countries which were not making any contribution towards the economic development of their fellow members might not have been as trivial as the preliminary idea suggests. It is more likely that Macmillan was apprehensive about the method proposed by Canada to contribute to such a fund. Put very simply, the Diefenbaker government was prepared to cancel Britain's billion-dollar loan debt, accrued from wartime and redevelopment assistance, "to be counted as part of Canada's subscription to the

capital of the proposed Commonwealth Development Bank."¹⁰⁶ Essentially, this would put the United Kingdom in the position of carrying the burden of a Commonwealth development fund while it was already heavily committed to aiding the development of the dependent members of the Commonwealth.

In spite of British doubts that a new Commonwealth financial institution could secure additional capital, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's statement at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference banquet on September 18 included such a proposal:

I am attracted by the idea of a Commonwealth financial institution as a channel to provide funds, particularly to those countries that are duly emerging or have just emerged from colonial status to nationhood within the Commonwealth.

There are difficulties, but I commend to the conference the objective of devising suitable Commonwealth arrangements to provide economic encouragement, more especially to nations as full status in self-government is attained.¹⁰⁷

Among the delegations most strongly in favour of the Canadian proposal was Ghana. However, the majority of Commonwealth members consisted of developing countries, and the ability of the advanced members to provide sufficient capital to create a loan fund was, quite realistically, severely limited. Consequently, while not rejecting the idea outright and suggesting that further time would be needed to study its ramifications, it was apparent that the senior members of the Commonwealth could only express sympathy with the proposal. In order to prevent his initiative from being dismissed entirely, Mr. Diefenbaker pressed for the

inclusion of a statement dealing with the fund
in the final report of the conference:

Serious consideration was given to the idea of a Commonwealth financial institution in which Commonwealth Governments might participate as partners. One of the objects of this institution would be to introduce additional capital from outside the Commonwealth. However, doubt was expressed whether these objectives can be accomplished in present circumstances. . . . The Conference agreed, therefore, that following the New Delhi meeting there should be further joint studies to determine whether there is, or will be, a role for a new Commonwealth institution for financing economic development.¹⁰⁸

Prime Minister Diefenbaker was equally enthusiastic that the Commonwealth take a greater role in providing development assistance as Third World countries became fully self governing. To this end, the Canadian delegation announced at the Conference that,

Canada proposes to make available an initial sum of \$500,000 to cover technical assistance and associated expenditures for the benefit of Commonwealth areas in Africa, including Ghana which is already receiving technical aid from Canada.¹⁰⁹

Finance Minister Donald Fleming was quoted by the Ghanaian Press as stating that in

his discussions with the Ghanaian delegation he believed the focus of Canada's aid should, at least to begin with, be a technical assistance programme.

The Canadian Parliament had already made preliminary financial provision for this purpose. The Canadian Government intended next year to request that this should be increased, that it should cover associated expenditures not ordinarily considered as falling within the realm of technical assistance, and that it should cover some technical assistance expenditures for the benefit of other areas in Africa.¹¹⁰

In line with their original precepts, Canada was committed to technical rather than capital assistance for the new Commonwealth states in Africa. External Affairs had already presented the argument that the problems associated with emergent territories involved the training of native Africans to replace former colonial administrators in technical and administrative capacities rather than a shortage of capital funds for investment. This was an attractive proposition to Ottawa as it obviated the case for capital assistance. Thus, it was resolved that in the early stages of Canada's aid program a Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program would be the most effective and economic way to help Commonwealth Africa.

But Nkrumah was quite naturally interested in generating large sums of capital in order to stimulate Ghana's economy and improve the overall standard of living in his country. Consequently, in June 1960, the President requested Canadian support to develop an atomic reactor that could serve as a regional project for West Africa on a basis similar to the Indo-Canadian arrangement under the Colombo Plan.¹¹¹ It was obvious to Ottawa that an experimental reactor would be an unrealistic development undertaking. More technically advanced Commonwealth members such as New Zealand and South Africa had not acquired nuclear technology, and it was apparent that Ghana lacked

the resources and trained manpower for such a project. The idea of Ghana promoting a project on a regional basis could not be given much credit insofar as the other West African governments had not been consulted as to the prospects for a regional centre to be located in Ghana. Since the capital required would be disproportionate to the Canadian assistance being provided for Africa as a whole, Prime Minister Diefenbaker informed Dr. Nkrumah in September that the cost of supporting a single project as complex as a nuclear reactor would be financially unfeasible at this time.¹¹²

Ottawa was prepared to entertain Ghanaian capital projects that were not on so grand a scale as the reactor proposal. When, in April 1960, Ghana requested Canadian support in financing the power-production phase of the important Volta River project, Canada responded with substantial aid credits.¹¹³ Although Canada's assistance to Ghana had begun with technical expertise, it was clear that Ottawa also was prepared to give some encouragement to the flow of capital to developing countries in Commonwealth Africa. Thus, Ottawa was more opposed to the idea of a reactor than capital aid projects.

The Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program was an interim measure, and when Canada's allocations under the

program exceeded its appropriations within the first four months of the 1959-1960 fiscal year, it was obvious that the funds would have to be increased. CTAP was not exclusive to Africa, but that continent did receive the majority of assistance, and with expectations of additional African members joining the Commonwealth, Canada also had to take a fresh look at the possibility of broadening the program to include capital assistance. Consequently, when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London in May 1960, Mr. Diefenbaker recommended that an assistance program similar to the Colombo Plan be considered for Africa.¹¹⁴ The final communiqué reported that:

The Commonwealth ministers reviewed the economic development of Commonwealth countries in Africa which have recently attained or are approaching independence. They agreed that consideration should be given to the possibility of co-operative action among members of the Commonwealth in assisting the economic development of these countries.

While the Prime Ministers' conference was being convened, the Minister for External Affairs, Howard Green, stated in the House of Commons that in his opinion:

Africa is the most important continent in the world from the point of view of political development and potential changes. This is certainly a continent to which all possible assistance should be given.¹¹⁵

The establishment of a Canadian mission in Lagos, with the further expectation that Sierra Leone, Tanganyika and Uganda would soon be assuming self-government and Commonwealth membership, gave External Affairs even more

incentive to consider a revised development assistance program for Africa. Since some similarities existed between Canada and Anglophone Africa, including language and educational and legal institutions, it was assumed that the program might more effectively be limited to Commonwealth African countries. Eventually, at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting in September, Mr. Fleming announced the Canadian government's intention to contribute \$10.5 million to the Special Commonwealth African Aid Program during its first three years beginning in the 1961-1962 fiscal year.¹¹⁶ SCAAP was to be similar to the Colombo Plan in that contributions were made bilaterally, while its progress was reviewed annually by a Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council. To the extent that SCAAP was totally exclusive to Commonwealth Africa, it was very similar to Canada's Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program.

Within a month of the Finance Ministers' meeting, a new External Aid Office was created to centralize Canada's assistance programs under one agency. As noted in the preceding section to this chapter, the Director-General, Mr. Herbert Moran, was responsible for administering aid and formulating policy, in coordination with a Board, consisting of representatives from the Departments of Finance, External Affairs and Trade and Commerce, and from the Bank of Canada. The EAO continued to follow the policy of concentrating the SCAAP portion of Canadian aid mainly on human assistance since, it was argued, Commonwealth African countries were

generally in need of trained personnel within the civil service, education and business. Mr. Moran explained that:

The proposed development assistance was designed to provide equipment and technical assistance to help these new nations develop their agriculture; expand limited transportation facilities, strengthen public administration, and improve medical and health services; to carry out surveys of natural resources; and to assist education as a supplement to the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan.¹¹⁷

More than two-thirds of Canada's external aid during the introductory phase of SCAAP was in the form of technical assistance with the bulk of it going to West Africa.¹¹⁸

For example, of the \$3.5 million allocated each year, approximately \$3.0 million went to Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone, and \$500,000 distributed to Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya and other dependent territories.

Military assistance was also extended by Canada to Commonwealth African countries. By the end of the 1962-1963 fiscal year, the Canadian Armed Services were involved in training military personnel from Ghana and Nigeria, and were seriously considering a similar request from Tanganyika. In the 1950s Ottawa had permitted the training of some Indian and Malaysian Air Force technicians and pilots in Canadian Service establishments¹¹⁹ so that a precedent had been set for assisting non-NATO countries. But perhaps the government was favourably disposed towards assisting the new Commonwealth states in Africa because there was an obvious need. Upon gaining self-government, Ghana and Nigeria immediately had to build their Armed

Services sufficiently strong to insure national order and stability, and they needed technical and financial resources to accomplish this.

It was reasonable that the developing members of the Commonwealth should turn to a senior partner such as Canada. Though allied with the West, Canada was a more acceptable source than a former colonial power. Besides, Canada had developed a reputation as an "honest-broker" through its participation in international peace-keeping activities, and it was less likely to have political ambitions for providing aid.

But there were some indirect advantages to Canada's involving itself in training the Armed Services of African countries. Collaboration among military personnel provided an opportunity for Canada to develop rapport with some of the potential leaders of the new states. Moreover, if military training assistance was not forthcoming, Soviet-bloc countries would be anxious to fill in the gaps left by departing colonial administrators. Of course, the Department of Trade and Commerce was not unaware that such programs might lead to substantial sales of military equipment.¹²⁰ With considerations such as these, the Military Assistance Committee commended the worthiness of extending Canadian military assistance, and Cabinet responded by deciding in June 1961 that Canada should accept a part of its defence commitment by training military personnel of Commonwealth countries.¹²¹ It was significant that the Cabinet decided to

extend military aid to only Commonwealth members among non-NATO countries. Apparently the Diefenbaker government was cognizant not only of the benefits for Canada of providing such assistance, but also the importance that this assistance might have for enhancing the Commonwealth relationship.

Prime Minister Nkrumah first indicated his government's interest in Canada providing military training assistance in October 1958, just after the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference held in Montreal.¹²² At this time the Ghanaian Armed Services were staffed almost entirely by British officers, which was unsuitable for a country whose leader envisaged the prompt Africanization of all areas of leadership. Rather than drawing on the experience of the former colonial power, Ghana was turning to the older members of the Commonwealth to assist in the training of its defence and security personnel. At the Prime Ministers meeting in March 1961, Nkrumah apparently discussed with Mr. Diefenbaker the possibility of Canada's sending military instructors and medical officers to Ghana. External Affairs was inclined to respond favourably to encourage Ghana's close relations. Though the Department of National Defence was less well disposed towards acceding to the Ghanaian request because of a relative dearth of staff officers in Canadian military training establishments, this department indicated that it would cooperate. Consequently, on 1 June 1961 Cabinet approved the Military Assistance

Committee's recommendation to send up to 30 Canadian officers and NCOs to assist in training the Ghanaian officer corps and technicians of the Armed Forces.¹²³ Although military aid was originally to be administered as technical assistance to fall within the jurisdiction of the External Aid Office, expenditures were eventually charged to National Defence, making it all the more difficult to win that department's support for new aid initiatives.

While President Nkrumah had indicated his acceptance of the Canadian proposal in June, he was also seeking military training assistance from the Soviet Union, ostensibly to reinforce his country's non-aligned position. The implications of sending 400 Ghanaian cadets to the USSR were evidently not very attractive to the United Kingdom and, following the dismissal of the British commander of the Ghanaian Armed Forces (General Alexander), Britain decided to withdraw the majority of its military personnel from that country.¹²⁴ But Ottawa did not consider that the curtailment of British military aid was sufficient reason for Canada to abrogate its military assistance agreement with Ghana. Indeed, reduced assistance from the West would only increase Ghana's dependence on the USSR.

On the other hand, the Canadian government was not prepared to replace the British by increasing the scope of its military training to take in the general supervision of the Ghanaian army as the Canadian press had speculated.¹²⁵ Neither was Ottawa interested in establishing a joint

British-Canadian military training program regardless of the vacuum created by the reduction of the British commitment. The Canadian training team, which had been functioning since September 1961, had a much more limited objective as an auxiliary source of military aid from a Commonwealth and Western country. The separate identity of the Canadian team could be handicapped by appearing to shore-up the West either by replacing the British team or by amalgamating with it. No doubt it had been considered in the East Block that Canada's reputation was at stake. Canada had committed itself to a program of military training assistance to Ghana as announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 22 June 1961, and it would have been unwise of this country to appear as though its initiative was in response to an appeal from the British Foreign Office.

While Canada's military advisers in Ghana numbered 26 by February 1962, President Nkrumah was interested in enlarging the scope of the program to include the training of 250 Ghanaian armed forces personnel in Canadian Service establishments.¹²⁶ It is likely that DND would have looked favourably upon taking some of these students by developing additional courses, but External Affairs was hesitant to accept too many Ghanaians in the event that Nigeria should make a similar request. This much larger country was expected to become a leading force in Africa, and it was important that Canada should show a reasonable balance in

the provision of military assistance to both Commonwealth member states.

Following a visit in September 1961 of the Nigerian Defence Minister, Mr. Ribadu, the Department of External Affairs had become aware of Nigeria's interest in Canada undertaking the training of 10 officer candidates from each of its three Services.¹²⁷ External had reason to be sympathetic to the idea of extending aid to Nigeria. After all, Canada wanted to strengthen its relations with Nigeria, not only because of its Commonwealth membership, but because that country took a moderate approach to both African and Commonwealth issues. Since Canadian military assistance was being provided to Ghana, it was desirable to give Nigeria the impression that Canada was prepared to extend it comparable assistance, particularly as Nigeria was far the larger in size and population and seemed to attach a greater value to the Commonwealth connection. Whereas External Affairs was sympathetic, therefore, to a Nigerian request for aid from a political point of view, the Department of Trade and Commerce regarded the prospective provision of pilot training as a preliminary step towards promoting the sale of Canadian-built aircraft. With the weight of these two departments behind a military training program, the Canadian government proposed in February 1962 to admit a total of 32 cadets from Nigeria for training in Canadian defence establishments.¹²⁸ Cabinet also approved the provision of up to six naval officers to assist at

Nigerian naval shore establishments and to provide a Commandant and a Director of Studies for the proposed new Nigerian Military Academy if the British did not fill these positions.

The positive response initially given to Nigeria's interest in Canadian military training assistance did not continue. Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa indicated in the later part of February that his government wanted a single country, preferably Canada, to organize and train personnel for its Air Force.¹²⁹ Apparently, Sir Abubakar's administration was interested in reducing the role of its former colonial power by extending the opportunity to other Commonwealth countries to develop Flying and Ground Training Schools.

Once again, External Affairs recommended that Canada accept this added responsibility. Nigeria was unquestionably the most powerful and the most pro-Commonwealth of the emerging African members of the Commonwealth. But like any other member, Nigeria was looking for concrete evidence that the Commonwealth had something to offer if it was to continue to be associated with that community of nations. Clearly, Canada's willingness to accept the task of setting up the Nigerian Air Force would be concrete evidence of the value of its association with other Commonwealth members. Furthermore, there was a real possibility that if Canada failed to assist its developing Commonwealth partner that Nigeria might turn to the USSR for assistance

inspite of its pro-Western attitude. Thus, External was convinced that Canada was in a unique position to foster close relations with Nigeria, and should assist with its military training. Trade and Commerce could be expected to support the views of External Affairs if only because the use of Canadian instructors would increase the opportunities for securing a market for the sale of Canadian light aircraft. However, the Department of National Defence was responsible for military aid allocations and considered the training of the Nigerian Air Force beyond its capabilities. If DND's decision seemed unalterable under the administration of Mr. Harkness, it was ever so much more the case with the coming to power in April 1963 of the Liberals who were committed to cutting back defence expenditures.

Reorganization and austerity within the Defence department was likely the primary reason why Tanganyika was not offered military assistance. Canada had shown a good deal of interest in the country by establishing a diplomatic mission in Dar-es-Salaam on the eve of Tanganyikan independence. In January 1962 Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green had expressed to the House of Commons "the importance which the government attaches to the establishment of close relations between this new member of the Commonwealth and Canada."¹³⁰ Yet requests later that year from the Minister of Defence, Mr. Kambona, for Canadian military assistance were not favourably received, at least not by DND.

External Affairs first recommended the provision of military equipment and then Canada's assistance in the establishment of a military aviation school following specific requests from Dar-es-Salam. After all, Prime Ministers Diefenbaker and Pearson were pleased with Tanganyika's objective of developing close Commonwealth relations and impressed with President Nyerere's approach, both as a non-participant and as a member, towards the 1961 and 1964 Prime Ministers' meetings. Nyerere evidently wanted Tanganyika to maintain communications with the West, but did not favour securing military assistance solely from Britain, particularly as his country was also committed to non-alignment. Since Tanganyika also was committed to establishing an Air Force, it was quite conceivable that Nyerere would turn to non-Commonwealth or communist countries if Canada did not offer assistance.¹³¹ Whereas External Affairs considered assisting Tanganyika as an opportunity to forge ties of friendship with this Commonwealth East African country, the new Minister of National Defence, Mr. Hellyer, had just begun an examination of the Armed Services programs and was not prepared to take on additional military assistance training, regardless of foreign policy considerations.¹³² In the event, Canada did embark upon a substantial military aid program in Tanganyika (later Tanzania) in 1964, and shortly thereafter assistance was also granted to Zambia, Kenya and Uganda,¹³³ but none of these programs is within the scope of this study.

There was a plethora of reasons for assisting African countries, but one stands out in dark relief; almost all of the entire Canadian aid commitment was directed to Commonwealth Africa. The limited role of a humanitarian motive in Canada's external aid was discussed with regard to the Colombo Plan and, the importance of certain economic interests was considered with respect to Caribbean development. In both cases, the concern to check the spread of communism was also seen to be important. These three points clearly are present in the development of the Canadian aid program to Africa. The conclusion to this section will assess some of the political considerations for Canada's extending development assistance in Africa, primarily to Commonwealth member states.

The French-Speaking Africa Assistance Program was the only other arrangement of Canadian bilateral aid beyond the Commonwealth-related schemes. Professor Louis Sabourin notes its origin:

Following a Canadian mission to Africa headed by Ambassador [to France] Pierre Dupuy, Canada established [in April 1961], within the Canadian External Aid Office, a new "regional" assistance program for the benefit of Francophone Africa.¹³⁴

With an annual allocation of \$300,000 to support teacher training in the developing countries, the External Aid Office managed to use only \$370,000 of the funds during its first two years.

There are a variety of explanations for Canada's more substantial support for Anglophone rather than Francophone Africa that generally centre on President de Gaulle's paternalistic approach towards the French-speaking parts of the continent which did not brook interference in what France considered to be its own sphere of activity.

Although there were eighteen African countries which had gained their independence from France (and another that had become independent of Belgium) by 1960, the government in Paris dominated the economic affairs of their former territories with the consequence, Professor Sabourin has pointed out, that they "are still searching for their identity."¹³⁵ On Canada's part, the recruitment and provision of teachers and advisers appeared to be hampered by a lack of coordination between the EAO and Quebec's Department of Education. It was intended that the educational personnel in Quebec would service the aid program. However, Mr. Moran explained that "Quebec was very interested in providing aid to Francophone Africa but the provincial government wanted EAO to forward them the funds so that Quebec could develop their own program."¹³⁶ Yet it was entirely questionable whether the province of Quebec had sufficient human resources to carry out a more comprehensive aid program. In assessing Quebec's potential for providing assistance to Francophone Africa in October 1963, one French-Canadian nationalist stated that

dans l'état actuel des choses, le Canada français ne peut apporter qu'une modeste contribution à l'effort international d'assistance au tiers-monde.¹³⁷

Aside from these problems, Ottawa had not made a wholesale attempt to establish diplomatic representation in Francophone African countries which was prerequisite to an effective aid program. It was not until 1962 that

Canada established in Cameroon its first embassy in French-Speaking Africa whereas prior to that there were three located in Accra, Lagos and Dar-es-Salaam. It is perhaps even more surprising that while there were nineteen Franco-phone African sovereign states in 1960, only Ghana and Nigeria in Anglophone black Africa were fully self-govern-ing. Perhaps an over-riding concern of the PC government in the Commonwealth connection precluded a more balanced distribution of Canadian aid in Africa. But a Common-wealth aid focus appeared short-sighted in view of the fact that the Francophone program had been created in an attempt to promote the duality of Canadian culture. Keith Spicer expressed it this way:

In principle, increases [in aid] would strengthen Canada's national unity by satisfying a natural and legitimate wish of the French-Canadian elite. For if sentiment and common traditions are valid reasons for helping Commonwealth countries, they must also be for aiding French-speaking ones.¹³⁸

In sum, the Diefenbaker government's decision to channel most of Canada's external aid to Anglophone African countries underscored its interest in the Commonwealth relationship. There were multiple motives for Canada to provide for its Commonwealth partners. As in the case of the regional aid schemes, the government was interested in mitigating the problems encountered by these emerging nations. In terms of the Colombo concept, Ottawa aimed at helping to provide the conditions in which the African countries could help themselves. This basically

humanitarian motivation was diluted with other considerations. External assistance was often geared towards the prospects of promoting Canada's export markets as in the case of its military training program. Moreover, there was some anxiety in Ottawa that if Canada did not assist its fellow developing Commonwealth members, communist countries might fill their orders. This concern was aggravated inasmuch as many potential Western donors were former colonial powers whose foreign aid was not always appreciated. Although Canadian aid programs would not be expected to have an appreciable impact on a recipient's economy, Ottawa believed that Canada could at least represent Western interests while helping the host country to achieve economic stability. It was also perceived to be in the best interests of the Commonwealth for Canada to expand its relations with black Africa if the new members were to continue to regard this association as a worthwhile institution to which to belong. Whereas the developing member states were to realize some concrete benefits in the form of development assistance, Canada was content to utilize the Commonwealth to strengthen its own ties with Africa.

Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan

CSFP is an interregional bilateral scheme which provides assistance to scholars from any country in the Commonwealth seeking an education in the humanities or social sciences rather than in specialized and technological

training programs. The Plan was of interest to both Canada and the United Kingdom as an additional source of funds to foster educational growth in developing Commonwealth countries. They envisaged total Commonwealth participation and contribution, according to the respective capabilities and needs of the members.

Just prior to the 1958 Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, Ottawa had sought Britain's reaction to a scheme to provide grants for Commonwealth students and teachers to study in each others' countries. The initial response from the United Kingdom while positive was not entirely compatible with Canadian ideas. Canada's High Commissioner informed Ottawa that Britain had originally approached the plan from the point of view of solely reserving places in British universities for Commonwealth students.¹³⁹ But the Canadian government conceived of a program with less emphasis in technology and one which would provide for the movement of students from more developed to developing countries. Ottawa also was interested in providing for studies in the humanities and social sciences so that students would not be limited to purely technical and professional disciplines. However, the two senior Commonwealth members were in essential accord with urging an agreement by their fellow members to a broad program of scholarships and teaching fellowships at the forthcoming meeting in Montreal.

At the Commonwealth Trade and Economic conference Prime Minister Diefenbaker spoke of the need for a new program of scholarships and fellowships which might be initiated by the Commonwealth to supplement the existing schemes of technical assistance.

I would suggest that this Conference give consideration to agreeing in principle on the establishment of a broad and reciprocal Commonwealth programme of scholarships and teaching fellowships . . . [which] would provide for students and teachers to study and to teach in the schools and universities of other member nations and would apply particularly to schools and universities in the Asiatic and African nations of the Commonwealth.¹⁴⁰

As an enthusiastic supporter of the Commonwealth, Canada's Prime Minister possibly envisaged that such a format would promote understanding and respect for the values of member states, resulting in a more cohesive association. With Cabinet approval for a reciprocal educational exchange program, Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith subsequently proposed at the conference that 1000 Commonwealth positions be created. Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Earl of Home, promptly accepted on behalf of Britain responsibility for 500 of these whereas Canada had planned to assume only 100. On the assumption that this was not an equitable division of responsibility, the Prime Minister's economic adviser, Merle Menzies, suggested that Canada take on a greater number of the positions.¹⁴¹ Consequently, Mr. Smith announced to the conference plenary session on September 19

that while the specifics of the scheme remained to be worked out, the Canadian government would be willing to make 100 scholarships available each year.¹⁴² With most courses extending over a two to three year period that would mean approximately 250 of the 1000 students eventually would be supported by Canada. As a result, the final report of the Conference recorded that Canada had assumed a more respectable ratio of the scholarships:

It was expected that within a few years after its inception the programme (CSFP) would cover some thousand Commonwealth scholars and fellows. Of this total of places and teachers, the United Kingdom took to be responsible for one-half and Canada for one-quarter.¹⁴³

CSFP generally was welcomed as a means to fulfill a need that was not being met by the existing technical assistance programs. A further conference was recommended by all delegations to work out the scope of the proposed scheme. In addition, this educational conference would have the wider mandate

to review existing arrangements for co-operation between Commonwealth countries in the field of education and to make recommendations for any improvement or expansion that may be possible, particularly in regard to the supply and training of teachers.¹⁴⁴

In the interim, External Affairs was charged with the task of communicating with Canadian educationalists to assess how the Plan might best be formulated. By the new year, a sub-committee under Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Douglas Le Pan, was able to report to

the Interdepartmental Committee on External Aid Policy that the scholarship scheme should endorse "outward" as well as "inward" awards.¹⁴⁵ Whereas Whitehall evidently was interested in providing places for students from other Commonwealth countries to study in the United Kingdom, Mr. Le Pan's working committee had found that the Canadian university community was strongly in favour of reciprocal arrangements on the basis that there should be no a priori assumption that some countries have everything to give and others everything to receive from the scheme. Reciprocity was, therefore, expected to be central to the Canadian position at the next Commonwealth Education conference.

The conference was convened in Oxford from 16 to 28 July, 1959 during which period of time the scope and details for CSFP were to be worked out. While in Montreal the Plan was essentially conceived as a method to supplement programs that already existed for providing educational and technical assistance to developing countries. However, Canada's High Commissioner in London George Drew, who was head of the Canadian delegation, emphasized in his opening remarks the need to support scholarship opportunities in the more developed Commonwealth countries:

The plan for scholarships and fellowships should not be regarded as one designed simply for the purpose of opening new opportunities to scholars of the less-developed parts of the Commonwealth. Naturally it is our desire that such opportunities be made available on the widest possible scale, but we

regard this as a reciprocal plan through which selected young men and women from every part of the Commonwealth will gain a better understanding of the life, culture and institutions of other countries in the Commonwealth. We believe that we Canadians shall gain no less than the smaller and newer members of the Commonwealth if our young scholars are able to increase their knowledge and understanding of the wider problems and aspirations within the Commonwealth through the operation of such a programme. 146

Mr. Drew thus wanted to promote an open-ended scholarship plan by increasing its scope to include more students from developed countries than might first have been anticipated.

Having expressed Canada's interest in a reciprocal educational scheme, Mr. Drew proceeded " to express some personal opinions" about the need " to define in simple and understandable terms the aims and objects . . . of the word " Education " and concluded by requesting

that this Conference will formulate a declaration setting forth, in clear and simple words, the ethical and practical concepts of education within the Commonwealth which we are prepared to support.

We can produce nothing more valuable at this Conference than a clear statement of our aims and objectives in words which will give life, vitality and increasing strength to the system of education which we seek to encourage throughout the whole Commonwealth. 147

There was little doubt that the senior Canadian delegate's initiative was entirely his own since there is no evidence

that Ottawa was interested in a declaration of the concepts of education in the Commonwealth. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, John Holmes, who served as deputy of the delegation, confirmed that his department had not been privy to Mr. Drew's idea, explaining that "this was an aberration of Drew's which caused us a great headache as no one else wanted it."¹⁴⁸

In fact, following his opening statement at the conference, the High Commissioner informed the Secretary of State for External Affairs that he had called for a declaration of the principles of education to stimulate the interest of the public and to put some imagination into the conference.¹⁴⁹ Mr. Drew's proposal was not ignored entirely inasmuch as a number of his ideas found expression in the preamble of the final report of the conference. The report referred to the Commonwealth as an "experiment in human relationship," and education was regarded as fundamental to the ultimate "strength and stability of the Commonwealth and to social justice and human dignity which must be its inspiration."¹⁵⁰ In addition, the conference shared the belief that the Commonwealth offered a "special opportunity for pooling of resources" and implied "an obligation on those with more highly developed educational facilities to help their fellow Members."

But a Commonwealth declaration per se was not pursued. Rather, the conference proceeded to detail the arrangements requisite to the scholarship scheme and examine the

possibility for improved cooperation in Commonwealth teacher training. The outcome was that an agreement was reached on the reciprocal exchange of scholarships, putting greater emphasis on the training and supply of teachers as well as on lending additional support to technical assistance in the developing areas of the Commonwealth. Aside from the academic positions announced by Great Britain and Canada at the Montreal conference, Australia and India each offered 100 places, Pakistan 30, New Zealand 25, Malaya 12, Ghana, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland ten each, Ceylon six and the East African Community four.¹⁵¹ In terms of machinery to administer the Plan, the conference recommended that

it should be operated on the basis of bilateral arrangements to allow for the necessary flexibility . . . to take account of the diverse and changing needs of the countries of the Commonwealth."

It was further agreed that another educational conference should be held in two years time to review the progress of the scheme. Accordingly, a committee was created composed of representatives from Commonwealth offices in London, and under its direction an administrative unit was formed, to prepare for the conference and keep intra-Commonwealth cooperation in education under review during the interim period.

CSFP came into effective operation with the beginning of the academic year in September 1960, and it made

substantial progress towards achieving its goal of having 1000 scholars studying throughout the Commonwealth. The purpose of the New Delhi Conference, from 11 to 25 January 1962, was to review the development of the Plan and to suggest areas for improvement.¹⁵² There seemed to be two primary issues arising from the conference involving the possibility of expanding the program and setting up more centralized machinery for its administration. In considering these questions the Canadian delegation appeared to take the approach that no substantial changes were required.

It was evident that one concern of the developing member states was their desperate need for a greater supply of trained teachers and technicians. But the Canadian delegation was hardly in a position to offer any additional positions insofar as the government had committed Canada to an annual expenditure of \$1,000,000 for CSFP during the initial five year period. However, the delegation assured the conference that within the framework of existing Canadian aid programs increased emphasis would be given to education according to the requests of individual recipients.¹⁵³ Consequently, the conference recorded that although some donors were restricted in the total amount of their assistance, "a principle of maximum flexibility within the Plan is commended so that the greatest benefit may be obtained by each country from the resources available."¹⁵⁴ Increased institutionalization of the Plan was rejected as well. One of the benefits of the method of

operation employed under CSFP was the opportunity for bilateral exchanges of views. To have a central bureau act on behalf of member state administrative agencies might have detracted from the cooperative spirit which existed. Accordingly, the conference refrained from adding administrative machinery:

Clearly the benefits of co-operation and the experience of arrangements to facilitate Commonwealth co-operation in education by the normal methods of bilateral contacts have increased confidence. On the basis of this experience the Conference decided that the machinery should now be confirmed as an instrument which Governments could constructively use.¹⁵⁵

Under the circumstances the Canadian delegation seemed to have achieved its objectives. Economic and administrative expansion were controlled. Yet the primary objective of the Plan was secured because a closer understanding among members of the Commonwealth had indeed been fostered by cooperation in education.

CSFP began in the fiscal year 1960-1961 with Canada rapidly assuming its full scholarship commitment. Though only 650 scholars had taken up positions studying in Commonwealth countries by summer 1961, by the end of 1961-1962 over a thousand awards had been granted, of which, Mr. Diefenbaker announced:

nearly 200 scholars from other lands in the Commonwealth are pursuing courses at Canadian Universities. At the same time, 61 Canadian scholars have accepted awards to study in other Commonwealth countries under the plan.¹⁵⁶

The Plan still operates as an active example of the Commonwealth relationship. It was a joint venture in its planning

stages, but it was Canada rather than the United Kingdom which had enthusiastically proposed the establishment of Commonwealth scholarships. Once again, it was the PC Government that sought a Commonwealth program, presumably to strengthen links within the association through a bilateral exchange program aimed at emphasizing the Commonwealth's educational heritage.

An important aspect of CSFP is its reciprocal character. By encouraging Third World members to make contributions, the Plan implied that the Western member states were recognizing that their developing partners had something to offer and, more significant, the old members were willing to learn from the new. The cumulative effect was to develop some understanding of the problems and frustrations encountered by each which, over time, might help to reduce the gap accentuated by their differences. Aside from developing understanding amongst the peoples of the Commonwealth, CSFP was conceived for an important economic reason. The development of Britain's territories into self-governing states increased their need for educational assistance as the colonial administrators withdrew. Through CSFP the more developed members countries were able to supplement programs of human assistance shortly after the first Commonwealth African country gained independence.

But perhaps the primary motivation for founding the educational exchange program was to revitalize the educational cultural experience that was well-rooted in the Commonwealth prior to the addition of its new members.

Among the indigenous elite of the former British colonies there had been a propensity to become educated in the mother country which often developed an appreciation or some understanding of Western ideas and institutions. As these countries achieved self-government, their elites increasingly were becoming educated in local institutions. As a consequence, many new states were seen to be interpreting the Commonwealth solely in terms of national self-interest with little regard for the traditional values of the association. Quite rightly, African leaders wanted more tangible benefits from the Commonwealth. Intra-Commonwealth educational exchanges afforded the future governing elites of these countries an increased awareness of the constitutional, legal and cultural heritage of the association. It was expected that CSFP might influence their attitudes positively towards the Commonwealth and strengthen the bond between members.

Conclusion

Canada's bilateral aid programs have been described in terms of their origin and development during the period from 1950 until 1963. The governments' attitudes towards development assistance have been considered. It may be worthwhile to summarize who shaped this policy and what external and domestic influences affected Canadian policy-making. Specifically, what was the role of the External Affairs department under both

the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments, and what international actors were important in the formulation of their foreign policy? What constraints did Parliament, interest groups and public opinion pose on Canadian external aid? Finally, in what way did Canada's Commonwealth membership affect its approach to development assistance?

The Department of External Affairs was closely associated with Liberal governments, and particularly with External Affairs Secretary Lester Pearson, who had served in the department from 1928 until 1948 during which time he rose to the position of Under-Secretary. Perhaps Mr. Pearson commanded the respect of the Department not so much because of his position as Minister as the personal rapport that he had developed with members of External before becoming a politician. Besides Pearson's personal connections with External Affairs, he had also developed a relationship of mutual respect with Prime Minister St. Laurent while he had acted as his Under-Secretary. Both men held similar views with regard to international affairs. The principles of foreign policy to which they subscribed were cogently summed up by Robert Spencer as

close cooperation within the Commonwealth though without rigid commitments to it or exclusive arrangements within it; close cooperation with the United States though with careful regard to Canadian sovereignty; and reliance on international organization.¹⁵⁷

It is evident from the preceding examination of Canada's development assistance program that Louis St. Laurent and

Lester Pearson operated within this framework with regard to external aid.

Essentially, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs considered that Canada had a responsibility to assist international economic development. Canada was participating in the UN Expanded Program for Technical Assistance and such specialized agencies as the Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization before its involvement with the Colombo Plan. But Colombo marked Canada's entry into the field of bilateral assistance to developing countries, and it was a Commonwealth initiative. If the association was to serve effectively as a vehicle for the decolonization of an empire, some practical reasons had to be advanced for former colonies to join. Aid was perceived by the St. Laurent government as a means to put purpose into the Commonwealth. Certainly the movement of capital and technical assistance from the more developed to the developing members helped to secure its continued existence.

St. Laurent and Pearson were also aware that since World War II there had been a steady growth of Canada's military and economic dependence upon the United States. They saw Commonwealth membership as a way to counterbalance American influence. As a partner in NORAD and a member of NATO, Canadian interests were subject to those of the most dominant country though those interests did not necessarily differ. But it was evident in 1950 that Canada's trade with its fellow Commonwealth members had declined substantially whereas its economic

relations with the United States had become more closely knit. In order to avoid a loss in Canada's economic bargaining position with the Americans, Ottawa wanted to diversify its trade by developing closer relations with the Commonwealth. Canada had become less wary about Commonwealth centralization, real or imagined, and was interested in encouraging closer collaboration, particularly with Asian members. South Asia offered a future alternative for trade, and an opportunity to provide a counterbalance to American influence. Indeed, Canada's new found relations with Commonwealth Asia clearly represented its early interest in the "third option."

Although the Cabinet's decision to join the Colombo Plan was deferred for several months, St. Laurent eventually sided with Pearson to effect a consensus in favour of External Affairs' recommendation for Canadian participation. Ottawa's interest in Colombo, following a cautious introductory phase, was unquestionably indicative of Canada's Commonwealth interests. There is little doubt that Canada's involvement in United Nations activities would have eventually focused Ottawa's attention on South Asia. But Canada's participation in the Colombo scheme developed immediate and fruitful relations between Canada and that part of the world, and particularly with India. In 1954, for example, Prime Minister St. Laurent made a tour of the subcontinent, and two years later committed Canada to assist non-aligned India with the development of a nuclear reactor.¹⁵⁸

If St. Laurent's impact on Canadian foreign policy could be partially attributed to a close relationship with his Minister for External Affairs who had the confidence of the Department, Mr. Diefenbaker may have been the antithesis. Precisely because External Affairs was so closely associated with the outgoing Liberal administration over the past two decades, the Department was held suspect by the Prime Minister. Though one could argue that there was a smooth transition between governments, effective communication between the Prime Minister and External Affairs was limited during the PC administration. This occurred in spite of the energetic and professional liaison provided by H. Basil Robinson who served as a special foreign policy adviser on loan to the Prime Minister from the Department of External Affairs. Peter Newman cited an extraordinary example of this lack of consultation:

~~Norman Robertson, one of Canada's most distinguished diplomats who served as the Department's Under-secretary through most of the Diefenbaker Years, was formally consulted only twice by the Prime Minister during the six years of Conservative rule.¹⁵⁹~~

However, Mr. Diefenbaker had a penchant for working individually, and he was perhaps not at all sure that he could engender the enthusiasm and confidence of those who had been so intimately associated with the new Liberal leader, Lester Pearson.

If External Affairs was to have influence on Canadian foreign policy, it should have been ultimately achieved through the Minister. However, both Dr. Smith and Mr. Green

were dominated by John Diefenbaker who had relinquished the position himself prior to their appointments. Aside from a lack of experience with either foreign affairs or Parliament, Sidney Smith was probably most hampered by his inability to command authority in the Cabinet on policy matters. Whether Mr. Diefenbaker ever intended Dr. Smith to have any impact on his own foreign policy preconceptions, it was evident that the Secretary of State for External Affairs never secured any measure of autonomy from the Prime Minister.¹⁶⁰ Following Dr. Smith's death in March 1959, and Mr. Diefenbaker's twelve weeks as Minister for External Affairs, an experienced politician and a friend of the Prime Minister took office. Although Howard Green was sincere, honest and strong-principled, and enjoyed the trust of Mr. Diefenbaker and influence in the Cabinet, he did not have a voice independent from the Prime Minister but rather assumed the approach of his leader.

Foreign policy was, therefore, dependent on Mr. Diefenbaker who, together with Howard Green, had the task of interpreting the international environment and formulating a practicable role for Canada to play in world affairs. It was apparent that neither of them had been impressed with the functional approach to international organization practised by their predecessors. They perceived Canada as something more than a "middle-power." In fact, Mr. Green declared to the House of Commons in February 1960 that

Canada had come of age; it was time

to drop the idea that Canada's role in world affairs is to be an 'honest broker' between nations. We must decide instead that our role is to determine the right stand to take on problems, keeping in mind the Canadian background and, above all, using Canadian common sense. In effect, the time has come to take an independent approach. 161

Embodied in this view was a concept of the Northern Vision, conceiving Canada among the world leaders, which was adopted by Mr. Diefenbaker as a pillar of his foreign policy. Even though Canada's immediate post war influence was on the decline, the Progressive Conservative government believed that Canada's Commonwealth membership as well as its vast resources combined to give the senior Dominion substantial status in the world community.

While the UN, NATO and the United States remained important considerations, for the Diefenbaker administration the Commonwealth was the keystone of Canadian foreign policy. The Prime Minister was never reluctant to point out his party's close association with the Commonwealth, reminding the opposition in a reply to the Speech from the Throne in January 1962

that the foundation of the Conservative party is close relationship with the British Commonwealth. That was our foundation when it was an empire and that has continued to be the foundation ever since. 162

The Commonwealth was also perceived as essential, to preserving Canada's identity from American influence. Successive Canadian governments had been sensitive to the magnitude of American wealth and power. In order to prevent themselves from being engulfed culturally, economically and ultimately politically by the United States, Canadians were increasingly becoming interested in reducing the interdependence between the nations or, at least rectifying the imbalance. This was the aim of the Progressive Conservatives. Former Vice-President of the PC party, George Hogan, put it this way:

Conservatives have always looked upon the Commonwealth as a counterbalance to the otherwise almost overwhelming influence of American economic and cultural forces upon our society...What we must avoid is complete dependence upon the United States; and this we can best do by associating with another world body with whom we are also interdependent. In economic and cultural interdependence with these two great balancing powers lies Canada's great hope for political independence from both.¹⁶³

In order to strengthen the Commonwealth connection as a counterweight to Washington, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced at the Montreal Trade and Economic Conference that he intended to increase Canada's trade to Britain by 15 per cent although he was advised by the Cabinet Secretary, Robert Bryce, not to give a specific figure.¹⁶⁴ Of course the Prime Minister was hoisted on his own petard when the Macmillan government proposed a tariff cut on commodities to stimulate such an increase, but which would have had a negative impact on a less than competitive Canadian industry.

Since the attempt for expanded Commonwealth trade proved inoperative, the PC government transferred their Commonwealth commitment to external aid. This was no mean commitment inasmuch as Keith Spicer had ascertained in 1965 that Canada's assistance to UN programs represented "no more than about one-fifth of all official Canadian development aid since 1950,"¹⁶⁵ and Canada virtually provided all of its bilateral development assistance to Commonwealth countries. The three Commonwealth assistance programs that were created during Mr. Diefenbaker's term in office did little to alter the economic dependence of Canada on the United States, but they were clear evidence of the Commonwealth's presence in Canadian affairs.

In sum, both Prime Ministers had a strong interest in Canadian foreign policy, and each played an influential role in Canada's approach to economic development assistance. Canada's aid commitments were subject to the approval of Parliament, and to public assessment, yet the success which governments had in securing funds under Commonwealth programs in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean suggests that there were few restraints.

During the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker administrations, MPs seemed to indicate through their debate and questions in committee a general satisfaction that the government was fulfilling Canada's international aid responsibilities.¹⁶⁶ On occasion the opposition indicated that the government may not have been going fast enough or even far enough, but its support was forthcoming nonetheless. For example, following the Sydney Conference in 1950, opposition parties urged that the

Liberal government should show greater interest in, and make a firm commitment towards Canada's participation in a co-operative development scheme for South and Southeast Asia.¹⁶⁷

When the St. Laurent government proposed Canada's contribution to the Colombo Plan in the Throne Speech, there was a favourable response from the main opposition parties. Mr. Pearson drew reference to Parliament's positive reaction in a statement to the House on 21 February 1951:

The Canadian government has been giving very serious consideration to the course of action which should be recommended to parliament. We have been conscious that Canadians, as individuals—and this has been clearly reflected in the press from one end of the country to the other—wish to contribute to the success of this plan [Colombo]. This desire of the people of Canada, to extend assistance, has also been clearly shown in the debate on the speech from the throne. It was reflected by the remarks of the leader of the opposition, (Mr. Drew) when he expressed his confidence that members of the house would support all practical measures which will bring hope and encouragement to those who are in such great distress in so many parts of the world. It was reflected also in the remarks of the member for Rosetown-Biggan, (Mr. Coldwell) when he called the Colombo plan the most imaginative ever adopted by the commonwealth countries.¹⁶⁸

In June 1962, after a period of low economic growth and high unemployment resulting in an inflated currency, the PC Government announced a temporary cut of \$8.5 million in Canada's Colombo Plan allocation for the fiscal year 1962-1963. Opposition parties were critical of the 17 per cent reduction. Perhaps the most condemnatory statement was issued by the New Democratic Party's David Lewis, who labelled the government's retrenchment as "an act of meanness in a world which cries out for generosity."¹⁶⁹

Several influential sectors of Canadian society, including labour and business, and the religious and academic communities, appeared to be favourably disposed towards increased foreign aid. The Canadian Peace Research Institute survey in late 1962, for example, indicated that a number of "elite" groups would support an increase in Canadian external aid.¹⁷⁰ Responses to the CPRI Poll, and a French-speaking survey conducted in 1963 by Claude Lemelin and Jean-Claude Marion, indicated that the Canadian public was well disposed towards external aid.¹⁷¹ Since the bulk of Canadian aid went to Commonwealth countries, it is possible that the public may have been inclined towards providing assistance because they favoured ties with that association. Certainly Dr. Mildred Schwartz' study, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, had revealed that Canadian membership in Commonwealth initiatives commanded wide public support.¹⁷² Yet it is questionable whether the public is aware of the relevance of the Commonwealth in Canadian aid policy or even of the concept of development assistance. Without any sophisticated studies concentrated exclusively on external aid, it would be difficult to reach any broad conclusions. Perhaps all that can be concluded was put most cogently by Howard Green when he told the House of Commons in 1961 that foreign aid obviously was "supported by Canadians from coast to coast" because he had "heard very few complaints about Canada supplying aid."¹⁷³

Since the Parties and public supported the St. Laurent or Diefenbaker governments' external aid policies from 1950 until 1963, it would be worthwhile considering how Canada's Commonwealth membership affected the direction of Canadian aid and the governments' attitudes towards providing development assistance to its fellow member states.

The Colombo Plan was the main vehicle of Canadian development assistance during this thirteen-year period, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of Canada's bilateral allocations with almost all of this assistance going to Commonwealth countries in Asia.¹⁷⁴ Ottawa was attracted to Colombo for a variety of reasons, but the government essentially wanted to help to contain communism and to preserve world peace by assisting economic development in southern Asia. It was unrealistic to expect that political stability could be secured in a region where the vast majority of the peoples were bordering on starvation. Moreover, the Asian members of the Commonwealth expected help from their fellow members. If the association was not able to meet this challenge, it was possible that the newer members might question the value of their continued membership. In addition to putting some meaning into the multiracial Commonwealth, economic development assistance provided an opportunity for Canada

to collaborate with the Indians with whom contact would have been otherwise much more limited. In fact, Escott Reid, Canadian High Commissioner to India during the mid-1950s, considered that Canada's participation in the Colombo Plan had a revolutionary impact on Canadian foreign policy because previous to 1950 it had little communication with South Asia.¹⁷⁵ Whether or not Canada's burgeoning relations with southern Asia was revolutionary, it is reasonable to assume that Ottawa would not have been involved with assisting the developing countries of Commonwealth Asia quite as early if Canada had not been a member of the Commonwealth.

Historically, Canada had had trade relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean, and it was interested in any scheme aimed at promoting the economic development of this region. Consequently, Canadian bilateral aid expanded beyond Colombo in 1958 with the inception of the Canada-West Indies Aid Program. Yet the five-year plan of \$10 million was to serve the Commonwealth countries to the exclusion of the other countries in the region. It would, therefore, seem likely that Canada had become involved in providing external aid to the British Caribbean precisely because of its forthcoming Commonwealth membership, and "Canada naturally has a family concern," Prime Minister Diefenbaker stressed, "for those countries achieving independence within the Commonwealth."¹⁷⁶ Of course, Canada always had closer communications with the

Commonwealth Caribbean than Latin America. Aside from historical reasons for this relationship, Canada shared a common language and similarities in government, legal and administrative institutions. Institutional commonalities and certain shared values made the Commonwealth Caribbean a better export market for Canada's goods and services and a more obvious recipient of its aid. Moreover, while assisting the economic development of the West Indies Federation Canada was assisting itself by contributing to the stability of the Western hemisphere and strengthening Commonwealth ties.

As British colonies in Africa approached independence, CTAP was devised as a means to provide technical assistance without interfering in colonial affairs. As more countries assumed self-governing status, Canadian aid to Africa became administered under SCAAP beginning in the 1961-1962 fiscal year. Whereas Canada allocated \$10.5 million for a three-year period to Commonwealth Africa, its assistance to Francophone Africa was relatively non-existent at this time, in spite of the fact that French and British decolonization in Africa occurred simultaneously. But the growth of self-government in Anglophone Africa put demands upon the senior members of the Commonwealth to assist with the economic development of these emerging nations. However, Canada's provision of external aid was viewed less as a responsibility to its Commonwealth partners than as a

means to preserve the multiracial association. Based on the assumption that Canada gives aid because it is in its interest to do so, the government evidently believed that the provision of external assistance would promote closer relations with Commonwealth Africa. "Commonwealth ties thus not only determined the focus of Canadian aid in Africa (at least until the mid-1960s) " Professor Robert Matthews has stated, "to the extent that Canadian officials felt the association worth perpetuating, these ties directly promoted the granting of aid itself."¹⁷⁷

In the meantime, CSFP had been created to supplement existing educational programs within the association through a bilateral exchange aimed at emphasizing the Commonwealth's educational heritage. The Canadian government provided \$1 million to subsidize about 250 scholarships each year, primarily for students of developing countries to study in Canada. While CSFP ostensibly was to develop the bonds of understanding between new and old members, it implied yet another attempt by the Diefenbaker government to strengthen Canada's links with that association.

In sum, the overriding emphasis in Canada's aid programs during the period under investigation was to assist developing countries of the Commonwealth. Yet less developed Commonwealth countries represented only one-third of the world's poor.¹⁷⁸ That 98 per cent of Canada's bilateral aid in this period went to Commonwealth countries (see Table 1) is conclusive evidence of the importance of this association to at

least this one area of Canadian foreign policy.

TABLE 1

Canada's Bilateral Development Assistance

	1950-1963 <u>fiscal years</u> <u>\$ million Canadian</u>
Colombo Plan (Commonwealth Asia-412.55)	423.18
Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program	8.90
Commonwealth Technical Assistance Plan	.54
Special Commonwealth Africa Aid Program	4.72
Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan	2.05
French-Speaking Africa Assistance Program	.37
Total	<u>439.76</u> 179

The St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments probably perceived sentimental value in assisting fellow citizens of the Commonwealth. Giving to Commonwealth partners at least enabled Ottawa to sell aid more effectively to the Canadian public on humanitarian grounds. Of course there were very practical reasons for assisting Commonwealth countries because inter-Commonwealth links improved the administrative coordination of Canadian aid. It also made sense that Canada's assistance should be concentrated most in those places where there were better chances of identifiable Canadian impact. Besides the practicalities of insuring effective aid utilization, there were very real political concerns. The furnishing of development assistance was initially considered by Canadian governments as a way to improve the standards of living in poorer countries, particularly

those of Commonwealth Asia, so that communist ideology would be less attractive. Moreover, both the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker administrations wanted to encourage Third World participation in the Commonwealth to give it reason for its continued existence.

In conclusion, Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Diefenbaker together with the support of their respective Ministers for External Affairs were mainly responsible for shaping aid policy which consisted of broadening Canada's interests abroad by closer cooperation with Commonwealth countries. Whereas the Liberal government was sensitive to the possibility that Commonwealth structures and programs would deride the importance of UN activities, during the PC administration there was a strong pro-Commonwealth approach. Canadian foreign aid was extended by both governments for a combination of idealistic, practical and diplomatic reasons. But in the last analysis, the assistance was directed towards Commonwealth countries, presumably to strengthen their economies as well as the Commonwealth relationship, and in so doing, gain good will for Canada abroad. Thus, Canada's Commonwealth membership was the reason for its initial involvement in providing bilateral aid to developing nations and directly influenced the government's attitudes towards development assistance during the period, 1950-1963.

NOTES: CHAPTER IV

¹Development assistance became recognized as the allocation of financial and human resources in the form of grants or loans, in terms more favourable than would be obtained through commercial means, from more developed to less developed nations. External aid could therefore be regarded as all public and private resource transfers between nations. But this chapter will focus solely on bilateral public transfers composed of capital and technical (including military) assistance.

²For a detailed summary of Canadian contributions to relief, reconstruction and the European Recovery Program, see Robert Spencer, Canada in World Affairs, 1946-1949, Toronto, OUP, 1959, pp. 189-206, 229-242.

³Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Norman Robertson, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 and 13 October 1948, DEA files.

⁴Robertson to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 14 October 1948, ibid.

⁵Robertson to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 5 November 1948, ibid.

⁶Robertson to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 October 1948, ibid.

⁷The Hindustan Times, editorial, 22 October 1948.

⁸Hume Wrong to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 14 December 1949, ibid.

⁹Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Norman Robertson, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 December 1949, DEA files.

¹⁰Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, Sydney University Press, 1969, p. 208.

Aside from Spender's book, a half of which is aimed at proving that Australia in general and he in particular was responsible for conceiving the Colombo Plan, the most detailed account of the Colombo, Sydney and London Commonwealth conferences of 1950 is found in Douglas Le Pan's, Bright Glass of Memory, Toronto, McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1979, pp. 145-226.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 210.

¹³Ibid., p. 216-220.

¹⁴Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 108.

¹⁵Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, op.cit., pp. 223-230.

¹⁶For this statement, see ibid., p.205; and for the remainder of the paragraph, see LePan, Bright Glass, op.cit., p.177.

¹⁷SS 50/6, "The Colombo Conference", Lester Pearson's statement in the House of Commons, 22 February 1950, p. 5.

¹⁸Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II., op.cit., p. 109.

¹⁹A.F.W. Plumptre to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs A.D.P. Heeney, 3 April 1950, DEA files.

²⁰Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 109-110. Additional quotations in this paragraph were taken from the same source.

²¹Research material.

²²Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II., op.cit., p. 110.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Spender, Exercises, op.cit., p. 252.

²⁵Ibid., p. 254.

²⁶Canada, Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1950, Ottawa, HMS, 1951, p. 3.

²⁷SS 50/27 "The Commonwealth as a Regional Force," R.G. Riddell's lecture delivered at the Mount Holyoke Institute of the United Nations on "Regional Forces in International Relations: East and West," 9 July 1950, pp. 5-6.

²⁸The Economist: London, 7 October 1950, pp. 572-573.

²⁹Holmes, "The Commonwealth: 1944-1947," op.cit.

³⁰DEA files.

³¹Mr. Pearson's statement in the House, Debates, op.cit., 5 June 1950, p. 3187.

³²Research material.

³³For detailed projections see Cmd 808, The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and

South-East Asia, Report by the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, London, 1950, pp. 51-58, 73-89. The programs for Singapore and North Borneo are included as well.

³⁴Ibid., p. 3.

³⁵Ibid., see the concluding statement.

³⁶Lester B. Pearson's letter to Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, 2 November 1950, DEA files.

³⁷Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 111.

³⁸Holmes, "The Commonwealth: 1944-1947," op.cit.

³⁹Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, loc.cit.

⁴⁰Secretary of State for External Affairs' statement in the House of Commons, Debates, op.cit., 2 February 1951.

⁴¹Holmes, "The Commonwealth: 1944-1947," op.cit.

⁴²Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. II, loc.cit.

⁴³Debates, op.cit., 21 February 1951, pp. 537-538.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵For information regarding the operation of Canada's development assistance under the Colombo Plan until 1965, see Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy, University of Toronto Press, 1966, pp. 123-242.

⁴⁶See ibid. (pp. 105-106) and A.F.W. Plumptre, "Perspective on Our Aid to Others," International Journal, summer, 1967, pp. 484-499.

⁴⁷Interview with Dr. O. E. Ault, Ottawa, 27 July 1978.

⁴⁸LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, op. cit., p. 223.

⁴⁹SS 59/13 "A New Commonwealth," a speech by the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker to a State Banquet at Kuala Lumpur, Malaya on 28 November 1958.

⁵⁰Debates, op. cit., 11 September 1961, p. 8199.

⁵¹"Canada's Aid to Commonwealth Countries," speech by Dr. O. E. Ault in Montreal to the Royal Commonwealth Society, 7 October 1959, p. 12.

⁵²Of course, commodity transfers also included industrial raw materials, but food grains comprised the bulk of commodity aid.

⁵³For example, \$20 million of wheat was given to India during the 1955-1956 fiscal year. By selling it at world prices, India was then able to finance the construction of the "Canada Dam": The New York Times, 9 January 1956.

⁵⁴Mr. Pearson argued in the House that grain surplus export in place of development assistance was interfering with recipient agricultural subsistence programs, Debates, op.cit., 9 July 1959, p. 5757.

⁵⁵Ibid., 8 January 1958, pp. 2979-2980.
The trend continued. In the 1958-1959 fiscal year Canada extended \$15 of \$34.4 million worth of aid in wheat and flour under Colombo: ibid., 17 July 1958, p. 2326. Commodity grants comprised four-fifths of Canada's aid to India and Pakistan in 1959-1960: The Ninth Annual Report, ETAB, 1960, pp. 191-192. Of \$50 million allocated under Colombo in 1960-1961, the Asian dominions received nearly \$37 million in food stuffs: The Tenth Annual Report, EAO, 1961, pp. 29-42.

⁵⁶Spicer, A Samaratin State?, op.cit., p. 182.

⁵⁷John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker: The Years of Achievement, 1957-1962, Toronto, Macmillan, 1976, p. 116.

⁵⁸Spicer, A Samaratin State?, op.cit., p. 191.

⁵⁹Munro, Inglis, One Canada, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 107.

⁶⁰SS 50/27, op.cit., p. 4.

⁶¹Debates, op.cit., 22 February 1950, pp. 130-131.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³SS 52/52 "The Colombo Plan," an address by the Administrator of the International Economic and Technical Cooperative Division, Department of Trade and Commerce, delivered at the Empire Club, Toronto, 4 December 1952, pp. 10, 11.

⁶⁴Debates, op.cit., 11 September 1961, p. 8199.

⁶⁵Cmd 9733, Report from the Conference on British Caribbean Federation held in London in February 1956. Reproduced in Mansergh, Documents, 1952-1962, op.cit., p. 165.

66 Research material.

67 Ibid.

68 Interview with Dr. O. E. Ault in Ottawa, August 1, 1979.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Interview given by the Honourable Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance, to Mr. Blair Fraser, 16 September 1957.

73 Research material.

74 Ibid.

75 Interview with Dr. O. E. Ault, op. cit.

76 The Right Honourable Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, "The Canada-West Indies Aid Programme," Press Release, 29 January 1958.

Canada's immediate objective was to promote the political-economic development of the West Indies Federation, but its aid was expanded within a few years to include other Commonwealth dependencies, and the program was more appropriately called the Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program.

77 Diefenbaker, One Canada II, op. cit., p. 194.

78 Note from Prime Minister Diefenbaker to the Prime Minister of The West Indies, 13 October 1958 (with the appended Statement of Principles) reproduced in Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy. op. cit., p. 297.

79 Interview with Dr. O. E. Ault, op. cit.

⁸⁰ SS 59/14 "Report on External Relations," 26 February 1959.

⁸¹ Interview with Dr. O. E. Ault who was the Director of ETAB during the creation of the Canada-West Indies Aid Program, 27 July 1978.

The Venezuelan vessels would not have had passenger accommodations, but neither the Federation nor its citizens could afford this luxury.

⁸² Research material.

⁸³ Spicer, A Samaritan State?, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

⁸⁴ Research material.

⁸⁵ Elisabeth Wallace provides a cogent analysis of the reasons for the break-up of the federation in The British Caribbean From the Decline of Colonialism to the end of Federation, University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 192-227.

⁸⁶ Interview with Mr. Herbert Moran in Ottawa, 16 August 1977.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Spicer, A Samaritan State?, op. cit., p. 77.

⁸⁹ Letter from Prime Minister Diefenbaker to Sir Grantley Adams, 18 October 1958 reproduced in Arthur Blanchette ed., Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1977, pp. 297-298.

A survey of ETAB and EAO annual reports from 1958 until 1963 shows that little use was made of this concession.

⁹⁰ Grant Reuber, "Why Canadian Foreign Aid?," International Journal (Winter 1958-1959), pp. 13-16.

⁹¹ Lester B. Pearson, chairman, Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development, New York, Praeger, 1969, p. 172.

⁹² SS 62/8, "The Meaning of the Commonwealth," notes prepared for an address by Prime Minister Diefenbaker to the Royal Commonwealth Society, Toronto, 30 March 1962, p. 4.

⁹³ Stephen Triantis, "Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid," World Politics (October 1971), pp. 9-10.

⁹⁴ Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 12 December 1963, p. 59 cited in Spicer, A Samaritan State?, op. cit., p. 78.

⁹⁵ Kari Levitt, Alister McIntyre, Canada-West Indies Economic Relations, sponsored by the Private Planning Association of Canada and McGill University, 1967, p. 24.

96 Douglas Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa," International Journal, Autumn 1960, p. 307.

97 Prime Minister Malan had warned Britain of South Africa's disapproval of moving the Gold Coast too hastily towards independence as early as 1951; see "Dr. Malan and the Commonwealth," The Round Table, June 1951, pp. 219-226.

98 Interview with Mr. John W. Holmes in Toronto, 20 February 1978.

99 J. D. B. Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969, London, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 133.

100 Interview with Mr. Evan Gill in St. Andrews, N. B., 24 August 1978.

101 Research material.

102 Debates, op.cit., 30 January 1958, p. 4016.

103 House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes, op.cit., 26 May 1961, p. 159 cited in Robert Matthew's "Canada and Anglophone Africa," in Peyton Lyon, ed. Canada and the Third World, Toronto, Macmillan, 1976, p. 106.

104 Research material.

105 Diefenbaker, One Canada II, op.cit., pp. 199-200.

106 Patrick Sergeant in The Daily Mail: London, 19 September 1958.

Canada's cancellation of Britain's debts, consisting of £ 392 million from the 1946 loan and £ 8 million from wartime loans would also require Britain to end discrimination against dollar imports.

107 Statement made at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, Montreal, 18 September 1954 by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and recorded in Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 283.

108 Cmnd 539 Report of the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference held in Montreal, 15-26 September 1958, para 69.

109 Ibid., para 66.

110 "Canada Suggests Colombo Type Aid for Africa," Ashanti Pioneer: Accra, 24 September 1958.

111 Interview with Mr. John W. Holmes in Toronto, 12 January 1978.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

The Volta River Project involved a large hydro-electric scheme and an aluminium refining plan which was subsidized by a consortium of aluminium producers, including Canadian, American and British companies.

114 Diefenbaker, One Canada II, op.cit., p. 194.

115 Debates, op.cit., 10 May 1960.

116 Diefenbaker, One Canada II, loc.cit.

With the establishment of SCAAP, CTAP was confined to developing Commonwealth countries outside the area covered by the new African scheme and the Colombo Plan.

117 Interview with Mr. Herbert Moran, op. cit.

118 Canada, External Aid Office, Annual Review: 1966-1967, Ottawa, 1968, p. 24.

119 Research material.

120 T & C was particularly interested in the export of Canadian designed transport aircraft such as the De Havilland-built Caribou, Otter and Buffalo. cf: Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa," op.cit. p. 108.

121 Research material. Requests for military assistance were subject to the approval of the Ministers of External Affairs and National Defence.

122 Interview with Mr. Evan Gill, op. cit.

123 "Military Assistance for Ghana," External Affairs, April 1962, pp. 136-137.

124 "Canadian Officers for Ghana Training?," Montreal Gazette, 30 January 1962.

General Alexander's dismissal was probably the result of his criticism of Ghana's policy of developing closer relations with the Soviet Union.

125 Ibid.

126 Research material.

127 Interview with Mr. Herbert Moran, op. cit.

- 128 of: External Affairs, August 1963, pp. 295-296.
- 129 Interview with Mr. Herbert Moran, op. cit.
- 130 Debates, op.cit., 29 January 1962, p. 285.
- 131 The Chinese were possibly the most keen on providing military assistance; cf: J. W. Holmes' testimony before the Senate Committee on External Affairs, op.cit., p. 34.
- 132 Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa" in Lyon, op.cit., p. 210.
- 133 Ibid., p. 109, see Table 3:4 for disbursements of Canadian military assistance in Commonwealth African countries up to 1970.
- 134 Louis Sabourin, "Canada and Francophone Africa" in Canada and the Third World, op.cit., pp. 138-139.
- 135 Ibid., p. 135.
In addition to the former Belgium territory, Zaire, African states which gained independence from France by 1960 included: Benin (formerly Dahomey), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta.
- 136 Interview with Herbert Moran, op.cit.
- 137 Jean-Marc Léger, "L'Aide à l'étranger: la compétence prime nettement les bons sentiments," Le Devoir, 28 October 1963, p. 4 cited in Spicer, A Samaritan State?, op.cit., p. 60.
- 138 Ibid., p. 57.
- 139 Interview with Dr. O. E. Ault in Ottawa, 27 July 1978.
- 140 Statement made at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, Montreal, 18 September 1958, by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 285.
- 141 Research material.
- 142 "Canadian Plan for Student Aid to be Adopted," The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 19 September 1958.
- 143 Cmnd 539, op.cit., para. 75.
- 144 Ibid., para. 76.

¹⁴⁵The information in this paragraph is consistent with the recollections of Mr. Douglas LePan, interview in Toronto, 28 March 1970.

¹⁴⁶Speech delivered to the opening session of the Commonwealth Education Conference (Oxford, 15 July 1959) by Mr. George Drew, Leader of the Canadian Delegation to the Conference, in Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 290-291.

¹⁴⁷SS 59/25 "The Commonwealth Scholarship Plan," speech by Mr. George Drew to the Commonwealth Education Conference held in Oxford, 15 July 1959, pp. 4-6.

¹⁴⁸Interview, Toronto, 17 November 1977. Dr. Ault, who was the Director of the Economic and Technical Assistance Branch and also present at the conference, confirmed that there was much "internal discussion among Canadian delegates to keep the lid on Mr. Drew's ideas," interview, op. cit.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Cmnd 841, Report of the Commonwealth Education Conference held in Oxford, 15-28 July 1959, paras 5-7.

¹⁵¹For details regarding this outcome and those referred to in the rest of the paragraph see, ibid., paras 13, 14, 65-66.

¹⁵²For information regarding the next two paragraphs see Cmnd 1655, Report of the Second Commonwealth Education Conference held in New Delhi, 11-25 January 1962.

¹⁵³Research material.

¹⁵⁴Cmnd 1655, op.cit., para. 15.

¹⁵⁵cf: Report of the Second Commonwealth Education Conference: New Delhi, 11-25 January 1962, Ministry of Education, India, item 9, p. 3.

¹⁵⁶SS 62/8 "The Meaning of the Commonwealth," speech by Prime Minister Diefenbaker to the Royal Commonwealth Society, Toronto, 30 March 1962, p. 4.

¹⁵⁷Robert Spencer, "Canadian Foreign Policy - Conservative Style," Behind the Headlines, Vol. XVIII #3, p. 4.

¹⁵⁸Prime Minister St. Laurent emphasized the fusing of closer Indo-Canadian relations in his address to the Parliament of India, SS 54/14 (23 February 1954). Further co-operation between the two nations was evident at the

1956 Consultative Meeting in Wellington when an Indo-Canadian nuclear reactor was planned to supplement India's power resources at a projected cost of \$14 million, which was to be shared equally: External Affairs, Ottawa, DEA (May 1956) pp. 113-116.

¹⁵⁹ Peter Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1963, p. 252.

¹⁶⁰ Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 18.

¹⁶¹ See James Eayrs' The Art of the Possible, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961, pp. 155-156.

There is an interesting similarity between the theme of Mr. Green's review of external affairs in 1960 and Mr. Trudeau's foreign policy review a decade later.

¹⁶² Debates, op. cit., 22 January 1962, pp. 70-71.

¹⁶³ George Hogan, The Conservatives in Canada, Toronto, Macmillan & Stewart, 1963, pp. 67-68.

¹⁶⁴ Interview, Mr. Herbert Moran, Ottawa, 16 August 1977.

¹⁶⁵ Spicer, A Samaritan State?, op. cit., p. 197.

¹⁶⁶ Mr. Erhart Regier, M.P. informed Secretary of State for External Affairs Green in 1960 that during the past eight years no member of parliament had opposed Canada's development assistance programs: Canada, SCEAND, Minutes, op. cit., 1960, p. 90.

¹⁶⁷ Debates, op. cit., 1950, 2nd session, p. 395.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 21 February 1951, pp. 527-533.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 30 October 1962, p. 1083 quoted in Feyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 352.

¹⁷⁰ Questioned with respect to whether the volume of aid should be increased, 75 per cent of labour leaders and 44 per cent of businessmen surveyed, responded that the present level of assistance was insufficient. Interestingly, 73 per cent of MP respondents were in favour of aid increases: John Paul, Jerome L'auicht, "In Your Opinion," CPRI National Poll, Clarkson, Ontario, 1963, p. 18.

¹⁷¹CPRI National Poll, op. cit.; Claude Lemelin, Jean Claude Marion, "Le Canada français et le Tiers-Monde," Ottawa, 1963, reported in "The Way to Peace: Views of 1,000 Canadians," The Globe and Mail, 15 November 1963.

The results of the surveys were:

	PER CENT RESPONDENTS	
	CPRI	Lemelin & Marion
• more aid	12	16
• about right	51	37
• too much	23	17
• no aid	3	9
• no opinion	11	19

¹⁷²Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, op. cit., p. 74, Table 16: Public support for Canadian membership on Commonwealth initiatives reached a high of 70 per cent in November 1954, dropped to 56 per cent in July 1956, and reached 62 and 55 per cent in July 1960 and March 1962, respectively.

¹⁷³Debates, op. cit., 11 September 1961, p. 8196.

¹⁷⁴EAC Review: 1966-1967, op. cit., p. 23.

Of course, Commonwealth Asia had the greatest need for development assistance, at least in terms of population and per capita income. India and Pakistan had a combined population of approximately 600 million people living on an average annual income of £ 26 (India) and £ 27 (Pakistan): UN Statistical Yearbook: 1963.

¹⁷⁵Escott Reid, "The Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy: 1947-1951," India Quarterly, Vol. 14, 1958, p. 195.

¹⁷⁶SS 60/32, "People's Want Peace not Propaganda," an address by Prime Minister Diefenbaker to the UN General Assembly, 26 September 1960, p. 8.

¹⁷⁷Matthews in Lyon, Third World, op. cit., p. 104.

¹⁷⁸ The UN Statistical Yearbook: 1963 indicates that the population of the developing countries of the world was approximately 3160 millions whereas the Commonwealth (including full member and associated states and both self-governing and dependent territories) accounted for approximately 700 millions.

¹⁷⁹ Figures adapted from EAO Review: 1966-1967, loc.cit., and A. Faturios, R. Kelson, Canada's Overseas Aid, Toronto, CIIA, 1964, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 114, 116.

CHAPTER V

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEPARTURE

To some extent the early history of the British Empire and Commonwealth was the antithesis of the multi-racial Commonwealth. The former was developed with an assumption of race superiority as the British settled or administered parts of the world, while the latter fostered decolonization and pursued race equality. To the credit of Britain and its Commonwealth partners, the transition from the old to the new did not involve a synthesis through conflict, but an evolution through peaceful change.¹ South Africa was the exception to the more enlightened Commonwealth philosophy, and its racial policy caused a conflict, at least in conceptual terms, between the convention of non-interference, based on the sovereign independence of all member states, and a growing commitment to racial equality among the membership.

Canada took a progressive attitude towards the evolving multiracial Commonwealth. This chapter describes Canada's approach towards the South African racial issue from 1947 until the Union's departure from the Commonwealth in 1961. This issue was crucial to the Commonwealth because the practice of racial discrimination by one of the members, as part of its public policy, disavowed the values that the membership considered essential to the

continued existence of the multiracial association. The purpose is to examine whether Canada's concern for the Commonwealth may have caused it to take an influential part in forcing South Africa's departure, and to suggest how the association may have affected Canada's foreign policy.

Since the Commonwealth convention of non-interference inhibited the discussion of the South African racial question within that forum, the first part of the chapter describes the attitudes and behaviour of Canada towards the issue in the United Nations from 1947 until 1959. The emphasis is on an interpretation of Canadian voting behaviour in the General Assembly in contrast to other Commonwealth member states.

In the second portion of the chapter there is an examination of the South African racial issue within the Commonwealth context. The focus of analysis is on the 1960 and 1961 Prime Ministers' meetings, and the role that Canada played in the events leading up to South Africa's departure.

The conclusion provides an assessment of the domestic and external influences that were brought to bear on Canada's Prime Minister, and it analyses the impact which the Commonwealth may have had on Mr. Diefenbaker's attitude and behaviour regarding this issue. Secondly there is a brief accounting of changes in the Canadian government's approach to South Africa, to determine how the Commonwealth affected Canada's foreign policy.

Canada, the Commonwealth, and the South African Racial Question


The Commonwealth had an understandable concern about South African racial policies, including the treatment of Indians and subsequent policy of apartheid, all of which exhibited a common characteristic - race supremacy. The white member states increasingly wished to liberalize the Union's race policy to a point where it would be more acceptable to a multiracial association, while the non-white members were insistent on securing human rights for the majority of South Africa's inhabitants. The members' dilemma was to secure the initiation of change in South Africa's race policy without explicitly challenging its autonomy. The convention of non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state was not specified in a charter, as in the case of the UN, but it was the inevitable consequence of the fact that complete self-government was the raison d'être of Commonwealth membership. Criticism of a fellow member within a Commonwealth forum generally was considered as unacceptable.

However, the Commonwealth's inter se doctrine,² which had developed from a common allegiance to the Crown, and upon which the non-interference convention was based, was less viable after 1949. New members generally did not have an affinity for a common head of state. Consequently, the convention was neither applicable to all member-states nor was it consistent with their will to criticize race supremacy. Nonetheless, the members respected the principle of non-interference to the extent that formal criticism of

South Africa was launched in forums outside the Commonwealth prior to 1960.³

One such forum was the UN, where all the Commonwealth countries were required to take some position on resolutions in the General Assembly. In this setting, the non-white members generally considered that race discrimination was an obvious example of an abuse of human rights which threatened international peace. The white member states were more apt to acknowledge that human rights were also abused by states other than South Africa, and were more interested in a legal clarification of Article 2 (7).

The question of the treatment of Indians by the Union,⁴ which disregarded the human rights section of the UN Charter, was referred to the UN by India in 1946. India submitted that Articles 1 (3), 55 and 56 distinguish human rights and identified race discrimination as falling within UN jurisdiction, whereas South Africa argued that the race question brought before the organization was essentially within its domestic jurisdiction under Article 2 (7) and not a matter for settlement under the Charter. Article 2 (7) states the limits to the jurisdiction of the UN vis à vis its member states, yet "to intervene" and "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" are open to interpretation by the UN and the International Court of Justice.



An additional problem is that the Court's interpretation of the Charter is not binding on the UN membership. Yet it is generally accepted that if a domestic situation has an impact beyond its borders, the UN may have jurisdiction over the issue without violating Article 2 (7). With the exception of a situation which threatens international peace and security, what constitutes intervention in the domestic affairs of a state is hard to determine. However, Inis Claude submits that discussion under Article 10 and investigation under Article 13 in the interests of international stability do not necessarily represent intervention.⁵ Thus certain discussions or investigations on matters within domestic jurisdiction, do not violate Article 2 (7), while others might constitute intervention.

The question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa had repercussions internationally, and while Canada was to criticize the Union's race policy, Ottawa was not prepared to support resolutions at the UN which might interfere with domestic affairs. Accordingly, in the first few years following World War II the Canadian government supported the inclusion of this racial issue on the Assembly agenda while seeking an advisory opinion from the Court as to UN jurisdiction. Thus the Canadian position was that the UNGA was a legitimate forum in which to discuss race questions, but that an advisory opinion from the Court was necessary to determine the competence of the Assembly to make recommendations. India was not pleased with Canada's voting behaviour in the General

Assembly. Prime Minister Nehru considered Canada's voting on the treatment of Indians in South Africa to be decidedly uncommitted, "even when the representatives of the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth members took [India's] side."⁶

The Canadian delegation at the UN was taking a legalistic viewpoint in order not to be drawn into a controversy in which Canada was not itself above criticism. The franchise was not extended to East Indians in British Columbia until April 1947 and Canada's discriminatory immigration policy was not altered until 1951 to admit a modest number of Commonwealth Asians. Canada's low profile in discussions of the race question may also have been a means to facilitate discussions with the Union. Such an ambition was to become much more difficult, however, when the Nationalist Party, led by Dr. D. F. Malan, won the general election in May 1948 with a declared policy of racial segregation. Within a few months the new government introduced a bill for the abolition of part two of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act which had provided for some representation of Indians by Europeans in Parliament and by Indians in the Natal Provincial Council. Although South Africans of Indian descent had never accepted this Act, demanding the franchise on the common role with Europeans, the law repealing these cosmetic provisions was significant inasmuch as it was indicative of the Nationalist government's approach to

non-white citizens.⁷ While the vast majority of South Africa's Indians were born in that country, the Malan régime did not consider them as an indigenous part of the Union's population.

But Canada was not reticent about engaging in bilateral consultations with its racially intolerant Commonwealth partner. During high level talks in December 1948, South Africa's High Commissioner te Water attempted to gain Canadian support for his country's racial policy on the basis that South Africa contained about one-half of Africa's white population and they were opposed to communism.⁸ Canada's Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, noted that non-white Africans could also act as a force against communism and recommended that South Africa relax its racial policy by respecting the clauses in the Union's constitution under which the basic human rights of the non-white population were guaranteed. Indeed, Prime Minister St. Laurent had spoken to te Water privately and had questioned the South African premise that "the white man had been ordained to occupy the greater part of the earth's surface while the coloured races remained crowded in a small part of the world."⁹

It seems as though the Canadian government may have had a more perceptive understanding of the race question than it wished to acknowledge in a public forum, and that it did not equate an independent black Africa with communism. What is more evident is that Canada did not sympathize with a state policy of race discrimination, and

that it was attempting through bilateral consultations to encourage moderation in the application of the Union's racial policy. Though the desire to play the role of "helpful fixer" initially influenced Canada's approach towards South African's policy of racial discrimination, the changing racial balance in the UN and Commonwealth would finally alter Canadian policy.

In the meantime, the Canadian delegation to the UN General Assembly voted much the same as the old Commonwealth members and the United States by taking the position that the South African question should be referred to the International Court. When, in December 1948 India invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to support its proposal to have the Assembly establish a round table conference to discuss the treatment of Indians in South Africa, Canada abstained from the resolution.¹⁰ On the other hand, the Canadian delegation did not hesitate to condemn the violation of human rights in non-Commonwealth countries. On the question of the abrogation of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Canadian statements in Committee were strongly critical of the conduct of these governments.¹¹

The Union's treatment of Indians was the forerunner of a more serious race question. An extensive program of race supremacy under Prime Minister Malan's administration had prescribed a system of separate development which

served the white South Africans to the inherent injustice of non-whites. In theory apartheid was a means for the physical separation of non-white from white society with full opportunities for each group to develop within their sphere and according to their own culture. Under this policy black South Africans were grouped into eight "Bantu homelands" where they were to enjoy the privileges of tribal citizenship. However, the homelands amounted to only approximately 13 per cent of the area of South Africa and much of these scattered parcels of land was not suitable for agriculture.¹² Since the rural homelands were inadequate to serve the needs of all their designated peoples, most black Africans were employed in the urban areas. Whereas apartheid assumes that black Africans are only temporarily resident in "white" South Africa, in fact, South African industry depends upon a permanent non-white labour force. Urban non-whites were subject to the restrictions of racial discrimination. By 1952 the rules of apartheid provided for the segregation of public utilities and residences under the Group Areas Act, Pass laws governing the freedom of movement of non-whites, and the disenfranchisement of the roughly 90 per cent non-European South Africans who were confined to specified townships at the fringe of the urban centres.¹³ South African racial policy not only withdrew the privileges of non-whites, but schools, hospitals and other basic facilities were grossly inadequate as compared to those prevailing among whites. In short,

apartheid legislation gave the sanction of the law to white domination, and by permitting Europeans to control Parliament, the armed forces, the police and the Bureau of State Security, it insured the maintenance of racial supremacy.

In contrast to our approach in the General Assembly vis à vis Eastern Europe, Canada seemed to be opposed to what it regarded as unnecessary criticism of South Africa. In 1952, Canada stood along side of its old Commonwealth partners by abstaining on resolutions calling for a UN commission to assist South Africa, India and Pakistan consultations, and to study race separation in the Union. But unlike the old Dominions, the Canadian delegation supported a subsequent resolution requesting UN member states to observe the Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁴ Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson explained to the House of Commons, on 8 December 1952, Canada's position at the UN with respect to the South African issue:

We drew a distinction between consideration in the form of discussion and consideration in the form of intervention.

We felt, and I think it is becoming the established jurisprudence and established doctrine of the United Nations, that the assembly is now competent to discuss anything as the town meeting of the world, but that does not mean that the assembly is competent to interfere in the domestic affairs of member states by certain types of resolutions or by setting-up committees or commissions to visit these countries and report and possibly take action at succeeding assemblies.¹⁵

By first abstaining and then supporting the more moderate resolution on human rights, it was probable that the

St. Laurent government was disposed toward recognizing the UN's prerogative in showing concern about human rights while indicating that such concern should be prohibited from interfering with a state's internal affairs.

During the period from 1953 until 1956 Canadian representatives to the UN General Assembly favoured the discussion of South African racial policy in order to assert some moderate pressure of world opinion on the Nationalist government. But like the old Commonwealth members, Canada voted against the resolution in 1954 requiring the Commission to pursue its study of South African racial policy.¹⁶ Such an initiative was considered an ineffective measure which might isolate the Union from the world organization. Moreover, the Liberal government was apparently concerned that the UN was not contributing to a practicable solution by renewing the mandate of the Commission. In a statement to the Ad Hoc Political Committee with regard to the Commission, the Permanent Canadian Representative, Mr. R. A. Mackay, noted that:

from its inception [in 1952] we have doubted the wisdom of the procedure. Aware that the Government of South Africa was not disposed to cooperate with the Commission, we viewed its establishment not only as bordering on the kind of intervention which the Charter prohibits but, and this was a much more compelling reason in our view, as a procedure which would not yield worthwhile results.¹⁷

Indeed, following the inscription of the apartheid issue on the agenda of the eleventh session, South Africa recalled its delegates from the UN.

The St. Laurent government had been reluctant to vote against South Africa in order to prevent the racial issue from becoming irreconcilable. But it was also anxious to avoid being labelled as a state which condoned racial discrimination. In essence, this government wanted to be considered as progressive by Third World countries while it avoided, at least publicly, taking a stand along side of the emerging Asian and African nations on a crucial colonial issue. Yet even in bilateral consultations with the Union government, it appears as though Canada did not officially take any initiative to try to engender a relaxation of the apartheid policy because that would have been counter-productive.¹⁸ However, if Ottawa would not instruct its diplomats to make representations relating to South Africa's racial policies, it was not because the St. Laurent government was sympathetic to South Africa but because it was being realistic. Ottawa was under no illusions as to the uncompromising Boer mentality. It was apparent that Pretoria was determined that apartheid would be a workable solution to the "non-white dilemma," at least within their lifetime. On the basis of that assumption the Nationalist government refused to take steps towards admitting non-white representation in the House of Assembly.¹⁹

Canada's Progressive Conservative government took a tack similar to its predecessor. By anticipating that further debate on the South African issue was likely to have little beneficial effect, the Canadian delegation refrained from supporting a UN resolution in 1957 that singled South Africa

out for criticism. In fact the Department of External Affairs considered that Canadian support for Article 2(7) may have been a persuasive factor in South Africa's decision to return to the Assembly in 1958.²⁰ Thus, Canada's course of action under the Diefenbaker administration appeared to involve a tacit understanding with Pretoria to disagree on its racial policy while maintaining a posture of conciliation rather than one of condemnation.

In 1958, Canada supported a resolution mildly critical of South Africa's racial policy. The government probably expected that a reasonable statement, which would receive the overwhelming support of the UN membership including that of New Zealand and the United States, might promote moderate change in the Union. This attitude was consistent with standard Canadian policy at that time on issues such as Algeria and New Guinea. Canada sought to get a moderate resolution passed in place of extreme resolutions of one kind or another in the hope that this might have some positive effect or at least not make things worse. When the Canadian delegation abstained on a similar resolution the following year despite the continued support of New Zealand and the United States, Professor Douglas Anglin had grounds for charging the Government with inconsistency:

It is doubtful if even the 1958 resolution, un-revised, would have been acceptable to Canada in 1959. In fact, Canada abstained on one paragraph which merely recalled the resolution which Canada had voted for a year earlier.²¹

But the Minister for External Affairs, Howard Green, later explained to the House of Commons that it was important at

that time, to refrain from supporting "paragraphs [of the resolution] which named South Africa," and correspondence from High Commissioner Hurley to the Secretary of State for External Affairs during August 1959 corroborates Mr. Green's statement to parliament.²² Mr. Hurley had communicated to Ottawa his belief that if Canada's voting behaviour continued to be generally supportive in the Assembly that South Africa would be prepared to take a more cooperative approach to UN resolutions.

International condemnation of South Africa had led increasingly to the isolation of that country rather than to a modification of its policies. The PC government considered itself to be in a position to plead for a relaxation of South African racial policy because it had confidence in its own tolerance towards peoples of different races. A discriminatory immigration policy which had acted as an Achilles heel for the Liberal administration was being revised by the PC government to remove regulations which discriminated on the basis of race.²³ Canada's approach at the UN had been one of conciliation, to prevent the Union from being isolated outside the world community from the influence of world opinion. Yet if Ottawa were to take the advice of its High Commissioner to South Africa, it would have been inclined to try to develop some influence in Pretoria.²⁴ But was it realistic to believe that Canadian views might gain weight with the Nationalist government towards winning a gradual relaxation of South Africa's racial policy? Was it reasonable by 1959 to assume that compromise was possible

if an increase in the civil and political rights of the non-white South Africans was accompanied by the preservation of sufficient protection for the white minority? It is far more likely that Ottawa would try to retain Canada's reputation as a helpful-fixer as long as there was a possibility, however remote, for constructive changes in South African racial policy.

Opposition to South Africa's racial policy had developed as countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America gained statehood and membership in the UN and declared that the perpetuation of apartheid in South Africa constituted a threat to world peace. Communist countries took the side of these Third World states from the outset, declaring that the Union's practice of racial discrimination towards its non-white population was a form of colonialism. Western powers increasingly criticized the racial policy of the Nationalist government as contravening the spirit of the Charter, but generally regarded the matter as falling within domestic jurisdiction.

But South Africa's apartheid policy had made that country an object of international opprobrium. By the end of the 1950s the only Western nations consistently refusing to criticize South Africa on the race question were Portugal, Australia and the United Kingdom. Portugal remained firmly committed to its colonial policy. Australia was, perhaps, defensive about its approach towards

aborigines and hesitant about criticizing a fellow Commonwealth member. Britain had economic and security ties with South Africa, yet it was becoming concerned about the threat the Union posed to the unity of the Commonwealth. Former colonial powers were also becoming reluctant to be associated with South Africa in order to promote better relations with their former colonies. With the realization of self-government among the nations of black Africa together with the reduction of European power on that continent, Washington was concerned about being regarded as an ally of South Africa, and the United States also joined in condemning apartheid. Thus, the balance of power, at least in the General Assembly, had gradually tipped in almost total opposition to South Africa during the years from 1947 until 1959.

South Africa's Departure

In the Commonwealth, it was becoming increasingly evident that there would be less restraint among the members in criticizing South Africa's racial policy. Not only had the value of the association, serving as a forum to promote closer relations between peoples of different races, been handicapped by the presence of a member which practised a public policy of racial discrimination, but the continued existence of the Commonwealth as a multiracial entity was at stake. In February 1960 Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, spoke to the Union's Parliament of the need for changes in its race policy to be more consistent with the expectations of a multiracial Commonwealth:

As a fellow member of the Commonwealth we always try and, I think, we have succeeded, in giving to South Africa our full support and encouragement, but I hope you won't mind my saying frankly that there are some aspects of your policy which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men which in our territories we are trying to give effect.²⁵

The Canadian Government considered that such criticism aimed at initiating a progressive change in the apartheid policy was beneficial. However, in response to a brief submitted by the Canadian Labour Congress, Prime Minister Diefenbaker explained in the House of Commons that he "would not support any action to exclude from the councils of the commonwealth of nations the Union of South Africa regardless of my strong feelings in respect of discrimination."²⁶ The Prime Minister was plainly disturbed that an organization representing one million Canadians should put forward such a strong proposal as a solution to the South African problem. Were the Union to be pushed out of the Commonwealth, Mr. Diefenbaker felt that the world community would lose that institution as a vehicle to influence South African opinion.

Even after the Sharpeville shootings on March 21, Mr. Diefenbaker indicated to the House that Canada would pursue a conciliatory approach in an attempt to alter South African race policy for "no beneficial purpose would be served by diplomatic protests or by more extreme measures."²⁷ Indeed, the Canadian High Commissioner, James Hurley, communicated to the Department of External Affairs

on March 30 that, according to South Africa's Secretary of State G. P. Jooste, Canada's more moderate attitude towards apartheid was favourably received in Pretoria.²⁸

Hurley's despatches persistently pointed out the possibility that the South African government might legislate constructive changes in its race policy. Yet communications from those who served under the High Commissioner, Gordon Brown and Ross Francis, clearly indicated that they considered it to be unrealistic to expect any change in the Nationalist government's attitudes. Thus, Ottawa simply may have been trying to keep on speaking terms with the South Africans in order not to isolate them from world opinion.

Although the Canadian government did not send a formal note of protest to Prime Minister Verwoerd at the time of the Sharpeville and Langa incidents, it did after Norman Phillips, a Toronto Daily Star correspondent, was arrested on April 9 presumably for reporting on police brutality at Nyanga. South Africa's Foreign Minister, Eric Louw, placed the onus on the media for adversely affecting relations between the two countries. So as to avoid damage to these relations, Phillips was subsequently released, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green informed the Canadian High Commissioner that the affair was to be regarded as closed.²⁹ The Phillips affair might have been covered over in the diplomatic sphere, but it was not forgotten in the public domain.

Following on the steps of the Sharpeville and Langa incidents, it brought a strong public criticism of South African racial policy in Canada which must have made it much more difficult for the Prime Minister to remain silent. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Nationalist government's actions was its total indifference to the reaction of world opinion. Moreover, the Sharpeville shootings invalidated the Union's arguments that its racial policy was an internal affair. For the first time this racial issue was brought before the UN Security Council which resolved that the situation had "led to international friction" and if continued, might endanger international peace and security.³⁰ Due to the international implications of apartheid, the Council called on the South African government "to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality."

It was becoming increasingly evident that the prospect for any liberalization of South Africa's racial policies was becoming less likely. Before the 1960 Prime Ministers' meeting, Mr. Diefenbaker appeared to have mixed feelings about South Africa's position in the Commonwealth. Previous to that, he had left no doubt that he was unsympathetic to apartheid, which he had declared as incompatible with the multiracial character of the association. The Clerk of the Privy Council, Robert Bryce, had on April 18 proposed that the Prime Minister submit a declaration on race equality

to which all members of the Commonwealth might subscribe. Since apartheid affected the reputation of the Commonwealth as a whole, Mr. Bryce believed that the association should make clear to the world that it did not endorse racial inequality.³¹ There seemed to be two overriding considerations. First, Mr. Diefenbaker would be expected to take a position consistent with his past record on human rights and, second, Canada was the member Bryce believed most likely to achieve a consensus in a Commonwealth forum on this racial issue. Mr. Diefenbaker wanted to be quite sure, however, that Canada should not become involved in the direct criticism of the internal affairs of a fellow member state; particularly in multilateral consultations such as the forthcoming conference. He preferred rather to take a position of "restrained responsibility" and contribute to the solution of the racial issue. It was this position that Mr. Diefenbaker upheld at a press conference on April 29 at London's Heathrow Airport.

The acceptance that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference could indulge in collective condemnation would, I think, bring an end to the whole concept of the Commonwealth . . . the spirit of the Commonwealth denies that the Prime Ministers' Conferences should in effect become a judge and jury on the actions of other members of the Commonwealth.³²

It was far more likely that the Prime Minister looked towards the forthcoming meeting as an opportunity to have informal discussions with South Africa's representative

with the hope that these consultations might have a beneficial influence on the Union's racial policy.

New Zealand's Prime Minister Nash held attitudes similar to Mr. Diefenbaker inasmuch as he preferred private to formal discussions of South African race policy. In fact, with the exception of the Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, other Commonwealth heads of government concurred with this position, but none so vigorously as Australia's Robert Menzies, who was adamant that there should be no formal discussions of what a Commonwealth member regarded as its own concern. Menzies explains in his memoirs that:

My colleagues and I were not unconscious of the dangers to our immigration policy inherent in the proposition that a matter normally one of domestic jurisdiction can become one of international jurisdiction if it excites criticism and hostilities in other lands.³³

Mr. Nehru was concerned that a discussion of apartheid might become a precedent for others on Kashmir. Dr. Nkrumah was also reluctant to see the association transformed into a "judge and jury" over its members' internal affairs, perhaps out of concern that Ghana's affairs would be then open to similar criticism.³⁴ The Commonwealth meeting may have been an opportune occasion for the Tunku to demonstrate his concern in attempting to bridge racial differences at home, for the other heads of government were aware that he favoured discussion on

apartheid in relation to the aims and ideals of the society.

At the opening session of the Prime Ministers' meeting on May 3, the Tunku Rahman took the lead by declaring that:

the Commonwealth had to preserve its standards of conduct and its moral principles of equality of men irrespective of colour, and of justice and fair play. The policies of the Government of South Africa . . . seemed to many people to be at variance with these principles; and while he had no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of another country, recent events in South Africa had exceeded the limits of purely domestic concern.³⁵

As chairman of the meeting, Harold Macmillan tactfully suggested employing small group discussions of the race question. In private there would be more opportunity for negotiating a compromise. After all, an "exchange of minds" and the capacity to "listen with forbearance" are the essence of Commonwealth consultations. Consequently, Eric Louw, South Africa's senior representative, agreed to meet heads of government separately and informally to explain the Nationalist government's point of view.

During these discussions, Mr. Diefenbaker had an opportunity to explain Canada's attitude

I left Mr. Louw in no doubt that in Canada there is no sympathy for policies of racial discrimination, on whatever grounds they may be explained, and that such policies are basically incompatible with the multiracial nature of the Commonwealth association. I made it clear to him that the policy of South Africa was denial

of the principle that human dignity and the worth of the individual, whatever his race and colour, must be respected, and that there could be no doubt as to our views in that connection.³⁶

At the same time, he suggested that the Union consider accepting a token representation of three non-white representatives in its parliament.³⁷ Consequently, Mr. Diefenbaker as well as his fellow heads of government were shocked when Mr. Louw issued a press statement in which he stated that South Africa had the general support of the Commonwealth on its racial policy. Abdul Rahman responded with a vigorous statement of his own which reiterated that racism was incompatible with the character and values of a multiracial Commonwealth. Though behaving with great restraint, Dr. Nkrumah indicated his disappointment with South Africa's unwillingness to compromise. Mr. Nehru may have represented a consensus of opinion when he stated that the time was soon approaching when "we must say something collectively, if only about the external effect of South Africa's internal policies."³⁸

Over the weekend of May 7 and 8 a general sense of agreement emerged from private consultations between heads of government that South Africa could remain in the Commonwealth as a monarchy, but Mr. Louw wished to know whether the country would also be welcomed as a republic. In the case of Ceylon, approval had been simply a formality as Louw was quick to point out:

three years ago we [the membership] had agreed in advance to Ceylon remaining in the Commonwealth as a Republic and that in point of fact, though three years had elapsed, Ceylon had not taken the necessary steps to become one. This was a clear precedent for an anticipatory decision.³⁹

But Prime Minister Diefenbaker perspicaciously recommended that no decision as to re-admittance be considered until South Africa had decided on a republican status — ostensibly in order not to interfere with what should be a domestic decision on an issue which was so controversial in that country.⁴⁰ The final communiqué issued May 13 expressed the opinion of the membership.

In the event of South Africa deciding to become a republic and if the desire was subsequently expressed to remain a member of the Commonwealth, the meeting suggested that the South African Government should then ask for the consent of the other Commonwealth Governments either at a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, or, if this were not practicable, by correspondence.

The real reason that the prime ministers had declined South Africa's automatic re-admission to the Commonwealth as a republic was to prevent any misunderstanding on the part of South Africa or the international community as a whole that the association condoned the Union's racial policy. By the conclusion of the conference, Mr. Louw had been clearly informed that the Commonwealth by its very composition was obliged to pursue a course of racial equality. The practice of non-intervention in domestic affairs was seriously affected by multiracial values even though the final communiqué reported the South African

discussions as informal, and made only a discreet reference to the multiracial character of the Commonwealth:

Whilst reaffirming the traditional practice that Commonwealth Conferences do not discuss the internal affairs of member countries, Ministers availed themselves of Mr. Louw's presence in London to have informal discussions with him about the racial situation in South Africa. During the informal discussions Mr. Louw gave information and answered questions on the Union's policies, and the other Ministers conveyed to him their views on the South African problem. The Ministers emphasized that the Commonwealth itself is a multiracial association and expressed the need to ensure good relations between all member states and people of the Commonwealth.

The future of South Africa in the Commonwealth was unresolved, and between the 1960 and 1961 Prime Ministers' meetings, the apartheid issue was, therefore, of persistent concern to the Canadian government and the Department of External Affairs. Dr. Verwoerd had remained confident that the Union would be just as welcome in the Commonwealth as a republic as it was as a monarchy. In his statement to the Union's House of Assembly on July 2, Prime Minister Verwoerd stated that he was "convinced that the influence of Britain, Australia and Canada and even India . . . will ensure that we retain our membership."⁴¹ But only Australia was prepared to support South Africa unconditionally: Mr. Diefenbaker had not indicated what Canada's attitude would be toward South Africa's application for republican membership. In fact, the Prime Minister's conversation with the South African High Commissioner, Willem Dirske-Van-Schaikwyk, on August 15 indicated that South Africa's

request for readmission without a corresponding change in policy might be denied:

For Prime Minister Verwoerd to delude himself into believing that the application of South Africa to rejoin the Commonwealth as a republic would receive a unanimous vote was to have no regard whatever for the world situation and the position taken by several Commonwealth countries.⁴²

Mr. Diefenbaker even proposed that if no immediate change could be made in South Africa's race policy to provide nominal political representation to the non-whites, a referendum on republican status should at least be postponed indefinitely.⁴³ Since there was little chance of the Union's expulsion from the Commonwealth, a deferral of the referendum could temporarily circumvent the need to apply for readmission.

In August 1960 Mr. Macmillan wrote to Commonwealth heads of government to urge them, at the least, to take a neutral position in the event that South Africa applied for republican membership, because republicanism had never before been reason enough for rejecting an application. Prime Minister Diefenbaker assured him that he did not intend to give any indication as to his future approach to the South African issue prior to the next Prime Ministers' meeting but that he had informed the Union that it could not necessarily assume Canadian support.⁴⁴ A few days later, Mr. Diefenbaker received a letter from the Tunku Rahman requesting Canada to indicate its objection to the Union's racial policy. Malaya, together with its fellow

Commonwealth partners - India, Ghana and Nigeria - had applied a trade embargo against the importation of South African goods until such time as the Union undertook some progressive legislation. Mr. Diefenbaker replied:

I abhor the denial of fundamental freedom in South Africa, but if every country in the world refused to trade with every other nation whose domestic policies were repugnant to it, the international economic scene would be very distorted indeed. Moreover, it would do a disservice to peaceful international relations by limiting the opportunities for the healthy interchange of goods, ideas and people, which is the best hope for breaking down barriers of ignorance and prejudice.⁴⁵

Following a national referendum of the enfranchised white population of South and South West Africa in October 1960, the Nationalist government announced that it would become a republic the following May and that it would seek to continue Commonwealth membership. Yet the Union refused to accept even token non-white representation in parliament as proposed by the opposition parties even though they supported an over-all system of white supremacy. In view of the South African government's unwillingness to compromise on its apartheid policy, Mr. Diefenbaker advised Prime Minister Macmillan in November that he could not count on Canadian support for South Africa's readmission.⁴⁶ Regardless of his strong feelings on race discrimination, however, the Canadian Prime Minister was reluctant to be responsible for a denial of the Union's application for membership. He made another attempt at

compromise just two months prior to the 1961 meeting of Prime Ministers involving the placement of South Africa on probation in the Commonwealth during which time the Nationalist government would have to make some concessions. But Dr. Verwoerd would neither submit to changes in policy nor delays in deciding South Africa's membership status.⁴⁷

By January 1961, Mr. Diefenbaker was convinced that he must place the onus on South Africa either to make concessions or withdraw its application for Commonwealth reinstatement. The Department of External Affairs correctly assumed that the Canadian Government did not want to take the lead in denying South Africa membership in the Commonwealth. It considered rather that if South Africa was permitted Commonwealth status, the other members could simultaneously issue a public statement disclaiming any sympathy for the Union's racial policy while indicating that the Union gradually would be expected to approach more closely the views of the other members to justify its continued association, and submit a paragraph to this effect to be included in the Prime Ministers' communiqué.⁴⁸ This statement would neither constitute a condemnation of South Africa nor a clarion call for ending racial discrimination, but rather a public stand on race relations. Like External Affairs, Mr. Diefenbaker had mixed feelings, realizing South Africa's part in the old Commonwealth and hoping that it could adapt its racial policy to the expectations of the new Commonwealth. Regardless of his strong feelings in respect of racial discrimination, the

Prime Minister seemed reluctant to be responsible for rejecting South African membership at least until a further opportunity had been given for changes to evolve in the Union's racial policy. However, he also seemed prepared to defer giving consent to South Africa's remaining within the Commonwealth as a republic unless that country was to make some concessions. But it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Prime Minister believed that it behooved South Africa to either change its racial policy or pay the price in terms of Commonwealth membership.

To communicate Canada's hardened position, Mr. Diefenbaker carried out a suggestion by Howard Green to meet with High Commissioner Van-Schalkwyk and emphasize that South Africa could count on Canadian support only if Dr. Verwoerd was prepared to forecast a gradual amelioration of his government's racial policy.⁴⁹ The Prime Minister's toughmindedness towards South Africa and his interest in proposing a statement on racial equality were not revealed to the public, however, in keeping with his promise to Mr. Macmillan not to prejudice the forthcoming Prime Ministers' meeting. In fact, in response to Mr. Pearson's question in the House of Commons as to whether the Government was considering a declaration of racial equality, the Prime Minister remained non-committal by stating only that: "It would be a desirable objective if it could be attained, that the commonwealth might stand for a certain body of principles."⁵⁰

At the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting, the membership may have been willing to compromise with South Africa, but it was generally accepted that the recognition of human equality was essential to the Commonwealth relationship. The Department of External Affairs knew that the Prime Minister was interested in proposing a formal declaration of principles, emphasizing that racial equality was central to the Commonwealth relationship, which it considered as whimsical and inappropriate.⁵¹ Effective liaison between the DEA and the Prime Minister was achieved through Basil Robinson, who was a member of the department serving as Mr. Diefenbaker's special adviser on foreign policy. Mr. Robinson then recommended on behalf of the department that Mr. Diefenbaker consent to South Africa's remaining in the society and, at the same time, issue a statement on racial equality - one to which all members might be expected to subscribe. Mr. Bryce emphasized in a memorandum to the Prime Minister on March 9 that without any amelioration of the apartheid policy, Canada would have to refuse consent to South Africa's remaining within the Commonwealth. Prior to Mr. Diefenbaker's leaving for a weekend at Chequers on March 10, Mr. Bryce again urged the Prime Minister to refuse consent in the interests of Canada and the Commonwealth. He argued that as an individual who had defended human rights throughout his life-time, by taking the lead and refusing consent, Mr. Diefenbaker would be

recognized as a man of courage as well as convictions. In essence, the advice to the Prime Minister was a straight refusal of South African membership or "consent plus a declaration." The proposals were distinct insofar as External Affairs had recommended that the Union's application should be accepted on the basis of a promise that it would work towards the implementation of racial equality in its treatment of natives. The Cabinet Secretary had advised the Prime Minister to require South Africa to agree to compromise its racial policy in order to remain within the association.

Informal discussions between leading Commonwealth personalities (see Appendix F) at Chequers on March 11 revealed the various attitudes toward South African membership. Dr. Nkrumah's previous position had been to recommend the readmission of South Africa as a member state while refusing to recognize the Nationalist government as representative of South Africans for the purposes of Commonwealth consultations. This idea was unattractive to all members and particularly to those of the Third World. But at Chequers Nkrumah began to take a stronger line on South African membership by stipulating that to accept South Africa was to threaten Ghana's continuance in the Commonwealth.⁵² By this time, it was also doubtful that India would continue to accept the Union's rigid and uncompromising position much longer. Indeed, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman indicated that the non-white member states wanted the

support of the white members to pressure the Union into liberalizing their racial policy. He was not to garner support from Prime Ministers Macmillan, Menzies, or Holyoake who all believed that membership should be automatic, since there were no constitutional grounds for rejecting it. Mr. Diefenbaker was sympathetic to the Third World members, but he favoured a cautious approach which did not alienate political support at home. Responding to the Prime Minister's request, Howard Green had informed him of Cabinet opinion on the question during the first few days of the meeting. Essentially, Mr. Diefenbaker's Cabinet colleagues recommended Canada's continued criticism of apartheid and possibly a deferral on South African admittance with Canada assuming a low profile.⁵³

Julius Nyerere, chief minister of Tanganyika, wrote an article in The Observer on March 12 stating that without changes in South Africa's race policy, "to vote South Africa in is to vote us out."⁵⁴ Dr. Nkrumah, who had previous knowledge of Nyerere's letter, mounted stronger opposition to South Africa's admission.⁵⁵ It is conceivable that Nkrumah was concerned that Nyerere's initiative might preempt his own ambitions to be recognized as Africa's leading statesman. Mr. Macmillan claimed that Prime Minister Nehru now maintained that Third World members

could not accept South African membership without progressive changes in its racial policy.⁵⁶ By Sunday evening it had become clear to Mr. Diefenbaker that the majority of Commonwealth members disapproved of South Africa's continued membership, and he formulated a position which was to influence the course of events. Leaning toward the advice of Mr. Robert Bryce, the Prime Minister considered proposing that a statement on racial equality be embodied in a declaration of fundamental principles to be put to the membership.⁵⁷ He envisioned that the declaration might be incorporated into the communiqué which South Africa would have to either accept and amend its racial policy or reject, and thereby dissociate itself from the Commonwealth. Mr. Diefenbaker's formula was, at once, tough and tactful.

In the discussion period on Monday, March 13, Mr. Diefenbaker was unsuccessful in persuading the South African delegation to modify their franchise to afford non-whites some representation. It was only after Dr. Verwoerd refused any amendment to apartheid that the Canadian Prime Minister recommended to the heads of government that they issue a declaration on racial equality.⁵⁸ Mr. Diefenbaker stated that, since the Union's policies brought the whole association into disrepute, such a declaration was one way in which a Commonwealth position on race relations could be publicly established.

On Tuesday, March 14, Mr. Diefenbaker specifically outlined his ideas as to an appropriate declaration of race

equality on the basis that all member states had subscribed to such a purpose under the UN Charter and could do no less as members of the Commonwealth.⁵⁹ Such was the force of Diefenbaker's argument to recognize racial equality as a principle of the association that the essence of his proposal found expression in the original draft communiqué.

Dr. Verwoerd pleaded that such a communiqué would mean that:

no country could honourably remain as a member unless it submitted itself to those principles. It would mean that South Africa would have to change its policy, and that we would not be prepared to do so.⁶⁰

But the Commonwealth existed because of an absence of structure, and its respect for compromise as a means of collaboration. The Prime Ministers therefore agreed to work out a communiqué which was unfettered with principles in order to reach a consensus. A compromise proposal was subsequently drafted by Harold Macmillan and other officials, which constituted a statement rather than a formal principle of racial equality, together with a clear indication of the association's opposition to apartheid. In this portion of the "phantom communiqué", the Prime Ministers:

expressed their deep concern about [the apartheid policy's] impact on the relations between the member countries of the Commonwealth and on the cohesion of the Commonwealth itself as a multi-racial association. The view was strongly expressed that this policy was inconsistent with the basic ideals on which the unity and influence of the Commonwealth rest (and with the Charter of the United Nations). The other Prime Ministers further affirmed their belief that, for all Commonwealth Governments, it should be an objective of policy to build in their countries a structure of society which offers equality of opportunity for all, irrespective of race, colour or creed.⁶¹

This draft was supported by Mr. Diefenbaker on the basis that, "South Africa's racial policies have such a far-reaching effect that the impact was international."⁶² Indeed, the statement on racial equality was acknowledged by one participant as having corresponded in almost every detail with Diefenbaker's initial proposal.⁶³

The compromise draft appeared to be generally acceptable to Dr. Verwoerd,⁶⁴ provided that he was allowed to include the South African point of view. After a brief discussion, Verwoerd was permitted by the other members to amend the draft by inserting a statement clarifying the Union's position. The South African part of the draft communiqué read:

The Prime Minister of South Africa stressed the positive aspects of the racial policy of the Union Government and deplored the accusations of racial discrimination levelled against South Africa by member countries, which he alleged were themselves guilty of such practices. He expressed the view that the development of proper relations between members of the Commonwealth could only be impaired if they attempted to interfere with one another's domestic affairs instead of concentrating on co-operation in matters of common concern. . . .

The Prime Minister of South Africa said that he was not prepared to accept that the Charter of the United Nations should be invoked when dealing with Commonwealth affairs. He stated his conviction that in South Africa the policy of separate development remains the only way of ensuring full opportunities for all, irrespective of race, colour or creed, whereas any form of integrated society would become a source of strife or injustice to one or other population group and should not be an objective of policy.⁶⁵

Unfortunately, the South African submission dissociated that member from the spirit of the original statement agreed to by all other members, and it was, therefore, found to be unacceptable.

Nonetheless, the Union was permitted to issue another statement which would indicate its reservations while respecting the essence of the statement on racial equality. Prime Minister Verwoerd and his staff worked out the fourth draft, and it was amended on Wednesday, March 15 by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, to their satisfaction. However, Dr. Verwoerd seemed more prepared to compromise on the principle of racial equality than on South Africa's policy of apartheid. According to Mr. Louw, "Mr. Diefenbaker again took the lead, and said that the communique gave too much emphasis to the views of the South African Prime Minister."⁶⁶ Both the Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sir Abubakar Balewa recommended that, if South Africa was admitted as a republic, a declaration of incompatibility be incorporated in the final communique. Moreover, the Nigerian Prime Minister stated that "he would in the circumstances have to consider whether Nigeria should remain a member of the Commonwealth if South Africa nevertheless remained a member."⁶⁷ Pandit Nehru declared "that it must be made clear that India would at the first opportunity . . . raise the question as to whether South Africa's membership could continue whilst its racial

policy remained unchanged." Kwame Nkrumah made it emphatically clear "that he reserved the right to move for expulsion, or to withdraw his own country" if the Union continued in the Commonwealth.⁶⁸ Prime Minister Verwoerd later explained to the South African House of Assembly:

What he [Mr. Macmillan] had thought would be the solution was now apparently rejected by most of the Afro-Asian countries as well as by Mr. Diefenbaker . . . it emerged perfectly clear that the Afro-Asian members, with one single exception, intended to try to force us at every opportunity, indeed at the first opportunity, to abandon our colour policy.⁶⁹

To some extent, Canada's Prime Minister had contributed to placing South Africa in check-mate. Mr. Diefenbaker's proposal that racial equality be recognized as essential to the Commonwealth relationship was not inscribed in the communiqué as a principle. But a statement, expressing the need for racial equality to be pursued by all members, was carried into the phantom communiqué, which Dr. Verwoerd was required to either accept or reject. Heads of government refused to include the South African corollary to the statement on racial equality because it did not sufficiently respect the values which most other members expected of a multiracial society. On the other hand, Dr. Verwoerd's support of the communiqué would have been an explicit rejection of his country's apartheid policy. By failing to endorse it, Verwoerd was unavoidably relinquishing the opportunity for South African membership in the Commonwealth.

Compromise is an essential function for an association which relies on collaboration to reach agreement on the basis of consensus. However, the Commonwealth had apparently drawn the line beyond which compromise could be considered unacceptable. The multiracial membership had decided that, as a multiracial entity, the Commonwealth could not compromise on a purpose which it held to be fundamental to its existence. Since South Africa found this purpose intolerable, Dr. Verwoerd was required to withdraw its application for continued membership in the Commonwealth. The final communiqué recorded that:

The Prime Minister of South Africa informed the other Prime Ministers this evening that in the light of the views expressed on behalf of other member Governments and the indications of their future intentions regarding the racial policies of the Union Government, he had decided to withdraw his application for South Africa's continuing membership of the Commonwealth as a republic.

Conclusion

Technically, South Africa withdrew its application for membership in the Commonwealth as a republic; effectively, it was forced out of the association by the members as a whole. Prime Minister Diefenbaker appears to have been a catalyst in effecting the Union's withdrawal while he responded to influences from within and outside the Commonwealth.

Mr. Diefenbaker's strategy at the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting could be described as one of "compromise or

withdraw" in order to put the onus on the Nationalist government to alter its race policy to gain membership as a republic. It was he who moved for a paragraph condemning the Union to be included in the communiqué, and he was among those who objected to the emphasis given to the South Africa position in the final draft communiqué. At the close of the London conference, Mr. Louw accused Mr. Diefenbaker of "spearheading" attacks on South Africa, and explained to the Senate that it was only certain members that forced them out of the Commonwealth: "This attitude was fairly strongly supported by the Prime Minister of Canada."⁷⁰ Sir Robert Menzies, probably incensed that the leader of the senior dominion should be culpable for South Africa's departure, reported to his Parliament: "

the attack upon South Africa was promptly led by Diefenbaker of Canada, who came armed with a resolution of his Parliament and presented his views with immense emotion.⁷¹

John Diefenbaker was inclined to elicit support for his beliefs by performance rather than negotiating support for his views. Mr. John A. Munro considers that it is probably more likely that:

Prime Minister Diefenbaker had established (at least in his own mind) the basic criteria necessary for the continuation of the multi-racial Commonwealth, and he would have South Africa conform to his rules. He influenced the final outcome of the conference to the extent that the Union had to show some capitulation to what he perceived the Commonwealth to be.⁷²

Prime Minister Macmillan informed his parliament that,

had Dr. Verwoerd shown the smallest move towards an understanding of the views of his Commonwealth colleagues, or made any concession, had he given us anything to hold on to or any grounds for hope, I still think that the conference would have looked beyond the immediate difficulties to the possibilities for the future.⁷³

But accommodation of South Africa's racial policy would threaten the continued existence of the Nationalist government and the whole superstructure on which the basis of white supremacy rests. Since Prime Minister Verwoerd could not even accept token concessions to his government's race policy, Mr. Diefenbaker's requisite criteria became decisive, leading to South Africa's withdrawal from the association.

There was probably a combination of domestic factors contributing to Canada's influential role in South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth. A Gallup Poll taken in November 1960 had indicated that public opinion was substantially less favourable towards the Prime Minister than it had been in the previous year.⁷⁴ But Mr. Diefenbaker placed little credence in public opinion polls; he relied more on his mails and interest groups. Before the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting, he had received many letters from distinguished members of the academic community essentially suggesting that it would be in keeping with the wishes and character of Canadians that the Prime Minister invite all Commonwealth members to subscribe to a declaration on

racial equality.⁷⁵ The Canadian Council of Churches had requested that the government declare "its unequivocal support of the claim of all men everywhere to the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Declaration of the United Nations." The Canadian Labour Congress had issued a statement condemning the policy of apartheid and urging the Prime Minister to take a firm stand on the issue. John Diefenbaker never lost sight of Canadian public opinion but rather considered his international role in terms of partisan politics. No doubt, the Prime Minister instinctively perceived public support for human rights while he was occupied with the passage of the Bill of Rights, and perhaps believed that Canadians expected him to pursue this approach abroad. In fact, after the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting, Mr. Louw accused the Prime Minister of catering to Canadian opinion in order not to alienate any portion of public support.⁷⁶ These domestic forces were not decisive, but neither were they ignored. There was an accumulation of feeling on this subject as opinion in the world at large became more aware of racial issues, and the South African issue was one on which a clear decision could not be avoided.

When Howard Green surveyed the opinion of his cabinet colleagues prior to the discussion of South Africa at the 1961 meeting, Mr. Diefenbaker was made aware of their reticence in having Canada play a leading part in the issue. After all, in many respects the Progressive Conservative party only perceived the old Commonwealth relationship based as it was on common affinities such as cultural values and political and legal institutions. By the same token, the traditional support of the PCs for the Commonwealth

connection bolstered Diefenbaker's opinion that the association must be preserved, and recognition of the concept of racial equality seemed to be the only positive approach to assure its continued existence.

The Department of External Affairs had recommended that Mr. Diefenbaker submit a statement on racial equality to which all members, including South Africa, would be expected to subscribe rather than to refuse outright its application for republican membership. On the other hand, Mr. Bryce had, all along, advised the Prime Minister to refuse admission to an intransigent South Africa. Essentially, Mr. Diefenbaker followed External Affairs' strategy by permitting the Union's admittance as a republic provided it would agree to a commitment to pursue racial equality. To this extent, the Department was influential. According to John Munro, Mr. Bryce's impact was also of significance:

He confirmed Mr. Diefenbaker's opinion that the new Commonwealth could only be founded on a multiracial basis, and that if the Prime Minister did not remain steadfast to the principle of racial equality, it would be a denial of everything he had previously stood for.⁷⁷

To assess relative influences would amount to an oversimplification of policy decisions which were incremental, responsive, developmental and, above all, resting on a belief that this issue was a dilemma for the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister adopted Canada's position to the changing attitudes and opinions, which were occurring day-to-day at the conference. Mr. Diefenbaker saw arguments for keeping South Africa in and for rejecting its application, but he came to believe that in the end there was no alternative. Thus the advice of Cabinet, External Affairs and the Clerk of the Privy Council may have helped to shape

the scope of Mr. Diefenbaker's options, but external influences seemed to be foremost in determining the direction of the Prime Minister's initiatives.

John Diefenbaker had a strong attachment to the old Commonwealth developed around the convention of non-interference. He was aware of the practical realities faced by the white minority in South Africa, and that by pushing it out of the association, the Commonwealth might be abdicating its responsibility for influencing South Africa's racial policy. Yet, though Dr. Verwoerd showed "some likelihood of accepting Smuts [formerly South Africa's Prime Minister] suggestion of admitting three non-white legislators, Louw convinced Verwoerd not to accept the 'thin edge of the wedge'.⁷⁶ There is little doubt that Mr. Diefenbaker was disappointed with Prime Minister Verwoerd, whose uncompromising attitude towards apartheid threatened to destroy the Commonwealth.

Mr. Diefenbaker's loyalty to the association was perhaps inflated by the continental threat which he considered the United States posed to Canada's identity. The Commonwealth was perceived by the PC government as a valuable instrument to counteract American influence, while providing Canada with a greater voice in the world community. Former Vice-President of the PC Party, George Hogan, explained the value of the association:

Conservatives have held fast to the British connection throughout our history, because they have realized that without the counterbalancing force of some major outside influence, Canada might have long since been swallowed up by the American colossus. To reinforce Canada's independence and identity, Canadian Conservatives have reversed Canning's dictum and, as Professor D.G. Creighton has said, called the Old World into existence to redress the balance of the New.⁷⁹

The reality of Canada's economic and security relationship with its neighbour would not vanish, but the Commonwealth was considered to enhance Canada's international image, and John Diefenbaker was not prepared to sacrifice it over the policy of apartheid.

Mr. Diefenbaker was also aware that the Commonwealth served a purpose in the devolution of the British Empire and much of the task still remained. It had not gone unnoticed that if South Africa continued in the association, the heads of government from Nigeria and Ghana had threatened to depart, and Julius Nyerere had unequivocally stated that Tanganyika would not join after receiving its independence:

We believe that the principles of the Commonwealth would be betrayed by an affirmative answer to South Africa's application for readmission as a Republic.⁸⁰

The multiracial character of the Commonwealth had become important in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy, primarily because the association afforded Canada the opportunity to collaborate closely with Third World nations. If South Africa's remaining in the Commonwealth jeopardized the membership of these African nations, it also put Canada's foreign policy interests at stake. Undoubtedly, the Prime Minister also was aware of the political currency that would be made from Canada taking the side of its non-white partners on this crucial issue. But, in the final analysis, Mr. Diefenbaker, together with the Cabinet Secretary

and External Affairs, realized that the whole Commonwealth might collapse over the issue of racial equality and that there had to be a commitment to those values appropriate to its multiracial composition. In Mr. Diefenbaker's words:

There was no doubt that a wholesale withdrawal of non-white members would have resulted had South Africa remained in the Commonwealth without accepting the statement on racial equality. I was compelled to act according to my own beliefs, and in order to prevent the break-up of the Commonwealth.⁸¹

Indeed, it seemed logical that a multiracial association which had come to justify its existence on the basis of non-racialism could be preserved only by adopting another convention - one of racial equality. Though not officially prescribed as a binding principle in the final communiqué, racial equality emerged from the 1961 conference as the foremost expectation for the future Commonwealth relationship.

Mr. Basil Robinson, who attended the 1961 meeting, summed up the Prime Minister's response to the Commonwealth:

Mr. Diefenbaker possessed a nostalgia for the old Commonwealth relationship and for South Africa's place in it, but he read the times accurately during a fulcrum-like period and responded constructively towards the new Commonwealth.⁸²

Yet the Prime Minister's course of action may not have been determined so much because he had envisioned a new Commonwealth ideology, as it was by his desire to defend human rights wherever they were challenged. As he put it:

I had always defended freedom and equality in the past, both before the bar and in public life, and I could not, therefore, be restrained from expressing the contradiction of the basic rights of democracy occurring in South Africa, particularly since it was a fellow member of a multiracial association.⁸³

It seems fair to conclude that, through his advisers and consistent with his personal beliefs, John Diefenbaker was appreciative of the changes taking place, that the multiracial Commonwealth had to become multiracial in philosophy, and that such a philosophy could not be compromised.

Together with the impact that the Commonwealth had on Canada's Prime Minister, it is relevant to consider the effect South Africa's departure may have had on Canada's foreign policy. In areas which were deemed to be outside the realm of the Commonwealth relationship, such as trade and diplomatic relations, the departure did not affect Canadian external affairs. But where Canada's policy had been formulated out of respect for the Commonwealth, as in the case of its voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly, there was a distinct change in approach.

In reply to an inquiry by Mr. Williams, Ghana's Attorney General, and the Chief Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Nyerere, External Affairs informed them in April 1961 that Canada would not break off diplomatic or economic relations with South Africa despite its intended withdrawal from the Commonwealth.⁸⁴ Prime Minister Diefenbaker took the well-established position that

it had long been Canada's practice to carry on normal relations with countries or governments whose philosophies were at variance with our own . . . it was an accepted rule of international conduct that differences in philosophical outlook in political systems do not justify a refusal to maintain normal intercourse with another government.⁸⁵

As to the continued preferential trade relationship between the two countries, Mr. Diefenbaker supported the policy that ideological reasons had not been recognized by Canadian governments as sufficient reason to cut trade relations unless there was a threat to world peace, as outlined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Undoubtedly, there were some voices arguing that South Africa was a good customer. In fact, Mr. Diefenbaker had told the House of Commons the previous April that in 1959 Canada exported \$51.3 million worth of goods to that country while importing only \$6.6 million.⁸⁶ Inasmuch as this amounted to only about one per cent of Canada's total export trade, South Africa could hardly be considered a significant customer. However, the commercial factor certainly was a consideration when Ottawa decided not to alter the Canadian-South African preferential trade agreement.

Even though political and commercial interests were involved in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy, it would have been unrealistic for Ottawa to discontinue diplomatic and trade relations with all countries of the world which defy human rights. Indeed, Mr. Diefenbaker's decision to force an uncompromising member out of the association, yet continue international relations with that same country, may suggest that Canada's policy developed more out of concern

for the preservation of the Commonwealth than out of disappointment with South Africa and its race policies.

In its voting behaviour, Canada upheld the policy of respecting the sovereignty of Commonwealth partners which, prior to 1961, included a refusal to condemn South Africa at the UN for its practice of apartheid. The South African race question was not considered by the fifteenth session of the General Assembly until, after Dr. Verwoerd had announced the Union's future withdrawal from the Commonwealth. The Asian resolution on the apartheid item

deprecatd policies based on racial discrimination, censured the racial policies of the South African Government as inconsistent with the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [and] requested all states to consider taking such separate and collective action as was open to them, in conformity with the Charter, to bring about the abandonment of racial discrimination. 87

For the first time, the Canadian delegation supported a resolution to censure South Africa. Since the real turning point in Canada's policy occurred after South Africa's proposed departure, it is reasonable to assume that Canada no longer felt obligated to respect its former partner under the Commonwealth convention of non-interference.

In conclusion, Canada exhibited tolerance in its relations with the Nationalist government from 1947 until 1960 in an attempt to promote an amelioration of the Union's racial policy. But by 1960 it had become clear that the value of the association, serving as a forum to promote closer relations between peoples of different races,

had become handicapped by the presence of a member which practised a public policy of racial discrimination to the extent that the continued existence of the Commonwealth as a multiracial entity was at stake. During the 1960 and 1961 Prime Ministers' meetings, the Union dogmatically refused to alter its social policy to be more compatible with the expectations of the Commonwealth. Since Prime Minister Verwoerd would not make even token concessions to his government's race policy, South Africa was forced to withdraw its application for membership in the Commonwealth as a republic.

Canada's policies evolved as attitudes in the UN and the world at large evolved. The awareness of racial issues constantly broadened as both the UN and the Commonwealth had their effect on our thinking. We were never a decisive actor. We had to have a policy of pleading and pressing but also responding to changing situations. None of the policies we had in mind for South Africa seemed to us ideal but we were feeling our way, trying to take advantage of opportunities, and also to be prepared for developments we did not necessarily welcome.

In order to preserve the Commonwealth from dismemberment over this racial issue, Prime Minister Diefenbaker took a leading part in compelling South Africa to withdraw from the association. Both domestic and external influences were brought to bear on the Prime Minister. While public support for the PC administration had been slipping, Mr. Diefenbaker

was convinced that Canadian opinion was solidly behind his position on human rights. The Conservative party was firmly committed to the Commonwealth connection and, therefore, prepared to accept South Africa's departure if it was necessary to sustain the association. Clearly, advice from External Affairs and the Prime Minister's Cabinet colleagues and secretary contributed significantly to Mr. Diefenbaker's approach but, in the last analysis, external factors seemed to effect his course of action. John Diefenbaker had a fondness for the monarchical connection and he was well aware of Canada's influence with Third World members as a result of the Commonwealth relationship. Facing the threat of the departure of African members and the break-up of the multi-racial association, accommodation on the part of South Africa became requisite. On the basis of these considerations, and consistent with his personal beliefs, Mr. Diefenbaker felt compelled to act by resolutely taking a "compromise or withdraw" position and, thereby, effecting South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

Following South Africa's departure, there was a distinct change in Canada's approach towards that country, at least insofar as its policy had been formulated out of respect for a Commonwealth partner. Canada altered its policy in the UN General Assembly by no longer refraining from censuring the Union both in its voting behaviour and in committee. Thus, Canadian policy towards the South African racial issue in general, and Mr. Diefenbaker's approach in particular, had been influenced by Canada's Commonwealth membership.

NOTES-CHAPTER V

¹This point is developed by John W. Holmes in The Better Part of Valour, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1970, p. 121.

²The doctrine relied on the attitudes of members to consider their relations with each other as different from their relations with non-Commonwealth states insofar as they attempted to settle their own disputes without relying on international institutions and refrained from criticizing one another in public forums. For a good review of the doctrine, see J. E. S. Fawcett, The Inter se Doctrine, *op.cit.*

³As noted in chapter III, exceptions would be the 1954 Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference at Lahore when South African apartheid was criticized as a threat to the Commonwealth relationship, and the 1956 Prime Ministers' meeting where K. M. Panikkar pressed to have racial equality incorporated as a principle in the communiqué.

⁴A principle object of the India complaint was the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act which stipulated, inter alia, that the sale of fixed property in either Natal or the Transvaal by non-Asians to Asians, or vice versa, was forbidden.

⁵Inis Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (4th ed.), New York, Random House, 1971, pp. 181-190.

⁶Escott Reid to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, 21 November 1947, DEA files.

This criticism was not entirely justified, at least with regard to the principal resolution (44) on the treatment of Indians in S. Africa which was adopted by a vote of 34-6-13 on 8 December 1946 in which Canada joined with Britain, New Zealand and S. Africa in opposing the resolution and Australia abstained.

⁷Actually the Malan government ignored the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court's decision that coloured voters could not be disenfranchised without a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament: Nicholas Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Relations, 1952-1962, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 310-318.

⁸Discussions between High Commissioner te Water and Minister of National Defense Brooke Claxton 15 December 1948, ibid.

⁹Noted in a despatch from Lester Pearson to the Canadian High Commissioner (E. McGreer) to South Africa, 17 January 1949, ibid.

¹⁰Resolution 395 (V) of 2 December 1950 gained the support of the United States although no Commonwealth members voted in favour with exception of India and Pakistan.

¹¹see: Ad Hoc Political Committee, fifth session, fifth meeting, 3 October 1950.

¹²Gwendolen Carter, "Selling out Apartheid," The Politics of Inequality, South Africa since 1948, New York, Praeger, 1962, pp. 75-118.

¹³Leo Marquard, "The Colour Bar," The People and Policies of South Africa, London, Oxford, 1960, pp. 136-154.

¹⁴For a statement on resolutions 511 (VI), adopted 12 January 1952, and 616A (VII), adopted 5 December 52, on the Commission of three and resolution 616B (VII), adopted 5 December 1952, on human rights, see: Canada and the United Nations, 1951-52, Ottawa, DEA, 1952, pp. 39-40; Canada and the United Nations, 1952-53, op.cit., 1953, pp. 11-12.

¹⁵Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 December 1952, p. 423.

¹⁶Resolution 820 (IX) was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1954 with a roll-call vote of 40-10-10. Among Commonwealth members, India and Pakistan voted in favour and the old members voted against the resolution.

¹⁷Statement by Mr. R. A. Mackay, Permanent Canadian Delegate to the UN, to the Ad Hoc Political Committee, 9 November 1955 in Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955-1965, op.cit., p. 300.

¹⁸This writer talked with Evan Gill (24 August 1978) who was Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa during the period 1954-1956, and Arthur Blanchette who was Charge d'Affairs before the arrival of James Hurley in July 1957. Neither of these External Affairs officials received instructions from Ottawa to try to effect a more progressive racial policy.

¹⁹Reporting to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on 24 June 1954, Evan Gill concluded that regardless of growing economic integration in South Africa or change in government leadership, the Union's racial policy was unlikely to improve.

²⁰ Expressed in the Briefing Documents to the Canadian Delegation to the UNGA, 1958, DEA files.

Canada had abstained on Resolution 1178 (XII) of 26 November 1957 whereas, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Malaya and Pakistan all voted in favour of the Assembly deploring the Unions' apartheid policy.

²¹ Douglas Anglin, "Canada and Apartheid," International Journal, XV (Spring 1960), pp. 125-126.

Resolution 1248 (XIII) of 30 October 1958 called for the end of race conflict in South Africa whereas Resolution 1375 (XIV) of 17 November 1959 reiterated this plea, adding the Assembly's regret and concern for the situation caused by the Union's racial policy.

²² Canada, Debates, 10 February 1960, p. 940; DEA files.

²³ As a result of the efforts of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Ellen Fairclough, Canada's revised immigration policy came into effect in February 1962, establishing "skill as the main criterion in the selection of unsponsored immigrants," see Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, op. cit., p. 125.

²⁴ Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa, James Hurley, continually communicated to Ottawa the favourable attitude of the Pretoria government towards Canada's conciliatory position, DEA files.

²⁵ Speech: 3 February 1960 in Mansergh, Documents, 1952-1962, op. cit., p. 350.

²⁶ Canada, Debates, 5 February 1960, pp. 491-492.

²⁷ Ibid., 25 March 1960, p. 2448.

²⁸ DEA files have been used as the source for this paragraph.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Security Council Resolutions S/4300 was adopted 1 April 1960 by a vote of 9-0-2 (France and the United Kingdom).

³¹ Research material.

³²Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Press Conference reported in The Times of London, 30 April 1960.

³³Sir Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events, London, Cassell, 1961, p. 193.

³⁴The attitudes of Prime Ministers Nehru and Nkrumah were reported in The Times, 30 April 1960, and in Harold Macmillan's Pointing the Way, 1959-1961, London, Macmillan, 1972, p. 173.

³⁵John Diefenbaker, One Canada, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 210.

³⁶Canada, Debates, 16 May 1960, p. 3899.

³⁷Diefenbaker, One Canada, loc.cit.

³⁸For the responses of members as indicated in this paragraph, see Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, op.cit., pp. 172-173.

³⁹Menzies, Afternoon Light, op.cit., p. 197.

⁴⁰Diefenbaker, One Canada, op.cit., pp. 211-212.

⁴¹Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 2 July 1960.

⁴²Diefenbaker, One Canada, op.cit., p. 215.

⁴³Research material.

⁴⁴Ibid. Mr. Macmillan's letter is outlined in Pointing the Way, op.cit., p. 287.

⁴⁵Tunku Rahman's letter and Mr. Diefenbaker's response are reported in One Canada, op.cit., pp. 214-215.

The Commonwealth African members had instituted economic sanctions in accord with resolutions adopted at the Conference of Independent African states held at Addis Ababa during the period 15-24 June 1960.

⁴⁶Macmillan, Pointing the Way, op.cit., p. 216.

Mr. Louw had visited London in November for discussions with British officials whereupon Mr. Macmillan had renewed his efforts to dissuade his fellow prime ministers from committing themselves before the Commonwealth conference next May.

⁴⁷Diefenbaker, One Canada, op.cit., p. 216.

⁴⁸This paragraph has been developed on the basis of research material.

⁴⁹DEA files.

⁵⁰Canada, Debates, 1 March 1961, p. 2544.

⁵¹Research material has been used throughout this paragraph.

⁵²Reported in the Manchester Guardian, 13 March 1961.

⁵³Research material.

Of his Cabinet colleagues, Mr. Diefenbaker chose the Hon. David Fulton (Minister of Justice) and the Hon. Noel Dorion (Secretary of State) to complement the Canadian delegation to the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting, together with Robert Bryce, Basil Robinson and the Hon. George Drew (High Commissioner in London). There was some speculation that the Prime Minister chose Fulton and Dorion to assist him in drawing up a declaration of Commonwealth principles. Since Mr. Diefenbaker was not committed towards that end before the London Conference, it is just as likely that these Ministers were chosen to represent Cabinet opinion at the meeting. Whether they were present because of their legal expertise or to permit Cabinet participation, the author could find no evidence that Fulton or Dorion contributed to Mr. Diefenbaker's approach on the South African issue.

⁵⁴"Commonwealth Choice: South Africa or Us," The Observer: 12 March 1961.

⁵⁵Research material.

⁵⁶Macmillan, op.cit., p. 298.

At this time, Third World members constituted a majority, and Tanganyika and Sierra Leone anticipated membership within the next several months.

⁵⁷Research material.

⁵⁸Diefenbaker, One Canada, op.cit., pp. 218-219.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰South African, Debates, 23 March 1961, coll. 3488-3504.

There is no public record of this draft communiqué.

⁶¹The compromise or phantom communiqué is found in J.D.B. Miller's "The South African Departure," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (November 1961) pp. 71-72, and reproduced in Appendix G.

⁶²South Africa, Debates, 18 April 1961, c. 4835, cited in Peter Harnetty, "Canada, South Africa and the Commonwealth 1960-1961, JCPS (November 1963) p. 39. Harnetty has presented a most detailed analysis of Canada's approach to the South African racial question from 1960 to 1961, and it has been a valuable resource for this study.

⁶³Research material.

⁶⁴In fact, one participant at the 1961 Meeting recalled that Verwoerd might well have been prepared to accept the initial compromise draft, replete with the statement on racial equality, "but he was pressured by Mr. Louw to append the South African view." Ibid.

⁶⁵Miller, "The South African Departure," loc. cit.

⁶⁶South Africa, Debates, 18 April 1961, c. 4836.

⁶⁷Dr. Verwoerd paraphrased statements made by Prime Ministers Sir Abubakar and Nehru in a speech to the South African House of Assembly: ibid., 23 March 1961, coll. 3498-3501.

⁶⁸From Prime Minister Menzies' speech to the Australian House of Representatives, Debates, 11 April 1961, p. 650.

⁶⁹South Africa, Debates, loc. cit.

⁷⁰Mr. Louw's remark is in the Republic of South Africa, Senate Debates, 7 June 1961, c. 4883 in Harnetty, op. cit., p. 41.

⁷¹Sir Robert Menzies' statement is recorded in his memoirs, Afternoon Light: op. cit., p. 213.

Menzies may have been referring to Mr. Diefenbaker's response in the House of Commons to Pearson's query about a declaration of racial equality cf: footnote 50.

⁷²Interview with John A. Munro (Ottawa, 3 August 1977) who assisted in researching and writing One Canada, op. cit.

⁷³United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, 22 March 1961, col. 448.

⁷⁴The Conservative rating had slipped from a high of 57% in January 1959 to 39% in November 1960: "Parliament and Politics," Canadian Annual Review for 1960, ed. J. T. Saywell, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 60.

⁷⁵Information in this paragraph has been derived from DEA files.

⁷⁶Noted in Robert Spencer's "External Affairs and Defence," ibid., p. 118.

⁷⁷Interview with John Munro, op.cit.
Indeed, Prime Minister Macmillan stated on 24 March 1961 that in the case of a vote, "Mr. Diefenbaker would have been against South Africa remaining in the Commonwealth": Pointing the Way, op.cit., p. 299.

⁷⁸Interview with the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker, 14 August 1978. See also Mr. Diefenbaker's discussion with Dr. Verwoerd on 13 March 1961 in One Canada, op.cit., pp. 217-218. There is even reason to assume that the South African delegation offended the Prime Minister by remaining inflexible to even the slightest change while drawing reference to race discrimination in Canada.

⁷⁹George Hogan. The Conservatives in Canada, op.cit., pp. 62-63.

⁸⁰Nyerere, "Commonwealth Choice," op.cit.
Mr. Diefenbaker reported to the House of Commons that this article influenced the attitudes of some prominent Commonwealth leaders: Debates, op.cit., 17 March 1961.

⁸¹Conversation with the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker, 6 March 1978.

⁸²Conversation with Mr. H. Basil Robinson in Ottawa, 2 August 1977. Mr. Robinson was attached to the PMO from the Department of External Affairs.

⁸³Conversation with Mr. Diefenbaker, op.cit.

⁸⁴DEA files.

⁸⁵Diefenbaker, One Canada, op.cit., p. 173. The substance of External Affairs' reply to Mr. Williams and Mr. Nyerere was similar to the position previously taken by Prime Minister Diefenbaker and recorded in ibid. Mr. Diefenbaker's stand on economic relations is outlined on pp. 214-5.

⁸⁶Canada, Debates, 27 April 1960.

⁸⁷Resolution 1598 (XV) was adopted by the Assembly on 13 April 1961 and reported in Canada and the United Nations: 1961, op.cit., pp. 23-24. Canada's policy remained unchanged toward the expulsion of South Africa from the UN which ignored the principle of universality, and an economic embargo which was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council.

CHAPTER VI

THE RHODESIAN ISSUE

South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth had established the precedent that this association could discuss a member government's race policy. With pressure from Canada and Third World members, and the acquiescence of the others, the Commonwealth had changed by 1961. Member states had become committed to the practice of non-racialism. Moreover, though not officially prescribed as a binding principle, racial equality was noticeably emerging as an expectation for the multiracial Commonwealth.

By 1963, a white minority in the self-governing British territory of Southern Rhodesia sustained a system of government on the basis of race supremacy which was contrary to Canada's beliefs and basic human rights as outlined in the United Nations Charter, and inconsistent with the ideals of the Commonwealth. If Rhodesia (as it became known after the ~~disintegration of the~~ Central African Federation) contravened the concept of racial equality, its subsequent unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 was to challenge the very foundation of the association. Since this issue struck at the very heart of the multiracial association, and was one over

which the Commonwealth might be dismembered, the Canadian government was to take an influential part towards resolving it, particularly at the Prime Ministers' meetings.

Chapter six examines the approach that Canada took from April 1963 until April 1968 to preserve the Commonwealth from dissolving over the Rhodesia issue. The first part of this chapter briefly describes the attitudes of member states towards this issue. Since the Rhodesia issue had an impact beyond its borders, consideration is given to the reactions of Commonwealth countries in the United Nations General Assembly. A virtual division existed within the association on a common approach to end the minority Rhodesian government. Consequently, the second part of the chapter examines Canada's role as an intermediary between the old and new member states in an attempt to find a compromise formula. Part three deals with Prime Minister Pearson's attempts to ensure that the compromise measures were put into practice. The conclusion summarizes the approach taken by Mr. Pearson in order to keep the Commonwealth together and achieve a peaceful settlement to the Rhodesian problem. An assessment is made of the various influences that may have affected Mr. Pearson's search for a compromise solution to the issue. Finally, there is an attempt to determine whether certain Commonwealth actors and the institution itself may have influenced Canada's approach towards the Rhodesia issue.

Commonwealth Attitudes towards the Rhodesia Issue

The evolutionary process of Commonwealth membership had changed its collective character and interests by the 1960s. The judgment was made, beginning with Ghana in 1957, that the long term stability of the African colonies and the continuation of close economic and political links with Britain would both be more likely safeguarded by a rapid transition to majority rule. Britain's commitment to an accelerated program of decolonization seemed to reach a threshold following Prime Minister Macmillan's "wind of change" speech to the South African Parliament in February 1960. The Conservative government had become increasingly concerned about the rise of national consciousness in Africa, and the need to quicken the pace of dismantling the Empire. Nigeria gained self-government within the Commonwealth in October 1960. Independence and Commonwealth membership were received by Sierra Leone and Tanganyika in 1961, and subsequently, by Uganda and Kenya in consecutive years. With the dissolution of the Central African Federation, Malawi and Zambia entered the Commonwealth in 1964. Thus, by October 1964, there were twenty member states or a dozen more than a decade earlier. Among the dramatic

infusion of new members were eight African countries. With an African dimension came new expectations for the association to work towards resolving racial problems such as the one that existed in Southern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia was a problem peculiar to the Commonwealth.¹ During a period in which all other British colonies in Africa were achieving their independence under governments representative of the majority of their population, Southern Rhodesia continued to be a self-governing territory of Britain, under a government dominated by its white minority.² From 1961 until 1965 that government pressed Britain to grant independence to Rhodesia under a constitution that would retain white supremacy. The majority of member states determined that this would be a profound denial of the principles of the Commonwealth. They saw that a British surrender to a white minority on this issue would threaten the very foundation of the association.

The attitude to which most Commonwealth Third World states subscribed was stated in a letter from Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, to Prime Minister Diefenbaker which was received on 9 April 1963. He

pointed out that it was the practice of the multiracial Commonwealth that independence be granted to territorial governments which were representative of all their people.³ Therefore, if Britain was to be consistent in its policies, Southern Rhodesia should not receive independence until after a new constitution was formulated, providing for majority rule. Nyerere argued that Britain had enforced the protection of all the rights of all sections of its colonies in the past, and both precedent and justice required that the same policy be applied in Southern Rhodesia. Canada's External Affairs department sympathized with this position. Canada always had respected Britain's constitutional position by supporting its attempts to find a solution to the problem by means of consultation with Southern Rhodesian governments because Ottawa chose not to criticize a fellow Commonwealth member, a NATO partner and a close friend. But External Affairs also realized the sense of urgency with which the African members of the Commonwealth regarded this racial issue. Before the changeover of governments in April, it is significant that the Under-Secretary, Norman Robertson, recommended to his Minister that Canada no longer should support the United Kingdom if its solution were to grant independence without a firm guarantee of an early transition to African majority government.⁴ Mr. Green concurred with this

viewpoint because his government was concerned that Rhodesian independence without provision for majority rule would cause the withdrawal of African and possibly Asian members from the Commonwealth.

Canada's new Liberal administration approached the Southern Rhodesia issue in much the same way as its predecessor had. Within a month of convening Parliament, Prime Minister Pearson had communicated his government's attitude to Winston Field. In a letter, dated 19 June 1963, Pearson explained that Canada had been impressed by the position taken by Commonwealth African governments and indicated his concern for maintaining the integrity of the association.⁵ Subsequently, Ottawa suggested that the Rhodesian Front should broaden the franchise to a point where non-whites would have the same rights as white Rhodesians.⁶ In the meantime, the United Kingdom, even under the new leader, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, continued to maintain that Rhodesian independence would be forthcoming only after constitutional changes. In an address to the British House of Commons on 15 November 1963, the Commonwealth Secretary further indicated that the terms for independence would have to be generally acceptable to Commonwealth countries:

The question of Southern Rhodesia's independence is one in which the whole Commonwealth is acutely interested. Great principles and deep emotions are involved. If we were to give independence to Southern Rhodesia on terms which were unacceptable to our fellow members we would be likely to cause grievous injury to the unity of the Commonwealth and to the image it presents to the world. It is clear, therefore, that the whole Commonwealth will have to be consulted. I am wondering whether we

might not go further than that. Might it not perhaps be possible for other members of the Commonwealth to help in a more positive way in the task of finding a generally acceptable solution? 7

Mr. Sandys wrote to Winston Field several weeks later to initiate consultations between their governments as well as "a few representatives of Commonwealth Governments to try to help us to find a generally acceptable solution" which would provide for Rhodesian self-government.⁸ Sandys had made it clear in a letter to Mr. Field on 7 December 1963 that independence would not be granted "on a basis of a franchise which is incomparably more restricted than that of any other British territory to which independence has hitherto been granted."⁹ But Prime Minister Field's government was neither interested in Commonwealth participation in Rhodesian affairs nor receptive to amending the 1961 Constitution to accommodate a more equitable representation of the African majority.

Britain was adamant in its refusal to grant constitutional independence to the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, in a despatch to Mr. Field on 22 February 1964 the Commonwealth Secretary declared his government's probable reaction to a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).

I fear that feeling in Britain and in the rest of the Commonwealth would be so unfavourable that we should be pressed to regard Southern Rhodesia as being in a state of revolt and to have no official dealings with her Government. In such circumstances I cannot believe that Parliament would be willing to

vote financial aid of any kind. What is more, we should certainly be under heavy pressure to withdraw Commonwealth preferences and to reconsider Southern Rhodesia's membership in the sterling area. 10

Thus, by the time of the Prime Ministers' meeting in July 1964, it was clear that Britain had determined that the 1961 Constitution was unacceptable as a basis for Southern Rhodesia's independence because it contravened the concept of racial equality. Canada had taken the approach that this issue could not be considered exclusively as an internal affair, for Rhodesia could affect the future of the multiracial Commonwealth and even those relations between non-white races and the West in general. Ottawa preferred keeping this issue within a Commonwealth context because it offered an appropriate medium for influencing the policies of member states and associated territories. Indeed, it seemed reasonable to assume that those countries having a direct interest in resolving the racial problem would be in the best position to contribute. Canada discovered at Prime Ministers' meetings from 1964 until 1966 that it had a mediatory role to play, acting as a middleman between white and non-white members which had different views on the Rhodesia issue.

Canada's Mediatory Role

The volatile situation in Southern Rhodesia was the central issue at the 1964 Prime Ministers' meeting. Though Prime Minister Douglas-Home wanted to circumvent this issue by not including it on the formal agenda, provision for its discussion was made under the broad topic, "Progress

of dependent territories toward independence." Third World members essentially proposed that Britain was responsible for holding a constitutional conference, representative of all political groups, to determine a basis to proceed to majority rule and an early independence.¹¹ In order to reduce racial tensions, these member states considered that the British government should bring about the release of all political prisoners, particularly Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole who headed rival African nationalist parties. For their part, Commonwealth African leaders such as Milton Obote of Uganda, Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere undertook to persuade black Rhodesian nationalists to accept a compromise short of their demand for immediate majority rule which would include a transitional period of qualitative franchise prior to independence under a majority African government.¹² But Sir Alec Douglas-Home disclaimed any power to intervene in the affairs of a self-governing colony so long as the Rhodesian minority government remained within the bounds of constitutional action.¹³ Rather the Conservative government intended to negotiate with the Rhodesian Front for majority rule at the earliest possible time; a position which was less likely to evoke criticism from within the ranks of their own party prior to the forthcoming October election. The old Commonwealth members, particularly, realized the constitutional, financial and political limitations which weighed on Britain and generally sympathized with its position. Australia's Prime Minister Menzies was most strongly supportive of British

policy. He was incensed with the African members "itch to give advice, to demand promises from Great Britain, to lay down and publish conditions" and

protested that, as we had agreed that it was not our business, but clearly a matter of difficult and delicate negotiation between Britain and Rhodesia, we should not embarrass the parties by what would appear to be orders given publicly by people who had no authority at all.¹⁴

With the exception of Canada, differences over Britain's approach to the Rhodesia issue had developed along colour lines. Evidently concerned about the ramifications of a racial split in a multiracial association, Mr. Pearson requested Arnold Smith, a member of the Canadian delegation, to draft a declaration on race equality to which it was hoped that all members might agree.¹⁵ Working from External Affairs' preparatory documents for the conference and with help from Mr. Robertson and Mr. Campbell, Arnold Smith developed a statement of principles for which the Commonwealth might stand. In his statement at the July 13 session, Prime Minister Pearson proposed that the conference should reaffirm in the final communiqué the principles on which the Commonwealth was based and suggested this declaration of racial equality.¹⁶ The Canadian proposal was accepted and read, in part:

The Commonwealth has a particular role to play in the search for solutions to the inter-racial problems which are threatening the orderly development of mankind in general and of many particular areas in the world today.

As a community of many different races, the Commonwealth is itself an almost unique experiment in international co-operation among peoples of several

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racess and continents. Within their own borders many of its members have faced and are facing issues raised by the coexistence of different cultures within a democratic society.

The Prime Ministers affirmed their belief that, for all Commonwealth Governments, it should be an objective of policy to build in each country a structure of society which offers equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

The Commonwealth should be able to exercise constructive leadership in the application of democratic principles in a manner which will enable the people of each country of different racial and cultural groups to exist and develop as free and equal citizens.

In this initiative, Canada was reaffirming its earlier position with regard to racial equality taken at the 1961 meeting. Like John Diefenbaker, Mr. Pearson considered that a multiracial association had to face the challenge of racial equality:

If we could not take a stand; if we could not reaffirm in the communiqué the principle of racial equality and non-discrimination - if we could not do that, then the Commonwealth was not likely, in the form which it is now, to go ahead or even survive.¹⁷

The Prime Minister further suggested that the conference should apply the principle of racial equality to the problem in Southern Rhodesia. Insofar as all members were agreed that minority rule was in conflict with this principle and that the common objective was to see Southern Rhodesia achieve independence with a constitution providing for equitable representation to all segments of Rhodesian society,¹⁸ there was some basis for a Commonwealth agreement. In addition, there was no difference of view on the responsibility of Britain for

ensuring progressive changes in the constitution, leading to independence. Consequently, Mr. Pearson perceived the difficulties as relating, first, to the methods most effective to achieving Commonwealth objectives and, second, to the question of timing.

Canada's Prime Minister first addressed the constitutional means that had been suggested for fulfilling the objective of majority rule. Since it was "the decision of the British Government that for Southern Rhodesia ... the existence of sufficiently representative institutions would be a condition of the granting of independence,"¹⁹ Mr. Pearson asked whether Britain would declare in the communiqué its intention to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia only after the territory had achieved majority rule. The Douglas-Home government refused, however, to make explicit its strategy towards Rhodesia, compelling Pearson to express his support for the viewpoints held by most Third World members.

An independence conference should be convened which the leaders of all parties in Southern Rhodesia should be free to attend ... that the objective of the conference would be to seek agreement on the steps by which Southern Rhodesia might proceed to independence within the Commonwealth ... 'at the earliest practicable time on the basis of majority rule'.

Thus, Canada's Prime Minister took the attitude that it was Britain's responsibility to ensure the independence of its colony by at least guaranteeing eventual majority rule.

For Pearson the objective of constitutional progress involved a second problem - one of timing. It was the opinion of most member states that,

unless some early progress is made in Southern Rhodesia the African majority might be driven increasingly to despair and to the acts of desperation that despair can engender.

With concern that the continued incarceration of responsible African leaders might effect a greater potential for extremism, Mr. Pearson suggested that,

the Commonwealth Conference should issue a reasoned appeal that the African leaders in Southern Rhodesia be released as a contribution toward the holding of those discussions that must take place soon, and on which the hope for agreed and early achievement of independence must inevitably be based.

However, there was a distinct possibility that the minority government of Southern Rhodesia might avoid all these pressures by unilaterally declaring its independence. Indeed, there was some anxiety that the territorial government might use the statement of Prime Ministers, reported in the communiqué, as fodder to feed their appeal to the white Rhodesians that the Commonwealth was intervening in their internal affairs. Mr. Pearson believed that "it might strengthen the hand of the British Government" and "support the moderate elements among Southern Rhodesian voters if all governments at the Conference would let it be publicly known" that members of "the Commonwealth would not be able to recognize the validity of any such unilateral declaration of independence" or give diplomatic support within the UN to any régime that came into

being by such illegal action. Pearson suggested that Prime Minister Ian Smith should be informed that "unconstitutional action" by his minority government

would gravely diminish Southern Rhodesia's international status, might lead to economic and political internal difficulties and might lead to disaster and violence and attempts to organize ... a Southern Rhodesian government-in-exile.

By taking a stand in this manner Prime Minister Pearson believed, and the other Commonwealth leaders concurred, "there could be no misunderstanding anywhere about the position we would have to adopt if such a desperate and illegal measure were taken."

With the assumption that the real interests of the Rhodesian population as a whole lay in developing confidence and cooperation between the two races on the basis of justice, the Commonwealth heads of government also called for the African majority and European minority to encourage mutual understanding of the problems of both communities. Mr. Pearson commended the political acumen shown by Mr. Kenyatta who stressed that the conference communiqué should reassure the European minority that their interests would be protected and "their cooperation would be essential in the development of an independent state." Indeed, this was to be the last time that the Commonwealth would formally attempt to allay the fears of the white minority for their security during the course of the next four years.

Assuming that the transition to majority rule, regardless of the timing, would require representatives of the

African majority to acquire the necessary education and practical experience to run their country, Mr. Pearson reminded the conference that economic assistance was urgently needed by Southern Rhodesia. Pearson suggested that the more developed Commonwealth countries might provide for the training of African Rhodesians while promising grants to the territory if it proceeded towards majority rule. To this end, Mr. Pearson stated that Canada

would be glad to provide technical facilities or resources to help in the training of Africans from Southern Rhodesia to take on the new responsibilities of administration.

The Prime Minister indicated that Canada was "already doing a good deal in this regard," but he "suggested we might do more" by allocating grant funds and special development loans for use within the territory or to bring selected African Rhodesians to Canada and train them for the future work at home.²⁰ In order to induce the Smith government to agree to political advancement for the Africans as an incremental step towards majority rule, Pearson added that substantial capital grants could be offered to Southern Rhodesia by the more developed Commonwealth members.²¹ Insofar as the territory had been suffering from a cessation of external investment, the movement of the headquarters of mining companies from Salisbury to Lusaka and the emigration of many European professionals and skilled tradesmen, it was hoped that financial inducements might effect a negotiated settlement acceptable to both Britain and the African nationalists.

Another development at this Prime Ministers' meeting, and one indirectly related to the Rhodesia question,

was the initiative which the newer nations took in calling for the establishment of a Commonwealth secretariat in London to ensure closer and more informed understanding between the member governments. Such a secretariat would be available to provide information, to assist existing agencies for the promotion of Commonwealth links, and to help co-ordinate ministerial conferences.²²

Perhaps more important, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah envisioned a secretariat which would act as a "central clearing house to prepare plans for trade, aid and development, and serve all Commonwealth members equally."²³ It was perhaps inevitable that an association which had more than doubled its membership during the preceding eight years would require some institutional machinery to coordinate its expanding activities. However, there was some concern, at least in Britain, that a Commonwealth civil service might depreciate the interpersonal contacts built up between governments with consultations bypassing the United Kingdom's Commonwealth Relations Office. Another consideration was whether additional bureaucracy might duplicate the network of coordination already present between the External Affairs departments of each government. Prime Minister Pearson expressed it thus:

We must be sure the basis of this new Secretariat is sound, and that we are adding an institution of value and not simply an additional agency available for the free play of Parkinson's Law.²⁴

But there were clearly political interests behind these objections. In February 1964 the Plowden Report had

recommended phasing out the CRO on the basis that a department working in the best interests of Commonwealth countries as well as those of the British government presented a conflict of interests.²⁵ The Plowden proposals for merging the British Diplomatic Service suggested the need to create a distinctive Commonwealth bureaucracy, representative of all member states.

Canada had, historically, been concerned with the possible centralization of the Commonwealth under the aegis of Britain. Ironically, an essential reason for new member states wanting a secretariat was to get the administration away from the British Cabinet Secretariat and its CRO. It was considered that a distinctive Commonwealth civil service, controlled by all members rather than under the authority of one, could better serve the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole. As Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin put it:

We see the Commonwealth Secretariat as one means of strengthening the Commonwealth in its role as an important link between countries with differing backgrounds and racial composition. By providing machinery to facilitate a broad range of contacts between Commonwealth countries, the Secretariat is making a contribution towards increasing the value of the Commonwealth association.²⁶

Indeed, this organization, particularly its Secretary-General, was to become increasingly important in promoting the interests of the association with regard to the Rhodesia issue from 1965 onwards.

Due primarily to the initiative of newer members and with support from Canada, the 1964 Prime Ministers' communiqué concluded that member state officials should consider appropriate machinery for establishing a permanent Commonwealth Secretariat to develop "closer and more informal understanding between their governments on the many issues which engage their attention." A group of senior officials met in January 1965 under the chairmanship of Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the British Cabinet, to formulate a blueprint for the civil service and recommend a Secretary-General. The new Commonwealth members must have been suitably impressed with Arnold Smith at the Prime Ministers' meeting because their officials pressed for his selection to the head position despite some reluctance in Ottawa in having an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs take the appointment.²⁷ At the next meeting of heads of government in July, Mr. Smith was unanimously approved as Secretary-General of a secretariat whose purpose was to coordinate inter-Commonwealth activities such as conferences and programs in the spheres of political affairs and economic development assistance.²⁸ Thus, Ottawa had indicated a greater willingness to have the Commonwealth play an active role and to have Canada be active within it.

The 1964 Prime Ministers' communiqué, presented on July 15, represented the attitudes of all members on the Rhodesia issue. Britain was acknowledged as responsible for granting independence to its territory. While no Commonwealth approach was formulated, the Smith government had been informed that Britain would have to be satisfied that there were sufficiently representative institutions in order for it to proceed to

independence, and that a UDI would not be recognized. Whereas the older member states were sympathetic with giving the Douglas-Home government more time to negotiate a settlement with the minority régime, the support of the newer members was the result of their own lack of power to resolve the issue rather than the consequence of a willingness to allow Britain a free-hand.²⁹ But Third World members had at least gained some support for their points of view from the Canadian delegation. Prime Minister Pearson

let the new members of the Commonwealth know that we were entirely on their side in principle Nevertheless, it was quite impracticable to do some of the things they wanted, such as enforcing racial equality on Rhodesia by military action if Rhodesian independence were declared unilaterally.³⁰

Starting from a point of consensus and then diagnosing what was to be achieved, Mr. Pearson suggested alternative proposals which were more likely to gain support, no matter how little, towards a common objective. First, his declaration on racial equality secured a consensus. Then, while acknowledging British responsibility for the constitutional status of its territory, Pearson argued the position of the moderate African members by calling for a constitutional conference, representative of all political groups, to work out a formula for independence on the basis of majority rule. Next, he ensured wider agreement by proposing that the membership should clearly establish in the final communiqué what the response of the Commonwealth would be to a UDI. Finally, Mr. Pearson secured the support of the more developed Commonwealth members to

assist the Southern Rhodesian government if it were to participate in a constitutional conference leading to independence on the basis of majority rule.

Just as Mr. Diefenbaker, three years earlier, had taken the lead in preventing a Commonwealth cleavage over the South African racial question, Lester Pearson played an intermediary rôle at the 1964 meeting of Prime Ministers which prevented the association from splitting up along colour lines.

Presidents Kenyatta and Obote were, undoubtedly, pleased with the stand taken by Mr. Pearson. Julius Nyerere was reported to have spoken to the British High Commissioner to Kenya, Malcolm MacDonald, in high praise of Pearson, calling him, "the Great liberal."³¹ Though Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand was generally supportive of Pearson's proposals, Douglas-Home and Menzies refused to accept his initiatives with respect to calling a constitutional conference. But the declaration on racial equality had established the broad objective of all member states inasmuch as it won unanimous approval. It was perhaps the declaration, more than anything else, which was to help direct the course of the multiracial Commonwealth on this racial issue during the next several years.

The declaration was an explicit statement of the fundamental purpose of the Commonwealth, making clear that the Rhodesia situation was at cross-purposes with the expectations of the membership. This statement of purpose had been devised to make clear to all member states that the Commonwealth was an association of independent nations with certain common ideals. Any

hesitancy with which Commonwealth countries had approached the statement would have been out of concern for its practical application, because the principles appeared to cross the Rubicon into domestic jurisdiction. Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect so many sovereign states, each of which valued an independent foreign policy, to bind themselves to a Commonwealth purpose. With the assumption that common principles might determine "the ends" but not "the means," Prime Minister Pearson had proposed some guidelines which would respect the sovereignty of all members. Such a declaration was significant for the multiracial Commonwealth because it endorsed racial equality as a goal for the association.

A Commonwealth authority, Professor Bruce Miller, had questioned in 1958 whether racial equality could ever be accepted as a Commonwealth purpose for the very plausible reason that "questions of racial policy have been assumed to be domestic".³² The declaration did not detail rigid requirements. Rather it permitted each member state to interpret for itself the proper approach to racial issues. By the same token, the declaration recognized that racial questions are of Commonwealth concern, and an objective had been formulated to guide the policy of all members. Prime Minister Macmillan's words, enunciated several years earlier, were finally accorded formal recognition: "Mind your own business, of course, but mind how it affects my business too."³³

In spite of Commonwealth African opinions voiced at the 1964 meeting of Prime Ministers and an agreement by all

members to respect the principle of racial equality, the course that Britain followed toward the Rhodesia issue did not appear to have been guided by the Declaration of Racial Equality or by the interests of most of its Commonwealth partners. ³⁴ In essence, the Conservative government was prepared to grant Southern Rhodesia independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, maintaining racial inequality, provided that the Smith régime could gain the general support of the African population by means of some form of referendum. Mr. Smith proposed an indaba of the chiefs and headmen as a way to gain a judicious appreciation of non-white opinion, but Prime Minister Douglas-Home indicated that these men were theoretically public servants of the minority government, and were thus unrepresentative of the people as a whole. ³⁵

With the victory of the Labour Party in the British general election on 16 October 1964, the Rhodesian problem was assumed by Harold Wilson. Shortly after forming his government, Prime Minister Wilson informed Ian Smith of his administration's requirements for Southern Rhodesia's independence:

- (i) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
- (ii) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.

- (iii) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
- (iv) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
- (v) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.³⁶

These conditions, which were similar to those initially stated by Douglas - Home, went a long way towards pacifying the Rhodesian government since they did not require majority rule before independence.³⁷ But the Smith government was adamant that its endorsement by a meeting of African chiefs should be regarded as adequate evidence that the minority régime had the support of the Rhodesians as a whole.³⁸ Exchanges between the two governments also clarified the constitutional conditions under which Mr. Smith wanted Rhodesia to proceed to independence. In sum, Smith's administration was neither prepared "to increase the rate of progress to majority rule in view of all the evidence that is before us to-day" nor could it accept, as Wilson put it,

any form of constitutional safeguards which would prevent the Europeans in Rhodesia from altering the Constitution [1961] if they deem it necessary to prevent the emergence of an African Government.³⁹

Negotiations continued between the two governments over franchise qualifications and entrenchment procedures until the 1965 Prime Ministers' meeting in June. It was be-

coming increasingly apparent, at least to Commonwealth African members, that pressure had to be applied on Harold Wilson to prevent his government from conceding independence to the white minority régime without providing for majority rule.

The Commonwealth heads of government met in London from June 17 until June 21. Harold Wilson reiterated that Rhodesia was a self-governing colony and that it might achieve independence by guaranteeing "unimpeded progress towards majority rule."⁴⁰ But the British leader went further than his predecessor with regard to the Rhodesia issue by indicating that:

If negotiations did not produce speedy results, having regard to our insistence on 'unimpeded progress towards majority rule', we would be ready to take the initiative in that we would 'consider promoting such a [constitutional] conference'.

The Labour government believed that if it immediately intervened to enforce constitutional changes in favour of the African majority, it would provoke a UDI. With a considerable body of sympathy existing in Britain for the white Rhodesians, Wilson considered that he could not risk such an outcome.

For most of the Third World members, there were two issues of discontent - one involving "ends" and one "means". On the first issue, contrary to the British position, most member states required that the objective for a Rhodesian

settlement had to include "independence within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible date on the basis of majority rule."⁴¹ Of the "Five Principles," the first implied that the British government would be willing to grant Rhodesia independence on a basis other than majority rule if this was acceptable to "the people of Rhodesia as a whole." Most Commonwealth heads of government, therefore, were concerned as to how the wishes of the African population could be legitimately assessed so long as their leaders were in jail and political activity among Africans was forbidden by the government. Under these circumstances Prime Ministers Margai of Sierra Leone and Balewa of Nigeria, and Milton Obote insisted that,

although the primary responsibility rests with Britain, the political prisoners must be released, and this release would pave the way for a constitutional conference.⁴²

Britain's statement that safeguards for the African majority would be entrenched in the constitution if Rhodesia proceeded to independence under a minority government was also challenged. Julius Nyerere emphatically rejected the proposition that a promise of "unimpeded progress to majority rule" should be a sufficient basis for a settlement. Rather he wanted Britain to commit itself to the precedent that was established while dealing with other colonies, and for the communiqué to stipulate that the basis for a settlement must be "no independence before majority rule" (NIBMR):

I am not concerned about timetables. I know that this is a tough, difficult business and that it cannot be done in a hurry. But this does not matter so much as long as the objectives of achieving

independence on the basis of majority rule were established in advance. But it was the adamant refusal of Mr. Wilson to commit the British Government to these six words that caused all the trouble.⁴³

Consequently, Nyerere recorded his disagreement over this fundamental objective by dissociating Tanzania from this portion of the final communiqué.

On the second question, one of devising an appropriate approach towards the Rhodesia problem, most members advocated that Britain should threaten to use force to assert its authority over the minority government if negotiations failed to lead to majority rule within the next few months. African leaders, in particular, considered that Britain should approach Rhodesia in the same way as it did Cyprus, Kenya, Aden and British Guiana where constitutions had been suspended and British troops used to keep order. Harold Wilson recalls that President Nyerere "~~condemned our failure to use force~~" and Kenneth Kaunda noted the inconsistency of British policy by refusing military intervention in Rhodesia.⁴⁴ Even the incoming Commonwealth Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, suggested that Wilson might send an RAF squadron of Javelin fighters to Zambia on the premise that it was protecting the Kariba Dam while acting as a deterrent to Rhodesia's proposed independence.⁴⁵ He additionally recommended that British paratroops could be stationed in Lusaka; in the event of UDI, these British forces together with loyal Rhodesian personnel under the direction of the Governor could be used to prevent

an illegal revolt. According to Richard Hall, President Kaunda had been assured by Harold Wilson that he would despatch British troops to Rhodesia in the event of any breakdown of law and order.⁴⁶ There is reason to believe that Wilson gained Zambia's support for the final communiqué on the basis of such a promise.⁴⁷

An alternative approach towards the Rhodesia problem was put forward by President Nkrumah on behalf of non-white members, with the exception of Malawi. In Harold Wilson's words:

He put forward a six-point plan. Britain must convene a constitutional conference of all parties and groups in Rhodesia. Britain must tell Smith to release all political prisoners. Smith should be given a specific time in which to carry out this instruction. Failing that, Britain should suspend the Rhodesian constitution. An interim and representative government should be appointed, charged with the repeal of all repressive legislation. A general election should be held on a franchise based on 'one man, one vote.' Rhodesia was to be given independence as soon as a genuinely representative government was formed after the election.⁴⁸

Of course, the possibility of using troops to enforce these measures was implicit in such a proposal.

Although Third World leaders were advocating a specific progression of initiatives to establish Rhodesian majority rule, they were not inflexible. Like Nyerere, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa realized that a transition period over a reasonable period of time would be required to move towards majority rule because

African Rhodesians needed time to develop technical and administrative experience before gaining independence.⁴⁹ Whether or not Prime Minister Balewa's patience was shared by all his fellow African leaders, the majority of Third World members seemed to believe that a constitutional conference of all parties was a necessary first step.

Prime Minister Pearson's "lynchpinmanship" was admirably suited for working with the more moderate African approach. Pearson supported the objective for Rhodesia of "independence within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible time on the basis of majority rule," in the words of the 1964 Prime Ministers' communiqué, but without using violent means to fulfill that objective. In his report to the House of Commons following the conference, Mr. Pearson stated that,

nothing but chaos would come from attempting to use force to change the situation, whether this was military force, or even political or economic force used prematurely.⁵⁰

Unquestionably, Pearson realized that if Canada supported the use of force then there would be some obligation on its part to participate in military activities in Rhodesia which his government would not have been prepared to contemplate.

Nonetheless, it was evident that while the Canadian Prime Minister objected to military intervention, he had given his support to the alternative approach of Third World members. Mr. Pearson had expressed the opinion that the Smith government should soon bring the African population

into full political participation, release political prisoners from detention and remove racial discriminatory laws. These measures, he declared, would lead to African majority rule and independence within the next several years and help to create an atmosphere of respect among the different racial groups in Rhodesia. It was less apparent to Third World leaders whether Mr. Pearson was in full support of majority rule as a necessary pre-condition for Rhodesian independence. On this crucial issue Pearson was careful not to oppose explicitly the British position. In order to divert attention from this important question of NIBMR, Pearson pledged Canadian support for any program for the training of African Rhodesians in government and technical fields that the Commonwealth might be willing to devise. In addition, Canada was prepared to contribute to a Commonwealth capital assistance program for Rhodesia if the minority government were willing to accept a phased transition to majority rule. Mr. Pearson believed that the promise of Commonwealth aid for Rhodesian development might induce the minority government to accept some postponement of independence, during which time the crash program for general education of the African population might reach fruition.

Political development did not prove to be sufficiently favourable to implement a capital assistance scheme, but Mr. Pearson was able to combat some of the divisive issues before the conference, and help to limit the widening gap between members on an effective approach towards the Rhodesia problem. By diverting the conferences's attention from the use of force

to a British constitutional initiative, Canada's Prime Minister helped to develop a measure of Commonwealth consensus on this critical issue.

On 11 November 1965, Ian Smith's minority government unilaterally proclaimed Rhodesia's independence. In the face of this action, the British Foreign Secretary requested a meeting of the UN Security Council.

because an attempt to establish an illegal minority regime was a matter of world concern and because the goodwill, co-operation and active support of United Nations members would be required if the various economic measures against Rhodesia were to be effective.⁵¹

Evidently, the British government had resolved that although Rhodesia remained its own responsibility, events in the territory had escalated such that Britain required the support of the world community to implement its policy. In accord with Britain's initiative, the Security Council met in emergency session the following day and condemned UDI, calling upon all member states not to recognize or assist the illegal régime. But after further meetings, the Council approved a more substantive resolution on November 20, requesting the United Kingdom "to quell this rebellion of the racist minority" and

all states to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military equipment and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.⁵²

The Wilson government could hardly have avoided taking a course of action which would gain some credibility with its Commonwealth partners and at the UN. After all, it was the Labour Party which was responsible for the multi-racial transformation of the Commonwealth. In order not to circumvent the UN's interest in this crucial African issue and to preclude other initiatives, Harold Wilson had invited all member nations to support British policy. Mr. Wilson assumed that by preventing essential supplies such as arms and oil from reaching Rhodesia and boycotting the sale of exports such as tobacco, sugar and metals, the British territory would be forced to capitulate on his terms. Britain obviously was concerned that military intervention would put a drain on its resources and result in a full scale war on the African continent which might involve South Africa (a principal trading partner) and Portugal (a NATO ally) while putting to an end any prospect of building a multiracial society in Rhodesia. Perhaps most important, Wilson headed a minority government which would be facing a general election within another six months. The British public had not indicated in the October National Opinion Poll any enthusiasm for military intervention in Rhodesia.⁵³ Moreover, Britain still had the support of some of its Commonwealth partners, particularly Prime Minister

Menzies. Not without some paranoia about the potentiality of UN-interference in its own domestic policy, Australia took a jaundiced view towards Third World opinion on Rhodesia.

Menzies considered that Rhodesia was an internal affair and Australia, therefore, would follow the course of action determined by the United Kingdom.⁵⁴

Commonwealth Third World countries generally were disappointed by the Wilson government's position that it would not intervene militarily to prohibit the perpetuation of the illegal régime in Rhodesia. There is no doubt that most of the member states believed that sanctions would be ineffective and the application of force was the only appropriate approach to end the rebellion and ensure majority rule. Since they were powerless to use force, these countries sponsored successive resolutions at the UN. On November 5 a resolution was adopted by the General Assembly which

called on Britain to release all political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia, repeal all repressive and discriminatory legislation, remove all restrictions on African political prisoners and on African political activities, suspend the constitution of 1961 and immediately call a constitutional conference, ... [requesting] Britain to employ all necessary measures, 'including military force', to implement these recommendations.⁵⁵

Following UDI, the Assembly adopted a more moderately worded resolution

which condemned the Rhodesian declaration, invited Britain to implement immediately the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in order to put down the rebellion, and referred the question to the Council.⁵⁶

Thus, Third World members had a vehicle for proclaiming their opinion on the Rhodesia issue, but they were hamstrung inasmuch as the Security Council, on which Britain exercised a veto, was not prepared to take enforcement action.

Commonwealth African and Caribbean members were equally frustrated in trying to apply direct pressure on the United Kingdom. Tanzania and Ghana severed diplomatic relations with Britain in accord with the recommendation of the Organization of African Unity's Council of Foreign Ministers which had resolved that members should discontinue diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 15 December 1965 if the colonial power did not use effective means to put an end to UDI.⁵⁷ Presidents Nkrumah and Nyerere were forced to act less out of respect for the principle of racial equality than out of the frustration of being unable to persuade Britain to take some effective steps towards Rhodesia. Presidents Kenyatta and Kaunda and Prime Minister Sir Abubakar did not support what they considered an impracticable measure to put an end to the illegal régime. Uganda, Sierra Leone, Malawi and, eventually, Lesotho and Botswana claimed that posturing was ineffective. But it is far more likely that these countries did not want to prejudice their relations with Britain on whom they were dependent for foreign aid.⁵⁸ Jamaica and Trinidad supported the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, including military intervention, to remove the illegal government in Rhodesia. Prime Minister Eric Williams apparently wrote to Harold Wilson, indicating that he believed the Rhodesia question

was crucial to the future of the Commonwealth and if not properly handled probably would lead to the withdrawal of the African member countries.⁵⁹

For its part, the Canadian government severed relations with Rhodesia and imposed diplomatic, military and economic sanctions following UDI. Prime Minister Pearson declared in the House of Commons that Canada did

not recognize either the unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Mr. Smith in Rhodesia, or the independent state of Rhodesia which he claims now exists, or the Smith Government itself in Rhodesia.⁶⁰

Canada took a stand, Pearson continued, in full support of Britain's policy of using economic pressure on the illegal régime to bring about a return to constitutional government.

In view of the action of Mr. Smith's Government, we are withdrawing the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Salisbury. We are recommending immediately to the Governor in Council the withdrawal of the preferential tariff treatment Rhodesian goods have enjoyed in Canada. Imports from Rhodesia will no longer be accorded the British preferential tariff, nor will they be entitled to the rates in the most-favoured-nation tariff. Instead, they will be subject to the much higher rates in the general tariff. We are also bringing into effect immediately a complete arms embargo. The export of all arms, military equipment and ammunition to Rhodesia will be banned, and there will be no new aid and financing agreements.

In response to the UN Security Council resolution adopted on 20 November 1965, Canada banned the import of most Rhodesian products and within a month had placed an export embargo on oil and petroleum products.⁶¹ However, these sanctions could not be effective without the full co-operation of all nations. Portugal and South Africa had

made it clear that they would not respect an economic embargo, and multinational oil corporations likely were to continue to supply oil through South Africa and Mozambique unless they were prevented from doing so by a comprehensive blockade.

Although still unwilling to try to restore constitutional government in Rhodesia by military means, Canada also took a stand alongside of Commonwealth Third World members by adhering to the objective of majority rule as a basis for Rhodesian independence. Anything less than this would be inconsistent with the Commonwealth's commitment to the principle of race equality, and could lead to African, and possibly Caribbean and Asian, members withdrawing from the association.

Possibly no one was as interested in the preservation of the Commonwealth as its Secretary-General. Shortly after his appointment, Arnold Smith toured Central and East Africa in order to show that the Secretariat was concerned with the Rhodesia problem.⁶² Mr. Smith was in Nairobi when UDI was announced, and helped to maintain some equanimity among African Commonwealth members at this crucial time. In an interview with The Times, following his return to London, he stressed that "the Rhodesian crises could lead to the disintegration of the Commonwealth if it were not properly handled."⁶³ Realizing that "most African leaders [were] skeptical about the effectiveness in a reasonable amount of time of the present level

of sanctions," Smith indicated that a "complete trade embargo coupled with measures to protect Zambia would look more persuasive and sincere in their eyes." Smith was prophetic in stating that African leaders "have to be convinced that Britain's measures are serious and likely to be effective." On December 3, the OAU passed a resolution which underscored the Secretary-General's warning, and within a few weeks Tanzania and Ghana had cut off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom for failing to take stronger initiatives towards ending the rebellion. In order to counter threats by member states to withdraw from the Commonwealth, Mr. Smith urged them to remain in the association where African views would have more influence on British policy.

I am convinced that a withdrawal could not help the present crises and that it would diminish pressures on Britain and elsewhere outside Africa towards adoption of such further measures as may be needed to achieve a just solution; moreover ... all Commonwealth countries including Britain are committed to majority rule in Rhodesia. Continued Commonwealth consultation can help hold Governments to this commitment.⁶⁴

As the Secretary-General had pointed out, each member government was free to take an approach towards the Rhodesia issue which it judged to be the most effective. However, Britain's policy clearly was not compatible with Commonwealth expectations to make Rhodesia independent on the basis of majority rule. Perhaps for more than any other reason the African members remained in the association because they believed that Britain was morally and politically committed as a result of agreements at the previous two Prime Ministers' meetings to a settlement in Rhodesia which would be satisfactory to the Commonwealth.⁶⁵

Britain's approach to the Rhodesia issue had not changed by January 1966 but its activities had. The Prime Minister seemed to be convinced that the application of economic sanctions could be effective "based on advice [they] were receiving that oil sanctions and the closure of the Beira pipeline would bring the Rhodesian economy to a halt."⁵⁶ Moreover, Wilson had also been advised "that Portugal would not challenge the determination of the UN, nor seek to encourage sanction-breaking." Thus when Rhodesia cut off the supply of oil and petroleum products to Zambia in reaction to the sanctions measure, Britain initiated an airlift, in which the United States and Canada participated, to move these commodities from Kinshasa to Zambia. The economy of Zambia had been almost fully integrated into that of Rhodesia during the time of the Federation and, as a result, this new Commonwealth member still depended on oil from the refinery at Umtali, inside Rhodesia. Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin explained to the House of Commons that,

this airlift has enabled Zambia to maintain and build up its oil stocks to the point where, with increased use of road transportation, the airlift itself may be reduced or become unnecessary in a few weeks time. This has been a useful undertaking and one most effectively carried out by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Our participation was originally intended for a period of one month, starting late in December. We subsequently agreed at the request of the British and Zambian Governments to continue the airlift until the end of April. The position now is being reviewed. I might say that the airlift has cost Canada up to March 31, \$1,125,000.⁵⁷

But what was intended to be short-term emergency assistance evolved into long-term development assistance when Zambia,

subsequently, closed its border to Rhodesia as an integral part of the application of sanctions. While strengthening the embargo, alternative means had to be found for bringing in oil and gas as well as exporting copper, which was essential to that country's survival.⁶⁸ Consequently, Britain and the more developed Commonwealth countries contributed aid towards reducing some of the economic costs of implementing the sanctions approach. Yet it remained true that the real impact of re-routing trade was felt by Zambia itself.⁶⁹

But the unwillingness of Britain to use stronger measures to end the rebellion in Rhodesia continued to cause acrimony within the Commonwealth. As a consultative body, it was reasonable that a conference should be called for members to express their differences of opinion and to try to reach some agreement on the issue. Consequently, the Secretary-General was requested by Sir Abubakar to organize a meeting of Commonwealth heads of government for January to deal exclusively with the Rhodesia problem.

Harold Wilson was not pleased with the idea of holding a special Commonwealth conference because the disagreements that could result might outweigh any benefits of discussing this issue. Since he was reluctant to go to Lagos to be "put in the dock," Arnold Smith asked Mr. Pearson to persuade the British Prime Minister to attend.⁷⁰ After consultations with Pearson in Ottawa, Wilson finally agreed to go to Lagos, concluding that "we could not turn the proposal down and aggravate feelings in the Commonwealth still further."⁷¹

However, Sir Robert Menzies dissociated Australia from the conference because he thought that it would serve no useful purpose:

It is necessary to ask what the purposes or likely results of a special conference would be.

The Australian Government believes that the Government of Britain has behaved with firmness, expedition, and good sense; and that its resistance to the use of arms to enforce a constitutional settlement is sound.

But several Commonwealth countries are publicly demanding that armed force be used, and by Britain. Some of these countries seem to have deeply and passionately committed themselves.

Under these circumstances, a Prime Ministers' Conference would in our view be unlikely to do more than record and emphasize differences. No unanimity of view could be achieved, and considerable bitterness would be disclosed.⁷²

Neither Presidents Nyerere nor Nkrumah were to attend this conference, assuming that Harold Wilson was not prepared to accept the majority Commonwealth opinion. But there were advantages to the absence of each of these leaders. Menzies evidently was not prepared to permit the Third World members to encroach on an issue which he believed to be entirely a British affair. Nyerere may have considered that his presence would be of little value other than to emphasize the different points of view, and Nkrumah may have found himself having to break with the Commonwealth in order to remain in the forefront of African activists. In the event, their refusal to come to Lagos provided an opportunity for voices of moderation to speak more freely, and to present the case for a non-military

approach at a time when sanctions were not having an appreciable impact on Rhodesia.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Pearson was aware of the potential explosiveness of the Lagos meeting and in a letter on January 3, advised the Secretary-General of his concern

lest a conference of the nature and form now likely, as well as the advocacy at such a conference of measures which appear logically to derive from a clear perception of the issues, may serve in itself to accentuate the cleavage on racial lines already implicit in the Rhodesian situation. I am concerned, too, that during this stage of its development the Secretariat should not appear to be taking sides rather than representing whatever consensus there may be among the nations whose common interests it is designed to serve.

There are undoubtedly times when issues should be brought to a head. Equally, and perhaps more frequently in the field of international relations, there are times when the best course may be to strive to avoid a show-down. My own feeling is that, if the Lagos meeting is to serve any constructive purpose, it must find some means of re-establishing mutual confidence without forcing the discussion through to what might be counted as a clear win or loss for any given point of view.⁷³

Pearson indicated that while an agreement on military intervention was unlikely, there was a consensus of Commonwealth opinion on the goal to be achieved in Rhodesia. But rather than focusing on the approaches to achieve their mutual long range objectives which would further strain Commonwealth relations, it might be more useful, Pearson suggested, to work on some less sensitive aspects of the Rhodesia issue where some agreement could be reached. Apparently, Lester Pearson had some sort of "watch-dog committee" in mind to consider the implementation of sanctions and organize educational

assistance for African Rhodesians. Pearson's suggestions must have been well-received because they were included on the conference agenda:

The Prime Ministers discussed in particular the ending of the rebellion; the need for cooperation with and assistance to Zambia; and the future of Rhodesia under constitutional rule. A Working Party of officials discussed in greater detail the nature and efficacy of economic measures against the illegal régime in Rhodesia; ways in which Zambia could be helped in its cooperation in these measures; and the question of Commonwealth assistance in training Africans in Rhodesia.⁷⁴

During the conference, held from January 11 until 13, Zambian Vice-President Kamanga expressed his country's misgivings about economic sanctions.⁷⁵ While Kamanga made it clear that Zambia appreciated the airlift of oil and gas supplies to Ndola and Lusaka, he was concerned that its economy would suffer greatly if the rebellion did not end within the next several months. Sir Albert Margai recommended armed intervention as the only means to assure a quick and decisive return to constitutional rule in Rhodesia.⁷⁶ The only reasonable alternative President Obote explained was to adopt more stringent economic measures by declaring the Rhodesian situation a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and calling for mandatory economic sanctions under Article 41. Since Commonwealth African members had maintained all along that sanctions were ineffective, it is likely that Obote hoped that the Security Council would eventually have to institute military action as a natural follow-up measure under Article 42. But Harold Wilson was not prepared

to sanction the use of force which, he argued, would result in death and the destruction of the very society the Commonwealth was intending to help. The British government's firm position was to give economic sanctions a chance to work.

Mr. Sangster, Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica, disagreed with Britain's approach, but he expected, at the very least, that Harold Wilson should promise heads of government that Rhodesia would not be given independence on a basis which provided for something less than majority rule. The Asian members were more sympathetic towards Mr. Wilson's dilemma over Rhodesia, realizing that the Labour government could lose the general election by going too far in employing measures against the Smith régime and, yet, lose its Commonwealth partners by not going far enough. The Indian Minister of Law, Mr. Sen, and Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak understood that Wilson had to respond to the political imperatives at home. Nonetheless, they shared Sangster's opinion that the British Prime Minister should assure the conference that Rhodesia would not receive independence before working out a constitution embodying majority rule.

The Canadian delegation took a middle position to reduce friction between members on the most appropriate approach to restore constitutional government in Rhodesia, and to develop sufficient cohesion on a Commonwealth course of action. In order to help Harold Wilson, Pearson persuaded the conference

to give sanctions additional time to develop their effectiveness. According to Paul Martin, it was the Canadian government's belief that,

when Mr. Smith's followers realize that the grow-economic dislocation resulting from the UDI is not a temporary phenomenon but rather that their trade will continue indefinitely and progressively to be damaged by sanctions and that their economic prospects are distinctly bleak, they should realize their mistake in backing his illegal action.⁷⁷

Extraordinarily, neither External Affairs nor any other government department had conducted a detailed study to establish that sanctions would have such an impact that one could properly conclude that they would lead to a change in régime.

To assure the effective coordination of sanctions, and to consider additional economic measures that might be practicable, Prime Minister Pearson proposed the establishment of a committee, consisting of a cross-section of Commonwealth members, who might report on the progress of sanctions within the next several months.⁷⁸ In spite of having suggested the creation of this committee, Ottawa did not want to get further involved in the controversial Rhodesia problem. However, Canada accepted the chairmanship of this Sanctions Committee at the urging of Third World member states. The High Commissioner to Britain, Lionel Chevrier, took the chair for meetings which were held in London approximately every three weeks, and attended by other High Commissioners and Britain's Commonwealth Secretary Arthur Bottomley.⁷⁹ Aside from buying more time for sanctions to work, the Committee had a functional value. It acted as a means to get various Commonwealth members involved in a common approach to the Rhodesia issue and helped to keep it on the UN agenda. In addition to considering ways in which to make the imposition of economic sanctions more effective, the Committee's tasks included coordinating aid to Zambia with the close consultation

of the Commonwealth Secretariat. For example, a sub-committee was established to prepare information "on the requirements of the Zambian Contingency Planning Organization" and to expedite "offers of assistance" from Commonwealth countries to the Zambian government.³⁰

A second committee, chaired by the Secretary-General, was also formed to help administer the special fund for providing administrative and technical training for African Rhodesians and to screen candidates for a post-secondary education.³¹ Arnold Smith initially indicated that some African members had shown strong interest in assisting refugees. However, it was Lester Pearson who had envisaged a potential for an Education Committee in preparing the African majority for their responsibilities in governing an independent Zimbabwe, and it was he who proposed this idea at the conference.³² Pearson considered that directing Commonwealth energies towards a general program for training African Rhodesians was a constructive step towards preparing the groundwork for majority African rule as well as providing clear evidence to Third World members that majority rule was the objective in Rhodesia.

Thus, the Canadian Prime Minister helped reduce friction among Commonwealth members by proposing the two Committees as compromise measures on which Third World countries and Britain could agree. There is little doubt that Canada's ultimate interest in helping to develop a consensus on the Rhodesia issue

was "largely based upon our concern for the continued integrity and unity of the Commonwealth."³³ It was the concern of all members, however, to avoid a split in the association along racial lines over this issue. As a consequence, most member states accepted the reaffirmation of the British government that,

a period of direct rule would be needed, leading to the holding of a constitutional conference. This conference representing all sections of the Rhodesian people would be for the purpose of recommending a constitution leading to a majority rule on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.³⁴

Sympathy for Wilson's minority Labour government, which was facing a general election, may have contributed to the heads of government accepting that military force "would not be precluded if this proved necessary to restore law and order," but that it would not be employed in the existing circumstances. But, essentially, a Commonwealth consensus was achieved on the assumption that sanctions would work, although "some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard." Third World members might have been prepared to endorse the sanctions approach more because of the credibility that Pearson lent by acting as a character witness for the British Prime Minister than Wilson's confident prediction that sanctions would restore legality in Rhodesia within "a matter of weeks rather than months."

Harold Wilson's fellow heads of government assumed that he was sincere in believing that South Africa would cooperate with the oil embargo and Rhodesia would suffer an economic

collapse in a relatively short period of time. However, Rhodesia was supplied with oil from both South Africa and the Portuguese territory of Mozambique, and Britain would not contemplate extending the embargo to these Western allies to enforce their adherence to sanctions. Alternatively, the British government sought and received authority from the UN Security Council to stop tankers from transporting oil to Rhodesia through the port of Beira (see Appendix H).³⁵ Unlike Canada, Commonwealth African countries considered this initiative as an inadequate measure inasmuch as a greater volume of oil was being supplied to Rhodesia by rail from Lourenço Marques and South Africa.³⁶ It is likely that Britain wanted an effective embargo but was not prepared to undertake the additional naval effort involved. By employing this half measure Britain at least appeased those who were demanding more forceful action.

The Bingham report has recently revealed that the Wilson government had been informed early in 1966 "that British oil was being moved in [to Rhodesia] illegally from Lourenço Marques."³⁷ In fact, the government was subsequently told that "more than half of this oil . . . was supplied directly or indirectly by British Petroleum (51 per cent owned by the British Government) and Shell Oil." BP and Shell have given evidence that as early as 1968 they informed Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson of the strategy they employed

to supply oil, necessary to keep Rhodesia running directly through a joint subsidiary in Mozambique, or indirectly through swaps with a French company in South Africa.

Contrary to Sir Harold Wilson's denial in the House of Commons that neither he nor any of his ministers had any knowledge of

sanctions busting, former Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart recently confessed to the House that he had been aware of the oil companies illegal actions.³⁸ Moreover, Mr. Thomson (now Lord Thomson) admitted to the House that he

conveyed in writing to the prime minister and other ministers most directly concerned a full account of all that passed at his meetings on behalf of the Government with the oil companies.

Though it is still questionable whether Harold Wilson knew that his government was responsible for undermining its own sanctions measures, it is clear that his Ministers were aware of the circumvention of the embargo, and that his government failed to inform the British public, the Commonwealth and the UN. It is also evident that the Wilson government had been informed that British oil was being supplied to Rhodesia before the Prime Ministers' meeting in September 1966, and may well have been pushing for the continuance of its sanctions policy in bad faith.

The meeting of heads of government, held in London from September 6th until 15th, was almost exclusively concerned with the Rhodesia issue. It was clear that non-mandatory economic sanctions were not having the impact that Harold Wilson had projected.

The oil import embargo had not been successful, and there had been serious breaches in the export embargo on minerals ...[as] Rhodesia continued to export minerals, pig iron, chrome, and asbestos in considerable quantities.³⁹

Consequently, sanctions were not causing the Smith régime to make concessions or accept a return of constitutional authority

in Rhodesia. While the voluntary sanction measures increasingly were looking like a charade, Britain's attempts at negotiation with its former colony were a source of growing distrust by African leaders.

Thus, the temper of this conference was clear from the outset. In a BBC television interview the day before the opening meeting, Mr. Pearson declared that the Rhodesia issue challenged the continued existence of the Commonwealth.

It is a very serious problem because it affects the question of racial discrimination, racial equality and those principles on which the new Commonwealth is based. If we do not solve this problem on the basis of its confirmed equality and non-discrimination, it could be very serious. ⁹⁰

In view of the crucial nature of the conference, Harold Wilson suggested that Mr. Pearson should act as chairman of the sessions in order to ensure impartiality. But Third World members insisted on having as chairman the British Prime Minister, expressing the view that "Wilson was not going to be let off the hook in that fashion."⁹¹ Apparently, it was believed that Harold Wilson would be more susceptible to criticism at centre stage, and possibly that Pearson would be free to play an intermediary role.

Mr. Wilson's opening statement on Tuesday, September 6 did not reveal any change in his government's policy.⁹²

Force would not be used unless there were a breakdown of law and order in Rhodesia. The Wilson government would reject any proposal for the implementation of mandatory sanctions. South Africa had made public its opposition to UN sanctions,

and Wilson explained that this measure would not be effective unless that country could be induced to comply. Whereas South Africa might be persuaded to support voluntary sanctions limited to Rhodesia, its non-compliance with a mandatory embargo could lead to demands for the application of sanctions on South Africa itself. This outcome would have a detrimental impact on Britain which carried on approximately £300 million of trade with South Africa each year. Thus, the Wilson government was inclined to intensify voluntary measures by plugging loopholes and applying diplomatic pressure on Portugal, South Africa and the oil companies while providing additional aid to Zambia. Finally, Harold Wilson stated that Britain would continue to carry out exploratory talks with the Smith régime, but it would not depart from the objective of achieving a return to constitutional rule in Rhodesia on the basis of the "Six Principles."

Following Wilson's remarks, President Obote requested an adjournment, until the following day, to permit members to study the text of the British statement. On Wednesday Simon Kapwepwe, Zambia's Foreign Affairs' Minister, explained to the conference that the Commonwealth's objective for Rhodesia should consist, first, of

a period of direct rule imposed by HMG and, second, no independence until there was a Government elected by the majority of the people on the basis of one man, one vote.⁹³

In order to reach this goal, Kapwepwe demanded that Britain should either use force or, if Mr. Wilson believed that British public opinion would not support this course of action, the

Commonwealth should request the UN Security Council for the application of comprehensive mandatory sanctions. Of the two approaches, military intervention was recommended by Zambia as the more effective way of returning constitutional government to Rhodesia. Comprehensive sanctions would inevitably embroil Britain in an economic clash with South Africa that would benefit no one. Mr. Kapwepwe pointed out that it was the United Kingdom who was responsible for Rhodesia and best suited to apply the necessary force. It would be better that the colonial power assert its authority, Kapwepwe explained, rather than leaving the initiative to an OAU or Soviet military operation which would lead to a racial or ideological war. Evident in Kapwepwe's demands was the requirement that either Britain alter its position by asserting more effective measures to bring down the Smith regime or Zambia would withdraw from the Commonwealth.⁹⁴

The speeches of other Third World members that afternoon were somewhat more equitable. Drawing reference to the Zambian statement, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew warned Harold Wilson of the potentiality of the departure of African member states from the Commonwealth if his government were not more forthcoming on the Rhodesia problem. Dr. Sangster reiterated the Third World members' position by requesting Britain to endorse the objective of NIEMR and to take more effective measures, including the use of force, if negotiations with Rhodesia were unsuccessful after a specified period of time.

By Thursday, September 8, a cleavage had developed amongst members along racial lines. Antipathy between Britain, on the one hand, and most Third World countries had caused a caucusing of non-white members each morning, holding up conference meetings.⁹⁵ This was hardly in keeping with the concept of racial equality, but the Secretary-General interpreted it as a positive maneuver by the moderate members to temper the more radical ones.⁹⁶ Inasmuch as Sir Albert Margai had accused Harold Wilson of insincerity and Simon Kapwepwe labelled the British Prime Minister as a racialist, Mr. Smith was probably correct. Nonetheless, this unprecedented measure did not bode well for a multiracial association.

Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh expressed the caucus points of view with some forbearance. In his statement, Singh implored Britain to commit itself to majority rule on the basis of one-man-one-vote, to take additional measures such as recommending mandatory sanctions or military intervention at the UN, and to clarify the steps the government intended to take towards solving the Rhodesian problem.⁹⁷ Sir Albert Margai then spoke for two hours in very forceful terms about the reasons that Sierra Leone was supporting the caucus' position. Nigeria had been shaken by the successive assassinations of its heads of government, Sir Abubakar in January and General Aguiyi-Ironsi in July, but its policy towards Rhodesia had not changed. Following the caucus line, the Nigerian representative wanted to be assured that any agreement worked out between Britain and the Smith régime

would provide for a constitution that guaranteed majority rule, and that there should be no equivocation on this fundamental point. In the view of the Kenyan government, Britain should instruct the Governor of Rhodesia to appoint an alternative government which would be representative of the African majority. If the Smith régime resisted the British action, this would constitute a breakdown in law and order and military intervention would be required. The Tunku Rahman expressed his opposition to the use of force although he supported the caucus with respect to their other proposals. However, Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia, like Keith Holyoake the day before, spoke in support of Harold Wilson by explaining that the use of force by Britain would not be supported by the British public or Parliament and could well bring down the Labour government. Holt thought that the possibilities for limited non-mandatory sanctions had not been exhausted, and, therefore, supported the attitude of his predecessor, Robert Menzies, who believed that,

if U.N. mandatory sanctions are both universally applied and economically complete, Rhodesia may be economically and financially ruined, with disastrous consequences for the very Africans whom the United Nations designs to protect. There is a marked, and indeed vital, difference between sanctions aimed at exercising pressure, and far-reaching sanctions which are aimed at punishment and even destruction.⁹⁸

Canada's Prime Minister addressed the conference on Friday and developed the premise that there was unanimity on the objectives of majority rule in Rhodesia with only some differences of opinion "as to the most effective means of achieving them."⁹⁹

Mr. Pearson submitted that there was a dichotomy of purpose by noting that the,

first objective is to end the illegal Smith régime [and] according to most speakers, our next objective . . . is to bring about majority rule as the basis for independence.

To fulfill the first objective, Pearson explained that he was prepared to support UN military action:

I do not consider that the use of force as part of police action; or force used under international authority with a UN mandate; or to repel an aggressor, as wrong in anyway in itself. It is wrong when used exclusively for selfish national purposes, or whenever the objective can be achieved without force; or when good results are not likely to be achieved; or achieved only at a prohibitive cost. Results must always be related to the means of achieving them. So each situation must be considered on its merits.

However, Mr. Pearson considered that the association should apply limited mandatory economic sanctions before resorting to the use of force which could "destroy those that we are trying to help, [or] have far-reaching consequences never intended or desired."¹⁰⁰ Admitting that "strengthened economic measures" would "take longer than we expected," Pearson still believed that "it would seem premature to discuss military sanctions before the possibility of economic sanctions had been exhausted." Thus, in order to win African acceptance of a continued reliance on sanctions, Pearson affirmed a willingness to consider force if sanctions failed, and he did this in contradistinction to the British position.

Prime Minister Pearson urged the conference to consider directing

special attention to stopping these [Rhodesian] exports and, if we achieved no results by diplomatic approaches to some of the main importing countries, we might consider action at the United Nations, as we had envisaged at Lagos. [Pearson] emphasized to the meeting that [he] was discussing limited

mandatory sanctions by the United Nations.

Pearson assumed that limited sanctions would oblige the United States and other countries to stop importing Rhodesian minerals such as chrome, pig iron and asbestos as well as exporting oil and petroleum products to the rebel régime. Although they were not UN members, it was expected that West Germany and Switzerland would also comply with the world consensus. On the other hand, there would be difficulties in applying general mandatory sanctions which would amount to a UN blockade of Rhodesia. Pearson explained that these

would have the effect of driving closer together Rhodesia and the other areas of Southern Africa under white minority control, South Africa and the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola. To affect the important trade between these areas and Rhodesia, mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia would have to be followed by similar sanctions against South Africa and the Portuguese territories. Rather than achieve a speedy solution in Rhodesia, a general mandatory sanctions resolution, [he] believed, would tie that country to South Africa, and would link a satisfactory solution of the Rhodesian problem with a long and difficult economic siege of South Africa.

Whereas limited mandatory sanctions would amount to a concession to Third World members and possibly offer a basis for a broad consensus, follow-up action, nonetheless, would be expected if the limited sanctions were not effective. Thus, implicit in Lester Pearson's compromise initiative was the likelihood of the eventual need to enforce limited sanctions, and Canada would be expected to support proposals for stronger action under the UN.¹⁰¹ But Pearson obviously had decided that he would cross that bridge when he came to it.

Mr. Pearson assumed that all members were agreed on the second Commonwealth objective, that an independent Rhodesia must be founded on the basis of racial equality. He interpreted this to mean "that the grant of independence should take place only after majority rule has been ensured." The Prime Minister expected that there would be different interpretations as to what constituted majority rule. However, as he understood it, this principle involved the recognition of political rights without racial discrimination because any other basis would be unacceptable to the Commonwealth or the people of Rhodesia as a whole:

When we talk at this Conference about majority rule in Rhodesia ... [w]e are concerned with something that is vital to the survival of the Commonwealth because it involves the issue of racial equality which is the only basis on which the new Commonwealth can survive.

Consequently, Mr. Pearson asked Harold Wilson to give the conference some assurance that independence for Rhodesia would be preceded by the establishment of a system of government providing for majority rule.

Ghana, Pakistan, Guyana, Malawi and Uganda were among the Third World members which addressed the conference on Friday.¹⁰² The Ghanaian High Commissioner, Mr. Harlley, indicated that his country did not want to see Commonwealth principles compromised. Consequently, the new government (established after the overthrow of President Nkrumah in February) recommended the application of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia to effect the return of constitutional government,

established on the basis of majority rule. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Pirzada, also advocated the imposition of mandatory sanctions, followed by force as an ultimate recourse. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham stated that Guyana favoured immediate military intervention in the form of British police action to establish constitutional government in Rhodesia after a period of direct rule by Britain. Dr. Banda, however, supported the United Kingdom by reminding members that British military intervention would be political suicide for the Labour government, and force would undoubtedly destroy any hope of forming a multiracial society which was the Commonwealth's ultimate objective. Insofar as mandatory sanctions would require the support of the major powers, which they were not prepared to give, Banda suggested that members should give non-compulsory sanctions more time to work. Milton Obote summed up the position of the caucus by declaring that most members were in favour of using force,¹⁰³ and NIBMR must be clarified as the Commonwealth's objective for any negotiated settlement between the Wilson and Smith governments. Nonetheless, Third World members were willing to compromise because Obote had recommended the application of limited rather than comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia. By accepting Pearson's arguments that an economic war between Britain and South Africa could do nothing to advance, and perhaps hinder, the resolving of the Rhodesia issue, the basis for a compromise was in the making.

Over the weekend the prime ministers had a break after a long week of formal talks. Harold Wilson took the opportunity on Saturday, September 10 to consider the recommendations presented thus far, and deliberate with his Cabinet on the tactics to take towards the Rhodesia problem.

We found a serious situation. The dissolution of the Commonwealth seemed imminent unless we agreed categorically to the statement the majority of the Commonwealth demanded: no independence before majority rule. That would mean the end for that year, and all time, of any possible negotiated settlement and, in the absence of a settlement, a continuation of the deadlock in Rhodesia, with sanctions only slowly biting, and with no way out until the Rhodesian liberals succeeded in taking over—an unlikely event—or bloody revolution created a new situation.

In the event, the Cabinet gave the Commonwealth Secretary and me a free hand, including the power, virtually an instruction, to agree to 'no independence before majority rule' rather than see the Commonwealth break up.¹⁰⁴

The position of Third World members was summed up succinctly by President Nyerere in an interview in Dar-es-Salaam:¹⁰⁵

Delegation after delegation has hammered right on the point—the commitment that independence for Rhodesia will only come after majority rule. This is the single most important issue, and almost all the delegations have demanded an answer from Britain. This is not only the African delegations. Mr. Pearson of Canada has also raised this issue.

Of course the defeat of Smith is essential. We are all agreed on that. But there is no point in bringing down an illegal minority régime in order to substitute a legal minority régime. It is not just the question of legality which matters; it is the question of majority rule before independence — Britain remaining sovereign until there is majority rule in Rhodesia.

Admitting that it would be desirable that independence should be on the basis of "one-man-one-vote," President Nyerere

explained that Commonwealth African members could accept something less than universal adult franchise so long as Britain would make a clear statement that majority rule would come before Rhodesian independence. The history of the Smith-Wilson negotiations suggested to Nyerere that Britain had been prepared to grant independence to a minority government. The collapse of these talks seemed to indicate only that Wilson was not prepared to grant independence to a minority government without some safeguards as outlined in the six principles. Refusing to commit Britain to NIBMR at the Commonwealth conference Nyerere found unacceptable because it still meant that "Mr. Wilson is willing to settle for something less than majority rule before independence, in other words, he is willing to sell out." Third World members were unlikely to agree to Rhodesian independence simply on the basis of six principles, Nyerere maintained.

Look around the world to see what has happened to other 'constitutional safeguards'. And look at Rhodesia itself to see what the whites there think of safeguards! The only safeguard is majority rule before independence. There is no other way in which the unprivileged can be saved from those who have both power and privilege.

With regard to an approach to achieve majority rule, Mr. Nyerere explained in his interview that Britain would have to ensure that sanctions were made more effective. In order to accomplish this, Canada had suggested that the Commonwealth should request the Security Council to impose limited mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII (41) of the UN Charter.

Whereas Harold Wilson had been unwilling to do this, presumably because Britain might be confronted later with the imposition of Article 42 involving UN military action, Nyerere questioned "how anyone who has faith in the efficacy of economic sanctions could use this argument." Implicit in Wilson's argument was that Britain would go no further than imposing sanctions on Rhodesia whether or not the Smith régime was brought down. If the Labour government really believed that it could not afford an economic confrontation with South Africa, Nyerere expected that Britain should, at the very least, not oppose mandatory sanctions in the Security Council. For the Commonwealth or even the Smith régime to believe that the Wilson government was genuinely interested in restoring constitutional rule in Rhodesia, sanctions, which were the cornerstone of British policy, had to be enforceable.

President Nyerere's statement was cogent, unequivocal and sincere. Undoubtedly, part of the Third World position, as outlined by Nyerere, was acceptable to Mr. Pearson. In his speech on Friday, Pearson had agreed that African control of the Rhodesian government was essential before independence was granted. In a private discussion with Simon Kapwepwe on Monday morning, September 12, Pearson specifically indicated that a constitution leading to Rhodesian independence must at least provide for African majority rule and the additional guarantee of unimpeded advance towards universal adult suffrage.¹⁰⁶ In fact, during the weekend

the Canadian delegation had been working on a compromise formula on the basis of these precepts. Essentially, this formula consisted of providing majority rule inasmuch as Africans would dominate the government by the time independence was granted to Rhodesia. The Canadian scheme permitted the granting of independence to the majority without requiring one-man-one-vote so long as this was acceptable to the people as a whole. Whereas this would not conflict with the six principles, the Pearson formula would put control of Rhodesia in the hands of the African majority before independence and provide for unimpeded progress towards complete adult franchise to satisfy some Third World interests. On an appropriate approach to effect a return to constitutional rule in Rhodesia, Canada's compromise proposal was based on selective mandatory sanctions as outlined in the Prime Minister's statement on Friday:

At the formal meetings on Monday, September 12, Harold Wilson stated that he would maintain the British policy on Rhodesia in terms of the principles for a negotiated settlement and voluntary selected sanctions until the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.¹⁰⁷ However, he was prepared to compromise if his government's proposals to the Smith régime had not been accepted by mid-December 1966:

We would claim rather less than three months for final discussions with Rhodesia. No agreement would be concluded which did not fully implement the six principles, with full guarantees. If by the beginning of December agreement was not reached we would support mandatory sanctions at the UN and agree to a statement that there would be no independence in advance of majority rule.

It may have seemed to some members as though the Wilson government was sincere about negotiating a settlement which would eventually provide for a government representing the majority of the people but it simply did not want to be restricted by a specific formula. Yet if Britain was interested in guaranteeing African majority rule, it should have found the Pearson formula acceptable because it truly guaranteed that this would be the basis for an independent Rhodesia even though the principle of racial equality would not be realized immediately. Moreover, the Bingham inquiry has revealed that the Labour government knew that Rhodesia was being supplied with enough oil and petroleum to sustain its economy, and at least one British company was circumventing the embargo on Rhodesia. It is, therefore, questionable as to why Britain was proceeding with measures which it knew all along to be ineffective when the Pearson formula, calling for mandatory sanctions would be more likely to make this measure effective. Clearly, Britain was not prepared to face up to the extensive and expensive efforts required to enforce the sanctions in the face of powerful private interests which did not want to cooperate. Inasmuch as neither majority rule nor mandatory sanctions were immediately acceptable to the Wilson government, it seems fair to conclude that Britain simply wanted another few months in order to divest itself of the Rhodesia problem on terms that were favourable to the white minority.

In order to reach a consensus of Commonwealth attitudes on the Rhodesia issue, member states "mandated Lester Pearson, who carried the confidence of almost every delegate, to consult with all delegates and put forward proposals for ratification by the conference."¹⁰⁸ But Pearson's draft recommendations, circulated on Tuesday, were not met with overwhelming

support. After a prolonged caucus of Third World members in the morning, the formal sessions reconvened. Harold Wilson threatened to adjourn the conference and withdraw his government's future concessions on NIBMR and sanctions if the caucus members were not prepared to compromise on their position. Speaking on behalf of the caucus, Swaran Singh underscored the major stumbling bloc by indicating that most Commonwealth members wanted Britain to give a thorough statement of its intentions regarding negotiations for settlement with the rebel régime. Furthermore, members required a clear course of action from the Wilson government, indicating what measures it would take to enforce sanctions. For example, if selective mandatory sanctions failed, members wanted to know whether the United Kingdom was prepared to use comprehensive sanctions or force under Article 42. Whereas Harold Wilson gave delegates an outline of his government's intentions with respect to the negotiated settlement,¹⁰⁹ he was unwilling to project British policy beyond the measures for which he had already given a commitment.

Under the chairmanship of Mr. Pearson, a drafting committee, consisting of delegates from India, Jamaica, Uganda, Zambia and Britain, was constituted to work out an agreed statement on the Rhodesia section of the communiqué. Working from the original Canadian draft statement, Pearson directed his committee to try to accommodate the British and caucus positions by developing a formula which "would maximize agreement and minimize disagreement."¹¹⁰ By Tuesday evening, the working committee had knit together a statement which was broadly

acceptable to its members. Following the circulation of this draft, the caucus indicated its approval, suggesting the deletion of only one paragraph and some minor additions.¹¹¹

Since the amendments involved a change of emphasis rather than substance, the compromise statement was found acceptable by all members on Wednesday, and subsequently incorporated into the final communiqué.

Notwithstanding the joint portions of the communiqué, prepared by a group consisting of Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malta and Malawi as opposed to the "others", consensus had been reached on two important aspects.¹¹² The Commonwealth had settled what appeared to be an almost irreconcilable situation by accepting Pearson's compromise formula, attended by a promise that if Harold Wilson could not negotiate a settlement by the end of the year on the basis of the six principles, Britain would request the UN Security Council to impose selective mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia and adopt a position of NIBMR.¹¹³ Thus, the difference in the British and African positions seemed to involve a matter of timing. The Labour government's commitment was explicit. There was no question as to the deadline to end the Wilson-Smith negotiations. In a letter to Kenneth Kaunda, Prime Minister Pearson explained that if during

[t]he next three months ... legal government has not been restored in Rhodesia, then the substantial concession made by the British with respect both to majority rule and to proposals for UN mandatory sanctions will come into effect.¹¹⁴

In sum, Prime Minister Pearson had played a decisive role at the London conference, mediating between most of the Third World members, on the one hand, and Britain on the other. Canada had endorsed the principle of African majority rule before independence which marked a substantive difference with Britain on an important aspect of policy. By taking the side of the non-white members, Mr. Pearson was in a better position to develop a compromise formula which amounted to giving Britain more time to negotiate a settlement with the Smith régime while gaining Wilson's commitment to the long-term objective supported by most members and a course of action to inject some clout into the sanctions measure. Whereas some questions still existed within the Commonwealth as to additional means for enforcing sanctions, including UN police action which Pearson had indicated could not be ruled out, it was significant that sufficient cohesion for the Commonwealth's continued existence could be found in a compromise initiated by the Canadian Prime Minister. As Australia's Sydney Morning Herald editorialized, the reason a division between white and non-white members had not caused a permanent rift along colour lines was probably due to the mediatory role played by Mr. Pearson who:

once again acted as a bridge-builder. His was largely the triumph of the actual drafting of the communiqué when it seemed as though a communiqué of any real clarity and meaning would be impossible. Canada has been in the position to do this because it would seem that for years past there has been the development of a special cordiality between Canadian leaders and officials and leaders in the Afro-Asian Commonwealth world. 115

Pearson's Compromise Formula and the Preservation of the Commonwealth.

There is no reason to suspect Prime Minister Pearson's belief that the imposition of selective mandatory sanctions would contribute to restoring constitutional government in Rhodesia. But that was a long-range objective. Pearson's compromise formula had been proposed to circumvent a more immediate, and for Canada, a more serious threat. The Prime Minister had worked at the London conference primarily to prevent the break-up of the Commonwealth by seeking an unanimous approach to the Rhodesia issue. Inasmuch as the association did not fall apart, he was successful in achieving his primary objective. Nonetheless, Mr. Pearson was morally bound to try to make his formula work. The concessions made by Third World members in order to win a consensus were based on Britain's taking some concrete initiatives if it failed to negotiate a settlement with the Smith regime. It behooved Mr. Pearson to attempt to ensure that these follow-up measures were carried out. Thus, at the UN Canada supported the application of selective and then comprehensive mandatory sanctions, and through bilateral consultations it urged the Wilson government to stand behind its NIBMR commitment.

Before the end of September, British Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden had talks with Ian Smith in Salisbury. Britain's negotiating position was based on the six principles, to be applied as Harold Wilson had specified in the London communiqué.¹¹⁶ By the conclusion of the second set of meetings

between Bowden and Smith in November, three fundamental questions remained unanswered:

(i) Did the Smith government require a residual constitutional power enabling it to control the advancement of African political rights?

(ii) Would Mr. Smith accept a broadbased interim administration representative of all races to negotiate a new constitution directed towards the eventual achievement of majority rule?

(iii) Did the Smith government require that the test of the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole take place before legal government had been restored?¹¹⁷

To obtain some clarification of these questions towards reaching a settlement, Prime Minister Wilson met Ian Smith aboard HMS Tiger, off the coast of Gibraltar, from December 3 until 5. But the agreement reached between the Prime Ministers did not fall entirely within the British statement of intentions recorded in the final communiqué or the six principles.¹¹⁸ In particular, the Tiger arrangements incorporated provisions neither for a rapid progress to majority rule nor for a referendum to determine their acceptance. Rather a Royal Commission was to be used to test Rhodesian opinion on the constitutional settlement, and in the event of its affirmation, independence would be given "at the earliest possible date" and before the introduction of majority rule. In essence, Wilson had retreated from the six principles.

However, the Smith government rejected the Tiger proposals, and Harold Wilson announced in the British House of Commons on December 20 that the policy of his government was now "as set out in paragraph 10 of the communiqué which was

issued at the end of the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in September."¹¹⁹ Mr. Wilson made it clear in response to questions in the House that "no independence before majority rule" was now British policy. In reply to a letter from Prime Minister Wilson, Lester Pearson wrote to him just before Christmas, indicating his opinion that this commitment to NIBMR was the proper course of action to maintain the unity of the Commonwealth and respect for Britain of its membership.¹²⁰ More likely Pearson intended to counter any intention on Wilson's part to recall the six principles as a basis for a negotiated settlement with Rhodesia. Yet the principles were now irrelevant since their intention was to guarantee progress towards majority rule after independence had been recognized, and Wilson had stated in the House that a settlement based on "independence before majority rule" was "no longer an offer."

In accord with his commitment to Commonwealth heads of government in September, Prime Minister Wilson requested the Security Council to impose selected mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia on December 5. As he also had indicated in London, Wilson was opposed to general sanctions which he believed could magnify the impact of the Rhodesia problem to affect the whole of southern Africa. In particular, Britain did not want to include oil in the list of mandatory sanctions which could "escalate into economic confrontation with third countries."¹²¹ Uganda and Nigeria, however, were resolute that oil should be included inasmuch as it was the life-blood of

the Rhodesian economy. After Britain agreed that it would be prepared to support a compulsory oil sanction so long as it did not cause any conflict with South Africa and Portugal, the Security Council adopted a resolution on December 16 providing that,

all states should forbid the import from Rhodesia of asbestos, pig-iron, chrome, copper, sugar, tobacco, hides and skins, meat and meat products, as well as the export to Rhodesia of arms, military equipment, oil and oil products, motor vehicles, aircraft and related parts.¹²²

But Rhodesia received virtually all its oil by road and rail from South Africa and Portugal's territories and neither were prepared to observe the oil embargo. Since Britain was not committed to enforcing the oil sanctions on these Western allies, the inscription of an oil clause in the resolution was not expected to be of much value.

Commonwealth Third World members had been active at the UN during the three month period between the London conference and the British initiative taken on sanctions in December. Two principal resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly in October and November 1966 calling, in the first instance, for "any arrangement reached between the United Kingdom and the Rhodesian régime" to "recognize the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination," and in the second, the imposition of oil sanctions and the use of force.¹²³ During the debate on Rhodesia, it was evident that Commonwealth African states, in particular, were concerned that the Wilson-Smith talks would lead to an agreement which would not provide for majority rule before independence or even at a

specified time after independence. The Tanzanian delegate expressed his country's disapproval of the vague, circumlatory principles on which Britain was trying to negotiate a settlement, stating that "the equivocal position adopted by the United Kingdom with regard to Southern Rhodesia is as disappointing as it is regrettable."¹² Zambia's representative was incensed especially with the fifth principle which, he declared, showed that Britain was not negotiating in the best interests of the African majority.

When the United Kingdom's representative says 'the British Government will not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole are shown to be in favour of it', this is shocking. This is a trick which some people here may not see, but it is double-dealing.

Now it is not support that is lacking for the British; it is courage and sincerity. Support they have; the whole world supports them against Smith. . . . let them not hang on to the primitive policy of kith and kin. We are living in an age in which we are all brothers: black, white, yellow. The world has become so small that we do not consider ourselves different by clinging to old and primitive methods of segregation, of kith and kin.¹²⁵

However, the old Commonwealth members seemed to take a "wait and see" attitude rather than support a resolution which presumed that a settlement would not serve the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

On the question of sanctions African member states generally maintained that they had proved ineffective and force now was required to end the illegal Rhodesian régime. The Ghanaian attitude was representative of most African countries:

The trend of affairs in Rhodesia has confirmed the view which Ghana has always held that only force would topple the illegal regime It is up to the United Kingdom's Government to devise more effective measures to safeguard the rights of the African majority.¹²⁶

Malawi, which had close economic ties with South Africa and was economically dependent on British foreign aid, was an exception. Taking a stand similar to that propounded by Dr. Banda at the meeting of prime ministers in September, the Malawi delegate fairly chastised his fellow Africans:

I know full well that there are many nations, especially in Africa which are becoming increasingly impatient with Britain and are angry that its policy . . . [consisting of the] application of sanctions is not having the desired result as quickly as we would all wish. Those differences, however, concern not the objective, but the means of attaining those objectives.¹²⁷

The Canadian delegation shared this viewpoint, expressing the opinion that if non-mandatory sanctions continued to be ineffective,

mandatory sanctions would be a useful and practical step forward and urged all members to support the economic measures which had been and might be decided upon by the Security Council.¹²⁸

But even after mandatory sanctions had been put into effect following the Security Council resolution in December, the minority government in Rhodesia continued to be sustained with help from South Africa and Portugal. Consequently, in November 1967 the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the sanctions-breaking and demanding the United Kingdom apply a comprehensive embargo on Rhodesia backed by force.¹²⁹

In plenary session, the Tanzanian delegate explained that it

was evident that a trade embargo could only work if it were all-encompassing and enforced.¹³⁰ Since selected sanctions had failed, Tanzania now expected Britain to employ stronger measures. Indeed, by this time a good deal of antipathy had developed between these Commonwealth members. During this acrimonious debate, Tanzania charged Britain with duplicity in its approach towards the Rhodesia issue:

In January 1966, they even told us that their measure against Rhodesia would be successful within a matter of weeks. What went wrong with the British forecasts? The answer is not far to seek. For the simple truth about the whole Rhodesia problem is that the 4 million African people in that colony have been deceived; Africa has been deceived; the Commonwealth has been deceived; and the United Nations and the world as a whole have been fooled.

It is the British Government which has been guilty of this deceit before the whole world and before this Organization. It has been consistent in only one thing: that is, the dishonesty and trickery with which it has treated the whole Rhodesia question.

That the view expressed by Tanzania was generally representative of Third World Commonwealth countries had become increasingly evident in their voting behaviour in the General Assembly on the Rhodesia issue. With the use of roll-call votes from the twentieth to the twenty-third sessions, the pattern of Commonwealth voting is displayed in Table 2) 131




TABLE 2

Scalogram¹³² of Commonwealth Votes on the Rhodesia Issue
20th- 23rd Sessions

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Tanzania	(UT)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Zambia	(Z)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nigeria	(N)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uganda	(U)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	(K)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	(P)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ghana	(G)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ceylon	(Ce)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sierra Leone	(SL)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
India	(I)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cyprus	(Cy)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Trinidad	(TT)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Malaysia	(My)	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+
Jamaica	(J)	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+
Malawi	(Mw)	+	+	+					A	+	
Malta	(Mt)	+									
United Kingdom	(UK)					A	A	A	A		
New Zealand	(NZ)	+	+	+		A	A	A	A	-	-
Australia	(A)	+	+	+		A	A	A	A	-	-
Canada	(Ca)	+	+	+		A	A	A	A	-	-

Key: + equals vote in favour; - equals vote against; A equals absention; equals no vote.

Only those countries which were Commonwealth members by January 1965 were subject to examination.

With the exception of Malawi which (like the old members) was reluctant to support the use of force and Malta which did not participate fully in the voting, Table 3 also reveals a virtual cleavage in Commonwealth voting behaviour on the Rhodesia issue. In the light of this empirical analysis, it would appear as though there was explicit disagreement between white and non-white members on an issue that has serious implications for an association which embraces the concept of racial equality as a principal objective. As Lord Caradon has stated,

if the Commonwealth does not stand [together] against race discrimination and race domination it is worthless. If the division of the world between the Africans and the Asians on the one hand and the white West on the other continues the first casualty will be the Commonwealth. 135

The fact that Commonwealth countries failed to take a stand together at the UN on a racial issue did not bode well for the future harmony of the association. Though Canada had been occupied with performing a mediatory role at Prime Ministers' meetings by refusing to align itself with the old Dominions on this issue, its intermediary position clearly was confined to that forum. This is partly explained by the different procedures used to reach a decision. But Ottawa also appreciated the practical problems encountered by the Labour government in attempting to settle what seemed to be an almost insoluble dilemma. Mr. Wilson had little public support for the use of force, the Opposition and members of his own Party preferred that Britain stay clear of an economic clash with South Africa which could result from the enforcement of comprehensive

sanctions, and Britain had almost no influence over southern African white governments. Certainly Canada supported NIBMR but the government was chary of supporting resolutions calling for UN military intervention. To take the lead would place the onus on Canada to act in a peacekeeping role which it was not anxious to do. Moreover, voting in favour of resolutions which would not gain the support of Britain, which held a veto power on the Security Council, was a futile endeavour. Mitchell Sharp, who was a senior member of the Pearson cabinet during this period, and later became External Affairs' Secretary in the Trudeau administration, explained that Canada wanted to take a practical approach:

like the Africans we supported the idea of majority rule in Rhodesia, but we were also looking for a peaceful settlement. The Canadian government considered sanctions must be given time to work before employing additional UN measures, including the use of force.¹³⁶

Although the UN had an effect on the Commonwealth relationship insofar as it revealed the differences which existed between white and non-white members, the impact of voting behaviour was quite superficial. It had not gone unnoticed among Commonwealth Third World States that Canada's intermediary position was not reflected in its voting behaviour on the Rhodesia issue. They could also appreciate the Canadian approach of refusing to support resolutions which would not be put into practice while supporting the Third World position in collaboration with the Wilson government.¹³⁷ Through bilateral consultations and, particularly, Commonwealth

meetings which are conducted in an atmosphere more conducive to conciliation, Canada had tried to promote the interests of non-white members and of the Commonwealth itself. Thus, Canada's behaviour at the UN and in the Commonwealth was tailored to the different types of organization. Regardless of the forum, Canadian governments seemed anxious to support actions which would promote a generally acceptable solution, and, above all, minimize the danger of Commonwealth dissolution.

In the absence of Prime Ministers' meetings from September 1966 until January 1969, informal collaboration was the most appropriate way for Canada to promote an approach towards the Rhodesia issue that would be acceptable to all members. But aside from trying to preserve the unity of the Commonwealth, which unquestionably was a foremost objective, Mr. Pearson had a personal interest in preserving the integrity of the compromise formula agreed to at London. Since Pearson was primarily responsible for prompting Third World members to back peaceful measures rather than force to bring down the Smith regime, he had assumed some responsibility for reminding the Wilson government of its commitments to NIBMR and mandatory sanctions.

By July 1967, the Wilson administration appeared to be retreating from one of its commitments. A former High Commissioner to the Central African Federation, Lord Alport, had been despatched by the government to Salisbury with the

intention of testing Rhodesian public opinion towards a negotiated settlement.¹³⁸ Alport reported that the Tiger proposals were now generally acceptable, provided certain constitutional changes could be adopted. In a statement to the British House of Commons, Harold Wilson stated that the Governor of Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, had been authorized to undertake the task of identifying the proposed changes, and announced that his government "fully reserved" its position on NIBMR" and on the return to legality and the kind of broad-based government of national unity which would be required for any major step forward."¹³⁹ The Prime Minister's intentions became clearer when, in answer to a subsequent question, he indicated that if there was a "very substantial change of circumstances the British Government might consult other Commonwealth Governments about a change in British policy concerning NIBMR." Curiously, within six months of implementing mandatory economic sanctions and indicating to the world that it intended to take a tougher stand towards the illegal regime, Britain seemed to be back-sliding on an iron-clad commitment.

Possibly what disturbed Third World leaders most about the Wilson government's continued negotiations with the Smith regime was the apparent lack of sincerity on the part of Britain. Renewed discussions on the basis of the Tiger proposals amounted to a lack of honesty, or at the very least, the abuse of "fair play"¹⁴⁰ in dealing with the Rhodesia issue. Aside from the use of English as a lingua franca, probably the

most distinctive tradition which was retained by the newly-emerged and independent-minded members was English common law. Naturally, the law was adjusted to meet the social and political requirements of individual member states. But a judicial feature which remained well-rooted was the spirit of justice. In application to Commonwealth collaboration this "spirit" is perhaps characterized most by the concept of fair play. Just as a consensus may only be reached by a grouping of nations so large as the Commonwealth by respecting the opinions of all members, fair play is expected of members in dealing with international issues which are of general concern to the membership. But this concept appeared to be disregarded by the very country from which it had been derived, and Commonwealth Third World members were powerless to do anything about it.

President Kaunda, for one, was convinced that the Wilson government was planning to sell-out the African majority by recognizing the minority Smith régime on the basis of the provisions included in the Tiger agreement. He communicated this concern to Lester Pearson in October 1967 while confiding that Commonwealth African members were grateful for the personal interest that Pearson had shown in the Rhodesia problem.¹⁴¹

Apparently, Kaunda believed that if it were not for Pearson's interest in achieving a just and equitable settlement in Rhodesia on the basis of majority rule, the Wilson government would have given in to the demands of the white minority régime. Kaunda now hoped that Canada could put some pressure on Britain which seemed to be showing less interest in trying to arrive at a just solution to the Rhodesia problem. Kaunda's fears were shared

by the Canadian Committee for Zimbabwe which believed that Britain might renege on its commitments made at the Prime Ministers' meeting in London.¹⁴² In an article written for the University League for Social Reform, Cranford Pratt and Clyde Sanger called upon the Canadian government to support "a further intensification and augmentation of UN sanctions" and "to establish publicly that the [Tiger] Agreement is unacceptable."¹⁴³ Such initiatives, they argued, would strengthen the trade embargo while making

more difficult any British retreat on the principle of no independence before majority rule, and ... prevent her making arrangements which, however elaborate and complex, amount to a sellout to the Smith régime.

Mr. Pearson had opportunities for talks with Prime Minister Wilson late in December and again early in February, 1968 in Ottawa. On both occasions, he expressed the Canadian view that the commitments made at the London conference must be met if Third World members were to continue to have confidence in the meaningfulness of Commonwealth agreements as expressed in the communiqué.¹⁴⁴ Nonetheless, Wilson repudiated his NIBMR pledge in October by offering to test, by means of a Royal Commission, the acceptability of the Fearless proposals which would provide for neither majority rule nor even guarantee "unimpeded progress to majority rule" under a transitional government.¹⁴⁵ Harold Wilson argued that Britain could expect the Commonwealth membership to release it from the NIBMR pledge

if there were an affirmative response from the people of Rhodesia as a whole towards the proposed Independence Constitution.¹⁴⁶ Though most members thought it was obvious that the African majority would not be any more enthusiastic about being governed by a white minority régime that had been legalized as opposed to one that was illegal, Wilson declared that the Commonwealth could not substitute its views for those of the Rhodesians themselves. However, if the Wilson government was willing to compromise on NIBMR in negotiating the Fearless proposals, there were grave doubts among members as to how far it could be trusted in taking a fair assessment of Rhodesian opinion, particularly by means of a Royal Commission rather than a referendum. Furthermore, the test of acceptability was susceptible to serious handicaps including a ban on African political organizations as well as obvious physical limitations for securing an equitable sample of public opinion.

If the Fearless proposals had earned Britain the distrust and disparagement of almost all of the new Commonwealth members, they were to become increasingly disillusioned with its approach towards sanctions. In spite of the Security Council having adopted a resolution in May 1968, imposing virtually comprehensive mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia,¹⁴⁷ South Africa and Portugal had refused to comply. Yet the United Kingdom would not permit the Council to include these countries within the embargo, partly because Britain would have been obligated to provide a naval blockade that would involve a large proportion of the Royal Navy. As a consequence, the illegal régime

received critical supplies necessary to sustain its economy. Moreover, President Kaunda believed that the sanctions measure also was being breached by multinational organizations, and that this was being condoned by the British government.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, the Bingham report has now confirmed that the Wilson Cabinet was aware of the sanctions-busting, but had failed to inform the Commonwealth or the UN. This is an extraordinary indictment of the duplicity with which the British government had approached the Rhodesia issue, at least since the London conference in September 1966.

Whereas Mr. Pearson was cognizant of the fact that the Labour government was failing to deal effectively with the Rhodesia issue, he also realized that Canada was not in a position to take any new initiatives without British support. By taking the lead, such as proposing that sanctions should be backed by force, Canada would be expected to play a military role for which it lacked the power and the cooperation of its NATO allies. On the assumption that another Commonwealth conference could spark renewed interest and perhaps new initiatives towards solving the Rhodesia problem, there were several requests for Canada to hold a heads of government meeting in mid-1968. Even Harold Wilson "was anxious that Lester Pearson, with his high standing in the Commonwealth, should chair" a meeting of prime ministers and "asked him if he would agree to its being held in Ottawa."¹⁴⁹ But Pearson was reluctant to set into motion a conference in Canada because of his impending retirement in April.

Thus, the Pearson formula agreed to at the Prime Ministers' meeting in September 1966 did not succeed in bringing down the Smith régime. What his compromise measure did achieve was to prevent the break-up of the Commonwealth by securing an objective on the Rhodesia issue, and a means to work towards that objective, to which all members could agree. At the UN, Britain followed through on its commitment to introduce mandatory economic sanctions. Through bilateral consultations, Lester Pearson reminded Mr. Wilson of his commitment to NIBMR. Britain's refusal to enforce sanctions and its willingness to circumvent NIBMR reduced the effect of this Commonwealth approach on the Rhodesia issue. But the compromise formula had not been introduced exclusively for that reason. Inasmuch as the association did not split up, Pearson had achieved his primary objective.

Rhodesia has remained an intractable issue for Britain, the Commonwealth and the world. It now appears as though Ian Smith's internal settlement with the African moderates (Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau) will lead to majority rule in April 1979. However, the exclusion of the two Nationalist groups, under Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, which have constituted the force behind the apparent capitulation of white minority rule will neither lead to a cessation of war nor recognition of the multiracial government by the international community.

Although the Commonwealth has not broken up over the Rhodesia issue during the past decade, it has been unable to

reach a consensus on "ends" and "means" beyond those agreed to during the Pearson administration. After prolonged British-Rhodesian negotiations, leading up to the Home-Smith proposals and the Pearce Commission, by which the Rhodesians as a whole rejected an Independence Constitution based on something less than guaranteed majority rule, the Commonwealth reaffirmed its commitment to NIBMR.¹⁵⁰ Sanctions have not been enforced, although, significantly, an accord was reached between Presidents Nyerere, Kaunda and Khama (along with the Commonwealth Secretary-General), and President Samora Machel of Mozambique in 1975 to re-direct the latter's trade, and to cut communications and transportation to and from Rhodesia.¹⁵¹ Assistance to African Rhodesians has been extended to encompass the Nationalist movement, and the Patriotic Front has been legitimized as an essential party to a negotiated settlement.¹⁵² Force has been deemed impracticable because those states desiring its implementation have been militarily impotent, and those with power lacked sufficient public support. The full potential of a Commonwealth approach, to create an independent Zimbabwe on the basis of racial equality, essentially has been sanctions and economic assistance.

International initiatives have not been successful in securing a peaceful settlement among the peoples of Rhodesia. The Geneva conference proceeded on the basis of very vague proposals for transferring power to a majority government, resulting from Secretary of State Kissinger's shuttle talks

with concerned parties. Indeed, a settlement may have failed because there was little agreement on conditions for a transitional government to begin with. An Anglo-American proposal to include a UN peacekeeping force under British stewardship to supervise the implementation of the transfer of power while protecting the white minority was rejected by all parties, including the Smith government, the United African National Congress, the Patriotic Front and the front-line African countries. An international fund to revitalize the Rhodesian economy and guarantee the pensions of European Rhodesians has been a repeated offer by Western nations in order to make majority rule more attractive.. Yet virtually all the measures and proposals of recent years had been suggested by the Canadian delegation to Prime Ministers' meetings beginning in 1964.

But neither the solution to the Rhodesian problem nor the events that have occurred during the 11 years since Prime Minister Pearson's retirement are within the scope of this study. Rather Chapter VI has attempted to detail Canada's approach towards the Rhodesia issue and describe the part played by Mr. Pearson to prevent the dissolution of the Commonwealth at meetings of prime ministers from 1964 until 1966.

Conclusion

As discussed in the preceding studies, Canada's Commonwealth policy is essentially developed by the Prime Minister in conjunction with the Department of External Affairs. The

Canadian approach towards the Rhodesia issue, at least insofar as the Prime Ministers' meetings were concerned, was initially devised by the Department in the form of background papers and policy alternatives. Consequently, Canada's policy at the crucial Commonwealth conferences from 1964 through 1966 was virtually shaped by External inasmuch as the groundwork had been laid and direction recommended. Nonetheless, there was sufficient latitude for the Prime Minister to develop his own ideas, and the preparatory documents were necessarily tailored to fulfill his attitudes and interests. While Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin did not participate in these meetings, he undoubtedly shared Mr. Pearson's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth and vigorously supported the Prime Minister's mediatory role on the Rhodesia issue.¹⁵³ On the other hand, Cabinet was not directly involved with meetings of heads of government where no common policy was struck, although its support had to be secured on some commitments arising out of the meetings such as those dealing with sanctions and emergency aid to Zambia. In sum, Canadian initiatives at successive Commonwealth conferences were formulated by External Affairs along the lines of the Prime Minister's personal philosophy.

The Commonwealth was perceived by Mr. Pearson less as a countervailing force to the United States, as was the case during the Diefenbaker administration, than as a means for Canada to gain contacts with Third World countries. One of the

Prime Minister's particular interests was to promote world peace by fostering better race relations. No better kind of organization existed for this purpose than one which represented a cross-section of the world, and was directed towards the task of inter-racial cooperation. The Commonwealth is an organization different from any other, Mr. Pearson expressed in his memoirs, because

it is an association of peoples of every race, freely joined together as equals in the hope that they have something to offer one another and can give the world an example of inter-racial as well as international friendship and co-operation.¹⁵⁴

Since the Prime Minister considered that the Commonwealth was a fundamental Canadian interest, he was committed to its preservation and played the role as "helpful fixer" over the Rhodesia issue which threatened to break-up the association. Consistent with Mr. Pearson's concern, "the Department was inclined", former Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Ralph Collins explained, "to permit briefing documents to be influenced by the overriding concern for the association—at almost all costs."¹⁵⁵ Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin naturally possessed a concomitant interest in sustaining the Commonwealth. In a foreign policy statement in February 1968, Martin explained Canada's mediatory role on the Rhodesia issue:

In such issues as Rhodesia, Canada has worked within the Commonwealth framework to find common ground among countries whose basic aims may be similar but who differ in approach. Canada will continue to do what it can through the Commonwealth to strengthen the bridge between the races and between peoples in different regions with very different ways of life.¹⁵⁶

Thus, while a virtual division existed within the Commonwealth on an approach to this racial issue, it was significant that sufficient cohesion for its continued existence was found in functional activities suggested by Canada's Prime Minister. Lester Pearson demonstrated the capacity to determine the "grey areas" where agreement might be reached, and an ability to propose and then win a compromise solution at Prime Ministers' meetings from 1964 until 1966.

Prime Minister Pearson proposed the Declaration of Racial Equality at the 1964 Prime Ministers' meeting which was endorsed by all members as a commitment necessary for maintaining a multi-racial association, and a principle which should be applied in Rhodesia. By supporting the views of most of his African colleagues, Pearson's initiative temporarily ameliorated friction between members while it helped to establish the principle, at least implicitly, that majority rule was the only basis for Rhodesian independence which would be acceptable to the membership. As a result, Canada had prevented a white-non-white split over the Rhodesia issue by "acting as a bridge across a Commonwealth colour divide."¹⁵⁷

As the only member able to bridge Commonwealth differences, Canada had a responsibility at the 1965 meeting of prime ministers to combat the divisive effects of the Rhodesia issue and to seek some consensus. In order to divert attention from the more militant African members' demand for Britain to use force, Mr. Pearson helped to win a compromise by finding agreement on other measures more acceptable to the membership. With the exception of Tanzania, a consensus was reached on giving Britain additional time to conclude negotiations with the Smith government

which would lead to majority rule on a basis other than NIBR. If a settlement were not found within a reasonable period of time, Harold Wilson promised to consider convening a constitutional conference "in order to ensure Rhodesia's progress towards independence on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."¹⁵⁸

Two months after UDI was proclaimed by the minority régime in Rhodesia a special conference of Commonwealth leaders was held at Lagos. The Rhodesian problem threatened to destroy the Commonwealth, and Canada reacted by seeking compromise measures on which Britain and the Third World members could agree. Pearson persuaded African leaders to give sanctions more time to work on the basis that this measure would be supervised by a Commonwealth committee. Anticipating an early end to the Smith régime, Pearson suggested a second committee to devise an educational program for Rhodesian Africans to prepare for the implementation of majority rule. As a result of these Canadian compromise proposals, Mr. Wilson was given some additional time, which he had assured the conference would be "a matter of weeks not months," to end the illegal régime, and African leaders were to expect the application of more vigorous measures if the situation in Rhodesia was not resolved.

By the time of the next heads of government conference in September 1966 it was clear that non-mandatory sanctions were not working, and the majority of Commonwealth members "expressed their firm opinion that force was the only sure way of bringing down the illegal régime in Rhodesia."¹⁵⁹ Pearson

was adamant that the Rhodesia issue should not "violate the multiracial character of our Commonwealth or destroy our association,"¹⁶⁰ and, once again, worked for a compromise. While not opposing the possibility of military intervention, Pearson argued that other avenues for gaining the desired objective should be explored first. Given the task of drafting the final communiqué, Canada's Prime Minister was successful in finding a middle ground to secure a consensus. Whereas Britain was given an additional three months to negotiate a settlement leading to majority rule with the Smith régime, Third World members were assured that after this period of time if a settlement acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole was not found, the British government would back NIBMR and recommend to the Security Council the application of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. It was probably because Canada had taken a stand alongside of its non-white Commonwealth partners and had not completely rejected the possibility of military intervention if all else failed that enabled Mr. Pearson to mediate successfully at the London conference. Whatever the reason, Pearson was applauded by the Canadian and British press as the one who had "saved the Commonwealth."¹⁶¹

While the Commonwealth may have been sustained by Pearson's ability at "lynchpinmanship," the illegal régime in Rhodesia had remained in power. Indeed, former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Garfield Todd, charged that this dilemma was a result of Pearson's compromise measures. Whereas more aggressive action might have ended the illegal régime,

Commonwealth African members "were persuaded by his pleas to them that Britain should be allowed to try its policy of sanctions in dealing with the Rhodesian situation."¹⁶² After Wilson's abandonment of NIBMR despite his solemn pledge, African states suspected that Pearson was not as committed to African independence as they had thought. They began, from then on, to take a more realistic view of what could be expected from the Commonwealth. Indeed, events after the London conference show that the intense effort to pressure Britain during the years from 1964 until 1966 was an untypical phase and Pearson had helped the Commonwealth through it.

During his visit to Ottawa in January 1968 President Kaunda expressed the view that Canada should take the lead by convincing Britain to ask the Security Council to implement comprehensive sanctions, and host a Prime Ministers' conference.¹⁶³ Canada acted on the first request by directing its Permanent Representative to the UN, George Ignatieff, to "suggest that the Council consider extending the existing mandatory sanctions to encompass the whole of Rhodesia's trade as we ourselves have done."¹⁶⁴ However, Mr. Pearson found the second recommendation impracticable since he already had announced his intention to retire in April and did not want to commit his successor to host a Prime Ministers' meeting. Moreover, there was not a serious threat of Commonwealth dissolution during the final 16 months of the Pearson administration. Undoubtedly African countries were dissatisfied with Wilson's vacillation on the Rhodesia issue, but their condemnation was reserved for Britain rather than the Commonwealth as a whole. Certainly the Canadian government was concerned about the possibility that a prolonged war in Rhodesia might escalate into an ideological conflict between the East and West. But the over-

riding concern of Canada all along had been the preservation of the Commonwealth.

Canada's approach toward Rhodesia does not appear to have been affected greatly by domestic constraints. With the exception of some occasional interest in Canada's emergency aid to Zambia and its application of UN sanctions, this issue was not a major concern of Parliament. At least one of those involved in Canadian interest groups, addressing the problem of racial inequality in southern Africa, is convinced that the achievements of

interest groups in securing a change in government policy . . . does not justify the optimistic conclusions about the . . . effective influences of pressure groups in Canadian foreign policy . . . [rather] the government (including the bureaucracy) is left relatively free to make and implement foreign policy.¹⁶⁵

Moreover public interest or simply public knowledge of Commonwealth related matters has been notably modest. Indeed, even at the climax of the recent Commonwealth Games in Edmonton only 32 per cent of over 1100 respondents to a poll sponsored by Weekend Magazine could name more than three of the 37 member countries, including Canada.¹⁶⁶ Although the media can have a great impact on an international question when it is considered germane enough for public consumption, they generally have not related such questions to the Commonwealth.¹⁶⁷

Among external influences, only the Commonwealth seems to have influenced Canadian policy substantively on this issue. Certainly pressure was applied on Canada by African countries at the UN, but support for their position on racial equality was less evident in Canada's voting behaviour in the General Assembly than in its functional activities at Commonwealth conferences. Indeed, the Commonwealth as a whole was influenced

by its African membership which threatened to break-up the association over the Rhodesia issue at successive meetings of prime ministers. The Commonwealth Secretariat, which had a concomitant interest in redressing racial inequities, also had some effect on the behaviour of member states. Yet Canada was probably the most responsive member. By devising compromise formulae in order to preserve the association, Mr. Pearson showed that Canada was subject to influences from various Commonwealth actors.

In 1964 the Commonwealth was comprised of a majority of non-white members, and a plurality of African states. Britain was occupying a less prominent position though it remained at the hub of Commonwealth activity. That the impact of the new members was not commensurate with their numbers was probably due to the process of Commonwealth collaboration which was based on influence and consensus rather than majoritarianism. For example, unlike the UN, Commonwealth meetings were unfettered by resolutions and votes that inevitably result in success or failure by those who are for or against a given point of view. Consultation directed towards a consensus of opinion generates influence for those who are persuasive or those most able to compromise. Since the objective of consensus is to reach some agreement, invariably all participants will share some satisfaction with the outcome. Thus, as a forum for consultations, the Commonwealth provided a medium in which the African members could negotiate for a philosophy more compatible with a multiracial society. Particularly at the Prime Ministers' meetings from 1964 until 1966 the new

members took advantage of the opportunity to persuade Britain and the former Dominions of the need for the association to embrace the principle of racial equality.

However, an expectation for the membership to be committed to racial equality could not limit a member's freedom of action entirely. National self-interest was justified under the Balfour Declaration which provided that,

Commonwealth countries were independent in their policies and not subordinate to any one of them or to any common decision-making apparatus.¹⁶⁸

Consequently, it was inevitable that member states would interpret the expectations of the association to suit their own governmental policies and the will of their peoples. Yet the convention of non-interference in a member's domestic affairs was to receive less respect at Prime Ministers' meetings in the 1960s. Recognition for the concept of racial equality became increasingly evident as Rhodesia was pressed to guarantee racial equality before receiving its independence. The dominance of the new concept over the old convention was naturally due to its greater suitability to a multiracial membership, but it also exemplified the influence of African member states.¹⁶⁹

Thus, the African dimension had changed the character of the Commonwealth in the 1960s more than just in terms of its composition. African members had challenged the precepts of the association by claiming that the pursuit of racial equality was requisite to its very survival as a multiracial entity or as Professor Holmes has put it: "the more recent principle of

racial equality took precedence over the preservation of the family."¹⁷⁰ The impact was neither immediate nor was it promoted by African members alone. The new principle evolved slowly, and the membership as a whole was to contribute to the assertion of a multiracial philosophy.

For Canada the Commonwealth provided a forum within which to promote international cooperation, and Prime Minister Pearson unquestionably appreciated its potential for solving sensitive problems involving race relations. Meetings of heads of government permitted informal discussion of the Rhodesia issue within a multiracial context in an attempt to reach some understanding without imposing conditions on Canada's policy. Nonetheless, the confidences Mr. Pearson shared with his African colleagues and the understanding that he showed for their interests and values likely influenced his own attitudes and behaviour.

No doubt Canadian assistance to Zambia during the Rhodesia crises helped to forge the friendship of President Kaunda and Lester Pearson. But, more important, Kenneth Kaunda appreciated Mr. Pearson's repeated attempts to develop a Commonwealth consensus on Rhodesia while supporting the non-white members' efforts to ensure that Britain did not sell-out the African majority. Speaking at a Press Conference in February 1968, Kaunda declared that Pearson "has saved two Commonwealth conferences with his personal convictions and performance" and through his compromise formulae "has done so much to keep the

Commonwealth together."¹⁷¹ The Pearson government also promoted the best interests of the Commonwealth through bilateral relations. When Tanzania broke relations with Britain in December 1965, Canada represented the interests of both countries. That Tanzania continued to remain in the Commonwealth despite its breach with the United Kingdom was perhaps due in some ways to President Nyerere's respect for the Canadian Prime Minister. In a speech delivered in Toronto in September 1969, Julius Nyerere paid tribute to the friendship that had developed between their two countries as a result of Mr. Pearson's regard for the principle of racial equality:

. . . for many of the new nations, Canada became personified in Mr. Lester Pearson . . . It was under his leadership that Canada first demonstrated its understanding of the emerging Third World. Without always agreeing with us, he expressed Canada's respect for the principles of national sovereignty, and for their application even to small and weak nations. He also showed Canada's acceptance of the principle of human equality and dignity [as in] his understanding of Africa's position on Rhodesia.¹⁷²

It is, of course, hard to determine to what extent Commonwealth leaders have influenced each other, particularly when they often shared views in common. But it seems likely that Prime Minister Pearson's attitudes were molded to a greater or lesser degree through conversations with Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere at Commonwealth meetings if only because all the Canadian initiatives on the Rhodesia issue were taken at these meetings.

Since 1965 the Secretariat has served as a civil service for administering Commonwealth programs and supervising some of its activities. As a consequence, the Secretariat has caused the Commonwealth to be perceived more as an international organization rather than simply in terms of an association of equal and independent states with a common British legacy.¹⁷³ In fact, the Secretariat's impact on the Commonwealth may not simply be that it is now much more characteristic of an organization, distinct from its colonial heritage, but that the Commonwealth is now much more multi-racial in character. Secretariat personnel are representative of the whole Commonwealth. Through its functional involvement with race-relations, the Secretariat has been supportive of the multiracial philosophy, and its activities are often involved with redressing racial inequities. It has been valuable as a mediator during sensitive consultations over volatile racial issues in southern Africa, and as an administrator of emergency and educational assistance to Zambia and African Rhodesians. In this manner, it has supported the multiracial Commonwealth in its objective to overcome the Rhodesia crises.

The Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, has taken an active interest in trying to resolve the Rhodesian issue. For example, over the development of a plan for Commonwealth sanctions in 1966, Smith and Pearson were in close collaboration.¹⁷⁴ Since the Secretary-General complemented Pearson's mediatory activity,

it is possible that Mr. Smith had some influence on the Prime Minister's compromise proposals at the heads of government meetings, particularly as the groundwork for Canada's approach to the Rhodesia issue would have begun long before the meetings were underway.

However, it must be remembered that the issues at stake often reflected Prime Minister Pearson's own commitments and values. The understanding that he shared with other Commonwealth actors on the concept of racial equality undoubtedly effected a relationship of reciprocal responsiveness. Where there is a mutual respect for the principles of an association, influence is bound to run both ways.

In sum, Canada has been internationally rather than regionally oriented since World War II and intergovernmental organizations have provided Canada with a global forum for asserting its influence. It is apparent from this study that Prime Minister Pearson found the Commonwealth valuable for shaping Canadian foreign policy, and responded to prevent the break-up of the association by permitting Canada's approach to develop in accord with what he perceived as Commonwealth interests. For example, in the 1960s there was an extraordinary advance in the willingness of the Liberal government to involve itself in the Rhodesian issue. Pearson generated expectations of a commitment in principle to a common objective with the African member states and helped to sustain the Commonwealth during the period from 1964 until 1966. Since he did not take any further initiatives once the immediate objective

of defusing the issue had been achieved, it is clear that Pearson's mediatory role was taken primarily with one objective in mind - to preserve the Commonwealth.

Yet Canada's approach has not been affected by domestic actors, who (aside from the policy-makers themselves) did not take an active interest in Commonwealth affairs. Of Commonwealth actors, perhaps the Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, and Presidents Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda may have had the most influence on Prime Minister Pearson. But in the final analysis, the Prime Minister's mediatory position on the Rhodesia issue was likely most due to his view of the Commonwealth as a useful instrument in shaping Canadian foreign policy. Therefore, he worked toward preserving the Commonwealth and permitting Canada's approach to racial issues to develop in accord with the best interests of the association. To the extent that Prime Minister Pearson responded to prevent the break-up of the Commonwealth, Canada was subject to the influence of this association.

NOTES - CHAPTER VI

¹The reason why Rhodesia was bound to be an issue for the Commonwealth is developed very briefly because the argument given, already has received adequate attention in J. D. B. Miller's Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

²A description of the system of white minority government in Southern Rhodesia, which perpetuated its rule on the basis of racial discrimination, has been detailed by others. For example, see: James Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion, Oxford, OUP, 1967, chs. 4-5; Patrick Keatley, The Politics of Partnership, Middlesex, Penguin, 1963, pp. 337-336; Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Africa, Oxford, OUP, 1958; Colin Leys, R. Cranford Pratt, A New Deal for Central Africa, London, Heinemann, 1960; Martin Loney, Rhodesia, White Racism and Imperial Response, Middlesex, Penguin, 1975, chs. 3-5; Philip Mason, Birth of a Dilemma, London, OUP, 1960; R. Cranford Pratt, "African Reactions to the Rhodesian Crises," International Journal, Spring 1966, pp. 146-150.

³Research material has been used to develop this paragraph. Lester Pearson also received a copy of this letter from Nyerere because it was possible that his party would win the general election (as it did on April 3).

Aside from South Africa, the sole exception to this criterion for independence was Zanzibar, and it was incorporated with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania within a matter of months.

⁴Claire Palley convincingly argues that Britain only had the right to withhold consent to colonial legislation relating to franchise and constitutional amendment; it could neither initiate legislation nor repeal existing statutes: The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1885-1965, Toronto, Oxford, 1966.

⁵Research material.

⁶Commonwealth Survey, 30 July 1963, p. 656.

Canada did not indicate whether independence should come first or suggest when equal rights should be provided.

⁷Britain, House of Commons Debates, 15 November 1963, col. 586.

⁸Cmnd. 2807, Southern Rhodesia : documents relating to the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, November 1963 - November 1965, p. 7.

⁹Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 10-11. Commonwealth African governments had not been informed of the steps that Britain would take in the event of a UDI.

¹¹Richard Ogden, "The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, International Journal, Autumn, 1964, p. 546.

¹²The Times: London, editorial, 8 July 1964.

It is significant that this initial proposal was to be adopted by Britain about a decade later.

¹³The British statement was included in the final communiqué, Cmnd. 2441. p. 4.

¹⁴Menzies, Afternoon Light, op. cit., pp. 219-220.

¹⁵Interview with Arnold Smith, Ottawa, 7 December 1976. In addition to Prime Minister Pearson, the Canadian delegation included: Canadian High Commissioner to London, Lionel Chevrier; Clerk of the Privy Council, R. G. Robertson; Policy Secretary to the Prime Minister, Tom Kent; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, A. Smith; Director of the Commonwealth Division, A. G. Campbell.

¹⁶SS 64/15 "The Expanding Commonwealth", an excerpt from Prime Minister Pearson's address to the House of Commons on the 1964 Prime Ministers' meeting, 17 July 1964, p. 5.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸It appears that Pearson had in mind something less than one-man-one-vote. His ideas are outlined in ibid., p.6.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 6-7. Unless otherwise noted, quotations in the following four paragraphs have been taken from the same source.

²⁰Ibid., p.7. Canada, in fact, had been giving very little assistance. Following the Canadian High Commissioner's official visit to Salisbury in March 1964, the External Aid Office allocated \$125,000. Training positions for 25 African Rhodesians were to be provided in Canada and some educational advisers were expected to be sent to Rhodesia.

²¹Research material. Capital investment could be directed towards development projects such as irrigation, land clearance, railway expansion and hydro-electric schemes.

²²Ogden, "The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference" op.cit., p. 547.

²³J.D.B. Miller, Survey, op.cit., p. 398.

²⁴Canada Debates, op.cit., 17 July 1964, p. 5607.

²⁵Cmnd. 2276, The Report of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas, 1964, pp. 11-12.

²⁶SS 67/16 "Canada and Britain in a Changing Commonwealth," an address by Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin to the Commonwealth Correspondents Association, London, 21 April 1967, p. 2.

²⁷Research material.

²⁸Cmnd. 2713, Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 1965, Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat. A group consisting of the High Commissioners in London developed the Secretariat's budget on the basis of the UN assessment schedule such that Britain was responsible for about 30 per cent, and Canada 20 per cent, of the financing.

²⁹Pratt, "African Reactions to the Rhodesian Crises", op.cit., p. 193.

³⁰Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. III, op.cit., p. 283.

³¹Research material.

³²Miller, World, op. cit., p. 287.

³³In Mansergh, Documents, 1952-1962, op. cit., p.348.

³⁴See Cmd. 2807 (op. cit., pp. 21-39) for the information provided in this paragraph.

³⁵Professor Pratt explains that as paid civil servants, the chiefs were "therefore subject to strong pressure and influence from the government", "African Reactions", op. cit., p.109.

³⁶Cmd. 2807, op. cit., pp. 65-67. Southern Rhodesia generally became known simply as Rhodesia following Northern Rhodesian (Zambian) independence on 24 October 1964.

In a statement to the House of Commons on 25 January 1966, Prime Minister Wilson added a sixth principle, requiring that there should be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority: The United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, 25 January 1966, col. 42.

³⁷As for the entrenchment of provisions in the Rhodesian constitution guaranteeing progress towards majority rule, Professor Pratt has pointed out ("African Reactions," op. cit., p.192) that: "Historical precedents and the character of the Rhodesian Front Party indicate that an entrenched white minority rule would have prevailed."

³⁸Cmd: 2807, op. cit., p. 40.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 67-68.

⁴⁰Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, London, Little, Brown, 1971, p. 119. This insightful source provided information for this paragraph as it did for the meetings of Commonwealth heads of government until 1969.

⁴¹Prime Minister Pearson's report to the House of Commons on the Prime Ministers' meeting, Debates, op. cit., 29 June 1965.

⁴²For this statement and Nyerere's statement below, see Wilson, Labour Government, op. cit., p. 114.

⁴³Observer: London, 27 June 1965 quoted in Miller, Survey, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

Nyerere was referring to the six words: "no independence before African majority rule." This objective is abbreviated, NIBMR, in the Third Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1971, p. 2) and this form will be used in this study.

⁴⁴Wilson, Labour Government, op. cit., p. 116. See also Guardian: Manchester, 22 June 1965.

⁴⁵ Each of these recommendations was noted in an address by Mr. Smith to the CIIA (15 November 1976) entitled: "The Commonwealth as an Instrument of North-South Politics."

Martin Loney corroborates the credibility of Smith's proposal for military intervention. Interviews by John Rex of Rhodesian officers in 1965 found unanimous loyalty to the Queen, and both Arthur Bottomley (Commonwealth Secretary) and Cledwyn Hughes (Minister of State at the Colonial Office) believed that immediate British intervention would not have involved South Africa. Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Middlesex, Penguin, 1975, pp. 140-141.

⁴⁶ Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles, London, 1969, Hodder & Stoughton, p. 112.

Whereas Kaunda considered UDI a constitutional breakdown of law and order, it became apparent that Wilson considered that a breakdown should involve communal rioting, exemplified at the time of India's partition.

⁴⁷ Research material.

⁴⁸ Wilson, Labour Government, op. cit., p. 114.

⁴⁹ Guardian: Manchester, 23 June 1965, ibid.

⁵⁰ Canada, Debates, loc. cit. This source, along with Mr. Pearson's statement in External Affairs, August 1965, pp. 326-327, and the final communiqué (Cmnd. 2712), provided the basis for information in the next two paragraphs.

⁵¹ Canada and the United Nations, 1965, op. cit., p. 54.

⁵² Security Council Resolution 217 (1965) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 10-0-1 (France) on 20 November 1965.

⁵³ The United Kingdom, National Opinion Poll Bulletin, Supplement 1, "Rhodesia", October 1965 cited in Miller, Survey, op. cit., p. 212.

⁵⁴ Menzies, Afternoon Light, op. cit., p. 224.

⁵⁵ Resolution 2022 (XX) adopted by a vote of 82-9-18 (Canada) on 5 November 1965: Canada and the United Nations, 1965, op. cit., p. 31.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Resolution 2024 (XX) adopted on 11 November 1965 by a vote of 107-2-1, Canada in favour.

⁵⁷ The Council of Foreign Ministers' decision was taken on December 3 and recorded in Commonwealth Survey, 21 December 1965, p. 1296.

Canada assumed the role of protecting power for Britain in Tanzania and represented that country in Britain. Ghana resumed diplomatic relations following a coup in February 1966.

⁵⁸Pratt, "African Reactions", op.cit., p. 193.

⁵⁹Research material.

⁶⁰Prime Minister Pearson's statement to the House of Commons (11 November 1965) reproduced in Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955-1964, op.cit., p. 308.

⁶¹Canada and the United Nations, 1965, op.cit., p. 55.

⁶²Annual Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General (CSGRI), London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 26 August 1966, p. 6.

⁶³The Times: London, 27 November 1965.

⁶⁴Research material.

⁶⁵CSGRI, op.cit., p. 6.

⁶⁶Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 196.

⁶⁷SS 66/16, "The Use of Sanctions Against Rhodesia", Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin's statement to the House of Commons, 4 April 1966, p. 6.

⁶⁸Hall, High Price of Principles, op.cit., pp. 162-168.

⁶⁹Wilson, (Labour Government, op.cit., pp. 181-183, 189) details some of Britain's contributions to maintain the Zambian economy. Aside from the air-lift, the road from Lusaka to Dar-es-Salaam was improved with British aid. Eventually, the Tan-Zam railway was developed with assistance from China.

⁷⁰Arnold Smith explained that "Pearson was decisive in getting Wilson to the Lagos meeting": Interview, Ottawa, 18 October 1977. Additional references to Smith are based on the same interview.

⁷¹Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 189.

⁷²Prime Minister Menzies notified Sir Abubakar of his opinion on 24 December and, subsequently, made a public statement reiterating Australia's position on 28 December 1965, Afternoon Light, op.cit., p. 222.

⁷³Mr. Pearson's attitudes, as outlined in this paragraph, are detailed in Munro, Inglis, Mike, Vol. III, op.cit., p. 284.

⁷⁴ Cmd.2890, Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, Lagos, 11-12 January 1966, final communiqué, p. 3.

⁷⁵ Unless otherwise noted, research material has been used to delineate members' positions in the next two paragraphs.

⁷⁶ Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 195.

⁷⁷ Unless otherwise noted the next two paragraphs have been developed on the basis of Mr. Martin's statement to the House, SS 66/16, op.cit., p. 5.

⁷⁸ The Economist, 15 January 1966, p. 185.

⁷⁹ CSGRIL, op.cit., p. 7.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 8. Such educational assistance was in addition to the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan that coordinated bilateral agreements under which member states' supported a proportional amount of awards for students from Commonwealth countries.

⁸² The Economist, op.cit.

Prime Minister Pearson originally had considered the possibility for formulating an Education Committee at the 1964 Prime Ministers' meeting when he recommended that the Commonwealth should provide educational assistance to African Rhodesians.

⁸³ SS 66/16, op.cit., p. 2.

⁸⁴ Quotations in this paragraph have been taken from the final communiqué, Cmd.2890, loc.cit.

⁸⁵ SC Resolution 231 (1966) adopted by a vote of 10-0-5 on 9 April 1966.

Tankers discharging oil at Beira were considered by the UN to threaten peace under Article 39 of the Charter. This was the first mandatory sanctions resolution (under Article 41) ever passed by the Security Council.

⁸⁶ R.C. Pratt, "Towards Justice in Rhodesia" in Stephen Clarkson ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, op.cit., p.218.

⁸⁷ The head of Lonrho Limited, commissioned to "shut off its oil pipeline from Mozambique to Rhodesia to comply with British sanctions legislation" testified that he informed the British government of sanctions breaking early in 1966.

Unless otherwise noted quotations in this paragraph were taken from: Norman Webster, "Shades of Watergate seen in UK scandal over Rhodesia Oil Sanctions", The Globe and Mail: Toronto, 13 September 1978.

38 The Bingham inquiry was begun in June 1977 by the Labour government's Foreign Secretary, David Owen.

For both Stewart and Thomson's statements see "Sir Harold Bombs even with Laborites"; ibid., 18 November 1978.

39 Munro, Inglis, Mike III, op.cit., p. 283.

90 BBC television interview of Prime Minister Pearson, London, 5 September 1966, p. 11.

91 Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 277.

92 For the position of the United Kingdom on the Rhodesia issue developed in this paragraph, see ibid., pp.278-280.

93 Zambia's position, and the statements by Singapore and Jamaica, are outlined in ibid.

94 Commonwealth Survey, op.cit., 19 August 1966, p.873. Kapwepwe's threat of Zambia's withdrawal was supported by President Kaunda. Zambia's subsequent decision to remain in the association was likely influenced by an appreciation of the effect that step would have on British aid, and possibly a realization that the Commonwealth consists of more than just ties with Britain.

95 Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 279. The caucus meetings consisted of all the African, Asian and Caribbean representatives except Malawi's Dr. Banda and the Tunku Rahman who refused to caucus, claiming "I am not a caucasian."

96 CSGR II, op.cit., p. 16.

97 This paragraph is developed primarily on the basis of Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., pp. 280-281.

98 Menzies, Afternoon Light, op.cit., p. 227.

99 The quotations of Lester Pearson in the following three paragraphs were taken from Mike III, op.cit., pp.285-287.

100 Although Pearson's reason for advancing limited rather than comprehensive sanctions was to prohibit other white minority régimes from being affected and driving them to Rhodesia's aid, subsequent events were to prove this could not be avoided.

101 Since Canada would become a member of the Security Council in January 1967, it might have been forced to take a position on the enforcement of sanctions different than the

United Kingdom or part company with moderate Third World Commonwealth states. But possibly Ottawa believed that UN action to enforce limited sanctions would itself be limited to a mandatory ban on South African exports covered by the Rhodesian ban which would not constitute a serious clash in Western relations.

102 Their statements are summarized in Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., pp. 281-282.

103 Douglas Anglin has concluded that approximately two-thirds of the Commonwealth membership or 15 of 23 members were in favour of Britain using force: "Britain and the Use of Force in Rhodesia", Freedom and Change, ed. Michael Fry, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1975, Table 2, p. 52.

104 Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 282.

105 Interview of President Nyerere by Kenneth Ridley, a journalist resident in Dar-es-Salaam, 10 September 1966. Tanzania was represented at the conference by an observer.

106 Research material has been used to develop this paragraph.

107 For quotations in this paragraph, see Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 283.

108 See ibid. for information in this paragraph.

109 Wilson's statement found expression in paragraph 8 of the final communiqué: Cmnd.3115, Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, London, 6-15 September 1966:

- (a) After the illegal régime is ended a legal government will be appointed by the Governor and will constitute a broadly based representative administration. During this interim period the armed forces and police will be responsible to the Governor. Those individuals who are detained or restricted on political grounds will be released and normal political activities will be permitted provided that they are conducted peacefully and democratically without intimidation from any quarter;
- (b) The British Government will negotiate, with this interim administration, a constitutional settlement directed to achieving the objective of majority rule, on the basis of the six principles;
- (c) This constitutional settlement will be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by appropriate democratic means;

- (d) The British Parliament and Government must be satisfied that this test of opinion is fair and free and would be acceptable to the general world community;
- (e) The British Government will not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole are shown to be in favour of it.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Arnold Smith, Ottawa, 7 December 1976.

¹¹¹ Interview with Ralph Collins (Ottawa, 26 July 1978) who was an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and a member of the Canadian delegation.

¹¹² It is worthwhile noting that both Malta and Malawi were economically highly dependent on Britain.

¹¹³ The pertinent passage is paragraph 10 (Cmd. 3115):

The heads of government also noted that the British Government proposed immediately to communicate its intentions as indicated above through the Governor to all sections of opinion in Rhodesia and to inform the illegal régime there that if they are not prepared to take the initial and indispensable step whereby the rebellion is brought to an end and executive authority is vested in the Governor, the following related consequences will ensue:

- (a) The British Government will withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which have been made; in particular, they will **not** thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule.
- (b) Given the full support of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, the British Government will be prepared to join in sponsoring in the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of this year a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.

¹¹⁴ Munro, Inglis, Mike III, op.cit., p. 288.

¹¹⁵ Sydney Morning Herald, editorial by T. S. Marks, 17 September 1966.

164 Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin's statement in the House of Commons, 20 March 1968; recorded in the Monthly Report, CIIA, March 1968, p.36.

165 See Robert Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa" in Lyon, Third World. op. cit., pp: 121-122.

Between the Prime Ministers' meetings in 1966 the Canadian Committee for Zimbabwe, initially a Toronto-based group of academics, church persons, journalists, ex-CUSO volunteers and others who had worked in Africa, wrote to individual MPs and External Affairs in order to stimulate the government to take initiatives at the London conference. The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy towards Africa, which was an outgrowth of the former, attempted to convince the Canadian government to remain firmly committed to NIBAR and apply diplomatic pressure to prevent sanctions-breaking.

166 "The Commonwealth," Weekend Magazine, 29 July 1978, p. 1. The poll was conducted by Data Laboratories Research Consultants of Montreal, and based on 1113 "telephone interviews" by National Market Development Limited in 32 of Canada's largest urban centres.

167 The dearth of press coverage of Commonwealth related questions is dealt with in "Summary Report on the Dalhousie Conference, The Commonwealth and Non-Governmental Organizations," 29 October 1976, unpublished report.

168 Max Beloff, "The Commonwealth - from disillusion to dissolution;" a speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society on 14 June 1971, reproduced in Commonwealth Journal, January 1972, p. 40.

169 Ali Mazrui makes a stimulating argument for the African conquest of the Commonwealth during the early 1970s in The Anglo-African Commonwealth, Oxford, 1967, pp. 27-41.

170 John Holmes, "The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa," International Organization, 16 (1962) p. 298.

171 A Press Conference given by President Kaunda in Lusaka on 16 February 1963.

172 For Nyerere's opinion of Pearson see his speech delivered in Toronto (30 September 1969) in Freedom and Development, Oxford, 1973, p. 105.

¹¹⁶ Cmnd. 3159, Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement, 1966.

The six guidelines were contrary to the UN Security Council Resolution 202 (6 May 1965), requesting Britain to prevent a UDI and to develop a constitution acceptable to the majority of Rhodesians.

¹¹⁷ See Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit. pp. 304-317.

¹¹⁸ A copy of the "working document" for a constitutional settlement agreed to by both leaders is reproduced in Commonwealth Survey, op.cit., 23 December 1966, pp. 1297-1309.

¹¹⁹ For the whole speech and follow-up questions see: United Kingdom, Debates, op.cit., 20 December 1966, coll. 1175-1183.

¹²⁰ Research material.

¹²¹ Miller, Survey, op.cit., p. 233.

¹²² SC Resolution 232 (1966) adopted on 16 December 1966 by a vote of 11-0-4: Canada and the United Nations, 1966, op.cit., p. 59.

It was a credit to the Commonwealth that the Sanctions Committee report was largely the framework under which the Security Council acted, cf: CSGR II, op.cit., pp. 19-21.

¹²³ Resolution 2138 (XXI) was adopted by the General Assembly by a roll-call vote of 86-2-18 (Canada) on 22 October 1966 and Resolution 2151 (XXI) passed by a vote of 80-2-17 (Canada) on 17 November 1966.

¹²⁴ United Nations Documents: Official Records of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, New York, Readex Microprint, Twenty-First Session, Plenary Meeting 1440, p. 7.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 1443, p. 26.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 1435, p. 42.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 1436, pp. 4-5.

¹²⁸ Canada and the United Nations, 1966, op.cit., p. 56.

¹²⁹ Resolution 2262 (XXII) was adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1967 by a roll-call vote of 92-2-18 (Canada).

¹³⁰ For the Tanzanian statement see: United Nations Documents, op.cit., Twenty-Second Session, Plenary Meeting 1583, p. 57.

131 All roll-call votes recorded in the Yearbook of the United Nations (New York, Office of Public Information) from 1965 until April 1968 on the Rhodesia issue have been used:

- (1) A/C.4/L.804
(approved 102-2-11, 11 November 1965)
+ equals vote condemning UDI, calling for all members not to recognize the illegal régime.
- (2) R. 2024 (XX)
(adopted 107-2-1, 11 November 1965)
+ equals vote inviting Britain to implement UN resolutions; reference to Security Council.
- (3) A/C.4/L. 794/Rev.1
(approved 95-2-1, 11 October 1965)
+ equals vote calling for UK to prevent UDI and set up a representative government.
- (4) A/C.4/L. 835
(approved 77-2-9, 21 October 1966)
+ equals vote calling for Wilson-Smith talks to end in recognition of Zimbabwe people, and for UK to support the "one-man-one-vote" concept.
- (5) R. 2138 (XXI)
(adopted 86-2-18, 22 October 1966)
+ equals vote calling for Wilson-Smith talks to recognize Zimbabwe people on the basis of one-man-one-vote.
- (6) A/C.4/L. 836
(approved 94-2-17, 10 November 1966)
+ equals vote calling for independence of Zimbabwe people and for UK to implement measures to end minority regime—even by force.
- (7) R. 2262 (XXII)
(adopted 92-2-18, 3 November 1967)
+ equals vote calling upon all members to assist Zimbabwe refugees; Rhodesian negotiations to include all political parties; and the UK to sanction a mandatory embargo.
- (8) A/C. 4/L. 870/Rev. 2.
(approved 90-2-18, 27 October 1967)
+ equals vote condemning South Africa for trading with Rhodesia and the UK's measures which should be backed by force.
- (9) R. 2022 (XX)
(adopted 82-9-18, 5 November 1965)

+ equals vote calling for release of political prisoners, the repeal of repressive legislation, and for Britain to call a constitutional conference leading to full adult suffrage and early independence, applying force if necessary.

(10) A/C. 4/L. 795 and Add. 1-3.

(approved 79-8-17, 5 November 1965)

+ equals vote condemning racial discrimination in Rhodesia and any assistance to the illegal régime; calls upon Rhodesia to repeal repressive legislation and for UK to use force to suspend the 1961 Constitution, and give full adult suffrage and early independence to the people of Zimbabwe.

132 Guttman scale analysis arranges roll-call votes in an order such that a country which responds in favour of any particular resolution, responds positively towards all resolutions of lower rank order. Only Malawi has recorded an "error". By voting in favour of R. 2022 (#9), Malawi ~~also~~ should have been able to support the draft resolution L. 870 (#8). A coefficient of reproduceability is not used because the distribution of votes is too one-sided, and this would artificially raise the coefficient: L. Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly," loc. cit.

133 A. Lijphart, "An Analysis of Bloc Voting in the UN General Assembly," op. cit., p. 911.

134 The formula for the IA is: $\frac{f+g}{t} \times 100\%$

in which t equals the number of votes on which two countries were in agreement and g equals the number of votes in which one country votes either in favour or against to the other country's absence. As IA of 100.0 per cent indicates full agreement on all roll-call votes; an IA of 0.0 per cent shows that the two countries were in complete disagreement.

135 Lord Caradon, Race Relations in the British Commonwealth and the United Nations, Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 14.

Caradon (formerly Sir Hugh Foot) was the United Kingdom's ambassador to the UN during the early years of the Rhodesia problem and resigned because he could no longer support British policy on colonial issues: see A Start in Freedom, London, 1964, pp. 222-224.

136 Interview with Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 21 July 1977. Mr. Sharp served as Minister of Trade and Commerce from 1963 until 1967 when he became the Finance Minister in the Pearson government.

137 Geoffrey Pearson, Director General of the UN division, believes that Third World States are under few illusions in interpreting UN roll-call votes. For example, they realize that although East Germany supports their resolutions, it continues to supply arms to Rhodesia's minority régime: Interview, Ottawa, 10 August 1977.

138 Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 424.

139 For the Prime Minister's statement and his response to subsequent questions, see United Kingdom, Debates, op.cit., 25 July 1967.

140 This thesis is espoused by Ivan Head. cf: "The Alien's Access to Local Remedies: The African Commonwealth Countries' Experience" in The Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. XXI (October 1968) pp. 701-711.

141 Research material.

142 Conversation with Professor Pratt, Toronto, 30 January 1979.

143 Pratt, Sanger in Clarkson, Independent Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 225, 223. The substance of their arguments was also expressed in personal letters to Prime Minister Pearson.

144 Research material.

145 Prime Minister Wilson negotiated with Mr. Smith aboard HMS Fearless, off Gibraltar, from October 9 to 13. The talks were recorded in Cmnd. 3793, Rhodesia: Report on the discussions held on board HMS Fearless, October 1968.

146 United Kingdom, Debates, op.cit., 15 October 1968, coll. 207-223.

147 Arnold Smith credited the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee with providing much of the data on which the UN subsequently decided to apply comprehensive sanctions: OSGR II, op.cit., pp. 19-20. Essentially, trade with Rhodesia was prohibited except for commodities which could be justified on humanitarian or medical grounds.

148 Webster, "Shades of Watergate," loc.cit., is the source used in the rest of the paragraph.

149 Wilson, Labour Government, op.cit., p. 504.

¹⁵⁰ Cmnd. 4835, Rhodesia: Proposals for a settlement, 1971. Though the constitutional provisions included a modest declaration of rights, and broadened the qualitative franchise somewhat, there is no evidence that minority rule would not continue in perpetuity.

Cmnd. 4964, Rhodesia, Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion, May 1972.

Subsequent British-Rhodesian negotiations were to include all groups that were representative of Rhodesian opinion rather than having arrangements that were worked out with Ian Smith being put to the "people as a whole."

¹⁵¹ For its part, the Commonwealth agreed at the 1975 Heads of Government meeting to provide financial and material assistance to Mozambique, which had effectively cut-off about 60 per cent of Rhodesia's imports and exports. cf: CSGR V, op.cit., pp. 25-26.

¹⁵² See Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Ottawa, 2-10 August 1973, final communiqué, para. 23, and Press Statements by Prime Minister Trudeau on August 2 and 10.

¹⁵³ Mr. Martin's speeches and Lester Pearson's memoirs, dealing with the Commonwealth and the Rhodesia issue, differ more in the style of presentation than in substance. For example, see those statements of the External Secretary referred to in this chapter: SS 65/11; SS 66/7; SS 66/16.

¹⁵⁴ Munro, Inglis, Mike III, op.cit., p. 284.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Ralph Collins, op.cit.

¹⁵⁶ SS 68/3, "Canadian Foreign Policy," a statement delivered by Paul Martin in Medicine Hat, Alberta, 5 February 1968, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷ The Toronto Star, editorial, 15 July 1964.

¹⁵⁸ Cmnd. 2712, op.cit.

¹⁵⁹ Cmnd. 3115, op.cit.

¹⁶⁰ Munro, Inglis, Mike III, op.cit., p. 287.

¹⁶¹ For example, see the Ottawa Citizen, 16 September 1966 and The Times: London, 15 September 1966.

¹⁶² Mr. Garfield Todd's statement was made in Toronto on 19 October 1967, see: Saywell, ed. Canadian Annual Review, 1967, op.cit., p. 244.

¹⁶³ Reported in The Globe and Mail by Charles Taylor, 16 January 1968 and recorded in ibid, 1968, p. 259.

173 Perhaps Margaret Doxey has expressed best that the Commonwealth has blossomed with the growth of the Secretariat into a full-fledged international organization replete with a headquarters, a more formalized agenda, and an international staff for directing a network of functional activities: "The Commonwealth in the 1970s," The Yearbook of World Affairs: 1973, London, Stevens, 1973, pp. 90-109; "The Commonwealth Secretariat," The Yearbook of World Affairs: 1976, op. cit., pp. 69-96.

174 Interview with Ralph Collins, op. cit., See, for example, Pearson's letter to Arnold Smith prior to the Lagos conference reproduced in Munro, Inglis, Mike III, op. cit., p. 284.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

There has been an extraordinary transformation in the Canadian government's approach towards the Commonwealth between the mid-1940s and late-1960s. To some extent, the Commonwealth itself has had an influence on Canadian government policies. This chapter will explain the changes in Canada's external behaviour while distinguishing between the policies of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments. The method for assessing influence also will be employed to determine who exercised it, where it was brought to bear, how it was applied and with what results. Finally, the thesis will provide a general assessment of the evolution of Canada's Commonwealth relations during this period in the light of the individual case studies.

By seeking to reconcile Canada's **independence** with the Commonwealth relationship Prime Minister King inadvertently had helped to shape a decentralized flexible association that would not encroach upon the sovereignty of its member nations, making the Commonwealth more compatible with Asian membership. But whereas Mackenzie King was obsessed with the idea that the Commonwealth was used by Britain as a vehicle for carrying out an empire policy, Prime Minister

St. Laurent was prepared to consider how this institution might be utilized in conducting Canadian external relations. For St. Laurent, the essence of Canada's foreign policy was to promote world stability through international involvement. Since the multiracial entity now had among its membership nations that were rich and poor, white and non-white, aligned and non-aligned, it provided Canada with a valuable instrument to foster greater international understanding. Consequently, Canada was interested in retaining India in the Commonwealth as a republic, and worked towards this end by acting in a drafting capacity to facilitate agreement on a new formula for membership.

As Canada developed closer relations with Commonwealth Asia, and particularly with India, this connection was to effect a change in the Liberal government's immigration policy. Following the exchange of diplomatic representation between Canada and India in 1947, High Commissioner Kearney proposed that Canada should accept a token number of Indian immigrants as a means for improving bilateral relations. The subsequent reappraisal of Canada's approach towards Asian immigrants, or at least those from Commonwealth countries, was due primarily to the St. Laurent governments interest in maintaining friendly relations with Delhi. A revised immigration policy was not significant in the modest number of Asian nationals who were admitted, but it was insofar as the change came as a direct result of Canadian membership in the Commonwealth.

Canada's link with India had an impact on Canadian attitudes during a period of time when the cold war dominated international affairs. The Indo-Canadian relationship ensured that Canada did not fall exclusively into the bi-polar confrontation. Consultations with Commonwealth Asian leaders, and particularly Pandit Nehru, may have persuaded Mr. St. Laurent to realize that the future relied on more than just the competition between the communist and non-communist worlds. Moreover, ties with the East convinced Ottawa that there was a need for a whole new dimension in Canadian external policy beyond North America and the North Atlantic. If the Ottawa-Delhi axis was to be sustained, however, the St. Laurent administration realized that it would require more than frequent and close consultations. Pandit Nehru had made it clear that India was interested in garnering support for its economy through development assistance as well as for the struggle for self-government among colonial peoples. It is indicative of the persuasiveness of the Indian Prime Minister that Canada eventually furnished aid to the emerging nations of Commonwealth Asia, and became increasingly more tolerant of their attitudes towards the decolonization of the empire.

In seeking to put some purpose into the multiracial Commonwealth and to strengthen Canadian links with southern Asia, Canada participated in the Colombo Plan and, subsequently, created several bilateral aid programs that were exclusive to that association. The Liberal government was interested in expanding Canada's international contacts in order to

diversify trade so as to avoid a loss in Canada's economic bargaining position with the United States. Development assistance provided an opportunity for closer collaboration with countries of Commonwealth Asia and the prospect of broadening our trade relations. Like the Liberals, the PC administration considered the allocation of aid as a practical method to promote communications and commercial ties with developing countries. Unlike the previous government, the Commonwealth was the keystone of Prime Minister Diefenbaker's foreign policy interests. The Diefenbaker government contributed twice the amount of aid under the Canada-West Indies Aid Program as its predecessor had allocated for the same period of time. Moreover, Canadian development assistance was expanded to embrace the member states of Africa and the Caribbean to the exclusion of the countries of Francophone Africa and Latin America.

To some extent due to the practical arguments advanced by Pandit Nehru and Mr. Senanayake, Canada was among the original members of the Colombo Plan. The St. Laurent government initially approached the Plan with a good deal of reluctance, partly because it was concerned that this new scheme might conflict with aid programs already operating under the UN, and partly because it was financially involved in assisting the North Atlantic area. But the prospect of disposing of our grain surpluses and helping to foster greater understanding between the West and the Eastern hemisphere at a time when communism had penetrated southern Asia helped to outweigh our

reluctance to take on additional aid commitments. Participation in Colombo had a significant effect on Canadian foreign policy because prior to 1950 it had little communication with this region. Through its aid program Canada developed particularly close relations with India such that, following Prime Minister St. Laurent's tour of the subcontinent in 1954, the Canadian government felt sufficiently confident of its relationship with that non-aligned country to assist with the development of the first Indian nuclear reactor.

The Diefenbaker government broadened Canada's development interests by providing external aid to the West Indies Federation precisely because it was expected to achieve full self-government and Commonwealth membership within the next several years. It was not until after exhaustive bilateral discussions during 1957 and 1958 between senior officials of External Affairs and Federation representatives that the Canada-West Indies Aid Program really began. Of course, Ottawa did not need to be persuaded as to the mutual benefits of the bilateral aid program. Canada had significant commercial interests in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and it was interested in any scheme aimed at promoting the purchase of Canadian exports. Furthermore, by assisting the Federation's development, Canada was helping itself by contributing to the stability of the western hemisphere which had seen communism introduced in Cuba. Indeed, the interest shown by Dr. Jagan towards developing a socialist Guyana affected the Canadian government as this South American country was included in

the Canada-West Indies aid package. Nonetheless, Canada's concern was restricted solely to Commonwealth states to the exclusion of the other countries of the Caribbean region.

The emergence of self-government in Anglophone Africa put demands upon the senior members of the Commonwealth to assist with the economic development of these nations. The Ghanaian delegation put forward a comprehensive outline of their country's prospective aid requirements at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' conference held at Mont Tremblant in 1957. Canada was willing to dispense with some modest educational and technical assistance almost immediately, and allocated capital aid following the 1958 Commonwealth Trade and Economic conference. Following the Prime Ministers' meeting in 1961, during which time Dr. Nkrumah discussed with Mr. Diefenbaker Ghana's need for assistance in the training of its defence and security personnel, the Canadian government also decided to extend military aid to Ghana. This was a significant departure in policy for up to that time, Canada essentially had not provided this type of aid to non-NATO countries. It was significant too that Canada had responded to the needs of a Commonwealth member, and that future military assistance programs were to be confined to Commonwealth African states. Indeed, while Canada had developed an aid program for former British colonies in Africa, its assistance to Francophone Africa was relatively non-existent during the early 1960s inspite of the fact that French and British decolonization in Africa occurred simultaneously.

While Canada undoubtedly would have become involved in UN assistance programs to the developing world, Canada initially contributed external aid to southern Asia because it was a member of the Commonwealth. Particularly during Prime Minister Diefenbaker's term in office, there was an emphasis on Commonwealth affiliations to strengthen the linkage between members, and to give increased meaning to the multiracial association. If the Commonwealth was really an association whose members came to the assistance of one another in times of need, then providing development assistance was considered as requisite to a continuing Commonwealth relationship. The allocation of bilateral aid strictly to the Commonwealth Caribbean was indicative of that association's presence in Canadian external affairs. Ottawa's subsequent decision to channel most of Canada's development assistance to Anglophone African countries again underscored its interest in the Commonwealth relationship. The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan, which was proposed by Canada, was yet another attempt by this country to forge ties within the association. Indeed, Canada virtually provided all of its bilateral development assistance to Commonwealth countries despite the fact that less developed Commonwealth member states represented only about one-third of the world's poor. Thus, the evidence in this case study indicates that Commonwealth membership directly and indirectly influenced the direction of Canadian external aid and the governments' attitudes towards development assistance.

Canada's policies on the South African racial issue evolved from 1947 until 1961 in response to changing domestic and international attitudes. The approach of the Liberal government was one of "non-interference". Canada refused to condemn the Union and to support proposed actions at the UN. Moreover, Ottawa did not officially try to persuade the Nationalist government to modify its racial policies. The St. Laurent administration did not sympathize with South Africa, but it realized that Pretoria was unwilling to compromise. The PC government took an approach similar to its predecessor by refusing to denounce a fellow Commonwealth partner at the UN while making it clear that Canada did not support the apartheid policy. Whereas the new Canadian government may have felt more confident of being in a position to influence attitudes in Pretoria, during the years from 1957 until 1959 Ottawa simply insured that the channels of communication remained open between the two countries.

However, by 1961 it had become clear that the value of the association, serving as a forum to promote closer relations between peoples of different races, had become handicapped by the presence of a member which practised a public policy of racial discrimination to the extent that the continued existence of the Commonwealth as a multiracial entity was at stake. Mr. Diefenbaker was aware that the Commonwealth had served a valuable purpose in the devolution of the British Empire and that much of the task still remained. The Prime Minister also appreciated that the multiracial association had to recognize racial equality as its foremost principle,

and that this principle could not be compromised. Consistent with his belief in human rights and his personal attachment to the Commonwealth, John Diefenbaker took the side of Canada's non-white partners on this racial issue during the course of the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting. He was prepared to support South Africa's request for republican membership provided that the Verwoerd government was willing to alter its racial policy to be more compatible with the ideals of the multiracial Commonwealth.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker possessed a nostalgia for the old Commonwealth relationship developed around the convention on non-interference, and he was aware of the practical realities faced by the Nationalist government. But Commonwealth colleagues such as the Tunku Rahman and Pandit Nehru, for whom Diefenbaker had a high regard, had confirmed his belief that the new Commonwealth must be committed to those values appropriate to its multiracial composition. In fact, Sir Abubakar and Kwame Nkrumah had threatened to withdraw their countries from the Commonwealth and Julius Nyerere had stated that Tanganyika would not join if South Africa continued in the association. Realizing that the Commonwealth might collapse over this issue, at least in its multiracial form, Mr. Diefenbaker believed that accommodation on the part of South Africa was mandatory. In order to keep the African members in the association, Canada's Prime Minister took the lead by proposing that Dr. Verwoerd accept a paragraph in the final communiqué, expressing that the Commonwealth's fundamental purpose was the promotion of racial

equality. In the event, Mr. Diefenbaker was among those who effected the Union's departure by compelling it to either accept the principle of racial equality or withdraw its request for continued membership as a republic.

The multiracial Commonwealth had become important in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy, particularly as this association now afforded Canada the opportunity to collaborate closely with black African countries. Canadian independence and influence were also believed to be bolstered by Commonwealth membership because it provided Canada with a greater voice in the international community. If South Africa's remaining in the Commonwealth would sacrifice the membership of the African members, this would jeopardize Canada's foreign policy interests. Thus, in order to preserve the association from possible dissolution, Mr. Diefenbaker felt compelled to demand that the Verwoerd government alter its race policy to gain republican membership. That Canadian policy was formulated more out of concern for the preservation of the Commonwealth than out of an abhorrence of South Africa, seemed apparent when the Diefenbaker administration decided to continue international relations with the Union after its departure. Moreover, where Canadian policy had been developed out of respect for a Commonwealth partner, there was a distinct change in approach. Canada altered its behaviour in the UN General Assembly by no longer refraining from censuring the Union either by vote or in committee. In sum, Canadian policy in general,

and Mr. Diefenbaker's approach in particular, towards the South African racial issue had been clearly influenced directly by African member states and indirectly through a concern for the preservation of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth certainly was not the most significant factor in shaping Canadian foreign policy under the Liberal government but it was important. This institution was perceived by Prime Minister Pearson less as a counterpoise to the United States or as a monarchical connection, as was the case during the Diefenbaker administration, than as a means with which to foster inter-racial cooperation and broaden Canada's contacts with the Third World. But African member states had threatened the Commonwealth with dissolution by claiming that the implementation of racial equality in Rhodesia was requisite to its very survival as a multi-racial entity. Since a virtual division existed between Third World members and Britain on an approach to take to ensure that majority rule would be instituted in Rhodesia, Mr. Pearson played a "lynchpinmanship" role by devising compromise formulae at the meetings of Prime Ministers from 1964 until 1966. However, Canada did not take any further initiatives on this racial issue once the immediate threat posed on the association had been defused. Like the Conservatives, it appears that the Liberal administration had a particular interest in preserving the Commonwealth.

The convictions Mr. Pearson shared with other Common-

wealth actors towards the concept of racial equality makes it difficult to ascertain whether they influenced Canadian policy. But African heads of government clearly had an impact on the emphasis that the Commonwealth put on the principle of racial equality by threatening to withdraw their countries from the association if the principle was not put into practice in Rhodesia. Although their dominant numbers did not generate sufficient influence to persuade Britain to take initiatives in its territory which would ensure racial equality, the prospect of the African members' departure did effect repeated compromises at the Prime Ministers' meetings towards that objective. Insofar as it was Lester Pearson who responded to the threat posed to the association by the African members by devising formulae to achieve a consensus, his African colleagues had effected Pearson's mediatory behaviour. Canadian emergency assistance to Zambia and diplomatic representation of Tanzania, when that country broke relations with Britain, were specific cases when Ottawa took initiatives out of respect for its Commonwealth partners. Yet, since the issue at stake ultimately was one which Mr. Pearson was already committed to, his actions in support of the non-white member states and his efforts to ensure that Britain did not sell-out the African Rhodesians may have been taken regardless. Nonetheless, the building of consensus on this racially-charged issue at successive Heads of Government meetings brought Mr. Pearson into close consultations with fellow Commonwealth leaders such as Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere. The understandings and confidences he shared with them likely had some impact

on Canada's Prime Minister. To that extent, it seems reasonable to conclude that Mr. Pearson's attitudes and behaviour on the Rhodesia problem were influenced by his Commonwealth colleagues.

Of course, the Commonwealth Secretary-General also had an interest in redressing racial equality, and took an active part in administering emergency and educational assistance to Zambia and African Rhodesians, and serving as a mediator during collaboration over the Rhodesia issue. Though Arnold Smith was expected to play a neutral role by steering a middle course between the approach taken by London and the one sought in Lusaka, he had an inherent interest in preserving the institution which he represented. Consequently, Mr. Smith travelled to Commonwealth capitals in Central and East Africa during the crises, urging leaders to keep their countries in the association. Since the Secretary-General complemented Canada's intermediary approach, he was often in collaboration with Prime Minister Pearson, particularly before and during the Prime Ministers' meetings in 1966. In fact, Smith and Pearson discussed diplomacy to reduce acrimony and develop consensus among members at these crucial conferences at Lagos and London. In addition, Mr. Smith was able to assist the winning of Pearson's compromise proposals through the tactful allocation of items on the conference agenda and serving as a contact for the Prime Minister with African leaders. As a consequence, the Secretary-General carried some influence on the course of events and Lester Pearson's role in them.

Thus, an ~~examination~~ of Canada's approach towards this issue reveals that it was subject to direct and indirect influences from various Commonwealth actors and from the institution itself.

The purpose of this study is to assess the evolution of Canada's relations with the Commonwealth in the context of issues which were important to the development and preservation of this multifacial association. Hence, it has been necessary to assess the role that Canada has played in the Commonwealth as well as the impact of this institution on Canada's foreign policy.

There has been an extraordinary transformation of Canada's attitude and behaviour towards the Commonwealth from the post-war period until 1968. Mackenzie King perceived the association as a potential threat to Canadian sovereignty due to pressure from some members for an empire policy. Of course, a common Commonwealth policy was out of the question after the admission of the Asian members in 1947, and the St. Laurent government assumed a more open-minded attitude towards Commonwealth involvement. Ottawa became attracted to the idea of developing closer contacts with Commonwealth Asia in order to preempt the extrusion of communist influence and broaden Canada's commercial relations to include that region. Indeed, the early 1950s were a revolutionary development in Canada's relations with Third World countries, beginning with our participation in the Colombo Plan. But whereas the Liberals initially were sensitive to the possibility that Commonwealth structures and programs would

deride the importance of UN activities, during the Diefenbaker era there was a strong pro-Commonwealth push. Under a Conservative government, Canada's new aid programs were exclusive to the Commonwealth, underscoring its interest in that association.

The year 1961 was a watershed in Canadian foreign policy on race relations. Realizing that the Commonwealth was at stake over the question of South African membership, Mr. Diefenbaker took a stand alongside of the Third World members at the Prime Ministers' meeting by challenging the Nationalist government to compromise on its race policy or withdraw from the association. In order to develop a common ground on which agreement could be reached on the Rhodesia issue, Prime Minister Pearson played the role of "helpful-fixer" at successive Heads of Government meetings. Insofar as Canada did not take any further initiatives on the Rhodesia issue once the immediate threat to the Commonwealth was defused, it can be assumed that the Liberals also acted out of a concern to preserve this association.

Thus, Canada's relations with the Commonwealth had evolved dramatically during the years from 1945 until 1968. Successive governments' awareness of development needs and racial inequality constantly broadened as both the Commonwealth and the world at large had their effect on our thinking. Canada's policy was one of responding to changing situations by shaping our attitude and behaviour towards international developments in a way which would serve Canadian interests.

Yet Canada's approach to international relations also served the interests of the Commonwealth.

On each of the issues selected for examination, Commonwealth heads of government appeared to affect the shaping of Canadian thinking and the implementation of policy. But while Canadian perspectives may have been broadened or initiatives taken out of consideration for our Commonwealth partners, most of the attitudes or behaviour came as a result of ideals or objectives that Canada shared in common with its fellow members. In assessing indirect influence, a similar problem arises. Ottawa clearly acted in the best interests of the Commonwealth either to give the institution greater purpose and vitality or to preserve it from dissolution on issues involving racial equality. But in order to use the Commonwealth for negotiating support in matters that concerned Canada, it was in Ottawa's best interests to keep this institution intact. Canada's interests and those of the Commonwealth were similar, and the association was moving in the direction that Ottawa wanted. For example, Canada was attracted to India's continued membership as a republic, and directed the bulk of its aid to Commonwealth countries in the attempt to promote world stability as well as to strengthen Canada's Commonwealth ties. In taking the approach it did towards racial issues in southern Africa, Canada may have enhanced its international prestige while it sustained the Commonwealth as an instrument for continued collaboration with the nations of the Third World.

But if Canadian foreign policy was tailored to the best

interests of Canadians while serving Commonwealth interests, it is reasonable to assume that Canada had broadened its conception of the Canadian "national interest" to embrace the Commonwealth. Whereas Canada contributed much to developing and preserving the multiracial Commonwealth by acting as a middleman during the Indo-British talks leading up to republican membership, by devising and contributing to Commonwealth aid programs, and by acting as a catalyst and then as an intermediary over racial issues, the Commonwealth reciprocally had been an important factor in shaping Canadian attitudes and behaviour. Commonwealth collaboration enlarged our perspectives, enhanced our awareness, and clarified our views and interests. Support for the Commonwealth evidently was compatible with the views of Canadian governments because its multiracial transformation had made this association valuable to a country interested in international cooperation. Consequently, on Commonwealth related issues, Canada acted by taking initiatives, usually in the role of "helpful-fixer" to stimulate and sustain this institution. At the same time, we achieved our policy objectives by preserving the Commonwealth as an instrument of Canadian policy. Thus, Canadian external behaviour became identified as Canadian by virtue of our membership in the Commonwealth. To this extent, the Commonwealth had an impact on Canadian foreign policy.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS
(By April 1968)

Britain	1 July 1867 ¹
Canada	1 January 1901
Australia	26 September 1901
New Zealand	31 May 1910 ²
South Africa	15 August 1947
India	15 August 1947 ³
Pakistan	4 February 1948 ⁴
Ceylon	6 March 1957
Ghana	31 August 1957 ⁵
Malaysia	1 October 1960
Nigeria	13 March 1961
Cyprus	27 April 1961
Sierra Leone	9 December 1961 ⁶
Tanzania	6 August 1962
Jamaica	31 August 1962
Trinidad and Tobago	9 October 1962
Uganda	12 December 1963
Kenya	6 July 1964
Malawi	21 September 1964
Malta	24 October 1964
Zambia	18 February 1965
The Gambia	15 October 1965 ⁷
Singapore	26 May 1966
Guyana	30 September 1966
Botswana	4 October 1966
Lesotho	30 November 1966
Barbados	12 March 1968
Mauritius	

¹ Date of Dominion status

² Withdrew in 1961

³ Withdrew in 1972

⁴ Became a republic (Sri Lanka) in 1972


⁵ The Federation of Malaya until 1965

⁶ Tanganyika until 1964 when it joined with Zanzibar to become the United Republic of Tanzania

⁷ Seceded from the Federation of Malaya in 1965

APPENDIX B

MAP OF THE COMMONWEALTH: 1968



West Indian Associated States
 Antigua, Dominica, Grenada,
 St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla,
 St. Lucia, St. Vincent (not yet
 an Associated State).

The Commonwealth 1968
 [White box with dot] Member States
 [Hatched box with dot] Protectorates and
 Dependencies

(Reproduced from Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, op.cit., p.415)

APPENDIX C

COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETINGS

1944	London	May 1- May 17
1946	London	May 1- May 23
1948	London	October 10- October 22
1949	London	April 21- April 27
1951	London	January 4- January 12
1953	London	June 3- June 9
1955	London	January 31- February 8
1956	London	June 27- July 6
1957	London	June 26- July 5
1960	London	May 3- May 13
1961	London	March 8- March 17
1962	London	September 10- September 19
1964	London	July 8- July 15
1965	London	June 17- June 21
1966	Lagos	January 11- January 12
1966	London	September 6- September 15

APPENDIX D

THOSE PRESENT AT THE 1949 PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING

The Right Hon. C.R. Attlee, M.P., Prime Minister to the United Kingdom (in the Chair)

UNITED KINGDOM

SOUTH AFRICA

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer
The Right Hon. P.J. Noel-Baker, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
Sir Percivale Liesching

Dr. The Hon. D.F. Malan, Prime Minister
Mr. Leif Egeland, High Commissioner in London
Mr. D.D. Forsyth

CANADA

INDIA

The Hon. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs
Dr. R.A. Mackay
Mr. J.D. Kearney

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister
Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, High Commissioner in London
Sir Girja S. Bajpai

AUSTRALIA

PAKISTAN

The Right Hon. J. B. Chifley, Prime Minister
The Right Hon. J. A. Beasley, High Commissioner in London
Dr. J. W. Burton

The Hon. Liaquat Ali Kahn, Prime Minister
Sir Zafrullah Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Mr. Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola, High Commissioner in London
Mr. M. Ikramullah

NEW ZEALAND

CEYLON

The Right Hon. Peter Fraser, Prime Minister
The Right Hon. W. J. Jordan, High Commissioner in London
Mr. A.D. McIntosh

The Hon. D.S. Senanayake, Prime Minister
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, High Commissioner in London
Mr. K. Vaithianathan

APPENDIX E

FINAL COMMUNIQUE : 1949 PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING

During the past week the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs have met in London to exchange views upon the important constitutional issues arising from India's decision to adopt a republican form of constitution and her desire to continue her membership of the Commonwealth.

The discussions have been concerned with the effects of such a development upon the existing structure of the Commonwealth and the constitutional relations between its members. They have been conducted in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding, and have had as their historical background the traditional capacity of the Commonwealth to strengthen its unity of purpose, while adapting its organisation and procedures to changing circumstances.

After full discussion the representatives of the government of all the Commonwealth countries have agreed that the conclusions reached should be placed on record in the following declaration:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, whose countries are united as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and owe a common allegiance to the Crown, which is also the symbol of their free association, have considered the impending constitutional changes in India. The Government of India have informed the other governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Indian people that under the new constitution which is about to be adopted India shall become a sovereign independent republic. The Government of India have, however, declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The King as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations, and as such the Head of the Commonwealth.

The governments of the other countries of the Commonwealth, the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth is not hereby changed, accept and recognise India's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this declaration.

Accordingly the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare that they remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely cooperating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.

These constitutional questions have been the sole subject of discussion at the full meetings of prime ministers.

APPENDIX F

LEADERS PRESENT AT THE 1961 PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, Q.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada

The Right Hon. Robert G. Menzies, Q.C., Prime Minister of Australia

The Right Hon. Keith J. Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand

Dr. The Hon. H.F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa

Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India

Field-Marshal Mohammad Ayub Kahn, President of Pakistan

Senator The Hon. Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon

The Hon. Ako Adjei, Minister of External Affairs, Ghana

Yang Teramat Mulia Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Al-Haj, Prime Minister of Malaya

The Hon Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria

The Right Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

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APPENDIX G

THE PHANTOM COMMUNIQUE : 1961 PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING

The Prime Ministers recalled their decision of last year that a change from a Monarchical to a Republican form of government is an internal matter solely for decision by the country concerned, and recalled that India, Pakistan and Ghana were admitted[sic] as members of the Commonwealth when they adopted Republican constitutions. They agreed that following these precedents this constitutional change was no bar to South Africa's remaining a member of the Commonwealth after becoming a republic on May 31.

THE RACIAL QUESTION

The Prime Ministers also discussed the racial policy followed by the South African Government. It is an established convention that at these meetings matters falling within the internal jurisdiction of a member country are not discussed without the consent of that country. On this occasion, however, the Prime Minister of South Africa agreed to a discussion of the racial policy of the Union Government. In the course of a full discussion the other Prime Ministers strongly criticised and deplored this policy which appeared to them to involve a substantial measure of racial discrimination. They stressed the anxiety to which they felt it was giving rise in the hearts and minds of millions of people throughout the world and expressed their deep concern about its impact on the relations between the member countries of the Commonwealth and on the cohesion of the Commonwealth itself as a multi-racial association. The view was strongly expressed that this policy was inconsistent with the basic ideals on which the unity and influence of the Commonwealth rest (and with the Charter of the United Nations). The other Prime Ministers further affirmed their belief that, for all Commonwealth Governments, it should be an objective of policy to build in their countries a structure of society which offers equality of opportunity for all, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA


The Prime Minister of South Africa stressed the positive aspects of the racial policy of the Union Government and deplored the accusations of racial discrimination levelled against South Africa by member countries, which he alleged were themselves guilty of such practices. He expressed the view that the development of proper relations between members of the Commonwealth could only be impaired if they attempted to interfere with one another's domestic affairs instead of concentrating on co-operation in matters of common concern.

While no basic ideals for the Commonwealth had been formulated or deemed desirable he suggested that, if formulated, one of these should be the observance of democratic principles,

in which case the present policies of some member countries might be said to constitute a serious threat to the unity and influence of the Commonwealth.


The Prime Minister of South Africa said that he was not prepared to accept that the Charter of the United Nations should be invoked when dealing with Commonwealth affairs. He stated his conviction that in South Africa the policy of separate development remains the only way of ensuring full opportunities for all, irrespective of race, colour or creed, whereas any form of integrated society would become a source of strife or injustice to one or other population group and should not be an objective of policy.

After hearing this statement by the Prime Minister of South Africa the other Prime Minister reaffirmed [their views as stated above].



APPENDIX H

MAP OF SOUTH-EASTERN AFRICA IN 1965



(Reproduced from Wilson, Labour Government,
op.cit., p, 145)

APPENDIX I

SURVEY OF PUBLISHED WORKS RELATED TO THIS STUDY

There are some useful sources for examining the evolution of the multiracial Commonwealth. These writings suggest that as the association changed to accommodate non-white and then republican membership, new expectations also would evolve. It was inevitable that such ideals would be more compatible with the changing character of the Commonwealth, and it was improbable that the old Dominions would remain unaffected by the aspirations of the new members.

Frederic Soward edited and compiled the papers presented at the fourth unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference to produce The Changing Commonwealth (1950). The book stresses the interest of Asian members in a Commonwealth initiative for providing development assistance. In The Multi-Racial Commonwealth (1955), Nicholas Mansergh reported on the fifth Commonwealth Relations Conference by suggesting that the multiracial composition of the association was having some impact on its values inasmuch as the views of the Asian representatives expressed concern about colonial issues, and especially about South Africa's apartheid policy. Frank Underhill addresses the changing character of the association due to Asian membership in The British Commonwealth (1956), and perceptively notes that the purpose of the society could no longer be found in its relationship with the Crown, but with developing interests and ideals consistent with a multiracial association. Some of these developments, such as India's

admission to the Commonwealth, the emergence of the Colombo Plan and South Africa's apartheid policy, were considered in Nicholas Mansergh's Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952 (1958).

Among the many studies of the constitutional status of the Commonwealth, K. G. Wheare's The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (1960) is the most succinct. By surveying the transformation of the association since 1947, the author explains the declining importance of the principle of non-interference. Two subsequent books which describe the changing nature of the Commonwealth in constitutional terms as well as the limitations of a multiracial association are J. E. S. Fawcett's The British Commonwealth in International Law (1963) and S. A. deSmith's The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (1964).

Two works in the 1960s espoused contradictory views as to the responsibility for the growth of the multiracial Commonwealth, although both authors considered the association to be a valuable organ to bridge global racial and economic differences. The Post-War Transformation of the Commonwealth (1963) estimates the significance of India's presence in the society. Indeed, M. S. Rajan expounds on the revolutionary effect of the Asian membership as a rebuttal to Patrick Gordon Walker's The Commonwealth (1962). Walker has, less convincingly, conceived the multiracial association to be a natural post-war phenomena which was inevitable with or without the Asian membership. In The Commonwealth Experience (1969), Nicholas Mansergh has examined the multiracial character of the society.

The dean of Commonwealth scholars considers the "association of partnership" as having contributed to the decolonization of an empire, but he makes no judgment as to whether it can function successfully as an instrument to promote racial equality and economic equity.

Writings on Canadian external aid essentially indicate that Canada's Commonwealth membership had a substantial influence on Ottawa's decision to provide aid to developing countries. Perhaps seeking to gain some identifiable Canadian impact through its development assistance program caused Canada to direct its aid almost exclusively to Commonwealth developing nations. Regardless, it is evident in several of the studies that the association may have affected the direction of Canadian aid contributions, at least until 1963.

The purpose and development of Canada's external aid policy has received attention in some single-volume works, but primarily in journal articles. Writing in the International Journal, some scholars took an early look at economic, political and humanitarian forces in development assistance. In "Canada's External Assistance Programme" (Summer 1954), Douglas Anglin considered economics to be the foremost consideration in giving aid, and with some foresight, argues that Canada's emphasis should be on trade rather than aid. Grant Reuber believes that motives for granting aid are mixed, but properly notes in "Why Canadian Foreign Aid" (Winter 1958-59), that Canada assists developing nations to maintain its international respectability.

There have been several books written exclusively on Canadian external aid: Arghyrios Faturios and Robert Kelson, Canada's Overseas' Aid (1964); Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? (1966); Clyde Sanger, Half a Loaf (1969). Faturios and Kelson extend Reuber's interpretation of Canada's aid rationale by submitting that aid may be politically oriented as far as the government is concerned, interpreted as economically viable for the sake of business, and translated in terms of Humanitarianism for the public's benefit. Spicer provides a thorough assessment of Canadian external aid policy, and concludes that assistance was allocated to prevent Canada from losing esteem. Sanger has surveyed Canadian assistance projects in various parts of the world, and considers Canada to be a donor of aid basically because the international community expects it to be.

More recent essays that are advantageous to the study of Canada's aid policy include: Grant Reuber, "The Trade-offs Among the Objectives of Canadian Foreign Aid," International Journal (Winter 1969-70); Stephen Triantis, "Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid," World Politics (October 1971); Clyde Sanger, "Canada and Development in the Third World in Canada and the Third World, op. cit. Triantis re-examines Canada's motives as a donor which he sums up as partially philanthropic, seldom economic, and most often political - to maintain its good image in the world community. In an insightful essay, Reuber exposes how Canada's motives for extending aid affects the quality of assistance it gives. Sanger provides an incisive

evaluation of Canada's performance as a donor with explicit recommendations for improved efficiency.

There are several works which provide a good overview of Canada's role in compelling South Africa to withdraw from the Commonwealth. They suggest that Mr. Diefenbaker responded to the needs of the Commonwealth in his vigorous support of the concept of racial equality.

Gordon Walker's "Policy for the Commonwealth" in Fabian International Essays (edd. T. McKittrick and E. Younger, 1957) briefly looks into the future of anglophone Africa. Though Walker anticipates that these countries may join the association because it respects each member on an equal and independent basis, he forecasts a clash between the convention of non-interference and the concept of racial equality. In a like manner, Dennis Austin speculates on the implications for future African Commonwealth membership, and projects the adjustments requisite to their becoming members in West Africa and the Commonwealth (1957).

Writings which make an appreciation of the influence of the African membership on the Commonwealth are: John Holmes, "The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa," International Organization, (Spring 1962), and Ali Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth (1967). Both writers note that along with an African dimension to the Commonwealth, there came more urgent introspection as to the purpose of the association. Mazrui claims that African influence in the society necessitated the recognition of racial equality as the fundamental principle. For Holmes, the African emergence

caused the trans-regional association to function more as a bridge across world racial and economic differences.

Three works are invaluable for examining South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth: Bruce Miller, "South Africa's Departure," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (Nov. 1961); Peter Harnetty, "Canada, South Africa and the Commonwealth," ibid. (November 1963); Robert Wagenburg, Commonwealth Reactions to South Africa's Racial Policy, Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics (1966). Wagenburg's historical study describes member states' attitudes towards the Union's racist behaviour from that country's origin until its inevitable departure in 1961. Miller's article gives a fairly accurate account of events at the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting, while Harnetty presents an analysis of South Africa's withdrawal. Unfortunately, Harnetty fails to focus enough on Mr. Diefenbaker's values, which may have been a crucial factor in shaping Canada's decisive role at the 1961 meeting.

Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's One Canada II (1976) is the most insightful presentation of Mr. Diefenbaker's role leading up to South Africa's withdrawal from the association. The Prime Minister was clearly concerned about the possibility that the Commonwealth might disintegrate over the racial issue, and advocated the recognition of the multiracial concept in the best interests of the association. Among the memoirs of other Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Sir Robert Menzies' Afternoon Light (1967) reveals the Australian leader's correspondence with Dr. Verwoerd during 1960 and 1961, and Harold Macmillan's Pointing the Way (1972) offers a brief

account of the proceedings at the Prime Ministers' meetings during these years.

The general impression derived from works which examine Canada's approach towards the Rhodesia issue is that Prime Minister Pearson found the Commonwealth valuable for shaping Canadian policy. Consequently, Pearson repeatedly played the role as an intermediary between the British and African members to prevent the dissolution of that association.

Several sources were helpful in developing an appreciation of events in Southern Rhodesia immediately before and after UDI. Two articles, one written by Cranford Pratt, "African Reactions to the Rhodesian Crises," International Journal (Spring 1966) and the other by the same author and Clyde Sanger, "Towards Justice in Rhodesia," in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada, ed. Stephen Clarkson (1966), review the constitutional basis of racial inequality in this self-governing colony. Whereas James Barber argues in Rhodesia, Road to Rebellion (1967) that Harold Wilson did everything possible to effect a just solution in Rhodesia, Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence (1967), contends that negotiations between Britain and its territory foundered because the Labour government placed too much emphasis on the need for majority rule. In The High Price of Principles (1969), Richard Hall offers another interpretation of British policy towards its colony by concluding that the Wilson government continually manipulated Commonwealth African members as well as African Rhodesians to serve its own political interests.

In James Barber's "The Impact of the Rhodesian Crises on

the Commonwealth, "Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (July 1969), it is argued that the divisiveness among members over the Rhodesia issue has made the Commonwealth an ideological rather than an historical society. While Barber describes the lack of consensus at Heads of Government meetings due to the Rhodesia question, Harold Wilson's The Labour Government, 1964-1970 (1971) provides some details as to the approach of the actors involved in collaboration, and his impressions as to the reasons for their differences. The most thorough treatment of the early years of the Rhodesia issue is in Survey of Commonwealth Affairs (1974). Bruce Miller has examined the historical background to the racial problem, and presents a well-balanced account of the proceedings at Prime Ministers' meetings. An inside view from a Canadian perspective on the meetings of 1964 and 1966 is found in Lester Pearson's memoirs, Mike III (1975). It is apparent that the Prime Minister's concern for the preservation of the Commonwealth led him on these occasions to play the role of "helpful-fixer" by mediating between members' differences which threatened to destroy the association.

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