

**THE BRITISH NORTHERN INTERIOR**  
**FRONTIER OF DEFENCE**

**THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH  
NORTHERN INTERIOR FRONTIER OF DEFENCE  
DURING  
THE HALDIMAND REVOLUTIONARY WAR ADMINISTRATION  
OF QUEBEC,  
1778-1782.**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study examines the geography of the British Interior Frontier of Defence, between the colony of Quebec and the rebel colonies of America, during the Revolutionary War administration of Sir Frederick Haldimand (1778-1782). The study has three aims: firstly, to map the location of the frontier, secondly, to identify its essential characteristics and thirdly, to describe its defence administration. A reconstruction approach has been taken in order to uncover the geographical elements of the frontier as perceived by eighteenth-century administrators.

To a large extent the identification of the interior frontier of defence was made from primary source material, chiefly the Haldimand Papers and historic maps. One research problem was the matching of primary source locations with modern maps and field identification.

The defence frontier, unlike the pre-conquest frontier of Eccles, was a frontier of the colony of Quebec, which exhibited several characteristics. Firstly, it was a zone of tension as with a marchland, being organized on a semi-permanent military basis. Secondly, it was sparsely settled thus limiting the amount of provisions that could be generated for defensive activities. Thirdly, its military government was imposed from outside, giving rise not only to distance decay and the diminishment of central power, but also to reactions from frontier settlers who wished to govern themselves. Fourthly, the degree of administrative control necessary to administer frontier defence precluded the operation of lawlessness and anarchy, postulated by Turner for his frontier. Fifthly, the frontier exhibited both integrating and separating characteristics, depending on the volatile political allegiances within it. Sixthly, the frontier did not exhibit a well-defined line of confrontation, although there was a general accordance with colonial frontier forts and settlements, with arteries of travel, and with the Upper Post administrative centers.

The British imperial administration of the frontier was based on two major policy directives: the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act of 1774. However, due to the exigencies of war, the Quebec Act was never fully instituted along the Upper Post administrative chain and the defence frontier.

The defence frontier was governed by the Upper Posts of Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac, with Quebec and Montreal as the command headquarters for the colony as a whole. It was administered chiefly through the Military and Indian Departments, which instituted



policy for frontier defence. Defence activities, chiefly campaigns, raids and scouts, were concentrated on the Mohawk Valley, the Delaware and Susquehanna Rivers, Fort Pitt and the Allegheny River, the Ohio and its tributaries and the Illinois. Due to the problem of provisioning military activities during the War of Revolution the geography of the interior frontier of defence was largely delimited by provisioning sites such as forts, settlements, forge and mill sites and agricultural areas.

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## PREFACE

The Haldimand Papers were selected as the primary source material for this study for several reasons. Firstly, Sir Frederick Haldimand (1718-1791) was the administrator of the Interior Frontier of Defence during the latter part of the War of Revolution and as such his papers are of primary concern.

Haldimand had long administrative experience in North America. From the time of his arrival from Europe in 1756 he served in both military and civil postings at Philadelphia, Ticonderoga (Lake Champlain), Saratoga or Fort Edward (near the upper Hudson), Oswego on Lake Ontario, Montreal, Three Rivers (Quebec), Pensacola (Florida), New York, and Quebec. At the last three of these postings, he served respectively as Commander of the Southern District, as acting Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in North America, and as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the colony of Quebec. His papers document a consistent administrative agenda at these postings, based on imperialist and military principles. However, during his administration of the Interior Frontier of Defence, his military agenda took precedence over civil matters in order to concentrate on retaining Canada in the British imperialist regime.

Haldimand's methodical approach to administration can be seen in the application of similar policies at all his postings. His scheme of agriculture, in which gardens and crops were planted to help maintain the self-sufficiency of the military posts, was instituted at Fort Edwards, Oswego, Three Rivers, Pensacola, and along the Great Lakes administrative line in Canada. His building program, in which buildings were rejuvenated and kept in adequate repair for defensive purposes, was likewise instituted at these posts. He also concentrated on water purity and on improving river transportation through the building of canals. His policies on the defensibility of the posts were identifiable throughout his administration: the guiding principle being that each post must at all times be in a position to repel invasion, whether by Indians or by rebel colonists. One policy that did, however, receive a change in emphasis was that concerning the encouragement of the fur trade in the interior. During his governorship of Quebec, Haldimand downplayed its importance in favour of military defensibility and of preserving the interior in the interests of the British imperial government. The impact of this emphasis on the fur trade deserves further study.

Secondly, due to this methodical administrative approach, his papers provide a fairly complete source of documentation on his Quebec administration. The number of letters and documents that he retained in his possession can be assessed through at least one method: that of noting missing copies in his numbered correspondence. Colonial record-keeping was based upon numbered correspondence, which commenced with number one on the first day of assuming office. Furthermore, correspondence was in either duplicate, triplicate, quadruplicate or greater, depending not only on the level of administration to which it was directed (local correspondence often being only in duplicate) but also on such factors as the importance or sensitivity of the subject matter, its applicability within the system, the number of scribes used to copy it, and, during the War of

Revolution, the possibility of its interception by the enemy. As many of the colonial administrators retained these copies in their files, the researcher has an additional source of verification. With respect to both the completeness of the numbered correspondence and the accuracy of duplicated copies in other collections, such as the Gage and Shelburne Papers, the Haldimand Papers suggest a high degree of reliability in terms of providing a verifiable research source for Haldimand's revolutionary war administration.

Thirdly, an attempt was made to confine the research to an in-depth study of the Haldimand Papers, in order to reconstruct the geography of the Interior Frontier of Defence as accurately as possible. Due to the wide coverage of subject matter in each individual piece of correspondence, important material and the "flavour" of the historical period could be overlooked in a hasty reading. This approach therefore answers in part the criticism that reconstruction research does not adequately represent the historic period because of the intrusion of the twentieth century milieu.

The study was based on the microfilm copies of the Haldimand Papers assembled by the British Library in 1977. The reels, housed in McMaster University Library, are numbered from one to one hundred and fifteen, and are based on the catalogue of Additional Manuscripts (numbered 21661-21892) acquired by the British Museum in 1857. Unfortunately, in assembling this collection the sketch maps and other map and data documentation were microfilmed separately from the letters in which they were enclosed, making it difficult for the researcher to verify the data and maps with the letters and official correspondence. Thus their relationship must be assumed.

Several problems were encountered using historic maps for this study. Firstly, with reference to their reproduction, the legibility of the original maps determined that of their facsimiles, especially after reduction. Some of the originals were up to three or four feet in size, and their reduction became a major research problem. As well, the lettering and symbols of a historic map are often unfamiliar to the reader, thus making the problem of legibility even more acute. For these reasons, most of the maps in the study have been hand-reproduced by the author.

Secondly, as many of the maps were originals, accessibility to them, particularly in terms of reproduction, was delimited by the regulations and reproduction methodology of the map libraries that held them. Cost was a primary factor in limiting the reproduction of the original maps.

Thirdly, the location of the maps was dispersed over a wide geographic area. This made it difficult, both in terms of time and expense, to gain access to them. It also placed pressure on the scholar to select and reproduce maps quickly and later limited access for rechecking.

Fourthly, it was difficult to verify maps in the Haldimand Papers accurately for reasons mentioned earlier. The removal of maps from their context is a major problem in historical research.

Despite these problems, the author felt it was important, especially in a reconstruction approach, to base the identification of the Interior Frontier of Defence on eighteenth-century maps. This provides the reader with a much fuller understanding of the geography of the eighteenth century as interpreted through the original material.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of the discipline of geography there has been a continuing fascination with the concept of the frontier. Interest in the concept peaked in the late 60's and early 70's with an attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of this somewhat intangible geographical phenomenon in comparison with the specificity of a legally defined boundary.

The dictionary definition of a frontier as either that part of a country that borders on another, or as the 'border' of civilization or knowledge, was seen to be inadequate.<sup>1</sup> As a means of identifying its essential characteristics, research focussed on the relationship of a frontier to a marchland. The marchland concept, as a tract of often disputed land lying between two countries,<sup>2</sup> or as an area "of the frontier organized on semi-permanent military lines to defend the state,"<sup>3</sup> seemed to provide some insights into the nature of the frontier. The linkage between marches and military defense was stressed in Wilkinson's study of the Yugoslav Kosmet area of the Balkan peninsula.<sup>4</sup>

Bailyn, quoted in Nobles, attempted a more concrete description of a march by arguing that it was "a periphery, a ragged outer margin of a central world, a regressive, backward-looking diminishment of metropolitan accomplishment."<sup>5</sup> This accorded with the concept of a frontier as a periphery or 'border' of civilization but it placed the march firmly under the sovereignty of a state, although it was a "diminishment" of its central authority. Bowman, in the

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<sup>1</sup>Endnotes for this thesis are found at the conclusion of each chapter.

1920's, also allied a frontier with the marchland concept in that he talked of it as a "line of defense." "Frontiers" he stated "are indeed a razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death for nations."<sup>6</sup> Thus he suggested that if their sovereignty was poorly defined they could become the source of political conflict and continuing disharmony between contending states.

In an attempt to define its sovereign status De Blij argued that a frontier was an ill-defined area lying beyond the integrated part of the state as exemplified by the American frontier.<sup>7</sup> However it did allow room for the expansion of the state in much the same way as Turner, quoted in Glassner and De Blij, hypothesised that the frontier permitted a 'safety valve' of expansion for its institutions and population.<sup>8</sup> This definition accorded with the Middle English and early French concept of a 'frountier' or 'frontiere' respectively, as a boundary or area along it: a region just beyond or at the edge of a settled area, or an undeveloped area with few indications of sovereign status. However the Roman frontier or 'frons,'<sup>9</sup> as portrayed in Burghardt's study on Pannonia, the Burgenland region of the Austro-Hungarian empire, was under the sovereignty of the Roman Empire. This old Roman frontier was well organized, with key military posts for its defense. Its continuation depended on Roman military and economic prowess achieved by access to routes of communication, particularly the water route of the Danube. Outside of the frontier to the north lay the lands of barbarian tribes, viewed by the Romans in much the same way as the Indians' lands were viewed by the settlers of North America. Ever mindful of their possible encroachment, the Romans established the town of Carnuntum to serve as a military garrison, and as the visible evidence of the sovereignty of Rome. However the town also served a gateway function for trade conducted with the barbarians.<sup>10</sup> Louis De Vorsey emphasised this gateway function in his study on the Indian boundary in the southern colonies of America, by arguing that the frontier presented a

meeting-ground between the Indians, who did understand the concept of a formal and legal boundary line, and the British. Nobles commented that this involved a “protracted process of cultural exchange.”<sup>11</sup> Stilgoe also saw the frontier as a meeting place for such differentials as the known and unknown, the civilized and uncivilized, the settled area and the wilderness, and between different economic activities, such as between farming and the fur trade.<sup>12</sup> The famous frontier thesis of Turner further emphasised the Roman concept of “savagery meeting civilization,” and East, quoted in De Blij, stressed both the gateway and the defensive aspects of the Roman frontier by hypothesising that frontiers could serve either the function of contact or separation.<sup>13</sup>

More recently, Gregory Nobles has argued that the frontier is a “cultural construct that has meaning largely in ethnocentric terms.” His thesis is that there was a common back-country culture distinct from, and generally in conflict with, that of the eastern seaboard.<sup>14</sup> If this is accepted then during the American War of Revolution the frontiersmen fought on two fronts: not only against British imperialism but also against the rebel cause in the eastern seaboard colonies. There is evidence, from contemporary documents of the day, to support this unity of frontier culture, particularly with respect to reactions to the British policy of limiting settlement in the Indian country, and reports of republican fervour in the Illinois.

Other theories of frontiers also have concepts pertinent to this study. Meinig’s point/path concept and ‘distance-decay’ are particularly useful. The point/path concept postulates a system of interaction between America and Europe and within America itself, comprising “points of attachment” joined by strands of communication, based on a “sequence of increasing magnitude of change.”<sup>15</sup> Thus it is a hierarchical territorial system of geographical linkages, in a generally diminishing scale from Europe to the frontier. In the context of a “revolt of a periphery against the center,” as in the



American war of Revolution, Meinig argued that distance, in terms of at least 3,000 miles of ocean, became a major factor. Distance was not to be measured simply in miles “but in time and costs, in reaction time to directives from the center, in the need to delegate authority to imperial officials operating in the provinces, in the inevitable disparity in perceptions between centre and periphery as to problems and needs, issues and opportunities.” He quoted Edmund Burke who stated to the English Parliament at the time, that “In large bodies, the circulation of power must be less vigorous at the extremities .... This is the immutable connection, the eternal law, of extensive and detached empire.” This statement thus linked the concept of distance decay with a point/path “circulation” and Bailyn’s “diminishment” of power at the frontier. Meinig argued therefore that the geography of empire was critical in understanding distance decay: such as the patterns of population and resources, the trunklines and networks of civilization and the points of strategic control. In order to minimize its negative effects the imperial government must establish a logistical system “for the efficient application” of power, which was in itself expensive and tended to lead to a concentration of power on areas regarded as key points, in terms of such factors as defence and administration. This logistical system however was vulnerable in that it could be interrupted by rebel control of centers, particularly on the frontier, thus undoing acculturation rather than promoting the process of integration.<sup>16</sup>

Prescott concentrated on sovereignty along a frontier zone with his concept of political frontiers. He argued that political frontiers indicate sovereign jurisdiction.<sup>17</sup> However it can be argued that this form of sovereignty would be limited in geographical scope, simplified in administrative structure (although it may be based upon a complex administrative system), and ephemeral through time: an argument which supports Meinig’s emphasis on distance decay.

Jackson in 1962 focussed on a very dynamic zonal interpretation of a frontier by arguing for three frontier zones as exemplified by the Russo/Chinese borderlands: namely, the zone of contact, the zone of tension, and the zone of stabilization or cooperation.<sup>18</sup> The first two zones had strong marchland connotations and both were in evidence along the northern frontier during the War of Independence in America. The zone of contact could have negative or positive connotations in terms of either military aggression or friendly intercourse through trade. However contact may not occur equally, or have the same connotations, over all parts of the zone, and thus could be seen as either a point of contact, a line of contact, or the whole zone as a unit. Along the Northern Canadian frontier this contact occurred between such different political systems as the British, French, rebel Colonial, and Indian. Boggs was aware of differences in the political loyalties of frontier dwellers and suggested that the frontier dweller's political loyalty to his government may be modified by political conflict and a proximity to the other side.<sup>19</sup>

These studies however, while isolating factors apparently common to many frontiers and thus relevant to this study, fail in themselves to present a comprehensive theory on the nature of a frontier, particularly a frontier of defence. A comprehensive approach was attempted by three scholars: namely Frederick Jackson Turner, W. J. Eccles and Ladis Kristov. Their now classic theories provided the springboard for much of the modern research on the frontier. Turner and Eccles used a case-study approach to the problem while Kristov used a theoretical approach.

The Turner thesis, which was written in response to the official closing of the American frontier of settlement in 1890, proposed a westward advance along a single line into an area of

“free land” during which there was a continual renewal of American social development. However, although hypothesised as a continual advancement of settlement, the Turner thesis incorporated European ideas on the stages of development of a country, and thus propounded a theory built upon successive waves of frontiers from the Atlantic, via the Indian fur-trader, hunter, cattle-raiser, and pioneer farmer, to the west.<sup>20</sup> Each successive frontier line became an outer edge of a wave in which European civilization met the Indian. This confrontation was hypothesised to take place in an area of “free land”, a concept which totally ignored any claims of Indian sovereignty. However, Turner was forced to admit that the French and English traders gave the Indians guns, thus increasing their “power of resistance to the farming frontier.” Furthermore they provided forts which according to Duquesne, placed the Indians at a military advantage in their own territories. These frontier garrisons ran counter to Turner’s postulation of the “openness” of the frontier to all. The association of forts with frontiers in the North American context was clearly delineated by Alden in his discussion of the southern colonial frontier. He emphasised that the British Indian policy prior to the Seven Years War (1756 - 1763) included the erection of forts as centers of English influence and trade, and later to repel French aggression, a policy that was supported by Governor Haldimand while commander of the Southern District at Pensacola.<sup>21</sup> Turner also noted that the westward progression was unequal, being held back not only by Indian resistance but also by such geographical considerations as the need to find passable valleys, mountain notches and desirable land.<sup>22</sup> This ignores the influence of government policy in holding back the advance of settlement to the west.

The Eccles study (1969) on the administration of the Canadian frontier prior to 1760, sought to compare the Canadian experience with that of the American West. It postulated that the French colonial experiment in Canada was a frontier experience different to the American west in that Canada itself was a frontier. The Canadian frontier accorded with a line of

administrative posts and settlement along the St. Lawrence River and to a much lesser extent around the Great Lakes. Thus it was a frontier at the “outer limits of European civilization” unlike the American west which was the frontier of the Atlantic seaboard. However this was merely a distinction of scale in that Turner argued that as his frontier progressed the territories left behind manifested frontier characteristics, even those along the Atlantic, which could be said to be a frontier of Europe. Eccles further argued that a principal difference between the two theories was that in Canada the frontiersmen, particularly the voyageurs, kept returning to the main body of the colony: either Montreal or Quebec.<sup>23</sup> However the Haldimand Papers suggest a strong liaison between the American West and the Atlantic and a close relationship, at least during the War of Revolution, of the interior frontier of defence with the command posts back east. However one significant difference in approach between the frontiers of Turner and Eccles is that Turner argued for a frontier of occupation, based on the activities of the frontiersmen, which tended to individualise the frontier experience. On the other hand Eccles postulated a frontier based on function: namely commercial, religious, settlement, imperial and military. This had the effect of institutionalizing the frontier, an approach which has considerable relevance to this present study.

The Kristov study (1959) postulated five characteristics of a frontier: it was not a legal concept, it was the result of spontaneous growth of the oecumene, it was outer-oriented resulting from a manifestation of centrifugal forces,<sup>24</sup> it was an integrating not a separating factor and it was characteristic of rudimentary socio-political relations. Kristov argued that the frontier was not a legal concept with respect to its having definitive boundaries created by a political system. It was rather a phenomenon of the “facts of life” resulting from the spontaneous growth of the oecumene. However this ignores the sovereign jurisdictions of states over frontiers in a manner reminiscent of the Roman ‘limes.’ Such frontiers could be tied in with Lapradelle’s political

frontiers.<sup>25</sup> Burghardt's Burgenland study has relevance to the argument of the manifestation of centrifugal forces on the frontier in that it suggests that the military prowess of Carnuntum was more inner-oriented to Roman authority than outer-oriented to the barbarians, unless with respect to trade: such trade pursuits being described by De Blij as "a coveted prize."<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, Lattimore argued that the centers of gravity for controlling these forces were different on each side of a frontier.<sup>27</sup> For example, in Burgenland the barbarian centres of gravity were widely dispersed because of the tribal organizations they represented, while in the Roman Empire they were more concentrated in military garrison outposts that were dependant on the central government. Thus one would expect centripetal forces to operate on the Roman side of the frontier and centrifugal forces on the barbarian side.

However the argument for centripetal vs. centrifugal forces also depends on such factors as the nature of the frontier and the degree of, and competition for, administrative control, as well as the closeness of these centres of gravity to the frontier. During the American War of Independence both centripetal and centrifugal forces were operating along the Canadian frontier of defence. On the one hand there was the pull of the British administration, as exemplified by its favours, presents, or provisions to the Indians, to buy loyalty, while on the other push factors (centrifugal) were operating to encourage frontiersmen to support their family and friends in a bid for independence. Thus the frontier had two faces: one inward and one outward-looking.

The concept of opposing forces within a frontier can be likened to a military combat zone or a battlefield. In a meteorological sense this would represent the interface between air masses at different temperatures producing a line of tension similar to the line of friction produced when two geological plates are shearing against one another. Such a line of friction or

'shear' is reminiscent of the dynamic political tension along the U.S./Canada frontier during the American war of Revolution.

The government, or administration, of frontiers, contested areas, or peripheral areas, has been largely ignored by scholars. Eccles study stands as the definitive work on the administration of the Canadian frontier, prior to the conquest of French Canada by the British, while Severance's work on the 'Old Frontier' of France focusses specifically on the Niagara frontier.<sup>28</sup> Both Bowler and Curtis discussed the administration of the War of Revolution and the British army in America, but largely ignored the administration of the Northern frontier during the war.<sup>29</sup> This study aims to remedy this omission.

Frontiers present special problems in administration. Governments must either create new policies for, or adapt existing ones to, their needs, often during periods of political stress. As well, frontiers are usually geographically distant from their centres of government, and policies created for their administration can suffer from a diminishing relevance, proportionate to the accessibility of the frontier to the centres of administration. This phenomenon of distance decay was at the root of the administration of the northern interior frontier of defence during the Haldimand administration.

The northern interior frontier of defence, under the sovereignty of Britain, was actively contested during the American War of Independence, and as such its administration was not a 'normal' representation of the British colonial government administration. The circumstances of war, and the isolation of the frontier meant that established, or newly created policy, such as the Quebec Act, was shelved in order to concentrate on military policies more relevant to the milieu

of war. Due to this concentration on the administration of frontier defence, the frontier will be identified by such defence activities as military campaigns, raids, and scoutings. It is recognized however, that the frontier was not only the locale for defence activities but sustained the fur trade throughout the War of Revolution.

This study of the defence frontier between Quebec and the rebel colonies will attempt to identify specific points of defence contact between the Quebec British and the rebels, chiefly in the colonies of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. It is expected that this will not present a static geography of points and areas and their linkages but will indicate a "moving line" or 'zone' of friction in response to the British administrative policies relevant to frontier defence. It is also expected that such a line of defence will be located further south than the main centres of administration of Quebec, namely Quebec, Montreal, Carleton Island, Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac. It is argued that because of the locational distance between administrative centres and their arena of defence, the administration of the defence frontier was subject to such problems as the lack of adequate communication and a limited identification of the policy makers with the topography, culture, and defence problems of the frontier.

The frontier itself will be identified by documented places of contact between the British and rebels during campaigns, raids and scoutings, and the supply lines and linkages between these places and the points of administration and control. Its administration will be identified by the types and location of the political institutions and departments that governed its defence, and the number and location of administrative personnel. The intrusion of revolutionary influences will also be considered, such as the location of disaffected traders and Indians, and the location of rebel supply lines and cells of resistance to the British Crown.

Niagara was a key point in the colonial administrative line because of its location as the “most central point” for the colonial supply line into the interior and, apart from Quebec, as the chief military administrative center for the defence frontier. The defence frontier was connected to the administration line by a series of predominantly north/south linkages, with this spatial framework representing the ‘effective’ limit of British control along the frontier.

‘Distance Decay,’ or the increasing loss of administrative effectiveness over distance, proportionate to locational accessibility, was a significant factor in both the creation and maintenance of the frontier and its administration. This was in part a response to the British jurisdiction which entered Quebec from England as a flow force from the east, as shown on Figure 1.1. The strongest impact of this jurisdictional force was at Quebec (town), with a gradual (or possibly abrupt) weakening along the paths of contact running predominantly westward from this point. At connecting points there was a resurgence of part of the initial impact strength but this tended to diminish with distance, depending on the importance and accessibility of each administrative point, as shown in Figure 1.2.

The defence frontier, consisting of both an inner and outer edge, was both dynamic and expansionary. As shown in Figure 1.3 the outer edge faced the rebelling colonies and was the effective limit of the defensive edge of British administrative control. The inner edge faced the line of administration along the Great Lakes. The western extremity of the frontier, as in the Turner model, blended into the wilderness.






Figure 1.1. A Diagram Showing the Flow of Administrative Force from England to Quebec, a Force Which is Influenced by Distance Decay as Shown by the Broad Arrow at the Top of the Diagram.




Figure1.2. A Symbolic Diagram Showing Relative Administrative Point Importance Along the Great Lakes Defence Administrative Line. The Shaded Areas Represent a Degree of Loss of Initial Impact Strength from the Point of Entry of British Administrative Control.




Figure 1.3. A Diagram of the Frontier with the Inner and Outer Edge Facing the British and Rebel Administrative Centres Respectively.

The British defence frontier can also be seen as the edge of the rebelling forces. It thus overlay colonial frontiers, Indian territorial jurisdictions, areas of territorial dispute, and the wilderness. As a result it presented special problems of administration not the least of which was, in a civil war context, the problem of maintaining imperial control. The Declaration of Independence by the rebelling colonies had challenged Britain's historic sovereignty over the frontier. Thus unlike the Turner frontier model the defence frontier was, where possible, closed by the British to 'rebel' encroachment in a vain attempt to retain sovereignty. The degree of success of this 'closed-door' policy was reflected in the locational stability of the frontier at any point in time. The maintenance of the fur trade was an adjunct to defence, not only in buying the loyalty of both traders and Indians, but also in acquiring intelligence that might otherwise have been unobtainable. Thus in terms of administrative policy, the time lag between the creation and implementation of policy, the degree of its implementation (all or in part), and its locational direction, reflected not only the location of the frontier but its role in the defence of Quebec at any point in time.

Several hypotheses on the defence frontier can be formulated from the foregoing discussion. Firstly, the defence frontier was an arena for conflict and was thus a potent, dynamic zone that was in marked contrast to the 'stability' of a boundary. Secondly, unlike the Turnerian frontier the defence frontier had little or no settlement, at least on a permanent basis, largely because of the military activities within it. Thirdly, the administration of the defence frontier was imposed from outside, with a policy emphasis on military control, and on measures to induce loyalty to the government. Fourthly, the degree of administrative organization necessary to achieve military control produced a socio-political environment which was in marked contrast to Kristov's argument for such rudimentary socio-political relations as rebelliousness, lawlessness

and the absence of a legal system. Fifthly, the 'poles' or centres of revolutionary ferment, such as Fort Pitt, Fort Stanwix and the Illinois, tended to act as a separating factor for British sympathy, in the defence landscape, and thus from a rebel perspective produced the integration hypothesised by Kristov. Sixthly, the frontier of defence did not have a well-defined 'line' of confrontation as in the Roman 'limes' but instead exhibited a pattern of blurred political and military identification.

The purpose of this study therefore is not only to provide a definition of the defence frontier and a cartographic representation of it, but also to discover the essential features of the British military system that governed it. It is hoped that this will not only help to provide a clearer picture of a frontier and its administration but also help redress the current research emphasis on the rebel experience. It will also attempt to provide an example of the way in which historic reference points and their political administration become entrenched in the landscape: in this case forming the basis for much of the current settlement location pattern in Ontario and Quebec. For example, the line of administration of the frontier has been permanently memorialised on the landscape by the placing of an international boundary along its length. The study takes a case-study approach based on reconstruction from primary source material, chiefly the Haldimand Papers.

In this study the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defence will be defined as the zone of territory, administered by the British imperial government and the colonial government of Quebec, in which there was both defensive and offensive contact between the British/colonial military and the rebel forces. The contact may have been actual physical combat or the gathering of intelligence for defence purposes. It is argued that this zone of defence acquired frontier characteristics because of the general accordance of campaigns, raids and scoutings with colonial

frontier territories, which were usually sparsely settled. However it did extend into settled areas as well.

The system of British imperial administration which governed the northern interior frontier of defence will be examined in Chapter Two. It provided the model for the Quebec colonial government's frontier policies, described in Chapter Three. In Chapter Four, the location of the defence frontier will be delineated and mapped, by identifying the points of contact between the British military and the rebel forces. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, the centres of administration of the frontier, will be examined. Chapter Five will concentrate on the administration east of the Great Lakes: namely the headquarters of Quebec and Montreal, and the posts of Lachine, the Cedars, Oswegatchie and Carleton Island. Chapter Six will focus on Niagara as the Upper Post command centre of the frontier. The administrative posts of Detroit and Michilimackinac, west of Niagara, will be discussed in Chapter Seven. The conclusions on the northern interior frontier of defence, and its system of administration, and suggestions for further study will be outlined in Chapter Eight.

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Sykes, J. B. (Ed). *The Pocket Oxford Dictionary*. Sixth Edition. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978, 347.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 1978, 533.

<sup>3</sup>Prescott, J. R. V. *Political Geography*. London: Methuen, 1972, 59.

<sup>4</sup>Wilkinson, H. R. "Jugoslav Kosmet. The Evolution of a Frontier Province and its Landscape", *The Institute of British Geographers*, 1955. Reprinted from *Transactions and Papers*, Publication No. 21, 171-193.

<sup>5</sup>Nobles, Gregory H. "Breaking into the Backcountry: New Approaches to the Early

American Frontier, 1750-1800", *The William and Mary Quarterly*, XLVI (October 1989), 642.

<sup>6</sup>Bowman, Isaiah. *The New World. Problems in Political Geography*. Fourth Edition. London: George G. Harrap, 1928, 31.

<sup>7</sup>De Blij, Harm J. *Geography: Regions and Concepts*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971, 115.

<sup>8</sup>Glassner, Martin Ira and De Blij, Harm J. *Systematic Political Geography*. Third Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980, 82. Turner's 'safety valve' was described as a "gate of escape from the bondage of the past" (see Taylor, George Rogers (Ed). *The Turner Thesis Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History. Problems in American Civilization*. Revised Edition. Boston: D. C. Heath, 1956, 18).

<sup>9</sup>De Blij, 1967, 208, 231.

<sup>10</sup>Burghardt, Andrew F. *Borderland. A Historical and Geographical Study of Burgenland, Austria*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962, 6, 24, 27-28; *Ibid.*, "The Origin of the Road and City Network of Roman Pannonia", *Journal of Historical Geography*, 5 (1979), 1-20.

<sup>11</sup>De Vorsey Jr., Louis. *The Indian Boundary in the Southern Colonies 1763-1775*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966, Chapter 3; Nobles, 1989, 645-646.

<sup>12</sup>Stilgoe, John R. *Common Landscapes of America. 1580 to 1845*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982, 12.

<sup>13</sup>De Blij, 1967, 212, 213.

<sup>14</sup>Nobles, 1989, 641, 643.

<sup>15</sup>Meinig, D. W. *The Shaping of America. A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History. Volume I. Atlantic America, 1492-1800*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986, 66-69.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 1986, 374-375.

<sup>17</sup>Prescott, J. R. V. *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, 56.

<sup>18</sup>Jackson, W. A. *Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict*. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962.

<sup>19</sup>Boggs, S. Whittemore. "Boundary Functions and the Principles of Boundary Making", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 22 (March 1932), 1-49.

<sup>20</sup>Taylor, 1956, 1, 2, 6.

<sup>21</sup>Alden, John Richard. *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier. A Study of Indian Relations, War, Trade and Land Problems in the Southern Wilderness, 1754-1775*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press; London: Humphrey Mitford, Oxford University Press, 1944, 25, 34, 39, 237.

<sup>22</sup>Taylor, 1956, 8.

<sup>23</sup>Eccles, W. J. *The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760*. Revised Edition. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1969. Reprinted in 1984, 1, 2, 9.

<sup>24</sup>The notion of centripetal and centrifugal force formed the basis of Hartshorne's 'Functional Approach' or the spatial consequences of political process. These integrative and disruptive forces respectively, within a state, were to be in balance for effective statehood (see Kasperson, Roger E. and Minghi, Julian V. (Eds). *The Structure of Political Geography*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969, 11).

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 1969, 126.

<sup>26</sup>De Blij, 1967, 210.

<sup>27</sup>Lattimore, Owen. *Studies in Frontier History. Collected Papers, 1928-1958*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

<sup>28</sup>Severance, Frank H. *An Old Frontier of France. The Niagara Region and Adjacent Lakes Under French Control*. In Two Volumes. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1917.

<sup>29</sup>Bowler, R. Arthur. *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America. 1775-1783*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975; Curtis, Edward E. *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution*. New York: AMS Press, 1926. Reprinted in 1969.



## **CHAPTER TWO. THE BRITISH IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM: THE MODEL FOR THE COLONIES.**

The administration of the British home government was the model for the imperial administration of Britain's colonies in the eighteenth century. Thus, in order to understand the colonial administration of the Quebec frontier, it is important to examine the characteristics of the system upon which it was based.<sup>1</sup>

### **A. CONCEPTS OF THE SYSTEM**

#### **1. Royal Prerogative.**

As with other monarchical institutions of Europe, the essence of the British administrative system was its dependence on the royal prerogative, and the concept of the sovereignty of the king and crown. The royal prerogative, defined as "the powers inherent in the king,"<sup>2</sup> was at the apex of the administration, to the point where Dorothy Marshall argues that the king retained more power in his own hands than scholars have often realised.<sup>3</sup> However, the eighteenth century saw a gradual lessening of these powers and the increasing role of parliament in both domestic and foreign affairs.<sup>4</sup> This was largely in response to the Bill of Rights, which had been created in 1689, and which targeted such areas of constitutional concern as taxation, and legislative and judicial decision-making.<sup>5</sup> This bill fostered the increasing intrusion of parliament in both domestic and foreign affairs, which had a tremendous significance for the imperial administration. Not only did it provide a wider base for decision-making, but it also permitted more colonial influence in British parliamentary affairs, through the personal and professional connections between the colonies and

the home government.

This form of government, where the royal prerogative is tempered by parliament, has been defined as a constitutional government.<sup>6</sup> Bailey further defines this form of monarchy as one where the “executive government is carried on by ministers responsible to an elected assembly.”<sup>7</sup> This implies that the responsibility is away from, rather than toward, the king. However, all policies created by the executive and legislative branches of government, both foreign and domestic, were submitted to the king for his approval, particularly during the reign of George III. If he did not approve the policy it was either abandoned, or the minister responsible for its creation forced to resign. Likewise, if the ministers did not approve of the policies of the king, they in turn could resign.<sup>8</sup> As well, the parliament lacked adequate representation by the people, any election being largely controlled by the king and his ministers.<sup>9</sup>

## **2. The Concept of the Office and Office-Holding.**

Furthermore, one important feature of eighteenth-century administration provided an effective counter-balance to the autonomy of parliament and the full use of its powers: that is, the concept of the office and office-holding. The highest office, the office of the crown, being embodied in the king, meant that all the executive functions of government were theoretically embodied in one individual. This medieval concept of a king and his knights ruling over a small kingdom, became increasingly inappropriate as the complexity of the administrative network, both at home and abroad, grew. It was physically impossible for all the offices of government to be personally held, and administered, by the king. As well, as the king could legally do no wrong, there had to be someone to take the responsibility for his executive acts. Thus offices began to be delegated to those chosen by the king.<sup>10</sup> From this delegation of authority there arose two important

concepts inherent in government administration in the eighteenth century: firstly, the unique relationship to the king engendered by the personal delegation of office from him to the office holder and secondly, the notion of responsibility in office engendered by its rights and obligations. Both of these concepts have relevance to the issue of whether or not the eighteenth-century administrative system can be classified as a hierarchical system of organization. This becomes even more relevant in the context of colonial administration because not only was such administration geographically removed from its original source of authority, but it was a less complex system of administration than that of the home government.

In terms of the first concept, the unique relationship of the office holder to the king, Chester argues that there were two kinds of offices: those who derived their authority directly from the king and those whose authority was derived from other sources, such as from the Common Law or from Acts of Parliament.<sup>11</sup> However a further type of office can be added, to include those whose authority was delegated by an office holder, a common colonial practice. It was these varying forms of offices that have led to an essential contradiction in labelling the British administrative system as hierarchical. An office holder who gained his office from the king was, at least theoretically, in a direct face-to-face relationship with his sovereign, and subordinate only to him. As well, these offices carried the weight of sovereignty inherent in the person of the king, and as such were equal in importance. When Lord North, Prime Minister during the American Revolution, attempted to set himself up as a chief authority over the other ministers of the crown, the king invoked the notion of the direct relationship of each minister to the crown, and informed North that he was equal to his peers.<sup>12</sup> Thus administration based on this form of office-holding was theoretically non-hierarchical.

Offices whose authority was not directly derived from the king, supported the concept of a

hierarchical organization of the administration. The delegation of office was a response to the increase in the size of the administration, due to the Anglo-French conflicts of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Simmons argues that these conflicts “had important results for British government, administration, and policy, necessitating greater efficiency, greater bureaucracy, and greater expenditure.”<sup>13</sup> With the expansion of the administration, and the added stress on its machinery, there was an increasing tendency for office holders to appoint deputies and their assistants to fill their offices. This was widely practised in the colonies partly because of the geographical impossibility of an office holder, who could hold office in the imperial administration, being present in the colonies. In the case of dual office holding, the deputy was usually delegated to the less desirable office, such as a posting to the colonies. It was in the deputy’s power to also appoint a substitute, although theoretically all delegates were responsible to the principal office holder.<sup>14</sup>

This subordination of the deputy to his patron made explicit the notion of a hierarchy, but in terms of the colonial administration, posed a serious problem for policy creation and the efficient operation of government. This was due to the fact that not only did the principal office holder often lack the practical experience of his office, but in delegating authority, lessened the legal responsibility of the deputy. This diffused responsibility and thus weakened the imperial administrative effectiveness, particularly between Britain and its North American colonies.<sup>15</sup> In order to lessen the administrative abuse resulting from office deputising, the latter part of the eighteenth century saw a move away from the notion of individual responsibility to that of collective responsibility, such as that by boards or committees. The Board of Trade and the Colonial Office were examples of such collective institutions.

### 3. The Concept of Patronage.

Implicit in the practice of deputising offices was the concept of patronage. This was a basic ingredient of eighteenth-century administration, and can be defined as the practise of influential patrons sponsoring less well-born or less well-known individuals for administrative positions. One good example in the colonial context was the appointment of Lord George Germain, seen by at least one historian as a “stupid man,” to the office of colonial secretary in London, and in turn, his appointment of General Burgoyne, “a Court favourite,” to command the troops for the defence of Canada.<sup>16</sup> The terminology used by McIlwraith to describe these individuals emphasises a less desirable characteristic of patronage, namely the personal recommendation for advancement that had little to do with either qualifications or experience. Bowler thus argues that patronage was at the root of administrative incompetence and amateurism.<sup>17</sup> However, as will be discussed later, the Frederick Haldimand administration in Quebec demonstrated that despite patronage, there were administrators whose administration showed considerable competence, even during war. This was due in part to the fact that there were other routes of advancement in administration besides those connected with patronage: chiefly through seniority, either in the civil or military service, or through widely recognized and demonstrated administrative competence.




Figure 2.1. A Policy Chain of Command in a Monarchical System.

## **B. THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF THE IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM.**

Theoretically, a hierarchical structure of administration should result in a greater efficiency down the administrative ladder, due to such factors as a single source of decision-making, a uni-directional flow of authority from the top down, and the implementation of policy decisions through a system of strict obedience to commands. In the monarchical chain of civil command, shown in Figure 2.1, authority flows down from the king, through the parliament and ministers, to the colonial office in London. This is the British sector of the chain. The colonial sector, divided by a line from the British sector, to indicate geographical distance and administrative subordination, is commanded by the governor-general and the lieutenant-governor. They in turn pass authority down to the Council, the Board of Council, and the colonial courts.

However, in the actual structure of government, operational in Britain, the “balance of forces” in administration, that is, the departments and their relationships, did not show complete accordance with the simple hierarchical chain described in Figure 2.1.<sup>18</sup> Instead the civil government, which included the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, was characterised by a considerable overlapping of departmental responsibility, thus leading to administrative complexity. This resulted from the fact, previously noted, that one individual could hold several offices in different departments of government, which had two effects on governmental administration. In a positive sense, the holding of dual or multiple offices, led to considerable inter-departmental cooperation, particularly in terms of the Cabinet, which was composed of most of the heads of departments.<sup>19</sup> However in a negative sense, departmental self-protectionism, and the conflict of interest resulting from dual office-holding, such as with members of the Admiralty Board and the Board of Ordnance, led to an ineffectiveness in the implementation of policy, which impacted on the colonial administration.




Figure 2.2. The Principal Offices of the British Civil Administration, Including Those Most Concerned with Colonial Affairs.



## 1. The British System of Administration.

As shown on Figure 2.2, the British administration was essentially composed of four bodies: the Privy Council,<sup>20</sup> a smaller Cabinet council,<sup>21</sup> the House of Lords,<sup>22</sup> and the House of Commons.<sup>23</sup> the latter two comprising Parliament. The two Houses of Parliament had their own separate responsibilities. The House of Lords was primarily concerned with examining and revising Bills brought from the Commons, initiating non-controversial Bills, delaying Bills for consultation, and conducting discussions of the major issues of the government. The House of Commons had a much wider range of responsibilities, one of its most important being control of the financial affairs of government. However, both Houses functioned as a unit legislatively, in that the approval of both was needed for legislation. The cabinet was responsible to both, particularly the Commons in the matter of finance,<sup>24</sup> a relationship that linked policy-making and the financial means to sustain it during the War of Revolution. However, towards the end of the eighteenth century the Cabinet, which included the Prime Minister, the Principal Secretaries of State, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, (the principal holders of office throughout the George III administration to the War of Revolution, are listed in Appendix 1,) began increasingly to meet without the attendance of the king.<sup>25</sup> This is important to note in connection with the creation of colonial policy, particularly because of the close liaison of the principal secretaries of state with the colonial governors and commander in chiefs.

Throughout the War of Revolution however, the king was still the lynch-pin of the imperial administration. Chester notes that the administrative system was largely held together by 'the influence of the crown.'<sup>26</sup> He stated that such devices as patronage and pensions, "and the cultivation of client's interests and family alliances, were increasingly skilfully used to build up safe ministerial majorities." As well, Porter made the important point, especially in terms of the

colonial administration, that “the Crown, as head of the executive, still appointed the leading ministers and courtiers, and directly shaped policy, especially foreign and religious affairs.”<sup>27</sup>

Against this image of a tight hierarchical system was the fact that there was an increasing number of cabinet, and other important ministers, in the House of Commons. By the end of 1780 the First Lord of the Treasury (the Prime Minister,) the Secretary at War, the Paymaster of the Armed Forces, and the Treasurer of the Navy, had seats in the House.<sup>28</sup> As the House of Commons provided funding for government and its activities, it was principally concerned at this time with the funding of the War of Revolution. Thus it was in the interests of administrative policy for the policy-makers to ensure that their funding was secure, supporting Donoghue’s claim that not only did a politician need the ear of the king, but also the commons.<sup>29</sup> The strained relations between the king’s ministers and the commons, during the War of Revolution, which eventually brought down the North ministry, exemplified the fact that the commons was not merely a part of a rigid hierarchy but an entity in its own right, with considerable influence on domestic and foreign policy. Therefore its pivotal position in relation to colonial policy must not be overlooked.

Thus it must be stressed that the eighteenth century administration did not consist of an “autonomous absolutist centralized `state,’ staffed by a distinct rank of bureaucrats ..., ”<sup>30</sup> but a cumbersome collection of semi-autonomous departments, each working with a degree of self-interest in contrast to the loosely hierarchical system within which they were organized.

## **2. Public Offices of the Civil Administration.**

The major public offices of the civil administration, as distinct from the departments of government to which these offices may belong, were the First Lord of the Treasury (by 1780 called the Chancellor of the Exchequer) who was also Prime Minister, the Principal Secretaries of State,

the Lord President of the Council (or Cabinet,) the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Lord Chancellor, and the Lord Privy Seal. These officers comprised the 'effective' Cabinet, presided over by the Prime Minister. The Master-General of the Ordnance (an important officer in provisioning the War of Revolution,) and the Secretary at War, were two of a number of offices on the 'fringe' of the Cabinet.<sup>31</sup> Of these offices, those most closely concerned with colonial affairs were the First Lord of the Treasury, the Principal Secretaries of State, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Master General of the Ordnance, and the Secretary at War.

### **3. The Principal Executive Functions of the Public Office.**

The four principal executive function of the public office in quantum were, as defined by Chester, finance, defence, overseas affairs, and domestic affairs. These functions impinged on colonial affairs chiefly in the areas of finance, defence and overseas affairs, but there was also an interrelationship of colonial affairs with domestic issues in Britain.

#### **a. Finance.**

With regard to finance, the Treasury Board, administered by the Lord High Treasurer as Chair, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer as Under Treasurer, in conjunction with the House of Commons, was to raise money for the nation's wars. Equally important was the raising of money for the imperial administrative system, both at home and abroad. There were several sources of funds for use by the government, including monies from the civil list, hereditary revenues, and the funds collected from Scotland and Ireland. However the principal means of fund-raising was by taxation, which was handled by seven different tax boards.<sup>32</sup> The wide sources of revenue posed problems for administrative coordination, particularly revenues raised in the colonies. It was the collection of tax, particularly by the Customs, Excise, and Stamp Boards, that precipitated much of the active revolt of the American colonies. As the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

escalated, there was pressure on the tax boards to raise even more revenues. Thus state lotteries were used to help fund these imperial endeavours.<sup>33</sup>

Due to its wide area of responsibility, in particular the administration of colonial finance, the Treasury Board was an important voice in shaping colonial policies. However, its internal organization, with the division of responsibility among various boards, made it, as argued by Bowler, relatively inefficient. Bowler argued that it was the geographical scale of its responsibilities, and the increasing range of new responsibilities, that made its task so difficult. For example, the department was understaffed and naive with regard to “commercial transactions and technical problems ...,” which was a handicap in financing the imperial mercantile system, which was built upon commercial transactions. Furthermore, as one of its many areas of responsibility, the Treasury Board was initially charged with handling the supply, storage, and transportation of provisions during the American War. The Board was so inefficient at this task (as will be discussed later) that the supply, with regard to the inspection and shipping of provisions, was in 1780 turned over to the Navy Board.<sup>34</sup>

However the greatest factor in the effectiveness of the Treasury Board was its responsibility to parliament, particularly the House of Commons. Christie stressed that the area of colonial administration of most interest to parliament was that of “imperial trade and navigation.”<sup>35</sup> The American War, which threatened to annihilate such trade and close the Atlantic to British shipping, was of prime concern to parliament; the corollary was considerable parliamentary intervention in colonial finance. Thus the Treasury Board, and its relationship to parliament, was of central importance in the colonial administration of the North American colonies during the War of Revolution.




Figure 2.3. The Principal Offices of the Army and Navy Administration During the War of Revolution. From Curtis, 1969.

### **b. Defence.**

The second executive function of the public office was that of defence. As shown on Figure 2.3, the administration of defence was theoretically divided into two separate administrative areas: one related to sea defence and one related to defence on the land. Sea defence, while theoretically under the administration of the king as Captain General of Naval Defence, was in practise under the control of the Admiralty Board. However, land defence was under the direct control and administrative policies of the king as Commander in Chief.<sup>36</sup> These two areas of defence presented a marked contrast in administration, for while the Navy administration, composed primarily of the important Board of Admiralty and the less important Navy Board and naval courts, was a well-organized hierarchical system, the army lacked such organization and its administration was diffused over a number of different departments.

### **i. The Army.**

The army was under the administration of the king as Commander in chief. He delegated responsibilities for defence to either the Principal Secretaries of State, or to the Secretary at War. However, because the Principal Secretaries of State were members of Cabinet, and the dominant ministers in both domestic and foreign policy, the king usually delegated the major responsibility for defence to one of the Principal Secretaries, who was then given the title of Commander in Chief.<sup>37</sup> This delegation was necessitated not only by the increasing size of the colonial administration, but also by the varying and geographically distant locales of imperial defence involvement. Thus, after the Seven Years war, a Secretary for Colonial Affairs was appointed in 1768, to administer the North American colonies, in recognition of the specific needs of this large geographical area.<sup>38</sup> He was to cooperate with the Principal Secretaries for the imperial Northern and Southern Military Districts, in terms of matters of defence.<sup>39</sup>

The Secretary at War was administratively subordinate to these secretaries. His duties included the framing of the articles of war, the presenting of the army estimates and the army accounts to the House of Commons, and the administration of the payment of the army.<sup>40</sup> His role in terms of colonial policy creation was therefore largely an advisory one, despite the fact that he was one of the chief correspondents of the imperial administration with the colonial governor and commander in chief and army officers, both at home and abroad. However, as with other office holders, he was limited by his prior experience in colonial administration, together with the limitations on time and distance of a range of authority which included England and Scotland, as well as the colonies.

One of the major problems in the administrative authority of the Secretary at War was that he did not have jurisdiction over all of the defence personnel. He could exercise authority over the Horse and Foot Divisions of the army, but did not have control of the Artillery and Engineers, who were administered by the Master-General of the Ordnance, while the Militia were under the control of the Lord Lieutenants of the counties.<sup>41</sup> This division of authority had the potential for hampering the coordination of a unified defence thrust in North America during the War of Revolution.

Another administrative influence on the organization of the army was parliament. Although the king was the Commander in Chief of the land forces, he could not maintain a standing army without the consent of parliament. Thus every year a Mutiny Act was passed which gave the army a legal identity.<sup>42</sup> This meant that much of the policy creation tended to be limited to an annual time scale: although it was often a reiteration of the policy created in the previous year. However, Acts of Parliament with regard to the administration of defence, could extend policies beyond the time limitations of the Mutiny Act.

## **II. The Financing of Defence.**

Parliament, chiefly through the House of Commons, intruded into the military administrative framework by its control of the financing of the defence program. The financing, approved by parliament, was administered by the Paymaster General for the land forces: in a custodial capacity, rather than in the capacity of a policy creator. He was assisted by the Deputy Paymaster General, the Accountant, the Computer of the Off-Reckonings, the Cashier of Half Pay, and the Keeper of the Stores. At a colonial level, the method of paying the army was generally by a civil agent, appointed by the colonel of each regiment, who was under a civilian contract to the government for one year. The civil agent disbursed the monies received to the regimental paymaster, who in turn passed them on to the captains of the regiments for disbursement to the troops. The accounting for the monies went, in reverse, from the captains, to the regimental paymaster, to the agent, and then to the secretary at war.<sup>43</sup>

The organization of the Paymaster General's office in 1775, gives an example of the proliferation of offices in the administration, necessitated by the geographical spread of the imperial regime. Apart from the offices of his department noted above, there were eight subordinate paymasters in Gibraltar, Nova Scotia, New York, Quebec, Montreal, Minorca, Louisburg, and Boston. The location of these offices provides some indication of the weighting of defence in the imperial system, particularly in North America, where at this time there was considerable political tension.

A problem in the administration of defence was that one officer could be given two appointments, geographically distant from each other. For example, John Powell held the office of



Accountant in London and Paymaster in Quebec. This necessitated him appointing a deputy to fill one of the offices. It was not common to resign from an office in the situation of a dual appointment, probably because of the lucrative fee schedule associated with each office, and the suggestion made by Curtis, that office incumbents were "accustomed to deduct . . . heavy percentages from the moneys . . . disbursed."<sup>44</sup> Dual appointments also gave rise to the possibility of a conflict of interest, as for example in the case of John Powell, where his accounting and auditing duties could conflict with the field procedures of fiscal distribution and fee collection.

The system of the payment of the army was further complicated by the fact that at the colonial level other offices were charged with not only the distribution of the monies but also its direction of allocation, either by department or by geographical location. The principal offices charged with these responsibilities were the Quarter Master General, the Commissary General, the Barrack Master General, and the Chief Engineer.<sup>45</sup> The amount of money distributed can be estimated from the fact that between the 1st. of June, 1776, and the end of October, 1781, the sum of £2,236,029/11/7 was issued to pay officers for the maintenance of the army in Canada.<sup>46</sup> Thus if the remuneration in fees to the pay commissioners in any way approximated the sums of monies disbursed, the system was lucrative. In fact, the financial system of the administration, particularly with regard to the North American colonies at war, was so questionable that the 'Seventh Report of the Commissioners of Public Accounts' on the 18th. June, 1782, made very specific recommendations for its reform.<sup>47</sup> One of the major reasons for this inquiry was the fact that the payment for the defence system came through civil or public channels, and it was to the public of the home government, represented in parliament, that an account was to be given of the spending of public funds. This provides an example of the intrusion of the domestic sphere into the defence system.

The commissioners of this report sought the advice of those to whom the system, particularly in the colonies, was well known: namely, Lieutenant-General Howe and Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, both of whom served with the forces in North America. Thus, allowing for the influence of patronage, self-interest, and administrative incompetence, the report makes some attempt to present the system as it was at the time, as experienced by qualified observers. It thus provides a good example of the hierarchical organization of the administration: its administrative complexity, particularly in departmental duplication between the two levels of imperial administration, the home government and the colonial government; and the diffusion of authority among several different departments. However its particular value lies in its attempt to give an eighteenth-century viewpoint of the defence administration at the time.

### **III. The Abuses in the Defence Financing system.**

The commissioners' report noted several abuses in the financing system. These occurred along the pay-chain from the commander in Chief in England, to the Paymaster of the forces in America. They focussed on the inflated and duplicated<sup>48</sup> fee scale, by which the officers were reimbursed. One significant abuse arose out of the two different kinds of payments made to the paymaster in America: the temporary warrant and the final warrant. The temporary warrant was for money issued for the projected day-to-day running of the service, and the final warrant was a quarterly or annual reimbursement of expences actually incurred. The abuses usually occurred with the amount of the temporary warrant, because not only was this payment usually made by officers lower down on the administrative hierarchy, especially deputies, but also by officers geographically removed from the center of administrative control.

Besides the collection of fees significant abuses took place with regard to the contractual

system, used by the government for servicing the defence system. Vessels, pilots, seamen, waggons, horses, drivers, artificers, and labourers, were among those contracted to government service for either a day, a month or a year, according to their contracts or the annual disposition of the services under the Mutiny Act. With the escalation of the War of Revolution, the Quarter Master General for example, could not handle the contracting system, and thus deputised the inspection and management of the vessels and small craft to a Superintendent of Vessels (appointed in 1777.) Such deputization added to the proliferation of offices and increased the cost of fee remuneration.

The appointment of the inspector of shipping also illustrates the inter-departmental diffusion of authority. The shipping inspector was in charge of the ships in three departments: the Commissary General's department, the Quarter Master General's department, and the Barrack Master General's department. Departmental arrogance, and the duplication of fee collection by the shipping office from all three departments, contributed to the problems and expence of their administration.

Record keeping was an integral part of the administrative service. Receipts for the payment of services were kept, but the commission found evidence of fraudulent accounting. In verifying the fraud, the commission complained that reliable witnesses were difficult to locate, particularly those resident in North America. More specifically, the commissioners identified two abuses in accounting: firstly, the accountants were often involved in the fraud, and secondly, their accounts were not examined closely enough by their supervisors.<sup>49</sup> As well, the contractual system provided ample opportunity for non-recorded pay-offs, a problem made more acute by the fact that much of the service had to be contracted within a hostile political environment.

It was this latter problem that caused the commissioners to observe that the conflict of interest between the government service and private profitability had a “tendency to corrupt and endanger the service of the army:” particularly with respect to business liaisons of British officers with rebel colonials. That these liaisons proved profitable is evidenced by the fact that the commissioners estimated that the army officers gained £197,889 in two and a quarter years in profits from colonial business alliances. As well, they estimated that the system of inservice contractual ownership by British officers, particularly in transportation contracts, cost the British public £241,690 annually. The monies earned by these ventures were, as Chester contends, in addition to any fixed salaries the officers received.<sup>50</sup>

The commissioners therefore concluded that fraud, in the pay service of the defence administration, was committed in several ways: through collusion, false subject matter, services not performed or over-rated, false reporting, the forging of certificates, and through the signing of blanks and the filling in of details later: all of which were “obscured in the account of the Quarter Master General.” They also estimated that of the approximately £10 million paid out for the services in America over six years, only about £1,100,000 could be adequately accounted for. This was despite the annual decrease in the size of the service since 1778.<sup>51</sup> The impression left by this report was that there was an attitude of inevitability and resignation, by the commissioners, to the problems of administration. However, the commissioning of the report by the British government, supports the contention of Harold Nicolson that the latter part of the eighteenth century, particularly with regard to the events of the American War of Revolution, saw a challenge to the traditional systems of administration, and a desire for change.<sup>52</sup>

#### **iv. The Board of Ordnance.**

The Board of Ordnance, and its civil director, the Master General of the Ordnance, was an

important agency in the administration of defence. This department provided the arms, ammunition, and military stores, for both the army and the navy. The wide range of responsibilities of the Board was exemplified by the fact that it “provided military prisons, regulated the inspection of arms and accoutrements ... and the preparation of maps for military purposes.”<sup>53</sup> The complexity of its departmental responsibilities can be seen in the fact that the activities of the Board intruded into the affairs of the Board of Admiralty and the Privy Council, and was advised by the King and the Principal Secretaries of State. In order to lessen the problems associated with the scope of its administration, the department was divided into a civil and a military branch, as shown in Figure 2.3, which tended to fragment the department even more, and contribute to further bureaucracy, as shown by the number of assistants in the department. The weighting of the personnel towards the military branch of the department, (18 in the civil branch and 47 in the military branch) reflects the escalation of tension in the American colonies at this time.

To further substantiate the complexity of the administrative defence system, the Board of Ordnance enjoyed considerable autonomy. This was evident with regard to finance. As was noted earlier, the paymaster for the land forces did not pay the artillery and engineers of ordnance. This gave the Board considerable control of its own financial administration. Therefore, of all the defence boards, the Board of Ordnance came the closest to approximating the more efficient Admiralty Board.

**v. The Judge Advocate General, the Apothecary General, the Comptroller of Army Accounts.**

Three other departments of the army, all non-combatant, were also involved in the defence administration: the Judge Advocate General, the Apothecary General, and the Comptroller of

Army Accounts. The Judge Advocate acted as a legal advisor to the Crown in matters “pertaining to military law,” both at home and in the colonies. There is little doubt that his advice was sought more frequently as tensions in the American colonies mounted. The Apothecary General supplied the army with medical supplies and equipment, while the Comptroller of Army Accounts attempted to keep an account of expenses.<sup>54</sup> The difficulty of administering the overseas sector of these offices was considerable, particularly as they had little experience in administering a defence operation of the size of the American War of Revolution.

#### **vi. Other Important Boards.**

In addition to these Boards with specific duties, the army was also administered by the Treasury Board, for food, transportation, and certain clothing and equipment, and the Admiralty Board for convoys, marines, and a liaison with the navy, particularly in North America. Another board involved in the defence administration was the Board of General Officers, an advisory board to the King and the Secretary at War, in matters of defence.<sup>55</sup> This board in turn chose the Clothing Board, who supplied uniforms for defensive operations. However the Clothing Board exemplified departmental duplication because the clothing for the artillery and engineers was under the control and regulation of the Ordnance department.

Three other Boards were also involved in the defence administration: namely, the Board of Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital, which administered the retirement of ‘old soldiers,’ the Victualling Board, which provided the provisions for the transport of the army while at sea, and the Board of the Sick and Wounded. As well, not to be ignored, were the military and admiralty courts, which were administered within the military service.<sup>56</sup>

Curtis challenged the concept of the army administration as a system. He argued that even

in the eighteenth century there were doubts regarding its status as a system. General Pattison, in writing to the Board of Ordnance in March of 1778, noted that the “want of method and a regular system must necessarily create intricacies and confusion ....”<sup>57</sup> Curtis also argued that the administration exhibited “clumsy and antiquated” methods, along with the “overlapping, duplication, and decentralisation of authority.”<sup>58</sup> However, despite the problems, insofar as the British imperial administration functioned in a manner consistent within itself, it must be seen as a system, whatever its lack of internal cohesion and logic. The one comprehensive, cohesive force of this system was its commitment to Empire, which governed the rationale for its administration.

### **c. Overseas Affairs.**

The third executive function of the public office was that concerning overseas affairs, primarily colonies. The principal board for colonial administration was originally the Council of Trade and Plantations. Its primary role had been to promote trade both within the British kingdom and in the colonies. However, one of its principal problems had been its weak position in relation to the administration of colonial affairs: it being in a subordinate position in the government hierarchy, and it having only advisory powers in relation to the creation of policy.<sup>59</sup> However, with the creation of the office of Principal Secretary for Colonial Affairs, the role of the Council became largely advisory.<sup>60</sup> In its place a new colonial office was created as an attempt “to regularize appointments and payments of various imperial officials ....”<sup>61</sup> The colonial office took over much of the responsibility of the Board of Trade, which had acted as a “general supervising department, record office, and clearing house for colonial affairs .... [It also] furnished information and advice for the Privy Council, the executive departments and parliament.” As such, it provided an “important element for continuity in colonial policy.”<sup>62</sup>

#### **d. Domestic Affairs.**

With regard to the fourth executive function of the public office, that pertaining to the domestic affairs of the Home Government, the greatest concern to the imperial government in the latter part of the eighteenth century was finance: particularly the financing of the American War. Due to the increasing accumulation of debts that related firstly to the Seven Years War, and secondly to the War of Revolution, the administration was under considerable financial stress. As noted earlier, the Treasury Board was empowered to raise monies by several means: principal of which was taxation. Although the raising of these monies had partly devolved upon the colonies, a large portion was also raised at home. The amount to be raised and spent was legislated in the Appropriation Acts of Parliament. For example, in the Appropriation Act of 1780, the king was empowered to spend not more than £5 1/2 million on naval services: £1 1/2 million on paying off the Navy Debt: over £6 1/2 million on the land forces: and £438,136 on the ordnance. These monies were to be raised by taxation and the sale of French prizes taken at sea. However, Chester argues that in order to implement an increasingly higher taxation, the tax was dispersed throughout the administration so as not to appear to be a burden.<sup>63</sup>

One particular financial burden of the Home Government during the War of Revolution was the increase in the size of the administration and the consequent increase in fee demands. This occurred through such factors as the accumulation of hand-written government documents creating notation fees, and the increasingly larger denominations of monies changing hands creating transferral fees. A word of caution is necessary here in the evaluation of the size of the administration, because there has been little research on the minimum number of government employees necessary



to man the eighteenth-century administrative system during the War of Revolution. However, it can be argued that the war put additional stress on the already overburdened financial system of government.

As the financial pressure increased, the London city merchants, described by Sutherland as one of the most important British pressure groups in the latter half of the eighteenth century,<sup>64</sup> and the landed gentry, sought a common unity in their opposition to the king and his ministers over tax imposition.<sup>65</sup> It can be argued that through their lower position on the social and economic scale, these merchants were particularly vulnerable to coercion through patronage. However the gentry, many of whom had money invested in colonial-related businesses, realized that the return on their investment depended on these merchants, who had business contacts that the gentry could not have acquired themselves. Thus in terms of domestic policy creation, the imperial administration could not ignore the sentiments of pressure groups in Britain, particularly those with colonial business connections.

### **C. THE POLICY OF EMPIRE: MERCANTILISM.**

The policy of empire pursued by the administration at this time can be labelled as a policy dictated by mercantilism. Mercantilism can be described as a nationalist policy aimed at strengthening the economic position of the home government.<sup>66</sup> The policy was effected through a system of communication with the colonies: such communication depending largely on the navy as the main trunkline between the domestic government and overseas dependencies. This naval strength had been developed through the Navigation and Trade Acts, that from 1660 onwards restricted certain “enumerated articles,” to British traders, ships, colonies and Britain itself. Thus the lucrative West Indies trade, for example, had to be detoured to England before it could be sold to Europe: a process

that cost much in terms of the duplication of government departments necessitated by the frequent handling of goods between the colonies and Britain.<sup>67</sup>

With this administrative system as a basis for the defence administration of the colonies, Chapter Three will place the imperial administration within the parameters of the policies created, during the American War of Independence, either specifically for the colonial service, or adjusted to meet its requirements at this time.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Chester argues that one of the clearest expositions of the administrative system of the eighteenth century is that expounded by Sir William Blackstone, in a set of commentaries based on lectures delivered at Oxford, while he was Vinerian Professor of English Law, between 1760 and 1780 (see Chester, Sir Norman. *The English Administrative System, 1780-1870*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, 2). The value of these lectures is that they are of the period, and represent an eye-witness observation of the eighteenth-century constitutional system.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 1981, 2.

<sup>3</sup>Marshall, Dorothy. *Industrial England 1776-1851*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973, 172.

<sup>4</sup>Foord, A. S. "The Waning of 'The Influence of the Crown'", *The English Historical Review*, LXII (October 1947), 484.

<sup>5</sup>Chester, 1981, 4, 5.

<sup>6</sup>May, Thomas. *Constitutional History of England since the Accession of George III, 1760-1860*. I. Boston: Crosby and Nichols, 1863, 19.

<sup>7</sup>Bailey, Sydney D. *British Parliamentary Democracy*. Second Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962, 20, 21. Thus, according to this definition, the colonial administration in Quebec did not conform to a constitutional monarchy because it lacked the elected assembly.

<sup>8</sup>*Sir Frederick Haldimand: Unpublished Papers and Correspondence 1758-1784*. London: The British Library, 1977, Reel 15, Additional Manuscript Number 21697, 189, 194. When Lord George Germain, under the direction of the King, appointed Burgoyne as Commander in Chief of the army in Quebec during the American War of Revolution, Guy Carleton, then Governor of Quebec and the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, resigned in protest.

<sup>9</sup>May, 1863, 27.

<sup>10</sup>Chester, 1981, 6, 9, 12.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 1981, 14.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 1981, 40.

<sup>13</sup>Simmons, R. C. *The American Colonies. From Settlement to Independence*. New York, London: W. W. Norton, 1976. Reprinted in 1981, 150-151. During the eighteenth century central government public spending increased from about 7% of the Gross National Product in 1715 to 16% in 1783. At the same time the National Debt increased from £14.2 million in 1700 to £456 million in 1800. By 1784 the cost of debt-servicing was £9 million a year (see Porter, Roy. *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*. Middlesex: Penguin, 1982, 131).

<sup>14</sup>For Example, Bowler notes that "the Commissary in Canada before the War of Revolution was John Christopher Roberts. However he employed George Allsopp as a substitute who, in turn, employed Adam Cunningham to do the actual work" (see Bowler, Arthur R. *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975, Footnote, 212).

<sup>15</sup>Donoghue, Bernard. *British Politics and the American Revolution. The Path to War, 1773-1775*. London: Macmillan, 1964, 12.

<sup>16</sup>McIlwraith, Jean N. *Sir Frederick Haldimand*. Toronto: Morang, 1904, 112.

<sup>17</sup>Bowler, 1975, 247.

<sup>18</sup>Chester, 1981, 1, 2.

<sup>19</sup>Bowler, 1975, 243. Bowler notes that one exception to this was the omission of the Secretary at War from the Cabinet, which had an increasing impact on policy during the War of Revolution.

<sup>20</sup>The Privy Council was composed of approximately one hundred members, of whom about two-thirds were members of the British peerage (see Chester, 1981, 31; Christie, I. R. *Crisis of Empire. Great Britain and the American Colonies, 1754-1783*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1966, 12).

<sup>21</sup>The Cabinet Council, or the Cabinet, was the inner cabinet of the Privy Council, called to advise the King. It was by their advice that "the King issued Proclamations and Declarations of war and summoned or dissolved Parliament" (see Chester, 1981, 31). It was after this group that the 'Privy Council' of the Carleton and Haldimand regimes was modelled, rather than after the Privy Council as a whole.

<sup>22</sup>In 1780 the House of Lords was composed of three peers of the Royal Blood, twenty-two Dukes, one Marquis, seventy-eight Earls, fourteen Viscounts, and seventy-two Barons, all of whom had the hereditary right to be summoned. To these were added the two Archbishops and twenty-four Bishops and sixteen members elected from the Scottish peerage" (see Chester, 1981, 32).

<sup>23</sup>The House of Commons had "558 members elected from time to time, 513 representing England and Wales and 45 representing Scotland" (see *Ibid.*, 1981, 32).

<sup>24</sup>Bailey, 1962, 36, 161; Chester, 1981, 32.

<sup>25</sup>Chester, 1981, 39-40.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 1981, 34.

<sup>27</sup>Porter, 1982, 127, 129.

<sup>28</sup>Chester, 1981, 37.

<sup>29</sup>Donoghue, 1964, 14.

<sup>30</sup>Porter, 1982, 158.

<sup>31</sup>Chester, 1981, 42-43.

<sup>32</sup>Taswell-Langmead, Thomas Pitt. *English Constitutional History: From the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time*. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1946, 671; Foord, 1947, 489, 490; Chester, 1981, 43. The tax boards were Customs, Excise, Stamp, Salt, Tax (Land Tax) Hackney Coach and Hawkers and Pedlars.

<sup>33</sup>Chester, 1981, 44.

<sup>34</sup>Bowler, 1975, 247-250.

<sup>35</sup>Christie, 1966, 13.

<sup>36</sup>Curtis, 1969, 33. The army was under the control of the King because it was one of the prerogatives of the King to make war and command the forces during it.

<sup>37</sup>At the beginning of the Haldimand regime in Canada Sir Jeffrey Amherst was the Secretary of State with the title of Commander in Chief.

<sup>38</sup>Chester, 1981, 45.

<sup>39</sup>Carter, Clarence Edwin (Ed). *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with The Secretaries of State, 1763-1775*. I. Yale University Press: Archon Books, 1969, x.

<sup>40</sup>Curtis, 1969, 34.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 1969, 35.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 1969, 33.

<sup>43</sup>H.P. 15, 21697, 31; Curtis, 1969, 37.

<sup>44</sup>Curtis, 1969, 38, 39.

<sup>45</sup>"Extract from Intercepted Letters of Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin regarding the peace negotiations, 1782", 'Extracts from the Seventh Report of the Commissioners of Public Accounts', *Anonymous Copybook*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The William L. Clements Library, Manuscript Division, 43. Other persons charged with the distribution of monies to the forces were the secretary to the Commander in Chief, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, the Bridge Master, the Purveyor of the Hospital and the Commissary of Prisoners.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 1782, 48. The payments were usually made in North American currency, which in New York was “to sterling as twelve to seven.”

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 1782, 38-82.

<sup>48</sup>In this context ‘duplicated’ means receiving more than one fee for the same service.

<sup>49</sup>Copybook, 1782, 55-57.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 1782, 58-68; Donorhue, 1964, 116; Chester, 1981, 14.

<sup>51</sup>Copybook, 1782, 75, 76, 79. The Canadian portion of this money between June 1, 1776 and October 23, 1781 was £2,236,029/11/7.

<sup>52</sup>Nicolson, Harold. *The Age of Reason 1700-1789*. London: Constable, 1960, 190.

<sup>53</sup>Curtis, 1969, 39.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 1969, 44, 45.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 1969, 47.

<sup>56</sup>Chester, 1981, 51.

<sup>57</sup>Bowler, 1975, 247.

<sup>58</sup>Curtis, 1969, 50.

<sup>59</sup>Simmons, 1981, 164, 165.

<sup>60</sup>Chester, 1981, 45.

<sup>61</sup>Meinig, 1986, 296.

<sup>62</sup>Christie, 1966, 12.

<sup>63</sup>Chester, 1981, 58. Porter notes that per capita taxation in England more than doubled between 1715 and 1803, but the tax bypassed liquid capital and the investment incomes of financiers and industrialists. Instead it was in the form of indirect taxation on such commodities as soap, coffee, tea, sugar, starch for hair powder, salt, port (liquor), candles, bricks, leather and glass. Many of these products were of colonial origin (see Porter, 1982, 133).

<sup>64</sup>Sutherland, Lucy. *Politics and Finance in the Eighteenth Century*. Edited by Aubrey Newman. London: The Hambleden Press, 1984, 59.

<sup>65</sup>The city broke away from a too-close liaison with the landed gentry under the leadership of John Wilkes after 1768. His influence was profound, and even Benjamin Franklin, "who was in London in 1768, thought it inexplicable" (see Sutherland, 1984, 61).

<sup>66</sup>Christie, 1966, 8. It operated on the basis of "the mother country [as] ... the entrepot and manufacturer with colonies as suppliers and a captive market .... Colonies were allowed to trade directly with foreign markets in certain commodities, and to manufacture goods that were not seriously competitive with those made in Britain: if the mother country gained the largest share of the profits, it also subsidized various productions in the colonies" (see Meinig, 1986, 297). Thus mercantilism was seen as a "just bargain" in which the mother country provided capital and military protection while the colonies in return provided raw materials (see Nicolson, 1960, 174).

<sup>67</sup>Nussbaum, Arthur. *A History of the Dollar*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 30, 31.

### **CHAPTER THREE. THE ADMINISTRATION OF QUEBEC AND ITS FRONTIER.**

In order to understand the imperial institution of colonial government, it is necessary to give a brief historical analysis of the major policy directives within which it was organized. The administration of the colony of Quebec and its interior frontier of defence, during the Haldimand administration, was constituted within two British imperial directives: the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act of 1774. As well, the Quebec administration was governed by policy created for the other North American colonies, as exemplified in Meinig's model of empire. A further influence was the policy of the former French administration. Thus the Quebec administration, during the American War of Revolution, was governed within the context of British imperialistic colonial policy.<sup>1</sup> Such policy was adjusted to the needs of each individual colony only in terms of specific political or administrative problems, that were not relevant to the other colonies. Labaree argued for example, that the instructions issued to royal governors, an "important source for the study of British colonial policy," "became definitely standardised," but "amended from time to time in the light of correspondence" with particular colonial governors or advisors. Labaree defined this standardisation as "the permanence of stereotyped policy."<sup>2</sup> The specific colonial problem with regard to Quebec, was its long-standing French system of administration, and the large numbers of French subjects that remained after the conquest (1763).

Thus, despite the argument for a generally static policy by imperial Britain over its colonies, the conquest of Quebec and its people, together with the rumble of unrest throughout the



other British American colonies, placed the Quebec administration in a dynamic framework. Of particular significance is the timing of the Quebec Act, just prior to the War of Revolution. The specific reference in the Act to the re-institution of French civil law, and the removal of the Oath of Allegiance to the Protestant religion as a condition of public office, suggest policy flexibility by the British administration, an approach that was perceived to be the answer to maintaining the imperial presence in Quebec.

### **A. THE PROCLAMATION OF 1763.**

The Proclamation of 1763 was issued on October 7, 1763, in the third year of the reign of George III of England. It followed immediately upon the signing of the 'Definitive Treaty of Paris,' on the 10th. of February, 1763, which signified the end of the Seven Years War. With George Grenville as Prime Minister, the King drafted the proclamation to meet the administrative crisis brought about by the conquest of French Quebec and Spanish Florida (East and West,) as well as other island territories such as Grenada.<sup>3</sup> The Proclamation was designed to achieve four objectives: firstly, to assign territorial boundaries to the new acquisitions, secondly, to establish an Indian territory and issue directives for the regulation of trade in it, thirdly, to provide the policies and structure for the administration of the conquered territories and fourthly, to establish a policy for land grants for military personnel. Before elaborating on these objectives it is important to note that the Proclamation, although perhaps varying in its specific instructions from most other British colonial policy directives, was part of a previously established imperial policy with regard to the role and administration of the colonies in the imperial system. The colonies, in the imperial eye, had a dual role: not only were they to provide economic advantages, both to other colonies and to the kingdom of Great Britain, but they were also to receive benefits from their participation in this imperial network. This mercantilist philosophy, as discussed in Chapter Two, was to continue

primarily through the medium of the Navigation Acts.<sup>4</sup> The Board of Trade and the Secretary of State for the American colonies, through whom this policy was administered, had as their main objective therefore, the promotion of trade with the colonies in order to achieve a favorable balance of trade for imperial Britain. This preoccupation with trade is a dominant theme in the administration of the colonies, and of particular importance to Quebec and its defence frontier because of that colony's participation in the fur trade, and its heavy reliance on fur trade profits for economic viability. Thus in the preamble to the Proclamation, the older British colonies were instructed to "avail themselves" "of the ... Benefits and Advantages of the Commerce, Manufactures and Navigation" of the new colonies.<sup>5</sup>


### **1. Objectives of the Proclamation.**

Having placed the Proclamation within the context of the mercantile system the imperial government then presented its objectives, chief of which was the creation of policy for these newly conquered territories (Quebec, East and West Florida, and Grenada). Labaree's documentation of the administration of the 'Oath of Allegiance' to the new British colonists, and the eviction from the colonies of those who did not comply, gives strong support to an imperial fear of the impact that colonial disloyalty may have on the future of the mercantile system.<sup>6</sup> It was argued that disloyalty would seriously hamper the continuation of the trade systems for which the colonies were acquired: chiefly, the fur trade in Quebec and the sugar industry in Grenada. Thus the Proclamation was not designed to meet the administrative exigencies of the colony of Quebec alone. Quebec would wait ten years before the introduction of the Quebec Act.


### **a. The Creation of the Territories of the New British Colonies.**

With regard to the drawing of the territorial boundaries of the new British colonies, the boundary established for Quebec created a parallelogram configuration, comprising about 100,000 square miles, as shown on Map 3.1. The colony was oriented to the St. Lawrence settlements, which seemed justified by the fact that this narrow stretch of river settlement had been the focus of settlement under the seigneurial system of the French regime. It has been estimated, by Hubert Charbonneau and R. Cole Harris, that in 1763 the population of the colony numbered about 70,000, 85 percent of whom lived along the St. Lawrence.<sup>7</sup> The Lake Champlain corridor was also included within the boundaries of the colony, because of its importance as an avenue of communication and trade with New York and the middle Atlantic coast.


This territory, as defined by the Proclamation, was not that formerly included in the territory administered by the French regime. Map 3.2 shows that the territory of New France, under the Treaty of Utrecht, included the St. Lawrence to Montreal and part of the Great Lakes waterway: chiefly Lake Superior and part of Lake Michigan. This configuration reflected the dominance of the French in the interior fur trade, which Map 3.3 shows was supported by a system of forts on the Great Lakes and on key Indian trail crossings or meeting points.<sup>8</sup> The decapitation of the fur trade posts from their source of supply, deriving from the redrawing of this territory in the Proclamation, had serious implications for the trade unless the Quebec boundary line was merely an administrative convenience. The diminution of the territory thus seemed to reflect a lack of perception, by the British government, of the geography and orientation of the fur trade, particularly given the imperial mercantilist aspirations. Eccles suggests however, that the motive for the reduction in territory may have been William Pitt's war policy, which aimed at the destruction of the French commercial empire, an imperial mind-set which lingered after the conquest.



Map 3.1. The Boundaries of Quebec under the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Adapted from Harris, 1987, Plate 42.



Map 3.2. The Territory of New France Under the Treaty of Utrecht. Adapted from Harris, 1987, Plate 40.



Map 3.3. The Indian Territory as Defined by the Royal Proclamation. Adapted from Harris, 1987, Plate 44.

A more local explanation for the Quebec territorial contraction can be sought in the long-standing conflicts between Quebec and the English colonies. The governor's instructions prior to 1763 indicate that as early as 1719, the governor of Nova Scotia was instructed to keep a strict watch over his French colonial neighbour. It was rumoured that they (the French) had opened a communication "from the Gulf and Rivers of St. Lawrence to the Lakes of Ontario and Erie and from thence down the River Mississippi to the Bay of Mexico." Prior to this time there had been boundary conflicts between Quebec and the English colonies of New York, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Newfoundland, and the Hudson's Bay Company.<sup>9</sup>

**b. The Creation of an Indian Territory and the Regulation of the Fur Trade.**

Closely allied with the territorial definition of the colony was the creation of an Indian territory, as shown on Map 3.3, and the regulation of the Indian or fur trade. The Indian territory, administered as a Crown colony, was to be located west of the eastern seaboard colonies and west of the St. Lawrence River, on territory formerly perceived as the frontier of Quebec.<sup>10</sup> The impact of the creation of the Indian territory not only had relevance to Quebec but to all the continental seaboard colonies. This relevance derived from its territorial delimitation, which comprised an area of "Lands beyond the Heads or sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West and North west, or ... land ... not having been ceded to or purchased by ... (Great Britain)."<sup>11</sup> Thus the 'Proclamation Line' was to run along the watershed between the Atlantic and the Mississippi, theoretically separating the European settlers from the Indians. That it was heavily biased in favour of the Indians, and by implication the fur trade, is evidenced by the fact that the survey of the line was to be conducted under the joint administration of the two superintendents of Indian affairs: Sir William Johnson in the Northern Department and John Stuart in the Southern department.<sup>12</sup> The relevance of this territory to all the colonies was made more explicit by the fact

that no further granting of warrants of survey, of settlement patents, or purchasing of land from the Indians, could take place in the Indian territory without government approval and a license. Furthermore, those already settled on the land were “to remove themselves from such settlements.” Even within colonial boundaries no person could purchase land reserved for Indians except by a public meeting of the Indians, attended by the governor or commander in chief, who then purchased the land on behalf of the British government.<sup>13</sup>

The Proclamation’s directives concerning the regulation of the Indian trade within this territory and elsewhere were explicit. The government declared that only licensed traders could participate in the trade, such licenses being issued without a fee, most likely in order to prevent the abuse of fee extortion, as well as to open the trade up to as many participants as could acquire a license. Traders were also to give security to the government for the observation of government regulations, which were to be enforced by a commissary appointed for that purpose.

Under the French regime, the frontier had been characterized by one of the traditional functions ascribed to the frontier by Turner: that of providing a refuge for those fleeing the law. However, now it was to lose that function because of the imperial directive that those who had fled to the frontier in advance of the law were to be arrested by the military administering the territory. These directives, along with the prohibition on settlement in the Indian territory, had the effect of creating antagonism by frontiersmen towards the British administration. This finally culminated in support, by many white frontier settlers, of the rebel cause during the War of Revolution.

Thus the Proclamation, in the context of Indian colonial history, established a definite Indian frontier and a territory that would presumably make the regulation of the fur trade more



feasible. From a mercantilist perspective, the continuation of the fur trade was of greater importance to the imperial government at this time, than the provision of new agricultural land and economic opportunities for the rapidly developing eastern seaboard colonies. This imperial stance therefore provided justification for the defence of the fur trade posts and territories during the War of Revolution.

With such an emphasis, in the Proclamation, on the Indian boundary line, the Indian territorial jurisdiction, and the regulation of the fur trade, Meinig argues that it was essentially a geographical device to activate a general policy with regard to the interior trade of North America.<sup>14</sup> However, this argument must be set against De Vorsey's statement that the Proclamation, particularly its Indian trade provisions, was a "provincial arrangement" until more definitive policies could be established. Martin also cautioned against "reconstructing" a general trend from historical hindsight, which the colonial policy-makers may not have perceived themselves.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand it is important to note that once policies are established, even as provisional arrangements, they tend to become 'intrenched' in the political landscape, and remain in force much longer than originally intended, as documented by Labaree in the governor's instructions.

### **c. The Institution of Civil Government for the Colonies.**

The third objective of the Proclamation was the creation of civil government for the conquered colonies. In the colonial system of administration, already well-established in the 'old colonies,' the governor was the head of the colonial executive. He was the "connecting link between the English administration and the colonial local government."<sup>16</sup> It was his prerogative to command the militia, preside over the supreme colonial court, to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the colonial assemblies, to hold a power of veto over both the council and the assembly, to dispense

pardons and appointments, to act as chief land agent, both in terms of making grants and collecting rents, to enforce the commercial system, and to defend the prerogatives of the crown. Thus the governor stood in the same position in the colonial administration as the king did in the imperial administration.

The administration of the governor's military duties, as commander in chief, had considerable significance for the civil status of the colonial government, in that it emphasised the enforcement of the imperial system by military means. However it presented a contradiction in terms, in that one of the principles of the imperial administration was that civil and military affairs be kept separate. This contradiction proved problematic for Haldimand when he assumed command during the War of Revolution. The milieu of the colony endorsed a military emphasis on security, defence, and loyalty, while on the other hand it was argued that loyalty would follow upon a commitment to the civil and mercantile affairs of the colony: affairs which were of secondary importance during the hostilities. As with the king in Great Britain, the degree of control of government by the colonial governors and/or commander in chiefs, was diminished by several other governmental bodies: namely the council, the judiciary, and the legislative assembly, the latter not constituted in Quebec. These bodies not only enforced British laws and administrative customs, but also created new laws when these were endorsed by the imperial regime. However, during the War of Revolution the Quebec legislature was largely ignored and military command assumed precedence.

#### **I. The Legislative Council.**

The colonial council was the chief policy body of the colonial legislature. By the time of the Proclamation, the appointment of councillors was not solely at the discretion of the British

government. The colonial governor could now appoint councillors, sufficient to “make up the full number of the council ...,” if council positions fell vacant.<sup>17</sup> This gave the governor considerable power over the council, which Haldimand later used in order to prevent the council from interfering with his military policy during the War of Revolution. This independence from council control was further assisted by the fact that Haldimand did not have to reveal all his royal instructions (generally prepared by the Secretary of State, the Treasury Board, the Privy Council and the Board of Trade) to the council, unless explicitly directed by the Home government. Although these instructions usually covered all aspects of the colonial administration, such as legislation, finance, justice, religious issues, land ownership, the Indian trade and military concerns, Haldimand argued that the precarious defence position of Quebec justified his keeping military instructions in particular, from the majority of council members, particularly those accused of harbouring rebel sympathies.<sup>18</sup>

However, despite this power over the council, the governor was expected to allow it to function as an effective tool in the colonial administration. In discussing the relationship between the governor and the council, Coffin argues that the royal instructions directed the governor to act with the “advice and consent” of his council, particularly with reference to Indian/colonial relations. However, in reality, the Quebec council gave an impression of “a body so docile as to present no obstacle” to the governor. This docility was no doubt partly a function of the governor’s selection of members, together with the tenuous relationship between the French on council, who took the ‘Oath of Allegiance’ to the British crown, and their English conquerors. It was further reinforced by the governor’s power of suspension from council and his ability to control the frequency of council meetings. Coffin also noted the unfamiliarity of the French colonists with English parliamentary practise, thus limiting their ability to participate fully in legislative affairs.<sup>19</sup> The degree of council control by the Haldimand administration suggests that these problems had become deeply entrenched

in the Quebec legislature. The question of whether or not such control by the governor was responsible for maintaining the loyalty of Quebec, and its defence frontier, to the British administration during the War of Revolution, deserves further study.

The instructions regarding the council in Quebec stated that the town of Quebec was to be “the principal seat of government.” This location remained throughout the War of Revolution, although Haldimand found it necessary to use Montreal as a secondary base, largely because of its proximity to the lines of communication between the Upper Posts and the defence frontier, and the Quebec administration. The council was to be composed of “the lieutenant governor of [the districts of] Montreal and Trois Rivieres, the chief justice of the province, the surveyor general of the customs in the northern district (a powerful voice in colonial administrative affairs,) and eight other persons. The councillors were to take the oaths of ‘Allegiance’ and ‘Supremacy,’ which formed the mandate by which they assumed office.”<sup>20</sup> However the fact that most of the councillors lived close to Quebec, or even Montreal, meant that the concerns of the defence frontier, during the War of Revolution, were both politically and geographically distant from their own experience. Thus it seems reasonable to suggest that the presence or absence of the council during the Haldimand administration, had little impact on the administration of the interior frontier of defence.

## **II. The Judiciary.**

Another important arena for colonial legislative activity was the judiciary. The judiciary received emphasis, in the governor’s instructions following the Proclamation, with respect to the creation of the courts in the conquered colonies. With the establishment of the Quebec legal system, the imperial government instituted both a check on the possibility of a French reaction to British control, as well as establishing the English common-law legal tradition. To ensure control the

imperial government directed that an account was to be kept of all “establishments of jurisdictions, courts, offices and officers, powers, authorities, fees and privileges granted ....”<sup>21</sup> The difficulty of achieving this in a frontier environment is not referred to in the Proclamation, although there can be little doubt that the reference to all jurisdictions was to include those in the Illinois, for example, where there was a strong independent French tradition.

With respect to the English common-law tradition, this was to be pursued in stationary courts, which had been a feature of the old French regime.<sup>22</sup> The only concession to the English tradition was the weekly rotation of Justices of the Peace (who at Detroit were the only form of justice) amongst provincial districts. This is a legitimate concession in light of the difficulty of administering a legal system over vast, relatively unpopulated territory, with a limited legal personnel resource. The law courts were to hear both civil and criminal cases, “agreeable to the Laws of England, with Liberty to all persons ... to appeal ... to [the] Privy Council.”<sup>23</sup> The introduction of English law was a sore point with the French colonists, particularly on the frontier, and provided the incentive for the imperial government to modify the legal system, in favour of the French, in the Quebec Act.

It is in the blending of the French and English systems of jurisprudence that the problem of administering the Quebec legal system emerged. Neatby argues that there was considerable stress, particularly among English colonists, over which system to adopt in matters of imperial trade and laws of inheritance.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps the most reasonable view of the post-Proclamation legal system is that of a self-serving use of both systems wherever circumstances were deemed appropriate. However it can be suggested that, in the western sector of the interior frontier of defence during the War of Revolution, there was a reversion back to the French system amongst French settlers and

traders, who did not support the British cause.

### **III. The Assembly.**

One of the most contentious issues of the Proclamation concerned the institution of the Assembly: the lower house of the colonial legislature. The Proclamation stated that an Assembly could be instituted in Quebec if and when “the state and circumstances” of the colony were appropriate. However, in view of the growing power of the English colonial assemblies, the British began to take steps to restrict such local domination.<sup>25</sup> The problem in adopting restrictive strategies for limiting the power of the assemblies was their enforcement, which became more significant as the size of the colonies grew.

Consequent upon the restrictive proscriptions issued by the imperial government against the colonial assemblies, was the reluctance of the home government to foster the same problems in Quebec. Although the governor’s instructions of 1763 do not appear to permanently withhold an assembly from Quebec, it was not instituted in the province.<sup>26</sup>

Its non-institution coincided with an increasingly strident parliamentary agitation in England, for a change in either policy, or the management of policy, in the colonies. Andrews, quoted in Coupland, argued that the policy at this time therefore, began to show increasing centripetal tendencies, directed towards centralizing imperial authority in England.<sup>27</sup> Thus any colonial institution that interrupted this mechanism would, according to this argument, be delayed until it could be adjusted to conform to the imperial model.

#### **d. Land Grants Policy.**

The fourth objective of the Proclamation was the establishing of a policy for land grants, particularly of those to the military. The inclusion of land provisions emphasised two important areas of imperial concern in the American colonies: one was the westward spread of settlement into the colonial frontiers, and beyond the Allegheny watershed, and the other was the premier position of the military in the imperial administrative framework.

With regard to the westward spread of settlement, it has already been argued that it aroused the ire of the Indians, upon whose cooperation the economy of the interior rested. Hence the provision of an Indian territory to protect it. That this was a difficult problem to redress however, is indicated by Stuart, the superintendent of the Southern Indian Department. He stated that the Indians' principal complaint was "Encroachments on their Lands by the Traders who contrary to every Regulation and to His Majesty's ... Instructions as set forth by His Proclamation in 1763 have made & do continue to make Settlements ... in the very midst of their Country .... This Proceeding ... Contrary to all the Promises made the Indians, that no Settlements should ever be allowed ... beyond the Boundary Line without their Consent."<sup>28</sup> Despite these complaints, westward settlement continued, although greatly restricted during the War of Revolution.

#### **I. Land Grants to Individuals.**

The granting of land to individuals was to be organized by the governor and council, in accordance with a set procedure as set forth in the governor's instructions. These included such requirements as the cultivation of 3 acres for every 50 acres of plantable land, a survey by a "proper officer" within six months, registration of the grant within six months of its survey, and official registration in England within six months. The grants also carried with them the obligation of a rent payment, which in Quebec was 2/- per 100 acres. The difficulty in monitoring this policy in the

Indian territory was not perceived by the imperial government, especially the difficulty of meeting the survey requirements. However there were attempts at monitoring settlement in the defence frontier as exemplified by Hamilton's request that Haldimand respond to applications for the granting of lands near Detroit. On July 2, 1771, the British returned to the seigneurial system of land grants, which was entrenched in the Quebec landscape. Its reinstitution would hopefully minimise the administrative regulation and supervision that would be necessary to institute the English system. Furthermore, it was a cultural institution of importance to the French, and thus would avoid the antagonism resulting from instituting an alien form of settlement.

## **II. Military Land Grants.**

The importance of the military in the colonial imperial system was emphasised, in the Proclamation, by the grants to military personnel who had served in the Seven Years War. The imperial preoccupation with military control of the colonies, was endorsed by several governors' instructions, emphasising the importance of an adequate defence posture in the colonies. In Quebec, the state of military stores was to be assessed immediately after the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the inhabitants were to be administered the 'Oath of Allegiance' by the military, and a compilation of the inventory of arms held by Catholic colonists was to be made. In the interior, an assessment was to be made of the state of the defence of the forts, their stores of war, and "what more may be necessary to be built for ... [their] defence and security." Furthermore, in Quebec the Proclamation followed upon a military government which had been administered, since its surrender on September 8, 1760, by General James Murray. The districts of Montreal and Three Rivers had also been administered by military men: namely, Thomas Gage and Ralph Burton respectively. Military security was the principal concern of these war-time administrations, and it can be conjectured that the program of 'old soldier settlement' of the ancient empire of Rome, may have had some



influence on the specific reference to military settlement in the Proclamation.

## **2. Assessment of the Role of the Proclamation in the Revolutionary Administration of the Quebec Interior Frontier of Defence.**

In order to understand the role that the Proclamation played in the revolutionary administration of the Quebec frontier, it is important to underscore two points: firstly, the Proclamation left the frontier of the former French colony of Quebec without civil government, and secondly, the principles of the Proclamation formed the basis for the administration of the interior frontier of defence during the Haldimand administration. Thus this 'temporary' document became embedded in the imperial policy for the American colonies.

With regard to the civil government of the frontier, the Proclamation line divided the settled part of Quebec from its former frontier: that is, the fur trade front that advanced in a westerly direction along several well-defined routes. These routes were chiefly the Ottawa River and the Great Lakes, which extended through the Niagara portage to Michilimackinac and the Grand Portage. They also included such well-known spurs as the Green Bay/Mississippi, the St. Joseph/Illinois, the Detroit/Ohio, the Sandusky/Presque Isle/Fort Pitt, and the southward extensions from the Niagara and Mohawk to the Allegheny, Susquehanna, Delaware and Hudson Rivers. The Proclamation placed this territory in a separate administrative category from Quebec, thus, at least theoretically, removing it from the administrative control of the colony.

The presence of French civil settlements in the Indian territory was largely ignored. For example, Detroit, Kaskaskia, Vincennes, and Michilimackinac, had a long history of French occupation, much of which, apart from the military garrisons at the forts, was civilian. The Proclamation suggested that the solution to the dilemma of providing civil government for these

settlements was that “all Persons Whatever, who have either Wilfully or inadvertently seated themselves upon any Lands still reserved to the said Indians, [were] ... to remove themselves from such settlements.”<sup>29</sup> It is assumed that this proscription was directed not only at settlements within the Indian territory, but also those on Indian land along the colonial frontiers. As late as 1773, the resettlement of civilians within the Indian territory, was still being promoted as a solution to the problem of the provision of civil government to the interior. What this solution overlooked, or ignored, was that not only were most of these civilians newly conquered subjects, but permanent citizens of the frontier. The creation, by the British government, of an Indian territory was therefore regarded by them as unjust, even if it was designed to promote the fur trade with which most of them were connected. This led to an increasingly belligerent attitude by the western settlers to the policies of the British, which predisposed to their adopting rebel sympathies during the War of Revolution. However there was some acknowledgement within the Proclamation of the possibility for government-directed settlement, or commercial enterprise, within the borders of the Indian territory. It was stated that “if at any Time ... the ... Indians should be inclined to dispose of ... Lands” within their territory, that such lands should be purchased by the imperial government.

With regard to the permanence of the principles of the Proclamation, British imperial policies were built upon earlier antecedents, in the tradition of eighteenth-century administrative conservatism. Thus the Proclamation, as exemplified by the governments of Governors Murray and Carleton (prior to the Quebec Act), formed the basis for the directives of the Quebec Act. This had considerable significance for the administration of the interior frontier of defence because the Quebec Act was instituted on the eve of the War of Revolution. As such, its directives took second place to military policy, created for the security and defence of the colony. It was upon the principles of the Proclamation therefore, which had been in existence since the conquest, that the

policies of the war administrations were built. This was in order to lessen the burden of instituting a new body of policy, much of which applied to the civil aspects of government, in the colony and the defence frontier during the war.

## **B. THE MURRAY ADMINISTRATION. (1763-1766)**

The Proclamation was established within the colonial administrative framework by the civil administration of Governor Murray, and the governor's instructions accompanying his commission. Murray assumed the governorship of Quebec on August 10, 1764, after having commanded the colony, under a military regime, since 1759. Murray's commission directed him to establish civil government, and utilize the military only insofar as it supported the civil principles of government. Murray's government, minus an assembly, consisted of a legislative council and a system of law courts, headed by a chief justice.

### **1. The Legislative Council.**

As Quebec had no assembly, which was the usual colonial funding source for the government administration, the province was funded, until the appointment of a Receiver General in 1766, directly by the home government. The removal of the right of the colony to provide its own source of funding greatly reduced its legislative effectiveness, independent of imperial domination.<sup>30</sup>

### **2. The Judiciary.**

The judiciary was established by an ordinance on 17th. September, 1764. The judicial system, established under this ordinance, closely followed the British model, and with French intrusions, became the basis of the judicial system created under the aegis of the Quebec Act. One legal right, common to all colonies, was the right of appeal from the colonial Court of the King's Bench, to the Privy Council in England. This right was one means of cementing the bond between

Britain and Quebec, and ensuring, at least theoretically, the extension of the legal rights of British citizens to the colony.<sup>31</sup>

Three levels of judicial administration were established by the ordinance. At the apex was the Court of the King's Bench, for the hearing of both civil and criminal cases. This court, presided over by the Chief Justice, was usually held at Quebec. It was somewhat divorced from the French legal tradition of the colony in that it "usually heard cases in English and determined them by English law."<sup>32</sup> This had particular relevance to the western sector of the interior frontier of defence, because most of the inhabitants spoke French, and thus would be reluctant to have their cases argued in an English court.

The next lower court was the Court of Common Pleas, which was for the hearing of civil cases only. Its strength was that, as it was oriented to domestic and commercial cases, it impinged quite closely on the French Canadian culture. However, it was again limited in its effectiveness by the use of the English language, and predominantly English jurors (although the French could become jurors after 1766,) during legal proceedings.<sup>33</sup>

At the base of the system was the Justice of the Peace, an office which Neatby argues was a "typically English institution." The justices could "hear and determine police and minor criminal cases and some civil suits," and in theory at least, should have helped to mitigate the effect of the lengthy litigation process at the upper levels of the judicial system. It could therefore be argued that along the defence frontier, where access to the upper courts, in terms of both distance and language, was limited, the justice of the peace would preside over the majority of legal cases, both civil and criminal. However Neatby argues that they were inadequate because Quebec "did not possess

enough men of substance and education, (and of course English background) independent enough to be judges, and yet willing to take directions from the central government.”<sup>34</sup> This was borne out by the difficulty that Hamilton had at Detroit, in securing a justice for that post, particularly one that was bilingual, and willing to be impartial in disputes involving the French inhabitants.

### **3. Colonial Reports.**

One of Murray’s principal duties as governor was to render detailed reports of his administration, to the home government. These reports, which had become an administrative tradition in the colonies, formed a permanent record that provided information for the imperial creators of colonial policy. The reports were to include such geographical information as a map of the province and an accompanying survey, the total number of acres, the nature of the climate, detailed topographical information, the quantity of land under improvement, and the amount of settlement. It also included the number of mills and their operation, the amount of uncultivated land in acres, the stock and amount of provisions, the kind and extent of woods, and the colour, occupation, and military readiness of the inhabitants. Demographic figures, such as the total number of births and deaths, were also to be recorded, together with reports on governmental proceedings. The imperial officers to whom these reports were sent were the Principal Secretaries of State, the Board of Trade, and the Privy Council: it being understood that the King would also be informed of all colonial information, particularly that relevant to its military status. These reports became even more critical during the War of Revolution, although it was more difficult to maintain the level of communication established prior to the war.

### **4. Religious Affairs.**

The Roman Catholic tradition of Quebec was a matter for imperial concern. Religious liberty had been guaranteed to Catholics within the Articles of Capitulation after the conquest,

however the Church of England was to be the official church of state, and the 'Oath of Supremacy' its insignia.<sup>35</sup> With the abandonment of the 'Oath of Supremacy' for Roman Catholic office holders, the imperial government was convinced that they had ensured continuing loyalty to Britain within the colony. However, the restriction of the activities of Roman Catholic missionary orders, particularly along the frontier, promoted antagonism amongst the French settlers, which hindered the administration of the frontier, by the British, during the War of Revolution.

## 5. Indian Affairs.

Upon taking up civil office, Governor Murray was to appoint a "proper person or persons to assemble and treat with the ... INDIANS, promising ... protection and friendship ... and delivering ... presents ...."<sup>36</sup> He was also to supply a report on Indian affairs to the home government, that detailed the "number, nature, and disposition of the several tribes..., ... the manner of their lives, and the rules and constitutions by which they are governed or regulated; and ... to use the best means ... for conciliating their affections and uniting them to our government ...."<sup>37</sup> In this respect Murray was acting as a quasi-governor of the Indian territory, or at least as one of its principal colonial overseers.

There were two important issues which arose out of the policy on the Indian territory. The first concerned access to the fur trade, across the boundaries of the Indian territory, and the second concerned the agitation for civil government by French settlers in the territory. Apart from the antagonism aroused in the seaboard colonies by the disruption of long-established Indian trade routes, there was ire in the hearts of the Quebec merchants as well, on account of the enforcement of traffic restrictions, particularly of ammunition, into the Indian territory.<sup>38</sup>

It was the issue of civil government however, that presented the most perplexing problem

with respect to the Indian territory. The nodal relationship of the civil settlements with the forts, had been established under the French administration. Although these forts continued to serve both military and civilian functions under British rule, the French settlers of the Illinois demanded independent government, and by implication, independent legal and military services. These settlements did not just depend on the fur trade, but practised agriculture as well, shipping wheat, flour, corn, cattle, and swine, to Louisiana. Kaskaskia, the biggest settlement prior to the conquest, had approximately 700 inhabitants of French descent. It was these residents in particular, who in 1773 demanded civil government "suitable to their situation." It was argued that they had been "a long time" agitating for a "Republican form of government," largely in recognition of their distance from other centres of government and the independence that they had been forced to adopt.<sup>39</sup> The restriction on travel into the Indian territory further reinforced this sense of isolation, and predicated the hostility of the settlers to the British government during the War of Revolution.

The suggestion for civil government at this time points to the lack of a solution for the civil/military administration in the Indian territory, up to the time of the Revolution. This was exacerbated by the fact that there was considerable retrenchment of the British military in the territory during this time. Cruikshank, quoted by Burt, noted that by the early 70's "regular troops had been long since withdrawn from all forts on the borders of ... [the territory], except at Oswegatchie, Niagara, Detroit, and Mackinac, and the garrisons of these posts were reduced to the lowest point, while their defences had been permitted to fall into ruins."<sup>40</sup>

### **C. THE CARLETON ADMINISTRATION (1768-1778).**

It can be argued that the principle of this administration, as with the Murray government, was that of preserving the French character of the colony in order that it be retained within the

imperial system. Thus to the imperial government, placating the French in Quebec was seen as the key to the continuing mercantile success of the fur trade in Canada. The preservation of the French character was to take several forms, but it would be achieved principally through the guarantee of freedom of religion for Roman Catholics, the participation of the French inhabitants in government and the military, and the protection of French civil laws and customs. Carleton, because of his long governorship, had considerable influence on the administration of Quebec, as well as on the creation of the Quebec Act. He also led the colony into the War of Revolution.

A significant event in the first year of the Carleton regime, with reference to the administration of the interior frontier of defence, was the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. This treaty resulted from a meeting between Sir William Johnson of the Northern Indian Department, and the Six Nations Indians. Kelsay states that Johnson had long regarded the Proclamation Line, based as it was upon an interim document, as too temporary to provide an adequate boundary between the white frontier and the northern Indian hunting grounds. To convince the imperial government of the need for a more permanent boundary line, he used the argument of the long-standing Indian unrest concerning white encroachment on their lands, made explicit in the Pontiac uprising of 1763. He argued that such antagonism could lose the frontier to either the French or Spanish, and emphasised the consequent loss of fur trade profits if this were the outcome. However, instead of a mere boundary line drawn on a map, as had been done for the Indian territory under the Proclamation, Johnson requested that he purchase part of the Indian territory for the British Crown, the purchase acting as a sign of good faith to the Indians that the boundary, once established, would be respected. The fate of the rest of the Indian territory was not stated.<sup>41</sup>

There has been considerable argument as to who was responsible for drawing the line.



Kelsay implies that Johnson chose the line, while De Vorsey argues that the line was a Board of Trade suggestion: which, in view of the advantage that it gave to the Virginia land expansionists (who included members of the Board of Trade), seems reasonable. The cession of land made to the Iroquois by Johnson on October 24, 1768, “began on the Ohio River at the mouth of the Tennessee, followed the Ohio up to Fort Pitt, proceeded on up the Allegheny to Kittanning, then directly overland to the west branch of the Susquehanna, ... down that stream and thence by two smaller streams to the east branch of the Susquehanna and up to Owego and then east to the upper Delaware, ... and back again to the Susquehanna at Unadilla ... to its source, and finally to a point on Wood Creek near Fort Stanwix. Everything to the south of this line, except what the Mohawks still owned would be white country.”<sup>42</sup> The treaty stated that the boundary had also been continued south of the Ohio into Cherokee country, because that was regarded as the “true bounds with the Southern Indians ....”<sup>43</sup> However De Vorsey argues that this southern extension was based on the tenuous military superiority of the Iroquois over the Cherokee, which was already on the wane at the time of the treaty.

The formal cession of part of the Indian territory to the British government at Fort Stanwix was, according to De Vorsey, seen by the Iroquois as politically expedient at the time, in that they received gifts and military equipment in return for the territory lost. However, the treaty line defined the Indian territory under the Quebec Act, and thus removed the rest of the Indian territory under the Proclamation from Indian sovereignty. The treaty angered the eastern seaboard colonies, in that the negotiations had not included adequate representation from them, and there was agitation, particularly by Virginia, to redraw the line. Modifications were eventually made eastward in favour of the Virginians, to include all the Virginia settlements in the west.<sup>44</sup>

This treaty had two significant implications with respect to the administration of Quebec. Firstly, it created a definite boundary line between the northern and southern Indians. This effectively redirected the hunting grounds of the Iroquois northwards, reinforcing the orientation of the Indian territory to the Great Lakes basin. The inclusion of the Ohio in this northern system enabled the traditional link, via the Allegheny and the Susquehanna Rivers, of the Ohio with the Champlain system and the northeast coast, to be maintained.<sup>45</sup>

The second implication of the treaty was that it continued the focus of the fur trade as experienced under the French regime: that is, the "centralisation of policy and organization [in Quebec and Britain]... and ... an increasing dependence on the traders [and the fur trade posts] in the interior."<sup>46</sup> The geographical difference of the trade under the English however, was that its seacoast outlet was now only at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, rather than also having access to the Gulf of Mexico via the Mississippi. Thus it became a northern trade, focussed on the Great Lakes, and on their forts. Therefore, as the War of Revolution approached, the imperial policy concerning the Indians and the fur trade was directed towards the Northern Indian Department, and the Quebec administration became almost solely responsible for the administration of the Indian territory.

By the time of the Quebec Act therefore, the British government had adopted a policy of the restriction of westward settlement, which provoked increasing hostility from the seaboard colonies and westward settlers, towards Quebec and its administration. As well, there had been a realignment in the control of the fur trade, with Montreal and Quebec predominating over the dwindling trade of New York: particularly Albany.<sup>47</sup> This led to the manipulation of the Quebec Act to fit this political/economic reality, which formed the basis for the continuing support of the Upper Posts and the defence frontier during the War of Revolution.

#### **D. THE QUEBEC ACT.**

The second major policy directive influencing the administration of the interior frontier of defence, during the War of Revolution, was the Quebec Act of 1774. This was the constitutional highlight of the Carleton administration. It followed his return to London in 1770 for, as Eccles puts it, “discussions on the framing of a new administrative structure for Quebec.”<sup>48</sup> However, although the Quebec Act was a new document in Canadian history, it was only explicable in the context of the policy directives previously established in the Proclamation. Simmons contended therefore, that the “Proclamation of 1763 provided a skeleton policy ... anticipating the more famous Quebec Act of 1774,” and thus, as Coffin argued, there was no inconsistency between the two policy directives.<sup>49</sup>

However, Lower suggests that there was inconsistency in that the Proclamation was not built upon any form of imperial policy: it was merely an ‘ad hoc’ solution to the crisis of providing administration for a conquered territory. Neatby and Jack P. Greene also argued that it was a “new and controversial form of colonial government,” “based upon concepts both unfamiliar and unwelcome to the colonists, such as centralization, uniformity and orderly development.”<sup>50</sup> However, while the application of British imperial control may have been intensified by the Proclamation, it was based upon long-standing principles of imperial mercantilist government.

The Quebec Act did differ from the Proclamation with respect to the method of its institution and its geographical application. Firstly, it was not instituted by the usual method of creating governments by prerogative acts of the Crown. Instead, by its creation as an Act of Parliament, it “inaugurated the era of parliamentary supremacy” in imperial affairs,” which became

increasingly dominant in the British imperial administration toward the end of the eighteenth-century. Secondly, unlike the Proclamation, it applied specifically to Quebec.<sup>51</sup>

With respect to its specific application to Quebec, the extension of the territory of the colony, and the premier place accorded fur trade interests in the Act, gave a pre-eminence to Quebec in the North American colonial mercantile system. The combination of both governmental and private interests in the fur trade, particularly evident in the administration and settlement of the interior forts, justified, at least from an imperial perspective, government control of the policy concerning the trade. This was further justified by the fact that in 1786 the trade was worth £285,977 in export trade from Quebec, with a capital investment in Canada of £200,000. Thus it was argued that the fur trade was “so essential a Branch of Trade” as to be “an object deserving of all the encouragement and protection” that government could provide.<sup>52</sup>

The Quebec Act was passed in June, 1774, in the 14th, year of the reign of George III. The preamble stated that the Proclamation, although meeting some of the administrative needs of the colony, had left unanswered the problem of the lack of civil government for the French settlers in the Indian territory. This would be solved by the Act, which would extend the boundaries of Quebec to include the French settlements in the Illinois. However the main concerns of the Act were the boundaries of Quebec, the question of religion, the choice of a legal system, and the administrative principles of the legislative council: all of which had their precedent in the Proclamation.

## **1. The Redefinition of the Boundaries of Quebec.**


The redefined boundaries, as shown on Map 3.4, extended the territory of Quebec from the Atlantic coast (Chaleur Bay), in a southwesterly direction, towards Louisiana. This swathe of territory included the Great Lakes and their principal forts of Detroit, and Michilimackinac. It did not include all of the former French colonial territory, but did recognize the importance of the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes system as a waterway to the interior. However, the boundaries overlapped the Indian territory to such a degree that only a comparatively narrow strip was left, north of the Ohio, bordering the eastern seaboard colonies. Thus the territory was left without any direct access to the sea, and with only one principal fur trade post: namely Fort Niagara.

The Act stated that the boundaries of Quebec were not to affect the boundaries of any other colony. This substantiated the policy of the Proclamation, in its stated objective that the western side of the colonial boundaries were to remain relatively intact. However, the western boundary claims of the colony of New York were ignored, and its claim was pushed eastwards, an unpopular decision in view of the predominant colonial demand for the extension of the seaboard colonies westward for settlement.

## **2. Religion.**

The second provision of the Act concerned the religious affiliation of the province. This issue, although not discussed in the Proclamation, was discussed in the governor's instructions issued after the Proclamation. The instructions of 1763, stated that religious liberty was to be guaranteed under the Treaty of Peace. As these instructions were valid until 1775, it can be assumed that religious liberty was also guaranteed under the Proclamation.<sup>53</sup>

The directions concerning the management of the religious question, included the abolition



Map 3.4. The Boundaries of Quebec under the Quebec Act. Adapted from Harris, 1987, Plate 44.

of the Society of Jesuits, no doubt because of the perceived role of this society “as a body corporate and politic,” and as a considerable landholder. It had been under censure since the Proclamation because of its influence in the colony, and its role as the chief missionary institution amongst the Indians. It was in the Jesuit influence, that the imperial government saw a link between the colony of Quebec and the Indian territory. Coffin argues that it was this link that was partly responsible for the annexing of part of the Indian territory to Quebec, as the province that “had been earliest and most closely associated” with the Indian territory.<sup>54</sup>

Associated with the concession of religious toleration in the Quebec Act, was the removal of the necessity for a Roman Catholic to take the ‘Oath of Supremacy’ of the Protestant religion before assuming administrative office. This had been a particularly contentious issue because it was a requirement for membership in the Council. The ‘Oath of Supremacy’ was to be superseded by the ‘Oath of Allegiance’ to George III, an oath which the imperial government assumed would be non-offensive to the new subjects.<sup>55</sup>

### **3. French Law.**

The third provision of the Act concerned the re-institution of French law in the province. It was stated “that in all Matters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil Rights, Resort shall be had to the Laws of Canada ....”<sup>56</sup> To make the legal system more explicit, governor’s instructions were issued concerning the institution of a new judicial system, or the validation of the existing system. In some cases it was left to the discretion of the legislative council as to whether suits were settled by French laws, or the laws of England. With the tight rein held on the council by the governor, this clause provided a means of safeguarding British imperial interests in the province, particularly with regard to contracts of mercantile intent, or concerning the fur trade.

The courts established under the Quebec Act were the same in name as those established under the Proclamation: namely, the Court of the King's Bench for criminal and civil justice, and a lower civil Court of Common Pleas for the districts of Quebec and Montreal. It can be assumed that the Justice of the Peace also continued to provide legal service, particularly in the interior. Again, the problem with the judiciary was its under-representation of Canadian-born subjects, exemplifying the restriction of French influence, through the legal system, in the colony. The ultimate court of appeal in the colony was the governor and council, providing the appeal concerned disputes, in commercial matters, over ten pounds and under five hundred pounds. Above this value the case was sent to the Privy Council in England. The English system of Habeas corpus was a vital ingredient in these judicial proceedings, based on the principle of "security to personal liberty, ... which is the right of every British subject."<sup>57</sup>

However the Quebec Act did attempt to remedy the heavy weighting of the judicial system in favour of the St. Lawrence settlements. It directed that four judicial districts were to be established west of Quebec: namely, the Illinois, Vincennes, Detroit and Michilimackinac. This acknowledged the French (and English) civil populations in these areas: numbering in the 1750's about 2,240 at the Illinois (including slaves and Indians), 400 at Vincennes, and 483 at Detroit (excluding Indians).<sup>58</sup> However the exigencies of war prevented these districts from being fully incorporated in the legal system.

It is interesting to note that the Quebec Act and the accompanying governor's instructions, make scant reference to military law. This is somewhat surprising given that the act was instituted at a time when tensions were heightened between the imperial government and its American colonies, and given that the colonies were largely administered by military personnel. Perhaps



some clue to this omission is given by Coffin, who argued that the “Quebec bill ... was not ... in any way connected with the previous American measures,” such as the Coercive Acts directed at the province of Massachusetts.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, to dwell on military law would not be conducive to allaying fears of a military regime dominating civil affairs in the colonies.

#### **4. The Legislative Council.**

The fourth directive of the Quebec Act concerned the provision of a legislative council. With respect to the non-granting of an assembly, a letter, dated August 22nd., 1774, stated that one reason for withholding this institution of government was the fact that the new, extended boundaries of Quebec made the assembly an “impracticable method of government,” in that reasonable representation from its frontiers could not be guaranteed. That the inhabitants of the frontier did not agree with this conclusion, was evidenced by the fact that representatives of frontier interests resident in England, such as the merchants of London, had tried in vain to persuade the imperial government to grant an assembly. These interests sought to ‘normalize’ government in the frontier, as well as to remove direct control of the fur trade from the hands of the imperial government.<sup>60</sup>

The governor’s instructions, given in addition to the Act, gave a clearer picture of the duties of the council and the nature of its legislation. For example, no ordinance was to be passed concerning trade, commerce, or the fisheries, which placed Quebec in an more advantageous position economically, than the other colonies. There can be little doubt that this proviso hinted at the possible reaction of the other colonies to the extension of Quebec’s boundaries, and the advantage this gave to Quebec in the operation of the fur trade.

In assessing the appropriateness of the Quebec Act to the colony at this time, Neatby and Coupland argue respectively, that not only could its immediate effect not be measured because of

the intrusion of the War of Revolution, but it was enacted too late.<sup>61</sup> With regard to the former argument, Neatby suggests that its passage, which followed immediately upon the Boston tea riot of December, 1773, fired the already primed resentment of the American colonies. This resentment crystallised around such issues as the geopolitical concept of the primary relationship of the colony of Quebec to the western interior, the prevention of westward settlement, the concessions to the Catholic church (a particularly inflammatory issue in puritan New England,) and the precedent of the denial of an assembly to Quebec.

With regard to the second argument, Coupland implies that the Act should have been instituted instead of the Royal Proclamation, or at least in concert with it. Such a parliamentary action would have given Quebec a constitutional form of government, that while not necessarily adequate, would have indicated a parliamentary commitment not only to maintaining the fur trade, but also to ensuring the promotion of civil government, permanent settlement, and hopefully economic diversity. This could have advanced the development of Quebec as a colony, and removed much of the suspicion of disloyalty on the part of Quebec's governors during the War of Revolution.

In the next Four chapters, the revolutionary administration of the interior frontier of defence will be discussed. In Chapter Four, the interior frontier of defence will be identified, based upon contemporary statements at the time, chiefly those assembled in the Haldimand Papers, and recorded on historic maps. The frontier will be defined in terms of military activities, such as campaigns raids and scoutings. Chapter Five will include a discussion of the government of the frontier by the headquarters administration of Quebec and its proximal posts. The Upper Posts administration will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, these posts being located west of

Carleton Island. This division, between the headquarters administration and that of the Upper Posts, is made because it is argued that the Upper Posts administrators had a closer identification with the frontier, and thus provided a clearer picture of its government. Chapter Eight contains a statement of conclusion.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Andrews, Charles M. *The Colonial Period of American History. England's Commercial and Colonial Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938, Chapter V; Labaree, Leonard Woods (Collater and Editor). *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors 1670-1776*. I, II. New York: Octagon Books, 1967; McMurrin, John. "Political Development", *Colonial British America. Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era*. Edited by Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, 446-447.

<sup>2</sup>Labaree, 1967, viii-ix.

<sup>3</sup>*Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985*. Prepared Under the Authority of the Statute Revision Act. Appendices. Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1985, 1; Ketchum, Richard M. *The American Heritage History of the American Revolution*. New York: American Heritage/Bonanza Books, 1971, 66.

<sup>4</sup>Andrews, 1938, 108.

<sup>5</sup>Revised Statutes, 1985, Royal Proclamation, 1.

<sup>6</sup>Labaree, 1967, 502.

<sup>7</sup>Harris, 1987, Plate 41; H.P. 3, 21665, 134-135.

<sup>8</sup>Burghardt, Andrew F. "The Origin and Development of the Road Network of the Niagara Peninsula, Ontario, 1770-1851", Reprinted from *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 59 (September 1969), 417.

<sup>9</sup>Labaree, 1967, 174-176.

<sup>10</sup>De Vorse, 1966, 64.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 1966, 66, 67.

<sup>12</sup>Alden, 1944, 244.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 1944, 247-249.

<sup>14</sup>Meinig, 1986, 284.

<sup>15</sup>Simmons, R. C. *The American Colonies. From Settlement to Independence*. New York, London: W. W. Norton, 1976. Reprinted 1981, 295; Coffin, 1970, 423; Neatby, 1966, 125; Greene, Jack P. "The Role of the Lower Houses of Assembly in Eighteenth-Century Politics", *Interpreting Colonial America. Selected Readings*. Second Edition. Edited by James Kirby Martin. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, 324, 325.

<sup>16</sup>Lower, 1977, 77.

<sup>17</sup>Labaree, 1967, 19, 48.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 1967, 499.

<sup>19</sup>Coffin, 1970, 432.

<sup>20</sup>Labaree, 1967, 31-33, 74.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 1967, 296.

<sup>22</sup>Coffin, 1970, 346.

<sup>23</sup>Revised Statutes, 1985, Proclamation, 3.

<sup>24</sup>Neatby, 1966, 49.

<sup>25</sup>Coffin, 1970, 333-335.

<sup>26</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 214, 215.

<sup>27</sup>Coupland, 1968, 189.

<sup>28</sup>H.P. 6, 21672, 12.

<sup>29</sup>Coffin, 1970, 360-364. It was estimated that the total expenses of the civil establishment were about the same as those during the last year of the French regime: that is, about £11,158, while revenue, largely from the fur trade, was £13,961.

<sup>30</sup>Revised Statutes, 1985, Royal Proclamation, 4.

<sup>31</sup>Labaree, 1967, 325, 326.

<sup>32</sup>Neatby, 1966, 49.

<sup>33</sup>On February 24, 1766 an amendment to the judicial ordinance stated that the “new subjects” of Quebec could “sit and act as jurors in all cases civil and criminal ...”, and that in civil disputes the juries were to consist of the nationalities, whether English or French or both, involved in the dispute.

<sup>34</sup>Neatby, 1966, 49-50.

<sup>35</sup>Labaree, 1967, 482-483, 496.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 1967, 479.

<sup>37</sup>Revised Statutes, 1985, Royal Proclamation, 5.

<sup>38</sup>Labaree, 1967, 502.

<sup>39</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 134-135.

<sup>40</sup>Burt, Alfred Leroy. *The Old Province of Quebec*. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1933, 5.

<sup>41</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 124.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 1984, 127.

<sup>43</sup>De Vorsey, 1966, 66-67.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 1966, 65-70.

<sup>45</sup>Innis, 1984, 174-175.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 1984, 177.

<sup>47</sup>Meinig, 1986, 287.

<sup>48</sup>Eccles, 1972, 233.

<sup>49</sup>Simmons, 1976, 251-252; Coffin, 1970, 423.

<sup>50</sup>Lower, 1977, 77; Neatby, 1966, 125; Greene, 1978, 324-325.

<sup>51</sup>Lower, 1977, 77.

<sup>52</sup>Morse, Jedidiah. *A New and Correct Edition of the American Geography*. Perth: R. Morrison and Son; London: Vernon and Hood, 1795, 424; H.P. 39, 21756, 110; 41, 21759, 81.

<sup>53</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 214.

<sup>54</sup>Coffin, 1970, 419.

<sup>55</sup>Revised Statutes, 1985, Quebec Act, 4.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 1985, Quebec Act, 5.

<sup>57</sup>Neatby, 1966, 49.

<sup>58</sup>Harris, 1987, Plate 41.

<sup>59</sup>Coffin, 1970, 394.

<sup>60</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 214-215.

<sup>61</sup>Neatby, 1972, 56; Coupland, 1968, 189.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE NORTHERN INTERIOR FRONTIER OF DEFENCE.**

Before discussing the government of the northern interior frontier of defence, it is important to identify its location, as perceived by the British administration at the time. As noted in Chapter One, the frontier will be defined in terms of the offensive and defensive activities that precluded the advancement of rebel forces into Quebec-administered territory. Such activities included military campaigns, small raids and skirmishes, and 'scouts' for acquiring intelligence. During such manoeuvres, attacks on civilian personnel living in the frontier were justified on the basis of military strategy. On the frontier therefore, a 'rebel' was any person, military or civilian, who did not show open sympathy to the British.


The identification of the locations of military contact between the British and the rebels, has been largely made from historic maps. These included the large Atlas maps of Robert Sayer and John Bennett, on Pennsylvania and its frontiers, manuscript and printed maps, such as Sauthier's map on the Province of New York and the Inhabited part of Canada, and the sketch maps of the Haldimand Papers, some of which are included, usually under the name of the author, in Guthorn's 'British Maps of the American Revolution.' As noted by Guthorn, military cartography was "dictated by its purposes: to provide data for the movement of troops and trains, to provide protection and cover, to provide subsistence, and to note features of terrain lending themselves to offense or defense."<sup>1</sup> It was widely recognized, especially in the colonies, that many of these maps, particularly the sketch maps, were inaccurate. Thus the maps must be read with this in mind. Even

more interesting are the Indian maps of the period, which show features relevant to an Indian view of the environment. They are often very sketchy but useful in delineating well-established routes of travel along the frontier. Guthorn rightly notes the inclusion in historic maps of soundings, shoals, and obstructions to ship and canoe navigation, which emphasises the predilection in eighteenth-century North America for water travel. He also notes that Loyalists were used to interpret geographical areas with which they were familiar, which is evident in the maps sent by the commanders of the Upper Posts to Haldimand. Populated areas were usually more frequently drawn, as well as areas of the frontier familiar to the Loyalists.


In order to avoid the discrepancies between the distances and directions of historic maps and those of modern maps, there has been considerable attention paid to matching the historic maps with modern locations. One important way of achieving this was by field trips to the area to establish the location by local evidence. The American Automobile Association guide books were particularly useful in establishing locations, as well as the use of a map gazetteer. However it was felt that primary attention should be paid to the historic evidence in that it assisted in a reconstruction of the eighteenth century perception of the frontier.<sup>2</sup>

During the Haldimand administration the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defence, extended in two belts of territory: one from the Hudson river in the east to Fort Pitt, and the other from Fort Pitt to the Mississippi in the west, as shown on Map 4.1. The eastern sector of this frontier roughly coincided with the territory of the Six Nations, described in Chapter Three, as defined by the Quebec Act of 1774. The line through the most northerly points of the eastern sector passed from Albany in the east, through Johnson Hall, Stone Arabia, Upper German Flats, Fort Stanwix, north of Newtown, Great Island, Kishkemanetas Town to Fort Pitt. The southern interface of the







Map 4.1a.(1) The Northern Interior Frontier of Defence, Showing the Eastern Sector of the Frontier.  
 Adapted from "Northeastern United States Including the Great Lakes Region", National Geographic Atlas of the World. Washington, D.C.: The National Geographic Society, 1975, 28, 29; Rand McNally Road Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico. Chicago, New York, San Francisco: Rand McNally, 1989.



Map 4.1a.(2) The Northern Interior Frontier of Defence, Showing the Eastern Sector of the Frontier. Adapted from "Northeastern United States Including the Great Lakes Region", National Geographic Atlas of the World. Washington, D.C.: The National Geographic Society, 1975, 28, 29; Rand McNally Road Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico. Chicago, New York, San Francisco: Rand McNally, 1989.



Map 4.1b.(1) The Northern Interior Frontier of Defence, Showing the Western Sector of the Frontier. Adapted from "Northeastern United States Including the Great Lakes Region", National Geographic Atlas of the World Washington, D.C.: The National Geographic Society 1975, 28-29; Rand McNally Road Atlas: United States, Canada, Mexico. Chicago, New York, San Francisco: Rand McNally, 1989.



Map 4.1b.(2) The Northern Interior Frontier of Defence, Showing the Western Sector of the Frontier. Adapted from "Northeastern United States Including the Great Lakes Region", National Geographic Atlas of the World Washington, D.C.: The National Geographic Society 1975, 28-29; Rand McNally Road Atlas: United States, Canada, Mexico. Chicago, New York, San Francisco: Rand McNally, 1989.

eastern sector roughly approximated the colonial frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, although there were intrusions into more settled areas, particularly near the Hudson River and Philadelphia. This line passed through Esopus on the Hudson, Minisink, Easton, Bethlehem, Fort Allen, Reading, Shamokin, Fort Augusta, Chibisquagy, Standing Stone, Wood Valley, Fort Bedford, Ligonier to Fort Pitt. This territory included the western flank of the Green Mountains near Albany, and the Appalachian and Allegheny Mountain chains, bearing northeast along the upper reaches of the Susquehanna and Delaware rivers. The line through the most northerly points of the western sector passed through Fort Pitt in the east to Licking Creek, Fort Sandusky, Upper Sandusky, Roundhead, Piqua, Rising Sun, the Falls of the Ohio, St. Joseph, Vincennes, Cahokia and St. Louis. The line along the southern interface of the western sector passed from Fort Pitt through the upper Ohio River to Chillicothe, Blue Lick Springs, Fort Boonesboro, Bryant's station to Fort Jefferson at the mouth of the Ohio at its junction with the Mississippi. This territory included spurs from the Appalachian Plateau, reaching along the Ohio, Scioto, Miammee and Kentucky River Valleys.

The frontier of defence was distinguished by three kinds of offensive activities: campaigns, raids and scouts. The two former involved military manoeuvres and usually loss of life and destruction of property. Thus they tended to be well-documented. However, because of the secretive nature of scouts, particularly those by Indians, and the absence of military action, they were largely unidentified in the Haldimand Papers and thus are only alluded to briefly in this study.

In theory the whole frontier of defence was administered from Niagara, Montreal and Quebec. Niagara was the principal military command post and source of provisioning for the defence frontier as a whole, while Montreal and Quebec were the headquarters for the administration of the war in Quebec. However, in reality the administration of the frontier of defence was divided

amongst the Upper Posts in proportion to their accessibility to the frontier. However, in general the frontier east of Fort Pitt was administered largely from Fort Niagara while the western sector was administered largely from Detroit, and to a lesser extent, Michilimackinac.

## **A. THE INTERIOR DEFENCE FRONTIER EAST OF FORT PITT.**

In looking more closely at the locations targeted for defensive and offensive manoeuvres it can be argued that each area was selected on the basis of specific defence locational criteria. As shown on Map 4.1, the eastern sector can be divided into three areas of concentration. The first area was that of the Mohawk/ northern Delaware/upper Susquehanna Rivers, bounded by the Hudson river to the east, the Mohawk river to the north, the Genesee River to the west, and to the south a line drawn east/west through Tioga. The second area of concentration centred on a roughly square-shaped area bounded by Wyalusing and Minisink in the north, and Fort Augusta and Easton in the south, with a deviation to Reading. The third area of concentration centred on the west branch of the Susquehanna, the Juniata and the Allegheny Rivers. These areas are not indicative of administrative divisions but of geographical concentrations of frontier defence.

### **1. The Mohawk/Northern Delaware/Upper Susquehanna River Area.**

The Mohawk River Valley had been organized as an area of white habitation on March 12, 1772 under the name of Tryon County.<sup>3</sup> It was part of the former Mohawk Indian territory which had been moved westward by the 1768 treaty line negotiated at Fort Stanwix. Thus in targeting this area the British had a triple agenda. Firstly, they wished to draw on the rich source of provisions grown on farms located along the river. Secondly, they wished to placate those Loyalists and Indians, formerly resident along the Mohawk, who had been dispossessed by the war and by their declaration of loyalty to the British cause. Thirdly, part of Haldimand's defence strategy was to clear the area of white rebel settlement in order to create a buffer zone between the Indian territory

and New York.<sup>4</sup> A number of frontier and garrison officers had been drawn from this area including Sir John Johnson and his cousin Guy Johnson, of Johnson Hall on the north side of the Mohawk, Joseph Brant of Canajoharie on the south side of the Mohawk, Rowland Montour, Gilbert Tice and Daniel Claus of the Indian Department, and John and Walter Butler of Butler's Rangers.<sup>5</sup> Their knowledge was very useful in this strategy.

Thus between the years 1778 and 1782 this area was the location of four campaigns, one of which was aborted, and of numerous scouting and raiding parties. The list of military activities in the area is shown in Table 4.1. The first three campaigns were initiated under the command of Sir John Johnson: the first in the fall of 1779 to "relieve" the Six Nations defeated by Sullivan, and the second two, in May and September/October of 1780, to rescue Loyalists at Johnson Hall, and to take action against the rebel Oneidas of Tryon county. The fourth campaign, called the Duanesboro expedition, was led by Major Ross.<sup>6</sup>

#### **a. The 1779 Expedition to Relieve the Six Nations.**

The first expedition, which was to include an attempt to persuade the Oneida Indians to join the British, was aborted, although at that time 294 Oneidas did join Colonel Johnson. With a combined force "consisting of about 400 of the best and most active Troops, besides a large body of the Seven Nations of Canada, and some Mohawks," Johnson, on the 13th. of October, set off from "Ascerotus [a harbour 35 miles due west of Oswego on Lake Ontario], it being the most central place and the nearest Route to approach the Enemy," and arrived at Oswego on the 15th. of October. However on the 22nd. October Johnson informed Haldimand that "nothing could be accomplished owing to the lateness of the season" and he returned to Carleton Island.<sup>7</sup> The next three expeditions were more successful.

**MAJOR CAMPAIGNS, RAIDS AND SCOUTS OF THE  
MOHAWK/NORTHERN DELAWARE/UPPER SUSQUEHANNA REGION.**

**CAMPAIGNS.**

- 1779 Fall. Sir John Johnson to relieve the Six Nations. Aborted.
- 1780 May Sir John Johnson, Daniel Claus to Johnstown, Stone Arabia.  
" Sept. Sir John Johnson against the Oneidas.
- 1781 Oct. Major Ross to Duanesborough.

**RAIDS/SCOUTS.**

- 1778 May John Butler to Cherry Valley, Schoharie.  
" Aug. John McDonell to German Flats.  
" Sept. William Caldwell to Schoharie.  
" " John Young to German Flats, Cherry Valley.  
" Nov. John Butler to Cherry Valley.
- 1779 May John Butler to the Mohawk.  
" Aug. John Butler to Newtown, Canawagoras.
- 1780 Feb. Widespread raids in the Mohawk area.  
" Apr. Cpts. Brant, Nelles to Harpersfield.  
" " Capt. Lottridge to the Upper German Flats.  
" May. Johnson, McDonell to Schoharie.  
" June. Johnson, McDonell to the Upper German Flats.  
" " Indian raiding parties to Herkimer, Cayuga.  
" Aug. Nelles, Brant to the Mohawk.
- 1781 Mar. Capt. Brant to Fort Stanwix.  
" Apr. Lieut. Bowen to Cherry Valley.  
" May. Scouting parties to Mohawk, Schenectady.  
" July. Lieut. Dochstetter to Lake Otsego, Corryst'n.  
" Sept. Lieut. Clement to German Flats.

Table 4.1. Major Campaigns, Raids and Scouts Conducted by the British in the Mohawk/Northern Delaware/Upper Susquehanna River Region during the Haldimand Administration.




**b. The May, 1780 Expedition to Fort Johnson and Stone Arabia.**

The spring, 1780 expedition was an attempt to “relieve the suffering Loyalists” at Johnstown and to “provide the promoters of the Revolution with as much distress as possible,” by destroying the grain farming settlements of Stone Arabia, and Caughnawaga on the northern bank of the Mohawk. The expedition of about 528 men left St. Jean, a garrison near Montreal, on May 3 and proceeded via Lake Champlain, to Crown Point. From there they marched overland, via Schroon Lake along the east branch of the Sacandaga River, to Johnstown where they arrived on the 20th. With the Indians in one party and the white troops in another, Johnson destroyed settlements near Caughnawaga, just east of ‘Anthony’s Nose’ on the Mohawk. The destruction of Stone Arabia was abandoned due to a fear of rebel reprisal, and Johnson returned to Montreal. During this expedition 11 rebels were killed, and 27 were taken prisoner, of whom 14 were released. At the same time 143 Loyalists, and 30 black men and women, accompanied the expedition back to Canada. Rebel property losses were considerable in that 120 houses, barns, and mills were burnt, cattle was destroyed and 170 horses were taken by the British.<sup>8</sup>

**c. The Fall, 1780 Expedition Against the Oneidas.**

During the month of October, 1780 Johnson led an expedition whose major objective was two fold: firstly, to persuade the rebel Oneidas to support the British cause and secondly, to “effect the total destruction “of Enemy provisioning supplies from Schoharie and the Mohawk river,” and to destroy the “vast Crops of Grain by this time housed in every part of the Country.” His force consisted of 150 men of Johnson’s own corps, the King’s Royal Regiment of New York, 140 of the 8th. Regiment, 80 of the 34th. Regiment, 200 of Butler’s Rangers and Indians of the Seneca, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Tuscarowa, Cayuga and Delaware/Nanticoke Nations: approximately 543 Indians in all. The route taken, as shown on Map 4.2, commenced at Oswego. At this time old



Map 4.2. The Fall, 1780 Johnson Expedition Against the Frontiers of New York: October 1st. to 26th, 1780. Adapted from "A Map of the Province of New York", Sauthier, 1776. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island.

Fort Ontario, at the mouth of the Oswego River, familiar to Haldimand from his time of service there during the seven years War, was abandoned. However, it provided a base for the transport of provisions by water, via the Oswego river to the Onondaga River, where there was an Oneida village. From that point the goods could be taken overland. This route was chosen as being the "Shortest Route through the Indian country to Schoharie [sic], and the one most likely to avoid detection by rebel scouts.

The expedition, now consisting of about 700 or 800 men, was smaller than anticipated owing to sickness. It left Oswego on the 1st. of October and travelled in two detachments: one consisted of 18 boats carrying provisions and artillery, while the other consisted of "the remainder of the Troops and Indians keeping pace with them along [the] shores."<sup>9</sup> Bypassing Oneida Lake, as Map 4.2 shows, entailed a considerable southerly detour, but it allowed for the expedition to requisition supplies from friendly Indians, and also avoided Fort Stanwix, which was under rebel occupation.<sup>10</sup> The boats were concealed at Onondaga, where Johnson arrived on the 5th. October, and the expedition left there on the 6th. with ten days of provisions, and cannon drawn on sleds. They arrived at 'Old Oneida' on the 8th. where intelligence was received from Albany. At the same time an Oneida deserted in order to warn the rebels on the Mohawk of an approaching force. The expedition was still at Oneida on the 13th., and with the provisions "being nearly Expended" a party was sent to a Scotch settlement within twenty miles of Schoharie to "bring back cattle."<sup>11</sup>

With threatened Cayuga desertion and rumoured opposition from two thousand men, Johnson moved forward and passed by the upper fort of Schoharie, some 70 miles overland to the east, early on the morning of the 17th. They were discovered by the fort and in defence they torched three to five miles of country, probably between the Upper and Middle Forts. They also destroyed

“everything within fifty yards of the Forts to the end of the Settlement beyond the Third Fort.” They camped beyond the third fort on the night of the 17th. and then proceeded north along the west side of Schoharie Creek, on an almost “impassable” road. Captain Thomson and Captain Brant of the Rangers, with 150 troops, were then detached to destroy the settlement of Fort Hunter, on the east side of Schoharie Creek.<sup>12</sup> The party then proceeded westward along the Mohawk, on both sides of the river, to ‘The Nose,’ and encamped there after “securing the narrow pafses on both sides of the River.” They met opposition from a rebel force from Stone Arabia under the command of a Colonel Brown on the morning of the 19th., about a mile from “Frey’s,” but managed to burn the settlement of Stone Arabia “and all the way up to George Klock’s near the Fort Hendrick Ford.” They also avoided “three or four fortified houses that entirely commanded the Roads & Flatts” and then did battle with the rebels at “Klock’s,” while the Indians retreated in panic. Here they crossed the river in retreat and advanced in two parties: one to Fort Herkimer under Captain Parke and one under Johnson. They met rebel opposition at Herkimer and retreated to Oneida village on the 23rd. Johnson then returned to Oswego via Canaghsioraga and Oswego Falls, arriving there on the 26th. October. During this month-long expedition it was estimated that the British destroyed 13 grist mills, many saw mills, 1,000 houses and barns and 600,000 bushels of grain.<sup>13</sup>

#### **d. The Duanesborough Expedition.**

The fourth expedition, or Duanesborough(boro) expedition was an attempt to complete the sweep of the Mohawk frontier begun the previous year, and to destroy settlements as far east as Schenectady. One reason for the targeting of Duanesborough was that James Duane was a member of Congress who, as Chairman of the Congressional Committee for Indian Affairs, argued that each of the Six Nations was individually unworthy to be called a Nation.<sup>14</sup> This angered the Indians and they were determined on revenge. As with the Johnson expedition Ross used a combination of


water and land routes in order to achieve maximum efficiency of transportation. Provisioning was a problem on this excursion because of the fact, as noted by Powell at Niagara, that the Mohawk had been “so long the Theatre of action for Troops and Indians” that “the people ... secure what grain they raise in fortified houses where it would be imprudent to attack them.”<sup>15</sup> This expedition also used Oswego as a rendezvous, although the route taken was via Oneida lake instead of the more southerly route of the previous year. One reason for this could have been that Fort Stanwix had been abandoned, and it was decided to take advantage of the storage facilities at Fort Brewerton (Bruenton) on the western end of Lake Oneida.

As with the previous year this expedition also began in October, (commencing on October 10, 1781), as it accorded with the completion of the rebel harvest, as well as permitting the Six Nations Indians who had been harvesting to take part in the expedition. The troops consisted of Major Ross's detachment from Carleton Island, 150 men of the 2nd. Battalion of Johnson's corps, 75 men of the 34th. Regiment under the command of Captain Ancrum, 48 men commanded by Captain Leake, and a Niagara contingent consisting of 150 Butler's Rangers under the command of Captain Gilbert Tice, 159 rank and file under the command of Captain Walter Butler, another detachment of 33 rank and file and 2 serjeants under the command of Lieutenant Coote of the 8th. Regiment and 109 Indians: making a total force of 726 troops. In comparison, it was estimated by the rebel Colonel Marinus Willet that the rebel strength of the Mohawk was now only 800 active troops, out of a former strength of 2,500 militia. However to attempt some form of defence the rebels had constructed 24 forts or fortified camps along the 63 miles between Schenectady and the German Flats, sheltering about 50 families and their crops and farm implements at each fort.<sup>16</sup>


The march again took the forces near 'Old Oneida' and across country towards Schoharie,

via a branch of the Unadilla, Croghan's Lake, Young's Lake north of Lake Otsego, via the upper end of Cherry Valley, Durlach (present-day Sharon, New York) and Corrystown. This time instead of detouring south to Schoharie they marched north to the Mohawk, crossing Schoharie Creek above Fort Hunter, sometime on the 17th. of October, as shown on Map 4.3. The march had taken 14 days to cover a distance of approximately 120 miles, or an average of about 8.6 miles per day. On the 25th. or 26th. Tice detoured to destroy the settlement of Warren's Bush and then marched along the main road to within 12 miles of Schenectady, where he met up with the rest of the force.<sup>17</sup> Captain Thomson of the Rangers and Joseph Brant, with 150 Indians, destroyed the settlement of Fort Hunter, but with little loss of life because the inhabitants had fled to the fort itself.<sup>18</sup>

At this point they wheeled around and returned westward along both banks of the Mohawk. As part of the plan was to pick up provisions at Johnson Hall, they crossed the Mohawk, at Anthony's Nose, to the north side, and collected provisions from sympathetic Loyalists in the area. At "Large Canada Creek," near Stone Arabia (due west of Johnson Hall as shown on Map 4.3), they were attacked by rebels under the command of Colonel Brown, and rebel skirmishes persisted amidst rumours that approximately 1200 men, commanded by General Van Rensselaer, were in pursuit of them. On the 30th. October they reached German Flats and crossed Canada Creek (Canada River as shown on Map 4.3) at 2.00 p.m. The rebels fired on their rear and Captain Butler, son of John Butler, was killed. They returned to Old Oneida, found all their stored boats stolen or sunk, but finally managed to reach Oswego on the 6th. of October, just under one month from setting out. Haldimand commended Ross for the expedition although he was disappointed that it was "so ill supported by the Indians ...," upon whose lack of assistance he laid part of the blame for Captain Butler's death.<sup>19</sup>



Map 4.3. The Duanesborough Expedition by Major Ross, October 8 to November 7, 1781. Adapted from "A Map of the Province of New York", Sauthier, 1776. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island.



Map 4.4. The Schoharie/Harpersfield Area of New York. Adapted from "A Map of the Province of New York", Sauthier, 1776. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island.



Kelsay's interpretation of the campaign was that it was too late as Willett was well prepared for their advance, and yet too early in that the British had not given the Indians sufficient time to prepare themselves for war.<sup>20</sup> Ross' interpretation of his about-face at Schenectady was given in his official report of the expedition to Haldimand. He stated that "Time, distance, Security, and in Short everything argued for the Retreat ...." In terms of time, as argued by Kelsay, the season was late and winter was approaching. Ross noted that near Schenectady "The weather was most unfortunate, heavy Rains and the worst Roads for 14 miles." Time was also of the essence with respect to rebel opposition. Distance was a problem because of provisioning. With the "scorched earth policy" practised on the frontier, provisioning was scarce.<sup>21</sup> From the 25th. October to the 7th. November the troops only had a little horse meat to eat, and hunger was a constant companion.<sup>22</sup> Security was also a concern, and only the limitation on provisioning a large rebel advance provided some guarantee of the success of a British frontier campaign.

There were continuous scouting and raiding parties along the frontier to provide support for the campaigns, as shown on Table 4.1. In 1778 and 1779 Butler's Rangers had been very active in the Mohawk area. In May of 1778 Butler had his field headquarters at Unadilla on the East Branch of the Susquehanna, see Map 4.1, and from there he conducted scouts and raids against Cherry Valley<sup>23</sup> and Schoharie, in which 294 rebels were taken or killed in two months. In August Lieutenant John McDonell of the 84th. Regiment led a company of Rangers against German Flats and destroyed all the grain and buildings from "William Tygert's" to Fort Herkimer on the south side of the River, & from Adam Staring's to Wydeck's beyond Canada Creek on the north side," see Map 4.3. Five mills and 120 buildings were destroyed except for the church and fort at Fort Dayton. The frequent use of the names of property owners in these frontier raid reports shows the familiarity of the Loyalists with this part of the frontier. In September, 1778 Captain Caldwell of

the Rangers, and Captains Powell and Brant of the Indian Department, led a raid to Schoharie and a John Young led a raid against German Flats and Cherry Valley. At the same time Adams, of the Indian Department at Carleton Island, led a scout to Fort Stanwix. In early November Butler led 200 Rangers, part of the 8th. Regiment and 321 Indians in an unsuccessful raid on a fort at Cherry Valley, but on the 10th. November McDonell and Brant burnt the valley. In December of 1778 Butler went into winter quarters at Fort Niagara, with six companies of Rangers, which was his custom during the War of Revolution.<sup>24</sup>

In May of 1779 Butler and McDonell were again at the Mohawk, while Lieutenant Johnson of the Indian department took 18 prisoners at Schoharie. In July there were rumours of the advance of General John Sullivan against the Six Nations territory, which was somewhat disquieting for the British, particularly as on July 19 Butler was forced to retreat to Genesee Falls, on the Genesee River, near present-day Letchworth State Park, because of a lack of provisions.<sup>25</sup> In late August and early September, when Sullivan arrived at the Indian country, Butler attempted to repel him at Newtown, (present-day Elmira, New York,) but was forced to retreat. They met Sullivan again, on his way to Niagara, at Canawagoras, near the south end of Conesus Lake. At this point Sullivan retreated after having destroyed a total of 40 villages, but taking no prisoners.<sup>26</sup>

The 1780 campaign was prefaced by raids, in February and on April 9, by Captains Brant and Nelles on Harpersfield near Schoharie, about four miles west north west of Stamford, New York, as shown on Map 4.4, and a raid, under the command of Lieutenant Lottridge of the Indian department, on the Upper German Flats. In May 1780 Johnson and McDonell conducted a raid on Schoharie, and in June and July on the Upper German Flats. There were also several Indian raiding parties to Herkimer in June, a raid on the 10th on a settlement at the western end of the Mohawk

valley, and in August a raid by 94 Six Nations Indians, under the command of Captain Nelles and Brant, on the Mohawk. As well there was a raid by a large party of Indians, under Brant, against Claysburgh (Kleysburgh), the Mohawk, and Schoharie.<sup>27</sup>

The settlements targeted in these forays were not unimportant. The raid by Brant and Nelles on Harpersfield for example, was designed to block provisions coming northwards along the Mohawk branch of the Delaware, or east/west between Unadilla, an Indian town on the East branch of the Susquehanna,<sup>28</sup> and Coksaky, (Coksackie, Kochacie) on the Hudson. However Kelsay argues that by this time, due to the constant raids on the Mohawk area, the settlement was almost deserted. As noted earlier, Schoharie was constantly targeted. Its three forts, an upper fort (Fultonham), a middle fort (Middleburgh), and a lower fort serviced an area of settlement on Schoharie Creek that provided sustenance for such garrison communities as Fort Hunter, 24 miles to the north. It was not only valuable for the grain grown but it was also the site of a former Mohawk village and as such its facilities were well known.<sup>29</sup> The raid by Brant on August 10th, 1780 resulted in 6 rebels killed, 6 prisoners taken, 20 houses and barns destroyed and the burning of a mill and a church. This was associated with the raid on Kleysburgh, near Herkimer on the Mohawk River, in which 29 were killed, 40 were taken prisoner, 100 houses and barns were destroyed, 2 mills and a church were burnt, and 2 forts were destroyed. However, more important to the raiders, was the capture of 300 cattle and 200 horses. The settlement of Vroman, in the same vicinity, was also destroyed with the burning of 20 houses and the killing or capturing of 12 rebels.<sup>30</sup>

The Upper German Flats and Fort Herkimer were also key defensive and provisioning posts. Ward notes that the German Flats was a settlement of some 60 to 70 houses on both sides of the Mohawk: 'Upper' for the northern side and 'Lower' for the southern side: the Lower Flats

becoming known as Herkimer. Herkimer contained several mills, a large stone church, the stone mansion house built for General Herkimer, after whom the town was named, and a stockaded and picketted fort known as Fort Herkimer. Another small block house was called Fort Dayton.<sup>31</sup> The area was also known as a rich grain-growing region, but after a raid on September 16 and 17, 1778, it was reported that only 2 houses, a church and the fort were left standing on the north side of the river.<sup>32</sup> A later raid on the Upper German Flats yielded 2 killed, 4 prisoners, 7 houses and 2 granaries burnt, and 4 horses and 40 cattle killed for meat. The raid on Herkimer by the Cayuga and Onondaga Indians resulted in 7 killed, 6 prisoners, 1 house and a granary burnt and 2 cattle killed.<sup>33</sup>

As with 1780, 1781 again saw scouting and raiding parties along the Mohawk. In March Captain Brant arrived one day too late at Fort Stanwix to intercept 50 provision sleds, but he attacked a party of wood cutters under the command of Colonel Van Cortland of the Fort Stanwix garrison, killed one and took 16 prisoners. Cherry Valley was again raided in late April, by Lieutenant Bowen and David the Mohawk Chief, a raid designed to destroy the settlement seriously crippled by the attack in November of 1780. This time the fort was burned, and 24 houses at Bowman's Creek nearby were destroyed, 16 rebels were killed, 30 head of cattle and horses taken and 3 Loyalists were retrieved.<sup>34</sup>

In May, five scouting parties went along the Mohawk towards Schenectady, assisted by the fact that Fort Stanwix had now been abandoned and burned, and thus did not pose a threat in movement on the western end of the Mohawk. However the situation was only slightly relieved because Colonel Willet, the rebel commander of Stanwix, took up residence at Canajoharie, Joseph Brant's former home on the Mohawk, and thus still patrolled the Mohawk. In July Lieutenant Dochstetter (Dachstetter) and a Corps of Indians attacked settlements at Lake Otsego, and on

July 9th burned 20 houses and barns and 4 iron-shod waggons, and took 60 horses, 50 cattle, and killed 150 hogs and 50 sheep at nearby Corrystown. Next day they encountered Colonel Willet and 300 rebels at Durlach, at which place 20 rebels were killed and five Six Nations Indians wounded. However they were forced to abandon their captured animals, especially as it was rumoured that General Washington had ordered 6,000 French troops to the Mohawk. On the 8th September Clement was at a fort at the German flats with Chief Fraouanda (?) and a small number of Rangers and Indians.<sup>35</sup>


## **2. The Wyalusing/Minisink/Fort Augusta/Reading Area.**

The second geographical area of concentration on the eastern sector of the western frontier of defence was the Wyalusing/Minisink/Fort Augusta/Reading area, see Map 4.1 and Table 4.2. Unlike the Mohawk valley however, during the Haldimand administration this area did not have any major campaigns mounted from Quebec, and thus depended on scouts and raids for its defence. The northeastern Minisink area in Ulster County, see Map 4.5, was targeted for raids in September, 1778, February and July, 1779, April, 1780 and in February and April of 1781. There were also raids due north east of Minisink at Catskill, in May and September of 1780 and to Kingston and Esopus in July of 1781. The raid at Kaatskill (Catskill) on May 7, 1780 was under the command of a Lieutenant Ferris and an Indian Ben Shinks, and it resulted in the capture of two prisoners and the burning of a house and granary. It was probably targeted for provisions as it was located on the main north/south artery along the Hudson River between Albany and New York. It was also at some distance from the usual provisioning source, indicating that provisions were becoming scarce. It was again targeted for attack in September of 1781 by a party of 40 Indians, but they never arrived.<sup>36</sup> The raids on Kingston and Esopus on the 11th July, 1781 destroyed a small settlement and a small fort at Lackawaxen, on the Delaware, and Neversink respectively. This attack was

**THE MAJOR RAIDS AND SCOUTS OF THE WYALUSING/MINISINK/  
FORT AUGUSTA/READING/SUSQUEHANNA REGION.**

1778	June.	The Seneca Indians to Kishkemanetas.
"	Sept.	Upper Seneca Chiefs to Fort Pitt.
"	"	Capt. Caldwell to Minisink, Schoharie.
"	"	Capt. Benj. Pawling to Wyoming, Wyalusing.
1779	Feb.	Seneca Indians to Minisink.
"	"	Capt. Benj. Pawling to Wyoming.
"	"	Lieuts. Dochstедder, Johnson to Fort Pitt.
"	Apr.	Lieut. Dochstедder to Fort Pitt.
"	May.	Lieuts. Thomson, Montour to Susquehanna.
"	July.	Lieuts. Frey, Brant to Minisink.
"	"	Capt. McDonell to Fort Freeland.
1780	Jan.	Chief Kadaragaras, Senecas to Fort Pitt.
"	Feb.	Kanadasagy, Ungarightas to W. Br. Susqueh.
"	"	Capt. Shinop, Indians to Wyoming.
"	Mar.	Chugnut, Delawares to E. Br. Susquehanna.
"	"	A party of Indians to Bethlehem.
"	"	Mohawk, Senecas to Minisink.
"	Apr.	Chief Togaia, Cayugas to Great Island.
"	"	Little Beard, Chenussios to Fort Allen.
"	"	Capt. Ebenezer Allen to Easton.
"	"	Capt. John and Montour to Pennstown.
"	May.	Kadaragaras, Seneca/Delawares to Standing Stone.
"	"	Indian party to Reading.
"	June.	Capt. Shinop, Nanticokes to Fort Augusta.
"	"	Chief Odongot, Chenussios to Chibisquagy.
"	"	Chief Kadaragaras, Ohios to Ligonier.
"	Aug.	Lieut. Dochstедder, Senecas to Wood Valley.
"	Sept.	Sayengaraghta, Kyashota to Fort Pitt.
"	"	Lieut. Wm. Johnson, Montour to Catawisse.
1781	Feb.	Senecas, Cayugas to Great Island.
"	Mar.	Seneca and Delaware Indians to Great Island.
"	"	Cayugas, Delawares to Fort Pitt.
"	"	Tuscaroras to Easton.
"	"	Lieut. Rykman to Wyoming.
"	Apr.	Capt. Shinop, Nanticokes to W. Br. Susqueh.
"	"	Chief Sayengaraghta to Fort Pitt.
"	May.	Lieut. Nelles to Frankstown.
"	June.	Indian raid to Frankstown.

Table 4.2. Major Raids and Scouts Conducted by the British in the Wyalusing/Minisink/Fort Augusta/Reading/Susquehanna Region during the Haldimand Administration.



Map 4.5. The Ulster County Area of New York. Adapted from "A Map of the Province of New York", Sauthier, 1776. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island.


conducted by Lieutenant John Clement and 74 Onondagas, which resulted in the death of 3 rebel officers and 19 privates, and the capture of 8 privates. At the same time Captain Caldwell and Lieutenant John Hare with 87 Rangers and 250 Indians had been making wide ranging attacks in Ulster County, and at Waysink and Cobuskill.<sup>37</sup>

Minisink, just north of Lackawaxen, was an important geographical location. Its location in the Delaware River valley, on a main river route between Easton, Pennsylvania and the Mohawk, gave it obvious transportation advantages and access to Canada. That the rebels were aware of its vulnerability to British attack was indicated by Joseph Brant, who commented that there were so many forts in the area that the rebels were always “ready to run like Ground-Hogs” into them. In September, 1778 Captain Caldwell of the Rangers, and Captains Powell and Brant of the Indian Department, effected a scouting raid on Minisink en-route to Schoharie. On February 2, 1779 it was again targeted by a Seneca Indian scouting party with the design of observing the situation of the enemy in that quarter. Again in July 3, 1779 Lieutenant Barent Frey and Joseph Brant marched to the settlement. Although these were primarily scouting parties they also involved skirmishes with rebels and the capture of prisoners. The Frey/Brant expedition resulted in the burning of “the Settlement called Minisink, one Fort excepted, ... one man killed and one wounded.” They also “destroyed several small stockaded Forts, and took four Scalps & three Prisoners, but did not in the least injure Women or Children,” this being a sensitive issue in frontier raids. Approximately two days after the raid, on the banks of the Delaware, they met up with the Goshen militia and defeated them, with the taking of forty scalps and one prisoner.<sup>38</sup> On April 2, 1780, 22 Mohawk and Seneca Indians, under the command of Chief Fishhook and Chief David, killed 4 at Minisink and on May 19, 14 Delawares with John Chugnut as their leader were on service in the area.<sup>39</sup>



Southwest along the Delaware were the towns of Easton, on the north branch, and Bethlehem and Fort Allen on the west branch, now the Lehigh River. Easton was the famed center of provisioning for the Sullivan march into the Six Nations territory, largely because of its accessibility by the Delaware to Philadelphia.<sup>40</sup> This accessibility made it a desirable target for provisioning British raids, and thus on March 1, 1781 "Volunteer Allen and Captain John" led a party of 43 Tuscaroras to the area: the numbers killed or prisoners taken were not stated. Bethlehem, see Map 4.6, was approximately 6 miles from Easton. The hilly nature of the area provided water-power for industry. Thus Bethlehem had two furnaces, New Furnace and Durham Furnace, two forges, Old Forge and Chasery Forge and the Cruikshank Mill. This no doubt provided munitions and milled wood products, if the Cruikshank Mill was a sawmill, or grain products, if a grist mill: both were needed during the rebellion. There was another mill also, called the Jones Mill which was located northwest of Easton on the Leheithan Creek. Northampton, present-day Allentown, was located about five miles from Bethlehem, as shown on Map 4.6. This gave a ready access by road or water to sources of supply for provisions, as well as to industry, its industrial importance being emphasised by the name of the township as Mill Creek. Fort Allen, present-day Lehighton, was located between Bethlehem and Easton in the east and Wyoming in the west. It was connected by a road to Bethlehem, Nazareth, Levis, Forts Penn and Norris, and by water via the Delaware south to Philadelphia or northwest to the Indian country.

The area was mainly targeted for scouts and raids in 1780 and 1781 as provisions closer to the Upper Posts became scarce. In the middle of February, 1780 a party of Indians raided Bethlehem, killed eight rebels and took three prisoners.<sup>41</sup> On April 14, 1780 the Indian 'Little Beard' led 27 Chenussios against Fort Allen and took two prisoners. On the 22nd April, 1781 a party of 43 Tuscaroras under the command of Volunteer Allen and the Indian Captain John took 6



Map 4.6. The Town of Bethlehem in Mill Creek Township, Northampton County. Note the forges in the area which would be useful for munitions. Adapted from "A Map of Pennsylvania Exhibiting ... Its Extensive Frontiers", Scull, 1770. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island.


prisoners and 3 scalps in a raid near Easton. On the 25th April Rowland Montour led 12 Chughquagy Indians in a raid against Pennstown, near Fort Allen, resulting in 1 killed, 15 prisoners, 14 cattle killed, 3 horses taken and the burning of 3 houses, granaries and mills.<sup>42</sup> These raids were probably left to Indian parties because of the ability of the Indians to conceal themselves during travel and to make raids with lightning swiftness and the element of surprise, particularly in an inhabited area. As well, the Indians were able to survive more effectively in travel along the frontier than were equivalent groups of white ranging parties.

Another targeted area was Reading. As Map 4.1 shows there were two Readings at the time: one was the Town of Reading on the Schuylkill River, on a main western road between Philadelphia and Fort Pitt, the other was the Township of Reading, on a tributary of the Susquehanna River. The Indians could have readily reached the first Reading after targeting Fort Allen and Pennstown, particularly as it had the Burdsborough Forge, located approximately 8 1/2 miles downstream and the Hughes Moones mill located about 8 miles on the road due east of Reading. The Township of Reading was a less likely target as it was located so close to the Maryland border, which was not a common site for raids. However, it had accessibility via the Susquehanna to areas more frequented on frontier raids, such as Standing Stone and Fort Bedford. It also had industrial capacity, such as the Spring Forge, Lehn's Mill, and Wynet's Mill. Another factor which may have played a role in the attack on Reading was that both Readings had Quaker populations which may have led the British to suppose that they would receive provisions from these pacifist religious groups. The raid, which took place in the middle of May, 1780 yielded 14 prisoners, and one scalp, a surprising number of prisoners for a raid in an inhabited area so far from Quebec.<sup>43</sup>

Northwest from Fort Allen was Wyoming, the Lackawanna River and Wyalusing. Although

located on the East Branch of the Susquehanna River, the meander in the river gave this area more affinity with the West Branch of the Delaware, and thus it is included in this area of concentration. The strategic significance of this area was the accessibility it gave by water to Tioga Point, located near the junction of the East Branch of the Susquehanna and the Chemung, a famed crossroads on both north/south and east/west Indian trails. Wyoming, (present-day Wilkes Barre) shown in Map 4.7, was a valley located in Luzerne County, some 28 - 30 miles in length and three miles in width. The hills along both its eastern and western flanks were about 800 to 1000 feet high, hemming in an area of fertile soil. The area had been settled in 1742 by Moravians under the leadership of Count Zinzendorf, and since then had been the centre of a land claims controversy between Pennsylvania and its Connecticut settlers, following its cession to Pennsylvania by the Iroquois Indians.<sup>44</sup> Thus as Map 4.7 shows it had long been an area of Shawanese Indian settlement and proprietarial interest. During the War of Revolution rumours of an invasion by rebels into the Six Nations territory and Quebec via the Wyoming Valley led to a concentration of British and Indian interest in the area.

There were several significant geographical characteristics of the valley that reinforced its importance as a frontier stronghold and provisioning post. Firstly, its valley configuration and the fact that the Great Swamp lay to the east, meant that an invasion had to come either from the north or southward. The south water route was protected however by the Wyoming Falls above the old town, and the falls at Nescopeck. Thus the rebels reasoned that they could adequately defend the northern route if any major force could survive the journey through the frontier wilderness. Furthermore, as both Kelsay and Ward point out, the area was well protected by forts.<sup>45</sup> The seven forts or stockaded blockhouses in the valley, were essentially places of retreat for the white population in the event of an Indian attack, but during the war were manned by a garrison.<sup>46</sup> However, despite this protection, the area was targeted four times during the Haldimand



Map 4.7. The Wyoming Valley on the East Branch of the Susquehanna. Adapted from "A Map of Pennsylvania Exhibiting ... Its Extensive Frontiers", Scull, 1770. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island. The inclusion of the forts are from Ward's account of the Wyoming Massacre. Ward, 1952, 630.

administration, particularly because of its reputation as a major frontier provisioning post for the continental army.<sup>47</sup>

Just prior to Haldimand's arrival in Quebec, an attack on June 30, 1778, called the 'Wyoming Massacre,' provided the lynch pin for cementing frontier antagonism to the British. This raid, led by John Butler, embarked at Tioga Point and landed some 25 miles above Wyoming at the bend at Three Islands. The Rangers and Indians entered the valley through a notch in the mountains in the west instead of following the river from the north. They attacked Forts Jenkins, Exeter, Forty, and Wintermoot, and took 227 scalps and five prisoners, with the loss of only one Indian and two Rangers. As well, they burned an estimated 1,000 houses and their mills and took 1,000 horned cattle, sheep and hogs.<sup>48</sup> The success of this raid and its element of surprise was probably a motive for the Sullivan campaign in 1779. Before the furore had died down a party of 30 Rangers and Indians, under the command of Mr. Pawling, scouted Wyoming in September and again in February, 1779 when the scout was commanded by a Second of the Rangers.<sup>49</sup> Their purpose was to keep "a constant watch upon the rebels ...," which however proved of little worth in giving warning of Sullivan's advance later in the year.

In early February, 1780, at a place near Wyoming, the Indian Captain Shenop and 25 Nanticokes killed one rebel, took four prisoners and two horses after earlier destroying a boat laden with stores for Wyoming. They also reported that there were still 30 rebels in one garrison at Wyoming and a German regiment of 100, of which 25 were stationed at Jenkins Fort and 25 at Montgomery Fort. An attack on these troops resulted in the death of one officer and four prisoners, while Captains Nelles and Brant killed 7 and took 6 prisoners at a point below Wyoming.<sup>50</sup> On September 5th Lieutenant William Johnson and Rowland Montour engaged rebels at Fort Rice, "at

the head of Chilleskewagie,” (Chilisquague Creek on the Susquehanna) at Fort Jenkins, Wyoming on the 10th, and at Catawisse Creek near the Indian town of Glafswanoge. These engagements resulted in the killing of 20 rebels and the taking of 11 prisoners, although the British lost the “gallant Montour” as a result of injuries sustained in the fighting. In March, 1781 a party under Lieutenant Rykman was defeated in its attempt to take a rebel blockhouse at Wyoming, and one Indian was killed. However another party in the area took a prisoner.<sup>51</sup>

Wyalusing was approximately 44 miles along the East Branch of the Susquehanna, the last post before Tioga. In September, 1778 Pawling, with 30 Rangers and Indians engaged the rebel Colonel Hartley at this place, with the loss of ten British Indians before a retreat was effected.<sup>52</sup> However the British killed four rebels and wounded ten. As well, there were other encounters on the East Branch, such as in January, 1778 when the Seneca Indians attacked ‘border settlements,’ and in May, 1779 when Lieutenant Thomson, Rowland Montour and 40 Rangers were dispatched to the Susquehanna for cattle. On March 26, 1780 a party of Delawares under Chugnut killed 5 rebels and took 5 prisoners on the East Branch, and in February and April, 1781 several scouting parties, numbering about 67 Indians including Captain Skenop and Lieutenant Rykeman with the Nanticoke Indians, were directed towards the Susquehanna.<sup>53</sup>

### **3. The Susquehanna Parallelogram.**

The third geographical area of concentration in the eastern sector of the western defence frontier was the Susquehanna parallelogram, bounded by Shamokin in the southeast, Great Island on the West Branch of the Susquehanna in the northeast, Fort Bedford in the southwest and Fort Pitt in the northwest. As with Area 2, no major campaigns were conducted in this area during the Haldimand administration, but the Shamokin/Fort Augusta (present-day Sunbury)/Chibisquagy

and Great Island side of the parallelogram was targeted for frequent raids during the War of Revolution, as shown on Table 4.2. The strategic importance of this area was, as with the Delaware, the access that the West and East branches of the Susquehanna and their tributaries gave the rebels to the Indian territory and the Upper Posts, see Map 4.1. Shamokin, on Shamokin Creek, was located 17 miles southeast of Fort Augusta and was the target of a raid on May 16, 1780 by 7 Kendac Indians under the command of Toroghiyoga, during which 2 rebels were killed. Again, in April of 1781 a party of Senecas was at Shamokin and captured 2 prisoners, although one later escaped. In May another raid took place in which 5 rebels were either killed or taken.<sup>54</sup> Fort Augusta, at the confluence of the East and West branches of the Susquehanna, was the largest Pennsylvanian frontier post, at the head of an area populated by rebels. On June 11, 1780 23 Nanticokes under Captain Shenop (Shinop) killed 1 person, took 1 prisoner and killed 2 cattle.<sup>55</sup> Chibisquagy (Chillisquaque) on the West Branch of the Susquehanna, was at a creek about 5 miles northwest of Fort Augusta. It was targeted for an attack by 11 Chenussio Indians, under the command of the Indian Odongot's son, during which 1 rebel was taken prisoner.

Further west on the West Branch was Great Island (present-day Lock Haven), at the point where the West Branch angled eastwards and the river was joined by Bald Eagle Creek, which ran along the northern edge of Bald Eagles Mountain ridge, a spur of the Allegheny Mountains. On April 2, 1780 70 Cayugas under Togaaia killed 4 rebels and on February 28, 1781 it was again targeted for an attack by a party of 12 Senecas and Cayugas. On March 31, 1781 another party of 12 Senecas and Delawares from Buffalo Creek, under the command of the Indian Infant, were on a scouting expedition here, having probably used the Indian trail that ran southeast from Lake Erie to the West Branch.<sup>56</sup>




There were other attacks on the West Branch in general. On the 28th July, 1779, Captain John McDonnel (McDonell) with 60 Rangers, a small contingent of the 8th Regiment and 120 Indians under Chief Cornplanter, burned Fort Freelan (Freeland), killed 2 of the garrison and took 31 prisoners.<sup>57</sup> One of the major objectives of this attack was the acquisition of provisions and thus 116 head of cattle were driven off. Another objective was to lessen the availability of provisions for the rumoured invasion by Sullivan. On February 1, 1780 6 Ungarikta Indians under Kanadasagy took a prisoner on the West Branch and an engagement in April, 1781 by Captain Shenop and his party of Nanticokes resulted in the killing of Captain Champlin of the Corps of Nine Months Men, one serjeant and a private.<sup>58</sup>

Another target area was the Juniata branch of the Susquehanna, which included Standing Stone on the Little Juniata river, Frankstown on the Frankstown branch of the Juniata and Wood Valley and Fort Bedford on the Raystown branch of the Juniata. Standing Stone, near present-day Huntingdon, was located on the Little Juniata in ridge country bisected by a number of east/west and north/south Indian trails. It was located due northwest of Fort Shirley on an Indian trail extension of a road through the Blue Mountains (Kittanning) from Carlisle (approximately 18 to 20 miles west of Harrisburg on the Pennsylvania turnpike) to Huntingdon, this road taking advantage of the gaps made by the Susquehanna through the predominantly north/south ridges. On May 10, 1780 the Indian Kadaragaras led 75 Senecas and Delawares against this area with the result that 14 rebels were killed and 12 taken prisoner. Frankstown (near present-day Altoona) was located approximately 30 miles southwest and about 33 miles from Fort Bedford to the south, where the Juniata angled northwards through the valley of the Three Springs. It was connected by an Indian trail to Fort Venango in the northwest, thus giving access to Lake Erie and the Indian settlements near it. There was a rebel fort here under the command of Captain Boyd of the 3rd Regiment of


Pennsylvania Continentals. On June 2, 1781 an attack was made in which 13 rebels were killed (of which 11 scalps were taken) and 6 prisoners were taken including Boyd, a Captain of the Militia and a Lieutenant. During the engagement the British lost 1 soldier, while 2 were wounded. However the useful information gained during this foray was that the rebel Colonel Clark, of Vincennes fame, had gone to Fort Pitt in April with 700 troops en-route to Detroit.<sup>59</sup>

Wood Valley in Bedford County, as mentioned in the Haldimand Papers, is probably the Woodcock Valley of the Faden Map, see Map 4.8, which was located between two ridges running southwest of Huntingdon and northeast of Fort Bedford, present-day Woodbury. It is likely that this was the location because of the fact that this particular area was targeted for attack during the war and it was near Fort Bedford, (present-day Bedford). In August, 1780 Lieutenant Dochstедder and 23 Senecas destroyed a rebel blockhouse here, killed 10 rebels, burnt 7 houses and their granaries and killed cattle and horses for provisions. The prisoners included Captain Phillips, the commanding officer of the blockhouse, hopefully a useful source of intelligence. Dachstедder gained access to the valley via the Philadelphia road, which ran through Fort Bedford to Fort Pitt.<sup>60</sup> It was possible for the British to use this road because it was noted that during the war the rebels used it only occasionally, preferring to use the Virginia road further south: namely either the Patapsco or Monocacy roads noted on the Faden map.<sup>61</sup> In May, 1781 Fort Bedford itself was to be targeted for attack by Lieutenant Nelles but the engagement took place at Frankstown.

Fort Ligonier, (present-day Ligonier) see Map 4.9, was situated on the Loyal Hannon (Loyalhanna) Creek, a tributary of Kishkemanetas Creek, at the point where it intersected the Philadelphia wagon road. It was some 45 miles by road from Fort Bedford and about 40 miles southeast of Fort Pitt. Thus it served not only as a point of defence but also as a provisioning post



Map 4.8. Wood Valley and Bedford. Adapted from "A Map of Pennsylvania Exhibiting ... Its Extensive Frontiers", Scull, 1770. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island.



Map 4.9. The Fort Pitt/Kishkemanetas/Fort Ligonier Triangle. Adapted from "A Map of Pennsylvania Exhibiting ... Its Extensive Frontiers", Scull, 1770. Courtesy: John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Rhode Island.

en-route to the west. In June of 1780 a party of Ohio Delawares under Kadaragaras, conducted a raid in the area which yielded 26 prisoners and scalps.<sup>62</sup>

Kishkemanetas, (Kiskiminetas or present-day Vandergrift) north of Ligonier on the Kishkemanetas River, see Map 4.9, was an Indian settlement that was located strategically on the Allegheny River between Fort Pitt and Fort Venango. In June of 1778 a party of Seneca Indians had attacked the area as part of a widespread harassment of the border settlements of Pennsylvania, largely in response to a rumour that the Connecticut settlers at Wyoming were to attack the Indian villages. The attack on the settlements near Kishkemanetas “reduced them to smouldering ruins, driving the unfortunate inhabitants ... into the numerous small forts built for their protection.”<sup>63</sup>

The major site for the gathering of intelligence, but not raids, was Fort Pitt, see Map 4.9. Fort Pitt, or the old French Fort Duquesne (present-day Pittsburgh), had long been a center of frontier defence and trade. Erected on the right bank of the confluence of the Ohio, Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, the fort was “able to command the very gate to midland America.”<sup>64</sup> Fort Venango, (present-day Franklin, PA.) to the north along the Allegheny, where it is called by the Indian word Onongaraghere, was at the same distance from Fort Pitt as Fort Bedford (about 77 miles).<sup>65</sup> This area, on the eastern bank of the Allegheny, serviced an important fur trade center. The Mitchell Map of 1755, recorded that the English settlements included Venango and Shannon Town on Kishkemanetas Creek. However when the French assumed control of key sites in this area in the early 1750’s, the English moved away but returned after the English conquest of the posts on the Great Lakes. Thus the British may have anticipated that some of these settlers may be sympathetic to the British cause. This could explain why the scouting line shown on Map 4.1, ran from Fort

Stanwix to Fort Pitt and thus appeared to divide the eastern and western sectors of the western defence frontier.

As Fort Pitt was well defended, and served as the base of operations for attacks by the rebels against Detroit and the Illinois, it became a pivot for intelligence gained either from the west or east.<sup>66</sup> Scouts were sent to the area at least seven times between 1778 and 1781. In September of 1778 the chiefs of the Upper Seneca were scouting Fort Pitt, and in early February of 1779 Lieutenants Dochstедder and Johnson took a scout to the area "to reside among the Indians ... in order to have scouts constantly out, and to send the earliest intelligence" to Niagara. In April of 1779 one of these scouts became a raid when 108 Indians and Rangers under Dochstедder killed 21 and took 9 in the vicinity of the fort. During this engagement Dochstедder was badly wounded, one Indian was killed and three wounded. Intelligence at this time revealed that many boats were being built at the fort and a large force was assembling at Wyoming. Although this was the preparation for the Sullivan campaign its purpose was not detected by the British, although it can be argued that they could have done little to repel it.<sup>67</sup> In January, 1780 40 Senecas under Kadaragaras met the rebels near the western side of the fort on the Ohio River, killed 2, took 3 prisoners and burnt a house and a granary, and another party killed another 4 rebels in the vicinity. In September of 1780 the chiefs Sayengaraghta and Kyashota and 200 Indians planned a joint expedition towards Fort Pitt but it yielded little. On March 22, 1781 34 Cayugas and Delawares, and on the 15th April Sayengaraghta with 36 Indians, attempted scouts towards the fort. The latter was recorded as not being particularly successful, with only 5 rebels being killed or taken. Another scout was sent out in April, particularly as it was rumoured that the west was under attack by Virginians. In June the rumour had been supported by intelligence to suggest that Colonel Clark had again, following this 1778/79 expedition, gone to Fort Pitt in order to rendezvous with the Virginian troops.<sup>68</sup>

## **B. THE INTERIOR FRONTIER OF DEFENCE WEST OF FORT PITT.**

Harassment on the western sector of the western frontier of defence was much more limited than that of the east. However, as with the eastern sector it can be divided into three categories: campaigns or expeditions, raids and scouts. These operations, listed in Table 4.3, also showed geographical areas of concentration: namely points south of Sandusky focussing on the Sandusky, Fort Pitt, Ohio, Chillicothe and upper Sandusky area, the Miammee River area, the Kentucky area bounded by Blue Lick Springs, Fort Boonesboro and Bryant's Station, the Ohio and the Ohio Falls, the Wabash and Miamis Rivers, and the Illinois/Mississippi area.

### **1. The Hamilton Expedition to the Illinois.**

During the Haldimand administration the major British offensive of this western sector was the Hamilton campaign against the Illinois in 1779. This campaign was an answer to the George Rogers Clark occupation of the Illinois, which included the forts and settlements of Cahokia, Chartres, Prairie de Roche, Kaskaskias, all located on the Mississippi south of St. Louis, see Map 4.10, and Vincennes and Ouiatenon on the Wabash. This expedition, which commenced on October 7, 1778 was to advance against Vincennes, which in 1773 had at least 50 heads of families or single persons. It was accessible from Detroit via two methods of travel. The first was a road which passed by "Forts Miami, Ouiattanon and St. Vincent," which is detailed in Appendix 2. This road took the Miamis river route, bypassing the Grand Glaze (Glaize) river on the left and the Little Glaze on the right. From there it passed to Fort Miami, approximately 216 miles from Fort Detroit. It then crossed via a portage to the Wabash and passed via the rivers Sallamonee, Mississinoway, Pipe, Eel and Teepecano to Fort Ouiatenon, 183 miles from Fort Miami. Fort Ouiatenon was situated on the right of the road about 70 yards from the river and was populated by the Ouiatenon and Reccapous Indian nations of whom there were 1000 men able to bear arms.

## **MAJOR CAMPAIGNS, RAIDS AND SCOUTS OF THE WESTERN SECTOR OF THE INTERIOR FRONTIER OF DEFENCE.**

### **CAMPAIGNS.**

1778 Oct. Lieut. Col. Henry Hamilton to Vincennes.

### **RAIDS AND SCOUTS.**

1778 Apr. Charles Baubin, Shawanese to a Kentucky fort.

" Aug. Miami Indians to the Ohio.

" Sept. De Quindre, Shawanese to Kentucky forts.

1780 Mar. Johnson, Seneca/Delawares to the Ohio.

"

" Apr. Simon Girty, Shawanese to Piqua.

" May. Col. Henry Bird to the Licking River Valley.

1781 Apr. Capt. Elliot to Bryant's Station, Kentucky.

" July. Brant to the mouth of the Big Miammee River.


1782 Apr. Capt. Wm. Caldwell to the Upper Sandusky R.

" July. Capt. Andrew to Wheeling.

" Aug. Cpts. Caldwell, McKee, Girty to Lower Blue Licks.

Table 4.3. Major Campaigns, Raids and Scouts Conducted along the Western Sector of the Interior Frontier of Defence by the British during the Haldimand Administration, for the years 1778 and 1780-1782.






Map 4.10. "A Plan of the several Villages in the Illinois Country, with Part of the River Mississippi &c.", Hutchins. Lancaster, Bruce. *The American Heritage History of the American Revolution*. Edited by Richard M. Ketchum. New York: American Heritage/Bonanza Books, 1971, 315.

There was settlement in the area away from the forts, as indicated by the Richards coal mine on the right of the river towards Vincennes, beyond the "Island of Garlic." Beyond Fort Ouiatenon the road traversed another 240 miles to the Illinois, "through plains and extensive meadows," making a total of 879 miles by road between Fort Detroit and the Illinois and 639 miles from Detroit to Vincennes. As Appendix 2 also shows, there was another road from Fort Detroit to Fort St. Joseph (near Niles, Michigan) and the Illinois River. Another route was by water, using the rivers along which these roads ran.

Predictably, Hamilton decided to use the water route, not only because it was a conventional form of frontier travel, but also in response to advice he had received on the condition of the road, and the speed with which traffic could move on it. He probably used small row boats with dimensions similar to those described in Appendix 3. That these roads and rivers were fairly well known can be seen by the fact that even by 1762 the Wabash, previously called the Quioachtana River, was mapped for width from Fort Miami to Fort Ouiatenon, the observation being made that between Lake Erie and the Wabash "The Bottom of the Channel [was] mostly Stony," and the river, although flowing through "fine firtle [sic] Country" was prone to Shoals."

Hamilton's account of the expedition was fairly specific, particularly in terms of the arrangements made for provisioning. The major provisioning post was to be located at the "carrying place" on the Miamis River, at which place a redoubt was to be "raised up," to prevent rebel attacks on the provisions. In locating this carrying place the Mitchell map, see Map 4.11, shows two portages: a northern portage crossing from Fort Miami due east to the Eel River, a northern extension of the Wabash and a southern portage crossing from the Miami to the eastern headwaters of the Wabash. The southern portage was probably the most likely because it was



Map 4.11. The route from Detroit to Fort Miami, Showing the two Possible Portages for the Hamilton Expedition. Adapted from "A Map of the British Colonies in North America", Mitchell, 1755. A Mean Scale of 35 Miles to 1 Inch. *North America at the Time of the Revolution*. A Collection of Eighteenth Century Maps with Introductory Notes by Louis De Vorsey, Jr., 1974. Courtesy: Lloyd G. Reeds Map Library, McMaster University, Hamilton.

mentioned as being about 25 miles from Fort Miami (3 - 4 days travelling) and associated with a road, which was probably the traders route which passed along the west bank of the Petite Riviere from Fort Miami to Pickawillan. This would accord with the present-day distance between Fort Wayne (Fort Miami) and Decatur, which is approximately 25 miles down the St. Mary's River. Furthermore, this route is shorter, it being only a 12 mile distance to portage from the St. Mary River to the Wabash, which accords with the stated distance of the portage as 9 miles. The road to the portage was described as being in bad condition although it passed through "clear woods" of a "great height," consisting of oak, ash, beech and nutwood trees.<sup>69</sup>

Hamilton's forces, consisting of 175 British troops, including a detachment of 50 of the King's Royal Regiment under Henry Bird and about 60 Indians, crossed the portage at Chemin Couvert using beaver dams to raise the water level in the stream so that the boats could pass from stream to stream.<sup>70</sup> The expedition arrived at Fort Ouiatenon on December 4, where they expected 50 "batteau-loads of provisions from the Miamis." The fort was described as a "miserable stockade, surrounding a dozen of wretched Cabbins [sic] called Houses (About 480 Indians if there were five men in a cabin.)" Vincennes was reached by December 16, thus taking 71 days to cover the 639 miles. Fort Sackville at Vincennes, located on the southeast bank of the Wabash, was captured on the 17th and held by Hamilton until his capture by Clark on February 24, 1779. It was described by Ward as a "solidly constructed wooden fort", but as a "bad stockade" by Hamilton. It was surrounded by a settlement of houses 100 to 200 feet apart, with the nearest house being close to the fort. Hamilton's time there was spent erecting a blockhouse at the northwest and at the "opposite angle," and with acquiring intelligence where possible.<sup>71</sup>

## 2. The Ohio Area.

In a general sense, the raiding parties that were to accompany the campaigns in the west, were sent from two main locations: Niagara and Detroit, with some assistance from Michilimackinac. The raiding parties from Niagara usually went to the Ohio or the vicinity of Fort Pitt, such as that on March 29, 1781 in which a party of 29 Senecas and Delawares of Kadaragaras, under the command of Lieutenant Johnson, marched to the "Ohio Communication."<sup>72</sup> This reluctance to go further westward was probably due to the difficulty of provisioning the parties at such a distance from Niagara. Furthermore, those that originated from Detroit or Michilimackinac were usually responding to rumours of either an invasion or rebel attack. These rumours became so persistent in 1779, particularly after the successful Clark campaign, that Colonel Bolton at Niagara sent a reinforcement of 50 Rangers, under the command of Captain Caldwell, to Detroit.<sup>73</sup>

From 1778 to 1782 parties were sent out along the frontier to areas that were further apart geographically, than along the eastern sector. The common destination was "towards the Ohio," which could mean anywhere along its 600 mile length. For example, two parties of 115 Miamis and a Chief and 50 men on 25th August, 1778 and September 5, 1778 respectively, set out to war 'towards the Ohio.' The latter party were from Ouiatenon and included Quiquaboos, Mascoutainges and Ouiattonong Indians. In 1782 on the 11th September Captain Andrew Bradt and 238 Indians marched against Wheeling, on the Ohio, and "devastated the settlement there."<sup>74</sup>

The success of these parties can be measured by the fact that on the 1st February, 1778 Hamilton commented that a party of Indians had returned to the post with 23 prisoners, 20 of whom they gave up to Hamilton, and 129 scalps, and on April 1st, 1778 some Shawanese arrived at Detroit with 4 prisoners. Between May and September, 1778 the Indians took 34 prisoners, 17 of

whom they delivered up to the British, 17 were adopted by the Indians: 81 had been scalped.<sup>75</sup> Thus on the 6th July, 1782 De Peyster complained to Haldimand that the prisoners multiplied so fast that he could not provision them adequately.<sup>76</sup> One of the reasons for this success could have been the isolation of this sector of the frontier, particularly with respect to the provision of forts: which were few and far between, except in the Kentucky area. However government policy was less to capture them, and place a burden on the commanders of the Upper Posts to provision them, than it was to drive them back “upon their brethren” in the east and clear the frontiers of rebel sympathizers: an action which would appease the western Indians concerned over white encroachment on their land. That this policy was achieving some measure of success can be argued by the fact that in 1778 Daniel Boone had reported that “the people on the frontier [had] ... been so incessantly harrassed by parties of Indians” that they had not “been able to sow grain” and at Kentucky would “not have a morsel of bread” by the summer. As well, “Cloathing [sic] ... [was] not to be had, “and they did not expect any relief from Congress.”<sup>77</sup>

### **3. Sandusky and Points South.**

With respect to the area of Sandusky and points south, see Map 4.1, the principal raid in the area was a response to a rebel attack against Cushoking, launched from Fort Pitt by Colonel Brodhead in the spring of 1781. Cushoking (present-day Coshocton), was located at the upper forks of the Muskingum. In this attack a British scout reported that Brodhead killed 15 inhabitants and burned the town, but left 6 houses on the Sandusky side of the creek.<sup>78</sup> In the spring of 1782 the rebels attacked Muskingum, a town of the Owendoe Indians and the site of an English fur factory. The town was located due south of Sandusky, which as noted on the Mitchell map, had been the “Seat of War, the Mart of Trade, & Chief Hunting Grounds of the Six Nations on the Lakes & the Ohio.” Thus the area had important symbolic and national value to the Six Nations and was a likely

target for rebel attack. Muskingum had benefited from this preeminence, and its accessibility to both the Ohio and Lake Erie meant that it was also on the east/west trader's route from Philadelphia to the Miamis. In the fall of 1781, due to the supposed pro-rebel sympathies of the Indians of the Muskingum villages of Schoenbrunn, Salem and Gnadenhutten, who had been Christianised by the Moravians, the British moved the Indians to Sandusky. However in the spring of 1782 the Indian women and children decided to return to harvest their corn. While there they were attacked by rebels, and 96 were killed.<sup>79</sup>

This 'Muskingum Massacre' so enraged the British and the Six Nations that a party of Rangers and Indians, under Captain William Caldwell, the British Commandant at Sandusky, attacked 300 rebels, under the command of Colonel William Crawford, at the Upper Sandusky River, near the present town of Upper Sandusky. The rebels were defeated with the loss of 50 troops, but the event stimulated much unrest on the frontier that fortunately was held back by the peace agreement. The area also saw other raids such as in 1780 when Colonel Henry Bird with 150 British troops and Indians went towards the upper Ohio. He "captured two small American stockaded posts, Ruddle's and Martin's in the Licking River Valley," a tributary of the Muskingum River which branches to the west at present-day Zanesville, Ohio, and took more than 100 prisoners. However it was stated that many "were tomahawked on the journey to Detroit ...."<sup>80</sup>

The Scioto River further west was also the target for rebel attack but the numbers of rebel fighters involved in these attacks virtually precluded any major British reprisal. For example, in August, 1779 George Rogers Clark, marched against the towns of the Shawnees and Delawares, particularly their capital Chillicothe, killing 6 Indians and wounding 3.<sup>81</sup> Again on November 4, 1782 he led an expedition of 1050 "mounted" Kentucky riflemen from "the mouth of the Licking

River towards Chillicothe.” This required an overland trek probably through Hockhocken or Margaret’s Town on the Hockhocken river, and on the 10th they attacked the town and burned it, killing 10 Shawnee and wounding 10.<sup>82</sup>

#### **4. The Miammee River Area.**

Another area of provocation, particularly by the rebel Clark, was that of the Great and Little Miammee River valleys. There is the possibility for confusion in the similarity between the names of the Miamis River, then flowing into the western end of Lake Erie and the Great and Little Miammee Rivers, then flowing into the Ohio. This is not helped by the fact that on modern maps the Great and Little Miammee Rivers have become the Great and Little Miami Rivers, while the Miamis River has become the Maumee River. However in the Haldimand Papers it seems clear that Miami or Miamis refers to the river flowing into Lake Erie, via Fort Miamis, while Miammee refers to the Great and Little Miammee Rivers. This poses a considerable problem in research as Cruikshank, for example, refers to the Miammees as Miami.<sup>83</sup> In 1780 Clark attacked Piqua or Pickawillan on the Great Miammee. Here however Clark was resisted by Simon Girty and a party of Shawnees, but the town was burned. In August, 1781 Clark drafted 400 men at Fort Pitt and moved westwards down the Ohio in response to an ambush, conducted by Joseph Brant and 100 troops and Indians, against Colonel Archibald Lochay and 107 Pennsylvania militia near the mouth of the Big Miammee River. During this ambush the British killed 37 rebels, including Lochay, and took 64 prisoners, including a major and several officers. They themselves suffered considerable loss with the death of 50 of their party.<sup>84</sup>

#### **5. The Kentucky Settlements South of the Ohio.**

Another area targeted for attack was the Kentucky settlements south of the Ohio, see Map 4.1. It was stated that in this area the British had most to fear from the settlers themselves, and thus



the Indians and Tory troops were directed to subdue them. In April, 1778 Mr. Charles Baubin, the commander of the fort on the Miamis, took a party of 40 Shawanese towards a fort on the Kentucky River, 30 miles from its mouth. They captured Daniel Boone and 26 of his men, and brought them back to Detroit.<sup>85</sup> In August and September, 1778 it was known by intelligence that the rebels had 3 forts on the Kentucky River and on September 30 De Quindre led 300 of the Shawanese against two of the forts.<sup>86</sup> In 1781 a scout by Captain Mathew Elliot of Detroit to Bryant's Station, a small palisaded fort near present-day Lexington, Kentucky, yielded the intelligence that Clark proposed an advance against Detroit from two fronts: Fort Pitt and Vincennes.<sup>87</sup> This information precipitated an attack in 1782 by 300 Indians and a few Loyalists, commanded by Captains Caldwell, McKee, and Girty, against the Kentucky. They crossed the Ohio, and on the night of August 15 "appeared at Bryant's Station." After an unsuccessful two-day siege, the Tories and Indians withdrew along the "Great Buffalo Trail" to the ford of the Licking River (Kentucky.) They were pursued by 200 Kentucky frontiersmen under Major Hugh McGary, whom they defeated at the Lower Blue Licks, see Map 4.1. According to Ward the British killed 70 and captured 20, with their own loss of 7 and 10 wounded.<sup>88</sup> There were also a few raids and scouts to the Illinois, but these will be discussed briefly in Chapter Seven.

In order to provide Haldimand with a reasonably complete picture of the military activity along the eastern and western sectors of the interior frontier of defence, the commanders at the posts and the Indian Superintendents compiled composite returns of the campaigns, war parties, and scouts on the frontier. The year 1780 provides a reasonably complete picture of these returns, which as Table 4.4 indicates for the Indian Department, usually included the nations, their Chiefs and numbers, when they marched and to where. They may also record rebel and British losses. In March, 1780 it was recorded that 239 Indians were at war and in June, 21 war parties had returned

but 10 were still on service. Of this group 803 soldiers and Indians had marched from Niagara and 48 from Carleton Island, with the Niagara troops taking 139 prisoners. From May to July, 1780 the total troops from Colonel Guy Johnson's Indian Department numbered 49 in May, 251 in June and 559 in July, making a total of 859 on service. These included the Senecas of Karayadera, Delawares of Chugnut, Schores, Cayugas, Delawares and Senecas of Kadaragaras, the Neutrals, Six Nations, Mohicans and Senecas of Sayeng, the Kindawe Senecas, the Toderwromos, the Delawares of Shamong (Chemung) and the Senecas of Chenussio. In September there were 16 war parties out, totalling 892 men, and 43 war parties or 1403 men had returned, making a total of 59 war parties or 2,295 men on service. Of this number the British reported that they had only lost 2 Chiefs and 7 warriors in battle. However, the rebel losses totalled 142 killed, 161 prisoners and 247 horses taken, 422 cattle taken or killed, 2 churches destroyed, 4 forts, 157 houses and 150 granaries destroyed and 17 mills burnt. In November, 1780 11 war parties or 340 men were still out and 54 war parties or 1,666 men had returned, making a total of 69 war parties or 2,140 men on service. The British losses totalled 18, with the deaths of 3 Chiefs and 15 warriors. Again, the rebel losses were reported as significant, with 8 officers killed and 6 taken prisoner, 159 rank and file killed and 157 taken prisoner, 250 horses taken, 430 cattle killed or taken, and 3 churches, 357 houses and granaries, 6 forts and 10 mills burnt.<sup>89</sup> These activities came to a conclusion after the preliminary Articles of Peace had been decided on at Paris on November, 30, 1782, and word of the cessation of the war had spread along the frontier.<sup>90</sup>

**RETURN OF INDIAN WAR PARTIES OF COLONEL GUY JOHNSON'S DEPARTMENT,  
ON SERVICE THE 19TH OF FEBRUARY, 1781**

NATIONS	OFFICERS OR CHIEFS	STRENGTH	WHEN MARCHED	DESTINATION
Six Nations	Christian	-----28	--Last December	--Mohawk Communication
Delawares	Philip Hough	-----14	-----Jan 10th	-----Hudson's River
Shawanese	Karaghgunty	-----15	-----Jan 15th	-----Ditto
Nanticoks & others	Capt. Shenop & Lt. Ryking	-----67	-----Jan 17th	-----Susquehanna
Onandagas & Oneidas etc	Capt. Brant & Vol <sup>n</sup> * Hare	---185	-----Feb 1st	--Mohawk Communication
Cayugas	Foreahses	-----16	-----Feb 7th	-----Ditto
Onandagas	Onoghsadaga	-----7	-----Feb 9th	-----German Flats
Senacas	Young Odongat	---20	-----Feb 10th	-----Minisinks
		352		

\*Vol<sup>n</sup> — volunteer

Table 4.4. Adapted from "A Return of the Indian War Parties of Colonel Guy Johnson's Department, on Service the 19th. February, 1781." H.P. 47, 21766, 163.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Guthorn, Peter J. *British Maps of the American Revolution*. Monmouth Beach, N. J.: Philip Freneau Press, 6.

<sup>2</sup>Harley, J. B. "Historical Geography and the Cartographic Illusion", *Journal of Historical Geography*, 15 (1989), 84-85.

<sup>3</sup>Ward, 1952, 864.

<sup>4</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 301. A census taken on December 20, 1780 noted that at least 1200 farms were uncultivated, and 354 families had abandoned their farms and left the county.

<sup>5</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 8, 12; Graymont, 1972, 184; Kelsay, 1984, 46.

<sup>6</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 110.

<sup>7</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 32-35.

<sup>8</sup>Thomas, Earle. *Sir John Johnson. Loyalist Baronet*. Toronto and Reading: Dundurn Press, 1986, 87.

<sup>9</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 46, 51; H.P. 48, 21768, 76, 80-83. There were 50 artillery men, with 9 pieces of cannon and two 12 pounders, accompanying the expedition.

<sup>10</sup>At the time there were 349 rebels at Fort Stanwix, commanded by a Lt. Colonel Van Dyke (see H.P. 48, 21768, 80-83).

<sup>11</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 51.

<sup>12</sup>Fort Hunter was vulnerable to attack because the Six Nations Indians had formerly lived there and regarded it as an area of agricultural prosperity (see Graymont, 1972, 147).

<sup>13</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 76.

<sup>14</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 358.

<sup>15</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 79.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 1931, 80.

<sup>17</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 116. On August 25, 1775 Albany had been the venue for a Congress with the Six Nations on the Indian attitude to the colonial rebellion to the British. After this, Johnson decided to hold all future councils at Johnson Hall because of rebel antagonism to the pro-British position of the Indians. The council fire of the confederacy remained at Onondaga (see Graymont, 1972, 71).

<sup>18</sup>Thomas, 1986, 91.

<sup>19</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 82-83.

<sup>20</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 323.

<sup>21</sup>For example, Warrensborough "for seven miles was in flames, near one hundred farms, three Mills and a large Granary for Public Service were reduced to Ashes" (see Cruikshank, 1931, 81).

<sup>22</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 116.

<sup>23</sup>Cherry Valley was the principal settlement south of the Mohawk and east of Schoharie. Before the War of Revolution it had nearly 300 inhabitants of Scotch-Irish descent, and gained its name from the predominance of cherry orchards in the area (see Kelsay, 1984, 218, 223, 229).

<sup>24</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 73.

<sup>25</sup>Genesee Falls was two days march from Canadasaga, present-day Geneva, on the north-western tip of Seneca Lake (see Kelsay, 1984, 248).

<sup>26</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 73.

<sup>27</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 65, 70.

<sup>28</sup>Unadilla was a settlement of stone and frame houses, with a saw and grist mill (see Ward, 1952, 634).

<sup>29</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 298; Graymont, 1972, 29.

<sup>30</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 80-83.

<sup>31</sup>Ward, 1952, 633.

<sup>32</sup>Graymont, 1972, 178-179.

<sup>33</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 65.

<sup>34</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 80-83.

<sup>35</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 116.

<sup>36</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 80-83.

<sup>37</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 116. In September they burned a settlement near Waysink, and then divided into four parties, killing 2 rebels, capturing 9, and taking 20 head of cattle, sheep and horses for provisions (see H.P. 47, 21707, 226).

<sup>38</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 250-251.

<sup>39</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 116.

<sup>40</sup>The ironic nature of the use of Easton as a provisioning centre for this campaign was that in 1758 it had been the venue for a treaty between the Six Nations and the Indians on the Ohio, in which the Six Nations compelled the western Indians to "drop the hatchet" against the British (see Kelsay, 1984, 61).

<sup>41</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 7.

<sup>42</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 65, 116.

<sup>43</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 71.

<sup>44</sup>Graymont, 1972, 73.

<sup>45</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 219; Ward, 1952, 629-630.

<sup>46</sup>The forts were from south to north, Durkee, Wyoming, Ogden's, Forty, The Pittstown Redoubts, Wintermoot's and Jenkins.

<sup>47</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 45, 47.

<sup>48</sup>Ward, 1952, 630-631; Cruikshank, 1893, 46-47.

<sup>49</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 51, 61, 63.

<sup>50</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 7.

<sup>51</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 12, 169.

<sup>52</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 51; Graymont, 1972, 180.

<sup>53</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 153, 175; 48, 21768, 65.

<sup>54</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 71.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 65, 116.

<sup>57</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 66-67; Graymont, 1972, 202-203.

<sup>58</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 175; 48, 21768, 65.

<sup>59</sup>Ward, 1952, 864.

<sup>60</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 189.

<sup>61</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 65.

<sup>62</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 77, 189.

<sup>63</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 77.

<sup>64</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 40; Kelsay, 1984, 56.

<sup>65</sup>Fort Venango served more as a supply depot for the fur trade than as a centre for defence (see Severance, 1917, II, 40).

<sup>66</sup>Graymont, 1972, 245; Ward, 1952, 852. George Rogers Clark mounted his offensive against the Illinois from Fort Pitt.

<sup>67</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 61-62.

<sup>68</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 13; 47, 21767, 165, 169, 189; 48, 21768, 65.

<sup>69</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 46, 51-52.

<sup>70</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 45, 49, 51-52.

<sup>71</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 58.

<sup>72</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 116.

<sup>73</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 74.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, 1893, 109. Wheeling was about 63 miles east of the mouth of the Muskingum.

<sup>75</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 26, 29, 44.

<sup>76</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 9, 13.

<sup>77</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 29.

<sup>78</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 37.

<sup>79</sup>Graymont, 1972, 252-253.

<sup>80</sup>Ward, 1952, 861.

<sup>81</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 76.

<sup>82</sup>Ward, 1952, 865.

<sup>83</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 96.

<sup>84</sup>The interception took place at a creek on the Ohio, 11 miles below the Great Miami (see Kelsay, 1984, 313; H.P. 47, 21767, 226, 254).

<sup>85</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 13; Ward, 1952, 864. It can be assumed that Boone was later released or escaped because in August of 1781 he was again involved in a skirmish with the British.



<sup>86</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 38, 43.

<sup>87</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 75.

<sup>88</sup>Ward, 1952, 864. The frontiersmen refused to listen to Daniel Boone's advice to wait for reinforcements.

<sup>89</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 16, 65, 76, 80-83.

<sup>90</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 335.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION OF THE QUEBEC FRONTIER BY CENTRES EAST OF THE UPPER POSTS**

It has been shown, in Chapters One and Two, that the government of the interior frontier of defence originated in the British king and parliament, and was translocated in the North American colonies by colonial administrators selected by the imperial regime. Thus the perception of Quebec and its frontier was biased by imperial attitudes to the administration of colonies, and their potential contribution to the British mercantile system. This led to a focus on the forts around the Great Lakes because of the access they gave to the interior fur trade. To a certain extent therefore, the magnitude of the interior frontier of defence reflected the accessibility to the interior made possible by the Upper Posts on the lakes: an accessibility however, that was often overestimated by imperial officials. This chapter will focus on the government of the Upper Posts, and the defence frontier, by the Quebec administration, under the direction of the imperial regime.

The government of the Upper Posts, namely Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac, can be divided, on the basis of both administrative superiority and distance from centres of imperial administration, into centres east of the Great Lakes and those around the Great Lakes. The centres east of the Great Lakes, namely Quebec, Montreal, and posts along the St. Lawrence River, can be regarded as the administrative superiors of the Upper Posts. These centres were the headquarters for the administration of the colony of Quebec, as well as the northern frontier, and were administered by officials who usually held a superior rank to those at the Upper Posts. The posts along the St. Lawrence, namely, Lachine, Coteau du Lac, The Cedars, Oswegatchie, and Carleton

Island, although less important administratively, are included in the eastern administrative sector because of their proximity and accessibility to Quebec and Montreal.

Theoretically, the Quebec colonial defence machinery was administered by the Commander in Chief of the Forces in North America, located in New York; the Commander in Chief of the Forces in Quebec, located in Quebec; the legislative Council of Quebec; the Commanders of the posts; and the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern District. However, the administrative potential of these officers was limited by the top-heavy Imperial administration discussed in Chapter One.

It has been argued, in the literature, that the Secretary of State for colonial affairs was the principal spokesperson for the policies of the Home Government. As noted earlier, the colonial secretary during the administration of Haldimand was Lord George Germain. It was his responsibility to provide policies for the continuing offensive and defensive operations along the frontier. Mackesy supports the argument for the pre-eminence of the colonial secretary in formulating frontier policy, by arguing that the planning of the war was largely out of the control of the Treasury, the Board of Ordnance, the Admiralty and the Army.<sup>1</sup> Instead, these bodies formed a supportive role as directors of the machinery through which the war was conducted or as implementers of policy rather than creators.

The principal implementers of policy on frontier defence in the colonial sphere were the Commanders in Chief of the forces. The Commander in Chief of North America during the war years of the Haldimand administration, with headquarters in New York, was Sir Henry Clinton, who succeeded to the office on May 8, 1778.<sup>2</sup> He was the officer who was usually the most senior

in rank in the North American service. Theoretically, military rank took precedence over a civil appointment in the colonial service, unless the civil governor had a military appointment equal or superior to that of the military commander. Thus in matters of defence it was expected that the colonial commanders in chief, governors, and Indian superintendents, would defer in matters of policy to the Commander in Chief in New York.<sup>3</sup>

However, distance decay played a role in interrupting this chain of command between New York and Quebec. The perceived distance of Quebec as a conquered French colony was extended by the isolation of Quebec from the mainstream of colonial communication. For example, Quebec was separated from western Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, by the Indian territory, and from eastern New York by the largely uninhabited area along the upper reaches of the northern Mohawk tributaries and the Champlain system, and by largely uninhabited Vermont. As well, during the war, there was a gradual closing of avenues of communication between New York and Quebec. Thus Haldimand gained, at least in practical terms, almost total autonomy in his administration.

Due to the emphasis in this study with defence policy, an apt example of the separateness of Quebec can be found in the organization of the army. In listing the strength and disposition of the land forces in 1776, the Imperial government divided the forces for North America into those on the coast of the Atlantic, under General Howe, and those in Canada, under General Carleton. The Canadian contingent, as listed in Table 5.1 consisted of 13,842 troops compared with the 40,522 troops under Howe: thus representing 34 percent of the total troops in North America.

This argument for separateness may be challenged by the fact that in listing the civil

### LAND FORCES IN CANADA UNDER GENERAL CARLETON.

#### BRITISH TROOPS.

11 Battalions	8th., 9th., 20th., 21st., 24th., 29th., 31st., 33rd., 34th., 53rd., 62nd..		
	each 677 men	7,447.	
1 Battalion.	McLean.	<u>615.</u>	
			8,062.

#### FOREIGN TROOPS.

9 Brunswick Battalions.		4,300.	
1 Regiment	Hanau.	668.	
1 Artillery	Hanau.	128.	
1 Regiment	Waldeck.	670.	
1 Artillery	Waldeck.	<u>14.</u>	
			<u>5,780.</u>

<b>TOTAL IN CANADA.</b>	<b>13,842.</b>
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Table 5.1. The Land Forces in Canada Serving Under General Carleton. H.P. 12, 21687, 322.

departments of the Army the forces in both Quebec and the rest of North America were treated as a whole in 1774, as shown in Table 5.2. One may presume however, that as communication between New York and Quebec worsened the departments of the army in Quebec issued separate reports and thus became increasingly divorced from the rest of the forces. For example, even in 1774 it was argued that the routes of communication from New York to Quebec were such that if troops had been marched overland from New York to Albany General Gage (the commander in chief) would "have lost half of them ..." either to desertion or rebel attack.

The Quarter Master General's department recognized that basic defence provisioning must be bound to location and readily available at all times. To have the stores for Quebec in New York would have made this vital part of the defence system less effective: hence the need for an administrative supply post in Quebec. As the colonial rebellion intensified munitions accessibility became even more critical and location based. The Commissary General's department was, in 1776, under the administration of Nathaniel Day in Quebec. His orders came not from New York but directly from the imperial Treasury, and he supervised his own supplies, magazines, depots of provisions and the distribution of these to the forces. His equivalent in New York, Daniel Wier, had the administration of the Atlantic colonies, including Nova Scotia.<sup>4</sup>

A further example of the separate administrative structure of the army in Quebec was the supply system for food provisions. In supplying "the army in America the Lords of the Treasury ... enter'd into contracts with a Variety of Persons ..." for the supply of provisions to the Commissary at Cork (Robert Gordon) for its shipping to America. The army in Canada was to receive its provisions separately, on a twelve-month contract, from Messrs. Muse, Son and Atkinson (1776), who also undertook to supply the provisioning ships. The tonnage of this shipping was 21,000 tons

### CIVIL DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY IN AMERICA.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE.	Frances Hutcheson Esq.
QUARTER MASTER GENERAL.	Major Wm. Shirreff (N. York) Gabriel Maturin Esq. (Montreal)
ENGINEERS DEPARTMENT.	Wm. Forman - Paymaster Capt. Thomas Sowers Capt. John Montresor
COMM'Y GEN'S DEPARTMENT.	Robert Leake Esq. (N. York) Frances Hutcheson (N. York) Daniel Chamier Esq. (N. York) Adam Cunningham (Quebec.) William Williams (W. Florida)
BARRACK MASTER GENERAL.	Col. James Robertson (N. York)
HALIFAX GARRISON EXP'S.	Lieut. Col. Hamilton (Halifax)
QUEBEC GARRISON EXP'S.	Col. Val. Jones (Quebec)
CASTLE WILLIAM EXP'S.	Lieut. Col. Leslie (Boston Harbour)
INDIAN DEPARTMENT.	John Stuart Esq (Sthn District) Sir Wm. Johnson (Nthn District)
PAYMASTER TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF.	Frances Hutcheson Esq.
INCIDENTAL EXPENSES PAYMASTERS.	John Powell Esq (Quebec) Thomas Barrow Esq. (N. York) John Garnier Esq. (Boston) George Williams Esq. (Halifax)

Table 5.2. The Civil Departments of the Army in North America, circa 1774. H.P. 12, 21688, 1.

for 12,000 men for three months. The contractors also undertook to supply liquor for the army to the amount of 125,000 gallons (1250 Puncheons) per annum of rum from Jamaica, Grenada, St. Vincents, Tobago, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat, Nevis and Tortolao. These supplies were to be purchased from such contractors as John Blackburn at Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat and Nevis at 3/- per gallon, Thomas Burfoot at Barbados at 3/- per gallon and Richard Atkinson at Jamaica at 5/3 per gallon.<sup>5</sup>

It is important to stress the separate identity of the army in Quebec as a means of understanding the role played by Haldimand in setting the policy for the defence of the frontier. Haldimand commenced his defence administration subsequent to a negative report on the colony from his predecessor Sir Guy Carleton. In a letter to Lord George Germain dated Quebec, June 10th., 1778, Carleton argued that it was virtually impossible to sustain a defensive war along the Canadian frontier. The Upper Posts, he said, were defenceless, the people were "unsettled" and though the armaments "on the different Lakes ... [were] in good order, that on Lake Champlain [being] ... formidable," the boats and vessels were too "precarious" to be of service, difficult to guard and useless in winter. There was constant motion from "Stations, Patrols and Scouts" to prevent the rebels approaching near the British defences and those who served under such conditions were being well rewarded, particularly the "savages". As he saw it however, the chief problem was the "dejected state" of "the people in Canada at the failure of the Burgoyne campaign to seal off the Hudson river waterway from rebel advances, as well as rumours of a formidable invasion of the province."<sup>6</sup>



## **A. THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE HALDIMAND ADMINISTRATION.**

From a geographical viewpoint the administrative difficulty faced by Haldimand in administering an arc of frontier territory, stretching 1000 miles westward from the Atlantic, while at the same time being himself removed from his superior officer in New York and the imperial administration in London, was two-fold. Firstly, the English-speaking section of the frontier had a historic dependence on New York and Philadelphia for its administration and provisioning, and secondly, the seat of operations for the interior frontier of defence was Niagara, not Quebec, presenting problems in communication.

### **1. The Historic Dependence of the Defence Frontier on the Eastern Seaboard.**

With regard to the first difficulty, the maps of the period, detailed in Chapter Three, give a visual record of the orientation of the road system from the frontier, east of the Wabash, to either Philadelphia or New York. A secondary orientation was that of the French-speaking Illinois country to either Michilimackinac and St. Josephs in the north, or to New Orleans in the south. For example, the Mitchell Map of 1755 shows major roads running north/south along the Hudson River from New York to Albany, Lake Champlain and Quebec, with a western spur along the Mohawk river. This Mohawk spur continued to Fort Stanwix and then divided into three smaller spurs: one due westward to Niagara, one due south to the Indian gateway of Tioga and then via the West Branch of the Susquehanna to the great east/west Philadelphia wagon road, and the third spur due either south through Tioga or west through Genesee to the Allegheny and Fort Pitt. There were also notable Indian roads such as that eastward from Tioga and Pine Creek to the Jersey shore, and westward from Tioga to the Kadaragaras settlements near Lake Erie.

Another major east/west connection was the Philadelphia wagon road running west from

Philadelphia through Lancaster, Frankstown, Fort Pitt, Logs Town, Muskingum, Hockhocken and Pickawillan to the Wabash, with spurs northwards at Lancaster to Shamokin, at Logs Town to Venango, southwards from Hockhocken to Shawnoah, southwards from Pickawillan to Shawnoah, via the Gist Trader's Road, and northwards from Pickawillan to Fort Miamis and Detroit. Burghardt, in his article on the Niagara Peninsula road system, notes the orientation of many of these roads to river or stream systems.<sup>7</sup> He suggests that one reason for this could have been a desire to provide all-weather communication in terrain where the streams or rivers were either in flood in the spring, or frozen in the winter. In such cases the road would form an alternative form of transport. The present-day dyking of the Chemung river at Elmira, New York, and at Corning, gives telling evidence of such flooding. As well, Route 6 in Pennsylvania, between present-day Mansfield and Coudersport on the Allegheny River, which is purported to be an old Indian trail, follows Pine Creek, but the road itself is approximately ten to thirty feet above the creek bed. Another reason for such orientation was the transportation of bulky goods via water while the lighter goods went by road, as in the Johnson expedition to the Mohawk delineated in Chapter Three. Burghardt also argues that water provided a source of sustenance for troops and animals while traversing the frontier.

One could assume that with Haldimand's previous experience as acting Commander in Chief of the Forces in North America (1773-1774) he would have been well aware of these avenues of communication, but as communication with New York became more difficult, so did his ability to take advantage of the relationship of the Virginian, Pennsylvanian and New York frontiers with the Atlantic seaboard. Thus one of the major problems of his administration was the difficulty of forging new channels of administrative communication along the defence frontier.

## **2. The Distance of the Upper Posts From Quebec.**

The second major geographical difficulty was the distance of the Upper Posts from Quebec and Montreal, which placed Niagara in a pre-eminent position for frontier defence. Thus Quebec, 600 water-miles to the east, was out of the arena of frontier defence activity: complicating the administrative network instituted for the creation of defence policy. This distance decay meant that Haldimand's administrative directions tended to concern principles of defence rather than the minutiae of the actual day-to-day administration of defensive and offensive operations along the frontier. This led to a certain degree of frustration on the part of both Haldimand and the commanders of the Upper Posts, the latter who, because of the chain of command, were trained to await hierarchical decisions from their superiors. Thus in answer to the argument that Haldimand often responded with "too little and too late,"<sup>8</sup> it can be suggested that this hesitancy was as much a function of geographical difficulties as it was of administrative incompetence or mismanagement.

With distance came autonomy, and throughout his administration Haldimand felt a frustration with the commanders at the Upper Posts, particularly Niagara because they considered themselves "at liberty to incur what expence they please and as subject to no controls." This problem was compounded by the fact that the commanders were "constantly resident" at the posts and sought local and Indian support for their actions, as for example in the distribution of Indian presents.<sup>9</sup> This propinquity gave them an advantage in terms of policy creation for the frontier, particularly as they were more aware of the local conditions and the defence potential of the Posts, and the defensive and offensive conditions on the frontier.

However, to a certain extent the geographical isolation of the Upper Posts limited their commanders in assessing the defence capabilities of the frontier as a whole. Their views of the

frontier tended to be restricted to a series of small vignettes based on the mental maps of the participants in the scouts and raids along the frontier. This locale-based information often came from second-hand information given to the war parties by informants or prisoners encountered while on duty and thus its reliability was often questionable. Haldimand received his information in much the same way, although on a larger scale, because his sources were greater in number and from more diverse geographical locales. The same could be said for information received at an imperial level, although here the information supply line was seriously impaired by its distance from the arena of operations.

The following example illustrates this intrusion of geographical distance into the defence policy of Quebec. In January, 1782, in response to a requisition by Haldimand for £571,194 for his administrative expenses for that year, John Robinson, secretary of the imperial Treasury, complained that "... the said Requisitions so greatly exceed those of former Years ... that my Lords cannot but be extremely surprised that the General should have made Requisitions for so large an Amount Without Explicit Notice either to His Lordship or to this Board ...." Robinson went on to state that Haldimand should firstly seek the approval of the Board for "works so expensive & burthensome to the Public ...." In fact Robinson was replying to a request from Haldimand, dated six months previously, to allow him to grant bills to the Provincial government, including the commanders at the Upper Posts, on credit, a practise which Haldimand stated had been in operation for some time. The practise, which upon receipt of Haldimand's request, Robinson argued was "dangerous & hazardous and may be attended with ... heavy losses to the Public ..." was bolstered by the colonial fear, real or alleged, that if it was discontinued, it would tend to cause the government in Quebec to fall into rebel hands because of civilian discontent with the financial opportunities in the province. As well, the difficulty of adequately supervising credit on goods purchased by the commanders at

the Upper Posts, was perceived as greater than the risk involved in allowing the credit system to continue. However, the point that was missed by Robinson was that Haldimand had no other choice than to grant credit at least in the interim until his letters containing requests for money had reached London, been processed through the Treasury and approved by the House of Commons. This problem of distance was freely admitted by another colonial officer, Robert Adair, Apothecary General for the army, who stated that it could not be supposed that he "should undertake to regulate Hospitals at the distance of Quebec ..." from his headquarters in London.<sup>10</sup>

As well, from a geographical viewpoint, the frontier itself was described by Captain Sir James Murray in November 1775 as "almost entirely covered with wood," and in 1777 Ensign Hughes described the roads around Ticonderoga (Lake Champlain) as "so very crooked that we seldom saw 300 yards before us," and another opinion described the country as "peculiarly unfavourable in respect to military operations."<sup>11</sup> These difficulties increased the problems of communication as was noted by Haldimand with respect to getting his ciphers (codes) through the countryside overland from Quebec or Montreal to New York.<sup>12</sup>

### **3. The Difficulty of Supplying Provisions and Equipment to the Frontier.**

These difficulties in communication impinged on one of the most troublesome difficulties raised by the War of American Independence."<sup>13</sup> Without a systematic administrative organization and coordination between government departments this problem of frontier defence maintenance would become overwhelming.

The defence administration of the frontier centred around the upper posts of Fort Niagara, Fort Detroit and Fort Michilimackinac, with commanding officers also at Fort George on Lake Champlain, Montreal, Lachine, The Cedars, Oswegatchie, Carleton Island, Fort Miami and at St.

Joseph until its evacuation by Sinclair in the spring of 1780.<sup>14</sup> The western posts of Vincennes, Kaskaskia, and Cahokia had been in rebel control since the Clark expedition of June, 1778, apart from a brief occupancy by Hamilton in the winter of 1778/1779.<sup>15</sup> Of considerable importance to the British defence of the frontier was the fact that the key posts of Fort Stanwix and Fort Pitt were under rebel control, thus making the provisioning of the frontier more difficult, and the role of British sympathizers along the frontier an important one. Germaine, in a letter to Carleton, included a list of persons who were "well disposed" to Britain and who lived on the frontier of Virginia, near Fort Pitt.<sup>16</sup> The location and identity of these sympathizers was probably well-known to the British Loyalists, particularly the Butler's Rangers and the Indian forces, who in many cases must have relied heavily on their provisioning for survival.

The food provisioning for the war effort was divided into two stages: the first stage concerned the collecting of the provisions in England and assembling them at points of embarkation, and the second stage concerned the transportation and distribution of these goods in North America and the acquiring of provisions locally wherever possible. Arthur Bowler argues that the one predominant characteristic of the provisioning supply line was that it never supplied enough to adequately maintain the British forces during the war. Thus he stated that from 1778 to 1781 there were "critical shortages" that were particularly felt along the frontier.<sup>17</sup> These shortages were due to such factors as undersupply, as in 1778 where the provisions for Canada were sent for only 7,000 regulars, instead of 11,000 total recruits: the difference largely being accounted for by civilian employees of army departments, "Loyalists and refugees, Indian contingents, and prisoners at war." Raids by privateers and other marauders in the Gulf of St. Lawrence also accounted for some provisioning loss, particularly in 1778.

The Imperial government was sensitive to a degree over these losses and in December of 1778 directed the Treasury to guarantee to the Upper Posts a nine-months supply for 3,021 men, which were to be sent by the following March. However this figure totally ignored the numbers of Indians being victualled at the posts, the number at Niagara alone being around 4,000 in 1779.<sup>18</sup> In reality the convoy was delayed and did not arrive in Quebec till late July, with three ships being lost out of the original thirteen sent. The provisioning situation in 1779 was exacerbated by the destruction of the Six Nation Indian territory by Sullivan. To feed the extra mouths Haldimand had to divert provisions from the Montreal/Quebec supply, thus further depleting the already limited supply of provisions. In response to this situation the provisions were increased for 1780 "to provide for 15,000 men for eighteen months." These provisions never arrived in Canada due to the fact that "heavy gales ... dispersed ... [the convoy] all over the North Atlantic." This disaster was one of the factors that forced a review of the provisioning system, and in 1781 it was decided to place the responsibility for provisioning in the hands of the Treasury, the Navy Board and the office of the Secretary of State. Although the system became more efficient under this administration, the provisions for that year were again delayed so that they were not available for distribution to the frontier.<sup>19</sup>

Bowler argued, and it is substantiated by the Haldimand papers, that the upper country (and the frontier) was seriously affected by the provisioning shortages of 1778-1781, particularly with respect to the re-opening of Fort Ontario at Oswego, which was a gateway to the eastern sector of the defence frontier.<sup>20</sup> For example, in 1778 the provisioning of the Upper Posts was adequate only because of the surplus from the abortive Burgoyne expedition, but stress was placed on even these provisions by the Hamilton expedition of the fall/winter of 1778-1779 to the Illinois and the Sullivan destruction of the Finger Lakes Indian country in 1779. In fact, Haldimand's tardiness in

responding to the rumours of the Sullivan expedition was in a large part the result of the lack of troops and provisions to maintain them on the frontier at that time. Again, his lack of enthusiasm in responding to the George Rogers Clark expedition to the Illinois was in part a function of the provisioning crisis.<sup>21</sup>

The chief imperial administrators of the provisioning supply line to the frontier were Robert Gordon, Commissary of Provisions, who was appointed by the Treasury in 1776, and John Marsh, who succeeded him in 1779. These individuals had their headquarters at Cork, but there was an agent victualler, namely George Cherry, appointed to supervise the acquisition of provisions, based at Deptford, near London and at Cowes, near Portsmouth harbour on the south coast of England. From Cork the provisions for the Quebec service were carried to Halifax, Quebec or Montreal for storage and distribution. As with other army services, the provisioning service was contracted out to civilians, both in terms of the acquisition of provisions and of their delivery to North America. These contracts were under the supervision of the colonial secretary and were usually based on an annual contract with deliveries in increments every three or four months.<sup>22</sup> Of particular relevance were the prices and quality of foodstuffs on the British marketplace and the procedure of packing and delivering perishables and non-perishables via the Atlantic to Quebec.

The contract stated the time-period of its validity, the number of rations, and the price per ration: the conditions of risk were also usually appended, although it was customary to charge import and export duties to the Lords Commissioners. The provisions included the army staples of beef, pork, biscuit, flour, oatmeal, rice, pease, butter and salt, as well as the more 'luxury' items of cheese, bacon, suet, fish, raisins, molasses and vegetables, such as potatoes, parsnips, carrots, turnips, cabbages and onions, as well as the "anti-scorbutics" such as sauerkraut, porter, claret,



spruce beer, malt, vinegar, celery seed and brown mustard seed.<sup>23</sup> The Canada contract for 1778-1779 stated that the soldiers's ration of seven rations per man per week was to consist of: 7 lbs of Flour, of the first quality, made from wholly kiln-dried wheat or 7 lbs of Bread, 7 lbs of Beef, or in lieu of this, 4 lbs of Pork, 6 ozs of Butter, or in lieu of this, 8 ozs of Cheese, 3 pints of Pease, 1 lb of Flour or 1/2 lb of Rice and 1/2 lb of Oatmeal. The ration also included rum or spruce beer, which in 1776 was substituted for porter, and was brewed at an army brewery in New York.<sup>24</sup> However it is doubtful that this ration was ever fully received by the troops during the War of Revolution, particularly along the frontier.

Curtis lists a whole line of ills that plagued the provisioning service. These included poor quality provisions, such as "mouldy bread, weevily biscuit, rancid butter, sour flour, worm-eaten pease, and maggoty beef," the destruction of provisions by rats and vermin, improper packing of goods and thievery. He also included the problems of "careless, dilatory, and sometimes dishonest business methods (as with the Taylor and Forsythe embezzlement charge at Niagara,)<sup>25</sup> the ill proportioned (too little or too much) supply of provisions, and the lack of an adequate census of the numbers to be victualled. Another problem that has often been overlooked was the difficulty of securing an estimated 2100 tons of shipping for the American service, a circumstance that led Muse, Son and Atkinson to complain to General Carleton that they were forced to pick up ships "at all the Outports," and hurriedly arm them and prepare them for service.<sup>26</sup>

In response to this chronicle of ills it must in all fairness be noted that there was an attempt to remedy them. For example, Robert Gordon had tried to minimize the destruction of the provisions while in transit by placing tin plates on all the bungs of the casks to keep the rats from chewing on the wood.<sup>27</sup> As well, the masters of ships had to fill out a Bill of Lading<sup>28</sup> and account

for the goods at the termination point of their journey, although it is possible that such accounting was vulnerable to corruption, and thus may not be a reliable indicator of accountability in the supply of provisions. Furthermore, the masters were also to guard against the squandering of provisions by troops travelling in provision ships to the colony. Table 5.3 lists the rules for shipboard victualling, it being noted that the mainstay of the diet was to be bread and rum, the rum in part mitigating the tediousness of the voyage.

A "List of Transports destined for New York..." illustrates that during the War of Revolution the Admiralty considered it important to convoy the provisions in order to provide the maximum probability of the provisions reaching their destination. In this listing 23 ships were to be sent out to New York as a convoy as organized by Lieutenant Bradley of the Royal Navy, who was the Agent of Transports. These convoys were victualled for seventy days or about 2 1/2 months, this being considered the average time for them to reach America.<sup>29</sup>

In 1777 the Chief Commissary in Canada was Nathaniel Day, who was paid at the rate of 40/- per day, assisted by deputies Collin Drummond and Parkhurst, who were paid at a rate of 30/- per day, their assistants, both named Clarke, being paid at the rate of 20/- per day.<sup>30</sup> The role of the commissary was an important one because the survival of the troops and their ability to perform their military duties depended on the provisions. It had long been recognized by the Home government, particularly in response to information received from the commander in chief at Quebec, that the provisioning system was flawed and that provisions were not reaching the Upper Posts in a quantity sufficient to ensure both the survival of the troops and their adequate defence of the frontier. The British parliament was however aware that since the beginning of the revolution "upwards of 12,000 Barrels of Flour and 6,000 Barrels of Biscuit had been supplied annually for

# **RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN VICTUALLING LAND FORCES.**

## **SIX SOLDIERS ALLOWANCE FOR EVERY DAY IN THE WEEK.**

	BREAD	BEER/ RUM	BEEF	PORK	PEASE	OATMEAL	BUTTER/ OIL	CHEESE
	lbs.	gills half pints	11b 4pcs	11b 2pcs	pints	pints	1.5 lbs pints	1.5 lbs
SUN	4	4	-	2	2	-	-	
MON	4	4	-	-	-	4	1	
TUE	4	4	2 or 1.1 lb suet			-	-	
WED	4	4	-	-	2	4	1	
THU	4	4	-	2	2	-	-	
FRI	4	4	-	-	2	4	1	
SAT	4	4	2	or as	Tues.	-	-	

VINEGAR—ONE QUART A WEEK FOR SIX MEN

Table 5.3. Quantities to be given by the Masters of ships in Victualling Land forces in Transit: either to or from North America. H.P. 12, 21687, 282.

the troops" in North America, a quantity which they reasoned was adequate for their survival. It was also recognized that the Upper Posts appeared to be consuming more than their share of these provisions. For example, in the spring of 1780 Germaine complained to Haldimand that in one year the garrisons at the Upper Posts had exceeded the rations issued for provisioning the whole army for six months, or 20,000 rations for a troop complement of 8,000 men.<sup>31</sup> The Treasury and the House of Commons was also reacting to the cost of these rations, which in 1773 was 2/6 Sterling per ration.<sup>32</sup>

To help alleviate this provisioning crisis Germaine, in a letter dated Whitehall, 17th. March, 1780, suggested that the garrisons at the Upper Posts would have to become at least partly self-sufficient by "cultivating lands around the Posts. This suggestion was based on the fact that not only was there an inadequate supply of provisions from England but also because there was a financial crisis in the funding of the war. The only "consolation" Germaine could find in this situation was that while the colony had inadequate provisions, partly aggravated by crop failures in 1779-1780, it was, he felt, not attractive to a rebel invasion. However he was aware that Haldimand feared the loss of the Upper Posts and the effect this would have on "the Fidelity of both Canadians and Indians," and thus he stated that he was willing to support a continuation of the provisioning for the Upper Posts.<sup>33</sup>

Haldimand had good reason for his fears of a rebel attack on provisions at the Upper Posts, particularly with the large quantities of arms and ammunition sent by the traders to their fur trade interests in the upper country. With possible rebel access from the frontier to the supply posts, particularly Niagara and Detroit, a large quantity of provisions could act as a magnet to rebels. A restraint in supply was even more important in the light of the constant rumours of an invasion from

the rebel south and east into Canada. By 1780 Haldimand had even taken the precaution to station “three light vessels” at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, to act as heralds of an imminent invasion and to inform Vice Admiral Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton in the event that an invading force was sighted in the Gulf. He was also keeping up a “constant Intercourse and Correspondence both by Land and Water” with Clinton in order to request assistance “in case of danger.”<sup>34</sup>

Despite the reluctant willingness of the imperial government to continue Upper Post provisioning, the Haldimand papers give little indication of an Imperial understanding of the demand for provisions by the Indian allies both at the Upper Posts and along the frontier and western interior. As well, Germaine’s comment on the need for self-sufficiency provides evidence of the time lapse in communication between the Home government and Quebec, in that by the time this suggestion was received by Haldimand his agricultural scheme, at least that operated by the garrisons, had been in operation at the Upper Posts for two years. However there can be little doubt that the suggestion motivated Haldimand to include Loyalists in the agricultural scheme as well.

As the War of Revolution progressed, the provisioning expences, both in terms of the numbers of troops and the supplies of equipment, increased. In view of the rumours of an imminent invasion Haldimand requested, an additional supply of troops. These were sent both from New York and from England, as for example the troops sent in the ‘Bridgewater’ storeship bringing provisions to Canada in the Spring of 1780. By the 8th. of April the British had real evidence of an expected invasion against Canada. Intelligence had revealed that an armada was being prepared at Brest in Brittany, on the northwestern coast of France, “said to consist of Twelve Sail of the Line & two Fifty Gunships,” it also being rumoured that 12,000 land forces were to accompany the fleet. It was expected that the armada would disembark in Boston and mount the invasion from that

location. Further intelligence however, scaled down the operation to five ships of the line and accompanying troops, that were to disembark in the Chesapeake Bay. This latter location made sense if the Delaware River was to be the avenue of penetration through the frontier. At the same time British unease along the frontier increased in response to reports that rebel positions along the Ohio were being strengthened.<sup>35</sup>

These fears were mitigated somewhat by successful British manoeuvres, such as the Mohawk expeditions and raids and the attacks by the Indian and Loyalist troops "near Albany, and very low down in Pennsylvania" which met with very little rebel opposition. As well, the preoccupation of the rebel army with the middle and southern Atlantic colonies could be interpreted by the British administration as a valid reason for reducing the provisioning to the northern frontier, particularly as Germaine argued that the town of Quebec was in a relatively defensible position and would be more so if Ethan Allen and Vermont could be won to the British cause.<sup>36</sup> However the defensibility of the "Settled Part of Canada" did not answer the defense needs of the Upper Posts and the frontier and there was considerable pressure on the Imperial regime to continue funding the increasing financial burden of this part of Canada.

Such an administrative policy seemed appropriate, particularly in 1782 when Shelburne informed Haldimand that an armada was again being prepared at Brest for an invasion against Canada.<sup>37</sup> Haldimand was advised to reinforce Quebec, guard the entrance to the St. Lawrence, prepare signals for the conveyance of intelligence along the Great Lakes and the Upper Posts, reinforce the naval force in the province and ensure the Indians were loyal.<sup>38</sup> To Haldimand, with his limited military force and the limited provisions to maintain it, such a geographical spread of imperial orders must have seemed impossible to effect.

However it was these persistent rumours of invasion that ensured the continuing supply of provisions to the Upper Posts and the frontier, even to the extent of complying with requests for “additional” supplies. For example, in 1780 Germaine informed Haldimand that “A Blanket, a pair of Mittens & Leggings have this, & the former Year been superadded to the ordinary Regimental Clothing of the Troops.”, on service on the frontier. Funding for this additional clothing was received out of a special fund called the ‘Royal Bounty’ in recognition of “the severity of the Climate and the Hardships the Men may be exposed to ... and as an Encouragement to a Cheerful Performance of such Laborious Services as you may find it necessary to employ them in.” This bounty was to be applied only to regular British troops at the Upper Posts because they shewed “Repugnance to undertake anything that was not strictly military.”<sup>39</sup> These non-military duties included the supervision of Indian councils, the provisioning of Indians, the participation in gardening duties for the garrison gardens, the supervision of either temporary Loyalist settlement at the post or of the transportation of Loyalists east to Montreal or Quebec, the supervision of fur trade activities and the settling of disputes between residents at the post. However, the application of the bounty just to army regulars indicates a lack of understanding by the colonial secretary of the role played by the provincial militia, Rangers and the Indians, in frontier defence: a role which placed tremendous stress not only on their supply of provisions but also on their mental commitment to the British cause.

In order to secure this loyalty from Indians in particular, the colonial administration committed themselves to an ever-increasing supply of presents from ‘the King’, in addition to those that were already pouring into the Indian country with the fur trade. Their policy was that little expence was to be spared in the type, quality and quantity of these gifts. It was argued by the Indian Superintendent in Montreal, Mr. Campbell, that the “King’s presents should always be of the best

kinds and superior to the Traders' Goods." Thus as the level of excellence of the traders' goods increased, largely in response to an increasing discrimination on the part of the Indians, so it was expected that the 'King's presents' would also increase in excellence. However, this level of excellence was not always reached. In 1779 the Indian goods sent on behalf of the Crown were "of the lowest price and consequently of an Inferior Quality," which probably represented the differing perceptions, on the part of the Home government, of the importance of the role of the Indian presents in buying loyalty.<sup>40</sup> This response is hardly surprising in view of the reports delivered to the Home government in 1782, which estimated that the cost of the Indian presents for the posts of Montreal, Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac for that year was £62,564, with Niagara accounting for £18,298, as shown on Table 5.4.

The subsistence for the prisoners at the Upper Posts was an additional burden on the expence of provisioning the frontier and its supply posts. The British government had specified the amount of victuals to be given for the subsistence of prisoners. These victualling requirements were however qualified by the statement that the amounts were to be fixed "as nearly similar to the ... [specified amounts] as circumstances will permit,"<sup>41</sup> a considerable qualification in times of war, particularly along the frontier when provisioning shortages were critical. Compared with the weekly allowance for soldiers, see Table 5.5, the prisoners received much the same biscuit as the troops, but their meat rations were three quarters that of the troops and they were not given cheese, flour and oatmeal. There was an attempt to prevent scurvy by the theoretical inclusion of yams, potatoes, pease and greens, and an attempt to satisfy the fat needs of the diet by an issue of 2 oz. of butter and an issue of olive oil, if available, on Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays. The prisoners also received rum, but spruce beer may have been substituted for it if scurvy became a problem.<sup>42</sup>



ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF THE SEVERAL DEMANDS FOR INDIAN PRESENTS FOR CANADA FOR THE YEAR 1782.				
ARTICLES	MONTREAL	NIAGARA	DETROIT	MICHILIMACKINAC
Silver.	£862	£245	£2525	£1652
Tobacco.	680	680	1600	1600
Ball/Shot.	160	600	420	420
Cutlery.	350	330	350	270
Haberdashery.	1770	1770	1510	1510
Linen/Cottons.	2660	2660	2600	2600
Woollens.	6500	6500	3100	3100
Gunpowder.	600	600	600	600
Shirts/Shifts.		355	355	
Brass Kettles.	380	380	130	130
Guns/Pistols.	210	2060	1420	660
Iron/Steel.	138	176	284	143
Saddlery.			130	230
Paint.	543	543	408	408
Hats.	439	439	122	122
Tobacco Pipes.	20	20		15
	£15312	£18358	£15554	£13460

Table 5.4. Estimate of the cost of the Several Demands for Indian Presents for Canada for the Year 1782. H.P. 17, 21704, 156.

**DAILY SUBSISTENCE FOR THE TROOPS.**

<b>SUN</b>	<b>MON</b>	<b>TUE</b>	<b>WED</b>	<b>THU</b>	<b>FRI</b>	<b>SAT</b>
1lb. Bread/ Flour	1lb. Bread/ Flour	1lb. Bread/ Flour	1lb. Bread/ Flour	1lb. Bread/ Flour	1lb. Bread/ Flour	1lb. Bread/ Flour
1lb. Beef or .6lbs. Pork	1lb. Beef or .6lbs. Pork	1lb. Beef or .6lbs. Pork	1lb. Beef or .6lbs. Pork	1lb. Beef or .6lbs. Pork	1lb. Beef or .6lbs. Pork	1lb. Beef or .6lbs. Pork
.86oz. Butter or 1.14oz. Cheese	.86oz. Butter or 1.14oz. Cheese	.86oz. Butter or 1.14oz. Cheese	.86oz. Butter or 1.14oz. Cheese	.86oz. Butter or 1.14oz. Cheese	.86oz. Butter or 1.14oz. Cheese	.86oz. Butter or 1.14oz. Cheese
.43pts. Pease	.43pts. Pease	.43pts. Pease	.43pts. Pease	.43pts. Pease	.43pts. Pease	.43pts. Pease
2.3oz. Flour or 1.14oz. Rice or 1.14oz. Oatmeal	2.3oz. Flour or 1.14oz. Rice or 1.14oz. Oatmeal	2.3oz. Flour or 1.14oz. Rice or 1.14oz. Oatmeal	2.3oz. Flour or 1.14oz. Rice or 1.14oz. Oatmeal	2.3oz. Flour or 1.14oz. Rice or 1.14oz. Oatmeal	2.3oz. Flour or 1.14oz. Rice or 1.14oz. Oatmeal	2.3oz. Flour or 1.14oz. Rice or 1.14oz. Oatmeal

**TOTAL QUANTITY.**

Bread	7 lbs.
Flour	7 lbs.
Beef	7 lbs.
Pork	4 lbs.
Butter	6 oz.
Cheese	8 oz.
Flour	1 lb.
Rice	1/2 lb.
Oatmeal	1/2 lb.

Table 5.5. Suggested Daily Subsistence for the British Troops Serving in North America. H.P. 17, 21704, 1.

However despite the administrative problems of meeting these additional expenses the Home government was persuaded by the colonial administration that they were essential to continuing offensive and defensive operations in Canada. In fact in 1781 Haldimand was informed by Knox, under-secretary of the American Department, that the Imperial government wished him to turn his full attention to "The Frontiers of the Revolted Provinces, in co-operation with, and support of, the Southern Army ... in pursuance of the great object of the war, the Restoration of the [British] constitution."<sup>43</sup> Thus any further expenses could be justified according to this "great object."

#### **B. HALDIMAND'S RESPONSE TO THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN HIS ADMINISTRATION.**

In recognition of the geographic difficulties of administering its colonial empire, as exemplified by the provisioning system, the Imperial administration allowed Haldimand to establish his administration upon the principle of his being "the best Judge of the Utility of all Domestic Arrangements ...." This was a rational solution to the colonial administration, particularly when up to eight months, or even longer, might elapse before communication was received from Quebec. However, Haldimand was still subordinate to the British Parliament. For example, after the returns of the Indian expenses for 1782 had been received by the Lords of the Treasury, Haldimand was asked to justify these expenses in comparison with those received from the Southern Indian Department under the superintendency of John Stuart. It was suggested to him that he would do well to adopt the mode used by Stuart in the south, and thus save the government money.<sup>44</sup> In this way the Imperial government imposed its opinions on the colonial administration, although these did not always result in a change of policy. In this particular case, the opinion coincided with the appointment of Sir John Johnson as the Indian Superintendent for British North America, an

appointment which was a direct result of an increasing Imperial and colonial frustration with the expences of the Indian Department, and thus resulted in a considerable change in the administrative policy governing it.<sup>45</sup>

In his administration of the frontier Haldimand was bound by his commission to fulfil the dual role of Governor in Chief and General and Commander in Chief of the Forces “upon the Frontiers of the Provinces bordering ...” Quebec.<sup>46</sup> During the War of Revolution the defence role assumed primacy, and was divided into two major policies: one for a ‘large-scale’ war of campaigns and the other for a local ‘guerilla-type’ war consisting of scouting parties and small ambush-like attacks on rebels and settlers along the frontier. With regard to the campaigns Haldimand was to act as the commander in chief, but the scouts and guerilla attacks were to be left largely to the discretion of the commanders at the Upper Posts and to those in charge of the Indian Departments and the Indian corps. During his assumption of the supreme military command in North America from February 20, 1773 to the summer of 1774, Haldimand was kept well informed of the administration of the frontiers of the several colonies and provinces and of the process of administrative communication between New York and the Home government.<sup>47</sup> This provided him with at least some of the necessary expertise for this commission.

## **1. Administrative Communication.**

Haldimand was informed by his Imperial superiors that “all occurrences which shall happen within the Extent of ... [his] Command ...” were to be reported to the Secretary of State for North America on numbered letters commencing from the date of the assumption of his command.<sup>48</sup> Matters of frontier defence were also to be reported to the Secretary at War, such as the monthly returns of the garrison staffs and officers for North America in 1775, as shown in Table 5.6. As

### THE GENERALS AND STAFF OFFICERS SERVING IN NORTH AMERICA SEPTEMBER 1, 1775.

Commander in Chief. Lieut. Gen. Gage.		
Maj. Gen.	Haldimand. ....	Gone to England. Gov. of Canada.
"	Carleton.	
"	Howe.	
"	Clinton.	
"	Burgoyne.	
Brig. Gen. Earle Percy.		
"	Robertson.	
"	Pigott.	
"	Jones.	
"	Prescott. ....	In Canada.
"	Grant.	
Deputy Adjutant General Major Kemble.		
Major of Brigade		
"	Small.	
"	Skeen. ....	On Parole.
"	Dunbar. ....	Gone to Canada.
"	Smith. ....	5th. Regiment.
"	Disney. ....	44th. Regiment.
"	Brown. ....	52nd. Regiment.
"	Barker. ....	5th. Regiment.
"	Le Batein.	7th. Regiment. Coming from Canada.
Deputy Quarter Master General Major Shirreff.		
A.D. Quarter Master General		
"	Captain Gamble.	Gone to Canada.
"	Captain Hutcheson.	60th. Regiment.
"	Captain Handfield.	Half pay.
"	Lieutenant Mair.	47th. Regiment.
Barrack Master General Brigadier Robertson.		
Commissary General Mr. Chamier.		
Town Mayor of Boston Captain Urquhart. ....		
Aid de Camp to Com. in Ch. Maj. Duncan, ....		
"	to Maj. Gen. Howe Capt. Cuyler. ....	46th.
"	to Maj. Gen. Clinton Capt. Drummond. ....	Roy. Artillery.
"	to Maj. Gen. Burgoyne Captain Gardner.	Dragoons.
"	to Maj. Gen. Carleton. ....	Lord Pitt. 47th.
Purveyor of the Hospital Doctor Mallet.		
Physician Doctor Morris.		
Apothecary Doctor Brown		
Surgeons Roberts, Bruce and Morrison.		
Secretary to the Commander in Chief, Mr. Samuel Kemble.		

Table 5.6. A Return of the Generals and Staff Officers Serving in North America, September 1, 1775. H.P. 12, 21687, 233.

well, the monthly returns of troops were to be sent to the Adjutant General under cover to the Secretary at War. The Secretary of State and the Secretary at War were also to be notified of all troop movements, and troop vacancies were to be reported to the Secretary at War. The Secretary at War was also to receive half yearly copies of the officers belonging to the chief staff of the forces, such as aid-de-camps, as well as returns of the regular army reviews, which were also to be sent to the Adjutant General. As well he was to receive, as soon as possible after the 24th. December, an annual return of the officers commanding the Upper Posts.<sup>49</sup>

As well as his communications with the Home government Haldimand was to communicate with each of the departments under his command, both civil and military, as shown in a listing of the civil departments in the American service in 1775, see Table 5.2. Table 5.2 indicates that all of these departments were represented in Quebec, but usually under the administration of deputies. As the Table shows, each of these departments had its own expense account, which made accounting more responsible on the one hand, but more complex on the other when the expenses of the departments interlocked, such as when the Indian department was involved in manoeuvres with the garrisons.

## **2. Colonial Financing.**

Although on a smaller scale than the North American service, the system of payment for the Departments in Quebec provides an example of the operation of the expense system for Quebec. The departments were financed by temporary warrants or advances issued by the Deputy Paymaster General at Quebec. The Barrack Master General, Deputy Quarter Master General, Deputy Commissioner General and Commanding Engineer's Departments had a system in which it was "usual for them to submit a Memorial for the sum that ... [would] be immediately necessary ..."

and this was attached to the warrant granting them the advance.<sup>50</sup> The departments were to deliver their accounts to the Commander in Chief on a quarterly basis, except for the Deputy Commissary General, whose accounts were submitted half yearly, probably because of the difficulty of administering the provisioning of food throughout the province. If the final accounts or warrants, when submitted and approved, had unpaid balances, the commander in chief assumed responsibility for these and paid them. As well as the submission of accounts, each department was to submit a recapitulation or a summary of the total moneys expended in the quarterly period, a statement which usually formed the basis for a check by the commander if he felt that the warrants were either inaccurate or inappropriate for the service. Furthermore, the heads of each department, and even their deputies, retained all receipts and vouchers in their own files, a constant reminder to both themselves and the commander in chief of not only their own responsibility in administering their departments, but also their right of access to military or civil courts of appeal in the case of a wrongful charge concerning funds expended or credited, as well as their right of access to Haldimand's superiors in the Imperial administrative machinery.<sup>51</sup>

One department that rendered its accounts on an annual basis was the General Hospital in Quebec, in recognition of the fact that the department was small and therefore, by implication, insignificant.<sup>52</sup> However the department must have been significant enough to give rise to a dispute over whether or not a second independent hospital should be established in Quebec. The dispute appeared to have arisen out of the fact that despite the "few sick" at the general hospital the expenditure of medicines had been very high, and the government did not wish to add to these expenses by establishing another medical institution. However in this case, the administration overlooked the pressure on the hospital in Quebec to make up the deficit of medicines on the frontier, which at Niagara had led to critical shortages.<sup>53</sup>

The system of pay for the troops also operated on the warrant system. In Quebec the commanding officer of each regiment granted warrants at each muster of the troops (either at a troop inspection or when a regiment was first made up) upon the Deputy Paymaster General, who then advanced the subsistence or pay to the troops. The Deputy Paymaster General then transferred these warrants to the Commander in Chief who assumed the responsibility for them. If he approved them, he cancelled them and issued new warrants for future subsistence.<sup>54</sup> However, with the cost of transportation, the spoilage, deterioration and loss of supplies, and the fluctuations in the numbers to be subsisted, the actual expenditures on the frontier rarely accorded with the warrants issued, the deficit usually being made up of items purchased on credit from merchants at the Upper Posts. As well, the high proportion of Canadian and Loyalist militia on frontier service and the pressure on the commanding officers at the posts to buy loyalty meant that their experience in reducing expenditure may have been limited or that the expenditure was perceived as unavoidable. Thus, although the system of the issue of temporary warrants was theoretically to act as a check upon the financial management of the forces, in fact the long time span between the expenditures and the approval of the warrants by Haldimand, and the urgency of the war environment, meant that Haldimand was under pressure to approve all expenditures whether he felt that they were legitimate or not. Thus Haldimand faced continual recrimination from headquarters in London over his authorisation of expenditures that appeared to be well over the limit imposed by the House of Commons and the Treasury.<sup>55</sup>

The pay for the regular British troops serving at the Upper Posts was sent out "in specie" from Spithead and Portsmouth by the Treasury, "to be consigned to the Deputy Paymaster of the Forces in Canada." In 1776 this specie totalled £35,338/7/4 for the pay of both the English and the Brunswick troops. As Table 5.7 shows, pay was usually issued according to the rank of an officer,



**PAY FOR THE GENERALS AND STAFF OFFICERS AND OFFICERS OF  
THE HOSPITALS FOR THE FORCES IN NORTH AMERICA &c. FOR THE YEAR 1777**

		Per Diem	Total
Two Gen. and Comm. in Chief	each	£10	£20
Eight Aids de Camp	"	10/-	4
Two Secretaries	"	10/-	1
Four Lieut. Generals	"	4	16
Eight Aids de Camp	"	10/-	4
Seven Majors General	"	2	14
Seven Aids de Camp	"	10/-	3/10/-
Six Brigadiers	"	1/10/-	9
Two Adjutants General	"	1	2
Two Deputy Adjutants General	"	10/-	1
Ten Majors of Brigade	"	10/-	5
Two Quarter Masters General	"	1	2
Two Dep. Quart. Masters General	"	10/-	1
Ten Assistants	"	5/-	2/10/-
Commissaries of the Musters			10/-
Two Deputy Commissaries	"	5/-	10/-
Barrack Master General			1
Two Judge Advocates General	"	10/-	1
Commissary of Stores			1
Two Prevost Marshalls	"	2/6	5/-
Fourrier			5/-

**OFFICERS OF THE HOSPITALS**

Five Physicians	"	£1	£5
Three Purveyors	"	1/ 5/-	3/15/-
Eight Surgeons	"	10/-	4
Eight Apothecaries	"	10/-	4
Sixty Mates	"	5/-	15
Two Chaplains	"	6/8	13/4
Three Storekeepers	"	3/-	9/-

**COMMANDING OFFICERS AT THE FOLLOWING POSTS:**

Fort George	7/6
Niagara	7/6
Detroit	7/6
Oswegatchie	5/-
Michilimackinac	5/-

**BARRACK MASTERS AT THE FOLLOWING FORTS:**

Fort George & the Comm'n. to Albany	4/-
Niagara, Schlosser, Erie & the Comm'n to Presqu'île	4/-
Communication to Philadelphia	4/-
Detroit and Michilimackinac	4/-
Cumberland and Nova Scotia	4/-
Chartres, Kaskaskias, Illinois Country	4/-
Oswegatchie	4/-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>£125/7/10</b>

Table 5.7. Officer Pay for the Forces in North America for the Year 1777. H.P. 15, 21698, 9.

and the date of his commission.<sup>56</sup> It is likely however, that this specie was not always transported to the frontier and that bills of credit were issued instead. The provincial troops, including Loyalist militia, were not of the same status as the regular troops, but were paid the same pay as an incentive to enlist,<sup>57</sup> unless otherwise arranged, as in the case of the Butler's Rangers.

The Indian Department in Quebec also operated according to warrants paid by the Imperial government, usually half-yearly at September and March. The Imperial warrants were channelled to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Quebec or Montreal, from which he paid his civil employees, such as the deputies, the storekeepers, the interpreters, the surgeons and the blacksmiths, as well as any other miscellaneous expenses. Apart from these expenses, the commanding officers at each post were responsible for such charges as paying Indian interpreters for council meetings and blacksmiths to service Indian equestrian or iron-work needs at the posts. These accounts, which were to be meticulously recorded, were to be kept as a separate record from the usual account records of the Indian Department.<sup>58</sup> During the War of Revolution however, both the commanders at the posts and the Indian superintendents, either unwittingly or wittingly, aided the rising cost of buying Indian loyalty and assistance, particularly in the matter of provisioning Indian scouts and their families and in issuing presents to encourage participation, expenses for which no approval had been given from London. Thus Haldimand was pressured to approve these expenses and to assume the responsibility for them, if not financially, at least morally.

In examining the system of accounts in the Haldimand Papers it appears as if there was an important distinction between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' expenses. The ordinary expenses seem to be those associated with the pay of the regular army, as approved by the House of Commons and the Treasury Board. On the other hand, extraordinary expenses seem to be those

expenses incurred in addition to the basic military defence budget, particularly those arising from times of war, such as the hiring of foreign troops, the increase in munitions, and in terms of the frontier, expenses relating to the operations of the provincial and Loyalist corps. The extraordinary administrative expenses for the province of Quebec were organized under four headings: Contingent expenses of the commanding officer (that is, incidental expenses in addition to regular expenses), Repairs to Works (such as non-capital repairs to military or government buildings, particularly at the Upper Posts,) disbursements in the Assistant Deputy Quarter Master General's Department (such as those established at the Upper Posts) and the expenses of the Deputy Commissary General of Provisions Department (again with reference to the Upper Posts).

These four branches of extraordinary accounts were not made out in the same manner. The contingent expenses were computed annually at headquarters and paid by warrant. The repairs to works in the Engineer's department, such as at Niagara for example, were made out by the engineer in command under the authorisation of the commanding officer at the post, and an account was sent half yearly to the Engineer's department in Quebec for payment by warrant upon the Deputy Quarter Master General at Quebec. The disbursements in the Assistant Deputy Quarter Master General's department, and the Deputy Commissary General's Department, were paid by warrant upon the Deputy Paymaster General, usually half yearly. There were two deputy paymaster generals in the province: one located in Montreal and one in Quebec. The Deputy Paymaster General at Montreal was only responsible for the subsistence of the Regiments in that District.", however, the paymaster at Quebec was responsible for all "Extraordinaries" paid out to the service.<sup>59</sup>

In analysing this system of accounting and payment several observations can be made

relevant to the system of frontier administration during the War of Revolution. Firstly, there was a system of accounting throughout the colonial service, confusing though it may appear to be, that attempted to inject some degree of uniformity into the financial administration. This system was based upon record-keeping that applied to all posts of command, whether at Quebec or on the frontier. Secondly, there was also a system of hierarchical responsibility for finance, that was exemplified by the different levels of approval for the temporary (lower level) or permanent (higher level) warrants. The temporary warrant also implied a more restrictive geographic area of responsibility, such as at an Upper Post, compared with the wide area of responsibility associated with the permanent warrant. The system of warrants and their associated responsibilities was necessary in order to provide a certain measure of autonomy to those commanding at a considerable distance from headquarters, while at the same time attempting to retain central control of expenditures. The basic problem was that it became in essence an expense-account system that was approved 'fait accompli': a system that would require legal action to challenge. Thirdly, the system, by the very nature of its hierarchical structure, operated by a 'tiering' of accounts, such as from the Engineer's Department upwards to the Deputy Quarter Master General's Department to the Paymaster and then on to Haldimand for approval. This tended to diffuse personal responsibility and as well proved onerous to those keeping the accounts. Guy Johnson at Niagara frequently commented on the difficulty of filling out forms and keeping accounts for the Indian Department, while at the same time ensuring an adequate defence posture along the frontier.

The level of responsibility did not end at Quebec. All financial affairs, especially those concerning extraordinary expenses, were to be reported quarterly to the secretary of the Treasury Board. These financial reports were to include copies of letters to the money contractors' agents for requests for contingent expenses and lists of the warrants granted and the particular services for

which they were granted. As well, a half yearly report of the provisioning of the troops was to be submitted to the Treasury and the pay office.

### **3. The Defence Administration.**

Apart from these provisioning and financial returns Haldimand was preoccupied with defence issues along the frontier. At the Upper Posts this centred around the minutae of the day-to-day operation of the military departments established there. An example of such minutae was the Barrack Master's department, which was responsible for the amenities of the garrison. It included for example, the provision of firing (for wood fires) and candles, which while seemingly insignificant became, in a frontier setting, an important component for survival. However this department was plagued by the same duplication of departmental responsibilities as was characteristic of the colonial defence administration in general. Furthermore, requests to the Board of Ordnance would probably be processed in Quebec, thus increasing the administrative paperwork of Haldimand's staff, particularly his secretary Captain Mathews, and diminishing their accessibility in terms of important defence matters.

In administering the Upper Posts and their defence of the frontier, Haldimand relied heavily, largely because of their geographic accessibility, on support from posts located between Quebec and Carleton Island: namely, Montreal, Lachine, The Cedars, Oswegatchie and Carleton Island. Up until the time of Haldimand's assumption of the Quebec command, Oswegatchie (Ogdensburg, New York) had been the post where "the provisions and other supplies from Montreal for the Upper Posts ... [were] first lodged."<sup>60</sup> It made a logical post for the storage and transshipment of supplies not only because it was regarded as "the easiest and cheapest communication" between Montreal and Lake Ontario, but also because it was located on the

Oswegatchie River flowing northeastwards towards the St. Lawrence River. It was administered by the assistant Deputy Quarter Master General at Montreal, whose responsibility it was to ensure that the food, clothing and equipment for the troops was transported as efficiently as possible to the Upper Posts. However, its location, sixty miles from the junction of the St. Lawrence River with Lake Ontario, meant that goods had to be transhipped again into larger boats for the Lake Ontario passage. Thus one of Haldimand's first administrative decisions was to relocate the storage depot from Oswegatchie to Carleton Island in the St. Lawrence, located about twelve miles from Lake Ontario in the lee of Wolfe Island. This location, he reasoned, gave a better access to Forts Niagara, Erie, Detroit and Michilimackinac.

In conjunction with this realignment of supply depots Haldimand also maintained a policy of keeping the Upper Posts "in a situation to defeat all attacks of Indians," and during the War of Revolution, keeping the posts defensible against rebel attack. An essential part of this defensibility was ensuring that the Upper Posts were kept in good repair. In 1773 it was recorded that garrison repairs were usually contracted out to civilians, under the administration of the Chief Engineer.<sup>61</sup> Even at this time there was concern about Upper Post defensibility largely because of increasing French unrest, particularly by settlers at the Illinois, to the British policy of retaining the Indian country 'in toto' for Indian use, a policy which conflicted with both the fur trade and western settlement. Unfortunately for British influence in the area, Fort Chartres, just north of Kaskaskia, had been abandoned in 1772 and the British garrison at Fort Kaskaskia had been greatly reduced, leaving only a Captain Lord of the 18th. Regiment, a French interpreter, a Clerk and a Deputy Commissary.<sup>62</sup> Thus, maintaining a supply line to the area, particularly with Fort Pitt in the rebel interest, was difficult.<sup>63</sup>

Civilian contractors from Philadelphia had been hired to transport small supplies of clothing, such as shirts, shoes and stockings, for the frontier militia: the contractors travelling mainly in the Spring and Autumn because of the "Freshes" or high water associated with run-off, particularly into the Ohio River. The transport lines for these supplies were most likely the General Braddock road of 1755, up the Potomac Valley via Cumberland and through the Pennsylvanian frontier, and the John Forbes road of 1757, passing due west from Philadelphia, via Lancaster, Chambersburg and Bedford to Fort Pitt.

Thus, due to the difficulty of administering and provisioning the garrisons at these frontier locations the British put pressure on the French settlers, particularly at Vincennes, "to remove to any of the Provinces," thus distinguishing the Illinois as a frontier without provincial status. The response to this suggestion, as noted elsewhere in this study, was a sketch of a Republican form of government which was widely circulated in the area.<sup>64</sup> Thus when Haldimand assumed the command of Quebec he was advised that Fort Pitt, and points west, needed watching because of the republican fervour and rebel sympathies, which were endemic to the area and fueled by the Spanish influence west of the Mississippi.<sup>65</sup>

The defensibility of the Upper Posts was not only to be effected through the maintenance of garrison structures and works but also through the maintenance of services at the posts, such as the Indian interpreters and blacksmiths, and artificers, noted earlier, that were hired by the commander to assist him with Indian relations. Haldimand also wished to continue the tradition of supplying presents to Indians for their service to government "more or less as Occasions happen." However this service proved increasingly costly and special orders were given by Haldimand regarding their distribution. In fact, the expenses of these services to Indians both at the Upper

Posts and on the frontier became so enormous that it was “found necessary to appoint a Person to accept and pay such Bills, as well as to keep an Account of with the Drawers thereof; such Person ... [having] been furnished with Monies in Advance for the Payment of said Bills ....” These bills were to be rendered on a three monthly basis.<sup>66</sup>

Other services provided at the Upper Posts were less obvious, such as those provided by boatmen, waggon-men and express information services between the Frontier and the Upper Posts and between the Upper Posts and Quebec. These contingent services were under the administration of the assistant Deputy Quarter Master General, a department which in 1773 General Gage of New York noted as having “the most considerable [contingencies]” and the most “extensive” department. This comment acknowledged not only the distance and difficulty of transportation in the western interior, but also tacitly acknowledged the commitment of government to maintaining such services. The non-contingent services at the Upper Posts, such as the supply of paper used for reports and letters, and the weekly or monthly express and package service between the Upper Posts and Quebec, were usually administered by the Deputy Commissary General in Quebec. This was an unnecessary duplication of service administration, as one department could have handled both contingent and non-contingent services. The Commissary General’s Department usually submitted its reports and accounts of services on a half-yearly basis, a time-lapse which was not always conducive to either accuracy or administrative control.<sup>67</sup>

There were also two kinds of contingent services at a regimental level: the ‘non-effective’ services and the ‘effective’ services.<sup>68</sup> The non-effective services included such activities as following and apprehending deserters, the “subsisting” of deserters, and raising recruits for the army.<sup>69</sup> It probably also included the cost of prisoner upkeep and exchange.<sup>70</sup> The effective



services consisted of the provision of a hospital and the service of a surgeon, postage services, a paymaster, the provision of stationery, and the hiring of special skills for frontier scouts and raids. Another contingent service, relevant only to active military service, was that for the marches of troops, in which the commanding officer of each corps certified the route of the march and its purpose and results. It was administered by the Deputy Quarter Master General, who also paid any expenses for the march after approval by Haldimand.<sup>71</sup>

Troop movements were a significant administrative headache, particularly with regard to major military campaigns, which in the present context included the John Johnson expedition for the relief of the Six Nations, his 1780 expeditions to the Mohawk in May and October, the Major Ross expedition to Johnstown and West Canada Creek in 1781, and the Hamilton expedition to Vincennes in 1778/1779. It was the policy of the Imperial government that whenever troops were moved through a province that the civil governor be notified of the numbers, divisions and the quarters required for the troops. As Haldimand was both the civil governor and military commander of Quebec the responsibility for troop movement fell entirely on him. However it was difficult for him to assess the logistics of troop movement, at any one time or place along the frontier, largely because of its 'wilderness' character, and thus it became the responsibility of the commanders at each post to administer troop and garrison logistics. It is doubtful therefore that the policy of the orderly movement of troops, with a specified number of waggons, along a "March Route" signed by the Deputy Quarter Master General, was ever followed along the defence frontier, especially during Indian scouting and offensive sorties. Perhaps the nearest a British frontier campaign came to this 'ideal' was the 1780 Johnson campaign in which he describes dividing his troops up into groups and using roads wherever possible to facilitate orderly movement.<sup>72</sup>

Another service of particular importance to the Upper Posts and the frontier was that of volunteer service. Cruikshank notes that in the eighteenth century it was customary for “gentlemen” volunteers, or persons of some social status, to serve in the military as privates while either awaiting the opportunity to purchase a rank or earn a commission through merit. The frontier provided this opportunity, particularly in allowing for enlistment in such provincial regiments as the King’s Royal Regiment of New York, which did active frontier service. This regiment had, according to Cruikshank’s Master Muster Roll, 27 listed volunteers.<sup>73</sup>

However, while this definition of a volunteer may have accounted for those who joined ‘regular’ army corps, it did not account for the motivation of the volunteers, which Isobel Kelsay notes served under Joseph Brant for part of the duration of the War of Revolution.<sup>74</sup> As these soldiers were, at least initially, not on regular muster rolls they served without pay, although their food and clothing (rations and provisions) were provided at the expense of government. The cost of their service was “One Guinea [ £1/5/-] and a half” for each volunteer and five pounds to either the regiment they joined or, as in the case of Brant’s volunteers, to Brant for their maintenance on the frontier. Their service was a critical factor in ensuring success in frontier raids because of their motivation in joining the British cause. Some of them still had families in the rebel colonies and thus were risking not only their own lives, but those of their families.

With this degree of devotion to the British Crown they were prepared to do almost anything for the defence of the frontier. The added bonus for government was that as many of them lived in frontier communities, particularly along the Mohawk valley, they were familiar with frontier terrain, were able to provide information, often through their families, on rebel movements, strengths and weaknesses, and as well could either supply provisions from their own farms or

provide information on possible sources of provisioning along the frontier. For example, Kelsay notes that some of Brant's volunteers were Scottish Presbyterians from such places as the head of the Delaware River (probably near Harpersfield or Schoharie), Tryon County on the Delaware and in Ulster and Albany counties near the Hudson.<sup>75</sup> The location of these counties so close to rebel activities made the knowledge possessed by these volunteers particularly valuable.

#### **4. The Administrative Departments Relevant to Frontier Defence.**

Apart from these general concerns of the frontier defence administration Haldimand was also responsible for the management of particular departments with relevance to frontier defence. There were two major departments that had the most relevance to the defence of the frontier: the military department and the Indian Department. The military departments east of Carleton Island were largely concerned with the wider issue of the defence of the province as a whole, particularly the settled area, but there was concern for frontier defence that was reflected in the administration of the Quebec and Montreal garrisons. The main branches of the army were the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, supplemented by military artificers, and a small corps of engineers, including map makers. No medical corps existed but there was usually a surgeon for each regiment of about 477 men.<sup>76</sup> The Montreal garrison in particular, had an intimate knowledge of, and service on, the frontier.<sup>77</sup> Amongst those garrisoned at this post was the King's Royal Regiment of New York, a loyalist corps commanded by Sir John Johnson,<sup>78</sup> and the Royal Highland Emigrants (the 84th. Regiment), commanded by Colonel Maclean,<sup>79</sup> both of whom had frequently participated in frontier excursions.

One of the chief responsibilities of the Montreal garrison, with reference to the frontier, was to keep the routes of communication open from New York to Quebec, such as the eastern route

“thro’ the Woods from Penobscut [sic] ....”<sup>80</sup> However, as the rebels tightened the net of communication access in the east the government was forced to send its communiques by routes further west, impinging on the western sector of the frontier of defence. Therefore, although the eastern sector of the frontier was important for the gathering of information, military encounters were less likely, and the garrison turned its attention to the western sector. This was also logical in view of the fact that the Montreal garrison commanded several other military posts between Montreal and Carleton Island, in particular, Oswegatchie and Isle Aux Noix (on the eastern shore of Lake St. Francis), and St. Jean and Sorel in the Montreal district, which served as winter quarters for those regiments from the garrison on frontier service.<sup>81</sup>

Lachine, the point of embarkation and return for the canoe fur trade, and administered by the Montreal District, was an important post with respect to frontier service. It was the place of billeting for Sir John Johnson’s corps, and Johnson spent considerable time there when not out campaigning along the eastern sector of the frontier. He conducted his scouts from Lachine, such as in the spring of 1779 when he received papers from his old home, Johnson Hall, concerning rebel movements in the Mohawk valley. Johnson also organized his campaigns against the Mohawk from this location finding it a convenient place from which to direct movement either westward towards Oswego and Niagara, or southwards for intelligence from Lake Champlain. For example, Johnson’s third campaign, was designed to bring the Oneida Indians to the British cause, and to destroy all supplies and supply lines to the Mohawk Valley. As noted in Chapter Four, this Duanesborough expedition involved a rendezvous with troops from Niagara at Oswego, and a rapid advance through the Mohawk towards Schenectady and Albany, both manoeuvres being greatly facilitated by the access that Johnson had by water to Lake Ontario.

It is in connection with this expedition that Johnson gives some indication of the problems associated with organizing frontier campaigns. Firstly, he stated bluntly that he would prefer British troops to the German Chasseurs as the latter were "not accustomed to Wood Marches or carrying large Packs." Secondly, he complained that clothing was easily destroyed "from the nature of the Service," particularly the Indian shoes. Clothing, he stated, was an important item on frontier service, and his labelling the point suggests that it was in short supply. Thirdly, due to the fear of rebel infiltration into the British army service, Johnson and Haldimand decided to keep the nature and timing of the campaign a secret. Not even Brigadier General Allan Maclean, Commander of the Montreal District, was informed. Haldimand admitted that such secrecy between commanding officers could lead to jealousy, but he justified it in the context of security measures during a war. Thus Haldimand advised Johnson that "the fewer men you take from this part of the Province the more likely you are to conceal your views, and the fewer will be your difficulties," a statement giving evidence of Haldimand's reservations about the loyalty of the 'settled part' of Canada.

The result of this secrecy was the declaration, by Maclean, of his military superiority over Johnson, as his commanding officer, and the order that notwithstanding the fact that Johnson might receive orders from headquarters, "he was not at liberty to move or march any part of his Regiment out of the district" without first informing Maclean. He then rebuked Haldimand for bypassing the chain of command, by stating that "... sending orders to inferior officers to execute without any communication to the Commanding Officer of the District, may contribute to create an opinion that the Commanding Officer is not of any consideration Whatever."<sup>82</sup> This response illustrates the security of tenure perceived by officers in the military, in that, as stated in Chapter One, there was always the avenue of appeal to the Imperial government and the monarch in the event of any dissatisfaction with administrative policy at a colonial level.

Further up the transportation line to Carleton Island was the Cedars, at the southwest tip of St. Louis (Lewis) Lake. Major Robert Leake's corps of Loyalists, activated in 1779, were stationed here, and it later became the site of a canal to circumvent the rapids at this point.<sup>83</sup> Next in line was Oswegatchie which had a commanding officer and a garrison. The main reason for keeping a garrison at this point was to facilitate the passage of goods through the St. Lawrence and then via the Great Lakes to the Upper Posts and the frontier.

Carleton Island was the major dispatch post, west of Montreal, for the transportation of goods into the interior via the Great Lakes and related tributaries. The First and Second Battalions of the King's Royal Regiment were stationed here, which made it a convenient place for the holding of prisoners on their way to Montreal for detention or exchange.<sup>84</sup> However its location due northwest of Fort Stanwix and Oneida Lake made it vulnerable to rebel attack, especially with the amount of military provisioning stored there at any one time. Thus in 1781, after persistent rumours of an invasion, Haldimand judged it prudent to reinforce the garrison with 100 men and their officers drawn mainly from the Second Battalion of the King's Royal Regiment. These troops were to concentrate on fortifying the neck of land where the ships wintered.

The second major department, east of Carleton Island, with reference to the frontier was the Indian Department. This department was under the administration of Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who had the title of Commandant and Superintendent of the Indians at Montreal and Inspector of Indian Affairs within the province of Quebec. However, although Campbell was a military officer this appointment was a civil posting and thus he could not interfere in military or garrison matters. This distinction between civil and military authority was reinforced by the principle, as stated by Haldimand, "that no Officers, even such as are actually attached to

Regiments, have a right to command ... where the Corps they belong to are not employed.”<sup>85</sup> Thus Campbell, as an officer of the 95th. Regiment, which was not on regular service in Canada, had no military authority.<sup>86</sup> However because of the involvement of the Indians in the Fur trade and in defence it was important that there be a close liaison between the civil and military branches of the service. Haldimand in fact noted that “a good understanding between ... [the civil and military aspects of government]” was critical in getting the Indians to act in a military capacity during the war.<sup>87</sup>

As the size of his department indicates, see Table 5.8, Campbell had considerable responsibility. Although he was the superintendent of the Seven Nations Indians of Canada,<sup>88</sup> his department had formerly administered the affairs of both the Six and Seven Nations Indians under the Superintendency of Daniel Claus.<sup>89</sup> In this capacity the department had long had the responsibility for distributing the Indian presents destined for the Upper Posts. Indians, such as Joseph Brant, described as “better instructed and much more intelligent than any other Indian,” had in the past been given special favours from the Montreal department for their service to government.<sup>90</sup> This departmental responsibility was continued under the Haldimand administration, and much of Campbell’s responsibility concerned the distribution of the presents for the buying of Indian loyalty. Later, in 1783, when clarifying the duties of Sir John Johnson as Superintendent General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs, Haldimand clarified the imperial policy towards the distribution of presents. There were three criteria, he stated, that justified the issue of government presents to an Indian or group of Indians: namely, the fulfilment of “real services” by Indians, the use of “influence” by an Indian nation or party with another, and real “distress” among Indians “from Age or infirmities.” Even after these criteria had been met the presents must still be distributed “with great Caution and Discretion,” with the “great object ... [of] ... [securing] The

**LIST OF THE OFFICERS OF THE INDIAN DEPARTMENT,  
MONTREAL, 1 SEPTEMBER, 1781.**

Lieut. Col. John Campbell, Commandant and Superintendent.  
Capt. Alexander Fraser, 34th., Deputy Superintendent.

**British Officers**

Lieutenant Houghton, 53rd. Regiment  
Lieutenant Johnson, 47th. Regiment  
Lieutenant Crawford, Royal Yorkers.

**Canadian Officers, Messieurs.**

Langlade, at Michilimackinac always.  
Lorimier Verneuil.  
Lorimier Chevalier, unfit.  
Clignancour, unfit to undergo great fatigue.  
La Mothe.  
Bleury.  
La Madelaine, unfit.  
Piernont.  
De L'Orme Sournanda, unfit.  
Tonnancour.  
Gauthier, always at Michilimackinac.  
Joseph Launiere, always at La Beauce.  
Michel Launiere, always at La Beauce.  
Luc Schmid.

John Campbell, Lt. Col.

Table 5.8. A List of the Officers of the Indian Department, Montreal, September 1, 1781.  
H.P. 50, 21772, 85.



Attachment of the Chiefs and Head of Tribes, by Whose Influence the Conduct of their People is entirely governed.”<sup>91</sup> That this policy was followed, at least to a degree, is shown by the distribution of equipment to the Indians in accordance with their “class”: the highest class being a chief and the lowest the Indian child.

As well, the general policy of the Indian Department was reiterated at the same time for Johnson’s guidance in reorganizing the department after the war. It represented not only a compilation of current practises in the department but the introduction of practises that Haldimand hoped would correct some of the abuses that he had witnessed during his administration. Firstly, a “friendly Intercourse and Communication between all the Indian Nations” and the Crown was to be maintained, with particular attention being paid to “their Dispositions, Customs, and Manners.” Secondly, the expenses of the department were enormous and a result, said Haldimand, of “bad management” in the department. Here Haldimand appeared to overlook the general perception at the time that if Indian demands, which were very expensive, were not met that Britain might lose possession of all its colonies in North America. Thirdly, the department was to be well staffed, no doubt with competent administrators, with particular importance being paid to Indian interpreters who, as a general principle, were not to be involved in the fur trade while under appointment to the government. Fourthly, it was expected that the Indian superintendent would make annual visits throughout his district in order to keep a finger on the pulse of the administration at the Upper Posts. Haldimand implies here that a failure to do so during the war was probably at the root of the bad management. Fifthly, all Indian goods were to be stored in “proper Storehouses prepared to receive them ...” in order “to be secure from Damage & Waste.” As well, the superintendent was responsible for ordering the annual “quotas,” the receipts for these orders being inspected half-yearly and transmitted to Haldimand for the granting of warrants signifying approval of the orders.

These requisitions were to state the quantity and quality of the goods required and be returned to Haldimand in duplicate. If the goods did not arrive in time from England to send to the Upper Posts, purchases were only to be made from those local merchants who were prepared to “sell them [to government] cheapest and in good Qualities ....” Invoices were to be kept of these purchases so that they could be approved by Haldimand, although time and distance often precluded this approval. Sixthly, the presents were not to be dispatched to the Upper Country except in the charge of “a Careful Interpreter or Conductor [that is, the person who was in charge of transporting the goods to their destination], with an Invoice to be delivered on his arrival to the Officer ... for transacting Indian Affairs at that Post ....”<sup>92</sup>

Due to its importance in the administrative process, the dispatch of presents was under the administration of Haldimand. Haldimand controlled the seasonal dispatch times of the presents and the manner of their dispatch and carriage. The presents were itemised in an account, with each of the bales being numbered and their contents listed. The principal difference between the consignment of the Indian presents and the consignment of goods for the use of traders appeared to be the method of packing. Armour and Widder note that the trade goods were made into bales, with “Each bale containing a variety of merchandise so that when the trader opened it, he had a wide range of goods for his wilderness customers.”<sup>93</sup> However, the government presents were consigned in containers usually containing a single item. A further distinction between the two classes of goods was that the goods dispatched for presents to Indians only required the Quarter Master General’s signature, but Merchant’s goods required Haldimand’s approval and a signed pass before being dispatched.<sup>94</sup>

Despite the administrative policy regarding care in dispatching the goods they did not

always arrive in good condition. If the goods from England arrived damaged,<sup>95</sup> then the government was forced to send damaged goods, or goods of inferior quality, on to the Upper Posts. The goods were often damaged in transit from Montreal to Niagara, the commander at Fort Niagara complaining that they were often sent "in common trunks, ... without a Rope ... and the key ... tyed to the Handle; therefore such as intend robbing them can find no difficulty ...."<sup>96</sup> This problem was not lessened by the fact that as, during the War of Revolution, all goods had to be carried in a limited supply of military shipping, there was often a long waiting list and goods could be forgotten or misplaced in transit.<sup>97</sup> The problem was compounded by the absence of accountability by lesser officials in the colonial service. Distance from headquarters, military rank, the difficulty in recruiting and a first-person relationship (theoretically) with Imperial headquarters made it difficult for Haldimand to effectively monitor employee responsibility.

There were also principles regarding the hiring of staff in the Indian department. In 1777 Knox stated that as the Indians were "a free and independent People; liable to no Subjection or Subordination to any Power" that they must be "managed or conducted either by Persuasion and Influence, or some kind of ... Military Authority & Parade. The Persons therefore who are to have the Care and Superintendency of their Affairs in behalf of the Crown, and would carry on Indian Business properly, ... ought to be pofsefsed of an even Temper, great Patience & good Nature, being well acquainted with their Customs, Language and Manners, Persons of Authority and Consequence of Merit and Character in Public Life, and according to the Indian Phrase, have been great and Successfull Warriors in their Time." It was also important that the employees be able "to keep a Private Conference with an Indian ..." so that the Indian could impart to him what he would not say to an interpreter. As well, in meeting with the Indians, particularly in council, there ought to be "Decency and Decorum" with "an Air of Gravity and Consequence ... and the Men neat and

Clean,” which Knox stated was a custom that had formerly been practised very successfully by the French. He also stated that in general the Indians had more respect for military officers than civilians, the implication being that Indian affairs should be managed by military personnel. Knox also argued that the biggest mistake made by the British in organizing the Indian Department, after the death of Sir William Johnson, was to appoint several Indian superintendents, at each of the Upper Posts and in Montreal, “independent of each other:” particularly with respect to creating an arbitrary division between the Six Nations Indians of the Mohawk Valley and the Seven Nations Indians of Canada. These he argued, at their own request, wished to be administered as one Confederacy.<sup>98</sup>

As with the principles of Haldimand outlined above, these principles appeared to represent a desire to remedy poor hiring practices in the department during the British administration. For example, Kelsay argues that Major John Campbell’s appointment, in the summer of 1775, as Superintendent of the Canadian Indians was directly related to his connection by marriage with a “powerful French-Canadian family,” thus ousting Daniel Claus who had been appointed by Sir William Johnson in 1760.<sup>99</sup> As well, Campbell, along with his deputy, Captain Alexander Frazer, could not speak any Indian languages,<sup>100</sup> and thus could not adequately fulfil the principle that superintendents be able to hold private conferences with Indians without the presence of an interpreter. Graymont also suggests that Daniel Claus regarded Frazer as “one of the gentlemen who, by their harsh and indiscreet treatment of the Indians, were the occasion of the greatest part of them to quit General Burgoyne’s army.”<sup>101</sup> There were also problems with other employees of the Montreal department. Of the 19 officers (five British and fourteen Canadian) of the department, four were unfit for “any great fatigue.”<sup>102</sup>

Not all of the employees of the Montreal Indian Department were stationed in Montreal. Of the fifteen active officers Lieutenant Crawford was stationed at Carleton Island, Lieutenant Johnson was at Lake of the Two Mountains (Caneghsadagey),<sup>103</sup> Langlade and Gauthier were at Michilimackinac, Joseph and Michael Launiere were at La Beauce, Bleury was at St. Regis and Luc Schmid at St. Francis. As well there were twelve Indian interpreters located at Michilimackinac, St. Francis, Lake of the Two Mountains, Lachine, Oswegatchie and St. Francis, four commissaries at Montreal, Lake of the Two Mountains, St. Regis and Chanawagan, to administer provisioning to the Indians, two conductors at Montreal and Lachine to administer the supervise the carriage of the goods to the interior, and a shopkeeper and two assistants at Montreal. This geographical spread of employees made the department a difficult one to supervise.

Lieutenant Crawford at Carleton Island and James Stanley Goddard at Montreal served a special function in the department. They were the Examiners of Accounts and Indian presents, whose responsibility it was to report on the expenditures within the department, not only to Haldimand but to his superiors.<sup>104</sup> Carleton Island was a logical location for an examiner of accounts because it was the major dispatch center for the bulk-goods to the Upper Posts, and thus the point at which the quality, packing and carriage of the goods could be monitored. It was stated that Goddard was retained in Montreal because of his former residence "among the Upper Nations," centering on Niagara, thus presumably giving him the experience necessary to judge the need, quality and quantity of the Indian presents dispatched to the Upper Posts.<sup>105</sup>

One aspect of the Indian Department was the provision of a surgeon to cater to the medical needs of the Department. This appointment was not included because it was a military appointment and thus not a civil concern. However the appointment provides a good example of cross-

departmental administration because of the fact that the medicines for Indian and department use were transferred to the department from "Apothecarys Hall" by Charles Blake, the surgeon at the Montreal garrison, and then dispatched to the Upper Posts by Campbell.<sup>106</sup> However as the need for medicines on the frontier increased, it must have been a source of frustration for the officers in the department to know that they had to rely on the garrison for their medicines and not order them independently from another supplier, particularly if there was a large demand for medicines by the garrison itself.

However besides administrative responsibilities at Montreal and its dependent posts, Campbell was also involved with administering part of the defence frontier. In April of 1779, for example, he was informed by Haldimand that he was to send a speech to the Oneida Nations in the Mohawk Valley "to make them sensible of their daring and traitorous behaviour" in being "in the interest of the rebels." He was to be assisted in the preparation of the speech and envoy by Joseph Brant, who had arrived from the frontier with news of the Oneida support of Sullivan's destructive campaign into the Six Nations territory.<sup>107</sup> Closer to home, he was also asked to monitor the behaviour of the St. Regis Indians who, it was rumoured, were planning to assist a rebel invasion against Oswegatchie. This was a critical location and Haldimand urged Campbell to protect the "long line of communication for provisions" by ensuring that these Indians remained loyal to Britain, which, he suggested, could be accomplished by sending both a British and a Canadian officer, Monsieur Bluery, to St. Regis to gain their support. It is likely that Bluery had an interest in the fur trade because one of the ways of enlisting Indian support was through the co-operation of traders who generally were well versed in Indian politics and allegiances.<sup>108</sup> Another area of concern was in relation to the Caughnawagha Indian village, near the Lachine rapids, and the St. Francis Indians, both of whom were suspected of sympathising with the rebels.<sup>109</sup> As with the St.

Regis Indians, their location on the major supply route to the interior, made it imperative that they remain loyal. Thus in 1779, when Haldimand suspected that they may have received copies of an inflammatory address by the rebel Marquis de Lafayette, he advised Campbell to investigate the matter and enlist the support of the Indians on the British side of the colonial dispute.<sup>110</sup> At the same time Campbell was advised to keep watch on events at Lachine to ensure that the Indian goods, prepared in Montreal and embarked at Lachine, be well protected from diversion to rebel interests.

As a further defence measure Campbell was encouraged to send the Indians of his department "more into the Settlements behind the Forts, and deeper into the Country ..." no doubt on both scouts and raids. The area that Haldimand was referring to was points towards Fort Edward, located on the Hudson due north of Albany, a post at which Haldimand had previously served. The object of these offensive measures was to keep the rebel inhabitants of the eastern sector of the defence frontier "perpetually alarmed" and force many of them "to retire from their Habitations thus facilitating any Operations [or major campaigns] that may be carried [sic] on from below [New York and points south]."<sup>111</sup> This accorded with the Imperial policy of having Haldimand administer Quebec as a northern garrison for the major campaigns along the eastern seaboard, rather than have Haldimand mount major campaigns independently of the southern theatre of war.

There were however, limits imposed on Campbell's administrative initiative. After a night attack by Campbell upon the Caughnawagay Indian village, in which two Oneida Indians were murdered by his troops, Haldimand informed him that "so violent a step" should not be taken without his approbation, especially in view of the negotiations that were then being conducted by Major Butler at Niagara, in order to win the Oneidas to the British side. To remedy his behaviour,

Campbell was directed to make a conciliatory speech to the Caughnawagas outlining the history of the Oneida rebellion, and to go through “the Ceremony of Covering the Blood that ... [had] been spilt on their Village ....” This directive shows Haldimand’s familiarity with Indian customs and his desire to participate in them in order to win the support of the Indian nations. Campbell justified his actions by using the tradition of policy precedence from one administrator to another, in that Guy Carleton, he argued, had given him license to “use every possible means to prevent evil Messages from the Rebels being brought into the Province,” which orders had not heretofore been contradicted” by Haldimand.<sup>112</sup> Such policy precedence tended to limit initiative on the part of administrators for the reason, as illustrated by Campbell’s behaviour, of insubordinacy by officers of a lower rank, that may be approved of at an Imperial level.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Mackesy, 1964, 14.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 1964, 213.

<sup>3</sup>The Commander in Chief was also to maintain direct correspondence with the Superintendent of the Indians in both the Northern and Southern Departments, and with the Indian Chiefs of each nation. As well, he was given authority to grant military commissions, and to fill vacancies in case of death, court martial, or the desertion of officers at a rank lower than colonel, or regimental or battalion commander. Appointments at a level higher than this had to come from the imperial administration (see H.P. 15, 21697, 21700).

<sup>4</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 322.

<sup>5</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 265, 283. Curtis notes that Cork was selected as the depot for the provisioning because “It was the largest western port of the British Isles; it lay on the route of ships bound for the colonies [particularly from Southport and Liverpool]; it possessed a good and capacious harbour; and it constituted the natural outlet of a region whence ... contractors drew large supplies of beef, pork and butter. Furthermore, it was an important recruiting center for



southern Ireland, and troops ... could conveniently be embarked aboard the victuallers" (see Curtis, 1969, 83).

<sup>6</sup>H.P. 15, 21697, 187.

<sup>7</sup>Burghardt, 1971, 269-285.

<sup>8</sup>Graymont, 1972, 214; Kelsay, 1984, 246, 253-254.

<sup>9</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 29.

<sup>10</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 33, 36.

<sup>11</sup>Robson, Eric. *The American Revolution in its Political and Military Aspects, 1763-1783*. London: The Batchworth Press, 1955, 94-95.

<sup>12</sup>H.P. 72, 21806, 3.

<sup>13</sup>Robson, 1955, 101.

<sup>14</sup>H.P. 15, 21698, 9; Armour, David A. and Widder, Keith R. *Michilimackinac During The American Revolution*. Mackinac Island, Michigan: Mackinac Island State Park Commission, 1986, 148.

<sup>15</sup>Armour and Widder, 1986, 84-88.

<sup>16</sup>H.P. 15, 21698, 4.

<sup>17</sup>Bowler, 1975, 231.

<sup>18</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 226.

<sup>19</sup>Bowler, 1975, 233-235.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 1975, 237.

<sup>21</sup>Haldimand stated that, as he saw it, he could not advance on Sullivan because of a lack of troops to "defend the easiest passes into the country, and prevent the possibility of ... [the] enemies [sic] obtaining any regular Supply of Provisions" (see H.P. 72, 21807, 42). This was in part a response to the limited number of provisions sent to the colony for the support of the troops.

<sup>22</sup>Curtis, 1969, 83-84; H.P. 15, 21698, 19. Curtis states that it is unclear as to whether these contracts were advertised publicly, but the contractors were governed by contracts formulated according to recommendations from the Prime Minister, the Colonial Secretary and his Under-Secretary of State, and the Secretary at War. There were also submissions from the commanders in North America, the colonial commissaries and other subordinate officers.

<sup>23</sup>Curtis, 1969, 88. The 'anti-scorbutics' relate to the prevention of scurvy.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 1969, 92.

<sup>25</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 34.

<sup>26</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 264-265.

<sup>27</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 283. The contracts also specified that the wheat was to be well packed in barrels, "the biscuit was to be sound of the quality known as "Kings Bread" and well packed in barrels and the Meat was to be of the first and best Quality and packed in barrels secured with four iron hoops" (see H.P. 15, 21698, 19-20). It was also specified that the provisions were to be fit upon arrival in America providing they arrived "within six months from the time of the Delivery of ... Provisions at Cork" until they arrived at their destination. The notable exception to these requirements, which was particularly relevant during the War of Revolution, was "the dangers of the Sea" for which the contractor was not personally liable. However, as Curtis has noted, these contracts were not always filled in their entirety and thus provisions were either lost, unsound, or not supplied.

<sup>28</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 283.

<sup>29</sup>H.P. 72, 21808, 104.

<sup>30</sup>H.P. 15, 21698, 16.

<sup>31</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 24, 123.

<sup>32</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 129. Thus Germaine concluded that the government would be forced to send out an additional supply, equal to the consumption of 15,000 men for six months, when the fleet sailed in the autumn (see H.P. 17, 21704, 24-25). As noted earlier, this supply never materialised (see H.P. 17, 21704, 30).

<sup>33</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 11.

<sup>34</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 12, 17, 23.

<sup>35</sup>H.P. 72, 21807, 115.

<sup>36</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 98.

<sup>37</sup>Shelburne was elected Prime Minister after the death of Rockingham on July 1st., 1782. Prior to this appointment he was Secretary of State in charge of domestic, Irish and colonial affairs (see Higginbotham, 1983, 425; Mackesy, 1974, 471).

<sup>38</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 44-47.

<sup>39</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 23, 26.

<sup>40</sup>Thus despite Campbell's request to supply goods in accordance with his directions, in terms of both the patterns or types of goods made up and the materials of their composition, such as the "strouds and moltons" requested by the Indians for clothing and bedding, the imperial government, largely because of expence, sent the cheapest goods possible (see H.P. 17, 21704, 74).

<sup>41</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 74.

<sup>42</sup>H.P. 15, 21698, 17.

<sup>43</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 136.

<sup>44</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 27, 29.

<sup>45</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 4.

<sup>46</sup>H.P. 17, 21704, 50.

<sup>47</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 116, 124-125.

<sup>48</sup>This numbered filing system aided the commanders in tracing lost letters or documents, particularly when these had to be sent, in duplicate or triplicate, via the Atlantic to imperial headquarters.

<sup>49</sup>H.P. 12, 21687, 233.

<sup>50</sup>A memorial was a statement of facts as a basis for a petition or request.

<sup>51</sup>Vouchers were documents that established the fact of the payment of money or the written account of a transaction.

<sup>52</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 146.

<sup>53</sup>H.P. 17, 21705, 42; 42, 21760, 287.

<sup>54</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 146.

<sup>55</sup>H.P. 16, 21703, 163.

<sup>56</sup>H.P. 15, 21698, 14. These commissions however, only conferred "rank during service", the rank usually being lost when the service was discontinued (see H.P. 72, 21807, 111).

<sup>57</sup>H.P. 72, 21807, 111.

<sup>58</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 132.

<sup>59</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 146, 149-150.

<sup>60</sup>Oswegatchie, which had begun as a small village of the Five Nations Indians, was given a fort and a mission by the French in the 1750's (see Kelsay, 1984, 13).

<sup>61</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 131-132.

<sup>62</sup>Armour and Widder, 1978, 59.

<sup>63</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 133.

<sup>64</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 134-135.

<sup>65</sup>H.P. 72, 21807, 44.

<sup>66</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 132, 140, 148.

<sup>67</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 139.

<sup>68</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 145.

<sup>69</sup>In 1779 Haldimand stated that the German soldiers had “in some degree imbibed the principles of the Inhabitants [of the colonies], which has of late been conspicuous in repeated and considerable desertions, even from the most secure cantonments in the province” (see H.P. 72, 21807, 43). Ward estimated the numbers of desertions during the Burgoyne campaign to be 3,000 out of 8,000 enlisted (see Ward, 1952, 524). The government allowed about 20/- for the apprehension of a deserter (see Ward, 1952, 165).

<sup>70</sup>Betsy Knight notes that the British required payment (subsistence) for the upkeep of American prisoners, which the Americans proposed to supply in paper money devalued at 20 dollars to the pound. However, she argues that prisoner exchange was never formalized into a general cartel, although small numbers of prisoners were exchanged from time to time (see Knight, Betsy. “Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution”, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, XLVIII (April, 1991), 201-222).

<sup>71</sup>H.P. 3, 21665, 144-145.

<sup>72</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 46.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 1931, 155, 281.

<sup>74</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 190. These men, some of whom were killed in action or wounded, or enlisted in provincial corps, were disguised by Brant as Indian warriors. Kelsay in fact notes that of Joseph Brant’s personal war party, only one fifth were ‘bona fide’ Indians.

<sup>75</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 191.

<sup>76</sup>Curtis, 1969, 3, 8, 14-16.

<sup>77</sup>During the Haldimand administration the Montreal garrison was commanded by General Watson Powell (1778-1780) and Brigadier General Allan Maclean (1780-1782) (see Cruikshank, 1931, 289).

<sup>78</sup>John Johnson, a son of the famed Indian Superintendent of the Northern Department, declined the post of Indian Superintendent after his father’s death. In 1776 he fled to Canada from Tryon County, New York, with 170 of his Scottish tenants (see Kelsay, 1984, 139, 176-177).

<sup>79</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 11, 13.

<sup>80</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 169.

<sup>81</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 30.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*, 1931, 47, 49.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*, 1931, 26, 72, 77, 118, 122.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*, 1931, 35.

<sup>85</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 3, 5.

<sup>86</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 278, 291.

<sup>87</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 5.

<sup>88</sup>Graymont records that the Seven Nations Indians were "Lake of Two Mountains Oka (Mohawk), Lake of Two Mountains (Algonquin), Lake of Two Mountains (Nipissing), Caughnawaga, St. Francis (Abnaki), Lorette (Huron), Oswegatchie (Cayuga and Onondaga). The Oswegatchie Indians later went to live at St. Regis" (see Graymont, 1972, 199).

<sup>89</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 283. Daniel Claus was son-in-law and deputy to Sir William Johnson (see Kelsay, 1984, 119, 167).

<sup>90</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 98; 45, 21764, 16.

<sup>91</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 6.

<sup>92</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 95; 53, 21776, 5-6, 10-11.

<sup>93</sup>Armour and Widder, 1978, 198-206.

<sup>94</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 3, 188.

<sup>95</sup>H.P. 15, 21697, 187.

<sup>96</sup>H.P. 43, 21761, 260.

<sup>97</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 65.

<sup>98</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 14-16. Although they were divided under the French, Knox stated that after the conquest of Canada by the British these nations held a "Grand Congress" at Sault St. Louis [Caughnawagy] in 1760, and united as one Confederacy."

<sup>99</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 157; Graymont, 1972, 81. Campbell was married to the daughter of La Corne St. Luc, former director of Indian affairs in Quebec under the French regime.

<sup>100</sup>Graymont, 1972, 148.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, 1972, 154-155.

<sup>102</sup>H.P. 50, 21772, 100.

<sup>103</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 767.

<sup>104</sup>H.P. 50, 21772, 99-100.

<sup>105</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 19.

<sup>106</sup>H.P. 50, 21772, 92.

<sup>107</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 17.

<sup>108</sup>H.P. 50, 21772, 100; 21773, 33.

<sup>109</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 34.

<sup>110</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 39. Lafayette arrived in America on June 13, 1777 to espouse "the cause of liberty". He was made a major general "without a command" by Congress, and in 1778 suggested an elaborate plan for conquering Quebec the following year (see Ward, 1952, 558-560; Higginbotham, Don. *The War of American Independence. Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice. 1763-1789*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983, 115).

<sup>111</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 59.

<sup>112</sup>H.P. 50, 21773, 69, 70, 77.

## **CHAPTER 6. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENCE FRONTIER AT THE UPPER POSTS: NIAGARA.**

Niagara was the headquarters of the defence frontier administration at the Upper Posts, as stated in Brigadier General Powell's commission, in which he was given the command of "The Lakes & Posts &c in the Upper Country ...." Of necessity, as communication became more difficult between the posts, this commission was modified to give more autonomous command to the commanding officers at Detroit and Michilimackinac, but Niagara still retained its premier position "on the back of the colonies."<sup>1</sup>

Niagara gained its pre-eminence for two reasons: firstly, because of its location and secondly, because of its importance to the Indians. In terms of location, Niagara's position at a geographical break-point between Lake Ontario and Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan and Superior, (see Map 4.1) made it "the most central place for the supplying of the other Upper Posts." Thus, as the "Navigation of the Lakes" depended on it, its defence was an "object of particular attention" to the Haldimand administration.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the access it provided from several main land and water routes, such as the Susquehanna, Genesee and Allegheny rivers, and the Iroquois trail overland from the Mohawk and points east, into Canada, made it vulnerable to rebel attack, and thus its defensibility critical.

Its importance to the French fur trade and the Indian nations was recognised in 1760 by Sir William Johnson who stated that Niagara was then "the principal post in the Upper Country ... [and]



might be fixed upon as the place for holding General [Indian] Congrefses ....”<sup>3</sup> There can be little doubt that this opinion, coming as it did from the Superintendent of Indians for the Northern Department, led to an imperial conviction that Niagara was essential to the “Trading Interests” of Quebec, particularly during the War of Revolution. Whether this opinion was held by Haldimand is debatable. In 1779 he cynically commented that “The Expences of the Upper Posts are immense to Government and far exceeds any benefit which they have ever derived from them,” but he added, “commerce must be protected, [and] everything must give way to this general cry.” Thus for “the good of the whole” he would preserve the Upper Posts and their headquarters Niagara.<sup>4</sup>

Haldimand’s defence policy had two prongs: a defensive and an offensive position. The defensive position at Niagara was largely concerned with the security of the post and its military strength, while the offensive position centred on defence and harassment of the frontier. Fort Niagara looked both east and west. To the eastward it was located at the opposite end of Lake Ontario from Carleton Island. Thus Brigadier General Powell, commander at Niagara, commented that during his term of office, the “Theatre of Action for troops and Indians from ... [Niagara] and Carleton Island” was the Mohawk River.<sup>5</sup> From this perspective the troops at Niagara could reach the frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and to the southward could reach Fort Pitt. To the westward troops from Niagara could reach the Ohio, the Illinois country and the Wabash.

Concomitant with its pre-eminence was a fear by Haldimand that Niagara would be a target for rebel attack, particularly as “the ... slackness of the Western Nations” would leave it without adequate Indian defence. If, as he argued, the chief means of fortification was to be “Provisions and Men, particularly the former,” then it became even more an attractive target for rebel attack or, as rumoured, a major invasion.<sup>6</sup>

It must be noted here that an important consideration in the administration of Niagara and the other Upper Posts was rumour, largely gained through frontier intelligence. For example, in 1779 the rebels established a post at Tioga, near the junction of the west branch of the Susquehanna with the Chemung River and Owego Creek; and it was rumoured that they planned an advance on Niagara in the spring of 1780. It was also rumoured that the rebels had "opened roads to Niagara and Detroit and established themselves on both." It was also rumoured that there was to be an advance on Niagara by using "a free Pafsage by Water from Fort Stanwix by Oswego into Lake Ontario, thence to Niagara ... without much Injury from our Shipping upon that Lake ...." At the same time there were constant rumours of an expected French invasion from the east coast, targeting the Ohio and Wabash rivers, Detroit and Niagara. The accuracy of these rumours could often not be determined as "every Track & Channel of Conveyance ... [was] now so watched [by the rebels] that it ... [was] next to impossible for a Mefsender to get through" to New York or elsewhere to verify them.<sup>7</sup> Thus it can be argued that one of the most distinguishing characteristics of policy creation for the Upper Posts was its crisis-oriented 'ad hoc' nature. As well, the distance of headquarters from the scene of operations led to a 'time-lag after-fact' type of policy which was reactive rather than proactive.

As with the administrative sector east of Niagara, the two most important departments were the Military Department and the Indian Department. In 1783 Haldimand stated that "The Line between the Duties of the Military and Indian Departments ... [was] so clearly drawn, that it ... [was] impofsible any difficulties ... [could] arise to the services from improper Interferences on either part."<sup>8</sup> By this Haldimand was probably referring to the fact that one was military and the other civil, and as such should concern entirely different areas of government. However the lines were not clearly drawn during the War of Revolution largely due to the Indian participation in both

the fur trade and the war. Thus the commander at the post had to observe continual vigilance in ensuring that the administration of the two departments was kept distinct.


## **A. THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT.**

At Fort Niagara the military department was pre-eminent. The fort itself was a defence structure, see Map 6.1, administered by military commanders from regular British military units.<sup>9</sup> Although the selection of these commanders was usually governed by the principle of seniority in rank amongst the officers serving at the Upper Posts, it was hoped that the selection would yield experienced administrators, especially in terms of frontier service.<sup>10</sup>

### **1. The Defence of Niagara.**

During the War of Revolution the first duty of the commander was to ensure that the fort itself was defensible. The orientation of the defence earthworks towards the south and east, and the construction of stockades along the lake shoreline and river frontage, implies the expectation of military aggression from either Lake Ontario or from various land avenues of access, such as via the Genesee or Allegheny rivers. Haldimand was aware of the defence needs of the fort from his previous posting there, and thus he ordered that the fort undergo a program of repairs and rebuilding as recorded in the reports from the Engineers Department. In his 1779 tour of inspection of the Upper Posts, Captain Brehm, Haldimand's aid-de-camp, noted that these repairs had only begun to redress the problem, particularly as the main source of communication, the wharf, was "almost [sic] washed away."<sup>11</sup>

The importance of Fort Niagara as a defence facility is shown by Table 6.1, in which Fort Niagara was allocated the largest number of troops, namely 680, compared with 362 at Carleton Island, 393 at Detroit, and 62 at Michilimackinac.<sup>12</sup> Brehm noted that one reason for the large



Map 6.1. Plan of Niagara, Francis Pfister, 1771. Courtesy: William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN THE UPPER COUNTRY.		
	Rank and File	Total
<b>Niagara and Small Forts Depending.</b>		
King's Regiment. 5 Companies complete.	280	
Yagars.	100	
Major Butler's Rangers.	300	
		680
<b>Detroit.</b>		
King's Regiment. 3 Companies complete.	168	
Part of Ditto to be sent in the Spring to complete two Companies at Michilimackinac.	50	
47th. Regiment	125	
Major Butler's Rangers.	50	
		393
<b>Michillimackinac.</b>		
King's Regiment. 2 Companies complete.	62	62
<b>Carleton Island.</b>		
34th. Regiment	162	
Sir John Johnson's Corps.	200	
84th. Regiment.	51	
Yagars.	100	
		<u>513</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>		1,648

Table 6.1. The Distribution of Troops in the Upper Country during the Haldimand Administration. H.P. 42, 21760, 252-253.

contingent at Niagara was that it was in a “forward” situation and largely inaccessible to back-up defence, particularly in terms of its role as a major provisioning supply post.

## **2. The Troops at Fort Niagara.**

A large administrative responsibility at Niagara was the paying of the troops which was organized through the “House of Ellice at Montreal.” Two pay accounts were kept: “subsistence” and “gross `off-reckonings’.”<sup>13</sup> `Subsistence’ was usually 6d. a day and was more than likely applied to the cost of food, but could include the cost of shoes, stockings, garters, medicines and shaving gear. `Gross off-reckonings’ was usually applied to such `garrison’ expences as “poundage,” for the paymaster of the forces, for hospital expences or for clothing.<sup>14</sup> Curtis argued that this division of accounts was “complicated and cumbersome,” and it must have been difficult to compile at the Upper Posts. This perhaps explains in part why the troops, including officers, had little or no money, both at the garrison and along the frontier: those at Michilimackinac finally being forced to complain that they couldn’t subsist on their pay.<sup>15</sup> They were either not receiving their pay or the government was using part of it to make up the shortfall between its budget and its actual expenses.

### **a. Regular Troops.**

The regular troops at Niagara consisted of the 8th. or King’s Regiment of Foot and the Yagars who were Hesse or Hanau Chasseurs, on loan from the Duke of Brunswick.<sup>16</sup> Throughout the War of Revolution there was considerable British opposition to the “employment of foreign troops to reduce America ....” It was argued that they were inferior to British soldiers, “were not reliable, deserted in large numbers, ... plundered everywhere ... and strengthened the American resistance ....” However despite these arguments John Johnson ordered the Yagars to Niagara in October, 1779, to replace, for at least part of the time, part of the 34th. Regiment and the Royal

Artillery. Although they were “not accustomed to Wood Marches or Carrying large Packs,” they were regarded as being amongst “the best and most active” of the troops available for frontier service at the time. Their participation in the war effort did however worry Haldimand, as he felt that on the frontier they could not compare with the rebel troops largely because of their unfamiliarity with the terrain, the climate and the guerilla-type warfare.<sup>17</sup> One of his other concerns was the fear of their deserting from the army, particularly along the Pennsylvania frontier. Some of these fears were justified. Bolton informed Haldimand that upon their arrival at Niagara the Germans complained about their subsistence and as well tried to get out of work. Bolton, on his own initiative, decided to send them back to Quebec, an action for which he was praised by Haldimand. They were replaced with “an Equal force [of British troops] from Carleton Island,” and a State of the Troops for 1783, 1784, indicates that no Germans were then present at the Upper Posts.<sup>18</sup>

#### **b. The Butler's Rangers.**

It was the field militia called ‘Butler's Rangers’ that Haldimand felt would provide a competitive edge against the rebels along the frontier. He chose them “to serve a limited time” in frontier locations where regular troops would be at a disadvantage. Their competitive edge came from the fact that they were Loyalist militia, drawn mostly from ‘frontier’ locations, with considerable experience in, or knowledge of, the techniques of frontier survival. As many of them had fled from properties in rebel colonies, and as well could “speak an Indian language” it was expected that they would be a valuable asset to the British cause.<sup>19</sup>

As with a regular army unit the Rangers were to be organized into Corps’, composed of eight Companies, as shown in Table 6.2. This table shows that in April of 1780 they only numbered 497, with a daily pay of £78/6/10, while in 1782 the “whole Strength” of the Rangers at Niagara

**THE CORPS OF RANGERS COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL  
JOHN BUTLER, COMMANDANT.**

NEW ESTABLISHMENT OF PAY		£ STERLING	N. YORK CURRENCY.
1 Lieut. Col. a.	17/- pr. day	17/-	
7 Cpts.	10/- "	3/10/-	
8 1st. Lieuts.	4/8	1/17/4	
8 2nd. Lieuts.	3/8	1/9/4	
1 Adjutant	4/-	4/-	
1 Q. Master	4/8	4/8	
1 Surgeon	4/-	4/-	
		<u>£ 8/ 6/4</u>	
			<u>£ 14/ 5/4</u>
24 Serjeants a.	5/- pr. day		6/ - -
24 Corporals	4/- "		4/16/ -
16 Drummers	3/6		2/16/ -
400 Privates	2/6		50/ - -
6 Interpreters (Additional Pay)			
	1/6		<u>9/-</u>
			<u>£ 78/ 6/10</u>

NB. If an Adjutant should not be approved of; There are 5 or 6 deserving Men who are qualified as Interpreters, and who are entitled to 4/- per day.

This arrangement to take Place 25th. April, 1780.

Table 6.2. The Corps of Rangers Commanded by Lieut. Colonel John Butler, Commandant.  
H.P. 46, 21765, 46.



was 409 men, this number fluctuating because of illness and injury. They were selected on the basis of a rather stringent set of military requirements. It was expected that they “march well, ... be able to endure fatigue, and ... be ... good Marksmen ....” Other qualities included “dispersing and forming expeditiously, priming and loading carefully, and levelling well ....” They were also expected to have “personal activity and alertness.”<sup>20</sup> One of the most important requirements was that they adopt Indian tactics in warfare, not only to encourage the Indians to assist them in military manœuvres, but also to strike fear into the hearts of frontier rebel settlers who had long feared Indian attacks, as noted by Archibald Loudon in his discussion on the outrages committed by Indians against the white settlers in North America.

The choice of their commander was particularly important. The man selected during the War of Revolution was John Butler, who had been a deputy to Sir William Johnson in the Northern Indian Department. He could speak several Indian languages and thus became an interpreter at Indian councils. He was also a large land-holder in New York and as such had many contacts, both rebel and non-rebel. His obvious loyalty to the British Crown and his previous experience as a Captain in the Indian Department during the Seven Years War further endorsed his candidacy for the command of the Rangers.<sup>21</sup>

There were important differences between the Rangers and the regular army corps that led to a policy of keeping them, as much as possible, geographically separate from the rest of the army. The most obvious difference was their rate of pay. If, as Curtis argues, the average rate of pay for a British regular was 8d. per day, then the Rangers pay, at 2/- to 15/- per day, as indicated on Table 6.2, was very high.<sup>22</sup> It was argued that their pay was high not only because of the fact that they were a volunteer force and their duties were largely offensive and therefore highly dangerous, but

also because they often needed to pay expenses out of their own pocket during a frontier expedition. These expenses were often paid in cash. Thus Haldimand stated that "it would be a very bad precedent" to consider them as a regular army corps because the high pay "might ... encourage desertion from other Corps' ...." As noted earlier the lack of pay was a sensitive subject at the Upper Posts and the garrisoning of the Rangers at Fort Niagara made the troops aware of the pay differential between themselves and the Rangers. Discontent did arise and the officers of the Indian Department, who worked closely with the Rangers on scouts, complained that "they were by no means inferior in point of services, fatigues, or losses ....," and therefore deserved the same pay.<sup>23</sup>

Another difference was that the Rangers were not expected to practise "the little Minutia and Forms of Parade ..." that in the eighteenth century were regarded as essential in the training of an army corps.<sup>24</sup> However, the commitment of the regular army to discipline and professionalism was hampered by the conditions of military service along the frontier. The "Engrained battledrills," the "quick-step,"<sup>25</sup> and the "wide frontage" marching of whole platoons or divisions<sup>26</sup> were not possible on the heavily wooded wilderness of the frontier, despite an attempt to move troops along established roads. Instead it required the European partisan tradition of warfare, where soldiers with a "grasp of terrain and languages" and "a touch of wildness ..." could engage in "raids and ambushes" with "secrecy and speed." One of the chief specialties of this form of warfare was the well-planned attack on provision, fodder and ammunition convoys, and where the taking of prisoners or "excess baggage" was kept to a minimum.<sup>27</sup> Such a form of warfare was very similar to the Indian approach in concert with the Rangers.

In order to keep the Rangers separate from the rest of the troops it was decided to house them across the river from the fort, on the west bank of the Niagara. They were located somewhere

in the proximity of Navy Hall, which at the time was regarded as an “improper” location because of the difficulty of a “retreat in case of necessity” as well as its inability “to have retarded any attack” upon the fort.<sup>28</sup> This suggests a location well back from the river. However the navy was an important department in relation to ensuring the defensibility of the fort and perhaps it was felt that a location in proximity to the naval command was an important defence strategy. At Niagara this command was centred in Navy Hall, which as Map 6.1 shows, was located on the west bank due south west from the fort.<sup>29</sup> It was part of a chain of command that stretched from Carleton Island to Detroit and Michilimackinac. Table 6.3 shows that there were six armed vessels operating on Lake Ontario at this time. These six vessels were assisted by two gunboats at Niagara and three at Carleton Island, plus a fleet of bateaux to ferry provisions from Montreal to Niagara.<sup>30</sup> The commander at Niagara observed that the naval department suffered from one serious disadvantage in fulfilling its role as a defence and transportation service: that of a divided command which lacked “Regulations and Orders.”

The command was divided between lake and shore. The shore commander, Captain La Force till October, 1781 and then Captain Breton, was located at Carleton Island and was responsible for preparing the ships for their passage and ensuring that the provisions arrived safely at Niagara from their point of embarkation, either at Montreal or Carleton Island. The commander of the Lower Lakes, was Captain Andrews, who was drowned on the 31st. October, 1780. After his death H. Watson Powell argued for a single command to unify operations “upon the Shore and on the Lake ....”<sup>31</sup> As the vessels only made about “Eleven voyages in the Season” it was critical that the service be efficient and not subject to delay, so that the provisions lay in waste at Carleton Island. Powell was also concerned that an inefficient naval service could leave the fort undefended. Furthermore, this inefficiency was aggravated by the change in command on the Upper Lakes

**Table 6.3. A General Return of Armed Vessels on Lake Ontario in 1782. H.P. 41, 21759, 125.**

where Captain Alexander Grant, based at Detroit, was the naval commander.<sup>32</sup> This meant that the command of Navy Hall, located on the lower Niagara River, and that on Navy Island, located on the upper Niagara, was theoretically divided between the Upper and Lower Lakes, despite the fact that Fort Erie was a military dependency of Fort Niagara, thus complicating the transshipment of goods between the two.

### **3. The Defence Expenses at Fort Niagara.**

Along with the provision of military personnel at Niagara and ensuring their security, Haldimand was concerned with minimizing the cost of the administration at the Upper Posts and of frontier defence. Under pressure from the British Parliament, particularly the House of Commons, Haldimand was forced to place expense high on his list of administrative priorities. In accordance with his principles of orderly administration, Haldimand decided to address the expenses on a departmental basis. However it was difficult to do this at the Upper Posts because of the frequent blurring of departmental lines and the limited staff assigned to the post to handle accounting. As well, because orders for all departments were given to the commander at each post, Haldimand often addressed finances in general terms as a principle for all departments and then expected the commander to categorize them according to the various departments at the post. The most important concern at the post was the provisioning, but it crossed departmental lines. Thus Mason Bolton, for example, was ordered to ensure that his deputy commissary, Daniel Bliss, kept the accounts for provisions given to Indians separate from those given to the "Garrison, Seamen & Rangers," as these expenses rightfully belonged to the Indian Department. However, as Brehm noted in 1779, Bolton supplied "all the [Upper] Posts, Indian and Rangers Departments" with provisions.<sup>33</sup> Thus it must have been difficult to keep the Rangers and Indian accounts separate, particularly as they belonged to the same military units, or to keep the accounts of traders buying

Indian goods from the King's Store for Indians, some of whom served on military scouts, from intruding into the accounts of either the Indian or the Military departments.

Another problem was the difficulty in distinguishing between the expenses for provisioning, rations and stores. Provisioning was a general term used to describe the supply of both food and non-food items to the Upper Posts, excluding Indian presents used to buy loyalty. However the term could also be used in a specific sense to describe particular provisions whether part of a ration or not. The ration, or subsistence, was a specific term to describe the allowance of food given on a daily basis to both military and non-military personnel, such as Indians, prisoners and Loyalists. It could be entered in the accounts in two ways: either as an ordinary or an extraordinary expense. If the ration was issued to a regular soldier or officer in a time of peace or war it was accounted as an ordinary expense. However, during times of war it was listed as an extraordinary expense if it was issued to provincial militia or other non-military personnel or if it exceeded the usual cost of a ration to military regulars during times of peace. Store items were provisions that were kept in storage for a considerable period of time or the provisions taken out of the "King's Store," as shown in Table 6.4.<sup>34</sup>

#### **a. Food Provisioning.**

Due to its importance in sustaining life at the post, provisioning was a major expense at Fort Niagara.<sup>35</sup> The high cost of provisions was in part a response to Haldimand's policy that "The supplying His Majesty's Forces ... with Good, Sound, and Wholesome Provisions, The Regularity of those Supplies, and their Safe Arrival at the Place of Destination" was of "vast Importance ... in this extensive Province ...." As noted earlier the government operated the provisioning of the military by contracts to largely civilian personnel, usually located either in Montreal or Quebec or

**A RETURN OF PROVISIONS ISSUED OUT OF THE KING'S STORE  
AT NIAGARA.**

COMPANIES	RATIONS
General Armstrong's	62
Lieut. Col. Bolton's	1,966
Major De Peyster's	1,581
Grenadiers	62
Lernoult's	--
Potts'	1,649
Parkes	1,736
Mompesson's	1,742
Le Maistre's	62
Mathews' Light Comp.	1,860
Watts'	26
<hr/>	
King's or 8th. Regiment	10,746
47th. Regiment	744
Royal Artillery and Conductor	496
Indians and Rangers	57,341
Navy and Artificers	5,067
Teamsters	744
Commissary and Cooper	<u>62</u>
<b>TOTAL RATIONS</b>	<b>75,200</b>

I am really surprised at the number of rations issued to Indians in the above return.

Mason Bolton Lt. Colonel.

Table 6.4. A Return of Provisions issued out of the King's Store at Niagara between the 25th. December, 1778 and the 24th. January, 1779. H.P. 42, 21760, 87.

England. These contractors charged commission as indicated by the 4.8 percent or £39/8/6 charged for the £826/3/6 worth of provisions supplied to Niagara between the 25th. March and the 24th. September, 1781. The contract system, by implication, leads to the assumption that the imperial regime regarded it as the least expensive alternative to government-employed suppliers, particularly in a frontier environment when the costs of transportation were high and the risks considerable. For example, the government contractors at Niagara, Taylor and Forsythe, were either to receive cash for government purchases or else credit on 60 days payment. However they complained that they often didn't get reimbursed until six months later.<sup>36</sup> It was perhaps this fact that led to their eventual dismissal by Haldimand, and subsequent lawsuit for the embezzlement of at least £15,000 New York currency of government funds.<sup>37</sup>

A major provisioning cost at Niagara was that of the food ration.<sup>38</sup> In 1781 the ration was estimated to be worth "two shillings York [currency] at Niagara ...," with 75,200 of them being issued for one month at the post. If one estimates the total military and Indian population on rations at the Upper Posts, excluding Carleton Island, to be about 14,000, and if one assumes that Table 6.4 is referring to daily rations, then the Upper Posts received one fifth of the estimated daily rations for the province, of which at Niagara 75 percent or 57,341 rations went to Indians. This caused Mason Bolton to remark that he was really surprised at the number of rations issued to Indians.<sup>39</sup>

The individual in charge of provisioning at Niagara was Edward Pollard, Deputy Commissary of Stores and Provisions in 1778, who was replaced by Daniel Bliss in 1779.<sup>40</sup> This was a civil appointment and they had the responsibility of ensuring not only the distribution of the appropriate quantities of provisions, but also the type of provisions distributed. One subject of contention was the issue of rum to the troops and Indians. Table 6.5 shows that Robison, a merchant



THE RUM SOLD TO GOVERNMENT BY THOMAS ROBISON.		
	GALLONS	PINTS
To the Navy	1994	5
To the Artificers under Mr. Coleman, Master Builder	282	1
To the Indians	5336	5
To the Rangers Employed building Barracks	650	5-1/2
Total	8264	1/2
For Thomas Robison		
Francis Goring		
Issued by the Commissary out of the King's Store from 25th. May to the 24th. April, 1779 inclusive		
To the Garrison &ca.	<u>844</u>	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	9108	1-1/2

Table 6.5. An Account of Rum Sold to the Government by Thomas Robison, Merchant at Niagara, from the 11th. May, 1778 to the 10th. May, 1779. H.P. 41, 21759, 38.

at Niagara, issued 8,264 gallons of rum in one year to government for non-garrison use, of which 65 percent or 5,336 gallons was issued to Indians, while at the same time the garrison received 9,108 gallons from this same merchant.<sup>41</sup> However, this was by no means the only issue of rum for consumption at Niagara. Other merchants at the post, and at Montreal, were also vying for rum contracts, the merchants at Montreal in particular being aware of Haldimand's principle of not purchasing goods from non-contracted merchants at the Upper Posts. Due to the difficulty of transporting the rum to Niagara in barrels,<sup>42</sup> the costs were estimated at around 5/6 a barrel in Montreal, with the additional costs of the hire of four boat men at 20 dollars (one dollar being worth £1 Halifax currency), the hire of a boat, cartage costs to Carleton Island at about 10 percent and the cost of cartage from Carleton Island to Niagara: at which point the barrel cost 6/3 on arrival. The contractor was then to receive 8 percent commission, making the total cost of a barrel at 6/9. Another contractor estimated the cost of 22 barrels in Montreal at £211/15/- but £458/6/8 at Niagara, approximately double the cost. Bolton complained that some contractors were even charging 20/- New York currency for a barrel of rum worth 8/- at Montreal, thus 2 1/2 times the cost, the payment of which would place considerable stress on the finances at the post. The problem was made more acute by the fact that it was argued that rum was necessary at the Upper Posts and on the frontier, not only for social and medicinal purposes, but also for trade, barter and buying loyalty. Therefore Bolton asked Haldimand if he would allow more merchants to Niagara to compete for government contracts so that the price monopoly could be broken.<sup>43</sup> However, in response to constant criticism over its demoralizing influence, particularly on Indians,<sup>44</sup> Haldimand recommended that spruce beer be substituted for it. This native, resinous drink had the advantage of supposedly curing scurvy and at Carleton Island was issued to the troops in the proportion of three pints per day per man: therefore Daniel Bliss requested that the same proportions be issued at Niagara.<sup>45</sup>

One major problem for the commissary was the personal preferences of the troops concerning the type of provisions they wished to receive. Nathaniel Day, the Commissary General at Quebec, grumbled that “the Canadians employed in the Upper Country will not use English Biscuit,” and “Neither Indians nor Canadians will eat Salt Beef, tho’” according to him, it was “exceeding good.” As well, few of the troops liked oatmeal.<sup>46</sup> Haldimand also had personal preferences, such as for English flour, because he felt that the Quebec flour, made mostly from spring wheat, did not have “Solidity or Consistence ...,” compounded by the frequent failures of the wheat crop due to summer droughts. However the acute problem of provisioning, which at one point reduced the post to only a few days supply, forced Haldimand to supplement flour imports with flour grown in Canada in the proportion of “one half of the Flour wanted for the Troops.”<sup>47</sup>

The problem was not only the type or quality of provisions but their time of arrival. For example in 1779, a critical year for provisioning shortages in Canada, the loss of three provisioning ships en route, and their late embarkation from Cork,<sup>48</sup> forced Bliss to use whatever was available at the post, regardless of type or quality. The shortage also worried Haldimand and Bolton in the event of a starving garrison being unable to repulse a rebel attack. Thus Haldimand informed Bolton that he must keep numbers at the garrison to a minimum, particularly Indians, Loyalists and prisoners.<sup>49</sup> The shortages became even more critical in 1780 when the total convoy for that year, which sailed on August 24, was lost at sea due to bad weather. This event was one of the factors that led to a change in the imperial policy regarding the supply of provisions, in which the provisioning service was assumed by the office of the Secretary of State and coordinated with the Treasury and Navy Board.

The problem of the transportation of the provisions to Niagara led to the non-compliance

of the commanders at the Upper Posts with Haldimand's policy of the non-purchase of rum and goods off the merchants at the posts. In the face of "sour and ... musty flour, goods being sent in "common trunks, often without a Rope ... and the Key ... tyed [sic] to the handle," and beef and pork with no pickle left to prevent its spoilage, the commanders felt that they had no option but to keep their troops healthy as a way of ensuring the defensibility of the posts.<sup>50</sup> The result was an increase in the expense of the war machine. Haldimand recognized the problem and suggested that if, in the event of an emergency, the commissary was forced to purchase goods from the local merchants, "that the provisions be paid for in money, rather than by returning it in kind." This suggests that one form of corruption among the merchants at Niagara had been the acceptance of bills of credit for goods supplied to government, whose value included a considerable mark-up for the credit service: which was either included in the stated price of the goods or in the commission charged for the length of time the credit was extended. Furthermore, Haldimand stated that this purchasing must be on behalf of government, and not on behalf of the commander at the post, who might be inclined to personally profit, in the name of government, from the illicit distribution of rum or other provisions by merchants at the post.<sup>51</sup> Even the civilian farmers on the west bank complained that they were being forced to supply produce to the garrison "at such prices as the Commanding Officer thinks proper ...," thus implying that they thought the prices were too low or subject to personal profit by the commander at the post.

In order to aid the commander in assessing the fairness of the merchant prices or of prices charged while on service on the frontier, it was important that he be informed of the average prices in the colonies and along the frontier. One valuable source of information on prices were the captured prisoners who carried accounts that indicated that Pennsylvania currency was worth more than New York currency,<sup>52</sup> and that articles such as beef and bread staples, or luxury items such as

whisky, apple brandy, sugar, chocolate and shad fish were rising in value. It was also important to know what such items as men's shoes and horses cost on the frontier, and the cost of such services as horse-shoe repair.<sup>53</sup>

Haldimand was well aware of the problems of 'distance decay' with regard to administrative responsibility and attempted to modify its effect by instituting a system in which stores were sent to the Upper Posts with "a proper person" who should be responsible for their safe delivery "in good order and condition ...." These stores were to be delivered into the hands of the Commissary, who was to place them in the storeroom built to house them. The process of transferring the stores from the wharf to the storeroom was to be aided, at Niagara, by "a Crane ... near the end of the Provision Store," which had been built by the Engineers Department "for hoisting up Provisions to the Garrison." This prevented the goods remaining on the wharf and "getting damag'd by the weather."<sup>54</sup> It was then assumed that the Commissary would take responsibility for their distribution, although he could not control their prices once they were in the 'King's Store and under the management of the storekeeper unless he himself was in charge of the store.

The frontier itself presented special problems in provisioning. After Sullivan's destruction of the Indian towns and the Genesee Valley in 1779, and the destruction of "a good part of the Rebel frontier" by the Rangers, John Butler commented that "The Rangers [and other militia] have not only farther to go, but are obliged to buy provisions /when they can get any/ at an advanced price ...." In order to help alleviate this crisis Haldimand suggested that his "Plan of Agriculture" be instituted at Fort Niagara as a means of supplementing the supply of provisions from the east, and as a means of supplying 'portable' food for those on frontier patrols. This plan, conceived as a system of gardens and farms around the fort, was not new at Niagara in that early maps show

gardens around the fort for the subsistence of the garrison. However what does appear to be unique about this plan was the intensity with which it was to be conducted at Carleton Island, Niagara and Detroit, the inclusion of civilian farmers in the scheme, the location of the farms at some distance from the forts: across the river on the western bank at Niagara and on Hog Island at Detroit, and the understanding that the scheme provide a mutually dependent chain of provisioning around the Great Lakes.<sup>55</sup>

Haldimand's stated reason for employing civilians in this scheme was that it would provide a useful occupation for "distressed" Loyalists, pensioned soldiers or prisoners from Ohio, until the war ended, and thus lower the cost of their upkeep to government. However a more feasible reason, judging from the small numbers of Loyalists initially employed, was that the commanders at the Upper Posts would be unwilling to release able-bodied militia from frontier service for gardening or farming duties.<sup>56</sup> The one important stipulation regarding the farmers, was that they be "Good husbandmen ...," so that they would not be a burden to government, particularly with the minimum of agricultural implements at their disposal.<sup>57</sup> Despite the use of skilled farmers however, the scheme offered no guarantee of permanent land occupancy: the only reward for enterprise being the right to a profit from farm surplus over and above the quantity needed for garrison use.<sup>58</sup>


The success of the scheme as a source of provisioning for the garrison was debatable. One of the most significant problems which devolved from the policy, noted earlier, of sending all food provisions from the east, was that the farmers were forced to send their grain east for milling in return for flour sent as part of the provisions. Thus the farmers complained that instead of supporting the principle of self-sufficiency at the post, the government was continuing an inflexible

policy of dependency on the east, even to the point of grain shortages at the post.<sup>59</sup>

These farms were not the only component of the agricultural scheme. John and Philip Stedman, contractors in charge of the Niagara portage,<sup>60</sup> were ordered to cultivate as much land as possible around Fort Schlosser, at the southern end of the Niagara portage, “supplying entirely the post with bread” and rearing cattle for garrison use.<sup>61</sup> As well, the garrison were to cultivate a “King’s Field,” located on the western bank of the Niagara river,<sup>62</sup> and the Indians were encouraged to raise corn at their Buffalo Creek settlements.<sup>63</sup>

#### **b. The Transportation of Provisions.**

The provision capability of Niagara was of little use to the other Upper Posts without an operative supply line between them. At Niagara the greatest hurdle was transshipping the goods from the lower to the upper Niagara river, thus bypassing the Niagara Falls. To accomplish this the British used a portage on the eastern bank that had been in existence since Indian times. Seibel argues that the portage was located on the eastern bank because it was three miles shorter (8 miles) than that on the western bank (11 miles.)<sup>64</sup> As Map 6.2 shows this route consisted of four parts: a seven mile road or river journey from Fort Niagara to the escarpment (A-C), the place where the goods were hoisted over the escarpment, called the Lower Landing (C), the Upper Landing at the crest of the escarpment (C), and the eight mile Portage road from the escarpment to Fort Schlosser (C-D). During the War of Revolution the system of haulage at the Landing, to raise the goods from the boats to the bank, was called the “Cradles” or “capstan, cradle and ways.”<sup>65</sup> Once on the bank the goods were either “rolled in barrels up the incline” or face of the escarpment, or else taken up the steep incline by ox carts. During the war the commander at Fort Niagara had stationed a garrison at the Landing,<sup>66</sup> due to the volume of goods deposited there while in transit,<sup>67</sup> and because it was



Map 6.2. A Plan of the First Niagara Portage. From a Copy in the Department of Lands and Forests (Ontario), Toronto.



feared that these goods may attract rebel and Indian attention, particularly in the event of a major invasion.

At the top of the escarpment, probably where the portage road and the Lower Landing road bisected, was the Upper Landing. Goods were stored here in "a large storehouse" which was under construction by Stedman in March of 1779. This building was to be defended by a recently completed blockhouse (since 1778), "inclosed with pickets." It was also suggested that this post could accommodate 40 or 50 of the Fort Niagara garrison due to overcrowding there.<sup>68</sup>

From the Upper Landing to Fort Schlosser the goods were conveyed "in waggons," usually drawn by eight oxen or horses.<sup>69</sup> This road was protected by redoubts erected at every mile,<sup>70</sup> but these picketed enclosures probably served more as resting places due to the poor condition of the road. There were complaints that Stedman charged too much for such an appalling road particularly as it often caused serious delays in the passage of goods.<sup>71</sup> However the fact that there was an attempt to protect the road provides evidence of its importance in the transportation of goods into the interior.

Fort Schlosser, one of the "dependencies" of Fort Niagara, was at the end of the portage, opposite to Navy Island in the Niagara River.<sup>72</sup> Since the conquest the fort had been the location for the residence of the portage contractor as it provided accessibility not only to the portage but to the upper Niagara River.

In accordance with British policy on contractual services, the portage contract was given to a civilian, namely the Stedmans. Their responsibility was to provide service to government by "carrying over all the King's stores, Provisions, and Officer's Baggage," for which, in 1768, they

received £100 sterling and 17 rations of provisions. However the lucrative part of the contract was the carrying of trade goods over the portage for which in 1768 they received £3 York currency for an empty batteau, 3/- New York currency for a pack and £5 New York currency for a cartload.<sup>73</sup> By 1785 the contract was worth £1600 in profit annually, including “300 tons of hay per year,” a farm at Fort Schlosser and at Goat Island, 60 horses “and as many oxen, besides waggons” as they wished.<sup>74</sup> The charge for cartage was now 6/- New York currency per gross hundred weight.<sup>75</sup>

However during the war Stedman’s responsibilities were to serve the needs of the Crown first. This was based upon a well-established portage principle that the use of the land “be solely reserved for the use of the Crown, for ever. ...” This principle had been established when the land was originally deeded to the British by the Seneca Indians.<sup>76</sup> Despite this commitment however, with the portage service proving so lucrative, the Stedman’s had made “improvements” along the portage road which were resented by the Indians.<sup>77</sup> Thus it must have come as a relief to the Indians to witness that, due to the Haldimand policy of preferential treatment for government goods, there was a reduction in the volume of merchant goods being carried over the portage. However there was still sufficient merchant goods carried over the portage for there to be a complaint that “goods to the amount of £50,000 Sterling were stored on Navy Island,” thus possibly attracting rebels.<sup>78</sup>

The importance of Fort Erie as the point of transfer from Niagara river boats to Lake shipping was indicated by the two prominent storehouses located just behind the wharf. Its location on the northern shore of Lake Erie, just above the rapids at the head of the Niagara river, gave it accessibility to lake shipping as well as to the Indian settlements on Buffalo Creek. In 1779 the fort itself was described as being in “bad condition; the Pickets which surround it are decayed, the Barracks and Storehouse Roofs wants almost [sic] new covering and the whole irresistible against

the smaller Canon [sic]. brought against it.” It was also argued that it did not “command the ground surrounding it,” but this could be improved by the construction of a “Fascine & Earthwork ...” to cover three sides of it. As well, it had “no more men than necessary to carry on the indispensable repairs for its defence” and thus it was vulnerable to rebel attack, particularly via either the west branch of the Susquehanna or the Allegheny river. Apart from its physical deficiencies the fort also had one major administrative problem, in that while the lake shipping was under the command of Captain Alexander Grant at Detroit, the fort was a dependency of Niagara. Thus, as with the divided command between land and water on the lower lakes, this reduced the efficiency of Fort Erie as a supply post. Some of the frustration resulting from this administrative division can be seen in the complaint that goods were not being received in time at Michilimackinac because of problems with transporting goods from Fort Erie “in the King’s Ships” to Detroit and then to Mackinac.<sup>79</sup>

### **c. Military Equipment.**

Another important provisioning cost at Niagara was the supply of military equipment. The military equipage required by the regular troops in Canada is shown in Table 6.6. The Table also shows that Provincial troops received the same allowance except for the addition of camp equipage, such as tents, haversacks, canteens, campkettles, hatchets and wood axes.<sup>80</sup> The equipage for the emigrants and provincials and the extra blankets for regulars, was an added expense to the imperial government and one that had to be carefully monitored in Quebec because of the amount of frontier service. Here the equipment was particularly vulnerable to wear and tear and loss through rebel attack. The tents were a vital necessity because of long weeks on the march, inadequate billets and the often inclement weather. Thus with a fairly high replacement rate and the long replacement time from England Haldimand sought for colonial suppliers or for rebel uniforms that could be

**Table 6.6. A List of the Military Equipage for the Troops in Canada. H.P. 16, 21701, 127.**

made over for the Canadian service. In 1778 one such source of uniforms were “ a hundred suits of ... Prize Uniforms,” that had been located by Cramahe, the Lieutenant Governor, at a cost of 40/- a suit.<sup>81</sup> Such uniforms would also be useful for frontier disguise.

Of primary concern at Niagara was the availability of weaponry and artillery. In 1779 Major Hereford was the conductor of Artillery at Niagara,<sup>82</sup> with the mandate to provide both munitions and the skilled persons to fire them. Carvana in his study on the use of artillery during the War of Revolution, lists the vast stock of munitions necessary to ensure a state of defensibility,<sup>83</sup> the cost and care of which was considerable. For example, the return of Colonel Guy Johnson’s equipment for one expedition in 1779, shows that for just 18 ‘white’ men it was necessary to provide 50 Firelocks, 50 Cartouch boxes,<sup>84</sup> 50 Powder Horns, 50 Shot Pouches, 200 Flints and 3000 Cartridges. As these munitions could be damaged, lost or stolen in transit, the supplying of Niagara with munitions became an expensive proposition.

Military Equipage also included medicines for the sick and wounded. There is evidence that there was, at least at Niagara, a caring attitude on the part of the surgeon, Robert McCausland, for his patients.<sup>85</sup> For instance, he requested spruce beer in the absence of fresh vegetables and meat, or “a proper Provision of Portable Soup, Sago and Barley” while out on the frontier. However despite his care the troops at Niagara were often sick, and he complained that he did not have enough government money to fund pharmaceutical supplies for the men, being thus forced to pay for medicines out of his own pocket.<sup>86</sup> These supplies were ordered from Europe which meant a considerable time lag before their delivery at Niagara. There was a further delay in getting the supplies to the frontier if the soldiers could not be brought to the fort. McCausland was also responsible for the sick of the Naval Department, who “occupied a separate hospital in the Fort.”

They also occupied “an entire House at Navy Hall” which was “filled with Sick, exclusive of Officers ....”<sup>87</sup> This was a further drain on the slender resources of the surgeon.

Adequate housing at the post was an important consideration in keeping the troops healthy. One of the major problems was housing the Rangers who, as noted earlier, were not to be garrisoned in the fort with the regular troops. Until 1778 they had been housed “in the Bottom (the wharf area of the Fort), where in Fall and Spring, there was “half leg deep of water and mud ....” As the Rangers usually returned from the frontier in poor health, their accommodation was important. Thus, after considerable discussion, it was decided to erect the barracks on the west bank.<sup>88</sup> Even after they were erected they were regarded as inadequate, and it was argued that unless additional log houses were built the Rangers would still not be fit for active service.

Another problem, and a continual drain on expenses, was the need for constant maintenance on the buildings at the fort and its dependencies. Most of this work was detailed in the reports of the Engineer Department, under the direction, in 1780, of Lieutenant Charles Terrot. He was assisted in the actual construction by Mr. Bennet till 1780, when Bennet was replaced by Mr. John McFarlane, who was also storekeeper for the Naval Department.<sup>89</sup> The pay for those working in the Engineers Department was 10d./day New York currency, the positions most likely being filled by civilians. The fact that the Return for stores wanted in the department, shown in Table 6.7, lists tents and tin kettles, suggests that these workmen bivouacked with the troops on the frontier: their expertise most likely being needed for the construction of such amenities as roads, bridges and other transportational facilities while on the march, and for the construction of possible ingress to rebel defence posts along the frontier. The reports of completed work were usually submitted to the commander of the post on a six monthly basis, for warrants to be made out authorising payment for

**RETURN OF STORES WANTING FOR THE USE OF THE ENGINEERS'  
DEPARTMENT AT NIAGARA, AUGUST 10th., 1782.**

Blankets	24
Tents	6
Tin Kettles	12
Large Batteaux With Sails	6

A Net 50 Fathoms Long and 16 Feet Deep  
and 12 lb. of Twine to keep the old  
Net in Repair.

Charles Terrot  
Acting Engineer.

Table 6.7. A Return of Stores Wanted for the Use of the Engineers' Department at Niagara, August 10, 1782. H.P. 43, 21762, 133.

the work.<sup>90</sup> The estimated cost for six months work to the fort itself between June and December, 1782, was £1256/8/11 New York currency, which was a considerable amount.

The Barrack equipment at Niagara and its dependencies was the responsibility of Daniel Bliss, the Deputy Barrack Master. This appointment was one example of an attempt to streamline the administration at the post because Bliss was also the Commissary, and thus could combine the provisioning of food with the provisioning of equipment in one office. The equipment for the barracks was purchased through the company of Thomas Campbell, the acting agent for the Barrack Master General's Department. One problem that perplexed Bliss was how to charge the repairs and equipment purchased for the Ranger's Barracks, because the Rangers were not a regular military corps. For example, on the 24th. August, 1780, Thomas Campbell sent an account to Bliss for £20/1/6 worth of repairs to the Rangers' Barracks in 1779 and 1780, and John Butler requested bedding and utensils, which Bliss was reluctant to supply. Bolton ordered Bliss to supply Butler's requisition from his stores, but Bliss refused on the grounds that he only had sufficient stock to supply the barracks in the fort. Bolton finally referred the matter to Haldimand for his decision.<sup>91</sup>

Another responsibility of the commander at Fort Niagara was the care of the buildings of Navy Hall and the shipyard. Although theoretically this should have been under the administration of Captain La Force, it devolved upon the commander at Niagara probably because of propinquity, and the fact that the Hall was not only used as regimental barracks,<sup>92</sup> but also the naval store at the Hall, under the charge of McFarlane, also supplied extra provisions to the garrison when they were needed. However the Naval Department was charged for any use of garrison equipment or facilities, and these accounts were kept separate from garrison spending.<sup>93</sup> One problem however was that the garrison was dependent on the Naval Department for its continuing occupation of the



post. Thus it was a source of concern when on November 18, 1780, Powell noted that the department had a “great want of Naval Stores, causing the ‘Haldimand’ to lie idle all ... [this] summer for want of sails and cables, and the sails of the Seneca ... are in so bad a state that it would be risking too much to venture her another trip this stormy season.” This must also have been of concern to Mr. Coleman, who was the Master Builder at Navy Hall.<sup>94</sup> Therefore it was in the interests of the garrison to assist the Naval Department in maintaining its fleet of ships so that the provisioning and defensibility of the Upper Posts would not be jeopardized.

With the responsibility of the various military departments at Niagara devolving upon him, at such a distance from administrative assistance, the commander at Niagara felt that it was a “complicated command.” His perception of it was not heightened by the fact that sickness was endemic at the post, often limiting his own effectiveness. However despite this, Higginbotham’s argument that “Britain’s regimental officers were generally competent and often superior in abilities,” seems borne out at Niagara. Colonel Bolton, it was stated, was possessed of a “great deal of Cooling and Temper, pays great attention to every branch of service ... and seems to have taken very proper steps in regard of supplying the Upper Posts, before ... [Haldimand’s] orders arrived on that head.” Bolton was thus declared as “very fitt [sic] to command.” As an important part of the command was a knowledge of the geography of the country around the post and of the frontier, Haldimand notified Bolton that he had sent him, and any other subsequent commanders, maps of the area for him to study. These were also to be sent to Detroit and Michilimackinac. Each commander received the same map, which Haldimand unfortunately did not identify in his letter, so that they could all become knowledgeable, particularly if the post at Niagara became vacant at any time.<sup>95</sup>

## **B. THE INDIAN DEPARTMENT.**

The second major department at Niagara was the Indian Department. In his review of the Upper Posts in 1779 Brehm commented that in his opinion this department was the “first and most important as affairs are at present.” No doubt he received this impression from the size of the department, the numbers of Indians at the post and on service, and the proportion of Indians to whites at Niagara. However it was even more likely that this remark was a response to the Imperial Government’s perception of the usefulness of Indians in the defence of the frontier and in maintaining an economic system, the fur trade, perceived as important to merchants in England. It was also probably a response to the fact that the expenses in the Indian Department far exceeded “all ordinary and Extraordinary Expences in [the] ... province, including army, navy, Engineer & all Departments.”<sup>96</sup>

In terms of defence (the fur trade is not discussed in this study) the British had two important aspects to consider regarding their relationship with the Indians: firstly, the political leanings of the Indians and secondly, the willingness of the Indians to participate in the actual defence of the frontier. Brehm informed Haldimand that the Indians had been informed that a political alliance with Britain and a defensive response would mean that “they and their Family’s would be supported, their wants supplied, and their rights to their lands maintained.”<sup>97</sup> The Indians understood the system of rewards because it had been practised in the fur trade by the French and English and because it had been used in concert with verbal and written declarations, through treaties, to gain ownership of land. However, the escalation of the expense of such rewards was to be a dominant characteristic of the Indian connection throughout the war.<sup>98</sup>

The system of rewards used by the department was similar to that used for the fur trade:

namely, the issuance of glass-beads, broadcloth, brandy, sugar, thread, vermilion, buttons, fish-hooks, firesteels, files, flints, guns, mittens, ... looking-glasses, sashes, tobacco, and finery. Besides these traditional gifts, during the War of Revolution the Indians also expected "provisions for themselves & Family, ammunition & Clothing (not being able to hunt or plant when at Warr [sic], or leaving their Familys [sic] exposed to an enemy, who in their absence may destroy them, but also some white people to join them, in what they call a Warr amongst themselves [the white people.]" The system was limited only by the willingness of the British to maintain it and the financial means with which to procure and deliver the presents. However, it was continued "with great difficulty ... and at great Expence ..." only because it "brought ... [the Indians] about, to take part with government ...."<sup>99</sup>

Until the 29th. June, 1779 the Indian department at Niagara had been under the administration of Major John Butler, who experienced few "Difficulties" in commanding it.<sup>100</sup> However he was only the acting commander until Colonel Guy Johnson, his superior in commission, took up his appointment as the Indian superintendent at Niagara.<sup>101</sup> This appointment was not favourably received by all. In 1783 Allan Maclean stated that in his opinion Butler was by far the superior in ability, an opinion concurred with by Cruikshank who argued that he was superior in "natural ability, courage, and experience." The headquarters of the Department were located in "the bottoms," directly opposite the gate of the fort. However Johnson's house was probably located on the west bank of the river, judging from the complaint that he could not adequately fulfil his command from across the river to the Indian Department headquarters.<sup>102</sup>

With respect to his administrative seniority at Niagara, Johnson argued that because he had by far a larger number of warriors at his disposal than there were soldiers in the fort, "he was

entitled to greater rank and precedence than the commanding officers of the garrison.”<sup>103</sup> However, while he had precedence in terms of the Indian Department, Haldimand bluntly stated that he was to consult the Commander at Niagara on military matters, such as where to post his officers on the frontier, and on “all cases where the Service is concerned.” Another question concerned the subordinancy of John Butler, commander of Butler’s Rangers. As a deputy of the Indian Department he was subordinate to Johnson, but as a Colonel of the Rangers he was subordinate to the Commander at the Post, with presumably the commander’s orders taking precedence over Johnson’s.<sup>104</sup>

Haldimand’s policy towards the administration of the department represented somewhat contradictory ‘public’ and ‘private’ opinions. With respect to his ‘public’ policy, he reiterated the Imperial stance that “Retaining the Indians in own Interests had been attended with a very heavy expence to Government, but their attachment has alone, hitherto preserved the Upper Country ....” However his personal opinion was that “In all excursions undertaken by the troops in this war, there has not been a single instance where the Indians have fulfilled their engagements, but influenced by a dream, or a desire of protracting the war to obtain presents, have dispersed and deserted the troops.” This private opinion was particularly directed at the ‘terrorist-type’ warfare of the frontier, and its “indiscriminate vengeance,” which Haldimand argued brought disrepute upon the cause of the King.<sup>105</sup> However in his commission as commander of the forces he adopted a supportive public role of both Indian participation and forms of warfare and directed his attention to ensuring that the Indian Department was as efficient, effective and humane as was possible under the constraints of a war.

## **1. Appointments in the Department.**

With respect to appointments in the Indian Department therefore, Haldimand made it clear that the officers were to be of high calibre. Despite this however, they were not to expect regular military rank. However if they took military command they were to be considered as part of a provincial corps. As well, while the superintendent could recommend prospective appointments, the power of appointing or dismissing officers was vested solely in Haldimand. Haldimand also believed that blending civil appointments with military in the Indian Department was very important in getting the Indians to act in the War of Revolution.<sup>106</sup>

There were at least seven characteristics that appear to have been important in selection for service in the Indian Department. Firstly, previous service in the Seven Years War was an advantage, despite the twenty years that had elapsed since its occurrence. Secondly, active service in the present war was considered as indicative of an attitude of loyalty to the British service. Thirdly, the possession of property was noted probably because firstly, it would provide a possible source of provisioning in frontier raids and secondly, it could provide a means of bargaining with the American Congress at the time of a peace treaty or in a prisoner exchange. Fourthly, the possession of a trade was noted. For example, Captains William and John Johnson were gunsmiths and John Rykeman was a blacksmith. These trades had obvious usefulness particularly along the frontier. Inn Keepers were also noted presumably because of their wide range of rebel and Loyalist contacts, especially if their inns were in frontier locations. Fifthly, recommendation from another officer verified their character and loyalty and sixthly, a relationship to a currently serving officer gave status through the eighteenth century system of patronage. Lastly, the candidates capacity to be "useful" or "active" was vitally important when a few troops had to fulfil a large role at the Upper Posts.<sup>107</sup>

**a. Officers.**

A List of the Officers of the Indian Department at Niagara shows a total of 56 persons employed, at a total pay of £3857/18/9 1/7 for six months. Before Johnson's arrival at Niagara these pay accounts and accounts for departmental expenses were submitted for the approval of the commanding officer at Niagara, and he authorised their payment. However after Johnson's arrival, the bills were to be drawn by him on Haldimand. The accounts were kept and made up by Taylor and Forsythe ("the Established House" through which the department received its goods), and consisted of "goods, orders, and all Contingencies & Disbursements for Indians, Ranging Parties, Prisoners &c." After paying for the goods, sometimes with cash on "60 days sight,"<sup>108</sup> the accounts were returned to Haldimand: usually on a half yearly basis. They were not always made up in writing as the commander "often sent verbal orders for Articles," from the Indian store. If the items requested were not available they may be substituted for something else. This laxity in accounting often led to "an Expenditure which it was impossible to ascertain with exactness," and the possibility of corruption, as exemplified by Taylor and Forsythe. Thus Johnson was told that a "reformation in the Expenses attending the Indian Department," "the Enormity of which is beyond Comprehension," was to be his "first care."<sup>109</sup>

With the many demands on his time in administering this volatile department, and the increasing disquiet in Quebec and London over his expenditures, Guy Johnson argued that he was short of clerical staff, particularly in making up his accounts. In his opinion the distance of Niagara from 'civilization,' the poor pay in comparison with the fur trade, and the conditions of war, prevented him from retaining the service of a qualified and competent secretary. On his own initiative therefore, he employed a Mr. Stevens who despite "the mediocrity of his Abilities," was "a person of close application and a desire to Improve."<sup>110</sup> This appointment was made despite the

fact that the Indian Department already had a secretary, a Lieutenant Wilkinson of the Kings Royal Regiment, New York. Johnson's initiative was not applauded by Haldimand because of the expense of another salary, and Stevens was not to receive payment for his new duties. Johnson also complained that the continued "interruptions" occasioned by the "Multifarious dutys and businefs of ... [his] Department" made it difficult for him to "methodize ... [his] correspondence so much as ... [he] could wish."<sup>11</sup>

#### **b. Military Companies.**

In order to effect its military duties the Indian Department was divided into seven Companies of Indians under the command of Captains Tice, Powell, Brant, Nelles, Johnson and Lottridge. The other Indian officers in these companies, such as the captains and subalterns, had also been granted commissions because it was argued that they received "insults and very severe treatment if taken prisoner ..." without being protected by military status. The companies were generally divided into the Indian nations most compatible with each other, and quartered, wherever possible, near their respective home territories. Guy Johnson justified these company and national divisions not only because the Indians were "mutually better acquainted" and "more easily attend to" a company officer whom they know, but also because "preserving the same order" as in a company, helped "prevent frauds in ... [the Indians] drawing provisions and ... Cloathing [sic] ...." Furthermore Johnson argued that the Indians had to be in small groups because if "their Numbers bear any proportion with the Troops, especially if they are unacquainted with the Commanding Officer ...," they were "not easily ruled."<sup>12</sup>

However one of the less stated objectives of having Indians in formally organized military units was to forestall the charge of barbarism levelled at Indians engaged in military warfare. The

concept of a war trophy, or symbol of victory, was basic to Indian warfare. Kelsay notes that the Indian usually provided a scalp lock on his head,<sup>113</sup> to assist his enemies in taking his scalp as a trophy or as a means of barter for political or economic favours. However during the War of Revolution the practise was used, particularly by rebel colonists along the frontier, as a rallying cry against the British.<sup>114</sup> That there may have been some truth to the allegation of barbarism is suggested by Johnson in November, 1780, when he informed Haldimand that the "True Chiefs" had "lost much of their ascendancy since the commencement of the Rebellion by ... introducing young men of little Experience and Interest to be heads of [war] partys." Thus not only were these young men likely to alter the route of a scout but also to practise modes of warfare that were not in keeping with the British policy of humaneness in military engagements.<sup>115</sup>

Thus an ever-present concern by the officers of these Indian companies was the degree to which the Indian loyalty could be depended on. The loyal Indians at Niagara chiefly consisted of the Six Nations, but even their loyalty was not guaranteed.<sup>116</sup> Guy Johnson was advised to occupy them "in such place and manner as would afford them least opportunity of conversing with Rebel Agents." It was therefore all the more important to have their military units "strongly united" and "advised by Officers of Knowledge and Experience ...."<sup>117</sup>

One major problem in organizing these Indian companies lay in the Indian adherence to territories established by various treaty agreements amongst themselves. In 1779 Brehm commented that the Six Nations, for example, "who live Easterly, ... are not very willing to go toward Tuscowrawas, Beever Creek and the Kittanin [that is towards Fort Pitt] ...." To help alleviate this problem several loyal and well-known Indians, such as Joseph Brant, Sayengaraghta, and Kyashota, were either given military commissions or used to rally the Indians to take service wherever they



were needed, particularly through bargaining with the Western Nations.<sup>118</sup>

## **2. Provisioning.**

### **a. Military Provisions.**

The British also had difficulty in provisioning the Indian units with military equipment. With regard to uniforms the Six Nations requested green cloth for their uniforms, instead of red, as red was too conspicuous in frontier fighting.<sup>119</sup> In providing military equipment a distinction was always made between the chiefs and principal warriors and the ordinary Indian warriors. For example, as a gift for service, the chiefs and principal warriors received a 3 point or scarlet blanket, a coat and waistcoat, a hat with a feather, a fine ruffled shirt, scarlet leggings, ribbons and black silk handkerchiefs, and silver work. In addition each war chief received ammunition, knives and tomahawks to supply his war party. Indians of "Superior Utility" were given further distinction, such as the pension of 100 dollars a year given to Tihinderacohta whom, it was stated, deserved "every mark of favour ...," and the gift of Haldimand's own "double Barreled Pistols to Sayengueracta [sic] and Joseph Brant" as "tokens" of his regard.<sup>120</sup>

The expence of provisioning the Indians with military equipment was inflated by the British policy of provisioning their wives and families as well. From November 1778 to March 1779, 7,365 Indians received "Cloathing [sic], Arms, [and] Ammunition." These suits of clothing were also used by government to redeem prisoners from war parties. Thus non-fighting Indians made up a significant portion of the provisioning inventory. It is little wonder then that Haldimand's admonition to lessen the expenses in the Indian Department should include keeping the Indians away from the fort as much as possible so that they could not claim provisions.

As well, as with provisioning and service, the Indians had preferences in the type of military equipment they used. These demands applied particularly to the Six Nations, who being “sensible of their long and Superior Service,” expected nothing less than the best. Instead of coarse gunpowder or buckshot, they liked fine gunpowder, which was not always available at Niagara.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, on military expeditions the Indians disliked the form of warfare popular in the eighteenth century. The ‘open ground’ or “clearfield” warfare in which troops lined up in a set of formations to face each other was an anathema to them. Instead they preferred ambush-type warfare, which relied more on tomahawks, knives and muskets, than on bayonets and howitzer cannon.<sup>122</sup>

The Indians also had other demands. Philip Stedman’s accounts from September 25th. 1780 to March 8th. 1781, show such items as rum, pork, bread, barley, oats, Indian corn, tobacco, coffin boards, potatoes, turnips, carrots, parsnips, cabbages, peas, pigs, moccasins, horse and hunting saddles, and snowshoes, which were all issued to Indians in service. It also recorded the issue of “15 lbs. of Bread to the Whiteboy an Ind’n going & coming from Niagara with his family.” There were also demands on the frontier itself, such as the provisions acquired by Serjeant Van Every, of the Butler’s Rangers, and Honyerry, a Mohawk Chief from Ralph and William Falkner and William Horn of Tryon County, New York, while they were on service there in November, 1777. Captain Brant also acquired provisions of Indian corn and cattle off Jonas Wood, of Ulster County, New York, while he was on service in 1778 and 1779. It was more feasible to deliver live cattle to frontier war parties because meat would not keep and pickling was out of the question. Furthermore it provided additional supplies in the event of a large number of Loyalists or prisoners accompanying the party.<sup>123</sup>

It is difficult to accurately determine the numbers of Indians serving along the frontier during the war. Several of the Chiefs and Warriors had been out two or three times, and thus the figures of Indian participation could be somewhat exaggerated. For example, on October 24th, 1781, it was estimated that there were 64 war parties on service, with a total strength of 2,945, which represents approximately half of the 5,280 Indians provisioned in October of that year. However, if these war parties were made up of Indians who had been out more than once a season the actual number on service probably represented about 16 percent of the numbers provisioned in 1780.<sup>124</sup> However, the acquisition of intelligence information from Indians engaged in hunting, planting and other non-military activities is not recorded on the returns, so that the actual involvement of Indians in the war may have been greater than these Returns seem to indicate.

#### **b. Non Military Provisions.**

However, as with the Military Department, one of the major concerns of Guy Johnson was the acquisition of, payment for, and distribution of non-military provisions for the Indians coming to the post; particularly when loyalty was the price for such a service. This expense fluctuated with the number of Indians present at any one time, which presented a problem in forecasting supply needs from year to year. For example, of an expected 2,623 Indians demanding provisions for January 1779, it was recorded that 1,042 were gone from Niagara. Of an expected total of 5,102 in March of 1780, 1,441 were listed as absent, and of an expected total of 5,280 in October, 1781, 3,831 were listed as absent.<sup>125</sup> It is not stated whether or not these Indians were "gone" or "absent" before or after receiving their provisions, but it does represent the fluctuation of the numbers at the post at any one time. While the large number of absentees would help alleviate the provisioning crisis, except with perishable goods that needed to be consumed, the greater problem was the possibility of an influx into the fort as the result of a crisis on the frontier, which occurred at Niagara

after the Sullivan expedition into the Six Nations territory in 1779.

In some cases, when either supplies were low or he wished to bestow particular favours, Guy Johnson provisioned both Indians and prisoners from his own personal supplies. One of Johnson's policies was to engage in a series of "private conferences" with Indians "concerning the propriety of harrassing the Frontiers ...."<sup>126</sup> No doubt these occasions were used as a venue for the distribution of 'gifts' if his objectives were achieved. Appendix 4 shows that 5,588 gallons of rum, wines and vinegar, and 40,826 pounds of sugar, tea, coffee, chocolate, almonds, raisins, prunes, beef, butter, barley and soap were issued out of his own stores, to the phenomenal cost of £10,685/3/- from 24th. June, 1780 to 24th. September, 1781. On the 10th. May, 1782, Johnson again charged the public purse with £2,229/8/6 for disbursements to Indians from his own personal expense account. Again the items charged included the 'luxuries' of brown sugar, Bohea Tea, Port wine, chocolate, Madeira wine and raisins. Furthermore, it was noted by Captains Tice and Powell, and Mr. Wilkinson, Secretary of the Indian Department, that "Chiefs frequently dined at his table, and Drank Wine, [and] that the Mohaw [sic] women did often get tea & suggar [sic] ...." As well, Miss Lydia, Johnson's housekeeper, gave "Handfulls of Raisins, Almonds & Pruns [sic]" to the chiefs' women.<sup>127</sup> Thus Johnson's lifestyle became a source of criticism at Niagara, it being stated that he kept "a very expensive house ...." He had accounts with the merchant houses of Taylor and Forsythe and Thompson and Company at Niagara, and with the Montreal House of Alexander Ellice and Company, and with the Indian store at Niagara. At Niagara the example of his lifestyle was so influential that one Archibald Cunningham observed that some of the officers in the Indian Department, and even in the garrison, had stored 12 barrels of provisions for themselves, "thereby starving a 1,000 Souls," which gave excuse for the Indians to slaughter Stedman's stock for food.<sup>128</sup>

The accusations against Johnson's extravagance were not lessened by the fact that as the war advanced and the rebels moved farther into the Indian territory, and the provisions along the frontier lessened by the 'scorched-earth policy,' the Indians demanded more compensation and the expenses rose proportionately.<sup>129</sup> Johnson complained that "the demand ... is far beyond what I have been able to supply ..." and the desires of the Indians extended to many articles, "Some of them Expensive, ... which they had not formerly received or expected." One estimate placed the cost of these demands at £100,000 Sterling per year.<sup>130</sup> In the face of such pressure Johnson felt justified in not complying with Haldimand's order to cease purchasing goods for the Indian Department at Niagara.<sup>131</sup> Thus while he was prepared to reduce Indian rum consumption, he would continue the distribution of luxuries to chiefs and their families, give clothing "to encourage [sic] the Reluctant [Indians] to plant" and continue to buy any articles deficient in the consignments sent up from Montreal from the merchants at Niagara.<sup>132</sup>

Such a policy of perceived extravagance eventually reached Haldimand's notice, and that of the Imperial government. Haldimand was appalled that Johnson should disregard his orders, and in 1783 informed him that the accounts of his department appeared to be in an "embarrassed State," and were under investigation by a Board of Inquiry. He had noticed that even on frontier service accounts were submitted that were inadmissible, and he used the Indian Department at Montreal as a committee of inquiry into Johnson's departmental affairs.<sup>133</sup> As a result, Johnson was notified that his admissible expences must only include those that related directly to the Department at Niagara or while on the frontier, such as the cost of keeping officers and Indians on the march, the cost for the redemption of prisoners, the cost of sending messages to and from the frontier, and the cost of boats, compasses, and axes for frontier service. Johnson was also allowed the cost of renting barracks at Niagara, and the cost of provisioning Indians, but only within 'reasonable bounds.'<sup>134</sup>

As well, he was not to purchase goods locally. The result of these reforms was, according to Johnson, a reduction in the half-yearly account by £7,000, which he attributed to reducing the rum provision and settling the Indians at Kadaragaras.

Johnson's answer to the accusation of mismanagement in his department was that he had only used £16,610 of the £55,000 spent for Indian goods at all the Upper Posts, that he had as many Indians to provision as at Detroit, and that unlike the Western Nations, his Indians were fighting and thus not able to plant. He justified his personal extravagance by stating that he was only following the precedent set by his "distinguished predecessor in office," Sir William Johnson, "Whose Judgement ... [was] not easily ... called in Question ...." Furthermore, the war had caused a change in the policy towards the Indian alliance, in that if they fought they received 'additional favours' from the government. As well, the geographical distribution of the Six Nations Indians had been drastically altered by the Sullivan destruction of their country. Prior to 1779, they had lived "from 100 to 250 Miles distance, and were only ... [at Niagara] occasionally," but after Sullivan's campaign they were living permanently at Niagara. The subsequent and necessary re-establishing of the Six Nations at new settlements was an added expense, particularly as Johnson had been forced to purchase many of the planting tools and seeds locally, thus acting counter to Haldimand's prohibition on such purchases. Johnson also argued that the war represented a change in the status of the Six Nations in that on them devolved the responsibility for the "preservation of the back country and communications,"<sup>136</sup> and expenses incurred in ensuring this continuing commitment were therefore justified.

### c. The Distribution of Provisions and Presents.

The system established for the distribution of the provisions and presents to Indians was a further source of expense to government. Their distribution was usually made at the forts, at Indian councils, or at other selected locations, such as at trading posts. The means of distribution at the fort was through the Indian store, stocked with provisions sent from the east. Indians could also buy goods at the store if what they desired was not available as part of the regular provisioning allowed by government.<sup>136</sup> The store suffered from a chronic shortage of stock, and in December, 1781 Butler stated that the "Goods in the Indian store ... were by no means sufficient to Clothe the Indians. I have Cloathed [sic] *two thousand four hundred and forty one* and not a yard of Linen left for the rest." Often this shortage was due not to the complete absence of goods, but to the fact that the Indians were increasingly particular about the goods they received, or because the wrong type of goods were sent up from Montreal.

There were at least four Indian stores at or near Fort Niagara: "the Front Store," the "Store in the Garrison," the store at "Colonel Butler's House," and the store run by Philip Steadman at Fort Schlosser.<sup>137</sup> It is unclear as to whether Johnson had a store at his house. The Front Store, probably in or near the buildings of the Indian Department, was under the management of John Burch, the Indian Storekeeper. Guy Johnson argued that it was "so small, and in such indifferent order" that he could not fit all the goods for the department into it, thus probably keeping some on his own premises. The Garrison Store appears to have been under the management of Commissary Bliss, and was largely supplied by the firm of Taylor and Forsythe.<sup>138</sup> Colonel Butler's Store, located in or near the Rangers' Barracks, on the western bank of the Niagara, appeared to have been used specifically for the Six Nations Indians who went on military service for government. It had a "quantity insufficient to supply" these war parties, as well as a very "indifferent assortment of

articles,” “several ... of which were totally useless to Indians.” One solution to this lack of supply was to issue “tickets” to the Indians, guaranteeing them of supply when more goods arrived. However this practise tended to put pressure on the supply of provisions because of the ‘back-up’ of demand. Mr. Stedman’s Store at Fort Schlosser was a reaction to the constant demand for provisions by Indians “passing and repassing” from their settlements on Lake Erie. Allan Maclean, commander at Niagara, argued that this issuance was “liable to objections” and should be “broken.” There is little doubt however, that it was good for business for Stedman to maintain good relations with, and a degree of obligation from, the Indians. Artillery was also issued but it was supposed to be distributed from the artillery store in the garrison.<sup>139</sup>

Another venue of distribution was the Indian Council. Twelve councils were held at Niagara between 1778 and 1783, as shown on Table 6.8, at an estimated cost per council of about 20,000 New York currency.<sup>140</sup> As Table 6.8 indicates, these councils fell into several categories of business, particularly that concerning loyalty to the British Crown and how the confederacies could achieve this, frontier security, Indian participation in military campaigns and the gathering of intelligence, as well as administrative matters such as the induction of new commanders into their duties at the fort. At each of the councils an elaborate ceremony was held and presents were given, by both the British and the Indians, during the council and at its completion. However, as with the system at the Indian store, particular care was taken against Indian duplicity in demanding provisions that had already been given out, or in demanding provisions for a larger number of dependents than actually existed.<sup>141</sup> Only those Indians with “tickets” were theoretically to receive provisions, or back-provisions, and an interpreter was to be present, not only to accurately assess Indian demands and prevent “misunderstanding or Discontents,” but also to persuade the Indians to leave immediately, before their provisions were expended. A weekly account was to be kept of



<b>INVENTORY OF INDIAN COUNCILS HELD AT NIAGARA &amp;ca.</b>			
<b>YEAR/DATE</b>	<b>NO.</b>	<b>PLACE</b>	<b>PURPORT OF THEIR PROCEEDINGS.</b>
<b>1779</b>			
Jan. 29th	1	Niag.	Major Butler's speech to the Senecas/Mohawks/Onandagas for Establishing a Post at Oswego.
Feb. 13th	2	"	Aaron the Mohock's Speech to the Hurons informing them that the Shawanese/Delawares, invited the rebels to their Country.
Mar. 5th.	4	"	Major Butler's Speech to the rebel Onondagoes, inviting them to join the English.
" 22nd.	5	"	Message from the Cochnawagoes of Canada to the Cayougas, enclosed in Major Butler's letter setting forth the Contents of a paper sent by order of the French King.
May 8th.	6	"	Copy of a Note/ Speech of the Six Nations sent to Gen. Clinton.
U.D.	8	"	Council with the Senecas/Cayougas/ Onondagos & several other Nations, Condoling for the loss of their Chiefs & Warriors at Fort Stanwix.
<b>1780.</b>			
Feb. 12th.	9	"	Colonel Johnson and the Six Nations proceedings with four rebel Indians for the Six Nations to lay down arms, & they may return to their habitations.
Mar. 28th.	10	"	Proceedings with Col. Johnson & the Indians to protect their Trade & their lands.
June 17th.	11	"	Proceedings of Kyashota & Chiefs sent southward to form a Confederacy with the South & West Indians & request for 4 rebel Indians release.
July.	12	"	Proceedings of meetings with rebel Indians of Ganaghaeragy/Oneidas begging excuse for being so ignorant to join the rebels.
Oct. 29th.	13	"	A Meeting held with Brig. Gen. Powell, Congratulating him upon his taking the Command.
<b>1781.</b>			
Dec. 20th.	14	"	Speech delivered by 2 Onondagoes and a Huron from Detroit, with a request to Gen. Haldimand for assistance in the Spring against Ft. Pitt.

Table 6.8. A List of Indian Councils Held at Niagara. H.P. 50, 21773, 250.

these distributions in the case of the store, or in the case of the councils when they occurred. The council meeting also provided a good opportunity for firstly, reiterating the tremendous expence of provisioning and secondly, for stating the fact that Indian families often received more provisions than the wives and children of troops in the military. As well, it provided a forum for the policy of government on self-sufficiency.

The new settlements for the dispossessed Six Nations Indians provided a good example of the operation of the provisioning system in the Indian Department. These settlements were described as at Buffalo Creek, about "eight miles up a Navigable Stream," and at Kadaragaras, forty miles from Fort Erie on the south shore of Lake Erie.<sup>142</sup> They had the advantage of not only minimising the need for provisions but also providing a defensive barrier against possible rebel encroachment from Fort Pitt or Tioga, while at the same time giving British access to the frontier. From these settlements scouts were "constantly kept out" upon the Pennsylvanian frontier, and "to the southwest" along the Ohio River. However, in order to establish the Indians the Indian Department had to provide ploughs, axes, hoes, seeds and kettles. Inevitably some of this equipment was lost, taken, or broken, and had to be replaced from the dwindling stock at Niagara, which was also used to supply the farmers on the western bank of the Niagara River. Eventually it was necessary to import some tools "from Canada" (probably Montreal) as there was "no Iron remaining at ... [Niagara] to make them."<sup>143</sup>

Despite Haldimand's opinion that the role of the Indians in growing provisions was superior to their role in providing military assistance, the commander of Fort Niagara and Guy Johnson were convinced of their utility, particularly in scouting the frontier. For example, in the Johnson expedition of the Fall, 1780, Mason Bolton argued that "without Indians" it would be

useless to send troops to support the expedition. Thus Johnson was ordered “with all diligence ... [to] prepare the Indians in the Neighbourhood” to assist in the expedition. In order to ensure their cooperation Guy Johnson called a ‘private conference’ with the chiefs, explaining to them only “as much as was absolutely necessary” the need for their assistance. Johnson also felt a need to divert Indian scouts westward, particularly after “private intelligence” revealed that the rebels, after hearing of the settlements, had “been secretly tampering with the Delawares ... to draw ... [them] (settled now among the Senecas at Kadaragaras & Iadaghque) down towards the Rebel frontier ...”<sup>144</sup>

Guy Johnson’s command effectively ended in October, 1781 when he was commanded by Haldimand firstly to appear at the prosecution of Taylor and Forsythe in Montreal, and secondly to appear before a Board of Inquiry into his own financial management of the Indian Department at Niagara. On the second point Haldimand stated that “The Enormous Expence of the Indian Department (for which he was ultimately responsible as Commander in Chief) has from the beginning been a subject of the most painful Reflection to me, I have, in vain endeavoured to reduce it, ... and it is at home (in Britain) become an object of Public Attention and Clamour.” After his recall the Indian Department at Niagara was once again under the charge of Colonel John Butler, with the guidance of Powell, his commanding officer. It was not until the 14th. March, 1782 that Sir John Johnson was appointed Superintendent over the united confederacy of the Six and Seven Nations Indians, an appointment that led to the Department once again being a unified whole, with the principal mandate of establishing “a Strict Economy through all Branches of ... [the] Department.”<sup>145</sup> However, this administrative reorganization was too late to be effective during the War of Independence.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>H.P. 16, 21702, 10; 43, 21762, 291; 45, 21764, 92, 148.

<sup>2</sup>H.P. 16, 21703, 119; 41, 21759, 65.

<sup>3</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 16.

<sup>4</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 5, 7, 132.

<sup>5</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 79. Haldimand complained that this geographical distance meant that, excluding Sir John Johnson's troops and small numbers of emigrant troops, he had to "divide and subdivide in ... [the] advanced posts", leaving only "about 1000 effective men in the settled areas along the St. Lawrence ..." (see H.P. 72, 21807, 42).

<sup>6</sup>H.P. 72, 21807, 63, 88, 107. After 1779 the fears of an invasion were not just academic in that Sullivan came within 80 miles of Niagara in his advance through the Six Nations country.

<sup>7</sup>H.P. 72, 21807, 97, 107-108, 115.

<sup>8</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 374.

<sup>9</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 208. In 1779 Fort Niagara was described as "1100 yards in Circumference, with five Bastions, two Block Houses and many other places to be manned." During the Haldimand revolutionary war administration it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton (1778 - October 31, 1780), Brigadier General H. Watson Powell (November, 1780 - 4th September, 1782), Lieutenant Colonel A. Dundas (September 5th, 1782 - November 5th, 1782) and Brigadier General Allan Maclean (6th November, 1782 - 30th October, 1783).

<sup>10</sup>Armour and Widder, 1986, 112; H.P. 44, 21763, 300.

<sup>11</sup>After the capture of Fort Niagara by the British in 1759, Haldimand was brought from Fort Oswego to "direct the repairs to the military installations above and below the [Niagara Falls]" (see Braider, Donald. *The Niagara*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972, 125). During his Quebec war administration the repairs included the construction of a row of pickets "in the bottom of the Ditch along the East front of the Fort", the repairing of a bridge, and work to control erosion on the lake side of the fort (see H.P. 41, 21759, 77; 43, 21762, 247; Dunnigan, Brian Leigh. *Glorious Old Relic. The French Castle and Old Fort Niagara*. Youngstown, New

York: Old Fort Niagara Association, Inc., 1987, 37).

<sup>12</sup>The King's Regiment referred to in Table 6.1 was probably the 8th. King's Regiment of Foot, not the King's Royal Regiment of New York, commanded by Sir John Johnson and garrisoned at Carleton Island.

<sup>13</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 19; Curtis, 1969, 22.

<sup>14</sup>Curtis, 1969, 22-23. Poundage was a commission or fee for a particular military service, usually at "so much per pound sterling or weight" (see Sykes, J. B. (Ed.). *The Pocket Oxford Dictionary*. Sixth Edition. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1978, 693).

<sup>15</sup>Curtis, 1969, 24. Captain Brehm, during his tour of inspection in 1779, noted that the officers at the Upper Posts found it hard to survive without getting into debt. However, soldiers with wives, either at the post or back east in Montreal or Quebec, fared better because the wives worked "between hours" on "needleworks for the [fur] Traders", thus in many cases receiving more money "than the pay of a subaltern officer" (see H.P. 41, 21759, 73).

<sup>16</sup>Cruikshank, 1931, 16, 291, 295. These troops were also known as Yawgers or Jaegers.

<sup>17</sup>Ryerson, II, 1880, 73; Cruikshank, 1931, 32, 35, 46; H.P. 16, 21702, 13; 42, 21760, 240. The Germans, he stated, were "heavy troops, unused to the snow shoe, to handling the Axe and the Hatchet, [and] only fit for Garrison duty ...."

<sup>18</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 88.

<sup>19</sup>H.P. 16, 21702, 28; Cruikshank, 1931, 36.

<sup>20</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 240; 43, 21762, 208; 45, 21764, 24; 46, 21765, 160.

<sup>21</sup>Cruikshank, 1893, 11-12. Before the Revolution Butler owned a large estate at Butlersburg, near Caughnawaga, New York. This was confiscated by Congress during the war.

<sup>22</sup>Curtis, 1969, 22. Haldimand estimated that the eight companies of Rangers cost the government as much as twenty companies of regular infantry (see Cruikshank, 1893, 38).

<sup>23</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 24, 26; 48, 21768, 31; 50, 21772, 1.

<sup>24</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 4. When Brigadier General Haldimand was serving as Commander of

the Southern District, with headquarters at Pensacola, he was ordered to remark on such details as manual exercise, marching, fireings [sic], manoeuvres, accoutrements, clothing and gaiters (see H.P. 3, 21664, 139).

<sup>25</sup>During the War of Revolution the British employed a quicker rate of marching than the troops were used to, in order to cover the greater distances involved. This exhausted the soldiers in summer time (see Duffy, Christopher. *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*. New York: Atheneum, 1988, 112).

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 1988, 112. This usually meant about 10 to 30 men abreast.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 1988, 99, 273, 275, 277.

<sup>28</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 387-388.

<sup>29</sup>Navy Hall had been erected in 1765 largely for the accommodation of naval officers wintering at Niagara, but during the War of Revolution its purpose had been extended to include both ship-building and the transhipment of provisions to the posts of Detroit and Michilimackinac.

<sup>30</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 125; 48, 21769, 25; Cruikshank, 1931, 29. The batteaux-men charged £10/12/6 for fifteen days batteauxing on August 31, 1779.

<sup>31</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 387.

<sup>32</sup>H.P. 11, 21805, 166; Armour and Widder, 1986, 65-67. Captain Grant commanded a larger naval force than that of the Lower Lakes.

<sup>33</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 49; 42, 21760, 6; 47, 21766, 167.

<sup>34</sup>H.P. 16, 21702, 28; 42, 21760, 10; 43, 21761, 45; 47, 21767, 20.

<sup>35</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 307. It was estimated that the subsistence for the Butler's Rangers alone was almost half that of the subsistence for all provincials.

<sup>36</sup>H.P. 16, 21702, 28; 47, 21766, 21, 23, 234.

<sup>37</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 2, 32, 41; Kelsay, 1984, 323; Burt, 1933, 305.

<sup>38</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 20. On the 30th. July, 1779 Knox stated that the total rations for Canada had been estimated to be 13,000, although Haldimand stated that it should be 15,000.

<sup>39</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 87, 226; 47, 21767, 20; Harris, 1987, 117. It is interesting to compare these numbers with the population of the colony at that time. Harris estimates that even by 1800 the population of the town of Quebec was only about 8,000 and that of Montreal about 6,000. Thus during the War of Revolution the British government was in essence supporting the entire town population of Quebec and Montreal with food. It is little wonder that this led to complaints at home in England.

<sup>40</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 55, 216; 47, 21767, 36.

<sup>41</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 38-39. This represented an average daily consumption of about 8 oz. of rum per soldier.

<sup>42</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 41, 43; Burt, 1933, 287. From Montreal the barrels were taken by road to Lachine and then transferred to small row boats for transportation to the Cedars. In doing so it was necessary to bypass the rapids at this point. From the Cedars the goods were taken either by road to the landing place at Riviere de la Grace, or by water to Carleton Island, where they were stored. Bypassing the rapids at Lachine became such a problem, particularly as the volume of goods increased, that Haldimand directed Engineer Twiss to build a canal at Coteau du Lac, just below Lake St. Francis, to circumvent them. At Carleton Island the barrels were loaded on to the 'King's Ships' or bateaux for the passage to Fort Niagara.

<sup>43</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 7; 42, 21760, 87.

<sup>44</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 37. The Commander at Fort Niagara complained that for the past seven years the Indians had been lying drunk about the fort.

<sup>45</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 216, 279. Spruce beer was of French origin, and was made by brewing the needles of the spruce tree (see Armour and Widder, 1986, 42).

<sup>46</sup>Curtis, 1969, 111.

<sup>47</sup>H.P. 16, 21702, 28. Haldimand also argued that in England the manufacturing and packing of the flour was better understood, particularly with regard to using properly seasoned casks.

<sup>48</sup>Bowler, 1975, 231. The ships had to be sent no later than the end of March in order for provisions to be sent to the Upper Posts for the summer and fall.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, 1975, 234-235; H.P. 45, 21764, 18. Haldimand informed Bolton that he wanted

“all prisoners and Idle People from the frontiers sent down to either Quebec or Montreal”, no doubt to lessen the stress of provisioning them at the post.

<sup>50</sup>H.P. 39, 21755, 76.

<sup>51</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 20, 192.

<sup>52</sup>For example, a plate dollar was worth £33/5/- in Pennsylvanian currency, but £36/-/- in New York.

<sup>53</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 66. The comparisons in currency were usually made in Halifax, New York or Sterling currencies.

<sup>54</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 65; 43, 21761, 106, 227.

<sup>55</sup>H.P. 45, 21766, 20, 124; 47, 21766, 15.

<sup>56</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 18, 132.

<sup>57</sup>The farmers at Niagara complained that iron for plows, axes and hoes was in short supply, and there was a lack of a forge and four grindstones.

<sup>58</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 18. Theoretically this surplus could be sold at an inflated price to traders at the post or to Indians.

<sup>59</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 137; 46, 21765, 280.

<sup>60</sup>Seibel, George A. *The Niagara Portage Road. A History of the Portage on the West Bank of the Niagara River*. Niagara Falls, Canada: The City of Niagara Falls, 1990, 12, 14. Philip took over from his older brother John when John retired to England in 1781, “having accumulated a fortune from the portage operations.” John had been a wagon master at Fort Niagara since 1760.

<sup>61</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 45; 42, 21760, 67. Bolton argued that this was an unreasonable expectation because their responsibilities as the contractors for a vital supply line allowed them little time for farming: a problem complicated by Indian depredations on their crops. However the Stedmans did manage to supply “Ten Draught Horses, ... two waggons [without harnesses], ... five ox carts with Yokes & Chains, and ... Twenty Draught Oxen ...” for the proposed 1779 Johnson expedition to the Mohawk.



<sup>62</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 324. This was stated to be "25 acres in area, fertile, partly cleared, and sown with Indian corn and Buckwheat."

<sup>63</sup>H.P. 57, 21768, 29-30.

<sup>64</sup>Seibel, 1990, 1.

<sup>65</sup>Stevens, Paul L. *A King's Colonel at Niagara 1774-1776. Lt. Col. John Caldwell and the Beginnings of the American Revolution on the New York Frontier*. Youngstown, New York: Old Fort Niagara Association, 1987, 14; H.P. 43, 21761, 84. This device, completed in 1764, was probably constructed by George Demler, the resident engineer at Niagara (see Seibel, 1990, 11; Severance, 1917, II, 357).

<sup>66</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 128; 43, 21761, 55. This garrison consisted of a sergeant and twelve privates.

<sup>67</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 208. It was estimated that there were up to "forty batteaux-loads of goods" there at any one time.

<sup>68</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 63, 68, 98.

<sup>69</sup>Seibel, 1990, 12.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 1990, 5. These had been constructed in 1764 after the Indian attack at Devil's Hole on September 14, 1763.

<sup>71</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 1; 45, 21764, 182.

<sup>72</sup>Seibel, 1990, 4. Seibel locates Schlosser, or Fort Little Niagara, as a mile and a half upstream from the falls, midway between present-day Grass Island and the mouth of Gill Creek. An historical plaque has been erected on the site by the New York State Historical Commission.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 1990, 13.

<sup>74</sup>Hadfield, Joseph. *An Englishman in America 1785, being the Diary of Joseph Hadfield*. Edited and Annotated by Douglas S. Robertson. Toronto: The Hunter-Rose Co. Ltd., 1933, 93.

<sup>75</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 75.

<sup>76</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 118; 45, 21764, 120; Kelsay, 1984, 106, 125, 671; Graymont, 1972, 3. The first treaty was enacted in April, 1764 between the Senecas and the British, and the second at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768. Both treaties were negotiated by Sir William Johnson.

<sup>77</sup>H.P. 43, 21761, 55; Cruikshank, 1927, 10.

<sup>78</sup>Severance, 1917, II, 56-57, 343. Navy Island, an early French ship-building post, served as a depot for the transfer of goods from Fort Schlosser to the main channel of the upper Niagara River, which according to Severance, probably lay on the west side of Navy Island. The post had barracks for officers and soldiers, and most importantly, a storehouse and a dock as shown on Figure 6.1.

<sup>79</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 3, 45; Armour and Widder, 1986, 65, 150, 178.

<sup>80</sup>H.P. 16, 21703, 127. The tents were distributed on the basis of one per man or one per two men, each man receiving a haversack and a canteen. Kettles and hatchets were shared between four men, and wood axes between ten men.

<sup>81</sup>H.P. 39, 21755, 76.

<sup>82</sup>His superior officer was Colonel Forbes Macbean, Commander of the Royal Artillery in Canada.

<sup>83</sup>Carvana, Adrian B. *British Artillery Ammunition 1780*. Bloomfield, Ontario: Museum Restoration Service, 1979, 12. This included round shot, case or canister shot, grape shot, shells, fuses, carcasses, smoke and light balls, rockets, bar and chain shots, structures for semi-fixed and unfixed ammunition, wood bottoms to stand them on, paper and flannel cartridges and ancillary equipment such as the quick match, port fires and tubes.

<sup>84</sup>A Cartouch box was a form of cardboard cartridge case (see Morris, William (Ed.). *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*. Boston: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1970, 246).

<sup>85</sup>McCausland was Surgeon to the King's or 8th. Regiment, but he served as a general surgeon at Niagara for detachments of the 34th., 47th., 84th., Sir John Johnson's Corps, the Rangers and Joseph Brant's volunteers.

<sup>86</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 279, 287, 359; 43, 21761, 114, 130, 198. McCausland had up to 400 sick at a time, and he estimated that between 1778 and 1780 he had paid £164/5/- of his own funds for medicine: the equivalent of a year's salary for a low ranking employee in government service.

<sup>87</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 359, 377.

<sup>88</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 3; 46, 21765, 128. The barracks, which were constructed under the supervision of Mr. Bennet, Master Carpenter, were erected at an estimated cost of £2527/19/2.

<sup>89</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 40; 44, 21763, 201. As with many appointments at the Upper Posts Terrot had the title of Acting Engineer, suggesting that he was either replacing someone on leave or deceased, or else was filling a vacancy for the time being.

<sup>90</sup>H.P. 43, 21762, 133, 247. For example, for the period from June to December, 1782, two barrack rooms were fitted up as Officers' quarters, with new flooring, ceilings and glazing in the windows. Another barrack room was "new floor'd" and had 32 new berths installed in it, while another was prepared for 50 men. Other work included the building of, and repairs to ovens, and repairs to exterior defences such as pickets, bridges, parapets "repaired by braces of wood and iron", "sodding of the 'curtain' of the east defence ramparts and the sawing of 30 feet of oak and pine logs for the exterior work.

<sup>91</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 354, 358; 43, 21762, 197; 46, 21765, 128.

<sup>92</sup>H.P. 43, 21762, 240. In 1782 "an old Room at Navy Hall [was] new Shingled, new Sashes, glaz'd, and Births [sic] put up for 48 men," as well as "a Kitchen at [the] ... Hall [being] new Shingled" because it was "intended for the Officers of the 34th. Regiment."

<sup>93</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 401; 44, 21763, 201. Between the 25th. June and 24th. December, 1780 the Naval Department owed over 11 hundredweight of iron it had borrowed from the garrison.

<sup>94</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 85.

<sup>95</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 35; 42, 21760, 102; 45, 21764, 33; Higginbotham, 1983, 124.

<sup>96</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 35; 46, 21765, 134.

<sup>97</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 35; Allen, Robert S. *A History of the British Indian Department in North America*. Ottawa, Ontario: National Historic Sites Service, 1971, 34. Allen contends that this promise by Governor Hamilton of Detroit represented a change in policy on the part of the government, from "controlling and appeasing discontented tribes" to conducting "a planned and careful crusade to win the allegiance of the Indians to the royal interest."

<sup>98</sup>Ryerson, 1880, 77-78. Ryerson argues that this connection was assisted by such colonial policies as the Massachusetts Indian Scalp Bounty and the perception, by such influential colonials as Thomas Jefferson, of the Indians as “merciless savages”.

<sup>99</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 35.

<sup>100</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 32; Cruikshank, 1975, 10. His administrative expertise was largely a result of his experience as a Captain and as second-in-command of the Indian Department since 1755.

<sup>101</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 26-27. Guy Johnson received his commission on March 8th., 1776, but did not take up residence at Niagara till the summer of 1779.

<sup>102</sup>H.P. 43, 21762, 53; 44, 21763, 114; Cruikshank, 1975, 11.

<sup>103</sup>McIlwraith, 1904, 159.

<sup>104</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 8, 32.

<sup>105</sup>McIlwraith, 1904, 164, 170. One example of this ‘vengeance’ was the Wyoming Massacre of July 8, 1778, in which an army of around four hundred Rangers and Indians destroyed eight forts, 1000 houses, and took or killed 1,000 cattle. In the final surrender 227 scalps were taken and 232 prisoners captured.

<sup>106</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 5-6

<sup>107</sup>H.P. 85, 21827, 319.

<sup>108</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 19, 21, 30.

<sup>109</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 30-32.

<sup>110</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 97. This could be the Nicholas Stevens who was recorded as being an interpreter in the Indian Department.

<sup>111</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 11; 48, 21768, 107; 85, 21827, 319.

<sup>112</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 8, 25, 263; 48, 21768, 80-83, 116, 165.

<sup>113</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 22. This was a small section of long hair, usually about the size of a

sovereign, at the top of the head, decorated with feathers and red paint at the time of war. It was easily seen because usually the rest of the head was shaved or plucked. It was not only a symbol of war but also of death and thus was greatly treasured.

<sup>114</sup>Kelsay, 1984, 221; Ward, 1952, 856; Ryerson, 1880, 76; Vaughan, Alden T. (Ed.). *Chronicles of the American Revolution*. Originally Compiled by Hezekiah Niles as *Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965, 283-285.

<sup>115</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 151.

<sup>116</sup>Cruikshank, 1975, 3-4; H.P. 44, 21763, 108. Even Joseph Brant, "a good fellow in the main", was not above suspicion. He was described as a "perfect Indian", who knew "too much and too little."

<sup>117</sup>H.P. 45, 21764, 350; 47, 21766, 3-4.

<sup>118</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 51; 44, 21763, 98; 47, 21766, 273; Kelsay, 1984, 65, 211; Graymont, 1972, 80. Brant was a Mohawk Chief whose Indian name was Thayendanegea. He had a long relationship with the British through his association with Sir William Johnson. He was described as "better instructed and much more intelligent than any other Indian." Sayengaraghta, or "Old Smouk", was a Seneca Chief. Kyashota was a Seneca of the Six Nations.

<sup>119</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 51.

<sup>120</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 39, 49; 48, 21768, 16.

<sup>121</sup>H.P. 41, 21759, 73; 42, 21760, 181; 47, 21766, 14. In one year at Niagara the Indians were issued with 101 1/2 barrels of gunpowder.

<sup>122</sup>H.P. 47, 21767, 263; Curtis, 1969, 16. Curtis states that the Brown Bess was the popular British musket of the frontier. It was a smooth-bore flintlock musket, with a priming pan, and was three feet eight inches long in the barrel. It had an effective range of three hundred yards but was not reliable after one hundred feet. It used round leaden bullets, weighing about an ounce and made up with a stout paper cartridge containing powder. The musket was fired by sprinkling a few grains of powder from the opened cartridge into the priming pan, and ramming the ball and cartridge down the muzzle of the barrel with an iron ramrod. The average firing time was about two or three rounds a minute. Its efficiency was determined by the weather, in that wind might blow the powder out of the pans and rain might wash it out or dampen the paper of the cartridges so that the powder would not ignite.

<sup>123</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 3; 48, 21768, 70, 98. For example, in August, 1780 Brant took 46 prisoners while on a scout in the Mohawk area, a considerable number to provision at that distance from Niagara.

<sup>124</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 46, 165. It was recorded that 5,105 Indians were provisioned at Niagara in March, 1780.

<sup>125</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 88; 48, 21768, 46, 165.

<sup>126</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 7; 48, 21768, 134.

<sup>127</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 114; 48, 21769, 145. It was also noted that Johnson had 8 1/2 barrels of brown sugar in his house, 7 barrels more than had been issued to him by Butler as part of the allowance for Indians. Furthermore, it was rumoured that ten or twelve prisoners, kept as servants about his house, "might have tea in the kitchen after it came from the Colonel's Table."

<sup>128</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 19; 48, 21769, 112-113, 126, 151.

<sup>129</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 99, 118. Many of these demands were related to the increasing uncertainty of the outcome of the war and the rumours of treaty arrangements that were circulating along the frontier. The Indians therefore requested that their own country be "secured to them and not ceded to America", and Maclean and Johnson were under pressure to keep them in "good Humour" in the face of treaty arrangements unfavourable to them.

<sup>130</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 6, 8-9, 14; Weld, 1795-7, 360. Johnson noted that "The Indians grow daily wiser and better acquainted with the Value of Goods, and from the nature of the war, during different places of resort ...."

<sup>131</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 17, 37-38. Haldimand had based this request on evidence that suggested that wines were "extravagantly" dear at the Upper Posts, that the prices at the Indian stores were influenced by trader demands and that the Indian Superintendent was being influenced by the demands of the Indians.

<sup>132</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 15. He would also reduce the consumption of rum from 600 to 300 gallons daily.

<sup>133</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 114; 47, 21766, 16-17; 48, 21768, 12, 174. For example, Gilbert Tice submitted accounts for payments made on behalf of government which Haldimand declared as inadmissible because Tice had no authority for the disbursements and in fact they appeared to be private expenses, rather than for government service.

<sup>134</sup>H.P. 48, 21768, 36-38, 40, 69.

<sup>135</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 17-18.

<sup>136</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 233, 273. One example of this was when Colonel Butler refused to give Sayengaraghta a gold laced hat. Sayengaraghta's response was that "if the King was grown too poor, and not able to purchase a Hat for him, he would do it himself, which he accordingly did, and made his brag of it."

<sup>137</sup>H.P. 48, 21769, 84-86, 168.

<sup>138</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 7, 16.

<sup>139</sup>H.P. 43, 21762, 40; 44, 21763, 6; 48, 21768, 17.

<sup>140</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 81; 55, 21782, 45-48. One of the reasons for the considerable expence of the councils was the formal procedure that was adopted in conducting them. They were usually addressed by the Lieutenant Governor or chief military commander at the post, and at points in the ceremony wampum and belts were issued to the Indians or received from them in recognition of the bond of loyalty and allegiance, or disloyalty, between the Indians and "The Great King ... who is the Father of us all, whether of White or Brown skins." The colour of the wampum and the belts had significance, as for example in a rebel and western Indian Council where there was a "white [belt] ... for the French, a red one for the Spaniards who mean to assist them, a blue one in the name of the Colonies - a green one offering peaceable Terms from the Americans ... & lastly a red one offering ... war if [they] prefer that."

<sup>141</sup>H.P. 53, 21776, 6. The British had long been aware of the Indian practice of selling, or bartering, the provisions for profit amongst themselves, and of "giving false Returns of their Parties drawing the Supplies of Provisions necessary to carry Parties to certain destinations ...."

<sup>142</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 1. There were two settlements at Kadaragaras itself, and one at Iadaghque Lake, about thirty miles from Kadaragaras, on "one of the known routes to Fort Pitt."

<sup>143</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 8-9, 11.

<sup>144</sup>H.P. 42, 21760, 368; 47, 21767, 13, 139.

<sup>145</sup>H.P. 47, 21766, 20, 22, 40; 53, 21776, 2.

## **CHAPTER 7. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENCE FRONTIER AT THE UPPER POSTS: DETROIT AND MICHILIMACKINAC.**

In contrast with Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac were much less garrison posts than they were fur trade centers. Detroit was the center of a fur trade that extended from the western end of the Ohio to the Wabash and the Illinois country, involving the Miami, Shawnee, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Huron Indians.<sup>1</sup> Thus Governor Hamilton of Detroit stated that “the Persons resident at ... [Detroit] ... [were] chiefly Traders ....” However, during the War of Revolution it was feared that Detroit would become a target for rebel attack, thus cutting off supplies to Michilimackinac and providing a base for the capture of Niagara. With the need for defensibility in mind therefore, Hamilton, in 1777, was ordered by Carleton to twice yearly make “a return of the garrison at Detroit, its Military Stores and quantity of Provisions,” together with a “State ... of the Fortifications, ... Lodging or Barrack Room for Troops.” In terms of the naval defense he was also to take “particular account of all the vessells [sic] upon the Lakes, their names, ... Masters, Commanders, ... Number of Guns and men they carry, distinguishing those on the King’s service” from those on fur trade business.<sup>2</sup>

### **A. DETROIT.**

The garrison and settlement at Detroit was located on the north west bank of the Detroit river, along the water pass or ‘Strait Le Detroit’ between Lakes St. Clair and Erie. The fort, known as Fort Lemoult (formerly Fort Pontchartrain), had eleven block houses and gun batteries for defence, but it was in reality a fortified and picketed town, containing “over forty shingled log



houses, trader's shops and stores, a church, military buildings and an Indian council house." It was surrounded by farms interspersed with Indian villages, see Figure 7.1, extending thirteen miles to the north and eight miles to the south, on both sides of the river.<sup>3</sup> Along the river bank was a sizeable wharf, a naval store and a dock yard, at which ships were built for service on the Upper Lakes.

The importance of Detroit as a civil settlement was indicated by the dual appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor and military commander to the post after the institution of the Quebec Act. However despite their civilian responsibilities, the commanders at the post during the Haldimand administration, namely Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, Captain Richard Lernoult and Colonel Arent Schuyler De Peyster, all held rank in the British army.<sup>4</sup> Although all appointments to the Upper Posts were theoretically joint civil and military postings, the number of civilians at Detroit and Michilimackinac, in contrast with Niagara, elevated the position of Lieutenant-Governor at those posts above that of military commander. The commander was also to assume responsibility for the Indian Department, which was under the superintendency of Guy Johnson at Niagara. However during the War of Revolution, although the administration of the settlement, both political and legal, was important, and "The Trade to the Upper Country ... much wanted," the Legislative Council at Quebec ordered that those matters should be "reserved for more settled times." Instead the commander was to turn his attention to the defence of the settlement and to an offensive and defensive campaign along the frontier.

### **1. The Defence of Detroit and the Frontier.**

In terms of the defence of the settlement he was to take careful note of the fur trade and the access that such an economy gave to the rebel frontier. Therefore a monthly abstract of Indian




Figure 7.1 A "Plan of Detroit with its Environs," John Montresor. Adapted from the Original Manuscript Map in the William L. Clements Library. Courtesy: William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

licenses (that is, licenses issued to traders in the trade) was to be compiled "mentioning the name of those to whom granted," and the place the traders were "destined for, when beyond Detroit. Of particular interest was "the Quantity of Arms, and Ammunition" carried by them, as these could be passed into rebel hands. As well, there had long been a suspicion that the inhabitants of Detroit were aiding or abetting the rebels, and Hamilton argued that "the disposition of the People at this place requires something more than the Shadow of Authority to keep them in the bounds of duty." Haldimand suggested that one way of solving this problem was to send suspected persons east to Niagara or Carleton Island, a measure which Hamilton probably realized would not endear the British authorities to the inhabitants, and there is little evidence that it was put into practise in any degree.<sup>5</sup>

One of the ways in which this rebel sympathy was perpetrated was through the fact that at Detroit a growing population was putting pressure on the availability of land on the established farms, particularly in families with many male children.<sup>6</sup> Those children forced off the land were hired as canoe men to the fur trade.<sup>7</sup> Their frequent absences in the Indian country and their French heritage, gave them opportunity for rebel contact and possible sympathy or even support. To assess the degree of rebel sympathy and provisioning support at Detroit, Captain Lemoult ordered Mr. Thomas Williams, Acting Justice of the Peace, Captain McGregor of the Town Militia and Mr. Sampson Fleming, Commissary in charge of provisions, to conduct a survey of the population and the provisions grown by them.<sup>8</sup> This census gave an indication of not only how desirable the capture of Detroit would be to a rebel force, but also the amount of provisions that could be commandeered by the garrison for their use. At the same time a census was also taken of the garrison, no doubt not only to assess the 'loyal' strength but also the number of 'extras' and prisoners who were using up provisions. This revealed the number of 500 persons, many of whom

should have been sent east according to the government policy on retaining 'extra mouths' at the Upper Posts during the war.<sup>9</sup>

With regard to frontier defence Hamilton was ordered to "invite all such loyal subjects as would be willing to make a Diversion on the Frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania" to join him in fighting the rebels. In return for their service they would be given "the same Pay and Allowances as ... [were] given to ... other Corps raised in America," and a bounty of 200 acres of land. As well, largely in response to a rumour that "seven hundred rebels from Illinois were coming up the Wabash and Miami rivers to attack Detroit," it was decided to strengthen Fort Pontchartrain.<sup>10</sup> Thus in 1779 Captain Lernoult built a 'new' fort (Fort Lernoult). Henry Du Vernet, a Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery, estimated that the post was short 3 cannon, and 36 iron trucks for mounting them. In terms of Detroit's isolation from Niagara and Michilimackinac, and its proximity to the rebel frontiers, these shortages could become critical. This fear of inadequate defence was an ever-present shadow on the administration of each of the Upper Posts during the Revolution.

With this proximity to the rebel country as a constant, Hamilton was informed that one of his chief military policies was to be the prevention of "a Correspondence between the Colonists and the Spanish Governor ... [of Louisiana]." As noted in Chapter Two, the western interior was largely composed of former French colonists, many of whom had engaged in the Spanish trade down the Mississippi.<sup>11</sup> Thus when the French and Spanish joined in supporting the rebel cause they sought to strengthen the alliances between the Detroit settlement and the Mississippi. However Hamilton wished to prevent a French defection by avoiding where possible the antagonizing of the Spanish on the western side of the Mississippi, thus to a certain extent condoning in principle the continuation of trade alliances, and 'a correspondence' between Detroit and the west.

Another important prong of his military policy was the mandate to “keep the [western] Indians firm to the King’s Interests.” In order to achieve this he was to conform to “one general and uniform plan of policy ... for the ... Tribes,” which was practised at all the Upper Posts. This included securing their loyalty, enlisting their cooperation in military activities, and rewarding them for their participation. It also extended to the management of the Indian Department according to that practised at Niagara, particularly the reduction of expenses in it. A check was to be kept on the management of the Indian alliance through the keeping of minutes at all Indian Council meetings, and the transmission of these on a regular basis to Quebec: the practicality of this being somewhat hindered by the difficulty in communication between Quebec and Detroit.

Furthermore, in his administration it was important to Haldimand for Hamilton to keep in touch with his subordinate at Michilimackinac and his superior at Fort Niagara. For example, with respect to the Indian Department, he was informed that though St. Josephs was “naturally more dependant on Michilimackinac,” “as the Indians of that place sometimes resort to Detroit ...” he and Captain Sinclair, Commander at Michilimackinac, were to “mutually inform each other of what pafses and ... coincide in whatever is to be Recommended to them [the Indians] to regulate their conduct.”<sup>12</sup> With regard to his administration of the settlement he was to be aware of, and act on, policies instituted by the legislature in Quebec.

With pressure from the civilian population to involve himself in matters other than defence, he was frequently notified of resolutions taken by the Legislative Council concerning Detroit. For example, in May 1777 he was informed that regulations had been passed not only pertaining to the administration of justice at Detroit but also regarding the “Trade to the Upper Country,” in which many Quebecers were involved. With respect to the appointment of a judge to

the town it had proved difficult to fill the post. Hamilton stated that traders did not wish to “give up their business” to accept the civil posting as it required “the Knowledge of two Languages [many of them only spoke French] besides some Acquaintance with Legal proceedings.” Furthermore, he argued, the salary was too low for most people to support themselves comfortably, and thus it would require an extremely “necessitous” individual to accept it. Hamilton also noted that the legal proceedings at Detroit were “as irregular as can be” but this was to be excused because of the difficulty of correcting it. He himself was forced to act as “Judge & in several Cases Executor of Justice ...” without the benefit of gaol, gaoler or executioner.<sup>13</sup>

The implied concern behind these difficulties was that in the absence of adequate justice at the post the inhabitants might become disillusioned and turn to the rebels for government. This concern was of particular relevance because at the same time Hamilton had been presented with a request by Virginian settlers wishing to locate near Detroit. When informed of this request it was Haldimand’s opinion that “it would offer an Expedient to the Rebels for introducing themselves into the neighbourhood of ... [the] Posts,” an argument he supported by the regulation that grants of land must always be made “in the regular manner, thro’ the governor general.” Of even more concern to Hamilton was the authority of civilians acting in a military capacity at the post, in light of the regulation that such appointments required “commissions from the Governor or Commander in Chief of the Province.” He was informed that these could be granted in a temporary manner by himself, thus maintaining some semblance of correct administrative (and military) procedure during the war.<sup>14</sup>

In terms of his military policies Hamilton’s chief ambition was to attack and repossess Vincennes, thus giving him control of the Illinois country. This ambition replaced an earlier

aspiration to recapture Fort Pitt sometime in the spring of 1778. The Fort Pitt plan was based on the access that the post gave to the Ohio and the western interior, and ultimately to the Upper Posts. With the abandonment of Fort Chartres in 1772, and Kaskaskia in 1776, Detroit was the only major British post west of Pitt and thus a target for rebel attack. Furthermore, Fort Pitt provided a logical provisioning post for any major east coast advance against the Upper Posts.

As a preparation for this offensive Hamilton had maintained, along with Bolton at Niagara, a continual harrassment of the Virginian and Pennsylvanian frontiers in order to lessen rebel strongholds and to reduce the numbers of rebel sympathizers along the defence frontier. He was further encouraged by the information that Fort Pitt "was by no means capable of resisting an inconsiderable force ... against it ...," as the garrison consisted of only 120 men, the cannon were out of condition, and the officer in charge was inexperienced, having previously served as a surgeons mate in the Royal Irish Regiment. However Haldimand advised Hamilton against this manoeuvre because although the fort could be captured, it would be "very difficult, if not impofsible to maintain it." The more feasible approach therefore was to take its magazines, stores and provisions, and destroy the 'habitations' and crops of the settlers near it, thus reducing its ability to maintain itself, an action completed fairly satisfactorily by Butler in the summer of 1778.<sup>15</sup>

With the Fort Pitt campaign abandoned Hamilton directed his attention to a major offensive against Vincennes, based on the information received from Lieutenant Governor Abbot, who left Vincennes in the spring of 1778. Abbot gave a discouraging report of the perfidy of the Ouabache Indians whose minds, he said, had been "poisoned" "by the falsehoods and misrepresentations of the French." While digesting this information Hamilton was informed of the successful invasion by Colonel George Rogers Clark on Kaskaskia, Cahokia and Vincennes in

June of 1778, and by the entrance of France into the War.<sup>16</sup>

Although caution was continually advised by Haldimand with respect to frontier offensives, particularly in terms of provisioning, Hamilton was confident that he was accomplishing what was “best for the King’s Service” in accordance with suggestions made to the Secretary of State in the fall of 1778. The problem of a lack of frequent correspondence between the posts led to Haldimand acknowledging that Hamilton would have to go to the Illinois without “any orders” from him because “of the Suddenness of ... [Hamilton’s] resolutions...,” in organizing the campaign. He also admitted to an even greater disadvantage in that “In the uncertainty of all things here [in Quebec], uninformed how far this war may spread, it is impossible for me at this distance ...,” to give orders that may have been appropriate to the western situation. However he did suggest that Hamilton seek the support of the Ouabash Indians, despite their previous ‘perfidy’, in that they could be useful in preventing rebel communication via the Ohio by the expedient of “falling upon the Vefsell’s, boats and parties of the Rebels” as they passed the Ouabash on their way downstream towards the Mississippi. The result of this, he argued, would be to leave the Ohio “without a [rebel] force,” a somewhat naive assumption.<sup>17</sup>

As well, he suggested that Hamilton communicate by cypher (code) with Stuart, Superintendent of the Southern Indian Department, for assistance from the Cherokee and Choctaw nations. Haldimand also ordered practical support to the extent of reinforcing Detroit in his absence with “not more than fifty or sixty Soldiers.”<sup>18</sup> He reminded Hamilton of the scope of the undertaking by suggesting that he assess the degree of Indian loyalty that could be expected en-route, and the “Numbers ... and disposition of the Militia” of his district, together with the Company he had raised for the expedition.” As well he should have “a competent knowledge of all the different Modes, and



Routes by which Forces ... [could] pass thro' the adjacent countries [of Indians]; of the difficulties they have to encounter and the articles necessary ... to provide themselves with; in short with all the resources to be made use of and all the obstacles to be met with."<sup>19</sup>

As history shows Haldimand's reservations about the expedition were well founded. One disturbing revelation made by Hamilton, that may have cost him the campaign, was the fact that since his arrival at Detroit he had "not slept a single night out of the Fort." While this in itself was not necessarily unusual for Upper Post commanders, his lack of experience on the frontier probably led to an over-confidence in his ability to capture and provision Vincennes at so great a distance from Detroit. He was however, not entirely ignorant of the geography around Detroit because he complained that there was no official "Surveyor of the Roads & Bridges, of which there are a Great Number."<sup>20</sup> However he may have assumed that this network of roads continued along the frontier, particularly considering the apparent frequency with which Indians, traders and prospective settlers reported to Detroit. Thus it would be feasible to transport provisions in large amounts to the Illinois.

As well, he was relying on sources of frontier information such as Hay, the Deputy Indian Agent, who was knowledgeable on the current state of Indian loyalties and allegiances. Charles Baubin, a government agent at the Miamis, was another respected source, along with Alexis Maisonneville, Charles and Nicholas Gonin, and De Rocheblave at Kaskaskia. He was also assisted by reports from Indians and prisoners brought in to the post after sorties by his officers. These officers, such as Captain La Motte and De Quindre, were often the most valuable source of information because they had first-hand reports of defence facilities along the frontier. Other information was discounted, such as that from Chevalier, "a Frenchman who live[d] at St. Joseph." Hamilton had not the least confidence in him, and regarded his information with suspicion.<sup>21</sup>

Once the campaign was underway, its route described in Chapter Three, he was greatly assisted by Du Vernet of the Royal Artillery, who not only provided sketches of the Miami and planned to map the route to the Illinois, but also masterminded, along with assistance from the Indian Department, the transport of provisions for the campaign, particularly the supply of artillery.<sup>22</sup> In setting up the two major provisioning depots, one at the “carrying place” of the Miamis and one at the forks of the Ouabash, Du Vernet must have been aware of Indian territorial divisions, either through information supplied by the Indians or by Charles Baubin at Fort Miami. This information was important because if the local Indians were supportive the depot could be set up “the other side of the Carrying Place,” between the Miamis and the Wabash: if not it would be set up on the Detroit side. These Indian boundaries thus affected the convenience of travel on the frontier and were an important consideration. Captain Alexander Grant also provided assistance in advising on the method of water travel, and on the best water route to take to cross from the Miamis river to the Wabash. Further, Hamilton wisely employed an “able Engineer” to mastermind the transport of the “troops, stores, boats and light cannon” along the water route and its portages, as he was forced to confess his “own want of Knolledge [sic] in a branch which requires Abilities which ... [he] could never pretend to know ....”<sup>23</sup>

As with Johnson’s 1780 campaign, Hamilton required garrison and Indian support from the Upper Posts. However the numbers of declared supporters west of Fort Pitt, particularly among the Indians, was small. For example, while the Delawares, Illinois, Outavas and Chaouanoes “were determined to strike the Rebels,” the Piankashaws and their confederates, the Quiquaboos and Ouattonons, declared themselves in favour of the rebels, partly as a result of the strong rebel sympathies engendered by the presence of the rebel commandant Myette, together with Major Baron and Lieutenant Monbran, at the Miamis. He was encouraged however, by the attitude of the

French settlers at Detroit, "particularly when they saw a reinforcement from Niagara."<sup>24</sup>

The recapture of Vincennes by Clark, and the capture of Hamilton on the 25th. February, 1779, illustrates far less rebel tenacity on the frontier, as argued by Ward,<sup>25</sup> than Hamilton's underestimation of the difficulty of control of the frontier, at some distance from a provisioning source, in a politically hostile environment. Hamilton gives some indication of the realisation of this after his capture of the post by stating that "At the moment" he was supported by the "Ottawas, Chippoways, Shawanese, Delawares & the Ouabach ...," however the latter were only supporting him because they feared retaliation from the confederation to which they belonged. He also noted that not only did the Indians wish to leave but his officers as well.<sup>26</sup> Thus from a garrison strength of 176 on the 24th. December, 1778, his numbers were reduced to 95 on 30th. January 1779. At the same time they were holding 233 militia prisoners, a number sufficient to not only cause tension in the allocation of provisions but to jeopardise the possibility of holding the fort for a long time in the event of another rebel attack.

The provisioning situation was made more acute by the fact that the nearest supply post was the Miamis to the east, which was only accessible in the spring. Wood was also difficult to obtain and it was being "purchafsed from the Inhabitants at Two Dollars for 4/5th. of a chord [sic]."<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, a Return of the Ordnance Stores at the Fort, (Fort Sackville) shows that only two iron cannon, two swivel cannon and a limited supply of powder and shot were captured, thus greatly reducing the defensibility of the post. Hamilton was also concerned about the report of "fourscore" rebels at Kaskaskia and "30 at Cahokia."<sup>28</sup>

Thus despite Hamilton's argument that the fort fell into rebel hands due to the "treachery"

of a cousin of Maisonville, and to the unwillingness of prisoners and volunteers in the fort to fight against friends and family,<sup>29</sup> the fort fell because of the wider implications of the difficulties of sustaining a British presence along the frontier. Despite Hamilton's preparations for the campaign, he did not have the practical experience to appreciate the geographical implications of the frontier and the mood of its inhabitants, upon whom he needed to rely for sustenance and defensive support.

This campaign became the only major British campaign of the western front during the Haldimand administration, and De Peyster, who succeeded Hamilton, concentrated on maintaining Indian participation in small scouting and raiding parties, with a view to thwarting another possible advance from Virginia and Kentucky by Clark. He focussed in particular on the communication between Fort Pitt and the Mississippi, a plan of frontier defence which continued till peace was declared.

With respect to his administration Hamilton, like the commander at Niagara, concentrated on two major departments: the Military Department and the Indian Department. Haldimand's instructions to him, as Commander of the garrison and settlement at Detroit, were that he was to submit "all the standing orders and Instructions" which he had received "from Home [England] or from former Governors of ... [Quebec]," so that Haldimand could add any orders that appeared "to be still wanting ... for putting the Post in the best State." In administering these orders Hamilton was to defer to the "Superior Military Officer of the Posts," stationed at Niagara. However although Hamilton was in charge of both civil and military affairs at Detroit, the garrison itself was commanded by Captain Lernoult, who assumed his duties on December 1st, 1777.<sup>30</sup>

## 2. The Military Department.

The military units at Detroit included the 8th. Regiment and part of the Butler's Rangers.<sup>31</sup> The post also had a corps of volunteer militia, consisting of two serjeants, three corporals, and fifty privates. This group, some of whom had frontier experience, "encamped on the Common," near the fort. However despite these added recruits Hamilton commented that "the Weaknefs of the Garrison" was well known, and had been mentioned to Haldimand in reports by Hamilton. The defensive or offensive readiness of the post appeared to be little better. After a report that the arms were bad Haldimand commented that they should be repaired "in the best manner" possible as the province was exhausted in its supplies.<sup>32</sup>

Hamilton also complained that the gunpowder supplies were low, particularly those for supplying "the savages" for war and hunting in the spring and summer. In 1778 he estimated that the quantity given was usually fifty barrels of fine powder, which allowed two pounds per man for 2,500 men: this amount being based on the estimate of 15 pounds per annum for each hunter. Haldimand's response to this complaint was that gunpowder would only be supplied in a quantity requisite for the good and advantage of ... [the] Service." The powder magazine was also in poor repair, its roof falling in on the 23rd. May, 1781. Some of the shortfall of this ammunition was eventually made up by "borrowing" ball and flints from the traders.<sup>33</sup> Detroit also had a deputy barrack master, Mr. Hay, and a Master Builder, whose joint responsibility it was to keep the fort defensible. Hay kept a sharp eye on prices, particularly those on the frontier, where no doubt the prices were greatly inflated by the French inhabitants of the post. As well, the post had an assistant engineer, who had a principal role in constructing the batteaux and wheels to transport the Hamilton Vincennes expedition across land.<sup>34</sup>

In view of his concern about expenses and the financial arrangements at the Upper Posts, Haldimand was explicit about the system for drawing money to discharge the debts incurred at Detroit. In accordance with the procedure at Niagara, bills were to be drawn on government printed copies, filled out with the relevant details, and the time set for their drawing to be sixty days. This sixty day finalisation of accounts appears to have served the purpose of not only enabling a revision of the bill before the money was paid but also enabling time to get the funds to pay the account. At Niagara and Detroit the principal form of currency was New York currency, largely because of its availability at the Upper Posts and along the frontier. Duplicates of the accounts were then to be transmitted to the paymaster for Detroit and then transferred to Haldimand for his approval.<sup>35</sup> All accounts were then sent to the Treasury in England. The method of paying the accounts, after the sixty days had elapsed, was either by bills of credit or specie. The latter may have included Spanish money from west of the Mississippi, which was used at Michilimackinac. However it was likely that specie was in short supply at Detroit, as it was at Michilimackinac where the troops complained that they had not been issued with money, or even corn for bartering, for eleven months.<sup>36</sup>

### **Provisioning.**

As at Niagara, a major consideration was the provisioning of the post. The commissary was a Mr. Heming, and it was his responsibility not only to provision the garrison but also to keep an account of the provisions in the settlement. The merchant firm who had the government contract for provisioning was that of Messrs. Alexander and William Macomb. They had held the contract since January, 1776 and had "furnished goods at a more reasonable rate than any other Merchant," even to selling goods cheaper, despite the added distance and risk, than the merchants at Niagara. This may have been because they did not charge commission or expenses, costs which were probably reimbursed from their participation in the fur trade. They had even advanced credit to the

amount of £12,000 New York currency, "Tho this place was at that period threatened with an attack by the Rebels." This attitude earned them the privilege of having their merchandise given preference on the Niagara portage.<sup>37</sup>

In view of its largely civilian population "The price of fresh provisions at Detroit [was] ... regulated Chiefly by the Quantity ... in the King's Store." If an adequate supply was sent from Montreal the inhabitants were forced to lower their prices.<sup>38</sup> The price of corn supports this theory. In February and April, 1778, when the closing of the "communication" between Montreal and Detroit had meant a shortage of supply, the cost of wheat and Indian corn was 16/- to 20/- and 20/- to 24/- per bushel respectively. However by September the price for corn had dropped back to 20/- per bushel. The inflated price of wheat over the February price perhaps reflects a marketing monopoly, a bad harvest, a diminished supply from the east, a need at the other posts or a need on the frontier.<sup>39</sup> Despite these market fluctuations however, Hamilton still declared these prices to be "extravagant" and a drain on the financial resources at the post.

These weren't the only prices causing concern. The prices for goods on the frontier were high. While Indian corn per bushel was 18/8, representative of the price at Detroit, flour was £ 6/13/4 per hundred weight, compared with £4/4/- per hundred weight at Detroit. Thus Hamilton requested an investigation into marketing procedures, so that a "reasonable" price, "after Securing the Quantity necessary for the Exigencies of the Post," could be established. As well, Haldimand advised Hamilton to weigh carefully "the difficulty and expence, that must attend the Transport of every article ...," particularly the 12,520 gallons of rum consumed annually at Detroit.<sup>40</sup>

As a further cost-saving measure Haldimand suggested that Hamilton institute the same

“agricultural scheme” as practised at Niagara.<sup>41</sup> The locale for this scheme was to be Hog Island, in the Detroit River, thus separate from the garrison in the same way as the west bank of Niagara. The land was to be appropriated from the estate of the late Captain McDougal, after an appraisal of its value.<sup>42</sup> Haldimand also suggested that unlike Niagara, the farmers in the scheme could be prisoners captured along the Ohio during frontier raids. The island location would ostensibly help to prevent them from not only having contact with the French settlers but also escaping from the farms.

The naval department was of considerable provisioning importance at Detroit. In September, 1776 Hamilton was ordered by E. Foy, Deputy Adjutant General of the British Army, to take “A particular account ... of all the vefsells upon the Lakes, their names ... Masters or Commanders, ... number of Guns and men they carry, distinguishing those on the King’s Service from the others, and specifying how the former are Commifioned paid and victualled.” As well, no “Vefsell of greater dimension than a Common Boat” was to be built at Detroit “except ... as ... requisite for the King’s Service.” These orders were a prerequisite to regulations issued on the 22nd. May, 1777, which stated that “no Vessels [were] ... to Navigate ... [the] Lakes except such as are Armed and manned by the Crown. Thus from that date all trade goods were to be carried in the ‘King’s Ships,’ with preference being given to military stores and ammunition.”<sup>43</sup>

The upper lakes naval force at that time consisted of 11 sailing vessels, one row galley and several privately owned batteaux. However as no military supplies were to be carried in open batteaux, (for defence purposes) and as all trade goods were to be carried in government vessels, these batteaux could not be used during the Revolution, except those owned and manned by Indians. These regulations placed a tremendous responsibility on Captain Grant, the naval commander



to police all vessels on the upper lakes, particularly as he was required to send monthly reports to Quebec. In order to assist him Hamilton suggested to Captain Zachariah Thomson, who had been sent from Quebec to inspect the Naval Department, that a civilian ought to be “appointed to attend to the arrivals of the vefsels, taking account of the Cargoes, & being a Check of the traders ....”<sup>44</sup>

Grant was also hindered by two other major problems. Firstly, his subordinate status to the Commander at Fort Niagara meant that he did not have full control of the organization of naval provisioning schedules from Fort Erie.<sup>45</sup> Thus for example in 1782, Haldimand “hoped” that De Peyster had received “the Remainder of last years presents from Fort Erie,”<sup>46</sup> Secondly, the non-use of trading vessels placed stress on the available shipping for the transportation of provisions. In August of 1778 Hamilton feared that the “Vefsels alone” would not be sufficient to transport the quantities of provisions needed at Detroit, and that even if they were, that “the goods of [1777] ... [were] left on the Carrying Place [at Niagara and] not yet forwarded”.

Hamilton argued that if he had control of the lake shipping, and it was not left to the commander at Niagara, that he would be able to get the supplies to his post more efficiently. He was further irritated by the fact that Bolton had delegated his naval responsibilities respecting the upper lakes shipping to the officer in charge of the garrison at Detroit. In making their reports therefore, these officers were not only bypassing Hamilton, but according to him, were so lax in their duties that “there was not a Single Vefsel at the Post.” Thus in order to send an express Hamilton was forced to use a batteaux as well as send a runner by land to “prevent miscarriage” in the event of a rebel attack.<sup>47</sup>

### 3. The Indian Department.

The Indian Department at Detroit, with its 5,000 dependants, was of principal concern and attention. One of the major problems of its administration was the lack of sympathy of the western nations to the British cause. During the War of Revolution a means of keeping the Indians neutral, if not loyal, was to use the influence of the Six Nations. Just prior to Haldimand's arrival in Quebec, Colonel Butler at Niagara sent a belt "to the Lake Indians & all the Western Nations" entreating them to "support Government & revenge themselves" on the rebel colonists whom, he argued, had taken their land. The land question was a potent political and emotional weapon because it focussed on the Indian adherence to territorial claims and rights of sovereignty, which transcended the wider political question of allegiance to white sovereignty. However the relationship with the Indians was at best only a tenuous, volatile connection and De Peyster noted that the western Indians were in general not supportive of the British cause. "I assemble them," he stated, "get fair promises, and send them out, but when once out of sight the turning of a straw may divert them from the original plan .... The Treasure given to them, [to ensure their loyalty] I must own is immense' ...."<sup>48</sup>

He acknowledged that some nations were less loyal than others. For example, the Miamis and the Indians of the Outash (probably referring to the Wabash), who "have been out of the way of knowing the power of the English," were even more difficult to control than the Mingoes, Shawanese, Delawares, "Ouiqaboes, Mascoutainges and Ouiattonongs," who occasionally were assisted by government on their war parties. Furthermore, in Hamilton's opinion, the "Ouabash Indians were the only western nation opposed to the Rebels, French [and] Spaniards," while the Delawares "were the least to be depended on." However De Peyster argued that he did not think the Indian cause entirely "thrown away:" instead "they ... [were to] be looked upon as a large body of Irregulars, Fed and clothed, to prevent the inroads of the Virginians into their country, and who

must be delicately managed to prevent their favouring ... [the] Rebels ....” This task was made easier by the influence of Alexander McKee, Simon Girty and others, whom as Indian agents were able to foster the British cause in the west. In particular it was stated that McKee had “a great influence with the Shawanese, ... [was] well acquainted with the country, and ... [could] probably give some usefull Intelligence ... [to the government.]”<sup>49</sup>

Haldimand’s skepticism of the role of the Indians in frontier warfare led him to view the rising costs of the department with considerable disfavour.<sup>50</sup> He was well aware of the fluctuating demands for presents, that made it difficult to compile estimates for the twelve-monthly periods necessary to order the goods from England. However despite this he stated that expenses must be reduced, and thus ordered the same prohibition on purchasing foods from traders as had been instituted at Niagara. This prohibition could however, have had a more damaging effect at Detroit than at Niagara because of the more varied representations of Indian nations at Detroit, thus theoretically presenting demands for a wider assortment of goods.<sup>51</sup>

Haldimand was not unduly concerned about the variety or quality of Indian goods as he reasoned that the Rebels did not have “necessaries sufficient for their own wants” let alone the amount of presents required to supply the ‘wants’ of the Indians. He even suspected that the Indians wished to continue the British participation in the war in order that they would continue to receive British largesse. The commanders at the posts however were concerned and continued to supply an increasing number and quality of presents, although not necessarily a different variety of goods for each particular nation. The mounting cost of this distribution so worried Haldimand that he feared that it would not be “pafsed [by the Treasury] at home, and that he would be held personally responsible to discharge the cost.”<sup>52</sup>

Another means of reducing expenses was by lessening the proportion of officers to regulars in the department, in order that the government would not have to pay for the higher pay of a lieutenant for example, at a dollar a day compared with the 2/6 of a common soldier. Haldimand also wished to reduce the "Enormous List of [the number of] Appointments," many of whom he felt were not necessary. Another concern, and eventually prohibited, was the practise of government employees becoming traders and in effect double agents, by manipulating Indian loyalties to suit their own ends. For example, a Messrs. Finchley and Fisher were seen as not fit to "trust at a distance," and thus Haldimand considered it "unsafe to permit them to winter from Detroit" in the Indian country.<sup>53</sup>

A further source of expense in the Indian Department at Detroit were, as at Niagara, the Indian Councils. An account of one council, held on June 14, 1778, with at least 13 nations participating, gives some indication of not only the variety of nations and numbers of Indians involved, but also the formality of the council meetings. Although the councils were an important medium for communication and information they were to be avoided, if other means of communication could be used, because of their expense and the fact that they attracted Indians to the post.

## **B. MICHILIMACKINAC**

Michilimackinac's role in the War of Revolution was two fold: firstly, to act as a support post for Niagara and Detroit, particularly the latter, and to attempt sorties down the Mississippi and around the Great Lakes to prevent rebel encoachment against Detroit and Niagara and secondly, to help maintain the allegiance of the western Indians to the British Crown. In its position as the supply post for the Grand Portage into the western interior, its preoccupation was largely with the

fur trade. As Table 7.1 shows, the number of packs of fur peaked at Mackinac, generating a total of £75,000 to £100,000 Sterling in revenue annually.<sup>54</sup> However its isolation from the other posts was emphasised by the fact that the principal fur trade canoe route was via the Ottawa river, thus bypassing Niagara and Detroit.<sup>55</sup>

In spite of the attempt of participants in the fur trade to remain separate from government control, the War of Revolution placed defence constraints on their activities. Frontier defence, as has already been argued, was of prime importance and disloyal agents represented a threat to the cause of government, particularly from agents “wintering” in the Indian country. As well, there was particular concern about Indian goods, particularly those used for warfare, “falling into yr. hands of the Rebels ....”<sup>56</sup> On the other hand, loyal traders, and a well-managed provisioning system at Michilimackinac, could do much to ensure Indian neutrality or support.

Haldimand did not leave the maintenance of Indian and trader allegiance to chance. He spelled out the defence regulations that would apply to the trade, and expected them to be strictly observed. They focussed on rewarding only those loyal to government, and on only allowing authorised government agents to speak at council meetings or distribute government presents. Loyal traders were to be distinguished by not only the passports or trading licenses issued by government but also by their reputation while amongst the Indians. The list of licenses shows a heavy bias in favour of French traders, as well as the surprising fact that licenses were issued to French traders operating in the Illinois and Mississippi country. As well, it shows the geographic area over which the Indian Department at Michilimackinac had control. It ranged westwards from Lake Superior and the Grand Portage/Northwest, southwest from La Bay (Lake Michigan) and the Illinois to the Mississippi, eastwards to the Grand river and Nipigon and due south to the Illinois

**THE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES AND VALUES OF FUR PELTS AND  
SKINS FOR THREE FUR TRADE ROUTES.**

<b>ROUTE</b>	<b>PACKS</b>	<b>STG EACH</b>	<b>TOTAL IN STG ANNUALLY.</b>
GRAND PORTAGE	700	£40	£28,000
MACKINAC	5,000	15	75,000
DETROIT	3,000	10	<u>30,000</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>£133,000</b>

Table 7.1. A Table Showing the Different Quantities and Values of Fur Pelts and Skins for Three Fur Trade Routes, Based Upon Sales in London in 1777. Hadfield, 1785, 109.

and St. Joseph.<sup>57</sup> These licenses were issued at the time of the seasonal passage of the canoes upriver, and it can be assumed that they were checked by officials at Lachine. They were checked again at Michilimackinac as the traders reprovisioned there. However as it was possible to bypass Michilimackinac and break the journey at the Grand Portage, there was a small garrison there and licenses could be checked by its officers.<sup>58</sup>

However De Peyster still felt that traders were entering the Indian country without being checked by government. Thus he suggested that every canoe going into the western interior from Montreal should "wait at the Mouth of the French River in Lake Huron for ... Instructions, so that should they Misbehave During the Winter ... I will Order every canoe load of goods back to Montreal." Such a statement of course assumes a garrison at the French River, or an adequate means of policing the conduct of the traders while in the field. However he must have had a reasonably effective policing system because a Joseph Howard, who set off from Montreal without a license, was to have his goods and canoes seized and impounded at Detroit.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore De Peyster insisted that the traders have the oath of allegiance administered to them, swearing their loyalty to the British Crown and their support of it during the War of Revolution.

This policy of support for the fur trade, although under strict regulations, placed Michilimackinac in a difficult situation with regard to provisioning the post during the war. As at Niagara and Detroit the same problem of transportation and supply existed, not only in terms of under-supply but also in terms of the competition between the transport of the 'King's Goods' used for frontier defence and those used for the fur trade. In 1778 for example, when Governor Hamilton limited the supply of corn and flour to Michilimackinac, the traders argued that the Indians in the back-country would perish if they did not receive the supplies from Detroit. This supports the

argument that without the supply of provisioning by the British, through the Upper Posts, the fur trade would have been less viable as a mercantile activity.

In terms of the possibility of rebel encroachment on the post, De Peyster was informed in the summer of 1779 that an expedition would not be made against Michilimackinac but military activity increased in the form of raiding parties to assist those from Detroit.<sup>60</sup> This necessitated an increased supply of provisions of almost 50 percent to support these raids,<sup>61</sup> particularly as the parties were sent to locations as far distant as the southern shore of Lake Michigan, at which place (River du Chemin) they arrested the pro-rebel trader Jean Baptiste Point du Sable.<sup>62</sup>

Sinclair was much less involved with organizing war parties than he was with relocating Fort Michilimackinac from the mainland to the island of Mackinac.<sup>63</sup> The reason given for the move was that the island had limestone which, for defence purposes, would permit the building of fortifications, as well as the fact that of the 2100 acres on the island some was suitable for farming.<sup>64</sup> As well, the fort on the mainland was in poor repair, "much incumbered with wooden Houses & Commanded even by Small Arms ...." It was also located on loose sand. By the 8th. July, 1780 the Indians located on the island had surrendered it "Without any Present" or payment, on the understanding that the government wished to make "Corn Fields of the whole Island." The move was completed in the Fall of 1781.<sup>65</sup> The new fort, renamed Fort Mackinac, was "Situated at the South end of the Island ... on an eminence, about half a mile from the shore, and about one Hundred and fifty feet above the level of the Lake, fronting a small bay." This gave it the advantage of height and visibility in the event of an attack, as well as harbour facilities.

Sinclair was also concerned about St. Louis and its role as a Spanish post on the



Mississippi in infecting the Illinois residents with pro-rebel fervour.<sup>66</sup> In the spring of 1780 he decided to take the town and to do this needed Indian cooperation. He enlisted the support of Charles Langlade and Charles Gautier who, as Officers of the Indian Department at Michilimackinac, had experience not only with the Indians but also with the frontier.<sup>67</sup> His plans were betrayed by Pierre Prevost, a British licensed trader, who informed Clark at Kaskaskia, and the expedition, under Emmanuel Hesse, was defeated. In June, 1780 war parties were sent to Chicago via the Illinois river but the cost of these expeditions were straining the limited budget allocated for frontier defence. Thus on May 9, 1781, Haldimand refused Sinclair's expense drafts and commenced an inquiry into his finances.<sup>68</sup> Robertson assumed command, with the mandate of lessening the expenses in the Indian department, but by this time the frontier offensive was almost over.

### **1. The Military Department.**

As at Niagara and Detroit frontier defence was organized through the Military and Indian Departments. On July 1, 1779 the Return for the garrison showed 80 soldiers supported by a militia force of at least 18 traders living around the fort.<sup>69</sup> De Peyster was assisted in his command by Lieutenants Thomas Bennett and George Clowes, but he also had civil duties commensurate with his lieutenant-governorship of the trading post.<sup>70</sup> He was assisted by a carpenter, blacksmith and masons, and a surgeon, Dr. Mitchell. There was an Engineer's Department under the direction of John Pattison, which often lacked tools with which to perform its duties. The tools for the engineers were stored in the Ordnance Store, along with some of the artillery. In 1779 the post had a limited supply of artillery, the powder being stored in an underground magazine.<sup>71</sup> Even in 1782, after the new fort had been built, it was stated that the forts defenses were vulnerable, due mainly to inadequate construction by the engineers and too small a garrison to defend it.<sup>72</sup>

There was a small naval department which was responsible for the construction of the sloop 'Welcome.' It employed a Master builder, Angus McDonald at 16/- per day, two assistants and two carpenters at 8/- per day, and 48 civilians from 2/6 to 5/- per day, who were probably on a corvee system. These were all dismissed with the reorganization of the administration of the post under Robertson in the fall and winter of 1782.<sup>73</sup>

## **2. The Indian Department**

The Indian Department, see Table 7.2, provisioned approximately 4,020 Indians in September, 1782 by merchandise provided by George McBeath. These provisions were usually issued twice yearly, in the spring and autumn, in proportion to the services required and rendered. This provisioning required "Six Thousand Blankets, Four Thousand Shirts and One Hundred pieces of Stroud & Moulton with the usuall [sic] small Articles." The provisioning was also supplemented by purchases from such traders as George Meldrum, (ten canoes and some provisions) Macnamara & Co., (to the amount of £49,503 New York currency) and the amount of £89,430 paid by the Indian Department between July 31 and September 30, 1781, for goods bought from local merchants.<sup>74</sup> However Sinclair argued that the "greatest part of the Expences for the Indian Department ... [had] arisen from the charges made by the Traders unauthorised so to do in their Wintering grounds." A remedy for this, argued Sinclair, would be to send even more supplies from Montreal and send them in time for the traders as they set out for the Indian hunting grounds in the Spring." The charges for rum however must be continued "however destructive it is," because without it there would be "much discontent." The substitution of items for those not available also increased expenses. For example, if grease or pork was not available sugar was substituted for it when the Indian corn rations were distributed.<sup>75</sup> This highlights one of the major differences between the command of the Upper Posts and headquarters. At the Upper Posts the commanders

## THE NUMBER OF INDIANS RESORTING TO MICHILIMACKINAC.

	PERSONS.
Ottawas of L'Arbre Croche with their families four hundred men .....	1,000
" of Grand River, Banks of Lake Michigan with their families five hundred men .....	1,200
Chipawas, Proprietors of this Island .....	100
" from St. Mary's .....	50
" from Lake Huron, Mississingi River, La Cloche etc. ....	150
" from Lake Superior .....	500
Tolleauoines, from LaBay & Lake Huron .....	250
Indians of the Mississippi, Winissigoes .....	150
Saies .....	250
Otogamies .....	200
Ayowe's.....	50
Sioux Indians, chiefly the Heads of Tribes who rec'd presents for their villages .....	100
Potewatimis .....	20
<b>PERSONS</b>	<b>4,020</b>

**Amounting to about Four Thousand and Twenty Persons.**

(signed)

## John Coates

**'Clerk to the Indian Department.'**

**Table 7.2. The Number Of Indians Being Provisioned at Michilimackinac. H.P. 39, 21756, 148.**

were forced to face the Indians from a vulnerable defence position : even more so on the frontier. Thus they were inclined to bend to Indian demands rather than abide by 'policy.'

Such expences led to an attempt to reform the department under Robertson, particularly with respect to the issue of rum and the 'kick-backs' received by commanders for favours to Indians.<sup>76</sup> The reforms, running like a thread through the Haldimand correspondence, included not buying presents locally,<sup>77</sup> sending "trusty persons" to give selected gifts to the Indians at their hunting grounds or villages,<sup>78</sup> monitoring the size of the rations, recording all issues from the commissary's store, buying Indian corn directly off the Indians rather than using the trader as a middleman, and reducing the numbers of employees in the department.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Armour and Widder, 1986, 50.

<sup>2</sup> H.P. 55, 21781, 33.

<sup>3</sup> Armour and Widder, 1986, 49; Harris, 1987, Plate 41. Heidenreich, Noel and Allaine contend that it had a Jesuit mission, serving an Indian population of about 2,600 people, which was "the largest concentration of natives in the Great Lakes Basin."

<sup>4</sup> Armour and Widder, 1986, 74, 264, 267, 269; Ketchum, 1971, 313; H.P. 55, 21781, 42, 74. Henry Hamilton, known as the "Hair Buyer" along the frontier because of his supposed predilection for purchasing scalps, took up his duties in September, 1775. After his capture at Vincennes on February 25, 1779, he was replaced by Captain Lernoult until the arrival of Major De Peyster from Michilimackinac on the 8th. of June, 1780.

<sup>5</sup> H.P. 55, 21781, 5, 8, 36.

<sup>6</sup>The population grew from 1,135 in 1773 to 2,207 in 1780.

<sup>7</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 28.

<sup>8</sup>There were 12,083 acres of land cleared in 1780, averaging about 31 acres per family. The crops grown included wheat, Indian corn, pease, oats, potatoes and cider apples: crops representative of much of the agricultural production of the Upper Posts at that time. The cattle included horses, oxen, cows, steers, sheep and hogs.

<sup>9</sup>H.P. 55, 21782, 215.

<sup>10</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 4; Armour and Widder, 1986, 106.

<sup>11</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 3; Armour and Widder, 1986, 59. This trade was centred at St. Louis, near the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi, and focussed on the settlements of Cahokia, Kaskaskia and Vincennes.

<sup>12</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 3-4, 11.

<sup>13</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 32-33, 37, 41, The salary was £100 per annum.

<sup>14</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 6, 9, 19.

<sup>15</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 19, 26; Armour and Widder, 1986, 63, 89.

<sup>16</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 28; Armour and Widder, 1986, 84.

<sup>17</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 20, 22, 38. However, Haldimand's comment that the garrison and Indians would "fill all the lower parts of the Ohio" must have seemed ludicrous to Hamilton, and a reflection of Haldimand's second-hand knowledge of the 600-700 miles of waterway between Fort Pitt and the Mississippi, through sparsely settled territory, inhabited by Indians and settlers largely unsympathetic to the British cause.

<sup>18</sup>He also ensured that this reinforcement would not be a financial burden on Hamilton by ordering that the appropriate provisions for their upkeep be sent from Niagara, or even Montreal.

<sup>19</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 21.

<sup>20</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 41-42.

<sup>21</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 29, 31-32, 38-39, 43, 47-48; Armour and Widder, 1986, 83.

<sup>22</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 46, 51-52, 63. Hamilton had estimated that the expedition would need 57 days of provisions for 300 men, or 97,000 lbs. of provisions. In fact it took 71 days to reach Vincennes, which made the provisioning of Fort Sackville, after its capture, more acute.

<sup>23</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 44, 46-47.

<sup>24</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 43, 45.

<sup>25</sup>Ward, 1952, 859.

<sup>26</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 58-59; 21782, 187. Du Vernet requested that he be allowed to return to Detroit and the Messieurs De Quindre wished to "return without afsigning any sufficient reasons for quitting the Service ...."

<sup>27</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 58. Hamilton noted that it was "very dear to obtain provisions & difficult", a situation which Haldimand had feared could jeopardize the operation.

<sup>28</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 55.

<sup>29</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 65.

<sup>30</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 20, 32.

<sup>31</sup>H.P. 44, 21763, 384.

<sup>32</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 19, 31, 47.

<sup>33</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 20, 31, 79-80.

<sup>34</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 26, 40, 42.

<sup>35</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 19. The originals were retained by the commander at the post as he was personally liable until his accounts had been approved by Haldimand.

<sup>36</sup>Armour and Widder, 1986, 71, 129, 152, 161.

<sup>37</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 30, 39.

<sup>38</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 22. Fresh provisions were used as much as possible in order to preserve the salt provisions which were to be used for a time of need, particularly along the frontier.

<sup>39</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 32. In July of 1778 Hamilton informed Carleton that there would "be a great call for provisions at Niagara" due to the fact that "considerable numbers of Indians" were assembled there. Thus he was going to send a "Sloop ... with 30 Carcasses of Beef & about 470 Bushells of grain, 731 lbs. of Suet & 1290 lbs [of] Rice."

<sup>40</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 9, 30, 38; 21782, 28, 172.

<sup>41</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 11.

<sup>42</sup>Haldimand stated that Mrs. McDougal was to receive "reasonable compensation for what Houses &c. may be found upon the Island" but not for improvements.

<sup>43</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 3, 5-6. The traders did gain one advantage in that "no payment [was to] be made for [trade] Goods so transported ...."

<sup>44</sup>Armour and Widder, 1986, 65-67; H.P. 55, 21781, 3, 5, 31-32. Thomson suggested that a Mr. Algee at Quebec may be willing to assume this responsibility.

<sup>45</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 20. On the 6th. August, 1778 Hamilton was informed that Haldimand had "found it best to put the control, management, and payment of ... [the Naval Department] ... under the superior Military Officer of the Posts, who is at present Lt. Col. Bolton [at Niagara]."

<sup>46</sup>H.P. 55, 21782, 14.

<sup>47</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 34, 36, 41. This laxness may have been due to the fact that the seamen lacked a barrack, which probably did not encourage them to linger at Detroit.

<sup>48</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 28, 81.

<sup>49</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 28-29, 34, 38, 81.

<sup>50</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 9. He stated that it was “distreßing to reflect that notwithstanding the vast treasure lavished upon ... [the Indians], no dependence ... [could] be had on them, and ... the most trifling circumstances, altho’ ever so false or absurd, will divert them from a pursuit of the least consequence ....”

<sup>51</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 16. For example, the Commander at Detroit had representatives from the Indian nations living at or near Fort Pitt, Wabash, Outash, Muskingum, Maumee, Ohio, Miamis, Kentucky, Riviere au Boeuf, St. Josephs, Illinois, Michilimackinac, and points south and westward.

<sup>52</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 11-12, 14. The expenses of the Indian Department at Detroit for the year ending April, 1781, were £44,962 New York currency, and by October of the same year, another £35,225/13/6 had been spent.

<sup>53</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 12, 17.

<sup>54</sup>Hadfield, 1785, 109; H.P. 41, 21785, 81. Its importance to the fur industry lay in the size and value of the pelts passing over the Grand Portage, which was the biggest and most valuable source of pelts such as bear, moose and stag. These pelts accounted for one half, or £100,000 Sterling, of the £200,000 Sterling worth of fur and peltry exports from Quebec during the Haldimand administration.

<sup>55</sup>Weld, 1795-7, 306; H.P. 41, 21758, 81. Weld concluded that the Ottawa River route was “by far the principal part, both as to quantity and value, of those [furs] exported from Montreal ....” During the Haldimand administration this route was dominated by the Northwest Company, which in 1780 was recorded as being divided into sixteen shares, comprising the names of Todd, McGill, Frobisher, Paterson, McTavish, Holmes, Grant, Madden, McBeath, Ross and Oakes. It was argued that this company received “improper preferences” in transporting bulky goods to Michilimackinac via the Great Lakes, and received other favours from government for particular “attachments” or “service to government”.

<sup>56</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 110; 41, 21758, 138. Sinclair, commanding at Michilimackinac, expressed uneasiness at traders whom he suspected “under a pretext of exercising the Fur Trade, ... do many things injurious to the King’s interests ....”

<sup>57</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 4, 51-53, 94.

<sup>58</sup>H.P. 16, 21701, 22; 41, 21758, 138; Armour and Widder, 1986, 77.

<sup>59</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 9-10, 26.



<sup>60</sup>H.P. 55, 21781, 3-4, 11.

<sup>61</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 13. De Peyster maintained that he was supporting "all who live within fifty or sixty Miles of [Michilimackinac:] ... were it not for the Sugar in the Spring ... many would starve".

<sup>62</sup>Armour and Widder, 1986, 100, 110.

<sup>63</sup>H.P. 40, 21757, 375. The relocation order was given on April 17, 1780.

<sup>64</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 224. In an assessment of the farming potential of the island Daniel Robertson, the commander, stated that the climate was good, the soil gravelly and thin but capable of supporting the farming of wheat, pease, barley, oats and buckwheat: the seeds for the latter having been ordered from Detroit. The grass was a "bad kind" but good for sheep.

<sup>65</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 10; 40, 21757, 414; 41, 21758, 160; Armour and Widder, 1986, 122.

<sup>66</sup>Armour and Widder, 1986, 129.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, 1986, 55, 90, 98. Langlade, on the French side, had helped defeat Braddock at Fort Du Quesne (Fort Pitt) in 1755 and, along with Charles Gautier, had assisted the Hamilton expedition, particularly in influencing the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians to participate on the British side.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, 1986, 139, 180.

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, 1986, 104, 155.

<sup>70</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 53. For example, with regard to complaints against an inhabitant at the post he stated that he could not "as Civil Governor refuse to hear the Complaints of the King's Subjects".

<sup>71</sup>Armour and Widder, 1986, 42, 77, 119; H.P. 39, 21756, 119. It had only 403 six-pound iron balls for the cannon and 129 empty shells for the 4 2/5 inch brass cochorn mortar. As well, the underground powder magazine had only 16 1/2 barrels of powder belonging to the Crown.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, 1986, 180. This comment was made by Engineer Richard Hockings, who had been sent to inspect the new fort.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 1986, 183.

<sup>74</sup>H.P. 40, 21757, 417; Armour and Widder, 1986, 171.

<sup>75</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 194.

<sup>76</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 1.

<sup>77</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 455. There was a general store at Michilimackinac formed by the merchants, but it was stated that the goods could only be purchased from the store at “a reasonable price” or “wholesale,” and only in small quantities.

<sup>78</sup>H.P. 39, 21756, 230, 240, 242. For example, it was argued that as “La Prairie de Chien” was the rendezvous of the western Indians, it would “make a reasonable location for imparting government policy and distributing presents.” Robertson instituted this practise, and concluded that it kept about “twelve hundred Indians” from Michilimackinac, and cost the government “fifty Thousand Pounds less [in 1783 than in 1782] ....”

## **CHAPTER EIGHT. CONCLUSION.**

This study has identified a northern interior frontier of defence that was administered by the British during the American War of Independence. The extent and breadth of the frontier were determined by primary source documentation, chiefly the Haldimand Papers, and by a comparison of this material with historic and modern map data and field study. The dimensions of the frontier are indicated in Chapter Four. The administrative centers of the frontier were Quebec and Montreal as the headquarters and Fort Niagara as the chief administrative center of the Upper Posts.

### **A. THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND.**

As discussed in Chapter Two, the imperial system, upon which the colonial government was modelled, was based on the ultimate authority of the King and Crown and the direct relationship of the subject to his sovereign. The implications of these realities for the colonial frontier administration were firstly that the King, although never present in person on the frontier, directed its military operations, and secondly, that all frontier personnel, whether military or civil, could theoretically bypass colonial authority to petition the King directly. In a time of war such realities could prove hazardous to military operations and defence.

However, through the increasing delegation of authority from the King to his subjects a hierarchical system of government was created in which authority passed from the top down. Curtis states that the King, as Captain General, usually delegated his military responsibilities to a Commander in Chief who in turn was a superior officer to the Secretary at War. Although he argues

that the Secretary at War had wide powers, his lack of a seat in the Privy Council or in the Cabinet hindered his capacity as a policy maker, particularly during the War of Revolution. Instead during the War of Revolution the direction of military operations was mainly in the hands of the Colonial Secretary for North America, with advice from the King and Cabinet and the Treasury Board, which was directed by the Houses of Parliament, particularly the House of Commons, on financial matters. The British home government was usually represented in the colonies by deputies or persons of lower rank or position, whose appointment was often under the patronage of a member of the British parliament. These deputies could themselves deputize which led to complaints of incompetence within the system, particularly through absentee office-holding. Such complaints were fueled by the geographical distance between the Upper Posts and London and the alienation in administrative perception that this engendered. However, despite the possible abuse of administrative responsibility through patronage, the Haldimand Papers suggest that, at least in the lower levels of military rank, promotion was based solely on seniority and hopefully administrative competence, such as that observed in the command of Colonel Bolton at Niagara.

The offices of the British administration most pertinent to the frontier during the Haldimand administration were the King, Prime Minister (also First Lord of the Treasury), Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Secretary at War, the legislative branches of government and most importantly the Treasury Board. These offices administered defence, finance and colonial affairs: the issues of defence and finance in Quebec being premier during the War of Revolution. All defence financing had to be approved by the House of Commons, including the provisioning of the Upper Posts and frontier and the buying of Indian loyalty.

Sea and land defence presented a marked contrast in administration. The land defence,

under the command of the King, George III, his Prime Minister, Lord North, his Commander in Chief from 1778, Lord Amherst, and his Secretary at War, Lord Barrington succeeded by Charles Jenkinson,<sup>1</sup> did not benefit from the cohesive management of the Board of Admiralty. At the Upper Posts therefore, where land and lake defence was under the military commander at Niagara, problems of provisioning supply through the lakes was acute, a factor that played a considerable role in limiting the geography of the frontier of defence.

A further problem was that as the Secretary at War was not a member of the King's Cabinet, he lost much of his military effectiveness. Instead the secretary for colonial affairs, an officer largely concerned with the civil administration of the colonies, was one of the key players in the war administration. Due to his location in Britain he had to rely largely on colonial based advice, particularly for the logistics of the war effort along the frontier. The role of parliament in influencing policy must not be underestimated, particularly the representation of frontier fur trade interests. It was to their advantage to pressure parliament to continue support of the Indian alliance, despite its cost, because such support engendered trade.

The payment of the army in the colonies provides a case study of problems inherent in administering the war along the frontier. The hierarchical tiering of pay officers, some of whom had dual office, and the mandate to distribute scarce specie and credit notes to troops distributed over a wide geographical area, were two problems that plagued the pay service. It is therefore not surprising that abuses arose in the service which included fee inflation and duplication, the falsification of expense accounts, the inflation of fees charged by contractors to the army, conflict of interest between military and civil service by contractors, the non-payment of the troops and the difficulty of laying 'responsibility' on any one department.

The Board of Ordnance was an important agency in the war administration along the frontier. Its mandate for providing arms, ammunition and military stores was vital to the system of defence that chain-linked through the posts on the Great Lakes. However it suffered from departmental fragmentation, particularly in the division into civil and military branches. At the Upper Posts such a division was arbitrary not only because of the lack of personnel to administer separate divisions but also because of the inter-relationship between civil and military concerns during the War of Revolution. As well, the proliferation of offices within the Board, and the increasing attention to urgent military concerns as the war progressed, further hampered the streamlining of the department.

It must also be noted that the funding of the war cannot be divorced from the domestic affairs of Britain during the eighteenth century. The cost of the imperial government as perceived by both the people of Britain and its colonies, the increase in taxation to fund it, and the increase in the size of the administration to handle the War of Revolution, were prominent factors in pressuring government to end the war in the North American colonies. The paternalistic policy of mercantilism it was argued, by such scholars as Adam Smith and David Hume, could be modified to allow for American Independence. However retaining the fur frontier in British hands was seen as vital to the survival of that branch of mercantile trade: a key argument in continuing the provision supply line to the Upper Posts during the War of Revolution.

## **B. THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM.**

The colonial administration was a smaller copy of the Imperial system. The principal policies which laid the foundation for the administration of the defence frontier were discussed in Chapter Three. These policies were imbedded in two British imperial directives, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act of 1774. The context for these policy statements was the

British conquest of Quebec, a change of government which was particularly pertinent to the largely French population of the Detroit and Illinois sector of the frontier of defence. In that area it left a residue of hostility that hindered attempts by the British to retain the Illinois during the War of Revolution. The Proclamation of 1763 laid down the broad bases of policy with respect to territorial boundaries (although amended in 1774), the creation of an Indian territory to facilitate Indian relations and the operation of the fur trade, the creation of a body of policy and structure of government for the conquered French colony and the establishing of a land grant policy for military personnel. It was placed in the context of the mercantile system where the finance, manufacturing and navigation of the colony was to be controlled by the Imperial government.

In terms of finance the customs service, under the administration of the surveyor general, was an important institution in the collecting of revenue from the colony. Again, the same problems of administration as inherent in the Imperial government surfaced in this service, providing a visible source of discontent for the inhabitants. The system of reporting on administrative affairs, including all financial matters, to the Imperial regime was firmly established by the King's commission to the Quebec governor, a system which became increasingly difficult to maintain during the War of Revolution.

Manufacturing was also controlled by well-established policy dating from the late 1600's. This impacted on Quebec in the Iron Act of 1750 encouraging the extraction of ore and its formation into bar iron, thus facilitating transportation: but any further manufacturing was to be undertaken in Britain. Such policies on limiting manufacturing in the colonies caused irritation even on the frontier, such as in the Illinois where small ore extraction plants were established along the Wabash River.

Navigation was vital in the imperial-colonial system in which, as Meinig observes, there was a clockwise interdependence of Britain and its colonies. The desire to prevent foreign interference in the navigation of the colonies provided a well-spring of discontent in the colonial milieu, but in terms of the frontier the British emphasis on navigation aided the penetration of the interior and provided the system through which both the defence frontier and the fur trade could be maintained.

The policy on territory created a greatly reduced area for the colony of Quebec which was oriented to the St. Lawrence River. Theoretically the interior was to be left either to the administration of the other colonies or to Indian sovereign jurisdiction. However the administrative decapitation of the fur trade posts from their source of supply was resolved by the creation of an Indian territory that was administered by the Upper Posts of Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac, as well as the posts of Fort Pitt and the Illinois. This administrative system had considerable relevance to the frontier during the War of Revolution because the Indians regarded this territory as under their sovereignty and were willing to fight the rebels for possession of it, and for the continuation of a system with which they were familiar. Furthermore, the regulations contained in the Proclamation for administering the Indian trade became standard policy within Quebec and the Indian territory and were continued throughout the War of Revolution.

The establishing of civil government for Quebec was theoretically irrelevant to the frontier of defence because it was not included in the territory of Quebec. Thus during the War of Revolution, when military authority was dominant along the frontier of defence, there was resentment on the part of the civilians to the British assumption of administrative control over their own civil government. Evidence of the increasing independence of the west can be found in the



judicial representation along the frontier where the Justice of the Peace assumed responsibilities often far beyond his mandate. This created a climate for disloyalty to the Crown, which was stimulated by the British preoccupation with the supremacy of not only the king but his religion, which manifested itself in the swearing of an oath of allegiance before assuming office.

The policy on land grants for military personnel had particular relevance to the Indian territory where westward settlement was to be severely restricted. This caused anger amongst the Virginians in particular who were settling the Kentucky River basin and the Ohio. The proclamation virtually ignored this westward phenomenon, except for the proscription that ordered settlers within the Indian territory to leave, unless the land had been purchased for them by the imperial government. This was accompanied by the declaration that all land was to be officially surveyed into townships before occupation, which in many cases on the frontier would mean the realignment of existing township and property boundaries. It can be argued that the intrenchment of settlement patterns was one of the reasons for the return to the French system of 'Fief and Seigneurie' in 1771. However until this time the Proclamation land policy formed the basis for all land grants along the defence frontier, particularly around the forts, and was in part responsible for the alienation of the settlers of the western frontier from the Quebec administration.

The Proclamation, as a body of policy, provides evidence of the systematic institution of policy by the British Imperial government. This policy remained consistent throughout the Murray administration, which immediately followed the conquest, and the Carleton administration, which heralded the institution of the Quebec Act. The institution of its policy was evident in the administration of Indian affairs, although it must be recognized that official documents do not always accurately reflect the reality of the period, particularly at the Upper Posts or along the

frontier.

The Quebec Act, instituted by Parliament on the eve of the American War of Independence, had little impact on the frontier during the Haldimand administration, except as an affirmation of the Proclamation. The extension of the territory of Quebec in the Act implied a concession to fur trade interests, while the reduction in the Indian territory reflected the increasing preoccupation with white settlement along colonial frontiers. However the fact that the Illinois, for example, was granted civil government in the act was of little effect once defence became a pre-eminent issue at the Upper Posts. The status of civil government in the Indian territory was left to the discretion of the Crown.

The Quebec Act also dealt with the issue of the religious affiliation of the French inhabitants. In a climate of conquest the British feared that if concessions were not made on religious issues the inhabitants would not be loyal on civil or military matters. The fear of disloyalty was of considerable concern to Haldimand during the War of Revolution: in particular the liaison between the French and Virginian settlers of the Illinois and the French and Spaniards of Louisiana. To minimise French alienation the British removed the need for a Roman Catholic to take the Oath of Supremacy to the Protestant religion before assuming administrative office. As well, they re-instituted French jurisprudence, within certain English legal constraints, such as Habeas Corpus and English criminal law.

Immediately following these placatory measures however, military law was instituted as a result of the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and its colonies. This was accompanied by the defection of much of the defence frontier to the rebel cause. As such the tenets of the act with

respect to the existing civil and legal organization of the frontier were not instituted during the War of Revolution. As well, the decisions of the Quebec Legislative Council, pertinent to the Upper Posts and the frontier, were rendered largely ineffective by Haldimand's preoccupation with defence and the difficulty of both communicating and effecting these decisions during the war.

### **C. THE FRONTIER IDENTIFIED AND DELIMITED.**

The interior frontier of defence, mapped and described in Chapter Four, extended from the Hudson River in the east to the Mississippi River in the west, and from the Mohawk River in the north to the Susquehanna and Ohio Rivers in the south. It can be divided into an eastern and western sector by the line of scouting that ran from Fort Stanwix to Fort Pitt at the confluence of the Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers. Although the frontier of defence roughly accorded with the colonial frontiers of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virginia, it intruded into settled areas, such as near Philadelphia, along the Hudson near Kingston and Esopus and along the Mohawk, near Schenectady.

Identification of the frontier was made through documented evidence in the Haldimand Papers of campaigns, raids and scouts, and through editions of primary evidence such as by Cruikshank. As Niagara was the principal military command post (west of Montreal) for frontier defence, the reports sent by the commanders at the post and the Indian Superintendent, on a monthly basis, were particularly useful. One problem was the matching of eighteenth century place names to modern maps. This was done as much as possible through comparing the historic record with more contemporary reports, as well as using modern atlases, road maps, and directories that pinpointed historic sites. When all else failed a field trip was made to the conjectured site to ascertain from local evidence whether or not it accorded with the historic record. However there is

still the possibility of a small degree of error when comparing historic place names with modern maps.

The eastern sector of the interior frontier of defence comprised three areas of concentration, but the major campaigns in this sector were conducted along the Mohawk. This was probably because the area was well known to the British frontier forces, it having been the home of many Loyalist troops, including John Johnson, John Butler and Joseph Brant. Thus the area still contained Loyalist sympathizers who could provide both intelligence and provisions. As well, due to its reasonably settled geography, access by both water and road was more feasible for a large force than in other areas of the frontier. Another important motivating force for an expedition in the area was the recruiting of any Loyalists who wished to fight with the British, and who until then had not been able to leave the area safely.

The upper Delaware and Susquehanna areas of the eastern sector were largely targeted by Indian raids, either led by Butler's Rangers, the Indian Department, or the Indians themselves. It was dominated by Indian raids because the Indians were not only familiar with the terrain but able to travel long distances on foot, traverse difficult and narrow pathways, and sustain themselves from the wilderness. A more subtle use of Indian troops in this area was the psychological fear that the frontier settlers had of the Indians, thus facilitating the withdrawal from the frontier of rebel sympathizers. When raids were conducted, an effective method of obtaining provisions was to offer British coinage, the value of which was inflated on the frontier. As well, the pacifist stance of the Quaker communities, particularly in eastern Pennsylvania, offered a possible source of provisions, although somewhat tenuous.

Due to the problem of provisioning along the frontier, raiding sites tended to favour former Six Indian Nation towns, areas of defence, such as the forts in the Wyoming valley and along the Susquehanna, small settlements, forge sites for ammunition, mill sites and granaries for grain and sites of known or possible British sympathy. During the raids houses and granaries were usually burnt together in order to prevent the possibility of the rebels returning for provisions. Cattle were either taken or killed but the distances travelled and the difficult terrain precluded the herding of large numbers of cattle on raids. Furthermore, the taking of live prisoners was limited by the provisions available to the raiding or scouting party at any one time. Prisoners could also be tomahawked en route if provisioning became scarce.

The routes travelled on raids included rivers, streams, roads and Indian trails, but there tended to be a reliance on well-established routeways to facilitate speed. The difficulty of carrying canoes overland or hiding them on creek and river banks while on an overland trek predisposed to a considerable reliance on land travel by Indians as well as whites. Although these raids may in themselves not have been large, as a defence mechanism they were quite effective in providing a constant source of fear and irritation on the frontier. As well, the Indian participation in frontier defence extended the geographical range of frontier territory far more than would have been possible by white troops alone.

The western sector of the interior frontier of defence presented greater problems in defence because of the sparse settlement in the west and the strong sympathy of the Virginian/Kentucky settlers along the Kentucky and Ohio Rivers, and the French settlers of the Illinois, for the rebel cause. As well, many of the western Indian nations had rebel sympathies, largely due to their historic participation in the fur trade with French, Spanish and middle-Atlantic colonials. Fort

Pitt was under rebel control and thus not available as a provisioning source.

Therefore the defence of the area was limited to one campaign by Henry Hamilton to the Illinois, and several raids and scouts along the Ohio or its tributaries, largely in response to rebel provocation. The Hamilton campaign was unsuccessful with respect to long term control of the Illinois. This was in part a response to the distance of Vincennes from the provisioning sources of Detroit and Michilimackinac, the lack of sympathy for the British cause in the Illinois, and the lack of perception by Hamilton of the difficulty of defending the frontier during the War of Revolution. The raids were more successful although they often occurred after a devastating attack by rebel militia.

#### **D. THE HALDIMAND ADMINISTRATION OF THE FRONTIER.**

The colonial administration of the interior frontier of defence had its headquarters in Quebec and to a lesser extent in Montreal, as discussed in Chapter Five. The commander in chief of Quebec during the period of study, Sir Frederick Haldimand, was theoretically subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the forces in North America, Sir Henry Clinton and later Sir Guy Carleton, whose headquarters were in New York. However the exigencies of war and the effect of distance decay precluded adequate communication between New York and Quebec. Thus the command of Haldimand was for the most part autonomous, with instructions from the imperial government in London, chiefly the Secretary of State for colonial affairs, Lord George Germain.

The organization of the army, particularly the civil departments, supports the autonomous status of the Quebec administration in that there were separate offices for the Quartermaster General, Commissary General and Paymaster in Quebec. These were key offices in the provisioning of the forces during the war and understandably could not operate within the climate of inadequate

communication from headquarters. As well the supply system of provisions to Quebec from England was separate from that to New York. This autonomy did not preclude the possibility of exchange between the colonial centers of British administration in the event of a major crisis in defence. Neither does it ignore the fact that in terms of the military hierarchy Haldimand was required to advise the commander in chief in New York of his administrative decisions and if possible seek his approval. However it was the rebel knowledge of this chain of command that was responsible for much of the interception of intelligence and military policy by rebel colonials during the War of Revolution.

The geography of his command placed Haldimand under several constraints. One major constraint was the historic dependence of the interior frontier of defence on provisioning and support services from the Atlantic seaboard: principally New York and Philadelphia. As well, the French-speaking inhabitants of the Illinois tended to depend on the Mississippi for provisions. This dependence provides one explanation for the sympathy of these areas with the rebel cause. Furthermore, during the War of Revolution Niagara was the principal command post for the frontier of defence, making efficient communication over the 600 miles of waterway between Quebec and Niagara somewhat difficult. This allowed for the possibility that distance decay could modify administrative concern over the difficulty of survival at the Upper Posts and of maintaining a system of defence on the frontier. This distance was compounded between Quebec and England, with respect to such issues as the administrative expenses for sustaining a British presence at the Upper Posts and of maintaining Indian loyalty.

Another constraint was the very real difficulty of transporting equipment and provisions to the Upper Posts and on to the frontier. The Upper Posts, namely the Forts at Niagara, Detroit and

Michilimackinac, were respectively subject to increasing difficulties in the transportation of food provisions and the protection of them from rebel or Indian attack. The supply of food to the frontier was maintained by a supply line that had its headquarters at Cork, Ireland, with transfer posts at Deptford and Portsmouth in England. This provisioning chain was contracted by government to civilians and convoyed by the latter to the chief commissary at Quebec or Montreal. It was his responsibility to tranship the provisions to the Upper Posts. Shortages occurred as a result of such factors as inadequate or ill-proportioned supply, poor quality provisions, poor packing procedures, delay in embarkation, length of transportation in terms of time and distance, raids by privateers and enemy vessels, bad weather, losses by pilfering or misplacement, inadequate storage and underestimation of the numbers to be provisioned, especially Indians.

Despite the fact that these shortages were seen by the Haldimand administration as a crisis, the food provisioning service was adequate to maintain or supplement the diet of the forces at the Upper Posts and on the frontier, allowing for the continuation of frontier defence. It was also adequate to retain the loyalty of the Indians throughout the War of Revolution. As well, despite its problems, the provisioning service provided an operative example of the ability of the British administration to continue a contractual service to the Upper Posts and the frontier over considerable distances from the source of supply, particularly in a hostile political environment. The British did however attempt to alleviate the burden of provisioning by promoting the growing of food provisions at each of the Upper Posts. However the constant complaints by the Home government on the provisioning of Indians shows a marked lack of understanding of the system for retaining frontier loyalty.

Haldimand responded to the difficulties of his commission by concentrating on key areas



of administration: namely administrative communication, finance, defence and the administration of government departments. In his role as a subordinate to both the Imperial government and New York, he was particular about the receipt of orders and reports and the communication of colonial affairs to his superiors. Such communication was increasingly difficult to maintain throughout the war, as noted earlier, leading to a greater degree of autonomy than Haldimand considered satisfactory during a war.

Financing and expenditures were major concerns for Haldimand. Administrative specie was shipped from England leading to constant worry about the financial state of the government if it didn't arrive. This eventually led to Haldimand's use of bills of credit, a system which was not condoned by the imperial government. It is difficult to assess just how much specie was sent to the Upper Posts, in light of the complaint by the employees of the Indian Department at Niagara that they had not been paid. However some specie must have been distributed in order to provide a basis for bargaining on the frontier.

In analysing the system of accounting and payment several observations can be made relevant to the system of frontier administration during the War of Revolution. Firstly, there was a system of accounting throughout the colonial service, that attempted to inject some degree of uniformity into the financial administration. This system was based upon record-keeping that applied to all posts of command, whether at Quebec or on the frontier. Secondly, there was a system of hierarchical responsibility for finance, that was exemplified by the different levels of approval for the temporary (lower level) or permanent (higher level) warrants. The temporary warrant implied a more restrictive geographic area of responsibility, such as at an Upper Post, compared with the wide area of responsibility associated with the permanent warrant. The system of warrants

and their associated responsibilities was necessary in order to provide a certain measure of autonomy to those commanding at a distance from headquarters, whilst at the same time attempting to retain central control of expenditures. The basic problem was that it became in essence an expense-account system that was approved 'fait accompli': a system that would require legal action to challenge. Thirdly, the system, by the very nature of its hierarchical structure, operated by a 'tiering' of accounts, such as from the Engineer's Department upwards to the Deputy Quarter Master General's Department, to the Paymaster and then on to Haldimand for approval. This tended to diffuse personal responsibility and also proved onerous to those keeping the accounts. Guy Johnson at Niagara frequently commented on the difficulty of filling out forms and keeping accounts for the Indian Department, while at the same time ensuring an adequate defence posture along the frontier.

Haldimand's concern for the departments of government centred around the chief administrative departments for frontier defence: namely the Military and Indian Departments. The Montreal garrison, apart from its duties to protect the settled parts of Canada, was responsible for assisting in the administration of Lachine, the Cedars, Oswegatchie and Carleton Island. It was also responsible for sending troops either to the frontier or to engage in relief duties at the Upper Posts. Of particular importance to the Quebec administration was the defence of routes of communication between Quebec and New York, such as the Champlain/Hudson route and the St. Lawrence/Mohawk route.

With respect to the types of troops employed in these duties Curtis notes that the chief branches of the military were the infantry, cavalry and artillery, with vital assistance from the artificers and engineers. However while these branches were represented in the military garrisons

of Quebec and on the frontier, the respective troops were forced to subordinate their traditional training to the guerrilla-type warfare of the Rangers and Indians, which was found to be more appropriate to the conditions of the frontier. As well, the uniforms of the forces, described by Curtis as ill adapted for comfort and speedy movement were modified both by the Indians, who loathed the conspicuous red coat, and the Rangers and other troops, to include moccasins and fur hats for quiet speed and warmth in winter.

The posts of Lachine, the Cedars, Oswegatchie and Carleton Island were important not only for troop billeting and defence but also as provisioning depots enroute to the Upper Posts. Haldimand placed considerable emphasis on the Cedars and Carleton Island as major depots: the Cedars because of its location at the portage around the 'Seven Dangerous Rapids' on the St. Lawrence, and Carleton Island because of its location at the eastern end of Lake Ontario.

A major responsibility of the Indian Department was the administration of the provisioning of both the Seven Nations of Canada and the Six Nations. During the War of Revolution the department was preoccupied with supplies to the Six Nations because of the loss of their country after the Sullivan invasion. The Superintendent at Montreal had the responsibility of ordering all Indian provisions and presents for the Quebec service but did not have administrative responsibility over the Six Nations. This was under the superintendency of Guy Johnson at Niagara.

The Indian connection was a constant source of contention during the war, not only because of the escalating Indian demands for rewards for service but also because of the civil responsibilities of the department with respect to the Fur Trade. The profit motive of the trade meant that there was constant pressure to maintain Indian cooperation with the Quebec fur traders,

even in some cases, at the risk of jeopardising defence along the frontier. As a result Haldimand paid considerable attention to 'regulating' the trade and attempting to ensure that during the war defence was of primary concern. Those regulations included maintaining friendly relations with Indians, limiting expense, particularly of the presents, staffing the department with competent personnel, paying frequent visits to the frontier, storing goods well and dispatching them with a reputable 'conductor'. As well, the Superintendent was to admonish the Indians, especially those with rebel sympathies such as the Oneida nation, to remain loyal and where possible, assist in frontier defence.

#### **E. THE ROLE OF NIAGARA.**

The administration of the frontier at the Upper Posts was centred in Niagara, as discussed in Chapter Six. The pre-eminence of Niagara had been gained both in terms of its importance as a portage and because of its historic importance to the Indians. Haldimand had two major policies with respect to the military defence of the frontier. Firstly, a defensive policy that focussed on the post of Niagara and its military strength and secondly, an offensive policy that focussed on frontier harassment. Geographically Niagara's theatre of action stretched from the Mohawk to the Mississippi, but it tended to be concentrated on the Mohawk and the defence frontier east of Fort Pitt. This was in part due to the fact that Niagara was close enough to assist Montreal and Quebec in their defence of communication routes into Quebec and also because of the familiarity of many of the Rangers and Indians with the Mohawk, which was readily accessible from Niagara. The one major exception to this preoccupation with the eastern sector of the frontier was the Hamilton expedition to the Illinois.

As with Montreal the important departments at Niagara for frontier defence were the

Military and Indian Departments. However the distinction between them was less clearly drawn at Niagara because of the participation of the Indians, who formed a large proportion of the potential fighting force, in the fur trade. The Military Department was concerned with maintaining the defence capability of Fort Niagara, provisioning and paying troops, both regular and Loyalist, and minimizing the expense accounts of the post.

With respect to the troops it is reasonable to argue that without Butler's Rangers, a Loyalist Corps, and several notable Indian Captains, such as Joseph Brant and Rowland Montour, the defence of the frontier would have been much less effective. Butler's Rangers only ever numbered about 500 and they were frequently sick from the arduous nature of their duties. However their chief contribution was in their colonial frontier upbringing and commitment to the British cause. In recognition of their commitment they received higher pay, which led to their isolation, wherever possible, from the regular army corps in order to prevent pay comparisons. This policy of isolation was in part responsible for the location of their barracks on the western bank of the Niagara River, rather than on the eastern bank where Fort Niagara was located.

They also practised a form of warfare that was probably known to the Chasseurs, who most likely were familiar with the guerrilla warfare of the European steppes. This warfare, which was intrinsic to Indian combat, consisted of small surprise attacks, good marksmanship from preferably concealed locations, and a detailed knowledge of the terrain. As well, it required the acquisition of provisions en route and the ability to travel long distances with speed. On the frontier therefore, the 'formal' method of large scale warfare, with armies drawn up in symmetrical formations, was not practised because it was inappropriate for effective defence over a wide geographical area. The Indians, although unreliable at times, were a valuable mainstay along the

defence frontier, even if only for the psychological fear of attack that their presence induced in the minds of frontier inhabitants.

Minimizing expense was a dominant theme in the correspondence between Haldimand and the commander at Fort Niagara. The cost of provisioning was a continual burden, particularly maintaining the daily ration issued to each soldier upon enlistment. Again, as noted earlier, the accounting system was onerous and the ration itself could be regarded as either an ordinary expense, if issued to a regular soldier, or an extraordinary expense if that soldier's ration had to be increased for any reason, or if it was issued to provincial troops or Indians. As provisions were sent from Montreal or Quebec the contract system was operative and the commander forced to negotiate annually for the minimum price upon tendering the contract. As well, at the Upper Posts the individuals in charge of the various departments were deputies to those in Quebec or Montreal. Thus all decisions had either to be cleared with the commander at Niagara or with the superior officer back east: a time-consuming system in times of stress.

Food provisions, administered by the deputy commissary of stores, suffered from the same problems as noted earlier with respect to their distribution from England. However the major contention was the issue of rum to the troops, particularly Indians, upon whom it was argued that it had a demoralizing effect. The supply of rum to the military, regarded as a vital provision, was subject to considerable mark-up by the contractors who supplied the government. Haldimand attempted to control its issue, such as by substituting spruce beer, but the commanders at Fort Niagara were continually faced with demands from Indians for rum. The defence vulnerability experienced at Niagara made these demands difficult to refuse, particularly if other provisions were in short supply.

Problems of provisioning became more acute on the frontier. With Sullivan's destruction of the Indian towns of the Genesee for example, the troops were forced to seek further afield for provisions, which made them vulnerable to rebel interference. It can be argued that the geographical extent of the frontier was in part a response to the search for provisions by frontier troops. The use of specie as a means of acquiring such provisions is a fruitful area for research. The 'plan of agriculture' instituted at Niagara, which was to help in provisioning, did little to alleviate the problem because the wheat was sent east for milling and thus subject to the same transportation problems as the provisions regularly sent from the east.

The supply line for transportation depended for its survival on the Niagara River road and portage. This historic Indian route passed along the eastern bank of the Niagara River from Fort Niagara to Fort Schlosser, thus bypassing Niagara Falls. Without it the British could not have taken advantage of Lake Erie for the transshipment of goods. Instead the goods would have had to have been reduced in bulk and either transported via the Ottawa River to Michilimackinac, or via the Humber or Don northwest to either the Nottawasaga River or Lake Simcoe respectively, en route to Detroit. These routes would also have necessitated the creation of a new chain of forts focussing on the eastern shore of Lake Huron.

Provisioning frontier troops with military equipment was basic to the maintenance of a defence frontier. Most of the equipment provided was classified as an extraordinary expense because it was not included in the regular issue to British military units. As well, the loss of equipment on the frontier was high largely due to wear and tear, capture by rebels or Indians, or the trading of equipment by Indians for other goods. Weaponry and artillery were difficult to transport because of their weight and in the case of powder, because it needed to be kept dry in all weathers.

The basic equipment therefore for the frontier was the rifle or musket, which was easily carried, and weather-proof powder boxes. Military equipage also included medicines which were in chronic short supply at Niagara, due to the continual illness of troops on frontier duty and the limited supply of medicines from Montreal.

The supply of military equipment at Niagara depended on the Navy. The location of Navy Hall, on the western bank of the Niagara River, was under the administration of the commander at the fort, rather than under naval administration. This may explain in part why the wintering fleet at Niagara was poorly maintained, leading to a fear on the part of the commander that not only could the ships not maintain a supply line but could not provide an avenue of retreat in the event of a major enemy offensive.

The Indian Department, under the administration of Guy Johnson as Superintendent of the Six Nations, was theoretically autonomous of military command. However during the War of Revolution Johnson was subordinate to the fort commander in matters related to defence. Johnson's mandate was to advise the Indians that their support of the Crown would guarantee provisioning for themselves and their families and a supply of 'rewards' for active service to government. There is little doubt that in making this promise the British underestimated the result of the rebel destruction of the Six Nations country. The number of Indians resorting to Niagara after this event placed a tremendous burden on the financial administration at the Upper Posts. The role of the Indians in maintaining British control in North America was, as a consequence of this expense, challenged by the imperial administration, although it continued to support the Indian connection throughout the War of Revolution. However it did have the effect of forcing Haldimand to give the expenses of the Indian Department top priority in his administration.



Guy Johnson's superintendency of the Indian Department at Niagara was very brief (Summer, 1779 - October, 1781), which gave little time for the development of policy with regard to the Indian service. Before he arrived at Niagara the command of the department had devolved almost entirely on the commander at the fort who, because of his other responsibilities, had little time to give to Indian policy. Therefore the individual who provided a stable command of the Indians during the War of Revolution was John Butler, Commander of Butler's Rangers. His close liaison with the Indians in frontier defence gave him an advantage in understanding the Indian culture, and in providing appropriate administration. He advised on appointments to the department and on the arrival of Johnson, assisted him in its administration, particularly the expense accounts.

In order, as he argued, to maintain Indian participation in frontier defence and to forestall the charge of barbarism levelled at both the Indians and the Rangers by the rebels, Guy Johnson divided the Indians into seven companies. The loyalty of the Indians, as perceived by the British, was always in doubt and it was policy to employ them in the defence of their own territories, or former territories. Thus wherever possible the Six Nation Indians were sent to the Mohawk, Delaware and Susquehanna area while the western nations were employed along the Ohio and its tributaries.

As noted above, the expenses of provisioning the Department were enormous and the demands tended to increase in proportion to the Indian familiarity with the system and his opinion of his own worth to the British government. The demands, both in terms of provisions and rewards, were multifarious and resulted in the British maintaining the transportation of an amazing array of articles to the Upper Posts during the war. This transportation system alone provides evidence of the British commitment to Indian participation in defence and a fear that without it they would not

even retain the fur trade in British hands. Thus when supplies were low the commanders at the Upper Posts became uneasy and reiterated to Haldimand the necessity for continuing the supply despite its cost. However, as in the case of Guy Johnson at Niagara and Patrick Sinclair at Michilimackinac, Haldimand felt that there was too much extravagance, particularly in the issue of rum, and he attempted to lessen it, especially after orders to that effect were received from the Home Government. The result was an Inquiry into Indian expences at the Upper Posts, and the appointment of an Indian Superintendent, Sir John Johnson, who would administer the Six and Seven Nations jointly, as had been done under the former French administration. However these reforms were too late to be effective during the Haldimand administration.

As well as his organization of Indian companies Guy Johnson was also responsible for relocating the Six Nations in new settlements near the southeastern shore of Lake Erie. These settlements, besides giving the Six Nations new territory, had a defensive purpose in that they were located on a major routeway from Fort Pitt to Niagara and thus could act as a buffer against possible rebel encroachment.

#### **F. THE ROLE OF DETROIT AND MICHILIMACKINAC.**

The system of administration at Detroit and Michilimackinac was the same as at Niagara only on a smaller scale and with a greater attention to civil affairs. Both Detroit and Michilimackinac served as fur trade depots and settlements for the traders and Indians serving the western interior. Furthermore, from a defence perspective, their largely French civil population had relatives, friends or business acquaintances in the Illinois and among the rebel colonies. With this in mind Haldimand issued directives concerning the administration of the fur trade during the war, paying particular attention to those traders wintering in the Indian country. As well, the distance of Detroit from Fort

Niagara and points east had given the western settlements a degree of independence which led to a desire for a republican form of government. This political milieu was underestimated by Hamilton when he undertook his campaign to Vincennes.

As with Niagara, Detroit was inadequately garrisoned and munitioned although it did have an effective naval command in the person of Alexander Grant. However the problem of the division in administration between a naval command of the navy at Detroit and a military command at Niagara surfaced with respect to transporting the provisions to and from Fort Erie. Grant was frustrated by having to rely on the administration of the Niagara Portage and Fort Erie for the passage of goods to Detroit. Michilimackinac was even further removed from the arena of war. However, in terms of defence, its small garrison served as a reserve supply centre for both troops and provisions for either Detroit or Niagara, or for sorties onto the frontier.

A major problem in the defence of the frontier west of Fort Pitt was the lack of sympathy engendered for the British cause by the Virginian settlers along the Kentucky River and the French settlers in the Illinois. As well, the western nations of Indians were not as unified as the Six Nations nor as committed to the British cause. However the British were aided in frontier sorties by the fact that the area was less densely settled with rebels although this presented problems in acquiring provisions. It also meant that there was a greater risk of prisoners being tomahawked en route for want of food by the scouting parties. It is noticeable therefore that scouts and raids, particularly after the capture of Hamilton at Vincennes, were much fewer in number than in the east, and only served as an irritant in a sector of the frontier heavily committed to the rebellion.

As with Niagara the frontier defence administration of Detroit and Michilimackinac was

divided into both the Military and Indian Departments, the line of jurisdiction between the two forts roughly passing east of St. Joseph's. Provisioning was a central issue to both posts although the Fort at Detroit was aided considerably by the well-established farming community in its environs. However, because the farmers were predominantly French, strict orders were given to monitor their harvests and the prices charged for provisions. As well, the garrison was to institute its own agricultural scheme as at Niagara. This scheme was to be located on Hog Island in the Detroit River, providing a reasonably defensive location for the employment of Ohio prisoners in the scheme. The garrison at Michilimackinac was more heavily dependent on supplies from the east because of its function as a fur-trading supply depot: the number of farmers at the post being small.

The Indian Departments had even larger numbers of Indians to provision than at Niagara, with a more volatile situation in terms of loyalty. The Six Nations were used by the British as envoys to the western nations to encourage the latter to be loyal: this policy had some degree of success. The attitude of the western nations caused Haldimand to be skeptical about the utility of supplying them with provisions, particularly with the large numbers involved and the small number actually engaged in defence. Haldimand also argued that even if the provisions were reduced the Indians would not defect to the rebel cause as the Continental Congress could not match the British largesse. This belief was not held by the commanders at the Upper Posts who feared the consequences of reducing the supply. In deference to this 'front-line mentality' Haldimand continued the supply but attempted to lessen expenses in other areas such as in the numbers of officers appointed to the Indian Department.

At Michilimackinac Haldimand paid particular attention to trader loyalty. The traders were to be licensed with passports and their place of trade noted. There appears to have been little

attempt to prevent them trading in the Illinois area, which was perhaps in response to pressure from the fur trade interests in England, Quebec and Montreal. However the presence of traders in the area did not preclude scouts and raids being conducted along the frontier, despite the preoccupation of Sinclair with the relocation of the Fort from the mainland to Mackinac Island in Lake Huron.

## **G. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FRONTIER.**

In considering the geographical extent of the interior frontier of defence, Eccles, and to a lesser extent Severance, as noted in Chapter One, identify the pre-conquest Canadian frontier as a main base of settlement along the St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Quebec and a "largely uninhabited virgin wilderness" to the west, punctuated by trading or missionary outposts or settlement 'bases' along the Great Lakes waterway. Thus to Eccles the frontier of Canada was distinct from that of the other colonies in that it embraced the whole area of settlement and its forts, "not merely the outer fringes of the territory in North America controlled by France." Eccles further argues that although there were four types of frontier, commercial, religious, settlement and military, these converged on to the narrow ribbon of frontier territory stretching from Quebec in the east to Michilimackinac in the west.

However in 1778 Guy Carleton in writing to George Germain made a distinction between the settled parts of Canada and the 'outposts' and 'frontier.'<sup>2</sup> In this reference it suggests that the outposts were distinct from the frontier, a distinction supported by another reference in the letter to serving "beyond the lakes," or beyond the defence posts on the Great Lakes. This concept runs counter to Eccles pre-conquest frontier in which the military frontier coincided with the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes frontier.

In this study the distinction of the defence frontier from the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes

waterway is supported by the references in the primary source material to the defensive activities conducted at some distance from the Upper Posts, and to the frequent reference to these activities being on the 'colonial frontiers' or in a frontier location. It is suggested therefore that there can be several frontiers in any geographical area according to the criteria upon which they are defined. Thus although the primary source material did not specifically mention a defence frontier as such, the accordance of defence activities with 'frontier' territory, can infer a British military perception of a frontier of defence.

With respect to identifying the essential characteristics of this frontier, in accordance with current frontier theory, six hypotheses appear to have been borne out. Firstly, the defence frontier was an arena of conflict similar to Jackson's zone of tension, in which there was constantly fluctuating British control. Thus it took some characteristics of a marchland or zone of disputed borderland, lying not between two countries but between a country and its rebelling colonies. As such the frontier of defence was organized on a non-permanent military basis until the War of Revolution ceased and peace was declared. However unlike Bowman's concept of a line or boundary, the frontier of defence was a large zone of territory, usually according with De Blij's concept of ill-defined colonial frontiers.

During the War of Revolution it had little of the 'safety valve' characteristic because of the fear engendered in its inhabitants by the constant British and Indian raids within it. It did serve a gateway purpose however, throughout the War of Revolution, as traders and even settlers continued to advance into the far west of the frontier. Furthermore the boundaries of the zone conformed to a moving line of defence although certain key places tended to be targeted repeatedly. Thus it was a dynamic ephemeral creation for a specific purpose: the defence of British interests in North

America.

Secondly, the defence frontier had little or no settlement, thus conforming to the Jacksonian interpretation of the frontier as sparsely settled. What little settlement it did have however was largely pro-rebel, with sporadic pockets of British sympathy, from which provisions and intelligence could be acquired. It was the supply of provisions that largely governed the area of the defence frontier and the amount of time the frontier troops spent in it.

Thirdly, the defence frontier had a military government imposed from outside, that created two major problems in terms of administrative policy. Firstly, distance decay resulted in a difference in the perception of the political environment between the Home Government in England and Quebec and the administrators at the Upper Posts. Such factors as geographical distance, the cost of buying Indian loyalty, the difficulty of supplying provisions to troops along the frontier and the sense of isolation experienced at an Upper Post command, was often underestimated, even by Haldimand who had frontier experience. Secondly, the difference between the republican attitudes of the inhabitants of the western sector of the frontier and the monarchical institutions of the British Crown was increased with the failed attempt to impose British military government in the Illinois. Since the Conquest there had been an increased attempt by the British to tailor their administrative policies to the frontier, as seen in the Quebec Act, but the War of Revolution and distance decay precluded the imposition of such policy at the time when it was most needed.

Fourthly, the assumption by Turner of a socio-political environment of white lawlessness can not be supported in this study. As with the Roman frontiers, the degree of military control

necessary to institute frontier defence during the War of Revolution precluded anarchy on the frontier. The British attempted to impose a system of administration that was consistent at all the Upper Posts, as exemplified in the instructions to the commanders from Haldimand. Where possible this system of administration was to be extended to the frontier despite the difficulties inherent in geographical distance, particularly in terms of monitoring the system once in place. Hamilton at Vincennes found that monitoring was virtually impossible without local support and an effective supply line of communication and provisions from the Upper Posts. It can be argued that because the Indians did not conform to the same principles as the British that they appeared to engage in lawless activity, but this was a reflection of the cultural differences between the whites and the Indians rather than lawlessness per se.

Fifthly, the interior frontier of defence exhibited attributes of both separation and integration, rather than just the integration postulated by Kristov. The political separation occurred at points and along lines of political allegiance although further study is needed to pinpoint the geography of separation within the frontier. This separation was not always clear cut however, in that Quaker communities and communities in the far west did not always support the rebel cause, although for different reasons. It is suggested that the Quaker communities, with their principles of pacifism, could be looked upon by the British as a possible source of provisioning, although an unlikely source of intelligence. On the other hand the Kentucky and Illinois communities, on the strength of their isolation and increasing independence from the east, sought an alternative form of government to both the Continental Congress and the British monarchy.

However, in accordance with Noble's argument on a "common Backcountry culture" there was a reasonably consistent aversion to Indian participation in the conflict, which generated a



need to create centres of defence for common protection.

This strategy of survival acted as an integrating factor along the frontier, despite differing political views, particularly when the ownership or occupation of land was threatened. The poles of integration east of Fort Pitt were the forts located a cavalry ride apart, such as Forts Augusta, Bedford, Ligonier and Pitt and the forts of the Wyoming Valley. Farther west forts were established along the Kentucky River, such as at Bryant's Station.

In light of Bailyn's argument for the 'diminishment of power' at the frontier, it would be interesting to study the effects of distance decay on poles of integration or separation along the frontier. If power did indeed diminish with distance it would be expected that revolutionary fervor would be less in the Illinois than in Pennsylvania. Such a study would need to rely heavily on Meinig's points and paths of communication and Hartshorne's centrifugal vs. centripetal forces as the catalysts in fostering a sense of revolutionary identification amongst frontier communities.

Lastly, the frontier exhibited no well-defined line of confrontation although there was a general accord of the defence frontier with the outer limits of settlement of the colonial frontiers, and an accord with well-known frontier settlements and forts. As well, there tended to be an accord with main arteries of travel: either rivers such as the Mohawk, Delaware, Susquehanna, Allegheny, Ohio, Miammee and Wabash, or roads, such as the Philadelphia wagon road, and Indian trails. It also was defined in terms of a reasonable proximity to the centers of administration around the Great Lakes. Furthermore as certain areas tended to be targeted repeatedly there was a degree of locational stability of the frontier. It had an inner edge facing Quebec and the line of Upper Post administration, but it tended to be as difficult, due to the rebel presence along the

Mohawk and the Illinois, to defend the inner edge as it was to defend the outer edge which faced the rebelling colonies. The British did attempt to close the outer edge to rebel intrusion by clearing the frontier of civilian settlement, but this was not practical in the western sector of the frontier.

With respect to the effectiveness of the administration of the interior frontier of defence Curtis' argument that the British colonial administration was subject to maladministration must be qualified. Admittedly, the supply and transportation of provisions and presents was hampered by distance decay, particularly in terms of administrative perception and the delegation of authority to both deputies and civilians. This lessened the degree of responsibility at each lower rung of the administrative ladder. Curtis also argued that the absence of centralized authority exacerbated the placing of responsibility and such problems as inter-departmental friction, clumsy business methods, ignorance and administrative incompetence. These problems existed at the Upper Posts. For example, the charge levelled at Guy Johnson for extravagance and the law suit against the merchant firm of Taylor and Forsythe for fraud attests to maladministration.

However, against these problems must be placed the competent administration of Bolton at Niagara and his handling of the provisioning of the Six Nations Indians when their territory was destroyed by Sullivan. As well, Sir John Johnson and John Butler's retrieval of the loyalty of the Oneida nation was a fit example of their long experience with, and understanding of, the Indians. Haldimand's advice to Hamilton to act with caution in retrieving Vincennes and Fort Ouiatenon also attests to military expertise and some understanding of the geographical limitations of the frontier. The retention of the Upper Posts and Quebec itself during the War of Revolution is in part a response to rebel respect for the defence of British garrisons and the ability of the British to engender loyalty in their Indian allies.

The geography of the frontier, and its extent, gives evidence of wilderness survival techniques by British and Indian frontier troops, some of whom were regular British troops and not native to North America. Curtis' argument that there were no large fortified towns to give control over a wide area gives credence to the ability of the administrators of the small Upper Posts to administer and defend such a large area. Furthermore the supplying of provisions to the frontier throughout the War of Revolution, and the ability of the troops to acquire provisions while on it, qualifies Bowler's argument that the army could not obtain any dependable supply of provisions in North America. Admittedly frontier provisions were hardly dependable, one reason for the chronic illness of Butler's Rangers. Thus the continuing presence of the British along the defence frontier during the War of Revolution exemplifies a significant British achievement in administrative logistics and adaptability.

One question raised by this study is whether the British presence at the Upper Posts and on the frontier was supported by loyal attitudes to the British Crown or a desire for a continuation of a way of life that was familiar and in many cases profitable. In other words, what were the political attitudes of the civilians at the Upper Posts, and those who supplied provisions and intelligence on the frontier? Did they share the loyalty to a monarchical form of government that was held by the Haldimand administration? Rawlyk, in his study on attitudes in Quebec to the Rebellion, and Moore's study of the Loyalists, point out that loyalty was subjective and not necessarily motivated by political considerations. It can be expected therefore that, as with the Quakers, the degree of loyalty varied widely amongst British sympathizers. Of particular interest would be the attitudes to the British amongst Indian supporters, especially those holding military rank, such as Joseph Brant. His attitudes, documented in Kelsay's study, were not always in line with British military policy, and it is reasonable to assume that other Indians also held divergent views. Such a study would have

a dual purpose as it would also magnify the geography of the defence frontier by isolating the location of those who supported the British imperial administration.

The Frontier was the zone between the major east-west life-lines of the British, and the rebelling Americans. In the east it lay between the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence, and the Pennsylvania wagon road from Reading to Fort Pitt; in the west between the southern edges of the Great Lakes, and the Ohio River.

It was in the nature of a Defence Frontier to create a glacis rather than a belt of settlement. The zone was cleared, the population killed or driven out, and the agricultural development arrested. The result was to create a cordon sanitaire; a broad "green-line."

The British flank had a clear administrative structure, but its organization was beset by the huge problems and costs caused by vast distances. The administration of the American flank, despite similar problems in organization, was favoured by people "on the ground." The British initiated most of the forays east of Fort Pitt (and thus largely defined the frontier), but were unable either to control the zone, or to inflict damages beyond the capacity of the Americans to absorb.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Higginbotham, 1983, 40.

<sup>2</sup>H.P. 15, 21697, 187.

## **APPENDIX 1.**

### **CHIEF OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH MINISTRY THROUGH THE REIGN OF GEORGE III.**

1760. A Coalition Ministry. The Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt.

Leading Statesmen: Mr. Grenville.  
Lord Chatham.  
Marquess of Rockingham.  
Duke of Bedford.  
Mr. Burke.

1761. Lord Bute. Prime Minister.

1763. George G. Grenville Ministry.

July, 1765. Marquess of Rockingham Ministry.

Leading Statesmen: General Conway, Secretary of State.  
Duke of Grafton, Leader of the House of Commons.

July, 1766. Earl of Chatham (Mr. Pitt) Ministry.

The King was without a Ministry from October, 1768 till 1770.

1770. Lord North's Ministry.

March, 1782. Rockingham Ministry.

July 1, 1782. Lord Shelburne's Ministry.

Source: Mumby, Frank Arthur. *George III and the American Revolution: The Beginnings*.  
London: Constable, 1924. Reprinted by Kraus Reprint Co., New York, 1970, 24-  
64.

## APPENDIX 2.

**THE ROAD FROM DETROIT TO THE ILLINOIS BY WAY OF THE  
FORTS MIAMI, OUIATTANON AND ST. VINCENT WITH SOME REMARKS.**

From Detroit to Lake Erie.....	18	miles
To the River Miamée.....	36	"
To the foot of the Rapids. ....	18	"
To the top of the Rapids. ....	18	"
NB. Part of the Ottawa Nation and a few of the Hurons Inhabit this part of the River - In the Summer when the Water is low Canoes cannot pass these Rapids otherwise than by being dragged over the Stones and frequently the Traders are obliged to carry their Goods the whole eighteen Miles.		
To the end of the Still Water. ....	24	"
To the top of the next Rapids. ....	9	"
To the Grand Glaze, on the left going up. ....	6	"
NB. A few Ottawas live at this River.		
To the little Glaze on the right. ....	3	"
To the King's Glaze on the right. ....	12	"
To the Elm Meadow. ....	15	"
To Sledge Island. ....	12	"
To the Split Rock. ....	6	"
To the Wolf Rapid. ....	12	"
To the Great Bend. ....	12	"
To Fort Miami. ....	15	"
	<u>216</u>	"
NB. The Miami Nation live opposite to the Fort and consist of about 250 Men able to bear Arms. The Fort is inhabited by eight or ten French Familles [sic].		
From Fort Miami to Cold Feet (old French Fort) .....	3	"
The Carrying Place to the little River. ....	9	"
To the River a Boite. ....	6	"
To the Flats. ....	21	"
To the Little Rock. ....	3	"
To the Ouabache. ....	6	"
NB. Between the Miami and the Ouabache there are Beaver Dams which when the Water is low passengers break down to raise it, ... when they are gone the Beaver come and mend the breach - for this reason they have been hitherto sacred as neither Indians or white people hunt them.		

To the River Sallamonee on the left going down.....	15	"
NB. This River is navigable for Canoes 150 Miles or more.		
To the Vessel, or a Stony Island resembling one. ....	6	"
To the river Mississinoway on the left. ....	30	"
NB. This River is navigable for Canoes 150 miles.		
To the Pipe River on the left. ....	18	"
To the Great Rapid. ....	3	"
To the Eel River on the right. ....	3	"
To the little Rock. ....	9	"
To the Island of Garlic. ....	115	"
To Richards Coal Mine on the right close to the River. ....	9	"
To the river Teepeecono on the right. ....	9	"
NB. This River is navigable 150 Miles for Boats.		
To Ouiattanon Fort. ....	18	"
	<u>183</u>	"
NB. This Fort is on the right about Seventy Yards from the River, the Ouiattanon Nation of Indians is on the opposite side, and the Reccapous are round the Fort. In both Villages about 1000 men able to bear Arms.		
From Fort Ouiattanon down the Ouabacheto the River Vermillion. ....	60	"
NB. This River is on the right and at some Season is navigable for Boats about 120 Miles. A Mile up it is a Village of Peankeshaws of upward of 150 men.		
To a coal mine on the left. ....	3	"
To the Highlands or old boundary between Canada & Louisiana. ....	57	"
To Fort Vincent. ....	120	"
	<u>240</u>	<u>639</u>
To the Illinois by Land, the road is chiefly through plains and extensive meadows. ....	240	"
<u>From Detroit to the Illinois:</u> .....		<u>879</u>
NB. The above distances are all computed.		

**THE ROAD FROM DETROIT TO FORT ST. JOSEPH BY LAND & FROM  
THENCE TO THE JUNCTION OF THE ILLINOIS RIVER WITH THE  
MISSISSIPPI BY WATER.**

From Detroit to the River Huron. ....	40	"
NB. There is a village of Puttawattamees of six large Cabans [sic]. The River at this place is about Fifty feet wide and the Water is generally from one & a half to two feet deep where there is Floods. Travellers are obliged to make Rafts to cross it. The road to this place is bad.		
To the Salt River or Wandagon Sippy. ....	12	"

NB. There is another Village of Puttawattamies of five Cabans [sic]. This River is never so high as to prevent people passing it.		
To one of the branches of Grand River or Washtonon that falls into Lake Michigan.	60	"
	<u>112</u>	"
NB. There is another Village of Puttawattamies of eight large Cabans [sic].		
To Reccanamazo River or Pusawpaco Sippy, otherwise the Iron Mine River. ....	75	"
NB. There is another Village of Puttawattamies of eight large Cabans [sic]. This River cannot be passed in freshes but on Rafts, at other times it is one or two feet deep.		
To the prairie ronde. ....	30	"
NB. There is a small Lake of about three quarters of a Mile wide and ten or eleven Miles long, abounding with several sorts of fish; such as Mashinongi white fish etc.		
To Fort St. Josephs .....	75	"
	<u>292</u>	"
NB. There are but a few Puttawattamies near the Fort. The Road after you pass the River Huron is very good being mostly on a small height of Land and little wood till you come near St. Josephs where you pass through one of about a Mile long and another of about Six Miles long.		
From Fort St. Josephs you ascend that River to a carrying place. ....	12	"
From the Carrying Place to Recankeekee River. ....	4	"
To the junction of this River with the Iroquois River. ....	150	"
NB. In this Fork there is a Village of 14 large Cabans [sic] of Mascoutains.		
To the junction of this River with the Chicagou River which forms the Illinois River.	45	"
NB. At this Fork there is a Village of Puttawattamies of twelve large Cabans [sic].		
To the Rocks or old French Fort call'd Pumitiwee. ....	90	"
To the Mississippi. ....	<u>240</u>	"
	<u>541</u>	"
<u>From Detroit to the Mississippi by way of the Illinois River: .....</u>		<u>833</u>



**APPENDIX 3.****THE DIMENSIONS AND DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN ROW BOATS.**

Forty Five Feet Keel.

Two & 72 Feet Rake Forward.

Two & 72 Feet Rake Aft.

Seven & 72 Feet Broad.

Two Feet Deep under the Midship Thwart.

Three & 72 Inches Dead Rising.

Extream [sic] Breadth to be Two Thirds Forward.

The Keel to be Four Inches Broad by Five Deep at Midship.

To be Planked Clinker Work of 1 Inch White Cedar.

To Row 26 Oars all Double Banked except the Bow and After Oar.

To be Sharp Under Water Forward and a Very Sharp Clean Tail Under Water Aft.

The Timbers to be of Red Cedar or light Wood, and not large so that the Boat may be light and easily drawn out of the Water by the Boat's Crew.

The Thwarts to be of 7 Inch White Pine.

This Boat to be Square Sterned.

The Bow full Aloft, on which is to be fixed one light Brass Field Piece 3 or 4 prs. or a 6 pr. if not in too Boisterous a Navigation, to run in Grooves on an Occasional Carriage, and its Recoil Eased by Breechings well secured forward by 2 Ring Bolts.

The Oars to be 12 Feet in Length.

This Boat to carry two Shoulder of Mutton Sails.

To Contain 50 Men, with Three Weeks Provisions if Necessary.

Signed

John Montresor

Comm.d Eng.r at N. York.

NB. If 12 prs. are intended the Timber of this Boat to be somewhat Stronger. If 12 prs. is fixed thereon, she will be by far too much by the Head, draw considerably more Water, not Capable of Rowing so fast, nor to be hawled [sic] out of the Water by her own Boats Crew.

## APPENDIX 4.

A RETURN OF 'LUXURY' PROVISIONS ISSUED TO INDIANS AND PRISONERS BY COLONEL GUY JOHNSON FROM HIS OWN QUARTERS, FROM THE 24TH. JUNE, 1780 TO THE 24TH. SEPTEMBER, 1781.

	Rum (Galls.)	Wines (Galls.)	Vinegar (Galls.)	Sugar (lbs.)	Tea (lbs.)	Coffee (lbs.)	Chocolate (lbs.)	Almonds (lbs.)	Raisins (lbs.)	Prunes (lbs.)	Beef (lbs.)	Butter (lbs.)	Barley (lbs.)	Soap (lbs.)
From the 24th June to 24th September, 1780	320	403	65	1234	274	151	109	75	169	131	111	79	50	751
From the 24th Sept. 1780 to 24th Sept. 1781	1490	2982	328	10572	4515	2266	1467	517	2102	2215	4653	1827	444	7227
TOTAL	1810	3385	393	11806	4789	2417	1576	592	2271	2346	4653	1906	494	7978

N.B. The value of these articles at the current prices at Niagara is York Currency £10,685/3/- out of which deducting what has already been charged and transmitted £2229/8/6 the remainder is £8,455/14/6

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