PHILOSOPHY OF GOD IN KASHMIR SAIYA DUALISM: SADYOJYOTI AND HIS COMMENTATORS

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ABSTRACT

Scholars know a good deal about Kashmir Saivism. Beginning in the teens of our century the works of Abhinavagupta and others were edited, translated and studied both by Indian and Western students. The philosophy of non-dualism or absolute monism that characterized the thought of Abhinavagupta and the Trika or Pratyabhijña school of which he was a representative has come to be identified with the name Kashmir Saivism.

Yet a Saiva school teaching philosophical dualism existed in Kashmir during the same period. The only early writer of this school whose writings have survived is Sadyojyoti (9th.C). It is the writings of this author, along with their commentaries by Rāmakantha (12th.C) and Aghoraśīva (12th.C) which form the main textual basis for this study. The essay also includes a study of Aghoraśīva's commentary on King Bhoja's (11th.C) Tattvaparākāśikā.

The first two chapters give a detailed exposition of the philosophy of God in Sadyojyoti's Tattvatrayanirnaya (with Aghoraśīva's commentary) and Tattvasaṅgraha (with Aghoraśīva's commentary). The first chapter, on the Tattvatrayanirnaya, includes a complete translation of this work and its commentary.
into English for the first time. This is followed by a study on the same theme in Bhoja's Tattvapraśīkā and Aghoraśīva's commentary thereon. These three chapters are followed by a summary of the findings concerning the positive teachings on God put forth in these texts. Chapter four is a study of the polemics in the second chapter of the NaresvaraparTksā of Sadyojyoti with a commentary by Rāmakānta. It is here that the defence of the philosophy of God is effected against other schools of Indian philosophy. Chapter five is a study of Abhinavagupta's polemic in the Tantrāloka against Sadyojyoti's dualism and conception of God. This is followed by a summary and conclusion.

In brief, the findings are that Sadyojyoti's system of thought resembles what one might think of as theistic Sāmkhya. The metaphysics is similar with the only significant difference being that Sadyojyoti finds a place for God (Śiva) largely, so the thesis argues, due to the presence of mala in Saivism, which is absent in Sāmkhya. The argument for the existence of God is similar to the Nyāya syllogism (i.e., is a combination of the cosmological and design arguments). The main opponents to this attempted proof of the existence of God are the Buddhist, Dharmakīrti, and the Mīmāṃsāka, Kumārila.
In general, Sadyojyoti's philosophy of God and his doctrine of philosophical dualism are as successful as any thought system in terms of power of explicability and internal coherence.

The final part of the conclusion argues that the type of philosophy espoused by Sadyojyoti and his commentators cannot really speak to the modern western world since the premises of the former are those which the latter sees itself as having outgrown.
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INTRODUCTION

It is difficult if not impossible to make a foolproof generalization about Hinduism. In fact it has been said recently that Hinduism is to India what comparative religion is to the rest of the world. This means that under the heading 'Hinduism' one can expect to find the most varied and often mutually contradictory philosophical ideas imaginable. But this is to be expected since the word 'Hindu' was originally the Persian (Iranian) pronunciation for the name of a river in present day Pakistan. That same river, the Indus, is also the source of the English word 'India'. Thus the word 'Hindu' was, like the word 'India' still is, a geographical designation. It was not the name of a religion nor did it stand for a certain kind of philosophical view of the world. So it is understandable that 'Hinduism' contained in the past, as it continues to do in the present, some schools that are monistic and others that are dualistic, some that are materialistic and others that are idealistic, some that are theistic and others that are atheistic, etc. Some schools seem to mix several of these elements together and thus make

1 This idea is Prof. Sivaraman's.
2 Cf. Hinduism, Troy Organ, pp-1,2.
classification more difficult. Certainly, 'Hinduism' is too anomalous and multifaceted for there ever to have been in the past or the present, the possibility of one view of things being able to claim that it represents the essence or crown of 'Hinduism'. And this is so in spite of the fact that there is an extensive popular misconception to the contrary.

The philosophy of God which is the topic of this essay may be, depending on the individual, either quite strange or quite familiar. It may be quite strange because it is part of a system which, for example, is monotheistic but not bhaktic; which posits that a released soul becomes the Absolute but not in the sense of advaita; and which posits a caring and compassionate God who helps the souls realize the ultimate value of the system: the attainment of the state of absolute power of independence (svatantryam) the essence of which is that one will not need to be caring or compassionate since no-thing and no being will ever boss one around again. It may seem familiar in that many of the philosophical issues involved in Judeo-Christian or Islamic theological speculation and debate recur in this 'Hindu' philosophy of God.
In the two hundred years that India has been the object of study of modern scholarship it is only in the early decades of our century that we find sustained attention being given to Saiva thought. Most of this

Western awareness of India extends back at least to the time of Megasthenes, the ambassador of Seleukas Nikator to the court of the Chandraguptas (circa 300 B.C.E.). Clement of Alexandria knew of the Buddha and the expedition of the Portuguese Vasco de Gama, six years after Columbus rediscovered America, began the modern period of contact between the two cultures. But European intellectual interest was only awakened in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Last year (1986) marked the bi-centenary of the first translation of an Indian work directly from Sanskrit into a European language (Charles Wilkin's translation of the Bhagavad-Gita into English. In 1801-1802 Anquetil Duperron translated certain Upanishads from Persian into Latin and by 1824 H.T. Colebrooke gave the first description of Indian philosophy to the West in his Essays on the Philosophy of the Hindus. (Cf. Die Philosophie der Inden, H. von Glasenapp, pp. 1-6. See also Les Relations Extérieure de l'Inde: Les Échanges de l'Inde et de l'Empire Romain Aux Premiers Siècles de l'Ère Chrétienne, and La Doctrine Brahmanique à Rome au IIIème Siècle, Jean Fréaisaz).

Even a brief survey of the literature will reveal the growth of interest in Saivism beginning in our century. Early philosophical interest in the West was centered on the Upanisads, the six orthodox systems, Buddhism and Jainism. The thought of Saivism finds no place in the A. Weber's Indische Literaturgeschichte (Berlin, 1852), nor in A. A. Macdonnel's History of Sanskrit Literature (London, published in 1899, the year before Max Mueller's death), nor in A. B. Keith's History of Sanskrit Literature (Oxford, 1928). In all of these works space is given to the description of the six orthodox and two heterodox systems. M. Winternitz's History of Indian Literature (Calcutta, 1927) discusses the Saiva Agamas briefly (Vol. I, p-588) in the section on Tantrism. Monographs on sectarian thought and on Saivism in particular had appeared in quick succession beginning in 1910. In that year L. D. Barnett published a translation and commentary on the Parmārthasāra of
attention has been concerned with two main schools of Saivism: Kashmir Saiva Nonism and Saiva-Siddhanta. The


After this time we begin to see interest in Saiva thought accelerate. J.N. Farquhar’s An Outline of the Religious Literature of India (Oxford, 1920) contains an extensive exposition of Saiva ideas. Saiva philosophy finds a place in the histories of philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan (New York, 1927) and S. N. Dasgupta (Cambridge, 1957). H. von Clasenapp’s Die Religionen Indiens (Stuttgart, 1943) and Die Philosophie der Incer (1958) both contain valuable sections on sectarian thought. The year 1956 stands out. It marks the beginnings of two publications. One was by the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique at Paris, the other by L’Institut Francais D’Indology at Pondicherry. The first series called Publications de L’Institut de Civilisation Indienne contains a number of studies and translations of texts that had been edited in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, which series had itself begun in the early part of our century (1911) and which remains the main source of edited Sanskrit texts on Kashmir Saivism. The Pondicherry series of studies and translations, especially from the early 1960’s has concentrated on the southern Saiva Agamas and is at present turning its attention to the more purely philosophical literature also.

The growth of interest in Saivism beginning in our century can be seen in the periodical literature also, concerning which the reader is referred to the bibliography of this work. It is noteworthy that of the 24 major periodicals searched a large number of articles deal with the aesthetics of Abhinavagupta or with the philosophy of the Pratyabhijna school of Kashmir Saivism, and a couple of articles comprise summaries of the contents of Agamas (by Hélène Brunner-Lachaux) but only one article dealt with the literature with which this essay is chiefly concerned (Pierre Filliozat’s study and translation of Bhoja’s Tattvaprákāśikā).
Flourished from the 9th-14th C.E. and taught abhedavāda (monism). It is also called the Trika or Pratyabhijñā school.

5 The terms ‘Saiva’ and ‘Siddhānta’ are the terms with which the authors of Kashmir Saiva dualism refer to their doctrine. (cf. TP, p-35, PMN,K, p-212, NIP, pp-168, 203, 222, etc.). ‘Saiva Darśana’ is the name by which Sayana-Madhva refers to the school in his Sarvadarśanasangraha. Yet in our time the term ‘Saiva-Siddhānta’ has come to mean southern Tamil Saivism: “Saiva Siddhānta is the name by which Tamil Saivism is known.” (Cf. the article on Saiva Siddhanta by T.H.P. Mahadevan in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, ed., S. Radhakrishnan, p-369). Jean Filliozat understands the term in this way in Les Philosophies de l'Inde (p-107ff.) as does Glasenapp in Die Philosophien der Inden (p-258ff.). Encyclopedia Philosophica (vol.7) makes the same association of the name ‘Saiva Siddhānta’ and the Tamil south. For all intents and purposes, then, ‘Saiva Siddhānta’ now means southern Tamil Saivism and more particularly the doctrines of Mekandar (13th C.) and the writers coming after him. Since these doctrines differ from those of our authors, I refer to the school with which this essay is concerned as Kashmir Saiva Dualism, Saiva Darśana, or simply Saiva philosophy.

At one point Helene Brunner-Lachaux called the pre-Meykandar, Agamic-based, Sanskrit language tradition ‘Saiva’ to distinguish it from Saiva Siddhānta (cf. Somaśambhupaddhati, T.1, pp-I, ii). Concerning Tamil Saivism she says that the school has assumed the position of an independent teaching whose connections with the Agamas is certain but whose fidelity to the Agamic view is less certain. She also states that although this branch of Saivism is the only one that can be said to be still flourishing in the south of India in the present time, and is interesting in its own right, she would not rely on it in the exposition of the teachings of the Somaśambhupaddhati (1085 C.E.). This latter text she considers to be in a different line. However, in a recent private communication she has indicated that there is now no way to avoid using the term ‘Saiva Siddhānta’ to refer to the tradition involved. I prefer to continue to use another name inspite of the fact that, as indicated above, it is by the term ‘Saiva Siddhānta’ that the writers of the texts involved, themselves refer to their doctrine. The philosophy of what is now widely known by the epithet ‘Saiva Siddhānta’ is too different from that of Sadyojyoti and his commentators and this has to be indicated somehow. The best way is to call them by different names.
thought of the earlier (pre-Mekandar) tradition of Sadyojyoti (9th C.) and his commentators Rāmakanta (flourished circa 1115) and Aghoraśiva (flourished circa 1130-1158) on the other hand, has received little attention. Yet it is clear that there was more to the Saivism of Kashmir than is normally associated with that term. For there was a strong school of Saiva dualism there at the same time as the more well-known monistic school. It is the philosophy of God of this Kashmir Saiva Dualism of Sadyojyoti and his commentators that is the subject of this study.

LITERARY BACKGROUND OF KASHMIR SAIVA DUALISM

The canonical literature upon which Sadyojyoti bases himself are the Sanskrit Āgamas ('that which has come' or 'been revealed'). These were composed between the fourth and ninth centuries and are 28 in number. The

6 On the Āgamas cf. Les Āgama Civaites by J. Filliozat, which is the introduction to N.Bhatt's edition of the Raurava-Āgama (Pondicherry, 1961). A valuable table of the 28 Āgamas and 207 Upāgamās follows Filliozat's introduction. For a discussion of the important question as to the relationship of the Āgamas to the Veda, cf. Mahadevan, op.cit. pp-369-370; Sivaraman's Saivism in Philosophical Perspective, p-24ff. and NIP p-285ff. Saivism usually considers the Veda to be a general revelation and the Āgamas to be a special revelation. The latter facilitates the easy comprehension of the essence of the former. L.Silburn states that monistic Kashmir Saivism does not belong to the Vedic tradition and rejects the Veda in Le Paramārthasāra intro. p-5.
canon also includes 207 Upāgamas (ancillary Āgamas).

An Āgama is supposed to be made up of four parts which deal with four separate topics: the jñānapāda (gnosis section), kriyāpāda (ritual section), yogapāda (meditation section) and the caryapāda (devotion section). A philosophical treatise which attempts to elucidate and systematize the information mostly contained in the gnosis section of an Āgama or upāgama is called a prakarana in Saivism. Sadyojyoti and his commentators were writers in this latter genre.


8 Eighteen prakarana writers are listed according to Saiva tradition (cf. Brunner-Lachaux, op.cit., p-xxii). Ugrajyoti is the first listed. His student, Sadyojyoti, is the second. The names Rāmakāṇṭha and Aghorasiva also occur in the list, as does the name Nārāyanakaṇṭha. Our Rāmakāṇṭha always identifies himself in the colophons of his works as the son of Nārāyanakaṇṭha (NIP, p-274, MK, p-63, NK, p-24, PMNK, p68, Sārdhatrisatikalottaragama, p-166). But this is still no guarantee that Rāmakāṇṭha is ours. It seems to me to be highly likely that it is.

Concerning the confusion over the name 'Rāmakāṇṭha' cf. K.C.Pancey's intro. to Bhaśkari, pp-xviii, xxi, xxii. Prof. Brunner-Lachaux's comment concerning prakarana writers is worthy of note. She says that many of them journeyed to Kashmir where they were claimed by the Kashmiris to be their own, while the same writers were claimed by the Tamilians in the south. (cf. op.cit., p-xxii).
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON SADYOJYOTI AND HIS COMMENTATORS

The biographical information on Sadyojyoti is scanty. All we know about him is, that he was a student of Ugrajyoti and that the tradition of the Raurava Āgama is said to have persisted, unbroken, from Ruru through to Sadyojyoti. We do not have any direct evidence of where he was from although I take it on circumstantial evidence that he was a Kashmiri for the following reasons. His writings were well-known by at least four writers who were Kashmiris: Narayanakāntha, Rāmakānta Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja. Except for the Tamilian Aghorāsiva, he is not known, to my knowledge, by any writer in the medieval period, outside of Kashmir. It seems to me much more likely that Aghora went to Kashmir and studied Sadyojyoti and his commentators rather than to have brought the teachings of Sadyojyoti from the south to the north, or that the northerners went south to study Sadyojyoti. Given

9 For the following information on Sadyojyoti cf. Frauwallner, op. cit. p-8ff.; Pandey's Abhinavagupta, p-170ff.; and intro. to Bhāskari by Pandey (Lucknow, 1954), p-xvff. In Abhinavagupta's TA, VIII, 36, Sadyojyoti is called Khetapala. In Narayanakāntha's commentary to the MA he is called Khetanandana throughout.
Kashmir's small size and isolation, the fact that Abhinavagupta devotes two chapters of his TA to the refutation of the teachings of Sadyojyotī, can only mean, to my mind, that the latter's writings and line of commentators had always constituted a strong local presence. In addition to this the editor of a number of Sadyojyotī's works, N. Kṛṣṇaśastri, without giving evidence, states that Sadyojyotī was from Kashmir.

Sadyojyotī's date, given as the 9th c. is inferred on the basis of his having become an author of considerable stature by the time that Abhinavagupta wrote. Abhinava's period of literary activity is known to have extended from 990-1015 C.E.

10 Kashmir is an oval-shaped dried up lake bottom about 84 miles by 20-25 miles which gives it almost the same area as Prince Edward Island. It is ringed by mountains on all sides with only two passes. This means that on a clear day the whole of the valley would be visible from the right vantage point. Its elevation is about 5,000 ft. which is about 2,000 ft. less than the hill-stations of the South, Kodai Kanal and Ooty. Its elevation spares it from the punishing heat of the plains to the south (Cf. M. Stein's transl. of Rājatarangini, Vol. 2, p-388) Given this geography, I cannot believe that all of the important writers and commentators, and main schools of thought, etc., did not know each other very well in this valley.

11 Intro. to Astaprakaranam, (Devakottai, 1923), p-2

12 Cf. Pandey in Abhinavagupta, p-9 and his intro. to Bhaśkarī, p-xvi. I list here the known works of Sadyojyotī as given in Pandey's Abhinavagupta, p-170: Bhogakārikā, Mokṣakārikā, Paramoksanirūṣakārikā, Tattvasangraha, Tattvatrayaniñaya, Nareśvaraparīksa, and the Rauravatantravṛtti which latter is not extant.
Sadyojyoti's significance in the history of Śaiva philosophy is due to a considerable extent to the genre in which he chose to write. He was not primarily a commentator on the works of others. At least one of his works does appear to have been a commentary on the Raurāva (the non-extant Rauravatāntavṛtti) and two others, the Tattvatrayanirṇaya and the Tattvasaṅgraha were summations of doctrines contained in certain Āgamas. But the bulk of his works are original in that they are attempts at systematic formulation and defence of Śaiva teachings. They are the only such works which we possess in early dualistic Saivism of this genre, with the exception of Bhoja's Tattvāprakāśikā, which is not, in any case a dualistic text although Aghora tries to make it out as such in his commentary on it which is studied below in Ch.3. From Sadyojyoti's pen alone do we possess such a profusion of texts (six in number, on a variety of topics) which makes it possible to make out clear attempts at systematization.

Rāmakanta hailed from Kashmir.13 His literary

activity is placed in the first quarter of the 12thC. and was a teacher of Aghoraśiva.

Aghoraśiva was from the Cola country (Tamil Nadu). His period of literary activity was 1130–1158.

I have included a study of a text (Bhoja's Tattvapraḥsīkā) in this essay which was not authored by Sadyojyoti because this text has an important commentary by Aghoraśiva. The King Bhoja whose name appears in the colophon of the TP has been taken to be the King Bhoja of Dhara who reigned in the Malava-Konkana region of India in the first half of the 11th C. P.S.Filliozat has expressed some doubt as to whether this is the right King Bhoja, since there were several. He also suggests that the text may have been written by an author who was

14 Cf. Pandey, Abhinavaqupta, p-175.

15 Idem. Pandey (op.cit.p-175) lists his works as follows: Nādakārīka, Paramoksanirāsakārīkāvṛtti, Mokṣakārīkāvṛtti, Nareśparaparīksāvṛtti; and these two known only from references: Mantravārtikātikā and Agamaviveka.

16 Tattvatrayanirnayā, p-32.

17 His works (cf. Pandey, Abhinavaqupta, p-176): Commentaries on the Tattvapraḥsīkā of Bhoja, on Sadyojyoti's Tattvasaṅgraha, Tattvātrayanirnayā and Bhoetakārīka, Śrīkaṭha's Ratnārāyaṇa, Rāmakāṭha's Nādakārīka and Nārāyanakaṭha's vṛtti on the Nṛgena Agama. The following are known only from references: Ascaryasāra, Pākhandaśajapa, Bhaktapraḥśa, Abhyudayānātaka.

18 Cf. Sivaraman, p-32.
receiving royal patronage. Besides Aghoraśiva's commentary on this text, there is another by one Śrīkumāra. Nothing definite is available in the biography of this writer. There is no direct evidence that either of the two commentators knew of each other's work although Aghora may have had Śrīkumāra's interpretation of the TP in mind when he suggests in his introductory verse that others had wrongly understood the text.

STRUCTURE OF THE ESSAY

This essay has two parts. The first, comprised of the first three chapters followed by a summary and conclusion, is a study of the positive teaching concerning God. The second, comprised of chapters four, five and then a summary and conclusion, is a study of the defence of the dualistic Śaiva philosophy of God against opposing schools.

I have aimed to be thorough in the expositions in all five chapters and a certain amount of tediousness has been unavoidable. There are some long excursions in the first three chapters, into the nature of angels, into the minutia concerning the problems about the classification of bound souls and into what exactly is

19 Filliozat, p-245-246.
operator in the questions concerning the relationships between various entities, especially Siva and Sakti, etc. In the last two chapters there is high scholastic debate studied where the same essential points are returned to time and again and hammered away at. I have tried to cut out tiresome repetition of the same point and have attempted to distill pleonasm down to essential points but in the end I shied away from trying to depict the texts as something they are not. These writers split hairs and to my mind not only have good and vested reasons for doing so, but probably enjoyed it. To me there is something laudable and familiar in the tenacity and bloody-mindedness of the debates we will witness. The long arguments are not without their humor and caricaturing. This is always, in my view, a sign, if not of saintliness, at least of sanity.

In the final conclusion I try to make a few points which do not die the death of a thousand qualifications. Perhaps all I need say about this at this point is that the premises of a philosophy of God such as we are about to encounter have progressively come to be viewed as being innocuous among the educated and the ruling classes in the West. To say the same thing a different way: this philosophy will be, for an educated Westerner an object of tolerance rather than of significance.
Chapter I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOD IN THE TATTVATRAYANIRNAYA OF
SADYOJYOTI

The Tattvatrayanirnaya is the most appropriate work with which to begin the study of the doctrine of God in Saiva Darśana because it gives, in a brief format, the broad outlines of Sadyojyoti's system. It avoids the discussion of detail (i.e. the thirty-six or so tattvas which we will encounter in the Tattvasaṅgraha and the Tattvaprakāśikā) and limits itself to explaining the three principles of the system: Śambhu (Śiva/Pati/God), Purusa, (paśu/animal, the individual bound souls) and Māyā (paśa/bonds). In bold strokes, then, the text is about God, man and the world; or the ones concerning whom something is wrong, the cause of something being wrong, and the one who facilitates the righting of that wrong. In this short text these three principles are defined and the similarities and differences that exist between them are limned. Almost all of the basic tenets of the system are either directly mentioned by Sadyojyoti in his verses or by Aghoraśiva in his commentary.

The doctrine for which this school is most famous is that God depends on the maturation of mala (impurity) in the dispensing or the withholding of his
grace which latter is the condition for the removal of \textit{mala} and the attainment of release. This doctrine is stated and defended in some detail in the \textit{TTN}.

Thus, because of its clarity, brevity and conciseness the \textit{TTN} is an ideal introduction to the philosophy of God in \textit{Śaiva Darsana}, the more detailed discussion of which is to follow in the subsequent two chapters.

Before giving a brief overview of the contents of the \textit{TTN}, which will be followed by a study and then a translation of both the verses and the commentary, it will be worthwhile to note the following point. Sadyojyoti and his commentators, in their attempts to systematize the contents of the philosophical sections of certain \textit{Āgama-s}, walk a tight-rope. On the one hand they want the teachings to make sense both to themselves and to others. This means that they aim to portray the teachings of the \textit{Āgama-s} as having inner logical coherence, hence as corresponding to the way things really are, and hence as being the most effective means for the attainment of release. On the other hand, they have to deal with the recalcitrant givenness of \textit{Śaiva religious practice}, the description of which has a far more voluminous place in the \textit{Āgama-s} and which would appear to have been danced out according to la raison de
La coeur before Sadyojyoti and his commentators tried to think it out.

If the above point be accepted that this system is quite well thought out but that incoherence remains due to 'existential' factors, it can be said that Sadyojyoti's system is more typically 'Hindu' than more well known teachings such as that of Śankara, for example. I mean by this, that what S. Dasgupta says about the philosophy of Vijñāna Bhikṣu is true, mutatis mutandis, also of Sadyojyoti’s thought. He says that Bhikṣu’s system:

...may therefore be regarded as a faithful interpretation of the theistic Vedānta which is the dominant view of the Purāṇa-s in general and which represents the general Hindu view of life and religion. Compared with this general current of Hindu thought, which flows through the Purāṇa-s and the Smrīti-s and has been the main source from which Hindu life has drawn its inspiration, the extreme Sāṃkhya, the extreme Vedānta of Śankara, the extreme Nyāya and the extreme dualism of Madhva may be regarded as metaphysical formalisms of conventional philosophy.¹

If one understands the theistic Vedānta to include Śaivism and if one adds the Śaiva Āgama-s to the Purāṇa-s and Smrīti-s in the above, then one gets a neat description of the place of Sadyojyoti and his commentators within the broader context of Indian Philosophy. 'Metaphysical formalism' has its place in the writing of Sadyojyoti and his commentators but it is

¹ Dasgupta, S. History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 3, p-471.
not as extreme as that found in Sankara or Madhva. The reason that it is not so is that Sadyojyoti's systematization had a very strong requirement that it describe the way Saivism was actually practiced, as he knew it from his own experience and as he found it described in the various kriyā-pāda-s etc., of the Āgama-s. Thus Sadyojyoti, like the fathers of the early Christian Councils at Nicea and Chalcedon, was guided by the principle, canonized in the West by Prosper Tiro of Aquitaine (306-463), to this effect, that "The law of worship establishes the law of belief."² So if it is the case, as will be shown, that some things Sadyojyoti believed did not make as good logical sense as one might wish, the next question to be considered is whether truth lies in the direction of the ideal and logically tight or in the direction of the actual and logically loose. Depending on how one answers that question one will either value or devalue what this medieval Indian has to say. I defer the expression of my own preference to the conclusion of this essay.

OUTLINE OF THE TTN

The TTN is a short work of 32 verses (in the

printed edition, 22pp. including Aghorasiva's commentary). It is said in the last verse that Sadyojyoti intended it to be an exposition of the essential teaching of the SA.

The lay-out of the work can be briefly summarized as follows: verse 1 is a propitiatory verse (maṅgalam) which includes some description of Siva; verse 2 enunciates the purpose of the work; verse 3 lists the three principles of the system along with their common characteristics; verse 4 describes the dissimilarities between the first two principles on the one hand and the third on the other; verse 5 lists the dissimilarities between the first two principles; verse 6 further describes Siva; verse 7 describes the bound souls; verse 8 describes the individual soul's inability to achieve release on its own; verses 9 and 10 describe the necessity of the role of God in the soteriological scheme; verse 11 posits mala as the cause of the soul's association with māya (the material world); verse 12 to 16 discuss the process of release; verse 17 to 31 discuss the relationships between God's grace, human effort and release from bondage, along with certain objections to God's depending on factors external to himself in the granting or withholding of grace; and verse 32 concludes with an identification of the author.
and the statement, noted above, that the TTN is an exposition of the SA.

STUDY OF THE TTN AND ACHORASIVA'S COMMENTARY

Sadyojyoti is one of those thinkers who opines that man cannot pull himself up by his own bootstraps. He is like Rāmānuja, Kumārila, all Nyāya thinkers, and Śaṅkara in this, and unlike Kapila, Mahāvīra and Buddha. Whether the help man needs be God, a mahāvākyā from Chāndogya or the āsvamedha-sacrifice makes no difference for the point is the same: man cannot do it all. For the latter three man can do it all, unaided. Anyone, by a kind of hit and miss process and a great deal of effort will, given time, achieve release. Following the teachings of Kapila, etc., just cuts down on the time involved. Or similarly, knowing the name of the Buddha, for example, or the Eight-fold Noble Path is not a conditio sine qua non for attaining enlightenment.

But there is a further distinction to be made among those thinkers who contend that man needs outside help to achieve release. On the one hand there can be the conception that release is aided by the placing before the aspirant, in written or spoken form, of the
Gesetz\textsuperscript{3}, which the aspirant then tries to realize. When he has done so he will have done what is to be done, that is, release will have been achieved. But there was never anything in the impersonal law which was constitutionally like himself and hoping for him. The impersonal Brahman, like the law that the velocity of a falling object is equal to the cube of the time the object has been falling, does not hope for men, though Brahman, like the law of velocity, may well be beneficial if discovered. But Sadyojyoti does not think of things in this way. His moksa-scenario is thoroughly peopled. The Lord, the conditio sine qua non for release is a Big Man, an Old Boy, a Generalissimo who is anxious about his pups, who in fact does all he can to get them promoted, who knows and acts like we do but without our limitations.

Sadyojyoti's universe, at least insofar as we look at it from the position of the unreleased, is moist with warm love. (The situation after release, as we shall see below, would appear to be one in which to love, which means being related to something, is impossible for this would imply lack of independence; and this in turn, is on Saiva terms, precisely, to be un-free. But there can be no doubt that it is compassion that moves Siva to help the presently un-free humanity.

\textsuperscript{3} By this is meant some law or impersonal truth.
and it is to this situation that the above statement applies, for here is not the dust-bowl of the Gesetz.)

All of the above is clear, not only from the first verse of the TTN but also from Aghorasiva's maṅgalam which speaks of a receiving from the giver due to the grace of the giver. Similarly in the propitiatory and descriptive first verse of the text the Lord is said to personalize his giving of grace depending on the condition (i.e., number of bonds) of the individual involved. That is, there is a decision made ad hominem on the part of the Lord, whereas a stone, obeying the law of velocity makes no exceptions concerning those unfortunate ones who might be in its path. Sadyojyoti's universe is saturated with meaning, not because all is sapience, but because nothing happens without impulsion or decision on the part of the Lord or on the part of man.4

The only difference between an ordinary human

4 Since Sadyojyoti teaches a dualism in the sense that, in his thinking a part of the world is eternally insentient, it cannot be said that all is sapience. But insofar as even the insentient (acit, jāda) part of the world has soteriological significance only when incited or employed by the sentient, all things can be said to be saturated with soteriological significance. The acit does not need cit to be, but only to be significant to what Sadyojyoti cares about, i.e., mokṣa.
being and the Lord is that an ordinary human being has always, and the Lord has never, been veiled by mala. Sadyojoyoti 'posits' the Lord to make sense of the possibility of moksa in the same sense in which Aristotle posits the Unmoved Mover to make sense of motion. Thus Aghora notes in his commentary that if the Lord too, were admitted to have become enlightened at some point in time, infinite regression would result (for the question would then become: owing to what cause did this happen, ad infinitum.) But what was said in the introduction to this section has to be kept in mind here. It is simply une donnée for Sadyojoyoti that man, by nature, cannot achieve release in an unaided fashion. If this is admitted then one has as much as admitted that either release is impossible, or that, in Sadyojoyoti's case, Siva exists. But if one says with Kapila or the Buddha, for example, that each person, by nature is the cause of his own release, whether this be expedited by listening to the teachings of someone who has been there or not, then the chain of causality of moksa ends with each one of us individually. There is no infinite regression here either. It is unacceptable to Sadyojoyoti that the infinite regression end with each

5 TTN, 5.6. Note all references are to the Sanskrit text.
6 TTN, p-1, L-14.
individual and not with Siva because of the Saiva teaching that individuals are always veiled by malas and therefore require Siva to effect their release. But the Buddhists and Sāmkhya-s do not accept this anthropolog y and so do not accept the theology. We will not go far wrong if we keep in mind that the doctrine of mala makes Siva necessary. It is like a make-work project for Siva. It is that which necessitates that there be such a thing as Saivism in the world. Mala is like a stain that is too tough for all of the other cleansers on the medieval Indian market to remove, with the exception of Saivism. Mala is the raison d'etre of Saivism. Karma is not a problem. The other teachings can take care of that.

In this first verse one of the adjectives used by Sadyojyoti to describe the Lord is anāyattah. Aghora Śiva comments that it means that Siva is independent (svatantryam) of all else.7 Rāmakanṭha, in a similar context explains that the Lord can depend on other things and yet be independent. The thing that would take away the independence of the Lord would be if he were at the disposal of another god (īśvarāntara-ayatā). Rāmakanṭha points out that a king is independent in commanding that his elephants and horses be left—where they are or brought to him, etc. He is not thought to be lacking in independence just because he

7 TTN, p:1, L15
possesses and thus 'needs' these things. Loss of independence would become a reality only if another king ordered him around. Thus God can depend on the maturation of karma and mala in granting or withholding grace and yet be independent. 8

The other adjective used to describe the Lord in the first verse is ānādyudayāh (lit. beginninglessly manifest). Aghora explains that this means that the powers of omniscience and omnipotence of the Lord are ever present since he is beginninglessly without mala. 9

The second verse gives the following information: The TTN is written by Sadyojyoti for the benefit of the slow to learn; he is qualified to write the text since he belongs to a lineage of teachers that goes right back to the Lord (i.e. authentic apostolic succession); the purpose of the text is to throw light on truths only partially understood up until this time.

Verse three gives the three principles of the TTN and hence of the SA as Sambhu, Purusa, and Māyā. Aghora gives an etymological break-down of the word Sambhu. He also emphasizes that the word purusa, though singular, is here a collective noun in the singular number (jñātyekavacanena), referring to all (numerically)

8 NIP, p-259, L-13 for Īsvarāntarayattā. For the example of the elephants and horses cf. NIP, p-151, L-18 to p-152, L-9.

9 TTN, p-1, L-13.
diverse souls. Māyā, in the verse, is understood by Aghora to mean the material cause of the impure creation (from māyā-tattva down to prithivi-tattva) and also the material cause of the pure material creation (from Śiva-tattva down to vidyā-tattva).\(^{10}\)

The three tattva-s mentioned here are the same as those mentioned in the TP, verse 69, except in the latter case the name of Śiva replaces that of Śambhu.\(^{11}\)

All three of these principles are endowed with the capability to be doers. Śambhu and the souls are so by nature, while māyā, being insentient, is only so due to being superintended by the Lord.

In his commentary to this verse Aghora seems to sense something that has continued to puzzle me. Why is mala not a tattva? His answer is that mala is not mentioned separately because it is understood to be eternal and omnipervasive on the basis of its being the

\(^{10}\) TTN 3 is quoted in Nārāyanakantha's śāstrī on the MA, IX, 2 and by Sivaraman in Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective, fn. 6, p. 533. The sentence, which follows the one to which the latter refers (Sivaraman, p. 207) is true of Śaiva Siddhānta but not of Śaiva Darśana: "The manifestness of matter as well as its very existence is comprehended 'non-dualistically' in that of spirit." In Śaiva Darśana matter's (mala's, māyā's) manifestness or very existence is comprehended within itself, not within spirit. It exists but cannot act on its own. It does not need help from spirit to be, but only to be significant (ie., to act or cause effects).

\(^{11}\) The name 'Śiva' also replaces that of Śambhu, in the next verse (no. 4) of the TTN.
veiler of the eternal and omnipervasive soul. The idea seems to be here that mala is in the list in the sense that it is included in the purusa principle. But this still does not make sense. Mala is substantially heterogeneous from the purusa-s. The former is acit, the latter cit. It is precisely because of this heterogeneity that there is bondage of the souls. Just because the souls, each with their mala share the same locus in the sense that they are beginninglessly found together still does not explain why mala is not listed as a separate principle. Mala is the root cause of bondage and should be expected to be listed as a principle. This would seem to be especially the case when one considers that maya, which is listed, finds its role in aiding to remove mala, and is in this sense, less important than mala.

I have not been able to find an answer to the above difficulty. I would speculate that mala as a bond is a relative late comer, after karma and maya, in the field of Indian soteriology. It is extremely important to Saiva thinkers since it is the raison d'être of Saivism (i.e. dīksā alone can remove it) but is bound to be more or less redundant and, as is the case in the SA as depicted in TTN 3, not even listed as a principle of

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12 TTN, P-3, L-18.
the system. Thus Aghora's explanation of its absence seems to me to be unconvincing.

All three of the principles of the system are described in verse three as being omnipervasive (vibhu). Aghora points out that in the case of māyā this 'omnipervasiveness' extends only to the limits of its own proper domain.13 Were this not so, even Siva and the released souls might be effected by māyā. Abhinavagupta and Ksemarāja will point out the difficulties involved in this matter in a similar situation concerning māla.14 That debate will be studied in the fifth chapter of this essay. In any case, the absurdity of positing that an insentient entity like māyā could somehow know that its omnipervasiveness is not to extend to Siva and the released souls is a structural problem for Sadyojyoti and his commentators. It is one they never overcome.

Verse four delineates the difference between Siva and the souls on the one hand and māyā on the other. Siva and the souls are both numerous, sentient, and not the source of the material creation; whereas māyā is one, insentient and is the source of material creation. This attribution of exactly opposite characteristics to Siva/souls on the one side, and māyā

13 TTN, p-3, L-17.

14 TA, Ah IX, 68a and comm.; and Ksemarāja's commentary on the Svacchandatantra, V, p-76, l-8ff.
on the other, is the primary reason for the classification of the system of Sadyojyoti as dualism. As we shall see throughout this essay, this division of the world into sentient and insentient loci has, in those areas where it naturally possesses the upper hand, unrivalled power of explanation.

One of the defining characteristics of the philosophy of God of Sadyojyoti begins to emerge here. The idea is that in the beginning there is only one God, Siva; but the whole idea of the system is that each bound soul, upon release becomes a god, equal to Siva. That is, each soul is destined to recover its powers by the grace of the one whose powers have never been veiled. The idea is that in the beginning there be one God but in the end there be as many gods as there were bound souls (plus one, i.e. Siva). The recovery or unveiling of one's powers makes one a Siva. One is promoted to a general's rank. One does not merge with the Generalissimo such that one loses one's identity. One is another Generalissimo with the same rights, privileges and powers. These powers, however, are not added to one from the outside, but are rather the manifestation of what was always present from the start. The idea is that man, as a bound being, needs outside help to realize what lies within. But once this
realization has taken place one needs nothing. One is impelled by nothing.

Māyā in this verse is said to be one. One reason seems to me to be that the cosmogonic is defined in Śaivism on the analogy of the pot and the pot maker. In this analogy, which is a simple given, not only are the material and efficient causes separate, but the material cause is unitary. The many pots are made of the one substance, clay. Thus what is material, many and insentient wants a cause that is one and insentient. The weakness of this explanation is that the Nyāya school uses the same analogy and arrives at a material cause that is many and not one., i.e., atoms. Another explanation might be that when one posits in philosophy, an entity which is eternal and one (which 'occupies' all time and space), one is exempt from questions concerning the causal source of that entity. This is the way the dualistic Śaiva-s prevent the source of material creation, and hence 'impurity' from being traced in a causal fashion back to the Lord. Finally, the fact that the source of the cosmogonic scenario is based on Samkhya metaphysics no doubt made it logical that māyā, like the prakṛti of the Śaṁkhya-s, be unitary and not many.

In verse five the difference between Śiva and the soul is limned. There is in this delineation a
reason for God and man being different in the beginning but not in the end. For in the end men will be gods. Thus the distinction about to be drawn is an impermanent one, the extinction of which is the goal of Śaiva Darśana.

Now the distinction between Śiva and the souls is that among all souls only one has had the distinction of having never been bound and that is Śiva. Thus Śiva is just a soul like any other, the only distinction being the above proviso. And since Śiva is really only just a soul it follows that the souls can become Śiva-s. The system is monotheistic in the beginning and polytheistic in the end.

Verse six denies mutability in Śiva who is one. The scriptures imply in certain places, according to Aghora, that Śiva is not completely homogeneous, that he has different embodiments, that he can be with or without form, etc. The manner in which this charge is handled is to say that any attribution of heterogeneity to Śiva is metaphorically and not finally true. This distinction between metaphorical (upacārena) and final truth (paramārthika) amounts to a denial that the

15 TTN, 5
16 TTN, p-5, L-14, 15.
17 TTN, p-6, L-5.
18 TTN, p-6, L-5, 6.
Aristotelian Law of Excluded Middle applies to the case in question. It is denied that Siva either must have or must not have homogeneity. It is asserted that he both has it and does not have it. He has it really. But he does not have it since he 'loses' it metaphorically when he acts as Lord of creation. This device allows Sadyojjotì and his commentators in this and similar situations to escape all charges of contradiction in their doctrine. A contradiction can only be demonstrated if there is simultaneous attribution to the same thing in the same way, of mutually exclusive characteristics. The significance of upacāra is that it denies that the attribution is made 'in the same way'. For heterogeneity and homogeneity are attributed to Siva in different senses: the former metaphorically, the latter really.

It seems to me that this introduction of a third category between the real and the unreal i.e., the metaphorical, allows the manifestation in doctrine of an existential necessity in Saivism. Siva is the Lord of creation. He acts and to act is to be mutable and heterogeneous. Yet the Lord, to really be Lord must also be immutable. Upacāra allows Siva to be both and yet not be both. The existential situation requires that Sadyojjotì use 'loose' logic to think a God that is both Saiva (that is 'mutable' in acting) and 'Pan-Indian'.
(and not only Indian) in the sense of being eternal, immutable, and one.

It is interesting to note that the picture of God that is beginning to emerge in Sadyojyotī's thought is that of a God which needs 'loose' logic in order to be defensible. Another way of putting this would be to say that Sadyojyotī prefers inferring a relatively incoherent divine nature which sticks close to the 'earth' and tries to make sense of as much of our experience as possible and hence is a little jumbled, to the positing of a logically 'tight' and coherent divine nature from which it is impossible to deduce the 'earth' or existential experience in any way which is recognizably familiar or finally valuable.

Briefly, what Sadyojyotī seems to be saying here is that one can have a coherent and 'tight' conception of the divine nature but this divine nature would be irrelevant to man and the world. If one wants a conception of the divine nature that is relevant to man and the world, this too one can have, but it will come at the expense of coherence and logical 'tightness'. That is, one will begin to speak in terms of upacāra.

Verse seven is a syllogism deducing the existence of māla from the premises that, on the one hand it is known that the powers of human beings are the same as those of Śiva, yet on the other, that these
powers are not fully manifest in men. There must therefore be something veiling these qualities and that is mala.

It is to be noted that if the premises are not accepted then neither will the conclusion be so. Also, we should make it clear that the premises are based on Saiva scripture. For example, in connection with verse seven, Aghora quotes the MA\textsuperscript{19}. Thus the metaphysics is determined by theological presuppositions. To my mind it is here, as is so often the case in philosophy: the strength is the weakness. In a real sense the very same thing that makes debate possible between Sadyojyoti and his opponents also makes it impossible. The debates arise because there is dispute over certain conclusions (for example that jñāna cannot result in release because of the fact that mala is a drāvyā or a substance like the film over the eye which cannot be removed by mere knowledge). But the premises of the conclusions are based on scripture and both sides have their own scripture which are, to the respective debaters, simple givens which cannot be questioned.

Verse seven deduced the existence of what ails man. Verses eight and nine posit that it is impossible for man to free himself by himself (i.e., to lift himself up by his own bootstraps). The implication is that if

\textsuperscript{19} TTN, P-17, L-4.
there is to be release at all it must come from some outside source and that is Siva. Thus verse nine enunciates the dependence of the souls on Siva and Siva's activities which lead to their eventual release. It is important to note that bondage and obstruction of the souls is understood by Sadyojyoti to be integral to the soteriological scheme. This means that the world is, in the final analysis, good, despite its impurity. Kṣemarāja reads verse nine of the TTN differently when he quotes it in Svachchanda, V, p-87. I have noted this in my translation. In any case, the meaning of the verse read either way is the same.

Verse ten answers a question concerning the manner in which mala veils the powers of the soul. The point of the question is to ask how, if the powers of the soul are ever present to it, are they not always manifest? The answer is that they are not manifest due to mala which veils but does not destroy them. Since the souls are of the same nature as Siva they can have nothing added to them or subtracted from them. The difference between the souls and Siva is not that the powers are always present and therefore constantly manifest in the latter but not in the former. For the powers are never absent in either. If they could be absent this would involve the soul in mutability. Thus
absence is understood to be non-manifestation due to being veiled.

The above argument seems to be directed against the pravāhanēśvaravādins. As we shall see, this school believed that the soul, upon the attainment of release acquired lordly powers which it did not formerly possess. The argument of Sadyojyoti and his commentators is that this involves the soul in mutation. The point at issue is the satkāryavāda to which Sadyojyoti and his commentators subscribe and its violation by theories such as that of the pravāhanēśvaravādins which posit that a cause can produce an effect (or substance can acquire and attribute) that was not in it all along.

Verses eleven and twelve posit mala as respectively the reason for the soul's being connected with māyā (ie., being in samsāra) and as that upon the maturation of which there is release. These verses thus posit the doctrine for which this school was widely

20 TTN 32 seems to refer back to this verse. There Aghora links this view with the Nyāya school. The principle involved on this point is, however, the same on the part of both the pravāhanēśvaravādins and the Naiyāyikas. In the view of both of these schools the powers of the soul can be added or subtracted at some point in time. These powers do not, on this view, comprise the essence of the soul. This is, for Sadyojyoti, execrable, because for him the powers of the soul are its essence and this is by definition immutable.

21 TTN, p-22, L18.
known and vehemently criticized by Abhinavagupta and Ksemaraja.

Verse eleven, in addition to the above information, contains the idea that mala, though one, can function with specificity towards the individual souls due to its possession of variegated powers. Thus all are not released upon the release of one. This positing of power (śakti) and the possessor of power (śaktiman), besides the upacāra device, is another way in which Sadyojyoti handles the problem of the one and the many, or the problem of unity and diversity in his thinking about God, man and the universe. If the intelligibility of the śakti/śaktiman relationship as an explanation for the problem of the one and the many is called into question as is done by Jayaratha in his commentary to the TA, Sadyojyoti can easily be refuted.

In his commentary to verse twelve Aghora states that since mala is insentient it cannot mature all by itself. He says that it is the activity of the Lord that matures it. But we will see shortly that this is not

22 TA, Ah IX, passim.
23 Svacchanda, V, p-84-89.
24 cf. comm. to TA, X, 68b, 69a.
25 TTN, p-10, L-8.
the whole story. Both Sadyojyoti and his commentators are ambiguous on this issue.

It is clear that mala cannot mature itself since it is insentient. But whether it is the activity of God or that of the individual soul that matures it is a difficult question. There is danger for Sadyojyoti in the unqualified assertion of either position. If it is God alone who matures mala, irrespective of the presence or absence of certain qualities in the souls then there may be bondage of those souls which deserve release and release of those which deserve bondage. This, according to Rāmakantha, is madness. 26 On the other hand, if the maturation of mala depends solely on the activity of the individual souls (i.e. on karma) Siva becomes superfluous. One in effect subscribes to Buddhism.

A good part of the remainder of this text is a brooding about the above conundrum. Its central issue is this: Who is responsible for release, God or man? In Saiva terminology one asks the same question when one queries: what causes the maturation of mala?

It has been noted above that according to Aghora, mala matures due to the activity of God. But then in the third line following the above he says that mala matures (parināti) in association with certain conditions such as following certain religious

26 NIP, p-151, L-3.
practices. Thus the responsibility for mala maturation seems to be here put in the court of the individual soul.

Verse thirteen and commentary affirm the responsibility of the individual soul in the process of the maturation of mala. It is said that the various souls attain different results (according to Aghora, different moksa-s) in accordance with the different kinds of religious practices undertaken, the length of time the process has been going on, and other qualities of the soul. This verse specifically denies that God, who is impartial, is in any way responsible for the variegated fates of the souls.

Verse fourteen and commentary affirm the same point. Aghora says that there are many different kinds of dīkṣā and therefore many different kinds of mokṣa.

Aghora, in his commentary to verse fourteen, and repeatedly elsewhere brings in the idea of dīkṣā when the verse of the TTN mention the maturation or the removal of mala. But the word 'dikṣa' does not occur once in the verses of the TTN. Sadyojyoti speaks in

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27 TTN, P-10, L-1.
28 TTN, P-10', L-17.
29 TTN, P-11, L-9.
30 TTN, P-11, L-10.
terms of various religious practices (sādhana-s)\textsuperscript{31}, various causes (nimittam)\textsuperscript{32} of moksa, of time (kala)\textsuperscript{33} and qualities of the soul being factors in the bringing about of moksa. It is true that in the TS, 36-39 he speaks of the necessity of dīkṣā for moksa, but here the emphasis seems to be rounded out by the other factors just mentioned. It is Aghora who constantly reminds the reader of the connection of all of this with dīkṣā.

It appears from the TTN thus far, and as we shall see, also from what is to follow, that the individual soul, by its own effort and the means and faculties provided by God, brings about the maturation, but not the removal of mala. This removal is brought about only by dīkṣā. But there are many kinds of dīkṣā. Some kinds remove more mala than others, and one kind removes it all.\textsuperscript{34} So as a result of there being these different kinds of dīkṣā it must be accepted that there are different kinds of moksa, or perhaps different levels of moksa.

Verses fifteen and sixteen continue making the same point. In verse fifteen Sadyojyoti leaves us clearly with the idea that the process of the maturation

\textsuperscript{31} TTN, 13.

\textsuperscript{32} TTN, 14.

\textsuperscript{33} TTN, 13.

\textsuperscript{34} This is the sadyanirvānadiksā. Cf. TS, 37b.
of mala is carried out by the Lord supplying a certain number of bonds, etc., to a certain soul in accordance with the deserts of that soul. The idea from this verse and commentary seems to be that the Lord supplies the facilities and it is up to the individual to do his best under the conditions. If he does so this results in his mala being matured. Verse sixteen then reiterates the conclusion that there must be many (levels) of moksa since Saiva scripture speaks of different means for attaining moksa.

In his commentary to verse sixteen Aghora mentions that scripture speaks of certain signs that indicate that an individual's mala has reached maturity. He has repugnance for the world, is desirous of moksa, has devotion to Siva, etc. Then he says that a guru should give dīksā only to persons distinguished by these marks and not to anyone else. This lends support to the conclusion reached above that the maturation of mala is effected by various means, but that its removal, whether in whole or in part, can only be effected by means of dīksā. But the matter is not clear since Aghora also speaks of dīksā as that which matures mala too, rather than being that which removes it. It is

35 TTN, p-12, L-17.
36 TTN, p-13, L-1.
37 TTN, p-11, L-10.
possible, though, that the removal of mala is conceived of as the final stage of its maturation, so that there would be continuity in the whole process.  

Verse seventeen features an objector asking who it is that matures mala? The answer given is that it is the Lord. But this is immediately qualified by saying that he does this by depending on the karma of each individual soul involved. The idea is that the Lord draws out of maya the requisite materials, such as a body etc., for the soul and thus provides the opportunity for pleasant and unpleasant experiences. And this results in the maturation of the mala of the soul.

Aghora notes that with respect to the impure creation (maya-tattva and below) the Lord does not act

38 On the relationship between spiritual practices, diksä, the removal of mala, and moksa, cf. Michel Hulin's transl. of the MA, p-356, fn.2: "... dans quelle mesure les rites--dont l'exécution à chaque niveau qualifie pour le rang de 'fils spirituel', sadhaka, etc.--se suffisent-ils à eux-mêmes? Cette question se pose tout spécialement pour la nirvändiksä dont le but avoué est bien de faire accéder l'adept à la 'possession de l'atman', à la récupération de son omniscience et de son omnipotence 'natives', semblant à celles de Siva, une fois le karman et le mala supprimés. D'une part il est clair qu'une certaine ascèse yogique (au comportement indiquées dans le caryapada)--est requise pour l'accès à toute diksä; sinon, le rite ne porterait pas de fruit (cf. par exemple Somasambhupaddhati,III, p-112n.) D'autre part, on peut se demander si la nirvändiksä--en tant que parcours de l'ensemble de la voie jusqu'à Siva--est autre chose que l'anticipation symbolique d'un processus qu'il faudra ensuite effectuer réellement, pas à pas, et justement par la voie du Yoga faute de quoi elle demeurerait stérile." On this topic see also Sivaraman, p-394-396.
directly but rather through Ananta, etc. He quotes a frequently used verse from the Kiranagama to this effect that the Lord acts directly only with respect to the pure creation but works through other agents in dealing with the impure creation.\(^{39}\)

So the answer that emerges to the question as to the relative roles of God and man in the soteriological scenario is that both play a part. God does so insofar as he provides the wherewithal for experiences. Man does so insofar as he is an active maker of the rate at which his \textit{mala} is matured.

Verses eighteen and nineteen affirm that both in the furled and unfurled states of the world the Lord is active in providing the means for the maturation of \textit{mala}. This affirmation, however, seems to make good sense in the unfurled state of the world, but not in the furled state. For there to be maturation of \textit{mala}, \textit{karma} is necessary. But this is absent during \textit{pralaya} (world dissolution). Yet if \textit{karma}, \textit{mala}, and \textit{mâyā} are all present in some distinguishable form even during \textit{pralaya}, it is hard to see what the real difference is between the furled and unfurled states of the world. The existence of \textit{karma}, for example, during \textit{pralaya}, would seem to defeat the whole idea of \textit{pralaya}. For the souls could not really rest. And if the soul's \textit{karma} can be

\(^{39}\) TTN, p.13, L.14.
separated from the soul and matured by God even during pralaya, that is, without the soul actually experiencing it, then there is no reason for all not to be released at once.

In fact, Sadyojyoti and Aghora begin to get into some trouble here. I wonder, with Michel Hulin, why Saiva Darśana posits the activity of God even during pralaya? It could be, as Hulin has noted, that for God to have sarvakartṛtvam (omnipotence) as his essence means that he must always be active, even during pralaya.\(^{40}\) And that in order for him to be active there needs to be a subtle māyā, karma, and mala for him to work on during this time. So it may be that all of this is to protect the sarvakartṛtvam of the Lord. In any case all of this puts the ball too solidly in the court of God. He alone begins to appear as the one responsible for the maturation of mala and not the souls. And if this is the case the objection will arise, as it does in fact in verse twenty-two, why God does not free all simultaneously by simply maturing all mala and karma automatically without the necessity of the souls actually experiencing their karma-s.

\(^{40}\) cf. Hulin, p-136, fn.18 and his references. Another reason for this may be, as we shall see below, to have an explanation for the fact that God does not release all simultaneously during pralaya, when the criterion for his not doing so would appear to be absent (i.e. karma).
Before we come to the answer that Sadyojyoti gives to this question we should note the contents of verses twenty and twenty-one. In these verses the following points are made: tirodhāna-śakti, by which Siva causes the bondage of the souls so that they can experience karma and eventually attain release, functions like a doctor's caustic medical salt. It hurts but it heals. 41 This is the Śaiva Darśana's solution to the problem of evil or suffering in the world. They see it as part of a larger process that is for the good of man. In his commentary to verse nineteen Aghora gives a quotation from the MA 42 affirming that God abides, even during pralaya, obstructing those that deserve to be obstructed, maturing karma, etc. Gods activity even during pralaya is reiterated in verse twenty-one. It is stated there that the maturation of mala during pralaya is fitting because mala, like māyā, is insentient. And it is known from the MA 43 that God works on māyā during pralaya, so there is no bar to inferring the same concerning mala. This similarity between mala and māyā is taken as proof that māyā can be matured even though karmic experience, the supposed conditio sine qua non for mala maturation, is absent. (Note though that the

41 TTN, p-15, L-16.
42 MA, IV, 15.
43 Idem. Cf also TTN, p-14, L-11.
Now we come to the objection at verse twenty-two. In the discussion which follows, expressions such as "...in your theory...", "...it is the same for us as for you...", etc., frequently occur. The opponent is not identified any more than this and the refutation does not have any further specificity which allows identification on the basis of what is said in the TTN. But it is clear from Ksemaraja's refutation of Sadyojyoti in the Svacchanda Tantra that he takes the TTN to be refuting his own (and Abhinavagupta's) theory of the descent of grace. So I understand that Sadyojyoti is refuting what is called svanatryasaktipata and is positing malaparipaka- saktipathvada. Both theories are

44 MA, IV, 15.

45 Aghora's comment in TTN, p-25, L-17, that the Nyāya theory is referred to in the final verse of the text must refer to the discussion that follows verse ten, not to the one that follows verse twenty-two. To my mind it is Saiva monism (Trikā) with which Sadyojyoti has a bone to pick, not the Nyāya school on this issue of whether or not the descent of the grace of God is dependent on some factor outside of God. This is the topic which occupies the most space in the TTN. It occupies far more space than does the discussion concerning the eternal sentience of the soul which is mentioned by Sadyojyoti in the final verse of the text. In any case, in addition to the fact that it is probably not wise to make too much of this comment by Sadyojyoti in the final verse, since he may have been looking for a reasonable yet metered way to end his text, Aghora connects the idea of the text being about the eternal sentience of the soul to all of the other points of importance in the text in his commentary to the last verse.
so called in the Svacchanda and the NIP. The implications of adopting either theory are far reaching and it will be impossible to fully limn either theory. It will suffice to say that the svatantryāsaktipāta theory teaches that in giving his grace the Lord relies on himself alone and not some factor outside of himself, whereas the malaparipakṣaśaktipāta theory contends that he does depend on a factor outside of himself in the giving of grace, namely, the maturation of mala of each individual soul. The advantages and disadvantages of each theory are that according to the former God absolutely retains his independence while in the latter he appears to lose it by becoming dependent on mala in the dispensation of his grace. But by depending only on himself in the dispensation of grace as Kṣemarāja would have it, there is absence of any criteria for the attainment of release. The attainment of release is fortuitous. This is madness for the deserving may be bound and the undeserving released. The latter theory (that of Śadyojyoti) has the advantage of avoiding this madness but the disadvantage of appearing to involve the

46 Svacchanda, V, p-84, L-10ff.
47 NIP, p-258-260 passim.
49 This theory is clearly and fairly limned by Kṣemarāja in his outline of the pūrvapāksin's in the Svacchanda, V, p-84, L-10 to p-86, L-2.
Lord in the loss of independence. Various arguments are produced by each side to shore up the weak points but what has been said will suffice to make it possible to follow the arguments which are about to be studied.

The objection in verse twenty-two is that if Siva effects the removal of mala he should do it simultaneously for everyone. Sadyojyoti's answer is to bring forward an external criterion which prevents Siva's carrying out the simultaneous universal release of souls. The criterion is karma (and by implication, the maturation of mala). Karma, being serial cannot mature all at once. Hence release, which comes about due to the grace of God which latter depends on karma and thus the maturation of mala, is also sequential and not simultaneous. But if we keep in mind what was said in Aghora's quotation from the _MA_ that even during pralaya God matures karma, which implies that the individual's karma need not be experienced to be matured there would appear to be no reason why he could not do all of this maturation during pralaya. And even if during pralaya he can only mature karma-s sequentially then there is really no difference between pralaya and the evolved state of the world since actually experiencing karma is not necessary for its removal.

50 TTN, 23.

51 Quoted at TTN, p-14, L-10.
Everything is falling apart here for Sadyojyoti. He is stepping in one mess while earnestly trying to avoid another.

Verses 23, 24, and 25 constitute Sadyojyoti's reply to the objection in verse twenty-two. Verse twenty-three brings in the criterion of karma as the reason for the non-simultaneity of release of all souls and verses 24 and 25 further explain this. At the time of the arising of the world, all is already present. That is, the power to bring about creation is there in Siva, all of the karma-s are there separately waiting for their owners in māyā, and the owners of these karma-s are ready after their rest during pralaya to take up these karma-s, since they are decked out with the capacity to be experiencers and also possess all-pervasiveness. Siva, relying on all of this as external criteria, draws out of māyā the bodies, etc., which the souls will need to experience karma and hence mature their mala. He draws this drawing out all at once so that all souls are fitted with bodies at the same time. Thus all begin to experience their karma-s (which experience is, of course, sequential).52

Verse 26 raises another objection but this objection is really a further exposition of Sadyojyoti's own teaching since, as he says in the verse, his own

52 TTN, 24, 25.
theory teaches the same thing as the objector's. The objector says that Sambhu must mature karma-s serially for we see in experience that karma-s are experienced serially. Apparently the objector is supposing, perhaps on the basis of some such statement as that quoted by Aghora from the MA₅³, that since Sambhu matures karma, rather than the souls experiencing karma and mala being matured thereby, and since he does this even during pralaya there is really no reason for him not to do all of this all at once.

But Sadyojyoti's answer, that the reason of the objector is accepted by himself too (i.e., that we observe that karma is experienced sequentially, therefore that the Lord's maturation of it must likewise be sequential) seems to me not to answer the objection. It does not address the difficulty that I have raised in this matter above.₅⁴ It merely repeats what has already been shown to be unintelligible.

To my mind, in his commentary to this verse, Aghoraśiva comes very close to identifying karma and mala. To do so would mean suicide for Saivism since mala is the raison d'être of Saivism, at least in the area of soteriological theory, in the Indian middle ages. Thus he

₅³ Quoted at TTN, p-14, L-10.
₅⁴ cf. above, pp. 26, 27.
speaks of Siva maturing karma. This would make sense if, upon the soul's maturation of karma release were attained. But we know that this is not the case for Saivism. It is the soul's experiencing karma that somehow matures mala. Karma is a product of the soul not of God. What sense can there be in saying that God matures karma? If God matures karma and then proceeds to mature mala, then indeed the soul has nothing to do with its own release even though that release may be brought about by God sequentially and not simultaneously.

It may be, however, that Aghora means to say that God matures karma in the sense that, the soul, having done this or that deed, has the fruition of that deed return to it under the guidance of Siva. The idea would then be that the soul is responsible for its own actions but that God is the coordinator of this process. Thus, as Aghora says, the maturation of karma by God would be like the maturation of the lotuses by the sun. They do not all bloom at the same time but in accordance with the stage of maturation of each specific plant. In the same way, says Aghora, Sadyojoyoti and his camp infer that the descent of God's grace, which is caused by the soul's mala having reached a certain stage of maturation, happens to each soul individually. This

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55 TTN, p-18, L-6.
56 TTN, p-18, L-7.
can be determined because the signs of the descent of grace (love for Siva, a dispassionate attitude towards the world, etc.) do not occur in everyone at once.\footnote{TTN, p-18, L-8.}

So the upshot of all of this is that Sadyojyoti's theory accounts for the serial and separate occurrence of moksa as well as the other theory, which I have assumed to be the svatantryāsaktipāta theory, according to which the Lord, when he manifests himself in the form of the variegated world does so in a rational manner (i.e. according to the law of cause and effect; according to priority and posteriority and in accordance with the fruits of karma). So there is, according to this latter theory, bondage and release (and hence dispensation or withholding of grace by Siva) and the appearance or non-appearance of 'bound and 'released' souls only in the sense that the Lord desires to shut his eyes, in which case variegation and the 'many' souls disappear, or open his eyes, in which case variegation and the 'many' souls appear. It is part of the Lord himself which becomes the many and then becomes the one again; playfully and endlessly\footnote{Svacchanda, V, p-96, L-11ff.}.

So in Sadyojyoti's theory grace descends serially due to the serial nature of the maturation of mala which maturation in turn depends on the serial
experience of karma. In the opponent's theory grace descends serially because that just happens to be the way that Śiva decides to manifest things (at least so far). The cause of the serial nature of the descent of grace is in this latter theory a factor internal to Śiva, whereas in Sadyojyoti's theory it is due to a factor external to Śiva.

Verses 27, 28, 29 and 30a conclude this same discussion. The emphasis in these three and one half verses is to make it clear that the serial nature of the maturation process that holds during the evolved stage of the world holds likewise when the world is in lysis. The objection being dealt with is the same according to Aghora's commentary: Why does Śiva not mature everyone's māla simultaneously during pralaya? And Sadyojyoti's answer is always to insist that the manner in which Śiva acts in this matter is the same in both states of the world. Verse 29 and 30a clearly bring out the point that just as God relies on the givenness of the data of māyā to produce the material creation, so he relies on the givenness of the data of māla-maturation of each individual soul in the granting of moksa.

To my mind, what has happened in this section of the TTN is that the opponent, seeing that Sadyojyoti posits a criterion external to the Lord in the granting

59 TTN, P-19, L-5.
or with-holding grace and thus in the granting or with-holding of mokṣa, and seeing that there is a time when that criterion is absent (i.e. during pralaya) asks why the Lord, during the time of the absence of that criterion, does not simultaneously free all souls? Sadyojyoti's answer is to deny that there is a time when that criterion is absent. He does this by making the stage of the world during which the criterion is allegedly absent (i.e. pralaya) exactly like the stage of the world (i.e. sthiti) when it is not absent. This does handle the objection at hand, but it seems to me that it results in an equal amount of difficulty for other aspects of Sadyojyoti's thought.60

Verses 30b and 31 reaffirm the definition of mala that has been assumed throughout the TTN. This reaffirmation is supported by śāstric authority.

Verse 32 concludes the text. It identifies the author as the 'writer of the commentary on the RA', that is, Sadyojyoti. The verse mentions that the text has tried to remove the idea that the soul is beginninglessly insentient. Aghora identifies the Naiyāyika-s as the proponents of this view of the soul. Actually the debate over the insentientcy of the soul, most explicitly stated in verse ten, forms a relatively insignificant topic in the text. From verse seventeen

60 Cf. above, pp-26,27.
on, for example, this is not the topic in any direct sense. In any case, Aghora sees the connection between the debate over whether or not the soul is beginninglessly insentient (rather than having its sentiency beginninglessly veiled) and the rest of the text in the sense that the whole text is about the soul. Such is the case because the whole of the text speaks about either māla, the veiler of the soul, māyā, that in which the soul transmigrates, or Śiva, the effector of the neutralization of māla which veils the soul. 61

61 TTN, p-21, L-19, p-221-1, 2.
THE TATTVATRAYANIRNAYA

by Sadyojyoti, with the commentary of Aghoraśīva.

(Aghora, hereafter, A):

Having bowed to Śiva, from whose grace (comes) the attainment of visible and invisible wishes quickly, I prepare this commentary on the TTN.

First the teacher (Sadyojyoti, hereafter: S) propitiates the Supreme Lord (Śiva) alone, (and not any other gods), who is distinguished by the things He establishes (his effects). He (S) does this for the purpose of (guaranteeing) the unobstructed completion of the work about to be undertaken.

Obeisance to that (One), Unimpeded, Eternally Awake, (Who), having noticed the various kinds of bonds (of men), gives various kinds of fruits (deserts) to men via his own Greatness. //1

A: (The compound anādyudayah is broken up thus):

anādir-udayah. He is eternally awake who, being without malā manifests (the qualities of) omniscience and omnipotence [hereafter, O and O]. If there were admission that the liberation (i.e. the possession of O and O) even for this (Śiva) had a beginning (in time), infinite regression would result. That is the meaning. So for this reason, this (Śiva) is not impeded by anything (or anyone) else. He is independent (self and not other impelled). That is the meaning. Such a one (it
is) who gives various fruits to men who are not independent. (He does this) with his own greatness which consists of his Sakti, which has the nature of rolling back (unveiling) mala. (He does this) after having noticed the various kinds of bonds (of men). Thus he gives to those souls with mature mala (the two kinds) of moksa, supreme and non-supreme, in accordance with the various (degrees to which their) mala has matured. To the (souls) with immature mala he gives fruit in the form of (worldly) experience in accordance with (their) various kinds of karma, for the purpose of maturing (their mala). So by this it is established that this (Siva has the status of) being the giver of grace to all. He, who is eternally established as being eternally united with Siva-ness which consists of being O and O, obeisance to that Siva, obeisance!

Thus having propitiated the Supreme Teacher, he (S) explains the purpose of the study:

Now I, reverently bowing (to Siva), briefly speak about the knowledge (contained) in the (Saiva) tantra (the Svayambhuvagama), (which knowledge is authentic since coming from the true) guru (lineage), (and is given) for the benefit of the slow-witted. //2

Here, indeed, the teacher (S) explains, with this work (the TTN) the conclusions (contents) of the Svayambhuvagama (hereafter, SA), having briefly explained the meaning of the final truth of the Rauravagama (RA) in the Tattvasangraha (TS):
"Sadyojyoti, the writer of the Suvṛtti (on the RA) has spoken about the tattva-s." (He says this) because he is the one who completed the RA. (commentary entitled) Suvṛtti, through being a good commentator. At the end of this work he will say: "This study of the three tattvas of the SA has been briefly enunciated by the writer of the commentary on the RA." 'Nati' means 'namaskāra' (obeisance): he reveres (Śiva), doing this with all his heart. Śiva alone is the one who is reverently bowed to since of him alone is there the state of being worshipped by all. (The last part of the verse can be paraphrased): 'I (s) speak of the knowledge of the tantra-sāstra of this Śiva, for the good of the dull-witted, because (I belong to) the guru-lineage which extends, unbroken, back to God.'

Śambhu (Śiva), Purusa and Māyā (are the three tattva-s in this work). (They are) eternal, ubiquitous and endowed with the capacity to be doers. This triad of tattva-s remains evident (i.e., continues to exist) in the furled as well as unfurled states (of the world).//3

Here Śambhu means: "He causes there to be (bhavayati, from bhū as in SamBHU) sam (auspiciousness) (as in SAMbhu) which means the happiness that comes from not being impelled by another." By the word Śambhu he means Śiva along with his Sakti, which is in a necessary relation with him (samaveta: the necessary relationship between two independent entities). All souls (are mentioned) by the word purusa which is (here) a singular
collective noun. By the word māyā he means the two kinds of material causes of (respectively) the pure and impure domains. (These are called) māyā and mahāmāyā, the latter of which is not (explicitly) mentioned in this book (the TTN). (But) as is said in the RA: "Mahāmāyā is above māyā." This triad is eternal because it is beginningless. For if they too had a beginning infinite regression would result. And (in addition) scripture speaks of them as being eternal. Furthermore, they are ubiquitous. (Actually) only Sambhu and purusa are truly ubiquitous, while māyā is 'ubiquitous' only within the domain of its effects (the first 30 tattva-s). (Sambhu and purusa are ubiquitous because) if they were not so it would not make sense for there to be the experience of the fruits of karma in another place for the souls (purusa-s) and universal superintendence for Siva (also would not make sense); (for in both cases) movement is impossible, since like the ether, (neither) have form (i.e. movement is only possible for entities which have form and formless entities like Siva and the purusa-s are known to be present at various locations as in the experiencing of the various fruits of karma at various places by the souls and as in the superintendence of various events at various locations on the part of Siva. Now since neither the souls nor Siva can move to get to these places, the fact that they are there proves that
they are already everywhere). Here māla is not mentioned as a separate tattva because it is understood to be that which beginninglessly veils the souls (and is thus subsumed under the purusa tattva, the bondage involved in which only makes sense if the purusa-s are veiled, thus māla is analytically contained in the concept of purusa). It is thus established to be eternal and ubiquitous [i.e. by its connection with the souls which are known to be such]. There is association with the power of being doers, in the cases of Pati (Siva) and paśu (purusa-s) because of their sentiency. (This sentiency is proven in the case of the former) because he is author of the world [which on Saiva premises requires sentiency]. (In the case of the latter sentiency is proven) through their being experiencers. And since both of them are endowed with the capacity of being doers, from this doer-ness itself there is (proof of the possession of) the powers of being knowers. For the essential nature of sentiency consists in knowing and doing. As is said in scripture: "Sentiency is essentially knowing and doing." And māya is superintended by the sakti of God who is the doer [i.e. this is that wherein consists māya's "being endowed with the power of being a doer" or kartrṣaktiyyuktam. Thus it does not possess this latter itself]. This triad alone remains evident, or shines forth [i.e., continues to
exist] in both the furled and unfurled states of the universe.

Thus, having enunciated the similarities of these (three tattva-s), he says, concerning their dissimilarities:

'Siva and the purusa-s are (both) exceedingly numerous, (they are) not the source (i.e. not the material cause of the world) and are inherently intelligent. Māyātattva is one, fit to be the source (material cause of the world) and devoid of intelligence.'

The souls domain is exceedingly numerous because indefinite (in number). But 'Siva is metaphorically exceedingly numerous due to metaphorical association with an indefinite number of things because he is the superintender of the indefinitely numerous sentient and insentient things. Or else, (a second interpretation might be) since, for the souls too, there is fitness for Sivahood, which consists in being able to know and do all things due to the removal of mala, they are referred to by the word 'Siva' [i.e., since they actually become Siva-s they are called Siva-s]. Both are devoid of evolution, which is that in which being the source of the world consists. (They are also non-evolving) because, as has been previously mentioned, they are endowed with intelligence.

Māyātattva is one because it is the ultimate material cause of the pure and pure creations. If it were many and insentient, due to its (very) manyness, it
would require a previous cause [but note that what is many and sentient needs no further one or unified cause, and that such is the case for the purusa-s and Siva-s who are both many and sentient. Everything in the material world, which is by definition a world of manyness and insentientcy, requires a material cause which is one, or unified and insentient]. By the very fact that it is the material cause it is fit to be the source of (material effects) and is insentient like the clay (for making pots).

Thus, having shown the differences between mâyā on the one hand, and Siva and the souls on the other, now, in order to show the difference between Siva and the souls he says:

Among the gods (Isâh) who have the power to do (all things), there is one whose perfect qualities (of O and O) have been eternally manifest. From that one, the (other) gods became free of mala and gained O and O.

All those who have omni-capabilities, who have the power to do (all things) are referred to by the name 'gods', because they are independent. Among them, one, Supreme Siva, has had his perfect qualities eternally. Owing to that (one) there are released souls who share in sameness of nature with him. (Owing to him) there are gods and gods of the mantras (vidyāśavara-s). From that Siva alone, whose nature it is to be the efficient cause, is there separation from mala and manifestation
(in the released souls) of Siva-hood. Thus the Vidyēśvara-s carry out the superintendence (of the impure creation) by Siva's order, because they are still associated with a little bit of mala due to their superintending duties. [Note that this argument is circular as Aghora has stated it but in fact, if properly stated is not so. The process of maturing mala is not quite complete in the case of the Vidyēśvara-s and due to this they do not become Siva-s immediately but rather serve a term as lords of the impure creation, which posting is in turn the eventual cause of their attainment of purification and Sivahood]. But the released souls (those that have become Siva-s) do not have to function (as superintenders, etc.) because of being unimpelled (by another) and since they have overcome (the need) for another's grace.

(Objection): "But one hears in scripture that there are many forms of Siva who is beginninglessly liberated, such as sakala and nīskala, etc., and different (embodiments of him) such as Īśāna, Tatpurusa, etc." For this reason, (ie. in response to this he says):

(Siva is mentioned in the scripture) before (the commencement) of the descent (unfurling of the universe), (before) the effect-state. Therefore, that which is sung (in scripture), that there is difference of sakala and akala and (difference according to) different spheres of activity (ie. the five divine activities) in the Master (Siva) who is eternally established (is only metaphorical)
"Siva is mentioned before the descent which is the effect-sphere, the artifact-sphere, which has the form of being pure and impure." That is the remainder (that has to be added to the first half of the above verse). Therefore, what is sung in the Sāstra-s about difference such as Sadyojata (a 'face' of Siva), etc., about the (participation of) Siva in the sphere of the five-fold activities and in the sphere of the artifected effects, sakala etc., (what is sung about these being) in the One who is eternally established (unchanging) is metaphorically, not ultimately true. As is said in scripture: "(the idea that Siva is) the Superintender, the Experiencer, the one in Lysis (furled up) must be (understood to be) metaphorical. " (Also): "Difference is not ultimately true (in Siva). Difference in that (One) is due to difference of activity." "(Siva is) differentiated into Iśā, Sadasiva, Santa, etc., according to different activities." But in the pāsu-sphere (i.e., the sphere of bound souls), the differences such as sakala, akala, etc., are real. Thus the sakala souls are of two kinds: 1) when there is association with kala etc., when the soul is bound by the three bonds, and 2) when k arma has been exhausted by knowledge, etc., and there is the remaining (in the body, of the soul) for (yet) a little while, due to samskāra-s. Akala-s are also of two kinds: 1)
pralayākala-s, who are bound (by only two bonds) karma and mala, owing to pralaya, which is the dissolution of kala, etc. [i.e., whereas the sakala souls under number one above are bound by three bonds: kala/maya, karma and mala, the pralayākala souls, for whom maya/kala does not exist are only bound by two bonds]. And 2) the vijnānakevela-s, bound by mala alone, because they have exhausted their karma (unlike the pralayākala-s) by means of vijnānayoga. (Even beyond these vijnānakevela souls are) the liberated souls who are alone, without mala. As is said in the SA: "The souls are known as being three-fold: kevela, samala, and amala, according as they are respectively pure [vimala] used here in correspondence with vijnānakevela souls is difficult. It literally means 'stainless' or 'separate from mala', which is precisely the only bond from which vijnānakevela souls are not separated. So I take it here in the sense that they are devoid of kala and karma. They are pure, then, when compared to the other more thoroughly bound souls, the sakala-s and the pralayākala-s], bound and released by dīksā (initiation)."

Now concerning the nature of the bound souls he says:

The souls have the same set of qualities (powers), ubiquity, etc., as does Siva. But those qualities of all (the bound souls) are obstructed beginninglessly by the one (unified) mala.
There is, for the souls too, as for Siva, the nature of being ubiquitous, of being 0 and 0. It is said in the *Mrogglerāma* (hereafter, MA): "Sentiency, in the form of 0 and 0, are in the souls at all times, and that in their entirety, since they are heard of as being there in mokṣa, in an unlimited fashion." (ie:According to the satkāryavāda theory of causality to which the Saiva writers subscribe, an attribute of a substance can never be absent from that substance, though it can fail to manifest. When it does manifest, this is understood to be proof positive that it was always present in a subtle manner. That a substance could acquire an attribute anew or that a cause could produce an effect that was not subtly in it all along is a non sequitur which would destroy the world for these Saiva-s. For theirs is a steady-state world, wherein causation, or creation of the novel means the manifestation of the already subtly present, out of its own proper source. If the effect did not pre-exist in its cause causal regularity becomes, on Saiva premises, inexplicable.

Since there is dependence on another for the manifestation of the true nature of the souls, it is determined that there is obstruction of the souls beginninglessly, carried out by a certain one thing, mala. And this mala is one because beginningless. For when there is the state of manyness, there is (the
necessity) of another cause, as a pot (requires) clay. This is because of the insentience (of the many) [i.e., what is both insentient and many requires a cause which is insentient and one]. Therefore it is impossible that the souls be beginninglessly unveiled. For it is said in the SA: "There is beginningless mala of the souls."

Thus (the souls) are non-lordly, i.e., are devoid of manifesting their (innate) powers. (They are) unknowing and undoing. Nor is it possible for them to effect, by themselves, (the manifestation) of their innate powers, which are stainless and extend to all objects.//8

Because associated with mala, the souls, which are not independent, and which are neither doers nor knowers, are devoid of the strength to manifest by themselves. Therefore they depend on Siva to manifest those powers. That is the meaning. "But there may be manifesting of the powers of the soul by (the soul's own acquiring of) knowledge, etc." But this is not fitting. Thus he says "nor is it possible". This is the sense: Since mala is a substance it is not possible to remove it by mere knowledge. It is the same as when a film over the eye (cannot be removed by mere knowledge). (Mala can only be removed) by what is known as dīksā, which is (in the end) the functioning of the Lord, just as the eye disease is removed by medicine (and not by mere knowledge). I have explained this in detail in the Short Commentary on the TS.
As a result of their being obstructed, for the uncreated souls there is beginningless subjugation to Siva (who alone can remove their obstruction). For this reason they are obstructed, bound, purified and enlightened by God.\footnote{Ksemarāja, in quoting this verse in Svacchanda Tantra, V, p-87, reads: malasamsargāt-tadvat-tesām-akṛto hi sivavādikārah. patyustvete roddyā... (As a result of being mixed (with mala), for the uncreated souls there is beginningless subjugation to Siva (who alone can remove their obstruction). For this reason they are obstructed by the Lord...) There is no significant difference in meaning between the two readings.}

Because of their being veiled by mala, the souls, eternally existent, uncreated, are brought into subjugation by Siva who is not veiled. For this reason they are obstructed by rodha sakti; (for this reason they are deserving of being) obstructed by the bonds of kala etc., for the purpose of experiencing karma. Here "rodha" means "tirobhāva" (ie., "obstruction" means "veiling" and not "destruction"). And this consists in experiencing experiences in accordance with the soul's deserts. And there is this rodha by means of (Siva's effecting, through sub-deities like Ananta etc.,) the productions which come from the bonds' (various) powers. By this (process of rodha) there is (to be) purification (of the souls) by means of the removal of bonds such as mala, etc. This done by means of dīksā when there is (sufficient) maturation of mala, and by that dīksā
alone they become enlightened, that is, they manifest their Sivahood.

Now the doubt of an opponent is expressed:

"But there is seen to be) deprivation (absence of 0 and 0 of the souls) which is the work of mala, etc., when the powers of knowing, etc., (of the souls is supposed to be) eternal." True, but since (eternality of 0 and 0 is seen) in God, such (must be in the souls too, who are) seen (in this system) not to be different (in nature from God). //10

"But when there is establishment of the eternality of the powers of 0 and 0 (of the souls) there (must be) deprivation which is the work of mala, etc., and this by the veiling of those powers and not otherwise [i.e., there is no destruction of those powers in the souls, which may, nevertheless, not manifest the powers for veiling is the only modus operandi which can explain change in a satkāryavāda causal theory. So since the presence of 0 and 0 has, ex hypothesi, been established for the souls because they are actually Siva-s all along, the non-manifestation due to mala does not mean their destruction]. But since there is observation of the episodic nature of this (0 and 0 of the souls), how then, is this (veiling by mala) performed? [i.e., 'episodic nature' means that not all souls are always covered identically by mala nor is the same soul always with or without the manifestation of the powers of 0 and 0]. In answer to this he says: "True..." Since it is seen that in God the sentiency
that consists of 0 and 0 is of such a kind that it is
eternal, in the souls too, which are here viewed as not
being other-natured than him, because they too are
sentient, must (have) eternal (0 and 0). Otherwise there
would result the unwelcome conclusion of the non-
-eternity of the souls due to being insentient through
being transforming [i.e., subject to change]. That is the
meaning. Moreover there would be no possibility of the
souls' being associated with a body, etc., were there no
mala. Thus he says:

When there is association with transforming māyā,
for the souls, mala is the cause (i.e., mala is the
cause of the souls' having a body which means
association with māyā). (Mala is the cause which
makes the soul) fit for (experiencing) karma. Mala's
powers are specific to each individual and they veil
the qualities (of 0 and 0) of that (soul).\footnote{The first half of this verse is quoted by Kṣemarāja at Svaccchanda, V, p-89.}

Because a body is needed for experiencing karma
and since there is no possibility of that (association
with a body) for a released soul who is free of mala,
there is linkage with a body (for the souls). Thus it is
said in the \textbf{MA}: Due to (being a) \textit{pāsu} all
transmigrators, of such nature (are in) \textit{samsāra} which
consists of māyā." (Also): "Due to karma there are many
(different) bodies of the embodied."

(Objector): "But if so, since mala is one, there
will be release of all upon the release of one." In
answer to this he says: *Mala's powers...* Mala has many powers which are specific to each soul, so when there is cessation (of the powers of *mala*) for one, due to the maturation (of *mala*) there is *moksa* only for that one (whose 0 and 0) has been unveiled, and not for everyone. That is the meaning.

**For this reason he says:**

*Mala, (gradually) maturing, desists from obstruction of the souls powers at a certain time, (with respect to a certain soul, in a certain way, because it matures in association with a certain maturation time.)*

*Mala matures (transforms). It desists from veiling. It desists from veiling in the sphere of the soul's powers. But since it is insentient it does not do so of its own accord. Rather it happens by the functioning of God alone. And this maturation happens irregularly, (i.e., not simultaneously) just as the blossoming of the water-lilies (does not happen all at once and is) of a serial nature. Thus he says: "...in association with a particular transformation time."*

**For the very reason that it matures in association with particulars, i.e., due to a more mature state of maturation of *mala* in certain souls due to their having practiced different kinds of religious means, there are different kinds of *moksa*, supreme and non-supreme (for the different souls). Thus he says:**

For that reason, and not any other, is it possible for there to be observation of different results for
the (different) souls, i.e., due to the different spiritual means, time (i.e., degree of maturation), and qualities of the soul. This difference is never due to God (who is impartial)/13

In the Mataṅga-gama one hears of seven kinds of mokṣa, etc., produced according to differences of time, qualities (of the souls), faith, love and spiritual means; and the difference of results, i.e., mokṣa, is possible (only) owing to the specific maturation of the mala (of each individual soul) and not otherwise.

Nor is there destruction of our position (if someone says) that there is this difference due to God, who does not depend on [mala maturation specific to each soul, for in fact he does so depend on that in the giving of mokṣa]. Nor is there destruction of the position that God is the giver of grace to all (because only some are released, since each soul receives in accordance with its own deserts).

Thus it is reasonable that there be different kinds of dīkṣā like the Naistikya etc., and so he says:

Thus having noticed the endless religious means, extremely high in number, which are proclaimed by God and which are the cause(s) of liberation; as in the bound state, so in the state of mokṣa, it cannot

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3 It is the position of the svatantrya-śaktipāta-vādins, such as Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, that is referred to. According to these, Siva does not depend on any factor outside of himself in the granting or withholding of grace.
be different (i.e., thus there are different kinds of mokṣa).  

Only if there were only one form of mala-maturation, and one means to cause the cessation of mala would there be only one form of the result (mokṣa). The different kinds of dīkṣā and resultant mala-maturation has been treated by me in detail in the commentary on the MA.

In order to flesh out the infinite number of religious means he says:

He, the most Eminent, effects obstruction of mala, for certain ones, in certain ways, with a certain number of bonds; there is then the (eventual) loss of bonds for those same ones, in those same ways, due to the (previous) bestowal of that same number (of bonds).

(God) causes obstruction of mala by means of a certain number of bonds for each individual soul, such as vijñānakevelā souls, etc. There is only one bond for the vijñānakevelā souls. There is the effecting of (their) obstruction by means of bonds which consist of God's own effects, such as the soul's having an impediment to devotion (or appetite), being a non-doer, a non-knower, etc. Thus it is said in the SA: "Due to the soul's being a knower, there is lack of its own true nature; it is thus a possessor of bonds." And God effects the obstruction of the pralayākala souls through

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4 Cf. below in the study of the TS., p-144 ff, for a discussion of two kinds of mokṣa.
karma (in addition to mala); and of the sakala souls by
means of the various worlds, having public and private
forms (i.e., subjective and objective) in accordance with
the souls' deserts. There is then the abandonment of
bonds by the (particular) soul, according to the same
number as have actually been bestowed. Therefore:

Thus, since (many) forms of spiritual means for true
liberation are seen in Saiva scripture, these
differences exist equally (not otherwise) for these
bound souls (in moksa), when their bonds are absent;
so there are different kinds of moksa).//16

Thus since there is hearing in Saiva scripture
about (different kinds) of spiritual means called dīksā,
having various differences, such as the Naistikya
dīksā), etc., and which differ as to whether or not
they require a support (i.e., a guru to conduct the
initiation or whether it is given directly by Siva), and
which have various natures (some of which) cut off bonds
completely (and others only) partially, (and this latter
depends on the differences in the bound souls being
initiated, i.e.,) whether it be a sakala soul, etc.
Therefore, these bound ones do not exist otherwise when
there is absence of the different causes which consist
in (effecting) particular kinds of maturation of mala
[i.e., there are also differences among them in the kinds
of mokṣa they attain]. (And also) since the hearing
about different kinds of spiritual means in scripture
does not make any sense any other way, there undoubtedly
has to be admission of different kinds of mokṣa and
different kinds of mala-maturation (processes, i.e.,
dīksā) which cause mokṣa.

The marks of the maturation of mala are heard of
in scripture. Of whichever embodied one there is the
beginning of the descent of grace, of him there are
these marks: there is anxiety for mokṣa and repugnance
for the world, there is love for Śiva devotion, and
faith in the injunctions and teachers of those
injunctions, and so forth. Thus dīksā should be given by
a guru, only to one marked out by these (signs) and not
otherwise.

Here a question (is raised):

Who causes the maturation of mala? (It is he who)
gives variegated experiences and the means for
(experiencing those variegated) experiences, having
drawn (these) out of māyā, and having depended on
karma alone (since he gives) in accordance with the
various desires (of each soul).//175

Since mala is insentient it is not fitting that
it should mature itself. That is the meaning. So above
he says "depended on karma alone." He who gives
experiences in accordance with various deeds of good and
evil nature, and who gives the body, et., which are the
means for (experiencing those) experiences, and having
brought them forth or drawn them out of the impure māyā-
tattvā, which is the seed, is Śiva. He causes the

5 Aghora glosses kamāpeksya with karmāpeksya.
maturation of mala by his rodha-śakti. But in the impure
domain his doershhip (is not direct but rather) by means
of Ananta, etc., as is said in the Kirana: "In the pure
sphere Śiva is the doer, in the impure, Ananta is the
lord."

Moreover (who is it that causes the maturation
of mala?):

(It is ) he who abides even in the furled state (of
the world), effecting mayā which is fit to be the
source (material cause) and where all (material)
things are stored up. Due to God alone is there rest
in pralaya (for the souls).//18

In the furled up state (of the world) too, (as
in the unfurled state) Śiva still effects maya, which is
fit to be the source, possessing many powers. Thus he
supplies souls who are fit for rebirth.

Also in the unfurled (evolved) state of the world
God (supplies the means etc.) for the experience of
karma which is only somewhat matured (ie. has yet to
be experienced) to the souls. He, the bestower of
great powers, always from compassion, (gives) to the
souls (stained) by mala, (in order to effect)
removal (of that mala).//19

He effects the souls deserving of experience,
and, of karma; he causes maturation. That is the
meaning. This is stated in the MA6: "Even during the
state of world dissolution he abides, enlightening those
who are to be enlightened, obstructing those who are to
be obstructed, maturing the karma of those souls with
karma, rendering the powers of mayā fit for manifesting.

6 MA,IV,15.
He sees all that is, as it is." (Also): "He abides when the world is in repose, after having withdrawn experience and the means for experience, after having made the (world to) rest in its cause, after having subdued that along with the souls, for the benefit of all beings, natures and domains." Thus having noted the functioning of Siva even in the furled state of the world, in order to do the same for the unfurled state of the world he says: "also in the unfurled state." He gives the souls great power, ie., O and O. This God, even in the unfurled state of this whole world, because he is eternally endowed with compassion, gives fitness for the removal (of mala) by means of experiencing partially matured karma (ie., karma that was not ready to be experienced previous to this time), to the souls with mala. The meaning is that during the unfurled state of the world he causes the experiencing of karma which was still a little immature (previously), with the goal of maturing mala.

Moreover:

Even before the removal of the (mala), Siva is seen obstructing the powers of the soul, which he does by his aiding (activating) the powers of pasa (bonds-power). (He does this when he) brings about the bestowal (of the means) for the strengthening of the power of those (bonds).//20

Even before the removal of mala, since it is impossible for this to cure itself, it being insentient, the Supreme Lord is seen to be effecting (giving) aid to
the powers of the bonds which (in turn) obstruct the souls' powers. (He does this) by means of his tirodhanasakti for the purpose of strengthening the capabilities of the powers of the bonds [i.e., pāsa, being inert, cannot activate itself, so Śiva does this. This activation of the powers of the bonds results in the obstruction of the powers of the souls, which obstruction is the first step on the road to freedom for the bound souls].

"But it does not make sense for there to be (the giving of) grace (in the form of) bondage; for the obstruction (and not the enlightenment) of the soul results from that activity." No. Since there is the possibility of the removal (of māla) by means of the maturation of māla alone, he brings this about by means of bondage. It is the same as when a doctor brings about the cessation of suffering by the application of the caustic medical salt; (the same goes for) the veiling (obstructing of the powers of knowing and doing of the souls—by God) which consists of experiencing (limited) experiences (on the part of each bound soul. [i.e., the souls by nature possess 0 and 0, but the first step towards the recovery of these powers is limited and not unlimited experiencing of the powers of knowing and doing. In contrast with the 0 and 0 which the souls have by nature, the limited powers of knowing and doing that
the souls are capable of in the experiencing of experiences in this world appear to the objector to be a cruel, purposeless impairment, rather than a first step on the road to the full recovery of O and O. The reply constitutes the solution to the problem of evil in the Saiva Darśana. (So just as the doctor must hurt to heal) the same goes for (God's) giving of grace. So there is no contradiction. It is said in the MA: "It is the same as a doctor who, though he makes his patient suffer by the application of caustic medical salt, is not considered to be a cause of suffering because in the final analysis he procures a desired end."7

Thus:

Having observed the fitness (readiness) for the removal of that mala, he enjoins the cause for the release of the souls. Since mala, like māya, is insentient, its maturation (by God) in the furled state of the world is accepted.//21

Having noticed its fitness for mala removal due to its mala maturation, Siva undertakes, that is he enjoins the cause which is his own Sakti, known as dīksā (initiation) for the release of the bound soul. But if so, since it has been said that the cause of the maturation of mala is the experience of karma alone, there could not be maturation of mala in the furled state of the world (when the conditions for the experiencing of karma are absent). Thus he says: "like

7 Ibid., IV,18.
māyā..." Since māla, like māyā, is insentient, the maturation of it too is possible in the furled state of the world, by the superintendence of the sentient Śiva. Here the doubt of an opponent is expressed:

"If Sambhu effects the removal of māla that is fit for removal, why does he not do it simultaneously for all souls?" This question is enunciated by the opponent./\22

Having been interrogated by these words he says

"This question..." How so? He says:

Why does he not do all simultaneously? On each (particular) day, one's own karma is to be experienced, but not all at once. This is due to the diversity (of the types of karma). The weaker (karma) will be experienced later (the stronger sooner)./\23

"That day" means "whatever occurs, that alone (is experienced)." "But since there are contradictory fruits of actions such as killing a brahmin or doing the horse sacrifice it is not possible to experience (their fruits) simultaneously." For that very reason he says "but not all at once", i.e., the combination of their fruits is not possible (in the same experience).

Why are they not experienced all together? He says:

Since at the time of the unfurling of the world, Śakti is fully present in Śiva, Śakti fully present in māyā, and ubiquity and the nature of being experencers in the souls, therefore, having made many (different) bodies (for the souls) from māyā, the cause of all (material) effects, God causes all souls to (separately and serially) experience all their karmas at the same time./\24,25
Since (at the time) when there is the arising of the transformation of mâyā, public and private [i.e., mâyā transforms into the objects perceived publically or objectively and also those perceived privately or subjectively], Šakti or power is present in Śiva; and since (at this same time) there exist experiencer-hood and ubiquity in the souls, and the whole mass of karmic fruits kept separately divided in mâyā (so that fruits go only their proper owners); therefore, having simultaneously raised from mâyā the numerous bodies, he can cause the souls to experience all (their) karmas (individually and serially). So just as in your theory, here too the same thing occurs.

Again the opponent raises a doubt:

"But we infer (that God must act serially) since we observe the experiencing of karma (to be serial). In the same way must God cause the maturation of these karmas." (Answer): It is the same in both theories.//26

Since there is observation of the serial nature of what is to be experienced (i.e., karma), it is to be inferred that this (maturing) is affected by Śiva in accordance with the fitness of that which is to be matured [i.e., he only lets the soul experience those karmas which are ready] as is done when the sun shines on the water lilies (they do not all bloom at once). So for us there is no simultaneous experiencing of karma. If so, having noticed the signs of the descent of grace,
such as love for Siva and detachment from the world, on the part of the soul, (which signs occur) serially, there can be the inference by us to that the descent of grace caused by the maturation of mala is of the same serial nature. So there is no simultaneous maturation of mala for all souls. So we too are not to be censured. As is said: "Where there is the same fault in both, or where there is the same omission, there is not to be the censoring of one. This is the decision." With this intention he says: "It is the same..."

He further develops the same point:

Having noted here the said effect, (the descent of grace due to the performance of dīksā) there is known to be the removal of mala. The doer, God, in the same (serial) way, is capable (of effecting) the state of fitness (for mokṣa on the part of the souls).\[27

Having here noted the descent of grace which is necessary (for the removal of mala) and which is declared to be the effect of the performance of dīksā, it can be ascertained that there has been removal of mala. Thus since there is observation of the serial nature of the effects, Siva's effecting the maturation of mala must also be serial and cannot be inferred to be simultaneous. That is the meaning.

Thus since it is seen that the maturation of mala is serial in the unfurled state of the world, in the furled state too, the maturation of mala is in accordance with that which is to be matured (i.e., in
accordance with certain criteria) and there is no occurrence of the simultaneous maturation of all. So your question concerning that matter, voiced above (verse 22) censuring us (for having an absurd theory) that the maturation of mala is simultaneous, is not fitting. With this intention he says:

Since there is the capability even in the furled state for both karma and māyā (to produce effects serially), your voicing (an objection) by means of a question that in the unfurled state (there should be) simultaneity (is not fitting). //28

(The meaning of the first line of the above verse is that there is the) fitness for giving fruits in the case of karma; and the fitness for production, i.e., the power of (giving rise to) effects in the case of māyā the matrix, and finally, the maturation of these (by God). So the objector's objection is refuted. The rest is easily intelligible.

How is the above-mentioned (question answered more fully)? (To this) he says:

At the time of creation when there is absence of limitation (of the world to its furled state), whatever thing, in whatever manner, for whatever length of time arises in the stream (of māyā) that thing, of such a kind, for that length of time is capable of being produced by God. The same goes in the case of mokṣa and the cause of mokṣa (i.e., mala maturation). //29, 30a

Since it is known that at the time of the arising (of the universe), when there is falling away (absence) of the restriction (of being confined to the subtle state), when there is the creation of the body,
when all that arises from the midst of the stream of māyā, whatever thing, for whatever length of time, in whichever manner arises, that thing, for that length of time, and of such a kind is able to be made by God and not otherwise; (since all of this is known) the questions posed above by you (verses 22, 26) concerning the simultaneity of the arising of the effects of māyā is contained in that concerning karma maturation or its absence. (Thus the two questions) the one about the giving of moksa (to all) at once, and the (other) one about the simultaneity of the maturation of mala which is the cause of moksa, are the same. Thus he says "The same goes..." And there has been detailed description of this mala being one, a real (non-illusory) thing, etc., in the scriptures. Thus he says:

Mala has been completely and fully described in the sāstras as being real, one, having a multitude of powers, etc. In the event that mala not be thus endowed with many powers there could be no removal of that mala (or there would be) the occurrence of suffering (i.e. return to samsāra) for even one who is released (lit: yoked to truth). //30b,31

It is said in scripture: "That (mala) is one, great, beginninglessly and uninterrupted (accompanying) all souls. It is like an aggregate of powers destroyed at the end of a particular existence (in samsāra for each soul) and which endures (only) with respect to that particular soul (and not all others too)" As has been said, without endless sakti-s
comprising the very nature of this mala, there would be no possibility of the (individual) removal (of mala), since moksa (and hence the implied removal of mala) of all would be entailed by the moksa of one. Also there would result the return to samsāra even of one who had attained moksa [i.e., since no particular sakti-s of mala applied to that soul alone and mala, being one, still exists even after his attainment of moksa, eventually this soul would be re-infected and would have to return to samsāra]. Thus he says, "endowed with many powers..." And this multiplicity of powers as comprising the essential nature of mala has been established, enjoined and proven in the sastra. Thus he says: "having a multitude of powers..." (The word 'described' (in 30b) goes with the fore-going [i.e., mala is described as having a multitude of powers]. By the word 'etc.' is included 'beginninglessness', etc., (of mala). As is said in scripture: "(Mala) is either present (in the souls) beginninglessly, or, (if it had a beginning) its cause must be indicated [which is impossible on Saiva premises]. If present in any other manner it would obstruct even the liberated souls and all effort to attain moksa would be in vain."8 There is detailed explanation by me of the way mala operates, in my commentary on the MA.Vrtti, and it can be studied there.

8 MA.VII,9.
It is not treated here for fear of making this book too long.

Now, to conclude the book, (he says):

The author of the Commentary (on the RA) (Sadyojyoti) has briefly enunciated this Examination of the Three Tattva-s (TTN) of the SA in order to put away (the idea) of the beginningless insentienty of the soul.//32

There is the denial of the insentienty of the soul (in moksa) as is conceived by the Naiyāyi ka-s, because (for us) the powers of knowing and doing of the soul are beginninglessly veiled [and moksa consists in their unveiling and hence their presence in the soul in moksa, not their absence] because the soul's nature is unchanging [i.e., if the soul has the powers of knowing and doing before moksa, it has them after, since they form its essence]. He (thus) establishes briefly here in this book 1) mala which veils the power of the soul; 2) the samsāric souls which exists in Maya; and 3) Siva, who effects the removal of that mala.

It is with a skill without stain that this commentary on the TTN has been composed by the master Aghoraśivācarya, who is renowned in the world for his commentary entitled Srijanyā, who is the ornament of the Kundina family from the Cola country (Tamil Nadu), and who venerates the dust from the lotuses which are the feet of (his master) Sarvātmāśiva.
Thus is completed the TTN-Vrtti, written by Aghoraśivacarya.
श्रीमतेंद्रनाथमायोजने}

तत्त्वज्ज्ञानीयः

तत्त्वज्ज्ञानीयः

अध्यक्षाध्यायोऽक्षण्डकुतांचारणह्यतः

विद्याश्रयायाश्रयस्वाभाविकोपग्रहणोऽधिकारे

नत्त्वा शिवं विपाकः तत्त्वज्ञानीयः वृजिम्

तत् तत्त्वज्ञान: प्राणात्मकन्त्राच्यविकन्त्रमार्य विभवा विविद्यते एवं संगीतसवर्धवे मयाभिः

पुनः फलज्ञिष्ठः

ददाति संभवेण वंचवैचन्यम्

स्वाभिष्क्रानान्तर्खलोऽनायतो नमो नमस्तस्मै

अनादिरन: सर्वविद्याध्यायिकाएः मिमेसिं चतुर्विद्याति

श्रव्योऽस्त्रयि: सत्याविद्याश्वलाः अनादिरन: सत्याविद्याश्वलाः सत्याविद्याश्वलाः सत्याविद्याश्वलाः

त.न. 1
तत्त्वशृङ्खलाम्।

इतर्य शिवार्तनोत्साहात् दैवेदिक दैवेदिक दैवेदिक दैवेदिक —

ईश्वर। प्रवृत्तविययः—

स्वतः कोचनामादिरिदुधुणविभवः।

सुकृष्टवैवैमस्यं

सवर्णं दैवेदिकवे च तत् || ६ ॥

प्रवृत्तविययः स्वतीयमालम्: ये न ते सब एस सबस्य-स्वाध्वरासवायम्।

तेषु सवर्णं: परमप्रायोगिकादिरिदुधुणविभवः।

सुधारण। सत्यसमाधिक्रियाकृतियोऽभिभुज।

पुनः प्रवृत्तविययः स्वतीयमालम्: ये न ते सब एस सबस्य-स्वाध्वरासवायम्।

तेषु सवर्णं: परमप्रायोगिकादिरिदुधुणविभवः।

सुधारण। सत्यसमाधिक्रियाकृतियोऽभिभुज।

पुनः प्रवृत्तविययः स्वतीयमालम्: ये न ते सब एस सबस्य-स्वाध्वरासवायम्।

तेषु सवर्णं: परमप्रायोगिकादिरिदुधुणविभवः।

सुधारण। सत्यसमाधिक्रियाकृतियोऽभिभुज।

पुनः प्रवृत्तविययः स्वतीयमालम्: ये न ते सब एस सबस्य-स्वाध्वरासवायम्।

तेषु सवर्णं: परमप्रायोगिकादिरिदुधुणविभवः।

सुधारण। सत्यसमाधिक्रियाकृतियोऽभिभुज।

पुनः प्रवृत्तविययः स्वतीयमालम्: ये न ते सब एस सबस्य-स्वाध्वरासवायम्।

तेषु सवर्णं: परमप्रायोगिकादिरिदुधुणविभवः।

सुधारण। सत्यसमाधिक्रियाकृतियोऽभिभुज।

पुनः प्रवृत्तविययः स्वतीयमालम्: ये न ते सब एस सबस्य-स्वाध्वरासवायम्।

तेषु सवर्णं: परमप्रायोगिकादिरिदुधुणविभवः।

सुधारण। सत्यसमाधिक्रियाकृति
मलापरिवर्तितः

तेषः तेषः तेषः तेषः तेषः

पश्चात् पश्चात् पश्चात् पश्चात् पश्चात्

मलाद्रिकं मलाद्रिकं मलाद्रिकं मलाद्रिकं मलाद्रिकं

सर्वत्र नाम्प दक्ष लाइणमसादिष्ठे द्राक्षे || १० ||
काठमण्डौने

मनुष्य। तद्वायंसेवं भौषणं न संस्कृतं भावं। ॥ १२ ॥

पूर्वेत्—

चिन्तिष्ठिते निरोधा

सुखदः परिणमन्मतः कालात्।

परिणतिविद्यमयोऽगा

सकादाचित्तं स्वस्तकाष्ठचिच। ॥ १२॥

वघिः शि परिणाममुच्यते प्रारुत्तरास्विबहुंते। क्षण

भाषेरत्नसाधनं सबिन्ति। भवं धर्मसंसारः स्वारं निवारोऽविवेक

खुश्यूः। स च परिणामः कबिरास्वभावानं पद्मानामिक

अभियोक्तकं इत्याद। परिणति विदेश इति। ॥ १३॥

अतः एव परिणति विदेश्योगान्तः सप्ताहार्तकाश्यं अनि

मनं साधन मेधास्वरपुरुषानं इत्याद।—

अतः एव पुद्रकानां

परिणामं साधनादुधुरमेदः।

कालातुगतकं तथा

पदेकासो मन्येश्चतां जातु। ॥ १५॥

मेधः: विशेषभायोपार्यायः शीतवञ्चिन्धुयनायः

व्रीणेत्रेदात्त अभिक्षण्यथमेदात् कालेदात् जायमा—

तत्त्वार्थस्य। ॥

नात्रधि विशेषायक व्ययं भुसे महाराजविशेषाय व्यये

नायथा। सवहनश्वतवधुरिये भवं भस्ति काव्यशास्त्रे

दवसाकंम्य नं भावसूनादस्य: परम्परा। ॥ १३॥

अतः एव काव्यत्वः विद्वेदसमन्त्वते यथेऽपेक्ष

विद्वेदाया: प्रकाशपान्त्व शमाविशेषराजस्वमा

समाविशेषादिशितायविधिप्रसादे। विद्वेदवर्गः। ॥ १५॥

साधनावचाने: प्रवा बहुतमाहः

यथात् यथा यात्रि

स अन्यो रूपस्यमेदः पावः।

ततः तथा ताच्छि

निर्दिष्टविभागतरत्नवस्थालम्। ॥ १५॥

वचे पिक्करक्षणादिशा: यावः: पावः: सह यथा

मर्दः सर्वं विश्वासं करोति। विश्वासकल्पश्च एव वि

अनामिकः—
हृद्यूँ शूषणि यतः
सन्नुक्तः साधनानि ददयते
पावें शाखे नाना च
नेतर्या युस्तकादि जापणे ॥ १६ ॥
हृद्यूँ शूषणि स्वस्ततमस्वार्ज्जुकारणी सज्जाधिक्र
स्त्रेष्ठ साधनीनारायणेशानि जाधिक्रयित्वाधिक्रयानि च
दीपकाधिक्रयानि साधनानिनिश्चित्कारणी यूक्ते सत्यतात्त्व
मद्यपदोपजेन्यायकायांकारुकयेशां युक्तकः च
न अभिनवता ततः साधनानिनिश्चित्कारणी यूक्तकः
मोधस्वार्ज्जुकारणीमयेन ब्रह्मशास्त्रां च
मद्यपालिकायांकारुकयेशां यूक्तकः ॥ १७ ॥
किंचि
यथा स्वप्न सत्यं
कूर्वास्ते प्रसूने योग्यम्
चिद्वनः तत निहितं
प्रख्ये तेनेद चिरस्तले ॥ १८ ॥
विश्वे जामलापि सर्वभू काळपायुक्तातमलङ्कालितं दिशिष्टम् प्राकृतं भोगनि निर्मिते योगम् करोति महापरिपार्थ विक्षिप्तस्य केषी सिद्धिकाले भोजनालयम् ॥ १९ ॥
किंचि ॥

tविनिप्रस्थोऽप्राणिपि
तत्साधयां उलझन्दानकृत
पुष्पादिरथ्युक्तः
न्दनः स च पादशाक्षितसाहाययु ॥ २० ॥
महानिन्द्रे: प्राणिपि तथा चंदनक प्रकृत: पाणपाय महाकालाकालो वस्त्रामयोऽख्त्वरीयो तिरोप्यालयक ॥ वृक्षद्रोहं पाण शाक्षितायु ॥ कुलेन परम्परे हृदयेऽ न नु आस्तानाय हाय प्रकृतः अर्थात्तरोऽषानेन पाणां शाक्षितायु ॥ तत: तद: शाक्षितः प्रतिवर्तयु शाक्षितायु ॥ शाक्षितायु ॥ वृक्षद्रोहं पाणां शाक्षितायु ॥ कुलेन परम्परे हृदये।


tवत्स:—
हाण्डा च तविनिप्र
योग्यं युज्य: द्वारकये करणम्।
वीजस्येव स्थापे
परिणामितिरिद्यामलस्यचित्तिदान॥ २१ ॥

विशुद्धिव्यथा वर्गम वनस्पति सिंहः पञ्चमेव सुलोकः।
वर्षभरे स्थापे बलेष्वरेष्वर्मी त्रिभुवनीः ॥ २२ ॥

कस्मिन्निमित्ते गृहस्थसिद्धां विवस्याविता विशेषः।
स्वेक्षयति चोद्रवेदव्राय ॥ २३ ॥

अन्नपूर्णांकान्ते
वंचित्वा विनिमयोऽयोऽ
कृतसम्पूर्णं तत्र चिन्मिति ॥
सर्वस्मृतं न युगप
स्तुपौर्वदिति चोद्रवाचवः ॥ २४ ॥

इत्यतदेव सबन्धवः
धुतांस्मृतिः तत्र सर्व पहिरन्ति ॥
हैथो प्राणो च नागः
अत्यन्ति विचुल्वं च मोक्षसाधनं ॥

तेनानुकूलीना
कृत्वा कुष्ठानि कार्यकरणाते ॥
वीजायुगस्तुमुखः
भोजयो सर्वकामणि ॥ २५ ॥

सहारांस्मृतिः समस्त्वर्तः
मधुर्यवीर्यगतिः ॥ २६ ॥

वस्मादिव्र तदाहं यत्र विद्वानि
शक्तिवीर्यां विस्मृतमपि संस्करणिः
व्यापरं भोक्त्रस्तवधिञ्च विचिन्ते।
ततो यथाशुचमधुर्यं
पृथकः जनाधारणस्तवः ॥ पद्मस्मृतिः सर्वकामणि
भोजयो तत्र कार्यकरणाते ॥ २७ ॥

T. N. 2
पुनर्पि पूर्वप्रचारांकते—
नन्दमित्रिमि: कारणो
हद्वा कार्मिक व्यस्तकालादि।
पाच्य पि तथैव श्राद्धे।
स्थानादिति समानसुभाषल II २६ II

क्रास्वर्ग भोगवत्व दृष्टीकोष कथा: शिवेन
पायथय: व्यवहारलब्धम् पञ्चादिति। संज्ञारिणी। क्रियत् हि।
वधृते वतो नामां युगपक्षमज्ञानशक्ति।
एव चे: साधनरुप: क्रिक्ष एवानां संसारवैविध्यभावनादि:
श्रायणाविभाजिताः। शाक्तिपाहुन्नक्षातास्वत्तमाः
हतो न कर्मां युगपक्ष महतीर्थी दृष्टि वयमपि न
चर्चेयोत्या एव। पुरुषूम: श्व स्वाध्यात्मक: परिहारोश्री
वा सम:। नै: पर्य्येोक्ष्यस्तादार्थम् विश्वस्ये। इत्यिन्नानं
सत्यान्विति। II २६ II

परंन्त श्रवण्यः—
प्रत्या कार्य प्रदेहः
बिन्नविन्नामियो महत्याप्राप्त।
शास्त्रलघु हि योगमतः
तथेऽव कर्तव्येऽवस्तृपीत। II २७ II

तत्रतप्रिणिनी। १६

अङ्क वि: प्राकृत कार्ये विविधार्थानं विषयः विषयः।
मा व्याख्यातीति विषयः। वि: क्रिमिनकार्यमहीनाः
कालसमय महतीर्थी शिव:। द्वारे न। योगसिद्धांमामेव
यथा: II २७ II

इत्यं क्रिमिनकार्य महासे: दिश्यनित्यके स्वर्गेन
संधारसमयविषयः वाच्याः एव। मझाठे: पको न। युगपक्ष
शेषां पार्थापरितिते तात्पर्यास्वपि भवता। वसर्गवर्णमेव
अव: समानात्विति युगपक्षावर्णकार्यैवो भवस: न। युक्त-
मिलनेऽत्वाह। बाहुः—

स्मरे स्वन्योऽन्तः
स्ववर्यसे कर्ममेव बुद्धिः
स्वताःसमान्योऽन्तः
अप्तार्थस्वर्यमे समानकान्ति:। II २८ II

तन्त्रात्मनायां योगमतः प्रभृतिसमात्वातः। कर्ममेव
कर्ममेव यथाच व्यस्तास्य: पको न। युगमुर्त् II २८ II

कर्म कार्यार्थिर्मूयमाहं

शोभां च सर्गातः
नियमविवृद्धिनि स्था च यथा। II २४ II
पायात्मा काले भवति
तन्द्रे तथा तांत्रिक्षेत्रे।

कुले शाक्यामिनी
तुल्यं मोक्षे च तामिर्मित्वे।

एवं ध्यात्वादि निष्णविद्वाने वायुशाक्तिः, वसीक्षणं बंधु
हारे वा दस्ताने वशः मायाः होतं भवन् वयं दु:स्तु
वावित काले वेद प्रकरण समुपस्थते। तरस्तु तावाति काले
हारावं देशं िरुः काले सा वमयं अवंता सांगः।

मायादशीिर्वाणप्रमाण यहं भूमिः प्रस्तुतं तवं गर्गयानका
शायणलयूज्यं तं च परिहाराः मोक्षायनगणपति तदेकोपे
धाकाकप दीनच्या प्रस्यं कमाण्याः।

हुः तुल्यामिति
अयात्मा च महत्त्मा वसवात्मक हस्मेनसन्तायि च बिस्ववेन
शाखोऽहुः इश्वार्ध।

अलसुहिद्विशमुदः
सखुः निरधोरैण।
शाखेपिरकायम्
शाख्यानलयं विचा निचत्ये तदृष्ट।
शाख्यानलपवर्त्यं
सहुकरेशासनोपत्या।

तन्त्रपतिपुरा:।

यथार्थे च वैदिकमंत्रामानविक्षिप्तां सहता:।
हस्मेनसन्ताये इश्वारकानिष्ठाः स्वस्वायमस्वनिः
सहायतां भीतर्यं निष्के च।

उक्तः समातयोः
तत्वम्यायनिक्षेत् दु:स्तिष्टता:।
हस्मेनस्वनिः जड़ताः
मपनेतुमानि दिकां सुवन्या।

अनायात्मात्मा निविलयाः 
नैतिकिकसंविकिष्टाः
जबला भावभयो अपनेश्च ते 
अभिविोत्तिः तदन्तः।
Chapter II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOD IN THE TATTVASAŃGRAHA

The Tattvasańgraha (TS) of Sadyojyoti is a work of 56 verses and has a commentary by Aghorasiva. In another context Aghora tells us that Sadyojyoti wrote the TS to throw light on the contents of the Raurava Ágama(RA).¹ In various places in the present study we will check the relevant sections of the RA in order to try and discover to what extent the above is the case. Before giving a description of the lay-out of the TS it will be worthwhile to note a few points about the RA in order to make the exposition of the philosophy of God in the TS more intelligible. I will follow this with a brief description of the lay-out of the TS and then a detailed study of the sections of the TS that bear on the topic of this essay.

The Tattvaprakásikā of Bhoja, in conformity with the general practice of later Saivism lists 36 tattvas. In contradistinction to this the RA lists 30.² The enumeration of these 30 is as follows:³ sixteen are transforming tattvas (vikaraññ); ten are foundational

¹ TTN, P-2, L-13.
² RA, Vidyapada, 10, 99.
³ Ibid, verse 99ff.
(prakrtayah) and then four more are known, namely, purusa, vidyā, rāga and śiva-tattvas. The sixteen transforming tattvas are the eleven indriyas (five motor organs, five sense organs, plus manas) and the five mahabhūtas (material elements). The ten foundational tattvas are kalā, avyakta, guna, buddhi, ahamkāra and the five tanmātras (subtle matter).

The initial laudatory section of the RA contains verses which make it difficult to classify the teaching as dualistic or monistic, etc. In his introduction Ruru repeatedly praises Sadāsiva (Śiva) in the familiar

4 Sāmkhya Kārikā 3 uses, the terminology of the vikāra and prakrti-tattvas. There the eleven vikāra-tattvas are bare evolutes which are produced by other tattvas but which are not themselves productive of other tattvas. In the same context a prakrti-tattva is one that is productive of other tattvas but not produced by any other. The term is thus properly applied only to prakrti itself. In addition there is, according to the Sāmkhyas, a third category of tattvas, the prakrti/vikrti tattvas. These possess both of the above-mentioned characteristics. These are seven in number (the 5 tanmātras, buddhi and ahamkāra). The RA confuses the prakṛti class with the Sāmkhya's prakṛti/vikṛti class of tattvas. It adds three tattvas (kalā, prakṛti, guna) to the above list of seven and instead of using the Samkhya name for the class simply calls it the prakṛti class of tattvas. But if one uses the Samkhya definition of a prakṛti tattva this makes no sense since the guna tattva, for example, is both an evolute and evolving. Both the Sāmkhya and the RA allow for the existence of yet another kind of tattva which neither is an evolute nor is evolving. This is, in the case of the former, the purusa tattva and in the case of the latter, the śivatattva (although there is a good deal of doubt about the teaching of the RA on this, and not only this matter, as we shall see throughout this chapter). Cf. S.S.S. Sastri's transl. of Sāmkhya Kārikā, p-8ff.
dualistic manner as directing, impelling or guiding creatures and creation rather than being their essences.

Thus:

I bow down to that Sadāśiva, creator of the world, creator of all things, gods, demons, Brahmā and all the rest.5

I bow down to God, to Sadāśiva, the impeller of bondage and release, the giver of pleasant and unpleasant fruits which consist of merit and demerit.6

I bow down to Sadāśiva the Lord of purusa and pradhāna, whose (pradhāna's) sphere of activity is manas, buddhi, ahamkara, the tanmātras and the indriyas.

But also included in this section is the following:

I bow down to Sadasiva, omniscient and omnipotent, all-giving, unconquered, residing as the real self of all beings.8 (my underlining)

It is difficult to say what significance should be attached to the occurrence of a monistic phrase such as that underlined in the above. Perhaps it is common enough to be trans-doctrinal and thus have little philosophical importance. In any case, the description of the creation of the world that occurs in other sections of the Vidyāpāda of the RA appear to conform with the dualism that Sadyo'jyoti is an exponent of. Thus

5 RA, Upodghātapatāla.  
6 Ibid, vs.12.  
7 Ibid, vs. 13.  
8 Ibid, vs.8. Translated according to the reading of fn.4,p-2 of Bhatt's edition.
in Srstikrama, 4ff., māyā is clearly the separate eternal matrix of beings; in Sivatattvanipatāla 14ff., māyā is just there, apparently eternally and is then stirred by Ananta. There appears to be the thesis put forward in vs. 9 of this patala that the 8 vidyesvaras are forms of Siva's sakti which would be more monistic than the familiar teaching that Siva chooses eight of the best vijnānakevela souls to become the eight vidyesvaras. Even so, the teaching of this section is, on the whole, dualistic.

The RA, as we have seen in its listing of the tattvas, misses four out of the five that usually occur above māyā. These are the (suddha-)vidyā, iśvara, Sadāśiva and sakti tattvas. It only lists the Sivatattva. This should mean that the same tattvas will be missing in the TS and as we shall see, this is the case. But several other tattvas appear in the TS which very nearly make up the missing number, and on at least one occasion (the ātma-tattva) there is direct textual evidence from the RA to support its postulation (Vidyāpatāla, 4, 43. Note also that the ātma-tattva must be the same as the purusa-tattva, in the list at Vidya-patāla, 10, 98ff.) As we shall see, Aghora makes some attempts to align Sadyojyoti's tattva's in the TS with a conventional listing such as that which occurs in the TP, for example. Also, when kalā and niyati tattvas fail
to appear in the TS just as they fail to appear in the RA. Aghora attempts a weak and unconvincing explanation.

Keeping these few points in mind, we can now turn to the lay-out of the TS.

The first 26 verses of this work describe the material creation from the earth, the lowest tattva, to the matrix of the material creation, māyā. The first 24 tattvas are listed according to the ordering of the Samkhya system up until prakṛti, the only exception being the inclusion (verse 8,9) of the three gunas as one separate tattva in contradistinction to the Samkhya system which sees them as being constitutive of, rather than separate from prakṛti. According to the Samkhya, above prakṛti is listed purusa. But in the TS raga tattvā comes directly after prakṛti. The reasons for this difference will be studied in their places.

After prakṛti are listed rāga tattva (10,11), vidyā tattva (12) and kalā tattva (17). Interwoven with the discussion of these latter three tattvas is discussion concerning karma, the soul's possession of the power of action and not just the power of knowing, and the fact of the soul's possession of these powers from all time (ie, they are never acquired de novo by the soul).

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9 Samkhya Karika,11.
Verse 24-47 explain and describe the domain of the bound soul (paśu). This domain includes not only ordinary unregenerate human beings, but also the various kinds of angels (Mantras, Mantreśas, Mantramahēśas) which latter are bound, but not to as great an extent as ordinary human beings.

Verses 36-39 contain a digression which discusses dīksā (initiation) as the only means to mokṣa.

Verses 42 and 43 contain an interesting discussion on the nature of mantras.

The final nine verses (48-57) discuss the nature of God, his powers, and the relationship between the two. These verses also discuss the nature of mokṣa and reject some opposing views concerning this.

In summary, then, the TS consists of a discussion of the three padārthas (categories) of Saiva Darsana: Pāśa (31-26), Paśu (27-47) and Pati (48-57).

I now proceed to a detailed study of those portions of the text that are relevant to the topic of this essay.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN THE TS

Aghora's mahālam (propitiatory verse) to the TS says:
I praise that All-Giver, Lord of Abhrasabha10
distinct from the world from time immemorial (or
perceiving the world from time immemorial),
stainless, who has Sivahood.//

Sadyojyoti, the best of teachers, was a knower of
valid means of knowledge, words and sentences. He
was like the mighty invisible Siva (appearing) right
before our eyes.//

An excessively bulky commentary, the Great
Commentary called Sarannisā (was written) by
Nārāyanakantha to throw light on the moon which is
the Ts. //

This shorter commentary has been prepared by me for
the slow-witted, for whom the Great Commentary was
too much.//11

According to the first verse of this maṅgalam
Siva is eternally distinct from the world (or eternally
perceives the world as a subject separate from an
object). Siva is not, as is the case for Abhinavagupta,
the one who "strings in a regular order the multitude of
gems, the objects which lie heaped up in the treasury of
his heart..."12 Aghora would, for example, accept that
the objects are heaped up, but in the interests of
purity he would say that they are not heaped up in the
heart of God but in māya (viśva in the above maṅgalam).
Thus the ontological rupture which Abhinava formulated
his metaphysics to avoid (ie. the postulation of a
material separate from God) is postulated by the

10 Cf. Filliozat for information, p-248
11 TS,P-1.
12 IPV,Pandey's transl.,p-40.
dualists because they would rather contend with ontological rupture than the contamination of perfection such as is entailed by allowing that the changing, impure objects are 'heaped up' in the heart of god. The dualist can tolerate ontological rupture as long as there is conative seamlessness, i.e., as long as everything that is obeys one will. Thus the dualists remind us at every turn that while God is not the material substance of the world, he is the one without whom nothing would happen. The dualists' vocabulary about God is peppered with references to his impulsion of the world, his superintendence of the world and his power of will. And so Sadyojyoti begins the very first verse of the TS along these lines:

Having bowed to Śankara (Śiva), guide of the sentient and insentient, omniscient, unborn, I briefly expound upon the tattvas, in order to effect the enlightenment of the dull-witted. //

According to Aghora the 'sentient' means the bound souls, the 'insentient' the two material causes hindu and māyā, and their effects. Leader means 'superintender' (adhisthitāram). The meaning, according to Aghora is that Śiva, the superintender, bestows pure or impure experiences on the souls in accordance with their deserts, by means of the pure of impure worlds. He does this directly in the case of the pure worlds.

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13 TS, p-1.
(above māyā) and indirectly in the case of the impure worlds (below māyā). In the latter case he acts through Ananta and other Mantrēśas. In his commentary to this verse Aghora briefly refers to the argument for the existence of God which will be studied in Ch.4 below in detail. The argument is based on the premise that the world is an effect exhibiting ordered arrangement of parts and this indicates an intelligent author as cause. In this same commentary Aghora mentions several other theories of the origination of the world. Thus prakṛti (Sānkhya) and karma (Mīmāṃsā, Buddhism) are rejected as possible explanations for the origination of the world because both are insentient (and what is insentient cannot, on its own, cause the world). The Śaiva dualists identify the theory that the cause of the world is purusa with the Vedantins but are not specific as to which school or schools they refer to. In any case the Śaiva rejection of this theory is based on the Śaiva's own understanding of what a purusa is i.e., a pasu or bound soul. Thus the pasu, being covered with mala, cannot have caused the world. They combine this conception with the common idea in Vedanta that the absolute (now understood, apparently, to be the ātman/brahman of the Advaita) is inactive, which ipso facto debars world-cause status to this purusa.
'Unborn' in the verse means, according to Aghora, eternally devoid of mala, or eternally devoid of birth, which consists of linkage with a body, etc. God's eternity is proved by his never having to undergo birth. Were the author of the world also accepted as being subject to birth and as such non-eternal, this author would have to be considered to be insentient (since in this system non-eternity and insentientcy are two concepts which analytically contain each other). Also infinite regression would result (due to there being infinite regression of the parents of this supposed 'author' of the world.)

God is omniscient because devoid of mala and because he has been proved to be author of the world (and only he can make all who knows all). The meaning of this is according to Aghora, that knowledge is the essence of God and is not an accidental attribute as is contended by the Naiyāyikas. Any variation in knowledge is due to variation among the subjunctive conditions, that is among the objects to be known and the things to be done. Thus non-eternity with respect to God is merely metaphorical.

Aghora quotes scripture to this effect: "There is admission that the one is eternally variegated due to the infinite variegation of objects. But this (variegation in God) is only metaphorical. In the same
sense there is really no difference (in God) due to his being the author. Such difference must be metaphorical."

Aghora glosses the epithet Sankara as follows: God makes (kara in SamKara: karoti, from kr) or effects happiness (Sam in SAMkara: sukham) for the selves, which consists in their gaining omniscience and omnipotence just like Siva's.

After having glossed the 'bowing down' of the verse as meaning bowing down (prahibhuya) with body, word and mind, Aghora notes that the intention of the work is to explain the tattvas such as earth, etc. This is so in spite of the fact that these have been exhaustively explained in works such as the Matanga Agama, etc. The reason that the TS is not redundant is that in works like the Matanga the details are too much for the dim-witted and so Sadyojyoti, writing for the sake of these latter composed the TS in a briefer format (samksepena). He also notes that the purpose of the work consists in effecting the supreme end of man, since the means to attain this end which is moksa, whether the supreme or the non-supreme moksa, is through knowledge of the tattvas (it is not, for example, through repentance). It is well established according to Aghora, that there is a relationship between knowledge of the tattvas and study, and knowledge of the tattvas and
moksa, the former being defined as being concerned with the thing to be known and the means for making that thing known, and the latter with the end to be attained and the means for the attainment of that end.

Finally for this verse, Aghora notes that Sadyojoyoti, the son of Ugrajyoti, belongs to a guru-lineage which goes right back to Siva himself and is thus authoritative to speak on these matters.14

Next15 Sadyojoyoti begins discussing the tattvas starting from the lowest (prthivi:earth). Aghora, in introducing verse 2 notes that the order of enumeration of the tattvas in the TS is from the lowest to the highest (samhāarakramena, the order of resolution of effects back into their cause) which is the reverse of the normal enumeration. But, notes Aghora, this is the order of enumeration used for purposes of purification in preparation for initiation. He finds his authority for this in the SA.16

The enumeration of the tattvas proceeds in regular order from verse 2 onwards and need not detain us until verses eight and nine.17 Here Sadyojoyoti, in

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14 TS,p-2,3.
15 TS,p-3.
16 TS,p-3.
17 TS,p-11,12.
conformity with the teaching of the RA\textsuperscript{18} lists the three gunas as comprising a separate tattva. Aghora, in his commentary to verse nine supplies the following explanation: the gunas are multiple and insentient like pots and thus require a cause (for what is many and insentient can neither cause itself nor be uncaused). This cause is prakrti. The three gunas are not constitutive of prakrti as the Samkhyaists would have it. Rather prakrti and the three gunas form two separate tattvas, the former being the cause of the latter.\textsuperscript{19}

At verse ten Sadyojyoti proceeds to describe the rāga tattva immediately after having described the prakrti tattva.\textsuperscript{20} What is notable in this for our purposes is that he omits the purusa tattva. Aghora in his commentary\textsuperscript{21} on this verse, notes an objector as contending that in some works such as the Mātanga, the purusa tattvā is listed between the prakrti and rāga tattvas. Aghora's reply is that the being a material realm (adhyatvam) such as is involved in being the material support or foundation of various worlds, which is what being a tattva involves, is not possible for purusa because it is sentient (i.e. non-material) and

\textsuperscript{18} RA, Vidyāpāda, 10, 99.
\textsuperscript{19} TS, p-12, 13.
\textsuperscript{20} TS, p-13.
\textsuperscript{21} TS, p-13, 14.
eternal (unchanging). Since being an inert support or material cause of the insentient world is not a role which purusas can play they are not tattvas. When the ontological import of being a tattva is secondary and the tattvas are being used in the process of purification in preparation for initiation, then the purusa tattva can be listed after the prakriti tattva and before the five kāṇchukas (sheaths). For in this situation it is the locus of the erroneous conception of seeing the self in the non-self, which locus would be absent were it not for the listing of the purusa tattva. The reason for this is that none of the tattvas above prakṛti (i.e., none of the five kāṇchukas) can serve the purpose for none of them are associated with the arising of the above-mentioned error. Now since the TS is not concerned with ritual purification, the description of the purusa tattva is delayed by Sadyojyoti until after the listing of the inert tattvas is completed; that is, until after the listing of māyā at verse 26.22

Rāga, vidyā and kālā tattvas are enumerated in verses 10,12 and 15 respectively.23 These are the only three of the normal five kāṇchukas that the TS mentions

22 There it is called pāsu-tattva and this is discussed in TS,p-28,vs. 27, and below p-

23 Respectively TS p-13,vs.10;p-15,vs.12; p-19,vs.17.
and this accords with the RA. In his commentary to verse 24 where Sadyojāti summarizes the succession of tattvas from māyā down to prakṛti as being māyā, kalā, vidyā, rāga and then finally prakṛti, in that order, Aghora quotes the RA to the same effect: The two tattvas, rāga and vidyā arise from kalā, and that from avyakta, and from that (avyakta) the Lord creates the gunas. Aghora interprets the word 'and' (ca) which occurs after avyakta in the RA text and after the word 'kalā' in verse 24a of the TA as referring to the two missing tattvas, kāla, niyati. He then gives an inferential proof for both and refers the reader to his commentaries on the MA and TP for more information. Finally he says that Sadyojāti has not explicitly mentioned these two tattvas because they are inessential (bahirāṅgatvād) since they are dependent upon kalā, etc. which have been listed. None of this is convincing. We have here a clear indication of doctrinal fluidity. Aghora seems to have a kind of stock reply which attempts to make sense of there either being too many or

24 Cf. RA, Vidyāpāda, 10, 99.

25 RA, Vidyāpāda, 2, 15, and TS, p-25.

26 TS, p-25.

27 Cf. TP, verses 41 (kāla) and 42 (niyati), pp-37, 38; also MA, 10, 14ff.
too few tattvas as the case may be. If an opponent contends that a certain tattva posited by the Saivaś is redundant since another tattva already posited does the same job, Aghora, following the MA, will insist that the tattva in fact has a special role to play and is thus not redundant, and that further, if the same tattva can serve two different ends, then all tattvas can be collapsed into one. On the other hand when too few tattvas are listed as is here the case, he can always find the missing tattvas in some word like 'and' or 'etc.' which words occur in virtually every verse anyway.

Verse 26 posits and defines māyā:

Beyond the transforming (changing) tattvas is māyā. (It is ) eternal, ubiquitous, one, insentient, matrix (bearer) of creation, maintenance and dissolution (of the world), and material cause. //26

Aghora comments that the remainder of the verse would read: (māyā is ) beyond the transformation of its own effects because it is the material cause of creation, etc., because it is the substratum (or bearer) of creation, etc." Māyā is eternal because if even this were admitted to have a cause infinite regression would result. 'Ubiquitous' means that it

28 Cf. MA 10,16;11,10.

29 Aghora uses this same argument in his MA Vṛtti near the end of his commentary on MA10,14' (Hulin's transl. p-213) and TP, verse 42,p-38.
pervades, not all things everywhere, but only its own effects (i.e. all of the tattvas below and including kala). It is insentient because it is the material cause and all material causes such as the clay are observed to be insentient. It is one because it is the ultimate material cause (it is axiomatic in this system that the multiple insentient entities like the pots want a unitary, homogeneous, insentient material cause which forms their substratum as clay does of pots). If this material cause itself were to require a cause then infinite regression would result. It is for this reason that the theory of atoms of the Naiyayikas is rejected. Aghora also rejects the Vedanta theory according to which the Paramatma (or Supreme Purusa) is the ultimate cause of the world, saying that if such were the case, then the Paramatma, like the tattvas of which it is supposedly the cause, would be insentient. Similarly, if, as the Pancaratras (Vaisnavas) claim, the Supreme Self (Narayana) is the cause of both the sentient and insentient sections of the world, the unwelcome result is that Narayana must have parts (part of him forming the substratum of the sentient and part of him forming the substratum of the insentient things). He must thus be an effect which makes him insentient according Saiva logic. We can see here that it is in the interests of maintaining the purity of God in a logical manner that
the Saiva dualists are dualists and reject the panentheism that they attribute to the Pancaratras.

The principle of Saiva logic involved in the above argument is stated by Aghora as follows: whenever and whatever be the nature of the effect, so will be the nature of the cause. This is the premise used constantly by the Saivas in their rebuttal of the Pancaratras, and seems to me to stem from their acceptance of satkāryavada, the causal theory which posits a natural and necessary relationship between the essences of the cause and the effect. It is the 'no surprises' theory of causation in the sense that predictability becomes possible concerning the nature of the absent cause or effect on the basis of the presence of one or the other of them. It also makes it possible for the Saivas to have a wissenschaft of moksa, i.e., a progressive and preponderantly rational view of the path to moksa. In this they are "Catholics" who see real value in sacrament and "objective" grace.

Aghora contends that the Saivas avoid the unwelcome result that he deems to occur in the case of the Pancaratras above, by their acceptance of māyā as the substratum of the material creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world. Thus the positing of māyā as the material cause appears to be motivated, at least in part, by the desire to avoid the consequences that
accrue to panentheisms such as that of the Pancaratra's God Nārāyana. It seems that there is a curious kind of paradox in this. The dualists are dualists in the sense that they are concerned to maintain the non-contamination or the purity of God. One normally associates a concern for purity with the monist position in the sense that a monist wants to reduce all things to pure unity and sees contamination in terms of the rupture of pure unity, or in terms of the presence of the 'other' in the 'one'. Thus for a monist impurity and duality are concepts which analytically contain one another. Yet it is precisely the same motive, the concern for purity, which drives the dualist to his dualism. The dualist, emphasizing the causal law in the manner we have just observed, cannot see how spirit (cit) can cause matter (acit). Nor can he find an example in experience of spirit causing matter. So he concludes that such is not the case and posits different kinds of 'stuff' as the causes of, or constituents of spirit and matter. The monist, de-emphasizing causal law and our ordinary experience of the world begins with an idea (gained by insight, revelation, tradition, etc.) that unity is the sumnum bonum. Thus for the dualist difference (bheda) is what makes purity of God possible. For the monist the same thing makes purity impossible.

Verse 27 posits and describes the bound soul:
The tattva called pāśu is eternal, ubiquitous, and has its powers of knowing and doing beginninglessly obstructed by māla. It is for the sake of his experience that the (previously) named group (of tattvas from earth to māyā) exist.  
Sad yojyoti's use of the word tattva with reference to the pāśus should be noted. Aghora has insisted elsewhere that the tattvas are all sentient and that it is for this reason that Pāti and the pāśus are not tattvas.  

But Sadyojyoti, not only here but also in the title to another work (the TTN) calls both the souls and Śiva tattvas. So it appears that at least in the case of Sadyojyoti, there was no rigid adherence to the definition of a tattva as being something necessarily sentient. Further, in the RA Śiva is himself considered to be a tattva. And finally even Aghora uses the term tattva with respect to the purusa which on his own definition is sentient. All of this makes any easy generalization of the meaning of the term tattva in terms of sentiency or insentiency difficult.

In Aghora's commentary to the above verse there is an important discussion concerning why māla is not a

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30 TP, comm. to verses 5, 49 and TS comm. to verse 10, 67, 68. Also see P.S. Filliozat, p-253.

31 RA, Vidyāpāda, 10, 99.

32 TS comm. on vs. 10, p-13. He also quotes approvingly, the reference to the ātma-tattva in the RA in his comm. on TS, vs. 28, p-30.
tattva. It is said that paśu is a tattva in the sense that being a bound soul (paśu) is the result of the ātman being covered by mala. Now there has been no time when this has not been so since mala and the ātman have been in relationship beginninglessly. As such, mala is subsumed under the paśu tattva, for the state of being a paśu necessarily includes being covered with mala. So from this discussion of Aghora's it seems possible to say that mala and paśūtvam (the being a paśu) are in a samavāya relationship (i.e. a relationship of inherence), but that mala and ātman are in a samyoga relationship (separable relationship). Thus when mala is removed from ātman so is paśūtvam. In fact this is the goal of the whole system. At the same time this may be a possible explanation for the fact that mala is not a tattva. In the commentary to the same verse Aghora lists the three kinds of bound souls. In his description of the lowest type of soul, the sakala (bound by all three bonds, mala, karma, and māyā) he says that Sambhu effects bondage with the goal of maturing mala. He does this with the effects of māyā which facilitates the experiencing of karma on the part of the bound souls. He describes mala which binds the sakala souls as kūṭasthanityena (eternally uniform) whereas the karma which binds these souls is pravāhanityena (eternally serial). Aghora then seems to see the difference between
mala as a bond and karma as a bond in this that the
former binds in a legato fashion whereas the latter
binds in a staccato fashion. While karma is a series of
meritorious and demeritorious actions going back,
beginninglessly (like a conjunctive series of atoms or
like a cardiograph's monitor display's 'blips') mala is a
steady-state bond which binds by its mere presence in
the same way as water wets one merely by the fact that
one is standing in it.

In verse 28 Sadyojyoti continues his description
of the pasu tattva that he began in verse 27:

Souls whose powers of knowing and doing are
manifest, who have had the net of bonds broken by
Siva's sakti in the form of what is called
initiation-knowledge, (these souls form) the pure
domain of the tattvas. //28

Aghora quotes RA Vidyāpāda, 4, 43 as scriptural
support for this verse. In this quotation from the RA
there is mention of an ātma-tattva. To this point
Sadyojyoti has spoken of the purusa tattva, or the pasu
tattva and now the ātma tattva as following māyā tattva.
That means that the ātma tattva would be the 31st tattva
(i.e. the 24 Samkhya tattvas, plus guna tattva, the 5
kāñchukas, plus māyā, plus pasu tattva, and now ātma
tattva for a total thus far, of 31). We now have at this
point in the TS, one more tattva than the RA accepts in
total.
Aghora also takes the opportunity to insist, in his commentary to the above verse, that it is by dīkṣā alone, and not by mere knowledge that one can attain mokṣa. He quotes the Sa to this effect.

In verse 29 Sadyojyoti describes the activities of these pure souls (suddha-ātmas, as opposed, apparently, to the impure souls or asuddha-ātmas that inhabit the paśu-tattva):

A pure soul sees and meditates upon Śiva along with his sakti by means of a visioning sparked by Śiva (himself). (A pure soul) sacrifices to Sambhu with mantras, for his own and others' sake. //29

In his introduction to this verse Aghora says that this applies only to souls yoked to a body for the purposes of superintending various impure creations. These souls receive and require grace from Śiva (i.e. it applies to Mantrēśvarē and Mahāmantrēśvarē whom Aghora sees as being referred to here.) It does not apply to the souls who have attained mokṣa which is sameness of qualities with Śiva. For these latter are referred to as being 'released sivas' (muktāśivatvena) and not 'pure-souls'. So 'pure' does not mean 'released' and only serves to distinguish the Mantrēśvarē etc., from the paśus. There may be some confusion about the term 'released-sivas' also. It means that the souls who have overcome all bonds become sivas. This means that they are muktātmanas. One cannot be Śiva and then be released
but one can have been a pāsu and then be released to become a śiva.

The phrase in the verse "... a visioning sparked by Śiva..." (śiveddhya drśtasya), according to Aghora, has the aim of eliminating the conception of the Patañjali yoga system that this visioning is due to the functioning of some sort which has its origin in the buddhi. This is impossible on Saiva grounds because buddhi belongs to the domain of pāśa and is by definition insentient. Thus man's seeing of God is sparked from the side of God and not from the side of either man or matter.

In this same commentary Aghora quotes RA I,3,21, in support of verse 29b of the TS and both verses say the same thing.

Finally for this verse, Aghora includes ācaryas (teachers) along with the mantrēśvarēs, etc., in this pure-soul tattva (the Ātma-tattva). In another context Aghora makes it clear that acaryas or guruś function as channels for the flow of grace from Śiva into the impure creation (aśuddhādhvā), just as the mantrēśas superintend the pure creation. We also know that the mantrēśas that belong to the pure-soul tattva superintend the pure domain of creation (śuddhādhvā). So

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33 TP, comm. to verse 15.
the pure souls of the pure-soul-tattva function in both the pure and impure domains and in fact are not entirely pure. This is due to two reasons. First if they were entirely pure they would be sivas. Second their very status as superintenders of the pure or impure creations (in the cases respectively of the mantramahēsas and the mantrēsas) involve having residual mala remaining to be matured by the performance of these duties. Similarly, the acaryas are connected with a body which entails for these inhabitants of the pure-soul tattva, connection with mala. The significance of all of this is that once again we are running into a certain amount of incoherence and ambiguity because we are dealing with those beings that exist at the interface between the two duals of this system. This means that we are dealing with the pāsus who are neither purely cit like Pati, nor purely acit like pāsa. So we must expect that things cannot make as good sense as one might wish.

Aghora introduces verse 30 by indicating that it speaks of a tattva made up of the Lords who superintend the māyā-garbha (the māyā-womb, i.e., the tattvas below and including māyā), which Lords are culled from those in the pure-soul tattva. These Lords are thus the manteśvaras and thus form the 32nd tattva in the TS.

Verses 30 and 31 describe and name some of the manteśvaras. They are linked to the kalātattva, etc.
(i.e. the first tattva below māyā) and have their powers of knowing and doing manifested by Śiva himself (and thus do not rely on a guru or initiation for the manifesting of these powers). Aghora, in his commentary to verse 30 says that even though, like pasus the manṭreśvaras are linked to kalā tattva, etc., their knowing faculty is not perverted thereby because of their receiving grace directly from Śiva. He quotes an unidentified source to the same effect.

Verse 31 describes the activities of these manṭreśvaras as being the effecting of bhukti and mukti (experience and release) of souls in their own domains.

Verses 32-35 discuss the 70 million mantras. There will be more extensive discussion of the curious nature of these mantras below. For now it will suffice to recognize that the mantras form one of three types of angels in Saiva Darśana. The other two types of angels are the manṭreśvaras and the mantramahēśvaras. All three types serve as the means whereby Śiva can have something to do with impurity and not compromise his own purity. These 70 million mantras are divided in half. Half of them work by using gurus as supports and half work without these as supports. This distinction between the manner of functioning of the two halves of the mantras would lead one to believe that the half that uses the support of the guru would function in the
Impure domain of creation and the other half which does not use the support of the guru would function in the pure domain of creation. There would thus be expected to be a division of the mantras along the lines of which domain of creation they function in, in the same way as there is a division of the mantras and the mantramahesas according to which domain of creation they function in. Yet both halves of the mantras function in both halves of creation, and there seems to be an incongruity here, as Michel Hulin has noted.34

In his commentary to verse 32 Aghora says some interesting things concerning the mantras, mantras, and mantramahesas. He says that the mantras (or vidyasa which in this context actually refers to the mantramahesas) come from the vijnanakala (i.e. vijnanakevela) class of bound souls (that the eight mantramahesvaras are the best of these) and that the aparamantas (meaning the mantras) come from the pralayakala (pralayakevela) class of bound souls. He also says that the mantras are to be equated only metaphorically with ordinary spoken words. He gets the etymology of the word from mananam meaning all-knowing and banam (protection), the whole word meaning 'grace to those in samsara'. According to Aghora, these mantras which cause the manifestation of knowledge and activity

34 Hulin's transl.p.130,fn.8)
in the souls are spoken of in Saiva writings like the RA as forming the mantra tattva because they are devoid of mala, are associated with the power of thinking, etc., and (in other scriptures) are said to be ensconced in the 'suddhavidyā tattva' (i.e. the first tattva above maya). So it appears that Aghora equates the mantra tattva of the RA and the TS with the vidyā tattva of other sources. In any case they form the 33rd tattva of the TS while the vidyā tattva with which Aghora appears to want to equate the mantra tattva, normally is the 32nd tattva.

In his commentary on verse 34 and 35 Aghora makes the following important points. The sakala souls alone need to receive grace through mantras which latter require a support (i.e. a guru). Next is given a brief description of the three bonds that dikṣā can remove, that is, of mala, kārma, and māyā. We need not go into this description since it has been covered already. But then he says that these bonds are removed by the activity of the Lord through the mantras (mantrakaranena) just as the effects of poison are observed to disappear through the recitation of certain mantras. Then he differentiates the mantras from the two kinds of lords of the mantras (i.e. the paramanteśvaras or the mantramahēśvaras and the aparamantrēśvaras or the mantrēśvarās). Mantras are karanas (channels of grace or
instrumental causes of grace) while the two kinds of lords of the mantras are karttas (effectors or doers of grace). At TS 42c more discussion takes place which fleshes out in greater detail Aghora's thinking on the nature of the mantras. For now it will suffice to say that he seems to be trying to walk a kind of tightrope on this subject as is the case whenever the sentient and insentient domains interface in this system. The mantras are said here to be instrumental causes (karana) and the lords of the mantras are said to be efficient causes (karti). On the one hand Aghora wants to avoid the Mimamsaka position which makes the mantras (i.e., words of the Veda) ends in themselves, in which case the mantra itself is the deity in the sense that the proper utterance of the word is efficacious for the realization of heaven, etc. In this situation no deity to whom the mantra is addressed or who is named by the mantra is needed. The mantras are thus 'gods' for the Mimamsakas since they function in the same way that God or 'gods' function in a mono- or polytheism. This is why Aghora makes the mantras only karanas. For a karana always requires a kartri. But there is a concomitant danger in the latter distinction.

The implication of the above distinction is not drawn out here by Aghora. He waits until TS 42c to talk about it. The implication is that the mantras are inert
or insentient just like māyā. In fact, Aghora will say that the mantras as words are efficacious only insofar as they name gods. If they work at all it is because the god whom they name grants the desire of the reciter (cf. discussion of verse 42,43 below). All of this is to avoid the Mīmāṃsaka position. But then Aghora will run into trouble with the previously stated position of Sadyojyoti that Śiva makes souls into mantras and that all souls are kartr̥ not karanas. He will also run into trouble trying to explain how these mantras fulfill their functions and then achieve release, which achievement is congruous with being a kartr̥ but not with being a karana. So it appears that there is a good deal of incoherence in Aghora's teaching concerning the mantras.

But it must be kept in mind that the mantras were of tremendous importance for the Saiva Darsana. For they were believed to play a crucial role in the attainment of release. As such, Aghora includes them, in another context, in the dāti padārtha, which is by definition sentient. So the problem seems to have been for Aghora, not to make too much nor too little of the mantras, while at the same time, not becoming too incoherent with the rest of Saiva doctrine.

35 TP comm. to vs.5.
Verse 36 establishes that even the most horrible sin can be removed by dīksā (initiation). In Aghora's commentary the point is made that a law of proportionate analogy holds between the visible and invisible worlds, so that just as the effects of poison can be removed by dīksā (which means here the recitation of mantras), so spiritual poison is removed by the same process. The presence of a verse like this one forces one to re-think the idea of karma in Saiva Darsana, and by implication, in the rest of Indian thought. There is a widely held view that the rigidity of karmic law makes 'Hindus' passive in the face of fate, and that, for example, that real rejuvenation as in the forgiveness of sins in Christianity, is precluded in 'Hinduism' by the law of karma. Such is the thesis of Nicol Macnicol in his Indian Theism. Such a thesis seems to me to be less tenable in the face of evidence like that in Ts 36, although it has to be admitted that just because Sadyojyoti happened to have thought that there was something even more powerful than karma does not make this view definitional of the people of the sub-continent. But it should be noted also that virtually every chapter in the Śiva Purāna either begins or ends with a promise that doing this or that (often just reading the Purāna) will expunge all sin.

36 Oxford, 1915, pp-81,82 and p-100ff.
Verse 37 answers the objection that if dīksā removes all sin (papam) the body should be given up immediately after someone has received initiation, since the raison d'être of the body papam (i.e., karma, mala) is gone. The answer is that dīksā only destroys stored up karma (whose effects have not yet begun to bear fruit). The karma whose effects have begun to bear fruit is thus not destroyed by dīksā and the body does not fall. But Sadyojyoti also mentions a kind of dīksā which can even destroy this latter kind of karma. Aghora calls both of the kinds of dīksā, by the same name: sadyonirvānadvadīksā. But in the case where all karma is removed, the difference seems to be that the subject of initiation had extremely mature mala before initiation (atyantaparipake tu...).

But even after having said all of the above, Aghora finishes his commentary on this verse by saying that the body will still endure even for one whose mala is excessively mature and who undergoes sadyonirvānadvadīksā. This is due to samskārae (residual traces). One wonders which of Saiva Darsana's three bonds these samskārae come under, or are they a new kind of bond? Aghora then quotes the well-known idea of the jīvanmukti continuing awhile in the body even after having achieved liberation, due to inertia. It is the same as when a potter's wheel continues to turn awhile
due to inertia, though the potter is through with it and it is receiving no new impulse.

I would suggest that when Aghora enunciates the above proviso concerning samskāras as the explanation for the continued existence of the body of a saint enlightened through dīksā is that there is a kindly bit of common-sense contributing at least partly to the scenario. This last proviso is to prevent the administration of the sadyonirvāndīksā from becoming tantamount to an execution. Firstly, even in the cases of those saints who undergo this initiation with hope of leaving the body the failures that must have occurred more often than not would have required an explanation. And secondly, I doubt that very many saints were that anxious to achieve beatitude that they would seek out an initiation which, if it worked, would surely kill them. Aghora's proviso attenuates both of these problems. In verse 38 another curiously incongruous point is made. It is said that subsequent to dīksā all actions except certain meritorious actions prescribed by the Śāstras will have no effect on the soul, just as a seed which falls on salty earth will not grow. Now provided that karmic equilibrium\textsuperscript{37} be accepted as a necessary though not sufficient condition for the cessation of the

\textsuperscript{37} kārmasāmya. More can be found about this concept in Ch. 5 below.
effects of mala and hence for the achievement of release (which is unclear in the case of Aghora but certain in the case of Sri Kumara) there should be no distinction made between good and bad karma as is done here. Both kinds of karma bind and one of the conditions for release is the equilibrium of karmas. So why is good karma privileged? Aghora seems to see the significance of the verse in terms of social/religious order. He says that it is well established in certain scriptures that after diksa there is no generation of fruits (by karma) which result in once again being joined to a body and that this is due to the power of obstruction to fruition that the performance of diksa has. It is by the performance of diksa itself that there is the performance of that which is prescribed. In this sense past karmas do not effect souls which have undergone diksa, nor do present actions generate karma to be experienced in the future. But actions such as the propitiation of the gods with mantras which actions are to be carried out by the spiritual adept (even after his diksa) are still efficacious in giving results. He quotes the SA to this effect: "Whatever and wherever

38 For Sri Kumara's acceptance of karmasamya as the condition for the maturation of mala and the descent of grace from Siva cf. TPD p-42. Concerning this point and Aghorasiva cf. Hulin's notes in MA p-116, fn.23 and p-197, fn.13. On karmasamya in general cf. Sivaraman, p-394-396 and notes, plus Ch.5 below.
kinds of experiences are desired, the spiritual adept (siddhibhāj: lit. participant in success) enjoins those (experiences) then and there by the powers of mantras". So certain kinds of activity (ie. karma) remain potent for the adept even after his dīksā, but the negative side of karma, that is, its ability to effect future bondage to a body, are not efficacious after dīksā. I would speculate that this proviso is there to save the efficaciousness of the guru. He could not play an active role in the effecting of the release of others if all of his actions were sterilized by his having, at some point in his life, undergone dīksā.

Next Aghora points out that in scripture one hears even of those desirous of mokṣa (mumukṣuh, an ascetic who, according to certain doctrines, need not bother himself with the performance of the various prescriptions of the scriptures) incurring sin (pratyavāya) if they do not perform expiatory rites, etc; and that this sin can be as a result of doing or not doing prescribed deeds. He quotes a bit of 'hell-fire and brimstone' to back up his point: "Because of the transgression of (scriptural) decree there is said to be (a result) similar to one hundred funeral pyres". He claims that it is also by scriptural injunction that it is established that one should follow one's own caste and station in life: "Whoever attains whatever station
in life (involving various kinds of) Saiva initiation, he must observe the Saiva duties involved therein."

All of this commentary of Aghora's seems to me to want to simultaneously do two things which are not exactly compatible with one another. First, he wants to establish that dīksā really does work and that karma really is sterilized thereby, but he also wants to say that a spiritual adept is still useful to others insofar as certain of his actions are still potent (and it should be noted that even this first point on its own is incoherent). Second, he wants to prevent arrogance on the part of spiritual adepts with respect to the rites of Saivism in particular and caste-ism in general. So as was the case above with the mantras the trick is to not make too much nor too little of dīksā, while at the same time trying to remain as coherent with the rest of the Saiva system as possible.

In verse 39 there occurs a clear expression of the belief, general in Indian thought, that the damnation of the wicked is not eternal:

Even a soul who violates doctrine, etc., after having served a little while as king of the devils (and thus having become) a stainless soul, attains sameness with the Supreme God.//39

Verse 40-42 list and describe the mantrasvaras (ie., the paramantrasvaras or in some cases simply the mantrasvaras). They are eight in number and culled by Śiva, before creation, from the best of the
vijnana kevela souls (best meaning the ones with the most mature \textit{mala}). (Cf. \textit{TS} 40). They all have omniscience and omnipotence and Ananta is their leader. But there is looming here the warring pantheon of polytheism. This is stemmed by positing a deficiency in the \textit{mantrasvaras}. They have deficient \textit{karttvam} (doership). This deficiency consists in still being in association with some \textit{mala} and having to serve as superintenders of the pure creation which latter involves impulsion by the will of another which is in turn considered in Saiva Darsana to be the ultimate sign of deficiency. So since they are dependent on God they are deficient. With respect to omniscience, Aghora states that these \textit{mantrasvaras} have no deficiency since none is heard of in scripture.

Verse 42 names this domain of Ananta etc., the \textit{mantrasatattva}. But Sadyojyoti has already called another \textit{tattva} by the same name. In verse 31 above he has called the 32nd \textit{tattva} where the lower (apara) \textit{mantras} reside the \textit{mantrasatattva}. Aghora, in his introduction to this verse, says that because the souls in this \textit{tattva} are \textit{mantramahasvaras} (are higher or para-mantresas) they are said to reside in the \textit{Isvaratattva}. Frauwallner understands the verse to be referring to the "higher \textit{tattva} of \textit{mantrasvaras}" (ie. to the \textit{mantramahasvaratattva}). I think it is the constraints of
meter that has prevented Sadyojyoti from distinguishing the tattvas mentioned in verses 31 and 42. So I consider this to be a separate tattva from the mantrēsātattva mentioned in verse 31, since it is clearly the lower mantrēsa that reside in the mantrēsātattva mentioned in verse 31 and the higher mantrēsa that reside in the tattva mentioned in verse 42. So we have here the 34th tattva of the TS, the (maha- or para-) mantrēsvaratattva. The Īsvaratattva with which Aghora wishes to align this tattva is normally the 32nd tattva.

In the second part of his commentary to this verse Aghora again discusses mantrās. He insists that since the spoken word has the characteristics of protecting and giving knowledge and since it is insentient, the referent (vācyam) of the mantra-word must be/something other than itself. Similarly, words like 'pot' or 'cloth' refer to objects other than themselves. So it is established that it is not the mantrās themselves that are efficacious in their granting of the desire of the reciter, but rather the mantrēs that they name. By this is refuted the theory of the Mīmāṃsakas that the word itself is the god. For results only come about when the insentient is superintended by the sentient. So in the case of the mantra-word, it has to be admitted that the real giver is the one named by
the mantra, i.e., Siva. It is the one revealed or manifested by the word and not the word itself.

Aghora’s introduction to verse 43 establishes that it is Siva alone who gives meanings to the words and not the higher or lower mantresas, and it thus follows that it was Siva who created the mantras. (This would appear to be a further criticism of the Mimamsakas since according to them, Vedic words are eternal and uncreated.) This same verse also gives further information about the relationship between Siva, the mantresas, and the mantras:

Sambhu, who knows the general and specific characteristics of the mantras and mantresas (vidyas and vidyesas) made the mantras (which latter name the mantresas) since it is observed that he who knows a thing names it. //43

In Aghora’s commentary to this verse it becomes clear that the mantras are really understood as names of the mantresas and mantramahesas. Yet none of this is coherent with the original conception of the mantras being 70 million in number and being sentient souls, that is, kartra and jantra (doers and knowers) just like the two kinds of mantresas. Even from Sadyojyoti’s verse it is clear that Siva’s qualification for being the one who creates the mantras is that he knows the specific and general natures of those beings whom the mantras name. Here it is, according to Aghora, the same as in ordinary life where it is the father who tells the
son the names of various things because it is he and
not his son who knows what the various things are. After
citing the above example Aghora says "Therefore Sambhu
alone created the mantras which are expressive of the
very natures of the mantresas." He then points out that
Siva's knowing the general natures of the higher and
lower mantresas means that he knows they are eternal,
ubiquitous, etc. and that knowing their specific natures
means that certain gods are fit for certain ranks depending on how much mala they have left to mature.
Then he says that there is here an implicit proof of
mahamaya (the material cause of the pure material domain
above mayatattva). He says mahamaya is also called
kundalinī. The reason he gives for finding this
(implicit) proof of mahamaya is that there must
necessarily be a material stuff out of which are made
the bodies, etc., of those beings, the mantramahesas,
who inhabit these levels, and also that there must be a
material stuff out of which are made the words (i.e.
physical sounds) of the mantras. This seems to say that
the material cause of the mantra-words is mahamaya (also
known as bindu) in the same sense in which the bodies of
the higher mantresas are made of mahamaya. It seems then
that the mantra-word (i.e., the physical sound) is the
mantra's body. But we have seen above that the mantras
only have souls in the sense that they name either
higher or lower mantras and as such have no souls of their own. They were said above to be conveyors or channels or to be instrumentally efficacious in dissemination of grace, the upshot of which was to deny them karttvam (being a wilful, sentient subject who is an agent of action.) So the mantras cannot be said to have souls other than the souls that they name. It becomes difficult to see, as was noted above, how these are to be included in the Pati padārtha which contains only the sentient. But as I have suggested above, beings at the interfacing of the two kinds of stuff posited by the Saiva dualists can be expected to display contradiction and incoherence of nature which appears to be the case here. This seems to me to be a structural defect of all dualism. It is its congenital defect that it cannot explain how the duals interact and maintain their identity. It cannot explain the 'one'.

Finally, for the commentary on this verse, Aghora quotes passages from the RA and the MA to support the existence of mahāmāyā. He also says that the various tattvas of which mahāmāyā is the material cause (ie. the usual listing would be śiva-, sakti, sadāśiva, Īśvara and suddhavidyātattvas) are discussed in detail in the Matanga Agamas and the Ratnakrīya and can be studied there. This amounts to an admission that these other tattvas are absent in the RA and the TS and is further
proof that there was significant doctrinal difference even among the dualistic Agamas.

Verse 44a is difficult. Aghora introduces it, 45b and 46 thus: "In the Agamas it is said that there is a close relationship between mantras and mantras with Siva and sakti, which latter vary according to the subjunctive conditions (upādhi-s) involved, i.e., according to the various things to be superintended by Siva/sakti." The sense of the verse seems to be that because of the close relationship between the mantras and mantras on the one hand, and Siva/sakti on the other, there is a danger that the immutability of Siva/sakti will be jeopardized. This seems to be the concern of Aghora when he begins his commentary with the following scriptural quotations: "Siva (becomes) a mantra for the grace of the world."; "That which is grace-sakti is mantra."; "The Supreme Lords of the 24 mantras are said to be of anava, of Sambhu and of sakti, other are the millions of mantras which are the substratum of the egg (of Brahma, the lower creation), having Virabhadra at their head." The discussion which follows in Aghora's commentary and the verses which follow TS 44a is concerned to show that there is essential unity in Siva/sakti though there is association with mantras etc. Thus after having given the last scriptural citation above, Aghora immediately asserts that
difference is real in the anava-pakṣa (the pāṇḍavārtha),
which for Aghora means all of the tattvās forming the
pure and impure material realms of the universe) but
that difference is only metaphysical in the Śiva and
śakti pakṣās (for Aghora this means the Patipāda rtha).
Any apparent difference in Śiva/śakti occurs due to
their superintendence of multiplicity.

All of the above leads me to translate verse 44a
thus:

(It is said) by the wise (ie. in the Āgama) that the
vidyās (soul-mantras), śakti-mantras or Śiva-
mantras are (actually present) in the vidyēsvaras
(māntreśvarās) (and that these māntreś are actually
in Śiva/śakti, which implies change in this
latter).//44a

Then verse 44b/45a makes sense as an attempt to off-
set this doubt:

(But) Śiva is one and so is his śaktī. It is not
fitting that these two be held to be many. For if
they change they would both be devoid of
sentiency.44b/45a

Following the above, verse 45b introduces the
objection that the relationship between the one (Śiva)
and the many might be analogous to that wherein the
yogin simultaneously occupies many different bodies. In
this way, Śiva, who is one, might be called by many
different names, such as Ananta, Sadāśiva, etc. The
answer to this objection occurs in verses 46ff. which
latter is preceded by a significant discussion by Aghora
on the nature of Śiva/Śakti in his commentary on verse 44b/45a which we now turn to examine.

Śiva is said to be one, world creator and giver of grace because he alone has been from all time, free from mala. Aghora argues that it is impossible that more than one god created the world because it is seen, for example in the manufacture of a cart, that, even when many cartwrights are involved, unless they follow one will, nothing gets built.

Aghora also rejects the theory that there are a series of creator gods in the sense that one god handles creation this time around and then after the dissolution of the world, retires, handing the chore over to another creator god (i.e. this is the pravāhanēśvaravāda that was discussed above in the TTN p-35 ff.) Aghora's refutation is based on the thesis that the Lordly powers involved in world creation are really the attainment of the manifestation of the very essence of God and that if these powers were amenable to transference to another god, this would result in the destruction of the essence of God. The upshot of all of this is that the power of world-creatorship is in a samavāya relationship with Śiva (inherent relationship). This means that this power is the necessary attribute (guna) of a substance (gunin). Thus the loss of one involves the loss of the
other. Thus the lordly power of world-creatorship is non-transferable.

Continuing, Aghora says that God is non-transforming because he is sentient and eternal. His šakti is like him because it is his attribute. Now it is never proper for an eternal thing to have a non-eternal attribute since this would involve the unwelcome result of the non-eternality of the substance since substance and attribute (dharma and dharmin) are non-different. It is for this reason that the text says that it is not fitting for there to be change in Śiva/šakti due to association with Ananta, etc. Thus Ananta is not a form of Śiva/šakti. For if these latter two were accepted to have a state in which they are many they would be insentient like māyā because they would be transforming. And insentiency of Śiva/šakti is not fitting because one does not hear of it in scripture and evolution of the insentient without the sentient superintending it is impossible on Śaiva premises. Thus difference in the case of Śiva/šakti is only metaphorical.

39 I amend the text, reading a na before yuktau in TS, P-44, L-11 as there is a na in the verse upon which this paraphrasing by Aghora is based. In any case, reading the sentence without the negative particle yields incoherent meaning.
In the above argument we should note the logic: difference entails transformation which entails insentienty. Now since this 1) goes against scripture and 2) evolution of the insentient without the sentient supervising is impossible, change cannot be an attribute of Siva/sakti. We can anticipate that the Sāmkhyas will be a major opponent of the Saivas on this point because they consider it possible for the insentient prakṛti to evolve without supervision. As for the claim that Siva/sakti must be sentient because nothing to the contrary is heard of in Saiva scripture, anyone who does not accept those Saiva scriptures can contest this point. This goes to show that the metaphysics of this school are based more strongly on scriptural fiat than the arguments for the existence of God, which are based on inference (anumāna), might lead one to expect.

In concluding the discussion of this text Aghora quotes the following scripture: "God (sa) is only metaphorically the superintender, the experiencer and the one who sleeps (layt, the one who goes into lysis)." But there is, of course, a problem understanding what the actual difference between only metaphorically superintending creation is and really doing it. If there really is a difference between these two, then God really does not superintend creation. If there is no difference and he really does this, then he is subject
to change. I do not find any solution to these questions. It seems to me that the Saivás simply took the idea of metaphorical superintendance (upacārena) as somehow making relationship between God and the world possible without this involving any pollution of God. The concept of metaphorical relationship between the world and God is in this sense a cypher: it names an unintelligibility which allows life for the Saiva thinker to proceed or which allows that there be a greater power of explanation in his system of thought than would be the case without the inclusion of this cypher. In technical terms it is possible to say that the inclusion of a cypher such as this allows a drstivādin to do philosophy while yet recognizing the partial truth of the vaitandika's position. To put this in non-technical terms, the inclusion of a cypher (or cyphers) in a metaphysical theory means that the thinker who makes this inclusion thinks metaphysics can be done well or not so well which is a position that the vaitandika rejects (for Kant, Nagārjuna and, for the most part, Śrīharṣa, no position is better than another in metaphysics). But the fact that a cypher names and does not solve an unintelligibility means that metaphysics can never be more than a 'likely story', in Plato's terms. This is in fact the difference between a metaphysician (drstivādin) and a critical thinker.
(vaitandika): the former thinks metaphysics may not be the whole story (i.e. it will be, in part cyphric) but it is a likely story, while the latter thinks metaphysics is just a story.

The idea that the metaphorical relationship between God and the world is a cypher may also be understood in another way as being, not a positive teaching but rather a reaction against undesirable rival doctrines. This would make it similar to the teaching the early Christian church gave concerning the soul. Thus the Saivas wanted to avoid the superfluity of Siva which would result if they admitted, with the Sámkhya, that matter could evolve on its own. They also wanted to avoid contact between God and the world as the Pancaratras understood it, so the cyphric concept of metaphorical supervision both allows and does not allow the involvement of God in the world. God is related to the world because he superintends it, but he is not polluted thereby because his superintendence is only metaphorical.

All of the above reinforces the idea mentioned above that the category of the 'metaphorical' is the dualists third category between being and non-being, or

it plays the role of a third substance besides cit and acit, or it is a third value in the two valued logic of the dualist: there is thus not only 'true' and 'false' but also 'metaphorical'. Anyone one who deals with significant things, such as philosophy and politics, knows that it is indispensable to be able to affirm and yet not affirm the same thing at the same time, under certain circumstances.

It has been suggested above that the relationship between the world and Śiva/śakti might be like that of a yogin who assumes many different forms. Thus Śiva could be one and yet remain many. The following verses contain Sadyojyotis reply:

Śakti is the body (form) of God and this is one. (Manyness) is not primary (here) (i.e. it is metaphorical). But the souls are many and participate in varying degrees of excellence. There are seen to be comparative degrees of superiority (and inferiority) of the manifesting cause (of their powers of knowing and doing). Thus that nature (i.e. differentiation and manyness due to there being levels of the powers of knowing and doing) is primary among them (i.e. is not metaphorical).

Aghora, in his commentary to this verse, rather soon after having insisted on the identity of Śiva/śakti says: "Since it is not fitting for Śiva to have a body made of bindu because on the level of supreme truth he is without mala, it is metaphorically said that his sakti is his body." But the question is the same as before: If Śiva's sakti is only metaphorically his body
then it cannot be the means of his superintending the world; if it really is so, then, like any other embodied being he is subject to change.

Aghora continues, saying that there is a difference between the way a yogin relates to manyness and the way Śiva does. Though there can be said to be difference in Śiva due to his superintending the other gods such as Ananta (i.e. he directs their activities by his will), this is not real as is the case for yogins (who actually enter the various bodies). So Śiva's being associated with Ananta, etc., does not result in actual differentiation in him.

To the objection that scriptures speak of Śiva in very anthropomorphic terms as having five mouths and fifteen eyes, etc., Aghora answers that this is for the purposes of meditation. The implication here is that there are qualities that are facilitators of approach to Śiva but which are not really his qualities. We should note that the Śaiva Dārsana writers with which this essay is concerned are like Rāmānuja and unlike Sahkara in this that while here it is said that certain qualities of Śiva are there only for the purposes of meditation, there are others which are really there and are not only for the purposes of meditation (i.e., he really does have svaṭantryam, sarvakartṛtvam, sarvajñānatvam, etc.). God is not ultimately quality-
less for Sadyojyoti. Nor are you or I, who on his premises, will be gods.

Aghora concludes his commentary on this verse with the point made above that differentiation is real in the *pasupaksa* (souls-domain) and that this difference can been seen from the fact that various souls have different capabilities and suffer different fates.

Verses 47b and 48a complete this discussion of how the many and the one are related:

'Siva and Ṣakti, having superintended (the bound souls and the domains in which they live) bring about (the souls' desired) goal. These two (Siva and sakti) appear to be differentiated (into manyness) through secondary (metaphorical) meaning (bhinne iva lakṣya ete). And this is due to (their superintending) the various realms which contain difference. So this referring to that (tan-nama: this calling Siva/sakti subject to differentiation) is only metaphorical and is a figure of speech.

Aghora's comment on this verse affirms that Ṣiva/sakti facilitate human ends (*purusārtham*; the wherewithall for worldly experience and eventual release). It is due to this activity that the two, Ṣiva and Ṣakti appear to be differentiated into manyness. Ṣiva, along with his Ṣakti come to be called this or that due to the functioning of secondary (metaphorical) meaning. It is clear from this commentary that the dissipation into manyness does not refer to a differentiation between Ṣiva and Ṣakti but to a dissipation of Ṣiva/sakti as one, into manyness.
In verse 48b-50a Sadyojyoti appears to refuse the idea of considering 'sakti' to be a tattva which is different from 'Siva', which latter is the main subject of description of these verses:

'Sambhu is eternal, without mala by nature, omnipotent and omniscient, the lord, of unimpeded power, the one friend of all souls. It is related (in the sāstras) that there is a second (tattva) sakti, (which latter) is for the purposes of knowledge and meditation. These two are briefly referred to as form and that endowed with form or 'sakti' and that endowed with 'sakti'.//48b-50a

We have seen that there is the repeated assertion in the Saiva Darśana that 'Siva' and 'sakti' are one. But it is also common practice to list them as two separate tattvas as is done, for eg. in the TP. But the RA to my knowledge does not consider 'sakti' to be a second tattva. Certainly it is not included in the list at Vidyāpāda, 10, 98ff., as a separate tattva. The conception of 'Siva' and 'sakti' having a relationship of form and that endowed with form (i.e., a samavāya relationship such that one cannot exist without the other) seems to speak against seeing 'sakti' as a second tattva. This is how Frauwallner understands the verse.

41 TP, 21. Note also that in his commentary to the TP, below, p-14, Aghora speaks of Siva's sakti being of two kinds: 1) primordial and 2) by adoption.

42 Nach ihm (Sadyo jyoti) ist die Kraft Gottes keine eigene Wesenheit. Wenn in die heiligen Schriften von zwei Kraften Gottes, seiner All-Wissenheit und seiner Allmacht gesprochen wird, so dient das nur dem Zweck, das erkennen und Betrachten Gottes zu
Aghora brings in the concept of Siva having two modes, sakala and niskala, into his commentary. It is curious though, that it is said in the verse, after the description of Siva, that there is a second tattva, sakti, which is for the purposes of knowledge and meditation. Yet in neither the verse nor in Aghora’s commentary is there direct mention of metaphorical meaning. It is true that there may be indirect implication of this in the mentioning of the idea of sakti being for the purposes of meditation, as we have seen above, but Aghora does not make this connection explicitly as he did above. Rather his commentary seems to want to emphasize the equality of reality of Siva and sakti:

(The word atra in the verse) "here" (means) "in the shastras"; it is said that there are two tattvas called sakti and the bearer of sakti, otherwise known as sakala and niskala, depending on whether the reference is to the accomplishment of the goal of worldly experience or moksa, (for the souls). These two, sakti and the one endowed with sakti are also known in the shastras as form and the one endowed with form (or body and the one endowed with a body). The following is meant: Various effects exist when God is in his superintender-of-the-world-mode. Since this is so, sakti, which consists of the 38 different kalas (powers) is his form (or his body), (note that there is no suggestion in this

erleichtern. Wenn ferner von einer Gestalt Gottes gesprochen wird, so ist damit seine Kraft gemeint und diese ist die Gestalt, deren er sich bedient, um die Seelen Wesenswandelzlauf zuführen und schliesslich zu erlosen." Frauwallner, p-12. Cf. also his translation of verse 49 of the TS.

43 Cf. above, p-136
sentence that this is not really so). Siva (asau) is called sakala due to his association with those (38 kalaś). When there is the carrying out of the withdrawal (of those 38 kalaś), (Siva is) niskala.44

The parallels of this type of expression with the panentheism of Rāmānuja are strong. The only problem is that, while for Rāmānuja the world can be the body of Nārāyaṇa/Viśnu in the sense that all things are modes (prakāraś) of Nārāyaṇa/Viśnu,45 the world cannot be a mode of Siva for Śaiva Dārśana since the world is understood to have a separate cause māyā, and is a mode of that separate cause and not of Siva. Nor can the sakala and niskala states of Siva have a monistic sense so that Siva emanates and then withdraws the world like a spider does its web, out of its own substance, because again, the world, for Śaiva Dārśana is not the substance of God but of māyā. Nor can Aghoraśiva imply that Siva only possesses sakti for sakti is the dharma of a dharmin or the guna of a gunin. And we have seen above that the loss, or what is here the same thing, the merely metaphorical existence of the one implies the same for the other. This is why he seems to carefully avoid any mention here that sakti is the metaphorical quality of Siva.

44 TS, p-47. For a list of the various kalaś and their various names in the various texts see RA, ed. N. Bhatt, p-29.

45 Vedārthasāndhra, 94 passim.
I would suggest that the same thing is happening with respect to \textit{sakti} above as we saw occur with the mantras, mantr\text{s}varas and \textit{diksa} earlier in this chapter.\footnote{46} We have, once again the interfacing of a dualist's pair of opposites. Siva who is one and sentient is 'rubbing against' the world (\textit{pasa}) which is many and insentient. In this case the entity with the ambiguous nature is \textit{sakti}. It acts like grease which eases the interfacing of the static axle and the spinning hub. It is thus a cypher and this means that it will to be understand 'Siva dualism poorly should one expect to get clear about this entity. This theme will be picked up in the conclusion of this essay.

Verses 50b and 51a read:

Hara, who is Sambhu has the good of others as his one aim, having superintended (his) body (\textit{murtim}) (or: having attained form), brings about the world experience and (eventual) \textit{moksa} of the souls which are incapable of bringing this about by themselves because they are obstructed with \textit{mala}.

The phrase \textit{murtimadhisth\text{\text{"a}}ya harah...} in verse 50b is ambiguous (and Sadyojyoti may have meant it to be so). The indeclinable past participle of \textit{adhi-v\text{\text{"a}}tha} (adhist\text{\text{"a}}ya) can mean in this context either 'having attained, resided in, dwelled in, or depended upon' or it can mean 'having superintended, governed, presided over, or guided' a body or a form. Now we have to...

\footnote{46 Above pp-115, 122, 127}
remember that 'sakti' is an ambiguous entity in 'Saiva Darśana. Depending on the situation it can appear to be identical with or different from 'Siva. Thus it is not impossible that the phrase above might mean that Hara attains or resides in or assumes a form or a body. For mūrtim means his 'sakti' and we know that 'Siva's 'sakti' is his essence. So there is no necessary incoherence in saying that 'Siva resides in his own essence. But it would be startling if mūrtim meant 'body' or 'form' in the sense of a material form or body, for this would be the only instance that I am aware of where 'Siva directly contacts matter in 'Saiva Darśana. This would make the system a panentheism. 'Saiva Darśana typically speaks of the relationship between 'Siva and the world, not in terms of 'Siva entering or residing in the world, but of him governing or superintending the world. Even this latter is, in the case of the impure part of creation, done indirectly through Ananta, etc. This why I privilege, in my translation of the verse, the idea of Hara superintending his body or form ('sakti).

But in all of this there is a third possibility that Aghora brings out in his commentary. He takes the phrase in question as meaning that 'Siva assumes a body (mūrtim) consisting of 'sakti' which is manifest as having form for the purposes of meditation. So this is a case where 'Siva assumes a form which is his body but the
clincher is that it is all for the purposes of meditation. Since we have already seen that the body Siva assumes for the purposes of meditation is assumed metaphorically, what is really being said here is that Siva both does and does not assume form for that is what upacara means. Now depending on whether or not one maintains a sympathetic attitude towards the system, this is either quite clever or quite stupid. I delay my own assessment until the conclusion of this essay.

So in his commentary, Aghora says that Sambhu, who has as his one goal the good of others, having assumed a body consisting of sakti which is manifest for the purposes of meditation, because he is capable due to not having any mala, effects worldly experience and (eventually) moksa for the bound souls which latter are incapable due to having mala. Aghora then gives the etymology of the name 'Hara': "He carries away (harati) the bonds from the bound souls"; or "He carries the goal of moksa or worldly experience to them." Aghora says the souls are bound like beasts (paśus) just like sheep are bound by ropes. In the case of the bound souls the bond is not a rope but pāśa (i.e. mala, māya, karma). This is what makes the souls' working out of their own release impossible. It is in this way that the system creates a need for Siva.

\[47\] Above pp-136
In the same commentary, having explained how it is impossible for the bound souls to free themselves, Aghora makes it clear that the only other alternative, the third padartha, pasa, cannot act or desist from action because it is insentient like the rope (for raju I read rajju) which binds the sheep. As such it is Siva alone who can be the effector of the release of the bound souls. This latter proviso is a refutation of the Samkhya school which teaches that it is the insentient prakriti which brings about the moksa of the bound souls and the former is a refutation of the Vedantins who suppose that it is the soul itself, by attaining knowledge of the atman, which effects its own release.

Verse 51b describes the two kinds of moksa, the higher and the lower. The mantras and their mantresas (both the higher and the lower) attain to the lower kind of moksa while the released souls attain to the latter which is similarity with Siva. The lower kind is lower because the mantras, etc., which attain it are still impelled by another, that is, Siva, even though they are beyond maya, are devoid of mala and do not return to samsara. (Actually Aghora is wrong here when he says in his commentary that the mantresas, etc., are devoid of mala, for in fact they have a little mala left to

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48 TS, p-48, L-1.
mature). The higher or supreme moksa is described as
'sivasaīmyam, similarity to Śiva, not in the sense of
attaining union with him but in the sense of attaining
the same powers that he possesses while remaining
numerically and substantially separate:

The mantrac, etc., will attain (the state) of what
is called a released soul for they are deserving of
supreme moksa. There is manifestation of the powers
of the souls by Śiva and thus there is the arising
of similarity with Śiva for the bound souls. The
'saktis of the souls' are observed to be manifest
previous (to the time of moksa) (which manifesting)
is in accordance with (individual differences).
Owing to the previous observation of the powers of
the soul, these powers are not transferred to it at
moksa. Nor are all souls one in their sense of (being
an instantiation, purely and simply, of a) universal
(i.e., souls are similar individuals).//52,53

Aghora comments that the mantrac, etc., share in
the name muktas (released souls) because they are worthy
of supreme release. With respect to verse 52b above the
importance of the powers of the soul becoming manifest
due to Śiva is in order to overcome the following
objection: In the samsāra state it is observed that the
souls only know and do a little, so in the state of moksa
it will be the same. The answer is that since it is Śiva
who causes these powers of the soul to be manifest and
since he possesses these powers fully, and since the
souls will become similar to Śiva when they attain
moksa, the souls will have these powers absolutely and
not only partially. Aghora goes on to say that

49 Cf. TP, verses 9, 10, 11 and Aghora's comm.
at the samsāra level it is observed that some people are smarter than others depending on the power of the cause of their intelligence. Now though it is true that knowledge forms the essence of the bound soul, the degree to which that knowledge is manifest depends upon the conditions of the manifestation of that intelligence (and ultimately on Śiva). He also notes that the theory that at mokṣa there is a transference of the powers of omniscience and omnipotence to the soul is known to be incorrect. The reason for the latter is that the same powers are known to be present to a limited degree in the souls even during samsāra. Then he gives a second reason for rejecting the above theory. He says a quality (such as the power of knowing) which is formless cannot be transferred because no example can be given from experience of such a thing happening. In support of this latter reasoning Aghora quotes Sadyojyoti's lost commentary on the RA. saying the transfer of a thing with form, such as the transfer of the flame of one candle to another candle is observed, but not that of something which is formless.

Finally for this commentary Aghora says that the nature of the supreme mokṣa which these souls possess is not a oneness in the sense of sharing the same universal as is the case when, according to some thinkers such as the Naiyāyikas, all cows share in the universal
'cowness'. (For the Naiyāyikas the universal exists, separately from the individuals and is the cause of the recognition of similarity). According to Aghora there are differences specific to each individual soul. The idea of all souls sharing in one universal is an impossibility because difference remains even while there is similarity between two things. So, according to Aghora, it is well established that in mokṣa, too, difference remains, for were this not the case, all would achieve mokṣa when one does so.

Verse 54 continues on the theme of the necessity of the separateness of the souls even in mokṣa:

The souls are repeatedly observed to be separate; therefore there is no oneness (of them). Nor is there destruction of the relationship between the souls and their powers (of knowing and doing) in mokṣa, for both (the souls and its powers) are eternal. //54

In his introduction to this verse Aghora sees the opponents as being those thinkers who conceive of mokṣa as the dissolution of the individual soul in the Supreme Self (Advaitins of some stripe). The argument given here against this thesis is that experience

50 In his comm. to Tp.64 Aghora again denies the acceptance in Saiva philosophy, of universals (jāti): "(The idea of ) species (anyaya, as the context which follows shows, simply means 'family resemblance') is the cause of the conception which follows upon (experienceing) 'This is a cow. This (too) is a cow'. And this (idea of ) species is said to come about somehow through mere similarity, since there is no admission in Saiva philosophy of a universal (jāti) different from the manifest (individual)."
testifies massively for the separateness of souls. Souls earn, suffer and enjoy different fates in this world and there is no reason to suppose it is not the same in moksa. Thus the souls maintain their individuality even in moksa.

With respect to the latter part of the verse, Frauwallner takes puṃśaktyoh as a genitive tatpurusa compound: die beiden Krafte der Seele while Aghora takes it as a dvandva compound: saktisaktimathoh. The former means that both powers of the soul remain in moksa and are not destroyed. The latter is the interpretation that I have followed in translating the verse. Aghora sees the latter part of the verse to be directed towards the Naiyayikas who hold that knowledge is a quality of the soul which is separated from the soul at moksa. By asserting the eternity of both the quality and the possessor of the quality the Nyaya thesis is refuted. The eternity of both of these is asserted on the basis of both of them being sentient. In Saiva Darśana eternity and sentiency, analytically, contain one another.

Verse 55a refutes the pravāhaneśvaravādins whom we have encountered before. According to them,

51 Frauwallner, p-20.
52 TS, p-50, L-4.
53 Above, p-130 and in the study to the TTN, p-35ff.
when A, for example is destroyed, B, which was not present before, arises. Thus they teach that after the destruction of pāsas (bonds) the lordly powers, such as omniscience, etc., which were not present in the soul ṛṣp until this time, arise in it. Thus the powers necessary for the creation of the world arise in each soul at mokṣa. Such a soul will perform the task of being creator for this or that world cycle and then retire so that next time another soul will be the creator. In this way there is a series (pravāhana) of creators (Īśvaras). But according to Aghora, in his introduction to this verse, destruction is impossible both in the case of Śiva and his powers.

Non-existence is impossible for either Śiva, the (efficient) cause, or his sakti (the instrumental cause).//55a

Frauwallner takes both nimittasya and sivasya to be adjectives of śakteḥ: Auch schwindet nicht die Kraft Śivas, welch die Ursache (der Erlosung) ist."54 This is not the way Aghora understands the verse and it is the latter that I have followed in translating55.

Verses 55b and 56a describe the similarities and differences between Śiva and the released souls:

54 Frauwallner, p-20.

55 Aghora says:"Destruction is not possible either for Śiva who is the (efficient) cause of mokṣa or for his lordly powers of which sakti consists (i.e. sakti is the instrumental cause). This is because these are eternal, having had no beginning." TS, p-58.
There is declared to be the attainment of the same form (as Siva by the released souls) because both have the same qualities. But there is also difference.//55b

Aghora says in commenting on this that the released souls and Siva have the same form because they possess the same qualities. This identity of nature means manifesting knowledge of all objects etc. However there is a difference:

The pre-eminent (powers of omniscience and omnipotence) which are without beginning, middle or end, are manifested in the soul due to Siva.//56a

Aghora explains that due to the souls having been beginninglessly covered by mala, the manifestation of their powers had to come as a result of outside help. Such was never the case with Siva. He never required a manifestor to aid him and herein lies the difference.

The final verse and one half read:

The knower of the tattvas should propitiate Sambhu alone who is the best of providers to the ordinary bound souls (sakalas). When he is praised there is then supreme moksa for the souls. Thus Sadyojyoti, the author of the Suvrtti (on the RA) has spoken about the tattvas.

In his commentary on these lines Aghora gives a strong sectarian finish to the work. He begins by quoting from the Saiva Upanisad called the Atharvasikā: "Siva, the one who causes peace, is alone to be meditated on, after one has given up all of the other (gods)." Aghora says there is authoritativeness of the Saiva Āgamas alone because of their having been
written by Śiva who is omnipotent and the giver of grace to all. The Āgamas of other sects such as the Buddhists are not to be followed since they are contradictory and this due to the fact that they were written by a non-omniscient author. He quotes the following verse: "If the Buddha is supposed to be omniscient and Kapila (the founder of the Sāmkhya) not so, what is the valid means (for so deciding)? And if both are so why do their teachings contradict each other?" Then Aghora notes an objector stating the obvious, that the Śaiva Āgamas too, cannot be authoritative since they are contradicted by other teachings. Aghora's answer is that this is not so, for the Saiva Āgamas, having first studied the doctrines that are present in all of the other Āgamas of other schools, explain the truths that are not present in the other Āgamas and thus the authoritativness of the Saiva Āgamas alone is unimpugned. He then quotes a verse which defines a pramāṇa as that which conveys new truths. He then goes on to try to demonstrate the concordance with this view about the supremacy and exclusiveness of Saivism with the Veda, Purāṇas, Itihāsa, Mahabharata, Rāmāyana, etc. He also quotes from the Atharvasiras and Śvetāsvatara Upanisads and finally from another of Sadyojyoti's works, the Moksa Kārikā. We need not go into details. Suffice it to say that Aghora, like any good exegete, is capable of finding what he needs to
make his point, at least to those who have already accepted his conclusions.
Chapter III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOD IN THE TATTVAPRAKĀŚIKA

The Tattvapraķāśika (TP) of King Rhoja\(^1\) consists of 76 verses in āryā meter.\(^2\) The two commentators divide the work differently and interpret it according to their own philosophical positions,\(^3\) but in spite of this something can safely be said about the general lay-out of the book.

The book deals with the three padārthas (independent categories: Ṛti/God, Paśu/man, Pāśa/bonds) first and following this the 36 tattvas (dependent categories). It includes a couple of digressions and ends with a summary. The text begins in both the expositions of the padārthas and the tattvas with the highest and moves outward or downward toward the lowest.

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\(^1\) Concerning Rhoja, cf. the Introduction to this essay.

\(^2\) Āryā meter: "...a kind of meter of two lines (each line consisting of seven and one half feet; each foot containing four instants, except the sixth of the second line, which contains only one and is therefore a short single syllable; hence there are thirty instants in the first line and twenty-seven in the second.)" Monier-Williams Dictionary, p-152.

\(^3\) Aghora's position is bheda (dualism); Srikumara's bhedabheda (dualism and non-dualism).
The TS, as we have seen, moves in the opposite direction.4

The first three verses laud and describe Siva (1) and his šakti, which latter can be furled (lāyavastām:2)5 or unfurled (adhikāravastham:3).6 The first verse is concerned with the dharma (substrate/substance) and the next two with the two different states of the dharma (attribute/function). The fourth verse gives the reason for the composition of the treatise. The fifth verse lists the three padārthas and the following fourteen verses explain these (#6-8 Pati;#9-16 Paśu;#17-20 Paśa). Verse twenty-one then begins the exposition of the tattvas, listing the first five tattvas, the 'pure' ones (śiva, śakti, sadāśiva, īśvara, and vidyā tattvas). Then verses 22-24 list the rest of the tattvas (māyā, the five kaṇchukas, and the 25 tattvas7 of the Samkhya system). Verse 25 takes up the exposition of the first tattva, the śiva-tattva8 and

4 TS, p.3.
5 TP, p.4.
6 TP, p.5.
7 There is some variation as to the inclusion or exclusion of certain tattvas on the parts of Bhoja and Aghora as we shall see. We have also noted above that Sādyojyoti's enumeration of the tattvas is slightly different than that of Isvarakṛṣṇa's in the Śāmkhya Kārikā.
8 Aghora and Śīlkuṃāra radically differ in their interpretations of this tattva.
the rest of the tattvas are explained in order up to verse 62. A digression occurs at verses 32-38, where, after having expounded upon the first five 'pure' tattvas, discussion takes place concerning the grace giving function of Siva, the purpose of creation being the facilitation of the opportunity to attain moksa, for the bound souls, the status of Siva as the efficient cause, sakti as the instrumental cause and māyā as the material cause, etc.

With the second half of verse 38, māyā, the sixth tattva, and the first in the impure creation, is explained. Here the thread of the main exposition of the 36 tattvas is resumed. After the completion of this exposition at verse 62, verses 63-68 discuss groupings and commonality among the tattvas (the first five, the next seven and the final twenty-four are groups). Verses 69-76 conclude the work by giving definitions of what a padārtha is9 (i.e. that which endures mahāpralaya, the great dissolution, and is eternal); what a tattva is10 (that which endures only until mahāpralaya and is not eternal); give reasons for the creation and dissolution of the world; and finally identify the author as King Bhoja.

9 TP, p-54.
10 TP, p-56.
In the exposition of the philosophy of God in the TP I will focus on the first seven verses which deal directly with the topic. Relevant passages from the rest of the work will also be studied. Of the two commentaries on the TP, only that of Aghorasiva will be examined in detail. There will be only occasional reference to the commentary of Srikumara for contrast to aid comprehension.

Aghora's introductory verse (mañgam) sets the tone for the philosophy of God to follow:

Having bowed to Siva, who is beyond the 36 tattvas, who is endowed with sakti, I (Aghora) compose this short, concise commentary on the TP. For it has been explained in a different manner by some others, imbued with the odour of advaita, who do not know the true meaning of the Siddhanta. (Their explanation) is different than that set forth by us (Siddhantins) in a constant (uninterrupted) tradition. II

For our purposes it is important to note the conception of Siva as being beyond the tattvas and the condemnation of an advaita interpretation of the TP which conceives of Siva as participating, in some way, in the scale of the tattvas. The difference between the dualistic interpretation of Aghora and the advaita (or more strictly speaking dvaitadvaita or bhedabheda) of Srikumara, for example, lies, to a great extent, in the inclusion or exclusion of Siva from the scale of tattvas. Aghora views all 36 tattvas as being inert

II TP, p31
(jada) and cannot include Siva or the souls in this scale because both of them are sentient. Srikmara, on the other hand, views the tattvas as the various stages of 'thickening' of the same evolving substance and thereby includes Siva as the most subtle substance of the 36 tattvas.

Aghora introduces the first verse thus:

With the first aryā verse the ācarya (Bhoja) praises supreme Siva, who is beyond the impure tattvas, who is pure, who is the cause of the manifestation of the Siddhanta doctrine, so that the treatise about to be undertaken may be completed without any obstacles.12

Siva is then described in the first verse:

He who has consciousness for his body, who is unique, omnipresent, eternal, eternally delivered, foremost, tranquil, unique seed of the world, who gives grace to all, (this) Sambhu triumphs over all.//13

The first sanskrit word of this verse gives Aghora difficulty. Cidghana, literally 'mass of consciousness', is a word that frequently occurs in monistic Kashmiri Saiya works as part of the description of Siva.14 For Srikmara, cidghana is equivalent to

12 TP, P-1
13 TP, P-1, 2.
14 iha hi svaṭantrasvādvayadarśane paramesvarah svaṭantraścidghanasamvidsvabhava... (in this non-dualist school where Siva has unimpeded will...), Sattrimsattattvasaṁdoha, p-1. Similarly in the Anuvatarkaraś sapanaśika: akrtrimahamamaraśapmokṣaśaikaghanah śivah... (Siva is a singular mass of inartificial luminous consciousness of (pure) subjectivity... p-1. Also in the Brhadāraṇyaka
cinmātra, cidrūpa ('consisting of consciousness'; 'having the form of consciousness')\textsuperscript{15} Cinmātra can also mean 'mere knowledge'. All of this is unacceptable to Aghora who sees in cit (consciousness) not the essence of Siva but rather the attribute of a substance. Cit is a dharma of a dharmin and Aghora refuses to identify the two.

Aghora defines cit as jñāna and kriyā and quotes the MA in support.\textsuperscript{16} For Aghora-ghanā (mass) means déha (body), i.e., whose body is made of cit is cidghana.\textsuperscript{17}

'Siva is not to be thought of as being inert as in the theories of those who hold that either kārma (action) or kāla (time) are God. The reason is that an Upanisad, 2:4:12, Brahman is described as a 'mass of knowledge' (vijñānahana). Cidghana is the same as prajñānahana which is used in the same Upanisad at 4:5:13. This last reference I owe to Dr. Arapura.

\textsuperscript{15} cidghana iti caitanyaghana, caitanyasāraḥ, cinmātra iti yavadd, "athaiva eva paramānando'ntaro'pāro vijñānahana" ityādi srutēḥ, "ādyaantaraitam sūdham cidghnandamāyam sivam" ityāditeśca bhagavataḥ sambhoscidrūpatvam siddham. (Mass of consciousness means being consciousness alone, being essentially consciousness or a mass of sentiency. Such is the explanation. According to šrutī; This one Siva is alone a mass of knowledge, has no other besides itself, is homogenous, supreme bliss. According to smṛti; Siva is devoid of beginning and end, pure, and consists of consciousness and bliss. So the Lord Sambhu is established as having the form of consciousness.) TPD,p-2

\textsuperscript{16} TPV,p-2.

\textsuperscript{17} Idem.
insentient thing cannot act without a sentient thing superintending it.\textsuperscript{18}

Nor is it possible for Siva to have a body made of bindu (subtle matter, equated by Aghora, with the first of the 'pure' material tattvas, the Sivatattva). For this would involve the loss of the status of being, the Lord for it would involve dependence on another. And where Siva depends on another causal agent there is infinite regression for then Siva would depend on another to create but the other would not create unless Siva were dependent on it.\textsuperscript{19}

Siva is unique which means that he has no second.\textsuperscript{20} There is only one God. The thesis of polytheism is untenable since it is known that a number of makers cannot make anything unless they all follow one will, as in the manufacture of a cart.\textsuperscript{21} In support of this Aghora quotes an unidentified verse:

Where there are many leaders, all wanting to be great, all thinking themselves wise, there destruction is certain.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{18} Idem.
\textsuperscript{19} Idem.
\textsuperscript{20} Idem.
\textsuperscript{21} Idem.
\textsuperscript{22} bahavo yatra netarrasarve panditamanih/tatha mahatvaicchanti tadvyaktma avasid//
In this commentary Aghora refutes the *pravāhanaśvaravādins*. Since we have examined this argument above there is no need to go into it again. 23

Siva is omnipresent. He is not limited by a body as are mendicants, nor does he expand and contract in size, because for such a one there is the unwelcome result of being sentient and non-eternal, etc. 24 What is sentient, like the ātman for example, does not undergo modification. Things that are liable to undergo modification like the clay which transforms into the pots, are sentient and due to their being changing are also non-eternal.

Siva is eternal which means having neither beginning nor end. 25 Aghora sees here a rejection of the Buddhist theory of momentariness. He says that it is impossible for that theory to explain the creation of the world because everything there is destroyed the moment it arises. 26

At this point an objection is raised that delivered souls are also eternal and that they are thus of the same nature as Siva. Is it not possible that a released soul and not Siva is the creator of the world?

23 Cf. above Ch. 1, p. 35 and Ch. 2, p. 130.

24 *TFV*, p. 2.

25 Idem.

26 Idem.
The answer to this question is contained in the word *sātadītah* in the verse being commented upon. This word means, according to Aghora, 'delivered eternally'. *Siva* differs from other souls which have attained release in that these latter have attained release through the grace of another (at a certain time). Such is not the case for *Siva*. If such a one as *Siva* is not assumed infinite regression results. 28 If *Siva* were not eternally delivered (or better, 'eternally free') he would have to have been delivered by the grace of another and that one by some other *ad infinitum*.

*Siva* is lord which means he has the characteristic of being the ruler. 29 Aghora comments that this means that *Siva* is not impelled by any other for reasons already given (i.e., he is unique, eternal, ever free, etc.). Aghora's glossing *prabhū* with *prabhavasāsilah* can also mean that *Siva*, as *prabhū* is primordial, or first among things. This meaning may also go equally well with 'not being impelled by another', i.e. being by implication the first cause.

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27 Idem.
28 Idem.
29 *TPV*, p-3.
30 Idem.
32 Idem.
Aghora adds that it is not possible that Śiva is a non-agent (is inactive or completely passive) since Śiva alone is proven to be the cause of the world.33

Śiva is tranquil which means that he is devoid of passion and hatred, etc.34 This characteristic is due to the fact that Śiva is devoid of mala, the cause of agitation. Aghora lists the seven imperfections constituting mala as delusion, pride, hatred, despondency, grief, sorrow, and lust (ardent desire).35

The word that comes next in the text is jagadekābījam. In introducing his commentary on this word, Aghora asks, in the form of an objection, what proof there is that there actually exists a Lord of such nature as has been described?36 Jagadekābījam supplies the answer, according to Aghora.

Jagadekābījam means that Śiva is the efficient cause of the world.37 Aghora then gives the standard proof for the existence of God in this school. He notes that the world is an effect displaying ordered arrangement of parts and this points to an intelligent

33 Idem.
34 Idem.
35 Idem.
36 Idem.
37 Idem.
The logical principle involved here is that whatever has parts is an effect and what is an effect has a causal agent. This whole proof is the topic of the fourth chapter of this essay and there is no need to go into the details here. Aghora notes that he has dealt with the topic in greater detail elsewhere. For our present purposes it will suffice to note two things. First the reason (hetu) given in the argument proving the existence of God is that the world is an effect. This can be contested by anyone who does not believe that the world is an effect, i.e. is eternal. Such is in fact the position of the Mimamsakas. Second, Aghora is careful to say that whatever is an effect has a causal agent (yadyadhkaryam tadsakartrkam). He does not say that all that is required is that there be a cause (i.e. he does not say yadyadhkaryam tadsakaranam). The usual way of making this distinction is to say that the world is an effect which requires being preceded by an intelligent causal agent (buddhimatkartrpurvakam). This is to preclude the contention by opponents that the cause of the world might be insentient, i.e. the pradhana of the Sankhya school. It is also significant that

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38 Idem.
39 Idem.
40 Cf. Iśvarasiddhi of Utpalagupta, p-1; and MA, Patilaksanaparikṣāprakāraṇam, p-120ff.
Aghora's use of inference (anumāna) precedes his quoting sruti as proof of Śiva's existence. Others, notably ubhāyakāranavādins like Śrikantha, Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara do not accept inference as a valid means for proving the existence of the absolute. There are a number of very interesting issues involved here which would take us too far afield to examine in much detail.  

The unidentified source proving the existence of God reads:

41 Briefly, those who, like Śrikantha, Rāmānuja, and Śaṅkara, accept the Absolute as both the material and efficient cause of the world cannot use inference to establish their position since inference ineluctably leads to the conclusion which is accepted by the Saiva Darśana (and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). This conclusion is that the Absolute is only the efficient and not the material cause of the world. Śrikantha frankly admits that there is no proof from inference: "...what is designated by the Holy Scripture alone is to be accepted by those who rely on scripture as the only source of knowledge (concerning super-mundane things). Otherwise, if one resorts to argumentation, opposed to scripture, then the fact that Brahmā is the material cause of the universe can never be established. Śrikanthabrahmasūtrābhāṣya, p-344, vs.2.

Śivāgrayogin too, bases the whole of his thesis that Śiva is the material and efficient cause, not on argument, which would prove otherwise, but on scripture and grammatical/exegetical details concerning the use of the ablative case ending (Saivaparibhāṣa, transl., p-81.)

All of this seems to me to strengthen the contention of Prof. Pandey (Bhāskarī, v.III, p-XXVI) that the Saiva Darśana and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are closely related and may well have sprung from the same common ancestor (the Pasupata school).

Finally it should be noted that even though Aghora first resorts to inference, he uses scripture to prove the existence of God too, only his sources say exactly what he contends, i.e., that God is only the efficient and not the material cause of the world.
As in the case of the pot, etc., which is an effect, (a maker) is established from the fact that there is an effect having parts, so the whole world, which is also an effect, must have been preceded by an omniscient causal agent who knows all the various things (lit. who has settled all disputes).  

Aghora also quotes the Mataṅga Āgama which simply states "but the Lord is the efficient cause" and not the material cause. 

Finally for this first verse, Siva is said to be the giver of grace to everyone. Aghora points out that the word anugraha (grace) is used by the sutrākāra elliptically to refer to all five of the activities of the Lord, of which anugraha is usually the last named. The meaning of the word in the verse is that Siva's grace consists in giving to all bound souls the opportunity for worldly experience (which involves the exhaustion of karma and the eventual removal of mala). It is due to experience that moksa is eventually attained. Siva has five activities through which he helps to free bound souls. They are creation, maintenance and destruction of the world, obstruction of bound souls, and finally giving grace to bound souls. 

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42 TPV, p-3.  
43 Idem.  
44 Idem.  
45 Idem.  
46 Idem.
Aghora adds that the omniscience of the Lord is proved by the very fact of his being the creator of all, for being the cause of the world is impossible for a non-knower. On this point Aghora quotes an unidentified source which is similar in sense to TS 43:

It is well established that he who knows something is he who can make that same thing. So from the fact (of the Lord) being the creator of all things is established the fact of his knowing all things he makes, along with the means (instrumental causes) and ends (of creation).

For the same reason it is declared that the Lord of such nature is triumphant or exists as superior to all else.

In his introduction to the second verse Aghora notes that the first verse praised the essential nature of the dharmin (ie. the substrate, Siva) and now Bhoja is going to praise the essential nature of the dharmin's power. The dharmin's power, its dharma, (attribute/sakti) is capable of assuming a furled or unfurled state. The former is the topic of this second verse and the latter the topic of the third verse.

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47 Idem.
48 Ibid., p-3,4.
49 Idem.
50 Idem.
51 Idem.
52 TPV, p-5.
This power, normally called sakti is here called tejas (light).

The light of Siva, of the nature of consciousness and action, triumphs over all. It is neither born nor does it die. It bestows deliverance but does not have deliverance bestowed on it.\[253\]

According to Aghora the author of the verse is pointing out the difference between Buddhism and Saivism by saying that Siva's sakti neither arises nor is destroyed.\[54\] In Buddhism, where everything is momentary, everything is destroyed the moment it arises and this includes knowledge (caitanya). Siva's sakti, on the other hand, is enduring.

Aghora next deals with the following question: If, as is said in scripture, the powers of knowing and doing which are called caitanya (sentiency) are ever in the bound soul, what is the difference between the powers (samarthyaṃśakti) of the self and the powers of the Lord.\[55\] The answer that Bhoja gives, according to Aghora, is that sakti bestows deliverance but yet does not have deliverance bestowed on it.\[56\] This sakti of the

\[53\] Idem.

\[54\] Ibid, p-4.

\[55\] Idem.

\[56\] Idem.
Lord is not delivered by anything else but is made manifest by the deliverance of the bound souls.\textsuperscript{57}

With respect to the above point it should be noted that Siva/sakti is, before the release of a soul, different from the soul, but that after release not different from it, in that it, like Siva/sakti, has no mala. There is accidental difference before moksa, but substantial equality (ie. but not substantial identity), after moksa. In an important sense then, this Saiva-Darśana is Advaita-Vedānta turned on its head: release in Advaita means substantial identity and non-existence of attributes, in Saiva Darśana substantial heterogeneity and equality of attributes. In Advaita release means that the 'separate' self sees that it is Brahman; in Saiva Darśana the recovery of powers such that the separate self can know and do the same things as the Siva. In Saiva Darśana moksa means a promotion to a kind of officers mess as in the military, which promotion carries with it certain privileges and powers, the central one being that no one will push one around any more. One will be free from being subject to the will of another. One will be svatantryam (literally self-dependent, self-willed) and not anyaprerya (impelled by another, or bossed around by any other).

\textsuperscript{57} Idem. We have seen this point above p-29 so there is no need to go into the details again.
One does not become one substance with the Absolute and lose all attributes, the primary one being individuality. One will not, as in Advaita, be like the space inside the jar, which, upon the jar being broken, be united with absolute space which is devoid of qualities, attributes and individuality.\textsuperscript{58} Release in Saiva Iśvara means that the individual as a monad (i.e. as a numerically separate All), in substantial disjunction with other monads in a state of release, will be privileged and empowered in an identical way as all the rest. This is wherein 'identity' consists in this system.

Aghora continues his commentary on the second verse by considering the meaning of the phrase 'the light of Siva which is of the nature of consciousness triumphs over all'. He glosses \textit{jñānakriyāsvabhāvam} (of the nature of consciousness and action) with \textit{cidadtmakam} (consisting of consciousness). The reason sakti is said to consist of \textit{cit} is that it has the quality of being sentient. He quotes a scriptural source to the same effect. From all of this it is clear that Aghora understood sakti to consist essentially of sentiency.

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. for this analogy Śankara's BS Bhāṣya (Thibau's transl.) pp-55,113,134,161,282,349 and volII,pp-63,339.
(cit'sakti) and that this latter takes the form of jñāna and kriyā saktī.\textsuperscript{59}

The third verse is a description of Śiva's ṣakti in the unfurled state:

That by which Śiva makes it possible for this group of bound souls to experience (karma) and attain deliverence, which is unique, of the nature of consciousness and primordial, (that) I salute with all my heart.\textsuperscript{1/3}

Aghora notes that Śiva is empowered with sakti when he acts as cause of his five-fold activity. In order to facilitate the accomplishment of experience and eventual release of the bound souls, Śiva acts through his ṣakti alone, which is the cause of bhoga and moksa (worldly experience and release). To the objection that it is never observed that a doer devoid of body and senses, etc., can be a causal agent Aghora replies that there is observance of this. In the case of the movement of one's own body there is an example of the movement by sheer will of a material entity, the body, by a non-material entity, the ātman. Thus causal agency belongs to Śiva/ṣakti alone and not in conjunction with other things (ie. a body etc.)\textsuperscript{60}

Sakti is unique (ekam). According to Aghora this means that any diversity that there may appear to be in

\textsuperscript{59} TPV, p-4.

\textsuperscript{60} TPD, p-5.
\textit{sakti} is only metaphorically and not really present. This point has been covered above and the discussion in the TPV adds no new information so we can move along.

\textit{Sakti} is of the nature of consciousness (\textit{cidrūpam}). By this, says Aghora, Bhoja wants to point out that though \textit{sakti} has different kinds of effects it does not actually evolve into anything since what transforms is necessarily insentient.

\textit{Sakti as cit} is primordial in the sense of being the first, principal or chief \textit{sakti}. This means that it, unlike other \textit{saktis}, is in a \textit{samavāya} relationship with \textit{Siva}. This \textit{cit\textit{sakti}} is to be distinguished from other \textit{saktis} which, though \textit{Siva}'s own, lie outside of him and do not inhere in him. These external \textit{saktis}, such as the two material causes (\textit{māyā} and \textit{bindu}) are only \textit{Siva}'s by adoption: \textit{parigrahasvarūpam}. Aghora stresses the necessity of accepting these \textit{saktis} by adoption when he states a main principle of dualism in Indian philosophy (and not only in Indian philosophy) that the world cannot be created without a (pre-existent, separate) material cause, and quotes an unidentified source as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} TPV, p-5.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Cf. Ch.1, p-30 and Ch-2, p-136
\item \textsuperscript{63} Idem.
\end{itemize}
stating: "Without the two material causes the creator cannot (produce) the effect (the world)." 64

So with respect to this discussion of Aghora's about sakti, it appears that he accepts at least two kinds of sakti to belong to Śiva. There is citśakti (which differentiates itself into jñāna and kriyā sakti) which is in a samavāya relationship with Śiva, and there are the two material causes which are external saktis which nevertheless, somehow belong to him. But in fact the relationship between Śiva and sakti, so immensely important in its implications, is not clear in Aghora's writings. He waffles on the issue. Here he calls the relationship samavāya but in his commentary to the Ratnatreya he calls the same relationship tadātmyasambandha (identity) 65 but this is exactly how a rival school, the monistic Kashmir Saivism describes the relationship using the same language. Abhinavagupta writes in the Bodhapañcadasikā:

There is asserted to be no difference between sakti and the possessor of sakti. these two are eternal and in a relationship of identity (tadātmyasambandha) just like the fire and its power to burn. 66

The example of fire and its power to burn is

64 TPV, p-5.
65 RT, p-102.
66 Cf. p-1.
also used by the dualist to illustrate the *samavāya*
relationship.\(^{67}\)

Prof. Filliozat notes in connection with this third verse that for Aghora the paramount thing is to keep Siva, who is pure spirit from all contact with matter and the non-spiritual. Siva does not have or require a material body to carry out his actions. He has as his sole instrument his *sakti* which is pure spirit (cit).\(^{68}\) Yet in an important sense, if we can understand *sakti* as a kind of buffer between spirit and matter the time of reckoning is just delayed but not really met. For the next question for Aghora will be: "How does *sakti* relate with matter on the one hand and with Siva on the other?" We have had some intimation of how Aghora intends to handle this question.\(^{69}\) He would probably say that *sakti* always remains one but depending on *upādhis* (adjunct conditions) it can metaphorically be said to be many. But if this is the answer the question becomes: "Is it then the case that Siva, who is pure spirit, acts upon the world with his *sakti* which is also pure spirit, but then when push comes to shove, *sakti* only metaphorically acts on the world? If so, who or what really acts on the world? And if to act metaphorically

\(^{67}\) Cf. MA, p-126.

\(^{68}\) Filliozat, p-216ff.

\(^{69}\) Cf. above p-171.
is to act really, then śakti really does become many in contact with upādhis and is thus insentient and Śiva's contact therewith pollutes him.

Finally with respect to this third verse, it is interesting to compare Aghora's commentary on it with that of Śrīkumāra. Śrīkumāra sees in this verse an invocation to the Goddess Mahāśvarī (the consort of Mahēśvara or Śiva). The preceding verse was seen as an invocation to Mahēśvara. Mahēśvara is Śiva, Mahēśvarī is śakti. With respect to the relationship between Śiva and Śakti he says they are a unity. Both the states of release on worldly existence prove the unity of Śiva and Śakti. The state of release consists of consciousness and bliss, the god and the goddess. The god is the bliss of consciousness and the goddess the consciousness of bliss. Similarly in worldly experience all things are made up of the material and efficient causes in union at the same time. And finally, and most significantly for our purposes, Śrīkumāra understands the relationship between Śiva and śakti to be analogous to that which exists between a substance (dharma) and an attribute (dharma). He concludes from this that it is necessary to accept both difference and non-difference (spirituality and materiality).

70 TPD, pp-20-23 and Filliozat, p-262.
So far then, the analogy of a substance and its attribute has been used to illustrate the relationship between Siva and Sakti by a monist (Abhinavagupta), a monist/dualist (Srikumara) and a dualist (Aghora).

Verse four is the statement of the purpose of the treatise (the TP):

For the welfare of the world, with the spirit heavy with the feeling of compassion, we mindfully write this Light on the Tattvas.

Aghora comments that the meaning is that the treatise is meant to shed light on the 36 tattwas from earth to Siva (which latter is not to be confused, on Aghora's reckoning, with the Lord, Siva); on the creator or efficient cause of those tattvas i.e., Siva; and the bound souls who are to be helped by Siva. These are, of course, the three padartha of the system. Clearly, by naming Siva and the bound souls separately from the 36 tattwas Aghora has to be understood as insisting that the former two do not belong in the scale of tattvas. Rather the 36 tattvas comprise, as one group, the third padartha, pasa for him. The tattvas, including the Sivatattva, in spite of its name, are all insentient. In contrast to this one can compare the interpretation of the Kṣemarāja of the monistic school of Kashmir Saivism, for whom both Siva and the bound soul are included in the scale of tattvas as different stages of evolution of the same substance, from a state of pure inwardness to a
state of pure outwardness.\textsuperscript{71} Or compare the remarkable statement at \textit{Tantrāloka} XI,109:

The fact that Bhairava (Śiva) thinks 'I am solid' is the earth; when he thinks 'I am consciousness' then he is in a state of lysis.\textsuperscript{72}

The fifth verse of the \textit{TP} lists the three padārthas:

In the Śaiva Āgamas the principal thing is the triad Pati/Paśu/Pāśa. Pati is said to be Śiva, Paśus are the bound souls and Pāśa consists of the five kinds of bonds.\textsuperscript{73}

Aghora begins his commentary on this verse by remarking that the words 'of the padārthas' has to be added to the verse, i.e., that the principal thing of the Śaiva Āgamas is the triad of the padārthas. He gives the definition of a tantra (Śaiva Āgama) as consisting of

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Parapraveśika}, pp.1-5 and comm.

\textsuperscript{72} Quoted by R.Gholi in his commentary on Somānanda's \textit{Śivadṛṣṭi} in 'East and West,' April, 1957, p-21. This statement from the \textit{Tantrāloka} is a clear enunciation of the gnostic principle that knowing and being are a continuum with knowing being the primary ens realissimus; that there is a kind of knowing which is so intense that it is "...no longer divorced from being: we know the way we are and we are the way we know." (Robert Aven in \textit{The New Gnosticism}, p-3). Knowledge in this view has direct ontological impact. For Śaṅkara knowledge makes the world disappear. Knowledge is not something that relates a subject to an object or which is something that works on things from the outside like water which sprays on a car at a carwash. The idea here is that the way things are, their ontological status is what the absence or presence of knowledge is. The presence or absence of knowledge is what we mean when we say that a thing is or is not.

The philosophy of the texts upon which this essay is based is directly opposed to this gnostic line of thought on every point.
four sections concerned with the three padārthas. In the verse the words tatra patih occur and mean, according to Aghora, that each padārtha contains a number of things within it. Thus among the three padārthas, Siva belongs to the patipadārtha. And by the word 'Siva' a number of other things are meant which are of the same nature such as mantras, mantrēsas, mantramahēsas, released souls, Siva's sakti, the names of these entities along with the means for attaining Sivahood, such as initiation, teaching about the way to release, etc. 73

The paśu is defined as the one who is impelled. By this is meant that the pasupadārtha includes bound souls of various kinds such as the vijnānakevela, etc. defined under verse 8. There are thus paśus in both the pati and paśu padārthas although a paśu in the patipadārtha would be called a muktātman. A paśu and a muktātman are essentially the same, they are both cit. The only difference is that the former has and the latter has not mala. This is proof that the Saiva Darsana is not a pluralism of substances but is rather a dualism in the strict sense. For there are really only two kinds of stuff, cit and acit, though there are three padārthas. The whole idea of the system is to effect a situation where the number of padārthas will correspond to the number of the kinds of stuff in the

73 TPV, P-7
world. That is, the whole idea of the system is to reduce the number of padārthas to two, pati and pāsa by emptying the pāsu padārtha of any members. The pati and pāsa padārthas are respectively pure cit stuff and pure acit stuff. The pāsu padārtha is a mixture of cit stuff and acit stuff. Once this mixture is unmixed the pāsu padārtha will be an empty set.

Symbolically, if pati, pāsu and pāsu padārthas are represented by A, B and C, one wants to get B to equal A by subtraction of C, for when B and C are in conjunction B is less than A. What one has is B+C<C and what one wants is B=A via subtraction. The pāsu paradoxically becomes more by losing something.

The pāsapadārtha is fivefold consisting of mala, rodhasakti, karma, māyā and bindu. Various kinds of beings with various kinds of natures, various kinds of worlds and tattvas which arise out of the pure and impure material causes, respectively bindu and māyā also belong to this padārtha. 74

An objection is raised in Aghorasiva's commentary that sakti is listed as belonging to two different padārthas: it is listed as sakti in the patipadārtha and as rodhasakti in the pāsa padārtha. The answer is that this is true but that it really belongs to the patipadārtha, whereas it metaphorically belongs

74 TPV, p-7
to the pāśapadārtha. The latter is justified because as rodhaśakti, śakti has the functional characteristic of being a bond (pāśa). Aghora quotes the MA in support:

This (rodha)śakti which is Mahēśvarī, Śiva, the giver of grace to all, is metaphorically (called) pāśa (bond) due to its having such a functional characteristic.75

Aghora introduces the sixth sutra with the following question: If the released souls have the status of Śiva (i.e. belong to the patipadārtha) because they are devoid of association with pāśa, how can the vidyēśvaras, etc. who are associated with pāśa through having a body made out of bindu be included in the patipadārtha and not in the pāśupadārtha where they would seem to belong. The answer is:

Delivered souls are Sivas also, but they are delivered by his grace, while Śiva must be understood to be eternally free. He has a body made of the five mantras.76

This verse is trying to more clearly define the patipadārtha. Aghora comments that released souls are souls who have attained likeness with Śiva. The meaning of the word 'also' in the verse is that the vidyēśvaras are also sivas because they are devoid of impurity (mala). Being in association with mala means being in association with the bound state (pāśutva). Then Aghora quotes the tautological definition of a bound soul's

75 TPV.p-7
being a bound soul because it is in association with the state of being a bound soul. Thus the vidyēśvaras are Śivas (lit. 'have Śiva-ness') because they have omniscience etc., which are characteristics of being a Śiva. Having a body made of hindu only means being assigned by Śiva to be a superintending deity which means being in contact with residual impurity due to so superintending. But the superintending deities are nevertheless included in the patipadārtha, understood as meaning they have achieved a lower liberation. This is due to their being devoid of mala and being beyond the māyātattva.

To the question how mantreśvaras who are in contact even with kālatattva (which is below māyātattva and in the very heart of impurity) can be Sivas, and thus be included in the patipadārtha, Aghora answers: The criteria for their inclusion is that they are devoid of mala and possess omniscience, etc., through receiving grace directly from Śiva rather than indirectly through a guru, as does an ordinary pāśu. Being in contact with kāla involves having residual mala from superintending what is born of māyā. There is this contact necessarily for these mantreśvaras because they have been assigned by

76 pāśuḥ pāṣutvasamyogāt iti śruteḥ. TPV, p-8, l-3.

77 TPV, p-8.
Siva to be superintenders. Aghora gives the following quotation in his support:

Even though in contact with kāla etc., these obedient ones (the mantrāsvars) do not belong in kāla, etc., like the group of bound souls do. 78

Following this Aghora covers the question of what the difference is between the released souls and Siva and no new information is included that we have not seen before so we can move on. 79

As for the occurrence in the verse of the statement that Siva has a body made of the five mantras which corroborated in the Agama wherein it is stated that the Lord has five mouths, fifteen senses, etc., the meaning according to Aghora is this: since it is impossible to meditate on, or perform worship to a formless deity, the Lord is said to assume form, having five mouths, etc. Aghora quotes the following texts to support his case:

Having necessarily worshipped you with form the wise do not worship the formless. (unidentified)

78 TPV, p-8, l-11

79 Cf. TTN 5 for the same question.
the Pauśkara Āgama:

The Lord is said to assume form for the purpose of facilitating the goal of the worshippers.

The MA:

By possession of a body he does what is to be done. Wherever there is something done by that agent it is done with an adopted body.\(^{80}\)

Aghora concludes his commentary on the sixth verse by saying that the Saktis of Śiva (Isana, etc) which are useful in carrying out the fivefold activity of Śiva (see below), which are mentioned in the verse as the five mantras are said metaphorically to be the body of Śiva when in fact they are only the agents in carrying out what is to be done by an embodied being. Thus they do not really constitute Śiva's body. He quotes a verse to this effect:

The head of the Lord's body (is comprised of) the five mantras, Ṭisa, Tatpurusa, Aghora, Vama and Aja. (They are) useful in carrying out the five-fold activities.\(^{81}\)

The seventh verse lists the five-fold activity of Śiva and is the final one, according to Aghora, which deals with the patipadārtha:

The five-fold activity of this eternally free one is said to be creation, sustaining, destroying, obscuration and grace.//7

For Aghora, Śiva is the direct agent of these activities only in the pure creation (in the first five

\(^{80}\) TPV, p-9

\(^{81}\) TPV, p-9
tattvas). In the impure creation (the last thirty tattvas), Siva is the indirect agent acting through Ananta and the other mantras. Aghora quotes the Kirana Agama thus:

In the pure creation Siva is the agent, in the impure Prabhu (Ananta, etc.)

The cosmogonic procedure is then outlined briefly by Aghora. In the pure creation Siva first creates the pure tattvas and bhuvanas (worlds), etc., out of the subtle matter bindu. Then he links the vidyas and vidyeśvaras that are to inhabit these worlds with bodies made of this same bindu. Then by the evolution of nada he produces the mantras. In the impure creation carried out by Siva through Ananta, etc., there is first the creation of the impure tattvas and bhuvanas from the gross material cause, māyā. Then bodies, made out of the same stuff are given to the bound souls. They receive a subtle body aligned with a certain tattva and a gross body aligned with a certain bhuvana in accordance with their karma. Also in the impure creation the mantras are given bodies in accordance with the requirements of their being superintenders.

It should be noted how different this account of creation is (due solely to the dualist's separation of the

82 TPV, p-1
83 TPV, p-9
efficient and material causes) from that of a monist like Kṣemarāja in his Parāprāveśikā. And this difference rests on either the admission or the refusal of the possibility of mixing knowing and materiality in the same substance. Aghora refuses this possibility, Kṣemarāja admits it. There seems to me to be equal theoretical strength to each position so that the only reason one might have for preferring one over the other is that the actual existential situation requires stressing one over the other to effect a balance. I see no possibility of establishing a categorical superiority.

Aghora defines the second of the five-fold activities, maintenance of the world, as the abiding in its proper condition or state of the whole constrained

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84 Cf p-6 of this text where, after having enumerated the 36 tattvas, Kṣemarāja defines the first, the 'sivatattva, as "Supreme Śiva himself of the nature of absolute pure bliss, consisting of willing, knowing and acting." This is in direct contrast with the idea of Aghora that the 'sivatattva is insentient clay to be molded by Śiva. Similarly, for Kṣemarāja the 'saktitattva is: "...the very first fluttering of the Supreme Śiva as endowed with the desire to create this world due to his having an unobstructed will." On the other hand, for Aghora the 'saktitattva is nāda, the first evolute of the insentient bindu. The philosophical principle involved between Aghora and Kṣemarāja is that the former does not and the latter does accept the gnostic principle discussed in fn. 72 above.

The two quotations from the Parāprāveśikā read: tatra sivatattvam nama iccha-āhāra-kriyā-ātmakaevam apnīnandasya vabhāvarūpah paramāśiva eva. asya jagat sratmicchām pariçṛtavatāh paramesvarasya prathamaspanda evaçcāsaktitattvam apratihiñnatatvat.
world due to the particular power of Śiva appropriate to that state.85

The third divine activity is destruction of the world. Aghora defines it as the reabsorption of the two classes of material objects into their respective material causes, māyātattva for the pure material creation and bindutattva for the pure material creation. This destruction has to be understood as the transformation from a visible gross state to an invisible subtle state and not as a becoming non-existent. This is all in accordance with the theory of causality that this school accepts, i.e., satkāryavāda. It is important to note that the reabsorption stops short of Śiva. This means that everything is not reabsorbed into the Absolute, but rather into the two material causes.

Obscurcation or obstruction is defined by Aghora as (the supplying of the opportunity) to bound souls to experience things in accordance with their various qualifications. This is done by Śiva by means of pāśa-grace. By creating the world which binds the souls, the Lord has their best interests at heart. For it is only

85 TPV, p-10
through experience that release can be obtained and experience requires a world to be experienced.  

Grace, the fifth activity of Śiva is defined as the granting to souls, the higher or lower form of mokṣa by means of the obscuring of their bonds. Aghora uses the name of the fourth divine activity in his definition of the fifth divine activity, just as he used the name of the fifth in his definition of the fourth.  

Thus whereas the fourth divine acivity, tirobhāva, is carried out by means of pāśa-grace (pāsanugrahānenā) the fifth is carried out by Śiva by means of pāśa-obstruction (pāsatirodhanena). Of the five kinds of pāśa, mala is immune to removal by all but Śiva's grace.

So the situation is this: release of a bound soul requires experience of karma, etc., which can only take place in a situation where there is the linking of a bound soul to both a body and a world which is to be the field of activity of that bound soul. Binding is a step in the process of unbinding. The binding process having had its effect (i.e., karma having been experienced, mala matured thereby, and the desire for initiation into Saivism having arisen) the unbinding of the binding takes place either directly by Śiva letting his grace fall on the bound soul or indirectly through

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86 TPV, p-10

87 tirobhāva and tirodhāna are synonymous.
the receiving of initiation at the hand of a Śivācārya. The key in the transmission of grace in the indirect manner is the mantra (hence the importance of vidyās or mantras, and nāda the first evolute of the subtle matter bindu). 88

In closing his commentary on this verse Aghora answers an objector who contends that in the RA the vidyās and vidyēṣas are said to carry out the creation of the world, etc. So how can there be said to be exclusivity with respect to Siva in this matter. The answer is that the vidyās, etc., carry out this creation under the direction of Siva so there is no contradiction. 89

This, according to Aghora, ends the section of the TP describing the patipadārtha. For the purposes of this essay all that remains to be done to complete the investigation into the doctrine of God in the TP is to examine some of the other relevant passages occurring in the rest of the treatise. It will be profitable to also include in the remainder of this chapter a summary of the conceptions of the other two padārthas in the system.

88 It seems to me that the immense appeal of the mantra, seen even today in the Transcendental Meditation movement, is that it is given to one by another as one's own personal mantra. It has all of the appeal and secrecy of a love letter or a present. It is portable and, like a medal worn around the neck, will protect one from evil, etc.

89 TPv, p-11
since the role and hence the nature of Siva is closely bound up with these.

It has been mentioned above that the patipadārtha is populated and is not an amorphous homogeneity. 90 It is important to note that there is a certain amount of overlap between the populations of the pati- and paśupadārtha-s. For example the mantramahēśvaras included by Aghora in the patipadārtha are actually vijnānakevēla souls which belong to the paśupadārtha but who are appointed by Siva to special positions due to their having certain pre-eminent qualities. 91 There are several kinds of these special souls who superintend various worlds and Frauwallner has called them angels 92 and the epithet seems to me to be not inappropriate. When one remembers that in addition to the over-lap between the pati and paśupadārtha populations, that an unbound soul is a Siva 93, that angels here become equal in attributes to God, it becomes clear in this system that angelology and theology are closely related. It seems then that if one does not do one, one cannot do the other. Thus one

90 Above p-20

91 Cf. above p-122 ff.

92 Aus der Philosophie der Sivaitischen Systeme, p-11ff.

93 Cf. above p-28 and TTN 4 and TP 6.
cannot understand Śiva if one does not understand these angels and one cannot understand these angels if one does not, in turn, understand the bound souls which have become these angels.

There are three kinds of bound souls: vijñānakevelas, pralayakevelas and sakalas. The progress towards release and hence the rank of a soul depends on how many bonds the soul's powers are still veiled by. The more bonds the lower the rank of the soul.

The vijñānakevela is bound by one bond (mala); the pralayakevela by two (mala and karma); and the sakala by three (mala, karma and māyā).

Of the first kind of bound soul, the vijñānakevela (also called vijñānakala) there are two kinds, those with mature and those with immature mala. This idea of mala having various stages of maturity rests on a particular conception of mala in this school.

94 Cf. TPV verse 7, p-10.

95 Vījñānakevela: souls whose karma is destroyed by gnosis, yoga, asceticism, or experience.

96 Pralayakevela: souls which at the time of pralaya remain bound by mala and karma but not by māyā.

97 Sakala: consisting of parts, visible, material. This is the ordinary state of human beings usually referred to as pasus. Cf. verse 13 and 16 below and TS, p-47 where we have seen Aghora characterize pasus as bound beasts like sheep.

98 unbound (akala) through knowledge.
It is not ignorance to be dissipated by knowledge but is rather an inert substance (dravya) like a certain disease of the eye which results in there being a film over the eye which impairs the vision. The treatment is mechanical and scientific. No irrational leaps are involved in the process of salvation. For the foe here is not sentient, changing and wily. Once the cause of the film over the eye is found out it can be cured and dried up the same way every time. This process of treating mala is called maturing it (pakha: lit. cooking). 99

99 The philosophical significance of the analogy with eye disease is clear enough, but the medical details of caksusah patala are not. Neither Monier-Williams nor Apte give a medical term for their description of it as 'a film over the eye'. It can also mean a cataract which is the progressive opacity of the eye lense. But this does not fit well with the analogy where the idea of something ripening and falling off or disappearing by drying up through treatment, as chaff separates from the mature grain (cf. below).

This idea of mala being an object rather than a psychological or spiritual state of ignorance being the cause of what ails man is a further rejection of the gnostic principle spoken of above. As such it shows what distinguishes Saiva Darsana from a certain kind of Indian philosophy: The dualist likes to start from externality, objectivity, ontological positing of separate distinct things like cit and acit then to begin attenuation towards the one by relating these things. But the duals are never dissolved. The other kind of philosophy of the gnostic principle puts everything through the wringer of epistemologization. Subjectivity, consciousness, etc. are the real and then attenuation takes place which tries to account for the many. I fail to see any reason to categorically privilege either position though circumstances will often dictate the stressing of the truth of of the one way of looking at things over the other.
Even among the viññānakevāla souls whose mala is matured there is no strict uniformity. There are some whose mala is more mature than others. Of these Siva chooses eight of the best and appoints them as vidyēsas (or vidyēśvaras). Their names are Ananta, Suksma, Śivottama, Ekanetra, Ekarudra, Trimūrti, Śrīkantha, and Śikhandā. They are given bodies made out of bindutattva also called sivatattva. They dwell at the īśvaratattva level and carry out the five-fold divine activities in the impure creation under the direction of Siva. Of the remainder of this group of viññānakevāla souls with mature mala, which remainder numbers seven million, Siva makes them into mantras, that is they become instruments of the grace of Siva and dwell at the vidyātattva level. Half of these seven million mantras serve as instruments of grace by acting as vehicles (karanatvena) of this grace which finds a support in a guru at the empirical level. By acting in this way, through the mantras and with the support of a guru, Siva gives his grace to the sakala souls. The other half of the seven million viññānakevāla souls which have become mantras serve as instruments of Siva's grace without taking a guru or anything else as a support. They serve as instruments of

100 Cf. TPV, p-12, verse ten and comm. where the vidyēśvaras are also called mantramahēśvaras to distinguish them from the mantrēśvaras who superintend the impure creation.
grace not to sakala souls but to vijnânakevela souls with immature mala and also to mantresas (bound souls appointed by Siva as superintendents of the impure creation. Aghora notes that one of the effects of this grace is that the mantresas become dis-enamoured with the superintending job they are appointed to do and at the end of the duration of the world they have been appointed to superintend, they achieve release. All of these seven million vijnânakevela souls whose mala is matured in the above manner, having served in the dissemination of grace throughout the whole of creation achieve release when the whole of creation is dissolved at mahâpralaya (the great universal dissolution). As for the vijnânakevela souls whose mala still remains somewhat immature after all of the above, these remain vijnânakevelae. They repeat the process and are also eventually released. 101

The second kind of bound souls, the pralayakalas are also of two kinds depending on whether or not their mala is matured or not. 102 Aghora says that due to the force of the mala being matured the karma too is matured. 103 This makes maturation of karma dependent on the maturation of mala which in turn depends on the

101 TPV, p-12, 13.
102 TPV 12.
103 TPV, p-13.
descent of Siva's grace. But this descent of grace must depend on something specific to the individual and the natural thing to look for here would be exhaustion of karma or a balanced state of good and bad karmas, etc. Though Aghora does not here make reference to the point, and in fact implies that karma is redundant in the soteriological scheme, Sri Kumara makes the condition for the descent of grace and the removal of mala the equilibrium of karma.\textsuperscript{104} This seems to make sense since karma is something that man can do something about. He can have something to do with becoming dispassionate—by abandoning the dvandvas (opposites like emotional peaks and valleys, etc.). On the other hand mala is not something he can do anything about directly.

The pralayakalas with mature mala and karma achieve release. Those with immature karma and mala are given bodies (called puryastikadehae) and are born in all the various worlds and act in these worlds in accordance with their previous deeds. A difficulty arises in Aghara's stating that pralayakevelas—pralayakalas are born into all the realms and worlds\textsuperscript{105} for this must mean that these souls are born into the impure creation too which would mean that they are

\textsuperscript{104} Karmasāmya, TPD, p-42. This point is discussed above in the study of the TŚ, p-119 and below in Ch.5, p-359

\textsuperscript{105} TPV, p-13.
connected with māyā as a pāśa which directly contradicts their definition. The only difference between a pralayakala and a sakala soul is that the former has not and the latter has connection with māyā. The issue becomes even more unclear when Aghora notes and then rejects another reading of verse 11. The verse as Aghora reads it says:

Among the pralayakalas, those whose mala and karma are mature attain release. The others (anye), united with a body made of puryastika are born in all wombs under the effect of their karma. //l3

Aghora rejects the reading of ete (these) for anye (others). His reason is that this meaning would contradict scripture and result in the return to sāṁsāra of even souls whose mala was mature, which would mean that mokṣa would be impossible to attain if those linked to a puryastika body must return to sāṁsāra. Yet he has just said that those pralayākalas linked with a puryastika body have immature mala. I have been unable to resolve this problem.

In verse 12 and commentary a puryastika is defined as a pralayakevela/pralayākala soul with a body made of the 30 tattvas below and including māyā) which 30 are divided into eight (astika) groups: the five material elements, the tanmātras, the organs of sense, the organs of action, the gunatattva, the pradhāna and

106 p.15.
the five kāñchukas. 107 How a pralayakevela soul with a body made up of these elements is not considered a sakala soul is not explained.

Among these puryastikās, Śiva, acting through Ananta (Aghora glosses mahaśvara in verse 12 with mantramahaśvara, i.e., Ananta, etc., which is not convincing) makes a few of them bhuvanapatiś, that is lords of a certain limited realm. He gives them certain extraordinary powers like the ability to see things that are far away, etc. 108

Verse 13 appears to be a continuation of the discussion of the pralayākalas. It talks about the rest (śesa) of the pralayākalas. The rest' means, apparently, those with immature mala who, during the next creation become sakala souls. Then it seems to say that from among these, Śiva (svayameva) makes certain ones mantreśvarāe and that these latter number one hundred and eighteen. According to Prof. Filliozat, Aghora does not understand the verse this way. Aghora is supposed to understand by śesa, not the remainder of the pralayakevela souls (i.e. the ones with immature mala) but rather a special (śesa) group within the sakalāe who are appointed to be superintenders of the impure creation

107 TPV, P-14.
108 TPV, P-15.
of which the matrix is māyā. It is also possible to read Aghora as understanding, not a special group of sakala souls but the remainder of the pralayakalas, although the weakness of this reading is that pralayakevelabhyah 'sesāh does not occur.

"Aghora ne prend pas 'sesāh comme désignant des âmes parmi les pralayakala. Il en fait une épithète de sakala. Pour lui il s'agit ici d'une group particulier des sakala qui retournent dans la transmigration parce que leur mala n'est pas mûr. Ils se distinguent de ces sakala par un mûrissement de leur mala. Mais en raison d'une certain lenteur de ce mûrissement, ils sont chargés d'une fonction dans le sein de māyā et reçoivent donc un corps fait de tattva." Filliozat,p-270.

Aghora writes: anatimalapakvatvena samsārayogibhyāsca ye 'sesāh pakvamalāh santo'pi tatpākāmandyānmayāgarbhādhi kāra-yogāste'pisargarpaśramphedhikaranibhandanena kalādinā yo gāt-sakalā bhavanti. Tatyoge'pi te malarahitavat 'sesa ityuktah.

I translate:

The remainder (of the pralayakalas) whose mala is mature, yet due to connection with samsāra not fully mature, are fit to superintend the impure creation just because their mala has been a little bit slow maturing. At the commencement of the next creation they become sakalas because of their connection with the impure creation which results from their being superintenders. Even though linked to the impure creation they (i.e., the pralayakalas with immature mala who have become sakalas in the next creation) are special since they are devoid of mala.

Prof. Filliozat seems to understand that there is a special (group of souls) whose mala is mature, yet due to connection with samsāra, not totally mature. They are fit to superintend the impure creation just because their mala has been a bit slow maturing. (This special group of souls are sakalas (sakala bhavanti) at the commencement of the next creation (and were so before that also) because of their connection with the impure creation which results from their being superintenders. They are special sakalas because, though linked with the impure creation they are devoid of mala.
Nevertheless, Prof. Filliozat, in his summary of the pralayākalas says that according to Aghora pralayākalas with immature mala become (redeviennent) sakala souls again in the next creation. In addition to all of this Aghora clearly takes verses 15 and 16 to be the ones giving expositions of sakala souls. So the weight of evidence would seem to be against Prof. Filliozat's reading of Aghora's commentary on verse 13. The issue remains confused.

So from among the pralayākalas or the sakalas certain ones are appointed to be mantreśvaras, superintenders over the impure creation after having had

The last sentence of the sanskrit quoted above seems to support Prof. Filliozat. But the verb bhavanti would seem to mean 'they become' not 'they are' as he appears to understand. If so it is hard to see why Aghora would say that a special group of sakalas become or are (ie. remain) sakalas in the next creation. The phrase sargaprārambhe ('at the beginning of the next creation') indicates that something is different at the beginning of the next creation than was the case at the end of the last one. This change, in this context, can only mean that something that was not a sakala before has become so, since all of the other words which follow 'te'pi' in the phrase in question give reasons for the change (ie., are either in the ablative or instrumental cases) and cannot therefore be that into which something has changed. The easiest way to understand the sentence is to say that the rest of the pralayakalas, that is the ones with immature mala, become sakalas in the next creation.

111 "Pour Aghorasiva les pralayakala dont le mala est mur sont delivres. Ceux dont le mala n'est pas mur redeviennent sakala lors de la creation qui suit..." Filliozat, p-270.
their *mala* removed by Siva himself. Ananta etc., is in charge of giving these *mantresvaras* bodies made of the *tattvāc* of the impure creation. Even these *mantresvaras* are ranked according to the level of the *tattva* at the head of which they stand.¹¹²

The third group of bound souls is also divided into two groups according to whether there is maturity or immaturity of *mala*. Thus verse 15 reads:

'Siva, assuming the form of an ācarya makes the (sakala) souls with mature *mala* fit for the highest goal (tattva) by means of initiation which is the descent of grace, the cause of destruction (of *mala*).//15

Aghora understands that Siva acts in the midst of the *sakala* souls who are bound by the three bonds but this only means that he takes a *guru* as a support or channel for his grace. There is no indication that Aghora understands that when Siva takes the form of an ācarya he actually incarnates. This would go against the whole idea of Siva acting through intermediaries in his dealings with the impure creation. For Aghora, Siva causes the *sakala* souls with mature *mala* to be fit for supreme mokṣa which is *sivasāmya* (equality of attributes with Siva), by letting his power of grace fall which automatically wipes out the powers of obstruction that have obstructed a bound soul up until that point.¹¹³ (It

¹¹² *TPV*, p-16, verse 14 and comm.

¹¹³ *TPV*, p-17.
has to be kept in mind that these powers of obstruction in the forms of mala, karma and māyā, understood as a group to be tirodhānāsakti, are ultimately for the benefit of the souls, and are, in this sense, of Śiva by adoption, though eternally ontologically separate from him.) There are certain sakala souls whose mala is a little bit slow maturing and these are showered a little more slowly with grace and are not given moksa like the others, but rather, at the commencement of the creation following this slower descent of grace, are made viḍyeśvaras/manteśvaras and dwell in the pure creation.114

Thus the way to moksa for sakala souls is via initiation (dīksā), for this alone can remove the substance mala, which latter is not removeable by mere knowledge. The two other kinds of bound souls, the pralayākalas and the vijnānakevālas do not need initiation to receive the grace of Śiva but rather receive it directly from the Lord without a guru acting as an intermediary.115

The sakala souls whose mala is immature are caused by Śiva to experience experiences in accordance with their karma.116

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114 _TPV_, p-17.
115 _TPV_, p-17.
116 _TPV_, verse 16, p-17.
The above examination of the natures of the bound souls and the angels made out of these bound souls in the TP leaves the impression that both of these entities are ambiguous and/or contradictory in nature. This ambiguity remains despite Aghora's best efforts. The reason is, in my view, that these beings, like the sakti of Siva which impells and informs them, mark out the interface between the duals of this system, the cit (sentient) and acit (insentient); abheda (being) and bheda (becoming). But the important thing to be kept in mind is the following: If in a pure monism the thing that is difficult to explain is that the unity which is abheda seems to not purely be so, in spite of the systems premises, then the difficult thing to explain in this Saiva Darśana dualism is that the two things which are bheda (cit and acit) seem to not purely be so, in spite of the systems premises. In an important sense vivartavāda in Saṅkara's Vedānta, for example, can be understood as an attempt to ease the cognitive dissonance of a pure monism in the same way as the doctrine of angels and sakti can be understood as an attempt to ease the cognitive dissonance of a pure dualism. The angels then, as mediators between the duals will understandably be of ambiguous natures. Sometimes they will seem to be purely cit as when they are classified in the patipadartha. At other times they will
be sunk right into matter as when the pralayākalas have bodies (puryastika) made up of the 30 impure tattvas. They will be characterized as vijñānakevelas with mature mala who are yet not released souls and who are made vidyēśvaras because their mala is not quite completely matured! All of this becomes something other than nonsense only if one sees here a move towards philosophical metaxy which means in this context, the desire to situate oneself between philosophical extremes in order to be able to make sense of more of human experience than affirming one philosophical extreme would allow.

We now turn to an examination of the kinds of bonds of this system.

Bhoja says there are four kinds of bonds: mala, karma, māyā and tirodhāyika.117 The latter is also called tirodhāna, tirobhāva and rodhasakti. Immediately in his commentary, Aghora deals with the objection that previously he had stated that there were only four bonds.118 He answers that the fifth bond, bindu (śivatattvā, the material cause of the pure creation), is a bond only for the beings that dwell in the pure creation such as the vidyēśvaras, whereas the verse listing the bonds here is concerned only with the impure creation. The former are striving for the higher moksa.

117 TP,17,P-18.
118 Cf. TPV, verse 5 and comm.
the latter for the lower. With respect to the lower mokṣa, bindu is not a bond.\textsuperscript{119}

Aghora notes that the souls connection with mala and karma has been from all time whereas the connection with māyā is adventitious, for example, in the case of the pralayākalas who are bound by the former two bonds but not by the latter.\textsuperscript{120}

The explanation of mala which follows adds nothing that is new to what we learned above from the TTN\textsuperscript{121} The only difference is that here the analogy is that of the husk which covers the grain.\textsuperscript{122}

Karma is said to be a beginningless series of good and evil deeds.\textsuperscript{123} It is not one like mala, but is variegated and many depending on the individual concerned. Its manyness is proven by the difference of fates that individuals suffer at its hand. In the commentary to the previous verse the point had been made that mala and not karma is the cause of the ātman's connection with a body, just as the rice seed is the cause of the arising of the rice.\textsuperscript{124} This affirmation

\textsuperscript{119} TPV, p-18.
\textsuperscript{120} TPV, p-19.
\textsuperscript{121} TTN and above Ch.1, p-
\textsuperscript{122} TPV,18 and comm., p-19.
\textsuperscript{123} TPV, 19, p-20.
\textsuperscript{124} TPV, p-20.
was made in the context of affirming that just as mercury removes the blackness that veils the copper pot underneath, or just as the maturation of chaff causes it to fall away and reveal the rice beneath, so dīksā removes mala from the soul. In all of this it is hard to see the difference between karma and mala. It seems as if the postulation of pati (Śiva) and the postulation of mala go hand in hand. Where, typically in other systems, moksa is achieved by the saint himself achieving equilibrium of karma, or experiencing the exhaustion of karma, here this would not be enough. For mala would still remain in such a saint. And nothing the saint can do can get rid of this mala. The action has to come from the side of the other, Śiva. The doctrine of the irremoveability of mala can be seen as a kind of make-work project for Śiva. If there were no mala, Śiva would be redundant since the sādhaka (aspirant) could manage everything else on his own.125

Māyā, the third bond, is real, unlike in the case of the Vedāntins where it is unreal.126 Māyā is the material cause of the whole impure creation. This includes the objective worlds common to all souls, the subtle bodies of the souls but uncommon in the sense of not being public, and bodies born from worlds which are

125 Cf. above, Ch 1, p-25.
126 TPV, p-28.
common and uncommon at the same time. The proof of the existence of maya is that without a material cause no effect can arise. Maya is proven to be eternal because it is the supreme cause for if such were not the case infinite regression would result. From the eternality of maya follows its oneness for an inert thing must either be one and eternal or many and caused.

Aghora contends that the proof of bindu the material cause of the pure creation is arrived at in the same way as that of the impure creation.

The fourth bond, tirodhana, is a bond only metaphorically whereas the three described thus far are bonds actually according to Aghora. Thus verse 20 reads:

Because it is grace for the bonds the power of Siva which obscures the souls is called a bond. Such are the four bonds.

Aghora simply states in his commentary that tirodhanaasakti operates in both the pure and impure domains whereas the other three kinds of bonds operate only in the impure domain. Srikumara notes that without the impulsion of the tirodhanaasakti the other three bonds which are sentient would be unable to carry out their functions. Though there is nothing in

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127 TPV, p-20.
128 TPV, p-21.
129 TPV, p-21.
130 TPD, p-56.
Bhoja's verse to suggest that tirodhāna is a bond in a metaphorical sense only, the fact that Aghora insists on this point is a warning that he sees here the possibility of pollution of Siva. There is no superintending deity like Ananta to deflect the too direct contact between the pure and the impure, even if it is only a sakti of Siva and not Siva himself involved. Srikumara has no such problem because he admits the consubstantiality of cit and acit. That cit (the tirodhānaśakti) of Siva should be necessary to enliven or perk acit (the other three insentient bonds) holds no threat of pollution for him since cit and acit are equally of Siva. Inspite of all this, or possibly because of this blatant contact between cit and acit in Bhoja's verse, Aghora, after having magically made contact possible between cit and acit even if it is only metaphorical contact, then feels secure in affirming that whereas the first three bonds operate only in the impure creation the last operates in both creations. Thus there is the accomplishment of a kind of 'monism of events' in this ontologically pluralistic
This is the manner in which Aghora, like any decent philosopher, can keep his cake and eat it too.

With verse 21 Bhoja, having completed the section of his treatise on the three पदार्थास, now turns to the enumeration and description of the 36 tattvas, which for him are a more detailed elaboration of the same three पदार्थास. This is the way Srikumara understands the book. It seems to me the most natural way. But Aghora sees everything differently. For him the first five tattvas listed in verse 21 are not called 'pure' because they are the very nature of Śiva himself, but because the first of these five, the

131 Als Shaiva-Siddhanta, das heisst etwa 'endgültiges Lehrrsystem der Shivaiten', bezeichnet sich ein system, welches im Gegensatz zu der 'Wiedererkennungslehr (Pratyabhijña)' die ewige Existenz von drei verschiedenen Substanzen (Gott, Seele, Ungeistiges) annimmt, gleichwohl aber ein 'Shivadvaita' lehrt, weil durch Shiva die Alleinheit alles Seienden in der form eines Monismus des Geschehens hergestellt wird. Helmut von Glasenapp in Die Philosophie der Inder, p-285. With respect to Saiva Dāśana it would not be right to say, as does Glasenapp, that there are three eternal substances, for there are only two, cit and acit. And though his comment is made with respect to the post Meykandar Śaiva-Siddhānta of the Tamil south, it does apply to Śaiva Dāśana. This not insofar as Sadyojyotī of Aghora would subscribe to some kind of Siva-advaita but in so far as Śiva's śakti is made to operate directly or indirectly in both the pure and impure realms and is made to preponderate over the ontological dualism of the system where it suits the dualists to have it do so. As such there is a 'monism of events' or 'conative seamlessness'.

132 Srikumāra begins a second chapter at verse 21.

133 This is the case for Srikumāra: atrādyam pañcakam 'sivasvarūpatvācchuddham... TPD, p-58.
śivatattva, serves as the material cause of the other four. This pure material cause and its four effects conjointly comprise the material creation just as māyā and its 29 effects comprise the impure creation.

There is no need to go into a detailed exposition of the 36 tattvas. I will only pick out points as they occur in the TP which are important to the study of the philosophy of God.

In general it can be said that Aghora has the most trouble toward the beginning of the enumeration of the tattvas and then has less and less trouble as he moves downward. The explanation for this is that the monistic emanationism which the verse clearly espouses teaches a progressive thickening or loss of luminescence as one moves downward from the śivatattva to the final prithivītattva (earth-tattva, the most solid, thickened, opaque and recalcitrant). Thus as one goes downward one gradually begins to get characterizations of the tattvas that better jibe with the way in which Aghora wants to think of all tattvas, namely, that they are inert matter. Conversely, more and more acrobatics are demanded of Aghora as he moves upward since it is with the first few tattvas especially that one encounters clear statements of their possessing consciousness.

134 Cf. comm. to TPV,21,p-22.
which according to Aghora's premises they cannot possibly possess.

The verse describing the first tattva, the sivatattva, describes it as:

Omnipresent, one (unique) eternal, cause of all the tattvas, having the nature of knowledge and action, such is the sivatattva.\textsuperscript{135/25}.

For Aghora the sivatattva is not omnipresent since it is only pervasive of the pure creation or the first five tattvas. He defends this position in his commentary when glossing the words kāranamkhilasya tattvājaṭasya (lit. cause of the arising of all of the tattvas). He says that the sivatattva is the cause in the sense of being the material cause of the pure creation and not of the impure creation which has its material cause in māyā.\textsuperscript{136} Yet in order to make sense of the word vyāpakam (omnipervasive) he says that the sivatattva the pure and impure creations because both creations have similar natures in being comprised of parts, being obstructive, having naturally evolving natures, etc.\textsuperscript{137} The question then becomes, if these two creations and hence their respective material causes are really so similar, why does Aghora distinguish them? His reasons are obviously based on his unwillingness to

\textsuperscript{135} TP, p.25.

\textsuperscript{136} TPV, p.24.

\textsuperscript{137} TPV, p.25.
allow cit and acit to be consubstantial. This unwillingness does not fit well with the text upon which he is commenting so he has to say contradictory things and hope no one notices.

Similarly, the words jñānākriyāsvabhavam are not understood to mean that the sivatattva is sentient and animate. Rather they refer to the fact that the sivatattva is the field of action in which the powers of knowing and doing of the beings that dwell therein are manifested. Bindu (i.e. the sivatattva) is fit to be called a bodhaka (cause of enlightenment) because it is the abode of the lower type of liberation. Māyā and the impure creation that springs from it are called mohika (cause of delusion) because, though in this domain the powers of knowing and doing of the inhabitants are somewhat manifested, since it also causes the seeing of the self in the not self it is the cause of delusion.¹³⁸ Aghora also sees the possibility of reading an ap privative so that the meaning would be that the sivatattva is not of the nature of knowing and doing (jñānākriyā- asvabhavam). He also offers the reading according to which jñānākriyāsvabhavam is analysed as jñānākriyākhyam svam dhanam ātmanām bhavayati, abhivyakattita (the sivatattva) makes manifest the wealth of the souls, which is known as the powers of knowing

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¹³⁸ TPV, p-25.
and doing. None of these attempts to explain ānātāsrayavabhāvam are convincing.

Aghora never admits that matter and spirit can be consubstantial. He cannot allow that the sentient slowly evolves into the insentient. Thus he can never admit that the scale of tattvas is an evolutionary continuum from spirit to matter which is precisely the way that Śrīkumāra understands them. For Aghora there is a rigid identification of insentient and mutability on the one hand, and sentience and immutability on the other. It is for this reason that what is sentient can never be the material cause for to say 'material cause' is to say 'insentient' and to say that the sentient is the material cause is to say that the sentient is the insentient which is absurd. Aghora quotes the Parākhyā Agama as declaring that the material cause is bindu and that elsewhere bindu is called kundalini and is described as being an insentient, pure sakti of Śiva. But this bindu/kundalini is only a sakti by adoption (parigrahaśakti) which means that it is in neither a relation of identity (tadātmya) nor inherence (samavaya) with Śiva. Aghora says the verse in question (§25) must refer to bindu and not to either Śiva or sakti because in a book on the tattvas there cannot occur description of what is beyond the tattvas. If there is admission

139 TV, p-26.
that \textit{Siva and sakti} are being described as the material cause of the pure creation in the verse describing the \textit{sivatattva}, since this would be attributing mutability to them it would also be attributing insentienty to them which is absurd.\footnote{TPV, p-26.}

\textit{Just as Aghora rigorously identifies insentienty and mutability, so he identifies vivartavāda and the philosophy of the pure illusionism of the world. He rejects this theory because it goes against the conclusions of all the valid means of knowledge, that the world is real.\footnote{He quotes an unidentified source: citovivarta evoktastathatve karyasunyata. sarvapramanamsamsiddham cidvivartam katham jagat?} In addition, scripture declares that the material cause in question here is a sakti (albeit by adoption) of Siva and is thus not illusory.

An additional proof brought forward to show that Siva cannot be the referent of verse 25 is that, according to Ramakantha in the \textit{Nādakārikā} (#17ff.), it is necessary to find a material cause for nāda (the essence of inner speech) which is different from both the self and the self's powers.\footnote{Aghora writes: sabdabrahmavādipaksenāpi ātmanā eva nādādi kramena bahudvasthānam yuyjata... (and then he quotes Nādakārikā 17): avikāryatrātmokes taccaktiś cāpyato na yogavau tāu bahudha sthātum yadvā caitanyavinākrtau vitkāritvāt// (note that this verse is the same as TS 44,45). Pm. Sivaraman has translated the above verse in \textit{The Word as Category of Revelation} as}
sequential belongs to the realm of manyness and cannot have as its material cause that which is one and non-sequential (ie. Siva or sakti). If the self or its sakti were considered as the material cause of nāda they would be insentient. Nor can the material cause of nāda be māyā because eventhough nāda is insentient, because of its purity it is beyond māyā\textsuperscript{143} and the Āgamas themselves distinguish the pure from the impure domain. The conclusion is that there must be a pure material cause for nāda and this is mahāmāyā (bindu/kundalinī/sīvatattva).\textsuperscript{144}

Bhoja plainly understands the evolution of the first five tattvas to be a kind of awakening (unmesha)\textsuperscript{145} of a Supreme Being which issues out into creation. The positing of this Supreme Being is done in the sīvatattva, its first stirring in the saktitattva and the subsequent development in the sadāśiva,Īśvara and vidyātattvas is explained as being the result, respectively of the equilibrium of, then preponderance of kriyā and jñāna saktis. The other well-known saktis, follows: "(The experient agent) is of the essence of changelessness. So is his power. Wherefore neither is fit to be united with the feature of being or becoming manifold. Otherwise, being subject to change it will forfeit its (character as) consciousness."

\textsuperscript{143} Cf. Nādaśīkā,18.

\textsuperscript{144} Nādaśīkā,22 and TP, p-27.

\textsuperscript{145} Cf. TP,27.
the īccha-sakti is associated with the saktitattva, that is, with the desire to create. Aghora's device for accounting for the occurrence of words attributing sentiency to these five tattvas is to say that the beings inhabiting those tattvas are referred to and not the tattvas themselves or to say that the fact that the insentient tattva acts as a support for the sentient activity results in its being called sentient. In all of this Aghora comes across as a thinker who prefers clarity, division, heterogeneity and externalism, i.e., individual things in some kind of external relationship rather than ambiguity, unclarity, homogeneity and internalism, i.e., one thing somehow being what everything essentially is.

We have noted that Aghora does not include either pati or pāsus in the scale of tattvas since both

146 Cf. TP, 26.

147 sīsrksor. Cf. TP, 27. The same meaning and similar language occurs in Parāprāveśika (of Ksemaraja), p-6: asya jagat srastumīccham...

148 As we have seen above p-269 and this will occur again at verse 30. The same technique is used repeatedly by Srikantha in his BSBhasya to explain how the various Vedic references to Hiranyagarbha, Surya in the Gayatrīmantra, etc. can all be referring to Śiva. Thus Śiva is in the sun, or is the inner controller of Hiranyagarbha, etc. Cf. pp-65, 71, 78, 165, 170, etc. of the translation. Rāmānuja uses the same technique all the time in his Śribhāṣya.

149 acētanasya cetanādhistānāṃ vinā kāryautpādanāvyogāt. Cf. Aghora's comm. comm to TP, 26, p-27. This is one of Aghora's constant refrains.
a sentient and all of the tattvas are insentient. Though Bhoja's text clearly includes pati (Śiva) in the scale of tattvas (inspite of Aghora's attempt to explain this away) it is questionable whether he includes pāsu as a tattva. Purusa, pums, pudgala, pāsu or some such epithet should occur in either verse 22 or 23 after the listing of the five kāṇchukas or just before the mentioning of avyakta. In fact pums (human being) is mentioned in verse 22 but is not stated that it is a tattva. All that is said is that the five kāṇchukas are evolved from māyā for the purpose of effecting the knowership and doership of the pums, the bound soul. Aghora seems to suspect the Bhoja meant to include the pums in the list of tattvās for he comments that "He says there is a tattva called purusa because this soul, linked to the five kāṇchukas, is an experiencer since it is in contact with the impurity of being a bound soul." 150 In any case Bhoja does mention a purusatattva in verse 49. 151 But there again Aghora denies that it is to really be considered a tattva. 152

In verse 24 Bhoja explicitly denied that there is any difference between prakṛti and the three gunās and he lists the evolutes of pradhāna (prakṛti) as

150 TPV, p-26.
151 TP, 49, p-42.
152 TPV, p-49.
being 23 in number. Thus he clearly denies that the three gunas constitute a separate tattva. Yet at verse 51 and 52 he explicitly mentions a guna tattva which functions there in every way like a separate tattva, i.e., it evolves from the tattva that precedes it (prakrti) and evolves into the tattva that succeeds it (buddhitattva). 153 So it is difficult to say how many tattvas Bhoja accepted. If he rejected both purusa and the gunas as separate tattvas the number would be 35. If he accepted either or both of them the number would be either 36 or 37.

Later Saivism normally accepts 36 tattvas. Aghora, having begun with a deficit of two due to his refusal to include Siva and the purusas/pasus makes up the deficit by renaming and reinterpreting the sivatattva (it becomes bindutattva) and by splitting the prakrititattva in two to yield the prakrti and guna tattvas and the total of 36. Aghora says that Bhoja's denial that there is any difference between prakrti and guna tattvas is due to the fact that they are in a relation of cause and effect and can therefore be said to be non-different. That they are in a relation of cause and effect is proven by the fact that the gunas, being insentient and multiple, are effects which

153 TP p-43,44.
therefore imply a cause. The assumption is here, once more, that what is inert must either be one and eternal or many and non-eternal which latter is the same as being caused. The cause of the gunas is prakriti.

We have seen that there is some unclarity concerning the number of tattvas accepted by Bhoja and that there was no unanimity with respect to the number of sadārthas in Saivism. Verses 31 and 32 add to the impression of fluidity of doctrine. Verse 31 reads:

The nāda and bindu in gross form (sakala) are included in the sadāsivatattva, the vidyeśvaras in the śavaratattva and the mantras and vidyās in the vidyātattva. /31.

Sṛkumāra comments that this verse is in answer to the question that in other texts, besides the five pure tattvas which Bhoja has mentioned to this point, there is mention of two other tattvas, the bindu and nāda tattvas. Now are these two tattvas to be included in one or another of those already mentioned or are they separate tattvas? Sṛkumāra reads sakalau for sakala and takes it to be an adjective of nāda and bindu and explains that nāda and bindu are called sakala because they are possessed of or bearers of time (kalāvātayā). He includes them in the sadāsivatattva because they are never separate, that is, are always with (sadā, sarvadā) sivalkhyam (sivatattva). He also mentions that the latter

154 TPV, p-24.
half of the verse is to refute others who wrongly include the mantras, vidyās and vidyēśvaras in the sadāśivatattva.\footnote{TPD, P-68.}

Aghora, as we have seen includes bindu and nāda as different names for śiva and śakti tattvās respectively. But this verse plainly says that they belong to the sadāśivatattva. Aghora's solution is to multiply entities, so that there are not only a pure or supreme nāda and bindu, but also a gross form of both. Aghora reads sākala as differentiating the bindu and nāda that belong to the sadāśivatattva from the bindu and nāda that constitute the śiva- and śakti tattvas respectively.\footnote{TPV, P-31.}

It could well be that Bhoja felt the need to say something in his text about bindu and nāda, topical terms in philosophy of grammar and possibly adopted from there by the Saivās. Aghora adopted them as the names of the pure material cause and its first evolute. They really have no place in the scheme of the 36 tattvas, so Bhoja throws them in where they will do the least harm. He just happen to pick a location where they give Aghora difficulty.

In the Śiva Purāṇa there is inclusion of philosophical schools and viewpoints which have nothing
in common but, like an encyclopædia, it includes them all, and something not very different appears to be happening with the former and the following verses. Bhoja has taken the trouble, unexpected in the case of the monism he espouses with respect to the first five tattvas, to talk about the locations, within those tattvas, of the angels. But in the next verse he affirms that there is really no succession of evolution in the evolution of the first five tattvas since there is no time here. The postulation of succession among these tattvas in all the śāstras is due to the fact that various saktis of Siva are functioning. Siva and sakti, being one and unchanging, are not really participants in the vicissitudes of time and space, therefore neither are the first five tattvas. Then in the following verse an even clearer affirmation of the same point is made. Srikumara, in his commentaries on these two verses, 31 and 32, has no trouble with the ideas expressed since

157 Cf. in the transl. Kashmir Saiva Monism, p-1739ff; Saivasiddhānta Dualism, p-1789ff, and p-1926ff.; Pāṣupatasāstra, p-1731ff., etc. The Saiva Upanisads that I have seen in the 1950 Adyara Library edition present a diversity of viewpoints too, though there seems to be a preponderance of advaita influence. One constantly encounters the pati, pāśu, pāsa terminology familiar from Aghora but there are also constant pronouncements of the identity of the self and the Absolute (pp-35, 52, 139, 152, 155), the illusoriness of the world and the theory of superimposition (äropavāda) (pp-51, 53, 137, 152). The Siva Samhita published as $15 of the Sacred Books of the Hindus is thoroughly monistic and contains no cataloguing of diverse views.
for him the first five tattvas are really only the manifestation of the same reality. He is careful to note that differentiation does not really even belong to \textit{sakti} but rather to the adjuncts (upādhiś) with which \textit{sakti} is involved.\footnote{TPD,p-70}

Aghora cannot accept the natural meaning of the verses. He considers verse 32 to be interpolated since it contradicts scripture which definitely speaks of a succession in creation, dissolution, etc., and which teaches the real existence of the various domains of the pure creation and of the beings who live in them. Finally, he contends that there is a pure time which exists in the pure creation and accounts for the existence of succession there.\footnote{TPV,p-31}

In commenting on verse 33 Aghora is careful to make the upādhiś (adjunctive conditions) the ultimate cause for differentiation. The \textit{sakti} of Siva is thus not self-differentiating but owes its metaphorical differentiation to the external conditions with which it deals. Thus \textit{sakti} only metaphorically takes the form of sadāśiva, etc. \textit{Siva} and \textit{sakti} are said to have various forms in order to facilitate meditation. But in the case of the material cause, bindu and its evolutes, transformation and the worlds resulting from that...
transformation are both real. Thus Aghorasiya appears to have distinguished a sadāsivatattva, the third evolute of bindu and a sadāsiva a form of Siva for the purposes of meditation.160

Aghora accounts for the statement in verse 33 that the sivatattva is one and possesses many powers by saying that tattva does not mean the sivatattva but refers to the fact that Siva is, in reality (paramārthatah) the only (ekam) thing in existence (tattvam) which is the superintender of the world.161 This is a very unnatural way to read the verse. Though the verse gives trouble to Aghora it fits well with the bhedābheda doctrine generally espoused by Bhoja.

In verse 34-37 there is a digression. These verses intend to show that the whole of creation is for the good of beings, sentient and insentient. Siva gives his grace in bestowing both liberation and worldly experience (bhoga). An objector says at one point that it makes sense that Siva bestow his grace in the form of moksa but not in the form of bhoga which consists in not only happy, but also painful experiences. The last can hardly be considered as grace. The answer is that there is no other way of removing karma than to experience it. Insofar as Siva supplies the conditions for the

160 TPV, p-32.
161 TPV, p-32.
experiencing of karma and thus makes moksa possible, bhoga is grace.162

A couple of other points are made in this digression which are relevant to this study. Moksa is said to be the attainment of the state of sivasamānatārūpa or sivasāmyarūpa which is said, by Aghora, to consist in being able to know and do all things through the removal of bonds. There is no talk of identity.163 This is in such contrast with the gloss of Srikumara on the same point. Moksa is for him, absorption into the divine essence (sāyujya). It is said to be the state of one whose own nature is indistinguishable or identical with Siva's and possesses discriminative wisdom.164

Finally for this digression, the point is made that without an agent (kartr), means (karana) and material cause (upādana) no effect (kāryam) can be produced. For Aghora, the identity of the kartr depends upon which creation, the pure or the impure, one is referring to. He understands the reference here to be to the impure creation so that Siva is kartr (via Ananta,

162 TPV, p-33.
163 TPV, p-34.
164 sivena samānatā nirviśeṣatā vivekatā rūpam svarūpam yasya sa sivasamānatārūpaḥ, sāyujyelaksanah iti yāvat. TPD, p-64.
etc.), sakti is the karana (instrumental cause), and māyā is the upādānakarana (material cause). 165

With the second half of verse 38 the description of the tattvas is resumed and continued until verse 62 where it is completed. The following points are of interest.

At verse 39 it is said that karma belongs to buddhi not to ātman. The reason given is that the ātman, being sentient, cannot change which is what is involved in the acquisition of karma. 166 We note here a reiteration of the impossibility, according to Aghora, of any intercourse between cit and acit. But here there is no real solution becomes what the relationship is between buddhi and ātman is not clear. If there is no real relationship bondage is unintelligible, if there is relationship the ātman is insentient since it mutates.

At verse 41 167 Aghora affirms satkāryavāda, the causal theory according to which the effect exists subtely in the cause prior to its actually appearing. Thus all effects continue to exist even during mahāpralaya in the subtle form of māyā's sakti. It should be made clear that this causal theory only holds with respect to the acit domains. There is no such

165 TPV, p-35.
166 TPV, p-36.
167 TP, p-47.
application of the theory to the sentient domain's (Siva and the pasus) since change of any kind is impossible there. The idea of superintending (adhisthāna) of the insentient by the sentient replaces the idea of causality where the concern is to relate the sentient and the insentient domains.

At verse 46 there is establishment of the necessity of the (asuddha) vidyātattva. It is said that though kalā and the other tattvās have begun the process of rolling back the veiling power of mala from the soul, and though the soul is by nature luminous, nevertheless an instrument is necessary which allows the power of knowledge of the soul to seize the object.168 When an objector notes that the vidyātattva would appear to be redundant since the buddhitattva already serves the said purpose, the reply is that buddhi, etc., are externally related to the soul while the vidyātattva is internally related to it.169 The important thing to note in this matter is that the same hierachizing according to internality and externality is used here as was used in speaking about the relationship of the various saktis with Siva. Jñāna and kriyā saktis were said to be in an internal relationship with Siva and the two material

168 TPV, p-40.
169 TPV, p-40.
causes were said to be in an external relationship.\textsuperscript{170} Aghora’s procedure in both cases is to set up a dichotomy and then attenuate it or emphasize it depending on the situation. One of the ways of emphasizing or de-emphasizing the dichotomy is to talk in terms of degrees of proximity between the two poles involved, i.e., in terms of one pole of the relationship being internal or external to the other. In this way a dualist like Aghora can say yes or no or even yes and no to either unity or plurality without jeopardising his premises anymore than a monist or mono-theist jeopardises his premises when he attempts to account for plurality. Thus there are not just sentient and insentient things for Aghora, for there are things which, though insentient, are internal to the self due to their luminous nature yet they are not thereby constitutive of the self. Such is the \textit{vidyātattva}.

After having listed and explained all of the \textit{tattvas} the following points of interest are made in the last few verses. In verses 64, 65 and 66 a classification of the \textit{tattvas} takes place according to similarity (\textit{sādṛṣvyam}). Similarity is what causes there to be the continuous idea that \textquote{this is a cow}; \textquote{this (too) is a cow}; etc. There is no admission in Saiva philosophy of

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{TPV}, p-5ff. and above p-171.
a universal different from the manifest particular. Two things are somehow alike just by similarity.  

It is in this way that the first five tattvas are similar and classed as a group for they all cause the strengthening of the powers of omniscience and omnipotence of the soul. They are thus similar in being aids to the spirit (cit). Yet they themselves are not sentient.  

The seven tattvas from māyā to purusa (Aghora seems here to admit pumṣṭva as a tattva?) are similar in that they function to somewhat aid the powers of the soul but they are also generators of delusion, pleasure and pain because they relate the soul to the gunas via the subtle body.  

Thus these seven are similar in their functioning to enlighten and to veil.  

The rest of the tattvas from prakṛti down to prthivī are classed together. Their similarity lies in the fact that they all consist of (and engender in the soul) pleasure, pain and delusion. This due to their being connected with the gunas which consist of sattva,  

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171 Cf. TPV, pp-50, 51 and TŚ, p-50

172 TPV, p-51.

173 TPV, p-51.

174 I translate dvividhascidacidanvāyāh in line P-51, TPV as meaning enlightening and veiling powers of the seven tattvas from māyā to pumṣ because Aghora cannot mean that these tattvas are actually sentient in part.
rajas and tamas, the respective causes of the above three characteristics.  

In verses 67 and 68 Bhoja clearly endorses the principle that at mahapralaya (dissolution) the whole of the insentient is reabsorbed back into the supreme sentient principle (Siva). Again Aghora rejects this natural reading of the verses (which natural reading is accepted by Srikumara) and reinterprets them so that there is no relation of inherence between cit and acit. Aghora has done this consistently throughout the book. 

Verse 69 states one of the defining characteristics of the philosophy of this system. At dissolution three entities remain. These are the three padārthas: Pati, Paśu and Paśa. These, as has been explained above are categories something like labelled bags which contain similar kinds of things. In no case do the padārthas melt down at dissolution into a homogeneous mass. The first two padārthas are populated in the same way whether the universe is manifest or not. Even in the cases of the material causes, māyā and bindu, where the concept of individual insentient things melting down into one mass would seem to make the most

175 TP 65 and comm. p-52.  
176 TPV, pp. -52, 53, 54. 
177 P-54ff.
sense, the individual things are still conceived as being there, only subtly in the forms of the Saktis of māyā and bindu.

In his commentary on this verse Aghora speaks of three degrees of dissolution, the first being up to the trailokya, the second as far as the gunatattva and the last complete dissolution of all the tattvas (mahāpralaya). It is the latter that this verse refers to. In his explanation of what kinds of things belong in each of the padārthas that survive mahāpralaya Aghora simplifies things and says that bound souls belong in the purusapadārtha and released ones in the patipadārtha while the two material causes belong in the pasapadārtha. The latter is clear but we have seen repeatedly that the other two categories are not as cut and dried as they are made to appear here (and this of necessity).

The verse under consideration should give Śrīkumāra more trouble than is the case. For him the three padārthas are names given to the various degrees of 'thickening' of the same substance. The 36 tattvas are detailed descriptions of the same process under 36 headings rather than three. The doubt he sees verse 69 answering is this: If there is destruction of everything (sakalasaya) at dissolution how can recreation ever arise

178 TPV, P-54.
again? The authors state that when both the pure and impure tattvas are dissolved the three causes of creation, māyā, purusa, and Śiva remain. He makes no mention here of the idea that purusa and māyā exist subtly during dissolution, although this may be implied. Even so, if māyā, for example, continues to exist in subtle form even during mahāpralaya, then so would all of the other tattvas so there would be no sense in mentioning only māyā. Further there is flat contradiction in saying that kālatattva, etc., are dissolved into māya but that māya continues to exist at mahāpralaya. For we know that according to Sṛktumāra māyā and purusa are two degrees of 'thickening' of Śiva himself and that at mahāpralaya, when everything melts down or 'thins out' it makes no sense to say that māyā and purusa remain intact. In mahāpralaya there can be no degrees of 'thinning out' as there were of 'thickening' during the manifestation of the world. The whole idea of mahāpralaya is that the many melt down to the one not the three. To say that there is a melt down that stops at three and not at one is to say that the melt down is incomplete which means it cannot have been mahāpralaya but some lesser dissolution.

Verses 70 and 71 establish that Śiva brings about dissolution out of compassion for the suffering. 

179 TPD, p-137.
souls, to give them rest and to mature their *karma*. It is
noteworthy that in both cases where there is talk about
something maturing it is *karma* and not *mala* which is
mentioned. There seems to have been little distinction
in Bhoja's mind between *karma* and *mala*. Aghora carefully
makes the equation that we have seen before between
the maturation of *karma* and the maturation of *mala* in
his commentary to verse 72. But he still leaves us with
the same difficulty as before. Either *karma* or *mala*
appears redundant. The further point is made in these
verses, that Śiva matures *karma* even during *mahāpralaya*.
This is a significant revision of the ordinary idea in
Indian thought, according to which only acts of the
individual concerned can produce or exhaust *karma*. There
is here intervention in the *karma*-affairs of the
individual on the part of Śiva, and that out of
compassion. Also, in his commentary Aghora insists that
dissolution is not only intended for the rest of *souls*,
but by implication, for the rest of the material cause
(*māyā*) too. He says that the powers of the material
cause are diminished after creating bodies for the
souls, etc., incessantly. This is a curiously vivid
conception of the material cause. It gets tired and is

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180 Above p-192.
181 TPV, p-56.
replenished through rest inspite of the fact that it is act.

In his commentary on verse 72 Aghora admits the possibility of Śiva causing the release of souls from mala, etc., after having destroyed all kinds of karma instantaneously. He quotes a verse from the Kirana Āgama which says;

The one by whom there is complete obstruction of the various kinds of karma, even of future karma (done) by the bound souls (whose said complete obstruction is just) like the burning of seeds, that one is the Experience-Giver (Śiva).\textsuperscript{182}

Aghora points out that Śiva destroys mala and karma and thus gives release by dīksā (initiation). This dīksā is the very sakti of Śiva. It is the descent of grace. It can take place through the functioning of a guru or by itself. This seems to be a different scenario than we have seen above concerning dīksā.\textsuperscript{183} There sakala souls all received grace through dīksā only, via a guru. Manthreśvaras, etc. could receive grace directly from Śiva. Here there is the possibility of a sakala soul receiving grace directly from Śiva without the intervention of a guru. In addition to this Aghora says that when there is this spontaneous occurrence of dīksā which results in release (nirvāna) there is destruction even of karma which has begun to bear fruit. Thus

\textsuperscript{182} TPV, p-56.
\textsuperscript{183} Cf. above, p-198.
apparently all forms of karma can be destroyed by dīksā and there is no kind of karma which is finally recalcitrant to the grace of Śiva.

In verse 73 a tattva is defined as that which endures up until the time of mahāpralaya and this distinguishes a tattva from ordinary objects such as jars, human bodies, etc., which endure only for short periods of time and occupy limited space.\(^{184}\) The tattvās are also defined as those things which supply the possibility of experience to bound souls.\(^{185}\) Śrīkumāra notes that there cannot be more than 36 tattvās because there is no possibility of the subsumption of one tattva by another since all perform separate functions, such as prthivītattva (earth) functioning as the basis for jars and buddhitattva of determinate mental effort.\(^{186}\)

**SUMMARY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOD IN THE TTN., TS., AND TP.**

Before moving on to a study of the defence of the philosophy of God which is to follow in the final two chapters of this essay a summary of the above three texts wherein the positive teaching about the nature of God occurs can be made.

\(^{184}\) TPV, p-56.

\(^{185}\) bhoqadāyibhūtānām in verse 73.

\(^{186}\) TPD, p-143.
We have seen in detail in our study thus far that the conception of God in the Ādī Śaiva Darśana is of an eternal, ubiquitous, omniscient, omnipotent and completely free being. There is conceived to be no ultimate difference in essential nature between Śiva and the bound souls. The accidental difference is that Śiva has never and the souls have always been bound by māla. The uniqueness of Śiva lies in this accidental difference and the goal of Ādī Śaiva Darśana is to remove this accidental difference to reveal the essential identity between the souls and Śiva. But this essential identity does not mean monism or numerical unity. The mokṣa scenario is not that of advaita nor is it that of the bhakti. The numerical difference between Śiva and the released souls in mokṣa debars the former and the absolute equality of powers which the souls possess with Śiva debars the latter. There is no indication in our texts that after having achieved mokṣa the souls pray to, praise, are devoted to, or meditate upon Śiva, where as all of these activities are indicated before the attainment of mokṣa. In fact to praise and, by implication, to be beholden to any being is the sign of the absence of release. For to be released is in the final analysis to be independent (svatantryam). To be bossed around by another being is unreleas. Śiva is
unique in that at no time has he been bossed around by any being.

The logic of this situation leads necessarily to a conception of the moksa scenario as a radical democracy (the direct inverse of the social system in which these thinkers lived). Every released soul is equal in power and independence and there is no chairman of the board. Not even God. Each released soul is a monad, an All. Each is an infinity without there being only one infinity. Since there are many Alls, many infinities, God cannot be anything special since there is no superlative actuality which he, alone, could be.

For there is nothing greater than an All. 187

187 The idea of many infinities is irrational as the post-Newtonian discussion contended (i.e., if the universe was infinite there was either no infinite God transcendent to it or the universe was itself God which is the view of pantheism). But this idea of a numerically and substantially independent unit being an All is by no means unique to Saivism. For example Nietzsche's idea of a moment of time is the temporal version of the same conception of an independent unit paradoxically being All. The moment is not simply one member in a succession of moments which succession is more complete than any one of the moments comprising it. In the moment is found eternity. But this eternity is not other-worldly for Nietzsche due to his doctrine of eternal recurrence. Eternity is the massive, cyclical return of the same. Eternity is temporal recurrence. This is why he contends that if ever one wants a moment of joy to stay or to come back again one also wants the return of all woe because All is in that moment, compressed, squashed and tangled together. The moment is compressed eternity. The unit is the squashed All:

"Pain, too, is joy...." says Nietzsche because both are there in the moment. This is the temporal version of the Saiva Dārśana doctrine that a soul is separate yet is All. (Cf. Kaufmann's Nietzsche (Meridian, 10th ed.), p-277)
If one tries to think about what a theistic Śāṅkhyā system might look like it is hard not to strike upon something similar to the Śaiva Darśana. The souls are many in number and mokṣa is the achievement of separation from that which causes bondage (māla for the Śaivas, prakṛti for the Śāṅkhyas). Release is a progressive, rational, step-by-step wissenschaft. Neither Śāṅkhyā nor Śaiva Darśana are 'leap philosophies' in Karl Potter's definition.¹⁸⁸ Both subscribe to satkāryavāda. The tattvas are the same give or take a few. Māyā is one and eternal for the Śaivas as is prakṛti for the Śāṅkhyas. The only significant difference is the postulation of māla and Śiva as God in the Śaiva Darśana. As I have remarked on a couple of occasions, māla and Śiva make each other necessary. If there were no such thing as māla as is the case in the Śāṅkhyya system, Śiva becomes a useless appendage. But if there is such a thing as māla Śāṅkhyā is not a means to final release since Śiva alone can remove it in the final analysis. What use could the Śāṅkhyas have for God when the soul's realization of its separation from prakṛti is release and there is no further bond called māla? But if there is this 'congenital' māla the soul cannot effect its own release and if release be possible

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, p-179.
some other entity like the soul but not exactly like the soul (at least at this point) will be a desideratum. And finally the moksa scenario is identical in both schools. The souls are still many but are now devoid of bondage. And the God of the Saivas, indispensable before moksa of the souls, is now indistinguishable among their multitude.

We have also seen that the positive doctrine of God in the three texts studied has a tendency to begin from duality or from the postulation of more-than-one-thing and then try to explain experience (bhukti and mukti) by relating those things and in relating them to attenuate, to some degree, the separateness of the more-than-one-things. But the difference is attenuated only to the extent required to meet the objections of opponents or to explain experience as fully as is within the power of a dualism to do.\textsuperscript{189} It is in this tendency to attenuate the difference between cit and acit that Saiva Darśana most resembles a bhedabheda school.

We have noted that there is a predictable ambiguity of nature manifest in phenomena at the frontiers between cit and acit. Siva's sakti is many yet one; the mantrasvaras have no mala but have 'residual'...

\textsuperscript{189} I have, to this point, not encountered a doctrine with greater power of explicability and greater coherence, though it seems that there are several other metaphysical systems with comparable power and coherence.
mala; tirobhāvāsakti belongs to the patipadārtha but operates without pollution directly in the māyā sphere, etc. I have suggested that we understand these phenomena at the frontiers as cyphers. I have also suggested that the presence of these cyphers indicates a métaxic character in the philosophy. That is, in the best sense, this philosophy is mugwumpery.

Exactly how one is to classify the theology of Saiva Darśana depends on when one 'photographs' it. Perhaps this is not only true in the case under consideration. If one 'photographs' Saiva Darśana at the 'end of time' it is a dualism for cit and acit will be eternally apart. If one 'photographs' it when the cosmic realities are as they are at the present time (i.e., according to the Saivas, in the Kaliyuga) we have a labyrinthine mixture of cit and acit. That is we have the two as one, when what is wanted is the two separately (the exact inverse is the case for monism).

One final observation of a more speculative nature might be permissible before moving on to a study of the polemics of Saiva Darśana against other schools: The philosophy of God that we have discovered in the three texts studied thus far might well be understood as the result of a primordial Śiva-theism getting re-fitted with some new-fangled ideas (a good dose of Sāṃkhya, and as we shall see in the chapter to come, a
little Nyāya). That is, there was never any question for Sadyojoyoti of giving up Śiva no matter how well or ill he fit his new clothes. Yet times change, and fashions too. Even in India....
CH. IV: SADYOJYOTI'S DEFENCE OF HIS PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

The foregoing chapters have given us a clear conception of Sadyojyoti's philosophy of God. There were in his time, a number of schools which either had a different conception of God or which saw no need at all for the hypothesis. Sadyojyoti devotes space in his writings to a refutation of these opposing schools and it is to an examination of this refutation that we now turn, prefacing our study with some clarificatory remarks on Indian logic.

LOGIC

There were two types of attack on his philosophy of God with which Sadyojyoti had to contend. One type was like the attack of the Vedāntins or the Sāmkhyas where the opposing school proposed to account for the existence of the world, etc., on a different basis than the particular brand of theism which Sadyojyoti espoused. This type of attack and Sadyojyoti's defence against it involved philosophical argument of a cosmological/theological nature. The other type of attack was like central parts of the Buddhist and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā polemic. This involved an attempt to show the
failure of the logical syllogism with which the Śaiva Darśana purported to demonstrate the existence of God.

The above two types of argument against Sadyojyoti's conception of God doubtlessly involve each other, but the distinction is clear enough to be noticeable. The criticism of the Śaivas' logical syllogism is carried out mainly by Dharmakīrti (Buddhist) and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (Mīmāṃsā). This criticism and the Śaiva attempt to defend against it is highly technical. Virtually every sentence refers to the hetu, the sādyya, the paksā, etc. In a couple of instances, technical logical terms are used which do not even appear in the standard dictionaries or in the latest edition of the Nyāyakośa. In trying to understand the criticisms of Dharmakīrti and Kumārila I have found Kuppuswamiśastri's Primer of Indian Logic and John Vattany's Gangesa's Philosophy of God valuable. In order to make the criticisms and defence of the Śaiva's syllogism more intelligible a few words on the Indian syllogism, based largely on the above two sources will not be out of place.

Essentially there is no difference between the Indian and the Western (Aristotelian) syllogisms. There may be more dominant stress on the material aspects of inference in the Indian syllogism and on the formal
aspects in the Western syllogism, but the central conception of inference is identical in both.

At its simplest, both in India and the West, inference is a process of gaining knowledge of the presence of a certain thing in a certain place even though one cannot see that such is the case. To put the same thing less spatially, inference is a process of gaining knowledge of one thing's possession of or relationship with another thing even though one cannot see both things. One gains this knowledge because one knows that both of the things are related to a third thing and must therefore be related to each other. One

1 Cf. Kuppuswamiśastri's A Primer of Indian Logic, p-191. The fact that the Indian syllogism contains, as part of one of its propositions, an example from the Lebenswelt, which debarls pure formalism and which requirement is absent in the Western syllogism is the reason for the contention that the Indian syllogism places greater stress on the material rather than the formal aspects of inference. At one point I was more convinced of this than I am now (cf. my paper Lakṣanalaksanam in Annambhatta's Tarkasahāgra and Dipīka in South Asian Horizons, Vol.1, ed. V.S. Pendakur). It now seems to me that the Lebenswelts from which the example is supposed to come is so broadly defined that the example in many important syllogisms can be the ātman or the perception of a yogin, etc. These examples, even within the Indian context, are not examples from everyday life which support the thesis one is trying to prove. The Carvāka does not accept the former and Kumārilabhaṭṭa does not accept the latter. And certainly to a Westerner these kinds of examples are purely formal and not at all material supports. As such I am more hesitant now to agree with the distinction Kuppuswamiśastri (and Benedetto Croce according to Kuppuswamiśastri, p-218) makes between the Western and Indian views of inference as per the above.
knows this in spite of the fact that one cannot yet confirm it perceptually.

It is important to understand the difference between a term and a proposition (premise, statement, judgement, sentence or conclusion) in a syllogism. A term is a simple; a proposition is a compound comprised of two simples, one simple being predicated of, related to, or belonging in the other in the proposition. A syllogism is, in turn, comprised of a number of propositions: three in the west, five (though this varied) in India.

The basic and quite beautiful idea of the syllogism is to be able to conclude something which one cannot see to be the case in the conclusion, that is, to predicate one term of another in the concluding proposition, on the basis of one's having related both terms of the concluding proposition to a third in the other propositions of the syllogism. The simple idea is that if both terms of the concluding proposition are related to a third term in the other propositions of the syllogism, it follows that they must also be related to each other. And this is what the concluding proposition proposes.

We can now introduce the Western terminology and then the Sanskrit translations.
The Western syllogism contains three terms and three propositions. The three terms are called the major, middle and minor terms. The three propositions are called the major premise, the minor premise and the conclusion.

The major term is the predicate of the conclusion. It can be symbolized as 'P'. The minor term is the subject of the conclusion. It can be symbolized as 'S'. The middle term does not occur in the conclusion, but does occur in both of the other two propositions: once as subject and once as predicate. It can be symbolized as 'M'. The syllogism, at its simplest, can be symbolized as follows:

Major premise: M is P.
Minor premise: S is M.
Conclusion : S is P.

Since both P and S are related to M they are also related to each other. Simply put, two 'extremes' S and P, are both related to a middle thing, M, and thus to each other also.

The standard example in Western books on logic is:

Major term=mortal which is the P(redicate) of the conclusion.
Minor term=Socrates is S(ubject) of the conclusion.
Middle term=man which is MIDDLE, absent in the conclusion.

Thus: Major Premise: All men (M) are mortal (P).

Minor Premise: Socrates (S) is a man (M).

Conclusion : Socrates (S) is mortal (P).

The Sanskrit equivalents of the above are the following: major term: sādhyā; minor term: pākṣa; middle term: hetu (sādhana, linga). The aim of the Indian syllogism is then, the same as the Western, namely to show that two terms (the sādhyā and the pākṣa) can go together in the conclusion on the basis of their both being related, in the other propositions of the syllogism, to a third term, the hetu.

The five propositions of the Indian syllogism along with the stock Indian example are the following:

1) pratijñā (thesis) : The mountain (pākṣa) has fire (sādhyā);

2) hetu (reason) : for the mountain (pākṣa) has smoke (hetu);

3) udāharana (example: like in the hearth, smoke (hetu) and fire (sādhyā) always go together;

4) upanaya (subsumptive correlation): such is the case here;

5) nigama (conclusion: thus it is so, the mountain (pākṣa) has fire (sādhyā).
For the purposes of paralleling the Indian and Western syllogisms it is possible to expand the Western syllogism to five members or reduce the Indian to three.

The former would look like this:

1) **pratijñā** (conclusion): Socrates (pāksa) is mortal (sādhyā);

2) **hetu** (minor premise): for Socrates (pāksa) is a man (hetu);

3) **udāharana** (major premise): and all men (hetu) are mortal (sādhyā) like Devadatta;

4) **upanaya** (subsumptive correlation): such is the case here;

5) **nigama** (conclusion): thus it is so, Socrates (pāksa) is mortal (sādhyā).

The latter would look like this:

1) **major premise** (**udāharana/upanaya**): All smoke (M) means fire (P).

2) **minor premise** (**hetu**): The mountain (S) has smoke (M).

3) **conclusion** (**pratijñā/nigama**): Thus the mountain (S) has fire (P).

It is to be noted that the term **hetu** is ambiguous. It translates two different concepts in the Western syllogism: the 'middle term' and 'minor premise'. In practice, however, there is never any confusion since whenever the **hetu** is mentioned, except when the actual structure of the syllogism is being
examined in a text on logic, it is used in the sense of 'minor premise'. This means that it is used in the sense of a proposition predicating a predicate to a subject and not in the sense of a simple (i.e., a term). Technically the word hetu virtually always means a proposition proposing universal concomitance (vyāpti) of two simples (the sādhyā, for eg., fire, and the hetu, for eg. smoke).

With the above in mind we can now turn to the syllogism with which the Saiva Darśana, including Sadyojyoti and his commentators attempt to establish the existence of God.

THE SAIVA DARŚANA ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The Saiva argument, which is virtually identical to the Nyāya argument for the existence of God, and which, in Western terms combines elements of the

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2 For example Tarkasangraha 33,ff. or Kuppuswamisastri p-194ff.

3 For a summary of Nyāya theism see John Vattankya's Gangesa's Philosophy of God, pp-3-33.
cosmological argument and the argument from design\(^4\), is

\(^4\) According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. P. Edwards): "The Cosmological Argument" is the name given to a group of interrelated arguments that claim to prove the existence of God from premises asserting some highly general fact about the world, such as that it exists contingently. It does not attempt (as the Ontological Argument does) to derive the existence of God from an analysis of his 'essential nature alone, nor does it argue from particular manifestation of orderliness or apparent design in the world's structure to a divine designer. [This last point I will call into question momentarily]. It is enough that there is a world--a world of conditioned objects and events. To explore their conditions is to be led towards something unconditioned; to be aware of the regress of causes behind any given event is to become aware that there must be a First Cause of all; To realize the contingency of the things of this world is to be compelled to acknowledge a being whose existence is uniquely necessary. This unconditioned necessary source of the world's being is to be identified with the God of theism."

The above then is the argument from motion in Plato's Laws (BK.X) and Aristotle's Metaphysics (BK XII). It is also the basis for Aquinas' first three proofs (from motion, hierarchy of efficient causes and contingent/necessary being), in Summa Theologica (I,2,3).

I have said that the Saiva proof is a combination of the cosmological and design arguments. If they are really different arguments as the above suggest it would not make sense to say, as I have done, that one argument can combine elements of both. In this connection, the following points have to be considered. First, I doubt that there is a difference between the cosmological argument from motion and the design argument. I can see a difference between the ontological argument on the one hand, and the cosmological and design arguments on the other. But I cannot see the distinction from the argument from motion to a First Mover (which is a cosmological argument according to the Encyclopedia) and the argument from design to a Divine Designer (which is not a cosmological argument according to the Encyclopedia). It seems clear to me that both motion and design are both equally 'general facts about the world' which is the criterion for being a cosmological argument in the above quotation from the Encyclopedia. If this is so it will make good sense to say as I have, that the Saivas combine elements of both the design and
cosmological arguments in their proof.

Second, if one strictly applies the criteria for a cosmological argument in the Encyclopedia quotation, the only argument that is acceptable would be the argument from contingent to necessary being. For it proves the existence of God purely and simply. It does not prove that he is a Mover, a Designer, or has other qualities. (I will not go into the debate raised by Kant concerning whether existence is a predicate, i.e., a quality, in the same way as being a Mover or Designer are qualities). It is this argument, then, which could be distinguished as the cosmological argument and distinguished from the others from motion, design, etc., if one applies the above Encyclopedia criteria. But, as we shall, in the Saiva context, the proof of God's mere existence, devoid of other qualities such as omniscience, etc., is unintelligible. The reason is that, according to the Saivas, the world is not contingent on God for its existence. It is dependent on its material cause for that. But it is dependent on God for its significance in the soteriological scenario and that is what the Saivas care about. Now to be significant in the scenario of release the world must be ordered or designed and it is dependent on God for this in their view. Thus the world depends on God, not for its existence but for its arrangement of parts because for the Saivas to be an effect is to have arrangement of parts and to be a non-effect is to exist in a non-manifested manner. The world does not depend on God to be, but only to be significant. This is what the Saivas mean when they say that the world is an effect implying a cause. This I understand to be their cosmological argument and it is clear that, given the idea that being existent as an effect means having parts arranged in order, an 'existent effect' and 'having ordered arrangement of parts' are equivalent. Thus the design argument is inseparable from the cosmological argument in the Saiva proof of the existence of God.

5 The argument as given below is a composite of information contained in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentaries on NīP, II, 1a and 4a. In my reading of Saiva texts I have only encountered the full five-membered syllogistic statement of the proof (nyāyapryoga) for the existence of God in one place. That is in Utpalagupta's commentary onĪśvarasiddhi, 1. There are some minor differences in the argument as it appears there and as it appears here in my reconstruction. There the hetu is sannīvesavīsesavāt. Here it is karyatvāt which is
1) pratijnā: The world (pāksa) has an intelligent maker (sādhya);

2) hetu: for the world (pāksa) is an effect having ordered arrangement of parts (hetu);

3) udāharana: as with a pot whatever is an effect having ordered arrangement of parts (hetu) is caused by an intelligent maker (sādhya);

4) upanaya: such is the case here;

5) nīgama: therefore, the world (pāksa) has an intelligent maker (sādhya).

As a three membered syllogism the major term is 'God', the minor term is 'the world' and the middle term is 'having parts':

1) major premise: All things which are effects having ordered arrangement of parts (M) have an intelligent maker/God (P).

2) minor premise: The world (S) is an effect with ordered arrangement of parts (M).

3) conclusion: Thus the world (S) has an intelligent maker/God (P).

Equipped with the above as background information, we can now turn to our study of the second

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equivalent to both savayavatvāt and ajuvadvat. There the vipaksa (the counter example where the hetu is known never to occur) is wider, etc. Also the fourth proposition (the upanaya) is present in Utpala's statement of the syllogism (which is absent in Ramakanta's and is frequently omitted in the statement of an inference in Indian philosophical texts anyway).
chapter of the **NIP** which contains the most detailed defence of the 'Saiva Darśana philosophy of God. The second chapter of the **NIP** will be the focus of our study. Additional information will be brought in when needed, from two other sources, the **Moksa Kārikā** of Sadyojyoti and the **MA** along with their respective commentaries.

**THE DEFENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOD IN NIP CH.II**

Ramakantha introduces the first verse of the second chapter (**kānda**) of the **NIP** by dealing with an objection that the topic of the second chapter is made redundant by the chapter which preceded it. The first chapter is called the **Narasiddhi** (establishment of the human being) and the second is called **Īśvarasiddhi** (establishment of God). The objector says that one already has a complete idea of what God is when one has a complete idea of what man is. For God is simply a human soul with the same powers and capacities of the human soul, but without the limitations of the human condition. Thus to know what God is one need only magnify the human soul, just as the sun has the same nature whether its powers are covered over by the clouds and thereby reduced or whether these powers are not covered over and are shining brightly. In the ordinary
soul we have the sun covered over, so to speak. And the objector insists that the human soul is known fully both by inference and by cognizing it within oneself (svasaṃvedanayogyatānumānābhyām). So since God is already known in this way there is no need for a second chapter about God in the NIP.  

Rāmakantha answers that a separate chapter is needed because this investigation will show that the God to be established is the eternal God who is the world cause. And such a God cannot be known by cognizing the ātman within: for this God is a different individual than one's self. Though there is similarity between the human souls and God insofar as God possesses his powers fully and the human souls only partially, one can never, by merely cognizing this, conclude that God is the world cause. He notes that neither God's nature nor the nature of one's own self can be known via the senses of the body, but that even were this not the case, the particular differences between the powers of knowing and doing of God and the individual souls would still not be known. He then quotes two verse from the *Ślokavārtika* (SV) of Kumārilabhaṭṭa which argue the same point.  

Having made his point that a way of knowing God is still wanting Rāmakantha introduces the idea that

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6 NIP,p-113,L-1-6.
7 NIP,p-113,L-7-17.
inference may be the desideratum. He briefly recites the
syllogism proving the existence of God thus:

He (God) can be inferred on the basis of this
reason: the world has the characteristic of being
his own effect, just as in the everyday world, (from
the existence of the) pot, (we infer the existence
of the) potter.\(^8\)

Rāmakanṭha then says that in order to show that
the above is tenable and to refute the idea held by the
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and the materialists (Lokāyatas) that the
world is eternal (i.e., is not an effect and hence wants
no cause), Sadyojyoti writes the first verse of \textit{NIP}
Ch.II:

The earth, etc., because they consist of parts, just
like a pot does, are considered to be effects./1a\(^9\)

What Sadyojyoti begins to do here and will
continue to do with the first three verses is to define
his \textit{hetu} and \textit{sādhyā} in such a way as to meet objections
to either one, which objections, should they stand,
would scuttle the syllogism. This is what I call
‘widening’ the \textit{hetu}, etc.

\(^8\) \textit{NIP}, p-114, L-1, 2.

\(^9\) Cf also Rāmānukṣa's commentary on \textit{MK} 1 and 2 (p-
2, L-10) ‘having parts’ (\textit{svayatvād}) is the \textit{reason} for
the whole world’s being \textit{an} effect. The \textit{MA} does not
preface its proof of the existence of God with a
widening of the \textit{hetu} or the \textit{sādhyā}. It begins
immediately with the inference: "Now considering that
things like the body, etc., have the nature of being
effects, by inference we know the maker of this (body,
etc.) in a specific sense (i.e., as being intelligent,
etc.)." \textit{MA}, III, 1.
For an argument to work it is necessary that the hetu and the sādhyā be co-extensive. Or to put this another way, the hetu should neither under- nor over-pervade the sādhyā. In the context of this argument this means that God is to be established as the cause of the whole world (pāksa) because it is an effect since it has parts (hetu). If there were admitted to be something in the pāksa (world) which is partless and hence not an effect, the hetu would not cover that thing. It would under-pervade the pāksa and the inference would fail. For there would be something in the world which he did not cause (for example an atom, which is partless).

Not infrequently, in order to meet objections, the hetu or the sādhyā of an argument have to be narrowed or widened as the situation demands. And this is where a good deal of the disagreement over the success or failure of an argument comes in. The proponent of the argument will see no problem with his manipulation of the hetu and/or the sādhyā while the opponent will see it as logical gerrymandering. We will see a good deal of this in the pages to come.

In the above verse, then, Sadyojyoti has defined his hetu more closely. He has said that what it means to be an effect is to 'consist of parts'. In the second half of the verse he will again widen his definition of the hetu. There he will say that to be an effect is to
be insentient. His reasons for so widening the hetu is, as we shall see, to meet certain objections.

Rāmakaṇṭha, in his commentary to the first half of the first verse gives a neat, though formally incomplete syllogism establishing that being an effect means having parts:

Wherever there is the state of 'having parts' there is the state of 'being an effect' as in the case of the pot for example. And wherever there is absence of the state of 'having parts' there is absence of the state of 'being an effect' such as in the case of the ātman for example. Now there is the state of 'having parts' for this whole world which is observed to undergo birth (and destruction) and which includes the earth and the mountains right up to the sky. Thus all of this has the state of 'being and effect' and is not eternal (as the materialists and the Mimamsakas have contended).10

Following this Rāmakaṇṭha introduces another hypothetical objector contending that the hetu 'having parts' is not established with respect to some things in

10 NIP,p-114,L-8-12. Aghorasiva, in his Dīpiṅka on MA.Vṛtti,III,1,p-119, gives three inferences proving that the whole world is an effect as follows: 1)All which possesses concrete material form (mūrtam) is an effect. For example dust. Where there is absence of concrete material form there is absence of being an effect, as, for example, in the case of the ātman. Now atoms possess concrete material form. Therefore they are effects. 2)That which has parts (sāvayavam) must be an effect. Like a pot for example. That which has no parts is not an effect, like the ātman. Now the whole world has parts and is thus an effect. 3)All things that are instruments are effects. Like a sword for example. Where the characteristic of being an instrument is absent so is the characteristic of being an effect, as in the ātman. Now the eye and the other sense organs are instruments. Therefore they are effects. (The idea of this last argument is to refute those who contend that the senses of the body are saktis of Siva, which latter is eternal and not an effect).
the world (pākṣa). For atoms and the senses\textsuperscript{11}, etc., are in the world but do not consist of parts. The second half of the first verse answers this objection.

(All things) up to the level of the sentient (i.e., from māyātattva down, which is understood to include mahāmāyā throughout this chapter) have the fore-mentioned quality (have parts) and are insentient because they are many.\textsuperscript{1b.}

Ramakantha in his commentary breaks up the compound ajñataprotadharmanah as a dvāṇāva compound as translated above and then makes the typical dualist's distinction between substance (dharma\textsuperscript{-}occuring in L-1, p-115 as a loc.sg.) and attribute (dharma in L-18-19, p-114). He notes that according to the maxim that 'the red is not the pot' the substance and its attribute are distinct from one another and hence the said quality of being insentient accrues only to the sphere of existence which consists of parts and not to the sphere that does not consist of parts (i.e., the sentient sphere). He then points out that partless entities like the atom and the senses which were not covered by the hetu 'having parts' are so covered by widening the hetu to have it also mean 'being insentient' because of 'being many'. Just as trees, pots, etc., are insentient

\textsuperscript{11} This same objection occurs in Aghora's Dīpikā on ṛṣh

\textsuperscript{1b} This same objection occurs in Aghora's Dīpikā on ṛṣh

\textsuperscript{1b} This same objection occurs in Aghora's Dīpikā on ṛṣh
because many, so the senses and the atoms are many because they are specific to each soul that possesses them. For this reason they are accepted as being effects (i.e., as part of the world (pāksa) of which the sādhyā, God, is to be predicated as the needed cause).  

According to Rāmakṛṣṇa the Buddhists insist that just as a cloth forms a unity though made up of variegated threads, so the world, though insentient, forms a unity. In such an event the hetu 'having parts' need not be equivalent to 'being an effect' and the hetu of the Saivas would then be faulty. (That is, a thing might have parts yet still not be an effect, since the threads do not cause the cloth. Thus the world may have parts but still not stand in need of a cause, God, since it is a self-subsisting unity). This is refuted by making 'being many' (anekatvam) and 'being an effect' (kāryatā) equivalent.  

In the above manner the whole world, whether consisting of parts such as is the case with trees, etc., or not consisting of parts as is the case with atoms, etc., are covered by the hetu 'being an effect'. So the whole world without exception is an effect standing in need of a cause. The materialists and the

\[13\] NIP, p-115, L-5-7.
Mīmāṃsāka's objection that the whole world or some part thereof is eternal is thus defeated.\textsuperscript{14}

Rāmānātha, briefly, in one line, rejects the idea that universals (sāmānyas like cowness in cows) are eternal. He flatly states that they are included in the pāksa (in the world and hence as standing in need of a cause).\textsuperscript{15} We have seen\textsuperscript{16} that the Saivas account for generic qualities on the basis of similarity (sādṛṣṭyam) and not on the basis of, for example, the individual cow's possession of a universal 'cowness'. Within the present context one can see with greater clarity why there is the rejection of universals as eternal separate entities. Were they eternal it would be impossible to include them in the pāksa (in the world) and Siva would then not be the cause of the entire world.

Another objector is brought in saying that Siva is not the cause of the whole world because there are other causes of the world, for example the 'Lords of the Elements'. But Rāmānātha rejects this with a quotation to the effect that the whole world (even that consisting of the elements—bhūtamayam) would collapse if it were

\textsuperscript{14} NIP, p-115, L-7-11.

\textsuperscript{15} NIP, p-115, L-11,12.

\textsuperscript{16} Above in the study of the Ts, Ch.2, p-116 and in fn.171, p-215. See also NIP, p-127, L-4ff.
not supported by an intelligent cause just as the body collapses upon the departure of the ātman. This is refuted by saying that the cosmic dissolution is by no means never observed. For the Saivas this process is established as occurring at the present time. There is deviation in the argument of the opponent since it is plain that at least with respect to a part of his thesis he is incorrect. Trees are a part of the world and these are observed to undergo dissolution. So the birth and death of at least a part of the world is established. So the opponent cannot argue that the whole world has never been different than at the present time. Ramakantha then infers that since the whole of creation is of the same nature, i.e., destructible, at some point universal destruction must take place. He makes the same argument elsewhere in the NIP and the argument also occurs in the MA. The argument thus infers that.

17 NIP, p-117, L-14-17.
19 NIP, p-186, L-3ff.
20 MA, IX, 12. Aghora mentions this verse in his comm. to NAVṛtti, p-119, L-4.
universal dissolution must take place at some point in
time because destruction of various particulars is
taking place constantly (which does not at all follow in
my view). On this basis the whole world is posited as an
effect wanting a cause.

A further objection is that the world must be
accepted as being eternal because its author is not
remembered, just as in the case of the Veda. Rāmakaṇṭha
refutes this by first showing that it contradicts the
Veda itself which says "The one God, creating heaven and
everth..." (RV,3,2,26). In addition, modern works written
by more recent authors, are distinguished, exactly as is
the Veda, by having ordered arrangement. Since these
works have authors such must be the case for the Veda.
Therefore just because the author of the Veda is not
remembered it does not follow that it had none.²¹

Another objector is brought forward who contends
that even something which has ordered arrangement of
parts may be eternal. The objector asks how one might
avoid this doubt. Rāmakaṇṭha answers that it is through
the grasping of the relationship (between 'having
ordered arrangement of parts' and 'being non-eternal').
He quotes a verse which he ascribes to his opponent to
the effect that if someone, due to ignorance, still sees
an obstruction to inference even though the relationship

²¹ NIP, P-116, L-4-9.
(between the sādhya (fire) and the hetu (smoke)) has been understood (jātam, lit. 'has arisen') that person, being a self-doubter, will go to ruin in all of his day to day activities.²²

Ramakantha introduces verse 2 and 3 as follows:
An objector contends that the Saiva thesis that God is the cause of the world is not established because certain Sāmkhyas consider the tattvas like earth, etc., to be eternal.²³ The answer, given in verses 2 and 3 is that Saivism considers all things beginning with the tattvas and ending with the bhuvanas (the various kinds of worlds existing at the levels of various tattvas) to be effects which are incapable of self-generation. It has to be kept in mind here that the Saivas too think prithivi-tattva etc., are eternal but that these are not eternally generated from potentiality into actuality. The being of the tattvas spoken of is thus not their absolute being but their manifest being. So Ramakantha says that the effects are only considered to rest in the material cause of the world. The only disagreement can then be concerning the efficient cause. According to Sadyojyoti, the efficient cause is Śiva. Śiva is established to be so by the inference which is to follow in verse 4.

²³ NIP, p-116, L-16-18.
In his commentary to verses 2 and 3 Rāmakanṭha notes that not only the material cause (māyā and all of the tattvas below it) is to be considered an effect wanting an efficient cause, but the same holds true for the instrumental cause karma.²⁴

The argument establishing the existence of God is given in verse 4:

The body, etc., are effects made by an intelligent unseen maker, just as in the case of the pot.²⁵

Rāmakanṭha's comment on this verse has been quoted previously²⁶ and is the closest thing to a full five-membered syllogistic proof²⁶ of the existence of God that occurs in the NIP. After having stated the argument in fuller form than occurs in the verse, Rāmakanṭha deals with the following objection: The hetu in the argument undercovers the thesis to be proven. The thesis to be proven is that a maker endowed with specific powers of knowing and doing made the world because the world is an effect having ordered arrangement of parts. The hetu is that the form of the effect is such that could only be consummate with having been preceded by an (intelligent and singular) maker. But the Buddhists and Śāṅkhya also admit that the world

²⁴ NIP,p-117,L7-10.
²⁵ Above, fn. 5.
²⁶ According to Kuppuswamiasstri, p-220, this is called a nyāyaprayoga.
is an effect but they do not admit that it is the effect of a maker like the Supreme Lord of the Saivas, i.e., an intelligent and singular God. The Buddhists, for example contend that the world is the result of the karma of individual human beings, and the Śāmkhyas that the primordial matter (prakṛti) itself shapes itself into the world which is fit to serve the purposes of the souls (purusas). But this is all refuted, according to Rāmākṛṣṇa, when Sadyojyoti makes 'being an effect' (the hetu of his argument) equivalent with 'being the material cause' (and a material cause, by definition wants an efficient cause.) Thus the efficient cause can be neither karma nor prakṛti, both of which are included in the definition of the material cause (i.e. they are both insentient and cannot be their own efficient causes).  

Nor is the argument of the Saivas meant to prove the existence of a visible author of the world in the sense that the author of the pot in the example of the inference (udāharana), is visible. It is only an invisible author proof of whose existence is being attempted. Rāmākṛṣṇa says that any objector charging that the 'Saivas' proof of the existence of God is redundant had best understand that what is being proven is not only the existence of an author for that part of

27 NIP, p-118, L-4-7.
the world which has parts in which case authors like the potter, etc., might do, but also an author for that section of the world which does not have parts. For this latter reason the inference proving the existence of an author of partless things in the world is not redundant.28

The second half of verse 4 answers the objection that the syllogism proving the existence of God fails because there is a counter example (vipaksa) in which the absence of the sādhyā is known for certain. To explain, the paksā in an inference is that wherein the presence of the sādhyā is not yet known for certain, about which there is some doubt, or which has yet to be proven. Such is the case in the case of the mountain in the stock Indian example of the syllogism. Sapakṣa is an example where the existence of the sādhyā is known for certain, as fire is known to be existent in the hearth. Vipakṣa is a dissimilar example in which the sādhyā is known for certain not to occur, as in a tank of water fire is known definitely not to occur. Now the dust particle is a counter example, or an instance where the absence of the sādhyā (God's causality) is known definitely to be absent. Thus the syllogism trying to show that he is the cause of all things fails.

The second half of verse four denies the above charge. Ramakantha explains that the dust particle and other supposed counter-examples such as rocks, sand, etc., are included in the pakṣa because an unseen maker may have made them (whereas they certainly would be counter-examples in the case of a visible maker). Technically, if there is doubt about the pakṣa having the sādhyā then this is a proper pakṣa. If there is certainty either that the pakṣa has or does not have the sādhyā then this is not a proper pakṣa for inference. For in the former case inference would be redundant, in the latter impossible. Now since there is doubt about whether or not an unseen maker made the dust particles, etc., they can be legitimately included in the pakṣa. Thus they are not vipakṣa and the objection fails.\textsuperscript{29}

It is to be noted that Ramakantha's definition of vipakṣa is a letter-perfect repetition of the standard Nyāya definition as contained, for example, in Anamabhatta's Tarkasangraha (35c) and the Nyāyakośa.\textsuperscript{30}

In the course of showing why dust particles can legitimately be included in the pakṣa because there is doubt about whether an unseen maker made them, Ramakantha brings in the example of abandoned huts or

\textsuperscript{29} NIP, p-118, L-19-21, p-119, L-1-7.

\textsuperscript{30} 1978 ed., p-764. Rāmakantha adds the expletive vāstavah to his definition at NIP, p-119, L-9, 10.
wells which one might come across. One has never seen anyone making these particular wells or huts. But it is by no means legitimate to conclude from this that they have not had makers which one cannot see (i.e. invisible or absent makers). In technical terms, it is not legitimate to say that an abandoned well, etc., is a counter example (vipaksa) since it may be included in the (paksa) if the śādhyā which one is trying to predicate of that śādhyā is of a certain kind, i.e., is invisible. For it is certainly possible that the abandoned well had a maker whose existence cannot be verified perceptually at the present. Thus in the case of dust particles, sand, rocks, etc., just as in the case of abandoned wells one cannot be certain that they are counter instances. So the dust particles do not cause the failure of the proof of the existence of God.

At this point the objector (the Buddhist, Dharmakīrti) objects to the postulation of an unseen maker when in the case of phenomena like grass, visible causes like water, soil and sunlight can fully explain the grass's existence. Rāmākānta quotes the following two verses from the Pramāṇavārtika:

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31 NIP, p-119, L-12, 13.
32 NIP, p-119, L-10-17.
33 NIP, p-119, L-17-20, p-120, L-1-4.
If one accepts as cause something different than that which, when present, something else comes into existence, then there would be no determination of causes.  

Wound (or healing of Caitra (ie. John Doe) occurs because of his connection (respectively) with a weapon or medicine. A post which does not at all stand in any connection with (him) may also be considered the cause (if God is considered the cause of grass for example).  

As Rāmākānta notes, the upshot of these objections is to try to show that there is a counter-example to the inference of God's existence, in the example of the grass, etc. For God is obviously not needed as an explanation for the existence of this latter.  

Rāmākānta's way of handling this objection is to ask why the grass does not exist (ie. grow) all the time. The Buddhist's answer is to say that this depends on auxiliary conditions (lit. instrumental causes like water). Rāmākānta asks why these latter are absent in certain cases. The answer is because of the unseen effects of karma. Rāmākānta then says that even in the case of grass it is necessary to resort to an invisible cause. So grass is not a counter example.  

Rāmākānta also goes to some length in the commentary on this verse, to establish that unseen causes such as ghosts have to be accepted by everyone, 

34 NIP, P-119, L-18, 19.  
35 NIP, P-120, L-4-8.
including the Mimamsakas who oppose the hypothesis. In this way it is shown that an inference seeking to prove the existence of an unseen cause (this time the ultimate unseen cause) is legitimate. In concluding this discussion he says that karma (the adhrstam of the Buddhists and the Mimamsakas) cannot be the unseen cause because it is insentient and unable to bring about its effects without the superintendence of a sentient efficient cause. 36

Verse five contains an objection. It is the central Buddhist argument against the syllogism which attempts to prove the existence of God. In essence this objection says that it is illegitimate to infer the same kind of cause (i.e. type A) from two different types of effects (i.e. from effects of both type A and B). The Buddhist contends that the Saiva (and Nyaya) inference proving the existence of God does precisely this and is therefore invalid. 37

The Buddhists make a distinction between two types of effects: There are man-made artifacts like pots on the one hand and natural objects like mountains and trees on the other. 38

36 NIP, p-120, L-9-17, p-121, L-1-23.

37 Verse 5 is translated below, p-270

38 Cf. Vattanky, p-36ff., for this and the following information.
The Buddhists contend that the above two kinds of effects are similar in name only. They are both called kāyas (effects). But this is where the similarity ends. Their objection to the Saiva inference of the existence of God is that, based on nothing more than this similarity in name, the Saivas argue that just as a pot is an effect having an intelligent maker so the whole world is an effect having an intelligent maker. But the Saivas fail to see that the 'whole world' is not at all the same kind of effect as the pot. In the case of finding a pot one can legitimately infer that it was made by a potter because one has seen other pots being made by other potters. But one has never seen other Gods making other worlds. So merely on the basis of verbal similarity, that is, on the basis of both the Saivas and the Buddhists agreeing that the pot and the world are namable as kāryams, it is not legitimate to infer that the world as a whole has the same kind of cause as does a pot.

If one were to infer the same maker of two effects which differ in every way except in name, it would be legitimate to infer that the potter also made the anthill since both the pot and the anthill are 'clay formations'. Or it would be legitimate to infer fire upon seeing anything white, such as chalk, since both smoke and chalk are similar in being white.
The technical name for the above fault is kāryasama and Dharmakīrti calls the fault by this name. He defines it as follows: 39

When a sādhyā is established by means of a reason which is accompanied by a (particular) sādhyā (that is, both the inference and the example in the inference will have sādhyas, the former being God, the latter, the potter), because of the differences of the relata (i.e. between God and the potter), if different things are mentioned as reason, this involves the fault of kāryasama. //PV,IV,16.

As we shall see below, this is the same essential fault that Kumārila and Mandanaśīra find with the Saiva inference. 40

The central point of Dharmakīrti's objection is to contend that there is lack of parallelism between the subject of the inference and the subject of the example in the inference. The subject of the example shows us a visible being, the potter, producing an effect, yet this is proposed as part of an inference attempting to prove the existence of something totally different, i.e., an invisible maker. The example shows us an embodied maker producing an effect with a certain kind of arrangement of parts yet it is proposed as a support for a non-

39 Quoted at NIP,p-136,L-16,17. This translation is based on Vattanky, p-34. For further information on kāryasama cf. Nyāyasūtra,IV,5.

40 Cf. the quotation from the SV of Kumārila in NIP,p-128 and from Mandanaśīra's Vidyāviveka in NIP p-145,L-15,16. This same type of objection occurs in the MA. The quotation is different but the meaning is the same. Cf. MA,p-115,L-11ff. Mandanaśīra's quotation occurs at MA,p-117,L-16,17.
embodied maker producing an effect (the whole world with and without parts) with a different kind of arrangement of parts. 41

This manner of showing the fault of the Saiva inference is the stock Buddhist (and not only Buddhist) way of effecting a refutation. It consists of denying the possibility of similarity and the rigid application of the Law of Excluded Middle to the terms of the opponents position. 42 This means that it consists of dichotomy and dilemma. 43 Here a dichotomy is made between the example and the thesis of the inference just

41 As will be seen frequently below, the effect that God is supposed to produce is tanukara-nabhvamā (the human body, its senses, the various worlds, etc). The distinction between the two kinds of effects that Dharmakirti insists on is that between artifacts like the pots that are made by the potter on the one hand, and natural objects like our bodies, etc., which are not artificated by an artificator in any parallel sense to that of the pot by the potter.

42 I have tried to show this to be the case in an unpublished paper entitled “An Examination of the Buddhist Method of Argument in the Tattvasangha of Saṅtaraksita as Exemplified in the Treatment of the Doctrine of Saṅdhabrahmaṇ” for the course at McMaster called Patterns of Language in Indian Philosophy, Aug. 1983.

43 The dichotomy is this: the saḍhya or subject of the inference (God) and the saḍhya or subject of the example (the potter) do not overlap in any way; there is nothing analogous between them. A middle area of similarity is excluded or denied by the Buddhists. The dilemma of the Saivas is either the inference fails because the example does not support the thesis to be proven or if God is proven to be the cause he will be momentary, for to be a cause is to change and to change is to be momentary, exactly as the potter is in the Buddhist view.
as elsewhere a dichotomy is drawn between God's having an eternal nature and his inability to be causally efficient.

If taken to its logical conclusion the refusal to see any kind of similarity between the example and the thesis of an inference would result in the failure of all inference. But Dharmakīrti claims not to go this far. He is willing to admit that the example of the pot and potter allows one to infer, should one come across a pot in the store, that it was made by a potter. But for reasons we have already seen, this does not support the inference that God is the author of the world.

With the above as background information we can translate the verse under discussion as follows:

It is fitting for there to be inference of an intelligent (maker), in the case of those effects (alone) which have been seen (at some point to have been made by an intelligent maker). For this alone is observed. (The maker) of the body, etc., (ie., the natural objects of the world) (is not to be inferred to be of an) opposite character (ie., the opposite of the visible maker like the potter would be an invisible maker like the God. This cannot be inferred).//5

44 This will be the repeated charge of the Saivas. They will say that if God cannot be inferred as the cause of the world on the basis of the analogy of the pot and potter, then fire on the mountain cannot be inferred from smoke on the mountain on the basis of the analogy of smoke coming from fire in the hearth.

45 Cf. Vattanky, p-37.
The inclusion in the above translation of large amounts of bracketed material is unavoidable given Sadyojāti's cryptic style. Its content is based on Ramakanta's commentary.

Ramakanta explains the verse saying that whatever is established as the effect of a certain cause can serve only as the basis for the inference of a certain kind of cause. The whole class of effects in general (kāryamatram) cannot serve as the basis for inferring a universal cause (God) in the same way as smoke in general serves as the basis for the inference of fire in general. There is no proof that different effects such as pot, cloth, cart, palace and city arise from the same maker. Thus it is fitting only to infer a certain kind of separate maker for each of these effects, which maker has a certain kind of knowledge. Nor is it fitting to use in one's inference of the existence of God 'because the world is his effect' just because the pot is also the 'effect' of the potter. This verbal similarity does not get over the fact that the body, senses, etc., are totally different kinds of effects from pots.⁴⁶

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⁴⁶ NIP, P-122, L-6-11.
Rāmakantha then quotes the following

four verse from the PV of Dharmakīrtī.

From that kind of conjunction of parts that is
activated by an intelligent agent, or not so
activated, (if that kind of conjunction of parts is
present) if an (intelligent agent) is inferred, it
is proper.//13

But the inference from something that is known to be
similar (only) in words with something that is known
in some (other) definite object, it is not proper
(as for instance inference of) fire from some white
object.//14

Otherwise, since the potter is the cause of pot,
which is a kind of transformation of clay, it would
be established that he brings about also an
arathīll.//15

An inference of something in another class (of
things) only by means of similarity of words is not
correct like the inference of horns for speech from
the word go.//16

Verse six and commentary of the NIP answer these
objections to the Saiva syllogism:

Since the pot and the body, etc., are both effects
there is no difference (between them for the purpose
of inference). And without an intelligent cause an
effect is nowhere seen.//6

47 Vattanky's translation. Verses 13 and 14 simply
say that the kind of conjunction of parts that one finds
in a pot is different than the kind of conjunction of
parts that one finds in a natural object like the human
body. This is because one never observes a maker making
the body in the manner that a potter makes a pot. Thus
these two effects are absolutely different.

With respect to the word go in Sanskrit in verse
17, it has to be noted that it can mean, among other
things, both 'speech' and 'cow'. Thus if one can infer
similarity of cause from mere verbal similarity in the
effect it would be proper to infer that speech must have
horns.
In his (roughly five page) commentary on this verse, Ramakantha makes a number of points, all of which deny that there is any essential difference between effects that are artifacts and effects that are natural objects. Thus the whole issue between the Saivas and the Buddhists boils down to a rather simple (and quite ubiquitous) problem in philosophy in general. What is really involved is that one party, with a certain set of motives refuses to see that two things are similar and the other party involved, having different motives, sees the similarity as being as plain as the nose on one's face.

First of all Ramakantha points out that since the Buddhists contend that the whole world is a momentary effect it makes no sense to distinguish various kinds of effects such as those that are produced by visible and invisible makers. It has to be kept in mind that it is upon such a distinction that the Buddhist refutation rests. The Buddhist replies that the two kinds of effects differ because they are based on different things, the one being made by a visible, the other by an invisible maker. Ramakantha denies this on the basis of the bigness or the brownness of various cows. Just because one cow is brown and another one a different colour, one cow big, another one small, we do not fail to see the similarity and say that they are all
cows. This is due to their possession of the same nature (rupa). Similarly, a pot and sound have the same nature in that both are artifacts (i.e., are non-eternal objects). Even the Buddhist assumes that things have a generic quality (sāmānya) when he proves the non-eternality of all things on the basis of their having been artifacted (krtakatvena). 48

Rāmakānta asks how the Buddhist can say there is no such thing as 'being an effect' in a general sense (i.e., devoid of the visible maker/invisible maker distinction the Buddhist want to insist upon) when he admits all kinds of generic qualities in things such as 'being empty', 'having no self', 'being knowable', 'being an existent effect', etc. Thus Rāmakānta insists that 'having ordered arrangement of parts' is to be admitted as a generic quality in all effects and not just in artifacted or man-made effects. 49

Now a short dialogue takes place in which Rāmakānta cleverly traps the Buddhist. It has to be kept in mind that up to this point the Buddhist has tried to argue that all effects are not of the same kind and that Rāmakānta has caught him by showing that the Buddhist himself sees several generic types in all things. It thus seems contradictory—for the Buddhist to

48 NIP, p-123, L-5-17.
49 NIP, p-123, p-17-19.
say that all things have the same type of 'emptiness' but not the same type of 'arrangement of parts'. It is not a question whether things have or do not have either of the above qualities, it is a question of whether the Buddhist can refrain from seeing a distinction among things in general in one case and, in another case, in order to defeat the Saiva, suddenly decide to make a distinction among those same things. Now the Buddhist explains that what he means by generic types like 'emptiness' is not that they are characteristics of things in themselves, but rather that the mind imposes certain classificatory generic types on things that are really not at all similar to each other in themselves. Thus when Rāmakantha says that there must be a class characteristic in things called 'having ordered arrangement of parts' just as there is one called 'emptiness' the Buddhist says that 'ordered arrangement' (sannivesa) is not something different than the arranged things (sannivistebhyah). "Child's babbling!" says Ramakantha. He asks whether existence (sattvam) is not something different than the existent (sāto) or effecthood (kāryatvam) is not something different than the effect. The Buddhist replies that this is right. He says that the seeing that various things are of the same generic type arises from a
synthetic act of cognition (ekavimarsajanakatvena) and quotes the following verse

When there is the denotation (of certain things) by the same term, even though there is difference (among the things denoted by that term), it is due to what is called a synthetic act of cognition. Such is the case with the term 'sense organs' which are by nature delimited (and different from one another but still called by the same collective term). Or like the reduction of fever through the use of various things whether taken singly or all at once, even though they are manifold (i.e., ginger root, etc.,) they are all called by the same term 'medicine' and not the opposite (i.e., not by their own several different names).

To this Rāmānaṭha replies that the perception that all things belong to the class of 'having ordered arrangement of parts' will also come about in the same manner according to the Buddhist, that is by a synthetic act of consciousness which imposes similarity, sometimes by calling various different things 'medicine' and other times by calling various things 'effects' because of having 'ordered arrangement of parts'. As such it is not fitting for the Buddhist to suddenly want to introduce different types (jātyantara) into this class of objects. That is, it is not fitting for the Buddhist to want certain things in the class which has ordered arrangement of parts to be different from other things in the same class on the basis of whether or not they have an invisible maker. The reason is that the criteria for belonging to the class is not external or in the

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50 NIP, p-123, L-19-22, p-124, L-1-5.
things themselves but is internal, in the synthesizing
act of consciousness of the mind.\footnote{NTP, p124, L6-8.}

In the Buddhist attempt to show that there are
some effects which are not caused by any author there is
supposed to be difference of class though similarity of
name. Thus it is said that though all effects are called
kāryam some are not made by visible makers. Similarly
the Buddhist contends that there is no doubt of there
being a perceptible difference in the appearance (ākāra)
of white objects (like caulk and smoke) when one is
establishing different causes for these white objects
(in an inference). Also there is no doubt that there is
a perceptible difference in the appearance of the
various things denoted by the word go ('cow', etc.) Thus
it is not legitimate to infer fire from just anything
that is white or to infer that words, like cows, must
have horns because both are called go. In the same way
the Buddhist wants to say that the effects of a visible
maker are different from those of an invisible maker
because those of the former are well established (one
regularly sees potters making pots) whereas those of the
latter are not so established. The distinguishing mark
that separates the two kinds of effects is that there is
certainty about the effects of the visible maker and
doubt about those of the invisible maker. But if all of
this is really so, then one, though perceiving the concomitance of smoke with fire in the hearth, cannot also establish that fire is causing smoke in another place because of the intervention of extreme distance. For there is doubt involved by mere lack of perceptibility.52

Continuing his rejection of the Buddhist argument, Rāmakanṭha says there can be no distinction between the effects of visible and invisible makers on the basis of the former having and the latter not having doubt about them. The reason is that whether an invisible maker made all effects is the thing that is sought to be proven just as fire, as the cause of the smoke on the distant mountain is the thing that is sought to be proven in the stock example. That there is some doubt involved about each of these things is not a bad thing. Rāmakanṭha quotes the following maxim (which rhymes in Sanskrit): "Non-establishment of the reason in an argument is a bad thing, of the thing to be proven, a good thing."53

The Buddhists have denied the inference of God by denying that effects in general are universally concomitant with 'having a maker' in general. (That is, the Buddhists agree that only certain effects are

52 NIP p-124, L-8-16.
53 NIP p-124, L-16-19.
concomitant with having a maker. Pots are so. Trees are not. Now Rāmakāṇṭha asks how the Buddhists can accept the universal concomitance of smoke in general with fire in general. For one only sees the smoke in the hearth being produced by the fire in the hearth and not by the fire on the mountain. The mountain, after all, is not the hearth. The Buddhist replies that one can infer that smoke in general is caused by fire in general because one sees that smoke in general comes from fire of no matter what kind, i.e., burning leaves, grass, etc. But Rāmakāṇṭha (sounding like a Buddhist playing logical hard ball here) refuses this saying that there has been no perceptual evidence that the smoke on the mountain is produced by fire as is the case for the smoke in the hearth which is perceptually verified. So one cannot say on the basis of some supposed generic quality in smoke that the smoke in the hearth and the smoke on the mountain have the same cause. The Buddhist agrees saying that inferability is made possible owing to smoke being the same thing (arthaśāmarthyāt) wherever it appears. So, just like the smoke in the hearth, everywhere else too, smoke is generated by fire simply because it is smoke. To clinch the above point Ramakantha has the Buddhist put the above point in the concise terms of standard Indian logic. Thus there is knowledge of the pervader (vyāpakasya), fire in general, (in the sense
that) different fires are irrelevant (apratistitabheda) (to the point at issue), by means of there being a mark (i.e., middle term: lingatayā) smoke in general, which is the pervaded, (in the sense that) different smokes are irrelevant (to the point at issue). Finally the Buddhist quotes a verse to the same effect.54

To the above Rāmakanṭha answers that since in the production of various effects like the pot, cloth, cart, etc., it is impossible that one particular maker have made them all, it is established that effects in general (the different particular effects being irrelevant here), are universally concomitant with makers in general, for the simple reason that they are signs (hetutvena). That is, all effects are signs in general of having been made by some maker in general, just as smoke, irrespective of what kind of smoke, is the sign of fire, irrespective of what kind of fire. And this is all that Ramakantha wants to prove at this point. It is in this way that the Buddhist objection that some effects are not indicative of a maker is overcome.55

In closing the above argument Rāmakanṭha says that according to those in the know about what it is that makes up universal concomitance (vyāpti), it is at

55 NIP, p-125, L-8-12.
root, relationship (pratibandha) which exists between the sadhya and the hetu. The opponent picks up on this and says that if such a relationship is to be established in the inference it must be on the basis of the example. But the example in the inference is deviant (vyabhicarinī) just as when one infers that a son will be dark skinned on the basis of the colour of his mother (using as one's example this or that particular case). In this inference one must rely on the prognosis (upadeśa) of the physician and not on some well-established means of knowing. But the situation is different in the case of inferring fire from smoke. For the relationship between the two is established by perception. Similarly the relationships between being an artifact and being non-eternal, between having manifold functions and being manifold cannot be established except through sense perception. The upshot of this objection is to reiterate that the case of inferring fire from smoke is of a different kind than that of inferring God from the world's being an effect. The reason is that we can establish by sense-perception that other fires cause other smokes but not that other gods cause other worlds. And the example of a potter making a pot is not an instantiation paralleling a god making a world. 56

56 NIP, p-125, L-11-19.
Ramakantha replies that the opponent too, agrees that the third proposition of the syllogism (sādhanavakyesu=udāharana) contains the example but does not consist only of the example. It also has to come within the purview of a conclusive means of knowing which establishes the relationship (between the sādhyā and the hetu, which the example in the third proposition is meant to exemplify). This is what is absent in the inference of a dark skinned son on the basis of the colour of the mother. As a result the argument is deviant (vyabhicaritā). But in the inference proving the existence of God, there is establishment in the example, of a causal relationship between the effect as the material cause and a maker (i.e., between clay and the potter who produces the pot out of its material cause, clay). And it is on the strength of this that universal concomitance is established between every effect and a maker who is the cause of that effect. Thus there is no deviation in the argument.57

To this the Buddhist objects that universal concomitance is only established between being and effect and having a visible cause and not an invisible cause, by the above means. And it is an invisible cause that is the sādhyā of the Saiva’s argument. Ramakantha again calls this the babbling of a child. The reason is

that this contradicts the Buddhists acceptance of the possibility of inferring invisible fire from smoke on the basis of having seen smoke and fire together in the hearth. One cannot say that the inference of the existence of God does not work just because there is some difference between the example and the thesis of the inference, since this is also the case between the purported invisible fire on the mountain and the visible fire in the hearth.58

Now the Buddhist objects that there is a difference between visible authors and the state of being a purported invisible author and that there must be deviation in the case of effects of such kind as the pots, etc. That is, the objection is to once again claim lack of parallelism between the example and the thesis of the inference. This is again denied by Ramakantha on the grounds that all effects, whether made by visible or invisible authors are of the same type.59

Finally for the commentary on this verse, the central issue is raised in a slightly different fashion, this time centering around the example of the potter necessarily being inferred not only as the maker of the pot but also of the anthill. For both are transformations of clay. The objector contends that only

58 NIP, p-126, L-4-7.
59 NIP, p-126, L-7-10.
if such an inference were legitimate would it be legitimate to infer God from the world as his effect, on the analogy of the pot and the potter. This objection rests on the maxim that a cause of Type A can only be inferred from an effect of Type A and not of Type B. Now the effects of a visible maker are of a different type than those of an invisible maker. Thus it is illegitimate to infer an invisible maker on the basis of the effects of a visible maker.60

This is once again denied by Ramakantha by insisting that the effects are the same whether produced by a visible or an invisible author just as pots and words are the same in that they are both non-eternal, or all ontological categories (padārthanam) are the same in that they are existent (sattvena). Ramakantha points out that it would never makes sense to the Buddhist for there to be identity of 'being non-eternal' and 'being artifacred' if the objects involved were different in the sense of being from heterogeneous classes. The same goes for the Buddhists seeing identity between 'being momentary' and 'being existent' (ie., for the Buddhist, to exist is to be momentary). The point is that just as the Buddhist sees momentariness in all things, in spite of other differences, the Śaiva must be allowed to see 'arrangement of parts' in spite of other differences.

60 NIP, P-126, L-10-14.
(such as having a visible or invisible author of the arranging of those parts).  

To this the Buddhist answers that non-eternity and being artificed are the same because they have the same form and not different like the effects of visible authors on the one hand and invisible authors on the other. Rāmakaṇṭha says that this is contradictory. He then repeats his claim that the exclusion or inclusion with respect to the class 'cow' is not done on the basis of the redness or bigness, etc., of the cows in that class. The idea is that there is a difference between a brown cow and a black cow but the difference is not significant enough to exclude one or the other from type class 'cow'. The same goes for the case of the effects of visible or invisible authors. The Buddhist simply contends that this is a significant enough difference. Following this Rāmakaṇṭha states the same maxim in his own support that the Buddhist has used in his attempt to refute the Saiva position. Thus he says that when there has been establishment of relationship between one thing and another of a certain nature, on the strength of that relationship one can infer another thing of the same nature. That is, on the strength of the relationship between the pot and the potter one can infer a maker of the same intelligent nature for the world, since the

61 NIP,1-14-18.
world and the pot are the same type of things, i.e. effects. "So what with (all of these objections) about (effects being of) the same class or a different class?" asks Rāmakantha rhetorically.62

After having quoted a verse of the opponents to the same effect as the above, Rāmakantha says that though there is deviation in supposing that the potter made the anthill in the objector's example, the maker of the anthill, as possessing intelligence, is part of the sādhya (what is to be proven) in the Saiva syllogism. Thus, since the anthill too, is an effect, it will be proven to have proceeded from an intelligent cause.63

What then, asks Ramakantha in closing the commentary on this verse, is a class (jāti) upon the basis of which one distinguishes the being of the same or different class in ordinary life? The Buddhist answers "Why, as for you, it is similarity (sādṛṣyam)." Then Rāmakantha says that if this is so there must be similarity of all effects because of the state of being effects of all things, in exactly the same sense in which the Buddhist says there is similarity in all existent things because of their being existent (sattvena, which is equivalent, for the Buddhist, to momentariness). Thus in the Saiva inference proving the

existence of God, a maker of the same and not a
different class is inferred from effects which are all
of the same class. There is no failure of the inference
because it is based on mere verbal similarity. How then,
asks Rāmakāṇṭha, can the Buddhist charge that if the
Śaiva inference of the existence of God is valid, so is
the inference of fire from any white object? For even
when fire is absent one sees white objects such as
caulk, for example, just as one sees (the Buddhist's
much beloved) existence (sattvasya) even in entities
that are not effects, such as the ātman. (The Buddhist
insists that to be existent is to be momentary and to be
momentary is to be non-eternal or to be a produced
effect. So according to this reasoning it must be
impossible for an eternal entity like the ātman to
exist. Rāmakāṇṭha denies all of this.) And, adds
Rāmakāṇṭha, without a maker no effects at all come
about, so there is no possibility of there being
deviance of the presence of the hetu (being an effect,
without there necessarily being a producer of that
effect). Since the Śaivas contend that natural objects
too, like mountains and grass have an unseen maker there
is no disproof thereby, of the Śaiva thesis that all
effects are preceded by a maker. Such a disproof was the
aim of the Buddhist objection that one could infer fire on the basis of seeing any white object.64

With the above Ramakanta ends his commentary on NIP,II,6. I have gone into the argument with as much detail as I thought necessary to gain an understanding of the main Buddhist objection to the Saiva syllogism proving the existence of God. Ramakanta will recur to this argument and others virtually identical to it in the remainder of his commentary on NIP,II. When this happens we will be able to be much briefer in our study of those arguments since we will be able to refer back to material given extended attention in NIP,II, and commentary and also the verses and commentaries that precede NIP,II,6 which on the whole deal with the same objection.

Verse seven and commentary reassert that if it is only legitimate to infer like cause from like effect when the relationship between that particular cause and effect has been established by perception then there has indeed been victory for the materialists who accept only perception as a pramana. The example Ramakanta gives is one we have seen before. According to the above conception of inference it becomes impossible to infer fire on the mountain from seeing smoke on the mountain on the basis of seeing smoke and fire in the hearth. For

64 NIP,p-127,L-4-16.
the smoke on the mountain is different from the smoke in the hearth in that the latter's relationship with fire has been established by perception while the former's has not.65

Verse eight addresses a problem which Rāmakaṇṭha, in his introduction to the verse, ascribes to Kūmārila. The potter, who is the subject of the example in the inference, possesses qualities such as non-omniscience, non-omnipotence, etc., which are opposites of the qualities of the subject of the inference, God. Also the potter does not create by mere will power but rather uses a body which God has not. The reply is that one's own experience shows the objection to be untrue. Rāmakaṇṭha explains this answer in detail in his commentary.66

The answer to the latter part of the objection is given first. It is said that the idea that no effect can be produced by mere will is contradicted in the movement of one's own body to produce this or that effect. The effect follows from the will itself without the intervention of another body. The same goes for the case where one decides by mere will to effect inner contact with this or that sense (when one gives attention to the hearing rather than the seeing of a


66 NIP, p-128, L9-19.
certain phenomena. Here again no body intervenes between the will and the carrying out of the effect. So the subject of the example, the potter, does not possess qualities that are the opposite of the subject of the inference (God). 67

In any case, Rāmakāṇṭha adds, the example is bound to contain characteristics that the subject of the syllogism does not possess (and vice versa). Unless one admits this, one may ask, having proven the non-eternity of sound on the basis of the example of the pot, which is equally non-eternal, why sound too does not have a wide-bellied shape like the pot! Thus he says that only those qualities of the example which jibe with the thing that one is attempting to prove are to be taken into consideration in the inference. And to the extent that the potter is intelligent there is enough similarity for the inference to work. 68

At this point another objection from Dharmakīrti is dealt with. Dharmakīrti says that there is nothing wrong with the idea that the effect is produced by an agent who is linked with a body, as long as both the body and the agent are considered to be momentary, like all other things. Thus a series of moments make up both the 'embodied one' and the body and these work together

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67 NIP, p-128, L-21, P-129, L-1-7.

68 NIP, p-129, L-7-13.
to produce the effect. So there is nothing wrong with thinking that an effect is produced by an 'agent' with a 'body' but only in thinking that either of these is enduring. For an enduring entity (and this includes God above all) is by reason of this very eternity, incapable of producing effects. Rāmakantha then quotes 

Pv, IV, 30:

Therefore, in those things which are incapable (of producing something) separately a (new) quality is assumed (to arise) when they are joined together; such things have causality and not God, who (is eternal) and does not change. 69

To all of this Rāmakantha answers that it would only hold true if the doctrine of momentariness were proven. Since this doctrine has been refuted in the first Kānda (chapter) of the NIP in connection with the establishment of the ātman as an enduring, non-momentary entity, all of that refutation applies likewise to this latest Buddhist objection. (The refutation of the theory of momentariness in the first chapter of the NIP is based on the inability of the Buddhists to adequately explain memory, recognition or recollection. It is a widely used and well-known argument used by many 'Hindu' schools against the Buddhists and will not be gone into in detail in this essay).

Even in the face of all of this the Buddhist objects saying that a purported enduring entity (stairye) has to come under the umbrella of momentariness because for there to be action such as motion there has to be a body. Rāmakantha, for the third time in this chapter tells the Buddhist he is babbling like a child. He answers that the only requirement that there be action is that there be an effect produced not that there be a body involved. We have seen that the will, even without a body can produce a vibratory action or a 'motion-action' (spandakriyā) according to Rāmakantha. The same goes for the objection that a body is to be a requirement if there is to be an agent who can take up a motionless state having desisted from a state of being in motion. Here again, Ramakantha says that all of this is possible without a body. All that is required is that an effect, not a body be there.70

Now Rāmakantha returns to Kumarila who charges that God can neither know nor act without a body. The answer to this is based on Saiva dogmatics according to which the released souls, which have attained equality of powers with Śiva, are omniscient yet do not have bodies.71

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71 NIP, p-130, L-9-17.
In this context it is interesting to note that Ramakantha comments that the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists are birds of a feather and he quotes a verse to the effect that Buddhist arguments are borrowed as a rule, from the Mīmāṃsakas.72

At this point Rāmakanṭha goes on the attack against the Buddhist. Many of the inconsistencies that the Buddhists have charged accrue to the Saiva attempt to prove that God is the cause of the world are now turned against them. Rāmakanṭha asks how the Buddha is supposed to be omniscient by Buddhists even in the absence of any possibility of relationship between the knower and the known (that is, in the absence of a body)? When the answer comes that the Buddha has a body, Rāmakanṭha, sounding very much like a Buddhist dialectician, shows the incoherence of such a conception by asking whether or not the Buddha’s body is born of karma or not. If the former then it must be like our own body in which case his knowledge would be like our own (i.e., non-omniscient). On the other hand, a body not born of karma is an impossibility, like smoke that supposedly comes from something non-firey. For all effects are generated by specific causes. Then the Buddhist tries to argue that the Buddha has a body due, not to karma, but due to compassion, or due to his

72 NIP, P-130, L-17-21.
having the power of transformation, or due to the power of his meditation he can use anything as his body and that in such a case wise sayings would issue forth even from walls due to the Buddha's presence (in the form of his power of meditation). But Rāmakaṇṭha answers that if this is so, that the Buddha can be omniscient without a body in any ordinary sense of the word; can be a causal agent by mere will in the case of the transformation of his own body, etc., and that the Buddhists admit that others like Manjuśrī, etc., also possess the same abilities, then Śiva too must be accepted as being like that! For everything in the world has been established as Śiva's effect because he is the overseer of all.73

The above constitutes Rāmakaṇṭha's explanation of Sadyojyoti's reply to the first objection addressed in verse eight which concerned creation by will power alone on the parts of both the potter and God. The second objection, that the potter possesses qualities opposite those which God is supposed to possess is now addressed.

Rāmakaṇṭha says that the potter, within the sphere of his own proper activity, i.e., making pots, has both the powers of knowing and doing, for when these are lacking the pot is not produced. Nor is the potter

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73 MIP, p-130, L-23, p-131 to p-132, l-4.
perishable and God imperishable, for the potter, as an atman, is eternal. 74

At this point Rāmakantha quotes two separate half verses from Kumārila's Gīlokavārtika which try to flesh out the possession of opposite qualities in the cases of the potter on the one hand and God on the other. It is contended that if God creates by mere willing the effect should appear immediately. But such is not the case for the potter. Also it is unintelligible how the insentient material cause follows the will of a sentient being at all. Rāmakantha's reply to this is to repeat his argument about the human body being moved by the will of the atman without any other body intervening and this effect is seen to follow immediately upon the willing. To this the objector says that in things other than one's own body, such as in the makin of the pot, the effect does not follow the willing immediately. But Rāmakantha says that even in that case, without the willing no effect appears for we see that in the case of someone who wills nothing or who wills something other than the pot, no pot appears. But the objector insists that this is still missing the point (which seems to me to be the case). For there is really no creation by will alone in Rāmakantha's example, for the potter relies on his own body to make the pot. "So

74 NIP, p-132, L-5-11.
what of that?" asks Rāmakantha. There is nothing that prevents a cause from producing an effect through dependence on some auxiliary causes. For God too, there is a parallel situation for he depends on the karma of men in the creation of the world.75

Rāmakantha also denies that there is no such thing as causality by will alone in the case of objects other than one's own body. For people who know how to use mantras cause various effects in people other than themselves. A quotation from a Buddhist source shows that this possibility was admitted by the Buddhists too.76

Rāmakantha then offers another explanation for the way the will of a sentient being might interact with the insentient material cause. He says that God may cause the world in the sense that he oversees the absorption of his present body, here considered the world, and its subsequent transformation into a different body. This may have been going on beginninglessly similar to someone who has, from all time, been leaving one town and entering another. So the charge that if God has a body it must be like ours is not valid. Such is the charge contained in a quotation

75 NIP, p-132, L-11-22. On God’s depending on factors external to himself in creation, etc., cf. above Ch, I, p-46 and below p-546.

76 NIP, p-132, L-22, p-133, L-1-4.
which Rāmakanṭha introduced previous to the above reply.77

Finally, Rāmakanṭha says that even though there would be the 'having ordered arrangement of parts' in the case of God's body (i.e., the world) in the above sense, there is no admission that the world is eternal (which is the thesis of Kumārila). The reason for this is based on Śaiva dogmatics. It is said that the semi-divine beings (māyāgarbhaśvarānām) who oversee the domain of māyā have bodies yet retain their lordly powers and eventually pass beyond the material realm altogether. Thus God's having a body in the above sense entails neither his loss of lordly powers or the world's eternal existence, since, when his relationship with the world ends, the world undergoes dissolution.78

Now a different objection is raised which once again comes from the SV.79 The objector says that in the inference proving God is the cause of the world there is the following conundrum: if the potter made the pot God

77 NIP, p-133, L-5-11. The quotation which contains the charge is from SV, 17, 77. It is hard not to see a kind of parenthesim in Rāmakaṇṭha's reply to Kumārila's objection here. I doubt Aghorasiva would be comfortable with Rāmakanṭha's language here. But we have to keep in mind that what is reabsorbed, etc., could well be a metaphorical body, though this seems to me to just delay and not solve a knotty philosophical problem.

78 NIP, p-133, L-11-17.

79 SV, 17, 79.
did not make it and is therefore not the maker of all things; but if God, and not the potter, did make the pot (in spite of this going against all experience) then the inference has the fault called sādhyahinatā (abandoning of the thing to be proven). That is, since the example in the inference is robbed of the property of being an instantiation similar to that which one is trying to prove in regard to the thesis of one's syllogism, one has abandoned what one is trying to prove. We know that in Indian logic the udāharana (example) is a requirement in inference. What, in fact, happens if one contends that God made the pot is that one has taken away the pot and potter as an udāharana in the syllogism and the inference fails.

Ramakantha, in introducing this objection, puts it in slightly different language. He says that if there is no establishment of God's being maker of the pot in the example then there is non-establishment of one of the qualities of the sādhyā. That is, one of the qualities of the sādhyā was that he be the 'all-maker'. But if the potter and God made the pot then God is not the all-maker. On the other hand, if the potter is established as the maker of the pot, then there is contradiction in the sense that the lordly powers such as omniscience, etc., are not seen in the unlordly potter, who, as subject of the example in the inference,
is supposed to exemplify the same properties and powers as the subject of the inference.\textsuperscript{80}

Thus the objection from the \textit{SV} tries to set things up so that whether the example in the syllogism works or does not work makes no difference since in both cases the syllogism fails. Such a method of refutation in philosophy is always possible. All one need do is radicalize the opponents vocabulary or take his argument in a purely formal sense, manipulate these pure formalities a little so that the desired absurdities result and then claim victory. The only thing that is redeeming about such a procedure is that it can be done with a sense of humour.

In verses ten and eleven Sadyojoyoti raises the above objections and then denies that they threaten the inference of the existence of God. Rāmakantha explains why.

First of all he reiterates what he has said above about the potter being omniscient with respect to his making pots. Thus there is no contradiction whereby the subject of the example and that of the inference differ radically in the qualities they possess.\textsuperscript{81}

The purpose of the third proposition of the syllogism is to establish universal concomitance between

\textsuperscript{80} NIP, p-133, L-18-21.

\textsuperscript{81} NIP, p-134, L-12-14.
the sādhyā and the hetu. By calling into question the parallelism between the subjects of the example and inference, the opponent, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, has doubt about the universal concomitance of 'being and effect' and 'having an intelligent maker'. This leads Ramakantha into an interesting discussion concerning the nature of vyāpti (universal concomitance).

Rāmakaṇṭha enters the discussion concerning the nature of vyāpti by saying that if one assumes the objector's premise that the inference proving the existence of God fails because the subjects of the inference and example differ in their possession of certain qualities, a reductio ad absurdum results. Technically this is called a tarka. 82 It is the assumption of the opponents premises to show that they come into conflict with some established fact. Here the established fact is that inference is a valid means of knowledge. Ramakantha's tarka argument shows that inference is impossible on the assumption of the opponent's premises (that difference between the sādhyās of the example and inference debars inference altogether). Thus Rāmakaṇṭha again repeats that the same premises of the opponent will result in it being impossible to infer fire on the mountain from seeing smoke as in the hearth. For the subjects of the

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82 Cf. Kuppuswamisastri, p-205.
inference and the example differ. Thus all inference would be impossible.\textsuperscript{83} But then the pleader for the possibility of there being such a thing as inference says that \textit{vyāpti} is established between smoke in general and fire in general. The opponent of inference asks how this is so. In the example all one sees is a particular fire producing a particular smoke. This does not establish the co-presence of smoke and fire in every other case. Then the pleader for inference succinctly refers to three different theories which attempt to explain how \textit{vyāpti} comes about.\textsuperscript{84}

The first theory says that \textit{vyāpti} come about by perception accompanied by remembrance (\textit{pratyabhijñā}). Smoke is perceived to be present at a time subsequent to one's having repeatedly perceived smoke coming from fire in the hearth. \textit{Vyāpti} is this remembrance of the repeated observation of the co-presence of fire and smoke.

The second theory says that even a single observation of the co-presence of fire and smoke is enough to establish their universal concomitance, provided this single observation assumes the form of a

\textsuperscript{83} NIP, P-134, L-14-18.

\textsuperscript{84} NIP, P-134, L-18-20.
universal generalization due to its being free of all delimiting factors such as space and time.

The third theory is that vyāpti come about by the force of the objects power (vāstuṣaktisāmarthyna: to know smoke is to also know its necessary concomitance with fire). 85

In all of the above three ways, says the pleader for inference, vyāpti is established as operating on the basis of generality. But to this the opponent answers that even if all of the above is established he still does not see how a fire on the mountain can be established by the example of the fire in the hearth since the two fire are different. To this the pleader for vyāpti says that generality, upon which vyāpti is based, is not overturned by the mere presence of difference. For vyāpti occurs in spite of there being certain differences (of time, space, etc.). 86

At this point the opponent of inference brings in the classic materialist's argument against inference. 87 The materialist is at pain to refute the possibility of inference being a pramāna since he accepts only one pramāna, pratyakṣa or perception. He


86 NIP, p-135, L-3-7.

87 NIP, p-135, L-7-13. Cf. also Kuppuswamiasatri, pp-211,212.
asks, is vyāpti (universal concomitance between fire and smoke) known merely from seeing its presence on the mountain (parvatavartyeva); or is vyāpti known on the basis of observation of particular cases and from this one concludes that 'this particular case is like that too' (atha so'pi)? In either case inference merely establishes what is already known. To explain, in the former case:

...if vyāpti...(is) looked upon as a universal generalization having reference to all of the conceivable particulars, unobserved as well as observed, all that has to be known is already known and nothing remains to be known through inference.88

In the latter case

...if vyāpti...(is) restricted to the known or observed particulars, it would be impossible to have any inference regarding unknown or unobserved particulars for the simple reason that the latter are wholly different from the former.89

To this the pleader for inference says that one gains knowledge that there is the presence of one definite thing, fire (niyato vahniḥ), from perceiving another definite thing, smoke (niyatasya dhūmasya grahanāt) on the strength of subject-adjunctness (paksadharmatā—which simply means the presence of the hetu, fire, on the sādhyā, mountain).90 Two quotations

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88 Kuppuswamisastri, p-211.
89 Idem.
which drive home the same point follow.\textsuperscript{91} Then, from all of this Ramakantha concludes that disregarding inessential differences there is established universal concomitance between effects of a certain kind and a maker of a certain kind. Thus the lordliness (omniscience, etc.) of a certain maker is established on the basis of his effects which are of a certain nature (i.e., the human body, the bhuvanas or various worlds, etc.) and which are brought about by his power (sakti). Thus there is no sādhyahinata (abandoning of the thing one was trying to prove).\textsuperscript{92}

Following this the opponent makes a different point. He says that just as the potter is ignorant about things outside of the sphere of pot making, so must God be ignorant of things outside the sphere of his own expertise. Ramakantha answers that there is nothing outside the domain of God's expertise so there is nothing about which he is ignorant. God's domain of expertise is said to be the providing of human ends (i.e., the means for worldly experience and eventual moksa). These are his effects. Ignorance on God's part, about other things such as the hare's horn is honorific not pejorative. Then he quotes a famous verse which says

\textsuperscript{91} One of them is attributed to Dharmakirti (L-17,p-135).

\textsuperscript{92} NIP,p-135,L-19,p-136,L-1.
that a maiden need not worry about the presence or absence of attractiveness in a eunuch.\(^93\)

As for the objection that if the potter makes the pot God is not the all-maker, Ramakantha answers that being a potter is not something that comes about without a cause. Rather, the cause is God, who causes the potter to know how to make a pot. Thus God indirectly makes the potter's pot also.\(^94\)

Verses eleven and twelve have to be read together. Verse eleven puts forward an objection and a part of verse twelve insists that the fault pointed out in the objection applies only to the Saivas. Then the remainder of verse twelve answers the charge.

The charge is similar to one we have seen before. It is said in verse 11 that there is pratihetutah and hence contradiction in the inference of the existence of God. Pratihetutah is a reason in a syllogism which establishes the opposite of the sadhya.\(^95\) In this context it means that the inference proving the existence of God establishes a maker who is non-lordly just like the potter. The answer Ramakantha gives is one we have seen before. He reiterates that all

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\(^93\) NIP, P-136, L-1-9.


\(^95\) Neither Monier-Williams, Apte, Kuppuswamisastri, nor the Nyāyakośa (1978 ed.) list this as a technical term. I take it in the literal sense of 'opposite-hetu'.


inference will be impossible if the inference of God from his effects like the human body, etc., is not allowed. He gives the following tricky syllogism as the type of absurdity which would result from taking the opponent seriously:

Wherever there is smoke there is fire-which-is-not-on-the-mountain; just as in the hearth; there is smoke on the mountain; therefore there is fire-which-is-not-on-the-mountain.

Rāmākṛṣṇa says there is no end anywhere to such shitty (avaskarasya) counter-use of inference.96

But the Buddhist claims in reply to the above that the hetu establishing the opposite of what was intended only happens when there is the possibility of there not being universal concomitance between the hetu and the sādhya of an inference. And this is so only in the case of the Saivas who establish vyāpti by repeated perception of the hetu and the sādhya together. If vyāpti is established on such a basis there is no guarantee that the next time one sees smoke that it will be accompanied by fire. But such is not the case for the Buddhist who establishes vyāpti either on the basis of the identity of the sādhya and the hetu or on the basis of the causality of the hetu by the sādhya. The point is that for the Buddhist there is said to be a necessary and indissoluble relationship between the sādhya and the

96 NIP,p-136,L-21,P-137,L-1-3
hetu, whereas the relationship is neither necessary nor indissoluble for the Saiva.97

Sadyojyoti's reply is to say that if there is any such thing as a necessary relationship, it surely must be that an effect like the world is caused by the power of God who is the cause. Rāmakaṇṭha comments that if this inference of the Saiva's is not kosher (sadhu), that is, if there is no necessary relationship (pratibandhamūlam—lit. root-relationship) then there may be the stated supposition that the hetu may establish the opposite of that desired (pratiprayogasambhāvana). But inasmuch as there is the generation of the effect by the power (sakti) of the maker, who is the sādhya (arthasya in Sadyojyoti's verse), it is fitting (sadhvam) for there to be inference of a maker of this effect because the effect is pervaded by the power of God. So how can there be the arriving at the opposite of what one hoped to prove (tatpratiprayogodbhāvanam)? For when there is manifestation of the power of a thing (ie., the sakti of Siva) there is no possibility that one can legitimately infer the counter-correlate (ie., absence of Siva).98

It will be seen that in the above Sadyojyoti and Rāmakaṇṭha have insisted that the universal concomitance

97 NIP, p-137, L-5-11.
98 NIP, p-137, L-13 to p-138, L-1.
between the śādhyā and the hetu (God and his effect, the world, etc.) has an a priori nature in spite of the charge of the Buddhist that the Saivas establish vyāpti empirically or inductively. But the Buddhist charge concerning vyāpti clearly does not pertain to the establishing of the universal concomitance between God as the cause and the world as the effect. This is not a universal concomitance based on inductive generalization of empirical repetition. This universal concomitance is based on a conception in Saiva dogmatics. Siva and sakti are in a samavaya relationship (necessary inherence). Now no effect can come about without sakti thus none can come about without God. Sakti in fact plays the role of a middle term in an auxiliary syllogism proving the a priori nature of the connection (vyāpti) between the śādhyā (Siva) and the hetu (the world as his effect). Thus because God and sakti are necessarily related, and because sakti and being an effect are also necessarily related, so must God and being an effect (i.e. the world) be necessarily related. The argument is not without a certain amount of ingeniousness. But it totally fails if one does not accept the dogmatics. I am not aware of any philosophical argument, however, of which the same is not the case.

Verse 13 which is about to be examined, is the last of the verses of this chapter that is concerned
with an objection to the syllogism the Saivas use to establish the existence of God. The rest of the chapter will be taken up, preponderantly, with the second kind of argument spoken of in the introduction to this chapter of this essay, the theological/cosmological arguments.

Verse 13 repeats one of the classical materialist arguments against the possibility of inference which we have seen above (p-302). Thus as Rāmakāṇṭha's introduction to the verse shows, the charge is that one does not need to infer that there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, for one already knows this. For the knowledge of all particular fires and smokes is contained in the knowledge of the universal generalization "smoke and fire are universally concomitant." The verse in question and its commentary deny all of this.

Rāmakāṇṭha explains the verse saying that there is never generation of smoke situated in one place by fire situated in another. This means that, there are peculiarities about each fire that one comes to know through inference which one does not have in the mere knowledge of the universal generalization that smoke and fire always go together. But these peculiarities are not so strong as to debar the possibility of inference.
altogether. For since there is inference of fire on the basis of perceiving smoke limited to a certain time, space and form, different fires, cut off from connection with that time, space and form are also inferred (from other smokes). Thus there is no establishing of what was already established by other means of knowledge. For this pramāṇa (inference), too, is grounded in difference (i.e., one does not know all particular fires and smokes when one has knowledge of the universal concomitance of fire and smoke). Nor does this pramāṇa (inference) operate if it is grounded upon a different locus where exists the opposite reason. This means that just because it has been said that inference can produce new knowledge not contained in the mere knowledge of the universal concomitance involved, which new knowledge is based upon difference (seeing different smokes in different places and inferring different fires from them), it does not also mean that inference can function to prove the same thesis if an opposing reason is utilized. This is because there is a locus of this (smoke) which is general, since it is not based upon the limitations of difference (i.e., of time, place, etc.). Thus difference, which has just been shown to be that which makes it possible for inference to produce new knowledge, must not be understood as making the
inference of just anything at all possible, and hence as making inference useless.\textsuperscript{100}

From all of the above Rāmakantha concludes that there is no fault technically called by the logicians kāryasama\textsuperscript{101} which would come about if the hetu in the inference was actually based on two different things rather than one. To explain, within the context of the argument proving the existence of God, if the hetu 'being an effect' were actually based on two different things (if there were two different kinds of effects that make up the world: natural and man-made) one could not legitimately infer the same kind of cause for both. But the Saiva denies that the differences among effects are so radical as to make the division of them into two different types possible. Thus there is no kāryasama fault and the Saivas are entitled to infer the same cause—God—for all effects.

In closing his commentary on this verse, Rāmakantha quotes the same verse used above (p-268) in explaining kāryasama, and, on the basis of his foregoing commentary, denies that it is a logical fault infecting the Saiva syllogism proving the existence of God.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{100} NIP, p.138, L5-14.
\textsuperscript{101} Cf. above p-
\textsuperscript{102} NIP, p.138, L-14-18.
THEOLOGICAL/COSMOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the arguments against the Śaiva philosophy of God took two forms, the logical and the theological/cosmological. Having covered the former, Sadyojyoti now turns his attention to the latter.

Sadyojyoti has insisted that the world is an effect that necessarily presupposes God as its cause. Now, in the first half of verse 14 three objections are limned which say that the world may well be an effect but that it in no way follows that God is needed to explain how this effect came about.

The three objections come from the Sāmkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Lokāyatika (Materialist) camps. The first claims that prakṛti (pradhāna, bija) is the cause of the world; the second that the karma of ordinary human beings (kārtrībhutani) is the cause of the world; and the third that atoms (anus) are the real causes of the karma which gives visible results (and this visible kind of karma and its visible results are alone real).

Rāmakāṇṭha gives a quotation from the SV supporting the Mīmāṃsaka thesis. None is given in support of the Sāmkhya which is general knowledge anyhow. In support of the Lokāyatika position he quotes a famous phrase which says that the purusa (that which
is thought in all other schools to be in some sense spiritual and not material) is a material body epiphenomenally distinguished by consciousness (caitanyavisistah kāyah purusah). 103

The latter half of verse 14 rejects the thesis of the Samkhyas and the Mimamsakas on the basis of Saiva dogmatics, saying that since both bija and karma are insentient and the cause of the world which the Saivas are trying to establish is different in that it is sentient, there can be no charge that the Saiva cause is redundant (i.e., that the Saivas are proving what has already been proved). In Sanskrit terminology, the Samkhyas and the Mimamsakas accept a cause of the world which is merely kartr-pūrvakatvam, whereas the Saivas are proving that the world's cause is buddhimat-kartr-pūrvakatvam. 104

According to the Buddhists there is no atman (doer) different than the karmic act itself. Thus an act like giving (dana) is itself sentient. Thus one cannot assert the insentience of karma. To this Ramakantha replies that the insentience of karma has to be admitted since it consist of numberless vasanas (karmic residual impressions) acquired in the course of numberless lives.

103 NIP, p-138, L-18, p-139, L-1-14.

104 NIP, p-139, L-16 to p-140, L-4.
Since, at least for Rāmakantha, mānyness (in the sense of having parts) and insentiently are equivalent terms, it is nonsense to say that karma is sentient.\textsuperscript{105}

With respect to the materialists, Sadyojyoti says there is no redundancy in proving that God is the cause of the world because the cause which the Materialists accept, atoms, do not have a quality which God does. One would expect that the quality lacking in atoms would turn out to be sentiency but Rāmakantha in his commentary does not key in on this issue. Rather he says that the quality lacking in atoms is that they are not accepted even by the Materialists, as being the cause of the body, senses, etc. But, says the Materialist, atoms are accepted as the cause of pots, etc.? To this Ramakantha answers that it is true, and that is why pots, etc., are included as part of the example of the inference. It has to be kept in mind here that the Saivas accept māyā and not atoms as the material cause of pots, etc. on the basis of the oneness and hence eternity of māyā as opposed to the mānyness of atoms. The materialist's charge here is that just as the pot can be reduced to its material cause, atoms, and nothing more, so the human being can be reduced to its body and hence to atoms and nothing more. The sense of the reply is that in neither the case of the pot nor

\textsuperscript{105} NIP, p-140, L-5-10.
that of the human body is such reduction possible, for in both cases an efficient cause is wanted in both cases. Hence by including the pot in the example of the inference proving the existence of God there is an implicit denial of the Materialist's reductionism, even in the case of the pot.\textsuperscript{106}

To the above the Materialist replies that he takes the \textit{jīva} to be like a water bubble that takes various bodily configurations in accordance with certain variegated visible causes. The idea is not that the \textit{jīva} is a spiritual entity that takes on various bodies, but rather, that given certain kinds of causes various bodily configurations arise. The \textit{jīva} or life principle possessed by certain bodies is a by-product of chance atomic agglutination.\textsuperscript{107}

Rāmakanṭha refuses all of this. He says that the size of the bubbles is dependent on certain causes such as the amount of rain and the velocity of the flow of water in the stream which produces the bubbles. He denies that the appearance of the \textit{jīva} is a fortuitous by-product in that it occurs in conjunction only with certain causes (i.e., according to the biology of the time, when the sperm from the male is mixed with the blood of the female, etc.—\textit{sukraṣonītādeh}). He says that

\textsuperscript{106} \texttt{NIP,p-140,L-12-18.}

\textsuperscript{107} \texttt{NIP,p-140,L-18-20.}
the whole world would be completely fortuitous if there could be variation in the effect without variation in the cause. When an effect only occurs in conjunction with a certain time, space and form, fortuitousness makes no sense at all.\textsuperscript{108}

To the above the materialist answers that the essential nature even of the sperm and blood as causes of the jīva/life-principle, varies. (In all of this dialogue about the jīva it has to be kept in mind that the jīva is not here equivalent to the ātman which latter is uncaused. The jīva means tanukaranādi, that is, the living human organism which is part of the natural world, of which it is the Saiva intention to prove that God is the cause. The materialist's tack is to try to show that there is no rational order in the appearance of phenomena like the jīva and that the latter's appearance can be best explained on the basis of the chance agglutination of atoms and not on the premise of intelligent, ordered design). Now the materialist's answer (that even the chuse, the sperm and blood, which Ramakantha posits as the rationally predictable cause of the jīva varies) means to deny that there is an orderly discoverable cause of the jīva. Thus there need not have been an intelligent maker involved. That is the idea. But were this the case, Ramakantha

\textsuperscript{108} NIP, p-140, L-20, p-141, L-1-4.
answers, the sameness of effects (i.e., that sperm and blood always produce entities with jīvaness) becomes inexplicable. The sperm and the blood should cause a pot or a cloth, and the effect should always vary in this way. For according to the materialist the nature of the cause, the sperm and the blood, always varies.\textsuperscript{109}

To the above Rāmākanṭha has the materialist answer that the regularity with which the sperm and the blood produce the jīva is due to some similarity in the composition of the sperm and the blood, etc. (śukraśonitātmanā). Thus it does not also produce pots and clothes. Then Rāmākanṭha says that if this is so, that there is similarity in the cause, it follows that there must be (rigid and mechanical) similarity in the effects. But in this case the differences among the jīvas such as that some are rich and others poor becomes inexplicable.\textsuperscript{110}

Now Rāmākanṭha (carefully orchestrating the dialogue) has the materialist say that in spite of a certain similarity in all jīvas their individual differences can be accounted for in that it is like when one has a variety of objects in front of one, yet only certain ones, by their very nature, are attracted by the magnet, and not others. Such is the case for iron

\textsuperscript{109} NIP, p-141, l-4-7.

\textsuperscript{110} NIP, p-141, l-7-10.
filings. The same goes for jīvas. Some, by dint of nature, will be rich and others poor.\textsuperscript{111}

To this Rāmānātha says (moving in for the kill) that this nature too (so'pi) cannot be purely fortuitous. And if this is so some unseen cause must be involved. If this latter is the case the materialist's attempt to refute the necessity of admitting an unseen cause is refuted.\textsuperscript{112}

We can see that Rāmānātha's method of argument here has been employed previously against the Buddhists.\textsuperscript{113} Through a dialogue which he subtly controls and manipulates, he maneuvers the opponent into realizing the incompleteness of the opponent's explanation of a phenomena. That is, Rāmānātha keeps asking what is the cause of the opponent's latest explanatory entity (karma, or here svabhāva). In both cases the opponent is forced to admit that something unseen must have caused this latest explanatory entity. When this point is reached, Rāmānātha has what he needs. All he need do is to name it Siva.

In his introduction to 14b Rāmānātha says that previously the doership of prakṛti etc., (bhūjādinam kartṛtvam) has been admitted but that now even that is

\textsuperscript{111} NIP, p-141, L-10-12.
\textsuperscript{112} NIP, p-141, L-12-14.
\textsuperscript{113} Above, p-265.
Thus this verse and its commentary deny the possibility of an insentient entity taking up and then desisting from action. This is because it lacks independent will (svatantryam). Thus one is left with only one alternative. The only being who possesses complete svatantryam is Śiva who must therefore, alone, be the doer (kartr).¹¹⁵

It is plain that the above is simple dogmatic fiat. Sadyojyoti recognizes this since he immediately considers the possibility that one might definitionally attribute svatantryam to the insentient and develop one's metaphysic on that basis. This has in fact been done by the Sāmkhyas. It is logical then, that it is their example of the insentient milk of the cow functioning, by its own nature, to nurture the calf, that is taken up. This discussion and refutation of the Samkhya continues to verse 19a.

Rāmakanṭha, in his commentary to verse 16a quotes the Sāmkhya Kārikā, 57, to this effect that bija though insentient, functions as if it had svatantryam.¹¹⁶ For it [svatantryam] works for the release of the

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¹¹⁴ It has to be kept in mind that whereas previously kartṛtvam has been admitted for bija, etc., at no point has buddhimat-kartṛtvam been admitted for them.


¹¹⁶ svatantryam—independent free power of will.
souls. In the same way the insentient milk works for the nourishment of the calf.\textsuperscript{117} This whole idea is denied in the final part of verse 16a and commentary, again on a dogmatic basis. Just as the clay, the stick, the wheel, etc., used in making the pot only function in conjunction with a sentient doer and are not themselves doers, so too, milk has no \textit{svatantryam} of its own. For it is insentient.\textsuperscript{118} As we have seen before the cow is considered to be the sentient doer in conjunction with whom the milk can carry out its action of nourishing the calf.\textsuperscript{119} In this context, however, neither Sadyojyoti nor Ramakantha specifically mention the sentiency of the cow.\textsuperscript{120}

Next the idea of \textit{Sāmkhya Karika}, 12, is brought forward which contends that the mutual interaction of the three \textit{gunas} which constitute \textit{prakrti} allows \textit{prakrti} to be the doer (which the \textit{Saiva} says God alone can be). Such is the case for a lamp which produces light through the interaction of the oil, wick, etc.\textsuperscript{121} Verse 16b

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{NIP}, P-142, L-2-4.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{NIP}, P-142, L-7-11.

\textsuperscript{119} Cf. \textit{TS}, 21.

\textsuperscript{120} Nārāyanakantha, in his commentary on \textit{MA}, II, 1, p-114, 115, appears to ascribe intelligence to a worm which inscribes a letter of the alphabet into some wood. The passage is obscure. Hulin's French translation (p-101, 102) is no help.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{NIP}, P-142, L-12-16.
denies that the above can be the case since the gunas are insentient by nature. In the same way a lamp only produces light if it is made and attended to by a sentient maker.122

Verse 17a gives a further reason for positing the insentiency of prakrti. It is said there that when prakrti resumes action after having desisted from action (stitva kriya) it does so under the guidance of a sentient overseer. The idea is that whatever state matter assumes it will keep that state until sentiency decides to change it. Thus the world would continue forever in its furled or unfurled states without superintendence. Since prakrti, having attained a state of rest at the time of mahapralaya, lurches into motion again at the beginning of creation, it follows that it is superintended by a sentient being and that is God.123

In the next couple of verses a structural problem is brought to light in the Sāmkhya system by the Saivas. The Sāmkhyas both want and do not want there to be sentiency in prakrti. The controversy centers around buddhi which in its purest form, the sattvic, constitutes prakrti at its most refined. In this most refined form buddhi and by implication prakrti, exhibits the qualities of sentiency in spite of its insentient

122 NIP, p-142, L-18, 19, p-143, L-1-3.
123 NIP, p-143, L-5-10.
nature. Thus the first half of verse 17a raises the objection from the side of the Sāmkhya that says pradhāna (prakṛti) is sentient. In his commentary Rāmakanṭha quotes Sāmkhya Kārikā 17 to this effect. In the last half of 17a this is denied when Sadyojyoti says that prakṛti is like clay and insentient. Rāmakanṭha then quotes Sāmkhya Kārikā 11 to the same effect in his commentary. To my mind the Saivas have a valid point. The two verses from the Sāmkhya Kārikā contradict one another.\footnote{NIP,p-143,L-12-19,p-144,L-1-4.}

Verse 18a contains a return charge from the Sāmkhyas that the Saivas also admit that there is sentiency in buddhi which is a product of prakṛti. The reply contained in the same verse, is that buddhi is actually itself devoid of any ability to know and that any ability in that direction that it does display is due to the power (sakti) of the soul which is by nature sentient. Rāmakanṭha comments that according to the Saivas, knowledge (jñānam) consists of illumination (prakāsātmakam). Due to this illumination an object is known in the buddhi. But knowledge is not itself the intellect. The soul (purusa) alone is the intellect. Nor is knowledge, described as such, ever manifest in pradhāna which is causally efficacious at producing other insentient things but not at producing knowledge.
Rather, where knowledge is manifest in pradhāna it is placed there by the soul's power. Thus, since pradhāna is not really the cause of its own 'effect' which is discriminative knowledge (adyavasāya) it is the same as knowledge not even being in the insentient pradhāna (and by implication in buddhi) at all. Thus since there is the absence of knowledge (jñānam) in pradhāna it cannot be the maker of the world and one must conclude that the world has some other maker, 125

Verses 18b and 19a contain another objection by the Sāmkhyas and answer by the Śaivas. The objection is that the Śaivas have said that anything that resumes activity after having desisted from activity must be overseen by a sentient entity. In this way they proved that the insentient prakṛti could not alone be the cause of the world. Now the Sāmkhyas ask how it is that God himself is not overseen by another entity, since he desists from then resumes activity. If he can do this without superintendence of another entity just by nature so can prakṛti. Such is the Sāmkhya objection. The reply is just the flat dogmatic or definitional distinction that the Śaivas insist upon in every case such as this. God by definition is, and prakṛti by definition is not sentient. And by definition (and really nothing more) a

125 NIP, p-114, L-5-14.
sentient entity can and an insentient entity cannot desist from and resume activity on its own.\textsuperscript{126}

The next objection comes from Mandañamiśra according to Rāmakantha, and says that just as one sees many makers involved in the productions of different effects such as the pot, cloth, etc., and not only one, so the variegated nature of the effects which make up the world lead to the inference of many makers and not one. This objection is answered by saying that in the production of a palace or a cart for example, there are indeed many builders involved but that if they are not all following one master builder who is pre-eminent no effect at all will come about. Thus these effects come about due to there being the relationship of the superior and his subordinates (upakāryopakaraka).\textsuperscript{127}

To the objection that this relationship might in some way limit God, the supreme builder, the answer is put that later on in the second chapter of the NIP it will be shown that since God is endowed with the highest excellence, his relationship with subordinates in no way limits him.\textsuperscript{128}

At this point two objections are brought forward from the Ślokavārtika. The first charges that even a

\textsuperscript{126} NIP, p-144, L-15-19, p-145, L-1-10.

\textsuperscript{127} NIP, p-145, L-11-19, p-146, L-1-13.

\textsuperscript{128} NIP, p-146, L-15-20.
fool does not act without some purpose in mind and there would appear to be no purpose to the complete dissolution of the world supposed by the Saivas to be brought about by God. The second objection is that if God created the world with compassion alone as his motive as the Saivas say, then he should have created only happy beings since all depends on his will alone (svatantryam). This limning of the objections of the Mīmāṃsāka is completed in verses 21b, 22, and 23a and commentary.129

Verses 23b and 24a contain a warning from Sadyojyoti that a thing which is established by valid means cannot be objected to on the basis of some objection that is thought up by the opponent. I see this warning as an indication that Sadyojyoti really feels threatened by these objections. The whole problem, to my mind, is that the warning is ineffective since the opponent can legitimately use it exactly as it is worded against Sadyojyoti himself in exactly the same sense. In any case this warning acts as a preamble to an attempt to answer the objections.130

The first objection is that there would appear to be no purpose in the dissolution of the world by God. Verses 24b, 25 and 26a answer that the purpose of

129 NIP, p-147, L-1-18, p-148, L-1-3.
130 NIP, p-148, S-5-14.
dissolution is to give the material cause of the world a rest. According to Rāmākānta the material cause becomes exhausted after continually providing for human needs. This material cause has its energies recharged during dissolution. God watches over this process. In addition he watches over the process of the ripening of the karmas of all human beings at this time. During the time of dissolution the karmas of all human beings and the products of the material cause māyā are all in a seed state. This whole scenario is compared to a farmer watching over a field in seed state which will sprout in the near future.

With respect to the second objection that there should only be happy beings in the world if the creation of the world depends on the compassionate will of God alone, the answer is that the happiness of certain humans and the unhappiness of others is due to their own deeds. God merely allot karmic deserts to the owners of those deserts.

Rāmākānta, in his commentary to verses 26b and 27a, contrasts the above position with that of the Vedāntins, who, according to him, believe that all fruits, whether good or bad, come from God. He quotes

131 NIP, p-148, L-16-20, p-149, L-1-10.
132 NIP, p-149, L-12-15.
Dhagavat Gita, 3.26 as an example of the way one should not think about karma:

The wise who are disciplined should not unsettle the minds of the ignorant who are attached to karma. (The former) should be pleased in performing all karmas.

The wise should be pleased to accept all karmic fruits and not discriminate on the basis of pleasant or unpleasant karmic actions because God alone decides who is to receive all karmic fruits and this decision is not based on deserts. He frees whom he will and binds whom he will. That is the idea.

To the above Bamaakanta replies that since karmic actions like performing the jyotistoma sacrifice or killing a brahmin have substantial reality (vastubhutad) one's own actions determine the agreeableness or otherwise of the effects which will follow. So, asks Bamaakanta, how can the Mimamsakas reproach the Saivas by saying that there should only be happy beings in a world made by a compassionate and all-powerful God?

To the above the opponent replies that if all fruits are the results of human actions what is the use of God? Bamaakanta replies that in the case of fruits that immediately follow their actions and are visible there is no need for God. Such is the case when one does the jyotistoma and then gets to eat right away. But there are other fruits of the jyotistoma and other acts
such as the killing of a brahmin whose consequences do not follow immediately, are invisible, and must be experienced in another world. These, in order to be efficacious in reaching the proper recipients, require a guarantor in the same way that the seeds planted by the farmer which sprout long after the sowing require his attendance to see them through to the harvest. Thus karma implies the existence of a being endowed with superior intelligence to guarantee karmic efficacy. There is, then, in karma being a reality (gadbhāve) (truly dependent on human actions) proof of God's existence. 133

The next objection dealt with is related to the above two and also comes from the SV. It asks what possible motive God might have in arranging the karmic efficaciousness of the eternal souls. For it makes no sense for there to be the undertaking of action without a motive. The verse from the SV, of which Rāmakantha only quotes half, says:

If the activity of the creator were due to a desire for mere amusement then that would go against his ever-contentedness. And the great amount of work would be a source of infinite trouble for him. (SV,16,56).

The answer to the above, which is contained in 27b and 28a is that God's motive in arranging the karmic efficacy of the souls is pity (dayālu). Rāmakantha explains that God is like a king who undertakes to

133 NP, p-149, L-16-19, p-150, L-1-9.
govern a people who have no king out of pity. If God did not do this karmic deserts would not reach their proper owners. As such there would be no samsāra and since it is samsāric/karmic existence which, when mixed with mala matures the latter, mala would not mature. From this it would follow that there would be no moksa. Thus everything would go to hell in a handcart (sarvacchedaprasangah).\textsuperscript{134}

Verse 28b brings another objection forward from the SV. It contends that if God depends on karma in giving deserts then he is not independent (tva-rāja-tvam). Verses 29 and 30a and commentary answer that loss of independence occurs when one is used by another, not when one depends on some other things which obey one's commands. Rāmānuja says that a king loses his independence when he is used by another king not when he commands the fetching or removal of his elephants, horses, etc., in conformity with his own purposes. Independence is not constituted for God by his being able to mete out grace and punishment irrespective of whether or not the individual involved is deserving. This is not independence but madness in Rāmānuja's eyes.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{134} NIP, p-150, L-10-20, p-151, L-1-4.

\textsuperscript{135} NIP, p-151, L-5-18, p-152, L-1-5.
Finally for this chapter, an unidentified objector contends that God cannot have doership (kārtrtvam) as his essence unless he is never without this doership. In the same sense fire is essentially heat because it is never without this characteristic. But God, during the great dissolution of the world, would appear to have nothing to do. Thus he cannot be said to have doership as his essence. This charge is denied in verses 30b, 31 and 32a and commentary. It is said that at the time of the great dissolution of the world God is still active working on the world in its subtle form (tatprakṛtim) which subtlety is due to the world's consisting at this time, of pure potentiality (ṣaktyātmanā). There is, according to the theory of causality to which the Saivas subscribe (satkāryavāda) no time when any effect is non-existent. All things are always existent whether in manifest or unmanifest form. In this essay I have often used the terms furled and unfurled to express the same thing. Thus the world continues to exist even when one is freed from worldly experience (bhogamokṣe) for a time during the great dissolution. Thus, says Rāmakṛṣṇa, God matures the karmas which continue to exist as residual traces in prakṛti (prakṛtisamkāriḥbhutani). In some cases he does this slowly and in others quickly. He causes the souls to rest from their wondering in samsāra. He gives his
grace to certain souls whose mala is mature and he withhold his grace from those whose mala is immature. In this way it is shown that even during the great dissolution God is active and that he is never without the characteristic of being a doer. Rāmakaṇṭha completes his commentary on this section of the NIP with a quotation from the MA to the same effect. 136

SADYOJYOTI’S DEFENCE OF HIS PHILOSOPHY OF GOD AGAINST THE VEDANTINS

The above completes our study of the Saiva Dārsana's defence of its philosophy of God in the second chapter of the NIP. In it we have seen that the major opponents have been the Buddhists, Mīmāṃsākās, Lokāyatikās and the Sāmkhyas. This list of opponents covers virtually the whole gamut of positions with respect to the topic of theism in Indian thought. The only major opponent missing is the Vedāntin. 137 Since a refutation of this school is taken up in the first part of the third chapter of the NIP and also finds a place in the Mokṣa Kārikā of Sadyojyoti and the MA it will

136 NIP, p-152, L-6-20, p-153, L-1-15.

137 The Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika is not taken up as an opponent of Saiva theism in the Saiva texts that I have read. The reason seems to be the great similarity between the two schools’ teaching on the nature of God and the syllogism purportedly proving his existence.
round out this section of this essay to see what the Saiva Darśana writers have to say with respect to the Vedantins.

There are two kinds of arguments that the Saiva writers use against the non-dualism of the Vedantins. The one type is aimed at the cosmological theory of those Vedantins who hold to parināmavāda (the theory that the whole world, sentient and insentient is an evolute of the Supreme Self or Brahman). The other type aims at showing that non-dualism is epistemologically unintelligible. Tied in with this latter type of argument is, the charge that non-dualism can make sense of neither ordinary experience nor final release. This type of argument is intended for use against the Vedantins who hold to vivārtavāda (the theory that multiplicity is an illusory superimposition on the One, i.e., Brahman.)

We begin with the former.

According to the Vedantins, says Sadyojoyoti, the Supreme Self is the cause of the whole world consisting of sentient and insentient beings.\footnote{NIP (Third Kanda), 1a; MK, 18b, 19, 20a. The same understanding of Vedānta is expressed at MA, II, 12a.} It is interesting to note that both Nārāyanakantha in his commentary on the MA and his son Rāmakantha, in his commentary on the NIP say in this connection, that this idea of the
Supreme Self being the cause of the sentient and insentient beings is simply accepted by the Vedantins. Narayana says explicitly and Rāmakanṭha implicitly, that anyone who tries to establish the doctrine of the Vedantins with valid means (pramāṇas) will find that this is impossible.\textsuperscript{139} Even śabda (Vedic revelation), which the Vedantins purport is the valid means for establishing their cosmology, will be shown to establish precisely the opposite. The idea is that Nārāyanakantha and his son are charging the Vedantins with a fault which a Śaiva non-dualist like Śrīkaṇṭha frankly

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{NIP}, p-154, L-10, 11. To Rāmakanṭha's objection that the Paramāṭma is said to be eternal so there would seem to be difficulty in seeing how transitory existence (bhavah) could come from that, the Vedantin glibly replies: "Right, but there is no fault because even though the sentient (Paramāṭma) is accepted as being eternal, that it is the source of transitory existence is simply stated in scripture to be the case (and this cannot be questioned)."

Narayanakantha says that the doctrine of the Vedantins will only be accepted by those who blindly say "Om" and do not want to listen to arguments pro and con. (\textit{NIP}, p-77, L-1). This has a very modern western ring to it, the only problem being that Narayanakantha simply says "Om" to his own scriptures too. But in all of this it has to be kept in mind that saying "Om" to something is a necessity of argument of any kind. Aristotle knew this when he noted that definition has to stop somewhere or infinite regression will result. One cannot keep asking for the definition of one's definition ad infinitum. And no matter where the chain of definition ends the obstreperous arguer will always accuse the one who stops of saying "Om". I am not of the opinion that where one stops the chain of definition is completely arbitrary. One deals with 'ball-park figures' in this matter as in so many others. This means that even in philosophy it is still possible to make a fool of oneself.
admitted: when one thinks about it non-dualism makes no sense, or to put this another way, reason (anumāna), provided the non-dualist is willing to resort to it in defence of his doctrine, will always prove his doctrine's unintelligibility.

The Vedāntin says that the Supreme Self is the cause of the sentient and insentient beings. The Supreme Self is thus the seed of the world (jagato bījam). Now it is well known that the seed of the world never acts without impulsion by some outside (lit. auxiliary) cause. But since there is nothing outside of itself to act as an impelling cause, it would never produce the world. For an unmixed entity never transforms.

If it is said that the above is not true of the spider which spins its web out of itself by itself, relying on no other auxiliary causes, Sadyojyoti denies this. The spider itself stands on a pot, bush, or some grass and spins its web so it is not unreliant on outside causes. Rāmakantha adds that the spider eats flies and other insects and that out of this comes the saliva which forms the web. Thus all causes to be

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140 Cf. above Ch. III, fn. 41.

141 NIP, p-155. The same argument occurs at NIP, p-157, #41 and comm. and MK 22b, 23a.

142 NIP, p-155, L-18-20. Rāmakantha quotes this idea from SV, 17, 51.
causes at all must rely on auxiliary causes. So the Supreme Self cannot be the sole cause.

In addition, if the Supreme Self were the cause of both the sentient and insentient beings, since the cause must be like the effect, the Supreme self must be partially insentient. That the Supreme Self be partially insentient is unacceptable to the Vedāntin. If the Supreme Self be held to be sentient in one part and insentient in the other it would mean that it has parts and is therefore an effect like a pot. It could then, not be the world cause. If it be said that the Supreme Self is one yet simultaneously sentient and insentient that is an absurdity. The same entity cannot simultaneously possess mutually contradictory characteristics any more than the same entity can both exist and not exist.

Nārāyanakānttha, in his commentary on the MA has the Vedāntin even try to say that the Supreme Self is insentient. To this the Saiva answers that it would

143 NIP, p-156, L-3-17; MK, 20b, 21a; MAP-70, L-8-13.
145 NIP, Kāṇḍa III, #36; MA, p-70, L-14-19; MK, 21b, 22a. This is a statement of the Law of the Excluded Middle, which, be it noted, when applied to Saiva Darśana shows it to be as absurd as the Vedānta.
indeed be strange if the cause of sentient beings were itself insentient.\footnote{MA, p-71, L-5-7. This hypothesis is not at all strange to a Westerner since it is the basis of all of his biology.}

According to the Vedāntin the individual selves are caused (or come out of) the Supreme Self. But if this is the case these will be effects just like pots and will thus be insentient.\footnote{MK, 22a; MA, p-71, L-9-12.}

Thus for all of the above reasons the idea of the Supreme Self being the sole cause of all is unintelligible. Any scripture that appears to assert that "Purusa alone is all of this (whole world)", etc., has to be understood as being metaphorical. Thus scripture is not a valid means for the establishing of Vedantin cosmology.\footnote{NIP, p-157, L-14-16.}

We can now move on to an examination of the epistemological arguments against the Vedāntins.

According to Sadyojayoti the Vedāntins run up against the following conundrum in their attempts to show that Brahman is alone real (satyam): Anything that is real must be established to be so by a valid means of knowledge. But if this valid means of knowledge is itself unreal it cannot establish the reality of
Brahman. On the other hand if it is real then something besides Brahman is real and non-dualism is refuted. 149

The MA mentions two other problems that result from adopting the Vedantins' thesis. These are that all worldly experience of all worldlings would be identical (bhogasāmyam) and moksa would become impossible. In the former case, since the Supreme Self is the only reality, all human beings, who are essentially only the Supreme Self, should experience the same things at the same time in the same way. But this goes against experience. One undertakes particular actions such as the study of the scriptures for certain ends. But the Vedantin texts such as "The Omnipresent assumes neither good nor bad actions" and "(In the Supreme Self) there is neither actor nor actions", etc., make the idea of there being different fruits from different actions accruing to different moral agents unintelligible. Since it is established perceptually that there are these differences, the theory of non-dualism is refuted. 150

Finally, since the Supreme Self supposedly brings forth the whole world of sentient and insentient beings out of itself periodically, even those who have attained release will be spawned forth into samsāra again at some point in the future. As such the moksa attained

149 MK, 132b, 133, 134a; MA, 13b, 14a.

150 MA, 14b and comm. p-69, L-12-20, p-70, L-1.
by the Vedantin would be about as valuable as a furrow made in water.

Such is the Saiva refutation of the Vedántins.
Sadyojyoti's dualism is a major opponent of Abhinavagupta in his Tantraloka (TA). The issue that is the core of that debate is the same as that which forms the topic of this essay and a study of this in-house Saiya polemic, replete with all of the strengths and weaknesses of high scholasticism, will form the final study in this essay on the philosophy of God in Kashmir Saiva Dualism.

What is the central issue between the Saiva dualists and Abhinavagupta? In general terms the issue is a problem of long standing in Indian (and not only Indian) thought. It is: Is there a second in addition to the one? In Saivism one asks the same question when one queries: Does anything exist which is not Siva? Whether the issue is how the world came to be (cosmogony) or the wrongness of the human condition and its righting (soteriology) the same theme runs through the whole of the debate between the Saiva dualists and Abhinavagupta. Abhinava consistently insists on the necessity of only the one (Siva) to explain both cosmogony and soteriology, whereas Sadyojyoti consistently insists on positing something other,
something ontologically separate from the One to explain the same phenomena.

The question whether or not the origin of the world requires a material cause (upādānakāraṇa: māyā, prakṛti) separate from the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa, i.e., Siva) is not a specifically Saiva debate. It has a place in the debate between the Vedantins and the Vaiṣeṣikas for example. But the debate over the ontological status of mala and its role in the soteriological scheme of things is a specifically Saiva debate (although the issue of the ontological status of ignorance or evil is central to other Indian philosophical debates and is the real issue in the Saiva debate over mala). We have seen that mala and Siva mutually make each other necessary. Thus, as the debate which follows will show, the discussion of one necessarily involves the discussion of the other.

In any case, in TA.IX and XIII the ‘other’ or the second which is separate and hence threatening to the one is taken to be mala (and not māyā as one might expect). Thus the debate in these sections of the TA is a soteriological rather than cosmological debate. But even having said this it has to be kept in mind that for both Abhinavagupta and Sadyojyoti soteriology and

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1 Cf. BS,II,2,17.

2 Cf. above,Ch.1,p-23.
cosmology are not radically separate compartments and so, in Abhinava's eyes, whatever entity the dualists posit, whether the name of that entity be mala or māyā, the positing of that entity poses the same threat: There will be ontological rupture in the heart of the one, which latter is, for Abhinava, a seamless unity.

At its core then, the ensuing debate can be understood in the following way: Abhinava, the monist, is happy to admit that explaining the world and man's place in it requires that the "House of Light" be a many-roomed mansion. Sadyojyoti, the dualist too, is happy to admit that the "House of Light" has many rooms, but he also insists that explaining the world and man's place in it requires the admission that there is something in the world that is so radically different that there is no room within the "House of Light" for it. It has its own separate abode, the "House of Darkness," and the substance of this House is radically and eternally different from the former.

**SUMMARY OF ABHINAVA'S ATTEMPT TO REFUTE SADYOJYOTI IN THE TA**

The following is the manner in which Abhinavagupta and his commentator Jayaratha attempt to
refute the position of Sadyojyoti that mala is a substance separate from Siva.

We know that according to Sadyojyoti the root cause of bondage is that the souls have been beginninglessly covered with mala and that the only way to remove this is by the grace of Siva. Jayaratha introduces Abhinava's refutation of the above theory by asking how, if everything is really the shining forth of the Lord, can there be the existence of this separate reality mala which is said to be different from the Lord? For the point has just been made in the TA that mala is not something separate from the Lord. It is, rather, the hiddenness of perfection which perfection itself brings about by its own will. Mala is merely the state of unknowing (ajñāna) which state the Lord effects in himself, by himself. When the Lord chooses not to shine forth fully, this is mala. Abhinava answers that mala is described in certain āgamas as a substance separate from the Lord in the same sense in which the earth, which is not really anything separate from the Lord is described as being

3 TA, IX, p-60, L-7ff.

4 Ibid, L-1ff. Ajñāna has been earlier defined (TA, I, 26) as a knowing that does not entirely illuminate its object. Thus ajñāna, like mala, is not a separate substance from Śiva. For the diminution of the absolute power of knowing of the Lord is playfully implemented by the Lord himself on himself.
so. Both mala and the earth are really the shining forth of the Lord himself. That is, when the Lord's will assumes the form of a vase a vase is there, when it desires to veil itself, mala is there. Jayaratha notes that mala shines forth as separate from the Lord but is in fact not at all an independent entity since it is caused by the Lord. Abhinava says that the situation between the Lord and mala is not like that between external objects (carts for example) which are mutually independent of one another (though they too are finally dependent on the Lord). Since mala is ultimately dependent on the shining forth of the Lord for its existence it is not a separate entity.

According to the dualists mala is ubiquitous. If this were so, and if mala binds by its mere presence, it would bind not only bound souls but also released souls and Śiva himself. If it is contended, to avoid this unwelcome conclusion, that mala does not bind by mere presence but it binds by saktis (powers) specific to each soul so that these powers may not operate toward

5 TA,66b,67a.
6 TA,65,66a.
7 TA,p-62,L-3ff.
8 TA,67b.
9 TA,p-61,L-11.
10 TA,68a.
certain souls or toward Śiva, for certain reasons, this is not unreasonable, then Jayaratha goes to some length to show that the idea of attributing saktis to mala gets the dualist nowhere. First of all, it may be that the saktis of mala, like mala itself, bind by mere presence. If so all would be bound as before. If not it has to be assumed that the attributes (saktis) have a quality which the substance (mala) of which they are attributes has not. Namely the ability to discriminate that certain souls are to be bound and others are not. Mala is agreed by all to be insentient and so must be its saktis: for a substance and its attributes can never possess opposite characteristics. Blue can never become non-blue. As a result this discriminative ability can belong to neither mala nor its saktis for both are essentially insentient. Jayaratha also rejects the possibility that mala could not bind the Lord by its mere presence because the Lord has been without mala for

Śiva is exempt because he is, by definition, beginningless omniscient, etc., the liberated souls are so because they are non-evolving and bondage means evolution.

12 TA, p-62, L-14ff to p-64, L-9. The refusal to allow distinction between substance and attribute which is the basis of the Jayaratha's attempt to disallow the possession of saktis on the part of mala, is the basis of Feuerbach's disproof of the existence of God (cf. John Hick, ed., The Existence of God. Feuerbach selection, passim). It should be kept in mind that what Jayaratha disallows to the dualists in his refutation of them he will amply allow to his own position in other places. Cf. p-310ff. below, for example.
all time, for the obscuration of the Lord by mala had begun to be accomplished at an equally beginningless date.\textsuperscript{13}

The dualist may try to say that it is the Lord himself who directs the powers of obscuration of mala. But in that case the question is "Towards which souls? The ones with or without mala?" In the former case his so doing would be redundant since those souls are already bound by mala. In the latter case his doing so would result in mala binding even the released souls.\textsuperscript{14}

The dualist may now say that mala is a separate substance which veils the powers of the soul like a cloth veils a pot. In such a case there is no danger that the essence of the bound soul be destroyed, for the powers of the souls which comprise its essence will still be there in the soul. It is just that they will not be manifest.\textsuperscript{15} This understanding of mala is rejected.

The reason given in rejecting the above conception of mala is that Śiva, seeing that the souls are veiled, would by this very seeing, become infected with mala too. And since the dualists do not admit, as do the Vaiśeṣikas, that a substance and an attribute are

\textsuperscript{13} TA, 64, L-7ff.

\textsuperscript{14} TA, 69b, 70, 71a and comm.

\textsuperscript{15} TA, 65, L-10ff.
separable, if the attribute is obstructed there is absolute destruction of the essence. Now since mala veils the powers of the soul, and by Śiva's seeing this, Śiva's powers go, the essences of both the souls and Śiva are destroyed. It was shown before that the attributes of an entity are its essence. Thus the destruction of one destroys both.\textsuperscript{16}

According to Jayaratha, the dualist may now object saying that when a blanket veils the eyes, the eyes are not destroyed but only the power to see. This is rejected. The analogy is said to be unfit. For both the rays of light that are necessary for the eyes to see, and the blanket which blocks them are corporeal, whereas the power of knowledge of the soul is incorporeal. And an incorporeal entity cannot be veiled by anything whether corporeal or incorporeal.\textsuperscript{17}

Mala is known to be corporeal (mūrta) because it is fit to coalesce or not to coalesce with form (ākāra). (In either case it is still corporeal). As a corporeal substance it would be an object of knowledge of the knowing soul it is supposed to veil. Now since mala would be an object of, rather than the veil of the knowing soul under these circumstances, the conclusion is that the powers of knowing of the souls who are

\textsuperscript{16} TA,71b-75a and comm.

\textsuperscript{17} TA,75b,76a and comm.
omniscient would still be unobstructed by anything. That is, they would still know all objects, mala just being one object among others. So all souls would be omniscient (which is absurd since experience shows this not to be the case).\textsuperscript{18}

Jayaratha now represents the dualist as objecting that there is an example of an incorporeal entity, darkness, veiling the light, so in the same way mala could be incorporeal and veil the equally incorporeal power of knowledge of the soul. This is rejected when Abhinava says that the atoms of light are obstructed by the atoms of darkness and that both kinds of atoms are corporeal. So there is nothing to the dualist's objection.\textsuperscript{19}

Now the dualist tries to bring forward the idea that the insentient mala can veil the sentient soul in the same way as the insentient alcohol veils the sentient man who drinks it. This Abhinava rejects.\textsuperscript{20} But it is here in this rejection that cracks begin to appear in Abhinava's argument. He states an axiom one encounters frequently in Saiva texts, that the sentient cannot act or desist from acting without a sentient

\textsuperscript{18} TA, 76b77a and comm. P-69, L-4. I read ākāra not akāra.

\textsuperscript{19} TA, 77b-78a and comm.

\textsuperscript{20} TA, 78b and comm.
being supervising it. Thus it is really the will of the Lord which causes the alcohol to make the drinker happily, sadly or stupidly inebriated. The will of the Lord issues these different kinds of inebriation on the basis of the karma of the drinker. Abhinava has committed two faults. First he has allowed himself what, only a few pages back, he denied to his opponent. If the Lord is infected by mala merely by seeing that they are bound by mala, certainly by supervising the powers of the insentient alcohol's powers he must be equally effected and hence would himself become insentient. Second, Abhinava cannot admit that the Lord depends on karma in dispensing the effects of alcohol, for to depend on anything other than his own will would mean loss of independence which must be unacceptable to Abhinava. In fact Jayaratha seems to sense that there is something wrong with Abhinava's replies to the dualist here for he adds an additional point of his own. He says that drunkenness accrues to those parts of the human being which are made of prāṇa (breath), etc., (i.e., the insentient parts) and not to the essence of the human being which is pure sentiency. The reason he gives is

21 TA, 79b. Cf. also Ch. IV above p-60, 61 and below p-20.

22 TA, 80b, 81a.

23 TA, 73a.
that the essence of the soul, which is pure sentiency, cannot be veiled. But even this says nothing since, both for Abhinava and Jayaratha, each individual soul is a contracted form of the Lord, willed to be so by the Lord himself. Each individual soul is the hiddenness of the Lord. What is hidden? Precisely the powers of knowing and doing all things. That is, precisely what Jayaratha here says cannot be hidden.

If the dualist still insists that the powers of māla are impelled or directed by the Lord's will the former reductio ad absurdum results. In addition, if the strange situation be admitted that the Lord (maliciously, like Descartes hypothetical deceiver God) tries to impel the powers of māla toward the souls who have no māla (ie. the released souls) then since the Lord on the one hand and the released souls on the other are equally devoid of māla and by implication equally powerful, the released souls, since they out number the Lord must prevail. Hence they would cause the powers of

24 Ta, P-71, L-14.

25 The whole of Abhinava's answer concerning the alcoholic beverage is an example of a monist, if need be, assuming dualistic premises. The same thing happens, when, in the Advaita tradition, epistemological dualism is subscribed to in the theory of two truths.

26 Cf. above, p-345.
mala to bind him rather than the reverse, which is absurd. 27

There is a curious error in the above argument which hinges on the mistaken notion that there are degrees of infinity. That is, that a number of all-powerful beings are stronger than just one. It is the same as if one were to suppose that there are degrees of possibility rather than probability. A thing is either possible or not. There are no degrees admissible here since the Law of Excluded Middle applies to the case in question. But a thing can have degrees of probability. Similarly, a thing either has infinite power or not. If it does have it the implication is that it is the only being which does since there cannot be two infinities in the universe (which is admittedly an argument against dualism, but that is not the point here since the monist Abhinava is himself making the error of assuming that there can be many omnipotent beings. 28 If he is not really assuming this his argument really does not work). But even if it were possible to have numerous all-powerful beings the all-powerfulness of any one of them would still be exactly equal to the all-powerfulness of

27 TA, p-72; L-15ff., and 82b, 83a.
28 Cf. for a discussion of this same point, the conclusion to the first section, p-233.
all of the others combined since infinity multiplied by any number one wishes still only equals infinity.

Jayaratha makes exactly the same error in his commentary to this verse, but surprisingly he makes it twice. The second time is when he affirms that many all-powerful souls must be more powerful than one as per the above. But earlier in the radically different context of setting up the reductio ad absurdum he makes a statement to the effect that even though mala is the binder of men beginninglessly the Lord's impulsion of that mala must be even earlier (lit. more beginningless), since the sentient cannot act without the impulsion of the sentient. The idea is that both mala and the Lord are beginningless but that the Lord's beginninglessness is of an earlier vintage. The error is to suppose there are degrees of beginninglessness. (It is not impossible that both Abhinava and Jayaratha are having some fun here caricaturing the dualists, which is always a welcome sign of sanity. But still, humorous bad logic remains bad logic. No matter how hard one laughs 2 plus 2 does not become 5).

29 TA, p-72, L-7ff.

30 The dilemma on p-345 above, referred to on p-349 above.

31 aditaram
Jayaratha introduces the concluding verse of this discussion by saying that this verse makes the essential point (i.e., that mala cannot be anything separate from the Lord): 32

Thus the appearance of mala is really the (Lord's) free will which is his essence (manifesting). This has already been limned by me (Abhinava) extensively elsewhere (in Āhnika I, 2, 3ff.) So enough! (TA, IX, 83b, 84a).

But it is not enough. For Abhinava returns to the same topic again in Āhnika XIII of the TA and there the discussion is about three times the length of this discussion in Āhnika IX. It seems that the philosophical position that Sadyojayoti represented sorely bothered the great Kashmiri aesthetician.

The topic of mala is raised in Āhnika XIII within the context of a search for some factor which distinguishes the released souls from the bound. The suggestion arises that ignorance (ajñāna) which is to be conceived as a veil covering the powers of knowing and doing of the souls is the cause of bondage. 33 The removal of this veil constitutes release. The veil is one but possesses many powers. It is identified as mala in a verse quoted by Jayaratha 34 and in verse 49 by Abhinava.

32 TA, p-73, L-8.
33 TA, Āhnika XIII, p-29, L-14.
34 TA, p-30, L-4.
Now a series of questions are asked which are
designed to show the absurdity of the concept.

Is this māla generated by another entity? If so
which one? It cannot be māyā for all effects of māyā are
insentient and act indiscriminantly which would result
in all being bound.

But if not produced by another entity it must be
unproduced and therefore be eternal. Hence all would be
eternally bound. On the other hand if it is somehow
destructible, since it is one, all will be released upon
the release of one. 35

Mala cannot be no-thing (avastu) since it
possesses causal efficiency (arthakāritvam). That is, it
has an effect, namely the veiling of the powers of the
souls. 36

Mala cannot be said to be a form of sentiency
since the sentient cannot be veiled by the insentient. 37

After having repeated the argument concerning
the absurdity of the māla binding either the souls which
already have māla or those which have been liberated,
the text reaches a point, according to Jayaratha, where
māla, having been partially defined in the preceding

35 TA, 44b-47b and comm.
36 TA, 48a and comm.
37 TA, 48b and comm.
discussion, is now fully defined. Thus according to the dualist, mala is one, real, eternal, beginninglessly (lit. eternally) attached to the various souls, insentient and the cause of the seed of transmigration. Jayaratha explains that mala is the root cause, whether directly or indirectly, of the other two kinds of mala: māyīyamala and karmamala. It is important to note this since it becomes clear that the largest category is mala and not karma or māya. The refutation of mala rather than māya as the main threat of the dualist makes more sense if it is understood that māya is subsumed under the larger category of mala.

The dualist's position concerning release of the bound souls is now depicted. When the paralysing powers of this mala cease to act on the soul, the soul is touched by the grace of Śiva and regains the powers that had been veiling it. Depending on whether the paralysing powers of mala completely or only partially cease to function, there is complete or only partial recovery of the soul's powers. Thus there are differences among the souls. Liberation comes from the descent of the grace of the Lord and this descent of grace depends on the maturation of the mala of the individual soul.

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38 TA, P-34, L-4ff.
39 TA, 49 and comm.
40 TA, 50-52 and comm.
In his commentary Jayaratha identifies all of the above with the name of Kheṭapala (Sadyojyoti) and others. 41

In verse 53 Abhinava begins his refutation of this idea of *mala*, noting that the topic has been dealt with previously (Jayaratha: in the IXth *Āhnikā*). Jayaratha insists that there is still no redundancy since some new things will be said in the refutation that is to follow. 42

The first question the dualist is asked is "What exactly is the maturation of *mala*?" If it means that *mala* is destroyed then all will be released simultaneously since *mala* is one. 43 (Jayaratha, has above, p-8, denied the possibility of *mala* possessing many powers)

*Mala* is said to be beginningless. If so, it cannot be destroyed and there will be no liberation. The dualist may reply that there is an example of a beginningless entity being destroyed in 'previous non-existence' (*prañabhatvatvam*). The 'previous non-existence' of a pot, for example, which latter exists beginninglessly, is destroyed when the pot arises. Such is the case for *mala* too. If this answer is admitted for

41 *TA*, p-36, l-17.
42 *TA*, p-37, l-8.
43 *TA*, 54.
the sake of argument, the further question becomes, is this destruction of mala caused or uncaused?44

The following are the arguments against the possibility that the destruction of mala is caused. What is the cause? If cannot be karma since karma generates experience and does not destroy experience. That is, karma's function is always positive and not negative. Nor can the will of the Lord be the cause, whether that will be understood to act in dependence on some other factor or independently. It cannot be that the will of the Lord depends on some factor other than itself in destroying mala. For what could that other factor be? He cannot depend on the degree of maturaion of karma or māyā of the individual soul (for he would not be independent then). Nor is it fitting that in the destruction of mala that the Lord be dependent on that same mala. And it cannot be that the will of the Lord acts without depending on some other factor in the destruction of māla for the Lord himself is impartial (and would thus have no internal criteria for the bondage of certain souls and the bondage of others).45

Next it is said that if the destruction of mala

44 TA, 55,56a. This specific question is raised by Jayaratha at p-38, L-17ff.

45 Cf Jayaratha's comm., p-38,L-17ff to p-39,L-7 and TA,56b.
is not caused by anything it should happen immediately. The idea here seems to be that only if the destruction of mala had a cause which was delayed for some reason, could there be the expectation that the destruction of mala would not happen immediately. If there is no such cause the destruction should occur at once.

Jayaratha introduces the next verse by presenting an opponent as contending that the destruction of mala goes on every moment, so that mala is made up of a series of identical moments which are destroyed the instant they arise. Due to the identical nature of these moments, this form of destruction is never noticed. This appears to be the grafting of the Buddhist theory of momentariness onto Saivism in defence of the theory of mala. I am not aware of this argument having been used by any Saiva dualist writer. It seems to go against the whole idea of mala being a beginningless, enduring entity which is one. In any case, if mala were momentary as described, its eternity would result, since only dependent things can be destroyed and the moment which occurs in the mala.

46 Cf. Jayaratha's comm., p-38,L-10ff, and TA,57 and comm.

series is independent of all else, hence would be indestructible. 48

But all of this assumes that mala is destructible when in fact it is not. An eternal entity whose existence does not depend on birth cannot be destroyed. A beginningless entity must also be endless or indestructible. The example of 'previous non-existence' of the pot is not fitting. For it is a sheer nothing devoid of any state capable of being subject to any kind of definition. If it were somehow conceived as being existent, then only could it be amenable to some sort of definition, whence it might be possible to say that it would be eternal due to its beginninglessness. 49

Now the dualist is depicted as taking a different tack, arguing that the annihilation of mala does not consist in the destruction of mala itself, but only in the neutralization of mala's powers which cause the obstruction of the soul's powers. The refutation of this position consists of a repetition of the arguments which we have already seen. It is said that if the powers of mala are neutralized through the precess of

48 TA, 57b and comm.

49 TA, 58 and comm. This way of reading this verse and commentary, i.e., that an eternal thing (whose existence) does not depend on birth makes more sense to me than Prof. Gnoli's "Non si e mai visto poi che una cosa permanente, nata indipendentemente da ogni causa si annichili." (The annihilation of a permanent entity, born independently of any cause, is never observed).
mala becoming mature, just as by certain means the effects of poison or fire can be neutralized, then should it happen that the cause of the neutralization of the powers of mala, poison or fire ever disappear, the effects of mala, etc., would return. 50 Here Abhinava brings up a real problem for dualism: since the other always exists it may return.

Following this a number of arguments occur which have been seen before. There is thus no need to repeat them. The next new argument occurs when a long discussion is begun on the topic of the Lord's being the neutralizer of the powers of mala. The questions concerning whether or not there is a criterion external to the Lord are repeated in the same manner in which they were previously. But now a new phenomenon is named upon which the Lord depends in effecting or refraining from the neutralization of the powers of mala. It is karmasamya (lit. karmic equilibrium). 51

Karmasamya has been conceived in at least three different ways. 52 One is the situation where two extremely strong karmas of opposite nature attempt to fructify simultaneously and become grid-locked. This

50 TA, 59, 60 and comm.

51 TA, 66, 67 and comm.

52 Cf. Aghoraśiva's discussion at MA VII, 6 and a briefer discussion at RT, 311. See also Sivaraman, pp-394-396 and notes.
jams up the lesser karmas. This paralysis of karmic fruition is the condition for the descent of grace from the Lord and the subsequent neutralization of the powers of mala followed by the release of the soul. This is the conception of karmasāmya about to be refuted. I am not aware of Sadyojyoti ever discussing karmasāmya though his commentators do so. In the discussion of karmasāmya of Aghora and Ramakantha, this conception of karmasāmya is rejected. Another conception of karmasāmya is that good and bad karmas as two large masses become balanced at some point and this is the occasion for the descent of grace and the release of the soul. I am not aware of Sadyojyoti or his commentators having embraced this conception of karmasāmya. Narayanakantha, the father of Ramakantha, seems to have conceived of karmasāmya in this way. The third way of conceiving karmasāmya is as mental equanimity. This is the situation where one does not rejoice at the fruition of karma which benefits one nor despair at that which does not benefit one. This mental attitude is the condition for the descent of grace via dīkṣā. This is the

53 For Aghora's thinking on this see the previous fn. For Ramakantha see NIP, p-258,259 and MK comm. to §70. (Since the pagination of the Devakottai ed. of the MK is confused, no page number is given in the previous reference).

54 Cf. his comm. to MA, VII, 6.
conception of karmasāmya Upheld by Aghorasiva.55 I have not been able to discover Ramakantha's conception of the relationship between karma and the maturation of mala although it is clear that he sees the descent of grace to depend on both in some sense. He (and Kṣemarāja also mentions this idea)56 quotes a passage on a couple of occasions to the effect that an unmixed entity cannot transform, so that unless mala be mixed with karma, it would never mature. So perhaps he thought of karma as a kind of yeast which, when added to the dough or mala, made it rise or mature.57

Since the long refutation of karmasāmya is of a conception of karmasāmya Aghora certainly did not hold toward Sadyojyati and Ramakantha probably did not hold to, I give only the broadest summary of it.

As mentioned above, karmasāmya is limned in the TA as the grid-locking of all karmic fruition by the attempt to fructify of two enormously powerful karmas of opposite nature at the same time. The example usually given of two such karmas is the horse-sacrifice as the good karma and the killing of a brahmin as the bad. The

55 RT, p-105; and his comm. on MAvrtti VII, 6.
56 Cf. his comm. on Svachchanda, pataila 5, p-84: (mala) karmabhisca saha parinamati, amiśrasya parinamāyogat: mala evolves (matures) along with (by means of) the karmas. For an unmixed entity does not evolve.
57 NIP, p-151. Also in a different context but with the same import, p-155. See also NIP, p-259.
Lord, perceiving this grid-locking, zaps the mala of the individual soul involved and the soul is released from bondage.\textsuperscript{58}  

The refutation consists of the following arguments. \textit{Karma} is sequential. Therefore the fruition of any two \textit{karmas} simultaneously is impossible. Thus grid-locking of two \textit{karmas} is \textit{ex hypothesi}, an absurdity.\textsuperscript{59}  

But even granting that there can be \textit{karmasāmya} as limned, the question arises concerning whether or not the lesser \textit{karma} will fructify. For example do life-sustaining \textit{karmas} still function during this grid-locking? If they do then everything will be as before. There will really be nothing special about \textit{karmasāmya} since the majority of \textit{karmas} will go on fructifying as before. But if the life-sustaining \textit{karmas} do not function during the grid-locking of these two big \textit{karmas} then immediate death will result.\textsuperscript{60}

If the advocate of \textit{karmasāmya} insists that there is grid-locking of only the \textit{karmas} which give fruit and not those that sustain life the question is what

\textsuperscript{58} TA, 68, 69 and comm. Note that the grid-locking leads to mental equanimity. But this latter is the sign of and not the cause of grid-locking. For Aghora, on the other hand, the even-minded attitude towards all \textit{karmas} is the sign that \textit{mala} is mature in the individual. But this even-mindedness has nothing to do with the fortuitous grid-locking of two big \textit{karmas}.

\textsuperscript{59} TA, 70 and comm.

\textsuperscript{60} TA, 71, 72 and comm.
possible reason could the Lord have for zapping the mala
of the individual soul only when there is grid-locking
of the karmas which give fruit and not when all karmas,
including those which are life-sustaining, are grid-
locked? (There is no reason so this is absurd). 61

In addition, hundreds of times' there is absence
of happiness and sadness in a person's life and still
there is no descent of grace. 62

Space and time are not subjective but are
objective and common to all, thus there can be no
special significance of one time (i.e., moment in time)
from another. Now if karmaśāmya is a special moment in
time upon which the Lord depends to send his grace, then
that moment all will simultaneously be released. 63

Since karma, its fruition and the individual to
whom the fruition accrues are equally beginningless they
are all at the same moment of time. That is, all karma,
for all souls will be at exactly the same stage of
ripeness since all souls, karma and fruits began at the
same time, i.e., 'beginningless' time. It is the same as
when two fruit of the same tree ripen at the same time
or almost the same time. 64 (This whole argument rests on

61 TA, 72 and comm.
62 TA, 73 and comm.
63 TA 74 and comm.
64 TA, 75 and comm.
the mental blunder of assuming that two beginningless entities had the same 'starting point in time' and will thus be the same age, when the idea of a beginningless entity is precisely that it has no determinable starting point in time. So beginninglessness is no grounds for positing equality of maturity).

Only if one of the three, the soul, the karma or its fruits were not beginningless could there be avoidance of the simultaneous release of all.\(^{65}\) (And the dualist cannot admit that any of the three are beginningless so he is reduced to absurdities).

As a short aside Abhinava notes that the same argument dispenses with the idea that karma (and not \(\text{apohanasakti of Siva}\)) is responsible for variegation in the world. Jayaratha explains that if all karma is beginningless it must be uniform (in every sense). Thus there would be no variety in karma and none in the world which is caused by karma. But since there is variety in the world it must be caused by something other than karma. The opponent (it does not seem to me to be Sadyojyoti or his commentators) may try to explain the variety in the world on the basis of a couple of other factors such as 'desire for experience due to karmic residue' and this due to the power of 'power of necessity' or to 'passion'. But by continually asking

\(^{65}\) TA 76 and comm.
how these arise Abhinava and Jayaratha eventually get the desired vicious circularity in the opponents' argument and reduce him to absurdity. 66

If the variation in the world is, according to the opponent, due to the will of God, then the question becomes, what does the will of God depend upon? Itself or some other factor? Neither is a possibility. 67

At this point a debate arises with the Mīmāṃsāka position that there is no need to search for another cause for the variegation in the world for the world has always been as it is now, in a variegated state and the same goes for karma. So since this is the nature of karma there is no need to search for another cause. 68

There is no need for us to examine the argument since it is irrelevant for our purposes.

At verse 88 Abhinava returns to the idea of karmasāmya and asks why it is not possible for a third

66 TA, 77-81a and comm.
67 TA, 81b and comm.
68 TA, 82 and comm. This is, in fact, an extremely powerful argument. It is the same argument that Hume uses in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to refute that most ubiquitous of arguments for the contingent existence of the world and the necessary existence of God, the argument from design. It simply says that design does not originate in anything outside of the world's own nature. The naturalist's answer to the question -- "Where does order in this world come from?" -- which the theist answers by positing the existence of God, is to say "That just happens to be the way things are."
karma to arise at the time of the grid-locking of two big karmas? There is no reason why this should not happen. Now if such is the case there is nothing special about karmasāmya as a condition for the descent of grace and the release of the soul. 69

If karmasāmya ever happened as the opponent describes, the moment after the grid-locking of the two big karmas, they would not, on their own, desist from being grid-locked but rather would remain that way. Thus the grid-locking would continue. And if, as a consequence of this, the lesser karmas are prevented from fructifying, the body would die and the soul would attain moksa. Thus the descent of grace from the Lord would be superfluous. And since the state of karmasāmya is fortuitous in that the attempt, on the part of the two big karmas, to fructify at the same time has nothing to do with effort on the part of the individual involved, even the undisciplined will attain moksa. 70

Jayaratha quotes the following verse to this effect: If one finds honey everywhere, why go to the mountain?

Now if the opponent says that the lesser karmas which are restricted from fructifying due to the grid-locking of the two big karmas fructify in the future when the two big karmas become un-grid-locked, the

69 TA, 88, 89, and comm.
70 TA, 89b-92a and comm.
question becomes what causes this end to karmasāmya? Does it happen on its own? If so it must happen immediately which would result in karmasāmya not being a special occasion in any sense and therefore not the wanted condition for the descent of grace from the Lord. If it does not happen on its own the cause must be found which makes it happen. (Since none can be found this is absurd). 71

Karmasāmya cannot be the condition for the descent of grace for it has no variety in it. For example if two souls are both in karmasmāya one does not deserve more grace than the other on the basis of karmasāmya for on that basis they are all equal. But it is known that the Lord gives grace slowly, medium and quickly (strongly) and karmasāmya gives him no criteria to give grace to various souls in this variety of ways. 72

Having thus refuted the idea that grace (anugraha) has some condition specific to the individual soul connected to its descent, the idea of the obscuration of the soul's powers by the Lord (tirobhāva) on the basis of some characteristic of the individual

71 TA, 92b-94a and comm.
72 TA, 94b-95a and comm.
is shown to be absurd.\textsuperscript{73} The arguments used are all familiar and there is no need to repeat them.

Beginning with verse 98 a number of other possible conditions are listed which the Lord supposedly depends on in the giving or withholding of grace. These conditions include detachment, distaste for worldly experience, arising of discriminative knowledge, the keeping of the company of the wise, adoration of the Lord, continuous study or meditation, meditation on the occurrence of a calamity, completion of the group of (karmic) experiences, and knowledge of the Lord.\textsuperscript{74} It is clear that at least in the case of Aghorasiva, conditions or outward signs such as these were the indicators that the mala of the individual involved was nearly mature. He speaks of signs of the maturation of mala and quotes scripture as saying that eagerness, longing for moksa, distaste for worldly existence, love for the devotees of Siva and faith in the instructors of Saivism are the signs that an individual should be initiated (which brings the descent of the grace of the Lord and the final removal of mala).\textsuperscript{75} So the position

\textsuperscript{73} TA,95b-96a and comm.

\textsuperscript{74} TA,98-100a and comm.

\textsuperscript{75} Cf. his comm. to TTN 16 and 26.
limned here is one that Aghora held and the same can be said for Sadyojyoti with less clear textual support. 76

The refutation of all of these conditions takes the same form according to Abhinava. Jayaratha details it as follows. A thing can be conceived to be caused or uncaused. Now if the descent of grace is conceived to be uncaused, whether this is so always or only sometimes makes no difference since no causality occurs between the descent of grace and its 'non-cause'. Conversely, if the descent of grace is caused, this grace must be always forthcoming or only so episodically. It is not the former (since all would be saved at once). But if it is the latter, what causes the episodic functioning of the descent of grace? It cannot be the will of the Lord for that begs the question. Nor is it the maturation of māla or karmasāmya as has been shown. Thus the conclusion is that when there is the descent of grace it is the Lord alone, upon whom it is considered to depend and not on any other factor. It is not fitting that there be any other factor since limitation of the Lord by any factor external to him is impossible. 77

There is no necessary concomitance between the descent of grace and dispassion, constant meditation, etc., whether these latter be taken singly or all

76 Cf. for eg. TTN, 17.
77 TA, p-66L-13 to p-67, L-11.
together. They cannot be taken all together since no one has ever seen anyone possessed of all of these qualities at once. And they cannot be taken singly since Buddhists are dispassionate and Siva never gives them any grace. Also it is impossible to speak of these qualities as being absolutely disparate in nature. One cannot say that dispassion, for example is radically different from distaste for the world. As such the Lord would not be dependent on only one thing in the dispensation of grace but would be dependent on many things. Now if there is loss of dependence due to depending on one thing there must be more of this if more than one thing is depended upon. Thus all of this idea of the Lord depending on external factors in the dispensation of grace is unproven.78 "Fie on all that!" says Jayaratha.79

Having thus "refuted" Sadyojyoti's idea of mala one might wonder what the conception of mala is that Abhinava had. A brief examination of this will be worthwhile to show the strength of the dualist's position. For at significant points Abhinava, the monist, sounds exactly like Sadyojyoti the dualist and it is always instructive to observe this.

Abhinava's theory of mala is similar to that of Sadyojyoti in that it boils down to a flat statement of

78 TA,100b,101a and comm.
(in Abhinava's case) monist dogma. Also any reasons that he or his commentator try to give in support of their theory will be open to the same method of refutation that they have used against the dualists. On top of all of this their own theory is as lacking in coherence as is that of the dualists. The limning of Abhinava's own theory begins at verse 102. His theory, in broad outline, is as follows. The Lord himself, who consists of free, independent sentiency, amuses himself by concealing his real nature and becoming the multiple individual souls. His real nature is concealed in the sense that his omnipotence and omniscience are reduced so that in the form of an individual soul he can only know and do in a limited manner. He does all this depending on no other cause than himself. In the same way, when he so desires, he recovers his original state by his own power depending on nothing else. 80

Now Jayaratha represents the dualist as asking how it is if the above is true, that it is only in certain individuals and at certain times that there is the manifestation of the true self (i.e. that one is in fact Siva which means the attainment of moksa)? The answer is a flat statement of dogmatism which does not at all answer the question. The reply, then, is that,

80 TA, 102-105 and comm.
since according to the monism that Abhinava subscribes to no individual soul exists who is not Siva in essence, no questioner exists who can ask the dualist's question! The Lord is simply of such a nature that he shines forth (as both the pure and impure selves). Abhinava thus 'solves' the problem of the differing fates of souls by denying their individual existences. For Rāmākṛṣṇa this is madness since deserts would not determine mokṣa.

Abhinava has stated that the essential nature of a thing cannot be questioned. But it should be remembered that if this is so, the attribution by the dualists, of a certain nature to mala, as is done in their definition of it also cannot be questioned for that is simply its nature. And that is the end of the question whether it makes good sense or not. Nor does it help to quote an authority in support of the nature of

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81 TA, 106, 107 and comm.

82 NIP, p-152 and p-259. This reply of Abhinava to the dualists is an example of the fascist attitude non-dualists display not infrequently. They will simply not admit that it is possible to have understood their position and disagree with it. Here this is expressed by saying that the dualist's serious question is illegitimate since he does not exist. The reply is certainly convenient but hardly convincing. It also has to be kept in mind that the political equivalent to the metaphysical position here expressed is to arrange it so that the opponent does not exist.

83 TA, 107.
the Lord being as Abhinava insists it is,\textsuperscript{84} since the dualists have their own texts.

Now Jayaratha represents the dualists as objecting as follows. Without some outside cause, when something is to be done, some action or the experiencing of the fruits of action, the soul would never act (and each individual soul is Śiva, so since souls depend on karma to act so does Śiva)\textsuperscript{85}. Abhinava's answer to this is to make an untenable distinction between the Lord as anu (the contracted individual soul) and the Lord in his original condition of having uncontracted powers. In the former case it is a simple given that there be dependence on other objects, like women, for example, for there to be experience. In the latter, dependence on an object is precluded by the Lord's being absolutely independent. This means that in the former case experience is by definition karma-born but in the latter it is innate in the Lord himself.\textsuperscript{86} But this distinction can easily be jack-hammered to pieces by the same method of dichotomy and dilemma as Abhinava and Jayaratha have used on the dualists. Are the Lord and the individual soul identical or not? If the former the Lord himself is dependent on karma to act and thus his freedom is

\textsuperscript{84} TA,108-109b.

\textsuperscript{85} TA, p-73,L-8.

\textsuperscript{86} TA,p-73,L-8.
compromised. If the latter Abhinava gives up his own пакша (position) and becomes a dualist. (What is good for the goose is good for the gander).

Jayaratha now has an objector bring the following charge against Abhinava: All theoreticians accept that both мала and карма are beginningless, but here there is the impression that both of these appear only when the Lord chooses to become contracted. How is this to be reconciled? The answer is that both exist beginninglessly as the desire of the Lord, to conceal himself. Their essential existence thus has no beginning in time. Мала is thus not an entity separate from the Lord. It is defined by Abhinava as the desire of Perfection — for complete fulfillment by becoming many; for imperfection is really the Hiddenness of Perfection.

In every instance where the dualist has insisted that this or that entity can find no room in the 'House of Light' Abhinava has tried to show that there is room. The Lord, for Abhinava, ingests the whole universe, whereas for the dualist, there are things in the universe which even the Lord cannot ingest.

87 TA, p-74, l-1ff.
88 TA, 11b, 11a and comm.
89 TA, 11b, 112a. This is, for me, the most arresting verse by Abhinava of those studied in this chapter.
The central conception of monism is reiterated subsequent to the above: Since nothing in the universe can exist without the Lord, mala, etc., have to be understood as being caused by the Lord.\textsuperscript{90}

Following the above it is said that the Lord, in those functions which involve contraction of his essence into the ontological level of the individual souls, depends on karma and māyā, but in those functions that do not, he does not so depend. That is, of the five functions traditionally attributed to the Lord in Saivism (creation, maintenance, and destruction of the world, hiding and revealing himself) he depends on karma and māyā in effecting the first three but not the last two.\textsuperscript{91} Jayaratha, sensing a problem here, represents an objector asking how the Lord can be one and still have such different characteristics. This, says the objector, is like a person who has a body, only half of which grows old.\textsuperscript{92} This objection is not directly answered, rather an attempt is made to show that, in spite of logical problems it must be so. Thus in giving and withholding of grace (i.e., revealing and concealing himself to the souls) there can be no dependence on karma, mala, or māyā. The reason is that the causes of

\textsuperscript{90} TA,112b,113a.

\textsuperscript{91} TA,113b,144.

\textsuperscript{92} TA,p-77,L-10.
the contracted state cannot be used in its alleviation just as what is used in the making of a pot is not used in its destruction. But this is indefensible since mala, etc., are ultimately not the cause of the state of being contracted. The Lord himself is. Thus there can be no legitimate reason for him to depend on mala, etc., in the carrying out of certain functions and not to do so in others. Rāmakantha's fear of a radically independent Lord leading to madness in the world is not attenuated by Abhinava. To really handle this charge requires the admission of criteria for the Lord's actions which really are external to the Lord's will. That means that to really handle this charge would require that Abhinava become a dualist.

The discussion of the last two of the five activities of the Lord, that is, his concealing and revealing of himself or his withholding and granting of grace to the souls, all yields more massive cracks in Abhinava's theory. For example, in introducing verse 120b, 121a, Jayaratha leads us to expect that Abhinava

93 TA, 115-116a and comm.

94 The same situation was encountered by Augustine when he gave up his Manichean dualism. In this latter doctrine he had a convincing answer to the question 'whence evil?' which, given its premises, he could never find again in Christianity. This is why, once he became a Christian, the question bothered him sorely. For he knew that to answer it well he would have to become a Manichean again.
is going to demonstrate that the Lord is independent of external factors in the withholding of his grace just as he is supposed to be in the granting of grace. The purpose of this is apparently to avoid Sadyojyoti's idea that the Lord consistently withholds his grace from those souls whose mala is not yet mature. Now while it is true that Abhinava makes no mention of the Lord's depending on mala, etc., in carrying out this function, he is, nevertheless, dependent on certain characteristics of the individual souls. Thus he withholds his grace from the deceitful, etc. Yet this must destroy his independence just as surely as dependence on mala? Neither mala nor the souls are separate entities from the Lord. Why then should there be such fear of dependence on one and not on the other? It seems that everything is coming unravelled here for Abhinava.

The discussion of mala is concluded in this section of the TA with several quotations which would convince only those who already agree with Abhinava. Since they add nothing new to what has already been said there is no need to study them.

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95 TA, p-80, L-18 ff.
96 TA, 120b, 121a and comm.
SUMMARY OF SADYOJYOTI'S DEFENCE OF HIS PHILOSOPHY OF GOD AND CONCLUSION.

We have seen in chapter four that the Saiva Darsana writers went to great lengths to defend both the logical syllogism which they were convinced proved the existence of God and the cosmological/theological account of the creation of the world which their dualism espoused. The central point of the defence of the syllogism against the main opponent, the Buddhist, was to insist on the uniform nature of all effects and disallow the Buddhist distinction between natural objects and man-made artifacts. This made it possible for the Saivas to posit Siva as the cause of the whole world and to insist that the example of the pot, though admittedly a human artifact, legitimately supported the inference of God as the ultimate efficient cause. A good deal of the debate was involved with the question of whether or not the example (udhārana) of the syllogism supported the conclusion. Thus on the one hand we have the Buddhists contending that if it did then it would be kosher to infer that the potter also made the anthill, etc., and the Saivas insisting on the other that if it did not then it would be impossible to infer smoke on
the mountain on the analogy of fire and smoke in the hearth. There seems to me to be a profound sense in which this labyrinthine scholasticism boils down in the end, to something similar to those school-yard arguments we have as children: once all of the reasons that could conceivably bear on the issue have failed to settle it, the result is the following dialogue: "It is so"; "It is not"; "Is so"; "Is not"; "Is so"; "Is not".... until it's time for supper.

The cosmological/theological debates carried on mainly between the Saivas and the Mīmāṃsakas, Lokayatikas, Sāṃkhyaśa and Vedāntins in the last half of Chapter IV and then between the Saiva monists and the Saiva dualists in Chapter V have all of the strengths and weaknesses of high scholastic debate and not infrequently the issues are the same ones one encounters reading Islamic or Christian sources dealing with creation, God, the origin of evil, the nature of man, etc. Despite the scholastic tone of the polemics some perennial and really quite simple questions were being wrestled with such as whether reality is one or many, whether God is absolutely free in his giving of grace or whether he depends on a criteria external to himself, etc.

My own impression of the debate is that no one won. I have repeatedly tried to show that the methods
that are used by one side to defeat the other can be used against that same side just as effectively. Further, it seems to me that where this is not the case, what one runs up against is the fact that certain conceptions of things naturally possess the upper hand when it comes to trying to make sense of certain parts of our experience. Other conceptions of things will be equally strong in other circumstances. And no system that I have encountered has over-all superiority. Such a system may exist or if it does not it may not be an impossibility. I am not sure of this last point. This means that I am not sure whether or not I agree with Nāgārjuna, Śrīharṣa and Kant, who all saw philosophy as being essentially critical in nature.

Certainly the Saiva Darśana writers we have studied did not agree with them. Our writers believed they were dealing with realities about which one could get things right or wrong. Being right or wrong about these realities had consequences which were verifiable both in this life and in a final soteriological sense. This means that these Saiva Darśana writers were 'substance philosophers' who believed in a natural order in things. The theistic model which they follow with its concomitant wissenschaft leading to release only makes sense if there is something like substance, predictability and intrinsic purposefulness built into
things. This is in fact what the satkārya theory of causality posits. In this sense, if we look at the positions studied in Chapter V for example, the Śaiva Darsāna dualists are the 'Catholics' and Abhinava and Jayaratha are the 'Calvinists'.
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