THE DOCTRINE OF EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BHOΓA KĀRIKĀ

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ABSTRACT

The following dissertation consists of a study of an eighth century A. D. Sanskrit text dealing with the soteriological implications of the nature of "bhoga"—"mundane experience" or, more precisely, "empirical consciousness". The dissertation can be subdivided into two major sections. The first section consists of a critical discussion of the doctrine of bhoga in the Bhogakārikāvṛtti; the second section consists of an English translation of the Sanskrit text.

The following study of the Bhoga Kārikā and its commentary has as its major concern the explication of the idea of "bhoga" put forth in the text. According to the school of Saivism to which the author of the Bhoga Kārikā belongs, souls are by nature possessed of the two "capacities" (śakti) of consciousness and agency. Existing in a beginningless condition in the soul, these two capacities are obfuscated by the defiling power of a cosmic principle described as "mala". Due to this defilement the soul is forced into experiencing things in a limited manner, i.e., solely as an ego-personality whose self-understanding is both defined by and limited to the empirical sphere of experience.

In explicating the doctrine of bhoga expressed by Sadyojyoti and defended by his commentator Aghora Śiva, the dissertation takes up a discussion of the various polemics against other systems, such as the Buddhists, Čārvaka, Nyāya and Sāmkhya. As well, an attempt is made to point out the particular manner in which Sadyojyoti's doctrine of "bhoga" shares close affiliations with the schools of Mīmāṃsā and Sāmkhya-Yoga.
The text was translated under the guidance of Dr. S. S. Janaki, the Director of Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute in Madras. The Sanskrit text of the Bhoga Kārikā consists of 146 verses by a renowned Śaivite author, Sadyojyoti (8th c. A.D.) and a brief commentary by another renowned Śaivite author, Aghora Siva (14th c. A.D.). Although by themselves the verses are difficult to understand without the aid of the commentary, the commentary itself is written in simple Sanskrit prose. The Bhoga Kārikā is one of a host of Śaivite "manuals" that systematically define the essential teachings and particular themes of Āgamic Śaivism. Aghora Siva's commentary on the Bhoga Kārikā is typical of the commentaries accompanying most of these manuals: it is brief and polemical.

Chapter I of the dissertation deals with the authors Sadyojyoti and Aghora Siva in relation to the Śaivite tradition; as well, Chapter I treats the basic concepts of "bhoga" and "tattva" employed in the Bhoga Kārikā. Chapter II deals with the doctrine of the subtle and the gross elements, emphasizing the concern of the tattvic doctrine that each tattva is a sine qua non in the event of bhoga. Chapter III treats the sphere of the motor, sense and intellectual organs and the polemics against the Cārvākas and Nyāya concerning the role of "consciousness" in the sphere of empirical experience. The specific organs of the "antahkarana", i.e., manas, buddhi and ahāmkāra, are treated in Chapter IV. More epistemological issues are discussed in Chapter V, most notably the Śaivite doctrine that the soul has intrinsic to it the dual capacities (sakti) of consciousness and agency. The last chapter, Chapter VI, deals with the trans-buddhi conditions governing empirical consciousness.
and includes a discussion of the soteriological import of māyā and mala. Appendix I consists of the translation of the Bhoga Karikā Vṛtti while the transliteration of the text appears in Appendix II.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation has taken shape with the help of many friends, colleagues and teachers. I cannot thank them all, but I hope that the final completion of this work will in some small measure stand as a tribute to their support and encouragement. Special thanks are due to Drs. K. Sivaraman, J. G. Arapura and W. Whillier -- the "ratnatraya" so instrumental in my development as a student of Indian philosophy. I am especially indebted to Dr. K. Sivaraman, the chairperson of my supervisory committee, for his valued criticism, advice and encouragement. I first met Dr. Sivaraman in 1978 during a course in phenomenology given by Dr. G. B. Madison of the Philosophy Department, McMaster University; Dr. Sivaraman had been invited by Professor Madison to speak on the various conceptions of consciousness held in classical Indian thought. From this initial meeting and through the following years I spent studying Indian philosophy at McMaster University, Dr. Sivaraman's eloquence and perspicuity in discussing the most difficult epistemological and soteriological issues central to classical Indian thought inspired me to appreciate the original contributions of the early thinkers and to avoid the overly simplistic and philosophically superficial understanding of the central issues so pivotal to the Indian philosophical tradition. As well, I would like to thank Dr. Sivaraman for the personal attention he showed me both in his office and in his home. I owe both the gratitude and the honour of having studied with Dr. J. G. Arapura during my years as a student in the Religious Studies Department. Dr. Arapura's tenacity of thought as well
as his friendly demeanour, whether in the lecture hall or in peripatetic conversation, helped me root my studies in more fertile philosophical soil. I am greatly indebted to Dr. W. Whillier for having passed on, through the pedagogy of example, the importance of "integrity", whether it be in one's personal comportment or in one's philosophical convictions.

I would like to thank Dr. P. Granoff for her encouragement and attention during the early stages of my dissertation project and for her criticisms and suggestions concerning the first forty verses of my translation. I am also grateful to Dr. S. Panagiotou of McMaster University for accepting to be a member of my supervisory committee and for willing to enter into unaccustomed philosophical terrain. I would also like to take this opportunity to record my debt to Dr. S. S. Janaki, Director of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras; Dr. Janaki took time off from her busy schedule to read the Sanskrit text of the Bhogakārikāvṛtti with me during my stay in Madras. Without Dr. Janaki's assistance the early stages of my dissertation project would not have been possible. As well, I thank Dr. Janaki for introducing me to the world of the traditional Indian scholar, both at the research centre and in her home. The excellent facilities at the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Centre and the stimulation derived from the scholars and assistants associated with the Centre helped facilitate the progress of my studies while in Madras.

To the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute this dissertation owes a great deal: the fellowship the Institute awarded me was of the greatest importance to the development of the original material upon which my dissertation is based. I hope the Institute will feel that the
The completion of this dissertation was in some small measure justified.

To Mr. P. N. Malik of the Delhi Office of the Institute I owe a special note of thanks for the attention he paid to accommodate me in New Delhi and for expediting many of the details relating to my residence in India during the tenure of my fellowship.

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Finally, I would like to thank my wife Candy and my two sons, Calvin and Gabriel. I would especially like to thank my wife for her encouragement, forbearance and, above all, love during the writing of this work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... viii

FORWARD ................................................................................................................ xiii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... xx

I. AUTHOR, TEXT AND TRADITION ............................................................. 1

1. Author ......................................................................................................... 1
2. The Relation Between the Bhoga Kārikā and Raurava Agama .......... 4
3. The Doctrinal Relation Between the Bhoga Kārikā and the Raurava Agama ......................................................................................... 5
4. Aghora Siva, the commentator on the Bhoga Kārikā ....................... 8
5. The Manner in Which "bhoga" is introduced in the Bhoga Kārikā ... 10
6. The Concept of a tattva ........................................................................... 12

NOTES TO CHAPTER I ....................................................................................... 19

II. DOCTRINE OF THE SUBTLE AND GROSS ELEMENTS ..................... 29

1. The Teleological Concern Regarding the Elements ......................... 29
2. The Origin of the Gross Elements .......................................................... 30
3. The Common and Specific Functions of the Gross Elements .......... 31
4. The Qualities of the Gross Elements ..................................................... 33
5. The Subtle Elements ............................................................................. 36

NOTES TO CHAPTER II ................................................................................... 39

III. THE SPHERE OF THE ORGANS ............................................................. 44

1. The Sense and Motor Organs: The "Organ" (indriya) Considered as a "Capacity" (sākti) as Distinct from its Corporeal Locus (sthāna) .......... 44
2. The Tenfold Enumeration of the Organs .................................................. 46
3. The Necessity of the Postulation of a Separate and Tripartite "Internal Organ" (antahkarana) Distinct from the Sense and Motor Organs ........................................................................ 49
4. The Refutation of the View that the Internal Organ is a Modification of the Vital Air (prāṇa) .............................................................. 51
5. The Refutation of the View that the Internal Organ is a Quality of the Soul (ātmāgūna) ........................................................................... 53

NOTES TO CHAPTER III ................................................................................... 59
IV. THE SPECIFIC INTERNAL ORGANS: MANAS, BUDDHI AND AHAMKĀRA

1. The Concept of Manas ........................................... 63
2. The Three Functions of the Ego ................................ 67
3. The Conflict with the Naiyayikas Over the Ontological Function of the Ego ............................................ 73
4. Cognition (bodha) Understood as the Essential Modification (vṛtti) of the Buddhi .............................................. 77
5. Introduction to the Doctrine of the Eight Dispositions (bhāva) and Four Conceptions (pratyaya) ......................... 79
6. Dispositions (bhāva) ............................................. 83
7. Conceptions (pratyaya) ......................................... 87
8. The Relation Between the Bhavas and Pratyayas According to the Saiva Darsana and the Samkhya ......................... 94

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV .................................................. 97

V. THE TRIADIC STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Introduction .................................................................. 110
2. The Distinction Between Cognition and the Object-of-Cognition: the Sākārajñānavāda vrs the Nirākārajñāna-vāda ................. 110
3. The Soul Considered as the Enjoier (bhoktr) and the Agent (kartr) of Empirical Consciousness ........................ 115
4. The Carvaka Doctrine of Consciousness Understood as a Purely Empirical Phenomenon ......................... 128
5. The Debate with Sāmkhya ........................................ 138

NOTES TO CHAPTER V .................................................. 144

VI. THE TRANS-BUDDHI CONDITIONS GOVERNING EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Introduction .................................................................. 155
2. The Concepts of Prakṛti and the Three G sans .................. 157
3. The Exclusion of "Puruṣa" as a Tattva ...................... 160
4. "Rāga" as a Trans-Buddhi Source of Engagement in Empirical Consciousness ............................................. 162
5. The "Vidyā-tattva" as the Facilitating Instrument for Empirical Consciousness ........................................ 166
6. The "Kālā-tattva" as the Causative Factor Mediating Empirical Consciousness ............................................. 170
7. The Soteriological Implications of "Māyā", the Fundamental Ontological Principle Governing the Empirical Sphere of Consciousness and Being .............................. 174
8. "Mala" as the Fundamental Soteriological Concept ............ 176

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI .................................................. 183

VII. APPENDIX I: TRANSLATION OF THE BHOGA KĀRIKĀ BY SADYOJYOTI AND Vṛtti BY AGHORA ŚIVA .................................................. 189
NOTES TO APPENDIX I ................................................................. 289

VIII. APPENDIX II: THE TRANSLITERATED TEXT OF THE BHOGA KĀRIKA
AND ITS VRITI BY AGHORA SIVA .............................................. 296

NOTES TO APPENDIX II ............................................................... 353

BIBLIOGRAPHY I: TEXTS MENTIONED IN THE NOTES ...................... 354

BIBLIOGRAPHY II: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................. 361
The known categories of the object cannot be applied to what forms the very precondition of objectivity itself. The self being a transcendental condition of experience cannot be evidenced in the same manner in which any content of experience becomes evident to our understanding.

-K. Sivaraman,

*Saivism in Philosophical Perspective*
DEDICATED
IN APPRECIATION
TO
CANDY
FOREWARD

The text which forms the basis of the following study stems from approximately the eighth cent. A.D. and is a philosophical expression of a particular form of early Indian religiosity that is ultimately based on the worship of the god Śiva. The worship of this god is thought by some to be one of the earliest forms of worship indigenous to the Indian soil and is also thought to predate the Sanskrit speaking culture whose gods and mythology have been captured in the Rg Veda.

Historically, Śaivism developed along various lines according to the respective social groups and local traditions in which and through which it came to be cultivated. Basically, one can discern two "forms" of Śaivism that can be described as "folkloric" and "orthodox". The Śaivism of folklore has been captured, for example, in a work known as the Śiva Purāṇa, which is a collection of tales and legends dealing with the mythic proportions of Śiva and the role of the devotee. Throughout its exposition the Śiva Purāṇa emphasizes the value of a fundamental devotion (bhakti) towards Śiva and the consequential "grace" soteriologically bestowed upon the devotee for such devotion. The Purāṇa also emphasizes the transcendent nature of the teaching concerning Śiva; in some cases, simply hearing a discourse on the nature of Śiva is said to guarantee a heavenly existence after death, as is the case with a certain Devarāja who, shortly before his death, "just
happened" to hear a discourse on the nature of Śiva:

Devarāja, the base brahmin, addicted to wine, enamoured of a vile harlot, slayer of his own father, mother and wife and who out of greed for money-killed many brahmins, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, and śudras and others, became a liberated soul instantaneously reaching the supreme Loka."

Other works of folkloric Śaivism, such as the Tamil Tiruvācagam by Maṇikka Vācagar, emphasize a divine and cosmic "eros" at the basis of the world and human existence; for example, in a moment of ecstatic rapture— the poet Maṇikka Vācagar invokes Śiva as a lover would a beloved:

Thee, Lord Supreme, with milk-ash adorn'd, meeting with grace superne, thy servants true, Who dost appear, and show the heaven of grace—

Thee, glorious light, I void of righteousness, extol as my ambrosia, praising Thee—praise, glorify, invoke with weepings loud!

Thee, thus working in me mightily, in grace speak, in pity speak!

The "orthodox" expression of Śaivism brings the Śaivite teachings more in line with the basic cultural and ritualistic forms of Vedic religiosity. The literature of orthodox Śaivism has been recorded in the "revealed" writings known as the Śaiva Āgamas. The form of Śaivism expressed in the Āgamas represents a totally self-contained and self-explained "cosmos" wherein every aspect of the devotee's existence is understood according to the Śaivite teaching. In very precise detail the Śaivite Āgamas describe, for example, the accepted theological doctrines concerning the nature of the god Śiva; the mythological sphere of the pantheon of Śaivite demigods; the epistemological, soteriological and eschatological nature of the soul; the accepted philosophical position of Āgamic Śaivism and the refutation of other systems; the exact architectural standards to be employed in the
building of temples and other sacred structures; the details governing iconographical representations; the particular vows, rites and ceremonies to be employed on the proper occasions; etc.

Although, like its folkloric counterpart, orthodox Śaivism accepts as fundamental a basic devotion towards Śiva, orthodox Śaivism places a greater degree of importance on the inherent efficaciousness of the consecratory and sacramental rites (dīkṣa) governing the devotee's life and soteriological development. Coupled with this notion of the importance of the purificatory rites the Śaivite Āgamas also place a corresponding degree of emphasis on the soteriological importance of "understanding" or "insight" (jñāna).

The text that forms the basis of the following study falls within the scope of "orthodox" Śaivism and is more concerned with the details concerning the soteriological role of "understanding" rather than with the details concerning the rites. The text specifically treats the philosophical position of Āgamic Śaivism concerning the nature of consciousness and the refutation of other doctrines. The term "philosophical" is applied to the main import of the text in order to indicate the critical and thematic format employed by the authors in the exposition of their views.

The text essentially treats the nature of the "soul" or "self" in terms of its engagement in mundane existence, or what I have chosen, for philosophical reasons, to designate as "empirical consciousness". In the process of the discussion of the import of the text it will become increasingly clear to the reader that the text employs, or perhaps it might be more appropriate to say "presupposes", two different
methods of interpreting the nature of the self and consciousness. On the one hand, the self endowed with consciousness is treated and understood in a definitively mythic manner as designating an "eternal soul" that is completely separate from the "fallen" and "reincarnating" condition of physical embodiment and mundane existence; soteriological "liberation" in this mythic sense refers to the final release from reincarnating existence and to the consequent attainment of a heavenly and blissful existence. On the other hand, however, the conscious self is also treated and understood in a definitively literal manner, as designating the principle of individualized consciousness engaged in mundane experience; soteriological liberation in this "literal" sense refers to a more experiential state of affairs according to which the self is understood as the pre-empirical condition of mundane or empirical experience itself.

Although one does not find a clearly drawn distinction between these two manners of interpreting the self in the Bhoga Kārikā and its commentary, and although it is clear that the authors would subsume the literal under the mythic, according to both ways of interpreting the self, liberation is soteriologically understood as a more "purified" condition of experience (śuddha-bhoga).

In the study of the Bhoga Kārikā and its commentary which follows, I have chosen to treat the more literal interpretation of the self in greater detail, as my interests lie more with philosophical concerns. Although readers untrained in the classical Indian thought of the more advanced texts may find that the following study contains much that is unfamiliar, I have attempted to discuss the epistemological and ontological doctrines put forth in the text in the clearest possible terms.
NOTES


### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Asta Prakarana</td>
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<tr>
<td>BK</td>
<td>Bhoga Kārikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKV</td>
<td>Bhoga Kārikā Vṛtti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Mrgendra Āgama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mrgendra Āgama Dipīkā</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAV</td>
<td>Mrgendra Āgama Vṛtti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Mataṅga Paramēśvara Āgama</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAV</td>
<td>Mataṅga Paremeśvara Āgama Vṛtti</td>
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<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Raurava Āgama</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPB</td>
<td>Śaiva Paribhāsā</td>
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<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Śata Ratna Samgraha</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRU</td>
<td>Śata Ratna Ullekha</td>
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<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Tattva Prakāśa</td>
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<td>TSV</td>
<td>Tattva Samgraha Vṛtti</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTNV</td>
<td>Tattva Traya Nirṇaya Vṛtti</td>
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We may speculate that Sadyojyoti flourished approximately during the eighth century A.D. This date is arrived at through the more established dating of other Śaivite authors and texts. The terminus ad quem for Sadyojyoti's writings is placed prior to the beginning of the ninth century, which is the time during which one of his commentators, Rāmakṛṣṇa II, has been established to have flourished. There are no means to establish securely the earliest period of Sadyojyoti's writings except through the very general dating of the earliest Śaiva Āgamas, since Sadyojyoti is considered to have commented on at least two of the Āgamas. Scholars are divided as to the precise century the Āgamas began to be composed; after a consideration of the available theories concerning this period, J. Gonda has suggested the seventh cent. A.D. as the earliest possible dating. Thus, as a compromise between the earliest and latest datings of works having direct relevance to his works, Sadyojyoti is established to have flourished approximately in the 8th century.

Sadyojyoti's works fall into two genres: either commentaries on Āgamas or manuals (prakārana) summarizing the Śaiva "darsāna", i.e., view of the world — "philosophy" in the classical sense. He is said to have written a commentary on the Raurava Āgama, and claims himself to have written a commentary on the Svāyambhuva Āgama. Although more will be
said of Sadyojyoti's apparent commentary on the Raurava Āgama in the sequel, it is sufficient at this point to mention that the commentary has not been recovered. His commentary on the Svāyambhuva, which he mentions in one of his own manuals, exists in an incomplete form and remains unpublished. Although there is no way of knowing how many philosophical manuals Sadyojyoti composed, five have come down to us. Originally, these manuals may have been written for inclusion in an Āgama as specific treatments of certain topics. All the manuals are written in very concise and complex argumentative verses (kārikā); without the commentaries that accompany each of the manuals, it is doubtful whether modern scholars or traditionally trained Śaiva pundits could discern the intent of the verses, although this is not to suggest that the early commentators are always correct in their interpretations of the original verses. According to Sadyojyoti in the opening line of the Bhoga Karika, the Mokṣa Karika and Bhoga Karika actually form one complete text, although the complete text was early on chosen by the commentators as two separate texts.

Aghora Śiva (twelfth cent. A. D.) has commented on the Bhoga Karika while Rāmakṛṣṇa II (ninth cent. A. D.) has commented on the Mokṣa Karika. While the Bhoga Karika opens with the appropriate statement of obeisance (māṅgala), the Mokṣa Karika ends with a traditional colophon stating some detail about the author. Aghora Śiva has also commented on the Tattva Samgraha and the Tattva Traya Nirgaya; the former work summarily treats the entire Śaivite cosmology while the later specifically deals with the relationship between the three basic categories of God, bondage and the soul. The Paramokṣa Nirāsa Karika
deals with the refutation of other doctrines of release and has been commented on by Rāmakaṇṭha II.

In the works that still survive, neither Sadyojyoti nor his commentators provide much in the way of biographical detail. In the Tattva Samgraha the author refers to himself as "Sadyojyoti, the author of the Good Commentary (suvarṇākṛt)." Aghora Śiva takes this to mean that Sadyojyoti is the author of the Sadvṛtti, a commentary on the Raurava Āgama. In his own conclusion to the Tattva Samgraha Aghora Śiva refers to Sadyojyoti as Khetakanandana; other authors also refer to him by this name. In the closing verse of the Tattva Traya Nirnaya Sadyojyoti refers to himself as the author of the commentary on the Śāyambhūva Āgama. In the closing verses of the Mokṣa Kārikā the author refers to himself as "Sadyojyoti" and to his teacher as "Ugrajyoti"; he further says that his teaching ultimately derives from Śīva who revealed it to the sage Ruru who passed it on to the Ātreya, from whom Sadyojyoti received it. Rāmakaṇṭha II pays particular respect to Sadyojyoti as one of the founders of the Śaiva-dārśana.

Among the masters one should pay particular respect to Sadyojyoti and Brhaspati, who have illuminated the path of the Śāiva position through their accomplished virtues.

After Aghora Śiva (twelfth cent. A.D.), Sadyojyoti's works no longer gained the attention of serious commentators, although even during the fourteenth century Sadyojyoti is still recognized as an authoritative representative of the Śaiva doctrine, as he is quoted, for example, in both the Sata Ratna Ullekha and in Mādhava's Sarva Dārśana Samgraha. In the later development of the tradition, Sadyojyoti is considered to be one of the eighteen renowned authors of manuals.
We can gather from such textual references that Sadyojyoti considered himself and was considered by others to be an authoritative and exalted spokesperson of the Śaiva tradition. As well, it can be concluded that he represented the tradition of the Raurava Āgama and Svāyambhuva Āgama. He may also have written his philosophical manuals in order to clarify the Śaivite position on points of doctrine that the various Āgamas differed over. Whether he was from northern or southern India remains an unanswered question, as both Aghora Siva, a Tamilian, and Rāmakantha II, a Kashmiri, wrote commentaries on Sadyojyoti’s works; however, since Rāmakantha II predates Aghora Siva by two centuries, one is led to believe that Sadyojyoti is originally from the north and that his works travelled to the South.¹⁸

Of direct concern to the work at hand is the relation between Sadyojyoti’s Bhoga Kārikā and the Raurava Āgama, as the Bhoga Kārikā claims to describe bhoga in terms of the tradition established by Ruru, the supposed sage of the Raurava Āgama. In the following section a more detailed account of this connection between the two texts will be dealt with.

2. The Relation Between the Bhoga Kārikā and the Raurava Āgama

In the second verse of the Bhoga Kārikā Sadyojyoti says that he is going to describe empirical consciousness and liberation, i.e.: bhoga and moksa, “in accordance with the teaching of Ruru (rurusiddhāntasamsiddhau bhogamoksausasādhanau vacmi).”¹⁹ Aghora Siva explains that this means “in accordance with the Raurava Āgama (śrīmadrauravatantropalakṣitasiddhāntasāstre).”²⁰ As will be pointed out in the sequel, there are specific points of agreement between
Sadyojyoti and the philosophical position of the Raurava Agama to warrant Aghora Śiva's identification between Ruru's teaching and the Raurava Agama. However, there is less reason to accept, as is generally accepted,21 Aghora Śiva's and Rāmakāṇtha II's assertion that Sadyojyoti is in fact the author of a Raurava Vṛtti, which Aghora Śiva specifically refers to as the Sadyṛtī. There are two problems with this identification. Firstly, although Sadyojyoti refers to himself as the author of "the author of the good commentary (suvṛttikṛt)" in the Tattva Samgraha,22 he does not state which text he is the commentator of; this statement could indeed refer to his commentary on the Svāyambhuva Agama which he refers to in the closing verse of the Tattva Traya Nirpaya, describing himself as the commentator (vṛttikṛt) of the Svāyambhuva Agama.23 Secondly, there is a problem with Aghora Śiva's description of the title of Sadyojyoti's Raurava Vṛtti as the Sadyṛtī, since Śrīkaṇṭha in the closing verses of his Ratna Traya claims that his mentor, Rāmakāṇtha I, wrote a "Sadyṛtī", which Śrīkaṇṭha has modeled his own Ratna Traya after.24 In his commentary on the Ratna Traya Aghora Śiva peculiarly says nothing about the reference to the Sadyṛtī.25 Although Rāmakāṇtha II mentions a Raurava Vṛtti in his commentary on the Mataṅga Pārāmeśvara Agama, he does not actually quote from it; as well, it is difficult to discern whether or not he is referring to his own commentary on a certain Raurava Vṛtti called the Raurava Vṛtti Viveka or to the position of the Raurava Vṛtti itself.26 This confusion over the authorship of the commentary on the Raurava Agama is further compounded by the fact that it no longer exists, or at least has not been discovered. Nor is the "Raurava Vṛtti" quoted by the commenta-
tors most familiar with Sadyojyoti's works, i.e. Aghora Śiva and Rāmakṛṣṇa II; an actual citation from a certain Raurava Āgama Vṛtti in the commentary on the Matanga Pārameśvara Āgama is actually a verse from Sadyojyoti's Paramokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā. If there had been such a Vṛtti on the Raurava Āgama and indeed if it had been written by Sadyojyoti, the likelihood exists that it no longer existed by the time Rāmakṛṣṇa II and Aghora Śiva came to write their commentaries on Sadyojyoti's manuals.

3. The Doctrinal Relation Between the Bhoga Kārikā and the Raurava Āgama

Ideally, each Āgama contains four sections which treat philosophy (jñāna-pāda), yogic discipline (yoga-pāda), ritual (kriyā-pāda) and conduct (caryā-pāda). To date, only the sections dealing with philosophy and ritual have been recovered from the Raurava Āgama. The philosophical section of the Raurava Āgama, which has been edited by N. R. Bhatt of the French Institute of Indology, is most likely an incomplete, abridged version of a larger text; most of the manuscripts of the Raurava Āgama actually refer to it as the Raurava Sūtra Samgraha in the colophon of each sub-section (pāṭala). Bhatt suggests that the Raurava Sūtra Samgraha has been taken for the Raurava Āgama itself since the 12th century, as is evident from the fact that the various commentators of the philosophical manuals refer to it as if it were the Āgama; if the text of the Raurava that we possess is actually the Āgama, it may be referred to as a "summary" since, like other Āgamas, it claims to be a summary of a much larger teaching.

In his discussion of the importance of the Raurava Āgama to light of Āgamic literature, Bhatt distinguishes three things which make
its section on philosophy of interest in light of other Āgamas; firstly, the exposition of yoga lists just six members of yoga instead of the traditional eight as passed down by Patañjali; secondly, the tattvas are listed as thirty whereas in most of the Āgamas and manuals they are listed as thirty six—Sakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara, Śuddhavidyā, Kālā and Niyati are omitted; thirdly, in the manuscripts of the Raurava Āgama which have been discovered so far, there is no evidence that the twelve verses which form the Śiva-jñāna Bodha, the locus classicus of the Tamil "Meykandar School", come from the Raurava Āgama, a claim upheld by commentators on the Sivajñāna Bodha, although this is not to say that in the future a more complete text of the philosophic section will be found which will contain the twelve verses.

Of more specific concern to the connection between the Bhoga Kārikā and the Raurava Āgama one can point to Sadyojyoti's claim that he is going to explain bhoga according to the teaching of Ruru. Concerning Ruru we learn in the Raurava Āgama that he is the only one who can cause the understanding of Śiva (śivajñānaikāraṇa). The object of Ruru's discourse is the instruction of other sages in the understanding of Śaivite doctrine. Like Sadyojyoti in the Bhoga Kārikā, Ruru speaks in the first person. He says that other sages have come to him, i.e. Bhārgava, Āṅgirasa, Ātreya and Marici, in great obeisance to ask him to reveal the nature of the Śaivite doctrine and the enumeration of the tattvas.

Another area we find some doctrinal similarity between the Bhoga Kārikā and the Raurava Āgama concerns the basic metaphysical view shared by both works, i.e. a pantheistic dualism wherein the Supreme Being Śiva
is both immanent in the world and at the same time transcendent to it, a condition that applies to the soul as well. Although Śiva is, on the one hand, "beyond" the world and any connections to it, He is, in the form of Sadāśiva, engaged and immanent "in the world". Objectively, Sadāśiva is described as the creator of the world and time—indeed, of "everything" (sarvakrt), including the gods Brahman etc.; subjectively, He is described as residing in the self of all things (sarvabhūtātma-bhutastha). Sadāśiva is "the soul of the world (paratma)."\(^{35}\)

Throughout the Vidyāpāda of the Raurava Agama solar imagery is employed to describe the relation between the world and Śiva. Śiva is described as a source of light and the world as the light itself (qua Śakti).\(^{36}\) Śivajñāna is said to cause the supreme "illumination" for those who are "blinded" by the darkness of the bonds. The primordial impurity (mala or anīna) is the primordial darkness. Although Śiva is devoid of this impurity he engages in it in order to "purify" it and bring about the "illumination" of the estranged souls. The dualism between Śiva and the world begins with the separation of Śiva from a host of lower gods who carry out the various worldly supervising activities;\(^{37}\) these gods are Śiva's own "rays of illumination (svakīrana)." The imagery of light and darkness is employed both cosmologically and soteriologically in order to explain the benefits conferred upon the initiate, as the Raurava Agama states:\(^{38}\)

Just as darkness quickly disappears when it encounters sunrise, thus after obtaining initiation one is freed from merit and demerit (dharmadharmā). Just as the sun illuminates these worlds with its rays, thus God shines (becomes manifest) with his powers (śakti) in the mantra sacrifice. Just as sparks dart out of the fire, thus the powers come forth from Śiva. When (ritually) urged (used) they reach the bodies of those who aspire to success (sādhaka), just as the sun with its rays removes the impurity which is on the
earth.

Concerning the specific enumeration of the tattvas, Sadyojoyoti is in close agreement with the Raurava Agama in leaving out "time" (kāla) and "limitation" (niyati) from the account of the tattvas from kalā to the earth. In the Raurava Agama the cosmic function of "time" is ascribed to Śiva in his form as Sadāśiva, who is "the instigator of all time" (sarvakālapravartaka) and "the lord of time" (kālādhīpa).\textsuperscript{39} A similar approach to "time" as a pre-tattvic factor of creation is also found in the Bhoga Kārikā. Although "limitation", the factor that limits one to specific life experiences and temporal events, is not mentioned in the Raurava Agama, the Bhoga Kārikā discusses it in nontattvic terms as the working out of each soul's karma that is ultimately under the guidance of Śiva. As well, neither the Raurava Agama nor the Bhoga Kārikā treats the soul as a tattva, i.e., the purusatattva, as do other forms of Ṛgamic Śaivism.

For the above discussed reasons, there appears to be sufficient reason to hold that the teaching of Guru referred to in the Bhoga Kārikā actually refers to the teaching established in the Raurava Agama, as Aghora Śiva asserts.

4. Aghora Śiva, the Commentator on the Bhoga Kārikā

Aghora Śiva, who flourished during the 12th century,\textsuperscript{40} was not only an accomplished poet, dramatist and commentator, but also a religious leader as well, with a very large number of followers.\textsuperscript{41} He tells us that he is from the Coḷa country, i.e., Tamilnadu; although he is a southerner, in one of his works he claims to represent
the teachings of Rāmakantha II, a Kashmiri. 42 As a testament to Aghora Śiva's importance and authority, in the Śaiva tradition, his works on ritual are said to be conscientiously followed by all the Śaiva priests in the south to this day. 43

Since Aghora Śiva choose to comment on three of Sadyojyoti's works, we must consider that he was well acquainted with Sadyojyoti's thought. From Aghora Śiva's commentary on the Mrgendra Āgama Vṛtti by Rāmakantha II it is evident that Aghora Śiva was very well acquainted with the Śaivite philosophical doctrine and the positions of many other Āgamas. Although Sadyojyoti claims to represent one Āgamic tradition in the Bhoga Kārikā, i.e. the Raurava Āgama, Aghora Śiva appeals to many Āgamas to justify his views—e.g. Kṛṣṇa, Raurava, Śvāyambhuva, Matāṅga, Mrgendra, etc. 44 As a commentator, Aghora Śiva is clear and consistent. His main aim is expository, usually word by word or phrase by phrase. His own doctrinal concerns are always clear. Three such concerns are often expressed in his commentary on the Bhoga Kārikā: dikṣā and not jñāna is the major prerequisite for mokṣa; Śiva has no direct material contact with anything worldly, as Śiva is solely the instrumental cause and not the material cause of the world; and lastly, there are no doctrinal contradictions among the various Āgamic teachings.

The particular style of Aghora Śiva's commentarial writings on Sadyojyoti's manuals is perhaps brought out through a comparison of his commentary on the Tattva Prakāśa by Bhoja Deva (11th century) with the commentary by Śrī Kumāra, a clear exponent of Śaiva monism. While Śrī-kumāra quotes many Vedic texts (i.e., the Upaniṣads and Brāhmaṇas), Purāṇas and Āgamas, Aghora Śiva ignores the Vedic material and Purāṇas.
and solely relies on the Āgamas. Again, while Śrīkumāra stresses logical and definitional clarity in his interpretation of the verses, Aghora Śiva stresses the scriptural authority of the Śaivite Āgamas to explain and justify the ideas expressed in the verses.45

5. The Manner in Which "Bhoga" is Introduced in the Bhoga Kārikā

In the first four verses of the Bhoga Kārikā Sadyojyoti both introduces and summarizes his treatment of the concept of "bhoga", i.e., empirical consciousness. He begins with a traditional obeisance (mahagācarana) to Śiva and an outline of the work (anubandha).46 The outline is fourfold, describing the subject matter (visaya), the purpose of the work (prayojana), the method of treatment (sāṅgati) and, finally, the person for whom the work is written (adhiśrī). In due order, the subject matter is said to be the dual topics of bhoga and mokṣa; the purpose "the discernment" of these two topics; the method of treatment is "by tradition, logic,47 and brevity"48; and the person for whom the work is directed is described as "the sādhaka",49 i.e. the one engaged in the quest for śiva-jñāna.

Concerning the two fundamental spheres of experience described as bhoga and mokṣa, Śiva is described as the one who "provides" or "gives" both of these. By stating this at the outset of the Bhoga Kārikā, Sadyojyoti is expressing a basic theological concern of Śaivism that the soul is not the sole "cause" or "means" (nimitta) of its soteriological station in life. Ultimately, the Śaivite argues, the supreme being, Śiva, is the instrumental cause of all of the soul's experiences.

In a cosmological sense, bhoga is said to arise when those souls
that have the "triple bonds" come in contact with kala, the manifesting agency of bhoga qua individual consciousness. The "triple bonds" include mala, the original obscurational factor inhibiting the soul, karma, the repository and instrumental agency of the particular defilements of each individual soul, and maya, the more specific obscurational cause of the soul's absorption in the condition of empirical consciousness. This bound condition describes the more cosmic side of bhoga since kalā actually originates from māyā or can be said to be a further development of māyā—thus making the three "bonds" characterize the bhoga-condition of the soul. Ultimately, according to the Śaivites, there are only three basic "categories" (padārtha) of reality: God, Souls and Bonds. "Bond" in this sense is another term to designate that which experientially limits the full capacity of the soul's innate powers of consciousness and agency. In Sadyojyoti's works one discovers a tendency to see mala itself as representative of the category of bond (pāśa), i.e. as the obscurational and defiling power (rodhaśakti) responsible for the soul's predicament in the condition of bhoga. Thus, all bonds are referred to as material (jadatva) and unconscious (acetana) and are set in cosmic opposition to the soul, which is of a non-material and conscious nature. Bhoga simply represents the predicament of the soul when it is involved in this cosmic opposition.

Sadyojyoti adds a further, more specific, description of bhoga which brings out the psychological sense of the notion. The term "bhoga" literally means "enjoyment" and in this psychological account of bhoga the idea of "enjoyment" plays an important role. Sadyojyoti expresses the classically yogic idea that bhoga is the "buddhi-vrtti-
anurāñjana"—the (impassioned-) attachment to the modifications of the mind. The conception of the "modifications of the mind" (buddhi-vṛtti) is based on the distinction between the soul qua source of consciousness and the mind as constitutive of the experiential "object" of the soul's consciousness. The mind is simply that in which and through which empirically circumscribed consciousness comes to be; the mind is that in which and through which the bonds of the triadically bound soul come to form "empirical" or "mundane" forms of consciousness for individual souls. The modifications of the mind act as the final instantiation of the "limited" condition of the soul in its empirical predicament. The limitation is a result of the soul's empathetic identification with the modifications of the mind; due to the establishment of this empathetic identification circumscribed by the condition of bhoga, the mind appears as anything but "unconscious" and "material".

The term Sadyojyoti uses for this condition of the soul's empathetic identification with the "buddhi-vṛtti" is "anurāñjaka", which literally means to be coloured by something, "enreddened" in the sense of "passionately attached to" as well as "endarkened" in the sense of "obscured". "Anurāñjaka" is a condition of being not only "impassioned" but also "deluded" by the modifications of the mind. The term closely approximates the conception of bhoga as enjoyment. Throughout the Bhoga Kārikā Sadyojyoti plays on the twofold sense of "bhoga" as both "experience" and "enjoyment". As the empathetic identification with the buddhi-vṛtti, "bhoga" is something the soul "wants" and "enjoys" in spite of the fact that "bhoga" is essentially an "impure" condition of "self-estrangement". It is precisely this element of pleasure constitutive of
bhogic experience that the notion of anurañjaka addresses. Bhoga is not only a certain kind of "experience" but at the same time the desire for this experience.

If it were not for the grace of Śiva the soul would be eternally caught in the enjoyment of empirical experience through continual rebirths. Out of "graciousness", Śiva grants the possibility of the separation from bhoga for the snapping asunder of the obfuscating and empathetic identification with the buddhi-vṛtti. Bhoga is a privation of the soul's innate capacities of consciousness and agency; mokṣa is the overcoming of this privation. However, although bhoga is the only means souls have open to them to bring about mokṣa, mokṣa cannot be considered a more developed condition of bhoga, a more "cultivated" or "refined" form of bhoga. Soteriologically, bhoga is only a "means" to mokṣa.

6. The Concept of a Tattva

The concept of a "tattva" plays an important role in the Bhoga Kārikā as it does in Sadyojyoti's Tattva Samgraha. In both works Sadyojyoti begins with the lowest tattvas, defining and describing them by providing a logical foundation for the postulation of their existence as separate causative aspects of phenomenal reality: no tattvas are in themselves directly open to perception, except of course to yogi-

53 In the case of all the tattvas there is a link from the "lowest" to the "highest", a genetic and constitutive link causally connecting each stage of the creation and maintenance of the world. Even the "subtle body" is considered to be a "set" or "collection" of a specific grouping of "tattvas", a personal "set" of tattvas said to trans-
migrate into one of the various physical bodies employed in rebirth.

In spite of the importance of the conception of the notion of a "tattva", neither the Bhoga Kārikā nor the Tattva Samgraha offers a clear definition of the concept of a tattva. The term is usually employed in two different senses that can be described as "general" and "specific". In a general sense the term is used to refer to the formal and underlying constitution of the world as descriptive of the ontological structures that the notion of "the world" can be reduced to. The more specific sense of the term is used to describe the genesis of the world-event and the consciousness of it; "tattva" in this sense is a more causal notion which forms the basis of the satkāryavāda, the doctrine that states that the effect pre-exists in the cause, or that the "effect" is simply a "modification" (vyrtti) of the cause.

The more general use of the notion of a tattva is found in most Śaivite texts, although expressed in different ways. The Śivajñāna-siddhiyar, for example, gives a clear expression of this use of the term:

The whole universe, constituting all that has form, the formless, and those that have form and no form, is the manifestation of the tattvas.

Within this same work we find a concomitant idea of the general conception of tattva when the author defines "other" doctrines according to the tattva level they construe as fundamental; for example, the Cārvākas are said to remain within the sphere of the gross elements, the Buddhists the sphere of the mind, etc. Again, in the Sataratna Samgraha we find a similar, more general conception of tattva:

Tattva, in reality, is only one, but in the process of creation
assumes different names as nāda, bindu etc., in the same way as gems of the same cutting assume different names in different settings.

Abhinavagupta, for example, describes "tattva" as something akin to a "form" or "universal": 58

Tattva (the essential nature of that) means one that shines undivided in the various groups of things, with distinctive features, and so serves as the cause to justify their being represented as belonging to one class. For example, a mountain, tree and city are all, in their essential characteristic, earth, and so are river, lake and sea water.

We find a more "specific" approach to the ontological status of a tattva in the Tattva Prakāśa and a more detailed account of this concept by Śrīkumāra and Aghora Śiva. In the Tattva Prakāśa the specific notion of a tattva is framed in temporal and spatial terms: 59

A tattva is that which provides enjoyment (bhoga) for all beings and which continues to exist up to the period of the periodic cosmic destruction. Thus, pots, physical bodies etc. are not considered tattvas.

Śrīkumāra explains that, up until the period of the periodic cosmic destruction, the tattvas act as the cause (kārana) of the enjoyment of all beings. He explains what he means by "cause": the tattvas are pervasive over a certain amount of time whereas the objects such as pots, bodies, etc., do not continue through time. He provides an analogy: just as the forms (rūpa) of the mind (buddhi) [i.e., the eight dispositions] are responsible for the various "modifications" it assumes, so are the tattvas responsible for the various modifications of pots etc. 60 Śrīkumāra further quotes a Śaivite text which gives an interpretation of "tattva" based on an etymological interpretation of the term "tattva" derived from the root tan, which means "to extend": 61

The tattvas are so called because of their extensiveness and constancy—extensiveness here has reference to their pervasiveness
(vyāpti) with regard to space while constancy refers to their pervasiveness with regard to time. The tattvas, which even have pervasiveness over millions of miles, exist up to the periodic cosmic destruction. Otherwise, even pillars would be classified as tattvas.

According to the Tattva Prakāśa, the tattvas continue to exist "up to" the time of the cosmic destruction and survive this period in embryonic form in māyā; although the Tattva Prakāśa does not further explicate this notion of the embryonic form of the tattvas, the Saiva Paribhāṣa does, bringing out in more specific terms the exact relation between the "form" and the "function" of the tattvas.62 During the embryonic period of rest following the cosmic destruction, the tattvas maintain a basic ontological status and are said to "exist" (vidyāmānattva); however, the "functions" or "activities" (vyāpāra) of the tattvas are said to lack existence (abhāva).63 After the period of the cosmic destruction, the tattva can resume its activity only after the intervention of a third element, the soul; in order for the functional aspect to become "engaged" and to take on the status of "existence," there needs to be a "conjunction" (samyojana) between the soul and the tattva. Like the tattva, the soul is also said to "exist" in embryonic form during the cosmic destruction, and its "functions" are also said to lack existence. By first prompting the functional activity of the soul through the prompting of each soul's karmic predispositions, Siva ultimately prompts the activity of the tattva to serve the soul in the bringing about of bhoga.

Sīvāgrah yogin provides an analogy to explain this relation between the soul and the tattva: although both a fire and a piece of iron may exist, due to the "non-existence" of the activities of a person to
bring them together, the iron will not heat up.  

Just as there is conjunction of the fire with iron and disjunction of iron from fire, similarly there is the dependence on \textit{karma} of the \textit{tattvas} and (the conjunction and disjunction) of the soul from \textit{sakti}.

In this description of the activity of the \textit{tattvas} it is clear that insofar as \textit{bhoga} is concerned, the essential activity the soul is engaged in occurs between the soul's karmically accumulated predispositions and the \textit{tattvic} forms. Both \textit{karma} and \textit{tattva} (qua sub-subspecies of \textit{mâyā}) are aspects of the category of \textit{pāśa}; thus, \textit{pāśa} as circumscribed by "\textit{bhoga}" is essentially this specific relation between the two \textit{pāsas}. \textit{karma} and \textit{mâyā} (qua \textit{tattva}).

Throughout the \textit{Bhoga Kārika} Sadyojyoti tends to employ the notion of a "\textit{tattva}" in its specific sense as a causal principle; through a process of logical deduction he begins with the most phenomenally "given"--i.e., the qualities of the gross elements--to establish the existence of the lowest \textit{tattvas} on the basis of which the higher \textit{tattvas} come to be explained. This more causal employment of the notion of a \textit{tattva} is most notable when Sadyojyoti does not include the soul under the category of \textit{tattva}, a sphere of being that is limited by the finite conditions of temporal sequence and spatial restrictedness.
Chapter I

NOTES

1 Bhatt establishes the date of Rāmakantha II in an indirect manner which is ultimately based on the dating of Abhigayagupta. In his MAV Nārāyanakantha cites a verse from Utpaladeva (Isvarasiddhi, v. 55, KSTI, vol. 24, 1921, p. 30). Utpaladeva is known to be the peer of Laksmiṇaṇaṇagupta who is the mentor of Abhinavagupta, who states in his Tantriloka, 12.25: “Utpaladeva is the master of my master”; Utpaladeva is therefore established to have flourished around the second half of the 9th c. As a result, it can be inferred that Nārāyanakantha and Rāmakantha II are prior to the beginning of the 9th c.; cf. Matāṅga parameśvara Agama (Vidyāpāda), critically edited by H. R. Bhatt, Publications de l'institut Français d'Indologie, No. 56 (Pondicherry: Institut Français d'Indologie, 1977), pp. viii-vii. Since Rāmakantha II commented on two of Sadyojyoti's works and since Rāmakantha II considers Sadyojyoti to be one of "the venerable ancient masters" indicating that some time must have passed between Sadyojyoti and Rāmakantha II -- the latest date for Sadyojyoti can be set as approximately the 8th c. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that Sadyojyoti's date might be much earlier.

2 A precise date for the oldest Agamas cannot be established although various dates have been suggested. For example, K. S. Ramaswami Śastri maintains that the early Agamic literature is pre-Vedic; cf. K. S. Ramaswami-Sastri, Vol C. (Adyar: Kunhan Raja, 1946), p.74. Dasgupta, on the other hand, suggests that the earliest Agamas began to be composed in the second or third centuries A.D.; cf. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), II, 40. Although Jan Gonda accepts that the earliest Agamas may have been composed between the fifth and the ninth centuries A.D., he concludes his discussion of the various datings put forth by other authors by restricting the earliest dating to the seventh or eighth century; cf. Jan Gonda, "Medieval Religious Literature in Sanskrit," Vol. II, Fascicle1, A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda (Wiesbaden; Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), pp.163-165. In passing it may be noted that the Saivite Śvetāsvātara Upaniṣad is generally held to have been composed around the fifth or fourth century B.C.; cf. Jan Gonda, Visnuism and Śivaism: A Comparison (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharial, 1976), p. 18.

3 Pandey suggests the ninth century, although he does not provide the specific reasons for this dating; however, he probably adopted it as a compromise between Rāmakantha II's dating and an early dating of the Agamas; cf. K. C. Pandey, "Bhāskari," Vol. III, The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Texts, ed. by T. P. Upadhyaya, No. 84 (Lucknow:

4A style of work which would not fit into these genres would be the Mantravārtika attributed to Sadyojyoti by Rāmānkantha II in his commentary on the MK, p.4. The Mantravārtika has not been recovered.

5In the closing verse of the Tattva Traya Nirnaya (v.32, p. 21) Sadyojyoti refers to himself as the commentator (vyrtikrt) of the Svāyambhuva Agama and claims that the Tattva Traya Nirnaya is written according to the teaching of the Svāyambhuva Agama.

6The Institut Français D'Indologie has an unpublished manuscript of the Svāyambhuva Agama — entitled the Svāyambhuvasūtrasamgrahavṛttīn — whose incomplete attribution is attributed to Sadyojyoti; the commentary contains the first four sections of Śāṅkara which deal with Pati, Pasū, Śakti and Adhva. Various other Saivite authors refer to this commentary by Sadyojyoti as Svāyambhuvasūtra, Svāyambhuvatī, Svāyambhuvasūtrasamgrahavṛttī and Svāyambhuvasāstra; cf. Bhāt Matangaparameśvara Agama, pp. XVI-XVII. It is also referred to as the Sādyojyotikā; cf. Pāṇḍit Pānchān Satrī. "Sātārata Śāṃkara with Sātāratnolkehāni," intro. by Shrimat Svami Bhairabananda, Tantrik Texts, ed. Arthur Avalon, vol. XXII (Calcutta: Agamanandha Sanṣṭi, 1944), p.83. In terms of Agamic chronology, the Svāyambhuva Agama is prior to the Raurava Agama as Ruru refers to the former work in 3.74 of the Raurava Agama.

7In his commentary on the TS, Aghora Śiva mentions a "long commentary" (bṛhattīkā) called the Sarannīśa by Nārāyanakānta of which his own, which he describes as "a short commentary" (laghutīkā), is modeled after; cf. TS, p. 1.

8v. 57; TS, p. 52

9TS, p. 52: "svṛttīḥ sadvṛttirīti rauravavṛttternām tatkartṛdham nimmattamityarthah."

10For example, cf. also MĀV, p. 153. Sadyojyoti is also referred to as Kheṭakabala in MPV, p. 72. He is referred to as Kheṭapāla in Jayaratha's commentary on the Tantrāloka (KST, XXIX, p. 74 and 211).


12Mokṣa Kārikā .. 155, p.63: "śivātparamparāyatau bhogāmokṣau āśādhanau/ātreyaya munīndrena ruruṇa samprākṣitau." In the Śiva Mahapurāṇa the twenty-eight original Yogacharyas are enumerated; each of the twenty-eight had four disciples of which a certain "Ruru" is said to be a prominent one; cf. Vāyavya Samhitā, 2,9. The Raurava Agama is said to be communicated by the sage Ruru to "Marici" who in general mythology is "an ancient sage and demiurge; the mental son of Brahmā" — cf. E. Hopkins, Epic Mythology (Strassburg: Meiner and Co. 1915), p.189.
13"Yābhyaṃ prakāśītaṃ vartma śiddhānte śiddhahāvataṃ guṇaṃ
     tau vandyau sadyojyoṭiḥ bhṛhaspati." This mangalāsloka is found in both
     the MKV, p. 2 and the MPV, p. 1.

14In his commentary to 1.104A of the Tantrāloka which states that
     "in the Śivatanusāstra the Lord is revealed by the masters," Jayaratna
     says that the term "masters" refers to Bhṛhaspata (the plural being
     honorific); cf. KSTS, XXII, p. 146. One is thus led to conclude that
     the Śivatanusāstra (although lost) is by Bhṛhaspata and that he is prior
     to Abhinavagupta.

15The Mokṣa Kārikā is quoted in the commentary on v. 27 and the
     Tattva Samgraha is quoted in the commentary on vv. 40, 41, and 76. Cf.
     Sataratnasāṇgraha of Śrī Umāpati Sivācārya, trans. P. Thirugnanasambandan,
     (Madras, University of Madras, 1973).

16Madhava quotes IS 248-25A and Aghora Siva's commentary thereon;
     cf. Madhava, Sarvadarśana Samgraha, trans. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough,
     Chowkamba Sanskrit Series Studies, Vol. X (Varanasi: The Chowkamba

17For the list of the eighteen renowned authors, of manuals,
     i.e., Ugrajyoti, Sadyojyoti, Rāmakāṇṭha, Somāsambhu, Aghora Sambhu, etc.;
     cf. H. Brunner-Lachaux, Somāsambhu-Paddhati, Publications de l'Institut
     Français d'Indologie, 2 Vol., No. 25 (Pondicherry: Institut Français
     d'Indologie, 1963, 1968), I, xxii. Śrī Umāpati quotes from the Mokṣa
     Kārikā, Tattva Traya Nirṇaya and Tattva Samgraha: cf. the
     Sataratnolīkhanī Commentary on verses 21, 27, 40, 41 and 76.

18Rāmakāṇṭha II claims that he is from Kashmir in the last verse
     of his Nāda Kārikā (v. 25; AP, p. 14) and Aghora Śiva claims that he
     is from the region of the COṭa both in the TTNV (v. 32; AP, p. 22) and in
     the Kriyākramadyotiṇi (Madras; Cintadripet, 1970), p. 443.

Since Rāmakāṇṭha II is earlier than Aghora Śiva it is more
     plausible that Sadyojyoti is also from Kashmir and that the works of
     Sadyojyoti and Rāmakāṇṭha II were brought to the south. Aghora Śiva
     claims to remain faithful to the "teaching" of Rāmakāṇṭha II (MAD, p. 1);
     cf. also Bhatt, MP, p. ix-x.


20BKv, p. 2.

21Cf. for example, Pandey, Bhāskarī p. xvi and Bhatt,
     Matalaṅgaparameśvara Agama, p. xvi.

22IS, v. 57, p. 52: "ityavadattatvāni tu sadyojyoṭiḥ svuṛttikṛt."

23Tattva Traya Nirṇaya, v. 32, p. 21. "uktah samāsatoyaṁ
     tatvatrayanirṇayaḥ ca vṛttikṛtā svayambhuvasya..."
24. V. 319, Ratna Traya, p. 107: śrīRāmakāṇṭhāsadvṛttīṁ mayaivamanukurvata." This problem is even further complicated by the reference to a Sadvṛttī, by a certain ŚrīRāṇa; for a discussion of this problem cf. Bhatt, MPA, p. xiv.

25. Ratna Traya, p. 107. Aghora Śiva adds almost no commentary to the last six verses.

26. cf. MPAV (3, 19), p. 68: "darsitamasmābhiḥ...rauravavṛttīviveke iti." Bhatt takes this to refer to the Rauravavṛttīviveka by Rāmakaṇṭha II.

27. In the MPAV the quotation from the so-called "Rauravāgamavṛttī" actually refers to v. 52 of the Paramokṣa Nirāsa Karika; in the MPAV Rāmakaṇṭha II may simply be referring to his commentary on either this work or the Mokṣa Karikā; cf. MPAV, p. 609.

28. With respect to the title of the Raurava Agama as the Raurava-Ūsūtra-" samgraha, Agamic writers loosely refer to the verses as Sūtras rather than Slokas; cf. MA, I, 27.

29. Compared to the Jñānapādas of other Agamas, such as the Mataṅga and Mrgendra, the Jñānapāda of the Raurava Agama is very paltry. In the Raurava Agama itself Ruru says that the Agama was first revealed in different forms by the five faces of Sadasīvā and was later reconstituted by Anantapārāmesvara to form one crore of Slokas, which Ruru further condensed to 1200. The present edition of the Vidypāda contains 399 Slokas. If all the Slokas from the Kriyāpāda are taken into account the present Raurava Agama would contain well over 1,200 Slokas. For a summary of the ten sections of the Jñānapāda of Raurava Agama, cf. Gonda, Medieval Religious Literature in Sanskrit, p. 169-170.

30. Cf. RA, 7.5. For a discussion of the Śaivite construal of "yoga" cf. Dasgupta, op. cit. p. 204. Bhatt mentions the listing of the Āngas in other Agamas: Matanāpārāmesvara (Yogapāda, patala 2) lists the same six; MA (yoga-pāda, patala 3) lists the same six but adds japa; Kiraṇāgama (yogapāda, patala 1) lists six but replaces the tārka of RA with āsana; and the Suprabhedāgama (yogapāda, patala 3) lists the eight given in the Yogasūtras.

31. Actually, an exact numerical enumeration of the tattvas does not appear to be a concern of the RA; for instance, in some sections "manas" is included among an enumeration of the tattvas while elsewhere it is excluded (cf. 1.13 and 4.49). Although throughout the RA the five Sivatattvas (Siva, Sakti, Sadasīvā, Isvara, and Suddhavidyā) are discussed in the exposition of the Saivadarśana in 10, 98-107, they are not included in a numerical exposition of the tattvas.

32. Certain Tamil commentators on the Śivajñānabodha claim that
the Śivājñānabodha is a portion of the twelfth adhyāya of the seventy-third pātaḷa of the RA designated as the "pāśavimocanapātaḷa"; as well, in the Kannada speaking area of the south there is a legend that a teacher called "Śivājñānabodha" wrote the twelve verses as a condensed version of the essence of the RA. For a discussion of the Meykaṇḍa literature, cf. K. Śivaraman, Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), pp. 30-39.


34 Ibid., vv. 3-5, p. 1.


36 Raurava Agama, Śivatattvāni, v. 14, p. 5: "tato bhīṣṭhāvān yādvedo marīm sa paramesvāraḥ/ksobhāvatvā svakriyānāh śrīate tālāṣaṁ kalām."

37 Cf. v. 51B-52, p. 48 and MK, v. 117, p. 44. For the contra-eṣātva" cf. TS, v. 54, pp 50 and MK, vv. 131-133, p. 51. The liberated condition of Vidyēśvaras is a lower type of liberation. The higher moksha is the "śivasāmya" where all the bonds, are removed and the soul's "dr̥g kriyā-sakti" becomes manifest. Aghora Śiva is emphatic that this (śiva-) samvarūpa is not a participation in a condition of oneness in the way represented by a "universal", i.e., the soul does not come to participate in "Sivahood". Rather, it is a more negative condition where every distinction between the soul and Śiva "falls away".


39 Raurava Agama, Upodghāta, v. 18, p. 2.

40 Aghora Śiva lists his date in the colophon of one of his major texts as "the saka era 1080 [1157 A.D.]"; cf. Kriyākramadyotikā, p. 437 and Brunner-Lauchaux, SSP, I, XLII.

41 For a history of his works, cf. Bhāskarī, p. XXIV.

42 Cf. Tatttvatrayānimāya, v. 32, p. 21 and Aghora Śiva's opening mangala to MAD.


44 The majority of Āgamic citations described by Aghora Śiva come from the Śīlmatsvāyamabhūva Agama, Mṛgendra Agama and Matāṅga Agama.

46 These four traditionally accepted "anubandha" (e.g., tatra anubandho pāma adhiṅkāriṣaṇyasambhandhaprayojānavāni -- Sadānanda’s Vedāntasūtra, I.5) are not always clearly evident in the original texts as interpreted by the commentators; for example, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the pratiṣṭhānasūtram, 11-25 of his Ślokavārtika draws all four from Jaiminī’s first sūtra, "athāto dharmajñānasya".

47 By "logic" Sadyojyoti means something along the lines of including "simple enumeration" (uddesa), definition (lakṣana) and examination (parikṣa), which are considered to be the characteristics good manuals (samgraha) should possess; cf., for example, Athalye’s notes in the Tarkasamgraha of Annāmbhaṭṭa with Author’s Dīpikā and Govardhana’s Nyāya Bōchini, ed. by Y. V. Athalye and trans. by M. R. Bodas, 2nd ed., Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. LV (Poona: Bhandarkar Institute Press, 1963), p. 71.

48 This is the same claim made by Ruru in the Rā; in fact, many Agamic authors claim that what they are presenting is a condensed version of a larger and more detailed teaching.

49 Aghora Śiva takes the term "sādhakaṁ" to refer to the "ācāryāh" by playing on the etymology of the term "sādhaka"; the "ācāryāh" are the ones who "bring to accomplishment" (sādhyantī) both bhoga and mokṣa. Aghora Śiva’s comments do not, however, agree with Sadyojyoti’s own remark at the end of the MK that the work was written for the "dull-minded" (mandabuddhayaṇa), unless of course "manda" has reference to all who are "lower" than the god Śiva, and the sages Ātreya and Ruru mentioned in the kārīka previous to this statement.

Concerning the term "sādhaka" in the Agamas, H. Brunner-Lauchaux defines the term in its technical usage in light of the four scales of Agamic Saivism initiation, i.e. samayin, putrakā, sādhaka and ācārya. The sādhaka "is the disciple who, after the initiations called samaya and nirvāṇa-dīkṣa, chooses the path of powers (siddhi) and is given to that effect a special consecration." Cf. "Le Sādhaka, Personnage Oublié du sivaisme du Sud," Année, 1975, p. 443.

Generally, samayadīkṣā and viśeṣadīkṣā allow one to worship Śiva, render service in the temples and observe obligatory duty. "But the nirvanadīkṣa is one which provides eligibility for the study, reflection etc. of the Agamas." Cf., SPB, p. 297. The SPB lists seven different kinds of dīkṣā, although it does not discuss ācāryabhijeśa.

50 "Bhoga" as "enjoyment" also has reference to karma as the soul is the one who enjoys the effects of karmic fruits. "Anuraṇjīka" is also etymologically used in describing rāga; the soul is "affected/coloured by rāga" (rāgena raṇjītah), which attachment designates the
attachment to objects (visaya-āsaktiḥ or visaya-anurāṇjaθaṁ). In Sāṁkhya the term has the same sense; for example, in his commentary on SK 40, Gaudapāda glosses "to be endowed with" (adhiθaθita) [with respect to the subtle body being endowed with the eight dhāvas] with "anurāṇjaθaṁ".

51 Although a distinction must be drawn between the three fundamental categories or "padārtha" -- i.e., pati, paśu and pāsa -- and the concept of the tattvas, quite often even the padārthas are referred to as tattvas. In the Ratna Traya and Tattva Traya Nirmaya, for instance, the three basic "tattvas" which are discussed are actually the three padārthas (in the former work, bindu is representative of pāsa while in the latter māyā is). According to the Tattva-Traya Nirmaya the three padārthas are said to be aspatial, atemporal and possessed of agentive powers. In his commentary on BK 1458 Aghora Siva uses the term "tattva" to describe a "padārtha". There is also an unresolved problem over which padārtha the five Pure Tattvas (Siva Sakti, Sadāsiva, Iṣvara, Mantraśa, and Sadvidya-Mantra) should fall. On the one hand, qua Tattvas, they are said to fall under the pati-padārtha while, on the other hand, as "higher" forms of māyā (i.e. as bindu) they are said to fall under the pāsa-padārtha.

Different texts assume more than three padārthas; Śivaśrayogin enumerates the various extra padārthas, held by other Agamas, but concludes that the extra tattvas fall under the pāsa-padārtha. cf. SPB, pp. 59-60; as well, cf. Das Gupta, p. 29 and MPA, xviii-xxiv.

52 The second sūtra of the Yoga Sūtras states the importance of this concept in terms of the goal of yogic practice: "yogascittavṛttiṇirodha", cf. Patañjalaśutrāni with the Scholiom of Vyāsa and the Commentary of Vācaspati. Ed. Dajāvam Shastri Bocas, Bombay Sanskrit Series, XLVI. (Bombay: Department of Public Instruction, 1892), p. 4.

53 In this case "Yogi-pratyakṣa" is an exception; Sadyojyoti, however, begins his description and justification of the tattva theory from the point of view of "jaukika-pratyakṣa". Even pratyakṣa qua svasamvedana in the form of a ahampratyaθaya is not a direct perception of the ahamtattva as the pratyakṣa is an effect of the tattva and not the tattva itself.

54 This twofold manner of viewing the tattva, i.e. what is here called the general and the specific, would be doubted by some. G. Larson eschews the identification of the tattvavāda with the Satkāryavāda; he claims that the concepts of cause and effect are inappropriate in discussing the relation between the tattvas and the world. Larson argues that even the early authors of the tattva theory "themselves confused" the two by drawing causal analogies from "the phenomenal space-time level" to which the Satkāryavāda applies -- such as the milk and curd or water in different forms -- to apply to the theory of tattvas.

In place of this causal interpretation of the role that the tattvas play in the tattvavāda, G. Larson applies a structural model which stresses the idea of "transformational change" wherein the tattvas are viewed as the "deep structures" of the surface reality and are those
elements of the yogic world which provide "the idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation and the idea of self-regulation." Cf. G. Larson, "The notion of satkārya in Sāmkhya: Toward a Philosophical Reconstruction." Philosophy East and West, (1984), pp. 31-48. The major fault of Larson's analysis is clear: he shows no concern for any possible comparable conceptions of the concept of "deep structure" in classical Sāmkhya. In his short critique of Larson's article, Bhagwan B. Singh also points out that the conception of "kāraṇa" in the tattvic view is "much richer" than the specific concept of a cause; cf. Bhagwan B. Singh, "Commentary on Gerald L. Larson's 'The Notion of Satkārya in Sāmkhya'" and Frank Posdoroski's "Śāṅkara's Critique of Sāmkhyan, Causality in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya," Philosophy East and West, (1984), p. 59-63. It might further be argued that what Larson calls "the structuralist perspective" simply puts in greater relief the role that ontology and soteriology play in the tattvic theory, especially classical Sāmkhya. According to the Satkāryavāda, the ontological conception of the tattvas postulates that all creation proceeds from prakṛti as a "transformation" or "modification" (vṛtti) and is connected to the teleological conception of the soul's utilitarian engagement in the tattvas (i.e., nimitta-naimittika prasārtha) that have their own soteriological purpose—which is "for the release of each soul" (pratiprasārthimān). Incidentally, the term "tattva" is mentioned only once in the Sāmkhya Kārīka, in verse 64 the study of the tattvas (tattva-abhyāsa) is said to lead to the correct understanding of things. A similar use of the term is found in the Sāmkhya Šūtras (1.107; 3.73; and 4.1) and is mentioned incidentally in 5.30; 5.72 claims that everything but prakṛti and puruṣa is anitya—which would imply that if prakṛti is considered anitya so must "tattva" be. The term is not used in the Yoga Šūtras.

The analysis of the transformation of "structures" from a deep to a surface reality has also been used to explain forms of Indian ritualism, cf. Frits Steal, "Ritual, Grammar, and the Origins of Science in India," Journal of Indian Philosophy, 7 (1982), pp. 1-29.

55 cf. Arunandi Śivāčārya, Śivajñāna Siddhiyār, translation, introduction and notes by J. M. Hallasvami Pillai (Madras: Meykandar Press, 1913), p. 183. At this cosmic level the tattvas seem to operate at the level of the "form" through which the śṛṣṭikrama operates, as māyā and not tattva is still considered the seed from which the whole universe evolves after the pralaya. In the act of creation, Śiva is the efficient cause, māyā the material and Śakti the instrumental; cf. Śivajñāna Siddhiyār, p. 129.

56 Ibid., p. 184. This is the same approach to the various "darsanas" found in other works, such as, for example, Mādhava's Sarva-Darśana Samgraha, although this work does not treat the other systems along tattvic lines. One of the more detailed accounts of other systems from a Śāṅkhā point of view is found in Kṣemarāja's Pratyabhijña Hidaya. Kṣemarāja says that all the other doctrines are simply Śiva's "roles" as the dramatic dancer disguising himself; the tattvic level reached by the other doctrines follows these general lines: Čārvāka remains on the level of the Bhūtas; Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and the Saugata Buddhists remain at the level of the Buddhī-tattva; Vedānta, Mādhyamikas and the
Pâñcarâtras remain at the level of Prakrti; Sâmkhya remains at the level of Vijñânakala; the "Srutiyyâta" attain the level of Iṣyara; and the Vyâkaraṇa attain the level of Sadâsiva -- only the Saivites attain the level of Śiva-tattva. Cf. Pratyabhijñâradayam, trans. and intro. by Jaideva Singh (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1980), pp. 65-69.

57 SRL, p. 20.

58 Agamādhikara, Āhn. I, "Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarsini,"

Āhāra, III, 191.


A very similar view of a tattva understood in temporal terms as the essence (rupa) of things which is not affected by the manifestation and ultimate disappearance of created objects, i.e. a distinction between the "vyakta" and the "rupa" is found in the Yukti Dipikâ: cf. Yuktidipikâ, ed. by Ram Chadra Pandeya (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), pp. 57-61. For a discussion of this concept of the tattva in the Sâmkhya, cf. Pulinbhati Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sâmkhya System of Thought (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975), pp. 251-253.

60 Ibid., p. 143. It should be added that, ultimately according to the monist Śrî Kumâra, insofar as all the tattvas fall under the pâsa aspect of the tripartite, pati, pâsa, and pâsa, tattva is simply a "superimposition (upâdhi) on the basic unity of Śiva. Cf. Tattvapracâsa, p. 17 and Filliozat, p. 263.

61 Tattva Prakâsa, p. 144:

\[\text{tatata}\ \text{santatatvācā tattvānītī tato viduḥ tattvaṃ deśato vaṣṭīlīḥ sanatatvāṃ ca kālātā laṣādyojanayāpi tattvām pralayat sthitam anyatha stambhakumbhādirapi tattvām prasajyate}\]

This play on the etymological sense of the term "tattva" being linked to the root tan which means "to extend" and is meant to indicate the spatial and temporal extensiveness aspect of the tattva [tan changing to tat before -tva] is probably the very opposite of the actual etymological conception of the literal meaning of "tatt-tva" as "thatness" [i.e. tadh-tva] in an immediately experiential sense whose apodictical connotation lent itself to a conception of the aspatial and atemporal "essence" of a thing (i.e., as in the Mahabharata 1.1.4, "tadapi nityam yasmistattvam na vihanyate. kim punastattvam -- tadbhavastattvam). In this sense, the original meaning of the term tattva has its more literal reference in something comparable to the "tōdē tī" in Aristotle's Categories (i.e., as in 3b.10: "πᾶσα δὲ ὀψία δοξεῖ τόδε τί σημαίνειν."")

62 Cf. SPB, pp. 138-139. In the TP the tattvas are said to
dissolve (Īyante) into māyā (v.67); only māyā, puruṣa and Śiva continue to exist during the cosmic destruction (v.69).

In the manner in which Śivārayogin describes the Mahapralaya, the three abhāvas are: Śivasaktiprerana, Purusa-vyāpāra and Tattva-vyāpāra. The real "fuse" is karma (i.e. "bhujakārṣṭa").

SPB, p. 139: ayasāgneryathā yogo viyoga 'gneryathāyasā/ tattvanamātmānaścaiva śaktvā karmavasābbhavet.
Chapter II

DOCTRINE OF THE SUBTLE AND GROSS ELEMENTS

1. The Teleological Concern Regarding the Elements

In the BK the gross and subtle elements are dealt with solely in terms of a theology that construes all events as ultimately connected to the will or intention of the Supreme Being, Śiva; within this conception of the world the elements serve a specifically teleological goal as contributory factors engaged in the final release of the soul. The elements are thus exclusively treated in terms of their participation in and contribution towards bhūga; they are merely the "ancillaries" of bhūga (bhogāṅgatva) without which the soteriological activity of bhūga could not be brought to fruition.¹

Once a soul is bound by "pāśa" qua māyā, the foundational material cause of the world, it is ipso facto united with all the ancillary members of māyā. The "elements" -- specifically the material elements -- are considered to be the final evolutes in the last stage of the evolution of the world process (srṣṭikrama). The gross element represents, in a more abstract manner, the final stage of "manifestation" (vyakta); it represents the experiential plenum of the vyakta, the sphere of the world-experience on the grounds of which the whole tattvic doctrine comes to be "inferred".² If one were to set up a cosmic duality in the Śaiva doctrine between "matter" and "spirit", the level of the gross elements certainly represents the final manifested form of "matter"; since the ultimate calling of the spirit relates to
its freedom from the connection to matter, the elements, and all they
teleologically entail, represent the basic "hindrances" which must
first be "overcome" in a soteriological sense.

2. The Origin of the Gross Element

The five gross elements (bhūta) are described as earth (prthivī)
water (jala), fire (agni), air (vāyu), and ether (ākāśa). Sadyojyoti spe-
cifically deals with gross elements in terms of their functions (vṛtti) and
their qualities (guna). The function of each gross element is either
"common" (sādhāraṇa) or "unique" (asādhāraṇa). The common function
describes the process whereby the gross elements collectively work to-
gether in constituting the physical body by means of which the sense
organs come to operate. The unique function describes the specific
activity, which is relative to each individual gross element. The
"qualities" of the gross elements are also considered in a two-fold
manner as either common or unique: each gross element has its unique
quality while at the same time sharing the qualities of the other gross
elements, except in the case of ether. The qualities are very important
in terms of the establishment the tattvic doctrine, since it is only
through the "perceptual" qualities that the imperceptible gross
elements are inferred.

In describing the origin of the gross elements in terms of the
process of tattvic evolution, Sadyojyoti employs biological terminology
applicable to organic genesis. The gross elements are said to be
"filled out" (pustana) in the organic sense of being "nourished" or
"fed". The source or cause (kāraṇabhūta) of this nourishment is the
subtle element (tanmātra). In an organic sense the process of material creation is understood as an ongoing activity which brings the "cause" and the "effect" into a concomitant and inseparable relation. The "cause" qua cause continues to exist "in", so to speak, the effect. 5 This understanding of causality is in direct opposition with the asatkāryavāda which holds that the cause ceases to have a direct ontological relation with the effect once the effect comes into existence. 6

Aghora Śiva cites a text which emphasizes the twofold activity of causation as well as maintenance involved in this organic creation: "the activity of prakṛti is [said to have two functions]: the increasing of that which has already been accomplished and the acting as the cause of that which has not yet been accomplished (ākṛtasya kāraṇam kṛtasya parivardhanam ca prakṛtkarma yataḥ)." 7 In this quoted passage "prakṛti" stands for the entire realm of the material world and the manner in which all causality is governed by the concomitant interconnectedness of the cause and the effect. Both the original causation and the ongoing maintenance of the material elements is due to the subtle elements.

3. The Common and Unique Functions of the Gross Elements

As has been mentioned, the functions of the gross elements are either common or unique. The common function of the gross elements is said to involve the supporting of the sense and motor organs (indriyādhāratva). This function is not actually carried out directly by the gross elements but takes place through the instrumentality of the physical body. Through the commonly shared activity of constituting the physical body,
the gross elements come to support the activity of the organs. Although the sense organs are technically described as having their "locus" (sthāna) in the subtle body, the gross elements are said to "bear" them, i.e., provide a receptacle for them, as a cup, for instance, does for water. Aghora Siva argues for the necessity of postulating the existence of a specific medium to bear the organs, even though the organs already have a supporting locus in the subtle body. He argues that the organs are in themselves inactive and require a medium through which they come to be active, i.e., the physical body. In one sense this common function precedes the actual unique functions of the gross elements, since it is only when this common function exists that the unique functions come into being. Teleologically, the specific functions of the gross elements do not come into being on their own account but simply on account of bearing the sense organs; this bearing requires that the collection of the unique functions of the gross elements work together as a common function. However, it is not the physical body understood as the totality of the unique functions working collectively but the soteriological activity of karma that ultimately activates the sense organs, since karma directly controls the activity of bhoga; insofar as the gross elements are essentially considered to be "ancillaries of bhoga", all their activity is directed towards bhoga, whose overriding cause is karma. Since both the sense organs and the gross elements (in their embryonic form as subtle elements) have their locus in the subtle body, the sense organs and gross elements share the common purpose of bringing about the enjoyment of karmic effects. Although the subtle body is, in part, constituted by these
two separate groups of *tattvas*, it is said to carry out one goal, as is the case with a lamp (*bhinnajātiyamapyekapahalam dīpāngaṅgavastuvat*). In a word, all of the functions of the gross elements are subsumed under this one goal of the subtle body, i.e. *karmabhoga*.

The following specific functions of the gross elements are listed in verse six of the BK: "supporting" belongs to the earth, "bringing-together" to water, "maturing" to fire, "structuring" to air and "providing space" to ether. In a very significant sense these unique functions are the gross elements themselves, since it is as these unique functions that the gross elements carry out the common functions and possess the qualities. The gross elements exist in the form of these specific functions and not as separate "entities" removed from the activities of these functions.

4. **The Qualities of the Gross Elements**

In terms of understanding the relationship between the gross and subtle elements and the ontological status of both, the qualities of the gross elements serve a much more important role than the functions since it is only by means of the qualities that the existence of the non-perceptual gross and subtle elements can be pramanically established, i.e. through inference.\(^{12}\)

*Sadyojyoti* first describes the qualities of the gross elements before giving the logical proofs justifying this description. Each gross element is said to possess one specific quality. Although ether only possesses sound as its quality, each of the other gross elements possesses at least one other quality besides its own specific quality: earth,
for instance, possesses all the qualities besides its own specific quality, smell. From the most subtle to the most gross, the elements along with their qualities are arranged hierarchically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Element (Bhūta)</th>
<th>Quality (Guṇa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ether (ākāśa)</td>
<td>Sound (śabda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air (vāyu)</td>
<td>Touch (sparśa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire (agni)</td>
<td>Colour (rūpa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (jala)</td>
<td>Taste (rasa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth (prthivi)</td>
<td>Smell (gandha)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This ordering of the gross elements together with their qualities should not be confused with a similar arrangement known as the "pañcikaraṇa" according to which each gross element accompanied by its unique quality is conjoined with the other gross elements accompanied by their unique qualities. The numerical ratio of this combination of gross elements is very exact: each gross element constitutes half and the other four one eighth each of the combination. Ether, for example, is the result of the following combination of gross elements and their qualities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Touch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>Colour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Taste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Smell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ether</td>
<td>Sound</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13
According to Sadyojyoti each quality is itself subdivided into various species which are differently associated with the various gross elements. For example, "colour" is of six varieties in its specific substratum earth, although it is said to be only "white" (śukla) in water. According to the manner in which the qualities are arranged in the various gross elements, the specific "arrangement" of the gross elements is inferred; Sadyojyoti demonstrates the reasoning process that leads to the following inference (BK, v. 16-16A):

No cognition of earth is possible without a cognition of odour etc., while a cognition of water etc. takes place without a cognition [of odour etc.]; consequently, earth is separate from water etc. but is not separate from odour etc.

In this manner the necessary connection (avyatirekitva) between the substratum and quality (i.e. the guṇin and guṇa or viśeṣyatva and viśeṣana) comes to be inferred on the basis of the principle that "the apprehension of the thing possessed by qualities is preceded by the apprehension of the qualities (guṇigrahanasya guṇacrahanapūrvakatvam)."

(BKV on v.17) The order (krama) established at the level of the "qualities" therefore establishes the order at the level of the possessor of these qualities, i.e. the gross elements. The Naiyāyikas, who hold that the substratum of the qualities and the qualities themselves are both separately and perceptually cognized, argue against this Śaivite principle by citing the specific example of the white crystal put next to something red; the fact that the crystal takes on the "red" colour of the object beside it indicates that there can be an apprehension of the qualities of a thing apart from any necessary substratum-quality connection belonging to the apprehension. In the case of the quartz
The real "colour" quality is whiteness, not redness; however, if one is to accept the principle put forth by the Śaivites, then the quartz when perceived as "red" would have to be naturally qualified by redness, which is not, in fact, the case. This proves, according to Nyāya, that the quartz qua substratum can in fact be perceived as separate from its quality, as it is perceived in the second instance as qualified by redness.

To this specific argument against the Śaivite's conception of the connection between the substratum and quality, Sadyojyoti claims that the quality "colour" should be understood as consisting of two things, both the colour and the general configuration (samsthāna) of the thing to which the colour belongs. In other words, certain things possess certain colours; hence, even when the crystal appears "red", we remember that this particular four cornered object originally possessed a white colour. Hence, the principle is not violated.¹⁶

5. The Subtle Elements

The five subtle elements have the same names as the five qualities and stand to the gross elements in exactly the same sequential order as the five qualities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtle Element (Tanmātra)</th>
<th>Gross Element (Bhūta)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sound</td>
<td>Ether</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Touch</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Colour</td>
<td>Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Taste</td>
<td>Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Smell</td>
<td>Earth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The view that the subtle elements are established as the causes of the gross elements is based on an argument initially founded on the following principle: if an object is of an unconscious and manifold nature, it should be considered an "effect". From the condition of being an effect, some cause must be inferred. Since the material elements are considered to fall under the category of effects, a cause must be postulated to account for these material elements. Furthermore, the specific nature of the cause is established through the nature of the effect; in the case of the gross elements, the qualities of the gross elements are thought to define the ontological status of the gross elements as effects. Hence, the nature of the cause of the gross elements will be comparable to the nature of the qualities; as a result, the subtle elements construed as the causes of the gross elements are designated with the same characteristics as the qualities, sound etc. One could almost say that the subtle elements are the unmanifested form of the qualities themselves operating through the instrumentality of the gross elements. The gross element, nevertheless, is still considered to be the "effect" of the subtle element; the gross element, qua "substratum" (gunin) of the quality, cannot be considered apart from the quality. The gunin-guna or bhūta-guna complex is considered to be the "effect" which explains the necessity for the postulation of the subtle element as the cause. This explains why the subtle elements themselves cannot operate as the substrata of the qualities; the subtle elements are those causal factors that are themselves without manifested qualities (anabhīvyaktavisēṣatva).¹⁷
the causes of the gross elements the subtle elements are described as the "generating-loci" (yogi); although they are in essence of the same nature as the manifested qualities of the gross elements, they do not share the same functions of the gross elements. According to the idea already mentioned that all creation is a combination of both causation and maintenance, the subtle elements function in a dual role: as the "cause" (kāraṇa) the subtle element functions as the material cause (upādāna) in the bringing about of that which has not yet emerged (akṛtasya kāraṇam) and as the "maintainer" (āpūrṇa) the subtle element is that which continues the maintenance (poṣaka) of that which has already come into existence (kṛtasya parivardhanam). 18

In concluding the discussion of the elements, it may be pointed out that in the section of the DK that specifically treats the elements and their contribution towards bhoga, Sadāvyātthe direct origin of the elements as stemming from the individual instantiations of the ego-principle, i.e., the tāmásic aspect of the āhāmkāra (from which the subtle elements directly arise). 19 In thus avoiding to discuss the direct origin of the elements at this point in the discussion of the tattvas, Sadāvyātthe may be avoiding the possible charge by an opponent that each individual soul both materially and experientially creates its own world (bhuvana). 20 Restricting the originating locus of the elements to the ego, which is "specific" to each "individual" soul, may in principle rule out the possibility of the independent status of an "external" and "intersubjective" world. An opponent might argue that this "individual ego-creation theory" leaves us with a conception of the mundane "world" as simply a totality of many individual, ego-experiencing worlds.
This possible criticism never enters into the doctrine of elements as described by Sadyojyoti and Aghora Śiva, nor, for that matter, in the works on Sāmkhya that hold a similar doctrine of elements. Although both the Śaivites\textsuperscript{21} and the Sāmkhya\textsuperscript{22} assume the existence of a commonly shared, "objective" world (whether its basic material cause is assumed to be "māyā", as according to the Śaivites, or "prakṛti", as according to Sāmkhya), the physical evolution of this world appears to end in the ego-based creation of individually created and individually experienced worlds. In short, an opponent may conclude that the ego-based origin of the elements leads to a solipsistic conception of the world, i.e., in order to account for an independent world, the tattvic doctrine would have to avoid limiting the creation and genesis of the elements to the locus of the ego-principle.
Chapter II

NOTES

1 The larger function of the elements concerns the role the elements play in bringing about bhoga; it concerns the "instrumentality" (śādhaṇa) of the elements. In these terms the elements are not considered in a specifically cause-effect relation with bhoga; "śādhaṇa" is not specifically causal in a purely instrumental manner as "karaṇa". Rather, "śādhaṇa" refers to the instrumental role of the elements as "contributory factors" (āṅga) - in the activity of bhoga.

2 Although ordinary mortals who lack lordly powers cannot perceive the elemental tattvas directly, yogins can, since their powers of cognition are not limited to the buddhi. (BK, v. 8Ab-8B) Nor can ordinary mortals perceive the Pisācas, the deities who have yogic powers (aiśvarya) and who rule over the tattvas from the buddhi to earth: cf., SPB, p. 239.

3 More mythic and life-world associations that the material elements possess are described in other works. For the deities, geometric forms, colours, Tamil letters and symbols (sword of diamond for ākāśa, lotus for air, etc.), cf. Śivājnāna Siddhiyār (3. 67-68), p. 182.

4 This more biological terminology is employed as well in describing māyā, the ultimate material cause of the world, as the "seed" out of which all created things arise. Such an organic model of the world is in accordance with the conception of this manifestation as a single source of both the matter and the form of things, of both the cause and the effect - in short, as a whole in spite of its formalization in a numerical and tattvāc manner. The only "external factor" of the "jagadbiṣṭa" is the iśvareccā which activates the activity of the seed; cf. BK, v.4.

5 According to Śivāgray yogin, a change of something into something else can only occur in five ways, according to the ontological status of the effect: parināma, transformation; ārambhā, a totally new creation; samuḥa, a aggregation of something totally new and something contributory; vivarta, an illusory manifestation and vṛtti, a modification. In describing Śiva's agency (pravartakatva) in creation (srṣṭi), the jagat qua karya is said to be a "vṛtti": Therefore, just as in the original state of the cloth (as folded) and of the snake as coiled there is even without detriment to the original nature (of the thing) the attainment of another state, constituting vṛtti, similarly, the world, too, is but a vṛtti of the suddha- and asuddhamāyās controlled by Śiva."
The common criticism of the satkaryavāda points to the apparent contradiction in identifying the "cause" with the "effect" as Kamalaśīla, for example, points out:

This cannot be right: as a matter of fact, it is not the same thing that becomes changed (anyathātvam); because "change" consists in the production of another nature or character (svabhāväntarotpattib); now this "change" that you speak of -- is it something different from the Thing itself? Or is it the Thing itself? It cannot be the Thing itself; as that has already been produced by its own Cause [and hence could not be produced again by the cause of the change]. If it is something different from the Thing, then the Thing itself remains as before, retaining its permanence; so that it has not changed."


Also quoted by Aghora Śīva in the TSV, p. 5.

The subtle body (sukṣmadeha) is also called "the eightfold one" (puṇḍrata) in that it is constituted by the three inner organs (buddhi, manās and āhamkāra) and the five subtle elements; the "organs" (indriyāṇi) can only be said to have their locus in the subtle body insofar as they fall under a species of the āhamkāra. Śivārayogin provides the inference establishing the existence of the subtle body (Sā, pp. 285-286):

"The soul's going to another world, etc., is to be accomplished by some instrument, since it is an act, like a member of the gross body. Nor is this possible directly for the self which is pervasive; hence it should be said to have an adjunct; hence, that (subtle body) is established as an adjunct.

Since the gross elements are effects of the subtle elements, the condition of bearing the sense organs belongs to both kinds of elements and is referred to as a joint state of "sthūlasukṣmatva". Together, the two kinds of elements form a receptacle. As a receptacle, the subtle elements are like the pot itself and the gross elements its [enamel] covering (tannātrāṇiḥ chatavadvīśeṣasa ca pralpayat); this analogy is provided by Hulin; cf. Mrgendra-gāma: Sections de la Doctrine et du Yoga, trans. by M. Hulin. Publications de l'Institut Français d'Indologie, No. 63 (Pondicherry: Institut Français d'Indologie, 1980), pp. 266-267.

Nārāyana Kanṭha presents a long argument defending the bhoga-directed teleology of the gross elements through a consideration of the
use (or purpose, upayoga) of the gross elements themselves. He presents only four possibilities of this purpose.

Although God is the "creator" (kartr) of the gross elements, they are of no use to God (qua upayogin), as God's comportment is not self-directed ("svātman") but is rather directed towards eternal plenitude (nityaparipurnasarūpam); they cannot be of use to themselves (svopayogin) because they are of an unconscious nature; they cannot be "useless" (anupayogin) on account of the greatness of their creator, God; consequently, they must serve the purpose of another (anyopayogin), which upon further investigation turns out to be individually bound souls. Cf. MĀV, pp. 177-179.

11 MĀ (12.32A), p. 341. The introduction of the subtle body and karma (qua "adrśta") at this point of the discussion, especially the claim in 8Ab-8b that the subtle body is only perceptible by those who have lordly powers, may be an argument against the Cārvākas who argue that the "ceṣṭā" of the organs is solely and self-evidently a product of the physical body.

12 In the MĀV, p. 332, Aghora Śiva holds that the five gross elements can be inferred on account of their functions; he refers to the five specific functions (samyavīṣeṣanam) of the five gross elements, which are inferred by their "effects" (karyāni), the functions (vṛttayāh).

13 The compounding takes place thus: each of the five elements, viz. ether etc., is divided into two equal parts; of the ten parts thus produced five -- being the first half of each element -- are each subdivided into four equal parts. Then leaving one half of each element to the other half is added one of these quarters from each of the other four elements." Cf. Vedānta Sūtra of Sadānanda, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1949), p. 56. A similar description is found in the Pañcasāstra (1.27) and in the Brahma Sūtra Bhashya (on 2.4.22).

14 An exact enumeration is not given in the BK; the commonly accepted enumeration views rasa as sixfold, gandha as ninefold, rūpa as sixfold vāyu as fivefold and sabda as fourfold.

17. The Naiyāyikas argument is unconvincing since the crystal qua guna is cognized with the "changed colour" and not without colour, i.e., with a guna; cf. MAV, p. 187.

17. Aghora Siva explains this conception in greater detail in "Possessing the same properties as these gross elements, the subtle elements are the material causes and sustaining agents of the gross elements; although the gross elements possess distinct properties, the subtle elements lack such properties. (tadbhutasamanañagnam kāram kāram aprakāraṇa tasya vīśeṣa tanmatram bhūtasya hyayam vīśeṣo vīśeṣarāhitam tat)."

18. MA, 12.5, gives the etymology of the term "tanmātra" as "just those things [their measures are such...tad-mātram]" -- i.e., they are solely what they are without the manifested distinctions or qualities (anabhiyaktaviśesatvam), as the gross elements; Narayana Kantha describes them as being of the nature of fundamental elements (bhutaprakṛtirūpam). With the receptacle analogy already mentioned, the subtle elements are themselves without manifested qualities, as a pot. Only the covering is perceptible.

In his gloss on SK, v. 38 Vacaspati Miśra glosses "avīśeṣa" with respect to the subtle elements as "suksma", which is in opposition to the "sthūla", the gross element i.e., "vīśeṣa". Śrīkumāra holds a similar conception in his commentary on TP, v.6T (p. 124).

19. Besides v. 5-20 of the BK, the elements are also treated in verses 30A-31 wherein a contra-prāṇāntākarana-vāda (which links the gross element vāyu with caitanya) is refuted. In verses 37-42 the bautikendriyavādins are also refuted. In verse 45 there is a description of the subtle elements as they arise from the ego and in verses 60B-72A there is a refutation of the view that the bhoktr is simply a modification of the gross elements.

20. This is clearly brought out in the MA and MAV; in MA, 6.1 wherein the ātman is described as the cause or means (nimitta) of the universe, the locus is not considered to be the ego but the ātman itself. In MA, 5.10 the mała-tainted souls are said to create the bhūvanas. In his commentary Narayana Kantha explains that the ātman is the nimitta qua pravartika, the instigating cause, on account of the arising [as effects] of the "worlds, organs and bodies" -- all of which takes place for the bhogasādhana.

21. The specific manner of viewing the condition of "embodiment" occurs on account of the "bhogasādhana" (BK, v. 4) and is threefold, consisting of the subtle body which is specific to individual souls, the objective and intersubjective world which is common to all bound souls, and the "bodies born of their world" (bhuvana-jādeha) which represents both a common and restricted condition. A similar conception of embodiment is found in the MAD. On the one hand, the physical body is said to be a "product" of the material world (bhaṭutikā deha iti bhuvana-jādeha) while on the other hand, material creation when discussed is
done only with respect to the elements constituting the body — for example, when the author of the MA comes to enumerate the qualities of the gross elements in some detail, the discussion is restricted to the qualities constituting the physical body (cf. pg. 339-340). In the final analysis, the soul comes to share a common world and have its own subjective world through a "specific" subtle body; however, the acceptance of the "common, shared world" (sādhāranabhuvana) is not ontologically explained given the ego-locus of the production of the elements, which only accounts for the "bhuvanajadeha" creation of the body itself. Vaiśeṣika, it may be noted, avoids this problem with its doctrine of "atoms" (paramāṇuvāda); the material atoms in their state as "effects" (of the eternal atoms) are threefold: in the form of the body, the sense organs and the objects of mundane consciousness (eg., Vaiśeṣika Sūtras 4.2.1: "tatpunah prthivyādi karyam dravyam trividham śārīrendriyavisayasaṃjñākam" [only ākāśa does not fall under this threefold distinction]). Umesha Sastri still construes the ultimate creation of the atoms and all they entail, i.e., the entire sphere of the jāta, in very subjective terms: "The relation between 'Matter' and the 'Atman' is vyānaya-vyānajakabhāva; so that, the harmony of the samsārayatra under the influence of adṛṣṭa becomes possible." Cf. Umesha Sastri, Conception of Matter (Allahabad: Umesha Mishra, 1936), p.55.

Chapter III
THE SPHERE OF THE ORGANS

1. The Sense and Motor Organs: The "Organ" (indriya) Considered as a "Capacity" (sakti) Distinct From its Corporeal-locus (sthāna)

Both the sense and motor organs are dealt with by Sadyojyoti independently of their originating-locus, the ego; a similar method is adopted in the treatment of the elements. In the examination of the organs, the argument is put forth that what is called an "organ" is something quite distinct from the body part identified with the specific functioning of the organ,¹ a position dramatically opposed to the materialist, who holds that the organ is in fact just the corporeal functioning of certain body parts. According to the materialist, in the case of both the sense and motor organs, whenever there is a "defect" in the body part, the "organ" is not seen to function; for example, in the case of the motor organs, one may have legs and feet, which constitute the motor organ of "locomotion", and yet one may be unable to walk. The person may be crippled by a debilitating disease which prevents the body parts from functioning, thus proving that the body part and the organ are one and the same thing. In the case of the sense organs a similar argument applies: when one is blind, i.e. when there is a defect with one's eyes, one does not see, "the sense of sight" is absent.² This absence of the "sense" due to a "defect" in the body part, the materialist argues, establishes that the sense organ is in fact identical with the body part.
The Śaivite uses the same examples offered by the materialist to prove the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the sense organs cannot be identified with the body part. In the case of the motor organs and the example of a "defect" in those body parts contributory to the locomotive organ, i.e., the legs and feet, the fact that the body parts exist and the motor ability is absent is proof that the two cannot be identified. If the body part is to be identified with the motor organ, then the existence of the former necessitates the existence of the latter. The same argument applies to the sense organs and the example of blindness: one may have eyes yet one may not see. According to Sadyojyoti the cause of the absence of the functioning of the organ even when the body part is present is not due to a defect in the body part itself but rather in a defect of the sense organ whose capacity to function (śakti) is separate from the body part. Sadyojyoti appeals to a cause of this "organ defect" which the materialists would be unable to accept: karmic influences. Due to the "imperceptible" (adṛṣṭa) karmic influences one may be given eyes but not the ability to "see", legs but not the ability to "walk", etc.

In the case of the absence of the body part, the organ does not function due to the fact that the organ depends on the physical body part to provide it with a locus whereby it can be active. More specific terminology is employed by Aghora Śiva to describe the exact relationship between the organs and their corporeal loci. The general purpose of both the sense and motor organs is "vitality" or "activity" (ceṣṭā or kriyā). The organ (indriya) he describes as an instrument (karana) which is essentially a faculty or capacity (śakti) to function in a specific manner; however, it can only function when dependent on the
corporeal-locus (sthāna) which acts as a supporting-medium for the active functioning of the organ. Although the organ is distinct from the corporeal-locus, it is dependent on this locus for its functioning. The metaphysical underpinning of this view is clear: the corporeal-locus (sthāna) is abstractly a representation of the sphere of material creation, the sphere of the manifested "qualities" of the gross elements; it is only at the level of material creation that any real "activity" of the sense and motor organs can occur since they both are only instruments engaged in material activity.

2. The Tenfold Enumeration of the Organs

Sadyojyoti provides the following enumeration of the organs along with their specific functions as:

**MOTOR ORGAN (KARMENDRIYA):** ACTIVITY (KRIYĀ) QUÆ ACTION (KARMAṆ)

- **Genitals (upastha):** Joy (ānanda)
- **Foot (pāda):** Locomotion (gamana)
- **Anus (pāyu):** Evacuation (utsarga)
- **Hand (pāni):** Seizing (ādāna)
- **Mouth (mukha):** Speaking (vacana)

**SENSE ORGAN (JÑĀNENDRIYA):** ACTIVITY (KRIYĀ) QUÆ SENSATION (ALOCANA)

- **Ear (śruti):** Hearing (śabdagrāhakatva)
- **Skin (tvak):** Touching (sparśagrāhakatva)
- **Eye (caksus):** Seeing (rūpagrāhakatva)
- **Tongue (jihvā):** Tasting (rasagrāhakatva)
- **Nose (nāsikā):** Smelling (gandhāgrāhakatva)

The "activities" or "functions" serve as the inferential marks
whereby the organs come to be inferred. The specific and observable number of activities establishes the enumeration of the imperceptible organs. The Naiyāyika immediately raises the objection that, with respect to the motor organs, the reason (hetu) for inferring five organs from five activities is not justified; rather, the number of "activities" is limitless and therefore the so-called "organs" should also be limitless. According to the Naiyāyikas all five activities fall under the category of "activity" (karman) and are a result of the soul's intentionality affecting a certain circumscribed part of the body (sātrāikadeśavṛtti). Raising the eyebrows, claims the Naiyāyika, is simply one of these activities: if we accept the principle that the "activities" are the hetu for the inferential establishment of the organs, then there should be an organ for every activity and in this case, for example, a specific organ for raising the eyebrows.

By responding to the argument Sadyjoyjoti spells out his position more clearly: the "activities" are said to be only five on account of their own inherent characteristics (antarbhāva). These five are the "basic factors." (pradhānabhūta) in the whole variety of activities. "Raising the eyebrows", for instance, is classified as a species of "grasping" (ādāna) and is mediated by the organ designated as the hand; in like manner, all forms of bodily evacuation, for example, are representatively attributed to the organ designated as the anus. Such reasoning also applies to the sense organ and is most evident in the case of the sense organ "skin" whose activity is "touching": this organ clearly pervades the whole body, including a variety of specific body parts, which all fall under the category of this organ.
With the argument defending the limitlessness of the motor organs having been rejected, Aghora Śiva turns his attention to a criticism of the view that posits the singleness of the sense organs. The Naiyāyika queries: why not have just one "organ" which senses everything, and the separate "senses" acting as "aspects" of this one sense? The grasping of different kinds of objects (bhinnāsvayagrāhakac) can simply be explained as taking place through the different loci of one sense organ (ekavevānindriyamadhisthānabhēdena). In his rebuttal Aghora Śiva first accepts the need to postulate the general category of "sense organ" according to the principle that all activity is dependent on an agent; all activity consists of an "agent", "instrument" and activity—in this case, the soul, the sense organ and the sensing. Although this provides the need for a general category of "organ" in the case of "sensing", more than one sense organ must be postulated to account for the various kinds of sensing. If one were to accept the opponent's view then there would always be the necessity of appealing to another type of organ to describe the separate acts of sensing: as it is already established that there are only five kinds of "activities" and therefore five kinds of organs, one would have to choose one of these five organs to represent the various activities. However, if one were to choose the "ear", for example, another organ would have to be postulated in order to account for the sensation of smell etc. Although this argument put forth by Aghora Śiva is based on the prior principle that there are in fact only five types of sense activities and consequently five types of organs, we find a more general criticism of the opponent's view, for example, in the Ślokavārtika.
If the sense organ were one only, in all cases, then either everything or nothing would be perceived. If it be urged that we postulate different capacities (or functions) of the same sense organ -- then, these capacities themselves could be said to be so many distinct organs of sense.

The five sense organs, maintains Aghora Śiva, are limited to the sphere of those five phenomena which are "grasped", the specific function of the act of sensing (ālocanā) which takes place when the organ is in the proximity (samnidhi) of its object. It can also be described in more general terms as an act of "resembling" or "mirroring" (samnibhatva) in terms of which the sense organs, through the medium of the "internal organs" buddhi and manas, provide the "vidyā tattva" (the final "instrument" facilitating empirical consciousness for the soul) with an internal "copy" (antarākāra) of the external counterpart (bahiākārasadṛṣṭa).

3. The Necessity of the Postulation of a Separate and Tripartite "Internal Organ" (antahkarana) Distinct from the Sense with Motor Organs

The three internal organs -- buddhi, ahāṃkāra and manas -- are inferred on account of their activities: cognition (bodha), effort (samrāṃbha) and will (icchā). Sādvyojoti maintains that these activities cannot be explained by the various elements or organs so far discussed; the internal organs, for example, are not "products" of the material elements. Aghora Śiva provides three reasons for holding that the internal organs must be inferred from the three stated activities. The first reason lays down the general principle already enunciated that all the tattvas from kalā to the Earth are "established" inferentially by means of their "effects", in this case, cognition etc. Secondly, there is no other means of "proof"
or "correct cognition" (pramāṇa) except inference to establish a correct understanding of the observable "activities" or "effects". Thirdly, and lastly, it is inappropriate to bring into the discussion more than three tattvas to explain the three basic activities of cognition etc.; thus, buddhi, ahamkāra and manas each are said to have several functions, each of which is a specific transformation (vṛtti) of its respective organ. However, each of the organs is considered to have a single function (ekārthatva) encompassing all the various instances of its respective activity. In passing, it should be noted that the establishment of the nature of the antahkarana rules out the possibility of attributing this organ to just one tattva as, for example, buddhi itself.

Sadyojyoti employs an analogy to explain the relation between the internal organ and the sense organs in the act of cognizing (BK, v.28-29). He says that the three internal organs and the five sense organs combine together to carry out the activities which are specific to the internal organs; the whole process is carried out for the soul in the accomplishment of bhoga. The analogy given to explain the relation between the internal and sense organs is that of the palanquin and the palanquin-bearers: if either the palanquin or the palanquin-bearers is absent, no activity takes place. The internal organs cannot carry out their functions without the sense organs nor can the sense organs carry out their functions without the internal organs.

The internal organs are said to be dependent on the sense organs because there can be no cognition of things (adhyavasāya) etc. without a prior apprehension of some external object perceived through the senses;
even in the case of dreaming the images which constitute the dream are ultimately derived from the senses even though during the activity of the dream the internal organ is not immediately dependent on the senses; i.e., on a perception of an external object (bhyārthālocana). The senses, on the other hand, are dependent on the internal organs since "attentiveness" (avadhana) and so forth are required in order to sense things; the sense organs must be "directed" and "controlled" by an instrumental and onto-epistemological faculty higher than themselves.

4. The Refutation of the View that the Internal Organ is a Modification of The Vital Air (prāṇa)

According to Aghora Śiva one school of the Čārvākas maintains that the internal organ is simply the life-force energy of "prāṇa" (prāṇāntahkarana-vāda). Although this doctrine came to be developed by Čārvāka it is in fact a doctrine which runs throughout the Upaniṣads, wherein prāṇa is regarded as the first principle of life in the body, and came to be used as a synonym for "life" in general and "consciousness" in particular. According to the Čārvākas prāṇa is the cause of consciousness and is something living organisms are endowed with. Prāṇa itself, however, is simply a transformation of one of the four basic material elements constituting the world.

Aghora Śiva brings forth three reasons to refute the identification of prāṇa with the internal organ. Firstly, since prāṇa, according to the Śaivites, is ontologically dependent on "volitional activity" (prayatna) which is one of the functions of the ego-principle qua internal organ, prāṇa obviously presupposes the existence of an internal organ other than itself. Secondly, if the function of prāṇa is said to emit
consciousness, as the Cārvāka maintains, then some "instrument" must be postulated in order to account for the genesis of consciousness, i.e. if prāṇa is said to be the "origin" (utpatti) out of which consciousness arises, then an instrument must be postulated through which this activity can evolve. In this case, however, "air" (vāyu) is considered the cause and consciousness the effect; between the cause and the effect there must be the medium of an instrument. Since prāṇa qua "air" is considered to be the cause it cannot also be the instrument. Thirdly, and finally, as the internal organ, prāṇa cannot be said to emit consciousness, as prāṇa is simply a modification of the material element "air": something purely "material," cannot create something "conscious."

With regard to the first two criticisms of the Cārvāka view, the first claims that prāṇa itself will require an instrument and the second that the production of consciousness will require one; in neither case can prāṇa be considered the instrument. Although it begs the question, the first criticism is based on the argument that consciousness in fact precedes the biological functions entailed by prāṇa and is not, as the Cārvāka holds, a result of these functions. For example, in sleep we do not engage in physical activities considered to be biological functions of prāṇa; such activities are only engaged in once there has been some volitional motivation, which indicates that volitional activities precede activity based on prāṇa. By implication, if volition precedes prāṇa, consciousness precedes prāṇa. Concerning the second criticism, i.e., that one and the same thing cannot be considered to be both a cause and an instrument, the Cārvākas might reproach the Śaivite with the same
charge, as many of the tattvas are often thought of in different casual terms. The subtle elements, for example, are both "causes" and effects at one and the same time: "causes" of the material elements and "effects" of māyā. Buddhi, for example, is both the cause and the instrument of "cognition" (bodha). The examples could easily be multiplied. The Cārvākās might also point out that, with respect to the third criticism, their own view is in fact not much different from the satkāryavāda view that the "gross" (sthūlatva) emerges as a modification of "the subtle" (suksmatva), except that in this case the subtle emerges as a modification of the gross.

5. The Refutation of the View that the Internal Organ is a Quality of the Soul (Ātmagunatā)

Sadyojyoti proceeds to criticize the Nyāya conception of the internal organ as represented by "buddhi", i.e. jñāna, as a quality of the soul considered as its substratum (dravya). The debate takes place over the argument concerning the ontological status of buddhi as the representative organ of the triadic internal organ. Both the Naiyāyika and the Śaivite agree that the soul is eternal; however, they disagree over the explanation of the soul's connection to finite, limited consciousness. According to Aghora Śiva, the soul is intrinsically endowed with consciousness -- without any limitations. However, when its powers are limited by empirical consciousness, i.e., bhoga, the buddhi functions as the means whereby the soul experiences. The soul "grasps" the objective content of the buddhi. The Naiyāyikas, argues Aghora Śiva, establish too close a relationship between empirical consciousness and the
consciousness of the soul when they describe empirical consciousness as a quality of the soul; in doing so, they open their view to a host of contradictions.

According to Aghora Siva the Naiyāyikas adopt a twofold conception of the means of experience (bhogasādhanatā) that involves the sense organs and material elements. Accordingly, the range of experience (bhogyatva) is limited to the sphere (viṣayatva) of the material elements and the sense organs which grasp those material elements. As the instruments whereby experience or bhoga occurs, the sense organs are the only factors which could correspond to the role of an internal organ -- collectively taking on the role of buddhi. However, for the Naiyāyikas buddhi is not considered a means of experience; it is simply the experience itself (samvedana) which arises in the soul when there is the triadic contact of the soul with the senses with their objects. The soul exists as the substratum wherein this experience arises as its "quality." According to Sadyojyoti (BK, 48A) this establishment of the relationship between the soul and buddhi as substratum and quality creates the contradiction that "the known object" can in fact not be cognized, as the soul, according to the Naiyāyikas, can have no objective relation to the "objects of experience." As well, attributing the transitory condition of cognitive experience to the soul as its intrinsic property cannot make sense since the soul is supposed to be "eternal." In light of the fault with the Nyāya view Aghora Siva elucidates the Vāma teaching concerning the relationship between the eternal soul and the transitory empirical experience. Empirical cognition or experience (specifically designated as the buddhi-originated "bodha")
is twofold: of the nature of "ascertaintment" (adhyavasāya) and of the nature of "grasping" (grāhakatva). Ascertainment is described as the particular activity of the buddhi wherein there is the changing cognitions "of this or that," and involves the representational activity of buddhi as it carries on its role as the instrument of empirical consciousness. The "grasping" aspect of empirical cognition does not belong to the buddhi but rather to the soul, as an intrinsic condition of the soul. The soul grasps the ascertained object. The grasping aspect remains an eternal character of the soul and the ascertaining aspect remains a transitory character of the buddhi. Such a position is meant to avoid attributing impermanent cognition to the soul.

According to Aghora Śiva the buddhi -- qua representative organ of the triadic antahkarana -- is indeed an "object," of experience; he quotes the Tattva Samgraha which describes the buddhi qua "object-of-the-soul's-consciousness," as appearing to the soul in terms of an internal experience of "the nature (rūpa) of joy etc." and of "the appearing in the form of the external object" (i.e., the ēkāra of the viṣaya). In this case, there is no triadic "sāmnikāraśa" between the soul, senses and the objects. The relation the soul has to the discernment of the buddhi, i.e. the modifications of the buddhi (buddhivṛtti), does not alter the intrinsic and eternal conditions of the soul but merely covers them over (anuraṇiakatva). In place of construing the internal instrument as a "guna" dependent on the triadic sāmnikāraśa Sadyojyoti describes the internal organ (together with the senses) as "the immediate means whereby enjoyment is accomplished (sāksat bhogasya sādhanaṃ). (BK, 49)
In this case there is a distinction between "karana" and "śādhanā": the internal and external senses act as a "karaga" that functions as the immediate or direct "śādhanā" whereby the soul comes to grasp the objects presented by the senses. If the "instruments" were considered to be the direct "instruments" of the soul's cognition they would be extensions of the soul's consciousness -- this would attribute transitoriness to the soul. By describing them as the "means" whereby this consciousness occurs, Sadyojoyoti avoids drawing a direct ontological relation between these instruments and the consciousness of the soul.

Sadyojoyoti provides a number of analogies to explicate this notion of the "sāksat śādhanatva" role of the internal and external "instruments". As Aghora Śiva points out, these analogies are meant to illustrate a basic teleological principle of the satkāryavāda: the instruments, being by nature of an unconscious nature (acetanatva), cannot exist for their own sake (svārthatva) but must exist for the sake of a conscious soul (cetanapurusārtha). The discussion concerning the instruments is hereby elevated from a purely causal framework to one concerned with purpose (arthatva). Just as the king employs (prayuṅkte) soldiers for the purpose of conquering, so the soul is said to employ the mental apparatus, i.e. the internal and external instruments. The second analogy indicates that not only are the mental apparatus in themselves purposeless, they are powerless: when soldiers are engaged in battle, the king is said to be the "agent", just as when the instruments are engaged in experiencing, the soul is said to be the agent. The final analogy points out that the instruments have no purpose of their own; they simply serve the purpose of the soul in the same way as the conquest is not for the sake of the soldiers but for those things the king desires from the
conquest. In short, the employment, agency and purpose of the internal and external "instruments", i.e., the totality of mental faculties, are attributed to the soul.

The mediating factor between the soul and the "instruments", the mediating factor engaged in the bringing about of the employment, agency and purpose of the instruments, is said to be bhoga. Bhoga is the middle term thought to bridge the distinction between, on the one hand, a complete separation of the soul from the instruments of empirical consciousness and on the other, a limited involvement of the soul in empirical consciousness. The main criticism of the Naiyāyika doctrine of the connection of the soul to empirical consciousness is based on the Naiyāyika's account of the soul's involvement in empirical consciousness: it rules out the possibility of an explanation of the "separation" of the soul from the condition of empirical consciousness. One may, however, query the Śaivite solution to this problem: does it overcome the same difficulty the Naiyāyika conception of the relation is claimed to be in?

Bhoga, as it has been pointed out, is specifically defined as the "buddhivrtti-anurañjana", i.e., the obscuration or empassionment by the various states of mind (i.e., the collection of internal and external instruments). The Naiyāyika may very well argue that this description, or perhaps more accurately "analogy", actually describes the soul along the lines of a substratum qualified by a certain property. The triadic formula of "bhoktr-bhoga-bhogyā" attributes an inseparable (samāvāya) relation of the bhoktr and the bhoga; in this case "bhoga" takes on
the role that buddhi (qua jñāna) plays in the Naiyāyika system. For, although the soul is always considered to be a bhoktṛ, once the bhogya falls away in the released state, so also does the bhoga, even though structurally the soul is, by definition, still considered a bhoktṛ. Similarly, according to the Nyāya, the soul is still considered a substratum (dravya) even though the "quality" of empirical consciousness is no longer active; the structure of the "inherent relation" (samavāya) still exists.²⁰
Chapter III

NOTES

1 The sense and motor organs fall under the general category of "indriya" -- "instrument" or "organ". Although their specific functions are different, "sensing" (ālocaṇā) in the case of the sense organs and "activity" (karman) in the case of the motor organs, much of what applies to the one set of organs applies to the other.

2 The argument not only defends the bhautika nature of the sense organs but also supports the view that the sense organ does not, as the Saivite holds, come into contact (samādhi) with its object: the eye itself is said to be the sense organ on the grounds that we perceive objects either reflected or embedded in crystals -- proving that the eye "organ" does not come in contact with the object. For the Saivite response, cf. SPB, pp. 260-264.

3 The schematic representation appears as follows:

"ŚAKTI"          "CEFÄ"

KARANA → STHĀNA → KRIYA

(INDRIYA) (ADHARA)

KARMAH (KARMENDRIYA)

ALOCAṆĀ (JñAñENDRIYA)

4 Taken up in Nyāya Śūtras, 3.1.52-61.

5 According to the view which posits the singleness of the sense organs, the grasping of different objects (bhinnavisayagraḥakatvam) takes place through the different loci of the sense organ (ekam evaśindriyam adhisthāṇabhedena). The various deficient "conditions" (vyavastha) such as blindness, deafness, etc. are said to occur through the various and respective capacities (saktayah); cf. SPB, pp. 256-258.

6 The Śloka Vārtika criticizes this view in a more logical fashion: If the sense organ were one only, in all cases, then either everything or nothing would be perceived. If it be urged that we postulate different capacities (or functions) of the same sense organ -- then these capacities themselves could be said to be so many distinct organs of sense," ekam yadi bhavedaḥ śarvairgraḥyeta vā na vā/ kalpyate saktibhedāScenario saktirendriyam bhavet.

7 BK, v. 258: "śabdādyālocanaṁ te śāṁ śyāṁ vṛttvīṁ śabdādisamniḥdhau." Sāṃkhya Kārikā, v. 28A, is very similar: "śabdādiṣu pāṇcānaśaṁalocanaṁātmāṁ śisyātevṛttīṁ." Cf. Mainkar, Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Iśvaraṭkṛṣṇa, p. 84.

8 Aghora Śiva takes "samanbhātvam" ("mirroring," or "resembling") as a variant reading of "sammiiḥiḥ" ("proximity").

9 The Tamil manual "Tattuva-Kattalei," which is also known as the Tattuva-Prakāśam, lists four internal organs, the fourth being "sittam (Sanskrit, "siddhān"). Both the buddhi and sittam are said to evolve directly from prakṛti; buddhi is the cause of the ahaṅkāra which is itself the cause of manas while sittam creates no further tattvas and is described as "the will." Cf. Henry R. Hoisington, "Tattuva Kattalei," trans. and notes by Henry Hoisington, Journal of the American Oriental Society, IV (1854), pp 7, 15, 16.

10 According to Aghora Śiva, although it is not actually stated the antahkarana must be the sībhika and the ānānandrayiṇi the collective udvahina, together accomplishing the udvahana which is the various kriya, icchā etc. But the soul, for whom this all takes place, is presumably the enjoyer of this udvahana. SK, v.35 presents the analogy of the function as the gatekeeper (dvārin) and the gate (dvār), the former the antahkarana and the latter the ānānandrayiṇi, the instruments of external perception. This analogy plays more on the idea of the internal and the external. In the Kaṭha Upanisad 1.3.3-4, the analogy of the Ātman riding in a chariot plays on the same idea of "bearing" and indeed on the interdependence of the various aspects which do the bearing. In Maitri Up. (2.4) the Ātman is described as "carted" (rathita).

11 It is a generally held position by the various philosophical schools that dreams are simply an activity of the internal organ; the mental creations (vasanā) being "modifications" (vṛttayah) of previous perceptions (puruṣvānubhūtavāstu) during waking activities. This epistemological approach to dreams to a certain extent de-emphasizes the portentous aspect of dreaming. For a discussion of the understanding of dreaming in Vedānta, cf. Andres O. Fort, "Dreaming in Advaita Vedānta," PEW 35, 4 (1985), pp. 377-386.

12 The Yuktīṭīkā discusses a similar debate among the Sāṃkhya teachers concerning the status of the sense organs in the activity of perceiving things. It is said that a certain "Paṇcādhiḥkarana" holds that they are due to the antahkarana; according to Paṇcādhiḥkarana the organs are destitute of activity, like a dry river -- external factors are required. For discussion of this debate within Sāṃkhya, cf. Pulinbihari Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint, 1975), pp. 181-182.

The organism, however, is a material aggregate endowed with life (prāṇa), which is not the activity of an organ in particular, but is recognized to be the total function of the body.

As Sinha points out, although both the motor and sensory organs are dependent on prāṇa, "in order to perform their respective functions, prāṇa", in any case, differs from the sense organs (indriya) is not being an instrument, and consequently, is not in a position to interact with physical phenomena as its objects (visaya)." (p. 241).

14 The catuṣṭaya-factor (atman-manas-indriya-artha) is not mentioned in Nyaya Sūtras 1.1.4 ("indriyarthasannikarṣopanam...pratyakṣam"). According to Vātsyāyana this sūtra is not a complete description of perception but only mentions the most significant factors; cf. Nyaya-sūtra with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, trans. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya with intr. by Debinprasad Chattopadhyaya (Calcutta: Indian Studies, 1982), pp. 24-26. According to Randle, the sūtrakara had obviously not systematized manas as one of the four factors; cf. H.H. Randle, Indian Logic in the Early Schools (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 67.

Moreover, the Naiyāyikas cannot attribute "dharma" etc. (i.e. the dispositional qualities) to the soul, as this would attribute insentience (jagatva) and mutability (avikāra) to the soul. Dispositional qualities entail change through their refining activities and lasting impressions.

16 Aghora Śiva glosses "saksāt sādhanam" with sakṣaṭ karanam"; buddhi is not an átmaguna but a "sakṣaṭ sadhānam", i.e. "karanā".

17 For example, cf. Sāmkhya Sūtras 3.58 and 6.40; prakṛti is "pumartham".

18 A similar analogy concerning the king, soldiers and the victory is found in the Yogabhāṣya. "The victory or defeat carried out by the soldiers is attributed to the king in the same manner as bondage and release are attributed to the soul, although they are carried out in and by the buddhi." The Bhoktr (soul) experiences the fruit of the release or bondage: bondage is of the thinking substance (buddhi) only and is the failure to attain the purposes of the Self. Release is the termination of the purposes of the self." cf. The Yoga System of Patanjali trans. James Haughton Woods (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 145.

19 One may question the Śaivite postulation of "bhoga" as the intermediary link between the soul and the activities of the mental faculties. It is clear in Vātsyāyana, for example, that the cognitive
and dispositional activities take place on the level of the "guna" and not in the soul itself.

20 In this respect, Saivism is in agreement with Sāmkhya Kārika, v.37 wherein buddhi is described as the sādhana of all the "bhoga of the puruṣa (sartham pratyupabhogam yasmate puruṣasya sadhayati buddhih)." Vacaspati Misra, in his commentary on this verse, completely severs any ontological link between the bhoktr-bhoga-bhogyo triad. He states that since the "purusārtha" is the only motivating factor (pravojikatva) of the functioning of all the instruments, the most important (pradhana) is the one which is "the direct means of accomplishment (sāksatsādhanā)" -- i.e. the buddhi, just as the king's chief minister in the collection of taxes. Cf. Tattva-Kaumudi, trans. Ganganātha Jhā (Bombay: Tookaram Tatya, 1896), p. 78.
Chapter IV

THE SPECIFIC INTERNAL ORGANS: MANAS, BUDDHI AND AHAMKĀRA

1. The Concept of Manas

The Sanskrit term "manas"\(^1\) is etymologically cognate with the English term "mind". Generally speaking, in the oldest literature such as the Vedas, "manas" is held to be the principle of sentience. Throughout the Upaniṣads "manas" stands for the "mind" in general; manas also takes on mythic proportions, as Deussen points out:\(^2\)

Originally manas had a more general meaning, and in its indefinite character corresponded nearly to our "disposition", "feeling", "heart", "spirit". As such manas represents not infrequently the spiritual principle in general, and becomes sometimes a name for the first principle of things, Brahman or the Atman.

With the rise of the philosophical schools manas generally comes to signify an inner faculty or "organ"; not all of the schools consider manas a "separate" organ.\(^3\) Śaṅkara, for instance, recognizes that the "internal organ" (antāṅkarana) is called by different names in different places in the Upaniṣads, such as manas, buddhi, vijnāna and cit; in other places, he says, the internal organ is just subdivided into manas and buddhi, the former describing a doubting activity (śamśaya) and the latter an ascertaining activity (niścaya).\(^4\) Śaṅkara himself does not specifically establish the separate functions of a buddhi or manas but merely wishes to establish the existence of an internal organ responsible for the various mental activities, i.e., an internal organ that acts as the controlling factor over the "flow", so to speak, of perceptions, both
appereceptive and external. Moreover, in the formal definition of the act of perception the author of the Nyāya Sūtras does not include "manas" as a factor in the perceptual act nor does it appear in the listing of the sense organs. With those schools that accept manas as a separate factor responsible for empirical consciousness, manas is often assigned the role of regulating the flow of perceptual activity at the level of its genesis, as is the case in the Bhoga Kārikā.

Sadyojyoti only devotes one verse to manas (BK, v. 32), qualifying it by three characteristics: it urges the senses into action, causes volitional activity and functions rapidly. Aghora Śiva explains these three functions in greater detail. The rapid activity of the manas describes its ontological role in the genesis of perceptual activity. Even though the soul is in itself omniscient, states Aghora Śiva, it cannot experience objects perceptually in a simultaneous manner: what appears as an experience in which we are aware of different perceptions—i.e., seeing and smelling one thing at the same time—is in fact an experience generated from two separate perceptions occurring in quick succession. A unified perceptual experience based on all five sense organs together with an apperception is in fact a collection of temporally discrete perceptual events. Aghora Śiva provides an analogy to explain this conception of the sequentiality of perceptual experience (kramikajñāna): a needle piercing a large quantity of compactly stacked lotus leaves appears as if it pierces each of the leaves simultaneously when in fact it pierces each leaf separately. Another common analogy, although from a Buddhist source, is based on the experience of a dance performance.
Under such conditions as the witnessing of the dancing girl, we find that each single sensation, even though intervened by five other sensations, appears to be close to, and unseparated from, the other; for instance, at the same time that one sees the girl dancing, he also hears the song and its accompaniments, goes on tasting the camphor and other spices, smells the sweet fragrance of flowers placed before the nostrils, touches the air proceeding from the fans and thinks of making presents of clothes and ornaments.

Manas is also said to have the function of prompting (pravartaka) particular sense organs into activity; although Aghora Siva is not specific concerning the relation between the "quick action" of the manas and its role as "the promptor" of the sense organs, one may assume that the former function actually qualifies the latter, i.e., manas prompts the particular sense organs into action in a rapidly sequential fashion. As well, when Sadyojyoti describes the third characteristic of manas as "the cause of volitional activity" (iccaśhetutva), the fact of the rapid activity of the manas applies here as well. According to Aghora Siva, manas has the twofold directedness of superintending over the activities of the external (i.e. sense) organs as well as superintending over the apperceptive activities. As the cause of volitional activity (icchā) manas is referred to as the cause of the "attention" (avadhāna) or "intention" (ṣamkalpa) involved in apperceptive acts.

Although it is only reasonable to consider the "rapid activity" of manas as qualifying its involvement in both the external senses and apperceptive conditions, the exact nature of the manas is not exactly spelled out by either Sadyojyoti or Aghora Siva. Aghora Siva quotes the Mrgendra Āgama which describes the manas in very similar terms as does the Bhoga Kārikā, i.e., that manas is the instigator of the senses, acts
rapidly and is involved in intentional activity (devaprayartakaṁ śīghna-caṁ samkalpadharmi ca), 9 Aghora Śiva interprets this in the sense that the manas is the superintending or controlling factor involved in both external and internal perceptual acts. The Mataṅga Āgama, which Aghora Śiva also quotes, states that manas is twofold, as it both superintends over the sense organs as well as "interiorizes," the sense organs through intentional activity. The question concerning the basic function of the manas is important since "volition" (icchā) is considered to be the specific function of manas, as Sadyojyoti refers to volition, effort and cognition as the three specific functions of manas, ego and buddhi. If "volition" is the specific function of manas, then "rapid activity" and "instigator of the sense organs" qualify the volitional character of manas, which appears to be the most logical manner of interpreting the three functions. Ontologically, manas operates in a manner that establishes a sequential order (kramika) in cognitive acts; epistemologically, manas focuses through intentional activity (avadhana qua "icchā") on which sense or apperceptive event will be engaged. The Tattva Prakāśa appears to hold this view that the volitional activity is the central function of manas. The difficulty in viewing icchā as the specific function of manas appears to be the exact nature of this icchā, the wilful activity of choosing this or that perception or apperception. 10

Another topic discussed by those doctrines that accept manas as a separate organ concerns the "size or "magnitude" of manas, although neither Sadyojyoti nor Aghora Śiva discusses this point. The Śaivite holds that manas has unlimited magnitude (vibhutya). To the objection
that if manas manifests things sequentially it must be of a limited magnitude (ānuttva), the Śaivite responds that all limitation with respect to manas is due to the obfuscation of external factors ultimately caused by karmic influences. ¹¹

2. The Three Functions of the Ego

The ego (ahamkāra) is perhaps the most significant aspect of the process whereby bhoga is brought about; although the buddhi is the locus wherein all the activities of the cognitive faculties of the internal organ come to function synthetically, the ego as the principle of individuation is the point at which the false identification of the soul with the contents of the internal organ actually takes place. It is the ego that attaches a sense of legitimacy, authority and importance to the modifications of the buddhi. Buddha is simply the ascertainment of external objects and internal cognitions; the ego "individualizes" this ascertainment and attaches a "personal" reality to it, thus creating the conception that the internal organ is itself the principle of consciousness. Soteriologically considered, the ego is indeed the most important factor of the triadically constituted internal organ.

Sadyoyjoti subdivides the ego into three functions constituting two branches: ¹²

![Diagram of the three functions of the ego](image)
These three functions correspond to the physiological, psychological and ontological dimensions of the ego. Physiologically the ego constitutes the vital functions of the body through the biological instigation of the five vital airs (prāna etc.); psychologically it is the source of the conception (pratyaya) of the notion of "I" affixed to cognitive acts; and ontologically it is the source or cause of all the lower tattvas inclusive of manas, the sense and motor organs, and the gross and subtle elements. Again, as in his treatment of manas, Sadyojyoti does not specifically describe the relation between these three subdivisions of the ego, although he does claim that the specific function of the ego is physiological, i.e. the prompting of the bio-forces, which may indicate that this aspect of the ego has a priority over the other two functions in a temporal and constitutive sense.

As the cause of the lower tattvas the ego is sub-divided into three branches according to the preponderance of one of the three guṇas:

- **TAIJASA** (SattviKA)

- **AHĀMKARA**
  - **VAIKARIKA** (Rājasa)
  - **BHŪTADI** (Tāmasa)

Sense organs and Manas

This classification of the ontological aspect of the ego is not identical with the more well-known classification given in the Śāmkhya Kārikā, according to which the SattviKA aspect is termed vaikārika and the rājasa aspect tajasa; as well, in the Śāmkhya Kārikā both the
sattvika and tamasa aspects are said to arise on account of the rajas aspect (taijasa vibhaya), which itself has no specific creative function such as the creation of the "active" motor organs. The sattvika aspect is said to be the source of the eleven organs, i.e., manas and the sense and motor organs. The classification found in the Bhoga Karika is also not identical with classifications found in other Saivite works dealing with the tattvas. The Tattva Prakasa, for instance, states that the Taijasa aspect gives rise to manas, vaikarika gives rise to the senses (aksa) and the bhutadi gives rise to the subtle elements. Aghora Siva interprets this classification in a manner consistent with the Bhoga Karika. Srkumara, however, alters the gunic constitution of the taijasa and vaikarika aspects and assigns a different function to them: vaikarika is said to be sattvika and gives rise to the motor and sense organs; taijasa is said to be rajas and is the cause of manas; and bhutadi remains as tamasa which is the cause of the subtle elements.

The argument employed to prove that the various "results" -- i.e., the lower tattvas -- are in fact ontologically generated from the ego is based on the principle that "an effect is seen to act in conformity with its cause." In the case of the ego the guanic traits constituting it are considered to be the causative elements contributing to the ontological "status" of the "effects". Hence, since the sense organs and manas are of an illuminating nature they must be derived from that aspect of the ego which is of an illuminating nature, i.e. sattva. The motor organs are active and are therefore inferred to be derived from the "active", rajasic aspect of the ego. The subtle elements are inferred to be
derived from the "dark" or "obscure rational", i.e. tāmasic, aspect of the ego by process of elimination.16

Although this type of inference from the establishment of the ontological status of the effect to the establishment of the status of the cause is sufficient to establish that the sense organs, for example, are derived from an illuminating, i.e. sattvic cause, it is not sufficient to explain why these three different causes are necessarily co-existent as one cause, the ego. Although this problem is not directly taken up by either Sadyojyoti or Aghora Śiva, it is obliquely addressed when Sadyojyoti states in verse 41 that karma is responsible for delegating the restrictive scopes of the various sense organs, all of which are derived from the ego and are therefore considered to be of "one" nature. The principle appealed to in establishing the gunic traits shared by the organs, manas and elements, on the one hand, and the ego on the other, cannot be used to explain why certain sense organs are restricted to certain spheres of sensation. There is nothing in the ego to provide a rationale for the restrictiveness of the senses; hence, Sadyojyoti appeals to the notion of karma, the ontological raison d'être of the way "things are". If Sadyojyoti were pushed to explain why the three gunically different "causes" of the lower tattvas are unified in the ego-tattva, the answer would no doubt point to karma, as there appears to be nothing in the nature of the ego itself that can explain its particular ontological constitution as having three separate "aspects" each of which contains a certain preponderance of one of the gunas.

A similar problem plagues the Sāmkhya conception of the ego;
at the stage of creation beginning with the ego there is a change in the manner of evolution from what Van Buiten has described as a change from a "vertical" pattern to a "horizontal" one. The tattvas, prior to the ego, evolve in a vertical evolution, each tattva proceeding from the former; however, beginning with the ego "this pattern is abandoned: its evolution becomes a ramification." Van Buiten suggests that this emphasis on the ego as the focal point of a separate kind of creation has its source in the early creation myths as stated, for example, in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, wherein the process of creation is set going when an original being cries out "I am" and the original sense of the term "aham-kāra", i.e. "self-maker", is most evident. the Brhadāra nyāka Upaniṣad describes this process:

The self was here alone in the beginning in the form of a man. He looked around and saw nothing but himself: and he cried out at the beginning: "Here I am." That is how the name "I" came to be.

Madeleine Biardeau takes this cosmogonic function of the ego as found in the Upaniṣads in a sociological sense and argues that it reflects the general sense of conflict within "Brahmanical religion" between two different levels of religious thought and life; the more individualistic, renunciatory and "yogic" ideal as opposed to the group-based, sacrificial religion. "Ahamkāra" figures in the Upaniṣads, she argues, whenever the yogic states of meditational discipline are described; however, as one of the "levels" of the yogic states the ego is transferred from a psychological principle to a cosmogonic one, taking on mythic proportions in order to be a more "popular" medium for sectarian beliefs.
Although neither Van Buitenen's nor Biardeau's account of the ego in the tattvic doctrine actually answers the question concerning the reason the creation of all the tattvas below the ego have directly evolved from the ego, their speculations, in any case, point out the fact that the description of the ontological functions of the ego may be a result of an understanding of the ego which was first established outside of the framework of the tattvic doctrine.

The physiological aspect of the ego is described as "samrambha," a term which has the three basic senses of "seizing," "being empassioned," and "self-conceit." Aghora Śiva describes it as that which "instigates" (pravartakatva) the five-fold activities of vāyu, i.e., the five vital functions of the physical body. "Samrambha" is said to be the instigating principle of the five vital functions of the body "for the sake of keeping it alive (jīvana)." This physiological function of the ego is the source of "the will to live" as well as "the principle of life" within the soul's embodiment in a physical body; as it describes the self-assertion characteristic of the condition of physical embodiment governed by a conception of selfhood, it seems more appropriate to identify this function with the ego than with other cognitive faculties, as is done for example, by Praśastapāda, who identifies it with the Manas, or Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, who identifies it with the common function (Sāmānya-karana-vṛtti) of the internal organ.

As the principle of psychological individuation the ego is said to have two functions: one concerns the purely psychological attitude of "self-pride" or arrogance (gārva) which involves the "erroneous self-projection" whereby the empirical ego is itself taken for the soul, a
and the other concerns the more a priori aspect of cognizing the "I" as the inseparable component of every cognition. The cognition or ascertainment (adhyāyasāya) of the "I" is considered to be a radically different kind of cognition than that assigned to the buddhi. The difference between the two kinds of cognition is based on the nature of the object; the "object," of the ego's ascertainment is an object that always remains the same (ekarūpa) while the object of the buddhi is always different (bhinnarūpa). As well, in the case of the ego the object of the cognition is the subject, the one who does the grasping (grāhaka), while in the case of the ascertainment carried out by the buddhi, the object is of the nature of that which is grasped (grahya). In short, although the buddhi, and the ego both carry on an activity of ascertainment, the "effect" (kārya) is different in both cases.  

3. The Conflict with the Naiyāyikas Over the Ontological Function of the Ego

The Naiyāyikas criticize the Śaivite view that the ego can have the specific ontological function of being the cause of the sense organs (āhārakārendriyavāda); the Naiyāyikas rather claim that the sense organs are products of the material elements (bhautikendriyavāda). Sadyojyoti first voices the Naiyāyikas' major criticism of construing the ego as the cause of the sense organs, coming from one single cause the five sense organs ought to be of the same nature: if they are of the same nature, it becomes impossible for the various sense organs to have different "scopes" or respective spheres of objects. As Aghora Sivapuṇḍita points out, the Naiyāyikas put forth this criticism since they hold the view that
each particular sense organ is related to one specific sphere of objects: the ear is limited to sound, the eye to colour etc. The sense organs, maintains the Naiyāyikas, have this restrictiveness because the gross objects, which are the cause of the sense organs, possess the respective qualities apprehensible by the respective sense organs. Sadyojyoti criticizes this view on two accounts. Sadyojyotis first criticism is based on the fact that the sense organs respective restrictiveness (viṣayaniyāma) cannot be reduced to a restrictiveness based on the material elements putatively thought to constitute the senses (prakṛtiniyāma). The Naiyāyikas conception of a one-to-one correspondence between each sense organ and the quality of its respective material cause is false according to the Śaivite, as all the senses are not related to one sphere of material objects; the sense of touch, for example, grasps four spheres of material objects. The Nyāya response to this criticism concerning the one-to-one correspondence of the sense organ to its physical cause would be that the material substances themselves become mixed together and as a result the different sense organs perceive their respective objects in spheres of perception not materially connected to that sense organ. For example, whenever water smells, it means that the earth and water elements have become mixed up. In fact, this same argument based on the idea of a one-to-one correspondence between the senses and their objects can be used to criticize the Śaiva view that all the sense organs stem from one cause, the ego, and hence should be of one nature with one respective scope of objects.

Aghora Śiva's reply is based on an appeal to the basic principle of the satkāryavāda: the ego is "transformed" into the senses in such a
manner that the senses become separate products in the same manner as sugar is transformed into the various products, such as candy, sweet drinks, etc. As has already been pointed out, Sadyojyoti ultimately appeals to the notion of karma as the determining factor in the restriction of the senses to their objects; he further argues that the Naiyāyikas as well appeal to such a notion as is demonstrated by their explanation of the relation between the sense organ and the element ākāśa, ether. Ākāśa is considered to be "ubiquitous" and of one nature; it can not be the cause of the sense organ of hearing as this would contradict the ubiquity and eternity of ākāśa. According to the Naiyāyikas, the organ of hearing is described as a certain part of the ākāśa circumscribed by the ear cavity.31 But, as Aghora Śiva further elucidates, there is no reason that the circumscribed part of the body could not also be "the mouth", for example. Hence, in spite of maintaining that the sense organs are constituted by their respective substances which act as the niyamaka-factor, the Naiyāyikas ultimately appeal to karma to explain the rationale behind this restrictiveness, as is most evident with the sense of hearing.32

The second criticism against the bhautikendriyavāda brought forth by Sadyojyoti strikes more at the heart of the Naiyāyikas methodological first principles, the "categories" (padārtha).33 The "categories" would become impossible to "sense" given the restrictiveness of the scope of the sense organs to the material elements.34 In any way that the viṣaya-niyama of the sense organs is tied to a "prakṛti-niyama" one is faced with "an endless repetition of troubles."35 Although Aghora Śiva does not deal with such "repetitious troubles", the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors
certainly have addressed this problem. The "categories" can be perceived as universals (jāti). For example, the category "movement" (karma) is perceived insofar as it is perceived as a universal concomitant in the perception of moving things; the technical term for such a perpetual contact (samnikarṣa) is samyukta-samaveta-samavāya. Even the category of "inherence" (samavāya), which is claimed to be imperceptible and only open to inference, does not exist in the substances in the same way as universals, etc. and the other categories. "Inherence" is inferred from the idea that "this is in that", i.e., this 'subsists' in that with respect to the relation between the five other categories. Śrīdhara explains the Naiyāyika position: "Thus then, inherence should be regarded as that whereby is brought about the coherency of distinct substances, and serves to set aside independence." However, to overcome the problem enunciated by the Śaivites, for example, Śrīdhara adds that "inherence" nevertheless is still related to sensuous perception insofar as it is related to the other categories which are more directly open to sense perception.

In choosing the traditional Śaivite polemics against the Naiyāyikas to defend the ontological function of the ego in creating the lower tattvas, Sadyojyoti has chosen the most vocal critic of the tattvic understanding of the ego, especially where the generation of the sense organs is concerned. The Naiyāyikas do not attribute a separate ontological status to the ego; the ego is not listed among the aggregates of experience which constitute the twelve "knowables". Vātsyāyana, for instance, simply considers "self-identity" i.e. "aham" to be a "quality" of the self; in his commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra 3.1.1. Vātsyāyana
identifies the self (ātman) with the subject who uses "aham" in the various perceptions of things through a process of recognition (pratyabhijñā).⁴⁰ Egohood is simply the act of recognition which takes place in the soul; recognition, in turn, is simply a form of "smṛti," memory, which is itself one of the species of cognition, jñāna, a "quality" of the soul.

4. Cognition (Bodha) Understood as the Essential Modification (Vṛtti) of the Buddhi

The buddhi is certainly the main organ of the "internal organ" (antahkarana).⁴¹ When Sadyojyoti describes the essential characteristic of bhoga as the "buddhi-vṛtti - anurañjana" it is clear that buddhi is understood as the essential representative of empirical consciousness; the "internal organ" is only obliquely assigned this role. In one sense, one could say that manas and āhamkāra are subsidiary aspects of buddhi and that buddhi is itself the internal organ, as both manas and āhamkāra qualify the type of "cognition" the buddhi presents to the soul.

The buddhi is first and foremost of an unconscious nature (acit) and is only the locus in which the empirical consciousness of the soul comes to be manifested. The buddhi is inferred through "cognition" (bodha) as its modification (vṛtti). While the sense organs carry out a "manifesting activity" concerned with "external objects," which is specifically described as "sensation" (ālocana) (BK, v.258), the buddhi carries out the type of "manifesting activity" described as "ascertainment" (adhyavasāya), such as is demonstrated in the cognition "this is a pot."⁴³ In fact, this "ascertainment" is the more specific definition of "cognition" (bodha). Cognition is in turn subdivided into three types:
understanding (jñāna), imagination (kīrti) and memory (smṛti). This triadic cognition is further qualified by certain "dispositions" (bhāva) and "conceptions" (pratyaya), which are to be discussed in detail in the sequel.

As a modification of the "organ" buddhi, cognition is described as a distinct type of manifestation that is in principle different from the type of manifesting carried out by the sense organs, as it is considered to be the "ground" (bhūmitva) and "locus" (āśryatva) for the manifestation of the "cognition" -- i.e., empirical consciousness -- of the soul (pumbhodavyaktibhūmitva); it is called "bodha" in opposition to "ālocanā" since it is directed internally (towards the soul) whereas ālocanā is directed externally (towards objects). The cognition of the buddhi serves a mediating role between the soul and the buddhi; on the one hand, cognition is ascribed to the buddhi (buddhibodha) while on the other hand it is ascribed to the soul (pumbodha). At face value this appears contradictory: technically the buddhi and, by implication, the buddhi-bodha are both unconscious and "objects of enjoyment" (bhogyā) for the soul; since the soul is neither unconscious nor an object of enjoyment, it cannot be qualified by something possessing these attributes. In order to avoid this contradiction Aghora Śiva more narrowly defines these two types of "cognition". The cognition which belongs to the buddhi is, as has been mentioned, of the nature of "ascertainment". This cognition is transitory; it arises and perishes and is not considered an innate property of the soul. The cognition which belongs to the soul is indeed considered to be an innate property (svabhāva) of the soul; in this case, however,
it does not appear as "ascertainment" (adhyavasāya) but rather as the
discerner (grāhaka), the one who grasps the ascertainment. Very similar
terminology is employed to describe the twofold nature of cognition
(bodha) in the Pauṣkara Āgama. The Āgama begins by describing the
basic role of the buddhi as "that which ascertains the object (viśaya-
adhyavasāyaśin). The cognition (bodha) which arises on account of this ascer-
tainment is described as being twofold; one aspect is the ascertainment
itself (viśaya-adhyavasaka) and belongs to buddhi while the other
aspect is the apprehension (vyavasāya-ātmaka) of this ascertainment and
belongs to the soul. As the form of consciousness which "grasps" and
"discerns" the determination of the buddhi, the soul is simply caught in an
empirical condition in which its original powers of consciousness and
activity are obfuscated.

5. Introduction to the Doctrine of the Eight Dispositions (Bhāva) and
   Four Conceptions (Pratyaya)

The soteriological analysis of the buddhi rests with the doctrine
of the eight "dispositions" or bhāva. Sadyojyoti, like the author of the
Śamkhya Kārikā, does not describe the eight dispositions of the buddhi
in terms of their specific varieties but rather in terms of the general
influence they have as contributory factors in the soteriological
development of the soul. However, in certain Āgamas such as the Mātaṅga
Pāramarśvara Āgama and the Pauṣkara Āgama we do find specific details
concerning the exact enumerations of the dispositional varieties, although
there appears to be very little agreement among the various authors concerning
the details of the enumeration.
The classification of the different configurations of Dispositions into the well known distinctions of souls into "samsiddhika" "vainayika", and "präkṛta" is described by Sadyojyoti in such a manner that these three distinctions are themselves Dispositions or extensions of the Dispositions, as he refers to both the Dispositions and their triadic classification as "bhāva" (specifically "rupa"). In this case the emphasis is on the type of soteriological Dispositions the various sāṃsraric souls have. Although for the Sāmkhya these three types circumscribe the various types of souls, for the Śaivite the triadic classification merely applies to the lowest soteriologically developed soul, the "Sakala" soul.

The eight Dispositions are said to be the "cause" of the four "conceptions" (pratyaya). Although the various Śaivite authors do not appear to find the relation between the doctrine of the eight Dispositions and four Conceptions problematic, viewing the Conceptions as more developed forms of the Dispositions, modern scholars are at a loss to find a logical consistency between the two doctrines. Upon examination of the two doctrines in the Sāmkhya, Keith claims that it is a "hopeless" task to try and reconcile the two doctrines as they are too identical to be considered "radically different". Keith argues that they cannot represent two different views which developed in different ways, as they are introduced in the text of the Sāmkhya Kārikā without any indication as to their relationship -- resulting in the misleading idea, argues Keith, that they are concerned with the same thing. Keith therefore concludes that the "pratyayasarga" is a later interpolation into the text. In our discussion of the Conceptions a more detailed account of
the relation between the two doctrines as understood by Aghora Śiva and other Śaivite authors will be examined with Keith's critical observations in mind.

Concerning the relationship between Śāmkhya and Śaivism over the doctrine of the Conceptions it is interesting to note that Nārāyana Kanṭha in his commentary on the section of the Mrṇendra Ṭāgama which enumerates the Conceptions, expresses no qualms in citing the enumeration of the Conceptions given in the Śāmkhya Kārikā as authoritative.54 However, Aghora Śiva, in his commentary on Nārāyana Kanṭha, argues that the enumeration given by Nārāyana is actually a statement concerning one of the false ways of construing the Conceptions "according to the other systems."55 Although a comparison of the Śaivite and the Śāmkhya doctrine of the Conceptions clearly indicates that there is much agreement between the two doctrines and that Aghora Śiva is obviously over-zealous in his denial of such an agreement, there is one very important difference between the two doctrines. For Śāmkhya the Conception "Attainment" (siddhi) is considered to be the model of soteriological perfection for the aspirant, i.e. the discernment of "the manifest, unmanifest and consciousness."56 "Attainment" is in fact "moska" for the Śāmkhya, which is not the case for the Śaivite. Although we find the same description of "Attainment" in the Bhoga Kārikā Vṛtti as is given in the Śāmkhya Kārikā it must be remembered that this Attainment only pertains to the soul at the level of the "sakala", i.e. at the level where perfection is reached in the sphere of māyā — full Attainment can only be reached once the spheres of mala and karma no longer influence the soul.
The relation between the three gunas and the eight Dispositions appears more direct than it appears elsewhere in the description of the tattvas below the gunas. The "gunas" are "manifested" in psychic form as sukha, duhkha and moha. In their constitutive-genetic activity the gunas function through the manifested character of the Dispositions. In this psychological manner the gunas affect both "cognition" and the "objects" of cognition, both the subjective, procreative aspect of the buddhi as well as the manifested evolution of the buddhi into lower tattvas.

As the author of the Šata Ratna Ulekhā claims, experience is related to the gunas in a twofold sense, both immediately and mediately: sukha, duhkha and moha, he says, are immediate instantiations of the gunas while the five spheres of objects relating to the senses are "mediate" instantiations. In an attempt to trace the historical development of the relation between the bhāvas and gunas, E.H. Johnston maintains that the "oldest accounts of this relation are found in the Sāntiparvan section of the Mahābhārata; he argues that the activities of "psychical, moral qualities" are the original function of the three gunas. Van Buitenen, claiming to have more correctly "reconstituted" a variety of sections and readings from the Mahābhārata, claims that the bhāvas are indeed found in connection with such "sensations, qualities and conditions" as are indicative of psychical, moral qualities. However, and even more significantly, he claims there is a second sense of the notion of bhāva as a "form of being, cosmic phase evolved under the influence of a guna." On this account, bhāva is not identical with the guna but a result of it; over time, however, the
bhāvas take on an independent psychical status of their own: “at exactly the same moment when we watch the evolutionary guṇa-influenced bhāvas disappear, we see the 'psychical' bhāvas appear.”

It is wrong to think that the doctrine of the eight Dispositions and four Conceptions is only held by those who espouse the tattvic doctrine, such as Sāmkhya and Saivism. Prasaṭapāda, for instance, alludes to the doctrine of the eight Dispositions in his account of the periodic creation and destruction of the world. In the creation of the gods and mortals during the stage of creation, Māheśvara employs the services of Brahma who is said to be possessed of a high degree of the “good” Dispositions jñāna, vairāgya and aīśvarya. As his final act of creation Brahma is said by Prasaṭapāda to connect both the gods and mortals with the Dispositions of dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and aīśvarya according to their respective impressed potentialities (srṣṭyāśāyānurūpā). As well, sukha is said to be aided by the Agency of “dharmādi” while duḥkha is aided by “adharmādi”. Finally, Prasaṭapāda describes mokṣa as that which involves “dharma, jñāna and vairāgya.”

6. Dispositions (Bhāva)

Among the host of meanings that the term "bhāva" has, all relating back to "being" or "state of being", "bhāva" has the meaning of disposition or inclination, specifically referring to emotional states. In the Sanskrit works on aesthetics (alakārasāstra), "bhāva" is closely related to "rasa", the sentiment, mood or emotional consciousness produced by the various elements in an aesthetic work. The "bhāvas" are said to create the "rasā" (evam bhāva bhāvayanti rasaṃ). The bhāvas, for instance, are said to "lie behind" the dramatic activity of a play,
as A. K. Warder points out.\textsuperscript{70}

From the Nāṭya Śāstra's account of the method used by actors to produce rasa in an audience, we see that the object of this perception is the bhāva-s, the states of mind or emotions, of the characters in the play as they participate in its action. These emotions are for the most part invisible and are understood to be present only through the representation by the actors of their causes and effects.

The eight bhāvas as described by Aghora Siva perform a very similar role as those described by Warder. The eightfold bhāvas are said to exist "in the buddhi" in a pre-conscious, motivational sense as "vāsanās" or "samskāras," impressions, left by previous acts and thoughts whose soteriological import influences future acts. The "cognition" of the buddhi comes to be "manifested" through the latent influences of the bhāvas; the bhāvas represent the most basic "level" of buddhi-based consciousness.\textsuperscript{71} As a more developed "modification," of māyā, the three gunas "appear" (udbhūtātva) in the form of the bhāvas through moha, duhkha and sukha; the auxilliary cause (sahakārin) is said to be karma (BK, v. 55).

The eight bhāvas are schematically represented as follows:\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c}
DHARMA (Merit) & \textsuperscript{-} & ADHARMA (Demerit) \\
JñĀNA (Knowledge) & \textsuperscript{-} & AJñĀNA (Ignorance) \\
VAIRĀGYA (Non-attachment) & \textsuperscript{-} & AVAIRĀGYA (Attachment) \\
AISVARYA (Lordly Powers) & \textsuperscript{-} & ANAISVARYA (Powerlessness) \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In a most mundane sense the four bhāvas in the left hand column represent the "good" dispositions while the four in the right hand column represent the "bad" dispositions. The four that have a positive soteriological influence are all said to be of a sattvic origin; while of the four that have a negative influence, adharma, ajñāna and anaisvarya...
have a tāmasic origin while avairāgya has a rājasic origin.

Jñāna has for its sphere (gocara) five things: the three gunas, prakṛti and the soul (pañcadhā jñānam buddhyātmakāṃ yattad
gunāvyaktāntagocara). This jñāna is said to be the cause of the Con-
ception "Attainment" (siddhi); however, as Aghora Śiva points out in
his commentary on the Mṛgendra Āgama Vṛtti, this jñāna which is the cause
of "attainment," does not constitute the higher state of release (pāramokṣa),
as this can only come about through "initiation" (dīkṣā). Ajñāna is
fivefold and is the cause of the Conception "viparyaya", error: i)
"obscurity" (tamas) is that jñāna whereby there is the postulation of the
soul in that which is not the soul; "obscurity" is tenfold according
to how the tattvas from the earth to prakṛti are viewed, ii) "delusion"
(moha) is the self-interested fixation with the accomplishment of yogic
powers (animādiṣu labdhesu paratvapratipattitah...mohah); this delusion
is eightfold in that the yogic powers are eightfold; iii) "extreme
delusion" (mahāmoha) is the self-interested fixation with sensual ex-
perience; iv) "darkness" (tāmisra) is the suffering (tapas), which results
when one is afflicted by both "delusion" and "extreme delusion," which is
due either because of a defect in the means of mundane experience or be-
because of the loss of yogic attainments; and v) "utter darkness"
(andhatāmisra) one's sensual experience and yogic powers are experienced
by someone else.

Dharma is twofold: "yama", i.e., the abstaining from acts not
prescribed by the authoritative texts and "niyama", i.e., the engaging
in the prescribed acts as established in the authoritative texts. Both
"Yama" and "niyama" have five subdivisions: "yama" includes non-injury (ahimsā), truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (asteya), continence (brahmaçarya) and non-wickedness (akalkana); "niyama" is non-anger (akroda), service to the guru (śuśrūsa), purity (śauca), contentment (santoṣa) and straightforwardness (ārijva).

"Aisvarya" is eightfold, three relating to the body and five relating to the mind. The three which are established on account of the body are "anima", the ability to exist in a subtle form which is sub-atomic in magnitude, "laghima" quick movement and "mahima", pervasive existence. The five powers relating to the mind are "prāti", the attainment of whatever is desired; "prakāmya", freedom of will; "īśita", giving commands to Brahma and the other gods; "vasītya", "the ability to attract and create the world"; and "garima", "the non-interference of the enjoyments of one's activities".

"Vairāgya" is the non-attachment to the body, objects, possessions and loved ones. "Adharma", "anaisvarya", and "vairāgya" constitute whatever is opposed to "dharma", "aisvarya" and "vairāgya".

According to Sadyojyoti the "effects" of the eight bhāvas take on three forms which are descriptive of the souls possessed by certain configurations of the bhāvas: the "prākṛta", "vainayika" and "sāmsiddhika". The eight bhāvas with their respective "results" are schematically represented as follows:
Aghora Śiva quotes the Mrghendra Āgama which provides a description of the three types of souls influenced by these bhāvas. In the order of soteriological perfection the sāṃsiddhiśa soul is the most developed, the prākṛta the least developed and the vaihayika lying somewhere between the two. The prākṛta configuration of bhāvas belongs to the soul whose understanding of things is so poor (mūrcchana) that it is only manifested during the embodied condition; the sāṃskāric cultivation during this particular embodied condition is of no consequence in the next birth (na dehāpāya). The soul which has the vaihayika configuration cultivates the good qualities through its deeds, words and body by means of "wordly experience, reflection, a religious preceptor and Sastra." The Pauṣkara Āgama adds that "Sastra" means Śiva-Śāstras and the exercise of...
Saiva duties. The samsiddhika is that special soul whose good qualities are carried through the various embodiments; this soul has samskāras that are of a special virtue (visīstadharmasamskārasamudādipitacetās) and lead, as the Pauṣkara Āgama points out, to a transcendent sphere and the intuition of Śiva.\textsuperscript{85} Those who have performed hearing (of scriptures), reasoning and meditation in a previous life, but have not had the intuition of Śiva originated in them and for the sake of that have taken on bodies, like Sukla, Vāmadeva, Jadabhavata etc., and because of the impression of uninterrupted meditation, they come to have the intuition of Śiva.

7. The conceptions (pratyaya)

The term "pratyaya" generally signifies a mental event such as a cognition, experience or belief; in particular it tends to refer to a mental event involving a settled conviction or assumption. In some instances the "pratyaya" can refer to the mind itself. Etymologically the term is derived from the verb "prati-, i.e., prati" which is based on pratī, meaning to "go towards" or "return" and i, meaning "to go"; the verb "prati" has the two basic meanings of "return, reach and attain" on the one hand, and "to understand or believe" on the other. The term "pratyaya" is used by both the Śaiviteś and Sāṃkhya in a manner to describe a mental event involving a more settled condition than such terms as "jñāna," "bodha" and "adhyavasāya" imply. The pratyaya is the psychologically more settled condition of the latent bhāvas. The bhāvas, existing in a latent form (vasanā) in the buddhi, become developed into a "gross form" (sthūlārūpa), taking on a more settled or fixed nature of cognitive activity, and are thus designated as pratyayas, whereby they become
objects of experience - bhūya" for the soul. In his commentary on the 
Mrđendra Agama Kārīka Kātha says that the bhāvas are established as 
the pratyaya because the bhāvas cause the fixed cognition of the unreleased 
souls ( . . . te bhāvāḥ samsāryanoh pratyāyanāḥ pratyāyah Īstāh)."86

The Mrđendra Agama describes the bhāva as the material cause 
(upādāna) of the pratyaya, i.e., as the cause of the 
pratyayas.87 However, as the "effects" of the bhāvas, such as heaven, 
hell, etc., these latter are effects that exist in an "objective", 
situational level; for example, jnāna causes release in the sense of 
"leading to it", just as dharma causes Heaven in the sense of leading to 
it. The pratyayas however, are "effects" that still exist in a connected 
subjective sense to the vāśāna-condition of the bhāvas, although 
in a more evolved state (prakārāvasthā).

The pratyayas are of four kinds: "Accomplishment" (siddhi), 
"Contentment" (tuṣṭi), "Incapacity" (asakti) and "Error" (viparyaya). 
Sadyojyoti briefly describes each of these: Accomplishment is the 
awakened cognition (sambuddhi) of the manifest, unmanifest and soul; 
Contentment is the discernment of satisfaction when one grasps the 
soul; Incapacity is the lack of effectiveness (asāmarthya) in attaining 
prosperity etc., and Error is the discernment of an object otherwise than 
it is. In both the Bhoga Kārīka and Mrđendra Agama the pratyayas are 
described in a manner that highlights their gunic proportions. Accomplishment is the only pratyaya that is basically constituted out of the 
sattvic bhāvas, with only a little connection with rajas; the remaining 
three are basically caused by the tamasic bhāvas, adharma etc., with 
Contentment and Error being constituted by a little sattva and Incapacity
by a little rajas.\textsuperscript{88} "Accomplishment" is sattvic because it is the illuminating factor (prakāśakatva) of the vyakta, avyakta and āṇa; it is rājasa because it is active (pravṛtti) for the sake of illuminating the vyakta etc. Both Nārāyaṇa Kāṇṭha and Aghora Śiva explain the connection of "Accomplishment" to a rājasic element as a reference to the connection to the bāva vairāgya -- even though vairāgya is described as being sattvic in both the Bhoga Kārikā and Mrgendra Āgama: just avairāgya is rājasic. "Contentment" is derived from the tāmasic bāvas because it is of the nature of delusion (mithyāsvarūpa) wherein one thinks one is accomplished when one in fact is not; it is also slightly sattvic because it is of the nature of pleasure (sukha). "Incapacity" is rājasic because it is of the nature of inactivity (apraṇāti) and tāmasic because it is of the nature of suffering (duhkha). "Error" is tāmasic because it is of the nature of falsity and sattvic because it is a resemblance (sāṃnya; sādhārana) -- although the wrong one, it still involves some kind of manifesting agency.

Described as the discernment of the "vyakta-avyakta-āṇa", "Accomplishment" in this Śaivite sense immediately reminds the student of Indian Philosophy of the second verse of the Sāmkhya Kārikā according to which the aim of the Sāmkhya doctrine as the threefold suppression of duhkha is described as "vyaktāvyaktajñā-vijñānāt", even though in the Sāmkhya Kārikā the account of Accomplishment only plays an incidental role as the cause of one of the eight listed Accomplishments, i.e., as the threefold suppression of pain.\textsuperscript{89} The Mrgendra Āgama(11.2), which Aghora Śiva quotes in his commentary on the section of the Bhoga Kārikā dealing with
Accomplishment, is more exact in its description of Accomplishment. The Āgama states that "Accomplishment" is the consciousness (buddhi) whose object is the soul, prakṛti, etc. Aghora Śiva further points out that the soul is not dependent on the buddhi for this illumination, as the soul is in itself an "illuminating agent". Just the vyakta and avyakta, maintains Aghora Śiva, are discovered by the buddhi; the "jñā" -- i.e. "puruṣa", "pums" etc. -- is actually discerned by the soul itself in a kind of "self-awareness" (tadā draṣṭoh svarūpe 'vasthānām). Although Aghora Śiva accepts that "Accomplishment" is just a form or kind of the bhāva "jñāna", he nevertheless argues that this jñāna is directly linked to dharma.

"Siddhi-jñāna" is, so to speak, a more elevated (prakāraṣṭha) state of mind brought about by the purification of the buddhi to the point where one is no longer dependent on the master's teaching -- one has a direct insight into the nature of the tenfold dharma (sākṣātkṛtadharma). Those who do not have this direct insight must "recite mantras etc. according to the teaching." The eight causes of Accomplishment mentioned in the Mrgendra and identified with the eight causes given in the Sāmkhya Kārikā by Nārāyaṇa Kantha are, according to Aghora Śiva, simply the eight kinds of jñāna relating to the eight various levels of understanding "Accomplishment" -- i.e. "mokṣa" -- according to the other systems, beginning with the Cārvākas and ending with the Vedāntins, respective of the tattvic level they attain to. In short, maintains Aghora Śiva, these levels are mere levels of "Contentment", not "Accomplishment".

Being of an illusory and pleasurable nature tuṣṭi is described by Aghora Śiva as "a satisfying discernment" (kṛtārthavijñāna). Aghora Śiva
quotes the Mrgendra definition of Contentment which is said to be the assertion of the unaccomplished soul that "I am accomplished (nurakrtärthasya krtärtho 'smi)." This soteriologically false sense of feeling accomplished is a result of the bhāva "vairāgya", non-attachment, which is of a lower order (adhasthana vīśayāḥ). In his commentary on the Mrgendra Aghora Siva describes vairāgya as the cause of the various distinctions of Contentment; he quotes the Śrīmat Parākhyā Agama which describes the manner in which the ten vairāgya cause the ten kinds of Contentment:

**VAIRĀGYA QUĀ BHĀVA:**

1. seeing living creatures bound to torment ......................... aversion
2. yoking to the 3 Duhkhas: internal ...... abhorence of the Duhkha of: internal
3. " " " " " : external ...... " " " external
4. " " " " " : divine ............. " " " divine
5. acquisition of wealth ...................... detachment from possessions
6. lamentation ......................... [things] born from lamentation
7. women .................................. deception
8. irritation ................................ intoxication
9. cognitions .............................. things born from Karma
10. acceptance of gifts ................. ascetic comportment

This classification of the ten Contentments is obviously very different from the account given in the Śāmkhya Kārikā which lists the Contentments as nine: four internal (ādhyaṭmikatva) -- prakṛti, upādāna, kāla, and bhāgya -- and the five external -- i.e. those that result from the abstinence from the five sense organs. The Śāmkhya Kārikā text it-
self does not give the import of these nine Contentments or the soteriological role they play, except to say that Contentment, along with Incapacity and Error, is a "hindrance" (aṅkuśa) to mokṣa. The commentators, however, interpret the Contentments as the way the other systems construe mokṣa, i.e., "the error of confusing puruṣa with prakṛti" etc.

"Incapacity" is described as the inability (asāmarthya) in obtaining prosperity etc. (śubha etc.) due to the defects in one's "organs" and, by extension, in one's "body". "Prosperity" is glossed by Aghora Śiva as "the joy which arises from the activity of the organ of generation" (upasthenyāndiyapāṛā śhāla ucyate). The "etc." is extended to include the incapacity of the eightfold yogic powers as these are considered to arise on account of the sense organs with the body. The Mrgendra Agama offers a broader definition of Incapacity: "the lack of power over existent objects (sadartha-prabhavishnuta)." Nārāyaṇa Kāṇṭha lists the number of Incapacities at twenty-eight: eleven defects of the sense organs and manas and seventeen which are considered to be the contrarieties of Accomplishment and Contentment; he quotes the Śāmkhya Kārikā (v. 49) to justify this view. Aghora Śiva, on the other hand, quotes from a Śaivite text which enumerates twenty-one Incapacities: eight incapacities of the yogic powers (which are caused by anaisvarya), the incapacity of the body, the ten organs, manas, the ego and the buddhi.

"Error" is described as "the discernment of a thing otherwise than as it is" (ayathāvastuvijñānam). As based on a "resemblance", error is on some truth, as it is a "jñāna" that involves the illuminating power of construing one thing as another thing because of some common trait
(kiṃcitsāmānyato 'nyatra matiranyā viparyayah). Nārāyana Kanṭha gives the example of seeing a mirage of water in a desert to explain the element of truth in "error". Aghora Śiva states that "Error" is fivefold, all consisting of varieties of ajñāna.

8. The Relation Between the bhāvas and pratyayas according to the Saiva Darśana and Sāmkhya

As has been mentioned, both Keith and Larson think that the doctrine of pratyayas is a later interpolation into the Sāmkhya Kārikā text, given the disharmony between the bhāva and pratyāya doctrines and the lack of any explanation of the relation between the two doctrines in the text itself. The Saivite authors, as it has been pointed out, agree with the Mrgendra Āgama that the bhāvas are the "material causes" (upādānāni) of the pratyayas; the pratyāya is a result of certain collocations of dispositional qualities which exist in a vāsanā-state, a pre-cognitive and affective condition prior to their more formal instantiation in the form of pratyayas. Moreover, the bhāvas function as the material causes of the three character types (samsiddhika etc.); this threefold distinction is said to apply to the pratyayas as well (MĀ, 10.-25).

The various commentators on the Sāmkhya Kārikās each has developed a specific terminology and interpretation to discuss the relation between the bhāvas and pratyayas. Perhaps closest to the Śaivite position is the author of the Yuktīdipīka who regards the pratyayasarga as the final "result" (phala) of the bhāvasarga. Regarding the threefold division of the bhāvas into samsiddhika, prākṛta and vaikṛtika, the Yuktīdipīka discusses the various interpretations of these given by the early Sāmkhya teachers. A "Pañcādhikaraṇa", for example, subdivides
the bhāvas twofoldly into prakṛta, innate, and vaikṛta, acquired. A certain "Vindhyaśāsin", on the other hand, denies that there can be any innate (prakṛta), bhāvically influenced cognition; rather, Vindhyaśāsin maintains that there is only the "vaikṛta", even for a sage such as Kapila.  

The author of the Yuktidīpikā argues against the positions of Pānḍhikaraṇa and Vindhyaśāsin, by upholding the view that the Sāṁkhya Kārikā puts forth a threefold distinction wherein Samsādhi relates to the sage Kapila, prakṛti to certain Gods and vaikṛti to ordinary mortals. In this respect the author of the Yuktidīpikā agrees with Gauḍapāda, although they differ with respect to the details of their expositions. Vācaspati Miśra, on the other hand, agrees with Pānḍhikaraṇa and maintains that the bhāvas are only twofold.  

Gauḍapāda introduces the pratyayasarga by stating that the nimitta and naimittika aspects of the bhāvas are described as the causes and effects of the bhāvas, i.e., dharma leading to heaven etc.; the concept of the pratyayasarga describes the "ātmaka" of the bhāvas, as a further subdivision of their basic eightfold constitution. Vācaspati Miśra denies that the four pratyayas are a "collection" (samāsa) of the eight bhāvas, while the fifty varieties of the pratyayas represents an individual (vyāsa) accounting of the bhāvas. Vācaspati Miśra also appears to agree with the Sāṁkhya Sūtras in emphasizing the soteriological aspect of the Bhāva-Pratyaya doctrine.  

Vācaspati Miśra says that Īśvarakṛṣṇa brings in this analysis of the Bhāvas and Pratyayas for the sage who is desirous of mokṣa; the further distinctions of the doctrine are important for the sage to conduct himself to this goal.
Clearly the Samkhya commentators each had a particular interpretation of the ontological relation between the bhāvas and pratyayas, in spite of the fact that the SK text itself does not spell out such a relation in much detail. As well, the Śaivites do not find an incongruity or incompatibility between the two doctrines. Although there is no way to "prove" that the two doctrines are an unhappy and unconvincing amalgamation of two doctrines that were originally developed as separate accounts of the psychological constitution of the buddhi, one is struck, nevertheless, by the redundancy of having two separate sets of psychological categories explaining the same phenomena. Of more particular interest than the incongruity in viewing the pratyaya as a more developed form of the bhāvas is the fact that the bhāvas are considered to be the "form" in which and through which the samskāras are manifested. The bhāvas are the samskāric-form that marks all empirical consciousness or "bodha". One does not discover a "separate" buddhi as a separate substratum harbouring the samskārically constituted bodha. "Buddhi" is in fact the recognition that the bodha is considered to be a separate reality or phenomenon distinct from other phenomena in the tattvic doctrine. The "buddhi" is simply the formal stucture determining the samskārically constituted bodha.
Chapter IV

NOTES

"Manas" is also referred to as 'tītta', cf. TS, v.7.

Deussen, p. 271. Deussen cites as examples the following:

Upaniṣads: Aitareya 3.2; Brhadāraṇyaka 5.6.1; Taittiriya 1.6.1
Mundaka 2.2.7 and Chandogya 3.14.2.

As it has already been pointed out, the Nyāya Sūtras, for instance, does not include manas in the list of sense organs (T.1.12) nor does it serve a role in the explanation of the act of perception (1.1.4). However, in other sections of the Nyāya Sūtras, manas is presupposed as a mediating faculty in both external and apperceptive perceptions (31.8;3.2.1 and 5.2.5), which led to the view among later Mānyāyikas that four factors are involved in the act of sense perception (i.e., ātman, manas, indriya and artha) as well as the view that manas has two functions, manasapratyakṣa and bāhyendriyapratyakṣa. In the Padārthadharmasāṅgṛaha, for example, Prāṣastapāda construes manas as a dravya (as it has qualities) which functions as an instrument for the manasapratyakṣa of all internal states, including buddhi, which is on the same footing as desire etc. As such, manas is a recognized quality of the soul. On the contact of the soul with manas, "jīvāna" qua "samrambha" arises. Cf. Padārthadharmasāṅgṛaha of Prāṣastapāda with the Nyāyakanda of Āśīrvāda, trans. Ganganath Jha (Benares: E. J. Lazarus and Co., 1916), pp. 365 and 563.

In the Samkhya Karikā, verse 36, manas is described as an indriya involved in both the motor and sense organs; its function is said to be "samkalpaka", discernment. Manas does not play a part in Śabara's account of the cognitive act. Indeed, even the notion of a separate antahkarana is absent in his epistemology. However, both Kūmarilapāṇaṭṭ and Prabhākara hold views concerning the manas; for a discussion of such views, cf. Ganganath Jha, Purva Mimamsa in its Sources (Banaras: Banaras Hindu University, 1964), pp. 35-37. Stcherbatsky claims that while the Madhyamika Buddhists generally consider manas to be a special organ; cf. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, 318. "Manas" is mentioned three times in the Yoga Sūtras (3.48 and 1.35), all with reference to its "rapid activity" with respect to the activity of mundane consciousness.

4Cf. Brahmāsūtrabhāṣya, 2.3,32. The antahkarana is ultimately considered an "upadhibhūta" of the ātman.


6Cf. footnote 3 above.

7Neither the BK, TS, MA, nor MP adds that manas is also the pravartaka of the karmendriyāṇi as well as the jñānendriyāṇi, as does the SK, v. 36.

8The analogy of the dancer is given by Kamalaśīla to explain the notion of the simultaneity of perceptions giving rise to a unified experience in vs. 1254-1256 of the Tattva Samgraha, trans. p. 631, wherein the analogy of the whirling fire brand is given.

9cf. MA (10,7), p. 319:
Manas, by rapid activity, sets in motion the senses and is characterized by "synthesis" (saṃkalpa); with regard to hearing and the other senses, it perceives, each one in its own domain, sound etc.

devapravartakaṃ śīghnacāri saṃkalpaśvānī ca
manāśabājāvīśaya grahakāśravapadayaḥ

10cf. TP, v. 56, p. 120. The TP claims that Manas is of the "nature" of "icchā" (icchā-rūpa) and that its function (vyāpāra) is "samkalpa". Śrīkumāra glosses icchā-rūpa as icchā-svarūpa. Aghora Śiva provides two synonyms for samkalpa, avadhāna and ekagraṇa, attention and concentration; he further claims that icchā is the rūpa of Manas by means of the vyāpāra of samkalpa. Śrīkumāra, on the other hand, describes icchā as prārthā, wish or desire, and samkalpa more logically as aniruddha, mental specification, and ultimately as saṃsāya, doubt, whose existence provides the hetu for the inferential postulation of manas. In the SPB Śivagrāhyogīn describes saṃkalpa as niścaya and vikāpa as saṃsāya, both of which he describes as the basic epistemological categories of the manas (cf. p. 250).

11The regulation of this flow of perceptual activity assigned to manas i.e. the regulation of the yugapad or kramika nature of perception, also concerns the question regarding the "magnitude" of manas. Some think of manas as limited in its magnitude, i.e. as atomic (anuṭva), while others construe it as having an unlimited magnitude, i.e. as pervasive (vibhūtvā) [like ākāśa]. The basic argument in favour of its anuṭva is based on the claim that the soul during empirical consciousness would not kramikajñāna if manas were vibhūtvā. The argument in favour of its vibhūtvā is based on the claim that since the soul is vibhūtvā, so must the manas be. For example, according to the post-Sabara Mīmāṃsākās,
manas is said to be pervasive for a number of reasons: because it is "like akasa," as it is not open to sense perception; because it is a substance which lacks a special quality, "like time"; and because it is "like the soul," on account of being the adhara of the asamavay/ikarana-samyoga of jhana. For a discussion of the various arguments, cf. Tarkasangraha, p. 147. According to Srividhara manas is atomic because it is the instrument governing kramikajhana; cf. Padarthadharmasamgraha trans. p. 160. Prasastapada discusses the quality of "dimension," which subdivides in a fourfold manner: atomically, pervasiveness, longness and shortness. He says that atomicity (agutvam) is of an eternal and non-eternal form. The eternal variety belongs to two realities only, manas and atman (akasa, space, time and the atman have eternal pervasiveness as well); cf. pp. 284-285. According to the Vaisesika Sutras (7.23) manas is atomic, like akasa or atman.

Neither Sadyojyoti nor Aghora Siva addresses the question concerning the mahatva or agutva of manas. Nor do we find this discussion in either the MA or MPA. Sivagrayogin, however, discusses it, arguing that manas must be atomic, since it is the cause of kramikajhana; cf. SPB, pp. 251-254.

12 SK, v. 24, incidentally, describes the specific function of Ahamkara or "grahakadhayasaya" (qua abhimana). The TP also subdivides Ahamkara threefoldly into "jivana," the modification of the five vital airs, samrakshana (qua prajnati), the locus of the prana/panu movement in the body, and garva, the determinative-cognition (adhyavasaya) of the apprehender (graha) in the form of "aham." Cf. TP, v. 54, p. 117

13 Cf. SK, v. 25. For the various interpretations of this verse by the commentators, cf. V. V. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Samkhya (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1935), pp. 32-33. The author of the Yuktidipika explains the schema in v.25 in a way that emphasizes the priority of the eleven organs; he says that this three fold distinction of Ahamkara is a result of the sattvika element (in itself having niikriyayata) requires the rajasa element as an instigating factor (pravartakatva) and the tamasa element as a differentiating factor (bhedatva) in the tattvaparasruti. Cf. Yuktidipika, p.98. The MPA follows the same manner of classification given in the BK and also MA, although it uses the same terminology as SK, v. 25 to designate the sattvika and rajasa aspects; cf. MPA, p. XXXI.

14 "Akashini," the term used to describe the organs, seems more fitting to describe the jhanendriyani. The sense of the term is stretched to apply to the karmendriyani as well. Both Aghora Siva's and Srikumara's interpretation of this verse depends on the meaning of the term akashini in v.55. Srikumara's identification of sattva with vaikarika and rajasa with taijasa certainly goes against the grain of v. 54, but provides the basis for his interpretation of manas as "rajasa" due to its "calasvabhava"; cf. TP, p. 115.

15 Aghora Siva argues that in BK, v. 54, taijasa, vaikarika and bhutadi are respectively described as sattvika, rajasa and tamasa; as
well, he says that they respectively create manas and the jñānendriyāṇī, the karmendriyāṇī and the tanmatrāṇī.

16 This is the same inference employed by MA, 10.6, p. 318: “prakāśakarmakārya vailaksanyāttamobhāvāḥ.” Another reason is also given: “prakāśyatvā”, which Narayana and Aghora Śiva take to mean that the tanmatrāṇī are open to the perception of the yogins.


18 Van Buitenen, II, 16. In this process the ego is itself divided into three different forms, from which the whole empirical cosmos evolves. Van Buitenen maintains (III, 89) that in the Mokṣadharma section of the Mahābhārata one finds an attempt to harmonize the vertical and horizontal evolutionary schemes, as instances are found wherein the buddhi evolves into manas that gives rise to the indriyāṇī which then give rise to the bhūtāṇī. For a more general discussion of van Buitenen’s conception of the two different schemes cf. Michel Hulin, “Sāmkhya Literature,” A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda. Vol. VI, Fasc. 3 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1978), pp. 129 and Gerald James Larson Classical Sāmkhya (Santa Barbara: Ross Erikson, 1979), pp. 184-186.

19 Van Buitenen, II, 16-17.

20 “Self-maker” stresses the ātma aspect, as in kumbhakāra; van Buitenen also points out other senses, as “the utterance of āham”, as in “om-kāra”; cf. van Buitenen, II, 17.


22 Madeleine Biardeau. “Ahamkāra: The Ego Principle in the Upaniṣad,” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 8 (1965), 62-84. Biardeau finds van Buitenen’s philological analysis of the concept of ahamkāra inadequate; she argues that it is “meaningless to rearrange the texts so as to build a continuous line of evolution for a given concept.” (p. 62) Her interpretation of the Ahamkāra is a more specific application of Deussen’s interpretation of the ideological import of the Upaniṣads: “They are nevertheless radically opposed to the entire Vedic sacrificial cult, and the older they are the more markedly does this opposition declare itself.” Cf. Deussen, p. 396.

23 This is a purely individual process, that is, the practical quest of one desiring the highest and eternal bliss, the liberation mokṣa -- from the bondage of perpetual rebirths. Still, at a certain
point, the yogic process leads beyond the limits of empirical individuality [i.e. "ahamkāra"] to some kind of experience of the whole." cf. Biardeau, pp. 66-67.

24 Etymologically, sam-rabh derives from rabh, meaning to seize on strongly desire. The concept of "samrabha" plays no part in the SK or its commentaries, although it has much in common with the idea of the five karmayanayah, as described in the Yuktidīpikā, comm. on vs. 23 and 24, wherein the karmayoni collection is said to instigate the five vayu into action (pravartate); for a discussion of the karmayoni in the Yuktidīpikā, cf. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of Śāṁkhyā, pp. 270-277.

25 Cf. MA, 11.20, p. 307: "By its activities, the five airs of the body are set in motion (vyāparādyasya cestante śarīrān pānca vāyavaḥ)."

26 Cf. SK, v. 29, wherein it is claimed that each internal organ has its own peculiar (asadhāraṇa) "vṛtti," while combined the organs have a general or shared (sadhāraṇa) "vṛtti," which is said to be the five vital breaths. In his commentary on this verse Vacaspati Miśra argues that the vṛtti which is sadhāraṇa to the three internal organs is the "karana" for the five vital breaths — i.e. "jīvāṇa," which is relegated to a function of the Ahamkāra by Sadyojiyoti and Aghora Siva.

27 Neither in the BK nor in the MA is more emphasis placed on this aspect of the ego as the cause of the ego's onto-genetic activity, as is the case in SK, v. 24 wherein it is stated that "on account of the abhimāna/ahamkāra, there is the threefold creation (abhimanō /ahamkāra-tasmaddviśvadhaḥ pravartate sargāh)" or the Yoga Sutras (4.4) that the "created, individualized forms of consciousness (nirmanā-cittas) are solely a result of the ego-sense." cf. James Haughton Woods, The Yoga System of Patañjali, Harvard Oriental Series, 17 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p.303. This sense of ahamkāra involves the error or illusion of "erroneous self-projection" whereby the empirical ego is assumed to be the self or soul. Van Buiten notes out that in the early Upaniṣadic context this erroneous self-projection is not taken in a negative sense but a positive one. The process of cosmic creation involves the recognition of the "I AM" of the Supreme and is a result of a sense of incompleteness being completed; cf. II, 20-21.

28 For a detailed analysis of the difference between "adhyavasāya" as a buddhikārya and as a ahamkāarakārya, cf. the discussion in SPB, p. 246.

29 Anunambhaṭṭa provides a proof for this: the anvaya example given is "when the two gross elements (earth and water) are mixed up, water smells" and the vyatireka example is given "when they are not mixed, water does not smell." and the vyatireka example is given "when they are not mixed, water does not smell." Cf. Tarkasamgraha, p. 43.

30 cf. Vātsyāyana on 1.1.12: "The expression 'originating from
material elements’ is used (to indicate that) the characteristic of being restricted to the respective objects is possible only if these (senses) ‘originate from different elements (nāṇa-prakṛti) and it is not possible if these ‘originate from a single substance’ (eka-prakṛti). Each of the senses receives a specific type of object and this characteristic of the senses is explained only when there is ‘the law of being restricted to respective objects (viṣaya-niyama).” Cf. Nyāya-sūtra with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, p. 24.

31 This position leads to the conclusion as stated by Vātsyāyana (comm. on 3.1.73) that "ākāśa is ultimately considered to be the auditory organ.” cf. ibid. p. 218.

32 For Vaiśeṣika all events which involve human experience involve adṛṣṭa (karman); even in the experience of the quality of colour, the adṛṣṭa functions; cf. Praśastapāda, p. 233: ”After this the contact of the selves with the atoms, as aided by the adṛṣṭa (destiny) of the selves destined to experience (the effects of the jar), produces action in the atoms in which the colour has been produced by the baking.” This brings about the conjunction of the diadic atoms. Cf. also p. 109: ”...the unseen potential tendencies of all souls that are the causes of their bodies, sense organs and gross elements.” The “adṛṣṭa” instrumentally brings about all creation through the conjunction of the souls and atoms.

33 Neither the Nyāya nor the Vaiśeṣika works have dedicated much analysis to the epistemologically foundational status of the padārthas. The padārthas are usually thought of in a neutral sense outside of any connection to consciousness as consciousness as a reality is subsumed under the category of a padārtha. In his commentary on Nyāya Sūtras 1.1.1: Vātsyāyana described the category[“padārtha” termed “tattva”] as ‘whatever is known as what it is, either as existent or non-existent.” This description, however, doesn’t explain why the sixteen accepted categories are the basic ones nor does it address the epistemological question regarding their connection to consciousness. Praśastapāda’s basic description of the Vaiśeṣika padārthas also fails to answer this question when he boldly describes their properties: ”To all six categories belong the properties of beingness, predicability and cognisability.” Cf. p. 37.

34 The same argument is taken up in some detail in MāV, p. 329.

36 “Jātiṣ” only exist in three padārthas: dravya, guṇa and karma; therefore, no jāti of “samavāya”, for example, can exist. The samavāya relations thought to exist between the jāti and that in which it adheres is considered to be perceptual by the Nyāyāyikas, although only inferable by the Vaiśeṣikas. In BK, v. 40, Sadyojyoti singles out karma, samanya and samavāya, which addresses the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the “bhautika” is limited to the sphere of dravya and guṇa while karma, samanya and samavāya are in principle out of the direct range of the senses.
This only applies to laukika-pratyaṣṭa; presumably, in yogipratyaṣṭa the padartha would be perceived directly. In his commentary on section 99 of the Padarthaḥ amasamgraha (p.408) Śrīdhara describes the manner in which karma can be perceived.


Ibid., p. 683.

In the Nyāya Sūtras the ego does not attain inclusion into the list of the basic aggregates of experience constituting the twelve "objects of correct cognition" (prameyāṇi): the self, body, organ, object, buddhi, manas, motovational activity (pravrty), result (phala), suffering and liberation. The ego technically falls under the category of the buddhi although it does not serve as the cause of the motivational activity as it does with the Saivites. According to the Nyāya Sūtras (1.1.17) motivational activity is the "setting into engagement" (vārambha) — Saivite works use the term "sāmrāmbha" to describe this activity through speech, mind (buddhi) and body whose immediate cause are the samskāra-linked "faults" of passion, hatred and delusion. Vātsyāyana comes to construe the ahamkāra as a sub-category of the buddhi; he attempts to prove the existence of a separate self (ātman) in his commentary on 3.1.1 wherein he appeals to the fact of egohood qua self-identity as proof of a self-subsistent and persisting self. The self is identified with the subject who uses "aham" in the various perceptions of things through "recognition" (pratyabhijñā). In this case the ahamkāra is simply the act of recognition in the soul. Recognition, in turn, is a form of "memory" (smṛti) which is, qua buddhi, simply a "quality" of the self (cf. comm. on 3.1.14 and 3.2.25). Although Vātsyāyana uses descriptions of this ahamkāra activity suggest an equiprimordializing of the self and the ego ("...it is the conscious self which recognizes an object previously perceived...", p.220), the self has egohood only inssofar as it has mundane consciousness (i.e. buddhi).

In the Sāmkhya Sūtras, v. 1.99, we find such an attitude; the "antahkaranā" — is lighted up with the light of consciousness, as an iron ball with fire; cf. The Sāmkhya Sūtra Vṛttis, ed. and trans. Richard Garbe (Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1888), p.56.

This is a clear instance where "vṛtti" in the sense of "modification" is considered to be an "effect" (kārya); "vṛtti" and "kārya" are synonymous: "ayam ghatā ityādyātyavasāyātmā kāryeṇa buddhiḥ sīkṣā" (TPV, p.115).

TP is more general in its characterization of buddhi as "viṣayāyavasāyārūpyin", cf. TP, v. 52, p.103.

Aghora Śiva adds to Sadyojotis definition of bodha that it is a prakāsā which is characterized by the bhāyas and pratyayās, as this is not stated by Sadyojotis, as it is in the MA, v. 11.8. p.195. Such topics as savikalpa- and nirvikalpa-jñāna are dealt with by Aghora Śiva.
The threefold division of memory, discernment and imagination can also be interpreted in a temporal sense as being respectively related to the past, present and future, although the Saiva thinkers do not draw such an analogy.

45 BK and MA descriptions of this are almost identical: "bodhavyaktibhūmitayā pāsāḥ" (MA, v. 11.8; p. 295) and "punbodhavyaktibhūmitvat" (BK, v. 46).

46 The MA describes this more clearly in terms of the bhāvas which collectively act as the cause of the manifestation of the cognition of the soul through acting as the "objects of enjoyment" in the samsāric sphere: "dharmādayo 'pi bhāvabhāsārvāsthyām bhīyatvenātmāna jñānavyaktihetavo bhavanti." Cf. MA, p. 295.

47 Both buddhi and the ahamkāra share this role of adhyavasāya, although in the case of the former it applies to an external ascertain- ment and in the latter an internal one.

48 Cf. SP, pp. 226-229.

49 sa buddhirudita tantre viṣayādhyavasāyinī
dodho 'tra dvividho prakto viṣayādhyavasāyakah,
anyo 'nadhyaadhyavasāyena vyavasāyatmakastu yah
sebuddhiritarastvatmasvabhavagranakatmanah; cf. SP, p. 227.

50 For a detailed exposition of the bhāvas and pratyayas, cf. MĀ, p. 390 and SP, pp. 228-246.

51 It is unlikely that the doctrine of the jñānakevala, pralaya and sakala souls, which respectively apply to the dissolution of Mā, karmā and māyā, is a Saivite "reworking" of the doctrine -- which is more Śāṅkhya in origin -- of the samsiddha, vainayika and prakṛta souls.


53 SK, v. 46-51, contain the pratyayasarga.

54 MĀV, p. 281.

55 MĀ, p. 283.

56 SK, v. 63, states that the puruṣa, although bound by the seven bhāvas, is released by just one, i.e. "jñāna", which is the cause of the pratyaya "siddhi".

57 In this case the basic principle is that "the quality which is seen in the effect resides as well in the cause ("...guno drṣtaḥ kārye kāranasamsrayah)." Cf. MA, v. 11.6; p. 293.
The Sk, v. 12, describes the nature of the gunas as constituted by pleasure, pain and indifference (prīti, aprīti and viśāda), which Vācaspati Miśra glosses as sukha, duḥkha and moha; in v. 38 even the subtle elements are said to be constituted by these three more psychological aspects of the gunas. K. Šivaraman summarizes the manner in which the author of the Tamil work Cindanaiyura, a commentary on the Śivaprakāśam, analogically construes the three gunas qua sukha, duḥkha and moha in a direction beyond prakṛti and the gunas themselves:

SUKHA—typical of—PATI and the ICCHĀ power of the self—ANANDA
DUHKHA—typical of—PASU and the CIT power of the self—CIT
MOHA—typical of—PASA and the KṚTYA power of the self—SAT

Cf. K. Šivaraman, p. 563.

58. Šataratnasamgraha, p. 67. He further emphasizes that although experience (bhoga) is of the nature of sukha, duḥkha and moha, karma is still the basis of all experience (p. 69).


60. Van Buitenen, I, 56.

61. Ibid.

62. In I, 57 Van Buitenen says: "We find in the older portions of the Mokṣadharmā clear evidence that the "gunas" are indirectly responsible by their influence on a higher principle for the evolution of three bhāvas, 'forms' of being or becoming (bhā) cosmic phases' which in one text we have reconstituted correspond to manas, senses and elements.

63. Ibid., II, 25.

64. Padārthadharmasamgraha, p. 111.

65. Ibid., p. 557. Sukha and duḥkha are two of the eight qualities said to belong to the soul; the other six are desire, diversion, effort, virtue, vice and faculty (cf. p. 211).

66. Ibid., p. 601.

67. In the various Śaivite works the term "bhāva" has a host of designations and synonyms, all of which are usually affixed to buddhi, i.e. "-dharma" (BK, 64A), "-rūpa" (BK, 55), "-vāsanā" (SPB, p. 238), "-sthita" (MAD on 11.24), "-vṛtti" (SPB, p. 234) and "-samskāra" and "-gūna" (MA, 11.23).

68. Commonly eight rasas are mentioned: love (śṛṅgāra), heroism (vīra), disgust (bhāhatsa), anger (raudra), mirth (hāṣya), terror (bhayānaka),
pity (karuna), wonder (udbhuta), tranquility (saṅta) and paternal
fondness (yatsayya); such an enumeration is found in Māmata’s
Kāvyaprakāśa. In his Sringāraprakāśa Bhojaraja classifies all the
rasas under one, love; cf. E. Gerow, Indian Poetics A History of Indian
Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, Vol 5, Fasc. 3 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz,
1977), 270.

69Ibid., p. 249

70A. K. Warder, The Science of Criticism in India (Madras: Adyar
SK, v. 42 may be alluding to this psycho-aesthetic conception of the
bhavas when the subtle body (liṅga) is said “to play its part”
(vyāvatīṣṭate) like an actor (naṭavat) through the instruments of the bhavas.

71Cf. section 8 of this chapter.

72The Pauskara Āgama describes the eight bhavas as the eight spokes
of a large wheel in which the souls repeatedly revolve in the samsāric
conditions; cf. SPB, p. 242.

73MA, 10,v,65-66; p. 233. Devasenapatti, not citing his sources,
says that “jñāna” is fivefold; laukika, vaidika, adhyātmika, adhīmargaga
and mantra; cf. V.S. Devasenapathi, Saiva Siddhānta, Madras University
In the SPB Sivāgrayogin says that jñāna is tenfold, although the descrip-
tion is not provided; although he claims that the details can be found in
the Muktiprakaraṇa (ch. 5) no such description can be found in this
section. Cf. SPB, p. 231.

74Cf. MAAD, p. 288.

75In the Yoga Sūtras these are respectively called avidyā, asmitā,
rāga, dveṣa and abhinivesa; cf. The Yoga System of Patañjali, 3.3-9.
Incidentally, the “astabhāvas” are not specifically mentioned in the Yoga
Sūtras, nor in the Yoga Bhāṣya or Tattva Vaiśār adi.

76(I) animā, capacity to penetrate all things; (II) mahimā, ex-
tensive magnitude; (III) laghīma, extreme lightness so that one can rise
up on the rays of the sun; (IV) garīma, extreme heaviness; (V) prāpta,
extensive reach; (VI) prakāmya, obtaining all objects of one’s desire;
(VII) vaśītvya, subjugation of elemental forces; (VIII) yatra
kāmāvasāvitya, infallibility of one’s intentions, goals.

77“Adharma” is not described in the texts; the assumption is there-
fore made that adharma simply represents the opposite of dharma.

78Yama is further subdivided into āhimsā and satya.

79These powers are said to be possessed by both gods and men; the
gods are listed as Piśācas, Rākṣas, Yakṣas, Grandharvas, Indra, Soma, Prajāpati and Brahman. The ŚPB describes the manner in which the "powers are generated: "For that soul (anu) who is virtuous (dharmin), settled in wisdom (jñānaniṣṭhāya) desirous of non-attachment (vīrāgeccā), endowed with a (keen) intellect, the constituent of sattva in the intellect generates lordly powers according to his desires." ŚPB, p. 237.

80. It is clear that the four "bad" bhāvas, adharma etc., are to be thought of as "privations" of the four "good" bhāvas, dharma etc. The Pauṣkara Agama (cf. ŚPB, p. 245), for instance, construes the eight bhāvas as the various aspects of the four pratyayas, which are also designated as the four varieties of jñāna. The four "good" bhāvas are described as "varieties of jñāna" (jñānaviśeṣa) while the four "bad" bhāvas are described as varieties of ajñāna, which is not the non-existence of jñāna (jñānabhāva) but "incorrect," jñāna (anyathājñāna).

81. According to the MPĀV (17.157; p. 417) there is a total of 220 bhāvas; dharma has ten divisions; jñāna 80; vairāgya 100; aśvārya 64; adharma 10; ajñāna 5, avairāgya 10 and anāśvārya 10. The ŚPB lists 149 bhāvas with another 463 subdivisions; cf. p. 289.

82. SK v. 44 and 45 and BK vs. 57-58 use identical terms to describe the "results", "gamanamurdhva" etc. Neither the BK nor the MA attributes the specific Bhāva to the specific "result", i.e. "Dharma" specifically causes svarga etc. In the BK V Aghora Śiva basis his coordination on that given in the MA.

83. For example:
"svargomuktiḥ prakṛtibhāvo vighātāśca..." (BK, 57A)
"svargomuktiḥ prakṛtiratavāvighātāu..." (MA, 10.28B)
"vāśvorydhvasthitisaddhṛtibhṛtvam bhogāṣṭhāya..." (BK, 58A)
"vāśvākṛtistatpārijhānayogbo bhogānicchā..." (MA, 10.30A)

84. MA, p. 280.
85. Pauṣkara Agama; ŚPB, p. 152.
86. MA, p. 28. Bhāvas play a more soteriological role at the phenomenal level (liṅga)—they are said to "bring it about" (bhāvayanti). The pratyayas serve a more epistemological function by causing the consciousness (pratyayanti) of the soul and by thus serving as the bhogya.
87. MA, 10.24; p.
88. In both the BK and MA it is claimed that siddhi, although caused by the sattvic bhāvas, is slightly connected to that which is rajasic, which both Nārāyaṇa kāṇtha and Aghora Śiva explain as a reference to Vairāgya, even though Vairāgya is described as sattvic in both the MA and BK; just Avairāgya is rajasic. Cf. MA, p. 291 and MAO, p. 292.
The eight are: oral instruction, study, threefold suppression of pain, acquisition of friends, and purity. Vācaspati Miśra subdivides these into principal (mukhya) and subordinate (gauhya); only the suppression of the threefold duḥkha is mukhya -- the rest are only important insofar as they act as a means (upāya) to the mukhya. Both Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra provide different descriptions of the eight siddhis used by other teachers. Cf. T.G. Mainkar, The Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa with the Commentary of Gauḍapāda, trans. and comm. T.G. Mainkar (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1954), pp. 133-137. Tattva-kauṃḍī, text and trans. Gaṅgānātha Jhā (Bombay: Theosophical Publication Fund, 1896), p. 95.

MĀD, p. 282: "ata eva sūtrakārena-abhihitārthaḥ sāmkhya-matādau prasiddha ityarthah vr̥ttikārena "pi tad apekṣayāvottam uktam ca sāṃkhyair-ityādi."

Bk, v. 62 uses the term "devayākālayāt," which Aghora Śiva glosses with "sariravaikālayāt"; MĀ (11.3; p. 292) describes it as "kāramāpave" which Narāyana Kantha glosses as "kāramānantahkaranabahikarananām" āpave vināše".

Narāyana Kantha describes this as the inability to "see," colours, hear sounds, etc.; cf. MAV, p.

The author of the Yuktidīpikā regards "creation", i.e. "the manifested condition" (vyakta), as constituted by "form" (rupa) intentional activity (pravṛtti) and the results (phala) of this intentional activity. The "form" represents all the tattvas from buddhi to prthivi; intentional activity represents the level of the sentient and is circumscribed by the bhāvas; the "result" represents the sphere of the pratyayas. Cf. Yuktidīpikā, p. 126-127 and Origin and Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought, pp. 302-305.

Prakṛta is threefold vaikṛta is twofold; cf. Origin and Development, p. 182 for the details.

In the case of a sage such as Kapila, the proper dispositional understanding is developed very rapidly upon birth, due to a predominance of sattva in such a being.

As well as Jayamaṅgala and Maṭhara.

Vācaspati Miśra's interpretation of v. 54 does seem to go against the syntactical grain of the verse. He takes prakṛtika " and "vaikṛtika " as adjectival to samsiddha: bhāvas are either samsiddha or asamsiddha; the former are "prakṛtika", i.e. svabhāvi while the latter are vaikṛtika, i.e. naimittika.

Sāmkhya Sūtras 2.23-24, i.e. "jñāna muktih" and bandho viparyayat", are stated in a context discussing the attaining of mokṣa, not in dealing with the bhāva-pratyaya doctrine specifically; in 2.37-46 the pratyayas are enumerated just after the notion of practice is discussed. Neither the sūtras nor Aniruddha's commentary specify any distinction between the bhāvas and pratyayas.
Chapter V

THE TRIADIC STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Introduction

With his doctrine of bhoga Sadyojyoti makes explicit his conception of the triadic structure of empirical consciousness that is based on the elements of the knower, knowledge and the known. With reference to the soul the triadic structure refers to both the en joys, enjoyment and enjoyed-object as well as the agent, the act and the-object-so-acted-upon. Having made explicit his conception of the buddhi qua "the object of empirical consciousness" Sadyojyoti turns to a description of the relation between the consciousness of the soul and the buddhi vis-à-vis a criticism of the views of consciousness as held by the Buddhists, Carvaka, Sankhya and Nyaya. Sadyojyoti does not enter into a debate with Advaita Vedanta; in only one verse (BK, v. 1088) does he criticize Advaita when he claims that the plurality of subtle bodies establishes the plurality of souls. In the process of criticizing other doctrines Sadyojyoti places himself at the center of the debate within Indian Philosophy over the nature of consciousness and clearly indicates his doctrinal affiliation with the orthodox position of the Mimamsa doctrine of the soul as expounded by Sabha and Kumari Bhatta.

2. The Distinction Between Cognition and the Object-of-Cognition: The Sakara-Jñana Vāda Vrs.the Nirākāra-Jñana Vāda

In the section of the Bhoga Kārikā that he identifies as being
directed against the Buddhists, mainly the Sautrāntikas of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school [i.e., Swatamra Vijnānavādins]. Aghora Siva focuses the basic arguments put forth by the Buddhists that are direct attacks on the Śaivite conception of the soul, i.e., the doctrine of momentariness (kṣanikavāda), the doctrine that a valid means of proof (pramāṇa) only relates to "unapprehended objects" (anadhigatārthagantr pramāṇam), and the doctrine that there is no distinction between a cognizer and cognition (jñātrjñānakārabhavedāda). The Buddhists use these arguments, maintains Aghora Śiva, in order to establish their position that the buddhi itself is the source of consciousness (buddhi-caitanyavāda) and that, furthermore, within buddhi no distinction between a separate cognizer and cognition can be drawn. Aghora Śiva attacks the view of the inseparability of the cognizer and cognition by first establishing the distinction between cognition and the object of cognition.

Both Aghora Śiva and Sadyojyoti illustrate the degree to which they are in agreement with the Mīmāṇsākās when they formulate their position of the triadic nature of consciousness. In the next section of this chapter the arguments put forth by the Mīmāṃsākā in support of the bhoktṛtya and kārtrṭva of the soul will be examined in order to explicate more clearly Sadyojyoti's own position regarding the nature of the soul; hence, at this point of the discussion concerning the Śaivite construal of the triadic structure of consciousness it is important to illustrate the similarity between Sadyojyoti's and the Mīmāṃsākā's insistence that the cognition and cognized-object are structurally separate objects in the triadic formula of cognizer, cognition and the object of cognition. We
begin our discussion with the position of Śabara.

According to Śabara the Buddhist holds that the "cognized-thing" and "the cognition of it" cannot be structurally separated. Although the Buddhists and Śābāra agree that "external objects" -- pots, tables, etc., are always to be considered, at least in their ontological status, as "objects of consciousness", i.e. as pure objects outside of any relationship to consciousness and not dependent on consciousness for their ontological status; these "objects" are furthermore only revealed not as they are "in themselves" but only as "objects of consciousness". The Buddhist and Śabara disagree, however, over the exact relationship between "the objects of consciousness" and "the consciousness of such objects-of-consciousness". The Buddhist position has come to be known as the "Sākāravāda", the doctrine that "the form of the object" and "the object so cognized" are two aspects of one conscious act (ekam eva sākāram jñānam grahyam grahyam ca). According to Śabara the Buddhist argues that there is no apprehended distinction between the "form" of an object and the "form" of its cognition (arthajñānayoh ākārabhedam na upalabhāmahe); he quotes the Buddhist:

What is perceived (pratyakṣa) is the cognition (buddhi), hence we conclude that there is no form of any object (artharūpa) apart from that object itself.

This view is wrong, argues Śabara, since it mistakenly identifies the form (ākāra) of an object with its cognition (buddhi or jñāna). Only the "object" is perceivable as an "ākāra" -- not cognition itself, which is the central tenant of the Nirākāravāda. "Ākāra" only applies to "external objects" and is perceived as existing in "external space" (bahirdeśasambaddha); "cognition", jñāna, does not exist in external
space and is not an external object. Only external objects can enter cognition as specified objects; the property of ākāra is clearly a spatial property indicative of the three dimension extension of objects of perception. Consciousness simply represents the form of an object but does not in itself possess this form; in all the various cognitions, cognition itself remains of one nature (ekārūpa).

Having attacked the Buddhist conception of the inseparability of consciousness and the object of consciousness on structural grounds, Śabara turns to a criticism of this view on temporal grounds. The Buddhist maintains that the object and the consciousness of it arise together, i.e. simultaneously, like a lamp which illuminates itself and other objects (uṭpayamānaivāsau [buddhiḥ] jñāyate jñāpayati ca arthaṃtaram pradīpavat iti). When the cognition arises it causes the cognized object to be cognized; the emphasis is placed on the arising of cognition just as the emphasis is placed on the light in the illuminating of objects. This view is considered false by Śabara since the Buddhist is actually claiming that first there is the cognition and then there is the cognition of an object; in fact, when an object (artha) is uncognized (ajñata) there can be no simultaneous apprehension of a cognition. Thus, it is only after an object has been cognized, i.e. only after it has arisen (uṭpatti) as a known object, that the fact of the cognition of it can be postulated, and then only through inference. It is from the cognized object having arisen that the cognition is itself cognized (buddhi jñāyate). Since a cognition cannot in principle be perceived, it must be inferred.

In the verses from 64Ab to 64B Sadyojyoti specifically indicates
that the cognition—here considered as "bhoga"—is distinct from the object-of-cognition, "bhoga"; he makes it clear that the bhoga is not coterminous with the apprehended object. Rather, he says, once an apprehended object has arisen and has been so established as an apprehended-object (bhogyatvam cāya sāmsiddham) the cognition that arises on account of this, apprehended-object is technically designated as the object of bhoga (yenotpanno 'nubhyate sa cāpyanubhāvo bhoga...). The crucial term is "arising" (utpatti), which implies a constitutive distinction between the bhoga and the object-of-bhoga; constitutively the two do not arise simultaneously (yugapad) nor can they be considered to be of one nature (ekarūpa).

In the face of such an argument the Buddhist would continue to argue that the sheer fact of the object-of-bhoga already entails the presence of some bhoga and that to begin with this object-of-bhoga is really to begin with a complex of the two, which implies that the bhoga is not a secondary element in the equation but one more coterminous with the object-of-bhoga. In Sadyojyoti's terminology, Sabara, for instance, would allow that in order for there to be an object-of-bhoga there must first be the presence of bhoga—but that in order for there to be the bhoga of this connection between the two, a different cognitive event must occur, i.e. an inference. According to Mīmāṃsā principles, Sabara is interested in driving a wedge between the object and its cognition in
order to establish a basic prāmanic realism between the cognition and its object; he does this in a manner agreeable to the Buddhist idiom and ontology. In the Bhoga Kārika Sadyojyoti is more interested in pointing out that bhoga can be established from the fact of the presence of the object-of-bhoga in order to drive a wedge between the two. The object-of-bhoga, i.e., the "bhogyā", is in fact the buddhi and is only one member in the triadic complex of the bhogyā, bhoga and bhoktr.¹⁰

3. The Soul Considered as the Enjoyer (bhoktr) and the Agent(kartr) of Empirical Consciousness

Having established the separate existence of "bhoga" Sadyojyoti concludes that this bhoga is sufficient for explaining the existence of a separate "enjoyer", i.e., bhoktr. Such a position again conflicts with the Buddhists who claim that not only are the bhoga and the object-of-bhoga two aspects of one event, but also that the so-called bhoktr is simply an aspect of this single phenomenon. In light of the Buddhist position, Sadyojyoti establishes the existence of a separate and active bhoktr as the apprehending agent (grāhaka) involved in the activity of bhoga.

In explicating Sadyojyotis position Aghora Siva spells out the Buddhist positon concerning the structural "unity" of the act of consciousness:¹¹

Consciousness appears solely as of one nature (ekamevedam samvidrupām); we see a 'modification' (vivarta) of manifold 'forms' (anekākara) such as joy, depression, etc. In this case you can use any name you desire [to describe one of the manifold 'modifications' of consciousness].

According to this view, as Aghora Siva points out, the notion of continuity or permanence attributed to a substratum behind the cognitions --
a notion which corresponds to a concept of a separate cognizer -- is itself simply a modification (vivarta) of impermanent cognition. In his commentary on the Mārgendra Agama12 Aghora Siva cites more psychological arguments to bolster the Buddhist view of "the manifold self-modifications of the one cognitive event." The Buddhists, he says, argue that to postulate a separate "apprehending-self qua agent" outside of the sole fact of the cognitive event (jnāna) is to set up a basic epistemological and soteriological distinction between "one's self" -- i.e. what belongs to "oneself" -- and "the other," what inalienably belongs to another person; this possessive attitude, argues the Buddhist, is ultimately derived from an egotistic desire which engenders further attachments and passions -- thus impeding liberation.13 The Buddhists further claim that the postulation of a separate self is simply a result of "self deception": "It is said that the superimposition (adyāropitva) of permanence arises on account of the similitude (sādṛṣya) of the successive moments which are arising."14 In the Bhoga Kārika and its Vṛtti the epistemological argument put forth by the Buddhists, i.e. that the cognitive event is one reality with three basic aspects, is directly attacked while the psychological criticism is only addressed incidentally through a criticism of the doctrine of mementariness.

Epistemologically, the Buddhists hold that the triadic elements of consciousness are simply "aspects" of a single cognitive event; the "cognizer" is simply one aspect of this event. The proof brought forth by the Buddhists to prove that the cognizer is one aspect of the cognition comes from the sphere of perception (pratyakṣa), technically an "internal
perception" (mana apratyaksā) according to Dignāga: 15

Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely that of itself [as subject] (svābhāsa) and that of the object (viṣayabhāsa). The cognizing of itself as possessing these two appearances or the self-cognition (svasamvitti) is the result [of the cognitive act].

In his Pramāṇasamuccāya Dignāga further describes this internal perception as of two kinds; one is directed towards internal emotive states, which he terms "svasamvedana", and the other is directed towards other cognitions, which he terms "svasamvitti": 16 In the latter case cognition can itself be its own object. This allows the Buddhist, who holds that all things are momentary, to account for the continuity in experience without postulating a "self" as a permanent substratum behind the fluctuating cognitions; 17 it allows the Buddhist analysis of empirical experience to remain within the sphere of cognition itself and at the same time to hold the doctrine of momentariness. In place of the uniqueness of each aspect of the triadic cognitive event the Buddhist holds a similar formula except that in place of the cognizer he establishes "self-cognition", instead of a subject's self-reflective state of consciousness one discovers cognition self-cognizing itself. This impersonalistic conception of the cognitive event is also discussed in terms of the pramāṇa doctrine whereby the object, instrument and the result, i.e. the prameya, pramāṇa and the pramaṇa are described as belonging to the one cognitive event of the triadic state of consciousness. 18 Epistemologically, the "self-consciousness" (svasamvedanā), according to Dignāga, is simply a "result" (phala) of the cognitive activity: 19
According to Óignāga the self-reflective cognition itself conforms to the structure of a regular cognition, i.e., as a "sākāra-jñāna", which is descriptive of every cognitive event. An opponent may indeed question the necessity of postulating a distinction between a regular cognition and a self-reflective cognition as the cognition of the object in itself is indicative of self-awareness. Óignāga begins his own description of self-reflective cognition by pointing out the necessity of positing the distinction between the two types of cognition. He begins by pointing out that since self-reflective cognition itself appears in the form of a regular cognition it too has a cognizing and a cognized aspect. Its specific "cognized" aspect appears as the cognition, which is in conformity with the original cognition (arthā-nurūpajñānābhāsa); its cognizer aspect is simply the cognition of this cognized aspect. If the description of the cognition of an object were limited to either the "cognized-object" aspect or the "cognizing" aspect, argues Óignāga, the following calamitous results would follow. In the former case there would only be the cognized
object and the self-awareness of it while in the latter case there would
only be the cognition of the object and the self-awareness of it -- in
both cases there would be no distinction between the original cognition
of the object (vīṣaya-jñāna) and the cognition of this original cognition
(vīṣayajñānajñāna)! To explain: if we postulate just the cognized-object
and the self-reflective cognition involving it, the self-reflection would
not have another cognition for its object (which it by definition requires)
but simply the cognized-object -- and thus by Dignāga's definition it
would be a simple "cognition" (svākāra) and not a self-reflective cogni-
tion; if, on the other hand, we postulate just the "cognition" or "cog-
nizing" aspect and the self-reflective cognition, there will be no distinc-
tion between these two types of cognition as the objectless "cognition"
will remain self-identically contentless and the self-reflective cognition
will have nothing to distinguish itself from.20

In attacking this epistemological position of the Buddhists and
in the consequent establishment of the triadic structure of conscious-
ness in which the cognizer is the soul endowed with enjoyership and agency,
the outline of Sādvyojyoti's argument rests on the same premises as the
Mīmāṃsāka attack of the Buddhist position. Sābara, for instance, first
establishes the separate existence of the soul qua cognizer by drawing a
distinction between, on the one hand, the body with its physical properties
such as colour, weight, etc., properties which are "observable by all",
and, on the other hand, the soul with its emotive and cognitive properties
of "pleasure, pain, etc.", which are only "observable by oneself". He then
gives a number of arguments to prove that the "internal properties" must
belong to the soul qua cognizer.  

1) Personal pronouns lead one to assume the existence of a separate cognizer.

2) "Desire" leads to the inferential postulation of a cognizing self. Desire depends on memory which depends on a self-subsistent cognizer, i.e., in order to desire \( x \) one must first recognize \( x \) to be desirous, which itself involves the memory of \( x \) and which entails a subject who remembers.

3) Self-reflective cognition (svasamvedana qua pratyaksapramāṇa) proves that the cognizer, in cognizing, is self-cognized.

4) Scriptural texts (i.e. the Upanisads and Brāhmaṇas qua Sabdapramāṇa) also recognize that the soul is the cognizer possessed by internal properties.

5) By analogy: "just as you perceive yourself (identity), so I perceive my self (-identity)."

In explaining the Māṇḍūkya's conception of the soul in this anti-Buddhist manner, Śabara both describes the nature \( (rūpa) \) of the soul -- i.e., as something which possesses "properties" in the way the body possesses properties, albeit radically different kinds of properties -- and he as well establishes the nature of this soul in pramāṇic terms. There is, however, a lacuna in Śabara's response to the Buddhists. Śabara is not precise enough in his description of the nature of the soul; he is not precise enough in describing the exact ontological relationship between the "eternal" and "self-illuminated" soul and its "transitory" properties, emotions and cognitions. Kumārila attempts to spell Śabara's position out more clearly and in doing so he helps to explain Sadyojyoti's position
more clearly as well.

For Kumārila Bhaṭṭa it is clear the enjoyership and agency are attributed to the soul in order to explain its engagement in the sphere of karmic activity occurring most basically at the "property" level of "pleasure, cognition, etc." Kumārila expands upon this "property" conception found in Śābara but changes it to include two sets of properties, those that are intrinsic to the soul and those that are incidental: enjoyership and agency belong to the former class of properties and pleasure, cognition etc. belong to the latter class. 22 In explaining the indirect connection (lakṣanāsambandha) as opposed to the direct connection (sāksāt sambandha) the soul has with the body in the accomplishment of karmically determined activity—i.e., such "activities" meant to soteriologically "change" the soul -- Kumārila claims, contra the Buddhists, that the self is not just of the nature of consciousness (vijñānamātratva) but rather enjoyership and agency as well. 23 Agency applies to the soul in order that it may "carry out" (sādhanā) injunctions; enjoyership applies to the soul that it may reap the effects (sādhya) of the karmically determining injunctions. Furthermore, being possessed of eternality the soul is separated (vyatiriktatva) from the buddhi, sense organs and body, which are "finite" -- i.e. "open to destruction". Kumārila explains the soul's engagement in karmic activity which involves the specific description of the soul's connection to the fruits of the activities tied to the sphere of finitude (anītyatva).

Kumārila first addresses the Buddhist criticism that, if the soul is in fact eternal and yet possessed (pratipannatva) of enjoyership and
agency, then at the time of its enjoyment it must be directly connected to the fruits of its karmic activities (karmaphalasambandha). In response Kumārila argues that in such activity the soul indeed undergoes a "modification" (vikriya) -- but not a total transformation which actually leads to the "destruction", i.e. non-existence, of a former condition (uccchedatva). The modification is not in opposition to the aspect of the agency of the soul. Due to its "active character" (sakriyātva) the soul comes to be "the performer of sacrifices" (yajamānatva); the "instrument" for this activity is the body understood in a metaphorical sense, which refers to the sphere (avasthā) of the "means" whereby this activity occurs. All change at the level of embodiment occurs at this level (avasthā) itself while "the common character of the soul" (sāmānyātma) never gives up its character as the "superintending factor" (adhiṣṭhāna) and "instigator" of this change. This is definitely a very similar account of the soul's connection to karmic fruits that Sadyojyoti accepts. For Sadyojyoti the closest this "modification" comes to the soul is at the level of the "buddhiyārtti". Basically the transformation aspect occurs at the level of "avasthā", which is essentially altered by the yajñasādhana occurring through the śaraṇa-dvāra. For Kumārila the "śaraṇa-dvāra" essentially includes the triadic complex of buddhi, indriya and śaraṇa, which in Sadyojyoti's view would simply include the sphere of "buddhi etc." For Sadyojyoti the "yajñasādhana" would entail dealing with the three bonds -- mala, karma and mayā -- at the level of embodiment characterized by "kalādī". Both Kumārila and Sadyojyoti construe the soul as "jñāna-sakti-sadhāva", attributing jñānatva with
bhoktr\textsc{tv}a and s\textsc{k}\textit{tit\textsc{v}}a with kart\textsc{tv}a.

In his confrontation with the Buddhists over the nature of consciousness Sadyojyoti follows the M\textsc{im\textsc{a}}\textsc{msak}as in attributing consciousness to the soul but he differs with the M\textsc{im\textsc{a}}\textsc{msak}as over the nature of the third order cognition described by the Buddhists as self-reflective cognition, svasamvedana. Both the M\textsc{im\textsc{a}}\textsc{msak}as and the Ny\textsc{\textsc{\textsc{\a}}\textsc{y}}ayikas attach a certain personalism to the soul; for both systems the notions of "I cognize" and "I am self-conscious" attribute a self-subsistent entity behind the act of cognizing. In this case the "I" is considered to be a permanent quality of the soul whereas the act of cognizing is itself a product of an impermanent process carried out at the level of the buddhi. In the context of the debate with the Buddhists over the substratum of cognition Sabara quotes scriptural evidence in support of the view that the self is the substratum of consciousness, i.e., that it is the self which is self-aware in the act of svasamvedana. Kum\textsc{\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}rila spells this out more clearly when he states that there is an immediate intuitional insight of the soul by the soul through a conception of "aham" (ahampratyayavig\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}yah svayam\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}tapapadyate), which is neither a perception nor an inference in the strict sense. According to Aghora Siva, Sadyojyoti clearly indicates that self reflective cognition is simply a form of perception (manasa-pratyak\textsc{s}a), which serves as the basis for an inference regarding the existence of the soul; it is impossible to attribute a conception of "ah\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}mk\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}ra" to the soul. Moreover, since cognition at the level of the buddhi occurs due to the obfuscation of the soul's "j\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}na\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}akti" there can be no "self-illumination" of the soul through the notion of "I" or "ah\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}mk\textsc{\textsc{\a}}}ra".
Aghora Śiva explains the inferential process whereby the soul is established on the grounds of "svasadānā." The act of dreaming, he maintains, is a perceptual event which falls under the definition of perception, since it involves "touching" (sparśa) — not of an external object (viśaya) but of an "internal" one. This perception, argues Aghora Śiva, must depend on a permanent "internal" cognizer involved in the continued perception of the internally perceived objects. This internal cognizer cannot be attributed to consciousness itself as the Buddhist conceives of it, i.e., as a momentary event which ultimately is based on the momentary world of "objects." The Buddhist claims that the internal experience of phantasmal objects in fact proves that consciousness is momentary and not that there is a separate self, since there are no phantasmal appearances separate from internal experience itself. Internal momentary experience which projects imaginary objects appears to have a stable base (i.e., a self) because of the "illusion" produced by the similitude of the successive arising of the objects — as is the case in the continuous flow of water. Aghora Śiva reiterates his position that the phantasmal object is in fact internally perceived in a permanent or constant manner, which indicates that the grasper must also be permanent.

A second inference is brought forward to prove the existence of a separate soul qua enjoyer. In this case it is maintained that "desire" (or "intention"—i.e. samīhitā) cannot be explained without the postulation of one who does the desiring; similarly, enjoyment, bhoga, cannot be explained without one who does the enjoying, the bhoktr. Although such an argument is similar to the one proposed by Vātsyāyana whereby desire is considered to be a quality requiring a substratum, i.e., the soul, Sadyojyoti does not accept the quality-substance ontology in
terms of a notion of the "inherence" of the quality in the substratum. Aghora Śiva adds that the argument from "desire" also proves that the soul is an agent, since the activity-of-bhoga implied by "desire" cannot be logically explained without the postulation of an active enjoyer. (BKVI.99B)

These two inferences which Sadyojyoti employs to prove the existence of the soul qua enjoyer and agent are categories of the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference according to which something imperceptible (ādṛṣṭa) is inferred from something perceptible (dṛṣṭa); this inference is described by Vātsyāyana in his commentary on Nyāya Sūtras 1.1.5: "When the relation between the probans and the probandum being imperceptible, the probandum is known from a probans having the same nature with any other object."

Taken together, these two inferences satisfy the requirements that a positive concomitance (vyāpti) in an inference be complimented by an example of negative concomitance. For example, the constant concomitance of smoke and fire that we find in the kitchen, for instance, must be complimented by its co-absence in water, for instance. The standard charge brought against the Buddhists by the Śaivites and others is based on this criterion of a proper inference; regarding the Buddhists' doctrine of momentariness the critic claims that the Buddhist cannot provide a negative instance (vipakṣa) to prove permanence — i.e., non-impermanence. To establish impermanence from existence there should be a negative instance in which the non-existence (abhāva) of impermanence would be concomitant with the non-existence of existence. However, since everything is considered to be impermanent according to the Buddhist, no counter instance can be cited. When the Buddhist brings a similar charge against the Śaivités inferential establishment of the soul, Aghora Śiva,
for example, maintains that the positive concomitance is provided by the inference based on the svasamvedanapratyakṣa and the negative concomitance by the inference based on the activity of bhoga. This latter (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa) inference is a negative concomitance as it is an inference based on presumption (arthapatti), termed anyathānapapatti by Sadyojyoti), which, according to Nyāya, is an inference based on negative concomitance. In this case the Saivite infers that, since all actions require an agent, given the fact of the activity of bhoga, an active Enjoyer must be presumed.

The final criticism the Buddhist brings forth concerning the Saivite’s doctrine of the soul is based on the doctrine of impermanence. According to Aghora Śiva in both his commentaries on the Bhoga Kārikā and on the Mr̥gendra Āgama the Buddhist establishes the doctrine of momentariness in the following manner:

1) All things are either momentary or permanent.

2) All things occur either sequentially or simultaneously.

3) If all things are permanent, sequentiality is ruled out.

4) If all things are permanent and simultaneous, the sequentiality established by practical experience (arthakriyā) [the ultimate criterion of logical truth according to the standard of Buddhist pramāṇic theory] is ruled out.

5) Consequently, all things must be momentary and occur sequentially.

Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha succinctly states the Buddhist position: "All being (yat sat-tat-sarvam) is momentary on account of the unestablishment of the "being" (sattā) which is due to the impossibility of having an "arthakriyā" -- correspondence with practical experience -- of
sequentiality and simultaneity. The Pramāṇavārtika states this clearly.

The higher truth (paramārtha sat) is that which relates to whatever is "for the purpose of the correspondence (samartha)" with the practical situation (arthakriyāsamartha); the non-existents are the non-momentary things--this position is established by the conflict with [holding] simultaneity and sequentiality.

It is quite clear that sequentiality falls on the side of momentariness. As D. N Shastri points out, the doctrine of practical efficiency is actually equated with "reality" or "existence" (sattā) itself. Consequently, when the Buddhist claims "everything is momentary, on account of [the nature of] existence" (sarvam kṣanikam sattvāt), the claim is simply being made that in terms of practical experience, everything is in fact momentary. Of course the equation that "arthakriyā=sattā" goes one step further and identifies this "arthakriyāsattā" with sequentiality (krama) -- i.e., flux, continual change. Hence, in a more temporal sense of the Law of Non-contradiction, concerning moments A, B and C, if (x) exists at moment A it cannot also exist at moment B, as the existence of (x) at A cannot include its existence at B--as "existence" at one moment implies non-existence at another.

Aghora Śiva brings forth two arguments against the doctrine of momentariness. The first argument is based on what can be described as the "gem analogy." A "gem", an entity which the Śaivite considers to be "permanent", i.e. non-momentary, can be involved in two "activities" at one and the same time: the gem can "reflect" various separate objects occupying various separate spaces at one and the same time and in one and the same place, i.e. the gem. This is an example of a permanent thing carrying out two things simultaneously; by implication the "illumination" of the gem is meant to parallel the manner in which being or existence
itself can manifest things both simultaneously and sequentially, i.e., the soul and impermanent cognition. 38

The second argument brought against the doctrine of momentariness is more properly directed against the doctrine of arthakriya: given the position of universal momentariness entailed by this doctrine the ability to relate to anything becomes impossible as everything is being destroyed the moment it is arising -- consequently there is nothing to relate to. In principle, pramānic knowledge becomes an impossibility for the Buddhists, even if they define pramānic knowledge as "the comportment towards an unapprehended object (anadhigatārthagant)." 39 as even an unapprehended object becomes an impossibility.

4. The Cārvāka Doctrine of Consciousness Understood as a Purely Empirical

Phenomenon

Immediately after treating the Buddhists Sadyojyoti treats the Cārvākas solely in terms of their doctrine of consciousness. The most notable difference between the Buddhists and the Cārvāka is that "mokṣa" is the first priority for the former while "jīvana", life, is the first priority for the latter. As lying outside the sphere of brāhmanical orthodoxy, i.e. as "nāstika" doctrines, the Buddhists are more intent in upholding a "nāstyātmavāda" while the Cārvākas are more intent in upholding a "nāstiparalokavāda". 40 However, both the Buddhists, who espouse buddhicaitanyavāda, and the Cārvākas, who espouse the dehaātmavāda, begin with the sphere of the "drṣṭa" as the starting point of their views of consciousness; the Buddhists construe this "drṣṭa" mainly in terms of momentariness while the Cārvākas construe it in terms of the "modifica-
tion" (vikāra) of the material substances. While Sadyojyoti restricts his criticism of the Dehaṭmavāda to the more ontological framework of the four elements accepted by Ācarvāka, we find Aghora Śiva in his commentary on the Mrgendra Vṛtti criticizing this doctrine for epistemological reasons, i.e. that there is only one pramāṇa—pratyakṣa. Unfortunately we do not possess an extant text of the Ācarvāka doctrine. In limiting his criticism of the dehaṭmavāda to the doctrine of elements Sadyojyoti is obviously dealing with the Ācarvāka doctrine according to what he considers to be its essential position. We know from other authors, however, that the Ācarvāka doctrine had many different "schools"; for example, in his Vedāntasāra Sadānanda claims that there are four schools of Ācarvāka each of which holds a different interpretation of the origin of the conscious-self: 41 1) the physical body is the self (sthūlasarīramātma), 2) the sense organs are the self (indriyānyātma), 3) the bio-force is the self (prāṇa ātma) and 4) manas is the self (mana ātma). As well, we know from a late Ācarvāka text, the Tattvopaplavaśimha, that there also existed two main branches of Ācarvāka, one with a more materialistic and the other with a more sceptical orientation; in his examination of the Tattvopaplavaśimha Eli Franco 42 argues that the "original" Ācarvāka doctrine of the four material elements, i.e. the lost "Brhaspati Sūtra", apparently rejected the validity of inference, mainly as a rejection of the attempt to establish some "other worldly" foundation of the phenomenal world, such as God. 43 It was probably the weakness in this original "pratyakṣa only" position of Brhaspati, maintains Eli Franco, that led to the postulation of anumāṇa, as it became increasingly clear that more than perception is required to establish the four elements. 43 After the rise of the hyper-
critical epistemology inaugurated around the time of Dignāga, Cārvāka was faced with the serious charge that it was founded on a petitio principii (ātmaśraya): after all other means of valid cognition are denied, perception, in order to be established as a valid source of knowledge, must establish itself.\textsuperscript{44} According to Franco there were only two ways to solve this problem: either to accept inference, albeit in a limited sense, or to accept a radical scepticism and deny the validity of both perception and inference, as did the author of the Tattvopaplavasimha.

The charge that Cārvāka must employ inference in order to establish its doctrine of the four elements, the cause of consciousness, is found in Nārāyana Kanṭha's commentary on the Mṛgendra Āgama.\textsuperscript{45} In order to correctly ascertain the manner in which the four elements constitute the body as well as the world as a totality, argues Nārāyana Kanṭha, the Cārvāka must adopt a means of cognition other than mere perception -- i.e., inference.\textsuperscript{46} According to the Cārvāka position we in fact only "perceive" the differences in the qualities (gunabheda) of the gross elements (bhūtāni); the gross elements, as a result, must be inferred. Inference must be employed, for instance, when "earth" is discerned to be the "element," constituting clay, stones, etc. and "water" of such things as ponds, rivers, the ocean etc.:\textsuperscript{47}

There where "hardness" is known; there is earth, as in the case of a plateau, rock, mountains etc.; there where the earth element is absent, as in the case of the wind, etc., hardness is likewise absent. Or, everything which is liquid is [in the final analysis] constituted by water, as oil, ghee, milk etc. have the nature of water.

Nārāyana Kanṭha concludes, with respect to the body, that it is not immediately clear "by perception alone" exactly which "qualities"
that are manifested in the appearance of the body belong to which elements: "one may not conclude, without the aid of inference, which of the four elements, earth etc. constitute the body."\textsuperscript{48}

It is also pointed out by Nārāyaṇa Kantha that the prāmaṇa-pratyakṣa itself cannot justify the denial of other means of correct cognition, anumāna etc. He quotes Dharmakīrti in this respect: "As what is both the means and what is not the means of correct cognition are in a similar situation, i.e., isolated from anything else, another means of correct cognition in fact exists."\textsuperscript{49} In other words, the very truth of the validity of perception is based on a petitio principii. The Cārvāka response to this criticism is typical of the central debates between the various schools of Indian thought: Cārvāka charges the upholders of anumāna with a petitio principii themselves. Cārvāka maintains that in the case of inferring fire from smoke -- based on the vyāpti "where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen but not in the lake" -- what is actually being apprehended is not the real fire but the "fire" as part of the universal formula of the vyāpti. Hence, we are simply apprehending what has already been apprehended: \textsuperscript{50}

If a particular object is to be established then the relation of invariable concomitance between it and the reason cannot be established. We may infer fire but cannot infer the particular fire which belongs to the hill in question. If we infer fire in general then we apprehend what has been already apprehended. It is like doing what has been done. Moreover, fire, having no peculiar trait of its own exists nowhere. Hence the talk of inference is an absurdity.

In the Bhoga Kārikā and its commentary the rebuttal of the Cārvāka position is restricted to ontological issues concerning the dehātmavāda. Sadyojyoti introduces the Cārvāka position in opposition to the
Buddhists' unwillingness to accept a separate cognizer; the Cārvākas accept that there is a separate and conscious "bhokṣa" of cognitive acts -- however, they identify this conscious Enjoyer with the body. The "body" is understood by Cārvāka in a twofold sense as both "body" and "consciousness". The body is specifically defined as a modified aggregate (vīkāra -sāmāhāra) of the four material elements, earth, water, fire and air (with ākāśa apparently being left out because it is imperceptible). Consciousness is said to be manifested (abhivyakti) as a "modified characteristic of the body" (kāyaśayā paraśamāviśeśaṇa). Aghora Siva provides the example traditionally used to explain the manner in which a phenomenon like "consciousness" can arise from something "unconscious" and "material". Fermenting agents in the production of alcohol are said to have the "ability" or "capacity" (saṅkṛiti) to intoxicate. The fermenting agents qua "material elements", when in one state, do not exhibit the "quality" of being able to intoxicate; while in another state, they do. Likewise, argues Cārvāka, the material elements combine together to form the body; once the proper combination is reached, the elements possess the ability to manifest consciousness. The Cārvāka base this analogy on the perceptual observation that consciousness is seen only so long as the body is infused with the vital forces (i.e. prāṇa etc.).

The principle appealed to by the Cārvāka in the identification of consciousness with the body is simply stated: "it is improper to postulate something imperceptible when something [perceptible already] exists (cṛste _sambhavatvarṣṭaparikālapaṇā na nyāya iti)." Elsewhere this principle is expressed in a manner which emphasizes the conception of causality: "that in the presence of which is seen something else is recognized to be the cause of the latter (yadyasmin satyeva sandratām..."
Sadyojyoti begins his verse introducing the Cārvāka position with the statement, "just on account of the cause" which stands for both this principle as well as the body.

Sadyojyoti criticizes this view on the grounds of the pratyakṣa-pramāṇa that consciousness cannot be identified with material, perceptual objects like pots and so forth. He claims that the Cārvāka can provide no proof of such an identification between consciousness and the body, as the "reason" -- wherever there is the body, there consciousness is seen -- is too general, as in the case of the corpse: the body is present but there is no consciousness. Ultimately Sadyojyoti is basing himself on the position that the body's vital activity (cēṣṭita) or non-activity is dependent on the presence or non-presence of the self, which is separate from the body. This criticism is particularly directed against the Cārvāka position that "consciousness" is seen to arise only as a result of conception, i.e., the material conjunction of sperm and ovum which develops into the foetus qua the locus of consciousness. The Śaivite argues that conception does not indicate that the conjunction of consciousness and the body are coterminous, but merely indicates that consciousness is prior to the body; "memory," exists prior to conception (suklaśonitasamogātprāgapati), since at the time of the animated activity of the newborn child, the child's movements presuppose a memory of beneficial or harmful things, indicating that intentional activity (prayatna) precedes bodily behavior (pravṛtti). The newborn child, for instance, immediately wants to breastfeed and cries when not allowed to do so. Aghora Śiva adds the further argument, again based on the pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, that
consciousness and the body cannot be identified as one and the same entity based on the example of the perception of pain caused by some external factor; the sensation itself is experienced "in the body," proving that there can be no strict "identification" of the body and consciousness -- i.e., being of the same nature (ätmakatva). If there were this identification, pain would always be experienced exactly and only at the locale of the body where the cause of the pain occurs. 59

The body itself, together with the experiences of "sukhaduhkhādi" associated with it as bhāvas of the buddhi and so forth, is "an object of enjoyment" (bhogyatva) for the soul. 60 As an object of the soul's consciousness, the body is what is "grasped"; therefore, the body cannot be that which does the grasping or enjoying. Arguing against the Gārvāka in this manner, Śadyojyoti employs an argument shared by the Advaitin Śāṅkara, who points out the logical necessity in there being a radical distinction between the "subject" and the "object". For Śāṅkara, consciousness cannot be a "quality" (dharma-tva) of the body, as the body is an "object" (visayatva) of consciousness. Śāṅkara brings forth a simple argument to defend this view: it is contradictory for something to act upon itself (svātmani kriyāvirdhāt): "Fire is hot indeed but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well trained as he may be, cannot mount his own shoulders." 61

In his Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective K. Sivaraman describes this notion in more exacting terms: 62

The known categories of the object cannot be applied to what forms the very precondition of objectivity itself. The self being a transcendental condition of experience cannot be evidenced in the same manner in which any content of experience becomes evident to our understanding. It is like the sense organ being expected to turn its gaze at the seer by whom and at whose
service it is able to see.

Concerning the nature of consciousness, the Śaivite and the Cārvāka view certain "evidence," in a manner which leads to different conclusions. Take, for instance, the two statements, "I am short" and "This is my body." According to Cārvāka, "I am short" appositionally indicates that the self and the body are one entity, i.e., belong to the same locus (sāmānādhikaraṇa); while "This is my body" (mama deho 'yam) does not indicate the separation of the body and the self but is merely a "metaphorical" (aupacārika) manner of referring to the embodied self. The Śaivite, on the other hand, claims that the first statement "I am short" is actually the metaphorical statement while the second statement, "This is my body," actually describes the correct state of affairs, i.e., the separation of the soul and body.63

Aghora Śiva states the final argument against the Cārvāka concerning the theory of consciousness. This argument is centered around the "four stages of life": infancy, adolescence, adulthood and old age. Accordingly, each "bodily" stage is considered to be separate (vibhinna) because of the difference in the transformation (parināmaviśeṣana); these changes are said to involve the destruction of the previous stages due to the repeated transformations. Aghora Śiva puts the question before the Cārvāka: if you identify the self with the body, how can and does one remember previous stages in one's life, since these former stages no longer exist? The Mṛgendra Āgama, for instance, voices this same criticism: "[The body] exists as a characteristic of a transformational process (parināmasya vaiśiṣṭyāt); No! This would not account for memory."64
According to this criticism the Śāivite is taking the Cārvāka extremely literally: "transformations" of the body apply to particular cognitions as well as life stages. The Cārvākas, claims Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha, maintain that "consciousness" in the condition of living beings is an "effect" of the transformation of a collection of elements (vidhabhūta-parināmakṛta); as these respective changes are repeated effects of the transformations of the elements which constitute the body, the successiveness in experience and the destruction of former experiential "states" is just a characteristic or quality of transformation (parināma) itself -- there is no reason to attribute cognitive and experiential changes to anything else, such as the soul. The Śāivite replies that, if one holds that the transformation is itself a quality of the successive cognitions (samkrāmasamvedana viśeṣasya), i.e., if one claims that the particular consciousness which accompanies each object is a product of a certain transformation, memory becomes an impossibility: in order for there to be memory transitory cognitions cannot be based on something unstable (parināmatva), due to the separateness of each successive moment which is characteristic of something unstable or transformative (parināmaviśeṣanām kramabhāvinām bhinnatvāt). This clearly means that it becomes impossible to remember an experience which no longer exists in another experience and even whether the former experience belonged to someone else or not (asamviditasyānya-viditasya cānyahāsmaranāt). In addressing this argument against the Cārvāka the Śāivite is almost attributing a kṣanabhāṅgavāda at the basis of the Cārvāka's dehātmavāda.
In concluding the argument against the Cārvāka over the role of memory and the self qua consciousness, the Mrgendra Agama puts forth the Śaivite view succinctly:65

And the self may not be said to be without memory, for it is evident to all. Hence, there must be one who remembers, apart from the body.

Since the Mrgendra Agama describes "memory" as based on something "stable", i.e., the self, and describes memory as a "quality" of the self, a certain amount of clarification is called for. Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha explains that the successively occurring cognitions (sānkramajñāna) belong to the buddhi and not technically to the soul's consciousness. Aghora Śiva further adds the quote: "The one who unites (anusanghātr) these cognitions is just of the form of an agent (kartṛ)... established as the soul." According to this quote "the body", which is characterized by continuous transformation or alteration (asakṛtparipāmitva), is set in opposition to the stable experiencer (anubhāvitr), the "conjoiner" who, in the presence of certain objects, "joins" certain cognitions or joins different cognitions together. "Memory" is thus just a conjoining activity.66

Sadyojoyoti closes his criticism of the Cārvāka with a criticism of the doctrine which holds that the senses are sufficient for explaining the origin of consciousness, the Indriyacaitanyavāda. (Bṛh. 728-73A). The senses, argues Sadyojoyoti, cannot be considered to be identical with consciousness, or be consciousness itself qua "bhoga", as they are simply the means (karāṇa) in the presentation of the object of consciousness (bhogyatva). Aghora Śiva adds that the sense organs qua "karāṇa" cannot be the agents whereby consciousness comes about since the agent
must be distinct from the agency as the sword, for example, is distinct from the one who engages it. The soul is the agent and is said to be the cause of the "engagements in" and "cessations of" all agentive acts (sārvānyākāraka-pravṛttinivṛttihetutva). Aghora Śiva quotes a passage to illustrate this "non-engaged engagement" on the analogy of God's participation in agentive activity: "The Lord is the one responsible for the engagements in and cessations of agentive activities; the Lord is the unengaged one who is the agent responsible for the causative acts." 67

5. The Debate with Sāmkhya

The Śaivite authors including Sadyojyoti tend to deal with Sāmkhya within a purely ontological context as a criticism of the Sāmkhya conception of prakṛti and its relation to "puruṣa", which the Śaivites interpret as the individual soul. From the context of this criticism the argument between the two doctrines either remains more epistemological and treats the specific relation between the soul and buddhi or it becomes more soteriological and deals with the conception of mokṣa. The Śaivite is willing to accept points of agreement with the Sāmkhya doctrine and even, in the case of Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha, to quote sections of the Sāmkhya Kārikā as authoritative. 68 However, in matters which they disagree over, all Śaivite authors agree in condemning the Sāmkhya for the same reasons.

In the Bhoga Kārikā and its commentary Sadyojyoti and Aghora Śiva criticise the Sāmkhya epistemological doctrine that the buddhi is itself
the locus of empirical consciousness. Aghora Śiva cites Sāṁkhya Kārikā, verse 20, at the outset of the epistemological criticism of Sāṁkhya; the verse describes "puruṣa" as a "witness" (śāksitva), as possessed of isolation or freedom (kaivalya), as "indifferent" (madhyasthā), as a mere "spectator" (draṣṭr) and as inactive (akartrbha). According to the Śaivite interpretation of the Sāṁkhya, the soul or "puruṣa" is thought of as a "bhoktr" of empirical consciousness but not as a "kartr" involved in this empirical consciousness. The Sāṁkhya explains its notion of the "puruṣa" as bhoktr by means of a doctrine of "reflection" (pratibimbavāda) according to which the buddhi is construed as the means or matrix (dvāram) through which "the subject" and "the object", i.e., "the soul" and "the contents of the buddhi", are brought together as if in a mirror. The buddhi functions as the mirroring factor (chāyā) for the conjunction of its contents and the soul; as a result of this conjunction of the two reflections, the buddhi appears as if it is of a conscious nature. Aghora Śiva summarizes the Sāṁkhya doctrine of "reflection".

The "formal connection" (ākārāṇusanga) is just a "contact" (samsleśa) of the two "images" (chāya) or "reflections" which are of the nature of the conscious and the unconscious; due to this connection, the souls, enjoyers and bonds are transformed into objects of enjoyment through the instrumentality of the cognitive activity of the buddhi which itself functions in a mirroring manner and is called enjoyment. It is just for this reason that the Samsārians make the mistake of seeing the soul and so forth in what is not the soul etc.

One of the analogies used by the Sāṁkhya to describe this doctrine of reflection is given as the reflection of the moon in water; in this case the water itself appears to manifest the light which actually belongs to the moon. Aghora Śiva criticizes this on the grounds
that it draws a false comparison, since the soul and the buddhi are of radically different natures -- one of a conscious and one of an unconscious nature -- while the moon and the water are of the same nature both are by nature unconscious. The moon analogy is meant to explain more than just the connection between the soul and the buddhi in terms of the idea of the soul's consciousness; although the soul is, according to the Sāṃkhya, "in some sense" a bhoktr, it is a completely uninvolved bhoktr. The Sāṃkhya "soul" has no real connection to bhoga. The buddhi is said to be the locus of bhoga. All soteriological activity occurs in the buddhi itself as the reflection of the soul qua bhoktr and the buddhi qua locus of the bhoga.

With the criticism of the moon analogy Aghora Śiṣya has the Sāṃkhya appeal to another analogy in order to explain the unengaged—enjoyment of the purusa;  

Just as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the proximity of the unmoved soul.

In upholding the uninvolvment of the soul in the activity of the buddhi Sāṃkhya appeals to this magnet analogy in order to avoid attributing agency, kartrtvā, to the purusa: "agency'entails engagement in activity (kriyā-vesā); if agency is attributed to the soul, the soul becomes subject to transformation (parināmatva)."  

The objection brought against the magnet analogy adopted by the Sāṃkhya is based on a theory of causality. According to the Śaivite the agent is not to be identified with the activity (kriyā); the terminology adopted to describe this state of affairs is rather that the agent "does not reside in (vesā) or have its locus in the activity". Rather, just the
power or ability (śaktitva) to effect activity resides in the activity. In the case of the magnet, the magnet has the ability to cause the iron filings to move; in the movement of the iron filings the magnet remains the agent and its ability to cause the movement becomes engaged in the activity of the movement. Hence, the soul qua agent remains ontologically unmodified (paripāta) in the activity of empirical consciousness.

In a last attempt to defend the kartṛtvā of the soul and to attribute kartṛtvā to the buddhi, although the buddhi itself is not by nature constituted by consciousness, Śāṅkhaṇya appeals to the analogy of the calf: "As the non-conscious milk 'acts' for the sake of the growth of the calf, so prakṛti [qua buddhi] 'acts' for the sake of the release of the puruṣa." According to Śāṅkhaṇya, as long as the puruṣa has not attained soteriological perfection through the "discernment" (vivekajñāna) of the separation of puruṣa from prakṛti, the prakṛti-based buddhi continues to function or act "for another" (parārthapraṇaya), as it is dependent on the puruṣa. However, even though it is for the sake of another, it still functions by itself for this purpose, just as the milk flows by itself for the benefit of the cow. Aghora Śiva turns the analogy around and argues that buddhi qua prakṛti is not "autonomous" because even though it is unconscious -- it is superintended over by consciousness, just as the flowing of the milk is superintended over by the conscious cow. Superintendence (adhisthītāvā) in this case implies "instigation" (pravartakatva); even though the activity is unconscious, the "instigator" must be considered to be conscious, as the cow-milk analogy points out.

These arguments against the Śāṅkhaṇya conception of the relation
of the soul to the buddhi which Aghora Śiva brings forth in his commentary on the Bhoga Kārikā are based on his commentary on the Mrṣendra Agama Vṛtti. Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha offers arguments defending the notion that the soul is actively engaged in the activity of the buddhi; as an illustration of the succinctness of Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha's argumentation we cite the following passage: 

If the soul is not the bhoktr, what is the purpose of the body that is the locus of bhoga (bhogāyatana), the sense organs that are the instruments of this bhoga (bhogasādhana) the objects of bhoga (bhogārthā) and finally [as the culmination of all this], the bhoga, itself which is constituted by experience which is pleasurable or painful? As bhoga is necessarily accompanied by its locus (adhikaraṇa) and its instruments (sādhanasahitātva) it is impossible to deny to the soul the status of being a bhoktr. Moreover, if the soul is a bhoktr, how can it not be an agent, kartṛ? If it is purely Inactive (akartṛ) there is no justification for its conjunction with the instruments etc. (karaṇa etc.). Furthermore, since the soul is essentially constituted by both consciousness [qua being a bhoktr] and activity, to deny its agency is ipso facto to deny its consciousness.

Sadyojyoti and Aghora Śiva conclude the critique of Śāṅkhya with a soteriological criticism of the Śāṅkhya conception of mokṣa. According to Śāṅkhya all soteriological activity takes place on the level of the buddhi. Although the soul or puruṣa is said to be of a soteriologically "pure" nature (nimālaṇa), the process of "mokṣa" that is restricted to the prakṛti-based sphere of the buddhi is said to be "for the purpose of the puruṣa". Mokṣa is thus defined as the ceasing of the activity that arises on account of prakṛti; this cessation arises out of account of the discrimination that is instigated by the buddhi through the "jnāna" designated bhava. Verses 62 and 63 of the Śāṅkhya Kārikā describe the Śāṅkhya doctrine of mokṣa:

Verily, not any spirit is bound, nor released, nor migrates; it is prakṛti, the Primal Nature alone, abiding in manifold forms, that is bound, is released, and migrates.
By seven forms Prakṛti, the Primal Nature, binds herself by herself, by one form she releases herself for the deliverance of the Spirit.

The first objection brought forth against this conception of mokṣa is stated by Sadyojyoti in verse 76A-76B: given that the soul or "puruṣa" is considered undefiled (nirmalatva) at all times, whether in the bound state or the liberated state, there can be no distinction between the bound and the liberated soul, since the soul is at all times "unconnected" to that which could defile it. As a result, the liberated and the unliberated states cannot be distinguished. Secondly, even if we allow the Sāmkhya position that the activity of the buddhi and prakṛti "are for the sake of" the soul, which remains "unconnected" to this activity, there is nothing to prevent the activity from taking place for one who is already liberated, as the soul has no control over the activities of the prakṛti. Thirdly, and finally, if all karmic activity were limited to the sphere of the prakṛti-constituted buddhi, this activity would apply to all souls indiscriminately, as there would be no restricting-factor involved in linking a certain soul with a certain buddhi. As a result, liberation again becomes an impossibility given the Sāmkhya doctrine.
Chapter V

NOTES

1 Most of the quotes taken from Buddhist sources that appear in the BKV are found as well in the MAD and are identified by M. Hulin as taken from Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya. Since Aghora Śiva also discusses the arthakriyāvāda we must assume that Dharmakīrti is as well criticized as Dignāga was unfamiliar with the concept of arthakriyā; cf. Dignāga On Perception, trans. and annotation by Massaki Hattori, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 47 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 80. It may be argued that the concept of arthakriyā as conceived by later Buddhist writers was actually latent in Dignāga's conception of the distinction between the "svalakṣaṇa", the unconceptualized particular, and the "sāmānyalakṣaṇa", the conceptualized object or event. One of the marks of the svalakṣaṇa, according to Dharmakīrti, is its arthakriyāsakti while the sāmānyalakṣaṇa possesses no such capacity; cf. Hattori, p. 80.

Concerning epistemology, the Sakarajnanavada is held by the Sautrāntikas and some Yogacarās (some Yogacarās also hold a Nirakarajnanavada); cf. Hattori, p. 88.

For a discussion of the distinction between the two doctrines, cf. also Bimal K. Matilal, Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 151. Kamalaśīla, for instance, maintains that both schools accept the basic principle of the sākāra-vijñānavāda; the Sautrāntikas, however, accept the independent existence of external objects while the Yogācāras do not (cf. IS, v. 134).


5 Matilal points out that the terminological distinctions used by Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya to designate the "object-aspect" and the "cognizing-aspect" are, respectively, "arthābhāsa" and "svābhāsa", which are more commonly referred to as "grahyakāra" and "grahakakāra" by the Yogācāra authors: "Later on this arthābhāsa transpired as arthākāra, the 'object-form' of the cognition, in the writings of post-Dignāga expo-
ments and hence the nickname sākārvādin (sākāra = 'awareness with an object') was given to this school." Cf. Matilal, Perception, p. 151.

6 The context of this debate concerns the theory of the relation between consciousness and its object. Sabara extends the self-evidential character of sabda qua Vedic "scripture" into other spheres of cognition; hence, in the sphere of perception he upholds a type of realism (artha-lambanah pratyayah) wherein actual perceptions are in themselves valid (satpratyakṣam) -- and can only be proven to be false "after the fact" of the cognitive event. Kumārla describes this state of affairs: "Therefore, the authoritative character of a conception recognized through the mere fact of its having the character of 'cognition', can be set aside only by the contrary nature of its object or by the recognition of discrepancies of its causes." Cf. Ślokavārttika, trans. p. 46.

The Buddhists, on the other hand, because of their more ontological commitment to the kaññikāvāda, hold that perception has no ontological support (nirālambanah pratyayah) and in itself simply represents the false sphere of the undifferentiated and unconceptualized svalaksana.

7 The Aphorisms of the Mīmāṃśa, p. 9: "yadyarthākārabuddhiḥ svat; nir-ākāra tu no buddhiḥ, ākārayān bāhyo rthah sa hi bahirdeśasambuddhah pratyakṣamupalabhyate."

8 Ibid., p. 9.

9 Sabara says that the cognition becomes cognized (buddhi jñāyate); terminologically, the buddhi becomes "jñāta". Buddhi (ālambhana) is apratyakṣa -- because it has no "ākāra"; (therefore, it is only open to anuruddhi can only be said to have akāra) when it has an object: "Further, the form of the cognition is never apprehended except in terms of the object (sakāram cārtham pratyakṣam evvagacchāmah." Cf., ibid. p. 10.

10 If we were to speak of it in terms of "levels", level one constituting vyāvasāya-jñāna and level two constituting avyāvasāya-jñāna, buddhi-jñāna qua "bhoga" would be comparable to the level of vyāvasāya-jñāna. Such is the manner in which Aghora Śīya tends to construe this activity. The buddhi is the locus for a certain type of cognition (jñāna) which leads, so to speak, "a life of its own". The jñāna terminology is used to explain the events which take place in the buddhi; this "buddhi-jñāna" then becomes an object of the soul and comes under the category of "itma-jñāna", i.e. "bhoga" or "anubhava" and is more comparable to an avyāvasāya-jñāna. Of course, in this section of the BK under discussion this is not Sadvyojityi's concern; rather, the separate existence of bhoga is meant to establish the radical distinction between the bhoṭa and the bhoga.


12 The MA is very concise in its criticism. The first and no
doubt most important argument attributes a "category mistake" to the Buddhists who are said to confuse consciousness with the instruments whereby consciousness becomes manifested (i.e. senses, manas, etc.) and thus confuse the impermanence of the instruments with the impermanence of consciousness. The MA employs two other basic arguments: it is wrong to attribute impermanence to the self since we in fact enjoy the fruits of previous activities and since we remember previous experiences.

13 MAö, p. 100: "If the soul exists, there is a conception of an "other", this distinction of the "self," [i.e., as "what is mine"] and the "other" engenders the attachment to possessions and animosity (yaduktam "atmani sati parasamjña svaparavibhāgatparigrahāyānadvā anayossampratibaddhārṣarve dosāḥ prajayante iti")." The quote is from Pramanavārttika, p. 77.

14 MAö, pp. 102-103: "nau sadraśaparāparakṣanotpattivipralabdhatvāt sthairyamadhyāropitamītyuktam."

15 Dignāga, On Perception, p. 28.

16 Ibid., p. 28 (v.9a): "or [it can be maintained that] the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (svasamvittī) is here the result [of the act of cognizing]." Dharmakīrti describes the inner perception of emotive states as manovijñāna and the self-cognition as sarvācittacaitānam atma samvedanām. There is a sense in which svasamvedana is co-temporal with every cognitive state, which thus provides the continuity in experience, as Dharmakīrti states: "All (simple) consciousness, as well as all mental phenomenon, are self-conscious." Cf. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, 163. For a discussion of the Buddhist notion of svasamvedana, cf. Hattori, pp. 93-94 and Matilal, Perception, pp. 149-153.

17 Of course there is a difficulty in explaining continuity in the svalakṣaṇa sphere of experience, as svasamvedana qua manovijñāna appears to infuse some kind of conceptuality into the svalakṣaṇa experience. It is exactly this cryptic problem in Dignāga which has led M. Nagatomi to refer to it as "a conundrum in the Buddhist pramāṇa system." Cf. M. Nagatomi, "Arthākriyā," Adyar Library Bulletin, 31-2, (1967-1968), 243-260.

18 The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and [thus] is understood to include the act of [of cognizing] (savyāpāra)." Cf. Hattori, p. 28. The Buddhist is arguing against the Nyāya-vākṣya who construes the kārana qua kāraṇa as separate both ontologically and temporally from the kārya.

19 v. 10; Hattori, p. 29.

20 For the reasons behind the two alternatives, cf. Matilal, Perception, pp. 151-152.

Unlike Śabarā, Kumārila Bhātta does not construe sukhadubhka etc. as "properties" of the soul; cf. Ślokavarttika, trans. p. 385.

Bhoktrtvā and kartrtvā must be included if the sādhanasādhyasambandha is to be established (v. 4).

These two positions are respectively known as vikriyānityatva and ucchedānityatva. Kumārila states: "The applicability of the term anitya applied to the atman is not rejected if the non-eternality is one of modification [of the eternal soul] and not of its destruction." Cf. p. 385. Parthasarāthī uses more standard philosophical vocabulary to describe this state of affairs: the soul is nitya in its svarūpa and anitya and anitya in its upādhi.

In order to explain the specific ontological manner in which the soul qua kartr acts (kriyate) in activity (kriyā), v. 75 lays down the principle that the kartr need not always be the locus in which the activity adheres; actions are only brought about by the soul in its capacity as a superintending factor (adhishthana or instigator (prayojika) [v. 75] and is so involved in activities qua kartr in a different manner: for example, through movement, language, proximity etc. (vs. 95-96).

Kumārila does not accept a subtle body (cf. v. 62); transformation occurs at the level of "avasthā" with the soul taking on different physical bodies qua "avasthā".

Cf. Sāntarakṣita, Tattvasamgraha (contra Nyāya), pg. 213-214). Kamalaśīla quotes Uddyotakara (Nyāyavarttika, 3.4.1). Sāntarakṣita objects to this view since nityatva and vibhūtva etc. do not become manifest in ahamkāra; rather, the cognitions of physical attributes, like "fair complexion" etc., become manifest.

Cf. note 40 for chapter IV above concerning the notion of ahamkāra as held by Vātsyāyana. In Vātsyāyana's case it can be argued that he does attribute a certain "personalism" to the soul, even though this is not his intention. On the one hand, in his commentary on 4.2.44 he makes it clear that the "I" notion is only constitutive of the soul insofar as it has cognition; in the state of release there is no cognition. All cognition is a result of the condition of embodiment: "The conditions (necessary for the production of knowledge) are there only if there is a body produced as a result of adṛśa which is the substratum of actions (cesta), senses (indriya) and pleasure and pain. Thus cognitions are invariably produced (only in the presence of such a body)." Cf. Nyāya-Sūtra with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, p. 370. In his commentary on 1.1.22 Vātsyāyana further argues against construing mokṣa as the svasamvedana [which would definitely involve a form of ahampratyaya] of eternal bliss. On the other hand, however, Vātsyāyana describes "the eternal soul" as sarvadvraitrtya, sarvaboktrtvā, sarvajñātṛtā and sarvānubhavān (comm. on 1.1.22 p. 20); since the ahampratyaya leads to the inferential conception...
of a permanent self qua substratum of the fleeting cognitions, it appears that this ahampratyaya also applies to the "more eternal" qualities of the soul such as sarvadraśātva etc.

29. Slokavarttika (ātmavāda, v. 107), trans. p. 401: [According to the Bhāṣya] the soul is directly cognizable by the notion of 'I'." In v. 132 a similar idea is expressed: "The notion of 'I' must always (be accepted to) refer to the soul (ātmabhimānetyahbuddhirdhruvātmapi)."

29. MĀV, p. 99: "cideva hiyam kṣanikā tattadarthaprakāśarūpa anubhavasiddha natvetadyatirikta ātma vidyate saṃvedanavyatiriktaṃ bhedanapratibhasanat." Also see Kāmaśīla's commentary on vv. 1920-1922 which argue against the position of the Čārvāka that all consciousness proceeds from sense-organs and objects: "If all cognition were apprehended only through the sense organs and the objects, - then our assertion would have been an audacious one; as a matter of fact, however, in dreams and other states there appears Subjective Consciousness envisaging the blue and objects, which subjective consciousness is apprehended even when there is no Sense organ nor any object in the shape of colour, etc. (yad sarvameva jñānamidhyarthabhalaṇaḥ ātmaḥ tadā sāhasam bhavet, vyavāya svaprādyavasthavam nīlādipratibhasam manovijnānasyatyaḥ cakṣuṛadindire vina 'pi rūpāṇarthe na samvedyate)." Cf. Tattvasamgraha of Saṁt arākṣita with the Commentary, trans. pp. 919-921, ed. p. 345-347.

31. Nyāya Sūtras, p. 18. The two inferences Sadjaṣyoti employs to prove the existence of the soul are categorized as the saṃmāyataodrsta form, i.e., inferring something imperceptible (adṛṣṭa) from something perceptible (dṛṣṭa). Gautama (1.1.5) subdivides inference into three categories: pūrvavat (lit. "that which has the antecedent") is an inference from the cause to the effect, as from the viewing of clouds one infers that it will rain; sesavat is from the effect to the cause, as when one infers that it has rained from the viewing of swollen rivers; and saṃmāyataodrsta inference occurs when the perception of an object which is perceptible provides the basis for the establishment of something imperceptible, as the movement of the sun is inferred from the perception of its location in different places. Both the pūrvavat and sesavat inferences concern perceptual objects while the saṃmāyataodrsta only concerns imperceptible objects. In his commentary on 1.1.5 Vatsyayana subdivides these basic three kinds of inference into two alternative ways of viewing them, i.e. temporally and spatially (or logically). With respect to the saṃmāyataodrsta inference, the temporal manner would concern the movement of the sun whereas the spatial or logical manner would concern something like the postulation of the soul from the fact of cognitive qualities, which is more in line with Sadjaṣyoti's use of the saṃmāyataodrsta inference: "When the relation between the probans and the probandum being imperceptible, the probandum is known from a probans"
having the same nature with any other object. As, for example, self from desire, etc. Desire etc. are qualities. Qualities reside in substances. Therefore, that which is the substratum of these (i.e. desire etc.) is the self." Cf. Nyāya Sūtras, p. 18. With respect to the example of the sun's movement as given by Gautama, Keith claims that the sun is inferred to move based on the analogy of ordinary motion, even though the sun's movement is not open to perception; cf. Arthur Berriedale Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 89. Kisor Chakrabarti, however, argues that the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is an inference based on seeing or proving (drṣṭa) the universal (sāmānyatā) two things must necessarily share and not on an analogy; cf. Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, The Logic of Gautama, Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Monograph no. 5 (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1977), pp. 14-31.

The sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is generally accepted by the other schools. For example, in v. 6 of the Sāmkhya Kārikā Īśvarakṛṣṇa accepts this form of inference: "sāmānyatatstus drṣṭaṁ śāntihā vyāptiṁ pratiṣṭhitumānāṁ." Cf. The Śāmkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, p. 19. Sabara, as we have seen, accepts it when he uses the fact of "desire" to establish the nature of the soul; The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (2.2.15 and 2.1.16) as we will accept it. Even a Buddhist text, the Upādhyādaya, a pre-Dignāga work, accepts the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference; cf. G. Tucci, Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, G.O.S., no. XLIX (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), p. 14.

32 By the later tradition, following Uddyotakara, the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference was seen to include many forms of inference, including arthāpatti; cf. The Logic of Gotama, p. 16.

33 MAV, p. 100: yatsattātsarvāṁ kṣaṇikām akṣaṇikasya kramayaupapādyābhyām arthakriyā mupapattēḥ sattāvah evaśiddhatvāt.

34 MAV, p. 100; quote from Pramāṇavārttika, p. 100: "arthakriyāsamarthāṁ yat tadātra paramārthaḥ sat anāṁ kṣaṇikāstasmāt kramākramavirodhatāṁ.


37 The same argument is put forth in the MĀD, p. 104. As well, Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha gives the example of a "pot": it is both involved in many things and is one thing (MAV, p. 104).

38 The "jewels and the thread" example (manisūtravat) that many jewels are related to one thread is meant to illustrate the point that one object can be related to three different temporal events, the past, present and future; cf. Padarthaḥdhammasamagraḥa, trans. p. 81-82. The classic example is that a ruby (padmarāga) remains the same and does not become different due to its association with the past and present; For a well presented discussion of this in a Buddhist

Another formulation of this is ajñatārthajñāpakam pramāṇam; since the object is always momentary, it always appears as a new event.

Besides presenting the basic philosophical position of the Cārvāka as is corroborated by such works as the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Nyāyamaṇjarī and Tattvasāmgha, Mādhava in the Savyaratnasamgraha gives an account of the Cārvāka as an anti-Brāhmaṇic and anti-theistic social movement dedicated to a form of hedonism: Mādhava sees this "social" aspect of Cārvāka as the expression of those who neglect the four traditionally accepted "puruṣārtha", i.e. kāma, artha, dharma and mokṣa -- accepting only the first two; cf. Savyaratnasamgraha, pp. 10-11. In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (3.3.53) Saṃkara sees Cārvāka through its denial of a "separate" self, as denying the possibility of bondage and release both for the Pūrvamāṁśa, as it would deny the possibility of a separate self attaining heaven and for the Vedānta, as he would deny the possibility of the identification of the self with Brahman: cf. Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Saṅkaracārya.

Cf. Sadānanda, Vedāntasāra, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1974), 39. Although Jayanta Bhāṭṭa treats the saṁītavyādī, indriya-caitanyaavāda and the manascaitanyaavāda, he only attributes the saṁītavyādī to the Cārvāka. He also discusses the "Saṅkṣipta Cārvakas" who accept a "soul" which is distinct from the body but which perishes with the death of the body; cf. Nyāyamaṇjarī of Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, ed., I, 39.


It was generally assumed by the other schools that the pratyakṣa - only Cārvākas slipped anumāṇa in the side door. For example: "When he [Cārvāka] denies the existence of another world, he actually has resort to a proof called negation (anupalambha) [which is inferential knowledge]. Therefore, how can the Cārvāka be sane when he argues by means of inferential knowledge, while saying that inference is not valid knowledge." Cf. Mokṣakāra-gupta, Pārakāśasā, trans. Y. Kajiyama (Kyoto: Rinsen Books, 1965), p. 31. In his commentary on vv. 1482-1483 Kamalāśila identifies a certain Puranda who is quoted as claiming that the Cārvāka accepts inference in a limited sense as that which is held by most people in everyday affairs (lokaprasiddha-anumāṇa) but does not accept it to prove things beyond the worldy sphere (laukikamargatikramya-anumāṇa). Saṅtarakṣita observes that the notion such as "the effect arises from the cause" etc. is accepted "in the world" - i.e. by the person in the street; however, it is exactly such an idea, says Saṅtarakṣita, that the early logicians used to found anumāṇa on. Consequently, he argues, if one accepts anumāna in a laukika sense one accepts it in a paralaukika sense.
as well; cf. Tattvasamgraha, p. 738.

45. MĀV, pp. 181-189.

46. Nārāyaṇa Kantha attacks the pratyaksākapramāṇavāda mainly in terms of the discernment of the four elements constituting the body; without inference, it is impossible, he insists, to have a "synthetic view" (anvayagrahanātva) of the totality of things within sphere of experience; cf. MĀV, pp. 188-189.

47. MĀV, p. 188: "api ca yatra kāthinyam sa prthivi
sthalopalaparvatadvati prthivyabhaye kāthinyasyabhivyabhavah. vāyvādāvivaha.
yacca dravasvarūpaṃ tajjālam taidaghmośārādityyadāvatvadānayavayagrāhānamānunānātām kalpanāyam.

48. MĀV, p. 188: "[dehe] prthivyādibhūtastraṭayārabhātavamapi
nānumānām vina 'vagantum śākyam.'

49. MĀV, p. 189: "pramanetarasāmānyasthiteranyaviyogatāh
pramanāntarasad bhāva 'iti.'

'nupapannatvaanaumānakatha kutaḥ.'


52. Just as "kāya eva" appears to be an original maxim or Nyāya of the Cārvāka school, as it is cited by many commentators, so also this manner of describing consciousness as a "viśeṣa" of the body; eg., "caitanyaviśistab kāyāh puruṣa iti" — cf. The Brahmaśūtrasāmkarubhāṣyam, ed. Narayan Ram Acharya (Bombay: Saṅyaḥabhamābāḥ Pandurang, 1948), p. 424 (on 3.3.53). Śaṅkara also refers to the Cārvāka notion of consciousness as a "quality" (bhārmatva) of the body. Kamalaśīla on vv. 1858-1859 points out that some Cārvākās hold that consciousness is "produced out of" (upvadyate) the body while others hold that it is "manifested by" (abhiṣyatyate) the body; cf. Tattvasamgraha of Śaṅkarācārya, p. 887.

53. Kamalaśīla proffers an interesting argument against this Cārvāka position: "For instance, when one sees such disgusting things as the blood of a tiger, etc., there appears a manifestation in the mind of a cowardly person, in the shape of savour and so forth; and yet this does not make the said Subjective Consciousness a material effect of that blood." Cf. Tattvasamgraha, trans. p. 900.

54. BKV, p. 36.
55 Pauskara Āgama, pānapatāla, v. 61; SBP, p. 100 (yadasymin sati sandhātām tadāstām tasya kāraṇām). Sivāyogyin expresses this slightly differently: "If something is seen where there is something else, the latter is sure to be the cause of the former (yadasymin satyeva drṣyate tattasya kāraṇam drṣṭam)." SBP, p. 97. Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha expresses it as: "yadasymin sati yasya dhāvāh yadabhāve cābhāve tattasyakāryam, MA, p. 184. He gives the example of cold and the winter season. In the Brahmasūtrasāmkarābhāṣya (3.3.51 and 3.3.52) we find a similar explanation of the reason adduced by the Čārvāka to defend their position, although the emphasis in this case is more on the relation between localities or loci than on the relation between cause and effect: wherever x exists only when y exists and does not exist when y does not exist, x is considered to be an "quality" (dharma)of y; for example, light and heat are considered to be qualities of fire (yady yasmin sati bhavatya sati ca na bhavati tattadharmatvenādhyavastute yatha (gnyidhamavausgyaṃprākṣaṃ), Brahmāsūtrasāṃkarābhāṣyam, ed. p. 424. The two sūtras which appear as 3.3.51 in Sūrināṭha’s Bhasya do not criticize Čārvāka but are treated as a reference in the relationship of individual and supreme consciousness in light of proper meditation. Indeed, nowhere in his Bhasya does Sūrināṭha take up a criticism of Čārvāka; cf. The Brahma-Mīmāṃsā with Sūrināṭha-Sivāchārya’s Commentary, ed L. Srinivasacharya. Government Oriental Library Series, Bibliotheca Sanskrita No. 30 (Mysore: Government Oriental Library, 1903), pp.

56 For instance, cf. Pauskara Āgama, pānapatāla, v. 68; SBP, p. 99; "yadabhāvavadbāvābhyām cēṣṭacetete bhajettanah/ taccaītanyamiti proktamvīyatiriktam tu dehatam."

57 MA, p. 190.

58 In this case the "suklasanita" implies the foetus (kalana), a term specifically referring to the embryo a short time after conception (kāryāṣrayigaśca kalalādyāḥ, Sāmkhya Kārikā, v. 43).

59 Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha uses a similar example: we see a small cognition (alpaśāna) in a large body (mahākāya) and a large thought (mahāmati) in a small body (alpakāya); cf. MA, p. 187. M. Hulin gives the illustration of a mouse being smaller than the crocodile, which indicates that consciousness is not in direct proportion to bodily size; cf. Mrgendṛagama; Sections de la Doctrine, p.164.

60 In BK, v. 72 provides the reason, using the phrase "jīvacchāyopābhogatvāt" as a reason for holding that the body is an unconscious material object; the term "upabhogatvāt" is clear enough although "jīva-chāyā" is more difficult to understand in this context as it smacks of the Sāmkhya doctrine which construes the buddhi as a chāyā of the puruṣa: this doctrine is criticized by Sadgoyjotī in vv. 74b-77b. Aghora Sīva explains the idea of the chāyā in v. 72 as referring to the reflective or mirroring activity of the buddhi in its
"presentation" of objects to the soul; qua "object", therefore, the body has the same status as any other "object" and no more privileged access to consciousness than any other "object". "Chāyā" in this Saivite sense is a one-way mirroring, the presentation of objects in the buddhi, whereas with the Sāṃkhya, the chāyā is a two-way mirroring, the buddhi presenting objects and the subject in one activity.

61 Vedānta Sūtras, p. 271.
62 Sivaraman, Saivism in Philosophical Perspective, p. 271.
63 Cf. ŚPB, pp. 97-99. The "corpse" provides a similar use of the same phenomenon to prove the opposite conclusions. The Saivite sees the corpse as proof that the physical body is dependent on consciousness for its continued existence. The Cārvākas, on the other hand, claim that when the body is no longer functioning as a body, i.e. when the "prāṇa" is no longer in tact, there is no consciousness; death is said to be the departure (nirgāma) of the elemental bio-force.

64 MĀ, p. 186: "parināmasya vaiśiṣṭyādasti cenna smṛtistadā."
65 Ibid., p. 187: "nāpyevam upratītavat smṛta kāyetaro 'styataḥ."
66 The Cārvākā, however, might reply that the fact remains, the cognitions according to the Saivites are themselves transitory: if memory neither belongs to the unstable cognitions nor to the soul, then who or what actually remembers?

67 BKV, p. 35
68 MAV, p. 281.

69 The differences among the various commentators concerning the interpretation of this kārika are typified by the debate between Vācaspati Miṣra and Vijnāna Bhikṣu over the concept of "bhoktṛtya" in their commentaries on the Yoga-Sūtras. For Vācaspati Miṣra the puruṣa is really a non-experimenter assuming the pose of an experimenter while for Vijnāna Bhikṣu the puruṣa is a real experimenter; for a discussion of the various interpretations cf. Latika Chattopadhyaya, Self in Sāṃkhya Philosophy (Calcutta: Roy and Chowdhury, 1982), pp. 43-46.

70 In Sāṃkhya Kārika, v.17, one of the reasons postulated to prove the existence of the puruṣa is the fact of an enjoyer (bhoktrabhāvāt). The Sāṃkhya Sūtras, v. 6.54, explicitly states that agency belongs to the ego, not the puruṣa(ahāmkāraḥ kartā na puruṣah). In his commentary on Sāṃkhya Sūtras 1.96 Aniruddha argues that kartṛtya, bhoktṛtya and adhistātṛtya are falsely ascribed to the self when in fact it is the "prakṛta" [i.e. qua buddhi] which possesses these qualities.

71 The pratiḥimbavāda is associated more with the Sāṃkhya Sūtras and Yoga Sūtras than with the Sāṃkhya Kārika. The pratiḥimbavāda is
also expressed in Vedānta, as for example, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.12 and the Brahma Sūtras 2.3.50; for a discussion of the doctrine outside Śāṅkhya, cf. Latika Chattopadhyaya, p. 132. In the Śāṅkhya-Yoga writings the "reflection" doctrine is based on a number of analogies. In the Yoga Sūtras 6.28 the analogy of the moon in water is given; in Śāṅkhya Sūtras 2.35 and 1.96 the analogy of the gem's proximity to the red flower is given.

72 BKV, p. 36.

73 Ibid., p. 37. The magnet analogy is given in Yoga Sūtra Bhāṣya on 1.4

74 BKV, p. 36.

75 Śāṅkhya Kārikā, v. 57.

76 MAV, pp. 82-86.

77 MAV, pp. 84-85: "abhoktah puruṣasya bhogāyatanena dehena bhoga- sādhanairendriyaibhoktavairindriyaarthairbhogena ca sukhaduhkhavedanaṁ phalena kim prayojanam. yataśāsya bhogastadadhikaranatatsadhanasahito 'sti ato bhoktṛtvamapahatumaṣeṣyaṃ. yaṣca bhoktā sa kathamakartā akartāī karaṇādisambhandhasya nirāarthakatvat. drkkriyatmakatvameva svarūpaµm caitanyaśa tataśca kartrtvanirasat jñatvamapi."

78 The Śāṅkhya-kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa; trans. Mainkar, pp. 159 and 158.
Chapter VI

THE TRANS-BUDDHĀ CONDITIONS GOVERNING EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Introduction

The Śaivite doctrine of the thirty-six tattvas is often subdivided into three distinct groups. The first five tattvas are characterized as "pure" and are designated as "prerakāṇḍa", i.e., as those created by Śiva; they are also collectively referred to as the śivatattva. Inclusive within this more mythic group are the śivatattva, śakti-tattva, sadāśiva-tattva, īśvara-tattva and sadvidyā-tattva. The next group consists of eight tattvas and is characterized as "pure and impure". This group of tattvas specifically governs the trans-buddhi conditions which are a priori to empirical consciousness. For this reason, they are collectively referred to as the "bhoktpāṇḍa" (or "bhojyitikāṇḍa"), i.e., the group concerned with the enjoyer of empirical consciousness; secondarily, this group is referred to as the "vidyātattva". Inclusive within this group are the māyā-tattva, kālā-tattva, niyati-tattva, kāla-tattva, vidyā-tattva, rāga-tattva and puruṣātattva. The final group of tattvas is known as the "bhogyakāṇḍa" which implies that this collection of tattvas constitutes the "object" for the soul qua enjoyer of empirical consciousness. This group includes the tattvas from prakṛti to the earth and is referred to in a collective fashion as the "ātma tattva".

In line with the position of the Raurava Āgama Sadyojyoti does not
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consider kāla and niyati, Time and Restriction, to be tattvas. 4 Hence, Sadyojyoti speaks of the threefold "vesture" of kāla, vidyā and rāga, which constitute the soul's "cloak" during the period of empirical consciousness; elsewhere it is referred to as being fivefold. 5 Sadyojyoti also does not consider "puruṣa" to be a tattva in the strict sense. By not accepting kāla, niyati and puruṣa as tattvas, Sadyojyoti accepts only thirty-three tattvas instead of the more common thirty-six. Aghora Śiva accepts the doctrine of thirty-six tattvas throughout his commentaries on the Tattva Prakāśa and the Mṛgendra Āgama Vṛtti; in his commentaries on the Bhoga Kārikā and Tattva Samgraha he argues for the inclusion of kāla, niyati and puruṣa as tattvas, even though Sadyojyoti, according to Aghora Śiva, only "assumes" them.

In this final chapter we shall first discuss the concept of prakṛti and the three guṇas and then turn our attention to the threefold "vesture" of kāla, vidyā and rāga as well as the absence of kāla, niyati and puruṣa as tattvas. To conclude, the allied concepts of māyā, the foundational ontological concept grounding empirical consciousness, and māla, the foundational soteriological concept, are treated.

2. The Concepts of Prakṛti and the Three Guṇas

The prakṛti-tattva and the guṇa-tattva -- the former the cause of the latter -- immediately lie above the buddhi-tattva. The guṇa-tattva is constituted by the three guṇas: sattva, rajas and tamas. Although imperceptible, the three guṇas are inferrable through their immediate effects, the buddhi and so forth. 6 The guṇas are described as the "material causes" of the tattvas beginning with buddhi. Aghora Śiva quotes the
Sāmkhya Kārikā to explain the manner in which the three gunas combine together to form the results such as buddhi, etc., i.e., "through mutual subjugation, interdependence and co-operation." For example, in the attainment of "siddhi," the guna "sattva" dominates over tamas and rajas. Each entity, which is a result of the gunas, is a particular "blending of the gunas" (gunaśamprkta). The analogy provided by Sadyojyoti in the Tattva Samgraha to explain the manner in which the triadic guna-tattva forms different products is based on the relational manner in which the "earth" qua substratum exists in many different products, such as pots, skulls and so forth. The gunas, however, are not considered to be the immediate causes (sakṣātkarana) of all the tattvas below buddhi but take on a mediate role by becoming "transformed" (vikṛti) into the lower tattvas.

The Śaivite disagrees with the Sāmkhya over the ontological status of the gunas. For the Śaivite, the gunas, although "causes of the lower tattvas," are themselves "products" of prakṛti, and in themselves do not constitute self-subsistente realities. According to the Śaṅkhya, the gunas and prakṛti constitute one tattva. The gunas are simply the condition of equipose (sāmānya-avastā) of the prakṛti-tattva, considered to be the foundational cause of the empirical world constitutive of buddhi and so forth. Sāmkhya argues that there is no evidence that prakṛti is in fact an "effect" of some higher tattva. For example, verse 3 of the Śāmkhya Kārikā simply states that the "prakṛti" qua "mūlaprakṛti" is "avikṛti," i.e., not a result of some causative transformation of a higher tattva.

Commenting on this conception of prakṛti, Gauḍapāda states that
prakṛti is not produced by anything and therefore cannot be considered to be an "effect" of anything. Also commenting on this conception of prakṛti Vācaspāti Miśra offers a more interpretive explanation; he says that if we were to ask for a cause of prakṛti, which is itself the "root cause" (mūlaprakṛti) of the whole collection of effects, we would be seeking a "root" of this "root" and such a mode of inquiry leads, in the final analysis, to an infinite regress. 10

Contrary to the Sāṃkhya conception of prakṛti and the gunas, the Śaivite argues the prakṛti is in fact the cause of the gunas, as the gunas are both material (jagatva) and manifold (anekatva); 11 since whatever is material and manifold must have a cause, the gunas cannot in themselves be considered to be fundamental uncaused causes; in spite of the claim by the Sāṃkhya that the gunas can only be considered "manifold" in a transformed sense (since they remain of one nature in their pre-causative and pre-engaged condition of equipoise qua "prakṛti").

The Śaivite also disagrees with the Sāṃkhya over the temporal nature of the gunas. According to Sāṃkhya the gunas are eternally in a state of equipoise in the prakṛti state while in a transformed state in their manifested condition. According to Sadyojyotī (BK, 898-90A), on the other hand, the gunas are said to be in an undivided state when in prakṛti prior to their engagement in the manifested sphere. Moreover, although prakṛti is described as the material cause of the gunas, prakṛti does not constitute an eternally independent causal factor (svātantrvam), as it does with Sāṃkhya, but must be "set in motion" or "agitated" into activity by Śiva, specifically operating through the instrumentality of Śrīkanṭha. 12
Commenting on the criticism of the Śāmkhya conception of the gunas and prakṛti in the Mrgendra Āgama, Nārāyaṇa Kantha summarizes the Śaivite position:\(^13\)

The followers of Kapila imagine that prakṛti, which is of the nature of the equilibrium (śāmya) of the three gunas (sattvā, rajas and tamas), is a "higher cause" (paramakāraṇata). This prakṛti, first of all, is not something which is different from the gunas. Just the gunas themselves are prakṛti. But, if prakṛti is identified with the gunas, it is necessarily multiple (aneka); such a non-conscious and multiple thing depends on another cause (tatkāraṇatāntarapūrvaka) [other than itself], as when there is the existence of threads, mud or clay. If it depends on another cause, it cannot be a supreme cause.

The higher cause of prakṛti that Nārāyaṇa Kantha has in mind is the mala-māyā complex working through the instrumentality of kalā. In terms of serving as the ultimate and obfuscational cause of the world, the mala-māyā complex performs a similar function that prakṛti serves in the Śāmkhya.

3. The Exclusion of "Puruṣa" as a Tattva

The "puruṣatattva" is described differently in different works and with varying degrees of detail. In the Tattva Prakāśa, for instance, the puruṣa-tattva is technically described as "the soul circumscribed by the five sheaves":\(^14\)

When prompted by these tattvas [the pāncakaṅčukāṅ, kalā etc.] the soul is brought to the condition of Enjoyership; it receives the designation of "puruṣa" and a place among the tattvas.

In his commentary to this verse Aghora Śiva explains that there is no real "puruṣatatta" apart from the soul, as all the vidyā tattvas -- of which the puruṣa tattva is one -- are of an unconscious nature (jādatva). Puruṣa, i.e., the soul, is, on the other hand, of a conscious nature, like Śiva. Placing the bound soul in the tattvic order would also be subjec-
ing the soul to the causal process of the tattvas; the bound soul would thus become a "product" of the tattva above it. Since the soul pervades over all the vidya tattvas it is illogical to place it "as a tattva" after raga and before prakrti. Aghora Siva maintains that Bhoja Deva points this out when he states that the bound soul, which is a result of the five sheaves, becomes an Enjoier and therefore is designated as the purusa-tattva, as it is only after the investiture of the five sheaves ending with the raga-tattva that it becomes an enjoier. The purusa-tattva is not, however, a "tattva" proper nor does it support a "world" (bhuvana), as it is claimed in Saivite works dealing with certain initiatory and purificatory practices (i.e., diksa). In the Srmat Mtaanga Agama, Mrigendra Agama and other Agamas, for instance, only the raga-tattva is the locus for the worlds that apply to the soul yoked to the five sheaves. Aghora Siva states that "purusa" is counted as a tattva in the works that deal with diksa because it serves a role in the ritualistic purification of the soul vis-a-vis a sequential purification of the tattvas beginning with the most gross, i.e., the elements. In the works on diksa, purusa is designated as the tattva that follows "prakrti" because after the purification of the prakrti-tattva there must take place the purification of the "impurity" (mala) that is a quality of the bound soul (purusatva-mala); the "purusa-tattva" is simply the designation of the bound soul whose mala needs purifying. In his commentary on the Bhoga Karika Aghora Siva reiterates the same argument, adding that the "purusa" qua soul cannot be considered to be a means-of-bhoga and be of the form of a world, since the soul-qua-bhoktr is both
conscious and unlimited (i.e. not limited by the pañcakañcuka).

In Aghora Siva's description of the "puruṣa-tattva" one finds a distinction between the soul considered as a "fundamental category" (padārtha), i.e. as "paśu" and as a tattva. The puruṣa-tattva only applies to sakala souls and not to the vijnāna-kala or pralaya-kala souls. In his commentary on the Mrgendra Āgama Vṛtti Aghora Siva adds that it is not only the association (upābhrmhitatva) with the five sheaves that is the cause of the puruṣa-tattva but also the delusive attachment to the objects belonging to the sphere of prakṛti (prakṛtigocara-prāpyābhilāṣamoha). The soul thus becomes "deluded" and identifies itself with the transitory prakṛti: in this context Aghora Siva quotes Yoga Sūtra 2.5: "avidyā is entering the conviction (khyātipratipatti) that the perishing is permanent, the impure pure, the unpleasant pleasant and the non-self the self." The Pauśkara Āgama is even more adamant that the five sheaves are in need of "avidyā" in order for there to be the connection to prakṛti; this Āgama maintains that the five sheaves themselves cannot be the cause of the enjoyment of prakṛti since avidyā, which is a "prakṛta" phenomenon of the buddhi, is a prerequisite to the attachment. Avidyā, on the other hand, requires the five sheaves, since there can be no agency (kārtrtva) in the absence of kāla -- thus, it would become impossible for the soul to become an enjoyer of prakṛti.

4. "Rāga" as a Trans-Buddhi Source of Engagement in Empirical Consciousness

Commonly in Āgamic Śaivism one finds the puruṣa-tattva, kāla-tattva and niyati-tattva lying between the prakṛti-tattva and the rāga-tattva. However, in neither the Tattva Samgraha nor the Bhoga Kārikā does Sadyojyoti include puruṣa, kāla and niyati as tattvas. Kāla and
niyati find their place more as extensions of the notion of karma or as effects of karma, as Aghora Śiva explains:22

The Ācārya [Sadyojyoti] has not taken up the tattvas designated as kāla and niyati, which are discussed in the Āgamas, because it is self-evident from the context [of what has been discussed so far], as nothing would transpire (anutpatti) without both the temporal sequentiaility (kālaccheda) and individualized experience (bhoktrniyama) of that Enjoyment (bhoga) which is a result of karma.

One finds no attempt either by Sadyojyoti or Aghora Śiva to bring the trans-buddhi categories more in line with a Sāṃkhyā understanding of empirical consciousness; there is no attempt to liken māyā to a higher order prakṛti nor rāga, vidyā and kāla to guṇic qualities similar to tāmas, sattva and rajas, even though these tattvas share the qualities of the guṇas. Nor do we find Sadyojyoti, as Bhoja Deva for instance, attributing the powers jñāna, kriyā and icchā to the soul, with jñāna corresponding to vidyā, kriyā to kāla and icchā to rāga.23

For the soul there can be no experience (anubhava) of the objects of enjoyment without the concomitant "attachment" (sakti) or ontological relation to the object of enjoyment. Such an attachment requires a cause, which is taken to be rāga, "the desire for bhoga" (bhoga-anurañjaka). (BK, v.908-91A) In explaining rāga as a tattva Sadyojyoti begins with the phenomenal "effect", the experience of the object with its concomitant attachment to this object:24 the cause is postulated as the more general "bhoga-anurañjaka", the obfuscation by empirical consciousness. In the triadic relationship of the bhoktr-bhoga-bhogyya, rāga stands more on the side of the bhoktr. Directed more towards the subject, rāga is what causes the desire for bhoga. Once there is this desire the connection to the bhogyya follows as a direct and necessary result.
Rāga cannot be considered to be a "bhāva" or "pratyaya" of the buddhi; rāga is trans-buddhi not intra-buddhi. The classical Śaivite argument defending the postulation of a trans-buddhi cause of the "attachment" to the activity of buddhi is simply that, if there is no such cause, the attachment would arise even in the state of release. In this case the Śaivite argument rests on the formula that "causeless = beginningless = endless = without cessation". Sadyojyoti voices an objection raised by Sāmkhya: the positing of this rāga as the source of the attachment is superfluous! Sāmkhya attributes this craving for bhoga to the sphere of prakṛti itself, more specifically, as one of the eight bhāvas of the buddhi, i.e. "bondage" (avairāgya). In the triadic configuration of the bhokṛṭ-bhoga-bhogya this locates the desire for bhoga on the side of the bhogya and not on the side of the bhokṛṭ, as Sadyojyoti holds.

Two objections are brought against the Sāmkhya position. Firstly, it is pointed out that the prakṛti-based "bhogya" is itself simply a means whereby bhoga is accomplished (bhogasādhanā); hence, as a means it too requires some causative factor to explain the soul's desire for it. Secondly, the same argument employed defending the necessity of the postulation of the trans-buddhi rāga-tattva is sufficient for denying an intra-buddhi cause of the attachment to buddhi: without rāga being external to the bhogya there could be no freedom from rāga, since the bhogya itself would be the determining factor of the attachment and not the soul. In other words, the object and not the subject would determine the relationship between the object and the subject. Thirdly, and finally, a more direct attack is brought against construing rāga as a buddhi-bhāva.
instead of a "purusa-upakara" (an accessory in the experience of empirical consciousness): if rāga is said to have a "vāsanā" or bhāva as its cause, there will follow an infinite series of contradictory activities, since the vāsanās are considered to be endless in their dormant condition in the buddhi. In the face of this criticism, if Sāmkhya attempts to identify the role of the Śaivite's rāga-tattva with a pratyaya of the buddhi the same criticism as construing it as a bhāva will follow.  

Aghora Śiva concludes the defence of the postulation of a separate rāga-tattva to explain the attachment to empirical consciousness with an argument against construing rāga as somehow ancillary to the activity of karma, a position that makes the rāga-tattva a superfluous postulation. Aghora Śiva argues that karma is solely concerned with bringing about specific results of specific causes. Karma is not responsible for bringing about the general desire for bhoga. Although neither in the Tattva Samgraha nor in the Bhoga Kārikā does Sadyojyoti emphasize this more "general" aspect of rāga, the Tattva Prakāsa, for instance, does: "rāga is of the nature of attachment, is the general cause of the activity in the soul and is without distinction between particular objects..."  

It is this general nature of rāga as a cause of the soul's activity and this general non-distinction between objects that rules out the possibility of rāga taking on the function of karma. Aghora Śiva adds a final argument defending the separation of the rāga-tattva for inclusion within the notion of karma: if karma is accepted as the reason for the attachment to each object, then in every case of this attachment karma would be considered
a tattva. In order to avoid this problem, it is better to assume one tattva, i.e. rāga, to account for the multifarious activities.

5. The "Vidyā-tattva" as the Facilitating Instrument for Empirical Consciousness

As a tattva, "vidyā" serves two interrelated functions. The ṣākṣākṣātātta functions both as the "instigating agent" of the soul's power of consciousness (citsṛaktipravartaka), and as the "instrument" whereby the cognitive events of the buddhi are discerned by the soul (buddhibodhayaviveca). These two functions are interrelated because they entail each other: the specific manner in which the ṣākṣākṣātātta prompts the "cit-ṣakti" of the soul is through the discerning of the "buddhi-ṭodha". It is impossible for the "buddhi-ṭodha" to be discerned without the soul's "cit-ṣakti" being "engaged-in" the discerning process.

Although neither in the Tattva Samgraha nor in the Bhoga Karikā does Sadyojyoti draw clear links to the "jnāna-kriyā-ṣakti" of the soul and the functions of the collection of ṣākṣākṣātāttvas, he does establish the ṣākṣākṣātātta itself on an argument based on the conception of the soul as intrinsically of the nature of "kriyā-ṣakti" -- he thus, by implication, establishes a unity between the soul's jnāna and kriyā powers. In defining the nature and at the same time defending the postulation of the ṣākṣākṣātātta Sadyojyoti puts forth the principle that every activity which involves an agent requires an instrument in order to carry out the activity. The activity of the agent is said to "depend on" an instrument. Sadyojyoti assumes that the soul's cognitive powers are intrinsically related to its agentic powers when the argument is
put forth that in the discrimination of the presented "buddhi-bodha" the "instrument" of this discrimination is "vidyā". If the soul were solely construed along Sāmkhya lines as constituted by jñāna there would be no need to assume an instrument between the soul and the buddhi-bodha; according to such an account the relation so established between the soul and the buddhi-bodha would simply be accounted for by the discrimination itself. However, since the Saivite considers the buddhi-bodha itself as an act or activity, the postulation of an agent is assumed; as a result, the necessity of construing the need for an "instrument" between the soul and the buddhi-bodha is self-evident.

As an "instrument" in the production of empirical consciousness of which the soul is the discerning-subject, "vidyā" must be distinguished from the other major "instruments" involved in the production of empirical consciousness, i.e., the internal organs (buddhi, ahamkāra and manas) and the five sense organs. The terminology adopted by the various authors to describe the specific cognitive activity of vidyā implies a certain degree of objectivity on the part of this "instrument" or "organ" that the others do not possess: the term "viveka" literally means "to separate" or "split up"; as a term designating a cognitive act, "viveka" connotes a more objective discriminatory and judgemental activity whereas "jñāna" and "bodha", for instance, connote a cognitive act in general. A "vivekin" is a "judge" or someone who examines the "facts" as so presented in an objective manner.

At the level of the vidyā-tattva this "viveka-jñāna" is not considered a means whereby the soul attains the realization that it is in
fact separate from the prakrti-based empirical consciousness, as is the case with the Sāmkhya system. The Śaivite conception of vidyā as "viveka-jñāna" is not equivalent to the Sāmkhya ideal of "vyakta-avyakta-jñā-vijnāna." According to the Śaivite, at the level of this "viveka-jñāna," both the vidyā-tattva and the rāga-tattva are combined and thus limit the soul so it cannot actually discriminate itself from "buddhi-bodha." In so rousing the "citsākṣi" of the soul the vidyā-tattva "taints" this citsākṣi with the fact of empirical consciousness (bhogyparakatakcyakti), a process which leads to the "vidyā-tattva" being referred to as the "impure vidyā" (āśuddhavidyā). The Mrgendra Agama provides the justification for this designation:32

Affected by this [rāga (as well as vidyā)], the soul desires the objects of enjoyment and, although they are impure, grasps them. However, in the enjoyment of these objects of enjoyment, the soul does not acquire the freedom from this passion for them.

It is imperative to point out that although "viveka" is actually a function of the vidyā-tattva, Sadrojiyoti does not use the terminology of "vidyā-viveka" in a similar manner as he does when describing "bodha" as the function of buddhi as "buddhi-bodha." Rather, the terminology employed is "buddhibodha-viveka," as if "viveka" is in some sense intrinsic to the buddhi itself. Vidyā should not be thought of as a sort of "higher" buddhi, as one sort of buddhi over-looking another; instead of a " viṣaya-ākāra," as buddhi is in a presentative manner, vidyā is a "buddhi-viṣaya-ākāra" of which the soul is conscious. Such an analogy would of course needlessly entail the postulation of another instrument through which the soul could grasp the original "buddhi-bodha."
Sāmkhyā is willing to accept the principle that this argument is based on but will, however, take it one step further and argue that there is no need to take the discriminative process any further than the buddhi, i.e., that the vidyā-tattva is already superfluous. Sāmkhyā will argue that buddhi is itself self-illuminating in the way a light is self-illuminating. The Śaivite will reply that a light is taken to be an instrument when we observe posts and so forth; however, in order to view the light itself a further "instrument" is needed, i.e. "the eye", a receptor to light. In the same manner, Sadyojyoti grants that the buddhi has "manifesting powers" as is the case with a light but in order for the soul to grasp the buddhi, the buddhi itself cannot be considered to be the instrument. Hence, the postulation of vidyā. With this argument based on the analogy of the eye, vidyā is given a purely instrumental function whereas buddhi has the added character of being an agent in its own right, an agent in the sense of reflectively "lighting objects up", making them manifest (sāksāt-bhogyatva) as well as serving the purely instrumental function of being the means whereby "objects" are brought forth in the process of bhoga (bhogasādghana). Thus, although buddhi is capable of illuminating through a process of reflection (visayākāra), it is incapable of manifesting itself. As well, the buddhi is constituted out of the three guṇas, i.e. prakṛti, which is a "bhogya" phenomenon. In terms of the difference between vidyā and buddhi as instruments to the soul, Aghora Śiva describes "vidyā" as the "highest" or "most proximate" instrument of the soul's consciousness. 33 Technically, buddhi is described as an "external" member in the process of empirical
consciousness (bahiraṅgatva) while vidyā is described as an "internal" member. Moreover, vidyā acquires a certain "importance" in the event of empirical consciousness:

According to the maxim, "one travels by means of a horse, roadway and lantern," where one "means", i.e. the lantern at night is the most important, a manifold number of instruments go into bringing about the effect; likewise, vidyā is considered to be the most important instrument.

6. The "Kalā-tattva" as the Causative Factor Mediating Empirical Consciousness

Sadyojyoti begins his discussion of kalā by pointing out the more causative nature of kalā as opposed, for instance, to the more purely instrumental nature of vidyā. He begins by maintaining that when "bhoga" takes effect there has to be an instigating-agent (prayōktra) involved in the collection of agentive-factors (kāraka) involved in the activating of the buddhi. By defending the necessity of an instigating-agent between the soul and buddhi, Sadyojyoti establishes proof for the existence of the kalā-tattva.

The term for "agentive-factor," i.e. "kāraka" quite literally means "that which carries out the activity." Sadyojyoti describes the soul as "self-willed" and as an "agent"; kalā is described as the "instigating-agent" of the self-willed agency of the soul. Kalā is not itself self-willed (svātantrya) and is not therefore considered to be an agent in its own right; rather, in the causal process which brings bhoga about, kalā functions as a subsidiary agent Aghora Siva attempts to clarify the difference between a cause (karta) and a subsidiary cause (kāraka) as well as the difference between the soul qua "self-willed"
and the \textit{vidyā-tattva} qua "instigating-agent"; he bases his clarification on \textit{Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha}'s discussion of \textit{Mrgendra Āgama} 10.7.\textsuperscript{37}

O brahmān, these two [the soul qua \textit{kartṛ} and \textit{kala} qua \textit{prayojika}] in the effeacting of the activity of \textit{bhoga} belonging to the bound souls, stand together as if indistinguishably united and are designated [collectively] as the "agent-concomitant."

\textit{Kartṛkarmaka}.

\textit{Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha} explains that the soul cannot be actively engaged in the \textit{bhoga}-experience until it is so affected by \textit{kala}; as a result, the soul is described as the agent and enjoyer while \textit{kala} is described as the concomitant or auxiliary cause which serves to "corroborate" (\textit{upodbalana}) the agentive power of the soul.\textsuperscript{38} The two "appear" as one causative factor; \textit{Nārāyaṇa Kanṭha} quotes \textit{Bṛhaspati} who describes the epistemological result of this unity in the manner in which the soul and \textit{kala} function: "in the [bound] soul, it \textit{i.e.} \textit{kala} appears as a second consciousness, because consciousness is so united with it."\textsuperscript{39} Aghora Śiva raises an objection by an opponent: how can there be a corroborational relation between the "\textit{kartṛ}" and the "\textit{kāraka}" when agency is a property of consciousness (\textit{i.e.}, of the conscious soul, \textit{centanadharma-tvam}) and \textit{kala} is of a non-conscious nature? Aghora Śiva replies that \textit{kala} can indeed have such a relation with the soul since \textit{kala} is superintended over and has its locus in the obscurational power (\textit{rodhana-sakti}) which is considered to be of a conscious nature and of the nature of \textit{mala}.\textsuperscript{40}

Since the agentive soul, maintains Sadyojyoti, is of a pervasive nature (\textit{vyapaka}), something must be held responsible for "limiting its pervasiveness; \textit{mala} is designated as the limiting factor. \textit{Kala}, which is likened to a light, "renders apart" (\textit{vidarana}) some of this \textit{mala} and
thus allows the agentive-power of the soul to be revealed. In the
Saiva Paribhasa we find this role of kalā described by the analogy of
moss in water: kalā is like that which separates the moss which covers
all of the water.\textsuperscript{41} In the analogy the moss is likened to malā and the
water to the soul. The "separation" is only partial, both temporally
and spatially. Sivagar yogin gives a detailed analysis of this analogy
through a precise explanation of the actual function of the removal of the
obscurational mala.\textsuperscript{42} He says that kalā is a manifesting tattva
(abhivyajjakam tattvam) of both the active and conscious powers of the
soul. However, this manifestation takes on the form of that which termin-
ates or suspends (nivrtti) the obscuring factor (acchādaka). But this is
not the destruction of the very nature of the obscuring factor (sāpi
nācchādakasya svarūpavinaśān); rather, it is the removal (vināśa) of the
power (sakti) to obscure -- it is the suspension of that which possesses
this ability. On the analogy of the rock thrown into a moss covered pond,
the rock is said to remove the moss; it does this not by destroying the
moss but by removing its power or ability (sakti) to cover the water.
In more technical terminology the "sakti" of the mala is removed but not
its, "existence" (sadbhāva).

If the soul were not affected by kalā the soul would always be
considered omnipotent and omniscient; never having been in contact with
kalā means never having been in contact with mala. But it is impossible
for any souls not to have been in contact with mala, for in order to be
rid of mala (i.e. for the liberated souls) it is necessary to "work
through" the connection to the beginningless condition of mala-
obliteration which occurs in the empirical and samsāric sphere through
The soul is thus dependent "on the grace" of kalā for soteriological development; kalā is therefore described as "the gracious tattva" (anugrahikaṃ tattvam). With the emergence of kalā some of the original mala is removed and the soul is on its way to the full de-obscurcation by the mala, i.e. on its way to mokṣa.

Sadyojyoti further discusses kalā in terms of being the representative tattva most inclusive of cirtumscribing the tattvic range of the subtle body. The group of tattvas (tattvasamhati) that begins with earth and ends with kalā constitutes the subtle body. It is this "group of tattvas" that is said to migrate from one body to the next in the round of rebirths. In the soteriological development of each soul which takes place on the level of this collection of tattvas all of the individual tattvas are said to be "gracious," in the sense of providing the opportunity for mokṣa, kalā is said to be the most gracious of all.

Sadyojyoti concludes his discussion of the kalā-tattva with a more detailed discussion of the relation between the subtle body (qua the collection of tattvas beginning with kalā) and the soul; through this discussion Sadyojyoti argues persuasively that the establishment of the multiplicity of subtle bodies is sufficient for establishing the multiplicity of souls, which is a direct attack on the position of Advaita. He as well includes a description of the spheres of existence or "bhuvana" which are associated with this collection of tattvas. Unlike the individual collections of tattvas, which are relative to specific souls, the worlds or spheres of existence related to this collection are of a more general nature and are shared by all the souls associated with them.
7. The Soteriological Implications of "Māyā", the Fundamental Ontological Principle Governing the Empirical Sphere of Consciousness and Being

Sadyojyoti discusses the nature of the māyā-tattva from verse 117B to verse 123B; he restricts his discussion of māyā to its role as the fundamental material cause (paramopādāna) of the empirical world which is constituted by the tattvas beginning with kāla. He begins with an argument defending the postulation of māyā as the cause of the world with reference to kāla; in order for kāla to carry out its role of providing "bhoga" for the souls, kāla must have a cause. This cause is designated as māyā. Having established the necessity of this "cause" Sadyojyoti proceeds to describe its specific characteristics: māyā is said to be of an unconscious nature, eternal, omni-pervasive and possessed of many "saktis".

Sadyojyoti does not defend the postulation of the unconscious nature of māyā although Aghora Śiva provides an argument based on the Saivite principle that an "effect" which is "manifold" is "unconscious". In itself māyā is described as one phenomenon, the material cause of the empirical world; however, in its transformation or modification into the world of empirical experience, māyā takes on many forms through a transformation of its "sakti" or "innate potentiality". In this manifested state of multifarious effects māyā itself is considered multifarious, and therefore unconscious.

Sadyojyoti does defend the postulation of māyā as that which possesses manifold "saktis"; he maintains that māyā possesses a manifold of "saktis" both quantitatively and qualitatively. The proof of this
postulation is based on the observation that the effects of māyā are both quantitatively and qualitatively of a manifold nature. This argument is based on the accepted Śaivite principle that the cause must be of the same nature as the effect. As Aghora Śiva points out this principle is basic to the satkāryavāda: the "effect" does not come into being with its own and "new" sakti separate from the one which is its cause.

Aghora Śiva explains that the effects of māyā are simply "forms" (rūpa) māyā takes on through a modification of its sakti; the "sakti", maintains Aghora Śiva, remains a property of māyā in spite of the fact that it exists in a transformed condition qua effect.49 Concerning this conception of the relation between the cause and the effect, the Mrṇendra Āgama voices an objection: since a cloth is produced out of a collection of threads, the principle can be upheld that a single thing, i.e., the effect, can arise from many causes. The reply to this criticism is typical of arguments defending the satkāryavāda: "But then, the plurality (viz., the threads in the instance given) is produced only from a single cause (i.e., cotton, out of which the threads were manufactured)."50

Defending the eternality of māyā poses more serious problems for Śadyojyoti, especially given the satkāryavāda principle that the effect is a transformation of the cause. In this case, the effect is the totality of non-conscious and manifold things. Anything considered "unconscious" is considered to be "material" and in principle non-eternal. Śadyojyoti defends the eternality of māyā in the face of this criticism in the same manner in which he defends the oneness of māyā: just as māyā, although of one nature, possesses many saktis, so māyā is "eternal"
even though it is "unconscious." 

\textit{Māyā} is "eternal," in the sense of possessing the continued existence which outlasts the manifold creations or "effects;" not only does \textit{māyā} outlast the continued creation and destruction of individual entities, but it continues to outlast and provide both the "form" and the "matter," for the creation, maintenance and destruction of the continual succession of world orders. The eternity of \textit{māyā} if further bolstered by the establishment of its omni-pervasiveness (\textit{vpāpaka}) since \textit{māyā} affects all souls and since souls are innumerable, \textit{māyā} must be omni-pervasive. This spatial pervasiveness is thought by Sadyojyoti to lend credence to the notion of the temporal pervasiveness of \textit{māyā}.

In summing up the conception of \textit{māyā} as a unitary phenomenon possessed of temporal and spatial omni-extensiveness, Aghora Śiva clarifies the Saivite doctrine of causality: all "change" qua "transformation" (\textit{paripāmitva}) is only "partial" (\textit{ekadesa}). With respect to \textit{māyā}, its transformation into an omnifarious and vicisciduous totality of various effects is simply a "partial" transformation of its intrinsic unity and eternity.

8. "\textit{Mala}" as the Fundamental Soteriological Concept

"\textit{Mala}," literally "filth" or "defilement," is the fundamental soteriological concept employed by the Śaivites to explain the condition of the "fallenness" of the soul; the counterpart to \textit{mala} in the Advaita doctrine is \textit{Avidya} and even more precisely the \textit{Avidya-Māyā} complex. The common argument put forth by all the Śaivite authors defending the postulation of \textit{mala} as that which obscures the agency and conscious-
ness of the soul is succinctly stated by Sadyojyoti: the soul is found
to be consciously engaged in the totality of that which is an effect of
māyā and is therefore in a defiled condition, i.e. "covered by mala." 51
And more specifically, the soul's omnipotence and omniscience are
"limited" by mala. In the Bhoga Kārikā Sadyojyoti does not provide an
argument establishing the omnipotence and omniscience of the soul al-
though it is clear that, like other Śaivite authors, he basis himself on
"śabdapramāna", i.e., the authority of scripture, on the basis of which it
is maintained that the soul attains the state of Śivahood in the state of
release, i.e., attains omniscience and omnipotence. 52 Hence, the soul must
have these two qualities prior to the removal of the mala. Ultimately it
is the Lord who is responsible for the connection between the soul and
mala for soteriological reasons; the Mrgendā Agama provides a graphic
analogy to illustrate this: 53

(The Lord is) like a surgeon, who through inflicting pain on
the patient by applying caustics and the like, cannot be said
to cause his pain, since in the end he compasses the desired
end.

Before engaging in a description of the specific characteristics
of mala Sadyojyoti makes clear the distinction between mala and karma.
The opponent immediately responds to the Śaivite conception of mala as
the defiling principle governing the soul's defiled condition by point-
ing out that karma itself can carry out this function. Karma, argues the
opponent, is sufficient for establishing the soul's engagement in the sphere
of māyā, as Sadyojyoti states (BK, 125B-126A):

The Karma which is an effect of a previous existence provides the
soul's fruits at birth -- why then imagine that the soul is
defiled [i.e. covered by "mala"] when karma is already operative?
The opponent is not offering a radical criticism of the doctrine of mala but rather stays within the sphere of the śaiva doctrine. According to Sadyojyoti, Śiva is engaged in the world though the quality of his śakti; in the case of the obfuscation of the world Śiva's śakti becomes transformed into the three bonds, mala, karma and māyā. The opponent questions the necessity of postulating karma whose only function is, as Aghora Śiva points out, "to explain the variety of [the differences] of bhoga (bhogāvaicitrānyāthanupatti). Given the very notion of mala, mala should contain this restrictedness within itself if it is indeed to serve a useful function! Responding to the opponent's first criticism that karma is sufficient for explaining the bound condition of the soul, Sadyojyoti replies that karma cannot take effect without mala being present as we never see anyone who is born free from ignorance or limited consciousness, which is caused by a principle of obscuration — i.e., mala. In this case, karma only provides the connection to a particular condition of embodiment and obfuscation; the obfuscating factor itself is something which is prior to the karmic activity.⁵⁴

Responding to the second criticism that karma is a superfluous postulation since mala can account for the embodied condition of the bound soul, Sadyojyoti replies that there are souls who are only possessed by the bond of mala, i.e. the vijñānakevala souls. Since these souls remain unconnected to the sphere of māyā and embodiment, some other cause besides mala must account for such a connection. Hence, the postulation of karma.

A more radical criticism of the postulation of mala is addressed
when the opponent argues that it is contradictory to attribute mala qua ignorance to the soul since the soul is by nature possessed of omniscience and omnipotence and an intrinsic unity; to attribute mala to the soul as a beginningless condition of its state of being is to contradict the intention of the postulation of its three original stated characteristics. Sadyojyoti responds that we in fact see souls who are bound in the sphere of māyā and its consequent limitedness; in order for there to be the removal of this limitedness, there must be some cause behind it. There must be something to account for the soul's consciousness and agency being released from the bondage to the sphere of māyā. The "veil" over the soul is thus described by mala. If souls were not to be originally covered by mala they would be equal to Śiva; in fact mala is the fundamental distinguishing mark between the souls and Śiva, the "pāśu" and the "pāti".55

After having established the necessity for the postulation of mala Sadyojyoti proceeds to describe the essential characteristics it possesses. These characteristics are also shared by māyā: eternity; oneness; unconsciousness, and temporal and spatial pervasiveness. The arguments given by Sadyojyoti defending these qualities of māyā are quite similar to those given in the discussion of mala.

Mala is said to be eternal, i.e. "beginningless", because it is a covering of that which is also eternal, i.e. the souls. Although it is, said to be of one nature and applicable to all souls alike, it affects all souls individually through the application of its innumerable capabilities or "śaktis". This śakti doctrine is intended to silence the
opponents who criticize the universality of mala. The opponent puts forth two arguments: firstly, that if mala is eternally pervasive, the souls will never be capable of ridding themselves of it, and secondly, that even if we allow the possible freedom from mala, when one soul attains the freedom from mala all souls will attain the same freedom, given the universality and unity of mala. These two criticisms are brought forth by Sāmkhya which locates the source of the connection of that which defiles the soul in the buddhi, i.e. in the notion of the "pratyaya" designated as "misapprehension" (viparyaya); the specific "misapprehension" which causes this connection is "Great Delusion" or "Mahāmoha" whose manifesting cause is accounted for by karma. The sakti doctrine does not silence these two criticisms, argues the Sāmkhya opponent, because the fact remains that mala is the universal and pervasive veil over the soul prior to the evolution of the prakṛti-based sphere of objects.

Sadyojyoti replies to the Sāmkhya by bringing the same criticisms against the Sāmkhya doctrine of locating the cause of defilement in buddhi as aided by karma. If it is claimed that the soul is undefiled prior to its association with the "Mahāmoha" of the buddhi -- i.e., prior to this 'prakṛta-mala' -- it becomes logically impossible for the defilement to occur (BK, v. 1338-134A):

[If it is claimed that] prior to the arising of the "mahāmoha" the soul is without defilement, it is then impossible for the soul to separate itself [from mahāmoha qua defilement] as [according to this view] the soul itself is not veiled by anything, as is the case with the Lord.

If the Sāmkhya insists, in spite of this criticism, on maintain-
ing that the defilement does in fact have a temporal beginning as the defilement of the buddhi, then a cause must be brought forward to explain this beginning; ultimately, in order to avoid the charge of infinite regress, some single cause must be postulated, as the Saivite conception of mala. However, if, on the other hand, Sāmkhya maintains that the soul's connection to defilement does have a beginning but is without a cause, then again there will be nothing to prevent this defilement from continuing to defile the soul even in a released state as there is nothing to cause it to cease.

Sadyojyoti concludes his discussion of mala by stating that "on account of its connection to mala, the soul is termed 'the limited one' (anu)." Aghora Śiva points out that according to the Raurava Agama the notion of mala in inclusive in the notion of the soul qua "the limited one." For, without mala the soul would not be considered to be "limited." In this sense mala tends to represent the category of "bond", pāśa; the "soul," is described as a "pāśu" and not a "pati," for instance, because of its association with the category of pāśa. Just as, in the Mokṣa Kārikā, Sadyojyoti defends the identity of Śiva and Šakti i.e. that Šakti is in some sense the instrument through which Śiva is active, in like manner, the pāśu has a relationship of close identity with the pāśa. This is especially so given the fact that mala is essentially construed as a Šakti. Prior to liberation the soul plays out a similar role with the pāśa qua mala-Šakti as Śiva with his Šakti; the soul's Šakti, however, is impure and unconscious while that of the Lord's is pure and conscious. As well, the soul has no control over the essential direction its Šakti takes -- i.e. in an obscurational direction. The only control the soul has
over this sakti comes about indirectly through dikṣā and the pursuit of the Śaiva path. 57
Chapter VI

NOTES

1 Sivāgrayogin justifies the triadic grouping in spite of the fact that some texts postulate more than three categories; cf. SPB, p. 60: "Now since the categories seem to be differently enumerated in different works as, 'Seven categories are declared in the Svāyambhuva, six in the Pauṣkara and Mātāṅga, five in the sacred Pārākhyā, and three in the Raurava," how can it be said that there are three categories alone? If this be asked, true; but since those (others) which are different from pati and pasu are included even in pāsa, and since for Vamadeva, the first sage in our succession (of teachers), the Raurava was the principal āgama, the categories are said to be three; and there is no contradiction.

2 The pure is often distinguished from the impure ontologically: "bindu" is said to be the material cause of the pure realm while "māyā" is the material cause of the impure realm. Although bindu is in a sense a "higher" type of māyā, and is often referred to as the "mahāmāyā", bindu simply represents a more subtle degree of bondage with more positive connotations than the gross māyā. The worlds and supernatural beings that inhabit the realm of the pure tattvas are all dimensions of bindu in its form as nāda, sound-essence. For a discussion of the Saivite doctrine of nāda, cf. Pandey, Bhāskara, pp. 91-98 and K. Sivaraman, "The Word as a Category of Revelation," Revelation in Indian Thought, ed. Harold Coward and Krishna Sivaraman (Emerville, California: Dharma Publishing, 1977), pp. 45-64.


4 Raurava Āgama, Srstikrama, vv. 2-4. K. Sivaraman suggested to me that one possible clue for the omission of the Sivatattvas and kāla and niyati may be found in TS, vv. 25 and 26 wherein the tattvas from kāla to prthivi are said to constitute the subtle body vis-à-vis the sthulādeha which is in immediate contact with the world as impelled by karma. Therefore, the Sivatattvas, niyati and kāla are not necessary to explain the condition of bhoga.

5 For example, MA (4-18), pp. 230-245 and Tattva Prakāśa (v.49), p. 103.

6 Sadyojyoti says that the guṇas are visible or apprehensible (drṣṭa) in such things as the effects of the buddhi. The unapprehensibility applies.
to prakṛti as well, especially insofar as the guṇas, as Sadyojyoti claims (BK, v.89B-90A), remain "undivided" in prakṛti. The tattva-prakāśa states that prakṛti is undefinable or unapprehensible because of the unmanifested state of the guṇas (anabhīvyaktagunatvādavayapadesyam tadavyaktaṃ); cf. tattvaprakāśa, ed. p.104. The tattvaprakāśa also specifically mentions that the prakṛti-tattva is for the purpose of enjoyment of the purusā, a point not found in either the IS or BK. The Sāmkhya Kārikā, v.8, attributes the non-perceptibility of prakṛti to its subtlety (sauksmyāttadunlabdhinā bahāvat kāryātās tadupalabdheḥ) cf. tattva-Kāmudī, p.18.

7Sāmkhya Kārikā, v.12.
8IS, v. 9, p.12.
9Gaudapāda on Sāmkhya Kārikā, v.7.
10SPB, p. 222; Sataratnasamgraha, p.55.
11The equation "anekatva and jagatva = kāraṇapūrvvakatva" as follows: because something is manifold and unconscious, it therefore requires a cause, as Aghora states in his commentary on IS, v.9; pp.12-13: "guptānām acaitanye satyanekatvā yato ghatādyatat kāraṇapūrvvakatvam tatas teṣāmavayaktaeva sambhuāitya.

12By Śiva's urging, Ananta creates the tattvas from kalā to pradhāna; from Ananta's urging Śrīkantha creates the tattvas from guṇa to prthivī; and finally, at Śrīkantha's urging, Brahmā creates the elemental sphere (bhautikasrṣṭi) of the animates and inanimates; cf. Sataratnasamgraha, p.54.

13MAV, p. 83: "yeyam kāpilaiḥ paramakāraṇatayaih parikālpi satvarajastamolakṣaṇaḥpravasyāmyatātī prakṛtīḥ tasyastavannā guṇeyho nyāvatam guṇa eva prakṛtīrī. heṭubhiḥ pratiḥnātā guṇeyho nanyatve gāvaksyanekatvam āśayaḥ yaccacaitanye satyanekām taitkāraṇapūrvvakām yathā tāntaṃ mṛtpindaṃ vasiṣṭaḥ kāraṇpāntara-pūrvvakāte na paramakāraṇataḥ idam ca te prastavya.

14Tattva Prakāśa, v. 49, p.103.

15In his commentary to the same verse Śrīkumāra emphasizes that the puruṣa-tattva is Śiva himself: "having attained the condition of pāśu on account of the connection to the five sheaves (kalā, niyati, kāla, vidyā, and rāga), Śiva remains in the locale of the twenty-four tattvas beginning with the vyakta by means of His separation from the Sivatattva -- and is thus designated as the purusātattva" Cf. Tattva Prakāśa, p.103 "yadāyamśvarah ehiḥ kālaniyatikalalāvidyārāgakhyaiḥ pañcaḥbhūtatattvaiḥ sambandhatā paśubhāvam prabhya bhoktirvāstham prāńhoti tada vyaktādiciturvarṇaṁśtatvamāye purī sayanat puruṣasamāhām ca labhate śivatattvāvayatiṣṭhena tattvēṣu guṇānām ceti."
16. Mād., p. 103

17. The ritual purification of the elements (bhūtaśuddhi) or "tattvanyāsa" is carried out by the Saktas and Vaiṣṇavites in a very similar manner as in the case of the Saivites. For a discussion of the Saktas' method, cf. Sri John Woodroffe, Introduction to Tantrāśāstra (Madras: Ganesh and Company, 1913), pp. 108-109; for the Vaiṣṇavites and Saivites, cf. J. Gonda, Viṣṇulīn and Śaivism, p. 47.

18. There are six "adhvās" or aspects of the totality of creation: kāla, bhūvana, varna, mantra, pada and tattva; cf. Śivanīkāli Śiddhiyar, p. 156.

A similar argument is found in the Śataratnollekha wherein it is argued that there are no superintending Rudras nor objects of experience in māyā. In an attempt to explain the scriptural texts which claim that the eight Mandalas exist in māyā, the author says: "The statement is not to be taken literally in view of the fact that māyā is only a śakti wherein no bhūvana can have any spatial existence. What really pertains to kāla, desa etc. is transferred to māyā by courtesy. Similarly, tattvaśuddhi as part of dīkṣā that is ordained in relation to māyā really pertains to mastaka." Cf., Śataratnasamgraha, trans. p. 51. The Pauṣkara Agama uses the same laksana-argument to claim that in the dīkṣā sections which mention bhūvanas existing in the prakṛti-tattva; cf. pumstattvapātala, v. 7-9, SPB, p. 221-222.

19. Also quoted by Aghora Śiva in Mād., 9.18, p. 271.


21. There is also debate over the origin of rāga and vidyā. Aghora Śiva follows the Raurava Agama and maintains that both rāga and vidyā emerge from kāla: kalatattvādṛṣṭa vidyā dve tattve sambabhūvatum RA, II, v. 1.15A, p. 6. Other sources, such as the IP derive rāga and vidyā directly from māyā; cf. vv. 40-43.

22. BKV, p. 49. Śivāgrayogin expounds on the notions of kāla and niyati qua tattvas. Kāla is that factor which determines the extent of empirical experience (bhogeṣvattaprīcchādha) and is the first transformation of māyā; Śivāgrayogin cites a number characteristics of the kalatattva, i.e., inertness (jādatva), manifestness (satyanekatva), non-eternity (anityatva) and non-pervasiveness (avibhutva). Kāla is non-eternal given that it is subject to origination and destruction during the periods of cosmic destruction; he further says that eternity, a quality of the soul, is not to be understood as "eternal time" but simply the freedom from the determination by time, niyati, described as the second transformation of māyā, is the karmically determined "link" (yojana) regulating the relation between the triadically bound soul and the condition of bhoga. Cf. SPB, pp. 202-209.

23. Ibid., p. 217.
25. In his commentary on the Tattva Prakāśa, Aghora Śiva contrasts rāga understood in Śaṅkhya terms as a buddhi-dharma with the Śaivite conception of it as a puruṣopakāra, i.e., as something which of some service or use to the soul; cf. Tattvapraṇīti, p.103; as well, cf. MA, p. 162.

26. Aghora Śiva states this more simply in the TSV, v.4, p.14: pratypadasiṣṭāna, bhogatvānihīnadhāsatvāh. In the MA (10.11; p.262), however, Aghora Śiva accepts that rāga is also of the nature of a pratyaya as contributory to the bhogasādhana specifically brought about by rāga.


28. Kalā rouses the soul’s karmākārtti while vidyā rouses its citrākārtti; cf. Tattva Prakāśa, v.45, p.99 and MA 10.8-9, p.258. The MA emphasizes that Śiva is ultimately responsible for the specific arousal of the two akārttis of the soul by the respective akārttis.

29. An objection to Sadyojyoti’s position is taken up in the TSV, v.14, p.17: "na prakṛtireva bhogyaṁ nārīnāmātmanām puruṣasya bhokṣatvenā dārsyaṁ puruṣasya tu nā kartrtvam api tu draṣṭrvam." In so rousing the "citrākārtti" of the soul, the vidyā-tattva "taints" the citrākārtti with the bhoga (bhogoparakaṁ cittyaktiḥ, TSV on v.13, p.16) which leads to Vidyā being referred to as the "impure tattva"(aśuddhāvidyā, TPT, on v. 45, p.99).


31. MA, 10.10; p.260.

32. TSV, v.12, p.15: "āśvena pathā dīpikāyā yātītyadāvivātrānekakaraṇasādhane 'pi phale vidyāv paramaṁ karaṇaṁ." A similar analogy is found in MAD, 10.9, p.259

33. In grammar the term "kāraṇa" describes the syntactical relation between a noun and a verb in a statement; it includes all the Sanskrit declensions except the genitive (and vocative), which are kartṛ, karman, karana, sampradāna, upadāna, and adhikaraṇa. For a discussion of the grammatical notion of a "kāraṇa" in light of the interaction between grammar and philosophy cf. Matilal, Logic Language and Reality, pp.372-378.
37 MA, 10-7, p.257: "ityetadubhayam vipra sambhuyananyavatsthitam/
bhogakriyavidhau jantornijagun kartkarakam."

38 MAV, p.257: "tarhi bhoktreyayaka kartrenamoktab. tasya/
kartrkaterupodbalanakartdyat karam hetub kartri kal.

39 MAV, p.257: "uktam ca brhaspatipada jantrvibhityatiislesat/
sadvitveyev cetana iti.

40 Ibid., p.258: karamprayacakma prayacakatvan casyastirodhana-

41 SPB, p.241.

42 Ibid.

43 Concerning the connection between the anadimalavratvata condition of the soul and kalā, Aghora Śiva puts forth the following argument in the TSV (on v.48, p.20): since the consciousness (which is of the nature of drk and kriya) of the soul in the samsāric state does not cognize all objects (i.e., since it is limited by something), it is concluded that īśvara manifests things (abhivyapakte) in this sphere through the instrumentality of "pāśa". Aghora adds that the instrumentality of māla does not occur directly but through dikṣā.

44 The author of the Ṣataratnollekha (p.43) gives several synonyms used in the Agamas for mahāmāya: eg., nāda, parasumāṅgala, mālinī, anāhata bindu, aghoṣa vak, brahmakundalinī tattva, vidyā etc.

45 Ṣadyojyoti limits his discussion of mahāmāya to the sphere of the "suddhāsuddhatattvas", i.e. to those beginning with kalā, although in fact mahāmāya -- qua bindu -- has reference to the suddha sphere as well. For a discussion of the distinction between, mayā as the cause of the pure tattvas as well as the impure tattvas, cf. Ṣataratnollekha, p.44.

46 In this respect mahāmāya as the parigrahasakti of Śiva; cf. Ibid, p.45.

47 In the Śvyāmabhuvā Śiva a further characteristic is added, i.e. "akala" which the Ṣataratnollekha explains as in note 18 above.

48 cf. MA, (Māyāprakāra, v.4), trans. p.194: "It must be intelligent, since its products are seen to be so -- otherwise, there would be that most radical of all faults, uncertainty of causation itself." cf. ed.p.231: "tacetanameva sātya kārṣyayācitta-darsanāt; prayātas sarvaharo doṣāh/
karanāniyamo nyathā."

49 BKV, p.56

51. Cf. Sataratnollekha, trans. p. 40: "The Kirāna and Matangāgama bring out the difference between the two, the 'māyā' and 'mala', the former that reveals (vyakti) and sheds light (prakāsā) and the latter that obscures (āvrtī) the soul and creates darkness (andhakāra)."

52. SPB, p. 161: "And if their parvisciience were natural, there would be conflict with the scriptural declaration of omniscience at release." MA, trans. p. 152: "The atma is not avyāpi (not omnipresent, limited), not momentary, not one, not insentient (or inert), not a non-doer, and is ever united to intelligence, for it is heard that after the pāśa is removed, he attains to the state of Śiva."


54. "A very similar form of argument is taken up in the SPB, pp. 165-166. The basic distinction between karma and mala is that the former functions for enjoyment while the latter for obfuscation; Sivārayogin quotes vv.132-133 of the pasupakaraṇa: 'karma is of the nature of merit and demerit; and those two exist in the intellect; since they do not pervade above that (intellect), how can they serve as bonds throught? Further, they function in respect of activity for enjoyment; how could they function in respect of obscuration?"

55. This points out the unity of the mala-māyā complex, obfuscation and manifestation, the former addressing a more epistemological concern and the latter a more ontological one.

56. Cf. a quote from the Svāyambhuva-gama in the Sataratnasamgraha, trans. p.37: "The beginningless 'mala' associated with souls is otherwise called 'paśutvam' (the essential nature of soul). It serves to help the sprouting (initial evolution) of māyā in the same way as the bran helps the sprouting of the grain."

57. The author of the Sataratnollekha explains the Svāyambhuva's statement that "dikṣā alone" is responsible for removing the soul's mala and states the distinction of the Śaiva-darsana from the two major traditions of "jñāna" and "karma": "The words 'dikṣā alone' is indicative of the fact that neither jñāna advocated by the Advaitin nor 'karma' expounded by the Mīmāṃsākās nor any other means expoused by the other schools of philosophy is of any avail." Cf. Sataratnollekha p.90.
APPENDIX I

BHOGAKĀRIKA by Sadyojyoti (Khetakanandana) and VRTTI by Aghoraśivāchārya

HAVING MADE OBEISANCE TO ŚIVA, WHO IS THE GIVER OF THE TRUE ENJOYMENT AND RELEASE, I AM GOING TO EXPLAIN THE BHOGAKĀRIKA VERY BRIEFLY AND CLEARLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE SLOW MINDED.

Before the venerable Sadyojyoti begins his verses that explicate the nature of enjoyment and release, he first makes obeisance to the supreme Śiva (paramaśiva) for the unhampered completion of this work:

(1) HAVING MADE OBEISANCE TO THE UNBORN AND UNCHANGING ŚIVA WHO KNOWS ALL THREE TIMES AND ALL THINGS AND WHO IS THE GIVER OF "DHOGA", I.E., "ENJOYMENT" (WHICH OCCURS WHEN SOULS THAT HAVE THE THREE BONDS ARE IN CONTACT WITH KALĀ) AND "RELEASE" (WHICH TAKES PLACE THROUGH THE SEPARATION FROM ENJOYMENT).2

The three bonds are of the nature of mala, karma and māyā. Those who are possessed by these three bonds are the conscious souls who are called 'Sakalas', of whom there is this 'contact with kala'. This contact involves the connection (sambandha) to the constitutive parts of māyā, which are of the form of the bodies born with their respective worlds and which are of the nature of the 'Tattvas' constitutive of the subtle body, i.e., the Tattvas beginning with kālā and ending with earth. By means of this connection "He", i.e., Śiva, gives enjoyment and, by the separation from it, release. Śiva's beginningless state of release

189
(muktatva) indicates His ability to confer grace (anugrahakatva) and His omnipotence; for the same reason, Siva "knows all three times and all things", i.e., He knows all the things which take place in their respective times and the lapses of times of all the living beings. Moreover, since Siva is without mala (nirmalatva) and since He is omnipotent, His omniscience concerning all time is established. As well, since Siva is without mala, He is "unborn", i.e., without the birth which is characterized by the connection to a body; "unchanging" (dhruva) means to be without change (avikāriṇa), i.e., not to be subject to change (parināmitva), like bindu etc., as change entails materiality. Continuing the first verse, he says:

(2) FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ADEPTS, I AM BRIEFLY DESCRIBING BOTH ENJOYMENT AND RELEASE ALONG WITH THEIR MEANS AS THEY ARE PROPOUNDED IN THE TEACHINGS OF RURU AND ACCOMPANIED BY LOGICAL PERFECTION.

"The Adept" (sādhaka) are the 'Achāryas' and so forth, who can establish both enjoyment and release. "I am briefly describing..." means just in conformity with the way both enjoyment and release along with their means are established in the Raurava Āgama. "Accompanied by logical perfection" means "established by inference" for the purpose of understanding the means (sādhana) etc. [of bhoga and mokṣa] for the Ācāryas for initiatory purposes and so forth.

Now to point out enjoyment and the means [whereby it is attained], the ones who are qualified for enjoyment are described:

(3) THE LUST FOR ENJOYMENT ARISES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE KARMIC ACCUMULATIONS OF THOSE SENTIENT BEINGS WHO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN INTO
THE CYCLE OF WORDLY EXISTENCE BY GOD BECAUSE OF THEIR DEFILEMENT ETC.³

"The lust for enjoyment" refers to the "desire for enjoyment" that arises in accordance with the karmic predispositions (karmasamskara) during worldly existence. This condition of enjoyment is solely caused by the defilement -- i.e., by the Mala -- of those souls who have been driven into facing enjoyment through the superintendence of God (i.e., Śiva) through the instrumentality of Ananta etc.

The Sāmkyas raise the objection that the soul is without Mala. But this is false because if the soul is without Mala it becomes impossible for the soul to become attached to enjoyment.⁴ Or, if it is possible for a soul without Mala to become attached to enjoyment, then this attachment also becomes possible for the released soul. The Sāmkhyas object: the attachment [to enjoyment] is a result of the connection to passion (rāga). True! But even in the case of passion, the cause of the attachment is just due to those who possess Mala!⁵ In this respect, it is said in the Śrīmatsvāyamabhūva: "If the soul were not defiled, how could its attachment to Enjoyment ever be effected?"

He now addresses the question concerning the nature and means of enjoyment:

(4) AS THE DESIROUS ATTACHMENT TO THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE BUDDHI (BUDDHI-VRITI-ANURAJITA), ENJOYMENT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY VARIOUS MEANS WHICH THEMSELVES ARE A PRODUCT OF THE PRIMAL MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD⁶ INTO WHICH THE WILL OF GOD HAS ENTERED.

"God" is understood in this verse as Ananta, the only one who can agitate maya (māyāksobhakatva). In the Śrīmatkirapa it is said that
"Śiva is declared to be the agent in the pure realm while Ananta is the Lord in the bound realm."7 Through Ananta's desire (icchā) occurs the agitation of the primal material cause of the world (jagatbīja), which is called 'māya'; 'enjoyment' arises through the 'means' (sādhana) which have been engendered on account of this agitation of māya. The 'means' are [threefold]: of the nature of the subtle bodies that are of a restricted character [i.e., restricted to particular souls]; of the nature of worlds that are common [i.e., shared by different souls]; and of the nature of bodies born with worlds, which is both a restricted and common condition.8 Enjoyment is here understood to be of the nature of the attachment (anurañjana) to the modifications of the Buddhī (buddhivṛttī); more specifically, enjoyment is that condition of the "attachment" of the soul's consciousness to the modifications of the Buddhī, which is of the 'form' (rūpa) of the ascertainment (adhyāvasāya) constituted by pleasure, suffering and delusion. Here the 'attachment', which is of a desirous nature (anurāga), relates to the condition of the modifications of the Buddhī whose cognitive structure (adhyāvasāyākara) is constituted by pleasure (sukha). This attachment is a 'cognition' (samvitti) that is just a 'direct experience' (anubhava). This experience is not of a "reflection" (pratibimba). This latter position allows the possibility of change to be attributed to the soul (ātmanah pārināmitāprasāṅgāt). Thus it is said in the Śrīmatsvāyambhuva: "Enjoyment" (bhoga) is the [bound] soul's "experience", which is characterized by pleasure; suffering etc.

Now he is going to discuss the instrumentality (sādhanatā) of enjoyment with respect to the gross elements:

In this case, just the qualities etc. of the gross elements establish the ancillary nature as enjoyment (bhogāṅvatva) of these gross elements. Here the qualities are odour etc. The activities are 'bearing' etc. "Serving as the support of the sense organs" (akṣabhūmitā) means "serving as that which bears the sense organs" (indriyādharatva); the sense organs will be explained in the sequel.

The meaning of the verse, therefore, is: the earth etc., by means of their qualities and functions and by means of bearing the sense organs, become engaged in the means whereby enjoyment arises for the souls. Of what [source] are the earth and so forth? He says: 'of the filling out' by means of the 'increasing' of their respective subtle elements. The 'filling out' (puṣṭana) arises on account of the 'increasing' (pūraṇa) that is a condition of 'becoming full' (āpūra) that occurs by means of the subtle elements, which are themselves the material causes (kāraṇabhūta) [of earth etc.]. The activity of prakṛti is [likewise said to have two functions]: 'the increasing of that which has already been accomplished and the acting as the means of that which has not yet been accomplished'.

It is said in the Śrīmadmatāṅga: "Through a gross and subtle condition (sthūlasukṣmatva), the gross elements with their causes, which are the subtle elements, act as the conditions (sthita) supporting (āchāra) the organs." As well, it is said in the Śrīmadmatāṅga: "The subtle elements are like a pot and the gross elements like its covering." It is said [in the
Tattvasamgrahaj: "This tenfold effect [i.e. the bhūtāni and tamātrāni], having entered into the condition of [supporting] the organs, causes the activity [of the organs]. On the other hand, the organs, on account of being without their own power to act, are only active after they come to depend on the support of the effect."

When the general function of the gross elements exists, their specific functions, bearing etc., exist as well. The general function of the gross elements, which have their locus in the subtle body, is twofold: firstly, it consists in the property of increasing (upacayadharmītya) that takes place by means of the body as it is understood in its essential sense as a "covering over" [diha, etymological sense of deha, body], which means an "increasing" (upacaya); this property of increasing belongs to the gross elements as they take their locus (sthāna) in the external body. The second general function of the gross elements consists in their supporting of the sense organs. He says:


Here, the function of the earth is 'supporting' (dhrti), which is a 'bearing' (dharana). The function of water is 'bringing together' (samgraha), which is a 'binding' (avastambha). The function of fire is 'maturing' (pakti), which is a 'ripening' (paka). Air has the function of 'structuring' (vyūha), which is a 'joining of parts' (avayavaghatana). Ether (ākāśa) has the function of 'providing space' (avākāśadāna), which is the 'providing of a receptable' (āspadadāna).
Now, he will describe the common function (sādhāraṇa) of these gross elements, i.e., 'the supporting of the sense organs (indriyādharātva)' that takes place through the locus of the subtle body:

(7-8Aa) BY HAVING ITS LOCUS IN THE 'TRANSERENCE BODY' (ATIVĀHIKADEHASTHA); THE 'INSTRUMENT' (KARAṆA) TAKES ON ACTIVITIES (PRAVIJRMĪṬHITA) AND AS WELL TRAVELS FROM ONE WOMB TO ANOTHER IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ENJOYMENT FOR SOULS ON ACCOUNT OF THE 'INVISIBLE FORCE' (ADRŚTA) PROVIDES THE APPROPRIATE EXPERIENCES FOR [THE INDIVIDUAL] SOULS.

The 'transference body' is the 'subtle body' (suksma-deva): 13 "by means of enjoyment, the karma of souls "is caused to pass over" (ativāhayati), i.e., 'is caused to be driven away' (nāsayati). Solely in the condition of having its locus in this subtle body is the 'instrument' -- the 'collection of organs (indriyavarga) -- active (ceṣṭa). It is said, "Due to the fact that a thing that lacks its own power (avibhutva) cannot be active (ceṣṭa) when it has no supporting-locus (niraśraya), the collection of instruments is active solely through the support (ādhāra) of the gross elements and subtle elements, 14 which have their locus (stha) in the subtle body." 15 Moreover, on account of karma [qua 'adrśta'], which yields the appropriate experiences for the individual souls, the instrument that has its locus in the subtle body travels from one womb to another in order to obtain enjoyment for those souls possessing this karma. In this respect, it is said in the Tattvasāppadgraṇa: "The group of Tattvas beginning with the earth and ending with kalā is bound to individual souls (pratipummaya); on account of karma, such souls wander through all the different worlds in bodies born
of those worlds."\(^{16}\)

The subtle body, on account of being subtle, like the spirits (piśāca) etc., is not perceivable by us; however, it is experienced through the perception of yogins:

(8ab-8b) Like the spirits,\(^{17}\) the 'body of transference', which is the locus of the senses, cannot be experienced by the senses by those who lack lordly powers (ānīśā).

Now, he describes the qualities of the gross elements:\(^{18}\)

(9) Odour is in earth;\(^{19}\) taste is sixfold in earth, but sweetness is confined to earth and water alone; colour belongs to earth, water, and fire, being bright in fire, shining in water and of different hues in earth.

(10) This is the arrangement with regard to 'touch'; in both earth and air it is neither hot nor cold,\(^{20}\) the difference being that one is born from maturing, one not so born: in water it is cool and in fire hot.

(11) As produced from substances derived from sound, sound exists in the lowest four gross elements; in space it is of the collocation of echoes. This is the correct opinion set forth by the wise.

Here, odour is in earth just in the form of the fragrant and non-fragrant. Taste is in water and earth. Of the forms of taste that are in water, namely pungence, sourness, saltiness, sweetness, astringence, and bitterness, only sweetness is in earth. Colour is in earth, water and fire etc. In earth, colour is of manifold types: white, red, yellow,
black; in water, however, it is only of a shiny colour [śukla, white, bright]. In fire it is bright (bhāsvat).

The condition of touch (śparśasthita) is in the airs. In both the earth and air it is neither cold nor hot. What then is the difference between the two touches in earth and air? He says: "the difference is that one is born from maturing (pākaja), one not so born (apā kaja)."

The touch in earth arises from maturing whereas the one in air does not arise from maturing -- just this is the difference. Because of this designation [between the two types of touch qualities], colour etc., which are qualities of earth, are just born from maturing. The natural touch of water is just cool and in fire just hot.

Sound arises in the four gross elements -- earth etc. -- by means of the mutual 'clashing together' of their respective substances, ground, etc.; 21 in space, however, sound is of the nature of an echo. Now, the Vaiśeṣikas 22 raise an objection: "Sound is established as the special quality of ether, on account of the cognition of it elsewhere than in its locus." 23 This is false because of the fallacy of 'the passage in time' (kālātyayāpadistatva) 24 as the reason (hetu) contradicts both perception and the Āgamic tradition. Thus, "sound is just heard in the locus of sound, as in the drum etc." Moreover, "sound is perceived in the earth as the sound of 'rubbing together' (kaṭakaṭadika) etc.; in water as a swishing sound etc. (chalačchalādi); in fire as a blowing sound etc. (dhamadhamādi); in air as rustling etc. (sakaśakādi); and in space it is of the nature of an echo." The argument that sound is the special quality of ether is refuted in detail by us in the Mrgendra-vrtti-diṭikā. It is further stated in the Śrīmanmrśendra: "Sound is in the five gross elements
and touch is in four. The neither cold nor hot [touch] is in the earth and air; hot and cold are in water and fire. Brightness is in fire, whiteness in water and a variety [of colours] such as whiteness etc. in earth. Colour is in the three. Taste in water is sweet and is sixfold in the earth. By the wise odour is considered to be both fragrant and non-fragrant in the earth."

Thus, summing up what has been said:

(12A-12Ba) THUS DESCRIBED, THE EARTH ETC. ARE GENERALLY ACCEPTED TO POSSESS THE COLLECTION OF ODOUR ETC.

This means: it is generally accepted that the earth etc. exist as the loci of odour. It is said: "the five subtle elements are established as the 'cause' (karanata) of the five gross elements, since the five gross elements are established as "effects", which are discerned by means of the external sense organs of beings like us. He says:

(12Bb) THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS ARE INFERRED BY MEANS OF THEM.

Thus, "the cognition' (grahana) of a quality (guna) entails the cognition of the thing that possesses the quality, since there can be no distinction (avyatirekitva) [between the quality and the thing possessing it]." He will prove that the qualities of the gross elements do not have a separate existence (aprthak bhāyah):

(13) EARTH ETC. ARE SAID TO BE INHERENTLY VARIEGATED (CITRASVABHĀVAKA) AND DISTINCT BY MEANS OF THEIR QUALITIES (GUNABHĪNA); EARTH ETC. ARE REVEALED IN A SUCCESSIVE MANNER (KRAMAVYANGYA), JUST AS THE PAINTED PICTURE ON A CLOTH THAT IS COVERED OVER.
Here, the earth and so forth are being described. This is the sense: the mutual distinctions (parasparam bhinnāḥ) are seen by means of the qualities of odour etc. and the inherent variegations are seen by means of the differences (bheda) in the ‘constitutions’ (ākāra) of the ground, stones, mountains, rivers, oceans, etc. Thus, earth etc. are just revealed in a successive manner, as a painted cloth that is covered over [is revealed in a successive manner]. It is not possible to simultaneously (yugapad) grasp both the respective distinctions (bhinnā) and differences in the constitutions which belong to the earth etc., as it is impossible to grasp everything at the same time which is both close at hand and far away. But this can only be revealed in a successive manner by means of inference and by the senses. What results from this? He says:


The earth etc., on account of being revealed in a successive manner, acquire the status of ‘objects’ of sense (viṣayata) in terms of the designation of their relations (bhaṅgayapadeśa), i.e., in terms of the cognitive distinctions based on the distinctions of the qualified thing and the qualifying thing (viśeśanaviśeṣyarūpa), as in such cognitions as: “this earth is fragrant.” In this respect:

(15-16A) NO COGNITION OF EARTH IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT A COGNITION OF ODOUR ETC., WHILE A COGNITION OF WATER ETC. TAKES PLACE
WITHOUT A COGNITION [OF ODOUR ETC.]; CONSEQUENTLY, EARTH IS
SEPARATE FROM WATER ETC. BUT IS NOT SEPARATE FROM ODOUR ETC.

There can never be a cognition of the earth -- a 'qualified thing'
(viśeṣya) in the form of a possessor of qualities (dhammata) -- without
a grasping of the qualities odour etc. -- qualifying things (viśeṣana);
however, even when odour etc. are not grasped in the other elements,
water etc., a cognition [of the earth] still arises. Therefore, for this
reason, earth is not separate (ānya) from odour etc., although separate
from water etc. Likewise, the same reasoning applies to the other gross
elements:

(16B) BY THE WISE, THE SAME REASONING SHOULD BE APPLIED TO WATER ETC.

An objection is raised: 25 when beside a china rose, a quartz gem
is apprehended as possessing redness (raktabhāva) -- without the apprehen-
sion of its quality as 'clear' (śaukla) [i.e. its natural colour].
Therefore, [the principle that] 'the apprehension of the thing possessed
by qualities is preceded by the apprehension of the qualities (gunigrahanasya
gunagrhanapūrvakatvam)' is unestablished; thus, he says:

(17) NOR IS THE INFERENTIAL MARK (HETU) WE ARE USING HERE INAPPLIC-
ABLE IN THE CASE OF THE JEWEL WHICH IS COGNIZED APART FROM ITS OWN
COLOUR AND WHICH IS THE COLOUR OF A NEIGHBORING OBJECT, BECAUSE COLOUR
IS NOT ONLY A MATTER OF HUE (VARRA) BUT INCLUDES THE GENERAL CONFIGURA-
TION (SAMSTHĀNA) AS WELL.

Herein the quality (guna) 'colour' -- which substances possess --
is held to be of the nature of a 'configuration' (samsthāna) possessing
'hue' (vartta); therefore, even when there is the apprehension of the
quartz gem which is next to the china rose there is the remembrance of the past, apprehension of the 'configuration' of circular, four-cornered, etc. along with the memory of the apprehension of its clear hue. Thus, [the principle] 'the apprehension of the thing possessed by qualities is preceded by the apprehension of the qualities' is established; hence, the inferential mark (hetu) is not unestablished.

Now, having established the ancillary nature of the gross elements in the act of enjoyment (bhogaṅgatva), he will demonstrate that the gross elements are 'effects' (kāryatva) -- although without supplying a specific rule (aniṅdesā) -- in order to further qualify the establishment of the subtle elements in the proposition that 'the subtle elements are inferred by means of the gross elements [v. 12Bb]':

(18) THE INFERENTIAL MARK (HETU) ESTABLISHING THE FACT THAT THE QUALITIES (GUNA) ARE PRODUCTS (KĀRYATĀ) IS ALSO FIT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE SPHERE OF THINGS BEGINNING WITH EARTH AND ENDING WITH KALĀ HAVE A CAUSE (KĀṆĀNA).

It is said: "on account of the condition of manifoldness (anekatva) in the case of the qualities (guna), which are of a non-conscious nature, a condition of the priority of the cause (kāranapūrvakatva) exists, as in the case of a pot etc." Thus, just by means of this inferential mark the earth etc. are established as products (kāryatva). It is said that the subtle body, which is restricted to individual souls, is of the nature of the thirty Tattvas beginning with the earth and ending with kālā, on account of the failure to establish anything else to account for the variety (vaicitrya) of enjoyment as it is manifested.
that there is an increase of the qualities (gunañdhika), i.e., that there is a sequential increase by one (ekottara) of sound etc. which are possessed by ether etc.). "On account of being without characteristics" means 'on account of not being characterized by qualities', i.e., 'on account of the nature of the group of sound etc. which is of a non-manifest character'; on this account, the subtle elements sound etc., are the successively-operating 'generating causes' -- i.e., material causes (upādānabhūta) -- of the ether etc. The subtle elements endeavor to establish the successive ordering of the creation (sṛṣṭikrama) of the gross elements, ether etc., which, as the substrata of qualities (dharmin), possess the manifested qualities. The subtle elements engage in 'the condition of going lower and lower (adhodhobhāva)' by means of the successive increase of the qualities; this means that the subtle elements cause the condition of going lower and lower even of the 'effects' (kārya).

Again, how do the subtle elements contribute as ancillaries in the act of enjoyment (bhogāṅgatva)? He says:

(20) IN THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS ETC., WHICH ARE THE GENERATING CAUSES OF ALL THINGS (SARVAYONI), THE CAUSATIVE FACTOR (KARTRA) INVOLVED IN THE ARISING OF ITS OWN EFFECT AND OF ITS INCREASING IS MOST CERTAINLY THE MEANS WHEREBY THE AIM OF THE SOUL IS ACCOMPLISHED (PUMARTHA).

The ancillaries involved in the act of enjoyment '[both] act as the means of that which has not yet been accomplished and increase that which has already been accomplished', i.e., the ancillary nature of
In the Āgamas it is said: "the priority of the cause is established on account of the condition of manifoldness that exists when there is the condition of unconsciousness occurring by means of those Tattvas -- earth etc. -- that are restricted to individual souls."

Now it is said, "the successiveness (krama) of the earth etc. is established just on account of the distinctions between their respective qualities, i.e., on account of the establishment of the subtle elements as the causes of the gross elements; he says:

(19) THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS EXCEED EACH OTHER IN A HIERARCHY (EKOTITĀṆAHIKĀ) BY POSSESSING ONE MORE OF SOUND ETC., 26 ON ACCOUNT OF BEING WITHOUT CHARACTERISTICS (AVIṢEṢAṬA), THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS ARE ESTABLISHED AS THE SUCCESSIVELY-OPERATING (KRĀMĀ) GENERATING CAUSES (YONI) OF EARTH ETC., WHICH POSSESS QUALITIES.

This is the meaning: "the material cause (upaḍāṇa) of ether is the subtle element sound, whose natural condition (svarūpa) is just the sound that has the character of being unmanifest (anabhivyaktavisēṣasabdamātrasvarūpa); going one step lower, the material cause of air is the subtle element touch, whose natural condition is just of the nature of sound and touch. The material cause of water is the subtle element taste, which is just of the nature of sound, touch and taste. The material cause of earth is the subtle element odour, which is of the nature of the five qualities beginning with sound and ending with odour."

This is the meaning of the terms: "[the subtle elements] exceed each other in a hierarchy by possessing one more of sound etc." means
enjoyment is established both on account of the condition which generates the means whereby enjoyment is accomplished -- which involves the generating causes of the effects (karyayoni) (which are māya etc.) and the subtle elements -- and by means of the condition which increases this.

Now, in order to describe the condition of being an ancillary in the act of enjoyment in the case of the sense organs as well, he first establishes the motor organs (karmendriya).

(21) THE 'GENITALS, FEET, ANUS, MOUTH AND HANDS' ARE DISTINCT FROM THE ACTIVITIES 'DELIGHT, MOVEMENT, EVACUATION, SPEAKING, AND GRASPING'.

'Evacuation' is the release of bodily excretions. The meaning of the verse is that the organs of action, genitals etc., are established by the fact (hetutva) of the activities of delight etc.

An objection is raised: "the organs are just these [physical] loci, the genitals etc." This is not the case, as he says:

(22) EVEN IN THE PRESENCE OF A GIVEN BODY PART (STHĀNA) THERE MAY BE AN ABSENCE OF A GIVEN ACTIVITY. THE ENTITY UPON WHICH THE ABSENCE OR PRESENCE OF THE ACTUAL ACTIVITY DEPENDS IS THUS THE MOTOR ORGAN, AND NOT JUST THE BODY PART ALONE.

The activity of movement etc. is not seen to occur without the respective capacity of the [motor] organ, even though there is the presence of some physical condition, such as the feet etc. Therefore, even when the given body parts exist, their activities are dependent for
their absence or presence on the existence of the capacities, i.e., the five organs, which are separate [from the body parts]. Thus, just in this manner are the motor organs established and the position of the Naiyāyikas and others rejected. The objection is raised: just on account of the activity of raising the eyebrows etc., the infinity of the motor organs is established;²⁷ thus, he says:

(23) THE MOTOR ORGANS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY MEANS OF THE ACTIVITIES, DELIGHT ETC.; THEREFORE, THE CLAIM THAT THE MOTOR ORGANS ARE INFINITE (ANANTYA) CANNOT BE ACCEPTED ON ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES.

It would be false (doṣa) for us to hold that motor organs are functions of parts of the body (śarīraikadesa-vṛttiḥ). As in the case of the sense of touch wherein it is established that this sense pervades the body, so it is in the case of the [motor organ] 'hand' whose activity is inclusive of the 'raising of the eyebrows' etc.²⁸ As well, 'the activity of evacuation belongs [in all parts of the body] to [what is designated as] the anus. On account of the distinctions entailed by the inherent characteristics (antarbhāva) of delight etc. -- even in the case of the raising of the eyebrows etc. -- the infinity of the organs cannot be established. In sum [to explain the verse], there is no inconsistency in holding that "there are only five motor organs due to fact of the primary activities, described as delight etc." and "the respective designations of the motor organs are not infinite, since the special locus (viśeṣa-dhiṣṭāna) of the motor organs is in various places."

Now, he will establish the sense organs:

(24) IN THE GRASPING OF SOUND ETC. THE ACTIVITY OF THE AGENT --
I.E. THE SOUL -- IS NOT WITHOUT AN INSTRUMENT; MOREOVER, THERE CANNOT BE JUST ONE INSTRUMENT, AS A NECESSARY REQUIREMENT (APEKŚĀ) WOULD NOT CEASE.

It is proper to hold that without an instrument the activity of grasping sound etc. would not arise, as the activity of 'chopping' would not arise without an axe. Moreover, nor do these five activities arise just on account of one instrument, as hearing etc.; for, in this case, the requirement for another instrument would not cease. For, example, when the sense of hearing, which is the instrument in the grasping of sound exists, we see that there is a necessary requirement for another instrument -- the sense of touch etc. -- when there is the grasping of touch etc. This is thus the meaning of the verse.

"Exactly what are the instruments?" In answer, he says:

(25A) THE INSTRUMENTS ARE: EAR, SKIN, EYE, TONGUE, AND NOSE;

The instruments are inferred by means of the failure (anupapatti) to bring forth anything else to explain the [the particular sense organ restrictiveness of the] grasping of sound etc.; accordingly, he says:

(25B) THE FUNCTION OF THESE INSTRUMENTS LIES IN THE PERCEIVING (ĀLOCANA) OF SOUND ETC. WHEN IN THE PROXIMITY (SANMĀDHI) OF SOUND ETC.²⁹

If we were to take the reading of "like" (samnibha) [in place of "proximity" (samnādhi)], the meaning of this half of the verse would be: the sense organs, which are superintended over (adhiṣṭhita) by Manas, together with the mind (buddhi), the ascertaining faculty (adhyavasāyin), supply the Vidyā Tattva with its objects (visayatva), i.e. the internal
'forms' (antarākāra) that resemble the external 'forms' (bāhyākārāsadrśa) of sound etc. In the sequel we will describe how the soul apprehends things through the instrument designated 'Vidyā' that is related to (antarāṅga) the 'form' of the cognitive activity of the mind, which has been presented with things from the senses. It has been said elsewhere: "the soul is conscious of objects that have been cognitively ascertained by the mind."

It is not the case that the sense organs are just the physical loci (sthāna) as the auditory passage of the ear etc. Moreover, "the sense organs are just 'conditions' (stha) that are 'capacities' (śaktī); the cognition of sound etc. does not arise when there is a defect in the capacity -- due to karmic influences -- of the physical loci;" he says:

(26) DO NOT THINK THAT THE BODY PARTS ALONE ARE THE SENSE ORGANS BECAUSE EVEN WHEN THERE IS THE PRESENCE OF THE BODY PARTS THERE CAN BE AN ABSENCE OF COGNITION DUE TO SOME DEFECT.

He now discusses the internal organ (antarākāra):

(27) COGNITION (BODHA), EFFORT (SAMRAMBHA) AND WILL (ICCHĀ) CANNOT BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VARIOUS MEANS OF ENJOYMENT THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED; RATHER, THEY ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY MEANS OF THE INTERNAL ORGANS: MIND (BUDDHI), EGO (AHAMKĀRA), AND MANAS.

The means whereby 'will' etc. are accomplished are the internal instruments, mind, ego and Manas; one is led to this conclusion for three reasons: 1) the Tattvas beginning with earth are solely established by
means of their effects; 2) there is no way to prove that there is another reason to explain the effects (kāryāntarahaṅturte prāmāṇābhāvāt); 3) it is not possible to postulate a manifold number of Tattvas [to account for the effects] (anekatattvaparikalpanābhāvaprasaṅgāt). 30

The term 'will' refers to 'volition' (samkalpa), which is of the nature of the sequential attentiveness (ekagrataparaparyo 'vadhānātmakaḥ) and which is the function of manas. "Effort" is the 'exertion' (prayatna) of the ego; 'cognition' is the 'mental activity' (adhyāvasāya) of the mind. All this will be explained in the sequel.

The means whereby the purpose of the soul (puruṣārthaḥ) is accomplished takes place through the mutual assistance (parasparopakāra) of the internal and external instruments; he says:

'(28-29) As, in the case of the palanquin and the palanquin bearers, the internal and the external instruments combine together to accomplish the activity of willing etc.; if there is an absence of either the accomplishment of 'inward activities' (antarāṃkhaṅgata) or the cognitions directed toward external objects, the activity of willing etc., which is for the purpose of consciousness, does not arise.

The internal and the external instruments, like the palanquin and the planguin bearers, together become the means whereby the activities of willing etc. are accomplished. This is so for two reasons. First, ascertainment etc. (adhyāvasāyādi) is seen to occur only when there is prior perception of external objects (bāhyārthālocaṇapūrva). Secondly, it is impossible to apprehend an external object without
attentiveness etc. (avadhānādi). Consequently, when there is the loss of either collection of the external instruments of sound etc. or of the internal instruments (i.e., of 'the accomplishment of the inward activities') neither the activities of willing etc. nor the cognitions of external objects such as sound etc. would arise as providing the means of accomplishing the purpose of the soul (the phrase 'for the purpose of consciousness' means 'for the purpose of the soul' and is employed to refer to enjoyment). Analogously, when there is the absence either of the palanquin or the palanquin bearers, the activity of 'bearing' is not observed.

Now he addresses the position of an opponent:

(30A) OTHERS ESTABLISH THE INTERNAL INSTRUMENT AS LIFE-FORCE (PRĀNA), WHICH MANIFESTS CONSCIOUSNESS (VYAKTACETANA).

'Others' refers to one school of the materialists (lokāyata) who claim that the internal instrument is just the 'air' (vāyu), which is characterized by the term 'life-force'. This life-force manifests consciousness (abhivyaktacetana) as a property which is a result of the transformation of the elements (bhūtparināmaviśesa); the life-force is the cause (hetubhuta) of sentient existence etc. (jīvanādi) through the functions of 'taking up' etc. (praṇayana). He points out the falsity of this view:

(30B) WITHOUT VOLITIONAL ACTIVITIES (PRAYANTINA) THERE IS NO LIFE-FORCE. BUT THEN WHAT IS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE VOLITIONAL ACTIVITIES?

Behavioral activity (pravṛtti) is indeed seen to be preceded by volitional activity (prayatna) on account of the intermittence (kādācitkatva)
of the air that is of the nature of the life-force. It is said:
"How can there be the drawing out of activity (preranākārā) without the volitional activity of air?" The internal instrument is consequently established in response to the question: "In the establishment of volitional activity, which is of the nature of 'active effort' (samrāmbha), how then should the instrument be conceived?" It will be said in the sequel, "the function of the ego is 'active effort'." Moreover, if it is claimed that 'the production of consciousness as well arises from this air', another instrument ought to be brought forward to account for this production;

(31) THE TASK OF EMITTING CONSCIOUSNESS (CAITANYODGARĀBHĀRA), WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO THIS LIFE-FORCE--DESCRIBE ITS INTERNAL INSTRUMENT! AS WELL, BELONGING TO THE LIFE-FORCE, CONSCIOUSNESS CAN NEVER BECOME MANIFEST, BECAUSE AIR (VĀYUTVA) IS LIKE THE EXTERNAL WIND.

"It is not correct to argue that the manifestation of consciousness can belong to something unconscious (jāda), as this would result in the claim that the manifestation of consciousness can belong to everything." Consciousness does not belong to this [air qua life-force], because air is like the air that is external [to the body]."

Thus having refuted the claim that the life-force is the internal instrument (prāṇātāhkaraṇa), he now discusses the role of Manas (manāḥsādhana) as one of the three forms of the internal instrument already mentioned.

(32) MANAS IS THE CAUSE OF THE WILL (ICCHĀHETU): IT CHANGES QUICKLY (ASŪ SAMCARIH) AND PROMPTS THE EXTERNAL INSTRUMENTS (DEVA) INTO
ACTION. BECAUSE IT FUNCTIONS SO RAPIDLY, THE COGNITIONS OF THE AGENT CANNOT TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY (YUGAPAD).

By the term 'deva' the sense organs are indicated, because they 'shine' (devana), i.e., they illuminate things (dyotana). The word 'cognitions' in the verse refers to those cognitions that are characterized by having this or that object (tattadarthavisayam jnānam). Even when there is the soul’s connection between the senses and their objects, the sense organs do not function simultaneously; in no way can this ever happen. Manas should be conceived as that which prompts the external sense organs and as the cause of attention (avadhāna), which is of the nature of volition (samkalpa), i.e., 'will' (icchā) and is the 'instrument' in activity (pravṛtti). It is said, "the controlling factor (adhikārīn) is twofold: it superintends (adhīsthāna) over the external organs and it internally superintends over the internal organ, i.e., the volitional activity of pleasure etc. (sukhādisamlapā)." It is said in the Mataṅga: "The twofold controlling factor (adhikarana) is the consciousness (citta [i.e. Manas]) that causes the enjoyment of the enjoyer: one part always exists by [the control over] the external organs under its control and the other part exists by its own activity, i.e., by volition (samkalpa). Manas provides the capacity (sāmarthya) of the sense organs with an internal locus (antarsthitā); for this reason, it is considered to be an internal organ." It is as well said in the Śrīmanmrṣendra: "Manas is possessed of the rapid activity that prompts the sense organs into action and is characterized by volition.

An objection is raised: five cognitions are seen to arise simultaneously when one is eating (āsvadana) a cake (śaskula) that is
very large (dTrghātara), pleasing to look at (abhīrūpa), and pleasant to smell (svādusurabhī)—and there is a nice murmuring sound (abhijātamarmarasabdavat).\textsuperscript{35} No, this is not the case! The five cognitions arise solely in an indistinguishable (alakṣya) and imperceptible (sūksma) sequentiality (krama), like the perforation that is made in the hundred lotus leaves [by a needle].\textsuperscript{36} Thus, it is said that Manas changes rapidly.

(33A-33Bb) THE EFFORT (SAMBRAMBHA) THAT PROMPTS INTO ACTIVITY AIR (VĀYU) WITH ITS FIVE FUNCTIONS TO SUSTAIN LIFE (JĪVANA) IS A FUNCTION (VRTTI) OF THE EGO;

"To sustain life" means 'for the purpose of sustaining the body. The 'five functions' are "bringing forward (prapayana), discharging (apanayana), etc."; by means of their respective functions (VRTTI), they acquire the designations of life force (prāṇa), respiration (apāna), etc. That which prompts into activity (pravartika) the air is of the nature of 'effort' (samrambha), i.e., 'exertion' (prayatna), which is the function of the ego. Thus is the ego established.

In the Śrīmanmṛgendra it is said: "thus, an instrument of consciousness, 'pride' (garva) [i.e. ego] has arisen from the mind, which is from something other than the manifest [i.e. the guṇas]; by its effort (samrambha) etc., the five airs of the body become active."\textsuperscript{37} The activity (vyāpāra) of the vital-force (prāṇa) is 'bringing forward' (pranayana), which directs the subtle body either below or upwards. The activity of respiration (apāna) is the lower reaching 'discharging' (apanayana) of excrement etc. The activity of generality (samāna)
is the 'distributing' (nayana) of the nutrients (rasarūpa) of food etc. throughout the body. The activity of the diffused air (vyāna) is the 'bending' (vinamana) of the limbs of the body. The activity of 'breathing upwards' (udāna) is the 'raising' (unnayana) of interior sound into articulate sound (varṇatā). Thus, the essentials of the five activities have been discussed. Since it is said that the agency of vāgara (expelling) etc. belongs to air (vāyu), the Śrīmatkālottara says: 38 "In eructation, nāga is emitted; in the activity of opening the eyes, it is kūrma which is present; in sneezing it is krkara; in yawning it is Deva-datta; in nourishment (posa), it is the acquisition of wealth, which is not abandoned even at death."

Furthermore, the activity (vṛttī) that specifically belongs to the ego concerns the conception (pratyāya) that is of the form (rūpa) of an ascertainment (adhyavasāya) of the cognizer (grāhaka), as in "I am", which appears the same (ekarūpa) throughout the cognitions of all objects; there is a complete difference between this kind of conception and the one that is a result of the mind (buddhi-kārya) in the form of a ascertainment of an object that is grasped (grāhya) and which is of a separate form (bhinnarūpa) for each object. He says:

(338b) THE OTHER IS THAT WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THE CONCEPTION OF THE OBJECT.

This means: the conception that is of the nature of the activity of the ego is different from the conception of the object. An objection is raised: "the specific activities of hearing etc. are the grasping of sound etc.; since the common activity of these sense organs is 'effort',
why postulate something else, i.e. the ego." Hence he says:

(34) EFFORT (SAMRAMBHA) CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED AS THE COMMON ACTIVITY OF THE SENSE ORGANS BECAUSE EVEN WHEN THERE IS A DEFECT IN ONE OF THE SENSE ORGANS, THE EGO CONTINUES TO FUNCTION.

This means: the effect (kārya) that specifically belongs to the ego is either the conception, 'I am' or this effort that exists even when there is a defect in one of the sense organs, since it is said: "when one of the agents responsible for a common effect is not functioning, no activity arises." It follows that "the collection of the subtle elements, organs of action, and sense organs, together with Manas, arise solely from the ego." He points this out:

(35) THE THREE DIVISIONS (SKANDHA) OF THE EGO GENERATE, IN A SEQUENTIAL MANNER, THE THREE GROUPS, CALLED TAIJASA ETC., WHICH ARE DERIVED FROM SATTRA ETC.

The abundance (bāhula) of sattva, rajas, and tamas becomes in a sequential manner, the threefold grouping of sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa, which have the names taijasa, vaikārika and bhūtādi. The ego's triadic condition of being sāttvika etc. is due to the abundance of the sattva quality (guna) etc. The mixture of the different qualities of the ego's triadic condition arises in accordance with the maxim that "there is no change without mixture."

"What arises and from whence does it arise?" In response to this he says:

(36) SINCE THE QUALITY (guna) OF THE SENSE ORGANS AND MANAS IS
OF AN ILLUMINATING NATURE, THE SENSE ORGANS THEREFORE DERIVE FROM THE EGO, WHICH IS SATTVIKA AND IS THUS SIMILAR TO THEM.

Now, after he states the Nyāya doctrine, he will then refute it:

(37) OTHERS CLAIM THAT THE SENSE ORGANS ARE DERIVED FROM THE GROSS ELEMENTS SINCE THE REASON (HETU) IS UNESTABLISHED CONCERNING THE RESTRICTION (NIYAMA) OF THE SCOPE (VIṢAYA) OF THE SENSE ORGANS.

This is just what they think: "the ear is the sole apprehender of sound, skin the sole apprehender of touch etc." Thus, on account of the restrictedness of the scope of the sense organs with their respective objects, the sense organs arise from the gross elements, which are the loci of sound etc. However, if the ego is construed as the cause of the sense organs, the sense organs would be of one nature (ekarūpa), since they would be derived from one cause. There would therefore be no restrictiveness of the scope of each sense organ. Thus, the Nyāyāyikas think that the reason (hetu) is unestablished on account of the unestablishment of the accomplishment (sādhaka) of the restrictiveness concerning the material cause (prakṛtiniyama) of the sense organs, i.e., of the restrictiveness concerning their scope.

In response: in the case where the sense organs are restricted to a certain [material] scope, the sense organs should just grasp those gross elements (along with their qualities) which are the material causes of the respective sense organs. However, the eye etc. grasps different substances and their qualities:
(38) JUST IN A NON-RESTRICTIVE MANNER DOES THE SKIN, WHICH IS RELATED TO THE WIND, GRASP THE SUBSTANCES ALONG WITH WIND AND THE FOUR 'TOUCHES' RELATING TO THE FOUR SUBSTANCES.

The sense of touch, which is held to be related to the wind (vayavyatva), grasps the earth, water and fire together with the wind (and the four touches which are related to them). He adds:


He now puts forth another criticism:

(40) IF ONE HOLDS THAT THE RESTRICTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE SENSE ORGANS IS DUE TO THEIR ORIGIN IN THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR PEOPLE TO HAVE COGNITIONS -- DERIVED FROM THE SENSES -- OF 'MOVEMENT', 'GENERAL TRAIT' AND 'INTIMATE UNION'.

When there is the acceptance of a restriction of the scope of the sense organs, which serves a material purpose (bhautikatvasādhana), the cognitions arising from the sense organs concerning the categories (padārtha) of 'movement', 'general trait' and 'inherence' -- which you accept as distinct from the elements and their qualities -- ought not arise.

But how can there be a difference in the senses qua effects when these senses are of the same nature as the ego?

The differences in the senses is thought to be 'like the arising of differences in the changes of sugar cane in molasses, candy, etc.'
"When there is a requirement for a restricting factor (niyamaka) in
the grasping of sound etc. by the sense of hearing etc., we hold that
the restricting factor is just karma, which is the bestower of human
destiny (purusārtha). He says:

(41) I DO NOT HOLD THAT THE CAUSE OF THE RESTRICTION ARISES FROM
THE EGO: RATHER, THE CAUSE IS KARMA, WHICH IS THE BESTOWER OF
HUMAN DESTINY (PURUSĀRTHA) ACCORDING TO THE WILL OF ŚIVA (BHAWERITA).

We do not hold that the cause in the restriction of the scope
is just the ego (ahamkārajata); rather, the cause is karma, which is
superintended over by Śiva (śivādhisthita) -- this is the meaning.

When it is held that a portion of space, which is characterized
by an opening in the body, makes sound manifest (śabdāvadyotaka), then it
follows that the sense of hearing should even belong to the nasal
cavities! Thus, in the case of the restriction of the grasping of sound,
which solely belongs to the space of the ear, even those who hold that
the sense organs are material maintain that the restricting factor is
just 'karma', designated as 'the invisible factor' (adrṣṭa). He says:

(42) DUE TO THE FEAR OF POSTULATING MANY LOCI OF HEARING, OTHERS
AS WELL CLAIM THAT KARMA, WHICH IS THE BESTOWER OF THAT [HUMAN
DESTINY], IS THE CAUSE OF THE RESTRICTING OF THE ENJOYMENT OF
SOUND TO AN-INHERENCE [IN THE ETHER CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE BODY].

This is the sense of the verse. On account of the fear of the
possibility of there being many sources of hearing when it is postulated
that the apprehender of sound is innate to the ether of the body, then
by you as well it is established that in the restricting of the apprehend-
ing of sound, which is solely the ether of the ear, the cause is just karma, the bestower of human destiny.

He is now going to discuss the motor organs as arising from the ego:

(43) Since an effect acts in conformity with its cause, the collection of motor organs, which act as the agents of action, arise from the vaikārika [aspect of the ego] which is rājasā.

Since an effect is seen to act in conformity with its cause, the collection of motor organs, which cause activity (kriyāhetu), arise from the division of the ego called 'vaikārika' which is rājasā and is the cause of activity (pravṛttiñetutva); it is derived from the quality (guna) of rajas. The same principle [i.e., the cause-effect conformity] applies in this case: because they are of an illuminating nature, the sense organs are said to be derived from sattva, as illumination is a property of sattva.

If one otherwise holds that the arising [of the effects of the ego] is due to the oneness (ekasmāt) of these two groups [sense and motor organs] which are by nature distinct, then one commits oneself to the fallacy of infinite regress concerning the non-restrictiveness of the cause (kāraṇāniyama); he says:

(44) If it is thought that the arising of both the sāttiviaka group and the rājasā group are solely derived from sattva, then it will be impossible to ward off the logical fault of 'infinite regress'.

(ANAVASTHĀ)

Thus:


Now, he described the cause (hetutva) of the ascertainment etc. (adhyavasāyādi) which belongs to the Buddhi:


The manifestation (prakāsa) that is of the nature (rūpa) of the ascertainment (adhyavasāya) of external objects, as in 'this is a pot', arises on account of the instrumentality of the sense organs. Aside from this, there is the activity of the mind, which should be designated by the term 'cognition' (bodha) on account of being the condition whereby there is the manifestation (vyaktisthānātva) of the cognition belonging to the soul; this cognition is described as the manifestation that is characterized by Dispositions (bhāva) and Conceptions (Pratyaya) -- which will be discussed in the sequel -- or else as the "internal" manifestation of memory, imagination, etc. Thus, "the mind is established as having the characteristic (liṅga) of conceptions, memory and etc." It is said in the
Śrīmanmrgendra: "This manifestation of the mind is characterized by Dispositions and Conceptions. It is called 'cognition' on account of being the locus (bhūmitā) of the manifestation of cognition for the bound soul." This mental cognition (buddhibodha) occurs in three ways; he says:

(47Aa) IMAGINATION (KLĀPTI), DISCERNMENT (M ATI) AND REMEMBRANCE (SMRTI):

"Imagination" refers to the imaginative envisioning (pratibhā), i.e., the activity of imagining (kalpana). 'Discernment' is the ascertaining activity (adhyāvasāya), i.e., understanding (jñāna) -- cognitive activity (manana).

Now, he concludes that the differences of the internal organ are established on account of the differences in the 'effects' (kārya), such as will, etc.

(47AB-47B) SINCE THE EFFECTS (JĀTA)--WHICH ARE CALLED WILL, EFFORT AND COGNITION -- DESIGNATE SEPARATE FUNCTIONS (ARTHA), THE INTERNAL ORGAN IS TRIPARTITE.

This is the meaning: even when there is the subordinate distinctions of memory etc., the activity of the mind (buddhiyāttitva) is 'cognition', since this is the single function (ekārthatva) of the mind; the activities of will etc. are separate causes, because they have separate functions (bhinnārthatva).

An objection is raised. Just let the means whereby Enjoyment is accomplished be attributed to the cause whereby things are apprehended, which [function] belongs to the senses, since the condition of being an object of enjoyment is due to the earth etc. becoming objects [of the
senses]. The means whereby enjoyment is accomplished cannot be attributed to the mind, which is of the form of the cognition (samvedana) that arises in the soul on account of the contact between the senses and object. Rather, according to the Naiyāyikas and others, the mind is only a quality of the soul; he says:

(48) [OBJECTION]: BUT, THE OBJECT OF COGNITION (SAMVEDYA) IS ESTABLISHED AS SOMETHING WHICH IS A QUALITY OF SOMETHING OF LIKE NATURE; AS WELL, THE MIND (BUDDHI) IS NOT AN OBJECT OF COGNITION (ASAMVEDYA) -- SUCH IS YOUR EXCELLENT LOGIC!

This is the meaning. In this case, cognition is twofold: of the nature of ascertainment (adhyavasāya) and not of the nature of ascertainment. The latter exists, and exists eternally, simply as an apprehending factor (grahaka), which is an innate quality of the soul. The former, however, exists in a condition characterized by "arising and perishing", and is not an innate condition of the soul, as it is improper for a non-eternal property (anityasvabhāva) to belong to something eternal as this would attribute non-eternity to something innately eternal. An eternal thing cannot be [empirically] experienced. Therefore, the cognition that is of the nature of ascertainment is not an innate property of the soul; rather, it is an innate property of something else -- the mind. The mind is the cause of the ascertaining of the Dispositions and is itself qualified by dharma, jnana etc. As well, the condition of being an object of experience (samvedyata) just belongs to the mind, since a) the mind is an object of enjoyment through its nature as being connected to the three qualities (sattva etc.)
in the form of the Dispositions and Conceptions, and since b) the mind (buddhi) itself] is of the nature of the ascertainment of the object. It is not, however, a quality of the soul. Thus it is said in the Tattvasamgraha: "In short, the mind, which is of the form (rupa) of pleasure etc. and the constitution (akara) of the object, is an object of enjoyment." There is also the use of the term 'mind' in this manner: "the mind is an object [of cognition] on account of its association with the qualities sattva etc., like the earth etc." As well, it is said: "Like the sense organs, the instrumentality of the mind is established on account of being the cause in the ascertainment of the object."

An objection is raised: we hold that the Dispositions, Dharma etc., are as well qualities of the soul! This is false, as it is improper to attribute the refining (samskaraka) of the soul to these! The refinement (samskara) of karmic activities such as the jyotistoma rite etc., does not arise in the soul, since there is no change seen to occur in the refinement of the soul by such activities as farming etc.; rather, in whatever locus actions create such refinements, that locus is unconscious (jada) - which is, in the case at hand, the mind. The same thing applies to the refinement (samskara) of knowledge etc; for, just due to the force of the refinements (samskara) of knowledge etc., the distinct appearance of things is seen even when the object does not exist, as in dreaming, remembering and imagining. As a result of the preceding:

\[(49)\text{THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ORGANS ARE THE IMMEDIATE MEANS}\]
WHEREBY ENJOYMENT IS ACCOMPLISHED. A MEANS FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ENJOYMENT IS NECESSARY SINCE "WITHOUT AN OBJECT-OF-ENJOYMENT THERE IS NO ENJOYMENT".45

The collection of internal and external organs is the immediate instrument of enjoyment, which is of the nature of the experience (vedana) of joy, suffering, etc. The Srimatsvayambhuva states: "Enjoyment is the [bound] soul's experience, which is characterized by joy, suffering, etc."46 However, this enjoyment would not arise without the objects-of-enjoyment, eg., incense, sandalwood, etc.; thus, there needs to be a means (sādhanā) for the bringing about of the prior apprehension of the ascertainment of pleasure, etc. He illustrates this with examples:47

(50) JUST AS A RULER EMPLOYS SOLDIERS FOR CONQUERING, SO THE SOUL EMPLOYS THE MIND ETC. FOR COGNIZING ETC.

(51) JUST AS AGENCY BELONGS TO THE RULER WHEN CONQUERING RESTS IN THE ARMY, SO AGENCY BELONGS TO THE SOUL WHEN COGNITION ETC. REST IN THE MIND ETC.

(52) THE CONQUEST OF THE ARMY IS NOT FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT FOR THE SAKE OF THE ACCOMPLISHING OF THE THINGS THAT ARE DESIRED OF THE CONQUEST [BY THE KING]; IN LIKE MANNER, THIS APPLIES TO THE MIND ETC. (BUDDHADI).

(53) AS MOST CERTAINLY, COGNITION ETC., WHICH BELONG TO THE MIND ETC., DO NOT FUNCTION FOR THEIR OWN SAKE.

Since the organs (karana) are insentient, their activities cannot be for their own sake; rather, they serve a purpose for the
conscious soul.-- this is the meaning.

(53B) THUS, THE MIND ETC. ACT AS THE MEANS WHEREBY THE ACTIVITIES
OF COGNITION ETC. ARE ACCOMPLISHED.

Now he distinguishes the object of enjoyment:

(54) THE "MANIFESTED CONDITION (ākāra)" OF DELUSION, SUFFERING,
AND PLEASURE IS DESIGNATED BY THE TERM 'FORM' (rūpa); WHAT ARISES
FROM THIS IS BIPARTITE: MENTAL COGNITION (bodha) AND THAT WHICH
IS SEPARATE [FROM THIS], THE OBJECT-OF-ENJOYMENT, māyā ETC., WHICH
IS FOR PURPOSE OF THAT [I.E. ENJOYMENT].

Due to the reason that delusion (mohā) etc. are qualities (guna)
that have become manifest, the 'constitution' of delusion etc. is
designated by the term 'form' and is the collection of Dispositions,
Merit etc. and the collection of Conceptions, Accomplishment etc. (of
which the Dispositions are causes). This form is twofold. On the one
hand, it is the mental cognition as it belongs to the soul. On the other
hand, it is the object-of-enjoyment as it is exceedingly separated [from
the soul] and is constituted by māyā etc., the stuff of the worlds
etc; it is called "the object of enjoyment" because it is the locus of
enjoyment (bhogādhikaranatva), i.e., because it is for the purpose of
enjoyment (in the sense of being connected to enjoyment).

What is this thing called 'form'? He says:

(55) THERE IS THE THREEFOLD DEMERIT ETC., ATTACHMENT AND THE
FOURFOLD MERIT ETC.; AS TAMAS, RAJAS AND SATVA, THEY ARISE IN
THE MIND AS THIS 'FORM' (rūpa) ON ACCOUNT OF KARMA;
The 'Forms' designated as Demerit, Ignorance and Powerlessness are derived from Tamas. The Form designated as Attachment is derived from Rajas. The Forms designated as Merit, Understanding, Non-attachment and Powerfulness and derived from Sattva. This eight-fold Form arises as a condition in the mind (buddhi) on account of Karma and because of the Gurus, the material cause (upādāna). It is said in the Śrīmatsvāyambhuva and elsewhere: "the Tattvas, worlds, bodies etc. arise, however, both immediately and mediately on account of the material cause, which is designated as Māyā, together with an auxiliary cause which is Karma."

Furthermore:

(56) SINCE [OTHERS CLAIM THAT] IN THE STATE OF RELEASE THERE IS THE COMPLETE SEPARATION [FROM SUCH QUALITIES AS DHARMA ETC.], AND SINCE THERE IS AN OMNIPRESENT CONDITION [OF THE SOUL IN THE STATE OF RELEASE], AND SINCE THERE IS A LIMITED CONDITION ENTAILED IN THE COGNITION OF A CLOTH, NEITHER QUALITIES [LIMITING THE SOUL] NOR THE LACK OF SUCH QUALITIES CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOUL.

Since 1) by others as well [as by us] it is established that there is the complete separation from Merit and so forth in the state of release—since it is said in [our] Sāstra that there is the all-pervasive manifestation of the innate condition of the eternal and all-pervasive soul, which is of the nature of consciousness and activity—and since 2) the non-pervasiveness (i.e., limitedness) of the cognitive dispositions such as the cognition of a cloth and so forth is seen, it follows that the [cognitive] qualities such as Demerit etc., which are non-eternal
and unlimited, cannot belong to the soul, which is eternal and unlimited. If this were not the case, and if one were to accept that such qualities were in a relation of 'inherence' (samavāya) with the soul, there would result the fault of attributing transitoriness (parināmitva) to the soul. Demerit etc. give rise to three distinctions of the [sakala] soul: the sāmsiddhika (natural), vainayika (cultivated) and prākṛta (worldly). The Mrgendra Agama says: "The Sāmsiddhikas, Vainayikas and Prākṛtyas [are the designations of the different configurations of dispositional qualities which] belong to the soul. The Sāmsiddhika is the quality belonging to the souls that are illuminated by the Samskāras of special virtue; The Sāmsiddhika quality is manifested even after the loss of the physical body, as it has been manifested before [the loss of the body]. The Vainayika is the quality that is manifested by means of worldly experience, reflection, a religious preceptor and Śāstras; the Vainayika quality is purified by the activities of the body, mind and speech. The Prākṛta is the quality that is manifested [only] in the association with a physical body, like the cognition during the dream state.

Thus, just being of these three varieties, Merit etc. are now described in terms of the differences in their results:

(57) in order, the results of these are: Life in hell (adhogati), bondage (bandha), impediments (vighāta), and worldly life (samsrīti); heaven (svarga), release (mukti), absorption in prakṛti (prakṛtibhāva), and non-impediments (avighāta).
(58-59) **Samsāric Existence (bhāva)**, Disgrace, Obstacles, Inability to Overcome Bhoga, the Attendance over Those of a Lower Station, Possession of a Correct Insight, Absence of the Desire for Bhoga, and the Obstacle to What One Proposes to Accomplish -- These are the Results of the Sāmsiddhi Dispositions; the Vaiñayika and Prākṛta Dispositions belong to those mentioned [in v.57].

"Life in Hell" etc. are results that come to be, in order, from Demerit etc., i.e., from the Vaiñayikas and Prākṛtas. "Worldly life" etc. is a result of the Sāmsiddhi. Here, "life in hell" means the attainment of hell. "Bondage" is not in the soul but in the ego's self-conceit. "Worldly life" is the birth in the womb of animals etc.52 "Release" here is the release according to other systems, since according to the Mokṣakārikā the highest form of release can only arise on account of dīkṣā. "Absorption into Prakṛti" is a union (laya) with prakṛti.

"Worldliness" refers to Samsāra. "Disgrace" means the degradation of one's condition. The 'non-overcoming of enjoyment" is the passion (icchā) for enjoyment. The "attendance over beings of a lower station" is the superintendence over those who are of a lower station than oneself; "possession of a correct insight [concerning one's higher station]" is the correct understanding of the respective objects [of one's station]. The rest is clear.

Having discussed the Dispositions, he now treats the Conceptions (pratyaya).

(60) Being the Awakened Cognition (sambuddhi) of the Manifest,
UNMANIFEST, AND THE SOUL, ATTAINMENT (SIDDHI) THUS ARISES ON ACCOUNT OF THE COLLECTION OF DHARMA, ETC., WHICH COLLECTION IS SLIGHTLY CONNECTED TO RĀGA [I.E. VAIRĀGYA].

In our system, the eight Dispositions, Merit etc., subsist in the mind (buddhi) in a latent form (vāsanātva). Thus, it is said: "The dispositions (bhāva) are so called because they cause the subtle body (liṅga) to arise (bhāvayanti)." Furthermore, when the Dispositions have reached a pre-eminent [i.e., developed] state (prakāsa) and have entered into the condition of being objects of experience in a gross form (sthūlārūpa), they are called "Conceptions" on account of causing the mental activity (pratyāyana) of the bound souls. Thus it is said: "The conceptions are so called because they cause the soul's mental activity (pratyāyanti).

Accomplishment arises from the group of four Dispositions, Merit etc., which are derived from sattva and which are slightly associated with rajas in the form of non-attachment (vairāgya). It is said that Siddhi is the attainment of a superior state (prakāśavasthā), which is just a cognition of its respective object (tadvāsyām jñānam); this cognition is a 'complete understanding' (sambuddhi) of the manifested condition of the Gunas, the unmanifested condition of Pradhāna and the conscious souls. It is said, "accomplishment is the cognition (buddhi) whose object (viṣaya) is the soul, Prakṛti etc." In this case, the soul, which is exceeding separated, shines forth independently as the illuminating agent (prakāśakatva) in the cognition of the mind (buddhi-bodha), whose object is the manifest and unmanifest. Thus, they say
"When the seer abides in his own natural condition." This does not take place on account of the illuminating agency of the mind; such a view would entail the fault of describing the soul as an object-of-enjoyment; in the Mokṣaṅārikā this is discussed: "If the soul is considered to come within the scope of an object-of-enjoyment, the soul becomes subject to transformation [or "mutability"]." 

(61) MIXED WITH THE DISPOSITIONS OF DEMERIT ETC., CONTENTMENT
(TUŚTI) ARISES FROM THE THREEFOLD COLLECTION SUCH AS MERIT ETC.; BY MEANS OF THIS CONTENTMENT THE SATISFYING DISCERNMENT ARISES WHEN ONE POORLY GRASPS THE SOUL.

Contentment arises from the threefold tamas-based collection of Demerit etc. This collection is slightly blended with Merit etc., which are of a sattvic origin. This contentment arises through the instrumentality of the attainment that is of the nature of the cognition of the gross and subtle elements (which have already been discussed), which occurs when one grasps the nature of the soul according to the various [other] systems.

Contentment is described as a cognition (buddhi) that arises when one, even though unaccomplished, says: "I am [satisfactorily] accomplished." This is due to a non-attachment (vairāgya) that is of a lower order. Thus, it is said: "Contentment is the cognition of that [soteriologically] unaccomplished soul that "I am accomplished." 

(62) INCAPACITY ARISES ON ACCOUNT OF THE THREEFOLD COLLECTION OF DEMERIT ETC., WHICH IS COLOURED BY A LITTLE RĀGA: INCAPACITY IS
THE LACK OF EFFECTIVENESS (ASĀMARTHYAM) IN [ATTAINING] PROSPERITY ETC.

'Prosperity' (śubha) here means 'the activity of the organs of generation' that is described as 'joy' (āhāda). The 'lack of effectivity' in 'prosperity etc.' stems from a defect in the organs or, by implication, in the body. This 'incapacity' originates out of the tāmasic group, which is slightly connected to rajas. It is said, "Incapacity arises on account of inactivity (apravrta-tvata) and is of a tāmasic origin (on account of being of the nature of suffering; as well, incapacity is of a rājasic origin, as the [rājasic] quality which is in association with the cause (kāranasamśraya), is seen in the effect." 59

(63) ERROR IS THE DISCERNMENT OF AN OBJECT OTHERWISE THAN IT IS.
ERROR ARISES DEVOID OF A CONNECTION TO RĀGA, ALTHOUGH ERROR IS SLIGHTLY CONNECTED TO MERIT ETC. 60

'Error' arises on account of the tāmasic group, which is devoid of rajas and which is slightly connected to sattva. Error is of the nature of the grasping of an object as otherwise than it is (ayathārtha). Error is characterized by delusion (mohā), extreme delusion (mahāmohā), mental darkness (tāmisra) and extreme mental darkness (andhatāmisra). It is said: "Error consists of perceiving one thing as another, for the reason that the two [confused] things share a particular common element."

Now, having briefly discussed the Dispositions and Conceptions, he concludes [the topic of] mental cognition (buddhibodha):

(64Aa) BRIEFLY STATED, THIS [COLLECTION OF DISPOSITIONS AND CONCEPTIONS] IS A QUALITY OF THE MIND (BUDDHI).
In the Śrīmañmatāṅga and elsewhere there is a detailed account of the Dispositions and Conceptions. In the Mrgendravṛttidīpikā these have also been elucidated and accurately determined by us. From a fear of dealing with too many minute details [which have already been dealt with], I am not delineating any further details here.

(64AB) THIS [BUDDHI-DHARMA] IS ENJOYED BY CONSCIOUSNESS [I. E., THE SOUL]

'Due to the condition of being an object of enjoyment (bhogyatva)' should be supplied [in v. 64Ab].

He now establishes 'the condition of being an object of enjoyment':

(64B-65A) WHEN AN OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT IS ACCOMPLISHED, WHATEVER ARISES IS APPREHENDED; THIS APPREHENSION (ANUBHĀVA) IS ENJOYMENT (BHOGA) AND IS SUFFICIENT FOR EXPLAINING THE ENJOYER (BHOKTR).

Just the object-of-enjoyment is possessed by the arising and perishing of the cognitive activity (jñāna) that originates in the mind (buddhi); the enjoyer is not so possessed [of this transitory mental activity] on account of the establishment of the self-consciousness (svasamvedana) that belongs to the experiencer who is in a permanent condition (sthira) by means of always being of the form of the apprehending agent (grāhaka). Furthermore:

(65B) WITHOUT THE ONE WHO ACCOMPLISHES (SĀDHAYITR), [THE POSTULATION OF] "DESIRE" CANNOT BE LOGICALLY EXPLAINED (SIDDHI).

This verse is directed against the Buddhists who hold that "the mind (buddhi) is itself consciousness" (buddhicaitanyavāda). By
appealing to a conception of an impermanent Enjoyer of the buddhi-based cognition, the Buddhists hold the view that the "mind is itself consciousness" for three reasons: 1) on account of the insentient (like a pot etc.) [of the impermanent Enjoyer]; 2) on account of the impossibility of the experiencer being the result of karmic action from another time, and 3) on account of the condition of being an object of enjoyment, like what is spoken.

The meaning of the verse is that the logical establishment (siddhi) of the activity-of-Enjoyment (bhoga-āriyā) is impossible without [the postulation of] an Enjoyer who is active (cestamāna); as well, on account of the activity of Enjoyment, the soul is established as the condition of agency (kartrya) involved in that activity. In the verse, "[an accomplishment] desired (samīhita) means [any accomplishment which is an object of ] wanting (abhīṣta).

An objection is now raised:

(66A) WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE (SANYĀDA) WITH SOMETHING PERCEPTIBLE (DRSTA) THERE CAN BE NO PROOF OF AN INFERENCE.

According to the above position an inference must be seen to have a concurrence with another means of proof (pramāna) [i.e. pratyakṣa]; for example, fire is inferred from smoke once one has actually been present and directly perceived [the concomitance of smoke and fire]." The validity of an inference can only be established in this manner.
The Buddhists claim that one cannot establish a "self" that is the experiencer and that is separated from cognition, due to the absence of any means of proof [applicable in this case], as there is indeed the doubt raised by the fallacy of the unsupportable conclusion (vyabhicāra) concerning the inference regarding the ēnjoyer: "experience" itself allows of no apprehension of a constitutive distinction (ākārabheda) between a 'cognizer' and 'cognition', as we only discern (darsana) cognition in its nature as 'apprehension' (anubhava)."

We see no such fallacy of the unsupportable conclusion (vyabhicāra) concerning the thing inferred (sādhyā) in such examples as the smoke on the mountain top. They say: "This nature of consciousness (samvidrūpā) is just of one form; we see a modification (vivarta) of manifold forms (anekākāra) such as joy, depression, etc. In this case you can use any 'name' you so desire [to describe one of the manifold 'modifications'].

This is false! He says:

(66B) FOR WHATEVER REASON THAT THERE IS THIS CONCURRENCE WITH SOMETHING PERCEPTIBLE, FOR THAT REASON THERE IS THE VALIDATION OF THIS CONCURRENCE.

This is the meaning. It is not proper to hold that, on account of there being a 'conflict with activity (kriyāvirodha)' when one attributes impermanent cognition to the soul, there is a false attribution of permanency [in one's soul]. It is said: "The soul, which is of the nature of that which apprehends (grāhakāra), is established (siddha) by means of a perceptual self-consciousness (samvedanapratyakṣa) that is due to a condition of permanency established on account of the
'manifestation' (bhāsamānatva) [which appears] just by means of a condition of permanency in the form of an 'object' (viṣayatva) that is only sensed within the body as in sleep etc. [i.e., dreaming, imagining, etc.] wherein there is no proximity to external objects of this apprehension (anubhava), which is of the nature of the awareness (samvedana) of an object and which is [classified as] experience. 

This is also said [by the Buddhists]: "All things are momentary on account of the 'conflict with activity' (arthakriyāvirodha) which results when one holds that there is both sequence (krama) and simultaneity (yaugapadya) of that which is non-momentary." This is false because of the case of the gem, something which is certainly permanent (akṣanika): at one and the same time (yugapad) various objects such as pots etc. can appear sequentially reflected in the one gem. Furthermore, since whatever is momentary is destroyed the moment it arises, it is impossible for there to be a 'conformity with activity' with manifold instants that no longer exist.

In the Śrīmammatāṅgavṛtti and elsewhere such arguments are carried out in detail by the Ācārya [Rāmakaṇṭha II].

Thus, holding that the soul can be inferred by means of the establishment of self-consciousness (svaṃvedana), he says:

(67A) HEREIN THERE IS NO CONCURRENCE WITH A MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE (PRAṂĀṆA) SINCE THE MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE IS PERCEPTION.

In this case there is no need for there to be a concurrence with another pramāṇa of this pramāṇa [i.e., pratyakṣa].
Even though there is an absence of a concurrance with another pramāṇa for perception, due to the criterion of validity (prāmāṇya) [defined] as the condition that generates the cognition of an un-apprehended object (anadhigatavisaya), the Buddhists say: "A pramāṇa is the comportment towards an unapprehended object (anadhigatārthanganṭ-pramāṇam)."

Again, in what manner does the fallacy of the unsupportable conclusion apply in the case of the mountain top etc. He says:

(678) [THE FALLACY OF] THE UNSUPPORTABLE CONCLUSION IS REFUTED BY THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INSTANCES [OF THE INFERENCE].

The fallacy of the unsupportable conclusion is not seen in the example of smoke etc. In this case, there is the connection (sambandha) that is characterized as an inseparable concommitance (avīnābhāva) is discerned with positive and negative instances. Such is the case with the smoke that has been well discerned to have its locus in fire; but, an error (bhṛanti) occurs when one does not discern the proper nature of "smokiness" and attributes its genesis to the mountain-top itself. Therefore, here as well, on account of discerning the antecedence of the agent (kārtrpūrvakatvadarśana) of actions in all cases, the Enjoyer is inferred from the activity of Enjoyment. By you as well, the mind (buddhi) in another's body is inferred by an inference without the concurrence with another pramāṇa, because of the activity of the effect [i.e., the body], which is established by the prior-existence of the mind in one's own body. Thus he says:

(68A) THE MIND IS ESTABLISHED AS THE CAUSE IN THE EXPLANATION
REGARDING THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS (Dharma) OF THE BODY;

This is the meaning. When there is the explanation regarding the ontological status of the body that is of the nature of activity etc., then in another's body the cause is established as the mind. Concerning this the Buddhists say: "Having seen, in one's own body, the activity that is preceded by the mind, on account of seeing it elsewhere, [i.e., in another's body] the mind is recognized [as preceding the activity]. Therefore, the Enjoyer is established by the presumption of experience (bhogānyathānupapatti), like the sense of sight etc. [which is inferred] by means of the presumption from the discernment of colour etc. He says:

(68b-69a) The Pramāṇa of that which is other than that which is generally accepted as perceptible is established by means of inference.

The Cārvāka says: "Let there be an Enjoyer, but that too is just the body which is of the nature of a manifestation of a modified aggregate of the elements such as earth etc. As the manifestation of the ability to intoxify arises as a [result of a] fermenting agent (kīrava) etc., so the appearance of consciousness arises as a modified characteristic of the body. Furthermore, on account of seeing the activity of enjoyment etc. [existing] by means of the power of the vital forces such as prāṇa, no other thing can be appealed to [in order to account for the manifesting cause of consciousness], as it is not observed through perception. Thus, they say: "It is impossible to postulate something imperceptible when something perceptible [already] exists."

He rejects this view:

(69a.b-70a) "But, just on account of being the cause [of conscious-
NESS], LET THE AGGREGATE OF EARTH AND SO FORTH BE THAT WHICH
DEMONSTRABLY ESTABLISHES CONSCIOUSNESS, THE ENJOYER OF THE MENTAL
ACTIVITY OF THE MIND." THIS IS WRONG!

This is the meaning: It is wrong to hold that consciousness is
like a pot and so forth, because of the observation concerning the sphere
of the objects of enjoyment: the hard, soft etc. touch on the outside
of the body is [felt as] pain, pleasure, etc. within the body. Therefore,
it follows that, "the soul is established by means of being the Enjoyer
even in the case of the body;" furthermore, "there is no means of proof
to establish that consciousness belongs to this [body]." He says:

(70B) FOR, HOW CAN YOU COME UP WITH A DECISIVE PROOF TO ESTABLISH
THAT CONSCIOUSNESS BELONGS TO THIS?

There is the objection [by Cārvāka]: Consciousness is just of
the nature of the body, as it is only observed when there is the exis-
tence of the elements that give rise to the body (which is of the
nature of sperm and blood) and it is not observed when the body is non-
existent.

(71A\(a\)) EVEN WHEN THERE IS THE EXISTENCE [OF THE BODY], THE FALLACY
OF BEING TOO GENERAL (ANAIKĀNTIKA) APPLIES HERE;

Even in the case of the existence of the elements of the nature
of the body in the womb etc., or in a corpse, since consciousness is
not observed, consciousness is not of the nature of the body; conse-
sequently, "there is no proof to substantiate the claim that the soul
is the body." He says:
(71A,b) CONSEQUENTLY, "THE CAWING OF CROWS" [I.E. SUCH IS THE SENSE OF YOUR ARGUMENT].

"On account of being an object of experience, the body is not of the nature of consciousness;" he says:

(71B-72A) SUCH THINGS AS MOLASSES AND SO FORTH ARE OBJECTS OF ENJOYMENT, ARE PERCEPTIBLE AND ARE INCAPABLE OF MANIFESTING CONSCIOUSNESS; ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITION OF BEING AN OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS AN "IMAGE" (CHĀYĀ) OF THE SOUL (JĪVA), LET THE BODY BE EQUAL TO MOLASSES AND SO FORTH.

Molasses and such things are made objects of experience (visayī-kriyamāna) by means of being the objects that are 'grasped', i.e., 'enjoyed' by means of cognition that is of nature of experience and is a 'reflection' (chāyā) belonging to the soul, i.e., 'jīva'; such objects are never observed to be manifested forms of consciousness (abhivyaktacetana). Therefore, with reference to the position already stated that, "the soul is the body, which is an aggregate of elements," it is maintained [by us] that there is the non-consciousness (acetana) [of the body] due to the process whereby something is made an object (visayīkarana) by means of being an object of enjoyment, i.e., by being something which is 'grasped'; the condition of being the enjoyer cannot be established to belong to the body. Moreover, when consciousness is just said to belong to the body, of account of the repeated changes in the body resulting in a condition of destruction [of previous states], it becomes impossible for an older person to remember something from childhood. Such criticisms [as raised above] are taken up by us in
detail in the Śrīmaṇmaṛgendra-vṛtti-dīpikā.

A new objection is raised by those who claim that the senses are consciousness: "let the condition of being the Enjoyer just belong to the senses, which are separate from the body." That this is false, he says:

(728-73a) MOST CERTAINLY, THERE IS THE NON-CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE SENSES THAT ARE THE INSTRUMENTS (KARANA) FOR [THE PRESENTATION OF] THE OBJECTS OF ENJOYMENT (BHOGAYATVA); THEREFORE, THE SOUL, WHICH HAS CONSCIOUSNESS INTRINSIC TO IT (CIITSVĀBHĀVA), IS THE ENJOYER.

As it has already been described, even the senses are for the purpose of enjoyment (bhogārthatā); on account of being objects of enjoyment (bhogyatva) and on account of being instruments (karanatva), like a sword etc., the senses most certainly cannot be [identified with] consciousness. Therefore, agency (kārtrtvva) cannot belong to the sense organs; rather, agency just belongs to the soul, which has consciousness as constitutive of its nature, as the agency of the soul accounts for "engagements in" and "cessations of" all other agentive activities that are caused by an agent (sarvānyakārakapra-vṛttinivṛttihetutevena). They say: "the Lord is the one responsible for the engagements in and cessations of agentive activities; the Lord is the "Unengaged One", the one who is responsible for the causative process (kāraka) is the agent (kārtr)."
(73B) THE ENJOYMENT OF THE ENJOYER IS THE MANIFESTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS THAT IS "COLOURED (ANURAÑJITA) BY THE REFLECTION (CHĀYĀ) OF THE OBJECTS OF ENJOYMENT.

The enjoyment of the enjoyer is just the manifestation of consciousness that is "coloured" (anurañjita) through the 'form' (ākāra) which is the reflection (chāyā) of the nature of pleasure etc. that belong to the mind (buddhi), which is an object-of-enjoyment. As it is said in the Śrīmatśvāyambhūva: "Enjoyment is the consciousness (vedana) characterized by the [bound] soul's enjoyment etc."

Now a new topic:

(74A) CONSCIOUSNESS APPEARS AS AN OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION OF THAT WHICH IS NOT CONSCIOUS WITH THAT WHICH IS CONSCIOUS.

The object-of-enjoyment, which is of the nature of the mind (buddhi), even though it is not of the nature of consciousness, appears as if it were of the nature of consciousness on account of its connection to the consciousness (caitanyasamāśesa) [constitutive] of the soul. It is said by the Sāmkhyas: "that which is not conscious appears (liṅga) as if it were conscious." Moreover:


The 'object-of-enjoyment' is indeed a 'thing' (vastu) that is
superintended over by consciousness (cittādhiṣṭhita) and is the collection of the instruments of the mind (buddhāṅdriyavrinda); it presents the 'object' to the soul (ātmano viṣayatvenopasthāpayati). The soul [in turn] grasps the mental activity of the mind (buddhyādhīyasita). They say: "The soul (puruṣa) is cognizant on account of the mental activity of the mind. The 'phenomenal connection' (ākāraṇuṣaṅga) is just a 'contact' (samsālesa) of the two 'images' (chāyā) or 'reflections' (pratibimba) that are of the nature of the conscious and the unconscious; due to this connection, the souls, enjoyers and bonds are transformed into (parināta) objects of enjoyment through the form of the 'object' (viṣaya) that arises through the instrumentality of the mental activity of the mind, which itself functions in a mirroring manner and is called enjoyment. It is just for this reason that the Samsārins make the mistake of seeing the soul and so forth in what is not the soul etc. However, through discernment (vivekajñāna) there is the dissolution of prakṛti for the Samsārins. Samkhya defines this dissolution as moksa. Thus:

(75B) ENJOYMENT [WHICH APPEARS] IN THE OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT [I.E. IN THE BUDDHI] IS A REFLECTION OF THE SOUL (PRABHU), LIKE THE MOON IN WATER.

Enjoyment that is characterized as an object of enjoyment just belongs to the soul that is pervasive (vāpaka) and lordly (prabhu).

In the cognitive activity of the mind, which is of the nature of ascertainment (adhyavasāya), there is a reflection, like the reflection of the moon in water; this reflection is characterized (viśisṭa) by the
manifestation of consciousness. However, the example (drṣṭānta) [supporting the metaphor] is only applicable to a 'naturally occurring manifestation' (viṣṭasvarūpābhivyaktimātrā), as the moon reflection is of a purely insentient (jaḍa) and material (sthūla) nature. Therefore, on account of the condition of the Enjoyer (bhoktṛtya), the agent (kṛtṛtya) just belongs to the soul that is conscious, and cannot be said to belong to the mind (buddhi) and its products, which are non-conscious and objects-of-enjoyment.

But objects Śāṅkhya agency (kṛtṛtya) entails engagement in activity (kriyāvesa), if agency is attributed to the soul, the soul becomes subject to transformation (parināmita). Since the soul is not subject to transformation (nirvikāra), agency cannot be attributed to the soul. Rather, agency just belongs to [the sphere of] prakṛti; prior to the arising of discriminative knowledge, prakṛti shows itself to the puruṣa through the instrumentality of the mind and its products, which are objects of enjoyment; in this manner Samsāra is described. According to Śāṅkhya, liberation means 'the ceasing of the activity that arises with this prakṛti.' Thus, they say: "having shown herself to the audience the dancer draws away from the audience; likewise, having manifested itself to the puruṣa, prakṛti ceases from its activity. As a result, he says:

(76A-76B) WHEN ENJOYMENT IS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOUL OUT OF A FEAR OF ATTRIBUTING TRANSFORMATION [TO THE SOUL], THEN THE DIFFICULTY ARISES CONCERNING THE IDENTITY (AVIŚEṢA) OF THE RELEASED ONE AND THE BOUND ONE.

This is the meaning. In this case agency is not the [direct].
engagement in activity; rather, just the 'capacity for activity' (śaktitvā) is engaged in activity. For instance, like the iron filings that have come within the proximity of a magnet, the locus of activity (kriyāvesa), which is of the nature of movement (spanda), is just seen to belong to the body, which is in proximity to the soul. Therefore, there is no possibility of the transformation of the soul during the enjoyment, which is of the nature of the 'representational activity' (visayākarana) of the mind and its products.

However [objects the Saivite], this 'representational activity' just takes place as something separate (paratva) [from the puruṣa]. But, when you do not postulate this separate condition in the case where there is the purity (nirmalatva) of the soul, the difficulty arises as to the identity (aviśesa) of the one who enjoys and the one who is liberated, since both are similarly unconnected [i.e., even the bound soul is not connected to the impurity enjoyment entails].

No! It is said: "Prakṛti purposely functions for the sake of another (pararthapavr̥tti)." They say: "As the non-conscious milk functions for the sake (nimitta) of the growth of the calf, so prakṛti functions for the sake of the release of the puruṣa." Thus he says:

(77A) Moreover, there is the opposition to: "The activity of the bonds is for the purpose of the soul."

This is the meaning. It is false to hold that the activity of prakṛti is for the sake of the puruṣa, as prakṛti is just non-conscious, as even in the case of [non-conscious] milk etc., one observes the
activity just as it is superintended over by the conscious cow etc. Moreover, on account of the [useful] appropriation (paksātkrtatva) even of air, water, etc. [i.e. of purely unconscious things not directly superintended over by a conscious being], even if we accept this type of activity [of purely unconscious things], it does not make sense that this activity can be for the sake of something unconnected [to anything]; or, if the activity be said to be for the purpose of that which is unconnected (nirapekṣa), then even in the case of the liberated one this activity will occur. Furthermore, on account of the engagement (samudvyoga) of the bound soul (baddhātma) who has a desire (sābhilāsatva) for enjoyment, since no change (vikāra) is said to occur in the soul, it is false to attribute enjoyment to the bound soul; he says:

(778) IN AN UNCHANGEABLE ENJOYER, AS IN THE CASE OF A LIBERATED SOUL, ENJOYMENT DOES NOT ARISE.

But (objects the Sāṃkhya) just non-discrimination (aviveka) is the cause of the activity of prakṛti. When there is the discrimination between the puruṣa and prakṛti, on account of the qualification (adhimārātva) of the cessation with respect to the activity, it is no longer activity. Therefore, there is no identity (avīśeṣa) of the bound one and the released one. They say: "It is my belief that there is nothing more beautifully youthful than prakṛti, who, with the thought 'I have been seen', does not come within the sight of the puruṣa again."

This is false! Given your position, it is not possible for there to be the non-discrimination, since the soul is pure (nirmalatva). And since non-discrimination is at all times without a cause, the
possibility of the non-existence of discrimination becomes a possibility. Therefore, we claim that, by the unestablishment of anything other than non-discrimination, there ought to be the acceptance of the passion (sārāgata), impurity (samalatva) etc. attributable to the soul itself.

If one holds that the innate condition of being unconscious is roused to consciousness on account of the association with that which is defiled, i.e., the connection to a body etc., then it follows that there will arise the eternal connection to things which are other than what is innate -- thus the opponents view is put in doubt.

IF IT ISCLAIMED THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SUBJECT TO TRANSFORMATION (Vikāritva), IT IS NON-ETERNAL (Anitya),

Here, the "enjoyer" (bhoktr) should be supplied in the verse [i.e., accept transformation, and the enjoyer becomes non-eternal]. He refutes this:

(78Ab) THEN THE EFFECTED CONDITION OF Māyā (Māyasādhyā) IS NOT RECOGNIZED.

The "peculiar characteristic" (višeṣa) that is brought about (kriyamāna) by means of māyā and its effects (svakarṇāni) through the instrumentality of the subtle and gross bodies is not recognized ("by you" should be supplied here). Therefore, the fault (dosa) of non-eternity and so forth does not apply -- this is the meaning [of the verse]. How is this possible? He says:

(78B) AND, ON ACCOUNT OF THE INTRINSICALLY MANIFESTED CONSCIOUSNESS
(SVARUPAVYAKTILABHA), NEITHER TRANSFORMATION (VIKA RA) NOR DESTRUCTION [CAN APPLY TO THE SOUL].

Unlike the Naiyāyikas and others we do not hold that the soul (Ātman) is solely of a material nature (jadarupa). Rather, the soul has consciousness innate to its nature.

[The Naiyāyikas raise the question:] But, concerning the innateness (svabhavata) of this consciousness, on account of there being no manifestation of consciousness without a connection to a body etc. [the Naiyāyikas definition of jñāna], what is the beginningless (anadi) thing by which the bound condition (pratibaddha) [of the soul] is discerned [by the Śaivites]?'

[The Answer follows:] He is going to say that this [beginningless thing] is just mala. And thus, when there is the removal of mala (mala-vyudāsa) by means of māyā -- i.e., by Kāla etc., which are its effects (svakārya) -- the total manifestation of the innate nature (naiķadesasvarūpavyakti) of the soul (Ātman) takes place. When there is the ripening of mala by means of śivaśakti -- which is designated as dīksā -- all objects become manifested (sarvaviśaya bhivyajyate). Thus, he says in the verse, "neither transformation nor change" belong to this [soul]. And of this [soul]:

(79A) RAGA SERVES THE ROLE OF "OBJECTIFYING" [IN THE PRESENTATION OF] THE OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT. SINCE RAGA IS LIKE A CRYSTAL [I.E., SINCE IT SIMPLY MANIFESTS THINGS], IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE AS DISCUSSED ABOVE.

Raga gives rise to the presentation of the object-of-enjoyment, which is manifested in the form of suka, duhkha and moha.
Raga is said to be "like a crystal" because it manifests things by means of its own luminosity. Raga is not a cause of that "transformation" [of the innate consciousness of the soul] as discussed above. It is said that "the affection to the attachment to objects" (visayoparāga) is just "the making something an object" (visayikarana) through the intentional-activity towards it.

There is no transformation of the Enjoyer, even though there is the repeated transformation of the body, which is an object-of-enjoyment:

(79B-80A) BY MEANS OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE BODY THE SOUL IS NOT THE THING TRANSFORMED, BECAUSE THIS SOUL WOULD BE UNCONSCIOUS AND AN OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT, LIKE BUDDHI, ON ACCOUNT OF TRANSFORMATION [BEING ATTRIBUTED TO IT].

This is the meaning: if the transformation of the soul is accepted, then unconsciousness and the fact of being an object of enjoyment [apply to it], like the Buddhi etc.

Herein, after having proposed another's viewpoint, he will criticize it:

(80B-81A) CONSCIOUSNESS IS RATHER THE "QUALITY" THAT IS DESCRIBED AS A "COGNITION" (jñāna) THAT IS IN A RELATION OF INHERENCE [WITH THE SOUL]. THEREFORE, CONSCIOUSNESS CANNOT BE SHOWN TO BE INTRINSIC TO THE SOUL.

THIS IS FALSE!

This is what the Naiyāyikas and others think: the soul is by
nature unconscious; on account of the connection of manas [manahsamyoga] with the soul, cognition arises as a quality [i.e., as a quality of the soul]. And just this cognition is the consciousness of the soul; in no other way can the soul be considered to be of a conscious nature.

This is false because, as in the case of a pot etc., there can be no connection of inherence of cognition (jñānasamavāyāyogat) to the soul if the soul is considered to be unconscious (jadatva).

An objection: herein, the restricting factor [in the relation of inherence between cognition and the unconscious soul] is karma, which is designated as "the unseen" (adrṣṭa) [the pūrvapakṣin says that the invisible activity of karma is the restraining force in this matter]. Cognition, which is in a relation of inherence when the soul (puruṣa) is a common substratum/generic locus of Karma (karmasamānādhikarana) [the soul, according to the pūrvapakṣin, is the adhikarana of jñāna]. This cognition does not arise in other places, i.e., in different substrata (vyadhikarana), such as in pots etc. Thus, he says:

(81B-82A) "CONSCIOUSNESS (VIJÑĀNA) IS JUST IN THE UNCONSCIOUS SOUL (AJNE NARI) AND NOWHERE ELSE"; BUT EVEN KARMA IS NOT SUITABLE AS THE RESTRICTING FACTOR, AS KARMA IS FOUND IN A DIFFERENT LOCUS [THAN THE SOUL].

It is said, "on account of the possibility of transformation, there is no [soteriological-] development (samskāratva) but just the [soteriological-] development of Prakṛti, on account of being like the activity of agriculture etc." Therefore, even karma cannot be the restricting-factor here. Thus, "the soul (ātman) is established solely
as innately conscious, on account of its intrinsic connection to consciousness (caitanyasāmavāyāt);" He says:

828-83A) IN THE SAME WAY THAT DELUSION (MOHA) -- ACCORDING TO THE WISE -- IS [GENERATED] ON ACCOUNT OF THOSE WHO HAVE DELUSION INTRINSIC TO THEM (MOHASHVĀHAYA), AND NOT OTHERWISE, SO CONSCIOUSNESS (CITI) IS [GENERATED] ON ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUS THINGS (CAITANYEBHYAH PADĀRTHEBHYAH) AND NOT OTHERWISE.

On account of the "cognition", which is of the nature of consciousness, being a "quality" (dharmatva) of the soul, when there is the destruction of the quality, the destruction of the substratum (dharmin) is also entailed, due to the inseparability of the substratum and quality. Thus, the soul (ātman) ought to be accepted as always having consciousness intrinsic to it. It is said, "due to the veiled condition of mala (malāvrtatva) of the innately conscious soul, there is the establishment of Manas, Buddhi etc. as the manifesting agents (abhivyajjakata)."

He is now going to describe Kalā, Vidyā and Rāga, which are collectively described as "the triadic sheath" (kaṇṭukatraya). In terms of the "means whereby enjoyment is accomplished", these tattvas lie above Prakṛti and collectively act as an instigating-agent by means of being an "auxiliary cause" (upakārakata) in the activity of the enjoyment of the soul. He says:

(83B-84A) THE TRIAD, WHICH IS DESIGNATED TO BE ABOVE PRAKRITI, IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR INSTIGATION AND A CAUSE OF EXCITATION IN-THE-OBJECT-OF-ENJOYMENT; AS WELL, IT IS AN AGENT IN THE SOUL'S ACTIVITY OF ENJOYMENT,
Having dealt with Enjoyment in this manner, he is now going to speak about the arising of the ego from the prakṛti-based Buddhi.

(84B-85A) THE GROUPING IN THE BUDDHI WHICH IS A POSTERIOR DIVISION (APARO BHNNA) GIVES BIRTH TO THE EGO. THE GUNAS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PROGENITORS. THE GUNAS ARE ALSO MANIFESTED (DRSTA) IN THE IMAGINATION ETC.

The Gunas are manifested (drsta) as the material-causes (utpādayītāra) of the effect (kārya) according to the maxim, "by means of mutual subjegation, on account of the interdependence and on account of being coupled together (parasparābhībhavena, aśrayāt, mithunībhāvāt)."

Hence, this cause (kārana) is in in the imagination etc., i.e., in the modifications of the Buddhi Sāmkhya claims: "the Gunas function inter-relatedly on account of mutual suppression and cooperation (anyonyābhi-bhavāśrayānmithunapravṛttayaśca gunāḥ). Therefore, according to this account [of the way the Gunas generate the lower tattvas], one the one hand, the Buddhi generates "ascertainment" (and gives rise to the imagination etc.) and on the other hand, the Buddhi generates the ego, which consists of its own particular "blending of the Gunas". Thus, according to the maxim that "more than one progenitor is required" (na hyekam janakam), the Gunas are considered to be the progenitors (janaka) that are mutually blended together (anyonyasamprakṛta) [in the generated effect]. In like manner [i.e., as mutually blended together], the Gunas exist in all objects (padārtha). This means that when we say that such and such a thing is sattvika etc., we mean that it contains an abundance (bāhulya) of Sattva etc. of the three Gunas. On the analogy of the association of the forms of mud in pots etc., the Gunas are in a direct association with the effect [eg., Buddhi, ego, etc.] as a result of direct participation.
He says:

(85B-86A) "THE FIRST TRANSFORMATION OF THE GUNAS TAKES PLACE
BY MEANS OF THE ARISING AND DOMINATING [OF ONE OVER THE OTHER]--
BUT THIS SETTLED CONDITION SHOULD REMAIN IN VARIABLE!

It is said that, if the gunas are in an invariable relation whereby
they mutually suppress one another, then it becomes impossible for the
Gunas to be the progenitors of "Accomplishment" [siddhi qua buddhi-
pratyaya] etc. If this is so, just let the ego arise from the Gunas
in a direct association with the Gunas. He says:

(86B-87A) O PUNDITS, DO NOT PRATTER THAT THIS [SAME] MAXIM APPLIES
TO THE CASE OF THE EGO AS WELL. BECAUSE OF THE GENERATIVE TRANSFOR-
MATION [OF THE GUNAS], EVEN THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS ARE IN ASSOCIATION
WITH THE GUNAS.

On account of the serial transformation of the Gunas—as it is
said, on account of the generative transformation (anyonyavikrtitva) of
everything beginning with the ego and ending with the gross elements—
this association with the Gunas not only applies to the ego but to the
subtle elements as well (which means the collection of the organs and
the collection of the gross elements). It is, therefore, correct to
hold that, as in the case of the association of the shapes of earth
(mrdakaranyavat) in pots, skulls, etc., not all things arise directly
from the Gunas.

He now addresses the question, "What are the Gunas and by
means of what activities (vyapara) are they accomplished? He says:
(BZB-888) SATTVA, RAJAS AND TAMAS -- THESE ARE THE GUNAS THAT ARE THE CAUSES (kāranā) IN THE BUDDHI. THEY ARE MANIFESTED WITH RESPECT TO EACH SOUL BY MEANS OF THE RESTRICTIONS [I.E., THROUGH THE RESTRICTIONS] OF THE MANIFESTED ACTIVITIES.

As has already been described, there is this "thing" (vaśtu) that is "an object of enjoyment for the soul" (purusabhogya) -- it occurs through the instrumentality of the Buddhi(buddhīdvaraṇa) in the form of Bhāvas, Pratyayas, etc. The Gunaś were the cause at the beginning of creation [i.e., buddhyadisarga] and continue to maintain this creation to the present time (adhunapi); as well, the Gunaś are the cause of the Buddhi.

Since these Gunaś are mutually-interconnected (parasparāviyoga), they are considered to be just one Tattva. Thus, it is said: "Even though the Gunaś are three in number, they are still considered to constitute one Tattva, on account of their inseparability (avīyoga)." Therefore, the accomplishment of Sattva etc. occurs by means of the activities (vyāpāra) referred to as the "restriction of the manifested activities" (prakāśāvṛttiṇīyama). The activities occur by means of the casualty of the Buddhi (buddhīkāranā) and are manifested (pradarsīta) because of the dominance (prādhānyāt) [of one particular quality over the other two].

In the Āgamas it is said that there are other effects of the Gunaś (gunakaryāni) as well: steadiness (sthairya), patience (dhairya), etc.; valour (śaurva), cruelty (krauya) etc.; and discontent (arati) and slowness (māndya) [i.e., each has its more dominant guṇic trait].
An objection is raised by Samkhya: "the Gunas are just "conditions" (sthita) through the eternality that is designated as Prakrti. He says:

(88B-89A) THE PRIOR EXISTENCE OF THE CAUSE OF THE GUNAS IS ESTABLISHED, AS IN THE CASE OF THE BUDDHI, POT, ETC., DUE TO THE CONNECTION TO A MANIFOLD NUMBER WHEN UNCONSCIOUS.

Thus, because of unconsciousness and manifoldness, there is the establishment of the condition of being an effect, like a pot etc.

What is the [material] cause of the Gunas? He says:

(89B-90A) THE [MATERIAL] CAUSE OF THE GUNAS IS DESIGNATED AS PRAKRITI; BEING UNDIVIDED (AVIBHAGASTHITA) IN PRAKRITI, THE GUNAS BEGIN THEIR ACTIVITY WHEN SIVA INDUCES PRAKRITI.

The Gunas exist as undivided and subtle conditions in Prakrti; through the inducement of Siva they develop into gross form through the distinctions of their respective activities. In the verse it is stated that Siva induces Prakrti. Because Prakrti is of an unconscious nature, the Prakrti-activity is not self-willed [and therefore depends on the inducement of Siva]. Furthermore, as each soul is separately linked to Prakrti through the engagement in a subtle body, Prakrti is manifold. Being manifold, Prakrti is an effect—I will discuss this further.
Now, on account of being yoked to Māla, there is a "pumstva", [state of being a pums, i.e., bound soul], which occurs through the condition of being an Enjoyer for that soul which is yoked to the five sheaths, Kāla etc. [Kāla, Kāla, Niyati, Vidyā, Rāga]. Dīksā is for the purification (suddha) of this condition and according to the Āgama as is above the Prakṛti-tattva. The accomplishment of Enjoyment and the attainment of a particular station of existence cannot come to be on account of the condition of Enjoyership, the soul [qua Enjoyer] is qualified by both consciousness and pervasiveness. Having considered this, he is going to establish the Rāga-tattva, which was earlier said to be the cause of the craving for Bhoga.

(90B-91A) UPON THE ACCOMPLISHMENT (ĀSĀDYA) OF THE EXPERIENCE (ANUBHAVA) OF ENJOYMENT THE ATTACHMENT TO THE OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT COMES TO PASS; IN ORDER FOR THERE TO BE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT (SIDDHYARTHĀ) OF THIS [SAKTI OF THE BOUND SOUL], RĀGA SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS THAT WHICH CAUSES THE CRAVING FOR BHOGA (BHOGANURĀNGJAKA).

In this worldly condition (samsāravāsthā), when the soul has seen an object of enjoyment (Bhoga), an attachment (sakti) arises in the soul. This attachment does not arise without a cause (hetu), for this would all for the possibility of this attachment to occur in the state of release as well (muktyavasthā). Thus, for this reason, Rāga ought to be accepted as "the
generating factor in the craving for Bhoga" (bhogābhilāsajanaka) which is for the purpose of the accomplishment [i.e., release] of this [bound] soul's attachment.

He now expresses an opposite opinion:

(91B-92A) QUITE RIGHTLY SATTVA, RAJAS, AND TAMAS ACT AS THE CAUSE-OF-THE-CRAVING FOR THE OBJECTS (VIṢAYA); WHEN THIS CRAVING HAS ARISEN IN THE BUDDHI OF THE SOUL, THIS OTHER THING [i.e., RĀGA] IS OF NO USE! 72

The manifested condition of the object-of-enjoyment is solely a result of the three Gunas (sattva etc.), which arise in the Buddhi in a transformed state as pleasure, suffering and delusion. The "transformed" Gunas thus appear in the Buddhi in terms of the ascertained appearance of the object; in turn, this ascertainment serves to bring about enjoyment, which itself is influenced by the predominance of one of the three Gunas. It is, therefore, clear that some cause [extrinsic to the object-of-enjoyment] must be postulated in order to account for the soul's desire for this "object-of-enjoyment". Hence, Rāga ought to be considered to be this cause and should be considered to have its locus in [i.e., gata, lit. to be connected to] the grasper, the one who apprehends the object-of-enjoyment. The grasper is not of the same nature as the "object-of-enjoyment", which is constituted by the three Gunas (sattva etc.) and is produced in the Buddhi in the form of the Gunas, objects, etc.
The verse addresses the opponent: "if you hold that the cause of the attachment just belongs to the object-of-enjoyment, then it follows that it will be impossible to ever be free from Rāga (vītarāgābhavaprāsaṅga)!" Thus it is said in the Tattvasamgraha: [Rāga is the desirous-attachment (abhiṣvanga) that causes the soul's engagement in the object-of-enjoyment]; however, if Rāga is considered to be of the character of the object-of-enjoyment, then it could not provide any freedom from Rāga."73

But [replies the Sāṁkhya] just let Rāga be the Buddhī-based Disposition characterized as "bondage" (avairāgya); thus, he says, "even if Rāga is considered to be a 'Disposition' the same fault holds." This is what he means: there can be no production of effects (kāryakaratva) on account of the vāsanā-condition characterized by the [Disposition] "Avairāgya." If something in a vāsanā state is capable of producing effects, then since the vāsanās are infinite in the [dormant conditions in the] Buddhī, the soul will be confronted with the simultaneous formation of an infinite number of opposing activities—an unacceptable situation.74

Even if Rāga is held to be that which has "entered into" (āpanna) the condition of the object-of-enjoyment (bhogyadāśā) through the gross form (sthumārūpena) of the nature of a "Conception" [i.e. Pratyaya], then the same difficulty already mentioned arises, i.e., that the freedom from Rāga becomes impossible (vītarāgābhāva). Now [you might claim that] Rāga
ought to be construed as something other than either Rāga or a buddhi-based Disposition. However, if you claim that Karma should be the cause of the craving, we disagree, for two reasons. First, there is no way of proving that Karma is the cause responsible for bringing about effects other than those one is responsible for bringing about, as in the case of farming etc. Second, if Karma is postulated as the cause of this craving, a manifold number of activities are therefore postulated (anekatattvaparikalpanābhāvaprasaṅgāt). 

Now, the Vidyā-tattva is established:

(93B-94A) WITHOUT AN INSTRUMENT, THE ACTION (KRTI) OF AN AGENT IS NOT SEEN IN THE ACTIVITY (KARMA); THUS, VIDYA IS THE INSTRUMENT THAT SERVES IN THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE COGNITION OF THE BUDDHI (BUDDHIBODHAVIVEÇIN).

As it has been said, [this is] "on account of the proximity of the objects that have been presented by the senses." When there is the grasped-object (grahya), which is the activity (karma) described as the cognition of the Buddhi, what then ought to be the instrument whereby the soul's grasping activity [of this cognition of the Buddhi] takes place? That instrument is Vidyā. 

Here an opponent says:

(94B-95A) LIKE A LIGHT (PRADIÇPAVAT), BUDDHI IS THE MANIFESTING-AGENT (PRAKĀŚIKA) OF BOTH ITSELF AND OTHER THINGS. A "VIDYA" CONSTRUED AS THE INSTRUMENT WHEREBY THE SOUL COGNIZES -- OF WHAT USE IS IT?
"Because of the nature of its manifesting property (prakāśarūpatva),
which is like a lamp, the Buddhi causes to be manifested (prakasayati)
an appearance of the object (viṣaya-ākāra) as well as itself--
no other instrument can be established!" He refutes this:

(95B-96A) IN THE APPREHENSION (UPALABHĪ) OF OBJECTS SUCH AS
PILLARS ETC., A LIGHT (PRADĪPA) IS THE INSTRUMENT FOR THE SOUL
AND IN THE APPREHENSION OF A LIGHT, THE EYE [IS THE INSTRUMENT] --
THE SAME ANALOGY HOLDS IN THE CASE OF THE BUDDHI

The verse points out that an instrument must be postulated
in order to account for the activity whereby the Buddhi becomes an
apprehended object (grāhyatva). The Tattva Samgraha states: "like
the sun, the Buddhi has a manifesting nature; however, since the Buddhi
is an object-of-activity [whereby it is apprended], the Buddhi requires
some other instrument in order for it to be grasped.78 He points this out:

(96B-97A) ON ACCOUNT OF BEING OF THE NATURE OF THE THREE GUNAS,
THE BUDDHI, IN ITS PRESENTATIVE-FORM AS THE OBJECT, IS NOT
CAPABLE OF ILLUMINATING ITSELF THROUGH DISCRIMINATION -- AND THUS
IT REMAINS UNDISCRIMINATED.

(97B-98A) Vidyā OUGHT TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS BEING HIGHER THAN THE
GUNAS ON ACCOUNT OF (ITS) SEPARATION (VIVIKTATA), WHICH IS DERIVED
FROM DISCRIMINATION (VIVEKATA), Vidyā IS CAPABLE OF MANIFESTING
FOR THE SOUL -- AND THUS IT REQUIRES NO FURTHER INSTRUMENT.

Being of the nature of the three Gunas, the Buddhi is an object
of that activity whereby it is discerned in the form of an object-of-enjoyment (bhoga-ākāra); therefore, the Buddhi is not self-illuminating, like a lamp etc. But, being beyond the sphere of the Buddhi, Vidya is separate from the form of the object of enjoyment; in causing the illumination of that which is to be known by the soul, Vidya does not require a further instrument.

Now he describes the function of Kalā:

(98B-99A) FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT (SIDDHI) OF ENJOYMENT, THERE IS AN INSTIGATOR (PRAYOKTR) OF THE MULTITUDE OF AGENTIVE-FACTORS OF ACTIONS ETC. (KARMAI); THE SOUL (PURUSA), WHICH IS SELF-WILLED, IS THE AGENT; KALĀ IS A CONCOMITANT-AGENT.

It is said, "the soul (purusa) is the agent on account of [being] the prayoktrtvā (instigating-agent) of the collection of concomitant-factors (kāraka) such as the Buddhi etc., which are for the purpose of Enjoyment (which takes place on account of the Enjoier)."79 The one who is the Lord of the concomitant-factors involved in activity and the cessation of activities, and yet who is neither active nor inactive, is the one who is designated as an agent as well as a concomitant-factor. In the authoritative texts Kalā is called the "instigating-agent" in the activity of Enjoyment, as Kala's causative activity is similar to the Lord's.

An objection is raised by Sāmkhya: the soul is not an agent! That this is false, he says:

ENJOYER IS AN ACTIVITY, ENJOYERSHIP ENTAILS AGENCY; AS WELL, THE FRUITLESSNESS (NIŚPHALATVA) OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF PRAKRĪTI—ACTIVITY (UPĀDĀṆAPTAVĀTVA) WOULD RESULT [AS THE EFFECTS OF PRAKRĪTI, SUCH AS BUDDHI ETC., ARE INSTRUMENTS (KARĀṆĀNI), THEY REQUIRE AN AGENT].

The agency of the soul (pums) is established just by means of Enjoyership, on account of the activity of Enjoyment [Enjoyment qua activity entails agency]. If one claims that the soul is not an agent, the rise of Prakṛti — which is for the purpose of Enjoyment [of this non-agent] — becomes fruitless, because of the uselessness of there being a connection to instruments etc. in something which is not an agent!

Moreover:

(1008-101A) ON ACCOUNT OF BEING THE MÉANS OF ACTIVITY (KRIYĀSĀDHANAANBHĀVATAH) THE MOTOR ORGANS ETC. ARE POSSESSED BY AN AGENT (KARĪRMAT); THE AGENT, SPOKEN OF BEING "COVERED ETC." [BY MALA ETC.] (VĀSYĀDI) OUGHT TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS THE SOUL (PUMSA), WHICH IS PERVERSIVE (VIBHU).

If it is postulated that the soul (ātman) is non-pervasive on account of being formless, like the sky etc., then [your left with the absurdity that] it becomes impossible (anupapanna) to observe the Enjoyment which is the result of one place to be observed in some other place as, for example, a resident of the south to experience things in Kashmir; thus, it ought to be accepted that the soul (ātman) is pervasive (vyāpaka) by means of the failure of holding any other position [i.e., pervasiveness].

It is said in the Śrīmatparākhyā and elsewhere: "The agentive-cause of
this [soul] is Kāl ā, which manifests the agentive-capacity [of the soul]." Thus, the soul bound to Kāl ā is the agent-concomitant in Enjoyment.

The agentive-capacity (kartr-śakti) of this soul that is an agent does not come to affect [all] objects, because this agentive-capacity is veiled by Mālā. (In the sequel we will discuss both the "capacities" of agency and "consciousness", given that "capacity" is a unity of the two.) Kālā has the power to illuminate things, like a lamp. However, because of the veiling power of Mālā, Kālā only partially manifests the soul's agentive-capacity. Kālā is thus described as the "agentive-cause", "cause" and "agent".

This "limited" soul appears to be indistinguishably linked to Kāl ā and is, therefore, described as the "agent-concomitant" (kartr-kāraka) in the activity of Enjoyment. The limited soul is the agent on account of [having] Enjoyership, while Kāla is the concomitant-cause (kāraka) on account of [having] the agentive- causation (pravojjatva). The Mrgendra Āgama states: "O Brahmas, so these two, standing together as if indistinguishable (saṁbhiya-ananyavat-sthitam) in the activity of enjoyment (bhogakriyā), are called the agentive-concomitant (kartr-kāraka)."\(^8^1\)

(1018-102A) WHEN ONE HOLDS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGENT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANOTHER AGENT IN THE MANIFESTED SPHERE, THEN THERE WILL BE [POSTULATED] THE CONTINUAL OMNIPOTENCY OF THE SOUL, AS A RESULT OF BEING PRIOR TO KĀLĀ.
(102B-103A) ON ACCOUNT OF BEING OMNIPOTENT, THE SOUL WILL BE OMNISCIENT, LIKE THE LORD! BUT, IT IS IMPROPER TO HOLD THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING OMNISCIENT, THE SOUL IS AN AGENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ITS OWN SUFFERING.

If one holds that there can be agency that does not require Kalā (kalānapekṣa) due to the innate purity (nirmalatva) of the soul, then it follows that there will be, as in the case of Śiva, both a) omnipotence, which is without a connection (sambandha) to a body of the nature of Pāśa, i.e., Kalā etc., and b) omniscience, which is unconnected to any instruments of ignorance. This independent soul is not presided over by Śiva. However, it is improper to hold that this independent soul that is undefiled can be an agent engaged in the bodily activities etc., which are for the purpose of suffering. Thus, "the grace of Kalā" is necessarily established in order to account for the limited consciousness and activity of those souls that are possessed of enjoyment on account of being veiled by Mala." He says:

(103B-104A) ON ACCOUNT OF BEING IN A STATE OF BONDAGE, THIS SOUL IS NOT OMNIPOTENT, LIKE ŚIVA ETC. WHEN IT IS ENGAGED IN ENJOYMENT, THE SOUL QUA AGENT REQUIRES THE GRACE OF KALĀ.
Having established Kalā, he will now describe the
generation of Vidyā, Rāga, and Prakṛti from Kalā:

(1048-1050) THERE IS ANOTHER GROUPING (SKANDHA) THAT DERIVES
FROM KALĀ; THIS OTHER GROUPING IS KNOWN AS Vidyā, Rāga AND
PRAKṛTI, WHICH ARISE IN SUCCESSION IN A PAIR [RĀGA AND VIDYĀ]
SINGLY [PRAKṛTI].

Rāga and Vidyā sequentially arise as a pair. Prakṛti arises
separately as a separate entity. Thus it is said in the Śrīmatāuraṇava:
"From Kalā, the two Tattvas--Rāga and Vidyā--have arisen, and Prakṛti as well.
The Āchārya [i.e., Sadyojyoti] has not taken up the Tattvas
designated as Kāla and Niyati, which are mentioned in the Āgamas,
because these two Tattvas are self-evident in light of the context
[of what has so far been discussed], as nothing would transpire (anupatti)
without both the temporal-sequentiality and experiential-restrictedness
of enjoyment, which is a result of karmic activities. In the case of
farming etc., thieves are seen to steal the fruits of [others'] activities
(karmaphala) when there are no restrictions established by a ruler. "Restriction" (Niyati) is established (siddhi) by means of being the restrict-
ing-principle when the question is asked concerning exactly what it is
which is the restraining-principle (niyamaka) restricting the fruits of
karmic-activities (karmaphala) such as the jyotistoma sacrifice etc. to
individual enjoyers (bhoktrpratiniyamaka).
However, it is false to claim that Karma is itself the restricting
principle, for, as it is said, Karma only generates the fruits of
activities. In over-seeing the sphere of enjoyment, even the Lord's
capacity (sakti) requires and auxilliary causal factor (kāryakaratva),
which occurs through the intervention of other Tattvas. Otherwise,
none of the Tattvas would exist [they would be useless if the Lord
did everything].
Time (kāla) is established as the factor that separates off various states of the object-of-enjoyment etc. For example, in statements such as, "He has been enjoying it for a long time," the conceptions of "long", "quickly", etc. are indicative of the "separating" function of time.

It is impossible for time to be eternal, as the Naiyāyikas and others think, because time is of an unconscious and manifold nature, due to [its] having the form (rupatva) of living beings (bhūta) etc. The Śrīmatmrprendra states: "Time, which arises from Maya, is based on the conception of an "instant" (truti) etc."84

He will now discuss the collection of tattvas that are constitutive of the subtle body and the fact that the subtle body is restricted to each soul separately:

(159b-106a) [THE TATTVAS] BEGINNING WITH EARTH AND ENDING WITH KALĀ ARE THE COLLECTION WHEREBY THERE IS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ENJOYMENT (BHOGASĀDHANASAMHATI); ACCORDING TO THE LEARNED, THIS COLLECTION IS RESTRICTED (NIYATA) TO EACH ENJOYER [INDIVIDUALLY].85

Thus, it is said in the Tattvasamgraha: This group of characteristics, beginning with earth and ending with Kala, are bound (niyata) to each soul."86 Thus, it is said: "so this [bound soul], under the control of Karma (karmavāṣata), is caused to wander
in all the bodies born in their respective worlds.

In the event of a single, universal subtle body, there would be no diversity in enjoyment. However, the diversity of enjoyment is seen by all to be diverse! He says:

(106B) OTHERWISE, IT IS NOT PROPER, DUE TO THE DIVERSITY (BHEDA) THAT IS [PHENOMENALLY] SEEN IS PLEASURE ETC.

An objection is now raised: in the case of a universal subtle body, the diversity among the fruits of enjoyment will arise solely on account of the karmic diversities applying to the subtle body.

This objection is false! He says:

(107A) ON ACCOUNT OF THE KARMIC-DIVERSITY, THE DIVERSITY [OF ENJOYMENT WITH RESPECT TO EACH ENJOYER] IS ESTABLISHED.

The diversity of enjoyment is established solely on account of karmic-diversity. "When there is the establishment of the diversity of enjoyment, the karmic-diversity is inferred" -- such logic entails "the fault of the mutual locus" (itaretarāśrayadoṣa). This is the sense of the verse.

Another objection is raised: "The karmic-diversity is established solely on account of the agentive-diversity, and the diversity of enjoyment on account of the karmic-diversity. There is no fault of the mutual locus here." He states:
(107B-108A) GIVEN THAT THE AGENTS OF ACTIONS (KARMAKARTR) ARE
ACTIVE BECAUSE OF THE SIMULTANEOUS CONNECTION (SAMBANDHĀDYUGAPAD)
TO THAT [I.E., THE SINGLE COLLECTION OF TATTVAS CONSTITUTING THE
SUBTLE BODY], HOW CAN THERE BE SEPARATE ACTIONS (KARMAH)
POSTULATED ON ACCOUNT OF THE DISTINCTION OF THE AGENTS
(KARTRBHEDĀT).

There is no possibility of there being a "karma-kartrtva",
(i.e., a relationship between the agent and the action) without a
connection between the subtle body etc. (which are constituted by Kalā
eetc.), and the souls that are covered by Mala. By means of the simultaneous
connection to all the agents, the action is an activity that is in the
form of the subtle body, which is a single tattvic collection. In this
case, how can there be the distinctions between the various activities
come about? This cannot be the case! This is the meaning [of the
verse].

An objection is raised. The Diversity of the subtle bodies can
only be based on the diversity of each soul's "desire".

We oppose this objection, since the "desire" only arises on account of
each soul's connection to a subtle body. And it is false to hold that the
diversity of desire arises on account of a single subtle body. On account
of the failure to account for the phenomenon of the diversity of enjoyment
in any other manner, one is forced to accept the diversity of subtle
bodies with respect to each soul.

An opponent may raise the objection that the diversity of subtle
bodies is only applicable in the case of the diversity of souls. The
Vedantins uphold that the soul is single. He says:
(108B) THUS, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE MANIFOLDNESS APPLIES AS WELL TO SOULS.

If you accept the unity of the soul, then it is improper to accept the diversity of pleasure, suffering, etc. and the differences of birth, death, etc. -- thus, the manifoldness of souls is established because of the diversity of enjoyment. The refutation of Advaita is taken up by us in the *Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā* in detail.

A question is raised: this tattvic-collection that is of the nature of the subtle body, is it pervasive, like the soul, or is it non-pervasive? Thus, he says:

(109A) THE NON-PERVASIVENESS OF THIS [TATTVIC-COLLECTION] IS ESTABLISHED ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS FUNCTIONS.

The subtle body is established as being non-pervasive due to the impossibility of its activity—which is characterized as manifesting consciousness and activity—to occur at all places at all times.

A further objection is raised: If you postulate that the "effects" of activities come about on account of *Karma*, which is an auxiliary cause, then a pervasive subtle body can still account for the [limited] manifestation of the soul's consciousness (by inciting it). Hence, as this argument proves, the pervasiveness of the subtle body does not entail the simultaneous arising of effects everywhere!

The reply: even this reasoning is false, on account of the non-eternity of the subtle body, since it is in the condition of being an effect--due to its non-pervasiveness, like a pot, etc. This is the sense of the following verse:

(109B-110A) IT IS NOT PROPER TO ANSWER THAT THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE SUBTLE BODY'S INSTRUMENT IS RESTRICTED BY KARMA; ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LIMITLESS ACTIVITIES, THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL PERVASIVENESS [OF THE SUBTLE BODY].
A further question is raised. Is the partial manifestation of consciousness due to the non-pervasive nature of the subtle body or soul? He says:

(1108-111A) ACCORDING TO ŚRUTI there is a problem in holding that the soul is a substratum characterized by transformation etc. during the time that there is the manifestation of consciousness, which is simultaneous with the non-pervasive [subtle body], the soul (anu) remains pervasive.

It is said, "If the soul is [considered] non-pervasive, then it will be impossible (anānupanna) for there to be the experience (upabhoga) that is the result (phala) of another place (desāntara)." Moreover, in the state of release of this (soul), the necessity of pervasiveness ought to be acknowledged, on account of the Agamic claim that the soul has omnipotence and omniscience, like Śiva. If one holds that in the state of release there is pervasiveness and in the state of bondage there is non-pervasiveness, then there is the possibility of the fault of unconsciousness and mutability etc. [attributed to the soul]; such a position would contradict Śruti concerning the soul's eternity, pervasiveness, etc. Thus it is said in the Śrīmanmrgendra: "Consciousness, which is of the nature of cognition and activity, is in souls at all times and in all ways; therefore, in release there is pervasiveness. There is no non-pervasiveness, instantaneousness, singleness, unconsciousness etc. [of the soul].

Now, having discussed the creation (Śrṣṭi) of the unique [or "individual"] Tattvas that are of the nature of the subtle body, he is going to speak about the common (Sādhārana) Tattvas that are of the
nature of the "worlds".

(111B) In a different grouping of Tattvas [than those which
constitute the subtle body] there are the groups that
constitute the spheres of enjoyment (Ratibhumia) for the
enjoyers (Bhogin).

This is the meaning: the levels of enjoyment (Bhogasthāna)
of the bound ones are the enjoyments (Bhogā) of the Tattvas that are
of the form (ākāra) of the various worlds etc., which are other than the
enjoyment (Bhogā) that is of nature (Rūpa) of the subtle body. He says:

(112A) This tattvic-collection having entered into a body born
with that [i.e., a world], it brings about the [respective karmic]
results [Phala] in these [respective spheres of enjoyment] of
those [souls].

When the tattvic-collection has entered into the bodies born of
their respective worlds (Tattadbhuvanajādehaśu) on account of the force
of Karma (Karmavaśāt), i.e., when it has entered into the loci-of-enjoy-
ment (Bhogā bhūmi), which is for the purpose of the behavior (ācārāpeksa),
this [tattvic-collection] becomes the manifesting-factor of the
force [or capacity, i.e., āsanonthya] of the consciousness and activity of
a part of the soul. It is said in the Tattvasamgraha: "On account of the
force of Karma, one wanders in all the bodies born with their [respective]
worlds." As well, it is said in the Śrīmanmrṛgendra, "This subtle body,
which belongs to this creature (Jantu), is [described] briefly as
"conscious" (Cit), because it is in [i.e., born from] the contact with
consciousness (citsāṅga) and is an evolute in the mysterious womb
(gahāgarbhavivartī), i.e., an evolute in māyā; judging that this is not
sufficient I am going to describe a series of

Now he is going to briefly describe the creation of the worlds
(bhuvanāsrṣṭi):

(112B-113A THE "COURSE" OF THE GROSS WORLDS BEGINNING WITH HELL AND
ENDING WITH TRUTH ARE SUPERINTENDED OVER [I. E. IMPLED] DURING THEIR
GENERATION, SUBSISTENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY DEŚIKA, HĀTAKA, AND KĀLA.

Here Kāla is Kalāgni. Hātaka is the Pātālādhipati. Deśika is
the Lokācārya on account of imparting teaching in all the śāstras; he
resides in a place that is above the Satya loka, and is even above the
Viṣṇuloka. The Ananta Śrīkṛṣṇa is present in the Rudraloka on account
of being the one who has superintendence in Brahmāṇḍa in these gross
regions. Thus:

(113B-114Ba) THE LEADER OF THE 100 RUDRAS, TOGETHER WITH THE 8 ALONG
WITH THE 5, IS IN THE CAUSES OF THE EARLIER MENTIONED ELEMENTS
(BHŪṬĀṆI) -- NOT THE [GROSS] ELEMENTS [BORN] OF THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS,
BUT AS THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS [THEMSELVES] WHICH ARE CATEGORIES OF THE
INTERNAL ORGAN (CITTAVARGA).

Virabhadra is Governor of the Śatarudras, who are the Bearers
the Brahmāṇḍa; Virabhadra is located in the subtle prthūvitattva (not to
be confused with the gross Prthivy (prthūvitattveprāguktastūlaprthūvitikāraṇabhūte
tanmātraṇayē). Likewise [for the Paṇcabhūṭāṇi starting from Prthivy,
there are two classes, a gross and subtle, and a particular divinity in charge of these in the group of four elements, the subtle water etc., which are not the subtle elements but the causative elements that are the gross water etc.; as in the [collection] beginning with the subtle elements and ending with the ego [which is on account of being the material cause of the internal organ as is indicated by the word "cittavarga" (in the verse)], so in this sphere with those called Sthānu, Guhya, Atiguhyā, Guhyatara and Pavitrā, there are the five and eight that are in these worlds. Thus it is said in the Śrīmānandikesvarakārikā: "Brahmā is located in the gross things for the purpose of the objects of enjoyment of the bodies that are the support of the subtle etc. The Rudrasata is of the Kṣetrabhūva and the forty subtle elements. The subtle elements, Manas, the ego, Buddhi, organs, the best of the Yogins, Vāma, etc. are at the summit of the Guṇas and rule in the Prakṛti-tattva; the Mandalins have their sphere in Kāla; he says:

(114Bb-1168) THE EIGHT WISE ONES, PAIŚACA, ETC., THAT TAKE OFFICE IN THE GUṆA-TATTVA OUGHT TO BE WORSHIPPED IN THE BUDDHI;

The thirty Rūdra, Vāma etc., together with the eight Krodhesvara, by means of being the Lords of the Prakṛti sphere, are located at the
head of the worlds of the Guna-level (gunaṃstakabhuvaneṣu). On account of the subtle nature of Prakṛti, it is improper for [them to be] the support of the worlds — so say the ones who know the Āgamas.

(117a) THE MANDALAS, THE EIGHT DESIRABLE ONES, ARE IN THE KALĀ-TATTVA.

The Mañḍalas are in the eight worlds in an eight-fold sequentiality of the Kalā-tattva in association with Rāga and Vidyā. Thus, it is said in the Śrīmatmrṣendra, "the Mañḍalādhipas are in the 64 groups (Mañḍala) of the Great Cities (Mahāpura) that occupy Kalā which is the womb (garbha) of Rāga and Vidyā."

Therein it is said that "Kāla and Niyati have two worlds (bhuvanadvaya); restraint (niyata) is in nitya while the capacity to cause things (kalanaśakti) is in Kāla."

Since the worldly states (bhuvanadhva) are well treated in the manuals dealing with ritual and elsewhere; they are not going to be treated here in great detail. In these ritual manuals and elsewhere there may be some differences concerning the enumeration of subordinate worlds; however, some of the enumerations get included somewhere or other — so there is no inconsistency.

Now, having discussed the creation of the Tattvas that is of the nature of the worlds, he is going to establish Māyā as the higher material cause of the worlds which is of the nature of Kalā etc. (which have already been discussed):

(117b-118a) MAHĀMĀYĀ, WHICH IS UNCONSCIOUS, IS THE "SEED OF THE WORLD", THE CAPACITY TO CREATE; IN ORDER FOR THERE TO BE THE ENJOYMENT OF THE ENJOYERS, THERE IS THE BIRTH OF KALĀ ETC. ON
ACCOUNT OF THIS MAHĀMĀYĀ.

"Māyā" is "the extensive one" (mahati) on account of its self-effected pervasiveness in the form of a manifold "flowing"; Māyā is the "mati" (conception/idea) in the "Cosmic Rest (pralaya) of the whole impure world. [Māyā qua Mati outlives the Pralaya and serves as the source of the succeeding creation].

This Māyā is the seed of that world which is in the form of Kalā etc.; Māya is thus the material cause, both directly and indirectly (sāksātparāmparyā), of everything that is of the form of an effect, since Māya is bearer of the worlds and the principle of the manifoldness regarding the difference with respect to each soul.

Māya is "the capacity to create", which means that it is of the nature of a collection of its own effected capacities that are of a subtle form. By the acceptance of Satkārayāda, Māyā is of the form of the capacity (sakti) of all effects; being such a condition as the material cause, Māyā is unconscious, like earth and so forth. Therefore, Māyā is the origin of the means whereby Bhoga is accomplished in the sphere of Kalā etc.

He is now going to describe the nature of Maya as a collection of capacities:

(1188-119A) THIS MAHĀMĀYĀ POSSESSES CAPACITIES; THE PLURALITY AND MANIFOLDNESS OF THE CAPACITIES ARE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF THE MANIFOLD AND ENDLESS EFFECTS.
On account of observing the arising of the manifold and endless effects, this Māyā is known to be of the nature of the collection of capacities that are of the manifold and endless effects.

An objection is raised. If one holds that Māyā's manifold capacities cause manifold effects, and yet, if one also holds that all the forms of capacity actually are capacities of Māyā itself, then it is unnecessary to postulate further capacities [in the form of the manifold effects] stemming from this capacity [of Māyā]. As a result, Māyā should be considered to be eternal on account of being the ultimate [single] cause; otherwise, an infinite regress [of causes] will follow. This is the sense of the following verse; he says:

(119B-120A) [AN OBJECTION:] ON ACCOUNT OF THE MANIFOLDNESS OF THE NON-CONSCIOUS THINGS, THERE IS MOST CERTAINLY THE NON-ETERNALITY [OF MAHĀMĀYĀ]; [THE REPLY:] NOT BEING ITSELF MANIFOLD ON ACCOUNT OF ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE, MĀYĀ IS ETERNAL, EVEN THOUGH IT IS OF AN UNCONSCIOUS NATURE.

Moreover,

(120B-121A) ON ACCOUNT OF THE INFINITE NUMBER OF SOULS, MAYA MUST BE PERVERSIVE; FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ENJOYMENT, MAYA CAUSES ALL EFFECTS THROUGH ALL THE COURSES [OF THINGS] AND THROUGH ALL THE ABODES.

Bṛhaspati says: "[if Māyā is not eternal] all the Siddhas' words, which have been vocalized over a long period of time, will perish."

Although Māyā is eternal [i.e., beginningless, anantya], the various courses [of things caused by Māyā] are not innumerable. The maxim that "curd comes from milk" supports the idea that transformation
is not a total transformation; the maxim that "insects [taking sustenance] from the ghee" supports the idea that transformation is only partial. 

(121B-122A) CREATION, MAINTENANCE, AND DESTRUCTION ARE SAID TO BE THE CONDITIONS INHERENT TO MĀYĀ; THE INHERENT CONDITION BELONGS TO THE TRANSFORMATION WITH THE TATTVAS AND ENDS WITH THE WORLDS.

So, on account of being the ultimate material cause, Māyā is responsible for the creation, maintenance and destruction of the universe. The transformation of the worlds, etc. remains as an inherent condition of Māya in the form of tattvas, etc. Indeed, the universe, as a transformation of Māya, consists of the tattvas, material things, sentient beings and worlds.

An objection: the Agamas claim that Bindu is the material cause of the pure Tattvas etc.

True! That holds good in the case of the higher condition of release, such as is obtained by the Vidyesvaras etc., but not here, however, as the material cause (qua Māyā) provides the means whereby enjoyment is accomplished (Bhogasādhana) -- thus, there is no contradiction [in holding both Bindu and Mayāmāyā as material causes]. And here:

(122B) WHEN CREATION AND MAINTENANCE HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED, DESTRUCTION IS [DESCRIBED AS] THE REVERSE PROCESS OF CREATION.

This is the meaning [of the verse]: creation and maintenance are described by explaining their activities and by describing the sequence of their genesis with respect to each Tattva; destruction, on the other
hand, is described as the "drawing in/contracting" (upasamhāra) into its own causes by an inversion of creation.\(^{93}\) Moreover:

(123A) **ON ACCOUNT OF THE BEGINNINGLESSNESS OF WORLDLY EXISTENCE,**

**THERE IS NO PERMANENCE IN THE PROCESS OF CREATION ETC.**

The Beginninglessness refers to samsāric existence. An objection: as they provide the means whereby enjoyment can be accomplished, creation and destruction affect souls; however, why should the Lord want to carry out destruction?\(^{94}\)

We reply: since Māyā has the incessant capacity (śakti) of increasing the production of the infinite enjoyments of the soul, the re-absorption (samhāra) is for the purpose of the maturation of the (souls') Karman (karmapākartha) and also for the purpose of providing some rest for the souls (ātmanām visramārtham) for the rejuvenation of their powers (śāmarthyopdbalanārtham), as is sleep for a beautiful woman. Thus, it is said in the Śrīmatmṛgendra,\(^ {95}\) "Having been seized, the soul remains for the purpose of rest." This is done for the benefit of all created beings who are the "worldlings" fatigued by the bound condition; even in this state of rest, there is instruction for those who are fit for instruction, the obstruction for those who are fit for obstruction, and the maturation of Karma for those who are fit for this maturation. Making the capacities of Māyā fit for manifestation, the Lord watches over the whole genesis of things.

Now summing up that Enjoyment (with its means) belongs to the soul, he is going to introduce [the view] that the Pāśa, which is of the nature of Māla, just belongs to this [soul].
(123B-124A) THE SOULS' "OBJECT-OF-ENJOYMENT" CONSISTS OF MÀYÀ (MÀYÀ-MÀYÀ) BY THE MEANS (SÀDHANA) THAT HAVE BEEN PRODUCED FROM MÀYÀ; THEREFORE, THE ENJOYER IS A DEFILED-SOUL THAT IS CONSCIOUS -- THE OBJECT-OF-ENJOYMENT IS NOT CONSCIOUS.

As it has been said, the object-of-enjoyment is of the nature of the cognition of the Buddhi, which is of the nature of pleasure etc.; this object of enjoyment is just an effect of màyà and is not inherent in the soul as its "quality", since the soul is of the nature consciousness. As well, to postulate such an inherence (samavàya) would entail the fault of attributing mutability etc. to the soul. Thus, just the conscious soul is the Enjoyer of the object of enjoyment.

On account of the soul's obfuscated condition of consciousness and agency (which is an impure condition that will be discussed in the sequel), it is possible for the soul to enjoy that which is accompanied by the Tattvas such as Kalà etc., which are produced from Màyà.

But, without some cause to account for the effect, limited consciousness is not possible. Hence, how does this impure soul come to be? He says:

(124B) THUS OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE ARE OBFSUCATED BY THE MALA OF THE EXPERIENCER (VIŞAYITVA).

Although possessed by omniscience and omnipotence, like Siva, the soul requires Kalà etc. in the cognition that has a limited scope (kimcidviṣaya). Thus, it is said that the released soul -- who is not an enjoyer -- is possessed by omniscience etc.

Therefore, given [the sense of] Enjoyership there is the designation of "experimcer" (vişayitva), which means that the obfuscation
by Māla is designated by "experiencer". It is said that "Enjoyment is a result of Māla". Thus, the soul [with Enjoyership] is impure.

The Srimatsvayambhuva states: "If the soul is not impure, how come it has this attachment to enjoyments? Thus:

(125A) BY MEANS OF THAT PASSION (RAGA) THAT FUNCTIONS ON ACCOUNT OF KARMA IN A LATENT CONDITION, THE SOUL [OBSCURED BY MĀLA] CHASES AFTER MAYA.

It is improper to attribute [karmic] development to the soul, as in the case of agricultural activities etc. The soul follows after Māyā (which is transformed into the form of the means whereby Enjoyment is accomplished) through the means of Rāga, which is of the nature of Karma.

During the period of the Cosmic Destruction (pralaya) when there is the disappearance of the Buddhi in the samsaric sphere due to the Reabsorption of the destroyed Buddhi into the "seed of the world" (which is of the nature of Maya), enjoyment arises due to the fructification of [the latent] Karma. Now an objection is raised.

(125B-126A) KARMA WHICH IS AN EFFECT OF A PREVIOUS EXISTENCE PROVIDES THE SOULS' FRUITS AT BIRTH ETC. -- WHY THEN IMAGINE THAT THE SOUL IS DEFILED WHEN KARMA IS PREVAILING?

Karmic-activities are the givers of birth, life and Enjoyment through the condition of the bondage to the body that is an effect -- [this can be understood] in terms of the maxim that "the seed and sprout relationship is beginningless." Just let these karmic-activities provide the soul's connection to the body, which is for the purpose of the enjoyment of the respective fruits. Of what use is Māla? After you have
construed *Mala* as useful [i.e. as capable of providing the soul's bondage], you go on and postulate *Karma*, [claiming that it must be postulated] since there is nothing other to explain the variety [of the differences] of enjoyment. Thus, just *Karma* should be postulated as the cause of bondage; your explanation is too cumbersome! The postulation of *Mala* is unnecessary. Thus they say, "What is conceived again obstructs the conception (*kalpyam punar nirunaddhi kalpanāmiti*)." In this [verse] he refutes this:

(126B-127A) ON ACCOUNT OF *KARMA* THERE IS THE CAPACITY (*Sakti*) THAT GENERATES BIRTH ETC. -- BUT THIS DOES NOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT *MALA*, AS A SOUL THAT IS FREE FROM IMPURITY IS NOWHERE TO BE SEEN.

Since it is impossible to observe either the engagement in karmic comportment or the actual birth of a released soul. that is not possessed of *Mala* (the cause of ignorance) it follows that the acquisition of *Karma* solely belongs to a soul possessed of *Mala*. Once the accumulation of *Karma* has been effected, the soul thenceforth engages in its enjoyment. If the cause of birth etc. is *Mala*, then why even posit *Karma*?

(127B-128A) IF LET THE WORLDLING/EXPERICER (*Viṣayitva*) BE EXPLAINED BY ONE THING [I.E. *MALA*] -- THEN OF WHAT USE IS *KARMA*? ON ACCOUNT OF HAVING ACQUIRED [*MALA*], THE CONNECTION TO BIRTH ETC. CERTAINLY ARISES.

Now he refutes this:
(1288-129A) In respect to the "kevalins" (released souls) who are possessed of consciousness and who are accomplished without karma, there is no connection to birth etc.: Therefore, the cause behind the existence in this world is twofold.

Since we do not see the birth etc. of the Viññānakevalins who are free of karma but are still impeded by Mala, the cause of the connection to Māyā is twofold -- this is the meaning of the verse.

Now an objection: it is not proper to hold that the soul can be obfuscated [by Mala], since prior to creation the soul is possessed by consciousness and partlessness, like Śiva. He disposes of this doubt in the following verse:

(1298-130A) It is false to say that "since the soul is possessed of the qualities of consciousness and activity and is partless prior to creation, there can be no connection to ignorance."

If this accepted, it then becomes improper for the soul to have a connection to Kalā, as in the case of Śiva. Therefore, there is failure of anything else to account for the connection to Kalā; hence, Mala ought to be accepted as belonging to the soul.98 Furthermore:

(1308-131A) When it is postulated that the consciousness and activity [inherent in the soul] apply to every object on account of the soul's pervasiveness, the soul becomes omniscient and omnipotent and is therefore self-satisfied without a cause.

This is not the case on account of the requirement of Kalā etc., as in the case of limited knowledge.
(131B) ON ACCOUNT OF THERE NOT BEING A MANIFESTING-AGENT OF
KALĀ ETC., THERE IS NO MANIFESTATION OF THE BOUND SOUL'S
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACTIVITY.

And it is not proper for this to apply to a soul that is not veiled.

(132A) THE LIGHT OF THE SUN, NOT BEING VEILED, DOES NOT REQUIRE A
MANIFESTING-AGENT.

And therefore:

(132B) MALA IS A BEGINNINGLESS CONNECTION TO [SOMETHING]
BEGINNINGLESS; IT IS UNIVERSAL [SĀDHARĀNA, I.E. APPLICABLE TO ALL]
AND INDESTRUCTIBLE.

In this verse the "beginningless connection" means the "beginningless covering [by Mala]" and "to [something] beginningless" refers to the beginningless of the souls; "universal" means that it applies to all bound souls—the one has to accept that Mala is eternal. [The opponent raises an objection:] If Mala is eternal, there will never be a "cessation [of samsara]" for the soul! Or, on the other hand, if "cessation" is accommodated, on account of the unity of Mala, at the time of the release of one soul, all souls will attain release. He says:

(133A) WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATIONS PERTINENT TO EACH SOUL, MALA HAS THE
CAPACITY (SĀKTI) TO SEPARATE THE RESPECTIVE TIME [GOVERNING THE
RESPECTIVE LIMITATIONS].

Mala's innumerable capacities (sakti) are restricted to individual souls. Thus, individual souls are released when their bonds qua
"capacities" (śakti) [of Mala] reach their proper maturation. In this respect, it is said that the capacities are simply superimpositions (upādhi) over individual souls and that that these capacities reach their own end.

The opponent argues: the obfuscated condition of the soul arises as a result of the "mundane delusion" (mahāmoha) that comes about only after the creation of the world and due to the soul's "connection-to-Kāla, etc." We reply:

(133B-134A) ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, THE SOUL IS CONSIDERED TO BE UNCONNECTED TO MALA AND IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED TO BE UNOBFUSCATED, AS IS THE CASE WITH ŚIVA.

However, according to this view, it becomes impossible for the soul [which is only obfuscated by mundane defilement] to abandon the mundane defilement (prakṛtamala). Thus, one ought to accept the beginningless connection between the soul and the beginningless Mala.

Furthermore:

(134B-135A) ACCORDING TO THE WISE, IF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MALA AND THE SOUL HAS A BEGINNING, THEN ONE MUST ALSO SPEAK ABOUT A CAUSE (kārana) [OF THIS BEGINNING] -- AND THUS, AN INFINITE REGRESS WILL FOLLOW.
(135B-136A) IF, ONE THE OTHER HAND, THE CONNECTION IS CONSIDERED TO BE WITHOUT A CAUSE, THEN EVEN THE CONNECTION TO KALÁ ETC. IS CONSIDERED TO BE WITHOUT A CAUSE, AND THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE NO RELEASE FOR SOULS AND THERE WILL BE NO LORD!

When one holds that the association with Pāśa [the category of the bound condition] is without a cause, on account of the uncaused connection to a body etc., then even the released soul will have some connection with this Pāśa, and it will actually be impossible for the soul to be released from samsāra. Since this association to Pāśa would even apply to Śiva, Śiva would no longer be considered the Godhead. For these reasons, the soul's connection to Mala ought to be accepted as beginningless and as the cause of samsāric existence.

An opponent may claim that Mala is manifold due to its specificity. According to this view, Mala is therefore considered to be non-eternal, due to its manifoldness and materiality, as in the case of pots etc. However, since this view postulates a type of Mala that would have have a beginning, the same faults already mentioned would apply here as well, i.e., the charge of "infinite regress", the impossibility of release", etc. He says:

(135B-137A) IF MALA IS HELD TO BE SPECIFIC [TO EACH SOUL], THEN IT IS UNCONSCIOUS ON ACCOUNT OF BEING MANIFOLD; HOWEVER, ON ACCOUNT OF HAVING AN ORIGIN AND BEING SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION, THE EARLIER MENTIONED FAULTS APPLY [TO THIS ACCOUNT OF MALA].

Since Mala is beginningless it cannot "have an end" [i.e., be open to destruction]; otherwise [if one holds that something beginningless can have an end], everything becomes open to destruction [i.e., everything becomes non-eternal].

(137B-138A) IF THE CONNECTION OF "SOMETHING BEGINNINGLESS TO SOME-
THING BEGINNINGLESS" IS ESTABLISHED AS BEING OPEN TO DESTRUCTION, THEN EVEN SUCH BEGINNINGLESS THINGS AS MAYA AND SIVA WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION!

Having established the indestructableness, eternity and beginninglessness of Mala, he will now establish that Mala is possessed of endless capacities (sakti):

(1388) THESE CAPACITIES OF MALA, WHICH ARE RESTRICTED TO EACH SOUL INDIVIDUALLY, ARE THE OBSTRUCTORS OF THE [SOUL'S] QUALITIES.

"The obstructors of the quality" means the obstructors of the soul's qualities, which are of the nature of consciousness and activity (as has been pointed out already).

Due to the failure to otherwise account for the variety of enjoyment, which is [empirically] observed, the variety [of enjoyment] is established to be based on the temporal transformations of Mala's "capacities". He says:

(139A-140A) IF MALA'S CAPACITIES WERE NOT TEMPORALLY RESTRAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE TERMINATION OF THE OBSTRUCTION [OF JNANA AND KRIYA], THE SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF ALL THOSE WHO POSSESS CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD OCCUR. SINCE THE SOUL EXISTS IN A CONDITION OF BEGINNINGLESS OBfuscATION, MALA IS THE ONLY PASA THAT INNATELY COEXISTS ALONG WITH THE SOUL.

Mala is the only Pasa that innately coexists along with the soul. However, the Srimsavayambhuva and other works entertain the opponents claim that Maya etc. are just "independent" phenomena [lacking any innate connection to the soul and Mala]. The opponent claims that all the entities that belong to the sphere of Maya to which the bound soul has
a connection, are just of the nature of Māya itself.

In the Śrīmaṅmrgendra and elsewhere this opponent is refuted on the grounds that the Mala that innately coexists along with the soul is in fact the cause (hetutva) of the Mala constitutive of [the Māyā-based] delusion, etc. (i.e., delusion, madness, passion, depression and emaciation). Thus, he says:

(140B-141A) IT IS NOT PROPER TO HOLD THAT THE FIVE [DELUSIONS] SUCH AS MADNESS, ETC. ARE THE [OBSCURING-] ACTIVITIES OF THE EXPERIENCER (Viśayitva), AS THESE FIVE DELUSIONS ARE NEVER SEEN IN THE SOULS WITHOUT KALĀ.

The five delusions (which are going to be described in the sequel) are not seen when Mala is without the connection to Kalā etc. as in the case of the Viśñānaka and PralayaKaka [souls]. The five delusions only apply to the Sakala souls. Thus, it is established that the five delusions, which belong to Mala, do not have the function of obfuscating consciousness and activity.

The Śrīmatmataṅga and other texts state that Mala exists as the generating cause of the five delusions. In this case, the five delusions, which are of the nature of such mental conceptions as seeing the soul in what is not the soul, are said to have Māya as their material cause, because those souls that are involved in the sphere of Māya and that are linked to Kalā, are not free-of Mala. Consequently, the five delusions arise on account of Mala acting as an associate cause (sahakārin). Only as an "associate cause" is Mala, therefore, the cause (hetutva) of the five delusions. Hence, there is no contradiction in speaking of Mala as the cause.
Now, an objection is raised: "The five delusions, whose material cause is considered to be Mala, are not manifested during the period of Cosmic Rest. They are only manifested after their connection to Kalā. What is wrong with this position?" He says:

(141B-142B) "THE FIVE DELUSIONS ARE MANIFESTED ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION TO THE MEANS WHEREBY ENJOYMENT IS ACCOMPLISHED."

THIS IS FALSE! ACCORDING TO YOU THE FIVE DELUSIONS HAVE THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AS FUNCTIONS OF THE GUNAS. THUS, ACCORDING TO YOU, THE FIVE DELUSIONS ARE SIMPLY SPECIES OF THE GUNAS.

He states that the manifestation of the five delusions does not arise after the connection to the means whereby enjoyment is accomplished.

An objection is raised. Mala is described as the cause of the five delusions. However, since Mala is also described as eternally being of the same nature, it is impossible for there to be a distinction between a manifested and an unmanifested condition of Mala. As a result, it must be accepted that the five delusions are in an effect condition obfuscating the soul's consciousness and activity.

No, this does not follow! Rather, the five delusions attributed to the soul are simply conditions of the internal organ (antahkarana) and temporally arise after the connection to the means whereby enjoyment is accomplished. Thus, the five delusions should be construed as arising from the Gunas, which have arisen from Māyā together with the auxilliary cause Mala.

Now he is going to point out the nature of the five delusions as of the nature of the Gunas:
(143A-143B) MADNESS AND DELUSION; ATTACHMENT; DESPAIR AND ERROR -- THESE ARE RESPECTIVELY DERIVED FROM TAMAS, SATTVAM AND RAJAS.

An objection: if the five delusions are not modifications of the Gunas in the condition of the internal organ, then the five delusions must be separate modifications of Mala and are seen to occur in the soul with limited consciousness. That this is not the case, he says:

(144A) THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE CAUSE [I.E., MALA] ARE NOT SEPARATE FROM THE FIVE GUÑA-BASED DELUSIONS--THIS IS NOT THE CASE!

Thus:

(144B-145A) IF ONE DISMISSES THE CAPACITIES AS THE OBSCURATIONAL FACTORS, NO OTHER QUALITY THAN THIS SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED. THE CAUSE OF THE "SAMSKĀRAS" IS ONE THAT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RECEPTACLE OF KARMA.

The ubiquitous Mala is the obscurational agency of consciousness and activity while the connection to the samskāra-based Karmic activity is the cause of samsaric existence. There is no other reason to explain the effect except Mala. This is the meaning of the verse.

Now, having pointed out the innate nature of Mala, he concludes [this verse]:

(145B) IN A WORD, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS CONNECTION TO MALA, THE SOUL IS TERMED "THE LIMITED ONE" (ANU).
In the Śrīmadbaurava etc. the word "soul" (paśu) is used to indicate "mala"; Mala is not a separate Tattva from "soul" but rather Mala is inclusive in the "Paśu-tattva" -- without this inclusiveness of mala in the "Paśu-tattva", it is impossible for there to be the bound condition (paśutva) the soul. Moreover, in this section, the activity [of Mala] has been treated as (a) the form of "Enjoyment" and "the object of Enjoyment" belonging to the bound souls and (b) of the nature of a "diminishing (pośana) qua the generating of Kalā etc. which forms the means whereby Enjoyment is accomplished and which is derived from mayā, and (c) which is of the nature of the soul's enjoyment of Enjoyment (bhogabhojana) prior to the act of creation etc. of Śiva and at the time of creation, on account of the beginningless-veiling (anādyavṛttatva) by Mala. All of these activities of these [limited souls] arise solely on account of the soul's obfuscation by Mala. All obfuscational activities occur because of the existence of Mala. Moreover, the five delusions are herein shown to be Kleśas of the soul; he is now going to sum up, pointing out that the differences of the activities [of these kleśic souls] are due to the differences in the competance (achikārabhedā) [of these kleśic souls];

(146A-146B) FOR THOSE WHO ARE ABSORBED IN THE TATTVAS, THE KLEŚAS ARE INACTIVE (PRASUPTA); FOR THOSE WHO ARE YOGINS, THE KLEŚAS ARE THE OBSTRUCTIONS ON THE SHORE (TATARUDDHA); FOR THOSE WHO ARE ADDICTED TO WORLDLY OBJECTS (VIṣAYASANĪGIN), THE KLEŚAS ARE OF A MANIFOLD AND DEVELOPED FORM (VICITRORODARUPO). Belonging to those in the Maya-tattva, the Kleśas belong to the
Pralayākala souls who are limited to the Guṇa-tattva etc. being so limited, the Kleśas of the Pralayākala souls are "inactive", because they do not contribute towards any significant change. The Kleśas of the Yogins are manifested on account of the power of yoga; being in the middle sphere, Yogins' activities are obstructed. The ones who are attached to sense objects are the Sakala-souls whose activities are diverse (vicitra) and developed (udbhuta). If we take the reading "vicchinnoḍara" instead of "vicitroḍara [vicchinnaudara, separate and illustrious, vicitra-udara, manifold and illustrious] the meaning [of the verse] becomes: For those who are addicted to worldly objects (viṣayasaṅgin) the Kleśas are sometimes of a developed form and sometimes of a split up form, because of the mutual ascendancy and subjugation of the two types.

Now, having earlier mentioned that Bhoga and Mokṣa along with the the means whereby they are accomplished would be treated, Bhoga along with its means has been dealt with and the manual dealing with Bhoga is concluded. Mokṣa along with its means will be dealt with in another manual.
APPENDIX I

NOTES

1 As the "Paramātman", Sadāśiva is described as the "sarvakālāpravartakah" in RĀ, 1.18, p. 2.

2 Sadāśiva is described as the "bandhamokṣaṇapratir" in RĀ, 1.2, p. 1.

3 Compare Sāṃkhya Jūtra, 3.72: "[Bondage and Liberation belong] to matter directly, because it is subject to association, like a beast (prakṛterajasyatmasaṅgāt)."

4 Cf. Pandey, Bhāskarī, p. LXII for a discussion of the distinction between Agamic Śaivism and Sāṃkhya.

5 A soul becomes capable of enjoying objects-of-enjoyment because of being attached (saktātva) to enjoyment (bhoga) by the Rāga-tattva which is technically that which causes attachment (anurāṇjaka) to things (viṣaye); however, Rāga is dependent on Māla.

According to Sāṃkhya, Rāga is the cause (hetu) or manifestor (abhivyāṇjaka) of attachment (abhiṣaṅga) which is an attribute (dharma) of the buddhi.

6 BK, 117B-118A; the jagadbīja is described as the "mahāmāyā", which is the "janyāsakti" and is acetanā.

7 This verse is also quoted by Mādhava in the Sarvadarsanāsamgraha in the section dealing with the Saivadarsana; cf. ed. p. 80 and trans. p.118.


9 Also quoted by Aghora Śiva, TSV, p. 5

10 A similar quotation is found in MA, p. 317: "sthūlasukṣmarupatvena tanīndriyayādharāni sthitāni ityartham."

11 Also quoted in MA, p. 317 and MA, 19.21, p. 467; the source is TS, v. 4, p.

12 "Activities" or "modifications" are variously referred to as vṛtti, kriyā, or vyāpāra.

13 The subtle body (suksmādeha) or "transference body (atiyahika)" is also known as the "puṇyaśataka" as it consists of the five tāṇmātra and three atathākaraṇa. Elsewhere the puṇyaśataka is identified with
the prāṇāstaka, i.e. that which consists of the five prāṇa, the karmendriya, jñānendriya and antahkarana; cf. Yuktidipīka comm. on vv. 23-24 and Brahmasūtrasāṅkarabhāṣya on 2.4.6. Sāṁkhya Sūtra 3. 7-16, claims that the subtle body (linga) is "seventeen and one" (saptadasaīka), which includes the three internal organs, ten organs and five subtle elements. The Śivajñānasiddhiyār (trans. p.206) claims that there are actually "five" bodies, the sukṣma-, sthūla-, guna-, kañcuka- and kāraṇa bodies, which the author respectively identifies with the five kosaas of the Vedānta, i.e. the prāṇamaya-, ānāmmaya-, manomaya-, vijñānamaya- and ānanda-maya-kosa.

In this context, the commentator supplies both the "gross" and "subtle" elements whereas in the previous verse just the gross elements are discussed.

The commentator is attempting to explain the compound "ativānikadehaestha" in terms of the fact that the gross body is the receptacle; therefore, the "stha" cannot directly be the receptacle. Moreover, the introduction of the subtle body and karma at this point, especially the claim in 8A-8B that the subtle body is only perceptible by those who have lordly powers, may be an argument against the Cārvākas who argue that the "cēsta" is solely a product of the physical body; of the two causes the Śaivism brings forth in his explanation, i.e. karma and the subtle body, karma is adṛṣṭa and the subtle body is only open to the perception of those who have lordly powers.

TS, vv. 24B-25A, p. 25.

"Spirits", i.e. "piṣacāḥ"; for a description of these spirits, cf. SPB, p. 239. The Piṣacas are the deities who rule over the Tattvas from Buddhi to earth, possess lordly powers and are of eight types.

A very similar description of the kramic ordering of the elements and their qualities is found in the Mrgendra Agama, 12.26-30; pp. 337-338.

Cf. Mā, 12. 28A; p. 338.

Ibid. 12.26A, p. 337

Ibid. p. 331: "ete ca śabda etasām parasparāhātivaśat utpannah".


The Śaivites want to argue for a "krama theory" of evolutes. Śabda is actually a specific gūpa of ākāśa but a shared gūpa of the other gross elements as well; the Śaivites are arguing against the more static view of Vaiśeṣika that śabda is an ekagūpa of ākāśa.
Vaiśeṣika explains the presence of sābda elsewhere by arguing that ākāśa is present everywhere; cf. SPB, p. 283: "svaviveśagunānāḥ sābdaṁ aśrayādaṁ yanāḥ sthitam heturvaiśeṣika (ato 'yam hetvabhosā vaśamyātā)." Sridhara (comm. on 41, trans. p. 132) argues that sound can never be a quality of any other substance, one of the reasons being that "it is perceived elsewhere than its substratum". Sound is perceived in the ear, not in the objects which are thought to be its substratum.

24"kālatīta": the hetu is proven to be bādhita by some other pramāṇa which is stronger; it is fivefold according to the five pramanas. A typical example with respect to the pratyakṣa pramāṇa is the statement that "fire is not hot because it is a thing".

25According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the conception of rūpa is only "colour" although it signifies form as well, which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika calls anvaya-samsthanaṇिष्ठ (a particular arrangement of parts).

26A similar citation is found in MA, 12.19B, p. 330: "sabdaṇḍyekottara..."

27According to the Vaiśeṣika, the five karmendriya fall under the category of "movement" (karma); cf. Padartha-dharma-samgraha, trans. p. 5. According to Nyāya, the definition of the "sarira" is "atmano bhogāyatanam" or more specifically, antyāvayavitva sati ceṣṭāśrayam, a final product which possesses voluntary action; cf. Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 106 and K. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic (Madras: P. Varadachary, 1932), p. 83. As well, cf. Sridhara, trans. p. 629, for a description of the function of "conscious movement": "if one wishes to perform an action then there arises an effort in the soul, occupying the region of the body, aided by that effort and gravity, produces an action (motion) in the hand (explained in terms of the soul being in "contact" with a circumscribed part of the body)."

28Quoted in MA, p. 321: also quoted by Aghora Siva in his commentary on v. 51 of the Tattvapraκaṇa, p. 105.

29Cf. TS, v. 6A, p.: "pratycakam sābdadhivesamālocam vṛttib." 

30Compare TSV, p. 9: "na cāyām tattvaantarāṇām kāryah tesām svakaryaireva siddhiṁ kāryantararhetuvā pramanabhavat. anekatattvaparīkalpanabhavaprasyaṇgaśca."

31MA, p. 319: "devanāḍdyotanādvā devā indriyāni..."

32A similar idea is expressed in the MA, p. 321: "when the soul, the senses, and the objects are in contact all the senses do not enter into action. Therefore, by the same reasoning, some may infer that there is an agent which sets the senses into [their restricted] activity.

33MPA, 18.81-82; also quoted in MA, p. 320 (wherein "citta"
is glossed as "manas" by Rāmakanṭha).

34 MA, p. 323.


36 The needle piercing the collection of lotus leaves is a commonly used analogy. Śridhara, for example, uses it to explain the quickness with which we perceive two separate objects at the same time in different places; cf. PDS, p. 57.

37 BK, 1178-1184. The jagadbija is "mahānāya" (which is the janyaśakti and acetanatva).

38 In the MAD (p. 312) which deals with the vāyu "udāna" Aghora Śiva mentions the different kinds of udāna (naga etc.) which are mentioned elsewhere as "pradhāna", i.e. as essential forms of vāyu, but in fact they are, he says, secondary (aprādhānya). He cites the Kālottara Agama which lists five kinds of udāna, which are the same that are cited here.

39 Quoted in MAV, p. 324 as well.

40 Ibid, p. 325.

41 Quoted also in MAV, p. 327.

42 A similar idea is expressed in MAD, p. 327.

43 Cf. MAV, p. 32.

44 The same quote appears in MAD, p. 308 and in the IS, p. 9, although with the more logical "tatra yo anādhyvāsāyātmakāḥ..."

45 Sāmkhya Sūtra 3.58 and 6.40: "prakṛti", which is pumārtham, represents the sphere of the bhogya.

46 The whole verse appears in the Śataratnasamgraha, trans. p.69: "Bhoga is called vedāṇa and is of the nature of joy, suffering, etc; the soul fit for this has the consciousness as due to Karma (bhoga 'sya vedanā pumāṣaḥ sukhaduḥkhaśilakṣanāḥ tam samarthitacaitanyān pumāḥ abhyeti karmaṭaḥ).

47 The MA (p.342) even attributes cit to the suksamadeha, thus indicating that the subtle body acts as a kind of "intermediary" factor although it does not come within a substained analysis in the text.

48 Cf. MA, pp. 64-65. According to the SPB (pp. 337-339), Sāmkhya
construes mokṣa as "kaivalya", the atman without adjuncts; for Nyāya it is "uccheda", the complete destruction of all ātma-guna; and for the Bhāṭṭas, the manifestation (abhivyakti) of eternal bliss (nityasukha).


50 I.e., with respect to v.55.

51 BK, v. 59 is quoted in MĀD, p. 289 as "svacintiteṣu cāvighnorūpe...".

52 "vighaṭa" is not explained.

53 A similar etymology is found in the Pauskara Agama (pumspaṭala, v. 47; SPB, p.232): "ete dharmādayaśca caṣṭau bhāvayanti".

54 Cf. SPB, p. 243, quoted from the Pauskara (pumspaṭala, vv. 104-128): pratyāyanti kṣetrajñānam tena te pratyayau smṛtah:

55 MA, 11.12, p. 298.

56 Yoga Sūtras, v. 1.3.

57 Mokṣa Kārikā, v. 105, p. 38.

58 MA, 11.12; p. 298.

59 MĀ, 11.6; p. 293. The Pauskara Agama (pumspaṭala, v. 120: SPB, p. 243) describes "anaisvarya" as that which "results from incapacity (asakti); and this incapacity is of 176 kinds. Since it is often of the form of ajñāna and atushti; it is of 164 varieties; these are all incapacities of the intellect..."

60 Cf. Vedānta Sūtras, trans. II, 272: "Nor is it true that the body is absolutely required as an auxiliary of perception -- for in the state of dream the body is motionless."

61 anythanupapatti=arthapatti: presumption of some "adrṣṭa-artha" to account for some "drṣṭa-artha" according to Nyāya, it is an anumāna which can only be proven by vyatirekavyāpti.

62 Cf. SK, v.20.

63 Not a quote from either the Sāmkhya Sutra or Sāmkhya Kārikā.

64 Sāmkhya Śūtra, 6.54: "ahamāraḥ kartā na purusah". Aniruddha justifies this view on the basis of the position that the purusa is aparinamitva: cf. also 6.55.

65 Similar quote in MĀD, p. 85-86.

67. Cf., for instance, Śridhara on Padārthadharmaśāstra, trans. p. 597 concerning dharma; he argues that the ātmā is neither a bhoktr or kartr -- it is wholly indifferent. Its connection to the body and the senses and the resulting egoistic conceptions of "I," and "Mine" cause the sense of "bhoktr" and "kartr".

68. Sāṃkhya Kārikā, v. 37

69. Cf. Sāṃkhya Kārikā, vv. 55-60

70. Sāṃkhya Kārikā, v. 57.

71. Ibid. v. 56.

72. MĀ, 10.21; p. 276.

73. TS, v. 10. p.

74. Quoted in TPV on v. 48, p. ; a similar citation is found in MĀ, 10.11, p. 262, TSV on v. 4, p. 14 and MPA, 11.7, p. 326.

75. Cf. ŚPB, p. 201 wherein Śivāgrayogin argues that that which is an object of enjoyment is not that which causes enjoyment; thus Karma must be distinct.

76. Similar quote in the MĀ, 10.11, p. 262.

77. Cf. ŚPB, p. 215: the samvedana (cognition) of the Buddha has a distinctive karana, since it is an act (kriyā) which thus establishes the Vidyā-tattva.

78. TS, v. 14, p.

79. MĀ, p. 129 appears to be a better reading: apravrttaḥ pravṛtto va...

80. Cf. ŚPB, pp. 160-161 wherein limitedness implies pervasiveness: "The soul is an omniscient being veiled by something, since he is parviscent. If he were not an omniscient being veiled by something, he could not even be parviscent, like Siva.

81. MĀ, 10, 7, p. 257.

82. Kalā, not Śivaśakti, activates the Buddhi-tattva; cf. Śivarāman, Saivism in Philosophical Perspective (pp. 240-241): "How about Śiva-Sakti which is spirit itself? Can it not serve to activate the buddhi-tattva? The answer is that just as one's body is activated by one's own self, one's
psyche too is activated on one's self alone. Because sakti is the cause of all effect it does not mean that it is sakti and not the potter that fashions the pot. It may be asked: is not kala itself jada? Has it not to be activated by a self again? The answer to this objection is that kala and other tattvas, jada as they are, are activated in their turn by siva-tattvas presided over by the intelligent siva-sakti. The siva-tattvas themselves cannot take the place of kala-tattva because it has been explained, the 'pure' siva-tattvas cannot function as revealers for impurity-ridden selves."

83 RA, 2.14, p. 6. In his commentary on v. 24 of the TS, Aghora Siva interprets the "ca" in "avyaktaragavidyah kalasamuthah kalca ca mayajah" as entailing kala and niyati.

84 MA

85 TS, v.

86 MA, 6.7. p. 201.

87 TS, v.

88 Cf. MA, 3.12, pp. 138-139: Vama, Guhya, Atigunya, Pavitra and Sthana are five five of the fifty Lords of the worlds of the subtle body.

APPENDIX II
The Transliterated Text of the Bhoga Kārikā by Sadyojyoti and its Commentary by Aghora Siva

ŚRĪH
ŚIVĀBHĪM NAMAṆ
BHOGAKĀRIKĀ
(VṛTTISAHĪṬA)

ŚIVAṂ PRAṆĀMYA SADDBHOGAMOKṢADĀM MANḍACETASĀM
HITAYA LEṢATAH SPAṢṬĀM VYĀKHYĀSYE BHOGAKĀRIKĀṂ.

ihā hi tatrabhavadbhiḥ sadyojyotipādaiḥ prakaraṇapratipādyāmanām
bhogamokṣātmakamartham sūcayadbhistasyaiva 'vighnaparismāptyartham pra-
thamaṃ paramāśivanamaskāraḥ kriyate.

(1) TRIBANDHICITKALĀYOGA BHOGAVIŚEṢAMOKṢADĀM
SARVAKAṬALAKRAMĀRTHAJNĀM PRAṆĀMYĀJĀM ŚIVAṂ DHRUVAṂ.

trayo bandhaś ca malakarmamāyālakṣaṇāste vidyante yesām te tri-
bhandhināḥ teṣām tribandhināṃ sakalākhyānāṃ citāmatmanāṃ yo 'yām kalā-
yogāḥ sūkṣmadehārambhakakalādiṣṭhīryantarātivātmaistaṭāttadhuvanajā-
deharūpaiśca. māyāyairavayaivaissambandhaḥ tena bhogam' tadvśiṣṭeṣaṇā [2]
mokṣaṃ ca yo dadāti. tam tāddṛśam. anena śivasyaṁādīmuktatvena sarvā
'nugrāhakatvaṁ sarvakartṛtvam ca sūcyate. ata eva ca sarvakāṭalakramārth-
jnāṃ sarvaṁ ca bhūtādirūpaṃ kālakramam sarvāṃśa tattatkālabhāvīṇaḥ
padārthān jñāṇatītī. etena cāsyā nirmalatvātsarvakartṛtvāc ca sarvakālaṃ
sarvajñataḥ pratipādyate. kim ca, ajam amalatvādeva sarīrādisambandhāt-
manāpi janmanaḥ rahitaṃ dhruvaṃ cāvikāraṇāṃ na tu bindvādivatparipāmitvaṃ.
vikāritve jādatvaprasāṅgat. sīvaṁ praṇamya bhogamokṣa vacmīti vakṣya-
sambandhah.

(2) RURUSIDDHĀNTASAṂSIDDHĀU BHOGAMOKṢAU SASĀDHANAŬ

VACMI SĀDHAKABODHĀYA LEŚATO YUKTISAṂSKRTAU.

sādhayanti bhogamokṣaviti sādhakā ācāryādayaḥ. tesaṁ diśādau
tatsādhanaṇāṇāya yuktyā anumāṇena saṃskṛtau pratipaṭittau śrīmadraura-
vatantropalākṣitasiddhāntasāstro, siddhau sādhanau bhogamokṣau rau-
ravānusārenaśīva samkṣepādevadāmi. tatra tāvatsatsādhanaṁ bhogam
darśayitum bhogādhiḱāraḥ keśamityata āha. [3]

(3) AṆṆANĀḌAṆUNAṆĀṆ JĀYATE BHOGALOLIKĀ

KARMAŚAṬYAṆURŪPEṆA CĪDVATĀM BHAVAMANDALE.

malinatvādiśāṅdhikāśvasthena sīvenanantādīdvārena nunnāṇāṁ
bhogā 'bhimukhiṅkṛtānāṁ ātmanāṁ aţjananmalādeva hetoh saṃsramaṇḍale
karmasamkārapākāṇugunāṁ bhogalolikā bhogecchā jāyate.

nanu nirmala evāṁ, saṅkhyaśrāṣṭrapagataḥ. tadayuktaṁ. nir-
malasya bhogasākyasambhavaṁ tatsuṁbhave va muktaśaya prasaṅgataṁ
nanu rāganibhandhanāsaktirīṣyate. satyaṁ. rāgopī malinasyaivāsaktihetuṁ
yaduktam śrīmatasvāyamabhuc yadyaśuddhirna puṃso 'sti saktirbhogesu kim
krta iti. atha ko 'sau bhogaḥ kaiḥ sādhanaḥ sādhyate ityata āha.

(4) ĪŚVARECCHASHAMĀṆIՎIŠTAṆAGADĪBĪJAPARICYUTAIH

SĀDHANAṆI SĀDHYATE BHOGO BUDDHIVRṬYAṆURĀṆJANAṆAṆ.

Īśvaro 'trāṇantā eva tasyaiva māyākṣobhakatvāt. yaduktam
śrīmatkraṇe śuddhe 'dhvani śivaḥ kartā proktonanto site prabhuh iti.
tadiṣṭhyā kṣubdham yajjaṅgadbījaṁ māyākhyāṁ tasmātpraśūtaṁśādhāraṇais-
sukṣmadhātmaṁsāḍhāraṇabhubhuvanādirūpaṁ sādhāraṇaṁ 'sādhāraṇabhubhuvanaṆa-
dehātmatīsca yaś sādhanaṁbhogo niśpādyate sa ca buddhīvrṭyaṆu- [4]
rañjanātmakah. buddhivṛtyā sukhaduhkhamohāḥdyavasāyārūpayā ātma-
caitanyasya yadanañjanam sa eva bhogah. anurāgaścātra sukhdhyā-
vasāyākārabuddhivṛttiniṣṭhatayā tatasūvittistadanubhava eva na tu
pratibimbātmatā. ātmanah pariṇamitāprasangat. taduktam śrīmatsvāyam-
bhuve bhogosya vedanā punsassukhaduhkhādilakṣaṇā iti. tatra bhūtānām
tāvadbhogasādhanaṇām pratipādayati.

(5) KŚMĀJALĀGNIMARUTVYOMNĀM GUNAVRHTYAKṢABHŪMITĀH
SVAMĀTRĀPŪRAPUṢṬĀNĀM GAMAYANTI TADĀNGATĀM.

atra prthivyādinām bhūtānām ye guṇādayas ta eva teṣām bhogāṅgataṁ
sādhayanti. tatra guṇā gandhādayah. vṛttayastu dhāraṇādayah. ākṣa-
bhūmitā cendriyādhiḥratvam. etānyapayanantarameva darśayātati. tatas-
ca. kŚmādayo guṇairvṛttibhirakṣādhiḥratayā cātmanām bhogasādhanaṇām
bhajantītyarthaḥ. kīḍāṃ kŚmādināmityata āha svamātrāpūrapuṣṭānām iti.
svaih svaih kāraṇabhūtaiśtamātrair ya āpūrah pūraṇāṁ tena puṣṭhānāṁ.
akṛtasya karaṇam kṛtasya-pārvardhanam ca prakṛtikarma yataḥ. etāni
cā bhūtānি svakaraṇaistamātraṁ saha sthūlasukṣmatvendriyādhiḥrāṇi
sthitanityuktam śrīmanmataṅge. tanmātrāṇiha ghaṭavahmahabhūtāṇi
[5] lepavat iti. etatkāryam daśadhākaraṇairvīśyā kāryate cēṣṭām. avibhutvāt
karaṇaṁ tu kāryamadhiṣṭhāya cēṣṭanta iti. atasaścaśaṃ sukṣmaśresthaḥbhūtānāṁ
bhūtānāmindriyādhārative bāhyaśārīrasthānām ca diha-upacaya iti
dhātvarthapātyā dehatvam copacyadharmitve sādharāne sati teṣāṁ
dhṛtyādayo 'sādharāṇavṛttaye ityāḥa.

(6) KARAṆĀDHĀRADEHATVE DHRTISAṆGRAHAPAKTAYAH
VYUHO 'VAKASĀDANAṀ CA VRTTAYO VASUDHĀDISU

tatra dhṛtīr dhāraṇāṃ bhūmervṛttiḥ. saṁgrahō 'vaśtanbhō 'mbhasaḥ.
paktiḥ pāko 'gneḥ. avakāśasyāspadasya dānamākāśasyā. atha tadevaścāṃ
sādhāraṇamindriyādhāratvam suṣkṣmadehasthatvenāha.

(7-8Aa) ATIVĀHIKADĒHASTHĀM KARAṆAM PRAVIJRMBHITAIH
YONERYONYANTARAM CĀPI YĀTI PUMBHOGASIDDHAYE
PUMARTHADĀRŪṬSTAVASFAT
ativāhāpayatmanām karma bhogena nāsayatītyātivāhikaḥ suṣkṣma-
dehāḥ tatsthameva karaṇamindriyavargaśceṣṭate. avibhutvena nirāśraye
ceṣṭāṇupapatteḥ suṣkṣmadehasthabhūtatanmātrādhāra evakaraṇavargaś-
[6] ceṣṭata ityuktam. kim ca tatsūkṣmadehastham karaṇam puruṣārthapradaka-
karmavaṭaṭ tasyaiva pumso bhogasiddhaye yoneryonyantaram prayāti. yad-
uktam tatvasāṅgrehe 'vasudhādyastatvagunāḥ pratipumniyatāḥ kalānto
'yam paryaṭati karmavaśato bhuvanjadeheśvayaṃ ca sarvesu iti. sa ca
suṣkṣmadehah suṣkṣmatvāt piśācādināṃsādiprayākṣaḥ. api tu yogi-
pratyakṣasagamyā ityāha.

(8AB-BB) DEHO NAIVĀTIVĀHIKAH
AKṢADHARO 'KSAGAMYO 'YAMANTANAM PIṢĀCAVAT.
atha bhūtanām guṇānāha.

(9) GANDHAḤ KṢITAU RASAḤ ŚODHA MADHURAḤ KṢMĀΚABANDHAKAH
ŚUKLĀḤI 'SUKLAM BHĀSVACCA RŪPAM KṢITYĀDIṢU TRIṢU.

(10) ASĪTOṢNAU MAHĪVAYVOH PĀKAJĀPAKAJAU PRṬHAK
JALE ŚĪṬAH ŚIKHINYUṢNASṆAṆRO 'YAM SAMYAYAVASTHITAH.

(11) ŚABDASTADDRAVAYAJANITAḤ PRṬHAGBPḤṬACATUSṬAYE
PRATISĀBDASĀSAMGHAṬO NABHASYEVDITO BUDDHAIH.

iti. tatra gangdhah surabhyaśurabhirūpah kṣitaevat. rasaḥ. kṣmā-
jalayoh. tatra kṣitau katvāmlalavanamadhurakāṣayatiktarūpah. jale tu
madhura eva. rūpam ca kṣmājalāgniṣu. tatra kṣitau śuklaraṅka-
pitakrṣṇādyanekavidham. jale tu śuklameva. agnau bhasvadrūpam. teṣu
sa vāyuṣu sparśasthitāḥ. sa ca mahyām vāyua ca pratyekamaśīto 'nuṣṇoḥ. kaḥ punāmahīvāyuṣparśayaḥ parasparam bheda 'ta ṣaḥa-pākajāpakajau prthagiti. mahyām sparṣaḥ pākajāḥ. vāyau tvapākajā ityapakajā ityayam- evanāyorbhedāḥ. asya copalakṣaṇatvādṛūpādayo 'pi mahīgūṇāḥ pākajā eva. jale punaḥ svābhāvikāḥ sparṣaḥ śīta eva. agnāvusṇa eva. śabdaśca bhūmyādiṣu catursu taistaiḥ pārthivādibhirdravyaiḥ parasparamāhatya jātaḥ. nabhasi tu pratīśrūkchabādmatakaḥ. nanu vaiśeṣikādibhirāśrayad- anyatropalabdherākāśaikugunāḥ śabda īṣyate. tadāyuktam pratyakṣaṃgama- bādhitatvena hetōḥ kālātbhayapadiṣṭatvāt. yataḥ śabdaśraya eva bheryādau śabdaḥ śrūyate. kim ca prthivyām tāvatkaṭakatādiḥ śabdo dṛśyate.

jalecchalacchālōdiḥ. āgnau dhāmadhamādiḥ. nabhasi ca pratiśabdātmataka iti. etaccākāśaikugunātvam śabdasya vistaraṃśāmbhir mṛgendravṛtti- dīpikāyāṃ pratiṅṣiptam. uktaṁ ca śrimarmṛgendre iti pāncasau śabdo 'yam sparṣo bhūtacatūṣṭaye. aśītoṣṇo māhītvayaḥ śītoṣṇau vāritejasōḥ. bhāsvadagnau jale śuklaṃ kṣitau śuklādyanekadhā. rūpāṃ triṣu raso 'mbhaṇṣu madhuraḥ saṅvidhāḥ kṣitau. gandhaḥ kṣitavasurabhīḥ surabhiścā mato budhaiḥ. iti. atha uktārthopasadharah.

(12A-12Ba) ITTHAM YATHOKTAGANDHĀDIVRĀTOPETA DHRĀDAYAH

ABHIPRASIDDHĀ LOKASYA

gandhaśyāśayayataya prthivyādayo 'rthā lokasiddhā ityaīrthāḥ.

eṣāṃ ca bhūtānāmasmadadibhanyendriyaparicchedyagunatvadghadadivaktāryatva- siddhestat kāraṇataya pañca tanmātrān siddhā ityāhā.

(12Bb) MĀTRĀSTAIRANUMĀNATAH.

atha guṇagrahaṇādeva tadavyatirekviṅgūṇino 'pi grahaṇānām siddhatīti darśayitum proktānām tāvadbhūtānām guṇebyo 'prthak bhāvaṃ sādhayitumāha.
(13) CITRASVABHĀVAKAH PROKTA GUÑABHINNA DHARĀDAYAH
KRMAVAṢNYA YATHĀ CITRAM PATE RŪPAM TU VESTITE.


(14) VIṢEṢANAVIṢEṢYATVAVYAPADEŚASYA DHĪBHIDAM
KRMAVYĀNGYATVATO HETORGOCARATVAM VRAJANTYAMI

amī dharādayo 'rthāh kramavyāngyatvādhetosurabhiriyaṃ prthivītyādi-nām viṣeṣanaviṣeṣyarūpānām dhiḥbhīdam jñānabhēdānām tatt-bhāvavyapadesasya ca viṣayatāṃ prāpnuvanti atra ca.

(15-16A) NĀGRHĪTAISTU GANDHĀDYAIRJĀTU CIJJAYATE MATIH
DHARITYAMI HI JALĀDINAMAGRAHE 'PI PRAJAYATE;

GANDHĀDIBHYASTATO 'NANYĀ JALĀDIBHYAH PRTHAK CABHUH

hi yasmāt kāraṇādi viṣeṣanarupairgandhādibhirguṇairagrahitair-
viṣeṣyāṃ dharmirūpaṃ dharitryāṃ kadaścibuddhirnotpadyate. dravyāntareṣu tu jalādīṣygraḥītesvapyaṃ padyata eva. tasmādgandhādibhyo bhūmirananyā. jalādibhyo 'nyaīveti. evāṃ bhūtāntaresvapi jñeyamityāha.

(16B) JALĀDĪṢYEVAṆEVAṆAṂ YOJYO HETURMANĪṢIBHIH,

nanu japākumasaṃnidadhāne raktabhāvāṃ bhajan spaṭṭīkamaṃ hi [10] sauklyagunagrahaṇaṃ drte 'pi grhyate. tasmādgunigrahaṇaṃ saṃgrodhaṇaṃ-pūrvakatvamasiddhamata āha.

(17) SAMSTHĀNAṂ ČAPI VARṆĀṂ CA RŪPAM DVIVIDHAMĪṢYATE
TASMĀDASIDDHATĀ NĀSTI HETORUPAHITE MANĀU.

iha hi dravyānāṁ varṇavatsāṁsthānātmakamapi rūpāṁ guṇa evesyate
tasmājjapakusumohitasyāpi sphoṭikasya grahanāṁ sauklyagunagrahanā-
bhāvepi vṛttacaturśrādismsthānagrahānapurasmarmacava bhavati dravya-
graṇaṇasya gunagrahanāpūrvvakkatvām siddhameva. ato 'syā hetornāsiddhateti.
itthām bhūtanāṁ bhogāṅgatvāṁ prasādhyā adhunā 'mātrastairanumānātā iti
prāguktām tenantātrasiddham visēśayitum bhūtanāṁ tāvattkāryatvamanirdesena
darsayati.

(18) GUṆĀṆĀM KĀRYATAŚIDDHAU YO HETURABHIDHIYATE

KSĪṬYĀDIKAKALĀNTANĀM YOJYĀH KARANASIDDHAYE

guṇāṅgamacaitanye satyanekatvādghatādivatkāraṇapūrvvakkatvam iti
vaksyati. tatastenaiva hetunā prthivyādīnāmapi kāryatvasiddhiḥ, tathā
hi paridṛṣṭyāmanahbhagavacitryānyathānupapantera prthivyādikakalānta-
triṃśattattvātmakāḥ pratyātmaniyatamsūksmadeho 'stīyuktam. āgāmesu
cā śrūyate. tatasteṣām prthivyādīnām-pratipuruṣāniyatvatvenacaitanye

tatra tāvadbhūtakāraṇatvena tannātra 'stiddheḥ tattadgunabhēdādeva
prthivyādīnāṁ kramasiddhirityaḥ.

(19) SĀBDĀDYEKKOTTARĀDHIKYĀMĀTRASTADAVIṢEṢATAH

YONAYO GAGANĀṆĀṆĀM KRAMADJICHANTI DHARMINĀM.

ayamatra tātपaryārthaḥ. anabhivyaktavisēṣaśabdamātrasvarūpāṁ
śabdatanmātramākāsasyopādānam. evam taddhovartī śabdasparsāmātrasva-
ṛupāṁ sparsātmanmātram vāyoḥ. śabdasparsārūparasātmakāṁ rasatanmātram
jalaṣya. śabdādīgandhāntapāṇcagunārūpāṁ gandhatanmātram bhūmehe iti.
akṣarārthastu gaganādivacchabdādyekottaram guṇādikyām yāsāṁ tāṁ
śabdādyekottarādhiyāḥ. taddaviṣeṣato guṇaviṣeṣat, anabhivyaktavisēṣa-
sabdādīmātrasvarūpātteśāṁ gananāḍīnāṁ kramāt yonayah upādānabhūtāḥ
sabdādītanmātrāḥ. teṣāmeva viśīṣtaguṇayogināṁ dharmiṇāṁākāsādīnāṁ
bhūtānāṁ sṛṣṭikramamicchanti. guṇādhikhyakramenādhopabhāvaṁ bhaṇjyaṁ
kāryaṃśāmapyadro ḍobhāvaṁ kurvatītyarthaḥ. katham punarāsāṁ
bhogāṅgatvamata āha.

(20) SVAKĀRYOTPATTITATSṚŚIKARTṬĀ SARVAYONISU
MĀṬRAYĀSU PUMARTHASYA SĀDHANATVAM VINISCITAM
akṛtasya karaṇam kṛtasya parivardhanam ca yatassarvopādānāṁ tattastanmātrānāṁ
māyādīnāṁ ca kāryayonānāṁ bhogasādhanatavotpādatvāttaṁdāpūrakataya
ca bhogāṅgatvam siddham. atha indriyaṁāmapi bhogāṅgatvam darsayītum
prathamam karmendriyasiddhamāha.

(21) ĀNĀNDAGAMANOTSARAVACANAĀDAṆAKARMAṆĀM
UPASTHAPĀḌAPĀṆVASYA PĀṆINĀMĀṆI VAI PRTHAK
utsargo mālavirekaḥ. ānandādikriyāhetutvenopasthitānāṅkarmendriyaṁi
siddhātyarthaḥ. kimetānyupasthitāṁi sthānānyevendriyaṁi netyāha.

(22) BHĀVĀBHĀVAU TU YATTANTRAU PRATYEKAM KARMAṆĀM ŚMRṬAU
STHĀṆEṢU SATSU TĀṆĪHA PAṆCA KARMEṆDRIYĀṆI TU
iha hi keśāṁcitpāḍādisthānayogināṁapi tattadindriyasaktīṁānāṁ
gamanādikriyā na dṛṣṭya. tasmātteṣu sthāneṣu satsvapi tāsāṁ kriyānāṁ
yadadhīnau bhāvabhavau tātātstrastraṁ sakta eva prthak paṇcendriyaṁi
jñeyāni. ata eva karmendriyaṁi yenecchanti naivyikādayaste prati-
kṣiptāḥ. nanvevaṁ ācāḥhrutotkṣepāṅkāṁapi kriyātvādanantata


(23) ĀNANDĀDIBHIRETAISTU KARMAṆĀH PARIBHĀṢITAIH
KARMEṆDRIYĀṆYATO NAĪṢĀṆANANTYĀṁ KARMAṆĀM VAŚĀT
bhavedayāṁ doṣo yadyasmābhiḥ śāṇḍāikadesavṛttīṁ tāṁśyaste.
tvagindriyavatteṣām sarvasārīravyāpakatveneṣṭaḥdhaṣṭasyaivaivyām bhrū-
khṣepaṇādivyāpārah. pāyvāderiva jīrṇavirecanādyātmaka iti bhrūkhṣepaṇām-
apyaṇaṁandādiśveṅantarbhāvāna tadbhedādatrendriyānanyasiddhiḥ. kiṁ-
caitaireva anandādibhiḥ praguktaiḥ prachānabhūtaīḥ karmabhiḥ paṅcaiva
karmendriyāṇi sidhyanti tītā nānanta karmendriyānāṁ tattatsamjñāni tesaṁ
tatra tatra viṣeṣādhīsthānaṁdityavirodhaḥ idaṁ buddhīndriyasiddhamānaḥ.

(24) sābdādighrahaṇe puṃsaḥ karturnā karaṇā kṛtiḥ
na ca ikarkaraṇaṁ yasaḥdaṇapekṣā na nivartate
sābdādighrahyāpi kriyātvaḥcchidriyāyavatkaraṇaṁ vinā notpattir-
yuktā. na ca taḥ paṅcāpi kriyāḥ sītrotrāderekasmādeva karaṇādutpadyante
yasaṁkaraṇāntarapekṣā na nivartate [14]
sābdagrahaṇakaraṇabhūte śrotrē satyapi sparṣādigrahaṇe tvagṛdi
karaṇāntarapekṣitā dṛṣṭyata iti bhavaḥ. kāṇi tāṇi karaṇānītyata āha.

(25a) karaṇāni śrutiṁ tvaka ca kṣurijhva ca nāsikā
tataśca sābdādighrahaṇānyathānupapattyā tānyanumīyante ityabhi-
prāyenāha.

(25b) sābdādyaśocananaṁ teṣāṁ vṛttīḥ sābdādisaṁnidhau
sannibheti pāthaḥ sābdādibhāvyākārasadrṣamāṅtaramākāramadhyavasāyinaḥ
buddhāḥ saha mano 'dhiṣṭhitāndiyāṇi vidyā yā viṣayatvenop-
sthāpayantīyarthāḥ. tāṁ cendriyopasthāpitaṁ buddhyādhyavasitamākāram
amārāngenā vidyākhyena karaṇena purṣo grhaṇatiti vakṣyāmaḥ. uktaṁ
cānya. buddhyādhyavasitamārtham puruṣāṣcetayate iti. na caitāni
karaṇāsāṣkalyādīsthānānvyevendriyāṇi. api tu tatstāḥ sāktaya eva yataḥ
sthānavaṭāmapi karmavasaṭṭacchaktivaikalyāṇaḥ sābdādiṁnānamutpadyata
ityāḥā.

(26) etāni sthānāmāṭraṇī buddhyākṣāṇīti ma kṛthaḥ
STHĀNEṢU SATSU VAIKALYĀNNA SĀṆVIJĀṆAYATE YATAH
athāntaḥkaraṇasiddhirucyate.  —  [15]

(27) ICCHĀSAMRAMBHABODHĀKYĀ NOKTAḤ SIDHYANTI SADHANAIH
TATSIDDHAU KARAṆĀNYANTARAMANO 'HAM KĀRAVUDDHAYAḤ

Iha hi pṛthivyādīnāṁ tatvānāṁ svakāryaireva siddheḥ kāryāntara-
hetutve pramāṇābhāvat anekatattavaparikalpanābhāvaprasanāgacca yānīcchādī-
siddhau sādhanaṁ tāni manohāṅkārabuddhyākhyāṇyāntarāṇi karaṇāṇītya-
antahkaraṇasiddhiḥ. tatrecchāśabdenakragratāparaparyo 'vadhānātmakāḥ
sāṅkalpo vivakṣitaḥ sa manaso vṛttīḥ. samrāmbhaśca prayatnohāṅkārasya
bodhaścādhyāvasāyo buddhiriti. etacca prapañcayiṣyate. eṣāṁ ca antaḥ-
karaṇābhāṅkaraṇānāṁ parasparopakāreṇa puṇaṁśaḥsādhanatvamānaḥ.

(28) ANTARMUKHĀṆI BĀHYĀṆI SĀMBHŪYECCHĀDĪŚADHANAM
ŚIBIKODVĀHINARAVADEKĀPĀYENA TĂSTATAḤ
(29) ANTARMUKHĀGATĀṆĀM CA CITERARTHĀM PRAKURVATĀM
BĀHYĀRTHĀM BUDDHIBHISSĀRDOHĀM NA SYURICCHĀḌIKĀḤKRIYĀH

Kato 'ntarmukhāni bāhyāni ca karaṇāni śibikodvāhinaravatsam-
śāṅkhuṣcchāḍīnāṁ kriyānāṁ sādhanāṁ bhavanti. bāhyārthālocaṇa-
pūrvāṇeva 'dhyāvasāyaśīdīnāṁ datānāt avadhānādīnā vinā bāhyārthā-
grahaṇa 'sāṁbhāvācca. tataściteratmano 'rthāṃ bhogā khyāṁ prayojanaṁ
sādhyatāmantarmukhāṅgatāṅmaṇtaḥkaraṇānām ca śabdādibhāṅkaraṇānām vā
anyatarasyāpi vargasyāpāyena tiṣṭhatāṁ satāṁ tā icchādikāḥ kriyān
śabdādibāhyārthabuddhayo vā puṇaṁśaḥsādhanataya notpadyante. yatha-
śibikodvāhinorūmadyādekaśāyāpāye tadudvahanakriyā na drṣyate. atra
parābhiprāyamāṇa.

(30A) ANYENATAHKARANAM PRĀNAMICCHANTI VYAKTACEITANAM
anye lokāyataikadesāḥ prapaṇaṁdiśvṛttibhirjītvanāḥhetūbhūtāṁ
bhūtaparīṇāmaviṣeṣādabhiyaktacetanaṁ prāṇākhyamāntaram vāyumevāntah-
karāṇamah. asya dūsanamāhā.

(30B) PRATNAIRNA VINĀ SO 'STI TATSIDDHAU KARĀṆAM TU KIM
prāṇatmanastāvaadvāyoḥ kādācitkatvena prayatnapūrvikā pravruttir-
dṛṣyate. yadāhuh preraṇākarṣena vāyoḥ prayatnena vinā kutah iti. tataḥ
samrambhātmakaprayatnasiddhau kenāpi karanena bhāvyamityantaḥkarāṇa-
siddhiḥ. vākṣyati ca samrambho 'hamkṛtervṛttiḥ iti. kimca Caitanyakotpattir-
āpyasya vāyorbhavatabhypagateti tasyāḥ karāṇāntaram vācyamityāhā.

(31) CAITANYODGARABHĀRO 'YAMASYANTAHCARĀṆAM VADA
VYAKTĀM NA CASYA CAITANYAM VĀYUTVĀDBHAYAVĀYUVAT

na jaḍasya caitanyābhivyaktiryuktā sarvasya caitanyābhivyakti-
prasāngādityasya na caitanyam vāyuvādbhāyavāyuvaditi. itthām
prāṇāntahkarāṇapakṣam nirasya prāguktādantahkarāṇatrayānmanah-
sādhanāyāhā.

(32) IČCHĀHETVĀSU SĀNCĀRĪ BĀHIRDEVAPRAVARTAKAM
MANO YASYAŚUBHĀVACCA KARTURNĀ YUGAPANMATIHI

devanāddyotanāddevasābdenendriyānyucyante. matisabdena ca tattad-
arthaviṣayam jñānām tatścāyamartah. iha hī ātmano indriyārtha-
sannikarṣe satyapi sarvāṇindriyāni yugapanne pravartente. kīncideva
na ca tatsarvād pravartate tatastapatpravṛttai yatkarāṇāṃ tadīcchāyāh
śāmkalpatmano 'vadhanāsya hetubhūtam bāhyendriyapraṃvartakāṁ ca mano
buddhavyam. ata eva ca tadāntarena antahkarāṇadhisthānena sukhādi-
śāmkalpena ca bāhyendriyādhisthānena ca dvidhā 'dhikāritiṃktam. śrī-
manmataṅge - dvidhā 'dhikāri taccitam bhokturbhogopāpadakām. bahī-
karaṇābhāvena svocitena yataḥ sadā. indriyānām tu sāmartyam śām-
kalpenātmavartinaī
karotyantarṣḥṣḥitam bhūyastato 'ntākaraṇām manah. iti. śrīmanmṛgendre
'pi. devapravartatam śīghnacāri sāmkalpadharmi ca manah. iti. nanu
svadūśurabhyabhijātamarmarasaśabdhavadabhirūpadirghatarasaśkulyāśvādane
yugapatpaṇcājñānotpattirdṛṣyate. tanna. yatastatrāpyutpalapatrasāta-
vyaaktibhedavadalakṣyasukṣmakramāṇyena paṇca jñānanyutpadyante. ata eva
etadāśu samcārītyuktam. evamahankāramāpi sādhayati.

(33A–33BB) PAŃCAKARMKRTO VĀYORJIVANĀYA PRAVARTAKAH

SAMRAMBHO 'HANKRTERVRTTYIH

jīvanāya śārīradhārāṇārtham prāṇāyanāpanayanādipaṅcakarmkṛta-
tattadvṛttibhedena prāṇāpanādisamjñābhājō vāyoḥ pravartakah sam-
rambhātmaṇo yaḥ prayatnaḥ so 'hāṅkāravrttityahāṅkārasiddhiḥ. yad-
uktam śrīmanmṛgendre - atha vyaktāntaraṁdbuddhergarvo 'bhūtkaranam citah.
samrambhadyasya cestante śaṅkṣa ṇa paṅca vāyava. iti. tatra prāṇayanam
sukṣmadehasyordhāvonayanam prāṇasya vyāpaṁaḥ. apayanamadhai.-
prāṇam malāderapanāsyā. annadeh rasarūpasya sarvagātresu sāmyena
pañyanam samānasya. vinamanamanīgaṇām vyānasya. unnayanamāntarasya

dhvanervarṇatāprāṇamudānasya.
[19]

paṅca karmkṛta iti ca prādhānyaduktam. udgarādikartṛtvena cāsyā vāyoḥ
śravanat. yaduktam śrīmatkālottare - udgāre nāga ityuktah kūrma
unmīlane sthitāḥ. krKarastu kṣate caiva devadatto vijṛmbhane. dhanaṁ
jayasthito 'pyeṣa [sthitah posē iti pāthhabhedaḥ] mṛtasyāpi na muṇcati.
kim ca buddhikāryādayam ghaṭa ityādigrāhyādhyasāyārūpapratyartham
bhinnarūpapratyayādatyantabhedena bhāsāmaṇāḥ sarvarthagrahaṇepeyekarūpo
'hamiti grahakādyavasāyārūpaḥ pratayo 'hamkārasyaiva vṛttityāḥha.

(33BB) ANYO 'RTHAPRAYAYO PARAH

ahamkāravrītyatmakapratyay 'rthapratyayādanya ityarthah. nanu
śabdagrahaṇādayaḥ śrotrādināmasādhāraṇāvṛttayāḥ samrambhastu teṣāṁ
evendriyānāṁ sādhāraṇāvṛttirīti kimanyenaṁ haṅkāreṇa kalpitena. atā āha.

(34) NA DEVAGRĀMASĀMANYAVRṛTTIḥ SAMRAMBHĀ IṢyATē
YATO NYATAMAVAUKALYE JAYATE SATYAHAMKRṛTīH

sādhāraṇakāryakartānāmekāpya tatkriyānupattābuddhvāttadvaiyālye-
'pi jāyamāno 'yam samrambhō 'hampratyayo vāhaṅkārasyaiva kārya
ityarthah. atrajva prasangaḥ buddhindriyakarmendriyatmanatravargānāṁ
manahsahitāṁ mahāṅkārādevotpattirīti darsayitumāha.

(35) ANYE CĀHAKRṛTISKANDHĀSTRIRVAGAJANAKĀSTRAYOH
TAIJASĀDIKANĀMĀNAH KRAMASĀH SĀTVIKĀDAYAḥ

sattvarajastambabhūlah sātvikarājjasatamasāstrayo 'haṅkāraskandhah
kramātijasavaiyārikabhūtādikasamjāṇābhājo bhavanti. sātvikādityām
caiśām sattvādiguṇabāhūyat. na miśrām pariṇamatā iti nyāyena
guṇāntarasamsargo 'pyesām vidyate yatāh. tatra kutah kesaṁupattir-
ityata āha.

(36) SA MANOBUDHIDEVANĀM GURO YASMATPRĀKASAKAH
TASMĀTSAṬVIKAIJJĀTASSVANURŪPĀDAHAKRṛTARH
atra naiyāyikamatamanūdyā duṣayati.

(37) ANYE TU BUDDHIDEVANĀM BHAUṬIKATVAM PRAPEDIRE
VIṢAYANĀM TU NIYAMĀDASIDDHĀDEVA HETUṬAH
evam hi te manyante. śabdaikāgrāhakam strotam sparsāikāgrāhika
tvagityādiniyatavaiṣayatvāindriyānāṁ tāni śabdādyādārākāsādi-
bhūtajanyāni. haṅkārikatve tu teṣāmekakāraṇatvādekarupātā syāt na
tu pratyekam viṣayaniyamasiṣḍhiriti.

tadidam tairasiddhādeva hetoḥ kalpyate. teṣām viṣayaniyamasya prakṛti-
niyamasādēhakasyā 'siddheḥ. niyataviṣayatve hi indriyāyānīm tāni sva-
svakāraṇānyeva bhūtāni guṇasahitāni grhnītān. yāvatā dravyāntaranī tu
tadgūnasca caśurādina grhyate. tathāhi.

(38) CATURDRAVYAGATĀNUSPARŚAMSCATO RO MĀRUTĀ TVACA
DRAVYĀNYANIYATAM [DRAVYĀNI NIYAMITI PĀṬHABHEDĀH] CAIVA
GRHNĪTĀ MĀRUTĀ SAMAM
tvāgindriyām tāvat vāyavatvenā 'bhyupagatam vāyu sahitāni
prthivyadipalīsi tadgatāmsca sparsāṅgrhnī ti. kim ca.

(39) . TRIṆI DRAVYĀNI CAṢUSCā TEṢU RUPĀNI CAIVA HI
ATO NA NIYAMOKSANM VIṢAYANĀM CA KALPYATE
dūṣanāntaramāna.

(40) BHĀUTIKATVĀCCĀ NIYAME KARMAṢAMĀNYAYOḤ SPHUṬAM
DEVEBHYO BUDDHAYO NA SYUH SAMAVAYE CA DEHINĀM
bhautikatvasādhānāyaksānām viṣayaniyame 'bhyupagamyamāne bhūtebhyo
guṇebhysca vyātirekena bhavadbhirabhupagatānām karma-
[22] sāmānyasamavāyānām padārthānām buddhayāstebhyo jāyamanā na bhaveyuh
yadapyuktamāhaṅkāritve tulye kathamokṣānām kāryabheda iti tadapyutpatti-
bhedādiśuvikāranām gudakhandasārkarādināmaiva bhavisyatīti matvā ś
śrotraṅinām sabdādigrahananiyamākpeṣkṣayāmapiyasmābhīḥ puruṣārthādāyakān
karmaiva niyāmakamisyata ityāha.

(41) NA CĀPYAHĀM KṛTO JANMA NIYAME KĀRANĀM MAMA
PUMARTHADĀṬR YATKARMA KĀRANĀM TAT BHATERITAM
nāsāṃbhiraḥaṅkārajatvameva viṣayaniyame kāraṇamisyate. kintu
śivādhīṣṭhitāṃ karna cetyarthah. kāyārandhraviśīste nabhobhage sa
śabdāvadyotake 'bhyupagamyamāne nāśārandhrādīnāmapi śravaṇendriyatva-
prasāṅgatayā śravaṇākaśāsayaiva sabdāṅgakratvaniyam karmaivā
'drśtākhyām niyāma kāṃ bhautikendriyavādināpi īṣyata ityāha.

(42) NĀṆĀṢRUTI BHAYĀṬKLṛPTE SVE PAREṆĀPI KĀRANĀM
śabdabhogasya niyame tatpradaṁ karma bhāsitam
svē kāyākāśe śabdagraṅhake kalpyamāne nānāsrutitvaprasāṅgabhayaḥ-
chravanākāśasyaiva śabdagraṅāhanīyaśe puruṣārthapradāṁ karmaiva kāraṇāṁ
bhavatāpiṣyatā ityanvayāḥ. ittham karmendriyānāṁ āhaṅkārikatvamāha. [23]
(43) rājasādvaiṅkttādvargah karmākṣānāṁ tu karmaṅkṛt
jātaḥ kāryasya yeneha kāraṇānūvidhāyita
rajasaḥ pravrddhutvād rājasādvaiṅkārikākhyādahankāraskandhāt-
kriyāhetuḥ karmendriyavargo jātaḥ yasmāt kāraṇānūvidhāyitvamāṁ kārye
drṣya. ata eva satvasya prakāśatvāt prakāśasya buddhiṁdriyavargasya
sātvikādūtpattiruktaḥ. anyathā bhinnasabhāvayoranayorvargayorekasmād-
evopattvābhuyapagame kāraṇāniyamalamakṣaṇo 'navasthādosāḥ prasajyate
ityāha.
(44) vinivārayityum śākyā āvyavastha vikāraja
sātvikātśambhaye klāpte sātvārajāsāvargayoh
(45) mātrāsāṅgho 'pyahāṅkārādāvargadāvayavilakṣanaḥ
prakāśyastāmasastasmajjato 'bhūtādisamjñākāt
idānīm buddheradhyavasāyādiḥhetutvamāha.
(46) prakaśo viṣayākāro devadvāro na vā kvacit
pumbodhayaktibhūmitvādōbhodho vrūtirmatermataḥ [24]
indriyadvāro 'yaṁ ghaṭa ityādibāhyaviṣayādhyavasāyārūpaprakāśas-
tadanapekṣasācāntarasmṛtipratiḥbādiḥprakaśo vā śabdādvakṣyamāno bhāva-
pratyayalakṣanaśca prakāśāḥ puruṣabodhasya vyaktishānātvādodbhākhyo
materbuddhervrttirēyē. tato 'dhyavasāyasmṛtyādīlinga buddhiṁ
siddhyatīti. taduktam śrīmanmrṛgendre iti buddhiprakaśo 'yaṁ bhāva-
pratyayalakṣanaḥ. bodha ityucyate bodhavyaktibhūmitayā pāṣoḥ. iti.
eva ca buddhibodhastrividha ityāha.
(47Aa) KLRPTIRMATIṆ SMṚTISČETI

tatra kṛptiḥ kalpanāṃ pratibhetyarthah matisa mananāṃ jñānam-
adhyavasāya iti yāvat. itthamicchādikāryabhedādantaḥkaranaḥ abhedāḥ siddha ityupasamharati.
(47Ab-47B) JĀṬĀ BHĪNṆĀRTHAVĀCAKAṆH
ICCHĀŚAMRAMBHABODHĀKYĀSTENĀNTAḤKARĀNAM TRIDHĀ

smṛtyādīnāmavāntarabhede 'pi bodhakatvenaikārthatvat buddhi-
vyṛtītvam icchādayastu vyṛttayo bhinnārthatvādabhinnakāranā iti bhāvāḥ.
nanu prthivyādīnāṃ visayatvena bhogvatvādindriyaṇāṃ ca tadgraṇāha-
hetutvādastu bhogasādhanatā. Buddhēstū indriyārtha-
apīp tu ātmagunjatai eti naiyāyikādayaḥ. ata āha.

(48) TULYE GUṆANVITATVE TU SAMVEDYAṆ KIṆCIDIṢYATE
BUDDHIŚCĀPIHYASAMVEDYĀ DHANYĀ TĀṆKATAṬ TAVA

ayamabhiprāyaḥ dvividho 'tra bodho 'dhyavasāyātmako 'nadhyavasāyāt-
makaśca. tatra yo 'dhyavasāyātmakaḥ sa sarvadā grāhakarūpenaiva bhas
bhāsamānatvādītmanah svabhāva eva. astu anadhyavasāyarūpah sa ut-
pattyapavargayogitvena bhāsamānatvānna pumsāḥ svabhāvah. nityāṇitya-
svabhāvatvāyogat. tatsvabhāvate cānityatvaprasāṅgat. na ca nityonu-
bhūyate. tato na pumsāḥ svabhāva iti yasya saḥ svabhāvah sā buddhirbhā-
bhāvanāmadhyavaseyatotpādikā dharmajñānaṃdāyaṣṭagunā buddhirīti. tataś-
ca viṣayādhyavasāyārūpatvādabhāvapratyayātmanā satvādiguṇātrayāṅvitvena
svarūpena bhogatvāc ca buddherapi samvedyataiva. na tvātmagunjatvam.
taduktam tatvasamgrahe buddhirviṣayākārasukhādirūpa samāsato bhogyam
iti. prayogaścātra bhavati buddhirapi samvedyāiva satvādiguṇānvyāt-
prthivyādivaditi. karaṇatvam ca indriyavadasyā visayādhyavasāyahetu-
tvātsiddhamityuktam. nanu dharmadānam [26]
bhāvānāmapi asmābhiritmagunatvamisyate. tadayuktam. teṣāmātmam-
skārakatvāyogāt. tathāhi. jyotiśtomādikarmasamkārastāvannatmani
sambhavati, avikāritvāt karmanām ca kṛṣyādīnāmātmamāsmkāratvādrṣteh
api tu jada eva yatra tāni samśkarāṁ kurvanti. sa buddhiḥ. evam
jñānādisamśkāre 'pi vācyam. tadbalādeva svapnasmṛtipratibhādāv-
asatyaparthe uleko drṣyate. yataḥ ataśca.

(49) ANTARBAHIŚCA KARAṆĀM SĀKSĀT BHOGASYA ŚĀDHANAM
Bhogam vinā na bhogo 'sti tyato bhogasya śādhanaṁ
ántaro bāhyaśca karaṇagroho bhogasya sukhāduḥkhādisamvedāntamanāḥ
sāksāt karaṇām. yaduktam śrīmatasyāvambhuve bhogo 'syā vedanā pumṣaḥ
sukhāduḥkhādilakṣaṇā iti. sa ca bhogaḥ sraścandānādibhogyam vinā na
syādītī tadgrahanapūrvakasya sukhādyadhyavasāvasāyāpi śādhanaṁisyate.
etadeva drṣṭāntena prakatayati.

(50) SAINIKĀṆVIJAYĀYĒHA PRAYUKTE NRPAṬIRYATHĀ
PRYUKTE MAHAḌĀDĪNI BODHĀDYARΘAMAṆUSTATHĀ [27]

(51) SAINIKASTHE JAYE RĀJṆĀH KARTṬVAM TU YATHĀ TATHĀ
BUDDHYĀDISAMSTHE BODHĀDAU PUMSAH KARTṬVAMIŚYATE

(52) SVĀṬMĀRTHAM SAINIKĀṆĀM TU VIJAYO NETI TE YATHĀ
SĀDHANAṀ VIJAYASYEŚṬASTHATAIVA MAHAḌĀDAYAH

(53A) TEṢĀMABI HI BODHĀYAM SVARΘAM NETI VINIŚCITAM
karaṇānāmacetanatvāttadvṛttināṁ na svārtham. api cetana-
puruṣārthataiṣevi bhāvah.

(53B) TATO BODHĀDVṛTTINĀM ŚĀDHANAM MAHAḌĀDAYAH
adhunā bhogyam vibhajati.
(54) MOHADUHKAŞUKHĀKĀRO RUPĀKHYASTADBHAVO DVIDHĀ
BADHVAHOPARAM BHOGRAM MAYĀDI CA TADARTHATAH
udbhūtagunatvena mohādihetuvānmoḥādyākāro rūpasamjñō dhammādi-
bhāvavargah tadupādānāh saddhyādiprātyayavargaśca dvidvidho yaṁ baḍddho
bodhāḥ pūṃṣaḥ paramavyavahitaṃ bhogyāṃ māyādikāṃ bhuvanādivastu tad-
avayatadantarthatvād bhogādhihāraṇatvātparamparayābhogyamiti. ko 'sau
rūpākhyā ityata aha.
(55) ADHARMĀDITRAYĀM RĀGO DHARMĀDI CA CATUŚTAYAM
TAMORAJĀH SATVAMAYĀM RŪPAṂ TATKARMAJĀM MATAU
adharmajñānaśivāryākṣyām rūpaṃ tāmasām rāgaśtvāvairāgyākhyām
rājasām dharmaḥ jñānavairāgyaśivāryākṣyānāṃ sātvikamityevamaṣṭavidham rūpaṃ
buddhaṃ guṇatvena sthitam karmatascopādānajjātām. tattvabhuvanāsārārādi
tu karmajñāva sahakāraśca māyākhyādūpādānāt sāksatparamparayā cotpannam-
ityuktām śrīmatsvāyambhūvādau. ete ca.
(56) ATYANTOCCHEDATO MUKTAVABHVYAKTESCA SARVATAH
PĀṬADIBODHĀVAITATYĀDĀTMANO NA GUNAGUNAH
yato dharmaṇānam mokṣetyantocchedah parairapiṣyaite yataścātma-
svabhāvasya jñānakriyātmano nityasya vyāpakasya muktaṃ sarvato vy
vyāpakatvenābhivyaktiḥ śruyate yasmācca pāṭadijñānānāmadyāvasāy-a
rūpaṃcānāvaitatyaṃ avyāpakatvaṃ drśyate. tasmādanyā avyāpakās-
cādharmādaya nityasya vyāpakasyātmano gunā bhavītaṃ nārhaṇti. tat-
samatvāye tasya parināmitvādidosprasaṅgāt. ete cādharmaṇāyaḥ
sāṃsiddhiḥvainayikaprākṛtavhedāstrivdhā atmanā upadyante. yaduktaṃ
śrīmanmrṛgendre sāṃsiddhiḥ vainayikā prakṛtāśca bhavantyanyoḥ. visiṣṭa-
dharmasamśkārasamuddāpita cetasaṃ. gunah sāṃsiddhiko bhāti dehaṃpāye
'pi pūrvavat. lokadhīgurusāstrebhyo bhāti vainayiko gunah.
sa māṛjito vainayiko manovāktanuceṣṭayā. prāṛto dehasamyoge vyaktaḥ svapnādibodhavat. iti. ataścaivaṁ trividhebhyo dharmādibhyah phala-bhedānāhā.

(57) EŚĀMADHOGĀTIRBANDHO VIGHĀTAH SAMSṛTIH KRAMĀT
SVARGO MUKTIH PRAKRṬIBHĀYO 'VIGHĀTASCĀ PHALĀNI. CA
(58) BHAVASTHĀNAAPARĀDHO 'THA VIGHNO BHOGĀNATIKRAMAḤ
VASYORDHVASTHITISADDRṬIBHRTVĀM BHOGĀSPRṛHĀ PHALAM
(59) SVACINTITEṢU VĀ VIGHNO RŪPE SĀMSIDDHIKE PHALAM
VINYAPRAKRṬE RŪPE PŪRVPATAPHALASAMGRAHĀḥ

vaināyikebhyaḥ prāṛtebhāyaścādharmaḥdibhyah kramādadhagatyādīnī phalānī bhavanti. sāmsiddhikebhyaḥ astu bhavādīnī. tatrādhagatirnarakapraṭṭih. bandho 'nātmani atmbhāmīnītādiḥ. samsṛṭistirīyagādiyoni-praṛṭtiḥ. muktisca darsāṇāntaramokṣaḥ. paramukterdiṅkṣāphalatvena mokṣā- kārikāsā vakṣyamānatvāt. prāṛti bhāvaḥ prāṛṭilayaḥ. bhavaḥ sāmsāraḥ sthānāparādhāḥ svasthānānnyakāraḥ. bhogānātikramo bhogecchā. vasyordhvasthiṁ vaśyānāṁ svapadādhāhāṁsthānāṁadhīsthānāṁ saddṛṣṭibhṛtvām tattadviṣayasyamatyājñānayogah ēṣeṁ sugamam. [30]
ittham bhāvānvicārya pratyayāvyāçeṣṭe.

(60) VYAKTAVYAKTAJÑASAMBUDHIHSIDDHIH SAMPRATI SIDDHYATI
RĀGAMĀTRĀNULIPTĀNGADDHARMĀDI SAMUDĀYATAH

iha hi buddhau vāsanātvena sthitā dharmādayoṣṭau bhāva ucyante yadayah bhāvayanti yato liṅgam tena bhāvaḥ prakṛṭitā iti ta eva pra-kārsāvasthāṁ praṛṭaḥ sthūlene rūpeṇa bhogyadaśāmapannāḥ sāṃsaṛiṇāṁ pratyāyanātpratyayāḥ kathyante. taduktām pratyāyayanti kṣetrajñāṁ pratyayāstena kīrtitāḥ. iti. ataśca vairāgyena rājasena īṣadyuktāt sātvikādadharmādibhāvacatūṣṭayātsiddhiruptadyate. sā ca vyaktasya
गुप्तेण दर्शयंत्व प्रचोदण्या स्रवणं करते विद्या। पुष्प सब्भुक्तं वास्तव श्रवणं प्राप्त शिष्यो यादाहुं द्रास्तु वस्त्रं वादण्यं भोजय।

(61) धर्मदिरुपसांप्रक्तं पापदित्रितयोधवाव तुस्तिस्क्रतर्थविज्ञानानासामत्वभा, सत्तविकार्धर्मादिवहि इति।

(62) अधर्मदिरुयाभाजा रागालेसानुराज्जितात।

(63) तस्मादेवायान्त्व सितारागतं।

इशाद्धर्मदिरुपसांप्रक्तादाधिविष्यको विपरयाय। तस्मात्मसवाङ्गाण्ड्राजसहितं शतविकेनेश्युक्तं यथार्थी ग्रहणारुपो विपरयायामो महमहं महोत्तमस्तिस्तं श्रद्धां रागस्तमयफ्युरूषो श्रवणं।
itthamatisamkṣepenoktaṁ bhāvapratyayātmakaṁ buddhibodhamupasamharati.

(64Aa) LEŚOKTA BUDDHIDHARMO 'YĀM

ēṣāṁ ca bhāvapratyayānāṁ prapañcaḥ śrīmanmataṅgādau vistareṇa
darśitaḥ. prakāśitaścāśmābhirmṛgendravrūttidīpikāyāmi ti ata evāvadhāryaḥ. 
gandhavistarabhayāttaṁ nātra likhyate. ayaṁ ca.

(64Ab).

CETANENOPABHAYATE

bhogyatvāditi ēṣāṁ bhogyatvameva sādhayati.

(64B-65A)

BHOGYATVĀM CĀSYA SAMSIDDHĀM YENOTPANNO 'NUBHŪYATE

SA CĀPYANUBHĀVO BHOGO BHOKTĀRĀM GAMAYATYALAM

asya bauddhasya jīvāṇasyotpattyapargayogitvena, bhogyatvameva na
tu bhoktṛtvāṁ tasya sarvādā grāhakarūpeṇa sthirasyaiva svasaṃvedana-
siddhitvādityuktam. atasāca.

(65B)

SĀDHAYITRĀ VINĀ YASMĀTSIDDHIRNEHA SAMĪHITĀ

iha hi buddhicaitanyavādibhirbaudhaṁbhoktṛtvānābhhyupagatasāyaṁśya[33]
bauddhasya jñāṇasyāsthiratvena ghaṭādivadacetasātvaṁvākālāntarabhāvi-
karmaphalalabhoktṛtvāsambhavādaktavadbhogyatvāccca sa tattvasāya-
sukhādayanubhavarūpo bhoga eva bhoktārām sādhayati. yato bhogakriyā-
siddhirbhoktāram caśeṁmaṁamantareṇa na saṁbhavati bhogasyāpi kriyātva-
tatkartṛtvānāyātmasiddhirī bhāvāḥ. samīhiteti. abhiṣṭetyarthāḥ.
ata ra codayati.

(66A)

NA VINĀ DṚŚṬASAMVĀDAMANUMĀNASYA MĀNĀTĀ

iha hi dhūmenānumito 'gnirāśidatā prayakṣikriyata iti tasāṇu-
mānasya prāmaṇāntarsamvāda dṛṣṭyate. ata eva tasya prāmāṇyam. cakra-
mūrdhādu dhūmāderiva sādhavyabhicārādarsanāttatascātṛpyanubhavātmano
jñānasaiyāvārādarsanāt jñātṛjñānayorākārabhedānupalambhāt bhogādbhoktṛ-
umānasayāpi vyabhicārāsaākyā prāmaṇātvābhāvāna bhoktṛjñāna-
vyatiriktāsyātmanāḥ siddhiriti saugataḥ. yadāhuh ekamevedam saṃvidrūpam
harṣaviśādādyane kākāravivartam paśyāmastatra yatheṣṭaṃ saṃjñāḥ kriyantāṃ-
iti. tadayuktamātyāha.

(66B) DRŚTASYA KENA SAMVĀDO YENA TASYĀSTI MĀNATA

ayambhipraāyaḥ. bhogasya viṣayasamvedanātmanonubhavasya [34]
bāhyaviśayāsamnidhe 'pi susūpyādāvāntaradehasparśamaṭraviṣayatvena
sthiratayaiva bhāsāmatatvat sthiratvena svasaṃvedananapratyakṣasiddho
grāhakarūpo ātmetyuktam na ca jñānasya ksāṇikasya svātmanī kriyā-
virodhenasthair yādhyāropo yuktāḥ. yadapayuktam aksāṇikasya
kramayaugapadyābhyaṃmarthakriyāvirodhāt yatsat tatasṛvāṃ ksāṇikamītyapi
na. aksāṇikasyaiva maṇyaḥhe kramena ghaṭādīṃbhāvānanavbhāsaya
yugapāncakagraghatāṃstāmnārthin prakāṣayato 'nubhavasiddhatvāt.
ksāṇikasya cotpattikāla eva naṣṭyato 'neka ksāṇanirvartya kriyānu-
śtanāksamatvādityādī vistarena śrīmanmataṅgavṛtyādāvācāryāṁ sādhhitamīti.
tataścātmanah svasaṃvedanasiddhatve 'pyanumeyatvam abhyupagamycote.

(67A) NEHA PRAMĀṆASAMVĀDAḤ PRATYAKSASYA PRAMĀṆATAH

nātra pramāṇasya pramāṇāntarasaṃvādaṃ pekṣā. pratyakṣasya
pramāṇāntarasaṃvādaṃ bhāve 'pyan-
adhigatavisayajñānanajanakatvena prāmāṇyāt tadāhuh anadhitgarthaṅgantṛ
pramaṇam iti. kathāṁ punaścakramūrdhiḍau vyabhiḥcāro 'ta aha.

(67B) ANVAYAVYATIREKĀBHYĀM NYABHICĀRANIRĀKRTIḤ

yasya dhūmāderyena 'vinābhāvala ksāṇaṇaṃbandho 'nvayavyatirekābhyām
niścitaḥ na tasya tatra vyabhicāro dhṛṣyate. su-
vivecitasya dhūmasya 'gnāviva. cakramūrdhādijanyasya tu svarūpāvivekena
dhūmatvabhrāntiḥ. tataścātārā pi kriyāyāssarvatra kartṛpūrvakaṭvadārśanāt
bhogakriyāyā bhoktra 'numīyate. bhavaddhirapi svadehe buddhipūrvakatvena
siddhātākāryādvayavahārātparaśarīre buddhiḥ pramāṇāntarasamvadam vinā. 'pyanumānena 'numīyate ityāha.

(68A) DEHADHARMASYA MĀNATVE KĀRAṆĀM BUDDHIRĪṢYATE

dehadharmasya ceśṭādyātmano mānate hetutve sati tena paraśarīre
taddheturbuddhiḥ sādhyate ityarthāḥ. yadāhūḥ buddhipūrvvām kriyām drṣṭvā
vadehe 'nyatra tadgrahāt. jñāyate dhīḥ iti. atasca rūpādidaśanān-
yathānupapattyā cakṣurādīndriyavadbhogānyathānupapattyā bhoktṛsiddhir-
ityabhiprāyenāha.

(68B-69Aa) ASMĀTSĀMĀNYATO DRŚṬĀDANYASYAYĀ PI PRAṂĀṆĀTA

ANUMĀṆASYA SAMŚIDDHĀ

yaduktaṃ cārvākaiḥ. astu bhoktā. sa tu paridṛṣṭyamāhanaprthivyādi-
caturbhūtakārṇaṃāhāratmakaḥ kāya eva. tasyaiva pariṃmānavigeseṇa
kīvādīdrikaṃ kārṇaṃ madhāsaktyabhivyaktavaccaitanyābhivyaktiḥ. prānādi-
vāyubalena bhogādikriyādaśaṃācca. na tu tato 'nyāḥ. tasya
pratyagṣaṇādaśaṃāt.[36]

yadāhūḥ. drṣṭe sambhavatyaadrṣṭapārikalpanā na nyāyāḥ. iti. tadapi
nirākṛtamityāha.

(69Ab-70A) KĀRAṆĀDATĀ EVA HI

CETANO BUDDHI×ODHASYA BHOKTĀ MĀṆASAMARTHITĀH

PRTHIVYĀDISAMĀHĀRO BHAVATVITY NA YUKTIMAT

ayamabhiprayāḥ. yataḥ sarīrasyāpyaṃtah śūlādyātmanā bahiṣca mrdu-
kaṣāśdinaṃ sparṣena bhogyatvadarśaṃādghatādivaccetanatvam na yuktam.
tatastasyāpi bhoktṛtvena 'tmā siddha iti cetanatyām cāsyā na pramaṇopa-
pannamityāha.

(70B) CAITANYAM HI TVAYĀ TASYA KENA MĀNE NA NISĆITAM

- ranu śuklaśonitātmakadehārambhakabhūtasadbhāva eva caitanyadarsānañāt-
tadabhāve ca 'darsānād dehātmakameva caitanyamata āha.  (71) [37]

(71Aa) SATI BHĀVE 'PYANAİKĀNTAḤ

śavaśārire garbhādau vā dehātmakabhūtasadbhāve 'pi caitanyā
darsānāna dehātmakam caitanyam tataśca śārīrā 'tmavādo na pramāṇopapannā
tyaha.

(71Ab) TASMĀDVAYASAVASITAM

bhogyatvācāsyaśa 'cetanatvamityahā.

(71B-72A) ANABHIVYAKTACAITANYĀ DRŚṬ Ā BHOGYĀ GUDĀDAYAḤ

JĪVACCHAYOPABHOGYATVĀDASTU TULYO GUDĀDI'BHIḤ

gudādayo hi jīvasyā 'tmanaśchāyayā 'nubhavātmaṇā saṁvidā bhogyatvena
grāhyataya viśayākriyāmāṇāḥ kadācidapabhivyaktaṇca na drśṭaḥ. tataḥ
kāyā 'tmāpi bhūtasamāhāraḥ proktavadgrāhyatvena bhogyataya viśayākaraṇād-
acetana eveti na tasya bhokṛtvam upapadyate. kiṁ ca dehasayiva
cetanatve tasyā 'sakṛtpaṁiṇāmena vināśādbhālyāvāsthā 'nubhūtaṁ vrddhāva-
sthāyān smaryamāṇam nopapadyate ityādi vistareṇa niraṅkto 'yam pakṣo-
'smābhīśrīmanmrgendravṛttiṇidīpikāyām. nānū śārītravyatiriktānam-
indriyāṇāmeva bhokṛtvam astu. nānyasyeti indriyācaitaniākāstādayuktam-
ityāḥ.

(72B-73A) BHOGYATVAKARAṆATVĀBHYĀMINDRIYĀNĀM VINISCITAM

ACAITANYAMATO BHOKṬĀ PURUṢAŚCITSVABHĀVAKĀḤ

uktavadindriyāṇāmapi bhogārthatayā bhogyatvākaraṇatvācchāstraśādi-
vadacetanatvamaniśvamvātō nāsām kartṛtvam api tu citsvabhāvāyaśātmana
eva tasayaiva hi sarvānyakārakapraavṛttinivṛttihetutvena kartṛtvam yuktaṃ.
yadāhuh pravṛttau ca nivṛttau  [38]
ca kārakānām ya śivaraḥ apravṛttih pravṛttau vā sa kartā nama kāraka
iti.
(73B) BHOKTURBHGÂŚCITERVYAKTIRBHOGYACCHÂYÂNURÂNJITA
bhogyâ ya buddhe sukhâdîrupâyâh châyayâ âkârâpûrânânjita caitanya-
vyaktireva bhokturbhogaḥ śrîmatâ śrîmatsvâyambhuve bhogosya vedanâ 
pumsâh sukhaduḥkâdilâkâsanâ iti tadânîm ca.

(74A) ACÎTTACITISÂMÎBANDHÂDBHOGYAMÂBHÂTI CETANAM
acetanamapi buddhâtmaṃ bhogyam tasyâtmanâh caitanyasamśâla-
cetanavadâbhâsat. tuduktaṃ sâmkhyaîrâpi acetanam cetanâvadiva liṅgam 
it. evam ca.

(74B-75A) BHOGYADVÂRENA PÂŚÂNÂM PAŚUNÂM CA PARASPARAM
CETANÂCETANACCHÂYÂNUSÂNGO BHÂSAṬE BHÂRÂM
bhogyam hi vastu cittâdhiśhitâm buddhândiryaḥbrandmatmano 
visayatvenopasthâpayati.tacca buddhyâdhyavasitâṃ puruṣo grhâtī. tad-
buddhyâdhyavasitamarthâṃ puruṣâścetayatī iti. tataśca prakâṣâ-
rûpâtvâdâdâsrâtsthânîyena bhogâkhyena buddhâbodhâtmanâ dvâreṇâtmanām 
bhoktrânât pâśânām ca visayarûpeṇa pariṇatânām [39]
bhogâyânâm cetanâcetanarupayoh châyayoh pratibimbitayorâkârânuṣângah 
samśâlaśatram bhṛṣamâtyarathamekâkârâtâya bhâsate. ata evâtâtmaṃdau 
âtmâdhramah saṁśâriṇām. tadvivekajñâne tu tesaṃ prakrâtilaya ityuktam.

(75B) BHOGYE BHOGAH PRABHÔŚCÂYÂ YATHÂ CANDRAMASO JALE
prabhôrvyâpakasyâtmanassadiva bhogyavisayo bhogah. ya tadadhya-
vasâyâtmanî buddhâbodhe candramasa iva jale châyâ visīṣṭā caitanyâbhi-
vyaktisândrabimbasyâ jâdatvât sthûlatvâccâ visîṣṭasvarupâbhivyâktîmatra 
evâtra drâṣṭântatvam anato bhoktretvâccetansâya puruṣasyâiva karttrtvam 
nâcetanânäm bhogyânâm buddhyâdinâmîti mantavyam. nanu kriyâveso hi 
karttvam. sa yadi pumsassyâtparinâmîti-bhavat. puruṣo hi nirvâkâras- 
tato nâsya karttrtvam. kîm tu prakrineva sa hi vivekajñânâtpûrvam
mahadādi rūpeṇa bhogyatayā tasyātmānam dasāyatīti saṃsāra ityucyate.
tatsambhave tu tasmānivaṃsāna muktiśabdābhidhīyeti saṃkhyāḥ. yaduktam
taiḥ. rāgaṣya dasāyitvā nivartate nartakaḥ yathā rāgaṭ. puruṣasya
tathātmānam prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ iti.

(76A-76B)  PARINĀMABHAYĀTPUMSI BHOCGE ČANIŚITE SATI
AVIŚEŚO DURĀPOHAH PRASAKTO BHOKTRMUKTAYOḤ
ayamabhiprāyaḥ. nātra kriyāvesaḥ kartṛtvam. api tu kriyāyām
śaktatvameva. tathāhi ayaskāntasannidhānādayas ivātmānaḥ sannidheḥ
śarīrādereva spandādirūpah kriyāveso dṛṣyate. tataṣca buddhyadivīṣayi
karaṇarūpe bhoge pumso na pariṇāmāprasaṅgaḥ. kintu tatparatvena tad-
viśayīkarāṇameva. bhavatpakṣe tu pumso nirmalatvena tatparatve 'py-
anabhuyapagamyamēne bhoktrmuktyoraviśeṣo durnivāraḥ prasajyate. ubhayaor-
apyanapekṣatvena tulyatvāt. nanu parārthapraṇṛtta prakṛitreva tad-
ārthām pravartata ityuktam. yadāhuḥ vatsavṛddhinimittaṃ kṣīrasya. yathā
pravṛttirajnāsya. puruṣavimokṣanimittaṃ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānāsyeti
ata āha.

(77A)  PUMARTHĀYA CA PAŚAŅĀM PRAVṛTTRVINIVĀRĪTĀ
ayamabhiprāyaḥ acetanatvādeva pradhānāsya puruṣam prati pravṛttirna
yuktā. kṣīrāderapi cetanagavādyadhiścchitaśyaśaiva pravṛttidṛṣṭaiḥ. vāyu-
jalādīnāmapi pakṣikṛtavacca tatpravṛttyabhuyapagamē-

(77B)  BHOKTARYAVIKRTΕ BHOCGE MUKTAVANNOPAPADYATE
nanu aviveka eva pradhānapravṛtterhetuḥ. prakṛtipuruṣavivekajñāne tu
tam prayupātādhiḥkāratvānnapravartate. ato na badghamuktayoravisēṣaḥ yad
āhuḥ prakṛteḥ sukumārataram na kīm cidastīti me matirbhavati yā
dṛṣṭam iti punardarsanamupaita puruṣasya iti. tadayuktam. bhavatpakṣe
pumṣo nirmalatvenaviveka-yogāt. nirhetuke cā viveke sarvadā vivekahāvav-
prasaṅgāc ca. tasmādavivekānayathānupapattyāpi tasya samalatvasarāgataḥ-
abhyupagantavyamiti vakṣyāmaḥ. yadyevamātmanah samalatvenāṃsva-
bhāvatev śarādiyogena jñāntṛtaya vikāreca bhupagyamāne svabhāvāntara-
yogāditiyatyaprasānga iti paramatamāśaṅkate.

(78Aa) VIKĀRITVĀDANITYAŚCET
bhokteti śesāḥ. pariharati.

(78Ab) MĀYĀŚĀDHYAṂ NA MANYATE
māyāya svakāryaissūkṣmabāhyasaśarādiyāreṇa kriyāmaṇaṃ visēṣaṃ na
jānīte bhāvāniti śesāḥ. tato nānityatvādidosā ityabhīpraḥāḥ katham-
ityata āhah.

(78B) SVARŪPAVYAKTILĀBHĀCCA NA VIKĀRO NA NĀŚITA
nāmbhirnaityāyikādivaśadārūpa eva 'tmā śisyate. api tu jñāsabhāva
eva. sa tu tasya svabhāvah śarādiyogam vinā 'nabhivyakteranādina
kena 'pi pratibaddho 'vaśiyate. sa ca mala eveti vakṣyāmaḥ. tataśca
māyāya kalādibhiḥ svakāryamalavyudāse naikadeśasvarūpavyaktirevātmanah
kriyate. malaparipāke tu dīkṣākhyaya śivaśaktyā sarvaviṣayobhivyajyate.
tato nāsya vikāro vināśita ceti. asya ca.

(79A) BHOGYOPADHĀNAṆAṆAGASA SVACCHATVĀNNOKTAKARĀṆAṬ
ato bhogyaviṣayopadhānājanito rāgo 'pi sukhaduhkhahākāraḥ prakāśo
'sya sphaṭikasyeva svacchatvātprakāśarūpavat. na tu pūrvoktātpari-
nāmākhyātkāraṇāt. 'sa ca viṣayoparāgo 'pyasya tatparatāyā tadviṣayī-
LEAVES 323 TO 332 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING.

FEUILLES 323 À 332 NON, INCLUS, DANS LA PAGINATION.
karaṇam evetyuktam. tato bhogyasya saṁrasyāsakṛṭparināme 'pi bhokturna pariṇāma ityāha.  

(79B-80A)  

SARĪRAPARINĀMEVA PARINĀMI NA PUDGALAH  
SA YATO 'CETANO BHOGYO BUDDHIMATPARINĀMATAH  

tasyāpi pariṇāmābhupagame buddhyādi�dhbhogyatvamacetanatvam ca  
syādityarthaḥ. tatra paramatamupanyasya dūṣyati.  

(80B-81A)  

CAITANYĀM HI GUNO JñāNĀM SAMAVĀYO 'THA TENA VĀ  
SVARŪPAṂ PURUṢASYETI NANYADASYA NA YUKTIMAT  

evam hi naiyāyikādayo manyante. jaḍasvabhāva evātmā tasya mahā  
samyogādgunataya jñānām samavetamutpadyate. tadeva ca tasya caaitanyām  
nānyajñānasvabhāvatvameti. tadayuktam. jaḍatve tasya ghaṭādivatjñāna-  
samavāyogāditi. nanvatra niyamakām karmādrṣṭākhyamasti. yatkarma-  
samānādhihikaraṇe puruṣa eva jñānām samavetamutpadyate. nānyatra tad-  
vyaadhikaraṇe ghaṭādāvīti. ata āha.  

(81B-82A)  

AUŅE NARYEVA VIJNĀNĀM NANYATRETI NIYĀMAKAM  
KARMA 'PI NOPAPPANĀM TU TADANYATRA STHITĀM YATAH  
karmānāh kṛṣyāderiva prakṛtīsamkāratvameva nātmasamkāratvam  
vikāritvaprasaṅgādityuktam. tatastadaṇi nātra niyāmakām  

bhavitumarhati. tatascaitanyasamavāyāccitsvabhāva evātmāsiddhi ityāha.  

(82B-83A)  

MOHO MOHASVABHĀVEHYO YADVANNĀRTHĀNTARĀM BUDHĀH  
CAITANYEHYAḥ PADĀRTHEHYASTADVANNĀRTHĀNTARĀM CITIHI  

caitanyāṭmano jñānasyātmadharmatvāddharmanāse dharmino 'pi tad-  
avyatirekānāsah prasayata iti sarvada cetanasvabhāvevātmabhupag-  
gantavyah. tasya ca malāvṛtatvānmanobuddhyādaśadayastadbhivyanjakatayā  
siddhā ityuktam. asya ca bhogakriyāyāmupakārakatayā sahakāribhūtām  
pryoktṛkaraṇaraṇajakarūpāṃ kalāvidyārāgākhyam kaṇcukatrayan prakṛti-
sādhanātpaścādabhidhāsyate ityāha.

(83B-84A) PRAYOKTRKARANĀM BHOGES RĀṆJAKAM COPARI TRAYAM
ASYA BHOGAKRIYĀKAMAṬUHPRAKRTERUPADEKSYATE
ittham prasaṅgādbhoktāram prasādhya prakṛte buddherevāhāṅkārasyotpattirityāha.
(84B-85A) BUDDHE SKANDHO 'PARO BHINNO YO 'HĀṅKĀRAMAJĪJANAT
JANITĀRO GUNĀ YENA DRŚṬĀSTATPRATIBHĀDIṢU

yena kāraṇena tasyā buddheḥ pratibhādiṣu vṛttisu proktena nayena
parasparābhibhavenārayāṃmithunī bhāvācca kāryasyotpādayitāro gunāḥ
dṛśṭāḥ. yaduktaṁ sankhyaiḥ anyonyābhibhāvārayāṃmithunapravṛttayasca
gunā iti tena buddherevādhyavasāyayahetoḥ skandhādanyo bhāgo gunasampṛkto
'haṅkāramajījanat. tataśca na hyekam janakamiti nyāyenanyonyasampṛkta
eva gunā janakāstathaiva ca sarvesu padārthesu vartante. sātvikāди-
vyavahārastu teṣāṃ satvādhībāhulyāditi bhāvah. sāksāḍgunakāryatvādeva
casyām gunānvayo ghaṭādiṣu mṛdakārānvayavadityāha.
(86B-86A) PRATHAMĀ VIKRṬIHI SĀTO GUṆĀṆAM TATRA YUJJAYE
UDBHĀVABHĪBHĀVĪBHYĀM TU NIYAMENA VIYAVASTHIṬIḥ

gunā hi tasyām niyamena parasparābhibhave na bhavantah siddhyādi-
janakā ityuktam. yadyevamahāṅkārasyāpi gunānvayāggunebhya evotpattir-
astu ata āha.
(86B-87A) ĀḤĀṅKĀRE 'PYAYĀM NYĀYA ITI MA JALPA PĀṇṬITTA
ANYONYAVIKRṬITVĀTTANMĀTRASVAPYANUṢAJAYATE
ahaṅkāraṇādibhūtāntānam sarveṣāmāpavyanyonyavikrṭitvātproktavatparam-
parayā gunavidaravānna kevalamahāṅkāra eva tanmātrasvapi api sābdādi-
Indriyavarge bhūtavarge ca gunānvayo 'nuṣajyata

eva. ghaṭakapālādiṣu mṛdakārānvayavat na tu sarvesām sāksātgunebhya
evotpattirityadoṣaṁ. atha ke te guṇāṁ kairvyāpārāisaṁca teṣām siddhir.

(87B-88A) SATVAM RAJASTAMASCETI KĀRAṆĀNI DHIYO GUṆĀH
PRAKHYĀVYĀPĀRANYAMAISH PUMYOΓAMA YE VITENIRE
proktavaddhuddhyādīvārena bhāvaprathyādīvarupam puruṣabhogam vastu ye
sargādau cakrurutpāditavantaḥ adhunāpi kurvate te buddherapi kāraṇaṁ
guṇā iti. ete ca parasparāvyākānekameva tatvam. yacchṛṣyate. trayo
guṇastathāpyekeṁ tatvam tadaviyogataḥ. iti. tato buddhikāraṇatayaṁ.
prakāśavṛttinyamākhyayāvyāpārah satvādīnāṃ siddhiḥ ite ca prādhānyāt-
pradarsitāḥ. anyeṣāmapi sthairyadhairyādīnāṃ sauryakrauryādīnāmamarati-
māṇḍyādīnāṃ guṇakāryāṇāmāgāmesu śravanaṭ. nanu guṇā eva
pradhānākhyāṇityatvena sthitā. iti. sāmkhyāstadayuktamityāḥ.

(88B-89A) ACAITANYE 'PYANEKATVASAMKHYSAMAMBANDHAHETUTAH
TESĀM KĀRAṆAPŪRṆATVAMĪSTĀM BUDDHIHATĀDIKAVT
yata esāmanekatvasamkhyaśasambhandhādanekatvaṁ tato 'nekatvād-
acetanatvācaca ghatādīvatkārayatvasiddhiḥ. kim teṣāmupādānityata āha.

(89B-90A) UPĀDĀNAM GUṆĀM YATPRAKRTIḤ SABHIDHIYATE
AVVIBHĀGASTHITAYASYĀM NIRGACCHANTI SIVERIṬAH

yasyāṁ sūkṣmatvenāvibhāgaṇa sthitā guṇāṁ śivaprasaṇena svasva-
pravṛttivibhāgaṁ sthūlāṁ abhivyajyante sā prakṛtiḥ siveriṭā iti ca
acetanatvānāṁ svātantaṇyena pravṛttitir darśayati. asyaśca prati-
puruṣām sūkṣmadehavartītvānekaṇyatvāṁ vākyāṁāḥ. atha
puṣṭasya kalādipāṅcakaṅcukayuktasya bhokṛtṛtvena pumstvammalayogāddikṣāyāṁ
tacchuddhyartham prakṛtisattavādūrdhvamāgāmesu pathe satyapi
tasya vyāpakatvācacetanatvena bhokṛtṛtvācādhrvarūpatvam bhogāśādhanatvam ca
na saṃbhavatīti tamukeṣya tasyaiva raṇjakatvena prāguktaṁ rāgaṭatvam
sādhayitumāhā.

(90B-91A)  BHOGYĀNUBHAVAMĀŚĀDYA BHOGE SAKTIH PRAVARTATE
TATŚIDDHYARTHĀM TATASTASYA RĀGO BHOGĀNURAṆJAKAH
iha hi samsārāvasthāyāṁ puruṣasya bhogyam dṛṣṭvā tasminsaktih
pravartate. sā ca nāheturutpayate. muktyavasthāyāmapi prasāṅgāt.
atastasya pumāstastasyāṁ sakteḥ siddhyarthāṁ bhogābhilāṣa-
janako rāgo 'bhupagantavyaḥ. atra paraḥ bhuprāyaḥ.

(91B-92A)  SATVĀṁ RAJASTAMO YUKTĀṁ VIṢAYEŚVANURAṆJAKAM
BUDDHĀVABHYUDITĀṁ PUMĂSTASTMĀDANYO NIRARTHAKAH
pariharati.

(92B-93A)  TANMATĀVUDITĀṁ BHOGEYĀM TASMİNYO 'SYĀNURAṆJAKAH
SA RĀGO 'NYAH PRAMANTAVYO RŪPE 'PYETADHĪ DŪṢANAM
sātvikābhogasādhanaśāyākārābhavasāyadvāreṇa buddhāvuditasya
sukhaduḥkhamoharūpeṇa pariṇatasya satvādīgunatrayasyaiva sākṣa bhogyā-
tvāt tasminnapi bhogyeyāṁ puṃsā bhilāṣajananakasya tasmādviṣaya-
guṇadīrūpeṇa buddhāvuditātsatvādīgunatrayādbhogyarūpaṇāḥ grahakagato
rāgo mantavyaḥ. bhogyasyaiva 'bhilāṣajanaṇakte vītarāgabhāvaprasaṅga
iti bhāvaḥ. tad uktām tatvasamgraha bhogyaviśeṣe rāgena hi kasād-
vītarāgasyāditi. yadyevamavairāγyalakṣaṇo buddhidharma eva rāgo
'stvata aha. rūpepyetaddhi dūṣanamiti. ayamabhprāyaḥ. avairāgya-
lakṣaṇasya rūpyasya tātadvasānārūpatvānā kāryakarataṃ. vāsanāvasthāyāṁ-
api kāryakarate buddheraṇantavāsanāyogena puṃsō yugapadviruddhā 'nanta-
pratipattivaiśasprasāṅgāt.

(94A)  pratyayātmanā sthūlarūpeṇa bhogyadasāmāpannya tasmin rāge 'bhupag-
gamyāne 'pi prāgadvitārāgabhāvaprasaṅga iti tayaranyo rāgo 'bhupag-
antavya iti karmaiva raṇjakamastviti cenna. tasyā kṛṣyādiyadivatphala-
janana eva caritārthatvāt kāryāntararhatutve pramāṇābhāvādaneke tatvāparikalpanābhāvaprasyagacca atha vīdyāsiddhiḥ.

(93B-94A)   KARANAṂ NA VINA KARTUḤ KṚṬIH KARMAṆI DṚŚYATE
ATO 'STI KARANAṂ VIDYĀ BUDDHIBODHAVIVEÇINĪ
proktavindriyaṇāṁ viṣayopapastāpakatvenopayogat. tasmin buddhī-
bodhākhye karmanī grahye graṇaṅkriyaṇāṁ pūmsaḥ kena 'pi karanaṇa
bhavitavyaṁ. yattatkaranaṃ sā vīdyeti.

(94B-95A)   PRADĪPAVANMATISTASYA SVAPARĀTMAPRAKĀŚIKĀ
VIDYATE KARANAṂ PUMSO VIDYAYĀ KIṆKARIṢYATI
buddheṇ prakaśārūpapātviṇaprāṇavadeśyākārāṃ svatmaṇamapi pra-
kāṣayatīti na karanaṅtaraśiddhiḥ pariharati... [50]

(95B-96A)   PRADĪPAḤ KARANAṂ PUMSAṢTAMĪṛHYARΘPALABDHĪṢU
DHOPALABDHĀU CAKṢUŚCA BUDDHĀVAPYEMIṢYATĀM
buddherapi grāhyatvena karmatvātkaranaṇāpeksā 'ṣṭi ti uktam iti
bhāvaḥ uktam ca tatvasaṅgrahe 'ravayatprakaśārūpo yandinām mahāṃstatha
'pi karmaṇvāt. karanaṅtaraśāpeksaśāśakto grāhyitumātmanam iti. etad
eva darśayati.

(96B-97A)  Traitugūyācta vīvekena ṣaktā darśayitum na hi
vīṣayākāramāttmanamavīvikta ṣatassvayam

(97B-98A)   VIDYĀ GUNAPARĀ VEDYAṂ VIVIKTAṬO VIVEKATAḤ
ṢAKṬA DARŚAYITUM PUṀSO NĀ 'TRA KĀRYO 'TIMATSARAḤ

buddhestrigunāttmakatvena bhogyākāravivekāt karatmayā na svatma-
prakaśākathvam pradīpādivat. vidyā tu tadātatvena bhogyākārādivīkta
sati puṃso vedyam karaṇāntaranirapekṣa prakaśāyatveeti. atha kalāyā
vāpāraḥ kathyaḥ.

(98B-99A)   KARMAṆIKĀRAKĀṆIKAPRAYOṬṬA BHOGASIDDHAYE
SVATANTRAH PURUṢAH KARTĀ KALĀ TASYA PRAYOJIKĀ
bhoktrtvena bhogārthām buddhyādikārakavrātprayoktrtvātkartā
puruṣa ityuktam. pravṛttau ca nivṛttau ca kārakāṇām ya īśvaraḥ.
apravṛttajñ pravṛttau vā sa kartā nāma kārakaḥ iti. tasya ca bhoga-
kriyāyaṁ vakṣyamāṇavatsārthayopodbalena prayojika kalā-
śāstreṣūcyate. nanu akartaiva puruṣa iti sānkhyāḥ. tadayuktam ityāha.

(99B-100A) AKARTRTVĀ 'BHYUPAGAME BHOKTRŚABDO NIRARTHAKAH
UPĀDĀNAPRAVRṬTESČA NISPHALATVAM PRASAJYATE
bhogasyā 'pi kriyātvādbhoktrtvenaiva pumṣah kartṛtvām siddhyati.
tasminnakartaryabhupagamyamāne tadbhogārthām pradhānasyā 'pi pravṛtti-
niṣphalā syāt. akartari karaṇādisambandhasya nirarthakatvāt. kim ca.

(100B-101A) KARTRMTKARMADEVĀDI KRIYĀŚADHANABHĀVATAH
VĀSYĀDIVADTTAHAH KARTĀ PARIJÑEYO VIBHUH PUMĀN
avibhutve hyātmavo gaganādivadamūrtātātveddesāntaranayanā 'sambhavena
dākṣinātyadeh kaśmirādaṃ dṛṣyamāṇah desāntaraphala bhogo 'nupapannah
iti tadanyathā. 'napatattyā 'tmā vyāpako 'bhuyapantavyah. iti. uktaṃ ca
śrīmatparākyādaṃ kartṛsaktīṃ vyanyaktyasya kalāsyātah prayojika. tataḥ
kalā samāyukto bhoge 'nuḥ kartṛkāraka iti. asya kartuḥ pumṣah Kartṛ-
saktissākterakatvātiṇākriyāśaktiṇivakṣyamāṇavat malāvrtaṃvaṃraṃ
na pravartate iti pradīpavatprakāṣārūpā kalaikadeśe
malavidāranena tāmabhivyanyakti prakāśayati tatassā prayojikā hetuḥ
kartṛ bhanyate. sa çānuḥ puruṣastāya'tyantāvivekenā bhāsamatāno bhoga-
kriyāya kartṛkārakacuṣcyate. sa hi bhoktrtvātkartā kalā tu tat-
prayojikātvātkārakamiti. taduktaṃ śrīmanmrgendre ityetadbhanyam
vīprāssambhūyānanyavatsthitam bhogakriyāvidhau jantarirjaguḥ kartṛ-
kārakamiti. anyathā hi.
(101B-102A) VYAKTIKARTRANAPEKSASYA KARTRBHAVE SAMIHITE
ATMANAH PRAKKALAYOGATPRASAKTA SARVAKARTRTA

(102B-103A) SARVAKARTRTVA SAMBANDHATSARVAJNAH PARAMESA VAT
SARVAJNATVADAYUKTASYA SVATMADUHKKHAYA KARTRTA

ātmano hi nirmalatvena kalānapeksasyaiva kartṛtve 'bhyupagamyamāne
śivavatkalādipātmakasarīrasambandham vinaiva sarvakartṛtvam ajnātasya
darāsambhavena sarvajñatvam ca bhavet. niravāraṇatvena sivenā'
'nadhiṣṭhitasya svatantrasya 'syā svatman eva duḥkhaḥyā sarīrādikartṛtvam
na yujyate. ato 'syā sukhotpādaau pāratantrayadarśanāt baddhatvam
samalatvam ca niścītyate. tata eva ca 'syāsarvakartṛtvam asarvajñatvam
ca samsārāvasthāyaṁ drśyate. [53]
tato maḷāvṛttyavāsasya bhoge visaye kīmciṁjñatvakartṛtvavoryopapi
kalānugrahāpeksā siddhetyāha.

(103B-104A) NA CĀSYA SARVAKARTRTVAM BADDHATVADGOVSADIVAT
KALĀNUGRAHASAPEKSĀ BHOGES TENĀ 'SYA KARTRTĀ

(104B-105A) SKANDHO 'PARAH KALĀYĀSTU YASMĀDETAH PRAJAJNĪRE
VIDYĀRĀGAPRAKRṬAYO YUGMAYUGMAKRÅMENA TU

yugmakramena rāgavidye sahaiva jāyete. avyaktam tu prthagayugma-
kramanetyarthah. uktam ca śrīmadraurave kalātattvādrāgvidyedeve tate
sambhūvatuh. avyaktam ca iti. atra karmaphalabhogyasa kālā'
vacchedam bhoktniyamam ca vinā 'nutpatteh kālaniyatyākhyam.tattva-
dvayamagāmesu śrūyaṇāṇam arthasiddhatvādaćāryena 'nupattam. tathāhi
kṛṣyādvivatkarmaphalānām rājaniyamā 'bhāve dasyubhirapahāradarsānāt.
jyotiṣomādikarmaphalānāmapi bhoktrpratiniyāmakena kena 'pi bhāvyamiti
tanniyāmakatvena niyatissidhā. karmanō niyāmakatvamastīti cettanna.
tasya phalajanana eva caritaṁthatvādityuktam. īśvarāskāterapi
tatvāntara-
vyavadhānenaiva bhogaviśaye kāryakaratvam. anyathā sarvatatvābhāva-
prasāṅgat. kim ca cirakṣiprādipratyayadvārena ciraṁ buṅkte ityādi-
bhogayādyavacchedakatvena kālassiddhāḥ. sa ca naiyāyikādyabhyyupagatavan-
(nityo bhavitumarhati. bhūtādirūpatevenānekatvādacetanatvāccha. taduktam
śrīmanmṛgendre trutyadipratyayasyārthaḥ kālo māyāsamudbhavaḥ. kalayan-
nāsamutthānānīyatyā niyātam paśū niti. ittham suksmaheātmikāṁ tatva-
saṁhatimuktavā tasyāḥ pratipuruṣam niyatvatvāmahā.
(105B-106A) VASUDHĀDIKALĀPRĀNTĀ BHOGASĀDHANASAṂHATIḤ
NIYATĀ PRATIBHOTĀRAM PARIJÑEYĀ MANĪŚIBHIḤ

taduktām tatvasamgrahaḥ. vasudhādyastatvagunāḥ pratipumniyataḥ
kalānto 'yam. paryatati karmavaśato bhuvanajadeheśvayam ca sarvesu
iti. ekatve suksmaheṣasya sarveśāṁ driyamaṁabhogabhodo ha yukta ityāha.
(106B) ANYATHĀ HI SUKHĀDINĀM DRSTO BHEDO NA YUYATE
nunvekatve 'pi suksmaheṣasya karmabhedādeva tatphalabhogabhede
bhaviṣyatiti cettadayuktamityāhā.
(107A) YOKSYATE KARMAṆO BHEDĀTTADHEDO YADI YOKSYATE
karmabhedādeva bhogabhedassiddhyati. siddhe ca bhogabhede karmab-
bheda 'numīyate iti itaretarāśrayadosaḥ prasakta ityarthāḥ. nanu kartṛbhedad
eva siddhāḥ karmabhedāḥ karmabhedācca bhogabheda iti nānyonyāśrayadosa 'ta vāha
(107B-108A) SAMBANDHĀDYUṆAPATSA TЎ KUVRANTI KARMAKARTṚBHĪH
KATHAM BHINNĀṆI KARMAṆI KARTṚBHEDĀṬKARIṢFYATI
malāvṛtatvenā 'tmanām kalādisuksmaheśhadosambandham vina karma-
kartṛtvā 'nupapatteḥ. yugapatsarvakaṁṣambandhena karma kurvānā
sa suksmaheṣharūpa tatvasaṁhatirekarūpa katham bhinnāṇi vicitrāṇi karmaṇi
karoti naivetyarthah. nanu pratipurusah cikirsabheda tarmabhedah iti cettanna. cikirsayaśca sūkṣmadehasambhandhādevotpateḥ. tasyās caikatvāc-
cikirsabheda 'pyanupapanna iti paridṛṣyamānabhogabhedānathā 'nupapattyā
pratipurusah sūkṣmadehabheda 'vāyamābhvyupagantavyah. nanu ātmabhedha
hi sūkṣmadehabheda yuktā. sa eva tāvadeka iti vedāntavidastatrā ha.
(108B) ĀTMANĀMAPYANEKATVAMATA EVA PRATĪYATE [56]

ekatve hyatmanassukhaduhkhādivaicyitryaṁ janmamaraṇavaicyitryaṁ cā
'ṇupapannamiti bhogavaicyitryādeva 'tmanānātvasiddhiḥ. 'ēṣa cādvaita-
nirāsō 'sābhīmrṛgendravrṣtidpirkāyāṁ vistareṇa darsitāḥ. atha kimiyāṁ
sūkṣmadeharūpā tatvasamhathirātmavadvāpyāpi. āhosvidavyāpiṣketyata āha.
(109A) TASYĀŚCĀVIBHUTA SIDDHĀ YUGAPADVRTYASAṂBHĀVĀT

jñānakriyābhivyaktalākaṇṣasya tatkāryasya sarvatra yogapadanutpateḥ
tasyāścāvāyāpakatvasiddhiḥ. nanu yatra sahakāriṇā karmanā phalārambhena
nirdeso bhavati tatraivaśāvātmanasaicitanyābhivyaktaye vikṣobhamabhī-
vyanjanarūpāṁ karoti tisrādevāṣyassarvatra yogapakāryānuttattir-
nāvāyāpakatvāditi cet. tadapayuktam tasyāṁ kāryatvenā 'nityatvātghatāddi-
vatvyāpakatva 'siddherityabhīprāyena āha.
(109B-110A) KARMANIRDEśĀVIKṢOBHAKARANATVAM CA NOTTARAM
YUGAPADVRTYANUTPATTESARVATRA VIBHUTAIWA NA

atha kimiyamekadeśe caitanyābhivyaktissūkṣmadehavyānjakasyā
'vibhutvāt uta vyāṅgasya 'tmana ityata āha.
(110B-111A) VIKĀRITVĀDIDHARMYĀTNĀ VIRODHASCA ŚRUTERĀNAU
AVĪBHĀU YUGAPACCITVĀVYĀKTIKĀLEPYANURVĪBHŪH [57]
yadyavyāpaka ātmā syāt tadā desāntaraphalopabhogyapananupapanna
ityuktam. kim ca tasya muktyavasthāyāṁ śivavatsarvajñātvasarvakartṛ-
katvasravanāt vyāpakatvamavasyamābhvyupeyam. atha samsāravasthāyām-
avyāpakatvam Muktyavasthāyām ca vyāpakatvām tasyeṣyate tadā pari
nāmitvācetanatvādiddoprasaṅgāh tato nityatvavyāpakatvādisūtravīrodhaḥ.
taduktam śrīmanmrgendre ca apyam dṛkkriyārūpam tadastyaṭmanī sarvadā sarvataśca yato muktau ēryutte sarvatomukham. iti. nāvyāpakao na kṣanikona niṣpanāh naći jādātmaḥ iti ca. itthāṁ sukṣmadehātmikāmasādhanaṇaṭvatva-
śrṣṭimuktvam bhūvanātmikāṁ sādhanaṇaṭvāśṛṣṭimāḥ.

(111B) TATVĀNĀMAPARE SKANDHĀ BHOGINO RATIBHUMAYAH
sukṣmadehārūpādbhogādaye vicitrabhūvanādyākāraśtatvānāṁ bhoga-
samśārināḥ bhogasthānānīnityarthāḥ. ataśca.

(112A) TAJJADEHAPRAVISTĀ SĀ TESAṂ TĀSU PHALĀVAHĀ
sukṣmadehātmikā tatvasamhitārācārāpekṣayā tāsu bhogabhūmiṣu karma-
vaśāttattadbhūvanajadeḥsu praviṣṭa satī puruṣasyaikadesaṇa jñānakriyā-
sāmartyamsabhivyānjīka bhavati. taduktām tatvaśangrahe [58]
paryāṭati karmavaśato bhūvanajadeḥṣvayām ca sarveṣu iti. śrīmanmrgendre
'pi. ītyātiḥāhikamānāṃ vapurasyā jantoṣcitsaṅgācidgahanagarbhāvīvartī-
lesā. haitavatamaṃ bhūvanatvapakaparamadehavisaṃ 'bhūdayāya
vakṣye. iti. tāmeva bhūvanāṣṛṣṭim samkṣepena darsaṅyati.

(112B-113A) NIRAYĀDISTU SATYAṬṬA KĀLĀṬA KADEŚIKAIH
ADIMADHYĀNTASAMRUDDHĀ BHŪTESU STHĀNAPADDHATIH
	 
 
itātra kālāḥ kālāṃniḥ hāṭakaḥ pāṭalāḥhipatiḥ. desikaḥ samaṣṭa-
śāstropadeśaṅkavāllokaścāryasatyalokdhhasthātasya viṣnulokasyāpyupari
vartateḥ rudraloke vartamaṇo 'nantaśisyah śrīkaṇṭhaḥstasaiva
brahmāṇdāntaradhikārattaiḥ kālavāṭēsakadesīkaisvabhūvanavartīvādi-
madhyāṃtesvadhīṣṭhitā narakapāṭalabhūṛādi-lokātmikā bhūvanapaddhati-
sthūleṣu brahmāṇdāntarvartīṣu sthitā tataśca.

(113B-114Ba) ŚATARUDRAVIBHUŚCĀPI SAHAPĀṬCABHIRASTAKAIH
MĀTRĀSAMBHŪṬABHŪTESU PROKṬABHŪṬAVIDHĀṬRṢU
TANMĀṬRĀ CITTAVARGEṢU

tatra śatarudrānām brahmāndadāraścāramadhisthātā virabhadraḥ
prthīvitātive prāguktaṣtḥūlaprthīvikāraṇabhutes tānmāṭrā janye
sūkṣmaprthīvitātive sthitāḥ. tathā stūlajalādikāraṇabhūte tānmāṭrā janye
eva sūkṣmajalāṃbhūṭacatūṣṭaye citta vacagarṣabdenāntaḥkaraṇāmupāyāḥ
tanmāṭrādyahāṅkārānte cā dhvaniguhyātiguhyāguyatarapavitratsthāṅvākhyāṇi
paṅcāṣṭakāṇi bhuvanānām sthitāni. tad uktam śrīmannandikeśvarakārikaśu
brahmā stūlāni gataḥ sūkṣmādīnyādhrādehahabhogarthaṃ. rudrāṣṭanaṃ
kṣetrabhūvām catvārīṃ sacca sūkṣmaḥbhūtāni. tanmāṭrā mano 'haṅkṛti-
buddhirdeva guṇāṃstū yogivaraḥ. vāmādyā guṇāsāram krodhaḥ prakṛtim
kalātta mandalina iti ata eva 'ha.

(114Bb-116B) BUDDHAU CA KRAMAŚO NYASET
PAIṢĀCAḌYĀṢṬAKĀM VIDVĀN GUṆATATVΕ KRṬĀDIKAM
APRAṬTAGUṆAṬHAVΕ TU VIŚUDDHE GUṆAMASTAKE
VIKĀRE PRĀKRTE LĪNĀ VĀMĀDĪSTHĀṆAMĀLĪKĀ
KRODHESVARARUDRĀNĀM PURAPĀNKTĪṆ PRADHĀṆAGĀ

vāmadevādayastrayodasa rudrāḥ kroḍheśādibhirāṣṭabhissahā pradhānā
'dhipairguṇamastakabhuvanesu sthitāḥ. prakṛṭesūkṣmarupatvādbhuvanā
'dhāratvā 'yogat. ityāgamavidaḥ tathā.

(117A) MANDALĀṆI TU VĀMĀṢṬAU KALĀṬATVΕ STHITĀṆI TU

rāgavidyāsahite kalātavēṣṭāṣṭakaramenaṅṣṭau bhuvanānāṃ mandalāṃni
sthitāni. taduktam śrīmanmrgendre rāgavidyāgarbhe kalāpade mahāpura-
cactusasthīmandale mandaladhipā iti. kālaniyatoṣca bhuvanadvayam
tatraivoktam niyatau sthito niyataḥ kāle kalanaṣaktimān. iti. esa ca
bhuvanādhvā paddhatyādiṣu bahuṣo dṛṣṭyata iti nātra vistareṇa pradarsītah.
teṣu ca 'vāntarabhuvanasaṃkhyābhedaḥ keśucitkeśām cidantarbhāvāditya-
avirodhāḥ. ittham bhuvanātmikāmapi tatvasrṣṭimuktvā proktasya kalādi-
rūpasya jagataḥ paramopādānam māyām sādhayati.

(117B-118A) JAGADBĪJAM MAHĀMĀYĀ JANVASAKTIRACETANĀ
TASYĀH KALĀDISAMBHŪTIRBHOGINĀM BHOGABHŪTAYE

mahātīcāsāvanekasrotorūpapurakāryavyāpttermāyā ca mātyāsyām pralāye
sarvamaśuddham jagaditi māyā. sā ca jagadbījam jagataḥ kalādirūpasya
pratipūrussam bhedenā 'nekatvādbhuvanā 'dhāratvāc ca kāryarūpasya
sarvasya sākṣātparamparayā copādānām. ata eva janyāsaktissūksmaruṇa-
svakāryasaktisamāhārā 'tmikā satkāryavādaḥ bhupagamena sarvakāryāṇām
saktirupena tatrā 'vasṭhānādudāṇāvātavāduḥ mrṛdādivadacetanātā ca tata-
tasyāḥ kalādibhogā-

sādhhanasambhūtirityuktaṃ. saktisamāhārātmakataṃ eva 'syāḥ prakātayati.

(118B-119A) ANEKBHĪRVICITRĪDHĪSSAKTĪBHISSAKTIMATYASAUV
VICITRĀ 'NANTAKĀRYĀṆĀM DARSĀŅĀTSAMPRATĪYATE

vicitrā 'nantakāryotpattidarsāṇādvicitrāṅnattakāryasaktisamāhārātmika
'sau jñāyate. nanvasya eva 'nekakāryajanikā 'nekāsaktayāḥ kalpyāḥ
tasyāsvayaṃ saktirūpatvācchaktesa śaktyantarakaṇa 'nupapatteḥ
paramakāraṇatvādeva 'syā nityatvam anyathānavsthāprasangādityabhi-
prāyena 'hā.

(119B-120A) ACIDVĀTAMANEKATVĀDVINĀŚITVAM SUNIṢCITAM
NA 'NEKĀ SATVATO NITYĀ MĀYĀ YADYAPYACETANĀ
kim ca.

(120B-121A) VYĀPINĪ PURUṢA 'NANTYĀDBHOGĀYA KURUTE YATAH
SARVAKĀRYĀṆI SARVATRA STROTBHĪRVĪŚVADHĀMABHIH

taduktaṃ brhaspatipādaiḥ api sarvasiddhavācaḥ kṣīyerandīrghahakālam-
udgīrṇāḥ. māyāyānāntyānnyānocyate srotasāṃ sankhyā āt iśaśa ca kṣīra-
dadhinyāyena na sarvātmanāṃ pariṇāmameti kīm tu ghrtaśītīnanyāyena eka-
desēneti mantavyam. [62]

(1218-122A) SARGASTHITILĀYĀTASTASYĀSSVĀTMASAMSTHĀH PRAKĪRTITĀH
SVĀTMASAMSTHĀM VIKĀRASYA TATVĀDIBHUVANĀ 'VADHEH

evaṃ paramopādānātvāmāyāsthā eva jagatassargādayaḥ bhuvanādesaṃ
vikārasya tatvādisvarupāṃ svātmasamstamiti tatvabhāvabhūtabhuvanātmakām
cā samastam jagadvikārāsthameva jñeyam. nanu śuddharūpamapi tatvādikām
tadvāpānām ca bindusamījñamāgāmesu śrūyate. satyam. tatprāpter-
vidyēsvarādipadaprāptipratvenā 'paramuktiṣvāna 'trā 'syā bhoga-
sādhanañatayopādānāmyāvirodhāḥ. atra ca.

(122B) SARGASTHITĪŚAMĀKHYAYET LAYASSARGAVIPAARYAYAYT
pratitattvamuttappattikramakathanena vyāpārapradarśanena ca sarga-
sthiti prokte. -layastu sargaprātilomynena svasvakāranesūpasamhara ity-
arthaḥ. etcca.

(123A) BHAVASYĀṆĀDIMATVĀCCCA SARGĀDIGUNĀNAŚYUTAM
anādirayāṃ samsāra ityarthāḥ. nanu bhogasādhanatvādātmanāṃ 'yukte
sargasthiti. layastu kimarthamīśvareṇa kriyate. atraṃ vadāmaḥ an-
aṣvāratamanantapurūṣabhogajananopacitaśaktermāyāyāssukumarāvanitāya īva
svāpena sāmartyopodbalanārthātmānāṃ [63]
viśramārtham ca karmāpārtham ca samhāra ityadosah. taduktam śrīman-
mṛgendre taça sātmakākramya viśramāyā 'vatiṣṭhate. bhavināṃ bhava
khinnānāṃ sarvabhūtabhito yataḥ. svāpe vyāste bodhayan bodhayogyān
rodhyān rundhan pacyan karmikarma. māyāśaktirvaktiyogyāḥ prakurvān
paśyan sarvāṃ yadyathāvastuṣṭātam itī. itthāmatmanāḥ pratipāditaṃ
sasādhanaṃ bhogamupasamhartāṃ tasyaiva malātmakāṃ pāśamupakṣeptum caḥ.
(123B-124A) पुम्षाम मायामयं भोगयम मायोत्तायेरवा साधनायहुः
यतो भोक्ता विशुद्धात्मा सेतानास्तान्नः सेतानाम्
उक्ततावुक्तहादिरुपां बुध्मिदोहात्मकां भोगम मयाकृत्यमेव ना
tvātmanī गुष्टवेना समावति। सेतानात्वत्। तत्सामवाये पुरुषास्या
परिनामादिदोसापः गंयका। तस्या चा सेतानां पुरुषा एवा भोक्तेयुक्तम्।
सा चा वक्ष्यामानवादविसुद्धत्वादवृत्तायान्तिकाययावतमयोथायइह तलासिद्धिशं
त्तवायुपार्म्हिता एवा तद्भोक्तुम् छाणस्ति। कार्याक्राणांम् विनासिमिचित्रा
ञातवृद्धराधायर्मानं। अथा कुर्तो 'यामविसुद्धात्मा 'तता ाः
(124B) विशयित्वामलाच्छनसार्याज्ञानानक्रियो यताः
यतो 'यामताम् सिववात्सर्वायज्ञानानक्रियायुक्तो 'पिक्मिचित्रित्
विज्ञानादांर तालाकामापेक्षाते। यात्स्याचा मुक्तस्या भोक्त्र्त्वम्
[64]
सर्वविशयायज्ञानाधियुक्ततवम् स्रुयाते ततो 'याम विशयित्याह्याय भोक्त्र्त्वाया
हेतवाविशयित्याक्ष्यने मलेन्यर्तो 'वसित्याते। याच्रुयाते भोक्त्र्त्वाम्
मलाताः प्रोक्ताम इति एवा 'यामाभिसुड्धां तत्त्वातम् श्रीमस्तवायुंवभुवे।
याद्याभिसुध्धिर्ना पूम्स्य 'स्ति सक्तिरभोगेशु किम्ब्रे 'तिः। अत्स्याचा.
(125A) बिजास्थाकर्मारैज्ञेन मायामेशो 'नुद्वावति
कर्मानाः क्र्ष्यादिवदातमसामकार्त्तवय 'योगात। बहावस्त्यायम् बुध्मिग
गतेन प्रालये नातबुध्दरेपि मायात्मानि जगाद्भिज्ये प्रातिसाम्चरारोत
tथेनां परि-पाकावसाहदबोहामनाकेना कर्मात्मानाः रागेन मार्गेन मयाम्
भोगासाधनात्मिरुपेना परिनामादिमेपामानानुसारति। अत्र पाराह।
(125B-126A) भवावंतराक्रत्तां कर्मा जात्यादिपलादाम नर्नाम्
आसुध्धिहं कर्पितापुम्सास्तास्मीति तत्यातिरिक्याते
नादिवेना बिजान्कुरविययेना कार्यासारिरबंधस्यावस्थितिर्ज्ञायुरी
भोगाप्रजाति कर्मान्येवा स्वाप्हालबहोगार्थमात्मानास्सारिरयोगा प्रवृत्तु。
किम मलेना भवाताः 'पिह्लम मलाम कल्प्यितवा भोगवाचित्यायथानुपाधात
pattyā कर्माः 'पिकल्प्याते तताः
[65]
kalpanāgauravaprasāṅgāt karmaiva kalpyatāṃ yadāhuḥ kalpyāṃ punar- niruṇaddhi kalpanāmityati. atra parihāraḥ.

(126B-127A) ČANMĀDIJANIKĀ SAKTIH KARMANO NA MALĀM VINĀ
ANUROJNĀNAKARAHṬ KVACIJJĀTO NA DRĪYATE
ajñānahetunā malena rahitasya muktātmano janmādarsanāt
karmānusthānādarsanāccha malayuktasyaiva karmārjanam tadbhogo va-
apujyate. yadyeva malasyaiva janmādihetutvamastu kim karmaneti
codatyati.

(127B-128A) VIṢAYITVĀH HI TASYAIKAMASTU KIM TENA KARMAṆĀ
YATO JANMĀDISAMBANDHAMANUSAMPRĀPNUYADHHRUVAM
pariharati.

(128B-129A) SANTI KEVALINO JÑĀNAGRASTĀH KARMAVINĀKRTAH
NA CA JANMĀDISAMVANDHO DVAYĀM TENEHA KĀRANAM
vijñānakevalinām malāvṛtānāmapi karmaniḥahānāṃ janmādyadarśanāt
dvayamapi māyāyoge heturitvārthāḥ. nanu srstēḥ prākṣṇiskalatvāc-
cetanatvācācātmanasāśivavadajāṅvatvām na yujyate iti prāsankām nirasyati.[66]

(129B-130A) PRĀKṢRŚTERNIKALO JANTURDVRKKRIYĀGUNAVĀNYATAH
TATAŚCĀJṆĀNAŚAMBANDHO NĀYAMITYANRTAM VACAḤ
yadyevām śivavadeva kalāsambandho ‘pyasya na yujyate tataśca
kalāsambhandā ‘nyathā ‘nupapattyā tasya malo ‘bhyupagantavya. ityarthāḥ.
etadevāḥ.

(130B-131A) DRKKRIYE SARVAṆĪŚAYE SARVAGATVĀDANORMATE
SARVAJṆĀH SARVAKRTTASMĀTSUTRPṬAḥ KĀRANAM VINĀ
na ca itadevām kīncajjñātvādāvapi kalādyapekṣitvādityāḥ.

(131B) KALĀDIYĀṆJĀKĀHĀVĀṆNAVYAKTE TASYA DRKKRIYE
na ca itadanaṁvaranasya yujyate ityāḥ.
NA HYANAVARANAM TEJO BHANORYANJAKAMIKSETE
ataaca.

ANADYANADISAMBAHDHO MALAH SADHARANO KSAHYAH
anadicascavatmanam anadisambandhascanaidyavarakah sarvapurusannam-
eka eva. ata eva nityasca malo 'bhyupagantavyah. yadyevam malasya
nityatvaktadcidapaytmahyo na nivrttih. nivrttau va tasyakatvad-
ekapurusamokshakale sarvamokshaprasangho 'ta ah.

PRATIPUMNYATAH SVASVAKALAVYAVRTTASAUKTIKAH
malasya pratyatmaniyanantasaaktivatvadekasyah sakteh pari-
 namaasannirodhe kste tasyaiva mokso nanyasya yacchroyate pratyatma-
sthvaksakalantopadhisaktisamuhavaditi. nanu prakrta eva viparyayarupo
mahamobkahyo malo 'stu tasyastata eva vyajjakapeksa karmanusthanam
copapadyate. ata ah.

MAHOMOHABHAVAATPURVAMANURESA NIRAÑJANAH
NA SAKYOJHAYITUM TENASAMVRITTAH SARVAVATSVAYAM

mahomohasya kaladisambandhottharakalabhavttvaatprathamatah
sargarambhe bhavatpakse nirmalatvena sivavadanaavrtah pumamstena-prakta-
malenojhayitum na sakyate. ato 'nda na malenatmano 'nandisambandro
'bhyupagantavyah. anyathah tu.

ADIMANYADI SAMBANDHAI STAH PUMMALAYORBUDHAH
TASYAPI KARNAH VACYAMITI NASTI VYAVASTHITIH

ATHA NIRHETUKO YOGAH KALAYOGO PYAHETUKAH
ANIRMOKSAFLCA JANTUNAMISABHAVASCJAYATE
nirhetukasya pasasamsargasyabhypagame sartragiyasya 'pi nir-
hetukatvamuktasyapi punassamsarayogadanimokshah.
sivasya 'pi pāsasamsargādaṇīśvaratvam prasajyate. ato 'nādiśreva maḷa-
sambandhaḥ paśossamsāraheturabhulyeṣaḥ. evaṃ maḷasya 'sādhāraṇatve
pratipuruṣamanekte vebhyupagamamāne jaḍatve satyanekatvādghātādīva-
anityatvaprasaṅgaḥ. tataścānāditaḥbhāvātprāygukto 'nava sthānānir-
mokṣādidoṣassyādityāḥ.

(135B-137A) ASĀMANYO YADIBHAVEDACAITANYETVANEKATARU
UTPĀDAVĀNVINĀŚI CA TATAḥ PŪRVIKAṬDOSĀBHAH
anādityādeva cāsya nāntavatvam tadyoge vā sarvāniṣṭavatvaprasaṅga
ityāḥ.

(137B-138A) ANĀDIYAṆĀDISAMBAṆDO YADI ĆESTO VINĀSVARAH
MĀYĀŚIVĀṬMAVASTŪṆĀMAJĀṆĀĀM NĀṢĀ ISVĀTĀM
ittham prākṛtiprājñātam maḷasyānādītvām sādhāraṇatvamaksayatvam ca
prasādhyāṇantaśaktiyuktatvamapi sādhayati.

(138B) PRATIPUMNIYAṬŚCĀSYA ŚAKTAYO GUNARODHIKĀH
ātmagunasya jñānakriyātmane rodhikāḥ. etacca prāgeva darśitam.
paridrṣyāmaṇabhogavacītṛityānyāthā 'nupapattyā tāsāṃ maḷaśaktīnām
parināmakāle vaicitṛyam siddhamityāḥa.

(139A-140A) NA KĀLANIYAṬIŚTĀSĀM VINIVRTTAYAI NIRODHATAH
ANYATHĀ YUGAPANUKTIṢKARVESĀM CIDVATĀM BHAVET
NA CA SĀ DRŚYATE TASMAJÑEYĀSTĀSSŪKSMEΛAŁKANAH

evam cānādyāvārakatvānma la eva 'tmanassahajah pāsah... māyādayastu
tadbhāvabhāvino bhāvāḥ sarve māyāmatakah paśorityādiśrīmatsvāyambhuvādi-
struteragantukā eva jñeyāḥ. nanu śrīmanmataṅgādūa tu moho maḍāsca
rāgasca viśādaśśoṣa ityādinā mohādīnāmapi mahasahetutvam sahajamalatvam
ca śrūyate. ata āha.

(140B-141A) VRṬṬAYO VIṢAYITVASYA MAṬĀḌYAṆ PAṆCA ŠOCITĀH
NIŚKALĀTMANI TASYAITE NO DRŚTA JĀTU CIDYATAH
yato viññānakalaprayākalyoḥ kalādisambandharahitatayāmāle
satyapi vakṣyamānamadādayo na dṛṣṭyante. kim tu sakala eva. ato na
malasyaite jñānakriyāvaraṇavaddhṛtitveneṣṭaḥ. śrīmanmatahāgādu tu
malasadbhāva eva māyopādānāmanātmadāvātmābhīmānādirūpānāmesām
madādināmupadyāmanatvātkalādiyoge 'pi nirmalaṁ māyaṁgarbhādhikāryādīnāṁ
tadadarśānācca tena malena sahakārīṇā jāyanta iti sahajamalahetutvāt-
sahajasābdenocyaṇte. na tu malopādānātayetyavirodhaḥ. nanu malopādānā
apyete pralayekevalāvasthyāmanabhiyaktāh [70]
paścātākalādisambandhādbhīvyanījyanta ityasya paksasya ko doṣo 'ta āha.
(141B-142B) BHOGASĀDHANASAMBANDHĀDVYAJYANTA ITI NOCITAM
TVAYĀ TU GUNAVRṬTIBHYO YENOKTABHĪNNAŁAKSAṆĀH
BHAVATA GUNAVRṬTIBHYO BHĒDENAIVA MADĀDAYAH
proktā iti. na teśām bhogasādhanaśambandhātapaścādabhīvyaktir
upadyate. etaduktaṁ bhavati. madādināṁ bhī malopādānatve
'bhyupagamyamāne tasya sarvādaikarūpatvādbhīvyaktyanabhīvyaktabhedānute
pattestakāryabhūtajñānakriyāvaraṇavatsamhārāvasthāyāmmapyupalabhyeran.
na copalabhyaṇte. api tu bhogasādhanaśambhandhattarakālamantahkarana-
samstā eva pumśemupalabhyaṇte. ato malena sahakārīṇā māyodbhūtagunopā-
dāṇā eva te 'bhyupagantavya iti. athaisām gunātmakatvameva dārsyanti.
(143A-143B) MADAMOHAṆAṬABHIŚVANĀH PARITAPABHRAṀAU CA YAU
TĀMASAU SATVIKĀŚCAIVA RAJASAU CA YATHĀKRAMAM
evaṁ cāntahkarānasamsthanāṁ guṇām vrṭtayastvimāṁ na caitad-
vyatiriktaḥ kāścinmalasya vrṭtayo madādisanjanāḥ kasyāmciṣvahāṇām-
āṭmanī dṛṣṭyante. ato na santyeva tā ityāha. [71]
(144A) ABHYOḌHINNA NA MULASYA VRṬTAYO 'TO NA SANTI
atasca.

(144B–145A) TYAKTVÂNIRODHIKÂŚSAKTÎRNÂNYODHARÂMÔ SYÂVIDYÂTE
KARMAŚAYASAMETASYÂ HETUTVÂM CA BHÂVEDDBHÂVE
kevalamalasya jñânakriyāvārakatvam karmasamùkārayuktasya
saṃsārahetutvam ca yuktisiddham. nānyatkārayântaramityarthah. ittham
malaśvârūpamāpi pradarśyopasamharati.

(145B) PAŚURYÂM SAMÂKHYÂTO YÂTSÅMBANDHÂDANÂHUH PASUḤ
paśuśabdâ malavācakatayā śrīmadrâuravâdau dhīyate. tasya ca na
tatvāntaratâ. api tu paśuatvâ evântarbhâvaḥ. tena vinâ 'tmanâm
paśutvā 'yogât. tenānādyâvârtvatvâcâ kiṃ ca vidhau sṛṣṭikâle śivasya
sṛṣṭyâdikaranapûrvamātmanâm bhogabhujanâtmako mâyâśca bhogaśâdhanâ-
kalâdyutpâdanatatpoṣânâtmakaḥ paśvâtmanâm ca bhogyabhogârûpo vyâpâro
'smin prakârâne proktâḥ. ete caiśāṃ vyâpâra âtmâvârakamalâdeva hetu-
bhūtâdbhavanti. malaśabhâva eva 'sya sarvasyas pravṛtteriti. api ca
madâdayasca klesâh pumâsâmstraiva pradarśita ityupasamharan adhikâra-
bhedâtteśam vṛttibhedânāha.

(146A–146B) PRÂŚUYÂ TATVALÎNÂNÂMTÂTAURDHÂSAŚCÂ YOGÎNÂM . [72]
VICITRODÂRÅRUPÂŚCA KLEŚA VIŚAYASAŚÂNGINÂM
mâyâtatvalînânâm pralasyâkalânâmete klesâḥ gunâdînâmâpi tatvānâm
tatraivopasamhârât prasuptâ akîmâcikârâ āsate. yogînâm tvabhivyaktâ
api yogabalânmadhye niruddhâvyâpâra bhavanti viśayasaśânginâm tu sakalanâm
paśûnâmudohûtavividhasvâvyâpâra bhavanti. vicchinndârârûpi iti
paðhe parasparamudbhâvâbhâvabhâvyâm kâdâcicdâvichinnarûpiḥ kâdâcicdâra-
rûpaścâ bhavantiyarthâḥ ittham prakpratijñâtayossasâdhanayorbhogamoksâyos-
sasâdhano bhogâstâvadetâbhîh pradarśita ityatraiva bhogapraKarâpopa-
samhârâḥ. moksastu sasâdhanâh prakaraṇântare pradarśayiśyâta iti.
śūbhām.
śrīmatkhetakanandaṇena gurunā siddhāntasiddhasphutam
samkṣepādiśārikābhirudito bhogaḥ samaṃ sādhanaśī
vācastasya samīkṣya vītatapasyā ghorādinā sambhunā
gleśādeśikakuñjareṇa vīrtistāsāmiyam nirmiṣā.
samāpteṣyam bhogaśārikā. ityaghoraśīvācāryaviracita bhogaśārikāvṛttiḥ-
sampūrṇā.
APPENDIX II

NOTES

1 The transliterated text appears from the Astaprakarana, ed. Krishna Sastri, Vol I (Devakottai: Sivagamasanga), 1923. The square brackets on the right hand side of the page list the Sanskrit page number appearing in the Astaprakarana. I have included the errata which appear in the Astaprakarana within the body of the transliterated text.

2 Throughout the text the editors spell the term "tattva" as "tatva".
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LEAVES 367 TO 376 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING.

FEUILLETS 367 À 376 NON INCLUS DANS LA PAGINATION.


