SPORTS CROWD DISORDER, MASS MEDIA AND IDEOLOGY

By

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ABSTRACT

An examination of the hundreds of books and articles produced by sociologists of sport reveals, amongst other things, three important omissions in this literature: (1) until recently little serious attention has been paid to the disorderly behaviour, roles and rituals of sports spectators, and to the way their behaviours are broadly interpreted and understood in dominant ideology; (2) there is a lack of cross-cultural studies of sport and sports crowd behaviour; (3) there is a paucity of information on the role of the mass media in sports violence in general, on how the media treat sports crowd disorder and on how, if at all, their treatment contributes towards dominant ideologies of the issues involved.

The study attempts to redress the neglect in these areas by examining the relation between sports crowd disorder, the mass media and ideology in two different international contexts: the United Kingdom and North America. The theoretical framework employed derives from Marxist theories on the production and reproduction of ruling or 'hegemonic' ideas, and has been broadly adopted by an inter-disciplinary group of scholars working at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University
of Birmingham, England. Essentially, 'cultural studies', as the mainstream perspective of this group is now called, uses a critical-materialist concept of ideology to show how ideology is created and signified, and how it shapes the public consciousness.

In compliance with multiple-method approaches advised by cultural studies, data were collected by way of a synthesis of methods, including: (1) semiotic content analysis of media reports of sports crowd disorder and sports violence; (2) interviews and observations with involved parties (sports spectators, sports organizations, media personnel, etc.); (3) a questionnaire distributed to professional sports organizations in North America.

The study shows that the media play an active, not passive, role in sports crowd disorder and that, partially due to differential techniques of media coding and signification, dominant ideological understandings of sports crowd disorder in the United Kingdom and North America are very different. In essence, while reports of and responses to British soccer hooliganism have displayed all the classic symptoms of moral panic, any presence or threat of sports crowd disorder in North America appears to be consistently downplayed (by official and unofficial parties) if not denied in more explicit terms.
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The success of a task such as the writing of a doctoral dissertation is dependent upon much more than that which the author can achieve alone.

For their time and assistance, I would like to thank a constellation of groups including journalists and other media personnel in the southern Ontario region, professional sports club owners, board members, team mascots and other employees all over North America, and police and security personnel, again mostly in Ontario.

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Despite the critical appraisal of the media and their socio-political roles presented below, I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the many journalists who believe that their work is not created and consumed in a vacuum, but also the equally large group who are oblivious to this, because although the latter work in a profession whose power and effect is either unrecognized or ignored, they still gave of their time generously.
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'Up 'till now it has been thought that the growth of the Christian myths during the Roman Empire was possible only because printing was not yet invented. Precisely the contrary. The daily press and the telegraph, which in a moment spread inventions over the whole earth, fabricate more myths...in one day than could have formerly been done in a century.'

1 Karl Marx
(writing on atrocity stories in the British press during the Paris commune—in a letter to Kugelmann, 27 July 1871)
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

In contemporary society, sport has developed into one of the principal and most influential components of popular culture, and as such is of enormous significance for sociology. Few other elements of popular culture are so extensively and consistently reported upon in the mass media, or discussed in mundane conversation. Only a cursory glimpse of sports coverage in the media is necessary for purposes of verification, but sociologists of sport have provided more convincing data: (1) amongst the large and diverse selection of sports magazines available on the market today, Sports Illustrated has the highest circulation at some 2.4 million (Leonard, 1980:265); (2) American radio stations broadcast nearly half a million hours of sports annually (Leonard, 1980:265); (3) in 1980, the three major American television networks (C.B.S, N.B.C. and A.B.C) ran more than 1200 hours of sports (Leonard, 1980:265); (4) over 100 million viewers worldwide watched the 1985 superbowl, and the 1980 Olympic Games and 1982 World Soccer Championships each attracted over 800 million people (Morse, 1983:46); (5) the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's (C.B.C.) annual reports show that 'Hockey Night in Canada' has drawn some of the largest audiences on all Canadian
television for many years (Cantelon and Gruneau, 1988:177). In addition, we have, in the 1980s, seen the inauguration of two twenty-four hour sports channels on North American television; the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (E.S.P.N.) in the U.S.A., and The Sports Network (T.S.N.) in Canada. All available evidence suggests, then, that spectator sports play an important role in modern society and that they are being 'consumed' (McPherson, 1975), for the most part indirectly via the mass media (K. Young and M. Smith, 1988), at increasing rates. As Hargreaves (1982:19) writes:

...the coverage of sport by the media has become a gigantic, global affair, and... more people are involved in sport, by way of the press and broadcasting, than through any other means including active participation and spectating at live events.

During the last three decades, the subdiscipline of the sociology of sport has begun to pay considerable theoretical and empirical attention to what Lipsyte (1975) calls 'SportsWorld' as an influential aspect of mass culture. Sport has generally been viewed as either a form of cultural production which mirrors society, as a 'microcosm' of mainstream values (e.g., Boyle, 1963; Hoch, 1972; Kidd, 1981), or as one in which forms of (cultural, political, social) resistance or opposition can be staged (e.g., Donnelly, 1983, 1988; Donnelly and Young, 1985). Within this subdiscipline (and certainly within the parent discipline), however, sociologists have shown a reluctance to study the
sports crowd and sports crowd disorder (Guttmann, 1981:5, 1986). Of the hundreds of books and articles written on sport, until recently very little serious attention has been paid to the disorderly behaviour, roles and rituals of sports spectators, and to the way their behaviours are broadly interpreted and understood, i.e., to their ideological meanings. There is, further, a disturbing lack of comparative cross-cultural studies of sport and sports crowd disorder in the literature. Similarly, there is a paucity of information on how the media treat sports crowd disorder and on how, if at all, their treatment and coverage contribute toward dominant impressions and understandings of the issues involved.

On the most fundamental plane, this study represents an attempt to redress the general neglect in this area by making an academic contribution to our understanding of the relation between sport and mass communication processes, and to fill existing 'gaps' in the literature. It does not attempt either to provide exhaustive causal explanations for sports crowd disorder, or 'solutions' to the problem per se. However, in Chapter Two much of the work which has been conducted in this direction is reviewed.

For the purposes of this study, sports crowd disorder is defined as: intentionally violent and/or injurious or potentially violent and/or injurious sports related crowd conduct which threatens the well-being and
safety of other fans, players, officials, by-standers, or property, including behaviour which interrupts action on the field of play.

Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study

Over the last two decades, the exploits of violent British soccer fans--'hooligans'--both at home and abroad have earned them an infamous international reputation. The following is just a sample of the type of violence, or 'aggro' as the participants call it, that has occurred in recent seasons:

March 5, 1985 - 23 people injured and 100 arrested during rival fan conflict at Chelsea in West London.

May 8, 1984 - A Tottenham Hotspur fan is shot dead and 200 Tottenham supporters arrested for an affray at a match against Anderlecht in Brussels.

February 28, 1984 - Rioting English fans cause $900,000 worth of damage following an exhibition game against France at the Parc des Princes in Paris.

November 16, 1983 - 1500 English fans riot for 48 hours before a European Championship game in Luxembourg. 13 fans arrested, 1 for stabbing a local bar patron.

September, 1980 - 5000 rampaging Sheffield Wednesday supporters invade their Boundary Park field following the sending-off of a popular player. 15 fans arrested and 3 policemen hospitalized in a 28 minute game-delay.
Following such an extended and highly publicised series of violent confrontations, England's soccer problems finally came to a head during the early months of 1985. After several field invasions at the nationally televised cup-tie between Luton Town and Millwall in March, hundreds of fans tore seats from their moorings in a final riot and used them in a missile attack upon a surprised and unprepared police contingent. "Appalled" by the Luton events and particularly by the "all too obvious defiance of the law," Mrs. Thatcher vowed that she would be waging a personal 'war' on the soccer 'thugs', and promptly set about mobilizing a 'War Cabinet' to challenge the problem head on.

Just two months later, Liverpool supporters were involved in a fatal riot that dwarfed the scenes at Luton. This time, live television pictures stretched across eighty countries. On May 29th, before a European Cup game due to be played between Liverpool of England and Juventus of Turin, Italy, in Heysel Stadium, Brussels, Belgium, a riot broke out inside the stadium and thirty-nine (mostly Italian) fans were crushed to death. Following the riot, all English clubs were banned from international competition until further notice, a sanction never before imposed in the history of soccer (a much more comprehensive analysis of this event can be found in Chapter Seven).³

Not surprisingly, then, in recent years and particularly during Margaret Thatcher's term as Prime Minister,
the phenomenon of English soccer hooliganism has been elevated to the status of a national social problem, a problem of 'law and order' that is seen to require instant remedial attention. The British government's concern has been amply demonstrated by both the increases in strict security and policing procedures at soccer matches and by the spiralling of punitive sanctions levied upon offenders. For example, in 1985 the Chairman of Chelsea Football Club installed an electrified fence around the playing area of the Stamford Bridge ground and was determined to make it operational until the Greater London Council pressured the club into removing it. In addition, the 1984-1985 season witnessed the first life jail-term imposed upon a soccer hooligan. In step with all of this, there has been a concomitant rise in the number of government-sponsored investigations into the surrounding issues (e.g., Harrington et al., 1968; Lang et al., 1969; C. Smith et al., 1978; Popplewell et al., 1985) in addition to escalations in rates of media attention. As the present Thatcher government continues to demand that soccer 'gets its own house in order', there is an ongoing debate as to whether hooliganism is caused by the game or by English society itself.

This tendency on the part of the Thatcher government to look to the game as a source is demonstrated by the types of suggestions for solution offered by the aforementioned research and by Thatcher's now notorious 'War Cabinet'. The
most widely publicised suggestion in this regard has been the idea of introducing a national identity card scheme which would principally be aimed at removing the protection of anonymous membership in the soccer crowd normally enjoyed by hooligan fans. To date, Reading is the only league club to have fully inaugurated the scheme, so its long term effects remain speculative. However, one wonders at the feasibility of implementing this presumably expensive identity card programme when many British soccer clubs are experiencing financial crises. Its potential costliness is underlined when one considers that many of the larger First and Second Division clubs have a cumulative regular and occasional spectator following upwards of eighty thousand. Moreover, several of the clubs themselves have hinted at the futility of introducing a widespread identity card programme when those with hooligan proclivities represent a very small minority of the overall fan support.

In contrast to schemes of this type, academics who have conducted work in this area (see Taylor, 1982a, 1982b, 1985; Williams et al., 1984) have generally been critical of all sources who look solely to game-centred explanations and solutions for soccer hooliganism and who advise 'short, sharp, shock' treatment (experience over the last two decades shows that the incidence of hooliganism does not decrease as more draconian policies are imposed). Rather, such scholars have emphasized that practicable long term
solutions must be pre-empted by adequate understanding and interpretation of causal phenomena. Therefore, social scientific analyses have generally attempted to contextualize those involved in soccer hooliganism in a wider socio-historical examination of youth, culture and class relations in Britain. In Chapter Two, these analyses are reviewed.

In response to soccer hooliganism, the mass media both in the United Kingdom and North America have contributed towards the construction of the myth that hooliganism is a uniquely English or British 'disease'. Quite simply, British soccer has no monopoly on crowd disorder. Rival gang violence at soccer has been visible in other European countries such as France (Williams et al., 1984) and West Germany (Pilz, 1982) for some time. We are also aware of the infamous behaviour of soccer fans in South America where officials are known to use special exits to escape their hostility (Lever, 1983), but recently hooliganism has surfaced as far afield as Israel, Hong Kong, China, India and the U.S.S.R. (Williams et al., 1984), showing that it is not a problem experienced by capitalist societies alone. Nor is fan violence solely the domain of the world's premier sport, for there is a growing concern with the behaviour of fans elsewhere, such as rugby fans in Britain, cricket fans in India, Pakistan and the Caribbean (Gammon, 1981:37) and Australian Rules Football fans 'down under' (Main, 1985:8).
In juxtaposition to the British situation, the problem of sports crowd disorder in North America is much more difficult to identify and analyse. This is not, however, because sports crowd disorder does not exist in the North American context. For example, the following is just a small sample of a growing number of citable incidents in North American sport:

Los Angeles, 1986 - 14 fights, 2 arrests, 8 citations issued and 19 fans ejected at an L.A. Rams game.

Toronto, 1985 - Over the course of 3 days of baseball, the Toronto Blue Jays security staff eject over 200 fans for rowdiness and drunkenness.

New York, 1985 - A pregnant woman is shot in the hand by another fan carrying a pellet gun.

Madison Square Garden, 1978 - 2 men are stabbed, 1 shot, and 1 woman felled by a thrown bottle at a boxing bout.

Foxboro, Mass., 1976 - 60 fans arrested, 35 hospitalized, 1 stabbed following N.F.L. game.

In addition, over the course of the last two decades in North America, certain forms of sports crowd disorder have become regular and predictable, most notably the sports 'celebration' or 'victory' riot, and several researchers have argued that death threats from hostile spectators aimed at sports participants and sports personnel are becoming increasingly common and menacing (e.g., Kram, 1982; Yeager, 1979).
There appear to be at least two factors which render the phenomenon of sports crowd disorder in North America difficult to research and to 'measure'. First, any problem that does exist tends to be systematically downplayed by sports clubs and organizations themselves; and second, North American sports crowd disorder tends also to go largely unreported in the media. There have, of course, been exceptions to this more general 'rule', and in the last two decades there has been some indication of increasing concern regarding the sports crowd issue on the part of a small group of sports journalists and scholars working in this area. For example, in 1974, *Newsweek* (June 17:93) argued that "...the spectacle of the ugly American sports fan has been assuming increasingly frightful proportions," and with his contention that "...ugly incidents caused by rowdy fans are multiplying," Fimrite (1976:200) clearly agreed. In 1977, Beisser published *The Madness in Sports* in which he focused on what he (rather sensationaly) referred to as the 'beast in the stadium', and in the same year Yeager drew attention to "...increasingly brutal spectator outbursts and injuries to participants" (p. 161). In addition, there has been evidence that policing procedures at and around most North American sports stadia have increased considerably in recent years, and that clubs are modifying stadium arrangements to encourage a less aggressive sports spectatorship (for example, the introduction of the sale of
low alcohol beer at games, and talk of constructing special 'family enclosures'). There is also evidence that in the U.S. the state itself is becoming concerned with the sports crowd disorder problem. For example, at a hearing of the Congressional Subcommittee dealing with the Sports Violence Act of 1980, it was argued that "...one of the greatest threats to the future of sports of every kind, here and abroad, is mayhem on the field and crowd violence" (Mottl, 1980:3). It seems, then, that Lewis' (1982b:176) argument that "...fan violence is a social problem in the United States that warrants study by scholars" is a pertinent one, but one which to date has gone largely unaddressed. The few examples of research which have been conducted in this area are also reviewed in Chapter Two.

There are, then, two fundamental purposes of the research at hand. The first is to provide an in-depth examination of sports crowd disorder as it has occurred and continues to manifest itself at sports events in the post-war era. The focus, cross-cultural in nature, will compare the cases of sport in North America and the United Kingdom, and attempt to locate areas of convergence and divergence, particularly with regard to historically and culturally contextualized forms of disorder. Methodologically, data will be provided here by way of a diverse range of sources including semiotic content analysis of newspaper reports, a questionnaire distributed to professional sports clubs, and
interviews with club personnel, police, fans and stadium security personnel.

Second, an extensive semiotic content analysis of British and North American media sources will attempt to identify the relation between sports crowd disorder and the media (and particularly the press), and the ideological messages offered to the public regarding this problem. There is thus a concern with the 'social impressions' produced by media commentary; how North American and British sports crowd disorder is treated by their respective media as a 'social problem' and how such coverage assists in establishing the 'reality' around which the phenomenon of sports crowd disorder is generally understood and discussed. In part, the study will represent a testing ground for Stan Cohen's (1973) original concept of 'moral panic'. In a contemporary and more politicized variation of labelling theory, Cohen and a number of other writers have argued that the media play a key role in sensationalizing the threat offered by a number of social 'types' which has had the effect of amplifying the problem occasionally to the point of moral outrage and panic and transforming it into a problem of 'law-and-order'.

In order to achieve this link between sports crowd disorder, the media and popular perceptions of sports crowd disorder in Britain and North America, it is helpful at this early stage to briefly trace the historical emergence of the
mutually reinforcing or symbiotic relation that has developed between sport and the mass media in the twentieth century.

The Relationship Between Sport and the Mass Media: A Brief History

As we suggested earlier, of the various elements that comprise popular culture, sport has become one of the most conspicuous, one of the most widely consumed and thereby perhaps one of the most influential. Moreover, its colossal popularity in contemporary society shows no sign of relenting. The pervasiveness of sport in society owes great debt to the mass communications industry, which has been catering to the transmission of sports news since the first organized sports leagues began over a century ago.

Although the first North American 'sports report' as such (of a boxing match that took place in England) appeared in an edition of the Boston Gazette in 1733, it was not until the 1800s that the press, greatly aided by widespread developments in urbanization and improvements in literacy, began to establish close ties with sports events through the medium of the printed page (Leonard, 1980:259). Clearly, this was a considerable time before the invention of the cathode ray tube. Since then, something of a genuine
symbiosis or 'reciprocal affinity' (Snyder and Spreitzer, 1983:211) has developed between sports and the mass media. As Hoch (1972:36) describes it:

One factor that made a decisive difference was the tremendous coverage of sports by the press. About the same time the first sports leagues began, there developed (not by coincidence) the sort of mass audience-oriented newspapers needed to sell mass consumption products. A symbiosis between sports and the new media was quickly established in which sports became the decisive promotional device for selling popular newspapers, and newspapers were the decisive promotional device for selling sports spectacles.

Although both sport and the media prosper in this relation, which is fundamentally oriented towards the protection of economic interests and reciprocal promotion, few would disagree that sport benefits more than the mass media.

To be sure, there are occasional disagreements and conflicts between sports organizations and what media personnel may have said or written about them, their staff, or their policies. On the whole, however, the media and particularly television provide a gamut of significant advantages for sports clubs, not the least of which is the directing of local and/or national attention to the sport, the club and its players, in addition to the direct or indirect provision of monies for coverage rights.

Cozens and Stumpf (1973:420) have provided an in-depth analysis of the historical emergence of the 'sports page'. According to them, the New York Sun, Transcript and
Herald were all covering "...prizefights, foot and horse races, as well as other sports" as early as 1835, and by the 1850s weekly newspapers devoted entirely to sports events began to be published. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century, however, that the sports section of newspapers as we know them today appeared, representing in many instances alternative front pages. This new trend was initially prompted by William Randolph Hearst (Cozens and Stumpf, 1973) who, having purchased the New York Journal in 1895, and apparently intent to improve available reporting practices by his peers, inaugurated the custom of having sporting personalities and ex-athletes write for his paper.

Since then, of course, the press and the mass media more generally have become increasingly generous in the space they devote to sports events. As Klein (1979:18) puts it, "...many metropolitan dailies now carry more news about sports than any single subject." Lever and Wheeler (1984: 301), comparing the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times, have estimated that the size of the sports page has grown from fifteen per cent of overall news coverage at the turn of the century, to approximately fifty per cent by 1975.6 They go on to say that the sports page receives approximately five times as many readers as other sections of the daily paper. Similarly, Edwards (1973:4) has estimated that approximately thirty per cent of people who buy newspapers do so principally to enjoy the sports section.
Even closer and more mutually dependent than the relationship between sports and the press, is that between sports and the television networks. Most professional sports events are now staged and scheduled explicitly for the benefit of the camera eye (Coakley, 1986). In fact, many sports have undergone several notable modifications in their rule structure to accommodate the television audience. Two examples should suffice to illustrate this.

As much as any other sport, tournament, golf has been forced to undergo changes in its structural organization. In fact, its entire point structure has been modified. Originally based upon 'match play' where the player taking the most holes won the game, the scoring in golf is now usually staged as 'medal play' whereby the player with the fewest strokes taken, i.e., the lowest score, wins the game. Such a change in staging has been vital to golf's television career since in match play the game could actually end at a hole much earlier than the last, i.e., usually the eighteenth, and possibly where no camera equipment, spectators, judges, etc., were prepared. Additionally, with the increasing popularity of football as a television sport in the last three decades, a number of scheduling changes have taken place. For instance, linesman carrying distinctive yardage markers have had to be introduced to enable commentators to identify possession gained and lost swiftly and lucidly. A most conspicuous presence in football today
is that of the television network person, characteristically clad in radiant orange uniform, whose function is to mediate between the networks and the game officials vis-a-vis discretionary time-outs for commercials.

Most regularly televised professional sports have sustained rule alterations of this type to facilitate easier network coverage and more predictable time spans. The introduction of the 'tie-breaker' in tennis, designed specifically for the latter purpose, has been one of the most recent scheduling changes of this sort. Finally, location and timing of sports events have also been centrally affected by media coverage, usually to attract and accommodate larger audiences. In North America, for example, we now see football on Monday and Thursday nights in addition to Saturday and Sunday afternoons, and night (as well as day) baseball. The rationale for all such modifications is, quite simply, financial. As Nixon (1974:237) has said: "The commercial success of professional and big-time amateur sport depends crucially today upon the television dollar." The re-scheduling of football and baseball games, then, represents some of the many changes that have taken place in the sports realm in order to attract larger (paying) audiences which would otherwise have been lost. Finally, coverage of sports has also contributed towards changing television techniques themselves and the experience of observing televised sport more generally. In
the 1986-1987 season, for example, the National Football League inaugurated the use of the 'instant replay' rule (already used experimentally by the United States Football League), which not only led to an increase in numbers of time-outs during games and therefore in the length of games and television programming schedules, but also meant that television networks (and specifically their camera pictures) began to play a direct and important role in the outcome of football games themselves.

Many writers, including media and sports people themselves, have contributed to the conjecture over what would happen to 'big time' sports if the television networks collapsed their coverage. One can only speculate that such a reversal of events would be ultimately more damaging to the structure of sports than it would to the mass media. Certainly, sports such as tournament golf and world circuit tennis could not exist on the same scale without television. The President of A.B.C. Sports, Mr. Roone Arledge, recently commented upon this 'imbalanced symbiosis': "...so many sports organizations have built their entire budget around television that if we withdrew the money the whole structure would just collapse" (cited in Runfola, 1974:6). Given the traditionally conservative structure of both institutions (Loy, McPherson and Kenyon, 1978), however, it is unlikely that the status quo emerging out of their 'marriage of
convenience' (Chandler, 1977:64) will dissipate in the near future.

Despite the near ubiquity of sports on television, and despite the apparent symbiosis that has grown between sports and the media, it appears, rather paradoxically, that the major television networks are not assisted in their financial growth by sports revenues to the extent that one might at first expect. Durso (1971:264) quotes the Sports Director of C.B.S. Television, Mr. William McPhail:

Sport is a bad investment, generally speaking. The network needs it for prestige, for image, to satisfy the demands and desires of our affiliated stations. The rights have gotten so costly that we do sports as a public service rather than a profit-maker. We're doing great if we break even.4

Although the costs of television rights to sports coverage continue to escalate (for example, A.B.C. recently paid U.S. $309,000,000 for the rights to telecast the 1988 Calgary Olympic Winter Games—Sports Illustrated, Jan 27, 1988:8), television networks cannot afford, as McPhail puts it, to lose the prestige offered through the broadcasting of sports, not to mention monies earned through advertising. Happily for sports, however, sponsors who are willing to pay huge costs for commercials (e.g., the cost for a thirty second television commercial during the National Football League (N.F.L.) Superbowl has spiralled from U.S. $275,000 in 1981 (Snyder and Spreitzer, 1983:212) to U.S. $675,000 in 1988 (Calgary Herald, Jan. 29, 1988:D2)) continue to compete
for prime time advertising slots. Hence, the symbiosis is perpetuated.

The emergence and growth of the mass media in the twentieth century has clearly facilitated the greater and more immediate communication of sporting information to the public. From the earliest moments of sports reporting, some characteristic presentational features have developed. Amongst others, these include hyperbole, metaphorical embellishment, fantasy and hero-creation.

Although all forms of the mass media participate in this process of 'image reification', it is in radio commentary and press reports in particular that one is most likely to encounter overstatement of this type—television viewers have, after all, a visual image against which they can gauge exaggerated reporting. Consider, for example, a now famous quotation by sports writer Grantland Rice (cited in Snyder and Spreitzer, 1983:211), which originally appeared in the sports pages of the New York Herald Tribune, October 19, 1927:

Outlined against a blue-gray October sky, the Four Horsemen rode again. In dramatic lore they are known as Famine, Pestilence, Destruction and Death. These are only aliases. Their real names are Stuhldreher, Miller, Crowley and Layden. They formed the crest of the South Bend cyclone before which another fighting Army football team was swept over the precipice at the Polo Grounds yesterday afternoon as 55,000 spectators peered down on the bewildering panorama spread on the green plain below.
Rice's account is clearly far from objective and impartial. As Dolgan (1977:23) writes of the pre-World War II 'Golden Age' of sports writing:

They wrote as though athletes were gods descended from Olympus. Their athletes were always kind to small children and dogs, chivalrous to ladies. They won because their hearts were pure...the gosh-wow school of writing remained in style for years and the hero-worshipping American public loved it.

We can see, then, that Rice's report of an Army vs Notre Dame football game was highly typical of the 'gosh wow' or 'gee whiz' school during the 'Golden Age'.

More recently, however, several changes have occurred in presentational styles, and it must be stated that the 'Golden Age' of sports commentary has been considerably 'toned down'. Beginning in the 1960s, and possibly spurred on by waves of political and cultural crisis occurring during this period (e.g., the emergence of countercultural and 'lifestyle' movements by Hippies, environmentalists, women's liberationists, anti-war groups, etc.), many aspects of sporting life began to be viewed differently, more critically, not only by media commentators but also by the spectating public and academics interested in sports processes (K. Young, 1983:153). Young, in fact, attempts to locate these critiques of sporting practices in a wider democratic movement also occurring in sport at this time. Such a movement is amply demonstrated by the extensive exposes of sport and sports heroes, and critiques of the
social and political conflicts and discontents in sport written in the 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Edwards, 1969; Schechter, 1969; Sample, 1972; Meggysey, 1971; Scott, 1971; Hoch, 1972; Meschery, 1972; Shaw, 1972; Wolf, 1972; Dickey, 1974). Dolgan (1977:26) argues that sports reporters during the same period began to adopt a 'muck-raking' tack towards their subject whom they "...mocked...and held everything they did in irreverence. They delighted in showing that successful athletes were often boobs in private life, and vice-versa."

Although sports writing in the 1980s probably displays more tendencies towards muck-raking and critical appraisal than the fantastic images of the 'Golden Age', and that news accounts now carry frequent and in-depth exposés of crises in sport (e.g., drug abuse; sexism; racism; alcoholism; sports violence, etc.,) and of the political economy of corporate sport (e.g., details of players' contracts; financial controversies between players and management; sponsorships, etc.,), the types of overstatement and indeed romanticism intrinsic to the themes in Rice's piece can still be found in many sports columns and commentaries today. Themes from the 'Golden Age' have been diffused, but they are far from extinct. Anyone who is familiar with nicknamed and revered athletes such as Wayne Gretzky (the 'Great One'), Jack Nicklaus (the 'Golden Bear'), Greg Norman (the 'Great White Shark'), Steve Garvey
(the 'All American Boy'), John McEnroe (the 'Man of Fire'),
Marvin Hagler ('Marvellous Marvin'), not to mention the
recently retired Julius Erving (the 'Doctor'), Pelé (the
'Black Pearl'), Walter Payton ('Sweetness'), Muhammed Ali
(the 'Greatest'), Guy Lafleur (the 'Flower') and Bjorn Borg
(the 'Ice Man'), will appreciate that the media still
contribute towards—in fact partially thrive on—hero-
creation.

Of course, it should be mentioned that team owners
normally look upon this process of media hero-creation with
immense approval. This is for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is the fact that such news coverage provides
excellent promotion not just for the player involved but for
the team and organization as a whole. In the twentieth
century, there have been (and still are) many famous cases
of 'cozy' relationships developing between sports writers
and team owners, and it is here that the symbiotic nature of
their relation is very apparent. As Snyder and Spreitzer
(1983:217) argue, sports journalists are, after all:

...dependent on the sports establishment for
their "copy"... The sportswriter who takes
the party line of the baseball establishment
is called a "house man." A sportswriter
spends many hours travelling with the team
and fraternizing with club officials as part
of the search for a good story. The
tendency, then, is to be accommodating and
agreeable, to write stories that will not
displease the players or club officials, and
in this way keep the channels of commu-
nication open.
Snyder and Spreitzer also go on to discuss the fringe economic benefits to be gleaned by 'house men/women' in this way. In one sense, then, hero-creation and embellishment in sports writing represents an economic and cultural symbiosis between sport and the mass media; the team receives promotion cheaply, while the journalist maintains his/her job and (often) receives financial remuneration and/or other fringe benefits (e.g., free tickets, team paraphernalia, meals, transportation and other general 'expenses').

An extended glimpse of 'styles' in sports commentary suggests that the chances of media hyperbole expiring altogether are slim. To be sure, such language styles continue to be orchestrated explicitly for the purpose of 'selling' sports. Importantly, embellishment of the type discussed so far has helped to remove sport from the world of 'news' and move it into the world of 'entertainment'. Coverage of corporate sports has in a very real entrepreneurial sense become a division of the mass entertainment industry which requires promotion (via all these forms of language embellishment) to sustain financial solvency.

Of course, in the final analysis, embellishment frequently amounts to sensationalism, and there is increasing evidence that sensationalism and dramatization in this sense can strongly influence audience behaviour. Only very
recently has the attention of scholars been cajoled in this direction, but an expanding volume of literature is slowly being amassed on styles and techniques of media coverage and on their wide-ranging ideological effects.

A small number of writers have initiated this investigation with regard to sports and sports practices. Hall (1978), Whannel (1979), Bryant and Zillmann (1983) and Dunning et al., (1987), for example, have all been interested to probe the area of media reportage of sports violence and, as with the 'Golden Age' of sports writing, all indications to date suggest that typical themes (struggle, defeat, victory, heroic and malevolent deeds, etc.,) are immersed in an overstated and exaggerated code where this phenomenon is concerned. Hall (1978:27) has, in fact, suggested that media reports of soccer hooliganism in the United Kingdom are immersed almost exclusively in a control-centred 'language of violence'. However, on the whole there remains a relative absence of in-depth enunciation in this area and of in-depth case studies. Again, one of the fundamental intentions of this dissertation is to redress this deficiency.

In the twentieth century, then, a mutual interdependence or symbiosis has developed between sport and the mass media. This period has been marked by a rapid expansion in media commentary of sports events and processes, and some perceptible trends in styles of sports reporting have
emerged. From its early years, sports reporting has developed a tendency towards language embellishment, overstatement and hero-creation, trends still recognizable today in the mass media. Additionally, where violence in sport is concerned, such trends towards overstatement and exaggeration (particularly when assisted by reactionary or alarmist statements made by the control culture or other elite persons), carry the potential of oversensitizing the public towards social problems which can in fact be altogether less threatening than sensationalist media reports suggest. Again, this study is centrally concerned with an in-depth interpretation of these processes.

Organization of the Study

The remainder of the study is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter Two provides the general theoretical framework of the study and reviews relevant bodies of literature. The chapter begins by critically appraising traditional perspectives on collective behaviour and aggression, which in many ways represent a broad foundation upon which specific theories of collective human behaviour have been constructed. Arguments are made with regard to the usefulness of collective behaviour theories for the study of sports crowd disorder, after which the
chapter proceeds to examine culturally and historically contextualized explanations for sports crowd disorder itself.

One generalized effect of social disorder, deviance and conflict is an escalation in public interest and alarm, so the chapter next goes on to consider 'moral panic' as a sociological concept. Moral panic is seen to result in part from the ideological functions of the mass media, so the final part of Chapter Two discusses how 'news' is produced socially, how the media can be seen to play an ideological role by producing dominant-hegemonic ideas, and some of the effects of media coverage of certain issues and events.

Chapter Three introduces the methods and procedures implemented in the study. This chapter begins by addressing the status of the sociology of sport as a subdiscipline and arguing that at least one of its problems in ascertaining concrete credence in the parent discipline exists in the fact that little widespread agreement has been achieved regarding helpful and relevant methodologies for the area. It is argued that methodological (and theoretical) approaches (especially multi-method approaches) used at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in England could be more profitably employed by sociologists of sport in addressing their academic concerns. The chapter then considers some potential methodological problems in using the mass media as a source
of data. Finally it introduces the multiplicity of procedures implemented in the study (questionnaire, interview and observation, content analysis) and discusses some of the author's methodological experiences in studying a phenomenon as unpredictable and spontaneous as sports crowd disorder.

From a methodological standpoint, the value of this research lies in its attempt to synthesize a wide selection of methods, each testing different but connected sources of information. Such a synthesis, it is argued, facilitates multiple confirmation or disconfirmation regarding arguments made within any given area, and may thus also provide more complete understandings of that area of concern.

Chapter Four is the first of four chapters discussing data which emerged as 'findings' in the study. Specifically, the chapter examines the structural and formal aspects of sports spectatorship in the United Kingdom and North America, and the manifestations or forms that sports crowd disorder has assumed in these contexts. A comparative examination of six of the most common forms of sports crowd disorder is presented.

Having examined the formal and structural aspects of sports crowd disorder, Chapter Five goes on to consider the phenomenological and interpretational aspects of the problem by examining and again comparing the meanings of sports crowd disorder for a number of involved parties, i.e., fans,
sports clubs, police, security personnel, sports league
committee members and team mascots. This chapter also raises
the more general issue of how sports violence, both by par-
ticipants and fans, is encouraged and legitimized by sports-
world.

The third findings chapter, Chapter Six, examines
themes in mass media treatment of sports crowd disorder and
sports-related violence more generally. It has two inter-
related parts: (1) an analysis of how the sports crowd issue
is dominantly 'encoded' in the media and of subsequent
ideological messages which emerge from this encoding
process; (2) a discussion of data unearthed during inter-
views with media personnel pertaining to their occupational
news strategies and agendas, probing questions of why
typical reporting features are commonly produced and
reproduced in the news process, and of their (specifically
discursive but also behavioural) effects.

Following this general analysis of media coverage of
sports crowd disorder in North America and the United
Kingdom, Chapter Seven presents a case study of two sports
riots as a particular analysis of the problem. This involves
a comparative semiotic content analysis of press treatment
of a soccer riot, the Heysel Stadium riot of May, 1985,
which received international media attention, supplemented
by empirical references to the Montreal/"Rocket Richard"
riot of May, 1955, for purposes of historical and cross-
cultural comparison. The focus here is on how media discourse assists in establishing the 'reality' around which disorderly events are generally understood and discussed.

Finally, Chapter Eight represents an attempt to integrate and interpret what the author perceives to be the most important elements of the study brought out in the four previous findings chapters and related to the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter Two. It provides a brief summary statement on the study, its findings, its meanings for sociology and its implications for future research.
NOTES

1. The conspicuous reluctance on the part of sociologists to acknowledge this field of study as a legitimate and important one can be seen in the relatively slim literature available, but also in the rare positions available in departments of sociology in colleges and universities across North America and Britain for researchers working within this area. Consequently, many departments of sociology do not offer courses in the sociology of sport at all. It appears that there has been and remains a form of occupational resistance on the part of practitioners here towards the subarea in question which tends to be viewed as largely unimportant and trivial.

2. As Pearson (1983:502) informs us, despite widespread lay interpretations of youth disorder or 'hooliganism' as a uniquely contemporary phenomenon, the derivation of this term has its roots in Victorian England:

The words "Hooligan" and "Hooliganism" made an abrupt entrance into common English usage during the hot summer of 1898. Like Teddy Boy or Mod or Skinhead, it was a word which came out of the popular culture of working class London. It was first popularised in a music hall song by the Irish comedians O'Connor and Brady:

Oh, the Hooligans, Oh, the Hooligans!
Always on the riot,
Cannot keep them quiet.
Oh, the Hooligans! Oh, the Hooligans!
They are the boys
To make a noise
In our backyard.

But what made the new word notorious was an excessively rowdy August Bank Holiday celebration in 1898, when hundreds of people (many of them youths) were brought before the London police courts on charges of assault, disorderliness, drunkenness, robbery and attacks on policemen.
Since the late 1900s, the terms 'hooligan' and 'hooliganism' have been adopted broadly to describe unruly and violent conduct of many types, but they have become strongly identified, at least in part due to widespread media usage, with violent British soccer fans. In fact, in dominant ideology, the term hooliganism has virtually become synonymous with soccer crowd violence.

3. It should be noted that May 1985 represents a particularly climactic moment in the notorious history of British soccer, because it saw a total of ninety-six soccer-related deaths in the space of eighteen days--fifty-seven fans were burned to death at a fire at Bradford on May 11, and thirty-nine fans were killed in the Heysel Stadium riot on May 29.

4. This decision was subsequently changed by way of court rescission.

5. For a discussion of potential areas of conflict between sports clubs and the media, see Snyder and Spreitzer (1983:216-220).

6. Lever and Wheeler (1984:301) qualify this rather surprising finding by asserting that "...the reader's impression of extensive news coverage is distorted due to the disproportionate number of ads located in the front news pages relative to the sports, leisure, and business sections."

7. Mr. Arledge is now President of A.B.C. News. His successor as President of A.B.C. Sports is Mr. Dennis Swanson.

8. An example of the way in which sport is seen as a generally "bad investment" by the networks occurred at the recent Calgary Olympic Winter Games. Although it paid U.S. $309,000,000 for the rights to telecast the Olympic events, A.B.C. Sports publicly announced after making its successful bid for these rights that it fully expected to lose at least U.S. $30,000,000 in the process.

9. This changing process can partially be explained by the separate effects of television and the proliferation of what can be called 'quasi-news programmes' which profile the 'lifestyles of the famous'. With television in general, there is an apparent ongoing collapse of traditional elite boundaries, and an emergence of a new kind of elite made up of those who become famous for being famous.
10. Leading from Snyder and Spreitzer's (1983) argument, it has been interesting to witness in the last twenty years the less than positive responses on the part of professional sports clubs and their owners to a number of ex-athletes who have (typically in the 'countercultural' late 1960s and early 1970s) published scathing exposés of corruption involved in the structure and organization of 'big time' sports (cf., Bouton, 1970; Meggysey, 1971).
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

As a study fundamentally concerned with examining (1) a specific form of collective human action (sports crowd disorder) taking place in two different cultural contexts, (2) mass media treatment of this phenomenon in both settings, and (3) dominant, alternative and oppositional responses to and understandings of the phenomenon, this is clearly a study of an eclectic nature. As such, it is crucial to adopt a broad theoretical perspective, capable of interpreting and explaining all of these concerns as they inter-relate.

The approach employed here is extremely appropriate because it ambitiously attempts to examine the production and reproduction of various aspects of popular culture as related to the socio-political experiences of particular groups in society, and the role of the mass media in this ongoing cultural production and reproduction. Usually referred to as 'cultural studies' or the 'Birmingham School', most of the work conducted from this interdisciplinary perspective has been carried out at the Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, England.

Influenced by the powerful cultural-historical work of Hoggart (1958), Williams (1958, 1961) and Thompson (1963), and adopting Gramsci's Marxist notion of ruling ideology--'hegemony'--cultural studies has shown a primary concern with what its most noted writer calls 'the rediscovery of ideology' (Hall, 1982). This concern is witnessed in the concentration on ideology itself, on how ideology is created, expressed and signified, and on "...the mechanisms by which it survives and flourishes with the apparent compliance of its victims (mainly the working-class) and succeeds in invading and shaping their consciousness" (McQuail, 1987:66). Thus, a critical-materialist concept of 'ideology' has been broadly adopted in cultural studies, where a fundamental distinction is posited between the 'real' and the 'apparent'. This distinction is premised upon Marx's earlier separation between what he called the 'real' basis of social experience (the mode of production where the propertied class exploits the unpropertied class) and the collective social consciousness or ideology (in which this oppression and exploitation is often masked and unrecognized).

Crucially, cultural studies writers do not see ideology as being coercively imposed upon individuals in unsubtle ways by hegemonic forces, but as an elusive
phenomenon which is absorbed in a rather more voluntaristic fashion whereby the ideas and practices of the ruling classes are taken-for-granted and appear 'naturalized', 'legitimate' and consistent with the cultural experience of the masses. As Hall (1982:95) writes about previous research on ideology:

That notion of dominance which meant the direct imposition of one framework, by overt force or ideological compulsion, on a subordinate class, was not sophisticated enough to match the complexities of the case. One had also to see that dominance was accomplished at the unconscious as well as the conscious level: to see it as a property of the system of relations involved, rather than as the overt and intentional biases of individuals in the very activity of regulation and exclusion which functioned through language and discourse.

Hence cultural studies moves its attention from economic to ideological roots of capitalist production, and has centred on the media as one of the key 'ideological state apparatuses' (Althusser, 1971) in and through which capitalist production is achieved. Importantly, the media are generally seen to confirm and reproduce hegemonic ideas and practices in society.

These arguments will be further explored later in the chapter in a general discussion of theories and concepts of news production and ideology to be implemented in the study for purposes of interpretation. First, however, it is important to briefly review literature which has addressed the general substantive topic--human collective behaviour.
In many ways, traditional perspectives of collective behaviour provide the general foundation upon which more sophisticated and issue-specific theories of collective action and popular culture have been constructed, such as theories of sports crowd disorder. The latter are subsequently reviewed and appraised. As mentioned, the second half of the chapter goes on to look at ways in which cultural studies has examined certain effects of social disorder and deviance. In particular, the concept and theory of moral panic is examined, and links are drawn between the development of public alarm and panic and the ideological functions of the mass media.

Theories of Collective Behaviour

When we consider that one of the earliest treatments of collective behaviour (The Crowd, Le Bon, 1895) was first published nearly a century ago, it is no surprise that social science has amassed a great wealth of theoretical commentary on the subject. Although Le Bon is widely considered the 'founding father' of theories of crowd psychology (Rüge, 1964:3), it was in fact Robert Park, one of the central figures of the Chicago School of sociology, who introduced the term 'collective behaviour' to the discipline. Park (1924:42) actually defined sociology per
as as "...the science of collective behaviour."

There has been, as Quarantelli and Weller (1974) argue, a lack of agreement regarding formal definitions of collective behaviour, and this can be explained at least in part by the fact that no social phenomenon can be viewed intrinsically as 'collective behaviour'. The potential scope of behaviours that can be considered under this label is boundless, ranging from interpersonal action, to action between hundreds of thousands of individuals brought together by a common interest or cause. Hence, collective behaviour can include action at bus stops and at weddings, in subways, shopping malls, and parks, on beaches and concert stages, as well as action during riots, stampedes, panics, revolutions, war and, of course, sports events. It is, however, forms of relatively disorganized collective action arising spontaneously and unexpectedly that seem to be the fundamental concern of theorists of collective behaviour to date. Such a focus has tended to preclude the study of highly systematic and organized group behaviour, which includes some forms of sports crowd disorder, under the general aegis of collective behaviour.

Generally, theoretical perspectives on collective behaviour have attempted to locate causal factors either in the individual or in her/his social situation (Aveni, 1977:98). Most frequently, however, there is an emphasis on de-individualization (loss of personal identity) and
anonymity in the crowd. Widely employed in the literature are at least six major theoretical paradigms, all of which can be applied very loosely to collective violence in sports.

I. Contagion Theories

The work of three eminent social scientists falls within the category of contagion theory. Published in 1895, Le Bon’s The Crowd discussed the unpredictability and irrationality of mob behaviour during the French Revolution. Le Bon argued that in the vicarious security offered by a crowd, various precipitants evolve which lead to actors losing rationality and imitating each others’ actions. The behaviour of self-elected leaders becomes hypnotic and contagious, and the result is complete homogeneity, a ‘collective mind’. This, Le Bon called the ‘law of mental unity in crowds’.

Until the 1920s, most other studies conducted in the area of 'crowd psychology' followed Le Bon’s basic thesis (e.g., Tarde, 1903; Ross, 1905; McDougall, 1920). Later this century, Freud (1922) modified contagion theory in a 'motivational' discussion of the role of leaders in crowds, and Blumer (1951) advanced a symbolic interactionist explanation of collective behaviour arguing that actors in crowds are reciprocally influenced by one another’s behaviour. Other work has built upon the contagion model to
describe collective action in general (e.g., Couch, 1970:48), and in sport specifically. In sport, Harrington (cited in Sheed, 1969:90) uses contagion theory to account for the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism in Britain, and Breaux (1975) has described patterns of contagion amongst crowds at Roman chariot races.

There is, no doubt, some truth to the contagion argument. When one attends a play, a concert or a motion picture, for example, it is nearly always the case that one participates more strongly when there is widespread audience participation. Further, participation in a crowd often provides the necessary 'cover' for risk-taking and/or residual rule-breaking as 'primary deviance' (Lemert, 1967), i.e., what is contagious is in fact often the feeling of security vis-a-vis 'getting away with' behaviours which would usually violate mainstream codes.

Despite these concessions, however, and despite the fact that the mob psychology view of contagion abounds in lay conversation, the contagion thesis has been widely criticized for one fundamental flaw. In suggesting that some form of overwhelming irrationality grips the members of crowds and directs them towards the performance of pathological behaviours irrespective of extraneous factors such as personality, social structure and status within the crowd, etc., contagion theory can be seen as based on spurious assumptions and generalizations. It is highly
unlikely that all members of any crowd behave entirely uniformly. Moreover, contagion theory fails to explain why by-standers are not engulfed into the ensuing action or why, if it spirals contagiously, collective behaviour ever ceases. As will be demonstrated in a following section dealing with explanations of British soccer hooliganism, crowd behaviour can be highly rational, systematic and coordinated, and based on both verbal and non-verbal interpretations. That is, there is frequently order in 'disorder'.

II. Convergence Theories

Generally, convergence theories of collective behaviour (Allport, 1924; Milgram and Toch, 1969; Turner and Killian, 1972) reject the contagion view that actors in crowds may be found performing behaviours alien to their usual characteristics. Rather, they propose that individuals sharing 'common qualities' (Milgram and Toch, 1969:551) come together in a non-random fashion to form crowds and to realize these predispositions anonymously. In this sense, convergence theories postulate that individuals exploit the 'protection' of the crowd to engage in behaviours very much integral to their character, but which are usually constrained.

As with contagion theory, the convergence perspective tends to assume that a collective attitude or predispos-
ition prevails in crowds. Again, such a view fails to understand that individuals will bring to a situation a diversity of attitudes and values and will, moreover, interpret what is happening according to their own definition of that situation as it develops.

III. Decision/Gaming Theories

Although 'decision' or 'gaming' theories differ markedly from contagion theory, they are not totally incompatible with convergence or emergent-norm theories of collective behaviour. Rather than positing an irrational crowd being influenced by processes of emotional contagion, decision theory postulates that crowd members react to stimuli within the crowd by way of rational decision-making, i.e., the estimated rewards of engaging in a course of action are actually balanced against the potential costs.

This theory, as witnessed in Berk's (1974) work in particular, is based on the assumption that the individual is at all times engaged in a logical decision-making process, and that no 'group mind' as such exists. In this way, for example, a person may be unwilling to invade a sports field alone because she/he is likely to be apprehended and arrested, but amid a large crowd of field invaders, she/he can enjoy the vicarious 'pleasure' of invasion with minimal chances of punishment.
Unfortunately, despite amending many of the flaws regarding alleged undirected and irrational crowd behaviour inherent in the contagion and convergence perspectives, in arguing for the ubiquity of rationality and structure in collective behaviour, decision theorists have ironically entirely disregarded any possibility of contagion effects in crowds. It is extremely likely that collective behaviour is comprised of varying degrees of rational and non-rational action on the part of participants.

IV. Emergent-Norm Theories

The contagion and convergence perspectives describe collective behaviour as a situation devoid of normative rules and regulations. By contrast, emergent-norm theories propose that collective behaviour is indeed normatively-based, but that governing norms, quite different from those manifested in everyday routine activity, emerge spontaneously at the time of the action. Individuals are seen to interact on the basis of 'informational social influence', whereby they respond to behavioural cues from one another, particularly during moments of ambiguity. Emergent-norm theories are aligned with a number of social psychologists, notably Asch (1958), Sherif (1936), Turner and Killian (1972) and Quarantelli (1974), all of whom focus on behavioural expectancies in ambiguous contexts. In the sub-discipline of the sociology of sport, an attempt has
also been made to apply an emergent-norm approach to *The American Sport Event as Carnival* (Kutcher, 1983).

Emergent-norm theories succeed in overcoming some inadequate conceptualizations of some of the other perspectives already mentioned, particularly the notion of a group mind developed in a crowd precipitating the performance of a plethora of irrational acts. They correctly underscore the necessity of students of collective behaviour to anticipate the development of a variety of new norms within the crowd depending upon events that occur, and which are interpreted through members' changing definition of the situation.

V. Value-Added Theory

An attempt at a comprehensive causal explanation for collective behaviour has been made in Smelser's (1962) value-added theory. Although Smelser's work actually incorporates several themes from the aforementioned perspectives, it also differs from them quite fundamentally in offering an essentially macrosociological account of group action. With the notion of 'value-added' borrowed from economics, Smelser shows how determinants of collective behaviour can actually supplement ('add to') prior determinants and influence subsequent collective actions. A series of incremental behavioural steps (including structural strain and growth of hostile beliefs) are thus seen to culminate in the manifestation of collective behaviour.
In addressing the influence on collective behaviour of broad societal, i.e., cultural, political, social, issues and of smaller, spontaneous events, and in attempting to answer the question 'why' as well as 'when' and 'how' of collective behaviour, Smelser's value-added theory can possibly be viewed as the most substantial and balanced of the five perspectives introduced here. On the one hand, its scope of application is so broad that it has been employed to analyze a constellation of social events and behaviours as diverse as the Kent State shootings (Lewis, 1972), the My Lai massacre (Spencer, 1976:289), the rise of a political party in Canada (Pinard, 1971:15), and spectator disorder at sports events (C. White, 1970; M. Smith 1976b; Lewis, 1982b:177). On the other hand, however, the breadth of scope of value-added theory has also been a source of criticism. Manning (1971), for example, argues that Smelser's incremental steps are too nebulous, i.e., they are so unspecific that almost any riotous or disorderly event can be made to 'fit' the model, irrespective of its causes and characteristics. Despite this, value-added theory has generally been viewed as a more helpful framework of analysis than the four previous perspectives, probably because of the aforementioned potential scope of its application.
VI. Catharsis Theory

Although catharsis theory is not a theory of collective behaviour as such, it is often used to complement the analysis of collective behaviour which takes on aggressive or violent forms. The theory that man is naturally aggressive can be traced back to the writings of Aristotle (Berczeller, 1967), but in more recent times it has become aligned with the work of several scholars, most notably the ethologist Lorenz (1966). The proponents of 'catharsis' believe that human actors accumulate frustrations in their routine daily activities which can potentially lead to aggressive behaviour, but which can also be diffused through participation in certain aggressive tension-relieving activities, or through observing others participate in such action.

Popularized by the work of Lorenz (1966), catharsis has become associated with ethologists (e.g., Morris, 1967; Perls, 1969) concerned to explicate the release of human aggression in a diversity of settings, including sport (e.g., Brill, 1929; Moore, 1966:74; Goodhart and Chataway, 1968; Browne, 1972:16; Marsh et al., 1978.) For example, in one of the earliest discussions of sport and catharsis, Brill (1929:434) celebrates the rewards of spectating at sports (for males):

He will purge himself of impulses which too dammed up would lead to private broils and public disorders. He will achieve exalt-
ation, vicarious but real. He will be a better individual, a better citizen, a better husband and father.

More recently, Beissel (1967: 183) has celebrated similar benefits of sport:

There can be little doubt about the advantages of confining violence to the athletic field if it frees man to act in a humane manner at other times. Certainly to compete in a symbolic way in sports and thus to avoid wanton killing is consistent with the highest goals of civilization. If sports, as has been suggested, could, at least in part, be a substitute for some of the forms of aggression which are destructive to society, they would represent an important step along the way toward civilization.

In these ways, the catharsis view has been applied to the behaviour of both sports participants and fans by scholars arguing that real or vicarious participation in aggressive sports provides the imperative release for stored aggressiveness. As discussed later in this chapter, Marsh et al. (1978), for example, argue that hooliganism on the part of young British soccer fans is actually a constructive and relatively harmless, i.e., highly predictable and symbolic, way of ritually reducing aggressive drives, which could otherwise be manifested more dangerously outside the sports milieu. In sport, then, shooting a deer, watching a boxer pummel his opponent, or yelling abuse at officials from the bleachers are all construed as harmless and socially acceptable ways of releasing pent-up hostilities. It would even appear as though some recreational activities (particularly 'wargames') have been specifically designed to
accommodate the alleged requirements of human cathartic release.

Interestingly, the catharsis argument, having gained enormous early recognition, continues to be propounded in a variety of circles despite the fact that its two seminal writers (Lorenz (in Evans, 1974) and Tinbergen, 1968) have long since refuted substantial portions of their original theses. Lorenz (cited in Evans, 1974:93), for instance, has almost unequivocally denied catharsis and its association with sport: "Nowadays, I have strong doubts whether watching aggressive behaviour even in the guise of sport has any cathartic effect at all."

Although, as Lorenz (1966) postulated early on, there are undeniable similarities between displays of aggression in birds, animals, fish and in humans, human behaviour generally and aggression specifically are much more complex phenomena and require deeper and more sophisticated sociological (rather than biological) understanding. This and a remarkable paucity of empirical support for catharsis have combined to influence most noted authorities working in the area of aggression and its relation to sport almost unanimously to reject the catharsis view, both when applied to sports participants themselves and (more germane for our purposes) to sports spectators. Furthermore, a large cluster of academic studies (e.g., E. Turner, 1970; Goldstein and Arms, 1971; Berkowitz and Alioto, 1973; Sipes, 1973;
Berkowitz, 1976; Atyeo, 1979; Leuck et al., 1979; Zillmann, 1979; Arms, Russell and Sandilands, 1979, etc.,) have provided support for a 'disinhibition' thesis, i.e., that participation in, or observing, hostile sports, serves to enhance rather than reduce aggressive drives.

Despite the fact that the catharsis view has been refuted in many more academic studies than it has been validated, the benefits of catharsis continue to be propounded by some academics (psychiatrists and physical educators in particular) and remain widely accepted in lay circles, particularly by those involved in and participating in sport itself. As with the other theories reviewed here (particularly contagion theory), catharsis theory appears to have taken on its own common sensical version in lay conversation, usually as a form of psychologistic rationalization for aggression and violence. It should be reiterated, however, that most data currently available are extremely non-supportive of cathartic effects. Sport probably offers a channel for the manifestation of aggression rather than one for its reduction and relief.

As mentioned at the start of this chapter, many writers included in this review (particularly those emanating from the contagion and convergence paradigms) focus on the essential spontaneity of collective behaviour
as if, as Blumer puts it, there were no "...pre-established understandings or traditions" in crowds (Blumer (1951:68; also see Lang and Lang, 1961:11-14; Turner and Killian, 1972:4-5). In many contexts, such a view is simply incomplete. As we now move on to review contemporary theories of sports crowd disorder, it becomes clear that it is quite possible for members of crowds to bring to an event an intricate collection of rational pre-understandings and expectations based on notions of social structure, class culture, relationship to other crowd members, etc. As Simmel (1950) has argued, it is important to realize that in any given situation, the complex sequence of small-group relations at work is probably moulded by the influence of larger social structural factors. Moreover, behaviours arising from such pre-understandings can be performed normatively in their own context. For example, rival gangs of English soccer 'hooligans' have been in conflict with each other for so long (Dunning et al., 1984a, 1984b) that most informed sources consider their unique form of collective behaviour normative and highly structured. Thus, assertions such as Lang and Lang's (1968:556) that collective behaviour is explicitly behaviour which displays a "...derailment...from its normatively structured course" cannot be considered universally accurate or helpful.

When applied to specific sports milieux, all of the theories outlined above offer little more than superficial
theoretical frameworks. Collective crowd disorders at sports events are extremely complex and varied (and often highly organized) phenomena, and attempts to explain their occurrence must be based on a historically-grounded interpretation and understanding of the specific conditions, i.e., form and context, of behaviour and action. Although the above theories can be utilized to explain certain aspects and phases of sports crowd disorder, it is unrealistic to expect that a perfect 'analytical fit' can be achieved between this specific type of phenomenon and any one of these theories. Consequently, the presumption implicit in much of the literature that all crowd processes are alike and therefore equally interrogable must be discarded. It is a continuing line of argument in this study that because crowds can differ enormously by context (time, place, culture, history, etc.) and form (crowd composition per se), causal explanations for crowd behaviour must be grounded in contextual rather than broad and non-specific analyses. At this point, then, it is important to examine a selective review of culturally and historically contextualized explanations for sports crowd disorder.
Theories of Sports Crowd Disorder

Initially, it is important to establish some parameters around what we mean by the 'sports crowd.' It is possible to demarcate the sports crowd as: an assemblage of individuals at or around a sports event, in close physical contact, stimulated by factors emanating from the aura of the occasion or action on the field of play, and in possession of an allegiance, involvement and identity with a participating individual and/or team and of a rapport with one another. It also needs to be said that the sports crowd is, in fact, quite different from other crowds and collectivities. Unlike crowds formed in shopping malls and subways, etc., it gathers on a highly ritualistic basis to be entertained by, identify with and offer emotional support to athletes competing against one another on local, regional or international bases.

Because most sports spectators have an informed knowledge of 'their' game (this is due to the cultural relevance of sport in contemporary society), they can immediately identify the significance of an event either in terms of seasonal goals (e.g., making the play-offs, winning championships) or in terms of the relations ('rivalries') that have developed historically between the contestants, and indeed, in the case of some sports (this is probably most visible at soccer), between the fans too.
For these reasons, sports crowds, unlike crowds in many other contexts, have a vested interest—a fanaticism—in the outcome of the event at hand. Combined with factors caused by aggregation (physical proximity, tension, noise, competition, etc.), it is therefore unsurprising that sporting contests are characterized by highly emotionally-charged behaviour on the part of participants and spectators alike, where proceedings can, under the appropriate conditions, 'get out of hand'.

**Brief Synopsis of Sociological Perspectives**

As Milgram and Toch (1969) informed us some time ago, when large crowds gather at public events such as sports, many of the preconditions for collective behaviour exist. There has not, however, been widespread agreement on behavioural tendencies of the sports crowd, or on explanations for disorder therein. Increasing attention is being paid to the consumers of organized sport, and particularly to their role in violent conduct. Undoubtedly, the sports crowd has become a significant force in sport aside from the athletes or the events themselves.

Incidents involving spectator violence are legion, and the following list represents no more than a fraction of citable cases:

**El Salvador, 1969** — Hundreds of people injured in 10 days of rioting following soccer match between Honduras and El Salvador. *(Newsweek, July 28, 1969:54)*
Minneapolis, Detroit, New York, 1970—Hockey fans pelt players with missiles including live duck, cooked octopus, fruit and eggs. (Bingham, 1970:22)

Cleveland, 1974—Baseball fans invade field and fight with players following player-fan confrontation. (Newsweek, June 17, 1974).

Foxboro, Massachusetts, 1976—60 football fans arrested, 35 hospitalized, 1 fan stabbed following N.F.L. game. (Sports Illustrated, Oct. 13, 1980:29)


A number of sociologists have attempted to account for the apparent proclivity of the contemporary sports crowd towards violent behaviour. The following represents only a very brief and selective review of such causal explanations. Given constraints of space, its purpose is not to provide an exhaustive review of the literature, but to demonstrate the diversity of interpretive frameworks employed in that literature to date.  

Several sociologists have applied a structural-functionalist perspective to the analysis of spectator disorder. M. Smith (1976b), for example, examined crowd violence at a number of soccer riots using Smelser's (1962) value-added theory of collective behaviour. Focusing on Smelser's notions of 'structural conduciveness' and 'precipitating factors', Smith found the most common determinants of crowd hostility to be officials' decisions and player
violence. These findings led Smith (1976b:205) to conclude that:

Sport probably often exacerbates the very strains that initially give rise to collective hostility.

More recently, Smith (1983) has gone on to further validate what he calls the 'violence-precipitates-violence' hypothesis using extensive archival data. Elsewhere, C. White (1975), Edwards and Rackages (1977) and Lewis (1982b) have also used Smelser's value-added theory to examine hostile outbursts in sport, and their findings regarding the violence-precipitates-violence hypothesis support those of Smith.

Cheffers and Meehan have conducted similar work to Smith. They have been concerned to investigate how fans respond to player violence, or what they call 'unwarranted actions' on the part of athletes. Gilbert and Twyman (1983:66) cite their findings:

In soccer, fights among the players have triggered violence in the stands in 57% of the cases the researchers have observed. For football and baseball, the percentages are 49 and 34 respectively.

According to Gilbert and Twyman, however, Cheffers' data revealed that only 8.5% of hockey fights prompted fan violence. Cheffers accounts for this by asserting that hockey, like roller-derby and professional wrestling, is becoming a 'giggle sport', and that fans witness on-Ice
fights so frequently that they are becoming blasé about them.

Fimrite (1976) has also been interested to identify the fundamental causes of sports crowd disorder. In his now famous piece, *Take Me Out to the Brawl Game*, he attributes the apparent increase in spectator violence to certain socio-economic 'dis-affections' emerging between the fan, the athlete and society. According to Fimrite, a growing alienation between these three is resulting in widespread social frustration which is being vented in sports stadia. Analogous to Fimrite's argument is the thesis of Fontana (1978), which proposes increasing loss of individuality and excessive bureaucratic practices as central causes of frustration. Life in contemporary society is becoming overly structured and predictable for the individual which, says Fontana, is undermining his sense of 'distinctness'. Therefore, violence and inordinate participation in the sports crowd are seen in this argument as an attempt to reassert individualism "...by resurrecting the primitive feelings of simulation and vertigo" (Fontana, 1978:225).

A popular perspective, found in both the work of scholars and lay persons (e.g., media personnel), follows from Fimrite and Fontana's work, and this is what can be called the 're-integration' thesis. A number of writers (e.g., Beisser, 1977; Petryszak, 1977) have suggested that life in modern cities is essentially anonymous and mundane.
With the disintegration of the extended family network, and the steady drive of people towards the large cities, modern man/woman, it is argued, is losing membership with valued groups and, concomitantly, the necessary sense of belonging derived from association with such groups. Violence in sports stadia is thus understood in terms of spectators' need to reestablish forms of group identification. As Petryszak (1977:1) writes:

Incidents of violence and aggression that occur in the stadium are understood as overt displays of competition. It is finally suggested that sports violence as an overt and visible index of group competition is the means by which the spectator is able to temporarily satisfy the basic human need for group membership. The spectators' joy in sports violence represents in fact his enthusiasm in the realization of this essential need.

Irving Goldaber, founder of the Centre for the Study of Crowd and Spectator Behaviour in Miami, agrees with Petryszak—he sees problems in sport as linked to problems in mainstream society. To illustrate, Goldaber argues:

...more people aren't making it. You work hard, you exist, but you haven't got much to show for it. There are increasing numbers of people who are deeply frustrated because they feel they have very little power over their lives. They come to sporting events to experience, vicariously, a sense of power. (Cited in Gilbert and Twyman, 1983:71)

Goldaber's thesis is thus one of vicarious power-seeking, whereby sports violence is an attempt to distinguish oneself in a milieu that, unlike the work-place, provides the individual with the possibility for so-doing.
Clearly, then, an assortment of explanatory frameworks has been offered to date regarding sports crowd disorder, some speculative and impressionistic, others empirically-substantiated. In concluding this section, it should be re-emphasized that other causal explanations focusing on, for example: hostility-evoking social deprivations (e.g., Sheed, 1969; Hecht, 1968; Lever, 1972; Dahrendorf (cited in Main) 1985:9; Deford, 1985:58); political protest (e.g., Katz, 1955; Lang and Lang, 1961; Hain, 1971); climate, starting time and seat location (e.g., Dewar, 1979); and crowd size (e.g., Green and O'Neal, 1976) exist in the literature. Finally, most informed sources working within the area of sport and violence (e.g., Marsh et al., 1978; Williams et al., 1984) concur in the belief that excessive alcohol use is often linked quite strongly to more fundamental precipitants of hostile behaviour on the part of sports fans.

Theoretical Perspectives on Soccer Hooliganism

I. The Ritual of Soccer Violence

One approach to the question of soccer crowd disorder has been presented by Peter Marsh and his colleagues (Marsh, 1975, 1982; Marsh, Rosser and Harré, 1978; Marsh and Harré, 1981; Marsh and Campbell, 1982) following observational work at Oxford United Football Club. Marsh et al., (1978:15-16) have employed what they call the
'ethogenic method' in their research programme to detail the career structure of hooligan fans, and the 'rules' (norms) intrinsic to that structure. They commence from the premise that one has to view disorder "...through the eyes of people who take part in it" (1978:2). The ethogenic method, as Marsh et al., see it, is thus a means of empathizing with subjects of sociological investigation, and as a research method was established in response to "...middle-class investigators who enter the social world of working-class children from the outside and without credentials valid in that world" (1978:6).

Building on Tiger's (1969) study of the aggressive behaviour of Men in Groups, and on notions of 'male bonding', Marsh and his colleagues offer a type of 'psychology of action', conceptualizing aggression as a constructive and rule-governed means of controlling the social world, in the process of achieving certain goals. They argue that depending upon the culture of specific groups, aggression will be realized in different ways. Hence, soccer crowd disorder is forwarded as a specific cultural adaptation to the lower working-class environment, which manifests itself in terms of aggressive (but largely symbolic and harmless) rituals on the soccer terrace, thereby facilitating the cathartic expression and release of aggressive impulses for young working-class adolescents, i.e., it is a 'ritual of teenage aggro'. Moreover, Marsh et al., (1978:134) warn authorities
that the catharsis offered by soccer aggression is an indispensable cultural, requisite, and that if we:

...take away the opportunities for boys and young men to engage in structured aggro, then we might very well be faced with a set of problems that are far more serious and much more difficult to control.

Ironically, then, as Marsh *et al.*, see it, authorities are faced with having to tolerate ritualized soccer aggression in order to avert 'real' violence.

It is evident that Marsh's work also has ties with the ethological and catharsis theories of Lorenz (1966), discussed above, in addition to other writers emphasizing the ritualistic and 'tribal' aspects of soccer fan behaviour (e.g., Edgell and Jary, 1973; Harrison, 1974; Corrigan, 1979; Morris, 1981.) Following research at Sunderland Football Club, for example, Corrigan arrives at similar conclusions to Marsh:

For the vast majority of youths involved, the aim is not to cause violence. Aggression...is firmly limited and the ritual is more important than the reality. If someone gets hurt,...then it's more by accident than design. (*The Times*, April 5, 1980)

As one of Corrigan's research incidents demonstrates, this argument appears, at least superficially, to be quite valid.

He (C) is here interviewing a fan (F):

C. Why do you come to football?
F. For the violence.
C. I've got some film of you running away from Chelsea supporters last week.
F. Yeah, but Chelsea have got axes.
C. If you come to football for the violence, then what's wrong with that?
F. Well, axes is real violence (The Times, April 5, 1980).

Edgell and Jary (1973:226) also posit the notion of the non-violent soccer crowd, and focus on the predictability of its behaviour which "...tends to be highly ritualized rather than 'undefined'...mild forms of saturnalia." For empirical support, they draw our attention to two points; first, the manner in which officials or 'authority' can be verbally insulted with a near immunity from retaliation; and second, the profane and threatening nature of regular songs and chants, reciprocally used by rival fan groups.

To minimize the frequency and amplitude of soccer 'aggro' in these ways, however, and to suggest that the phenomenon is only a ritualistic 'fantasy' of violence, fails to provide a fully adequate account and leaves several questions unanswered. What Marsh et al., Morris, Edgell and Jary, etc., have failed to recognize is the regularity with which serious (and sometimes fatal) injury is caused at soccer. Marsh et al., (1978) in particular make no reference to the pre- or post-match context, where undoubtedly violence is particularly prevalent. Rather, the main focus of their analyses is on 'hand to hand' combat during games. This completely overlooks several significant aspects of hooligan transaction, not the least of which are extra-ground incidents of organized violence between rival 'fighting crews', and aerial confrontations through the use of missiles, both well-established characteristics of
current hooligan deportment. Moreover, theories focusing on the 'ritual of soccer 'aggro' entirely omit any notion of structural differentiation and political backdrop, so fundamental to adequately explaining the phenomenon (at least as it occurs in Britain.)

There is no denying some ritualistic flavour to soccer violence--many of the songs, chants, profanities and even aspects of fist-fighting are ritualized--but to argue that the very essence of hooliganism is ritualistic and that 'real' violence plays no more than a peripheral role poses serious doubts as to the validity of all these hypotheses (particularly in the wake of several recent, but now infamous, hooligan incidents, e.g., 39 fans dead at the Brussels soccer riot of May 1985). Moreover, one wonders how responsible such theses are in an era when soccer-related disorders show no sign of relenting. Actual violence is as central to the problem as its ritualistic counterpart.

Finally, in addition to all of these flaws, we have already seen that any argument based on the catharsis view remains, at the least, unsubstantiated.

II. Social Deprivation and the 'Little England' Ideology

As we mentioned above, sports crowd disorder has been explained by some North American writers in terms of the effects of a social deprivation experience on the part of spectators. With respect to disorder that has occurred at
soccer matches over the last few decades in Britain, several sociologists (e.g., Corrigan, 1979; Taylor, 1969, 1971, 1982a, 1982b, 1985) have similarly forwarded 'deprivation' hypotheses. The work of Taylor is foremost in this category.

In an explanation of soccer hooliganism more centrally concerned with structural differentiation than the analysis of Marsh et al., (1978), Taylor argues that contemporary changes in the (English) game have combined to effect important alterations in the behaviour of traditional supporters. Central to Taylor's analysis are notions of 'soccer subculture' and 'soccer consciousness.' For him, the subculture of soccer in a working-class community is an allusion to groups of working men socially and culturally bound together in a general concern for the game—the soccer consciousness—and for the local team in particular. He writes (1971:143):

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and throughout the Depression, the evidence is that players were very much subject to control by such soccer subcultures; expected to receive advice and 'tips', expected to conform to certain standards of behaviour (as the subculture's public representatives) and (in return) given a wage for so long as they fulfilled these expectations.

According to Taylor, the rank-and-file supporter could thus view himself as a member of a "...collective and democratically structured enterprise" (1971:145) in which players, managers, owners and fans were all engaged in a kind of working-class 'participatory democracy.'
Taylor argues, however, that specific post-war changes in the British game have threatened this state of affairs. Clubs now enter international competitions and have introduced new domestic competitions. Further, clubs have recently set out to 'bourgeoisify' the game in becoming more oriented towards profit maximization. The player, too, has:

...been incorporated into the bourgeois world; his self-image and his behaviour have become increasingly managerial and entrepreneurial; and soccer has become, for the player, a means to personal (rather than subcultural) success. (1971:146)

For the members of the working-class soccer subculture, Taylor argues, these changes are having a traumatic effect. Their relatively deprived socio-economic status is being exacerbated by a feeling that they are now being cast off by the clubs which have traditionally provided their life-blood. Taylor suggests that these people constitute a 'subcultural rump', and argues that it is principally they who engage in the sorts of behaviour which authorities usually designate as 'hooliganism'.

Hence, the invasion of pitches, destruction of property in and around stadia, and the pillaging of soccer buses and trains returning from games, etc., are all, according to this view, responses by the remnants of a working-class subculture to reclaim a game which has become increasingly removed from their control. That is, disorder so-created represents, as Edgell and Jary (1973:227) have
written, "...a highly specific protest against football's loss of class exclusivity."

Taylor (1982a, 1982b, 1985) has recently gone far towards developing his thesis of soccer hooliganism, arguing that the phenomenon can only be understood if placed against the ongoing crisis of the British state, and of (industrial and commercial) dislocations in working-class experience which has given way to differentiation within the working-class itself. Moreover, Taylor (1986) believes that an increased upper working-class jingoism developing during the Thatcher period has exacerbated Britain's 'hooligan' problem:

...I think that what one's seeing...is the desperation or the nihilism of a more affluent section of the upper working class in Britain, a fraction of the class that's always existed in that society, a fraction of the class that has always been rather more individualistic, self-interested, proprietorish than the working class as a whole. The kind of worker that is sometimes seen taking anti-union or non-union jobs, indeed, the lump workers who appear from time to time in the post-war industrial relations scene in Britain. The section of the working class that does live, I think, within Thatcherite culture, that does accept the Falklands ideology, the Little Englander ideology, the anti-foreigner hysteria that has accompanied the Thatcher period in Britain.12

Such arguments clearly show that Taylor's most recent contributions to the hooligan issue locate the participants themselves in an altogether different, i.e., more affluent, class faction than his earlier work.
In locating soccer hooliganism in the context of (a) certain changes that have occurred recently in the structure and form of the British game, and (b), the effects of 'Thatcherism' on working-class experience and values as a whole and soccer support specifically, Taylor has succeeded in demonstrating, crucially, that "...no sensible discussion" (1985:20) of this phenomenon can proceed unless developed against a historical, cultural and political backdrop, and he must be commended for this. Nevertheless, several flaws in Taylor's work require identification.

First, Taylor nowhere provides convincing evidence to support the notion of a 'participatory democracy' in the 1920s and 1930s, i.e., that fans were ever in a position to exert control over the game or its players. In fact, as Carroll (1980) points out, it is extremely doubtful whether current soccer hooligans were ever cognizant of any participatory democracy or 'illusion of control' as Taylor puts it, or, moreover, are concerned with regaining it. Second, if, as Taylor suggests, fans have only recently turned to hooliganism through feelings of estrangement from the 'participatory democracy' of the club-fan relation, how do we account for the regular soccer crowd disturbances of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century (Dunning et al., 1984a, 1984b; K. Young, 1980) when this relationship allegedly reached a peak? Although he mentions pre-1960 forms of violence sporadically in his work, Taylor continues
to refute (without empirical testimony) the possibility of extended phases of crowd disorder at soccer before the 1960s. His failure to examine the span of the phenomena surely results in an overall lack of historical clarity in his argument. Finally, (and linked to this point), since they are not based on any (acknowledged) empirical work, many of Taylor's insights regarding soccer hooliganism must remain speculative and impressionistic.

III. Theories of Working-Class Subcultures

Several writers at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (hereafter to be referred to as C.C.C.S.) at the University of Birmingham, England (e.g., Clarke, 1973, 1978; Hall, 1978; Critcher, 1979) have echoed Taylor's perspective in accounting for soccer hooliganism. As Clarke (1978:49-50) writes:

Hooliganism comes out of the way in which the traditional forms of football watching encounter the professionalization and spectacularization of the game. It is one of the consequences of the changing relationship of the audience to the game.

In this way, soccer hooliganism is seen as a reaction on the part of working-class adolescents to commercializing processes (the increasing presentation of soccer as 'spectacle') appearing in what has traditionally been construed as 'the people's game' (Walvin, 1975).

However, Clarke et al., have modified Taylor's thesis slightly with a new focus upon adolescent subcultural
characteristics emerging out of post-World War II changes in British working-class culture. These changes include breakdown in family ties, decline in the heavy industries, loss of communal space, dislocations in relations between the generations and incumbent emergence of a selection of youth 'styles'... Clarke believes that the changing relation between adults and youths in working-class communities has facilitated greater freedom and independence for youths, and therefore fewer (social and physical) constraints upon them at soccer and elsewhere in their lives. Hence, traditional forms of crowd behaviour at soccer, including profanity, pushing, 'controlled' aggression, etc., (Hopcroft, 1968), are now seen as escalating into new styles of spectatorship—specifically, forms of aggressiveness and violence which the authorities have designated as 'hooliganism'.

In arguing that hooliganism is integrally related to dislocations in working-class life in the post-war period—"Into the hiatus between the traditional supporter and the modern consumer stepped the football hooligan"—Critcher's (1979:171) thesis is compatible with Clarke's. Like Clarke, Critcher is concerned to rework Taylor's (early) argument that locates soccer-related crowd disorders entirely within the context of the game itself, preferring instead to view them as representative of changes occurring in working-class culture more broadly, i.e., in the social position of the working-class as a whole.
There can be no doubt that relating soccer hooliganism to the context of a culture (and society more generally) in flux is a very helpful framework of analysis. Equally, there can be no doubt that the socio-historical approaches of Taylor and Clarke et al., offer considerably more explanatory insight into a complex social problem than the ethological and rather microsociological ventures of Marsh and his colleagues (1978). In combining explanations of transformations in social relations and cultural meanings and in the composition of the soccer crowd, Clarke et al. seem in many ways to have transcended Taylor's (1971) narrow early focus on the latter account alone, although it must be said that Taylor (e.g., 1982a, 1982b, 1985) has very recently rectified this position in his writings on soccer hooliganism as related to the effects of structural differentiation within the British working-class.

However, as we remarked about Taylor's early work, Clarke, Critcher et al., unfortunately produce no concrete evidence to support the argument that hooliganism is a response to the establishment's challenge to working-class traditions and values. Stability of working-class social relations in the past, i.e., in the pre-1960 era, is a view that both parties tend to assume rather too uncritically and, since both assume that soccer hooliganism began on a widespread basis for the first time during the early 1960s,
is a view they are unlikely to relinquish in the foreseeable future.

IV. The Social Roots of Soccer Violence

A team of sociologists at the University of Leicester, England (Eric Dunning, John Williams and Patrick Murphy), have been interested, like Taylor and the working-class subculture theorists, to place the 'socio-genesis' of British soccer hooliganism in historical and class perspective, although, unlike these other writers, their work is grounded in extensive and empirically-tested comparisons of this phenomenon in its past and present contexts.

On a theoretical level, Dunning *et al.*, (1979, 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1984a, 1984b, 1987; Williams *et al.*, 1984) acknowledge academic influence from several diverse sources. Most fundamentally, their work is predicated upon Norbert Elias's (1978) evolutionary theories of the 'civilizing process', although supplementary impetus has clearly been provided by Suttles' (1968) socio-anthropological work on the social order of American slums, in addition to several histories of British soccer (e.g., Marples, 1954; Hopcraft, 1968; P. Young, 1968; Walpin, 1975; Hutchinson, 1975; Vamplew, 1980; Mason, 1980).

Dunning *et al.*, argue that certain standards displayed by soccer hooligans are directly influenced by social conditions and characteristics inherent in the class-
cultural background of those involved. A predominant theme of their work, and one which represents a direct conflict with Taylor's recent 'Little England' thesis, is that hooligan groups are largely comprised of individuals from the 'roughest' sector of the working-classes. Aligning themselves with notions of deprivation, they argue that the hooligan's deprived 'social condition' is instrumental in the production and reproduction of normative modes of behaviour including strong emphases on ties of kinship and territory, loyalty to peers and family, conjugal role separation, male dominance, and a need to express masculinity through physical means (e.g., fighting). As Williams says of working-class soccer hooligans in a recent Thames Television documentary, Hooligan (developed around the Leicester researchers' work):

They spend a lot of time in the same areas, they do the same kinds of jobs, they have the same sorts of interests, they have relatively narrow social horizons given the kinds of opportunities they have for status and expressing themselves. They have very strong bonds of loyalty and group solidarity. They prize many of the things that are more generally prized and accepted in our society...they prize pride in their own area and their community...You also find in communities of this kind...a much stronger division between the sexes...and the males tend to dominate...there tend to be dominance hierarchies built up between males and one way you can gain status is through the ability to fight.

It is precisely, say Dunning et al., the reproduction of this social condition that leads to the development of a
specific violent masculine style manifested regularly on the soccer terraces. The context is soccer because:

The match on the field of play itself is a match as they (hooligans) see it on behalf of their community, not just the wider city but in particular the working-class sections of their city, because they see the game as part and parcel of their working-class culture...they're also involved in a competition with the fans of the opposing side because they're battling on behalf of their community. (Dunning, cited in the documentary Hooligan)

This is the thrust of Dunning et al.'s explanation regarding soccer hooliganism in Britain. In order to explain fan violence at international soccer matches, we are introduced to what Paul Harrison (1974:604) has called the 'Bedouin Syndrome'. Simply stated, this means that in the same way that usually hostile neighbourhood groups come together to defend their 'home territory' against 'away' fans, so too is social solidarity of this type manifested on a regional scale (e.g., northern fans against southern fans) and even on a national scale (e.g., English fans against Spanish fans). Harrison's concept of the Bedouin Syndrome is thus usually described in terms such as: "...the enemy of your enemy is your friend" (Harrison, 1974:604). Dunning et al.'s first book, Hooligans Abroad (1984) was, in fact, an attempt to substantiate such a scenario empirically in the context of international soccer competition (The World Cup, Spain, 1982.)
Most explanations of soccer hooliganism in Britain (e.g., Marsh et al., 1978; Clarke, 1978; Critcher, 1970; Taylor 1971, 1982a, 1982b, 1985) have postulated that the phenomenon began on a broad scale for the first time in the early 1960s, and is therefore very recent. The Leicester research, by contrast, is based on a quite different assumption, i.e., that patterns of soccer crowd disorder (although varied in their manifestations) can be traced as far back as the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Moreover, Dunning et al., argue that "...every phase of the Association game in Britain...has been accompanied by episodes of spectator disorder" (1981:342), although the pre-First World War and post-1960 periods are seen as most prolific vis-a-vis disorder. For example, the Hooligan documentary shows that the English Football Association was so concerned with increasing crowd disorder prior to World War II that military personnel were regularly allowed into soccer matches free of charge to help informally 'police' unruly crowd members.

The argument that hooliganism has pervaded the entire history of British soccer requires discussion, however, and possibly represents a quite fundamental flaw in the analysis of the Leicester scholars. We have said that their work is theoretically grounded in Eliasian evolutionary notions of the civilizing process. This leads them to view the current hooligan problem as no more pressing than during
other periods of British soccer history. This is, at the very least, a contentious position (particularly in the wake of several incidents which have involved British soccer fans recently, such as the Heysel Stadium riot), and it must be said that the empirical evidence of Dunning et al., at least as we have seen it to date\(^4\), seems to provide an overly convenient 'fit' for their Eliaisan model of behaviour.

However, the work of Dunning et al., offers as sophisticated and informed an understanding of the complex issues and meanings behind soccer hooliganism as is currently available in the literature. Despite the question of the apparent (and rather suspicious) ease with which their empirical data complement their theoretical framework, these writers have gone far in mapping the socio-genesis of the phenomenon and linking it to the broader culture in which it emerges.

It should be pointed out that the problem of sports crowd disorder as it relates to the United Kingdom displays a rather more specific focus and location, i.e., soccer, than in North America, where crowd disorders appear to be distributed between the most popular team sports (football, ice hockey and baseball) on a roughly equal basis. In both contexts, however, there is a clear association between spectator disorder and sport structure, i.e., violence is
most common among spectators of professional, confrontation-al/hostile team sports. In their discussions of the importance of the defence of 'territory' for British soccer fans, only Dunning et al. (1982a, 1982b) to date have been concerned, albeit implicitly, with the connection to be drawn between aggressive behavioural patterns on the field of play and aggression in the stands. For example, ritualistic spectator disorder seems more common in those team sports where the contending teams have their own 'territory', which they defend against invasion from opponents. Moreover, to be successful, each team must literally invade their opponents' turf in person. This apparently significant overlap, which suggests the necessity for a type of 'social ecology' of sports crowd disorder, has unfortunately been largely ignored by sport sociologists studying the phenomena in both the United Kingdom and North America.

Of course, as with other forms of social deviance, one of the more generalized effects of social disorder, deviance and conflict of the type discussed so far is the escalation of public interest and alarm, and in some cases, the development of moral panic. Official and public attention to the sports crowd disorder issue (at least as it has transpired in the United Kingdom) has recently been representative of moral panic. It is to this aspect of the problem that we now turn.
The Concept and Theory of 'Moral Panic'

Although perhaps originally prompted both by Gusfield's (1963) early work on the history of the American temperance movement and the prohibition laws, and Wilkins' (1964) work on social deviance and public reaction, the term 'moral panic' was employed by Stanley Cohen in the early 1960s in a 'transactionalist' study of two British youth groups which first became publicly visible in the previous decade. In *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, Cohen employed a contemporary variation of labelling theory, attempting to examine the interaction or 'transaction' between those that possess power to judge in society (e.g., the judiciary; the police; the media; the politicians, etc.), and other less powerful groups whose behaviour is widely 'judged' (specifically, deviant youth groups who, because of a unique cultural style, came to be known as the 'Mods' and 'Rockers'.)

On the most fundamental plane, the study thus analyzed societal reaction to certain social definitions, and was in fact in many ways an empirical testing ground for the theoretical distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' deviation postulated earlier by the labelling theorist Lemert:

Primary deviance is assumed to arise in a wide variety of social, cultural and psychological contexts, and at best has only marginal implications for the psychic
structure of the individual; it does not lead to symbolic reorganization at the level of self-regarding attitudes and social roles. Secondary deviance is deviant behaviour, or social roles based upon it, which becomes a means of defense, attack or adaption to the overt and covert problems created by societal reaction to primary déviation. (1967:48)

The dominant focus of Cohen's study was on secondary deviance, i.e., on how, once publicly labelled as deviant, actors begin to adopt attitudes and behaviours attributed to them, thereby actually amplifying the deviant form (Cohen, borrowing from Wilkins' (1964) earlier work, calls this an 'amplification spiral'.) Cohen shows lucidly how an 'ideal-type' of Mods and Rockers was fostered and developed in the media which, by way of emotive and evocative language and consistent and prolonged levels of dramatic reportage epitomised often in headlines (e.g., 'Day of Terror by Scooter Groups'; 'Wild Ones Invade Seaside'--Cohen, 1973:30), helped sensitise the public to an escalating moral panic over the threat offered by these allegedly violent and injurious 'folk devils.'

Although there is no doubt that the Mods and Rockers had been guilty of several outbreaks of gang violence on the beaches of southern English towns, and of using amphetamines (they were not "...psychogenic apparitions"--Cohen, 1973:203), Cohen in fact found charges brought against them, both by the control culture and by the media, to be greatly exaggerated. He found general policing measures, for
instance, to be over-sensitized to the potential of the Mods and Rockers for violence, and that charges and arrests were sometimes made indiscriminately. Further, examining court records and transcripts, Cohen discovered that the judiciary apparently began to view the Mods and Rockers as social conspirators, making judgemental statements and imposing stringent punitive sanctions based upon such a view. He cites one now famous statement made by a Magistrate, for example, who claimed that:

These long-haired, mentally unstable, petty little hoodlums, these Sawdust Caesars who can only find courage like rats, in hunting in packs, came to Margate with the avowed intent of interfering with the life and property of its inhabitants. (1973:109)

Combined with emotional and dramatic press reports, the author argues that the effects of these control-centred responses was to scare local communitites into anticipating invasion and violence, neither of which usually materialized, and to transform even the most mundane events involving Mods and Rockers into 'headline' news.

Cohen (1973:9) proposes that moral panics occur on an essentially episodic basis:

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerge to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are
evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.

Moral panics must be seen as episodically based (they can retract from public view and later be 'reproduced' in a different context) because, as Cohen (1973:10) informs us, the twentieth century has spawned a 'gallery of types' over whom the media and the control culture have responded comparably, and to whom the label 'folk devil' has been similarly applied. Under these circumstances, it is thus no surprise that Cohen predicts the emergence of future moral panics centred around "...other, as yet nameless, folk devils" (1973:204).15

The Mods and Rockers have been used by Cohen in an empirically based case study to describe the social mechanisms which can result in a spiralling moral panic. More recently, other writers working within the framework of the sociology of collective behaviour and the sociology of law and social problems have borrowed his original concept to discuss societal response to a diverse cluster of different social types. Many of them have laid emphasis on the inadequacy of labelling theory alone to account for the phenomenon in question, preferring instead to combine this approach with a class or culture conflict analysis, in order to contextualize groups and issues historically, culturally and politically. Among these can be found studies of Teddy Boys, Skinheads, Punk Rockers and Rastafarians (Clarke et
British youth in general (Pearson, 1983), violence against
the elderly (Fishman, 1978), attacks on women (Voumvakis and
Ericson, 1984), Maori gangs (Kelsey and Young, 1982), and
youth unemployment (Cashmore, 1984; Tanner et al., 1985.)
Additionally, some scholars have considered the social
effects of alarmist media reactions to a range of other
unrelated issues. Gussow and Tracy's (1971:699) analysis of
The Times' response to the alleged increase in rates of
leprosy in the 1890s, and Erikson's (1966) examination of
crime waves in seventeenth century Massachusetts, are cases
in point. The very obvious variety of sources in such
studies demonstrates that moral panics are not culturally,
temporally or issue specific.

Generally, these studies have considered the
influence of statements made and action taken by those in
positions of power and autonomy--the primary definers--upon
a spiralling societal reaction to this ensemble of social
types. For instance, Hebdige (1979:158) writes of the
British Punk subculture:

Official reactions to the punk subculture
betrayed all the classic symptoms of a moral
panic. Concerts were cancelled; clergymen,
politicians and pundits unanimously denoun-
ced the degeneracy of youth. Among the
choice reactions, Marcus Lipton, the late
M.P. for Lambeth North, declared "...if pop
music is going to be used to destroy our
established institutions, then it ought to
be destroyed first."
Similarly, Cashmore (1984:26) cites the view of a certain Reverend Carter, who in the 1950s decried the effects of 'Rock 'n' Roll' upon youth which, as he saw it, was "...to turn them into devil worshippers; to stimulate self-expression through sex; to provoke carelessness, and to destroy the sanctity of marriage." Finally, Pearson (1983:5) cites a rather hyperbolical response of 'the great Tory reformer', Sir Keith Joseph, to the English youth-race riots of 1981:

> Warning that 'the balance of our population our human stock is threatened', Keith Joseph sensed truly momentous possibilities of decline. 'Rome itself fell', he reminded us, 'destroyed from inside. Are we to be destroyed from inside, too, a country which has successfully repelled and destroyed Philip of Spain, Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler?'

In these ways, all these studies detail the role of overreaction on the part of the control culture and other 'primary' and 'secondary' definers, in particular in making radical suggestions for solution, and indeed suggest the possibility that moral panics can tell us much more about the symptoms of the panic (who panics and how), than the actual social form around which the panic develops.

In addition, all such studies have, to a greater or lesser degree, placed primary emphasis on the mass media as the fundamental vehicle for the fuelling of moral panics. Crucially, they have done this by proposing that the media (and the news press in particular, adopting language
techniques we saw earlier such as hyperbole, metaphorical embellishment, etc.,) are able to play a pivotal role in contributing to dominant ideology regarding a threat offered by an emerging social issue or group which may in fact be out of all proportion to its real significance. Studies of moral panics, therefore (amongst which Cohen's piece remains seminal), are centrally concerned with the selection and presentation of media information—mechanisms discussed in a following section. They propose that the media are not only able to mirror what transpires in the social world, but are also able to define and 'code' it in a certain fashion. We have seen that, according to 'moral panic theory', this work of ideological definition can have the effect of heightening public reaction, and directing it towards control measures which may be unnecessary or inappropriate.

Although there is mounting evidence to suggest that spectator disorder in a variety of sports and contexts around the globe continues to increase, the only group of sports fans which the media and the authorities have identified, in Cohen's (1973:10) terms, as one of the many "...visible reminders of what we should not be," seem to be the soccer hooligans, and specifically the English soccer hooligans. Indeed, numerous sociologists of sport (Hall, 1978; Whannel, 1979; Taylor, 1982a, 1982b; Dunning et al., 1982a, 1987; M. Smith, 1983) have recently endeavoured to provide some elucidation on the process of deviancy
amplification involving soccer fans, although only Dunning et al., have attempted a thorough historical analysis of this process to date.

It appears that the British media began to report widely upon incidents of delinquency and youth violence at the time of the Teddy Boys during the late 1950s and early 1960s. This represented part of a more generalized moral concern at the time over youth (especially male youth) with the emergence of a new popular music culture, non-conformity in dress, personal appearance, etc. Another social milieu to receive attention from this new media focus at this time was the soccer terrace. Dunning et al., (1982a, 1987) note that during this period, and probably in anticipation of the global attention to be focused on the World Cup Finals due to be played in England in the summer of 1966, dramatic press reports and emotional editorial commentaries restructured the relation between the Saturday afternoon game and the Sunday morning headlines. In combination with the apparently modified strategy of television crews to intermittently pan crowd behaviour during broadcasts, and in particular to 'zone in' on crowd unruliness, the soccer hooligan quickly surfaced as a new and rather ominous folk devil.

The public concern that subsequently ensued over soccer hooliganism (represented most clearly in dwindling attendance records) was assisted in part by melodramatic
suggestions for 'extreme' solution made by a number of persons in positions of high social status. Taylor (1982a:160), for example, cites the cases of Lady Emmet of Amberley who in the House of Lords in October 1976 requested the reinstatement of the stocks, and of the Labour M.P., Mr. Arthur Lewis, who in 1977 proposed that an appropriate penalty for soccer hooliganism would be to spray offenders with indelible dye.

Thus the process of ideological amplification began to unfold: the hooligan news story depicting hundreds of 'mindless morons' engaging in a diversity of irrational 'animal-like' behaviours began to proliferate in the press; this was responded to by public outcry and frenzy (letters to editors, falling attendances at soccer, etc.); this precipitated stricter policing procedures and control at and around matches; this sensitized the judiciary and the courts to a need for imposing tougher punitive measures, etc. Amongst the effects of this rather predictable chain-reaction by the control culture was the consolidation of the soccer fan's terrace identity (his sense of pride and masculinity), the facilitation of revelry in infamy, and finally the propulsion of the soccer fan, in Lemert's terms, along a career of secondary deviance.

Considering the public furore that has surrounded the behaviour of sports fans in a succession of different contexts around the world (e.g., soccer fans in South
America; football and hockey fans in North America; cricket and rugby fans in Australia), it is surprising that so little sociological attention has been paid to the effect of the relationship between crowd disorder, the media and the control culture on public sensitization. In order to gain accurate insight into the actual levels of crowd disorder that prevail in any one context, and to test the adequacy and applicability of the concept of moral panic, the interplay between all these parties needs to be further explored.

In general, moral panics are representative of the wide-ranging effects of forms of social disorder and deviance which typically emerge during periods of political or cultural conflict and crisis. They are also clearly a result of the ideological functions of the mass media. As the chapter now goes on to show in a general review of theories of news production and ideology, in bringing news to the public in specific and deliberately orchestrated ways, the mass media play a key role in contributing to dominant ideological understandings concerning various issues, their causes, their meanings and their possible solutions.
The Social Production of News and the Ideological Functions of the Mass Media

'News' is not intrinsic to an act or event, nor is it something that emerges anonymously and transparently out of social experience—it is media coverage of an event which is prey to the machinations of the entire communication process in which it undergoes forms of alteration and censorship. News is socially produced (MacDougall, 1968; Altheide, 1976; Golding and Elliot, 1979). As MacDougall (1968:12) has stated:

At any given moment billions of simultaneous events occur throughout the world—all of these occurrences are potentially news. They do not become so until some purveyor of news gives an account of them. The news, in other words, is the account of the event, not something intrinsic in the event itself.

This process must also be seen to have central links with wider relations of social and political power:

Reality is socially defined. But the definitions are always embodied, that is, concrete individuals and groups of individuals serve as definers of reality. To understand the state of the socially constructed universe (of meaning) at any given time, or its change over time, one must understand the social organization that permits the definers to do the defining. Put a little crudely, it is essential to keep pushing questions about the historically available conceptualizations of reality from the abstract 'what?' to the sociologically concrete 'says who?' (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:134)

It is precisely amid this news production process that 'purveyors of news' can, administering a professional
ideology of what constitutes 'newsworthiness', "...cover, select and disseminate stories about items identified as either interesting or important" (Tuchman, 1978:183), and report upon these in almost any manner compatible with the overall ideological goals of their news organization (Glasgow Media Group, 1976, 1980).

Particularly by way of the editorial voice of newspapers, but also in general column accounts, opinions regarding topics of current concern are expressed, but expressed in such a manner that it actually appears that these opinions are those held by the public at large. Hall et al., (1978:62) call this technique 'taking the public voice.' There are a number of subtle and complex ways in which this 'consensualizing' effect, where society is presented as having no significant conflicts of economic or cultural interests between groups and classes, can be achieved. For instance, Hall et al., demonstrate that by gingerly employing phrases such as 'we believe...' or 'the public knows...', the reader can interpret the view before her/him as a predominant one and perhaps one of her/his own. Further, consensus infers harmonious social unity, frequently implied by way of the suggestion that 'we' all have the same interests and by use of the adjective 'our'--'our nation', 'our economy', 'our game of soccer', etc., (Hartley, 1982:82). A similar effect is commonly established by the media's use of capital cities in discourse and
dialogue--'Ottawa', 'Washington'--to create a general impression of consensuality and general harmony in any given cultural context. As Hall et al., (1978:55) put it:

Because we occupy the same society and belong to roughly the same 'culture', it is assumed that there is...only one perspective on events; that provided by what is sometimes called the culture, or...the 'central value system'.

Of course, those living on the margins of or beyond this cultural system are thus to be considered deviant, threatening and profoundly 'anti-social'.

More germane for our purposes, this news process often has the effect of diverting public attention to the symptoms of behaviour rather than the root causes. In film theory, Robinson (1984:208) shows how news personnel establish such diversions and maintain observer attention through a process of narrative 'suturing', i.e., 'stitching' or 'sewing' the observer into a flowing and uninterrupted subject matter where image transitions are "...so smooth as to be invisible." One of the practical advantages of such techniques might be to gain public support to take control measures against the issue in question. Voumvakis and Ericson (1984:5) have, in fact, suggested that during periods of moral panic, groups and organizations may wish to encourage public perception of crime waves through the media to enhance their own organizational interests.

The media, then, should be seen to play a significant role in defining and shaping social problems, and in
setting 'agendas' through which carefully selected social
issues are given public visibility. Cohen (1973:16) writes:

The media have long operated as agents of
moral indignation in their own right: even
if they are not self-consciously engaged in
 crusading or muck-raking, their very
reporting of social facts can be sufficient
to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or
panic.

By punctuating discourse with moral directives (e.g., 'where
will it end?'; 'what can we do about it?', etc.), the media
can assist in evoking and perpetuating public anxiety
vis-a-vis certain issues. This is not to say, of course,
that the public blindly accepts and internalizes news.

'Consumers of news' (Tuchman, 1978) should be seen to
identify, interpret and be affected by news differentially.
Nor do the media simply "...create 'bad news' from scratch"
(Knight, 1982:28), but respond to social events in specific
ways which themselves elicit varied public decodings and
meanings.

Hall et al., (1978:53-54) point to two rudimentary
characteristics which generally constitute 'cardinal' or
'primary' news value. First, the media tend to hyperbolize
the ordinary, to make it and its effects extraordinary and
controversial (dramatic, shocking, tragic, incredible,
etc.). Second, if this extraordinary aspect of an issue or
event can be combined with an element of unexpectedness and
ambiguity, and possibly further bolstered with negative
and/or fatal consequences, then it is likely that it will
possess considerable news potential. That is, 'bad news' is 'good news' (Glasgow Media Group, 1976, 1980; Galtung and Ruge, 1981:58), whose purpose, in a sense, is to re-emphasize the normal and approved in society. As Durkheim (1960:102) informs us, "Crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates them." Such events or issues (e.g., presidential assassination attempts; terrorist bombings; nuclear and radiation disasters; sexually transmitted diseases; sports-related injuries and deaths; etc.) apparently rate so highly on scales of primary newsworthiness and news immediacy so as to warrant interruption of normal scheduling, be it on radio or television or in the press, sometimes for an extended period. Hartley (1982:78) and Hall (1973:183) inform us that this trend is particularly pronounced with regard to news about elite groups in elite nations:

Newspapers are full of the actions, situations and attributes of 'elite persons'. The prestigious are part of the necessary spectacle of news production—they people and stabilize its environment. But the very notion of 'elite persons' has the routine knowledge of social structures inscribed within it... 'Elite persons' make the news because power, status and celebrity are monopolies in the institutional life of our society. In C. Wright Mills' phrase, 'elite persons' have colonized 'the means of history making in our society'. (Hall, 1973:183)

Thus, news in the western media is premised upon the value that the actions of elite persons are more consequential than those of ordinary people, and that disaster and
disorder occurring in the west should take precedence over similar (or more serious) events taking place in less elite nations.

It is widely held that the media are the principal institutional definers of news in society. On another level, however, and as the Marxist argument proceeds, the news process can be seen to reflect and reproduce wider relations of economic, cultural and political power in society "...in a relatively uncritical fashion" (Knight, 1982:15). Orchestrated through an ideological sequence which emanates predominantly from the upper middle-class (Gans, 1979), the political bias of news seems largely to be accepted in an almost taken-for-granted manner—it has been hegemonized—and has become, as Knight (1982:21) says, the 'natural' standpoint for society as a whole.

In this sense, the news media can be seen essentially as 'secondary definers', reproducing and developing the definitions of the truly autonomous definers—those institutions and individuals of privileged social status in society on whom the media depend for information channels. Tuchman (1978:4-5), in fact, has shown three ways in which news is intrinsically "...embedded in relations with other institutions":

First, news is an institutional method of making information available to consumers. The consumer buys the newspaper because he or she wants to read the comics or the bridge column, learn the weather forecast, find out what movies are playing, or read
about floods, fires, or the frenzy of social life. Second, news is an ally of legitimated institutions. The secretary of state can float an idea in the news media. The "average" man or woman does not have such access to the media. Nor does an average citizen have the same power, held by legitimated politicians and bureaucrats, to convert his or her reactions to the news into public policies and programs. Third, news is located, gathered, and disseminated by professionals working in organizations. Thus it is inevitably a product of newworkers drawing upon institutional processes and conforming to institutional practices. Those practices necessarily include association with institutions whose news is routinely reported.

News production from this perspective is, then, "...in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers" (Hall et al., 1978:59), or to the 'moral enforcers' as Becker (1963) calls them.

It was stated above that in the same way as media agencies code discourse differentially, so audiences decode news meanings differentially. Importantly, recent cultural studies work on media and ideology has stressed that both discourses and their decodings can resist and oppose dominant ideology (Sumner, 1979; Hall, 1982; Knight, 1982; Knight and Taylor, 1986). Symbolically and materially, news tends to represent relations of power in society; but the struggle within such power leads to a news process which is at once closed and open, fixed and fluid:

As these relations are themselves characterized by contradiction and conflict, the function of news cannot be reduced to the role of merely reproducing a closed,
internally integrated social system.
(Knight, 1982:15)

Ideological hegemony, then, must be seen to be ephemeral and ambiguous, with the societal 'consensus' already described undergoing not only persistent reproduction, but also renegotiation and reinterpretation. In Policing the Crisis, Hall et al., (1978) correctly illustrate that such renegotiation occurs most commonly during moments of social and political upheaval. In his Marxist research on the philosophy of language and discourse, Volosinov (1973) argues that what gives language 'signifiers' or 'signs' their potential to become an 'arena of struggle' is their 'multi-acentuality', i.e., that the decoding of signs can have 'more than one 'uni-acentual' interpretation or meaning (the latter, says Volosinov, is the eternal goal of the ruling class).

Essentially, media signs can be seen to 'fit' with three coding procedures. Although several sociologists have referred to these in a variety of ways (e.g., Parkin, 1972; Hall, 1980; Hartley, 1982; Schlesinger et al., 1983), they will be referred to as 'dominant', 'alternative' and 'oppositional' codes of meaning throughout this study.
(1) The official or dominant code represents messages encoded within the dominant ideology. The reader/listener/viewer receives the sign as a form of "...perfectly transparent communication" (Hall, 1980:136) in a hegemonic manner. Thus, the hegemonic quality of dominant definitions regarding, say, the Reagan administration's position on
'star wars', or the British government's stand on the soccer hooligan issue, is likely to be maintained and reproduced, though "...not without contradiction" (Hall, 1980:136). In general, dominant discourse will reflect the views of the state and elites within it, and will be characterized by an effort to depoliticize and dehistoricize the phenomena under scrutiny in favour of a view which emphasizes (where crime is concerned) 'law and order' and 'victim'. For example, Elliot et al., (1983:157) show that with regard to Northern Ireland, the British Broadcasting Corporation news has a continuing stress on British soldiers as victims of irrational terrorism and on the government-backed belief that solutions can be achieved through military force.

(2) In the negotiated or alternative code these dominant messages are partially challenged by such persons as civil libertarians, academic critics, opposition politicians, etc., (Elliot et al., 1983:157). Using Elliot et al's example of 'terrorism', whilst the alternative view would not deny that the state should legitimately use violence to protect, it would nevertheless question the manner and extent of this violence. This interest would reflect a broader concern with excessive state violence transgressing democratic rights, and more of a concern with explanation and cause than is apparent in the dominant code.

(3) Finally, the oppositional code extends and develops the alternative in flatly refuting the dominant ideology and, in
a sense, propounding an inverted dominant view. Thus, using the terrorism illustration once more, an oppositional discourse would focus on the hypocrisy of state violence and on the justification of violence used by those parties dominantly perceived as 'terrorists'. Claims of violence legitimacy by the latter would noticeably accompany a label for their actions—'freedom fighters', etc.—with altogether different (less negative) connotations than that normally applied.

To reiterate, media discourse is never totally hegemonic, but represents an arena in which ideology is both encoded and decoded differentially and constantly contested. Coding will reflect the ideological position of the news agency and decoding will be influenced, in Hartley's words (1982:151), by "...the structure of the relationship between socially-located 'reader' and 'text'." Like hegemony itself which "...has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified" (Williams, 1977:112), media discourse represents the constant struggle to win out dominant, alternative and oppositional ideologies.

Suggestion or 'Copycat' Effects of the Mass Media

Foucault (1971) would argue that one of the greatest powers of the mass media, and in particular television and
radio, exists in the immediacy of information transference to millions of people in such a manner that it appears immediately persuasive and believable. Although literally a myriad of examples could be provided, there is no more apt an illustration of the awesome power of the communication process than Orson Wells' alarming radio broadcast of H. G. Wells' science fiction novel *War of the Worlds* in 1938, which provided widespread public hysteria in North America, and even evacuation (Cantril *et al.*, 1940).

Few people read, watch or listen to media messages without an immediate response being evoked. As Rubington and Weinberg (1971:3) put it:

> The morning paper reports war on one continent, campus disorders at home, pollution in the air, traffic jams on the road, and crime in the streets. It also reports a downturn in the stock market, quarrels that either result in fist fights, stabbings, murder, or suicide, drug use in high schools, an increase in cigarette smoking, and a decrease in automobile sales. After reading the news, the reader puts down the paper and finds he is upset about some of the reports and wants to "do something" about them.

At the very least, readers or listeners, whether they are in agreement or disagreement with the news themes, are made aware of developing or continuing social events to which, as Rubington and Weinberg suggest, they may respond in a series of ways, ranging from surprised and angry, to unmoved and blasé.
Research data provided by some scholars have illustrated the potential of news for influencing public opinion. Findings by Szalai (1972), Phillips (1982) and Comstock et al. (1978) for example, which have suggested that the average American adult spends more time watching television than any other activity except working and sleeping, and by Schramm et al. (1961) who argue that between the ages of three and sixteen, the average American child spends one sixth of her/his time watching television, place this potential in realistic perspective. In defining social events, one of the manifest effects of the media is the shaping of public attitudes and beliefs, but such manifest effects of 'news' may also precipitate latent and unintended consequences.

Earlier in the chapter it was shown that some forms of sports crowd disorder have been explained using the 'violence-precipitates-violence' hypothesis. Similar themes and implications can be found in the thesis of 'suggestion' or 'copycat' effects of news messages postulated by media theorists. An expanding collection and variety of academic work (including laboratory studies, survey and correlational studies) has been produced in the social sciences on the impact and influence of media commentary (e.g., Bandura, 1965; Blumer, 1971:302; Weiss, 1969:133; Phillips, 1974, 1979, 1982; Hubbard et al., 1975.) Bandura studied the effects of observational learning of violence from audio-
visual depictions of violent acts. He found that children used these audio-visuals as learning models and subsequently, under specific conditions, behaved in an overtly violent manner. Phillips conducted laboratory and non-laboratory experiments into the effect of media reports of suicides directly following fictional suicides (e.g., on televised soap operas), and found that a significant increase in real suicides was manifested, particularly amongst women. His data also indicated a 'Werther effect' regarding widespread news reports of murder.17

The underlying importance of a discussion of this type exists in estimating the effects of media messages for ideology. The work of Phillips and others would seem to suggest that there is something far more complex and significant in the effects of the relation between, say, the recent spate of terrorist hijacking and media reports, or spectator disorder at sports events and media reports, than a simplistic social action-media report-'blind' public consumption effect. It remains, however, that slight empirically-based conclusive evidence is actually known about the exact roles played by the media in these processes (Howitt and Cumberbatch, 1975:22.) In fact, although several studies (such as Phillips') relying on the experimental method point to adverse influences of the mass media, much is known and has been documented on the artificiality of laboratory experiments, many of which are characterized, as
Tumber (1982:49) argues, by "...a wide range of mistaken assumptions, dubious methodologies, empirical contradictions and wrong generalizations."

Moreover, sceptical of the conspicuous absence of any sound empirically-based proof regarding adverse effects of news, some writers have argued that there are, in fact, no adverse effects. Halloran (1978:827), for example, writes:

No case has been made where television (or the other media) could be legitimately regarded as a major contributory factor to any form of violent behaviour.

and he concludes that "...at most they play a minimal role."

Interestingly, Tumber (1982) found in his study of television coverage of English youth race riots that the main groups involved actually denied any copycat effects between media and rioting behaviour, (although one receives the sense in the study that, having become acquainted with his respondents, the author is sceptical of such testimony).

Simply put, Halloran and others are correct—there has been no conclusive proof offered to date in the literature which points to a direct positive relation between news and suggestion effects, be they 'positive' or 'adverse'. But then the same can be said of conclusive evidence to disprove the relation—scant research data are available here also. The inherent problem in proving or disproving such a relation actually lies in the method of analysis. Afterall, short of asking individuals to confess to being directly
prompted by media reports in pursuing certain acts (even then the problem of distortion would exist), or of accumulating statistically significant data to demonstrate a positive relation herein, testing suggestion effects is an extremely complicated task. However, fairly persuasive data collected especially by Phillips (1974, 1982), for example, on suicide and murder and the media, and by Dunning et al., (1982a, 1987) on soccer hooliganism and the media, suggest that the traces of 'copycat' public reactions to media commentary they have unearthed are more than simply coincidental.

It would certainly seem likely that some social problems have been assisted in their emergence and development by media reportage, although it must be reiterated that news reports have not been found to be directly causal. On a daily basis, the press and television, in providing often graphic descriptions of arsons, rapes, murders, suicides, car crashes, kidnapss, guerilla activities, hijackings, sports violence, etc., (descriptions of events, incidentally, which are rarely experienced first hand by readers) offer the public a vivid depiction of the 'how to' in the performance of all these activities, and perhaps whet the appetite of individuals attracted towards any one of them.
Summary

This chapter has discussed a body of literature which represents the theoretical framework of the study. It began by summarizing available work on what Park (1924) originally called 'collective behaviour', and it was suggested that there has been a lack of formal agreement as to what the topic is actually comprised of. Having conducted a brief review of six important theoretical approaches to collective behaviour, however, it was noted that action considered under this title usually includes behaviour occurring unexpectedly and spontaneously. Following from a brief critique of these perspectives, several arguments need to be made: much of the work conducted to date has been non-empirical; no crowd is completely homogeneous or inherently rational or irrational; significant theoretical overlaps exist between perspectives of collective behaviour—they are not mutually exclusive; a balance between microsociological and macrosociological explanation must be achieved when describing the crowd process.

With regards to the theory of catharsis, it was shown that many academics have found that although humans have quite strong tendencies towards aggression, the strength of this predisposition differs with the individual and his/her social learning experience. There is no ubiquitous predictive law of human aggression. It would appear that
the extent of aggressiveness and its mode of expression are factors emanating from a larger make-up socially learned within important contexts such as the family, social class, work and general socio-cultural experience. Despite being widely adopted in lay circles as a common sensical interpretation of sports violence, catharsis theory continues to be largely refuted by natural and social scientists. In the sense that it contributes towards dominant understandings of social behaviour, 'common sensicalization' or public rationalization, as seen implemented here with catharsis theory, can be understood as an important aspect of hegemony itself.

This introductory section concludes with the argument that traditional collective behaviour perspectives have provided the general context for theories of sports crowd disorder. A review of more in-depth and sophisticated approaches to this specific problem as manifested in the United Kingdom and North America followed. Importantly, it should be noted that the general collective behaviour literature and the more specific sports crowd disorder literature demonstrate clearly that both are gendered behaviour, with males being overrepresented. Sports crowd disorder in particular appears to constitute something of a male-preserve.

Although the current literature available on sports crowd disorder in North America remains very slim and in
need of further attention, an expanding body of explanatory literature is emerging in the United Kingdom, apparently in step with increasing official and public concern over soccer hooliganism. Causal explanations in the four main arguments offered to date focus on: rituals of soccer violence; characteristics specific to the British working-class; changes in the historical relations between traditional supporters and the game itself; the effects of the ongoing crisis of the British state upon youth and society. Again, a brief review and critique of this literature was presented.

As with theories of collective behaviour, none of these theories of British soccer hooliganism should be seen as mutually exclusive. While recognizing the diverse theoretical roots of the four perspectives in question, perhaps a truly adequate explanatory account of hooliganism could best be achieved by way of combining them all.

Although the respective authors would undoubtedly be loath to accept the theoretical problems incumbent of such a synthetical view (it would, admittedly, be problematic to uncritically assume that the ethological and sociobiological work of Marsh and his colleagues could easily be married with the Eliasian view of the Leicester group), it is important to recognize that Marsh's work on the ritual of teenage 'aggro', Taylor's explanation of 'soccer subculture' and 'consciousness' and his more recent analysis of structural differentiation ('Little Englander-ism') within
the British working-class, the Birmingham School's discussion of post-war structural changes in the experiential condition of working-class life itself, and the strongly historical perspective of the Leicester group, are all representative of crucial elements in the explanation of the hooligan issue in the British context.

Finally, with regards to sports crowd disorder, and particularly British soccer hooliganism, the theories covered in the review clearly show that many 'hooligan' behaviours have become normative if not institutionalized components of the cultural experience of sports spectatorship. What most of this literature fails to take into account (the work of Dunning et al., is an exception here), however, is the fact that sports crowd disorder involves violent behaviours which emerge more spontaneously than others and which are less recurrent and ritualistic. This aspect of the sports crowd disorder issue needs to be further addressed by all theorists concerned.

A common theme running through the second half of the chapter was the ideological role of the mass media in reporting upon social disorder. The theoretical framework presented has been largely informed by Marxist theories on hegemony and ruling ideas in which a critical-materialist concept of ideology has been employed, particularly encapsulated in recent 'cultural studies' examinations of the relation between media and ideology. This part of the
chapter began by discussing one of the generalized effects of social disorder such as sports crowd disorder—moral panics. It was shown that the concept and theory of moral panic has been employed in the sociological literature to demonstrate that public understanding and alarm of an allegedly portentous issue or group can be directly assisted in its growth by the mass media. That is to say, the media fulfill the ideological role of bringing news to the public in deliberately orchestrated ways which function to enhance their own ideological orientations and goals, and which often encourage overreaction on the part of the audience.

The chapter then went on to further explore this argument in a brief analysis of the production of news per se. The work of several writers who have argued that what the media portray as news is actually a set of social events which have been carefully selected, ranked from an endless sequence of ongoing social events, and 'coded' in a specific and stylized fashion was summarized. Such selectivity and coding, it was argued, depends upon the preconceptions and ideological positions of the specific news medium. It was also postulated that news, often encapsulating the political view of society's 'primary definers', can play a very influential role in defining and shaping social problems in society at large. With this in mind, it was argued that a key function of the media in capitalist society is to confirm and reproduce hegemonic ideas and practices.
Importantly, however, media discourse was not seen to be entirely hegemonic—it can be coded and decoded in a variety of ways and thus represent and precipitate a fluid diversity of interpretations and meanings, depending on the social location of the 'reader'. Three such codes of meaning—dominant, alternative and oppositional—which will be used for purposes of analysis later in the study were presented.

Finally, some arguments regarding the potential of news for influencing the audience's behaviour were discussed. Whereas studies by some writers infer 'suggestion' or 'copycat' effects of the mass media, other writers have been quick to argue that nothing concrete is known vis-a-vis this alleged relationship. It was concluded that although the manifest and latent effects of the media are extremely difficult phenomena to measure, and although no conclusive proof regarding copycat effects have been offered to date, an expanding volume of literature is extremely suggestive of such effects.
1. The indefinite scope of collective behaviour would seem to advise a fairly general definition of its subject matter. In this light, McPhail and Pickens (cited in Wohlstein and McPhail, 1979:77) offer a simplistic but acceptable definition of the phenomenon:

...two or more persons, engaged in one or more of the behaviours of locomotion, head/body position, gesticulation, tactile manipulation, and/or vocalization, which are judged sequentially and simultaneously uniform in direction, velocity, tempo, spacing and/or substantive content.

Perhaps the most crucial facet of any definition of collective behaviour is its ability to remain flexible and adaptable, since its subject is manifested in a diversity of forms and contexts. This is not to say, of course, that specific definitions of distinct types of collective behaviour need not be postulated. Adequate sociological explanation of any form of collective behaviour requires such definitional work in order that the margins and boundaries of that particular milieu be understood. Thereafter, lines of similarity and discordance can be established between the phenomenon under consideration and other forms of collective behaviour.

2. This cluster of examples demonstrates that collective behaviours can be extremely transitory, as in the case of fads or crowds brought together for a small number of minutes or hours, or more long-term, systematically-organized social movements.

3. The notion of 'circular reaction' as used by Blumer in this way is similar to his concept of 'taking the role of the other'.

4. For example, Metta Spencer (1976:295) informs us of some evidence from the American ghetto riots of the 1960s which suggests that elements of selectivity and
will, in addition to varying 'definitions of the situation' (W. I. Thomas, 1967), are much more prevalent in crowds that the contagion argument would have us believe:

The behaviour of rioters was not random, as the contagion theory might lead one to predict, but rather it was selective. Black-owned shops were not looted. Rioters did not forget, in the heat of the moment, who were their friends and who were their enemies.

5. Emergent-norm theory is sometimes referred to rather clumsily as 'collective decision-making theory.'

6. The incremental steps as described by Smelser (1962) are: (1) 'structural conduciveness' is created when divergent social groups (e.g., rich and poor; young and old; competent and incompetent) are brought together; (2) 'structural strain' describes a condition of social malaise or internal contradiction (e.g., racial prejudice; unemployment; poverty; favouritism) experienced by a group and represented in a crowd; (3) 'growth and spread of a generalized hostile belief' begins when individuals define and diffuse social strains amongst themselves (e.g., that officials at a sports event are not giving one team a fair chance); (4) 'precipitating factors' take place to confirm the generalized belief (e.g., a home team player is penalized, in the eyes of the home crowd, unfairly); (5) 'mobilization for action' occurs when rumours begin and individuals are encouraged to participate in collective action (e.g., a riot ensues); (6) 'social control', the final phase of Smelser's sequence, begins when authorities move in to quell the disturbance.

7. For Aristotle, music and tragedy, in addition to sports and leisure, all held cathartic powers. For a detailed review of the historical development of the catharsis position, see Zillmann (1979).

8. In addition, Case and Boucher (1981:3) cite three studies conducted at the University of Maryland on the effects of watching professional wrestling and basketball contests, all of which similarly substantiate the catharsis hypothesis, and Goodhart and Chataway (1968) have written an entire book, War Without Weapons, which addresses the cathartic 'benefits' of sports violence.
9. The word 'fanaticism', from which the abbreviated version 'fan' derives is not issue, i.e., sport, specific. It can be used to describe anyone who adheres with zealous enthusiasm to a given interest (issue, event) or set of ideological commitments.

10. Interestingly, this is an important factor in the way the scale of order is signified. One of the principal concerns with any disciplinary regime (e.g., prisons, schools, etc.,) is the regulation of social noise.

11. For helpful reviews of theoretical approaches to the problem of sports crowd disorder available in the literature see: Boire (1980), Case and Boucher (1981), Mann (1979), and M. Smith (1975b, 1983).

12. This is excerpted from "Play, Performance and Power," a three-part series investigating aspects of sport and culture produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1986.

13. Clarke (1973), in fact, relates soccer hooliganism in the early 1970s to the development of one specific youth subculture-the Skinheads—as a result of such cultural crisis.

14. A forthcoming book by Dunning et al., The Social Roots of Football Hooligan Violence, is expected to offer historical evidence of violence associated with various periods of British soccer, in order to substantiate their Eliasian position.

15. In many ways, moral panics can only have a short life-span before becoming exhausted. That is, extensive and prolonged media attention over certain 'threatening' issues can undo itself as overload and become neutralized. In his book 'The Whole World is Watching', Todd Gitlin (1980) discusses this effect vis-a-vis U.S. media coverage of Vietnam.

16. It should be mentioned, however, that a recurring theme in the work of media theorists is that media agencies will devote differential time and space to news of crime and disorder. In an early study, for example, Deutschmann (1959) discovered that the New York Times gave seven per cent of its overall space to crime news whereas the Daily News devoted twenty-eight per cent.

17. Goethe's eighteenth century novel describing the young man Werther who committed suicide, allegedly resulted in a temporary rise in public suicides. Subsequently,
the novel was banned in various countries, supposedly to protect the public from its apparently severe influence, and this process of imitation has come to be known as the Werther effect.

18. Apparently, the mass media are occasionally unaware that such a potential may exist. One Toronto television news programme, for instance, recently showed speculatively how candy can be injected with a toxic substance without a perceivable perforation of the wrapper, following a series of incidents in which people were hospitalized after consuming products tampered with in such a fashion. Some cities have, in fact, become so sensitized to the possibility of suggestion that they have incorporated rigid policies regarding the reportage of certain behaviours. Spencer (1976:301) points out, for example, that one is very rarely informed of subway suicides or suicide attempts in the Toronto media, despite their apparent prevalence.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE

Introduction

As stated in Chapter One, since the first generation of sport sociologists in the 1960s, this sub-discipline has experienced difficulty in acquiring substantial legitimacy and credence in the parent discipline (Melnick, 1975; McPherson, 1978). This problem has been exacerbated at least in part by a conspicuous lack of sound suggestions for an appropriate methodology within the area. The purpose of the first part of this chapter is to briefly address this problem and discuss (and support) some recent methodological developments in the sociology of sport, in addition to advancing a multiple methods approach to the study of sport and other social phenomena more generally. Following this, some of the problems inherent in using the mass media as a source of data will be outlined, and the procedures and techniques implemented in this study will be discussed. This final section of the chapter will contain a brief analysis of the author's methodological experiences in studying a phenomenon as unpredictable and spontaneous as sports crowd disorder.
Methodological Issues in Sociology and the Sociology of Sport

Sport provides an ideal sphere for the employment of direct observational methods and a forum in which general sociological theory and model-making can be tested (this approach has generally been referred to as sociology through sport). Despite this, however, many sports-related studies in sociology to date have demonstrated descriptive and rather atheoretical orientations. It would seem that sport sociologists have exhibited a trend towards autobiographical and biographical accounts of their subject, and a penchant for studying groups to which they are already associated, if not bona fide members.¹ Polsky's (1969) study of poolroom behaviour is a classic example of the latter category:

Billiard playing is my chief recreation. I have frequented poolrooms for over 20 years, and at one poolroom game, three-cushion billiards, am considered a far better than average player. (1969:35)

We know that Meggysey (1971) and Shaw (1972) had close associations with the North American football fraternity and, as an ex-international player, Laidlaw's (1973) exposé of the world of rugby is a similar example of close ties. Donnelly's 1980 study began with more theoretical intentions, but his persuasion towards a study of the subculture of rock climbers owes much to his prior participation and expertise in that area. Finally, this author similarly acknowledges that previously acquired access to,
expertise in and knowledge of the world of rugby was a fundamental motivating source of his earlier work on the subculture of rugby players (K. Young, 1983). Thus, various 'environmental' precipitants can be seen to exist in the sociological study of sport (and other social phenomena) to date.

The general tendency for studies of sports-related groups to provide only basic descriptive analyses without concerning themselves with any larger notion of history and social structure is indicative of the symbolic interactionist trend particularly evident in North American sociology. As Coser (1977:574) writes:

In Symbolic Interactionism the structural level of analysis is all but abandoned, and the scene is almost completely occupied by interacting individuals who modify their respective conducts regardless of position in the social structure, socio-cultural climates of values, or institutional settings.

Representing an attempt to combine microscopic concerns with more macrosociological concerns in the sub-discipline, however, several sociologists of sport (Gruneau, 1978, 1983; Dunning and Sheard, 1979; Beamish, 1981; Taylor, 1982a, 1982b, 1985; K. Young, 1983; Donnelly, 1983, 1984) have very recently made the much called-for effort to explain sporting behaviour and processes in terms of certain historical, cultural and structural precipitants. As Beamish (1981:59) has argued, "...because sport is a dialectical form it is always in a state of change and must be viewed and studied
historically." In addition, Gruneau (1978:82) has written convincingly that the sociology of sport:

...should be seen as the continuous effort to relate sport to general features of social organization in order to gain a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of institutional arrangements and cultural values in the whole society and the place of sporting activities within them.

Hence important theoretical questions have begun to be addressed: how have sporting practices changed over time (i.e., how have they come to be the way they are?); what is it in the wider social structure that makes sports participants and spectators behave the way they do; how are they responded to by members of the larger society (including the media); and does societal response reciprocally affect their behaviour?

It seems that the sociology of sport is transcending the era where the simple presentation of descriptive fact was a welcomed scientific method. The emphasis on description is now being replaced by an emphasis on explanation. It is argued here that the appreciation of microscopic concerns (e.g., how do British fans manifest forms of 'hooliganism' at soccer?) must be combined with macroscopic interests (e.g., can hooliganism be linked to life experiences in a depressed socio-economic environment?) to arrive at more in-depth and historically and culturally contextualized understandings of sports-related fraternities. In this way sport sociologists can learn much from Gerth and Mills'
classic (1953) study where the authors skillfully illustrate that private issues are very often representative of larger structural ones.

The argument that one method ought to be employed over all others is not new in sociology. Becker and Geer (1957:28) offer the classic example of this in their attempt to elevate participant-observation above other procedures, and more recently those vying for the 'social fact' paradigm (see Ritzer, 1975) have, of course, heavily favoured the use of quantitative and statistical analysis. However, a number of scholars at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Butters, 1976; Roberts, 1976; Willis, 1980) have recently offered support to earlier methodologists (Trow, 1957; Gold, 1958; Gans, 1968), in arguing that there are various procedures involved in the data gathering process and that the researcher should avoid "...the hegemonizing tendency of technique" (Willis, 1980:94), i.e., the consolidation of one technique over others, which emerges, says Willis, particularly at points of uncertainty, suspending creativity and the element of surprise. Willis' own spectrum of qualitative methods, which he advises should be used interchangeably, includes: participation; observation; 'just being around'; group discussion and interview.

In many ways reiterating Trow's (1957:34-35) earlier suggestions, Willis argues that the favouring of one technique over others should be avoided because equally
valuable data can be collected by a less prestigious technique such as what he refers to as 'just being around' as by the procedure that has traditionally been viewed as one of the most productive in field work--participant as observer. The specific research context ought to determine the relevant techniques, but as Trow (1957:34-35) puts it, "...most sociological problems are so complex that they require the use of multiple methods." He goes on:

Every cobbler thinks leather is the only thing. Most social scientists...have their favourite research methods with which they are familiar and have some skill in using. And I suspect we mostly choose to investigate problems that seem vulnerable to attack through these methods. But we should at least try to be less parochial than cloggers. Let us be done with the arguments of 'participant observation' versus interviewing...and get on with the business of attacking our problems with the widest array of conceptual and methodological tools that we possess and they demand. This does not preclude discussion and debate regarding the relative usefulness of different methods for the study of specific problems or types of problems. But that is very different from the assertion of the general and inherent superiority of one method over another on the basis of some intrinsic qualities it presumably possesses.

Thus, like Willis, Trow addresses very perceptively one of the principal orientations of an adequate sociological method, and one which has been implemented in this study.

In addition to the methods that Willis (1980) proposes (these are all sources of raw data), it is argued that sociologists of sport should direct themselves to all other possible sources of information. Some raw sources
available include: players and ex-players; office staff; coaches; administrators; fans. Additionally, some secondary sources provide excellent forms of background material: histories; biographies and autobiographies; team newsletters and reports; magazines and mass media sources, etc. Exhaustive understandings of peoples' habits are probably, in reality, out of the reach of any scientific investigation, but adequate understandings can only ever be achieved if sociologists (of sport) direct themselves to all sources of potential data.

Although the recent trend in the sociology of sport has been to disregard the use of quantitative procedures (the use of multi-variate statistics, for example) from which spurious 'meanings' and relationships have often been derived (cf., Gruneau, 1978; Dunning and Sheard, 1979; Beamish, 1981), it is argued that these methods can also be employed to complement more qualitatively-oriented techniques. After all, as Cantelon (1981:261) demonstrates using the Olympic motto (higher, faster, farther), much of sport is "...geared towards quantitative ends" (e.g., the public recording of individual and team statistics as well as analyses of the demographic characteristics of organizational structures). Because there are so few other milieux in which facts and figures are so meticulously recorded as the sporting context, in many cases quantitative methods are
actually the most appropriate for the study of certain aspects of sport.

To reiterate, the principal point here, and one upon which the methods used in this study are premised, is that no methodological procedure has the potential to fully illuminate the meanings that sport and sports-related conduct has for its players, its spectators, its organizers and even its antagonists in isolation. Thus, through the careful use and synthesis of a range of complementary methods, the investigator will be afforded the most adequate level of understanding of sporting histories, locales, practices and meanings.

Reliability of the Mass Media as a Source of Data

Despite the advantages to be gained from the implementation of multiple methods, one of the most immediate limitations of this kind of study which is predominantly based upon a content analysis of newspaper and other media reports perhaps concerns the method itself, i.e., the accuracy and significance of media sources for social science research. As we saw in Chapter Two, much has been documented regarding the reliability of newspaper reports--chosen over other media forms here as a primary source because of their greater accessibility and retrievab-
ility—and, not surprisingly, it seems that scholars have generally been skeptical of how accurately events and issues are raised and treated in the news production process (e.g., Whannel, 1979; Williams, 1980; M. Smith; 1983:171-172; Williams et al., 1984:200). As M. Smith (1983:171) puts it, for example:

Newspaper reports are open to criticism on several counts, the most important of which are inaccuracies and distortions of facts, editorial slanting, and suppression of information.

For this reason, the possibility exists that data presented in this study and extrapolations made from them may in fact be several steps removed from reality. Several points, however, can be made in defense of the methodological procedures implemented in the study.

Although much of the data here are very current, some were obtained using newspaper and magazine reports written as far back as the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Thus, unlike recent reportage, these are in many cases the only available sources of information for that particular era, and sociologists are unable to confirm their reliability against other reports (what is known about late nineteenth century soccer crowd behaviour, for example, is fundamentally dependent upon early newspaper reports). Moreover, this point has even more problematic implications in that once the media present an issue as 'news', that issue thereby becomes an historical fact—it takes on a life
of its own—irrespective of how accurately or illegitimately it may originally have been recorded and presented. Of course, very early media information is most difficult to substantiate or refute for these reasons. Fortunately, however, the work of several historians of sport (e.g., P. Young, 1968; Walvin, 1975; Atyeo, 1979; Mason, 1980; Vamplew, 1980) has been very helpful in documenting modes and frequencies of early sports crowd disorder and, where possible, reports unearthed by this researcher were compared for reliability with accounts offered by these historians.

With regard to more recent and current newspaper reports, the press have for some time used wire services as "...self-correcting networks of communication" (M. Smith, 1983: 171), so the chances of distorted reporting of 'hard' facts (e.g., "38 killed in Riot". Toronto Star, May 31, 1985: 1) is limited. However, where newspapers offer interpretations of events or 'soft' facts (e.g., "The Shame of Britain". Globe and Mail, May 31, 1985: 5; "This is not a Sport. This is a War". Time, June 10, 1985: 26), a trend particularly pronounced in editorial commentaries, the chances of distortion and bias are amplified. It is important to state simply that newspaper reports in both highbrow and tabloid press and including both hard and soft facts have acquired a reputation in the scientific forum for forwarding less than objective and reliable statements.

Suffice it to say, then, that the researcher who cautiously
oompares and contrasts news accounts, and verifies them against other sources (such as official statistics, histories, personal reports, etc.), is one who is most likely to eliminate problems of bias and misinterpretation in using the mass media as a methodological source. For the purposes of this study, media sources are used primarily for 'hard' facts, and in cases where accuracy can be cross-verified. Chapter Six represents an in-depth attempt to probe and critically appraise the contributions toward dominant ideological thinking of 'soft' media commentaries regarding sports crowd disorder and other aspects of sports violence.

Procedures used and Methodological Experiences in the Study

As noted in Chapter One, this study represents an attempt to ground research findings on sports crowd disorder in theoretical advances recently made in the area of the critical theory of social control, ideology and youth subcultures (e.g., Cohen, 1973; Clarke et al., 1976; Hall et al., 1978; Willis, 1978), i.e., an attempt to borrow elements of these new analytical approaches used in the explanation of crime and deviance and apply them to the study of spectator violence in sports. Following this growing literature and its suggestions regarding the use of multiple methods (firmly postulated by Butters (1976),
Roberts (1976), and Willis (1980), data have been collected in this study by way of a synthesis of methodological approaches. Specifically, three main procedures were implemented.

1. Content Analysis

Content analysis is primarily a procedure that affords the social researcher an opportunity to indirectly observe human behaviour as represented in oral and written symbols. In addition, content analysis is a fundamentally 'unobtrusive measure' (Webb et al., 1966) because the researcher is able to conduct her/his work without being observed, and to eke out and analyse individual components of oral, written or pictorial information without disturbing or influencing the data source itself. In this study, content analysis has been employed mostly in qualitative and semiotic terms, as opposed to quantitative analysis of textual structure and organization.

In order to: (a) place sports crowd disorder in the United Kingdom and North America in recent (i.e., post-war) historical perspective, and to trace temporal variations in its rates, forms and locations; (b) examine mass media coverage of sports crowd disorder in the same period and locations, focusing on their treatment and representation of the issues involved, and to trace the social repercussions and effects of such coverage, a systematic content analysis
of news relating to sports spectating and sports violence in three respected and influential national newspapers (The Times (England), New York Times (America), Globe and Mail (Canada)) and one local Canadian (southern Ontario) newspaper (Hamilton Spectator) was conducted. The latter granted the author access to its private library which, due to systematic filing procedures, proved to be of enormous value for the present study. Other national and local North American and British newspapers were processed for information, but in a less intense and systematic manner. Similarly, an extensive scan of predominantly North American periodicals and magazines provided supplementary data.

More specifically, sports sections of newspapers (including game reports, opinion columns, editorials, etc.,) and other relevant sections (front pages, more general editorials, letters to editors, etc.,) were examined over roughly a thirty year (1956-1986) period. Due to the enormity of such a task, only one year out of every three was covered, so that a thorough examination of each paper was effectively conducted for a total of approximately eleven years over the three decade time span. Since a key objective in the study was the comparison (the search for overlaps and contradictions) of reports of crowd disorder, it was considered important to maintain the same schedule for each of the four papers involved. However, numerous incidents of sports crowd disorder already (or becoming
during the course of study) familiar to the author frequently fell outside of the arranged content analysis schedule, i.e., between the three year cycle or in other newspapers and sources. Content analysis of such reportage was also considered significant and was therefore conducted to provide additional data.

In total, information from approximately four hundred (400) separate newspaper items was gathered and, using Hall's (1975:15) words, the author participated in "...a long preliminary soak" in the materials. In each case, consideration was given to the ideological dimensions of the comment/report, etc., as represented by its overall layout, its narrative sequence and its general content. In detail, focus lay on six report features and their effects: central themes; use of language and syntactic structure; headline construction; ideological bias; how 'accessed' voices are introduced "...to make the story's 'preferred meaning'... emerge 'naturally'" (Hartley, 1982:155); types of pictures (and associated captions) used to complement the story. Importantly, attention was paid to the interactions between these individual aspects of reports and to how, cumulatively, they merged to represent an overall image and meaning.

Finally, in an effort to trace the significance and effect of press photographs included in the sports pages of newspapers, a small analysis of photographs attached to ice
hockey reports was conducted. Photographs in three Canadian newspapers (Toronto Star; Globe and Mail; Hamilton Spectator), examined over a twelve week period (January 1 to March 31) in 1985, 1975, 1965 and 1955, were counted and categorized according to three thematic types: 'fighting', 'body contact' and 'other'. Results were quantified and tabulated, and discussed in association with themes unearthed in the larger semiotic analysis of press reportage.

2. Interviews and Observation

As discussed, content analysis served as the primary method in this study. However, because it was considered important to elicit the views of persons directly involved in the broad topic of sports crowd disorder and the media, the content analysis was supplemented with an extensive programme of interviews and observation conducted with relevant personnel, mostly in the southern Ontario region. In general, observation and interviews were executed with three categories of subjects (see Appendix 'A' for interview schedules): sports spectators; sports organizations and security personnel; media personnel.

I. Sports Spectators

A number of scholars (Smelser, 1962; M. Smith, 1976b; Wright, 1978; Mann, 1979) have addressed the apparent
paucity in the literature regarding reliable and illuminating information on crowds and crowd processes. M. Smith (1976b:203) has argued that: "The void in understanding is due in large part ...to the elusiveness of the subject matter," and Wright (1978:155) has similarly pointed to the extremely spontaneous and unpredictable nature of crowd members' actions. Crowds tend to be transitory, unpredictable, lack a permanent institutional or organizational structure, involve persons in immediate, spontaneous and emotional circumstances that render direct techniques of observation, interviewing and data gathering difficult and time consuming. Of course, as with the study of crowd types and activities in general, these problems are very pertinent in the study of sports spectators.

Content analysis and interviewing were supplemented methodologically by direct participant-observation practised at a large number of sports events (approximately thirty) over an eighteen month period (this procedure has been ongoing). For reasons specified above, attendance at live sports events does not necessarily lead to first-hand and spontaneous observation of crowd disorder and violence. However, attendance at such events provided an important opportunity to observe the behaviour of fans during a number of hostile incidents which did arise--usually involving incidents of interpersonal violence and confrontations with security personnel. Moreover, specific sections of crowds
(e.g., general admission seating at major league baseball and football games) have acquired a reputation in the North American sporting realm for rowdiness. The researcher attempted to usefully maximize the advantages to be gained by such knowledge which led, on occasion, to 'being in the right place at the right time.'

Due to the difficulty of taking notes during spontaneously erupting, rapidly executed and resolved incidents of spectator disorder often taking place over a large area both inside and outside stadia, data were collected by way of portable tape recording equipment, i.e., the author would record a brief summary of the incident, and a more thorough account would be transcribed 'back at the work desk.'

A total of forty-five spectators were interviewed at major league sports events--fifteen conducted at ice hockey, football and baseball respectively. Eight supplementary interviews were also conducted at wrestling and boxing events, bringing the total for spectators interviewed to fifty-three. Usually, interviews took place during stoppages in play late in games (e.g., after the second period in hockey, at half or three-quarter time in football, around the seventh inning 'stretch' in baseball). Such a regimen allowed the researcher to monitor the activity of crowd members during the early stages of games and to establish a reasonably 'balanced' selection of interviewees on the basis
of aggressive or passive crowd participation—a roughly equal selection of both was obtained. Also, an effort was made to observe and interview fans involved in confrontations with other fans, security agents and/or ejected from games. Finally, the researcher attempted to interview fans differentially located in stadia, i.e., in both expensive and cheap seating. Such attempts to establish 'balanced' interview sets clearly allows the researcher to interpret respondents' answers comparatively.

In general, fans were asked a number of demographic questions (age, occupation, frequency of attendance, etc.), and their interpretations regarding (1) attitudes to player violence, (2) satisfactions and meanings derived from being part of the sports crowd, (3) media treatment of disorder, were elicited. The transitory, unpredictable, spontaneous and emotional nature of crowds mentioned above combined to create a series of concrete methodological difficulties for the researcher.

First, it became obvious early on during observation that sports crowd disorder takes place rapidly and often involves a number of simultaneous occurrences. Although the researcher attended few sports events where inter-fan conflict (e.g., verbal abuse, aggressive gesticulation, missile throwing, physical contact, etc.,) did not take place, at least four factors frequently precluded fully adequate information gathering. Due to the enormity of
professional sports crowds and continual movement within them, crowd disorder would most often be sighted after it had started and occasionally in its concluding phases (e.g., as the disturbance died down naturally or when policing agents intervened). This made it difficult for the researcher to interpret the events in terms of precipitants and sequential characteristics.

Second, where incidents of disorder were spotted in their formative phases, quite often they took place rapidly, almost out of sight of the researcher, or simultaneously with other disorderly incidents, again all preventing satisfactory data collection. At one football game, the researcher was surprised to view three small groups (each containing between two and six participants) of male spectators at various locations around him engage in aggressive dispute and fist-fighting. Confused by the unique opportunity presented to him, the researcher hurriedly attempted to orally describe all three events into his tape recorder. Back at the work desk, this apparently 'golden opportunity' for data gathering quickly turned to disaster as the author, transcribing from the tape, learned that in the process of trying to record everything, he had ended up with a series of largely incoherent and uninformative recorded observations. The golden opportunity had been lost, and the researcher quickly learned that studying crowd conduct requires not only the keen observation of events
transpiring spontaneously, but also the subjective selection for study of crowd activities taking place simultaneously.

This illustration shows just one of the ways in which sociologists are limited when studying crowd processes, and that Miller, (1956) was correct in arguing that trained human observers can rarely discriminate between more than a small number of events simultaneously. 2

Third, although an attempt was usually made to interview fans observed as participating in disorderly behaviour, this was sometimes rendered impossible by structural stadium arrangements. For example, the researcher, attempting to gain access to fans located in parts of stadia inaccessible to him, was reprimanded on several occasions by stadium security personnel and ushers for climbing walls, fences and taking similar 'short cuts', in addition to entering stadium sections without the appropriate ticket or pass. Needless to say, the researcher's professional and scientific status was exploited under these circumstances in response to warnings of policing personnel and several threats of outright ejection which were levied.

Fourth, although most spectators approached were willing to be interviewed, a number of both passive fans and fans involved in crowd disorder were reluctant to provide the author with information. Several times, questions were greeted with unfavourable responses by angered fans clearly
in no mood for intellectual analysis, and on two occasions
the researcher narrowly avoided what can be understood as an
'occupational hazard' of crowd study--personal injury. On
one of these occasions, for example, having observed a fist
fight between six fans at a baseball game develop and break-
up, the author approached two of the fans and explained his
interests. Inebriated, bloodied and visibly unimpressed with
intellectual probing, these fans at first aggressively
denied any responsibility for the preceding mêlée, but on
further questioning undermined their allegedly 'honourable'
characters by threatening the researcher with physical
violence should the questioning continue.

Although the sports crowd displays a number of
characteristics which facilitates reasonably systematic
investigation (e.g., it is scheduled and the researcher can
prepare ahead of time, its location is known and it is
relatively captive (Mann, 1979:338)), in general,
sociologists studying crowds are likely to encounter such a
variety of methodological problems and difficulties. For the
specific case of this study, because the 'disorderly'
elements of sports crowds are less organized, structured and
routinized in North America than with, say, soccer hooligan-
ism in the United Kingdom where a more permanent institu-
tional and organized structure lends itself towards greater
research accessibility, conducting observations of and
interviews with disorderly (and conformist) 'North American
sports spectators proved to be a complicated and often unmanageable task.

Finally, a number of field researchers have acknowledged that gaining access to any group for purposes of interviewing and participant observation can be enhanced by the sharing of their attributes and values (e.g., Becker, 1963; Polsky, 1969; Parker, 1974; Jonassohn et al., 1981). It was also stated above that a number of 'environmental' precipitants have been seen to exist in the sociological study of sport to date, with scholars choosing groups for study with which they are already familiar or to which they are already attached (e.g., Meechey, 1971; Shaw, 1972; Laidlaw, 1973; Donnelly, 1980; K. Young, 1983).

In interviews with fans, this investigator frequently received strong indications that congenial and positive fan responses were at least in part due to his knowledge of sport and perhaps even the audience's perception of him as 'one of the guys.' Thus by initiating and regularly punctuating interview dialogue with statements displaying shared knowledge and characteristics with the respondents (e.g., "That pitch was never a strike, hey guys?"; "Do you know that assist puts Vaive ahead of Lemieux in the points standings?")}, the researcher augmented the possibility of establishing a solid 'research bargain' based upon common understanding and trust. In the sociology of
sport, Jonassohn et al., (1981:189) have made a classic statement to this effect:

When the researcher does manage to secure the necessary interview time, he or she had better be prepared both sociologically (competent interview schedules and familiarity with the sport) and interpersonally. That is, to be conversant with the interviewee's statistics, the team's playoff chances and the general economic situation in the specific league. To make basic mistakes during the discourse is to minimize one's chances in the field.

In this study, then, developing positive field relations with some fans may well have been enhanced by the investigator's appearance and/or deliberate presentation of self as an 'average fan' and his knowledge of sport per se.

II. Sports Organizations and Security Personnel

Twenty-four interviews were conducted with various personnel associated with professional and amateur sports organizations and their security arrangements, including: league committees; managing directors; team mascots; heads of security; stadium security personnel; police superintendents and officers; a sports promoter.

Clearly, the diversity of occupational orientations amongst this group necessitated the implementation and maintenance of extremely flexible interview schedules—team mascots, for example, were asked to discuss rather different issues than security personnel or league committee members (see Appendix 'A').
Again, informal interviews lasting approximately forty minutes to one hour were conducted on an individual basis, although in certain instances (with police officers and members of league committees) respondents were interviewed in small groups and usually with two to four interviewees present. Within this category, only one respondent (a boxing promoter) refused to be taped. Data were collected in all other situations using recording equipment.

On the whole, interviews with sports organizers and security personnel proceeded very smoothly. Having received some early indication from the questionnaire that sports clubs themselves might be unprepared to discuss any crowd disorder problem at their games, the researcher was surprised but pleased to discover that most personnel included in this category shared a genuine and informed interest and concern with issues related to sports crowd disorder, and were more than willing to discuss their knowledge and experience. Invaluable for the research as a whole, subjects here frequently assisted in precipitating or 'snowballing' (Polsky, 1969) further contacts, subsequently leading to more interviews and more research data.

There was, however, one exception. Mid-way through the data collection process, the researcher attended a boxing event which, due to the 'top-of-the-bill' appearance of a popular Canadian boxer, was a 'sell-out'. After the first bout and three bouts before the main attraction, the
researcher began to interview fans using tape recording equipment. Within minutes, security personnel protested to the researcher that permission of the sponsor would be required for such an endeavour. On approaching the sponsor to request such permission, the author found himself under prolonged verbal attack from an incensed promoter. The surreptitiously recorded comments of the boxing promoter illustrate that certain personnel involved in the organization of professional sport are in some way threatened by those concerned with interpreting and explaining the phenomenon of sports violence:

I have no idea what you want or what you think you're going to find. Listen, these fans have paid top dollar to watch these fights and it is my job to make sure someone like you doesn't fuck it up for them. So I don't want you asking stupid questions about goddam sports violence. If the fans thought boxing was violent they'd be at home doing something else...Listen, I've met a lot of people like you. People who think they can change the fucking world of sport by making sport into a place for wimps...I'm not interested in your study or anybody else's for that matter. The fans aren't interested in your study. And if any of my people see you using that tape or hassling fans, we'll confiscate it and you'll be gone. Do you understand?

Despite this unanticipated diatribe (on completion of which the researcher returned to his seat and spent the remainder of the evening being scrutinized by physically imposing security personnel), it should be emphasized that almost all police, security personnel, league committees, and mascots were quite forthcoming in providing what appeared to be
candid observations regarding their understandings of sports
crowd disorder.

III. Media Personnel

Finally, since a fundamental concern of this study
was with the mass media's presentation and treatment of
issues relating to sports crowd disorder, it was vital to
interview and elicit meanings held by persons involved in
the news production process. Twenty two interviews thus took
place with television crews (directors of programming,
sports show hosts and colour commentators, cameramen), and
with newspaper employees (editors, sports reporters and
columnists, photographers).

Amongst the issues respondents were asked to comment
upon were (1) temporal variations in rates of disorder as
represented by their coverage of them, (2) perceived causes
of disorder, (3) the hegemonizing of specific news items,
i.e., the choice of one over others, (4) general present-
atonal themes and styles, (5) accuracy and sensationalism
in the news process, (6) policies regarding the coverage of
certain aspects of sports violence (i.e., how and why they
are 'signified', Clarke et al., 1976:77).

In contrast to the previous two interview cat-
egories, media personnel were most frequently interviewed on
a small group discussion basis (Willis, 1980). More conduc-
tive to long and wandering sessions than the single respond-
ent interview, these taped discussions frequently lasted up to ninety minutes and on some occasions longer still. With this category of respondents, one field work strategy which was employed profitably was the use of 'key informants' (Fine, 1980). Three sports journalists (two television sports show hosts and one newspaper sports editor) continually provided the researcher with important media and sports contacts, and with ongoing information which proved crucial for the overall success of the data collection process.

It was during these interview sessions with media personnel in particular that the researcher both discovered some of the more frustrating elements and unrecognized benefits of interviewing as a method. Quite frequently, the author found that in order to maintain good field relations he had to allow respondents to discuss issues at length he already knew about and/or considered largely irrelevant. It thus became clear soon into the interviewing process that obtaining field data considered useful also entailed obtaining what appeared to be 'not so useful' data. For this reason, although an attempt was often made to 'guide' the discussion by raising certain issues at certain junctures, in general the investigator encouraged respondents to talk for as long as they were willing to do so.

On many occasions, having initially interpreted the subject's responses as only partially pertinent during the
interview itself, the author was surprised to discover much greater relevance in such responses than was first thought during more extensive analysis back at the work desk. For example, although the researcher did not recognize it fully at first, answers which initially appeared mundane, commonsensical, irrelevant, and even deceptive and evasive, were subsequently found to be extremely important in demonstrating the interpretations and meanings of phenomena for those involved in the substantive area of sports crowd disorder and media coverage of it. Interviewing should thus be understood as a method which almost always provides useful data, although at first it may not appear to do so. For these reasons, and as Denzin (1970:14) has written, it is crucial that the sociologist's conceptual scheme allows the interview to proceed spontaneously so as to avoid doing "...violence to the phenomena under investigation."

3. Questionnaire

The problem of sports crowd disorder cannot satisfactorily be examined without considering the views of the sports clubs themselves, since it is often their view regarding this phenomenon which provides a basis for widespread social understanding of its rate, frequency, manifestation, etc. In order to further supplement perceptions of the phenomena unearthed by previously discussed procedures, a small questionnaire was constructed and mailed
to eighty-seven (87) professional sports organizations in Canada and the U.S. Financial and time constraints dictated that it would not be feasible to implement this method outside of North America, i.e., in the United Kingdom.

Although questionnaires were sent to organizations participating in the four dominant North American sports—football, hockey, baseball and basketball—because evidence has shown disorder to be most centrally linked to spectators of the first three sports as listed here (e.g., see M. Smith, 1983), a minimum of questionnaires were mailed to basketball clubs. An equal and much larger number were mailed to clubs of the other sports. In brief, the questionnaire consisted of a combination of fifteen (15) open-ended and fixed-response questions relating to sports crowd disorder (see Appendix 'A').

Seeking maximum questionnaire clarity and usefulness (Phillips, 1985:225), a pretest was conducted with a questionnaire mailed to two randomly selected clubs of each sport. Fortunately, an 87.5% correspondence rate on the pretest was recorded. This procedure proved most helpful not only in indicating which questions had elicited comprehensive and significant data (and, therefore, might be expected to continue to do so in the larger survey), but in also directing attention to some questions which required revision. For example, several initial pretest answers showed that certain ideas needed to be replaced by others,
that some questions needed to be rephrased (substituted, shortened or lengthened), that a more coherent sequencing of questions was required, and that other as yet unprobed but related issues could be raised. For example, having initially asked clubs on the pretest to comment upon the availability of alcohol at their games, two clubs said that alcohol was in fact not sold at all. This question was therefore rephrased to include this possibility (see Question 7a in Appendix 'A').

A low response rate (roughly 15%) was recorded following the initial mailing of the questionnaire. However, two follow-up letters (sent out at one and three month intervals after the initial distribution) subsequently contributed towards a final 35.6% (n=31) response rate. Clearly, one would encounter problems in generalizing to a larger population from such a relatively small group of responses, i.e., from only thirty-one (31) clubs, and hence statistical analysis was not pursued in any manner other than frequency counts. Despite this, much of the data received are considered to be of great significance when examined in isolation and when used comparatively with data disclosed by other methods, particularly because they provide an insight into how the clubs themselves perceive the problem of sports crowd disorder. They have, then, been discussed illustratively in the second 'findings' chapter, Chapter Five.
Summary

For some time, sport sociologists have criticized the "...proliferation of unrelated facts" (McPherson, 1978:74) pervading their area, which is in need of "...the acquisition and establishment of a cumulative body of knowledge" (Melnick, 1975:39). The first section of this chapter dealt with some methodological issues connected to the potential solution of this problem.

Two key arguments were presented. First, any notion of human action (the self or individual) in sport cannot be satisfactorily explained without a coexistent examination of social structure. In addition, these concerns must be combined with notions of temporality and historicity. As Giddens (1979) has argued, we must view social action as process not as event. Second, the implications of the work of Willis (1980) and other 'cultural studies' researchers for the sociology of sport lie in showing sports writers that an interchange or synthesis of multiple methods can be used as fruitfully in the study of social action and interaction in the sports context as in the study of other more extensively examined groups (e.g., delinquent youth subcultures, countercultural groups, etc.). Clearly, this study represents an attempt to apply a synthesis of
methodological procedures to the substantive 'problem' of sports crowd disorder.

The chapter then went on to consider some of the methodological problems inherent in using the mass media as a source of data. It was suggested that when examining, interpreting or relying upon particularly 'soft' media facts, extreme caution on the part of the researcher ought to be exercised since such facts are often more representative of the overall ideological orientations of various media and of their concomitant selection procedures than accurate and unbiased reflections of social events and processes.

Finally, a review of the three primary procedures employed in this study, content analysis, interviewing and observation, the questionnaire, was presented, and the author's methodological experiences in studying behaviour such as sports crowd disorder which is unpredictable, episodic and generally lacking in organizational structure were described. The range of methodological difficulties experienced in the study of sports crowds and sports crowd disorder specifically clearly requires that observation and interviewing be combined with a number of other research procedures. Hence, in addition to these direct techniques implemented with the sports crowd, this study has employed an essentially multi-method approach that relies on indirect and inferential forms of data collection. The fundamental
objective of this synthetic approach is to hopefully provide new explanatory and interpretive possibilities regarding sports crowd disorder and its meanings for different groups.
NOTES

1. It would appear that sociologists in general have exploited their affiliation with or proximity to groups which are known to them. From a huge series of illustrations which can be made, Becker's (1963) ethnography of jazz musicians, a group which he was already a part of, represents one of the most well known cases in the discipline.

2. These types of difficulties experienced by researchers studying events simultaneously could possibly be greatly reduced in two ways. First, sociologists studying large groups of people could enhance their potential for good data collection by restricting the area or number of units being observed at one time. In this way, the observer could attain greater control of his/her activities. Alternatively, multiple observers might be assigned, although for the purposes of this study such a procedure was not financially feasible. Second, the observational difficulties described here could be almost entirely overcome by the use of film and video. One of the central advantages of film over memory is the capacity of film and video records for multiple reviewing at certain speeds and even in reverse. This would allow the easy and reliable identification of behaviour patterns of large assemblages of people simultaneously. Unfortunately, financial constraints also precluded the implementation of this method in the present study.

3. Sometimes, the contribution of key informants is so illuminating that it becomes integral to the entire research project. Whyte's (1943) 'Doc' and Liebow's (1967) 'Tally' are probably the most famous examples in the sociological literature.
CHAPTER FOUR
A STRUCTURAL COMPARISON OF SPORTS CROWD DISORDER - IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, U.S.A. AND CANADA

Introduction

This is the first of four chapters discussing the data which emerged as 'findings' in the study. In order to adequately contextualize sports crowd disorder in the socio-cultural setting in which it develops, this chapter examines the structural and formal contexts and conditions of sport spectatorship in Britain and North America. Because, as already stated, most spectator violence is usually associated with three team sports in North America (football, baseball and ice hockey) and, of course, with soccer in the United Kingdom, it is mostly to these sports that the data apply. This is also the case with the second concern here—a discussion of the forms of sports crowd disorder. An in-depth analysis of six of the most common patterns and styles of sports crowd disorder in Britain and North America demonstrates that the phenomenon manifests itself in a variety of ways, and several areas of overlap and divergence are considered.
In essence, then, this chapter is centrally concerned with the structural and formal aspects of sports crowd disorder. Importantly, this analysis provides a foundation for the examination to follow in the next chapter of phenomenological and interpretational aspects of the problem.

**Structural Contexts and Conditions of Sports Crowd Disorder**

In order to examine and explain some of the ways in which sports crowd disorder is expressed, i.e., its forms, it is helpful to first describe the structural and formal contexts and conditions in which it occurs. For British soccer, this has already been partly achieved during the sociological explanations of hooliganism presented in Chapter Two, but a more comparative summary is needed. The purpose of this initial preamble is to introduce a selection of the most significant areas of overlap and divergence in the contexts and conditions of North American and British sports spectating, in order to provide an insight into the socio-cultural milieux in which violent fan behaviour to be discussed subsequently transpires (contextual variations are outlined in Table 1). Based on data emerging during the research for this study, including extensive observations conducted at British and North American sports events, the
following represents a central feature of the overall data collection process.

Although, as mentioned, the data below are mostly related to British soccer and North American baseball, football and ice hockey crowds, many of the phenomena discussed are highly representative of the conditions of the political economies of sport as a whole in the two settings. As noted at the start of the study, and at several other junctures, a sustained sequence of violent incidents at British soccer has, in association with a number of other factors including changes in leisure patterns and increased ticket prices, contributed towards declining attendances, withdrawal of sponsorship, and club banishment from international competition. This has left Britain's national sport in a rather formidable and widely-publicised state of crisis. By contrast, the condition of North American sport is usually presented in an altogether healthier fashion, despite ongoing public concern with player violence and concrete evidence to suggest that organized sport here has its own problems with crowd disorder (for a further discussion of this contradiction, see Chapter Eight).

The types of immediate similarities one finds in the North American and British sporting experiences are probably representative of a global experience in sport. In brief, large aggregates of spectators come together in a tense, noisy, crowded and highly volatile atmosphere, and are
Table 1. Structural and Formal Contexts and Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North América</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brief</td>
<td>HISTORY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively high level</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Range</td>
<td>FANS' CLASS STATUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside cities</td>
<td>STADIA LOCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outdoor/indoor</td>
<td>STADIA TYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansive</td>
<td>PARKING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%—relatively spacious</td>
<td>SEATING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerous</td>
<td>AMENITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 60–70% males</td>
<td>FAN GENDER RATIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily season-ticket</td>
<td>FAN ATTENDANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>FAN SEGREGATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open &amp; cordial</td>
<td>STADIA APPEARANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of teams &amp; sports</td>
<td>FAN LOYALTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widely available</td>
<td>ALCOHOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively inconspicuous</td>
<td>SOCIAL CONTROL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
emotionally involved in athletic action taking place on the field of play. Levels of game-related fan participation are high in both contexts. For example, the sorts of songs and chants which are often thought unique to British soccer do in fact have counterparts in North America, although they typically contain less profanity and threat (the latter are central features in the notorious soccer ritual of crowd chants and songs). With regard to crowd intensity, local 'derby' or 'play-off' games tend to elicit the highest degrees of fan emotion in both contexts, and, not coincidentally, it is here that some of the most serious incidents of fan violence have occurred.

As Table 1 suggests, the overall experience of attending North American and British sports can be highly divergent. One of the most fundamental explanations for this is the fact that, unlike North American sport, British soccer has a long history, and numerous clubs (many of which were originally formed by employees of town factories and businesses--Mason, 1980) have been in existence for one hundred years or more. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter Two, in the twentieth century a unique relationship developed between British towns, the game of soccer and a largely working-class group of followers (Marples, 1954; Hopcroft, 1968; P. Young, 1968; Walvin, 1975; Mason, 1980), and a number of changes in this relation have been postulated as having had quite serious consequences for fan behaviour in
the post-war period (Taylor, 1971; Clarke, 1978; Critcher, 1979). The mature structure of British soccer, combined with a general lack of geographical mobility among clubs, has allowed generations of fans to establish strong club identifications, affiliations and rivalries over the years.

By contrast, the history of North American sport *per se*, and of professional North American team sports specifically, is relatively short. Although there also exist a number of well-established clubs in a range of sports, on the whole there is much greater geographical mobility among franchises, many of which are extremely young. Thus, while fan support in Britain has a deeply-entrenched, class-related genesis, fan support in North America, which has a much broader class base, is considerably more divided among the four most popular team sports (football, baseball, basketball and ice hockey) with fans regularly following more than one sport and level of sport (professional or collegiate) equally. Finally, due to the aforementioned geographical mobility among North American sporting franchises, fans are occasionally forced to cease and/or change their team identifications.

Cumulatively, these diverse patterns of historical development have resulted in British soccer being played and spectated in totally different surroundings to most North American sports. Take, for example, the following descriptions of a typical British soccer experience:
Gray, bleak, cold. The fans are jammed so close that you can’t get your hand to your mouth to move the cigar in or out. The crowd sways sideways and lifts you five feet to the right. "God bless our gracious team," they sing. And "...the sodding visitors." Toilet rolls whistle and flap past your ear to clutter the field like ticker tape. Someone drops his tea on you for a giggle. (Sheed, 1969:79)

Hideously uncomfortable. The steps are greasy as a school playground lavatory in the rain. The air is rancid with beer and onions and belching and worse. The language is a gross purple of obscenity. (Hopcraft, 1968:162)

Add to these remarkably accurate descriptions of the British soccer experience a number of other formal game conditions: most fans (predominantly male) enjoy standing room only throughout the course of games; few entertainments or amenities are provided; fans walking long distances to stadia (a majority due to inadequate parking facilities) do so under regimented and suffocating police surveillance; stadia have numerous penning cages, spiked railings and fences designed to allay hooligan conduct but whose overall visual effect is one of militaristic restraint; a highly conspicuous display of police strength exists both inside and outside stadia.

By way of contrast, the following represent typical characteristics of the North American experience: stadia (indoor and outdoor) are relatively new, spacious and luxurious, have expansive parking facilities and are replete with a range of amenities (refreshment and alcohol stalls,
clean washrooms, souvenir stores, etc.), and game-related entertainments (team mascots, cheerleaders, bands, half-time displays, expensive electrical scoreboards and replay screens, etc.); one hundred percent of fans (which includes roughly thirty to forty percent females) are seated comfortably; stadia have open and cordial appearances with few 'penning' structures--rival fan segregation is so minimal and subtly arranged that it is barely noticeable; agents of social control are relatively inconspicuous.

Thus, a series of quite significant differences emerge in the contexts and conditions of the North American and British match-day experience. Clearly, this experience as it relates to either context is steeped in the historical and cultural development of sport itself and the society in which it takes place. In Britain, soccer has over the last century amassed a loyal and predominantly working-class spectator following (Walvin, 1975; Taylor, 1971), and many of its cultural meanings are linked closely with working-class experience as a whole. Indeed, the soccer match-day has in many ways become culturally inseparable from a cluster of symbolic class-based events such as pre- and post-game drinking, and large groups of working-class fans marching to the match collectively. Games are played in old, dilapidated and sometimes unsafe (see Popplewell, 1985) stadia located in run-down urban areas where there is rarely adequate parking space. Stadia display few of the
comfor\(\text{t}^s\) of their North American counterparts, and cater to a predominantly standing audience of mostly male supporters. The 'hooligan’ problem which has developed around the game has contributed towards changing both the appearance of stadia themselves, of fan behaviour and the atmosphere at and around them and, therefore, the total experience of attending British soccer more generally.

Professional sport in North America, although still in its adolescence by comparison, has developed under a totally different set of economic and cultural conditions altogether more bourgeois in origin. Although it is important to acknowledge that some of the larger Eastern and mid-West cities (e.g., Boston, Detroit, Brooklyn/New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Chicago, etc.) have inner-city (and often subway-fed) stadia, many of which have been in operation or were in operation (before being modified or destroyed) since the early part of this century, most North American stadia, largely built away from city centres, have extensive parking facilities which accommodate the automobile and contribute toward a more privatized approach to sport spectatorship. They are mostly new and spacious, have relatively luxurious public amenities, and cater to a more gender- and class-integrated audience. Without the sobering effects of pens, fan segregation structures, spiked fences, intense police surveillance, etc., North American sports
stadia enjoy a more hospitable and family-oriented atmosphere than British soccer stadia.

Under all of these conditions, and as Roadburg (1980) suggests, many of the features, i.e., discomforts and tensions, which characterize the soccer game and general game atmosphere of the British context would appear ultimately more conducive towards disorderly spectator conduct than the conditions experienced at North American stadia. With this in mind, we turn now to an empirically-grounded comparative analysis of forms of sports crowd disorder in both contexts as presented in mass media reports.

Forms of Sports Crowd Disorder in North America and the United Kingdom

Fundamentally influenced by contexts and conditions in and under which sport is played, the general modes in which sports crowd disorder are actually expressed in the United Kingdom and North America display a number of important areas of overlap and divergence (see Table 2). The purpose of this section is to examine these forms as we know them from previous research and as they are described in press reports.

It should first be stated that the content analysis revealed that sports crowd disorder at soccer in Britain began to receive national media attention, albeit sporadic,
Table 2. Forms of Sports Crowd Disorder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North America</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aimed at players &amp; playing area</td>
<td>MISSILE THROWING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aimed at players &amp; opposing fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncommon</td>
<td>USE OF WEAPONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Used as missiles &amp; fighting aids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually limited to victory celebrations</td>
<td>FIELD INVASION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstration rioting &amp; rival fan fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goalpost demolition &amp; celebration riots</td>
<td>DESTRUCTION &amp; VANDALISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associated with gang fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual or small-group interpersonal violence</td>
<td>FAN FIGHTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pronounced collective rival gang fights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly during game. Celebration riots an exception</td>
<td>DISORDER LOCATION &amp; TIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extra-ground &amp; non-game context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronounced &amp; relatively predictable</td>
<td>VICTORY CELEBRATION RIOTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fan rioting irrespective of game result</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
for the first time in approximately the mid-1960s, although we do have fairly conclusive proof that fan violence at soccer can be traced as far back as the last quarter of the nineteenth century (e.g., Vamplew, 1980; K. Young, 1980; Dunning et al., 1982a; 1984a), and indeed throughout "...every phase of the Association game in Britain" (Dunning et al., 1981:342; 1987). Throughout the 1970s and up to the present time, hooliganism has been given consistent attention by the press and other media, at home and abroad.

With the North American situation, on the other hand, the content analysis showed that prior to approximately the early- to mid-1970s, any incidents of sports crowd disorder reported in the press were largely isolated cases. Since that time, however, and possibly influenced by media exposure over the British hooligan issue, North American incidents of sports crowd disorder have been more widely reported in the North American press (this change is interpreted in Chapter Eight). Due to this change in coverage frequency, and because the emphasis below is placed on most commonly manifested forms of disorder as they appear in both contexts, examples provided are of predominantly recent origin.

1. Missile Throwing and the Smuggling of 'Weapons' into Stadia

Missile throwing as a form of disorder at British soccer has a long history. Dunning et al., (1982a; 1984a)
and K. Young (1980), for example, have traced their use to the late nineteenth century when players and officials were occasionally struck and injured by objects thrown by unruly fans. Since that time, aerial confrontations involving 'ammunition' smuggled into games have become an institutionalized form of disorder in Britain, which usually takes place between rival groups of fans, but also includes fans throwing missiles at players and officials.

A 1980 newspaper report with ex-Arsenal goalkeeper Pat Jennings reveals how:

He has been struck by a dart which pierced his arm at Nottingham, felled by a bottle at Everton, and missed by a snooker ball (the pink) somewhere else. His goalmouth is regularly littered with coins, fruit, nuts and screws. (Sunday Express, Sept. 14, 1980)

In 1975, Everton was the first British club to install small-mesh goal nets after Jennings had been struck by the above-mentioned bottle at their Goodison Park ground. One of the most dramatic examples of missile use took place at the Anfield ground in Liverpool in 1978 when a seventeen year old Manchester United supporter had a randomly thrown steel dart pierce his nose less than an inch from his eye (Yeager, 1979:67).

The ritualistic nature of this form of violence is linked to the way groups of supporters at games maintain constant vigils upon one another and observe action on the field of play simultaneously. The Times (Dec. 16, 1979)
describes this process at Manchester United's Old Trafford ground:

The Stretford End, once infamous, is tame now, almost bored at times. The gangs have moved out, some to the Old Trafford paddock where they can hurl insults or coins or bolts at the adjacent Scoreboard End. Neither set of fans watches much football. They bay constantly at one another. The police stand between them.

As Murphy and Williams (1979:30) indicate, one of the most convincing statements on the regular projection of hooligan missiles comes from a St. John's Ambulance Brigade official at Leicester City's ground, who states that missile injuries constituted a substantial percentage of the overall wounds at soccer during the 1970s. The official's evidence is that two pence coins (slightly larger and heavier than a Canadian quarter) "...inflict a very distinctive wound" when thrown in a particular fashion.

Such usage of ammunition has resulted in the regular frisking of supporters at some grounds. The same Sunday Times article cited above focuses on this procedure at Manchester United's ground:

Once the turnstiles are open, police literally have their hands full. Leeds youths are frisked inside by Sgt. Geoff Lightfoot's likey lads. There's a lass, too, because girls sometimes carry the weapons. Studded dog-collars concealed beneath scarves, sharp-toothed Afro combs, filed metal discs and flag-sticks are confiscated. (Dec. 16, 1979)

Similarly, at a Leicester City vs Liverpool league game in August 1971, police seized forty steel-tipped umbrellas
carried by fans (Daily Telegraph, Aug. 22, 1971), and in 1986, Scotland Yard's 'Operation Own Goal' "...uncovered weapons including switchblade and fixed-blade knives, daggers, clubs, iron bars, crossbows, a ball-and-chain mace and spiked brass knuckles" (Globe and Mail, March 27, 1986:D10). In response to missile- and weapon-related injuries, the British courts have imposed harsh jail terms. For instance, in 1985 a Carlisle fan "...was given six years for manslaughter for hurling a seven-pound sandstone block that killed a fan from a rival team" (Globe and Mail, March 27, 1986:D10).

In North America, too, there is evidence to show that sports fans have participated in missile throwing for some time. Indeed, outfielders in baseball have complained of being struck or narrowly missed throughout the sport's history. Green (1984:111), for example, cites comments made by baseball stars of the 1930s and 1940s who were struck with bottles, garbage, fruit and other missiles, and Greenberg (1977:26-27) provides a thorough account of baseball 'superstar' Reggie Jackson being regularly bombarded by 'cherry bombs' and other missiles during the 1970s. As with the British situation, however, incidents of missile throwing prior to the late 1960s were given minimal coverage in the press and, so far as we can tell, were of fairly low frequency.
Since then, however, reports of fans throwing objects onto the field of play and at players have increased substantially. For example, Major League Baseball in the 1970s became almost synonymous with missile-throwing and the latter began to be reported upon in the media with considerable frequency:

In the 1973 championship series between the New York Mets and the Cincinnati Reds, for example, after Pete Rose punched the Mets' Bud Harrelson, fans in Shea Stadium pelted Rose with bottles, beer cans and garbage. During the 1974 baseball season, Bob Watson, the Houston outfielder, hit the wall and lay semiconscious, bleeding from facial wounds, prompting a group of fans to pour beer on him. Violence became such a way of life at Madison Square Garden's Felt Forum in 1974 that there were three riots where bottles were thrown, property damaged and people injured. (Runfola, 1976:304)

Also, at the end of the 1960s, several newspapers reported that ice hockey games had witnessed a number of animals, fish and other objects thrown onto the ice and interrupt play. An article by Bingham in *Sports Illustrated* shows how:

In Minneapolis...someone tossed a live duck onto the ice, this following an earlier deluge of beer, eggs and programs. In Detroit spectators matched the duck with a cooked octopus—while in New York it was oranges, eggs and apples. (1970:20-23)

Generally, in baseball and football, missiles have included beer and soft drink cans, fruit and vegetables, rolled-up beer cups and snowballs (*Globe and Mail*, July 30, 1985:19; Dec. 11, 1986:D8). In a rather bizarre reproduction of some of the earlier game interruptions involving animals and
fish, fans released three pigs onto the ice at a Quebec Nordiques hockey game in 1985 (Globe and Mail, Feb. 9, 1985:59). (For more data on missile throwing in North American sports, see the section on questionnaire responses in Chapter Five.)

Although missiles appear to be a very common form of disorder today in both North America and the United Kingdom, a significant difference lies in their actual intended 'targets'. In the United Kingdom, there is no doubt that ammunition and missiles are aimed at both players and rival fan groups, whereas in North America most missiles are more commonly thrown onto the playing field and/or at players only. Incidents of one group of fans attacking rival groups with missiles exist (e.g., the Toronto Star (Sept. 15, 1985: A16) reported that New York "Yankee fans rained beer, soft drinks and peanuts on the Toronto contingent"), but they are generally very rare. By contrast, the evidence here supports previous work (Marsh et al., 1978; Murphy and Williams, 1979) in demonstrating that the use of missiles and ammunition by British soccer supporters constitutes a very specific, preconceived and ritualistically-manifested form of hooligan deportment.

2. Invasion of the Playing Area

In addition to the projection of missiles, invasion of the playing area by incensed fans is not a new phenomenon
at British soccer. In an earlier study (1980), for example, this author verified data unearthed by Dünnings (1979) in finding incidents of field invasion, such as the two illustrated below, to be quite normative throughout the 1890s:

The referee--Mr. Durban--complained that in consequence of certain decisions of his the spectators behaved in a hostile manner and broke onto the field of play. The players escorted the referee off the field and the pitch was cleared. At the conclusion, the crowd made a rush at the referee who was, however, ably guarded by the police and officials. On the first occasion of the interruption, Mr. Durban asserted that orange peel, stones and turf were thrown at him. (Liverpool Daily Post, Feb. 12, 1892)

The players were showing too much vigour and fouls were too frequent...(Bury) managed to score their first success, which pleased their fans immensely. It also served to stimulate the players and with great dash they again proceeded to make tracks for Sutcliffe (Bolton). The ball, however, went out and unfortunately Turner (Bolton) kicked Smith"(Bury), at which the spectators took a most unaccountable procedure, flocking onto the field in all directions and literally surrounding the players. Turner was guarded off the field, but after waiting some time it was found impossible to clear the field and the game was abandoned. (Liverpool Echo, March 13, 1893)

During this period fan violence associated with field invasion was noticeably directed at officials and players.

Since soccer hooliganism first began to receive widespread media attention as a 'national social problem' in the 1960s, press reports of field invasions have prolif-
erated. The following paraphrased accounts are taken from an extensive list of possible examples:

1. 1964—When Dennis Law was sent off in a match at Blackpool, there followed a "10 minute soccer riot" which spilled onto the pitch. A 14 year old girl was "...seriously injured." (The Sun, Oct. 16, 1964)

2. 1969—Following the sending off of Derek Dougan in a league match between Wolverhampton and Everton, the crowd chanted "We want a riot." 84 people were injured in the subsequent field invasion. (Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 5, 1969)

3. 1980—Following a confrontation between Oldham and Sheffield Wednesday players in which Sheffield's Terry Curran was expelled, about 5,000 rioting Sheffield supporters invaded the field, hurling bricks and concrete torn from the terraces and a wooden kiosk was broken up for ammunition. The game was postponed for 28 minutes whilst over 100 police with dogs tried to control the melee. In the violence 15 people were arrested and 3 policemen injured. (Daily Express, Sept. 15, 1980)

4. 1985—After several pitch invasions at the nationally televised cup-tie between Luton Town and Millwall, hundreds of fans tore seats from their moorings in a final riot and used them in a missile attack upon a surprised and unprepared police contingent. (Sunday Times, March 17, 1985:4)

These examples point to two important features of the field invasion process, at least as applied to British soccer. First, the available soccer evidence confirms research conducted by M. Smith (1983) in Canada regarding the 'violence-precipitates-violence' hypothesis, i.e., that violence by sports participants can instigate 'demonstration' violence in the stands which spills onto the field. Second, a perceptible difference exists between characteristics of late nineteenth field invasions and those of the contemporary period, i.e., whereas crowd violence in the
earlier period seems to have been principally directed at the officials or members of the opposing team, recent fan invasions more normally involve collective fighting between rival fan groups. The Luton example, however, shows that 'invasion violence' is still occasionally aimed at officials and police. It should be noted that field encroachment can also include non-violent fans who pour onto the field of play to avoid 'trouble' in the stands.

Again, some of the earliest media reports of field invasions in North American sport occurred during the late 1960s, and have generally been associated with victory celebration rioting on and around the playing area. When the New York Mets won the World Series in 1969, for example, jubilant fans burst onto the Shea Stadium field and proceeded to rip up the sod and home plate in a newly-defined demonstration of base(ball) 'stealing' (Sports Illustrated, April 7, 1970). Almost every championship victory in North American baseball and football since then has been followed by similar events. In 1986, New York Mets' fans were again involved in celebratory turf destruction and damage (New York Times, Sept. 19, 1986:D19). The content analysis provided no examples of collective invasion of the playing area in ice hockey—apart from the obvious problems fans would encounter with footing on ice, the unlikely manifestation of ice hockey playing area invasion would probably
cause fewer economic problems for clubs whose ice, unlike sod, is rapidly and cheaply replaceable.

Other forms of field invasion in North American sport are not particularly common, although solitary exceptions to the rule do exist. For example, at the Toronto Blue Jays' home opener in 1986, this author observed hundreds of marauding spectators clash with police on horses behind the home-run fence for six innings of the game:

Three Metro policemen were injured and 125 people were ejected yesterday during the Blue Jays' rowdy home opener against Baltimore Orioles. . . Metro Police said 45 charges were laid, most of them alcohol-related. . . Stadium announcers twice urged fans to stay off the field and "let the outcome of the game be determined by the players". . . But even as that announcement was being made, fans in the bleachers were massing behind the right field wall for an assault on mounted policemen and Blue Jays security guards who defended the grounds near the playing field. . . About 200 fans kicked over steel barriers and sprinted across the park towards unoccupied field level seats on the other side, 50 yards away. (Toronto Sun, April 15, 1986:15)

The anomalous nature of this field invasion, however, is demopstrated by the fact that this was the only incident of its kind throughout the entire Blue Jays' 1986 season.

Regarding invasions of the playing area, it should be remembered that British soccer has a number of historical precedents, and field invasion involving rival gang fighting has over the years become very much a subcultural characteristic of hooligan behaviour. In response, the Thatcher government has for some time been known to be discussing
"...making invasion of the playing pitch an imprisonable offence" (Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 7, 1985:4). In North America, where collective rival gang violence has not developed at sport, field invasion seems to be limited so far to victory celebrations and other irregular scenarios such as the Toronto incident.

3. Property Destruction and Vandalism at and around Stadia

Another central form of crowd disorder often closely associated with invasion of the playing area is the destruction and/or vandalism of property in and around stadia, and on the way to or from games. We have seen that British soccer has had problems with fan defacement of property since its earliest days (the example cited above from the Liverpool Daily Post in 1892 describes a soccer official being struck with turf torn up from the pitch). However, like missile throwing, frequent soccer-related vandalism and destruction at games involving British soccer fans has in the last two decades contributed towards bringing international disrepute to the British game.

In Britain, certain fixtures have become notorious for the vandalism and destruction fans cause at them. The most recognized illustration is the England vs Scotland fixture, the oldest international fixture in sport dating from 1872 (Miller, 1985:16), which over the years has resulted in fan destruction of the Wembley stadium pitch and
goalposts, and has had corollary effects such as the cessation of the London underground subway system on match days. Disturbances so-created at this match have recently prompted Mrs. Thatcher to entirely close Wembley Stadium to Scottish fans, proposing instead to play the game in Scotland (Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 7, 1985:24). In addition, many of the frequent riots that accompany weekend league games in Britain have included an array of destructive activities including window smashing, graffiti writing, car overturning, arson and stadia sabotage. We saw above, for example, that Millwall fans destroyed seats and used them as missiles at Luton (Sunday Times, March 17, 1985:4), and in August, 1985, Manchester United fans smashed beer mugs and overturned tables in a Coventry public house (Sunday Express, Aug. 11, 1985:1).

Even more infamous are the destructive exploits of British fans at international matches, particularly in continental Europe, where fans are known to participate in extended periods of "binge-boozing". This has been documented at length by Williams et al., (1984), but three examples (quoted from the Sunday Times, June 2, 1985:18) should suffice to demonstrate this trend:

May 29, 1974, Rotterdam. Feyenoord vs Tottenham
Spurs fans hurled seats at Feyenoord fans. Rioting followed; 200 people were injured and 100 Tottenham fans arrested. Tottenham were barred from playing next two European matches at home.
November 16, 1983, Luxembourg. Luxembourg vs England
1500 English fans went on the rampage 48 hours before the match, smashing shop windows, cars and bars; 13 fans were arrested, one for stabbing a local man in a bar. The army teamed up with the police to patrol the streets. There was approximately 10,000 pounds worth of damage.

May 9, 1984, Brussels. Anderlecht vs Tottenham
A Tottenham fan was shot dead in a bar and Tottenham fans rampaged through the streets before and after the game, wrecking bars and shops and setting cars on fire.

Vandalism and destruction caused by British soccer fans at and around stadia should be understood in the context of rabid local and international team-fan identifications (Williams et al., 1984), of rival fan confrontations (the 'Bedouin Syndrome'—Harrison, 1974:604) and, with specific reference to international matches, to excessive alcohol consumption.

Rather differently, spectator destruction and vandalism of property at and about stadia in North America is usually linked to post-game, and again, alcohol-related victory celebration rioting by supporters of one team only (usually the 'home' team), although isolated incidents have occurred which demonstrate that this type of disorder can also be a response to team failure. At the end of the 1986 baseball season, for example, the New York Mets' failure to clinch the National League East title in Philadelphia resulted in the following Stadium defacement cited in the Boston Globe (Sept. 16, 1986:69):
About 1000 New York Mets fans...took their frustrations out on the seats of Veterans Stadium over the weekend, ripping 30 of them to shreds.

Destruction and vandalism at North American stadia have, however, become most commonly associated with team victory revelry. Fans of both collegiate and professional football, for example, have developed a reputation for goalpost destruction. In the last six years, goalposts have been dismantled and broken at a number of college venues including McMaster University in Canada (McMaster University Silhouette, Oct. 28, 1982:5), Yale (where an eighteen year old Harvard student was critically injured when a metal section of the posts fell on her head), Northwestern (twice in the 1981 season), Illinois (five times in the 1983 season) and so frequently at Pennsylvania State games that the athletic department has "...offered $4500, the cost of new ones, to the student activities fund if fans refrained from tearing down any more" (Sports Illustrated, Nov. 28, 1983:27).

This trend has also been witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s in American professional football where serious injury has occasionally resulted:

Five men were injured yesterday, when a goalpost that had been torn down by New England Patriots fans hit a 13,200-volt electric wire. The men were among hundreds of people who stormed onto the playing field after the Patriots defeated Cincinnati Bengals 34-23, to gain a berth in the National Football League playoffs.
Important team victories, then, appear to be a fundamental precipitant in many incidents of destruction and vandalism occurring at North American sports stadia.

4. Fan Fighting

Over their long history, British soccer clubs have attracted large numbers of supporters, some of whom interpret 'commitment' to the local club and community in terms of defending their reputation through violent conduct (Williams et al., 1984). The latter are, of course, the soccer 'hooligans'. Many of these 'super crews' of fighters, some of which contain several hundred members, have established structural boundaries around themselves and within their ranks, and have informally elected organizers, leaders and peripheral members, rationally constructed plans of 'attack', group names, and even professionally designed calling cards which they leave with their victims. The public furor which has developed over soccer hooliganism in Britain since the 1960s has resulted in part because of the regularity of rival 'super crew' clashes and attacks, although as Chapters Six and Seven show, the treatment of such violent incidents by the mass media has also played a significant role in the public's broad understanding of the surrounding issues.

Reports of collective hooligan fighting in the press are extremely common:
Rival gangs of British soccer fans clashed in this port city last night, badly damaging a tavern before the fight spilled into the streets...Police said 53 people were arrested...fans battled with clubs, fists, and feet and some tossed billiard balls stolen from the tavern's pool tables. (Hamilton Spectator, Dec. 11, 1985:B6)

The rioting involved supporters of Manchester United, Everton and West Ham, who had joined 2,000 other passengers, mostly vacationers, on the Dutch ferry...After drinking in the tax-free bars, the rival fans turned on each other with knives, bottles and other weapons...The ship's captain headed back to Harwich on the English coast, where police led away 110 people. (Globe and Mail, Aug. 9, 1986:C4)

Birmingham City F.C. were yesterday fined 5,000 pounds by an F.A. disciplinary commission and ordered to make ground improvements after the riot involving City and Leeds United fans in which one youth died and 200 were injured. (The Guardian, July 30, 1985:3)

As these examples demonstrate, clashes between rival soccer gangs do not transpire 'in a vacuum'. Apart from police and agents of social control, public employees, bar and hotel owners and other uninvolved bystanders are among those who are regularly 'drawn into' or affected by such violent confrontations.

Such side effects of soccer gang violence have also been evident at international games involving British supporters. Several examples of this were provided above in the 'property destruction' section, but perhaps the most infamous example occurred at the Heysel stadium riot in Brussels, May 1985, where hundreds of innocent fans were
crushed against a collapsing retainer wall (thirty-nine to death) trying to escape from a charge by Liverpool fans on Juventus fans (for a more in-depth discussion of this riot, see Chapter Seven).

When we speak of British soccer violence, then, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on collective gang violence. To be sure, incidents of fans fighting individually or in small groups also occur, but violence and damage so-created is negligible by comparison with that of the gang violence associated with the behaviour of 'super crews' of fighters. Partly due to the structural characteristics of North American sport which were referred to earlier (financial and geographical constraints vis-a-vis travelling to away games, high season-ticket sales, broadly distributed team support, etc.), fan fighting at North American sports has so far not expressed itself in this rival gang manner, and certainly 'super crews' of fighters in the British sense do not exist.

The majority of incidents of fan aggression and fighting occurring frequently at North American games reported in the press involve individuals or small groups of supporters participating in a range of activities such as assault (Globe and Mail, Nov. 6, 1985:D6), drunken and disorderly behaviour (Toronto Sun, June 9, 1985:80) and confrontations with police (Globe and Mail, April 15, 1986:C1).
Less frequently, larger episodes of fighting and violence have occurred, particularly at baseball and football games. At a Los Angeles Rams play-off game in 1986, for example:

According to the Anaheim Police Department, there were 14 fights in the stands, 2 arrests, 8 citations issued and 19 fans ejected. Now, 14 fights among 60,000 people isn't alarming, until you consider that most of the fights involved only participants. Entire sections, in some cases. (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 25, 1986:3)

Even more large scale were two riots which broke out during Monday night N.F.L. games at Schaefer Stadium in Foxboro, Massachusetts. Sports Illustrated (Oct. 13, 1980:29) describes the first in 1976 as:

...a frightening evening during which a fan was stabbed, a police officer assaulted and his gun stolen, and drunkenness and brawling resulted in the arrest of more than 60 people. 35 others were treated at hospitals.

The second riot, in 1980, is similarly described as "...another night of sheer horror," when a man was killed in a car accident outside the stadium, traffic jams led to fans not reaching their seats until half-time, and fifty arrests and one hundred evictions were made. Further:

...youths rampaged through the parking lots, snapping off auto antennas, kicking in car doors and urinating on tires...Bonfires were built, and drinking and fighting continued 'till the wee hours of Tuesday morning.

It should be reiterated, however, that these types of illustrations, although (on the basis of total numbers of press reports) apparently becoming more common in the 1970s
and 1980s in North America, are still exceptions to the normal course of sports crowd disorder events. It is difficult to estimate the exact frequency of fighting because, unlike the bigger and more dramatic riots, cases of interpersonal fan violence at sports go largely unreported in the press. However, in interviews and on the questionnaire, clubs informed this author that the vast majority of games involved incidents of interpersonal violence, and general observations at a broad range of sports events is highly supportive of such a claim. For example, at a Buffalo Bills vs Miami Dolphins football game in November 1985, this author observed no fewer than seven incidents of individual (one on one) and small group fighting in the same bleacher section.

Fan fighting exists at sports in both contexts. On the basis of reportage frequency and levels of information and damage, fighting appears to be a more pronounced feature of soccer disorder in Britain where it is manifested on a large collective scale by fans committed to 'defending the pride' of their team (Williams et al., 1984). Reports of North American fan fights indicate that they are usually much smaller, if not individualized, and are more centrally associated with drunkenness than those occurring in British soccer, where hooligan leaders are known to avoid inebriation because it 'lacks style', threatens the potential success of interpersonal combat, and does not lend itself
towards incisive decision-making regarding how to avoid police and opposing fans, etc.\textsuperscript{13}

5. Time and Location of Disorder

The available empirical evidence (e.g., K. Young, 1980; Vamplew, 1980; Dunning et al., 1982a; 1984b) indicates that up until the 1960s, crowd disorder at British soccer was manifested predominantly inside stadia during the context of games themselves, although there were occasional exceptions.\textsuperscript{14} Growth in the public profile of the 'hooligan problem' since then, resulting in concomitant increases in public and football authority anxiety, has led to amplified levels of police and security surveillance inside grounds, particularly in the late 1970s and 1980s, which has in turn precipitated its own side effects. Fundamental here has been the displacement of hooligan action to the extra-ground and pre- and post-game contexts.

Although levels of police force outside stadia also continue to be upgraded, pre- and post-match action is generally least susceptible to police control, and it is in this context that 'super crews' of hooligan fighters now plan ('plot up', as they call it) their prospective targets and venues for 'attack'. Consequently, over approximately the last ten years, some of the most serious incidents of hooliganism (in terms of numbers of injuries, damage, etc.) have occurred in the pre- and post-match context. Many of
the examples given so far are illustrative of this, but two final examples are sufficient to emphasize the point. The first describes pre-match and the second post-match hooligan action:

Fans of the England national soccer team fought with knives and bottles on a cross-channel ferry, smashed stolen cars in races in Dunkirk and vandalized cafés near the Parc des Princes Stadium in Paris, police and other officials reported yesterday. England was playing France in an exhibition match at the stadium as a warm up to the European championship next June. France won the game 2-0...Despite the presence of four British policemen on the vessel, fans threw lifebuoys and lifejackets overboard, broke glass doors and stole goods from the duty free shops, the company said. At Dunkirk, a few dozen fans found new British Leyland cars, due for delivery in Switzerland, in a dock parking area with keys in the ignition. They started playing stock cars and damaged about 15 cars, the company reported. No damage estimate was available. (Hamilton Spectator, March 1, 1984)

About 500 soccer fans clashed with police after a match on Saturday and four officers were injured in the mêlée. One policeman was taken to hospital with severe facial injuries, and 17 people were arrested. Four police horses were also hurt. (Hamilton Spectator, Nov. 11, 1985:C5)

Aside from confrontations with police and members of the public, super crews of fighters regularly travel to away games long before kick-off to meet and fight with opposing crews in a number of locations often including train stations, highway service stations, city centres and in public houses. All this has clearly had the effect of extending match-day activities for both hooligans and police
and has, therefore, significantly modified the overall cultural experience of soccer in Britain.

As a number of examples provided earlier indicate, on a week-to-week basis, North American crowd disorder primarily takes place during games and inside stadia. As we noted in the previous section (see Table 1), whereas a trip to British soccer is commonly perceived as an experience which lasts much longer than the duration of the game itself (e.g., collective drinking sessions before and after games are a traditional characteristic of supporters' match-day activities), North American sports fans appear to enjoy a more privatized perspective towards sports which is facilitated by a number of their own cultural contexts and conditions (e.g., parking facilities allow fans to arrive at and leave from games alone; all-seater stadia mean that fans do not experience the same intimacy with fellow spectators as the British fan, etc.). Generally, the experience of the North American game day is altogether shorter than at British soccer. Under these conditions, and despite occasional concern over 'tailgate parties' (e.g., Los Angeles Times, Nov. 25, 1986:3), sports crowd disorder usually takes place within the boundaries of the game itself. Victory celebrations, which do not occur on a weekly basis in North America, provide a notable exception to the rule.
6. Victory Celebration Riots

The content analysis showed the celebration riot, where fan revelry following team victory (usually in 'play-offs' and cup competitions) escalates and 'gets out of hand', to be perhaps the most predictable and widely-publicised form of North American fan disorder.

Over the last two decades, celebration rioting in a large number of cities has left a long trail of violence and vandalism. Locations include: New York (Mets--World Series, 1969); Pittsburgh (Pirates--World Series, 1971); Pittsburgh (Steelers--Superbowl, 1975); Philadelphia (Phillies--World Series, 1980); Toronto (Argonauts--Grey Cup, 1983); Detroit (Tigers--World Series, 1984); San Francisco (49ers--Superbowl, 1985); Montreal (Canadiens--Stanley Cup, 1986); Hamilton (Tiger-Cats--Grey Cup, 1986). As shown by the two examples below (of events in Pittsburgh, 1971, and Hamilton, 1986), the celebration riot is generally characterized by widespread inebriation, revelry, fighting, looting and vandalism:

An extraordinary orgy of destruction, looting and sexual excess took hold of Pittsburgh...following the unexpected victory of the Pittsburgh Pirates baseball team...During nearly 10 hours of wild, drunken celebrations around the city, men and women participated in public love-making and nudity. More than 100 people were injured and about 100 others were arrested. Some 30 shops were looted and another 30 damaged. Two incidents of sexual assault occurred in full view of hundreds of celebrating fans who, according to eye-
witness reports, cheered the assailants and made no attempt to help the victims... There was scattered gunfire during the rampage and one of those admitted to hospital was a middle-aged man suffering from a gunshot wound. (The Times, Oct. 19, 1971)

Following the Hamilton Tiger-Cat Grey Cup victory on November 30th, 1986, 3,000 to 5,000 fans converged in the downtown core to celebrate. Most had been drinking and some were clearly intoxicated. During the course of the evening, the exuberance of some fans was transformed into spontaneous acts of destruction. It is estimated that just over $55,000 worth of damages to passing automobiles, public utility vehicles and commercial premises was caused and 13 charges were laid by the early morning hours of December 1st.18

Significantly, policing during celebration riots is minimal and, as several officers commented when interviewed, police maintain a general policy of not interrupting such revelry unless, in the words of one superintendent, "...it is absolutely necessary." (For an interpretation of this, see section on 'Approval and Expectation of Violence in Sport' in the following chapter.)

The content analysis did not provide examples of such victory rioting at British soccer, although certain games (such as the England vs Scotland fixture) have developed reputations for precipitating fierce displays of revelry (and rival fan fighting) in the post-game context. As we have seen throughout this section, many of the types of behaviours (looting, vandalism, interpersonal violence, etc.,) which characterize North American victory celebration riots share lines of similarity with soccer hooligan
riot ing which occurs regularly in Britain often irrespective of game outcomes.

Thus it can be seen that the structural and formal contexts and conditions of North American and British sport have significantly affected the many varied forms in which sports crowd disorder is manifested in both settings. In general, the content analysis revealed quite clearly that incidents of British soccer crowd disorder—hooliganism—are reported in the press with much greater frequency than North American crowd disorder. Even in the North American press, the profile given to British hooliganism overshadows by far attention given to its own forms of disorder. For example, in a smaller content analysis aside from the more central one, the author inspected editions of the Globe and Mail, Canada's national newspaper, from January 1, 1982, to December 31, 1986. Seventy-one accounts of soccer hooliganism were unearthed against only twenty-seven accounts of crowd disorder at North American sports (this included several reports of the same incident). Moreover, there was a recurring theme in many of these accounts that sports crowd disorder was overwhelmingly a problem experienced in British society—the 'English disease'—but of relatively minimal concern in North America (e.g., Globe and Mail, May 30, 1985:M11; Oct. 24, 1985:A7). The implications of this trend are addressed at greater length in Chapter Eight).
It is argued here that although the North American media are probably partially correct to focus on the 'occasional' nature of disorderly crowd incidents at and around North American sports events, the 'regular' nature of incidents in the United Kingdom has been and continues to be overstated and exaggerated. Simply, it is important to point out that the majority of British soccer games are, in fact, played without (disorderly) incident.

Summary

This chapter began by supporting Roadburg's (1980) contention that many of the historical and socio-cultural conditions under which soccer is played in the United Kingdom actually appear more conducive towards spectator disorder than those experienced in the North American sports context. Because of the long and working-class-related history of British soccer, stadia (many of which were built before World War I or II) are drab, uncomfortable, more than occasionally unsafe (Popplewell, 1985), and offer few of the amenities of their North American counterparts. Moreover, the hooligan problem that has developed around British soccer has dramatically transformed the appearance of stadia, the atmosphere inside and outside of them, and thereby the general cultural experience of a 'trip to the
match' per se for all fans. It is under these conditions that 'super crews' of young, male, proletarian supporters, from towns sufficiently close to have developed deeply entrenched rivalries over the years, come to soccer to defend the reputation of their team and contest their notions of 'manliness' (Williams et al., 1984). By contrast, we argued that many of the features that make up the experience of North American sports spectating are totally incompatible with this set of circumstances. Although a number of exceptions were mentioned, facilities provided at and around stadia were seen to afford a more relaxed, cordial and family-oriented atmosphere for the sports crowd. The cumulative result of all this is that in terms of actual numbers of violent incidents and the regularity of their manifestation, the British soccer match, replete with all of its historical and cultural baggage, appears potentially more prone to crowd disorder than North American sports.

The chapter then moved on to a comparison of the most commonly manifested forms of disorder in both settings using press accounts collected from the content analysis for purposes of illustration. These included missile throwing and the smuggling of weapons into games, field invasion, property destruction and vandalism, spectator fighting and victory celebration riots. Additionally, the question of when and where sports crowd disorder takes place in North America and Britain was raised. The significance of this
discussion lies in demonstrating that disorder is expressed in a broad assortment of ways and that, although there are several areas of overlap between them, types of North American and British disorder are generally expressed differentially. It was argued that in large part this is due to divergences in historically constructed contexts and conditions of sports spectating in each setting. For example, it was noted that the more organized hooligan rival gang confrontations in Britain usually take place outside stadia because of an increase in policing procedures inside stadia.

It is clear that sports crowd disorder has taken on a more formalized organizational structure--soccer hooliganism--in the British context than sports crowd disorder in North America. As the systematic and now institutionalized features which characterize soccer hooliganism have developed since the 1960s (e.g., hierarchical group structures, rationally constructed plans of attack, informally arranged meeting locations, the invention of group names and argot, etc.), so the relationship of hooliganism to the sport of soccer has become attenuated. The soccer match is apparently increasingly becoming a pretext for hooligan endeavours and, despite occasional evidence for the 'violence-precipitates-violence' thesis of M. Smith (1983), the actual course of the game as it is played seems to govern less and less the occurrence of
disorder. This is not to suggest, however, that the relationship between hooliganism and soccer has been annulled. With quite distinct ongoing links between hooligan incidents and the soccer season itself, the point at hand is that, as it has developed as an institutionalized cultural form, hooliganism has in many ways taken on a life of its own, i.e., it often takes place whether the game is passive or violent, whether the home team wins or loses, etc. It is in this sense that its relationship to the game itself has become mediated.

By contrast, in the North American situation where sports crowd disorder is altogether less institutionalized, its occurrence still appears to be closely connected to action on the field of play (e.g., when the home team is losing, imbalanced games, violence by participants, etc.,).

It also needs to be mentioned that British soccer hooliganism accompanies a large and now notorious group of ritualized subcultural forms and styles associated with (male) youth in the post-war period. As a number of sociologists have noted (e.g., Clarke et al., 1976; Hall et al., 1978; Hebdige, 1979; Pearson, 1983), this group includes the 'Spivs', 'Teddy Boys', ' Mods and Rockers', 'Skinheads', 'Punks', etc. Importantly, these cultural forms have usually been identified both by primary and secondary definers and by members of the general public as more than 'everyday' deviants; as groups which represent an inherent threat and
menace to 'respectable' society. That these social types do not lend themselves to easy rationalization has only exacerbated their status as menacing folk devils. One important indication of this is that in the United Kingdom (and indeed in Europe more broadly) police and the courts have punished soccer hooligans and other deviant youth much more severely than other groups which participate in aggressive public behaviour, such as race/political rioters, etc.

Again, the situation is different in North America where many youth subcultural forms appear easier to rationalize. This is probably attributable to the associations often drawn between youth culture and deviant/criminal forms of profit making and capitalist accumulation such as drugs, pornography, prostitution, and the sale of 'bootleg' fashion and musical forms on the 'black market'. This association with disapproved of but largely interpretable activity has meant that most youth gang violence and death in North America (the U.S. specifically) has been easily rationalized away on these grounds, particularly among non-whites. The net result of all of this is that North American youth cultural forms have traditionally been and continue to be widely perceived as less threatening to dominant ideology and its hegemonic associations.

The chapter concluded with a note on the frequency of press accounts of disorder for each context. On the basis of a small count of total numbers of accounts of crowd
disorder in both contexts reported in Canada's national newspaper, the *Globe and Mail*, over a four year period, and of results from the larger content analysis, it was argued that something of a preoccupation exists in the North American press with 'the British/English disease' of hooliganism, the frequency and magnitude of which tends to be exaggerated. By comparison, incidents of North American disorder that are reported in the North American press are covered in rather different terms which tend to negate any sense of public 'threat' they may carry. This process and its implications are discussed further in Chapter Eight.

Having examined the formal and structural aspects of the problem, and having argued that sports crowd disorder manifests itself in a variety of forms in both North America and the United Kingdom, the following chapter goes on to review what can be seen as the phenomenological and interpretational aspects of the problem, i.e., the meanings of sports crowd disorder for fans, sports clubs, police and security personnel, etc.
1. In addition to chants of encouragement British soccer fans sing to their teams, fans also use songs to threaten rival sets of supporters. An example of the former is the rhythmic chanting of the team's name (e.g., "LIV-er-pool, LIV-er-pool," etc.) while the following are examples of the latter:

We don't carry hammers, we don't carry lead
We only carry hatchets, to bury in your head
Because we are all supporters, fanatics every one
We all hate Man. City, Leeds and Everton.

We're forever blowing bubbles
Pretty bubbles in the air
They fly so high, they reach the sky
Like West Ham, they fade and die
Tottenham are always running
Chelsea are running too
But when you come to Anfield
We'll be running after you

Due to the fact that British fan rivalries do not exist in the same form in North America, and that most stadia predominantly contain one set of fans only because of geographical constraints upon travelling to away games, threatening chants such as these have not developed in North America to date. Chants that are used generally focus on the names of teams or players (e.g., "RAID-ers, RAID-ers," etc.) or on plays which fans feel the team should implement (e.g., "DE-fence, DE-fence").

2. For example, the English Football Association, the controlling administrative body for the game, was formed in 1863 (Marples, 1954; Mason, 1980).

3. For example, the Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club, an extremely successful American League team, was not inaugurated until 1976, and the similarly successful Seattle Seahawks did not join the National Football League until 1977.
4. It should be noted, however, that Hopcraft (1968:162) goes on to rationalize the appeal of standing on crowded terraces to watch soccer games:

In this incomparable entanglement of bodies and emotion lies the heart of the fan's commitment to football. The sense of triumph and dejection expressed here (on the terraces) are never quite matched in any seated section of a football ground.

Following some fifteen continual years of soccer spectating experience in the United Kingdom, this author would concur with Hopcraft's assertion.

5. Nowadays, this regularly includes closed-circuit television facilities, police on horses and with dogs, and the recently introduced 'hooligan', a specifically designed 'hi-tech' police vehicle for apprehending and detaining hooligan fans.

6. For a more thorough socio-anthropological explanation of these and other match-day events, see Marsh et al., (1978) and Morris (1981).

7. It is widely recognised, for example, that many wooden-framed stadia still in use in Britain are as unsafe as the Bradford City Stadium, part of which burned to the ground in less than eight minutes during a fire on May 11, 1985. Fifty-seven fans burned to death trying to escape. Popplewell (1985) discusses the structural conditions of British soccer stadia and fan safety in them.

8. For example, Chicago's Wrigley Field, one of the oldest stadia in Major League Baseball, has been in operation since 1916 (Time, March 7, 1988:33).

9. Dunning et al., (1984a:21) have argued that this new media attention to a problem which had existed for some time at British soccer should be understood in terms of anxiety on the part of the British public and Football Association over the global television attention which British soccer grounds (and fans in them) were to be receiving during the World Cup Finals in the summer of 1966. The anxiety was amplified following an incident at a Millwall vs Brentford game in 1965 when a fan threw an extinct hand-grenade onto the pitch and caused a scare.

10. See the 'Hooligan' television documentary (1985).
11. See Marsh et al., (1978) and the 'Hooligan' television documentary.

12. As a report in The Observer (March 17, 1985:4), and the 'Hooligan' documentary show, hooligan groups are constantly involved in 'plotting up', i.e., studying how to avoid detection by police, how best to attack rival fans, and how to defend one's 'manor' (home territory).

13. The supporters of most English and Scottish soccer clubs who engage in hooligan behaviour have adopted their own nicknames. These include: 'Bushwackers' (Millwall); 'Goonies' (Arsenal); 'Yids' (Tottenham Hotspur); 'Scallies' (Liverpool); 'Red Army' (Manchester United); 'Inter-City Firm' (West Ham United); 'Anti-Personnel Firm' (Chelsea); 'Service Crew' (Leeds United); 'Soccer Casuals' (Aberdeen); 'Main Firm' (Cambridge); 'Utility Thugs' (Dundee); 'Saturday Alternative Squad' (Hibernian). The origin of such nicknames is associated with some characteristic of the group's behaviour. West Ham's 'Inter-City Firm', for example, are known to travel to away games in the luxurious coaches of 'Inter-City' trains.

14. Members of Chelsea's 'Anti-Personnel Firm', for instance, leave gold-embossed cards reading: "Nothing personal--you have been serviced by the Anti-Personnel Firm." (Globe and Mail, June 8, 1985:9).

15. While this is largely true of soccer hooligan behaviour in England (i.e., in its 'home' context), games abroad (i.e., in continental Europe) have acquired reputations for 'binge boozing', where these cultural requirements regarding not being drunk and 'out of control' are relaxed, if not inverted.

16. For example, in an earlier study, this author (1980) unearthed one of the earliest examples of underground rival fan violence in the English context available to date:

An exciting scene took place at Middlewich Station on Saturday evening, after a match between Nantwich and Crewe for the Cheshire final. Both parties assembled on opposite platforms waiting for trains. They commenced operations by alternately hooting and cheering, and then one man challenged an antagonist to a fight. Both leaped on the metals and fought desperately until separated by the officials. Then a great number of the Nantwich men ran across the line, storming the platform occupied by the
Crewe men. Uninterested passengers bolted right and left. The special then came in and the police guarded them off, many of them carrying away marks that will distinguish them for some time.

(Liverpool Echo, April 1, 1889)

17. The 'Hooligan' documentary, for instance, shows the West Ham United 'Inter-City Firm' travelling to Manchester long before kick-off to meet up with Manchester United's 'Red Army'.

CHAPTER FIVE
INTERPRETATIONAL ASPECTS OF SPORTS CROWD DISORDER

Introduction

As stated, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a general phenomenological analysis of interpretations and meanings of sports crowd disorder held by various parties involved. First, questionnaire and interview data are used in an examination of how a range of personnel experiencing sports crowd disorder directly, i.e., the clubs, police and stadium security agents, perceive the surrounding issues. As noted in Chapter Three, due to financial and time constraints and problems of accessibility, these data relate only to information rendered by such personnel in the North American context.

Second, the more general question of 'approval and expectation of violence in sport' is raised in order to demonstrate that sportsworld has actually institutionalized the use of violence in sport by players, and that an extremely ambiguous separation exists between orderly fan behaviour as perceived and encouraged by the clubs, promoters, etc., and behaviour perceived as disorder. Further data unearthed from interviews with fans, and police
and security personnel are introduced to show that aggressive and violent behaviour by players and fans is both formally and informally encouraged and legitimized by the structural and cultural organization of sport in general.

**Questionnaire Results: How the North American Clubs Perceive Sports Crowd Disorder**

The total response rate to the questionnaire was 35.6% (n=31) and, as we noted in Chapter Three, one would encounter problems in generalizing to a larger population from such a relatively small data set. However, information submitted by the clubs was considered of great importance, even when used illustratively, since it provided an insight into the problem of sports crowd disorder as perceived by the clubs themselves which compared with other interpretations of sports crowd disorder, such as those held by stadium security staff and police, to research previously conducted, in addition, of course, to press reports.

Of the fifteen questions contained on the questionnaire, most were open-ended. Consequently, several answers focused on a variety of issues, although certain common response themes nevertheless emerged. It is usual with questionnaire responses for certain questions to elicit more comprehensive and pertinent data than others, and the questionnaire used in this study proved to be no exception.
Thus the following report of questionnaire results will centre predominantly upon those answers, comments and emerging themes which were considered of greatest relevance for the study of sports crowd disorder. In order to support the responses to key issues being described, some tabular summaries of frequency distributions are also presented.

Although the age of spectators at North American sports events varies enormously (roughly 18-70 years of age), most clubs noted that the majority of crowd members fall into the 25-45 years of age bracket. Their gender, economic and racial characteristics were also seen to differ depending upon the type of sport played, and the socio-economic climate in which the sports organization was located, but, in general, clubs asserted that their audiences were comprised of largely white, male, middle-class spectators. All clubs concurred in the argument, allegedly supported by privately kept records (of numbers of arrests, injuries, ejections, etc.), that the most frequent offenders in sports crowd disorder were overwhelmingly young, white males aged roughly between 18-35 years of age. One baseball club from the American Northeast commented:

A complete cross-section of society attends our home games, with blacks and whites being represented about the same. But most of the fans we throw out or arrest are young white guys. This group is really the group which causes most problems for security here.
In support of these comments, two football clubs reported that fans arrested and ejected at their games, in the words of one, "...are nearly always under 25 years of age" (see Table 3).

Table 3. General Summary of Clubs' Interpretations of Factors Related to Crowd Disorder at Their Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club Responses</th>
<th>Frequency of Club Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male participants involved</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female participants involved</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White participants involved</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white participants involved</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly fans aged 20 and younger</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly fans aged 30 and younger</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly fans aged 30 and older</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly fans as season ticket holders</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly fans as regular attenders, non-season ticket holders</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly fans as casual attenders</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.
A high proportion of clubs (77%, n=24) noted that most offenders were usually 'casual' spectators or non-season-ticket holders, and this was understood as resulting from the fact that "...these are the fans who don't have to come back week after week and face other fans they've embarrassed themselves in front of"; or again:

These people are basically anonymous faces in the crowd. They don't attend all games, but when they do they move from section to section and get into trouble in most of them. With one particular group, we've followed them for some time now and know exactly who they are.

In previous research, Leuck et al., (1979) have similarly argued that irregular attenders show higher levels of aggression at sports, but explained this in terms of the fact that regular attenders become accustomed to the stress of the game.

Only one (N.F.L.) club alluded to female participation in disorder, but commented that its records indicated that the numbers of women apprehended for unruly behaviour at games had "...increased during the last five years." The club pointed out that an increasingly common form of female disorder was encroachment onto the playing area and/or 'streaking'.

Commenting upon the extent and frequency of crowd disorder in and around stadia (see Table 4), the majority of clubs clearly assessed the issue in direct relation to the usual size of their audiences with the predominant conclus-
ion that crowd disorder was 'minimal' (70.9%, n=22). For example, a Canadian Football League (C.F.L.) club said that its levels of unruly behaviour were "...quite reasonable," and one N.F.L. club pointed out that "...only minor incidents occur at each home game, which is expected when crowds of 60,000 gather." Similarly, a Major League baseball club in Canada experienced "...relatively few problems," and a National Hockey League (N.H.L.) club in the American mid-West boasted of its "...basically well-behaved fans."

Apparently surprised by any suggestion of the existence of crowd disorder at hockey in general, one N.H.L. club in Canada commented:

The perspective and direction of your questioning assumes that crowd disorders exist at hockey games. In this regard, the answers provided...may be disappointing to you. Crowd disorders are not a relevant concern to date.

Moreover, as many as twelve clubs (38.7%, n=12) mentioned that in relation to spectator disorder elsewhere in the world (eight referred to British soccer, two to soccer in South America, and two gave no examples) they felt "content-ed" with the behaviour of North American fans:

When we compare our hooliganism to that elsewhere around the globe (of course England is the worst place) we feel very fortunate. So far, our fans have really been very easy to control.

Only 16.1% (n=5) of the clubs which responded considered that the frequency of crowd disorder was sufficiently high as to cause concern. As one N.F.L. club put it:
Disorders at our games have been rising at such a rate that we have doubled our security staff in the last five years. And that staff may have to be increased further if things continue as they are now.

It should be noted, however, that few other clubs made comments to this effect.

Table 4. Frequency Count of Clubs' Interpretations of Extent and Frequency of Crowd Disorder at Their Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club Response</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal and basically well-behaved</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better behaved than sports crowds in other countries</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better behaved than soccer crowds in the U.K.</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder increased in last decade (1976-1986)</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder decreased in last decade (1976-1986)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder remained stable in last decade (1976-1986)</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to upgrade crowd control in last decade (1976-1986)</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite this alleged general lack of concern and the broadly held view that crowds are 'relatively well-behaved', clubs perceiving their crowd disorder frequency to have
increased in recent seasons, i.e., in the last decade, 1976-1986 (35.4%, n=11) outnumbered those perceiving it to have decreased (19.3%, n=6) by almost two to one. Most respondents (45.1%, n=14) considered crowd disorder to be both 'minimal' and 'stable'. Interestingly, given this alleged contentment with crowd behaviour, a very large number of clubs (74.1%, n=23) also commented that they had, in the words of one American baseball club, "...felt a need to upgrade crowd control measures in recent seasons" and several even spoke of introducing 'security awareness' programmes. One wonders at the rationale behind such security modifications implemented by clubs which perceive crowd problems at their stadia to be of 'minimal' concern.

Regarding the actual expression of crowd disorder, i.e., its forms, it was unsurprising (given the connection usually drawn between the two) that (100%, n=31) of respondents listed profanity and its link with inebriation as the primary form. As one N.F.L. club said:

The two leading contenders have to be verbal abuse and drunkenness. Actually, drunkenness should be listed first as...the verbal abuse tends to be centred around what is happening on the field of play whereas the drunkenness seems to be a problem no matter what is happening.

Significantly, however, other types of disorder that were described tended to differ by sport (see Table 5). For example, while football and baseball clubs underlined fighting amongst fans, confrontation with police and
security, vandalism, the use of drugs (predominantly cited were marihuana and cocaine) and even public urination as the principal forms of disorder, the locus of crowd disorder problems for hockey clubs seemed to be the throwing of missiles (coins, cups, programmes, food, beer, etc.,) and the rhythmic chanting of profane slogans and songs. As one N.H.L. club observed:

The location of our games is an area of downtown New York that could be classified as a sociologist's dream. The events in the stands hardly seem out of place when one evaluates the overall setting, but I am sure there are people from other planets who attend our games. And they affect the whole audience. If the team is winning, the crowd will pay attention, but if it becomes apparent that a loss is about to occur, or if the team is playing poorly, then the general booing starts and spreads and becomes almost deafening. One unpleasant trend in recent seasons is the rhythmic chanting of profanity and profane songs which usually spreads to the entire 17,000. I'd say of all the public complaints we get now, this is one of the most common.

Another N.H.L. club emphasized problems at their games caused by the throwing of missiles:

Unfortunately, this tends to be occurring more and more, whether we win or lose. The result doesn't seem to matter any more. You'd be amazed at what has been thrown onto the ice lately. We get the typical stuff like candy, programmes and popcorn, but we also get bizarre stuff like hot coffee (which messes the ice), coins, pretzels, etc. Last season a kitten was thrown onto the ice. This is a concern because it usually stops play. The players are concerned because it's dangerous and someday one of them is going to lose and eye or get injured.
All of this substantiates arguments made in Chapter Four regarding missile throwing as a specific form of sports crowd disorder in North America.

Table 5. Frequency Count of Clubs' Interpretations of Expression (Form) of Crowd Disorder by Sport*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club Response</th>
<th>Baseball %</th>
<th>Baseball N</th>
<th>Football %</th>
<th>Football N</th>
<th>Hockey %</th>
<th>Hockey N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inebriation</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profanity</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontations with Police/Security</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan Fighting</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Drugs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Throwing</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profane Slogans/Songs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Urination</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These are the percentages of total responses for clubs of each individual sport. Of the 31 questionnaire respondents, 8 (25.8%) were hockey clubs, 15 (48.3%) were football clubs, and 8 (25.8%) were baseball clubs.

As asked to detail the perceived causes of crowd disorder (see Table 6), 97% (n=30) of respondents looked to factors within the context of the game situation itself (as
opposed to larger, social structural precipitants), and particularly to the excessive levels of alcohol sold by vendors in and around stadia. The four most common other causes, often postulated together, were uneven or one-sided scores, poor officiating, player violence (lending support to M. Smith's (1983) 'violence-precipitates-violence' hypothesis) and rival fan provocation. By contrast, the one club which looked to factors outside the context of the game situation as causes of disorder explained that its evidence showed crowd disorder to be precipitated by "Frustration caused by stress--unemployment, financial problems, domestic problems, etc.," but, again, unfortunately felt "...impelled to withhold private records (i.e., evidence) in the interests of the club."

Interestingly, and in contradiction to research conducted elsewhere on crowd disorder in soccer (e.g., Mann, 1974; M. Smith, 1976b; Fisher, 1976), one N.H.L. club argued that participant violence in hockey should not be viewed as a cause of disorder: "...player violence always brings the crowd under control by attracting its attention." A small number of football and baseball clubs similarly refuted such a link between participant violence and crowd disorder, but in general, participant violence was seen by most (especially hockey--75%, n=6) clubs as a cause of crowd disorder.

Of the sixty-three sports stadia in the U.S.A. that serve professional teams, sixty-one of them sell beer and
twenty-four hard liquor (Gilbert and Twyman, 1983:68). With the apparently widespread agreement among clubs that crowd disorder was often alcohol-related (74.1%, n=23), it followed that most clubs (80.6%, n=25) had recently introduced or modified regulations regarding the sale of alcohol inside stadia. Only 16.1% (n=5) of respondents, all based in the U.S., commented that alcohol was sold without limitation throughout games. In the majority of cases, clubs advance a policy of terminating sales prior to the conclusion of games (e.g., at or around the end of the third quarter in football, during the seventh inning in baseball, during the last period in hockey), and/or restricting its purchase to a certain quantity at each sale (normally between two to four cups per person), in addition to confiscating alcohol containers at the gate and reserving the right to refuse to serve intoxicated patrons. Further, a number of clubs mentioned that the "continuous review" of alcohol sales and their effects had recently led to a transition to low-alcohol or 'light' beer. This represents such a recent introduction that it is too early to comment on the effects of 'light' beer for sports crowd disorder accurately, but with the difference in alcohol content between regular and light beer usually only being one percent, one can speculate that its introduction is unlikely to bring about a dramatic decrease in the problem.
Given the crowd problems that many clubs trace to alcohol consumption at sports, and that the large breweries frequently either own stadia in North America or offer attractive sponsorships to clubs, it was not surprising that data emerging from the questionnaire vis-a-vis the role played by alcohol in sports crowd disorder were indicative of the controversial nature of the issue and its implications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club Response</th>
<th>Baseball</th>
<th>Football</th>
<th>Hockey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Alcohol Consumption</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Player Violence</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneven/One-Sided Scores</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Officiating</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival Fan Provocation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Structural Factors (e.g., unemploymen, boredom)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Again, these are the percentages of total responses for clubs of each individual sport. Of the 31 questionnaire respondents, 8 (25.8%) were hockey clubs, 15 (48.3%) were football clubs and 8 (25.8%) were baseball clubs.
On the one hand, a number of clubs appeared ready to severely limit or altogether ban the sale of alcohol, but for reasons of sponsorship and/or ownership felt coerced into maintaining its sale:

There is a policy within our stadium that restricts the number of beer sales to three per customer at one time. We do not control the concessions at our stadium (city owned) and therefore have very little to say about the policies. It is not unusual to see someone walking through the crowd with more than the three beer limit...we have asked yearly that the city modify the drinking policies that they have set...Naturally, we have met stiff opposition as beer sales are a strong source of income for the city. We, on the other hand, do not receive any revenue from concessions and have always had the policy that we would like to see beer sales at the stadium done away with.

Similarly, another club wrote:

We must get greater cooperation from our concessionaires and their vendors who, all too often, are only interested in selling vast quantities of beer.

Many more clubs, however, were quick to indicate that if a link existed between sports crowd disorder and alcohol consumption, that link was more a result of fans arriving at stadia already intoxicated than the effects of consumption of alcohol sold inside the ground. As one club put it: "...the beer sold here is so frothy that your little sister couldn't get drunk on it!" Moreover, several clubs, many of which are noticeably owned or sponsored in whole or in part by famous breweries, went on to rationalize beer sales in
terms of problems that could be expected to develop in the
event of a total ban on the sale of beer inside stadia:

Since beer has been sold in stadiums of professional football teams...there may have been a decline in drunkenness due to the fact that the bars are closed at the beginning of the fourth quarter, whereas prior to this if fans brought a twelve-pack to the game they would probably drink all twelve so as not to have to take any home with them.

Another club concurred with this view:

Beer and crowd control are unrelated, at least in the sense that your question implies. If there is a relation, it is a positive one. In the days before the sale of beer, janitors would find hundreds of empty liquor bottles all over the stadium and we'd see fans go home very drunk. Some of these bottles were also thrown onto the playing field. Now, because beer is so accessible for fans who are interested, the quantity of hard liquor has decreased a lot. Because of this it's probably true to say that we get less drunks and less trouble.

It is, then, highly illustrative of the contradiction in the clubs' attitudes towards the role played by alcohol in North American sports crowd disorder that while most clubs rationalized alcohol sales inside stadia (in terms such as the above), a large number of them also placed fan inebriation high on their list of precipitants of disorder, and presumably therefore their areas of concern vis-a-vis crowd control.

The overall 'feel' emerging from the survey was quite ambiguous. As demonstrated here, while the majority of clubs believed that the frequency of crowd disorder at their
games had recently increased, and spoke of drunkenness and alcohol-related behaviour as a central source of crowd problems, it was equally clear that many of them were reluctant to acknowledge any general concern with the problem of crowd disorder per se. This renders the interpretations provided by the next category of subjects, stadium security personnel and police, very significant for a more balanced understanding of the issues involved.

Interview Results: How North American Stadium Security Personnel, Police, League Committee Members and Team Mascots Perceive Sports Crowd Disorder

The type and extent of security procedures at sports stadia in North America depends upon a number of factors, including: (1) stadium ownership--stadium owned by city councils provide fewer 'in-house' security personnel than privately owned stadia; (2) record of past behaviour by fans--certain clubs which historically have developed reputations for fan rowdiness employ greater numbers of security staff on match days; (3) type of game played and anticipated size of crowd and behaviour of fans--as in the United Kingdom, matches played between local rivals or other teams which have established rivalries will receive greater security surveillance. On the whole, however, most clubs employ a combination of 'in-house' security staff (e.g.,
ushers, retired policemen, doorguards) and outside sources (e.g., local police officers and specially trained security company personnel) as agents of social control on match days.  

A good deal of the information preferred by these sources (a total of twenty-four interviews) regarding forms of sports crowd disorder and their experience with it echoed and supported the dominant explanations presented by the clubs on the questionnaires, and some of this is reviewed here. A slightly different set of data, however, particularly concerning perceptions of the extent of the disorder problem per se, but also on types of and changes in policing regulations and procedures over recent seasons, was gathered during interviews. This was considered important for the study. Most significantly, these data unanimously suggested that the incidence of spectator rowdiness had increased in recent seasons. As one Chief of Police in the southern Ontario region pointed out:

Throughout the national and international sports scene, it is becoming apparent that more fans are reacting to sporting events in violent and destructive manners.

Essentially, data provided by interviews with security staff and police focused on three areas of concern.

First, having agreed with the clubs' view that the majority of offenders in sports crowd disorder are young, white males, a number of security staff and police further bolstered club comments in arguing that offenders are most
frequently 'casual' or non-season ticket holders, usually
located in the general admission sections of stadia, and are
generally more interested in being 'part of the crowd' than
observing a sports spectacle:

Basically, what you get at our games is a
lot of people who'll come down here to watch
you change a tire! I mean...they're not
interested in football, they're interested
in crowds. These are the ones who more often
than not start the trouble.

We have an element of fans...all they want
to do is come in here and wreck the place,
and party with their friends. They drink as
much beer as they can, get drunk and start
firing abuse around and entirely forget that
a baseball game is being played. At any
given point, they couldn't tell you what the
score was...I can give you examples if you
want. Two seasons ago we became aware of a
group of young men who frequently collected
in the 'nose bleed' section of general
admission. There was about 16 to 20 of them,
and I bet at one time or another every one
of them had been cautioned or fined or
ejected or something. Sometimes we had to
charge them with various things. Well, it
got to the stage where the officers in
question were getting tired of spending so
much time watching them and waiting for
something to happen. I'd have to brief my
men on these guys before the game itself.
Several times they'd come back with their
reports and make comments about these guys
not knowing which inning we were in or even
what the score was. They were there for the
hell of it. I don't think I'm exaggerating
when I say there wasn't one game where this
group didn't over drink and start something.
I think most of them were unemployed, you
know.

At least partial support for this argument seems to come
from a police report of a 'celebration' riot that took place
in Hamilton, Ontario, following Hamilton’s 1986 Grey Cup victory which states:

Then, there are always those individuals who, Grey Cup or no Grey Cup, will always be confrontational. Of the thirteen people charged as a result of the downtown post-game activities, seven possess criminal records.

Rather less support for this apparent common area of agreement between police and security personnel regarding types of participants in sports crowd disorder, however, was provided by a second theme emerging in their own commentaries—namely, that levels of disorder were substantially higher when the home team loses. For example, echoing results found by Bryan and Horton (1976) on defeat-precipitated fan violence, one Head of Security at a baseball club noted:

The behaviour of the crowd is strictly compatible with the type of ball team we have on the field...when the team has an off-day, then the mood of the crowd will change...if the team is losing big we can be sure to have much more trouble than if they were winning...fans all over the stadium begin to lose touch with why they originally came, start getting into the booze, etc. I think boredom has a lot to do with it. In a way it is like anything else. You know, your concentration only lasts for as long as the spectacle is entertaining. That’s why beer sales jump when the team is having an off day.

Similarly, the following remark was made by a police superintendent who regularly works at football games:

We have always had more trouble when they...lose. It’s a fairly predictable trend. The team plays badly, the fans become
frustrated and angry and flare-ups begin to happen in the bleachers...you see this at almost every game. And it's a kind of law or rule of thumb that we gauge our patrol by. Unfortunately, as you know, the ___ have had a pretty lousy team in the last 3 to 4 seasons and we have this reflected in the crowd. Often, even the fans in the pricey seats get into it, like, the regular ones. This differs by section and stadium location, but whenever the ___ lose and if they lose badly (which they do a lot), the flare-ups in the bleachers come on more and more...So I think you're probably right that the state of play is an indication of what we're likely to find in the crowd. We all joke now that sooner or later the ___ are going to get a good quarterback or something, and our job will be a lot easier. I didn't work here back then, but I heard that in the days of ___ and ___ when ___ had a good ball team, the fans were milder by comparison.

Thus, although the information presented by police and security personnel did not contradict the view usually held in sport that crowd disorder takes place most commonly in cheap seat sections of stadia, a substantial proportion of their comments suggests that those participating in disorder include both 'casual', i.e., relatively disinterested, fans and fans with more deeply-entrenched team identifications, who react aggressively to unstimulating team performances and team losses.

Finally, police and security personnel remarked that as a response to the aforementioned perceived increase in frequency of disorder in recent seasons and of problems so-caused, a number of crowd control measures have had to be introduced or modified. In addition to crowd control changes
detailed in the previous section, such measures include: stiff increases in fines for trespassing on the field of play (e.g., as a result of a spate of pitch invasions at football, one Ontario city passed a by-law charging fans encroaching onto the playing field during or following C.F.L. games $1000); reductions in police tolerance regarding treatment of fans inside stadia (e.g., a Director of Security at another Ontario football club noted that beginning in the 1985 season, police and security had been instructed to eject rather than warn inebriated fans when first apprehended); encouragements to clubs to discuss the feasibility of building family enclosures for season-ticket holders—and particularly children—who would benefit from 'safer' and more protected seating locations (e.g., a number of C.F.L. and baseball clubs are currently exploring this idea). In addition to these changes, we also know that at least two major league baseball clubs (Detroit Tigers and Chicago Cubs) have recently responded to sustained violent crowd behaviour by closing large bleacher sections (New York Times, June 2, 1985:Sect.5:2), costing them thousands of dollars in lost revenues each season.

In interviews, some of these crowd control and policing changes proved to be very contentious areas of the problem. Although in general, police and stadium security personnel appeared to agree on most issues, it was in the application of new and heavier penalties/sanctions that at
least one area of disagreement surfaced. For example, the Ontario city mentioned above had passed its by-law one season prior to starting the research for this study, and security personnel interviewed at the club in question made their contempt for police practices and police inconsistency quite clear with regard to the said by-law, and its meanings in practical terms. The following comments made by head of security at the club underline what was perceived to be a rare but increasing area of tension between police and security personnel:

Why the hell this city makes a by-law of this type is beyond me because the police don't do anything about it. At least not consistently, they don't. Our reports show that we get people trespassing every game, but few ever get charged with doing it. This makes our job more difficult because it puts us in a position where we have to deal with trespassers ourselves. As you are probably aware, we don't have power to charge or arrest so we just throw them out of the stadium, but until fans realize that going on the field is something they should be fined for, and fined a thousand bucks by the way, they'll keep on coming.

A rather different perspective on the same issue was offered by a police Chief Superintendent in the same city:

We've been around the table a few times on this one. I don't understand our job here one bit. There's so much going on during a game that trespassing on the field is something we see as trivial. Most of the time we don't see it at all because we're doing something else. In an average game, we get assault, drunk and disorderly behaviour, theft from the concessions, drunk fans hassling other fans, etc. You wouldn't believe what we get. Unless the trespasser stops the game, which I don't think usually
happens, or bothers the players or something, our attitude is that the club pays security to look after that type of thing. We don't understand why the new-by-law came in. We realize the fans do get on the field, but it usually involves fans who have had too much to drink or something like that. The best way to deal with it has been just to throw them out. Usually they're pretty harmless folks, just a bit worse for wear. It would be different if they were vandalizing the field or assaulting a player. Then we'd have to move in.

In general, however, such conflict of interest between club security personnel and police proved to be unusual. In fact, it needs to be said that there existed a remarkable congruity between their views and arguments, representing a general and consistent perspective of 'policing agents' on the issue of sports crowd disorder.

However, a significant difference in perception of the problem of sports crowd disorder apparently exists between the two data sources discussed here. Whereas a high proportion of questionnaire respondents (45.1%, n=14) considered crowd disorder to be relatively 'minimal' and 'stable' and thus of no apparent concern, police and security staff, often on the payroll of the same clubs, unanimously claimed to have observed over approximately the last ten years an emphatic rise in levels of disorder at sports events. When asked to comment upon this clear discrepancy in interpretations made by the two parties involved, police and security personnel provided two general explanations.
First, a number of policing agents at times appeared very skeptical of how much credence was actually given to their work by the clubs themselves:

Because of this there's been some complaints here in recent times. The job of our security here won't be made any easier until we get more cooperation from the clubs. We've asked for more people, even ushers and gate people, you know, but they'll only pay for so many. We've asked for more police officers, but the club will only have so many at one time. It has been like two heads clashing on this one. We say there's a problem so let's deal with it. They say the problem's not that bad and we're all they can afford. We are in control, but I know some of us feel that we could be in more control.

Second, this apparent lack of appreciation for police work was interpreted by those involved principally in terms of a lack of proximity of club officials to the problem being addressed. The same police officer cited above went on to excuse the club management in question on the following basis:

We get enough help from the club as it is but the club doesn't really deal with the problem directly. That's the problem, you see. So we describe the problems we get in the crowd, and estimate the rate of the problem, and the club makes a decision along those lines. But it's us who deals with it. It's us who eject the morons, charge them, arrest them and all that, so in some ways it comes down to this. The club just isn't close enough to the crowd. We see it and we feel it and they hear about it. It's just two different views of the same issue.

Again, on the whole the vast majority of police and security personnel appear to agree that sports crowd disorder had
rigen during the 1980s, and largely refuted the clubs' view that crowd disorder was not an area of 'official' concern. Interpreted as symptomatic of this increase was the fact that several new and modified crowd control procedures and regulations have recently been introduced.

Finally, interviews were also conducted with executive members of two professional sports leagues and three mascots of professional sports teams. On the whole, the views of the executives of these sports leagues were strongly supportive of the dominant perspectives of the clubs on sports crowd disorder, i.e., that crowd disorder was not, in their estimation, a matter for concern, nor had it ever been. As one Director of Special Events and Promotions informed the author:

We must agree with the clubs and owners that spectator violence, although no doubt present as you would expect in crowds of 60,000 plus, is minimal and of insufficient magnitude to warrant more than average attention. If what you say they've said is true and I believe it is, the clubs are very much in control of this problem and it doesn't look it's going anywhere serious in the near future.

In some ways, however, many of these responses seemed suspiciously routine and uninformative with answers such as "don't know", "not in a position to comment", "uncertain about that", etc., predominating. These answers are important because they demonstrate a level of indifference to the problem of sports crowd disorder; an attitude that the
problem per se and its control is largely taken-for-granted in an uncritical manner.

The three mascots interviewed, all under the employ of professional sports clubs in the southern Ontario region, totally concurred with the clubs and the views of league committee members and similarly offered largely routine and uninformative responses. In these specific cases, however, the taken-for-granted and uncritical attitude of the mascots was understood as much more defensive than that of the league committee members. At times, it became quite clear that the respondent was being deliberately vague, perhaps so as to protect the team's, i.e., his employer's, reputation:

If the clubs says there's nothing going on I think you should believe that. I'm on the field, not in the stands, so I don't really make much contact with the fans. But the club is right. I've seen hardly any trouble in my eight years at ____. It's a good crowd; most of them are polite and well-behaved. No! I don't think there's a problem at all.

Importantly, this represents an attempt to 'naturalize' the problem of sports crowd disorder, i.e., to see it and its operation as a natural occurrence and in fact as essentially 'unproblematic'.

In brief, then, interviews provided a contradictory set of responses. On the one hand, stadium personnel and police (representing those most directly in contact with the crowd itself), were extremely vocal in their arguments that sports crowd disorder is a growing problem at professional
sports in North America, a problem largely interpreted as in need of reparation. On the other hand, sports league committee members and team mascots agreed with the dominant view of the clubs themselves that sports crowd disorder is not a problem which justifies widespread official concern. It must be reiterated that these last two categories of respondents were only willing to offer comments which were so implicit and uncritical that they actually appeared deliberately evasive and protective of the clubs and their reputations.

Approval and Expectation of Violence in Sport

It was argued in Chapter One that 'SportsWorld' (Lipsyte, 1975) has in many ways institutionalized the use of violence in sport, and in professional sport in particular. As Ball-Rokeach (1972:101) has observed:

...violence in sport, whether legal or illegal, traditionally has been invested with an aura of legitimacy: qualities of 'righteousness', 'goodness' or 'justifiability' have by collective judgment been attributed to it, and the system of formal and informal sanctions has enforced this judgment.

Attitudes toward sports violence differ broadly but, more than any other social institution, sportsworld sanctions it and, indeed requires it. Moreover, violence is typically rationalized in less than convincing ways, such as in terms of the dubious benefits of cathartic relief (e.g.,
Zichmanis, 1969:15; Tutko and Bruns, 1976:17; Swift, 1986:1). The frequently offered cliché that it is better to do violence on the playing field than in the street predominates, despite being grounded in rather dubious ethologically—rather than socially-based expectations of human behaviour (why must humans do violence at all?).

Usually, 'sports violence' is conceived of as a specific form of player behaviour but, more germane for our purposes, in many ways sportsworld also encourages and approves of aggressive behaviour in the stands. This section briefly explains how the organizational structure of professional sport legitimizes player violence, and then goes on to discuss explanations for aggressive behaviour placed on the sports crowd itself. Using data gathered during interviews with fans, police and others, meanings derived from player and fan violence by the fans themselves are also considered.

That gratuitous violence on the part of athletes is approved of and demanded by coaches, owners and sponsors is a widely recognised feature of modern sports. This can be illustrated in a number of ways, not the least of which is the fact that many incidents routinely occur, and are expected to occur, as 'part of the game' which would be considered legally unacceptable were they to transpire in other areas of society. For example, consider the following information drawn from a wide range of sports events:
1. When asked to describe his favourite type of hockey player, Harold Ballard, owner of the Toronto Maple Leafs, remarks: "I'm looking for guys who you toss meat to and they'll go wild." (Cited in Surface, 1976:142)

2. The selectors of the New Zealand International Rugby team pick two players as 'enforcers' who have been criticized publicly by their peers for 'vicious' and 'dangerous' play. (Crawford, 1978:75)

3. Vanderbilt basketball coach Wayne Dobbs, commenting on the increase in flagrant fouls in the U.S. college game says: "College basketball is becoming like ice hockey...the more blood, the better the show." (Toledo Blade, Feb. 20, 1977:E7)

4. Paul Mulvey, a two hundred and twenty pound L.A. "Kings hockey player is demoted to the minor leagues by coach Don Perry when he refused "...to hit people without provocation." (Cited in Schaap, 1982:4)

5. After declining this author permission to interview fans at a nationally televised boxing bout in Toronto in 1986, a promoter comments: "Boxing is not as violent as people say it is—it is athletics at its highest level. The injuries you see in boxing are totally superficial. Tonight the fighters will look all scraped up but in two days they'll be fine again. It's really just a game played out by two fine-tuned athletes."

6. Ex-Boston Bruins coach Don Cherry tells this author that: "Hockey fighting is not violence. No one really gets hurt. The only real violence in hockey is dirty stick work."

7. Commenting upon 'sports' where specially-reared pheasants are killed in flight, greyhounds rip hares and foxes apart, and deer and stag have their throats slit, a spokesman for the British Field Sport Society argues that: "...field sports are not violent." (Cited in Atyeo, 1979:11)

8. George Allen, ex-coach of the Washington Redskins, admits to having encouraged vicious play "...just to get 'em going...Because unless you get 'em all together...you aren't going to be a winner." (Cited in Tutko and Bruns, 1976:16)

9. An N.H.L. manager comments: "A home team playing aggressive, pleasing hockey has to pick up at least five penalties." (Toronto Star, Nov. 21, 1972:16)
The problem of violence in sport, then, is exacerbated by the fact that many well-known and respected sports figures are happy to promote and defend violent play as a relatively harmless feature of sports, in addition, of course, to a means of increasing gate receipts and, allegedly, adding to fans' entertainment value. In this way, sports violence must be understood as part of the political economy of contemporary professional sports. Many aspects of sports participant violence (e.g., the violent tackle in football, the 'take out' check in hockey) remain sanctioned within the rules of the game itself, or condoned and rationalized if they exist outside the rules (e.g., the fight in hockey, the professional foul in soccer, the personal foul in football).

This tendency for the sports establishment to officially approve of player violence is apparently complemented by the values of players themselves, who frequently rationalize overt displays of violence not only as a means of impressing coaches and remaining employed (Faulkner, 1973), but of establishing kudos, prestige and identity within their peer group (M. Smith, 1975a:79, 1983; Kram, 1982:200). Consequently, one often hears top sports personalities rationalizing sports violence in terms such as those adopted by the coaches, owners and sponsors, i.e., that games are not as violent as publicly perceived, or that cathartic benefit is to be gained from violent play, in addition to offering explanations unique to their own.
situation (e.g., the pressure to keep their place on the team by playing violently). One of the more famous examples of the way in which top professional athletes internalize the views of organizers and owners is the case of hockey 'superstar' Wayne Gretzky, who has been extremely vocal in his defense of fist-fighting in the N.H.L. (e.g., *Calgary Herald*, Feb. 13, 1988: A5). In this way, the violent ethos of professional sports tends to be confirmed and reproduced.

Following all of this, it comes as no surprise that the 'language of sport' in general should also exhibit violent overtones. From the earliest days of sport, for example, the names of teams have always been deliberately adopted to conjure up a symbolic and melodramatic sense of power and potential aggression, and most predominant amongst these are the names of predatory animals and birds (e.g., 'Lions', 'Tigers', 'Bears', 'Falcons', 'Eagles', etc.,) and aggressive historical and mythological figures (e.g., 'Pirates', 'Devils', 'Trojans', 'Giants', 'Barbarians', 'Argonauts', etc.,). In the same way, team plays are given militaristic titles, such as the 'blitz', 'field general', 'suicide squad', and the 'bomb' in football, and players who take on the role of team 'enforcer' are given nicknames by peers and fans alike of violent figures in history and popular culture (e.g., 'Rambo', 'Psycho', 'Hercules', 'Clint', etc.,).
A good deal of contradiction exists as regards the expectations placed on fan behaviour by managers, owners, promoters and even players. While fans are required to 'get involved' in the team and the game emotionally and physically and to pursue rabid fanaticism, they are expected to also understand precisely where such fanaticism should stop. Again, that clubs maintain such expectations for fan involvement can be shown in several ways:

1. A range of behaviours which would be considered a deviation from normative codes in almost any other context are promoted, including: booing and aiming profanity at the sources of entertainment, i.e., officials and players; hissing and screaming; pointing and waving threateningly; stamping feet and banging fists against seats to make loud distracting noises.

2. Team mascots represent the fluctuating emotions of the crowd. They act out a number of symbolic gestures on behalf of the team and fans, including: threatening and pretending to assault opponents; reeling in exasperation when the home team plays badly; encouraging exuberant celebration when the home team plays well, including the mocking and taunting of opposing team players and fans.

3. Team bands, cheerleaders, musicians and scoreboards provoke the crowd into treating the opponents as an 'enemy' which can be beaten, for example, by encouraging the team to 'charge', 'attack', 'invade', etc.

4. Sports events are advertised and promoted as uniquely violent forms of excitement. For example, as Gilbert and Twyman (1983:67) inform us, "The late and un lamented professional box-lacrosse league advertised itself as putting on happenings that Attila the Hun and anybody with a taste for blood and battle would love."  

5. Clubs host special promotional events with extremely violent overtones to elicit fan participation and involvement. Sometimes, this violent potential is fully realised, as demonstrated by the two now famous riots which broke out at the Chicago White Sox's 'disco demolition night' in 1977, and the Cleveland Indian's 'nickel beer night' in 1974.
Certain contradictions thus emerge in the expectations sports clubs have for fan behaviour. The owners and promoters of sport deliberately encourage the violent and frenzied aspects of their sport on the field of play to enhance fan involvement, to generally leave fans "...tingling pleasurably at the spectacle" (M. Smith and Ingham, 1971:205), and thereby to increase box-office sales and profits. However, when fans are overstimulated by the spectacle and behave in a disorderly manner and/or violently, the clubs disapprove. That fans in modern sport are regularly involved in such activities as being drunk and disorderly, throwing missiles, shouting profane and abusive comments, fighting, etc., presents a dilemma for the clubs whose expectations for 'ideal' fan behaviour are not clearly separable from the above-mentioned types of behaviour fans participate in which they are seen to 'get out of hand'. Indeed, the forms of aggressive 'order' clubs condone in their stadia would seem in many ways to be logical precursors of behaviours construed as 'disorder'. As already mentioned, it is also a continual source of embarrassment for clubs owned or sponsored by breweries that many of their most regularly manifested incidents of crowd disorder are linked to excessive alcohol consumption. Perhaps the reluctance on the part of many of the clubs in the survey to recognise sports crowd disorder as a 'problem' can be traced at least in part to this 'ethical dilemma'.
So far, we have discussed a number of features typical of the modern sports spectacle, i.e., violent play and other provocative game-related phenomena (provided by mascot, cheerleader, musician and scoreboard activity, etc.), which sports clubs and promoters encourage to enhance crowd involvement and excitement. Conspicuous in this frenzy-provoking approach towards the sports event is the presumption that fans actually derive enjoyment and meaning from the aggressive stimuli before them. Preliminary investigations into this question (e.g., Comisky et al., 1977; Bryant et al., 1981; Bryant and Zillmann, 1983) have strongly suggested that fans' enjoyment of sport is facilitated by the violent actions of players. One of the purposes of interviewing fans in this study was to test this notion empirically; to establish the meanings fans derive from observing violent sports events, and from participating in disorder at them.

**Fans' Accounts of Sports Crowd Disorder**

The fifty-three fan interviews were conducted predominantly at five sports, four of which are generally construed as violent 'contact' or 'collision' sports (football, ice hockey, boxing, wrestling and baseball). 66% (n=35) of the subjects were male and 33.9% (n=18) female,
and ages ranged from 16 years of age to 44 years of age. Mean age was 29 years of age. To avoid any bias which may have been precipitated by a possible correlation between seat location and attitude to sports violence, interviewees were chosen randomly from a number of different seat locations inside stadia.

Questions asked focused on a series of wide ranging sports-related issues (see Appendix 'A') but particular attention was given to fans' perceptions of and reactions to (player and fan) violence in sport. Specifically, fans' comments were linked to two questions (Questions 4 and 13) in response to which two central themes in their attitudes toward sports violence emerged. It should initially be pointed out that 79.2% (n=42) of respondents (73.8% (n=31) males, 26.1% (n=11) females) said that participant violence enhanced their enjoyment of the sports spectacle, but only 22.6% (n=12) of respondents said that they would like to see more player violence in sport. Significantly, this latter group were all males.

First, those fans commenting that participant violence did not enhance their enjoyment of the sports event offered a range of personal interpretations and explanations usually focused on sportsmanship and skill:

No. There's too much fighting and hitting and it takes away from the skills of the game. It also does not demonstrate good sportsmanship to anyone but particularly youngsters. It's wrong in a major way.
No. Dirty play is everywhere these days in sport, especially in hockey. Sometimes, I feel like we're in gladiator days. No, I wish there was less violence and the _______ of the world were all gone. It doesn't achieve anything, so we're really amazed the fans react the way they do. Some of the fans really get off on it. It's crazy. You should see them when there's a fight. It's crazy. You'd think they were at boxing. There almost seems to be more enthusiasm for fights than goals.

Violence is stupid. Look at all of the teams who have ever done great in sport. Only one or two have been violent at all. Look at _______. Apart from _______ who everyone knows is there for one reason, you know, violence, they have no goons but they win and win and win. Violence and fighting should be stamped on... Lately I've been watching my son when there's a fight. I think he's getting wrapped up in the way the crowd laps up fighting and that. We've started talking about it but right now I think he's just really into it. I kind of resent goon hockey for having that effect on him.

Interestingly, although one might hypothesize that it would be the older, i.e., more mature and less impressionable, fans making such comments, the interviews showed no direct correlation between age of interviewees and attitude to sports violence. For example, the first two of the three explanations here were provided respectively by a young teenager (16 years) and an older teenager (19 years).

In general, however, violence seemed to have strong appeal for fans and two central explanations were offered by them to account for this and the apparent enjoyment of observing participant violence in sport.
First, rather than being essential to the appeal of the spectacle in itself, data collected suggest that player violence for the fan is representative of the fact that team members are playing with effort and intensity, and genuinely 'struggling' on behalf of the club. Fans regularly commented that watching athletes "...give all they've got" was an important contributory factor to the overall entertainment value of the sports event, irrespective of injuries caused by such vigorous play:

Violence intensifies the competition. You know, the players are not just thinking of a fat pay cheque. They want to win. I don't want to see anyone seriously hurt in a fight or rough play but I want to see them give everything they have to win, not just to go through the motions...broken legs and that don't attract me, but at least it shows those guys are trying.

Violent play adds to the look of the game. It shows the intensity of the individual player and what he is willing to give to win a game...being committed is showing you're a franchise player. That's the whole thing with ______. Sure he's dumb, but he's probably willing to go further for the _____ than the rest of the team put together. He's worth his weight in gold because of that. And that's why he's a team favourite.

When the players give all they have, whether it's violent or not, the crowd likes it. It proves they're really trying. The worst type of athlete to watch as a fan is the type who doesn't try. We have paid good money to see games and we are right to expect players to earn their money. When they play aggressively, it gets the crowd going, cheering louder, more involved, and makes for a better time all round. I think most people here will tell you that. Maybe that's why everyone goes crazy when there's a fight. It tells us that there is something real out
there. Otherwise we're spending money to get fooled, right? That would be like going to wrestling or something. No one wants to see fake sports.

Thus, at least one aspect of the appeal of player violence for fans interviewed in this study can be summarized using Novak's (1976:149) recent argument that:

The most satisfying element in sports is spirit. Other elements being equal, the more spirited team will win. The one that hits the hardest, drives itself the most.

This view appears to be readily internalized by fans; player effort, vigour and violence are factors which all contribute towards meaningful sports drama as fans perceive it, and therefore also towards augmenting fan enjoyment.

A second emerging theme in fan responses was clearly connected to this type of explanation regarding player intensity. As with the clubs, players, owners, promoters, etc., fans showed a strong belief in benefits derived from purging everyday tensions and hostility through the violent sports spectacle, i.e., in the notion of catharsis. The following three quotations are illustrative of this explanatory trend:

Yes, of course violence makes it more interesting. Most sports I watch have different degrees of violence and it appeals to me because it intensifies the competition. After watching a really good football game I often feel exhausted, but I get a real high from it that lasts all week. Like, I have a lot of pressure at work so it's good to be able to forget it once in a while.
Yes, one of the reasons I like hockey so much is the hitting. It gets me more involved in what's going on which I think is good. Sometimes I get too involved and start yelling at the referee and that, but afterwards I just forget about it. I don't take the game home with me, but when I get home, it's like I feel better and can get to grips with reality again.

Cheap shots don't appeal to me, although sometimes I would like to see a rougher style of play. I enjoy a fast, hard-hitting game in hockey but I can do without constant fights which bore me. The appeal of violence? It makes me forget everything else that goes on outside the stadium. Three hours of fast, rough hockey gets rid of all my pressures which has to be good doesn't it? Sometimes I come to the _____ and I'm all wound up but go home feeling better. That has to be good as well, doesn't it? It's a real escape or refuge for me. I feel the same when I play, too. Sport is great like that. It helps me deal with other problems. You can put on your skates and get out there in a shitty mood. Two hours later it's all gone and you've kind of pushed all the frustration away. That's really why I play. And it's the same here watching the ____. I feel great afterwards. Anything that makes me forget work for three hours is good with me.

Again, it is interesting that the three preceding quotes were provided by people representing different age categories; a man and a woman in their twenties, and a thirty-eight year old male. Other arguments supporting the catharsis view were offered from much younger sports fans. The following, for example, represent the views of two teenagers (16 and 17 years), one male and one female, both of whom, incidentally, were actively involved in high school sports themselves:
Sport really excites me. It's neat to see those really big guys pushing around out there and tackling and that. The ref can't see everything that goes on. There's all kinds of things that players do and we do it on our team as well. There's digging and punching and it feels really good if you can come out on top with the ball. The whole stadium starts cheering and it's a real high. It's good to get out those frustrations that build up with your parents and teachers nagging at you. Football covers all that up for a while.

The fighting and checking makes the game a lot more exciting. Without it it would be really boring. We come to a lot of games here mostly to get away from our parents. Home is so boring; nothing to do and no action. Sometimes I come with my parents but it is different then, especially when my mom is here. I mean, it's different because I have to be polite and less rowdy and that. When _____ and I come together we have a blast. We really get involved and talk about it for days at school. Just being able to cheer as the play goes on, I don't know, it just seems to take over. Sometimes it's like you're playing yourself.

On the basis of such evidence, it would appear reasonable to conclude that sportsworld has so thoroughly institutionalised its use of violence and, as Ball-Rokeach (1972:101) was seen to argue above, that society in general provides such positive justifications for violence in sport that both athletes and fans learn quite early on to expect it as an integral element of sports, and to approve of it when it transpires as rationalizable and and meaningful conduct.

Thus, despite the conceptual problems associated with catharsis addressed in Chapter Two, and the wealth of
non-supportive empirical evidence on the surrounding issues, subjects overwhelmingly accounted for enjoying player violence in typical catharsis terms, focusing on violence as an energy-reducer and outlet for their aggressions and frustrations built up by the pressures of modern living. The catharsis argument is broadly accepted and propounded in society, but particularly so in sportsworld. It is probable that definitions of and rationales for sports violence on the part of owners, sponsors and players, regularly highlighted in the mass media, assist sports spectators (many of whom are involved in playing or organizing sport themselves) in internalizing and reproducing this apparently widespread cultural understanding of the appeal of sports violence and its effects. That is, not only is enjoyment of violence in sports a socially learned activity, it is also broadly legitimated and reproduced.

The meaning of sports violence for fans becomes most apparent when the language that is used to produce these rationalizations is examined. In particular, it is clear that fans often discuss the day-to-day activities of school, work and family as sources of monotony, frustration and stress: "Home is so boring;" "I have a lot of pressure at work;" "...frustrations that build up with parents and teachers nagging;" "I'm all wound up because of pressures at the office," etc. Importantly, these are viewed as inevitable features of modern living which can be temporarily off-
set and countered by the excitement of spectating at sports events: "It's an escape;" "I get a real high from it that lasts all week;" "When I get home...I feel better and can get to grips with reality again;" "It makes me forget everything else that goes on outside the stadium," etc.

It is thus possible to interpret fans' participation as members of the sports crowd and the role of the violent sports spectacle generally as a form of "escape" or "refuge," as one fan called it, from what can otherwise be an uneventful, stressful and perhaps meaningless lifestyle. Again, Chapter Two discussed how catharsis theory has taken on its own commonsensical versions in lay conversation and thought as a form of psychologistic rationalization for aggression and violence. Crucially, in this context, the critical-materialist concept of ideology now becomes extremely relevant. Data presented in this chapter strongly suggest that for sports fans the sports event partly represents an 'inversion' of reality, a masked and distorted version of their everyday experiences which have altogether more sobering meanings and effects. In this way, the sports spectacle can be seen to contribute to the hegemonic order, as the excitement and emotional rewards gleaned from participation in the sports crowd serve to emphasize the positive attributes of modern capitalist life, and thus prevent (or at least postpone) the experience of class oppression and exploitation. The latter, i.e., what Marx
believed was the 'real' basis of social life, goes relatively unnoticed and dominant-hegemonic ideology reproduces itself (Parekh, 1982; Concoran, 1987).

When questioned about fulfilling expectations that clubs and sponsors have for their behaviour inside sports stadia (e.g., drinking, vocalizing loudly, booing, gesticulating, etc.), a large number of sports fans in all seat locations spoke of how participation in such subcultural behaviours also intensified their enjoyment and satisfaction drawn from the sports event. Moreover, such emotional and physical involvement in the game, i.e., exactly what the clubs and promoters require of fans, was described as being fundamental to the overall meaning of the sports occasion:

I come to sports to see a good game but also to be entertained. I'm not going to sit here like a stiff and get bored. Unless I get involved in what's going on, and I mean on the field and here in the seats, I don't enjoy it so much. So yes, I jump up and do the wave, shout a lot, tell the officials to 'fuck off'. And, yes, I like to have a few cold ones as well...that's what sport's all about.

Sure we get rowdy at sport! Who doesn't?, If I couldn't do all this stuff here, I wouldn't come. I sit in this seat about thirty times a season and as soon as my ass hits the seat it tells me to do this and do that...if I get carried away it's because I'm enjoying myself. The cops never bother us so it must be fine with them too...I have a real good time at these games and I think it helps me keep my sanity when I'm away from all this...it's a lot more fun when you get involved. Everyone around gets involved and it just seems to carry on. If you sat still, you probably wouldn't see half of what's going on anyway. Everyone's up and
down all the time, either to get a beer or shouting for something on the field. Everyone's interested in having a good time, especially when the ____ play good. When we score we go wild. Sometimes, I can't believe what I do myself. Every now and then I catch myself and get kind of embarrassed. My husband tells me that my language at these games is disgusting. But, you know, I don't know any of these people, and they don't really care anyway because they're all doing the same thing.

There's no way I'm gonna sit here and not shout and swear and all that. Or drink beer. Sport is a type of escape for me and I know these guys feel the same. It's a time to get away from all that day to day stuff. It's a time to celebrate actually...When the ____ won the Grey Cup a few years back we had the biggest party downtown. It was great—drinking, partying on Yonge Street, doing all kinds of stuff we couldn't do normally. There were hundreds of us standing on cars, taking stores over...it was really a good time. Nobody means any harm by partying. It's just a good time.

A final prevailing theme thus emerging in the comments of fans was the notion that sports events provide a type of 'time out' function, i.e., an opportunity to relax normative codes of behaviour regarding courtesy, sociability and restraint, where a series of 'semi-deviant' behaviours become tolerable within the boundaries of the event itself. 'Semi-deviance', as defined by Etzioni-Halevy (1975:357-8), would appear to be a most appropriate description for this cluster of rowdy fan behaviours which are expected and informally sanctioned by clubs, promoters and fans themselves, because they are perceived by all to have a series of salutary effects (specifically the maintenance of
system equilibrium through cathartic outlet) for the participants:

Semi-deviant behaviour may be the kind of behaviour that falls into the jurisdiction of more than one normative domain. Thus when a certain behaviour is regarded in society as having favourable effects on that society, certain norms are likely to arise which label that behaviour as legitimate. Conversely, when a certain behaviour is conceived in society as having adverse effects...certain norms are likely to label that behaviour as illegitimate or deviant. It may happen, however, that behaviour which by the above criterion should be considered as deviant, is legitimized by its connection with other attitudes and behaviours which are regarded as having salutary effects on society, and which consequently fall into a different; legitimate, normative domain. When this happens, it is likely that the behaviour will not be deviant but semi-deviant.

Members of sportsworld tend to accommodate and sanction a range of boisterous, crowd behaviours which frequently lead quite logically to violent and vandalistic sports crowd disorder. Additionally, these behaviours are legitimized both inside and outside the sports arena.

For example, the last fan comment quoted above is significant, given the broader theme here of 'expectation and approval of crowd disorder', because it shows that fans also perceive and treat team victory celebrations as an opportunity to participate in similar forms of 'legitimate deviance' (Listiak, 1981:532) outside the sports stadium, but still in association with the sports event. As we saw earlier in this chapter, team victory celebrations which
frequently metamorphose into what have been called 'celebration riots', are an increasingly prevalent mode of fan disorder in North American sport. Again, the types of disorderly behaviours which they routinely contain occur, at least in part, because fans are actively encouraged to represent the city or town in which the victorious team is based in participating in team-related revelry; revelry which promotes many of the conditions which characterize the sports crowd inside the sports stadium, such as shouting, pushing, drinking and generally behaving 'wildly', all acted out in a highly volatile atmosphere.

It should be noted that celebration riots elicit a very ambivalent response from law enforcement agencies. It became obvious during the course of interviews, for instance, that despite the extremely violent and destructive recent history of team victory celebrations in North America, police are nevertheless reluctant to approach these riots in the same light as other, non-sport-related protests (e.g., political, race riots), which are construed, in the words of one officer, as "...alot more threatening to our society and public safety."

Comments such as these made, first, by a police officer and, second and third by police superintendents, clearly suggest that police themselves legitimize much of the rowdiness that occurs in team victory celebrations:

So far, I think victory parades haven't gotten out of hand as much as people tend to
think. Of course, there are always one or two bozos who'll spoil it for everyone, but generally it's just a matter of locals who are proud to be fans of a winning team. That's what they're doing, you know. They're showing the team they're glad to be winners. It's really only the booze factor which causes problems. The smashed telephone booths, the busted car windows, all that is the booze talking.

Everyone is happy when the team wins. You're right, there has been some trouble recently here in ____ with celebrations turning ugly, but I think it's a very small minority of people who do this. Basically people are there to talk about the team amongst themselves and have good clean fun...Our ____ team here in ____ obviously brings a lot of exposure to the city, and if they do well, well I think we should help them as much as possible. This has always been our policy.

Celebration riots? I don't know that's a good term for them. They're not riots like we get other riots, say political rallies which can get out of hand. It's sport. It's not malicious or evil or anything. Just a bunch of kids usually, getting out their frustrations by getting rowdy for a while. Maybe some of them have been drinking and get out of hand and smash windows, you know, but when you think of how many people are involved (I mean, we're talking thousands), this is a very tiny minority. It's the majority we have to concern ourselves with. It's the safety of the majority. And the majority are well-behaved. Sure, there's shouting and yelling and all that stuff, some people stop the traffic and block the street, but it's all in good spirit usually. In ____ two seasons ago, we were all briefed to let it go, to let it run itself out. It lasted for hours but the damage was negligible...I think it's an exaggeration to talk of celebration 'riots'.

Such interpretations of celebration riots on the part of the police, which significantly often include commonsensicalized
notions of catharsis, would appear in many ways to lend (apparently economically prompted) official support to the types of behaviour which we have said that sports owners and promoters expect of fans at sports events and generally condone. Finally, Michener (1976:432) provides us with interesting evidence to further substantiate such a claim:

When the citizens of Pittsburgh rioted in the wake of a glorious World Series Victory, with reports of crime, rape and multiple injuries, Police Chief Robert E. Colville had to rise in defense of his city. He said, "I have called this news conference because of the many unfounded and, in some cases, completely fabricated stories which went over our national news media." After assuring his listeners that there was nothing to such stories, the police admitted that there had been 128 reported injuries, 98 arrests, 25 store windows smashed, one taxicab, one other car burned, and one woman yanked out of a passing car. "But she wasn't raped," the police insisted.

In sum, the problem of sports crowd disorder and the larger problem of violence in sport per se are compounded by several characteristic traits of sportsworld: (1) players are frequently encouraged by owners, coaching staff and management to adopt violent and 'dirty' tactics and to 'win at all costs'; (2) players receive subcultural identity and prestige through violent play in certain contexts; (3) fans are encouraged to behave boisterously but not violently; (4) fans derive substantial meaning, enjoyment and satisfaction from observing aggressive and violent player conduct, and from rowdy participation in the crowd itself. Moreover, many fans perceive the sports stadium as a sanctum where they
have a right to participate in unruly behaviours without being penalised; (5) a large number of people involved in sport (club management, coaches, league officials, promoters, players and fans, etc.,) rationalize rowdy and violent sports behaviour in terms of cathartic release; (6) law enforcement personnel are willing to officially condone and legitimize certain forms of sports crowd disorder which themselves can be highly violent and destructive.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to integrate a substantial portion of the data from interviews, the questionnaire, observation and the content analysis into a general discussion of the phenomenological and interpretational aspects of sports crowd disorder in the United Kingdom and North America.

The first part of the chapter analysed questionnaire results, i.e., how the clubs perceive the problem of crowd disorder, and interview results, i.e., how police and stadium security personnel perceive the problem. The dominant view offered by the majority of clubs was that crowd disorder was infrequently manifested and therefore of minimal concern. At the same time, however, many of them went on the assert that in their estimation crowd disorder
had increased in recent years, that they had felt a need to seriously upgrade the security and police procedures at their games, and some even spoke of the introduction of 'security awareness programmes'. Further ambivalence was also shown in clubs' interpretation of the role of alcohol in sports crowd disorder, for while there was an overwhelming consensus regarding the fact that drunkenness was a central precipitant of crowd problems at games, many of the clubs rationalized the sale of alcohol at their grounds in terms of a greater problem that would exist in its absence, i.e., fans smuggling hard liquor into games, etc. It needs to be said that few clubs volunteered information regarding breweries who sponsor and/or own them and, importantly, clubs which were most critical of alcohol sales were noticeably not in positions to control these sales.

There was no ambiguity or contradiction in the position of the police and stadium security personnel vis-a-vis the phenomenon of sports crowd disorder—all interviewed were of the opinion that North American sports crowds are becoming increasingly disorderly, and as evidence they spoke of a number of preventive security measures which have had to be introduced recently, and of plans to change stadia structure to enhance game comfort and safety for certain groups of fans (e.g., special family enclosures). Police and security personnel also alluded to the lack of proximity of club owners and management to the problem of
sports crowd disorder as an explanation for the apparent
discrepancy in the perspectives of both parties on the
phenomenon, its rates, its manifestations and its
implications.

The final part of the chapter introduced data from
interviews with fans, police and others in a discussion of
how the entire socio-structural organization of sport
sanctions aggression and violence both on and off the field
of play. Using comments made by coaches, owners and promot-
ers, etc., it was initially argued that such sport personnel
not only approve of violence, but actively encourage and
require it of players. For this reason, a great deal of
violent player conduct is considered acceptable, indeed
normative, within game rules. Moreover, if player violence
is one precipitant of spectator violence as indeed it seems
to be, then this prevailing sports 'attitude' to violence
becomes extremely significant in our understanding of the
broader sports crowd disorder problem. It was also seen that
both male and female fans respond positively to player
violence which, as a central gauge of player effort and
intensity, apparently enhances enjoyment derived from sports
spectating. Extensive informal observations of sports crowd
responses to violent player conduct provided empirical
verification for this position (e.g., the loudest and most
enthusiastic cheering at N.H.L. games frequently occurs
during and following fist-fights, particularly when home
favourites emerge 'victoriously').

Next, the expectations clubs and promoters place
upon fan behaviour at sports events were discussed. The
argument was made that an ambiguous separation exists
between notions of expected and encouraged orderly fan
behaviour and largely disapproved of disorderly fan
behaviour. It was suggested that one of the reasons crowd
disorder actually exists is that these expectations are not
clearly distinct. Fans were found to enjoy participating in
unruly sports crowd behaviours, and again, this was freq-
uously rationalized by those involved in terms of the
alleged powers of catharsis. It was also argued that in
clouding or distorting the everyday realities (stress,
boredom and frustration at home, school and work) of fans'
lives, a commonsensicalized version of catharsis theory used
to rationalize violence in sports has contributed towards
dominant-hegemonic ideology in modern society by disguising
class oppression and exploitation. Fans were dominantly
found to be of the opinion that the sports event and the
sports-related celebration (e.g., the team victory celebra-
tion) provided a 'time-out sanctum' where the performance of
a range of 'semi-deviant' acts was considered legitimate.
Comments offered by police and security personnel in
interviews regarding these issues showed that sports fan
rowdiness inside and outside stadia is also accorded a
certain amount of official approval and sanction.
1. All but one of the clubs which replied but declined to answer the questionnaire (10.3%, n=9) instructed the author that it was their policy not to divulge information regarding crowd disorder and control to the public. Interestingly, the one club in question rationalized its refusal to complete the questionnaire in terms of the exemplary behaviour of its supporters:

   We don't feel that we could provide you with the information you are seeking on spectator...dis-order. This is a very conservative and intelligent section of the country and we have no documentation of disorder of any kind other than minimal where you have sell-out crowds of 62,000. We are very proud of our fans!

This view is extremely representative of the dominant one offered by the clubs.

2. Several clubs commented that the average age of their crowds differ depending upon the 'type of attraction' being offered. For example, whereas 'give away days', i.e., promotional occasions during which merchandise such as seat cushions, calendars and flags are distributed, tend to attract an audience with a large contingent of very young spectators, post season play-off games and other important matches (with regards to seasonal goals) where tickets are in much stiffer demand, tend to draw those with more purchasing power, i.e., more adult audiences.

3. For instance, two football clubs in America and one in Canada who play their games in the same stadia as professional baseball, concurred in the belief (based on impressionistic evidence and 'private' data) that many more women attend baseball than football.

4. Whereas members of every professional sports crowd represent an extremely wide range of economic statuses irrespective of geographical location (this tends to be represented by the distribution of seat locations),
racial characteristics do tend to differ by geographical location. For example, one N.F.L. club in the American south noted that the vast majority of its crowd was white while one in the American north east said its crowds were comprised of a "...roughly equal combination of whites and blacks." Similarly, while one C.F.L. club in the southern Ontario region drew support from a "...basically working-class section of the community," another club in the same area commented that its supporters were mainly of middle-class roots.

5. All clubs said that they maintained private records which could confirm these data, compiled in a variety of ways from security records, reports and observations to complaints rendered by subscribers and visitors. When asked for permission to review these records, one hundred percent of respondents noted that, as 'privileged information', they were inaccessible to this author.

6. Lewis (1982b:187) cites evidence to show that only five percent of people arrested at the large Pittsburgh Super Bowl celebration riot in 1975 were women, and research into gender and soccer hooliganism in Britain (e.g., Harrington, 1968; Sports Council, 1978; Trivizas, 1980) has similarly found that a very small minority of women participate in violent behaviour at sports.

7. Perhaps the most recognised 'pitch invader' in all North American sport is a young woman who has encroached onto a large number of baseball and football fields during nationally telecast games and interrupted play by kissing players. The woman, who calls herself 'Morgana the Kissing Bandit', is known to have several impersonators who have created similar disturbances at sports events.

8. Brackets added.

9. Irrespective of how many 'in-house' security agents are employed at sports grounds, all clubs employ police officers on match days since they alone can enforce the law in making arrests. As one police officer remarked, "...'in-house' staff are essentially public relations people who...act as liaison between ushers, doorguards and the police."

10. This includes the Hamilton 'Tiger-Cats' Football Club and the Toronto 'Blue Jays' Baseball Club.
11. The public demand for professional box-lacrosse is apparently quite high in the U.S.A. because the sport has recently reappeared in a similarly organized form (now called M.I.L.L.—Minor Indoor Lacrosse League), and is being heavily promoted on television in the larger urban centers in exactly the same way.

12. In the summer of 1977, a promotional 'Disco Demolition Night' was hosted by the Chicago White Sox, and fans gained entry into the doubleheader with a disco record and ninety-eight cents. The idea, which was to destroy the much despised records on the field of play between games, backfired when thousands of fans used them as missiles and started a riot in which bases, turf and the batting cage were destroyed. The second game was abandoned. (Snyder and Spreitzer, 1983:202)

13. In the summer of 1974, the Cleveland Indians promoted a 'Nickel Beer Night' at a game due to be played against the Texas Rangers. The plan similarly backfired when fans, many of whom were intoxicated, bombarded players and officials with bricks, cans and bottles. A riot ensued in which a number of players and officials were injured, and the game was forfeited to the Rangers (Newsweek, June 12, 1974:83; New York Times, June 5, 1974).

14. It is commonly assumed, incorrectly, that only cheap general admission seating areas contain rowdy fans with a penchant for sports violence.

15. With regard to this process, see the discussion of M. Smith's (1975b) 'violence-precipitates-violence' hypothesis in Chapter Two.
CHAPTER SIX
GENERAL ANALYSIS OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF SPORTS CROWD DISORDER

Introduction

Having examined the structural and formal contexts and conditions of sports crowd disorder in North America and the United Kingdom, the specific forms that the phenomenon takes in both settings, in addition to the interpretational and phenomenological aspects of sports crowd disorder, i.e., how the clubs, stadium security personnel and police, fans, etc., interpret and respond to the problem, this chapter now goes on to analyze ways in which the mass media, and particularly the press, generally treat sports crowd disorder and sports-related violence more broadly.

The chapter begins with an examination of three dominant presentations of the phenomenon in both the North American and British press: how soccer hooliganism is commonly perceived as an exclusively British social problem; how dominant press discourse can contribute toward heightening the public profile of crowd disorder by concentrating on elements of threat and prediction of violence and, how press discourse can serve to legitimize and even glorify sports
violence in general. In representing characteristic features within the dominant code of press coverage of soccer hooliganism per se, the first two of these discussions set the groundwork for a specific case study to follow in the next chapter; an in-depth analysis of press treatment of the Heysel Stadium soccer riot of May, 1985.

Having shown 'how' the media normatively report upon sports crowd disorder, data unearthed during interviews with media personnel are examined to probe the question of 'why' typical features of reporting appear to be so commonly produced and reproduced in the news process.

Images of Sports Crowd Disorder and Sports Violence Constructed in the Press

1. Soccer Hooliganism: 'The English/British Disease'

For some time, there has been a tendency on the part of the press and other media to refer to soccer hooliganism as an exclusively English or British 'disease'. As we noted in the previous chapter, this usually takes place in the news press outside of the United Kingdom (e.g., Globe and Mail, May 30, 1985:M11; Toronto Star, May 30, 1985:A17; Hamilton Spectator, May 30, 1985:C13; Sports Illustrated, June 10, 1985) although the problem of violence at soccer is referred to in these same terms in the British news press itself (e.g., Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 9, 1985:1;
World Soccer, Nov. 1978:23). The ideological message emerging from the usage of this appellation—that soccer hooliganism (or any other form of sports crowd disorder) is not present in other national contexts—is an inaccurate one.

In content analyses that they have conducted of English newspapers, for example, Williams et al., (1984) have unearthed over seventy reports of spectator disorder at soccer matches in thirty different countries in which English fans were not involved between 1904-1983. In addition, they have found fourteen cases of hooliganism involving English soccer fans at international games where the English fans were the victimized party. All this leads this Leicester group to conclude that:

...football hooliganism is by no means purely and simply a British phenomenon. Nor is it solely found in Western capitalist societies or in those of the 'developed' world. (1984:7)

Elsewhere, research into Scottish hooliganism by Murray (1984) and Italian hooliganism by Robins (1984) is supportive.

Findings from this study also substantiate the claims of Williams et al., (1984), and suggest that crowd violence is almost endemic wherever soccer is played. Incidents of soccer-related crowd violence were located in twenty-six different international settings around the world, representing all but one continent—Australasia.
Appendix B). Because no systematic survey was conducted to search for these examples either in this study or in that of Williams et al., it is extremely likely that such figures to show soccer’s apparently ubiquitous crowd disorders are underestimations of the real extent of the problem outside of the United Kingdom.

Research beginning to be conducted in other European countries, such as France, Holland and West Germany (see Pilz, 1982; Dunning et al., 1985) is strongly indicative of the growth of the type of 'super fighting crews' of hooligan followers we have already described in relation to British soccer (see Chapter Four). A recent article in the Toronto Star (Sept. 9, 1985:B7) speaking of the hooligan fans of the Paris Saint Germain club as 'The New Villains' shows that soccer violence in continental Europe is beginning to receive a more international profile:

They are spreading terror wherever their team plays in the French top division and with Saint Germain leading the league for the first time in 50 years, their numbers are growing and so is the destruction.

After ransacking arenas and surrounding places in the club’s previous away games at Laval and Auxerre, the fans last week took aim at the stadium of Nice where their club was scheduled to play.

Using axes and crowbars, the Paris fans broke into the stadium and destroyed everything in sight. They then lit propane torches and started to burn the place. Fortunately police were on the scene in minutes and prevented complete destruction while the fans shouted "Long Live Vandalism."
Following similar scenes in Holland (where clubs such as Ajax and Feyenoord are known to have violent followers), the state-owned railway system recently banned alcohol on all soccer excursions (Globe and Mail, Aug. 6, 1985:19), and West German police have assigned special investigation units to detect neo-Nazi hooligans who attack immigrant workers at soccer games (The Guardian, June 5, 1985). Robins (1984:89) informs us that certain Italian clubs have recently amassed gangs of fighting followers similar to those of British clubs, which also adopt their own suggestive nicknames (e.g., the 'Commandos' of A.C. Milan and the 'Ultras' of Torino). Finally, following the Heysel Stadium riot in 1985 where thirty-nine fans lost their lives when Liverpool fans attacked their Juventus rivals, supporters of other Italian and French clubs were reported to have sprayed graffiti in their local towns congratulating the Liverpool contingent for their 'triumph' (Hamilton Spectator, June 1, 1985; Daily Telegraph, June 19, 1985).

In terms of total numbers of fatalities, some of the most serious cases of soccer crowd disorder in the history of the sport have not involved British supporters at all. In May, 1964, for example, over three hundred persons were killed at a riot that broke out at the National Stadium in Lima, Peru (New York Times, May 25, 1964), and in perhaps the most notorious case of soccer-related violence ever, a
one week 'soccer war' was waged between Honduras and El Salvador in the summer of 1969 following a game played between the two countries on 'neutral' ground in Mexico. In order to end the conflict, the Organization of American States had to intervene (Newsweek, July 28, 1969:54).

Moreover, soccer should not be understood as the only sport around which crowd disorder has developed. In Chapter One, for example, we saw that this phenomenon has been associated with a variety of sports including rugby, cricket and Australian Rules football and, of course, in Chapter Four, we discussed a range of forms of crowd disorder frequently manifested at the dominant North American sports; baseball, football and ice hockey.

All of this, however, is not to underplay the seriousness of British soccer hooliganism which, as we have seen, is manifested in a diversity of forms on a regular basis in that context, and has created widespread problems with violence and vandalism at international games in continental Europe (see Williams et al., 1984). Given the hooligan events of the last two decades and the inescapable crisis that now faces British soccer, such an attempt would be both grossly inaccurate and irresponsible. Rather, the intention here is to show the power of the press and other media in contributing to the production and maintenance of broad ideological understandings of specific phenomena which
may, in fact, be distorted representations of the real nature and extent of the issue under consideration. Importantly, questionnaire responses analyzed in the previous chapter show that these ideological understandings of sports crowd disorder are consistent with the views of many North American sports clubs whose personnel clearly rationalize their own levels of crowd disorder in terms of more 'serious' crowd problems occurring elsewhere. As one club cited in Chapter Five commented: "When we compare our hooliganism to that elsewhere around the globe (of course England is the worse place) we feel very fortunate."

2. Threat and Prediction of Crowd Violence

Another characteristic feature in dominant press discourse relating to sports crowd disorder is the tendency on the part of the press to concentrate on a component of threat offered to societal stability and peace. The press, it is argued here, are capable of contributing to a widespread public sense of social threat by way of selective reporting, and specifically by implementing discursive codes and structures which lay primary emphasis on predicting trouble and violence.

With regard to British hooliganism, predictions of soccer-related violence have played an integral role in press coverage of the phenomenon for some two decades (predating England's hosting of the World Cup Finals in
1966—see Dunning et al., 1984a), and have thus contributed to broad understandings of the problem particularly regarding dominant impressions of violent conditions that are said to prevail at British soccer matches (Hall, 1978; Whannel, 1979). For example, the following quotations are largely representative of such press commentary. The first, taken from the London Evening Standard (May 23, 1975) is entitled "THE SCOTTISH ARE ON THE MARCH," and contains similar elements of public warning and alarm as the second and third examples:

Lock your doors...for the great Wembley walk is on. The Scottish invasion gathered pace today, with warnings of angry clashes between Londoners and footsore fans. Tory M.P., Mr. Rhodes Boyson, described the Scottish supporters as 'dangerous'. He advised local people to bolt their doors and board their windows. Hundreds took the advice. Many more decided to leave town for the day.

The football season has got under way with its customary vigour, yet again proving how mistaken it is to call this a spectator sport. Gone are the days when a soccer match involved no more than twenty-two players, a couple of linesmen and the referee. Now the list of participants tends to be a great deal more catholic including, as it generally does, hooligans, policemen, doctors, magistrates, British Rail employees, coach drivers, London Underground staff, journalists plus, of course, a good few ordinary citizens whose role is simply to be terrorized out of their wits. (London Evening Standard, Sept. 2, 1975)

It's the time of year when, for millions, a feeling of gloom and apprehension blots out the pleasures of high summer...The country is about to change its pace of life from the folksay, beguiling charms of the game of
cricket to the horrors of the interminable presence of the soccer season. (Globe and Mail, Aug. 27, 1986:A9)

Even more suggestive of trouble was a headline story appearing in the London Evening Standard of September 14, 1976, discussing Manchester United’s upcoming game against Ajax of Holland ominously entitled, "RED INVASION. AMSTERDAM RIOT SQUADS. MOUNTIES READY. POLICE LEAVE CANCELLED!"

Importantly, it should be noted that these illustrations present scenarios in which no soccer-related disorder or violence has yet occurred, but the implicit message of alarm and danger nevertheless advises both the soccer match attender and the uninvolved observer of violence that it is imminent.

A fourth example shows how such press reports are commonly coded in evocative and inflammatory tones which occasionally seem perfectly orchestrated to elicit and sustain public fear over soccer hooliganism:

British society as we know it seems to be coming to an end under a mass of frenzied Millwall football rowdies. (The Times, Mar. 17, 1985:4)

The cumulative press message in all such discourse thus becomes an ominous one of caution and menace where law and order is seen to be seriously at risk. Inevitably, again, such an emphasis tends to shift the focus of press discourse toward a concentration with the restoration of social order and control.
It needs to be said that whether or not violence actually transpires to validate such predictions is, to some extent, unimportant. Certainly, non-violent outcomes of soccer matches do little to impair the 'news value' of the hooligan story which frequently proceeds regardless. Moreover, such absences of violence are often rationalized in terms of alleged 'benefits' of police force. Hence, after the London Evening Standard's predictive headline *vis-a-vis* the Manchester United/Ajax confrontation cited above, the absence of any violence between rival support groups at this game was explained in the same paper two days later in the following terms:

The most awesome display of anti-riot force at any European football ground has finally silenced Manchester United's drunken hordes. The cost of providing such a massive security operation must be prohibitive and one wonders what will happen if United go through this round and visit a city or town with a small suburban ground and no comparable security network.

Thus, despite the lack of any concrete evidence to support such a claim, the reader is provided with a quite explicit message regarding the 'effectiveness' and 'necessity' of preventing soccer hooliganism by way of police intimidation and force, and by implication therefore, regarding the likelihood of violent eruptions that might occur in its absence.

The now infamous international profile of British hooliganism seems also to have influenced the foci and
styles of discourse adopted in North American press coverage of certain soccer events (usually involving British teams) where, again, reports of future games are frequently endowed with alarmist predictions of violence and danger:

Saturday is essentially a family day in Britain, a day on the move—shopping, sight-seeing, visiting relatives and friends. But if you happen to be on the move where there are soccer fans about, you virtually take your life in your hands.

It's probably safer inside the soccer stadiums these days, what with police, closed-circuit television, dog patrols and segregated areas to keep the supporters apart. Outside on the streets...you're likely to have your windows broken if you live nearby or get caught up in some murderous struggle on the public transport systems. (Globe and Mail, Aug. 22, 1986:A7)

A more powerful and comprehensive illustration of this trend, however, occurred recently during the 1986 World Cup Finals in Mexico, in which England were scheduled to meet Argentina in a 'sudden-death' quarter-final match. Alluding to the manner in which the game itself could potentially be played, but also, by implication, to the behaviour of fans on the terraces, the North American press discussed the upcoming meeting between these two nations, still experiencing strained diplomatic relations in the wake of the Malvinas/Falklands War, in terms of its potentially explosive effects. Moreover, the meeting between these teams provided a perfect opportunity for the North American press to develop a 'running story' fundamentally premised upon prediction and threat. This can be shown with brevity using...
two Canadian newspapers (Toronto Star, Globe and Mail) as sources.

On June 18, 1986, England defeated Paraguay and earned a quarter-final berth against Argentina. In response, the sport sections' headlines of Canadian newspapers the following day were explicitly concerned with Falklands-related predictions of trouble: "ENGLAND ADVANCES TO BATTLE" (Globe and Mail, June 19, 1986:C8); "ENGLAND, ARGENTINA BATTLE AGAIN" (Toronto Star, June 19, 1986:D3). Conspicuous in the texts of these reports were similar references to political tensions between the two nations: "England has graduated to a soccer war" reported James Davidson in the Globe and Mail (p. C8), "...with Argentina, still a rival four years after the Falklands War." Meanwhile, the Toronto Star's Wayne Parrish spoke of "...the spectre of violence engendered by (the) quarterfinal match" (p. D3). Emphasizing the fact that the game was to be their first post-Falklands confrontation in soccer, Parrish went on to underline tension in Mexico between English and Argentinian supporters:

Last weekend, when the prospect of the quarterfinal clash came into focus, Argentine fans burned two Union Jacks on a street corner here. English fans, asked for reaction, promised to reciprocate in kind. "If they want a war, we'll have a war in the stands," vowed one.

Yesterday, an hour after the English had throttled Paraguay 3-0 to assure their own passage and thus the match-up, two young English fans wearing Union Jack capes walked the concourse outside Estadio Azteca
shouting, "Remember the Falklands. Remember the Falklands."

Parrish then hinted at the inevitability, as he saw it, of fan aggression and violence at the World Cup, suggesting that the competition had in fact been fortunate to have avoided violent clashes thus far:

The World Cup has led a mostly charmed existence, avoiding such politically charged matches. (Toronto Star, June 19, 1986:D3)

The lunatic fringe is expected to boo each others' anthems, and the English version is likely to trot out a chant first used on Argentine player Ossie Ardilles, who played for Tottenham, in the wake of the Falklands crisis. "Ossie Ardilles, Ossie Ardilles, what's it like to lose a war?" is to be generalized to "Argentina, Argentina, what's it like to lose a war?" Officials are also expecting several anti-England and anti-Argentina banners. (Toronto Star, June 21, 1986:C2)

As a final indication of the 'spectre of violence' hovering over the up-coming game, Parrish also provided for the reader a recent history of Argentine-British sports-related antagonism:

There's even a saga of Argentine-English hostility that predates the Falklands battle. In 1966, during a World Cup quarter-final at Wembley Stadium, Argentina's Antonio Rattin was sent off by the West German referee after 36 minutes of arguing. Rattin refused to go, precipitating a 10-minute round of threats, counter-threats and angry negotiating that included an appearance by the chief of referees. The decision stood, England with its man advantage prevailed 1-0, and the Argentines went home convinced the match had been fixed.

Visits to Argentina by Celtic and Manchester United in 1967 and 1968 both ended in violence. Scottish goalkeeper Ron
Simpson was hit on the back of the head with an iron bar heaved by an Argentine fan. The players resorted to kicking, punching and spitting at each other. (Toronto Star, June 19, 1986:D3)

Echoing Parrish's preoccupation with ongoing English-Argentine conflict, on June 20, James Davidson raised many of these same issues in the Globe and Mail, this time more centrally addressing animosity between opposing players. For example, while Argentina's goalkeeper Neri Pumpido was quoted speaking of rival animosities and "...the special motivation to play against England" (p. D4), no laudatory comments made by players were cited.

Despite these press 'warnings' of trouble, the game itself was played under cordial conditions on June 22, and was won (2-1) by Argentina. As if to justify their previous claims and predictions regarding fan conduct, both the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail addressed in their respective post-match reports minor incidents of violence that did break out between small groups of rival fans inside the stadium following Maradona's first goal and outside the stadium in the post-match context. Using language which had characterized this game's treatment throughout the pre-game press build up, the Globe and Mail (June 23, 1986:C4) sensationally referred to the latter, in which no serious injuries were recorded, as a "20-minute battle." Completing this running-story which had placed greater significance upon selectively reporting issues whose
repeated emphasis served to exacerbate rather than soothe political hostilities between the two nations involved. Upon, for example, injury reports, player performances and other match commentaries, the *Globe and Mail* (June 23, 1986:C1 and C4) rather hypocritically felt it appropriate to castigate the British 'dailies' which had "...hyped the match with headlines like "IT'S WAR, SENOR!"" (p. C1), whilst at the same time citing extremely speculative rumours from one of these same 'dailies' accusing the Argentine government of bribing Peru to 'throw' a soccer game at a World Cup tournament eight years earlier.

Although, on the basis of report frequency, findings from this study revealed something of a preoccupation on the part of the North American press with spectator disorder at soccer, and particularly at British soccer; the study also disclosed that North American reports of fan disorder in their own context are occasionally as emotive and alarmist as their British counterparts in their exploitation of 'threat' as a news ploy and 'story maker'. For example, the first two quotations cited below stress the imminence of violence at and around Yankee Stadium in New York:

*Outside Yankee Stadium conditions are frightful. Except if you're delivered to your gate by bus or cab, there is a very real danger of becoming a mugging victim within 100 yards of the ball park at night... You don't ride the subways from Manhattan hotels at night because that's another invitation to mugging and robbery... Perhaps Yankee Stadium isn't the most dangerous park in baseball because all of*
the parks in major American cities are now hazardous...Conditions in the surrounding areas are dangerous, but so also are conditions inside. (Hamilton Spectator, Oct. 14, 1981)

A ride on a New York subway is a breeze compared with going to a hockey game, standing at ringside after a fight or "unfair" decision, or leaving Yankee Stadium after a game, where the prospect is likely that you will get a beer keg rolled down on your head or lose some teeth to marauding gangs. (Kram, 1982:84).

Similarly, an article entitled "A STRANGE NEW BREED DISCOVERED: ANAHEIM ROWDY" appearing in the Los Angeles Times (Nov. 25, 1986:3) advises the reader to consider before attending Ram's games the possibility of interpersonal fan violence:

The way it is now, you think twice about taking your son to a Ram game, unless your son is Mike Tyson or Hulk Hogan. Until the situation improves, there's no sure fire way to avoid trouble, but it will help if you know what to look for in your neighbouring fans, the warnings signs of potential trouble...If you're careful and alert, your chances of leaving the stadium with nothing damaged are at least 50-50. And who can ask for more than an even break?

As with their British counterparts, a message of imminent danger in sports spectating is evident here. In general, however, and as we remarked in Chapter Four, there is a conspicuous absence of reports of North American crowd violence in the press on this continent, especially considering some of the events which have occurred of late (e.g., the increasing profile of the celebration riot, the vandalising of goalposts at football matches, large scale...
ejections from games for intoxication, etc.). It would appear that the North American press tend to eschew their own crowd violence in favour of the higher profile hooligan occurrences at British soccer and of sports participant violence in their own milieu. With regard to the latter, it is indeed very common for the North American press to exploit predictions of game violence to increase reader appeal of stories. Sensationalist headlines are normatively used for this purpose, especially in reports of ice hockey games:


IN THIS CORNER... OILERS, FLAMES PREPARE FOR REAL BATTLE. (Hamilton Spectator, April 15, 1986:D2)

LEAFS PREPARE FOR WING WAR. (Globe and Mail, Nov. 26, 1986:D2)

A HOCKEY WAR IS BREWING. (Toronto Star, Oct. 8, 1975)

Confirming arguments made in Chapter One, it is significant that military rhetoric is employed literally to 'excite' the potentially violent and explosive phenomena being described. The next chapter goes on to interpret this theme in greater depth as it relates to press reports of soccer hooliganism, but this chapter moves now to an analysis of an associated theme--how press treatment of sports violence actually serves to glorify and reproduce its subject matter.
3. Legitimizing Sports Violence

In Chapter One it was shown that the emergence and growth of the relation between sport and the mass media has been associated with several characteristic reporting features including hyperbole, metaphorical embellishment and other forms of image reification, and in Chapter Five it was argued that members of sportsworld, including those on its periphery (such as sports journalists), have in many ways institutionalized the use of violence in sports. Consequently, we are presented with a situation in which sports violence is generally exploited by media agencies for their own economic interests in ways which serve to legitimize and perpetuate the phenomena. In the preceding section and in the case study to follow in Chapter Seven, this situation as it relates to sports crowd disorder is analyzed. This section deals more closely with press treatment of participant violence.

Stuart Hall's (1978:26) description of the treatment of soccer hooliganism in the British popular press since the 1960s is in a sense representative of the manner in which sports violence is reported in the press more generally:

...graphic headlines, bold type-faces, warlike imagery and epithets, vivid photographs cropped to the edges to create a strong impression of physical menace, and the stories have been decorated with black lines and exclamation marks.

Certainly, with regard to press treatment of North American sports participant violence, Halls' words accurately depict
the latter's powerful semiological effect. There are a myriad of ways in which this process of 'editing for impact' (Hall, 1978:26) takes place, but a brief discussion of three of these is sufficient at this stage.

I. The Melodramatic Headline

The headlines of sports stories, both in the quality and popular press, frequently reflect a very uniform semiological format. Most commonly employing rhetoric as violent as the subject being defined, laid out with large, capitalized, black letters, isolated on the page for extra visual clarity, and with splatterings of emphatic punctuation assistance (question marks, exclamation marks, etc.), such headlines not only 'signify' the violent sports act, but do so in a fashion that brings to it a strong sense of approval and commendation.

The following, for example, are taken from a comprehensive file of their kind collected during the research for this study and, importantly, represent no fewer than five different sports which include both violent contact sports (football, soccer and ice hockey) and non-contact sports (golf and baseball):

MAYDAY! MAYDAY! TEAM CANADA TORPEDOES MIGHTY SOVIET SHIP! (Calgary Herald, May 2, 1985:D1)

BATTLE OF THE SHINERS! (Globe and Mail, April 23, 1986:D1)
IT'S FIGHT NIGHT AT THE GARDENS! (Toronto Star, Nov. 16, 1986:B1)

BATTLE OF TITANS AT OPEN. (Toronto Star, July 17, 1985:E1)
JAYS POUND YANKS! (Toronto Star, Sept. 15, 1985:E1)

IT'S A WAR WITHOUT THE TANKS! (Toronto Sun, Nov. 8, 1981:90)

DAY OF GLADIATORS. (The Observer, Jan. 26, 1986:42)

BEANTOWN BATTLEGROUND! (Hamilton Spectator, Sept. 15, 1985:1).

A literal decoding of such headlines is confusing not only because 'war' and 'battle' have nothing to do with the sports in question, but also because they tell us little about what actually took place.

Rather, what these examples demonstrate is the manner in which the press do not simply objectively report on given sports events, but are able to manipulate them by stressing their potentially rougher elements (even where interpersonal 'roughness' is not usually a factor--see golf headline above in Toronto Star, July 7, 1985:E1) in a way that piques readers' curiosity and, arguably, enhances entertainment value and audience appeal. The sports headline is, then, fundamentally an eye-catcher, coded strategically, i.e., dramatically, to entice the reader and to signify the 'form' of the story to follow.
II. Commending the Violent Player

Frequently present in the reports headlined in ways such as the above are even more blatant attempts to endow violent sports participants with positive attributes. Moreover, the message emerging from press coverage of sports events often presents violent athletes' actions as admirable and desirable. Again, the following represent no more than a fraction of possible illustrations:

(1) An article entitled 'Fergy's Favourites' in Sports Illustrated (April 13, 1981:10), North America's largest circulation weekly sports magazine, ranks the N.H.L.'s ten 'best' fighters "...on the basis of their pugilistic abilities," commenting upon factors such as punching quickness, balance, difficulty to "...put down," etc.

(2) A scouting report written by a hockey writer in the Toronto Star (Nov. 18, 1978:B1) reads: "Sutter, 22, is a lean...lad from Viking, Alb., who played junior hockey with Lethbridge Broncos. He scored 13 goals in 103 N.H.L. games in his first two seasons but earned 205 penalty minutes. He's an accomplished fist fighter and (his coach) claims he's 11-0 in scraps this season."

(3) A Sports Illustrated (Sept. 24, 1979:32) article about New York Jets' footballer Joe Klecko discusses his appetite for violent contact. Entitled 'KILLER WITH A BABY FACE', the article goes on to say that Klecko "...may look angelic, but he has mayhem on his mind."

(4) A 'feature' in the Toronto Sun Sport Report Magazine (May 10, 1985) entitled, "The Survivor: Tiger Williams is the last of the N.H.L.'s Gunfighters," talks of the admiration that should go to Dave 'Tiger' Williams, renowned for his ability to fight: "From start to finish, even from those who decry the violence he brought to the league, he extracted a grudging admiration. It was his inner strength. Injured, hurting, sick, out-numbered, at home or on the road, Williams never failed to respond to the battle cry" (p. 76).

As the examples indicate, these types of press commentaries are most commonly used to describe players involved in
contact or collision sports. There is, of course, no better
an illustration of the admiration and approval given to
violent athletes by the North American press (and other
media) than the case of the hockey fighter. The instances
above show clearly how behaviour which not only contravenes
the rules of ice hockey but can also be considered as
fundamentally detrimental to the game broadly (in part
because it can promote 'modelling' by peers and youngsters
--K. Young and M. Smith, 1988) becomes signified in terms
that actually legitimize and glorify it ('accomplished fist
fighter', 'solid hitter', Hard to 'put down', etc.,).

Equally noteworthy is the subcultural stereotype
which has developed around violent sports participants (but
especially hockey 'goons'), i.e., that irrespective of how
pugilistic the player behaves on the field or ice, he is
'friendly' and 'gentlemanly' when away from it. For example,
the Toronto Sun story on Tiger Williams cited above is
careful to stress the 'other' side of the player's nature:

While Dave Williams orchestrates chaos on
the ice, off it he exists well within a very
orderly lifestyle. There is clear devotion
between him and his wife and childhood
sweetheart, Brenda, 29, Ben and Clancy are
polite and deferential to adults...Nice
kids, beautiful wife, even a couple of dogs,
a Doberman named Magnum and an Airedale
named Tonka. The only things missing are the
pipe and slippers. There is something
eminently dependable about the man. (May 10,
1985:79)

We saw in Chapter Five that despite a huge volume of non-
supportive scientific evidence, persons involved in sport often rationalize violence in terms of a 'vital' cathartic release on the part of the participants. Of course, the press and other media have also contributed towards the perpetuation of the frustration-aggression model. The 'animal/pussycat' stereotype which prevails in sport subcultures, of which the Tiger Williams story is a classic example, clearly serves to legitimize and indeed revere violent and injurious player conduct in sports. Afterall, if Williams is 'eminently dependable' off the ice, his on-ice behaviour must be explainable in terms other than the fact that he has a gratuitous appetite for violence.

III. Hockey Photograph Survey

As Hartley (1982:181) points out, that photographs have long constituted "...part of the diet of news" can be explained by the fact that they provide for the reader an "...apparently 'unarguable' rendition of the world." That is, their integration into the central story line is facilitated by the power of their complementarity. Part of their immediate impact is not only to complement the ideological message of the story but in a sense to justify or 'close' it, to show unequivocally that the message brought to the reader is unambiguous, the 'real' one. In his book Mythologies, Barthes (1972:110) talks of the importance of the photograph for ideology: "...pictures...are more
imperative than writing, they impose a meaning at one stroke, without analysing or disturbing it."

It was explained in Chapter Three that, as part of the research plan, a small analysis of photographs attached to press reports of N.H.L. games was conducted in order to probe the significance of the press photograph as related to sports violence. Ice hockey was selected because in relation to the other two most popular North American team sports (baseball and football), photographs of hockey games are prolific and accessible. Photographs appearing in hockey reports of three Canadian newspapers (Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, Hamilton Spectator) were examined (qualitatively and quantitatively) over a twelve week mid-season period (January 1 to March 31) in 1985, 1975, 1965, and 1955, and were counted and categorized according to three broad thematic types: 'fighting' included obvious out-and-out brawling between players, and players and fans; 'contact' included action such as checking, stick contact, elbowing, tripping, jostling, etc.; 'other' included goals being scored, passes, goal-tender saves, celebration poses, etc.

Survey results are shown in Table 7. On the basis of the data contained therein, three points need to be made:
(1) Over the four decade time span, the newspapers studied have increasingly come to rely upon hockey photographs as 'signifiers' of news. In all cases, there was a roughly
Table 7. Results of Newspaper Hockey Photograph Survey

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Globe &amp; Mail</th>
<th>Hamilton Spectator</th>
<th>Toronto Star</th>
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</tr>
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<td>F= 2/8.7%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C= 5/9.4%</td>
<td>C= 4/21%</td>
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<td>O=24/32.4%</td>
<td>O=19/27.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=total number of photographs; F=fighting; C=contact; O=other)
equal growth in the numbers of photographs used; (2) for all papers, the overall percentage of 'contact' pictures has increased steadily and currently stands at approximately fifty per cent; (3) until the mid-1970s, there was a significant increase in the percentage of 'fight' photos in all cases. Since then, their total percentage has levelled off in the Toronto Star (at about 25%), has continued to rise in the Hamilton Spectator (to 16%), but has decreased slightly in Canada's national newspaper (to 12%).

Although there may be methodological problems in generalizing to the use of hockey photographs in other papers or to the print media more broadly on the basis of this very modest analysis, the data here clearly suggest again that the press exploit a part of the ice hockey game which represents a major violation of its rule structure. Rather than showing higher numbers of pictures of, say, goals being scored, passes, skating action, poses of celebration or dejection, etc., the press substantially rely upon aggression and violence shots to signify their news message. Combined, photographs of 'contact' and 'fighting' action constitute the vast majority of hockey pictures. Such a trend is, of course, strongly representative of the cultural image that surrounds North American ice hockey more generally, i.e., that it is a 'rough-and-tumble' sport played by 'real men' (fist-fighting and other aspects of sports violence are after all attempts to confirm
traditional notions of 'manliness') in which interpersonal violence is accepted and approved, and also of the fact that the press contribute towards the perpetuation of this ideological view.

With regard to 'contact' and 'fight' pictures, it needs to be said that, normatively, where the intended meaning of the photograph remains ambiguous to the reader, captions function to render it unambiguous, to strengthen its interpretation as a type of 'linguistic anchor' (Hall, 1973:178): "Old-time hockey, eh!" (Toronto Star, Feb. 5, 1987:D4), "Take That!" (Toronto Star, April 13, 1986:B3), "Squaring Off!" (Toronto Star, Jan. 10, 1987:B3), "Pain in the Neck!" (Calgary Sun, Mar. 20, 1988:SS2). Moreover, captions like "That's a Wing-Ding!" (Toronto Star, Mar. 2, 1986:1), "Getting Right (and Left) to it!" (Calgary Herald, Feb. 18, 1988:D1) and "Laying Down on the Job" (Toronto Star, Nov. 21, 1986:C2) demonstrate that the press frequently deal with illegal and potentially injurious on-ice behaviour in a totally non-serious manner, which again facilitates legitimation. Moreover, these non-serious views have now been added to the general folklore of North American ice hockey. For example, in their The Joy of Hockey, Nicol and More (1978) write: "Hitting sometimes leads to fighting, much as spring sometimes leads to summer." Additionally, comedian Rodney Dangerfield's infamous line: "I went to a fight the other night and a
hockey game broke out" has similarly contributed towards the dominant lore and image of the game.

Finally, even clearer evidence of press legitimation of hockey violence is the fact that both quality and popular North American papers regularly carry advertisements promoting the sale of hockey fighting video tapes (see, for example, The Hockey News (Nov. 1, 1985:25); Toronto Star (April 14, 1986:84); Globe and Mail (April 10, 1986:D14)). These tapes are commonly advertised by way of language which further supports the argument being made here: "Best Fights in N.H.L. History;" "Toughest Players in the N.H.L.;" "Hardest Hits Ever", etc. As mentioned above, the net result of all of this is that hockey's place in ideology as a violent sport played by 'tough men' tends to be confirmed and reproduced.

Rationalizing the Media Message: "The Public Gets What the Public Wants"

In Chapter Three we mentioned that several interviews were conducted with media personnel in the Southern Ontario region, principally with television crews (directors of programming, sports show hosts, colour commentators, etc.) and newspaper workers (sports editors, reporters, columnists, photographers, etc.). Due to the emphasis in the study upon media treatment of violence in
sport, it was considered important to elicit values and meanings in sports journalism as held by persons centrally involved in the social production of news itself. This section briefly discusses data emerging from these interviews, with a specific focus upon the themes of 'cardinal' news value and journalistic responsibility.

At several previous junctures it has been noted that the potential of independent social issues/actions to become part of the media signification process often depends upon the extent to which they violate audience expectations *via-a-via* everyday occurrences. As Hall *et al.*, (1978:53) have suggested, such a characteristic is in the normal case of events likely to imbue the said issue/act with 'cardinal' news value as understood and reproduced, albeit implicitly (Chibnall, 1981:86), amongst media personnel. According to this occupational ideology, an event such as the Heysel Stadium riot, i.e., an unanticipated tragedy at a high profile sports contest replete with 'all-important' fatal consequences, is thus identified as relevant and newsworthy material by the media.

Conducting interviews with the programming personnel at the Canadian television channel which carried the 'feed' from Brussels, the author asked the director, commentators and other crew members to explain why the coverage of the game was maintained when other countries had either tempered theirs or cut it altogether (see Note 3 in Chapter Seven),
and why 'shots' of the dead, injured or otherwise distraught were replayed as frequently as they were. Responses provided unequivocal verification for Chibnall's (1981:86) argument that: "The rules of relevancy become associated with audience expectation and are legitimated in terms of audience desires":

My first reaction was not to show the incidents. I felt we were here to show soccer and this wasn't soccer. But at the same time I realized that I was on the air live, and okay this isn't soccer any more but it is news. All of us involved in soccer and soccer programming were really quite appalled by the events that day and we very quickly decided that this is what is happening and the newsworthiness warranted us showing it. Really, it became a news event and we did have to cover it. That's why we showed the replays and stills that you refer to.

I remember these events particularly well and the shock everyone was feeling, but there was also a sense of excitement because everyone's adrenalin was going and (we were thinking) 'what are we going to do next?' and here we are on live television and there are people running up from the newsroom with teletype reports of what's going on. Viewers were calling in in disbelief and we found ourselves in a situation where we were giving rivetting television without really trying. We knew there would be a macabre human intrigue with all the deaths out there. So in a sense it was exciting (although that's probably the wrong word). And, of course, we were paying for satellite time which introduced another criterion.

It was a decision that was made spontaneously. It was decided at that time that a major news event was breaking and it would have been senseless for us to break away. If a news story of this magnitude breaks in front of your own eyes, I think it's irresponsible not to display it for a curious public.
Similar arguments with regard to public 'duty' to cover events involving sports violence were also made by newspaper personnel. For example, asked to explain the volume and 'form' of its Heysel stories (the continued focus on the riot over a period of roughly a month, the regular use of photographs of the dead, sensational headlines, etc.), the sports editor of one Ontario paper austerely commented upon the would-be irresponsibility as he saw it of not covering the event in this manner:

First of all our job is to report the news and if there's violence or an incident, if people are hurt or killed--that's news. We can't ignore it. What would happen if we turned our back on it? We have a responsibility to let the general public know what's going on, good, bad, or indifferent. As for the 'volume' as you say, well we received so much information about the game that we felt kind of obligated to run it. It was world news. And it was very compelling news, which is our business after all. We are here to sell papers. But we just felt that the public really wanted to know. And if we didn't run those photographs, those people who didn't see the televised version wouldn't have understood the tragedy at all.

The values and perspectives inherent in these quotations were highly representative of all interview responses on this matter and indeed on the broader topic of reporting upon sports violence more generally. As Chibnall (1981) found in his study, the perceived requirements of the audience/public were continually interpreted as fundamental signifiers of cardinal news items. The financial advantages accrued from media coverage of sports-related violence were
customarily left implicit (although the newspaper sports editor cited last brings this-out explicitly), with media personnel instead usually preferring to rationalize and legitimize any such economic gain in terms of a responsibility to "...give the public what it wants."

When asked to comment upon some of the thematic and semiological trends discussed earlier in the chapter regarding the fashion in which sports violence is routinely treated in the press, and the possibility of glorifying and/or exacerbating the effects of the phenomenon, responses offered by sports journalists fell roughly into two broad categories.

Representing a wide range of newspaper sports journalists (significantly no editors were included here), the first and largest group, whilst acknowledging some media power and influence, were very defensive of the form in which violent sports issues are currently reported. Of hockey fighting photographs, for example, one sports reporter explained:

Listen, you can criticize these fight shots 'till you're blue in the face but hockey fights sell papers. The more violent the focus of the story, the more readers will be interested. I'm not advocating it should be that way but it is. And no, I don't think that showing a fight in the sports pages has any repercussions for what happens in a following game. The public know what they want and we try and give it to them.

On the same topic, a news photographer at the same paper
rationalized his apparent penchant for hockey fight pictures in the same manner:

I am a professional journalist. I have to get the best, most effective picture, which really means the most dramatic or the most exciting. With hockey, fight pictures are frequently the best. They're certainly the ones with the most impact and sell the best...I think you're exaggerating when you say that these shots have an effect on hockey in general. Fans want to see these. And I dare say players do too.

Also eschewing any importance to the glorification hypothesis, a well-known and respected Canadian sports columnist defended one of his stories controversially entitled "Jay-Tiger Rivalry lacks Good Clean Malice" (Globe and Mail, June 8, 1985:51) which clearly promoted animosity between two baseball teams with similar dismissive arguments:

Yes, I'm in a position of social responsibility...but I'm not in a position to interpret how some bloody unimaginative person is apt to interpret what I've said...If a guy gets all worked up about a tongue-in-cheek article or headline then he's too dumb to be reading it in the first place.

Representative of this group, then, was a conspicuous tendency to deny any substantial social influence of media discourse and signs for public understanding, and a concomitant denial, brought out more explicitly by some journalists than others, that 'irresponsible' media treatment sensationalizing sports violence could serve to perpetuate the phenomenon under scrutiny. Thus, perspectives emerging from this first category strongly support Tumber's (1982:45) findings in his study of media coverage of English race/
poverty riots:

Nobody...seems to give much credence to the copycat question. Camera crews, journalists and editors generally dismissed the idea and always added the rider that the dangers in not showing certain events far outweigh any possible dangers of showing them.

Rather more consideration, however, was given to the 'social effects' debate by a contrasting set of perspectives emerging as a second but smaller category of responses. Significantly, this group included several sports editors and, on the whole, older and more established news personnel, a finding which would appear to suggest that the younger, and perhaps more eager and ambitious journalists offering views discussed so far bring to their work more circulation-oriented, i.e., dramatic and sensationalist, values and techniques in order to 'make a name for themselves'.

In a report of violence in child athletics, for example, the sports editor of the Globe and Mail (June 11, 1985:7) spoke candidly on the role of journalists in sports violence:

Even journalists are co-conspirators. Most journalists who cover sports reflect the point of view of the sport industry. They cover events. Journalists love sports events because they have beginnings and ends, heroes and bums, records and world records. As a result, sports journalists often are little more than professional ingenues. They are reluctant to scratch beneath the surface or look beyond the next day's headlines because too many believe that social responsibility and the sports pages are incompatible.
More concrete testimony for this last statement came from a
sports editor of a local Ontario newspaper who, on the
occasion of first meeting with the author, admitted surprise
at the results of the author's hockey photograph survey, and
specifically at the role of his paper in it, i.e., the high
number of fight photographs. At the second meeting, and
having verified these survey figures, the editor confessed:

"Something that disturbs me greatly is the
number of fight photos we ran in the month
of November. And I came down on my staff and
said, "...look, it's hockey for Godsakes." And
the problem we've had is the Canadian
press. The easiest thing for photo-
journalists to shoot is a fight, but night
after night is too much. I leave a message
to my night staff and say, okay, this is
what's coming up, and at that time on these
notes I had to say 'no fights please'. If
there's a brawl and someone loses an eye,
well then I think we owe it to the readers
to tell them, but not night after night. The
score could be 9-6 you know, with 15 good
goals, but the photo the next day will be
one of a fight. I'm going to have to do
something about this."

In sharp contrast to the first category of media perspect-
ives, both editors, representing this second group as a
whole, were clearly of the belief, in the words of one, that
"...the power of the press to sway can be awesome and our
responsibility is to report accurately and responsibly."

Of course, what is construed as 'responsible' and
'accurate' is a matter of subjective definition and differs
greatly although, again, if any governing 'rule' of
'responsible journalism' exists in the media, it is the
stress upon accurately 'showing it as it is'. Interest-
ingly, the papers for which these editors work (and indeed their own editorial comments) have been cited widely throughout this chapter as using extremely sensationalist and exaggerating coding procedures to describe incidents of sports participant and crowd violence which have been criticized as irresponsible and damaging. What journalists purport as ideally responsible work, then, may not always 'read' responsibly. Moreover, media reports must remain ambiguous because they constantly undergo differential public decoding processes.

Throughout this chapter we have argued that the media frequently contribute toward legitimizing and perpetuating violent sports participant and crowd behaviour by treating the phenomenon in ways that tend to glorify it, by focusing on only very superficial elements of and explanations for it, and by providing for those with a taste for such behaviour notions of what is approved of and ideas for future conduct. The occupational ideology of 'giving the public what it wants' and the fact that television and newspaper personnel "...operate within a socio-economic system where readers and viewers have to be won and kept" (Halloran, 1978b:297) to a large degree dictates the content of news. The common media requirement of news which is 'action-packed', 'entertaining' and 'rivetting' can be translated into news which is dramatic, sensationalist and violent. The important point is not so much whether the
public want sensational media coverage of violent sports-related incidents but that the media interpret the public as wanting it, or at least rationalize away their own reporting styles in these terms.

What the interview data discussed here show is that media selection processes are socially constructed and involve estimations and interpretations of what the public want to see and read. Crucially, what is seen and read is literally a 're-presentation' of events, orchestrated and coded into a different form through the ideological process of news production, which includes carefully engineered discourse, headlines, photographs, camera angles, etc., (Clarke and Clarke, 1982:70). News 'immediacy' that we have referred to above is, then, essentially illusory: "We can never see the whole event, we see those parts which are filtered through this process of presentation to us" (Clarke and Clarke, 1982:73).

Summary

In this third 'findings' chapter, an attempt has been made to elucidate upon the manner in which sports crowd disorder and sports violence more broadly are most commonly treated in the mass media, and ways in which such treatment
contribute toward widespread public understandings and interpretations of the phenomenon as socially problematic.

The chapter began by examining three dominant images of sports crowd disorder and sports participant violence constructed in the press. First, it was demonstrated that soccer hooliganism is frequently identified in the press, both in North America and in Britain itself, as a uniquely British or English 'disease'. Despite the crisis that British soccer is currently experiencing, evidence unearthed both in this study and elsewhere is strongly indicative of the fact that soccer hooliganism takes place in a number of international settings. (It is also important to reemphasize here that despite all of its problems with violence, British soccer is usually played without incident.) Consequently, notions of the 'British disease' as addressed and reproduced in the media tend to construct a very distinct ideological message with regard both to the problem as it exists in that context, i.e., it tends to heighten its importance, but also with regard to sports crowd disorder as it exists in other settings, such as North America, i.e., because of the alleged magnitude of British hooliganism, crowd disorder in other contexts appears negligible and therefore unworthy of concern by comparison.

Second, elements of threat and prediction of violence that frequently pervade press discourse on sports crowd disorder were examined. Again, relying principally
upon the soccer hooligan issue, it was argued that the press exaggerate danger and threat offered to the social order by actually predicting crowd violence in their reports of upcoming games. It is not uncommon for such reports to provide quite explicit messages of alarm and caution, even when there is no logical reason for so doing. Combined, elements of threat, prediction, danger, need for public caution, etc., characteristic of British press treatment of upcoming soccer events, frequently transform the soccer narrative into a discourse of social control explicitly emphasizing the alleged indispensability of the latter.

Thirdly, a variety of ways in which the press clearly exploit sports violence for economic purposes were discussed. Using Stuart Hall's (1978) notion of 'editing for impact', it was shown that newspapers implement a diversity of semiological agendas to enhance audience appeal but which also serve to legitimize, glorify and perpetuate violent sports conduct. Systematic analysis of reporting styles including visual narratives (pictures, after all, do tell stories) revealed that a considerable portion of press coverage of sports action is devoted to dramatic and sensationalistic embellishment of the more violent aspects of sports contests. Additionally, comments were made with regard to how press treatment of violent sporting personnel cannot only imbue them with 'mythical' status which tends to negate the importance of sports violence per se, but also
strengthens values in the broader sporting culture in which violent players are revered.

In the concluding section of the chapter, data emerging in interviews with media personnel were used to examine the question of 'why' the media present sports-related violence in ways discussed in earlier sections. It was shown that media portrayals of the phenomenon are fundamentally premised upon perceptions of audience expectations and, in the austere words of one journalist, on "...giving the public what it wants." Importantly, aspects of sports reporting which have been criticized as irresponsible and insidious throughout this chapter were defended and rationalized by many such media personnel in these terms.

Finally, one of the purposes of this analysis of dominant themes and styles in media (specifically press) coverage of sports crowd disorder and sports-related violence more generally was to establish the normative 'ground rules' of media reportage in this direction. From here, the focus now shifts toward a particular case study of press treatment of sports crowd disorder to demonstrate how these general rules of news production and signification have been implemented under the circumstances of two actual sports riots.
NOTES


2. The camera pictures received in Toronto were those of the British Broadcasting Corporation (B.B.C.) filming in Brussels.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CASE STUDY: MASS MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE HEYSSEL STADIUM RIOT AND THE MONTREAL/"ROCKET RICHARD" RIOT

Introduction

The analysis to follow is centrally concerned with the 'social reality' produced by media commentaries of sports crowd disorder. Specifically, this chapter presents a content analysis of themes in British and North American press responses to the Heysel Stadium soccer riot of May, 1985, supplemented by empirical references from (mostly) Canadian press responses to a North American sports crowd riot--the Montreal/"Rocket Richard" riot of March, 1955--for purposes of cross-cultural and historical comparison. Rather than an attempt to eke out causes (causal explanations for hooliganism are reviewed and appraised in Chapter Two), the chapter represents an attempt to demonstrate how the construction of imagery and definition, and the distinctive labelling of deviant behaviour on the part of the mass media can assist in establishing the 'reality' around which the problem of soccer hooliganism and other sports crowd disorder is generally understood and discussed. Common coding and presentation techniques characterizing the
'violent spectator story' are brought out and categorized into a model of reporting themes. In order to explain the effects of these socially produced aspects of the news process, arguments are made using the sociological concepts of 'deviancy amplification' and 'moral panic'. There is, additionally, an explanation of differential codes of press discourse regarding reports on the Heysel-riot in particular.

The Heysel Stadium Riot

On May 29, 1985, the most celebrated event in European sport, the European Champion's Cup of soccer, was played at Heysel Stadium in Brussels, Belgium. The 1-0 victory secured by Juventus Football Club of Turin, Italy, over Liverpool Football Club of England was, however, considerably dimmed by a series of incidents that took place between spectators on the Heysel terraces prior to the game itself. Approximately one hour before kick-off, a period of mutual taunting between rival fan groups culminated in tens of Liverpool fans (or 'scallies' as they call themselves) breaking down a makeshift chain-link fence deliberately erected for segregation purposes, and charging opposing fans in an effort to 'take the Juventus end'. In the ensuing panic, thirty-nine (mostly Italian) fans were
crushed against a collapsing retainer wall and killed. Many more required hospital attention.

That the game itself procured a huge live television audience (it was seen in over eighty countries) only added to the immediacy of the impact. Not unpredictably, the television networks that decided to maintain the feed from Brussels' exacerbated the afternoon's ugliness by replaying, occasionally in slow-motion, the Liverpool onslaught. In frozen and magnified frames, viewers watched suffocated faces, clothes-littered empty terraces and stunned facial expressions of survivors anxious to locate friends and relatives, as commentators (perhaps excusably under the circumstances) 'struggled' for objectivity, but more accurately continued their diatribes aimed at the Liverpool 'animals'. "They can't be normal human beings" declared Mike Povey of Toronto's *World Soccer Report* somewhat unoriginally; "professional agitators" explained colleague Dick Howard. As an indication of the real interests of the television networks, when the frequently explosive game finally commenced, viewers were provided with numerous superfluous replays and slow motion images of violent tackles and players grimacing in pain on the turf.

For their part, the press developed what came to be called 'Black Wednesday' into an extended 'running story' that lasted for approximately a month on both sides of the Atlantic. (This verifies Hartley's (1982:78) argument that
once the press consider an event to be of 'cardinal' news value, it will be covered for some time.) Regularly cited in this commentary were reports of 'sub-human' English soccer fans and British 'social cancers'. That fifty-seven people had burned to death just three weeks earlier in a totally non-hooligan related incident (a factor largely ignored by the press) at the dilapidated soccer ground in Bradford, only seemed to compound the 'soccer problem' as addressed in the press. So 'important' and 'newsworthy', in fact, was the Brussels incident that its stories dwarfed those describing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of East Asians in a cyclone in Bangladesh at about the same time. In a remarkably imbalanced treatment of Brussels and Bangladesh, the press went on to familiarize readers with what frequently amounted to caricatures of soccer hooligans, with complex diagrams and illustrations of Heysel Stadium and of the route taken by the Liverpool 'mob' into the 'Z' section. Few maps, on the other hand, were provided to describe the Bangladesh cyclone.*

Soon after the Heysel riot, the European Football Union (U.E.F.A.) banned all English clubs from international competition until further notice, an isolating sanction never before imposed on any nation in the history of soccer. Thus, England, "...the country which had originally developed and then exported the game" (Walvin, 1975:7), ignominiously joined South Africa, ostracised globally for
its apartheid ideologies, as pariahs of the world's sporting scene.

We have said that the Brussels story ran extensively and consistently for roughly four weeks in Britain and North America. For much longer, any statements emanating from U.E.F.A., the English, Belgian or Italian Football Associations, or any other source directly involved in Heysel (e.g., British, Belgian, Italian politicians, police, fans, etc.), or indeed from sources only tangentially connected to the more general 'problem' of soccer hooliganism, were related to the original story in both the quality and popular press. Two years later, the press continue to report soccer-related disorders in terms of Brussels, making statements and comparisons regarding size, manifestation, damage, injury count, etc.

The Montreal/"Rocket Richard" Riot

The largest crowd riot in the history of North American sport took place some three decades before the Heysel incident, in Montreal in March, 1955. In the early part of this century, the Montreal Canadiens, along with the Toronto Maple Leafs, established a reputation as one of Canada's (and particularly French Canada's) most avidly followed sports teams. In fact, in an era of growing political strife
between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, and rising unionist sentiment in Quebec, the Canadiens became almost synonymous with the political plight and cultural experience of French Canadians as a whole. In the 1950s, their much cherished French Canadian hockey idol was Maurice "The Rocket" Richard, a highly talented but volatile player whose career had been punctuated by a large and widely-publicized number of violent incidents.

During a home game against Boston on March 13, an altercation took place between Richard and Boston's Hal Laycoe. With only six minutes left in the game, Laycoe retaliated against the persistent high-sticking of Richard by hitting the Canadien and opening a gash above his eye. Although the referee signalled for a penalty, Richard, bent on revenge, circled his opponent and attacked him twice with his stick, actually breaking it on the second occasion. Undeterred, Richard proceeded to punch a linesman, Neil Thompson, in the face as the latter attempted to restrain him.

Richard was ejected from the game and fined by the N.H.L., whose Anglophone President, Clarence Campbell, decided to levy further sanctions (in the face of Richard's violent history) in the form of a suspension for the remainder of the season including the play-offs—an unprecedented penalty. The implication of the suspension for Richard himself was that his once imminent goal-scoring
record was now out of reach, and the team's chances of going on to win the Stanley Cup had been greatly diminished. The subsequent crowd reaction has been described by Mark et al., (1983:84):

...fifty-five Montreal Canadiens' fans made threats on the life of National Hockey League Commissioner Clarence Campbell. When the commissioner appeared at the Montreal Forum at a Canadiens-Detroit Red Wings game, he was pelted with fruit, programs, galoshes, and other missiles. A smoke bomb was exploded and many spectators fled to the exits. Because of the fans' disruptive behaviour, the Montreal Fire Chief evacuated the Forum (resulting in a Canadiens' forfeit). When the fans from inside the Forum mixed with people mingling outside, a major riot ensued. Fifteen blocks of stores were looted, windows were smashed, cars were over-turned, and corner newstands and street kiosks were burned down. Over 100 people were arrested.

As with the Heysel Stadium riot, the Canadian media responded to the Montreal riot in sensationalist form, although for a shorter time-span. Its story appeared in many Canadian and American newspapers for a period of approximatively fourteen days, with front page headlines such as "HOCKEY MOB RUNS WILD" (Hamilton Spectator, Mar. 18, 1955:1), "CYCLONIC RAGE OF 10,000" (Toronto Star, Mar. 19, 1955:1), "STATE OF SEIGE NEAR MONTREAL RINK" (Toronto Star, Mar. 19, 1955:1) predominating. Setting a precedent for front page and headline coverage of North American sport, media treatment of the Richard riot clearly demonstrated the riot's perceived status as 'cardinal' news copy. For example, in some cases riot reports actually saturated the entire front
page of certain newspapers (e.g., Toronto Star, Mar. 18, 1955), and some went on to provide multiple-page coverage (e.g., this same edition of the Toronto Star had no fewer than five pages entirely dedicated to the incident, and the Hamilton Spectator's (Mar. 18, 1955) report of the riot included three full pages of photographs). Internationally, the riot made headline news in a number of countries (e.g., London News Chronicle). As with international reports of the Heysel riot, some international newspapers exaggerated the story and its effects more than others. Perhaps the worst offender here was a Dutch newspaper whose front page read "STADIUM WRECKED, 27 DEAD, 100 WOUNDED" (Beddoes et al., 1973:196) when in fact no deaths occurred at all.

Importantly, it needs to be pointed out early here that the media played a central role in the Montreal riot, in disseminating updates concerning the Campbell/Richard conflict in immediate and ideologically biased ways and in rallying for public support. Once Richard had been suspended, the French media took the opportunity to whip up a large number of attacks upon Campbell and the N.H.L. which was seen to be discriminating against French Canada. As the Montreal Star (Mar. 17, 1955:50) put it, the "...test of strength between the greatest player in the league and league authority" was generally understood in terms of French/English Canadian relations. For example, several Montreal groceries lobbied for a boycott against Campbell's
Soups, even though the President of the N.H.L. was unrelated to the chain; the editor of Le Devoir had commented that "If Campbell had been a Frenchman, he would have been killed immediately" (Katz, 1955:100); and Richard himself, exploiting the medium of his own radio show at first appealed to all French Canadians to protest his suspension, but later, once the riot had begun, made radio and newspaper appeals for peace. His appeals for both support and then peace were extremely influential.

The Content Analysis

As part of the research plan, a content analysis of a large sample of media reports on the Heysel riot appearing in both the quality and popular British and North American press (including several international news magazines such as Newsweek, Time, Sports Illustrated and World Soccer) from the time of the riot itself until the time of writing (November, 1986) was conducted. (In a less intense manner, this procedure has been ongoing.) As mentioned above, data gleaned from a content analysis of press reports of the 1955 Montreal riot are introduced here wherever possible for purposes of verification, and cross-cultural and historical comparison, but in a secondary way. Because data here were not as readily accessible as data on the Heysel Stadium
riot, the Montreal riot will not be used in an equivalent form.  

In addition to searching for the presence and effect of common presentational themes in these reports, care was also taken to compare differences in such themes and styles offered in the quality and popular press. In general, the analysis disclosed several recurring themes and significant modes of representation and style which together contributed towards establishing the 'reality' around which this isolated incident was largely understood and discussed.

**Blame**

When any event of 'cardinal' news value occurs, a great deal of 'scapegoat searching' on the part of both primary and secondary definers appears in the press. Following the Bradford fire, for example, the British press implicated the 'mindless minority' almost unanimously (e.g., *Daily Express*, May 31, 1985:1; *Sun*, May 14, 1985:1), and the North American press followed, until an official inquiry established that its more likely and unintended precipitant was a carelessly thrown cigarette butt. With Brussels, too, debates regarding who or what deserved to be blamed raged. (Needless to say, for every source of blame there was also an apologist.)

Sporadically cited in the press as causes were alcohol, irregular ticket sales and the volatile tactics of
the National Front (an extreme right-wing organization known to use soccer grounds for recruitment purposes). More widespread press criticism, however, was aimed at two other sources: (1) Liverpool's "goonish" (Toronto Sun, May 31, 1985:10) and "thuggish clans" (Sunday Times, June 2, 1985:15), "the animals of Merseyside" (The Spectator, June 8, 1985:8), universally condemned despite the fact that twenty-seven Belgian police officers had been attacked by Italian fans before the final riot (Williams, 1985:3), and that television pictures had shown quite clearly that Juventus supporters were not beyond provocation and violence themselves; (2) the organizers of the game itself, including the security forces on hand: "...were it not for the criminal insouciance of the organizers, the cowardly ineptitude of the Belgian police" reported Brian Glanville with austerity, "...no one need have died at all" (World Soccer, July 1985:16); the Globe and Mail (May 30, 1985:2) criticized the "...huge police contingent" for "...being too slow to make its presence felt," and the Toronto Sun (May 31, 1985:10) asserted that "...the authorities who permitted the carnage in Brussels must be charged." Not surprisingly, conspicuous by its absence was any press criticism of the disturbingly complacent and excessive 'explanations' and suggestions for solution on offer from the 'experts' during the live telecast.
Of course, serious questions do need to be asked about the behaviour of the Liverpool fans, the decisions of the Belgian organizers and security forces, and all other possible contributory sources. However, given the escapades of English soccer fans in Europe over the past two decades, all heavily documented in the media, the events of Brussels were in many respects inevitable and predictable. One wonders, therefore, why the press continue to demonstrate a penchant for focusing so extensively on superficial precipitants, particularly those postulated by the autonomous 'experts', and on accrediting unsubstantiated blame, whilst precluding any search for deeper and more meaningful explanation. A more pertinent question to be asked, surely, is not 'who led the first Liverpool charge?', but 'what were the satisfactions and meanings derived from that charge?' As indicated in Chapter Two, such questions have begun to be answered by British sociologists concerned with the hooligan issue (e.g., Marsh et al., 1978; Hall et al., 1978; Taylor 1982a, 1982b; Dunning et al., 1982a, 1982b, 1984a, 1984b).

'Blame' was also a central feature of discourse in press responses to the Montreal riot; and as with the Heysel riot, the source of blame essentially differed with the party offering the argument. Thus, as if to underline Francophone/Anglophone tensions already alluded to, two dominant perspectives emerged in the press, one clearly pro-Francophone and pro-Richard, the other less supportive of
these parties and perhaps implicitly anti-Francophone in orientation.

In Quebec itself, the Montreal press, both French and English, spewed out a myriad of anti-Anglophone sentiments offered by journalists and primary definers in defense of fans' and of course Richard's behaviour. In particular, Clarence Campbell, now cast in the villain's role, was the central source of blame. For example, *Le Devoir* used language such as "unjust" and "too severe" to describe Richard's punishment levied by the Anglophone Campbell. Katz (1955:102) cites the case of a French weekly newspaper which printed a cartoon depicting Campbell's head lying on a platter and dripping blood with a cartoon reading: "This is how we would like to see him."

Again, Andy O'Brien, writing in the *Montreal Star* (Mar. 18, 1955) underlined a similar pro-Richard position:

The cut received by Richard from Laycoe's savage stick blow would be enough to halt immediately any world heavyweight boxing championship bout...But President Campbell thinks it could possibly justify only an 'immediate and instinctive reaction'...How can you expect a man who has just been bashed across the head for five stitches to pause for reflection?...If Richard had only been born with a little less guts he might have dropped to the ice, rolled over in his own blood and fainted into a state of happy reflection over the dire penalty forthcoming to Hal Laycoe. Unfortunately, the stuff of champions doesn't allow others to fight their battles.

Several Canadian newspapers outside Quebec were also clearly prepared to blame the N.H.L. President for the riot. For
example, Jack Kinsella of the Ottawa Citizen argued in a rather threatening manner that:

...it was so serious a mistake as a matter of fact, that it would not be surprising if Mr. Campbell and the league as a whole lived to regret the decision. (Cited in Hamilton Spectator, Mar. 18, 1955:22)

A quite different perspective, however, could be found in the more Anglophone-based newspapers. Whereas the Toronto Star (Mar. 18, 1955:6) looked to Canadian youth in general as a source of blame, "...this is (increasingly) a nation of hicks and hooligans," the Toronto Globe and Mail (Mar. 19, 1955) was quick to castigate the Montreal media for their role in contributing to the riot itself, by whipping up substantial support for Quebec's hockey idol:

The blame rests, too, with the newspapers of Montreal and other Canadian cities, which built up Richard...into a veritable colossus. They wove about him an absurd legend which he and his team and his public were only too ready to believe, so that when he acted like a fool, they treated him like a hero, and when at long last his folly caught up with him, they screamed injustice. Thursday night's riots should warn newspapers of what can happen when a good hockey player...or a good pugilist becomes a demi-god to be worshipped, a king who can do no wrong.

This editorial comment is particularly germane for this study. Not only is it an Anglophone indictment of essentially French Canadian sporting experiences, but it also verifies arguments made in Chapter Six that certain media personnel actually perceive their role broadly as one
which can foster not just public reaction but also public over-reaction and therefore needs to be addressed as such.

Finally, blame was also implicitly aimed at Richard himself in an editorial in the same newspaper:

Clarence will be vilified and abused in Montreal...In Detroit, Boston, and all points North, South, East and West, he will be commended for the same performance of a dirty task. (Toronto Globe and Mail, Mar. 17, 1955:30)

Thus, it can be seen that 'blame' also emerged as a theme in press responses to the earlier riot. Importantly, although many newspapers correctly argued that the Montreal riot could be seen at least in part in terms of Anglophone/Francophone tensions, on the whole the focus again was very much on blame and punishment rather than on explanation or understanding.

Irrational and Meaningless Behaviour

In Chapter Two we noted that 'riff-raff' theory has been used by academics to describe members of crowds in a derogatory fashion since the time of Gustave Le Bon at the end of the nineteenth century. As M. Smith (1983:143) writes:

During the late 1800s and the first few decades of the twentieth century, European and American crowd theorists, most of whom were socially and politically of a markedly conservative bent, almost invariably depicted riotous crowds in negative and psychological terms: the crowd was irrational, fickle, impulsive, irresponsible, and destructive; the sources of its behaviour...
lay not in social issues but in mysterious psychological processes, like "mental contagion."

Although emphasis on such psychological rather than socio-cultural processes is still evident today in crowd theory (e.g., Kram, 1982), it is in the media that we are now most usually reintroduced to the 'riff-raff' view.

Since crowd violence at English soccer matches first emerged in the public eye on a broad scale in the 1960s, it has come to be quite normative for the media, and for the press (echoing official sources), to discuss it as if it were devoid of any method or rationale. While contemporary academics continue to forward the view that "...all human behaviour involves at least some degree of rationality and meaning" (Williams et al., 1984:10), words and phrases like 'senseless', 'stupid', 'insane', 'mad', 'lunatic fringe', 'mentally deranged' continue to predominate in our newspapers and media. Again, reports of the Heysel riot proved to be no different.

Media claims of 'hooligan senselessness' enacted by the "morons in red" (Daily Mail, May 31, 1985:39) were frequently combined with appeals for strict punitive sanctions:

The canker of mindless hooliganism is now destroying our national game, and clearly drastic measures will be taken to cure it. (Liverpool Echo, May 30, 1985:55. Editorial)

The scenes that you are seeing at the moment are not of people who enjoy soccer—they're of a mindless element that permeates this
game and the punishment that should go to these fans should be the highest and most severe. (Dick Howard, World Soccer Report, Channel 47, Toronto, May 29, 1985)

The significance of such statements regarding "The madness on the terraces" (Times, May 31, 1985:10), offered at length by primary definers and media personnel, lies in the fact that they combine arguments and attitudes remarkable only for their simplicity and lack of insight into the real issues.

First, the regular cat-and-mouse struggles between both fans and police, and between rival 'super crews' of fans, in addition to objectives inherent in fan fighting and the fact that violent fans now leave victims with professionally-printed calling cards, show that soccer hooliganism can in fact be highly rational, systematic and coordinated, and (for those involved) be based upon a complex set of extremely meaningful verbal and non-verbal interpretations (Marsh et al., 1978). The police themselves now acknowledge at least part of this interpretation, as indicated by their frequent public references to "organized football violence" (Globe and Mail, Mar. 27, 1986:D10). Second, although some form of punitive sanctions may be thought necessary as a preventive measure for problems of violence at soccer, experience over the last two decades shows that the incidence of hooliganism does not decrease as draconian policies are more frequently imposed (T. Morris, 1985).
The 'riff-raff' theory mentioned above also appeared in newspaper reports of the Montreal riot, both inside and outside of Quebec. The *Toronto Star* (Mar. 17, 1955), for example, reported at length on the "insane" and "bizarre" behaviour of fans before, during and following the riot itself. In particular, its focus was on violent threats offered by fans to Clarence Campbell. This edition of the *Toronto Star* contained an entire report based around a description of one 'hoodlum' Montreal Canadien fan—who telephoned the N.H.L. head offices and commented, referring to Campbell: "Tell him this is the undertaker—he'll be needing me in the next few days." Similarly, the *Montreal Star* (Mar. 18, 1955:56) also espoused a version of riff-raff theory, arguing that:

The mob creating the actual violence were basically riff-raff types—toughs who normally ramble in the shabby areas of the city in the wee hours looking for cheap thrills.

It has been some twenty-five years since Becker (1963) first wrote that there is a tendency amongst human groups to view behaviour different from their own as deviant and irrational. However, the effects of Becker's words are still pertinent today because there is a concomitant tendency to provide only cursory and simplistic solutions for behaviour that is explained on only simplistic levels. Thus we find, for example, that fans participating in soccer violence "...are punished more severely than offenders
committing the same kind of offences in political demonstrations" (Trivizaz, 1981:348). Press arguments concerning fan 'irrationality' and 'meaninglessness', important ingredients for an ongoing moral panic, are, therefore, quite insidious to any serious attempt to locate culturally and historically contextualized causes and feasible answers to the problem of sports crowd disorder either in the short or long term.

Dehumanized Qualities

In addition to press reports of Heysel emphasizing the culpability and irrationality of the Liverpool fans' behaviour, these reports were largely punctuated with language deliberately employed to underline alleged dehumanized qualities on the part of riot participants. An omnipresent tendency in press commentary on soccer over the past two decades, the public has occasionally been witness to some classic 'animal' sensationalism:

They should be herded together preferably in a public place. That way they could be held up for ridicule and exposed for what they are--mindless morons with no respect for other peoples' property or wellbeing. We should make sure that we treat them like animals--for their behaviour proves that's what they are. (Daily Mirror, April 4, 1977)

Brussels also precipitated a variety of sub-human analogies. On the one hand, we had description and definition, bombast with unoriginal and belaboured adjectives--the Liverpool
scallies were "...dehumanized...swinish...bestial" according to Glanville (World Soccer, August 1985:16) while the Daily Mirror (May 31, 1985:21) described their collective "...animal growl...crazed with booze and violence." On the other hand, much more graphic and entertaining, we were introduced to the Liverpool scally as Gargantua—"He was an animal, a beast. Saliva was spitting from his mouth, his eyes were popping" said one Italian fan cited in Time (June 10, 1985:26); similarly, the Globe and Mail (May 31, 1985:5) stated that soccer had "...become a sport possessed by demons...(and had) acquired the nastiest of parasitical infections;" "...time for the animals of Merseyside to be put in uniform" declared Waugh (The Spectator, June 8, 1985:8), proposing to cure soccer's ills with mandatory military service.

Very similar descriptions were offered by press responses to the Richard riot, with a number of sub-human metaphors being employed to account for unruly and violent fan activities. Katz's (1955:103) observation about Montreal fans chanting profanity aimed at Campbell, "The cry was taken up and repeated endlessly with a savage intensity," was followed by more explicit dehumanized metaphors:

There were probably 500-600 of them. Like packs of wolves they moved up and down the front of the Forum shrieking wildly and influencing the crowd. They took rubbers off the feet of spectators and threw them at the police. They ripped doors off hinges and broke windows. They were dissatisfied with this ammunition so they marched off to a new
building site and came back with pieces of concrete.

These comments were echoed by Andy O'Brien in an earlier editorial in the Montreal Star (Mar. 18, 1955:56):

I imagine that they had rushed to the Forum on hearing radio reports of the riot to join in the excitement—the delights of howling like savages, throwing rocks through windows, looting stores and even sending people to hospital with thrown rocks and chunks of ice as well as holding up street car traffic for almost 5 hours.

Again, referring to rioting fan behaviour, the Toronto Star (Mar. 17, 1955) argued that "It's savagery which attacks the fundamentals of civilized behaviour." Finally, Katz's explicit reference to animal types was matched by an interesting though perplexing international press reference to both Canadian hockey players and their fans as 'sub-human':

Ice hockey is rough... but it is now a matter of grim record that Canadian players are spring lambs compared to those who support them. (London News Chronicle, cited in Beddoes et al., 1973:196)

Again, irony and imperception leap from the news pages. First, such language is as violent as the behaviour it seeks to condemn. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, it proposes meeting violence with similar retaliatory violence—if violent fans are no more than parasitical beasts ("savages," "wolves," etc.), extermination becomes a logical solution. Additionally, as Keen (1986:16) and Vulliamy (1985:8-10) have argued, animal violence has no deep sociological meaning and is therefore inaccessible to
interpretation in human terms. Ironic, too, is the fact that at times this type of press description can actually serve to imbue fans with a vicarious sense of power and status. No wonder, then, that chants like 'We Hate Humans' have echoed from the British soccer 'ends' during recent seasons.

The violent and inflammatory animal imagery which the (usually popular but also quality) press prefer is in many ways the same for all male deviants and criminals (Keen, 1986:16). As Keen argues, male deviants are described by dehumanized metaphors while their female counterparts are portrayed as sharing more commonalities with the supernatural than other (more 'natural') women. The soccer hooligan and the sports crowd disorder story more broadly are in many ways, then, thoroughly interchangeable in terms of language and style with others describing rapists, terrorists, paedophiles and even members of flamboyant youth subcultures, and contribute in a similar fashion to dominant ideology.

Importantly, it is with this and the previous feature ('irrational and meaningless behaviour') of media reportage that it now becomes possible to locate certain contradictions of ideologically coded representations and discourses of sports crowd disorder. A diversity of irrational and sub-human images and metaphors have been described here as common coding techniques in press reports of crowd disorder, especially common for those coded in
dominant terms. In large part, these representations characterize the dominant 'control' and/or 'law and order' accounts of sports violence, where the social order and social behaviour in it becomes 'naturalized' and 'taken-for-granted'. At the same time, however, accounts offered by both primary and secondary definers emphasize what is seen to be the 'necessity' of stiff penalties in order to literally 'teach offenders a lesson', i.e., to impose a 'short, sharp, shock' on hooligans and therefore allegedly to reestablish control and order. The dominant code here represents a call for measures and sanctions which are extremely rationalistic and mindful as solutions for behaviours which are simultaneously described and understood as non-rational, mindless and even sub-human. An assessment of this problem leads to the posing of a question which would appear to defy logic: how can the irrational and the sub-human be disciplined and deterred in rational and human ways? Thus, as suggested by Vulliamy and Keen above, it is important to emphasize that dominant discourse is not only biased and selective, but also internally contradictory.

War Talk

As mentioned in Chapter One and demonstrated more extensively in Chapter Six in the discussion of press coding techniques regarding sports crowd disorder and sports
violence in general, whether describing the excitement of touchdowns and last minute penalty saves, the personalities of sports stars or violence at and around sports stadia, a process of 'image reification' has always been prevalent in the sports press. We have seen several styles of overstatement and embellishment thus far, but a fourth, equally common, tendency on the part of the press when depicting the behaviour of athletes and spectators is the reliance upon military rhetoric or 'war talk'. This is particularly true of sports violence. Combined with the aforementioned discursive styles, the prevalence of military analogies gives the sports report an extra crucial ingredient for the kindling of an amplification spiral where public concern over the issues involved escalate rapidly. Soccer grounds are thus depicted as the domain of irrational beasts who deserve blame at every juncture, and who run rampant and metamorphose what, implicitly, is perceived to be the normally tranquil sports stadium into a 'war zone'.

As horrendous as the results of Heysel were, the lurid impact- and circulation-oriented headlines suggested an event much worse: "THE KILLING FIELD(S)" (Halifax Chronicle-Herald, May 31, 1985:6; Sunday Times, June 2, 1985:15; Daily Mail, May 30, 1985:5); "THE SOCCER WARS" (Workers' Vanguard, June 14, 1985:2); "WAR GAMES" (Toronto Sun, May 31, 1985:10); "THIS IS NOT A SPORT, THIS IS A WAR"
(Time, June 10, 1985:26). Of note is the fact that both 'populists' and so-called 'quality' press are represented amongst this sample. (Ironically, none of the British or North American press reacted to the Bangladesh cyclone, surely a 'killing field' of much more devastating proportions, with such emotionally-charged headlines.) In addition, nouns and adjectives connoting all manner of warfare and militia were freely employed: 'siege', 'battle', 'battle-ground', 'carnage', 'combat', 'conflict', 'troops', 'campaign', 'invasion'.

Thus, Brussels entered journalism's annals as "A night of sheer horror" (Liverpool Echo, May 30, 1985:5), when the Liverpool "monsters" (Hamilton Spectator, May 31, 1985:A10), "...a sporting breed of urban guerilla" (Newsweek, June 10, 1985:44), "...made bloody war on Italian spectators" (Macleans, June 10, 1985:56), precipitating "murderous mayhem" (Globe and Mail, May 31, 1985:5) and "murderous rampage" (Calgary Herald, June 1, 1985:A4).

In addition to being as common as statements emphasizing irrationality and bestial characteristics, tones of war talk are equally dangerous. Their general place in the discourse of Brussels and of other soccer-related riots presents the soccer ground as a perilous place to visit, where the horror of Heysel could unfold again at any time, and the implicit message throughout is, of course, 'stay away'. The "spectre of violence" (Toronto Star, June 19,
1985:D3) thus persuades us to come no closer to the real thing than the television highlights. One of the effects is that gate attendances decrease, and the moral panic over hooligan violence is sustained.

Unlike the previous three coding styles, tones of 'war talk' were not found to be prevalent in press reports of the Montreal riot. Although Katz (1955:13) rather sensationally described post-riot Catherine Street as an area which "...looked like the aftermath of a wartime blitz in London," and the Toronto Star (Mar. 19, 1955:1) ran a front page story depicting the "...state of siege near (the) Montreal rink," on the whole the content analysis revealed that very little military rhetoric and metaphor had been used in newspaper reports. At the very least, however, these two examples provided represent historical and cross-cultural precedents for the more contemporary trend in press reports to rely heavily upon 'war talk' as a signifier of news, demonstrated clearly in the Heysel case and other more general scenarios discussed at length in Chapter Six.

Moral Directives

In general, the mass media provide a highly visible stage for the primary definers in society to advance their own ideological positions. Not surprisingly, then, press commentary on Brussels (and to a lesser extent Montreal) in many ways amounted to little more than brief description of
the event itself (particularly the case during newspapers' first and second reports), followed by lengthy quotations and discussions of primary definers' reactions and perspectives.

With Heysel, the worldwide condemnation of the event included the views of the Pope, the Queen of England, King Baudouin of Belgium, Italian President Alessandro Pertini, sundry political and religious figures, in addition, of course, to Mrs. Thatcher, only recently 'personally involved' in the fight against hooliganism, 10 "...popping up like a jack-in-the-box with her little party piece" (The Spectator, June 8, 1985:8). It has already been seen that this group, as well as other (largely right-wing) politicians, police, soccer authorities and personnel, etc., overwhelmingly reacted to this latest of soccer riots with calls for stricter control measures and tougher penalties which in their view would help solve soccer's problems by way of deterrence. For example, while Mrs. Thatcher reaffirmed her preference for "stiff sentences," high profile members of the soccer fraternity (managers, ex-players and other primary definers in this specific milieu) advised other rather extreme 'solutions': Bobby Charlton and Terry Venables (ex-England players) respectively advised the reintroduction of the birch and national service (Daily Mail, May 30, 1985:6), and Bobby Robson and Ron Greenwood (present and past England team managers) respectively
advised using flame throwers on hooligans and drowning them
A considerable portion of press discourse, echoing
the views of the state, similarly stressed tough measures
against both soccer clubs and the hooligans themselves. For
example, arguing that "British teams must be banned," the
Daily Mail (May 30, 1985:6) spoke of "...inefficient
(previous) government control" and the need to impose prison
terms of ten years plus upon offenders:

...we have to catch the thugs, convict them,
and send them down for so long that the
message gets across...The certainty of
conviction must be matched by the severity
of sentences. No more pussy-footing. (Daily
Mail, May 31, 1985:6)

The Liverpool Echo (May 30, 1985:11), suggesting that "If
the Government does not start to cure the cancer of soccer
violence...then surely they never will," also stressed the
urgency for such steps. In the more 'quality' papers such as
The Times, the focus was almost identical. With screaming
front page headlines, the latter vehemently protested, "ONE
YEAR F.A. BAN NOT ENOUGH" (June 2, 1985:1); whilst purport-
ing "far-reaching steps" as the only solution for the
hooligans themselves: "Above all, there must be a new and
specific offence on soccer hooliganism, carrying with it a
minimum mandatory sentence of two years" (June 2, 1985:16).
And with calls to "...police (the hooligans) out of
existence," the Economist (June, 1985:15) clearly
acquiesced.
Earlier, arguments were made about the dubious ability of such policies for curing soccer's crowd problems in the long term. Equally significant for our purposes, the control- and punishment-centred reactionary views of the right-wing primary and secondary definers began to have a reciprocal effect on one another, with the one using the other's statements for legitimation and verificational support to the point where it was "...no longer possible to tell who first began the process" (Clarke et al., 1976:76).

Those views emphasizing blame (and the other themes discussed above), affluence and lack of discipline on the part of hooligan fans (and youth in general), and punishment and sanction, represent the 'dominant' code of ideological media messages as discussed in Chapter Two (cf., Elliot et al., 1983:156; Hartley, 1982:148). This is a conservative view which essentially represents the larger perspective of the state, in which persons respond to crime and deviance with calls to restore law-and-order in a broad and rather decontextualized discourse of moralism, victimology and retribution.

Other more 'alternative' views offered, principally by more liberal-democratic thinkers and opposition politicians (cf., Elliot et al., 1983:157) emphasizing, for example, the need for less impetuous retaliatory moves, for causal understanding of the issues involved and for 'balanced' perspectives on human tragedy, also appeared in
some of the Heysel riot reports, particularly in the less right-wing press. For instance, the Manchester Guardian Weekly (June 9, 1985:1) responded to Mrs. Thatcher’s aim to levy stiffer jail sentences and tougher policing at soccer with the assertion that:

...no game is worth fortifications that merely address the symptoms, but not the disease. The disease is here, in the British Isles, and most plainly scattered across England. If we are to tackle it, that is where we must start.

Similarly, The Guardian (June 4, 1985) supported Mr. Kinnoch (the Leader of the Opposition) in his criticism of the rash right-wing call for swift and strict ‘no-nonsense’ measures:

Mr. Kinnoch repeated his demand for an inquiry and said that Mrs. Thatcher had only seemed interested in dealing with the symptoms of the problem. He asked her to reconsider her attitude so that an investigation could be held to find the real answers.

As noted in Chapter Two, ‘alternative’ views such as these tended not to question the legitimacy of harsh punitive measures so much as the apparently unrestrained manner in which dominant thinkers preferred to implement them.

Additionally, content analysis of press commentaries on Heysel showed that only David Lacey in The Guardian (May 30, 1985) was perturbed by the remarkable imbalance of press attention given to this event as compared to the Bangladesh cyclone disaster which occurred during the same month and where hundreds of thousands of lives were lost. As he accurately explained, supporting Hartley’s (1982:78)
arguments regarding the elitist orientation of western journalism:

...because football is the world game and because the Heysel Stadium was the focal point of the Western sporting world on Wednesday night, so the tumult of events ...have, inevitably, been thrown into sharper relief.

Despite demonstrating that press discourse is not totally hegemonic, however, these alternative views and concerns appeared in the press with such relative infrequency in comparison with the punishment-centred messages offered by the Right that their cumulative effect was not nearly as prevalent, powerful or influential, and therefore not as significant as contributory factors to any general public interpretation of the issues, i.e., to dominant ideology.

At least partial substantiation for this claim is provided by the fact that the content analysis showed an overwhelming proportion of 'Dear Sir' letters to editors in most press sources (except those of a committedly leftist bent, e.g., The Guardian) as following dominant code themes. For example, two letters cited below clearly represent the latter's stress upon instant 'far reaching' and 'firm' moves:

Sir, Football hooliganism is not a football problem, but one of delinquent human behaviour. In my experience as a former prison governor, two ingredients are essential in handling delinquent people. You must really care about them, and when they seriously misbehave they must be treated with "absolute firmness"...People only misbehave for as long as it is worth it. If
assaulting persons, throwing missiles and running onto the pitch in a football stadium could be made a special category of offence for which the penalty was severe police caning, then hooliganism would fade away in a few weeks...I simply seek "absolute firmness." Interestingly, when this takes the form of corporal punishment almost everyone prefers to behave, and so it is very seldom used. It is enough that it is there. Now that is real common sense. (Cited in The Times, June 6, 1985:13)

I only wish to convey my utter shock and disgust at the events at the Brussels Blood Bowl...to what can only be described as barbarity in the purest sense of the word. That anyone would resort to murder out of some twisted sense of national bravado boggles the mind...Those involved in inciting violence at events like these can hardly be looked at as mere "hooligans" any more, but as murderers and they must be prosecuted as such. Soccer stadiums have turned into forums where the disturbed can vent their "personal and national frustrations." Something must be done to punish those who use soccer games as a pretext to destroy life and property or we can usher in a new dark age via the soccer stadium. (Cited in the Toronto Star, June 4, 1985:A18)

The very moralistic emphasis in such letters upon urgency for acrimonious measures and on soccer hooligans as 'disturbed' and 'sick' is highly indicative of the majority of public letters sent to editors following the Heysel riot. Of course, this is partly uncoincidental since editors select letters for publication in their newspaper "...in keeping with its own 'social image' of itself" (Hall et al., 1978:120). Nevertheless, editors enjoy little power over the 'types' of letters submitted, and it is in this light that the examples provided above (taken from a substantial file
of similar illustrations) should be understood as accurate representations of widespread public opinion in response to the riot.

Finally, some 'oppositional' explanations were provided in the press by those of a more markedly leftist leaning. In direct contrast to the usually depoliticized and dehistoricized views of the right-wing definers and press that we have already seen, this oppositional code tended to emphasize strong social rather than moral roots to hooligan conduct. It was suggested by some writers, moreover, that one of the most pronounced regrets of thinkers following the dominant code--that 'British honour' had been denigrated--pointed in fact to a central cause of international soccer violence and the riot itself, i.e., that the Heysel deaths occurred partially because of rampant nationalism shown in overt displays of jingoism and xenophobia by English fans against Italian fans. This view, of course, is strongly consistent with Taylor's (1985) 'Little Englander' arguments discussed in Chapter Two.

Writing in the New Socialist (July, 1985:20), for example, Stuart Weir asserted that "Football hooligans are closer to Mrs. Thatcher than she thinks." He went on:

...it is plain to see that, apart from their rampant anti-authoritarianism, the football hooligans are anything but aliens from the rest of British society. Their well-documented chauvinism, racist and sexist attitudes, hostility towards intellectuals and homosexuals, physical aggression, drunkenness, are quite evident in the
culture and values of the dominant society in which Mrs. Thatcher and the rest are so at home. Enough people by now have drawn attention to the striking parallels with the Falklands. When the whole nation was invited to glory in "our boys" aptitude for what Major Keeble of the parachute Regiment called "gutter fighting" at Goose Green, our hypocritical press called Brussels a "massacre;" Goose Green really was.

Equally oppositional to the dominant stance was the argument made by Edward Vulliamy in the New Statesman (July 7, 1985:8-10), which similarly hinted at the contradictions inherent in dominant ideology, and of the inevitability of soccer hooliganism in a cultural setting which actively encourages physical defence of masculinity and national honour. Of the hooligans, Vulliamy writes:

The English supporters came less to win the cup for football or even 'their club' than to assert their collective English manhood, free from the ties of job or poverty, of 'normality', of women and girls of whom there were almost none to be seen. They bellowed timeless songs about 'wops' and 'spiks' and drank themselves into a state where nothing was real but their mass violence...it was a matter for their drunken, blood-thirsty and racist English 'honour' that the terraces be cleared of 'spiks' and the Union Jack flown unchallenged. I saw one Liverpool fan with a t-shirt: 'Keep the Falklands British' as though he and his mates were the task force. Perhaps, as he kicked and punched, he thought, in the Sun's infamous screech of violent chauvinism, "GOTCHA!"...The behaviour of English fans was, and is, sickening. It is hypocritical to belabour them for besmirching British values when in so many other areas of national life violence is made heroic, narrow chauvinism is appealed to and the need of the whole community for sports they can enjoy and take part in is ignored.
Despite the rationality and coherency that would appear to characterize these views, such discursive attempts to 'place' soccer hooliganism and indeed other problems with violent youth in a socio-historically informed framework of violent British jingoism and chauvinism were strongly overshadowed by the 'restoration of order' narratives of the dominant code appearing in most press sources. Likewise, only The Guardian and its affiliated publication the Manchester Guardian Weekly (probably the most 'left' of newspapers examined for the case study) carried 'Dear Sir' letters stressing socio-cultural explanations, such as jingoism and xenophobia and the role played by the state in encouraging such values, for soccer violence:

To the nonpolitical minds of untutored young men, recent history provides a paradigm for their behaviour. Between Argy-bashing, the loss of hundreds of lives in the sinking of their ships, and the huge but accepted cost of this particular act of jingoism on the one hand, and aggro with a few yobs on foreign soil on the other, the line to many fuddled young minds must seem indistinct... It would be in the worst possible taste to imagine, after the Brussels tragedy, that some insensitive, complacent, chauvinist political leader might have asked us to rejoice that our lads did so well. For brutal and unnecessary violence to be acceptable, it must be performed at the highest technical level, include politicians among its perpetrators, and ideally be master minded by a Prime Minister. (Cited in Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 16, 1985:2)

Again, however, despite underlining that press discourse and public ideology are not entirely hegemonic, it must be reiterated that these 'oppositional' perspectives located in
both press commentary and public feedback represent no more than a minority of overall responses to Brussels.

Although moral directives as addressed here were extremely prevalent in press reports of the Montreal riot (or at least those uncovered by the content analysis), they appeared to offer only one dominant perspective, i.e., a view that either Clarence Campbell or Richard was to blame. Of course, whether or not the latter or the former was chosen as a source of blame tended in this instance to depend on the ethnic origins of the newspaper in question, i.e., Francophone newspapers largely blamed Campbell, and Anglophone newspapers largely blamed Richard. Interestingly enough, although fans were described in dehumanized, war-like and irrational tones, etc., the dominant view seemed to be that given the events related directly to the Montreal/Boston game itself and Campbell’s subsequent sanctions, their behaviour was generally understood as anticipatable and taken-for-granted under the circumstances.

A final, and connected, precipitating element in the ‘amplification spiral’ set in motion by the sequence of dominant reactions, then, was the presence of a series of ’moral directives’ inherent in the statements offered by primary and secondary definers. Such directives came basically in two forms: (1) predictions of measures to be taken: "...the result of the slaughter is likely to be...swift and tough action by the Government to clamp down
on soccer hooligans" (Liverpool Echo, May 30, 1985:1); "When dozens die because of a football match that hasn't even started, you stop playing football matches. That is not indictive or punitive. It is sheer common sense" (Daily Mail, May 30, 1985:6); "If Richard is permitted to play one more game of hockey this season, Campbell should be fired" (Katz, 1955:98); (2) portentious statements regarding further evils that soccer and hockey violence could produce: "...when is it going to end?" asked the Liverpool Echo (May 30, 1985:9), and "What comes next," asked the Chairman of the Public Services Committee this time providing his own answer, "...water cannons, guards, tanks and consultant undertakers to ferry the dead?" (Toronto Star, May 30, 1985:A17); "How did hockey and hockey fans come to this shameful state?" (Toronto Star, Mar. 18, 1955:6). Combined with evocative and inflammatory commentaries regarding blame, 'irrational' and 'animal' behaviour, military rhetoric, the need for violent punishment, etc., the cumulative effect of all this in the case of the Heysel riot was that for some time the dominant 'public voice' in the press became very much centred around an intensified and panic laden 'law-and-order' campaign, with the alleged threat offered to the general public by soccer hooliganism quickly gaining momentum.

In the case of the earlier Montreal riot, the dominant 'public voice' in the press was more demonstrative
of Anglophone/Francophone political tensions occurring in Canada in the 1950s than moral panic associated with the behaviour of sports participants or sports fans, but when content-analyzed nevertheless shows clearly that the media have signified and coded sports-related violence in the same or similar ways for an extremely long period of time. As Duperrault (1981:66) indicates, "L'affaire Richard" represented a case "...completely overshadowed by emotional copy." He goes on:

L'affaire Richard serves as a reminder of the awesome power that the media control. To be able to stir a population to destroy its own streets, to shame and slander itself in front of the world is a power which must be carefully exercised. That power had been abused during those mid-March days of 1955.

Summary

The intention of this case study has neither been to blame the press for the events which took place in Heysel Stadium in May, 1985, nor to condone the behaviour of Liverpool fans which resulted in the tragic deaths of thirty-nine people. Rather, its purpose has been to consider the sociological link between a sports riot, the coverage of it in the international press, and its broader status and understanding in society. It has been noted that the press 'response' to Brussels was intense and prolonged. In fact,
not until an 'Air India' jet exploded over the Atlantic some twenty-five days later, killing all three hundred and twenty-nine passengers and crew aboard, did general media attention to Brussels diminish, reverting once again to its ongoing concern with international terrorism and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (A.I.D.S.).

Despite media suggestions to the contrary, very few of us, of course (especially in North America), have any more than a fleeting understanding of what 'soccer hooliganism' involves, what a hooligan 'looks like', or how prevalent his violence is inside and outside of European soccer grounds. Impressions that we do have are developed in large part from images and definitions received second-hand from others, particularly media sources. The media shape and determine not only our knowledge of the hooligan, but also provide us with expectations for his future behaviour. The hooligan story, then, and specifically the Brussels story as witnessed in press accounts of it, represents a 'model' of dominant presentational styles, replete with such images and definitions, and one which became the 'reality' around which the Heysel riot was discussed and understood. Five typical characteristics constituting this model have been described and assessed.

The constituent elements of the model support arguments made in the previous chapter on media coverage of sports-related violence in general, and emphasize several
significant aspects of press treatment of soccer-related disorders: (1) the views which are selected and presented come predominantly from both the primary describers and the press, but are forwarded with such frequency and so interchangeably that only one dominant 'public voice' (Hall et al., 1978:62) seems to emerge; (2) the inclination of these views and statements to focus on the most sensational features of the event, and to attribute irrational, bestial and military qualities to the participants, tends to exaggerate the importance of the phenomenon being reported and concomitantly the threat offered by it; (3) the preoccupation with threat and calls for tougher measures (meeting violence with violence) has the apparent effect in the press of escalating its own attention along these lines, which also heightens public anxiety over the issues; (4) although the popular and quality press often differ in terms of semiological format (e.g., dramatic words and phrases used in headlines—'hooligan', 'animal', 'mindless morons'—will be frequently placed in inverted commas in the quality press, whereas the popular will employ them uncomprimisingly), their overall ideological effect, i.e., their contribution towards ideology and a sense of public threat and panic, is extremely similar; (5) with press reports pervaded by hyperbolic and violent language, supported throughout with vivid photographs, thick headlines and bold exclamation and question marks, the cumulative results and
effects become quite alarming, and provide for the reader a picture in which social order appears to be quite seriously compromised; (6) the dominant press code tends to decontextualize soccer hooliganism from the political, cultural and historical arena by stressing its essential criminality.

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate how detailed and prolonged press coverage of violent sporting events can assist in establishing their widespread social meanings and interpretations. Recurring presentational themes in press responses to the Heysel Stadium riot were discussed, and Elliot et al.'s (1983) conceptual model of 'dominant'/ 'oppositional' and 'alternative' codes of meaning was applied as an explanatory tool. Of course, data provided by the content analysis of press responses to the Montreal riot of March 1955 were used wherever possible for purposes of comparison.

The essential argument of the case study was that to show only the sensational aspects of any event, and to consider only its superficial features can be irresponsible and damaging. The types of self-perpetuating reactionary views offered by primary and secondary definers to the Heysel incident in particular but also the Montreal riot tended to exhibit more concern with drama, simplistic analyses of violent behaviour, and solution, than accurate assessment and cause and, therefore, tended to pre-empt more adequate interpretation of the phenomena. It should be
emphasized that the press and the media broadly are not viewed as direct causal factors in soccer hooliganism. Rather, it is argued that their negligent implementation of extravagant and violent presentational techniques whenever the 'lads' decide to 'take the ends', serves to reproduce and confirm dominant stereotypes of soccer hooliganism and the threat offered to society by it, and ultimately does little to relieve an already complicated picture.
NOTES

1. That this fence was present at all is testimony to a series of warnings that the English Football Association, the Italian Football Association and the Liverpool club itself had given the game's organizers regarding the necessity of effective fan segregation measures.

2. The 'taking of the ends', a territory seeking ritual performed by contemporary soccer hooligans, is discussed in detail by Marsh et al., (1978).

3. Others, such as the German-television network (Z.D.F.), refused to maintain coverage and reverted to regular programming. Elsewhere, while the French and Benelux channels went ahead with coverage, the Swiss channel (D.R.S) cut it at half-time, and the Austrian channel broadcast the entire match flashing the message: 'This is not a football broadcast, but a report on the prevention of another massacre.'

4. The apparent obsession, literally, with reviewing the events may be because television networks are rarely provided with the opportunity to film violence/disorder as it occurs. More usually, they are only alerted to it via police response, so what normally is portrayed is not so much disorder as order restoration, i.e., the police moving in to control the situation. Heysel television coverage, of course, provided both scenarios.


6. Clearly, there are methodological and analytical problems inherent in this type of comparison where one event is the result of human malice and the other an act of nature. However, since both events occurred at approximately the same time, one resulting in a much more tragic loss of life than the other, the point is made here to support arguments made in Chapter Two regarding the overwhelming orientation of the media towards news involving elites in elite nations (Hall, 1973). Moreover, this example would certainly appear to suggest that the press and the media more broadly regard
the deaths of whites as 'more significant and 'news-worthy' than the deaths of non-whites (cf., Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Braham, 1982). In the case of the Heysel riot, it appears that the crucial signifying factor for the press was indeed the deaths of thirty-nine 'innocent' (and white) soccer fans at the hands of the 'mindless' and 'animalistic' hooligans.

7. In the 1950s, Quebec represented a situation of growing social and political unrest. With the increasing support for Maurice Duplessis in Quebec politics (this support included an outspoken Maurice Richard—Dupperault; 1981:73), and strong anti-Anglophone sentiments surrounding English imperialist policies such as centralization and provincialism, all Canadians began to be more aware of the widening gap between French and English Canada (McNaught, 1969). Such was the Franco-phone sense of Anglophone discrimination and racism against French Canada that Valliers (1971) referred to Francophones as the White Niggers of America.

8. At least one methodological problem in conducting a content analysis of media reports of events which occurred decades ago is the availability of public, i.e., media, records. For example, although two university libraries were used extensively for purposes of data collection, it was discovered that only a small number of 1955 newspapers were on file. A further methodological problem arises in that until roughly the 1960s, 'sports news' was not located in a separate sports section as it is today, but was integrated into the more general news text. This made information which was available even more difficult to locate.

9. For example, despite the international criticism aimed at the supporters of the Liverpool club, its chairman Mr. John Smith, who is also chairman of the Sports Council, publicly proclaimed that members of the extremist right-wing organization the National Front, deceptively clad in Liverpool colours, "led...Liverpool fans into a confrontation which otherwise they would not have joined" (The Times, May 31, 1985:5). See also Manchester Guardian Weekly (June 9, 1985:4) and Daily Mail (May 31, 1985:3).

10. Following disturbances during a match between Luton and Millwall in March, 1985, Mrs. Thatcher stated that she would be waging a personal 'war' on soccer violence.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

Mass Media Treatment of Sports Crowd Disorder: An Integration and Interpretation

The purpose of the case study was to provide support for arguments made in Chapter Six regarding dominant themes and styles in media coverage of sports-related violence, but in a more specific context. The central context was the Heysel Stadium soccer riot of May, 1985, and empirical references were made throughout to the Montreal riot of March, 1955, in order to provide a cross-cultural and historical comparison.

Although parallels were located in the case study between ideologically coded representations of sports crowd disorder in media reports of the two riots, it is crucial to re-emphasize that, on the whole, British sports crowd disorder, i.e., hooliganism, is signified by the media in much stronger and more menacing tones than its North American counterpart. Whereas hooliganism is represented in the dominant code as a phenomenon which is fundamentally threatening to social order, North American crowd disorder tends to be viewed in its dominant code in association with
the sports event itself and not in more culturally or historically contextualized terms as an ongoing social problem. Thus, although codes emphasizing 'war talk' and 'sub-human' qualities were also present in press reports of the Montreal riot, these reports nowhere implied any sense of panic or outrage regarding a threat offered to respectable society by violent sports fans. In fact, in many ways rioting fans' behaviour was described by primary definers and journalists in the media as quite rational and understandable under the circumstances, i.e., a French hockey idol being suspended by an Anglophone N.H.L. President.

On the basis of data examined and arguments made in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, common official and public images and meanings, fuelled and reproduced in large part by media coverage, are clear. While reports of English soccer hooliganism (both by its domestic and North American media) continue to display all the classic symptoms of moral panic and alarm (e.g., drama, distortion, reification, association with other 'folk devils' who are seen to 'threaten' social order--A.I.D.S. carriers, terrorists, militant strikers, flamboyant youth subcultures, etc.,)¹, any presence or threat of sports crowd disorder in North America appears to be consistently downplayed if not denied in more explicit terms.

It has been shown that the British press have treated soccer hooliganism as generally 'bad news' (which,
following the Glasgow Media Group (1976, 1980), usually renders it 'good news'); as one of the country's most alarming social problems and one which allegedly requires 'instant' remedial attention and the implementation of new and more draconian policies. This, despite reasonably convincing evidence that aspects of hooliganism have been associated with "...every phase of the Association game in Britain" (Dunning et al., 1981:342), despite the fact that the vast majority of British soccer games are played without incident, and that when compared to numbers of fans actually involved, soccer-related arrests, convictions, casualties and fatalities are actually quite low. As a Report on Public Disorder and Sporting Events (1978:32) put it:

It must be considered remarkable, given the problems of contemporary Britain, that football hooliganism has received so much attention from the press. The events are certainly dramatic and frightening for the by-stander, but the outcome in terms of the people arrested and convicted, people hurt, or property destroyed is negligible compared with the number of people potentially involved.

These dominant themes have been and continue to be regularly echoed in the North American media which, in general, appear much more concerned with perpetuating fears over 'folk devils' in other contexts than closely considering fans whose behaviour may be insidious more locally.

In general, North American sports clubs, sports authorities and media continue to express their astonishment and dismay at the current status of soccer-related disorders
in Britain and elsewhere (this came across emphatically on the questionnaire and during interviews) while, as witnessed in Chapter Four, many similar types of sports crowd disorder are taking place, sometimes with regularity, 'in their own backyard'. Although collective violence between rival fan groups is not a widespread problem in North America so far (general explanations for this were postulated in Chapter Four), other forms of fan violence are becoming publicly recognisable in and around North American sports stadia, not the least of which is the increasingly notorious and predictable 'celebration riot'.

Despite all of this, there is a conspicuously persistent belief on the part of sports authorities and media in North America that fan violence here is ephemeral and episodic, and that "...any problem that we do have" will "...go away," as one club put it, sometime in the near future. At least one interpretation of the fact that little attention is paid to North American sports crowd disorder is that the levels of violence institutionally legitimized and encouraged on the field of play where, crucially, North American notions of 'manliness' are contested and observed, are currently monopolizing public and official attention, and in fact have done so historically. Further, the reluctance shown in the previous chapter on the parts of sports owners, organizers and personnel to officially acknowledge a problem often strongly linked to excessive
alcohol consumption may be seen to be rooted in the rather hypocritical fact that many of North America's most famous sports clubs are owned and sponsored, wholly or in part, by breweries. For example, questionnaire data examined in Chapter Five showed that a number of clubs which are brewery- or city-owned have been trying, unsuccessfully, to reduce or altogether prohibit alcohol sales at their games for some time. Such official attention is associated with clubs' perceived alcohol-related crowd 'problems', but as one club informed the author, "...politically our hands are tied, because if we're told to sell beer by the city, then really we have no choice."

This is, of course, extremely amenable to interpretation in terms of the critical-materialist concept of ideology adopted by cultural studies writers and introduced in Chapter Two. Premised on the work of Marx, the critical-materialist concept of ideology postulates a separation between 'real' and 'apparent' social relations. Dominant-hegemonic ideology, according to Gramscian writers, is fuelled largely by the ruling classes and primary definers. As far as North American sports, media coverage of sports and general sports meanings are concerned, the primary definers here would include sports clubs (owners, managers, promoters, players, coaches, etc.), the North American mass media and other revered parties (e.g., politicians, institutional leaders, business leaders, etc.). If data on sports
crowd disorder presented in this study are accurate, it is clear that all of these parties (business leaders, incidentally, would include brewery owners) have contributed towards the masking or distorting of a social issue which in reality is more pronounced than they would care to acknowledge. After all, if non-violent fans' impressions of the sports stadium changed from a relatively 'safe' environment to one where violence and injury were possible, this might adversely affect gate attendance and, of course, economic profit, as it has in the United Kingdom. But this is the dominant ideological representation of sports crowd disorder on offer to the public in and through the mass media.

As Althusser (1971) argued, by providing ideologically coded representations of phenomena, i.e., sports crowd disorder, which in effect cloud or obscure social realities, the media should be seen as confirming and reproducing hegemonic ideas and practices in society. The 'imaginary' relationship between individuals and their 'real' conditions of existence has been summarized by Althusser (1969):

In ideology men do indeed express not the relation between them and their conditions of existence, but the way they live the relations between them and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a real and an 'imaginary', 'lived' relation. Ideology, then, is the expression of the relation between men and their 'world', that is the...unity of the real relation and the imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of existence.
Thus, a dominant—but in this sense masking and imaginary ideology in North America is that sports crowd disorder is of little social concern and of even less concern when compared to sports crowd disorder elsewhere, such as in the United Kingdom.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the 'dramatic' nature of news reports typically depends upon the estimated public interest that will be elicited by a given event or issue, or by the accredited 'news value' allocated by the specific media source (Hall et al., 1978). It is evident that violence in sport, both by participants and by spectators, is considered by British and North American media to carry enormous 'newsworthiness'. The patterns in which such items are coded tend to be extremely standard. News reports of sports crowd disorder characteristically integrate themes which highlight the bizarre, the violent and the controversial aspects of the event rather than the normal or the historically contextualized. Combined, the media themes examined in the previous chapter represent what Voumvakis and Ericson (1984:9) have referred to as the "recipe knowledge" of "journalists'...everyday work" in this specific area:

Journalists employ an integrated framework of categories, concepts and relevancies grounded in their particular modes of existence. This provides the background assumptions with which to understand what is to be treated as an event, what is to be treated as a fact about the event, and how that fact is to be implemented and used.
At least one indication of journalists' use of recipe knowledge is their implementation of 'running stories' in which 'newsworthy' themes, crucial in the ongoing ideological production of crime and violence news (Hall et al., 1978), are regularly coded and signified. The running story is further discussed as a 'discourse effect' later in the chapter.

The data discussed in Chapter Seven provide testimony to the remarkable power of the media in bringing public visibility to social phenomena and to perpetuate public interest and concern. As with other aspects of media reporting, the views of primary definers in this particular area (politicians, police, sports managers and owners, players, etc.,) are coded in such a way as to create an appearance of objectivity and reliability. However, the content analysis showed quite clearly that primary definers' accounts are rarely first hand. More usually they represent quotations 'borrowed' from other sources or accounts which have been employed so frequently and in such a variety of contexts that their original meaning has been altered or lost altogether. Moreover, the views offered by primary definers are employed in the first instance to embellish commentaries and perspectives being forwarded by the media source itself. Primary definers' arguments are, then, carefully 'placed' so as to enhance reports' 'natural' bias or slant. Not surprisingly, this process of 'placing' and
'slanting' frequently leads to inaccuracies and therefore the possibility of misunderstandings on the part of those who consume this 'knowledge'.

Throughout the course of the research for this study many examples of overt media distortion and inaccuracy surfaced. The previous two chapters represent an attempt to illustrate this process, but three brief final illustrations can be made here to underline the distorting tendencies of media reports of sports crowd disorder. First, Chapter Two quoted from the British television documentary 'Hooligan', a Thames Television production examining the lifestyles and activities of the 'Inter City Firm' (I.C.F.), West Ham United's notoriously violent hooligan followers. The documentary, built essentially around the sociological work of researchers at the University of Leicester, claimed to be centrally interested in explaining the sociological meanings of I.C.F. violence, of the 'backgrounds' of its hooligan members and also, therefore, of hooligan followers of other English teams, i.e., of the English 'problem' as a whole. But as John Williams, the Fieldwork Director for the Leicester group comments:

It simply wasn't the video we agreed to make. The Thames Television producers got 'cold feet'. They omitted an entire section on group behaviour in a working class section of London, a really important section as far as we were concerned on the segmental structure of social relations that is manifested throughout the week and away from football matches...information about smaller groups in-fighting rather than
fighting rival groups... For some reason the producers chose to omit this in favour of European footage, glamorous pictures of Heysel and China and Lima, etc. We had little to do with any of that nor had we been warned about its presence in the video beforehand.

'Hooligan', though sensitizing the public to some superficial interpretations of the sports crowd problem, stands as a classic illustration of the economically-fuelled media preference for sensationalism and drama rather than a more sincere concern with elucidating the meanings of an allegedly 'serious' social problem as experienced and understood by those 'on the inside'. Decisions of newsworthiness made by the production crew of 'Hooligan' are extremely consistent with treatment techniques shown in the previous chapters vis-a-vis press and media coverage of sports crowd disorder and sports violence more generally.

A second illustration of media distortion and irresponsibility involved the author more directly and transpired during the course of the research for this study. Most of the research collection and writing of this work was conducted in the southern Ontario region. During the writing phase, a reporter affiliated with Maclean-Hunter publications contacted the author and requested an interview with him regarding sports crowd disorder and other aspects of sports-related violence. The author acceded and during the interview provided a critical appraisal of the role of the media in sports violence, indicating specifically their
role in dramatizing and glamorizing violence and in providing often irresponsible interpretations of behavioural models for consumers (and particularly young children). The author was careful to criticize media sources for sensation-ally coding stories of sports violence by way of bold and glossy photographs and headlines, both of which, he argued, are frequently incongruent with actual report content.

The interview finally appeared in The Medical Post (April 21, 1987), widely misquoting and misinterpreting the author’s comments. Moreover, it was prefaced by a large ten-by-eight inch colour photograph of a hockey fist-fight splashed on its front page with accompanying headlines in bold black print, "VIOLENCE IN THE ARENA, HOOLIGANS IN THE STANDS." The journalist in question had ignored the author’s request to treat the discussed issues in a balanced, accurate and non-alarmist fashion, and, with a full complement of eye-catching coding techniques, her editor had clearly complied.

Such inconsistencies between the headlines and pictures and the real story here would appear to provide a perfect illustration of what S. Cohen (1981:266) calls 'over-reporting':

...a frequent use of misleading headlines, particularly headlines...discrepant with the actual story: thus a headline 'violence' might announce a story which, in fact, reports that no violence occurred.
This again is an editorial procedure used frequently by North American and British media in connection with sports violence. Mostly commonly, in both contexts, newspapers will report upon 'peaceful' soccer matches but will rationalize the conspicuous presence of glossy pictures of previous hooligan violence in terms such as, for example, 'This could easily have happened', 'Look what happened last time these two teams met' or 'This is what we feared most'. It has also been pointed out earlier that such photographs with accompanying headlines are also employed by the press to provide anticipatory messages of what is to come in the main report. That is, they will be 'placed' as signifiers before games have actually taken place. And finally, if no violence does take place at the particular game in question, its absence will commonly be interpreted in terms of increased numbers of police and successful policing procedures. Again, the crucial ideological message here is one that draws an emphatic but usually unsupported link between sports crowd disorder and the necessity of 'tough' punitive sanctions. Solutions by way of social control thus continue to accrue high public visibility and status.

The final example concerns comments made by a director of security at a professional sports stadium in Ontario about media accuracy:

What the press do is make more of these things than is actually there. There was an incident here last season. A woman ran onto the field, ran right up to the pitcher and
kissed him. Next day, there's a great big picture on the front page of the paper. All that does is glamorize that type of behaviour. And this is an offence which brings a $1000 fine if you're convicted in court. Now we have to contend with this business more often because the local media have given these idiots a license.... Again, last season some Detroit fans complained of violence here, and it reached the papers but the reporter who wrote the article wasn't even in the ball park. So I called him and he said he was only going by what he was told by a fan. The article was entirely based on what this fan had told him happened but this guy made it sound as though he'd seen it with his own eyes. That really annoyed us a lot.

All three examples provided here are final addenda to data discussed in previous chapters. Together they demonstrate media 'slanting' and media propensities to extract meanings and understandings from various events which may in fact be grossly inconsistent with what actually took place.

In Chapter Two the available literature addressing the problem of mass media reportage of violence and its effects was discussed. It was shown that although this voluminous body of work does not offer conclusive evidence of a simple cause-effect relationship between media treatment (of violence and aggression) and subsequent social behaviour, this same literature is extremely suggestive of such media-related effects. This is discussed further below. As Chapter Seven indicated, however, there is a much clearer discourse effect which occurs in this area, and this again requires final commentary.
Discourse Effects of Media Treatment of Sports Crowd Disorder

As with other categories of content in the news production process, the sports page does not present what happens in the world of sports in a simple or random fashion. It actively orders and 'hegemonizes' it to complement the ideologically-determined regimen of the medium in question.

Although different media employ different working values and 'recipes' (Voumvakis and Ericson, 1984:9)—what to report and how to report it—there are some standard codes of meaning with regard to media coverage of sports crowd disorder which in fact function not only to enhance further news along the same lines but also to sustain and in some cases escalate reporting styles and techniques. As one reporter, asked to comment upon such discourse effects, informed the author:

If we think that the public is interested in any given story then we’ll run it, that’s basically how things get in the paper. You’re right to a degree I suppose because I think we do cover a lot of the same bases and sometimes use the same guy’s words, etc., to refresh the reader’s memory about the story. But that’s really unavoidable, you know. We want the readers to know what happened, and they want to know it as well, so that means repeating stuff now and then. It gives the story the continuity it needs.

These and other views like them emerging from interviews with media personnel provide good support for Chibnall’s
(1981:86) argument that: "The rules of relevancy become associated with audience expectations and are legitimated in terms of audience desires." Such rules of relevancy precipitate a series of notable discourse effects vis-a-vis media coverage of the sports crowd disorder issue.

The content analysis disclosed that one fundamental element of importance to the media in their coverage of soccer hooliganism lies in the implication of a control discourse, i.e., 'What's to be done about it', 'These thugs must be stopped', etc., as the dominant and immediate frame of reference and perception. This trend was particularly apparent in the Heysel Stadium riot case study.

Importantly, the study unearthed strong evidence that there are certain aspects of this control discourse which subtly function to provide its own justification. For instance, the persistent emphasis upon 'victim' powerfully conveys the message that control, constraint and sanction are urgently required. As Schlesinger (1978:222) reports:

...television, like the press, tends to focus on those victims who are most vulnerable and innocent: women, children and animals. Where the victims are members of the security forces or the police, attention is drawn to their lovable human qualities.

Although it is regularly visible in other soccer hooligan reports both in the North American and British press and television, again, such a victimological approach was nowhere better exemplified than in the case study of the Heysel Stadium riot. Press (particularly the tabloids but
also the quality press) and television reports of 'Black Wednesday' indicated an almost perverse, repetitive fascination with specific images: blue asphyxiated faces, and particularly those of women and children; trampled feet and arms; grossly contorted limbs and hands; bleeding faces; clothes-littered empty terraces.

Through the conscious employment of an arrangement of victim-oriented language styles ('victims' were 'innocent', 'poor', 'naive', 'lovable', 'blameless', etc.,), journalists' reports extended immediate and self-evident rationales for their preferred coding categories in describing the hooligans themselves and how they should be treated ('animals', 'subhuman', 'senseless', 'lunatic', 'control them', 'punish them', 'ban them', 'give them stiffer jail sentences', etc.). And finally, with a full complement of 'action' photographs of injured or dead police and other 'victims', and widespread quotations of public moral outrage and anxiety, the control discourse established a firm grip on news content for the entire duration of the news reports. Finally, part of this exaggerative process emerges as a result of the media citing the views of victims and by-standers as primary accounts but which are clearly subjective, biased and dramatic.

Reports of anxiety and outrage, forwarded as we noted in the previous chapter by both primary and secondary definers in ways that they actually appear interchangeable,
tend to have the rather self-fulfilling effect of escalating media attention along these same lines and creating a 'running story'. Once established, any subsequent incident of sports crowd disorder will usually be compared to this story, even if the nature of levels of violence involved are totally discrepant. The overall ideological effect is that sports crowd disorder and sports crowds per se tend to be consistently interpreted and understood in terms of 'social control'.

As Hartley (1982) has shown, the dominant code of media messages tends to present society as if it were harmonious and totally in agreement over numerous events and issues. A central feature of this discourse of social control, for example, is the deliberate and frequent use of words and phrases (adjectives and pronouns specifically) which imply consensus. The use of 'we' and 'us' and 'our' is particularly pronounced in editorials. As noted in the last chapter, alternative and oppositional messages are available, typically from less right wing media agencies, but on the whole their effect remains weak and vague against a foreground of highly signified 'control' commentaries orchestrated as the dominant code. Hartley (1982:135), supporting the earlier arguments of Althusser (1971), incisively interprets this effect as being representative of societal conservatism in general and of a hegemonic media
largely echoing views of the state and its primary defining supporters:

In the absence as yet of an oppositional 'mass' class, aware of itself as such, and with a counter-hegemonic ideology, any oppositional appeal to broad audiences is liable either to fall on deaf ears, or drift into dominant ideological codes, or both.

Again, with regard to media treatment of sports crowd disorder, messages of social containment are the dominant form, whose sustained presence serves to reproduce ideologies of control in subsequent media reports.

The replication of the same quotations, same examples, same jargon, same views, etc., in subsequent reports tends also to confirm and reproduce the same public stereotypes and ideologies. To date, several cases of this have been described, but two final illustrations should suffice here.

First, with the dominant code of media messages regarding sports crowd disorder primarily focused upon 'threat' offered to society by 'rowdy' or 'hooligan' sports fans, it comes as no great surprise that the large majority of incidents involving interpersonal violence and/or tragedy occurring at or around sports events will be blamed in reports upon spectators who have previously behaved in violent ways. Needless to say, such assumptions are frequently less than accurate. So, for example, a wide selection of British newspapers implicitly and in some cases explicitly blamed the afore-mentioned Bradford soccer fire
of May, 1985, in which over fifty people died, on hooligan arson, linking this tragedy to instances of hooligan violence which had preceded it. A government-sponsored report into the fire later concluded that its precipitant had been a carelessly discarded cigarette, but by that time any slender recognition of the report which reached the newspapers was unpersuasive when compared to media-fuelled ideological understandings of the fire and its 'hooligan' causes which had already been constructed and confirmed many times over.

A similar event occurred in North America following the Detroit Tigers' 1984 World Series victory. The morning after celebratory riots in downtown Detroit, a local man was found dead. Subsequent media reports were quick to blame 'violent fans' and make alarmist commentaries concerning the deteriorating image of North American sports spectatorship. Although no conclusive evidence finally surfaced, media presumptions were strongly countered by police rumours in and around Detroit that the incident had been the result of well-known inner-city gang rivalries rather than sports-related celebrations. Not surprisingly, this interesting alternative view received only minimal status in the same media who had been so reactionary in 'pointing fingers'.

This illustration is important because it represents one of the few examples unearthed in this study of the North American media reacting in stereotypes (at least in negative
stereotypes) to North American sports crowd disorder as they typically do toward the now infamous 'English/British Disease'. As shown earlier, North American celebratory riots, during which interpersonal injury and property damage are frequently excessive, are usually downplayed by sports clubs, police and the media in terms of zealous—but largely rationalizable, containable and unthreatening—fan revelry. And this despite increasing evidence regarding their frequency, predictability and seriousness of injury to both persons and property.

A final discourse effect—one which takes place between the British and North American media—also requires attention. The study showed that incidents of soccer hooliganism which accrue 'cardinal newsworthiness' (Hall et al., 1978) and thus extensive coverage in the British media, i.e., typically those incidents which involve large numbers of injuries, fatalities or excessive property damage, tend also to be appropriated by the North American media as newsworthy material. Interestingly, such North American media treatment, although superficially and weakly acknowledging potential for increases in sports crowd disorder in the North American context, are coded in ways which actually serve to legitimize and support ideologies of British sports spectator 'madness' and to undermine the perceived likelihood of amplified levels of sports crowd disorder in North America.
As mentioned above, despite evidence that problems of sports crowd disorder exist in North America and that increasing attention is being paid to it by officials and academics, there is usually a conspicuous absence of messages emphasizing 'control' and 'fear' in media reports on this continent in the manner to which consumers of the British media have become accustomed. The content analysis of the Montreal riot is a case in point, but in general this can be witnessed in North America in the attitudes and perspectives of media personnel (e.g., journalists unanimously refuted any sports crowd disorder 'problem' during interviews in this study), in themes in their reports (e.g., sports crowd disorder is normally described as sporadic, unusual, unthreatening, etc.), but also in the labels used to describe participants in crowd violence. For example, while the British term 'hooligan' is commonly employed by the North American media to refer to British fans, these media prefer to use the term 'rowdy' to describe North American fans involved in much the same, if not identical, forms of crowd violence. The latter, of course, has altogether milder ideological connotations. Whereas 'rowdyism' seems to imply excessive but partly acceptable and understandable revelry, 'hooliganism' carries rather more serious and immediate ideological baggage, i.e., it conjures up a whole range of images, specifically that it is
immoral, threatening to social order and urgently requires sanction and preferably extermination.

It is, however, during these moments of trans-atlantic news coverage that the normal menu of North American media denial of sports-related violence undergoes a brief hiatus and an element of 'fear' begins to pervade North American media reports concerning the potential for escalation in the status of indigenous sports crowd disorders, although only for a short period. Again, the classic illustration of such 'serious' British fan violence being reported in the North American media and creating such a discourse effect was the Heysel Stadium riot. Given the riot's ubiquitous coverage in the international media and on the world stage, it is no surprise that North American journalists also exploited its potential as a 'powerful news story'.

Crucially, most distinct in North American media reports of Brussels was a widely discussed element of 'contagiousness' of the 'British disease', a fear of 'obscene' crowd violence being reproduced mimetically at and around North American sports stadia, in addition to a fear of crowd pathology in general. From a large sample of alarmist North American commentaries appearing at approximately the same time (a ten day period following the riot), several examples can be cited. The New York Times (June 2,
1985:Sect. 5:2) informed its audience that "DARK SIGNS EXIST IN THE U.S., TOO!" It went on:

An angry, drunken fan, supported by the group behaviour of his fellow fans and excited by the aggressive behaviour of his team on the field, can easily be provoked into participating in violent conduct in the stands. These norms of conduct are equally applicable to United States as well as European soccer fans. Consequently, many American sporting contests represent a powder keg waiting to explode.

The association of crowd violence here with European soccer and the game of soccer per se, essentially a foreign sport to North Americans, subtly confirms the link between crowd violence and the sport and simultaneously implies that other more 'American' sports may be exempt.

In Canada, the Toronto Star (June 2, 1985:H1) responded to Heysel similarly with the headlines: "METRO NOT IMMUNE TO SPORTS VIOLENCE:"

Metro has never had an incident like the tragic Brussels soccer riot and professional sports teams, stadium operators and security forces want to keep it that way...But there are concerns...that serious trouble could develop here as games get more combative and crowds get bigger and uglier.

And finally, posing the same question "CAN IT HAPPEN IN THE U.S.?," Sports Illustrated (June 10, 1985:27) replicated the same themes:

The chilling reality is that spectator violence in the U.S. could conceivably yield a sporting disaster to compare with the one in Belgium...Americans may not be quite as fanatical as European soccer fans, but some of them harbor the same frustrations, grow
similarly aggressive at sports events, drink excessively before and during games...

Despite these codes of fear and threat, the cumulative ideological effect of what we have called here a 'discourse effect' ironically lies not in bringing new and warranted knowledge of the sports crowd disorder issue to its own North American public, but in fact to reproduce the 'us and them' aspect of British and North American sports and sporting experiences. Hence, in the same way that the North American media cautioned their consumers about militant British strikers in the 1960s and 'outrageous' 'Skinheads' and 'Punk-Rockers' in the 1970s, in shocked disbelief, stereotypes of violent and uncontrollable British youth are fuelled and reproduced. As one high profile Canadian journalist, speaking on the Heysel riot, informed the author, interestingly using sub-human metaphors of his own:

Nothing of this type, of this magnitude, can ever happen here or in the U.S. In forty years of reporting, it has become clear that Europeans are a different breed. They breed violence over there. Hence, we are more passive, more interested in bringing women and kids to our stadiums and having a family atmosphere. Players and fans alike don't seem to have the passion that they have over there. Sure, the odd drunk gets thrown out now and then but I'm convinced it's not going to get to the level of Brussels because, well, people look at sport different here. The serious element of soccer in England has been replaced with the entertainment factor. That's the key difference.
In sum, there thus emerges a form of deviance disavowal on the part of the North American media and their personnel (in addition to clubs, owners, league officials, promoters, etc.,), a belief that sports crowd disorder is something that North Americans need not be overly concerned about at all. As the same *Sports Illustrated* article cited above argued rather irresponsibly in its final comment:

> With luck, American sport will suffer nothing worse than random knifings, shootings, fistfights and "celebration" riots. (June 10, 1985:27)

The result of all of this is that the North American media generally and press specifically have contributed towards anchoring and even exacerbating ideologies of 'insane' British soccer fans and youth as a whole, who are seen to be capable of any number of forms of atrocities and violence.

The classic statement of North American 'smugness' in this matter came some five months after the Brussels episode from one of North America's most well-known and respected journalists, Dan Rather: "America should no longer look towards Britain for civilized values" (cited in the *Globe and Mail*, Oct. 24, 1985:A7). In the final analysis the North American media assist not only in redefining the norms, characteristics and morals of the (British and European) soccer crowd and of "Britishness" *per se*, but in also contributing towards a further denial of problems of sports-related violence which clearly exist domestically.

In their study discussed in Chapter Two, Elliot
et al., (1983) show how the content and format of news fundamentally depends upon the proximity of news to its subject. With this in mind, we can interpret these dominant approaches on the part of the North American media to the "British disease" as an attempt by that media "...to exploit its relative distance from its object, and insert a critical stance" (Knight and Taylor, 1986:243). The axiom that what one does not say is as important as what one does is now brought into sharper relief. This ongoing sense of denial of sports crowd violence in North America by those inside of sportsworld and those whose job it is to bring sports to the public (the media) not only represents a screeching version of what Taylor (1982a:165) calls a 'significant silence', but a quite clear indication that by pointing to serious social problems elsewhere, one's own problems inevitably appear less important and menacing.

In Chapter Four, it was argued that the more formalized organizational structure of sports crowd disorder in the United Kingdom--soccer hooliganism--appears in dominant ideology to share close ties with a host of other folk devils, usually flamboyant and violent youth subcultures such as 'Teddy Boys', 'Mods and Rockers', 'Skinheads', 'Punks', etc. At least one common feature among this expressive "gallery of types" (Cohen, 1973) is the fact that they have all been viewed by primary and secondary definers and in dominant ideology more generally as more than every-
day deviants, i.e., as social types which are inherently dangerous and threatening to respectable society and order whose violent behaviour has created widespread moral panic. In addressing the issue of British soccer fans and media coverage of their behaviour, a crucial question thus becomes: how, if at all, can the moral panic alluded to end?

In *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, Cohen (1973) argues that at least two reasons for the demise of public interest in folk devils are, first, an increasing lack of official and public interest and, second, internal changes within the group, such as maturation. Although there is evidence that Cohen's points are germane in explaining the demise of moral panics concerning flamboyant youth subcultures mentioned above, soccer hooliganism perhaps provides a rather more complex case.

As far as the hypothesized decline in official and public interest is concerned, on the basis of frequency and nature of news reports of hooliganism, at the present time there is no indication that British society is any less concerned with or threatened by violent soccer fans than it was two decades ago. In fact, on the eve of English teams' re-entry into international competition, and with memories of Heysel Stadium still very fresh, the government, the public, soccer players and non-violent fans anticipate with trepidation what awaits the sport of soccer in the future. Certainly, hooliganism has not decreased at British games.
during the two year period of international suspension. Although the Football Association appears confident that once the ban is lifted hooliganism will not 'rear its head', again, a more realistic and historically-informed appraisal of the situation is that there is no reason to presume that violent soccer fans will not want to re-enact their notorious history and re-establish their "collective English manhood" (Vulliamy, 1985) abroad. In this sense, it is argued here that, at least in the near future, Cohen's (1973) and Gitlin's (1980) argument about moral panics undoing and neutralizing themselves by way of overload, will not be pertinent to the case of British soccer hooliganism.

Moreover, if scholars such as Dunning et al., (1987), Vulliamy (1985) and Taylor (1982a, 1982b, 1985) are correct in linking soccer hooliganism to deeply entrenched socio-cultural values of 'Britishness' and 'British manliness', the demise of hooligan conduct at soccer is fundamentally dependent on a change not only in the socio-economic context in which it occurs, but also in notions of what 'Britishness' means to hooligans themselves. As indicated above, the overarching irony here is that the Thatcher government (now looking toward its third term in office) is an unwitting contributor to British soccer violence in its perpetual and implicitly jingoistic encouragement to Britons that 'British is best'.
Cohen's second argument concerning internal changes within the group, such as maturation, is also unlikely to precipitate a decrease in hooligan behaviour. Although there is evidence (e.g., Hebdige, 1979; Clarke et al., 1976) that many youth subcultures (e.g., Teds, Skinheads, Punks, etc.) are for the most part era-specific, there is little evidence that hooligans are only a cultural feature of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. As the last point implies, media reports of hooliganism have been prominent now for nearly three decades and, if Dunning et al., (1982a, 1982b) and Young's (1980) work is to be followed, the problem is much more 'mature' than that. There now exists a wealth of information (e.g., Williams et al., 1984; Marsh et al., 1978) that 'super crews' of hooligan fans are comprised of veteran members and apprentice members,' so in this light "generational change" (Cohen, 1973:200) may well take place but obsolescence may not. Further, given the socio-cultural experiences of British youth more generally (unemployment, boredom, frustration, etc.), Cohen's further point that new recruits in subcultures are "put off" by more attractive cultural propositions, is similarly unlikely to detract from the cultural meanings and enticement of soccer hooliganism for young working class males. In fact, many hooligan fans are not youths at all (see Hooligan documentary), so generational change is slower here than in other youth deviant contexts.
In sum, it is argued that as a phenomenon integrally linked to the cultural and political context in which it takes place, British soccer hooliganism is only likely to change or 'fade out' as other youth subcultures have done if the cultural and political context changes itself. This means that hooliganism is equally unlikely to lose its newsworthiness in the near future.

Of course, the moral panic associated with hooliganism would certainly decrease if the mass media, and particularly television and the print media, devised alternative, i.e., less dramatic, sensationalist, and indeed violent, codes of signification. However, given that journalism is a business oriented principally towards economic profit maximization (Halloran, 1978b:297), and that most media personnel spoken to in the research for this study acknowledged an occupational belief in coding reports in terms of anticipated audience appeal, i.e., drama and violence (Chibnall, 1981), the ways in which sports crowd disorder and sports violence are ideologically represented in the mass media are also unlikely to change noticeably.

Because it has never been a source of official or unofficial concern, the likely circumstances that might lead to sports crowd disorder—assuming the form of moral panic in North America are more difficult to speculate about. Certainly the content analysis revealed that over the course of the last 10 to 15 years, levels of sports crowd disorder
have been reported in the media more widely than was previously the case, and there is some evidence, as mentioned above, that when fatal crowd riots take place abroad, some North American media run stories on the likelihood of domestic crowd disorder escalating. Examples of this were provided earlier. But this was found to be an exception to the rule and, when it does happen, the North American media have typically taken the opportunity to rationalize away any apparent increase in crowd disorder by comparing it to organized crowd disorder elsewhere, such as the United Kingdom. This represents a 'technique of neutralization' (Sykes and Matza, 1981) which has been adopted broadly by the media and the sports clubs themselves. The currently not-so-newsworthy phenomenon of sports crowd disorder in North America may become more newsworthy in the event of a fatal sports riot, or multiple firearm use, etc. It is possible to hypothesize that in the future sports stadia may become the target of random killings in the same way as California highways did in 1987-1988, and that in this scenario (as was the case with the Los Angeles shootings) the media would perceive sports crowd violence as extremely newsworthy material.

The possibility of sports crowd disorder taking on the form of moral panic in North America is really a question of how the phenomenon is signified by domestic media. The extent to which news is signified in essence
depends upon the structure of media agencies, and in North America this is quite different than in the United Kingdom. For example, there is no national press in North America in the same sense as there is in the United Kingdom, which means that there is also little extensive national coverage of disorder and crime. Further, despite the fact that television news has a national form (C.B.S., N.E.C., A.B.C., etc.), it would appear that violence and relatively 'micro' social panics have a greater chance of remaining at a local and/or regional level and be totally overlooked by national news. An illustration of this is that most national/network television actually avoids crime coverage except in unusual circumstances, such as mass slayings, etc., so that television crime news is primarily a very localized news form. This again would appear to preclude the chances of North American sports crowd disorder becoming extremely newsworthy in its domestic context, and perhaps accounts in part for its conspicuous absence to date, despite its known existence.

**Behavioural Effects of Media Treatment of Sports Crowd Disorder**

This study is more centrally concerned with discourse effects of media coverage of sports-related violence than effects on behaviour *per se*, but, as indicated in
Chapter Two, it is important to also recognize that media coverage carries the potential for precipitating behavioural (suggestion or 'copycat') effects among both sports players and fans. Several points are worthy of note.

Data discussed in the study have shown that media commentaries frequently include elements of pre-reporting and anticipatory violence, i.e., the anticipation of violence during an upcoming event, of riots and other forms of associated conduct. Thus, press headlines announcing that "A HOCKEY WAR IS BREWING" (Toronto Star, Oct. 8, 1975) are likely to remind fans of hostilities which have historically or recently developed between two clubs. Supplemented by graphic descriptions and occasionally photographs of violence either by players or fans which erupted on the last occasion the two clubs met, it is no surprise that, as M. Smith (1978:129) remarks, fans "...may harbour hostile beliefs and feelings before ever arriving at the stadium," which may in turn affect crowd behaviour at the match itself. Additionally, headlines and commentaries following games (e.g., "THE BATTLE OF QUEBEC: When Provincial Neighbours Montreal and Quebec Meet in the Playoffs it's War" (Sports Illustrated, May 4, 1987)) function to confirm and even exaggerate such hostilities and team rivalries which may again affect crowd conduct during future meetings.

In the United Kingdom, where several scholars (e.g., Taylor, 1982a; Dunning et al., 1987) have similarly argued
that media presentations of soccer hooliganism have at times had an exacerbating effect on terrace conduct, Dunning et al., (1987) show how:

A Chelsea fan convicted of carrying a razor at the 'needle match' against West Ham...told the court in his defence that he had 'read in a local newspaper that the West Ham lot were going to cause trouble'.

In addition to fan violence being partly a response to elements of provocation, threat and prediction in media (particularly tabloid press) reports of upcoming events, Dunning et al., (1987) also demonstrate how the British media have in fact contributed towards the development of a 'national status hierarchy' of soccer grounds to be feared, by regularly documenting, usually speculatively and impressionistically; alleged rates of violence and other hooligan action normally transpiring at and around one ground compared with others. In Chapter Six, similar treatment of 'feared' sports stadia in North America was analyzed. Most visibly, the American and Canadian media regularly depict New York's Yankee Stadium as a locale where "...there is a very real danger of becoming a mugging victim" (Hamilton Spectator, Oct. 14, 1981).

There are at least two potential effects of such media construction of 'national status hierarchies' here. First, non-violent fans interpreting such messages of warning literally might decide to stay away from games. Although this is only one explanation, the well-documented
decline in gate attendances at British soccer in the 1970s and early 1980s should be seen as partially attributable to public fears of hooliganism. Second, those fans interested in violently defending the reputation of their club and local community (see Williams et al., 1984) might actively seek to proudly maintain the described 'status' of their ground as potentially violent if they are so-labelled in media reports, or in fact to attempt to upgrade its status if it is seen to 'lack' by comparison with other grounds by participating in higher levels of hooligan conduct. These possibilities are explored in Dunning et al., (1987).

On the whole, of course, it is difficult to measure how much fans participating in sports violence are simply emulating spectacles they have seen before, or responding to media descriptions and commentaries such as those discussed here, or both. But we cannot rule out the possibility, as a number of sociologists have argued (Phillips, 1974, 1972; Tumber, 1982), of sensationalistic media coverage of riots in sport and elsewhere aiding potential participation in violence and precipitating a series of 'copycat' effects. Much more attention needs to be paid in this direction, and to M. Smith's (1983) illuminating work which shows that media portrayals of professional hockey violence tends to have a cumulative and long-term affect on young amateur players.
With soccer hooliganism in Britain, any 'super crew' of hooligan fans interested in learning new approaches to their cultural task or confirming ideas they have about ways in which other super crews do their violence need only to read the Sunday morning headlines or watch for evidence on television. In this respect, the media should certainly be seen as playing the role of providing fans with "assembling instructions" (McPhail and Miller, 1973) regarding where crowds will congregate, and regarding the 'how to' of this unique deviant behaviour. As paths taken by British sporting folk devils continue to achieve high status in the international media, opportunities abound for 'the lads' of North American sports, intrigued with their British counterparts, to emulate highly publicized aspects of hooligan deportment. For example, anyone who believes that the media do not put ideas into fans' heads clearly missed the Toronto Blue Jays' home opener of 1985 where hundreds of marauding fans clashed with police on horseback in Exhibition Stadium in what seemed--to the author as observer--to be a remarkable mimicry of the all to frequent field invasions (by 'streakers', drunken fans, aggressive fans, etc.,) of English soccer. In addition, there is no doubt that fans of the Italian club Roma who spray-painted walls in the Italian capital congratulating the Liverpool fans for their part in the Heysel Stadium riot where thirty-nine mostly Juventus fans died were responding to the media outcry following the
riot, in addition, of course, to drawing on knowledge of the English soccer 'situation' they had received indirectly via the mass media. Similarly, 'We Hate Humans' and other hooligan chants heard around English soccer grounds develop in direct response to 'subhuman' labels imposed upon them by primary and secondary definers' arguments voiced in the media.

As Chapter Two suggested, the 'copycat' argument is an extremely difficult one to prove or disprove, mostly because it requires dubious laboratory experimentation to provide empirical evidence. Not surprisingly, its literature remains inconclusive, unpersuasive and controversial. Nevertheless, where sports violence (by players and fans) is concerned, research which has been conducted into media treatment and media effects is extremely suggestive of media presentations acting as models and blueprints for further violent conduct. This is an area of particular concern regarding 'symbolic cues' (Stryker, 1980) that children may pick up from the media. As Yeager (1979:7) writes:

Sports officials, parents, and athletes themselves condemn the worldwide wave of bloodletting, but the ugly parade of savage spectator outbursts and player-maiming injuries keeps getting longer. We worry about our children viewing fictional mayhem on television, yet the camera's relentless athletic vigil presents, unexpurgated, every major act of sports viciousness, then endlessly replays it, in full view of millions of hero-worshipping youngsters.
And finally, as argued earlier in this study, if catharsis theory is less informative than observational learning theory, which appears to be the case (see K. Young and M. Smith, 1988), and the consumption of media presentations of violence leads more to a disinhibition effect than a cathartic release, then M. Smith's (1983) notion of 'violence-precipitates-violence' becomes crucially important in the interpretation of media effects and issues of media responsibility. Although more work is required to bolster his modest studies of fan violence in soccer and hockey, Smith's work is seminal in this area in pointing to the potential for behavioural effects of media coverage of sports-related violence.

Summary

In this study, crowd disorders related to a range of sports in two specific contexts—North America and the United Kingdom—have been examined. Although there is evidence to suggest that sports-related violence has been increasing globally since the 1970s (M. Smith, 1983:152—as Atyeo (1979:10) says, "...sporting violence is not hard to find"), the focus was essentially cross-cultural and comparative with regard to these two contexts.
Adequate explanations of sport crowd disorder must be grounded in the unique socio-historical and socio-cultural context in which it takes place. For this reason, and despite identifiable similarities in types and forms of crowd violence at some sports in different international settings, it is unhelpful to conceive of universal explanations when precipitants are usually tied integrally to the unique cultural environment in which they emerge. Thus, Chapter Four represents an attempt to demonstrate significant differences in the contexts and conditions of sport in the United Kingdom and North America giving rise to different forms of crowd violence. The theoretical literature available in the areas of collective behaviour and human aggression is equally unhelpful in providing more than superficial explanations in this area because, again, it tends to assume that certain universals exist in the way violence manifests itself. However, sport crowd disorders in North America and the United Kingdom manifest themselves in very different ways and for very different reasons. Of course, this study also raises significant questions vis-a-vis the role of the media in reporting sports crowd disorder as a 'social problem' and area of concern.

Since the 1960s, British soccer hooligans have participated in a well-documented series of deviant behaviours which have earned them an international reputation as the infamous 'folk devils' of a society once praised for its
refinement and civility. Far from this image of a 'civilized' race, however, a succession of hooligan incidents at soccer stadia (coupled with a broader and similarly well-documented concern over unemployment and youth disaffection) has assisted in bringing global attention to the fact that, currently, Britain is a society deep in social, economic and political crisis.

It is clear that, to the media, soccer hooliganism, replete with its disruptive, violent and unpredictable elements, is eminently newsworthy. In this way, it has, over the last two decades been accorded similar media treatment as the notorious company of Cohen's (1973) "gallery of (folk devil) types" in both the British and North American media. Soccer hooliganism has essentially been reported in ways which experts in this area consider 'misrepresentative' (Williams, 1980:111) and sensationalized (Murphy and Williams, 1979), and in ways moreover, which combined represent the fact that the media play active rather than passive roles in this general problem, and contribute directly towards the reproduction of dominant-hegemonic ideologies.

British hooliganism has become signified in increasingly serious tones by the media who have contributed towards the development of a law-and-order campaign around the issue. Earlier, it was pointed out that soccer fans in the United Kingdom have for some time been viewed by the
media and the public as a kind of 'internal enemy' against whom the state must fight by introducing draconian measures and policies. Under these conditions, and particularly following the Heysel Stadium riot, it is no surprise, as Raphael (1985:267) has incisively illustrated, that the phrase 'faire le Liverpool', has become synonymous with a wide range of obscene and unacceptable violence. It also appears, however, that the hooligans (if not British youth in general) are considered an 'external enemy' by the North American media. Although it has never been so stated, to 'faire le British' now takes on strong ideological overtones domestically and abroad.

Despite the fact that violence at British soccer has been located as far back as the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and that it has a very violent recent history, there is a tendency for the primary and secondary definers to view the problem as quickly resolvable and amenable to instant social policy, and to offer a series of moral directives based upon such a view. For example, in recent years radical and immediate punitive sanctions have been proposed by both the British control culture and by those responsible for organizing soccer. Amongst a broad range of similar suggestions, these have included the reintroduction of capital punishment, banning the game altogether, securing penning arrangements by electrifying them, and most recently, circulating 'wanted' posters of
'outlaw louts' (The Independent, Aug. 21, 1987:28) "... to all ninety-two football league clubs and their local constabularies."

Despite the numerous warnings offered by academics who believe that such 'short, sharp, shock' treatment will be inadequate in the long term if unaccompanied by some more innovative plan to replace the satisfactions hooligans derive from their Saturday afternoon exploits (cf., Eric Dunning in Hooligan video), the British state has increasingly come to deal with this problem of violence in violent and reactionary terms, usually focused on the 'here and now'.

Cumulatively, these approaches towards the hooligan issue have had the effect of heightening the threat posed to the social order by the hooligans, of reinforcing the polarity between them and the authorities, and of course of advising myopic and simplistic suggestions for solution. In this respect, cries to 'cage the animals' or 'ban the game', regularly voiced in the alarmist British media, are doomed to failure. As has already been pointed out, if anything has emerged from the hooligan debate over the years it is the fact that harsh punitive sanctions do very little to deter violent soccer fans in the long term. In addition, since the hooligan problem is more a feature of historical class relations than the nature of soccer as a sport, then in the unlikely situation that soccer were banned outright, we
could expect hooliganism to manifest itself in another setting. Rather than playing a passive role, then, primary and secondary definers have in these ways tended to act as catalysts in the hooligan issue, particularly in contributing to a moral panic over the phenomena, which has done little to relieve an already complicated picture.

Unfortunately, despite the long history of hooliganism, there is still little common agreement between academics, the government and the soccer authorities over the issues involved or the choice of policy implementation for either the short or the long term. While academics continue to advise that we are only beginning to understand the meanings derived from hooliganism by the participants and that these need to be further explored before effective policy can be constructed, objectives of the part of the control culture remain heavily oriented towards the 'here and now', towards short term measures, and in particular towards increasing jail terms and attempts to 'police the hooligans out of existence'.

At the time of writing, and on the eve of English clubs' likely re-entry into international competition following their two year ban, it appears probable that soccer hooliganism will continue, that there will be more ritualistic and spontaneous violence at and around soccer games, and that the primary and secondary definers will
continue to address the symptoms rather than the causes of the problem. The current status of sports crowd disorder in North America is altogether different. Despite evidence of a growing spectrum of forms and frequencies of sports crowd disorder in this context i.e., that it is an emergent social problem, the North American media and sporting authorities consistently downplay and deny any aspects of sports crowd disorder which do exist. Quite regularly, its allegedly 'non-serious' and 'trivial' nature is compared (often smugly) to what is commonly perceived to be the much more serious problem of soccer hooliganism in the United Kingdom. In brief, widespread sports-related crowd problems are viewed in dominant ideology as extremely unlikely to transpire as they have in the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, the North American public is given quite strong (imaginary) ideological messages from primary and secondary definers that sports crowd disorder on this continent is insufficiently disturbing to warrant widespread concern and that any sports crowd problem which does occur is unusual, ephemeral and unthreatening.

Crucially, these very different ideological interpretations of the meanings and significance of sports crowd disorder in the United Kingdom and North America demonstrate that:

Those who control the propagation and dissemination of moral ideas and the
machinery of sanctions—the law and the penal system—are in an unusually strong position to project their own ideas as being the only ones. (Fleming, 1983:153)

As Fleming points out, the media and control culture both play a "...pivotal role...in an ideological sense" in creating images and understandings for the public which may in fact not only be rather disorted, but which fundamentally profit their own political and economic goals.

This study supports arguments made by Hall and his colleagues (1978) in their seminal work Policing the Crisis. Here, Hall et al., again borrowing from Althusser's (1971) work, postulate that the result of the structural relationship between the control culture and the media is that the media play essentially a mediating service role for the state, particularly in their reproduction and dissemination of dominant ideological frameworks and meanings. This role is fundamentally dependent upon the media's capacity to posit consensualist images of society in ways "...which consolidate taken-for-granted reality and already entrenched beliefs" (John Hargreaves, 1982:19). Above, we have witnessed a diversity of ways in which this effect is achieved with regard to media treatment of sports crowd disorder in two international settings, and the popular ideologies and images developed as a result. In brief, the relationship between the mass media and hegemony is a very 'real' and powerful one.
It is hoped that this study enhances our knowledge of the complex relation between sports crowd disorder, the mass media and ideology, and that data unearthed and arguments made here contribute toward the slim literature available in this multi-disciplinary field.

Finally, two recommendations for future research need to be posed. First, more serious sociological attention needs to be paid to comparative analyses of sports fans and sports crowd disorder in different international contexts. This dissertation has been concerned with causal explanations only tangentially, and the literature still awaits an in-depth examination of the causes, meanings and satisfactions associated with sports crowd disorder in different cultural contexts. Although an expanding body of information is now available in this regard on soccer hooliganism in the United Kingdom, these comments are most pertinent in the North American context where there is a conspicuous paucity of knowledge about sports crowd disorder, its forms, its frequency and its meanings. Of course, in the final analysis, it is possible to argue that sociologists have voluntarily contributed towards dominant-hegemonic ideology here themselves, i.e., the neglect in this area may well be a result of academics not considering North American sports crowd disorder as an area of legitimate sociological concern.
Second, in recent years, critical theory in sociology (particularly on offer from British 'Cultural Studies' writers and those working in the areas of mass communication theory) has made valuable contributions in illuminating both the relation between the media, ideology and hegemony and the manner in which this relation can be studied semiotically. In pointing clearly towards one of the central mechanisms involved in the dissemination of popular ideas and images, this work needs to be ongoing. The sociology of sport as a subdisciplinary area still struggling for scholarly prestige within the parent discipline would be well-advised to make better use of this growing and important literature to illuminate the meanings of certain sports-related phenomena, not just for its participants, fans and organizers, but for society and ideology in general.
NOTES

1. As mentioned earlier, consistently negative media portrayals of these and other folk devils can be understood in terms of the advent of the new Right and its general assault on the 'permissive society' (and its welfare state). This includes attacks on many diverse social phenomena which are seen in some way as threatening to order, stability and consensus.

2. Worthy of attention here is the fact that genuine 'good news' from the beleaguered world of soccer tends to be ignored by the same British media (press specifically) who appear so committed to the systematic coverage of unattractive aspects of the game and soccer crowd problems. For example, in the mid-1980s we have witnessed new attempts on the part of clubs themselves and city councils to involve the community and particularly youngsters in their affairs and decisions. In the wake of the Heysel riot of May 1985, this is associated in part with the notion that in strengthening club and community relations, and in improving the general image of the professional game, the profile of hooliganism will somehow be reduced.

   In 1986, Sheffield Wednesday introduced an event called 'Sportacular', to be held on a bi-annual basis. 'Sportacular' involved inviting youngsters in the local community to the ground, to tour and use facilities, to meet players and management and to participate in a series of recreational activities and competitions. Despite weeks of promotion in the local and larger community, the enormous success of 'Sportacular' went largely unnoticed because the media failed to report on it. The situation is amply described by Clarke and Madden (1987):

   Few people were able to appreciate this fact however as the scheme received virtually no media coverage. All the media were notified of the event and collectively showed very little interest in the efforts of 250 youngsters and the team of professionals over a 5 day event. It apparently did not fit into a reporting frame despite the fact

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that the actions of a small minority for a few minutes during a game can make the headlines. Unfortunately, Sheffield City Council and Sheffield Wednesday became victims of the old adage that good news is no news.


4. Personal communication with the author.

5. The paths taken by old and new British 'folk devils' are frequently reported upon in these ways in the North American media.

6. These types of views, found in interviews and on the questionnaire to be commonly held both by those involved in organizing and managing sport and the media, are of course replete with rampant contradictions. Not the least of these is the fact that North American sports (and particularly football and hockey) are centrally premised upon overtly violent combat.

7. For example, the *Hooligan* documentary shows that the established members of West Ham United's Inter City Firm refer to those apprentice or novice members under that age of fifteen as the 'under fives'.

8. Among other explanations for declining gates at British soccer are tight economic conditions among working people and unemployment, and the general redefinition of leisure time and how to use it.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDICES
A. QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW GUIDE

Questionnaire Covering Letter

Dear Sir/Madam:

I am a doctoral student in the Department of Sociology at McMaster University. For my Ph.D. Dissertation, I am researching the area of sports-related crowd disorder. More specifically, I am comparing the phenomenon of spectator disorder as it occurs in North America and in the United Kingdom.

It would be of valuable assistance to my research if you could complete the enclosed brief questionnaire, and return it in the stamped, self-addressed envelope (also enclosed). The first fourteen questions refer to specific issues, but the fifteenth is 'open-ended'. For this question, please feel free to provide any additional information that you might consider to be of relevance for research in this area. Also, for all questions, please include examples whenever possible.

Finally, please be assured that any information you render available to me will be used and analyzed solely on an aggregate basis and for purposes of comparison. No specific statement regarding your club will be made, and all names and sources will be kept anonymous and confidential.

Thank you for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Kevin Young

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Questionnaire Follow-Up Letter

Dear Sir/Madam:

I am a Doctoral student in the Department of Sociology at McMaster University. For my Ph.D. Dissertation, I am researching the area of sports-related crowd disorder. More specifically, I am comparing the phenomenon of spectator disorder as it occurs in North America and in the United Kingdom.

In fact, this is a 'follow-up' to a letter I sent you in November, 1985. Part of my methodology has been to send out a questionnaire to all professional sports clubs in North America. To date, many clubs have responded but it seems that your club is one that has not. It would be of enormous assistance to my research if you could complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it at your earliest convenience. If you feel unqualified to complete it yourself, please feel free to pass it onto someone else at your club in a better position to respond. Please note that the first 14 questions refer to specific issues, but the 15th is 'open-ended'. For this question, feel free again to provide any additional information that you consider to be of relevance to research in this area. Include examples whenever possible.

Finally, please be assured that any data you make available to me will be used and analyzed solely on an aggregate basis and for purposes of comparison. No specific statement regarding your club will be made, and all names and sources will be kept anonymous. Information rendered by this questionnaire is of the utmost importance to a Ph.D. Dissertation still at the research stage, and I hope that in the interests of science and of sport more generally you can accede to this request.

Thank you for your further consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Kevin Young
Questionnaire
(distributed to 87 professional sports clubs in North America)

Club name and sport played ________________________________

QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING ISSUES OF SPORTS CROWD DISORDER

1. Can you comment upon the social make-up of spectator's at your club, and particularly upon their sex and age. (If you have no concrete figures for crowd composition, please comment on an impressionistic basis.)

2. Please comment upon the frequency of crowd disorder at your club (including such incidents as fighting, assault, the throwing of missiles, pitch invasion, drunkenness, etc.,).

3. a) Would you say that levels of spectator disorder are fairly stable, or have they escalated or dwindled during recent seasons?

   b) What evidence do you have in this regard?

4. How is spectator disorder actually expressed? (For example, does its expression include verbal abuse, fighting, drunkenness, the throwing of missiles, confrontations with police, and/or other forms of disorder?)

5. What appear to be the major underlying causes of disorder at your club? (For example, can disorder be linked to such phenomena as general crowd excitement, unpopular officials' decisions, player violence, uneven scores, alcohol, rival fan provocation, and/or other causes?)

6. a) Who would you say are the main offenders in disorder: males or females?

   b) Do these people fall into a specific age category or do they come from a wide range of age groups?
7. a) Do you have any regulations regarding the sale of alcohol at your stadium? (For example, do you limit the number of drinks that any one spectator can purchase, and is beer sold throughout the game or does its sale cease at some earlier stage?)

b) Have these regulations been changed or modified recently? How?

8. Do you find that most disorder is generally manifested by 'home' or 'away' fans, or between them both?

9. a) Do you think that there is a link between aggression on the field of play and aggression in the seats?

b) What evidence do you have for this?

10. Has crowd disorder caused your club to amend or in any way 'tighten' policing procedures and crowd control measures during recent seasons?

11. a) Is most disorder focused on one or more particular section/s of the stadium?

b) Can you speculate on why this may be the case?

12. a) How many police and/or security guards does your club generally employ for the duration of one game?

b) Does this vary depending on the reputation of opponents and their fans, anticipated crowd size, play-offs, etc.?

13. a) Can you comment on your policy of seating arrangement when providing clubs with tickets for home games, i.e., do you attempt to integrate or segregate 'home' and 'away' fans?

b) Why do you maintain such a policy?

14. Do you keep any official records of crowd disorder (ejections, arrests, assaults, etc.)? Could a copy of these be made available to me?

15. On the reverse side of this page please comment on any other aspect of spectator disorder and crowd control that you consider relevant to research in this area.
Interview Schedule for Sports Spectators
(totai of fifty-three)

1. a) Sex
   b) Occupation
   c) Age

2. Sports most usually attended (include Club name(s))

3. Why do you come to sports events? (For example, is it for reasons of: team identification; escape; belonging in a crowd; nationalism, and/or other?)

4. Does player violence make the sports spectacle more interesting for you? Please explain.

5. Many observers think that spectator disorder at sports events is generally on the increase. What is your impression? Please give evidence.

6. What are the major forms of spectator disorder that you have witnessed? (For example, does it include: verbal abuse; drunkenness; fighting; missile throwing; confrontations with police, or other?)

7. Why do you think there are far more males involved in spectator disorder than females?

8. What do you think are the main underlying causes of spectator disorder? (For example, is disorder mainly caused by: general crowd excitement; unpopular officials' decisions; player violence; uneven scores; rival fan provocation, and/or other causes?)

9. Which sports crowds would you say are most prone to disorder? Why do you think this is?

10. Do you think the press and other media over-emphasize or under-emphasize spectator disorder, or do they present the phenomenon fairly accurately? Explain.

11. Have press reports you have read shown you anything about sports spectator disorder? Explain.
12. Do you think that fan behaviour in the stands can be influenced by newspaper reports leading up to the event? Any examples?

13. Would you like to see more player violence in sports. (For example, more fighting in hockey; harder hits in football?)

14. Would you say that games involving more than normal amounts of player aggression have affected your behaviour during or after the game? Explain.

15. Can you recall any incident(s) of disorder and/or violence you have been involved in as a sports spectator? Explain.

16. Can you think of any way(s) in which spectator disorder can be more effectively dealt with?


18. What is your general impression of soccer fans in Britain and Europe?
Interview Schedule for Police, Security Personnel, Sports League Committees and Team Mascots (total of twenty-four)

Police and Security Personnel

1. Who is it that actually does the security here at _________? How many security agents do you employ for the average game?

2. What kinds of security procedures do you implement?

3. Would you say that your crowds are generally well-behaved?

4. What kinds of sports crowd disorder do you get? How is disorder actually expressed?

5. Does crowd disorder follow any particular patterns? For example, does it vary according to factors such as type of event, team rivalry, level of competition, how entertaining the game is, how one-sided the game is, etc.?

6. Is alcohol sold at games? Would you change its sale in any way and why?

7. Do you think alcohol plays a role in the crowd disorder that you have here? Any examples?

8. From your experience, what would you say are the major causes of crowd disorder?

9. Do you have any special family enclosures? If not, do you see them as either necessary or a good idea?

10. Are local by-laws actually enforced when violated? For example, do you actually fine fans encroaching onto the field of play (should this be a by-law here)?

11. What are the most charges levied upon disorderly fans?

12. Is crowd disorder mostly participated in by 'home' or 'away' fans?
13. Who participates mostly—males or females?

14. What role do you see the media playing in sports crowd disorder, if any?

15. Do you think the media report accurately or responsibly or not?

16. Have you any club records I could examine?

Sports League Committees

1. How would you describe the current level of player and fan violence in your league?

2. Has this changed at all in recent years?

3. Has the league been forced to modify rules and regulations in order to better control player and/or fan violence in recent years?

4. Does player and fan violence follow any discernable pattern?

5. What do you see as the major causes of fan violence at your games?

6. Do you have any particular policy to penalize clubs whose players or fans behave violently?

7. Does any of this violence ever get reported in the media? If so, is it usually reported accurately or not?

8. Do you have any league records concerning player or fan violence that I could look at?

Sports Club Mascots

1. First of all, can you tell me something about how you got into mascotting?

2. Have you noticed any crowd disorder at your games?

3. How is this disorder expressed?
4. Do you think that males and females participate evenly in crowd disorder?

5. I have read stories in the media which suggest that you have been victimized by rowdy fans. Have you ever been verbally or physically assaulted by fans?

6. Do the media ever report on your relationship with the fans? Are these reports accurate or not?

7. In your experience, would you say that spectator disorder is escalating, dwindling or stabilizing? Any evidence?

8. What do you see to be the major causes of disorder?

9. Is disorder usually found in specific sections of the stadium? If so, why do you think this might be?

10. Does spectator disorder differ with the type of sport being played?

11. How do you see the role of the police in crowd disorder? Do they deal with disorder responsibly or would you have them change their treatment in some way?
Interview Schedule for Media Personnel
(total of 22)

1. How do you see your role as a journalist/editor/columnist/television show host/cameraman/photographer, etc.?

2. How and why do certain events become news and not others? That is, what is it that makes certain events 'newsworthy'?

3. If two sports riots occurred today in two different North American cities, would they both receive equal attention? If not, why not? What would be the determining factors in them being reported upon?

4. There seems to be a pattern in press coverage of sports violence. Can you tell me why certain language styles are frequently used to describe persons involved in sports crowd violence (e.g., 'animal', 'subhuman', 'irrational')?

5. Similarly, why are certain images used very frequently to describe sports-related behaviour (e.g., 'warfare', 'battle', 'siege', etc.)?

6. Do you think that the media cover sports crowd disorder in an accurate and responsible fashion? Do you see any potentially negative effects of media reports of violent behaviour?

7. Who actually constructs the physical layout and organization of the news report?

8. How do you see the role of headlines and photographs in news reports?

9. How do certain stories become running stories? What criteria have to be fulfilled in this regard?

10. The Heysel Stadium riot received massive media coverage in your paper/program and in North America more generally. Clearly there was something eminently newsworthy about Heysel. What was it?
11. From your experience in the area, how would you describe sports crowd disorder in North America?

12. What is your impression of European soccer and its fans--I ask this because in one of your reports you said ____________________.

13. In one report, you made the following comment ____________________. Can you tell me what exactly was meant by this comment?

14. Some news people have told me that there is a pressure or deadline on reporters to get stories in on time. Does this pressure occasionally lead to distorted or partially inaccurate pictures being painted by the media?

15. How do you see the role of the consumers of your medium? Do you think that the public blindly consumes media messages or does it appraise it more critically?

16. How do you see the role of 'Dear Sir' letters to editors? Are they ever 'planted' by the papers involved?

17. Do you have any specific policy regarding the coverage of certain items such as violence? Do you have any policy on photographs, language use, headline construction, etc.?
B. INCIDENTS OF SOCCER CROWD DISORDER IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AS LOCATED IN MEDIA REPORTS

Europe

West Germany (Globe and Mail, Sept. 9, 1985:59)
Holland (Globe and Mail, Aug. 6, 1985:19)
Italy (Hamilton Spectator, June 13, 1983)
France (Toronto Star, Sept. 9, 1985:B7)
Belgium (Toronto Star, Sept. 1, 1986:D5)
Spain (Hamilton Spectator, April 11, 1986:B3)
Portugal (Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 30, 1984:23)

Asia

Turkey (New York Times, Sept. 18, 1967)
Lebanon (Newsweek, Jan. 11, 1965:37)
China (The Times, July 23, 1985:9)
India (Toronto Star, July 28, 1985:B6)
Israel (Time, Nov. 27, 1972:70)
Saudi Arabia (Liverpool Echo, June 7, 1985)
Libya (World Soccer, June, 1985:34)
Soviet Union (The Times, May 1, 1984)

North America

Canada (Hamilton Spectator, Aug. 9, 1982)
Mexico (Globe and Mail, June 5, 1986:C11)

Central America

El Salvador (Newsweek, July 28, 1969:54)
South America

Peru (New York Times, May 25, 1964)
Brazil (Hamilton Spectator, Feb. 9, 1982:25)
Chile (Toronto Star, Nov. 19, 1985:B6)
Argentina (Globe and Mail, Nov. 20, 1973)
Uruguay (Liverpool Echo, June 7, 1985)

Africa

Nigeria (World Soccer, Sept. 1969:18)
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"Understanding Aggro." Video documentary made by the Open University, England.