THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER
THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER

By

EDWARD JOHN VAN BUREN

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University
September, 1989
TITLE: The Young Heidegger

AUTHOR: Edward John van Buren, B.A. (Saint Thomas University)  
M.A. (University of New Brunswick)

SUPERVISOR: Professor G.B. Madison

NUMBER OF PAGES: xiii, 741
ABSTRACT

Using his recently published lecture courses from 1919 to 1926, I tell the story of Heidegger’s youthful thought, which has survived over the years as a “rumor,” if not a legend. More specifically, I attempt a deconstructive reading of his later thought by tracing the major themes of his question of being back to their origin in his youthful period. I present these themes as the end of philosophy, the other beginning for the being-question, and the constant initiation of this new beginning as an ongoing way. I argue that the real turn in his thinking is not found in a turn from his 1927 Being and Time to his later works after 1930, but rather in his turn away from the metaphysics of his very early 1913 doctoral dissertation and 1916 habilitation writing to his thought in the early twenties. Regarding the theme of the end of philosophy, I show that the young Heidegger already criticized the three epochs of metaphysics (the ancient, the medieval, and the modern), and that he did this with the help of Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s idea of the good; Luther’s attack on Aristotelian scholasticism and Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegelianism; and the critique of Neo-Kantianism in Husserl’s “Sixth Investigation” and in Dilthey’s philosophy of life. Regarding the theme of the other beginning for the being-question, I show that he posed this question as the question of “being in and through life,” which he investigated in terms of the three intentional moments of world, factical life, and temporalizing. Regarding the theme of the way-character of his being-question, I show that he understood his philosophy as the “formal indication” of a way for interpretively showing the things themselves. In my Conclusion, I argue for the critical appropriation of his later thought in the light of the existential-phenomenological problematic and language of his youthful period, which provides us with a philosophical Rosetta stone for demythologizing and translating his later mytho-poetic, speculative language into a more familiar and natural lexicon.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank especially my supervisor Gary Madison for his guidance, inspiration, and philosophical synousia.

I would also like to thank the other members of my committee - Kenneth Dorper, Jakob Amstutz, and Sam Ajzenstat - for their support and for the time and effort which they have spent in reading and commenting on my dissertation.

I am indebted to Hans-Georg Gadamer (Heidelberg) and Dieter Jähnig (Tübingen) who helped me follow the trail of the "rumor" of the young Heidegger during my study in 1986-1987 at the Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen in West Germany.

I am also grateful to Burt Hopkins of DePaul University (Chicago) for making available Heidegger's unpublished correspondence with Husserl and to Thomas Sheehan of Loyola University (Chicago) for making available an unpublished study of the early development of Heidegger's thought.

I also wish to thank those who listened and provided helpful comments and encouragement when I presented sections of my dissertation at meetings of The North American Husserl Circle (Waterloo), The Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern Thought (Windsor, Quebec), and The Canadian Graduate Students' Conference (Hamilton) in 1988 and 1989.

Finally, I would like to thank Dan and Annette Ahern, the "Hausfreunde," for their encouragement, conversation, and company during and after our study together in West Germany.
To my Mother and Father, and my Brothers and Sisters
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: RUMOR OF A HIDDEN KING 1

PART ONE
THE LATER HEIDEGGER (1927-1976) 10
CHAPTER ONE: PLACES AND WAYS 10
I. The End of Philosophy 13
   1. Ground 14
   2. Logos 16
   3. Presence 17
II. The Other Beginning 21
   1. World 21
   2. Praxis 24
   3. Time 25
III. Constant Beginning 30
   1. Three Ways: Meaning, Truth, Topos 30
   2. Collected Edition and Thinking-Further 32
   3. No Heideggerian Philosophy 39

CHAPTER TWO: SELF-INSTALLMENT 43
I. Self-Portraiture 44
II. Self-Destruction 45
III. Self-Stylization 49

PART TWO
THE METAPHYSICAL HEIDEGGER (1910-1918) 60
CHAPTER THREE: THE WAY OF MEANING AND TOPOS (ONTOLOGIC) 61
I. The Doctrine of Categories 62
   1. Logical Meaning and Topos 63
   2. Atemporality 78
   3. Judgment 86
II. Metaphysical Epochs 97
   1. The Platonic-Aristotelian Draft 98
   2. The Scholastic-Speculative Draft 101
   3. The Neo-Kantian and Husserlian Draft 105

CHAPTER FOUR: THE WAY OF TRUTH (ONTOTHEOLOGY) 112
I. Anti-Metaphysical Traditions 113
II. The Problem of the Categories 118
   1. World-View 118
   2. Living Spirit 120
   3. History 121
PART THREE
THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER (1919-1925)

CHAPTER FIVE: THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

I. The Hermeneutical Situation

II. The Way of the Phenomenon
   1. The New Turn to Husserl
   2. The Destruction of Husserl
   3. The Retrieval
      i) Intentional Worlding
      ii) Intentional Life
      iii) Intentional History
   4. The Fusion of Horizons
   5. The Later Distantiation
   6. Self-Stylization and Self-Installment
   7. Effective History
   8. Our Hermeneutical Situation

III. The Way of Suffering
   1. The New Turn to Christian Authors
   2. The Theological and Philosophical Destruction
   3. The Theological Retrieval
   4. The Ontological Retrieval
      i) Philosophia Crucis
      ii) Thorn in the Self
      iii) Kairological Time
   5. The Later Distantiation
   6. Self-Stylization and Self-Installment
   7. Effective History
   8. Our Hermeneutical Situation

IV. The Way of Praxis
   1. The New Turn to Aristotle
   2. The Destruction of Aristotle
   3. The Retrieval: Ethos, Phronesis, Kairos
   4. The Aristotle-Husserl Fusion
   5. The Aristotle-Christianity Fusion
   6. The End and Other Beginning of Ethics
   7. The Aristotle Book
   8. Self-Overcoming
   9. The Later Distantiation
   10. Self-Stylization and Self-Installment
   11. Effective History
   12. Our Hermeneutical Situation

V. The End of Philosophy
   1. The Turning-Around of Philosophy
   2. The Critique of Subjectivity

CHAPTER SIX: GENUINE BEGINNING: BEING IN AND THROUGH LIFE

I. The Existential-Phenomenological Topic
   1. The Questionableness of Being
   2. Average Everydayness
   3. Being-in-a-World
II. Lifeworld (It Worlds)
   1. Around-World
   2. With-World
   3. Self-World

III. Being-in (Dwelling)
   1. Dwelling-at
      i) I-am-meaning
      ii) Mineness
      iii) Caring
      iv) Illumination
   2. Larvance
      i) Tendency
      ii) Distance
      iii) Closing-Off
   3. Guilt and Conscience

IV. Kairological Characters (Ereignis)
   1. Eventing
   2. Awhileness
   3. Not-Having-Time
      i) Relucence
      ii) Ruinance
   4. Having-Time and Being-Awake

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CONSTANT BEGINNER

I. Indications of Indication
   1. Occasional Expressions (Husserl)
   2. Indirect Communication (Kierkegaard, Jaspers)
   3. Rough Outline (Aristotle)

II. Formal Indication
   1. Objectivism
   2. Relativism
   3. Hermeneutics

CONCLUSION: DEMYTHOLOGIZING HEIDEGGER

APPENDICES

I. Vita (1889-1926)
II. Early Lectures, Seminars, Talks, Poems, Essays, Reviews, and Books (1910-1926)
III. Theological Studies (WS 1909-10 – SS 1911)
IV. Mathematical, Natural-Scientific and Philosophical Studies (WS 1911-12 – SS 1913)
V. Letter to Martin Grabmann (Jan. 7, 1917)
VI. Letter to Engelbert Krebs (Jan. 9, 1919)
VII. Index to Discussions of Christian Authors in Heidegger’s Youthful Lectures and in his Being and Time
VIII. Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Edition

NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABBREVIATIONS

Earliest Works (1910-1917)

AS Abraham a Sankta Clara (1910)
B Besprechungen (1913-14)
BG Brief an Grabmann (1917)
FG Frühe Gedichte (1910-1918)
FL Neuere Forschung über Logik (1912)
KB Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (1916)
L Lebenslauf (1913)
RP Das Realitätsproblem in der Modernen Philosophie (1912)
UP Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus (1914)
ZB Die Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft (1916)

Youthful Works (1919-1925/26)

AJ Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" (1919-1921)
BK Brief an Krebs (1919)
GZ Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (1925)
HF Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) (1923)
IP Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (1919)
LW Logic. Die Frage Nach der Wahrheit (1925-26)
PA Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (1921-22)
PW Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie (1919)
WU Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums (1919)

Reports on Youthful Lecture Courses, Talks, and Seminars

APp Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus (lecture course, 1921)

ARs Aristoteles: Rhetorik, II (lecture course, 1924)

BZb Der Begriff der Zeit (talk, 1924)

BZs Der Begriff der Zeit (talk, 1924)
**HFb**  Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) (lecture course, 1923)

**IAb**  Interpretations of Aristotle (1920s)

**IAg1**  Interpretations of Aristotle (1923-26)

**IAg2**  Interpretations of Aristotle (1923-26)

**IAg3**  Interpretations of Aristotle (1923-26)

**IAS1**  Interpretations of Aristotle (1921-1928)

**IAS2**  Interpretation von Aristoteles, Physik, II (seminar, 1928)
Interpretations of Aristotle (1919-1925)
Wilhelm Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," in Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaftern (Bern: A. Francke AG. Verlag, 1949), pp. 75-79.

Interpretations of Aristotle (early 1920s)

Interpretations of Aristotle (1920-26)
Helene Weiss, Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967; unaltered reprint of the 1942 Basel edition). Weiss' doctoral dissertation works out in detail Heidegger's youthful "Aristotle-interpretations" that she learned in his lectures and seminars "above all in the years 1923-26" (see pp. 6; 10, n. 2; 52, n. 26; 100, n. 2; and her "Curriculum Vitae" appended to the original 1942 edition).

Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion (lecture course, 1920-21)
Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, pp. 36-38. Based on a transcript made by Oskar Becker (see Pöggeler, "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger," p. 185, n. 5).

Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion (lecture course, 1920-21)

Platon: Sophistes (lecture course, 1924-25)

Later Works (1927-1976)

Aristoteles: Metaphysik IX (1931)
Brief an Borgmann
Brief an Frings (1968)
Brief an Husserl (1927)
Brief an Krämer-Badoni (1960)
Brief an Richardson (1962)
Brief an Schynemakers (1966)
Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen. 2.
In references to Heidegger’s works in the body of my text, the page number(s) after the slash indicates the location of the passage in the published English translation, which is cited for convenience of the reader, even though all translations appearing in this work are my own. The title and other bibliographic information for the English translation is given in the Bibliography immediately following the entry for Heidegger’s work in German.
Wie du anfiengst, wirst du bleiben...

As you begin, you will remain...

Hölderlin
There was hardly more than a name, but the name travelled all over Germany like the rumor of the hidden king. (Hannah Arendt)

INTRODUCTION
RUMOR OF A HIDDEN KING

In the last decade, we have seen the ongoing publication of many of Heidegger's seminal lecture courses from his youthful period between 1919 and the publication of his Being and Time in 1927. The theme of my study is Heidegger's Jugendgeschichte, the history or story behind these as yet (all but one) untranslated lectures courses. I hope to show that the contents of these lecture courses offers us a new way of reading and appropriating Heidegger's philosophy.

Until recently, his youthful thought has unfortunately had to remain to a great extent on the level of "rumor" and legend. On the occasion of his eightieth birthday, when he had already enjoyed decades of fame, Hannah Arendt still spoke of the young Privatdozent, whose reputation as a teacher spread throughout Germany in the early 1920s like the rumor of a hidden king:

If it is true, as Plato once remarked, that "the beginning is also a god; so long as he dwells among men, he saves all things" (Laws, 775), then the beginning in Heidegger's case is neither the date of his birth (September 26, 1889, at Messkirch) nor the publication of his first book, but the first lecture courses and seminars which he held as a mere Privatdozent (instructor) and assistant to Husserl at the university of Freiburg in 1919. For Heidegger's "fame" predates by about eight years the publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927; indeed it is open to question whether the unusual success of this book - not just the immediate impact it had inside and outside the academic world but also its extraordinary lasting influence, with which few of the century's publications can compare - would have been possible if it had not been preceded by the teacher's reputation among the students in whose opinion, at any rate, the book's success merely confirmed what they had known for many years....in Heidegger's case there was nothing tangible on which his fame could have been based, nothing written, save for notes taken at his lectures, which circulated among students everywhere....There was hardly more than a name, but the name travelled all over Germany like the rumor of the hidden king.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, another well-known early student of Heidegger, has written often about "the revolutionary genius of the young Heidegger":5

The tremendous power emanating from Heidegger’s creative energies in the early 1920s swept along the generation of students coming home from World War I or just beginning its studies to such an extent that with his appearance a complete break with traditional academic philosophy seemed to take place - long before it was expressed in his own thought. It was like a new breakthrough into the unknown that posed something radically new....8

To this day hardly anything has been made public of this event. But it had its effect in academic teaching, and my own way was determined from here.7

Oskar Becker, who attended Heidegger’s lecture courses from 1919 onwards, even went so far as to say that his 1927 Being and Time is "no longer the original Heidegger, but rather repeats the original breakthrough only in a scholastically hardened form,"8 if not in the form of a "scholasticism of being." Still other early students, such as Karl Löwith,10 Wilhelm Szilasi,11 Herbert Marcuse,12 Leo Strauss,13 and Helene Weiss,14 have also written about the rumor of the young Heidegger and indicated that his thought in the early twenties, rather than his Being and Time, is the original Heidegger and the genuine beginning of his philosophical career. They tell an unofficial story about the origin and development of Heidegger’s thought.

Over the years, the rumor was kept alive in the form of student transcripts of Heidegger’s youthful lecture courses that circulated from hand to hand in a kind of philosophical underground and took on a status comparable to the esoterica15 in Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum. The rumor surfaced into the wider philosophical public occasionally by way of the excellent reports given by Heidegger’s early students and others with access to the pool of highly prized transcripts (Otto Pöggeler, Thomas Sheehan, Karl Lehman, Theodore J. Kisiel), and by way of a constant stream of books and articles (Weiss, Walter Bröcker, Becker, Gadamer, Szilasi) which claimed to be working out in independent philosophical work the directions and stimulations which had been
received from Heidegger’s early unpublished lectures and seminars. Recently, Pöggeler has written that Heidegger’s youthful philosophical activity was an "academic teaching in which he perhaps achieved his most significant influence." Kisiel has written that "this period preceding the publication of Being and Time is probably the most productive and most influential period of Heidegger’s career." Through his teaching in the twenties, he helped to mold a whole generation of philosophers and theologians who went on to shape the face of the German intellectual scene for decades to come.

Heidegger himself did not contribute towards providing any substantial information about the rumor of his youthful thought. Between the publication of his habilitation writing in 1918 and of his Being and Time in 1927, Heidegger published nothing, even though he was arriving at the breakthroughs and insights into the question of being which would preoccupy him for the rest of his life. This was a time of formation in which he "remained silent" for ten years. (US, 87/8) There was an essay on Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of World-Views written between 1919 and 1921, a large book on Aristotle he planned to publish in the 1923 issue of Husserl’s phenomenological journal, and a long essay called “The Concept of Time” submitted for publication, but none of these came to press. It was not until 1927 that he successfully gathered up his research from the last ten years into an epoch-making book, which immediately cast him in the role of the leading philosopher on the Continent. But by then his thought had already undergone certain transformations and real departures from his thought in the early twenties. Then, after 1930, his thought developed in still different directions in his later works. The works planned in the early twenties were forgotten, or else taken up in an altered form. Before his death in 1976, he made no plans to have his youthful Freiburg lectures (1919-1923) included in his monumental Collected Edition (approximately 80 volumes). The manuscripts sat in the Heidegger Archive in Marbach am Neckar for a decade until the literary executor decided in 1982 that plans would be made to
publish them. Looking back from the vantage point of his later thought, he viewed both his early Freiburg period and his early Marburg period (1924-1926) as inadequate anticipations of the real beginning of his Denkweg, his "thought-path," with the investigation of the "meaning of being" in his Being and Time, which then gave way to and completed itself in his two later paths of the "truth of being" and the "topos of being." Even after Heidegger's death, "right Heideggerians" still file away his thought in the early 1920s as only an inferior anticipation of his later thought. The youthful writings almost have the status of apocrypha in the Heideggerian canon. Thomas Sheehan has written that these writings are "one of Heidegger's best kept secrets." 18

When the aged Heidegger scrawled his signature 18 on the opening page of his Collected Edition - "Martin Heidegger/Collected Edition/Ways - not Works" (GA 1) - whose signature really was it? With so many "ways" coming and going, crisscrossing and looping back, ways as early as Heidegger's 1912 essay on "Recent Research in Logic" to his 1966 Le Thor seminar on Heraclitus, one can legitimately ask to which Heidegger his signature was supposed to refer? Was it supposed to refer to the so-called "Heidegger I" of his Being and Time, to the "Heidegger II" 20 of his later writings, or even the "Heidegger-Zero" of his earliest metaphysical writings between 1912 and 1916 "before Heidegger became Heidegger," 21 or perhaps even to a "Heidegger III" or a "Heidegger IV" when he would finally come into his own with the entrance of western thought into what he called the "other beginning" after the reign of modern technology, or perhaps even to the Nazi Rector of the 1930s? Here Heidegger's signature splinters, disseminates, decenters itself into a number of different ways and different Heideggers. If anything, his signature is the sign of an identity crisis. We know how Heidegger wanted the signature to be taken, namely, in terms of the themes and the language of his later philosophy, which was supposed to somehow capture the underlying meaning of his many ways. But this kind of retrospective self-narration becomes comical when in his Selbstdarstellungen, his "self-portraits," we see the
seventeen year old Heidegger pondering the "question of being" on his way home from school, or see the young Heidegger of the early twenties grappling with question of the "truth of being," when in fact he was rather opening his lecture courses with Luther's condemnations of speculative thought in his "theology of the cross," Kierkegaard's caricatures of Hegelianism, Paul's letters, Augustine's Confessions, Pascal, Dilthey, Aristotle's practical writings, Sextus Empiricus, Husserl's "Sixth Investigation," Jasper's "philosophy of existence," Dostoevsky's novels, and Van Gogh's letters. Without being facetious, we can here ask: will the real Martin Heidegger please stand up?

My study of the young Heidegger will, therefore, be a deconstructive reading, since I want to attempt to carry out a deconstruction (what Heidegger called "destruction") of the later Heidegger's self-understanding of his philosophy and also a deconstruction of the picture of Heidegger which, built up naively on the basis of Heidegger's own later self-interpretation, has hardened into a kind of dogmatic right-wing Heidegger-scholasticism. I would like to attempt to deconstruct the later Heidegger's thought back to its genuine origin in his youthful period. Is Heidegger's Being and Time, as it is read from the standpoint of his later thought, really the beginning of his thought-path? Is there a beginning before this beginning, a path before this path, a Heidegger earlier than the so-called "early Heidegger" of Being and Time? As Gadamer has said, we need to learn how to read Heidegger not only through his own eyes, but rather also "with the eyes with which someone reads, who is not him." In reading Heidegger's philosophy from the vantage point of his youthful writings, our "hermeneutics of suspicion" will not be limited by the mens auctoritis, the "mind of the author," that is, Heidegger's own self-understanding. Our study of Heidegger's youthful texts will be worked out primarily on the basis of the texts themselves. In this respect, our study will be following the basic principle of Heidegger's own hermeneutical praxis, that is, "destruction," which he applied in his interpretations of historical philosophical
figures, and which, as we shall see, he wanted to see applied also in the interpretive appropriation of his own texts in his Collected Edition.

In PART ONE, entitled "The Later Heidegger," I would like to deal with Heidegger’s later works, which I will present as running from his 1927 Being and Time to his latest writings in the sixties and seventies. In Chapter One, entitled "Places and Ways," I would like to deal with the later Heidegger not so much by giving an account of some sort of philosophical doctrine which he was supposed to have expressed, as rather by focusing on the major characteristics of his unifying "topic" or "question" of being, which led him to attempt what answers that he did. We will gain an understanding of these major characteristics as the "end of philosophy," the "other beginning" for the question of being, and the "constant beginning" anew of this other beginning, which is essentially a "way." With this understanding, we can then go on to explore how these characteristics have their origin in Heidegger's youthful thought and are expressed within an existential-phenomenological language, as opposed to his later mytho-poetic, speculative language.

In Chapter Two, entitled "Self-Installment," I would like to explore how the later Heidegger himself, however, did not see his question of being as originating in his youthful period in a significant manner, but rather tended to see this period as an inferior anticipation of the real beginning of his thought in his Being and Time and of its completion in his subsequent works. I will argue that in this way he hermeneutically stylizes the origin of his thought by means of a retrospective installation here of his later thought. We will then pose the task of deconstructing Heidegger’s backward-looking self-narrative.

In PART TWO, entitled "The Metaphysical Heidegger," I would like to show that in his very earliest student period between 1910 and 1916 Heidegger was to a certain extent raising the question of being, but was doing this metaphysically. In Chapter Three, entitled "The Way of Meaning and Topos (Ontologic)," I will thus
explore how, primarily in his doctoral dissertation, he worked out his metaphysical question of being in the form of contemporary Neo-Kantian and phenomenological "logic." In Chapter Four, entitled "The Way of Truth" (Ontotheology), I hope to show that in his habilitation writing he went on to work out the question of being metaphysically in the form of what he later called "ontotheology," that is, an account of being as the divine.

In PART THREE, entitled "The Young Heidegger," I hope to show that sometime around 1919 Heidegger's thought underwent a radical turn from his previous metaphysics to a non-metaphysical formulation of the question of being, which Heidegger would pursue in the rest of his philosophical career. More specifically, I hope to show that all the primal words of Heidegger's thinking that were first made public in his 1927 publication Being and Time and in his publications after 1930 - the "first beginning," the three "epochs" of metaphysics, the "end of philosophy," the "step-back," the "turn," the "other beginning," the "meaning" of being," the "truth" of being, the "place" of being, "Ereignis," the "worlding" of the world, philosophy as a "way" - were already used or else already operative in his unpublished youthful texts.

In Chapter Five, entitled "The End of Philosophy," I would thus like to explore how the theme of the end of philosophy, as a one of the characteristics of Heidegger's enduring being-question, originated in his youthful period. I will show that the young Heidegger performed a destruction of the three major epochs of metaphysics, that is, the ancient, the medieval, and the modern. We will see that he here drew support from Aristotle's practical writings, Luther's theology of the cross and Kierkegaard's existential thought, and Husserl's "Sixth Investigation" and Dilthey's philosophy of life, traditions which he appropriated in his own radical transformation of the question of being.

In Chapter Six, entitled "The Genuine Beginning: Being in and through Life," I would like to show how Heidegger's notion of an "other beginning" originated in his youthful period. The young Heidegger referred to this other beginning as the "phenomenological
existentiell topic" of "being in and through life." I will explore this notion of being in terms of three moments which Heidegger refers to as the "it worlds" of the world; the "dwelling" of factual life as being in a world; and the "Ereignis," the "event" of time.

In Chapter Seven, entitled "The Constant Beginner," I hope to show that the other third characteristic of Heidegger's being-question, that is, the way-character of his other beginning as a "constant beginning" anew, also originated in his youthful period. I will focus on the young Heidegger's concept of philosophy as the "formal indication" of a "way" of philosophizing. I would also like to explore how his concept of "formal indication" derived from an appropriation of Husserl's notion of "occasional expressions," Kierkegaard's and Jasper's notion of "indirect communication," and Aristotle's method in practical philosophy as providing a "rough outline."

In my Conclusion, entitled "Demythologizing Heidegger," I would like to gather up my investigations into a consideration of how such a deconstructive reading of Heidegger can open up new possibilities for appropriating his whole thought. I will clarify how I understand the deconstruction of his thought to be intended for the sake of its retrieval in the light of his youthful period, that is, for the sake of what he referred to as the necessary thinking further of his thought. Our inquiry into the Heidegger earlier the "early Heidegger" is for the sake of finding the Heidegger later than the "later Heidegger." Our reading of his youthful origin strives to be an original interpretation in the sense of preparing for this origin to originate in new, original ways of thought. I will explore the sense of this deconstructive retrieval as that of demythologizing the hermeticism of the later Heidegger's mytho-poetic, speculative language and translating it back into his youthful existential-phenomenological problematic and language, so that from here the undeniable greatness of his philosophical accomplishment can be meaningfully appropriated and thought further in one's own independent philosophy. Heidegger's
youthful texts will thus show themselves as a kind of Rosetta stone for his whole Collected Edition. And the title of our study, "The Young Heidegger," will thus turn out to mean also Heidegger's whole thought as a style of thinking which never grows old.

Let us now turn to Heidegger's Jugendgeschichte, the story of this hidden king, lending our voices to the rumor and letting it speak again.
PART ONE
THE LATER HEIDEGGER (1927-1978)

In Part One, I would like to examine Heidegger's mature philosophy from his 1927 *Being and Time* to his work in the sixties and seventies. I call the Heidegger of this period "the later Heidegger," since, as we shall see later, he had already been philosophically active for almost two decades prior to the publication of his *Being and Time*. In our examination, we shall lay out the basic characteristics of the later Heidegger's question of being (Chapter One), in preparation for deconstructively tracing these back to their origin in his youthful period. We shall also critically discuss the later Heidegger's "self-portrait" of his youthful period and his attempt here to read and stylize the origins of his thought from the standpoint of his later philosophy, a procedure which leads him to conclude that the path of thought really only began with his *Being and Time* and not, as we shall maintain, with his youthful thought in the early twenties (Chapter Two).

CHAPTER ONE
PLACES AND WAYS

What endures in thinking is only the way. (*On the Way to Language*, 1959) (US, 94/12)

In Chapter One, we will attempt to identify the unifying "topic" (*Sache*) of Heidegger's whole thought from his *Being and Time* to his very latest writings. We will explore this topic more specifically as a "way" of thinking, which we will describe in rough in terms of the following three characteristics. First, Heidegger provides a "destruction" of the metaphysical "first beginning" of the "topic" or question of being in western philosophy, a destruction which is supposed to effect the "end of philosophy." Second, he critically "retrieves" or "repeats" the
tradition and transforms it into a non-metaphysical "other beginning" for the topic of being. Third, he constantly begins anew this other beginning and thinks it out the non-metaphysical topic of being in ever new ways. Before proceeding to a discussion of these specific characteristics, let us first, however, make some comments on the general character of Heidegger's thought as a "way" of thinking about a basic "topic."

His thought is a re-asking of the traditional "question of being," which had been raised first by the Greek philosophers. But he so radically transformed this traditional question that he renounced the title of "philosophy" for what he was aiming at. He preferred to speak rather of his "path of thinking" (Denkweg), on which he was always "on the way" in asking and re-asking the single question: What is being? His "topic" of being endures only as a "way" (US, 187/92) or "field of ways" (Wegfeld) (GA 1, 437). His philosophy exists only as "a being on the way" (ein Unterwegs): "What endures (Das Bleibende) in thinking is only the way." (US, 94/12) His topic shows itself as many different topoi and "way-stations" (Aufenthalte), his path of thought as many different paths. Even though his thought continually thinks the "same" (selbe) topic, it never steps onto the "identical" (gleichen) path and topos twice. (ID, 111/45, 133-134/66) His thought can be seen as a violent interpretation of Aristotle's statement: to on legestai pollachos, being is said in many ways. (NP, 97/98)

"Heidegger," "Heidegger's philosophy" is thus something very difficult to pin down and get a hold on. His essays, books, and lectures number in the hundreds, and each of these counts in some sense as a separate way or path towards his topic. Indeed, he maintains that the path of the being-question neither started nor ends with him, but rather began to a certain extent in the distant past of western thought and points ahead into the future of philosophy after Heidegger. When we ask, where or what is "Heidegger's philosophy"?, everything starts looking very ambiguous and confusing. This is precisely how Heidegger wanted it, since we are asking the wrong question about his thought. We are asking him for
a fixed objective answer to the question of being. But there is no "Heideggerian philosophy" in this sense.

His thought does not have the character of an answer, but rather is a question precisely as a question, which must be answered over and over again. (S, 415) His question of being is literally a question, a quest, and an "adventure" in the sense a journey towards something which comes towards us (advenir). (WM, 363/240-241) As we shall see, this is what the young Heidegger in 1921 called the "absolute questionableness" of philosophy.

If there is a name for Heidegger's thought which has endured through his many thought-paths from his youthful period to the 1970s, it is precisely the word "Weg," "way" or "path." Likewise, if there is a name for the theme of his thought which has endured through the many topoi or "places" of Heidegger's texts, it is precisely the word "Sache." We have translated this word as "topic," but it can also be rendered as "matter," "issue," "problem," "question," "point in dispute." The later Heidegger likes to appeal to the original meaning of Sache as something disputed or discussed in a legal battle: "Taken in the old sense of the word (Sache = courtcase, lawsuit (Rechtsstreit)), the expression 'Sache', the 'Sache of thinking' means the contested case (der Streitfall), something controversial which is disputed (das Strittige), what is at issue." (SD, 41/38) His favorite synonyms for Sache are: "what is to be thought" (das zu Denkende), "what is worthy of question" (das Fragwürdige), and "what is to be said" (das zu Sagende). Here the emphasis rests not on "actuality," objectivity, availability, and presence, but rather on "the enduring possibility of thinking." (SD, 90/82) "Heidegger's philosophy" - this means a Sache des Denkens, a "topic for thinking." It is only by getting a sense for this topic that any reader of Heidegger's texts can avoid getting completely lost in their Black Forest of places and ways.

There is no presuppositionless and, as it were, utopian expression for Heidegger's topic in the sense of a universal over and above the various topoi in his texts. His topic of "being"
exists only concretely in the various ways in which it is "placed in discussion" (erörtert). His question is, therefore, constantly being transformed and displaced in posing it. What are our presuppositions here in placing Heidegger's topic in discussion? We will place it in discussion in terms of the three above-mentioned characteristics of his "way" in and towards it, which, as we shall see, can be found in each of the various stages of his thought from his youthful period to his latest writings. More specifically, Heidegger's destruction (literally, un-building) of the tradition attempts to expose the founded character of the formulation of the being-question in western metaphysics and thus to effect the end of philosophy. We will describe the metaphysical concept of being in terms of its three moments of being as causal ground, being as correlated with logos, and this ground-logos correlation as presence. His retrieval or repetition of the tradition into an "other beginning" attempts to re-think and transform these three moments into what we will describe as the three non-metaphysical moments of being as world, being as correlated with praxis, and this world-praxis correlation as time. His constant beginning anew of this other non-metaphysical beginning involves, then, constantly re-thinking these three moments of the concept of being. We now turn to a detailed discussion of these primal characteristics of Heidegger's unifying way under the specific headings of "the end of philosophy," "the other beginning," and "constant beginning."

I. The End of Philosophy

Heidegger's topic arises out of a conversation with the western metaphysical tradition, which as a whole he views as a "first beginning" (PA, 170; N, 470/208) starting with the Greeks and working itself out in various forms in the Middle Ages and the modern period. His conversation with first beginning has the character of a "destructive" "retrieval." Destruction here means "un-building" or "dismantling" (destruere, abbauen) (S, 337) the structure of the traditional question of being. Retrieval means that the question is repeated or retrieved in terms of its untapped possibilities. The question is restructured.
His destruction of the "first beginning" focuses on the three essential moments in the "structure of the guiding question" (Leitfrage) (N 1, 455/190) of metaphysics, which moments we can refer to as being as causal ground, being as correlated with logos, and this ground-logos correlation as presence. His usual procedure is first to uncover these dimensions in Greek philosophy, and then to show how they continue to operate in the subsequent transformations of the being-question which make up the history of western philosophy. His destruction can rightly be called an 'archeology', since it gives an account (logos) of the ruling origin (arche) of western thought. Let us now run through Heidegger's account of the three moments of the concept of being in the guiding question of metaphysics.

1. Ground

According to Heidegger, Greek philosophy conceived of being specifically as the "being of beings" (Sein des Seienden), that is, as the causal ground of and for beings. The "origin and view of the questioning belonging to metaphysics" consists in that "metaphysics begins with beings, elevates itself to being, in order to turn back to beings and clarify them in the light of being... metaphysics questions after being with a view to how it determines beings as beings." (S, 306-307/25)11 "What is interrogated" (das Befragte) is beings and "what is sought after" (das Erfragte) is the being of beings which can account for beings as beings. (S, 377-378, 332; N 1, 459/194)

This is the structure of the questioning in the "upward way" (anabasis) and "downward way" (katabasis) found in Parmenides' "proem," Plato's "divided line" and "allegory of the cave," Aristotle's "in-duction" (epagoge = "leading towards"), and the Heracleitean transition from "sleep" to "wakefulness." bios praktikos, the "practical way of life," is seen as a straightforward and naive comportment towards beings in the marketplace, the affairs of the city, and the nature of the countryside. bios philosophos or theoretikos, the "philosophical" or "theoretical way of life" is seen as a "turning around" (periagoge), looking
towards, and "wakeful remembering" (anamnesis) which questions after what "production" (poiesis) and "acting" (praxis) always already have in view in their "knowing" (techne, phronesis), but as something habitually looked through and away from directly towards beings, so that it remains for the most part unthematic, concealed, forgotten.

Aristotle says that the underlying structure of the age-old and primary philosophical question, "what is that which is as that which is, beings as beings?" (ti to on he on), is revealed in the more precise formulation "what is the beingness of beings?" (tis he ousia). (Metaphysics, IV, 1; VII, 1; N 1, 452/188) Heidegger writes:

When we interrogate the being as the being with a view to the fact that it is being, the being as the being, then with the question as to what the being is we aim at that which makes the being into a being. This is the beingness (Seiendheit) of the being - in Greek, the ousia of on. We are questioning after the being of beings (Sein des Seienden). (N 1, 459/194)

The Greeks conceived this beingness of beings as a stable, intelligible place or open area of unconcealment (aletheia), radiant appearance (phainomenon) and emergence (physis). (S, 326-333; PA, 112) As the "cause" or "what is responsible" (aitia) and the "origin" or "governing principle" (arche) of beings, the metaphysical place of beingness functions as the intelligible etiological ground which furnishes beings with intelligibility or meaning, i.e., lets them be "as" intelligible beings, unconcealed beings (ta alethea), phenomena as what appears (ta phainomena), beings that emerge forth (ta phusei onta). This is the etiological function of Parmenides' "being" (VA, 223ff./79ff.), Heracleitos' "logos" (VA, 198ff./59ff.), Plato's "idea," and Aristotle's "categories" of being.

According to Plato, the being (meaning) of individual beautiful beings consists in the "idea of the beautiful," which provides the "view" or "look" (eidos) through which beings can seen "as" beautiful. (WM, 213ff./176ff.) The "idea of the good" is what is "present in" individual "good" beings, which thus "participate" in the "idea." After Plato, Aristotle placed the "ideas" into the
context of the "schemata of the categories" (the what, quality, relation, quantity, etc.), which are the most universal "determinations of the being of beings" (WN, 253/232) that underlie our "addressing" (kategorien) of beings. (N 2, 71ff./36ff.) It is in terms of these "ideas" and "categories" that Plato and Aristotle attempted to clarify being as the meaningful ground of beings.

Greek philosophy tended to consider this intelligible ground of beings as the "most beingly being" (to on antos), i.e., as itself a being in the hierarchically and teleologically ordered whole of beings. That is, the Greeks conceived of beingness ultimately as the divine (to theion), what scholasticism later came to call the "highest being" (sumnum ens). (ID, 107-143/42-74) For Aristotle, as for scholasticism, "first philosophy" ends in "theology."14

2. Logos

Although the Greeks were all eyes and enchanted by being as something given and objective (noema), and conceived it as capable of existing independently of thought, they were still aware of the correlation of being with "thought" (noesis, logos).

In Greek philosophy, beingness is experienced as unconceal-
ment and radiant appearance for human being. As an open place of intelligible presence, being is experienced as the "dwelling place" (ethos)15 of human being. The philosophical relation to this open intelligible place has the character of "seeing" (idein), "gazing" or "contemplating" (theorein), and "wonderment" or "admiration" (thaumazein).16 Being as presence is "what is seen" (eidos). The philosopher stands in the intelligible topos and ethos essentially as cosmic spectator.

This ocular perceiving has the character of "letting appear" (apophainesthai), "making visible" (deloun), and "unconcealing" (aletheuein). Because being is conceived as phenomenon, Greek thought has an implicit phenomenological character, i.e., it gives an account (logos) of being in its appearance (phainomenon) and givenness to human being. Greek thinking is "legein ta phainomena" (SZ, 36ff./55ff.), letting be seen what shows itself to thought:
Philosophy seeks to elucidate being via reflection on the thinking of entities (Parmenides). Plato's disclosure of the ideas takes its bearings from the soul's conversation (logos) with itself. The Aristotelian categories originate in view of reason's assertoric knowledge.  

The ocular relation to being completes itself in logos, that is, speech as statement, assertion, judgment. For Aristotle, the logos of philosophy is primarily logos apophantikos, the assertoric judgement which lets being appear through a simple pointing out. This is what he also calls kategorain, the "accusing" or "addressing" of beings in terms of the "categories" (literally, "accusations"). With this ocular and assertoric orientation, the Greeks conceived of the intentional relation to being primarily in terms of 'theory' and 'knowing'. The philosopher resides in the metaphysical place of being as the knowing spectator who makes assertions.

Just as the Greeks conceived of being as the ground of beings, so they thought of "reason" (nous) as the intelligible ruling principle of the human being. This means that they modeled human life and its intentional relation to being in general on theoretical knowing. The human being is defined as the "animal which has reason" (zoon logon echon), as a composite of 'mind' and 'body'.

3. Presence

According to Heidegger, the Greeks conceived the correlation of logos and being in terms of presence. He points out that in pre-philosophical usage one of the meanings of the Greek words ousia, parousia, to on, and ta onta is stable "presence." (SZ, 35/47) Thus, for the Greek philosophers being is ae on, "always being" or "eternal being" in the sense of enduring presence, and to on antos, the "most beingly being" in the sense of the "most presently presence." As such, it also gets called to alethestaton, the most true or unconcealed, and to phanotaton, the most phenomenal and radiant. (WH, 221/181, 228/185) Beingness is the eternally present divine ground underlying and supporting the unstable "coming into
being" (genesis) and "passing out of being" (phthora) of present beings.

Likewise, human logos is defined in terms of presence. "Reason" or "soul" is seen as something eternal which survives the decomposition of the composite human being. "Truth" is defined as the "correctness" (orthotes) of a present at hand assertion, insofar as it agrees with present at hand being. The relation between logos and beingness is seen as that of two present at hand spheres lying side by side. (SZ, 211/201)

The three dimensions which make up the structure of the guiding question of metaphysics - being as the intelligible divine ground of beings, the correlation of being with logos as assertion, and this ground-assertion(seeing) correlation as presence - are summed up in Heidegger's designation of metaphysics as "ontology" (WM, 357/235), "ontologic" (FS, 55) or "ontotheology" (ID, 107-143/42-74). In metaphysics, being (on) is grasped as the stably present divine ground (to theion) of beings through present at hand assertoric statements (logoi).

The "topic" (to pragma) of Greek philosophy is the ontotheologic topos of the "being of beings," which is the causal ground of beings. Within the unquestioned "fundamental metaphysical position" of this question, there developed, as Plato said, a gigantomachia peri tes ousias, a disputation of giants about the title to being. (N 1, 448-462/184-197) Heidegger introduces the main combatants in the dispute as Parmenides' "being" (eon), Heracleitos' logos, Plato's "idea" (eidos), and Aristotle's "being-in-work" (energeia). (N 2, 389-410/1-10) These discordant metaphysical "positions" all share the underlying "fundamental metaphysical position" about being which lies precisely within the question itself. Each is characterized by a "preoccupation with finding an answer," and misses the possibility of "unfolding" the question itself in another direction. (N 1, 455/190; 457/192) Strife takes place against the backdrop of a deeper unanimity.

In his notion of this "first beginning" (Anfang) of western philosophy, one can hear Heidegger's translation of the Greek term
arche, "origin," which has the "double meaning" of "that from which something takes its starting-point (Ausgang) and beginning (Anfang)" and also "what, as this starting-point and beginning, at the same time reaches away over or beyond (über) the other, which starts from it, and so holds it in and back and thereby reigns over it. Arche (origin) means at the same time beginning and reign (Herrschaft)." "Hence the arche is not of the same sort as the starting-point of a push, which pushes the thing away and leaves it to itself...." (MH, 247, 254/227-228, 233) Thus, the "first beginning" in Greek thought was not something which the Middle Ages and the modern world has merely pulled along behind it, but rather something which always went in advance and was worked out in terms of its various possibilities and new ways of beginning. Heidegger writes:

A genuine beginning, as a leap, is always a leaping forward, a projection (Vorsprung), in which everything to come is already leaped over, even if as something veiled. The beginning already contains the end as concealed and sheltered....This founding happened in the West for the first time in Greece. What being came to be called in the future was set into work as a measure. Beings as a whole, so opened up, was then transformed to beings in the sense of what is created by God. This happened in the Middle Ages. Beings in this sense was again transformed at the start and in the course of modernity. Beings became objects that can be controlled and seen through by calculation. Each time a new and essential world broke forth. (MH, 64-65/76/77) Heidegger's destruction of the "first beginning" in Greek philosophy is, therefore, an archeology, since it gives an account (logos) of the "beginning" or arche which unfolded through the whole history of western thought. In this wider sense, the "first beginning" refers to the entire metaphysical tradition as a unified "history of being." (N 2, 399/1)

The disputation about the ontotheologic topic of being became the archontic "guiding question" of the western tradition. (N 1, 454/190) Along with the "positions" in Greek thought, Heidegger sees this entire tradition as a continual and varied "surveying" (S, 314) of the metaphysical topic "from one end to the other" (SD, 63/57) into the various metaphysical "positions" in the history of being, which positions are primarily those of actualitas
(God) in scholasticism, the various articulations of subjectivity in modernity (Descartes' res cogitans, Leibniz's monad, Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, Hegel's absolute spirit, Nietzsche's will to power), and the contemporary age of technology. (N 2, 410-480/10-74) In turn, the Greek logos and the definition of "truth" as "correctness" developed into the representationalism of western "logic," "epistemology," "theory of judgment," modern "symbolic logic," and finally the "cybernetics" and information theory of contemporary technology. (SZ, 211-212/202; EM, 127ff./119ff.)

The three major "constellations" or "epochs" (ID, 97/33) of the history of metaphysics are the ancient, the medieval, and the modern. Even though the "same" guiding question was asked over and over again, Heidegger is still sensitive to the fact that, on the other hand, the answers given in the various' epochs are radically different. In the ontotheology of medieval thought, the three moments of the metaphysical being-question - ground, logos, and presence - show themselves as God, rational soul, and eternity understood in a Judeo-Christian context. In the "onto-theo-ego­logy" (GA 32) of modern thought, the three moments show themselves as subjectivity as a quasi-divine, transcendental ground (e.g., Hegel's spirit, Nietzsche's over-man), the empirical knowing subject, and atemporality.

Insofar as the medieval and modern traditions progressively covered over the unthematic temporal dimension lying in the concepts and language it took from Greek thought, they are usually the primary targets of the negative aspect of Heidegger's destruction, since they failed to appropriate the positive deeper possibilities of Greek thought. (PA, 170, 2-3, 49; SZ, 31/44) He views the history of metaphysics as a progressive decline away from the ambiguity and richness of Greek thinking. It reaches its "end" or "most extreme point" (eschaton) in modern "nihilism," for which being appears as "nothing." Thus, the history of metaphysics shows itself as the history of the "forgetfulness of being" (EM, 53/50), the history of "nihilism" (N 2, 335ff./197ff.), and the "eschato-
logy of being" (VA, 325-327/17-18; SD, 63/57). But, behind their backs, as it were, Nietzsche's thought, the modern sciences, positivism, and contemporary technology are still dominated by the Greek understanding of being. Heidegger understands each of these as a form of ontotheology.

II. The Other Beginning

Heidegger's retrieval of the "first beginning" of the metaphysical being-question does not seek just another answer to the same old question, but rather abandons this very question itself by calling for "the end of philosophy." (PA, 35; SD, 61-80/55-73) It aims at a "turn" (Kehre) (BR, xvii-xxiii/xvi-xxii) into an "other beginning" (N 1, 470/206), an "other questioning" (GA 44, 232), an "other thinking," an "other language" (NH, 313, n. a.). It looks towards a transformation of the "first" metaphysical arche into an "other" non-metaphysical arche, which is concealed in the former. The retrieval of this other beginning is the real goal of Heidegger's philosophical archeology of western metaphysics.

His destruction seeks not to obliterate the first beginning of the metaphysical tradition, but rather to dismantle it until we arrive at the operative but unquestioned dimension of time lying in and behind it, which can be "turned" to in a "step back" (SD, 30/28) and retrieved as a question. Metaphysics is not completely "destroyed" in the common sense of this word, but rather "unfolded" into what Heidegger calls its own implicit and concealed "ground question" (Grundfrage), that is, the non-metaphysical question of being. (N 1, 458/193; EM, 3ff./1ff.) The founded three moments of the "structure of the leading question of metaphysics" - ground, logos, and presence - are led back to and transformed into their "ground" dimensions of world, praxis, and time.20 Thus, Heidegger's "ground question" also has a threefold "structure," of which we shall now give a more detailed account.

1. World

In Heidegger's retrieval, the Greek conception of being as the being of beings is purified of its etiological sense as the divine causal ground of beings.21 Being for Heidegger is not a
super-entity which causally acts upon beings. It is rather the intelligibility, "meaning" (SZ, 201/192-193), or "truth" ("unconcealment") (WM, 337/217) in terms of which beings can appear "as" the beings that they are: for example, as a river, as a tool, as a mortal, as a god. Being is the intelligible "as-structure" (SZ, 200/192) of beings. It makes up their "meaning."

Moreover, the primary locus of meaning is not a free-floating realm of ideas existing in itself, nor the universe of modern mathematical physics, but rather the concrete practical world of "average everydayness" - the environmental work-world, the interpersonal "with-world," and the self. Meaning is what makes up the "worldhood of the world" (SZ, 71ff./91ff.) in which human being "dwells" (75/80). As the place (topos) of meaning, world is the "dwelling place" (ethos) of man. The principal regions of this world are what Heidegger calls the "fourfold" of "earth and sky, gods and mortals." (VA, 139ff./145ff.) Being is so little the traditional notion of mere "meaning" or "intelligibility" that it is rather what offers itself as telos for practical understanding (WH, 313/193), "attunes" man's "moodful attunement" to the world (WP, 76/77), and shows itself as "language" in human discourse (US, 30/210).

Heidegger's un-building of metaphysics attempts to excavate the retrievable dimension of concrete meaning which had been levelled off since the Greeks. The "reigning principles" (archai) of beings in the concrete world of Aristotle's Ethics and Plato's Republic quietly pulsate below the surface of the eternal "principles and causes" investigated in the Metaphysics and the Parmenides. Aristotle and Plato themselves indicate that "science" and its study of "eternal being" arises historically out of the pre-philosophical understanding of beings as "practical affairs" (pragmata) (SZ, 92/96) encountered in "practical knowing" (phronesis) and "technical knowing" (techne). Still alive in the Greek word for "beingness," ousia, is the homely meaning of being as "property" which makes up the "farmstead" and the "estate." Kategoría, category, still rings with the "accusation" which is
made in a public place (agora) such as the market, the council meeting, and the law court. Eidos, idea, refers back to the "look" of the earth or the look of someone's face in a moment of leisurely gazing (idein), and to the "vision" or plan of the artisan. (WM, 214/176) Physis, nature or essence, refers back to the emerging into presence of the rose and the grape, but also of mortals and gods. (EM, 16/14) In the word aletheia, truth, Heidegger could still hear Homer describing how Odysseus "concealed" his tears before the other guests. (VA, 254/106)

Stirring beneath the philosophical understanding of logos, language, as statement "in the soul" and as a "sign" of external things is the Heracleitean logos as a name for being itself (VA, 204/64) and the Aristotelian linguistic approach to being as "what is said (legeTai) in many ways." (WP, 96/87)

Pervading the apparent moodlessness of ancient theoria is the way in which "being" is encountered in the tranquil mood (pathos) of "wonderment and admiration" (thaumazein), "comfort" (hrastane), "entertainment" (diagoge), "leisureliness" (schole), and "good-spiritedness" (eudaimonia), and encountered also as an object of "concernful desire" (orexis, eros). (SZ, 184/177, 227/215; WP, 78/79) Behind the impersonal medieval summa and its "doctrines" stirs the darkness of God, the uncreated being of created beings, who is encountered in the moodful attunement of man's radical insecurity and drive for certainty and salvation. (N 2, 133/89) In the modern world of the godless subject, this moodful attunement is transformed into the way in which being is encountered as the world's "standing reserve" of materials which challenges man in his drive for security and power. (N 2, 133/89; WP, 86/87)

Heidegger used all these factors as clues for digging into the deeper non-metaphysical character of being as "world." For him, being is closer to what the Greeks meant by agathon and telos (SD, 58/54), a "good" and "end," than to the eternal being contemplated in purely theoretical knowledge. Being makes up what the Greek were trying to understand as ethos (WM, 356/235) and polis (EM,
the historical ethical-political dwelling-place of human being in the natural world of mortals and gods, earth and sky. Being as "Sache means that with which thinking has to do, in Plato's language to pragma auto (cf. Plato, Seventh Letter, 341 c 7)." (SD, 67/81)

The primary historical models, which Heidegger used in his later thought-paths as aids for thinking out being in terms of the "concept of the natural world" (SZ, 68/76), were the early Greek notion of physis and Greek art,23 primitive man24, the peasant life of the countryside,25 and the romantic art of Hölderlin,26 Rilke,27 Hebel28 and Stifter.29

2. Praxis

Whereas in metaphysics being is conceived as "absolute," that is, capable of existing independently of human thought, Heidegger sees the two terms as essentially correlative. Human life cannot be without being, being cannot be without human life. (SZ, 304/272)

The intentional relation to being as the worldly meaning of beings is primarily concrete and practical, not theoretical and epistemological. The relation is defined primarily not through "contemplation," "knowing" and "assertion" belonging to the upper story of the mind-body composite, but rather through the "mood," "understanding," "interpretation," and "language" of the whole human being in its concrete practical dealings with things in the world of one's work and with other human beings in the social world. Disinterested theoretical knowing is a "founded mode of being-in-the-world" as concernful practical involvement. (SZ, 80-84/86-90) Heidegger sees the basic character of human being as a "dwelling" within the "fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals." As we saw above, Heidegger tried to show how these practical aspects of human life and thought were still operative in western metaphysics, even though they had been levelled off. In Greek philosophy, thought still retained a relationship to "mood" (pathe), "concernful desire" (orexis), "language" (legein), and "practical understanding" (phronesis).
Likewise, philosophical "thinking," which is supposed to be a more genuine form of "dwelling," is not the static gazing of contemplation, but rather a higher form of "praxis" (WH, 313/193) as the historical "accomplishment" of being as a telos. This is clear from the following epithets which Heidegger assigns to thinking: "remembrance" (Andenken), "homecoming," "house-friend," "thanking," "attunement" (Entsprechen), "being underway," "poetizing" (Dichten), "ethics" (WH, 356/235). For Heidegger, the poiesis of "art" and the polis-shaping acts of "politics" share the same superlative relation to being as thinking. (EM, 66/62; HW, 49/62)

3. Time

Heidegger understands the practical correlation of human being and world as time. In his "other questioning" what is pursued is not only the being of beings, but rather also and primarily "being as being" or "being itself" with a view to its temporal character. Metaphysics had asked what is being as presence, the stable ground which determines present beings as beings. This question already contains an unthematized and unquestioned answer that being is a specific mode of time, i.e., the present as opposed to the past and the future. Thus, what makes this question possible as a question is the deeper concealed understanding of being as being in terms of time. In the Greek synonyms for being - emergence (physis), unconcealment or truth (aletheia), appearance (phainomenon), being in work (energeia) - there lies only a vague acquaintance with a "profusion" or "excess" of presence arising out of a dynamic temporal emerging (phyein), unconcealing (aletheuein), appearing (phainesthai), and working (ergazesthai). If bios praktikos deals mainly with present beings "in" presence, bios philosophos deals "with" presence and coming into presence in order to clarify beings, but without questioning "after" it. (S, 332, 365) Being as time eluded Greek philosophy and remained forgotten in the subsequent tradition. Heidegger endeavors to retrieve the question of being by reformulating it precisely in terms of this "familiar (bekannt) but not thematically thought out and recognized
(erkannt)” (BF, 20/17; GA 1, 438) dimension of time which is uncovered through his historical destruction.

In the guiding question of metaphysics "what is interrogated" (das Befragte) is beings and "what is sought after" (das Erfragte) is the being of beings, so that the question can return to the clarification of beings as its terminus. In Heidegger's "different questioning," what is interrogated is the being of beings, the meaningful presence of beings, and what is sought after is this "being as being." (S, 377-378, 332; N 1, 459/194) He has various other ways of phrasing this question, some of which are as follows: the "being of being" (Sein des Seins) (S, 373), "the possibilizing" (Ermöglichung) of being (WH, 114/12), the "presencing (Wesen) of being" (ZP, 47/201), the "temporality of being," the "truth (aletheia) of being," the "clearing" or "lighting" (Lichtung) (SD, 71-72/65), the "place of being," the "place which happens" (die ereignende Ortschaft) (WH, 331, n. b.; S, 384), the "event (Ereignis) of being" (S, 101), "it gives" (es gibt), the "giving" of the givenness of being (S, 101). The time of being involves a historical past, a "having-been" (das Gewesene) or "origin (Herkunft), which is also the historical future (Zukunft) which comes towards us as possibility. In this constant retrieval of the past into the future, the "arrival" (Ankunft) of the historical present is opened up. Being is a "having-been-coming," a circular temporal movement of past, future, and present. (VA, 177/184) Metaphysics had levelled off precisely this multidimensional time to a static present.

Likewise, philosophical thought and human being in general are temporal phenomena. If for metaphysics thought is the static epistemological correlate of being as the intelligible topos and ethos of static presence, for Heidegger human life is the practical, temporal "there of being" (Da-sein) as time. Human being is "temporalizing" (Zeitigung) (SZ, 24/39) and "movement" (Bewegung) (517/444) as the "enactment" (Vollzug) and "accomplishment" (Vollbringen) (WH, 313/183) of meaning within concrete historical situations. Human "temporalizing" and "historicizing" are caught up
in the movement of being as the "having-been-coming" which defines the circular kinesis of past, future, and present. Human life and thought "dwell" historically and finitely within the epochal changes of the "fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals."

In the words which the Greeks used to describe thought—"unconcealing" (aletheuein), "making manifest" (deloun), "letting appear" (apophainesthai)—Heidegger was able to read a reference to the temporalizing of human life as a "making present." (SZ, 35/48, 43-45/56-57) At different points in his thought, Heidegger found this unthematic understanding of time at work primarily in Kant's "doctrine of schematism," in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, in the Pre-Socratics and Greek tragedy, and in Nietzsche and the poet Hölderlin. Heidegger takes these up as models and aids for his own other beginning. He sees them as either having a rich unthematic experience of time, or even groping towards a philosophical or artistic articulation of it. These sources, as well as those mentioned previously, belong to what can be called an anti-metaphysical counter-tradition. This tradition is "counter" not only in the sense of pointing away from and 'against' the characterization of being as static presence, but also in the sense of being merely alongside of and ignored by the mainstream of the orthodox philosophical tradition, the philosophia perennis, so that it had to be retrieved out of obscurity by Heidegger.

In Heidegger's destructive retrieval, the three moments of the "guiding question" of metaphysics—ground, logos, and presence—are unfolded into the three moments of the presupposed but unthematic "ground question" of metaphysics: world, praxis, and time. His "other questioning" asks: What is being as the historical time of the relation between world and human praxis? His way of thinking is, then, this destructive retrieval of the topic of being which effects the end of the first beginning of philosophy and the "turn" into the other beginning.

Contrary to existing belief and even Heidegger's own continued use of the phrase, his "other questioning" cannot really be called the "Seinsfrage," the "question of being," since it
misleadingly suggests that "being" here means what it has always meant in traditional metaphysics. Heidegger himself at times saw this radical implication and thus wrote that in his different non-metaphysical questioning, "being disappears." (S, 104; SD, 46/43) Likewise, he could say that "the name being loses its naming power in the step back, because it always unwittingly says 'presence' and 'permanence', determinations to which the essential presencing (Nesen) of being can never be attached as a mere addendum." (N 2, 388-390/243-244) The phrase "the question of being" is thus only "a staff borrowed from metaphysics" which can help philosophy on its path towards the other non-metaphysical topic of thinking. (N 2, 337/250) Heidegger's "other questioning" is "out beyond the conception of being as the being of beings." (S, 115) His rekindling of the ancient battle of giants does not question after being naively and straightforwardly so as to give but another answer to the same old guiding question, what is the nature of being as the most presently present ground? Rather, like the stranger from Elea (SZ, 1/19), he appears as the uncanny guest who "questions the questioning" itself. (N 1, 458/193) What is questioned is whether being can be pursued in terms of mere presence. His "other questioning" turns explicitly towards the full dimension of time which makes the presence of "the being of beings" possible. (S, 339, 378)

It also becomes evident from the foregoing that there is a wide sense of Heidegger's notion of the "turn" in his thought. This notion is usually interpreted as meaning a shift in Heidegger's writings after Being and Time from the central theme of human being to that of "Being" itself. But the turn really refers to the unifying intention or direction of the whole of his thought from his Being and Time to his latest works. He called this turn the "'the turn' (Kehre) in which thinking turns (sich zuwendet) ever more decisively to being as being." (S, 345) There is a narrow sense of the "turn" in Heidegger, which refers to what he thought was the first adequate but still provisional realization of this intention, which he believed took place in the 1930s when he turned away from the transcendental language of Kant and Husserl employed
in *Being and Time*. Indeed, the wide sense of the turn is supposed to refer not only to his own thought, but ultimately to a turn in the topic itself from its first beginning to its other beginning. This is supposed to be a matter for everyone who shares in philosophical thought. Thus, he criticizes the attempt to chop up his unified "thought-path" into the artificial figures of "Heidegger I" and "Heidegger II," since this tends to obscure the wider underlying sense of the "turn" as essentially the intention to effect a turn into his non-metaphysical topic and always being on the way towards this topic:

The thinking of the turn (*Kehre*) is a bend or change (*Wendung*) in my thinking. But this bend does not result from an altering or indeed the abandoning of the questioning in *Being and Time*. The thinking of the turn arises out of the fact that I remained with the topic to be thought, "Being and Time," i.e., I questioned after that perspective which already in *Being and Time* (p. 53/64) was indicated with the title "Time and Being." (*BR, xvi/xvii*)

Your distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only from what is thought in I is that which is to be thought in II accessible. But I is possible only if it is contained in II. (*xxii/xxiii*)

The turn is played out in the topic itself. It is neither invented by me, nor does it concern only my thinking.

Up to now I know of no attempt to think out this topic and place it in discussion critically. Instead of the groundless, endless idle talk about the "turn," it would be more advisable and fruitful if people would get involved in the mentioned topic... (*xviii/xix*)

The "turn" is the pervading way of Heidegger's whole thought. This way is a turn in the manner of destructive repetition. It turns the first beginning of western philosophy into philosophy's other beginning. And it turns in this way because the other beginning lies hidden in and as the first *arche* itself which has reigned in the traditional metaphysical topic of being. (*SD, 67/61*; *PA, 92*) The turn is not a farewell which with a flip of the hand veers away into the wilderness of an absolutely new and strange topic. The other beginning is not *ex nihilo*, but simply tries to begin the beginning again, to repeat and unfold the first beginning in terms of its hidden possibility. The turn is a radical re-turn.
III. Constant Beginning

In addition to his destruction and his retrieval of the being-question, the third moment which characterizes Heidegger's unifying way is the constant beginning and "thinking-further" (Weiterdenken) of the other beginning of the being-question. Like its first beginning, the other beginning of philosophy is a double arche of "starting point" and "reign." Similar to how the basic thoughts of Greek philosophy were constantly retrieved, unfolded and, worked out in different ways in the subsequent tradition, so Heidegger's turn into the other non-metaphysical beginning, too, is a "having-been-coming" that is destructively retrieved and unfolded in his different thought-paths. This constant beginning and thinking-further is the way character itself of Heidegger's thought.

1. Three Ways: Meaning, Truth, Topos

It was with an eye not to a fixed "Heideggerian philosophy," but rather to his open-ended topic, that Heidegger characterized "the path" of his thought in terms of "three steps," main paths or way-stations:

With Being and Time, however, "the question about being" receives a completely different meaning. Here it is a matter of the question about being as being. It is thematized in Being and Time under the name "the question about the meaning of being."

Later this formulation is given up in favour of that of the "question about the truth of being," and finally in favour of that of the "question about the place or the site of being," from which sprang the name "topology of being."

Three words which, while they give way to one another, at the same time mark three steps on the path of thinking:

MEANING - TRUTH - PLACE (topos)

If the question about being is to be clarified, we must necessarily disclose what binds together and what separates the three formulations which follow one another. (5, 344)

This passage allows us to see clearly the relationship between Heidegger's three ways into the other beginning which "give way to one another." The "binding factor" which "holds together" the three paths and "relates them to each other" is precisely the topic of "being as being" (345, 378). This topic is retrieved not only from the tradition, but also from whatever happens to be Heidegger's own
The preceding paths are not answers established once and for all, but rather pointers and way-markers for exploring the topic, and as such they are there to be taken up again and repeated. Each path is a way in the topic, a "catching sight of being as being" (339) in terms of its threefold structure of world, praxis, and time. They do not merely raise the question of being as metaphysics had from the beginning already done, but rather ask about the "ground dimension" of "the meaning," "the truth" and "the place" of being. In fact, the paths are not really answers at all, but rather ways of posing the being-question. Each of these paths sets up the "same" threefold structure of the "ground question" in a "different" way. Each has the character of a "way-station" (Auffenthalt) in that it pursues the question within the horizon of the position which already lies in its peculiar articulation of the structure of the being-question. Each is a destructive repetition of the first beginning, an end of philosophy which attempts to re-decide the whole western philosophical tradition through a turn into an other beginning.

If what "binds" the ways is that each retrieves the topic from its predecessor and thinks the "same," what "separates" them is the "destructive" or "critical" moment which thinks the same "differently." Each way is a destructive-repetitive turning of the first beginning into the other beginning which at the same time destructively retrieves or turns Heidegger's own preceding way. Thus Heidegger writes about his thought:

It is the attempt undertaken again and again since 1930 to shape the placing of the question in Being and Time in a more originary (anfänglicher) way. This means: to subject the beginning (Ansatz) of the question in "Being and Time" to an immanent criticism. Thus it must become clear how far the critical question of what the topic for thinking should be, necessarily and continually belongs to thinking. Accordingly, the name of the task "Being and Time" will change. (SD, 61/55)

Here Heidegger's understanding of his topic (Sache) as "contest," "battle," "dispute" (Auseinandersetzung) should be kept in mind. Each way critically repeats the preceding way in that it "turns more decisively to being as being." (S, 344, 335, 339) To the
constant beginning essential to Heidegger’s thought belongs also a constant ending, although the transformations here are not as violent as in the case of the end of philosophy as metaphysics.

In his period of the “meaning of being,” worked out in his Being and Time, his predominant models taken up from the counter-tradition were Husserl’s “transcendental” phenomenology and Kant’s “doctrine of schematism,” which attempted to translate the traditional Aristotelian categories of being into determinations of time. Heidegger came to see later that in Being and Time he had entangled himself in the subjectivistic metaphysical language of Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendental thinking.41 In his periods of the “truth of being” and the “place of being” from the 1930s to the 1960s, his major models were the early pre-Platonic notions of aletheia and physis, which point to the creative emergent character of being, and art (Greek tragedy and its revival in Hölderlin). But he came to see that this formulation of the “truth of being” made use of the term “truth,” which right from the beginning in Greek thought meant merely “correctness” of judgement.42 Likewise, his way of the “place of being” proved in time inadequate to penetrate to the dimension of the ultimate “event” (Ereignis) and “there is/it gives” (es gibt). (S, 335; SD, 24/23)

Thus, the three ways each turned out to be an “other beginning” which had to be begun again from the beginning, a turn to be returned to and turned again, a topic to be placed in discussion and disputed again. Heidegger remained a constant beginner because he remained with the other beginning of the being-question as a constantly “having-been-coming” arche. Had he been able, he would doubtlessly have gone on to still different transformations of his thought. He understood his thought as “preparatory thinking” (SD, 67/60) for more thinking. What he said on the occasion of Max Scheler’s death applies equally well to himself: “Once again a path of philosophy falls back into the darkness.” (ML, 64/52)

2. Collected Editare and Thinking—Further

Heidegger’s texts or ways do not have the character of objectifying “theses,”43 but are what he calls “hints” or “tips”
(Winke), "pointers" (Hinweise) or "way-markers" for putting the way of thinking back into motion again in thinking-further. His methodos, therefore, has nothing to do with the modern concept of "method" which attempts to provide exact "rules" with which "objects" are available and calculable in advance. His indications or way-markers provide only a rough outline which indeed guides thought and helps it to aim, but at the same time holds it open for the unavailable and uncludeable movement of his topic within a historical "moment of vision" (Augenblick). (ID, 135/67) In fact, he sees the philosophical tradition precisely as consisting of ways providing "pointers" to be thought further into his own other beginning. Moreover, each of Heidegger's three main ways into the other beginning - meaning, truth, and topos - is taken as a "pointer" for subsequent ways in Heidegger's own thinking-further of himself. Finally, he intends his texts as "pointers" for thinking-further in the independent thought of his readers.

This thinking-further is not merely the subsequent application of something which exists in itself, but essentially belongs to and is demanded by the temporal character of Heidegger's topic as a "having-been-coming." His thinking out of the topic in his various ways provides only "pointers...for taking up the way on one's own, in order to think out the indicated topic independently" (selbstständig) (BR, ix/viii):

The answer is not grasped in repeating in rote what it expresses in the form of sentences and propositions, especially if it is passed along as a free-floating result for becoming informed about a "standpoint"....According to its genuine meaning, the answer gives a directive (Anweisung) for concrete ontological research to begin the investigative questioning within the opened up horizon - and it gives only this. (SZ, 26/40)

We must ourselves discover the one and only way to answer the question "what is called thinking?"....If we do not find out, all talk and listening is in vain. And in that case I would urge you to burn your lecture notes, however precious they may be - and the sooner the better. (ND, 158/160)

Heidegger also stresses that this thinking-further of the topic, the "disputed matter," always has the character of Ausein-
andersetzung, critical confrontation. The "battle of giants about being" does not end with Heidegger:

The topic, the disputed case, (Sache) is in itself debate, confrontation (Aus-einander-setzung). (N 1, 9/xv)48

Confrontation is genuine criticism. It is the highest and only way to a true appreciation and estimation of a thinker. For it takes over the task of thoughtfully following up his thinking and pursuing its effective strength, not its weaknesses. To what purpose? So that through confrontation we ourselves become free for the highest effort of thinking. (N 1, 13/4-5; GA 43, 275-276)

Heidegger himself wrote on April 17, 1964 in regard to the "growing interest" in this book: "But I think that now it is about time to stop writing about Heidegger. What is more important is a confrontation regarding the topic."47

...I want no "following" - but rather battle and disputation (Streit).... (BKB, 176)48

Those who understand genuinely are always those who come from a distance out of their ground and soil, those who bring much with them, in order to transform much. (N 1, 404/142)

Thus, Heidegger also stresses that the mens auctoris, the actual horizon within which the topic was understood and mapped out for the "mind of the author," is not an ultimate criterion for thinking-further. The mind of the author is precisely what must "disappear." The sole authority and criterion is rather "die Sache selbst," "the topic itself," and its possible ways of showing itself as a "having-been-coming":

(Phenomenology) is the possibility for thinking to respond to the address of what-is-to-be-thought, a possibility which from time to time changes and only thus endures. If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it can disappear as a title in favour of the topic whose manifestness remains a mystery in which we are at home (Geheimnis)....its (phenomenology's) essential character does not consist in being actual (wirklich) as a philosophical school. Higher than actuality stands possibility. The understanding of phenomenology consists solely in grasping it as possibility. (SD, 92/82; ZP, 47/200)

...the only authority is the topic itself. What is important is, with the text, to run into the topic itself and to be concerned with it. Therefore the text is only a means and not an end. (S, 286)48

The knowledge of the sciences is usually expressed in propositions which are placed at man's disposal to be used and applied. The "doctrine" of a thinker is what is left unsaid in what he says, to
which man is exposed, so that he might spend himself on it. (WM, 203/173)

Whoever gets involved in the being-under-way to the sojourn in the oldest of the old, will bow to the necessity of later being understood differently than he meant to understand himself. (WM, ix)

When Heidegger interprets Plato and Aristotle, he does not limit himself to the actual horizon of their thought within the "battle...about being." Likewise, when "Heidegger II" thinks further "Heidegger I," he takes up the horizon of possibilities for thinking out the topic itself which are there along with what was actually thought in Being and Time, but which remained unavailable to the mind of the author. In the same way, he exhorts his own readers not to entangle themselves in merely pursuing "what the author really meant" and "writing about Heidegger." Rather, he tells the reader to go further than Heidegger by critically "checking matters for oneself," pursuing "what is left unsaid," "transforming" Heidegger and understanding Heidegger "differently than he meant to understand himself." Otherwise, he also tells us, we should "burn" all our "books" and "essays" on Heidegger - "and the sooner the better." 50

His introduction to his Collected Edition clearly indicates the task of independent thinking—further of the topic which is not limited by the mind of the author:

The Collected Edition should in a myriad fashion show: a being-under-way in the way-field of the changing questioning of the ambiguous question of being. The Collected Edition should in this way give guidance for taking up the question, to question along with and then above all to question more questioningly....

What is at stake is the awakening of the confrontation about the topic for thinking...and not communicating about the author's mind and opinion, and not characterizing the author's standpoint, and not ordering it into the series of other historically fixable philosophical standpoints. Such things are of course always possible, especially in the age of information, but concerning the preparation for entering into the topic they have no importance....

The large number of volumes attests to only the enduring questionableness of the question of being and gives many opportunities for checking matters for oneself (Selbstprüfung). (GA 1, 437-438)

There is no such thing as Heidegger's "Complete Works," since his Collected Edition (Gesamtausgabe) is only an "edition" in the sense
of a protreptical "giving out" (Ausgabe, editio) of incomplete and unfinished ways for thinking-further. His motto for his entire Collected Edition is: "Ways - not works." (GA 1, 437) Here the metaphysical idea of the "work" - the "art work," the "literary work," the "musical work," the "philosophical work" - shatters, insofar as it expresses only ergon, energeia, actualitas, Wirklichkeit, the static presence of being in work, the finished product which "has" itself "in" its "end" and "completion" (entelecheia, perfectio). As essentially the movement (Be-weg-ung, kinesis) of his way and topic, Heidegger's thought is energeia atales-imperfect, incomplete, unended, unfinished standing in the work which remains related to its possibility (dunamis). There are no works in his Collected Edition, but there is a lot of work to be done.

He did not consider himself an enemy of "careful philological work." But he did regard philology and scholarship as only a "means" (S, 286) to arriving at the possibilities for thinking out the topic expressed in his texts. What is actually there in the text is an unconcluded horizon of possibilities. When he was asked, "Do you hold a sentence, which you express, as correct or true?", he replied: "I would say that it is worthy of question (frag-würdig)." (S, 436) "...there is no such thing as a fact in itself...." (S, 429) Indeed, the possibilities of questioning which lie in the text only arise for us in conjunction with our "presuppositions," which may or may not be appropriate, and themselves need to be constantly questioned. (SZ, 202-204/194-195; S,427-429)

Scholarship is a means to living and interpretive "reading," to "philology" in the literal sense of "care for the usage of language" (ED, 33; WH, 363-364/241-242). Otherwise it easily degenerates into mere schole, the irresponsible "leisure" and vanity of technical busywork and aestheticism, which does not respond to the topic at issue. It is the mark of an educated man, he maintains, to be "experienced enough in the difference between an object of scholarship and a topic of thinking." (ED, 77/5) Heidegger's thought is an Arbeitsphilosophie, a "philosophy of work," of
entering into the energeia ateles, the unfinished being-in-work of the "works." Thinking-further is taking responsibility for the always unfinished being-in-work of the works. If Heidegger's thought is essentially a question, then to study it is inseparable from repeating this question and using his thought as a "way marker." This is a tall order for the reader, who feels himself confronted with an exhortatory language which seems to resemble more the dimension of practical discourse - ethics, theology, jurisprudence - than the language of theory and science. As we have seen, Heidegger understands thinking as "praxis."

In deciding to publish his lecture courses in his *Collected Edition*, Heidegger was certainly anxious from a "philological" point of view that "what happened to Hegel should not happen to me."58 The "friends of the eternal one" took unwarranted liberties in editing Hegel's lectures and books. Student transcripts were presented as Hegel's own word without his authorization. In some cases, Hegel's own original manuscript, which had been replaced by or meshed with the student transcript, was destroyed. In his guidelines for his *Collected Edition*, Heidegger thus restricted the freedom of the editors. For example, student transcripts of Heidegger's lectures courses, which were not approved and worked over by Heidegger himself, are not allowed to be inserted in the published text under Heidegger's own name.

But such precaution did not lead him to make arrangements for a vast and sophisticated philological apparatus in a historical-critical edition of his writings. He wanted only to insure that the proper philological "prerequisites" (*N 1, 32/24*) were in place, so that the confrontational appropriation of his writings could get underway. What he feared even more than plain philological crudity was that, especially in the age of technology, the way and pointing character of his texts would not be taken up in independent thinking-further, but rather would be levelled off into the "collection of information" (*WM, ix; ED, 201*) in a thriving, happy Heidegger-industry. This was his "philological Angst."59 He wanted neither conferences on "Heidegger,"60 nor a "Heidegger Archives"
for "Heidegger scholars," nor originally a Collected Edition. In order to guard against the "almost insurmountable difficulty in communication" (BR, ix/viii), he took special precautions in the guidelines for his Collected Edition. It is intended to be an "edition from his own hand" (Ausgabe aus letzter Hand), a "giving out" of the thought-paths which point to, and not a "historical-critical edition," which inserts the editor’s interpretations and an unwieldy critical apparatus between the text and the reader, and so gets in the way of the task of independent interpretation. There are to be no brackets, footnotes, and appendices, which would indicate such things as variant readings of the written manuscript, differences between his own manuscript and the student transcripts used, his insertions from a later date, the editor’s insertion of words and punctuation, the editor’s rearrangement of sentences and sections, and the editor’s own additional division of the text into chapters and sections. Also, there is to be neither an editor’s foreword and introduction at the beginning of the text, nor an index at the end.

Why exactly did Heidegger make these demands for his Collected Edition? First, he was led by the "sober insight" that "it would not be possible to complete a historical critical within fifty years." Second, even when such an edition was finally available to the reader, it would too easily encourage mere scholarship, the "collection of information." Finally, an editor’s foreword, introduction, and index would tend to enclose the text within the interpretation of the editor, and thus encourage the passivity of the reader. If he did not want the movement of his topic brought to language in the text limited by the mens auctoris, he certainly did not want it limited by the mind of the editor. He wanted an "edition without interpretation" and "from his own hand," not because he wanted jealously to hoard his texts as his private property and prevent anyone from interpreting them, but because he wanted the movement of the texts held open for the independent interpretation of the reader. His directives are intended to repel objectifying scholarship and aesthetic informa-
tion gathering, and to throw the reader back onto the possibility of his or her own independent enactment of thought as a way in the topic. In this way, the reader is forced "to learn how to read." (S, 427)

3. No Heideggerian Philosophy

Heidegger could thus say that, because his philosophy is really an incomplete way, there really is no such thing as a "Heideggerian philosophy": "The impression should be avoided that it is a matter of presenting dogmatic theses from a Heideggerian philosophy, which does not exist." (EP, 69/23) "Being" and "thought" - and this means also Heidegger's thought - are both radically "finite." (S, 414-415; 370-371) As we have seen, he does not understand "being" in the traditional sense of something timeless or eternal, an "absolute," a "present at hand object" (ein Vorhandenes) (VA, 176/183), a fixed underlying "subject matter" (hypokeimenon), or an "idea" (S, 333). Likewise, he does not see "thought" as traditional "theoria" ("gazing," "contemplation") (S, 353, 399; N 2, 223/187), "science," "philosophy" (SD, 62/56), "representation" (VA, 176/183), "method" (S, 399; SD, 67-73/61-64), "system" (S, 314/30), "doctrine" (N 2, 132-134/88-90; VA, 177-178/185), "school" (SD, 90/82), or "wisdom" (VA, 7; WM, 364/242). There is no "absolute" absolved from the movement of the way of thinking. (WM, 335-336/215-216, 364/242)

His thought does not have the character of an answer, a "philosophy," but rather is precisely a question, a topic, which must be answered over and over again. There is no "is" here, rather only a "having-been-coming." There is only the returning topicality of his topic, the questionableness of his question and the being-on-the-way of his way. The "turn" does not exist as something finished, but there is an ongoing turning and various turns. There is no such thing as the "other beginning," but there are various ongoing ways of beginning the beginning again from the beginning. Taking up "residence" (Aufenthalt) in the topos of his non-metaphysical topic is not the "way of salvation," the metaphysical "promised land" and "isle of the blessed," but the way of
"suffering" (pathos) (WP, 82/83) and "praxis," a wandering in the "field of ways," a "way across the field," being "on the way as a wanderer in the neighborhood of being" (WM, 344/224). "Thinking remains fast on the wind of the topic." (ED, 78/6)

In other words, Heidegger's way and topic, his philosophy, is "movement" itself (Be-weg-ung), a circle which is unconcludeable and whose possible direction and meaning remain unavailable as something to be represented and calculated beforehand in the manner of a finished and fully present object that can be gazed at, turned into a doctrine, accepted or manipulated, preserved or smashed to pieces. "Heidegger," "Heidegger's philosophy" - these are names for his topic and way, which is "there" only in the movement of its enactment.

"Heidegger," "Heidegger's philosophy" thus turns out to be extremely difficult to pin down and get a hold on. This is because in the end there really is no object here. Rather, there is indeed something actual and having-been, but precisely this is in motion, on the way and "coming" in terms of its possibilities. To hunt after a "Heideggerian philosophy" is like chasing a flying bird. Not only does his topic and way begin long before "Heidegger" with the first beginning and history of western philosophy, not only is there no fixed doctrine in his "field of ways," but there is also a Heidegger after "Heidegger," a Heidegger later than the "later Heidegger," a Heidegger III, IV, VI, etc., the Heidegger of thinking-further which remains unconcludeable and unavailable to objective representation. "Heidegger" - "the name of the thinker stands as the title for the topic of his thinking." (N 1, 9/xv) It is a "pointer" for "the possibility of thinking, changing from time to time and only thus persisting." In the movement of his topic, the title "Heidegger" is retained only in such a way that it can "disappear as a title in favour of the topic of thinking." In fact, "Heidegger's philosophy" is self-destructive, self-un-building. It calls for its own "destructive" "retrieval." It "must stab itself in the heart, not that thinking should die from it, but rather lived transformed." (WM, 417/95) The first beginning of western
philosophy "disappears" into Heidegger, "Heidegger I" "turns" into "Heidegger II," Heidegger's ways "disappear" and "turn" into us, whoever "we" may be. Just as his way began not absolutely with itself, but with the ways in the tradition, so it does not end with Heidegger, but rather leads into the ways in which it can constantly be thought-further, that is, it ends where there is no end and conclusion, only way and more way. Heidegger has now become a part of the tradition, and we find ourselves facing him in the same way that Heidegger himself faced the tradition. His thought has become a part of the movement and way of the tradition within philosophizing. If there "is" no "Heideggerian philosophy," perhaps we can say rather that it "ex-ists" in the literal sense of standing out beyond itself. Suddenly everything has become so ambiguous that we cannot even tell where Heidegger ends and "we" begin. But this is the way he wanted it, and when it happens in this way then we become genuine "Heideggerians."

It is, therefore, quite misleading to represent his thought in terms of either any single thought-path or even a synthesis of his thought-paths. These thought-paths are answers to a question, discussions of a topic. To examine them in abstraction from the question and harden them into "a philosophy" is to uproot them from the very source (arche) which gives them their meaning:

The answer is only the final step of the questioning itself, and an answer that bids adieu to the questioning destroys itself as an answer. Thus, it cannot ground knowing. It leads to and hardens only one's own forming of opinions (Meinen). (N 1, 457-458/192-193; NW, 58/70-71)

An answer becomes "ir-re sponsible" (un-verantwortlich) when it no longer "an-swers" (antwortet) and "cor-responds" (entspricht) to the demands and claim (Anspruch) of the topic in question.74 If there is no such thing as a "Heideggerian philosophy," then there is hardly such a thing as "Heideggerian scholarship" as an activity for itself. Cranking out mere summae of Heidegger's thought places it right into the steel bathtub which he tried so excruciatingly to avoid, that is, a static neo-metaphysical language.75 It leads to a Heidegger-scholasticism.
If his thought is essentially a topic and a way, then it can be called appropriately *poretics, hodics,* or *topics,* names which he approached when at times he referred to thinking not only as "way," but also as "agchribasie," "going towards and near" (*ED, 72-73/88-89), "topology," the saying of the historical place or location (*Ort*) of being, and "placing in discussion" (*Erörterung*). With these titles, his thought remains clearly related to its topic and way character and does not fall into a scholasticization of its answers. Heidegger's thought remains topical.

We have now have an adequate outline of the three rough characteristics Heidegger's way from his *Being and Time* to his very latest writings: the end of philosophy, the other beginning, and constant beginning. Did this way originate in his youthful period in the early 1920s, or did it only begin around the time of his 1927 *Being and Time?* If the former, in what way did the young Heidegger speak about the destruction of the epochs of western metaphysics and about the end of philosophy? In the light of which traditions did he retrieve the question of being and what did his turn into the other beginning look like? How did he conceive the constant beginning and way character of his thought? And, finally, what would be the possible significance of the specific thought-path of the young Heidegger, this Heidegger earlier than the "early Heidegger" of *Being and Time,* for the Heidegger of thinking-further who is later than the "later Heidegger"? What would it mean for placing Heidegger in discussion in a new way?

Indeed, we shall be attempting to deconstruct or dismantle the three basic characteristics of the later Heidegger's question of being back to their origin in his youthful thought. But before undertaking this task on the basis of his published youthful writings, we must now turn briefly to an examination of the later Heidegger's own self-portrait of his youthful period. Here, too, we shall find much which can be deconstructed.
I was constantly concerned with bringing into view something completely different - something, however, at first only unclearly, if not confusedly intimated. Such youthful leaps easily lead to doing injustice. (On the Way to Language, 1959) (US, 121/34-35)

CHAPTER TWO

SELF-INSTALLMENT

In Chapter Two of my examination of the later Heidegger, I would like to turn to a brief discussion of the later Heidegger's own account of his youthful period as it is given in his various "self-portraits" (Selbstdarstellungen). (FS, 57/22; BR, xv/xiv) Philosophical autobiography raises a number of interesting questions regarding privilege, adequacy, creativity, and deception which fall within the purview of the problematic of "narrative." But here I want only to argue that the later Heidegger's account of his youthful period does indeed provide some sort of provisional orientation for anyone who wants to study his youthful writings, but that it is merely a bare sketch which provides no details and, more seriously, involves a reductive and distorting interpretation of his youthful period from the standpoint of the themes and language of his later philosophy. I will argue further that this attempt to stylize the origins of his thought by installing the self-interpretation of "the mind of the author" into the meaning of his work contradicts his own hermeneutical principle that the mens auctoris is not an ultimate criterion for the thinking-further of his writings and is supposed to recede into the background. This conclusion will impress upon us the necessity of deconstructing the later Heidegger's self-portrait of his philosophical development and examining his very earliest writings (1910-1916) and his youthful writings (1919-1926) on their own merit, tasks which will preoccupy us in Parts Two and Three of our study.
I. Self-Portraiture

In his 1969 Le Thor Seminar, Heidegger drew, as it were, a map of his development in terms of his three main thought-paths (the meaning of being, the truth of being, and the topos of being), but he also spoke briefly of what he called a "preceding movement" (Vorgehen) through which his threefold way was "set underway on its path" (auf den Weg gebracht). (S, 334-335) In effect, he is saying here that his thought traversed not three but four paths. There is a fourth way or, better, an original way. In fact, virtually all his self-portraits of his philosophical development begin with a sketch of his very earliest student years and his youthful period. He explicitly calls the lines of thought pursued in his early Freiburg and Marburg lectures "ways," "way-stations" (SD, 87/80) and even "leaps" (US, 121/35). At one point he even goes so far as to say that his 1916 habilitation writing on Duns Scotus is the "beginning of the way." (FS, 55) His 1919-21 essay on Jaspers, which clearly shows his early preoccupation with Kierkegaard, is set at the opening of his 1978 collection of later essays entitled Waymarkers. The foreword runs: "This series of already published texts strives to bring attention to something of the path that indicated itself to thinking only as underway: showed itself and withdrew itself....It requires the sojourn in the continually sought sameness of the same." (WM, ix) Again and again he insists that the topic of his very earliest and his youthful thought was always the "question of being," and that his thought was at no time either mere "philosophy of life" and "philosophy of existence," or Husserlian phenomenology, for which the basic topic is "consciousness":

As my familiarity with phenomenology grew, no longer merely through literature but by actual practice, the question about being, awakened through Brentano's work, nevertheless remained in view. So it was that the doubt arose whether the topic itself should be characterized as intentional consciousness or indeed as the transcendental ego....being had to remain the first and last topic itself for thinking. (BR, xiii-xv/xii-xiv).

The question about the unity in the multiplicity of being, at that time only obscurely, unsteadily, and helplessly stirring within me, remained, through many upsets, blind alleys and perplexities, the
ceaseless impetus for the work *Being and Time* which appeared two decades later. (FS, 58/21; ZP, 47/200-201; SD, 87/79)

Thus, according to Heidegger's own remarks, his topic and way were already there in some sense in his youthful period. Regarding the theme of the destruction of the tradition, he notes that his youthful thought followed "many detours (Umwege) through the history of western philosophy" (BR, xi/x; US, 91/10), which served as a "stimulus which determined my thought-path." (BR, ix/viii). Here he found his "decisive insights." (BR, xi/x) He says that one of the models for his re-thinking of the question of being lay in Christian theology: "Without this theological origin (Herkunft) I would never have come upon the path of thinking." (US, 92/10) He also tells how starting in 1919 he "tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle," and that through his study of especially the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* he was "brought onto the path of the question of being." (SD, 86-87/78-79) Regarding the theme of the other beginning of philosophy, he writes that in the early twenties "I was continually concerned with bringing into view something completely different (das ganz Andere)...." (US, 121/34-35) Regarding the theme of his thought as a constant beginning, he refers to his youthful period as a "way-sign" (US, 130/41) for further thought.

II. Self-Destruction

Not only was his way already in some sense there in his youthful period, but the later Heidegger maintains also that "without" "the decisive insights" gained here he would never have been "lead" or "brought" to his subsequent thought. This dependency is similar to how his exploration of the "meaning" of being prepared the way for his later theme of the "truth" of being, which in turn prepared the way for his theme of the "place" of being.

Just as he insists that his notion of "truth" involved a retrieval of his early notion of "meaning," so he hints that his youthful period was not merely a bridge that was left behind in crossing to his subsequent thought. What characterizes the relation between his youthful period and his three major later ways must,
then, be a retrieval of an origin - an original way. "...during this time I acquired what became that which remains (das Bleibende) (FS, 57/22), such that "the youth's game and the old man's wisdom gaze at each other." (ED, 90/37) Likewise, an inconspicuous and almost haphazardly placed footnote in the first part of Being and Time reads: "The author may remark that this analysis of the environment and in general 'the hermeneutics of facticity' has been presented repeatedly in his lectures since the winter semester of 1919-20." (SZ, 97, n. 1/108, n. ii) An equally inconspicuous footnote in the second part on time reads: "These observations and those which follow were communicated as theses on the occasion of a public lecture on the concept of time, which was given in Marburg in July 1924." (356, n. 3/313, n. iii)3 As we shall see later, his Being and Time was composed by working up the notes from his lecture courses and talks in the early twenties. Likewise, one of his even later works, his essay entitled "Concerning the Essence and Notion of PHYSIS. Aristotle, Physics B, 1" (1959) clearly draws on his early Aristotle interpretations. (BP, 239-306)4 The later Heidegger once summed up the relation between his original philosophical activity and his many later paths with the words of the poet Hölderlin: "...as you begin (anfiengst), you will remain (bleiben)" (US, 88/7), and with his own philosophical translation of this verse: "...origin remains always what comes towards us as the future" (Herkunft bleibt stets Zukunft) (91/10). His three later ways are, then, in some sense retrievals of his original way, and also retrievals of retrievals of it..., which think the "same."

His original "youthful leaps" (Sprünge) (US, 121/34-35) into the other beginning of the being-question are, therefore, a double arche (Ursprung)5 of "beginning and reign." His youthful beginning is not "the starting-point of a push, which pushes the thing away and leaves it to itself," but rather a "having-been-coming," a Herkunft-Zukunft, a constantly originating origin. His youthful leaps are "leaps forward," "projections" (Vorsprüinge, Entwürfe) into the question of being as time, which at the same time are "leaps away" (Absprüinge) from being as static presence. They are
"originating leaps" (Urspriinge) in which "everything to come is already leapt over (überspringt), even if as something veiled." In terms of possibility, his youthful leaps already contain his later thought as their end. "A genuine beginning, as a leap, is always a leaping forward, a projection (Vorsprung), in which everything to come is already leaped over, even if as something veiled. The beginning already contains the end as concealed and sheltered." (HW, 64-65/76/77) These "leaps" "away" and "forward" in his youthful thought-path are the original and originating forms of "the turn" away from the first metaphysical beginning to the other beginning of the being-question. His youthful beginning was begun again and again in his subsequent thought, the turn turned over and over, the topic discussed in new ways and places. His thought remained with its origin and lived out of it as a source of possibilities that was ever retrieved. The youthful Heidegger is not behind the later Heidegger back in the chronological years of the turn of the century, but remained always ahead of him. The Heidegger before the early Heidegger is also the Heidegger ahead and "later" than the later Heidegger.

But the later Heidegger's retrieval of his youthful period was also a destructive retrieval. His youthful period is subjected to the same "immanent criticism" to which his later ways are subjected. Even though his earlier preoccupation with Aristotle and Christian writers appears on every second page of Being and Time, this is now overshadowed by and ultimately translated into a new "transcendental" language taken over from Husserl and Kant's doctrine of schematism. His 1959 essay on physis, which drew on his early Aristotle interpretations, was placed in the context of his later thought and pushed in the direction of his concern with early Greek thinking. Likewise, his early appropriation of the Christian theological tradition of hermeneutics was later pushed in the direction of the Greek poetic-theological tradition and its revival in Hölderlin. (US, 91/9-10, 115/29) As we shall later have occasion to remark, his early preoccupation with the Christian notion of kairos (Augenblick) and with Aristotle's notion of phronesis are
rethought in the context of his later notion of the "history of being."

Likewise, the later Heidegger's various self-portraits of his youthful period clearly bring out the destructive or critical side of his retrieval. First, he appears to object to the sheer plurality of youthful thought-paths or way-stations. He says that his youthful period was the "attempt to go on a path, from which I did not know where it would lead. Only its most immediate short range perspectives were known to me, because they lured me unceasingly, while the horizon shifted and darkened more than once." (US 87/6) He also refers to these shifting viewpoints as "upsets" (Umkippungen) and "perplexities" (Ratlosigkeiten). (FS, 56/21) "Thus I was brought to the path of the question of being....But the path became longer than I suspected. It demanded many way-stations (Aufenthalte)...." (SD, 87/79-80) Apparently, it was because of his constant agitated "circling" around his question of being that Heidegger "kept silent for twelve years" after finishing his habilitation writing in 1915. (US, 87/6)

Second, it is in a critical spirit that he characterizes his youthful concerns with the history of philosophy as "detours" or "roundabout ways (Umwege) through the history of philosophy." (BR, xi/x) Third, he calls his youthful work "very imperfect" or "incomplete" (unvollkommen) (US, 87/6), only a "confused intimation" of what came later: "I was constantly concerned with bringing into view something completely different - something, however, at first only unclearly, if not obscuringly intimated." (US, 121/34-35) "I always followed only a faint trail (Neg spur), but follow it I did. The trail was an almost imperceptible promise announcing that we would be set free into the open, now dark and confused, soon lightning sharp, which then again for a long time eluded every attempt to say it." (US, 130/41) The young Heidegger's "decisive insights" were "not yet sufficient for the venture of placing in discussion (Erörterung) the question of being as the question about the meaning of being." (BR, xi/x) The youthful work had the character of "an experiment." (US, 114/28) Finally, Heidegger
refers to the early work as simple "mistakes" or "wrong paths" (Abwege), i.e., paths which belong to Heidegger's single way, but which grasped the question of being in a distorting way or simply ended up in confusion and did not lead him to where he wanted to go.

The following statements sum up the later Heidegger's critical opinion that the lines of thought in his youthful period are inadequate:

...I was brought onto the path of questioning....But the way became longer than I suspected. It demanded many way-stations, roundabout ways and wrong paths. What the first lectures in Freiburg and then in Marburg attempted show the path only indirectly (nur mittelbar). (SD, 87/79-80)

Such youthful leaps easily lead to doing injustice. (US, 121/35)

His critical relation to his youthful period extends to his somewhat extreme and perhaps even contradictory statement that he only first in "1923 or 1922-23 found his way to his question of being and time." His criticism of his youthful period led ultimately to his making no plans for the publication of his early Freiburg lectures (1915-1923) in his Collected Edition.

III. Self-Stylization

But, as Otto Pöggeler has pointed out, the later Heidegger's unfavorable judgement of his youthful thought has to be compared with what can be found in his youthful texts themselves. In fact, his very condensed and hermetic statements have the character of dogmatic assertions, which never explain just why the plurality of the youthful ways is a flaw, why the intense preoccupation with the tradition is undesirable, why the youthful ways are imperfect, and what exactly is outrightly wrong with them. Outside of a few sketchy and unexplained remarks on his 1920 lecture Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, he never clearly relates either his positive or his negative judgments to any specific lectures or essays in his youthful period.

Strangely enough, his criticisms either point to characteristics that are actually actively pursued in the later writings, or else are the very same criticisms that he makes of the later
writings. His later writings and lectures, too, "showed the path only indirectly," but were not played down or suppressed. Rather, he saw them as necessary paths, which merit being pursued over and over again. Let us briefly examine the later Heidegger's active pursuit of the characteristics of thought which he seems to look unfavorable upon in his youthful period.

First, the later Heidegger "renounces" the pursuit of a single way or even a limited number of ways and applauds the diversity of "different" paths as a sign of richness and fullness. "Thinking," he writes, "is perhaps an unavoidable path, which refuses to be a way of salvation (Heilsweg) and brings no new wisdom. At most the way is a field-path, a way across the field, which does not just speak of renunciation but already has renounced, that is, renounced the claim to a binding doctrine and a valid cultural achievement or a deed of the spirit." (VA, 177-178/184-185; SD, 1/1) "Being is said in many ways." (WP, 96/97) His remark about his youthful period that "the horizon shifted and darkened more than once" is perhaps truer of the dizzy multiplicity of paths in his later thought, which he called Holzweg, paths which wander through a forest. "Each goes its peculiar way, but in the same forest. Often it appears as though one were similar to another. But it only seems so." (HW, Preface) Indeed, upon completion, his Collected Edition will probably contain close to a hundred volumes and, if we take him at his word, at least as many different thought-paths. Perhaps it was not his early Freiburg lectures which should have been put on the Heideggerian Index, but rather a good number of these later works. Often one cannot see the topic for the paths. This situation makes the way character of the youthful period appear very innocuous.

Second, apart from a few late seminars on his own thought (S, 326-371, 372-400), Heidegger's later writings are all "round-about ways" through the history of western thought, that is, critical retrievals of and "conversations" (WP, 66/67) with past philosophers. This follows from the essential character of being as the "having-been-coming." There is no such thing as an ahistorical
presuppositionless point of departure. The later Heidegger's identification with Kant, Husserl, Hölderlin, and the Pre-Socratics is just as consuming as his youthful preoccupation with Aristotle and the Christian theological tradition. Indeed, just as he criticized the inadequacy of these early preoccupations, so he also went on to criticize severely his later identifications with Kant, Husserl, and the Pre-Socratics.\textsuperscript{12}

Third, like his youthful period, each of his later ways is also "incomplete" and "imperfect." His thought could never be otherwise than "incomplete," since this is the essential character of its way character. If it was not incomplete, then this would mean that it had relapsed into "metaphysics." Completion, perfectio, entelecheia means having itself (écheia) in (en) its end (telos), stable presence. (\textit{WN}, 284/256) As we have seen, the essential character of his thought is energeia ateleis, imperfect being in work. "We know no ends and are only a way." (\textit{ED}, 27)

Finally, just as he calls his youthful ways "wrong paths," so he calls his later ways Holzwege. \textit{Auf dem Holzweg sein} means "to be on the wrong path." Thus the French translation of Heidegger's book bearing this title: \textit{Chemins qui mènent nulle part}, "paths leading nowhere." Heidegger writes: "In the forest are paths, which mostly grow together and then suddenly stop in the impenetrable....Wood-cutters and foresters know the paths. They know what it means to be on the wrong path." (\textit{HN}, Preface) "They go astray (\textit{in der Irre gehen}), but they never lose the way (sich verirren)." (\textit{ED}, 91)\textsuperscript{13} Just as thought is ever incomplete and on the way because the topic is essentially a way, so thought is ever erring because error, dissemblance, and concealment (\textit{lethe}) belong essentially to the topic of being as truth (\textit{a-letheia}). He could thus write that "'who thinks greatly must error greatly'....not meant personally, but related to the error which prevails in the essence of truth, into which all thought...is thrown." (\textit{US}, 254) If the concealment of error were ever overcome, then the way character of thought would be annihilated. Thus he says also that his topic is essentially a "critical question." Just as his youthful period
was critically appropriated in his later thought, so each of his later ways critically "gave way to one another." Even his formulation of "the place of being" was left behind in his last years in favour of the term "event" (Ereignis). Each path revealed the topic, but also concealed it and left something still to be thought. His later paths are "wrong paths," but they were not ignored as his youthful ways were. Rather, they were seen as retrievable. 14 Why cannot the following statement which he made in 1953 about his Being and Time apply also to his youthful work? "After a quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were to be presented anew. Yet the path it has taken still remains even today a necessary one, if our existence is to be stirred (bewegt) by the question of being." (SZ, vii/17) Does he not elsewhere in effect say precisely that his youthful path is a necessary one, insofar as he claims that without it he could not have arrived at even the first half of his Being and Time?

Taking all the above into consideration, it seems amazing that the later Heidegger took so little interest in his youthful period and excluded the early Freiburg lectures from his corpus. Indeed, were the criticisms, which he applied to his youthful period, also applied to his later thought, his entire Collected Edition would not exist. In other words, his criticisms contradict the very requirements demanded by the topic of his own thought. They are simply not convincing. In fact, they are not even criticisms, only unexplained statements. His relationship to his youthful work is very ambiguous and frustrating. One the one hand, he says that it is a way and a topos in his overall thought-path, that without it there would have been no later Heidegger, and that it entered into and is still present in his later writings. On the other hand, he either virtually ignores it, or else goes on to somewhat dogmatically dismiss it.

Indeed, he gives attention to and positively evaluates his youthful period only when it can be used as an occasion for pursuing the specific themes and language of his later thought. All
his self-portraits of his youthful period are drawn within the wider portrayal of his whole philosophical development, which he sees as almost inevitably leading to the final stages of his thought. This occasional use of his youthful writings sometimes even leads Heidegger to distort the facts. This is the case with his remarks on his 1920 lecture *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*. It is wrongly dated as having taken place in 1921, and the title is changed to "Expression and Appearance" (*US*, 86/6), so that it can more easily serve as an occasion for his reflections on language. (*US*, 121ff./32ff.) At one point the title is even changed to "Expression and Meaning." (*US*, 128/34) He also states here that he first used the words "hermeneutics" and "hermeneutical" in 1923, but these terms were used in his lecture courses already as early as 1919 (*IP*, 116; *PW*, 131; *AJ*, 32), Winter Semester 1919-20, and Winter Semester 1920-21 (*PA*, 3). Whether these discrepancies are intentional or simply due to carelessness cannot be determined. But they lead one to believe that Heidegger has perhaps also elsewhere taken "artistic liberty" with his youthful period. He does not here measure up to the simplest of philological standards which he wanted to see respected in his *Collected Edition*. He was interested in his youthful period only insofar as it could be viewed through the eyes of his later thought and used as an occasion for his later themes and language. He had moved on to other ways and was simply no longer interested in his youthful period. This was always his way, namely, taking up a path of thought, following it for awhile, and then moving on to the new questions that had been opened up. Just as his interpretations of the history of philosophy were violent attempts to see himself in the thought of other philosophers, so he was interested in seeing only his later concerns in his youthful period. In the process, his youthful thought is distorted and reduced to his later philosophy, or else simply ignored.

In other words, the later Heidegger is here to a certain extent in contradiction with his own hermeneutical principle that the meaning of texts cannot be limited and enclosed by the *mens*
auctoris, the author’s self-interpretation. In effect, he does exactly what he directs the editors of his Collected Edition not to do, namely, insert a reductive, monopolizing interpretation between the reader and the text, one which attempts to control the way in which the text is interpreted in thinking-further. This is what can be called Heidegger’s self-installation and self-stylization. It is the act of installing his own later self-understanding into the meaning of his youthful writings and thus stylizing them in his interpretive “self-portrait.” His self-interpretation is to a certain extent installed into the meaning of his whole Collected Edition with its map of Heidegger’s three major thought-paths. In spite of the leeway and openness, his philosophy then comes across as a kind of museum in which the visitors are taken on guided tours of the various thought-paths.17

Heidegger is certainly justified in using his youthful writings as "pointers" for his own thinking-further, which does not limit itself to the self-understanding of the young Heidegger. The later Heidegger is not trying to “give the impression that I already knew then what I am still asking today.” (US, 88/7; BR, xv/xiv; FS, 55/21) But he is not justified in plainly distorting the texts through interpretations which are not supported by the possibilities of the texts itself. Nor is he justified in making his "self-portrait" an authoritative criterion for the possible meaning of his youthful writings, attempting thereby to control the meaning of the texts,18 and thus not bowing "to the necessity of later being understood differently than he meant to understand himself."

This tendency to objectification, reduction, and monopolization involved in Heidegger’s self-installment sometimes entails placing his texts outside the reach of the movement of independent and different thinking-further. In his dialogue on language from 1953-54, he discourages his interlocutor’s dogged interest in the “youthful leaps” of his 1920 lecture course The Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression and expresses impatience with the continual hunting after and commerce in transcripts of his youthful
lecture courses or, as Heidegger calls them, "muddy sources." He prefers to direct the conversation primarily to his later thought. In the writing of his book *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, Pöggeler enjoyed the close collaboration of Heidegger himself, but he reports how Heidegger merely "tolerated" the use he made of his youthful writings: "Heidegger generously tolerated my treating his early lectures like Hegel's youthful writings (and thus even dreaming of a future discovery of the finest thing which he had written)....[the early] confrontation with Aristotle was placed out of my reach, since the later Heidegger directed the discussion of Aristotle completely towards the question of the relationship between ontology and theology." During his lifetime he published only a single thirty page essay from his youthful Freiburg and Marburg period, namely, his 1919-21 essay "Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of World-Views." Heidegger did decide to have his early Marburg lectures courses (1923-1928) published in his *Collected Edition*, but he made no plans to include his early Freiburg lectures courses (1915-1923). The decision was "left in the hands of the literary executor." These lecture course manuscripts and all Heidegger's manuscripts were not placed in an archive in Freiburg, which would have been the obvious choice, since Freiburg was the place of Heidegger's teaching activity, the manuscripts would have been readily accessible to the members of the university and visitors, and finally Freiburg has the necessary libraries without which one could not as effectively study the manuscripts. But he chose to store his manuscripts away at the "German Literature Archives" in Marbach am Neckar, an out-of-the-way town where there is no university and no suitable libraries. Only a select few have access to the manuscripts. A major reason for his choosing Marbach was the fact that here the manuscripts would be stored in special bunkers capable of withstanding a nuclear holocaust, a possibility which seemed very likely to him in the light of his prophetic and eschatological reflections on modern technology. He thought that, if the manuscripts survived, they could be of help in making an
"other beginning." His prophetic self-installation placed out of reach not only his early Freiburg lecture course manuscripts, but also all his manuscripts. After a decade, the literary executor, Hermann Heidegger, finally ordered in 1982 that the early Freiburg manuscripts be worked up into publishable texts. But only eight manuscripts of the fourteen lectures held in this period were found to survive. Some of the missing manuscripts were destroyed by Heidegger himself. This was perhaps the fate of, for example, his much talked about, but missing 1920-21 lecture course entitled *Introduction in the Phenomenology of Religion*, which dealt with Paul's letters, an early inspiration in which Heidegger later showed little interest and for which he was reluctant to provide details. (US, 91-92/9-10) His 1924 lecture course entitled *Aristotle: Rhetoric, II* is also missing. Here the violence of his "destructive" relation to his youthful writings in his subsequent thought takes on a more literal expression. The texts themselves have been destroyed, and all that survives is his later "self-portrait." A precedent for this is perhaps to be found in the possible destruction of the texts of the "sophists" by the members of the Academy, who would have been interested in installing Plato's own portrait of the sophistic movement.

The later Heidegger is open to the same charge of indifference and intolerance which he levies against the later "transcendental" Husserl of the *Ideas* (1913) in his critical appraisal of his youthful *Logical Investigations* (1900-01). In his essay "My Way in Phenomenology," Heidegger complains that the second edition (1913) of Husserl's originally "philosophically neutral" *Logical Investigations* appeared with "profound revisions" and the sixth investigation, whose "never-ceasing spell" "captivated" the young Heidegger, was in fact "withheld." Only after Heidegger and other "friends of the work" repeatedly implored Husserl did "the master" publish his sixth investigation again in 1922:

Husserl notes in the preface: "As things stand, I had to give in to the wishes of the friends of this work and decide to make its last chapter available again in its old form." With the phrase "the friends of this work," Husserl also wanted to say that he himself
really could not get close to the *Logical Investigations* after the publication of his *Ideas*. At the new place of his academic activity, the passion and effort of his thought turned toward the systematic development of the plan presented in the *Ideas* more than ever. Thus Husserl could write in the preface mentioned to the sixth investigation: "My teaching activity in Freiburg, too, furthered the direction of my interest toward general problems and the system." Thus Husserl watched me in a generous fashion, but at bottom in disapproval, as I worked on the *Logical Investigations* every week in special seminars.... *(SD, 84-87/77-79)*

By that time the master himself no longer held his work in very high esteem.... *(US, 88/5)*

Heidegger concludes here with an unambiguous criticism of the later Husserl’s attempt to install the final meaning of "phenomenology" in terms of his later "Neo-Kantian" turn to a transcendental consciousness: "But, in what is most its own, phenomenology is not a school (*Richtung*).... its (phenomenology’s) essential character does not consist in being actual as a school. Higher than actual stands possibility. The understanding of phenomenology lies solely in grasping it as possibility." *(SD, 90/82)*

But in this very same essay Heidegger plays down his own youthful work! Did he not perceive the irony that he was unwilling to see in himself what he saw and criticized in Husserl? If we imagine Heidegger’s youthful work as the "*Logical Investigations*," the reader as "the young Heidegger" and the later Heidegger as the "Husserl" of the *Ideas*, then we have a picturesque description of the situation which confronts anyone who is interested in exploring Heidegger’s youthful work.* In accord with the demands of the phenomenological attitude, he requires independent thought from his readers, but he is nonetheless watching the reader of his youthful writings "in a generous fashion, but at bottom in disapproval." *(cf. US, 88/5). The reader, who follows the way and topical character of Heidegger’s thought, can only respond by substituting Heidegger’s name for Husserl’s name in the above quoted passage:

But, in is most its own, [Heidegger’s thought] is not a school....its ([Heidegger’s thought]) essential character does not consist in being actual as a school. Higher than actuality stands possibility. The understanding of [Heidegger’s thought] lies solely in grasping it as possibility.
In his "self-portrait" presented to the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Heidegger acknowledges the completely interpretive character of his accounts of the development of his thought: "At each way-station the indicated way appears in a different light and with a different tone for the backward glance and out of the forward glance, and awakens different interpretations." (FS, 55/22) "What in the following time succeeded and failed, eludes a self-portrait, which could name only that which does not belong to oneself. And to this belongs everything essential." (FS, 57/22) He here alerts the reader to the fact that the genuine criterion is the way character of the topic itself, which cannot be enclosed within the author's interpretive self-portrait, but rather contains the possibility of "different interpretations."

Hans-Georg Gadamer, in his 1986 Messkirch memorial address before the German Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft, gave a clear expression to the fact that the eyes through which the later Heidegger viewed his youthful thought cannot serve as a final criterion of its significance:

The world-wide reputation of Hegel was in fact not realized through his "Phenomenology" or through his "Logic," but rather through the publication of his lectures. Something similar could happen with Heidegger, and in any case we should be aware that in this lies a genuine task for us....I am very grateful to Hermann Heidegger and the others responsible for having so quickly made the decision, left open by Martin Heidegger, as to whether his pre-Marburg lectures should be published. One needs to have a lot of courage to admit to oneself that a great man can himself nonetheless underestimate his own radiance and above all the promising richness of his beginnings. Volume 61 [1920-21 Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle] represents for me the first encounter with this text and signifies a task with which I have still not in any sense come to terms. The text builds the first bridge between the emerging Heidegger and his work. He himself would not at all have counted it as belonging to his work. He himself did not do this obviously because he believed it was first in Marburg that he found the final direction of his thought-path. However, precisely this early lecture is for us one of the most important preparatory paths in the voyage of discovery which Heidegger underwent in his thought....I can even imagine that Heidegger himself would have found many new things in this his youthful text, had he been able to read it with the eyes with which someone reads, who is not him.
Just as it was because of the young Heidegger’s insistent but ostracized interest in Husserl’s early *Logical Investigations* that he was "brought onto the path of the question of being" (*SD*, 87/79), so likewise the "promising richness of his [own] beginnings" could contain much more than the later Heidegger was capable of seeing. It is not impossible that something lies there as a possibility for future thought which could be just as monumental as Heidegger’s later paths into the "other beginning." Indeed, it was only by remaining, in spite of Heidegger’s disapproval, with his youthful work long after he had left it behind that figures such as Gadamer, Arendt, Marcuse, Becker, and others were able to work out their own thought. What other possible stimulations lie in Heidegger’s youthful work for transforming our reading of Heidegger, for unlocking the hermetic language of his later writings, for our reading of the history of philosophy, for our thinking-further of Heidegger’s contributions, and for developing completely independent lines of thought? Was it only in "1923 or 1922/23" that he first found his way to the "other beginning" for the question of being? Or is his topic already there as early as 1919? And is it there in a form which is capable of "stirring our existence"?

These questions can be answered only by looking at his youthful writings not with the uninterested and unfriendly eyes of the later Heidegger, but with our own interested and different eyes. Indeed, our whole endeavour could be summed up in Gadamer’s words: to read Heidegger’s youthful texts with eyes other than his own, i. e., with our own eyes. As we have been maintaining, this means that we must deconstruct or dismantle his self-portrait of his youthful thought back to what it is supposed to be portraying, either adequately or inadequately. In other words, it will be used only now and then as a provisional "pointer" for exploring his youthful texts themselves. In this way, we will be following his own hermeneutical principle that the *mens auctoris* should not be the final criterion in the interpretive reading of his texts.
Philosophy cannot for long do without its genuine optic—metaphysics.

Being (ens) signifies the total meaning of the sphere of objects in general, the enduring moment in what is objective. It is the category of categories. (The Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus, 1916) (KB, 406, 214)

PART TWO
THE METAPHYSICAL HEIDEGGER (1910-1916)

Very little is generally known about Heidegger’s earliest writings from his student years. But the anachronism of referring to his Being and Time (1927) as the "early Heidegger" is evident from the fact that his philosophical authorship begins fifteen years before this work. In 1912 he published two articles entitled "The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy" (RP) and "Recent Research in Logic" (FL). In the years 1913 to 1914 five book reviews appeared under his name. (B) In 1914 his doctoral dissertation was published in book form as The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism: A critical-positive Contribution to Logic. (UP) In 1916 his "habilitation writing" appeared as The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus (KB), and an article entitled "The Concept of Time in Historical Science" (ZB) was published. Then for a whole decade he published nothing. When the Heideggerian corpus is viewed in the light of his earliest writings and also his early Freiburg and Marburg lectures, then Being and Time (1927) surely appears as one of the "later works." His authorship between 1912 and 1916 has for the most part been neglected in studies of his thought. The later Heidegger himself showed little interest in this earliest phase of his work.

In Part Two, I would like to provide an analysis of Heidegger’s earliest writings in order to show that he was here still caught up within metaphysics. He was at this time a "metaphysician." He raises the question of being, but it is primarily the
61

traditional metaphysical formulation of the question which pre-
occupies him. In Chapter One, we will see that he develops a "pure
logic" in the sense of what he will later call a metaphysical
"ontologic," that is, a logical account of being. In Chapter Two, I
would like to show further that the early metaphysical Heidegger
also formulates the question of being in terms what he will later
call "ontotheology," that is, the account of being in terms of a
divine ground. We will, then, be attempting to depict the very
early Heidegger of his student years as a metaphysician in order to
be able to show in Part Three that around 1919 his thought under-
goes a radical turn towards a non-metaphysical "other beginning"
for the question of being.

But in his ontologic and ontotheology, we will also surpris-
ingly come across the later Heidegger's primal words for his three
main paths of thought, that is, "meaning," "truth," and "topos,"
and this will allow us in later chapters to reflect on how his
later philosophy was to a certain extent a return to his every
earliest thought, even though it was radically transformed in his
later philosophy.

CHAPTER THREE
THE WAY OF MEANING AND TOPOS (ONTLOGIC)

And only when a pure logic is erected and elaborated on such a basis will one
be able more securely to deal with epistemological problems and divide the
entire region of "being" into its various modes of reality..... (The
Doctrine of Judgment in Psychology, 1913) (UP, 186)

In Chapter Three, I would like to show that in his "ontolog-
ic" the student Heidegger formulates the question of being in
terms of the three moments of what he later called "the guiding
questioning" of metaphysics, which we analyzed in Part One. These
moments showed themselves as being as ground, being as correlated
with logos, and this ground-logos correlation as presence. In his
early ontologic, these moments will turn up as those of logical
meaning (categories), judgment, and atemporal validity. I would
like to explore also how his ontologic derives very much from his
uncritical appropriations of what he will later call the three "epochs" of metaphysics. As we saw in Part One, these epochs are those of ancient thought, medieval philosophy, and modernity. More specifically, we will see that he takes up the so-called "doctrine of categories" from Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, from scholasticism, and from modern Neo-Kantianism and Husserl's phenomenology.

I. The Doctrine of Categories

In his 1940 lecture "Nietzsche: European Nihilism," the later Heidegger referred back to his habilitation writing and characterized his discussion here of "value" and "validity" (Geltung) as a modern version of Plato's "idea of the good" and as belonging, therefore, to the history of metaphysics, nihilism, and the forgetfulness of being. Likewise, his 1926 lecture course referred back to his habilitation writing as "Platonism." (LW, 64, 75) As we shall have occasion to mention later, his 1927 Being and Time can be seen as direct criticism of the metaphysical position of his earliest writings, even though they are not mentioned by name. Again in 1953-54 he referred to the Neo-Aristotelian "doctrine of categories" and the "doctrine of meaning" developed in his doctoral dissertation and his habilitation writing as the "usual name for the discussion of the being of beings" and the "metaphysical reflection on language in its relation to being." That is, he characterized his earliest work as a form of Aristotelian metaphysics. His severest comment is found in the 1972 foreword to the first edition of his Early Writings, which in addition to his habilitation writing on Duns Scotus contained also his doctoral dissertation entitled The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism:

At the time of the writing of these literally help-less early attempts I still knew nothing of what would later trouble my thinking.

Nevertheless, they show a beginning of the way, which at the time was still closed to me: the being-question in the form of the doctrine of categories; the question after language in the form of the doctrine of meaning. The way in which both questions belong together remained in darkness. The unavoidable dependency of the manner of treatment on the prevailing standard of the doctrine of
judgment for all onto-logic never once allowed the darkness to be suspected. (FS, 55)

As with his comments on the early Freiburg and Marburg lectures, the later Heidegger does not explain these comments in a detailed discussion of the earliest writings. His term "onto-logic" can be used only as a "pointer" in our own examination of his early student writings. Our examination will not aim at a detailed and exhaustive account, but rather will be oriented schematically around the three previously discussed moments of the "structure of the leading question" of metaphysics as "onto-logic."

1. Logical Meaning and Topos

To what extent do Heidegger's earliest writings determine the "on," the "being," of "onto-logic" metaphysically as the meaning and ground of beings?

In his doctoral dissertation and in his preceding book reviews and essays, he speaks in the role of a "logician" who happens to be living in the "age of psychology." (FL, 18) The task he takes up is that of a refutation of psychologism, which is defined as the attempt to reductively explain the judgment and its "meaning" (Sinn) in terms of real spatio-temporal psychic processes. The first four sections of his doctoral dissertation describe and then criticize four psychologistic theories of the judgment: the "genesis" (Entstehung) of the judgment out of "apperceptive mental activity" (Wilhelm Wundt), the judgment as "consisting" of "component acts" (Heinrich Maier), the judgment as a "basic class of psychic phenomena" (Franz Brentano) and the judgment as being "fulfilled" through the "action of the psychical subject which is demanded by the object" (Theodor Lipps). The main argument which Heidegger uses to refute these four forms of psychologism is that the "point of departure" in the very "placing of the question" (Fragestellung) has from the very start already looked away from the logical meaning of the judgment towards the psychical, and is thus a question about not the logical, but the psychological. "Psychologism would therefore be, as its name indicates, a psychological posture of questioning with regard to a logical
object....It's failure to understand is not a mere misunderstanding, but a genuine non-understanding." (UP, 161, 32) It is essential to maintain the "distinction between psychical act and logical content," (FL, 22) between the noetic act of judging and the pure noematic logical meaning towards which the act is intentionally directed, and to focus on the latter, if one wants work out a "doctrine of judgment."

"Meaning" does not "exist" as a spatio-temporal reality in either the physical realm or the psychical realm. One cannot say: "it is." But it is a "something" which is "there" (da). It is not a "type of existence," but rather a Dasein, a Daseinsform, a "being-there," a "form of being-there." There are four kinds of "reality" (Wirklichkeit) which are not to be confused: the "physical", the "psychical", the "metaphysical" and the "logical," the sphere of "meaning." (UP, 169-170) The reduction of meaning to the physical and the psychical, which is attempted by empiricism, positivism and psychologism, overlooks these distinctions. "What is the meaning of meaning? Does it have meaning to question after this?....Perhaps we stand here at something ultimate and non-reducible, of which a further clarification is impossible....one will never get beyond description." (UP, 171) The meaning intended in a judgment can be neither "explained" in terms of something else, nor "proven" through deduction, but only "shown" (aufgewiesen) and "described" (umschrieben). (165, 171) The empiricist's limitation of perception and the perceivable to sensory perception and the sensibly perceived is dogmatic:

Empiricism - and psychologism is such - prides itself on the principle: that and only that which is perceivable is to be accepted. The "pure logician" makes fundamentally the same demand: what presents itself evidentially cannot be argued around and interpreted away, but rather simply is to be accepted. When the empiricist limits what in any sense can present itself to the sensibly perceivable, then that is a dogmatic claim a priori, which ill suits him as an empiricist, and for which he must each time owe a proof. (165)

Immediate "seeing" (noein), not merely sensory, experiential seeing, rather seeing in any sense at all as originally giving consciousness of any kind whatsoever, is the ultimate source of justification for all rational claims.
Kant himself gave up his thesis that only the intuited could be thought, that consequently understanding could have no specific object, when he made the pure concepts of the understanding and their deduction the object of his investigation. (RF, 10/68)

"Intuition of essence" is to be found in correlation with nonsensible "givennesses, which are "eidetic". "Meaning" does not belong to the realm of "the metaphysical," "the supersensory-metaphysical" (FL, 24), which cannot be intuited with the same "immediacy" available in the description of meaning. This metaphysical is as it were "suspended" (ausgeschaltet) in Heidegger's investigation. (UP, 189-170) He does not follow Plato's "hypo-stasization" of the logical into a metaphysical being." (FL, 24)

The final section sketches out plans for a purely logical doctrine of judgment" (the "logical object" as "validity"; the judgment as meaning; the judgment as knowledge; subject, predicate and copula as elements of the judgment; the problem of the negative judgment and the impersonal judgment). By uncovering the "autonomous region" (UP, 166) of logical meaning, this "doctrine of judgment" is to serve in turn as the "preparatory work" for erecting a "pure logic" and an ontology:

And only when a pure logic is erected and elaborated on such a basis will one be able more securely to deal with epistemological problems and divide the entire region of "being" into its various modes of reality, accurately bring out their peculiarity and with certainty determine the kind and scope of knowledge belonging to them. This statement indicates that the present work strives to be philosophical, in that it was undertaken in the service of the ultimate whole (des letzten Ganzen). (UP, 186-187)

The nature of this "pure logic," left unexplained here on the last page of Heidegger's dissertation, is clarified in the essay "Recent Research in Logic," which laid out the plan for the dissertation.

Pure logic is the "Kategorienlehre," the "doctrine of categories" of being (FL, 24). Heidegger expresses this also in terms of the Kantian "transcendental logic" of the highest a priori categorial-conceptual determinations of objects of experience which "transcend" any specific objective domain:

The fundamental question of logic directs itself towards the conditions of knowing in general. Logic is theory of theory, the doctrine of science. It studies...the theoretically primordial, the
fundamental concepts (categories), their relations and systematic...Kant worked out the logic of the categories of being. In order to understand it, one has to be aware that being has lost its trans-logical independence, that being has been reworked into a concept of transcendental logic. This does not mean that objects are stamped into nothing but logical content; only objectivity, thingness over and above the thingly, being over and above beings is logical value, formal content. (FL, 23-24)

Pure logic prepares the basis for the "logic and systematic of the individual sciences" (FL, 43), which correspond to the division of "the entire field of 'being' into its various modes of reality." In the form of regional ontologies, logic works out the diversity and interconnectedness of the categorial structures belonging to the sciences:

It studies - next to the theoretically primordial, the fundamental concepts (categories), their relations and systematic - the logical structure of the individual sciences, seeks to show the differentiating moments of their construction and their method, fences them off against each other as special provinces and strives finally back to unity in the system of the sciences.

What Heidegger means by these "epistemological problems" can be seen more clearly from the place which the notion of "validity" occupies in logic. If Aristotle's and Kant's forms of the doctrine of categories overcame the Platonic hypostasization of the logical into a "metaphysical being" and brought the logical into relation with sensible being, they, nonetheless, mistakenly "restricted the problem of the categories to sensible-being" and failed to see that the traditional categories are another "area of application" for still higher categorial determinations. (FL, 24) The form of forms, the category of categories is Gelten, "validity," "being-valid":

Logic, whose object of knowledge is the categories, can therefore know these forms only again through a renewed embracing with other forms. The philosophical category is therefore form of form. Just as being is the "regional category" for the sensible-intuited material, so being-valid is the constitutive category for the nonsensible material. (FL, 25)

"Validity" means three things for Heidegger. First, validity means the "form of reality" of the "ideal" (UP, 113) character of the categorial or logical. Just as Plato's "idea of the good" is something "beyond being" which is supposed to enclose the "ideas," so "validity" is the form of logical categories as "what is valid"
(Geltendes), but which do not "exist" spatio-temporally in either
the psychical or the physical realm. The being of beings, which
according to Aristotle "is said in many ways" in the "schemata of
the categories," is at bottom "validity," "logical value":

For [the form of being-there belonging to the logical object] Lotze
has found the decisive term in the German language: next to an "it
is" there is an "it is valid." The form of reality of the identical
factor uncovered in the process of judgment can only be validity
(Gelten). The being-gold of the bookcover at the most is valid, but
it never exists. (UP, 170)

Lotze was led to a discussion of validity by means of the problem
of the manner of reality belonging to the Platonic ideas. Whether
his ingenious interpretation is historically faithful to Plato's
doctrine of ideas is here an open question. (UP, 170, n. 2)

Validity also means the validity of the meaning of the
judgement for the object known in the judgment. In the judgment
"the bookcover is yellow" "being-yellow is valid for or holds for
the book cover (vom Einband gilt das Gelbsein)." (UP, 175) The
predicate is valid for the subject. The copula "is" means "is valid
for," "holds for." "The being-valid of this for that signifies the
logical concept of the copula. Thus the question about the 'meaning
of being' in the judgment is taken care of." (UP, 178) The "meaning
of meaning" is also thereby accounted for as "meaning-structure":
the "being-valid of one significance-content (Bedeutungsgehalt) for
another." (UP, 175, 172)

Presupposed in the meaning of the empirical, a posteriori
"categorial statement" (UP, 177) - "the bookcover is yellow" - is
also the validity of the categories of "substance" (ousia, ti esti)
and "quality." The highest categories and the specific categorial
structures of the individual sciences (e.g., mathematics, history)
are the "valid" categorial meaning of the "sensible-being" known in
the judgment: "The linking of form (category) and material is
characterized as "meaning." For transcendental philosophy, knowing
signifies precisely embracing the material (the sensible) with the
category." (UP, 24-25, 33) In the form of the categories, meaning
is the "objective," the "such-being" of objects (UP, 173; FL, 27),
the "objectivity" of objects, the "thingness" of the "thangly." This
does not mean the actual is reduced to the ideal in a kind of
upside-down psychologism. Rather, without the realm of validity, the actual would have no "meaning" and could not be "known":

Frischeisen-Köhler...is quite correct: "Actuality is not a determination of thought or the validity of recognizing and accepting." But I know and can only know about actuality in and through what is valid. And only that of which I know and can know is for me in some form or other actual. The form of the actuality in question reveals itself in the judgment in question; the judgment is different..., if it is such a judgment about nature or psychical actuality, about the logical or the mathematical, or the metaphysical.... (UP, 166)

The primary locus of "truth" is thus the noematic meaning in the judgment, and the psychical activity of judging is called "true" in only a "derivative sense" (UP, 176):

Insofar as a significance-content is valid for the object of judgment as determining it, the judgment is true or false. The old concept of truth aequatio rei et intellectus can be elevated to the purely logical, if res is conceived as object and intellectus as determining significance-content. (UP, 176)

What is true is rather the content of the representation, that which we mean, the meaning. The judgment is meaning. (FL, 31, 38-41)

The validity or truth of meaning is a mixture of what Kant called the "transcendental truth" of the "objectivity" of objects, the a priori categories, and the empirical meaning of the object (UP, 176, 182; FL, 34)

Finally, validity means the validity of meaning for the judging subject in general. "Meaning which is valid acts as a norm for psychical activities of thought." (UP, 176; FL, 22, 34, 38) In this sense, validity exacts assent to or acceptance of the meaning of the judgment as "true." The "being-there" of the normative dimension of validity is something to which I automatically submit insofar as I know anything at all:

Epistemological-theoretical aspect of validity: Validity is the sphere in which I, as an actual subject must live, in order to know of anything regarding both its what and its that.

The simple representing, which gives me something objective, does not give me the existence of what is represented, the significance, but rather only its what as regards content. I only know of its existence again in meaning which is valid. (UP, 166)

Logic as the doctrine of categories and the system of sciences articulates the totality of the "conditions of knowing"
which are "valid" in the three senses of "valid": 1) unchanging ideal reality which enters into 2) the "valid" objective meaning of beings that is 3) "valid" and binding for the activity of knowing. Thus, logic is the precondition for dealing with the "epistemological problems" belonging to the "doctrine of knowledge" and "theory of science" (UP, 176; FL, 23).

Heidegger's Doctrine of Judgment "strives to be philosophical" in that it posits the task of a "pure logic" dealing with the "ultimate whole" of the "field of being" and knowledge. It is not "logic" in the narrow sense of a discipline merely alongside others, but rather the logos of the logos-structure of the whole in the sense of the ancient "first philosophy," the modern Kantian "transcendental logic" and, as we shall see, the metaphysica generalis of scholasticism. It sets its sights on the Seinsfrage, the being-question. Being is validity as the logical categorial-transcendental meaning of beings. Being is "logical value." Being is the logical ground of beings.

We now turn to an examination of Heidegger's habilitation writing. It is entitled The Doctrine of Categories and Signification in Duns Scotus. A few years after its publication the medievalist Martin Grabmann proved that the scholastic treatise which is Heidegger's main focal point - De modis significandi or Grammatica speculativa - was written in fact not by Duns Scotus, but by the Scotist Thomas of Erfurt. In order to reinforce our and Heidegger's point that the mind or the name of the author is not an essential criterion for the meaning of a text, we will continue to refer to "Duns Scotus" as the author of the treatise.

Heidegger's study of Scotus' treatise does not belong to "factual science" (KB, 196) in the sense of a "literary-historical evaluation of scholasticism" (KB, 195) concerned with the exact dating of manuscripts, the assignment of factual authorship and the description of the literary-philosophical contents of texts from a psychological-biographical viewpoint or from the point of view of schools and cultural periods (early scholasticism, high scholasticism, etc.). This is the "historical-genetic manner of treat-
ment"11 pursued by the philologically oriented philosopher Grabmann. (KB, 193) Heidegger's departure from such a method actually led to a break in relations between the two of them.12 Rather, Heidegger's study is a "problem-historical" or "theoretical-systematic" investigation which looks to the "noematic" meaning in the text. (KB, 399, 195) "In its meaning oriented analysis [the evaluation] does not sink into empirical-genetic explanations, but rather seeks to hold fast the objective meaning-content and does not interpret away what it discovers in 'meaning' ('Meinen')." (KB, 201) Here Heidegger claims to be following the "noematically oriented" (KB, 205; RP, 1) character of medieval thought in which "moments of phenomenological seeing are hidden, perhaps precisely here in the most powerful manner" (KB, 202). Medieval thought is phenomenology without the "phenomenological reduction." (KB, 202) In contrast to the "self-consciousness" and being "at home with itself" (bei sich selbst sein) of modern culture and its "reflection" (KB, 198) in modern subject-oriented scientific "method" ("the constant sharpening of the knife is boring when one has nothing to cut") (KB, 200; ZB, 419), in the medieval "life-attitude" (KB, 193) "the matter-(object)value dominates over the I-(subject)value....the individuality of the individual thinkers goes under in the face of the fullness of the material with which he has to deal." (KB, 198, 199) Heidegger can thus enlist medieval thought and particularly Scotus in the "battle against psychologism." (KB, 275)

Heidegger's study focuses on the systematic problem, the question, the "Sache" (KB, 211, 196), the topic with regard to the specific way in which it was "placed" or "set up" (Fragestellung) (KB, 197) in Scotus' text and others in the history of philosophy. It is these "beginnings" or "points of departure" (Ansätze) which "determine...the solutions" found in the various philosophies. (KB, 197; UP, 160)

More importantly, the "problem-historical" treatment is oriented to the "potency of the problem" (KB, 399). This "deepening" which leads to a "new beginning" is a "repeating" (wieder-
holen), an "uncoiling" (Auswickeln), a "drawing out" (Ausschöpfen). (KB,196-197) In fact, Heidegger claims that this activity is an essential characteristic of philosophy itself. "The history (Geschichte) of philosophy...has an essential relation to philosophy" (KB, 196), since philosophy is constantly repeating and working out "the same groups of problems." History is not the being-past of mere facts, but a constant repetition: "where history ceases to be merely the past, it drives the most effective thorn into the spirit." (KB, 197) "Progress" is not "Ent-wicklung," "development" in the sense of "advancing forward to new questions on the basis of previous solutions," but rather "Aus-wicklung," "development" in the sense of a constant "coiling out" of a certain "problem-region" which is "always beginning anew." (KB, 195-196) Philosophy finds itself in this "questionableness" as a "fact." (KB, 195) Essential to deepening problems is going beyond the philosopher's own "consciousness of the meaning" (KB, 211) of the text and understanding the content of his philosophy better than he did himself:

To be sure, precisely through this investigation of the fully determinate realm of the categorial, this side of the Scotist philosophy must be set out more clearly and sharply than it perhaps came to consciousness for Duns Scotus himself. However, that changes nothing with regard to the fact that everything which is to be presented belongs to the region of thought of the philosopher, and this alone is decisive. (KB, 211)

In fact, Scotus never spoke of a "doctrine of categories" or a "doctrine of meaning." This is part of Heidegger's "deepening." It would then hardly matter to Heidegger whether the text was written by Scotus or Thomas of Erfurt. What matters is "writing" (graphein) about the "life" (bios) of the text, bringing the "soul" (psyche) of the text to language (legein), not biography, psychology and indeed the very psychologism which it is attempting to overcome. Heidegger's approach here in this earlier text is what he will later call destructive retrieval.

The two systematic problems in the light of which Heidegger investigates Scotus' thought are the "problem of the categories" and the "doctrine of signification," i.e., of the logical struc-
tures of language. Both are problems with which modern thought has been preoccupied. By being "understood from the point of view of modern logical problems" (KB, 203), scholastic logic "takes on a whole new set of characteristics" and Scotus appears with "modern traits." (KB, 202-203) This leads to a "revision of the old established judgments about the stereo-type formalism of scholasticism regarding its 'slavish' relation to Aristotle, its role of 'hand-maiden' for theology." (KB, 194, 202) In turn, modern thought has much to learn from the ways in which the questions where placed in scholasticism, e. g., about phenomenology, the battle against psychologism, the problem of the categories, the doctrine of meaning, intentionality, the "tension" between the "gray on gray" of abstract philosophy and the fullness of concrete life's "green glowing tree." (KB, 203) In his study Heidegger will make Scotus speak like a contemporary, and make modern logic speak in the language of medieval thought. The result is neither the one nor the other, but a fusion of the two in the young Heidegger's ongoing shaping of the being-question out of the various periods of western philosophy. Heidegger's study also promises a study of "Aristotelian logic and metaphysics." (KB, 204) The history of western philosophy is to be grasped as the "history of the doctrine of categories." (KB, 202; 197, n. 3) The being-question is understood in terms of Problemgeschichte, the "history of problems."

Heidegger first deals with the doctrine of categories as a preparation for the main focus of his study, the doctrine of meaning. It is primarily in the first part that we can see how he thinks out being as ground. The "non-philosophy of psychologism" is assumed to have been overcome in the doctoral dissertation, and Scotus' thought is interpreted within the framework of the "pure logic" laid out in the early essays and the dissertation. (KB, 205, n. 10)

As in the dissertation, the approach here is phenomenological "intuition of essence":

The essence (eidos) is a new object. Just as the given of individual or experiential intuition is an individual object, so the given of intuition of essence is a pure essence.
The categorial cannot be arrived at "in an a priori manner" and "proved in deductive ways." It is accessible only to "the way of showing" (Aufweisen, Aufzeigen), "revealing" (manifestare), "bring-something-to-givenness," "categorial description" (KB, 213, 216, 268, 211):

What is the meaning of this showing? What is shown stands in itself before us and, figuratively speaking, can be grasped immediately. No detour through something else is required. The single thing which can be shown holds our gaze fast. Regarding our praxis in knowledge, we have the duty of only looking on, actually grasping what can be grasped, exhaustively drawing out the pure self of the presented. (KB, 213)

According to Heidegger, this is what Scotus had in mind with the term simplex apprehensio, "simple apprehension" or "simple having of an object" which, unlike the synthetic judgment, is "always true." Scotus' view itself goes back to the Aristotelian noein, for whose "being true" or "unconcealing" (aletheuein) the opposite is not falsity, but rather "non-perceiving" (agnoein). "Truth completes itself in givenness and does not reach beyond it." (KB, 267-268, 213) Accordingly, Heidegger speaks of the categories as "phenomena." (KB, 302, 328, 342)

Heidegger begins with Scotus' version of the medieval metaphysica generalis, the "general metaphysics" which deals with the transcendentia, the highest forms of categorial "meaning" which transcend each and every genus of beings. "Being" (ens) is the simple "objectivity" of objects and therefore the category of all other categories of objects:

*Primum objectum est ens ut commune omnibus.* This *ens* is given in every object of experience, insofar as it is simply an object. Just as every object of the sense of sight is a colour, be it white, black or multi-coloured, so every object in general is a being, regardless of what content it may present.

...This *ens* signifies the total meaning of the sphere of objects in general, the enduring moment in the objective. It is the category of categories....

This *ens* belongs to the *maxime scibilia.* This can be understood in a double sense. A maxime scibile is what is known first in a primordial manner: this is to be understood not so much in a temporal-genetic as in a logical meaning. The "maxime" here contains a logical-theoretical value-thought and characterizes the primordial element of the objective, namely, objectivity. Ens, taken as the maxime scibilia in the above meaning, signifies
nothing else than the condition of the possibility of knowledge of objects in general. (KB, 214-215)

The other three medieval "transcendental" or highest "conditions of objects" as "convertible" properties of ens are unum, verum, bonum: one (every "something is a something"), truth ("every object is a true object" in the sense of being "related to knowledge), good (every object is an object of desire and will). (KB, 216-217, 265) Heidegger leaves the "good" out of consideration because his interests here are primarily oriented toward mathematics and logic, and not towards meaning as it is encountered in the concrete practical world.

Following indications in Scotus, Heidegger proceeds to what scholasticism called metaphysica specialis, the simplest version of which took the form of dividing being into the domains of god (theology), world (cosmology) and soul (psychology). For Scotus the major "regions of objects" are the logical, the mathematical, the physical, the psychical, and the metaphysical. Each of these regions has its own categories, and it is the task of the respective "special metaphysics" to investigate these. From this point of view, the "Aristotelian categories appear only as a definite class of a definite region and not as the categories pure and simple." (KB, 153.) The ten categories of Aristotle's "first philosophy," which is the predecessor of the medieval metaphysica generalis, apply only to physical spatio-temporal objects and not to the logical itself, privation, and non-being. (KB, 263, 287)

After giving a lengthy discussion of the categorial structures of the mathematical and logical realms, Heidegger then devotes the second part of his study to an examination of language, which he takes to be a specific area within ens logicum, "logical being." (KB, 290) Even though all three modes have the same "noematic nucleus" (KB, 317), the modus significandi, the way that we speak of things, is founded on the modus intelligendi, the way that we understand things, which, in turn, is founded on the modus essendi, i.e., the way that things are and as such can be immediately intuited. He writes: "The logical forms have their own reality,
even when they are not linguistically expressed." (KB, 291) The linguistic expression is precisely and always the expression of meaning, what is understood. For example, the general function of the noun is to express "being," the known object as known object. Thus, the study of language, grammar, is a division of logic.

In order for the intrinsically "alogical" material sounds and letters to become an intentionally significative "expression," there is required a "signification-bestowing act" (KB, 299) which animates the word with a signification. Thereby, the word or words in the expression become a "significative sign": "The linguistic form is a sign of the signification (Bedeutung), the meaning (Sinn), which in turn is a "sign" of the object....Things stand in thoughts, and these are affixed to words and sentences." (KB, 295) Even though "for those who actually live in discourse" in their unreflective natural life the grammatical and the logical are "fused into one," philosophical analysis keeps them apart as different "regions of reality." It is the task of a pure universal a priori grammar or "doctrine of signification," which Heidegger finds in Scotus' De modis significandi or Grammatica speculativa, to determine the basic categories of signification (noun, pronoun, verb, etc.) and the a priori rules of their combination which animate all empirical languages, regardless of how drastically their empirical characteristics may vary.

As in the doctoral dissertation, Heidegger here speaks of being as logical ground in the sense of the meaning of beings. The ens logicum (ens rationis) actually cuts across all regions of being: "insofar as knowledge is sought and gained of them, all regions of reality are capable of being encountered through non-sensuous valid forms of meaning." (KB, 287, 279) Being as meaning is "being-valid-for" beings: "Being-valid-for (Hingeltungscharakter auf) the regions of objects to be known is characteristic of judgment as meaning and the categories from which it is built up."

"The homogeneity of the logical sphere of validity is based on intentionality, on the character of being-valid-for." (KB, 281, 283) Meaning is valid not in the sense of faithfully copying
reality, but rather as "constituting the real objects insofar as they are known." (KB, 278, 271) The objects only "virtually" contain what is given in meaning (KB, 271):

Through the judgment we have knowledge. The individual elements of this form of ordering are the categories. They are not derived from the real region of objects as mere copies. The real gives as it were only the stimulus (occasio), only offers the point of departure for the creating of ordering relations, which have no adequate correspondence in the real. (KB, 281)

Valid meaning as such is what makes up the ens tanquam verum (on hos alethes), being as truth, or "verum transcendens," "transcendental truth" which is convertible with ens, being. (KB, 268) Every being is "true" insofar as it can "assimilate itself" (KB, 267) to valid meaning by immanently "entering into" knowledge which, therefore, is always "true":

It is simply not possible to compare the meaning of a judgment with the real objects, for again I only know about real objects precisely through knowledge, judgment....Consequently Duns Scotus gives up [the copy theory] and decides for immanence-thoughts. The "reality of the external world" is not thereby "argued away"....The properly understood thought of immanence does not dissolve reality and the outer world does not evaporate into a dream, but rather precisely through the absolute priority of valid meaning all physiological, psychological, and economic-practical epistemologies are condemned, and the absolute being-valid of truth, the genuine objectivity, is irrefutably founded. (KB, 273)

The subjective "noetic" activity of judging is true only in a secondary sense insofar as it activates and becomes conscious of noematic meaning, which is "truth in itself," "truth as truth," "truth as valid meaning." (KB, 278, 284, 307, 272)

Being as valid meaning and truth does not "exist," but is a Dasein, a "there-being." The "total region of being" is articulated into the categories and the various "regions of objects." Being is the "there-being" of "logical place" (Ort) which consists of logical places:

It is more than a popular manner of expression of logicians when logicians speak of the logical place of a phenomenon. Underlying this expression is a definite conviction about the immanent structure based on the essence of the logical, which cannot here be explained further. This structure allows for the fact that every phenomenon belonging in the region of what can be thought requires a determinate place according to its content. Every place is
founded on a spatial determination, which as order is itself possible only on the basis of a system of relations. The "place" in its logical meaning is based likewise on order. What has a logical place is placed in and obeys in a determinate way a determinate whole of relations. (KB, 212)\textsuperscript{15}

Because the "totality of what is knowable" is in itself articulated in terms of this self-enclosed logical place, the whole of knowledge can take the form of a "system." (KB, 207, 209) Knowledge is systematic because being itself is system, a placing-standing-together. For every individual science one can "point to its place" in the "system of sciences." (KB, 212, 209) Each science has its own definitive "Fragestellung," placing of its question within its logical place. (UP, 180; KB, 196-197) Even though for the living subject the logical place functions together with the natural world of the psychical and the physical, it is an "autonomous" "in itself" "world of meaning" (UP, 186; KB, 278, 280), a pure "ideal" "kingdom (Reich) of validity...over and against sensible being" (UP, 113; FL, 24): "The 'ens logicum', i.e., meaning...has shown itself to be its own world over and against real being...." (KB, 290) The "pure logic" which investigates the pure "logical place" is "Erörterung des Geltens" (UP, 170, n. 2.), placing in the place of validity, topology as surveying, gathering, fixing the articulated place in the "framework" (Fachwerk) (KB, 209) of the sciences. The transcendentals as the highest categories mark off the outermost regions of the open logical-cosmic place (agora) beyond which one cannot step (transcendere). Ens, being as meaning, truth, validity is the "category of categories," the agora of agoras, the logical place encompassing the totality of all logical places.

Here in the very earliest writings we unexpectedly come across the later Heidegger's three primal words for his topic and his three ways: "meaning," "truth" and "place." We even find Heidegger using the words Sache and Weg, "topic" and "way." (KB, 213, 201, 196, 212) But here these terms point in the opposite direction of the later Heidegger's theme of being as meaning in the concrete world of mortals and gods, earth and sky. For the later Heidegger, meaning is hardly a logical framework of absolutely
valid truth that enframes the concrete world. Meaning is defined as temporality, truth as the dynamic process of "un-concealing," and place as the "place that happens." Heidegger's usage of these terms here in the earliest writings points in the direction of a metaphysical "Instrumentarium logicum" (KB, 223), a "logical apparatus" for grounding beings. As noted, Heidegger leaves the concrete practical dimension of meaning (bonum, the "good") out of consideration. Already we have seen that the earliest writings are taking their bearings from the doctrine of categories in ancient philosophy (Aristotle), scholasticism (Scotus) and modern philosophy (Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology). Not only does the later Heidegger consider the interpretation of being in terms of the categories to be the paradigmatic language of "metaphysics" (N 2, 78/41), but these three traditions are precisely the ones which he designates as the three stages of the "history of being" as metaphysics. In the earliest writings "meaning" is closer to the Platonic "idea," "validity" to the "idea of good," "truth" to the ideas as "most true or unconcealed," and "place" to the ideas as "intelligible topos." As we have seen, all this is given expression primarily in the language of modern Neo-Kantian transcendental logic, which in turn is brought into dialogue with scholasticism and ancient thought. Heidegger comes off sounding like a "Platonic value-philosopher."^16

Moreover, for the young Heidegger the ens logicum is ultimately grounded in the "translogical" "true reality and real truth" of the "absolute spirit of God." (2B, 405-406, 408, 252) Philosophy must fulfill itself in its "genuine optic, metaphysics." (KB, 408) The tradition exerting its influence here is the speculative theology of scholasticism and modern Hegelian theology. This translogical theological dimension introduced in the supplementary chapter, which was later added to his habilitation writing in the published book, will be discussed in detail in a later section.

2. Atemporal

As we have seen, what marks the work on Duns Scotus as an advance on the purely systematic concerns of the doctoral disserta-
tion is its "problem-historical" approach. Thus, there is after all a certain acknowledgment of time and worldly meaning in the habilitation writing. But after being acknowledged in the introduction, it is immediately again placed in antithesis to logical meaning and "suspended" in the body of the work.

Philosophy as pure logic, the doctrine of the categories, is said to be essentially a problem, which receives various "problem-placings" (Fragestellungen) (KB, 195) in the history of philosophy. Thus, this history as the "history of the doctrine of categories" (KB, 202, 197, n. 3), the history of the ways in which being has been understood from Plato and Aristotle through scholasticism to Neo-Kantianism and Husserl's phenomenology (KB, 204-205, 197, n. 5), belongs to philosophy. Heidegger even promises future studies of "Aristotelian logic and metaphysics" and the "history of scholastic logic." (KB, 204-205, 193-194) The systematic cannot be pursued apart from the historical:

In terms of the constancy of human nature it becomes understandable if the philosophical problems repeat themselves in history. In history there is not so much a development (Auszwicklung) in the sense of a constant progression to new questions on the basis of previous solutions. Rather, for the most part and regarding the major issues (in der Hauptsache), one finds an always more fruitful uncoiling and drawing out (Auszwicklung und Ausschopfung) of a limited problem-region. This always newly beginning effort directed toward a more or less identical (gleiche) problem-group, this pervading identity (Identität) of the philosophical spirit not only makes possible, but rather demands a corresponding understanding of the "history" of philosophy. (KB, 196)

According to the character of the development of all philosophy as an uncoiling of determinate problems, progress lies mostly in the deepening and the new beginning of the placings of the question. These determine the solutions nowhere so powerfully as in philosophy. A philosophy-"historical" treatment...will accordingly direct its attention to the placings of the problem.... (KB, 197)

Regarding the overcoming of psychologism and the idea of a pure logic, Heidegger refers back to his dissertation in the following way:

Cf. my dissertation...where Husserl's significance for the idea of a "pure logic" is indicated. However, its region of objects regarding its form of reality must still further be made a problem. But this can be made possible only with the systematic means of a
philosophy which is oriented in principle in terms of world-view. (KB, 205, n. 10; 183)

If the historical belongs together with the systematic, then "philosophical world-view," "value-philosophy" (KB, 191), belongs together with philosophy and logic as the doctrine of categories: "...Eduard von Hartmann...speaks of the 'decisive role', which the understanding of the doctrine of categories plays for philosophical world-view...." (KB, 202) What Heidegger understands by "world-view" is the way in which the problem of the categories is set up and worked out in a particular historical "placing of the question," insofar as "life" here plays a decisive role. The motivation for setting up the problem comes not only from philosophy itself. This is in a constant "tension" with the motivation arising out of the "values" of the "will to power" (KB, 193; ZB, 415) of a historical "life-attitude." The "life that lives" (KB, 206) demands not only logical "validity," but also "validity" for life. The history of philosophy can thus appear under the aspect of the "value-judgments of the philosophers." (KB, 196, n. 2) Every "placing of the problem" is at the same time a "personal taking up of a position" (Stellungnahme):

Like every other science philosophy counts as a cultural value. But at the same time what is most its own is to make the claim of validity and function as a value for life....Philosophy lives at the same time in a tension with the living personality, and draws out of its depth and fullness of life content and the claim of value. In this way, a personal taking up of a position lies for the most part at the basis of every philosophical conception. Nietzsche, in his pitilessly severe way of thinking and his plastic ability for description, reduced this being-determined of all philosophy by the subject to the phrase the "drive that philosophizes." (KB, 195-196; ZB, 426-427)

Each valuative world-view underlying the three main problem-placings - the Aristotelian, the scholastic and the Neo-Kantian- is characterized by "originality" and "autonomy." (KB, 203) Each "thought milieu," locus (lieu), is a "totally other." (KB, 203; ZB, 427) Unlike the "quantitative" and "homogeneous" time-concept in mathematical physics, the "time periods of history differentiate themselves qualitatively." (ZB, 431, 426) Since each stage of the history of philosophy is a "condensation" (Verdichtungen), "crys-
tallization," or "objectification of life" (ZB, 431), they cannot be approached naively through a "merely external comparison of finished thoughts which have been taken out of their context."

Philosophy is the time expressed in thoughts. Modern scientific "consciousness of method," which is characterized by the "drive and courage of questioning, the constant control of each step of thought," is a "reflection of modern culture in general," which through a self-consciousness of its self-unfolding has asserted itself as something new." (KB, 198) The non-philosophical forms of this new culture are Renaissance humanism, Protestant emphasis on faith, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, etc. Likewise, the objective noematic orientation of scholasticism is a reflection of the "whole life-attitude of medieval man," which is characterized by the "absolute devotion to and lively absorption in the traditional material of knowledge" (KB, 198) and above all by the "ground-structure" of the "primordial transcendent relation of the soul to God" (KB, 193):

The Middle Ages lack precisely what makes up an essential characteristic of the modern spirit: the liberation of the subject from being tied down to its surroundings, the consolidation and securing in its own life. The medieval man is not at home with himself (bei sich selbst) in the modern sense - he sees himself placed in a metaphysical tension; transcendence keeps him from a purely human attitude over and against the whole of reality....[theory of knowledge] remains tied to transcendence, to the problem of knowledge of the super-sensual. Being tied down means here not lack of freedom, the position of hand-maid, but rather a one-sided direction of the gaze on the part of spiritual life. (KB, 199)

Modern life is horizontal, subjectivistic, personalistic and spread out in the "width and breadth" (KB, 199) of its newly discovered worldly concerns. The "goal" of the "will to power of philosophy,...power in the sense of the intellectual violence of the so-called 'natural scientific world view'" that begins with Galileo, is "to become master over the manifoldness of the appearances through law." (ZB, 415, 419) Medieval life is vertical, impersonal, devotional, objectivistic and concentrated, even though this directionality does get reflected back and "taken up in one's own life" (KB, 200) in mysticism, moral life and asceticism. Here
the "will to power of philosophy" expresses itself not as self-assertion, but as concern for the soul's salvation in its dependency on God. The "living life of medieval scholasticism," its world-view, is to be found most clearly expressed in medieval psychology and in "mystical, moral-theological and ascetical writings." Heidegger even promises a "phenomenological in-depth study" of these writings, which will disclose the "living life" at work in 'abstract' scholastic philosophy. (KB, 205-206, 207)

Heidegger has come a long way from the purely systematic and logical concerns of his doctoral dissertation. The categories, the being of beings, show themselves as unique historical worlds and places in which concrete practical life is situated and lives. The Aristotelian categories, which reflect the naturalistic and ocular world-view of the Greeks, had to be supplemented in scholasticism, since its world-view was concerned primarily with the supernatural and the inner life of the soul. In turn, the objective orientation of both the ancient and medieval categories, and especially the way in which the 'hylomorphic' categories of "ancient and medieval nature-philosophy" were fitted to the simple "observation" of immediate "appearances," no longer sufficed for the self-assertiveness and will to "power" of the modern world-view, which pushed the categories in the direction of "method," calculative rules for the direction of the mind in its investigation of reality, and in the direction of Galilean mathematical physics and Kantian transcendental logic. (KB, 198-201; ZB, 418-419) Here, the "history of the doctrine of categories" in terms of these three "crystallizations" of historical world-view looks like the later Heidegger's "history of being" with its three major "constellations" or "epochs" of being - the ancient, the medieval and the modern-technological. Further, the "metaphysical urge" of 'philosophy of world-view' and 'value-philosophy' awakening in the nineteenth century demands a "new beginning" (KB, 197) in which the domination of mere "theory of knowledge" and the "natural scientific world-view" is held in check and the deeper dimensions of historical time and concrete life are introduced into the
categories. (ZB, 415-418) This looks like an approximation of the later Heidegger's "turn" in the "new beginning." The categories of being look like both meaning in the concrete world and historical time. If, as we have seen, the categories are "meaning," "truth" and "place," then here these are closer to the sense given to them by the later Heidegger than to the way they are developed in his doctoral dissertation and in the body of his habilitation writing.

But it only looks like this. Just as language and meaning belong to separate worlds, even though they are "fused into one" for "those who actually live in discourse," so in general the psychological and the logical, the real and the ideal, the historical and the systematic, world-view and the categories belong to different realms, even though they function together. As "problem-historical," philosophy does investigate the history of philosophy, the various "problem-placings," but only so that these can be "suspended" and reduced to the "problems in themselves," which make up the noematic meaning of the questioning. (UP, 160, 32) Philosophy still has a "systematic goal" (KB, 412):

If even the religious, political and cultural moments in a narrower sense of a time are indispensable for understanding the genesis (Entstehung) and the historical conditionedness of a philosophy, these moments can be disregarded, however, in the pure philosophical interest, which as such moves precisely only around the problems in themselves. Time, understood here as a historical category, is as it were suspended (ausgeschaltet). The various related solutions to the problem move together, centripetally directed to the problem in itself.

Therefore, the history of philosophy has an essential relation to philosophy so long and only so long as it is not "pure history," a factual science, but rather has projected itself into the pure philosophical system. (KB, 196-197)

Here Heidegger follows the Neo-Kantian idea of philosophy as the perpetual recurrence of identical questions, which Windelband had worked out. (KB, 202) He also uses the language of the Hegelian dialectic, according to which, even though ideas or categories only arise in the "for-itself" of historical life, they are as such to be "cancelled, preserved and elevated" (aufgehoben) (FL, 17) into the purely logical realm of the "in-itself." "...the entire seemingly pure historical investigation is elevated (gehoben) to
the level of a systematic-philosophical treatment." (KB, 204) The motto of Heidegger's habilitation writing is from Hegel: "...with regard to (in Rücksicht auf) the inner essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors." (KB, 193, 410-411) Heidegger has been influenced here also by Husserl's "intuition of essence" and "eidetic reduction," which 'leads back' (reducere) from the realm of "facts" to the realm of "essences" (eidos).

Seen from the point of view of the logical, the "uncoiling" of the problem-groups in the various historical "problem-placings" is precisely the realization of the "system," which happens as it were 'behind the back' of life:

[The connection of the problems themselves somehow as such with other such problems] cannot be overlooked, because no problem stands alone for itself, but rather always intertwines itself with others, emerges out of them and itself drives forth new problems. (KB, 197)

In fact [such a pure theoretical system of the sciences] is possible, if nothing more of it is asked than it can perform. There can be as it were only an outline of the possible main groups of the sciences and the nature of their relations, a framework, into which the new formations can be placed. (KB, 209)

This systematic framework is nothing other than the "logical place" which articulates the "totality of all that is knowable" into logical places with a "relational whole." (KB, 212) On the other hand, seen from the point of view of its "tension" with life, every "question-placing" is a world-view. But these two dimensions - the logical and the historical - are separate.

Consequently, in the body of his work Heidegger simply "suspends" the temporal and worldly dimension in which logical meaning is embedded. If, as we have seen, in his subsequent writings Heidegger brings being as meaning, truth, and place down precisely into the concrete linguistic, moodful, practical situatedness of the three epochs of western history (ancient, medieval, modern), here he is in fact busy "suspending" these historical worlds. Being as meaning, truth and place is purified of language, mood, practical understanding and time. This is similar to the Platonic "upward path" that leads from concrete understanding in
praxis and work to the pure "intelligible topos" of the "ideas" embedded in it.

Thus, even though the work on Scotus does show an awareness of the role of the historical, it does not represent an essential advance on the ahistorical logical concerns of the doctoral dissertation. There the talk is of how pure logical meaning is "deposited and stored in an individual subject" (FL, 35; KB, 275, 278), of how "we have to do with the strange fact, which conceals in itself a perhaps never completely clarifiable problem, that the logical is imbedded in the psychical." (FL, 30) Temporal psychical life thus serves only as the "first operational basis" (FL, 29) which is "gone through" (UP, 169) in order to secure the pure logical object. Essentially the same position is put forth, when Heidegger writes in his doctoral dissertation that "...the results of the research into the connection between logical experiences and the rest of the events of consciousness are completely worthless...." (UP, 112), and when he writes at the opening of the body of his habilitation writing that "...an enrichening or in general the making possible of the systematic-philosophical understanding of the doctrine of signification is not to be gained from [research into its historical conditions and its genetic formation]." (KB, 207)

Both works declare the "total" "heterogeneity of the psychical, therewith spatial-temporal reality and the logical." (UP, 85; FL, 23; KB, 275) These are two separate "worlds," the "hemispheres of beings and what is valid." (FL, 24) Even though for the living subject the logical "hemisphere" functions together with the psychical and the physical, it is an "autonomous" "in itself" "world of meaning" (UP, 110, 168; KB, 278, 280), a "pure" "ideal" "kingdom (Reich) of validity...over and against sensible being" (UP, 113; FL, 22, 24): "The 'ens logicum', i.e., meaning...has shown itself to be its own world over and against real being...." (KB, 290)

The one "world" is temporal, the other "world" is atemporal. The latter is "ideal trans-temporal identical meaning" (UP, 22,
168), which has nothing to do with "happening" (Geschehen) (UP, 154):

That which always has the character of what temporally runs its course, of being-activity, remains necessarily foreign to the region of pure logical theory. (UP, 164)

We know that the judgment of logic is meaning, a "static" phenomenon, which stands on the other side of all development and change, which therefore does not become, emerge, but rather is valid.... (UP, 179)

Meaning and signification...are subject to no change. They are timelessly and identically the same. (KB, 283, 301, 390)

For the young Heidegger, the God, in whom timeless logical meaning is grounded, is understood as "eternity." (KB, 410) The primal distinction, cutting across Heidegger's earliest writings, between being as grounding logical meaning as the stable presence of "atemporality" and grounded temporal beings, is summed up in the motto from Eckhardt used in his essay on the "concept of time in historical science": "Time is what changes and varies, eternity endures simply." (ZB, 415) In his review of a book entitled Temporality and Atemporality, Heidegger takes up the stereotype contrast of historical philosophical types as either Heracleitean or Parmenidean. With the author, he asks: "How is the chasm between the atemporal reality of abstract thought and the temporal reality of sensible perception to be bridged over?" With this contrast, he places himself in the metaphysical tradition running from Plato and Parmenides to rationalism and Kant. On the other hand, Bergson's investigations on the temporal flux of all experience is characterized as "Heracleitism." (B, 46; UP, 168) In the preface to the doctoral dissertation, Heidegger rightly describes himself as "the unhistorical mathematician." (UP, 61)

3. Judgment

Heidegger's dualism of a timeless world of meaning and a world of spatio-temporal existence has its counterpart in the equally traditional mind-body distinction. More precisely, this distinction lies in Heidegger's setting judgment off from other types of intentionality and his assigning it priority as the foundational intentional relation to meaning and beings in their
meaning. "All knowledge is always judgment." (UP, 174; KB, 268) All other forms of intentionality (mood, wish, command, question, art, practical discourse, religious belief) are seen to be "founded" on judgment. As we have already seen, the noematic meaning belonging to these derived forms of intentionality (world-view) is likewise interpreted as "founded" on the logical meaning of the judgment. This calls for explanation.

In its concreteness as both scientific and "pre-scientific" knowledge (KB, 306), judgment is "expression" (Ausdruck) or "assertion" (Aussage) (KB, 290, 301; UP, 177), i.e., a judgment about an object that is expressed in oral or written form. It is what Aristotle called "apophansis, logos apophantikos" (KB, 278), the sentence or proposition (logos) which brings to light, lets be seen (apophantikos). As such, it is also called by Aristotle hermeneia (interpretatio), "interpretation" as linguistic "expression" or "statement," and also kategorien, predicative accusing something of something in the open public (agora). For Aristotle, being is "said" (legetai), "interpreted," "accused" in many forms of accusation (kategoria) in open public (agora, polis).

Even though Heidegger is concerned with the judgment or assertion primarily as noematic meaning, the content of judgment, he does identify three moments within it as an intentional "correlation" between the subjective or noetic and the objective or noematic. These three moments are the noematic content, the noetic act-quality and the actual enactment of the judgment or assertion as this relation.

As we have seen, the intentional relation is a relation to a "Gehalt" (KB, 277; UP, 172), the "content," the noema, the object in its meaning. In the judgment as assertion, there are three noematic "strata" which have the same "noematic nucleus," but are "founded" one on the other (KB, 317-320): 1) the object (Gegenstand) in its intuitable "immediate givenness," "existence" or "being" (ens), i.e., the object as object (Gegenstand) in its "over against" (gegenüber) and "before us" character (KB, 223, 214) (modus essendi passivus, the passive mode of being, i.e., the
object insofar as it undergoes being immediately intuited); 2) the given object as known or judged (*modus intelligendi passivus*, the passive mode of knowing, i.e., the immediately given object insofar as it undergoes being known); 3) the known immediately given object as signified or expressed in discourse (*modus significandi passivus*). Every object that is known in a judgment is as such at the same time an immediately intuited object, but not vice-versa. An object can be intuited in its pure and simple existence without becoming the determinate object of a judgment (e.g., ‘this perceived object is a bookcover’, ‘the imagined object is a centaur’). Every object expressed in an assertion is as such at the same time an immediately intuited object understood in judgment, but not vice-versa. An object can be known by the intellect in a judgment without that judgment being ‘put into words’. But the same noematic nucleus (the yellow bookcover) maintains its identity through its strata or layers (the intuited yellow book cover, the judged yellow bookcover, the said yellow bookcover).

Another moment belonging to the judgment is the "relation" itself (*Beziehung*) to the noematic content, the "subjective side" of the intentional correlation. If the widest categorial meaning of reality is "being" as "objectivity" (*Gegenstandlichkeit*), "standing-against-ness," then the relation to this "logical place" is in general also characterized by this "over against" (*Gegenüber*):

Everything that stands "over against" the I in experience is somehow grasped. The "over against" itself is already a determinate viewpoint (a respectus), an explanation (*Bewandtnis*) of the object. Of course, there can be here no thought of a spatial distance and neighborhood. "Over against" is an expression borrowed from natural reality, which is used as an expression for the sensible relation of *consciousness*. Consciousness is an absolutely unique kind of relation. Just as everything standing over against me in natural reality is something different, as soon as I myself am differently localized, and just as nonetheless precisely in the "over against" an identical moment, the pure over against, remains, so it is with experience, consciousness. This relation of I to not-I remains as this primordially characteristic relation, when I as it were change "place," i.e., in understanding stand-over-against different objects. (*MB, 223*)
Consciousness, as the intentional relation to meaning, is 'understanding' (cf. *Verstehen*), standing in the midst of (unter) meaning as logical "place" and "neighborhood"; the "having" (*Haben*) (*KB*, 267; *UP*, 151) of the 'property' and 'estate' of meaning as the beingness of beings (*ousia*); a 'holding oneself' (*Sich-Halten*) to the 'hold' of the noematic "content" (*Gehalt*) in knowing 'comportment' (*Verhalten*). Heidegger calls this conscious standing-over-against "intellect" (*intellectus*) (*KB*, 215, n. 1), "thinking" (*cogitatio*) (*KB*, 277), "reason" (*ratio*) (*KB*, 275), and "noesis" (*KB*, 284), the pure rational perceptual knowing of the noematic meaning.

Like the noema, the noesis is also characterized by a hierarchical "being founded of various act-strata" or "act-qualities" (*KB*, 317, 319): 1) the intentional "act in which the immediate givenness comes to consciousness" (*modus essendi activus*); 2) the intentional act of understanding or judging (*modus intelligendi activus*, the active mode of knowing); 3) the intentional act of signifying in discourse (*modus significandi activus*).

The third moment which Heidegger speaks of is the "actual here and now enactment" (*aktuelle Vollzug*) or "performance" (*Leistung*) of the noetic-noematic intentional relation. (*KB*, 284, 319) The enactment is the actual 'intuiting', 'judging' and 'asserting', in either everyday life or science, in which an actual object, e.g., the yellow bookcover, becomes the object of an actual judgment. The enactment of the judgment as assertion is accordingly characterized by the three above-mentioned noetic-noematic strata, which are "meshed in one another" and "dependent on one another" (*KB*, 317).

First, involved in every judgment and assertion (*apophansis*) is the intuitive *apophainesthai*, the letting be seen or bringing to light of the object as "something given," an "object," a "being" (*modus essendi*):

Already in that I am in any sense conscious of a something (ens), that I make something into an object of my consciousness, the concept of determination has started to function. What is an
object stands in clarity, even if only in as it were twilight, which allows nothing further to be seen as something objective. If this first moment of clarity were missing, then I would not have absolute darkness; for in that I have this, it itself stands again in clarity. It must rather be said: I have absolutely no object, I live blind in absolute darkness, cannot move mentally in thought, thinking stands still. With the ens I win the first determination, and insofar as every ens is an unum, the first ordering in the manifold fullness of the objective. Determination is therefore something ordering in the given, it makes it graspable, knowable, understandable. (KB, 224, 214-215)

Heidegger refers to this letting be seen as "bringing-something-to-givenness," "pointing out" or "showing," "uncovering" (Aufdecken), "revealing" (manifestari), "making present" (Vergegenwärtigen) or "having present" (gegenwärtig haben). (UP, 123, 170; KB, 213, 216, 268, 302) Every judgment and assertion presupposes this intuitive bringing to light of an object, even when they are "false" and do not receive "objective fulfillment," i.e., show or grasp "the object in a determination which does not fit it." (KB, 268) In this case, the object is simply the intended meaning itself. Without phainesthai there would be no knowing and speaking whatsoever.

Second, the actual enactment of the assertoric judgment entails the definite "determining" of the object as something (modus intelligendi). This is the judgmental predication in which the object (subject) is shown in its valid meaning (predicate): "We can say that all knowledge is a seizing of the object, a determining of the object, where the concept of object is to be taken in the widest meaning....Something is seized, determined through something....What is valid of the object determines it at the same time." (UP, 175; KB, 280) "I look towards the book lying before me and judge, without being conscious of why: 'The cover is yellow'." (UP, 167) In this judgment lies both the categorial determination of the meaning of the object as "bookcover" ('the perceived is a bookcover') (category of substance) and the determination of the latter as "yellow" (category of quality). The valid meaning of the object of judgment is intuitively shown and understood in the form: "Of the cover being-gold is valid." (UP, 175) The categorial meaning of objects is the "view-point" (KB, 223) in the light of
which these objects are determined—as in the act of judgment. As we saw earlier, in addition to the transcendental categories, every specific region of objects (the physical, the psychical, the mathematical, the divine, etc.) has its own categories in the light of which these objects are determined (e.g., the categories of physical nature are roughly those of Kant's in the first Critique and Aristotle's in the Metaphysics). The categories are the "many ways" in which, according to Aristotle, "being is said."

Even though the act of judging takes place in various different situations and moments (Augenblick), the activated meaning of the object remains identical and non-situational:

To be sure, the situation of my consciousness has been different in all the various cases in which I made the judgment about the bookcover. The conditions that lead me to make the judgment vary...in all these 'modifications of consciousness' in the moment (Augenblick) of making the judgment, in all the dissimilarity of the points of time I encounter in each judgmental activity a constant factor - each and every time I intend to say: "The bookcover is yellow." (UP, 168)

Finally, the act of judgment that shows the object in a definite predicative determination (meaning) completes itself in the act of linguistic "expression" (Ausdruck) or "assertion" (Aussage), either written or spoken, in which the meaning is, as it were, "said out" (ausgesagt) and "communicated" to or "shared with" (mitgeteilt) the listener or reader (modus significandi):

In the enactment of the judgment "the bookcover is yellow" my psychical activity reveals and announces itself usually in a spoken or written sentence. When I speak or write, I say something, I want to communicate something; in the present case the being-gold of the bookcover, i.e., the static moment, is what is communicated, the content or the meaning of the sentence. (UP, 170)

...[language] can awaken in the consciousness of the listeners and those understanding the complete and perfect meaning of what is meant by the speaker with his discourse. The performance of language aims therefore at the perfect communication of the meaning of the discourse. (KB, 305)

Judgment as assertion is, as Aristotle indicated, kategorien (cf. praedicare), an accusation or addressing of something as something in a public gathering of people (agora), e.g., council meeting, court proceeding, public debate, the marketplace. As we have seen,
all linguistic communication is supposed to take place in accordance with the a priori grammatical categories of signification.

In summary, the enactment of the judgment, the noetic-noematic relation, is a showing making-present which determines something in terms of a fixed static meaning that is communicated.

Following Aristotle, Heidegger maintains that it is only the judgment which can be true or false. (UP, 175; KB, 268) It is the 'locus' of truth, since "...meaning can be spoken of only where reflection, consideration, construing, determining is present. Meaning stands in closest possible connection with what we in general call thinking...." (UP, 172) All meaning is at bottom "Urteilssinn" (KB, 272), the "meaning of judgment." Non-judgmental activity such as mood and desire either "...exist or do not exist like the 'flowing' of the electrical current, which stands outside the either-or of 'true and false'." (UP, 175)

Judgment functions, therefore, as the "nerve of knowing," and here Heidegger quotes Kant with approval: "But we can lead all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be portrayed as a capacity for judging." (FL, 30) This claim that "all knowledge is always judgment" means that all other forms of intentionality are "founded" both noetically and noematically on judgment:

Apart from the act of assertion, still other types of the subject's taking up a position to the state of affairs (Sachverhalt) are possible; it can be a wished, questioned, command, doubted state of affairs....Statements expressing command, wish, question and doubt are even today still not sufficiently clarified and set off from one another; especially unclear is their relationship to judgment. That Duns Scotus assigns them to the accidental modi, therefore to the founded functions of signification indicates that even he understands them not as mere simple acts, but rather as ones encumbered with varied complications....the above-mentioned modi can all be dissolved into [the assertion], since they all contain the state of affairs in some way colored through the act-quality. (KB, 387-388)

Of "emotional acts" Heidegger writes:

The interjection determines not even the content of signification belonging to the verb as such, i.e., the state of affairs which is meant; its determining function is directed to the relation of the linguistic act of signification to consciousness.
The concrete forms of the interjection arise in accordance with the various emotions (Gemütsbewegungen) such as pain, sadness, joy, admiration, fear and horror. (KB, 398, 360)

Because the "emotional-practical side of mental life" (the "world of ends, norms, values and goods" in "religion, belief, in the ethical, law and morality" and in "art") (UP, 91) is founded on judgmental noetic acts and presents only a subjective 'coloring' of logical noematic meaning, it is to be "left out of consideration" (UP, 113, 155) in the pure logic of philosophy:

Even logic must give attention to whatever it is that concerns emotional thought-acts; but the "acts" cannot be purely logical phenomena; they are closely tied up with the questions, which have always been a problem for logic. How these phenomena are to be fitted into (einzuordnen) a system of logic remains an open question. In any case, they are not logically given priority (vorgeordnet) over the problem of judgment, so that here they can remain out of consideration. (UP, 113)

The attempt to find the "foundation" of logic in "ethical willing, the willing of an ethical ideal" (Maier) (UP, 108-109)21, or the attempt to make meaning dependent upon the empirical languages22 used by man as a "social being" (KB, 293-294), invert the real 'order' of things (ordo essendi), and thus are to be rejected as "anthropologism," "psychologism" and "relativism." (UP, 110, 114)

"...the results of the research into the connection between logical experiences and the rest of the events of consciousness are completely worthless...." (UP, 112, KB, 207) The latter are only "accompanying phenomena." (UP, 111)

In the same way that, as we have seen, Heidegger "suspends" the various practical, historical world-views and considers only the foundational, atemporal noematic meaning of the respective form of the doctrine of categories, on the subjective side he "suspends" the corresponding founded types of acts (the practical "will to power," the "life-attitude" of ethical, political and religious experience), and considers intentional activity only from the point of its foundational logical "noesis," i.e., "thinking" which judges:

The acts of knowledge are considered not so much as psychical realities as rather with regard to their function, their performance (Leistung). Seen in this way, they belong no longer actually
in the sphere of psychology as a real-science of the psychical, but rather belong to logic, if not to the most characteristic sphere of phenomenology (and indeed that which is oriented primarily towards the "noesis"). (KB, 284; FL, 30)

If, as we have seen, the subsequent Heidegger is busy bringing the human subject down into the factical historical dimension of mood, practical understanding, and language, here he is busy taking the human subject out of this dimension. If the earliest Heidegger "suspends" the practical historical subject of the three major world-views (ancient, medieval, modern), the subsequent Heidegger "suspends" precisely the ahistorical theoretical subject supposedly standing outside these world-views. The earliest Heidegger "founds" the practical historical subject on the ahistorical theoretical subject, whereas the subsequent Heidegger founds the ahistorical theoretical subject on the practical historical subject.

What allows Heidegger to bracket practical life is his commitment to the traditional mind-body distinction. The necessary counterpart of the objective ideal-real, atemporal-temporal couplet is the subjective mind-body, noesis-psychical couplet. Just as spatio-temporal objects are bearers of an autonomous logical framework of timeless meaning (the "kingdom of validity"), and just as material letters and vocal sounds are "bearers of significations and meaning-structures" (KB, 295), so the individual psychophysical subject in general is the "bearer," the "vehicle" (Träger) of a "consciousness in general" (UP, 153) or "transcendental-logical" (FL, 19) "trans-individual I" which is "deposited" and "imbedded" (FL, 30) in the former:

Geyser's critique of the "trans-individual I" does not seem to me to be very accurate. The conception of this notion grew precisely out of the endeavour to make truth and its validity independent of the individual subject. The notion is to be understood purely logically as the system of valid forms of knowledge, which in any case are deposited and stored (eingelagert) in an individual subject in actual knowing, just as Geyser must require a "bearer" for pure intentional thoughts. (FL, 34-35; KB, 278)

With this concept of "noesis," Heidegger is appealing to the notion of an atemporal "mind" or "reason" apart from and ruling the embodied individual. This notion goes back to the Platonic-Aris-
totelian "active reason" (nous poietikos), the scholastic "soul" (anima) or "agent intellect" (intellectus agens) (KB, 275, 267), and the modern Neo-Kantian transcendental-logical consciousness, the cogito, the "I think" (KB, 277).

Even though in actual life ideal meaning and empirical spatio-temporal data are "fused into one" in the known object, word and signification in the expression, and the noetic and the psychical in the whole concrete person, logical-phenomenological reflection distinguishes these components as belonging to heterogeneous realms. Naive natural life does not make this distinction because it is absorbed in the realm of "prima intentio," first-order intentionality directed straightforwardly to sensible objects. One becomes aware of the logical dimension only through "secunda intentio," a second-order intentionality:

In natural life, thinking, and knowing, our consciousness is aimed towards real objects of immediate reality; scholasticism characterizes this natural attitude with the expression "prima intentio." Through a unique turning of the gaze it becomes possible to direct thinking to its own content, "secunda intentio." Everything existing in the metaphysical, physical and psychical world of objects, even the logical objects are taken up in the domain of the "secunda intentio." (KB, 279)

Empirical objects known by the concrete practical subject are indeed first in the ordo cognoscendi, the order of knowing, but they are second or founded in the ordo essendi, the order of being.

If "way" (KB, 213, 201) and "topic" (KB, 196, 212) are the enduring names in Heidegger's thought from start to finish, then here in the earliest form of his being-question they have precisely the meaning which he subsequently attempts to overcome in his "other beginning." For here "topic" of being as "meaning," "truth," and "place" means the grounding intelligible topos of metaphysics, and "way" in this topic means static theoretical 'seeing' and judging. Human being "lives" (KB, 280) in the "neighborhood" of logical meaning as the animal rationale, zoon logon echon, the animal (psychical) which has reason (noesis). We dwell in the logical "framework" of being, the "Instrumentarium logicum," as the technical enramer of beings as "objects." As the later Heidegger
indicates, his position here is that of "onto-logic," a "logical" relationship to being as logical validity.

In mapping out the two realms of being in terms of the doublets of logical meaning and world-view, the atemporal and the temporal, and the theoretical subject and the practical subject, Heidegger expresses this distinction at the same time as a kind of ontological option between two primordial possibilities of philosophical orientation. Philosophy "lives in a tension" (KB, 195) between these two possibilities. Accordingly, Heidegger sees the history of philosophy as divided into two traditions: psychologism and logic, or world-view philosophy and the doctrine of categories. One can "give priority" to either the practical historical realm or the atemporal theoretical logical realm. Heidegger's "decision" (UP, 92, 112) is to establish the logical as the "foundation," the "anchorage" (UP, 108, 109). He places himself squarely in the first "decision" of the "first beginning" of western philosophy. His philosophical position has to be seen as pure and simple "metaphysics."

The principal philosophical opponents he combats all move towards deciding the ontological option in favour of the other dimension of time and concrete life as the "foundation" on which the logical itself is "founded." In his own way, Heidegger will himself in time come to join this tradition when he attempts to redecide the whole history of western philosophy in favour of the other forgotten dimension of concrete worldly meaning, historical time and practical life.23 Logical meaning will no longer be interpreted as "something ultimate and unreducible, of which a further clarification is impossible." (UP, 171) The "meaning of meaning" will be seen indeed not in terms of psycho-physical processes, as in the crudest form of psychologism, but rather in terms of historical time in factical life. If one is to speak of a radical "reversal" or "turn" in Heidegger's thought, it is to be found more in his retractio of his earliest writings than in a move away from Being and Time to his writings in the 1930s. Progressively after 1918, he does an amazing about-face and reverses the
relationship of founding between logical meaning and world, atemporality and time, and theory and praxis. The three moments of the "leading question of metaphysics" - being as ground (logical meaning), being as presence (atemporality) and being as correlated to logos (judgment) - will be transformed into the three moments of the "ground question of metaphysics": being as world, being as historical time and being as correlated to human praxis. Ironical-
ly, the very philosopher whose views Heidegger was closely follow-
ing in his earliest writings, i.e., Husserl, will accuse him of "anthropologism" and "psychologism." 24

In the foregoing analysis, we have seen that the later Heidegger's unexplained statement that his earliest writings are a metaphysical "onto-logic" is well-founded. When his first major publication after the habilitation writing - i.e., Being and Time - appeared a decade later, it presented a full-scale critique of the position defended in his early publications, even though these writings were not mentioned by name. The basic concepts of meaning as logical "validity," 25 the "atemporal" 26 and "judgment" 27 are criticized and seen as "derived" from a deeper practical and historical dimension. In other words, this work is also a self-critique. But we are interested in seeing how this "self-overcom-
ing" and reversal first takes place in his writings after 1919, and how it begins even in the supplementary concluding chapter of his habilitation writing. Indeed, Being and Time itself cites 1919 as the decisive year in which he first developed his "hermeneutics of facticity." (SZ, 97, n. 1/102, n. i)

II. Metaphysical Epochs

A brief highlighting of the philosophical traditions which Heidegger is following in his doctoral dissertation and habilita-
tion writing will help to clarify the metaphysical character of the earliest form of his being-question. As we have already seen, he understands the history of philosophy as the "history of the doctrine of categories," and, more specifically, as the "uncoiling" of the three major "problem-placings," which build on each other. These traditions are the Platonic-Aristotelian, the scholastic-
speculative, and the Neo-Kantian-phenomenological. I will refer to these influences on his thought as "drafts" of his metaphysical question of being. Here, "draft" (from trahere, to draw) playfully means both a current of traditional thought that provided an essential impetus and set him underway on the course of his early thought and, also, the resulting drafting up, the tractatio, of his response to the metaphysical question of being. "Tradition" (from transdere) means here, then, literally "handing over" and "drawing over." I call the drafts of his metaphysical being-question the "Platonic-Aristotelian draft," the "scholastic-speculative draft," and the "Neo-Kantian and Husserlian draft." In order to understand his early relation to these traditions, we will also use the later Heidegger's accounts of his earliest thought as helpful indicators.

1. The Platonic-Aristotelian Draft

We begin with the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, which Heidegger later called the ancient "epoch" of metaphysics. The above discussion was oriented around the three principal moments in the "structure of the leading question of metaphysics": being as ground (valid logical meaning), being as static presence (atemporality) and being as correlated to logos (judgment, transcendental-logical I). Translated into the Aristotelian lexicon, which, as we have seen, Heidegger appeals to directly for support, these moments present themselves as: the "categories"28 (ousia, beingness), "idea" or "beingness" as "eternal being" (aei on), and the "statement," the apophantic logos (nous poietikos, "active reason").

It is with this clearly in mind that one must read the later Heidegger's accounts of his earliest interest in Aristotle, especially since these often either leave the exact nature of the influence in a state of ambiguity, or else hint at something beyond a shared metaphysical position.30 It was actually through Franz Brentano's work entitled On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle (1862) that Heidegger first encountered Aristotle in 1907 and "came across the question of being." (US, 88/7) The four
sections of Brentano’s book deal with the four senses which Aristotle ascribes to being: being in the accidental sense (on kata symbebekos), being as the true (on hos alethes), being in the sense of potentiality and actuality (to dynami kai energeia), and being according to the categories (Brentano gives this last sense the fullest treatment). The following year Heidegger began studying Aristotle’s own texts (FS, 56/21) (indeed "from the time he was eighteen years of age he spent an hour a day reading the Greek poets and historians"):

"How is your first experience of the being-question in Brentano actually to be understood?" "In Brentano" - you have in mind that the first philosophical writing, through which I worked again and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano’s dissertation: On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle (1862). On the title page of his work Brentano set down the sentence from Aristotle: to on legetai pollachos [being is said in many ways]. I translate: "beings become (i.e., with a view to their being) manifest in many ways" (das Seiende wird (nämlich hinsichtlich seines Sein) in vielfacher Weise offenkundig). Concealed in this sentence is the question which determined the way of my thought: what is the simple, unitary determination of being which permeates all its manifold meanings? This question awakened others: what then does being mean? (BR, ix-xi/viii-x)

In an indefinite enough way, I was concerned with the question: If beings are said in many meanings, then what is the leading fundamental meaning? What does being mean? (SD, 81/74; FS, 56; ZP, 47/201; SM, 54/55; V, 303)

The answer that Heidegger initially gives to the being-question discovered in Aristotle is that the "leading fundamental meaning" of being consists in the "validity" of timeless logical meaning (ousia, eidos), which is articulated into a manifold of categorial regions, and is known through judgment (logos apophanti-ikos). It was in this way that he attempted to determine the "total region of 'being'" in "its various modes of reality." It is in this sense that the earliest form of Heidegger’s being-question and his earliest interest in Aristotle are "to be actually understood."

During Heidegger’s earliest years, his reading of Aristotle remained for the most part captive to the traditional neo-scholastic interpretation of Brentano and the theologian Carl Braig (SD, 81-82/74-75), and to the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Emil
Lask. As already noted, the later Heidegger indicated that his own earlier doctrine of categories was a restatement of Aristotle's doctrine of categories in his Metaphysics. In his habilitation writing, Heidegger hinted at a study of "the ultimate and most difficult problems of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics" (KB, 204-205). This planned study has to be understood as part of Heidegger's projected revival of medieval thought and neo-scholastic Aristotelianism.

Likewise, Heidegger's adoption of the terminology of "value" and "validity" has to be seen as part and parcel of the Lotzean and Neo-Kantian form of Platonism, which, following the notion of "the idea of the good" as "beyond being," conceived the "ideas" as "values" or functions of "validity," which do not "exist," but "are valid." Later in his 1926 lecture course, Heidegger critically referred back to his earlier appropriation of the Lotzean and Neo-Kantian notion of "validity" in his habilitation writing and clearly characterized this type of philosophy as "Platonism." (LW, 64, 75, 62-68; HF, 42-43; GZ, 92/68, 102/75) As we have already noted, in his later 1940 lecture Nietzsche: European Nihilism, Heidegger referred to his habilitation writing and characterized his discussion here of "value" and "validity" (Geltung) as a modern version of Plato's "idea of the good" and as belonging, therefore, to the history of ontotheology, nihilism, and the forgetfulness of being, which runs from Plato, Kant's "categorical imperative," Nietzsche's concepts of "value" and the "will to power" to the Neo-Kantian "value-philosophy" of Windelband and Heidegger's former teacher, Heinrich Rickert, and to Scheler's "phenomenology of value." In his habilitation writing, Heidegger indicated that he would not be dealing with the medieval transcendental of bonum, but it was actually there in the background. His notion of validity as universal and unchanging value stands squarely in the heritage of Plato's "idea of the good." As we shall see, this Platonic orientation remains in effect also in the concrete and historical concerns of the conclusion to his habilitation writing, where he places the Lotzean and Neo-Kantian notion of validity into the
context of a Neo-Hegelian speculative teleology. Here, the notion of God as "absolute spirit," "universal validity and the existing-in-itself of meaning," "absolute validity," and "eternity" plays the role of Plato's idea of the good. This Platonic and the Aristotelian background to Heidegger's thought places it in what the later Heidegger called the ancient "epoch" of metaphysics.

(197,772),(944,806)

The Seinsfrage in the earliest writings has very little in a positive sense to do with the Seinsfrage in the subsequent writings. This word functions almost as a homonym. In the first usage, it means "metaphysics" or, as Heidegger says, "onto-logic," and in the second, it means the "overcoming of metaphysics." How the being-question and the relation to Aristotle actually functioned in Heidegger's earliest writings has to be distinguished from what they became in terms of their possibility in his subsequent thought. We will later see that the later Heidegger's statements that his question of being was derived from Aristotle really have to be understood as referring to his very different appropriation of Aristotle beginning around 1919. We shall thus also have occasion to discuss how at the same time Heidegger subjects the three metaphysical moments of his earliest Aristotelian lexicon for the being-question to a destructive retrieval.

2. The Scholastic-Speculative Draft

Turning now to the scholastic-speculative tradition, which Heidegger later called the medieval "epoch" of metaphysics, we note that the three moments of Heidegger's early metaphysical lexicon—being as ground (valid logical meaning), being as static presence (atemporality) and being as correlated to logos (judgment, transcendental-logical I) — can be translated into the following scholastic terminology, to which Heidegger appeals primarily in Scotus: the "transcendentals" (ens, verum) of metaphysica generalis and the "categories" of metaphysica specialis (KB, 214ff.), which are themselves grounded in the "absolute spirit" of God (KB, 408); the unchanging "categories" or "universals" and the "eternity" of God (KB, 410); and the "soul" or "intellect" (KB, 275, 287).
The scholastic tradition is above called "speculative" because of its theological element, and also because this tradition exerts its influence on Heidegger along with the speculative tradition of German idealism and romanticism. Even Aristotle's "first philosophy" shares this speculative aspect, insofar it ultimately becomes *theologia*, the science of god as the highest being. Before the specific influences on Heidegger's thought in this respect are discussed, it will be helpful to mention the full extent of Heidegger's theological background, since this dimension of his thought is often overlooked. But the later Heidegger himself refers to his thought during this period as "theological-speculative thinking." (US, 91/10) As his other later remarks on his earliest writings indicate, Heidegger was here working out here a form of what he later called "ontotheology."

The theological-speculative dimension in Heidegger's habilitation writing will be explored in more detail in the following section. It comes fully to light really only in the supplementary concluding chapter which Heidegger added to the published form of his habilitation writing.

Born in 1899, Heidegger grew up in a Catholic family (the father was sexton of St. Martin's Church in Messkirch). With a promising career before him as a priest, the fourteen year old went to the Jesuit Gymnasium in Constance (1903-1906), later transferring to the Jesuit Bertholds-Gymnasium in Freiburg (1906-1909). (L, 111/110) At the end of his secondary education, the twenty-two year old entered the novitiate of the German Province of the Jesuits at Feldkirch, Austria, but left after only a few weeks for health reasons. Immediately he entered the archdiocesan seminary in Freiburg, simultaneously registering at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg. After two years of theological studies (1909-1911), he left the seminary and gave up the idea of becoming a priest. This was again for health reasons, not because of a renunciation of the Christian faith and theology.

Even though in the following semester Heidegger changed faculties, he continued attending theological lectures (SD, 83/75),
and remained in contact with the seminary. He worked mainly under the Catholic philosophers in Freiburg (Finke, Schneider, Krebs) (UP, 61; KB, 191, 205, n. 9). He understood himself, and was known by others (e.g., Husserl), as a "Catholic philosopher." The majority of his early articles were published in the *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* (FS, 435-436). His choice of the philosophy of Duns Scotus as a theme for his habilitation writing must also be understood in the same light. Indeed, he planned "further works in the area of scholasticism and mysticism" (BG, 104): the "influence of Aristotle on scholasticism" (KB, 193, 204), "scholastic psychology" and "moral-theological and ascetical literature" (KB, 205), a "history of scholastic logic" (KB, 204), "Eckhardt's mysticism" (KB, 402; ZB, 415), a "contrast between Thomas and Scotus" (BG, 103), the "great task of a principal confrontation...with Hegel" (KB, 411, 193; FS, 56), the "problem of a scientific-theoretical treatment of Catholic theology" (KB, 410). Through the mediation of Krebs, Heidegger here sought the support of the medievalist Grabmann. Ultimately, his aim was to secure a "Catholic-philosophical teaching position." As a Privatdozent in philosophy, Heidegger was in 1916 considered as a "nominee for the chair of Catholic philosophy" in Freiburg. In 1917 Paul Natorp considered him for a position in the history of medieval philosophy at Marburg. Heidegger was given neither position, but between WS 1915/16 and WS 1916/1917 he shared the "delivering of philosophical courses for theologians" with the Catholic philosopher and theologian Krebs.

In addition to those mentioned above (Scotus, Eckhardt, Hegel), still other influences on the "theological-speculative" aspect of Heidegger's earliest thought are Schelling (FS, 56-57/21-22), Novalis (KB, 399), Schlegel (KB, 406) and Schleiermacher. According to Heidegger, the Catholic philosopher Maurice Blondel (*L'Action*, 1893) and the spiritualism of Ravaisson also exerted a influence on his earliest thought.

Heidegger also mentions the great influence of the theologian Carl Braig, the "last representative of the tradition of the
Tübingen speculative school, who gave Catholic theology significance and scope through the confrontation with Hegel and Schelling." (FS, 57/22) Heidegger began attending Braig's theological lectures in 1910, and through Braig Heidegger was introduced to the thought of Hegel and Schelling:

After four semesters I gave up theology and devoted myself entirely to philosophy. I still attended theological lectures in the years following 1911, Carl Braig's lecture course on dogmatics. My interest in speculative theology led me to do this, and above all the penetrating kind of thinking which this teacher made present in every lecture hour. On a few walks when I was allowed to accompany him, I heard for the first time of Schelling's and Hegel's significance for speculative theology in distinction to the doctrinal system of scholasticism. Thus the tension between ontology and speculative theology as the structure of metaphysics entered the horizon of my searching. (SD, 81-82/74-75).

Heidegger also used Braig's work On Being: Outline of Ontology (1896) as a guide along with Brentano's dissertation:

What does being mean? In the last year of my stay at the Gymnasium, I stumbled upon the book of Carl Braig, then professor for dogmatics at Freiburg University: On Being: Outline of Ontology. It had been published in 1896 at the time when he was an associate professor at Freiburg's theological faculty. The larger sections of the work give, at the end, extensive textual passages from Aristotle, Thomas of Aquinas and Suarez, and in addition the etymology of fundamental ontological concepts.... (SD, 81/74)

The major sections of Braig's treatise deal with "Being (Sein) in general," "the Essence of Beings" (des Seienden), "the Activity (Wirken) of Beings," and "the Purpose of Beings." It opens with a long and incredible quotation from Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum ("The Mind's Path to God"), which echoes many of the themes of Heidegger's own thought in the habilitation writing and in his later philosophy:

...being (esse) is what first enters the intellect....Marvelous then is the blindness of the intellect which does not consider that which is its primary object and without which it can know nothing. But just as the eye intent (intentus) upon the various differences of the colors does not see the light by which it sees the other things and, if it sees it, does not notice it, so the eye of the mind, intent upon particular and universal beings (entia), does not notice being (esse) itself, which is beyond all genera, though that comes first before the mind and through it all other things. Wherefore it seems very true that just as the bat's eye behaves in the light, so the eye of the mind behaves before the most manifest
things of nature. (Aristotle, \textit{Meta. II, 1}) Because accustomed to the shadows of beings (\textit{entia}) and the phantasms of the sensible realm, when it looks upon the light of the highest being (\textit{esse}), it seems to see nothing.... (\textit{Itinerarium mentis in Deum}, V, 3, 4)\textsuperscript{58}

In Chapter Five, we shall explore how after 1919 Heidegger still considers himself to be a Christian thinker, if not a Christian theologian, but in a radically new sense. But he is also a philosopher dealing with a philosophical concern, the being-question, whose significance is not restricted to the religious sphere. In his courses on the phenomenology of religion he will subject what we have called the scholastic-speculative tradition at work in his habilitation writing to a thoroughgoing critique from the point of view of the "original Christianity" of Paul, Luther and Kierkegaard. One must think primarily of this theological tradition, when Heidegger reports that without his theological background he would never have come upon the path of thinking. (US, 91/10) This other tradition serves as a model for an "other beginning" in both theology and ontology. We will see how in this destructive retrieval he transforms the above-mentioned three moments of the theological-speculative formulation of the being-question.

3. The Neo-Kantian and Husserlian Draft

In his earliest writings Heidegger is continually translating the lexicons of the Platonic-Aristotelian and the Scholastic-speculative traditions into the modern language of Neo-Kantianism, Husserl’s phenomenology, and other contemporary currents of thought. This indeed involves a translating back and forth, in that, for example, the phenomenological concept of intentionality is placed into the context of medieval psychology. But the language in which Heidegger is most at home is the modern one. Thus, excluding the theological-speculative dimension, Heidegger’s own metaphysical lexicon – valid logical meaning (being as ground), atemporality (being as static presence), and the judgment of the transcendental-logical I (being as correlated to logos) – is, roughly speaking, the lexicon of Neo-Kantianism and phenomenological logic. As already noted, the later’s Heidegger’s remarks on his
earliest writings place them into the context of the modern "epoch" of metaphysics, namely, that of "subjectivity" and "technology." Indeed, in his 1926 lecture course, Heidegger critically referred back to his habilitation writing, radically criticized the modern Lotzean, Neo-Kantian, and Husserlian logic tradition to which he had earlier subscribed, and even spoke here of the "technology of thinking."

After Heidegger gave up his theological studies, he registered in the "faculty of natural science and mathematics," and for two years (1911-1913) devoted himself to an intensive study of mathematics and natural science. Thus, one finds Heidegger displaying an advanced knowledge of physics (Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Planck) (ZB, 418-425) and mathematics (ZB, 218-265) in his early publications.

During this period he also attended the lectures and seminars of Heinrich Rickert, who, along with Windelband, represented the "South-West German" school of Neo-Kantianism. Rickert was co-director for Heidegger's doctoral dissertation, and the habilitation writing was also "submitted" and dedicated to him. In the prefaces to his two works, Heidegger wrote: "To him I owe the seeing and understanding of modern logical problems." (UF, 61) "The dedication is the expression of a debt of gratitude...." (KB, 191) In his pursuit of a "pure logic," Heidegger appeals to the "transcendental philosophy" (UF, 153, 176) of Rickert's The Object of Knowledge, specifically regarding Rickert's notion of a transcendental subject (FL, 34, n. 2; UP, 153) and his distinction between the "two worlds" of spatio-temporal reality and the "validity" of logical and mathematical truth (KB, 276, 285). It was probably in Rickert's seminar "Epistemological Exercises in the Doctrine of Judgment" that many of Heidegger's ideas for his doctoral dissertation were worked out. With his "psychologism"- "pure logic" schema Heidegger places himself directly in the Neo-Kantian tradition of both Rickert's school and the so-called "Marburg school" (Cohen, Natorp):
The question [of whether psychologism or transcendentalism was established in Kant's philosophy] has been decided today in favour of the transcendental-logical interpretation, which since the 1870s has been represented basically by Hermann Cohen and his school as well as by Windelband and Rickert. According to these, Kant had not inquired in his critique after the psychological origin of knowledge, but rather after the logical value of its validity. For the problem we are dealing with, this logical Kant interpretation and its development is important, insofar as the intrinsic value of the logic has been emphasized. (FL, 18; UP, 63)

In this respect, Heidegger also acknowledges the "stimulus" provided by the mathematical and logical writings of Bolzano, Frege, Meinong (FL, 20, 26), Whitehead and Russell (Principia Mathematica) (FL, 41-41). In his long discussion of the essence of the mathematical in his habilitation writing, Heidegger relies heavily on Rickert's work on "the concept of number." (KB, 218, 227, 231; FL, 28) In fact, Heidegger's original theme for his habilitation writing was the "logical essence of the concept of number." Heidegger's description of himself as the "unhistorical mathematician" (UP, 61) can be taken in the double Platonic sense of mathesis, which means both unchanging a priori knowledge and the mathematical as the paradigm of this kind of knowledge.

When Heidegger left the seminary in 1911, he wanted to go to Göttingen to study under Husserl, but financial problems forced him to complete his studies in Freiburg. He had been reading Husserl's Logical Investigations (1901) "from 1909 onwards" (FS, 56/21), and he expected help from it for the question of being he had discovered in Brentano's dissertation:

Both volumes of Husserl's Logical Investigations lay on my desk in the theological seminary ever since my first semester there.... From Husserl's Logical Investigations I expected a decisive aid for the questioning stimulated by Brentano's dissertation. Yet my efforts were in vain because I was not searching in the right way. I realized this only very much later. Still, I remained so fascinated by Husserl's work that I read it again and again in the following years without gaining sufficient insight into what captivated me. (SD, 82/75)

Heidegger also studied the writings of Emil Lask on judgment and the categories, which mediated between Rickert's Neo-Kantianism, Husserl's phenomenology, and Greek philosophy (FL, 24, 33; KB, 205, 406).
From 1909 onwards I attempted to penetrate Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, although without the proper guidance. In Rickert's seminars I got to know the writings of Emil Lask, who, mediating between the two, attempted also to listen to the Greek thinkers. (FS, 56/22)

Both of Emil Lask's writings - *The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories, A Study of the Dominant Realm of Logical Form* (1911) and *The Doctrine of Judgment* (1912) - themselves showed clearly enough the influence of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. This circumstance forced me to work through Husserl's book anew. (SD, 83/78)

In these early years Heidegger sees himself as carrying forward Husserl's project of a "pure logic" laid out in the *Logical Investigations*:

We attach far-reaching significance to Husserl's penetrating and very appropriately named investigations; for they have genuinely broken the spell of psychologism and set in motion the above-mentioned clarification of principles....in his "Prolegomena to a Pure Logic" Husserl was the first to lay out systematically and comprehensively the essence, the relativistic consequences and the theoretical valuelessness of psychologism. (FL, 19-20; UP, 84; KB, 205, n. 10)

Likewise, the "doctrine of signification," which Heidegger explores in the context of Scotus' thought, is taken directly from Husserl's "Idea of a Pure Grammar" in his *Logical Investigations* and the first volume of his *Ideas* (1913). (KB, 327) In his doctoral dissertation, Heidegger relies equally on Rickert's, Lask's and Husserl's terminologies, but in his habilitation writing the "terminology of phenomenology" (KB, 310) becomes predominant: "meaning," the three moments of "intentionality" ("noesis," "noema," "performance"), "act-strata," "expression," "pure consciousness" (KB, 405). As we have also seen, the "method" of Heidegger's investigations is Husserl's phenomenological "seeing," "intuition of essence," what Husserl calls "categorical intuition" in his "Sixth Investigation."

If Heidegger understands Husserl's phenomenology as having incorporated the essential themes of Neo-Kantianism and winds up in the end identifying more with phenomenology, the "being-question awakened by Brentano's writing, nonetheless, remained in view." (BR, xiii/xii) His doctoral dissertation is ultimately "in the
service of the ultimate whole" of the "total region of 'being'" (Sein) in its "various modes of reality." The habilitation writing deals with the same topic in the form of the doctrine of categories. Although still in the sense of metaphysics, these writings already speak of being in the terminology of the later Heidegger's three thought-paths: being as meaning, being as truth and being as place. In the supplementary chapter to his habilitation writing, Heidegger will explicitly discuss his "genuine optic, metaphysics" and promise a future "investigation on being (Sein), value and negation." (KB, 406; 407, n. 5) But, as this indicates, Heidegger is at this point still using Husserl's phenomenology as an "aid" for a being-question which remains entangled in metaphysics.

When the later Heidegger reports that his thought would not have been possible without the "basis" which had been prepared by Husserl's Logical Investigations (SZ, 51/62), this statement obviously cannot be understood in the sense of Heidegger's first appropriation of Husserl's text. Rather, it refers primarily to his subsequent and very critical appropriation beginning around 1919. Thus, in Chapter Five we shall see how Heidegger's destructive retrieval, centering on Husserl's notions of "truth" and "categorial intuition" in his "Sixth Investigation," radically transforms the three moments of the phenomenological formulation of the being-question, which we have identified as noematic meaning (being as ground), this meaning as a static eidos or essence (being as presence), and noesis (being as correlated to seeing and judgment).

The three major "problem-placings" of the "history of the doctrine of categories," which Heidegger sketches out in his habilitation writing (that is, the Aristotelian categories, the scholastic categories, and the Neo-Kantian-phenomenological categories), are the three traditions with which he himself closely identifies in his earliest writings. The "uncoiling" of these three constellations is seen as a "progressive building" (Weiterbildung) (FL, 24) which culminates in the pure logic of Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. This history is what the later Heidegger will call the "history of being" as metaphysics, the three epochs (the
ancient, the medieval and the modern) in which the "first begin­ning" for being unfolds itself in human understanding, but in distorted ways. Whereas the earliest Heidegger follows this history straightforwardly, the later Heidegger will attempt precisely to overcome it. Being and Time, Heidegger's first major publication after his habilitation writing, singles out precisely the three major periods of the tradition for its "destruction of the history of ontology." (SZ, 29-30/43-44) As already indicated above, this work has to be seen also as a self-critique of his earlier naive absorption in the tradition. But, in Part Three, we will see how the Heidegger after 1919 already thematizes the history of western philosophy as the unfolding of these three major periods, subjects this history to a destructive retrieval, and so at the same time undertakes a self-critique.

After 1919, Heidegger will "de-stroy" or "un-build" each of these major traditions so as to discover behind them a concealed dimension of being in terms of time and factual life. More specifically, behind each of these traditions Heidegger finds and rehabilitates an "other" anti-metaphysical counter-tradition, which he turns against these traditions themselves. Behind Aristotle's doctrine of categories in the Metaphysics, he will uncover the concrete historical world of Aristotle's Ethics and the dynamic reality of Aristotle's notion of physis in the Physics. Behind the hardened conceptuality of scholasticism, he will unearth the concrete historical concerns of the primitive Christianity of the New Testament, which gets reawakened in the upheavals of Luther's and Kierkegaard's thought. Behind the epistemological-logical framework of Husserl's phenomenology, he will find the dynamism of time in Husserl's notion of "truth" in "categorial intuition." Heidegger uses all these archeological discoveries of a different arche for philosophy as models for his repetition of the being-question running through the whole tradition in its three major periods. The Heidegger who emerges after 1919 is a "romantic" Heidegger, since the spirit of his philosophizing is that of a passionate rebellion and rallying cry for a revolutionary new
beginning. He wants nothing less than to shake the history of western philosophy to its foundations. As we shall see, he called this his "destruction" of philosophy.
Time is what changes and varies, eternity endures simply. (Meister Eckhardt) ("The Concept of Time in Historical Science," 1916) (ZB, 415)

...it must in principle be called a disastrous error of philosophy as "world-view" when it contents itself with a spelling out of reality and does not aim at a breakthrough into the true reality and the real truth, which is its most authentic calling. (The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus, 1916) (KB, 406)

CHAPTER FOUR
THE WAY OF TRUTH (ONTOTHEOLOGY)

In Chapter Four, I would like to discuss briefly Heidegger's early ontotheological formulation of the question of being, where being is pursued ultimately in terms of a divine ground. But we shall begin by first exploring the influences of certain antimetaphysical, counter-traditions on his early development. I would like then to discuss how these influences effectively manifest themselves only in his later supplementary conclusion (1916) to his habilitation writing and in his essay on "The Concept of Time in Historical Science" (1918). As we shall see, in these texts he moves towards a fundamental decision of what we have called his ontological option between timeless logical meaning and concrete historical meaning, that is, a decision in favour of the latter. Here he critically pushes the three moments of his initial metaphysical being-question in the direction of the three moments of what he will later call the "ground question" of metaphysics, which we have discussed in Part One. These three moments showed themselves as being as world, being as correlated with human praxis, and this world-praxis correlation as time. In his early essay on history and in his conclusion to his habilitation writing, these moments will appear as "world-view," "living spirit," and "history." But we shall also have to show how he explores these moments
in the wider foundational context of a theological-speculative metaphysics (ontotheology), whose three moments are the "validity of value" based in the "absolute spirit of God," a "teleological" subject, and "eternity."

I. Anti-Metaphysical Traditions

As a preparation for exploring Heidegger's destructive retrievals of the philosophical tradition beginning in 1919, it will be illuminating to look briefly at the presence of certain anti-metaphysical, counter-traditions in his earlier development and at the limited role that they play here especially in the supplementary conclusion to the habilitation writing, which makes a break with the exclusively logical concerns of the body of the work. His critique of the metaphysical tradition with the help of models from the counter-tradition does not appear ex nihilo in 1919, but rather arises as the result of earlier such concerns and influences gaining the upper hand over his initial logical conception of philosophy and his identification with the metaphysical tradition.

The later Heidegger reports that during his earliest years he was reading much more than Aristotle, Scotus, and Husserl:

In 1905 I read Stifter's Colored Stones for the first time....
In 1908 I found my way to Hölderlin through a still preserved Reclam booklet of his poems.
In 1909 I began my four years of theological studies....

What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 brought cannot be adequately expressed, but only hinted at through a few items given in a selective enumeration: the second, significantly enlarged edition of Nietzsche's Will to Power, the translation of the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke's poetry and Trakl's poems, Dilthey's Collected Works. (FS, 56/22; US, 88/7)

Regarding Heidegger's theological studies, it needs to be noted here that this included not only the scholastic-speculative tradition (scholastic Aristotelianism, dogmatics, cosmology, mysticism), but also the more concrete and historically oriented traditions of the Old Testament, the Gospels, Paul's Letters, Christian art, moral theology and "hermeneutics," the theory of the
interpretation of Scripture.¹ During these years Heidegger also studied history.²

If the earliest Heidegger found all the above-mentioned traditions and their concrete historical concerns "exciting," this hardly shows up in his writings from this period. Rather, these concerns and traditions take second place to Heidegger's logical concerns stemming from the tradition of metaphysics. The "tension" that Heidegger sees in philosophy between its practical historical and its theoretical systematic concerns is also very much a "tension" in his own thought during this period. In the preface to his doctoral dissertation, Heidegger signals this tension in his thought by saying that, as "the non-historical mathematician," he nonetheless has a "love and understanding for history." (UP, 61)

But even though, as we have seen, the tension is resolved in favour of a logical foundation, and the other dimension is "suspended" and left to be dealt with only as something "founded" once the logical foundation has been established, this equilibrium was soon to snap. When one considers Heidegger's religious personality and his theological background, his fascination with the passionate existential thought of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, his attraction to the art of Hölderlin, Rilke, and Trakl, and his interest in Dilthey's "philosophy of life," then he appears as an electric charge waiting to go off. Such a personality could not long remain satisfied with "pure logic." Indeed, each of the above traditions, explicitly or implicitly, subjects western thought to a critique from the point of view of its failure to do justice to concrete historical life. Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Dilthey attack the very foundations of western philosophy as a whole, and call for a radically new orientation.

Heidegger's authorship begins actually not in philosophy, but rather in theology and poetry. At first glance, this authorship might appear quite trivial, but it is nonetheless very telling, since it signals an 'other' Heidegger than the young representative of logical problems. Heidegger's very first authorship consists of an essay on the eighteenth century Viennese preacher Abraham a
Sancta Clara (1910) (AS, 1-3) and three poems: "Dying Splendour" (1910), "Hours on the Mount of Olives" (1911), "We Shall Wait" (1911). (PG, 5-6) These publications of the almost still teenage Heidegger and also the later Heidegger's descriptions of his early life ("The Field-Path," "On the Secret of the Belltower") (ED, 87-90, 113-116), show us a very provincial and intensely religious young man who has grown up in a sheltered rural world. The poems speak of the "dying splendour" of summer's last days, of the "angel of 'grace'" to whom "my young being" has been entrusted on the Mount of Olives, and of "waiting" in a springtime garden for the "world-hymn of joy." The essay on Abraham a Sancta Clara ends as a sermon:

That the external culture of our times and its fast-paced life would only look ahead more with a backward glance! The frenzied innovation turning everything upside down, the crazed leaping away over the deep spiritual content of life and art, the modern meaning of life guided by the continually shifting stimulus of the moment, the occasionally suffocating muggy sensuosity in which every kind of modern art moves - these are moments that point to decadence, to a sorry fall from healthiness and the other-worldly value of life. (AS, 3)

The later Heidegger's essays on his early rural beginnings describe how daily work, the ceremonial ringing of the church bells, the round of Catholic festivals and the passage of the seasons "maintain their own relationship to time and temporality." "The expanse of all growing things which tarry around the field-path bestows world. In the unspoken of their language is - as Eckhardt, the old master of letter and life, says - God, only God." (ED, 88/33, 89/35)

The mysterious fugue (Fuge), in which the church festivals and the passage of the seasons and the morning, afternoon and evening hours of each day fitted themselves (ineinanderfugten), so that all the time a ringing passed through the young hearts, dreams, prayers and games - it is no doubt this, which with it shelters (birgt) one of the most enchanting and wholesome and enduring mysteries of the tower, in order to bestow it continually transformed and non-repeatable until the final ringing in the shelter (Gebirg) of being. (ED, 115-116)

As we have previously noted, the "world," the "temporality" and the rustic life of the southern German countryside became a model for
Heidegger's later thought: "...the youth's game and the elder's wisdom gaze at each other." (ED, 90/37) Likewise, it is not until the 1930s that Heidegger's early encounters with Hölderlin, Rilke, Trakl, Stifter, and Nietzsche grow into effective identifications with their thought. (US, 88/7)

In light of where Heidegger's thought was before his early logical writings and where it would go afterwards, these writings seem to display an ascesis, both a denial and a disciplining. He had just switched from the theological faculty and had to serve his apprenticeship and prove himself in the 'discipline' of philosophy. If he wanted to be a philosopher, he had to learn the language of the community of practicing philosophers. This language was not only the language of the entire philosophical tradition, but also and primarily the language of Neo-Kantianism. In those days Neo-Kantianism was running rampant in Freiburg. "Within the framework of the Neo-Kantianism at that time, a philosophy had to satisfy the demand of thinking in a Kantian way, critically, transcendentally, if it was to find an audience as a philosophy." (SD, 47/44)

Heidegger could not long remain satisfied with the logical concerns he was pursuing, and once the formal requirements for entrance into the philosophical faculty as a lecturer had been satisfied, he was all the more free to announce his independence from Husserl (KB, 205, n. 10; 404, n. 4) and Rickert. The preface attached to the book form of the habilitation writing states that the dedication to Rickert "...wishes, however, at the same time to express the conviction, as a completely free adherence to one's own 'standpoint', that the problem-conscious, world-view character of philosophy of value is called to a decisive forward movement and deepening of the philosophical working out of problems." (KB, 191) The conclusion (1916), which was written a full year after the submission of the habilitation writing (KB, 191), announces Heidegger's restlessness and rebellion against his earlier logical conception of philosophy: "...this is now the appropriate place to allow the spiritual unrest a chance to speak, until now suppressed, which the philosopher must always experience in the study of the
historical formations of his world of problems." (KB, 400) Likewise, Heidegger's essay "The Concept of Time in Historical Science" (1916), which is a reworked version of his 1915 "trial lecture" (FS, 436), opens with a Nietzschean note of dissatisfaction with logic and epistemology: "In the last few years a certain 'metaphysical impulse' has awoken in scientific philosophy. Standing still in mere epistemology no longer suffices....One will have to interpret this as a deeper conception of philosophy and its problems, and see in it the will of philosophy to power...." (ZB, 415)

Even though the supplementary conclusion to the habilitation writing is a "conclusion" and consists of only twelve pages, it can be seen as a separate work, which, along with the essay on the concept of time, interprets the body of the habilitation writing and the doctoral dissertation, and subjects them to a destructive retrieval. Therefore, this conclusion and the essay on time were previously not fully drawn into the above discussions of the earliest form of Heidegger's being-question. They represent a krisis in Heidegger's thought (the first of many to come), both in the sense of a "trial" or "contest" and its "decision." Heidegger moves in the direction of re-deciding the ontological option or tension between the logical and the historical in favour of the latter. He had "suppressed" the dimension of concrete historical life in the body of the habilitation writing and in the other logical writings, but in the conclusion it reasserts itself.

The conclusion is entitled "The Problem of the Categories," and here Heidegger focuses on the "potencies of the problem" and poses three "fundamental requirements" which must be worked out if the doctrine of categories is not to remain in a state of "death-like emptiness." (KB, 399) The conclusion is to a great extent influenced by Hegel, and Heidegger's use of the term "requirement" (Erfordernis) harkens back to Hegel's Differenzschrift where the "need (Bedürfnis) for philosophy" is posed in terms of the need to overcome the forms of "alienation" in modern culture. Heidegger's three "requirements" can be seen as an expression of those hitherto
"suppressed" 'needs' of his thinking, which derive from his rootedness in the 'other' counter-traditions. Heidegger had tried to become a phenomenological Neo-Kantian, but he found out soon enough that he could not. Instead, he enters the 'romantic' phase of his development in which he rebels against his own origins and those of western thought as a whole.

II. The Problem of the Categories

Heidegger's three requirements or tasks in the "problem of the categories" focus on the three moments of the being-question. His previous logical-metaphysical articulation of these moments—logical meaning, timeless validity, and the judging subject—are pushed in the direction of the "depth dimension" (KB, 407) of "world-view," "living spirit" and "history." Nonetheless, metaphysical aspects still remain present in this new formulation of the being-question.

1. World-View

The first requirement is the "descriptive delimiting of the various regions of objects into categorial realms that are non-reducible to one another." (KB, 400) Included in this is the task of grasping the categories as the "elements and means of the clarification of the meaning of what is experienceable," and overcoming the merely conceptual and logical character of the categories: "Here a strictly conceptual and in a certain sense one-sided presentation was demanded with a conscious suspension of the deeper metaphysical connections of the problem." (KB, 400-401, 407) Categorial meaning has to be seen as "translogical" (KB, 405) and "ontic" (KB, 406), i.e., as "immanent" (KB, 401, 407) in a concrete living "world-view," a "world of experience" (KB, 406, 409). In this worldly "context of meaning" (KB, 401, 405), meaning appears as a practical telos (KB, 406), "value" (KB, 405), "goal-bestowing meaning" (KB, 402). Meaning is here not reduced naturalistically to mere "fact-material" (KB, 402) or psychologically to an "irrational" dimension of experience (KB, 410), but precisely as meaning is seen as concretely and factically immanent in a lived world. Heidegger reintroduces being under the aspect of the
transcendental bonum, which had been left out of consideration in the body of the habilitation writing.

Once this is done, the problem of the "form-matter relation" (KB, 405) and the "application" (KB, 407) of the categories to actual experience becomes superfluous, since meaning is already in and 'applied' to the concrete world. The logical is the "'gray on gray'" (KB, 203) conceptual expression of immanent meaning in the concrete world. Thus, the doctrine of categories in scholasticism, and especially the notion of "analogy," is the "conceptual expression of the qualitatively fulfilled, valuative and transcendence-related world of experience of medieval man;...of the determinate form of inward human being-there (Dasein) which is anchored in the fundamental transcendent relationship of the soul to God." (KB, 408-409) Scholasticism is not a form of lifeless rationalism, but rather the world of "mysticism" bringing itself to conceptual expression and clarification:

The two contrasting pairs of rationalism-irrationalism and scholasticism-mysticism do not cover each other. And where an attempt is made to equate them, it rests on an extreme rationalization of philosophy. As a rationalistic construction detached from life, philosophy is powerless. As irrational experience, mysticism is goal-less. (KB, 410)

What Heidegger poses as a requirement and problem is that the "transcendental-ontic understanding of the concept of the object," the "principle of immanence" (KB, 407), is to be somehow included in the doctrine of categories. He poses this only as a problem and does not here solve it. In the introduction to the habilitation writing, Heidegger does already speak of how a world-view underlies each of the three main versions of the doctrine of categories (Aristotelian, scholastic and Neo-Kantian), but what marks the presentation in the supplementary conclusion as a new position is that here the dimension of world-view is not "suspended," but rather seen as an essential aspect without which there really could be no doctrine of categories at all. In fact, Heidegger characterizes world-view no longer as "founded" noematically on logical meaning, but rather as "deeper" than the logical, epistemological expression of meaning. Making his critical intention
quite clear, he writes concerning the notion of "validity":
"Whether it signifies a unique form of 'being' or an 'ought' (Sollen) or neither of these, but rather is to be grasped only through deeper lying groups of problems, which are contained in the concept of living spirit and doubtlessly closely connected with the problem of value, will here not be decided." (KB, 405) The deeper dimension of validity is the validity of meaning in a world-view, of objects in a world-view, and for "living spirit" which lives in a world-view.

2. Living Spirit

The second requirement for the doctrine of the categories is the "placing of the problem of the categories into the problem of judgment and the subject." (KB, 401) Firstly, this means that the categories are inseparable from the judging subject: "Category means the most general form of determination of the object. Object and objectivity have meaning as such only for a subject. In this subject objectivity is built up through the judgment." (KB, 403) The body of the habilitation writing had indeed thematized the noetic relation to meaning, but without clarifying its status. The doctoral dissertation had in fact declared the "total heterogeneity" of objective meaning and the subject. (UP, 85)

Secondly, the above requirement points to the nature of the subject and to the "the individual act-strata...and their relation among each other" (KB, 401): Within the richness belonging to the directions of the formation of living spirit, the theoretical attitude is only one.... (KB, 406) The epistemological subject does not clarify the metaphysically most significant meaning of spirit, to say nothing of its full content. And only if it is placed into this meaning of spirit will the problem of the categories receive its genuine depth-dimension and enrichment. (KB, 407)

"Living spirit" (language, emotion, practical understanding) appears as the "deeper" founding noetic strata for the theoretical, judicative strata of the subject. If the deeper dimension of categorial meaning is the "value" immanent in a world-view, then the necessary subjective correlate, for which meaning functions as value, has to be a practical "teleological" subject: "For the
theory of truth, this (translogical context of meaning) signifies the task of an ultimate metaphysical-teleological clarification of consciousness. In this consciousness, the valuative already lives in a primordially genuine manner, insofar as it is a meaningful and meaning-realizing living act..." (KB, 406)

Just as meaning in the sense of concrete world-view does not entail the naturalistic reduction of meaning to "fact-material," so the concrete "living spirit" does not signify that meaning-intentions are psychologically "neutralized in the concept of a biologically blind factuality" (KB, 406), but rather points to the concrete practical character of intentionality. "Historical science has as its object man not as a biological object, but rather insofar as the idea of culture is realized through his spiritual-bodily performances." (ZB, 426) Heidegger is here beginning to step outside of the simplistic doublets that he had formerly set up in terms of the two worlds of logical meaning and brute spatio-temporal factuality (eidos and fact), and of the trans-individual noetic I and dumb spatio-temporal psychic processes (mind and body). This also means that the doublet of "pure logic" and "psychologism"-"relativism" is also beginning to collapse. The problem is not, as it formerly was, to somehow "bridge over" (B, 46) the two realms of meaning and fact, mind and body, but rather to see meaning and the living subject as already a concrete bridge that has been broken asunder into two abstract sides. In this non-psychologistic sense, Heidegger appears to be moving decisively towards reversing the relationship of "founding" that he had formerly set up between the theoretical, judicative subject and the practical, living subject. Again, the task of situating the categories into this dimension of "living spirit" is left as a problem, and not solved by Heidegger in the supplementary conclusion.

3. History

The third requirement in the problem of the categories is that "history" is to be introduced into categorical meaning. This means, firstly, that living spirit is to be seen as historical-
teleological "performance" (Leistung) or realization of categorial meaning:

The living spirit is as such essentially historical spirit in the widest sense of the word. True world-view is far from the mere selective existence of a theory that has been detached from life. Spirit is only to be grasped when the whole abundance of its performances, i.e., its history, is elevated up (aufgehoben) into it.... (KB, 408)

Heidegger takes up Dilthey's theme that historical life is a process which objectifies itself in cultural forms:

In its abundance and variety of forms, this creating of culture runs its course temporally, undergoes a development, is subject to various transformations and deformations, takes up the past, in order to work on it further or to combat it. Within and in conjunction with the associations and organizations, which are likewise created by it, this human creating of culture is in its ultimate basis the objectification of the human spirit. The historian is interested in the objectification of spirit, which is enacted (sich vollziehend) in the course of time.... (ZB, 426)

This transformative historical enactment of meaning is clearly quite different from the performance of the judgment, which, as we have seen, involves the passive activation of static meaning that is supposedly not effected by the concrete historical situation in which the act of judgment occurs. Heidegger's motto for the conclusion of the habilitation writing is a passage from Novalis that indicates the historical conditionedness of knowing: "Everywhere we seek the unconditioned (das Unbedingte) and find only conditioned things (Dinge)." (KB, 399)

Heinrich Ochsner reports the following remarks by Heidegger from 1916: "The immanent structure of philosophy is a back and forth between meaning and being. In this duality lies the tragedy of the philosopher." "Searching for oneself and not being able to find oneself is the inner rhythm of philosophy." What Heidegger is moving towards in all the above is the conception of historical life and meaning as a past that is "taken up" as an "enduring and increasing means" (KB, 408) and applied within the present situation:

...what interests the historian - it has been said - is only the historically effective (Wirksame)...."The choice [of the object of historical study] is based on the historical interest, which the present has in some effect, the result of a development.......The selection of the historical from the abundance of what is given is
based on a relation of value. The past has meaning only when seen from the present. (ZB, 427)

Likewise, the categorial meaning immanent in this historical life must itself somehow be historical, a historical "cosmos," and this has to be taken account of in the doctrine of categories:

History and its cultural-philosophical and teleological clarification must become a sense-determining element for the problem of the categories, if one wants to consider working out the cosmos of the categories, in order to move beyond an impoverished, schematic table of categories. (KB, 408)

The fulfillment of this requirement would give the "genuine conceptual, cultural-philosophical foundation" for "living into" and understanding the "individual epochs of the history of spirit," for example, the Middle Ages. (KB, 408; ZB, 428) That is to say, this flexible conceptuality would be capable of doing justice to the "immanence" of categorial meaning in unique historical worlds, and would not dissolve concreteness into the "death-like emptiness" of a merely formal, logical doctrine of categories. Heidegger is here influenced by Rickert's distinction in "concept-formation" between "individualizing" thought in the human disciplines and "generalizing" thought in the natural sciences, a distinction which Heidegger also acknowledges in Dilthey and Simmel. (ZB, 433; KB, 353)6 This problem of the historical element in the doctrine of categories and of "how 'unreal' 'transcendent' meaning guarantees us true reality and objectivity" (KB, 406) is not solved in the conclusion of the habilitation writing, but Heidegger gives some guidelines for working out the "individual category" of "time" in the essay on historical science.

He begins not with a "theory" of time but rather with a description of the "factual function" of this concept in "historical science as a fact." (ZB, 417-418) His procedure is to move from the "goal" of historical science to the "function" that the concept of time plays in this goal and finally to the "structure" of the concept that allows it to fulfill this function. The goal of historical science is the understanding of the past from the point of view of cultural values: "The goal of historical science is...to present the effective and developmental context of the objectifica-
tions of human life in their individuality and uniqueness, which become understandable through their relation to cultural values." In historical science, the "function" of the concept of time or "a time" is to serve as a touchstone for the authentication of historical "sources" and especially "documents." The authentication of a document (e.g., a papal letter) requires that its "form, style and content" correspond to the unique characteristics of the "epoch" for which it is to serve as a "source" (e.g., papal conventions). (ZB, 429-430) Likewise, the unique characteristics of an epoch function as the "context" (e.g., "Christian antiquity") for interpreting the significance of the historical "facts" available in the "sources" (e.g., Augustine’s writings). (ZB, 430)

In order to fulfill these functions, the "structure" of the concept of time must consist of 1) not the indifferent now-points of the "homogeneous" concept of time in natural science, but rather unique historical times; 2) not the mathematically lawful succession of now-points in natural science, but rather a succession which is not subject to a law; and 3) not the quantitative time of natural science, but rather the "qualitative" time involving "significance" (Bedeutsamkeit) and "value" for human life. (ZB, 431-433) "The qualitative character of the historical concept of time signifies nothing other than the condensation - crystallization - of an objectification of life that is given in history." (ZB, 431) The "principle of historical concept-formation" is "the relation of value." (ZB, 433) Thus, the concept of time always involves an "individualizing" type of understanding. Even quantitative determinations of time in historical science (chronology) draw their meaning from the underlying qualitative character of the historical content (e.g., the dating of a famine, the measurement of time in historical accounts of war, the beginning of the calculation of time from significant events such as Christ’s birth, founding of Rome, Christmas). "Dates are only convenient markers for counting, which are, however, without meaning when considered in themselves, since for each number another number can equally
stand in its place, if one only shifts the starting-point of the counting." (ZB, 432)

Heidegger's introduction of meaning as world-view, the subject as living spirit and history as the "depth-dimension" of philosophy looks like his later "other beginning" for philosophy. However, these three moments are given expression in the context of a theological-speculative "optic, metaphysics." (KB, 406) The ontic, trans-logical dimension of meaning is seen ultimately as the "true reality and real truth" of the "absolute spirit of God." (KB, 406, 408) The "metaphysical-teleological clarification of consciousness" is centered on the spirit's "eternal affirmation" (Fr. Schlegel) of the divine, and entails the Christian conception of an eternal soul. Heidegger's notion of a "deeper, world-view essence of philosophy" (KB, 410) does not remain solely within the historical, but still hangs on to the notion of the atemporal "validity of value" (Rickert) and of an eternal God:

In the concept of living spirit and its relation to the metaphysical "origin," we are given an insight into its metaphysical ground-structure, in which uniqueness and individuality of acts is combined in a living unity with universal validity and the existing-in-itself of meaning. Objectively expressed, this is the problem of the relationship of time and eternity, change and absolute validity, world and God, which reflects itself theoretically and scientifically in history (formation of value) and philosophy (validity of value). (KB, 410)

Heidegger here appeals to the medieval "form of inward human being-there anchored in the transcendent primordial relation of the soul to God" (KB, 409) which teleologically runs its course in time and is then presumably taken up into the "absolute spirit of God." Even though medieval man is oriented objectively towards tradition, the universal and the transcendent, all this gets "reflected back" and "taken up" (KB, 200) in the concrete situations of "individual personal life" (e.g., mysticism, moral life, asceticism):

Transcendence does not signify a radical distancing from the subject, which loses itself - there is precisely a life-relation built on correlativity, which as such has no single fixed directional meaning, but rather is to be compared to the back and forth flowing stream of experience in mutually attracted spiritual individuals....The positing of value does not gravitate exclusively
to the transcendent, but rather is as it were reflected back from this abundance and absoluteness and rests in the individual.

This is why even in the entire medieval world-view there lies a whole world of multifarious differentiations of value, indeed because this world-view is in such a radical way consciously teleologically oriented. (KB, 409)⁸

Medieval man lives in a "tension" between the universal and the particular, eternity and time, God and world. Heidegger contrasts this medieval attitude with the one-sided individualism and relativism of the modern attitude, which tends to lose itself in a "flighty breadth of content," "growing insecurity and complete disorientation." (KB, 409, 200, 198) At the close of the concluding chapter, Heidegger also singles out Hegel's theological-speculative thought as a model, since it attempts to mediate philosophy and history, universality and particularity, God and world:

The philosophy of the living spirit, of active love and of worshipful intimacy with God, whose most general directions were only able to be indicated, and especially a doctrine of categories guided by its fundamental tendencies stands before the great task of a principal confrontation with the system of historical world-view, which could not be more immense and powerful in its richness and depth, its wealth of experience and concept-formation, and which as such has elevated into itself all previous fundamental philosophical problem-motives - i.e., with Hegel. (KB, 410-411)

The ultimate direction of the three moments of Heidegger's proposed transformation of the doctrine of categories turns out to be meaning as based in an absolute divine ground, a historical subject oriented teleologically to the eternal, and the elevation of history into the atemporal validity of values and the eternity of God. This religious metaphysics is a long way from Heidegger's earlier "pure logic," but it is still an expression of what the later Heidegger calls the "ontotheological constitution of metaphysics," which conceives of being as an eternal divine ground. Heidegger's essay on the concept of time begins with the motto from Eckhardt: "Time is what changes and varies, eternity endures simply." (ZB, 415) Moreover, this essay does not attempt to show that, as Heidegger will later maintain, the concept of lived historical time is the basis of the mathematical concept of time in physics. Following Dilthey's and Rickert's distinction between the
historical human sciences and the natural sciences, Heidegger argues simply for the "complete otherness" of these two concepts of time. (ZB, 433; KB, 353, n. 26)

In the supplementary conclusion to his habilitation writing, Heidegger does give a harsh critique of philosophy as logic and epistemology, but he believes that his concrete historical "requirements" can be accommodated within the language of the metaphysical tradition. Even though he wants to place philosophy into the "depth-dimension" of history and the concrete life, he is still hesitant about giving up the notions of timeless meaning (value), the teleological subject, and the eternity of God. His thought is still uncertainly balanced in the "tension" of his ontological option between an atemporally and a temporally oriented philosophy.

Only beginning in 1919 does he decide his ontological option unequivocally in favor of historical time and concrete life. Here the young Heidegger will begin to speak for the first time about the "destruction" of philosophy," the "end of philosophy," and an "other beginning." Since he himself in his earliest writings stood naively in the metaphysical tradition which he endeavored to "destroy," his overcoming of metaphysics is at the same time the "bitterness of self-overcoming." It is to this theme of overcoming in the years from 1919 to 1926 that we now turn.
Skepticism is a beginning, and as the genuine beginning it is also the end of philosophy....This situation is not the saving coast, but rather the leap into the driving boat, and now everything depends upon getting the rope for the sail in one's hand and looking towards the wind. (Phenomenological Interpreta-
tions of Aristotle, 1921-22) (PA, 35-37)

PART THREE
THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER (1919-1925)

In Part One, we saw how the unifying "topic" and "way" of Heidegger's thought can be articulated into the following three basic characteristics: 1) his destruction of the first metaphysical beginning for the being-question (ground, logos, and presence), 2) his retrieval of an other non-metaphysical beginning (world, praxis, and time), and 3) his constant thinking-further of this other beginning. What I propose to do in Part Three of my study is to show that each of these three characteristics can already be found in Heidegger's youthful period. I will treat the young Heidegger's destruction of the philosophical tradition in Chapter Five, his retrieval of the being-question in Chapter Six, and his notion of thinking-further of the being-question in Chapter Seven.

I also want to emphasize that the young Heidegger executed each of these elements in a unique way. Whereas the young Heidegger takes up certain anti-metaphysical counter-traditions (Husserl, Kierkegaard, and Aristotle's ethics) which give his thought a concrete existential-phenomenological character, the later Heidegger identifies with a different set of counter-traditions (Pre-Socratics, Nietzsche, Hölderlin) which give his thought a somewhat speculative, mytho-poetic character. As we shall see, the young Heidegger's "topic" is not the "meaning of being," the "truth of being," or the "topos of being," but rather, as he puts it, the "phenomenological existential topic" of "life = there-being, being in and through life."
CHAPTER FIVE
THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

On May 9, 1923, he had already told the students in his course *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity* that, as far as he was concerned, philosophy was over. (Bzs, 82)

In the present chapter, I wish to give a reconstructive account of the young Heidegger's version of his enduring theme of the "end of philosophy." That is to say, I wish to give a systematic exposition of the young Heidegger's "destruction" of the three "epochs" of the first metaphysical beginning for the being-question. As we have seen, these epochs are the ancient, the medieval, and the modern. The young Heidegger's critique of these epochs is usually directed towards a specific representative figure. In the case of ancient philosophy, it is the Aristotle of the Metaphysics. Likewise, Augustine is singled out for taking over Neo-Platonic philosophy and thus preparing the way for scholasticism. In the modern period, Husserl is subjected to a critique for taking over the modern and especially Neo-Kantian project of "pure logic" and "rigorous science."

I also want to show that, in his destruction of the history of metaphysics, the young Heidegger also uncovered certain anti-metaphysical counter-traditions 'behind the back' of traditional metaphysics. He retrieved these traditions into his own other beginning for the question of being. Behind Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics he uncovered and appropriated Aristotle's practical philosophy, behind medieval scholasticism the long tradition of what he called "original Christianity" (Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard), and behind modern Neo-Kantianism Dilthey's philosophy of life and Husserl's "Sixth Investigation." Thus, in examining Heidegger's destructions of the tradition, I will also examine the influences on the young Heidegger's thought. Heidegger's own attempted rethinking of the being-question was very much at the same time an attempt to radicalize and reformulate these
anti-metaphysical influences on an explicit ontological level. Therefore, I will refer to these influences on his thought as "drafts" of his proposed project of rethinking the being-question as the question of "Being and Time," i.e., being as time. As we have already mentioned in Part Two, "draft" (from trahere, to draw) here playfully means both a current of traditional thought that provided an essential impetus and set him underway on his own course of thought and, also, the resulting drafting up, the tractatio, of his new response to the being-question. "Tradition" (from tra(ns)dere) means here, then, literally 'handing over' and 'drawing over'. I call the drafts of "Being and Time" the "phenomenological draft," the "Kierkegaardian draft," and the "Aristotelian draft." I will discuss each of these drafts as what Gadamer has called a "fusion of horizons."

In Section I, entitled "The Hermeneutical Situation," I will provide a preliminary explanation of the young Heidegger's "way" for approaching his "phenomenological existential topic" of "being in and through life," i.e., the general perspective with which the young Heidegger approached the whole history of western philosophy. This is what he calls the "hermeneutical situation," i.e., interpretation within an historical situation. He saw this situation as being characterized by the fact that all traditional metaphysics has been a "falling-away" from the "origin" of "being in and through life." By "theorizing" and "objectifying" this factual life, metaphysics led to an "de-living" (entleben) of life, "un-life" (Entlebnis), a loss of the origin. Thus, the young Heidegger thought that this situation called for a thorough "destruction" of traditional philosophy, which "un-builds" it back into the origin of factual life. He thus called his philosophy a "pre-theoretical" "original science," a "science of the origin." This destruction was to bring about the end of philosophy. Second, this science was to retrieve the being-question in terms of the forgotten dimension of factual life. And this was to be done also through a retrieval of certain anti-metaphysical counter-traditions, which could provide an "formal indication" for effecting an other beginning for the
being-question "in and through life." Finally, Heidegger's resulting philosophy was to be the articulation of what he called "formal indication" or "hermeneutical concepts," which in turn were to be destructively repeated and thought-further in new hermeneutical situations. The three moments of the young Heidegger's "way" in his "topic" of "being in through life" were destruction, retrieval, and interpretive thinking-further.

In Section II, entitled "The Way of the Phenomenon," I will explore how the young Heidegger criticized the guiding moments of the Neo-Kantian and Husserlian-phenomenological notion of being, which Heidegger described in the following way: being as objectivity and ideality, being as correlated to theory and judgment, and being as atemporality. He un-built these moments by seeing them respectively as "de-worlding" (Entweltlichung), "de-living" (Entleben) and "de-historicization" (Entgeschichtlichung). Together they constitute a "falling-away" (Abfall) from "factual life." But in the notions of "being" as "givenness," "fulfilled" and "unfulfilled" intentions, and "truth" as "making present," which Husserl discussed in the Sixth Investigation of his Logical Investigations, Heidegger found helpful clues for thinking out the temporality of factual life. Thus, Heidegger's critique of the modern tradition was also a "self-overcoming" of his own earlier and naive identification with the "pure logic" and "rigorous science" of Neo-Kantianism and Husserl's phenomenology.

In Section III, entitled "The Way of Suffering," I will discuss how the young Heidegger un-built the theological-speculative tradition stretching from the Middle Ages to Hegel, which, on the basis of Greek conceptuality, had thought being as the causality of God, as correlated to an a quietistic aesthetic-ocular contemplation, and as the nunc stans of God's eternity. But Heidegger went back behind this speculative-theological tradition to the "primordial Christianity" of Paul's Letters (rediscovered in Augustine, the young Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard), which stressed the being of God as the Crucified encountered only in factual life, as correlated to the concernful praxis of the whole
person, and as a historical "coming to presence" (parousia) in a historical "situation" or "moment of vision" (kairos). Thus, Heidegger's critique of scholasticism was also a "self-overcoming" of his own earlier and naive absorption in speculative ontotheology.

In Section IV, entitled "The Way of Praxis," I will explore how the young Heidegger destroyed the conceptuality of western philosophy at its very origins in Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, which had thought being as "idea" and "substance," as correlated to theory and judgment, and as "eternal being." But behind Plato's metaphysical writings, Heidegger focused on the early practical Socratic dialogues and found here an understanding of philosophizing about being in terms of "life" (bios). Behind Aristotle's Metaphysics, he excavated Aristotle's Ethics and Physics, where he found a radically different understanding of being as "ethos" and "polis," as correlated to practical concerned understanding (phronesis), and as "motion" (kinesis) and "emergence" (physis) encountered in acts of "uncovering" or "being-true" (aletheuein) within the historical "situation" (kairos). Thus, here too his destructive critique of Aristotle's metaphysics was also a "self-overcoming" of his own earlier and naive preoccupation with question of being in the form of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories.

In Section V, entitled "The End of Philosophy," I will briefly discuss passages from Heidegger's youthful writings that speak explicitly of the "end of philosophy" and the turn to the "genuine beginning" of philosophy, themes which until recently were thought to be unique to Heidegger's later thought.

I. The Hermeneutical Situation

...what is decisive is the working out of the hermeneutical situation as the temporalizing of the philosophical problematic itself. (PA, 3)

Sometime after 1916, Heidegger came to realize that, in order to fulfill his concrete historical "requirements" for
deepening the problem of the categories of being, it was not enough simply to build onto an already available philosophical tradition, as he had done in the conclusion to his habilitation writing. The many works which he had promised in his habilitation writing were either never written or never published. During the years 1917 and 1918, Heidegger's teaching activity was interrupted by war service. When he returned early in 1919, he sent a letter of declaration to Krebs, his catholic-philosophical patron in the Freiburg philosophical faculty. Heidegger speaks of his "renunciations" of traditional metaphysics and Catholic theology, and states that he is looking for Christian theology and philosophy in a "new sense":

The past two years, in which I have struggled for a fundamental clarification of my philosophical position and have put aside all special scholarly tasks, have led me to conclusions, for which I, standing in an extra-philosophical affiliation, would not have been able to ensure freedom of conviction and teaching. Epistemological insights, extending to the theory of historical knowledge, have made the system of catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me - not, however, Christianity and metaphysics (these, though, in a new sense).... (BK, 537)

In 1921, Heidegger wrote to Karl Löwith that he had "nothing positive to offer," since he was preoccupied with the "single task...of critically destroying the traditional conceptuality of western philosophy and theology...where it can indeed also turn out that sometimes he is threshing only 'empty straw'." Heidegger came to see that the basis of Western philosophical language had from the beginning been oriented away from concrete life and history. He saw that the "battle of the giants about being" (GZ, 179/129) had to be awakened again at the very foundations of the metaphysical tradition, and its ontological option decided unequivocally in favour of time and concrete life. He realized that, in order to do justice to his "requirements" for a concretely and historically oriented philosophy, what was demanded was not merely a supplementing of the traditional doctrine of categories, but rather ultimately the "end of philosophy" and the initiation of an "other beginning," an "other language."
In his development after 1916, the young Heidegger does not completely leave behind his question of being and turn to some simple brand of "existentialism" or "anthropology." Rather, he places the question of being in the sphere of human existence, of "factual life." His youthful name for the Seinsfrage is "Seinsfraglichkeit, Seinsfragwürdigkeit," the "question-ability of being," "the worthiness of questioning belonging to being." (PA, 189) In 1921, his "topic" is indeed what he calls the "phenomenological existential topic" of "life = there-being, 'being' in and through life." (PA, 31, 85, 187) Factual life is the horizon in which being becomes present:

Philosophy is principally knowing comportment to beings as being (Seiendem als Sein) (being-meaning), and in such a manner that, in the comportment and for it, it is also decisively a matter of the being (being-meaning) at any time of the having of the comportment.

Philosophy is "ontology," and indeed radical ontology, and indeed as such phenomenological ontology (existentiell, historical and spiritual-historical), or ontological phenomenology. (PA, 80)

In 1923, Heidegger calls his philosophy "ontology (hermeneutics of facticity)," in which the task is to let "being come to seeking and to language" as it is given to human existence: "Hermeneutics is the bringing to language (Kundgabe) of the being of a being in its being to - (me)." (HF, 1, 10) "Heidegger investigates this "Being-meaning" (Seinsinn) in terms of the three moments of intentionality, which he calls "content-meaning" (Gehaltssinn) (world), "relational meaning" (Bezugssinn) (care), and "enactment-meaning" (Vollzugssinn) or "temporalizing meaning" (Zeitigungssinn) (kairological time).

Heidegger's "way" in this topic is the "way of interpretation" (AJ, 5; PA, 187; HF, 7, 87, 76), "the working out of the hermeneutical situation as the temporalizing (Zeitigung) of the philosophical problematic itself" (PA, 3). This temporalizing is a constant "being underway." (HF, 17) "Destruction," "retrieval," and constant thinking-further of "formal indication" or "hermeneutical concepts" are all moments in this hermeneutical situation. The "method" of philosophy is, thus, not a free-floating "technique," but the "way" involved in destructive retrieval of the tradition.
within the hermeneutical situation, which is constantly renewed. (AJ, 9)

The hermeneutical situation involves the "relationship of the present" to the past (PA, 3), i.e., to the history of philosophy, which is initiated in the "first beginning" (PA, 170) of Greek thought and undergoes various "transformations" and "re-structurings" in the other two "epochs" (IP, 20) of the "Middle Ages" and "modernity":

In the usual usage of the title, the history of philosophy encompasses the diverse succession of philosophical opinions, theories, systems, maxims in the historical period from the seventh century before Christ until whenever happens to be the present, and indeed the philosophies which have worked themselves out in the life-context of the intellectual and historical development of the Greek people, which for its part flowed into the history of Christianity; therefore, also the philosophies which at any time have undergone various transformations and re-structurings in the course of the history of the Christian west (Middle Ages and modernity). (PA, 2-3; HF, 75-76)

As in his later writings, Heidegger already to a certain extent understands contemporary thought and culture in general as a "falling" and "decline" (Spengler) into "technology." (PA, 26, 74; IP, 130, 136; LW, 37) But this history also pre-structures the future, since it makes up the "effective contexts" (Wirkungszusammenhänge) and "historical motivations" ("habitus") which "continue to be effective (nachwirken) in various transformations and concealments in contemporary spiritual Dasein." (PA, 6, 170; IP, 125, 4) In other words, this effective history constitutes the futural "prestruction," "anticipatory pre-conception" (Vorgriff), "prejudice" (AJ, 22, 9), "presuppositions" (PA, 159) operative in modern-day thought. Contemporary "concepts" (Begriffe) are both "recepts" (Rückgriffe) and "forcepts" or "preconceptions" (Vorgriffe). (IP, 116) Since philosophy never outstrips its being in a "hermeneutical situation" of one sort or another, Heidegger maintains that all philosophical understanding of the "things themselves" is through and through historical interpretation. It always moves in a "hermeneutical circle."
From this point of view, the separation of philosophy into the "historical" and the "systematic" is illusory, since the systematic is already structured through the historical (preconception), and the historical is, then, not behind systematic research into the "things themselves," but rather in front of it. (PA, 110-111; IP, 125) Husserl's "requirement of a standpoint-free observation," of a historically "presuppositionless" beginning is thus an illusion: "To what extent one makes the matter comfortable for oneself is shown by the absence of history in phenomenology: one believes that the things are to be won in naïve evidence by means of any old line of vision." (HF, 82, 75) This naivety and illusion on the part of Husserl's phenomenology is disastrous because it involves an uncritical blindness about the historical presuppositions it brings to its study of the phenomena. (AJ 4-5)

Likewise, the "repose and objectivity of history," the attempt to know the history of philosophy objectively without actively retrieving it and systematically philosophizing is motivated by mere "frailties and comforts." "The historical in philosophy is grasped only in philosophizing itself." Doing the history of philosophy has to be "Auseinandersetzung," "confrontation." (PA, 2-3)

The sciences stand naively within their hermeneutical situation, and they do this in a genuine manner, since they cannot in principle question their ultimate historical "presuppositions." (PA, 159-160) According to Heidegger, this naïve "falling" towards the tradition and out of the hermeneutical situation also characterizes contemporary philosophy (AJ, 3, 34), but not genuinely, since philosophy's task is precisely the radical questioning of fundamental presuppositions. Genuinely working out the hermeneutical situation means "taking hold" (Ergreifen) of it, temporalizing its past and future within one's present situation, "kairologically-critically questioning and establishing 'within one's time'" (zu seiner Zeit). (PA, 41) Philosophy is "kairological," "hermeneutical," "at its time" (jeweils). It always takes place in "the today" and is always "only as philosophy of its 'time'...."
works in the how of its being-now." (HF, 17, 18) It's relation to the history of philosophy is not that of objectifying "research into facts," but rather of "confrontation," letting the tradition become present in a new way in actual contemporary philosophizing "here and now...at this place (Ort), in this lecture hall" (PA, 1-2, 166, 63), in our present-day "hermeneutical situation." "There-being: hearing lectures, exercises, interest in educational formation; which being is there, which possibilities and failings?" (PA, 187) "The un-building takes its point of departure from the making present of the contemporary situation....corresponding to the changed historical situation, [the tradition] becomes something different and yet remains the same." (HF, 75-76) As hermeneutics, philosophy is a "being wakeful" (HF, 18) which brings to language futural possibilities of the tradition in a kairos, a contemporary situation. It attempts to make the past tradition living again, to give it a tongue, and to let it speak again in a new way. We shall note later how Heidegger's critical appropriations of the tradition (primarily of Aristotle, original Christianity, and Husserl) became a model for what Gadamer later came to call "Horizontverschmelzung," "fusion of horizons."

As we shall see, Heidegger claims that what basically characterizes the contemporary hermeneutical situation is the fact that the preconception, into which modern philosophy has hardened, has always consisted of a conceptuality which from its beginning in Greek thought arose out of a "falling-away" from the "origin" of "being in and through life." He understands this tradition as a process of "un-living," "un-life" (Entlebnis). Heidegger's attempt to set in motion his kairological "interpretation within the situation," to "en-liven" (verleben) the hermeneutical situation, is characterized by both "destruction" and "retrieval," "historical critique" and "appropriation" (HF, 75, 83) of this traditional philosophical preconception:

...the concrete possibility of bringing the phenomena of existence into view and explicating them in a genuine conceptuality, is only then disclosed when the concrete, somehow still effectively experienced tradition is destroyed, and indeed with a view to the
ways and means of explicating the actual experience of the self, when through the destruction the motivationally effectively past fundamental experiences are brought into relief and discussed regarding their originality. (AJ, 34)

Destruction means "un-building and building-back" (AJ, 5) traditional philosophical prestructions (preconceptions) into the original experiences of the "origin" (Ursprung) of meaning in "factual life."6 "[What is] needed is a disclosure of the history of concealment. The tradition of philosophical questioning must be followed up back into the sources of the subject matters. The tradition must be un-built." (HF, 75)

This critical destruction entails at the same, therefore, a critical "repetition" or "retrieval" (PA, 80, 190) of traditional conceptuality from the point of view of its origin in factual life. "...destruction of the traditional...is synonymous with the explication of the motive-giving original situations, from which the philosophical ground-experiences spring (entspringen)...." (AJ, 3-4)7 What Heidegger proposes is to repeat the tradition in terms of is concealed origin (Ursprung) in factual historical life. "The original position is to be worked out anew...." (HF, 76)

Since, in this destructive-repetitive way, Heidegger's philosophizing investigates being in and through "factual life" as the "primordial strata" (Urschichte) and "origin" (Ursprung) from which "springs" (entspringt) all meaning, whether theoretical, practical or aesthetic, he calls it the "pre-theoretical" "science of the origin" (arche). (IP, 59ff.)8 It was to take over the role of "prote philosophia" in Greek philosophy, i.e., the ontological investigation of the archai, the origins or principles, of being. (IP, 18-20, 24) Ultimately, for the young Heidegger "philosophy is a step back into the originally-historical" (das Ursprünglich-historische). (PRs, 317) Later we will have to discuss how the working out of the hermeneutical situation is in fact a "hermeneutics of facticity" in the sense of both factual life as the theme of interpretation (objective genitive) and interpretation as an activity of factual life (subjective genitive), and how, therefore, Heidegger understands the discourse of his "original
"science" as that of "formal indication" or "hermeneutical concepts" which remain open for the constantly self-renewed interpretation of factual historical life. Original philosophizing has to remain living, situational, topical, kairoplogical, "original".

Even though the young Heidegger understands the mainstream philosophical tradition as a falling away from the "origin" in factual life, he is also aware that an other way of "beginning," "original explication of experience," is also "living" at certain points in the tradition. (PA, 92, 49) He sees that the metaphysical tradition can be overcome to a certain extent with the help of the tradition itself - more specifically, anti-metaphysical counter-traditions, primarily Aristotle's practical philosophy, Husserl's Sixth Investigation and "original" Christian writers (Paul, Luther, Kierkegaard). Heidegger retrieves these traditions as models and "indication" for his own other beginning of the question of "being in and through life." In spite of its violence, his critique was to be an "immanent critique," a "kairoplogical-critical" renewal of the philosophical tradition "here and now... at this place (Ort), in this lecture hall." In the rekindled gigantomachia about being, one of the "giants" will come from neither Elea nor Ionia, but rather from the unfamiliar hinterland of an anti-metaphysical, counter-tradition. Although, as we have seen, during his earliest years Heidegger had been attracted to certain anti-metaphysical counter-traditions (primarily the New Testament, "hermeneutics," Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Dilthey), it was really not until around 1919 that he effectively identified with such anti-metaphysical sources as Socrates, Aristotle's Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics, and Physics, Seneca, ancient skepticism, Paul, Augustine, the young Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Van Gogh's letters, Jaspers' Existenzphilosophie, Dilthey's philosophy of life, and perhaps also the existential thought of Ortega y Gasset.

After his publications in 1916, Heidegger's "renunciations" and "self-overcoming," his romantic rebellion and groping search for a new philosophical language went on for ten years, during
which he "remained silent" (US,87/6), until finally in 1927 he decided to publish again (*Being and Time*). The "straw" that Heidegger was threshing in his decade of silence is to be found in his lectures from 1919 onwards. To these we now turn in order to explore Heidegger's destructive retrievals of the three major periods of western philosophy.
II. The Way of the Phenomenon

Being is nothing in the object....being is absolutely imperceptible. (Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, VI)¹

The intentional character of perceiving...is making-present (presenting). (Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, VI)²

In Section II,³ I wish to explore how the young Heidegger carried out his destructive retrieval of what he, in both his youthful and his later periods, called the modern "epoch" of the history of metaphysics, which is essentially a metaphysics of subjectivity. Even though the young Heidegger's critique is directed at the whole modern period from Descartes' *ego cogito* to the transcendental subjectivity of Kant, German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism, his critique is focused primarily on Husserl. But for the young Heidegger Husserl was an ambiguous figure, both a representative figure of the modern period and implicitly a radical departure from it.

Part of what Hannah Arendt has called "the rumor of the hidden king" is the rumor of Heidegger's intense phenomenological apprenticeship under Husserl, which begins in 1919. But until the recent publication of Heidegger's youthful lecture courses, this question has had to remain for the most part merely on the level of rumor. In Part Two, I attempted to show 'Heidegger', in his earliest texts between 1910 and 1916, as "poet," "preacher," "logician," "Neo-Kantian," "metaphysician," "Aristotelian," "Catholic ontotheologian," and orthodox Husserlian "phenomenologist." Each of these texts is a complex intersection of many paths and faces. In the present section, I wish to show that in his youthful writings after 1919 Heidegger remained a "phenomenologist," although in a new sense than the phenomenology of his earliest logical writings. One might almost speak here of how the
young Heidegger aimed at an 'end of phenomenology' and an 'other beginning of phenomenology'. In other words, I wish to sketch out the young Heidegger's 'phenomenological draft' of his Ur-text, which is the topic of 'Being and Time'.

1. The New Turn to Husserl

What was the hermeneutical situation within which the young Heidegger attempted to make the past thought of Husserl present in terms of its futural possibilities? In Part Two, we saw how in his earliest writings Heidegger had uncritically followed the project of a "pure logic" in Husserl's logical interpretation of phenomenology and in the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school (Natorp, Cohen), as well as the project of a transcendental philosophy of value in the Neo-Kantianism of the South-West school (Windelband, Rickert). Heidegger's own metaphysical "onto-logic" followed the three moments of Husserl's metaphysical articulation of the being-question, which we outlined in terms of the following three intentional moments: being as noematic meaning (content-meaning = ground), being as intentionally correlated to noetic 'seeing' and judgment (relational meaning = logos), and being as atemporal meaning that is "made present" in the performance of the intentional acts of consciousness (enactment-meaning = presence). In this way, Heidegger had originally identified with the modern "epoch" of metaphysics, which interprets being in terms of transcendental subjectivity and culminates in technology. But things were soon to change.

In 1916 Husserl came to Freiburg, but due to Heidegger's absence from the university in 1917 and 1918, it was not until 1919 that Heidegger really "met Husserl in his workshop" (SD, 85/78) and a close working relationship between them developed. By that time Heidegger had disassociated himself from both Rickert's circle and his catholic-philosophical ties. Heidegger became Husserl's assistant (1919-23), his "favorite student," the "phenomenological child," and Husserl was accustomed to say: "You and I are phenomenology." In turn, Heidegger wrote in 1923 that "Husserl gave me my eyes." (HF, 5) Because of his close identification with
phenomenology, the 1920s have been called Heidegger’s "phenomenological decade," even though he ascribed to phenomenology both before this period in his earliest logical writings (1910-16) and after this period in his "later writings," although in different ways. The titles to roughly half of Heidegger’s lectures and seminars during this period contain some form of the word "phenomenology" ("Phenomenological Exercises in...", "Phenomenological Interpretations of..."). Although many of Heidegger’s essential insights during this period come from other and even non-philosophical traditions, his philosophical language is primarily a phenomenological lexicon.

2. The Destruction of Husserl

The young Heidegger’s new preoccupation with Husserl’s phenomenology after 1919 was not a naive appropriation, as it was for the most part in his earliest logical writings. Indeed, as early as 1910, Heidegger had written the following marginal note beside Husserl’s sentence in his "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" "Not from philosophies but from issues (Sachen) and problems must the impulse to research proceed": "We will take Husserl at his word." Likewise, his habilitation writing had pointed to the necessity of pushing Husserl’s "pure logic" in the direction of a "philosophy oriented to world-view." (KB, 205, n. 10) In 1917 Heidegger wrote to Grabmann that his most immediate plans involved a "confrontation with value-philosophy and phenomenology from the inside out." (BG, 104) The later Heidegger reports that at this time he was engaged in a phenomenological battle of giants with Husserl’s thought about "the thing, the topic itself" of phenomenology. "Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the being of beings in its unconcealment and concealing?" (SD, 87/79, 47/44; SZ, 51/63; BR, xiii/xii; ZP, 47/200-201; S, 379)

Indeed, we find Heidegger carrying out this critique in detail in his first lecture course of 1919. (IP) Whatever suspicions Heidegger had entertained earlier about Husserl’s philosophy, it was not until 1919 that he expressed them in a full-scale critique. He here interpreted the three moments of Husserl’s notion
of intentionality, that is, logical meaning, judgment, and atemporality, respectively as "de-worlding," "de-living," and "de-historicization." Husserl's logical version of phenomenology was seen as a "falling away" from the "origin" of factual life, of "being in and through life." Heidegger's transformed interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology attempted precisely a "destruction," an "un-building," of Husserl's three moments of intentionality back into factual life. He considered Husserl's later "transcendental" "self-understanding" (GZ, 188/139, 124/91)\(^{11}\) of his "philosophically neutral" Logical Investigations (SD, 84/77) as a "decline" (Verfall) (GZ, 179/129) into traditional metaphysical prejudices, especially those of Descartes, Fichte and Neo-Kantianism.\(^{12}\) His destruction of Husserl's phenomenology was really an attempted demythologization of Husserl's "fantastically idealized subject" (SZ, 303/272) and Rickert's "pure ghost" (PA, 81), i.e., the transcendental ego, and therefore of his own earlier concept of a logical "consciousness in general." Philosophy should not be a "contortion of the spirit, the fantasy of life and thought that is elevated to the stature of a principle." (PA, 99) The young Heidegger's destructive critique was a demythologization of the human subject back into factual life. As we shall see later, the young Heidegger appealed very much to Plato's theme of doing violence to one's philosophical fathers, who are always "telling stories, as if we were children." When Heidegger later reported that his thought would not have been possible without the "basis" which had been prepared by Husserl's Logical Investigations (SZ, 51/62), this statement obviously cannot, then, be understood in the sense of Heidegger's first naive appropriation of Husserl's text in his earliest writings. Rather, it refers primarily to his subsequent and very critical appropriation beginning around 1919.

3. The Retrieval of Husserl

Whereas in his earliest logical writings Heidegger had relied primarily on the first volume of Husserl's Logical Investigations in which Husserl develops his idea of an anti-psychologistic "pure logic," Heidegger's new preoccupation with Husserl's
work turns toward the Sixth Investigation in the second volume, which gives a description of the "acts of consciousness" in knowledge. In his *Being and Time*, Heidegger later wrote that the "basis" for this work had been prepared by Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (SZ, 51/62), and in key discussions of truth and time he refers the reader to Husserl’s Sixth Investigation (SZ, 67, n. 9/75, n. x; 289, n. 15/261, n. xxxiv; 480, n. 10/414, n. xxiii). Even later Heidegger stressed the decisive influence of the Sixth Investigation on his youthful thought: "As I myself after 1919, teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity, practiced phenomenological seeing... my interest leaned anew toward the *Logical Investigations*, above all the sixth investigation in the first edition. The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the 'manifold meaning of being'." (SD, 86/78, 47/44; BR, xi/x) The later Heidegger reported that he "worked on the *Logical Investigations* every week in special study groups with advanced students" (SD, 87/79; US, 86/5), and that even though the "master no longer held his work in very high esteem," the youthful Heidegger had his "own reasons to prefer the *Logical Investigations* for the purposes of an introduction to phenomenology." (US, 86/5) It was primarily with reference to the Sixth Investigation that in 1925 Heidegger called not any of Husserl’s later "transcendental" works, but rather his early *Logical Investigations* the "fundamental book of phenomenology." (GZ, 30/24) In 1973 Heidegger held a seminar on the influence of Husserl’s Sixth Investigation on his youthful thought, and even hints at how the insights gained from Husserl were taken up in his later themes of "truth" and "topos." (S, 372-400) In his notion of "categorial intuition," the "essential discovery" and "burning point in Husserlian thinking," Husserl "brushed against the question of being." (S, 373, 376) This notion became for the youthful Heidegger an "essential spring-board" (Triebfeder) to his own re-thinking of the being-question. (S, 377)
Indeed, in his 1925 lecture course, we find Heidegger stating that "the question of being is sprung loose through the immanent critique of the natural trend of phenomenological research itself." (GZ, 124/91) His new retrieval of Husserl's phenomenology attempted to appropriate the three moments of Husserl's notion of intentionality in terms of their original meaning in factical life as world (content-meaning), care (relational meaning), and temporalizing (enactment-meaning).

The young Heidegger approached Husserl's investigations of intentional content-meaning (givenness of being), relational meaning (being-true), and enactment-meaning (making-present) as what he called "formal indication" or "hermeneutical concepts" (GZ, 58/44, 103/79), which pointed to "the things themselves" (content-meaning, relational meaning, and enactment-meaning) and were to be critically appropriated in light of a renewed showing of the things themselves as the ultimate criterion of phenomenological research. (IP, 109, PA, 181; GZ, 103/75). Phenomenology was to be overcome with phenomenology: "Phenomenology is non-phenomenological!" (GZ, 178/128) For Heidegger, this "indication" pointed to world, care and temporalizing. Likewise, Husserl's method of research into the a priori, i.e., "universal intuition" and "reduction," pointed in the direction of the self-interpretation of factical life ("hermeneutics of facticity"). He thus attempted to outstrip the "actual" "self-understanding" of the mens auctoris and pursue Husserl's phenomenology in its "possibilities." (GZ, 63/47, 184/136) This was to be, then, a "working out of the hermeneutical situation," i.e., the interpretation of Husserl's past thought in light of its futural possibilities within the present situation of philosophy. Heidegger's own philosophy was to be an "immanent critique" of Husserl's phenomenology, a "more radical internal development," and indeed the "most radical phenomenology, which begins in the genuine sense 'from below.'" (GZ, 124/91, 62/46; PA, 195) In 1921-22, Heidegger called his own philosophy "ontological phenomenology." (PA, 60) In 1925, he still considered himself a "learner in relation to Husserl" and cherished the hope that
Husserl, whose "questioning is still fully in flux," would himself follow Heidegger's own project of radically transforming phenomenology. In other words, the young Heidegger understood himself as a phenomenologist, if not a Husserlian phenomenologist. (GZ, 167-168/121)¹⁴ In 1931, Husserl wrote to Pfänder that, during the early 1920s, Heidegger "behaved entirely as if he were my follower and future co-worker, who stood on the ground of my constitutive phenomenology in all essentials of method and problematic."¹⁵ The young Heidegger's project of radicalizing Husserl's phenomenology in the direction of concrete historical life is nowhere more clearly expressed than in a passage from his 1919-21 essay on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of World-Views*, which shows how he both radically criticized Husserl and allowed himself for a time to speak the language of phenomenology:

In the first breakthrough of phenomenology in its specific goal of originally re-appropriating the phenomena of *theoretical* experiencing and knowing (Logical Investigations, i.e., phenomenology of the theoretical logos), there was to be found a winning of an unspoiled seeing of the meaning of the objects experienced in such theoretical experiencing and also of the how of its being-experienced in the goal of research. But the possibility of a radical understanding and a genuine appropriation of phenomenological tendencies depends upon the fact that not only the "other" departmentalized "regions of experience" (the aesthetic, the ethical, the religious) corresponding to some philosophical tradition are thoroughly researched in an "analogical" way. Rather, it depends on the fact that experiencing in its full sense is seen in its authentically factical context of enactment in the historically existing self. This self is somehow the ultimate issue in philosophy...what is relevant is that the concrete self is to be taken into the point of departure for the problems and is to be brought to "givenness" at the authentically fundamental level of phenomenological interpretation, i.e., the interpretation which remains related to the factical experience of life as such. (AJ, 34-35)

For the young Heidegger, Husserl both belonged to the philosophical tradition, which was to be brought to an end, and also was to occupy a special place in the radical repetition of this tradition. I now turn to a consideration of Heidegger's destructive retrievals of Husserl's articulations of the three intentional moments of "being-meaning." We will use Heidegger's later autobiographical remarks only as indications to be pursued in the youthful
texts themselves. Our discussion cannot hope to give all the details in an exhaustive account, but will rather give a rough outline of the young Heidegger's critical appropriation of phenomenology.

1) Intentional Worlding

I begin with the intentional moment of "content-meaning" (Gehaltssinn). In chapter six ("Sense and Understanding") of his sixth investigation, Husserl oversteps the empiricist and Kantian restriction of "intuition" to "sense intuition" of sensual objects. He shows how we are always performing acts of "categorial intuition" in which the categorial elements of perceptual statements (e.g., the 'this' and the 'is' in 'this paper is white') are brought to objective "givenness." For Heidegger, what was decisive here was that "being" is conceived as a "phenomenon" of lived experience and as capable of becoming an explicit phenomenon for phenomenological investigation.

According to Husserl, intuition is a fulfilling intention which fills an empty intention with the immediate givenness of the matter itself. For example, my intentional representation of white paper (the imagined paper) can be fulfilled by my immediate perception of the white paper (the perceived paper that is bodily there before my eyes). But Husserl insists that the empty meaning-intention in a linguistic expression of an object ("the paper is white", "the white paper") cannot be fulfilled merely through my "sensuous intuition." What I understand and express in my statement - the paper-being-white, the paper-as-white - cannot be found in the sensuously intuited object, even though it is given "with" this object. "Being is no real predicate [Kant]....I can see colour, but not being-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something is sounding. Being is nothing in the object....being is absolutely imperceptible." (LU, 665-666/780-781) Therefore, Husserl calls "being" an "excess (Überschuss) of meaning." Even though, in my statement 'the paper is white', I say only what I see, what I see (in the wider sense of
intuit) is also the being-white, the as-white, which exceeds the sensuous aspect of the white paper:

I see white paper and say `white paper', thereby I express, with precise adequacy, only what I see....We are not to let ourselves be led astray by such ways of speaking; they are in a certain manner correct, yet are readily misunderstood....In this knowing another act is plainly present, which perhaps includes the former one, but is nonetheless different from it: the paper is known as white, or rather as a white thing, whenever we express our perception in the words `white paper'. The intention of the word `white' only partially coincides with the colour-aspect of the appearing object; there remains an excess of meaning, a form, which finds nothing in the appearance to confirm it. White, i.e., being white paper. Is this form not also repeated, even if remaining more hidden, in the noun `paper'? (LU, 659-660/775)

In an act of categorial intuition, I can bring what was previously only emptily intended in "the little word `is'," i.e., the paper as-white, to an explicit self-givenness. 

[The is] is, however, self-given or at least presumably given in the fulfillment which under circumstances invests the judgment: in the becoming aware of the presumed state of affairs. Not only what is meant in the partial meaning gold itself appears, nor only what is meant in the partial meaning yellow, but also gold-being-yellow appears." (LU, 668/782) For Husserl, the "being" (Sein) of a particular "being" (das Seiende) is able to appear, as it were, "before our eyes." (LU, 671/785) In turn, my multi-level act of categorial intuition, which is founded on sensuous intuition, can become the basis for another type of categorial intuition, namely, "universal intuition" or "ideation." In this universal intuition, I no longer co-intend the founding object (the white piece of paper) of my categorial intuition, but rather abstractively intend its a priori categorial element (being-white, whiteness), which was previously only unthematically understood. On Heidegger's reading, this means that the "`as-what', the universal character of house, is itself not expressly apprehended in what it is, but is already co-apprehended in simple intuition as that which to some extent here illuminates what is given." (GZ, 91/67; cf. LU, 670/784, 690/799) Husserl later called this ideation "intuition of essence" (Wesensschau). It is
categorical or eidetic intuition which organizes the various "regional ontologies" of phenomenology. (HF, 2; GZ, 93-97/68-71)

Heidegger found Husserl's notion of the categorical intuition of being significant for a number of reasons. First, being is freed from its traditional confinement to the function of the copula as the mere binding together of representations and concepts in a judgment.17 (GZ, 72/54) Nor is it seen to be derived from reflection on inner sense (empiricism) or conceived as a subjective form with which sensuous material is ordered (Kant). (GZ, 78/58, 96/70) Nor is it described as a real part of an object, a being, even though it is always the being of a being.18 (GZ, 78/58, 237/175, 362/282) Rather, being can be brought to an "originary self-giving in corresponding acts of giving." (GZ, 80/60) Being can become a phenomenon, something which appears, "shows" itself.19 (GZ, 97/71) On this basis, one can raise the question of the "meaning" of being, of what is meant by being.20 (GZ, 73/54, 193/143) "Being" is not a "mere flatus vocis." (GZ, 98/71) Second, Husserl's notion of categorical intuition as "universal intuition" provides the empirical methodological basis for investigating the categorical structures of being. Husserl showed how categorial-ontological structures can be brought to "evidential" givenness. (GZ, 97-98/71-72) Third, by considering being as "objectivity," Husserl's phenomenology implicitly takes up the research of "ancient ontology," (GZ, 98/72) the question of being in Greek philosophy.

But precisely how Heidegger appropriated these three breakthroughs becomes clear only in the light of how he at the same time critically "un-built" them back into their origin within factical life. He claimed to be doing nothing other than following up Dilthey's critique and appropriation of phenomenology from the viewpoint of his own "philosophy of life."21 Dilthey sought a "psychology as a descriptive science, and we are indebted to him for valuable intuitions about the idea of this science....The secret longing of his life began to be fulfilled by phenomenology....But he was no logician, and he saw immediately the significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations which at that time
were hardly noticed and indeed misunderstood...." (PW, 184-185) Heidegger followed Dilthey's attempt to use Husserl's *Logical Investigations* not, as Husserl had sought to do, for the sake of a "pure logic," but rather for the sake of a "fundamental science of life." (GZ, 30/24; PA, 80, 117) "Dilthey was the first to understand the aims of phenomenology....the essential point here is not so much the conceptual penetration as the sheer disclosure of new horizons for the question of the being of acts and, in the broadest sense, the being of man." (GZ, 164-165/118-119) In this passage, Heidegger mentions what these horizons opened up by Dilthey are. They correspond exactly with the three intentional moments of Heidegger's notion of "being-meaning," i.e., content-meaning, relational meaning, and enactment-meaning. Regarding the moment of content-meaning presently under consideration, Heidegger paraphrases Dilthey's thesis that "the person in his particular selfhood finds himself over against a world upon which he acts and which reacts upon him." Here Dilthey pushes Husserl's notion of the intentional object out of the realm of logic and into the sphere of the lived experience of the practical and cultural world. The young Heidegger followed him in this project.

According to Heidegger, Husserl's characterization of being is taken from the way that it is experienced in theory, the simple gazing upon the world which consummates itself in judgment and assertion. The basic sense of being here is object-being, thing-being, reality, nature, "bodilyness" (*Leibhaftigkeit*). (IP, 108, 87, 100, 109; PA, 91; GZ, 83/61, 165/119) Husserl sees the other valutative and aesthetic realities as founded on this basic stratum. (GZ, 139/101) Despite Husserl's radical intention towards "the things themselves," he has naively taken over the traditional idea of being as present at hand thinghood from Descartes and ultimately from Greek philosophy. He thus fails to discuss explicitly "the question of the meaning of being." (GZ, 179/129) Heidegger sees Husserl's approach to the being of the world as "theorization" and "objectification," which lead to the "extinguishing" of the immediate givenness of the "there is world/it worlds" (*es weltet*)

---

22
and, as he also expresses it, the "un-worlding" (Entweltlichung) of the practical "around-world" (Umwelt), that is, the world around us in our practical dealings. (GZ, 266/196, 300-301/219) "The 'there is world/it worlds' is already extinguished in [thinghood]. The thing is merely still there as such, i.e., it is real, it exists. Reality is therefore not a characterization of what has the character of the around-world, but rather a specifically theoretical characterization, which lies in the essence of thinghood. What has the character of significance is de-signified down to the remnant: being-real." (IP, 89)

Following up Dilthey's critical reading of Husserl, Heidegger's basic intention was to reverse this process of theorization and de-worlding at work in Husserl's characterization of intentional "content-meaning" and to "build-back" this "content-meaning" into its "origin" in the "life-world" (IP, 4; PA, 6, 94, 97, 115), the "genuine phenomenologically primordial stratum" of pre-theoretical factual life. He described his radicalization of phenomenology as an "original leap" (ursprüngliche Sprung) into the "origin" (Ursprung), a "critical placing in discussion" (Erörterung) (GZ, 178/128, 140/102) which would place Husserl's phenomenology back into the original "phenomenological existential topic," the "place" (Ort) of factual life.23 (PA, 31) Phenomenology was to be retrieved from this origin of "being in and through life."

First, Husserl's notion of being as object-being (substance, accident, property, etc.) was to be re-thought as the "significance" (Bedeutsamkeit) ("being-ready-to-hand-there," "from which," "for which," "towards which," "for the sake of") and the lived "spatiality" of the practical around-world (Umwelt), which is the "everyday world." (HF, 85, 93-104) "World is the fundamental category of content-meaning in the phenomenon of life." (PA, 86)

Second, Husserl's notion of "universal intuition" or "ideation" was to be transformed into what Heidegger called "hermeneutical intuition," the "interpretive explication" (Auslegung) of the a priori of being which belongs originally to factual life. "Hermeneutical intuition, which understands, is
lived experience of lived experience, which grasps and takes itself along with itself...." \(^{24}\) (\textit{IP}, 117) "The phenomenological criterion is solely the understanding evidence and the evidential understanding of lived experiences, of life in and for itself in its eidos." (\textit{IP}, 126) Heidegger was influenced here also by Dilthey's development of "hermeneutics" as the method of historical and interpretive understanding in the human sciences. \(^{25}\) (\textit{PA}, 13-14; \textit{SZ}, 526/450) For the young Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity," philosophy was not to arrive at Husserl's atemporal "essences" (eidos) to which a fixed phenomenological terminology would correspond. He thought that philosophy could only give "formal indication" or "hermeneutical concepts" for constantly changing historical meaning. \(^{26}\) Indeed, along with Aristotle's method of providing a "rough outline" (\textit{PA}, 192) for practical life and Kierkegaard's notion of "indirect communication," (\textit{AJ}, 41) Heidegger here took up Husserl's notion in his \textit{Logical Investigations} of certain "occasional expressions" (e.g., 'I', 'here', 'you') which only formally "indicate" the situational meaning of such expressions. But for Husserl these expressions are still correlated to fixed and unchanging meaning.

Third, Husserl's recovery of Greek ontology was to be pushed in the direction of Heidegger's own "ontological phenomenology" as a "trans-theoretical science," a "science of the origin" of meaning in factual life: "...there must be a pre-theoretical or trans-theoretical, in any case a non-theoretical science, a genuine \textit{primordial} science, from which the theoretical itself takes its origin." (\textit{IP}, 96, cf. 59)

\textbf{ii) Intentional Life}

The young Heidegger likewise performed a destructive retrieval of the specific manner in which Husserl had worked out the "relational meaning" (\textit{Bezugssinn}) of intentionality, i.e., the "how" of the relation to the intentional object. This becomes visible when we consider Husserl's discussion of "truth."

For Husserl, the question of categorial intuition was precisely the issue of the truth present in the sphere of categorial intentions. (\textit{LU}, 651-656/765-770) He defines truth as the
"identification" which I achieve when the object gives itself immediately in my intuitional fulfilling intention just as I had signified it in my empty intention: "We experience how the same objective something which was 'merely thought' in a symbolic act is now intuitively presented in intuition, and that it is intuited as being precisely the determinate so-and-so that it was at first merely thought to be (merely signified)." (LU, 566/694) Husserl identifies two meanings of the traditional Aristotelian and scholastic notion of "being in the sense of truth" (on hos alethes; ens tanquam verum): first, being in the sense of the identification of the signified and the intuited ('the paper [really] is white'); second, being in the sense of the "true-making thing," the intuited "being" which bestows fullness on my empty signification. Husserl points out that these two senses of truth underlie the standard definition of truth as the "correctness of our intention....the proposition 'directs' itself to the thing itself, it says that it is so, and it really is so." (LU, 653/766) In the case of categorial intentions, truth is experienced as the identification I achieve when in my fulfilling categorial intuition the thing itself (paper-being-white, paper-as-white) "appears" in its "self-appearance" (LU, 651/765) just as it was intended in my empty categorial meaning-intention. On Heidegger's reading, this means that "the founded acts disclose the simply given objects anew...." (GZ, 84/62) "Categorial acts constitute a new objectivity....[Constituting] means letting the being be seen in its objectivity." (GZ, 20)

But especially in the "static unions" of signified and intuited, which we have already achieved and in which we habitually live, we "experience" truth as "identity" without, however, thematically apprehending it. (LU, 569-570/697, 852/766) Heidegger's gloss on this Husserlian theme runs as follows: "In the coming into coincidence of the presumed with the intuited, I am solely and primarily directed toward the subject matter itself....This is the phenomenological sense of saying that in evident perception I do not thematically study the truth of this perception itself, but rather live in the truth. Being-true is ex-
experienced as a distinctive relation, a compartmental relation between presumed and intuited specifically in the sense of identity." (GZ, 69-70/52) In my disclosive categorial intuition of the thing itself as-something (being), I focus intentionally on the thing itself without thematically considering my categorial meaning-intention in the background. In subsequent intentional acts, I can make the "identity" involved here into a thematic object, as well as the operative a priori dimension of the categorial itself (ideation).

What captivated Heidegger’s attention in Husserl’s analysis of "truth" was that truth was investigated here at a more basic level than its traditional definition as the "correctness" of propositions, judgments. First, Husserl refers to being itself as "truth" in the sense of the appearance of beings in their being (the "true-making thing" which is disclosed), a notion which is first found in Greek sense of aletheia. (GZ, 71/51; LW, 169-182) Second, Husserl’s concept of truth as being-true (act of identification) includes the dimension of "disclosure," "letting appear," which is what Aristotle meant by aletheuein, being-true, unconcealing. (GZ, 71-73/53-54)

But again Heidegger’s retrieval attempted to un-build these two senses of truth back into the original sphere of factual life. He here also followed Dilthey’s critical appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology. The second essential thesis from Dilthey that Heidegger mentions as characterizing Dilthey’s unique use of phenomenology is "that in every aspect of being the person, the total person, reacts, not simply in willing, feeling, and reflecting, but all together always at the same time." (GZ, 164-165/118-119) "He wants to get at the totality of the subject which experiences the world and not to a bloodless thinking thing which merely intends and theoretically thinks the world." (GZ, 302/220)

The young Heidegger attempted to show that Husserl’s characterization of the "how" of intentional experience was drawn one-sidedly from the "mere being directed towards" (MU, 207) of "theory" ("seeing"), "intuition" (PA, 153), "sense perception" (PA,
The so-called logical comportments of thinking or objective theoretical knowing represent only a particular and narrow sphere within the domain of intentionality...." (GZ, 106-107/78, cf. 73/54, 124/91) "Every directing-itself-toward (fear, hope, love) has the feature of directing-itself-toward which Husserl calls noesis. Inasmuch as noein is taken from the sphere of theoretical knowing, any exposition of the practical here is drawn from the theoretical." (GZ, 61/45)

According to Heidegger, Husserl views human being as a present at hand object, since he characterizes this human being, which has intentionality for its basic structure, as it is given to theoretical observation. In Husserl's later systematic "working out" and self-interpretation of phenomenology in his turn to a definitively "transcendental" phenomenology under the influence of Neo-Kantianism (GZ, 124-128/91-93), the person appears explicitly as a present at hand composite of a psycho-physical animal and an intentional consciousness, which is supposed to be "absolute being" in relation to the contingent and founded being of the empirical self. The factual human being gets characterized as "'a real object like others in the natural world'," an "'animal being'." (GZ, 131/96) The guiding idea of being here is again that of being-real, being a natural object. (GZ, 172-173/124-125) Husserl fails to raise the question of the "being of the human," "that of which intentionality is the structure." (GZ, 62-63/46-47, 148/108) The question of the "sum" of the theoretically intentional "cogito" is left unasked. (PA, 173)

Heidegger readily admits that Husserl's "reduction" from our "natural attitude" back to a pure transcendental consciousness does indeed begin with an attempted description of our concrete being in everyday life. But his description is colored by a very unnatural theoretical and objectifying attitude. "In the natural way of experience, does man experience himself, to put it curtly, zoologically? Is this attitude a natural attitude or is it not? It is an experience which is totally unnatural." (GZ, 155/113) After
this unnatural description of natural life, Husserl then "suspends" it ("epoche") and performs his "reduction" back to a transcendental-eidetic consciousness which, according to Husserl, is "not human." This reduction thereby involves "precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the question of the being of the intentional could be based." (GZ, 150-151/109, cf. 157/113-114)

Husserl's description of the person is derived not so much from "the things themselves" as from his "falling" towards the traditional anthropological notion of the "rational animal" in Greek thought, Descartes and Neo-Kantianism. (PA, 47, 173; GZ, 147/107, 178-180/128-130) His notion of intentionality ("intuition") is derived from the Platonic-Aristotelian orientation to theorein ("seeing"), which is passed on in Augustine's "fruitio Dei," Aquinas' "contemplatio," Descartes' "clara et distincta perceptio," Kant's "intuitus derivativus," and the dialectical "noesis noeseos" of Hegel. (LW, 58, 115-123; GZ, 381/276) For the young Heidegger, Husserl's characterization of the "relational meaning" of intentionality belonged too much to what he at that time (following Luther and Kierkegaard) referred to as the "ocular," "aesthetic," and "quietive" character of western metaphysics. (AJ, 23, 4-5; PA, 111, 140)

He saw Husserl's "modification to theoretical comportment" (WU, 210) toward mere "objects" as a "de-living" (Ent-leben) of concrete practically involved "lived-experience" (Er-lebnis) of one's own around-world. In this "self-alienation" (HF, 15), my "emotional relation" to the world is suppressed. (WU, 211) Theoretical comportment drives away the character of my experience of the world as an "ownmost happening" (Er-eignis), in which "ich selbst [das Er-leben] mir er-eigne," "I e-vent (appropriate) lived experience to myself," and in turn my experience of the world "er-eignet sich seinem Wesen nach," events (appropriates) itself according to its essence." (IP, 73-75) "The lived-experience-of-the-around-world is de-lived to the remnant: knowing something real as such....Thing-experience (Erfahrung) is undoubtedly lived experience (Erlebnis), but understood in terms of its origin out of
the lived experience of the around-world it is already de-living, un-life (Ent-lebnis)." (IP, 89-90) Theoretical comportment is a "derived mode" of intentional experience. (GZ, 215/160)

It was on the basis of this destructive critique that the young Heidegger's science of the origin attempted to retrieve Husserl's notions of truth and intentional "relational meaning." He defined this task precisely as that of going back to the original starting point of Husserl's transcendental and eidetic reductions in the "natural attitude" and here investigating the "being of the whole concrete man." (GZ, 148-152/107-110, 173/125) In other words, the young Heidegger returns to the practical dimension of knowing and truth, which he had himself "suspended" in his earliest metaphysical writings. He now wants to ask "which kind of truth is the most original, whether theoretical and scientific truth is the ideal of truth, or practical insight, or religious faith....In its beginnings, traditional philosophy and philosophical research had always oriented itself towards a specific kind of knowing, namely towards the truth of theoretical knowing - the truth of the theoretical proposition, the assertion...." (LW, 8) In contrast to Husserl's de-living of factical life, Heidegger's primordial science was to be a "repetition" or "retrieval" of life and an "en-livening" (Verlebendigung) of phenomenological philosophy. (PA, 80, 166)

Husserl's notion of "being in the sense of truth" as the "self-appearance" of beings in their objectivity (the disclosed "true-making thing") was radicalized by Heidegger into the notion of the "disclosedness" of "ready to hand" beings in a practical world of "significance." (HF, 93; GZ, 348-349/253) Husserl's other characterization of "being in the sense of truth, that is, the intentional act of disclosing beings in the "identification" of the signified and the intuited, was transformed by Heidegger in a number of ways. Following Aristotle's notion of aletheia praktike, his basic approach was to investigate intentional truth not as "the truth of theoretical knowing," but as the truth of "practical insight" (phronesis). (LW, 8)
First, Heidegger placed Husserl's theoretically biased notion of intentionality as a "mere directing-itself-towards" back into its original meaning as "being-in-a-world." (HF, 102) The basic character of this "being-in" is "caring" or "concern" ("orexis"), which gets expressed in the form of understanding, mood and language. For Heidegger, intentionality is something "ultimate," but this ultimacy has to be properly characterized:

What has always disturbed me: did intentionality fall from heaven? If something ultimate: in which ultimacy is it to be taken? Certainly not secured in a specifically theoretical discovery and experience. That I must live intentionally and must 'be' intentionally, 'elucidate'...intentionality is the formal and fundamental structure for all categorial structures of facticity.

Caring is the fundamental meaning of the relation of life....Full meaning of intentionality in what is original! The theoretical attitude faded. (PA, 131-132, 98)

Second, Heidegger attempted to re-think Husserl's notion of the role of empty and habitual categorial meaning-intentions such that it could now mean the unthematic "preconception" (Vorgriff) of the a priori of being, the anticipatory "being-ahead-of-itself" (sich-vorweg-sein), which belongs to pre-theoretical factical life. In other words, Heidegger re-interpreted it to mean the prior non-objective "discoveredness" of the "pre-world" (IP, 115-117) or "worldhood" of "significance." "Prestruction...as an expression of intentionality: the formal and primordial structure of facticity (of the meaning of the being of life)." (PA, 131) "What is meant by intentionality - the bare and isolated directing-itself-towards-must still be set back into the unified and basic structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in." (GZ, 420/303-304)

Third, Husserl's notion of the disclosing activity of categorial intuition, which fulfills the empty meaning-intention (being-true), was transformed into Heidegger's theme of the "interpretative" activity of factical life, which "fulfills" the prior unthematic disclosedness of significance (world) in preconception through the interpretive disclosure of beings in their 'as'-structure, significance, or being. Husserl's static "apo-
phantical 'as'" (the assertoric paper-as-white) was transformed into Heidegger's more situational and interpretive "hermeneutical 'as'" (the praxical paper-as-for-writing-wiping-throwing, etc.) of interpretation. (GZ, 73/54, 116/85; LW, 135-161) Moreover, whereas for Husserl sense perception is the basic stratum on which categorial intentions (expressions) are founded, for Heidegger what is primary is precisely the prior unthematic categorial "interpretedness" or "expressedness" of all experience in a preconception, especially the way in which this has been articulated through public everyday understanding. "...our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way....To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter."30 What is primary is not sense intuition but rather interpretation.31

Four, Husserl's point concerning the habitual and unthematic character of categorial meaning intentions in the only "experienced" and not "known" identification of signified and intuited was re-thought by Heidegger in his notion of how factual life has the tendency to "fall" towards the beings in which its "care" is absorbed, such that its prior discoveredness of the world and itself in preconception remains unthematic. Factual life has the tendency to interpret itself solely in terms of beings. Heidegger re-interpreted Husserl's "reduction" not as a leading back to the a priori of a transcendental-eidetic consciousness, but rather as a "re-duction" back to the a priori operative within the preconception of factual life ("hermeneutical intuition"). "The ruinant flight into the world; away from objects; positive meaning of Husserl's 're-duction'."32 (PA, 39)

Finally, for Heidegger the intentionality of factual life was not to be investigated in Husserl's manner as an eidetic present at hand "what" belonging to the equally present at hand "that" of a psycho-physical object which has (theoretical) intentional reason as an appendage. Heidegger wanted to understand the 'what' (intentional consciousness) and the 'that' (the concrete
person) as the "how" of a possible "way to be" or "exist" for a "who" in its "mine" and "particular while" (Jeweiligkeit). (GZ, 151-152/109-110, 205-207/152-154)

iii) Intentional History

Finally, the young Heidegger’s destructive retrieval was also directed to Husserl’s specific characterization of the "enactment-meaning" (Vollzugssinn) or "temporalizing-meaning" (Zeitigungssinn) of intentionality. This temporal enactment ultimately defines the "how" of the whole intentional relation itself.

In his sixth investigation, Husserl refers to the temporal character of the fulfilling intentions in which an identification of signified and intuited, i.e., truth, is achieved. He describes the fulfilling intention as a "making-present" (gegenwärtigen) or "presenting" (präsentieren): "The intentional character of perceiving...is making-present (presenting)." (LU, 646/761) "The object is actually 'present' or 'given', and present as just what we have intended it." (LU, 647/762) Categorial intuition "presents" the sensuous object anew in its categorial structure and "temporalizes (zeitigt) a new consciousness of objectivity." The categorically structured object, the being in its being, becomes "'present'," "set before our eyes." (LU, 670-675/784-787; cf. GZ, 85-90/63-66, 96-97/70-71) In the second volume of his Ideas, Husserl called this making-present "appresentation." In the Logical Investigations, he does not systematically discuss the temporal character of intentional acts, but in his early Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, which were later edited by Heidegger, Husserl does give detailed analyses of "memory," "expectation," and "presentation."

What appealed to the young Heidegger in Husserl’s discussions was that "being in the sense of truth" pointed in the direction of its basic meaning as time, i.e., the disclosed "true-making thing" becomes "present" for the "making-present" of my disclosive fulfilling intention. But Heidegger’s retrieval of this "indication" passed through the crucible of his destructive
critique. Here again Heidegger followed Dilthey's introduction of the theme of history into Husserl's phenomenology. "...the life-context of the person is in every situation one of development." 34 (GZ, 164-165/118-119)

Heidegger pointed out that, in his refutation of psychologism, Husserl draws the distinction "between the real being of the psychical and the ideal being of propositions in judgments - and moreover, between the temporal happening of the real and atemporal subsistence of the ideal." (LW, 50) In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl writes that "what is true is absolute, is true 'in itself'; the truth is identically the same, whether humans or non-humans, angels or gods comprehend it in judgments." (LU, 125/140) Heidegger attempted to show that Husserl understands being and "truth" within a temporal horizon as the static "presence" of ideal meaning over against the temporal variance of intentional acts. He subscribes to the "'couplets of opposition' real-ideal, sensible-nonsensible, beings-the valid, the historical-the transhistorical, the temporal-the atemporal." (LW, 92-93) For Husserl, acts of "making-present" are at bottom individuating acts that instantiate ideal meaning in the spatio-temporal world. Heidegger claimed that in this regard Husserl belongs to a tradition which begins with Plato's and Aristotle's notion of being as "always-being" (*aιοι'on*) and "presence" (*ousia, Anwesenheit*), which is correlated to "*theorein,* "seeing." (LW, 67-72, 56) Husserl's notion of meaning as "immutable and invariant identity" is "identical with the discovery of the concept of being in Parmenides and in Plato." (GZ, 92/68, 102/75; HF, 42) This understanding of being comes to Husserl via Lotze's notion of "validity" and also the Neo-Kantianism of Natorp, Windelband and Rickert, who distinguish between the validity of atemporal ideal contents (logical truth, values) of judgments and the real temporal acts of judging. (LW, 62-88; PA, 47, 111, 163) "What kind of being stands here in pre-having? Being present at hand, being present..." "...pure presence. This temporal determination comes into play in the characterization of objectivity. Why this is so must be made understandable." (HF, 43, 71, 75)
According to the young Heidegger, Husserl's understanding of the intentional relation in terms of a correlation of the static presence of ideal meaning and passive ocular making-present represents the "extinguishing of the situation" (*NU*, 205-207), the "de-historicization" of the "ownmost happening" of one's lived experience and of the "there is world/it worlds": "The historical I is de-historicized to the remnant of a specific I-ness as the correlate of thinghood...." (*IP*, 89, cf. 85) "The pure ego would derive from the 'historical ego' via the repression of all historicity." 35

In his "critique of the [Neo-Kantian and Husserlian] critique of psychologism" (*LW*, 87), the young Heidegger took up the impulses of ancient skepticism and modern psychologism, insofar as they have always made problematic the relation (*methexis*) of the ideal to "living thought." 38 (*LW*, 88, cf. 52, 54, 92) It is from this origin of "being in and through life" that Heidegger retrieved Husserl's discussions of the temporal character of intentional acts. First, he re-thought Husserl's Platonic notion of the a priori (literally: the 'before', the 'earlier') as the futural being-ahead-of-itself of factual life, its "not yet," and "horizon of expectation." (*IP*, 115; *GZ*, 99/72; *AJ*, 22) Second, Husserl's notion of "making present" as static individuating was transformed into Heidegger's notion of the "temporalizing" of one's futural understanding, which interpretively "presents" (*HF*, 55-56, 79), "makes-present" or "appresents" beings within a practical "situation" that is shaped also through the past. 37 (*GZ*, 292/213-214, 359/280; *LW*, 192) "The life-relation of the situation-I is no mere being-directed to mere objects. Every lived experience is intentional, it contains a 'view towards' something or other (the view which grasps, foresees and remembers in a very preferential manner). The view has a 'quality' (quality of the act-character)." 39 (*NU*, 206-207) Finally, the "presence" of beings in their being is, accordingly, no longer to be seen as the individuation of timeless meaning, but rather as a thoroughly interpretive and historical presence. "The full meaning of a phenomenon encompasses
its intentional relation-character, content-character, and enactment-character...."⁴⁰ (AJ, 22)

4. The Fusion of Horizons

What took place in the young Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology is what Gadamer has called a hermeneutical “fusion of horizons”⁴¹ between Husserl’s thought and Heidegger’s own concern to re-think the question of being within the horizon of “factual life.” In keeping with Gadamer’s notion of “fusion,” the position opened up between these two dialoguing partners was neither the one nor the other, but rather an agreement in which both had been, as it were, wounded in the phenomenological battle of giants.⁴² Heidegger’s concern to think “being in and through life” was motivated not only by the tradition of western ontology that originally had been transmitted to him through Brentano’s work on Aristotle and Carl Braig’s On Being: Outline of Ontology, but also very much by a cluster of anti-metaphysical traditions that consisted of Dilthey’s philosophy of life, Aristotle’s practical writings, ancient skepticism, “original Christianity” (Paul’s letters, Augustine’s Confessions, Luther’s “theology of the cross,” Pascal, Kierkegaard), Jasper’s “philosophy of existence,” Dostoevsky’s novels and Van Gogh’s letters.⁴³ Heidegger’s “kairological-critical” questioning in the “hermeneutical situation” endeavored to make Husserl’s phenomenology present and living in a new way – “here and now...at this place, in this lecture hall.” If Husserl could say “you and I are phenomenology,” Heidegger could well have replied: you and I – and Dilthey and Kierkegaard and Aristotle. Husserl later came to see that “unfortunately I did not determine his philosophical formation, obviously he was already into his own thing when he studied my writings.”⁴⁴ The young Heidegger’s project of re-thinking Husserl’s phenomenology was to have been carried out not only in his essay on Jaspers (first published only in 1973), but also in a large book on Aristotle (“Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle”)⁴⁵ that he had planned to publish in Husserl’s phenomenological journal in
1923 and in a seventy-page essay entitled "The Concept of Time," which was submitted but not accepted for publication.46

5. The Later Distantiation

When, instead of his book on Aristotle, Heidegger's Being and Time appeared four years later in Husserl's journal, it certainly presented the final results of Heidegger's "fusion of horizons" with Husserl's thought. But it provided few details about how his critical appropriation of Husserl's Logical Investigations and especially his sixth investigation actually provided the "basis" for this work. The fullest presentation of the destructive critique of Husserl occurs in section 10 of Being and Time (SZ, 61-87/71-75), but this section is not explicitly taken up in the remainder of the work. In Heidegger's 1925 lecture The History of the Concept of Time, one of many 'first drafts' of Being and Time, the corresponding section runs to sixty pages. After giving an almost two hundred page critical discussion of Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger presents what eventually became Being and Time's "Division One" and the first third of "Division Two" as a "fundamental critique of phenomenological inquiry." (GZ, 420/304, 192/141-247) In the 'second draft' as it were, which he in fact dedicated to Husserl,48 Heidegger toned down considerably this critique of Husserl's phenomenology and presented it in a very abbreviated form.

Whereas in his Being and Time the references to his appropriation of Husserl's Sixth Investigation are left undeveloped, the 'first draft' of this work, The History of the Concept of Time, presents 'Being and Time' unequivocally as a "retrieval," an "immanent critique" of Husserl's Sixth Investigation, which had already been critically discussed in the almost two hundred page introduction of Husserl's phenomenology. (GZ, 32/26, 192/141-2, 420/303, 124/91) In Being and Time, the long introductory discussion of Husserl, the detailed discussion of how his critical appropriation of Husserl is to be carried out, and his use of Husserlian terminology in the analysis of Dasein have all but disappeared. There is very little substantial acknowledgment of
Husserl's influence. Which of the two texts is the 'real' "Being and Time"? In his 1925-26 lecture course Logic: The Question Concerning Truth, which is still another early draft of "Being and Time" (primarily what became Division Two of Being and Time, "Dasein and Temporality"), Heidegger's discussion of human existence as time is preceded by an almost one hundred page discussion of Husserl's phenomenology.

What marked Being and Time as a departure from his identification with Husserl was his newly emerging preoccupation with the transcendental thought of Kant. After 1925, his lecture courses and seminars turn to a great extent to both Kant and German Idealism. His 1925-26 lecture course was to have dealt with the notion of truth emerging from a critical reading of Husserl and Aristotle, but half-way through the semester he dramatically switched to an examination of Kant's treatment of time in his "doctrine of schematism." Two years later in his 1927-28 lecture course devoted to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger told his students: "When I began again to study Kant's Critique of Pure Reason a few years ago and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, it was as if the blinders fell from my eyes, and Kant became for me the confirmation of the correctness of the way for which I was searching." (GA 25, 431)

Heidegger's appropriation of Kant's doctrine of temporal schematism entered into the analysis of time in the second division of Being and Time and colored the whole work in the language of transcendental thought. His new draft of "Being and Time," the Kantian draft, was called "fundamental ontology" which was to ensure "transcendental knowledge," "veritas transcendentalis," and a "science of being" (SZ, 51/62, 304/272), an "absolute science of being" (GP, 15/11). It translated his earlier three intentional moments of "being in and through life," that is, world, factual life, and enactment, into the transcendental-structuralist language of the "existentials" and "structures" of "worldhood," "Dasein," and temporal "schemata." This gave Heidegger's Being and Time an affinity with the transcendentalism of the later Husserl's eidetic
analysis, which investigated consciousness in terms of its eidos, its eidetic structures. In his 1925 Husserlian-Diltheyean draft of "Being and Time" and in his other previous writings, he had originally spoken of the various characteristics of human life primarily as forms of the "how" of existing or "ways to be," for which "formal indication" could be given here in his analyses, but, while he was transforming this text into his 1927 Kantian-transcendental draft, he actually changed these passages in the original text and rewrote them to fit his new structuralist language.

"...all the references in the published version of this 1925 course [G2] to the formal terminology of Existenz, e.g., 'existential-ontological' and 'ontic-existentiell', are later handwritten changes and marginal comments superimposed upon the stenographic typescript of the lecture course 'aus letzter Hand Heideggers', apparently in the process of drafting the final version of [Being and Time] (probably in early 1926)."

In Heidegger's Kantian draft, the concrete individual in factual life, which he had emphasized in the early twenties under the influence of Dilthey and Kierkegaard, tended to be lost sight of and dissolved into anonymous structures. As William Barrett put the matter, Heidegger's "Dasein has no soul" - it is more like a transcendental structure. For the concrete person of factual life, one can look more successfully to a short story by Tolstoy which Heidegger discusses in Being and Time. Whereas in 1921 he spoke of "being in and through [factual] life" and of the "passion" (Leidenschaft) and appropriation of all philosophy in one's historical situation, in 1927 he now spoke of "schemata," "transcendental knowledge," and "science." Then, two years later in 1929, he published a large book entitled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (KM), in which he expressed the concerns of Being and Time even more closely in Kant's language. Here and in his 1935 lecture course, he followed Kant's distinction between transcendental analysis and anthropology in suggesting that the "Dasein in man" is a transcendental structure that could just as easily be instantiated in Martians. In light of Heidegger's transcendental-
Kantian self-interpretation, Oskar Becker, who attended Heidegger's lectures from 1919 onwards, could go so far as to say that *Being and Time* is "no longer the original Heidegger, but rather repeats the original breakthrough only in a scholastically hardened form," if not in the form of a "scholasticism of being." If not in the form of a "scholasticism of being."

What we know of today as the published text *Being and Time* is thus really only one draft of Heidegger's planned work "Being and Time," one particular self-interpretation of it - and a late one at that. Heidegger later called it a "strange publication" which he weaved together hurriedly out of his old lecture course manuscripts in 1926 under the pressure of "the politics of publish or perish." Even though the later Heidegger viewed his *Being and Time* as his earliest and first Denkweg of the "meaning of being," when viewed against the earlier drafts of "Being and Time" in his youthful writings, it really appears as one of Heidegger's 'later writings', and the author of 1927 starts looking like the 'later Heidegger'.

Not only this - but the text *Being and Time* also appears as an aberration, as Heidegger himself later saw. As we know, it remained a fragment of the originally projected plan (SZ, vii/17), since the crucial third division of the first part ("Time and Being"), in which Heidegger was to deal with the temporality of being itself that is given "in and through life," "failed in the adequate saying of this turn and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics." Heidegger reports that he had indeed written this division, but then burnt it. He came to realize that his attempt to speak Kant's transcendental language led to an "inadequate interpretation of my own intention (Vorhaben)," since it placed his question of "being in and through life" too much into a Neo-Kantian context of unchanging transcendental structures and subjectivism. This intention had been formed in the early twenties, such that one can rightly say that "Heidegger II put in an appearance before Heidegger I." Heidegger mused later that the "fundamental flaw of the book *Being and Time* is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early."
Oddly enough, Heidegger's turn to Kant was in a sense a return to his earliest relation to Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Husserl in his doctoral dissertation and habilitation writing. As we have seen, his primal words for being were here the "Dasein" or "there-being" of "meaning"; meaning as transcendental "truth" (ens tantquam verum); and meaning as "logical place." He understood the Dasein, the truth, and the place of meaning basically as a "grid" of logical structures. But in *Being and Time* and in his lectures on Kant, these earlier concepts had passed through his analysis of "being-meaning" as "being in and through [factical] life" worked out in the early twenties, so that the Dasein of meaning, truth, and place could now appear only as the categorial structure of this "being in and through life" itself. This means that Heidegger's thought in the early twenties was a kind of "middle phase" (Zwischenphase) between his earliest speculative writings and his later renewed Kantianism and his speculative concerns after 1930, but it was not this in the sense of a mere phenomenology of life or existentialism, but rather as an existential-phenomenological ontology which explored "being in and through life." Thus, the basic sense of meaning in *Being and Time* is not the "categories" of objects, but rather the quasi-categories of human existence, which he called "existentials." These existential structures were supposed to make up the "transcendental truth" of "Dasein" which is its own "there" of "meaning." By passing through the analysis of factical historical life in the early twenties, the earlier three moments drawn from the transcendental thought of Kant and Husserl, that is, categorial meaning, judgment, and atemporality, were radically transformed into the three moments of existential-categorial meaning, constitution, and temporal schemata. His project here was similar to that of Dilthey's "Critique of Historical Reason," which attempted to provide for historical experience what Kant had done for the experience of the natural sciences, namely, a transcendental-categorial inquiry. Heidegger's notion of human Dasein thus appeared as an existentialized and historicized version of the transcendental subjectivity of Kant and Husserl. It
seems, then, that whereas the young Heidegger in the early twenties was busily destroying and demythologizing his earlier Kantian and Husserlian language of a logical-transcendental consciousness in general back into the natural experience of "being in and through [factual] life," the Heidegger of the late twenties was in effect taking the opposite direction, namely, re-mythologizing "being in and through life" in terms of the transcendental language of Kant and Husserl. In the margin of his copy of his 1929 *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger himself wrote: "relapsed totally into the standpoint of the transcendental question." 70

Then in the 1930s, "in order to counter this mistake" (S, 335), Heidegger turned - in a manner that almost betrays a state of emergency and panic - to other dialogue partners, primarily the early Greek thinkers, Hölderlin, and Nietzsche as his preferred dialogue-partners, and therefore turned still further away from his youthful beginnings and the dialogue partners here. This is "not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*" (WM, 328/298) and from his youthful work, but rather the attempt to realize his underlying "intention," formed in the early twenties, in new and what are considered to be more sufficient ways. Here, in Heidegger's two later "thought-paths" of the "truth of being" and the "place of being," we come across his Pre-Socratic, Hölderlinian, and Nietzschean drafts of "Being and Time," i.e., of his enduring "intention" to think out "being in and through life." For example, in his later marginal notes to his *Being and Time* (see especially the introduction) and in his "Letter on Humanism," one finds Heidegger translating *Being and Time* into his later language. But here Heidegger's youthful notion of the concrete self is lost sight of to a great extent, insofar as the transcendental structures of *Being and Time* are now replaced by the almost autonomous world-historical, cosmological structures of the "truth of being," the place of being," the "destiny of being," etc. 71 The transcendental "Dasein in man," the "there" of being, expressed in his *Being and Time* and his book on Kant becomes the "place" and the "clearing" of being in his later thought. 72 "Dasein exists as it itself."
Heidegger’s later gloss on this statement from *Being and Time* is: “But not as subject and individual or as person.” (SZ, 194/186) His statement that "being-towards-death is essentially anxiety" is glossed with the later statement: "but not only as anxiety and even less: anxiety as mere emotion." (SZ, 353/310) What this means is that in Heidegger’s later writings it is the "content-meaning" of being-meaning that comes to predominate and almost eclipse the "relational meaning" and "enactment-meaning" of being-meaning in the life of the concrete individual. Here, the young Heidegger’s three intentional moments of being-meaning (world, factical life, and enactment) are transformed and to a certain extent re-mythologized into the moments of the "fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals"; "poetic dwelling"; and "the destiny of being" and "it gives." As we shall later see, Heidegger’s two later paths of the "truth of being" and the "place of being" were also even more radical returns to his primal words of "truth" and "place," which he had used to name "being" in his habilitation writing.

6. Self-Stylization and Self-Installment

In his publications and self-portrayals after *Being and Time*, the later Heidegger’s references to his early critical confrontation with Husserl give few details about either his youthful critique or his appropriation of Husserl. Indeed, the later Heidegger performs his own destructions of Husserl’s thought, but these are carried out within his later language of the "truth" and "topos" of being, and usually involve playing off not Kierkegaard, Aristotle’s Ethics or indeed Husserl himself but rather the early Greek thinkers against Husserl. (SD, 69-80/63-73; S, 373, 376, 381-400) That is, Husserl’s logical phenomenology is no longer dismantled back into the dimension of factical life as seen in Dilthey, Aristotle’s practical thought, and Kierkegaard, but rather now seen as a "falling away" from the original experience of "truth" in early Greek thinking. Indeed, it is fitted into Heidegger’s later eschatological notion of the history of the "forgetfulness of being" (S, 379, 387-394), which as the destiny of being begins with Plato, culminates in modern technology, and may one day
in the distant future be replaced by an "other beginning" that remembers being.

Likewise, in his later remarks on his youthful retrieval of Husserl’s Sixth Investigation, Heidegger remains "strangely reserved," and the "reasons" for his positive evaluation remain "obscure and enigmatic." Heidegger remains "strangely reserved," and the "reasons" for his positive evaluation remain "obscure and enigmatic." Even in his later seminar on Husserl’s Sixth Investigation, what is "surprising" is, in the words of one of the participants, his "reservation" regarding the "extent of insight that this fascinating text had exerted on him." Here and in other discussions of Husserl’s thought, the later Heidegger does present retrievals of Husserl’s phenomenology, but these are executed no longer in direction of an "ontological phenomenology," but rather in the direction of his later language of the "truth of being" and the notion of aletheia in Parmenides. (S, 133-138; SD, 71-80/64-73) Husserl’s thought is here all but eclipsed.

This "silence" about his youthful destructive retrieval of Husserl’s Sixth Investigation is an instance of what we have called the later Heidegger’s tendency to self-installment and self-stylization. The later Heidegger is interested in relating his thought historically more to the early Greek thinkers than to Husserl (or to Kierkegaard, Dilthey and Aristotle’s practical thought), since this is the direction to which his early preoccupation with the notions of "truth" and "being" in Husserl’s Sixth Investigation ultimately led him. Whereas, as we shall see, the young Heidegger was reading the notion of being in Husserl’s Logical Investigations primarily from the point of view of Dilthey’s own interpretation of this work, we find the later Heidegger in his On the Way to Language violently stylizing his early appropriation of Dilthey by saying that here he opposed Dilthey’s concept of "lived experience." (US, 122-123/35-36) Pöggeler writes that "Heidegger certainly is not correct about the orientation of his early phenomenology of life, when he says that he spoke out against 'lived experience' and 'expression'." Language has here been installed into the mouth of the young Heidegger that derives rather from what the later Heidegger is saying about Dilthey's...
concept of lived experience, namely, that it belongs to the modern metaphysics of the subject. Likewise, in his later marginal notes to his *Being and Time* and in his "Letter on Humanism," one finds Heidegger reading the themes and language of his later thought (especially "the truth of being") back into his earlier work *Being and Time*.

We are not here questioning whether the later Heidegger's "way" of reading Husserl and Dilthey is a necessary one or not. The question that we are posing is whether Heidegger's youthful destructive retrieval of Husserl and Dilthey should not receive more attention as one of Heidegger's "ways." Husserl's *Logical Investigations* preoccupied Heidegger for roughly two decades. Would Heidegger have been able to arrive at his insights on the early Greek notion of *aletheia* without his youthful critical appropriation of "intentionality," "being" and "truth" in Husserl's Sixth Investigation? Throughout his career, Heidegger was fond of pointing out Husserl's lack of historical sense regarding the origin of his ideas in the philosophical tradition. However, Husserl was perceptive enough to see that Heidegger's early Aristotle interpretations were carried out from the point of view of the language and the problems, which he had discovered in Husserl's own phenomenology. Heidegger's philosophy certainly would not have been possible without the Greeks, especially Aristotle, but his overemphasis of the provenance of his thought in Greek philosophy displays itself a lack of historical sense. For all the later Heidegger's poeticizings on the nature of "thinking" as "thanking," he displays a curious lack of clear acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Husserl's thought.

7. Effective History

If, for Heidegger's early critical appropriation, "phenomenology presented the possibility of a way" (*US*, 87/6), to what extent were the end of philosophy and the other beginning carried out here with the aid of phenomenology? In what capacity can phenomenology continue to play this role? Or must Husserl's thought be thrown onto the scrap-heap of traditional metaphysical language
that is left behind in the "leap" to the other non-metaphysical language? Many of Heidegger's students and others (Gadamer, Szilasi, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur) carried on the young Heidegger's fusion of horizon's with Husserl's phenomenology, long after he himself had gone on to other thought-paths. This was done, then, "much against Heidegger's intentions" (Gadamer), i.e., against the mens auctoris, the later Heidegger's self-understanding of his own work. In their own philosophizing, Husserl's phenomenology continued to play a role in what Heidegger called the "turn" to the "other beginning" of philosophy, even though it had to be criticized. That is to say, Heidegger's youthful fusion of horizons with Husserl in his "phenomenological ontology" continued to exist in an "effective history" (Wirkungsgeschichte) (Gadamer), a history in which it continued to be "effective" or "at work" in philosophizing. Even though, as Szilasi has said, the young Heidegger "shaped the face of the times and the future," the "rumor of the hidden king["s]" fusion of horizons with Husserl was almost a reign in exile within the underground commerce in the esoterica of transcripts for his youthful lecture courses and within the philosophical thinking-further of his work in the writings of other thinkers. Although not quite on the philosophical Index of the later Heidegger, the thought of the young Heidegger went underground, as it were. Regarding Heidegger's youthful appropriation of Husserl's phenomenology, one can then ask, in chorus with the philosophers of this effective history, a question posed specifically by Gadamer:

What does the end of metaphysics as a science mean?...When science expands into a total technocracy and thus brings on the 'cosmic night' of the 'forgetfulness of being', the nihilism that Nietzsche prophesied, then may one look at the last fading light of the sun that is setting in the evening sky, instead of turning around to look for the first shimmer of its return?....However much the philosopher may be called to draw radical conclusions from everything, the role of prophet, of Cassandra, of preacher or even of know-it-all does not suit him....hermeneutical consciousness seeks to confront the will of man, which is more than ever intensifying its criticism of what has gone before to the point of becoming a utopian or eschatological consciousness, with something from the truth of remembrance: with what is always again effective.
8. Our Hermeneutical Situation

Our attempt to determine the unique hermeneutical situation within which the young Heidegger interpreted Husserl in the early twenties, then, itself stands within its own hermeneutical situation. This consists in the fact that we are confronting Heidegger's past thought, which now belongs as a classic in the history of western philosophy, in terms of the possibility of interpretively understanding his youthful fusion of horizons with Husserl's phenomenology, a possibility which must be realized in our present situation. As we have maintained, following Heidegger, a hermeneutical situation calls for both destruction of the past thought and retrieval of its futural possibilities. Regarding destruction, what we have been attempting is to un-build the later Heidegger's, as it were, translations of his youthful phenomenological draft into his three later drafts of "meaning," the "truth," and "topos" of being, the layers of his later self-stylized narratives of the origin of his thought that tend to install here his later language, and finally the encrusted and often lamentably distorted historical picture of the origin of Heidegger's thought built up over the decades in the secondary literature on Heidegger which has not challenged his later self-narratives, but rather has, in its extreme forms, degenerated into a kind of Heidegger-scholasticism which takes everything on the authority of the Philosopher. We have been dismantling this back to the authentic genesis of Heidegger's question of being in his fusion of horizons with Husserl in the early twenties, which is being retrieved for our present understanding by means of a study of Heidegger's youthful texts themselves.

As I shall attempt to show in the Conclusion to my study, this retrieval, as well as the retrievals of the young Heidegger's Kierkegaardian and Aristotelian drafts of his being-question, have radical possibilities and consequences for our appropriation of Heidegger's thought as a whole.

In thus going against the mens auctoris, the later Heidegger's self-understanding, we have only been following his own way
of reading of texts in the form of destructive retrieval, which violently and destructively cuts under the *mens auctoris* and retrieves the underlying and guiding origin (*arche*) of the author's thought itself, and which often finds this arche in the youthful works of the respective author. Even though, as we have seen, Heidegger called for this kind of "confrontational" reading of his own *Collected Edition*, he was never very good at when it came to reading his own thought (since, of course, he was himself), but rather tended to install his own self-understanding of his work as if for all eternity, in the same way that his manuscripts were locked away in the sanctum sanctorum of the Archives in Marbach. Our own attempt to retrieve the origin of Heidegger's thought in his youthful fusion of horizons with Husserl's phenomenology is similar to Heidegger's own attempt to find the genuine arche of Husserl's thought in his early *Logical Investigations*, of Plato's thought in the early Socratic *Apology*, of Kant's thought in his youthful dissertation, of Descartes' thought in his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, and of Nietzsche's thought in his earliest writings. Our attempt to recover the young Heidegger's phenomenological draft of "Being and Time" is similar to his own attempt to dismantle the hardened layers of both the later Husserl's transcendental, Kantian draft and self-understanding of his phenomenology and also the reception of Husserl in contemporary thought, in order to recover genuine and original phenomenology in the Ur-text of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and let it speak again "here and now...in this place."

The young Heidegger understood his "phenomenological ontology" as a "hermeneutics of facticity," which means "being in and through life" bringing itself interpretively to language. In our retrieval, we have attempted to return to the almost forgotten years of the early 1920s and attempted to make this language speak again in our own contemporary hermeneutical situation. This means lending our voice to the "rumor of hidden king," which spread throughout German in the early twenties, and causing it to whisper again after decades of silence. Let us see Heidegger's youthful
texts, then, "with eyes with which someone reads, who is not [the later Heidegger]," and find here "the promising richness of his beginnings." In this "ad-venture" (cf. WM, 363/241) of reading, we attempted "kairological-critically" to effect a coming to language of the young Heidegger's fusion of horizons with Husserl "here and now...in this place."
III. The Way of Suffering

...as abstract, philosophy floats in the indefiniteness of the metaphysical. Instead of admitting this and so directing human beings (the individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, the existential, philosophy has created the illusion (Schein) that human beings could, as one soberly says, speculate themselves out of their own good skin and into pure light (Schein). (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity) (PA, 182)

Take care that you do not drink wine, when you are still an infant. Every doctrine has its measure, time and age. (Luther, Preface to St. Paul's Letter to the Romans) (PA, 182)

In Section III, I wish to explore how the young Heidegger carried out his destruction of what he, in both his youthful and later periods, called the medieval "epoch" of the history of metaphysics. At the same time, we will consider the young Heidegger's retrieval of the tradition of "original Christianity" in Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, which lies behind and was covered over by medieval thought and modern theological metaphysics. Our aim is to understand how this youthful destructive retrieval of what he later called "ontotheological" metaphysics entered into his rethinking of the question of being "in and through life."

For a long time there has been a "rumor," especially in theological circles, about Heidegger's theological origins and the indebtedness of his philosophy to Christian theology. The "hidden king," so the story goes, is also a hidden theologian. But this question has either remained mostly at the level of rumor, or else too often has been ignored by Heidegger's readers altogether. In the previous section, I tried to show in what sense the young
Heidegger was a phenomenologist. In the present section, I wish to show that the young Heidegger was also still a Christian theologian in the 1920s, although in a different sense than the speculative theology of his habilitation writing. As in the case of Heidegger's relation to phenomenology, one can here also speak of how the young Heidegger aims at an end of theology and an other beginning of theology. In other words, I wish now to sketch out the 'theological draft', if not the 'Lutheran draft', of Heidegger's Ur-text 'Being and Time'. But from a more philosophical point of view, this means sketching out what can be called the 'Kierkegaardian draft' of 'Being and Time'. As we did with his critical appropriation of Husserl's phenomenology, we must ask what the hermeneutical situation was within which the young Heidegger attempted to make the past thought of Christian thinkers present in terms of its possibilities.

1. The New Turn to Christian Authors

From Part Two, we now already know that Heidegger had originally planned to become a Catholic priest, that he studied theology for two years at a Jesuit seminary in Freiburg, and that until sometime around 1919 he considered himself to be a Catholic philosopher, aspired to a Catholic chair of philosophy, and envisaged for himself a large number of projects for the revival of medieval thought and for the reform of Catholic philosophy and theology. We also know that Heidegger's earliest writings between 1910 and 1916 culminated in a full-blown speculative ontotheology, whose three moments we summarized as follows: the "absolute spirit of God" (content-meaning = being as ground), "living spirit" (relational meaning = being as correlated to logos), and teleological history, atemporal "validity of value" and the "eternity" of God (enactment-meaning = being as presence). We saw that Heidegger here takes up the thought of Scotus, Eckhardt, German Idealism (esp. Hegel) and Romanticism, and also the speculative Neo-Hegelian theology of Carl Braig. Heidegger's "genuine optic, metaphysics" was nothing less than a "philosophy...of active love and of worshipful intimacy with God." (KB, 410) It is for these reasons
that someone like Gadamer has called the Heidegger of this earliest period "a Catholic theologian." In his habilitation writing, Heidegger had in fact identified with the medieval "epoch" of metaphysics, which had re-interpreted the Greek question of being in terms of the three moments of God as the causal ground of the world (content-meaning), as correlated to logos (relational meaning), and as the nunc stans of eternity (enactment-meaning).

But when he returned home from the war in 1919, Heidegger abandoned not only his Catholic philosophy, but also his Catholic faith. His letter to Krebs is worth quoting again: "Epistemological insights, extending to the theory of historical knowledge, have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me...." Sometime around 1919 Heidegger had changed over to Protestantism. During the early twenties, Heidegger was absorbing himself in the writings of Paul, Augustine, the young Luther, Pascal and Kierkegaard. References to these and other Christian writers appear throughout his youthful lectures and throughout his Being and Time. In 1919-20, Heidegger scheduled a lecture course entitled The Philosophical Basis of Medieval Mysticism. In 1920-21, he gave the lecture course Introduction in the Phenomenology of Religion, which dealt with Paul's Letters. In 1921, he delivered the lecture course Augustine and Neo-Platonism, which also drew heavily on the young Luther's "Heidelberg Disputation." Heidegger also gave the following seminars and talks: Exercises in the Ontology of the Middle Ages (1924-25); High Scholasticism and Aristotle (1924); Colloquium on the Theological Basis of Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason (1923); Augustinus; Quid est tempus? Confessiones lib. XI (1930). During his teaching in Marburg between 1923 and 1928, Heidegger struck up a friendship and collaboration with the Protestant theologian Rudolph Bultmann. They attended each others seminars, held a joint seminar, and studied the Gospel of John in regular Saturday sessions. Heidegger is also reported first to have assisted a colleague at Marburg in his Protestant theological seminar, and then to have eventually taken it over completely, because of his colleague's illness. "At
Marburg it is not [Rudolf] Otto that the theologians come to hear but Heidegger." While in Marburg, Heidegger even delivered a lecture on Luther’s commentary on the Letter to the Galatians.  

2. The Theological and Philosophical Destruction

In 1921, the thirty-one year old Heidegger wrote to Karl Löwith that he is “not a ‘philosopher’ in any sense at all,” but rather “I am a Christian theologian,” who has the single task of destroying the conceptuality of traditional philosophy and theology:

[Heidegger]...said that we students do him an injustice by comparing him with standards like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard or any other creative philosopher, since he has nothing comparatively positive to offer, and is not a "philosopher" in any sense at all, but rather a "Christian theologian" (with the accent on the logos), who has the single task (completely unsuitable for the schoolroom and progress) of critically destroying the traditional conceptuality of western philosophy and theology, where it can indeed also turn out that sometimes he is only threshing "empty straw"....

In his 1919-20 lecture Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger "took as his point of departure the fact that factual life, which is historical, was discovered in the original Christian religion; this discovery had to re-assert itself then in violent eruptions against the foreign infiltration by Greek conceptuality: eruptions which took place with Augustine and the mysticism of the Middle Ages, and with the young Luther and Kierkegaard." After 1919, Heidegger followed in the footsteps of especially the young Luther who, believing that original Christianity had been replaced by Aristotelian Scholasticism ("theologia gloriae"), undertook an all-out attack on Aristotle and the entire institutional and conceptual edifice of Catholicism, and attempted to revive the original experiences of the New Testament, which are centered on the factual and historical event of "the cross" ("theologia crucis"). But the young Heidegger’s model for destroying Greek metaphysics was not only Luther’s attack on "that damned arrogant pagan" Aristotle and the "theology of glory" of Aristotelian Scholasticism, but also Paul’s attack on the "foolishness" of Greek philosophy and Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegelianism (PA, 182).
For the young Heidegger, the foreign Greek conceptuality of Christian theology represented a "falling away" (that is, a "de-worlding," a "de-living," and a "de-historicization") of "the factual experience of life" (faktische Lebenserfahrung) in "original Christianity," which experiences, one might say, God "in and through life." Heidegger saw his role in the early twenties as that of critically un-building what he later came to call the history of "ontotheology" back into "original Christianity." He attempted to trace the three moments of traditional Christian theology, that is, God as ground, as correlated to contemplation, and as the "standing now" of eternity, back into the three moments of original Christianity, i.e., the crucified God in the world (content-meaning = factual meaning), God as correlated to the concernful faith of the whole person (relational meaning = care), and God as "coming to presence" (parousia) within the historical "situation" (kairos) (enactment meaning = kairological time). He was thus engaged in demythologizing the very theological-speculative metaphysics which he had sketched out in his habilitation writing, in order to explore the meaning of Christianity rather in factual life. He attempted "to achieve the removal of the fundamental question of man from the traditional system of dogmatics. For this system rests foundationally upon a philosophical system and conceptuality, which has placed on its head both the question of man and the question of God, and all the more the question of the relationship of man to God." (OZ, 6/4) In a word, he attempted to bring about the end of traditional theology and speculative-theological philosophy (what he later called ontotheology).

3. The Theological Retrieval

By means of his destructive archeology of traditional Christian theology, the young Heidegger sought to retrieve both Christian theology and the wider philosophical being-question "in a new sense." (BK, 537) In 1923, Heidegger took part in the discussion following a lecture by the theologian Eduard Thurneysen. After appealing to the Christian skepticism of Franz Overbeck, he ended
his contribution by saying that "it is the true task of theology, which must be discovered once again, to find the word that is able to call one to faith and preserve one in faith."\(^{21}\) In 1924, Heidegger delivered a lecture before the Marburg theologians which was entitled "The Concept of Time," in which he worked out the basic concepts of Being and Time in reference to Augustine's discussion of time in Book XI of his Confessions.\(^{22}\) Gadamer has called this lecture the "original form (Urform) of Being and Time.\(^{23}\) Shortly afterwards, Heidegger worked up his lecture manuscript into a seventy page essay, still another draft of "Being and Time," which was submitted to a journal but not accepted.\(^{24}\) In his Being and Time, Heidegger writes that theology has reached a "crisis" in its "foundations": "Theology is seeking a more original interpretation of the being of man towards God, prescribed from the meaning of faith and remaining within it. It is slowly beginning to understand once more Luther's insight that its dogmatic system rests on a 'foundation' that has not arisen from a questioning in which faith is primary, and whose conceptuality is not only not adequate for the problematic of theology, but rather conceals and distorts it." (SZ, 13-14/30)\(^{25}\) In his lecture "Phenomenology and Theology," which he gave to the Protestant theological community in Tübingen in 1927, Heidegger laid out the new language and concepts for his project of re-thinking Christian theology. (PT) Heidegger wanted to find an "other beginning" and "other language" for theology, the "word"\(^{26}\) that could do justice to the concrete and historical self-understanding of Christian experience, which, as what I have called an anti-metaphysical counter-tradition, had never quite fit into the history of Western philosophy. Gadamer writes: "And then one reads: 'I am a Christian theologian'. One does not miss the point when one here recognizes the deepest motivation for Heidegger's thought-path: he saw himself - at that time - as a Christian theologian. That means: all his efforts to sort things out with himself and with his own questions were provoked by the task of freeing himself from the prevailing theology in which he had been educated, in order that he could
become a Christian."

...he certainly meant: against the tailored Christianess of contemporary theology, I would like to take up the true task of theology - 'to find the word, which is able to call one to faith and to preserve one in faith'.

As we will see, Heidegger found this "word," this discourse, to a great extent in Kierkegaard's notion of "indirect communication" (AJ, 41) which he himself came to call "formal indication." Heidegger retrieved the following three intentional moments from "original" Christian authors for his own re-thinking of theology: the crucified God (content-meaning), faith (relational meaning), and historical revelation as the arrival of God (parousia) in a situation (kairos) (enactment meaning).

4. The Ontological Retrieval

But the young Heidegger attempted to appropriate the writings of Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard as "indication" not only for an "other beginning" of Christian theology, but also for an "other beginning" of ontology. He knew that he was here following the general tendency of modern German philosophy:

And in the reception, further development, and also, however, partial loss of the new directions of Lutheran theology, there came about the building up of Protestant Scholasticism, which was immediately supplied with Aristotelian directions that were specifically interpreted by Melanchthon. This dogmatics with its essentially Aristotelian directions is the root and soil of German Idealism.

....Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were theologians, and Kant is to be understood theologically, so long as one is not inclined to turn him into the rattling skeleton of a so-called epistemologist. One must be methodically conscious of these contexts, at least as warnings for circumspection. Dilthey had a sure instinct here, just as he did everywhere in his research of our cultural history.... (PA, 7)

In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel was surely drawing on his youthful theological studies from his days at the Lutheran "Tübinger Stift" (with classmates Schelling and Hölderlin), since his entire text is emplotted within the Christian narrative of the "way of the cross" (the Greek eidos and nous, the "concept," which develops within the "becoming," "suffering," "labour," "anxiety," "death," and "tragedy" of history, which ends in the "Calvary of
Absolute Spirit".\(^3\)\(^2\) (\textit{IP}, 134-135) Hegel's contrast between the "royal road" (immediate intuition of the absolute) and the "stations of the soul" (from "stations of the cross") certainly harkens back to Luther's basic distinction between the "theology of glory" and the "theology of the cross."\(^3\)\(^3\) For Hegel, philosophy, absolute knowledge, is in fact the Christian religion grasped in the form of the pure concept. Likewise, Hamann,\(^3\)\(^4\) Kierkegaard,\(^3\)\(^5\) Dilthey and Count Yorck,\(^3\)\(^6\) Jaspers,\(^3\)\(^7\) and Scheler\(^3\)\(^8\) all attempted to use the language and insights of Christian theology into concrete historical life for an ontology of human existence. And the young Heidegger took up this aspect of especially Kierkegaard's thought and Dilthey's "ontology of 'life'\(^1\).\(^\text{(SZ, 331, n. 2/293, n. vi)\(^3\)\(^9\)}\) Heidegger's intention was not only to demythologize traditional speculative theology, but also to demythologize the understanding of factual life in original Christianity itself, i.e., to purge it of any special relation to the Christian religion. In the same way, one finds him demythologizing the ancient Greco-Roman "Fable of Care," in which the "care" and time of human life is represented mythically in form of the deities "Care" and "Saturn." (\textit{GZ}, 418-419/302-303; \textit{SZ}, 262-263/242-243)\(^4\) But for the young "Christian theologian" this also meant returning on the basis of the resulting ontology to clarify the \textit{mythos}, the "story" of Christianity. We shall see that in this double sense of both reforming Christian theology and the philosophical question of being the young Heidegger very much saw himself at that time as a kind of philosophical Luther of western metaphysics. In his appraisal of the correspondence between Dilthey and Yorck, Heidegger took sides with Yorck since he recognized in him "the genuine Lutheran."\(^4\)\(^1\)

Heidegger's ontological retrieval of original Christianity was not to be limited in its application to the region of theological experience.\(^4\)\(^2\) In fact, he saw that a reform of theology presupposed a reform of the philosophical or ontological language and concepts, which underlay it and all of the sciences. After all, it was Greek philosophy which had originally provided the conceptual basis of traditional Christian theology. Theology is a
"positive science" which deals only with a specific "ontic" "region of being," and therefore calls for a "formal-ontological" investigation into "being as being" ("being-meaning" or "what is experienceable in general"), which is the "philosophical principle of every specific type of being" (Seiendes). (PA, 55, 142) Philosophy is "atheistic" (PA, 197; BZs, 78) but, as we will discuss later (Ch. 7), it can provide not, of course, theology's specific content (faith), but rather "hermeneutical concepts" or "formal indication" which can be "interpreted," i.e., "concretized," in theology, as well as in the other sciences, e.g., ethics. (AJ, 9; PA, 54-58; SZ, 12-15/28-31; PT, 65-66/19-20) Heidegger's ontological "science of the origin" of the meaning of being in factical historical life was intended to make possible also a theological science of "original Christianity." But this meant finding the "word" (what he later called the "other language") for being in general, which could do justice to the facticity and historicity in all regions of experience and "direct (hinweisen) human beings (the individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, the existential" in general. (Kierkegaard) (PA, 182)

Outside of his 1927 Tübingen address and his two lecture courses on religious themes (his 1920-21 Introduction in the Phenomenology of Religion and his 1921 Augustine and Neo-Platonism), his early lectures courses and talks were intended not as theology, but rather as ontology. Heidegger's ontological retrieval of the three moments of Christian theology pushed them in the direction of the following three universal intentional moments of "being in and through life": factical world, care, and temporalizing.

The radical critique of Greek philosophy given in Christian authors such as Paul, Luther, and Kierkegaard also functioned as a "model" for Heidegger's own wider philosophical project of destroying metaphysics. As we shall see, Heidegger universalized this theological critique and its insights, its "radically other interpretation of being." What took place in the young Heidegger's reading of original Christianity was, thus, a philosophical "fusion of horizons" with
the thought and language of Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, who he read from the point of view of Husserl's phenomenology and Dilthey and, as we shall see later, Aristotle. He attempted to make especially Kierkegaard's thought present and living in a new way "here and now...at this place, in this lecture hall" within the "kairological-critical" questioning of the "hermeneutical situation." As mentioned earlier, this fusion of horizons was to have been published first in his long essay on Jaspers' Psychology of World-Views, his seventy-page essay entitled "The Concept of Time," and then also in his book on Aristotle.

In the following investigation of the young Heidegger's destruction of the tradition of ontotheology and his ontological retrieval of Christian authors, I will again use the later Heidegger's autobiographical remarks on this matter only as indications to be pursued in the youthful texts themselves. I will confine myself to Heidegger's appropriation of original Christianity for the sake of philosophy, and not for the sake of theology. As in the case of the previous treatment of the young Heidegger's destructive retrieval of Husserl's phenomenology, I cannot here hope to give all the details in an exhaustive 're-construction', but rather only a rough outline of Heidegger's destructive retrieval of the three moments of his earlier speculative-theological formulation of the being-question.

i) Philosophia Crucis

In his two lecture courses Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion (1920-21) and Augustine and Neo-Platonism (1921), Heidegger approaches Christianity in terms of the conceptual framework ("preconception") of "being-meaning" with its three moments of "content-meaning," "relational meaning," and "enactment-meaning" or "temporalizing-meaning." (PRs, 318) He subjects each of these three intentional moments to a destructive retrieval. First, he destroys the later falsification of the experience of factual life in original Christianity through the adoption of the inappropriate conceptuality of Greek philosophy, which is consolidated through Augustine and the patristic tradition. Second, he retrieves
the understanding of factual life in original Christianity. We will begin with Heidegger’s destructive retrieval of the intention-
al moment of "content-meaning" (God, world) in Christianity.

**The Factual World**

In his 1920-21 lecture course *Introduction in the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger concentrated on Paul’s Letter to the Galatians, Second Letter to the Corinthians, and his two Letters to the Thessalonians (the latter being the oldest Christian documents predating even the Gospels). (*PRp*, 36-37; *PRs*, 319) In these texts, he attempted to show how the "content" of Christian faith, namely God, is experienced not as an abstract idea, but rather in terms of the factual world as the crucifixion and the second coming of the person of Jesus. Likewise, in two texts from the late 1920s, which draw on his earlier theological studies, Heidegger showed that the Christian meaning of "world" does not have the abstract Greek meaning of the "cosmos" as either mere intelligible structures or as a bare collection of things (of 'whats' composed of form and matter), but rather has the significance of 1) the "how" which defines the manner in which beings are encountered in factual life (content-meaning), and thus at the same time 2) this same "how" as a type of factual human comportment to things (relational meaning). In other words, world as the "how" (meaning) of beings is a way of existing in factual life. Heidegger writes:

In Paul (cf. 1 Cor. and Gal.) *kosmos houtos*, this world, means not merely, or even primarily, the condition of the 'cosmic', but the condition and the situation of *man*, the character of his stance *towards* the cosmos and of his evaluations of what is good. *Kosmos* is the being of man in the how of an attitude that has turned away from God (*he sophia tou kosmou*, the wisdom of the world). (*WH*, 143/51)

This *kosmos*, this how, is defined by its relation to the already dawning *cosmos*, to the coming futural age (*aion ho mellon*). The condition of all beings is regarded in relation to the *eschaton*, the final situation. Again it is clear that *kosmos* means a how and is essentially related to *Dasein* and to time. *Kosmos* is the world in the sense of humanity, the community and society of humans in their attitude of turning away from God, i.e., in their basic stance toward themselves and all beings. (*HL*, 222/173)
Likewise, in the Gospel of John "world" means not only the "whole of creation," but also those who do not believe ("he was in the world... and the world knew him not"), as well as those who are already oriented to the coming age. For Augustine, mundus means both the "whole of creation" and the mundi habitatores, the inhabitants of the world. (WH, 144/53)

Heidegger's Retrieval

Heidegger retrieved the indications given by Luther, Augustine, and Kierkegaard for rethinking the "content-meaning" of intentional experience as the factual world, which is the "how" of a "way to be" for human existence. He here "explicated" the universal "ontological-existential" structure of world from the specific "ontic-existential" world of Christian experience. For example, in his 1919 lecture, Heidegger introduced the Old Testament's sense of the factual earthly world in order to counter the theoretical process of "de-worlding" in Neo-Kantian epistemology (e.g., the "problem of the external world"):...

The De-Worlding of Traditional Theology

Heidegger's 1921 lecture course Augustine and Neo-Platonism attempted to show how factual "content-meaning" was lost in the development of Christian theology, which increasingly took over the conceptuality of Greek philosophy. Augustine, the patristic tradition and scholasticism understood Greek philosophy as (in Augustine's words) "conjectures" (conjecturae) about the truth of the Christian message. In this way, they saw their adoption of Greek conceptuality as legitimated. More specifically, appeal was made to Paul's statement that the "invisible things of God, his eternal power and divinity, have clearly been seen, being understood from what has been made," i.e., from his works. (Rom. 1:20) (APp, 40) Heidegger shows how, in its very inception, Christian
thought took over what he later came to call Greek "ontotheological" thinking ("first philosophy" as "theologia"), which leads back from beings to their divine etiological ground ("being," "logos," "nous," "idea," "beingness"). The Christian God of the Old and New Testaments became the "highest being" (sumnum ens, to on ontos), "substance" (substantia, ousia), and "first cause" of beings.52

In his lecture course Augustine and Neo-Platonism, Heidegger shows how Augustine falsified his own factual and historical understanding of being through the adoption of the Neo-Platonic concept of the "enjoyment of God" (fruitio Dei, apolausis theou),53 which brings with it a wholly different and inappropriate interpretation of being. (APp, 39–42) Augustine here takes over the notion of God as the "highest being" and the "highest good" (sumnum bonum) in a hierarchical scale of beings. For Augustine, "perversion" consists in "enjoying" worldly visible things intended for "use" as a means to the invisible God, and in "using" what is to be "enjoyed" (God) as a means to other ends:

Thus in this mortal life, wandering from God, if we wish to return to our native country where we can be blessed we should use this world and not enjoy it, so that the 'invisible things' of God 'being understood by the things that are made' [Rom. 1:20] may be seen, that is, so that by means of corporal and temporal things we may comprehend the eternal and spiritual. The things that are to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit....54

In this way, Augustine opens the door to speculative theology which investigates the Christian God as the causal ground of the created world. Heidegger argues that this conceptual falsification of the original experience of God is continued in scholasticism and in modern thought. One would have to include here Heidegger's own earlier speculative theology in his habilitation writing. In his later thought, Heidegger argued that it was Nietzsche who genuinely understood what had happened in the history of Christian thought, and thus saw himself compelled to "kill the long since 'dead' God."55 But already in 1926, we find Heidegger making the argument, later echoed in his "Letter on Humanism,"58 that saying that "God is a value and even the highest value" is "certainly a blasphemy." (LW, 84) Likewise, he argued that "for Thomas the objectum optimum
for the intellect is precisely deus as he is graspable through the revelation of the Bible, whereas for Aristotle that which always is, the heavens and nous, is the genuine object of knowing, an object that does not have slightest thing to do with the God of Thomas." (LN, 123)

The later Heidegger also worked out in detail how this Greek-Christian ontotheology was taken up into "onto-theo-ego-logy" of modern philosophy, which understands the divine causal ground as "subjectivity" in the sense of "man" (the Greeks and scholastics had already understood "being" and "God" as "subject" (hypokeimenon, subjectum), i.e., as "what lies under" beings as their supporting ground). The various interpretations of this "subjectivity" as "man" are Descartes' "res cogitans," Leibniz's "monad," Schelling's "will," Hegel's "absolute spirit," and Nietzsche's "will to power." Finally, the Christian God becomes the highest "value," the technologically interpreted God of scientific scholarship (psychology, anthropology, and religious studies), and the "business" (GA 44, 184) of corporate religion (Rilke's "Christ telephone"), which understands the being of the Christian God in terms of a "standing reserve" of "consumer goods" that are to be "enjoyed." (N 2, 429-440/26-74; S, 388) Even though it was not until his later writings that Heidegger worked out the above "sketches" for the history of western philosophy as ontotheology, the basic insights were already present in his youthful period. In 1921, the young Heidegger stated that "Fichte, Schelling and Hegel [and Kant] are theologians." (PA, 7) In 1923, he argued that the philosophy of Kant, German Idealism, and Scheler amounted to "formalizing de-theologizations" of traditional Christian theology. "In the modern philosophical idea of person-being the relationship to God, which is constitutive for the being of man, is neutralized to a consciousness of norms and value as such. 'Ego-pole' of such a primordial ground-act, act-centre (arche)." (HF, 24, 26, 29) That is to say, in modern transcendental idealism, the Christian God is replaced by the transcendental ego, in whose "image" and "likeness"
the empirical human being is "created" or (as Hegel says) "produced." (HF, 22)

**Luther's Destruction of the "Theology of Glory"**

In his lecture course *Augustine and Neo-Platonism*, Heidegger introduced the young Luther's critique of scholasticism and Aristotle in his *Heidelberg Disputation* (1518), which was still little known in the 1920s. Heidegger points out how Luther's nineteenth and twentieth theses attack the very basis which Augustine, patristic theology and scholasticism used to justify its adoption of Greek philosophy:

That person is not rightly called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were perceptible through things that have been made [Rom. 1:20]. (APp, 40)

It is this type of scholastic theology, based on Greek philosophy (especially Aristotle), which Luther calls *theologia gloriae*, "theology of glory." It seeks "God in his glory and majesty" insofar as he is manifested as the first cause through his created works (HD, 362/53):

A theologian of glory (that is, someone who does not know along with the apostle the hidden and crucified God, but sees and speaks of God's glorious manifestation among the heathens, how his invisible nature can be known from things visible and how he is present (presentem) and powerful in all things everywhere) learns from Aristotle that the object of the will is good....He learns that God is the highest good (sumnum bonum)....

It is easy to see what stands behind Luther's characterization of the object of Greek thought and of Aristotelian scholasticism as "glory" (gloria Dei, doxa theou). As we have already seen in Ch. 1, Greek thought conceives of being as the "divine" and further as "radiant light" (phos, phainomenon), "the seen" (eidos), the "unconcealed" (aletheia), the "good" (agathon), and the "beautiful" (kalon). Aristotle writes:

...wisdom is science and pure intuition of the things that are by nature most exalted and honored (episteme kai nous ton timiotaton). This is why we say that men like Anaxagoras and Thales are wise but do not have practical wisdom (phronesis), when we see them ignorant of what is to their advantage, and why we say that they know things that are strange and out of the ordinary, marvelous, difficult and divine, but useless, because they do not seek human goods. (E.N., VI, 7) (IAW, 142)
Plato understands the concrete sensuous and temporal world as "me on," which is not absolute "non-being" (ouk on), but rather a relative "not-being" something or other. "Not-being" means privation, lack, defect, flaw, imperfection, deficiency (pollution, motion, absence, darkness, ugliness, evil) in relation to the exemplary "beingly being" (to on ontos) of the "idea" as purity, constant presence (eternity), divinity, beauty, light, and good. (S, 332-333) The "idea" is always, as it were, wounded and crippled with absence and imperfection in its worldly and temporal instantiation (eidolon). Thus, the word "glory" is the young Luther's name for the way in which Greek philosophy and scholasticism experienced the being of beings as a divine causal ground. 

Doxa, gloria is a synonym for "being," "presence," "idea," "light," and "unconcealment" or "truth." The Greek notion of "glory" means 1) stable presence, 2) the splendour and radiant light of appearance; 3) the wondrous and extra-ordinary, the elevated and exalted; 4) power and magnificence. In Greco-Roman culture, "glory" was also attributed to anything which had these above-mentioned characteristics, e.g., the heroes, the gods, wise men, statesman, nations, cities, the stars, the 'seven wonders of the world', etc. One might put this simply by saying that glory was attributed to anything which was big and powerful and awe-inspiring.

It is precisely this approach to the Christian God as "glory," "built up" (aedificatur) and "hardened" through Aristotelian scholasticism, which Luther attempts to "unbuild" and "destroy" (destruere). (HD, 362/53, 363/55) He insists that it has to be "annihilated," "emptied," and "crucified." (HD, 363/55) The point for Luther is not "to progress forwards" (procedere) to ever higher speculative heights, but rather "to go backwards" (retrorcedere) into the original meaning of the Christian God as he is encountered in factical and historical life.

Luther's "destruction" of the speculative scholastic "theology of glory" goes back to the experience of the "cross" in the Gospels, Paul's letters, and Augustine. (HD, 361-362/52-53) He cites Romans 1:22 where Paul says that those who attempted to see
God from his works became "foolish" by studying "images." He also cites 1 Corinthians 1, where Paul completely reverses the worldview of Greek thought:

The message (logos) of the cross is foolishness....For it is written: I will destroy (apolo) the wisdom of the wise....Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher of this age?....God was pleased through the foolishness of the message to save those who believe. Jews demand miraculous signs and the Greek seek after wisdom, but we bring the message of Christ on the cross - a scandal and stumbling block (skandalon) to the Jews, and foolishness, stupidity, absurdity (moria) to the Greeks....the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom, and the weakness of god is stronger than human strength....think of what sort of people you are, whom god has called. Few of you are wise men...few of you are powerful; few of you are of high and noble birth (eugeneis). But God chose the foolish things of the world in order to shame the wise men, the weak things of the world in order to shame the strong things, and he chose the lowly deformed things (ta agene), things of no account, and the things that are not [radiantly present, powerful and glorious] (ta me onta) in order to annihilate the things that are [radiantly present, powerful and glorious] (ta onta), so that no one may boast and glorify themselves before him.

See to it that no one steals you away through philosophy ....(Col. 2:8)

In this incredible passage, Paul has completely reversed the structure of Greek thought, since what is "the most beingly being" (the divine etiological ground) is now seen as something illusory and derived, and what is "not-being" for Greek philosophy (concrete temporal facticity) is now seen as something original and fundamental. What is real is not "ideas," but rather the "fact," the "that" of meaning, which is characterized by a radical lack.

Here is Luther's version of this "theology of the cross," inspired by his early encounter with Paul's letters, which again seeks the Christian god not in his metaphysical "glory" as first cause, but rather "through suffering and the cross":

He deserves to be called a theologian who understands the visible things of God and what issues from God as seen through suffering and the cross. The visible things of God, i.e., his humanity, weakness, and foolishness, are placed in opposition to the invisible....It is not sufficient for anyone, and it does him no good, to know God in his glory and majesty, if he does not know him at the same time in the humiliation and shame of the cross....So also, in John 14:8, where Philip spoke according to the theology of
glory: "Show us the Father." Christ immediately dragged back his flighty thought and lead him back to himself, saying: "Philip, who has seen me has seen the Father." For this reason, true theology and knowledge of God are in Christ....[The theologian of glory] who does not know Christ does not know the God who is hidden in his suffering....God can be found only in suffering and the cross. The friends of the cross say that the cross is good and works are evil, for through the cross works are destroyed (destruuntur).... (HD, 362/52-53)70

Human works always appear to the eyes (videntur) as beautiful and radiant (speciosa)....The works of God always appear to the eyes as deformed (deformia) and evil....That the works of God are deformed is clear from Isa. 53:2: "He has neither a radiant form (species) nor beauty".... (HD, 356/43-44)

In order to fully appreciate these passages, one has to see that the Latin words "species" and "forma" are standard Latin translations of the Greek word "eidos," which means not only the outward "form" or "idea" of something, but also the seen, the outward look and appearance, and even the "radiance" and "beauty"71 of the look of, say, a landscape, a temple, or a Greek youth. Likewise, in the above quote from 1 Corinthians where Paul contrasts eugeneia (noble family) and ageneia (lowly family), it should be kept in mind that genos (family, genus) functions in Greek philosophy as a synonym for eidos.72 For Paul and Luther, the Christian God is not encountered as an "idea" or as a "substance" (substantia, ousia),73 but rather in his factual historical meaning, and indeed as a concrete 'person' who suffers, loves, and dies.74 In fact, Luther speaks of the "death of God": "God who is dead, the anguish of God, the blood of God, the death of God."75 Long before Nietzsche's madman, Luther had already killed the God of western metaphysics. What Luther wanted to "destroy" was (in Heidegger's lexicon) the "theorization" and "de-worlding" of the world of "significance" (the Crucified) in which faith lives. In the patristic and scholastic traditions, the event of the crucifixion had been progressively "de-signified" down to the remnant: summum ens, substance, thing-hood, cause, summum bonum. Heidegger's speculative theology in the conclusion to his earlier habilitation writing would certainly count as theologia gloriae for Luther and for the young Heidegger of the early twenties, since he here attempted to revive scholastic
thought and to speak of God as "absolute spirit" and "absolute validity" (as if God were a Neo-Kantian) without once even mentioning the New Testament.

Because the "theology of glory" has turned "everything upside-down," substituting the "glory" for the "cross," Luther sees his task precisely in reversing this reversal by means of his "theology of the cross," "regressing backwards" and thus "destroying" or "un-building" the theology of glory back into the factual and historical event of the crucifixion. In this way, he attempts to free Christian theology from its traditional Aristotelian conceptuality and return Christianity to its original basis in factual life. In other words, the young Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation calls for the end of theology (theologia gloriae) and for an 'other beginning' of theology (theologia crucis). His "destruction" of scholastic theology attempted also to retrieve theology in terms of especially Paul’s insights into how the Christian God is encountered in factual life.

**Luther’s Destruction of Aristotle**

The young Luther also carries out a destruction of Aristotelian philosophy itself as a form of "glory." In addition to his 28 "theological theses" directed against Aristotelian Scholasticism, Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation contains twelve "philosophical theses," which primarily criticize Aristotle, but also discuss Plato, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, and Parmenides. In the "proofs" to his "philosophical theses," one finds Luther moving freely about in quoted passages from Aristotle’s *De Caelo, Physics, De Anima, Metaphysics,* and *Nicomachean Ethics.* He was not simply a dilettante who was good at swearing at "the Philosopher," calling this "dead heathen," this "blind heathen Master Aristotle" also a "three-headed Cerberus," a "Geryon with three bodies," an "idle ass" and "heathen beast," whose "fantasies and dreams" (somnia) are "a hundred times more obscure than the Sacred Scripture," and attempting to "unmask" him as a "showman," a "poisonous" and "deadly" "swindler," a "sycophant," a "hypocrite," a "slanderer," a "damned, arrogant, roguish heathen," and indeed as "the angel of
the abyss," who would have been the devil himself, had he not been made of flesh and blood. Rather, he had studied the whole corpus of Aristotle's writings in detail. He even claimed to "understand Aristotle better than Thomas or Duns Scotus." In 1508-09, he lectured on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* He also gave talks on Aristotle's *Physics,* which he claimed "to know inside out." In 1517, he was working on a commentary on the first book of the *Physics,* in which he planned to unmask the bankruptcy of Aristotle's philosophy, but it was never completed in this form. Instead, it became his 1517 *Disputation Against Scholastic Theology* and his 1518 *Heidelberg Disputation.*

Luther's philosophical theses in the *Heidelberg Disputation* open with a full-scale critique of Aristotle:

He who wishes to philosophize in Aristotle without danger must first become completely a fool in Christ.... All trust, life, glory, virtue, and wisdom of man is Christ alone. But Christ is hidden in God. Therefore, what is both inwardly and outwardly visible to the eyes (apparet) is nothing with which man can be presumptuous.

Luther's *Disputation Against Scholastic Theology* presented the following theses:

43. It is an error to say that no man can become a theologian without Aristotle. 44. Indeed, no one can become a theologian unless he becomes one without Aristotle.... 50. Briefly, the whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light. This in opposition to the scholastics.

In his third philosophical thesis in his *Heidelberg Disputation,* Luther critically discusses Aristotle's notion of the eternity of the world and the "the eternal being as the cause of movement in infinite time" in Aristotle's *Physics,* VIII and his *Metaphysics,* XII. What he felt was missing from Aristotle's treatment of the divine was precisely the facticity and historicity of God: "he treats the religious in such an icy manner." About Aristotle's god as "thought thinking thought," Luther writes: "The supreme being sits above the sky and sees nothing of what happens, but rather, as in the painting of blind fortune, he eternally rattles the heavens around each and every day."

Likewise, Luther sees Aristotle's investigations into "nature" (*physis*) and "world" (*cosmos*) as what Heidegger calls the
"de-worlding" of the factual lived world. Luther states that the point of his Heidelberg Disputation was to show that "one gains no aid whatsoever from [Aristotle's philosophy], either for theology and sacred letters or even for natural philosophy":

For what could be gained with respect to the understanding of things if you could quibble and trifle about matter, form, motion, measure, and time — words taken and copied from Aristotle?89

[The Physics] is a debate about nothing....[it is] as if someone were exercising his talents and skills studying and playing with dung....In it there is no real knowledge of the world of nature (rerum naturalium). His Metaphysics and De Anima are of the same quality.90

I dare say that a potter has more practical knowledge (Kunst von) of natural things than is written in those books.91

In his 1515-1516 Lectures on the Letter to the Romans, Luther argues that traditional philosophy does not penetrate to the concrete nature of the world:

The apostle philosophizes and thinks about the world (rebus) in an other way than the philosophers and the metaphysicians....Alas, how deeply and disastrously we are ensnared in discussions about categories and essential determinations; in how many stupid metaphysical questions are we involved....you will be the best philosophers and the best investigators of the world if you learn with the apostle to consider the creation as it waits, sighs, and travails....For then the study of the essence of things, their accidents and differences, will quickly grow worthless....Look how we esteem the study of the essences and actions and inactions (passiones) of things, and the things themselves reject and sigh over their own essences and actions and inactions.... And, I ask you, is he not a mad man who laughs at someone who is crying and lamenting, and then boasts and takes glory in the fact that he sees him as enjoying himself and laughing?...So the apostle is right in Col. 2:8 when he says against philosophy: "See to it that no one steals you away through philosophy and empty fraud...."92

For Luther, who here follows the Christian tradition, "world" does not mean primarily a bare collection of things (of 'whats' composed of form and matter), but rather 1) the "how" which defines the manner in which beings are encountered (content-meaning), and thus at the same time 2) this same "how" as the type of human comportment to things (relational meaning). In other words, world as the "how" (meaning) of beings is a way of existing. In his Heidelberg Disputation, Luther speaks of "world" as the "glory" (power, splendour, security) in terms of which the self,
God, and things are encountered, and of this "glory" as a way of existence. "[The theology of the cross] is the wisdom which is foolishness to the world." (HD, 362-363/52-54) When Luther maintains that the "sadness" and "sighing" of the world describes the world more genuinely than the philosopher's "categories" and "essences", he means by world human life and the "creation" as a whole understood in terms of the how of an "anxious expectation" of the "coming age." Likewise, this coming world is experienced not in terms of categories and essences, but as the coming of the "word" (logos), of the existential "message" (kerygma, evangelion) which addresses the community of believers and places them into a genuine community of love. In all the above cases, world is experienced neither as a mere object nor in terms of meaning in the sense of "ideas" or "forms" (e.g., Neo-Kantian "values" or Husserlian "essences"), but rather as concretely lived "significance" or "meaning" (Bedeutsamkeit) in the sense of "it means something to me" (es bedeutet mir etwas) and 'says' something to me. (IP, 73)

Hence Luther's statement that a simple craftsman understands natural things more genuinely than Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics. Here the immediate "it worlds/there is world" of the practical around-world has not been leveled off by the Aristotelian concepts of "form," "matter," "substance," and "category."

For Luther, the "theology of glory" refers just as much to Aristotle himself and traditional philosophy in general as to Aristotelian scholasticism. Appealing to Paul and to the tradition of ancient practical thought stretching from Socrates to Seneca in his Lectures on the Letter to the Romans (the "best philosophers" philosophize "in an other way than the philosophers and the metaphysicians"), Luther here and in the "philosophical theses" of his Heidelberg Disputation is in effect calling not only for the end of the traditional theologia gloriae, but also for the end of metaphysics (philosophia gloriae) and for an other beginning of philosophy, which can do justice to the facticity and historicity of life, even though Luther conceives this other beginning as ultimately moving in the direction of Christian thought. In the
next section on Heidegger's youthful reading of Aristotle, we will see how Heidegger himself took up Luther’s non-scholastic 'retrieval' of Aristotle’s *Physics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, and took up also Kierkegaard’s appropriation of Aristotle and Socratic thought. For Luther, "it is not as if philosophy [and Aristotle’s thought in particular] is in itself evil" (a "whore," "dung," etc.), but rather its "misuse." (HD, 363/55) He was interested not in rejecting Aristotle’s thought completely, but rather in seeing that one "philosophizes well": "no one philosophizes well unless he is a fool." (HD, 355/41) Luther’s wholesale condemnations of philosophy and Aristotle are directed to what he saw as the gross misuse of philosophy in scholasticism, and not to philosophy and Aristotle themselves. 87

**Heidegger’s Retrieval**

But the young Luther systematically unfolded neither his ideas for an other beginning of theology, nor his ideas for an other beginning in philosophy. In fact, Heidegger claims that the "later Luther" and his systematizer Melanchthon re-introduced scholastic and Greek (esp. Aristotelian) conceptuality back into Luther’s early breakthroughs, and so gave rise to a "new scholasticization" (APp, 41; GZ, 235/174), which in turn gave rise to German Idealism! (PA, 7) It was really not Melanchthon and the Lutheran theologians nor German idealism, but rather Hamann and Kierkegaard who took up the Luther’s "indications" in a genuine way, and attempted to unfold them in theology and philosophy. However, Heidegger claims that even Kierkegaard fell prey to the conceptuality of Greek ontology, which was transmitted to him through Hegel’s thought. Implicitly, the end of philosophy (and theology) and the other beginning for philosophy (and theology) had already taken place in Luther and Kierkegaard, just as - so we will see later - the end of philosophy (and ethics) and the other beginning of philosophy (and ethics) had already implicitly occurred long before Heidegger in Socrates’ critique of the speculative thought of the early Greek philosophers and in Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s "idea of the good." Heidegger’s great
contribution was that of taking up these counter-traditions, developing them, and providing an explicit philosophical language for what was only implicit in them. This is what he attempted for the insights of Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. Theologically, he wanted to provide a new language and conceptuality which could truly do justice to Luther’s and Paul’s notion of a *theologia crucis*, and he worked out the basic outline of this new language and conceptuality in his 1927 Tübingen lecture “Phenomenology and Theology.” Philosophically, he took up the indications of Luther and Kierkegaard, but also the insights of other anti-metaphysical counter-traditions such as Aristotle’s practical thought and Dilthey’s philosophy of life, and attempted to provide a new language and conceptuality for them and for all domains of factual life (what the later Heidegger attempted for Nietzsche, Hölderlin, and the early Greek thinkers). In this way, the young Heidegger wanted to accomplish for the various counter-traditions what Plato and Aristotle had accomplished for the thought of Socrates (who wrote nothing), i.e., a language. Heidegger saw that the tradition suffered from a language-need, and it was at the same his own need, as his letter to Löwith in 1921 clearly indicates.

The young Heidegger carried out a destruction of traditional theology and a retrieval of a new theology not only in his two lecture courses on original Christianity, but in the majority of his youthful works, in his *Being and Time*, and in his 1927 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology.” However, we are primarily interested not in his theological project, but rather in his use of the indications he found in Luther and other theological thinkers for the sake of rethinking ontology. For Heidegger this meant “explicating,” “making explicit” (*ARp*, 38; *SZ*, 447, n. 2/388, n. iii), on an ontological conceptual level the implicit historical understanding of being in Christianity, which is radically different from that found in western metaphysics. It was a matter of Heidegger following up “this Lutheran thought in all its consequences,
which for anyone doing philosophy is so strange and astonishing'." (Jaspers) (APp, 41)

In the first place, Heidegger's term "destruction" derives from Luther's *Heidelberg Disputation*, but more importantly so does Heidegger's very idea of the "destruction" of philosophy and especially of Aristotle in particular from the standpoint of factical life. At the beginning of his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger introduces Luther's adversarial "reception of Aristotelian philosophy":

The Christian consciousness of life belonging to Early and High Scholasticism, in which the actual reception of Aristotle and thereby a very specific interpretation took place, was already permeated with a process of 'Hellenization'. The original Christian contexts of life had already developed themselves within a world, whose life and the direction of its expression were determined also by the specific Greek interpretation of human existence and its conceptuality (Termini). Through Paul and in the apostolic period and especially in the "patristic" period, a molding into the Greek world came about.... Luther's religious and theological counterattack now took place against scholasticism, which had been consolidated through the reception of Aristotle....What is at stake here is something decisive. (PA, 6)

In its oral form, Heidegger opened this lecture course by "citing Luther's condemnation of the *Metaphysics*, *De Anima*, and *Ethics* of the 'pagan master Aristotle'!" The "mottos and also the indication of acknowledgment of the sources," which Heidegger placed at the start of the manuscript for this course in order to "characterize the tendencies of the interpretation," are criticisms of speculative philosophy taken from Luther's *Commentary on the First Book of Moses* and his *Preface to St. Paul's Letter to the Romans*, and from Kierkegaard's *Training in Christianity* and his *Either-Or*

From both a Christian and an ethical point of view, the whole of modern philosophy is based on thoughtlessness and easy-goingness....as abstract, philosophy floats in the indefiniteness of the metaphysical. (Kierkegaard) (PA, 182)

Likewise, Heidegger's 1922 introduction to a planned book on Aristotle, which he sent to Paul Natorp in Marburg, opened with a discussion of Luther's condemnation of Aristotle's metaphysics:

[It was] an analysis of the 'hermeneutical situation' for an interpretation of Aristotle. And with what did it begin? With the young Luther, precisely the Luther who required of everyone, who truly
wanted to be a Christian, that he must renounce Aristotle, this 'great liar'. And then followed, as I perfectly remember...other names: Gabriel Biel, Peter Lombard, the Master of Sentences, Augustine and finally Paul. Undoubtedly, it was Heidegger's old well-documented concern with the original Christian message which stood behind the Aristotle undertaking. In 1923, Heidegger wrote at the opening of his lecture course Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity):

Companions in my searching were the young Luther and the model Aristotle, who Luther hated. Kierkegaard gave impulses.... (HF, 5)

The young Heidegger's own "destruction" of the abstract being-meaning of Greek philosophia gloriae wanted to see this notion of being, so to speak, nailed to and crucified on the 'the cross' of facticity. His 'Good Friday' and 'Calvary' of western metaphysics was to rethink and resurrect the meaning of being "in and through" 'the cross', the "skandalon," and the "foolishness" of the factual world. Just as Luther spoke of the "death of [the transcendent] God" of glory through the suffering and hell of the cross, so the young Heidegger's own philosophia crucis looked to the 'death of being', of its transcendent "glory" through the "worlding" of the factual world. As we shall see, Heidegger followed not only Luther's, Augustine's, and Kierkegaard's critique of the "content-meaning" of Greek philosophy, but also their critique of the "relational meaning" and "enactment meaning" of Greek thought.

ii) The Thorn in the Self

We now turn to a consideration of the young Heidegger's destructive retrieval of the "relational meaning" of original Christianity.

Factual Life

As noted, Heidegger's 1920-21 lecture course on original Christianity centred on the experience of the Parousia, the imminent coming of Christ. In this context, he pursued a number of themes regarding the factual "relational meaning" of Christian experience. One of them was Paul's theme of mystical charisma and the "thorn in the flesh" in 2 Corinthians 12:1-10, which he introduced in order to demonstrate the understanding of the factual self in original Christianity (PRp, 37):
Although there is nothing to be gained, I will go on to visions and revelations from the Lord. I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up into the third heaven....To keep from exalting myself...there was given me a thorn in my flesh, a messenger of Satan who smashes me with his fists...That is why, for Christ's sake, I approve of weaknesses, insults, hardships, difficulties. For when I am weak, I am strong.105

In his discussion of this passage, Heidegger "emphasized how the turning to facticity is based precisely in the renunciation of visions and revelations [about the Parousia]..., in the refusal to boast and glorify oneself in a special gift, and in taking upon oneself one's weakness....By means of this reflection on the original Christian religiosity as the model of factical experience of life, Heidegger acquired the leading concepts, which emphasize the structure of factical life...." (PRp, 37-38) One can also note here how meaning-content (God) shows itself in "relation" to factical life and, therefore, not as an abstract and unchanging in-itself, but rather as a concrete and historical event (person of Jesus).

Heidegger maintains that this consciousness of factical life was maintained in original Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. He writes of Kierkegaard, for example, that "he explicitly seized upon the problem of existence as an existentiell problem, and thought it through in a penetrating fashion." (SZ, 312, n. 6/235, n. vi) Against Hegelian rationalism, Kierkegaard insisted the human subject is not a "something in general," "thinking in general," the idealist's "I-am-I," or "human being in general," but rather always "factical individual existence" (Jaspers), the "individual," the concrete "self":

Such an abstract thinker, one who neglects to take into account the relationship between his abstract thought and his own existence as an individual, not careful to clarify his relationship to himself, makes a comical impression upon the mind even if he is ever so distinguished, because he is in the process of ceasing to be a human being. While a genuine human being, as a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, finds his reality in holding these two factors together, infinitely interested in existing - such an abstract thinker is a comical duplex being: a fantastic creature who moves in the pure being of abstract thought, and on the other hand, a sometimes pitiful professorial figure which the former places aside, about as when one sets down a walking stick. When one
reads the story of such a thinker's life (for his writings are perhaps excellent), one trembles to think of what it means to be a man (And when you read in his writings that thought and being are one, it is impossible not to think, in view of his own life and mode of existence, that the being which is thus identical with thought can scarcely be the being of a man).

The self signifies precisely the contradiction that the universal is posited as the individual. In his 1923 lecture course, Heidegger quotes a passage from Kierkegaard's critique of the philosophical view of the individual as simply an instantiation of the species "rational animal":

To be a man means: to belong as an example to a race that is endowed with reason, so that the race, the species, is higher than the individual, or that there are only examples and no individuals. (PA, 108)

It was with the aid of Kierkegaard's thought that Heidegger worked out the themes of the "facticity," the "mineness," and the "whileness" of life. Indeed, in his 1923 lecture course, Heidegger prefaced his analyses of "being in the world" with a clear acknowledgment of Kierkegaard's influence: "Strong influences on the explication which is presented here come from the work of Kierkegaard." (HF, 30, 5; PA, 182)

Kierkegaard's notion that in the self the "universal is posited as the individual" is also expressed in his all-important theme of "subjective truth," i.e., truth or universality not in itself, but rather as related to the "passionate suffering" (Leidenschaft) of this truth in the individual existing self. In his Psychology of World-Views (through which Heidegger's knowledge and interpretation of Kierkegaard was mediated), Jaspers writes:

In opposition to objective thought on problems, solutions of contradictions, as it is performed most superbly in mathematical knowledge - according to Kierkegaard, all mathematical knowledge is indifferent to the existing person - an experience of the earnestness of existence is developed, and also a consciousness of how everything depends on self-comportment (Sichverhalten), life, the self-decision of the existing person. This is the passionate suffering of the existing person in contrast to the dialectics of the thinker who does not really exist and live, and who thinks at his desk what he has never done, never experienced, and never lived.

Knowing itself can indeed be existential and in passionate
suffering, and when this happens, the paradox [of the universal in the particular] is immediately there also....

Whereas "objective truth"...can be without any contradiction and is a matter of indifference [to the individual], "subjective truth" is the authentic truth, that of the existing person. It finds its expression in the paradox: "The highest point of the inwardness of an existing subject is passionate suffering, and to it corresponds truth as a paradox. That the truth becomes a paradox is based precisely on its relation (Verhältnis) to an existing subject." [Kierkegaard]

Who forgets that he is an existing subject loses his passion, and as a reward for this the truth becomes for him not a paradox [of the universal and the individual], but rather the knowing subject changes from a human being into a fantastic being, and the truth becomes a fantastic object for his knowledge.109

According to the concept of "subjective truth," the decisive factor is not the "what," the content of one's life, but rather the "how" of existing:

The lowliest man can relate himself absolutely to spiritual determinants [such as choice, suffering, guilt] quite as well as the gifted man: for brilliant parts, learning, talents, are after all a "what," but the absoluteness of relationship to spirit is a "how," indicative of what one is, be it much or little.110

Kierkegaard's notion of "subjective truth" and "passion" influenced Heidegger's theme of the "relational meaning" of the "being," i.e., that being is "in and through" the relation to concrete human subjectivity.111 Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, as we have seen, speaks of truth or being as primarily the "how" of a "way of existing."

Care

In his early lecture courses and in his Being and Time, Heidegger indicates the various characteristics of factual life according to original Christianity. In the New Testament, the basic relationship of human life to all content is spoken of as "care" (merimna, phrontis; sollicitudo in the Vulgate).112 In its genuine form, this care is care for the self, and the self precisely in its relationship to God: "care for things of the lord" (1 Cor. 7:32); "there should be no division in the body, but...its members should have equal care (phrontizosin) for each other" (1 Cor. 12:25); "so that those who have trusted in God may care for doing good works" (Tit. 3:8); "who will care for your welfare" (Phil. 2: 20). For
Augustine, "quaestio mihi factus sum," "I am a question to myself."
In his Confessions, he writes: "What is closer to me than myself?"
"Assuredly I labour here and I labour within myself. I have become to myself a land of trouble and much sweat." \(^{113}\) (LW, 211; SZ, 59/89) "I am a burden to myself." \(^{114}\) For Augustine, all intentional acts are at the same time acts of "love" which "take an interest" in the object from the point of view of the person's own (real or imagined) well-being. \(^{115}\) The notion of care was also treated extensively in the writings of Luther, \(^{116}\) Pascal, \(^{117}\) and Kierkegaard. \(^{118}\) For original Christianity, the fundamental object of care is the relationship between the person and God, which is expressed historically in the events of the incarnation and the Parousia.

It was this Christian notion of care that helped Heidegger to criticize Husserl's notion of intentionality as a colorless "being directed towards" the world. Heidegger clearly indicates that he retrieved the specifically Christian notion of care on a universal ontological level: "The way in which 'care' is viewed in the foregoing existential analytic of Dasein is one which has grown upon the author in connection with his attempts to interpret the Augustinian (i.e., Helleno-Christian) anthropology with regard to the principal foundations arrived at in the ontology of Aristotle." (SZ, 264, n. 3/243, n. vii) \(^{119}\) In 1921, Heidegger wrote: "In the widest interpretation of its relational meaning, life is: being anxiously concernful for one's 'daily bread'... 'living in need' (privatio, carentia) is, in terms of its relation and enactment, the fundamental how of the meaning of the being of life.... Secure objectivity is insecure flight from facticity." (PA, 90) But, according to Heidegger, the universal sense of care means primarily the fact that human life is always an issue for itself, such that on this basis it can either explicitly 'care' for itself, or else flee from itself.

**Understanding (Phronesis)**

Heidegger also shows how the three basic forms of this care or self-concern - understanding, mood, and language - are familiar in original Christianity. In his 1920-21 lecture course, he did
this through an analysis of the first twelve verses of the First Letter to the Thessalonians. (PRS, 320-321) Heidegger pointed out that here in the text there is a repetition of the word "to know" (eidenai). These usages are of the character: "But concerning the time and the moment (kairos) I do not need to write to you, for you already know...." (5:1) This kind of knowing means not a theoretical knowledge or science, but rather practical understanding: "experiential knowledge...comprehension of the situation." The situation about which Paul writes is the Parousia, the second coming of Jesus. Elsewhere in the New Testament, one finds knowing within the situation of the Parousia spoken of as phronesis, concerned practical understanding which discloses existential possibilities: e.g., "Who then is the faithful and practically wise (phronimos) steward, whom the master puts in charge of his servants to give them their food at the fitting moment (en kairo)?" (Luke 12:42) The metaphorical expression of this practical understanding in the Parables of Jesus is not centred on the detached gazing of the "eye of the mind," as in Greek metaphysics (theorein), but rather employs the images from the domain of concernful praxis: the manager of the household, the carpenter, the shepherd, the sower, the fisherman, the virgins waiting in the night with lanterns for the return of the master. This Christian concept of knowing as phronesis, along with the notion of phronesis in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (as we shall see), function for Heidegger as a counter-model to the Greek concept of knowing as "science" and "theory." This other type of understanding is not passive contemplation, but rather discloses possibilities for human existence. Heidegger was influenced here also by Kierkegaard's thought on how the existing self is defined not only by necessity (facticity), but also by "possibility" and "being able."

**Mood**

In the first twelve verses of 1 Thessalonians, there is also an emphasis on mood: "your labor prompted by love, and your endurance inspired by hope"; "in spite of much anxiety, you welcomed the message with joy"; "we had previously suffered." (PRS,
In the New Testament, mood in general is designated by the term "the heart" (kardia): "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, has shined in our hearts...." (2 Cor. 4:6); "great sorrow and unceasing anguish in my heart" (Rom. 9:2); "their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened" (Rom. 1:21). Augustine and Pascal stressed the role of mood, primarily the moods of love and hate: "The only way to truth is through love." "Things which encounter you [the soul] and then pass on bring you into a moodful state of mind (affectio, Befindlichkeit)." (Augustine) "The heart has reasons that reason does not know." "...while, in human matters, we are accustomed to inculcate that 'we must know before we can love', - an expression which has become proverbial (ignoti nulla cupidio); divine wisdom teaches that, in regard to spiritual things, we must 'love in order to know them'...." (Pascal) Kierkegaard has also given an extensive treatment of the role of moods. Here, too, Heidegger indicates his ontological retrieval of the theme of mood in original Christianity. For example, his discussions of "fear" and "anxiety" draw upon the analyses of Augustine and Aquinas. For Heidegger, it is mood which initially lets the world matter to one and affect one in a definite manner, e.g., as fearful, as joyful, as boring, etc.

**Anxiety**

According to Heidegger, a basic mood which permeates original Christianity is that of "anxiety" about one's being, and for Christianity this ultimately means one's being in relation to God. This anxiety is expressed in the theological notion of the "fear of God." "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the lord." (Ps. 110:10) "...they confessed that they were strangers and sojourners on the earth...searching for a home...." (Heb. 11:13; 1 Pt. 2:11) "...work out your salvation in fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you...." (Philip. 2:12) "I came to you in fear and trembling...." (1 Cor. 2:3) "...you did not receive a spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but a spirit of sonship, by which you cry: Abba, Father." (Rom. 8:15) On the basis of such
scriptural passages, Augustine and, following him, Aquinas developed the notion of "pure" or "chaste fear" (timor castus) of God. What makes this fear "pure" is the fact that what one fears for is one's community with God as one's "ultimate end." What motivates this fear is the "love" of God, the concern for community with God. This fear is anxious about one's "future life," and thus is found together with "hope" for the "future good" (bonum futurum). The real object of this fear, its "future evil" (malum futurum) is, therefore, not so much the wrath of God as the loss of community with God resulting from such wrath, which threatens in the form of the "sting of death." Along with hope, this fear or anxiety is a basic mood in which the Christian form of "care" (love, interest) manifests itself. Since this love is eternal, "pure fear," according to Augustine, is also "eternal."

In "servile fear" (timor servilis) of God, on the other hand, the object of one's love or care is the world, and thus that for which one fears is one's worldly attachments, which are threatened by the punishment of God. One is anxious about the world as the object of one's interest. The object of servile fear is punishment and the loss of worldly attachments. This fear is servile, the fear of the slave, since it acts outwardly in accordance with (and not for the sake of) God only out of fear of the force of the master's punishment which threatens its real worldly interests. "Pure" or "chaste" fear, however, acts for the sake of God and it's community with God out of love and interest and therefore acts "freely."

According to Heidegger, Augustine also "caught a glimpse of [anxiety in a general anthropological context] in a short study De metu [On fear, apprehensiveness, dread] within a collection of questions, 'On Various Questions of the Eighty Tribes'." (GZ, 404/292) Here Augustine speaks of "anxiety" as the type of "fear" that has the "soul" for its explicit object:

The only cause for fear lies in the fact that what is loved might be lost, once acquired, or might not be acquired, once hoped for....there is no fear except of a future and imminent evil....Now as for one whose breath is not taken away by fear, he is not
211

disquieted by passionate desire, nor is he tormented by the sickness of grief, nor is he troubled by excited and empty delight. ... Again, if he is made anxious (angitutur) by anguish of the soul, it is necessary that he be vexed and driven by fear, because anxiety (anxietudo) results from present evil whose imminence occasions fear. But if he is free of fear, he is therefore also free from anxiety. \(^\text{133}\) Heidegger also states that "Luther dealt with the phenomenon of dread in the traditional context of an interpretation of 'contrition' [from conterere, to wear away, to crush (with sorrow)] and 'penitence' [from paenitere, to regret, to be sorry] in his commentary on Genesis." (GZ, 404, n. 5/292, n. 5) Luther describes the "anxiety" (anxietate) \(^\text{134}\) of Adam and Eve after the original sin and separation from God and also makes comments on the pervasiveness of anxiety in all human life:

...Adam and Eve were terrified (territi) by the rustling of a leaf. (Lev. 26:36) We see it to be just so in the case of frightened (meticulosis) human beings: when they hear the creaking of a beam, they are afraid that the entire house will collapse; when they hear a mouse, they are afraid that Satan is there and wants to kill them. By nature we have become so thoroughly terrified that we fear even the things that are safe....Adam and Eve lose their confidence in God and are so filled with fear and trembling that when they hear a breath or a wind, they immediately think that God is approaching to punish them, and they hide....When the conscience is truly terrified, man is so oppressed that he not only cannot act but is unable even to do any thinking. They say that such a thing happens in battle when soldiers who are oppressed with fear cannot move a hand but permit themselves to be slain by the enemy. Such a horrifying (horribilis) punishment follows sin that at the rustling of a leaf the conscience is full of fear....With what security and lack of care (securitate) Eve listens to the serpent! We do not talk so familiarly with a puppy that has been raised in the home and has been accustomed to it - or with a chick....Oh, what a grave downfall, to plunge from the utmost security and lack of care, from confidence and delight in God into such horrible trembling....In its fear and trembling, to where should the heart flee from the presence of God? \(^\text{135}\)

Heidegger also refers to Pascal's treatment of "restlessness" or "anxiety" (inquiétude), "boredom" (ennui), and homelessness. "Concerning life and restlessness, cf. Pascal, Pens. I-VII; the description [is] valuable...." \(^\text{136}\) (PA, 93):

Man's condition: inconstancy, boredom, anxiety. \(^\text{137}\)

Men are by nature tilers and inclined to every calling, except that of abiding at home. \(^\text{138}\)
When I see the blind and wretched state of man, when I survey the whole universe in its dumbness and man left to himself with no light, as though lost in this corner of the universe, without knowing who put him there, what he has come to do, what will become of him when he dies, incapable of knowing anything, I am moved to terror, like a man transported in his sleep to some terrifying desert island, who wakes up quite lost and with no means of escape.

As I know not whence I come, neither do I know whither I am bound; all I know is that, when I quit this world, I fall for ever either into nothingness or into the hands of an angry God....Such is my condition, full of weakness and uncertainty....uncertain as to the eternity of my future condition.

The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fill me with dread.

Finally, Heidegger states that "the man who has gone the farthest in analyzing the phenomenon of anxiety - and again in the theological context of a 'psychological' exposition of the problem of original sin - is Soren Kierkegaard." (SZ, 252, n. 3/235, n. iv; 313, n. 6/278, n. vi) In a section entitled "Anxiety [about freedom] as the Presupposition of Original Sin [i.e., the specific choice of evil]," Kierkegaard argues that the disclosure of freedom (the "possibility of possibility") in anxiety makes possible the choice of evil in the original sin, which then further aggravates this anxiety:

When it is assumed that the prohibition awakens the desire, one acquires knowledge instead of ignorance, and in that case Adam must have had a knowledge of freedom, because the desire was to use it. The explanation is therefore subsequent. The prohibition induces in him anxiety, for the prohibition awakens in him the possibility of freedom. What passed by innocence as the nothing of anxiety has now entered into Adam, and here again it is a nothing - the anxious possibility of being able. He has no conception of what he is able to do; otherwise - and this is what usually happens - that which comes later, the difference between good and evil, would have been presupposed.

If we ask more particularly what the object of anxiety is, then the answer, here as elsewhere, must be that it is nothing. Anxiety and nothing always correspond to each other.

Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy.....Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when...freedom looks down into its own possibility....

The possible corresponds precisely with the future. For freedom, the possible is the future, and the future is for time the pos-
sible. To both of these corresponds anxiety in the individual. An accurate and correct linguistic usage therefore associates anxiety and the future. 146

Like Pascal, Kierkegaard also gave detailed analyses of the related phenomenon of restless "boredom" in human life. 147

The Pauline text (1 Thess. 1-12) which Heidegger discussed in his 1920-21 lecture course mentions "anxiety" or "affliction" (thlipsis) and "joy" (hope) as the moods of the early Christians in relation to the uncertainty of the time of the Parousia. "...'the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night'....'When people say, 'Peace! Security!' then destruction will suddenly come upon them' [1 Thess. 5:2-3]...the Christian's state...means a constant, essential and necessary insecurity." (PRs, 322)

The young Heidegger worked out his notions of anxiety and boredom by means of an existential-ontological retrieval of the specifically Christian experience of anxiety. 148 For Heidegger, all human beings - and not just Christian experience - is characterized by the basic mood of anxiety about one's existence. Likewise, Heidegger's distinction between fear, which fears something in the world that threatens one's worldly concerns (timor servilis), and anxiety, which is anxious about the self as the primary object of care (timor castus), was worked out with the aid of not only Augustine's distinction between "pure fear" and "servile fear," but also the reflections of Pascal and Kierkegaard. 149 This Christian tradition also lies at the basis of his notion that anxiety does not necessarily mean morbidness, but in its genuine form is found together with "joy." 150 As indicated above, the major source for Heidegger's thought on anxiety was Kierkegaard's The Concept of Anxiety.

Death

For Christianity, anxiety is also Todesangst, anxiety about one's death. "The anthropology worked out in Christian theology-from Paul to Calvin's meditatio futurae vitae-has always also kept death in view in its interpretation of 'life'." (SZ, 331, n. 2/293, n. vi) "The sting of death is sin...." (1 Cor 15:56) "We are in anxiety in all ways, but not crushed....We always carry around
in our bodies the death of Jesus...we who are living are always being given over to death...death is at work in us..." (2 Cor. 4:11) "...dying, and yet we live...." (2 Cor. 6:9) "Daily we die." (1 Cor. 15:31)\textsuperscript{151}

One of Heidegger's mottos for his 1921-22 lecture course is from Luther's meditations on death in his Lectures on Moses. For Luther, "temporal life" is a constant dying, a "running ahead towards" the "terrifying intermediate event" between the "present life" and the "future life":

"For surely you will die." [Gen. 2:17]...Paul says: "Daily we die." [1 Cor. 15:31] Although we do not wish to call the life we live here a death, nevertheless it surely is nothing else than a constant journey toward, a running ahead toward death (\textit{perpetuus cursus ad mortem}). Just as a person infected with a sickness has already started to die when the infection has begun, so after this life has been infected with sin it can no longer properly be called life on account of sin and the punishment for sin: death. Right from our mother's womb we begin to die....In life we are in the midst of death (\textit{in media morte})....our life can be called death....\textsuperscript{152}

Dying - that means to feel death as present. (\textit{HD}, 363/55) What man is not in horror and despair in the face of death? (374/69)

Pascal likewise saw that "restlessness" is caused by the all-pervasive presence of death in one's life:

Man is only a reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed...a vapour, a drop of water is enough to kill him....he knows that he is dying....\textsuperscript{153}

Imagine a number of men in fetters, all condemned to death, and some killed daily in the sight of the rest, and those who are left, reading their own fate in that of their fellows, waiting their turn, looking at each other in gloom and despair. That is a picture of the human condition.\textsuperscript{154}

For Kierkegaard, death is essentially not something objective (either as biological occurrence or as a universal truth), but rather always the "subjective relation to [my] death" (Jaspers), the factual self's relation to itself as dying. He sees death as 1) a constant source of anxiety and self-concern, 2) absolutely individual and individuating, and 3) uncertain and to be anticipated at every moment:

The problem of \textit{what it means to die}....Suppose that death were so devious as to come tomorrow!....To think about it once for all, or
once a year at matins on New Year's morning, is of course nonsense, and is the same as not thinking about it at all.... If death is always uncertain, if I am a mortal creature, then it is impossible to understand this uncertainty in terms of a mere generality unless indeed I, too, happen to be merely a human being in general.... it is at any rate the task which life sets me to become subjective; and in the same degree that I become subjective, the uncertainty of death comes more and more to interpenetrate my subjectivity dialectically. It thus becomes more and more important for me to think it in connection with every factor and phase of my life; for since the uncertainty is there in every moment, it can be overcome only by overcoming it in every moment....For the late Herr Soldin, his own death is supposed to have been such a something in general: 'when he was about to get up in the morning he was not aware that he was dead'. But my death is for me not at all something in general....

...the higher man is valued, the more horrifying is death. Animals do not really die, but when the spirit is posited as spirit death shows itself as the terrifying.158

From these Christian thinkers, Heidegger retrieved on an ontological level the notion that finite human being is characterized by a constant anxious "being towards death," whether this takes the form of fleeing in the face of my own unique death, or "running ahead toward death at every moment." Heidegger's notes for his 1923 lecture course include the line: "Cf. above all Paul: glory of christos as the redeemer; abandonment of humanity into distress and death." (HF, 111) The major influence on Heidegger's thought here was again Kierkegaard: "The experience of death in general; death - life - Dasein (Kierkegaard)." (HF, 111)157 But he brackets all theological and metaphysical questions concerning how death "came into the world" and what lies on the other side of death, if anything.158

Language and Interpretation

According to Heidegger, in original Christianity there is also a strong emphasis on language. In his 1920–21 lecture course, he noted that "the situation of [1 Thessalonians] is designated as 'preaching' (evangelizesthai)." (PRs, 320) In the first twelve verses, there is a repetition of certain words concerning the content of Christian experience as "message" (evangelion) (1:6, 2:2) and "word" (logos) (1:6, 8), and also a repetition of words concerning the linguistic expression of this content: "From you the
word has echoed forth..." (1:8), "they themselves narrate (apaggel-lousin)..." (1:9), "we dared to tell the message to you...." (2:2)

Whereas Greek thought focused on the intuitive aspect of understanding as "seeing" with the "eye of the mind," for the Christian tradition "the ears alone are the organs of a Christian man" (hearing and saying the Word). 159 (Luther)

This emphasis on language, on hearing the Word and speaking it, expresses itself also in the tradition of theological "hermeneutics,"160 which is the interpretation of the Sacred Writings. hermeneuein means both "to say" and to "to interpret." In the New Testament, Jesus is said to "interpret" or "explain" the meaning of the Old Testament writings (covenant, law, prophecies, messianism) in the light of the new situation of the incarnation, the resurrection, and the parousia. "And he said to them, 'O foolish men, and slow of heart to believe that the prophets have spoken'....And beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted (dierneneusen) to them in all the writings the things concerning himself." (Luke 24:25-27) The task of traditional theological hermeneutics was that of interpreting the Sacred Writings in the light of both past social and historical circumstances and present circumstances. The requirement of understanding sacred texts in light of the present arose on the basis of the fact that the Christian message - the viva vox, "living word" - is addressed to concrete individuals in their own circumstances, and is thus constantly renewing itself. The appeal or address is characterized by a pro nobis, a "for us" or "towards us."161 "And the word was made flesh and dwelt among us" (in nobis). (John 1:14) The message must 'speak to me', "say something to me", "sound appealing". Bultmann's demythologizing theology is an heir to this hermeneutical tradition, insofar as for him the past expressions of the Christian message must always be "demythologized," i.e., prevented from hardening into outdated dogma (e.g., miracles; Thomistic theology; Babylonian, Neo-Platonic or Aristotelian cosmology), and reinterpreted in terms of language and thought which is relevant to the contemporary situation.162 This is similar to what Kierkegaard
meant by the "contemporaneity" of Christianity, which does not mean that one strives to go back in time and become a sociological contemporary of Christ (the first generation of Christians), but rather that one lets the Christian message be "repeated" and become present again as a possibility in one's contemporary situation. The most extreme expression of the interpretive character of original Christianity is the uncertainty and unpredictability of the meaning and the time of the Parousia itself, which comes like "a thief in the night" and can be understood only from the situation (kairos) of its happening.

This hermeneutical dimension of Christian thought is also clearly visible in the theme of the overcoming of the "law" through the "spirit" (love). "Spirit" is no longer the external application of fixed rules (legalism), but rather the fulfillment of the law by means of its interpretation within the demands of the concrete situation through the insight of love (Jesus consorting with prostitutes and outcasts, disregarding temple customs, etc.) This is expressed, for example, in the parable of the good Samaritan, who acts according to the needs of the situation: "Appeal is made to the Letter to the Romans. That sin came into the world through the law, is not understood in the sense that what is forbidden entices and thus increases sin, but rather in the sense that precisely the observance of the law leads to the real sin, which is not merely an occasional transgression of the law. Rather, it leads to that superbia, that pride through which obedience of the law obstructs the commandment of love. It is not the priest and the Levite, but rather the Samaritan, who understands and follows the requirement of love, which is oriented to the situation."¹⁸³ (Gadamer) As Augustine also did in his formula "love and do what you will," Paul sums all ethical commandments into a single one: "love your neighbor...love is the fulfillment¹⁸⁴ of the law." (Rom. 13: 9-10) Love here means care in the sense of solicitude (Fürsorge). In the New Testament, this openness to possibilities in ethical situations and in the situation of the Parousia is spoken of as "wakefulness" and "readiness."
Heidegger's theme that all affective understanding is also linguistic and interpretive was developed through his ontological retrieval of the themes of language and interpretation in Christian thought, especially as they are manifested in theological "hermeneutics." In his 1923 lecture course Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity), Heidegger gave a detailed account of the history of theological hermeneutics (HF, 11-14) from the Byzantians Philo and Aristeas, through Augustine and finally to the "Hermeneutica sacra" of Protestant thought from the fifteenth century onwards (M. Flacius Illyricus, S. Pagnino, W. Frantze, S. Glass, Johannes Jakob Rambach). Schleiermacher's "general hermeneutics" then extended hermeneutics from the "'enarratio'," "'exegesis'," and "'translation'" of scripture and other theological texts to the "theory and doctrine of the art of understanding of foreign discourse in general." Dilthey then extended hermeneutics into the "methodology of the hermeneutical human sciences." Through Dilthey, hermeneutics became "the theory and methodology for every kind of interpretation." (US, 92/11) Heidegger followed the tendencies of Schleiermacher and Dilthey but 1) criticized their over-emphasis on the technical notion of hermeneutics as the "'giving of rules for understanding' ("doctrine of the art of interpretation of monuments in writing") and attempted to put this technique back into the context of the living enactment and event of interpretation, which was hinted at in Dilthey's analysis of interpretation as the structure of "understanding as such" and exemplified immediately in the hermeneutics of Philo, Augustine, and Luther (e.g., Philo's notion of the interpreter as the "hermeneus theou," "the herald and messenger of god"); 2) thus analyzed the activity of interpretation in everyday, pre-scientific life itself; 3) extended hermeneutics from the human sciences to include also the natural sciences and mathematics; 4) and, finally, extended hermeneutics even further so that it became the 'method' of ontology, 'metaphysics', which investigates the understanding of being operative in the life-world and all sciences. All being-meaning becomes hermeneutical, interpretive. Indeed, ontology, the question of being, is nothing but
hermeneutics itself. Hence the title of Heidegger's 1923 lecture course Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity). "Hermeneutics is the annunciation, the proclamation, the bringing to language (Kundgabe) of the being of a being in its being to - (me)." (HF, 10, 3) Hermeneutical ontology is the interpretive laying out of the self-understanding of factual life. In his 1919 lecture course, Heidegger quotes from Angelus Silesius and Matthew 19:12: "The awakening and increase of the context of life belonging to scientific consciousness is not an object of theoretical presentation, but rather exemplary pre-living (Vorleben) ... the activity (Wirkung) of originally motivated personal-impersonal being ... 'Man, become essential and what you are' (werde wesentlich) (Angelus Silesius). ['Not everyone can grasp this word, but only those to whom it has been given.'] Who can grasp it, let him grasp it' (Matth. 19:12)." Heidegger likewise acknowledged the influence of Kierkegaard's notions of "contemporaneity" and "repetition" on his own notion of interpretation as the working out of the ontological preconception of factual life: "Life first lets itself be clarified when it is lived through, just as even Christ first began to explain the scriptures and to show how they taught about him - when he was resurrected" (Kierkegaard). (HF, 16)

The Fall

What has been described so far is what original Christianity considers to be the genuine possibility of human existence, i.e., understanding, affective, linguistic, and interpretive care of the self for itself and its relationship to God, which is anxious about itself in the face of death. But original Christianity also has a strong notion of the non-genuine form of human existence. This is designated under the term of the "fall." Beginning with Adam and Eve, human life is seen as having fallen away from itself and its relationship to God, and as having fallen into "the world" in its flight from itself and God. "You have fallen away from grace," says Paul. (Gal. 5:4)

There are thus two notions of "care" in original Christianity, the one directed towards the self and God, and other
directed towards "the world." The latter is 'worldly care', "care for the affairs of the world." (1 Cor. 7:33) Care is oriented towards the "world" in two directions. First, it is directed towards the world in the sense of the practical environment ('worldly possessions'):

No one can serve two masters....Do not be anxiously concernful (merimnate) about your life regarding what you will eat or drink; or about your body regarding what you will wear. Is not life more than food, and the body more than clothes? Consider the birds of the sky....Consider how the lilies of the field grow. They do not toil....Seek first his kingdom and justice....Do not anxiously care for tomorrow. Tomorrow will take care of itself. Each day has enough trouble of its own. (Matth. 6:24-34) Second, care is directed towards the world in the sense of the domain of the public and the collective to which the individual surrenders himself ("this world," the 'eyes of the world', "the god of this world," "the prince of this world"173). As we saw above, this sense of world means a possibility of existing for human life in "its attitude, its way of thinking." (ML, 222/173) The values that are operative here are position, security, reputation, prestige, fame, power, idolatry, the law, wisdom (Greek philosophy). "The one who received the seed that fell among the thorns is the man who hears the word, but the anxious care (merimna) of the age and the deceit of wealth choke it, making it unfruitful." (Matth. 13:22) Both directions of worldly care - the environment and the public - are included in Paul's notion of the "desire (epithumia) of the flesh." (Gal. 5:16) Like Paul's terminology of "body," "heart," and "world," "flesh" means here not so much simply the biological organism, nor only the 'sins of the flesh', but rather primarily a way of existence in the sense of care or desire which is directed away from the self and God towards all worldly content, whether this care takes the form of sexual lust or Greek philosophy.174 Heidegger makes this point when he writes: "Flesh-Spirit...: to be in them, a how as a what; objective - heavenly; the what as a history which proceeds to the end." (HF, 111) In the New Testament, worldly care is seen as "temptation," which entices the self away from itself and God. It is often described
analogically as a "seeing" that is attracted to and captivated by the world, which as a whole is analogically described as "the seen." "We live by faith, not by what is seen (dia eidous)." (2 Cor. 5:7) "We consider not the seen, but the unseen." (4:18) The "unseen" means what is not the world, i.e., the hidden God, human subjectivity (the "heart"), and the future Parousia ("we hope for what we do not see") (Rom. 8:25).

Falling is seen as involving an illusory sense of contentment, self-satisfaction, and security (from the Latin, securitas, "freedom from care"), which is expressed in "pride," being "puffed up," and "boasting" or "glorying" (gloriari in the Vulgate) (e.g., material success, legalism, Greek wisdom). (Rom. 2:17; 1 Cor. 1:29, 4:18) It is also seen as hamartia ("evil," "error"), not only in the sense of moral evil, but also in the sense of "missing the mark," "failing," "going wrong," "losing" something, "errancy." The latter sense emphasizes the element of alienation in the notion of the "fall": the self has fallen away from itself and God, has lost itself in the world, and is constantly overlooking itself and God.\(^{176}\) This falling takes the form of legalism and hypocrisy, which are alienated from and go wrong as regards the demands of factual ethical situations. It also takes the form of philosophy, prophecy, and mystical charisma, which have lost themselves in speculation and therefore will "miss" its factual historical occurrence and meaning. (PRs, 322) This collapse into the world and resulting errancy is described in various ways as "drunkenness," "sleep," "blindness," and "darkness," all of which suggest forgetfulness and loss of insight. In the New Testament parables, one finds the metaphorical narratives, told over and over again, of the drunken manager of the household who misses the return of his master (Matth. 24:45-51; Luke 12:42-46), of the ill-prepared virgins who fall asleep in the night and miss the coming of the bridegroom (Matth. 25:1-13; Luke 12:35-40), and of the careless sower whose seed is choked by the "care of the world." (Matth. 13:22) The counter-concept of this condition is precisely Paul's theme of the "thorn in the flesh," as well as the "practical
wisdom" (phronesis), "wakefulness," and "readiness" that are attentive to the factual demands of ethical situations and of the Parousia. "Be attentive, or your hearts will be weighed down with dissipation, drunkenness, and the cares of life, and that day will come upon you suddenly like a trap.... Be always wakeful...." (Luke 21:34-36)

According to Paul's view of Greek philosophy ("the wisdom of the world"), it is a specific expression of the general condition of human life ("the world"), and thus is also seen as fallen, as care that is tempted by and lost in the world, as captivated by "seeing" and "the seen," as "pride" and "boasting," and as "errancy." Philosophy is an expression of fallen human life: "See to it that no one steals you away through philosophy and empty deceit, which depend on human tradition and the basic principles of this world...." (Col. 2:8; 1 Cor. 1, 3)

The notion of care which falls towards the world is a recurrent theme in Augustine's anthropology. In his 1920-21 lecture course, Heidegger discussed book 10 of Augustine's Confessions with regard to theme of how human existence has the tendency to fall towards worldly content. (PRp, 38) In chapter 35, Augustine writes:

Or do all men really desire [the happy life], but because the flesh desires against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh (so that they cannot do what they would) they fall (cadunt) into that which is in their reach and are content....they are more strongly occupied with other things...."

So men go outside themselves to follow things of their own making, and inside themselves they are forsaking him who made them and are destroying what they themselves are made to be. Augustine explains three forms of this what he also calls "temptation," "dispersion," and "entanglement" in the world: the "lust of the flesh," the "glory" or "ambition of the world," and the "lust of the eyes." He calls the latter curiositas, "curiosity," which literally means "having care," "being care-ful." But the specific meaning is here that of being concerned about something simply from curiosity, from the desire simply to know or "see" (analogical sense). Augustine sees this cura as present everywhere in "everyday
life," where such "curiosity" can, for example, take the form of "idle talk":

...since so many things of this kind are buzzing around in our everyday life in all directions, how can I ever dare to say that nothing of this sort can make me give my attention to it or fill me with the idle care (cura) to possess it? True that I am no longer carried away by the theatre; I have no care for knowing about the course of the stars.... Nevertheless, there are very many occasions, small and contemptible enough, in which this curiosity of ours is tempted everyday, and it is impossible to count the times when we fall (labamur). We often at first listen tolerantly to someone's idle talk, so as not to give offense to the weak; but then we gradually take a serious interest (advertimus). I no longer go to the circus to see a dog chasing after a hare; but if I happen to be going through the country and see this sport going on, it may divert (avertit) me from some serious thought.... And then there are all the occasions when I am sitting at home and my attention is attracted by a lizard catching flies or by a spider entangling them in its web.... It is one thing to stand up quickly and another not to fall (cadere).

This "curiosity" that belongs to human being also manifests itself in science, philosophy, and religion:

....there is present in the soul a kind of empty curiosity which aims... at acquiring experience through the flesh, and this empty curiosity is dignified and masked by the names of learning and science.... it is called in the divine language the lust of the eyes.... for the sake of experience, curiosity may go after the opposites of [beauty, sweetness], not in order to suffer discomfort, but simply because of the desire to experience and to know them. What pleasure can there be in looking at a mangled corpse, which must excite our horror? Yet if one is near, people flock to see it, so as to grow sad and pale at the sight.... Because of this disease of curiosity, spectacles and anything out of the ordinary are put on show in the theatre. Hence also men proceed to investigate the concealed working of nature which are beyond our ken, which it does no good to know and which men only want to know for the sake of knowing.... God is tempted when signs and wonders are demanded and are not desired for any salutary purpose, but simply for the sake of experiencing them.179

And men go to admire the high mountains, the vast floods of the sea, the huge streams of the rivers, the circumference of the ocean, and the revolutions of the stars - and desert themselves.180

Augustine sees this falling towards the world as the self's attempt to flee from itself, "conceal" itself, "forget" itself, and find a state of "contentment":

...they would not be able to love truth, unless there were some knowledge of it in their memory.... They love the light of the
truth, but hate it when it shows them up as wrong. Because they
would not willingly be deceived and have something concealed from
them, and do not want to deceive and to conceal (fallere), they
love truth when it reveals (indicat) itself, but hate it when it
reveals them. But thus it will give them what is due to them: the
truth will reveal (manifestet) those who do not want to be revealed
by it, in spite of their unwillingness, and yet it will not reveal
itself to them. So it is indeed thus that this human soul of ours-
blind and foul and unsightly - wants to be concealed,
unknown, forgotten (latere, from the Greek lanthano), but does not
want to have anything concealed from it. But what happens is just
the contrary: it cannot be hidden and concealed from the truth, but
the truth can be concealed from it....See what a distance I have
covered searching for you, lord, in my memory....For from the time
I learned you, I have not forgotten you.\textsuperscript{181}

In his 1923 lecture course, Heidegger described Luther's
conception of falling as follows:

Cf. Luther: \textit{Porro caro significat totum hominem, cum ratione et
omnibus naturalibus donis.} This in the \textit{status corruptionis}, but
which is fully determined; to it belong \textit{ignorantia Dei, securitas,
incredulitas, odium erga Deum}; a determinate negative relation to
God which stands against God. \textit{This} is as such \textit{constitutive}....for
the believer, man is "fallen," just as he now is encountered and
is.... (HF, 27-28)

In his \textit{Heidelberg Disputation}, Luther speaks of the "falling" of
the "will" into worldliness. The will is "in bondage and captive"
to the world. (HD, 365-366/58-59) For Luther, this falling primari-
ly takes the form of a "desire" for "power, glory, pleasure, and
satisfaction" (HD, 363/54), which is oriented to the outward
"visible appearance" (species) of the "law" and "works" in the
public domain, whereas "inwardly" (in their "hearts") such people
can be the opposite (hypocrisy):

Human works always appear to the eyes (videantur) as beautiful and
radiant in their outward form (speciosa), but inwardly they are filthy, as Christ says concerning the Pharisees in Matth. 23[:27].
For they appear to the eyes as good and admirable, yet God does not
judge according to the outward form which appears, but searches
"the minds and the hearts." [Ps. 7:9]....Rom. 2[:21] states, "You
who teach others to steal, do you steal?"...men are thieves
according to their conscience even if when they publicly judge and
show others as thieves. (HD, 356/43-44)

Inwardly and necessarily, nature glories and takes pride in every
work that is good outwardly and according the radiant appearance of
its form (\textit{in opere specietenus et foris bono}).\textsuperscript{182}
Many make pilgrimages to Rome and to other holy places to see (videant) the robe of Christ, the bones of the martyrs....[but they] do not also recognize the true relics, namely, the suffering and crosses which have sanctified the bones and relics....

Luther sees this collapse into external public appearances as a flight from "anxiety" and a drive for self-satisfaction and "security," the absence of anxious concern for one's self in relation to God (timor Dei). In his Commentary on Genesis and in his Heidelberg Disputation, he writes:

...not only Paradise but the whole world is "too narrow" to safely conceal him (latere). And now, in this anxiety (anxiestate) of the soul, he reveals his stupidity by seeking a remedy from sin through flight from God....He has stupidly hoped to be able to conceal himself...."I was in fear...and I concealed myself." To be assured and confident in works, where one ought to be in fear, means giving oneself glory and taking it from God, to whom fear is due in every work. But it is completely perverted to be pleased with oneself, to enjoy (fruique) oneself in one's works, and to adore oneself as an idol. He acts in this manner who is secure, carefree (securus), and without fear of God. That is to say, if he was in fear, he would not be secure and carefree, and therefore he would not be pleased with himself.... (HD, 358/46)

Indeed, he himself wants to be God....

✓

For Luther, this "pride" or "hubris" (superbia, from super, "beyond," "over and above") and "presumption" (presumptio, lit. "taking beforehand") mean that the self is thoroughly alienated both from its own finitude and from God. (HD, 358-359/47-48) It is "away" from God and itself. (HD, 360/50) The self is "completely puffed up, blinded, and hardened." (HD, 362/53) In its flight into the world, it has "concealed" itself. "...the being of man is under the power of darkness...." (HD, 272/68) In his Lectures on Romans, Luther refers to this falling as the self's "blocking itself off" from itself, from the "light of understanding." The self blinds itself. Luther here appropriates Aristotle's notion that the good is always found in a situation as a fitting "mean" between an "excess" and a "deficiency," but that "the many" lack the necessary practical insight (phronesis) for this, since they are always falling prey to either excess or deficiency. Luther uses Aristotle's language for his view that human life is a "turning" or "falling away" (declinatio) from God and the ethical good, which
must always be "questioned after" in a situation. This falling takes the form of either dispersion in worldly pursuits (deficiency) or else "presumption" concerning one's knowledge and possession of God and the ethical good. In this way, human life "ruins" itself:

...the statement "There is none righteous" is to be understood of these two classes of man, namely, those who have fallen away to the left and those who have fallen away to the right....For because they are not righteous, the former do not understand and do not question after God because of a deficiency and omission; the latter are in the same situation, but because of an excess and overdoing. For these men are excessively righteous, excessively intelligent, excessively seeking, so that in their own minds they are incorrigible....Hence we have the popular saying - "wise people make big fools of themselves"....Thus they are their own block (obex) against the divine light....Both groups put up a block for themselves (obicem sibi) and an alienating obstacle against the light of understanding....the condition of this life is not that of having God, but of questioning after and seeking God....they do not truly know God, but picture him to themselves in the way they want him to be. And thus they neither hear what God says, nor do they understand it, but they think and say that they have the Word of God and that they therefore must be heard. Thus they stray away and go wrong....All this happens on a moral plane to all overbearing and self-satisfied men, especially if it touches on things which pertain to God and the salvation of the soul. For here God speaks, but he speaks in such a way that neither the person nor the place nor the time nor the word appears such to pride that God is speaking through that person and in such circumstances....All have fallen away; together they have gone wrong and become useless....[Paul] depicts their fate. First is ruin, i.e., they are worn down, diminished, and humiliated in body and soul...[they are] "like chaff which the wind drives away" [Ps. 1:4]....they prosper in nothing they undertake...they are oppressed and crushed in many ways.196

Heidegger acknowledges that Pascal also saw the phenomenon of falling towards the world, and in a wider context than Luther. (PA, 93) According to Pascal, the condition of human beings is unceasing "agitation" and "motion" towards the world. This motion is "diversion" (lit., "turning away") from their anxious restlessness and boredom concerning themselves, and from their anxiety in the face of their own death. This flight from anxiety into the world includes everything from leisure, occupations, conversation to public life and the pursuit of knowledge. In their worldly cares, people think that what they seek is the happiness, the
security, and the "rest and repose" of success, but their real aim is just the constant production of motion and distraction from themselves, since rest only forces them to reflect on themselves and so brings boredom and anxiety. In his 1923 lecture course, Heidegger quotes the following passage from Pascal:

When everything is equally moving about, nothing apparently seems to be moving, as on a ship. When everyone goes overboard and to excesses, no one seems to. He who like a fixed point of reference halts makes us notice how the others are carried away.\(^{187}\) (HF, 109)

Diversion. Being unable to cure death, wretchedness, and ignorance, men have decided, in order to be happy, not to think about such things.\(^{188}\)

The only good thing for men therefore is to be diverted from what they are, either by some occupation which takes their mind off it, or by some novel and agreeable passion which keeps them busy, like gambling, hunting, some absorbing show, in short by what is called diversion....That is why men are so fond of hustle and bustle; that is why prison is such a fearful punishment; that is why the pleasures of solitude are so incomprehensible....They imagine that if they secured a certain appointment they would enjoy rest afterwards; they do not realize the insatiable nature of their desire. They believe that they are sincerely seeking rest, whereas what they really seek is agitation and unrest.....And so our life passes away: we seek rest by struggling against certain obstacles, and once they are overcome, rest proves intolerable because of the boredom it produces. We must get away from it and seek excitement....even if we felt quite safe on every side, boredom on its own account would not fail to emerge from the depths of our hearts, where it is naturally rooted, and poison our whole mind.\(^{189}\)

What could one do [to make them unhappy]? You would only have to take away all their cares, and they would see themselves and think about what they are, where they come from, and where they are going.\(^{190}\)

Nothing is so unbearable to man as to be at rest, without passion, business, amusement, occupation. It is then that he feels his nothingness, his foolishness, his insufficiency, his dependence, his emptiness. Immediately there will issue from the depth of his soul boredom, blackness, gloom, chagrin, vexation, despair.\(^{191}\)

Our nature lies in motion; absolute rest is death.\(^{192}\)

This flight from the self also involves falling towards public opinion:

'But', you will say, 'what is his object in all this?' Just so that he can boast tomorrow to his friends that he played better than anyone else. Likewise others sweat away in their studies to prove to scholars that they solved some hitherto insoluble problem....\(^{193}\)
'How well made that is! What a skilful workman! What a brave soldier!' This is where our inclinations come from, and our choice of careers. 'What a lot that man drinks! How little that man drinks!' That is what makes people temperate or drunkards, soldiers, cowards, etc.

Finally, Kierkegaard also saw the phenomenon of care which falls toward the world. This is what he calls the "aesthetic stage" or "existence-sphere" of human life. The "aesthetic" includes all immediate unreflective life, and finds its extremes in the hedonist, the public conformist, and speculative and "objective" philosophy. What defines the aesthetic is the immediate enjoyment of worldly content without any reflection back on the self, which is thus forgotten. The immediacy of the hedonist lies in pleasure and its distractions, the immediacy of the public conformist lies in surrendering his autonomy to the "monstrous abstraction" of the public, and that of the speculative thinker lies in objective thought.

Kierkegaard sees this immediate absorption in the world as a flight from "anxiety" (Angst) and "boredom" in the face of one's existence. He sees this flight as characterized by "idle talk (Gerede)," "curiosity" (Neugier), "temptation" (Versuchung), "dispersion" (Zerstreutheit), "comfort" (Bequemlichkeit), and "tranquillization" (Beruhigung). The ways of diversion and obscuring [of the self] are numerous:

"comfort, which wants to think at another time"; "curiosity, which never gets beyond curiosity"; "the endless self-deception"; the "effeminate weakness, which comforts itself with the company of others"; "docile ignoring"; "mindless hustle and bustle." "Or through diversions or in other ways, e.g., through work and hustle and bustle as a means of dispersion, he attempts to preserve for himself darkness and obscurity concerning his condition, in such a way, however, that it does not become completely clear to him that he does what he does only for the sake of creating darkness and obscurity." [Kierkegaard]

Like Pascal, Kierkegaard sees much of human life as a constant search for "diversion." In the self-conscious and cultivated "aesthete," this search takes the form of a "rotation method" in which diversions are always being replaced with new ones. For Kierkegaard, this flight from the self also takes such forms as
"inflexible orthodoxy," the "decorative cultivation of piety," attempts to provide "proofs for the immortality of the soul," and "clinging to 'objective' truth." "Man always feels anxiety, when these fixities are capable of being penetrated, manifest (offenbar) and understood; he strives against clarification, because he is stuck fast in a limited self, which - instead of self-becoming - he takes as his essential self."204 This flight from the anxiety of the self also involves fleeing from one's own personal death, which is covered over in the public objective view of death.205 Kierkegaard calls the flight from the self "despair," in that one despairs over one's self and flees from it, but can never escape it.

This flight from the self aims at and actually results in what Kierkegaard calls the condition of the self's "being closed off" (Verschlossenenheit) and "concealed" (verborgen)206 from itself. It falls prey to "non-transparency" (Undurchsichtigkeit), "ambiguity" (Zweideutigkeit),207 and "non-freedom," and forfeits its possibility of "becoming manifest" (Offenbarwerden) and choosing itself. In his "review of Kierkegaard," Jaspers writes:

This being closed off, which...hides from itself, obscures and evades is the force running counter to the process of becoming manifest. Kierkegaard calls this becoming manifest freedom, and this locking oneself up non-freedom, bondage. This absolute being closed off locks itself up not with just anything..., but rather in it man locks himself up; "and here lies the profundity of human existence (Dasein), namely, that non-freedom takes captive precisely itself. Freedom is constantly communicating: non-freedom becomes more and more closed off and reticent, and does not want communication."208 [Kierkegaard]

On an ontological level, Heidegger retrieved the theme of falling and its various characteristics, which were seen in original Christian authors.209 Thus Heidegger differentiates between "care" directed towards the self and "concern," which "falls" towards the environmental world and "forgets" the self.210 He also speaks of how human existence "flees" from itself and surrenders itself to the opinions of the public "they" and its impersonal objective view of death. He sees this falling as characterized by "idle talk" (Gerede), "curiosity" (Neugier),211
and "ambiguity" (Zweideutigkeit). He mentions other various characteristics of this falling in terms of how human existence "tempts" itself with the world, "disperses" (zerstreut) and "entangles" (verfängt) itself in the world, seeks "securitas" (PA, 109) in the world, "tranquilizes" (beruhigt) itself (the "quietive"), strives for "self-contentment" and "comfort" (Bequemlichkeit), attempts to "mask" itself ("larvance"), and "alienates" itself. He describes the general condition of fallen existence as being "away" from itself, "losing" itself, "blocking itself off" (Abriegelung), "being closed off" (Verschlossenheit), "overlooking itself and going wrong" (Versehen), "blinding," "presuming and measuring wrongly" (Vermessen), "missing itself" (Verfehlung), and "ruinance." Heidegger has here not only appropriated the ideas of original Christianity, but has taken over its terminology and especially the terminology of Kierkegaard. (HF, 30)

**Authenticity and Inauthenticity**

On the basis of the above discussion, we can easily see why Heidegger made the point in his 1920-21 lecture course that the New Testament differentiates between two basic ways of existing, the genuine and the non-genuine, and accordingly divides the human race into basically "two groups of people":

The first are those who urge peace and security. They are, says Heidegger, absorbed and totally dependent on the world in which they live...They cannot be saved because they do not possess themselves, they have forgotten the authentic self. They live, says St. Paul, in darkness.

The second group lives not in darkness but in the light of day. The word "day," Heidegger claims, has two meanings: first of all, the light of self-comprehension, and secondly, the Day of the Lord itself. (PRs, 322)

Again, in his notes to his 1923 lecture course, Heidegger made the same point concerning the either-or in human existence that Christianity poses:

Flesh - Spirit....Explication of facticity: of being-unredeemed and being-redeemed: the children of God, Rom. 8:14. Death - life; sin-justification; slavery - sonship (fundamental experiences! The decisive movement?); Christ the turn. 'Interpretive history of salvation' (Heilsgeschichte) unclear! (HF, 111, 28)
On the one hand, there are those who have fallen into the world and away from their factual self and the facticity of their relation to God, and, on the other hand, there are those who possess these in anxious self-concern. Paul writes: "I delight in the law of God according to the inner man, but I see another law...at war with the law of my self and making me captive to the law of sin...." (Rom. 22-23) In the New Testament, this either-or is expressed in the various oppositions between the fallen and the resurrected, errancy and truth, death and life, the world and the heart, power and love, the law and the spirit, the flesh and the spirit, the old Adam and the new Adam, sleep and wakefulness, night and day, darkness and light, drunkenness and sobriety. What can be noted here is the strong emphasis on the term "life" (zoe) in Paul and the Gospel of John as the counter-concept to "the world," which is conceived of as "death." "I am the bread of life." "The spirit is what turns us to life (estin to zoopoion)..." (John 6:35, 63) "Concernful understanding (phronema) set on the flesh is death, but concernful understanding set on the spirit is life...." (Rom. 8:6) Thus, in the context of their discussions about a "philosophy of life," Dilthey's dialogue partner, Count Yorck, could say that "the Christian religion is the highest expression of life" (höchste Lebendigkeit). As we shall see in the next section, the crux of the New Testament distinction between the genuine and the non-genuine lies, according to Heidegger, in the question of whether one is or is not in touch with the experience of temporality in original Christianity.

This basic distinction between two modes of existence - loss and possession of the self - was also made by Augustine, Luther, and Pascal, but in Kierkegaard it receives the sharpened expression of an absolute "either-or." Either one leads the immediate "aesthetic" life of flight into the world and away from one's concrete self, or one leads the reflective "ethical-religious" life of choosing one's concrete self (the ethical) and its relation to God (the religious). According to the ethical-religious sphere, what is important is not one-sided care for objective worldly content, but
rather primarily self-concern and self-choice; not "dispersing" oneself in the world, but rather "collecting oneself" out of this dispersion; not distracting "idle talk," but rather "keeping silent" and heeding one's own existence; not "curiosity," but rather real choice; not "ambiguity," but "transparency" and "becoming manifest." "Even the richest personality is nothing before he has chosen himself...the great thing is not to be this or that but to be oneself...."217 (Kierkegaard) "...man can either want to 'become manifest', transparent, and lucid; or he can struggle against becoming manifest, overlook himself, conceal himself, and forget himself. Both forces, which are present in every man, are in battle with one another."218 (Jaspers)

Heidegger's existential-ontological retrieval of the above-discussed distinction in original Christianity leaves behind the existentiell-ontic level of particular ethical and religious possibilities, which Christianity proposes as ways in which I can concretely possess myself. Rather, Heidegger's analysis of the contrast between what he calls a personal "ownmost happening" (Ereignis) and "de-living," between "originality" and "non-origi-
nality," between "ownness" or "authenticity" (Eigentlichkeit) and "un-ownness" or "inauthenticity" (Uneigentlichkeit), deals with the general characteristics which are presupposed in all possible ways in which the self can concretely choose itself and be itself. The strongest influence on Heidegger here was Kierkegaard's notion of the "either-or."219

Conscience

In Christianity, it is the "conscience" that leads the individual from his falleness in the world back to his own self and his relation to God. The Greek, Latin, and German terms used by Christian authors for the conscience all originally meant simply "consciousness" or "understanding" (syneidesis, conscientia, Gewissen) and "vigilance" or "preservation" (synteresis). In the meaning of joint ("syn-," "con-") understanding, the accessory to what is known can even be oneself, as in the phrase "syneidenai heauton..." "I am consciousness to myself...." Here conscience
means self-consciousness, self-awareness. In both their popular usage and employment in moralists (e.g., Stoicism), the Greek and Latin terms of *syneidesis* and *conscientia* developed into the narrower meaning of *ethical* self-consciousness, of an ethically judging consciousness, which reprimands one for past actions and exhorts one to present and future actions on the basis of ethical principles. In the New Testament, it was primarily Paul who took up the Greco-Roman concept of the conscience (*syneidesis*) and placed it in a new Christian ethico-religious context. 220

Paul uses the notion of the conscience in various different contexts. Here we can highlight some of the basic characteristics he ascribes to it, which were important for Heidegger's appropriation of it. 1) The conscience is the conscience of the individual, such that one can distinguish between "your own conscience" and "the other's conscience": "Why should my freedom be judged by another's conscience?" (1 Cor. 10:29) 2) The conscience is associated with the "manifestation" of what is "hidden" (the self and God) to those who are fallen in the world:

We have renounced the hidden things because of shame....by the manifestation (phanerosi) of the truth we commend ourselves to every man's conscience in the presence of God. And even if our gospel is hidden, it is hidden to those who are perishing. The god of this age has blinded the minds of the unbelieving, so that the light of the gospel does not shine forth....God, who said, "Let light shine out of the darkness," made his light shine in our hearts to give us the light of knowledge.... (2 Cor. 4:2-6)

Knowing the fear of the lord, we persuade men, and we are made manifest; and I hope that we have been made manifest in your consciences. (2 Cor. 5:11) 221

3) The conscience is associated with recollection of the self and God, which are either forgotten or in danger of being forgotten. 222

4) The conscience is the "conscience of errancy" (*syneidesis hamartion*) (Heb. 10:2) and also of indebtedness and owing something. That is, the conscience discloses guilt. 223

5) The conscience thus awakens anxiety about the self and its relation to God. 224

6) The conscience has the character of a "call" that calls the individual out of lostness in the world and back to the self and God. This call issues ultimately from God (the Word), and thus
the conscience is ultimately "the conscience of God" (syneidesis theou).225

The conscience concerns the individual, discloses the previously hidden self and relation to God, is bound up with recollection, discloses guilt, awakens anxiety, and has the character of a call issuing ultimately from God. This notion of the conscience was also taken up in the ensuing history of Christian theology. In the context of his description of distraction and self-forgetfulness in human life, Augustine describes how his self-concealment was shattered by a divine call: "...you were within me and I was outside of myself....You called, you cried out, you shattered my deafness: you flashed, you shone, you scattered my blindness."226 For Augustine, conscientia is the awakening of guilt, self-knowledge and interest, recollection, "pure fear," and "conversion."227

In patristic and scholastic theology, the conscience was often treated under the synonym synteresis (literally, "wakefulness," "vigilance," "preservation"),228 which meant a "natural inclination," an "inextinguishable spark of reason," an "inborn habit," a "power tending naturally to the good" that is preserved in human being in spite of its fallenness. This traditional notion received a systematic and intellectualized formulation in Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* (1 qu. 79; 2, 1 qu. 94) Aquinas often identifies synteresis and conscientia, but in its narrow sense, synteresis is equated with Aristotle's "practical reason" and means the conscience considered under the aspect of the potentia (dynamis) or habitus (hexis, ethos) of practical principles and ends. Conscientia then means the "application" and the actus (energeia) of these practical ends in particular situations. The lumen naturale of synteresis is "what cannot be lost"229 and cannot error, since it knows only simple practical principles, whereas conscientia can error since it deals with the variability of particular situations. Paul's notion of the conscience has here been intellectualized, insofar as it refers to only the rational faculty, and not to the whole person. But what is interesting here is that, as we shall see
later, Heidegger's own interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis* took up in a unique way Aquinas' equating of conscience with practical reason in Aristotel.

In his *Lectures on Genesis*, Luther gives an account of the conscience as the agency which calls the self back from its flight and concealment in the world and "reveals" it, awakens "anxiety" (*contritio* and *poententia*) about the self in the face of the "sting of death," and is the organ through which the divine Word calls directly to the individual self without the mediation of the institutional Church (the 'freedom of the conscience'). For Luther, the conscience becomes virtually co-primordial with faith, and functions as the "organ for the proper relating of man to God." Luther was largely responsible for introducing into subsequent Protestant theology the original meaning of *conscientia* as "consciousness," and here this means an ethical-religious "consciousness" of God and the self. (HD, 372/67) In his youthful works, Luther here takes over the medieval concept of *synteresis*.

Recalling the young Heidegger's statement that the German Idealists should be understood as Lutheran theologians, one can note here how Luther's notion of the autonomy and certainty of the conscience influenced the notion of the "certainty" of "self-consciousness" in German Idealism. Indeed, Hegel continually appeals directly to Luther's view that religious truth is found in the convictions of the "heart," which means for Hegel that "substance" (being) has here been transformed into the "self-consciousness" of the "subject" or "spirit." The "conscience" (*Gewissen*) is the "infinite formal certainty (*Gewissheit*) of oneself," the "absolute authority of subjective self-consciousness." For Hegel, the Lutheran conscience (religion) takes its place in the "new world" alongside of the self-certainty of Descartes' *res cogitans* (philosophy), the expression of "freedom" in the French Revolution (practical reason), and the notion of genius and subjectivity in Romanticism (aesthetics).
For Kierkegaard, it is the conscience which leads the individual over from "being closed off" to himself, to his "becoming manifest," from "dispersion" to a "self collection." It is really the conscience which constitutes a personality....For the conscience may slumber, but the constitutive factor is its possibility. The more definitely the conscience is developed in a human being, the more widely is he expanded, even when he closes himself off even from the whole world. Like the reality of death, the conscience is located in the "hidden inwardness" of the person and thus individualizes the person: "The concept of sin and guilt posit precisely the single individual as the single individual." This is the secret of the conscience; this secret, which the individual life has with itself: that it is at the same time individual and universal.... Kierkegaard strongly differentiates between the genuine individual’s conscience and the "external" and "comparative" view of the conscience, which seeks its standards in something outside itself (police force, the courts, the Church, the public). Thus, the proper mode of being attuned to the conscience is not the "idle talk" of the public self, but rather "keeping silent" (Schweigen) and "listening" (Gehorsam) in the isolation and "hidden inwardness" of one’s own existence. Like Luther, Kierkegaard holds that "God’s power is in the conscience." What the conscience discloses is the individual in his guilt, which is neither merely the guilt of this or that action now and then, nor the guilt deriving from the external standards and judgments of the police force and the courts, but rather the condition of being "essentially and unconditionally guilty" belongs to the finitude of one’s very being. Kierkegaard sees guilt as a "disrelationship" or estrangement of the self from its possibilities and primarily its possibility of "eternal happiness" in God. When this guilt is chosen and taken up into one’s futural possibilities, it becomes the "eternal recollection" and "absolute consciousness of guilt," which incites anxiety and pathos in the individual:
In turning inward, he discovers freedom....and another figure comes into being with the in-itself of freedom, namely, guilt....To the degree he discovers freedom, to that same degree the anxiety of sin is upon him in the state of possibility. He fears only guilt, for guilt alone can deprive him of freedom....the opposite of freedom is guilt, and it is the greatness of freedom that it always has to do only with itself, that in its possibility it projects guilt and accordingly posits it by itself....The relation of freedom to guilt is anxiety....

In the eternal recollection of the consciousness of guilt, the exister is related to an eternal happiness, yet not in such a way that he is now directly closer to it; for now, on the contrary, he is as remote as possible, but nevertheless is related to it. The dialectical in this...sets itself in opposition so as to raise paths to a higher power.

According to Kierkegaard, "it is this totality of guilt which makes it possible that in the particular instance once can be guilty or not guilty."

It was the young Heidegger's reading of the Christian notion of the conscience that helped him give an existential and motivational basis for Husserl's theoretical notion of the "phenomenological reduction." For the young Heidegger, the full sense of the phenomenological reduction is a leading or turning back from experience that has fallen into beings to the genuine content-meaning, relational meaning, and enactment-meaning of this experience. Heidegger's existential-ontological retrieval of the Christian notion of conscience attempted to show that there is a universal sense of conscience (becoming conscious), which belongs to all human life and is the "ontological condition" (SZ, 406. n. 1/354, n. ii) that makes possible the limited ethical and religious senses of the conscience. According to Heidegger, this conscience 1) is not the "public conscience" of the public "they," but rather is "in each case mine" and "individualizes" one away from the public; 2) has the character of a "call" issuing from the "authentic self" and addressed to the "inauthentic self"; 3) calls and is heard not with the idle talk of the public "they," but rather in "keeping silent" (Schweigen); 4) "calls" the self, which has been "closed off," back to itself from its "dispersion" in the world, "discloses" it in its factical possibilities, and thus
"attests" or "witnesses to" (bezeugt) to the possibility of the authentic self; 5) is the "call of care" and a "renewal" of anxious care; 4) "summons" the self to its essential "guilt" in the sense of an unavoidable "indebtedness" or "lack."

Regarding the influence of the theological tradition on the last-mentioned point, consider the following notes that Heidegger made for his 1923 lecture course, in which he alludes to the Christian notion that "justification," "redemption," and "salvation" (authenticity) involve precisely the insight into and taking responsibility for one's "fallenness" and "sinfulness":

\[ \textit{homo iustus} \]

Just man - upright and steadfast - good will - love of God (\textit{homo iustus - rectus - bona voluntas - charitas dei}); therefore: the first man is preserved in the grace of God; i.e., constituted in the happy life (\textit{homo primus in gratia conditus est; i.e. in beata vita constitutus}). Cf. De libero arbitrio, Liber I, cap. 11 [Augustine].

Formal deduction: "let us make man" (\textit{faciamus hominem}); preconception about man. Redemption there - the more originally and the more absolutely this taken, the more weight must sin have. It has this only when the fall is an absolute fall, i.e.: first whence, arche, absolute grace of God. The \textit{telos}: pure sinfulness. (HF, 111, cf. 28)²⁵⁰

Indeed, along with Husserl's notion of "reduction" as a "leading back," Heidegger's interpretation of Christian justification, redemption, and salvation ("Return you sons of men!" as a turn from fallen and forgetful worldly existence to the facticity and historicity of the self and its relation to God) is in fact a model for what he in his 1920-21 lecture course called his own ontological project of the "complete turning around (\textit{Umwandlung}) of philosophy"²⁵¹ and for what he after 1930 called "the turn." The above-quoted passage from Heidegger's 1923 lecture course ends with the following words: "Explication of facticity: of being-unredeemed and being-redeemed....(fundamental experiences! The decisive movement?); Christ the turn (\textit{Wende}). 'Interpretive history of salvation' (\textit{Heilsgeschichte}) unclear!" (HF, 111)

But for Heidegger the basic lack belonging to human existence consists not in a debt owed in terms of a specific moral or religious requirement, but rather in the fact that the self is, on
the one hand, "responsible" for itself and yet, on the other hand, it cannot completely master its own possibilities, since it finds itself simply "thrown" with certain given possibilities, which it has not willed into being but rather must take over and chose. Also, the self cannot realize all its possibilities, because every choice of a possibility excludes at the same time other possibilities. This guilt is the very condition of human finitude. The strongest influence on Heidegger's conception of guilt was again clearly Kierkegaard.252 But for Heidegger the religious sense of conscience is only one specific manner in which the conscience operates in human life.

Ocular-Aesthetic Quietism (De-Living)

In his 1921 lecture course Augustine and Neo-Platonism, Heidegger went on to show how the understanding of factual life in original Christianity was lost through the adoption of Greek conceptuality. Heidegger argued that this process, which began in the New Testament itself, was consolidated through Augustine's adoption of the Neo-Platonic concept of the "enjoyment of God," which is a form of contemplative "quietism" that entails the forgetting of the factual self through falling toward a fixed and abstract divine content. For Augustine, it is in this "contemplation" and "enjoyment" that the *via beata*, the "happy and blessed life," the *beatitudo hominis*, the "happiness and blessedness of man" consists. Here the anxious unrest of original Christianity, what Augustine calls the "motion" of desire, has been reduced to the "tranquillity" of the *visio beatifica*, the "happy and blessed vision." The Christian God has been reduced to a *praee oculis esse*, a "constant being before the eyes" (*oculis mentis*, the eye of the mind) (*APp*, 42):

...the absence of fear is common to the completely happy and blessed person, to the presumptuous person, and to the corpse, but the perfectly happy and blessed man possesses that quality by the tranquillity (*tranguillitatem*) of his soul....since love is a kind of motion, and since there is no motion except it be toward something, when we seek what ought to be loved we are looking for something to which this motion ought to direct us....Who can know to what extent something is good when he does not enjoy it?....what else is it to live happily and blessedly but to possess an eternal
object through knowing it?... If desire is in accord with the mind and reason, it will be possible for the mind to contemplate (contemplari) what is eternal in great peace and tranquillity... the eternal life is the happy and blessed life.253

From Neo-Platonism, Augustine takes over the thought that being-good and being-beautiful belong to being, and that it can be "enjoyed." In the fruitio Dei, God is enjoyed as the sumnum bonum.... Together with this valuing and appraising is found a quietism, which turns away from factual life and seeks God as 'rest and peace' (according to the saying of Augustine: 'my heart rests not (inquietum) until it rests (requiescat) in you' (Conf. I, 1)). Augustine indeed lives and thinks from the standpoint of the unrest that belongs to factual life, but in the quietism of the fruitio Dei, which stems from Neo-Platonism, he misses the factual experience of life in original Christianity and is untrue to himself. (APp, 39)

Augustine's adoption of the foreign Neo-Platonic conceptuality of the contemplative "enjoyment of God" is no longer oriented to the original Christian experience of hearing the Word, but rather to the ocular experience of Greek theorein, theory, seeing.254 He is here untrue to his own critique of speculative philosophy as the concupiscientia oculorum, the "lust of the eyes," and untrue to Paul's theme of the "thorn in the flesh" and his admonitions against the "sleep," "blindness," and "drunkenness" of mystical charisma and speculative philosophy. The young Heidegger argued that Augustine helped prepare the way for the more serious forgetting of factual life that took place in the speculative theology of scholasticism and modern thought. One would have to include here Heidegger's own earlier speculative theology in his habilitation writing. As mentioned previously, in his later thought Heidegger argued that - even though in such early figures as Augustine the human being does not appear as the one who, according to Nietzsche, rises up and kills God - this position is already prefigured in the notion of God being present at hand for the "enjoyment" of the human subject.

In the same way that, as we have seen, the later Heidegger worked out in detail his youthful insights into the history of the loss of the genuine "content-meaning" of original Christianity, so the young Heidegger's insights into the loss of the genuine "relational meaning" of original Christianity were also worked out
in detail in Heidegger's later writings on the history of metaphysics as ontotheology (the ontotheological self). The logos, the ontotheological self corresponding to the various versions of being as the divine ground in Greek thought, is characterized by \textit{theorein} and \textit{logos apophantikos}, "seeing" and the "assertoric statement." The "humanism" arising on the basis of this ontotheology expresses itself as \textit{paideia}, "culture" or "education," which molds the human on the basis of an "idea" of the human (the good, the beautiful). It is a version of this Greek orientation which in scholasticism levels off the logos of original Christianity as a factual, anxious, and interpretive announcing of a message, calling, preaching, and hearing. Corresponding to the scholastic interpretation of the Christian God as \textit{summun ens} and \textit{summun bonum} is the "relational meaning" of \textit{contemplatio} and \textit{doctrina}, "contemplation" and "doctrine" that is expressed in the form of the \textit{summa}, the cook-book collection and systematic presentation of church doctrine. It is this doctrine which provides the "method" for satisfying the drive for the \textit{securitas} and \textit{certitude}, the "security" and "certainty" of "salvation." The ontotheological "humanism" involved here takes the form of \textit{schola}, "schooling" in the method that ensures salvation. The teachers of this method are accordingly called "scholastics." In the modern period, the "relational meaning" corresponding to the interpretation of being as "objectivity," "raw material," and "consumer goods" takes the form of theoretical "science," "epistemology," "logic," and "technology," which in its various forms of "representing" and "manipulation" "enjoys" and "consumes" the world as its lord and master. Here, the medieval orientation to "method" as ensuring the certainty and security of religious salvation is taken up into the modern search for completely autonomous "method" (cybernetics), which no longer has any relation to the Christian God, and with which humanity, having killed God, can itself become a god and achieve complete certainty and security in the world. (N 2, 131-134/68-90) The various forms of "onto-theo-ego-logical" humanism arising on the basis of this apotheosis of the human subject are, for example,
positivism, Marxism, corporate religion, Americanism, etc. Heidegger sees this kind of modern humanism as inevitably giving rise to the modern reality of the "masses," i.e., a comfortable and empty herd-like collective existence that is technologically regulated. Nietzsche's "last men," who are the result of the whole history of Western thought and culture, say: "'We have invented happiness'...and blink."255 As mentioned previously, even though it was not until his later writings that Heidegger worked out the above detailed "sketches" of the history of ontotheology, his basic insights here were already present in his youthful period.

As we have seen, in his 1921 lecture course Augustine and Neo-Platonism and also in his other lecture courses, Heidegger introduced Luther's 1518 Heidelberg Disputation and its critique of the scholastic tradition, for which Augustine had helped prepare the way256:

[Metaphysical-theological speculation] looks away precisely from that in which God has factually acted: suffering and the cross. Therefore, Luther says that the wisdom, which wants to see God's invisible essence in his works, is inflated, completely blinds, and makes one completely stubborn and unrepentant. In his 'theology of the cross', Luther thus fetches back the 'factual experience of life' in original Christianity, which renounces all visions, apocalypses, and above all the visions of metaphysics. In pointing to the necessity of taking upon oneself the reality of human weakness, it penetrates to the depths of factual life - and that means to an essentially 'historical' life. (APp, 40-41)

In his Heidelberg Disputation, Luther says that the "theology of glory" seeks for itself "power, glory, pleasure, and satisfaction." All supposed contemplative "enjoyment of God" is at bottom an act of "enjoying oneself" (fruique seipso). (HD, 358/463) That is, for Luther the term "glory" refers not only to the content-meaning of scholastic theology, but also to its relational meaning, to the theological activity that relates itself to an abstract and glorified conception of God:

Because men do not know the cross and hate it, they necessarily love the opposite, namely, wisdom, glory, and power, and so on...."The eye is not satisfied with seeing"....Thus also the curiosity of knowledge [the care directed to knowing] (curiositas scienti) is not satisfied by the acquisition of wisdom but is stimulated that much more....he who glorifies himself in the fact
that he is wise and learned in the law glories in his confusion, his damnation, the wrath of God, in death. (HD, 362-363/53-54)

In his Lectures on Romans, Luther writes that, whereas the world suffers and anxiously awaits the Parousia, the theologians and philosophers look at the world in terms of "categories" and "essences," and derive a sense of "pleasure," "happiness," "power," and "glory" from contemplating these categories and essences:

[Thus] are we not completely mad when we turn our thoughts to the praises and glories of philosophy? Look how we esteem the study of the essences and actions and inactions (passiones) of things, and the things themselves reject and sigh over their own essences and actions and inactions. We are happy and glorify ourselves in the knowledge of that about which creation mouns and is displeased. And, I ask you, is he not a mad man who laughs at someone who is crying and lamenting, and then boasts and takes glory in the fact that he sees him as enjoying himself and laughing? Certainly such a person is rightly called a madman and a maniac....it is wise men and theologians, infected by this 'prudence of the flesh', who are now deriving a pleasant and enjoyable science from the sadness of the world, and from the sighings they laughingly gather their knowledge with a marvelous display of power. 257

From these passages, it is again easy to see what lies behind Luther's characterization of contemplative thought as "glory." For Plato and Aristotle, the hierarchical relationship between the "idea" (the divine, the most beingly being, presence [eternity], radiant light, the unconcealed, the good, the beautiful, honor) and the spatio-temporal world (not-being as the lack of the above characteristics) also exists in the soul that is correlated to this two-tiered content. Logos or nous (nous poietikos) is seen to "participate" in (Plato) or be an instantiation of (Aristotle) of the "idea" and the cosmic "reason." Therefore, especially for Plato, this upper storey of the human being gets called "being" or "more being," is seen to be the divine element in the person, and is characterized by presence (eternity), radiant light, unconcealment or truth, the good, beauty, and honor. The lower storey of the person, i.e., emotion and desire belonging to the spatio-temporal world, is seen as me on,258 "not being" in the sense of the privation or lack (imperfection, darkness, absence, motion, pain, pollution, ugliness, evil) in relation to the purity, constant presence, divinity, beauty, light, good, and honor of the
"idea" and "reason." The strains of Orphic religion in Plato's thought lead him to view the reason as wounded, crippled, and imprisoned in its instantiation in the evil and darkness of the spatio-temporal world. Although there is another side to Plato's thought, his philosophical stance in the face of the factual world leans in the direction of indifference, superiority, and disgust. He sees the bios theoretikos, the "life of contemplative seeing" of the ideas, as "purification" and the "practice of death," the dying away from the spatio-temporal world and one's factual life in it. Such dying away into the elevation and eternity of the ideas is further characterized as the apotheosis of the human being, as homoiosis pros ton theon, "becoming like the divine." Theoretical science is theiotate kai timiotate, the "most divine and honorable," but "useless," since it does not relate to practical goods. The life that lives in this eternal reason is, as Aristotle says in his Nicomachean Ethics not "living as a human being" (anthropeuesthai), but rather is "divine." Plato and Aristotle consider as "liars" the older poets who say that such knowledge is "beyond human power," that it represents an act of hubris. This attitude is what Nietzsche called "resentment," Kierkegaard the "despair of infinity" that will not choose the factual self, and Hegel the "beautiful soul," whose sense of delicacy and refinement will not allow itself to be touched by the actual world. It is what Luther calls the "gloria" of Greek philosophy and of scholastic theology, which adopted to a great extent the language and attitude of the former. Thus, the characteristics that we previously identified in relation to the content-meaning of theologias gloriae and philosophia gloriae are also found in their relational meaning: 1) stable presence, 2) the splendour and radiant light of appearance; 3) the wondrous and extraordinary, the elevated and exalted; 4) power and magnificence.

From the above quoted passages from Luther on "glory," we can identify three further characteristics of philosophia and theologias gloriae, which can be called ocularism, aestheticism, and quietism. Here, our discussions of Greek thought will for the time
being be somewhat one-sided, since they will treat only the
tendencies in Greek thought toward the above-mentioned characteris-
tics without at the same time considering the counter-balancing
ethical and existential tendencies also present in Greek philo-
sophy. As Kierkegaard said, the Greek philosopher was "always a
work of art in his existence." We will later consider Luther’s
and Kierkegaard’s positive appreciation and appropriation of the
existential and ethical character of Greek thought especially in
Socrates, Aristotle, and Seneca.

5) **Ocularism.** Luther characterizes speculative thought as
"ocular," as *curiositas*, the "care" for simple seeing. (*HD*, 363/54)
He here follows the tradition of Paul (the "wisdom of this world"
oriented to "the seen") and Augustine (knowing as the "lust of the
eyes"). Philosophy is *theorein*, "seeing," "looking at," "behold-
ing," "observing," "contemplating." Both Plato and Aristotle view
the origin of philosophy in a "desire" or "care" (*orexis*, *eros*) for
"seeing." The philosopher is a "spectator of the truth," a
"lover of the spectacle of truth." The *theoros* does not originally
mean our modern "theoretician" who represents the world with his
methods, ideas, and "theories (for Greek thought, "theorem"
[*theorema*], "theory" [*theoria*] means just as what is seen, the
world), but rather the "spectator" who sees immediately. *Theoros*,
the "theoretician," means originally especially the traveler or
tourist in the ancient world who travels to "see" the world (Solon
gets called a "philosopher" because he travelled much in order "to
see the world"), the spectator who does not take part in but
only watches the Hellenic games, the spectator who watches a play
at the theatre, or the ambassador of the city who goes as an
observer to a religious festival. *Theoria* in the philosophical
sense is thus a metaphor, an analogy, which gets expressed in the
following ways in Greek thought: philosophy is the spectator whose
knowing travels as it were from one end of the cosmos to the other
and embraces "the whole"; the spectator who feels "astonishment"
(*thaumazein*) at the "marionette theatre" of the cosmos; the
spectator at the games of life who is thus unlike the sellers
and the participants (praxis)\textsuperscript{272}; the reverent spectator and celebrant present at the religious festival of the cosmos, who is moved by "admiration" (thaumazein). The latter sense is the most literal, since, as Aristotle said, philosophy in its highest sense is theologis, "theology," speaking about the divine. Theoria means literally "care" (ora, whence the Latin cura) for the god (theos). This theory is not the same as any sort of gawking, staring, or to-m-peepery, but what it shares with these is the characteristic of an immediate unreflective perceiving. Thus, Augustine calls it "the lust of the eyes" and Luther "the curiosity of knowing," i.e., the care for simply gazing upon the world. Accordingly, the basic word for the content of Platonic and Aristotelian theory is eidos, the seen, the look, the visible outward appearance, the form, the "idea." This meaning of "idea" is still present in the empiricism of Locke and Hume, who simply subjectivize "ideas" by placing them 'in the mind'.\textsuperscript{273}

6) **Aestheticism.** Like the Pauline and Augustinian notion of the "desire" or "concupiscence" of the eyes, Luther characterizes the "theology of glory" as being oriented toward "pleasure" (voluptas) and "enjoyment" (frui), the pleasure and enjoyment of seeing. (HD, 356/46, 383/54) Here, the aesthetic, aisthesis, is meant not only in its literal sense of perception in general, but also in the sense of the pleasure (hedone, whence "hedonist") that is found in such perception (e.g., the aesthetically pleasing art work). The study of art comes to be called "aesthetics" through, on the one hand, a narrowing down of aisthesis to mean "sense perception" and, on the other, a restriction of the content of such perception to art (which is itself levelled off to the realm of the "sensible"). The wider sense that we rather have in mind here is that exploited by Kierkegaard, who understands the aesthetic (the "aesthete") to mean an attitude oriented primarily toward the pleasure and enjoyment of immediate non-reflective experience of the world. One is a 'spectator of life'.

Plato and Aristotle conceive "pleasure" (hedone) to be the (ful-)"filling" of desire (care) as a kind of "emptiness" or lack
and "motion" towards the desired object. "Pain" is the unfulfillment of desire. The pleasure of eating is the fulfillment of the emptiness in the desire to eat. The pleasure of theory is the fulfillment of the emptiness in the desire to see and possess the world. The latter is of course a metaphor, an analogy, in which the mind is conceived as a second mouth or stomach that swallows and digests "ideas," which provide nourishment for the growth and health of the soul. "And you agreed to pay me back with a feast of thought (logon)... so here I am, ready for that feast in festal garb...." Is it merely an off-the-cuff remark when Luther uses the epithet "pig-theologians" to name those scholastic theologians who took up the tendencies of Greek theologia, even though the latter is of course not literally on the same level as Plato's "city of pigs"? Or when he says that reading Aristotle's Metaphysics is like "playing with dung"? Plato often compares the act of knowing also to the sexual act, in which thoughts and statements are a kind of "offspring" of the intellectual copulation of the soul with the truth, or else are thought of as "wind eggs" (false thoughts and statements). Again, is it merely an off-the-cuff remark when Luther calls the "reason" of Greek philosophy and scholastic theology a "beast" and a "whore"? Just as Augustine saw how all comportment to beings is expressed analogically as "seeing" ('see how its tastes', 'see how it smells'), so one can easily identify the analogical expression of knowing as "eating." For example: 'feast your eyes on this', 'he devoured her with his eyes', 'intellectual taste', 'intellectual appetite', 'intellectual hunger', 'thirst for knowledge', 'intellectual nourishment'. Knowing is indeed not on the same level as gobbling, gulping, slurping, guzzling, pigging out and devouring, but the characteristic that it shares with these is that it is experienced as a kind of pleasure, and indeed the highest form of pleasure.

Likewise, the content of knowing as pleasure and enjoyment is experienced on the same level as groceries, drink, toys. ta onta, beings, are ta hedeia, that which is enjoyed, what gives pleasure. It is as if the cosmos were spread out as a transcenden-
tal supper table of being, ideas, light, and beauty, at which the reverent guest theoria sits and enjoys itself. In Plato's allegories of the cave and divided line, it is as if the world were a cosmic restaurant or shopping mall with various levels of being, which are perused by consumer-theoreticians. The highest "place of being" (the ideas) appears like a transcendental restaurant perched high above the city.

It is this tradition that stood behind Augustine's Neoplatonic concept of fruitio Dei, the "enjoyment of God." What the young Heidegger objected to in Augustine's notion that, whereas other things are "used," the "beauty" and "goodness" of God are to be "enjoyed" for their own sake (and here Heidegger appealed to Luther for support) was that "an order of values was at all established, that God was at all valued as a bonum and brought into comparison with other goods as summum." (APp, 39) What is implied in Augustine's concept is that the Christian God appears as one (even though the highest) present at hand being among a hierarchical totality of such beings that together are at one's disposal and 'at one's pleasure'. The "enjoying" of God is obviously not the same as "eating" and "drinking," but what these do share is the same element of 'grasping' and pleasure. Likewise, the reality God is not seen as identical with that of food or a painting, but what these do share is that they are all objects at one's disposal (verfügbar), present to hand (vorhanden) and at one's pleasure. As Luther put it, one makes "judgments about God in the same way that a poor shoemaker makes a judgment about his leather." 279

In Augustine's thought, God as the summum bonum is of course not yet the highest "value" and the "business" of modern technology, nor is his notion of contemplative "enjoyment" the modern "consumption" of the technological will to power, which views the world as "raw material" and "consumer goods." But Augustine's thought helps to prepare for this conclusion, which, according to the later Heidegger, had already begun with the Greeks, who, in spite of their objectivism, nonetheless conceived of being as "the pleasant," ousia (literally, "property," "present holdings" found
on an "estate": crops, cattle, tools, etc.) and kategoria ("accusation"). According to the later Heidegger, in the modern world the traditional definition of the human as "the rational animal" becomes 'man is the consuming animal', 'the homo economicus'. Interestingly enough, Hegel speaks about the modern transformation of "substance" (being) into "subject" in terms of the dialectic of desire, which at its lowest level takes the literal form of eating and digesting the world and so transforming it into one's own subjectivity.

3) Quietism. Luther also characterizes speculative theology and philosophy as "satisfaction" (HD, 363/54), "contentment," and quies. Quies means rest, repose, quiet, sleep, peace, calm, the peace and sleep of death. The basic idea here is that something in motion has stopped and come to rest (cf. Pascal's term quies for that state of rest never available to the constant agitation, restlessness, and motion of human life). Plato and Aristotle define the "life of theory" over against the "occupation and want of leisure" (ascholia) belonging to the life of "action" and "making." Therefore, it is seen as "freedom" from praxis and poiesis and thus as a life of scholè (whence "school," "scholastic"), "leisure," hraستο, "rest," "ease," "comfort," and diαγος, "recreation," "amusement," "play." Here human life has been taken out of the facticity and movement of praxis and brought to a standstill.

For Plato and Aristotle, theory is the highest form of pleasure, and only it can give complete "happiness" (eudaimonia) and "blessedness" (makaria), since only its objects (the ideas) are stable and fixed enough to be completely possessed. If the pleasure of theory is the filling of the emptiness and lack of desire and care for knowing, "happiness" and "blessedness" are seen as the complete 'ful-fillment' and 'content-ment' of this desire, such that no emptiness and lack remain and the "motion" towards the desired object ceases. One is at rest, satisfied, sated, full. One achieves a "fullness" (pleroma). As Aristotle says, the "astonishment" and "perplexity" (aporia, literally "waylessness"), in which
philosophy has its origin, is superseded by its opposite, _euporia_, the "solution," the "answer," where one ceases to be a "seeker." (IAW, 145, n. 157) As Hegel put it, thought ceases to be _philosophia_, the "love" of wisdom, and becomes absolute knowing. One achieves a state of "self-sufficiency" (_autarcheia_), "completed-ness" (_teleute_), "perfection" or "having oneself in one's end" (_entelecheia_), and "being in work" or "actuality" (_energeia_). Whereas praxis is a constant "_kinesis ateles_, an "incomplete movement," the pure seeing of the "_aei onta_," "the eternally present beings," is "_kinesis teleia_," "movement that has reached its end," "_energeia teleiote_," a "finished being-in-work that is most in its end." "_Orexis_," "striving," "desire" has come to an end. It is this state that Plato and Aristotle call "tranquillity" (_ataraxia_), pure pleasure, happiness, blessedness. Following up the metaphor we previously identified in the Greek notion of the pleasure of theory, one can see that the Platonic "place of the ideas" and the other Greek articulations of the _topos_ of being (_logos, to eon, nous_) appear like great transcendental resorts, utopias, cosmic spas, an 'isle of the blessed', where thought 'stops work' and 'goes on vacation' from factical life.

According to the young Heidegger, this Greek quietistic tradition expresses itself in Augustine's notion of the _tranquillitas, quies_, and _beatitudo hominis_ that is found in the contemplative "enjoyment of God." Augustine says that this enjoyment is the complete "possession" or "having" of God. As we have seen, for Heidegger this meant that Augustine here "turns away" from the "unrest" of factical life and "seeks God as 'rest and peace'." Again, Augustine's position is not yet the modern drive for security and certainty, which, according to the later Heidegger, expresses itself first in Descartes' notion of self-certainty and then finally in the technological will to organizing and mastering the world, but it helps to prepare the way for this ultimate conclusion. In 1926, Heidegger argued that the Aristotelian notion of "_eudaimonia_" as the theoretical contemplation of the pure presence of the divine, which unlike the "not yet" and "unful-
filled" character of practical willing "no longer points out beyond itself and is fulfilled in itself," entered into the Neo-Greek "beatitude" of Augustine's "enjoyment of God" and then into Aquinas' beatific "vision of God," which in turn entered into Descartes' "clear and distinct perception," Kant's "intuition," Hegel's "thought thinking thought," and Husserl's phenomenological "essential intuition" articulated in his "principle of principles." (LW, 114-123)

Luther's characterization of philosophia and theologia gloriae can be referred to as ocular aesthetic quietism. The same phrase could be used to describe Paul's, Augustine's, and Kierkegaard's characterization of speculative philosophy. The young Heidegger himself followed this Christian tradition and characterized traditional philosophy as "ocular," "aesthetic," and "quietive." Traditional metaphysics is "curiosity (cura-curiositas)" and indeed "absolute curiosity" and "idle talk" which in its claim to infinite and absolute knowledge is a "being everywhere and nowhere." (HF, 62, 54, 60) This "curiosity helps itself out to [its free-floating curiosity] by acquiring out of Dasein itself 'new food'." (HF, 63) In its fetish for absolute knowledge, it functions as "the pimp to the public whore of the spirit, fornicatio spiritus, the fornication of the spirit (Luther)." (HF, 46) In this ocular aesthetic orientation to absolute knowledge, philosophy "masks" itself from its own origin in factual historical life and seeks "comfort," "securitas," the "quietive," a "sleep-inducing opiate," "aestheticizing intoxication," "self-satisfaction," "making-it-easy-for-itself," and "carefreeness." (HF, 103, 64; PA, 109, 140, 164, 111, 109) It "increasingly lies down on life...and finally remains lying down on it, i.e., factual life wants to wear itself...and becomes in the end, expressly or not, fantastic or foolish." (PA, 140) It wants to "sleep," to "blind itself, stick out its own eyes," "to be done with and annihilated," i.e., in its "de-living" of factual life, it wants to die away from itself. (HF, 103; PA, 108, 107) Heidegger writes:
Absolute knowledge: ...at bottom a dream of ideal possibilities of absolute knowledge...one must be on guard against the use of the idea of absolute knowledge as a sleep-inducing opiate. (PA, 163-164)

It is of course the most comfortable thing to place oneself forthwith in the land of the blessed and the absolute. Only I do not understand why one continues to philosophize at all, if one is already "so far." (PA, 99)

Who is blind to principles and immune to the motivation of human being-there, which is in principle accessible in facticity, should not be further disturbed on his walks through world, soul, and God. (PA, 192)

And if we "go into decline," then there stands before us again either...radical existentiell concern, or: going to the dogs in the glossing work of mythical and theosophical metaphysics and mysticism and in the dream-condition of busying oneself with piety, which one calls religiosity. (PA, 70)

The high-point of the comfort and bankruptcy of philosophy is when one pleads that the "expression" ["life"] is not to be used. One pushes away the disturbing admonisher - and writes a system. (PA, 89)

He has here adopted the derisive style of Luther and Kierkegaard (cf. the mottos from Kierkegaard and Luther in PA, 182).

**Luther's Destruction of "Glory"

Like Paul (the "flesh," the "world"), Augustine ("lust of the eyes"), Pascal ("diversion"), and Kierkegaard (the "aesthetic"), Luther understands the ocular aesthetic quietism of theology and philosophy as an extension of a natural tendency, which is within the human condition in everyday life. Philosophy and theology are seen here from the standpoint of factual "life." More specifically, like Paul ("sleep," "drunkenness," "errancy"), Augustine ("concealment"), and Kierkegaard ("being closed off"), Luther sees the ocular aesthetic quietism of theology and philosophy as higher order expression of the tendency of human life to "fall away" from itself and into the world and so forget itself. All the terms that Luther uses in the first part of his *Heidelberg Disputation* to describe human fallenness - the tendency toward seeing, glory, self-satisfaction, pride, presumption, and securitas, the lack of self-concern - are used again in the second part of his disputation to describe the "theology of glory" and Aristotle's
philosophy in his "philosophical theses." According to Luther, the ocular aesthetic quietism of theology and philosophy is an expression of a state in which human life is "away" from itself and God, has "blocked itself off" from itself, and thus has "ruined" itself: That wisdom that perceives and contemplates (conspicit) the invisible things of God in his works is completely puffed up, blinded, and hardened. (HD, 362/53)

A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian of the cross calls the matter what it actually is.... [the theologian of glory] prefers works to suffering, glory to the cross, power to weakness, wisdom to foolishness, and, in general, good to evil. These are the people who the apostle calls the "enemies of the cross." [Phil. 3:18] For they hate the cross and suffering, and love works and the glory of works. Thus they call the good of the cross evil and the evil of works good. But God can be found only in suffering and the cross. (HD, 362/53)

Luther's opening two "philosophical thesis" dealing primarily with Aristotle read:

According to the apostle, 'knowledge puffs up' [1 Cor. 8:1]; therefore, if one does not understand that all knowledge belongs among those things promoting happiness only for those who are in grace, then the soul of the knower is completely puffed up.290

Philosophy [literally, the "love of wisdom"] is a perverted love of knowing.

In the theoretical study of "categories and essences," human life has been hardened into a state of "rest and quiet," in which self-care has been extinguished. Or in the lexicon of the young Heidegger, Luther sees theology and philosophy as a process of "de-living":

I have been worn out by these studies for many years now, and having experienced and heard may things over and over again, I have come to see that it is the study of vanity and ruination....the foolishness of the philosophers is like a man who, joining himself to a builder and marveling at the cutting and hewing and measuring of the wood and the beams, is foolishly content (contentus) and at rest (quiescit) among these things, without care (cura) as to what the builder finally intends to make by all of these exertions. This man is null and empty-headed, and the work of such an assistant is meaningless and null....291

To state that a theologian who is not a logician is a monstrous heretic—this is a monstrous and heretical statement.292

Here also Heidegger followed Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard in understanding the "de-living" of philosophy as an
extension of the everyday tendency to fall away from factical life, even though Heidegger's concept of factical life is by no means restricted to the narrow meaning given to it in Christianity (the religious self's relation to God).

Like Paul, Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, Luther launches a full scale critique of the ocular aesthetic quietism of theology and philosophy. Specifically, Luther again models his critique of the relational meaning of speculative thought on the Pauline themes of "destroying" the "puffed up" wisdom of the world, the "crucifixion" and "death" of the old self, "rebirth," and becoming a "fool" and "that which is not" according to the standards of worldly wisdom. For Paul, this process of metanoia, "change of heart," is bound up with the workings of the conscience. According to Luther, the contemplative theology of glory that has been "built up" and "puffed up" must be "destroyed" or "unbuilt" and must "regress backwards" into the "foolishness" of concrete life:

The friends of the cross say that the cross is good and works are evil, for through the cross works are destroyed (destruuntur) and the old Adam, who has been built up and edified (aedificatur) through works, is crucified. It is impossible for a person not to be puffed up by his good works unless he has first been deflated, emptied, and destroyed through suffering and malady, until he knows that he is a nothing....he who wishes to be wise does not seek wisdom by progressing forwards to it, but rather regresses backwards and becomes a fool by seeking after foolishness. Likewise, he who wishes to have much power, glory, pleasure, and satisfaction in all things must flee rather than seek power, glory, pleasure, and satisfaction in all things. This is the wisdom that is foolishness to the world....He does not glorify himself if he does good works, nor is he disturbed if God does not do good works through him. He knows that it is sufficient if he suffers and is destroyed by the cross in order to be annihilated all the more. It is this that Christ says in John 3[:7]: "You must be born anew." (HD, 362-363/53-55)

In his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle and in his 1927 Tübingen lecture before the Protestant theological faculty, Heidegger cites two passages from Luther that express the same idea of un-building speculative thought back into factical life:

And here we must set a limit for those arrogant and high-climbing spirits, who first bring their own thinking to this matter and lift
themselves on high to search the abyss of divine predestination, and there they are presumably anxiously concernful (bekümmern mit sich) about whether they are predestinate....Be anxiously concernful first about Christ and the Gospel, that you may recognize your sin and his grace....For without suffering, the cross, and the distress of death, one cannot deal with predestination without harm and without secret wrath against God. The old Adam must die before he can suffer and endure this thing and drink the strong wine of it. Therefore, see that you do not drink wine while you are still an infant. There is a measure, time, and age for every doctrine.297

You must be born anew....The wind blows where it wills, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know whence it comes or whither it goes; so it is with everyone who is born of spirit....It begins at the ear and ends at the ear....I will simply hear the Word...and believe....But we do insist on delving into the extraordinary operations of God. There we are busybodies and want to be very smart. We go about asking the abominable 'why'....in the matters of God they desire to know everything and to believe nothing, and do not wish to submit to the matters that must be believed without being seen....298

Luther's "theology of the cross" is intended as a "provocation," a "calling forth" (provocare) to the awakening and renewal of anxiety in the face of one's death, despair, fear of God, and care for the self and its relation to God. That is, it is an appeal to the "conscience" of the individual:

Such preaching concerning sin is a preparation for grace....A sick person seeks the physician when he recognizes the seriousness of his illness....one provokes him to seek medical care (cura)....we make them anxiously concerned (sollicitos) about grace....It is certain that a man must utterly despair of himself before he is prepared to receive grace.....(HD, 361/51)

...God does not judge according to the outward form that appears, but searches "the minds and hearts"....the lord humbles and terrifies us by means of the law and the sight of our sin, so that we seem in the eyes of men, as in our own eyes, as nothing, foolish, and evil. Insofar as we acknowledge and confess this, there is no radiant form (species) and beauty in us, but our life is hidden in God (i.e., in the bare trusting in his mercy), finding nothing in ourselves but sin, foolishness, death, and hell - as the apostle says in 2 Cor 6: "...as dying and yet we live." (HD, 356-357/43-44)

To be born anew, one must consequently first die and then be raised up with the son of man. To die - that means to feel death as present. (HD, 363/55)

...[the merits of Christ] always work grace for the inner man, and the cross, death, and hell for the outer man....A theologian of the
cross teaches that punishments, crosses, and death are the most precious treasury of all...  

In the "philosophical theses" of his Heidelberg Disputation, Luther calls for the same "destruction" of the philosophia gloriae of Aristotle:

He who wishes to philosophize in Aristotle without danger must first become completely a fool in Christ. All trust, life, glory, virtue, and wisdom of man is Christ alone. But Christ is hidden in God. Therefore, what is both inwardly and outwardly visible to the eyes (apparet) is nothing with which man can be presumptuous.

Just as a person does not use the evil of desire well unless he is a married man, so no person philosophizes well unless he is a fool. 

....you will be the best philosophers and the best investigators of nature if you learn with the apostle to consider the creation as it waits, sighs, and travails... For then the study of the essence of things, their accidents and differences, will quickly grow worthless.

Like Paul, who reverses the Greek hierarchical relationship between "that which is" (what possess the qualities of radiant presence, power and glory) and "that which is not" (what lacks these qualities), so Luther does the same in his discussion of Aristotle. As we will see more clearly below in our discussion of Luther's concept of time, he conceives of the concrete person as characterized by a radical temporal lack and not-being, and not by any kind of completeness and self-sufficiency according to the quietistic ideal of contemplative thought:

Ps. 41[:1] states, 'Blessed is he who considers the poor and the needy', for [according to Aristotle] the intellect cannot by nature comprehend an object, which is nothing, i.e., the poor and needy person, but rather some being (entis), something true and good. Therefore it judges according to the outward form that appears (faciem), grasps only the persona of human beings, and judges according to what is revealed and lies open before the eyes, etc. (HD, 365/57)

In fact, in the philosophical theses of his Heidelberg Disputation, Luther argues that Aristotle's notion of the "active reason" in his De anima is not even the concrete "man."  

Heidegger's Retrieval

The critical "destruction" of the ocular aesthetic quietism of philosophy and theology, i.e., dismantling it back into concrete
life, provided by Luther, as well as by Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard, was taken up by Heidegger as a model for his own "destruction" of the tradition of western philosophy, which Heidegger, however, carried out with a wider, more universal concept of factual life than the Christian one found in the above critiques. However, as we have already seen, the young Heidegger undertook this ontology especially for the sake of providing the conceptuality for a reform of Christian theology. Thus, he carried out not only a philosophical retrieval of the "relational meaning" found in original Christianity, but also a specifically theological retrieval of "a more original interpretation of the being of man towards God, prescribed from the meaning of faith." We are interested primarily in the young Heidegger's philosophical retrieval of original Christianity. As we have also previously seen, one of Heidegger's favorite procedures in his youthful lecture courses was to introduce Luther's swearing condemnations of Aristotle and Kierkegaard's critique of modern idealism, which is "everything in thought, and nothing in reality" (see the mottos from Luther and Kierkegaard in Heidegger's 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle [PA, 182]). Whereas Luther speaks of the task of theology as that of "calling forth," Kierkegaard speaks of philosophy as "directing" (hinweisen) the individual to "the existential":

Instead of admitting [that it floats in the indefiniteness of the metaphysical] and so directing human beings (the individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, the existential, philosophy has created the illusion (Schein) that human beings could, as one soberly says, speculate themselves out of their own good skin and into pure light (Schein). (Kierkegaard) (PA, 182)

The perennial Christian theme of how the "youthfulness," "cheerfulness" (Nietzsche) and "sweetness and light" (Arnold) of Greek thought and culture fails to touch the depths, the subjectivity and "hidden inwardness," the de profundis of concrete life led Heidegger to speak of the "superficiality of the Greeks." Like the Lutheran theme of "the death of God" in the facticity of the cross, the theme of the "crucifixion" and "death" of the homo gloriens of speculative thought and the "rebirth" of a genuine "new self"
became a model for the young Heidegger's own, one might say, *philosophia crucis*, which in calling for the "end of philosophy" demanded the end of the fantastically idealized self of "ocular," "aesthetic," and "quietistic" metaphysics (especially the "transcendental consciousness" of Husserl and all modern "ego-metaphysics"307). By contrasting the "I think" of the contemplative intellect with "I am" of the whole person discovered in original Christianity, Heidegger attempted, as it were, to drive a thorn into the side of metaphysics and, by thus wounding it, awaken it from the hubris, 'sleep', and 'drunkenness' of its "sleep-inducing opiate" and "dream of ideal possibilities of absolute knowledge." (PA, 163-164)308 "Philosophy has to start thinking of...giving up the swindle of its aestheticizing intoxication of itself and its contemporaries." (PA, 111) Philosophy, as metaphysics, was supposed to die and be born again in a new way. This was to be, as it were, the Last Supper of the aesthetic enjoyment of western metaphysicians. The meaning of being was to be thought anew "in and through" the "foolishness, death, and hell" of factical human life. As noted above, the young Heidegger here anticipates, although in a different and autonomous form, his later critique of the ontotheological notion of "man" and "humanism" in the history of metaphysics from Plato to modern technology.309

It was by means of his philosophical appropriation of the radically different understanding of human being as "factical life" in original Christianity that the young Heidegger was able to free himself from his earlier Neo-Kantian and Husserlian notion of a transcendental consciousness, as well as from his notion of a teleological "living spirit" that he had developed in the speculative theology of the conclusion to his habilitation writing. In other words, it was by means of his appropriation of Luther's either-or between the *homo gloriosus* (theology of glory) and the *homo crucis* (theology of the cross), and also by means of his appropriation of Kierkegaard's "either-or" between aesthetic speculation and the ethical-religious, that the young Heidegger re-decided the ontological option he had posed in his earlier writings
between a transcendental-logical consciousness and an empirical psychological subject living in space and time. He no longer opts for the foundational superiority of the former, but rather reverses his earlier hierarchical ordering, and here, in his own philosophical manner (i.e., for the sake of the question of being), he followed the reversal and "revaluation of all values" (Nietzsche) that he found executed in Paul’s letters, Augustine’s Confessions, Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation, and Kierkegaard’s "either-or." The young Heidegger set up this option in the confrontation expressed in the very title of his lecture course Augustine and Neo-Platonism - and that meant for him either being in terms of factical life and time or being in terms of theory and static presence.

iii) Kairological Time

We now turn to a consideration of the young Heidegger’s destructive retrieval of the "enactment" or "temporalizing meaning" of original Christianity, i.e., the historical enactment of the factical relation of the believing human being and God.

Parousia, Kairos, Wakefulness (Paul)

In order to show that original Christianity understands itself ultimately in terms of time, Heidegger’s 1920-21 lecture course focused on the theme of the "moment" (kairos, Augenblick [Heidegger’s translation, PRs, 321]) of the "coming" (parousia) of Christ as developed in the fourth and fifth chapters of 1 Thessalonians and the second chapter of 2 Thessalonians. "Kairos" means here the "moment" not in terms of the abstract mathematical and calendrical reckoning of time as a disconnected series of now-points. Rather, it means the present concrete situation and, more specifically, the fitting occasion and critical moment for something to be decided, fulfilled, brought about, etc. (e.g., harvest-time, the time to lance the ripe boil, the hour of death [‘my time’], the right occasion for an ethical act of generosity or courage, the time of the second coming of Christ [‘the fullness of time’]). Thus, Heidegger’s analysis of original Christianity is oriented to what he calls its "situation of historical enactment." (PRs, 319)
By means of an analysis of the repetition of key terms in 1 Thess. 1 (PRs, 320-321), Heidegger first shows how this kairos-
clical situation is structured by an "already having become" or "already having been" (genesthai, Gewordensein) of the community of
believers, which is further specified as "remembering," "knowing,"
affectivity ("tribulation," "joy"), and "preaching." This dimension
of the past and facticity makes up what Heidegger calls the "now
being" (jetziges Sein) of the believers, and makes up their
"comprehension of the situation." But this present perfect of
"having been" is what shapes precisely the hopeful awaiting of the
future (Zukunft, literally, "coming towards"), i.e., of the
"coming" of Christ: "You have turned to God and away from idols in
order to serve a living and true God and to await his son from
heaven."

Heidegger argues that this awaiting is different from all
awaiting of an objective, available, present at hand "content" and
future event that can be represented, speculated about, and dated
"chronologically" in visions and apocalyptic prophesies. (PRs, 321;
PRp, 36) Thus, he shows how the Pauline notion of the parousia
differs radically from the earlier Jewish prophecy and eschatology
concerning the "day of the lord" and the coming of the "messianic
man," from Iranian-Babylonian notions of eschatology, and even from
the Synoptic teaching of the coming of the kingdom of God. In 1
Thess. 5, Paul speaks of how the time and meaning of the "moment"
of the coming cannot be calculated and represented in advance. The
moment is an unavailable and non-objectifiable event, which happens
only in terms of a "suddenness," "in the twinkling of an eye" (1
Cor. 15:52): "Concerning the times and moments we need not write to
you, for you yourselves know that the day of the lord will come
like a thief in the night." (1 Thess. 5:1-2) In other words, the
time and meaning of the "moment" of the coming can only be decided
out of the temporal happening and enactment of the situation, the
"moment" itself. God becomes present to the community of believers
not as a static, fixed content, but only from out of what Heidegger
calls the "how" of a historical "context of enactment with God."
The meaning of God is determined from temporality. The futural coming (Wiederkunft) of Christ is defined further as a "second coming," i.e., as the futural return of the past within the present situation. Whereas in Greek philosophy parousia (ousia) means constant presence, in the New Testament it means rather a futural "coming" and dynamic "becoming present" that is just as much an "absence" (abousia), which never becomes completely present to human being.

According to Heidegger, the human side of the enactment of the relation to God expresses itself in an anxious and resolute "being wakeful" (wachsam sein) for the unavailable futural coming of what has been in the "moment," the historical situation. (PRs, 322) "But you are not in the darkness, brothers, for that day to surprise you like a thief. For you are all children of the light and children of the day; we belong not to the night and the darkness. So then let us not sleep like the others, but rather remain wakeful, watchful, and sober. Sleepers sleep at night, and drunkards get drunk at night, but we who belong to the day wish to be sober...." (1 Thess. 5:4-8)

In his this passage, Paul offers no fixed content for the coming, but only exhorts "Be wakeful!" That is, the time and meaning of the "moment" of the coming are referred away from a "what" and back to a "how" (resolute wakeful openness) of the human enactment of the relation to God, to the "context of enactment with God." This daily "doing and suffering" (PRs, 317) of the relation to God within a historical situation is a resolute wakeful living and sober readiness in the face of the "uncertainty" of the time and meaning of the "moment." Thus, Heidegger points out that the word "day" in the above passage ("children of the light and children of the day") means both the "day of the lord" itself and also the light of self-comprehension. In order for the self to enact its relation to God, it cannot have forgotten and lost itself in the world, but rather must be disclosed to itself and possess itself within the situation.

Heidegger maintains that it is in this "context of enactment with God" in the historical situation that authentic temporality is
generated. (PRs, 322) This temporality or temporalizing is the resolute "being wakeful" for the futural "coming" of "what has been" in the historical "moment." Factical life is here not in time, but rather lives time itself. (PRp, 38) In other words, this temporality is not "chronological," i.e., a mathematically measurable and datable linear series of discrete now points, in which human life appears as one among other events. Rather, it is "kairological," i.e., the circular enactment of the past and future in the present situation, which is the very "movement" of human life. (PRp, 36; PRs, 319, 321) It is what the young Heidegger calls "kairological temporality."312 This temporality makes possible both human experience and the givenness of God in experience. (PRs, 321)

Heidegger notes that this genuine temporality is lost to those who await the coming in terms of a datable event, visions, and prophecies. (PRs, 322) "When people say, 'Peace! Security!' then suddenly destruction will come upon them as travail comes upon a woman with child, and there will be no escape." (1 Thess. 5:3)313 According to Heidegger, the members of this second group of people indicated by Paul have fallen towards worldly contents and do not possess themselves. They lack the light of self-comprehension and are closed off from the situation of the coming. They are, says Paul, lost in sleep, drunkenness, darkness. Thus, regarding the "moment," they will go wrong and miss the coming. The "chronological" time, to which they ascribe, is not the genuine phenomenon of time.314

Thus, "being awake" is not only wakefulness for the coming, but also wakefulness against falling towards the world. "Be attentive, or your hearts will be weighed down with dissipation, drunkenness, and the cares of life, and that day will come upon you like a trap....Be always wakeful...." (Luke 21:34-36) The Christian life is lived out in a daily struggle between one's worldly cares and the demands of the imminent coming, between wakefulness and sleep, light and darkness, sobriety and drunkenness, attentiveness and forgetting. "...let those who mix in the world live as though they were not absorbed in it...." (1 Cor. 7:29-31)
**Time as the Extension of the Soul (Augustine)**

In his 1921 lecture course, Heidegger also noted how the understanding of time in original Christianity was also maintained in such authors as Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard. (PRp, 38) He noted that the priority of "enactment-meaning" over "content-meaning" was again expressed in Augustine's discussion of the "will" in book ten of his *Confessions*. (PRp, 38) In his 1924 lecture course "The Concept of Time," which Gadamer has called the "original form of Being and Time," Heidegger began his discussion of time by asking: "Could it be that I myself am the 'now' and that my existence itself is time?" He then quotes from book eleven of Augustine's *Confessions*, where Augustine dismisses the cosmological notion of time (the Greek philosophical thesis that time is the motion of the cosmos, as developed, for example, in Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *Physics*) and takes up a personalistic definition of time as the "extension of the soul" (*distensio animae*).³¹ Tim is the soul and, conversely, the soul is time:

Oh my spirit, when I measure you I measure time...I measure time in you. Things which encounter you and then pass on bring you into a moodful state of mind (*affectionem, Befindlichkeit*). The things themselves pass away, but this moodful state of mind remains. Therefore I do not measure the things which pass away, but I measure the moodful state of mind in my present existence. I repeat: when I measure time, I measure my moodful finding myself (*Mich-Befinden*). (BZs, 79)³¹

...there are three times - a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future. For these three [past, present, and future] exist in the soul, and I do not see them anywhere else: the present time of things is memory; the present of present things present is sight; the present of things future is expectation.³¹

So the life of this action of mine [reciting a psalm] is extended in two directions - toward my memory, as regards what I have recited, and toward my expectation, as regards what I am about to recite. But all the time my attention is present and through it what was future passes on its way to become past... The same holds good for any longer action, of which the psalm may be only a part. It is true also of the whole of a man’s life, of which all of his actions are parts. And it is true of the whole history of humanity, of which the lives of all men are parts.³¹

In his 1924 lecture course, Heidegger led into his analysis of time with the statement, inspired by Augustine, that "the fundamental
meaning of time is not the "time-within-of-which" of physics, but rather "the temporality of existence." (BZs, 79)

As we shall see below in our discussion of Luther's critique of the orientation towards presence in metaphysical thought, it is the notion of time that underlies Luther's "theology of the cross." Likewise, Pascal saw the phenomenon of time, and, according to him, the restless motion of human life is precisely a constant motion towards possibilities in the future: "We never keep to the present. We recall the past; we anticipate the future....It is almost never think of the present, and if we do think of it, it is only to see what light it throws on our plans for the future. The present is never our end. The past and the present are our means, the future alone our end. Thus we never actually live, but hope to live...."318

**Subjective Time (Kierkegaard)**

According to Heidegger, "Kierkegaard is the one who no doubt has seen the existentiell phenomenon of the moment with the most penetration." (SZ, 447, n. 2/388, n. iii).320 Like Augustine, Kierkegaard sees time not as the "objective" movement of the cosmos conceived as "nature," but rather as the "subjectivity" of human life itself. And, according to Kierkegaard's distinction between "external" and "internal" history, this temporal character of human subjectivity lies not primarily in its being externally viewed and recorded by, for example, the historian, but rather in its being actually lived and experienced.321 For Kierkegaard, "time has no significance at all for nature."322 In the Greek philosophical and Hegelian representation of time as "an infinite succession" of abstract and quantitative now-points, time has been falsely "spatialized."323 This series of "nows" is seen as running its course in an empty and indifferent presence, i.e., the "purely abstract exclusion of the past and the future": "Precisely because every moment, as well as the sum of the moments, is a process (of going by), no moment is a present, and accordingly there is in time neither present, nor past, nor future....as representation, the infinite succession is [as a whole] an infinitely contentless pre-
sent." According to Kierkegaard, the Greek philosophers and Hegel had no real understanding of time and history, which only really became thematic with the emergence of Christianity. For Kierkegaard, the reality of time is revealed in the "moment," which is not an abstract now, but rather the unification of the past and the future in the present. The human self is a synthesis of past (necessity) and future (possibility) within the moment, the situation. Appropriating Aristotle’s notion of "movement" (kinesis), Kierkegaard sees lived time as the "movement" of the past and the future into the present, the "transition from possibility [dynamis] [structured by necessity] to actuality [energeia]." This "transition" (metabole) is for Kierkegaard a coming into being within the "moment," a "qualitative" "leap" that brings into being something "new." The notions of "movement" and "transition" can be accounted for neither in the realm of Plato’s metaphysics nor in the abstract logical movement of Hegel’s dialectics, but rather only "in the sphere of historical freedom." Here Kierkegaard applies what was a notion primarily in the natural philosophy of Aristotle’s Physics, i.e., "kinesis," to the human historical sphere. As we shall see, Luther used Aristotle’s Physics in a similar fashion in his discussion of specifically human becoming.

Contemporaneity

The unification or synthesis of the past and future in the moment is expressed in three Kierkegaardian concepts: "contemporaneity," "repetition," and "suffering." The notion of contemporaneity is a rejection of the view of the past as a ‘now’ which has gone by into a fixed, objectified, and irrevocable past. The contemporaneity of the past means that the past persists as a possibility which is contemporaneous with the situation of the present generation. In the ethical sphere, this means that past ethical paradigms (e.g., life of Socrates) are contemporaneous with every subsequent generation and not just with, for example, Socrates’ fellow Athenians. The ethical realities of the past, as they are depicted in art and literature, are always to be made
contemporary, modern, up-to-date. The counter-concept of this "understanding in contemporaneity" is "understanding at a distance," which places the past away from itself into a distant objectified past that is not appropriated and enacted within one's own situation, i.e., the "moment," but rather observed aesthetically or studied theoretically in historical disciplines (e.g., questions of the form: Did Socrates really have a Theory of Ideas?) In the sphere of the Christian religion, contemporaneity means that the message of Christ is contemporaneous with every subsequent generation of believers as a futural possibility to be enacted in the "moment" of their own historical situation. All believers, and not just Christ's immediate disciples, are contemporaries of the proclamation of the good news. There are no "disciples at second hand." The coming of Christ always comes again in the historical situation of every subsequent believer. But "understanding at a distance," which Kierkegaard saw as predominant in the Church and in theology, assigns Christ's coming a fixed and objective reality in the past, which is passively contemplated, admired, and studied. Likewise, the immediate disciples of Christ are seen as the real contemporaries of Christ, who stand in a privileged position regarding the Christian message (e.g., one travels to Jerusalem to get as 'close' as possible to the reality of the Christian event). Kierkegaard also speaks of the contemporaneity of past sin and guilt, which makes possible their "forgiveness," because this past is always open as a possibility to be re-decided (i.e., the past sin is now forgiven sin).

**Repetition**

Kierkegaard's notion of "repetition" (Wiederholung in German translation) means that the past is "repeated" or "retrieved" as futural possibility to be enacted and decided in the "moment," i.e., in one's present situation:

...the future in a certain sense signifies more than the present and the past, because in a certain sense the future is the whole of which the past is a part....For freedom, the possible is the future, and the future is for time the possible. To both of these corresponds anxiety in the individual life....The past about which I am supposed to be anxious must stand in a relation of possibility
to me. If I am anxious about a past misfortune, then this is not because it is in the past but because it may be repeated, i.e., become future.\textsuperscript{330}

Whereas Plato taught that reality lies in the past and is to be "repeated backwards" by "dying away" from existence, Kierkegaard sees repetition as a "recollecting forwards" into the future and the present. Repetition is a "kinesis" from the repeatable and futural possibilities of the past into the "moment": "When the Greeks said that all knowing is recollecting, they said that all existence, which is, has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one says: actuality, which has been, now comes into existence." "Just as [the Greeks] taught that all knowing is a recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is repetition."\textsuperscript{331} Repetition is also distinct from mere "hope," insofar as the latter involves an orientation towards possibilities in the future that have no basis in the actuality of the past. Both recollection of the past and hope for the future are abstract, in that they do not relate the past and the future together within the "moment." In the ethical sphere, repetition is the retrieval of repeatable possibilities of the past within the re-decision of the present. An example of repetition in the ethical sphere is marriage, which, unlike the affair of the romantic lover, involves the constant repetition of conjugal love: "The ideal husband is not one who is such once in his life but one who every day is such."\textsuperscript{332} An example of repetition in the religious sphere is Job, who lost everything, but willed repetition through faith in God and "received everything double."\textsuperscript{333} Likewise, after having lost Isaac in the intended sacrifice, Abraham wills repetition through faith and "receives Isaac more gladly than the first time."\textsuperscript{334}

\textbf{Suffering}

In his account of Kierkegaard's notion of "suffering," Jaspers writes that for the existing human being there can be no eternal static meaning. Rather, regarding all ethical and religious meaning, it is always a matter of "suffering" or "undergoing" and "enduring" (\textit{paschein, passio, suffere}), i.e., passionately enacting
this meaning in the "uncertainty" of the situation of one's own historical existence through choice and appropriation:

Every formulated doctrine of the whole becomes a kind of box in which one can be at home (Gehäuse), robs one of the original lived experience of the limit situation, and suppresses the development of those capacities which seek the meaning of existence (Dasein) in the movement of the future and in self-chosen experience. This is replaced by the rest and repose of a transparent and complete world of eternally present meaning, which pacifies the soul. If that kind of man speaks against this, who affirms life, process, and meaning in his activity, and to whom the world is not but rather becomes..., then no systematically formulated doctrine will emerge, but rather a continuous agitation, unsettling, and appealing regarding one's own life-capacities and those of the others....The consequence [of suffering] is a constant uncertainty in which the relation to the absolute is experienced and lived....The escape to security always lies close by: the certainty of the religiously awakened and speculation, which develops and possesses evidential dogmas....The religious person understands 'the secret of suffering as the form of the highest life' [Kierkegaard] ....Were an existing human being - i.e., one at the same finite and infinite who lives in time - in the position to elevate himself beyond suffering through the knowledge that this suffering signifies a relation to the absolute, he would then also be in a position to transform himself from temporally existing to an eternal human being.335

The Moment and Keeping-Silent

Like Paul, Kierkegaard sees the "moment" as the present concrete situation, the fitting occasion and critical moment for something to be brought about and decided. Both hope, which is abstracted away from the present situation and lost in an unreal future, and recollection, which is likewise absent in an objectified past, are like "garments" that never "fit" the requirements of the "moment" and like sustenance that never "satisfy" the needs of the present situation. But repetition "has the blissful security of the moment....Repetition is an indestructible garment that fits closely and tenderly, neither binds nor sags....hope is a beckoning fruit that does not satisfy; recollection is petty travel money that does not satisfy; but repetition is the daily bread that satisfies with blessing."336

Kierkegaard refers to the Pauline expression of the kairos as "the twinkling of an eye" and notes that in the Danish Oiblikket and the German Augenblick the moment means literally a "blink or
glance of the eye," i.e., a sudden moment of vision in which one catches sight of the present situation. Kierkegaard maintains that in the "moment," one does not await an objectified and available "tomorrow." Rather, one comports oneself in an anxious and wakeful "keeping silent" (Schweigen in German translation) and openness for the reality and requirements of the moment, which is always characterized by "the sudden" and the "new":

From the lilies and the birds as teachers let us learn silence, or learn keeping silent. The bird lives in silence and waits: it knows...that everything occurs in its season, hence the bird waits; but it knows that it is not for it to know the time or the day, hence it keeps silent. It will yet occur in due time, says the bird....Then when the moment is come, the silent bird understands that it is the moment, it employs it, and it is never put to shame....[the lily] does not ask beforehand what kind of summer it will be this year, how long or how short; it keeps silent and waits - so simpleminded is it, but yet is never deceived....Then comes the moment, and then the silent lily understands that now is the moment, and employs it....only by keeping silent does one hit upon the moment....The bird is silent and suffers.

**Listening**

Another characteristic of the "moment," according to Kierkegaard, is "obedience" or "listening" (Gehorsam in German translation), which means that in the moment one is open for precisely factical possibilities, i.e., possibilities that are not arbitrary, but qualified by the necessity of the past:

Only by absolute obedience can one with absolute accuracy hit upon the 'spot' where one is to stand, and when one hits upon it absolutely one understands that it is absolutely indifferent whether the spot be a dunghill....[the lily] was absolutely obedient, hence it became itself in its beauty, it became actually its whole possibility, undisturbed, absolutely undisturbed by the thought that the same moment was its death....Only absolute obedience can with absolute accuracy hit 'the moment'; only absolute obedience can embrace the moment, absolutely undisturbed by the next moment.

**Earnestness**

Another similar characteristic of the "moment" is what Kierkegaard calls "earnestness." Both hope and recollection lack the "earnestness" of acting and deciding within the concrete "moment," since recollection annuls the present situation as something frivolous and unimportant in light of the seriousness of
the past (e.g., Plato's "recollection" of the "ideas"), and mere hope flees from the seriousness of the present situation into the frivolity of novelty and diversion. The earnestness of repetition lies in the fact that it is always relating the past and the future to the decision about one's existence made in the present situation. "Repetition - that is actuality and the earnestness of existence."341 "Earnestness alone is capable of returning regularly every Sunday with the same originality to the same thing."342

Joy

Finally, Kierkegaard characterizes the "moment" as "joy" in spite of all "anxiety" in the face of the uncertainty of the situation. He defines joy as the state in which one is present to oneself in a sense of fullness and fulfillment. This joy is in contrast to two forms of "unhappy consciousness," in which a person is "always absent, never present to himself."343 One can be absent from oneself, i.e., have the content of one's life outside oneself, either by living in memory of the past or by living in hope of the future:

'Behold the birds of the air... - unconcerned for the morrow....Consider the grass of the field - which today is'.[the] instruction [of the lilies and the birds] in joy is quite simply as follows. There is a today. Upon the word 'is' there falls an infinite emphasis....the morrow is non-existent - that baleful day which is the invention of idle talk and disobedience. But when by reason of silence and obedience the morrow is non-existent, today is, it is - and then there is joy....It is to be present to oneself; but to be truly present to oneself is this thing of 'today', that is, this thing of being today, of truly being today....Joy is the present tense, with the whole emphasis upon the present....the lilies and the birds are joy, because with silence and unconditional obedience they are entirely present to themselves in being today....'Even now today art thou in paradise'.344

Inauthentic Time

Kierkegaard contrasts this genuine "moment" to a non-genuine way of being in the present, which belongs to "worldliness."345 Since the latter has lost itself in the world, it does not practice "keeping silent" but rather "idle talk." It is not "obedient" but rather always "disobedient" and shirking the factual demands of the situation. And it does not know the "joy" of being present to
oneself in the present situation, but rather is constantly tormented with the anxiety of its worldly cares 'for the morrow'. Since it is always away from itself in the world, it is constantly deceiving itself, "missing" the moment, and ruining its growth and development:

...while one is talking, though one says only a word, one misses the moment....he cannot keep silent and wait, and perhaps this explains why he did not notice the moment when it came for him. For the moment, although it is pregnant with rich significance, sends no messenger before it to announce its arrival, it comes too suddenly for that.... nor does it come with noise and outcry; no, it comes quietly...it comes with the light step of the sudden, it comes stealing upon one....But everything depends on the moment. And this doubtless is the misfortune in the lives of the great majority of men, that they never sense the moment....And why? Because they could not keep silent.

'To what purpose?' he would say, or 'Why?' he would say, or 'What is the use?' he would say - and so he did not unfold his whole possibility, but had his deserts, in that stunted and ill-formed he sank beforehand under the moment.

In his description of the aesthetic sphere, Kierkegaard shows how the so-called 'living in the moment' destroys the genuine relation to the "moment." In one's enjoyment, one leaps from moment to moment in a series of disconnected now-experiences, which do not unify the past and the future in the present. Each moment is simply anticipated, experienced, and let pass by into an objectified and remembered past that is not repeated in terms of its possibilities in the present. The aesthetic life misses the real "moment" of its factual possibilities because it is dispersed into the insubstantial present of disconnected now-experiences.

In the ethical sphere, the "moment" is the synthesizing unification of the self through repetition of past ethical meaning in terms of its possibilities that are enacted in the present situation. In the religious sphere, the "moment" is this same unification, but now through the eternal breaking into time. Whereas Greek philosophy conceived of the eternal as lying in a past to be recollected, and Judaism saw the eternal in a distant future to be anticipated, Christianity unites these two abstract factors in the notion of the kairos, the moment, the "fullness of
time" in which God is present in the contemporary situation: "The pivotal concept in Christianity, that which made all things new, is the fullness of time [Gal. 4:4], but the fullness of time is the moment as the eternal, and yet this eternal is also the future and the past." Kierkegaard calls God's activity here "repetition" in which God's past relation to the world is repeated in the moment. Thus, the person who wakefully "keeps silent" for and chooses the "moment" and thus repeats one's relation to God, solves "the great riddle of living in eternity and yet hearing the hall clock strike." Finally, we can take note of the fact that Kierkegaard criticizes Greek thought for locating meaning not only merely in the past, but also for identifying "being" and "presence." In his discussion of the "moment," Kierkegaard explains how Parmenides and Plato asserted that "non-being is not" and that "only being is." This orientation led Plato to conceive of the "moment" as "a silent atomistic abstraction" that does not "occupy any time," even though it is supposed to be the transition point between rest and motion. Plato's view is an abstraction because it abstracts away from the real historical "kinesis" of the past and the future in the moment, which is a movement from non-being (possibility) to being (actuality). Kierkegaard then notes how the "moment," the "now" of "present time," "being," and the idea of "the one" are all equated by Plato, and how this equation turns up again in the "pure being" of Hegel: "The one must nevertheless be, so it is said, and then 'to be' is defined as follows: Participation in an essence or nature in the present time (to de einai allo ti esti e methexis ousias meta chronou tou parontos)....The 'now' (to nun) lies between 'was' and 'will become', and naturally 'the one' cannot, in passing from the past to the future, bypass this 'now'. It comes to a halt in the now, does not become older but is older. In the most recent philosophy, abstraction culminates in pure being, but pure being is the most abstract expression for eternity, and again as 'nothing' it is precisely the moment." With this static notion of the "moment" in which "ideas" or "concepts" are located, time
and being are reduced to "the present in terms of an annulled succession....in the eternal there is no division into the past and the future, because the present is posited as the annulled succession." According to Kierkegaard, the Greeks were "lost in the moment" as a "purely abstract exclusion of the past and the future." In their view of the "moment" and "being," what Greek philosophy and Hegel failed to see was the "historical presupposition." 

This category is of utmost importance in maintaining the distinction between Christianity and pagan philosophy, as well as the equally pagan speculation in Christianity [i.e., Hegelianism]....It is only with Christianity that sensuousness, temporality, and the moment can be properly understood...." In the words of Jaspers’ paraphrase of Kierkegaard quoted above, the Greeks saw the world in terms of "eternally present meaning, which pacifies the soul" and which thus lacks the element of "suffering" or "enacting" meaning within historical time.

Heidegger’s Retrieval

The young Heidegger’s notion of the "temporalizing" of "kairological time" was thus an existential-ontological retrieval of an existentiell-ontic experience of time in the original Christianity of Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. Without this retrieval, this "theological origin," Heidegger would surely never have (in his own words) "come upon the path of thinking" about "Being and Time." Like Dilthey and Count Yorck, Heidegger saw that Christian thought was at bottom the attempt to develop "an ontology of the higher historical life." Heidegger’s notions of time as the circular movement of the past into the future and the present was derived from the similar Christian notion; his notion of "retrieval" or "repetition" (Wiederholung) from the Kierkegaardian theme of repetition; his notion of the "moment" from the Pauline theme of the kairos and from the Kierkegaardian theme of the moment; his notions of "wakefulness" (HF, 7, 16-19), "resolve" or "resolute openness" (Entschlossenheit) (as "wanting to have a conscience," which in the moment calls one away from the "being closed off" (Verschlossen-
heit) of falling and into the situation), and "keeping silent" (Schweigen) from the Pauline theme of "being wakeful" and the Kierkegaardian themes of "keeping silent" and "choice"; his notion of "passion" (Leidenschaft) and "enactment" of meaning from Kierkegaard's theme of "suffering" (Leiden); his notion of the inauthentic present (the awaiting of fixed meaning) from the Pauline critique of eschatological prophecy and the Kierkegaardian critique of "idle talk" that misses the moment. As we have done previously, we can note here that, both in terms of lexicon ("temporality," the "moment," "repetition," "keeping silent," "passion") and content, the main influence on Heidegger's notion of time was Kierkegaard.

Metaphysics of Presence (De-Historicization)

We have now to consider how Heidegger's critique of the forgetfulness of temporality in Greek thought and its naive orientation towards presence also arose from a retrieval of the Christian critique of Greek philosophy. In his 1921 lecture course, Heidegger's discussion of Augustine's Neo-Platonic notion of the "enjoyment of God" showed how it falsified the original experience of time in original Christianity. Following Greek philosophy, Augustine sees the "happy and blessed life" of the "enjoyment of God" as "praesto habere," a "having present" of God. The constant "being before the eyes" of God is a "esse praesto," a "being present." Both the self and God have been brought to a standstill in the security and motionless of a nunc stans, a standing now:

...one who seeks what he cannot obtain suffers torment (cruciatur).... For what do we call enjoyment but having present the objects we love? And no one can be happy and blessed who does not enjoy what is man's highest good.... The highest good must be in the condition of being present in our possession, if we think of living happily and blessedly.... it must be something which cannot be lost against the will. For no one can feel confident regarding a good which he knows can be taken from him.... But if a man feels no confidence regarding the good which he enjoys, how can he be happy which in fear of losing it.

...what kind of object should a love love, unless it be that kind of object which cannot be in a condition of being absent (deesse) while being loved?.... it is the eternal life which is the happy and
blessed life. However, what else but God is that eternal object which affects the soul with eternity?  

If the present were always present and did not go by into the past, it would not be time at all, but eternity.  

In his lecture course, Heidegger argued that Augustine’s Neo-Platonic concept signifies the loss of the historical “enactment-meaning” of self and God. Both are “placed away into the rest of a dead eternity”:  

[Metaphysical conceptuality] covers over the fact that in factical life everything depends essentially upon a non-objectified enactment and that this enactment is "historical" ....If, for example, the experience of God is interpreted as fruitio Dei, if God is "enjoyed" as the "rest and peace" of the heart, then he is pushed out of the unrest of factical-historical life and his living character is brought to a standstill....Since its earliest beginnings, metaphysical thought is oriented towards seeing. Thus, also for Augustine, for example, being means a constant being-before-the-eyes and thus also a being present at hand or constant presence....Thought, which is oriented towards seeing, is directed towards representable contents and so misses the non-reducible, temporal-historical enactment that temporalizes time. (AP, p. 41-42)  

By adopting the foreign Greek conceptuality, Augustine is untrue to his own themes of the will and time in his Confessions and to the original Pauline notion of the kairos, the historical situation in which the parousia of God takes place. From the standpoint of Pauline eschatology, Augustine falls prey to the "sleep" and "drunkenness," the "Peace! Security!" of speculative thought and apocalyptic vision, in which an objective and available content is awaited. Augustine here helped prepare the way for the standard scholastic view of God as "nunc stans" and "substantia" (ousia), a fixed and static presence that is contemplated by an "eternal" soul. This view was then taken over by modern philosophy. One would have to include here the speculative theology of Heidegger’s own habilitation writing, which sees God as timeless "validity" to which a teleological "spirit" is correlated. The young Heidegger’s insight into the loss of the "enactment" or "temporalizing-meaning" in Augustine’s thought and the subsequent tradition already expresses in germinal form what the later Heidegger worked out in detail, i.e., his theme of the three epochs (ancient, medieval, and modern) of the history of ontotheological metaphysics as the
history of different expressions of being and the divine as static presence.

In his 1920-21 lecture course, Heidegger said that "Luther did understand this basic experience of temporality and for that reason opposed Aristotelian philosophy so polemically." (Prs, 322) After discussing Augustine in his 1921 lecture course, Heidegger again appealed to Luther's "destruction" of the scholastic tradition that had set in motion by the adoption of the foreign Greek conceptuality in Augustine and others. In his 1515-1516 Lectures on Romans, Luther gives an explicit and amazing account of the temporal significance of the "theology of glory" and the philosophia gloriae, which became the central theme of his 1518 Heidelberg Disputation. Luther maintains that the Greek and scholastic study of "essences," i.e., being, is precisely an abstract orientation towards presence:

...the philosophers so direct their eyes to the present state of things (in presentiam rerum) that they speculate only about essences and qualities of things....Alas, how deeply and disastrously we are ensnared in discussions about categories and essential determinations....[the philosophers] are happy and take glory in the knowledge of that about which creation mourns and is displeased.363

...[A theologian of glory] sees and speaks of God's glorious manifestation among the heathens, how his invisible nature can be known from things visible and how he is present (presentem) and powerful in all things everywhere....364

For Luther, "glory" characterizes not only the exalted object (content-meaning) and the human relation to this object (relational meaning) in the "theology of glory" and the philosophia gloriae, but also what the young Heidegger called "temporalizing-meaning" of the whole relation.

We have already noted previously in passing that in Greek philosophy "glory" (doxa) means standing presence. to on, ta onta, ousia means "presence" in the Greek language. Thus, Plato's description of the "ideas" as mallon onta means the "more presence" of the ideas, pantelos on means their "complete presence," and heilikrinos on means their "pure presence." The "ideas" as to on ontos ("really real," "beingly being") means their "presently
presence," i.e., a presence that is not infected with the lack, absence, and instability of temporal change. For Plato, the \( \text{me on} \) of the concrete temporal world means its "not-presence," its "lack of presence," the absence involved in "coming into being" (future) and "passing away" (past). By contrast, the \( \text{aei on} \) ("always being," "eternal being") of the ideas means their "always presence," which is not flawed by the absence of the past and the future: "We are wrong to transfer [the 'was' and the 'will be' of becoming] to eternal being; we say that it was and is and will be; but 'is' alone really belongs to it and describes it truly."³⁶⁵ For Plato and Aristotle, the rational soul is seen as participating in the standing presence of the ideas. Likewise, fragment nine of Heraclitus reads: "For the noblest choose one thing above all else: glory, everlastingly abiding over against mortal things (kleos aenaon thneton)...."

In the ocular aesthetic quietism of speculative theology and philosophy, what thought gazes upon and enjoys and comes to rest in is the pure presence of "ideas," which fulfills the "emptiness" or lack in the desire for knowledge, brings contentment, and thus brings to an end the "motion" of desire.³⁶⁶ "The standing presence of the \( \text{noeton} \)...brings with it that philosophizing neither can lose its object nor needs to first bring it into existence, but rather has it constantly before itself. But this means that, according to its inner essence, this comportment is something which is always present and always making-present. Philosophical knowing thus fulfills the meaning of \( \text{kinesis teleia} \) [movement that is in its end], pure \( \text{energeia} \)..." (IAw, 145) Both pure theoretical seeing and "pleasure" are "\( \text{en to nun} \)," "in the now, the present time."³⁶⁷ Since theory is comportment to eternally present ideas, it achieves the purest form of pleasure and enjoyment. (IAw, 147) What Greek metaphysics wanted was, as Plato intimated in the \textit{Phaedo}, to die and fall asleep in presence. The metaphysics of presence is the death of desire. Luther's statement that the "theology of glory" is "puffed up," "hardened," and "satisfied" means that this type of thought is puffed up and drunken with, completely hardened and
bloated into presence. It is sated and glutted with presence. The
movement, flexibility, and enactment of historical experience has
been solidified into the torpid smile of a static contemplative
presence. The self possesses itself and its object in a state of
completely transparent presence. For the ocular, aesthetic, and
quietistic tendency of Greek metaphysics, the "place of ideas"
functions as a kind of transcendental resort for aged philosopher-
kings, for whom being is always present at hand for their enjoy-
ment, rest and relaxation. Kierkegaard called this attitude an
"aesthetic holiday" from human existence. What the "superficiality
of the Greeks" did not fully understand was the "suffering" of
being-meaning within the historical situations of factual life.

According to the young Heidegger, it was this Greek tradi-
tion that Augustine took over in his notion of the "enjoyment
of God" as a constant "having present." In 1926, Heidegger argued
that the Aristotelian notion of "eudaimonia" as the theoretical con-
templation of the pure presence of the divine was passed on to
Augustine and then to Aquinas. In this theoretical "eudaimonia
or "beatitudo," the unfulfilled striving and movement of practical
life is dissolved into the fulfillment of desire in a complete
presence:

And why [for Aquinas] is intuition, pure visio Dei, pure intuiting
and pure having present of God the highest kind of being (beati-
tudo), which man can in general have? Because the comportment of
intueting no longer points out beyond itself and is fulfilled in
itself, whereas in contrast the second basic capacity of man as a
rational being, willing, is still unfulfilled precisely according
to it meaning as a willing of something. As willing, it is precisely
still directed towards something which it does not yet have and
not yet is, whereas in contrast in the intueting of that which is,
namely God, complete fulfillment is given....The highest capacity
of man is knowing (that is utterly Greek), cuius objectum optimum
est bonum divinum, "whose highest object is the divine good."
[Summa Theologica, III, qu. 3 a 5 c] Quod quidem non est objectum
pratici intellectus, sed speculativi. "And this bonum divinum is not
the object of practical thought, but rather of speculative
thought." In scholasticism, speculativus intellectus is also used
for theoretice, that is, it is the Greek theorein ...."blessedness
consists in pure intueting, contemplation of the divine"....This
intelligere, which is the highest human capacity, is therefore
defined: intelligere nihil aliud est quam praesentia quocumque
modo, "the presence of the knowable in relation to knowing."
This account of the concept of knowledge is here acquired in connection with Augustine, who is even cited in this section, "De utilitate credendi," cap. 11. (LW, 121-123)

Heidegger argued here that the notions of Augustine's "enjoyment of God" and Aquinas' beatific "vision of God" in turn entered into the notions of Descartes' "clear and distinct perception," Kant's "intuition," Hegel's "thought thinking thought," and Husserl's phenomenological "essential intuition" articulated in his "principle of principles," all of which have the meaning of a theoretical seeing of something statically present (Descartes' "ideas," Kant's "categories," Hegel's "Spirit," Husserl's "essences"). (LW, 114-123)

Luther's Destruction

In order to criticize this theological and philosophical tradition, Heidegger introduced Luther's "destruction" of the scholastic tradition, which was based on the inappropriate conceptuality of Greek philosophy. In the philosophical theses of his Heidelberg Disputation, Luther critically discusses Aristotle's notion of the eternity of the world and the "the eternal being as the cause of movement in infinite time" in Aristotle's Physics, VIII and his Metaphysics, XII, since these notions cannot do justice to the notion of history and creation in Christianity.368 In his Lectures on Romans, Luther criticizes the identification of meaning and "presence" in metaphysics by means of contrasting this with the experience of time and meaning in Paul. The passage he comments on is from Rom. 8, to which Heidegger himself in his 1923 lecture course refers for his discussion of the theological notion of the "interpretation of the history of salvation" (Heilsgeschichte) (HF, 111):

...our sufferings of the present are not worth comparing to the coming futural glory to be revealed to us. Creation watches anxiously in anticipation for the revelation of the sons of God....But hope that is seen is not hope. Who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, through patience we watch for it anxiously and expectantly....we do not know what we ought to pray for, but the spirit itself intercedes for us....And he who searches our hearts knows the phronesis of the spirit....
This is the original Christian notion of time, which is oriented towards the futural coming of Christ in the kairological situation. Even though from the limited point of view of the Christian religion, Luther nonetheless sees the metaphysical orientation towards the "present" as what the young Heidegger called the "de-historicization" of factual life. He thus reverses the Greek hierarchical relationship between to on and me on, "presence" and "lack of presence." What is prior is not the "is" of the present, but rather the privation of a futural "not yet." God and the self are not primarily present, but rather projected out into the absence and parousia of the future:

The creation anxiously waits. The apostle philosophizes and thinks about the world in an other way than the philosophers and the metaphysicians do....the apostle recalls our eyes away from the intuition and contemplation of the present, away from the essences and accidents of things, and directs us to the future. For he does not speak of "essence" or "operation" of the creation, or of its "action" and "passion" and "motion," but in a new and amazing theological vocabulary he speaks of the "expectation of the creation"....Therefore, you will be the best philosophers and the best speculators of things if you will learn from the apostle to consider the creation as it waits, groans, and travails, that is, as it turns away in disgust from that which is and desires that which is not yet and in the future....whoever searches into the essences and operations of the creation rather than its sighings and expectations is undoubtedly a fool and a blind man....

For Luther, this orientation towards the future is not the awaiting of a known and fixed metaphysical content (which rather always misses the situation), but rather is a radical openness to what can only be enacted and decided in the situation. As we have already previously seen, Luther conceives of the life of faith as a continual search for God within the historical situation, within the "circumstances" of "person," "place," and "time," i.e., through Christ. With Aristotle's notion of phronesis in mind, he calls this openness "prudentia," because it determines God's reality only in the kairos, the concrete situation:

Now hope that is seen is not hope...hope changes the one who hopes into what is hoped for, but what is hoped for does not appear. Therefore hope transfers him into the unknown, the hidden and the dark shadows, so that he does not even know what he hopes for, and yet he knows what he does not hope for....It is always the case
that we understand our own work before it is done, but we do not understand the work of God until it has been done....thus fools do not know how to greet God when they meet him, nor know how to receive the gifts he offers them. But the prudent take them with patience and joy. For at this point we have the greatest need for prudence, so that we are not wise in things that are apparent (for then we shall despair) but rather in future and unknown things which do not appear. For this reason the apostle in this passage uses a very significant word....The Greek text has: "He knows what the prudence of the spirit is." The Greek word *phronema* means prudence....But do we not preach the world...? For we understand things metaphysically, that is, according to the way we understand them, namely, as things that are apparent and not hidden, although he has hidden his power under nothing but weakness, his wisdom under foolishness....

Like Kierkegaard, Luther conceives of the search for God as a constant repetition or "renewing" of the search. Here there can be no such thing as Augustine's *praesto habere*:

The condition of this life is not that of having God, but of questioning after and seeking God....one goes from strength to strength, from clarity to clarity in the same form. For it is not he who begins and seeks, but he "who endures" and keeps seeking "until the end will be saved" [Matt. 10:22], he who is always beginning, seeking and renewing his questioning. For he who does not progress on the way to God regresses. And he who does not renew his quest loses what he has found, since one cannot stand still on the way to God.

To advance is nothing else but always to begin again. And to begin without advancing is to fail altogether.

In another passage, Luther explicates Paul's exhortation to "those who have already begun to be Christians": "Do not conform to the pattern of this age, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind." (Rom. 12:2) He does this by means of a destructive retrieval of Aristotle and presents a very non-traditional and non-scholastic reading of the *Physics*, which applies Aristotle's notion of *physis* to the Christian ethical theme of the constant repetition of human becoming in its relation to God. In this amazing passage, Luther argues that what one has become and is (one's being) is never cut off from the "non-being" and "privation" or "lack" (*steresis*, *privatio*) of its "possibility," in terms of which it is to be repeated and "renewed":

Their life is not something in quiet rest and repose (*in quiescere*), but in movement from good to better, just as the sick man
proceeds from sickness to health, as the lord also indicates in the case of the half-dead man who was taken into the care (cura) of the Samaritan....It is of no value for a tree to grow green and produce blossoms, unless it also bears fruit from the blossom....For just as there are five stages in the case of the things of nature: non-being, becoming, being, action, passion, that is, privation, matter, form, operation, passion, according to Aristotle, so also with the spirit: non-being is a thing without a name and a man in his sins; becoming is justification; being is righteousness; work is acting and living justly; passion is to be made perfect and complete....through this new birth he moves from sin to righteousness, and thus from non-being through becoming to being. And when this has happened he acts justly. But from this new being, which is really a non-being, man proceeds and passes to another new being through passion, that is, through becoming new, he proceeds to a better being, and from this again into something new. Thus it is most correct to say that man is always in privation, always in becoming or in potentiality, in matter, and always in action. Aristotle philosophizes about such matters, and he does it well, but he is not understood in this sense. Man is always in non-being....This life is the way to heaven or to hell...."You have put on the new man, which is being renewed" [Col. 3:10].

Here again we note that Luther has completely reversed the Greek priority of being over not-being, presence over the absence of future and past. Human being is primarily "non-being." The genuine relation to God is not praesto habere for the ocular aesthetic quietism of contemplative thought, but rather the constant repetition of the relation in terms of its futural possibility and within the "action" and "works" of the situation. According to the "theology of the cross," the original death out of falling and being reborn in faith is not a one time event, but rather is to be constantly repeated and enacted in an ongoing cycle of such death and rebirth. One constantly dies and is born anew. Christian life is the "passion" or "suffering" of this circular temporal "motion" and "way." This is what Luther means in his Heidelberg Disputation when he speaks of living "hidden in suffering and the cross."

**Heidegger's Retrieval**

Heidegger's own critical un-building of the traditional philosophical and theological orientation towards fixed present at hand meaning back into the original "temporalizing-meaning" of factual life was in fact a retrieval of Paul's critique of
eschatological prophecy, Augustine's critique of the cosmological notion of time, of Kierkegaard's critique of the Greek notion of time and the abstract orientation towards presence in Greek and Hegelian philosophy, and especially Luther's "destruction" of the orientation towards presence in the "theology of glory" and the Greek philosophia gloriae. His critique of the history of metaphysics was a radicalization of the anti-Greek strain in Christian thought. Consider, for example, the following passage from Heidegger's 1923 lecture course Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity), which is really nothing less than a translation of Paul's and Kierkegaard's language about the coming of Christ into the language of Heidegger's own (Greek) question of being. The entire passage is metaphorical:

Philosophy is what it can be only as philosophy of its "time." "Temporality." Dasein works in the how of its now-being... As what Dasein encounters itself in the so executed being-wakeful (Wachsein), i.e., its character of being, is not to be calculated in advance... As specifically historical possibility of Dasein at any time, existence - as that which it is - is already ruined when one suggests that it be present in advance for philosophical curiosity that imaginatively pictures it. It is never an "object".... both requirements [that philosophy should deal primarily with objects and that the presuppositions which are operative should be presented to the public in a reasonable and general manner] surround themselves with the illusion of purely objective philosophy. But they are only the masked cries of anxiety in the face of philosophy... One should not be surprised at the fact that such trivialities are today lost sight of in the great busy-work of philosophy, where everything is geared to making sure that one does not arrive too late for the "resurrection of metaphysics" which - so one hears - is now beginning, where one knows only the single care of helping oneself and the others to a friendship with the loving God, which is as cheap as possible, as comfortable as possible and in addition profitable and direct, and imparted through essential intuition. (HF, 19-20, cf. 5, 56, 100)

...naive "empirical knowing," a sin against the Holy Spirit of Knowledge itself! (HF, 61)

Just as Heidegger's 1921 lecture course juxtaposed the Christianity of Augustine and Neo-Platonism, so his 1923 lecture course did the same thing: Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity) says "The Greek Assertoric Logos of Being as Presence (Factical Historical Interpretation of Factual Historical Christian Life)."
juxtaposition occurs in Heidegger's opening words to a speech he made in 1923 (see infra): "Be awake to the fire of the night [Paul]. The Greeks.... [Plato, Aristotle]" Likewise, his phrase "Hermeneutik is Kundgabe des Seins eines Seienden" says literally: "hermeneutics is proclamation [Christian historical preaching and interpretation] of the being of a being [Greek philosophy]." (HF, 10)

But Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics was ontological and therefore did not limit itself to criticizing it only from the point of view of its failure to do justice to the historical character of specifically Christian experience. Nonetheless, Heidegger's appropriation of the original Christian critique of the orientation towards presence in speculative theology and philosophy was, at least in the beginning, also taken up in an intended destructive retrieval of traditional Christian theology. On the ontological level, Heidegger followed the attempts of Hegel and Dilthey to use the theme of history in Christianity for the sake of rethinking philosophy, which does not have an exclusive relation to the events of Christian history. For Heidegger, this meant a philosophy that could to justice to the theme of "being in and through" the 'cross', i.e., through the historical enactment and "suffering" of factual life. In Heidegger's philosophia crucis, his via crucis (if one can speak metaphorically of such a thing), as in Hegel's "stations of the soul," crucis means rather the "torment" of any and all human existence, which "does and suffers" its relation to the world. Here there is not much to "see," but much to be done and suffered in the "hiddenness" of the historical enactment of life. Just as four hundred years earlier the young Luther, accompanied by colleagues and students, had lit a bonfire outside the Elster Gate of Wittenberg and committed to the flames a number of texts of scholastic theology, so the young Heidegger assembled colleagues and students for a farewell celebration on the eve of his departure to Marburg in 1923 and concentrated the conclusions of the last four years of his teaching and research into the opening words of a rousing speech: "Be awake to the fire of the
night. The Greeks..."380 The Greek question of being was to be "kairologically-critically" repeated from the standpoint of the Pauline themes of the "thief in the night" and "being wakeful." Being, as what has been, always comes like a thief in the night into the present situation of wakeful resoluteness. Heidegger was the Luther of western metaphysics.

By means of his ontological radicalization of the Christian critique of metaphysics, the young Heidegger thus freed himself from the notion of "atemporality" he had taken over from Neo-Kantianism and Husserl's phenomenology. The reversal of the relationship between eternal being and time in original Christianity entered into his own redecision of the ontological option between atemporal meaning and historical experience, which he had posed in his earliest writings. Here in this reversal or turn Heidegger arrived at the question that was to occupy him for the rest of his life, i.e., the question of "being and time."

5. The Later Distantiation

In Being and Time, which showed that the new "model" for his thought was rather Kant's transcendental thought, Heidegger had already distanced himself from his youthful fusion of horizons with original Christian authors. Just as the later Heidegger in Being and Time did not acknowledge the real extent of his debt to Husserl's phenomenology, so he "did not acknowledge the extent of his debt to Kierkegaard."381 "One can legitimately be surprised that in Being and Time Heidegger did not more clearly bring to light this [theological] background of his questions."382 Whereas his 1921-22 lecture course, an important first draft of "Being and Time," begins with four quotations from Kierkegaard and Luther and actually opened with one of Luther's condemnations of Aristotle (his 1923 course also opened with acknowledgments of Luther and Kierkegaard [HF, 5]), his 1927 Being and Time begins with an ambiguous and tame quotation from Plato's Sophist about the venerable "question of being." In the actual text, there is indeed a handful of footnotes to Kierkegaard and other Christian authors, but these are often haphazardly placed, inconspicuous, and easily
passed over. As a whole, *Being and Time* showed that Heidegger had translated the three moments of his earlier Kierkegaardian draft—world, factical life, and kairological time (which can only be "indirectly communicated")—into his new Kantian draft, whose three moments were "existentials" or "existential-ontological structures" of "worldhood," "Dasein," and temporal "schemata." In his 1928 lecture course and in his 1929 essay "The Essence of Reasons," Heidegger attempted to clarify the concept of "world" in Paul's letters (the "wisdom of this world") by means of Kant's transcendental concept of the world as a categorial a priori. (ML, 222ff./173ff.; WH, 143ff./51ff.)

In his writings after *Being and Time*, Heidegger distanced himself even further from his youthful fusion of horizons with original Christian authors, and in the late 1920s he left behind his Christian faith altogether. His theological and philosophical concerns now followed Hölderlin and Nietzsche in their experience of the "death of [the Christian] god" and their return to the concept of the divine given by the poets, tragedians, and Pre-Socratic thinkers in the Greek mytho-poetic tradition. Just as the later Heidegger's destruction of Husserl's phenomenology was carried out from a different standpoint (i.e., the Pre-Socratics) than in his youthful destructive retrieval of Husserl (Dilthey, Aristotle's ethics, Kierkegaard), so the later Heidegger's destruction of the medieval epoch and the whole tradition of ontotheological metaphysics no longer traced it back into the original Christianity of Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, but rather un-built it back into the mytho-poetic tradition of the Pre-Socratics and Greek tragic poetry, Hölderlin, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Rilke. In fact, the later Heidegger came to see the original Christian tradition itself either as "having no relation to this question [of being]" (EN, 9/7; WH, 379/276) or else as a falling away from the original experience of being in early Greek thinking. In particular, this meant that Kierkegaard, along with Jaspers (through whom Heidegger's reading of Kierkegaard was greatly mediated), was explicitly assigned to the history of the "forget-
fulness of being." He no longer attempted to make Kierkegaard’s thought present and living in a new way “here and now... at this place, in this lecture hall.” “In [Heidegger’s] Forest-Paths, Kierkegaard was pushed aside with two words, because he was no ‘thinker’, but rather a ‘religious writer’.”

The later Heidegger did at times execute a retrieval of the original Christian tradition, e.g., a retrieval of Christian kairological time in his 1936 lecture course on Schelling. But this retrieval was not carried out not in the direction of his youthful phenomenological ontology, but rather in the direction of his later notion of the “destiny of being” with its epochal “sendings” or “mittences.” Likewise, his attempt to retrieve theology was no longer executed in the direction of his youthful existential and Christian theology. Heidegger’s earlier project of reforming Christian theology along the lines of the reformative thought of Luther and Kierkegaard was left behind and completed rather by the Protestant theologian Rudolf Bultmann. His later retrieval of theology was carried out rather in the direction of Hölderlin’s and Nietzsche’s experience of the “death of [the Christian] god,” their return to the concept of the divine given by the poets, tragedians, and Pre-Socratic thinkers in the Greek mytho-poetic tradition, and their search for a new birth of the divine (the “coming god”) on the basis of this Greek tradition. Heidegger’s earlier concern with the relation of ontology and Christian theology was displaced by his later concern with the relation of “thinking” and “poeticoizing”: “The thinker says being. The poet names the holy.” (HH, 312) Here Heidegger in a sense translated the three moments of his earlier theological retrieval of Christianity - facticity of God, concernful faith, and kairological time - into the three moments of his later Neo-Hellenic mytho-poetic draft of “Being and Time,” whose three moments are the “fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals”; “poetic dwelling”; and the epochal “fateful sendings” or “mittences” of being. Here the theme of the concrete individual within factical life, which Heidegger had focused on in the early twenties under the influence of especially Kierkegaard, was to a
great extent obscured by this notion of an almost autonomous, epochal "destiny of being," i.e., the "content-meaning" of being-meaning came to dominate and almost eclipse its "relational meaning" and "enactment-meaning" in the situation of the concrete individual.391

Insofar as the above three moments amount to the content of both Heidegger's religious concept of poetry and his own two later philosophical paths of the "truth" and the "place" of being, one has to seriously ask whether the later Heidegger was successful in keeping separate theology and philosophy, as he had demanded in his youthful writings, which presented philosophy as "atheistic."392 "Theology is a positive science, and as such, therefore, is absolutely different from philosophy." (PT, 49/6) Did the later Heidegger return to his very earliest definition of philosophy as "philosophy...of active love and of worshipful intimacy with God," which he gave in his habilitation writing? (KB, 410) In what sense did Heidegger's statement from 1921 that "I am a...theologian" remain valid for his thought from beginning to end, although in different ways?

6. Self-Stylization and Self-Installment

With the statement that "without this theological origin I would never have come upon the path of thinking" (US, 91/10) and elsewhere, the later Heidegger did acknowledge in passing the essential influence of Kierkegaard and other theologically oriented thinkers on the first beginnings of his thought. But because of his later distatination from these thinkers, he appeared reluctant to provide any details about this aspect of his youthful thought. Outside of his short discussion in his On the Way to Language (US, 91-92/9-10), Heidegger's various "self-portraits" of the first beginnings of his thought do not even mention his youthful encounter with original Christianity and in particular Kierkegaard in the early twenties. (cf. FS, 55-57/21-22; SD, 81-90/74-82; ZP, 47/200-201; S, 337-339) In one of these portraits of his youthful thought in the early twenties, Heidegger gives an account of the first historical influences on his original decisive insight into
the temporal character of being, but amazingly does not even once mention his youthful preoccupation with the concept of "kairological time" in original Christianity and Kierkegaard. (BR, xi-xiv/xxv) In still others, he states that in his youthful period he clearly saw the impossibility of using the traditional Aristotelian notion of time for thinking out the relation of being and time, but he does not indicate just exactly where he did turn for a different understanding of time. (ZP, 47/201; S, 338-339) As mentioned earlier, Heidegger made no plans to have his early Freiburg lectures published in which his interpretations of original Christianity were carried out, and his manuscript for his 1920-21 lecture course Introduction in the Phenomenology of Religion, which was on Paul's letters, is in fact missing. These youthful works almost have the status of apocrypha in the official Heideggerian canon. One can almost speak here of a Heideggerian Index. We have also seen how Heidegger mis-portrayed the extent of his use of the term "hermeneutics" in his youthful lecture courses.

The later Heidegger's reticence about his youthful "theological origin" is bound up with his tendency to stylize the origins of his thought by installing his later concerns here. For example, in his 1935 lecture course, Heidegger relates his question of being back to the early tradition of Greek philosophy. In the context of his presentation of the history of western philosophy as a falling away from its Pre-Socratic origins, Heidegger refers to Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 1:20 that Greek philosophy is "foolishness" in order to assert that Christian thought has "no relation to this question [of being]" (cf. EM, 9/7; cf. WH, 379/276). What is ironic here is that in the early 1920s Heidegger appealed to this very passage for his destruction and retrieval of the Greek question of being. What is equally ironic and misleading is that in another later text (WH, 379/276) his use of Paul's statement in order to dismiss the role of Christian thought for rethinking his being-question is preceded by a discussion of the concealed temporal meaning of "being" in Greek thought by way of a comparison of the Greek words "ousia" (being) and "parousia" (presence, coming
to presence) - a point which in fact derives from Heidegger's youthful reading of the meaning of "parousia" in Paul's letters as a futural "coming" (Second Coming of Christ) or arrival within the present (kairos). These texts are of course in plain contradiction to his own statement that "without this theological origin I would never have come upon the path of thinking." Likewise, in his later marginal notes to his Being and Time, Heidegger read his later concerns and language back into those passages that were the result of his youthful fusion of horizons with original Christian authors (interpretation, anxiety, care). (SZ, 204, 252, 335, 427)

But even the statement from his On the Way to Language about the decisiveness of his "theological origin," which almost expresses the drama of a confession regarding the "rumor" about his theological past, is completely ambiguous and misleading. As we have seen, the essential influence of Christian theology on Heidegger's question of being came not from his early theological studies and the speculative theology of his habilitation writing, but rather from his appropriation of "original Christianity" in Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal and Kierkegaard, which begins around 1919. It was through the "radically other understanding of being" expressed by such thinkers as Kierkegaard that the young Heidegger was able to free himself from his earlier Neo-Kantianism, Husserlianism and ontotheology. But in the passage from his On the Way to Language about his "theological origin," the later Heidegger is referring in fact to primarily his early "theological studies" (US, 91/9) and not to his theological interests after 1919, in which he gave up Catholicism, became a Protestant, and identified with Luther and Kierkegaard. In other discussions of his "theological origin," Heidegger mentions his reading of Kierkegaard and Dilthey only in the context of his studies between 1910 and 1914 and places great emphasis on his encounter with the Neo-Hegelian Catholic theologian Carl Braig. (FS, 57/22; SD, 82/75) He thus gives the misleading impression that, so far as the decisive influence of his "theological origin" is concerned, it was his very early ontotheological period and especially the speculative
theology of Braig which were all-important in his development. Why does the later Heidegger jump over his preoccupation with original Christianity in the early twenties and instead relate the theological origin of his thought back to primarily his earliest theological concerns, in which he, as he himself says, "still knew nothing of what would later trouble my thinking" and in fact was here developing a Neo-Hegelian speculative theology? Certainly not because he was simply interested in being misleading. The answer is rather that he was reading the origins of his own thought in the same way that he read the texts of other philosophers, i.e., emphasizing certain aspects, playing down others, violently going against the grain in the light of the presuppositions and interests of his own thought at the time. All reading is pre-judicial and interpretive, and the later Heidegger certainly could not have been anyone but himself. In other words, the later Heidegger singles out his earliest theological studies because their Neo-Hegelian and Neo-Hellenic speculative concerns more easily serve as a springboard for his own later somewhat speculative formulation of the being-question and his attempt to relate this question back to the mytho-poetic tradition of the early Greek thinkers, Greek tragedy, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Rilke. For example, in his account of his "theological origin" in On the Way to Language, he writes that "the term 'hermeneutics' was familiar to me from my theological studies. At that time, I was particularly agitated over the question of the relation between the word of Sacred Scripture and theological-speculative thinking." (US, 91/11) This focus on and rendition of his theological origin provides a spring-board not only for moving in the next line to his later concern of being and language ("It was, if you will, the same relation, namely, between language and being, only veiled to me..."), but also for shortly thereafter moving to a definition of hermeneutics drawn not from Christian theological hermeneutics and Dilthey (as was the case in the early twenties), but rather precisely from the Greek mytho-poetic tradition, in which the poets are "interpreters of the gods"
(Plato, *Ion*, 534e) and *hermeneuein* is then the saying of an epochal "message of destiny." (*US*, 115/29)

Likewise, in the same account of his theological origin, Heidegger refers to how "the question of poetry" was present in his earliest reading of Hölderlin and Trakl between 1910 and 1914 "not in order to give the impression that I already knew then everything that I am still asking today," but rather because it provides a spring-board for his discussion of language and being in his own later interpretations of Hölderlin and Trakl. (*US*, 88-89/7-8, 115/29; cf. *FS*, 56/21-22) In Heidegger’s 1919 lecture course, there is a quotation of Hölderlin’s translation of Sophocles *Antigone*, but it is used as an example of the lived experience of the around-world in factical life and does not have very much to do with the later Heidegger’s reading of Sophocles and Hölderlin in terms of the theme of poetry as the articulation of an epochal truth of the divine. (*IP*, 74) In his 1925 lecture course, Heidegger said only that "discourse, especially *poetry*, can even bring about the release of new possibilities of the being of Dasein. In this way, discourse proves itself positively as a mode of *temporalizing* of Dasein itself." (*GZ*, 375/272)

The later Heidegger was more interested in relating the origins of his thought back to Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Greek tragedy and the Pre-Socratics. Surely this is a case of self-stylization which reads the present and the future back into the past. The later Heidegger’s identifications with Hölderlin, for example, have more to do with the direction in which he wants to see his thought move than with where it originally came from. Again, one may ask: Does Heidegger here do justice to ‘empirical’ history, or does he lack a historical sense?

One can also ask whether Heidegger would have been able to arrive at his later insights into, for example, the early Greek notion of *aletheia* without the influence on his youthful thought of the notion of historical truth in such Christian thinkers as Kierkegaard. In fact, as we shall see, the young Heidegger’s interpretation of the notions of "phronesis," "*aletheia, and"
"physis" in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Physics* was a radicalization of Luther's and Kierkegaard's interpretations of these Aristotelian notions. Following up Husserl's suspicion that Heidegger was to a certain extent reading phenomenology back into Greek thought, one can ask whether Heidegger has not also read Kierkegaardian themes back into Greek thought.

The later Heidegger's preference for his very earliest writings was not just a heuristic preference, but rather a real return to his relation here to medieval speculative theology and mysticism (Meister Eckhardt), Hegel, Schelling, Novalis, and Braig, just as his *Being and Time* had in effect returned to his earliest use of the transcendental thought of Kant and Husserl. As we have seen, in the conclusion to his habilitation writing the earliest Heidegger understood his primal words for being at that time—i.e., the "Dasein" of "meaning," "transcendental truth," and "logical place"—ultimately in terms of the "genuine optic" of his speculative-theological and teleological metaphysics, which "aims at a break-through to the true reality and the real truth," i.e., the "absolute spirit of God." In his later path of the "truth of being" after 1930, this very early concept of "real truth" had to pass through the horizon of his "middle phase" of "truth" as "being in and through [factual] life" that he had explored in the early twenties. In the later path of the "truth of being," the three early moments of his speculative-theological treatment of the being-question—absolute spirit (content-meaning), living spirit (relational meaning), and teleological history and the eternity of God (enactment-meaning)—were radically historicized and transformed into the three moments of the "fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals"; "poetic dwelling"; and the "destiny of being." Thus, one of Heidegger's earliest students, Karl Löwith, could make the following incredible statement about Heidegger's later thought:

The first indication of the problem of the ontic-ontological difference, which is developed in *Being and Time*, i.e., the difference between being and beings, is already contained in Heidegger's habilitation writing on *The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus*, where it is written in the concluding chapter that a philosophy of the living spirit cannot be satisfied with the
"spelling out of reality" (of beings), but rather must, over and above the totality of what is knowable, aim at a break-through into the true reality and real truth. For this it is necessary to give validity again to the dimension of the soul reaching into the "transcendent," which provided an orientation for the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages, in contrast to the superficial modern attitude of life and its "flighty breadth" that is without anchor in the absolute spirit of God and in the transcendent "fundamental relation of the soul to God." If one translates "true reality" and "real truth" with "truth of being" and "being of truth," the dimension of "spiritual life" reaching into the transcendent with "ex-istence," "God" with "being," and the "self-loss" of contemporary man in the "content of the breadth of the sensuous world" with the fall into the world and the forgetfulness of being, one can thus recognize the later Heidegger already in his habilitation writing. Even the dialectical "correspondence" (Entsprechung) of being and human ex-istence is already clearly sketched out beforehand in a language which is still conditioned by philosophy of life and philosophy of value. That is, transcendence is supposed to signify not an absolute distanciation from the subject, but rather only one pole of a "correlative" relation of life, so that this valuation does not gravitate exclusively towards the transcendent, but rather from the absolute it reflectively, as it were, comes to rest in the individual, in spite of the superior value of the other member of the correlation. If one can assume with Heidegger that essential thinking always thinks only one thought and that for every great thinker the essential thought is already there from the beginning onwards, then the analytic of the Dasein that resolves upon itself... would signify only an intermediate stage (Zwischenstadium) and Heidegger's "turn" to a self-giving being would be a return to his theological origin.35 Heidegger's statements that "as you begin, you will remain" and that "without this theological origin I would never have come upon the path of thinking[, but] origin always comes to be meet us as future" take on an ironic significance, since, against Heidegger's own intention, they awaken a real suspicion about the extent to which his thought remained inwardly shaped by the speculative, if not metaphysical, orientation that dominated his very first beginnings - an orientation which was radically renounced in the "middle stage" of his confrontation with the anti-speculative realism of the young Luther and Kierkegaard in the early twenties, but which perhaps broke out into the open again in a new form in his later writings.396 Whereas the young Heidegger in the early twenties was busily demythologizing his earlier speculative-theological metaphysics derived from medieval mysticism and modern
Neo-Hegelian thought and dismantling this back into the natural experience of "being in and through [factual] life," the later Heidegger of the "truth of being" was to an extent (and to what extent is the real question) following the opposite direction, namely, re-mythologizing "being in and through life" in terms of the above traditions and the mytho-poetic thought of the Pre-Socratics, Greek tragedy, Hölderlin, and Nietzsche. I would be the last one to assert that the later Heidegger’s thought can be reduced to mere speculative and mytho-poetic thought, but the speculation and the mytho-poetic language are a real aspect here which colors what are otherwise still the old (and newer and better) existential and phenomenological analyses of "being in and through life" given in the early twenties. As will become clearer as we proceed, the speculative aspect of the later writings would have been criticized by the young Luther and, following him, by the young Heidegger as the infiltration of a kind of theologia gloriae, a speculative "theology of glory" (Kierkegaard’s "religion A," which is the concept of being and the divine in the Greek world).

7. Effective History

It is not the later Heidegger who has highlighted and provided details about his past youthful appropriation of Kierkegaard and Christian theology, but rather others, such as Becker, Gadamer, Pöggeler, Sheehan, Müller and Lehmann, who believe that Heidegger’s thought is not really understandable without thoroughly taking into account this influence on his thought, since without such an influence Heidegger would not have been able to execute his critique of metaphysics and pose his new “question of being” in terms of factual life and temporality.387 In the foregoing investigation, the reports provided by these philosophers have served as necessary and helpful source material.

With these philosophers, one can also ask again Gadamer’s question: "...may one look at the last fading light of the sun that is setting in the evening sky, instead of turning around to look for the first shimmer of its return?"398 That is to say, does Kierkegaard’s thought and language really in fact have to be left
behind on the scrap-heap of discarded metaphysics? Or in Heidegger's youthful "fusion of horizons" with Kierkegaard, did he already find a "turn" into an "other beginning" and an "other language," which could do justice to the claims of concrete historical life? Just as it was Heidegger's students and others who carried on the "fusion of horizons" with Husserl's phenomenology (Gadamer, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur) and, as we shall see, with Aristotle's practical philosophy, so it was also Heidegger's early students and others who carried on his youthful "fusion of horizons" with Kierkegaard and Dilthey (Gadamer, Ricoeur). Here Heidegger's appropriation of these Christian authors continued to have an "effective history." For these philosophers, Heidegger's 'Kierkegaardian draft' of "Being and Time," what Gadamer has called the "original form (Urform) of Being and Time," could continue to play a role in what Heidegger called the "turn" to the "other beginning" of philosophy. This was done, then, "much against Heidegger's intentions" (Gadamer), i.e., against the mens auctoris, the later Heidegger's self-understanding of his own work. The apocrypha of the "rumor of the hidden king[s]'" fusion of horizons with original Christian authors effectively survived in a kind of exile. As we shall have occasion to discuss later, many of the above-mentioned philosophers of the effective history of Heidegger's youthful thought (I include myself) have confessed certain difficulties in attempting to follow Heidegger's later transcendental-Kantian, Nietzschean, Hölderlinian, Parmenidean, and Heraclitean drafts of his enduring "topic" of "Being and Time," since these later ways suffer from the hermeneutical problem of understandability and betray a certain speculative turn in Heidegger's thought, which takes up again the speculative concerns of his very early habilitation writing within the new context of facticity and historicity.

We are now slowly beginning to see that such terms as 'Heidegger', 'Heidegger's thought', 'the young Heidegger', the 'other beginning', the 'other language', the 'turn' are not univocal, but thoroughly equivocal and plurivocal terms which
disseminate themselves into a wealth of different ways, 'drafts', 'leaps', roundabout ways, wrong ways.... 'Heidegger' - that means all of a poet, a logician, a Neo-Kantian, a Catholic ontotheologian, a phenomenologist, a Kierkegaardian, an Aristotelian of the practical writings. Thus, by presently stressing the theological and Kierkegaardian origins of Heidegger's thought, I am attempting not to reduce his thought to this specific aspect, but rather to show one of many different aspects, all of which deserve attention. There are many young Heideggers, many youthful paths.402 Heidegger's thought does not exist in a state of present to hand immediacy, but rather exists only as differently mediated through the many paths of his varied dialogues with the historical tradition. It would be just as blind to attempt to reduce the young Heidegger's thought to the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, Dilthey, or Aristotle's *Physics* and his practical writings.403 Each of these fusions of horizons with traditional thought played a role in the young Heidegger's radical transformation of the question of being and continue to be "effective" in various currents of contemporary thought, even though the later Heidegger distanced himself from them.

8. Our Hermeneutical Situation

Like our previous attempt to bring to light the young Heidegger's fusion of horizons with Husserl's phenomenology, our attempt here to determine the unique hermeneutical situation within which he interpreted original Christianity in the early twenties also itself stands within its own hermeneutical situation. The situation consists in the fact that we have been dismantling the later Heidegger's translations of his youthful Kierkegaardian draft into his three later drafts of the "meaning," "truth," and "topos" of being, the layers of his later self-stylized narratives of the origin of his thought that tend to install here his later language, and finally the hardened historical picture of the origin of his thought that naive readings of his self-portrayals have given rise to in the secondary literature on his thought, so that we can free up the possibility of retrieving the authentic guiding origin of
his thought in his youthful fusion of horizons with original Christian authors by means of a study of the youthful texts themselves "with eyes with which someone reads, who is not [the later Heidegger]," a possibility which is to be realized in and for our contemporary understanding and appreciation of "the promising richness of his beginnings." Our attempt to let the "rumor of the hidden king" - the young Heidegger's fusion of horizons with original Christian authors - speak again "here and now...in this place" is similar to his own attempt to dismantle the encrusted layers of medieval scholasticism and modern ontotheological thought in order to recover original Christianity in the Ur-texts of Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard and to let these speak again in the "today" of his own contemporary philosophizing. We have been attempting to "find the word" in Heidegger's youthful texts that is able to "call one" back to his original and radical reading of Paul, Augustine, Pascal, Luther, and Kierkegaard.
IV. THE WAY OF PRAXIS

Further, missing and failing is manifold (for the bad belongs to the unlimited, as the Pythagorians assert, but the good belongs to the limited), but right action is of one kind. (That is why the one is easy, the other difficult. Easy is it to miss the target, difficult to hit it.) And that is why excess and remaining behind belong to badness, but holding-to-the-mean belongs to virtue. (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, B 5, 1108 b 28ff.) (PA, 108)¹

And I would be acting in manner absolutely worthy of damnation, if I now—since God directed me, as I believed and confidently took upon myself, that I should live philosophically, questioning and examining myself and others— if now from fear of death or any sort of trivial matter I wanted to abandon the direction of the enactment of my life. (Plato, Apology, 28 e) (PA, 50)²

We have now seen the young Heidegger’s destruction of both the modern and the medieval “epochs” of metaphysics. In Section IV, I would like examine his critical dismantling of the ancient “epoch.” At the same time, I will be exploring the young Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s practical thought, as well as of the Socratic dialogues of Plato and other elements in the tradition of ancient humanitas (Stoicism, Skepticism, Rhetoric).

The “rumor of the hidden king” has been a rumor not only about the young Heidegger’s phenomenological apprenticeship under Husserl and about his relation to Christian theology, but also about a young Aristotelian who had developed a radically new interpretation of the master of the tradition and saw his own philosophy very much as a renewal of Aristotle.³ In 1983, Gadamer wrote that “to this day hardly anything has been made public about it, but it had its effect in academic teaching.”⁴ Sheehan has written: "But if
the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger is undeniable, the manner and degree of it remain among Heidegger's best-kept secrets. "The secret lies hidden in Heidegger's courses." ⁵ We have already seen that in his earliest metaphysical and ontotheological writings, Heidegger identified with the Neo-scholastic and logical Aristotle that he had learned in his earliest theological and logical studies. I wish to show that the young Heidegger was still an Aristotelian after 1919, but now in a completely new sense, which even differed radically from the interpretation of Aristotle that he went on to develop in his later works. As I have done in the case of the young Heidegger's relation to phenomenology and theology, one can speak here also of an end of Aristotelian metaphysics and a new beginning for Aristotelian ontology. As we shall see, this was also to have been an end of ethics and a genuine beginning for ethics (practical philosophy). In other words, I wish now to sketch out what I would like to call the Aristotelian draft, if not the Socratic draft or even ethical draft of "Being and Time." I wish to explore the young Heidegger's Aristotelian lexicon.

1. The New Turn to Aristotle

What was the hermeneutical situation within which the young Heidegger attempted to free up the past thought of Aristotle in its possibilities for his own present thought?

We have already seen that in his doctoral dissertation and in his habilitation writing Heidegger had taken up Aristotle's doctrine of the categories of being into his own "onto-logic" answer to the question of being, whose three metaphysical moments we characterized as follows: valid logical meaning (content meaning = being as ground), judgment and a transcendental-logical I (relational meaning = being as correlated to logos), and the logical atemporality of validity (enactment-meaning = being as presence). Heidegger's earliest answer to the being-question that he had discovered in Brentano's dissertation On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle - i.e., "what is the simple, unitary determination of being which permeates all its manifold meanings?...what then does being mean?" (BR, xi/x) - was that the "unitary deter-
mination of being" is the "validity" which permeates categories, ideas, or forms of logical meaning. Mediated through Neo-Kantianism and Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's "onto-logic" was a modern restatement of the three moments of Aristotle's metaphysics, which we summarized as follows: the "categories" (ousia, beingness), "idea" or "beingness" as "eternal being" (aei on), and the "statement," the apophantic logos (nous poietikos, "active reason"). We also noted that Heidegger had planned further studies on "the ultimate and most difficult problems of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics." (KB, 204-205) But his earliest relation to Aristotle remained confined within the traditional Neo-scholastic interpretation of Aristotle, which had been transmitted to him by his Catholic theological studies, Brentano's dissertation, and Braig's *On Being: An Outline of Ontology*. It remained confined also within the modern Neo-Kantian epistemological interpretation of Aristotle, which he acquired through Lask, Windelband, and Trendelenburg.

We also saw that Heidegger was a traditional Platonist. His notion of the "validity" of logical meaning was derived from the modern Lotzean and Neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato's doctrine of ideas and his "idea of the good." In the ontotheological teleology that Heidegger worked out in the conclusion to his habilitation writing, his notion of the "universal validity and the existing-in-itself of meaning," which is grounded in the "absolute spirit" of God, functions in much the same way as Plato's transcendent and unchanging "idea of the good" (as interpreted in Neo-Kantianism). In his uncritical appropriation of the traditional metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger thus identified very much at this time with what he later came to call the ancient "epoch" of metaphysics.

Commenting on his plans expressed in his habilitation writing to study "the ultimate and most difficult problems of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics," the later Heidegger remarked:

To be sure, the above-named dimensions of questioning [in the habilitation writing] point everywhere back to Aristotle, in whose texts I had, helplessly enough, already attempted to learn to think before the writing of this work. Presenting the historical relation
of medieval thinking to Aristotle in a proper way was something that I was not capable of venturing. (FS, 55)

It was not until the early 1920s that Heidegger undertook this study of Aristotle - but it was now carried out with a radically new intention. Indeed, his "renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises" (BR, xi/x) violently attacked precisely his own previous neo-scholastic and Neo-Kantian interpretations of Aristotle and resulted in the discovery a very different and non-traditional Aristotle. The later Heidegger reports that "after 1919 I myself, teaching and learning in proximity to Husserl, practiced phenomenological seeing and at the same time tried out a transformed Aristotle-understanding in the seminar....Thus I was brought onto the path of the question of being, illumined by the phenomenological attitude, made uneasy again and in a different way than before by the questions which began from Brentano's dissertation." (SD, 86-87/78-79)

In a letter to Karl Löwith in 1921, Heidegger said that he was very much interested in pursuing further in his seminars and lectures the religious questions which for so many years had been bothering him, but that he had decided against it since the students would in all likelihood take it the wrong way, i.e., as mere biblical exegesis. Instead he decided to undertake a major study of Aristotle. Thus begins, almost by accident, the young Heidegger's intense preoccupation with Aristotle, which lasted in its full force until the late twenties. He presented a long and impressive series of lecture courses and seminars either exclusively on Aristotle or at least involving detailed discussions of Aristotle. The following list (including talks and essays) also includes his lecture courses dealing with other figures and themes in ancient philosophy (Plato, Sextus Empiricus):

SS 1921 In Connection with Aristotle's De anima. (seminar)
               Phenomenological Interpretations. (seminar)
SS 1922 Phenomenological Interpretations of Selected Aristotelian Writings on Ontology and Logic. (lecture)
               Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. (seminar)
2. The Destruction of Aristotle

Heidegger's "transformed Aristotle understanding" after 1919 was thus not a naive appropriation of Aristotle, as had been the case in his earliest writings. His interpretations had "neither the intention of effecting a philosophical preservation and apology of Aristotle, nor do they aim at a renewal of Aristotle and initiation into Aristotelianism." (PA, 11) As we have seen, Heidegger had been reading too much Luther for this kind of approach. Instead, he introduced his lecture courses with Luther's condemnations of "that
Indeed, the "hermeneutical situation" within which he wanted to understand Aristotle aimed at precisely a "confrontation," a "destruction." (PA, 2-3) "Unbuilding - that means: going back to Greek philosophy, to Aristotle, in order to see how something specifically original was fallen away from and was covered over, and to see that we are standing in this falling away." (HF, 76) Heidegger's critical dismantling of Aristotle aimed primarily at the Aristotle of the Metaphysics, which he understood as a "falling away" from factual life in the three senses of the "de-worlding" of the practical world, the "de-living" of practical comportment, and the "de-historicization" of the temporal enactment of practical experience. As we shall see, this destructive critique was also aimed at the metaphysics of Plato.

Heidegger's intention was thus to trace the Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysical question of being back into its "origin" in factual life. He understood the basic concepts of their philosophy in terms of the "hermeneutics of facticity," i.e., as factual life interpreting itself, bringing itself to language in a specific "interpretedness," and thus being always "unterwegs zur Sprache," "on the way to language" (to use a phrase from the later Heidegger). He focused on how within the "words" in which the concepts were embodied there was still an echo and whisper of factual life, whose indications could, therefore, be followed up. In his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle and Plato, Heidegger wrote concerning his use of Plato's dialogues:

We will bring the meaning of the situation to a preliminary interpretative emphasis through a pregiven linguistic usage. We will seek an indication and clue [to what philosophy is] in history, in Plato. Here it is to be taken into consideration from the start that the words in the situation, in which they were spoken and written, do not yet have the pronounced meaning they do today, that in their expressive tendency they indicate something which is not so much set off and extensively shaped as an object, but rather they express precisely something which is not withdrawn, something accessible to each person and something to be had, taken possession of (zu Habendes) by each person. The concepts are specifically cut to fit (zugeschnitten auf) factual life, and at the same time are on the way precisely to an extensive molding and therewith into a decisive process. (PA, 42-49)
...destruction of the traditional...is synonymous with the explication of the motive-giving original situations, from which the philosophical ground-experiences spring (entspringen)....In this connection, the characteristic meaning of "theory" itself is tailored to its origin (cf. Plato and Aristotle). (AJ, 3-4)

This hermeneutics of facticity is what Gadamer has called "the linguistic turn of phenomenology" in the young Heidegger:

Heidegger’s study of Aristotle was also the beginning of a new turn, which I would call the linguistic turn of phenomenology....It was a turn to language, to how language occurred even without a concept of language, but was actually done as a linguistic turn. I mean that it was done in Aristotle. The Greeks had no word for language. They had two words, logos and glota, logos being normally translated as 'reason' and glota as 'tongue'. But that in this dimension between 'reason' and 'tongue' something of a real incorporation of language and of human life is going on - that is what we discovered in Aristotle with the help of Heidegger. One knows the famous definition of man given by Aristotle - the animal which has reason, the animal rationale. If you look in the Greek texts, you will see that there Aristotle speaks about the animal which has speech, since he compared man as the political being with the birds who only make signals with their voice. But in man nature made a new form of progress....Now I can introduce the word destruction....The linguistic turn was a form of letting language speak again, of letting the words for concepts speak again in their full richness and concreteness....[For example] the analyses of the word ousia [in Book Delta of the Metaphysics] begins with the line: Ousia is an expression for the ownership of an owner - his home, his acreage, his stables, and all that he needs and what is present for him in his farm life....Heidegger was able to introduce us to seeing how presence and the disposability of one's nearest environment remains as a hidden layer in this concept which was later translated as essentia and as essence in modern philosophical terminology....in Heidegger's case, destruction was also almost a magical skill of letting words speak again and thus freeing the whole philosophical atmosphere of the times from academic moderation and plainness.11

In the young Heidegger's linguistic analysis of the leading concepts of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, these concepts "were not pushed around like ciphers on little ivory dishes,"12 but rather they were approached from the point of view of a destruction which attempted to show how the words were originally drawn from and still implicitly expressed the horizon of concrete everyday praxis and productive behaviour (poiesis, technē). Thus Heidegger could say that "in the end it is the business of philosophy to
preserve the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself." (SZ, 291/282; PA, 128)

For example, *eidos* [literally, "the seen," "the look"] (Latin translation = *species*, English = idea, form) originally means the look of a thing to be produced which is sighted beforehand and anticipated by the artisan, e.g., the potter (*eidos* is the *paradigma*, the paradigm, model, plan). To *ti en einai* [literally, "the what (something) was to be"] (Latin = *essentia*, English = essence) means the *eidos* as that which the shaped product already was to be. (GP, 151/107) *Genos* [literally, "race," "tribe"] (Latin = genus) means the *eidos* as specifying the kind, the "kin" of the thing to be produced. (GP, 151/107) *Physis* [literally, "bringing forth, producing, growing"] (Latin = *natura*, English = nature) means the *eidos* as the very "nature" of the thing to be produced and therefore as making possible our production. (PA, 91; GP, 151/107) *Theoria* [literally, "seeing"] (Latin = *contemplatio*, English = theory) means originally the artisan's prior seeing of the *eidos*, the model, which guides productive activity. (AJ, 4; GP, 154/109) *Hyle* [literally, "wood," "timber"] (Latin = *materia*, English = matter, subject matter) means originally the raw material which is worked upon and shaped into a product in accordance with the *eidos*. (GP, 164/116; SZ, 92, n. a) *Morphe* [literally, "shape," "figure", "fashion"] (Latin = *forma*, English = form) means the shaped product produced in conformity with the model, the *eidos*, and therefore an *eikon*, a "likeness" or "copy" of it. (GP, 149-150/106-107) *Telos* [literally, "completedness," "being finished"] (Latin = *perfectio*, English = end) means the *eidos* as encompassing all the features of the thing to be produced and therefore the completedness and finishedness of the finished product. (GP, 152/108) *Horismos* [literally, "boundary"] (Latin = *definitio*, English = definition) means the completedness of the product as grasped in a concept that expressly delimits or marks out the boundaries of the formed thing. (GP, 152/108) *Entelecheia* [literally, "having-in-end"] (Latin = *actualitas*, English = actuality) means the having-itself-(being)-in-end (completedness) of the pro-
duct. *(BP, 285/257)* Energeia [literally, "in-work-ness"] (Latin = actualitas, English = actuality) means the setting-in-to-work of the product which is accomplished by human making and work *(ergazesthai)*. *(GP, 142-143/101-102)* Hypokeimenon [literally, "what lies under"] (Latin = subjectus, English = subject, substance) originally means the finished product and work as what now lies there on its own and before us *(hypostasis, what stands under)* as available for further use at any time *(das Vorhandene, what is ready to hand).* *(GP, 152/108)* Ousia [literally, "beingness,"] (Latin = substantia, essentia, English = substance, essence) originally means one’s own "property" in one’s "household," "estate," or "farmstead" (e.g., spoons and jugs, kitchen, house, yard, fields, forest, river, sunlight) which is lying present and available (cf. a "man of substance"). *(PA, 92; GP, 153/108)*

There is no more telling indication of the derivation of the Platonic-Aristotelian "doctrine of ideas" from the domain of productive activity than Plato’s "likely story" in the *Timaeus* about the "demiurge" *(demiourgos)*, literally the workman, handi-craftsman, technician (for the people) who shapes unformed matter and brings the world into being in accordance with his prior vision of the "ideas." Likewise, Plato’s "philosopher-king" appears in the role of a political craftsman, technician, and expert whose function it is to mold and guide the lives of the citizens in accordance with the "paradigms" of the ideas. The "Republic" thus appears on the surface to be a kind of factory for producing human beings, a theme which will be stressed by the later Heidegger’s thesis that technology, technocracy, cybernetics, and social engineering are the result of western metaphysics and humanism. On the level of the life of the individual, the philosopher appears as the craftsman of himself, who produces himself (the heuristic role of Plato’s analogy between *techne* and virtue is not in question here). It was thus understandable that Greek metaphysics was adopted so readily by Christian theology in the Middle Ages, since the doctrine of the ideas (along with Aristotle’s god as first mover) was "tailor-made" for expressing conceptually the creation
story in Genesis, according to which all beings (ens creatum) are
made (produced) in the image of God, who is conceived analogically
as a 'potter'. (GP, 168/118) In modern times, this Greek concep-
tuality, having been modified by medieval thought, is now expressed
in the context of the eidetic structure of a transcendental
consciousness, something which is evident in the predominance of
the terms of "form" (space and time, categories) and "matter"
(perceptual manifold) in Kant's thought and in the central function
of Hegel's notion of the dialectical self-"production" of spirit in
history.

The young Heidegger's linguistic destruction was directed to
the basis of Greek concepts not only in the sphere of techne, but
also in the sphere of practical self-understanding. For example,
logos [literally, "speech," "the said"] (Latin = ratio, English =
reason) means originally speech or discourse about what is to be
produced and what is to be done in one's ethical and political
praxis. (PA, 96, 112; LW, 1-3) Kategoría [literally, "accusation,"
"speaking upon something or someone in a public place"] (Latin =
praedictio, English = predication) means originally not so much
"predication" in a logical judgment as accusing someone of some-
thing in a public place, e.g., the marketplace, the court, the
assembly. (BP, 252/232) Aei [literally, "always,"] (Latin =
astermus, English = eternal) means originally not so much being
outside of time (aei on, eternal being) as tarrying (Verweilen) in
time (as in the phrase ho aei basileus, the reigning present king,
the king at the time, der jeweilige König). (BP, 269/244) Bios
theoretikos [literally, the "seeing life," the "life of seeing"]
means not mere knowing, but rather a kind of "human existence," a
"possibility of existence," the "existence of the scientific man."
(LW, 34) Episteme [literally, "standing over," "overseeing" (Vorstehen)] (Latin = scientia, English = science) means originally
knowing how to do something, being capable of it, and therefore
skill or know-how. (ML, 14/11; WP, 56/57) Philosophia [literally,
"striving love of wisdom"] points back to the dimension of "desire"
and "care" (orexis). Aletheia [literally, "unforgottenness," "un-
hiddenness" (Latin = veritas, English = truth) points to the dimension of not-forgetting, not letting something be hidden from one. (HF, 11) Hermeneia [literally, "uttering," "interpreting"] (Latin = interpretatio, English = expression, statement) means originally the interpretive discussion of something (e.g., a thing, an oracle, a sign, a text). (HF, 9-11) Ethos [literally, "dwelling place," "home"] (Latin = habitus, English = character) means originally not so much either mere physiological habituation or a concern for ethics as rather the facticity of one's being-at-home within a social community that is defined by traditional ends. (IAw, 101)

In his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger saw the locus of the inseparable relation between philosophy and factual life in the "university" - "here and now we are living in [the efforts to gain access to philosophy] and indeed at this place, in this lecture hall." (PA, 63) This was also true in the different "'today'" of "Aristotle's Lyceum, the Academy of Plato." (PA, 72) Here again in the "words" one finds factical life expressing itself, what the Greeks called bios, a way of life, a way of human existence. The Greeks always understood philosophy also in terms of what the young Heidegger called its factual "relational meaning" (to the individual) and "enactment-meaning" (in the individual's historical life). Academeia, the academy, means originally not "academia," the "academic world," but rather a grove of olive trees in the outskirts of Athens, which was named after the legendary figure Academos, and where Plato and his fellow thinkers pursued the sunousia, the society and friendship of philosophical discourse. Likewise, Lyceion, the lyceum, was a gymnasium in the outlying area of Athens, where Aristotle set up his school which became known as "the Lyceum." Why were Aristotle and his followers called peripatetikoi, "Paripatetics"? Because of their peripatein, their "walking around" probably either while teaching or in the covered walks of the Lyceum, where they pursued peripatoi, "conversations during a walk." Stoikoi, the Stoics, means not so much merely those who subscribe to the doctrine of
Stoic philosophy, but rather hoi ek tes stoas, those from the Stoa, the piazza where Zeno of Citium and his companions pursued philosophical questioning. Cynikoi, the Cynics, means "those like dogs," those who live in independence from worldly needs and pleasures (for example, Diogenes is supposed to have lived in a barrel or bathtub).

What the young Heidegger wanted to point out in his linguistic destruction of the basic concepts of Greek thought was not only that these concepts were analogical expressions, metaphors, drawn from the realm of poiesis and praxis, but rather also that they represented a real move towards falling away from, levelling off, "masking," and "ruination" of this "origin." The Greeks drew their basic concepts "naively" from the realms of poiesis and praxis without explicitly elaborating this "genesis" (PA, 92) from the pre-philosophical basis. The task that Heidegger set for himself was precisely that of a genealogy of the conceptual language of Greek thought, of giving an "explicit elaboration of the basis of Greek ontology" in the life-world, where the "birth certificate" of Greek thought could be displayed. (GP, 156/111) This meant an unmasking "counter-ruinant movement" (PA, 176) back into the "original experiences" within the sphere of poiesis and praxis:

But for understanding and for genuine and philosophically appropriating interpretation, it is necessary to go back behind this performance and make it understandable from out of the unexpressed presuppositions, i.e., from out of the unexpressed and non-explicitly given understanding of being in Aristotle and the Greeks. (LN, 181)

Aristotle's articulations of the three intentional moments of being-meaning in his metaphysical thought, i.e., content-meaning as the "categories" of being, relational meaning as "theory" and "statement," and temporalizing-meaning as "eternal being," were seen by Heidegger as a "falling away" from the "origin" of factual life. More specifically, the characterizations of the "content-meaning" of being as "idea" (Plato) and as "substance" (Aristotle, for whom the highest substance is divine nous) were criticized by Heidegger as a "de-worlding" of the realities that Aristotle had described in his practical writings, i.e., the around-world of the
"household," the social world of the polis, and the personal dimension of one's "ethos." (GZ, 301/219; PA, 92) Plato's and Aristotle's characterizations of the "relational meaning" of being as "theory" and "nous" were seen as a "de-living" of the realities of bios praktikos, "practical life." (LW, 123) Likewise, Plato's and Aristotle's characterization of the "temporalizing-meaning" of being as "eternal being" were seen as a "de-historicization" of the temporal character of practical experience which Aristotle had thematized in his practical thought, i.e., the human "movement" (kinesis) towards ends which are enacted within a present "situation" (kairos). (LW, 191) The task at hand for the young Heidegger was, then, to "destroy" Aristotle's metaphysical treatment of the being-questioning by "un-building" it back into what he called the "Lebenswelt."

Although Heidegger certainly dealt with the Metaphysics, the Physics, and the logical writings, he attempted precisely to trace the philosophy encountered here back into the themes of Aristotle's practical writings, above all the Ethics, the Rhetoric, the Politics, which therefore formed the real centre of his interpretations of Aristotle. It was in this way that Heidegger could make what he called Aristotle's "metal bathtub" more accommodating to his own concerns. It was in the practical writings that Heidegger found "the authentic Aristotle." His preference for the practical writings is clear not only from the list of his lecture courses and seminars on Aristotle, but also from the reports of his early students:

The phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle...aimed not so much at the philosophical theology, so precious to scholasticism, which was based on the Aristotelian orientation towards the Physics and on the mover-god of the Metaphysics, as at the proximity to the concrete factual enactment of human existence, which was able to be grasped above all in Aristotle's practical philosophy and in his Rhetoric. The ways of 'being-true', of aletheuein, discussed in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, had above all this significance for Heidegger, that in this text the priority of the assertion, logic, and 'science' reaches a decisive limitation for the understanding of the facticity of human life. An allo genos gnoseos, an other kind of knowing, was given its due, one which does not know objects and does not strive to objective knowledge,
but rather means the luminosity which is possible for human existence that is factically lived. Thus, alongside the Ethics, Aristotle’s Rhetoric became important because it knows about *pragmata* [practical affairs] and *pathemata* [affects] - and not about ‘objects’. In an astonishing way, the young Heidegger was able to gain support for his ‘existentiell’ critique of the transcendental concept of the subject and of the object in the Aristotelian critique of Plato’s idea of the good. Just as the good is not a supreme object or highest principle, but rather differentiates itself into the diversity of its ways of being encountered, so being is also ‘being’ that comes to presence in all that is....

What preoccupied him characteristically was especially the Nicomachean Ethics, the arete, which is supposed to be thought out in it. I say ‘characteristically’ because here the preparation for the breakthrough to *Being and Time* is indicated. In this research, the way was opened up for concentrating ontology on human existence, with the emphasis especially on how man - in his concrete interwovenness in world relations and comportments - expresses himself about his own being and understanding of being with a view to its performance and perfection....What also was of the greatest importance was how Heidegger’s understanding of aletheia as unconcealedness here for the first time appeared, and indeed from the unity of the phenomena of arete and logos....Heidegger treated Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Analytics in the same vein.

Likewise, in his *Being and Time*, Heidegger indicated the influence of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (especially Book 6 on “practical truth”), Rhetoric (especially Book 2 on the affects), and De anima.22 Here he wrote that "the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among [the Greeks], and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology - at least in Aristotle" (he refers the reader to Nicomachean Ethics VI and Metaphysics IX, both of which deal with "truth" and the division of knowing into the spheres of *techne*, *phronesis*, and *episteme*). (SZ, 298, n. 23/268, n. xlii) The young Heidegger was playing "practical truth" off against the "truth" of "science" in the Metaphysics. Later, Heidegger confirmed this in the statement that "a renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises (especially Book 9 of the Metaphysics and Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics) resulted in the insight into aletheuein as unconcealing and in the characterization of truth as unconcealment, in which all self-showing of beings belongs." (*BR*, xi/x) The young Heidegger attempted to go behind the three moments of the question of being in Aristotle’s metaphysics-
i.e., the unchanging ideas (content-meaning), theory and the apophantic logos (relational meaning), and the "always-being" of the ideas (enactment-meaning) - and to excavate the three deeper moments of being in the realms of praxis and poiesis, i.e., the ethical ends that make up one's ethos within the social world of the polis (content-meaning), the concernful "striving" (orexis) and moodful and linguistic "practical understanding" of phronesis (relational meaning), and the ongoing realization of practical meaning within a kairos, one's present situation (enactment-meaning).

If it was Dilthey who functioned as a model for Heidegger's youthful critique of modernity, and the young Luther and Kierkegaard as models for his critique of medieval thought, what functioned as a model for his critique of ancient philosophy was really Aristotle's own critique of the Platonic idea of the good, which maintained that there is no universal and unchanging good or end, but rather that the ends of human life can only be found in the diverse historical social worlds (polis, ethos articulated in logos, language) and individual situations of concrete life. Using the language of the young Heidegger, one could say that the Aristotle of the practical writings was seeking "being (the good) in and through" the "farmstead" and "household" (ousia) of the technical work-world, in and through the social "home and dwelling place" (ethos) of language, in and through "praxis" (vita activa), being in and through phronesis. Since Aristotle places the transcendent Platonic good into the kinesis of diversified and situational human life, once could also say that he sought "being in and through" the kinesis (as hodos, way, path), the movement and way (Bewegung) of concrete life.

Likewise, the Platonic-Socratic turn from the speculative thought of the early philosophers, as reported in the Phaedo, was an inspiration for the young Heidegger. (PA, 49-51) In the Sophist, the stranger from Elea says about the "battle of the giants about being" waged by the early thinkers, whose words are always "leaving us behind": "It seems to me that each of them (the old philosophers
of being) tells stories, as though we were children" (Heidegger's translation). (IP, 19) In the same discussion, it is suggested that what is required to make the arcane utterances of "father Parmenides" intelligible is "a moderate degree of torture" (237 b), even though this will not go so far as "killing one's father" (241 d). As Cicero put it, it was the accomplishment of Socrates' demythologization of speculative thought to bring philosophy down from the heavens into the marketplace, into the kitchens and living rooms, the ethos and polis of factical life. Or, as Kierkegaard put it, Socrates was the great thinker of "subjective truth," since he related the "content" of philosophy to the existence of the philosopher himself (relational meaning, enactment meaning). Philosophy had to ask not only what is physis, kosmos, to theion?, but also and primarily who am I, how am I to live, what is justice? "Know yourself," achieve self-understanding, was the protreptic of Socratic thought. In the language of the young Heidegger, one can say that Socrates (who was a model for Aristotle's phronimos, the practically wise man) was seeking the "being" of the early thinkers "in and through" the marketplace of factical life. In his 1919 lecture course, Heidegger quoted the passage about speculative story-telling from the Sophist. Again in his 1925 lecture course on the Sophist, he said (modifying Plato's text) that "the philosopher must dare to become a father-killer." Thus he could interpretively demythologize the notion of the "goddess of aletheia" in the poem of "father Parmenides," so that aletheia meant "nothing other than" the "unconcealing" activity of everyday practical life and the "unconcealment" of beings in praxis (ta pragmata, practical affairs). "That the goddess of Truth, who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of concealing, means nothing other than: Dasein is at any time already in truth and untruth." (SZ, 294/285) Likewise, the speculative-cosmological notion of logos in fragment one of father Heracleitos was interpreted to mean simply the uncovering of beings in practical life. (SZ, 290/282) The concept of "truth" in Heracleitos and Parmenides was thus only "pre-phenomenologically understood" in a "pre-
philosophical understanding." (SZ, 290-291/282) The young Heidegger's project was that of demythologizing the grand metaphysical narratives of not only the Pre-Socratics, but also Husserl's transcendental ego and the God of speculative theological metaphysics. He wanted to avoid a "going to the dogs in the glossing work of mythical and theosophical metaphysics and mysticism" and in "religious ideology and phantasy." (PA, 70, 197) His new type of "story" was to be that of the concrete "hi-story" of factical life and a "natural concept of the world." (SZ, 68/76) In his 1921-22 lecture course, following Kierkegaard's reading of Socrates, he modeled his own critical stance to metaphysics on the Socratic understanding of philosophy as a "way of life," which he translated as "the enactment of my life." (PA, 50)

Heidegger also modeled his critique of metaphysics on the wider tradition of humanitas (paideia) in the ancient world inspired by Socrates and the sophists, i.e., ancient rhetoric, skepticism, and stoicism. What he was able to appreciate in these movements is their shared turn away from purely speculative and cosmological philosophy and their attempt to base philosophy in practical thought. In the following passage cited with approval by Luther, Seneca sees in philosophy an option between practical thought (Aristotle's phronesis) directed to the advantageous and science directed to what is known for its own sake: "Of necessities we are ignorant because we have learned unimportant and superfluous things. Indeed, we do not know what is advantageous and healthy because we have learned only the things that destroy us." (SZ, 185/178, 264/243) The ancient rhetorical tradition beginning with the sophists (Heidegger concerned himself primarily with Aristotle) lets the logos, reason and language, be seen precisely in the practical social world, where moods play a great role in the art of the orator. "Rhetoric is a first part of logic rightly understood." (GZ, 384/284)

In his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger was willing to call his own philosophy "skepticism," which is "also the end of philosophy," although he would perhaps have regarded ancient skepticism
as close to that type of "lazy and tired skepticism, empty skepticism, which never begins." (PA, 35, 197) The lecture course that he scheduled in 1922-23 was entitled Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy (Phenomenological Interpretations of Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, III).28 In his 1925-26 lecture course, he again appealed to the "ancient skepticism" of Gorgias and Sextus Empiricus, since, like modern psychologism, it made problematic precisely the relation (methexis) between the "absolute truth" of ideal meaning (Plato, Husserl) and the facticity of "living thought." (LW, 4, 52, 54, 92) "In his writing on not-being or on nature, Gorgias discusses three major theses in order. The first that nothing is, the second that, if something is, it would not be graspable for human being, and the third that, if it was graspable, it could not be expressed and made understandable to the others." (Sextus Empiricus) (LW, 19)30 Taking obvious liberties, one could say that ancient skepticism31 thematized (at least for the young Heidegger) the question of "being in and through" skepsis and aporia, searching and perplexity (literally, losing one's way). Ancient skepticism was an aletics and zetetics of being. It thematized the relational meaning and the enactment-meaning of the content of thought (being).

Thus we can see that for the young Heidegger there were real anti-metaphysical counter-traditions in Greek philosophy itself, the very birthplace and hotbed of metaphysics. We find in these first anti-metaphysicians, who seem to be speaking about questions similar to those of our own contemporary thought, perhaps the first exponents of the end of philosophy (e.g., Sextus' epoche) before the "end of philosophy," the first postmoderns before "postmodernism." Within obvious limits, the young Heidegger's modeled his own critique of metaphysics on these anti-metaphysical traditions in the ancient world, just as he had admired Luther's "destruction" of Aristotelian scholasticism. The Aristotle of the Metaphysics was to be overcome with the Aristotle of the Ethics and the Rhetoric, the speculative Plato was to be overcome with the practical Plato himself, and ancient philosophy in general was to
be overcome with ancient philosophy itself in the form of the humanistic tradition encompassing Socrates, the whole rhetorical tradition, skepticism, and the ancient ethical schools. If the young Heidegger was right, ancient metaphysics was, at least implicitly, already over at the very moment that it started. At least in the case of the Platonic Socrates and Aristotle's practical thought, what the young Heidegger attempted and accomplished was to bring to fruition the implicit other beginning here, to raise it up to the level of ontology, and to give it a philosophical language.

In his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger opened with a consideration of the fact that "the relationship of the present to Aristotle is determined in a threefold way." (PA, 3) He saw these three ways as the three major movements in the history of the "reception of Aristotle." The first reception of Aristotle that he discussed was the alienating interpretation in the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and in modern Neo-Kantianism. His attempt to critically bypass Aristotle's metaphysics and find the genuine Aristotle in his practical writings called also for a destruction of the traditional interpretation of Aristotle. The "high scholasticism of the Christian Middle Ages" positively evaluated "the Philosopher" from within "the view of life and culture determined through the Catholic-ecclesiastical confession." In reaction to this Aristotelian scholasticism, which focused primarily on Aristotle's theological metaphysics, Neo-Kantianism - which saw Kant as a critical epistemologist and as the "crusher" of the old metaphysics and empty speculation - read Aristotle epistemologically and therefore as a "naive philosopher" developing a "naive metaphysics," as a "realist" concerning the problem of the "external world." Neo-Kantianism here follows the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle, according to which he paradigmatically defined assertion as the locus of truth and defined truth as the correspondencia of judgment with its object (adequatio intellectus et rei). (LN, 128; SZ, 284-285/257-258) "Thus the first great and radically scientific man was fitted into the lineage of so-called obscuran-
tists." One "turned up one's nose at the mention of Aristotle's name." In turn, there arose an attempted "apology of Aristotle," which only made more explicit the transformation of Aristotle into a nineteenth century epistemologist: "Thus, for his part Aristotle turned into an 'epistemologist' and at the same time became an authority for the epistemological school of 'realism'" (against which Heidegger asserted that the "central problematic" lies in the logos of Aristotle's "'logic'" and that the correspondence theory of truth has no real basis in Aristotle's thought). The "groundless" character of both the Neo-Kantian and the realistic interpretations of Aristotle was due to the "errant presupposition that Aristotle might have even only the slightest to do with the Middle Ages and with Kant. However, it is the reverse that is true." (PA, 3–6)

According to Heidegger, the translation of the Greek terms into Latin, which took place with Cicero and scholasticism, seriously muffled the echo of the experience of factual life which had originally spoken and interpreted itself in the Greek terms. He writes:

A linguistic usage comes to us from a history and has grown at one time out of a specific experience. This history can fall into forgetfulness and the articulate tradition can break off. In slipping into a linguistic usage, there lies a peculiar familiarity with intellectual-spiritual history, a grasping of "tradition," and indeed the very special tradition of historical enactment; but at the same time the possibility of slipping out of the linguistic usage. (PA, 42, 49)

This loss of the birth certificates of the Greek terms in the original experiences was partly effected in the translation of ousia into essentia and substantia, which no longer expressed the reality of the "presence" of the practical world of the "household." (LN, 193; PA, 92) In the Latin translation of logos into ratio and in the modern academic term "logic," the "discourse" of the practical and social world no longer clearly speaks. (PA, 96; LW, 2) With the translation of aletheia into the Latin veritas, into the German Wahrheit, and into the English "truth," the original sense of "unconcealment" no longer speaks. (LN, 131) The
modern natural-scientific concept of "nature," which derives from the Latin translation of *physis* into *natura*, has left behind the meaning of *physis* as "world: the whole—stars, earth, plants, animals, men, gods" and as a dynamic "bringing forth." (PA, 91; LW, 1) In the translation of *ethos* into the Latin words *mos* and *habitus*, the original meaning of *ethos* as "home" and "dwelling place" no longer speaks. (IAw, 101) The translation and appropriation of the Greek word *philosophia* in Latin and in the modern European languages (e.g., the English "philosophy") resulted in the loss of the original understanding of *philosophia* from its intransitive stem *philosophein*, "to philosophize," which characterizes philosophy purely in terms of its relational meaning and its enactment-meaning as a *bios*, a "way of life." The modern usages of "studying philosophy" and "doing philosophy" (Philosophie treiben) "objectify" and "set off" philosophy in terms of content-meaning as "a cultural object, an object of education," an "extensively shaped doctrine," a "technique" (like that of "studying carpentry") that is taught in "the universities." (PA, 47-50) The Latin translations and real interpretations of the basic Greek terms were handed on from medieval thought into modern thought, where they became the well-worn coinage of philosophy.

If the young Heidegger could go behind scholasticism and modern Hegelian theology so as to find an "original Christianity," so he also attempted to go behind the hopeless anachronisms of the scholastic and Neo-Kantian picture of Aristotle so as to discover the "Ur-text" of an original and authentic Aristotle. Hence his special mention of the nineteenth century Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle's works and of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, which "for the very first time created an extensive and secure basis for effective philosophical research of Aristotle." (PA, 8) In his 1925-26 lecture course, he again stated that what was needed was a removal of the traditional picture of Aristotle and a return to "the decisive historical beginning of the problem of truth in western philosophy":
And indeed we will here concentrate on the genuine documents of the beginning of philosophical logic and allow ourselves as it were to present a collegium logicum from its founder Aristotle himself, free from the over-layings and encrustations of a bad tradition. (LN, 25)

...Greek linguistic usage can be played off against contemporary linguistic usage. (PA, 49)

Heidegger introduced his students in the first years not to the Metaphysics and the Physics, but to the Rhetoric and the practical philosophy, the Ethics. There he could demonstrate how the authentic Aristotle was something else than the Neo-scholastic system to which he was introduced by his theological studies.....what he could do was destroy, carry out a destruction of those layers of scholasticism and tradition through the centuries, and find the concreteness of life in the Greek conceptual works. 33

Heidegger’s view was that one should be not so much reading Aristotle from the point of view of scholastic concepts and of Neo-Kantian epistemological problems as rather reading these from the point of Aristotle, since they are not only built on the basis of Aristotle’s thought, but are at bottom “re-structurings” of certain aspects of his thought, namely, the metaphysical aspects. (PA, 6, 92) In his return to Aristotle, Heidegger was thus at the same time attempting to un-build the medieval and the modern “epochs” of philosophy back to "the first beginning" in Aristotle and Plato:

One excuses oneself from the very first beginning, that is, from coming to terms with one’s own past, with one’s own intellectual history (der geistesgeschichtlich historischen) - not in the sense of dishing out truths and falsities, of a superior critique (for which the Greeks give us not the least occasion), but rather in the radical tendency of understanding how, within what was in any sense at all initiated and preconceived, there arose what became Greek philosophy and as such continues expressly or covertly to be effective in the various re-structurings and concealments in contemporary spiritual Dasein. (PA, 170)

3. The Retrieval of Aristotle: Ethos, Phronesis, Kairos

The young Heidegger’s critical tracing of Aristotle’s metaphysics and the metaphysical tradition built on it back to the factical life of techne and phronesis made possible a radical and creative retrieval of this dimension of factical life dealt with in Aristotle’s practical writings. Just as he had uncovered behind scholasticism a very different understanding of being in the original Christianity of Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard,
so he also uncovered behind Aristotle's metaphysical writings and behind the traditional reading of Aristotle a different and non-metaphysical understanding of being in Aristotle's practical thought. He found this different understanding of being in Aristotle's notion of phronesis, which Aristotle refers to as an allos eidos gnoseos, an "other kind of knowing." (E.N., 1141b, 1142b) Likewise, Heidegger's whole approach to Aristotle and Plato (as well as Stoicism, skepticism, and rhetoric) operated with the assumption that there was an implicit 'other beginning' here, which was different than what in fact became the "first beginning" of western metaphysics:

...in [Greek philosophy] both motives of beginning are alive (original explication of experience and categorial theoretical explication)...the one was lost in the process of levelling off of the original (das Ursprüngliche). (cf. owsia, 'having', 'household', 'property') (PA, 92)

This was, as it were, an other thinking and an other beginning before the "other beginning" and "postmoderism." Heidegger attempted to retrieve this forgotten other beginning in Greek thought itself and apply it "kairologically-critically" to his own present philosophizing "here and now...at this place, in this lecture hall":

Corresponding to our position, the original position is again to be worked out anew, that is, corresponding to our altered historical situation, it is something different and yet the same. (HF, 76)

...we have a great deal of trouble in understanding the beginning, and...we have to apply all available living characteristics of facticity to the task of holding ourselves radically and insightfully at the beginning and, in remaining at this beginning, of grasping and preserving it in its how from out of our own concrete situation. (PA, 170)

Phenomenology radicalized in its ownmost possibility is nothing but the questioning of Plato and Aristotle brought back to life: the retrieval, the re-grasping of the beginning of our scientific philosophy. (GZ, 184/136)

Thus, in 1923, Heidegger could say that Aristotle was a model for his thought: "The model Aristotle was a companion in my search- ing...." (HF, 5)

This attempt "to bring the past to life again - into a future" (LN, 14) was, as Gadamer has said, at the same time
Heidegger's "almost magical skill of letting [the Greek] words speak again" in a new way and in the language of contemporary thought. Heidegger writes of his use of Plato's language:

We will place ourselves into a linguistic usage, such a one which is available to us and is somehow understandable for us. With the pregivenness of a linguistic usage a situation of understanding is activated. Let us be clear: with the understanding of the linguistic usage — even with an indefinite understanding that is, however, indeed fixed in its indicated tendency — a situation is indicated. Our ongoing interpretation will remain within this situation. Out of this situation, interpreting it, there will spring loose for us the formally indicating definition of philosophy. We want to pursue the linguistic usage itself, its immanent tendency of expression.... (PA, 42-43)

The remarkable power of intuition which Heidegger brought to his interpretations freed the Aristotelian Ur-text so profoundly and strikingly from the layers of the scholastic tradition and from the lamentably distorted image of Aristotle contained in the criticism of the time (Cohen loved to say, "Aristotle was an apothecary") that it began to speak in an unexpected way. As with his reading of original Christian authors such as Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, Heidegger's great philosophical accomplishment was that of providing the implicit question of being, end of philosophy, and other beginning in Socratic thought, Aristotle's practical writings, Stoicism, and skepticism with a philosophical language. In this way, the traditions of non-metaphysical thought in the ancient world, which had been played down alongside the mainstream tradition of metaphysics, would be given a real philosophical voice. In a sense, his philosophical retrieval of these counter-traditions was, as it were, an attempt "to find the word which is able to call one to [concrete historical praxis] and to preserve one [in this praxis]." As we shall see, the young Heidegger found this word, this philosophical language, to a great extent in Aristotle's method in his practical investigations, which he refers to as tupo legein, speaking in rough outline.

According to Gadamer, in Heidegger's early lectures, "the power of Aristotle, though an adversary, came to dominate him for a time," such that he allowed himself to express his own concerns in the language of Aristotle "almost to the point of
identification." His appropriation of Aristotle, in which Aristotle spoke like a contemporary and Heidegger spoke in Aristotelian language, became a model for Gadamer's notion of "hermeneutical fusion of horizons":

But one had to have sat in Heidegger's lecture hall in the early Marburg years in order to appreciate the extent to which Aristotle was present in Heidegger's thinking in those years.... Aristotle became so immediately present and so crowded in on one (wurde einem derart auf den Leib gerückt) that at times one lost all sense of distance.... the distinction of this early Aristotle interpretation lay in how it wiped away the alienating scholastic encrustation and became precisely a model of hermeneutical 'fusion of horizons', which let Aristotle speak and come to language like a contemporary.

...we no longer knew whether he was speaking about Aristotle's matter or speaking about his own matter. It was a great hermeneutic truth that we then began to experience personally and that I was later to justify in theory and to represent.

Gadamer thus calls the Heidegger he knew in the early 1920s "an Aristotelian," "an Aristotelian, redivivus." Aristotle became "an ally," "an evidential authority for access to 'the things themselves',' "a strangely up-to-date Aristotle," and "almost a forerunner of Heidegger's own thought." Heidegger approached Aristotle "with a critical intention, but at the same time in intense phenomenological renewal, destruction and construction in one." In his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger indeed said that his systematic analysis of human Dasein (what eventually became the book Being and Time) would be nothing apart from his creative retrieval of Aristotle:

So far as one has posited it and used it for itself (which runs counter to its intended meaning), this introduction [in phenomenological research] is not only the one half alongside the concrete interpretation of Aristotle as the other half, but rather without this interpretation it is absolutely nothing, at most a misunderstanding of philosophy. (PA, 112, 11)

Gadamer's notion of a "fusion of horizons" in Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle is perfectly expressed in Heidegger's own statement about Aristotle's thought that "corresponding to our altered historical situation, it is something different and yet the same." (HF, 76) One of the very first recognizable drafts of "Being
and Time," Heidegger's 1921-22 lecture course, bore the title *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle.*

The three intentional moments of Heidegger's being-question were presented as a retrieval of the corresponding elements in Aristotle's practical writings and *Physics.* The moment of "world" ("around-world," "with-world," and "self-world") was a retrieval of Aristotle's understanding of the technical world of the "household," the social world of the polis, and the personal self-having (*hexis*) of one's *ethos,* all of which are articulations of the end or "the for the sake of which" (*hous heneka*) of human praxis.\(^67\) The various elements of Heidegger's notion of relational meaning, i.e., "care," "understanding," "mood," "language," "truth," "interpretation," "choice," "falling," "the easy," "difficult," "the hyperbolic," "the elliptic," and the "fitting measure" were presented as retrievals of the corresponding Aristotelian themes of human praxis, i.e., "care" (*epimeleia*) and "striving" (* orexis*), "technical know-how" (*techne*) and "practical insight" (*phronesis*), "passion" (*pathos*), "language" (*logos*), "practical truth" (*aletheia praktike*), "choice" (*proairesis*), the "difficult," the "easy," "excess" (*hyperbole*), "deficiency" (*elleipsis*), and the "fitting mean."\(^48\) Heidegger's intentional moment of "enactment" or "temporalizing-meaning" was presented as a retrieval of Aristotle's understanding of human praxis as a kind of *physis* and "becoming," which is essentially characterized by a "movement" (*kinesis*) towards practical ends enacted within a present "situation" (*karios*).\(^49\) Likewise, Heidegger followed Aristotle's version of practical philosophy as an "outline" of the above-mentioned moments as "principles" (*archai*) or analogical structures of human praxis (analogy of proportion). This is what the young Heidegger called "formal indication" of the "principles" of factual life.\(^50\) He also called these principles the "archontic" "categories" or "existentials" of human life. (*PA, 50; AJ, 29*)

4. The Aristotle-Husserl Fusion

Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle was thus a fusion of horizons between, on the one hand, Aristotle's question of being
and his practical writings and, on the other hand, Heidegger's own attempt to rethink the question of being with the aid of both Husserl's sixth investigation (as read through Dlthey) and the original Christianity of Paul, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. Let us first examine the Aristotle-Husserl fusion.

According to Heidegger, a second "reception of Aristotle" determining our present relation to his thought is the "Aristotelian tradition" in nineteenth century that begins with Trendelenburg's writings on Aristotle, passes on to his student Brentano (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 1874), then to the latter's student Husserl (Logical Investigations, 1900-1901), and also (via Brentano) to the Neo-Kantians Windelband and Rickert, and to Trendelenburg's student Dilthey ("Ideas on a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," 1894), Bergson (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 1889) and William James (Principles of Psychology, 1890). What the young Heidegger saw as the guiding thread of this so-called "Aristotelian tradition" was the notion of intentionality, which Brentano took over from the scholastics, who in turn took over the basic idea from Aristotle:

intentio is a scholastic expression which means directing itself toward. Brentano speaks of the intentional inexistence of the object. Each lived experience directs itself toward something in a way which varies according to the distinctive character of the experience ....Brentano expressly emphasizes that Aristotle already made this point of view the basis for his treatment of psychic phenomena, and the scholastics took over this phenomenon of intentionality. (GZ, 26-27/20) Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sense object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. [Brentano]

Aristotle's De anima is not a psychologistic or subjectivistic psychology in the modern sense, since it sees human life as being directed in the first place and for the most part towards "what-lies-opposite" (ta antikeimena) (415a). Aristotle's investigation begins with the objects of thought (being) and only then moves back from here to a description of the various types of "being true" or "unconcealing," i.e., to the various ways in which "the soul is
[unconceals] all beings"54 (431b) or ways in which beings are "in the soul,"55 such as the modes of sense perceiving (aisthanesthai), imagination (phantasia), thinking (noein), practical thought (nous praktikos), and speech (logos). (cf. E.N., VI) The scholastic concept of "intention" (via Avicenna and other Arabic philosophers)56 and later Brentano’s concept of "intentionality" were based on this Aristotelian thesis that 'consciousness' is always in the first place a directedness to an immanent object, either a practical or a theoretical "striving" or "reaching towards" (orexis) something (what the scholastics referred to as actus exercitus, the immediate exercise of the act of knowing the object; and as prima intentio, first intention). (HF, 70; cf. Meta., 980a22; E.N., VI, 2)57 Consciousness is indeed non-reflectively directed to itself as aisthesis aisthesos and nous noeseos, as "perceiving of perceiving" and "thinking of thinking," but it becomes explicitly aware of itself, of its act of sensing or thinking, only in a second and higher level act (what the scholastics referred to as actus signatus, a signifying of the act; and as secunda intentio, second intention). Aristotle writes: "Sight is the sight of something." (Meta. 1021a) Voice, as opposed to mere sound, is always "along with the showing of something....[and] signifying." (De an., 420b; SZ, 44/58) "A statement is a saying of something about something." (430b) Logos is always "discourse about something."58 "It appears that knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding are always of an other, and of themselves only as a side-act (en parergo)." (Meta., XII, 9; cf. De an., 425b)58 According to Brentano, intentionality or "intentional in-existence" belongs to both of the two basic types of comportment that Aristotle specifies, i.e., "thought" (nous) (which includes not only "science," but also sense perception, imagination, memory, and expectation) and "desire" (orexis) (including not only philosophical and ethical desire, but also the "lowest drives, and along with them all feelings and affects").59 Brentano uses Aristotle’s term orexis to designate his own third class of "mental phenomena" designated by "the terms ‘emotion’, ‘interest’, or ‘love,’” i.e.,
"all mental phenomena not included in the first two classes" of "representation" and "judgment" (as Heidegger points out, the scholastic term *intentio*, to tend toward something, was more a translation of Aristotle's term *oraxis*, i.e., practical desire of or striving after [care] ethical ends [cf. "good intentions"] than a logical function). (HF, 70) Taking over the basically Aristotelian notion of intentionality, Brentano developed a "descriptive psychology" whose task was the "classification of psychic phenomena" (i.e., of the forms of intentionality: "representation," "judgment," and "interest" or "emotion"). His idea of a descriptive science of intentional consciousness exerted influence on Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Bergson, and James. But, according to Heidegger, it was taken over with the most rigor in Husserl's descriptive phenomenology of intentional consciousness in his *Logical Investigations* (Brentano had already characterized his science as "descriptive phenomenology"). "Under Brentano, Husserl saw the decisive matter and therefore went beyond him the most radically, whereas the others influenced by Brentano took up separate interpretations, pondered on the matter, but did not bring it to a genuine understanding, i.e., to a development which fostered the problem." (PA, 8-9)

What this "Aristotelian tradition" meant for the young Heidegger's fusion of horizons with Aristotle is that, in the first place, he could read the threefold structure of Husserl's notion of intentionality - the enactment of a true intention of something which is fulfilled through the "true-making thing" - as a rediscovery of the threefold structure of Greek thought in its notion of truth as *aletheuein* and *aletheia*, "unconcealing" and "unconcealment." In his 1925 lecture course, Heidegger asserted that "without being explicitly conscious of it, phenomenology returns to the broad concept of truth whereby the Greeks (Aristotle) could call true even perception as such and the simple perception of something." (GZ, 73/55) Later, he reported that "there [in the study of the *Logical Investigations*] I learned the one thing - at first led by a hunch than by founded insight: What gets enacted for the
phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of the phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as aletheia, as the unconcealment of what-is present, its being revealed, its showing itself." (SD, 87/79) In his analysis of Husserl's notion of intentionality as it is expressed in the title of his philosophy, "phenomenology," the young Heidegger pursued the "reference back" (BR, xi/x) to the Greek words logos (as apophainesthai, deloun, and aletheuein, letting be seen, making manifest, and unconcealing) and phainomenon, what shows itself: "Phenomenology is legein ta phainomena = apophainesthai ta phainomena - letting the manifest be seen from itself." (GZ, 117/85; HF, 67, 71; SZ, 46/58) Thus Heidegger could say that "Aristotle [was] really in De Anima phenomenological (without the explicit reduction)." He was even able to convince Husserl that "Aristotle (at least without the transcendental subject) was a true phenomenologist." In his De anima and Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes a basic distinction in the modes of truth between the "practical truth" ("what can be otherwise") of practical thought (nous praktikos) and the truth of "science" ("what cannot be otherwise") (nous theoretikos), which in the form of sophia is "first philosophy," metaphysics. (LN, 7-8) In light of this distinction, we can see that Heidegger's reading of Husserl from the vantage point of Aristotle accomplished two things. First, as we have already seen, he attempted to read the three moments of Husserl's notion of intentionality - i.e., logical meaning (what Husserl calls "eidos" and "noema"), the truth of theoretical being-directed-toward (what Husserl calls "noesis"), and the atemporal validity of meaning that is "made present" - as "re-structurings" of the metaphysical notion of truth in Plato and Aristotle, whose three moments are eidos, the aletheia of episteme and theorein (noein, logos apophantikos), and aei on (on hos alethes). (GZ, 90/66, 61/45, 102/75) In other words, the theoretical character of Husserl's notion of intentionality derives from the original and implicit concept of intentionality in Greek and especially Aristotelian thought. Heidegger saw Husserl as both a
"Platonist" and an "Aristotelian." Heidegger's attempt to see Husserl's phenomenology as a result of ancient thought was part of Heidegger's attempt to see the modern and medieval "epochs" in general as "re-structurings" of "the very first beginning." Second, Heidegger attempted to re-read and interpret the content-meaning, relational meaning, and enactment-meaning of Husserl's notion of intentionality from the vantage point of Aristotle's more concrete version of intentionality in his practical writings, where the three operative moments are ethos and polis (world), practical truth of phronesis (care), and kairos (kairological time). Aristotle's critique of the Platonic good was to be brought to bear on the "Platonism" of Husserl's own phenomenology. Thus, one can say that "Husserl is the Plato to Heidegger's Aristotle." Heidegger was to be radicalized by a return not only to Dilthey and Kierkegaard, but also to Aristotle.

In turn, Heidegger approached Aristotle's and also Plato's texts with the quasi-Aristotelian language of the three aspects of Husserl's notion of intentionality, i.e., intentional content, intentional relation, and the actual enactment or performance of the intentional relation. This meant two things. First, the three defining moments of Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics - "idea" or "category," "theory" and the logos apophantikos (aletheia), and "eternal being" - were analyzed with the corresponding Husserlian intentional language of "meaning," "intuition" and "expression" (truth), and "making present." Second, the three moments of the different understanding of being in Aristotle's practical writings and in Socratic thought - i.e., ethos and polis, praxis (aletheia praktike), and kairos - were analyzed with Heidegger's reformulation of the three moments of Husserl's notion of intentionality, i.e., with the terms "world," "care," and "enactment" or "temporalizing." (PA, 48-52, 112) In these two senses, the implicit concept of intentionality in Aristotle's thought was to be made explicit. It is also in these two senses that one can concur with Husserl's statement that Heidegger's early Aristotle interpretations were carried out from the point of view of the language and
the problems, which he had discovered in Husserl's own phenomenology. Heidegger himself reported later that his "growing familiarity with phenomenological seeing made fruitful the interpretation of Aristotle's writings...." (SD, 86/78)

5. The Aristotle-Original Christianity Fusion

Let us now examine the young Heidegger's Aristotle-original Christianity fusion. The third "reception of Aristotle" that, according to Heidegger, defines our present relation to Aristotle's past thought is Luther's critique of Aristotelian scholasticism. "Luther's religious and theological counterattack now took place against scholasticism, which had been consolidated through the reception of Aristotle.... What is at stake here is something decisive." (PA, 7) We have already seen that Luther's scathing "destruction" of Aristotle and the theology of glory of Aristotelian scholasticism was not a complete rejection of Aristotle, but rather also involved a positive appropriation of Aristotle. What Luther objected to was primarily, first, the misuse of Aristotle in that "the Philosopher," this "twice most holy one," had replaced the New Testament as the authority in the medieval university. Aristotle "teaches in place of Christ." "They have taken away our clothing and torn it up and... clothed us with Aristotle's Ethics instead of with the clothing of Christ." As we have seen, for Luther Aristotelian scholasticism was not only an distortion of original Christianity, but also of Aristotle. "It is very doubtful whether the Latins comprehended the correct meaning of Aristotle."70 Thus Luther can be seen as carrying out "a defense of Aristotle," of the "true Aristotle."71 Secondly, he objected to the doctrine of categories and essences and the conception of God in Aristotle's "icy" theological metaphysics because of its distance from and indifference to concrete life. Thus he could say that Aristotle was not too much a philosopher, but rather "for him too little a philosopher."72 As we have seen, for Luther the "best philosophers" are the ones who do not speculate about "stupid metaphysical questions" concerning "categories and essential determinations," but rather, like Paul and Seneca, "philosophize
and think about the world in another way than the philosophers and the metaphysicians," i.e., in terms of "the advantageous" (the practical good) in concrete life. Here, as I have maintained, there was an implicit call for an other beginning of philosophy.

Luther's retrieval of the non-scholastic "true Aristotle" bypassed the Metaphysics and aimed at the practical writings and the concepts of the Physics, which Aristotle also uses in his analysis of human becoming. Luther here reads Aristotle not so much from the Thomistic tradition as from the Augustinian-Bonaventurian tradition, in which he is more at home. Undoubtedly he saw something like an option in Aristotle between his metaphysics and his practical writings, which confined themselves to an analysis of strictly "human things." Here he could read Aristotle along with Cicero and Seneca. In this way, Aristotle could be of use for speaking about Luther's own concrete concerns. Luther even said that "Aristotle is the best teacher one can have in moral philosophy," and that his Politics is legitimate, especially since it does not "mix divine and human things in one another." He says that Aristotle "sketched out in the best way the essential characteristics of the state, the art of the administration of the state and of justice." Likewise, he appreciated Aristotle's logic, Rhetoric, and Poetics, because they provided training in the art of discourse and especially in "preaching." He himself did not hesitate to quote the Aristotle of the Physics and the Ethics as an authority in his elucidation of the concrete historical concerns of Christianity.

In Aristotle's critique of the Platonic idea of the good and of the sophists' claim to be able to teach virtue as a technique, Luther saw the Christian theme of the overcoming of the law and indeed his own critique of the legalism of the medieval Church and of "theology of glory." He saw an analogy between, on the one hand, Aristotle's turn to a concrete historical "ethos" that is constantly being re-enacted in a "situation" (kairos) and, on the other hand, the Christian turn toward the "spirit" (justification, faith as habitus) that is constantly being re-enacted and flowing into
"works" within a situation (kairos). "The tree determines the fruit, and not the reverse." "Aristotle explained how no work [i.e., ergon] can be good unless it originates from correct insight [i.e., phronesis] and a good will [i.e., ethos]....Therefore, even the philosophers conclude that prior to the good works the person must be good and insight correct before something can be done justly, and this view is irrefutable." "Aristotle's statement that every good work arises out of free choice (ex electione) is true in philosophy and contains a truth, which in another manner is only properly valid in theology, namely, that a good work presupposes a good will and correct judgment, both of which are to be sure meant as actuated (gewirkt) through faith."74 We have already seen how Luther saw this Christian theme in his non-scholastic reading of Aristotle's understanding of human praxis as a kind of physis, i.e., as a kinesis towards an end, which moves from the non-being of possibility to the being of actuality and remains related to its own possibility in the mode of repetition and renewal. We have also seen that Luther appropriated Aristotle's notions of phronesis (a term that already appears frequently in the New Testament), the mean between excess and deficiency, and kairos, as well as Aristotle's concept of "practical reason" in the form of the medieval notion of the "conscience" (synteresis). There is no clearer indication of Luther's sympathy for Aristotle's concept of phronesis than a certain passage in his Lectures on Genesis:

Aristotle has a very fine passage about epieikeia (equity, fairness, fittingness) in the fifth and most brilliant book of his Ethics. The government has been established to govern according to the rigor of the law, which it should by all means observe and uphold. Because there are innumerable occasions and countless dealings which, due to the diversity of circumstances, cannot all be included in a document and in laws, and few men see clearly where the law should be properly and prudently mitigated, for this reason Aristotle has pointed out the best way. Thus he also adapts a definition of virtue to it when he says: "Virtue is a self-having (hexis, habitus) regarding choice, consisting in holding to the mean relative to us (pros hemas), which is determined in a rule of thought and language and as the practically person (ho phronimos) would determine it. [It is a mean between two vices, that of excess and that of deficiency.]75
But that mean or moderation is subject to the passions. For this reason Aristotle adds the words "as a practically wise person" judges or determines, which judgment could not be comprehended in laws. Rather, there must be a living law, namely, the authority which is the soul of the law and should note carefully where and how the law can be kept and how to moderate it if some impossible case should present itself. \textit{epieikeia} \textit{[even]} breaks the law because of a sudden and unforeseen event. For this reason, the well-known rigor of monastic statutes and rules should by no means be approved. Without any reason or \textit{epieikeia}, the monks forbade to all the use of meats, baths, linen clothing, etc... This is what it means to act according to arithmetical proportion, where all are regarded as equal. The difference in the person must be observed. And Aristotle deals with these matters in a very fine way, when he writes about geometrical proportion and \textit{epieikeia}, equity. For this is a part of the grace which should have a place in authority, in the home and in the state. For virtue is a habitus consisting in a mean, as the practically wise person would determine it. \textit{We} become haughty and puffed up by the righteousness of the law.\textsuperscript{76}

Luther is in complete agreement with Aristotle about the role of ethos or habitus in human life, but where he differs is regarding the origin (grace) and the exact nature (faith) of this ethos or habitus.\textsuperscript{77} Luther writes in his Heidelberg Disputation: He is not justified who does much, but he who, without works, believes much in Christ. For the righteousness of God is not acquired by means of acts frequently repeated, as Aristotle taught, but is imparted through faith. \textit{I wish to have the words "without works" understood in the following way: not that the justified person does nothing, but that his works do not make him justified, rather that his righteousness creates works.} For grace and faith are imparted without works. After they have been imparted the works follow. (\textit{MD}, 360-361/55-56)

For Aristotle, ethos is acquired naturally through education in an ethical and political community and through habitation effected in the repetition of ethical acts. In line with his position on original sin, Luther sees habitus (faith, justification) as arising through the grace of God that is imparted in faith. The repetition of just acts preserves but does not create this habitus. But Luther was willing to use Aristotle to express the importance of the role of ethos and its enactment within situations, so long as one held on to the wider Christian context.

In his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger was also following Kierkegaard's appropriation of Aristotle, which, similar to Luther,
seized upon Aristotle's sharp distinction between metaphysics and ethical-political thought and his analysis of human praxis as a kind of physis and kinesis. Heidegger notes that Kierkegaard's interpretation of Aristotle was mediated through his "connection with Trendelenburg." (HF, 42) In his return to Aristotle, Trendelenburg had attempted to revive Aristotle's understanding of kinesis and criticize Hegel's failure to differentiate between dialectical or logical movement and the movement of concrete life. Kierkegaard followed Trendelenburg's revival of Aristotle in his own campaign against Hegelianism. Kierkegaard writes:

"...pure thought either abrogates motion altogether, or meaninglessly imports it into logic....The goal of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it....Abstract thought is disinterested, but for an existing individual, existence is the highest interest. An existing individual, therefore, has always a telos, and it is of this telos that Aristotle speaks when he says (De anima, III, 10, 2) that nous theoretikos differs from nous praktos to telei [in its end]...The transition from possibility to actuality, as Aristotle rightly expressed it, a kinesis, a movement....When existence gives to the movement the requisite time, and I reflect this in my representation, the leap stands revealed in the only way possible: either that it must come, or that it has been." 

In this passage, we find that Kierkegaard has translated his own existential concerns into the language of Aristotle. His notion of self-"interest" appears as Aristotle's notion of "striving" (orexis) towards oneself in the form of ethical "ends" (the "for the sake of which" of practical reason is praxis). The end of theoretical reason is not human life, however, but the objects of metaphysics and theology, that which is beyond man, the eternal ideas, the stars, and the divine. Kierkegaard's notion of the self as a constant movement of decision and repetition from one's futural possibility to one's present actuality in a situation (kairos) is expressed with Aristotle's own notion of human praxis as a kinesis or movement from possibility (dynamis) to actuality (energeia) towards an end within a situation (kairos), a movement which (unlike in the case of natural things) involves "practical reason," "choice" (proairesis) and acting "repeatedly" (anapalin). As we have already also seen, Kierkegaard's thought is
very much modeled on the Platonic Socrates as the supreme example of "subjective truth," i.e., truth as the relationship of content to the existing individual who chooses and enacts the content in his life.81

That Heidegger took up Luther's and Kierkegaard's critical appropriation of Aristotle is clear from the fact that, as already mentioned, he opened his 1920-21 lecture course on Aristotle with Luther's condemnation of "the blind heathen Master Aristotle" in his To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, that the "thanking acknowledgment of the sources" at the start of the manuscript presents four passages from Luther and Kierkegaard, that the introduction to the lecture courses discusses the "decisive" importance of Luther's relation to Aristotle, and that the introduction to his planned book on Aristotle opened with a discussion of not only Luther, but also the Old Testament, Paul, and Augustine. Moreover, is it merely an accident that, in his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger's decisive quotation from the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle is quoted only twice in the whole lecture course) is from the same passage on phronesis which, as we have seen above, Luther's quotes in his Commentary on Genesis, a text with which Heidegger was intimately familiar (Heidegger's and Luther's quotations are back to back in Aristotle's text)? Heidegger's 1923 lecture course opened with the confession: "Companions in my searching were the young Luther and the model Aristotle, who the former hated." A line from some jottings at the end of this lecture course tell everything: "Aristotle - New Testament - Augustine - Luther." (HF, 5, 106) Because of Heidegger's retrieval of Luther's critical appropriation of Aristotle, one could say that in a way the young Heidegger completed the young Luther's planned commentary on the Physics.82

Heidegger's destructive retrieval of Aristotle was thus a fusion of horizons between Aristotle's own texts and his absorption in the thought of Luther and Kierkegaard. For his reading of Aristotle, this meant, first, that Heidegger followed Luther's "destruction" of the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. Second,
he followed Luther’s and Kierkegaard’s “destruction” of Aristotle’s metaphysics and their discovery of a more existential Aristotle in his practical writings, who was being read from the point of view of Luther’s and Kierkegaard’s religious concerns and also Kierkegaard’s philosophical concerns about human existence in general. For Heidegger, this meant that the three moments of Aristotle’s practical thought — ethos and polis, phronesis (hermeneia), and kairos — were to be read from the point of view of the three moments of his own theological thought, i.e., world, care (hermeneutics, conscience, falling, etc.), and kairological time. Likewise, Heidegger’s reading of Plato was a radicalization of Kierkegaard’s appropriation of Socrates as an existential thinker. In his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger drew his definition of philosophy directly from a reading of passages from Plato’s Republic, Apology, Phaedo, Sophist, Statesman, and Protagoras. (PA, 42-52, 108) He presented the three intentional moments of his question of being as a retrieval of Socrates’ understanding of philosophy as directed towards “being” in the form the “principles” or “ideas” underlying the polis (content-meaning), as a way of “life” (bios) (relational meaning), and as an “order” (taxis) that is chosen and endured until death (enactment-meaning). Heidegger even indicates that Aristotle’s notion of phronesis can already be found in Plato. (PA, 108) He himself was also willing to be counted among the “friends of the forms.”

For Heidegger’s reading of Luther and Kierkegaard, the fusion of horizons meant, first, that Kierkegaard’s philosophical treatment of concrete and historical life could be given a more rigorous treatment by a systematic return to the origins of western philosophy in Aristotle. Second, the religious concerns of Luther and Kierkegaard, and indeed Heidegger’s own theological concerns, could be promoted indirectly through the philosophical language arising from a creative re-thinking of Aristotle, which made room for the concerns of concrete human existence. This is the reason why, as we have seen in his 1921 letter to Löwith, Heidegger suddenly switched from the direct pursuit of a “phenomenology of
religion" in his lecture courses to an intense confrontation with Aristotle. His return to Aristotle was to help him sort out the religious questions and overcome the unrest arising from his dissatisfaction with and rejection of the Aristotelian Neo-scholasticism of his earliest theological and philosophical education. If Aristotle had once supplied Thomas and others with the language and concepts for Christian theology, but an inappropriate theology, perhaps a different interpretation of "the authentic Aristotle" could be of help in working out a new beginning and a new language for theology. The young "theologian" Heidegger was to be the new Thomas Aquinas for Aristotle's practical writings. "His return to Aristotle was in the deepest sense the seeking for a more living self-understanding as a Christian." (Gadamer)

6. The End and Other Beginning of Ethics

The young Heidegger's attempt to think out the end of philosophy and an other philosophical beginning by returning to Aristotle's concepts of phronesis and kairos in the Nicomachean Ethics was to be of help not only for an other beginning in theology, but also for his project (taken over from Kierkegaard) of effecting a kind of end of ethics and other beginning for practical philosophy, of "'directing human being (the individual human being) to the ethical'" (Kierkegaard). (PA, 182) Indeed, in his 1927 Tübingen lecture, Heidegger said that Christianity is a form of "praxis" and theology is "essentially a practical science." (PT, 58/14) Heidegger understood his ontology as providing conceptual "formal indication" that could be concretized in the regional sciences of practical thought.

His destruction of traditional practical philosophy, his project of an end of ethics, was directed towards contemporary Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy of value and against Husserl's and Scheler's phenomenology of value. He saw these traditions as revivals of Plato's idea of the good. This revival begins with Lotze's struggle against positivism with his interpretation of the Platonic ideas as normative and teleological forms of "validity" and his further interpretation of these valid ideas in the context
of Fichte's reading of "the primacy of practical reason as 'value-experiencing' reason" in Kant. With Lotze, there comes about a "founding of logic in ethics." (PW, 136-139; LW, 62-79). In Windelband's and Rickert's Neo-Kantian philosophy of value, Lotze's idea of "the primacy of practical reason, the founding of theoretical and scientific thinking in practical belief and the will to truth," is made more explicit with the transformation of his notion of "validity" into the notion of "value." Kant's three critiques (logic, ethics, aesthetics) are interpreted as demarcating different spheres of "value" (the true, the good, the beautiful). Eventually, Kant's investigations into religion are also seen as demarcating the sphere of "the value of the sacred," so that God too becomes a value. The task of philosophy is to develop a self-enclosed system of values and a scientific world-view, which normatively and teleologically guides concrete scientific culture. Philosophy of value is also then "critical philosophy of culture," insofar it "evaluates the factual material of thinking [in the given sciences], of willing, and of feeling on the basis of the goals of universal and necessary validity." "Transcendental philosophy of value" is a "critical science of universally valid values." (Windelband) (PW, 143-147; LW, 79-83). Husserl's critique of psychologism was directed primarily at the psychologization of logic, but it also touched upon the psychologization of ethics. Here Husserl took over the Lotzean and Neo-Kantian notion of the ideal validity of values in order to show that "every ethics...presupposes a theoretical discipline, and that as the fundamental discipline of the normative science this theoretical discipline cannot be psychology; but rather, analogously to the way logic deals with the pure content of propositions, so must ethics treat the pure content of norms, i.e., values."85 Scheler's phenomenology of values then "took up this type of questioning and worked it out in the field of ethics, of practical philosophy, as a value-ethics." (LW, 52-53)86 Heidegger saw the three moments of the modern concept of "validity" or "value" - objectivity or universal application to all objects and actions (content-meaning), norm
atively and teleologically bindingness for all rationally judging subjects (relational meaning), and atemporal ideality (enactment-meaning) - as a modern transcendental restatement of the three moments of Plato's idea of the good, i.e., universal eidos (content-meaning), theoria and logos (relational meaning), and ousia and aeon (enactment-meaning). (LW, 81, 56-57, 67, 71-72, 77) He saw modern Neo-Kantian and phenomenological philosophy of value as "Platonism."

Heidegger's "critical-positive and phenomenological overcoming of philosophy of value," (PW, 141, 127) his critique of "absolute ethics," of an "absolute system of morality (Sittlichkeit), of ethical values that are valid in themselves" (PA, 184-185) turned Aristotle's critique of the Platonic good against this modern form of Platonism, which revived Plato's equation of phronesis and sophia, of metaphysics and ethics (for Plato, metaphysics is phronesis, practical wisdom). Regarding the Neo-Kantian and phenomenological "'couplets of opposition'' in the realm of practical philosophy - i.e., "real-ideal, sensuous-non-sensuous, being-validity, the historical-the ahistorical, the temporal-the atemporal" - Heidegger wanted to raise the question of the relation (methexis) between ideal values and the historicity of factual life. He saw philosophy of value as a "falling away" from the factual and situational character of human praxis and therefore as an expression of what Aristotle meant by "excess" in the sense of being out beyond ("the hyperbolic") and falling short ("deficiency," "the elliptic") of the mark of "the fitting measure" (das gebührende Mass), i.e., what is possible and required in the concrete situations of human praxis. (PA, 108-109, 103) "The ideality of values and the like, which are dressed up as atemporal and posited as eternally valid on some exalted throne, flutter about like phantoms." (PA, 111; IP, 97) These values are "the swindle of an aestheticizing intoxication." (PA, 111; AJ, 23) As such, the ethica gloriae of modern philosophy of value is ocular-aesthetic quietism ("making-it-easy-for-oneself," "tendency to security," "self-satisfaction," "presumption," "masking," "blind-
ing," "overlooking," "missing," "measuring wrongly," "ruinance"). (P4, 108-109, 120, 122) "The whole of modern philosophy, both ethically and Christianly, is based on easy-goingness....philosophy has created the illusion that human beings could, as one soberly says, speculate themselves out of their own good skin and into pure light." (Kierkegaard). (P4, 182) Heidegger also saw all other attempts to orient life in terms of fixed ethical and cultural meaning as "falling" away from the historical character of practical life: "On the basis of this predominance of the being-meaning of these objective forms of significance [of the around-world]...it becomes understandable that, in relation to its being-meaning, the self is easily experienced in objective significance (personality, ideal of humanity)...." (AJ, 34) Within limits, the young Heidegger's critique of practical philosophy, which took up Aristotle's critique of the Platonic idea of the good, already carried out his later and more systematic critique of western metaphysical humanism as a series of restatements of Plato's modeling of humanistic education (paideia) on the basis of the technical paradigm of ideas, a historical development that culminated in modern cybernetics, bio-technology, technocracy, and the drive toward technique in general.87

Heidegger attempted to un-build the three moments of the philosophy of value back to "living morality, i.e., in facticity" (P4, 104), as it had been seen and defended by Aristotle's critique of Plato in its diverse historical and situational character and thus in its independence from metaphysical ideas and axioms. The three intentional moments operative in Aristotle's understanding of "living morality," which Heidegger appropriated, are the factual ends given in one's ethos and polis (content-meaning); desire and mood (orexis, pathos), practical understanding (phronesis), and language (logos) (relational meaning); and the moment (kairos) in which these futural ends, given by past tradition, are applied to and enacted within a situation. Heidegger saw modern philosophy of value as a de-worlding, de-living, and de-historicization of these respective intentional moments. It was this falling away from
factual life that he wanted to see avoided in practical philosophy, as in theology. The following passage expresses well Heidegger’s indications for a “rehabilitation” (PA, 198) of practical philosophy along Aristotelian lines:

The question is how, from a kairological viewpoint within anxious concern, life as such announces itself (comes-forth) and may announce itself (come-forth)....Philosophy...takes seriously the right of life as it is encountered and how it is encountered....One can draw up an absolute system of morality (Sittlichkeit), of ethical values and relations of value that are valid in themselves and can thereby - I am not saying - be a bad person; this type of argument is here at first out of place. But with and through these absolute relations of validity and absolute laws, one can be blind precisely for objects and relations, which are accustomed to come-forth at a particular time in living morality, i.e., in facticity as the how of its possible being-meaning and enactment-meaning....Before all comfortable calculations of validity and objectivity for humanity stands the reflection on what one actually plans and intends (vorhat) and can intend, on the ways in which one has the enactment of this at one’s disposal; there exists further the fact that one holds oneself free from all wide-ranging exaggerations, with whose novelty one musters oneself to an exceptional paragraph on the highroad-Heinze - otherwise nothing. (PA, 137, 163-165, 84)  

Just as the young Heidegger wanted to keep philosophy, which is "atheistic," and theology separate (although the formal indication of philosophy could play an indirect role in theology), so he followed Aristotle’s separation of ethics-politics and metaphysics and thus sought to affirm "the intrinsic lawfulness of ethical-religious life that is independent of scientific theory" (Ebbinghaus). (PA, 198) "Philosophy is not art (poetry), not life-wisdom (giving of practical rules)." "As critical science, philosophy is not identical with a doctrine of world-view." (IP, 24, 10) For the young Heidegger, neither ontology nor practical philosophy can legislate a single ahistorical concept of the good, which is known by a privileged group of philosophers or others. There is no such thing as a philosopher-king, philosopher-prophet, speculative know-it-all, or world-historical Führer, who can rule the hoi polloi and choose the good for them. The following passages from Heidegger’s youthful writings have to be read against the backdrop of the sense of cultural crisis in Germany after the horrors of the First World
War, a time when Spengler’s *Decline of the West* was the book of the day. Here Heidegger renounces prophetic universal solutions and Führers, philosophical or otherwise, with such visions:

Where they speak of the university, [these investigations] stand in principle outside of the discussions on the goal and ways, on the necessity or the superfluousness of the so-called university reform. ... The discussions about reform overlook the question of competence and forget the question about the suitable time. For us, it is a matter of philosophically seeing the actual situation without prophets and the affectations of Führers. (One writes today about the Führer-problem!) ... And if we "go into decline," then there stands before us again only either...radical existential concern, or: going to the dogs in the glossing work of mythical and theosophical metaphysics and mysticism and in the dream-condition of busying oneself with piety.... (PA, 69-70)

[Philosophy] guards precisely against one’s preaching about philosophy from some superior but non-specifiable place, as if philosophy could speak for coming cultural periods and destinies of humanity, such that one does not know who speaks for who and what, and what is the point of these prophecies and schools of wisdom, and who has assigned them such cultural missions. (PA, 68)

The enraptured (schwärmereische) intention towards a fundamental decision is seductive and tempting (one seeks what philosophy is supposed to ‘give’ as a wrong-headed historical ‘salvation’ [Heil]).... (PA, 36)

According to Heidegger, phenomenological ontology can provide only "formal indication" or "hermeneutical concepts" of human existence which can be interpretively concretized in the practical disciplines. In turn, these practical disciplines can provide for actual praxis only what Aristotle called a "rough outline" of practical life, what Kierkegaard called the "indirect communication" of the ethical sphere of life, and what Heidegger himself called "formal indication," which can help praxis to aim in a rough fashion and has to be interpretively concretized in the historical situation of one’s own existence. In this way, philosophy can be and has to be of help to ethical-political thought and actual praxis, but it cannot usurp their role and autonomy. Thus, philosophy is "neither sport nor prophetic pageantry that brings world-historical salvation." (AJ, 6) By providing only a "rough outline" of human existence, it "attains non-interference in personal decision and so frees the individual for his self-reflec-
tion," (AJ, 42, 8) which is a matter of "conscience." (AJ, 33; PT, 56/13) In the spirit of Aristotle and Kierkegaard, Heidegger's *ethica crucis* meant not "making it easier" for practical life by taking away its self-responsibility and providing it with techniques in philosophy courses and books, but precisely "making it more difficult" by putting ethical praxis back into the original "difficulty" of its enactment within factical life of the individual. (PA, 108, 37; PT, 56/12) In Aristotle's "rough outline" of ethical life and also in Kierkegaard's "indirect communication" about the ethical stage of human existence, Heidegger sought, as it were, "to find the word which is able to call one to [ethical praxis] and to preserve one [in this praxis]." Heidegger did not himself follow up his indications for rethinking practical philosophy, but rather, as in the case of his interest in finding a new theological language, left this to others (e.g., Arendt, Gadamer).

7. The Aristotle Book

Heidegger's critical appropriation of Aristotle was to have been presented in a "large and fundamental work on Aristotle," which in 1922 he had planned to publish in Husserl's *Jahrbuch* in the following year. It was to be called *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* and was to be the fruit of his teaching over the past three years. In the autumn of 1922 he wrote up what was to be the introduction to the book, a forty-page essay entitled "The Hermeneutical Situation." It was sent to Paul Natorp in Marburg who at that time was considering Heidegger for a chair of philosophy, a situation leading to the essay being referred to as the famous "Natorp essay." Natorp was greatly impressed by the originality and depth of the forty page introduction, calling it "absolutely astonishing," and offered Heidegger the teaching position in Marburg to a great extent on the basis of this introduction. Szilasi has called the introduction "one of the best things Heidegger wrote." Gadamer, to whom Natorp's copy (with "innumerable handwritten additions") was passed on but later lost along with Heidegger's letters to Gadamer in the bombing of
Leipzig, reports four points about the contents of Heidegger’s planned book and the introduction in particular, which he says effected him “like an electric shock.”

First, the introduction attempted a “working out of the hermeneutical situation: it tried to bring to awareness the questions and the intellectual resistance with which we confront Aristotle, the master of the tradition.” Second, the scope was “extensive” and the introduction covered not only Aristotle, but also “the young Luther, Gabriel Biel and Peter Lombard, Augustine and Paul” and the “Old Testament.” Third, in the introduction, “a highly unusual language was being spoken...it talked about the ‘for-which’ (Wozu), the ‘on-the-basis-of-which’ (Woraufhin), ‘pre-conception’ (Vorgriff), and ‘grasping-through’ (Durchgriff).”

Four, in a letter to Gadamer in 1922, Heidegger outlined the plan for his large work on Aristotle:

The first part (approx. 15 sheets) will concern Eth. Nic. Z, Meta. A, 1, 2 and Phys. A, 8; the second (the same size) will concern Meta. Z, H, Theta, De mot. an., and De anima. The third part will appear later. Since the yearbook will be printed only later, I can certainly provide you with a separate copy.

It is not difficult to see that what Heidegger was attempting to accomplish here was a reading of Aristotle’s texts from the point of view of his language of the three intentional moments of being-meaning. The first part of the book was to have examined both Aristotle’s understanding of the content-meaning of the question of being in terms of the “principles and causes” (especially the “for the sake of which,” the “end”) of beings as phusei onta, natural beings, (Meta. A, 1, 2; Phys. A, 8) and also his understanding of the relational meaning of being-meaning as the kinds of “being true” or “unconcealing” of these principles and causes (especially in techne and phronesis) (Eth. Nic. Z). The second part of his book was to examine Aristotle’s implicit understanding of the enactment or temporalizing meaning of being-meaning in terms of being as “unconcealment,” physis, and movement (kinesis) (Meta. Z, H, Theta), which is accomplished in the specific kinesis of human praxis, which is always a movement towards its “telos” or “for the
sake of which" in a concrete and temporal situation (kairos) (De mot. an, De anima). The third part of the book was perhaps to have spelled out Heidegger's own more systematic philosophy arising from his retrieval of Aristotle.

This threefold direction of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle is confirmed by the manuscript of Heidegger's 1921-22 lecture course. The loose pages which the editors found at the end of the manuscript indicate that Heidegger had intended to work it up (probably together with his 1922 lecture course on Aristotle, which was a continuation of the 1921-22 course) into a book, presumably the one he planned to publish in the 1923 edition of Husserl's yearbook. (PA, 190-195) The two lecture courses and the planned book on Aristotle all bore the same major title of "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle." Not only do the introductions to his 1921-22 lecture course and his planned book deal with the same material, i.e., "the hermeneutical situation" (PA, 3) for re-interpreting Aristotle, but also the lecture course indicates the same threefold direction of the interpretation of Aristotle that the plan for the book does. The following is Heidegger's plan for his interpretation of Aristotle's texts given in his lecture course, but not actually carried out there:

Up to this point in the introduction, the three groups of problems have also already come to language in a more or less determinate manner, which will occupy us in the interpretation of Aristotle: principal knowing, which in its enactment concerns (betrifft) its own facticity. For the purpose of a schematic orientation, the following can be singled out:

1. The problem of the principle and the principal (arche - aition) [i.e., content-meaning];
2. The problem of grasping determining and conceptual articulating (logos) [relational meaning];
3. The problem of beings (das Seiende) and of being-meaning (Seinssinn) (on - ousia - kinesis - physis) [enactment-meaning]. (PA, 112)

The following is Heidegger's Platonic draft of the question of being, which is given in the same lecture course:

I. philosophia [philosophy]....the way towards being as such [in the polis].... [Republic, 521c]
II. philosophos [the philosopher]...(appropriating) each thing as being (according to its being).... [480]
III. *philosophin* [philosophizing]...living philosophically...the enactment of my life. [*Apology*, 28d, e] (*PA*, 49-50; cf. *HF*, 42-43)

However, Heidegger's book on Aristotle did not appear. After the introduction to the planned book got Heidegger the chair of philosophy at Marburg, he took on new tasks and waited until 1927 to gather up his researches into book form, although as late as 1925 he still intended to publish the book on Aristotle.105 Only Heidegger's own copy of the introduction that he kept for himself (without his numerous handwritten additions) is extant. Of the original forty pages of the introduction, only twenty-two pages still survive. These fragments may be published before the turn of the century as an appendix to Heidegger's forthcoming 1922 lecture course on Aristotle (*GA*, 62).106

8. Self-Overcoming

We can see, then, how radical the young Heidegger's "transformed Aristotle-understanding" in the early twenties really was, since it was also very much a radical self-overcoming of his earlier thought. In his doctoral dissertation and in his habilitation writing, he had followed precisely the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle in terms of the doctrine of categories, which he had learned in his early Catholic theological education, in Brentano's *On the manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle*, and in Braig's *On Being: An Outline of Ontology*. He had also followed the epistemological and logical interpretation of Aristotle given in Neo-Kantianism (the doctrine of judgment, the doctrine of categories), which he had learned from Windelband, Trendelenburg, and Lask. In his 1921-22 course on Aristotle, Heidegger turned decisively against both these traditional interpretations of Aristotle, reading Aristotle now more from the point of view of Luther and Kierkegaard. Here he ridiculed the reading of Aristotle as an epistemological "realist" that had been given by the contemporary school of realism, but in his early essay "The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy" he had himself taken over this very same reading from the realist Külle. (*GA* 1, 1) It was "a very different Aristotle than that Aristotle which Heidegger had become familiar
with in his studies of Catholic theology in those years." In 1923, he said that his ontology did not have anything to do with the ontology of "Neo-scholasticism" or "phenomenological scholasticism." (HF, 1) In 1926, he said that the distinguishing mark of Brentano's book on Aristotle's being-question was how it interpreted Aristotle from the standpoint of medieval thought and especially Aquinas, "which is not to say that this is really the way to understand Aristotle. On the contrary, through this kind of interpretation Aristotle undergoes a change of meaning in his essential features." (GZ, 23/19-20) As we have also seen, the later Heidegger referred back to this earliest interpretation of Aristotle as "onto-logic."

In his earliest writings, Heidegger had prescribed also to the "Platonism" of Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy of value, which culminated in his own version of Plato's idea of the good in the conclusion to his habilitation writing, i.e., a speculative and teleological ontotheology which affirmed the "absolute spirit of God" in terms of "absolute validity" and the "universal validity and the existing-in-itself of meaning." In his 1926 lecture course, he in fact referred to his habilitation writing as standing within Lotze's modern revival of Plato's doctrine of ideas. (LW, 64) As we have seen, the later Heidegger saw his early appropriation of Neo-Kantian philosophy of value as standing in the history of Platonism. After 1919, Heidegger began reading Plato rather from the standpoint of especially Kierkegaard.

His transformed understanding of Aristotle and Plato represents, then, a real re-decision of the ontological option that he had posed in his earliest writings between "the couplets of opposition" "real-ideal...the historical-the ahistorical, the temporal-the atemporal." For he now appeals not only to the practical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, but also to ancient skepticism, rhetoric, and the Socratic ethical schools, i.e., precisely to those traditions that he had lumped together with psychologism and completely rejected as leading to mere skepticism, relativism, and anthropomorphism. The young Heidegger's appeal to
Plato's theme of killing one's philosophical fathers and demythologizing their metaphysical story-telling thus fits well his own critical relationship to the very earliest models of his thought, i.e., a scholastic and Neo-Kantian Aristotle, a Neo-Kantian Plato, and, as we have seen, also Husserl's logical phenomenology and the speculative theological metaphysics of Neo-Hegelianism. It was not only Dilthey, Luther, and Kierkegaard who helped Heidegger overcome these earliest philosophical authorities, but also Aristotle's own critique of the Platonic idea of the good, his notion of phronesis, and even the Socratic-Platonic critique of the mythic story-telling of the early Greek thinkers.

9. The Later Distantiation

In one of its original forms, Heidegger's treatment of his question of "Being and Time" was to have been a large book on Aristotle entitled Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, which was to have been published in Husserl's yearbook. When instead of this 1923 book on Aristotle, his Being and Time appeared four years later in Husserl's yearbook, it showed that he had already distanced himself from his youthful fusion of horizons with Aristotle and Plato. He "was surprisingly discrete as far as his debt towards Aristotle was concerned." Whereas Heidegger had presented some of his earliest drafts of "Being and Time" as "phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle," his 1927 Being and Time presented these interpretations in very abbreviated form and no longer "in the original detail and fullness." His original appropriation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics was reduced to a couple of sentences referring to the Greek concept of praxis (SZ, 92/97) and two references to Book VI in his discussion of the Greek concept of aletheia (SZ, 43, n. 1, 288, n. 23/56, n. iv, 288, n. xlii), his approximately seventy-page analysis of the concept of aletheia in Aristotle's On Interpretation and other writings which he gave in his 1925-26 course was reduced to approximately twenty-five pages. (SZ, 43-46/55-58, 282-305/256-273) His 1924 lecture course on Aristotle's Rhetoric was reduced to approximately fifteen pages. (SZ, 184-189/178-182, 449-457/389-396) Likewise, his 1924-25
lecture course on Plato’s *Sophist* survived only in the form of a motto to *Being and Time* and a half-page discussion of Plato’s notion of *logos* as always “speech about something.” *(SZ, 1, 211/19, 201)*

What lay behind Heidegger’s distancing from Aristotle and Plato was his turn to Kant as his new “model.” As we have already noted, in his 1925-26 lecture course on the notions of truth and being (a time when he still planned to publish his book on Aristotle), he dramatically switched over in mid-stream to a treatment of Kant’s doctrine of schematism. Whereas in the original plan of this course and in his 1925 course he had dealt with the concepts of care and time in dialogue with Aristotle’s concepts of *phronesis* as self-directed praxis and of praxis as movement (*kinesis*) towards an end (*hou heneka*) that is realized and concretized in the present situation (*kairos*), the second and new part of the 1926 course thought out these concepts by means of a reference to Kant’s thesis that “man is an end in himself” and to his doctrine of schematism. *(LN, 147, 235, 220)*

Heidegger’s Kantian self-interpretation is also evident in the text called *Being and Time* that was patched together quickly in 1926 out of old and new material. His analysis of practical being-in-the-world in Division One derives primarily from his earlier preoccupation with Aristotle’s practical philosophy and Christian authors (he refers back to his lecture courses from 1919 onwards). *(SZ, 97, n. 1/102, n. i)* But the introduction, which was written last, centers the entire study on the necessity of coming to terms with Kant’s transcendental analysis of the temporal character of subjectivity. In Division Two on the concept of time, he first presents the analyses of time in terms of the concepts of being-towards-death, resoluteness, conscience, guilt, and the situation, which derive from his earlier preoccupation with Aristotle and Christian authors (he refers back to his 1924 talk “The Concept of Time”) *(SZ, 356, n. 3/313, n. iii)*, but then gives another analysis of time in terms of Kant’s notion of temporal schemata and finally turns to an analysis of history by means of a dialogue with Dilthey and Yorck. Division Three of Part One on
"Time and Being" and the whole of Part Two on the destruction of the history of ontology were never published, since Heidegger could not reconcile his new quasi-Kantian language of transcendental subjectivity and transcendental structures with his older themes of the radical finitude and historicity of factual life. Thus, one can speak of a "transformation of the understanding of Plato and Aristotle in the 'Marburg Heidegger', as it emerges with his re-adoption of the transcendental manner of questioning." The summarizing indications [of the introduction to Heidegger’s 1922-23 book on Aristotle], which gave a picture of Aristotle that deviated completely from the usual one, were later carried out, but not in the same vein, despite Heidegger’s prevailing intentions at that time. Being and Time, the genuine execution, intervened. But most of the Natorp essay was able to lead the way for the steps that were carried out afterwards.

In the 1930s, Heidegger then distanced himself even further from his youthful fusion of horizons with Aristotle and Plato. As with his youthful theological concerns, his philosophical and ethical concerns now followed not only Hölderlin’s and Nietzsche’s experience of "the death of God," but also their theme of the death of man and humanitas, the humanistic tradition of ethical-political thought and culture, and the onset of a cultural and religious world—"night" (Hölderlin) and "nihilism" (Nietzsche). He came to characterize modern culture as suffering from the "forgetfulness of being" and therefore "homelessness" and "homesickness" ("nostalgia"). "Homelessness" is a literal translation of the Greek word aetheia, "being without a (ethical-political) being-at-home," "being without ethical-political character." He saw modern culture and even the whole of history of western humanism from Plato and Aristotle to modern liberal democracy as being characterized either covertly or overtly by a daemonic and uncanny "will to power" of "technology" and subjectivism (cf. Aristotle’s notion of deinotes, technical cleverness, which is unheimlich, strange, terrible [deinos], since it is not in the service of the ends of a shared ethical-political being-at-home [ethos] in which humans are at home.
with each other, but rather tends in the direction of the non-
humanity of the animal and the god who are outside of ethical-
political community). The later Heidegger’s anti-humanism thus
turned against the ancient tradition of humanitas (the Platonic-
Socrates, Aristotle’s practical philosophy, rhetoric, stoicism,
skepticism) and also against the modern humanistic tendencies in
Pascal and Kierkegaard, with which he had previously identified. 118

Whereas the young Heidegger had given no priority to the
Pre-Socratic thinkers and in fact had very little to say about them
(they were de-mythologized back into the practical life-world), the
later Heidegger’s destruction of Aristotle’s metaphysics and the
Greek epoch of metaphysics as a whole no longer destructively
traced these back into the themes of Aristotle’s practical writ-
ings, but rather traced them back into the themes of being and
ethos in the mytho-poetic traditions of Pre-Socratic thought and
tragic poetry. Aristotle’s and Plato’s thought was now seen as a
falling away from a more original understanding of being and ethos
in the early Greek thinkers and tragedians. Aristotle and Plato
were assigned to the history of the forgetfulness of being (N 2,
399-410; WM, 203-238), which Heidegger thought had effectively
began after the end of Pre-Socratic thought. Regarding Aristotle’s
and Plato’s practical philosophy, Heidegger wrote in his "Letter on
Humanism" that Heracleitos’s saying that "the (familiar) abode is
for man the open region for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar
one)" (ethos anthropoi daimon) and "the tragedies of Sophocles-
provided such a comparison is at all permissible - preserve the
ethos in their sagas more primordially than Aristotle’s lectures on
‘ethics’." (WH, 354/232; cf. GA 55, 227) But in his 1919 lecture
course the young Heidegger had been willing to see Sophocles
Antigone in the light of the "life-world" of techne and praxis, and
in his lecture courses on Aristotle he had been willing to see the
genuine meaning of polis and ethos as the concrete communal life-
world as it was analyzed in Aristotle’s practical thought. (IP, 74)
Heidegger’s later writings thus display a curious reversal, which
consists in the fact that, whereas the young Heidegger had traced
the mytho-poetic thought of the Pre-Socratics and the speculative thought of Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics back into the practical, everyday life-world, as it was analyzed by Aristotle’s practical writings, Dilthey, and Kierkegaard, the later Heidegger traced Aristotle’s analyses of this practical life-world back to the mytho-poetic thought of the early Greek thinkers. The practical onto-anthropological meaning of such concepts as physis, logos, aletheia, and to on (being) were traced back to their speculative cosmological meaning in early Greek thinking. Whereas the young Heidegger thought that the “fundamental book” of western thought was the Nicomachean Ethics, along with the De anima, the later Heidegger stated that the “Aristotle’s Physics is...the fundamental book of western philosophy,” since it preserves an “echo” of the original understanding of being as physis in early Greek thinking. (WH, 242/224) Likewise, whereas in his 1923 lecture course Heidegger had de-mythologized Plato’s statement in the Ion that poets are “interpreters of the gods,” such that “interpretation” now meant primarily the activity of everyday practical life (HF, 9), the later Heidegger quoted this same passage from Plato, but now followed its more literal meaning and used it as a basis for his own definition of interpretation as “the bearing of message and tidings,” “the message of unconcealment of the two-fold.” (US, 115/28, 145/53) In his later marginal notes to his Being and Time, the later Heidegger re-interpreted his earlier reading of Greek texts in terms of practical life, so that now these texts pointed more in the direction of his later preoccupation with the speculative cosmological thought of the Pre-Socratics. (SZ, 177, 219, 295) All this amounted to a certain re-mythologization of Heidegger’s question of being, in that he took over to a great extent the language of the Pre-Socratics for his attempt to think “being in and through life.”

The later Heidegger did continue to perform retrievals of Aristotle’s and Plato’s thought, even though he published only a single essay devoted to Aristotle. He even told his students that “it is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading
Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years." (WD, 70/73) But these later retrievals were not so much appropriations of the understanding of being in Aristotle's practical writings (e.g., the everyday work-world and the ethical world \([ta\ anthropina]\) behind the notions of \textit{physis} and \textit{logos}) as rather appropriations of the "echo" of Pre-Socratic cosmology in Aristotle's and Plato's notions of \textit{physis} and \textit{aletheia} (e.g., Heraclitus's understanding of \textit{physis} as the "emergence" into presence of being and \textit{logos} as the "gathering" of beings in being). (WH, 242/224) His retrieval of Aristotle and Greek philosophy was no longer pursued in the direction of his youthful existential and phenomenological ontology, but rather culminated in his later Neo-Hellenic mytho-poetic draft of "Being and Time," which translated ethos and polis as the practical and communal life-world (content-meaning) into ethos as the "fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals" and as the "there" of the "truth of being"; praxis and \textit{techne} as being-in-the-world (relational meaning) into "poetic dwelling"; and \textit{kinesis} and \textit{kairos} as the temporalizing of factual life (enactment-meaning) into the world-historical "event" and "destiny of being."

Likewise, his later retrieval of practical philosophy was no longer pursued along the lines of Aristotle's practical writings and Kierkegaard's ethical thought, but rather followed Hölderlin's and Nietzsche's theme that, since the traditional western ethos was dead, one had to go back to the mytho-poetic ethos of the Pre-Socratics and the Greek tragedians and look for a new birth of ethos through a creative revival of these traditions. Thus, the later Heidegger's "original ethics" attempted to think out the possibility of a futural "homecoming" sometime after the modern epochal reign of technological homelessness through a meditation on Heraclitus's saying that "ethos is the divine" and also even on Plato's attempt in the \textit{Republic} to determine the foundations of the polis by way of a reflection on being (the ideas). Just as the later Heidegger tended to collapse the distinction between philosophy and theology, he also tended to collapse together what he,
following Aristotle’s critique of the universal Platonic good, had earlier attempted to keep apart—namely, ontology (metaphysics) and ethics-politics.\textsuperscript{121} Apparently, the later Heidegger no longer saw ontology as limited to providing only a “rough outline” or “formal indication” that is “indirectly communicated” to practical philosophy and further to concrete ethical-political decision-making in concrete situations (the individual “conscience”), but rather had moved to the position that “that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of man, as one who eixists, is in itself original ethics.” “Nomos is not only law but more originally the assignment contained in the mittence of being.” (\textit{M&W}, 356/235, 361/239)\textsuperscript{122} Whereas the young Heidegger had spoken against the direct role of the philosopher in the politics of “university reform” and against philosophy as world-historical “preaching” and “prophetic pageantry that brings world-historical salvation,” “cultural missions,” “destinies of humanity,” and “prophecies,” the later Heidegger saw himself as the philosophical-political Führer of National Socialism who could reform not only the German universities in line with the world-historical “destiny” of Western thought, but also the whole of modern western culture. That is, he returned in a sense to Plato’s notion of a universal good, which, in Heidegger’s version, is also known by a privileged group of philosophers, poets, and statesman (and also nations, i.e., ancient Greece and Germany versus America, Russia, etc.), except that now in Heidegger’s post-metaphysical version the universality of the good is seen not as completely unchanging, but as changing from one world-historical epoch to the next. Heidegger epochalized Plato’s idea of the good. Here he was also to an extent following Hegel’s speculative turn from “objective spirit” (social world) to “absolute spirit,” which sees ethos and the state as a product of the historical unfolding of absolute spirit.\textsuperscript{123} In his 1942-43 lecture course, he even followed Plato’s thesis that “\textit{phronesis} [practical wisdom] is philosophy.”\textsuperscript{124} (\textit{GA} 54, 178)\textsuperscript{125}

Heidegger’s youthful concern with the indirect relation between ontology and practical philosophy was displaced by his
Later concern for the relation between the philosophical "thinker" of being and the "statesman," who does not bring to presence and install being in the poetic word that names the "holy" (the poet), but rather brings being to presence and installs it in the polis and ethos as the epochal "there" and world-historical "truth" of being. (EM, 68/62, 161/152, 200/191; HW, 49/56) What led him to his tragic involvement in National Socialism was his view, as philosophical Führer, that the Führer Hitler represented the statesman who could help bring Germany to realize its privileged world-historical destiny among nations that was allotted to it in the history of being. 128 He joined the National Socialist movement and supported Hitler in the same way that Plato went to Syracuse in order to inspire the local tyrant to produce a state on the basis of Plato's theory of ideas. Like his notion of ontology as "ethics," Heidegger's view of the practical philosopher and the statesman as world-historical prophet contradicts his earlier Aristotelian, Kierkegaardian, and also Lutheran position that practical thought cannot legislate a universal idea of the good (whether epochal or eternal) from a position of superiority, but can only be of help by providing a "rough outline" that is "indirectly communicated" to individuals who must interpret the good in their own situations and according to their own "conscience." 127 Indeed, the later Heidegger wrote that "the Führer himself and he alone is German reality and its law, today and forever" and that "the individual, wherever he stands, counts for nothing. The fate of our people in their State is everything." 128 In his later account of his association with National Socialism, Heidegger stated that he was still "not convinced that it is democracy" which is the best political system for modern times and that he still believed that "democracy...the system of constitutionally guaranteed citizens' rights" were only "half-way measures, because I do not see in them any actual confrontation with the world of technicity." 129 Presumably, Heidegger continued to look to philosophical, poetical (religious), and political Führers, i.e., autocrats who rule the people because they are ruled by law of the
truth of being. It is nothing short of amazing that whereas the young Heidegger had spoken passionately against "prophets and the affectations of Führers," the later Heidegger directly supported the Führer Hitler and even saw himself as a quasi-Platonic philosopher-king and philosopher-Führer. From the standpoint of his youthful attempt to rehabilitate practical philosophy along the lines of Aristotle and Kierkegaard, his later position appears as an epochalized form of "absolute ethics" and ethica gloriae.

What has been called the later Heidegger's "anti-humanism" left behind his youthful indications for the rehabilitation of practical philosophy along the lines of Aristotle and Kierkegaard, bypassing the whole western tradition of ethical-political humanitas and pursuing practical philosophy only on an elevated speculative level of his mytho-poetic version of the question of being. He discouraged all attempts to pursue concrete and detailed analyses of and programs for ethical-political action in the modern context of technology, since he saw these efforts (e.g. liberal democracy) as expressions of technology as the "destiny of being." He believed that the proper response is rather that of a nostalgic meditation on the early Greek thinking and poetry and an openness and waiting of philosophy and poetry for a new epoch of being and the birth of a new "god." "Only a god can save us".

Spiegel [the interviewer]: Fine. Now the question naturally arises: Can the individual man in any way still influence this web of fateful circumstance? Or, indeed, can philosophy influence it?...Heidegger:...philosophy will be unable to effect any immediate change in the current state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all purely human reflection and endeavour. Only a god can save us. The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god....At best we can awaken a readiness to wait.

The later Heidegger's nostalgia (literally, home-sickness) concerning the "no-longer" of the poetical world of the early Greeks and his eschatological expectation of an epochally destined "not-yet" and "other beginning" of a new "ethos" or "dwelling place" were to a great extent a form of utopianism, since his thought abandoned the now of the so-called "between-time" to the supposed radical
evil of technological nihilism and took up residence in the nowhere (u-topia) of this "no-longer" and "not-yet" of his "topos of being." The later Heidegger is in a sense the Wordsworth of western metaphysics. Aspects of his later speculative thought can be called eschatologic-kairological utopianism. His nostalgia is similar to the Christian flight from the supposed radical evil of the world to an otherworldly home and City of God, Plato’s disgust for the supposed depravity of the hoi polloi and flight into the "topos of ideas" and ideal Republic, Hegel’s "unhappy consciousness" which experiences reality out beyond itself in an other unreachable world, and Kierkegaard’s "despair of infinity" which cannot relate the "castles in the air" of its thought and imagination (possibility) to actuality. One can say not only that "there is no political philosophy in Heidegger," but also that there is no room for concrete ethical-political thought and action in Heidegger, except insofar as one goes violently against his own self-understanding of his writings by relating them back to the practical life-world, as it was analyzed in his youthful writings. This would mean returning to the young Heidegger’s emphasis on the "relational meaning" and "enactment-meaning" of being-meaning, which were obscured by the later Heidegger’s emphasis on an epochal "content-meaning."

10. Self-Stylization and Self-Installment

In his statements about his "renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises" (BR, xi/x) and his "transformed Aristotle-understanding" (SD, 86/78), the later Heidegger did acknowledge in passing the essential influence of Aristotle on his rethinking of the being-question in the early twenties. But because of his later distanciation from these thinkers, he appeared reluctant to provide any details about this aspect of his youthful thought. In his discussions with Heidegger for his book Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, Pöggeler reports that "[Heidegger’s youthful] confrontation with Aristotle was placed out of my reach, since the later Heidegger directed the discussion of Aristotle completely towards the question of the relationship between ontology and theology."
Around the same time Heidegger was questioned about the extant introduction to his youthful Aristotle book, but he replied that he would not publish it. In 1948 he announced that an Aristotle interpretation ("Interpretation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias") drawing on his early work would be published, but it never appeared. Also, Heidegger's manuscript for his 1924 lecture course Aristotle, Rhetoric, II is missing.

The later Heidegger's reticence about his youthful "transformed Aristotle understanding" is again bound up with his tendency to stylize the origins of his thought by installing here his later concerns and interpretations of Aristotle from the vantage point of Pre-socratic philosophy. Against Heidegger's self-interpretation...H.-G. Gadamer has portrayed the plurality of paths which Heidegger has travelled....Above all, it is the point of departure for the question of being that looks different in Heidegger's and Gadamer's backward glance.... Whereas for Gadamer (as a historical witness) the decisive beginning of Heidegger's being-question in the early twenties lies in his appropriation of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic good from the specific vantage point of the concept of aletheia in concrete praxis, the later Heidegger, on the other hand, reports that he was questioning Husserl's thought from the vantage point of a "transformed Aristotle understanding," in which Aristotle's concept of truth appears more like the cosmological notion of truth worked out by the later Heidegger in his reading of the early Greek thinkers. Heidegger writes that in the early twenties his question became: "Is [the matter itself of phenomenology] consciousness and its objectivity or is it the being of beings in is unconcealment and concealment?" (SD, 87/79) Here one has to ask whether the second part of this question is not "a clear reading back of the question of the essence of truth that emerges after the turn," i.e., of Heidegger's later path of the "truth of being"? Likewise, in his later marginal notes to his Being and Time and in his commentary on this work in his "Letter on Humanism," the later Heidegger give interpretations of key concepts deriving from his youthful appropriation
of Aristotle which read back into them his later thought and retrieval of Aristotle in the light the Pre-Socratics. (SZ, 177, 219, 295) But Heidegger’s youthful "Aristotle-interpretation is completely different just as much from the one inspired by Brentano as from Heidegger’s later interpretation after 1930."141

Just as the later Heidegger’s self-portrayals tended to see the origin of his thought in his earliest theological studies because their Neo-Hegelian and Neo-Hellenic speculative concerns more easily served as a spring-board for his own later formulation of the question of being and his attempt to relate this question back to the mytho-poetic tradition of the early Greek thinkers, Greek tragedy, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Rilke, so for the same reason he displayed a "ceaseless effort to connect up his question with the first impulse he received through Brentano’s dissertation On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle (1862) and the writing of his Freiburg teacher Carl Braig On Being: Outline of Ontology (1896) and also to grasp the reversal in his later work as a single thought-path."142 Interestingly enough, Brentano’s dissertation and Braig’s On Being, which deal primarily with Aristotle’s Metaphysics, belong more to the group of texts favoured by the later Heidegger than do Aristotle’s Ethics and Paul’s Letter to the Galatians, which were important texts for Heidegger in the early 1920s. He thus tended to see the origin of his thought in his earliest formulation of the being-question on the basis of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories in his habilitation writing, which relied heavily on the Aristotle-interpretation given by Brentano’s On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle and Braig’s On Being: An Outline of Ontology. In his self-portrayals, the later Heidegger wrote:

Finally, if I may be allowed to insert a personal note: Archbishop Gröber, when he was the parish priest in Constance, gave me, a seventeen-year old Gymnasium student, a philosophy book that became decisive for my entire thought-path. (SH, 54/55)

The first impetus (Anstoss) toward this question [of being] hit me during a lengthy preoccupation with Aristotle, at first being guided by Franz Brentano’s On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle, 1862. (ZP, 47/201)
...the question about the unity in the multiplicity of being, at that time only obscurely, unsteadily and helplessly stirring within me, remained, through many upsets, blind alleys and perplexities, the ceaseless impetus (Anlass) for the work Being and Time which appeared two decades later. (FS, 56/218)

The later Heidegger called the Neo-Aristotelian doctrine of categories in his habilitation writing a "hidden beginning of the way." (FS, 55) In his On the Way to Language, he stated that "I came up against the question of being in the dissertation of Husserl's teacher Franz Brentano....'For as you begin, you will remain'." (US, 88/7) He here used the twofold concern of his habilitation writing - the doctrine of categories (being) and the grammatica speculativa (language) - as a springboard for his own later "questioning about language and being" and being as the "message of unconcealment of the twofold."

In telling this narrative of the origin and development of his thought, the later Heidegger was presumably aware that Brentano's book on Aristotle and his own interpretation of Aristotle in his earliest period are actually "onto-logic." (FS, 55) "I am narrating (erzähle) all this to you not in order to give the impression that at that time I already knew everything that I am still asking today." (US, 88/7) "...I still knew nothing of what would later trouble my thinking." (FS, 55)

Heidegger's earliest interpretation of Aristotle was only a "hidden" beginning for his being-question, and the "question which determined the way of [his] thought" was only "concealed in [Aristotle's] sentence" (at the start of Brentano's book) that "being is said in many ways" (BR, xi/x), because, like the "other beginning" hidden in the "first beginning" of western metaphysics in general, this beginning was only concealed in the actual manifest beginning (metaphysics) and 'untruth' (lethe) of Heidegger's earliest writings as a possibility into which they could later be violently and destructively transformed, just as the violence of Heidegger's destructive retrievals transformed other metaphysical texts into his other beginning for the being-question. That is to say, Heidegger's earliest works and his interpretation
of Aristotle are actually no beginning at all. Plato’s allegory of the cave or Kant’s first critique are no less a “hidden beginning” than Heidegger’s habilitation writing. His first “hidden beginning” in his earliest writings belongs to the metaphysical “first beginning” of western philosophy. How could the question discovered in Brentano and Aristotle, then, have “remained as the ceaseless impetus” for Heidegger’s non-metaphysical “other beginning,” when, as we have seen, Heidegger’s doctoral dissertation and habilitation writing set up this very question as the metaphysical question of a “pure logic,” which questions after the “unitary determination of being which permeates all its manifold meanings” (BR, xi/x), i.e., the “total region of ‘being’” in “its various modes of reality,” in terms of a system of timelessly valid logical meaning? How could a metaphysical questioning “determine” and be the “impetus” for a non-metaphysical questioning? Like the whole history of metaphysics to which Heidegger’s earliest writings belong, their way of posing the being-question “remained through [the] many upsets, blind alleys and perplexities” (FS, 56/21) of Heidegger’s subsequent thought only as something which had been dismantled and radically altered, something that first took place in the early twenties with his turn to Aristotle’s practical writings. “Meanwhile a decade [1916-1926] went by and many detours and wrong paths through the history of western philosophy were needed for the above questions to reach even an initial clarity.” (BR, xi/x)

The later Heidegger’s acknowledgment of his earliest writings is like his acknowledgment of his indebtedness to the “first beginning” of history of western thought in general, since neither are totally “destroyed,” but rather creatively reshaped. The “hidden beginning” of his earliest metaphysical writings is, thus, not an arche for his subsequent thought-paths in the same sense as his writings after 1919, which for first time pose his question of being in a recognizable form and set him on the way to his later thought-paths. His critique of his earliest writings, which begins around 1919, cannot really be called an “immanent critique,” since it calls for the “end” of the philosophical
A "radical" break takes place here, because Heidegger's first metaphysical "beginning" (hriza) is uprooted in the breakthrough to the other "beginning" which from that point on dominates his thought and is repeatedly begun over again in new and different ways. The real beginning and arche of Heidegger's way was not his reading of Brentano's book on Aristotle's doctrine of categories in the Metaphysics and his own Neo-Aristotelian version of the categories of being in his habilitation writing, but rather his "transformed Aristotle interpretation" in the early twenties, which turned rather to Aristotle's practical writings and Physics. "One could so picture Heidegger's way that he arrived at his question of being through a constant meditation on the relevant books of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The phenomenology of life, which Heidegger presented in his lectures immediately after the first World War, shows such representations to be erroneous."

But in the self-portrayals of the origins of his thought, the later Heidegger did not explain all this, i.e., what exactly "hidden beginning" meant, and left it in a state of real ambiguity. Instead he continually focused on his earliest writings and his interpretation of Aristotle here without ever really adequately highlighting the decisiveness of his new interpretation of Aristotle in the early twenties. For decades this has given rise to an ambiguous and misleading picture of the origin of his thought as laying in his discovery of the metaphysical question of being in Brentano's book on Aristotle. His inordinate emphasis on his earliest reading of the being-question in Aristotle derives from a combination of his understandable attempt to stave off the continual misrepresentation of his thought as an immediate continuation of Husserlian phenomenology or existentialism, his quite legitimate appropriation of his earliest writings as a springboard for his later thought, and finally some real indulgence in self-stylization and installing of his later concerns into his portrayal of the origin of his thought. When one reads his narrative, told over and over again, of how he - the seventeen-year
old Gymnasium student - is presented with a copy of Brentano's book on Aristotle's question of being by the parish priest Gröber, how he reads and ponders over the book on the "Feldweg" (FM, 87/33), and how the book thus sets the young thinker underway on his thought-path and becomes "decisive for [his] entire thought-path," the suspicion cannot be avoided that this is a later poetic dramatization which does contain a core of truth, but is unfortunately so ambiguous and ritualized that it corresponds very little with what really happened. The importance that Heidegger ascribes to his early study of Brentano's book and Aristotle is out of proportion with the role it actually played in his initial and radical transformation of the traditional question of being. When one actually reads Brentano's text, Heidegger's doctoral dissertation, and his habilitation writing "with one's own eyes," one finds mainly the prosaic spectacle of a full-blown metaphysics that, no less than the philosophies which usually bear the brunt of the later Heidegger's scathing criticism, suffers from the "oblivion of being."

This naivety and poeticizing, which led the later Heidegger to portray the origins of his thought as he did, was also clearly at work in the way that he, at first, read his grand speculative 'narrative' of the eschatological-soteriological "history of being" back into the origins of National Socialism and portrayed it as a saving world-historical force of "being" and, then later after realizing his political mistake, as a demonic technological power of "being." The same speculative stylization of the past occurs in his later deliberate misrepresentation of his political role as a party member, Nazi university rector, and self-appointed philosophical Führer and spokesman for the ideals of National Socialism. His later self-portrayals of his affiliation with National Socialism are "so riddled....with omissions, historical errors, and self-serving interpretations that these texts can be used only with the greatest caution and a constant cross-check of the facts." In his 1953 publication of his 1935 lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics, he changed a crucial passage in the 1935 manuscript
which dealt with National Socialism, "thereby reading back into 1935 his much later, and in fact revised, understanding of the historical role of Nazism. And yet, to the day he died, he continued to maintain that his 1935 lecture notes read exactly that way and that he had never tampered with them." In none of the above cases does Heidegger do justice to empirical history.

Just as the Kantian character of the later Heidegger's investigation of "the meaning of being" as "transcendental knowledge" in his Being and Time was a return to a historicized and existentialized version of his earliest, primal, Neo-Kantian word for being as the "Dasein" of categorial-transcendental "meaning," and his path of "the truth of being" after 1930 was a return to an existentialized, historicized, and epochalized version of his primal word for being as "the [teleological] true reality and the real truth," so his third later path of the "topos" or "ethos" of being was in a sense a return to an existentialized, historicized, and epochalized version of his earliest primal word for being as the "logical place" and "being-there" of "meaning," which drew to a great extent on Aristotle's doctrine of categories. In its later version, the early designation of being as "logical place" had passed through the horizon of Heidegger's "middle phase" of the "phenomenological existential topic" of "being in and through life" that Heidegger had explored in the early twenties. In his later path of the "topos" or "ethos" of being, the three moments of his earlier Platonic-Aristotelian draft of metaphysical being-question - the "place" of the "categories" (content-meaning), apophantic logos (relational meaning), and the "always-being" of the ideas (enactment-meaning) - were radically existentialized, historicized, and epochalized into the later three moments of the "place" or "ethos" of the "fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals"; "poetic dwelling"; and the "destiny of being." His Lotzean version of Plato's idea of the good as the "universal validity and the existing-in-itself of meaning," which he had worked out in the speculative teleology in the conclusion of his habilitation, was radically epochalized in his later path of the "topology of being"
365

and "original ethics." Plato's static "intelligible topos" of the idea of the good, which is supposed to found the polis and all ethical action, is historicized by the later Heidegger into his "ereignende Ortschaft," the "place which happens" historically and gives birth to the various "epochs" or world-historical "places" and forms of "ethos" that make up the "history of being" and found all political and ethical life.

We can note again, then, that the later Heidegger's statement that his way begins with his introduction to the being-question in Brentano's book on Aristotle and that "as you begin, you will remain" contains a great deal of irony, since, contra the mens auctoris who wrote this, such a statement awakens a suspicion about the extent to which his thought remained inwardly shaped by the speculative origins of his Denkweg, which was subjected to a radical critique in the early twenties under the influence of Aristotle's practical writings and then re-emerged in a new form in his later writings. Whereas the young Heidegger was busily demythologizing his earlier speculative reading of Aristotle and Plato and dismantling this back into the dimension of "being in and through [factual] life," which he discovered in Aristotle's practical writings, the later Heidegger was to an extent (and, again, to what extent is the real question) following the opposite direction, namely, re-mythologizing "being in and through life" in connection with the speculative aspects of Aristotle's Metaphysics and Physics which pointed back to the mytho-poetic thought of the Pre-Socratic philosophers. As noted, the later Heidegger's speculative formulation of the being-question as the epochal "topos of being" and his attempt to make practical philosophy dependent on the ontological question of being by calling his "topology of being" an "original ethics" would have been criticized by the young Heidegger and certainly by his hero, the practical Aristotle, as a kind of (epochalized) "absolute morality."

11. Effective History

It was not the later Heidegger who has highlighted and provided details about his youthful appropriation of Aristotle, but
rather Heidegger's early students of the "famous Aristotle breakfasts" (H.-G. Gadamer, W. Szilasi, H. Arendt, Helene Weiss, K. Löwith, Walter Bröcker, Simon Moser, Hans Jonas, Jakob Klein) and others such as Pöggeler and Sheehan. Most of these philosophers believe that Heidegger's thought is not really understandable without thoroughly taking into account the youthful influence of Aristotle on his thought, since it was this influence which allowed Heidegger to execute his critique of metaphysics and pose his new "question of being" in terms of factual life and temporality.151 "Someone who begins with Aristotle - that is a true Heideggerian!" (Gadamer) The reports which they have provided on the young Heidegger's interpretations of Aristotle and their attempts to work out the details of these interpretations in their own studies of Aristotle have served as necessary and helpful source material in our attempt to shed some light on the 'secret' of this aspect of Heidegger's thought. It is the work of these philosophers which constitutes the "effective history" of the young Heidegger's fusions of horizons with Aristotle and Plato, long after Heidegger himself had radically distanced himself from these fusions in his later writings. His youthful interpretations of Aristotle, in the form of either oral presentations in his lectures or student Nachschriften, effectively influenced a whole generation of students, who to a very great extent determined the course that German philosophy would take in the following decades. They have carried on not only the young Heidegger's interpretive studies of Aristotle's texts (Gadamer, Szilasi, Bröcker, Weiss, Tugendhat, et. al.) and his philosophical appropriation of Aristotle (Gadamer, Arendt, et. al.) in contemporary hermeneutical philosophy, but also have worked out his indications for a "rehabilitation" of practical philosophy on the basis of Aristotle and have helped to bring about what has now been called a "rehabilitation of practical philosophy" (Joachim Ritter, Arendt, Gadamer, et. al.). That is, these philosophers believe that, even though the thought of Aristotle, Plato, and the whole tradition (ethos) of western humanitas has to be criticized, these traditions do not have to
become objects of a kind of philosophical witch-hunt and "hermeneutics of suspicion" which assigns them to the "history of the forgetfulness of being," but rather they can continue to play a role in what Heidegger called the "turn" to the "other beginning" of philosophy. This attempt to deepen the young Heidegger's fusions of horizons with the anti-metaphysical traditions of western philosophy and humanitas was done "very much against Heidegger's intentions" (Gadamer), i.e., against the later Heidegger's self-understanding of the ultimate goal of his own thought. The "rumor of the hidden king[s]" fusion of horizons with Aristotle reigned almost in exile. Regarding Heidegger's youthful appropriation of Aristotle, one can again ask, in chorus with the philosophers of this effective history, the question posed by Gadamer:

When science expands into a total technocracy and thus brings on the 'cosmic night' of the 'forgetfulness of being', the nihilism that Nietzsche prophesied, then may one look at the last fading light of the sun that is setting in the evening sky, instead of turning around to look for the first shimmer of its return?.. How­ever much the philosopher may be called to draw radical conclusions from everything, the role of prophet, of Cassandra, of preacher or even of know-it-all does not suit him.

12. Our Hermeneutical Situation

Like our previous attempts to bring to light the young Heidegger's fusions of horizons with Husserl's phenomenology and with original Christianity against the later Heidegger's self-understanding, our present attempt to determine the hermeneutical situation within which he interpreted Aristotle in the early twenties has itself also had to work out its own hermeneutical situation. Again, we had to destroy or unbuild the later Heidegger's translations of his youthful Aristotelian draft into his three later drafts of the "meaning," "truth," and "topos" of being, the layers of his later self-stylized narratives of the Aristotelian origins of his thought that tend to install here his later language, and finally the hardened historical picture of the origin of his thought that naive readings of his self-portrayals have given rise to in the secondary literature on his thought, so that
we could free up (for our contemporary understanding) the possibility of retrieving the authentic guiding origin of his thought in his youthful fusion of horizons with Aristotle by means of a study of the "the promising richness of his beginnings" in his youthful texts themselves. Our attempt to let the "rumor of the hidden king" - the young Heidegger's fusion of horizons with Aristotle - speak again "here and now...in this place" is similar to his own attempt to dismantle the encrusted layers of the scholastic and modern Neo-Kantian translations of the basic terms of Aristotle's language and to let the Ur-text of the original and authentic Aristotle speak again in his own contemporary philosopizing. In our "ad-venture" of reading, we have attempted, then, to hear Heidegger begin "to speak in an unexpected way" in the language of his youthful Aristotelian draft of "Being and Time."
V. THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

"But what philosophy and the philosopher find difficult is stopping." Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Vol. I.1 (Stopping at the genuine beginning!) (Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 1921-22) (PA, 182)

In this concluding section of Chapter Five, I would like to summarize my preceding discussion and show that already in the early 1920s the young Heidegger's speaks explicitly about "the end of philosophy" and a "turn" towards an other, genuine beginning for philosophy.

1. The Turning Around of Philosophy

As we have seen, Heidegger divided up the history of western metaphysics into the three epochs of Greek philosophy, scholasticism, and modern thought. The greater part of his energy was devoted to carrying out a destruction of the way in which each of these epochs had answered the question of being, more specifically, of the way that each had metaphysically characterized the three intentional moments of being-meaning. Indeed, we have seen how he claimed that he was "not a 'philosopher' in any sense at all," i.e., a thinker with a positive doctrine, but rather someone "who has the single task...of critically destroying the traditional conceptuality of western philosophy and theology, where it can indeed also turn out that sometimes he is only threshing 'empty straw'." The romantically rebellious Heidegger of the early twenties saw himself as the great destroyer or, as I have often expressed it, the great demythologizer of western metaphysics. He still had no clearly defined answer of his own to the question of being. Thus, he did not publish a single book or essay for an entire decade of silence between the appearance of his book on Duns Scotus (1916) and his Being and Time (1927). His attention was caught in the whirlwind of questioning in which his question of
being was undergoing a complete transformation, which he would later in his published writings after 1930 explicitly call "the turn" from traditional metaphysics to post-metaphysical thought.

To destroy the history of metaphysics meant for Heidegger literally to "un-build" or dismantle it back to the factical life from which it had fallen away. It was the success of this destruction that he meant in his statement already in 1921-22 about "the end of philosophy." "Skepticism is a beginning," he wrote, "and as the genuine beginning it is also the end of philosophy." (PA, 35)

Already in 1919 he had written to Krebs that the metaphysics of Aristotelian Neo-scholasticism had become "problematic and unacceptable to me." Again in his 1923 lecture course, he told his students "that, as far as he was concerned, philosophy was over." (BZs, 82)

The positive part of the young Heidegger's project was that of turning philosophy towards a "genuine beginning" for the question of being by means of a retrieval of the forgotten dimension of factical life that could be unearthed beneath the metaphysical tradition. His first name for what he later in his publications after 1930 more explicitely called the "turn" (Kehre) towards the "other beginning" already appeared in his 1920-21 lecture course, when he spoke of the necessity of a "complete turning-around (Umwandlung) of philosophy." In the same lecture course, he spoke of his philosophy as "the going-back (Rückgang) into the originary-historical." (PRs, 316, 317) This term, along with that of "re-ducation" as a "leading back," are Heidegger's first appellations for what he later called the "step back" out of metaphysics into an other beginning. Since for the later Heidegger the turn is focused to a great extent on turning from the modern epoch of the metaphysics of subjectivity and technology, because technology is seen as the culmination of the whole history of metaphysics and as the turning point towards the other beginning, we need to show more explicitely the young Heidegger's critique of modern "ego-metaphysics," in order to establish that the "turn" was already present in Heidegger's thought in the early twenties.
2. The Critique of Subjectivity

In his destructive critique of Husserl and the whole of modern philosophy, the young Heidegger already carried out what he would later execute in more detail, i.e., a destructive critique of the modern "epoch" of western metaphysics. According to the later Heidegger's reading of the "content-meaning" of the modern epoch, it progressively forgets the concrete practical "world" as the "fourfold" of "earth and sky, gods and mortals." It begins with Descartes' fixing of the content of experience as "extended substance" that is known with the "ideas" of modern mathematical physics. This abstract view of the world passes through the idealism of Kant and the German idealists, re-expresses itself in the nineteenth century notion of "value," and results in the twentieth century technological view of the world as naked "raw material" to be represented and manipulated. In both his youthful and his later periods, Heidegger sees the reflective knowledge of modern philosophy as overlooking the immediate "it worlds/there is world" of our lived experience. In fact, then, the later Heidegger's famous talk about the "worlding of the world" (and also the "thinging of the thing") displays the continuity of the whole of his thought from the early 1920s onwards and is not evidence for some kind of miraculous "turn" in the basic motivation of his thinking after 1930.

The later Heidegger's destructive critique of the "relational meaning" of being in modern metaphysics had likewise already been carried out in his youthful period, although not with the same detail. According to Heidegger's later reading, human being is conceived in modern metaphysics from Descartes to Nietzsche and Husserl as the "I think," "subjectivity," and "consciousness," such that the concrete essence of human beings as "mortals" who "dwell upon the earth" falls into oblivion. Moreover, the later Heidegger's critique of this view of human as leading to subjectivism and a contemporary technological "will to power" is already anticipated in his youthful thought.
In the first place, the young Heidegger, following up Spengler's thought in his *Decline of the West*, already to a certain extent saw the phenomenon of modern technology. He viewed it critically as an expression of human "falling" and the inauthentic drive for "security." *(PA, 26, 74; PW, 130, 136.)* He indicates that the same drive for security characterises the history of western metaphysics, which has always striven to be a "secure, absolute science." *(PA, 56, 90, 109)* Indeed, he calls modern logic the "technique or better technology of correct thinking." *(LW, 37; cf. AJ, 9)*

Second, the young Heidegger gave a strong critique of the "ego-metaphysics" of modern thought, which was inaugurated "intellectually-historically" by Descartes and gave rise to the thesis of modern transcendental philosophy that the world is "posited" and "constituted" by subjectivity:

In this questioning lies precisely the tendency to bring to understanding that which ego-metaphysics and ego-centered idealisms of the most varied shadings can in no sense allow to appear on the basis of their preconception: the question of the meaning of the "am"; - not the I as source and agent of a specifically grasped transcendental-relative or absolute-idealistic problematic of constitution; the idea of constitution, and indeed phenomenological constitution, is not necessarily bound to the transcendental question, the idea of the constitutively seen development of the world and positing out of the I and consciousness and in it. If this illustration from history is allowed in the sense of Kantian theory of knowledge and its modifications in the direction of an absolute idealism, what is necessary is to pursue the meaning of the "sum" in Descartes "cogito-sum" in a more original problematic and winning of the interpretive categories. *(PA, 173)*

The how of being-world-related and the world itself are in factual temporalizing. One is not allowed to imagine this, "idealistically" or in terms of some other theory of knowledge, as an isolated production of the world. In this temporalizing, the encounter of a world, of a world-object is just as relevant as the encountering. *(PA, 37)*

Far from being available in some sort of theoretical transparency, the world is rather encountered in state of "haziness" *(Diesigkeit)*. *(PA, 88)* What is primary is not the theoretical and reflective positing of meaning and "value" onto a domain of naked objects, but rather the immediate encountering of the "signific-
ance" of the "it worlds/there is world" of the everyday world. (IP, 71-73; FA, 31) Finally, we have already seen that the young Heidegger's critique of the "temporalizing meaning" of Husserlian phenomenology and modern philosophy in general as "presence" had already established the basic point of his later and more detailed discussions of "subjectivity" as the modern restatement of the Greek understanding of being as presence.

In his development after the logical and metaphysical concerns of his doctoral dissertation and his habilitation writing, the young Heidegger did not turn from his metaphysical pursuit of the question of being to some simpleton's form of existentialism, philosophy of life or anthropology, as Husserl, for example, thought. On the basis of this misunderstanding, one can proceed to argue quite incorrectly that subsequently sometime after 1930 Heidegger's thinking underwent a "turn" from a human-centred philosophy to a 'Being'-centred one. As Heidegger later made clear, there was indeed a "bend" or "twist" (Wendung) in his thought around 1930, but there was no such thing as a "turn" (Kehre) or "reversal" (Umkehr) from a "Heidegger I" to a "Heidegger II." (BR, xvii/xvi) The basic "intention" (Vorhaben) (BR, xv/xiv) of his questioning remained the same from the early 1920s onwards, namely, to ask what "being in and through life" means.

The real turn in Heidegger's question of being is to be found rather in his youthful "complete turning-around of philosophy" away from the concerns of his doctoral dissertation, which took up the Neo-Kantian and Husserlian project of a "pure logic," and from the concerns of his habilitation writing, which took up the project of contemporary Neo-Hegelian speculative theology (what he later called "ontotheology"). Heidegger himself later did not hesitate to characterize these writings as metaphysical "Onto-Logic." (FS, 55) After 1916, the young Heidegger turned away from his earlier transcendental and speculative lexicon of being as objectivity and value (content-meaning) for a logical and teleological consciousness (relational meaning), both of which were conceived within the horizon of the fixed presence of logical atem-
porality and the eternity of God (enactment-meaning). What he turned towards was the "genuine beginning" of being as a "there is world/it worlds" and "event" (Ereignis) for radically finite, pre-theoretical human life, which as "there-being" is (lives) the "there" of "being." This "it worlds" is more being than consciousness. As this "there" of "being," human life is subject to an element of "destiny." (PA, 84) Heidegger even calls his topic "being qua being." (PA, 59) As Gadamer has said, all this is "the turn before the turn."\(^4\)

The "question of being," the "first beginning," the three "epochs" of metaphysics, the "end of philosophy," the "step-back," the "turn," the "other beginning," the "meaning" of being," the "truth" of being, the "place" of being, "Ereignis," the "worlding" of the world - all these primal words that were first made public in Heidegger's published writings after 1930 were already operative in his unpublished youthful texts.

If the basic "intention" of Heidegger's questioning remained the same from the early 1920s to the 1970s, namely, to turn-around philosophy from metaphysics towards the question of "being in and through life," this fact completely explodes any simple division of his thought into a Heidegger I (Being and Time) and a Heidegger II (writings after 1930). In the first place, there is only one Heidegger, since there is unifying intention in the development of his thought. And secondly, in his long career Heidegger pursued his project of the turn in many more than two ways: his youthful existential-phenomenological way (with its phenomenological, Kierkegaardian, and Aristotelian ways); the quasi-Kantian way of the "meaning" of being in his Being and Time; and the Pre-Socratic, Hölderlinian, and Nietzschean ways of his writings after 1930. But long before any of these later ways, "Heidegger II" had already put in his appearance in the early 1920s.

It is Heidegger's first youthful attempt to realize in systematic fashion the unifying intention of his thought, the turn towards the question of "being in and through life," which must now occupy our attention.
The Genuine Beginning....One thing is certain: not at an end; thus to begin, to begin genuinely, to move towards the beginning.... (Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 1921-22) (PA, 186)

CHAPTER SIX
THE GENUINE BEGINNING: BEING IN AND THROUGH LIFE

In Chapter Six, I would like now to show how, in the early 1920s, Heidegger had already worked out his enduring theme of an "other beginning" for the philosophical question of being, or what he in 1921-22 called the "genuine beginning" and the "other understanding" (PA, 186) of philosophy. In examining the young Heidegger's destruction of the history of philosophy in Chapter Five, we already saw in a preliminary manner elements of his "retrieval" or "repetition" of the tradition, but here our examination of his "phenomenological draft" (the way of the phenomenon), his "Kierkegaardian draft" (the way of suffering), and his "Aristotelian draft" (via activa, the way of action) of "Being and Time" was primarily historically oriented. How did all these drafts and ways flow into Heidegger's project for a new "genuine beginning" in its systematic expression? What exactly did he mean in 1919 by "metaphysics" "in a new sense" and by "the turning around of philosophy," which he spoke of in 1921-22? I want now to give an account of his retrieval in its systematic expression with little or no reference to the historical influences on his re-thinking of the being-question as the question of "being in and through life."

I wish to focus on the young Heidegger's new beginning for philosophy as it is expressed in his early Freiburg period from 1919 to 1923. More specifically, I have chosen to follow the plan which he sketched out in his 1921-22 lecture course called Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Introduction in Phenomenological Research. In Section I, entitled "The Existential-Phenomenological Topic," I wish to show how in this lecture course
he poses the being-question as the question of "being in and through life" and sketches out the threefold direction of this question in terms of the three intentional moments of this being-meaning, i.e., content-meaning (world), relational meaning (care), and enactment-meaning (kairopological time). He attempts a systematic working out of the meaning of these three moments of being-meaning. In my exposition, these moments in turn provide the focus for each of the three subsequent sections of the present chapter: II. Life-world (It Worlds); III. Being-in (Dwelling); IV. Kairological Characters (Ereignis). In order to fill out the details of Heidegger's plan for his new beginning in 1921-22, I will also draw heavily on his 1919 lecture courses, his 1919-21 essay on Karl Jaspers, and especially his 1923 lecture course Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity). But it should be stressed that I am interested primarily in the architectonics and general language of Heidegger's new beginning, especially since he himself is during this time still not at the point of working out all the details. As he later said, his plan for a new beginning was still only an "intention."

My reasons for focusing on his early Freiburg period, as opposed to the first part of his Marburg period (1924-1928) leading up to his Being and Time, are threefold. First, his early Freiburg period is distanced enough from his turn to Kant around 1925-26 that we can see clearly here the uniqueness of his first attempt at a new philosophical beginning. Even though his original plan for the new beginning is still operative in his published 1925 lecture course Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time, in his 1925 lecture course Logic: The Question Concerning Truth, and in his 1927 book Being and Time, the plan has already been modified and carried out in a different manner. Second, his early Freiburg writings thus show more clearly his identification with and weaving together of the influences from Husserl, Christian authors, and Aristotle into his own philosophy. Third, by focusing on Heidegger's plan for the new beginning as articulated especially in his 1921-22 lecture course, we can get a good sense for the original
version of the book which eventually became Being and Time in an altered form, since, as we have seen, he had planned to work up this lecture course into a book around 1922-1923.

I now turn directly to an account of the young Heidegger’s systematic formulation of his “genuine beginning” for the question of “being in and through life” and his systematic working out of the various aspects of the three moments of this being-meaning.

I. The Existential-Phenomenological Topic

1. The Questionableness of Being

The young Heidegger considers his philosophical questioning to be “ontology,” “ontological,” which “mean: a questioning and determining which is directed to being as such; which being and how remains quite undetermined.” (HF, 1) He differentiates his ontology from the regional ontologies which do not investigate beings as beings, i.e., “being as such,” but rather beings as this or that kind of being:

Ontology addresses itself to beings not "as" this or that type of being, but simply "as" beings, i.e., with regard to the "principles" of “being,” which let them be understood "as" beings. “Principle is being (being-meaning) as the being of beings.” (PA, 60) Ontology investigates the principles of "being qua being" (Sein qua Sein) (PA, 59):

According to its relational meaning, the comportment to the object in philosophy, philosophizing is knowing comportment. ("Bringing to light" is more formally original....Knowing is a grasping of the object "as" object and a determining which so grasps it. This determining which grasps "says" that, what, and how the object is....The relation is held by something, a being as being and being such. (PA, 54)

Philosophy is principally knowing comportment to beings (Seiendem). That to which it comports itself, must give itself in its genuine
and final principle-character: beings, ultimately considered not in relation to other beings, but rather in themselves and as such.... And what is the principal for such beings in themselves? What is that which ultimately can be the matter of concern regarding beings in themselves? Being (Sein), or more determinately, with regard to the way such "being" is graspsable: "being-meaning." It is expressly to be kept in view: being, being-meaning, is the philosophical principal of every being; but it is not its "universal," its highest genus, what would have beings under it as special cases. Being is not the widest sphere for every and all being, the "highest region."

The object of the definition of philosophy is therefore determined: knowing comportment to beings as being (Seiendem als Sein). (PA, 58)

The horizon for understanding "being as such" is not to be taken from any specific, objective region of being, but rather from human being which has an understanding of being, such that this understood-being is precisely "being-meaning." Heidegger writes concerning his lecture course entitled "Ontology": "[Traditional ontology] misses the access to the being, which is decisive within the philosophical problematic: Dasein, out of which and for which philosophy 'is'.... The title, which arises out of the theme and the manner of treatment in what follows, reads therefore rather: hermeneutics of facticity." (HF, 3) This means that "being" encompasses not only the being of the world, as it was primarily understood to in the objective ontology of Greek philosophy (HF, 1-2), but also the being of the human being who understands being. In other words, being-meaning encompasses all three moments of "content-meaning" (world), "relational meaning" (human life), and "enactment-meaning" (historical time).

Heidegger, therefore, gives his concentrated definition of ontology in the following form:

Philosophy is principally knowing comportment to beings as being (Seiendem als Sein) (being-meaning), and in such a manner that, in the comportment and for it, it is also decisively a matter of the being (being-meaning) at any time of the having of the comportment.

Philosophy is 'ontology,' and indeed radical ontology, and indeed as such phenomenological (existentiell, historical-cultural) ontology, or ontological phenomenology. The object of philosophy, beings as being, determines from itself (function of the principle) the comportment as well. (PA, 60)
Such is Heidegger's "phenomenological existential topic" (PA, 31), the topic of being-meaning, which is given in human existence, and whose methodological "way" is that of phenomenological description. In other words, his topic is the question of "Dasein," "there-being," being which is factically "there" in life. This is the question of "being in and though life." Heidegger sees this question as his "major topic and issue" (Hauptsache), "what is at issue" (worauf es ankommt). (PA, 56, 12, 58) "What is at issue is being, i.e., that it 'is', being-meaning, that being 'is', i.e., as being is there (in the phenomenon) genuinely and according to its importance. Phenomenon: existentiell. What is at issue is that it comes to 'being', that it stands in exertion...." (PA, 81), that it "comes to seeking and language" (HF, 1). This is what Heidegger calls "Seinsfragenlichkeit," the "questionableness of being," and Seinsfragwürdigkeit, "the worthiness of questioning belonging to being." (PA, 189)

2. Average Everydayness

In order to stress that being is only given as the "being-meaning" which is understood by the one who is asking the question of being, Heidegger first focuses on the obvious fact that such philosophical questioning is being pursued within a "university" as a "context of life":

The efforts to gain access are not at any time and at any place and enacted by any one; but rather here and now we live in them and indeed in this place, in this lecture hall. You before me, I before you, we with each other. It is with the title university that we characterize this closest with-worldly and around-worldly fixable (self-worldly) situation and the context of life which dominates and lives genuinely in it....And the first task in gaining access in the course of understanding the definition, i.e., at the same time of genuine concrete appropriation of philosophizing itself, is to define this so indicated situation of life as that which is in its what and how. (PA, 63)

He then makes the point that the life-situation of the university presupposes the facticity of everyday life:

It was said that [the university] is a context of life, something in which one lives. What is going on in this "living" at and in the university? Taking and experiencing the university? And at the same time this question is, however, to be posed only concretely, how we here and now and today take it, how we live it. We live it just as
we ourselves are, out of and in our *factual* life... What is at issue in understanding the principal definition of philosophy is the being-meaning of the understanding itself... comportment in gaining access as a being in its what-how, here and now... What factual life is, is to be indicated... We are questioning after the university as a context of life, which itself is in the factual historical life of us ourselves. (*PA*, 76-78, 115; *IP*, 3-6; *WU*, 205-214)

Heidegger's basic point here is that if we want to investigate being as it is given as "meaning" to human understanding, then this understanding has to be investigated not only on the level of philosophy, but also and in the first place on the level of factual comprehension of being-meaning in everyday life. Thus, we must investigate "the being-meaning of factual life." (*PA*, 159)

Just as investigation of being is not cut off from life, so the investigation of human life is not undertaken in abstraction from the question of being. Heidegger writes that in his own specific use of "the expression 'life' there is at work... a characteristically pervasive meaning: life = Dasein, there-being, 'being' in and through life." (*PA*, 85) He insists that if we are not to investigate being speculatively as it is given in itself, but rather to take it as it is given "in and through life," then our approach to this being and life must simply take "life in and for itself" (*PW*, 121), "our life, which we live" (*PA*, 86), and take it up, therefore, as it presents itself in the "there" of its "average everydayness," in its "facticity." (*HF*, 85, 10) "The preconception of interpretation arises at any time from the level of appropriation which life itself has reached. Over and above this, there is no theoretical possibilities about factual life, which one chooses according to whim and the like." (*PA*, 87) "For the working out of an intention it is decisive to see Dasein in its *everydayness*." (*HF*, 85) We must approach being as it found in and as the "there" of human Dasein, being-there: "there stands the task of the clarification of the basic phenomenon of the 'there' and the categorial-ontological description of being-there." (*HF*, 86) Here, Dasein, or being-there, does not mean merely 'the human subject' or 'reflective consciousness', but rather means just as much "world"
and "temporality." "Dasein' describes in the same way the being of the world as the being of human life...." (HF, 88)

In other words, ontology must be "phenomenological ontology," where phenomenology means the methodological approach of "description" and "phenomenological disclosure of the sphere of lived experience." (HF, 90; IP, 109) Being must become a "phenomenon" as "that which shows itself, as the self-showing. This means at first: it is there as it itself, not somehow represented or in indirect consideration, and not somehow reconstructed. Phenomenon is the way of the being-objective of something, and indeed in an exemplary way: the being-present from itself of an object." (HF, 67) Heidegger speaks of phenomenological description also as an act of "making-explicit" (Abhebung) of that which is for the most part inexplicit in lived experience. (PA, 85)

Further, the phenomenological description of being in the everydayness of human life is also "existential categorial interpretation," since what it describes is the ontological "categories" of factual life. Heidegger describes "the basic task which has been posed: to grasp ontologically-categorially what is immediately closest to us in being-there." (HF, 91) "The categories are nothing created or a society of logical schemata for themselves, a 'grid', but rather in an original way they are alive in life itself (im Leben selbst am Leben)," "are living in one's own concrete life." (PA, 88, 99) Heidegger sometimes calls these living categories "existentials," since they are ways of existing and do not, therefore, merely indicate the characteristics of objects. (PA, 117, 148)

3. Being-in-a-World

The basic category of human existence is "'factual life': the expression 'life' is a fundamental phenomenological category." (PA, 80) Factual life means "being-in-a-world," "in-the-world-being." (HF, 102) "...factual life (Dasein) means: 'being in a world'..." "Dasein (factual life) is being in a world." (HF, 80, 85) Life as being-in-a-world contains a manifold of various categories of life. "What is meant with 'world', what does 'in' a world mean,
how does 'being' in a world appear? The phenomenon Dasein is not to be built up from these determinations, but rather the emphasis at any time of one term of the indication should always be only a possible view of the same unified, basic phenomenon." (HF, 85) The three basic categories of being-in-a-world are "world" (content-meaning), "being-in" (care) (relational meaning), and "temporality" (enactment-meaning). These in turn contain a manifold of categories.

Heidegger begins with a linguistic approach to "life," "living," and shows, as he does also with the verb "to philosophize," that the intransitive meaning of the verb "to live" indicates the relational meaning and enactment-meaning of life and that the transitive meaning indicates the content-meaning of life: In the outline of the structure of the meaning of the expression "life," we proceed from the verb "to live." A concrete experience is here, as everywhere, to be presented, even if the explicative making- emphatic of the meaning is at first here only completely "instinctive," "on the level of emotion." 1. To live as intransitive: to be alive, someone lives (in the sense: he lives intensely); "he lives chaotically"; "he lives withdrawn"; "he lives only halfway"; "one lives thus." 2. To live in the transitive sense: "to live life," "to live one's work"; here mostly in compounds: "to live-through (durchleben) such and such"; "to live-out (verleben) one's years"; above all: "to live something experientially," "to experience something" (etwas erleben). (PA, 82)

II. Lifeworld (It Worlds)

The transitive meaning of "to live," the content-meaning of "living," what is lived, is, in the widest sense, "the world":

The intransitive-verbal meaning of "living" explicates itself, concretely presents itself always as living "in" something, living "out of" something, living "for" something, living "with" something, living "against," living "towards" something, living "from" something. The "something," which in these propositional expressions (apparently only on the spur of the moment picked up and enumerated) indicates the variety of its relation to "life," is what we fix with the term "world." (PA, 85)

Heidegger explains as follows what he means by "content-meaning":

The to-which and towards-which (Worauf und Wozu) of the relation is the content (Gehalt). (The formally indicating, phenomenological category, the how of the to-which of the relation, does not have the meaning of "actual content" ("Inhalt"), of something that fills; this concept is to be used in a different way.) Every object has its specific content-meaning, which for its part is to be
He maintains, then, that "world is the fundamental category of content-meaning in the phenomenon of life." (PA, 86) If we are to get at "the Dasein, the being-there of world," "the world-being-there" (HF, 86, 87) in its facticity, then we must begin simply with the "everyday world." (HF, 90) Heidegger's favorite example in his 1923 lecture course is as follows: "We will pursue the purest everydayness: dwelling at home, being-in-one's-room, where finally one encounters something like a 'table.'" (HF, 88) "Being-in, which cares," he writes, "finds the world thus, grows into this world: table, jug, plough, saw, house, garden, field, village, way." (HF, 112)

Insofar as "life as care lives in a world" (PA, 93), world is "the wherein of being." (HF, 85) But the relation between life and world is not an external, accidental relation, which sometimes is there and sometimes not, like the relation of a chair and a table. (PA, 89) This means that the being-there of the world is not something in itself, but rather lies precisely in the basic character of "encounter" (Begegnis):

Encounter characterises the basic way of the being-there of worldly objects....The basic character of the object is therefore always: it stands and is met up with on the way of caring. (PA, 91)

It concerns therefore not a description (which chooses in advance) of a specific reality, e.g., the cosmos of nature and its description as a world in which living creatures occur, but rather arises out of the phenomenon indicated by the verb "living," which as our life, which we live, allows itself to be brought to view in a definite manner. (PA, 86)

Likewise, if the basic characteristic of the world is that it is always there in an "encounter," then our life is nothing outside of this basic characteristic of "experience" (Erfahrung) of the world around us:

Experience characterises the basic way of approaching [worldly objects], of coming up against them. Experience here not understood in a theoretical sense, empirical perception as opposed to rational thinking or the like....Every experience is in itself an encounter, and indeed encounter in and for a caring. (PA, 91)
It is because the world is always "there" as an "encounter" and our "experience" is always this "encounter" with the world that it makes no sense to set about raising "the epistemological question of the reality of the external world." (IP, 77-84) We have no access to what the world might be in itself, and the world that we do know is always already "there" for us:

The around-worldly has its genuine self-showing in it itself. The genuine solution of the problem of the reality of the external world lies in the insight that it is in no sense a problem, but rather an absurdity. (IP, 92)

According to Heidegger, the everyday world has three aspects, which he calls the "around-world" (Umwelt), the "with-world" (Mitwelt), and self-world (Selbstwelt). These "worlds of care" do not describe separate and different worlds, but rather aspects of world as a single, unified phenomenon:

But that in which a factual life is caringly absorbed (aufgeht), that from which it lives, is always in one of the basic worlds, which can be emphasized, and which we characterize as the around-world, the with-world, and the self-world. (PA, 94)

Insofar as these three worldly aspects are parts of a single world, they can all be seen as aspects of world in the single and extended sense of "around-world," the world that is "around" one. (PA, 130)

1. Around-World

Heidegger notes that we could begin our analysis of the around-world or environment made up of "things" as it is given in philosophical and scientific "theory":

As what is [the table] encountered? A thing in space; as a thing in space it is in addition a material thing. It is so and so heavy, so and so coloured, formed in such a way, with rectangular or round wood; so high, so wide, with a smooth or rough surface....The bodily being-so-there of the thing gives the possibility of making something out about the meaning of the being and being-actual of such objects. Stones and other such things of nature are genuinely such objects. But, viewed more closely, the table is still something more; it is not only a material thing in space, but rather in addition also outfitted with determinate predicates of value: well made, usable; it is equipment, furniture, a piece of furnishing. The total region of the actual can accordingly be partitioned into two spheres: things of nature and things of value, which last always have in themselves being as natural thing as a fundamental stratum of their being. The genuine being of the table is: spatial thing. (HF, 88-89)
But Heidegger wants to leave aside these "prejudices" of a theoretical approach to things, since "I cannot clarify these meaningful phenomena of the around-world in such a way that I destroy their essential character, annul them in their meaning and sketch out a theory.... If I attempt to clarify the around-world theoretically, then it collapses into itself." (IP, 86) "Therefore, the question 'is this lectern (just as I experience in the around-world) real?' is an absurd question." (IP, 91) Such an approach leads to the extinguishing of the "there is world/it worlds" of the way that things are immediately given to us in lived experience. The analysis must begin with a phenomenological description of the way in which, for example, "table, jug, plough, saw, house, garden, field, village, way" are given in our experience prior to any theories about that experience, i.e., simply in our "dwelling at home, being-in-one's-room":

In the room here (da), it is the table here (not 'a' table alongside many other in other rooms and houses) at which one sits in order to (zu) write, to eat, to sew, to play. One immediately regards it, e.g., while visiting: it is a writing table, dinner table, sewing table; it is primarily encountered thus in itself. The character of the 'for something' (zu etwas) is not first shifted to it on the basis of a comparative relation to something else, which it is not.

Its standing here in the room means: in the so or so characterised usage, to play this role; this or that in it is 'unpractical', unsuitable; this is defective; it now stands better in the room than earlier, for example, better lighting; earlier its position was not good (for...). (HF, 90)

The immediately given and genuine being of things in our around-world, our environment, consists not in being a mere "thing in space," but rather in their "being-there-ready-to-hand" for our "dealings" (Umgang) with them:

The "worldly" in what is being encountered...shows itself as being serviceable to-, used for-, no longer properly suited for-, no longer used for-; its Dasein, its being-there, is being-there-for. "Towards this," "for this" (Dazu) means: ready-to-hand for being occupied with-, for a dwelling at it, out of which this or that looking-around and doing with it and positioning oneself arises. In such being-there-ready-to-hand itself as such, the towards-which, the for-which (Wozu) is there as familiar and disclosed; and this for-which in the kind of being of a determinate
everyday being-so - e.g., for eating (this alone or with specific others, at the times of the day). (HF, 93-94)

This being-ready-to-hand, the being-available makes up its presence to hand. (HF, 97)

The being-ready-to-hand of things around us consists in certain "references" (Verweisungen) to other things, which Heidegger describes as the "from-which" (das Woraus), the "for-which" (das Wozu), and the "for someone" (für jemanden). The "from which" refers us understandingly to that from which the table was made. The "for which" refers us to what the table is used for. The "for someone" refers to the person who uses and enjoys the table. What is around us is a network of "references" in terms of which we understand how to deal with things:

This going-here-and-there and back-and-forth in the context of reference characterises caring as going-around, dealing (Umgehen). The context of reference is what is genuinely around us, environ­ing. Significance is to be ontologically defined as the with-which (that is there) of concernful dealings (Umgang) with it. It is this around which supports the factual-spatial environing world in its being-so-there. (HF, 101)

Usability; something used for something; in possession; produced out of-, the from-which itself; wood, to order. Corn, flour, bread. Context of reference. (HF, 112)

Thus, the "spatiality" of the environment, as it is immediately given to us, is not the geometrical space of physics, but rather encountered as a network of places and distances of ready-to-hand things:

Factual spatiality, which is carried out by concern, has its distances, is as there: too wide, near by, through the street, through the kitchen, a stone's throw, back of the cathedral, and the like. In this spatiality lies at any time a familiarity with its references, which are always those of concern.

The "around" is determined primarily-ontologically in no way from a being-laid-side-by-side and around-each-other and geometri­cal contexts.... (HF, 101-102; IP, 86)

It is the network of references that Heidegger calls "significance." In terms of this network of significant references, things "signify" (be-deuten) in the sense of both meaning something to me, being significant to me, and also pointing, indicating, or referring (Deuten) to something else. The "around-world" thus has two aspects: "significance" itself and the "worldish objects" in
the sense of what is in the world of significance and "signifies" in terms of it. Significance is the "being" of things in the world: Towards-what and about-what caring is, at-what it holds itself, is to be defined as significance. Significance is a categorial determination of world; the objects in a world, the worldly, worldish objects are lived in the character of significance. (PA, 90)

It is therefore not so that objects are in the first place there as naked realities, e.g., natural objects, which then receive the clothing of a character of value in the course of experiencing, so that they do not run around so nakedly. It is not so...that the constitution of nature could only in the least provide the fundament for higher types of objects. Rather, the objectivity nature arises at first out of the basic meaning of the object-being of the lived, experienced, encountered world. (cf. the history of the concept "natura.")....

Significance cannot be identified with value. (PA, 91)

...significance is not a thingly characteristic, but rather a characteristic of being. (HF, 89)

In our dealings with the world, it is the objects in the world and not the world of significance itself to which our attention is directly turned. Significance is the background against which we understandingly deal with things. "The object of care is not significance as a categorial characteristic, but rather at any time something worldly....Significance as such is not experienced, expressly; but it can be experienced. (PA, 93) It is because the around-world is defined primarily through its significance for our changing concerns that it is not some fixed region of objects, but rather is characterized by what Heidegger calls the "swimmableness of the lifeworld":

The around-world has no ordered borders, the "around" specifies itself at any time from the enactment-meaning and the relational meaning of the caring and its predominant direction, of the caring dealings with..., the breadth of the dealings, the originality of the dealings. What still, more or less, belongs in the around-world, modifies itself constantly.... (PA, 96)

As a network of references, significance is a form of "disclosedness" (Erschlossenheit). It is the prior disclosedness of significance which allows us to understand things in the world "as" something, "as" for something, "as" from something, "as" for
someone. In other words, it provides the "interpretedness" of things in the world:

The as-what and how of encountering is to be characterized as significance; this itself is to be interpreted as a category of being. Significant means: being, being-there in the how of a determinate signifying....The determinateness of the signifying...lies in the character of the disclosedness of what is at any time significant....In it moves interpretedness. This disclosedness shows itself in two characters: 1) in the character of presence-to-hand (Vorhandenheit) [of the ready-to-hand]. (HF, 93)

What makes up disclosedness in what is encountered is so little a manifold of relations, in which the being-there encountered is subsequently and secondarily ordered, that rather what is encountered is there precisely out of the disclosedness and through it. What is as being-there in everydayness is not already the genuine being before and beside its "towards something" and "for someone," but rather the being-there lies precisely in the "towards" and the "for"....Out of and with the disclosedness, which is encountered at what has significance and as it, the latter signifies itself in the "there" of a dwelling and of a situation of everydayness....Significance is only intelligible out of the disclosedness found in it, from which disclosedness what is encountered signifies in what is encountered and so penetrates into the there. (HF, 95-96)

The totality of the disclosedness of significance as a network of references makes up the around-world as the "wherein," which maintains itself in a "familiarity" and in which we "know our way around" in our dealings:

The phenomenal totality of disclosedness, out of which something that is factically encountered signifies itself in its there, is itself a peculiar context of assignment or reference (Verweisung). The how of such signifying that refers is encountered in the character of familiarity, which is at any time. The presence-to-hand and just as much the appearance of what is encountered, are known (hexis, aletheia), and this not in the sense of a knowledge of it and about it, but rather as where-in one, corresponding to what is encountered, knows one's way around, one oneself. (HF, 99)

The "wherein" of the around-world makes up the "existentiell dwelling-place" or "abode" (Aufenthalt) (HF, 109, 87) of our dealings. "The manifold of reference is nothing other than that wherein concern dwells, abides (sich aufhält)." (HF, 101) The world "is there in our dwelling in it" (Verweilen bei ihm). (HF, 87) "In-the-world-being means not: occurring among things, but rather means: dwelling in, which cares about, the around of the world being encountered." (HF, 102) The around-world makes up our "habit"
or "dwellingness" (Gewohnheit) (PA, 95, 18), our "habitus" (IP, 4) in the sense of the "pre-having" of a familiar context of meaning in which we move. In Aristotle’s language, the world is our hexis, our having, our ethos, our dwelling-place. Thus, "habitual, habituality, dwellingness represent basic categories of life in its facticity." (PA, 96, 84)

2. With-World

Heidegger explains that the around-world is also a "with-world" in that it is a world shared "with" others, who are also "there" in the "there-being" of world. The others are not only "around" one, but more so "with" one, since "the objects [in the world] are not such with the character of being and the what-character of the with-worldly, of 'human beings'." (PA, 96) He again uses his phenomenological example of "dwelling at home" to show how, dwelling alongside the things around one, one is also always dwelling "with" others - the friend, the wife, the children:

Here and there [the table] shows lines - the boys like to be creative at the table; these lines are not merely interruptions in the paint, but rather: that was the boys, and they are still that. This side is not the eastward side, and this narrow side so many centimeters shorter than the other, but rather it is the side at which my wife sits in the evening, when she wants still to read; at the table here we have had at one time such and such discussion; here that decision was made with a friend, here at one time that work was written, that occasion celebrated. (HF, 90)

The "there-being" of things is permeated with the "there-being" of others:

What is encountered is what it is and how it is as "the table there," at which we...eat our daily meal,...in which those specific human beings were there-at, i.e., are still also there in the being-there of the table....In what is so encountered in everyday-ness the others are there.... (HF, 96)

Thus, our relation to others is not an accidental feature of our existence, which is sometimes there and sometimes not; rather, our "being-in-a-world" is essentially not only "dwelling at" (bei) the around-world, but also being-with others. "The practical-historical I is necessarily of a social nature, it stands in a context of life with other Is. In all genuine life-worlds there always exists a connection with the 'natural experience of life'." (UN, 210) Like
the "swimmableness" of the around-world, the with-world is not an objective, fixed domain, but rather constantly shifting as others come and go, are near or far:

The with-world is encountered "partially" in my self-world, so far as I live with other human beings, am somehow caringly related to them, find myself in their care-world. The non-self-worldly with-world is not fenced off from this in the manner of an ordering. There are no borders here; the "partitioning" can shift at any moment by virtue of the character of life that it is experienced in encounters. In every factual life, with-worldly encounters have their own possibilities, so far as life itself is charged with possibilities and forms possibilities. (PA, 96)

The others whom I encounter are bound up in the network of "references" which make up the significance of the around-world. I encounter the others in such references as the "for whom" and the "from whom" of ready-to-hand things:

Even there, where the disclosedness of what is encountered (the for-what, the for whom, the from whom) is not encountered in the familiarity of the everyday..., where something strange, which we take exception to, penetrates into our closest world, precisely there the character of disclosedness announces itself in our dwelling on it, searching around, and its view-points; the question, what is that?, explicates itself into: For what is it used? What does one make with it? For whom is it? Who made it? (HF, 95)

The "disclosedness" of the "significance" of world encompasses both the "presence-to-hand" of the around-world and the "appearance" (Vorschein) of others:

The determinateness of the signifying...lies in the character of the disclosedness of what is at any time significant....In it moves interpretedness. This disclosedness shows itself in two characters: 1) in the character of presence-to-hand (Vorhandenheit); 2) in the with-worldly appearance (i.e., in bringing-to-light, holding the with-worldly in appearance)....2. In its being-there, the there, which is thus present-at-hand, brings "the others," a specific sphere of those who live-with (determining itself out of everydayness) to appearance; either specific others: who gave the book; the carpenter, who made the table; or who has a better library in the direction-. (HF, 93-94)

But the totality of significance, whether there is direct or indirect reference to others, is as a whole "permeated" with the others in the form of the "averageness" and the "publicness" (Offentlichkeit) (HF, 103; PA, 129) of all meaning in everyday life:
Everydayness permeates the determinate relations of the contexts of reference. Everyone knows his way around at any time, is familiar with others, just as the others are with him. This with-worldly being-known is an average one which develops in everydayness....  
(HF, 99)

...in the closest everyday dealings, the around-world is always also there as the with-world and the self-world. These terms do not delimit regions from one another, but rather are specific ways of the encountering of the world; each shows the specific character of the around, the environing. This around is nothing other than averageness, publicness. (HF, 102)

This "publicness" is what Heidegger also refers to as "das Man" (HF, 17), the "they," or the "one," which as a term is supposed to capture the indifferent, self-evident, public ways in which individuals understand and act. Man wird geboren, man arbeitet, man heiratet, man stirbt, one is born, one works, one marries, one dies. "...publicness is the way of being of das "Man," the "one," the "they": one says, one hears, one tells, one presumes, one expects, one is for it that...." (HF, 32)

The others are encountered with-worldly in such a way that the others bring with them the "one oneself." In the with-worldly appearance of what is encountered, one oneself is also what one does, "one oneself," one's position, look, performance, success and unsuccess among the others. In the there of the table, which is encountered, and such "possessions," one is in an inconspicuous manner also what is encountered....one encounters oneself in the dealing of this being-occupied with the world. (HF, 99)

3. Self-World

According to Heidegger, we have ourselves in a "self-having" (AJ, 29), but this is not introspection directed towards a world-less "I." Rather, our self-world is precisely the "around" of the around-world and the with-world, insofar as this world is always mine, lived by me, enacted by me:

The self-world cannot at first be identified with the "I." In my care for my self-world, for the "me" in the factual concrete sense, the "I," a category of complicated formation, does not at all need to be experienced by me as such. As self-world, the "me," for which I care, is experienced in specific forms of significance, which are absorbed in the complete life-world, and in which also the around-world and the with-world are always also there with the self-world. The life-world is at any time experienced in one of these predominating characteristics (Ausprägungen), expressly or not....the standing out (Abhebung) of, e.g., the self-world is not a negation of the others, but rather the reverse: in the standing
out of the self-world an appropriation of the with-world and the environing world (whose meaning are determined from the self-world) is also enacted - and so it is with each world. (PA, 94-95)

My self encompasses the totality of the disclosedness of with-worldly significance insofar as the pervasive and final reference within this totality is that of the "for who" or "for the sake of" (umwollen) (HF, 94) in the sense of the "me." World is always "mine" and for "me." But this means that the self is not something in itself, an isolated I, but rather precisely the "around" of the with-worldly around-world. I am my relations to things and to others.

The predominant way in which the self-world is encountered is not in taking the lead over the around-world and the with-world, but rather in being inconspicuously "absorbed" (aufgegangen) in them. In other words, the self-world is habitually experienced in terms of the "averageness" and "publicness" of the "they," the "one":

Living and caring in the self-world is not and rests upon no self-reflection....I encounter myself in the world in which I live, with which I concern myself, to which I give myself over...in my surroundings, in my around-world, in my with-world....The self-world is the world in which I encounter myself in a worldly way, in which I am somehow also there alongside (dabei), have been taken along (mitgenommen), in which something "happens" to me, in which I am active. This way of co-experiencing and caring is the "habitual" (gewöhnliche) one.... (PA, 95)

What shows itself in the expression "that was the boys" with emphasis on the past is inconspicuously, (in different ways) clearly, shiftingly there in every such worldly thing encountered: for the most part - and this precisely very refined and self-evident - "one oneself," one's own temporality in its everydayness. What one does, whereat one has one's dwelling, this world "is" one oneself. What one oneself is, is oneself in the world with others, determines itself out of that as which one comes to appearance with the others, in difference from the others. The everydayness of Dasein has this itself there and seeks it on the way of listening to what the others say about it, how one's activity looks for the others, how the others come to appearance at it. (HF, 94)

Since the being-there of the self-world is always encountered in terms of the facticity of the being-there of the around-world and the with-world (whether in the form of "the one" or not), since this encounter is always immediate without any con-
scious act of thinking and positing on my part, since, that is, world is the familiar "existentiell abode" in which I always already dwell, so that I always arrive too late with my theories and proofs for the existence of such a world, Heidegger accordingly describes such encounter and givenness as an immediate "there is/it gives" (es gibt, es-gaben) of world (IP, 67, 69) and as a "there is world/it worlds":

We have seen that in the lived experience of the around-world there lies absolutely no theoretical positing. (IP, 93)

There lies in pure living experience also no - as it is said-context of founding, as if I first saw brown, intersecting surfaces, which then give themselves to me as box, then as desk, further as desk for academic speeches, as lectern, such that I would, as it were, affix "lectern" to the box like a label. All this is bad and misinterpreted interpretation, a deflection from pure viewing of living experience. I see the lectern, as it were, in a single stroke, all at once; I see it not merely isolated, I see the desk as placed to high for me. I see a book lying on it, immediately as disturbing me...I see the lectern in an orientation, illumination, a background....In the lived experience of seeing the lectern, something gives itself to me out of an immediate around-world. The around-worldly (lectern, book, blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, janitor, student, streetcar, automobile, and so on) are not things along with a determinate character of significance, objects and in addition also grasped as signifying such and such, but rather the significance is what is primary, gives itself immediately, without any intellectual detour through a grasping of things. Living in an around-world, everywhere and always there is significance/it signifies to me, everything is worldish, "there is world/it worlds".... (IP, 71-73; PA, 81)

III. Being-in (Dwelling)

Heidegger's linguistic approach to the expression of "living," in and through which being is, also focuses on its intransitive meaning, i.e., the act of living. He here takes up the question of "the being of life," "the problematic of the being-meaning of life" with regard to its relational meaning, the relation to world. (PA, 114, 172)

1. Dwelling-at

Heidegger defines "relational meaning" as follows:

The relation of comportment (Verhaltens) is relation to something; the comportment to... holds (hält) itself to something, or, depending on the meaning of the relation, the something, to which the comportment is, is what the relation holds at itself, what is
held by it and in it, what it "holds" "of" the object. The to-which and towards-which of the relation is the content (Gehalt). (PA, 53)

The basic designation for this relation is "being-in," which is not the "in" of something spatially in something else, but rather is to be taken in the sense of "Verweilen bei-," dwelling at, where the "at" (chez) means a familiarity-with and a being concerned-with (cf. the expressions "at home," "at a friend's place"): 

..."life" and "world" are not two objects existing for themselves, like a table to which a chair standing before it is spatially related. The relatedness is such a relatedness of a relation, i.e., is enacted, is lived.... (PA, 89)

We can get a fuller understanding of the meaning of "dwelling-at" by focusing on how it is found in the factual "I am" of human life; how it is articulated into the categorial moments of interpretedness, mood, and language; how it is characterized by always being "mine"; and, finally, how it is fundamentally characterized as "caring."

i) I-am-meaning

We could approach the human being theoretically in terms of its traditional philosophical definition as the "rational animal," the "being endowed with reason," or in terms of its traditional theological definition, which absorbs the philosophical definition and defines "man" further as "person" in the sense of a complex of "body," "soul," and "spirit":

In the indicating determination of the theme of hermeneutics (facticity = our own Dasein at any time), the expression "human" Dasein or the "being of man" has been in principle avoided.

The concepts of "man," namely, 1) the living being endowed with reason, and 2) person, personality, have arisen within the experience and the view towards at any time determinately pregiven objective contexts of the world. The first concept belongs in the objective context, which is indicated through the series of objects: plant, animal, man, demon, God.... The second concept has arisen in the Christian explication of the original production and outfitting of man as a creation of God, a definition which was guided by the revelation of the Old Testament. In both conceptual determinations, what is at issue is the fixing of the pieces of furnishing of a pregiven thing, which then, on the basis of the same, is subsequently granted a determinate manner of being and indifferently left within a being-real. (HF, 21; cf. PA, 36)
According to Heidegger, this approach to human being in terms of "reason" or the "I think" (Descartes) as a piece of equipment attached to the body, leads to the "de-living" of our factical life. The human being is reduced to a thing that is constructed together out of objective parts. Heidegger wants to begin not with "reason" or the "I think," but rather with the "I am":

The question of the being-meaning of life, concretely of one's own concrete life at any time, can be grasped formally-indicatively as the question of meaning of the "I am"...what is necessary is to pursue the meaning of the "sum" in Descartes "cogito-sum" in a more original problematic and winning of the interpretive categories. (PA, 172-173)

If the "'is'-meaning" of human life is to be pursued within its "(I) 'am'-meaning" (AJ, 29) and as "existence," this "am" has to be distinguished from the "I think, I am" of Descartes, for whom the "am," "being," simply means the being-real of the res cogitans, "the thinking thing":

The "sum" is first indeed also for Descartes, but precisely here already lies the mistake: he does not remain here and already has the preconception of the meaning of being in the manner of mere observation and ascertainment, and indeed of what cannot be doubted. That Descartes was able to veer off into an epistemologically questioning and also to inaugurate this questioning intellectually-historically, is only an expression for the fact that the "sum," its being and its categorial structure became in no way problematical for him, but rather the meaning of the word "sum" was intended in an indifferent, formally objective, uncritical and unclarified meaning, which was not at all genuinely related to the ego. (PA, 173)

In other words, we are to begin with the "I am" of human being as it is given within "average everydayness," where we find "the full concrete historically factical self." (AJ, 30) "The being of life [is] its 'facticity'." (PA, 114)

ii) Mineness

If we approach human being in terms of the "reason" and the "I think," which indifferently "knows" an objective world, this leads to the "de-living" of what Heidegger calls the "ownness" or the "mine" of being-in-a-world. In the first place, this means then that the world loses its personal character insofar as it is abstracted away from any relation to "me." That the experience of
the world is "mine" is pushed aside. Heidegger considers the epistemological question of "is there something?" "the problem of the external world":

One will retort: there lies indeed in the meaning of the question precisely that an I belongs to it. "Is there" means indeed: is there for me, the questioner. Let us sink ourselves again into the lived experience. Is there in it something like the meaningful pointing back to me, who stands here at the lectern, with this name and at this age? Check it for yourselves by all of you asking: does there lie in the question, "is there something/is something given?," a for me (Miss X, who is an arts student), a for me (Mr., Dr. X), a for me (Mr., who is a law student)? Obviously not. Therefore: immediately there is not only not an I to be grasped; also, in the expansion of the field of intuition, therefore in the non-limitation to precisely me, it shows itself that the meaning of the experience has no relation to the individual Ies. (IP, 69)

Herein I do not discover myself. The something in general, about whose "there is/it gives" (es geben) is being asked, does not world. The around-worldly is here extinguished if we grasp every possible content of the around-world as something in general. This grasping, establishing (Fest-stellen) as object in general lives at the expense of pushing back my own I. In the meaning of the something in general lies the fact that I do not resonate in the establishing of it as such, but rather this resonating-with and this going-out-with of mine is stopped. The standing-against, the being-an-object as such does not concern me. I am no longer the I, who establishes. Establishing as living experience is only still a trace of living experience (Er-leben); it is a de-living (Ent-leben). The objective, the intimately known (Er-kannte), is as such dis-tantiated, lifted out of genuine living experiencing. (IP, 73-74)

The lived experience of the around world is de-lived down to the remnant: knowing something real as such. (IP, 89)

But against this orientation toward mere knowing, Heidegger wants to insist upon the personal character of our basic experience of the world:

But lived experience, however, also is, if I avoid objectification and insertion into an objective context, has indeed a now, it is there - and it is even somehow my lived experience. I am also there, I experience it, it belongs to my life....I bring a new experience to givenness to myself not only for myself, but rather ask you all, every individualized I-myself, who sits here, to do the same....You come, as usual (gewöhnlich), into this lecture hall at the usual hour and go to your usual place. Hold fast this lived experience of "seeing your place".... (IP, 69-70)

Let us recall again the living experience of the around-world, my seeing of the lectern. Looking to my seeing comportment to the
lectern giving itself in the manner of the around-world, do I find in the pure meaning of this living experience something like an I? In this living experiencing, in this living towards, lies something of me: my I goes fully out of itself and swings along (schwingt mit) in this 'seeing'. (IP, 73)

Moreover, if human being is seen as a living being endowed with reason, it itself is being seen as a mere thing constructed out of parts and is, thus, stripped out of the personal subjective character of the "my own." The tendency is to see the individual as an instance of some indifferent universal reason:

...experiencing does not experience the "I" as standing in a region, as the individuation of a "universal," as a case of - but rather experiencing is the experiencing of the "I" as self. (AJ, 29)

Facticity is the descriptive term for the character of being of "our" "own" Dasein....As always my own, Dasein does not signify an isolating relativization towards externally viewed particulars and thus the individual (solus ipse), but rather "ownness," "indivuality" (Eigenheit) is a how of being, the indication of the way of a possible being-awake. (HF, 7)

iii) Caring

In the epistemological approach, being-in-a-world is not only robbed of the character of being "mine," but, what goes along with this, is deprived of its character of anxious care or interest in itself. Human being appears as an indifferent object, which merely "is," and about which I have no anxious care. My "self-having" appears as not essentially different than, say, things "having" such and such properties:

How then is "life" there? And how is that won which has been there up till now? The phenomena of life are of course not like stones on a board, which now are to be newly ordered. (AJ, 38)

The neutral third person verb "is" is incapable of grasping the personal dimension of the "I am" of human "existence," which personal "am" points precisely to the "care of the self about itself" (Bekümmernng des Selbst um sich selbst) (AJ, 32):

Existence is a determinateness of something....it can be grasped as a specific way of being, as a specific "is"-meaning, which "is" essentially (I) "am"-meaning, which is not genuinely had in theoretical thinking, but rather had in the enactment of the "am," a way of being of the being of the "I." The being of the self, so understood, means (formally indicated) existence....In the archontic meaning of the authentically enacted, basic experience of the
"I am"...I myself am radically and purely an issue....Existence-meaning is...precisely the being-meaning that cannot be won from the "is" of the "is," which is explicated specifically in the manner of knowledge and thereby somehow is objectified, but rather from the basic experience of the concerned (bekümmerten) having of itself.... (AJ, 29-30)

Thus, Heidegger maintains that "caring is the basic meaning of the relation of life" (PA, 98), and not "knowing":

In its verbal sense, life is to be interpreted, according to its relational meaning, as caring; caring for and about something, living from something caringly. This characteristic does not mean that life goes around with a mournful expression. In happy giddiness, in indifference, in stagnation, and always, "life" is characterised as caring.....In its relational meaning, grasped in the widest sense, life is: caring for, being anxious for one's "daily bread"....."Living in want" (Darbung) (privatio, carentia) is the basic how of the being-meaning of life, regarding its relation and enactment. Where the opposite aspect comes to the fore, where life is in possession of itself, e.g., in a so-called objective life, which is completely absorbed (aufgeht) in an objective task and is simply there "of itself as it were," this basic how is the more tenacious, because it covertly eats itself in and has eaten itself in. Secure objectivity is insecure flight in the face of facticity, and it overlooks itself precisely in the fact that it believes itself to be able to increase objectivity by means of flight, whereas objectivity comes to the most radical appropriation precisely in facticity. (PA, 89)

Heidegger stresses that not even the "I am" is adequate to grasp the character of life's care for itself, since this "am" still suggests something fixed and available. Life has been characterized rather from "being" in the verbal sense, from the "to be."

We are "existence" in the sense of a striving "standing-out" towards ourselves as a "being-possible" (HF, 17), which is to be lived and enacted. In "having-me-myself," I have myself as something which "is an issue":

Being-there in the manner of being means: not and never primarily as an object of intuition and intuitive determining, of mere acquiring knowledge and having knowledge about it, but rather Dasein is there to itself in the how of its ownmost being. The how of being opens and defines the "there" which is possible at any time. Being - transitive: to be factual life! Being itself never a possible object of having, insofar as it itself, being, is the issue. (HF, 7)

Existence [is] the possibility of Dasein, which is at any time historically determined....It is never an "object," but rather being; it is there only so far as it "is" always a living. (HF, 19)
My "having-myself" is not final possession, but rather a "way," a "being-on-the-way" towards myself, such that I am given to myself precisely in "questionableness" (Fraglichkeit):
The basic questionableness in hermeneutics and its foreseeing: the object: Dasein is only in it itself. It is, but as the on-the-way of itself to it!....to it corresponds fundamental questionableness. (HF, 17)

Insofar as we are always being in a world, our care for our being is also care for our world as around-world and with-world. The world is not "known" objectively, but rather is always the focus of care or "concern" (Besorgen):
What one is concerned with shows itself as that out of which factual life lives. The out-of-which, explicated thus, gives the phenomenological basis for understanding being "in" a world, i.e., an original interpretation of the phenomenon of factual spatiality and of being "in" it, which surfaces here. The how of being-"in" as living out of a world (as what is encountered in concern) shows itself as care. (HF, 86)

This being in the world, which cares, is what Heidegger gets at with his notion of "dwelling at":
In-the-world-being means not: occurring among other things, but rather means: having concern about the around of the world that is encountered and dwelling, tarrying at it. The genuine way of being itself in a world is caring, as ordering, performing, taking-into-possession, preventing, guarding-against-loss, etc. (HF, 102)

For the understanding of the phenomenal context of significance, it needs to be seen that disclosedness stands in care, which is at any time. The manifold of reference is nothing other than that wherein concern resides. The for-which and the towards-which and their with-worldly others are in advance that which is an issue in care. The context of reference itself is what is cared about. (HF, 101)

But care is ultimately directed towards the person who is in the world, which is there as possibility "for the sake of" the person. In other words, the world always presents itself as a "self-world," a world of possibilities for the self:

...in the there, which is cared for, the with-world and with this one oneself is what is cared for. Its basic character is determined insofar as with that, which it is intent upon, it places it itself in care. Care somehow always cares for itself....It cares for itself, in that it finds itself in a worldly manner in the there which is encountered. Caring as such is precisely that which originally has the world there and so orders time that it is for it and in it that the world is encountered. (HF, 102)
iv) Illumination

If we begin with "reason" or the "I think" in the traditional definition of human being, we are immediately placed within the traditional "problem of the external world." Since thinking is supposed to be something "in" us, we are forced to raise the question of how we can get beyond this realm of interiority and its "representations" to the "external" world. (IP, 77-84) In other words, beginning with the "I think" leads to "de-living" the being of one's life as always already "being-in" one's world. We are always already "Verweilen bei" einer Welt, "dwelling at" a world. "The manifold of reference is nothing other than that wherein concern resides (sich aufhält)." (HF, 101)

The world is always present as a "there" of "disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)," "unconcealment" (aletheia) (HF, 11; PA, 54), or "illumination" (Erhellung). (PA, 126, 152, 179, 185) The being-in, the care, which resides in this "there," has the character of "disclosing," "letting be encountered," "illuminating" (Erhellend-es) (PA, 54), "announcing" (Melden) (PA, 138, 123). Being-in is an "illuminating" which lights up the "luminance" (Reluzenz) of the world. Heidegger's lecture notes read: "The approach and dealings which lets be encountered, being-open: for disclosedness in the pre-having of care out of and for everydayness." (HF, 93-94) Care lets the contents of the around-world, the with-world, and the self-world be encountered and disclosed in advance "as" something, so that our concrete dealing are not blind, but are always guided in advance. This care, which discloses and illuminates the "there" of "human-there," has three aspects to it, which Heidegger speaks of as "affect" (mood), "interpretedness" (understanding), and "dis-course."

"Affect" lets the world be encountered, discloses or announces it, in the character of a "being-to-me" in the sense of mattering to me (in one mood or another). Affect is, therefore, an aspect of care which lets the world be encountered as something which is cared about. The world is announced as something which "pesters" or "plagues" me in my care, "gnaws" at me and "eats in"
to me, such that it "day and night does not let me come to rest." (PA, 137, 93) It is in moods that the world assails me constantly, so that I am always in a state of "restlessness" (Unruhe). Moods are, therefore, not "feelings" in the psychological sense of merely interior processes. Rather, they disclose the world. In announcing the world in its "being-to-me," affect at the same time discloses this "me" to whom the world matters. For instance, in the affect of "anxiety" (HF, 17; PA, 195) or "horrescence," this "to me" in my care is disclosed in an exemplary manner. Affect "announces" the "being-there" of the world and the self in such a primordial manner that this announcing has nothing to do with "knowledge." Rather, world and self are announced in the character of something "befindlich," something which is simply "found." One encounters the world in terms of "no theoretical context of founding, but rather an enactment-context, adfectus, affect - being to me!" Understanding is then the "grasping of the factual, which is already 'found' in an inconspicuous having." (PA, 180) Affect, therefore, makes up one's Befinden, one's "finding oneself" or "state of mind" as being-in-a-world. Heidegger explains all this in a long passage, which I quote in its entirety:

If factual life is in complete concern, then something like something plaguing (plaguing), a gnawing, boring can be factically encountered. One does not say enough, and is on a false track regarding the interpretive categories, if one wants to characterize these (formal) characters simply as "feelings." "Feeling" is a psychological category, whose categorial structure is confused, in any case not so determinate that it could have something to say in the present interpretation.

We leave these characters of the factual movement of life terminologically undefined at first (a manner of being and even an existentially factual expression - "being-to-me"; cf. horresco), so long as they are not themselves interpreted. Here we shall emphasize only what is peculiar about them, i.e., that they have a special announcement-meaning, in such a way indeed that this would not convey knowledge or even only intend it. They are phenomena of one's own (factual) appearing in facticity with the tendency to determine factual life, in which they are encountered, in the manner of its enactment and according to its being-meaning specifically in terms of its relational meaning.

The character of announcement is not to be taken as directives, before and after, which give out knowledge, notices, but rather is a way (in being-to-me of what pesterers) in which factual life, from
itself, wants to address itself, claim itself, preoccupy itself (in Anspruch nehmen). In the manner of plaguing, something announces itself which eats away at life. In the manner of plaguing, therefore, a coming-forth in facticity (the "eating," gnawing) announces itself, in which coming-forth even the "at-what" of the eating comes-forth: "life itself," around-worldly; somehow not worldly, but precisely also not somehow categorically otherwise regarding content, but rather precisely in this being-announced in the manner of plaguing in facticity. (PA, 137-138)

If affect makes up one's moodful "fore-having" (Vorhaben) of world and self, which guides all lived experience in advance, it is understanding or what Heidegger calls "interpretedness" (Ausgelegtheit) (HF, 31) which makes up one's "foresight" (Vorsicht) or "preconception" (Vorgriff). (IP, 116) The disclosedness of worldly significance as a totality of references is held within a "pre-understanding" or "interpretedness," such that in our "dealings" we "know our way around" in the world. "Concern lets what indicates and signifies be encountered as a being, in being-there." (HF, 112) In other words, understanding signifies to itself in advance a totality of references, with which it familiar and at home.

The significance of the world is also illuminated and articulated in "discourse" (Rede), which is not ruled by "grammar," but by the "speaking of life itself." (PA, 83) The world has the character of "something which is addressed": "[The concept of the "being endowed with reason"] does not touch the decisive meaning of zoon logon echon. In the classical scientific philosophy of the Greeks (Aristotle), logos never means "reason," but rather discourse, conversation; therefore, man is a being, which has its world in the manner of something which is addressed (der Ange-sprochenen)." (HF, 21, 27) Since the interpretedness of the world is for the most part guided by "publicness" and the "they," it gets articulated into what Heidegger calls "Gerede," "idle talk," which has mapped out in advance how one "addresses" the world and oneself. "...they say, they hear, they tell....One even writes books from hearsey." (HF, 32) Discourse, therefore, partly makes up "preconception," which precisely "requires a how of addressing and interrogating." (HF, 16)
The illumination of the "there," i.e., the disclosedness of the "as what" (HF, 31) of the "being-there" of the around-world, the with-world, and the self-world is given in advance in affect, interpretedness, and discourse. This is what Heidegger calls the "fore-having of care," "fore-care," or "pre-encountering." (HF, 98)

And it is this "as what" which gets explicitly worked out in "interpretation" as a "laying out (Auslegen) of facticity." (HF, 14) There is always "a determinate pre-understanding, which Dasein has of itself: the leading 'as what', in which it addresses 'itself'". (HF, 31) Interpretation is "the announcing of the being of a being in its being to-(me)." (HF, 10) It is a concrete specific "illuminating" which "grasps the object 'as' object." It "'says' that, what, and how the object is." (PA, 54, 112) Heidegger refers to the interpretive logos as aletheuein, "un-concealing" something as something: "It is the achievement of discourse to make something accessible as openly there, as being present-to-hand. As such, logos has the exemplary possibility of the performance of aletheuein (making what was previously concealed, covered over as unconcealed, openly there, available)." (HF, 11)

2. Larvance

But human life, as "being-in" and "dwelling-at," has the tendency to "fall away" from itself towards that which it is "in," towards that which is the object of care, i.e., the world and especially the with-worldly around-world of "das Man." Because of this, its self-world comes to be characterized by what Heidegger calls "larvance" (Larvanz), a word he has coined from the Latin word "larva," which means both "ghost" or "spectre" and "mask." In other words, human life has the tendency to "mask" itself in terms of the with-worldly around-world of "das Man" and to live, then, in a kind of ambiguous "ghostliness," in which it always looks like it is such and such, but really is not. The "three basic categories" (PA, 109) of the relational meaning of care, as "falling away" or "larvance," are what Heidegger calls "tendency," "distance," and "closing-off." By giving a phenomenological description of these, he at the same time describes what it is that is being fallen away
from and masked, i.e., factual life in its authenticity. This roundabout way of getting at what human Dasein "authentically" is bound up with Heidegger's method of beginning precisely with the way in which human Dasein appears at first and for the most part in its average everydayness. (PA, 104, 105)

i) Tendency

The category of "tendency" (Neigung) is articulated into the categories of "inclination," "being-taken-along," "dispersion," and "self-satisfaction." These can be explained in turn. Beginning with "tendency," attention should be paid to the literal meaning of "bending," "tilting," "inclining," "tending" ("stretching"), which points both to the elements of "care" (which here can hardly be confused with "knowledge") and falling away towards worldly significance:

In caring about forms of significance, at its taking a direction which spends itself on these, in its having of direction at any time towards its world, in caring living from and out of the world, there lies the meaning-character of "Neigung," "tendency." This categorial meaning of tendency, which is contained in the relational meaning (Bezugssinn) of life itself, gives to life a peculiar weight, a direction with weight, a pull (Zug) towards.... As encountered, the world always meets this tending of care and is that which, as it were, commands the pull of tendency. (PA, 100)

Tendency takes the form of "Geneigtheit," "inclination" or "disposition" (literally "inclinedness"), insofar as it solidifies itself into a set direction. It is the possibilities (future) of this set disposition (past) which are "developed" and "enacted" in one's daily life (present):

The enactment of life can at any time develop (ausbilden) the tendency in specific ways, which is "living" in relational meaning.... This character of tendency, which is co-given in the relational meaning of life itself, temporalizes, temporally unfolds (reluctantly) a how of enactment, Geneigtheit, disposition. Caring about... is enacted in the enactment-meaning (determined by relational meaning [reluctantly categorially]) of disposition.

This disposition drives live into its world, holds it fast therein, temporally unfolds a consolidation of the direction-taking of life. It finds itself genuinely there where its own disposition holds it fast; and life takes from there itself the direction regarding it itself, i.e., regarding its dealings in its world, and it takes from there the "representation" which it develops for itself from itself (i.e., the world). In its disposition towards
its world, life "has itself" and experiences itself always only in the figure of its "world." (PA, 100-101)

"Disposition" towards a certain world, then, is always also a direction towards a certain picture of the self, i.e., the self-world, which, as we shall see more clearly below, is derived precisely from the around-world and the public with-world. One is disposed towards a certain life-style.

Tendency is also characterized categorically by what Heidegger calls "Mitgenommenwerden," "being-taken-along," a word which Heidegger simply takes up from everyday life and raises to the level of a philosophical concept, in much the same way that Aristotle took up such a colloquial word as "kategoria." "Der Bus konnte nicht alle mitnehmen" means simply: "the bus could not take everyone along." What Heidegger means by saying that in tendency and disposition we are "taken-along" is that we abandon ourselves to the pull and drag of our world and, as it were, "go along for the ride." We are taken away from ourselves, from our having a choice in the matter and from our more genuine possibilities, and taken along by the demands and pressures of our world:

In this tendency of relation...the world, in which life lives, has its weight, and indeed in such a way that in its facticity it adds constantly new weights; the significances, which are encountered in the temporal unfolding of life and become different ones in the changing of its world, take life along. In its disposition, it enters into the how of being-taken-along. Life abandons itself to a certain pressure in its world..... (PA, 101)

In turn, being-taken-along unfolds itself into "dispersion" (Zerstreuung), insofar as one's self is taken along and dispersed into more and more worldly tendencies and cares:

The relations of caring themselves, living in the world disperses itself and the sleepless disposition here holds life in its dispersions. Disposition wants to miss out on nothing of the dispersion and increases it thereby. The how of life is played out in its world, "from day to day." Out of and in its world, living provides for the "demands" of life arising and sheltered in care (how life in its world still addresses itself [sich an-spricht] as life in the worldly how, makes a demand [An-spruch]); there develops what we characterize as the self-satisfaction (Selbstgenügsamkeit) of life, a how of caring in living, which disperses itself and is drawn along by its world. (PA, 102)
What Heidegger means by the last-mentioned categorial character of
tendency, i.e., "self-satisfaction," is that life is driven to
constant fulfilling or satisfying of its dispersing tendencies, of
its "anxious care for one's 'daily bread'," such that life is, as
it were, always glutting and satiating itself with the world.
Meanwhile, it becomes emptier of the genuine content of its self-
world.

ii) Distance

The second basic category of our falling being-in is
"distance," which is articulated into the categories of the
"distantiality," and "the hyperbolic."

What Heidegger means by "distance" is the fact that "in the
caring relatedness of life to its world, life has its world,
concrete significances at any time, before itself." (PA, 103) Life
is this "dis-tance," this "standing-away" (Abstand) between itself
and its world not in a spatial sense, but rather in the existential
sense that the world of meaning is "before" it as something
understood and as possibility for life (self-world). But Heidegger
maintains that this distance, this understanding of the world as
"before," is present in life in the manner of constantly being
pushed away, since life tends to disperse itself into the world.
The "before" me tends to disappear, since I myself tend to be
absorbed and to disappear into my worldly dispersions. This is what
Heidegger calls the "setting-aside-of-distance (Abstandstilgung)."
Distance is thus "equi-primordial" with tendency and experienced
through it:

Enacted equi-primordially with tendency means here: that the
character is such that tendency precisely conceals it, pushes it
away, and drags it into dispersion, so that it now, having gone
through this pushing-away, is encountered as dispersed in the
world, where life at any time precisely finds itself....Distance,
which co-possibilizes tendency, is precisely carried away by
it....This having of something "before" itself, which is a categori-
al articulation of the relation-to-something, is now precisely
driven away in caring; the "before," "distance" is precisely not
there in caring absorption in significances. "Caring absorption in"
means precisely (is "ruinantly") the setting aside of the "before."
(PA, 102-103)
Heidegger specifies further this forgetting of the "before" of distance as what he calls "distantiality" or "standoffishness" (Abständigkeit), by which he means that distance is not encountered genuinely between self and world, but rather between different worldly realities. This distance within the world takes the form of both the distance between myself and the others and also the distance between my worldly experiences, which expresses itself as "variety" into which I tend to disperse myself:

Distance is not somehow obliterated; it is indeed in the being of the caring relation itself; but, in life, it is taken-along in dispersion. It turns up there, it is encountered, wherein disposition lives, in the world, and indeed precisely in its "meaning" as a how of significances. The character of distance is there, so far as life measures wrongly in its care in significances, widens out these themselves, is out after an estimation and distantiality within the significant world in its disposition: after rank, success, position in life (world), overtaking, advantage, estimation, hustle and bustle, commotion, styling, coarse and loud or refined.... These are the ways in which life lets itself be taken-along by the distances which comes towards it and to it in its world; ways in which its distantly cares for itself. (PA, 103)

By measuring itself in terms of "distantialities" and differences within the world, life lives within what Heidegger, following Aristotle, calls the "hyperbolic," the "excessive." This means that life attempts to exceed the worldly status of the others (rank) and the range of one's own present worldly experience (variety). The hyperbolic is out after a certain "endlessness" of worldly experience in the literal sense that it does not fix upon the genuine "ends" given in the "before" of genuine distance, but rather disperses itself constantly into new worldly distantialities (variety):

Life takes its measure as wide and as importantly as possible and thereby makes-easier for itself even that to which and how it comports itself, its dispersion; in its disposition and care for distantiality, it constantly gives to dispersion new food. The possibilities of being able to be-taken-along, the ways of satisfying multiplying themselves; it temporally unfolds itself in endliness, infinities (Endlosigkeiten). In the tendential dispersion of its distantial relational meaning, life is hyperbolic, excessive, thrown-beyond. It seeks distances and differences in that in which it lives, in the significances..... Variety itself becomes a how of significance, an object of care: that it is always there, does not run out, is always there anew. (PA, 104)
In its hyperbolic concern for worldly distantialities, i.e., worldly status and variety, life is thus hyperbolic also in the more important sense of exceeding, being thrown beyond, the genuine "before" of one's possibilities. This is what Heidegger also calls simply "overlooking" oneself, looking over and beyond oneself towards worldly differences:

Living in disposition and dispersion, life does not hold to the distance; it overlooks (versieht) it. In the dispersing pushing-away of the "before," distance as such is not expressly there. In disposition, it becomes precisely unexpressed; in the enactment of experience, life passes over it (geht über ihn weg). (PA, 103)

By measuring itself and setting standards for itself in terms of worldly differences, life then "mis-measures itself," "measures wrongly" (vermisst sich), i.e., mis-measures its genuine "before" of possibilities within its own situation. It overlooks "the measure fitting to it" and therefore is always "mistaking itself" and going wrong in its action (HF, 100). Heidegger's term "Vermessen" also plays on its meaning of "presuming," being presumptuous, too bold, which points to the hyperbolic concern with worldly status and importance:

In the self-overlooking regarding distance, life mis-measures itself; it mistakes itself in the measure fitting to it (measure not quantitative). (PA, 103)

iii) Closing-Off

The third basic category of being-in, which falls, is what Heidegger calls "closing-off," i.e., a closing off of the self from itself. This category articulates itself into the categories of "avoidance," "failing," "blinding," and "the elliptical."

Heidegger notes that the significance, which is "before" me in "distance," is not only an around-world and a with-world, but also a self-world:

Wherein I live caringly, whereto I comport myself caringly is something which can be expressly "before" me: "before" here grasped phenomenologically, not in a spatial sense. "Before," i.e., I comport myself expressly and caringly to something, I live expressly from something, in which "expressly"-"before" me the "me," I myself, factically my self-world, comes also to experience. In caring, this "before" is to be emphatically and expressly appropriated. The "before" only articulates in a sharper manner what was already characterized as "distance." (PA, 105)
The loss of the "before" is, thus, at the same time the loss of the self, which is not appropriated, made one's own (aneignen):

Along with tendency in its dispersion, where distance atrophies, what else gets and is lost?....insofar as caring lives factically in the basic how of its enactment, disposition, and solidifies itself caringly in this disposition, the appropriation of the "before" does not happen, e.g., in its being-taken-along from one significance into another, in setting-aside, a loosening of the relation to...: it becomes factically visible. What is going on, what is really happening? In this veiledness (Verhülltheit), "life" speaks. (PA, 105-106)

More specifically, it is the "authentic" possibilities of the self held in the "before" which are lost:

Insofar as care is so enacted, a possibility of life becomes lost: the tendency (Tendenz) towards the possible appropriation of the "before" and therewith of that which life authentically holds before itself in the "before," in distance; life as caring life, insofar as it cares for itself in its world factically. (Relucence of the "before", in "living"-"before"; temporal unfolding of an authentic coming-forth [Vor-kommens] of life.) Caring life finds itself precisely in the how of tendency in the world and has no occasion to seek itself also otherwise. But now we see: this possible coming-forth is to be appropriated in the enactment of the "before." The possibilities of appropriation of the "before," of the express having of distance in the enactment of life, are determined at any time also out of the character of the world, before which and in which life is, and out of the originality and the temporalizing-meaning of the directions of caring. (PA, 106)

But the self loses itself not in the sense of disappearing, but rather in the sense of encountering itself precisely in "looking-away" (PA, 109) from itself, "flight," and "avoiding" itself or "getting-out-of-the-way-of-itself" (Sich-aus-dem-Weggehen). As this flight from itself, life is a "repelling of "the" anxiety" (HF, 32) involved in taking responsibility for appropriating itself:

But now just as little as tendency and distance disappear as relational characteristics, are eradicated and driven off in the sense of an objective property, but rather impose themselves precisely at first from the significances of the lived world in the manner of encounter, so with the express "before" the possibility of life encountering itself does not disappear.

In letting itself be-taken-along by the significances of the world, in the hyperbolic development of new possibilities of experiencing and caring for world, tactical life, as itself, indeed constantly gets out of its own way, avoids itself (sich aus dem Weg
geht). So far as it avoids itself, expressly or not, it is precisely there. (PA, 106)

Heidegger describes the flight of this looking-away from oneself as "curiosity," which is a type of "care" (cura) (HF, 103) and "sight" that looks simply in order to see and be distracted. It is a type of "dwelling that does not tarry anywhere," a "being-everywhere-and-nowhere" (HF, 54, 62):

The phenomenon of being-nowhere in having-to-see-everything...is to be fixed terminologically as curiosity that is led and dragged along, led by its object. (HF, 54; cf. 64-65, 95)

He also describes the flight from self as "idle talk," in which the self addresses itself in terms of the publicness of "das Man." As expressions of the self's flight from itself, what both curiosity and idle talk flee towards is the around-worldly with-world of "the they," which unburdens it of self-responsibility:

Dasein moves (basic phenomenon) in a definite manner of discoursing (Redens) about itself, idle talk (Gerede) (terminus). This discoursing "about" itself is the public-average manner in which Dasein takes and preserves itself. In idle talk, there lies a determinate pre-understanding, which Dasein has of itself: the leading "as what," in which it addresses (anspricht) itself. Accordingly, this idle talk is the how, in which a determinate interpretedness of itself stands available to Dasein itself....Precisely because [this interpretedness] makes up publicness and as such averageness, in which everyone can easily take part and be in on it, nothing which happens eludes it. Idle talk discusses everything in a peculiar lack of sensitivity to distinctions. As such averageness, that which is harmlessly "closest," closest as for-the-most-part, publicness is the way of being of "das Man," "the they," "the one": they say, they hear, they tell, they presume, they expect, they are for.... Idle talk does not belong to anyone, no one takes responsibility for it, they have said it.

One even writes books from hearsay. This "they" is the "no one," which goes around like a ghost in factical Dasein, a how of the specific disaster of facticity, to which every factical life pays tribute. (HF, 31)

Looking-away from and fleeing from itself is further a "closing-off" of the self from itself. "Abriegeln" is another term from common German which Heidegger elevates to the level of a philosophical term. "Die Strasse abriegeln" means simply "to block off the street" from access. The self's blocking or closing off of itself means that it prevents access to itself and has itself in precisely this closed-off manner:
The more life increases its worldly concern, i.e., lets its "before" perish in increased disposition and suppression of distance, the more surely it here has always to do with it itself. In caring, life closes itself off from itself and in this closing-off precisely does not get rid of itself. (PA, 107)

Heidegger defines this closing-off more closely as "larvance," in which the self closes itself off by "masking" or "disguising" itself with the "mask" of "the they," which prevents it from having to take upon the anxiety of appropriating its genuine possibilities. The self lives in a condition of "veiledness" (PA, 106):

In constantly new looking-away, it seeks itself and encounters itself precisely there, where it does not suspect itself, and mostly in its masking, disguising (larvance). (PA, 107)

[Interpretedness] is that which gives to the "there" in factical being-there the character of a being-oriented, of a determinate enclosure in its possible type of sight and expanse of sight. Dasein speaks of itself, it sees itself so and so, and yet it is only a mask which it holds before itself, in order not to be frightened by itself. Repelling of "the" anxiety. Such giving of sight is the mask in which factical Dasein lets itself be encountered, in which it comes-forth for itself, as what it "should be".... (HF, 32, 136)

Larvance means not only "maskedness," but also "ghostliness," being in the manner of a "spectre." The masked self comes forth as a mere ghost or spectre because of lack of reality. It looks like it is everywhere, but it really is nowhere; it looks like "nothing can remain closed to it," but it is closed-off from itself; it looks life it enjoys a high degree of concreteness and leads a full life, but it wills its own annihilation; in the "appearance of the highest actuality, hustle and bustle" (PA, 136), it looks like something is being enacted, but "nothing happens." This "larvant ghostly character of life" is what Heidegger also calls "ambiguity" (Zweideutigkeit):

The appropriation of the "before" happens all the less insofar as, in dispersion, distance itself and distantial care, care about distants as significances (care about preeminence, the first, what is nearest, what is highest, what is the most, the comparative character in all significances, in which life cares for itself) has displaced itself into the world and, as encountered there, is not missing, is not mis-measured. (Ambiguity of becoming lost - larvant.) (PA, 106, 136)
If, by virtue of its genuine subjection to the how of the enactment in the disposition within dispersion, distance is driven-away, this goes all the more for the third character, "closing-off. This lies even less as itself in the light of day. (PA, 105)

...in this mask of public interpretedness Dasein presents itself as the highest being-alive (i.e., that of hustle and bustle). What happens? Nothing. One writes brochures about the crises in the sciences, about the professional calling of science. One says it to the others, they say, as one hears, that it is finished with the sciences. There is today already a specialized literature about the question of how things would have to be. Otherwise nothing happens. (HF, 31-33; cf. PA, 164-165)

Insofar as life is in this way "ambiguous" and "ghostly, it is characterized by a certain "Diesigkeit," another word from everyday German which means "haziness," "fogginess," "mistiness." Life is hazy and hard to see through because of its tendency towards self-concealment:

Just as life in itself goes around itself (ist umwegig), so is it also "hazy." Authentic sight is at first to be developed. (PA, 88, 109)

This is only another of saying that life is characterized by "entanglement" (Verfangenheit), insofar as it becomes entangled in its masks and self-deceptions. (PA, 101, 140)

In fleeing from anxiety, and closing itself off from anxious care for the self, what masking seeks is "care-freeness" (Sorglosigkeit) and "security" in the sense of "se-curitas" (PA, 109), the safety and freedom from care afforded by "das Man" which unburdens one from self-responsibility:

The character of the relational meaning of closing-off characterizes the peculiar manner of how factical life cares for itself in its world, in its increasing care for its world temporally unfolds against itself really a not-caring (factical) in its concern: being-carefree (Unbekümmernng) (itself a cared-for caring); and indeed in such a way that life itself is (still) there, but precisely as that which in caring and in the fulfillment of caring should be finished, annihilated. (PA, 107)

In other words, one seeks "the 'easy'," "making-it-easy-for-oneselection," "unburdening," "comfort," and the "sleep" (HF, 103) of self-annihilation:

At any time, factical life seeks making-it-easier, unburdening (Erleichterung), tendency follows the pull and drag of things, from itself, without having a hand in the matter. In disposition lies
that which corresponds to the pull and drag, that which leaps to it, "without further ado." The "further" would be that which lies precisely not in disposition. Even worldly difficulties are ways of making-it-easier. Along with comfort, life seeks at the same time the security that nothing can remain closed to it. (The larvant ghostly character of life or its world. The masking more tenacious and "easier.")

Life is caring, and indeed in the tendency to making-it-easier-for-oneself, to flight. Thus, the taking-direction towards that which can be missed and failed in as such, fallibility, falling away, making-it-easy-for-oneself, fooling-oneself, enthusiasm, excitement is temporally unfolded. (PA, 108-109)

Understood in terms of enactment, care lays itself down more and more on life and finally remains lying down on it.... (PA, 140)

Factual life is in fact characterized by the tendency to "tempt" itself with possibilities of looking away from itself, seeing itself in terms of "das Man," and so finding comfort and ease:

Life seeks to secure itself in looking-away from itself. This sight is the primary type of sight and it gives the basic paradigm of how life is seen by itself. There develops within it one's own self-affecting temptation, which in falling transforms itself into carelessness (securitas). Carelessness is a way of care, of the worry (Bekümmernng) of life about itself. (PA, 109; cf. 140)

This temptation takes the form of cultivating possibilities of masking, of "mistaking-oneself" and "missing" or "failing" (verfehlen). These possibilities of distraction are "endless" in the double sense of always requiring to be novel and therefore involving no genuine "end" which is chosen and enacted:

In this caring closing-off from itself, factual life always develops new possibilities of significance, in which it can be on the lookout and can thus secure its "significance."

But this variety of possibilities itself is always an increase of the possibilities of mistaking-itself-always-anew. Factual life thus temporally unfolds in itself as something factual the distantial endlessness of possible ways of missing and failing (Verfehlbarkeiten), and insofar as this endlessness of ways of missing all have the character of significances, in which (as significant-worldish objects) life lives, this endlessness becomes that which has been characterized formally as infinity and infinite richness, inexhaustability, that which is never to be mastered, living-more-and-more and more-than-life. This infinity is the mask, which factual life factically puts on from itself, i.e., from its world, and holds up before itself. Without itself being clarified, this concept of infinity plays a decisive role in the point of departure and concept of modern philosophy of life. (PA, 107-108)
This temptation to mistake and to miss oneself through disguises is, thus, a kind of self-"blinding," the refusal to look at oneself. The tendency to close oneself off from oneself is at bottom the will to what Heidegger, following Aristotle, calls "the elliptic," the characteristic of "leaving behind," "omitting" oneself," "falling short" of oneself, "failing" (elleipein):

With this, infinity life itself blinds itself, sticks out its eyes. In closing-off, life omits itself; it falls too short. Factual life omits itself precisely in that it fights specifically and positively against itself. Closing-off has the specific enactment and temporalizing-character of the elliptical. (PA, 108)

3. Guilt and Conscience

The character of the "elliptical," "the deficient," means that factual life forfeits its "authenticity" or "ownness" to the mask of "das Man." What is lost is "that which life holds authentically before itself in distance....Caring life finds itself precisely in the how of tendency in the world and has no occasion to seek itself also otherwise." (PA, 106)

As always my own, Dasein does not signify an isolating relativization towards the externally viewed particular and thus the individual (solus ipse), but rather "ownness," "individuality" (Eigenheit) is a how of being, the indication of the way of a possible being-awake. (HF, 7)

To everydayness belongs a certain averageness of Dasein, the "they," in which the ownness and possible authenticity of Dasein is kept in concealment. (HF, 85; cf. PA, 117, 137)

This character of the "elliptic," the "deficient," can be specified further as "guilt," which means precisely an awareness of a lack, a deficiency, a failure of some sort for which one is responsible:

Life, which is determined through tendency, is to be grasped more sharply as determined through guilt and haziness. (PA, 109,

This haziness is one for which the blame, the guilt, lies with life itself; the facticity of guilt means precisely persevering in this guilt, and falling always anew into it. (PA, 88, 109)

But if life is characterized essentially by the tendency to close itself off and thus to be guilty, it is also essentially characterized by the "tendency of factual life to be in the manner of a bringing-itself-to-having." (PA, 81, 62) This is "conscience" (Gewissen), in which "life comes to itself." (PA, 88) The "sharpen-
"Conscience" is a disclosive calling back from the concealments and disguises of larvance to life's being guilty, being in default of itself, and thus to that from which life has fallen away, i.e., its authenticity. (AJ, 3) Conscience is the "awakening" (AJ, 42) from the sleep of care-freeness and is thus a "renewal of care," in which the self responds to itself, takes "responsibility" (Verantwortung) for itself. (AJ, 33)

"Conscience," here understood as the enactment of conscience, not as an occasionally having a conscience (conscientia), is, according to its basic meaning, a historically characterized how of self-experiencing.... (AJ, 33)

In the habit (Gewohnheit) and publicness of everydayness, care disappears; but this does not mean that it stops, but rather that it no longer shows itself, it is covered over.... In this levelled-off there of concerned care-freeness, in which the world is encountered as self-evident, care sleeps. Thereby, there exists in the world the possibility of a distress, which breaks out suddenly. (HF, 103)

What conscience calls oneself to is more specifically a constant "wakefulness" (Wachheit) (HF, 16) or "Entschlossenheit" (PA, 62, 71, 79, 81, 109, 139), a word best translated by "resoluteness," but which literally means "de-closing (off)," not being closed-off. Resoluteness is "decision" and radical "taking-hold" (Ergreifen) of the self and its authentic possibilities:

Care-freeness now develops the world and, in order to find satisfaction, must increase it, becomes hyperbolic and provides an easier fulfilling and being concerned, i.e., an easier preservation and persevering of its Dasein. Hyperbolic Dasein shows itself to be at the same time elliptic: it avoids, gets out of the way of the difficult, that which is monachos [Aristotle], simple (without beating around the bush), fixes on no end, does not want to be placed at a fundamental decision (Urentscheidung) and in it (repeating, retrieving it). (PA, 109)

Conscience is thus not a static disclosure, which happens once and for all or only now and then, but rather, as a tendency, is a constant calling away from the counter-tendency of closing-off and masking and a calling to wakeful and resolute repetition of choice.

Falling and guilt are something which life can never outstrip, just as it cannot ever completely outstrip its own conscience: "...the facticity of guilt means precisely persevering in this guilt, and falling always anew into it." (PA, 88) As we shall see, the full
meaning of conscience, wakefulness, and resoluteness is to be found in the temporal meaning of "the situation."

IV. Kairological Characters (Ereignis)

In his linguistic approach to "life," in and through which being is, Heidegger finally considers a third sense which takes up the previously considered transitive meaning (what is lived, world) and intransitive meaning (the living, care). "As a noun and a substantive, the expression life has at the same time an enlarged and independent meaning..." (PA, 84) This third sense is what Heidegger calls the "enactment" or the "temporalizing" of the relation of living and world, i.e., of being-in-a-world:

In contrast to the formal expression "having," "comporting" indicates something determinate. Comporting(-oneself) has an ambiguity, which we can emphasize:

1. comporting oneself, be-having oneself;
2. comporting oneself to..., standing in relation to..., having a relation.

The second meaning is genetically (regarding meaning) more original; the first is the excess of meaning with respect to having. The first is equally enactment in the extended sense, and "together" with the second temporalizing, existence. The second is relation, and indeed this detached, intentionality objectified....

But comporting oneself can also be determined as a how of formal happening, action (Vorgehen) and, with respect to how it acts, i.e., is enacted (vollgezogen), as enactment, according to its enactment-meaning. But this furthermore especially so regarding how the enactment as enactment becomes in and for a situation, how it "temporalizes" itself, "temporally unfolds" itself. Temporalizing is to be interpreted on the basis of temporalizing-meaning. (PA, 52-53)

The how of being-related-to-world and the world itself are in factical temporalizing.... (PA, 97)

Heidegger calls the enactment-meaning or temporalizing-meaning of being in a world "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit). (PA, 176; HF, 17, 18) "...this object itself (factual life) is in the character of its temporality in a way which is completely its own." (PA, 176) "Temporality" is "the basic phenomenon of facticity." (HF, 31) The priority of the temporalizing-meaning of being means that the basic problems of ontology lies in the sphere of the relation of being and time: "In 'time' it shall be shown precisely that fundamental tasks also lie in ontology!" (HF, 3) In what follows, I will
consider in turn Heidegger's account of the general characters of human time, of inauthentic time, and of authentic time.

1. Eventing

On could approach the phenomenon of human time theoretically from the available standpoint of "history," i.e., historical science (Geschichtswissenschaft). Here, the "historical" (das Geschichtliche) is experienced as an "objective being-past, being-having-been" (Gewesensein) (HF, 65), which is "the correlate of an objective-historical and theoretical observing" (AJ, 32), of "theoretical-scientific objectification of what is past." (HF, 36; PA, 1) Historical science tends in fact to reduce the past to a static, objective "present" for theoretical "curiosity" and also to reduce the whole of time, including the future and the contemporary situation, to an "an objective-historical phenomenon...as being played out in the present." (AJ, 32) Time is seen as an objective process which runs its course in a present which is available for observation. (HF, 56, 43, 65) This detached theoretical observation of historical time as an objective process leads to what Heidegger calls the "de-historicization" of factical life, insofar as one distances oneself from participation in the factical happening of historical time. It is necessary, Heidegger maintains, to make a distinction between "das Geschichtliche," the historical as it is encountered in historical science, and "das Historische," the historical as it is lived in the temporalizing of factical life itself:

...the facticity of life, Dasein, is in itself historical (historisch) and as historical life has a relation (as comportment) to the objective historical (geschichtlich) world and time (Vorwelt und Vorzeit). The question about the meaning and right of tradition—its a phenomenon in the basic phenomenon of the historical (des Historischen) — is taken back into the problematic of the historical itself, which has its relevant roots in the facticity of factical life itself. (PA, 76)

The genuine access to historical time is not historical science, but rather the temporalizing of historical time in factical life itself. Indeed, the basis of the perception of historical time in historical time, whether authentic or inauthentic, is the histori-
cal time of factical life itself. The concept of time in historical
science must be "understood back into its genuine source of
meaning, out of which, in terms of its meaning and in a concealed
manner, historical experiencing in the refined form of objective-
historical knowing (historical human sciences) also factically
arises." (AJ, 33) It is from this that we must, therefore, begin if
we want to get access to the temporality of factical life.

But one could also begin with the way that time is en-
countered in the natural sciences, where it again shows itself as
an objective process. Past, present, and future are seen as
"temporal schemata for an objective ordering." (AJ, 33; PA, 139)

Here the reality of the "I" is excluded from the experience of
time:

We describe objectified happening (Geschehen), happening as
something objective, something known, as pro-cess (Vor-gang); it
simply goes-by-before (vor-bei), before my knowing I, has only the
relation of being-known to this I, this paled I-relatedness which
has been reduced to a minimum of living experience. It is the
essence of a matter (Sache) and a material context to give itself
only and precisely in knowing, i.e., in theoretical comportment,
and to give itself for the theoretical I. In theoretical comport-
ment, I am directed to something, but I do not live (as historical
I) towards this or that aspect of the around-world. (IP, 74)

The historical I is de-historicized to the remnant of a specific I-
ness as the correlate of thinghood, and it has its who only in the
pursuit of the theoretical, i.e., is only "disclosable"? (IP, 89)

What, among other things, the natural scientific concept of time
fails to grasp is that time is the time of the whole relation
between I and world, and not just of the one relatum, world in an
objectivistic sense. In contrast, Heidegger takes as his point of
departure for the investigation of time a common experience in the
"average everydayness" of factical life. The example he takes is
that of a sunrise, the rising of the sun, which marks the beginning
of the temporal course of the day in everydayness. In the German
language and culture, the sunrise can have the character of an
Ereignis, an event, an occasion charged with significance and in
which one somehow participates, as in a spring festival or a
mountain climbing expedition to "be there" when the sun first comes
up. Heidegger contrasts this lived Ereignis of the sunrise with the
experience of the sunrise in astrophysics, where it is not an "event" in which one participates, but rather a "pro-cess," which runs its course "before" one in an objectified manner. He focuses on an experience of the sunrise depicted in Sophocles' *Antigone*:

Let us again contrast whole contexts of experience, so that it will not be able to appear as if the "contrast" exists only in isolated experiences.

Let us transplant ourselves into the comportment of astronomers, who in astrophysics investigate the phenomenon of the sunrise as a mere process in nature, who, indifferently comporting themselves to it, let it run its course merely before them, and let us hold up next to this the lived experience of the chorus of the Thebian elders, who in Sophocles' *Antigone*, on the first friendly morning after the victorious battle, look to the rising sun:

*aktis aelion, to kal-liston heptapulo phanen
theba ton proteron phaos*

O glance of the sun, you most beautiful, who upon seven-throned Thebes a long time shines...[from Hölderlin's translation] (*IP*, 75)

Heidegger explains what he means by the word *Ereignis*. He plays upon the meaning of the word stem *eigen*, which means "own." *Ereignis* thus means for him both "event," "happening," and something like "own-ing," "ap-propriating." He again stresses that *Ereignis* is not objectified before one as a process which is observed, but rather is (so I translate) the "eventing(appropriating)" of both the I and the world at once. Our I is thus a "historical I," a "situation-I":

Situation in the Context of Life: Situation is a certain unity of natural lived experiencing. Situations can penetrate each other: their durations do not exclude each other (one year in the field, a semester: not an objective concept of time). In every situation, a unified tendency is present. It contains no static moments, but rather *Ereignisse*, "events(appropriations)." The happening of the situation is no "process" - as it is observed in the theoretical attitude, for example, in the physicist's laboratory, as, for example, an electrical discharge. Events "happen to me." The basic form of the context of life is *motivation* (*Motivation*). It withdraws in the lived experiences of the situation....The intentionality of all lived experiences of a situation has a determine character, which arises out of the whole situation. Example of a situation: "The course of things in a lecture"....

For example, mountain climbing, in order to see the sunrise up there. One arrives up there, and each one experiences in silence. One is completely abandoned in the *Ereignis*, one sees a sunbeam,
the clouds, the masses of rock with this specific form, but not as
determinate masses, which I have just climbed. Here the I always
remains existing. On the other hand, no theoretical objectivity is
possible. The objects are no longer held together: they are
isolated....

Every situation is an Ereignis, and not "process." That which
happens has a relation to me; it stands within my own I....The I
does not need to be in view, it swims along in the situation....The
I is itself a situation-I; the I is "historical"....The life-
relation of the situation is no mere being-directed-towards mere
objects. Every lived experience is intentional, it contains a "view
towards" something or other (the view grasping in a purely prefer-
ential manner, seeing in advance, remembering). (NU, 205-207)
The experience of time is thus bound up with "the personal," a
noteworthy difference from what we have seen to be the later
Heidegger's not having done justice to the concrete, personal
element of relational meaning and enactment-meaning, which always
"has" and "enacts" the content of being. It is the personal
historical I which the impersonal philosophical "problem of the
external world" de-personalizes and de-historicizes:

[The problem of the external world] is "burning," because it
hinders every step, is constantly there and appeals to the critical
consciousness. It concerns every lived experience of the around-
world, not only the existence and reality of the non-personal
around-worldly, but rather precisely the personal, the human beings
and their lived experiences. For everything clearly depends on the
reality of the last-mentioned, if a general science of lived
experience is to have any meaning at all. If the lived experiences
of other subjects have at all any reality, then indeed only as Er-
eignisse, and such are they and they are evident only as Er-
eignisse, as ge-eignet, own-ed, by a historical I. For me they are
not Ereignisse, for they are each and every time essentially only
precisely as for an other. (IP, 78)

Any theoretical, epistemological approach to the world leads to the
"obliterating of the situation" (NU, 207) as a personal, lived
event:

Extinguishing of the Character of the Situation: Here is meant the
extinguishing of the closed unity of the situation, i.e., the
determinateness of the aspect, at the same time the extinguishing
of the situation-I and its character of tendency. An emptiness of
experience is here given. The extinguishing concerns the whole
sphere of experience. Non-relatedness exists between the things of
a situation, i.e., non-relatedness of the meaning (e.g., the
objects on my desk build a situation)....The character of the
situation disappears. The unity of the situation is
exploded....Thereby, at the same time the situation-I, the
"historical" I, is driven away. There appears the "dehistoricization of the I." (WU, 205-206)

Let us be clear about what Heidegger is saying here with his notion of Ereignis, namely, that it is neither something objective (outer) nor something merely subjective (inner), but rather is the "event(appropriating)" of the "relation" of these, which only arise in the first place within the relation. When Heidegger speaks of the immediacy of the "it happens," "it events(appropriates)," "it happens," "it worlds," "it gives world," "it signifies" (IP, 72-73), he is trying evocatively to express the immediacy and unity of the temporal happening of being-in-world, in-the-world-being. These impersonal, indefinite constructions are supposed to capture the sense of immediate lived experience in which there is no awareness of a subject, cause, or ground (whether the human will or a cosmological ground) outside of the simple Ereignis. The "it" has no content apart from the verb, the action. When I say "it's raining," "it's snowing again," "it's a nice day," "it kitchens," "it coffee-pots," there is no subject, no cause, no ground. "There is" only the immediate, unified eventing, appropriating, owning, being what it is, in which world events(appropriates) and I event(appropriate), and all this without any reflective knowing and positing. There-being as Ereignis encompasses the dimensions of "there is world" and "there is myself":

Only in the co-being-discernible and, as it were, ringing (Mitanklingen) of my own I in its while (des jeweiligen eigenen Ich) is the around-worldly livingly experienced, does it world/is there world, and where and when it worlds/there is world for me, I am somehow fully there....Let us attempt again to understand both experiences - which, this is now indifferent - according to their own meaning, and let us watch to see if we in this understanding itself, as we turn towards the experiences, interpret them as processes, as objects, which are re-presented, placed before us (vorgestellt), and established (festgestellt). But in any case there happens something, something happens (es geschieht etwas). In seeing the lectern I am also there with my full I, it swings along, as we said, it is a living experience specifically (eigens) for me, and so I also see it; but it not a process, but rather an Ereignis, an event(appropriation). (Not-process, in the experience of the question a remnant of Ereignis). Lived-experiencing (Er-leben) does not merely go by before me like a thing, which I posit as object, but rather ich selbst er-eignet es mir, I myself e-event (ap-propri-
ate) it to myself, and es er-eignet es sich seinem Wesen nach, it-events (ap-propriates) itself according to its essence. And if I understand it by looking at it, then I do not understand it as a pro- cess, as thing, object, but rather as something completely new, a completely new point of departure, an Ereignis. Just as little as a type of thing do I see an objectified material sphere, a being, neither physical nor psychical being. Simply understanding the lived experience, I see nothing psychical. Er-eignis also does not mean that I ap-propriate (an-eignen) to myself the Er-lebnis, the lived-experience, from the outside or from somewhere else; "outside" and "inside" have here as little meaning as "physical" and "psychical." Lived experiences are Ereignisse, insofar as they live out of what-is-their-own and life only so lives. (The character of Ereignis here not yet fully determined. (IP, 75)

If time is not the objectified happening of the world in itself, then likewise neither is time merely the personal I, nor does this I exist outside of time as the Ereignis of in-the-world-being. The I does not stand outside the Ereignis so as to be able to "re- present" or "posit" it as an object of knowledge. The I is precisely, as Heidegger puts it, a "Mitanklingen," a "co-being-discern- ible (co-ringing-at)." Again, the metaphor evokes the sense of both happening ("it rings," "bells ring") and unity, cor-respon-dence (Übereinstimmung, Entsprechung). Heidegger also calls the I a "Hitschwingen," a "swinging-along-with": "My I goes fully out of itself and swings along in this 'seeing'." (IP, 73) "Swinging-along-with" is here supposed to evoke the sense of the I going and being outside in, for example, seeing the lectern. It evokes also the sense of the I as "swinging," swaying, vibrating along with world in the unity of Ereignis. Just as the footbridge swings along from bank to bank and back and forth from east to west, so our I is always, as it were, swinging along the relation of I and world and swinging along with world back and forth from future to present to past. Heidegger, thus, also refers to Ereignis as a "rhythmic":

We found further that the lived experiencing of comportment does not solidify itself and terminate in an objectification, that the around-world does not stand there with a fixed index of existence, but rather that it sways in lived experiencing, bears in itself the rhythm of the lived experiences and only as this rhythmic lets itself be experienced. If we hold up to this a mere thing-experience, there shows itself here a noteworthy break between experiencing and the experienced. The experienced is completely broken out of the rhythm of the character of lived experience
(itself minimal) and stands for itself, is only thought in know­
ing....This thinkability of everything thingly, which perseveres through a manifold of experiences is the meaning of reality. (IP, 98)

Do I experience this datum "brown" as a moment of sense perception just as I do the lectern? Does it world in the brown as such and understood as datum? Does my historical I swing along in this understanding? Evidently not....the sense perception is itself there, but only through having destroyed the around-worldly, through having deleted, having looked away, having suspended my historical I and pursued theory.... (IP, 85)

Still another word that Heidegger uses to evoke the inseparability of the I from the temporal "it worlds" of world is that of "Mit­s­chwimmen," "swimming-along." This term fits in with his description of time, following Bergson, as "'motion', ('process', 'stream', 'river', the happening of life, context of enactment, temporal unfolding)." (PA, 102) The I is immersed in the current of the situation, and can no more exist outside of the flow of the Ereignis of in-the-world-being than a trout can live out of water. The I always moves through what Heidegger calls the "swimmableness (Verschwimmbarkeit) of the lifeworld":

The around-world has no ordered borders....What still, more or less, belongs in the around-world, modifies itself constantly....This swimmableness of the lifeworld, this unbroken (because always determined by meaning) shiftingness of its extent (not to be taken quantitatively), is based in the character of the temporalizing of each life, which as such (factically) is world-related. (PA, 96-97)

The unemphaticness of the I in the situation. The I does not need to be in view, it swims along in the situation.... (WU,

2. Awhileness

Our being in the around-world, the with-world, and the self­world is temporality, and as such it is always permeated with temporal "characters of encounter." In order to show this, Heidegger gives a phenomenological description of everyday life in one's "dwelling (or whiling) (Verweilen) at home," "being in one's room," encountering the table. Here one finds that what "is there," what makes up "being-there," is not just the present; rather the "there" is thickly layered also with past and future:
Here and there [the table] shows lines....that was the boys, and they are still that....at the table here we have had at one time such and such discussion; here that decision was made with a friend, here at one time that work was written, that occasion celebrated.

That is the table, so is it there in the temporality of everydayness, and as such will it perhaps be encountered again after many years, when it is met with lying on the floor as given up and unusable, just like other "things," for example, a toy, worn out and almost unrecognizable - it is my youth. In a corner in the basement stands a pair of old skis; the one is broken in two; what stands there is not material things, which are of different lengths, but rather the skier of that time, of that daredevil trip with so and so. This book was given by X; this one there was bound by so and so bookbinder; this one must soon be taken to him; with this one I have struggled for a long time; that there is a needless acquisition, a flop; this one I must still read for the first time; this library is not as good as the one belonging to A., far better than the one belonging to B.; this matter is not such that one will derive pleasure from it; what will the others say to this presentation, and the like. These are characters of encounter. (HF, 90-91)

These various characters are what Heidegger calls "kairological characters," kairological "categories," or simply "existentials." What Heidegger in 1919 called Ereignis he now in 1921-22 calls "coming-forth" (Vorkommen, physis), "appearance" (Auftreten), "illumination," and "announcement" in the sense of the "movement" (Bewegung, kinesis) from "future" or "futural coming" (Zukunft), which is structured by the past, into the present. He calls this threefold movement kairos, the situation, the moment (Augenblick). He calls this motion also "enactment" and "temporalizing," "temporal unfolding" (Zeitung). He sees his project is that of giving a phenomenological description of the kairological characters that are involved here:

We have already frequently pointed to the phenomenon: life comes-forth, happens, in the enactment of care, it is encountered, even if for the most part worldishly, in such a way, however, that in this worldliness it shines through in what is its own (being-meaning and object-meaning; what and that it is). According to everything explicated to this point, this coming-forth is not meant as an objective appearing in the manner of occurrence, or such a turning up, but rather a how of the enactment of care itself. (We are speaking in this way formal-indicatively.) As such, every manner of coming-forth has now its determinate (factual) kairological characters (kairos - time), its determinate relation to time, i.e., to its time, which lies in the meaning of the context
of the enactment of facticity. The kairological, therefore, encompasses categorial determinations, concerning the (formal) relations of time in and for the factical....The question is how from a kairological viewpoint within concern life as such announces itself (comes-forth) and can announce itself (come-forth)....

Insofar as this (factical) appearing of such characters of announcing stands in a context of enactment with the coming-forth of around-worldly life, this shows itself as the historical and therefore the appearing itself is historical..., the historical in the appearing is co-constitutive for every encounter...."Time" here understood neither as ordered framework, ordered dimension, nor as a (specifically formal) character of the historical contexts of events, but rather as a specific how of movement in the sense of a character which not only makes possible movement, allows within it, but rather together makes it up and moves it as factically independent (eigenständig). (PA, 137-139)

In the following passage, Heidegger gives a sketchy description of some "kairological characters" which concern primarily one's being in the around-world: for example, the manner in which one's daily dealings are broken up into times, worldly things as having the past character of "from that time," the futural character of "not yet," or the present character of "in the way":

In such being-there-ready-to-hand itself as such, the towards-which, the for-which (Wozu) is there as familiar and disclosed; and this for-which in the kind of being of a determinate everyday being-so - e.g., for eating (this alone or with specific others, at the times of the day). Even this determinate everydayness and temporality is also present (vorhanden). Already having-been-there so and being here so in becoming. The past and the future [are] determinate horizons determining at any time the present (gegenwart); out of past and future pressing into the there. (Temporality: there from that time, for, at, for-the-sake-of. That which is there does not stand in the determinateness of a definition, but rather in everydayness and its historicity, e.g., the books originating at any time out of the "intensity" of concern: not yet, only to, already, but only so; "no longer" serviceable, "stands, lies around," "in the way," junk - the "there." (HF, 93-94)

As something cared for in the wide sense, the being-there which is encountered has its own temporality. Something cared for is not yet, only to-, as already, as nearly, as until now, as for the moment, as finally. These are to be characterized as kairological moments of being-there. Out of this temporality, all basic moments of time become understandable. (HF, 101)

Heidegger does not give a systematic and exhaustive description of the kairological characters, but does focus on what he considers to be the three basic characters. The first of these is
what he calls "Erstrecken," "stretching-along," "lasting," "enduring":

As a noun and a substantive, the expression life has at the same time an enlarged and independent meaning, which we sketch out briefly from three viewpoints:

1) Life in the meaning of the unity of the course and temporalizing of both the previously mentioned ways of "living," this unity in its total or each bounded stretching-along (Erstreckung), in its full or partial manifold of enactment and originality at any time or distance from originality (Aversion to origin and direct animosity). (PA, 84)

What Heidegger takes up here is our conception of time as always being a "stretch of time," a "span of time," a temporal journey, tempus. But what he has in mind is not time as track which is laid out and which we then go along, but rather the activity of temporally unfolding our lives in a unified manner, i.e., the activity of stretching ourselves along, lasting, enduring, spanning, so that there are recognizable "stretches" of time or periods in our life, which itself will be one long, more or less unified, span from the cradle to the grave. "...life is not a momentarily illuminated thing, but rather an objectivity with its factual stretching-along of temporality." (PA, 152)

What Heidegger means by stretching-along can be further clarified by focusing on another term which he uses to express this aspect of time. This term is Jeweiligkeit, which I translate as "awhileness." He speaks of the "stretchings-along of awhileness." (HF, 87) Weile, while, means a stretch of time, as in the following: "after a while," "a short while," "all the while," "worth one's while," "please stay a while." The adjective jeweilig, awhile (construed as adjective) means something like "during the while," "at the time," "of the day," "for the time being." Der jeweilige König means "the king at the time, during the while," "who is (was) awhile." Jeweiligkeit, awhileness, for-a-while-ness, time-being means, then, the character of being awhile and in a particular while. "One's own being-there is what it is precisely and only in its for-a-while "there" (jeweiligen "Da")." (HF, 29)

But, like stretching-along, awhileness expresses an activity, that of temporalizing in a unified manner. The verb, which
Heidegger uses to express this temporalizing, is Verweilen. Previously we translated the phrase Verweilen bei as "dwelling at" (in which case, Jeweiligkeit would be rendered as "dwellingness"), but this translation does not really capture the temporal meaning of the verb. Verweilen means "whiling" (construed both transitively to express relation to world and intransitively to express the temporalizing of this relation). I while away the afternoon, I while away my life, I am whiling, I while, it whiles. Whiling means the same as dwelling (upon), residing, staying, tarrying, abiding, lingering, sojourning. Verweilen bei einer Welt, whiling (dwelling) at a world means that one temporally whiles in a unified manner in this I-world relation. Heidegger writes of the term facticity:

The expression means more precisely: this being-there for-a-while (jeweili(g) (the phenomenon of "awhileness"; cf. Verweilen, whiling, not-running-away, there-at- (da-bei-), there-being)... (HF, 7)

Whileness means a bounded situation, in which everydayness finds itself, bounded by what is closest at the time (durch ein jeweil­iges Zunächst), which is there in a whiling at it.

This whiling at- has its while, what is in the manner of the sojourn (Aufenthaltsmassiges) of temporality, a whiling at- in a stretching along of temporality. Such a whiling is at first and for the most part no mere considering, but rather precisely a being preoccupied with something. (HF, 87)

This unified temporal "whiling" is what Heidegger also calls Aufhalten bei, sojourning at, and Aufenthalt, sojourn or abode:

"Sojourn ing at," a way of enactment and of temporalizing....One sees movement authentically only form the genuine "sojourn" (Aufenthalt), which is for-a-while. The existentiell sojourn, in the sojourn; what to fix as standstill? (HF, 109)

The other two basic kairological characters, which Heidegger describes, specify the stretching-along or whiling of human existence. In the first place, this whiling has the character of possibility and the futurity of "not yet" (IP, 115), which is temporalized or temporally unfolded. This character means that whiling is not something fixed and predetermined, but rather is open and cannot be fully calculated and predicted in advance:

2) Life, grasped as such bounded unity of the course: now in the meaning of something, which in the specific sense bears possibilities with it, partly temporalized as in themselves and for it. Life, of which we say, what can bring it all, what is unpre-
dictable, incalculable (unberechenbar); and it itself something, which bears in itself and is its possibilities, it itself as possibility (a phenomenologically and rigorously graspable category; it has nothing from the start to do with logical or a priori possibility). (PA, 84)

The being of factual life is distinguished in that it is in the how of the being of its being-possible. The possibility of itself, which is most its own, and which Dasein (facticity) is, and indeed without its being "there," is to be characterized as existence. (HF, 16)

The third basic kairological character described by Heidegger is that of "actuality" (Wirklichkeit) or "fate" (Schicksal). Even though we are possibility, this is not arbitrary, but rather is in some way structured or guided by the past:

3) Life understood in a meaning in which 1) and 2) intertwine themselves: the unity of the stretching-along in possibility and as possibility - fallen into possibility (möglicherkeitsverfallen), loaded with possibility and loading itself, building possibilities - and this whole taken as actuality, and indeed actuality in its specific opacity (Undurchsichtigkeit) as might, fate. (PA, 85)

If we "are" in our being-there our possibility, we also "are" our past. Our "having-been" (das Gewesene) (PA, 73) is a "fact," part of our "facticity," which we have not chosen. It is our "fate," something given or "sent" (geschickt) from who knows where. As such, our "tradition" or "history" cannot be completely outstripped and annulled in a stance of "superiority":

But our time is always at the same time expressly also from yesterday...with the yesterday we still have the seeing and the having from yesterday...we "are" in it and being itself, our being, cannot be cancelled. (PA, 85)

...one does not understand, what is at issue; does not understand above all that one cannot theoretically-scientifically and argumentatively "refute" the consciousness of a time, a time itself, finish up with it like a confused theory. (PA, 75)

But this past or fate is not so much something behind one as rather something in front of one and an aspect of our possibility, which is thus guided by past. "Its history speaks out, pointing the way, beyond its today" and gives us certain "standards and goals" and "direction." (PA, 73) The past gives us our "presuppositions" (Voraussetzungen) and "prejudice," understood not in an intellectualistic sense, but rather in the sense of our "historical in-
advance-being-there" (Voraus-dasein). (PA, 158-159; AJ, 22) Here we can, then, speak of the "claim (Anspruch) of the tradition" (PA, 75) which still "speaks" (anspricht) to us and holds our possibilities in its grip. The past or fate makes up the "effective contexts" (Wirkungszusammenhänge) in which we live:

...the situation itself is a how of factual life, but this so lives in its experiences and temporalizings, that these are and have their movement in the historical movement of effective contexts (generation), which is encountered factically in its own way and "is there" - indeed, according to which, factual life develops and retains its factual tendencies of expectation and preconception for itself. (PA, 161, 6, 170)

The past is not like a piece of luggage which is dragged behind one, but rather makes up one's futural "horizon of expectation":

For this "is," its "was" and its "will" in relation to the "he" have their own decisive significance....[The experience of having-me-myself] is not an immanent perception with a theoretical aim, which begins with the observation of present-to-hand "psychical" qualities of occurrences and acts, but rather it has its authentic historical stretching along into the past of the "I," which for this itself is not a piece of baggage dragged along, but rather is experienced in its horizon of expectation (placed in advance [vonweggesetzten] from itself and to itself) as the past of the I, which experiences it historically and has itself also thereby in the manner of self. The phenomenological explication of the how of this enactment of experience according to its basic historical meaning is the decisive task.... (AJ, 31-32)

The genuine meaning of the past is, therefore, found in the phenomenon of "repetition" or "retrieval," which is a "basic how of life itself." "'Repetition, retrieval': everything hangs upon its meaning." (PA, 80, 109, 190) Retrieval does not mean mere duplication, but rather a transformative appropriation:

Insofar as the task of access to the situation in its authentic being-meaning is understood radically, i.e., in such a way that its illumination keeps pace with the access, better: precisely temporizes the access, what is at issue is to overcome radically what is from yesterday, in order first to place oneself in a position with the overcoming to genuinely appropriate what is from yesterday.... (PA, 85)

The "historical" (das Historische) is not the "historical" in the sense of what is objectified in the science of history (das Geschichtliche), but rather means the enactment of the past within a future and a present:
In the basic experience, which is related to the I, its facticity becomes decisive; one’s own factical experience of life, which is lived hic et nunc, and which is brought to enactment in this historical situation, enacts also the basic experience, which arises out of it, remains in it, and returns to the factical itself. The factical experience of life...is an essentially "historical" (historisches) phenomenon according to the how of its own enactment, and indeed not primarily an objective-historical (geschichtliches) phenomenon (my life seen as being played out in the present), but rather a phenomenon of historical-enactment (vollzugsgeschichtliches Phänomen) which experiences itself in this way. The context of experience, which according to its relational meaning is historically directed to the self, has also a historical character according to its enactment-meaning. The "historical" is here not the correlate of an objective-historical and theoretical observing, but rather the content (in any case not at all detachable as such) and the how of the anxious care (Bekümmernung) of the self about itself. The having-it-itself arises out of, holds itself in and tends towards anxious care, in which anxious care the specific past of the self, the present, and the future are experienced... (AJ, 32-33)

Heidegger calls this repetition of past within future and present "temporalizing" and "movement." As we have seen, this unified process can also be called Ereignis or whiling. It is also what Heidegger calls "the situation," the "moment" (Augenblick), and "kairos."

3. Not-Having-Time

We now turn to other kairological characters or what Heidegger calls "categories of movement," those which are found specifically within the "falling away" and "larvance" of human existence. He calls the inauthentic experience of time "not having time." We can approach this inauthentic time by focusing on the two basic categories which it involves, "relucence" and "ruinance," each of which contains a manifold of categories or existentials.

i) Relucence

Heidegger notes that in his description of inauthentic relational meaning, there has often been reference to the character of life as "movement" (kinesis) and "coming forth" (physis):

In our rough description of life, there has often been talk of enactment, context of enactment. One speaks elsewhere of process, stream, flow-character of life. The talk follows a motivated and basic aspect, in which life is encountered, and we take it as an indication for the pursuit of the basic structures of life as
motions, movements....Facticity (being-meaning of life) is determined also out of movements.... (PA, 114)

The task which he envisages is thus to repeat his analysis of the categories of relational meaning on the more basic level of movement and ultimately time, which is the meaning of this movement:

Movement will be lead to an advancing categorial explication with the clue of a direction of the phenomenon of life (relational meaning caring) and in relation to the basic categories of this meaning (tendency, distance, closing-off).... (PA, 116)

Each of the categories of relational meaning, which have been discussed, expresses in itself something with the character of motion. (PA, 117)

More specifically, Heidegger attempts to show that the categories of relational meaning are "relucent," "prestructive," and "ruinant," since these are the basic aspects of movement. (PA, 121)

**Tendency**

In order to explain how what he calls "relucence" is operative in relational meaning, Heidegger begins by noting that in "tendency" it is tendency itself which pulls and drags at itself in the form of the world. In other words, tendency is self-stimulating, self-soliciting. It offers the world up to itself as something towards which it tends in care:

In the close characterization of the first category of the relational meaning of life, tendency, we noticed: life has "in itself" a peculiar weight. There is not something from the outside that hangs upon it (because it is such that there is missing from it an objective "outside" and "inside"); rather, what life encounters in its tendential caring and how it encounters it, is it itself; life, which caringly gives itself out into its world, offers itself to itself worldishly in the form and in the being-meaning of its world. What life lives, that towards which it goes, that upon which it awaits, what in its caring surprises it and falls to it, has the character of the encounter of something so and so significant which stimulates, solicits, demands, hinders tendency. (PA, 119)

This self-stimulation of care is what Heidegger calls "relucence" (Reluzenz), since in its disclosure of the world care or tendency lets this world "shine back" upon itself. Care, as being-in-a-world, lets the world "move" towards itself in the form of a future that comes towards it (Zukunft). Insofar as tendency falls towards the world and surrenders itself to it as something which is
objective, the world shines back upon care as something autonomous and self-evident. It is simply encountered as demanding, diverting, preoccupying, boring, as having such and such meaning. Care shines back and moves back on itself in the shape of worldly "cares of life":

Tendency turns back again, returns in this form, comes towards and upon (zukommen auf) caring life in this form. Self-distracting life encounters its world as "diversion," as diverting, diverse, fulfilling, preoccupying, emptying, monotonous. That is, tendency shows itself as something which moves towards and upon itself (was sich auf sich selbst zu bewegt). Caring for itself in this relation, life shines back upon itself, develops out of (bildet aus) the illumination of the surroundings for its closest contexts of caring at any time. This so characterized motion of life in the encountering direction towards and upon itself is what we characterize as relucence. What factical life at any time cares for in its world, it encounters from there as care. (PA, 119)

It is in this futural relucence that human existence, therefore, is "prestructive," i.e., "building in advance" (Vorbauen, preestruere) and "developing" (Ausbildung) possibilities for itself. One has to be aware here of the full meaning of the words "Bildung" and "Ausbildung." The stem "Bild" means: picture, image. It is something like a picture or image of being in the world which is given in relucence. The words "Bildung," "Ausbildung" mean an activity which is done in light of the picture, the image. "Bildung" thus means: forming, shaping, fashioning, molding, and even educating (formation of character) on the basis of some picture or image. "Ausbildung" means further: training, instructing, cultivating on the basis of a picture, paradigm, image. From this one can see what Heidegger means by saying that "prestruction," "building in advance," is "Ausbildung," "development." Prestruction builds possibilities in advance in the double sense of, first, "developing" them in light of some relucent picture of being in the world, to which human existence has fallen, and, second, thereby "fashioning," instructing, directing, "developing" human existence with these possibilities. It is from prestruction that being in the world gets, as it were, its "build":

...life takes from [the world] itself the direction regarding it itself, i.e., regarding its dealings in its world, and it takes
from there the "picture" (Vorstellung) which it develops for itself from itself (i.e., the world). In its disposition towards its world, life "has itself" and experiences itself always only in the figure (Gestalt) of its "world." (PA, 101)

(The specific larvance in the ambiguity of the linguistic expression of the categories of facticity is not accidental. Dispersion, diversion: 1. dispersing oneself [prestructive], 2. what disperses, distracts [relucent].)

Life is relucent through its world and with it upon itself, i.e., relucent upon it as caring life. Out of the how of the offer, which is encountered, caring life provides for its need in directives of caring, it takes out of the relucent world its standards and requirements, its proportions; it builds in advance out of this world and for it; it arranges itself in the sense of its undertakings (Vor-nahmen) and its plans, its pre-having (Vorhabe), to which it is devoted; it secures itself with plans and cares for itself in either an explicit or inexplicit view to them. Caringly, it is always building in advance, in its reluence it is at the same time prestructive. (PA, 119-120)

This prestruction is itself a part of the temporalizing activity of reluence, insofar as the prestructured possibilities "shine back" and move towards human existence as future, and thus "illuminate" human existence:

In this expression "forming" ("Bildung"), development (Ausbildung), this peculiar connection can be conceptually indicated by seeing that the expression is, first, grasped as temporalizing, enacting something in accord with an image, something pre-given, held in advance, something relucent; on the other hand, developing something (by way of enactment) in holding to the image, letting it come to shape (Gebilde), whereby what is at issue is not primarily the character of the shape (Gestalt) of what is to be developed, but rather the temporalizing as such, - struere, building....The first-mentioned moment of the meaning of forming: to temporalize in accord with a image, i.e., become more sharply grasped in connection with the phenomenon, which we grasp under the expression "illuminating".... (PA, 128)

This "prestruction of one's own existence" is "the disclosing and holding open of the concrete horizon of expectation..., which every context of enactment as such develops." (AJ, 22) This illuminating activity of relucent prestruction is what Heidegger also calls "announcing," "coming-forth" in a situation (kairos). "Bauen," "building" come from the Indo-European stem "bheu," "to grow," "to develop," from which the Greek word "physis," "growing," "coming-forth," also derives. Heidegger's translation of Aristotle's notion of "physis" is "Vorkommen," "coming-forth."
Another characteristic of relucent prestruction or pre-structive relucence is the "tendency to security," i.e., the drive towards developing and building up an organized world of more or less fixed possibilities, which provide one with "se-curity" in the literal sense of "being without care." This "Ausbildung," "developing" expresses itself in "Bildung" in its specific sense of "education" and "culture," and thus of the values and goals operative here:

The securing, watching over, the new acquisition and the letting out of sight of plans, which at any time guide one or at least distract and are somehow fulfilling, can be explicitly taken hold of, placed aside as tasks, commonly organized in the with-world, as a life of care in cultural goods (Kulturgütern), producing, preparation of cultural objects, means and ways, partially enacted in an explicit, active knowing about the cultural values and goals concerned: cultural life as the prestructively organized disposition of the worldly relucence of caring life. (PA, 120)

This tendency to security can harden itself into a world of "values in themselves," where life sinks into further "self-satisfaction" and security. Heidegger, therefore, see this tendency at work in "philosophy of value" and in "philosophy of life" which is oriented towards "culture" as an objective historical process.

**Distance**

Regarding the relational characteristic of "distance," of the world as "before" me, Heidegger sees also this phenomenon as grounded in relucence. The world is "before" me insofar as it shines back and moves towards me as future. In the inauthentic mode of distance, the "before" comes towards me futurally in the form of worldly "distancialities":

The character of distance, which is also contained in the relational meaning of life, the possibility of the explicitly appropriated "before" and of the enactment of life in such explicitly decisive "pre-having," does not become nothing in the manner of caring of the setting-aside-of-distance, but rather turns back again, returns, and is encountered - but only worldishly. The relation of caring is, in terms of enactment, in itself not distantial, but relucently it comes towards and upon itself in the form of worldly distanciality and places itself in care in this form, and indeed in such a way that this caring arranges itself towards success, rank, advantage, position, achievement.... (PA, 121)
As distantiality, distance is prestructive insofar as it is constantly developing hyperbolic possibilities of "exceeding" others and its own current range of experience, and so dispersing itself into the world:

...and not only that, but rather [caring] is positively and independently prestructive in the hyperbolic development of distantialities and possibilities of pursuing distance. The hyperbolic is a how of the expression of the specific prestructive movement of factical life. The relucently unemphatic, worldishly encountered distantialities are taken hold of in the factical enactment of caring (prestructive and developed). (PA, 121-122)

Heidegger maintains that these possibilities of distantiality can be taken up, developed further, and solidified in cultural activities and even in the sciences:

It comes to developments of special ways of securing such inner-worldly distantialities and orderings. Within and in connection with culture, sciences can have this specific origin....The "before" of the theoretical attitude comes back here as the high value of objectivity, scientific quality, free intellectual honesty.... (PA, 122)

Closing-Off

Relucence is operative in life's closing itself off against itself, in its masking of itself by means of "das Man," since life lets itself shine back upon itself and move towards itself as future precisely in the shape of the public "mask" of "das Man," with which it allows itself to be "taken along" and to "look-away" from itself. It moves towards itself precisely in not letting itself genuinely move toward itself, it comes-forth precisely in its not genuinely coming forth, it appears in its not appearing genuinely as itself, it announces itself in its not genuinely announcing itself. Indulging in a rare moment of humor, Heidegger explains that, insofar as human existence comes towards itself futurally in this distorted and masked fashion, it is always, as it were, frightening itself away from itself, i.e., it pushes aside the tendency to move towards itself in its authenticity:

In closing-off what is at issue is: to be away from life which is encountered and which announces itself in manner of coming forth....In the relational meaning of closing-off, caring is relucent in a peculiarly pressing manner of taking-along: in caring absorption in its world, life makes itself, as there in the
character of the encounter of the world, look-away from itself; but precisely thereby it lets itself be encountered in a special movement, lets itself comes towards and upon itself, i.e., as it were scaring itself away in the tendency-to-come-towards-and-upon-itself.

With this relucence, there shows itself...a basic meaning of relation which is relevant for the categorial structure of facticity: the "away-from-itself" in the "out-of-itself (Aus-sich-hinaus). (PA, 123)

Prestruction is, therefore, the development of various possibilities of life's closing itself off from and against itself:

The strength of relucence in the character of the movement of closing-off expresses itself now precisely in the fact that, in this away-from-itself of life, it itself develops an "against-it" and through and in this development "is"... and that factual life caringly arranges itself, installs itself precisely in this "away-from-itself"; it takes out of the how of this movement precisely the directional meaning of its prestructions; it wins out of this flight before itself the ways in which it deals with its world and itself. (PA, 123)

Prestruction develops possibilities of "missing" oneself:

The ways (guided by such relucence temporally unfolded in closing-off) of building in advance, of drawing from, and taking up of plans (pre-having) is out after this - that it misses factual life itself "authentically"... can miss, can fail. (PA, 124)

In inauthenticity, one installs oneself in the relucent public mask and always has on hand a stock of possibilities in which one can leap away from the genuine situation and realize "the elliptical," the deficiency of "omitting" itself, "falling short" of oneself:

The development, keeping ready, and holding open of possibilities of missing itself... are taken into care by life itself. Caring busies itself so that it never runs out of opportunities (regarding the category "opportunity", cf. facticity as historical "situation"), that it never comes into the embarrassment of having to look at life (pushing itself forward in the tendency of closing-off) in the face. Factual life cares at any time in its concrete situation that it can always and easily leap away to some worldly urgency and can let its worldly treatment be relucently stamped as unavoidable. In such temporal unfoldings of available "ways out" (ways for factual life to live out beyond itself), in the encounter and manner of having "important things," the elliptical (a specifically prestructive manner of movement) is factically related to relucence.... (PA, 123-124)

ii) Ruinance

In inauthentic life, movement is twofold in that life both moves towards itself futurally and does so precisely in the manner
of moving away from itself, leaping away from its authentic situation into the world:

In the context of these characters of movement, what is important is the further determination that in them factical lives fast and cares fast in its world. Directional meaning, but not representable in the sense of an ordered going along serialized objects towards a last one in the series, against which movement collides. (PA, 127)

Thus, in the context of the motion of relucence and prestruction, the movement of life expresses itself in that it so is that factical life in each way, even if in various ways, is concerned to live itself fast in its world. Each of the motions in itself and in relation to the others is out to live factically this living-itself-fast (SichFestleben) which is absorbed in its world (historically-factually?), seen objectively-historically: to "preserve" this. In the categorial structure of movement shown here, the movement of factical life has now the character of a peculiar originality, a movement that is its own, which is its own precisely in that life lives out of itself. (PA, 130)

Following Pascal's theme that life is an unceasing and distracting motion away from itself, Heidegger maintains that life is essentially characterized by an "unrest" (Unruhe) which drives one away from oneself and into the world. "The movement of factical life can be interpreted and described in advance as unrest." (PA, 93, 137)

This restless movement is what Heidegger calls "das Sturz," "the plunge" and "Abfallen," "falling away." He sums up life's double movement towards itself in moving away from itself with the term "ruinance" (Ruinance):

Ruinance can be determined in a formal-indicating definition: the movement of factical life, which factical life "enacts," i.e., "is in it itself as it itself for it itself out of itself and in all this against it itself. (PA, 131)

He coins this term from the Latin world "ruina," which means "falling down," "collapse," "ruin." It is intended to denote both downward movement and the sense of collapsing and being-ruined. A building that has fallen down, a ruin, is one which no longer "stands," and similarly ruinant life is one which falls away from itself, collapses into worldly dispersion, and ruins itself insofar as it does not "stand" by itself, has no "steadfastness," "fixes on no end, does not want to be placed at a fundamental decision and in it (repeating, retrieving it)." (PA, 109) Heidegger writes:
Getting oneself involved with the world of care is found in concern for an apparently chosen task, what day and night does not bring rest, for which life apparently fights, and it is..., however, a mere letting oneself be drawn along, letting oneself be taken along, and only so that thereby illumination is ruinantly given up and handed over to ruinance itself. (PA, 137)

Ruinance shows itself in four characteristics, which are: "1) the tempting (the tentative), 2) the tranquillizing (the quietive), 3) the alienating (the alienative), 4) the annihilating (the negative; active, transitive)." (PA, 140; HF, 103) In the last-mentioned characteristic, which is the only one that Heidegger explains, we can see clearly the double sense of ruinance as the movement of falling and as ruining, destroying oneself. "Annihilating" specifies the "whereto" of ruinance, which is "the nothing of factical life." (PA, 145) This is the "nothing" of "there is nothing go on," "there is nothing here." (PA, 147) "What happens? Nothing." (HF, 32; PA, 165) In other words, the nothing, which is the directional sense of ruinance, is the nothing of its not coming-forth and not announcing itself in the situation:

...the nothing of factical life is something which the plunge co-temporalizes....The character of the plunge is described as "annihilation"....annihilation, not-ing (Nichtung) - the nothing of life as temporalized in a determinate not-ing, inexplicit no-saying, enactment of movement. Its formal definition can therefore be given: the nothing of factical life is the nothing of its own around-worldly not-coming-forth, its not-happening (temporalized from itself and for itself) in the ruinant being-there of it itself....factical life...cares for the not-coming-forth of itself and for itself....this "not-coming-forth" is an expression, regarding motion, of the how of "still being-there" of around-worldly life. It is factically so "still" there; the "still" again a characteristic determination of the temporality at work here. Around-worldly life announces itself still in its not-coming-forth, and in such a way that it does not here make itself especially emphatic, but rather in this unemphatic manner is encountered with the lived world and as it.... (PA, 147-148)

Not-letting-come-forth becomes effective, in the manner of movement, in the way of the confrontation of factical life with its past. It lets only certain things from here become experienceable, and thus at the same time again lets only certain things become motivating in expectation. (PA, 154)

Heidegger also describes "the nothing" as "die Leere," "emptiness,"
the "void," the "vacuum," "vacancy," in which nothing happens. Life is what "should be annihilated." (PA, 107)

This not coming-forth or happening is what Heidegger calls "not having time" in the twofold sense that inauthentic life has lost its genuine "temporalizing" and that it has lost it because it is always leaping away from the situation to some worldly urgency and does not "have time" for its genuine possibilities. The specific "kairological character" of ruinance is "Zeittilgung," "cancelling-time," "setting-time-aside," i.e., falling and leaping away from the situation of temporalizing. He explains this in authentic form of temporality in the following detailed passage:

In this context, the kairological (which in the present consideration is included in its own area of problems, which principally concern facticity) is called into play only in order to show in it the specific ruinance of caring, of factical life...the historical in the appearing is co-constitutive for every encounter, i.e., how for the first time something plaguing ventures forth, how for the first time something befalls one, befalls the soul in the manner of plaguing, how at first what plagues as it were of itself again withdraws, how it places new demands in the course of time, in the succeeding "time," how at first factical life fights against it, how the appearing itself then completely and authentically fixes itself in the historical horizon of expectation (Erwartungshorizont), how it "less often" comes-forth, "still from time to time" (zuweilen noch), "temporarily" (zeitweilig), how finally factical life has "no more time" for it....

These are the kairological ways in which in concern life announces itself, still announces itself. For factical life, for it in its more or less explicit horizon of expectation onto the aforementioned coming-forth, the "less often" and "only still from time to time" are as it were not something less, but rather a "more"; "less often and only from time to time" are expressions of the growing worldly security, of not-bothering-oneself with such a thing, and precisely on account of their imperceptibility, which is connected with their own character of time and which historically does not change, i.e., grows more and more, these kairological characters express an intensification of ruinance.

Factual, ruinant life "has no time," because its basic movement, ruinance itself, takes away "time," a time that can be taken away, which factically ruinant life takes away for itself in itself. Ruinance takes time away, i.e., it seeks to set aside the historical out of facticity. The ruinance of factical life has this enactment-meaning of canceling-time. In this peculiar manner, the historical is always still there in life....

Ruinance takes time away; in reverse: "not to have time" as the how of factical life is the expression of its ruinance; the various kairological characters are determinate interpreters of the
increase of ruinance, categorial interpretents of the character of
the plunge.
In concern, in which factical caring takes it itself into care, ruinant life entangles itself in itself. Understood in terms of
enactment, care lays down more and more on life and finally remains
lying down on it, i.e., factical life wants to wear itself, to support itself.... (PA, 138-140)

Insofar as Heidegger sees philosophy as an extension of
everyday life and as form of factical life, he sees all absolute
philosophy, too, as "ruinance," "not having time," and "the
cancellation of time," insofar as it leaps away from the concrete
historical situation of factical life to some form of absolute. He
thus calls this philosophy the "being-everywhere-and-nowhere" of
"absolute curiosity which leads itself on." (HF, 62) This philo-
sophy, too, is a form of "movement," namely, that of a "falling
away" into the anonymous "publicness" and "mask" of an objective
and secure "system" which encloses "the whole of being in its
various regions." (HF, 65, 40, 48) The "pretence of a purely objec-
tive, absolute philosophy" is "the masked cries of anxiety in the
face of philosophy." (HF, 19) It is only a higher form of the
ruinance of factical life. (PA, 108, 120, 122) Objective philo-
sophical consciousness "interpretively lays out" and "develops"
(HF, 48) its possibilities of cancelling time, of "de-historicizing" factical life, similarly to how average everydayness "de-
velops" its possibilities of cancelling time:

...[objective philosophy] gives the objective possibility of a more
objective agreement, "we all...," i.e., presents (präsentiert) to
Dasein itself the prospect of the tranquil security of the common,
agreeing "yes" in contrast to the unproductive crushing-work of the
prevailing skepticism, which, as Rickert says, is merely the
business of "philosophical weaklings"...Absolute "needlessness"
(Bedürfnislosigkeit) (Hegel) is achieved; spirit lives in the place
of the certainty of itself....[in philosophy and objective history,
Dasein] is out after having itself objectively there, bringing
itself into the there. The basic phenomenon of curiosity, which
lives in them, and which is drawn along and is free-standing, makes
Dasein visible in its peculiar movement....[they] are ways of
Dasein, ways which are preserved as negotiable in it itself, and on
which it finds itself and finds itself in its (falling) manner,
i.e., brings itself into possession, i.e., however, secures itself.
(HF, 63-65)
The four characteristics of the self-interpretation [belonging to objective philosophy] are maskings of curiosity, by means of which it conceals itself from its own care. The "we all..." of Spranger is only the mask of insecurity; no one has seen it, no one believes it, each is too weak to confess it. (HF, 103)

As we have already seen in our discussion, Heidegger's interest in practical philosophy, philosophical ruinance and cancellation of time are especially evident in "absolute ethics." Instead of beginning with the question of "how, from a kairological viewpoint within anxious concern, life as such announces itself (comes-forth) and may announce itself (come-forth)," one here looks away and leaps away from the concrete situations of factual life into a realm of ideal values. Absolute ethics shows the same "blinding," "falling short," and "nothing" as does average everydayness:

But with and through these absolute relations of validity and absolute laws, one can be blind precisely for objects and relations, which are accustomed to come-forth at a particular time in living morality, i.e., in facticity as the how of its possible being-meaning and enactment-meaning....one musters oneself to an exceptional paragraph on the highroad-Heinze - otherwise nothing. (PA, 137, 163-165)

In its leaping away from the situation of authentic temporalizing, what ruinant life leaps towards is the inauthentic mode of the present, which Heidegger calls "the today" of everydayness. The authentic mode of the present is, as we shall see, rather "the moment" (Augenblick) (PA, 35) or "situation," in which one wakefully temporalizes the past futurally in the present. The "today" is for the most part the objective, public "interpretedness" of factual life given in the "mask" of "das Man," which elicits curiosity, idle talk, and ambiguity (HF, 31):

A determination of whileness is the today, the whiling in the present, one's own at any time. (Being-there as historical being-there, its present. Being in the world, being lived by the world; present-everyday.....The today ontologically: present of what is closest, they, being-with-one-another; "our time"...."Today," in our days, this is everydayness, absorption, into the world, speaking out of it, caring. (HF, 29-30)

The objective, public present of the "today" is the understanding in which factual life lives "every day" in its "everydayness." Dasein "whiles" at it, and in this way is fixated on the present.
Thus, it is always "calculating in advance" what will happen, since the future is experienced just as extension of the present "today." Dasein attempts "to be present in advance." (HF, 19) In this way, it steals away from the ambiguity and anxiety of the genuine present of the "situation" and leaps away into the fixed public present of the "today":

"Temporality." Dasein works in the how of being-now. But this means nothing like being as modern as possible, i.e., to echo the so-called needs and imaginary wants according to the talk. Everything modern is recognizable in that it steals away artfully from its own time and only in this form is capable of making an "effect." (Hustle and bustle, propaganda, proselytizing, setting up cliques, mental shuffle.) (HF, 18-19)

The intellectual, historical situation is not something which lies there open, and it is a coarse error to think that one lives in it and has taken hold of it if one takes an interest in the most modern lyric poetry or represents the newest sociological theory or recommends to one's acquaintances as urgent that they "read" the newest and thickest book on religion and Christianity. But it is just as little graspable through reporting about what has preceded it and about from which historical forces the contemporary time is determined. (PA, 161)

As ruinant factual life, objective philosophy, too, leaps away from the genuine situation into the fixed present of a certain public interpretedness. This objective "philosophical consciousness" and, along with it, objective "historical consciousness" are higher forms of "the interpretedness of the today." (HF, 33, 35, 19) In objective history, not only the past, but also the future is reduced to a present, since it views the whole of historical time as an objective process. The future is read off from the presence of the past and calculated in advance as something already present:

In its self-presenting, the manner of interpretive laying-out [belonging to historical consciousness] speaks also for the acquisition and maintenance (to be enacted in it) of the Dasein which is so viewed. In its objective distance to the past, historical consciousness has objectively as well the present (Gegenwart) of Dasein, which means, however, in the sense of the calculated objective character of the historical: "already" its future. The calculation in advance of this, of the "Decline of the West," is no quirk on the part of Spengler and no cheap joke for the masses, but rather the consistent expression for the fact that inauthentic historical consciousness has thought itself through to the end in its ownmost possibility, which has been sketched out for it. (The
not-yet, in itself as present in \textit{calculation}; comparative reading-from.\) \((HF, 56)\)

Likewise, objective philosophy leaps away from concrete historical time into the present of an apparently "trans-temporal in-itself" \((HF, 41)\) of objective truth:

Historical consciousness lets being-there be encountered in the full richness of its objective being-past \((Gewesensein)\), philosophy in the unchangingness of the being-always-so. Both bring being-there itself before its highest possible and pure present \((Gegenwart)\). The time-determination is in play in the objective characterization. Why is something that must be made understandable. \((HF, 85, 43)\)

Both these forms of absorption in the present have the character of a "whiling" at something objective and fixed, which they "present" \((präsentieren)\) themselves. They are "ways in which Dasein speaks to and about itself in an emphatic manner, i.e., makes itself present for itself and holds itself in this presence \((sich für es selbst präsent macht und in dieser Präsent hält)\)." \((HF, 79)\)

Because both average everydayness and objective philosophy ruinantly fall away from the concrete situation of factical life into an inauthentic present, they have the character of "missing" "the fitting," what is "fitting in the situation" \((das Gebührendes, situationsgebührrend)\), "the fitting measure." \((PA, 62, 71, 103)\) They are not able to "wait" in the situation and be attentive to what is called for here, which cannot be calculated in advance as already present and decided: "Ruinance as not-wanting-and-not-being-able-to-wait, plunging itself...." \((PA, 184, 139, 71)\) This ruinance is always driving itself away into the available possibilities in the "today," where it can securely calculate in advance what is and is not supposed to happen. But because it does this, it is always "going wrong" in the situation. Things often turn out "other than one thought":

Only on the basis of this familiarity can something like \textit{something strange} come-forth in what-is-closest of the worldly there; it is not-something-familiar, "it stands in the way," "comes at an inconvenient time," "is awkward," "disturbing," "bothersome," hindering. As such, it has in its there-character a pronounced obtrusiveness, an intensified there....

The strange is only the awoken, unemphatic familiarity, which is encountered in the character of unfamiliarity. Such deficiency of
familiarity is not something occasional, but rather belongs to the temporality of the encountering of the world as such. Familiarity is disturbed, and the disturbable familiarity gives to the chance "other than one thought" its resistant there-meaning.

Through the disturbability of the unemphatic familiarity, that which is encountered is there in its incalculability....The mostly-always-somehow-otherwise permeates the encounter of the world; it is comparative: other than - one thought, planned (vorhatte), etc. (HF, 100)

4. Having-Time and Being-Awake

If factual life is characterized by ruinant movement away from itself, away from the concrete situation of genuine temporalizing, it is nonetheless equally characterized by a "counter-ruinant movement," i.e., the "the tendency towards the possible appropriation of the 'before' and therewith of that which life authentically holds before itself in the 'before', in distance....temporal unfolding of an authentic coming-forth of life." (PA, 106) It is what Heidegger calls the "conscience" which calls one back from the dispersion of "not having time" and to the renewal of this authentic tendency. Conscience calls and brings one back to one's factual history, to one's "fate," to "what we ourselves are":

The phenomenon of existence discloses itself, therefore, only to a radically striven-after, historical...essentially anxious caring enactment of experience. This itself is not something removed and extraordinary, but rather is to be enacted in the factual experience of life as such and is to be appropriated from here, and this again not in momentary isolated uniqueness, but rather in a renewal of anxious care, which is necessarily motivated in the anxious care for the self as such and is for its part again historically directed. "Conscience," here understood as the enactment of conscience, not as an occasionally having a conscience (conscientia), is, according to its basic meaning, a historically characterized how of self-experiencing....With this reference to the connection of meaning between historical experiencing and the phenomenon of the conscience, the concept of the historical is not somehow expanded, but rather understood back into its genuine source of meaning, out of which, in terms of its meaning and in a concealed manner, historical experiencing in the refined form of objective-historical knowing (historical human sciences) also factically arises. The historical is today almost exclusively something objective, the object of knowing and curiosity, occasion and place for the winning of practical instructions for future comportment, object of objective criticism and of rejection as something out-of-date, collection of material and examples, a con-
glomeration of "cases" for universal systematic observation. Because we do not authentically see the phenomenon of existence today, we no longer experience the meaning of conscience and responsibility, which lies in the historical itself, which is not only something of which we have knowledge and about which there are books, but which much more we ourselves are, and which we ourselves bear. (AJ, 33-34)

But, as we have seen, the historical is not something dragging behind us, but rather that which is woven into our possibilities and as such is to be retrieved or repeated and not merely reproduced. The past qua possibility is to be interpreted and transformed within our concrete present situation. And it is to this act of "temporalizing" of past and future within the situation that the conscience calls one back to from out of falling. It makes one attentive to "what is fitting" within the situation:

...the situation, fitting which (der gebührend) understanding has to enact itself....That which is at issue must come "to the light of day," lie "in the light of day," become transparent and in daylight itself, in authentic dailyness. The problematic moves always more sharply and adamantly into the conscience. (PA, 62)

Conscience is, then, at bottom a certain "openness" or "resoluteness" (Entschlossenheit) and "being-awake" (HF, 15) for one's fitting possibilities in the situation, which cannot be calculated in advance in the manner of a technique:

"Temporality." Dasein works in the how of being-now....As what Dasein encounters itself in...being-awake, i.e., the character of being, is not to be calculated in advance and is nothing for general humanity, nothing for a public, but rather it is each time the definite, decisive possibility of concrete facticity....As historical possibility (determined in its while) of being-there, existence is already ruined as that which it is, when one makes the suggestion for it to be present in advance....It is never "object," but rather being; it is there only insofar as it is each time a living. (HF, 19)

What characterizes wakeful resoluteness is its ability to "keep silent" and to "wait" for the fitting possibilities and the right time to act, as opposed to leaping away from the situation into the ready-made, calculable possibilities of publicness:

In a premature (vorzeitigen) passionate taking up of a position for and against, there betrays itself only the lack of genuine passion, which here alone can be definitive and decisive, the resoluteness of understanding, which the more securely is there, the less it sets off, but rather can keep silent and wait. Because, regarding
life, we are no longer able to lay in readiness and wait in the genuine sense (not in the manner of detective psychology and spiritual snooping), but rather want the business to be cleared up in noisy zealouslyness (Eilfertigkeit), we fall towards the surrogates of spiritual advertising or into an objectivity, which is apparent because it closes one's eyes and is found in flight. (PA, 71)

Religion is misunderstood in the core of its being-there, when the history of religion today allows itself the feeble game of depicting forms, i.e., stylistic forms of piety in an entertaining picture book. The analogue counts also in economic history, the history of philosophy, and legal history. The possibilities, which are genuine at any time, do not come into concrete being-there insofar as a philosophically ingenious system of cultural systems is presented to the historical sciences as a plan of operation, but rather only insofar as at any time within this science the right man at the right place and at the right time decisively intervenes and takes hold. (HF, 57)

It is by waiting openly upon time and acting within the situation that one "has time" in the double sense of having time and attentiveness for one's genuine possibilities and thus also having this genuine temporality:

The kaiological - "time." Sitting still, being able to wait, i.e., "giving it time," in the world and its history. Factical life has its time; "time," what is entrusted to it, which it can "have" in various ways: keeping in expectation, preserving. "How I have time." Time not a framework, that is only a construction. Not to have time, but rather to let oneself be had by it, is the historical, the "with the times." (PA, 139, 184-185)

When one has time in resolute being-awake, then one has been "placed at a fundamental decision and in it (repeating, retrieving it)." (PA, 109) This means that one's "whiling" or "sojourning" will not be that of clinging to the static present of the public "today," but rather temporalizing one's historical and "fated" being in the world in its "questionableness":

But this is why precisely the highest task is to win the genuine and not arbitrary sojourn; the sojourn before the possible leap of anxious decision....In the sojourn, motion is visible, and there-with from it the possibility of counter-motion as genuine sojourn.

Sojourning at life itself, its object-meaning and being-meaning: facticity. Restrained by ruinant movement, i.e., to take the difficulty seriously, to enact the thereby wakeful making-difficult, safekeeping. (HF, 108-109)

We have now come to the end of our presentation of the young Heidegger's project for a new and "genuine beginning" for philo-
sophy and, more specifically, for the three moments of what he
called "being-meaning." As we have seen, he articulated these three
moments of "being in and through life" as the "it worlds" of the
world (content-meaning), "being-in" as "dwelling" (relational
meaning), and the "event" (Ereignis) of "kairopological" time
(enactment-meaning). We now turn to the young Heidegger's presenta-
tion of this new beginning as not a fixed result, but rather as
something which is constantly underway and constantly beginning
anew.
...the philosopher is precisely the genuine and constant "beginner"....

Beginning has its "time." To begin for another time is meaningless.

There is no such thing as the philosophy - in general and in such comfortable atemporality....

...I can make the discovery of "what the issue is" for no one. (Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 1921-22) (PA, 66, 186, 13, 191)

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CONSTANT BEGINNER

In Chapter Seven, I would like to show how in the early 1920s the young Heidegger already understood philosophy as essentially a "way," such that the new beginning for philosophy is something which must constantly be begun anew. More specifically, he understood philosophy as being able to give only "formal indication" of what "being in and through life" means at any particular time, since this being is always and only at work within a historical situation, i.e., within "whileness." This indication is indication of a way and a direction towards an encounter with being itself as it shows itself in one's own historical situation.

In Section I, entitled "Indications of Indication," I would like to explore the historical influences on Heidegger's notion of formal indication. We will see that the decisive influences here are Husserl's notion of "occasional expressions," whose function is that of "indication"; Kierkegaard's notion of "indirect communication"; and Aristotle's method of giving a "rough outline" in his investigations of human praxis. In Section II, entitled "Formal Indication," I wish to explore Heidegger's systematic presentation of what he means by "formal indication." I will focus on how with this "indication" he intended to overcome the philosophical either-or between objectivism and relativism within a new formulation of the position of "skepticism," which he understands as a constant
search for "being" that preserves its character of "questionable-
ness." He understands this skepticism at the same time as "her-
meneutics." My analysis will again concentrate on Heidegger's early
Freiburg period from 1919 to 1923 and especially on his 1921-22
lecture course Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, where
his notion of formal indication was most central in his philosophy.
He made use of this notion until 1926 and, to a certain extent,
even in his Being and Time. But, as noted in our discussion of the
Kantian and transcendental language of Being and Time, by 1927 this
notion had receded into the background of Heidegger's philosophical
lexicon. Instead of indication of radically concrete, individual-
ized, and situational being-meaning, Heidegger's Being and Time
tends often to focus rather on transcendental "structures."

I. Indications of Indication

1. Occasional Expressions (Husserl)

Heidegger's term "Anzeige," "indication" comes from
Husserl's first investigation entitled "Expression and Meaning"
(epecially ch. 3, "Fluctuation in Word-Meaning and the Ideality of
the Unity of Meaning") in the second volume of his Logical Inves-
tigations. The "essence of indication" is a "pointing-at," as the
word literally says. Not all indications are expressions, but
rather indication includes signs which point to something else,
e.g., "a brand" (sign of a slave), "a flag" (sign of a nation),
"the much-used knot in a handkerchief," "memorials," etc. An
expression functions as an "indication" when, as communication, it
"indicates" or "points to" something individual and specific and
indicates it to the listeners or readers. "Jemanden zur Anzeige bei
der Polizei zu bringen" means to report, to point to, to indicate
someone to the police. An "Anzeige" is also a card as the "announ-
cement" of, say, a marriage; a "notice" or "ad-vertisement" in the
newspaper; or even an instrument which indicates temperature, wind
velocity, etc. The meaning of an expression, which is an indica-
tion, is always bound up with the persons and circumstances of the
speaker and the listeners. The "announcement" in the card about
"the marriage" does not attempt to communicate something about the
universal meaning of marriage, about marriage as a concept. One must think of "who" is getting married and "where" and "at what time" in order to understand the full meaning of the statement. The expression "marriage" does not necessarily have this indicative function, even though in living discourse it usually does. It can just as easily express the concept of marriage, its universal meaning. But just as weather instruments and the genres of, e.g., the card, the letter, the farmer's almanac, and the section in newspapers devoted to the "announcement" of births, deaths, marriages, sales, etc. are essentially indicative and demonstrative, so there are, Husserl maintains, certain expressions which are "essentially subjective and occasional expressions."

He thus makes a "distinction between essentially subjective and occasional expressions, on the one hand, and objective expressions, on the other." (LU, 86/314) Essentially objective expressions are those that can be understood without any reference to the circumstances of the speaker and the listener, although such reference may in fact be in play:

We shall call an expression objective if it pins down (or can pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily requiring a view to (Hinblick auf) the person uttering it, or to the circumstances of the utterance....Among objective expressions we have, e.g., all expressions in theory, expressions out of which the principles and theorems, the proofs and theories of the 'abstract' sciences are made up. What, e.g., a mathematical expression means, is not in the least influenced by the circumstances of our actual discourse. We read and understand it without thinking of a speaker at all. (LU, 86-87/314-315)

Essentially occasional and subjective expressions, on the other hand, can only be understood by looking to the situation of the speaker and the listener:

On the other hand, we call an expression essentially subjective and occasional, or, more briefly, essentially occasional, if a conceptually unified group of possible meanings so belongs to it that it is essential to it to orient its current meaning at the particular time (seine jeweils aktuelle Bedeutung) to the occasion, the speaker and his situation. Only in view of the factual circumstances of the utterance can one definite meaning from this mutually connected class be constituted for the hearer....The case is utterly different with expressions serving the practical needs of
ordinary life and with expressions which, in the sciences, prepare the way for theoretical results. (LU, 87/315)

In other words, the indicative function belongs to the expressions themselves. Expressions such as "I," "here," "this" are essentially a demonstrative "pointing" towards the "hic et nunc" and thus give a "direction" in which to look. Whereas an empty universal-categorial intention, e.g., "all human beings are mortal," can be fulfilled through a pure categorial intuition of "all," "human being," "is," and "mortal," the empty intention in an occasional expression such as "I" or "here" is fulfilled through an intuitive presentation of the particular "I" and "here" of the speaker. It is the concrete intuition which gives the "full, authentic meaning" of the expression:

...the authentic aim (Ziel) of my discourse lies not in this general element, but in the direct intending of the object in question. Towards it and its fulness of content I am directed, and these empty generalities do little or nothing towards determining the latter. In this sense, the direct intention is the primary, indicated meaning.3

Consider more closely, for example, the expression "I". It is not an objective expression, since its meaning is precisely a self-referentiality which cannot be understood without looking to the speaker "at the particular time" (jeweils) who is referring to herself or himself:

Every expression, in fact, that includes a personal pronoun lacks an objective sense. The word 'I' names a different person from case to case, and does so by way of an always new meaning. What its meaning is at the particular time can be gleaned only from the living discourse and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it....the conceptual meaning is not what the word 'I' means, otherwise we could simply substitute for it the phrase 'whatever speaker is designating himself'....It is the universal indicative (bezeichnende) function of the word 'I' to indicate whoever is speaking at the particular time, but the concept through which we express this function is not the concept which immediately and by itself makes up its meaning. (LU, 86/314)

By itself the expression "I" is only a pure and empty pointing, an incomplete direction, which, unlike expressions such as "lion" or "marriage," cannot be given any content either through a conceptual or imaginative intuition. The expression "I" cannot by itself "directly" evoke and communicate a content, but rather only
indirectly indicates a direction in which to look, namely, to the speaker, the direct intuition of whom provides the "authentic" meaning of the expression. The indication does not intend a "form" (e.g., "lion") which materially prefigures the content and gets "applied" to it. It can only mediate (vermitteln) between the listener and the particularity which is ultimately meant. As it were, it "calls" to the listener or reader to follow the direction of the pointing:

The word 'I' has not itself directly the power to arouse the specific I-presentation; this becomes fixed in the actual piece of talk. It does not work like the word 'lion' which can arouse the representation of a lion in and by itself. In its case, rather, an indicative (anzeigende) function mediates (vermittelt), calling as it were to the hearer: Your vis-a-vis means himself. (LU, 88/316)

Most spatial and temporal expressions in everyday life are also essentially subjective and occasional expressions, whose meaning is subjective and situational in the sense of depending upon the circumstances of the speaker and the listener, which are being indicated. Such expressions as "here" and "now" are essentially demonstrative, indicative. Their meaning is precisely a pointing:

In the sphere of essentially occasional expressions one has also the subject-related determinations 'here', 'there', 'above', 'below', 'now', 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', 'later', etc. 'Here' (to think out a last example) indicates the vaguely bounded spatial surroundings of the speaker. Who uses the word means his place on the basis of an intuitive presentation of his person and location. This changes from case to case, and changes likewise from person to person, though each can say 'here'. It is again the general function of the word to name the spatial environment of the speaker, so that the authentic meaning of the word is first constituted in the presentation at any time of this place. The meaning of 'here' is in part a universally conceptual one, inasmuch as it always names a place as such, but to this universal element the direct presentation of place attaches, varying from case to case. (LU, 90-91/317-318)

Husserl notes that, in fact, indicative, occasional language "includes all the manifold forms of discourse where the speaker gives normal expression to something which concerns himself or something thought in relation to himself," e.g., impressions, beliefs, doubts, hopes, moods, commands. (LU, 91/318) "It's cold
out today," "Christ is risen," "perhaps it won’t snow," "hopefully there’s coffee," "it’s a lovely baby," "get out!," are all occasional expressions indicating a relation to the speaker and the listeners "at the particular time." Likewise, the definite article is thoroughly indicative:

When we Germans speak of the Kaiser we of course mean the present (gegenwärtigen) German Kaiser. When we ask for the lamp in the evening, each man means his own. (LU, 91/318)

Finally, Husserl notes that there are three other types of expressions which essentially indicate the subjective and the situational. "Incomplete expressions" would be nonsensical outside of their indicative, circumstantial meaning for the speaker and listener. Although they seem to be objective statements, the bald impersonal expressions of everyday life such as "there is coffee" and "it’s a girl" are really abbreviations which include an understood "for us":

The impersonalia of ordinary speech are good examples as to how apparently firm, objective expressions really vary subjectively in virtue of enthymemetic abbreviation. No one would understand the sentence ‘There are cakes’ as he understands the mathematical sentence ‘There are regular solids.’ In the first place we do not mean that cakes exist absolutely and in general, but that there are cakes here and now – for coffee. ‘It is raining’, likewise, does not have the general meaning that rain is falling, but that it is doing so now, outside. (LU, 92/317)

Likewise, "abnormal expressions" such as "forward!," "you!," "man alive!," "but – but" hardly have any meaning outside of their occasional, indicative meaning. And the "vague expressions" of everyday life concerning classes (e.g., "tree," "shrub," "animal," "plant") and properties (e.g., "coal-black," "round," "long") are always inexact and fluid terms, whose meaning is relative to what the speaker and the listener take to be a tree, coal-black, etc.

But Husserl insists that, if indicative, occasional expressions are not univocal and objective, nor are they for that equivocal and purely subjective. They are not equivocal in the sense of the equivocation in, e.g., the word "fly" when at one time it means a type of insect and at another time it means a part of clothing. "I“ and "here“ are not mere homonyms which can be broken
down into all proper names of persons and places. Husserl maintains that there is "a universally operative indication" in such expressions. In the case of the "I," this universal function is precisely the "meaning-me-myself," the one who is speaking; in the case of the "here," the universal function is the meaning-here where I am. These functions, which as such are empty, directional meaning-intentions, cannot be reduced to the various contents in which they terminate and with which they are thus intuitively fulfilled. In this sense, there is something both quasi-universal about them, insofar as they cannot be so reduced; and also something quasi-relative, insofar as they prefigure no content and are fulfilled in many ways, all of which are relative to the situation of the speaker and the listener. They are beyond both objectivism and relativism:

...we should not suppose that the immediate presentation of the speaker sums up the entire meaning of the word 'I'. The word is certainly not to be regarded as an equivocal expression, with meanings to be identified with all possible proper names of persons. Undoubtedly the presentation of meaning-me-myself, as well as the (lying in it) pointing to the individual presentation of the speaker, also belong in a certain manner to the meaning of the word. (LU, 86/316)

There are some words in occasional use which are essentially framed to designate something concrete, but which none the less lack their own relation to a definite concretum until individual application gives them one. (H. Paul) (LU, 91/318)

However, and it is a big "however," Husserl revokes everything he has said about the situational character of meaning and argues that the apparently radically occasional and subjective meaning of all occasional expressions can somehow be reduced to meaning "in itself" (essence), to "being-in-itself," and the occasional expressions can then be, as it were, translated into objective statements. How can the factical, what is a unique hic et nunc, be reduced to an eidos, a meaning in itself? Nonetheless, Husserl attempts to account for the radical variation in the meaning of occasional expressions by making a distinction between ideal noematic units of meaning, i.e., the meanings of "I" and "here" in themselves and also the meanings with which these are
cashed out (e.g., policeman, mountain), and the shifting acts of meaning (psychical), which do the cashing out. In this way, Husserl understands even the indicative character of occasional expressions as simply a more complicated form of the more straightforward instantiation and making-present of the ideal in the real:

The content meant by the subjective expression, with sense oriented to the occasion, is an ideal unit of meaning in precisely the same sense as the content of a fixed expression. This is shown by the fact that, ideally speaking, each subjective expression is replaceable by an objective expression which will preserve the identity of each momentary (augenblicklich) meaning-intention....Clearly, in fact, to say that each subjective expression could be replaced by an objective expression, is no more than to assert the unbounded range of objective reason. Everything that is, can be known 'in itself'....To being-in-itself correspond truths-in-themselves, and, to these last, fixed, unambiguous assertions....Factual word-meanings are variable, often changing in a single sequence of thought, by their nature mainly adjusted to the occasion. Rightly seen, however, such change in meanings is really change in the act of meaning (Schwanken des Bedeutens). (LU, 95-96/321-322)

As mentioned, Heidegger's own term "formal indication" is taken from Husserl. If one considers that for Heidegger being-meaning is precisely bound up with the "I" (I-am-meaning, mine-ness), expresses itself as "there" or "here-being," and is found only in the factical "situation" and "awhileness," we can see at once how he would have been drawn to take up Husserl's notion of indication in occasional expressions. They were to help him deal with the problem of speaking somehow universally about the radically particular and individual. As we shall see, Heidegger understands the whole of his ontology as nothing more than indicative, "occasional" expressions about being-meaning, which are precisely held in suspension and left unfulfilled. They do not express meaning in itself, nor does the factical being-meaning with which they are fulfilled have anything to do with meaning in itself. We can note also that Heidegger follows Husserl's insights into the concrete reference of occasional expressions in his own analysis of the way we express ourselves situationally in our lived "spatiality" in such statements as "it's a short walk" and "the hammer is heavy". These are not objective, quantitative statements, propositions about states of affairs, but rather notions such as distance
and weight are "hermeneutical concepts" which are interpreted in light of the circumstances of the speaker. (GZ, 308-322/225-234)

2. Indirect Communication (Kierkegaard, Jaspers)

Especially in his 1919-21 essay "Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of World-Views," Heidegger addressed himself directly to Kierkegaard's method of "indirect communication" and Jasper's adoption of this method for his own study of the "limit situations" of human existence. (cf. especially AJ, 2-8, 40-43)

Kierkegaard

In his From the Point of View of My Work as An Author and in his other writings, Kierkegaard reflected on the method of his work as "communication." Corresponding to his basic distinction between subjective truth and objective truth, he made a basic distinction between "indirect communication" and "direct communication." Since the latter is intended as a communication of something objective and universal, which has no essential relation to the speaker and the listener, it can express its content "directly" to the hearer or reader:

The difference between objective and subjective thinking must express itself also in the form of communication suitable to each....Objective thinking is wholly indifferent to subjectivity, and hence also to inwardness and appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct....It can be understood directly and be recited by rote. Objective thinking is hence conscious only of itself, and is not in the strict sense of the word a form of communication at all, at least not an artistic form, in so far as artistry would always demand a reflection in the recipient....

Since subjective truth is concerned precisely with realities of the individual subject in his or her own situation, this truth cannot be directly expressed in communication. The appropriate form of discourse here is that of indirect communication, which only hints at and points to the subjective truth that is not immediately present in what is said:

Inwardness cannot be directly communicated, for its direct expression is precisely externality, its direction being outward, not inward....the reproduction of inwardness in the recipient constitutes the resonance by reason of which the thing said remains absent, like Mary when she hid the words in her heart. And not even this is the true expression for the reproduction of inwardness in the relation between man and man; for she hid the words as a treasure
in the beautiful setting of her comely heart, but inwardness is when the thing said belongs to the recipient as if it were his own - and now it is his own.5

...on account of our vastly increased knowledge, men had forgotten what it means to exist, and what inwardness signifies. When I understood this, it also became clear to me that if I desired to communicate anything on this point, it would first of all be necessary to give my exposition an indirect form. For if inwardness is the truth, results are only rubbish with which we should not trouble each other. The communication of results is an unnatural form of intercourse between man and man, in so far as every man is a spiritual being, for whom the truth consists in nothing else than the self-activity of personal appropriation, which the communication of a result tends to prevent.6

In his account of the "prophets of indirect communication," whose major representatives are Socrates, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, Jaspers distinguishes them from the "teachers of determinate principles" and the "teachers of the totality of life," who fail to see that principles and "the whole" cannot capture the reality of the individual:

All doctrine, everything rational is something universal. Thus, the essential, the absolute can never be present here, since the substance of spirit, existence, is always at the same time absolutely individual....But indirect communication is a thread, which is able to join the essential from person to person, without being able to illuminate it.7

To say that the truth is always subjective is to say that it is always truth within one's situation, the "moment" of one's existence:

The active human being stands completely in the temporally present situation. He acts in the fulfillment of the given situation, not in a contrived or fantastic, timeless situation; not in an other alien world, but rather in the concretely present world. He does what appears to him objectively possible and what he can subjectively. He does not abandon himself to ideals and worlds which are alien to the situation, or to tasks which do not make room for the situation. He stands in complete opposition just as much to him who wants to realize an ideal unconditionally from out of his alien world (and here necessarily without results, misshapenly smashed to pieces) as to he who in resignation puts his hands in his lap and is now only contemplative, because to him the actuality of the given situation and the ideal are things without relation and cannot be unified.8

In its role of only indirectly expressing subjective truth, the first task of indirect communication is the negative one of
repelling the listener or reader both from the direct content of the communication and from the person of the communicator, and thrusting the recipient back into his or her own existence. This repelling can take many forms, e.g., irony, the epigram, the pseudonym, doubt, the anecdote, the thought-experiment, all of which will have nothing to do with the style of objective, scientific discourse. The task of indirect communication is not to make understanding easier in the form of information and facts, but rather to make it more difficult, so that the recipient will become subjectively involved. This repellent function of indirect communication is, as it were, a vomitive which purges the recipient of the glut of objective knowledge about subjective reality:

...the art of communication at last becomes the art of taking away, of luring something away from someone.... When a man has his mouth so full of food that he is prevented from eating, and is likely to starve in consequence, does giving him food consist in stuffing still more of it in his mouth, or does it consist in taking some of it away, so that he can begin to eat? And so also when a man has much knowledge, and his knowledge has little or no significance for him, does a rational communication consist in giving him more knowledge, even supposing that he is loud in his insistence that this is what he needs, or does it not rather consist in taking some of it away.... When the communication, recognizing such an order of things, does not aim to make the difficulty any easier, then it becomes a process of taking away. The difficulty is clothed in a new form, in which it really is difficult.

Indirect communication does not, therefore, present subjective truth directly, but rather is only an indirect "calling attention" and "pointing" to this truth as "possibility," which is to be appropriated, i.e., made one's own in one's own situation. The indirect communication is to be "reflected" back upon one's own existence. The genuine reception of indirect communication thus always involves "passion" (paschein, suffere, "to undergo"), "suffering," "repetition," and "contemporaneity":

When the thought has found its suitable expression in the word, which is realized by means of a first reflection, there follows a second reflection, concerned with the relation between the communication and the author of it, and reflecting the author's own existential relationship to the idea....Truth is inwardness; there is no objective truth, but the truth consists in personal appropriation....it is not the truth but the way which is the
truth....the entire essential content of subjective thought is essentially secret, because it cannot be directly communicated.\textsuperscript{10}

...as abstract, philosophy floats in the indefiniteness of the metaphysical. Instead of admitting this and so pointing (hinweisen) human beings (the individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, the existential, philosophy has created the illusion that human beings could, as one soberly says, speculate themselves out of their own good skin and into pure light. (PA, 182)

As Jaspers explains, for the prophets of indirect communication, the communication is only a "medium," an "indirect carrier," which indicates what must be worked out in the isolation of the recipient's own existence:

...in direct communication only this rational aspect of principles and of the dialectic is present...but behind both the incommunicative idea is all the while hidden, which is indirectly communicated (as Kierkegaard expresses it)....The prophets of indirect communication, i.e., such teachers who renounce being prophets, who only stimulate, call attention (aufmerksam machen), and disturb, who only make matters problematic, but give no instructions and do not teach how one is to live; who, therefore, to all appearances tear things up, bring us to despair, make difficulties, and yet give us nothing "positive"....Socrates named his method of dealing with youth a maieutic method, i.e., midwifery. The growth of life is in the youth, Socrates does nothing in addition, he only helps. Socrates can "give birth to nothing of the truth"....everything communicated, which is there and expressible, is in the end the inessential, but at the same time the indirect carrier of the essential....Indirect communication, i.e., thus the experience of the direct as a medium, in which something else is at work, is something as if life itself receives communion. Socrates says indeed that he does not generate, but rather only helps. Kierkegaard calls indirect communication, however, precisely "existence-communication."\textsuperscript{11}

The thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche has the character of an "appeal" and a "calling attention":

Every formulated doctrine of the whole becomes a secure box (Gehäuse), robs original, lived experience of limit-situations, and suppresses the development of powers which, in movement, seek the meaning of Dasein in the future in self-willed experience, so as to replace them with the peace (Ruhe) of a transparent and perfect world of eternally present meaning, which comforts (befriedigt) the soul.

If the human being speaks out against this and affirms life, process, and meaning in his activity, and for whom the world is not, but rather becomes, and who permits no absolute judgment of value about Dasein, since this cannot be known, but as value is also shaped by him, then no formulated, systematic doctrine will
arise, but rather a constant agitating, unsettling, and appealing to one's own powers of life and those of others...[Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche] appeal to the living process in human beings, to the responsibility of the individual, to the deepest individual earnestness in honesty and truthfulness against everything in itself. The "inward conversion," the inexpressible aspect of deciding and choosing at any time in the deepest recesses of the I is the essential, which each individual must himself creatively experience, and which no doctrine can convey.12

The tension between the subject and the objective, and the necessity of indirect communication, reaches a zenith in the case of Christ, since he is not objectively and directly recognizable as Christ. In the communication, the incomprehensibility and the offense of the God-Man repels any attempt to understand his reality objectively, and throws the recipient back upon himself and his appropriation of the possibility of passionate belief, which is indicated in the communication:

He who to the Jews was a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness, the mystery through which everything is revealed, but in a mystery - humanly [the preachers] transform Him into some sort of a public person as it were, almost as serious as the Parson....one learns to know directly that which cannot be known directly....these parsons have just as much understanding of seriousness as of Christianity in general. The seriousness consists precisely in the fact that Christ cannot give direct communication, that the single direct utterance can only serve, like the miracle, to make people attentive, so that once a man is made attentive by being offended at the contradiction, he can choose whether he will believe it or not....So the communication begins with a thrust backwards....it presents itself, but in such a way that it at first repels....The possibility of offense, which is the situation at the beginning, is in the deepest understanding of it an expression for the necessity of calling attention...with respect to the decision to become a believer....There is no direct communication, and no direct reception - there is choice.13

Because indirect communication can only point to a truth that must be worked out by the individual in his own situation, it allows for independence and autonomy. Each individual must precisely "go his own way":

The highest degree of resignation that a human being can achieve is to acknowledge the given independence in every man, and after the measure of his ability do all that can in truth be done to help someone preserve it.14

To stop a man on the street and stand still while talking to him, is not so difficult as to say something to a passer-by in passing,
without standing still and without delaying the other, without attempting to persuade him to go the same way, but giving him instead an impulse precisely to go his own way. Such is the relation between one existing individual and another, when the communication concerns the truth as existential inwardness.\textsuperscript{15}

In the Prefaces to his "The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air" and to his "Two Edifying Discourses," Kierkegaard states that the intended reader of his writings is not the person who follows, but rather "the individual," who can make his own choices. Kierkegaard renounces the role of "teacher" and the activity of writings "sermons":

This little book...will, as I hope, recall this to `that single individual whom I with joy and gratitude call my reader': `it desires to remain in retirement, as it was in concealment it had its origin - a little flower in the cover of a great forest.'\textsuperscript{16}

...this little book (which is entitled 'Discourses', not sermons, because the author of them has no authority to preach, and 'Edifying Discourses', not discourses for edification, because the speaker makes no claim to be a teacher) desires to be what it is, a superfluity, and desires only to remain in obscurity, as in obscurity it was brought to birth....\textsuperscript{17}

As Jaspers explains, the indirect communicator renounces the superior role of prophet and leader, and remains in the role of someone who only "helps" by throwing out suggestions and rough possibilities, which are to be appropriated in the isolation of one’s own existence. The indirect communicator is only, as it were, a midwife for the other:

They have the strongest drive to communicate, but, however, always in mutuality. The teachers of principles want a following and obedience in the face of the present truth which has been observed and formulated. The teachers of totality do not at all apply themselves to the individual, but rather give out as self-evident secure structures for all. The philosophers of indirect communication press themselves forward inwardly as individuals towards individual human beings, appeal to the life which is in the other and which they help to flourish through stimulation and through the medium of infinite reflection, but which they do not want to give as an imperative doctrine. They push away, when one wants piously to join a following, they love freedom in the other. According to the idea, they are never - even if very much so factically-superior, but rather in the community of indirect communication they themselves live as much from the student as they help him, without giving something direct, which would be the essential....Socrates does nothing in addition, he only helps.'\textsuperscript{18}
Luther

Although Luther did not use the term "indirect communication," this type of discourse was operative in his theological work. He wanted to find the logos which could do justice to and call the individual to a believing experience of the Word of God. He thus distinguished the logos of the "theology of the cross" from that of the "theology of glory." The logos of the latter is essentially "assertion," the logos apophantikos of Aristotle, which simply "lets be seen" in order to contemplate something objectively given. The "theology of glory" means objective "science of God," which omits the enactment of faith. "The theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. The theologian of the cross calls the things by their right names." (Heidelberg Disputation, thesis 21)

In theses 45, 47, and 49 of his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, Luther speaks out against the substitution of the objective, impersonal character of scholastic logic for the enactment of faith:

To state that a theologian who is not a logician is a monstrous heretic - this is a monstrous and heretical statement....In vain does one fashion a logic of faith, a substitution brought about without regard for limit and measure....If a syllogistic form of reasoning holds in divine matters, then the doctrine of the Trinity is demonstrable and not the object of faith.

For Luther, the true logos has the character of a "provocation" or "call" to the possibility of "care" for the self's relation to God. The "true theologian," the "theologian of the cross," is the one whose logos is a call to the other to take up his own "cross" of "anxiety," "sin, foolishness, death, and hell" and ultimately choice and faith. The basic message of the word of theology is Paul's exhortation "change your life!" in the sense of constantly renewing one's faith in becoming. Luther writes in his Heidelberg Disputation:

Speaking in this manner does not mean giving occasion for despair, but rather for arousing the desire to humble oneself and seek the grace of Christ....Such preaching concerning sin - or rather the acknowledgment of sin and the faith in such preaching - is a preparation for grace. Yearning for grace wells up when recognition of sin has risen. A sick person seeks the doctor when he recognizes the seriousness of his illness. Just as, therefore, one does not
give occasion for despair or death by telling a sick person about the danger of his illness, but rather provokes, calls to him to seek medical care (cura), so saying that we are nothing and constantly sin when we do the best we can means not that we give occasion to despair (unless we are fools), but rather to be anxiously concerned (sollicitos) about the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.... The law wills that a human being despairs in himself, for it leads him into hell and makes him poor.... (Theses 17, 18)

"to use the tongue, language" (linguis agere) is to teach, to warm, to exhort, to call, and to use it in every way as an instrument with which to approach another person. 18

Such provocation is, for Luther, always a call to the individual precisely in the isolation of his own personal relation to God, which is always according to conscience. The theological logos is only the awakening call to the logos of the individual conscience through which the Word speaks to the individual. In his notion of the universal priesthood of believers, Luther thus renounced the authority of the established Church and in principle all external religious authority. He placed authority in the conscience, i.e., in the individual's enactment of his relationship of faith to God. Luther's distinction between the "theology of glory" and the "theology of the cross" is at bottom a choice between "science" and "preaching" as the kind of communication proper to Christianity. Thus he immensely preferred Aristotle's Rhetoric, Poetics, and Ethics over his Metaphysics and Physics, because the former could serve as good oratorical training and practice for the true calling of the theologian in preaching. But his preference for "preaching" over science, for "expounding to children and ordinary folk the commandments and the lord's prayer" over playing with the "dung" of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Letter to Spalatin, March 13, 1519), i.e., his preference for homiletics and catechetics, does not mean that theological discourse was supposed now to take up a prophetic ranting and raving from the pulpit and in catechetical handbooks. Rather, prae-dicare means for Luther, when he is at his best, "saying before" others, "proclaiming," and precisely in the sense of the root word dicere, deiknunai, "indicating." What gets indicated before the others is precisely the possibility for each of them of the relationship of faith to God,
which is to be worked out in one's own existence, according to conscience. Luther's insistence on preaching, in order to get the Christian message out of the theological lecture halls and out into the lives of the people, was not to be prophecy and heavy-handed authority, but rather was to preserve precisely the independence of the individual.

**Jaspers**

In his 1919-21 essay on Jasper's *Psychology of World-Views*, Heidegger notes that "the nature and manner how Jaspers came to choose the 'method' and how he clarified it...goes back particularly to the expressly noted influence of Max Weber and Kierkegaard...." *(AJ, 40)* From Kierkegaard's notion of "indirect communication," Jaspers' "psychology of world-view" takes up the position that thought must speak about human existence and must communicate possibilities of existence (what Jaspers calls "world-view"), but can do so only indirectly. Jaspers wants both to speak about the in some sense universal "limit situations" (suffering, struggle, death, accident, guilt) and also to do justice to the principle that "individuum est ineffabile," "the individual is inexpressible." *(AJ, 39)* Heidegger writes:

Psychology of world-view should indeed develop and impose no positive world-view, but should provide 'clarifications and possibilities as means to (world-view) self-reflection' (foreword) through the observation which understands and orders the positions, processes, and stages of the soul. Only thereby does the aforementioned direction of the problems (winning of the whole of psychology) receive the assignment of its final goal. *(AJ, 2)*

In the original 1919 preface to his book, Jaspers gives his version of Kierkegaard's notion of "indirect communication":

Factual world-views remain a matter of life. Instead of a communication about what should matter in life *(worauf es ankomme)*, only clarifications and possibilities are to be given as means *(Mittel)* to self-reflection. Who wants a direct answer about how he should live, searches for it in vain in this book. The essential, which lies in the concrete decisions of personal destiny, remains closed. The book has meaning only for those persons who are beginning to wonder, to reflect upon themselves, to see the questions *(Fragwürdigkeiten)* of Dasein, and has meaning even only for those who experience life as personal, irrational responsibility, which is able to be cancelled by nothing. Through the presentation of means for orientation, it appeals to free, spirit-
ual intellectuality and the activity of life, but it does not attempt to manage life and to teach.20 (cf. AJ, 2-8, 40-43)

In the opening pages of his book, Jaspers thus draws a sharp distinction between the "universal observation" of his psychology of world-view and "prophetic philosophy," by which he means philosophy in the classical style of giving "tables of values" and communicating "what is right, what is important, what we should live for and how we should live, what we should do":

[Universal observation] does not take up a position, it does not want, like prophetic philosophy, to propagate anything, it gives to he who wants the meaning of life stones instead of bread, it directs back upon himself he who would like to follow, to subordinate himself, and to be a student. He can learn what is at best a means for him. What matters is something which he must find for himself in original experience...it wants to avoid an exchange of roles...it desires to do clearly what it can in its own sphere, and to do it ruthlessly, but it does not want to make pretenses about great things.21

From Max Weber, Jaspers took up the scientific ethos of "value-free science":

Max Weber's works in sociology of religion and in political science contain a kind of psychological analysis of world-view, which, in contrast to earlier such analyses, shows itself as new through the connection of the concretest historical research with systematic thinking, which previously seemed impossible. The systematic and objective force...is connected with a living vehemence, as it strikes us, for example, in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The separation of world-view valuing and scientific observation - for which he, after earlier formulations, for the first time, however, brought the pathos - is striven after also in this work.22

In other words, Jaspers' indirectly communicative "means for self-reflection" derive from his scientific "universal observation" (Betrachtung) of the limit situations of human existence. "What man is"23 is to be determined through a scientific "observation which orders the ultimate positions of human, spiritual being." (AJ, 1)

But, according to Heidegger, this is where Jaspers goes wrong. His adoption of Weber's notion of a pure, value-free science (taken over from the Neo-Kantian Rickert) (AJ, 40) as the self-evident methodological approach hides from him two disastrous things: first, his apparently pure observations of the universal limit-situations already present human existence in a certain light
through precisely this theoretical approach, i.e., it gets viewed a
something present to hand (de-living); second, these observations
and their conceptuality derive from a long philosophical tradition
and therefore are interpretive. Heidegger writes:

With the formulation of the psychological problem of world-view
there is given a specific access with respect to what has the
character of soul, which for its part is seen inexplicitly before
the starting point of the problem within a specific, traditionally
expressed preconception: the soul, which has limits, limit situa-
tions, from which an "influence" must take place on the play of
spiritual forces in which Dasein consists....In the starting point
of the problem, a preconception about the soul, articulating in a
specific manner, is already pre-given and effective. The psychology
of world-view is not supposed to develop and impose a doctrine of
life, but has as its goal "the giving of clarifications and
possibilities as means to self-reflection." The work of clarifica-
tion is clarification of "life" somehow viewed; with the starting
point of the clarification, the technique of clarification, and the
breadth and kind of goal of the clarification, life itself is
forced into a specific aspect for the one who is appropriating such
clarifications. (AJ, 7-8)

Because he is mesmerized by the Weberian pathos for value-free
science, Jaspers fails to see that his psychology of world-view
already biases individual reflection and decision-making and, in
being presented as pure observation, prevents one from seeing the
necessity of a constant, critical and interpretive questioning of
this and all conceptuality in one's self-reflection and individual
decision. This fluid conceptuality is, as we shall see, what
Heidegger calls the "method" or "way" of "hermeneutical concepts,"
which arise out of interpretation (questioning) and remain within
interpretation (questioning). It is only through this "infinite
process" of interpretative conceptuality that one can ever ap-
proach, but never fully achieve, the form of discourse that Jaspers
and Kierkegaard demand, i.e., one which both, on the one hand, says
something about human existence and can thus serve as a means to
self-reflection and individual decision and, on the other hand,
does not usurp individual autonomy and holds itself open to
revision in the light of the former. Only thus can a philosophy of
human existence be viewed "neither as sport nor as prophetic
stylization which brings the salvation of the world," i.e., neither
the leisure of mere "theory" nor the meddling of moralizing. (AJ, 6) Jaspers' notion of a static conceptuality as the "means to self-reflection" comes close to the notion of the mere application and filling out of a schema.

Heidegger claims that Jaspers' position is a "misunderstanding of the authentic intentions of both" Kierkegaard and Weber. (AJ, 40) It does not do justice to Kierkegaard's critique of objective truth and his understanding of the radical finitude and question-character of human existence. And it does not do justice to the fact that Weber's methodological distinction between value-free science and world-view valuing had an effective validity for him only within the historical studies of his "sociology," where he did not raise the question of whether his method could be transferred to the more basic philosophical inquiry about "what man is."

Heidegger explains his criticism in the following passage:

Jaspers falls prey to a deception when he thinks that in mere observation precisely the highest measure of non-interference in personal decision-making would be achieved and thus the individual would be freed for his self-reflection. On the contrary, precisely through the fact that Jaspers undertakes his investigation as mere observation he indeed appears to avoid imposing a specific world-view which has been portrayed by him, but he drifts precisely into the suggestion that his inexplicit preconception (life as totality) and the essential ways of articulating connected with it are something non-committal, something self-evident, where in fact everything is decided precisely with the meaning of these concepts and the how of interpreting. Mere observation does not give precisely that which it wants to give, the possibility of a radical, verifying re-examination and decision and, what is synonymous with this, the rigorous consciousness of the necessity of methodical questioning. One can meaningfully set free genuine self-reflection only when it is there, and it is there only in a rigorous being-awoken, and it can be genuinely awoken only in such a way that the other is pitilessly driven in a specific manner into reflection, and that he sees that appropriation of the objects of philosophy is tied to a rigor of methodical enactment, behind which every science lags, because in the sciences merely the requirement of objectivity (Sachlichkeit) is decisive, but to the matters (Sachen) of philosophy there belongs also the one who is philosophizing himself and (his) notorious piteousness. One can force someone into reflection, call something to someone's attention (aufmerksam machen), only in such a way that one goes in advance along the path itself for a stretch.... In order to be effective as a blow against present philosophy, mere observation must progress
to the "infinite process" of a radical questioning (Befragens), which holds itself in questioning. (AJ, 42-43)

But Heidegger's critique of Jaspers is an immanent critique, i.e., "a critique which measures itself by the immanent intentions and pursues them." "The critique frees the authentic tendency of Jaspers' work." (AJ, 1, 2) The young Heidegger critically took up and carried further not only Jasper's project of an investigation of human existence, but also his method of "giving clarifications and possibilities as means to self-reflection," especially insofar as the original motives of Kierkegaard's method of "indirect communication" were still visible here. Heidegger's model regarding method is really Kierkegaard:

Regarding Kierkegaard it must, however, be pointed out that it is not often that in philosophy or theology (where is here indifferent) such a height of rigorous consciousness of method has been achieved as it was precisely by him. One loses sight precisely of what is essential in Kierkegaard when this consciousness of method is overlooked, or taken in secondary significance. (AJ, 41)

In his "acknowledging indication of the sources" for his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger refers to Kierkegaard's notion that genuine thought is a "pointing (hinweisen) of human beings (the individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, and the existential" (PA, 182) and thereby acknowledges his indebtedness to Kierkegaard's notion of "indirect communication" in his own notion of "formal indication," which is systematically worked out in this lecture course. This indebtedness becomes clearer in light of the fact that here and in his essay on Jaspers he elucidates "formal indication" as a form of "communication" whose function is "calling attention." Heidegger writes: "In respect to the problem of validity and objectivity, what is to be attempted is calling attention to a way..." (PA, 180, 36, 167, 169, 185-186; HF, 14, 18)

In his essay on Jaspers, Heidegger states that his notion of the "formal" in "formal indications" (AJ, 10, 29) is not the traditional sense of "form" or "idea," but rather means the indication of or calling attention to factual, historical meaning:

There still remains the possibility that Jaspers wishes to have these observations understood in a completely formal manner. But then what is really first required is a discussion of the meaning
of this "formal," of to what extent it prejudices the concrete-material observation, to what extent it does not, how far prejudice can be avoided, how far formal meaning is again, however, won in a specifically characterized starting point from what is factically-concretely-historically available and in an specifically characterized explication of the experience of the starting point, how far authentically understood, conceptual expression revokes the formal, and in such a way, therefore, that concept formation means not the coming to light of a theoretical theme with a merely theoretical aim, but rather interpretively illuminated experience itself and calling attention to it in with-worldly announcing (Kundgabe). (AJ, 27-28, 42)

Regarding his critical treatment of Jaspers for the purpose of his own renewed investigation of human existence, Heidegger emphasizes that his reflections have only the character of a "calling attention," which has to be taken up in independent reflection:

But however it may be received, regarding its tendency to bring about an effect in the with-world its claims have to remain within the expanse of calling attention, just as all philosophizing does in the end. (AJ, 6)

Heidegger's idea that the interpretive working out of the formal indication of philosophy is a resolute, "counter-ruinant" "grasping" (Ergreifen) of the meaning of human existence and its immanent "principles" was also modeled on Kierkegaard's notion of "passion" and choice, which, for both Heidegger and Kierkegaard, are supposed to be also operative in the "repetition" and appropriation of what gets communicated in philosophical thought:

Life allows itself to be clarified only when it is lived through, just as even Christ first began to explain the Scriptures and to show how they had taught about him - when he was resurrected. (Kierkegaard, Diary, April 15, 1838) (HF, 16)

The genuine principle is to be won existentielly-philosophically only in the basic experience of passion (Leidenschaft). Here it is unilluminated. "On principle" is from the outside, "without passion," in reflection, becoming lost. Principally no "preservation." "On principle" one can be and have everything (Kierkegaard). (PA, 24, 37, 71)

Later we shall see more clearly how Heidegger understood "calling attention" as being for the sake of further philosophical interpretation, interpretation in the sciences (e.g., theology), and individual-personal reflection and decision.25
When in 1924 the young Heidegger said that "it is the true task of theology, which must be discovered again, to find the word that is able to call one to faith and preserve one in faith," it was especially of Kierkegaard's notion of "indirect communication" that he was thinking. When in 1927 he delivered his talk on "Phenomenology and Theology" before the theologians in Tübingen, it was precisely to the "word" of "formal indication" that he appealed as making possible a proper relationship between thought and Christian faith. Thought can only "indicate" the possibility of the enactment of faith, it can never usurp it. (PT, 61-67/17-21)

3. Rough Outline (Aristotle)

Heidegger's notion of "formal indication" was also influenced by Aristotle's method of providing a rough "outline" for the concrete, historical realities of human praxis. Since in his 1921-22 lecture course he provided many details of his modeling of his whole hermeneutical phenomenology on Aristotle's method, I would like now to provide a sustained analysis of his appropriation of Aristotle's method primarily in this lecture course. We must see how he took up Aristotle's critique of Plato's idea of the good, the phenomenological character of Aristotle's method, Aristotle's focus on the "principles" of human praxis, and the interpretive or hermeneutical character of Aristotle's method of providing an outline of human praxis, which is understood not as the fixed results of science, but rather as a "way" (methodos) to be travelled.

Aristotle's Critique of the Platonic Idea of the Good

We need to be aware of the details of the decisive significance of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic idea of the good on Heidegger's own thought. Heidegger followed Aristotle's thesis that philosophy can never arrive at fixed "ideas" in the concrete, historical realm of human praxis. Aristotle begins his study of human praxis in his Nicomachean Ethics with what is in effect a sustained critique of the manner in which Plato had expressed the three intentional moments of praxis in his doctrine of the idea of the good, which was an attempt to make practical philosophy dependent on his metaphysical theory of ideas. (I, 6)
In this regard, Aristotle is the effective founder of practical philosophy in the sense of an autonomous discipline separate from metaphysics or first philosophy.

Aristotle begins by speaking of the necessity of "destroying" Plato's views on human praxis, i.e., bringing them into "accord with the subject matter": "We had perhaps better examine the universal good....it would perhaps be thought better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of saving the truth even to destroy *(anairein)* what is close to us...." *(E.N., 1096a)* According to Aristotle, for Plato there is "a single idea" of "the good in itself" *(kath' hauto)*, which is something "separate" *(choriston)* from all concrete goods, is a "universal" *(katholou)* that is something "common" *(koinon)* to all "particular" goods, is a "one" that "manifests" itself in the many particular goods, is something the "same" *(autos)* which is in all that is "other" or "different" *(heteros)*, is a "paradigm" or "plan" *(paradeigma)* on which all individual goods are modeled, and thus functions as their formal "cause." *(I, 6)* The *auto to agathon*, the "good itself" is *epokeina tes ousias*, "beyond being,"*27* and those who are conscious of their inability to reconcile the plurality of opinions about what is good "marvel at and admire *(thaumazousin)* those who speak of *mega ti kai hyper autous*, something big and great and above them. It has been held by some that alongside these many goods there exists another good which is in itself and is the cause of all these being good." *(1095a)* The highest task of philosophy as metaphysics is to be a "single science" *(episteme)* of this idea of the good, and this science is supposed to be "exact and rigorous" *(akribes)* science, in the same sense as mathematics. *(1094b)*

But, according to Aristotle, such a separate and universal idea of the good is not given in our "experience" *(empeiria)*, i.e., in our "praxis" as it is lived in our "life" *(bios)*. "For even if there is some one good which is predicable in common or is something separate and in itself, it is manifest *(delon)* that it could not be enacted and possessed by man." *(1096b)* If we remain within human experience, we see that "the good *isachos legetai to onti*, is
said [revealed] in as many ways as being." This means, first, that
the good is said in the various *kategorias*, the ways of addressing
beings in the shared public world (*agora*), i.e., in the schemata of
the "what" (e.g., intelligence), the "how" or "quality" ("virtue"),
the "how much" or "quantity" (the "mean"), the "towards-which" or
"relation" (the "serviceable"), "time" (the "moment" [*kairos*]),
"place" ("place of residence"), etc. "Therefore, it is manifest
that good cannot be something common which is universal and one."
(1096a)

Second, even if we restrict the good to mean those things
that are "good in themselves," as opposed to what is good as a
means to these, we see that "the discourse about the good will have
to manifest itself as the same in all of them, just as that about
white manifests itself in snow and in white paint. But the dis­
courses about honor and phronesis and pleasure as being good are
other and different. Therefore, the good is not something common
according to a single idea." (1096b) "The good appears differently
in different forms of praxis and techne. It appears differently in
medicine and in strategy and likewise in the other arts." (1097a;
cf. 1094a)

Third, even if we seize upon only one of the many senses of
the good (e.g., health), we see that this particular sense has many
possible interpretive meanings, since its meaning is not *hen kai
tahton pasin*, "one and the same for everyone," but rather always
*pros hemas*, "towards us" or "in relation to us," the "us" here
signifying each of us as a unique "individual" (*hekaston*). (1106a)
Knowing the good is always *peri auton kai hena*, "about oneself, the
individual." (1141b) "For a doctor does not aim at health in
itself, but rather the health of man, or rather of some particular
man. For it is the individual that he cures." (1097a) What is good
(healthy) for Milo is not necessarily good for Socrates. What is
good for Socrates is not the same as what is good for fish or deer.
That is, the meaning of the good in the sense of health, pleasure,
or happiness is always also "in relation to" individual kinds of
animals:
If what is healthy or good is other for men and for fish, but what is white or straight is eternally (aei) the same, anyone would say that what is wise is the same but what is practically wise is other... even some animals are said to have phronesis... there will be many wisdoms. There cannot be a single wisdom about the good of all living beings (any more than there is one art of medicine for all beings), but rather an other and different wisdom about the good of each individual kind of living being. (1141a)

Four, there is no single science of a single universal good, but rather many different doxai and legomena, "opinions" and "statements" about what the good is in praxis as it is actually lived. "As far as the name [of the highest practical good] goes, among the greatest number they say something similar and are in wide-spread agreement (homologeitai). For the many and those of education and refinement talk of happiness or well-being (eudaimonian)... But regarding well-being, what it is, they are in dispute, and the account given by the many is not the same given by the wise." (1095b) "Of the two parts of the soul possessing language, phronesis must be the excellence of one, namely, the one that forms opinions; for opinion is about the possible and what can be otherwise, and so is phronesis." (1140b; cf. 1144b; E.E., I, 1, 3)

Concerning what the goods or the goods are, the kind of homologia (which we can translate as "agreement in language") (cf. E.E., I, 6-8) that human beings are capable of is primarily "by nomos, custom, usage, practice, convention" and not "by nature." Agreement takes the form of koinonia, "communication, intercourse, community, publicness" concerning the good and the bad, the noble and the base, the just and the unjust. Here "practical truth" is communicative, dialogical, and consensual, and not monological in the sense of being arrived either through deductive "demonstration" in the "soul's dialogue with itself" (Plato) or through the pure intuition of "thought thinking thought" (Aristotle's first philosophy). (1140b)28 "The noble and the just, at which politics aims, are possessed of much difference (diaphoran) and much wandering, dispersion, uncertainty (planen), so that they are thought to be by nomos only and not by nature." (1094b) If there is a central word
of Aristotle's that he uses in place of Plato's key word "idea" it is that of logos, language.

Because the good is not separate but rather in life, not universal but particular, not one but many, not the same but other and different, not by nature but by convention, there can be no "exact and rigorous" science of the good. "Further, since for things that are according to a single idea there is a single science, there ought to be a single science of all goods. But, as it is, there are many sciences...." (1096a) "...there will be many wisdcons. There cannot be a single wisdom about the good...." (1141a) "...matters of praxis and of what helps us to cope (sumpheronta) have no fixity, any more than matters of health. This being the nature of our general logos, still less does logos about the particulars have exactness and rigor; for these come under no techne or doctrine and instruction...." (1104a) "It is manifest (phaneron) that phronesis is not science." (1142a, 1140b)

Finally, since an exact science of a universal and ideal good does not exist, since in actually lived praxis no one knows about such an ideal or pursues it, this idea and the science dealing with it are useless. "...this account seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences. For all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to make up the deficiency of it, do not trouble themselves with a knowledge of the good itself....Moreover, it is not easy to see how a knowledge of the good itself will help a weaver or carpenter regarding his techne, or how anybody will be a better physician or general for having contemplated the idea itself." (1097a)

Although Aristotle himself does not say so directly, his operative thesis is that, in modeling practical philosophy on the universality of mathematics and metaphysics, Plato arrived at his notion of a "separate" idea of the good in his "upward way" through a process of what Aristotle elsewhere (in mathematics) calls aphairein, abstrahere, abstracting, taking away, robbing, depriv­ing, in the double sense that he, first, takes away from and robs the good of the plurality and ambiguity it possess in the praxis of
life and also, second, takes away from and separates out of actual praxis simply the most universal and empty characteristic that some good is always being pursued. If an idea of the good existed separately from the plurality goods experienced in our praxis, then in principle a very intelligent youth could come to know this idea (in the same way as knowing Euclidean geometry or a sophisticated computer programme), but, as it is, "we do not consider that a youth can have phronesis. The reason is that phronesis is also concerned with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but the youth has no experience. For experience is the fruit of much time....mathematics comes to be through aphairesis...." (1178b; cf. 1142a)

In our previous discussion of Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle, we already indicated how the young Heidegger, in his own comments on the rehabilitation of practical philosophy, followed Aristotle's critique of the Platonic good and in fact turned it against modern philosophy of value and indeed against the whole of western metaphysics. Regarding the question of method, what appealed to Heidegger in Aristotle's critique of Plato was that here he renounced the "scientific" approach and searched for another type of logos which could do justice to the concrete, historical character of human praxis. We shall see this more clearly as we go along.

**Aristotle's Ontology of Human Dasein**

After carrying out what the young Heidegger would have called a "destruction" of Plato's idea of the good and an uncovering of the dimension of human praxis in factual life, Aristotle goes on (again in the young Heidegger's language) to repeat practical philosophy from the standpoint of praxis in factual life. Plato's methodos, his "way-towards" the theme of the good in human praxis did not proceed kata ten hypokeimenen hylen, "according to the underlying matter," according to ton pragmaton, "the thing itself." (1094b) In fact, his hados, his "way" was backwards, since he attempted to let his theory determine the phenomena. He pursued hoi apo ton archon logoi, "statements proceeding from the
starting point of a principle," whereas he should have pursued
"statements proceeding to the starting point of a principle."
(1095a) In this sense, Aristotle's "way" is that of a radical
katabasis, a "down-going," which does not simply come down into
"the cave" with a vision and philosophical theory of the good, but
rather humbles itself and lets philosophy be determined by the
"matter" of practical life itself. This downward way is again
expressed in his statement that he is not concerned with the good
"itself," but rather with the good "towards us," down to us, the
actually existing individual human beings. Whereas Plato's meta-
physical approach sought for the good somewhere "beyond" human life
(and in general Aristotle says that metaphysics or first philosophy
deals not with bios anthropinos, ta anthropina, or ta prakta,
"human life," "human things," or "practical affairs," but rather
with bios theios, the "divine life" and such things as the stars,
the divine, the unmoved mover, and universals, which knowledge is,
therefore, "useless" for practical philosophy), Aristotle's
practical philosophy is he peri ta anthropina philosophia, "philos-
osophy about human things," which is concerned with to anthropeues-
thai, a wonderfully strange verbal noun which literally says
something like "human-being-ing," "being-a-human-being," "living-
as-a-human-being."29 Anthropizo means something like "I human," "I
human-being." Aristotle practices in effect a "suspension of
judgment" (epoche) concerning what is beyond human experience in
the realm of praxis (the ideal good) and contents himself with
describing "the matter" as ta phainomena, the phenomena, that
which shows itself. His practical philosophy is legein ta phainomena,
"phenomenology," letting the phenomena be seen in language. "We
must, as in all other inquiries, set before us ta phainomena, that
which shows itself...." (1145b)30 The good is always to phainomenon
agnoston, "the good that appears," and hekasto to phainomenon, "the
appearance to the individual." (1113a) In other words, Aristotle
presents us with a phenomenological "ontology of human Dasein," of
the praxis of "factual life." (IAw, 100)31
As we also indicated in our previous discussion (Ch. 5, sect. IV), Heidegger radicalized Husserl’s phenomenological method by a return to Aristotle’s accounts of logos and phainomenon. Heidegger’s version of Aristotle’s phenomenology of human bios was: “phenomenology” of “factual life.”

**Hermeneutics of Facticity**

Aristotle wants to find the archai, the “principles” of human praxis, that from which it originates and is governed, not in some “separate” “idea” (the “what,” “whatness”), which is expressed in a philosophical theory and which accounts for “why” things are as they are, but rather in what he, in some amazing passages, calls to hoti, “the that” - the “that” the archai appear and are factically so and so in the "that" of the self-understanding (phronesis) of factual human life: Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike, but rather in some cases it is enough if the ‘that’ is indicated (deichthenai), as with archai. The ‘that’ is the first and the arche. And concerning the archai we see (theorountai) some in induction, some in perception, some by a certain habitation and accustoming (ethismo)....they have a great influence on what follows. For the arche (the beginning, the principle) seems to be more than half of the whole. (1098b)

One must begin from what is well-known and familiar. But this has two senses, what is well-known to us and what is known in itself. Presumably, for us [as opposed to Plato] it is necessary to begin from what is known and familiar to us. Thus, the good hearer of lectures about the noble and the just and, on the whole, about politics needs to have been educated in ways of habitation and accustoming (dei tois ethesin echthai). For the arche is the ‘that’, and if this is sufficiently manifest (phainoito), the hearer of lectures on politics will not need also ‘the why’. And he already has the archai.... (1095b)

In investigating the "principles" (archai) of practical life, philosophy must take its "point of departure" (arche) not from a theory about the ideal, about what things ought to be in a utopian state, but rather from the factualness, particularity, and thatness of practical life and find precisely here the very operative principles that govern this praxis (factual being-meaning). We "already have the principles" in our self-"having" (hexis) (self-understanding) and "experience" as something familiar, customary,
and habitual (ἐθικός) and as that in which we thus have our "being-at-home" (οἰκείος). The good being investigated is the "practical good" and the "human good," the good already understood and enacted in and through human being (1097a, 1094b, 1141b), as opposed to either the "idea" of the "good itself" and "in itself," or the good of other kinds of living beings such as fish and bees, or the good of theory (stars, the divine, universals). "But we are seeking something enactable and attainable by the human being." (1096b) If someone, e.g., a youth, does not have this familiar pre-theoretical understanding and is not already at home here, she or he will not be an oikeios akroates, "a hearer [of lectures on human praxis] who is intimate and at home [in the matter] and thus fit. For he is inexperienced in the praxis of life, but the logoi ek touton kai peri touton, the discussions are from this and back into this." (1095a) Likewise, a principle such as Plato's idea of the good is not an oike arche, a "principle which is at home and proper." "We must take principles that are at home and proper." Plato's theory is atopon, "out of place," since it does not arise out of the way the matter is given in ethos, the self-understanding in which human beings are at home. (M.M., 1183b; E.E., I, 6)

In other words, Aristotle attempts to find the good and the other principles of praxis not so much in some form of cogito (philosophical reflection, sophistic instruction) as in the facticity of the "that" of the sum, the "I am," which he calls our factual already onta agathon, "being good," anthropo enti, "being a human being," and "having become." (1178b, 1144a) Thus, his "ontology of human Dasein," which is developed not only in his ethics but also in his Politics and Rhetoric, attempts to bring into view human existence or there-being (Dasein) in its facticity, that is, in its immediate everydayness, just as it is known to us through the familiarity of habitation, because we ourselves are the being, which in a special way is-there and is precisely therefore characterized as existence or there-being....[The point of departure] lies in clarifying the "that," namely, how Dasein understands itself... and what it expresses about that which it does or strives after. (IAsz, 108; cf. 118)

episteme ethike: science of ethos - of the behaving (Sichgehaben), the self-comportment (Sichverhalten) of man to other men and to
himself: science of man...here man is no longer a theme in the sense of a thing that occurs in the world...but rather man is now experienced insofar as he acts in relation to others and to himself. Now, in the *episteme ethike*, he is understood as a being, which, as it were, takes its ownmost being in hand. (*LW*, 1)

Aristotle’s practical writings present “the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another.” (Heidegger) He gives us a phenomenological ontology of the “principles” (being-meaning) of the “that” (facticity) of human praxis.

But his phenomenological ontology of human being is also hermeneutical, since it is the interpretive laying out (*Auslegung*) of our familiar “pre-philosophical understanding of being alive in life” (*IA*, 52) or, more precisely, of the way in which the phenomena (the principles) have already shown themselves in this understanding. “It is necessary to give heed to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and elderly men or of people with phronesis, no less than to their demonstrations. For, through having received an eye from experience, they see rightly.” (1143b)

All poiein and prattein, “producing” and “acting” have their own theoria, “theory” or “sight” and “knowing” (techne, phronesis). Since this understanding is essentially *meta logou*, “with language,” it has always already been ex-pressed, said-out (*ausgesagt*) and brought to language in *legomena*, “that which is said.” “The good is said in many ways.” The good is agathon *legomenon*, the good that is said. The stock of *legomena* on hand include those from “the many,” “the refined and educated,” the poets, historians, wise men, and philosophers. The *legomena* that Aristotle usually takes up are those that are homologoumena, “the said that is agreed upon.” “It is necessary to proceed *ek ton homologoumenon*, from what is agreed upon in language...,” e.g., that well-being is final end of human life. (*E.E.*, 1218a, 1216b-1217a; *E.N.*, 1095a, 1098b) Aristotle begins with the *koinos topos* (*locus communis*), the “common-place.” (cf. *Topica*, 100a) What is understandingly said (revealed) is some matter itself, such that Aristotle can use *ta legomena* (or *ta endoxa*, “opinions”) and *ta phainomena* interchangeably almost as synonyms. *Phainomena* means that “which shows itself (in *lego-
"legomena" means "sayings (showings) (of the things)."

These legomena-phainomena are thus ta hyparchonta, "the ready to hand," "the present circumstances," "the underlying starting-points" given in pre-philosophical life and given for philosophy, which must "sing-along-with," "harmonize" (sunadei) with them. (1145b, 1098b; E.E., 1216b) Aristotle's phenomenology or description of human life is hermeneutical in that it begins with the way in which the phainomena have already been disclosed in the legomena of everyday life and radicalizes this self-showing of human life through a renewed logos. We must "examine the arche ek ton legomenon peri autes, "from what is said about it." (E.N., 1098b) "For everyone has something at home and proper to contribute to the truth, and we must begin from this in order to indicate the truth. For from what is said, which is true but unclear, clearness will also be attained as we move forward, if we enduringly follow up what is familiar from habitation and accustoming and stated confusedly." (E.E., 1216b) "Philosophy has no other point of departure than that of taking up all the ways in which human Dasein expresses itself about its own possibilities of being." (IASzz, 111)

Aristotle sometimes refers to logos as "hermeneia." Heidegger explains what this term means in Plato and Aristotle:

hermeneutike [hermeneutics] (episteme, techne) is a formation from hermeneuein [to make clear, to interpret, to give utterance to], hermeneia [interpretation, speech], hermeneus [interpreter, expounder]. The etymology of the word is dark.

The name of the god hermes, the messenger of the gods, is brought into relation with it....

Plato: hoi de poietai ouden all' e hermeses eisin ton theon (the poets are the 'spokes-persons' ['Sprecher'] of the gods). [Ion, 534e] That is why the following applies to the rhapsodes, who in their turn recite the poets: oukoun hermeneon hermenenes gignesthe, will you not become the spokes-persons of spokes-persons? [535a] Hermeneus [interpreter] is someone who communicates, announces, to another what an other "means," which other in turn conveys such communication, announcement, re-enacts it; cf. Sophist, 248a5, 246e3: apheremeneue, to act as spokes-person: to proclaim, make known what the others mean.

Theaetetus, 209a5: logos = he tes ses diaphorotetos hermeneia. Announcement is a making-explicit of the difference from others next to and in relation to koinon [the common]. (cf. Theaetetus,
163c: what is seen in the words, and what those who interpretively lay out (die Ausleger communicate); not a theoretical understanding, but rather "will," wish, and the like, being, existence; i.e., hermeneutics is the announcement of the being of a being in its being to-(me).

Aristotle: lego de, ..., laxin einai ten dia tes onomasiais hermeneian [I mean...that discourse is interpretation through words]. [Poetics, 1450b; cf. De an., 420b]

Among the "writings" of Aristotle one has been handed down with the title Peri hermeneias [On Interpretation]. It deals with logos in its basic performance of uncovering and making one acquainted with beings. (HF, 9-10; cf. LW, 129-130, 150)

hermeneia means different things in Aristotle, but here in the case of practical philosophy the logos of the "that" of practical life is hermeneia, interpretation, in the sense that it is an interpretive "making-explicit," an announcing, a making clear, a bringing to language (for oneself and communicating to others) the logos (self-understanding) already present in practical life. As an interpretive working out of both pre-philosophical and past philosophical understanding, the philosophical logos of praxis is a hermeneutics of facticity in the double sense of both logos having praxis as its object (objective genitive) and also logos belonging to praxis (subjective genitive) and being human praxis' self-understanding and bringing of itself to language. (IAw, 140-141) This, then, is what Gadamer has called Aristotle's "linguistic turn," but one finds this methodos, this "hermeneutics of facticity," in all his investigations, even metaphysics.34

Heidegger's insistence upon "average everydayness" (HF, 85; SZ, 23/37), "there-being," and "the that of facticity" (SZ, 180/174) as the starting point of philosophy have to been as a retrieval of Aristotle's position that "the arche [beginning and principle] is the that." In developing his "hermeneutics of facticity" or "phenomenological hermeneutics" (PA, 187), Heidegger was influenced not only by Dilthey,35 but also by Aristotle's hermeneia of the hoti, the "that" of "life." (10-11; LW, 130ff., 150; SZ, 50/62)36 For Heidegger, the phrase "hermeneutics of facticity" is not only an objective genitive, but also a subjective genitive, since interpretation is the "how of Dasein" itself and the "being-awake of Dasein for itself." (HF, 14-15, 7) Philosophi-
cal research of the categories of factical life is nothing other than the explicitation and radicalization of this interpretive self-understanding of factical life itself:

The categories are nothing created or a society of logical schemata for themselves, a "grid," but rather in an original way they are living in life itself (im Leben selbst am Leben)....They have their own manner of access, which, however, is not one which would be alien to life itself and would encounter it externally; rather, the access is a distinctive one in which life comes to itself. (PA, 88)

...the grasping [of the being-meaning of factical life] is itself nothing other than the express...appropriated enactment of a tendency, which in the object in question (factical life) is inexplicit and is factically there in different ways of movement, the tendency of factical life to "be" in the manner of bringing-it­itself-to-having. (PA, 171)

More specifically, philosophical interpretation is what Heidegger calls a "counter-ruinant movement" which brings human existence back from its ruinance or falling away from itself (PA, 153, 160, 178):

"Repetition," "retrieval": everything depends on its meaning. Philosophy is a fundamental how of life itself, so that each time it authentically repeats it, fetches it back (wieder-holt), brings it back from falling away, which bringing back itself, as radical research, is life itself. (PA, 80)

But in its violent movement against the tendency of life to fall away from itself, philosophy here too simply radicalizes life's own counter-tendency towards its authenticity. Philosophy is, then, nothing short of the authenticity of factical life itself:

Categories come to understanding only insofar as factical life itself is forced into interpretation. What this means (that it does not mean simply reflecting and the like on life) will show itself later, above all in the deduction, the derivation of phenomenological interpretation out of the facticity of life itself. Interpretation is something which life is in its authentic self and through which it is....This forcing is not an unfitting imposition in the violence and arbitrariness of a groundless and alien systematic ordering, arranging into types, and the like, but rather is demanded...by factical life itself (tendency to fall away and motivation) and is what authentically makes it up. (PA, 87)

In 1919, Heidegger called this hermeneutics of facticity "the life-sympathy" of "hermeneutical intuition," where "sympathy" is meant literally as a "undergoing-along-with." (IP, 110) "The empowering, lived experience (taking itself along with itself) of lived
experience is understanding intuition, *hermeneutical intuition*..." (IP, 117) His statement that his "hermeneutic of Dasein" has "made fast the end of the guiding thread for all philosophical questioning at the point from which it *arises* and to which it *returns*" (SZ, 51/62) has to be seen as a translation of Aristotle's statement that the "logoi ek touton kai peri touton, the discussions are from [the "that" of "life"] and back into this." In 1921-22, he defined philosophy as the "knowing of principles, which in its enactment concerns its own facticity" and "which arises from facticity and returns to it....[one has to make out] how in it the Aristotle-interpretation develops as a genuine task of research...." (PA, 112, 115)

It is interesting to note that the young Heidegger saw the "hermeneutics of facticity," i.e., human existence bringing itself to language both in everyday life and in philosophy, to be at work also to a certain extent in Plato's dialogues, as he showed in his 1921-22 lecture course (PA, 54, 49), in his 1923 lecture course (HF, 9, 43) and in his 1924-25 lecture course on the *Sophist.* (IASz1, 79) In fact, as previously noted, Heidegger's introduction to this dialogue, which was supposed to provide the genuine horizon for interpreting this difficult work and which took up half the semester, was a detailed treatment of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.*

**The Archai of Human Existence**

The reason why a philosophical account of human praxis cannot be content with the pre-philosophical understanding of the principles operative here and must radicalize it is that it is only an implicit "habitational" familiarity with the principles of praxis, which are themselves not thematic as such. (IASzz, 109) In "the everyday and the scientific thinking belonging to pre-philosophical human being," the understanding of the principles of praxis maintains itself in a certain "in-explicitness. But this *noein* has indeed the possibility of being grasped explicitly and attaining autonomy....As philosophizing, *noein* has become an understanding and disclosive self-appropriation and preservation of
the principles as such." (IAw, 143; cf. 107, 127) Pre-philosophical life simply lives in a specific "ontic" understanding of the principles (its concrete historical world) and, moreover, has a tendency to be distracted from itself into beings (falling). One must, then, make a "distinction between the 'ontic' and the 'ontological'....The ontic or that which is (das Seiende) means the existing, the present to hand thing, or the factical happening, the fact. From this there is to be distinguished being (Sein), the manner of its existing or happening. The understanding of being is ontology....The greek concepts symbebekos [accident], anagkaion [necessity], on [being], etc. must be understood in both senses."

Ontology investigates "the meaning of being." (IAw, 52, 107, 130)

For Aristotle, all beings (the ontic: plants, animals, human beings, stars, the divine) are in a sense physei onta, literally "growing beings," "natural beings," kinoumena, "things moving," gignomena, "things becoming." (IAw, 9-11) All beings are energeia, "being-at-work." Aristotle here returns to the centrality of the notion of physis in the older Greek thinkers, the physiologoi, for whom physis, "nature," "growth," "emergence" was the "all of beings" and also the "being of beings," and not simply one region alongside others. The basic structure of physei on is "movement" (kinesis, Bewegtheit), more specifically, gignesthai or kinesis heneka tou, "becoming" or "movement for the sake of something" (telos), which has the arche of this movement within itself. The question of "being as being," which Aristotle's "first philosophy" here takes up from the older Greek philosophers, is that which asks after the archai ton onton, the "principles of being." The being of beings is experienced here as archai kai aitia, "principles and causes." (IAw, 20, 29) (Meta., I, 2) arche means both "beginning" and "rule" or "governance" (cf. principium) and thus also aitia, "cause" in the sense of "that which is responsible" for something being the way it is. (Meta., V, 1) Heidegger writes that "principle is that from which something, beginning here, 'is' in its own way, that on which everything depends." "Principle is being (meaning of being) as the being of beings." (PA, 21, 60) For Aristotle, the
primary "principles and causes" responsible for the movement of all natural beings are "the for the sake of which" or "end" (ou heneka, telos) (causa finalis), "idea" or "form" (to eidos) (causa formalis), the "source of change" (causa efficiens), and the "substrate" in the sense of "that from which, as underlingly present, something comes to be" (causa materialis). (Meta., I, 3; V, 2)

"Next to the universal-ontological question one finds in Aristotle also ontologies of special regions. Thus, his 'second philosophy' is an ontology of nature, his De anima an ontology of what lives, his ethics an ontology of human existence." In his writings on human life, the "general-ontological horizon is worked into his ontology of human existence." (IAw, 52, 104)

In other words, human "praxis is principally seen like physis and as physis." (IAw, 99; De an., 402a) Human being is phusei on, natural being, being that grows, becomes, emerges, moves. Thus, it has the same basic structure as natural things in the narrow sense of "that which grows" or "comes forth." The basic structure of praxis is kinesis heneka tou, "movement for the sake of something" (telos) which has the arche of this movement within itself. (IAw, 98-100; E.N., VI, 2; De an., III, 9-10) What differentiates the "movement" of human praxis from that of mere nature are the elements of logos, aletheia, and "care." The first line of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics reads: "All techne and all inquiry (way-towards [methodos]), and likewise all praxis and choice, is thought to strive after some good. Thus, it has been elegantly stated and shown that the good is what all things strive after." (E.N., 1094a) In other words, "praxis is the title for the being of man in general" and does not refer only to praxis in the narrow sense of ethical praxis. (IAw, 100)98 techne and theoria (episteme) are also praxis, insofar as they are movement for the sake of something (telos), in the one case the thing to be produced, in the other the truth (De caelo, 308a; Meta., 993b; E.N., 1098a), both of which are also for the sake of the life that enacts them (hence in a treatise entitled "ethics" Aristotle deals with the "theoretical life," metaphysics, as the highest form of "praxis" [Pol., 1325b]).
This wide sense of praxis in Aristotle is usually referred to as energya, "being-in or at-work." esmen d'energeia (to zen gar kai prattein), "we are (have our being in) being-at-work (in living and acting)." (E.N., 1188a) The being of man is "work" (ergon). (E.N., I, 7) The "ontology of human Dasein" investigates, then, "the meaning of the being of praxis as movement for the sake of something," which meaning is articulated into archai, "principles." (IAw, 145)\(^3\)

The "for the sake of which" or "end" (causa finalis) of the kinesis of human praxis is "the good," its efficient cause is "choice" (proairesis) (E.N., 1139a), its formal cause is psyche in the sense of nous and logos (which in turn enters into the "end" of action as its "work") (I, 7), and its material cause is "the body." (De an., II, 1-2) But each of these contains a manifold of structures. If we follow Heidegger's division of human praxis into "content-meaning," "relational meaning," and "enactment-meaning," then we can organize Aristotle's "rough outline" (tupos) of the "principles" as follows.\(^4\)

1) The "for sake of which" (content-meaning) is articulated into the moments of the "end" of techne (thing to be produced or used as a means), the "end" of friendship as being with others ("the other," "community"), the "end" of phronesis (the self), and the end of theoretical science (things revealed for their own sake). 2) The formal cause, the material cause, and the efficient cause of "choice" (relational meaning) articulate themselves into what Aristotle calls mere psyches, "parts of the soul" (desire, care, mood, nous and logos [techne, phronesis, episteme, and "understanding" as the knowing belonging to friendship], truth). 3) What Aristotle speaks about, but does not thematize under the heading of "principle" is "time" (chronos) (enactment-meaning), which is articulated into the moments of past, future, and kairos. Aristotle's "outline" of the principles of human praxis does not present a manifold of indifferent structures or "parts," as in the case of mere nature or a machine, but rather, since the human being has logos (consciousness), articulates "the possibilities of being belonging to Dasein." (IASz2, 111)
principles are the basic ways of human *zen kai prattein*, "living and acting." They indicate the various ways of *anthropoeusthai*, "being a human being." The three primary "factual ways of human existence" that Aristotle indicates are *bios hedonikos*, "life of pleasure" (guided primarily by the principles of desire and *techne*), *bios politikos*, "political life" (guided by *ethos* and *phronesis* within political community), and *bios theoretikos*, "life of theory" (guided by "science," *metaphysics*). (IAW, 106) "These three levels encompass our possibilities of being in general." (IASz2, 128-129)

The young Heidegger followed Aristotle's characterization of beings in general and of human life as *physis* and *kinesis*:

"...being-meaning (*on - ousia - kinesis - physis*)." "The movement of factual life....(cf. the phenomenon of movement in Aristotle)."

"(The problem of facticity, *kinesis*-problem)" (PA, 112, 93, 117)

Likewise, Heidegger followed Aristotle in specifying the kinesis of human life as "praxis," "action." "...the genuine being of Dasein, as authentic action, *praxis*, was also of course not unknown to antiquity." (ML, 236/183) And Heidegger follows Aristotle in seeing a wide sense of *praxis* (self-directed concern and activity) which covers both theory and *praxis* in the narrower ethical sense. (SZ, 257/238) His notion of the "being-meaning" of beings in the form of *Prinzipien*, "principles" is a retrieval of Aristotle's concept of *arche*. "Principle is being (meaning of being) as the being of beings." (PA, 60, 21, 57) "The problem of the principle... (*arche-sation*)...." (112) Thus, for Heidegger ontology is "science of the origin," a science of the "principles" of being. (IP, 24, 96) As we have already seen, the young Heidegger took up many of the principles of human life that Aristotle laid out in his practical writings. Heidegger writes: "Even the concept of self...does not have an ego-like origin! (cf. intentionality and its *arche*)." (HF, 29, 111; cf. ML, 136-137/110-111) It is the "principles" of human life that Heidegger calls the "categories" of factual life, sometimes referring to them as "existentials." They are not indifferent structures, but specifications of *bios*, life. These
categories, Heidegger says in true Aristotelian language, are "archontic," i.e., they are that from which life takes its origin and guidance. (PA, 50; AJ, 29)

Heidegger saw his science of the "principles" of factual life also as a retrieval of Plato's description of philosophy as the "enactment of the turning around of the soul" "back to the last 'origins' of all presuppositions, of all propositions, which are formulated in the sciences and also in the discourse of daily life." (PA, 49; IP, 20) It is only "'the Platonism of barbarians'," he thought, when contemporary "speculation" fails to see that Plato's arche, the idea of the good, is not some abstract, transcendent principle, but rather the concrete ontological basis of political praxis, and does not entail a distanciation from the human subject, but rather involves the greatest degree of human subjectivity and passion. For the young Heidegger, the point was to get back to "the genuine soil and roots of Plato" and "the original situation" of his thought. "What is decisive in the starting point for the object of philosophy is to be read off here [in Republic, 511b, c]." (HF, 42-43; ML, 237/184) In his lecture course on the Sophist, he tried to show that the extensive classification of the arts given here by Plato is not an arid exercise in logic, but rather, like Aristotle's ethics, is a hermeneutic of the categories of human existence:

Those who heard Heidegger's lecture course on the Sophist will never forget the dramatic suspense with which he handled its opening discussions...as a genuine division of the manifold structure of Dasein and therefore as the genuine basis and horizon against whose background the dreadful first becomes visible: the man who interpretively explicates being, the philosopher.... (IASz1, 79)

Aristotle writes: "The arche is thought to be more than half the whole and illuminates many of the matters being sought. (E.N., 1098b) His use of the word arche here is a play on its double meaning of "beginning" in the sense of the starting point of practical philosophy and also "principle" in the sense of what "governs" human praxis. In the first sense, we have Aristotle's version of what the young Heidegger called the other "beginning" of
philosophy! Both senses together mean that the genuine "beginning" of practical philosophy is found in the project of an "outline" of "principles" given in the "that" of bios praktikos, "practical life" - a philosophy which, since it, as we shall see, gives only an outline of the principles as the analogical structures of human praxis (analogy of proportion), is neither metaphysics nor mere relativism, but rather a science which both is universal in some sense and yet can do justice to the concreteness and historicity of life. Heidegger's version of this is that philosophy is "original science" which finds its own "origin" in the "formal indications" of the "origin" of all meaning in factical life. In his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger defined his philosophy as "a pointing-to principles" and then quoted Aristotle's statement that "the arche is thought to be more than half the whole...." (PA, 192) And if Aristotle could say that there is no good in itself, but rather only different meanings of the good given "in strategy," "in architecture," and "in every action and choice," so Heidegger could say that "being" is "there-being, being in and through life."

A Rough Outline of Human Existence (analogy of proportion)

But, if the principles of human praxis are indeed "variable" and found only in the "that" (something which seems to imply a radical relativism and the impossibility of any kind of science), how can there be an episteme ethike, a scientific ontology of these principles as opposed to mere ontic descriptions of them? "...episteme involves demonstration (apodeixis), but there is no demonstration of things whose principles are endechomena allos echein, matters possible of being otherwise." (E.N., 1140a) It is clear that Aristotle wants to hang on to the ontological problem, since we do not speak of the "good" and the other principal elements of praxis ("means," "choice," "phronesis," etc.) in a purely equivocal manner as mere homonyms. "But how then do we speak of the good? It is surely not like the things that only chance to have the same name." (E.N., 1096b) In other words, Aristotle wants to find a middle course between, on the one hand, Plato's purported universalism and objectivism, and, on the other hand, pure relativism,
where science of human praxis would be not be possible in any sense at all.

He considers two possible solutions - the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportion:

Are things called good, then, in virtue of being derived from one good (eph' henos), or because they all contribute to one good (pros hen suntelen)? Or are they rather called good more by way of analogy? For as sight is in the body, so nous is in the soul, and so another thing in something else. (1096b)

For the good appears differently in different actions and kinds of techne.... What then is the good of each? Surely that for the sake of which everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and choice the end. (1097a)

The two types of analogy that Aristotle speaks of here are crucial for understanding the movement and content of his inquiry in his ethics. The pros hen analogy (analogy of attribution) would mean that all particular goods converge upon a single good, to which they contribute and from which they derive their meaning, in the same way that, as we see in Aristotle's metaphysics, the various sense of being ("is white," "is less," etc.) are thought to converge upon a single sense of being, i.e., "substance," the "what it is," which "is white," "is less," etc. (Meta., IV, 2) But here in his analysis of human praxis he does not take this route, at least for the moment. He does take it at the end of his ethics, where he searches for a "highest good" (divine nous) to which all other goods are related as means and, therefore, returns in a sense to something like Plato's notion of a universal good, even though it is not an "idea," but some form of "substance" in the hierarchical and teleological order of the cosmos. For the moment Aristotle pursues the unity in the principle of the good (and in the other principles) in terms of the analogy of proportion, i.e., a structural analogy in which only the similarity of relationship is intended. This analogy means simply that a is to b as c is to d. Thus, Aristotle's unifying term for the good, i.e., the "for the sake of which" or "end," is only a relational term, which indicates that, whatever the principle of the good might be in actual praxis, it is related to other things as that for the sake of which they are or are done.
These in turn are indicated relationally by Aristotle as *ta pros*, the "towards," the "means." For example, the eye (as end and being-at-work) is in the body (as means and potentiality), as nous (end, being-at-work) is in the soul (means, potentiality), and so on. Or, fear and confidence (mood) are in insight (phronesis) into the right moment and right manner (kairos, fitting mean) of acting courageously (choice) as anger (mood) is in insight (phronesis) into the right moment and right manner (kairos, fitting mean) of acting even-temperedly (choice). Here there is no commitment to a universal idea of the good or to a particular good from which all others can be derived and towards which they are teleologically ordered (analogia attributiva), nor to some kind of structural relationship of "for the sake of which"-"towards" which exists in itself. Nor is any one element in the articulated structural whole of the principles of human praxis seen to function as a ground from which the others are derived. The principles of praxis form a structural whole articulated into related parts, each of which is equi-primordial. It is this matrix of the structural analogy (similarity of relations) exhibited in all human praxis that Aristotle’s ontology of human existence investigates.

It is this matrix which Aristotle sketches out in the form of what he calls a rough "outline" (*tupos*) of human praxis, which articulates "the structural manifold (*tupos*) of the possibilities of being belonging to Dasein" (*Iaszz*, 111):

Our discussion will be adequate if it achieves manifestness in accord with the subject matter. For precision is not to be sought for alike in all forms of logos....In speaking about it and from it, we must, then, be content with truly indicating roughly and in outline (*pachulos kai tupo talethes endeikmusthai*)....It is required that each of the things that are said be taken up in the same fashion. For it is the mark of someone educated that they search for that precision in each kind of thing which is offered by the nature of the matter. Thus, it manifestly comes to the same thing when one accepts a persuasive and probable logos from a mathematician and when one demands a demonstration from a rhetorician. (*E.N.*, 1094b)

...the whole logos of practical matters must be a discoursing in outline and not precise, as we said at the beginning that the statements we demand must be in accord with the subject matter. Matters of praxis and of what helps us to cope (*sumpheronta*) have
no fixity, any more than matters of health. This being the nature of our general logos, still less does logos about the particulars have exactness and rigor; for these come under no techne or doctrine and instruction.... (1104a)

*hermeneia*, the bringing to language of the self-understanding of human praxis, is *tupo legein*, "discoursing in outline" (1104a) and *graphein*, "drawing," "sketching," "writing" in the sense of a *perigraphein*, one that is done "around" the edges so as to capture only an outline of the parts and the whole: "Let this then serve as a sketching and writing in outline (*perigegraphtho*) of the good." (1098a) Aristotle's ethics is a *gramma* in the double sense of a rough "sketch" and a "written text." Since logos must be "in accord with the subject matter," and since this subject matter is possessed of "much difference and wandering," the proper logos of praxis is that which gives only this rough outline of praxis in terms of its analogical structures. In this way, it is only an *endeiknumai* (*indicare*), an "announcing" and "making known" which only "indicates" or "points-to" the various principles of human praxis, but which does not attempt to be "precise" or "exact" about them either in terms of universal content or ontic descriptions of this or that kind of praxis, something which would not be "in accord with" the radically concrete and historical character of "the subject matter." "Indication" is not "demonstration" (*apodeichnumai*), a making known and pointing out of the principles of praxis by way of a derivation from universal grounds. Practical philosophy can be only an *endeixis* of the principles, an "index" in the sense of showing which only indicates or points. The "definition" (*horos*) of what human praxis is can only be such in the more literal sense of *horizein* and also *perigraphein*, a rough marking out and drawing up in writing of the principal boundaries of praxis, which gives only the general "horizon" within which lived praxis moves. (*E.N.*, 1107a, 1138b, 1098a) The phenomenological de-scription (*scribere* = sketching, writing) of human praxis is, as it were, a kind of creative hermeneutical trans-scription of its expressed self-understanding in the form of a "script" of the analogical structures operative here, which does not give any ontic
pre-scriptions and pro-scriptions for the various characters of human praxis (what to choose). Ontology is not "scripture." It gives only a rough "picture" of the human condition. It does not attempt to give clear and distinct ideas and to be an exact, rigorous science after the manner of mathematics or metaphysics, whose objects are universal and eternal. But neither is it relativism or skepticism, since the similarity of structural relationships in all human praxis ("good," "desire," "choice," etc.) belongs to the being of this praxis itself and is not the result of mere "homonyms." Aristotle's ontology of human Dasein is beyond both objectivism and relativism. It attempts to do justice to the variety and richness of the historical concreteness of human life without at the same time giving up the very possibility of philosophy itself.

Heidegger's own idea of philosophy as giving "formal indication" of the categories or principles of factual life was a retrieval of Aristotle's method of an outline of the analogical structures of human praxis. For Heidegger, being-meaning can only be indicated analogically since it is characterized by a radical "awhileness," such that there is no such thing as a timeless being-meaning in itself, just as for Aristotle there is no separate good in itself. Heidegger's "index" or "indications" only point to the similar structural relationships found in all human existence. Gadamer writes: "...although not yet in an adequately self-conscious manner, Heidegger had before his eyes in those years the 'famous analogy', as he used to say. That was the element within Aristotelian metaphysics, from which he could call into question the systematic derivation of all validity from a single principle, whether Husserl's transcendental ego or Plato's idea of the good...Likewise, when Cajetan's tract De Nominum Analogia fell into his hands, this too became the subject of detailed study, privately and in his teaching."42 In his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger spoke about "a radical problematic of logic." "Since Aristotle's time philosophy has no longer genuinely understood the problem of genuine logic." (PA, 21) This genuine "logic" means here...
not school logic, but rather the logos which would be "in accord with the subject matter" of practical life and thus a *legein tupo*, a logic in outline. One thus finds Heidegger taking up Aristotle's theme that the "beginning" of a philosophy of human praxis is to be found in an outline of the analogical structures operative here:

...these pages are not at all a "program," but rather a pointing to principles, a pointing in the direction in which the end of the guiding threads, along which our "course" should go, is made fast. And who really "has" the rigor, i.e., has understood it and in this understanding has appropriated it, he has "already more than half the whole." *dokei gar pleion e hemisu tou pantos einai he arche, kai polla sumphane ginesthai di` autes ton zetoumenon*, For the arche (the beginning, the principle) seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of matters we are pursuing are illuminated by it. (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic. A* 7, 1098b6)....The guidelines are not a fixed framework; precisely not the framework, but rather something much more decisive, out of which the shaping of the problematic has first to be enacted, and this "always anew".... (*PA*, 192-194)

**Rough Outline as Way (methodos)**

If the *methodos*, the "way towards" the variable and historical subject matter proper to practical philosophy, has the character of an indicating or pointing, as opposed to a full showing and pointing out of what is invariable and eternal, then it is one which is ever incomplete, unfinished, and unending (*ateles*). In contrast, the way-towards of mathematics or metaphysics becomes complete, finished, and at an end (*teleion*) in the full showing of its unchanging subject matter. In other words, practical philosophy is essentially a "way-towards" and always remains within the *apotelein*, the "performance," "accomplishment," or "enactment" of this way (enactment-meaning). Whereas Aristotle's metaphysics is *energeia teles*, being-at-work that is at its end, his practical philosophy is *energeia ateles*, being-at-work that is not at an end and is on the way. (*IAw*, 145, 147) The "indication" of the principles of human praxis is at the same time the indication of a way to be followed and enacted. As logos, "discourse," practical philosophy is characterized by the three moments of the discoursing, that which is disclosed in the discourse, and the communication or "announcing" (*endeiknunai, hermeneia*) to others of what is thus disclosed. (*LW*, 134; *SZ*, 206/197; *GZ*, 115/84) Aristotle takes
special pains to indicate the "how" (pos) of the "taking up" of to legomenon, of "what is said" on the part of "the hearer" of the logos. (E.N., 1095a)

First, as a hermeneutical methodos, which proceeds "from" the self-understanding of praxis and points back "towards" this in the manner of a disclosure that only indicates analogical structures, the philosophical outline itself is incomplete in the sense that it has to be filled in and its disclosure of the subject matter made, therefore, more adequate:

For we must first make an outline, a rough sketch (hypotuposai), and then afterwards in the future write it up more fully (anagrapsai). All will be able to carry on and articulate the joints of what has been well sketched and written in outline, and time is a good discoverer and co-worker in this. And this is how advances in the arts have come to be. For all can fill in the deficiencies, what has been left out. The beginning (arche) is thought to be more than half the whole, and illuminates many of the matters being sought. (E.N., 1098a)

It is easy to see here that the meaning of the enactment of the "way towards" the matter is that of time or temporalizing. Aristotle's ontological "outline" is something indeed accomplished, but it is still bound up with future work to be done, which will be realized in the present of a renewed apophainesthai and aletheuein, "letting be seen" and "unconcealment" of the phenomena. Likewise, Aristotle's own practical philosophy is a testimony to this temporal character in that it takes up and re-enacts the already accomplished thought of the "ancients, the ones who are past" (palaioi), of immediately past philosophers, and of culture generally in light of its futural possibilities, which he works out in his own present philosophical outline.43 And it itself remains on the "way towards" the subject matter and indicates the necessity of its own re-enactment.

Second, part of this following up and temporalizing of the indications of Aristotle's outline is a concretization and specification of the analogical structures in the various practical sciences, both those that include a theoretical orientation (ethics, political science)44 and those that are explicitly practical (rhetoric, economics, medicine, etc.). (1094a-b) For example,
the different categorial meanings of the good, i.e., substance (e.g., intelligence), quality (virtue), quantity (fitting mean), relation (the serviceable), time (kairos), place (right locality), have to be explored in the various sciences in order to be concretely determined: "There are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g., that of kairos, the moment, for kairos in war comes under strategics and in disease under medicine, and the fitting mean in food under medicine and in exercise under gymnastics." (E.N., 1096a, 1094a) The various virtues of which human life is capable are present only in the form of a "diagram," which has to be applied to the various practical disciplines. (1107b) In practical thought, it is necessary not only to pursue "universal discourse, but also to apply (epharmottein) it to the particulars. For in statements about praxis those which are universal arrive at what is common to a greater degree, but those dealing with a part are more true and reveal more (alethinoteroi), since conduct deals with particulars, and our logos must be in unison with these." (1107a) Aristotle's rough ontological outline continues to be bound up with its futural possibilities for concretizing the analogical structures of praxis in the sciences within a renewed "unconcealing" of the phenomena in present investigation. It remains on the "way towards" its matter.

Third, Aristotle's logos in outline communicates not only that its "way towards" the subject matter has to be re-enacted on a theoretical level (ontology and application to the sciences), but also that its rough indications are intended to be enacted within actual praxis. This is because the ultimate goal of practical thought is action itself:

In practical matters, the end is not theoretically contemplating and knowing the particulars, but rather more enacting (prattein) them; regarding virtue, it is not enough to see, but we must try to have it and to use it, or try any other way there may be to become good. (1179b)

...our present practical inquiry (pragmateia) is not for the sake of theory like the others (for we are searching not in order to see what virtue is, but in order to become good, without which our inquiry would not be of any help).... (1103b; 1095a)
The *methodos*, "way towards," of a practical philosopher or someone learning a practical science and that of a mathematician are radically different, since the former calls for an *apoteleisin*, an "enactment" and "completion" (1099a) of the outline of praxis in the application of it to one's own praxis, while the latter does not since it exists by virtue of "abstraction" (*aphairesis*) from the life of the geometer (1142a):

...we must not search for precision in all things alike, but in each as is in accord with the subject matter, and so much as is at home and proper to the *methodos*, the way-towards. The carpenter or any craftsman and the geometer search for the right or straight (*ten orthen*) in different ways. For the former does so insofar as it is serviceable in relation to the work (*pros ton ergon*) [e.g., the straight board, the right board], while the latter inquires what it is or what kind of thing it is [the straight line, the right angle], since he is a spectator of the truth. (1098a)

Filling in the outline, which is like an unfulfilled intention, means here fulfilling its indication of and pointing towards acting itself. "The *logoi* are *ek touton kai peri touton*, the discussions are from [praxis] and back into [praxis]." (1095a) Thus, practical inquiry is supposed to have an "influence *kata ton bion*, in relation to life." (1094a) Aristotle sometimes calls his practical philosophy *pragmateia*, "pragmatics" (1103b) and *teche*, in addition to "science," "theory," and "methodos." 45 Ethics and politics are practical sciences in the double sense that they involve both the study of praxis and are practical knowledge or know-how. The communicating of practical philosophy even has the character of a *protreptikon*, an "exhortation" to the "hearer" in the sense an "urging or turning forward" and "calling" (*parakalein*) to enact the rough outline of praxis within one's own life. (1179b-1180a) 46 Thus, practical philosophy is more like the orders of a doctor, coaching in athletics, instruction in archery, or orders given in war than it is like the pure "theory" of mathematics or metaphysics, which is "for its own sake." (1104a, 1099a) As a rough "indication" of or "pointing to" praxis, Aristotle's outline remains on the "way towards" its enactment and fulfillment in actual praxis.
But how can practical philosophy have this role without dogmatically legislating the content of the particular sciences and of the actual praxis of individuals and communities and, therefore, proceeding in a way not "in accord with the subject matter," which, as we have seen, is fundamentally characterized by diversity and difference? Is Aristotle's "outline" of human praxis a techne, a technical knowledge that is to be indifferently applied to the sciences and to the praxis of individuals and communities, as Aristotle claims that Plato's "idea" of the good, as a "paradigm" or "plan" (paradeigma) (1097a), was? Aristotle's position here is that practical philosophy is anything but a techne, that it cannot speak from a position of superiority and privilege as a universal know-it-all, prophet, and preacher, but rather "...we must try to be of help." (1104a) More specifically, Aristotle's outline can help the sciences and actual praxis to "aim":

Will not knowledge of the good, then, have a great influence kata ton bion, in relation to life? Shall we not, like archers who have a target to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is fitting and needful (tou deontos)? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object? (1094a)

What Aristotle means here is that even though his ontological outline of the analogical structures of praxis cannot legislate the content of the sciences and of the praxis of the individual, it can "be of help" (1104a) by indicating in rough the kinds of things to look for, in the same way that the science of archery helps an archer to aim by providing rough guidelines, but without stipulating any specific content in the target.

Regarding the question of the application of ontological theory to the sciences, Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic "separate" idea of the good argues that it is actually useless since it cannot be interpretively applied to and concretized in the different ends pursued by the various sciences. "It is not easy to see how a knowledge of the good itself will be of help to a weaver or carpenter regarding his techne...." (1097a) But in being applied to the various sciences, Aristotle's ontological outline does not function as a single super-science which legislates a single super-
meaning of "good" and of the other principles, as he claims Plato attempted to do with his "paradigm." Rather, the outline is only a rough indication of the analogical structures exhibited in the various sciences, remains in this way uncommitted to any specific content, and therefore remains open to be filled and concretized interpretively with this content, e.g., the very different senses of the "for the sake of which" in the various sciences. The outline helps the sciences to aim in the sense of pointing out in outline the sorts of things to look for, i.e., the principles as analogical structures, but in this regard it lacks exactness and is actually always to a certain imprecise and must be interpretively applied and fitted to the situation of the actual content of the sciences.47

Regarding the application of theory to the actual praxis of the individual, Aristotle claims that here also Plato's "idea" of the good as a "paradigm" or "plan" is useless, since it cannot be concretized in particular situations: "It is not easy to see how... anybody will be a better physician or general for having contemplated the idea itself." (1097a) But in claiming to be of help to the praxis of the individual, Aristotle's outline is not claiming to be a techne of a better sort than that provided by Plato's "paradigm." Rather, its helpfulness lies precisely in its refusal to present itself as a manual of rules for ethical behaviour, a kind of cookbook for ethics, and in its reluctance to "meddle" (1142a) and to play the part of a superior "philosopher-king" and "saviour," or to emulate sophistic instruction, which claims to be able to teach a technique. By providing only a rough and imprecise outline of the analogical structures of praxis, it calls for its own interpretive application and fitting to the kairos, the situation of an individual or a community:

...the whole logos of practical matters must be a logos in outline and not precise, as we said at the beginning that the statements we demand must be in accord with the subject matter. Matters of praxis and of what helps us to cope (sumpheronta) have no fixity, any more than matters of health. This being the nature our general logos, still less does logos about the particulars have exactness and rigor; for these come under no techne or doctrine and instruction
(paraggelion), but it is needful that those who are acting themselves aim enduringly (aei) at that which is in relation to the kairos, the moment (ta pros ton kairon)...But though our present logos is such we must try to be of help. (1104a; cf. IAew, 130)

Aristotle’s outline helps individuals to aim not so much in the sense of legislating for them “what” they are to aim at as in the sense of indicating “how” they can and do already aim, i.e., pointing out the analogical structures of praxis (the for the sake of which, choice, interpretation, the moment, etc.). It points out the sorts of things to look for and keep in mind, if one is to hit upon the “needful and fitting” in one’s own situation, but it does not make any ontic prescriptions about what “the good” is or what should be chosen. Even Aristotle’s “diagram” of the virtues as different forms of “the mean” are not rules to be applied without further ado in action, but rather only rough guidelines that are always pros hemin, "towards us," "in relation to us," we the "hearers" in our own situations. It never tells us what exactly the right and fitting measure of this or that is, but rather only indicates that in all actions there will be such a thing, as well as a too little and a too much. What the right measure is can only be found out in the situation of one’s action.

In other words, the outline does not leap in and take away from the individual his or her autonomy, self-responsibility, and ‘conscience’. "...it belongs among the characteristics of the ethical phenomenon that the person acting must himself come to know and must decide and cannot let anything take this away from him. Thus it is essential that philosophical ethics have the right starting point and approach, so that it does not usurp the place of ethical consciousness...." (IAg2, 318/279) As a "protreptikon," a "turning" or "urging forward," Aristotle’s outline does not leap in for the individual, but rather leaps forward and "turns" the individual "forward" into his or her own situation. Its "call" to praxis is not in the form of an ontic directive, but rather is only a "calling from the side" (parakalein) and an "urging from the side" (parorman). (1179b-1180a) It is only in this way that practical inquiry can do justice to the concreteness, diversity,
and historicity of "the subject matter." As the word that calls to praxis, it does so in a way that preserves the individual within his enactment, as opposed to tearing one out of this by levelling off the "difficulty" of its situational character and making things "easy" by offering salvation in a universal "idea" and "plan." It endeavors not to be a "saviour" for individuals, but rather to help them to save themselves. In being "of help" for individuals and communities and demanding this role of itself, theory is indeed something like a higher level "understanding" or "conscience" (synesis), which is oriented to human beings in their situations, but, unlike actual "friendship," it does not offer advice as to a specific course of action based on the concrete circumstances of others. (1179b, 1181b) Rather, it can be of help only in the sense of pointing out in rough things to look for and keep in mind, lets individuals and communities be in their own situations, and indicates also that the individual cannot unburden himself or herself from the self-responsibility of always having to act within a situation.

Another way of saying that Aristotle's outline is intended to helps individuals to aim at what is "needful and fitting" in their situations is that this outline endeavors simply to cultivate the self-understanding of the various sciences and of acting human beings, such that they become more transparent to themselves regarding what it is they already are and do. This is an important implication of the fact that the outline claims to be nothing other than the hermeneia of the "that" of living praxis. As such, it is the elevation of the implicit self-understanding of the analogical structures already operative in the practical sciences and in lived action to the level of explicit self-awareness. In this way, it "helps ethical consciousness to attain clarity about itself." (IAg2, 318/279) It helps praxis to be more aware of what it is already doing and to do it better. As an outline or "script" of the analogical structures of human praxis, it is only a hermeneutical "de-scription" of praxis in the sense of, as it were, a "transcription" of its own self-understanding onto an explicit theoret-
ical level. It is not "pre-scription" or "pro-scription," i.e., a writing up in advance of how the human drama is to be acted out. The outline is only a theoretical "in-scription" of the logos already operative in the "that" of human praxis, which has an implicit pre-conception of the analogical structures operative in its different actions and in the actions of others. From this, we can see that Aristotle's insistence that his outline has to be interpretively applied to one's kairos, i.e., must be enacted or temporalized, is only an extension of the temporalizing activity of lived praxis itself, which is always unfolding its already (past) operative pre-conception (future) within its present situation.

An integral part of furthering the self-understanding of lived praxis and of the practical sciences is the negative task of preserving it from the possibility of self-deception or false consciousness about itself. As the hermeneia of the "that," practical philosophy has to fight against the tendency of human life itself to be "diverted" away from itself into the world and thus to fall out of its self-understanding. Human life has the tendency to flee from the "difficulty" of action into the "easy." This is taken into consideration in Aristotle's special remarks on what it is that the "hearer" and the public at large can "demand" (1094b, 1104a) from a lecture course or book on practical philosophy, or further what philosophers themselves can "demand" from practical philosophy:

...one becomes a just person from doing just things and a temperate person from doing temperate things. Without doing these, no one has any prospect of becoming a good person. But the many do not do these, but take flight into logos and think they are philosophizing and will become earnest and good in this way, behaving like those worn out and ill who listen with care (epimelos) to the doctor, but do not do any of the directives. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of care (therapeuomenoi), the former will not be made well in soul by such philosophy. (E.N., 1105b)

...the many marvel at and admire those who speak of mega ti kai hyper autous, something big and great and above them. It has been held by some that alongside these many goods there exists another good which is in itself and is the cause of all these being good. (1095a)
Now if logoi were in themselves enough for making men just and equitable, they would justly, as Theogonis says, have won very great rewards, and rewards should have been provided...but they are powerless to exhort the many to the noble and the good....Now some think that we become good by nature, others through habitation, others through teaching. (1179b) While the sophists profess to teach political matters, they do not practice it.... (1181a) Physicians manifestly do not become such from the study of books, that which is written (syngrammaton). (1181b)

What the Platonists who search for an idea of the good, the sophists who profess to teach ethics and politics as a doctrine or set of techniques, and the many who look to these and even to Aristotle’s own outline as a mere object of theory and technique all share in common is an approach to praxis that takes the form of a theoretical orientation towards universal doctrine. Aristotle regards this approach as "useless." It is the mark of an uneducated person, i.e., someone who has fallen out of the self-understanding of their own being as praxis. Why? In the first place, regarding the demand for universality, this approach has fallen away from the understanding of praxis as always enacted within a factual situation, such that all theory has to be interpretively applied to the diverse situations of the individual or the community. Second, and this is what lies behind the failure to concretize theory on the part of "the many," the theoretical approach has fallen away from the understanding of praxis as based on both the facticity of an already existing ethos, i.e., the habitational motivation to strive towards ethical ends, and also the experiential know-how (phronesis) to interpret this ethos in concrete situations. Thus, the good in the sense of "being good" in this double sense cannot be achieved on the level of mere theory or through instruction in lectures or books. In other words, an intellectual approach overlooks the facticity of the human being. Virtue is not merely knowledge, techne, as Socrates sometimes seemed to suggest, as if it were like mathematics, which exists by virtue of "abstraction" from the individual. (1144b) Aristotle never calls practical philosophy phronesis, practical wisdom, as Plato sometimes did, but rather at most a helper for it. Theory and instruction always arrive at the wrong time for someone who is not, to one degree or
another, already "good" and "practically wise" - too early for the young, who have not yet been educated in the family and in the polis and do not have the experience of the years, and too late for the person who "lacks self-mastery" and has merely "taken flight" from himself into theory. "...since he listens to his passions, his hearing of lectures will be foolish and of no help....the deficiency is due to his living in accord with his passion and taking flight after each thing." (1095a) Once the stone is cast, it cannot be recalled. No mere theory or instruction has power to rectify the "deficiency" (1095a) of ethos and phronesis. "What logos would recast such men?" (1179b) But "to those whose care (orexis) and acting is in accord with the logos knowing about the same will be of great help." (1095a) "This asks a lot of the person who is to receive this help, namely the person listening to Aristotle's lecture. He must be mature enough not to ask of his instruction anything other than it can and is allowed to give." (IAg 2, 318/279) As a "way towards" the good, practical philosophy has to insist on beginning with the "that" of our being schon unterwegs, already on the way (factual content and relational meaning) and has to insist on the "difficulty" of this way, which always acts within situations (enactment-meaning). In this way, it preserves the self-understanding of human praxis against self-deceptions regarding an "easy" way out by taking philosophy courses, reading books, or dreaming about a good in itself.

II. Formal Indication

Heidegger, too, understands his "method" of formal indication not in the modern sense of a set of rules, but rather in the literal and Aristotelian sense of a "way-towards." "[Methode] ist Weg in der Bewegtheit," "method is a way in movement." (PA, 157) Formal indication is the sketching out in advance of a way: "`Formal`," the `formal` is such a content that it points the indication in a direction, sketches out in advance the way." "The direction of the appropriation in understanding is sketched out in advance...." (PA, 34, 114) For Heidegger, as for Aristotle, this way includes the on-going working out of formal indication on an
ontological level, the application of this to the sciences, and application to one's own situation. Likewise, for Heidegger the way of formal indication provides a third option alongside objectivism and relativism, or rather it steps outside of this dichotomy altogether. We must see all this more closely in a systematic presentation of Heidegger's notion of formal indication, which, it must be remembered, is the result of his appropriation not only of Aristotle, but, as we have seen, also of Husserl, Kierkegaard, and Jaspers. We must examine how the young Heidegger understands his existential-phenomenological "topic," being in and through life, as the "way" of interpretation in formal indication.

1. Objectivism

At the start of his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger asks about "the goal and the way" of philosophy, about "what the issue is" (worauf es ankommt) and the appropriate formulation of the question about it:

The two naked questions in philosophy are: 1. What is the fundamental matter, topic (Hauptsache)? 2. Which is the placing of the question which is genuinely directed towards this? What is talk authentically about? What should and must talk unyieldingly and principally be about in philosophy? (PA, 12)

He simplifies these questions into the single question which has confused and embarrassed philosophers for over two millennia: "what is philosophy?" "With the question 'what is philosophy?'...there arises for the most part torment...." (PA, 14) As we have already seen, Heidegger's answer to this question is that philosophy is the phenomenological hermeneutics of being in and through life, but what we have yet to see is the character of this hermeneutics as formal indication. For the time being, Heidegger considers two traditional answers to this question, objectivism and relativism. The former overestimates what a definition philosophy can achieve, the latter underestimates what it can achieve: "Missing the mark in the treatment of the said question and the task of giving a definition...are of a twofold kind: the question and its treatment are underestimated, precisely not taken seriously enough here; and
the question and its treatment are overestimated, one loses oneself in long-winded endeavors...." (PA, 13)

The overestimation of philosophy sees it as a "foundational science," "objective, scientific philosophy," and "system," which takes "absolute knowledge of the truth as a standard for philosophy." (PA, 57, 163; HF, 63, 40) Here one is oriented to a notion of the "a priori," "trans-temporal ideality," and an "ideal of exactness" modeled on the "ideal of mathematical evidence and rigor," which Aristotle thought was achievable only in mathematics and metaphysics (PA, 47, 111):

The efforts to acquire a secure determination of the meaning of philosophy become always more lively and the object of ponderous and specialized reflections. What is the reason for this? Why is the foundation of philosophy sought after again and again? From where always the new efforts to elevate it finally to the rank of a secure, absolute science? (PA, 56)

More specifically, Heidegger sees at work two aspects of the overestimation of philosophy. First, the definition of philosophy is supposed to be so "universal" and to provide such fixed "principles" that all historical expressions of philosophy can be subsumed under the definition. And, second, the definition is supposed to satisfy the formal logical requirements of definition, where "definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam, definition is achieved through the nearest genus and the specific difference." Here the definition functions as genus for all particular philosophies. The exaggerated definition of philosophy is to provide the foundation not only for all historical expressions of philosophy, but also for the sciences:

The overestimations of philosophy are...twofold. On the one hand, the tendency is first and foremost towards the winning of the most universal definition possible, which makes it possible to grasp beneath itself every concrete form of philosophy which has appeared in the course of history; and then at the same time, the tendency is towards making the definition an authentic and rigorous one, which completely satisfies the requirements that formal school-logic has fixed for definition.

Also included here is determining "how and to what extent the so-called disciplines of philosophy - logic, ethics, and the like - are to be taken into account in the definition. In addition, there comes into play delimiting considerations, how philosophy relates itself to the individual sciences, such as art, such as religion.
On this path, a sufficient definition will be won, on the basis of which the working out of the individual disciplines will then be brought to completion. (PA, 14-15)

Heidegger concedes that "a genuine intention towards the meaning of philosophy" is at work here insofar as it is oriented at all to "principles":

The genuine consciousness is here: it must somehow be clear and certain what is wanted, what philosophy should be, what it is; the consciousness that everything else somehow depends on this; that, therefore, in the determination of the concept of philosophy something in principle (etwas Prinzipielles) must come to language (principle is that from which something, beginning here, "is" in its own way, that on which everything depends); that the object is, therefore, to be given in the definition in such a way that on what is thus determined "the rest" depends; to be given in such a way that it is had as an object in principle, can be had in principle in the progress of the genuine appropriation. (PA, 21, 15-16)

Heidegger wants to hang onto the orientation towards principles and towards "scientific philosophy" (as opposed to mere world-view) in the overestimation, but his approach here is that of a critical appropriation, which purges the orientation from the pretensions of absolute knowledge.

The attempt to satisfy the logical criterion of definition in giving a definition of philosophy uncritically takes over a narrow idea of definition in terms of genus and species. This idea of definition derives from "the objective logic of the Greeks," which is oriented to produced and ready to hand "things." In other words, this uncritical idea of definition derives from the sphere of techne, where one has a fixed "idea" of the thing which is to be produced and handled. Philosophy is, thus, in advance conceived as a static "thing," and the definition of it is essentially a "technical" one. But it is questionable whether philosophy is "techne." "Plato," for example, "would never define philosophy as techne" (PA, 50, 48, 115), in the same way that, as we have seen, for Aristotle practical philosophy is not techne:

...the idea of definition which has been developed from a specific formal logic is uncritically made basic as a norm, which a universally valid determination of the meaning of philosophy is supposed to satisfy. One searches in the direction of the conceptual
structures of the object, which are given in advance in the idea of
definition: definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam
specificam, definition is achieved through the nearest genus and
the specific difference...insofar as one holds to this norm of
defining, one takes philosophy as an object of the character
similar to that of the objects, for which the mentioned definition
is tailor made, and relative to whose manner of being grasped the
definition has a right: the rose is a plant, plant is an organism,
and so on....Philosophy is something; formally speaking, an object.
But is it an object of the character of the rose, or of a thing?
(PA, 17)

If a thing (Sache) is to be grasped principally as a thing, it must
thus be grasped in terms of what the issue is in it as the thing to
be grasped, i.e., in terms of how it is there corresponding to the
dealings peculiar to it; in the specific objective logic of the
Greeks, therefore, corresponding to its having-arrived, being-made,
being-put-in-place, being-dealt-with through a specifically viewed
becoming in being; i.e., it is grasped in its genus and ultimately
in its uppermost genus and region. In relation to philosophy and to
the tendency to define it in terms of something general, this,
however, means: philosophy is placed in preconception as a thing,
i.e., the preconception guiding the tendency of the definition is a
misconception regarding the genuinely intended object. (PA, 25)

It is necessary to see that there is a much wider idea of
definition than that given in the technical idea:

At the very beginning of the investigation, it is important to win
the original meaning of definition, from which the usual idea of
definition is only a specific derivative. Definitio: decisio,
determinatio alicuius dictur, quod tenendum et credendum declarar-
tur, manifestatur et indicatur; decision, determination of some-
thing said, that what is to be grasped and to be believed is
declared, manifested, and indicated....The full definition is not
merely its content, the proposition. (PA, 17)

More specifically, Heidegger explains that the wider sense of
definition is that of "addressing" something "as" something, which
defining is nothing other than the explicit working out of one's
"pre-having" and "preconception" of the object, which are very much
bound up with one's historical situation:

As an object, philosophy has, like every object, its way of genuine
being-had; to every object there corresponds a specific way of
access, holding onto it, and losing it....In these ways, which are
to be formally characterized as those of having...there is at the
particular time immanently co-functioning specific ways of grasping
and determining in the manner of knowing, the ways of the specific
illuminating of each experience.

These are not something which is placed on it or stuck onto it,
and which accompanies it, but rather the way of having of the
object at the particular time is, as such, itself an addressing, a speaking *(Ansprechens)* of the object.

In every having as such, "there is" in one way or another "talk *(Rede)* about the object." The genuine having at any time can now in itself demand an express talk: it can become a task to bring the "talk" around expressly to the what of the object in the how of having, to carry on a talk, which task is itself such that it each time springs forth *(entspringt)* out of and in a situation of the having of objects, in a situation of factical experiencing and Dasein, being-there. (Existentially and radically grasped: origin of phenomenological research of categories!) This task of so addressing the object and bringing-to-having, which is determined in the talking-over *(Anbesprechen)*, is the task of definition: pre-having *(Vorhabe)*. (PA, 18-19)

Heidegger gives the following tortured definition of the situational character of definition:

The formal meaning of definition is, therefore: a determining of the object in its what-how-being, which is fitting to the situation and the preconception, grasps out of the basic experience that is to be won, and addresses the object *(Das situations- und vorgriffsgebührende, aus der zu gewinnenden Grunderfahrung zugreifende, gegenstandansprechende ihm Bestimmen in seinem Was-Wie-Sein)*. (PA, 19)

The traditional logical and technical idea of definition is only one specification of the above formal meaning of definition. It is "fitting" only to certain modes of prehaving and preconception, e.g., those in our technical dealings with things. But there are other types of defining which do not give the object in such a secure and fixed manner, but rather only give a certain "idea" of it, as one’s says in the pre-philosophical use of the word. (IP, 13) For example, there can be no logical, technical definition of phenomenology and its objects, since its very meaning is that of the enactment and the re-enactment of the showing of the phenomena:

In its valid region, what is peculiar about the usual idea of definition is that, in respect to the leading tendency of understanding in such regions, it determines the object authentically and securely; that one can indeed provide still more cases of illustration, which, however, in principle contribute nothing more. But this moment does not belong to every definition; there are precisely such definitions which give the object indeterminately, and indeed in such a way that precisely the enactment of understanding of this peculiar definition leads to the proper possibility of determining. There are such definitions which only initiate the complete determining belonging to them....If it is required that, for example, phenomenology be defined in common
fashion, one must say: there is no definition in the usual sense and in philosophy there are in no sense definitions of this kind. (PA, 17-18)

Thus, the shortcoming in the attempt to make the definition of philosophy satisfy the logical, technical criterion of definition is that it is uncritically absorbed in this single, narrow sense of definition:

The tendency to miss the mark lies, therefore, in the fact that, regarding the object and its possible having, a norm for determining is uncritically introduced and, according to the traditional usage, is again and again employed as something self-evident, a norm which warps in advance the tendency of understanding. And this indiscriminate application of the norm for determining, the thoughtless sliding into the tendency of understanding which is given in it becomes possible through the absence of the basic experience in which philosophizing comes "to language".... (PA, 20-21)

What Heidegger calls for is nothing less than a new sense of "logic," "the radicalness of genuine logic," "existentiell logic" (PA, 38, 163, 112), i.e, a logos whose own unique (non-mathematical, non-technical) "rigor" can do justice to the situational character of definition (PA, 192):

The idea of determining, the logic of the grasping and understanding of the object, the conceptuality of the object in its definitive determinateness at the particular time, must be drawn from how the object is originally accessible. For the definition, what becomes decisive is also the situation of life, in which the object comes to experience, and furthermore the basic intention in which experience has access to it in advance (how it "is fitting" [es 'gebührt'] to the meaning of the situation and to the preconceiving tendency of understanding (preconception)). The idea of definition in "formal" logic is hereby revoked....The absence of the complete, basic experience, i.e., the one which also grasps the immanent explication of the task, suppresses a radical problematic of logic, so that actually since Aristotle's time philosophy has no longer genuinely understood the problem of genuine logic. (PA, 20-21)

The form that this new logic must take is that of "formal indication." The definition of philosophy in terms of principles can only give an indeterminate "formal indication" of it, one which is bound up with and fitting to the pre-having and preconception of one's historical situation, and which has to be (as we shall see) critically appropriated and worked out in explicit addressing and determining of what philosophy is. The principles which get
articulated in the definition are therefore in the literal sense what form "the starting point" of the way and what "guides" the direction of the concrete determination of philosophy:

The philosophical definition is a principal definition, and indeed in such a way that philosophy is not a "thing"; "having in principle." Therefore, it must be "indicating": what the issue is; this is only a sharper explication of the specific character of principle; takes pre-caution, turns forward towards (trifft eine Vorkehrung nach) - such that I do not turn to the content. It is "formally" indicating, the "way," basically in the "starting point." There is given in advance a binding (Bindung) whose content is undetermined and which is determined in the sense of enactment.

The phenomenological definition is such a definition of specifically existentiell temporalizing or temporal unfolding; with it, the enactment of understanding is in a decisive sense such that, out of the basic experience, the way, as it is indicated, is made "back," i.e., in such a genuine manner that from now on the addressing becomes explicit, that the task (research of categories), the idea of situation and preconception, is posed as a problematic and basic existentiell experience can be taken concretely into care as what is factically decisive. (PA, 20)

The definition of the object called philosophy, which for Heidegger is phenomenology, can only formally indicate it, since its very meaning is bound up with phenomena, which as such, therefore, are only genuinely given in the enactment of phainesthai, showing. (HF, 76) This indicative character of the genuine definition of philosophy will become clear as we move through Heidegger's analysis.

The other aspect of the overestimation of the definition of philosophy, i.e., the orientation towards an all-encompassing "universality," misconstrues the meaning of "principle":

Like the norm-giving idea of definition, the meaning of "principle" and "in principle" is here misunderstood and indiscriminately adopted. Here, principle is the universal, the most universal, what is valid "for" everything and "in all cases," on which everything particular depends, and from which it receives its essential determination....The individual cases stand under the principle, this is the "uppermost," that which encompasses every particular. The definition of philosophy must be a definition in principle and must determine what it determines as a principle, as the most universal, so that the determination fits every particular sphere of tasks in philosophy, i.e., every discipline, and is the uppermost for them, and the disciplines really "fall under the most general concept," and so that with the definition one does not have to be embarrassed in the face of the colorful variety which the history of philosophy hands down to us.... (PA, 21-22)
Heidegger argues that the principle of an object is not some free-floating universal, but rather belongs to the object itself as its "how," which provides the "view" in terms of which the object is understood. The principle is nothing in itself, but rather contains within itself a reference to the "for-which," the concrete object for which it is the principle. In a definition of an object in terms of its principle or "how," the latter is explicitly brought into view and allowed to function explicitly as an "indication" of the object. In the genuine understanding of this "principal definition," the theme is, therefore, not a free-floating principle, but rather the for-which of the principle, which principle indicates a "way" of determining this for-which, the concrete object. To understand the principal definition is really to enact this indicated way of determining:

Just as each object has its own way of having, its way of access to preservation, and its way of being-lost, so it is at the same time always somehow a principle in this having and for it, something which is the issue, which has something "to say" for something with a view to something....

If an object is to be grasped principally, if the task is to give a principal definition of it, then its what-how-being must come to determination precisely in the view. This means: the principal definition must make the object accessible in such a way that the how-being genuinely determines itself as principle-being, more precisely, the how must come to a first indication, in which how the object functions as principle. This functioning as principle, which the principal definition has to bring to understanding, this how-being of the object, is in a principal definition the determination of its genuine what-being. But the how-being is only genuinely given, i.e., the functioning as principle is only as such genuinely there, when the genuine understanding of the definition can and must take from the definition itself the reference, the pointing (Verweisung) to the for-which, for which the object is a principle. The how of principle-being first comes to understanding with the pointing to the for-which. The definitive content is such that it gives the directive (Weisung), which is the issue in the having of it (of the object).

A principal definition gives the object as principle. The object is a principle only in the being of the for-which, i.e., is had as a principle only when it is not and the principle is not the theme, but rather when the definition is such that the object is had as principle and the having begins in such a way that the tendency of this direction of enactment awakens, understanding thus takes this direction, and the having "is in principle" and holds itself at the principle qua principle. (PA, 23)
Instead of following an indicated way of determining and showing
the object, the universal definition of philosophy makes precisely
the principle itself as universal or genus into a fixed theme and
sees the relation between the principle and the for-which in terms
of the relation of "universal" and "particulars" or "instances,"
which only illustrate the principle, but do not add anything new:
The genuine principle is to be won existentially-philosophically
only in the basic experience of passion (Leidenschaft). Here it is
unilluminated. "On principle" is from the outside, "without
passion," in reflection, becoming lost. Principally no "preserva-
tion." "On principle" one can be and have everything (Kierkegaa-
rd)....It is not enough that one emphasizes the principal (one
still does not in any sense thereby stand at the principle as
such...."In principle," "principally" means: to have the principle
genuinely. But this means to temporally unfold it illuminatingly in
unilluminated passion and to "preserve" it; this means for us:
first to win this basic experience. The way is long for philosophy
as research....There can be principles which are to be won com-
pletely differently in different times, and indeed in such a way
that at first a pointing to this is there, a peculiar going back
into the basic experience, and that only from here does the
principle arise (entspringt). This manner of appropriation is
itself an essential characteristic of an intellectual situa-
tion....in unison with the misunderstanding of the character of the
object is found the misunderstanding of the principal functioning
in question and the misunderstanding of the fact that the function
of the pointing (Hinweisen) of the principle to that for which it
is the principle is decisive in a principal definition. Instead of
this, the definitive determinations themselves become the theme and
object of the showing; the for-which and therewith the genuine
character of the principle becomes a "side matter." (PA, 24-25; HF,
18)
What underlies the orientation towards a universal principle in the
definition of philosophy is, again, the transference to philosophy
of the type of technical understanding appropriate to ready to hand
"things." What is missing here is an orientation towards the
principles or categories appropriate for grasping philosophy as a
phenomenon of factual and historical life, as well as the type of
defining, i.e., "formal indication" appropriate to these categor-
ies. (PA, 28) The problem is, again, that of finding an "existen-
tiell logic."
Heidegger maintains that the overestimation in the defini-
tion of philosophy as "a secure, absolute science" is not simply an
intelectual error, but rather arises out of the ruinant flight in
the face of care and anxiety towards a fixed presence. Philosophy
wants to be objective, certain, and literally "se-cure," "without
cura, care":

So long as I let universal validity be relevant and philosophize
primarily towards it, then I speak in worldly care and even to the
extent that I carry the load "of the others" expressly and want to
sanction the others before the others. So long as facticity, the
fundamental meaning of the being of life, is covered over, falling
away fights against it with the public cry: the universal validity
of knowledge is in danger, skepticism! (PA, 87-88, 22, 163-164; HF,
63-65, 103)

2. Relativism

If the overestimation of the definition of philosophy can be
called objectivism, the underestimation can be called "relativism."
(PA, 162-164) Heidegger himself does not himself directly apply
this term as a description of the underestimation, but it is im-
plied. Elsewhere he uses it as the conceptual counterpart to
objectivism or absolutism, and, as we shall see, he also under-
stands the underestimation of the attempt to define what philosophy
is as such a necessary counterpart of the overestimation. Both
presuppose the same conceptual framework.

Heidegger focuses on two forms of the underestimation, the
first of which renounces the attempt to define philosophy and
preoccupies itself with particular philosophical problems. It
models itself on the concrete research of the sciences, which
rarely stop to give an essential definition of what they are:

One says: discussions about the concept of philosophy are unfruit-
ful, logical-methodological games; it is indicated that one should
follow the example of the sciences, which also do not beforehand
worry about and pursue wide-ranging thoughts about their own
concept, but rather begin right away. The mathematician and the
philologist will expect little benefit for their genuine tasks from
such empty speculations, and the more genuinely they live in their
sciences, the less will they develop a "taste" for such questions.
So concrete research is to be recommended also to philosophy and it
is to be enthusiastically suggested that philosophy finally
distance itself from the fruitless business of working out at first
a universally valid, secure definition of philosophy. For the
purposes of an ordered overview, one can afterwards carry out a
certain division of the disciplines and find a formula for the
whole. But this is an external affair. (PA, 14)
The second underestimation, which Heidegger considers, is the romantic conception of philosophy as "enthusiasm" or "rapture" (Schwärmerie), i.e., personal "experience" of something profound which cannot be universally defined. "Philosophy and what it is can only be 'experienced'" (PA, 36):

The second renunciation of an explicit discussion of the question, which thus underestimates it, comes from a direction opposite to the previously mentioned, specifically scientific tendency. Precisely because philosophy is actually more than science, something "more profound," "higher," it cannot be fixed in a pedantic definition. To dwell on such questions of definition is the mark of a coachman’s soul which "is happy when it finds earthworms." One cannot and even should not define philosophy, one can only "experience" philosophy.... (PA, 14)

Just as Heidegger finds a genuine intention toward the meaning of philosophy in the overestimation of philosophy, insofar as it is oriented to principles (except that it misunderstands these), so he finds a genuine intention in the underestimation:

A genuine intention lies in the underestimation insofar as it emphasizes the necessity of an effectively concrete philosophizing, in any case in two basically different ways. With the fact that I have knowledge of a secure definition of philosophy, the division of its disciplines, and the basic outline of the system and can give an account of this, it is not yet guaranteed that I have placed myself in the position of actually "philosophizing," or even have understood only the meaning of philosophy. (PA, 16)

In the orientation towards the concrete and towards personal, passionate experience, Heidegger sees an intimation of what is involved in the "formal indication" of what philosophy is, i.e., the personal, passionate enactment of philosophy in one’s concrete historical situation. The concrete is a "genuine moment of philosophizing." (PA, 30) But Heidegger’s appropriation here is, again, a critical one.

In the resolve to concrete research, which is modeled on the work of the sciences, the concrete is misunderstood merely as "the concrete" which has no relation to principles. But this sense of the concrete is a "fiction":

Concrete work means indeed: to approach, to have access to the object in its concrete form. What does concrete mean?....we stick to the word here. The concrete, more precisely what is called "concrete," is that which becomes and is in condensing (Verdicht-
ung) and out of condensing, in fusing together (Zusammenwachsen). So far as an object is concretely in having, the having is at the object in such a way that it understandably grasps its determinations completely and in their context of connections and condensations, i.e., genuinely grasps the (ultimate) structural meaning of the complete object in the completeness of its what-how-determinations. But what is intended in the object as the concrete depends on which idea one has formed for oneself about what is the basic matter in it, what the issue is in it, what it genuinely has to say. The concrete hangs upon how the object is taken "in principle." (PA, 27-28)

Just as the overestimation of the definition of philosophy fails to follow matters into the concrete, so the underestimation fails to see that the concrete is guided by principles. Insofar as concrete research and also philosophy as "experience" absolve themselves of reflection on principles, what results is that they let themselves be guided blindly by whatever principles happen to be current and operative. In modeling itself on the sciences and their endless stream of new discoveries, results, and information, the resolve to concrete research fails to see that "at the birth of every science there falls a principal decision and it lives on the basis of this." (PA, 29) "The sciences all have their origin in philosophy, are its heirs...." (PA, 45) Thus, it is questionable whether the sciences can provide a criterion for the meaning of concrete philosophical research, since the criterion of concrete scientific work itself ultimately derives from an original philosophical reflection on principles. The genuine meaning of "the concrete" is, therefore, bound up with the function of "formal indication" in the principal definition of philosophy. Specifically, concretion, the filling out of the object, is precisely the "for-which" which is indicated in the principle:

If philosophy is something in which the issue is somehow decisively also concretion (Konkretion), then its principal definition must be such that in itself it bears with itself the pointing to the concretion, and indeed in such a way that the understanding of the definition leads, according to its own enactment-meaning and temporalizing-meaning, into the concretion. But this is only the explication of the task of a principal definition, on which we have already touched....that for which the principle is the principle is also decisively crucial. Indicating: as that for which the principle "is," the concrete must be appropriated: one is to go towards it! (PA, 31)
The other form of the underestimation of the definition of philosophy, i.e., the "experience" of "rapture," fails to see that its very "communication" of the issue of personal experience presupposes the dimension of principles. It is precisely the indicative function of genuinely principal definition to indicate in communication the necessity of a personal, experiential appropriation of the definition:

In some rapturous vision or other, one lays hold of the "great" philosophies externally and admires their "profundity." In the misguided attempt to imitate them, one falls towards the disastrous confusion of rapture for so-called "profundity" with the radical, methodical tendency towards a starting point belonging to the problematic of the principal. Where "experiencing" is emphasized in this way, either such a philosophy must here remain privately by itself, and thus there is no sense in gossiping and scribbling about it, or it must be of the opinion that the with-world is to be brought to such an "experiencing" through some trick or other....

Or the with-worldly announcing, the communication to the others, the suggestion which one puts to the others with this indicative pre-giving (to say nothing of the specific responsibility of that person who is supposed to do this), must have an understandability and such a one which precisely places itself before with-worldly decision in a determinate situation. But then it must itself correspondingly be ultimately radical and rigorous in its understandability and demonstrability and in its manner of giving in advance. (PA, 36)

Moreover, the orientation towards "rapture" and "prophetic philosophy" (PA, 39) tends to suggest that philosophy is a "historical 'salvation'" which is immediately given without the active, passionate appropriation of the interpretive way which is indicated in the principal definition of philosophy:

The rapturous intention towards fundamental decision is seductive (one seeks what philosophy is supposed "to give" as an upside-down historical "salvation"), even there where one sees the problematic of access itself and in turn the positively productive relevance of the situation of basic experience. One is easily of the opinion that this situation is something lying there fixed, which is temporally-spatially there and to which one comes or should come, where one can go as ones goes to the tower on the hill.... (PA, 36-37)

3. Hermeneutics

Heidegger wants to maintain, then, that both the overestimation and the underestimation of the definition of philosophy misunderstand the genuine intentions operative in their concerns:
"The one misunderstands the radicalism of genuine 'logic'; the other misunderstands the originality of full concretion." (PA, 38)

What both approaches appear to presuppose is the conceptual framework of Greek philosophy which was derived from the realm of techne. Reality here falls apart into the two moments of the "what" (idea, genus) and the "that" (the particular). What is operative here are the aspects of "the temporal and empirical, the variable, subjective, real, and singular, the individual and accidental over against the trans-temporal and trans-empirical (a priori), the invariable, objective, trans-temporal, ideal, universal, and necessary." (HF, 60)

The view of philosophy as absolute knowledge, i.e., objectivism, is oriented to the former moment and, thus, overestimates the definition of philosophy such that it is supposed to apply as a rule to every particular. The resolve to concrete research, "rapture," relativism, and skepticism cut philosophy adrift from its "what" and orient themselves around the moment of the "that" and, thus, underestimate any attempt to define what philosophy is. Absolute knowledge and concrete research, objectivism and relativism, rationalism and irrationalism (PA, 122) are like the concave and the convex surfaces of a curved line. Heidegger's proposal is to step outside of this either-or game altogether:

Has philosophy itself ever determined and can it determine that in the field of its knowledge it can arrive and has ever arrived at absolute, valid truth....So long as philosophy cannot give this attestation, so long as one does not childishy close one's eyes before the change precisely in the strongest philosophical positions..., then just so long is every right missing in any sense at all to introduce in principle absolute knowledge of truth as a standard for philosophy, i.e., there is missing in principle the possibility of characterizing a philosophical knowing as skeptical or relativistic in any sense at all ....(Philosophy grasps life principally and takes seriously the right of life which is encountered and how it is encountered. Absolute knowledge:....Indeed basically a dream of ideal possibilities of absolute knowledge. As historical knowing, philosophizing not only cannot, but should not allow itself to think of such a thing.)....absolute knowledge is therefore not to be claimed as norm and goal, and thus its counterparts of relativism and skepticism are not to be claimed as possible characterizations....one should guard against making use
of the idea of absolute truth as a sleep-inducing opiate. (PA, 163-164; HF, 63)

The skeptic is the authentic absolutist; he takes seriously formal laws in a radical way, i.e., he does not play along with them and out of this makes for himself a nice and comfortable world....No theoretical skepsis...(the lazy and tired skepsis, the empty skepsis, which never begins, but only talks....Does not fit for genuine questioning!); rather, precisely the authentic taking a stand in questioning itself, in the enactment of questionableness. (PA, 196-197)

More specifically, Heidegger's proposal is to consider the real, and philosophy in particular, rather in terms of the "how" of a way to be, which is constantly temporally unfolding itself and is ultimately time itself. (cf. AJ, 39-40; GZ, 207/154) It is this "how" which first allows being to fall apart at any time into a separate and fixed "what" and a "that." In Heidegger's version of the definition of philosophy, it is this "how" which is to be explicitly elevated into the function of "formal indication." It is in this manner alone that Heidegger wants to hang onto "scientific philosophy," which is neither objectivism, since its principles are only the indication of a way of interpretive appropriation and concretion; nor world-view philosophy, relativism, or skepticism, since it always operates with an orientation towards principles. The indications of this scientific philosophy are "...neither nominal definitions..., nor a priori laws...." (PA, 52), neither univocal meanings nor mere equivocations. We must now take a closer look at this new "logic" of formal indication.48

As we have seen, Heidegger defines what philosophy is as follows:

Thus there arises as the principal, formally indicating definition of philosophy...: philosophy is principally knowing comportment to that which is as being (being-meaning), and indeed in such a way that, in the comportment and for it, the issue is also decisively the being (being-meaning) at the particular time (das jeweilige Sein) of the having of the comportment. (PA, 60)

There are two things which need to be noted here regarding the character of formal indication belonging to the definition. First, the indicating definition did not drop out of the sky, but rather, as with all definitions, it is derived from preconception in a
situation. In other words, Heidegger arrives at it through a critical appropriation of the formally indicating definition of philosophy in Plato and Aristotle, both of whom see philosophy as a knowing comportment (logos) to being. Second, since the principal definition of philosophy, i.e., knowing comportment to being, is formal indication, what it indicates is precisely its "for-which," that for which the principal definition functions, i.e., this comportment as it is lived, the having of the comportment, its enactment, actual philosophizing in which the definition is appropriated and the indicated way is followed.

The definitive object in its character as principle indicates what is the issue for the having of it. If the having is to be principal, the object of the philosophical definition must come formal-indicatively to understanding. The principal is to be so grasped that it is grasped in its function as principle, is understood in advance in the for-which it and how it is a principle. But the for-which is itself only formally indicated. The for-which requires the authentic, factical concretion, the authentic appropriation, in which appropriation only can the principle functionally give itself fully as principle. In the understanding of the definition, what is the issue is the having (understanding) of a comportment; and how the having of the comportment is the issue is what the principle of the content of the definition says. What the principle says, "is," this is the issue for the having of the comportment.

If, therefore, the having is to be principal, should that be at itself which is the issue for the having with respect to the principle (as knowing and indeed principally), then there is indicated as decisive for the having of the object (of the definition): the being of the having, and indeed the being of the having of the knowing comportment to that which is as being.

But the authentic having of a comportment qua comportment is a how of its enactment. Therefore, the being of the enactment (temporalizing, the historical) is decisive. (PA, 58-60)

Heidegger finds this function of indicating the actual "having" of philosophy in the Platonic Socrates' insistence that philosophy is a way of life, and in the Aristotelian association of the logos of being with physis, kinesis, aletheia, and kairos in practical life. It is precisely through Heidegger's following the indication of what philosophy is given by Plato and Aristotle and thus bringing philosophy to a renewed enactment and appearance that he arrives at his new indicating definition of philosophy. The indication of the inclusion of the factical philosophizing subject in the definition.
of philosophy means for Heidegger not only that this is to be pursued to the point of investigating how being is given in historical, everyday life, i.e., how being is given "in and through life," and seeing philosophy as a radicalization of this factual understanding of being; rather, it also means that this new definition of philosophy itself is formally indicating and must be appropriated "in and through life," i.e., through a constantly renewed philosophizing which brings it to appearance in new situations.

Heidegger's notion of "formal indication" is at once both phenomenological, in that the indicated phenomena must be brought to appearance as the things themselves, and hermeneutical, in that this indication which guides the presentation is always interpretive and is open to further interpretation in light of how the things show themselves in historical situations. In order to show these two aspects, we will in the following provide translations of some lengthy and key passages from Heidegger's treatment. Let us begin with the phenomenological aspect of formal indication.

It is the phenomenological demand to go to "the things themselves" which lies behind Heidegger's insistence that the principal definition of philosophy must not itself be the direct theme of understanding. One must bring the object itself, philosophy, to appearance in its concreteness:

The principle definition...of the object, called philosophy, and therewith the principal definition of all "philosophical objects" must be such a definition, with which in the determination of the what-how of the object...its function of principle-being is emphasized in a decisive sense, and indeed in such a way that the definitive content "indicates" the genuine concretion as necessarily to be appropriated; i.e., the principal definition is an indicating one, i.e., what is said in the definition, the definitive content, must be understood as "indicating"; in understanding, I must also place the definitive content precisely in relation to..., which means that the content, the determinations, which are given of the object, should precisely not as such become the theme, but rather the grasping understanding has to follow the indicated direction of meaning. (PA, 31-32)

In other words, formal indication has precisely a "repulsing" or
"prohibitive" function (PA, 141) which prevents this indication itself from being turned into dogma, which is fallen towards:

The concept and the role of definition in philosophy; cf. the formal meaning of definition, in addition the philosophical (complete) one: the existentially formally-indicating principal definition. Indicating: gives to the enactment a repulsion from a tempting fall away into obvious attitudes; taking "pre-caution," "turning-forward"! The definition such that it precisely holds at bay this tendency for its content, and when it is said that the definition of philosophy is an indicating one, there thus lies herein a very determinate task for the understanding of the content; but undetermined the how of the way. (PA, 32, 20)

Formal indication of the object only provides a "starting point" which does not give the object "fully and authentically," i.e., in its concreteness. This is what Heidegger means by saying that the indication is only "formal" and therefore "inauthentic":

As indicating, the definition is at the same time characterized as such a one which precisely does not give the object to be determined fully and authentically, but rather only indicates it, yet as genuinely indicating precisely gives it in advance principally. It lies in the indication that the concretion is not to be had without further ado, but rather presents a task of its own kind and a task for an enactment of understanding which is its own. The definitive content must accordingly be won in such a manner of beginning. The positive directive for this is given by the wider character of definition that it is a "formally" indicating one.

"Formally indicated" does not mean only somehow or other represented, thought, suggested, and that one is now at liberty to receive the object itself anywhere and just anyhow in having, but rather indicated such that what is said is of the character of the "formal," is inauthentic, but precisely in this "in-" is at the same time positively the directive. In its structure of meaning, the empty content is at the same time that which gives the direction of enactment. (PA, 32-33)

The indication is formal in the sense that it gives the object only in an "empty intention" which must be "fulfilled" in the showing of the object in its concreteness. But "formal" does not mean here "form," "eidos," "essence," or "a priori," which gets instantiated in the "material" and "filled" with the concrete, as one seems to find in Husserl. (PA, 47) Rather, the indication indicates the matter itself, but only in a rough fashion which must be filled out and in this sense fulfilled:

There lies in formal indication a very determinate binding; in it is said that I stand at the and a very determinate direction of
beginning (Ansatzrichtung), that, should it come to the authentic, there is only the way of suffering, tasting to the full (Auskosten) and fulfilling that which is inauthentically indicated, of following the indication. A suffering, tasting to the full, lifting out of it: precisely such a one that it does not acquire less (taking away) the more it grasps (zugreift), but rather conversely the more radical the understanding of that which is empty as the formal, the richer it becomes, because it is such that it leads into the concrete.

The indication does not, therefore, have to be helped out in reverse fashion! For the character of indication and pointing, the determination "formal" says something decisive! The object signified "emptily": and yet decisive! Not as you like it and without a starting point, but rather precisely "empty" and determining, indicating, binding the direction.

In order to grasp the meaning completely, the radial interpretation of the "formal" itself is required: existentiell meaning of the formal. The opposite is not "material," materially accidental. Formal is not the same as eidetic; its application in the interpretation of the general universal is indeed problematic in phenomenology. The "formal" gives the "character of a starting point" for the enactment of the temporalizing of the original fulfillment of what is indicated.

The definitive content is such that it points to the how of the authentic encounter, determining, forming, shaping. This lies in the enacted, imaginative shaping of the complete phenomenon,...the genuine phenomena become determinate and decisive. Understanding, which authentically begins, is not the grasping of the being-meaning in the complete sense, but rather precisely the character of a starting point, but this and precisely this. To be on the go, about to spring (auf dem Sprung sein), and to be resolutely intent upon it.

"Formal," the "formal" is such a content that it points the indication in a direction, sketches out in advance the way. "Formally-indicating" is here not to be separated in philosophy. The formal is not the "form" and the indication its content, but rather "formal" is the starting point of the determining; the character of starting point! (PA, 33-34)

If the object is given inauthentically and emptily in formal indication, then the having of the object is also "inauthentic." It must become authentic through following the indicated "way" of determining and thus appropriating the object in its full concreteness. This appropriation is, then, an act of temporalizing, of temporally unfolding the object in the sense of bringing it to appearance and making it present:

The object itself, determined in the how of principle-being, is inauthentically there, is "Formally-indicating"; one lives in the inauthentic having, which takes its specific direction of enactment
towards the temporalizing of the authentic having, a having which is determined as authentic precisely through this direction taking. In many objects, the authentic having is in a radical sense a being, a to-be (ein Sein), i.e., the specific being of what is enacted from time to time, of the temporalizing for existence.

From this it can be gathered that the situation of the beginning of such a definition and the situation of the understanding, which begins, is not the situation in which the object gives itself fully and authentically, and that, however, it is precisely the decisive starting point out towards (Ausgangssituation) for the enacting movement in the direction of the full appropriation of the object and of the having of it. But in order to be able to function so decisively, the starting point (Ansatz) must be radically and critically enacted. (PA, 34)

Formal indication must be critically appropriated because, insofar as phenomenological evidence "lies" in the givenness of the things themselves, the empty indication is therefore characterized by a certain "evidencelessness" and "questionableness" regarding the appropriateness of the formal indication of the things themselves:

Herein lies further: the evidence regarding the appropriateness of the definition to the object is not authentic and original; rather the appropriateness is absolutely questionable (fraglich), and the definition must be understood precisely in this questionableness and evidencelessness. But this means: just as it is a misunderstanding of the definitive content to make it into the theme and to show it extensively, instead of pursuing an indication, so it is a mistake to take the questionableness of the starting point as an occasion in order to show thereby the meaninglessness and the arbitrariness of the definition. (PA, 34-35)

The eventuality of its going wrong is a fundamental one which belongs to its own being. The evidence-character of its explication is fundamentally fragile; to want to ascribe to it an ideal of evidence and indeed such an exaggerated one as that of "essential insight" would be a misunderstanding of that which it can and should be. (HF, 15-16)

Phenomenology is to be grasped according to its possibility and not as public and self-evident. A possibility has its own way of being grasped (Ergriffen) and preserved, it is not to be picked up thematically and in the manner of a procedure, but rather grasping a possibility means: grasping and developing it in its being, i.e., what is sketched out in advance in it in possibilities. Phenomenology is, therefore, a distinguished how of researching....A way is here given in advance....As a thematic category for the manner of access and the readiness of dealing, phenomenon means a constant preparation of the way. The thematic category has the function of a critical-warning guidance of seeing in the return [to the things themselves] on the way of dismantling the critically detected concealments. It is monitoring, i.e., understood only in its
warning function. The task: bringing it to a phenomenon becomes here radically phenomenological. The hermeneutics of facticity attempts to go along this way. (HF, 74-76)

Let us now consider more closely the hermeneutical aspect of formal indication. The things themselves in their concreteness are not to be understood in Husserl's ahistorical sense of what shows itself once and for all, i.e., in the sense of the "in-itself of the 'things themselves'" (AJ, 4):

How comfortable one makes it for oneself is shown by the ahistoricality of phenomenology: one believes that the things are to be won in naive evidence by means of a mere turning of the gaze. (HF, 75)

Rather, "all enactment of intuition lives in a specific orientation and in an anticipatory preconception....It is a long way to the 'things themselves'...." (AJ, 4-5; HF, 77) This aspect points to the radically hermeneutical character of formal indication. Formal indication is itself interpretation, i.e., a pre-having and preconception about the things themselves. But, more radically, the "appropriateness" of this formal indication lies not in corresponding to how the things are in themselves, but rather in its being "fitting to the situation and the preconception" in this factical, historical situation. What is decisive is the "concrete situation of basic experience in which, out of which, and for which the access to and appropriation of philosophy is to be enacted...."

(PA, 69):

Genuine pre-caution is: positively to follow the idea of the definition, and indeed the philosophical definition. Genuine readiness to understand, first of all fitting to the situation and the preconception. (Kairologically-critically questioning and founding "in one's time.") (PA, 41)

The having of comportment as being, in its what-how, is to be taken into the grip of understanding. And this in the sense of the idea of the definition, of the authentic situation of understanding, fitting to the situation and preconception; these determinations of the definition are not taken care of with the first starting point and sufficiently illuminated, but rather on the contrary they become more urgent with the advance towards the authenticity of the understanding of the definition; they press forward more and more; as pressing together and in growing urgency, they temporalize precisely the appropriation of the concrete. Thereby, the peculiar binding, which lies in the idea of definition, comes to its expression, and at the same time the situation, fitting which understanding has to be enacted, comes into the view of understand-
ing. What the issue is must come "to the light of day," lie "in the light of day," become transparent and in the light of day itself, in the authentic dailyness. The problematic moves ever more sharply and adamantly into the conscience.

...The having is not yet authentically living, it "is" not yet; and yet it already is: in the starting point, in the beginning of the approach and access to it, in the context of enactment, in which we are now currently (aktuell) moving....The efforts of access are not enacted at any time and anywhere and by anyone; but rather here and now we are living in them and indeed in this place, in this lecture hall. You before me, I before you, we with one another....

The comportment of access to knowing comportment, philosophizing, is to be determined in its concretion which concerns us, the ones who are comporting themselves, and what is thereby already visible: the comportment to philosophy itself....the more authentically the fundamental meaning of the factual situation of comportment is appropriated, the more originally and genuinely is the illumination of the formally indicated meaning of philosophy enacted....For the concrete problematic of philosophy...the context of the facticity of the situation of life is at the particular time (jeweils) co-determining, the situation in which the problems are, out of which they and for which they press towards a solution. (PA, 62-64)

Heidegger stresses the variability of the historical situations of philosophizing. "It is encountered precisely as never the same." (PA, 178) He stresses especially the uniqueness of the "historical consciousness" at the turn of the century after World War I, which was characterized by "the perspective of decline" (PA, 74), as it was expressed in Spengler's Decline of the West. To say, then, that "the situation should be relevant for and in a principal definition" (PA, 72) is to affirm the "polemical" character of philosophy, which must make the past definition relevant for the present situation by means of destructive retrieval:

The appropriation of understanding is one which is initiated here and now by us. The understanding having determines itself as being in view of the actuality in which we are and live, indicated with the title university: context of life....What is its own: historical changeability brings a principal insecurity. (PA, 114)

The task is for us today still made especially difficult insofar as we have precisely possibilities of an original, existentiell-phenomenological view of this "being," which are completely our own, so that this problematic of being is only today for us possible and necessary....Other times did not have these possibilities with this motivation and direction. The treatment was easier and unencumbered, the situation was another. (PA, 84)
In our Dasein, we are today different than every generation before us... merely through the fact that we are the descendants of those earlier as no generation has been, and that we are this in a meaning which is completely our own, insofar as we have an express historical consciousness of it..., live in this consciousness, see ourselves in it, and see and expect the future with and out of it. (PA, 73-74)

...philosophy has to take into consideration other philosophies with other situational origins, which here means taking into consideration how the meaning and extent of specifically philosophical "polemic" is determined in the authentic sense....it is polemical in an eminent and not external sense (ventured in the light of "day"), insofar as the developing appropriation of the concrete situation of philosophizing is enacted in the manner of a destruction. The becoming relevant of a situation is in itself polemical.... (PA, 67)

This historical, situational character of being means that formal indication is essentially characterized by evidencelessness and questionableness. The definition of philosophy and its content is always a "presupposition." (PA, 159) All philosophical interpretation has a "conditioned character," and the point is "to prevent the interpretations from being taken dogmatically...." (PA, 162) The "answers" that one gives never leave behind the character of questionableness, i.e., the issue of their appropriateness and evidence. The answers are really at bottom still questions:

...self-givenness [of life] cannot be identified with the manner of givenness of what is immediately in the world, and just as little with the manner of the specifically theoretical self-giving, which as fulfilling intuition takes shape in the various regions of objects...and accordingly has its own theoretical relations of claims to evidence, correctness, and validity....[the suspension of this notion of givenness] is the struggle of philosophical factual interpretation against its own factical ruinance, which struggle is constantly simultaneous with the enactment of philosophizing. This means at the same time: holding oneself in genuine questionableness lies...in the fact that one questions out of motives, which are at the particular time factically illuminated within the situation and directed towards factical life, and as well lives in the answers themselves in one's research, that is, such that the forming of answers constantly has a relation to the question, i.e., that this question is there and living; that is: that the basic experiences of factical life and its being meaning remain in factically historical livingness (Lebendigkeit). (PA, 153)
But even though philosophy cannot be rigorous science, it has its own "rigor" and "exactness" which derives from both the "starting point" of the indication, which is not arbitrary, and, more importantly, "fitting" this starting point to the historical situation. In this sense, hermeneutics retains a "fundamental phenomenological attitude." (PA, 166) In light of the historical character of philosophy, the ideal of a "system" possessing quasi-mathematical rigor and exactness is a false ideal:

What stands in question is not objective demonstration to the whole world, but rather whether the intended bindingness of the interpretation becomes living, i.e., whether the philosophical enactment is so rigorous in its starting point, preconception, and method that it can in itself temporalize the enlivening of the genuine bindingness of the object, i.e., bring the object to genuine understanding, which bindingness itself has different ways of being and coming-forth each time according to the factual situation and the intellectual, historical situation. Therefore, what is the issue is the possible factual enlivening of the bindingness of philosophical knowing; but this means that the object as such is seen.... (PA, 166)

The understanding appropriation of principal knowing should lead away precisely from every kind of situation which makes possible a separation of "history" (Geschichte) and "system"....[it is] the original, factual appropriation of the historical (des Historischen).... In the appropriation of principal knowing, a false ideal of exactness pales before the urgency and rigor of an incessant questionableness, in which possibilities of philosophical thinking up and inventing something always quickly fall apart. Philosophy, as principal knowing, has to start thinking of giving up the swindle of aestheticizing intoxication of itself and its contemporaries.... In philosophizing there is no history (Geschichte) of philosophy and in the historical character (im Historischen) of factual (philosophizing) life there is no transtemporal problemtic-in-itself and system of philosophical questioning. As principal knowing, philosophizing is nothing other than the radical enactment of the historical character (des Historischen) of the facticity of life, so that in it and for it history (Geschichte) and system are equally alien and also superfluous in their separation. (PA, 110-111)

In philosophy, therefore, there is no foundation in the sense of an ultimate given. Philosophy is essentially only the question and the "way" of following indications and bringing what is indicated to appearance in a historical situation. Philosophy is only a constant "searching" (skepsis). Philosophy is no techne, but
rather is more like "making music" (musizieren); its logos of indication is more like a musical score which has to be interpretively enacted. (PA, 47-48, 50; HF, 19-20) Since what is indicated and to be appropriated is "being in and through life" in one's historical situation, the appropriation takes the form of "fundamental decision," "resoluteness," "passion," "wakeness," "keeping silent and waiting." (PA, 71; HF, 15-16) It is this way of decision and appropriation which is the real fundament of philosophy, which is, then, no "foundation." In this form, we have arrived at "the end of philosophy" and its "genuine beginning." The following long and incredible passage is the apex of Heidegger's discussion of the formally indicating definition of what philosophy is as the investigation of being in and through life:

The authentic fundament of philosophy is radical existentiell grasping (Ergreifen) and temporalizing of the questionableness; to place oneself and life and the decisive enactments in questionableness is the fundamental grip (Egriff) of all and the most radical illumination. This so understood skepticism is the beginning (Anfang), and as the genuine beginning it is also the end of philosophy. (Here no romantic, tragic looking at oneself in the mirror and self-absorption!)

In philosophical research, what is important is not only clarity about how to show, to prove, and about which demonstrability is available, but rather about "when" the moment (Augenblick) is there for genuine discussion. This can only be ventured when one has understood what the definition says, i.e., when the access to the original situation of evidence is enacted. Here it will be decided whether the claims regarding demonstration, which one posed in the definition, have any meaning at all in the starting point. As the situation of original access to the authentic what-how-being of philosophy, it is the situation of the fundamental decision (Urentscheidung) of the enactments of philosophizing (existence).

This evidential situation of the fundamental decision, the experience in which the object gives itself authentically as that which it is and how it is (the basic experience), more precisely the specific context of enactment in the direction towards the winning of this situation, is in the end the situation which the second underestimation means with the confused phrase: Philosophy and what it is can only be "experienced"....

This situation is not the saving coast, but rather the leap into the driving boat, and now everything depends on getting the rope for the sail into one's hand and looking towards the wind. One has to see precisely the difficulties; this illumination discloses for the first time the authentic horizon of factical life. Only insofar as I appropriate to myself this so structured having of the decision, and it is such that I become insightfully precisely in it
and out of it, does their lie in the decision the fundamental motivation of the temporalizing of philosophizing.

If genuine science holds itself in questionableness and in the problematic, is philosophy supposed to have an easy, comfortable time of it? The heirs have gambled it away. To steer into absolute questionableness and to have it insightfully, this means grasping philosophy authentically. The solid ground (ground something which always only temporalizes itself, just as the appropriation does) lies in the grasping of the questionableness, i.e., in the radical temporalizing of the questioning. "Grasping" is care; in the explicit task of research, to bring oneself radically into decision.

This "passion" (actual), as the sole way of philosophizing, is what for a long time has no longer been known. (PA, 35-37)

Heidegger’s genuine beginning for the question of being, as the question of being in and through life, is not a result, but rather precisely a question and a way, which must be begun over and over again. The philosopher - both Heidegger and the reader of Heidegger - remains a "constant beginner." Regarding the occasion of having to ask the question, "what is philosophy?", which always brings "torment," Heidegger writes:

...[such an occasion] returns precisely for the philosopher more frequently and more urgently than for others, because he is precisely the authentic and constant "beginner".... (PA, 13, 56)

...to go towards the beginning....Beginning has its "time." To begin for another time is meaningless. (PA, 186)

...the meaning of explication is to be won as the enactment of interpretation, and the explicata themselves, according to their essential character as hermeneutical concepts, are accessible only in the renewal of interpretation which begins again and again, and from here they are to be brought to their "sharpness" (incomparable with differently directed conceptional formations) and held in it. (AJ, 32, 4)

The meaning of Heidegger’s beginning is only that of a "starting point" which must be critically retrieved and questioned "further":

...categorial interpretation, if it is to be intelligible, is as such essentially to be retrieved. In its genuine and each time more rigorous retrievability, being able to be fetched-back again (Weider-holbarkeit), its evidence temporalizes itself at the same time. (PA, 88)

Research - a questioning search in and as the temporalizing of a factical life and context of life. "Questioning" is: "questioning further," "questioning back," "retrieving," becoming more question-worthy in questioning! (PA, 189)
Ultimately, the way-character of Heidegger's new beginning means that there is no such thing as "the" philosophy. There have been and there will be different ways of questioning about being in and through life. Heidegger's own philosophy is not the end of the road, a philosophical promised land, but rather one stop along the "way of interpretation" (PA, 187):

Through the indicating emphasis on the becoming decisive of the being-meaning at the particular time of each knowing comportment, the possibility of speaking of philosophy in such a general and indeterminate manner is negatively dismissed....It dismisses precisely the possibility that one can preach philosophy from some elevated, but basically non-specifiable place, that it can speak for the coming cultural periods and destinies of mankind, so that one does not know who and for whom and what is speaking, and what is supposed to be going on with these prophecies and schools of wisdom, and who has assigned them such cultural missions. There is no such thing as the philosophy - in general and in such comfortable atemporality - which one confusedly imagines somehow or other.

But at the same time, the directive is given positively to develop the problematic with a view to the basic meaning of the situation at the particular time of the comportment at the particular time. It lies in the meaning of the definition that it leaves open possibilities (but just as much gives the directive) of "looking" precisely towards the one coming in question at the particular time....Herein the principal character shows itself. The definition is essentially a task and cannot comfortably place something knowable in one's hands, since thereby the possibility would be prevented that it should each time come to philosophy.

There is neither the philosophy in general as something living, nor does there need to be only a single possible situation and its basic meaning given for the enactment of the comportment of philosophy. The indication emphasizes precisely that it should remain open so that other contexts of life can temporalize the access to philosophy and the enactment of philosophizing. (PA, 66-67)

...the issue is the motivated direction of interest; no pre-caution for this lies in non-genuine knowledge of things and results; this is misguided curiosity. The interest should not be directed towards acquiring knowledge of a thing, no result in an external sense is to be expected, for example, the outline of a system, marking out great perspectives, glowing descriptions of a standpoint, something "different," new, unusual; inappropriate tendency towards certainty and security and hankerings for comfort. (PA, 41)

As constant "skepsis," philosophy should remain skeptical about all "systems," "prophecy," "Führers," "salvation," "mythical and theosophical metaphysics and mysticism." (PA, 70) "There is only the way of tasting to the full and fulfilling what is inauthenti-
cally indicated, of following the indication." (PA, 33) There is only "the 'infinite process' of a radical questioning, which holds itself in questioning." (AJ, 43) There is no such thing as "the" philosophy, but rather only philosophizing. Heidegger's thought is not an answer, but rather a question, which is to be answered again and again "here and now...in this place." According to the young Heidegger, the logos, the word, that can call us to this way of questioning and preserve us in this way is that of "formal indication."

Thus, in the young Heidegger’s philosophy, there is no such thing as "being" in the sense of some fixed content which one could grasp and repeat by rote. "Being," "being in and through life," is only a "phenomenological existentiell topic," a "matter," "what the issue is." There is no such thing as "being," but there is rather the "questionableness of being, the worthiness of questioning being." (PA, 189) In other words, "being" is a formal indication: "Being" is the indicated formally-empty, and yet securely determines the direction in the starting point; towards the having of the comportment as a being! (PA, 81)

It is expressly to be kept in view: being, the meaning of being, is the philosophical principal of every being (jedes Seienden); but it is not its "universal," the highest genus, which would have particular cases beneath it. Being (Sein) is not the encompassing region for each and all being (Seiende), the "uppermost region." (PA, 58)

The being-meaning of beings, for which the principle is principle, is to be appropriated in understanding. Earlier it was said: "The for-which requires authentic factual concretion, authentic appropriation, in which appropriation itself only can the principle give itself fully in its functioning as principle." Seen from this view, philosophical knowing...is fitting to the situation in a special sense, and indeed in such a way that it presses precisely towards appropriating a situation, but the situation itself is a how of factual life, and this so lives in its experiences and temporalizings that these are and have their movement in the historical movement of effective contexts.... (PA, 160-161)

According to Heidegger, the formal indication of the meaning of being in and through life is not only a way leading to further philosophical interpretation, but also a way leading to interpretive concretization in the various sciences. Philosophy cannot
indeed function as a "foundational science" for the various disciplines after the manner of the absolutist "overestimation" of what philosophy can achieve, but it can be of help by providing "indications" of meanings which are to be worked out in the various "situations" of the sciences. (PA, 115; AJ, 9) This is just another aspect of saying that the definition of philosophy must be "fitting to the situation and to the preconception." We have already seen Heidegger himself attempting to concretize the indications of philosophy in the disciplines of theology (PT) and ethics (PA, 164-165).

The formal indication "being-meaning," with its three moments of content-meaning, relational meaning, and temporalizing-meaning, is to be interpretively concretized not only in further ontological questioning and in the sciences, but also and ultimately in one's own personal situation and experience. There is no such thing as "being-meaning" which is not for "me," "here and now...in this place....I before you, we with one another." "Being" is always an "Er-eignis," an event which is my own. Being is always personal. This, again, is still another aspect of saying that philosophy has to be "fitting to the situation and the preconception." Philosophy "arises out of facticity and returns to facticity" (PA, 115), i.e., it derives from the counter-ruinant movement of one's life towards its authenticity and leads back into this authenticity:

Philosophical research is authentic only when, and here it is completely factical, it itself in its enactment works out the specific existence of the concrete being who is researching and questioning (des konkreten forschend-fragens Sein). The enactment of the passage through these stages of decision in view of the determination of the object of philosophy is not just any acquisition of knowledge of possibilities, which freely runs its course for itself, but rather factical understanding in the face of the contexts of factical care in one's own life and its past and its future; a shaping of readiness and the pre-appropriation of preconceptions, which should be able to determine actively every step of a philosophizing which is to be enacted; a reflection, which cannot be executed in an indifferent and colorless "as you wish" and so utterly in general, but rather is understood only when it goes to the roots of one's own facticity in one's own concrete life.... (PA, 169)
All "characters" or "categories" of factual life articulated in philosophy are a part of its definition and thus also have the character of formal indication (PA, 79), whose "prohibitive" function prevents them from being turned into the metaphysical dogma of unchanging meaning in itself. There is no such thing as an "I am," "care," "death," "world," and "time," which is not my "I am," my "care," my "death," my "world," and my "time." The categories of factual life are themselves interpretations and have to be interpretively concretized in the light of how one's own factual life shows itself at any particular time in its situation. The characters of "falling" and "temptation" can be interpretively concretized in a Christian context of life, but this is only one way of concretizing these indications, which "prohibit" their reduction to a Christian meaning or to any other meaning in itself (PA, 42):

...these categorial contexts are living in one's own concrete life, and are not merely any old matters which are inconsequentially observed, as when I say: "The thing there is red." That they are alive in facticity, this means, however: to contain factual possibilities in themselves, and never (and thank God never) to be released from these.... (PA, 99)

These characters are formally-indicating, i.e., they receive their concrete factual categorial determinateness out the direction of experience and interpretation at the particular time; this means at the same time that nothing is factically "said" with them regarding the concrete movements of factual life, but rather they give precisely only the direction of the view, so far as a categorial interpretation of the meaning of the being of life is undertaken....Along with its pointing (hinweisenden) character, formal indication has in itself at the same time a prohibitive (holding away, refusing) character....Pointing to the refusing character of what formally indicates is here motivated in the fact that precisely the above-mentioned characters...can easily be taken as fixed, basic properties of a being and so can lead to setting up a metaphysics of life - for example, in the sense of Bergson's or Scheler's....Formal indication refuses every drifting away in autonomous blind dogmatic fixations of categorial meaning (cut loose from the presupposition, the preconception, the context, and time of interpretation) into the determinations-in-themselves of an objectivity, which has not been discussed regarding its being-meaning. (PA, 141-142, 134; AJ, 11; IP, 115)

To say that the formal indication of the categories of factual life, in and through which being is, maintains itself in
evidencelessness and questionableness is really to say that these categories or characters are in the last analysis questions which are addressed to "me." "I-am-meaning" means: am I, and how am I? "World" means: is there world/does it world for me, and how does it world? "Care" and "death" mean: do I care, am I dying, and how do I care, how am I dying? "Time" means: am I time, and how am I time? Here it is a question both of the facticity of meaning in the situation of the individual and also the authenticity of the individual's experience:

It is important to hold oneself at the pointing which is also given in advance in the concept of facticity as its possible direction of fulfillment. One's own Dasein is what it is precisely and only in its "there" at its particular time. (HF, 29)

The question concerning the meaning of the being of factical life, concretely of one's own concrete life at its particular time, can be grasped formal-indicatively as the question concerning the meaning of the "I am"....The formal indication "I am," which guides the problematic of the meaning of the being of factical life, becomes methodically effective in the sense that it is brought to its genuine factical enactment; i.e., in the discloseable character of the questionableness ("restlessness") of factical life, it is enacted as the concrete historical question: "am I?," whereby the "I" is to be taken merely in the sense of a pointing towards my concrete factical life in its concrete world, in its cultural, historical situation and possibility in the situation. It is precisely appropriate for the object-meaning of factically ruinant life when it remains undetermined and questionable and barren what "I" and "mine" are supposed actually (eigentlich) to say in factical life and for it....The indeterminateness of the object "my life" is methodically no deficiency, but rather it guarantees precisely the free and always new possibility of access in the ongoing temporalizing of factical life....In the concrete factical enactment of the question "am I?", the meaning of the "am" must be able to be brought to experience, but not such that it is encountered absolutely and directly, simply and once and for all....the determinateness of life is not genuinely graspable in a free-floating and indifferent acquisition of knowledge about an object lying before one's hand.... (PA, 172-175)

What is time? It is not a "what" but the "how" of existence. Then: Who is time? Better: Are we time? Better yet: Am I time? Or most basically of all: Am I my time? This question is the doorway to any discussion of time. And here all becomes serious. Here existence becomes questionable. (BZs, 81)

Again, it is the logos of formal indication which can do justice to the way in which the characters of being in and through life are
always concretely "there" in "one's own situation which is lived hic et nunc." (AJ, 32), and are "there" in ongoing interpretation, in which I continue to ask: am I, how am I? It is this logos of indicative hermeneutical concepts which is the "fari," the "speaking," which can speak philosophically about individual human existence on the level of principles and yet not objectify it, depersonalize it, and dissolve it into the cheap acid of "universals." Logos means here "dictum," "indicating-saying":

The inexpressibility of the soul is often and enthusiastically formulated in connection with the impossibility of completely grasping the individual. But here the weight falls decisively on the question of which concept of the individual is taken as the basis in this problem of conceptual expression. Instead of always repeating anew the often expressed "individuum est ineffabile," it should be time to ask which meaning the "fari" should then here have, which kind of grasping should come to expression and whether a definite manner of grasping the individual lies at the basis of this dictum, one which is ultimately based in an aesthetic, external observation.... (AJ, 39-40)

As the questioning after the topic of being in and through life, philosophy is, then, the formal indication of a way in the threefold sense of ongoing philosophical thought, concretization in the sciences, and concretization in one's own personal experience. In these ways, the theme of being in and through is indirectly communicated to individuals as a question to be questioned, a path to be travelled. In its protreptical function, philosophy can only call attention to the things themselves, since "things are there only where eyes are." (HF, 5) In the face of the demand for comforting answers, philosophy has little to offer and can only make things more difficult. Heidegger confesses that he can answer for no one the question of being in and through life. The point is to start philosophizing for oneself, to strike out on the way which he has indicated in rough, and ultimately to find one's own way:

Precisely in view of the problem of validity and objectivity, what should be attempted is calling attention to a way.... (PA, 187)

Who...does not himself dig in, to him must be said that he has not understood what is genuine. For, touching upon "what the issue is," I must step back and declare that, even if a quality of research has been given to me, I can make the discovery of "what the issue is" for no one.... (PA, 181)
It seems to me that each of them (the old philosophers of being) tell stories, as though we were children. *(The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World-View, 1919) (IP, 19)*

The poetic character of thinking is still veiled. Where it shows itself, it is for a long time like the utopia of a half-poetic intellect. *(From the Experience of Thinking, 1947) (ED, 84/12)*

The requirement of the "eternal youth" of the theoretical man. Always turning back anew into the origin, the first spontaneity. *(On the Essence of the University and Academic Studies, 1919) (IP, 214)*

**CONCLUSION**

**DEMYTHOLOGIZING HEIDEGGER**

In my Conclusion, I would like to consider the significance of Heidegger's youthful period for our understanding of the whole of his thought. In our deconstructive reading, which often went very much against Heidegger's authorial intentions, we have seen how his later philosophy from his *Being and Time* to his work in the fifties and sixties can in fact be dismantled or traced back to his original break-throughs and insights in the early twenties. But what is the point of this demolition work? Is Heidegger's philosophy simply to be left lying there in ruins? By no means. Destruction without retrieval is empty; retrieval without critique is blind. In other words, we must ask: How can Heidegger's thought now be retrieved, thought out further, and re-thought in the light of his youthful beginnings?

If in my study I told the *Geschichte*, the "history" or "story" of the development of Heidegger's thought backwards, starting from his later philosophy and ending with his youthful period, I would like now, partly by way of summary, to tell the story again very briefly, but this time forwards, starting from the
young Heidegger and ending with the later Heidegger. Here we can bring out an underlying implication of our study that has already been touched upon, namely, that the young Heidegger is the great demythologizer of the history of western metaphysics. But we can also highlight the further implication that, in a specific sense to explained, the later Heidegger re-mythologizes the question of being. After we have discussed these implications, we should then be in a position to appreciate how a destructive repetition of Heidegger's whole philosophy from the vantage point of his youthful existential-phenomenological thought provides us with a kind of philosophical Rosetta stone for translating the cryptic hieroglyphics of his later language into a more understandable and communicative lexicon. In other words, I would like to propose the project of demythologizing the later Heidegger.

As we have seen, the opening scene of his philosophical career is set in his student years from 1909 to 1916. This is his metaphysical period. As a young theological student and then as student of the Neo-Kantian Rickert, his earliest phase culminates in nothing less than a naive, speculative, and religious metaphysics, which he himself will later call "ontotheology." Here he attempts an answer to the question of being in terms of the three moments of the "absolute spirit" of God (content-meaning), the rational-teleological subject (relational meaning), and the atemporality of logical meaning and the eternity of God (temporalizing-meaning). His answer wove together influences from what he would later critically call the three "epochs" of metaphysics, i.e., Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics, Aristotelian scholasticism, and the modern metaphysics of subjectivity.

Enter the young Privatdozent Heidegger who from 1919 through the early twenties suddenly begins speaking about the "end of philosophy." By "philosophy" he means the whole history of western metaphysics, which he divides into the three "epochs" of the "first beginning" of Greeks thought, the Middle Ages, and modernity. To bring about the end of philosophy means for the young Heidegger to carry out a "destruction" of the tradition in the literal sense of
"un-building" it back to the factual life from which its abstract speculations had "fallen away." This destruction is at bottom the activity of demythologizing metaphysics, i.e., stripping away the mythical, speculative forms in which the question had been posed and reposing this question in terms of factual life. He understands traditional metaphysics as what he calls a distorting "theorization" of concrete historical life. More specifically, he understands the traditional metaphysical characterizations of the "content-meaning" of being (e.g., "substance") as the "de-worlding" of the immediate "it worlds" of the "life-world." He sees the "relational meaning" of being in traditional metaphysics (e.g., "intellect") as arising from the "de-living" of the personal "event" of one's life. Finally, he understands the "enactment-meaning" or "temporalizing-meaning" of being (e.g., eternity) in traditional metaphysics as the "de-historicization" of the temporal enactment of one's relation to the world.

In his demythologizing of ancient metaphysics, Heidegger identifies especially with the concrete practical concerns of Aristotle's critique of Plato's idea of the good, as well as with the concrete, anti-speculative concerns of the tradition of classical humanitas inspired by Socrates, the Sophists, rhetoric, skepticism, and Stoicism. Likewise, he follows the Platonic-Socratic theme of "parricide," of doing violence to "the old philosophers of being," whose speculative, mytho-poetic storytelling has to be put into more concrete and understandable language. "The philosopher," Heidegger says, "must dare to become a father-killer." Thus, regarding his demythologizing of ancient metaphysics, the characterizations of the content-meaning of being as "idea" (Plato) and as "substance" (Aristotle, for whom the highest substance is divine nous) is criticized by Heidegger as a de-worlding of the realities that Aristotle had described in his practical writings, i.e., the around-world of the "household," the social world of the polis, and the personal dimension of one's "ethos." Plato's and Aristotle's characterizations of the relational meaning of being as "theory" and "nous" are seen as a de-living
of the realities of human praxis, i.e., "care" and "striving," "phronesis," "passion," and "logos." Likewise, Plato's and Aristotle's characterization of the temporalizing-meaning of being as "eternal being" is seen as a de-historicization of the temporal character of practical experience which Aristotle had thematized in his practical thought, i.e., the human "movement" (kinesis) towards ends which are enacted within a present "situation" (kairos).

In his demythologizing of the medieval epoch of metaphysics, the young Heidegger models himself also especially on the passionate realism of the young Luther's "theology of the cross," which provided a scathing critique of the speculative "theology of glory" of Aristotelian scholasticism, and attempted to return to the concreteness and historicity of original Christianity as it is found in Paul's letters. He also follows Kierkegaard's existential critique of speculative theology and philosophy. Thus, his demythologizing of the medieval epoch of metaphysics attempts to show that the articulations of the three moments of being-meaning in Aristotelian scholasticism - i.e., God as uncreated substance and first cause (content-meaning), contemplation (relational meaning), and the "standing now" of eternity (temporalizing meaning) - arose respectively from the de-worlding of the factual event of the crucified God of the New Testament, the de-living of the concernful and anxious faith of the whole person, and the de-historicization of the "coming to presence" (Parousia) of God within the historical situation of "the moment" (Kairos). Following Dilthey's and Count Yorck's appropriation of Christian anthropology for the purposes of a "philosophy of life," Heidegger's intention is also to demythologize the understanding of factual life in original Christianity itself, i.e., to purge it of any special relation to the Christian religion, so that it can be taken up into a religiously neutral ontology.

In his demythologizing of the modern epoch of "ego-metaphysics," the young Heidegger models himself not only on Kierkegaard's critique of German Idealism, but also on Husserl's radical "phenomenological" call to "the things themselves" and on Dilthey's
critical appropriation of Kant and Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* for the sake of a "philosophy of life." He thus sees the articulations of the three moments of being-meaning in the modern metaphysics of subjectivity—i.e., logical meaning (content-meaning), judgment (relational meaning), and atemporality (temporalizing-meaning)—respectively as de-worlding, de-living, and de-historicization. Again, the task he sets for himself was that of dismantling the "fantastically idealized subject" back into the concrete historicity of factual life. All three epochs of metaphysics are seen as having fallen away from factual life into a speculative, aesthetic-ocular quietism.

Heidegger sees his task ultimately as that of tracing this "falling away" from "factual life" back into the "origin" of concrete historical experience, so that, in terms of this origin, the "question of being" can be "repeated" or "retrieved" in a new and "genuine beginning." This is what he calls the "working out of the hermeneutical situation," i.e., a "kairologically-critically questioning and establishing 'within one's time'" which lets the tradition become present in a new and relevant way in actual contemporary philosophizing "here and now... at this place, in this lecture hall." It is this kind of historical interpretation that Bultmann learns from the young Heidegger in their collaboration in Marburg and comes to call "demythologizing" in his own theological work. Heidegger’s chief guides in his positive task of retrieving the question of being are Husserl’s phenomenology, Dilthey’s philosophy of life, Kierkegaard’s existential thought, and Aristotle’s practical writings. His anti-speculative, demythologized version of the question of being is what he calls the "phenomenological existential topic" of "being in and through life," which is characterized by the three intentional moments of "world," "care," and "temporalizing." But, we are told, this topic is essentially a question and a way, which can only be "formally indicated" and begun over and over again within philosophy, within the interpretative concretization of philosophy in the sciences, and within such concretization in one’s own personal experience.
Thus, there takes place a "complete turning-around of philosophy" in Heidegger's thought sometime around 1919 when he overcomes the historical prejudices at work in his earlier speculative and metaphysical period. He turns away from his earlier transcendental and speculative lexicon of being as objectivity and value (content-meaning) for a logical and teleological consciousness (relational meaning), both of which were conceived within the horizon of the fixed presence of logical atemporality and the eternity of God (enactment-meaning). What he turns towards is a notion of being as a "there is world/it worlds" and "event" (Ereignis) for radically finite, pre-theoretical human life, which as "there-being" is (lives) the "there" of "being."

He plans to make his radical new beginning known to the world first in a long essay on Karl Jaspers, then in a book on Aristotle, and finally in another long essay on the concept of time. But none of these are published. Instead, his formal indication of the question of being in and through life is taken up into his later three paths of the "meaning of being," the "truth of being," and "the topos of being." It is in these later writings that the fundamental themes which Heidegger had worked out in the early twenties are now made public for the first time, themes such as the question of being, the first beginning of philosophy, the three epochs of metaphysics, the end of philosophy, the other beginning, philosophy as a way of constant beginning, the turn, "Ereignis," "Es gibt," the meaning of being, and the truth and topos character of being.

But his original break-throughs and insights into the being-question from the early twenties are presented in a transformed manner in his three later paths. To work out the details of this transformation would take us beyond the scope of our present study. The matter can be put in a simplified but essential manner as follows. In the way of the "meaning of being," i.e., in his 1927 Being and Time, his earlier three intentional moments of "world," "factual life," and "enactment" now appear as "transcendental" moments of worldly "structures," "Dasein" (whose counterpart in
Husserl is transcendental consciousness), and temporal "schemata." In his two paths of the "truth of being" and the "topos of being" after 1920, his youthful question of being in and through life now turns up in the form of the three cosmological moments of the "fourfold" of "earth and sky, gods and mortals"; "poetic dwelling," thanking," "homecoming"; and the "destiny" of being.

The later Heidegger makes clear that all this is not a "turn" in his thinking from an earlier human-centered philosophy to a Being-centred philosophy, but rather a "bend." It is the same thinking about the question of being on either side of the bend, but with a different "bent." This points to two things. First, the question of being is, as we have seen, central also in the first beginnings of his thought, but with a different "bent." Second, and more importantly for our interests, his later philosophy is still the existential-phenomenological question of being in and through life, but with a different "bent." No intelligent reader of Heidegger would assert that his later thought can be simply-mindedly reduced to mere speculative and mytho-poetic thought. In the later works, one still finds the old (and often newer and better) existential-phenomenological analyses of "being in and through life" given in the early twenties. Consider, for example, his powerful descriptions of modern technology; of our lived experience of "things" such as "shoes," "bridges," and "houses"; and of the workings of language. When he talks about the "thinging" of the thing and the "worlding" of the world, he is basically still talking about his youthful theme of how things "signify" in a totality of references. When he says that "language is the house of being," he is still basically talking about his youthful and Aristotelian theme of ethos. When he makes Hölderlin's poetic statement that "full of merit, and yet poetically dwells man upon the earth" central to his own thought, he is basically still talking about his youthful theme of the "awhileness" and "dwelling" of being-in-a-world. When he ruminates on the meaning of the "Es gibt," "there is/it gives," "Ereignis," the "Event," and the "destiny" of being, he is basically still dealing with his youthful
themes of "Ereignis," "es gibt," and the way in which the enactment or temporalizing of meaning is bound up with the factical givenness of "destiny." The later Heidegger is still philosophizing with "the things themselves" and still talking about "world," "factual life," and "temporalizing," but with a different "bent." The later Heidegger is, at bottom, still the original existential-phenomenological Heidegger, but with a different bent. The later Heidegger is not some mystical crank lost in speculative, mytho-poetic reveries. When we speak of the existential-phenomenological origin of Heidegger's thought in the early twenties, we must, then, understand this "origin" in the sense of Heidegger's "arche," which has the double meaning of both the "starting point" of Heidegger's thought and the "principle" that continues to "govern" and "rule" his thought. From beginning to end, Heidegger's thought unfolds itself out of the arche of the existential-phenomenological problematic of being in and through life.

But I want now to highlight briefly how this "bent," which we have already touched upon in our study, tends in fact to obscure the existential-phenomenological character of the later Heidegger's thought. In fact, there are number of "bents" here to be considered.

Let us consider first the later Heidegger's linguistic bent. What I mean here is what Gadamer has called the later Heidegger's "language-need" (Sprachnot) i.e., his frustrated need for what he called the "other language" which, in the "other beginning," could do justice to a non-metaphysical way of thinking and speaking about the being-question. In its original form, this need arises in the context of his rejection of the metaphysical language of his very earliest period. Here it in fact takes a theological form, insofar as he rejects the traditional theological language of Aristotelian scholasticism and searches for "the word that can call us to faith and preserve us in faith." But it expresses itself also as the ontological need for the "fari," the "dictum," which can both do justice to and transcend the old position that "individuum est ineffabile," i.e., can do justice to the concreteness and historicity
of meaning. It is a need for the logos of an "existentiell logic." The young Heidegger finds this logos in a creative reading of the language of Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Aristotle, and especially in Aristotle's notion of *legein en tupo*, discoursing in rough outline, Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication, and Husserl's notion of the indicative function of occasional expressions. All this gives to the young Heidegger a tongue with which to speak about being in and through life; in turn, his creative appropriation gives to these anti-metaphysical, counter-traditions a tongue with which they can speak a sophisticated philosophical and ontological language. What results is a fusion of horizons, a fusion of languages, which allowed us in our study to speak of the Husserlian, the Kierkegaardian, and the Aristotelian drafts of Heidegger's question of "Being and Time." Speaking more systematically, the young Heidegger's version of the question of being is a existential-phenomenological draft. But, beginning to a great extent with his work *Being and Time*, Heidegger left behind this attempt to mediate his new and radical concerns with familiar, traditional language. In doing so, he in effect cut out his own philosophical tongue. There now begins a "tragic struggle for the proper language" that often resorts to "desperate rescue measures" of forced and artificial, tortured and unintelligible turns of language, and fails and knows that it fails. Gadamer writes:

I remember a time up at the cottage during the war years when Heidegger began to read me a Nietzsche paper on which he was working. He broke off suddenly and pounded the table, sending the teacups clattering, crying out with irritation and despair: "This is all Chinese!"

To this one can put the question: "Does this have to be? Does not natural language in its universal flexibility always offer a way to say what one has to say?....It is easy to ridicule the unfamiliar and the forced. To make it better is difficult." The later Heidegger creatively and violently assaults and strains to the breaking point our traditional, familiar, natural language through his dialogue with poetry, through his excavation of the archaic etymological histories of the Indo-European languages (e.g., "Seyn,
"beon" as the archaic form of "Sein," "being"; "Er-augnis" as the archaic form of "Ereignis"), and through his creation of new words. Here one comes across strange and evocative phrases such as "the nothing nothings" and "the thing things." Consider also the difficulty of the following sentence: "Nur was aus Welt gering, wird einmal Ding,"5 which can be translated as "only what littles, rings out of world becomes one day a thing." Here Heidegger invents the verb "geringen," just as he invented the verb "to world" in 1919, but what differentiates the latter from the former is that it is embedded within a predominantly existential-phenomenological lexicon. The later Heidegger's other beginning was no longer mediated with the traditional language of western humanitas; rather, after his rejection of the Kantian-transcendental language of his Being and Time, he searches urgently for new types of vocabulary and turns to the cosmological, speculative, and mytho-poetic language of the Pre-Socratics, Greek tragedy, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Rilke. Heidegger's later language is even to a certain extent a return to his very earliest primal words for being, as these appeared in his early speculative study of Duns Scotus, i.e., the appellations of "truth" and "place." One can, then, speak of the later Pre-Socratic, Hölderlinian, and Nietzschean drafts of "Being and Time." In general, Heidegger's adoption of the language of these traditions leads us to refer to his later speculative, mytho-poetic draft of "Being and Time," even though the underlying ontological problematic is still an existential-phenomenological one. "Only Hölderlin," as Gadamer has said, "loosened his tongue" (S, 351), but when he spoke this new language it tended to alienate and distance his thought from the radical concreteness of his youthful period. He was not exactly speaking "chinese," but he was attempting to speak archaic Greek and German to speakers of modern European languages and attempting to speak mytho-poetically to philosophers, scientists, and lay-people living on this side of the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution.

Let us now consider the later Heidegger's speculative bent. What I mean here is what Sheehan has called Heidegger's "tendency
to hypostasize being into an autonomous 'other'." As we have seen, there is no "turn" from the young Heidegger to the later Heidegger, since the constant theme of his thought is indeed the temporal relation of human being and being, but with a different "bent." In his youthful period, it is primarily the human being which enacts the historical content of being, i.e., the event of the "it worlds." The "Ereignis" of world is always in the sense of an "Er-eignis," an event which is "mine." The question of being is always also the question: "Am I?" "Being" is a formal indication which points to the meaning of being in and through "my" life. The emphasis is primarily on the "relational meaning" and the personal "enactment-meaning" of being in the factual situation of the individual. What also belongs here is the way in which the formal indication of philosophy has to be interpretively concretized in the human sciences. In stressing all this, he follows Husserl's notion of "intending"; the Aristotelian theme of practical meaning as always "pros hemas," "towards us"; and Kierkegaard's central notion of individual "choice," as well as the wider Christian theme of the vox viva of Sacred Scripture as always being "pro nobis."

But in the later Heidegger's "bend," what happens is that the emphasis often shifts from personal relational-meaning and enactment-meaning to an autonomous historical content-meaning. The stress is no longer primarily on human being enacting and temporalizing being, but rather on "Seyn," "beon," enacting and temporalizing human being in the form of "destiny." It would take us far beyond the bounds of our study, but it could be shown in detail how the later Heidegger's speculative bent bends all the "categories" or "existentials" of his youthful period in the direction of an almost autonomous ontological "other." The emphasis of "Ereignis" no longer falls on the personal happening of my life, but rather on a cosmological event; the emphasis of "place," "Dasein," and "ethos" no longer falls on my being at home in a world, but rather on the world-historical "there" of being; the emphasis of "truth" no longer falls on the individual's act of un concealing being (in Husserl's and Aristotle's senses), but rather on being
unconcealing itself as the "clearing"; the emphasis of "indication" no longer falls on pointing to the situation of the individual, but rather on pointing to epochal truth; kairos often means not so much the concrete "moment" of the individual, but rather the world-historical moment of truth; the emphasis of the "for the sake of which" is no longer taken primarily in the Aristotelian sense of the end of praxis as praxis itself, but rather taken in the sense of human life being for the sake of the "dignity" (WM, 329/209) of being (similar to Aristotle's seeing first philosophy as for the sake of the unmoved mover and the stars); care is no longer primarily self-care, but caring for being in the role of the "shepherd of being"; phronesis often means not so much the application of the tradition to my own situation, but rather the reception of the fitting world-historical truth; mood is no longer primarily the individual's personal "attunement" (Stimmung) in the world, but rather the individual's "determination" (Bestimmung) on the part of being (cf. WP, 76/77); language is no longer primarily my speaking, but rather it is being which speaks (spricht) and the human being speaks insofar as he corresponds (entspricht); interpretation no longer means primarily interpreting to fit my situation, but rather the bringing of an epochal message; falling means no longer so much the individual's flight into the world, for which the guilt and responsibility lie with the individual, but rather the "destiny" of technological "enframing"; conscience is no longer so much the call of the self to the self, but rather the call of being. As we have noted, Heidegger's statement in the 1930s that "the individual counts for nothing" and the whole mind-set behind it would have struck Kierkegaard as a form of "objective thinking" and an attempt "to speculate oneself out of one's own good skin and into pure light." Heidegger in effect often tends to historicize or epochalize the cosmological ground of traditional objectivistic metaphysics. What also belongs to the later Heidegger's speculative bent is his reluctance to bring his question of being into close relationship with the various human disciplines.
In its extremest form, this speculative bent takes the form of considering "being," "Ereignis," or the "es gibt" completely apart from beings and therefore from human beings (cf. SD, 1-58/1-73), a tendency which first showed itself in the late twenties when he spoke about Dasein as the transcendental-categorial structure that could just as well be instantiated in Martians. "In 'Time and Being', however," Heidegger said, "the relation of Ereignis and the human being of mortals is excluded." 7 Again, he wrote: "...it belongs to the truth of being that being comes to presence without beings...." In a later edition, he changed this passage to its opposite: "...being never comes to presence without beings...."8 In spite of his ambiguity, he obviously saw that both moments of the relation of being and human being are equally important. What led Heidegger often to his excesses was his tendency towards a speculative "depth hermeneutics," which questions after some sort of ultimate "it gives," "it releases" beyond the surface appearances of being-meaning. "Ereignis," he said, "is without destiny (geschicklos) because it itself sends presence."9 One can here legitimately ask to what extent Heidegger's later speculative bent was a return to his very earliest formulation of the question of being in the form of the "absolute spirit of God."

Ricoeur's notion of the "hermeneutical arc"10 is helpful in elucidating the bend from the young to the later Heidegger. The movement along this arc is that of intentionality. In the first place, meaning and discourse is usually immediately referential and demonstrative, i.e., it is enacted interpretively in its relation to "me" in my situation. In the process of objectification, which takes place especially in the act of writing, discourse itself become the direct intentional object in the form of the "meaning" (Sinn) of the written text. Here what the young Heidegger called the "indicating" function of language is held in suspension.11 Linguistic meaning becomes noematically objectified and "autonomised." But for Ricoeur, meaning becomes empty and sterile if it is not eventually re-enacted in renewed interpretive reference in the situations of living human beings. Regarding Heidegger, this means
that, insofar as being is language, being appears here often in the form of an "ideology of the absolute text,"\textsuperscript{12} a text without a human author, which writes and speaks itself in monologue. The history of being often looks like a narrative without human agents and actors, a play without players. His ontology often appears as a kind of cosmological linguistic structuralism.\textsuperscript{13} It is as if the later Heidegger often did what he in his youthful period said should never be done, i.e., make formal indication itself into a direct theme without following its pointing into "the concrete."

The later Heidegger's speculative bending of such notions as "Ereignis" and "its worlds" in the direction of an autonomous ontological other tends to distance and alienate his thought from its original and underlying existential-phenomenological problematic, where personal relational meaning and enactment-meaning are just as important as content-meaning and its historicity.

Heidegger's later philosophy is also characterized by an eschatological-utopian bent. As we have seen, the young Heidegger's philosophy arose very much out of a fusion of horizons with the tradition, more specifically, with Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Aristotle. Here there was a sense that the end of philosophy and the turn to the other genuine beginning were already present in a rough form in these thinkers. What was required was only to make the implicit explicit and to provide a rigorous philosophical language where it was lacking. But the later Heidegger tended to leave behind these traditions and to relegate them to the history of the "forgetfulness of being," which culminates in the era of technology and its "night of the world." Now his notion of the end of philosophy took on a more sweeping and literal gesture. He indeed still looked back to the Pre-Socratics, Hölderlin, and Nietzsche, but this was only in preparation for an other beginning which was not to be found already implicitly and effectively present in the tradition, but rather was to appear sometime in the distant future after a passage through the eschaton, the end of the tradition and the "night of the world."
eschatological bent is thus also utopian in that it sees philosophy as abandoned to the darkness of the "between-time" between the radical "no-longer" of the poetical world of the early Greeks and the distant and unreachable "not-yet" of an other beginning, an other tradition, in which we can learn "to dwell poetically." Like the other aspects of the later Heidegger's bend, his eschatological-utopian bent also, then, has the effect of distancing his thought from the familiar traditions with which he had originally mediated his project for an other genuine beginning. The world about which his later philosophy talks often appears to be literally "nowhere," a "no-place" ("u-topia") which does not exist anywhere in our concrete and familiar experience, but rather is a lost home, a city of being, located somewhere beyond us in an archaic past and a distant future.

Finally, let us consider the later Heidegger's stylistic bent. What I mean here is what I have called the later Heidegger's tendency towards self-installment and self-stylization, i.e., his falling short of his own hermeneutical requirement that the mens auctoris is not the final criterion for interpreting philosophical texts, and his attempt to install his own self-interpretation into his philosophy and thus stylize it. In this respect, we have already seen how he considered his authentic philosophy to be composed of only three major periods, starting with his Being and Time. His early Freiburg period was judged not to belong to his authentic corpus. Rather, he attempted stylistically to relate the genuine origins of his thought back to his very earliest writings, especially his study of Duns Scotus, since it reflects how the later Heidegger wanted to see his philosophy interpreted. The schema of this self-interpretation is thus built right into the structure of his "Collected Edition," the volumes of which begin with his very earliest speculative works and move almost directly into his later works. His early Freiburg lecture courses, which he originally did not plan to have included, have now begun to appear almost at the end of his "Collected Edition" and begin at volume fifty-six immediately after his 1943 lecture course on Heraclitus.
Heidegger hardly left open the possibility of reading his corpus in such a way that his thought in the early twenties is seen as the genuine origin and centre of his philosophy. As we have also seen, this attempt to install his own self-interpretation into his work and to place the meaning of his thought out of reach of interpretation with which he would not agree, is also immediately expressed and colorfully symbolized in the fact that the location of the Heidegger Archives was determined on the basis of the availability of storage bunkers capable of withstanding nuclear holocaust, so that after the "end" Heidegger's manuscripts could be of help in forging a new beginning; that access to the Archives for the sake of scholarly examination of the manuscripts is restricted, both because of the out-of-the-way location and because the doors have been closed to the philosophical community; and that the editorial praxis of Heidegger's hand-picked editors does not involve making known to the reader the interpretive presuppositions in terms which the texts have been prepared, something which would be possible only in a modest "critical edition." Here too, then, the later Heidegger's self-stylizing bent tends to distance and alienate his thought from its existential-phenomenological origin in the early twenties.

In general, we can say that, whereas the young Heidegger was demythologizing western metaphysics, after his later "bend" he tended to re-mythologize his existential-phenomenological question of being in the four ways we have considered, even though the underlying problematic is still the original one of being in and through life. Insofar as this amounts to a definite process of distancing and alienating, we can to a certain extent see Heidegger's bend as a "falling away" or bending away from his existential-phenomenological problematic. This falling away is not a form of what the young Heidegger called "theorization," but rather processes of poetization, speculization, utopization, and stylization. In the light of these, we have to see more specifically that there is a certain amount of "de-worlding" going on in the later Heidegger's notion of the fourfold of earth and sky, gods and
mortals; of "de-living" in his later notion of "poetic dwelling"; and of "de-historicization" in his later notions of "Ereignis" and "destiny." What is missing is the fullness of an existential-phenomenological lexicon, the reality of the factical person, the relationship to familiar traditions, and the openness to being read in the light of these aspects and of still other possible viewpoints. As a result, Heidegger's later thought distances itself not only from its own existential-phenomenological arche, but also is accordingly experienced by its readers as distant and alien. In other words, there is a real hermeneutical problem at work here in understanding the later Heidegger's thought.

The writings of every great philosopher are always to one extent or another distant, strange, ambiguous. Otherwise we would not strive to understand them, to bring the distant near, to make the strange familiar. Tradition is handed down (trahere) simultaneously in the form of a future that comes towards us (Zukunft). The history of philosophy does not drag behind us, but rather stares us in the face like the sphinx that poses a question we must answer. To take an extreme example, consider the relation of Plato and Aristotle to the speculative mytho-poetic tradition of the early Greek thinkers. This tradition stretches only roughly one hundred years into the past before Socrates, but nevertheless already struck Plato and Aristotle as distant, dark, and enigmatic. In Plato's Sophist, for example, we read about the difficulties of Socrates and the Eleatic stranger in their attempt to take up "the question of being" as it was first formulated in the strange ontological story-telling of the wise men of old: "It seems to me that each of them (the old philosophers of being) tells stories, as though we were children." (IP, 19) "Alienness and its conquest"—such is the hermeneutical problem with which all understanding of tradition has to cope. This problem is hermeneutical since it challenges us to transform and make sense of the past in the light of our present understanding, as well as to transform our understanding in light of the claims of the tradition. That a definite
interpretation of early Greek thinking takes place in Plato and Aristotle cannot really be denied.

My contention is that the hermeneutical situation in which we today confront Heidegger's thought is similar to the situation in which Plato and Aristotle confronted the Pre-Socratics. Heidegger died in 1976. His thought already belongs as a classic and authority in the history of philosophy, if not to a great extent already as a lost classic. His renown as a philosopher in contemporary times recalls the fame of the Pre-Socratic "battle of the giants" in the Greek world. In both cases there is a temporal distance separating us by only a few generations from a philosophizing which has the character of a new fundamental beginning that poses the task of its interpretive unfolding (something that has taken over two millennia in the case of the Greek beginning and is still ongoing), but which nonetheless already stands there like "an erratic block of stone" which, in its distance and alienness, stares defiantly into the face of subsequent thinking. Heidegger himself was only too painfully aware of the difficulty of his thought and of the fact that the thinking-further of the matter of his thought was not taking place in the manner he desired:

I hesitate with my answers, for they are necessarily no more than indications. The lesson of long experience leads me to presume that the indications will not be taken up as a directive to follow the way for oneself in order to think out the indicated topic itself independently. One will inform oneself about the indications as an opinion expressed by me. Every attempt to make what has been thought understandable to the prevailing manner of representation must itself assimilate what is to be thought to these representations and thereby inevitably deform the matter.

This preliminary remark is not the lament of someone misunderstood, but rather the recognition an almost insurmountable difficulty of communication. (BR, ix/viii)

Often the reception of Heidegger's thought has split off into two extreme possibilities: adoration or exile, i.e., either piously repeating what has been said or rejecting it as "nonsense" (Ayer) and "humbug and mystification" (Edwards). The one way leads to the sterility of a Heidegger-cult and Heidegger-scholasticism, the other way leads to the emptiness of philosophical bigotry. The one way worships the erratic block of stone, the other way childishly
ridicules it in the hope that it will go away. In both cases, being "for" and "against," one makes oneself foolish, because the stone does not move. Both possibilities are at bottom the same insofar as the content of Heidegger's thought becomes the direct theme without following its "indication." In the one case, it comes to the cult of relics; in the other case, there is the desire simply to smash what one cannot immediately understand.

But, similar to the fate of Heidegger's predecessor Hegel, there are those who see his thought both as "great" and yet as characterized by certain "speculative" and "myth-poetic" strains, which have to be transcended in the ongoing thinking further of his thought. Here one can point to "hermeneutics" and "narrative" (Gadamer, Ricoeur), "critical theory" (e.g., Habermas), "deconstruction" (e.g., Derrida), and "post-analytical" neo-pragmatism (e.g., Rorty). Just as Plato's and Aristotle's critical appropriations of the Pre-Socratics are in a sense interpretive de-mythologizing, so the fruitful appropriations of Heidegger's thought have had the character of de-mythologizing, i.e., interpretively and critically translating his insights from their speculative myth-poetic language into a more concrete, natural language, which can be characterized as existential-phenomenological in a wide sense, and which is inspired to a great extent by the preservation of the problematic and the lexicon of Heidegger's youthful thought. Thomas Sheehan has written: "Anyone who wants first of all to locate Heidegger's topic - what he called die Sache - before submitting it to criticism, has the task of deconstructing Heidegger's own language when it tends towards such hypostasization."17 Again, he writes: "We know how greatly he 'erred'. The question remains about how greatly he thought. The way to answer that question is not to stop reading Heidegger but to start de-mythologizing him."18 De-mythologizing and deconstructing19 does not here have anything to do with the purely negative project of unmasking and rejecting Heidegger's thought as mere fantasy and nonsense, but rather is to taken more in Bultmann's sense of taking the message of past thought out of the historical forms that have grown alien to us and
letting this message speak again in contemporary, relevant language. As such, demythologizing Heidegger is to be understood as contributing to the *Weiterdenken*, the "thinking further" of his thought, which he himself regarded as a necessity. Demythologizing is the magical "open sesame" which can move the later Heidegger's erratic block of stone and let us glimpse its hidden treasures.

The meaning of this demythologizing of Heidegger has been, can be, and should be that of a destructive retrieval of his later thought in the light of youthful texts. This is something which was already attempted in a minimal sense in Chapter One of our study, where we interpreted the later Heidegger's topic and its three moments of "world," "praxis," and "time" with the help of the young Heidegger's investigation of "being-meaning" in terms of the three moments of "content-meaning," "relational meaning," and "enactment-meaning." In the same way, our exposition of the young Heidegger's "genuine beginning" in Chapter Seven was guided to a certain extent by the later Heidegger's notions of "worlding," "dwelling," and "Ereignis." Here we can speak of fusion of horizons between the young and the later Heidegger. But the ultimate task in destructive retrieval is to think Heidegger further in one's own independent philosophizing.

Deconstruction can also be called a kind of de-poeticization, de-speculization, de-utopization, and de-stylization, and regarding the right-wing Heidegger-scholasticism which has tended to solidify the hardening and encrustation of his thought into a dogma, destruction can be called de-scholasticization and de-Heideggerization (in Germany, when someone came under Heidegger's spell and began speaking "Heideggerian," it was said: "Ach, der ist verheideggerisiert!," "Oh, he's been heideggerized!"). Destruction means unbuilding the later Heidegger's mytho-poetic, speculative, utopian, and stylized language and following it as a "formal indication" back to the existential-phenomenological "topic" (Sache) and language of his youthful thought. This means following it back to its "origin." But insofar as origin means here "arche" in the double sense of the "starting point" of Heidegger's thought.
and what "governs" it from beginning to end, the return to the young Heidegger is at the same time a return to the underlying, "youthful" problematic which governs and rules the later Heidegger's three "thought-paths." It was the arche of his existential-phenomenological topic of being in and through life, originating in his youthful period, which was retrieved and unfolded in different directions in his later paths. The original origin still originates in the apparent originality of his later thought.

But destruction is inseparable from retrieval. Retrieval means letting Heidegger's existential-phenomenological origin originate in new, original ways. It means to take "the leap into the driving boat" and getting "the rope for the sail into one's hand and looking towards the wind." It means remaining true to the "youthful" character of his thought by enacting new "youthful leaps." This retrieval would not be an arbitrary activity, but rather would involve following both the young and the later Heidegger's "indications" of the things themselves and fulfilling the empty intentions in a renewed showing and saying of the phenomena. Like his youthful "formal indication," his later expressions such as "it gives," "Ereignis," the "thinging" of things, the "worlding" of the world, the "fourfold," the "truth of being," "only a god can save us," etc. are evocations, incantations, in that they immediately and powerfully evoke a sense of being as a concrete happening. As such, they are indicative and protreptical, their function being to startle and to make us look in a certain direction and begin searching. Suddenly the phenomenon is there, one sees it. But the magical power of these words is also seductive, since the issue is to keep following the pointing and to understand the phenomena as always "on the way to language." And this means on the way to a fuller and existential-phenomenological language, i.e., an open public language in which the phenomena come to a fuller showing and one can communicate more freely and meaningfully with others. The later Heidegger's language is characterized by a fecundity, a virtuosity, and an "infinity of the unsaid" (Gadamer). Its very ambiguity is part of its richness and possibility. To understand
this incantatory language as on the way to a more public, existential-phenomenological language does not mean to reduce it to the latter and eventually to do away with its poetical character. Nothing could be further from the truth, since his evocations work a manifestation of the phenomena which probably could not and perhaps should not be performed in any other way. Rather, the issue is the endless task of fulfilling the evocations. This means being always on the way from the dark and the ambiguous to the agora, the open region of shared discourse which is being worked out. One has to learn to be at home both in the countryside of Heidegger’s “physis” and “shepherds” and in the city of western humanitas. The philosopher has to know his way to the marketplace. But this also means that, as Heidegger put it in the early twenties, to a certain extent “the philosopher must dare to become a father-killer,” where the death of the author, of the mens auctoris, means that our appropriation of his thought is not necessarily confined within his own self-understanding of his work. But this type of reading has nothing whatsoever to do with treating the later Heidegger (to use Marx’s words against Hegel’s critics) as a “dead dog.”

Demythologizing means, therefore, a destructive retrieval of Heidegger’s whole thought in the light of his “original” existential-phenomenological problematic of being in and through life, one which lets this origin become present in different ways and speak again “here and now...in this place, in this lecture hall. You before me, I before you, we with one another.” This is what the young Heidegger called the “enlivening” of philosophical indication, i.e., following the pointing and letting the “it worlds” and the “event” of factual life come to appearance. This would no longer be Heidegger’s “philosophy” as an inert content for scholarship and pedagogy, but rather our “philosophizing.” We will really come to understand Heidegger’s philosophy when we realize that in the end there really is no Heidegger’s “philosophy” to hang onto, to repeat, and to find comfort in, but rather only the pointing out of a way whose direction is open-ended. What Heidegger said in his memorial address for Max Scheler refers equally to his own
philosophy: "...again a path of philosophy fades away, back into darkness." In the end, it is a matter of learning what one can and finding one's own way. The "Feldweg" does not end in Heidegger's hometown, Messkirch, under the quiet little star on his headstone.22 There are other "field-paths," other Messkirches.

We can elucidate what the destructive retrieval of Heidegger's thought in light of his youthful period means with an analogy between this and his own violent readings of Husserl, Aristotle, and Christian thought. The young Heidegger understood these traditions as a hermeneutics of facticity, i.e., factual life bringing itself to language. But in order to get at the genuine, "original" Husserl in his early Logical Investigations, he had to unbuild Husserl's own self-understanding and the reception of Husserl in contemporary literature; in order to get at the genuine Aristotle in his practical writings, he had to dismantle Aristotle's own metaphysical self-understanding and the distorted interpretations of Aristotle in scholasticism and Neo-Kantianism; and in order to get at "original Christianity," he had to dismantle the history of theology. But Heidegger excavated these origins, i.e., the underlying hermeneutics of facticity, in the sense of an arche which was energeia ateles and as such was to be retrieved in his own thought and unfolded in a radically transformed manner. It was a matter of looking at the words and letting the factual life, which had originally brought itself to expression in them, come to language again in renewed interpretation. In the same way, we are proposing to find the genuine, original Heidegger by tracing his thought and the Heidegger-scholasticism built up on it back to Heidegger's underlying, youthful arche, so that the factual life which initially brought itself to expression here and continued to bring itself to expression in his later works (although with a different "bent") can be brought to life again and made to speak in new, original ways. Such philosophizing means lending our own voices to Heidegger's problematic and giving back to it the tongue which he had cut off in no longer mediating his new type of thinking with traditional language. Just as the young Heidegger was
able to hear the concrete realities of "the household" in such an apparently detached word such as "ousia," "essence," "beingness," so we can learn to hear in the his later language not a "Seinsmystik," but rather his original existential-phenomenological topic of being in and through life, i.e., our natural, lived experience. This is the only way to the vox viva of Heidegger's philosophy which is capable of constantly renewing itself.

We can, then, speak of the "originality" of the young Heidegger. This originality means all of uniqueness, starting point, and the origination of Heidegger's later thought. The implications of this are radical, for it means that neither his *Being and Time* nor his later works are the centre of his philosophy. Our understanding of his thought has to be de-centred away from these, since the real centre and the genuine Heidegger is the young Heidegger. But this sense of the originality of the young Heidegger culminates in the sense of originality as the ability of his youthful thought to initiate the independent thinking-further of his whole thought, which he wanted to see take place with the appearance of his *Collected Edition*, his collective "giving-out" of paths for independent work. Here there is much to demythologize, to think further in destructive retrieval. Heidegger's youthful writings are the Rosetta stone for his whole *Collected Edition*. They allow us to mediate the alien, hermetic later language with a language which is already familiar to us. They are a linguistic bridge over which we can go back and forth between the mythopoetic, speculative, utopian, and stylized language of the later Heidegger and our own natural language which is rooted in the humanistic traditions. Ultimately, they are a bridge between a trans-human, cosmological language and a language of humanness, between a language in which being "speaks" and a language in which human being "speaks," between a language which "thanks" and "cares" for being and a language which "thanks" and "cares" for human beings, between a language which speaks of the "death" of being and a language which speaks of the "death" of human beings in the gutters and the concentration camps, between a language which hears
the "call" of being and a language which hears the "call" of human beings to one another. They are the bridge over which we can go towards "urbanizing the Heideggerian province" (Habermas). For the following reasons, they can function as this linguistic bridge, this Rosetta stone, for setting in motion the independent thinking-further of Heidegger's thought: 1) over against the later mythopoetic language, they employ a concrete existential-phenomenological language for talking about the question of being; 2) over against the later speculation about an autonomous cosmological other, they work out a notion of being in a more concrete and personal sense as being in and through (my, our) factical life; 3) over against the later eschatological-utopian bent, they see the question of being as rooted in humanistic traditions; 4) over against the later bent towards self-stylization and self-installment, they have a more radically open character in the notion of "formal indication"; 5) they show that Heidegger originally envisages a closer relationship between ontology and the individual disciplines; 6) as the arche of Heidegger's thought, they point to the underlying existential-phenomenological topic of Heidegger's later thought, a topic which is still effective here in spite of the "bend" in this later thought; 7) their hermeneutical praxis in interpreting the tradition is a model for our own reading of Heidegger. If our study of Heidegger from the vantage point of his youthful thought has any claim to being called an original interpretation, then this should only be understood in the sense of a going back to the origin of his thought for the sake of being of help in triggering a renewed origination in independent thinking-further. It is nothing for itself. Ultimately, it is a study of the young Heidegger in the sense of a way of questioning whose very meaning is that it should never grow old, but remain "young" in constant renewal and transformation.

In the following statement before the Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft in 1986, Gadamer expresses the basic impetus for my own study of Heidegger: "...the world-wide reputation of Hegel was...realized...through the publication of his lectures. Something
similar could happen with Heidegger....one needs to have a lot of courage to admit to oneself that a great man can himself nonetheless underestimate his own radiance and above all the promising richness of his beginnings." This means precisely that Heidegger's philosophy has to be read "with the eyes with which someone reads, who is not him." Just as Hegel has been rediscovered over and over again like a lost classic, so the same kind of ongoing renaissance can happen with Heidegger. We need a Marx or a Kierkegaard for Heidegger. We need a Dilthey for Heidegger in the sense of someone who, similar to Dilthey in his research of the young Hegel in his Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels, can find the living Heidegger in his youthful writings. To a great extent, Gadamer and others are already all these things. For Gadamer, the genuine Heidegger has always remained the one under whom he studied in the early twenties. Along with (or as a corrective to) the recently re-emerging theme of the later Heidegger et le nazisme, which also now has a more solid textual basis from which the issue can be worked out and which can alert us to some of the real problems and dangers of his later thought, the ongoing publication of the young Heidegger's texts will challenge our understanding of his thought, free up new possibilities, and prevent his thought from hardening into a Heidegger-scholasticism. The young Heidegger of the early 1920s can help realize the "young" Heidegger in the sense of a style of thinking that never hardens into the "gray on gray" of doctrine, but remains a "constant beginner."

It was always Heidegger's way to take up a certain line of thought, work out its possibilities, and then move on to other paths. He saw his question of being as affording many different possible paths and thus placed the motto "ways - not works" at the beginning of his Collected Edition, his collective "giving out" of possible paths. That the later Heidegger himself no longer pursued his youthful Husserlian, Aristotelian, and Kierkegaardian paths in the same manner and had moved on to different paths is not a final criterion for judging the possible meaning and richness of his youthful writings. In spite of his own lapses, the last thing that
he wanted was to have the *mens auctoris*, i.e., his own self-interpretation, determining the reader's appropriation of his texts and confrontation with *die Sache selbst*, the matter itself. As interpretive readers of Heidegger's thought, we should take seriously his following statements, since they alert us to the genuine meaning of anything like, for lack of a better word, fidelity to his thought: "Whoever gets involved in the being-underway to the sojourn in the oldest of the old, will bow to the necessity of later being understood differently than he meant to understand himself." (WM, ix) "What is at stake is the awakening of the confrontation about the topic for thinking...and not communicating about the author's mind." (GA 1, 437) "I want no 'following'."26 Heidegger saw the many ways that he had at one time taken up and then left behind as enduring possibilities for independent thought:

Ways of thinking - for which the past (*Verganges*) remains indeed what has past, but for which what has been (*Gewesendes*) persists in coming - wait until at some time thinking goes along them. (VA, 7)27

Exploring his youthful paths, wherever they might lead, lending our voices to the "rumor of the hidden king," and letting it speak again in new and different ways "here and now," would mean realizing for his thought what he in 1919 called the "eternal youth" of thinking - "always turning back anew into the origin, the first spontaneity." (HU, 214) Where the twists and turns of these paths lead is, of course, a question to be decided only in the ongoing appropriation of his great contribution to western thought.
APPENDICES

I

VITA UNTIL 1925-26

1889

Born September 26, son of Friedrich Heidegger (1851-1924), head sexton at Messkirch, and Johanna Heidegger, née Kempf (1858-1927).

1903-1906
Attends Jesuit Gymnasium in Constance.

1906-1909
Attends Jesuit Bertholds-Gymnasium in Freiburg.

1907
Begins reading Franz Brentano’s On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle.

1908
Begins reading Aristotle’s texts and Carl Braig’s On Being: Outline of Ontology.

1909
Begins reading Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations.

1909-1911
Enters the novitiate of the German Province of the Jesuits at Feldkirch, but leaves shortly thereafter for health reasons.

Studies theology in Freiburg, matriculating at both the archdiocesan seminary and the Albert Ludwig University.

1910
Begins reading Nietzsche’s Will to Power, Kierkegaard, Dostoievsky, Hegel, Schelling, Rilke, Trakl, and Dilthey’s Collected Writings.

1910-1911
Publishes an essay on the Augustinian preacher Abraham a Sancta Clara and three poems.

1911-1913
Abandons plans to enter priesthood, but continues attending theological lectures.

Enters faculty of natural science and mathematics.

Studies also philosophy and history.

Reads Emil Lask’s The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories and The Doctrine of Judgment.

Attends Heinrich Rickert’s seminars and lectures.

Publishes book reviews and essays.

1913
Graduation with his doctoral thesis (under Schneider and Rickert) entitled The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism (published in 1914).

Plans his habilitation work on the "Logical Essence of the Concept of Number."

1915
Habilitation in philosophy with his work (under Rickert) entitled The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus (published in 1918).

1915-1917
As lecturer (Privatdozent), teaches philosophy for the Catholic theological faculty.

1916
Husserl receives philosophical chair in Freiburg.

1917-1918
Conscripted into war service.

1919-1923
Loosens his Catholic-philosophical ties.
Becomes an assistant to Husserl.
Begins his pre-occupation with "original Christianity" (Paul, Augustine, Luther, Kierkegaard), Aristotle’s practical writings and Physics, Dilthey, and Husserl’s "Sixth Investigation."

1919-1921
Composes his review-essay "Comments on Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of World-Views."

1922
Plans to publish large work on Aristotle in Husserl’s journal, sending the introduction to Paul Natorp in Marburg.

1923-1925
Associate Professor at Marburg.
Tries unsuccessfully to publish his essay "The Concept of Time."
Friendship with the theologian Rudolpf Bultmann.

1925-1926
Begins his pre-occupation with Kant.
Composes Being and Time (published in 1927 in Husserl’s journal).

II
EARLY FREIBURG AND MARBURG LECTURE COURSES, SEMINARS, TALKS, POEMS, ESSAYS, REVIEWS, AND BOOKS (1910-1925)

Freiburg

1910
Essay Abraham a Sancta Clara. (GA 13)
Poem Dying Splendour. (GA 13)

1911
Poem Hours on the Mount of Olives. (GA 13)
Poem We Shall Wait. (GA 13)

1912
Essay The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy. (GA 1)

1913
Review Kant’s Letters in Selection, ed. F. Ohmann. (GA 1)
Review Nikolai v. Bubnoff, Temporality and Atemporality. (GA 1)

1914
Review Franz Brentano, On the Classification of Psychical Phenomena. (GA 1)
Review Charles Sentroul, Kant and Aristotle. (GA 1)
Review Kant – A Layman’s Selection, ed. F. Gross. (GA 1)
Book The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic. (GA 1)

WS 1915-16
Lecture On the Pre-Socratics: Parmenides. (Missing)
Seminar On Kant’s Prolegomena.

SS 1916
Lecture Kant and 19th Century German Philosophy. (Missing)
Seminar Exercises with Texts from Aristotle’s Logical Writings (with Krebs).
Book The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning
WS 1916-17 Lecture Truth and Actuality: On Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge from 1794. (Missing)

1917-18 Did not lecture, because conscripted into war front service.

WES³ 1919 Lecture The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World-View. (GA 56/57)

SS 1919 Lecture Phenomenology and Transcendental Value-Philosophy. (GA 56/57)

Lecture On the Essence of the University and Academic Study. (GA 56/57)

WS 1919-20 Lecture The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. (In preparation: GA 58)

Lecture The Philosophical Basis of Medieval Mysticism. (Missing or no publication plans)⁴

Seminar Exercises in Connection with Natorp’s General Psychology.


Seminar Colloquium in Connection with the Lecture Course.

1919-21 Essay Comments on Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of World-Views. (GA 9)

WS 1920-21 Lecture Introduction in the Phenomenology of Religion. (Missing)⁵

Seminar Beginners: In Connection with Descartes’ Meditations.

SS 1921 Lecture Augustine and Neo-Platonism. (In preparation: GA 60)

Seminar Beginners: In Connection with Aristotle’s De anima.


Seminar Beginners: Phenomenological Interpretations.

SS 1922 Lecture Phenomenological Interpretations of Selected Aristotelian Writings on Ontology and Logic. (To be published: GA 62)

Seminar Beginners: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

WS 1922-23 Lecture Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy. (Phenomenological Interpretations of Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposeon, III).
Seminar Phenomenological Exercises in Aristotle's Physics, IV and V.
Seminar Beginners: Husserl's Ideas, I.
Essay The Hermeneutical Situation. Intro. to a planned book entitled: Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle.7

SS 1923
Lecture Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity). (GA 63)
Seminar Phenomenological Exercises (Husserl's Logical Investigations, Bd. II)
Seminar Colloquium on the Theological Basis of Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason, according to Selected Passages (with Ebbinghaus).

Marburg
WS 1923-24
Lecture The Beginning of Modern Philosophy (Descartes Interpretation)./Introduction to Phenomenological Research.8 (In preparation: GA 17)
Seminar In Connection with the Lecture Course.
Talk Being-true and Dasein. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Z. (To be published in Division III of GA)

SS 1924
Lecture Aristotle, Rhetoric, II. (Missing)9
Seminar Advanced: High Scholasticism and Aristotle.
Talk The Concept of Time (given before the Marburg theological community). (To be published in Division III of GA)
Essay The Concept of Time. (To be published in Division III of GA)10

WS 1924-25
Lecture Interpretation of Platonic Dialogues (Sophist). (In preparation: GA 19)
Seminar Exercises in the Ontology of the Middle Ages.

SS 1925
Lecture History of the Concept of Time. (GA 20)
Seminar Exercises Concerning Descartes' Meditations.

WS 1925-26
Lecture Logic: The Question Concerning Truth. (GA 21)
Seminar Beginners: Phenomenological Exercises (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason).

III
MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S THEOLOGICAL STUDIES (WS 1909-10 - SS 1911)11

WS 1909-10
Introduction in the Sacred Scripture of the Old Testament. Hoberg, 4 hrs.
Exposition of Paul's Letter to the Romans. Weber, 4 hrs.
General Church History, Part One, with special Consideration of the
post-Nicene Period. Pfeilschifter, 4 hrs.
Theory of Religion. Straubinger, 3 hrs.
Logic. Uebinger, 4 hrs.

SS 1910
Messianic Prophecy. Hoberg, 3 hrs.
Hermeneutics with the History of Exegesis. Weber, 4 hrs.
General Church History, Part Two, with special Consideration of the
16th Century. Pfeilschifter, 6 hrs.
Theory of Revelation and Church. Straubinger, 3 hrs.
Metaphysics. Uebinger, 4 hrs.

WS 1910-11
Introduction in Catholic Dogma; Doctrine of God. Braig, 4 hrs.
Exposition of the Sacred Gospel according to John. Weber, 4 hrs.
General Moral Theology, Parts I-III. Jul. Mayer, 3 hrs.
The Doctrine of Property. Jul. Mayer, 1 hr.
Catholic Canon Law. Part One: Introduction, Sources and Constitu-
tion. Göller, 4 hrs.
General Church History, Part Three, The Age of Enlightenment.
Pfeilschifter, 1 hr.
German Constitutional History from the 18th Century to the Present.
v. Below, 4 hrs. (in philosophical faculty)
History of Medieval Mysticism. Sauer, 2 hrs.

SS 1911
Theological Cosmology: Creation, Preservation, Rule of the World.
Braig, 4 hrs.
Christian Art in the 19th Century and the Present. Sauer, 1 hr.
The Age of the Renaissance (History of the Late Middle Ages).
Finke, 4 hrs. (in philosophical faculty)

IV
MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S MATHEMATICAL, NATURAL-SCIENTIFIC, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (WS 1911-12 – SS 1913)

WS 1911-12
Analytical Geometry of Space. Heffter, 1 hr.
Exercises in Analytical Geometry. Heffter, 1 hr.
Differential Calculus. Loewy, 4 hrs.
Exercises in Differential Calculus. Loewy, 1 hr.
Experimental Physics. Himstedt, 2 hrs.
Inorganic Experimental Chemistry. Gattermann, 5 hrs.
Logic and Theory of Knowledge. Schneider, 4 hrs.
Seminar: Spinoza, Ethics. Schneider.

SS 1912
Algebraic Analysis. Heffter, 3 hrs.
Exercises in Analysis. Heffter, 1 hr.
Integral Calculus. Loewy, 4 hrs.
Exercises in Integral Calculus. Loewy, 1 hr.
Experimental Physics. Himstedt, 5 hrs.
Introduction to Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics. Rickert, 2 hrs.

WS 1912-13
Advanced Algebra. Heffter, 4 hrs.
Theory of Differential Equations. Loewy, 4 hrs.
General History of Philosophy. Schneider, 4 hrs.
Exercises in Problems of Knowledge. Schneider.

SS 1913
The Age of the Renaissance. Finke, 4 hrs.

V

LETTER TO MARTIN GRABMANN (Jan. 7, 1917)\textsuperscript{13}

Dear Professor,

I am very grateful for the sending of your essay and for your kind postcard. I discussed Külpe principally in the "conclusion" of my work, without having thereby come to a decision about the individual problems. It is really too bad that we will no longer get the additional volumes of his Realization, for here his position would have had to prove itself. You rightly attribute much importance to his essay on the categories. The parallels with Thomas appear clearly in your presentation. I have the impression that, in spite of everything worthwhile in his philosophical works, Külpe has not completely extricated himself from the natural-scientific attitude, so that one can well say that the scholastic treatment of the problem is much closer to the heart of the problem than Külpe's modern kind of treatment which works with an indeed more empirical, but still externally applied method. Volume III of your valuable work would be the proper place to express these thoughts emphatically. In my work I have formulated this as follows: The value of scholastic theory of knowledge is based precisely in the fact that it works not natural-scientifically but rather theoretically in terms of meaning. The work turned into an intentionally dense treatment, and much that enticed me and was worked out had to be held back.

To Professor Krebs, who read the work in manuscript, I now and then expressed the regret that I could not yet use Volume III of your History of Scholastic Method. On this occasion, I would like to wish this volume great success, especially since you will here also clarify principles systematically.

A work which I started, a contrast of Thomas and Scotus in relation to logical problems, was cut short by the war. I did not want to include everything in the larger work, since in principle I did not want to get involved with emphasizing historical ties, agreements, and differences. The only goal was merely to lay out the systematic content of scholasticism in a representative type. I know that here I did not avoid the danger of incorporating the so-
called common property of scholasticism into the picture of Scotus' problematic without expressly indicating this. In any case, I am convinced that this common good is no less critically thought out by the individual philosophers than their own theories.

For the most part, I understand very well these flaws in my work, which appear from a historical point of view, but they were not to be avoided with the intentionally new treatment of the material from the point of view of systematic goals, which at first was my sole concern.

You might be interested to know that Husserl found the work informative in a manner with which I can be satisfied. In the same way, Rickert today sees scholasticism with different eyes. But from these circles I can hardly expect a critique of the whole. So it would be even more valuable for me, if you intend to subject the work to a critical review from this point of view. I am convinced that from this I would learn much, and that above all you will be able to do justice to the two-sidedness of the treatment.

Your friendly postcard and a letter from Bäumker are for me the most valuable encouragements for further works in the area of medieval scholasticism and mysticism.

But first I want to arrive at sufficient certainty in systematic problems, something which is directed to a confrontation with value-philosophy and phenomenology from the inside out. However, this requires the possibility of absolute concentration and undiminished strength, of which there can now be no talk.

I will take the liberty of also in the future keeping you up-to-date on my efforts.

With a friendly New Years greeting
Respectfully and gratefully yours
Martin Heidegger

VI

LETTER TO ENGELBERT KREBS (Jan. 9, 1919)14

Dear Professor,

The past two years, in which I have struggled for a fundamental clarification of my philosophical position and have put aside all special scholarly tasks, have led me to conclusions, for which I, standing in an extra-philosophical affiliation, have not been able to ensure freedom of conviction and teaching.

Epistemological insights, extending to the theory of historical knowledge, have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me - not, however, Christianity and metaphysics (these, though, in a new sense).

I believe too firmly - perhaps more than your official colleagues - that I have experienced what the Catholic Middle Ages carries within itself regarding values, and that we are still a long way off from a true evaluation. Instead of any discussion, my phenomenological-religious investigations, which to a great extent
will bring the Middle Ages into play, should give evidence that in the transformation of my basic philosophical position I have not let myself be driven to replacing the objective esteemed judgment of and the deep respect for the Catholic life-world with the angry and coarse polemic of an apostate.

This is why it will also be important for me in future to remain in contact with Catholic scholars who see and admit the problems and are in a position to empathize with different convictions.

It is thus also of special value to me that I do not lose the good of your valuable friendship - and I would like to very warmly thank you for it. My wife, who has lately visited you, and I myself would like to preserve the very special trust shared with you. It is difficult to live as a philosopher - inner truthfulness regarding oneself and in relation to those, for whom one is supposed to be a teacher, demands sacrifices, renunciations, and struggles, which always remain unknown in scientific work.

I believe that I have the inner calling to philosophy and to carry out what stands in my power through its fulfillment in research and teaching for and only for the eternal destiny (Bestimmung) of the inner man, and so to justify my existence and work alone even before God.

Sincerely and gratefully yours
Martin Heidegger

VII
DISCUSSIONS OF CHRISTIAN AUTHORS IN HEIDEGGER’S EARLY LECTURES AND IN “BEING AND TIME”

IP, 5
18
28
65
PW, 134
WU, 207
AJ, 211
40-43
PA, 6-7
24
90
93
154
182
183
HF, 1
5
12
12-13
Matthew, Angelus Silesius
Scholasticism, mysticism, Luther
Catholic and Protestant theology
Book of Moses, I
Schleiermacher, the young Hegel
Jesus
Francis of Assisi
Kierkegaard
Paul, Scholasticism, mysticism, Luther, Melanchthon,
German Idealists (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel),
Dilthey
Kierkegaard
Matthew
Pascal
"Temptation"
Kierkegaard, Luther
New Testament, Augustine, Luther
Luther
Luther, Kierkegaard
Augustine
History of Protestant Hermeneutics
Heidegger’s editorial and hermeneutical praxis in regard to Nietzsche’s texts is another source from which to determine how he wanted his own texts edited and read. During the years when he was delivering his lecture courses on Nietzsche, which later would be presented in his large two-volume work on Nietzsche, Heidegger served as a member (1935-1941) of the commission, “The Society of the Friends of the Nietzsche Archive,” which had been set up to
prepare a historical-critical edition of Nietzsche's writings. He even presented to the society a plan for the publication of Nietzsche's Nachlass. In his lectures courses and in his book on Nietzsche he sketched out the editorial principles which he believed should be applied to Nietzsche's works in order to promote creative appropriation as opposed to mere scholarship.

In the first place, Heidegger insisted on basic standards of philological correctness. He agreed with the other members of the commission that the early Gast-Förster edition of The Will to Power and other early editions based on it had to be corrected through a more comprehensive presentation of the notes, which were to be arranged chronologically and aligned with the various stages of Nietzsche's plans for his major work. When the Propaganda Ministry, having learned of Nietzsche's criticisms of anti-Semitism, claimed the right to oversee the editorial project in 1941, Heidegger resigned from the commission.

But he maintained that the plans for the "historical-critical complete edition," which were developed by the commission, were faulty, because they strove to fulfill what he felt was the empty, nineteenth century philological ideal of publishing "everything that it can find" and expressed the "psychological-biological addiction of our times" by organizing the writings around the biographical facts of "Nietzsche's 'life'". (N 1, 18/9-10) The edition encouraged the "collection of information" and reporting psychologically on the "mind of the author." It inserted an inappropriate interpretation between the texts themselves and the reader. Thus, it only aggravated what Heidegger saw as the major problem prevailing in the reception of Nietzsche: "The confrontation with Nietzsche has neither been begun, nor have the prerequisites for it been created. Until now Nietzsche has either been praised and imitated or slandered and exploited." (N 1, 13/4; GA 43, 274-278; EM, 39/36)

According to Heidegger, after it has been ensured that the basic philological principles have been satisfied, the point is neither to turn out mere expositions of Nietzsche's thought, nor merely "to find fault" (GA 43, 276-277) with Nietzsche, but rather to concretize these two abstract moments in a destructive retrieval of the topic as it came to expression in his thought: "In a genuine grasp and attack on Nietzsche, [one is] to bring to full unfolding what was worked out (das Erwirkte) through him." (EM, 39/36; GA 43, 275) In the following passage in which Heidegger sums up the philological and hermeneutical principles he wanted to see applied to Nietzsche's texts, his own name can be placed alongside that of Nietzsche's, since in his introduction to his own Collected Edition he applies the same principles to his own texts: "But granted that this editing of the preliminary sketches (Vorarbeiten) for the major work, which has been guided by the theme of the will to power, is the best possible one, with this edition we have before us only something posthumous and something added later. What would have come to be out of these preparatory sketches, if Nietzsche [Heidegger] had been able to transform them into his planned major work - this is what no one knows. Nevertheless, what is available
to us today is so essential and rich, and even from Nietzsche’s [Heidegger’s] point of view so definitive, that the prerequisites have been given for what alone is important: actually to think Nietzsche’s [Heidegger’s] genuine philosophical thinking...what remains decisive is to hear Nietzsche [Heidegger] himself, to question with him, through him and so at the same time against him, but for the one single, common, and innermost topic of western philosophy.” (N 1, 32-33/24) See also Heidegger’s rich and comprehensive discussion of how Nietzsche conceived the relationship between the “communication of his doctrine” and his readers in N 1, esp. 285-289/14-18, 283-289/32-36, 403-404/141-142. In a lengthy appendix to his first lecture course on Nietzsche (GA 43, 275-290; cf. N 1, 9-10/xv-xvi, 13/4), Heidegger explains fully the hermeneutical principles of “confrontation” which he applies to his whole Nietzsche interpretation and to all his interpretations of the tradition.

of J. Glenn Gray and Joan Stambaugh. These collections, indiscriminately throwing together both essays and sections from books, abstract Heidegger’s writings from their original titles (e.g., Waymarkers [Wegmarken], Forest-Trails [Holzweger]) and from Heidegger’s own important introductions to these volumes.

This leads to the second point regarding the presentation of Heidegger’s writings in English. Despite the editors’ and translators’ intentions to the contrary, these editor-texts do not sufficiently discourage the temptation to turn Heidegger’s writings into “information” for mere scholarship. Heidegger’s original titles and introductions were intended to drive home the necessity of the creative thinking—further of his thought. Also to be noted in this regard is the practice of including lengthy prefaces, introductions, explanatory notes, epilogues, appendices and indices, which often take the passive reader by the hand and explain the meaning of the text before the reader has a chance to get past the quotations from book reviews on the flyleaf. Moreover, in contrast to the unobtrusive format of the German publishers, who followed Heidegger’s own wishes, the volumes in English translation have been subjected to indiscriminate advertising and marketing techniques, which appeal to the consumption of reading material. Garish colors, gaudy designs, a huge swollen face staring into the clouds, a greek statue painted blue and sitting inside of a geometer’s cube, snapshots of Heidegger—all these things appearing on book covers tend already to interpret the contents of the book as information. See VA, 31/106: “The way in which artificial insemination is handled corresponds with stark consistency to the way in which literature is handled in the sector of ‘culture’. . . . The need for human material underlies the same regulation of preparing for ordered mobilization as the need for entertaining book and poems, for whose production the poet is no more important than the bookbinder’s apprentice.” Cf. HW, 26/40; S, 367-369. See also Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf and Random House, 1964), pp. 412ff. For Heidegger’s working relation with the German publisher of the Collected Edition, Vittorio Klostermann, and for his characterization of the “coming tasks” of publication work in its attempt to prevent the transformation of texts into “a manipulable stock of information,” see ED, 199-201; von Herrmann, “Die Edition der Vorlesungen Martin Heideggers,” p. 155. For Heidegger’s relation to the publisher Max Niemeyer, see his contribution to the Festschrift for the eightieth birthday of Max Niemeyer in SD, 88-90/80-82. For his relation to the publisher Günther Neske, see Günther Neske, “Nachwort des Herausgebers,” in Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, pp. 293-302.

Finally, the prefaces, introductions, explanatory notes, epilogues, appendices, and indexes in many of the English translations tend not only to fixate Heidegger’s writings philosophically biographically within the horizon of the “mind of the author,” but at the same time to insert the editor’s and translator’s heavy-handed interpretation between the text and the reader. Especially in the case of a translation, there is certainly room for modest
and unobtrusive introductions and prefaces to provide "pointers" for reading, and precisely those that are hermeneutically self-conscious and enlighten the reader to, first, the translator’s and the editor’s operative presuppositions and, second, the necessity of the reader’s own appropriation of the text. But introductions and prefaces become presumptuous, when — before being able to get even to Heidegger’s own "Foreword" in each of the four volumes into which Heidegger’s two volume *Nietzsche* has been divided (and which still do not contain the whole of Heidegger’s original work) — the reader has to wade through anywhere between four to seven pages of long philological explanations, a quotation from Saint Jerome, reports about what the translator will do later in his appendix, a long list of personal acknowledgements, a remark about "the strange case of Dr. Heidegger," and the reporting of the translator’s place of residence. After having gone through Heidegger’s text and the translator’s copious footnotes, which sometimes leave only six lines of Heidegger’s own words on the page, the reader is then told what the text means in a thirty to forty page "Analysis," which not only gives an "exposition," but also launches into its own critique. At the very end of the text is a snapshot of the translator staring into the distance. Around two hundred pages of the translator’s own text, not including the snippets from book reviews spread over the flyleaf, appear along with Heidegger’s own text. Heidegger required interpretations and critiques of his texts, but not ones which hoard the text even before it even appears in print. In contrast, the German editor’s epilogue to the almost six hundred page *Sein und Zeit* (GA 2) is only five pages. For the same problem, see also the English translations of *BP; ID; SZ; WP; WH*, 385-426; *ED*, 37-74.

The written word, the book, the work as information, reading "material," and "consumer" item and as pre-packaged within the authoritative interpretation of editors and translators, would be viewed by Heidegger as a modern expression of the metaphysical conception of being as presence, actuality, *energeia*, static finished being-in-work. Ironically, an editorial and publishing praxis deriving from the metaphysical character of the Western tradition has been applied in the publication of writings which no longer stand within that tradition. What is required is reflection on the meaning of the nature of the non-metaphysical "book," "work," "publication," "editor," "translator," and "reader." Heidegger says much, even if not everything, about this in his guidelines for his *Collected Edition*. If all "edition is interpretation," the existing editorial praxis in English translations of Heidegger is bad interpretation. It does not hold Heidegger’s works sufficiently open in a manner which fits their way and topic character. It promotes a scholasticization of the texts. For the hermeneutical character of edition, "giving out" (*editare, Ausgabe*), see Kisiel, "Heidegger’s Early Lecture Courses," p. 33, n. 17. See also Sheehan’s concluding remark in his "Caveat Lector," p. 41: "If Ralph Nader can get General Motors to recall cars, Heidegger scholars might consider asking Harper and Row to recall books."
The editions of Nietzsche's writings, which were available to Heidegger, were philologically incorrect, encouraged mere scholarship, and enclosed the texts within a reductive interpretation. Likewise, in spite of undeniably vast work already done, is Heidegger still awaiting more conscientious English language editorial praxis, translation, publication, and philosophical treatment, which can create the "prerequisites" for thinking with, against, and further than his "preliminary sketches"?
Notes to Introduction


2. The titles (in translation) of Heidegger's lecture courses and one essay which have been published are as follows: Towards the Determination of Philosophy (which contains three lecture courses: The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World-Views, Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value, On the Essence of the University and of Academic Studies) (1919); Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of World-Views (1919-21); Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Introduction in Phenomenological Research (1921-22); Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity) (1923); Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time (1925); Logic: The Question Concerning Truth (1925-26). All translations from these works are my own.

As of 1988, all of Heidegger's so far unpublished lecture courses manuscripts from 1919 to 1926 have been turned over to the respective editors and thus presumably will all be published by the turn of the century. Planned for publication are (in translation): Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1919-20), Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression (1920), Augustine and Neo-Platonism (1921), Phenomenological Interpretation of Selected Aristotelian Texts on Ontology and Logic (1922), The Beginning of Modern Philosophy (1923-24), Aristotle: Rhetoric (1924), Plato: The Sophist (1924-25), Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy (1926). See the publisher's prospectus: Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Stand: Juni 1987 (Vittorio Klostermann). For a complete list of Heidegger's lecture courses and seminars from 1919 to 1926, see my APPENDIX II.

3. See Wilhelm Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," in Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften (Bern: A. Franke AG. Verlag, 1949), p. 75: "It would be possible and indeed a rewarding task to follow up the development of this thought on the various levels of his philosophical interpretations. This task is impeded by the fact that none of these works have been published." See also Otto Poggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Nesse, 1983), p. 351: "Today the number of titles in literature about Heidegger runs into the thousands; however, unfortunately there are still no reliable informative studies of Heidegger's early lectures on the basis of the transcripts and the few preserved manuscripts." See also Thomas J. Sheehan, "On the Way to Ereignis: Heidegger's Interpretation of PHYSIS," in Continental
Philosophy in America, ed. Hugh J. Silverman, John Sallis, Thomas M. Seebohm (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1983), p. 135: "The secret lies hidden in Heidegger’s courses...and, since it is not clear that his Gesamtausgabe will include the early Freiburg courses (1916-1923), the secret may be kept until Heidegger’s Nachlass becomes available."


8. Quoted in Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 351.


15. See Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," p. 75: "...none of these works has been published. But they circulated and circulate today in so many copies that they have had the greatest influence on philosophical research, similar to the works which in antiquity and the Middle Ages were available in only a few copies and nonetheless shaped the face of the times and the future." See also Theodore J. Kisiel, "Heidegger’s Early Lecture Courses," in A Companion to Heidegger’s “Being and Time," ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Phenomenological Research and University Press of America, 1988), p. 24: "From the very beginning of this post-war period [1919-1929], Heidegger’s students made a virtual ‘commerce’ of comparing, exchanging and passing on their notes, and so refining them to the point where certain drafts over the years became prized possessions..."
whose loss, say, in the flight from East to West Germany in the forties and fifties, was deeply felt. Some students attempted to take down the words of the lecture almost verbatim in longhand as it was presented, others tried to summarize as they listened, and still others formulated succinct paraphrases (perhaps from several students' notes) after the hour; some students made an 'official' stenographic record in shorthand and typed it up afterwards in longhand for Heidegger's perusal, others passed on their notes in the original shorthand. Extant Nachschriften from the phenomenological decade...include those composed by Oskar Becker (at the time also Husserl's assistant, on the same level as Heidegger!), Franz Joseph Brecht, Walter Bröcker, Fritz Kaufmann, Hans Leowald, Karl Löwith, Hermann Mörchen, Simon Moser, Fritz Neumann, and Helene Weiss."

17. Theodore Kisiel, "Translator's Foreword" to Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. xix. See also his "Theodore Kisiel," in American Phenomenology: Origins and Developments, ed. Eugene F. Kaelin and Calvin O. Schrag (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), pp. 240–241: "My interest in the overlap of hermeneutics and science in the Heideggerian opus led me early on to try to fill in the gaps in my knowledge of Heidegger's phenomenological decade. (The zealous quest for evidence and documentation, in order to establish the fullest possible context for interpretation, is undoubtedly a throwback to my early scientific training.) In 1974, Ernst Tugendhat, then in Heidelberg, gave me access to the notes on Heidegger's early lecture courses composed by his aunt, Helene Weiss, which reinforced my surmises of the importance of these facets of Heidegger. The excitement generated by the early glimpse into lecture courses which are now in the process of being published led, among other things, to my taking on the onerous task of translating one of them, the course of Summer Semester 1925 on the 'History of the Concept of Time'."

Notes to Chapter One

1. "Everything is way." See also SG, 94: "...ways themselves belong to the topic (Sachverhait)....discussions (Erörterungen) about the way are not merely reflections about method...." Cf. WM, 291/261-262.

2. See also the motto and opening line of the introduction to Heidegger's Collected Edition, which could also be titled "Collected Paths": "Ways - not works." "The Collected Edition should in a myriad fashion show: a being-under-way in the way-field (Wegfeld) of the changing questioning of the ambiguous question of being." (GA 1, 437-438) See also the titles of Heidegger's two collections of essays: Forest-Paths (Holzwege) and Waymarkers (Wegmarken).

3. "The same (das Selbe) is not the identical (das Gleiche). In the identical difference disappears. In the same difference appears. It appears all the more pressingly, the more decisively thinking is concerned with the same topic in the same way." "...when we speak of a universality, we have thought of being in an inappropriate way. We represent being in a way in which it, being, never gives itself....There is being only now and then in this and that historical character: Physis, Logos, Idea, Energie, Substantiality, Objectivity, Will, Will to Power, Will to Will." (GA 44, 221)

Cf. SD, 61/55; N 1, 457-458/192-193

5. See PA, 157 (1921-22); SZ, 576-577/487-488 (1927); SD, 38/36 (1989).

6. See PA, 12, 31, 56; SZ, 37/50, 3/21, 577/487-488; SD. As we shall see in Part Two, Heidegger uses the terms Sache, Ort and Weg even in the earliest writings between 1912 and 1916, but here they have a decidedly metaphysical meaning.

7. Cf. 4/4, 58/54, 67/61; ID, 107, 111-112/45-46; WM, 336/216; N 1, 9/xx. Heidegger plays also on the other nuances of the word Sache: 2) "task," "goal," "aim" ("Sache means that with which thinking has to do, in Plato's language to pragma auto (cf. Plato, Seventh Letter, 341 c 7).") (SD, 67/61, 61/55; WM, 313/193); 3) "care" (ID, 107; SD, 4/4; WM, 343/222; MP, 22/23, 82/83; SZ, 16 n. a, 56 n. c, 179 n. a.); 4) "the matter itself" (die Sache selbst) (SZ, 37/50; SD, 47-48/44-45, 67-68/61, 88-89/81-82; VS, 286/10; BR, ix/vii; ED, 77/5); 5) "primal matter" (Ur-sache) (SD, 72/65; GA 43, 276-277; SZ, 35/59); 6) "event" (Tat-sache); 7) "place," "property," "estate." Cf. Grimms' Deutsches Wörterbuch under Sache.

9. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, "Introduction: Heidegger, the Project and the Fulfillment," in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1981), p. vii: "Bergson has written that every great philosopher thinks only one inexhaustible thought and spends his whole life trying to express it: Et c'est pourquoi il a parlé toute sa vie. Over the half-century of his professional life, Martin Heidegger liked to insist that his thought was focused on one topic only and this topic was utterly simple. But defining and articulating that simple topic, die Sache selbst, has proven to be no easy matter for either Heidegger or his commentators." See also his "Getting to the Topic," in Radical Phenomenology, ed. John Sallis (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978), p. 302: "I suggest the employment of a heuristic device to designate what Heidegger was after. Let us call it simply 'the topic' (as in the phrase 'Get to the Topic!' - 'Zur Sache selbst!'), and only later shall I enlist words like Ereignis, physis or aletheia to explicate it." 10. SZ, sect. 6; WP, 70-72/73-74; S, 337.
12. See Parmenides, fr. 1; Plato, Republic, 508 c (en to noeto topo, "in the intelligible topos") (WH, 161/95). oustia (being, presence) also means "estate" or "homestead." (EN, 65/61) kategorija, which for Aristotle is always category of "being," originally means an "accusation" in an open public place (agora). (WH, 253/232; N 2, 71ff./36ff.)
13. SD, 61-62/55-56; N 1, 448-462/184-197.
14. See also Heracleitos, fr. 32: "That which is wise is one; it is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus."
15. "The dwelling-place (ethos) of man is the divine." (Heracleitos, fr. 119; WH, 356/234)
16. See Parmenides. fr. 3: "Pure perceiving (noein) and being are the same."
18. SZ, 80-84/86-90, 204ff./135ff.; N 2, 76/40.
19. See also WP, 80/61, 86/69: "Astonishment, as pathos, is the arche of philosophy. We must understand the Greek word arche in its fullest sense. It names that from which something starts out (ausgeht). But this 'from which' is not left behind in the process of starting out, but rather the arche becomes what the verb archein expresses - what governs or reigns. The pathos of astonishment does not simply stand at the beginning of philosophy, as, for example, the washing of the hands precedes the surgeon's operation. Astonishment carries and pervades or reigns through philosophy." "The tuning of confidence to the absolute certainty of knowledge which is attainable at all times is pathos and thus the arche of modern philosophy. However, on what does the telos, the completion of modern philosophy depend, if we may speak of such. Is this end determined by an other tuning?" In N 1, 451-452/187-188, 470/206, Heidegger discusses the notion of arche in the context of the first "beginning" of western philosophy and his own other beginning. See also SZ, 29-30/43-44, 14-15/30-31; N 2, 399ff./1ff., 458ff./55ff., 48ff./75ff; VA, 41ff./84ff. For a comprehensive exposition of
Heidegger's notion of "beginning," see Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), Ch. 3.

20. As we shall see in Part Three, Heidegger's articulation of his being-question into these three moments goes as far back as his youthful writings, where he distinguishes "being-meaning" (Seinssinn) into "content-meaning" (Gehaltssinn), "relational meaning" (Bezugssinn) and "enactment-meaning" (Vollzugssinn). These three moments are expressed in various ways in Heidegger's later writings, but he mostly expresses them as "world," "dwelling" and "temporality" or "truth." Beginning with their expression in Heidegger's youthful writings, Thomas Sheehan has also used these three moments in his interpretation of Heidegger's entire thought. See his "Introduction: Heidegger, the Project and the Fulfillment," pp. vii-xx.

21. See SZ, 202/193-194: "And if we question after the meaning of being, our investigation does not then become deep and profound, nor does it brood over what stands behind being. Rather, it questions after being itself insofar as it enters into the intelligibility of human being-there. The meaning of being can never be contrasted with beings or with being as supporting 'ground', because 'ground' is accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness." See also SZ, 8/26: "What is questioned after...is being, that which determines beings as beings, that on the basis of which beings are at any time already understood, however much we may discuss them in detail. The being of beings 'is' not itself a being."

22. See Plato, Republic, II; Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, i.

23. See SM, 153ff./144ff.; HW, 28ff./40ff.


25. See ED, 9-13/122-125; 87-90/33-39, 113-116; SM, 41/55; W, 31-35. As we shall see in ch. 2, here Heidegger's own rural origins serve as model for his later thought.

26. See ERLÄUTERUNGEN ZU HÖLDERLINS Dichtung. (GA 4)

27. See HW, 268ff./91ff.


29. See ED, 185-198.

30. See WH, 331/211: "The "question of being" always remains the questioning after beings. The question of being is still not at all what its elusive name indicates: the questioning after being....It thinks from beings and towards beings with a passage through a view on being."

31."...if 'nothing is new under the sun' means there is only the old within the inexhaustible transforming power of the origina­ting (das Anfängliche), then the statement hits upon the essential presencing of history. History is the arrival of what has been." (GD, 35/48-49) Cf. WH, ix; ED, 82/10; US, 96/10.

32. For the notions of "model" and "counter-tradition" see Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 28ff.; "Die ethisch-politische Dimension der hermeneutischen Philosophie," in Irving Fetscher, Gerd-Günther Grau, Karl-Heinz Itting and Otto Pöggeler,

33. See the "Introduction" to Heidegger's Collected Edition. (GA 1, 437)

34. When Heidegger uses this phrase, he usually distinguishes "being" (Sein) from the "beingness" (Seiendheit) of "beings" (des Seienden). In order to stress the distinction, sometimes he uses the archaic spelling Seyn (WM, 124, n. a) or puts an X over Sein (WM, 411/81). In 1966 he said that "I no longer like to use this word" (S, 20/8), and by then he had for the most part dropped the word from his vocabulary. One of the last few books that Heidegger published bears the simple title: Towards the Topic of Thinking (Zur Sache des Denkens) (1969). Cf. Sheehan, "Introduction: Heidegger, the Project and the Fulfillment," p. vii: "It is a truism to say that the subject matter of Heidegger's thought is the 'question of Being' (die Seinsfrage), but like most truisms this is both correct and potentially misleading. Indeed, it could be argued that we might enhance the explanation of Heidegger's subject matter by retiring the terms 'Being' and the 'question of Being' from the discussion."

35. See also WM, 327-328/207-208. Cf. Thomas J. Sheehan, "Heidegger: From Beingness to Time-Being," Listening, 9 (1974), pp. 22-23: "Out of insights such as these, which Heidegger developed in preliminary form over some twenty years (1907-1927), there was born the way of thought which Heidegger calls the 'reversal' (die Kehre). The reversal is not to be reduced to the de facto shift in emphasis within Heidegger's work from 1930 on, that became most clear with the 'Letter on Humanism' (1947) and that has given rise to so much discussion of an 'earlier' and a 'later' Heidegger. Rather, the reversal is the overarching movement of Heidegger's whole life's work. It is the step back out of metaphysics and its reflections on Beingness as stable Presentness into the claim that the Time-Being makes on man's essence. In its earliest form the reversal was thematized as a 'foundational ontology' wherein Being, its characteristics, modes and derivations were to be shown to be determined out of Time." See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," pp. 14ff.; Reinhart Maurer, "From Heidegger to Practical Philosophy," Idealistic Studies, 3 (1973), p. 135.

36. See also WM, 328/208, 335/215: "The section in question [the third division of the first part of Being and Time] was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turn.... The turn is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the attempted thinking first arrives in the location of the dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced.... "When philosophy attends to its essence it in no way strides forward. It walks on the same spot in order to constantly think the same. Progression, that is, forward from this place is a mistake which follows thinking as the shadow which it itself casts."
37."It only attempts to say something to the present which was already said a long time ago precisely at the beginning of philosophy and for that beginning, but is not explicitly thought."

38.See Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," p. 16: "Whenever I have said anything about the later Heidegger, I have always stressed: the turn has been something ongoing for Heidegger. Here I believed myself able to call upon the alemanian meaning of turn: on the way up a mountain the way turns back on itself...Heidegger would probably have been the last one to describe his ways as leading to a goal....in his 'Contributions to Philosophy'...Heidegger associates various structural analogies with the notion of the turn, even the hermeneutical circle and all forms of circularity. So it appears to me that my basic tendency was right: one moves further, even when one in truth turns back, is in a circle, goes round in circles, in which one again and again turns back to himself. The tendency to 'back' is probably the genuine model with which Heidegger began to speak of the turn."


41.SD, 47/44; WH, 357/235; BR, xv/xiv; S, 335, 345.

42."...we must acknowledge the fact that theletis, un concealment in the sense of the clearing of presence, was straight away and only experienced as orthotes, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from un concealment to correctness, is also untenable." (SD, 78/70)

43."Now I will attempt to give a few pointers for the treatment. The impression should be avoided that this concerns the presentation of dogmatic theses from a Heideggerian philosophy, which does not exist." (PT, 69/23) See also VA, 7: "If he comes up in the world, an author on thought-paths can only point (weisen) without himself without being a wise man (Weiser) in the sense of the sophos."

44."This type of thinking holds itself this side of every distinction between theory and praxis. In order to understand that, we must learn to differentiate between way and method. In philosophy there are only ways; opposed to this, in the sciences there are only methods, that is, procedures." (S, 398) See also US,
105/21: "But the way there cannot be staked out according to a plan like a street....We have a rich experience [of the nature of thought-paths]; only it has not been reduced to the form of a conceptual methodology, which destroys the moving force of the steps of thinking."

45. See also SZ, 49/60-61: "Every phenomenological concept and proposition drawn from primordial sources has, as a communicated assertion, the possibility of degeneration. It is repeated in an empty understanding, loses its indigenous character and becomes a free-floating thesis....And the difficulty of this research lies in making it critical against itself in a positive sense." Cf. 36/49; 576-577/487-488.

46. See also ID, 107: "But the dispute about this disputed matter is in no way at first started through thinking. The topic for thinking is in itself the disputed matter of a dispute."

47. Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 355. The indicated work is Pöggeler's Heidegger und die Hermeneutische Philosophie (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1983), which attempted to apply Heidegger's thought directly to various questions in particular disciplines (nature, praxis, virtue, history, poetry, the religious). Pöggeler comments: "However, regarding those systematic themes I came to see that what I had in view could not presented in direct connection with Heidegger...But both are of importance: to catch sight of the forms of stimulus which can go out from Heidegger's thinking, and to distance oneself from this stimulus and find one's own path."

48. See also the following passages: "If in thinking there were already adversaries (Widersacher) and not mere opponents, then it would stand more favorably for the topic of thinking." (ED, 77/5) "[Conversation] cheers to companionable reflection. This neither parades polemical opinions, nor tolerates complaisant agreement." (ED, 78/6) "...what is needed is to toil as was done in the past, so that through unrelenting attempts a region is prepared for what-is-to-be-thought since ancient times, but is still unthought....If he were this, an author would have nothing to express and nothing to communicate. He would never want to stimulate anyone, since those who are stimulated are already certain of their knowledge." (VA, 7) "'Introduction to Metaphysics'" means accordingly: a leading into the questioning of a fundamental question. But questions and especially fundamental question do not simply occur like stones and water. There are not given like shoes and clothes and books. Questions are only in the way they are actually asked. A leading into the questioning of the fundamental question is thus not a path to something that lies and is situated somewhere, but rather this leading-to must first awaken and create the questioning. The leading is a questioning going-in-advance, a pre-questioning (Vor-fragen). This is a leading for which there is essentially no following. When such a thing becomes current, for example, in a school of philosophers, questioning is misunderstood....But the best technical ability can never replace the genuine power of seeing and questioning and saying." (EM, 22/19-20, 10/8, 13/11) "As a student read out a protocol full of [Heideg-
...Thus, Gadamer can be especially proud of this answer, he received an almost bad-tempered answer: 'I already know what I have written, I want to know what you have to say about it.' (quoted in Walter Biemel, "Erinnerungen an Heidegger," Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 1 (1977), p. 2) Thus, Gadamer can say of Heidegger that he was "student-less," even though he had many followers. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Einzug in Marburg," in Neske, Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, p. 111. In a conversation in Heidelberg in July, 1987 with the author, Gadamer stressed how those students who Heidegger thought had any philosophical calling were pushed away and told to "find their own way," as Gadamer himself, for example, was. The others were used as assistants in, for example, the editing of the volumes of the Collected Edition. For the "heideggerization" of the German students, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophische Lehrjahre: Eine Rückschau (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 212-217/46-50.

49. See also ID, 107: "The conversation with a thinker can deal with only the topic itself. 'Sache', 'topic' means the contested case, something disputed, which for thinking is the only case that concerns thinking."

50. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Gibt es auf Erden ein Mass?" Philosophische Rundschau, 31-32 (1984-85), p. 161: "To think Heidegger further is the task of all those who have received from him a true stimulus of thought and are not satisfied with repeating his thoughts within his own language." See also his Heideggers Wege, p. 89: "...Ways - not works. Ways are there to be walked upon, to be left behind and to bring you forward; they are not something static on which you can rest or to which you can refer. The language of the later Heidegger is a constant breaking up of habitual phrases, a charging of words with a new, elemental pressure that leads to explosive discharges. This language establishes nothing. Therefore, all of the almost ritualistic repetition in the diction of the later Heidegger, as it is also frequently found among his disciples, is entirely incommensurate." (cf. 73) See also Werner Marx's comprehensive discussion of the nature, difficulties and possible areas of "Weiterdenken" in his Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 243-256, and in his article "Hermeneutics and the History of Being," in Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, ed. Hugh J. Silverman and Don Ihde...
(Albany: State University of New York, 1985), pp. 79-81. Heidegger's introduction to the *Collected Edition* has been taken up as the manifesto for the journal *Heidegger Studies*, but the critical element is here not sufficiently expressed in its call to "thinking further." See "By Way of Introduction," *Heidegger Studies*, 1 (1985). More in line with Heidegger's demand for "confrontation" are Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann's essay "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers in seiner Gesamtausgabe letzter Hand," *Heidegger Studies*, 2 (1986), pp. 166-171, and especially John D. Caputo's "Time and Being in Heidegger," *The Modern Schoolman*, 50 (1973), pp. 339-340, 348-349: "There is no final formulation of the question of Being; much less any final response to it. Heidegger has continually reworked his thought, indeed to an almost scandalous extent. Clearly, he regards his thinking as subject to critique, in fact, to endless critique. To criticize is to adhere ever more faithfully to the subject matter. The very title of this book [*Towards the Topic of Thinking*], as we have seen above, is a plea to engage in thinking and not only in textual exegesis. For there is no philosophy of Heidegger." "Our questioning is conducted within a concern for the subject matter - for that is the meaning of an 'immanent critique'....His work is not continued and kept 'underway' by an unservying allegiance to 'Heidegger's philosophy'." Sheehan and Pöggeler have also strongly expressed the need for critical *Weiterdenken*. See Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, pp. 7-15, 355; Sheehan, "Getting to the Topic," pp. 302-303; Thomas Sheehan, "On the Movement and Destruction of Ontology," *Monist*, 64 (1981), pp.534-535. See especially Sheehan's "On the Way to *EREIGNIS*," p. 163: "...the meaning of being is questionableness itself....The meaning of being, as Richardson has said, is not a doctrine to be learned but a risk to be taken....For all the information that they provide, Heidegger's works remain a protreptic....To heed that protreptic is to enter upon a path with no goal....For those who finally want more, this is not very much....being itself remains a path that leads only to more path...."

51. See von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Martin Heideggers," p. 168: "The motto [for the Collected Works]...reads 'ways - not works'. The author understands each of the writings collected together in this edition as an open way of thinking as opposed to a closed finished work."

52. "The movedness of movement is *energeia ateles*, the standing in work which has not yet come into its end." (WM, 291/282) For the importance of this Aristotelian notion for understanding Heidegger's thought, see Sheehan's comprehensive discussion in his "On the Way to *EREIGNIS*," p. 150ff.

53. Quoted in Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heidegger*, p.353: "You have meanwhile no doubt seen Gadamer's book. Regarding what is correct about the relationship of my thinking to Husserl, a few crude errors have arisen, which can be put aside of course only through careful philological work. Landgrebe's 'edition' of *Experience and Judgement* has had a disastrous effect." See also S, 427: "It would be a misunderstanding if you believed that I would
evaluate philology negatively."

54. "What is important is to encounter the topic itself with the interrogated text and to be concerned with it. Therefore, the text is only a means and not an end." See also the following passages: "Such schools can exist only in the domain of scientific and technical work. Here everything is organized according to successive levels and stages. This work also belongs necessarily to philosophy and today has been lost. But the best technical ability can never replace the genuine power of seeing and questioning and saying." (EM, 22/20) "Only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of the existence which has-been-there, and because the latter exists factically in a way which is world-historical, can it demand of itself that it takes its orientation inexorably from the 'facts'. Accordingly this factual research has many branches and takes for its object the history of tools, of work, of culture, of spirit and of ideas....If the historian 'projects' himself into the 'world-view' of an era, he has not yet thereby proven that he understands his object in a genuine and historical way, and not merely 'aesthetically'. And, on the other hand, the existence of a historian who 'only' edits sources, may be characterized by a genuine historicality." (SZ, 522-523/447-448)

55. See ED, 111: "What does reading (Lesen) mean? The supporting and leading character in reading is gathering. What does it gather? What is written, what is said in the writing. Genuine reading is the gathering of what has already addressed our essential being without our knowing, be it that we respond (entspricht) to it or deny (versagt) it. Without genuine reading we are not even capable of seeing how things look to us, and beholding what appears and what seems." See also VA, 201/61: "The lesen, gathering, better known to us, namely the reading of something written, remains but one kind of gathering, in the sense of bringing-together-lying-forth, although it is indeed the predominant kind." Finally, see S, 426-428: "Why do you tie the presentation of your own thinking to the interpretation of texts?....HEIDEGGER:.....In my 30-35 years of teaching I have only once or twice spoken of my own concerns. I have never delivered a so-called systematic lecture, because I did not dare, since I believed that we...first need to learn how to read. This quite simple concern, to learn how to read, the word of the thinkers and poets - it is this simple pre-school which, taken in a wide view, should prepare for what I would like to say....And thus I too pursue philology." In interpreting "reading" as "gathering" or "collecting," Heidegger revives the archaic meaning of the German and Greek words for reading, lesen and legein/epilegein, which can still be heard in Heraclitus' cosmic logos and in Aristotle's understanding of "statement" as "synthesis," a placing-together. Thus, our English word "anthology" does not mean "the science of flowers," but a gathering, a bouquet (legein) of flowers (anthos) and, analogically, a collection of poems or any writings. Similarly, our "reading" derives from the Indo-European stem *(a)re, to join, to fit together (cf. "articulate"), a meaning which survives in our usages: to gather that...."
to gather something from one’s reading, to gather (draw) it up into a conclusion, into a statement, etc. Heidegger is here interested less in describing a historical reality in the past than in exploring the possibilities of the Greek and German languages to point towards the practical and kinetic character of the reading and understanding of linguistic meaning as a dynamic “emergence” (physis), and away from reading as the passive, static decoding of present at hand signs pointing to present at hand meanings. Reading always gathers up the text and articulates it within an interpretation. With the same interests in mind, Heidegger also explores the Greek philosophical synonyms of λέγειν: “letting something appear from itself” (apophainesthai) and “unconcealing” (aletheuein).


61. See ED, 18: “…the sciences constantly and, so it might appear, must inexorably strive after ‘technization’ and ‘organization’ (cf., for example, the character and role of international congresses)....” Cf. S, 432-433. See also the following letters which Heidegger sent to the participants of various conferences on his thought: "It would bring me the greatest satisfaction if at once - in the first moments of the symposium - the discussion succeeded in being directed purely and decisively towards the topic. There would then develop a colloquium on the question of being, instead of a 'Heidegger-symposium'." (BF, 13/17) “Has the question posed in Being and Time regarding the ‘meaning of being’ (as being) been at all taken up as a question?” (BS, 9/10) "It would already be enough and beneficial, if every participant would devote his attention to [the] question in his own way and took it up as a stimulus for his own field of work." (BT, 2/4)


63. See von Herrmann, “Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers,” p. 167: "Heidegger's intention was to awaken a confrontation over the question of being through the Collected Edition. This desire to awaken and to give direction is the basis from which he made his decisions concerning the directives given for the Collected Works."
Some of the student lecture transcripts worked over by Heidegger (especially Simon Moser's from the Marburg period) were adopted by him as his own word and used as his working copies for the preparation of subsequent lectures. Other unadopted transcripts (e.g., those of Hermann Morchen, Helene Weiss and Oskar Becker) are also available to the editors of the Collected Edition, who have begun to publish them under the respective name of the student when Heidegger's own lecture manuscript is missing (e.g., in GA 56/57). In order to insure the "readability" of the text, Heidegger left instructions that transcripts authorized by him were to be used to fill lacunae and sometimes even replace sections in extant manuscripts, which, for example, often do not include Heidegger's lengthy extemporations. But the editors are now also using unadopted student transcripts for this purpose. Sometimes extemporations recorded in the student notes, for example, the mention of Aristotle's notion of *phronesis* at the close of the SS 1925 lecture, are ignored. Sometimes sentences, paragraphs and whole sections are moved to a different place in the manuscript. Since the Collected Edition, following Heidegger's wishes to deflect mere 'scholarship', does not provide even a simple and relatively inconspicuous historical-critical apparatus, the reader does not know when he is reading Heidegger's own lecture manuscript and when he is reading from the student notes, when he is reading Heidegger's original manuscript and when he is reading Heidegger's later insertions, or whether he is reading everything either written in Heidegger's manuscript or delivered orally and recorded in the student notes. Concerning this what some have called a "scandal" in which Heidegger's wish for an "edition from his own hand" (Ausgabe letzter Hand) "without interpretation" is ironical in light of the heavy-handed co-authorship of the interpreted "editor-texts," and completely fails to see that in the first place all "edition is interpretation," see von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers", pp. 153-172; Busche, "Wie lesbar darf ein Philosoph sein?"; Sass, "Heideggers Konzept der Phänomenologie," pp. 70-75; Sheehan, "Caveat Lector: The New Heidegger," pp. 39-41; Dahlstrom, "Hermeneutische Fragen an Heideggers Gesamtausgabe," pp. 189-196. See in particular Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," esp. 33, n. 17: "Editorial responsibility dictates acknowledgment of the interpretation (and the consequent possibility of misinterpretation) that already occurs in the initial editing of these texts, in the numerous minor and sometimes major decisions with regard to, for example, the 'expansion', 'abridgments' and 'transpositions' that Heidegger himself foresaw as necessary in the editing of his lecture courses. It is therefore incredible to me that a hermeneutically astute philosopher like Heidegger could have even coined the phrase 'edition without interpretation' to characterize his Gesamtausgabe....'edition is interpretation'." See also his "Theodore Kisiel," in _American Phenomenology: Origins and Developments_, ed. Eugene F. Kaelin and Calvin O. Schrag (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 240-241: "It became transparently clear to me at first hand how faulty and improper presuppositions tactlessly applied can lead to misinterpretation in the many major
sentences, paragraphs, etc. ... Simply on hermeneutic grounds, it is moreover a serious and ultimately indefensible obstacle posed to the reader of Heidegger, especially in view of the fluid 'underway' nature of his thought, on the part of the literary executors of the Collected Edition not to allow editors and especially translators the freedom to explain to the reader the presuppositions by which they understand and interpret their particular work in an Introduction to that work. That should be of particular concern to native American phenomenologists and scholars whose ingrained sense of freedom has to be offended by this undue infringement upon their freedom to develop and control their own hermeneutic situation for the reception of Heidegger in the Anglo-American world."

As an attempted justification of the notion of an "edition without interpretation," the above-cited essay by von Herrmann, the main editor of the Collected Edition, reports on the condition of the surviving manuscripts and student transcripts, as well as summarizing the directions left behind by Heidegger for the editing and how these directions are being applied in present editorial praxis. Most critics of the Collected Edition admit that 1) given the strict, even if at times ambiguous guidelines that Heidegger laid down before his death, the freedom given the editors is minimal in comparison to that enjoyed by, for example, Husserl's assistants and "the friends of the eternal one" in the case of Hegel; 2) we are getting a look at many hitherto unpublished lectures at a very fast tempo, and a critical edition would take fifty to a hundred years to complete; 3) the lectures, especially those in the 1820s, are an important hermeneutical key for unlocking the often virtually impenetrable language of the later Heidegger's highly crafted and stylized 'books'.

65. Reported in the 1987 prospectus from the publisher, Vittorio Klostermann.

66. See von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers," p. 187-188: "In a threefold 'not' Heidegger tells us towards whom the edition is not directed: 1. not towards those who take what is thought in the writings merely as the communication of the mind and opinion of the author; 2. not towards those who are out to characterize the philosophical standpoint of the author of this edition; 3. not towards those who, as historians, are concerned only with the insertion of author in the series of other historically fixable philosophical standpoints.

Heidegger rejects these three readers, because they approach the writings gathered together in the edition with an underlying attitude, which from the start excludes them from the possibility of a thinking co-enactment (Mitvollzug). Through this type of approach what holds itself in being-underway, and this means in enactment, is brought to a standstill and investigated like a present at hand stock of material. According to their underlying attitude, the three rejected readers are directed towards the acquisition of information... But the acquisition of information - be it ever so serious and scholarly - remains 'without importance' for preparing the reader for getting involved in the topic of
thinking, which is what Heidegger desired with his edition." For an example of the excess to which philology can go, see the 500 page volume which indexes each and every textual change in the various editions of Being and Time: Rainer A. Bast and Heinrich P. Delfosse, Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers "Sein und Zeit", Bd. I (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980).

67. See von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers," p. 169-170: "Edition without interpretation. In an edition from the author's own hand it must not be the editor who first turns to the reader, before the author himself gets a chance to speak. In such an edition there belongs above all no interpretation given by the editor. Rather, the texts should speak immediately and for themselves. However, interpretation as such is not thereby rejected, as if Heidegger wanted no interpretation of his writings whatsoever. In his decision not to allow the volumes of the Collected Edition to be accompanied by any interpretive explanation from the editor, Heidegger was quite aware that every reading appropriation of his writings can happen only on the path of an interpretation, and this is something which Heidegger also welcomed in his sketches for the uncompleted foreword [to the edition]. With his directive to edit the volumes of the Collected Edition without an interpretive and explanatory addition, he wanted precisely not to hinder the interpretation of his writings....On the contrary, he understood very well the essential hermeneutical situation that encounter with a text is interpretation, and that this is determined through fore-having, fore-sight and conceptual fore-grasp. Thus, he decided that his texts in the Collected Edition should be placed before the reader in such a way that the reader is not tied down to an already given interpretation, led and perhaps misled by them....In Heidegger's decision to make his texts directly accessible to the reader, the phenomenological insight and requirement 'To the things (Sachen) themselves' is applied. In this case the 'thing', the 'matter' (Sache) is the text, which shows itself in itself and from itself only when it is allowed to reveal itself freely and without hindrance in an active letting be seen ....What at first glance appears as a disparagement of someone else's different interpretation (Fremdinterpretation) of his own works, proves to be, after a little reflection, a decision for the sake of different appropriation and interpretation by others (Fremdeigneung und Fremdauslegung)." See also p. 171: "The absence of an index in the volumes of the Collected Edition is intended to force the reader into the undoubtedly more laborious task of reading through the whole text before he quotes this or that from it. During the reading he has the possibility of setting up a register for his own purposes."

68. See my APPENDIX VIII.

69. See also SD, 51/48: "...in France the impression was widely predominant that Heidegger's thinking was a recapitulation- as a deepening and an expansion - of Hegel's philosophy....With the help of these correspondences once could, so to speak, set up a table of concordances and thus find out that Heidegger says approximately the same as Hegel. But this whole view presupposes
that there is such a thing as Heidegger's philosophy."

70. See the following relevant passages: "Presumably it is a way in the determining of the topic of thinking. This determining brings nothing new. For it moves in the face of the oldest of the old. It requires the residence in the constantly sought sameness of the same. The way in this residence prohibits describing it as something present at hand. Those who endeavour to attain it are aided only by the unrelenting effort to place in discussion (to find it at its place) what the word 'being' once uncovered as what-is-to-be-thought, what one day it will perhaps cover over as something thought." (WM, ix) "Corresponding to the being of beings indeed remains constantly our abode or residence. But only at times does it become a comportment which is genuinely taken up by us and unfolded.... corresponding to the being of beings is philosophy, but not until, and only when, corresponding is enacted genuinely, thereby unfolds itself and develops this unfolding." (WP, 74/75) "...we must ask whether what is entertained under the rubrics 'truth', 'certainty', 'objectivity' and 'reality' has the slightest bearing upon the direction in which revealing and lighting point thought. Presumably, the thinking that goes in such a direction has more at stake than a securing of objective truth in the sense of valid propositions.... we know too much and believe too readily ever to become at home in a truly experienced questioning. For that we need the ability to wonder at the simple, and to take up this wonder as our abode.... The following remarks lead to no results. They point toward the event." (VA, 250-251/103-104) "Since being is never the only merely actual (wirklich), guardianship can never be equated with the task of a guard who protects from burglars a treasure stored in a building. Guardianship does not stare at the present at hand. Guardianship (Wächterschaft) is wakefulness (Nachsamkeit) for the having-been-coming destiny of being...." (VA, 176/184) "Thinking can stay with its topic only if in this staying with (Dabei-Bleiben) it becomes each and every time more in accord with the topic, only if the same topic becomes for it ever more sharply contested." (ID, 111-112/45-46) "...our discussion does not pose the task of winding up a fixed program." (WP, 96/97) "Insight into [the] difficulty which arises from language should keep us from hastily coining the thinking here attempted into a terminology... instead of devoting all our efforts to thinking through what has been said. For what was said was said in a seminar. A seminar is, as the word indicates, a place and an opportunity to scatter a seed here and there, a seed of thinking, which at some time may bloom in its own way and bring forth fruit." "...there is no way of determining once and for all what the task of philosophy is, and accordingly what must be expected of it. Every stage and every beginning of its development bears within it its own law." (EM, 11/8) "The thinking that is to come is no longer philosophy, because it thinks more originally than metaphysics - a name identical to philosophy. However, the thinking that is to come can no longer, as Hegel demanded, set aside the name 'love of wisdom' and become wisdom itself in the form of absolute knowledge. Thinking is on the descent to the poverty of its provisional
71. "However, thinking is perhaps an unavoidable path, which refuses to be a way of salvation (Heilsweg) and brings no new wisdom. At most the way is a field-path, a way across the field, which does not just speak of renunciation but already has renounced, that is, renounced the claim to a binding doctrine and a valid cultural achievement or a 'deed of the spirit.'" (VA, 177-178/184-185; SD, 1/1)

72. See SD, 4/4: "[Being and Time] are not topics, when 'topic' means: something which is."

73. Cf. Maurer, "From Heidegger to Practical Philosophy," pp. 133-134.

74. See GA 44, 221: "...questions not only support and sketch out answers, but also and precisely in the field of philosophy first let the answer be an answer in any sense at all. Since: where there no longer is questioning, a thought and proposition is no longer an answer - be it ever so 'correct'. When the thought is no longer an answer, it loses the strength to enforce responding and to hold open a free space of responsibility. In other words: with the attaining of the answer the questioning does not stop, as common sense believes, but rather with the answer the questioning first begins, in order precisely to preserve for the answer its character as an answer. An answer's strength for giving support reaches only as far as the strength of questioning reaches. The power of questioning is the origin of the will to responsibility." See also WP, 68/69: "If we succeed in this corresponding, then we answer the question in a genuine sense....The German word "antworten" ["to answer"] actually means just as much ant-sprechen ["to cor-respond"]." See also EM, 23-24/21-22: "But to know means: to be able to stand in truth. Truth is the possible openness (Offenbarkeit) of beings. Merely to have knowledge of something is not knowing. Whoever carries around such knowledge and in addition has acquired a few practical tricks and handles on things...will always be helpless in the face of actual reality and a bungler. Why? Because he has no knowing, for knowing means: to be able to learn. Everyday understanding of course believes that he has knowledge who no longer needs to learn, because he has finished up his learning. No: that person knows who understands that he must learn over and over again and who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has brought himself to the point where he is constantly able to learn. This is much more difficult than possessing knowledge and information. Being able to learn presupposes being able to question. Questioning is willing to know.... openness and resolve to be able to stand in the possible openness of beings."

75. Thus, Heidegger throws Richardson’s large summa of "Heidegger's questioning" back on Richardson himself, and insists that he himself has to take "re sponsibility" (Verantwortung) for it: "My wish is that your work - for which you alone bear responsibility - might help in setting in motion the manifold thinking on the topic for thought...." (BR, xxiii/xxii)

76. From the Greek words poros and hodos ("path", "way").

78. "...thinking poetizing is in truth the topology of being. It tells being the location of its presencing." (ED, 84/12) Cf. WM, 412/85, 447/275. See also Otto Poggeler's comprehensive discussion of "topology" worked out with Heidegger's assistance in his Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, pp. 280-299, 349-350.

79. "Placing in discussion means first: to show, to point out the place. It means: to heed the place...Placing in discussion thinks the place." (US, 33/159)
Notes to Chapter Two


2. See *S*, 372-400; *BR*, *ZP*; *V*; *SD*, 81-90/74-82; *US*, 83-146/1-54; *FS*, 55-57; *ED*, 87-90/32-39.

3. The lecture, delivered before the theological community in Marburg, was titled "The Concept of Time" and will be published in the third division of Heidegger’s *Collected Edition*.


5. See *EM*, 7-8/7-8: "...[the] why-question has its ground in a leap, through which man enacts a leap away (Absprung) from all previous security of his being-there, whether genuine or supposed. The questioning of this question is only in the leap and as the leap and otherwise not at all....the leap of this questioning originates its own ground through a leap (er-springt) - brings it into play in the leaping. We call such a leap, which originates itself as ground through a leap, an origin, an original leap (Ur sprung) in the genuine sense of the word: originating the ground through a leap. Because the question: ‘why is there being at all and not rather nothing?’ originates the ground for all genuine questioning through a leap and thus is the origin, the original leap, we must acknowledge it as the most original question.” See also *HW*, 85-86/77-78: "To originate something through a leap, to bring something into being from its essential origin in a founding leap - this is what the word Ur sprung, origin, original leap means."


7. The later Heidegger often speaks of the turn in terms of a leap. See *ID*, 96/32: "How can such an entry or turning-in (Einkehr) come about? By moving away from the attitude of representational thinking. This moving away is a movement in the sense of a leap. It leaps away, away from the habitual representation of man as the rational animal who in modern times has become a subject for objects. The leap away also leaps away from being. But being, since the beginning of Western thought, has been interpreted as the ground in which every being as such is grounded. To where does the leap away leap, if it leaps away from the ground. Does it leap into an abyss? Yes, so long as we represent the leap from the viewpoint of metaphysical thinking. No, insofar as we leap and spring ourselves loose...." See also Werner Marx’s discussion of the turn as leap in his "Hermeneutics and the History of Being," pp. 71-73.


9. *SD*, 87/80; *US*, 91/10; *BR*, xi/x; *FS* 1, 56/21.

10. Reported in Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, p. 351. See also *US*, 90/9: "...the summer of 1923. At that time I began the first notes (Niederschriften) for Being and Time."

12. See S., 104: "One will not succeed in thinking the event (Ereignis) with the concepts of being and the history of being, and just as little with Greek thought...." Cf. S., 335, 345. But Heidegger still maintains that a "detour" through the Greeks is necessary: "In my opinion the turning into the essential dimension of there-being... can only be achieved on the detour (Umweg) of a turning back to the beginning. But this turning back is not a "turning back to Parmenides".... The turning back takes place in the echo of Parmenides." (S., 132)

13. "Way is always in danger of becoming a way of error.... Remain on the path in genuine need, and learn the craft of thinking, unswerving (unentwegt), yet erring." (VA, 179/186)

14. "None of the ways are to be travelled, if the others are not gone along." (ED, 91) "Ways, ways of thinking, going themselves (selber), going by. When turning (kehrend) again, bringing vistas on what?/ Ways, going themselves, once open, suddenly closed, something for later...." (222) "Ways of thinking - for which the past (Vergangenes) remains indeed what has past, but for which what has been (Gewesenes) persists in coming - wait until at some time thinking goes along them." (VA, 7) See also von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Martin Heideggers," p. 166: "The motto (for the Collected Edition)... reads 'ways - not works'. The author understands each of the writings collected together in this edition as an open way of thinking as opposed to a closed finished work. Each of these ways contains its own validity. Earlier writings show themselves not as overtaken, when Heidegger's thinking changed on the way. The change remains in the same - the one all encompassing question of being. Even the ways (writings) lying back in time have lost nothing concerning the merit of being newly gone along in a later enactment, and this not out of a historical interest."


16. See Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 351: "Why did not Heidegger get up from his desk in the writing down and printing of these statements, in order to look up the exact title?" See also Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," pp. 25-28: "What are the reasons for these departures from the facts... was it some deeper reason, say, a bit of poetic license to suggest a measure of impatience mixed with the patience with which he tolerated this interest in his juvenilia, whereby one can nevertheless 'easily be unfairly judged' [sic], just as the old Husserl had 'generously tolerated' the young Heidegger's penchant for the Logical Investigations twenty years after their first appearance, at a time when Husserl himself no longer held this early work 'in very high esteem'? Indeed, this allusion to Husserl's attitude toward his work prefaces the entire discussion of transcripts in the dialogue... One therefore cannot disregard the possibility that Heidegger was deliberately exercising artistic liberty in order to introduce terms (especially 'hermeneutics') he took to be most appropriate for this Dialogue on Language."
17. Cf. Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege*, p. 100: "All of this is to say that he was an exiled man in his questioning and thinking, one who carefully put forward one foot at a time to see if there was any firm ground - a peevish, sulky man if one did not grasp where he sought to set foot, and a man not in a position to help others due to the weight of his own effort. I often brought him together with my own circle of students in Heidelberg. Sometimes a conversation succeeded, which meant that we were taken along on a hike through thinking and did not stray from the path."

18. See Dahlstrom, "Hermeneutische Fragen an Heideggers Gesamtausgabe," p. 195: "...it is as if he wanted to control the fate of his thinking after his death. But this attempt works (to no avail) against the dynamic and historical light of his hermeneutics....One almost has the impression that the guiding principle of the edition is not appropriate to the philosopher Heidegger. As a figure in the history of being Heidegger wanted to hold on to his self-interpretation. As a philosopher Heidegger knew better that 'libri autem habent sua fata'."

19. See Otto Pöggeler and Friedrich Hogemann, "Martin Heidegger: Zeit und Sein," in *Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen*, hrsg. Josef Speck (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1982), pp. 56-57: "In a conversation with a Japanese in his *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger's historically incorrect comments on his early lectures dismissed them as immature "youthful leaps." But these lectures belong not only in a decisive phase of his phenomenological philosophy; they also lay open the genuine motives and directions of Heidegger's thought. If, as it is claimed, Heidegger's working out of his questions about 'Being and Time' remains aporetic and biased, then these early works are decisive for a continuation of his concerns....Since Being and Time remained a fragment, the lectures from Heidegger's five years in Marburg are required to show how the leading motives and directions of his thought were formed and how he fell into aporias, which eventually forced him into a new path." Cf. Pöggeler, "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger," pp. 156-157.

20. The analogy is being made to Dilthey's pioneering use of Hegel's early and at the time still unpublished manuscripts, about which Dilthey initially heard in the writings of Hegel's students. See his *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 4, *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels* (Stuttgart and Göttingen: B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft and Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1959), p. 68: "Hegel has written nothing finer."


23. See Von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers," p. 154: "Regarding the early lectures of the Freiburg Privatdozent years (WS 1915/16 - SS 1923 with the interruption due to the war from SS 1917 until the end of 1918) which preceded the Marburg lectures, Heidegger ordered that publication should be put aside for the time being and remain reserved for a later decision."

24. For the following, see Busche, "Wie lesbar darf ein Philosoph sein?" and Sheehan, "Caveat Lector," p. 41.

25. See my APPENDIX II.

26. See von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Martin Heideggers," p. 154: "According to an oral communication from Heidegger, he himself destroyed at least a few of the lectures (presumably those originating from before 1919)."

27. Written communication from the literary executor, Hermann Heidegger (May 7, 1987).


29. For Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s later indifference to his early Logical Investigations, see also SD, 47-48/44-45; BR, xv/xiv. Heidegger’s criticism and his return to Husserl’s early "Sixth Investigation" will be discussed in Part Three, Chapter One.

30. See von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers," p. 168: "In his assistants Husserl gave an excellent example for how the attitude of questioning he established can be taken over by co-thinking in independent work. The undersigned is convinced that a similar thing must be possible for the thinking established by Heidegger. To be sure, a necessary part of this is working oneself into the attitude of thinking and questioning." Cf. Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," p. 25.

31. See also the following passages: "And ways of thought hide and shelter within themselves the mysterious - that we can go along them forwards and backwards, that even the way back only leads us forward." (US, 94/12) "What in a backward glance, which constantly becomes a retractio, can be portrayed in a simple drawing was in its historical actuality a tangled forward movement, which was not transparent even to me. It remained inescapably captive to contemporary ways of representation and language and carried with it inadequate interpretations of its own fore-having and intention." (BR, xv/xiv)

32. "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," pp. 8-9. Gadamer continues: "It belongs among the great mysteries of human life that one must constantly choose and in choosing always also give something up. One cannot travel all paths which are shown one, if one wants to go forward at all. Even Heidegger had to choose when he went forward."
Notes to Chapter Three

1. Heidegger's authorship in general goes back to 1910/11 when the young theology student published an essay on the 18th century Augustinian preacher Abraham a Sancta Clara and a handful of poems (ED, 1-3, 5-6).

2. See APPENDIX II.

3. The Habilitationsschrift is a dissertation after the doctoral degree which qualifies one to teach in a German university as a lecturer (Privatdozent).


11. Quoted in Köstler, "Heidegger schreibt an Grabmann," p. 107. "In his already earlier mentioned monograph on Duns Scotus' doctrine of categories and meaning Martin Heidegger has above all thrown the Grammatica speculativa...into a modern light, has brought the trains of thought developed in it into intimate contact with modern and kindred ways of posing problems and has clothed the frame of the medieval text with the flesh and blood of living present philosophy. Heidegger especially knew how and was able to fit the medieval author into the forms of Husserl's philosophy and into the terminology of phenomenology." "Thereby he has in principle renounced the historical-genetic manner of treatment, and has rendered the texts and the trains of thought into the language and
terminology of H. Lotze, E. Husserl, H. Rickert, E. Lask und W. Windelband."

12.ibid., pp. 106-109. See also Appendix V.


14.In Heidegger's usage, Bedeutung refers to the meaning of individual words within a sentence, and Sinn refers to the meaning of the sentence as a complex whole. (290, 292)

15.Heidegger refers to this section of the Ideas in a marginal note. (RB, 268, n. a)

16.Ibid., 174, 181, 183; KB, 223.


18.Cf. the later Heidegger's completely different use of the term the "neighborhood of being" (WH, 344/224, 342/22).

19.Scotus never explicitly refers to a modus essendi "passivus" or "activus": "It is peculiar that Duns Scotus refers to the modus essendi, which he previously placed in line with the modi intelligendi and significandi passivi, again in the description of the active modi, without however expressly distinguishing between a modus essendi activus and passivus. One might attribute this to Scotus' never becoming finally clear about the modus essendi, since he first explains it as absolute objective reality, but nonetheless does not fail to note that even it stands under a determinate ratio, namely, that of existence and so comes close to the character of a formal determination, to which an act-character must correspond." (KB, 319-320)

20.What is ironic about this passage is that one of the situations cited by Heidegger is strolling on the Feldweg, which later becomes the metaphor for his notion of being as "way." See also UP, 112: "Maier says that, when I perform it under a dull heavily clouded sky, the judgment 'it is not raining' has a different meaning than when I enact it in the face of a smiling cloudless sky. I mean that the meaning remains the same in both judgments, in that there is indeed stated: rain is not present at hand (vorhanden)."

21."The thinking of the ideals of thought is not absolutely necessary, rather the striving after them. The anchoring ground of this striving and with it logic itself is...ethical willing, the willing of an ethical ideal." (Maier) In his later analysis of technological "will to power" as the pervading characteristic of modern knowledge, Heidegger will himself approximate such a position on the essence of logic.

22.Heidegger cites with disapproval the following passages from a follower of Wilhelm von Humboldt: "The simple truth that linguistic thought is a matter for itself, something autonomous and especially something essentially other than logical thought, this simple truth is again and again overlooked. Accordingly, the hermaphrodite of logical grammar has missed its calling, forfeited its raison d'être." "Logic first begins after language or in the middle of language, but not before it or without it." (KB, 338)
23. See SZ, 287/259: "And with regard to the 'actual' judging of what is judged, is the separation of the real enactment (Vollzug) and ideal content (Gehalt) not altogether unjustified? Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways of being and 'strata', whose piecing together never reaches the way of being which belongs to knowing? Is not psychologism right in holding out against this separation, even if it itself neither clarifies ontologically the kind of Being which belongs to the thinking of what is thought, nor even knows it simply as a problem?"


25. See SZ, 207/198-199: "The prevalent theory of 'judgment', which is oriented around the phenomenon of 'validity', will not be extensively discussed here. It will be sufficient to indicate the various aspects of the questionable character of this phenomenon, which since Lotze has tended to be passed off as a 'primordial phenomenon' which cannot be traced back any further. The fact that it can play this role is due only to its ontologically unclarified character. The 'problematic' which has established itself round this idolized word is no less opaque....We do not in advance restrict the concept of 'meaning' to the signification of the 'content of judgment', but rather understand it as [an] existential phenomenon...." For his critique of the notion of "validity," see also his 1925/26 lecture (GA 21, 62-125). For his critique of the "doctrine of categories," see SZ, 59-80/70-71. For his critique of the "doctrine of significance," see SZ, 220/209 and 214/204: "The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale....The doctrine of significance is rooted in the ontology of Dasein." "The totality of significance belonging to understandability comes into language. Significations grow into words. But word-things are not equipped with significations." For a discussion of Being and Time's critique of the relation between meaning and language in the habilitation writing, see Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human, pp. 55-102. Finally, for Heidegger's critique of the notion of "value," "beauty" and practical "usefulness" ("ready-to-hand") as "founded" "strata," see SZ, 132-134/131-133.

26. See SZ, 25/39-40: "'Time' has long functioned as an ontological or rather ontical criterion for naively distinguishing various realms of beings. One sets off 'temporal being' (the processes of nature and the events of history) against 'non-temporal' being (spatial and numerical relations). We are accustomed to contrasting the 'atemporal' meaning of propositions with the 'temporal' course of the asserting of the proposition. Further, one finds a 'chasm' between 'temporal' being and the 'supra-temporal' eternal and attempts to bridge this over....In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of the meaning of being must enable us to show that and how in the phenomenon of time, rightly seen and rightly explicated, the central problematic of all
ontology is rooted." (cf. 207/198) For the critique of "timeless truth," see SZ, 299-300/269-270: "Newton’s laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatsoever - these are true only so long as Dasein is....Before Newton’s laws were discovered they were not "true"....That there are ‘eternal truths’ will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as such a proof is still outstanding, this principle remains a fanciful contention which does not gain in legitimacy from having philosophers commonly ‘believe’ it." This statement should be compared with Heidegger’s objections in the doctoral dissertation to Maier’s position that "...it is inconsistent to think that the judgment ‘the earth moves around the sun’ was true already before Copernicus. It therefore first became true through Copernicus in the moment in which he enacted it...." (UP, 113-114) See also FL, 22: "The principle of contradiction and of the excluded middle are ideal relations of content between objects of thought in general, for which it remains completely inconsequential whether, when and how they are thought."

27. See SZ, sect. 13 ("A founded Mode in which Being-in is exemplified. Knowing the World") and sect. 33 ("Assertion as a derivative Mode of Interpretation"). In particular, see SZ, 82-83/88-89: "If knowing as observing and determining of the present-at-hand is to be possible, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern holds back from any kind of producing, manipulating and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside....This kind of being toward the world is one which lets us encounter inner-worldly beings purely in the way they look (Aussehen) (eidos)....In this kind of ‘dwelling’ as a holding oneself back from any manipulation and utilization, the perceiving of the present-at-hand is fulfilled (sich vollzieht). Perception has its kind of fulfillment in addressing and discussing something as something. On the basis of this explicating or interpreting, taken in the widest sense, perceiving becomes determining. What is perceived and determined can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted." For his critique of the notion of a transcendental-logical subject, see SZ, 303-304/272: "With the question of the being of truth and the necessity of presupposing it, just as with the essence of knowledge, an ‘ideal subject’ has generally been posited.....Is not such a subject a fantastically idealized subject?....Both the contention that there are ‘eternal truths’ and the jumbling together of Dasein’s phenomenally grounded ‘ideality’ with an idealized absolute subject belong to those residues of Christian theology within the philosophical problematic which have not as yet been radically extruded." (cf. BH, 601-602/119-120)

28. FL, 24, 33; and KB, 204-205, 403.

29. See UP, 170, n. 2.

30. ZP, 47/201; SM, 54/55; SD, 81/74; FS, 56; V, 303; BR, ix-xi/viii-x; S, 385-386; US, 88/7.


33. Heidegger calls Brentano’s work on Aristotle "my first guide through Greek philosophy" (*US*, 88/7) and the "rod and staff of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy." (*SD*, 81/74).

34. See also Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, pp. 324-325.

35. *FS*, 56/22; *KB*, 205; *FL*, 24, 33.


38. See also Johannes Baptist Lotz, "Im Gespräch," in *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*, hrsg. Neske, p. 155; Sheehan, "Heidegger’s Early Years," p. 3-4.


41. See my Appendix III.

42. See Lotz, "Im Gespräch," p. 155: 

'*...after his high school diploma he had made the decision to enter the Jesuit Order. In the September 30, 1908 entry of the book, which registers the new arrivals to Feldkirch/Thins (Vorarlberg) in the novitiate, the house for the first trial period, stands the name of Martin Heidegger from Messkirch, born on September 28, 1889. However, his stay there lasted no more than two weeks; already on Oct. 13 of the same year he was released by the novice-master; as one heard, the reason was poor health, which sounds somewhat odd considering the age Heidegger had reached. Afterwards he entered the theological seminary in Freiburg, in order to study theology. When, after two or three semesters, he devoted himself only to philosophy, the sky fell in for his parents, as Heidegger’s brother Fritz told me. They had placed great hope in their son Martin, who was so bright and had received such a good high school diploma. They believed that one day he would be able to become perhaps not archbishop, but at least suffragan bishop and thus a famous man. Heidegger’s abandoning of the study of theology robbed them of this prospect and they said regretfully - the famous son has come to nothing!"  See also Sheehan, "Heidegger’s Early Years," p. 5.

43. See Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, p. 324.

45. Schneider was director for Heidegger's doctoral dissertation, and Heidegger attended his seminars and lectures from 1911 onwards (see Appendix IV). He also attended Finke's lectures on history from 1911 onwards (see Appendices III and IV). Finke played an advisory role for Heidegger's habilitation writing. (see Bernhard Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg," in Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv, 1980, Kirche am Oberhein, hrsg. Remigius Bäumer, Karl Suso Frank, Hugo Ott (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1980), p. 538, n. 10). Krebs supervised Heidegger's habilitation writing (see Appendix V and Casper, loco cit.), brought him into contact with Grabmann, and between WS 1915-16 and WS 1916-1917 enlisted his assistance in delivering philosophical lectures for theological students. See also Köstler, "Heidegger schreibt an Grabmann," pp. 105-106.

46. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," pp. 7-8. See also KB, 410.

47. See Appendix V.


49. See Appendix V.

50. See especially BG, 104: "You might be interested to know that Husserl found the work [on Duns Scotus] informative in a manner with which I can be satisfied. In the same way, Rickert today sees scholasticism with different eyes. But from these circles I can hardly expect a critique of the whole. So it would be even more valuable for me, if you intend to subject the work to a critical review from this point of view. I am convinced that from this I would learn much, and that above all you will be able to rectify the two-sidedness of the treatment. Your friendly postcard and a letter from Bäumker are for me the most valuable encouragements for further works in the area of medieval scholasticism and mysticism." See Appendix V for the entire letter from which the above passage was taken. See also Köstler's commentary on Heidegger's letter in "Heidegger schreibt an Grabmann," pp. 105-108.

51. See Köstler, "Heidegger schreibt an Grabmann," 106; Julius Ebbinghaus, "Julius Ebbinghaus," p. 31. Ebbinghaus writes: "In Rickert's seminar, which I attended in the summer 1914, I got to know Heidegger - still in the costume of an alumnus of the Freiburg seminary (the so-called "Sapienz"). So far as I can remember, at that time I assumed that he intended to habilitate in the Freiburg philosophical faculty as a candidate for the confessionally restricted teaching position in philosophy, which the state awards to the catholic church through an agreement." See also Krebs' statement from November 1913, quoted in Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg," p. 538, n. 10: "This evening between five and six [Heidegger] came to me and told how Finke urged and demanded that he habilitate with a work on the
history of philosophy, and that Finke spoke with him in a way which clearly intimated that, in view of the present vacancy of the chair in philosophy, he should hasten to be available soon as a Privatdozent. So it could be that my present temporary arrangement is keeping the chair in philosophy warm for Heidegger...." After Schneider's departure from Freiburg, Krebs was temporarily filling the catholic-philosophical chair.

52. See Husserl's 1917 letter to Paul Natorp, quoted in Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," p. 8: "It is certain that he has confessional ties, because he stands, so to speak, under the protection of our 'Catholic historian', Colleague Finke. Accordingly last year he was proposed in committee meetings as a nominee for the chair of Catholic philosophy in our Philosophy Department - a chair which we too would have liked to form into a scientific teaching position for the history of medieval philosophy. He was taken into consideration along with others, at which point Finke suggested him as an appropriate candidate in terms of his religious affiliation."


54. See Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg," p. 539: "After Arthur Schneider's departure to Strassburg at the beginning of November 1913, Krebs had been entrusted temporarily with the delivering of philosophical courses for the theologians, and attempted to involve Heidegger in these courses immediately after his habilitation." For a list of these courses, which dealt with the Pre-Socratics, Kant and Fichte, see Appendix II. Neither Heidegger's manuscripts for these courses nor any student Nachschriften appear to be extant (see Appendix II, n. 2). Casper (see p. 539) reports a remark from Krebs' Nachlass that Heidegger found "little understanding or sympathy with the theological students," since "he employed a difficult terminology and a mode of expression too complicated for the beginners."

55. See Ochsner's letter from August 5, 1917 in Das Hass des Verborgenen, Heinrich Ochsner (1891-1970) zum Gedächtnis, hrsg. Curd Ochwadt and Erwin Tecklenborg, p. 92: "It is too bad that you were not able to hear Heidegger's talk on the problem of the religious [in Schleiermacher]. The impression it made on me still lingers during this whole week. But perhaps we will be able to read together the second discourse in Schleiermacher's 'Discourses on Religion.' It contains the essential content of Heidegger's talk." See also the editor's commentary, p. 266: "In order to characterize the little known crucial angle of Heidegger's early thinking Ochsner often referred to Heidegger's talk on Schleiermacher....He also related that into the 1920s Heidegger studied theological authors to an extent which would "normally" have been very unusual for a "philosopher in the university." Heidegger and the theologian Ochsner knew each other from 1915 onwards, and in 1959 Heidegger dedicated his book On the Way to Language to Ochsner: "For Heinrich Ochsner in memory of the first semester 1915/16." See also Föggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 326.


57. See Appendix III.
608

59. See Appendix IV.
60. See FL, 19, 25 36; B, 51, 63; KB, 202, 335.
62. See Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, sechste Auflage (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1929), p. ix: "...there is still ‘another world’ than the immanent real one, and in fact it lies in the sphere of value, or it faces us as an Ought which may never be reduced to a being....Hence, we arrive at two worlds, an existing one and one that is valid."
63. See Appendix IV.
65. See Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg," p. 538
68. See also Lask’s sketch of the "categories in the history of theoretical philosophy" (Aristotle, Plotinus, Middle Ages, Kant) which Heidegger follows (FL, 24): Emil Lask, The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories, pp. 222-282. Heidegger is also influenced by the history of the doctrine of categories given by Wilhelm Windelband (KB, 202), Eduard von Hartmann (KB, 202) and Adolf Trendelenburg (KB, 197). See Wilhelm Windelband, Vom System der Kategorien (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1900), p. 45; Eduard von Hartmann, Kategorienlehre, Bd. I, zweite Auflage (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923), pp. 6-7; Adolf Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre (Berlin: G. Barth, 1846; repr., Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1979).
69. See Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," p. 76: "A later historiography will perhaps call this first stage of development [1919-1923] Heidegger’s romantic period, because shock and amazement about his own expansion stand at the centre."
Notes to Chapter Four

1. See Appendix III.
2. See Appendices III and IV.
4. See also ZB, 416: "As temporally conditioned cultural facts, the individual concrete sciences are never complete, but rather always on the way in finding truth."
6. See also KB, 253, 307, 318. Heidegger's remark at KB, 201 anticipates his discussion in the conclusion: "Not only the knowing of...principles is intended, but rather actually the knowledge of the connection between them and that for which they are principles. Not only the that and the what, but rather the how of the principle connection is the important matter."
7. For a critique of this christian anthropology, see SZ, 65-66/74-75, 304/272.
8. See also KB, 203, where Heidegger explains his choice of Duns Scotus as the object of his study: "What is decisive is his whole individuality as a thinker with his unmistakable modern characteristics. He has a greater and more acute closeness (haecceitas) to real life than the scholastic philosophers before him, and to a greater extent has discovered the manifoldness and possibility of tension in real life. At the same time, with the same ease he knows also how to turn away from the fullness of life into the abstract world of mathematics. He is equally familiar with the "forms of life" and with the 'gray on gray' of philosophy (so far as that was the case in the Middle Ages in general)." For Heidegger's discussion of "individual-being" or haecceitas ("this-ness"), see KB, 252-253, 306, 352-253.
Notes to Chapter Five, Section I.

2. For the whole letter, see Appendix VI.
4. The title of the introduction to the book on Aristotle that Heidegger planned to publish in 1923 was "The Hermeneutical Situation." This introduction will be discussed below in Section IV.
5. "The critique is phenomenological in a peculiar sense; it is 'presuppositionless' not in the bad sense that one expands what lies right 'before one's hand' in one's objective historical situation into the in-itself of the 'things themselves'. Here one fails to see what is peculiar, namely, that all enactment of intuition lives in a specific orientation and in a regionally anticipating preconception. Thus, a kind of intuition, which seeks to avoid foreign historical viewpoints and constructions and is concerned about its immediacy solely in this respect, only too easily falls victim to blindness regarding its own motivational basis, which ultimately lacks primordiality.... It is a long way to the 'things themselves'...."
7. See also PA, 85: "Insofar as the task of access to the situation is to be radically understood in its genuine being-meaning... it depends on radically overcoming the yesterday, in order to prepare oneself for the first time with this overcoming for genuinely appropriating the yesterday; for it is unavoidable, insofar as we 'are' in it and being itself, ours, cannot be cancelled."
8. See also BZs, 78: "Not only is Heidegger's treatment of time not theological, it is not philosophical as well. It is not philosophy insofar as it makes no claim to forging a universally valid systematic determination of time. Heidegger prefers to call it a "pre-science" [Vorwissenschaft] whose task is... to seek out what is shared by philosophy, science, and everyday life...." Cf. PRs, 316.
9. See HF, 32, where Heidegger quotes the following passage from van Gogh's "Letters to his Brother" in order to exemplify his distinction between the "masking" of the self in everyday life and the authentic encounter with one's own self: "An example: Vincent van Gogh once wrote the following to his brother in the critical period when he was engaged in the search for his own existence: 'I would rather die a natural death than prepare myself for this at the university....'... And what happened? He worked, tore pictures, as it were, from his own flesh and went insane through this confrontation with existence. Today: The situation of the sciences and the university has become even more dubious. What happens?

10. See Ortega's statement from a 1932 lecture that many of the leading concepts of Heidegger's *Being and Time* were borrowed from Ortega's own work dating back to 1914: "In his excellent book *Being and Time* Heidegger arrived at a definition of life, which is close to the one that I have here given....I should clarify that I owe this author only a very small debt of gratitude. There are hardly one or two concepts in Heidegger, which would not also appear in my books, occasionally with a priority of thirteen years. For example, the idea of life as unrest, care, and insecurity and the idea of culture as security and care for security are to be found word-for-word in my first book *Meditations on Quixote* (1914) in the chapter with the title 'culture-security'. Likewise, for many years in my lectures I have spoken of the liberation of the 'idea of being' from all aspects of 'substance' and 'objectivity'; this thought was already expressed in the preface to my first book....The structure of life as something which points into the future is the enduring and leading motive of my writings....Even the interpretation of truth as aletheia in the etymological sense of uncovering and unveiling is written in the same place [in my first book] on p. 80....Since I have remained silent about this for many years, I will continue to keep silent after breaking off this short statement, which has been made only to help all mistaken belief onto the right track." Quoted in Christoph von Wolzogen, "'Es gibt': Heidegger und Natorps 'Praktische Philosophie'," in *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie*, hrg. A. Gethmann-Siebert, O. Pöggeler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 321, n. 38.
Notes to Chapter Five, Section II.

2. loc. cit., p. 646/761. All further references to this volume will occur as LU within the text.
3. A shorter version of this section was presented in June, 1988 at the Semi-Centennial Meeting of the North American Husserl Circle at Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, Canada. For friendly and helpful comments, I am grateful to especially Dr. Burt Hopkins. I am also indebted to him for making available copies of Husserl’s letters to Heidegger between 1916 and 1932, the originals of which are preserved in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium.
4. The only real contact between the two prior to 1919 seems to be Husserl’s assistance in getting Heidegger’s Duns Scotus book published in 1916. (KB, 191)
9. See Appendix II. The word "phenomenology" no longer occurs in such titles after 1923.
11. In Part One, Chapter 2, we have already briefly discussed the later Heidegger’s account of how in his youthful period he went beyond the mens auctoris in interpreting Husserl’s thought. Heidegger thought that this “thinking-further” of phenomenology was demanded by its intrinsic self-critical principle (the “principle of all principles), which is expressed in Husserl’s rallying cry “To the things themselves” as the ultimate criterion of philosophical thought. (GZ, 32/26, 103/75, 108/79, 119/87, 123-4/90-91, 184/35) The self-critical element of Heidegger’s own thought, i.e., the requirement of “thinking-further” in the direction of the “thing itself,” is originally derived from the self-critical principle of phenomenology. (BR, xvii/xvi; SD, 90/82) We will see this most clearly in our later discussion of Heidegger’s early notion of “formal indication” (Part 3, Chapter Seven).
12. See SD, 47/44, 84/77; BR, xiv/xv.
13. Heidegger’s remarks indicate that these “special work groups” took place in the early Freiburg period (1919-23), when he was Husserl’s assistant. In 1923, Heidegger held an official seminar entitled Phenomenological Exercises (Husserl’s “Logical Investigations,” Bd. II). In 1922-23, he held a seminar entitled Husserl’s Ideas, I.
14. It is characteristic of Husserl that his questioning is still fully in flux, so that we must in the final analysis be cautious in our critique. I am not sufficiently conversant with the

612
contents of the present stance of his investigations. But let me
say that Husserl is aware of my objections from my lecture courses
in Freiburg as well as here in Marburg and from personal conversa-
tions, and is essentially making allowances for them, so that my
critique today no longer applies in its full trenchancy. But it is
not really a matter of criticism for the sake of criticizing but
criticism for the sake of laying open the issues and bringing
understanding. It almost goes without saying that even today I
still regard myself as a learner in relation to Husserl."

H. Spiegelberg, E. Avé-Lallemant (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982),
p. 345.

16. My expositions of Husserl's sixth investigation follow
Heidegger's own interpretations primarily in his 1925 lecture
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GZ, 63-103/47-75).
Heidegger's interpretations have to be seen as the climax of his
long preoccupation with the Sixth Investigation, which began much
earlier. His 1923-24 lecture The Beginning of Modern Philosophy/In-
troduction to Phenomenological Research contains a detailed
discussion of Husserl's Logical Investigations. See Kisiel, "On the
unpublished 1920 lecture Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression
recalls the language of Husserl's Sixth Investigation. This same
title appears as the title of section 6 (b) in Heidegger's 1925
lecture on Husserl.

17. See also S, 377-378: "With this analysis of categorial
intuition Husserl liberated being from its captivity in the judg-
ment... In order to be able to unfold the question of meaning of
being at all, in order to ask for its meaning at it, being must
have been given. Husserl's accomplishment consisted precisely in
this making present of being, which is phenomenally present in the
category. Through this accomplishment... I finally had a basis:
'being' is no mere concept, is no pure abstraction, which arises in
the course of a derivation." (cf. S, 334) Heidegger uses the same
word - Boden - in Being and Time (51/62), though without explaining
how Husserl's Logical Investigations prepared this "basis." For a
full discussion of the traditional restriction of being to the
copula in judgment, see chapter 4 of Heidegger's 1927 lecture
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GP), which undoubtedly draws on
his early reading of Husserl's sixth investigation. See also SZ,
212/202, 476/411.

18. In a later seminar, Heidegger described the Greek
experience of being as a "superabundance" (Überfülle) and "excess
(Uberschuss) of presence" (S, 331), thereby echoing Husserl's notion
of being as an "excess" (Überschuss) (S, 334). Husserl's notion has
to be seen as the precedent for Heidegger's talk of "transcend-
ence," the "ontological difference," "ecstasis" and "existence" in
Being and Time and his 1927 lecture course Grundprobleme der
Phänomenologie (BP) (see especially ch. 1 of the latter, which
discusses Kant's statement that "being is not a real predicate").
See also Jacques Taminiaux, "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical In-
vestigations," pp. 77-83. Likewise, Heidegger's description of being
as the "nothing" and his preference for saying of being not being 'is', but rather es gibt, there is/it is given/hearken back to Husserl's discussion of how, even though being is "given," it is not a thing which is (SZ, 281/255; BP, 13-14/10). For other passages which hearken back to Husserl's notion of being as an "excess," see EY, 36-39/33-36; SD, 3/3.

19. See also the discussion of being as "phenomenon" in Being and Time (SZ, 42/55, 47-48/59-60), which is indebted to Husserl's Sixth Investigation.

20. See also S, 377-378: "Husserl's accomplishment consisted precisely in this making present of being, which is phenomenally present in the category. Through this accomplishment...I finally had a basis: 'being' is no mere concept, is no pure abstraction, which arises in the course of a derivation." (cf. 334)


22. IP, 71-73, 88-89; WU, 205-206; PA, 91. 97.


24. See SZ, 57, n. 9/75, n. x: "But disclosing the a priori is not 'a-prioristic' construction. Through E. Husserl we have once again learned not only to understand the meaning of all genuine philosophical empiricism, but also to make use of the necessary tools. 'A-priorism' is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself. There is nothing constructivistic about it. But for this very reason research on the a priori requires the proper preparation of the phenomenal basis. The horizon which is closest to us, which must be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness."


26. IP, 13-15; PA, 34-35, 47, 88; HF, 10, 16, 71; GZ, 190/140.


28. GZ, 349-350/254; cf. PA, 97; LW, 146-147.

29. GZ, 226/167, 73/54, 326/238; PA, 33; HF, 29, 80. See also SZ, 201/193: "Dasein only has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be 'fulfilled' through the beings which are discoverable in it." For Heidegger's acknowledgment of Husserl's sixth investigation as the "basis" for his long discussion of "truth" in Being and Time, see SZ, 289, n. 15/261, n. xxxiv.


32. Cf. Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Husserl’s "reduction" in his 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (BP, 29/21).


34. In Being and Time, Heidegger presents his analysis of "history" as an "appropriation of Dilthey’s work" (SZ, 525/449).

35. This remark derives from a 1919 conversation in which the young Heidegger is reported to have "launched a campaign against the pure ego." Quoted in Thomas Sheehan, "Introductory Note" to 'The Understanding of Time in Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being-Question," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1979), p. 199.

36. The lecture course that Heidegger scheduled for the winter semester of 1922-23 was entitled Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy (Phenomenological Interpretations of Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposeon, III). Szilasi notes that around this time Heidegger was studying ancient skepticism, particularly Sextus Empiricus. See Szilasi, 'Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," pp. 75–76. In his 1921–22 lecture, Heidegger calls his own philosophy "skepticism." (PA, 35, 197) The young Heidegger’s interest in ancient skepticism belonged together with his interest in ancient rhetoric and the ethics of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, since all these have the virtue of making “factual life” thematic.

37. In his 1925 lecture The History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger notes that he has been studying the unpublished manuscript of the second volume of Husserl’s Ideas, in which the term "appresentation" occurs (GZ, 168/121). He uses the terms "making-present" and "appresentation" interchangeably throughout this lecture course.

38. In Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl’s notion of "making-present": "Husserl uses the expression ‘making-present’ to characterize sense perception.... The intentional analysis of perception and intuition in general must
have suggested this 'temporal' description of the phenomenon. That and how the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in the ecstatical temporality of Dasein will be shown in the following [never published] section" (SZ, 460, n. 10/414, n. xxiii).

39.Cf. Heidegger's critical discussion of Husserl's lectures on time in his own 1928 lecture course _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz_ (ML), sect. 12. Heidegger criticizes Husserl's analyses insofar as they explore "time-consciousness" predominantly as intentional consciousness of things and as somehow "internal" to a subject. But Heidegger adds that his own analyses are an appropriation of Husserl's: "That which Husserl still calls time-consciousness, i. e., consciousness of time, is precisely time itself, in the primordial sense....Temporality in its temporalizing is the primordially self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention and making-present" (ML, 284/204).

40.n GZ, 106/78, Heidegger says that the "matter itself" of Husserl's phenomenology is "intentionality in its apriori, understood in the two directions of intentio and intentum." Here, in a glance, we can see Heidegger's full description of this "matter itself" to which phenomenological inquiry is directed in accord with Husserl's slogan "Back to the things themselves": first, the intentio-intentum relation is to be studied within the sphere of factual life; and, second, the third moment of historical "temporalizing-meaning" is to be explicitly added. We now have the full "matter itself" of the 'phenomenon' of intentionality. Heidegger's insight into especially the intentional moment of "temporalizing-meaning" is the genesis of his life-long "matter" or "topic" (Sache), which he will pursue on his many later "thought-paths" (primarily "the meaning of being," the "truth of being," and the "topos of being").

41.Gadamer, "Heidegger's Wege," pp. 130, 118; Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1966), p. 484; "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," p. 13. Heidegger's interpretations of the history of philosophy in the early 1920s became a model for Gadamer's notion of "fusion of horizons." 42.When Husserl finally became aware of the differences between himself and his "phenomenological child" Heidegger, he followed to a certain extent Heidegger's suggestions for re-thinking phenomenology in terms of "factual life" and undertook his own "fusion of horizons" with Heidegger's new version of phenomenology. He did this in the reworking of his _Cartesian Meditations_ and in his _Crisis_, which for the first time systematically introduced his notion of the "life-world." See Edmund Husserl, _Briefe an Roman Ingarden_ (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 58; Edmund Husserl, _Cartesian Meditations_, trans. Dorion Cairns (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 156: "But, within the de facto monadic sphere and (as an ideal possibility) within every conceivable monadic sphere, occur all the problems of accidental factuality, of death, of fate, of the possibility of a 'genuine' human life demanded as 'meaningful' in a particular sense—among them, therefore, the problem of the 'meaning' of history—, and all the further and still higher problems. We can say that they are the
ethico-religious problems, but stated in the realm where everything that can have a possible sense for us must be stated." In his later introduction to his Ideas Husserl criticized Heidegger's thought and spoke of how "transcendental phenomenology" "includes all questions that are raised concerning concrete human life." See Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie and phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, Husserliana, Bd. V (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), p. 141. Husserl once remarked that Heidegger's analyses of the "around-world" were rooted in paragraph 27 of Husserl's own Ideas (Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21," p. 318).

43. Gadamer, Heidegger's Wege, p. 118; Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II, p. 404. See especially Heideggers Wege, p. 130: "With the breakdown of the Neo-Kantian conception of philosophy as transcendental, a conception which was basically an attempt to hold on to the legacy of idealism, the notion of "the history of problems" had to collapse as well, for the 'problems' it took for granted were part of this legacy. This breakdown is reflected in Heidegger's attempt to modify the systematic and transcendental conception of philosophy which had been advanced by his respected teacher Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. Heidegger wanted to modify this conception along the lines of Dilthey's historical reflection, and thus to effect a kind of synthesis between Dilthey's problematic of historicity and the scientific problematic of Husserl's transcendental orientation. So we find in Being and Time the astonishing combination of a dedication to Husserl and a tribute to Dilthey - astonishing since Husserl's proclamation of phenomenology, entitled "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," had dramatically criticized Dilthey and the concept of world-view." See also Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," p. 11-13: "In the summer of 1923, I - a young Doctor of Philosophy - had the honour of spending the weeks with Heidegger at his cabin in which he for the first time read the correspondence between Dilthey and Count Yorck. The reactions of the moment, which arose within our daily encounters, were for me at that time an especially valuable indication of a way. They showed me two things: first, to what a great extent Heidegger at that time had taken up Dilthey's work; and second, that Dilthey was clearly the genuine counter-instance with which Heidegger was able to justify his doubts about the transcendental reduction to the transcendental ego, which is found in Husserl's turn in his Ideas....Heidegger had learned from both [Aristotle and Husserl], and he had not only taken something, but rather at the same time sought to maintain his own task. Indeed, these are the genuine kinds of influences, which are worth pursuing, i.e., one is forced to find oneself in the encounter with the other. So it was undoubtedly the case with Heidegger that Husserl's analyses of time, but also his new encounter with Aristotle brought him onto the path of his own thinking.

44. Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 41.

47. Here I am following Kisiel's reading of the respective passage in the original manuscripts. (GA, 192 [11. 22-29]/141 [11. 39-40]-142 [11. 1-5]) This re-reading and others, which depart from the "interpretation" of the German editor, have been printed in an "Errata" at the beginning of PA (1985), I-IV. However, Kisiel's re-reading of the passage in question at GZ, 192/141-2 is not listed in its entirety in the "Errata." Lines 27 to 29 on page 192 of the German have not been marked for correction in accordance with lines 2 to 4 on page 142 of Kisiel's text. See Kisiel's 'Translator's Foreword' placed at the front of his translation of GZ.

48. Jaspers complained that, whereas in private Heidegger spoke "with contempt" of Husserl, he nonetheless "presented himself in traditional affiliation" with Husserl by dedicating Being and Time to him. See Jaspers, "On Heidegger," p. 116. Heidegger's now published marginal notes to Being and Time indicate clearly that, at least in his own mind, the book was intended as a direct and severe critique of Husserl. (SZ, 132, n. a; 213, n. a; 63, n. a) Heidegger's critique also shows up in his 1927 lecture The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (sect. 9, c; sect. 15, c; 378-9/268; section 21, b), which was to work out the unpublished "Division Three" of "Part One" of Being and Time (SZ, 55, n. b). See also Heidegger's marginal notes from 1927 to Husserl's article on phenomenology for the Encyclopedia Britannica: Edmund Husserl, Phinomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana, Bd. IX (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 274, n. 1-3; p. 275, n. 1; p. 276; n. 1; p. 277, n. 1. See also Heidegger's letter to Husserl which accompanied his own draft of the encyclopedia article on phenomenology. (BH, 600-602/118-120) With the publication of Heidegger's Being and Time and the attempted collaboration on the encyclopedia article in 1927, Husserl gradually became aware that Heidegger's position is "something essentially different from my works" (1927), that "unfortunately I did not determine his philosophical formation, obviously he was already into his own thing when he studied my writings" (1927), that "Heidegger...has not grasped the whole meaning of the method of the phenomenological reduction" (1927), that "I cannot fit [Being and Time] into the framework of my phenomenology...and I must even reject it" (1928), and that "Heidegger and Scheler are "my antipodes" (1931). These passages have been taken from Husserl's letters, published in Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 41, 43, 56, 67. See also the selection of marginal notes Husserl wrote in his copies of Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, which are published in Alwin Diemer, Edmund Husserl (Meisenheim am Gan: Anton Hain K. G., 1956), pp. 23-30. In
the end, Husserl judged Heidegger's work as "philosophy of life," "philosophy of 'existence','" "anthropologism" and "psychologism." See Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, pp. 138, 140. See also Husserl's remarks recorded in Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 9: "Previously [Husserl] had been a long time pessimistic - since a careful reading of Heidegger, which showed him how far Heidegger was from him. He laid this to Heidegger never having freed himself completely from his theological prejudices, and the weight of the war on him. The war and ensuing difficulties drive men to mysticisms." After reading Being and Time in 1929, Husserl wrote on the title page: "amicus Plato, magis amica veritas," "Plato is a friend, but truth is a greater friend." Quoted in Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," p. 16. For Husserl's 'immanent critique' of Heidegger's Being and Time, see: Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 56; Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, p. 141; Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 156. The battle of these two phenomenologists about "the things themselves" centred around Heidegger's unwillingness to follow Husserl into his later standpoint of a "transcendental ego," which is "not human," and in which both the world and the "mundane" human subject are "constituted." For Heidegger, the problem of the "transcendental constitution" of the world and the worldly self was to be approached at the level of the "factual self," the "whole man."

49. For example, how is the reader to know what "basis" means in Heidegger's following statement which is almost arbitrarily inserted into the text: "The following investigation would not have been possible if the basis had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logical Investigations phenomenology first emerged"? (SZ, 51/62)


51. Phenomenological Exercises (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason) (1925-26, seminar); Phenomenological Exercises (Hegel, Logic, I) (1925-26, seminar); History of Philosophy from Aquinas to Kant (1926-27, course); The Ontology of Aristotle and Hegel's Logic (1927, seminar); Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1927-28, course); Schelling, On the Essence of Human Freedom (1927-28, seminar); Phenomenological Exercises: Kant, Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals (1928-29, seminar); German Idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) and the Philosophical Problems of the Present (1929, course); On Idealism and Realism in Connection with the major lecture course (Hegel's "Preface" to the Phenomenology of Spirit) (1929, seminar); Introduction to Philo-
sophy ([Schelling's] On the Essence of Human Freedom) (1930, course); Selected Chapters from Kant's Critique of Judgment (1930, seminar); Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1930-31, course); Kant, On the Progress of Metaphysics (1931, seminar); Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1931-32, seminar); etc.

52. Kant's notion of time is not mentioned in Heidegger's to-date published lectures courses between 1919 and 1925, nor in his 1919-21 essay on Jaspers. His 1924 lecture "The Concept of Time" did mention the notion of time in Aristotle, Einstein, and Augustine, but apparently did not mention Kant. (BZs, 79) The first mention of Kant's notion of time comes apparently in the outline for Heidegger's 1925 lecture course, which was to deal with "The concept of time in Kant and Newton" in the second part of the third division entitled "The History of the Concept of Time." (GZ, 11/8) But the connection here with Newton indicates that he saw Kant as providing only the inappropriate concept of time in natural science. As we shall see, until 1926 the model for Heidegger's concept of time was the "kairological time" that he discovered in original Christianity and in Aristotle's practical writings. Here he spoke not of "schemata," but of "kairological characters."


54. See Heidegger's 1927 letter to Husserl in which he places his Being and Time into Husserl's language of "transcendental constitution": "We agree that beings in the sense of what you call 'world' cannot be explained in their transcendental constitution by a return to a being of the same mode of being. But that doesn't mean that what makes up the place (Ort) of the transcendental is not a being at all; rather, precisely the problem arises: What is the mode of being of the being in which 'world' is constituted? That is the central problem of Being and Time, i.e., a fundamental ontology of Dasein." (BH, 601/119)

55. In PA, Heidegger does very rarely use the terms "existentials," "ontic," "ontological," and even "categories of life," but, as we shall later see, these terms are used in the context of the concrete meaning for the individual human being, which can only be "formally indicated" and "indirectly communicated." (PA, 53 117, 148) "The categories are nothing created or a society of logical schemata for themselves, a 'grid', but rather in an original way they are alive in life itself (im Leben selbst am Leben)," "are living in one's own concrete life," and are not "autonomous" and "unchanging" "determinations in themselves." (88, 99, 142, 177-178)


57. Cf. the following comments by Heidegger's early students: "To put it briefly, at that time as well as today, human beings seem to me to be more important than the structures of Dasein....I am gladly willing to forgo living in the 'Abode of Being'; I prefer ultimately the insecurity of human autonomy...." (Dolf Sternberger, "Dolf Sternberger," in Martin Heidegger in Conversation, ed. R. Wisser, trans. B. Srinivasa Murthy (India: Arnold Heinemann, 1977), p. 17) "Heidegger's work appeared to me and my friends as a new beginning: we experienced his book (and his lecture courses, of which we possessed transcripts (Nachschriften)) finally as a
concrete philosophy, which talked about existence, our existence, anxiety, care and boredom, etc. Only gradually did we realize that the concreteness of Heidegger’s philosophizing was only an apparent one, and that we were again dealing with a transcendental philosophy (on extensive ladders), in which the existential categories lost their sharpness, were neutralized, and were finally lost in ever higher abstractions. That was also even the case when the ‘question of being’ gave way to the ‘question concerning technology’: again an apparently imminent concreteness, which then quickly fell prey to a process of abstraction - bad abstraction, in which the concrete was not elevated but rather lost.” (Marcuse, “Enttäuschung,” p. 162)

59. EM, Part IV; EM, 8/4.
60. Quoted in Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 351. Gadamer refers to Heidegger’s “transcendental” self-interpretation in Being and Time (“Heidegger’s Paths,” in Philosophic Exchange, 2, p. 87; cf. Heideggers Wege, p. 64/233). See also his Philosophische Lehrjahre: Eine Rückschau (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 173: “I had seen something similar [to the reality of dialogue] in the young Heidegger and sought to follow him here: no answer that is given is meaningless, even though it often requires a long clarification of its possible meaning, which stood behind the question and motivated it. So long as he had not yet fixed the essential features of his own question in literary form, the young Heidegger understood this in a masterful way, and we noticed it very precisely, at that time in Marburg, when he was writing Being and Time and suddenly no longer pursued the patience and openness that makes possible having a fruitful conversation of this kind.” See Gadamer, “Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers,” p. 18: “As the young Heidegger searched for his way, i.e., to think being ‘in and through life’, he attempted a great number of ways. Presumably he at that time took a very long look at Neo-Platonism. He gave lectures on Augustine, lectures were at least announced on Plotinus, and I myself experienced how in 1923 he enthusiastically took up the publication of the Opus tripartitum by Meister Eckhardt. So the thread of Platonism also runs through the first thought-paths of Martin Heidegger - until he then chose his own way, or better, until his own path pulled him away from these other paths.”
62. The first known mention of the work that came to be called Being and Time comes from Nicolai Hartmann who on June 24, 1925 reported that, in addition to a large book on Aristotle, the young scholar Heidegger has “a new and absolutely outstanding work” in progress. In a letter from August 3, 1925 he cites the title as “Time and Being.” See Thomas Sheehan, “‘Time and Being’, 1925-27,“ in Robert W. Shahan, J.N. Mohanty, Thinking About Being: Aspects of Heidegger’s Thought (Norman: University Oklahoma Press, 1984), pp. 180-183.
622

63. "Professor Heidegger - you have got to publish something now. Do you have a suitable manuscript?" With these words the dean of the philosophical faculty came into my study one day in the winter semester of 1925-26. "Certainly", I answered. The dean replied: 'But it must be printed quickly'. The faculty had proposed me unico loco as Nicholai Hartmann's successor for the chief philosophical chair. The proposal was rejected in the meantime by the ministry in Berlin with the explanation that I had published nothing in the last ten years. Now I had to submit my long-guarded work to the public... On the occasion of the strange publication of *Being and Time*, I came for the first time into direct relationship with the publishing house Max Niemeyer."

64. The lecture manuscripts that Heidegger primarily used in writing *Being and Time* appear to be his 1923 lecture course *Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity)*, his 1925 lecture course *The History of the Concept of Time*, and the 1925-26 lecture course *Logic: The Question Concerning Truth*. Heidegger lifted passages and whole sections out these lectures and reworked them in his *Being and Time*. In US, 91/9, Heidegger stated that "in the summer of 1923 I began the first notes (Niederschriften) for *Being and Time*.


66. BR, xv/xiv: "This process inevitably remained captive to contemporary modes of representation and language, and was accompanied by insufficient interpretations of its own intention (Vorhaben)." See also the following passages: "Even today it is very hard to imagine the scope of the difficulties which stood in the way of asking the question of being, its point of departure and its development. Within the framework of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of that time, a philosophy had to fulfill the claim of thinking in a Kantian way, critically, transcendentally, if it was to find an audience as a philosophy." (SD, 47/44) "But in order to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy, it could at first be expressed only within the horizon of that existing philosophy and its use of current terms. In the meantime I have learned to see that these very terms were bound to lead immediately and inevitably into error." (WM, 357/235) "What is inappropriate about this beginning of the question lies in the fact that it too much makes possible an understanding of the 'project' as a human accomplishment; accordingly, the project can only the more be taken as a structure of subjectivity - what Sartre does in that he bases himself on Descartes." (S, 335, 344-345) See also Heidegger's marginal note to US, 151 "When it is a question of bringing to language something never before spoken, everything depends upon whether language gives or withholds the appropriate word." "'Time and Being' - the not coming through here in 1923-26 necessitated a reflection on language and - not publishing the first projected parts."

67. David Farrell Krell, *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being*, p. 180, n. 3: "My readers may be astonished that such doubts come so soon. But when I asked Heidegger during my last conversation with him, on
January 31, 1976, precisely when he began to have serious doubts about being able to complete Division Three of Being and Time Part One, he replied, "1925 or 1926." But those are the years when Divisions One and Two were still underway. Heidegger-II put in an appearance before Heidegger-I could write his magnum opus! Perhaps he had already put in an appearance in 1919, as I have suggested in chapter one, in order to expose Jaspers' lack of clarity concerning the 'founding act'. (My conversation with Heidegger is recounted in greater detail in chapter six, below.)" Cf. Krell's Chapter 6.

71. See the stern words of Habermas in his "Die grosse Wirkung," in Philosophisch-politische Profile, 3. Aufl. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), pp. 76-79 (translated as Philosophical-Political Profiles (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 56-58): "At the parting of the ways [after Being and Time], when philosophy sees through the fragility of its original claim and renounces its claim to self-grounding, a question arises regarding the position from which it disputes its heritage - if not from itself. Heidegger might have been able to direct his inquiry back from the ontologically fixed structures of Dasein (the Existenzialien) to the factual experiences drawn from the concrete situation (the Existenzienten). In doing so, he might have been able, in the manner of the critique of ideology, to place philosophy in relation to the history of this situation, to the development of the context of social life. Instead he undertakes the famous 'turning' toward the history of the formally existential components (Existenzialien) themselves, toward the history of Being....Heidegger relativizes philosophy and the subject uselessly grounding itself in terms of ontology in the opposite direction of greater abstraction and less determinacy - against the background history of the dominant disposings of thinking by Being." See also Szilasi's point that whereas in Heidegger's youthful writings human existence "enacts" being, in his later writings being "enacts" human existence: "Philosophy is supposed to be brought to language as a decision not so much within the relation of man to being as within the relation of being to the destiny of man. It is clear that these two tendencies cross. In his youthful years, Heidegger was mostly guided by the first tendency." ("Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," p. 75)
72. See Heidegger's later marginal notes in Being and Time (SZ, 177, c; 56, c; 179, a) and throughout his "Letter on Human-ism." Cf. Heidegger's more concrete definition of "Dasein" in his 1925 lecture course (SZ, 205/152-153).
75. For other passages in which the later Heidegger performs a retrieval of Husserl and indicates the way in which his later thought is still "phenomenology" (even though he no longer uses the word "phenomenology" in the titles of his lecture courses, seminars, essays, and books after 1929), see also SD, 48/45, 90/82; BR, xv-xvii/xiv-xvi; ZP, 47/200-1; WH, 357/235; S, 288/11, 297/18. At S, 399, 417, Heidegger calls his thought the "phenomenology of the inconspicuous" (des Unscheinbaren). See also Bernard Boelen, "Martin Heidegger as Phenomenologist," in Phenomenological Perspectives: Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 93-114; Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 401-407.

76. Taminiaux, "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations," p. 82.

77. Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 351.

78. Cf. Gadamer's critique of the "violence" characterizing Heidegger's use of Pre-Socratic texts (Heidegger's Wege, p. 121).

79. S, 297/18; BR, xv/xiv; SD, 48/45, 85/78; ZP, 47/200; WH, 340/219-220.

80. See Husserl's remark recorded in Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 5: "Husserl characterized Heidegger's Aristotle interpretation as a reading back into Aristotle of an attempt to answer a question which first arose in Husserl's philosophy."

81. Leo Strauss and Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Correspondence Concerning Wahrheit und Methode," The Independent Journal of Philosophy, 2 (1978), p. 10. See Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heidegger, p.353: "In his old age, Heidegger tried to confirm with a wealth of anecdotes that Husserl had never had an original experience of time. If one nevertheless ascribed this experience to Husserl, then Heidegger found here a reading back of the impulses of his thought—for example, regarding the material on pages 229ff. of [Gadamer's] Wahrheit und Methode: 'You have meanwhile no doubt seen Gadamer's book. Regarding what is correct about the relationship of my thinking to Husserl, a few crude errors have arisen, which can be put aside of course only through careful philological work.' See Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode, Second Part, 3, (a) and (b); his three essays on Husserl and the phenomenological movement in his Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 3: Neuere Philosophie, I: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger (Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr, 1987), pp. 105-171. See also ZP, 47/201: "My question about time was determined from the question about being. It went in a direction which has always remained foreign to Husserl's investigations on internal time-consciousness."

82. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 447. Cf. Sternberger, "Dolf Sternberger," p. 18: "Later, Heidegger once said that his book [Being and Time] posed and developed, 'for the first time in the history of philosophy', the question regarding the meaning of Being. I only realized later how alarming this claim was and how conceitedly superhuman."
Notes to Chapter Five, Section III


2. See W. Grundmann, “Martin Heideggers ’Sein und Zeit’ und die christliche Verkündigung,” Die Furchte, 17 (1931), pp. 163-179; Edmund Schlink, “Weisheit und Torheit,” Kerygma und Dogma, 1 (1955), p. 6; Gerhard Wolfgang Ittel, “Der Einfluss der Philosophie M. Heideggers auf die Theologie R. Bultmanns,” Kerygma und Dogma, 2 (1956), p. 92. See Sheehan, “Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,’ 1920-21,” p. 312: “When Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time was born in 1927, its philosophical genealogy was quite obscure....another major influence on the uniqueness of Being and Time lay concealed in the background: Heidegger’s reading of St. Paul and early Christianity ....we are only beginning to gather the evidence which will allow us to document, rather than just surmise, the strong influence which early Christianity exerted on Being and Time.”

3. It is superficial to present Heidegger as a phenomenologist who simply came drifting into the philosophical world in 1927 with his Being and Time, as if it derived from Husserl’s thought like Athena from the head of Zeus. Even Husserl often quite blindly saw Heidegger’s thought only from the point of view of his own phenomenology, writing about the young Privatdozent Heidegger to Rudolf Otto in 1919: “My philosophical effect has something remarkably revolutionary about it: Protestants become Catholic, Catholics become Protestant....” See Edmund Husserl, “Edmund Husserl an Rudolf Otto vom 5. 3. 1919,” in Religion und Christentum in der Theologie Rudolf Ottos, hrsg. Hans-Walter Schütte (Berlin: Verlag Walter der Gruyter, 1969), p. 141. Husserl’s letter has been translated in Sheehan (ed.), Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, pp. 23-26. As has already been noted, Husserl came to see in 1927 that “unfortunately I did not determine his philosophical formation, obviously he was already into his own thing when he studied my writings.” In 1931, he ascribed the divergence of Heidegger’s Being and Time from his own thought to Heidegger’s never having freed himself from his “theological prejudices.” See Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 9. As examples of accounts of the development of Heidegger’s thought which either underestimate or ignore Heidegger’s theological origins, see: David Farrell Krell, “General Introduction: ‘The Question of Being,’” in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 7; Werner Brock, “A Brief Outline of the Career of Martin Heidegger,” in Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being (Indiana: Regnery/Gateway, 1979), pp. 6-10; Arendt, “Martin Heidegger at Eighty,” pp. 293-295; John Sallis, “The Origins of

4. "Destruction and Deconstruction" (public lecture held in 1986 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario).

5. See Husserl, "Edmund Husserl an Rudolf Otto vom 5. 3. 1819," pp. 139, 141: "In that same period, both of them [Heinrich Oxner and Heidegger] underwent radical changes in their basic religious convictions. Truly, both of them are religiously directed personalities... I have not exercised the least influence on Heidegger's and Oxner's migration over to the ground of Protestantism...." See also Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21," pp. 313-314.

6. See Ebbinghaus, "Julius Ebbinghaus," p. 33: "...[Heidegger] had received the Erlanger edition of the works of Luther as a prize or a gift - and so, on the evenings we spent together, we read for a while also into Luther's reformatory writings. Out of this grew [my] essay 'Luther and Kant'..." In the same passage, Ebbinghaus calls the Heidegger around 1923 the "at that time Catholic theologian Heidegger." Together, Ebbinghaus and Heidegger gave the latter's 1923 seminar on Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason*. See Appendix II. See also Heidegger's discussion of Ebbinghaus' unpublished habilitation writing in his 1921-22 lecture (PA, 198-199). In his essay "On Heidegger," pp. 109, 111-112, Jaspers has reported on Heidegger's youthful interest in Luther: "I visited with him, sat alone with him in his rooms, watched him at his Luther studies...." "Through Heidegger, the Christian, and particularly the Catholic, tradition of thinking were made known to me. If not for the first time then, however, with the unusual vigor of a man who stood with his very being in that tradition while at the same time surmounting it. He gave me many isolated, scattered phrases, stories, and hints. I remember how he spoke of Augustine, Thomas, Luther." Even as late as 1961, one finds Heidegger assisting the Luther scholar Gerhard Ebeling in his interpretation of Luther's *Disputatio de Homine*. See Gerhard Ebeling, *Lutherstudien, Bd. II, Disputation de Homine, 1. Teil, Text und Traditionsgrund* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1977), p. ix. At his house in Zähringen, Heidegger engraved the following line from Luther's translation of the bible (Proverbs, 4:23): "Behüte dein Herz mit allen Fleiss; denn daraus geht das Leben," shelter your heart with all vigilance; for from it flows forth life.

8. See Appendix VII.
9. See Appendix II.
15. Quoted in Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 142.
not of course justify me in making any assertion, but neither does it justify any doubt of their assent, since their importance (be it in reality what it may) absolutely does not consist in making any new proposal, any unheard-of discovery, or in forming a new party, or wanting to go further, but, precisely on the contrary, consists in wanting to have no importance, in wanting (at a distance which is the remoteness of double reflection) to read solo the original text of the individual, human existence-relationship, the old text, well known, handed down by the fathers - to read it through yet once more, if possible in a more heartfelt way."

18. Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke, Bd. VI (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1966), p. 458/XLIV, 201. The numbers after the slash indicate the volume and page number of the English edition of Luther's works, which is based on the Weimar edition. See Luther's Works, Vol. 44 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966). However, all translations are my own. All further references to Luther's works will appear with only the division, volume and page number(s) of both the German and English editions indicated. The four divisions of the Weimar edition will be abbreviated as follows: Major Works (WA), Tischreden (WAT), Deutsche Bibel (WADB), Briefwechsel (WAB). The above reference would, therefore, appear in the following form: WA, VI, 458/XLIV, 201.

19. See Rudolf Bultmann's letter (13/5/1955) quoted in Ittel, "Der Einfluss der Philosophie M. Heideggers auf die Theologie R. Bultmann," p. 92: "Heidegger himself has never made a secret of the fact that he was influenced by the New Testament, especially by Paul, by Augustine, and most notably by Luther."

20. See Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 261: "From the beginning, the question of God stands over Heidegger's path of thinking. This way begins with a metaphysical point of departure which, because it goes back to God as the ultimate ground, consequently ends up as a speculative theology. Heidegger opposes this metaphysical theology in the courses which he held after the First World War: the God that metaphysics tries to comprehend, grasp hold of, and lay at the basis of thinking is not the living God of faith nor the God of freedom and of history."

21. Reported in Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 29. See also p. 147: "At that time, Heidegger repeatedly appealed to the church historian Franz Overbeck, the friend of Nietzsche, whose polemical essay on the 'Christianness of theology' expressed Heidegger's own doubt, which animated him. It confirmed completely his philosophical experience of the inappropriateness of the Greek concept of being for the Christian thought of the Eschaton, which is not the awaiting of a coming event."

22. See B2s, 78: "1. 'Introduction: 'Questions of Access to the Phenomenon of Time' is geared to the theological interests of Heidegger's audience. He begins: If we were to hold that the meaning of time is ultimately eternity, then we would have to start from eternity in order to understand time. But further, if 'eternity' does not mean some empty 'foreverness' (as in the Greek aei) but rather means God himself knowable only in faith, then access to eternity and so to an understanding of time is the prerogative of
the man of faith, and the theologian becomes the expert on time. The philosopher, who by nature does not believe, can never use eternity, even for methodological purposes, to gain an insight into time.

But the philosopher does ask about time, and because he does not believe, he asks about it from the viewpoint of time itself. If his questioning has any relation to theology, it can only be that it makes the question of eternity more difficult."

23.Gadamer, *Heidegger's Weg*, p. 29: "The original form *Being and Time* was an address before the Marburg theological community." See Heidegger's reference to this lecture in the second part of *SZ* (356, n. 3/313, n. iii): "These observations and those which follow were communicated as theses on the occasion of a public lecture on the concept of time, which was given at Marburg in July, 1924." This lecture sketches out in rough outline the "two published divisions of *SZ*." (BZs, 79)

24.Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle: Human Being and the Practical life," presented at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Phenomenology, Evanston, Illinois, Oct. 13-15, 1988.) Heidegger's essay "The Concept of Time" is planned for publication in the third division of his *Collected Edition* and is composed of the following sections: I. The Questioning in the Fundamental Tendency of Dilthey and Yorck. - II. The Original Character of the Being of Dasein. - III. Dasein and Temporality. - IV. Temporality and Historicity." See the publisher's prospectus (June, 1987, p. 15). It is probably to this essay that Heidegger is referring in *SZ*, 356, n. 3/313, n. 3 where he says that, in addition to his treatment of temporality and historicity, his analyses of "conscience" and "resoluteness" were communicated in his 1924 lecture "The Concept of Time." His lecture did not deal with the latter two themes.

25.In Heidegger's 1925 course, this statement takes the following form: "From a renewal of faith, i.e., of the fundamental relationship to the reality that it thematizes, theology wishes to push forward to the winning of an original explication of the being of man to God, i.e., to achieve the removal of the fundamental question of man from the traditional system of dogmatics. For this system rests foundationally upon a philosophical system and conceptuality, which has placed on its head both the question of man and the question of God, and all the more the question of the relationship of man to God." (GZ, 6/4) See also Heidegger's statement in 1919: "And even theology...is an individual science. This is clearly shown by the role which the historical, somehow cogiven in the essential character of Christianity itself, plays within this science. I will mention only in passing that to this day neither in Catholic nor in Protestant theology has a methodologically clear concept of this science broken through. Indeed, except for a few imperfect attempts in recent Protestant theology, there exists not even the slightest consciousness that here lies a problem of great importance, which in any case can only be tackled in a methodologically rigorous fashion in the sphere of a problema-
tic that is to be worked out beforehand." (IP, 26)

26. Cf. the phrase from Heidegger's 1921 letter to Karl Löwith, which was quoted above: "[I am] a 'Christian theologian' (with the accent on the logos)."

27. Heidegger's Wege, p. 142. See also pp. 130-131: "If we ask ourselves what Heidegger's real intention was and what led him away from Husserl toward the problem of historicity, it is today very clear that it was not so much the contemporary problematic of historical relativism that preoccupied him as his own Christian heritage. Now that we know more about Heidegger's first lectures and philosophical ventures in the early 1920s, we can see clearly that his criticism of the official Roman Catholic theology of his time kept forcing him more and more to face the question of how an adequate interpretation of Christian faith might be possible. His question became: how can one successfully resist the alien influence of Greek philosophy upon the Christian message, an influence which lay at the basis of twentieth century neo-Scholasticism as well as of classical scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Here his inspiration came from the young Luther; from Augustine, whose thinking he followed up with great admiration; and especially from his absorption in the underlying eschatological current of the Pauline Epistles."

28. Heidegger's Wege, p. 147. See especially p. 151 and especially p. 29: "What Heidegger expressed in his discussion of the Thurneysen address can be traced through to the present day as central motif of his thinking: the problem of language." (cf. p. 32)

29. Heidegger is referring to, among other things, Dilthey's study of Hegel's youthful theological writings in his Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4.

30. The themes of spirit, the ethical will, and history in German Idealism have their roots in Lutheran theology. For Luther's influence on the course of modern German philosophy, see Peter Peterson, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921); Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, (Saint Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing, 1950), pp. 76-112; Werner Eler, "Deutschtum als säkularisiertes Luthertum," in his Morphologie des Luthertums, Bd. II (München, 1932), pp. 145 -158; George Wehrung, "Theologie und deutscher Idealismus," Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie, IX (1931-32), pp. 181-210; Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, 2. Aufl., Bd.1 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961), pp. 10-11. See also Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Great Britain: Penguin books, 1966), p. 121: "Among the Germans one will understand immediately when I say that philosophy has been corrupted by theologian blood. The Protestant is the grandfather of German philosophy....One has only to say the words 'College of Tübingen' to grasp what German philosophy is at bottom - a cunning theology." For Nietzsche's view of Luther and of his influence on German philosophy, see Heinz Bluhm's essays "Das Lutherbild des jungen Nietzsche," "Nietzsche's Idea of Luther in 'Menschliches Allzumenschliches'," "Nietzsche's View of Luther and


33. Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 109: “What is taken in Christianity as having happened once for all in Christ - incarnation, revelation, crucifixion, resurrection - is generalized into the pattern of all nature and history.” See also Ulrich Asendorf, Luther und Hegel: Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung einer neuen systematischen Theologie (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp. 249-284.

34. For the influence of Luther’s theologia crucis on Hamann’s philosophy, see Walter Leibrecht, “Philologia Crucis,” Kerygma und Dogma, 1 (1955), 236-239. See also Hamann’s Schriften, II, hrsg. Friedrich Roth (1821), p. 465-466; III, 145-146.

35. See Stack, Kierkegaard’s Existential Ethics, p. 122-123: “It was Kierkegaard, and not (as is commonly supposed) Heidegger who first applied Christian notions (e.g., conscience and guilt) to states of being of man that have a purely existential significance and are not necessarily related to a religious mode of existence.” See also John W. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975). In SZ, Heidegger notes that the analysis of “anxiety” and “fear” in Augustine, Luther, and especially Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety were carried out “even ontologically (though within narrow limits).” (SZ, 252, n. 3/235, iv; 313, n.6/278, n. vi)

36. See the correspondence between Dilthey and Count Yorck in Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877-1897 (Halle, 1923), pp. 154, 156: “[Count Yorck:] Dogmatics was the attempt to formulate an ontology of the higher, of the historical life...the Christian religion is the highest expression of life....[Dilthey:] All dogmas must be brought on to the level of their universal value for all human life. They were projected in the past within a historically based confinement. If they are freed from this, then they become in fact, if you will, the consciousness of the trans-sensuous and trans-intelligible nature of historicity pure and simple....if the dogmas are untenable in their restriction to the facts of Christian history..., then they in fact express the highest living form of all history. But in this sense, these concepts lose their fixed and exclusive...reference to the person of Jesus, which expressly excludes all other references.” See also Gadamer, “Der Eine Weg Martin
Heideggers," p. 12: "...Heidegger always took sides with Count Yorck against Dilthey. He recognized in him the genuine Lutheran, and his provenance and participation in a sphere of life, which thinks in terms of a historical destiny and rejects the illusion of a new epistemological grounding of the human sciences or philosophy...." On Dilthey's early theological studies and his use of Christian theology, see Misch's account of Dilthey in the introduction to Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften, V. Band: Die Geistige Welt, Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1924), pp. xxii-xxvii; also Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, pp. 34-36.

37. See Jasper's review of Kierkegaard in his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, p. 419: "Here the attempt is to gather together sentences from his various works, to construct, to complete and above all to leave out what appears as irrelevant for our present purpose (e.g., everything 'Christian')."

38. SZ, 180/130; SZ, 165/178; ML, 169/134. Heidegger's refers to a 1916 essay by Scheler in which Scheler attempts to derive philosophical insights from the original "Christian structure of experience" in the New Testament, which, according to Scheler, was preserved against its falsification through the adoption of Greek conceptuality in scholasticism and elaborated further by Augustine and Pascal. Heidegger's whole program of using original Christianity as a model for his transformation of the being-question is anticipated in this essay by Scheler. It undoubtedly had a significant influence on the young Heidegger. See "Liebe und Erkenntnis," in Max Scheler, Liebe und Erkenntnis, 2. Aufl. (Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1970), pp. 24-25: "...it is only in Augustine and the Augustinian tradition up until Malebranche and Pascal that we find serious beginnings for the conceptual understanding of the fundamental Christian experience of the relationship of love and knowledge even in the context of extra-religious problems....they present the first and only attempt to gain also metaphysical and psychological insights from the new Christian structure of experience." See HF, 24-29, where Heidegger discusses the theological influences on Scheler's thought.

39. SZ, 313, n. 6/278, n. vi; 525-533/449-455. See also Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 34-36. But Heidegger's appropriation here was also critical, since he thought that "Kierkegaard's ontology" was also still "dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy" (SZ, 313, n. 6/278, n. vi), and that Dilthey's "ontology of 'life'" remained caught in up an "ocular" and "aesthetic" approach to history and left the concept of "life" in a state of "ontological indifference." (SZ, 278/253) See Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 34.


41. See note 36.
42. See GZ, 391/283: "What is involved here is a pure consideration of structures, which precedes all such [theological] considerations... It is possible, perhaps necessary, that all of these structures will recur in a theological anthropology. I am in no position to judge how, since I understand nothing of such things. I am of course familiar with theology, but it is still quite a way from that to an understanding. Since this analysis time and again incurs this misunderstanding, let me emphasize that it proposes no covert theology and in principle has nothing to do with theology. These structures can just as well determine the mode of being of a man or the idea of a humanity in the Kantian sense...." See also PA, 142 and SZ, 236/224, 222/211, where Heidegger maintains that the application of such concepts as "temptation," "authenticity," and "falling" are not confined to religious experience, or to ethics. See also Gadamer, Heideggers Weg, pp. 147-148; Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21," p. 314; Michael E. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self, p. 13-14. In his "Heidegger's Topology of Being" (in On Heidegger and Language, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 112, Pöggeler writes: "However, Heidegger is not a theologian; the Christian faith is for him only a model of an experience of life and world, an experience that must be able to receive its philosophical legitimation without this model, also." However, Bultmann and others have seen Heidegger's Being and Time as a "secularization" of the New Testament. See Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in Kerygma and Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London: S.P.C.K., 1953), p. 23-25, where Bultmann discusses what he refers to as Count Yorck's, Dilthey's, Jasper's, and Heidegger's attempt to philosophically work out a "demythologized" "Christian understanding of being without Christ" (which Dilthey called a "transcendental theology"): "Above all, Heidegger's existentialist analysis of the ontological structure of being would seem to be no more than a secularized, philosophical version of the New testament view of human life.... Some critics have objected that I am borrowing Heidegger's categories and forcing them upon the New Testament. I am afraid this only shows that they are blinding their eyes to the real problem, which is that philosophers are saying the same things as the New Testament and saying it quite independently."

43. See also SZ, 252, n. 3/235, iv; 313, n. 8/278, n. vi; 447, n. 2/368, n. iii.

44. See also GZ, 292: "This phenomenon of dread is not something invented by me, but has already been seen repeatedly, even though not in its conceptuality. Here I am only trying to provide the conceptuality for the things, which are usually treated in a nebulous way in the sciences, even in theology at times." Cf. SZ, 13-15/30-31. See also IP, 115 and especially PT, 63-64/18-19: "All theological concepts contain that understanding of being in itself, which human Dasein as such has on its own basis, insofar as it exists at all.... Guilt is an original ontological determination of Dasein. The more radically and appropriately the basic constitution of Dasein is brought to light ontologically, e.g., the more..."
originally the concept of guilt is grasped, the more clearly can it function for a guide for the theological explication of sin." Cf. SZ, 406, n. 1/354, n. ii.

In his 1919 lectures, Heidegger speaks of how his "science of the origin" provides the "origins" or "principles" (archai) for the domains of knowledge and "truth" or "value" which had been outlined by Kant and Neo-Kantianism, namely, the logical, the ethical, the aesthetic, and the religious. (IP, 9, 59; PW, 145) In his 1925-26 lecture, he spoke of the necessity of doing justice to the notion of truth in the realm of not only logic, but also ethics and religion. (LW, 7-8)

45. In his Being and Time, Heidegger explains what I mean by an "ontic" model for a universal ontological inquiry: "...there are many ways in which [Dasein] has been interpreted, and these are all at its disposal. Philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, political science, poetry, biography, and historical writings have in different ways and in varying degrees studied the ways of behaviour, capacities, powers, possibilities and Dasein's vicissitudes. But the question remains whether these interpretations of Dasein have been carried through in just as primordially an existential [ontological] manner as they perhaps have been in an originally existentiell [ontic] manner." (22/37) See, for example, Heidegger's treatment of a story from Greek mythology. (261-265/241-244) Heidegger later spoke of how in his youthful period he was concerned with the "analogia proportionalitatis between theology and philosophy: As theology is to the word of God, so thought is to being and language. See US, 91/9; James M. Robinson, "The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger," in The Later Heidegger and Theology, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobbs (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 43. Following Heidegger's youthful interpretations, Gadamer has also taken up Christian theology and Aristotle's ethics as "models" for the "universality of the hermeneutical problem." See his Gesammelte Werke, I, pp. 317-329, 422-431; II, pp. 219-231.


47. See also Walter Bauer, Das Johannesevangelium, 2. Aufl. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1925), p. 18. A. Schlatter, Die Theologie des Neuen Testament, Zweiter Teil: Die Lehre der Apostel (Stuttgart: Verlag der Vereinsbuchhandlung, 1910), pp. 114-120, esp. 120. Heidegger used these studies as a basis for his own investigations (WN, 144, n. 22/53, n. 22) See also Bultmann, "Die Eschatologie des Johannes-Evangelium" (p. 135ff./186ff.), which, as we have already noted, grew out of the study group of the Gospel of John, which Heidegger and Bultmann set up. Finally, see Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp. 46-51, 92-95, which discuss Heidegger's and Bultmann's interpretation of "world" in the Old and
New Testaments, and also pursues Bultmann’s interpretation (in his above cited essay) of the biblical notion of “the world” in terms of Heidegger’s concept of “fallenness.”

48. Heidegger quotes a passage from Augustine: “What does it mean to say: ‘The world was made by Him’? Heaven and earth, sea, and all things which are in them are called the world. Yet in another sense, those who delight in the world are called the world. ‘The world was made by Him, and the world knew him not’. Heidegger glosses: “Thus, ‘world’ means: being in its totality as the definitive how in accordance with which human Dasein positions and holds itself with respect to being.”


50. M.L., 231-232/180: “There is a further ontical concept: ‘world’ here means not nature (inorganic and organic) but means existing humans as existing; it is in this sense that we speak of ‘the wide world’, of a woman or man ‘of the world’. This pre-philosophical concept of world is the ontic-existentiell (or human) concept, in contradistinction to the ontic-natural concept. Anticipating, we can name the fourth concept of world the ontological concept of world that indicates, not human society in an ontical way, but indicates ontologically the metaphysical essence of Dasein as such with respect to its basic metaphysical constitution, i.e., transcendence." Cf. SZ, 87-88/93.

51. IP, 77-84. See also ID, p. 112: “It is the absolutely worldless, the world-alien: it is the sphere where one runs out of breath and cannot live.”

52. See N 2, 399-429/1-26.


55. See Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 41: “It does not immediately result in a merely represented and dead God, but the development to this final end is brought on by the adoption of metaphysical conceptuality, and indeed forced upon us. Heidegger later draws attention to the consequences which consist in the fact that the man who values and enjoys God, also one day – through Nietzsche – in a revaluation of all values lifts his hand against the merely represented God, who has been relegated to the peace and repose of a dead eternity, and ’kills’ the long since ‘dead’ God.” See GA 43, 192, where Heidegger says that “Nietzsche, apart from Hölderlin, was the only man of faith in the nineteenth century.” See also ID, 140/72; “...causa sui. This is the right name for the
god of philosophy. Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe, nor can he play music and dance before this god."

56. WM, 349/228: "Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing....When one proclaims 'God' as the 'highest value', this is a degradation of God's essence."

57. Husserl understood Heidegger's lectures on Christianity and also Rudolf Otto's book The Holy as "phenomenology of religion" (regional ontology). In a letter to Otto in 1919, Husserl outlined his understanding of how such an inquiry would have to proceed: "Above all, one would need to carry out a radical distinction: between accidental factum and the eidos. One would need to study the eidetic necessities and eidetic possibilities of religious consciousness and of its correlate. One would need a systematic eidetic typification of the levels of religious data, indeed in their eidetically necessary development. It seems to me that the metaphysician (theologian) in Herr Otto has carried away on its wings Otto the phenomenologist, and in that regard I think of the image of the angels who cover their eyes with their wings." See Husserl, "Edmund Husserl an Rudolf Otto vom 5. 3. 1919," pp. 141-142. See also Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21," pp. 323-324. The point of the young Heidegger's lectures on original Christianity was precisely to show that the "content" of Christian experience ("faith") is not a free-floating "idea", a "what" which is instantiated into the "that," but rather the unique factual and historical meaning of the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ.


59. Pöggeler's report on this lecture indicates that Heidegger discussed Luther's nineteenth and twentieth theses, which form the centre of his Heidelberg Disputation. (APp, 40)

60. Wa, I, 361/XXXI, 52. All further references to Luther's Heidelberg Disputation will appear in the text under the abbreviation HD.


64. Plato also calls the "ideas" "more being" (mallon onta), "complete being" (pantelos on), and "pure being" (heilikrinos on). See Republic, 515 d, 477 a, 478 d.
65. See also F. Joseph Smith, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian Interpretation," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, pp. 195-197.

66. See the later Heidegger's interpretation of doxa, "glory," as a name for the being of beings in Greek thought (EH, 110/102-103): "Doxa means appearance, look (Ansehen), namely the appearance and look in which something stands. If the appearance and look, in accordance with what emerges in it, is a distinguished one, doxa means splendour and glory. In hellenistic theology and in the New Testament, doxa theou, gloria Dei, is the glory of God. To glorify, to attribute appearance and reputation (Ansehen), and to show it means in Greek: to place in the light and thus endow with permanence, being. For the Greeks, glory was not something additional which one might or might not obtain; it was the mode of the highest being. For moderns, glory has long been nothing more than celebrity and as such a highly dubious affair, an acquisition tossed about and distributed by the newspapers and the radio—almost the opposite of being.... for Pindar glorifying makes up the essence of poetry and is poetizing: placing into the light...." For the meaning of doxa in Greek philosophy and culture, see Liddel and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon. For the meaning of doxa and doxa theou in the New Testament, see Walter Bauer, Griechisch-Deutsch Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur, 5. Aufl. (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Topelmann, 1958), pp. 403-405. For the notion of gloria and doxa in Greek and Roman thought and culture, see Wilhelm Kamlah, Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit, 2. Aufl. (Stuttgart, Köln: W. Kohlhammer, 1951), ch. 6, "Der Drang nach Ruhm."

67. Luther translates Paul's word kauchesis (boasting) as gloriatio (boasting, glorying). See HD, 363/54.


69. Cf. Scheler, "Liebe und Erkenntnis," pp. 8-11, 18: "...a radical reversal of love and knowledge and of value and being is enacted in Christian experience. Elsewhere, I called this the 'reversal of the movement' of love, such that the Greek axiom is no longer valid, which sees love as a movement of the low to the high, of not-being (me on) to true being (ontos on), of man to the non-loving God, and of the bad to the good, but rather the loving descent of the high to the low, of God to man, of the sacred to the sinful....According to the early and genuine Christian understanding, there is in no sense whatsoever an 'idea', a 'law', a 'substantial value' or a 'reason' over and above the personal figure [of Christ], according to which this personal figure could still be evaluated and with which this personal figure could 'correspond' in order to be recognized as 'sacred'. Christ does not 'have' the truth, he 'is' it, and indeed in his complete concreteness."

Scheler discusses the major directions of the New Testament's "reversal" of the Greek philosophical distinction between ontos on (idea, pure mind, knowledge) and me on (concreteness, the person,
mood, interest, love), and discusses also how this reversal was in turn reversed through the adoption of Greek conceptuality in scholasticism. See also Scheler’s essay “Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen,” Kap. III, in Max Scheler, Vom Umsturz der Werte, 4. Aufl. (Bern: Francke, 1955). This essay has been translated as Ressentiment, trans. W.W. Holdheim (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). In this essay, Scheler critically discusses Nietzsche’s interpretation of the Christian “revaluation of all values” as the expression of the “ressentiment” of the weak, the suffering, and the enslaved against the aristocratic values of the Graeco-Roman world. Nietzsche himself attempted to revive these Graeco-Roman values of “the stronger” with his notion of the “will to power.”

71.Cf. Homer, Odyssey, xvii, 454.
72. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099 b: “...there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness and blessedness, such as good birth (eugeneia), good children, and beauty; for the man who is very ugly in form and appearance (idean) or low born (dusgenes) or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy....”
73. “They elevate their own opinion so high into the heavens that it no longer is difficult for them and no longer causes timidity for them to make judgments about God in the same way that a poor shoemaker makes a judgment about his leather.” Quoted in Helbig, Theologie des Kreuzes, p. 247.
74. In his Dr. Zhivago, Pasternak adopts as a metaphor the narrative of the Gospels in order to express what he saw as the underlying reality of the emergence of the Russian communist state, namely, the conflict between the impersonal power of the state and the concrete “life of the individual”: “What you don’t understand is that it is possible to be an atheist, it is possible not to know if God exists or why He should, and yet to believe that man does not exist in a state of nature but in history, and that history as we know it began with Christ, it was founded by Him on the Gospels.... There was no history in this sense in the classical world. There you had blood and beastliness and cruelty and pox-marked Caligualas untouched by the suspicion that any man who enslaves others is inevitably second-rate. There you had the boastful dead eternity of bronze monuments and marble columns.... It was only after Him that men began to live in their posterity and ceased to die in ditches like dogs - instead, they died at home in history....” "Those cosmogonies belong to the ancient world - a world peopled so sparsely that nature was not yet overshadowed by man... Rome was a flea market of borrowed gods and conquered peoples, a bargain basement on two tiers - earth and heaven-slaves on one, gods on the others.... And then, into this tasteless heap of gold and marble, He came, light-footed and clothed in light, with his marked humanity, his deliberate Galilean provincialism, and from that moment there were neither gods nor peoples, only man - man the carpenter, man the ploughman, man the shepherd at sunset...." "What the Gospels tell us is that in this new way of
life and of communion, which is born of the heart and which is called the Kingdom of God, there are no nations, but only persons....It's the mystery of the personality ...." See Boris Pasternak, Dr. Zhivago, trans. M. Hayward and M. Harari (Montreal: Fontana Books, 1965), pp. 18, 50, 126.

75. WA, L, 590.
76. WA, I, 613/XXXI, 225.
79. Nitzsch, Luther und Aristoteles, pp. 3-4, 19, 35ff.
80. WA, VI, 458/XLIV, 201: "No one can accuse me of over stating the case, or of condemning what I do not understand. Dear friend, I know very well what I am talking about. I know my Aristotle as well as you or the likes of you. I have lectured on him and been lectured on him, and I understand him better than Thomas or Duns Scotus. I can boast about it without pride, and if necessary, I can prove it. It makes no difference to me that so many great minds have devoted their labor to him for so many centuries. Such objections do not disturb me as once they did, for it is plain as day that other errors have remained for even more centuries in the world and in the universities."
81. For Luther's early study of Aristotle and Aristotelian Scholasticism in general, see Peterson, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie in protestantischen Deutschland, pp. 33-34; Gerhard Ebeling, Lutherstudien, Bd. II, Disputatio De Homine, 2. Teil, Die philosophische Definition des Menschen (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1982), p. 73.
82. WAB I, 359/XLVIII, 112.
83. See Luther's letter to John Lang in 1517 (WAB I, 88/XLVII, 36): "I wish nothing more fervently than to disclose to many the true face of that actor who has fooled the church so tremendously with the Greek mask, and to show to them all his ignominy, had I only time. I am working on a small commentary on Book One of the Physics with which I am determined to enact the story of Aristaeus against this, my Protheus....All my cupboards are filled with material against these books, which I consider quite useless. All others could see this too, if they would not be bound by the eternal law of silence...."
84. See Luther's statement on the purpose of his Heidelberg Disputation (WA, IX, 170/I, 70): "These theses were discussed and debated by me to show, first, that everywhere the sophists of all
the schools have deviated from Aristotle's opinion and have clearly introduced their dreams into the works of Aristotle whom they do not understand. Next, if we should hold to his meaning as strongly as possible (as I proposed here), nevertheless one gains no aid whatsoever from it, either for theology and sacred letters or even for natural philosophy.

85. The Weimar edition of Luther's works apparently does not contain the "proofs" for Luther's first two theses, but they have been published in Martin Luther, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. XVIII, hrsg. J.G. Walsch (Saint Louis, 1888), pp. 69-71.

86. WA, I, 225/XXXI, 12.


88. Quoted in Nitzsch, Luther und Aristoteles, pp. 32, 6.

89. WA, IX, 170/I, 70. Luther states that the purpose of his Heidelberg Disputation was to prove this point. See his thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth and fortieth philosophical theses: "Aristotle wrongly finds fault with and derides the ideas of Plato, which actually are better than his own." "The imitation of numbers in things is ingeniously maintained by Pythagoras, but even more ingenious is the participation of ideas maintained by Plato." "The disputation of Aristotle lashes out against Parmenides's one...in a battle of air." "For Aristotle privation, matter, form, movable, immovable, act, potentiality, etc. appear to be the same."

90. WAB, I, 359/XLVIII, 112.

91. WA, VI, 457/XLIV, 201.

92. WA, LVI, 371-72/XXV, 361-62. This passage is from Luther's Lectures on the Letter to the Romans. It has been reported that "in his preparations for his book Being and Time, the early Heidegger was strongly influenced by Luther's lecture on the Letter to the Romans." See Schlink, "Weisheit und Torheit," p. 6.


94. See, for example, WA, VI, 457/XLIV, 201: "What else are the universities, unless they are utterly changed from what they have been hitherto, than what the book of Maccabees calls gymnasia epheborum et graecae gloriae, in which loose living is practiced, where little is taught of the Holy Scripture and Christian faith, and where only the blind heathen master Aristotle rules....my advice would be that Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, De Anima, and Ethics...should be completely discarded with all the rest of his books which glorify in nature...."

95. See Schlink, "Weisheit und Torheit," pp. 6, 16-22: "How did Luther think of genuine philosophy?....Even if Luther provided no systematic unfolding of his point of departure in a philosophical work of his own, there are nonetheless many statements to be found scattered about in his writings, which give an answer to the
question about the development of genuine philosophizing. This is especially true of his remarks on secular law, politics and history....The discussion of the question raised above cannot, however, remain content with collecting and analyzing Luther's statements about philosophy, reason, logic, grammar, nature, history, etc., nor with working out the steps of thought and the justifications by means of which Luther came to these statements. Beyond this, one has to take into consideration the fact that Luther...made far-reaching breakthroughs against the conceptuality and forms of thinking which until then had been taken as self-evident -breakthroughs, which also disclosed new structures and possibilities of understanding and speaking for the problems of space and time, existence and history....In part, they are, to be sure, still today awaiting their philosophical unfolding." "Luther's paradoxes carried out an attack on the basic ontological structure of Aristotelian thought, and it permeated the core of the Aristotelian-scholastic form of thought with historical-existential thinking. Therefore, it is not accidental that the early Heidegger was so strongly influenced by Luther's lecture on the Letter to the Romans in his work before Being and Time. To be sure, Heidegger's existential analytic of human Dasein is a radical secularization of Luther's anthropology...."

96. Luther, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XVIII (St. Louis, 1888), p. 71.

97. For this point, and for Luther's appreciation and use of Aristotle, see Nitzsch, Luther und Aristoteles, pp. 25-34; Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, pp. 12-14; Ebeling, Luther, pp. 89-92. Ebeling argues that Luther defends the "true Aristotle" against the scholastic misinterpretations.

98. See also Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, pp. 24-75; Peterson, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie in protestantischen Deutschland, pp. 17-218; Schlink, "Torheit und Weisheit," pp. 7-12. Luther himself used the terms "fruitio Dei." See Lehmann, "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," p. 157.

99. See also Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, pp. 15, 113-120.

100. SZ, 313, n. 6/235, n. iv; 338, n. 2/388, n. iii. See also PA, 93, where Heidegger likewise rejects the language of "soul" and "body" which Pascal has taken over from Greek thought.

101. What the young Heidegger wanted to prevent in theology was the "theorization" and "de-worlding" of the "content-meaning" (God) of Christian experience, which had taken place through the adoption of the foreign conceptuality of Greek philosophy. See WU, 207: "The historian of religion is occupied with Jesus in just the way that he is experienced in devoutness. The figure of Jesus remains preserved as a religious figure. Here we have a minimum of theorization." (cf. IP, 65) For Heidegger's destruction of the traditional notion of the "content-meaning" of God as substantia and ens increatum, see GZ, 233/173; SZ, 33/46, 123/125. See also PA, 197, where Heidegger ridicules the attempt to approach the religious through speculative thought: "Questionableness is not religious, but rather is able to lead one in the first place at all
into the situation of a religious decision. I do not comport myself religiously in philosophizing, even if as a philosopher I can also be a religious man. 'But the art lies here': to philosophize and thereby to be genuinely religious, i.e., to take up factically one's worldly, historical task in philosophizing, in action and in a concrete world of action, not in religious ideology and fantasy. In its radical self-supporting questionableness, philosophy must in principle be a-theistic. On account of its basic tendency, it cannot presume to have and to define God. The more radical it is, the more definitely is it away from him, the more therefore is it precisely an ownmost difficult 'with' (bei) him precisely in the radical enactment of the 'away' (weg). For the rest, it may not ruin itself through speculation (verspekulieren) on this, but rather has its work (ihr 'Sach') to do. Heidegger's reference to "skepticism" recalls his early interest in Franz Overbeck's Christian skepticism.

For Heidegger's retrieve of Christian theology in terms of "original Christianity," see his 1927 Tübingen address "Phenomenology and Theology," which he delivered before the Protestant Theological Faculty: "For the 'Christian faith', what is primarily revealed to faith [its positum, its given], and only to it, and which as revelation first gives rise to faith, is Christ, the crucified God." (52/9) "...systematic theology is in its essence New Testament Theology." (57/13) "Theology is not speculative knowledge of God." (PT, 59/15)

102. See Max Müller, Existenzphilosophie im Geistigen Leben der Gegenwart (Heidelberg: F.H. Kerle Verlag, 1964), pp. 233-234: "What is important is not so much to investigate to what extent Heidegger's thought is based on that of Aristotle, but rather the real question is why, in spite of his great respect for Aristotle and constant appeal to him, Heidegger believed himself compelled to abandon Aristotle." See also Otto Pöggeler, "Heideggers Neubestimmung des Phänomenbegriffs," p. 130: "In contrast to my presentation in 1963, it has been argued that in this phase of Heidegger's thinking not only Augustine and Luther, but rather also Aristotle was discussed in an essential way. This is correct...but one has to ask how Heidegger took up Aristotle at that time, such that he could read him together with Luther and Augustine. This early Aristotle-interpretation is completely different just as much from the one inspired by Brentano as from Heidegger's later interpretation after 1930." Cf. Pöggeler's "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger," p. 166: "...his investigations of Aristotle as the teacher of the West took their point of departure from the polemic which Luther had unfolded against Aristotelianism."

103. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," p. 11. Heidegger is quoting from Luther's To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (WA, VI, 457-458/XLIV, 201): "What are the universities but places where free living is practiced, where little is taught of the Holy Scriptures and Christian faith, and where only the blind, heathen master Aristotle rules far more than Christ? In this regard my advice would be that Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, De Anima, and Ethics...should be discarded along with the rest of his books
which glorify in nature....It grieves me to the quick that this damned arrogant mischievous heathen has deluded and made fools of so many of the best Christians with his false words....This dead heathen has conquered, obstructed, and almost succeeded in suppressing the books of the living God....his book on ethics is the worst of all books."

104.Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, 145. Cf. pp. 31, 95. See also Gadamer, Philosophische Lehrjahre, p. 24, which also mentions the "Old Testament" as having been discussed by Heidegger.


"...in great endurance; in troubles, hardships, and distresses; in beatings, imprisonments, and riots; in hard work, sleepless nights and hunger....genuine, yet regarded as imposters; known, yet regarded as unknown; dying, and yet we live; beaten, yet not killed; sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; poor, yet making many rich; having nothing, yet possessing everything." See also Lehmann, "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," pp. 144-145.

106.Quoted in Jaspers, Die Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, pp. 418, 384, 419. The passage from p. 384 can be found in Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 268. See also Jaspers, loc. cit., pp. 106-107: "The individual becomes conscious of himself as this specific individual with these talents, these tendencies, these drives, these passions, under the influence of these specific environment, as this specific product of a specific milieu. Who becomes so conscious of himself, takes over all this together into his responsibility." For the theme of factical existence in Kierkegaard and Heidegger's appropriation of this theme, see Schrag, Existence and Freedom, Ch. 1.

107.However, Heidegger writes that Kierkegaard was primarily a theological writer, and that his philosophical conceptuality was unfortunately dominated by Hegel: "But the presuppositions, point of departure, the manner of execution, and the goal are fundamentally different, because he made it too easy for himself. Basically, nothing was for him in question except one's own reflection, which he pursued. He was a theologian and stood within faith, fundamentally outside of philosophy. The present situation is a different one." (HF, 30) "The very specifically motivated stubbornness of dialectic is documented most sharply in Kierkegaard. In his actual philosophical viewpoint he did not free himself from Hegel....His reading of the paradox into the New Testament and into what is Christian is simply negative Hegelianism. But what he wanted (phenomenally) is something else." (HF, 41)

108.Heidegger refers to Jasper's detailed "review of Kierkegaard" (pp. 419-432), as well as to Jasper's discussion of Kierkegaard's treatment of "time" (pp. 106-117) (SZ, 447, n. 2/308, n. iii) and was influenced also by Jasper's discussions of other Kierkegaardian concepts ("anxiety," "death," "conscience," "guilt,"
"dispersion," "curiosity," being closed off," "becoming manifest," "indirect communication"). Heidegger was intimately familiar with Jaspers’s book, since, as previously noted, he wrote a long unpublished review of it between 1919 and 1921. Indeed, in his "review," Heidegger actually worked out his whole philosophical program by means of this dialogue with Jaspers and Jasper’s appropriation of Kierkegaard. See also Sz, 399, n. 7/348, n. xv, where Heidegger acknowledges the decisive influence of Jasper’s book on his own thought: "Here the question of 'what man is' is raised and answered in terms of what he essentially can be (cf. the foreword to the first edition). From this viewpoint, the basic existential ontological significance of [Jasper’s notion of] 'limit-situations’ [e.g., "passionate suffering," "struggle," "death," "accident," "guilt"] is illuminated. The philosophical tendency of The Psychology of World-Views is completely overlooked, if one 'uses' it merely as a reference-work for 'types of world-view'." 109.Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, pp. 245-246, 386.

110.Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 481.
111.See PA, 24-61, where Heidegger discusses "being-meaning" in terms of "verhalten zu" (comportment to, relating to) and "sich verhalten" (comporting oneself, relating oneself) with its three moments of "content-meaning," "relational meaning," and "enactment-meaning.” Heidegger’s concluding definition of ontology sounds like a highly formalized restatement of Kierkegaard’s notion of "subjective truth": "Philosophy is principally knowing comportment to beings as being (Seiendem als Sein) (being-meaning), and in such a manner that, in the comportment and for it, it is also decisively a matter of the being (being-meaning) at any time of the having of the comportment.” (60) Indeed, Heidegger here appeals directly to Kierkegaard’s concept of "passion and suffering": "Existentially-philosophically, the genuine principle is only to be won in the fundamental experience of passion and suffering (Leidenschaft). Here it is unilluminated. 'In principle', outwardly, 'without passion', in reflection is lost. Principally no 'preservation'. 'In principle' one can be and have everything (Kierkegaard)." (24, 37, 71) In a detailed textual exposition of Plato’s dialogues, Heidegger also appeals to Socrates’ understanding of the philosophical quest after being and truth as a "way of life." (42-52) Here Heidegger is no doubt following Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates as the existential thinker of "subjective truth" par excellence. See Jasper’s discussion of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates in his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, p. 246. See also PA, 182, where Heidegger’s motto from Kierkegaard expresses the distinction between "objective" and "subjective truth."

112.For the notion of "care" in the New Testament, see Burdach, "Faust und die Sorge," Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 1 (1923), pp. 46-48. Heidegger refers to this article in his discussion of the above notion. (SZ, 418-419/302-303; Sz, 264, n. 3/243, n. vii) See also Bauer, Griechisch-Deutsch Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen


114. loc. cit., pp. 146/236.

115. See Scheler, "Liebe und Erkenntnis," pp. 24-25, 26: "What one calls the primacy of the will in Augustine is in fact the primacy of love, the primacy of the act of love just as much before knowledge as before striving and willing, and is at the same time the primacy of acts which take an interest... before acts of sensuous perception, of imagination, of memory and of thought, i.e., before all those acts which provide pictorial and meaning contents ('ideas')... love and taking an interest - in the last analysis: directedness... to the 'well-being' and 'salvation' of one's own soul and the souls of others - is for him the most fundamental tendency of the human spirit..." "...the origin of all intellectual acts and of the pictorial and meaning contents belonging to them...is essentially and necessarily connected with acts of taking interest and acts of attention guided by this taking interest, and in the final analysis with acts of love and of hate.... For Augustine, these acts are not merely added to emotive, perceptual, etc. contents already previously given to consciousness, such that this data would be owing to a pure intellectual activity. Rather, taking an interest 'in something', love 'for something' are the most primary acts which found all other acts. It is only in this taking interest and love that our spirit grasps at all any 'possible' object." Scheler states that for Augustine this "founding" is threefold, since it is interest which motivates any act whatsoever, determines the "direction" or "choice" from among the possible objects, and underlies the "increase" or decrease of the givenness of the object. As we shall see later, Augustine's position can be seen as a restatement of the opening line of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: "All technical knowledge and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good...."

Heidegger's reading of the notion of care in Augustine was probably mediated through Scheler's above-mentioned article from 1916, to which Heidegger often alludes without giving a citation. (GZ, 222/165; SZ, 185/178; ML, 169/134) Burdach's article on care does not discuss Augustine, and it was not published until 1923.
But in 1925 Heidegger noted that his discovery of the notion of care in Augustine goes back to the year 1918. (GZ, 418/302)

116. See HD, 361/51: "...one urges him to seek medical care (cura). To say that we are nothing and constantly sin when we do the best we can does not mean that we cause people to despair (unless we are fools), but rather we make them concerned (sollicitus) about the grace of the lord Jesus Christ." See also Luther's commentary on 1 Moses 3:19 ("By the sweat of your brow you will earn your bread until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are dust, and to dust you will return"), in which he discusses the various forms of "care" (cura). (WA, XLII, 157-160/I, 210-215) For Heidegger's references to Luther's commentary on 1 Moses, with which he was intimately familiar, see PA, 182; GZ, 404/292; SZ, 252, n. 3/235, n. iv.


118. See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 268: "Abstract thought is disinterested; but the difficulty inherent in existence constitutes the interest of the existing individual, who is infinitely interested in existing." For Kierkegaard's meditations on the New Testament concept of "care" (the German translations of Kierkegaard's texts here use Sorge), see his "The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air," in Soren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 311-356; "The Anxieties of the Heathen," in loc. cit., pp. 7-93. For Heidegger's familiarity with these essays, see Gadamer's recollection from 1924 of Heidegger's study of "The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air": "Einzug in Marburg," in Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, hrsg. Neske, p. 111: "The first time that Heidegger invited the students from his seminar to Schwanallee 21 has remained fresh in my memory: light-hearted playfulness in the garden, and then, indoors, Heidegger read from one of Kierkegaard's "Religious Discourses" ("Behold the Lilies of the Field"), which at that time had recently been published." See also SZ, 313, n. 6/278, n. iv: ...there is more to be learned from his 'edifying' writings than from his theoretical ones...." See also George J. Stack, "Kierkegaard and Subjective Concern," Journal of Thought, 9 (1974), pp. 95-103; Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics, pp. 55ff.

119. See the following passages: "It was seven years ago [1918], while I was investigating these structures in conjunction with my attempts to arrive at the ontological foundations of Augustinian anthropology, that I first came across the phenomenon of care." (GZ, 418/302) "In its widest sense, the relational meaning of life is: being anxious about one's 'daily bread' (sorgen um)." (PA, 90) See also PA, 93; SZ, 59/69. See also George J. Stack, "Concern in Kierkegaard and Heidegger," Philosophy Today, 13
120. See also Matth. 7:24, 10:16, 24:45, 25:2-13; Luke 1:17, 16:8; Rom. 12:16; 1 Cor. 10:15; Eph. 1:8. See also Bauer, Griechisch-Deutsch Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur, pp. 1713-1714; Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp. 52-64.

121. See also 2 Cor. 8:16, Rom. 2:5; Bauer, Griechisch-Deutsch Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur, under kardia; Hcqua.J.rie, An Existentialist Theology, pp. 75-76.


123. Confessions, XI, 27. This passage is quoted by Heidegger in BZs, 79, and the translation of affectio with Befindlichkeit is his own.


126. See Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, pp. 78-82.

127. See WU, 211; GZ, 222/165; SZ, 185/178: "What we have set forth here as the in-being of Dasein and characterized in detail is the ontological fundament for what Augustine and above all Pascal already noted. They called that which actually knows not knowing but love and hate." "Scheler, accepting the challenges of Augustine and Pascal, has guided the problematic to a consideration of the relationship of founding between acts which 'represent' and acts which 'take an interest'."

128. See Lehmann, "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," p. 145: "What Heidegger means by, for example, 'anxiety' in an existential sense, is shown by Paul factically-existentially-ontically in his accounts of privations, suffering, homesickness, maltreatments, dangers, brushes with death, night watches, punishments and stays in prison: exhausted by hunger and thirst, in many fasts, in the cold and nakedness, 'in life given over to death' [2 Cor. 4:11].... 'Distress came over us, according to outer battles and inner anxieties'. [2 Cor. 8:4]" For the notion of anxiety in the New Testament, see also Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp. 64-68.

129. For the following, see A.W. Hunzinger, Das Furchtproblem in der katholischen Lehre von Augustin bis Luther, Lutherstudien, 2. Heft, 1. Abteilung (Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuch-
handlung, 1908, pp. 5-42, which deals with Augustine. Heidegger cites this work in GZ, 394/285. Heidegger notes that Augustine's distinction between "pure fear" and "servile fear" is to be found in his "exegetical writings and his letters." (SZ, 252, n. 3/235, n. iv) See also Augustine, De Diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 33 ("On dread" (De Metu)), 34 ("Must nothing else be loved but freedom from fear?"); 35 ("What ought to be loved?"), in Corpus Christianorum, XXXII (Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, mcmlxxv), pp. 47-53. Translated as Eighty-Three Different Questions, trans. David L. Mosher, in The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 70 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), pp. 62-67. Heidegger refers to this work in GZ, 404/232; SZ, 252, n. 3/235, iv.


130. See Augustine, De Diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 33: "...there is no fear except of a future and immanent evil."

131. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II1, 44, art. 2, 4: "...fear makes men deliberate". [Aristotle] ....There are two ways one may be said to deliberate. The first is derived from a willingness or concern (sollicitudine) to deliberate. In this sense fear makes one deliberate.....When fear is intense a man wants to deliberate but his thinking is so disturbed that deliberation cannot touch him. If the fear is slight it will be conducive to concernful deliberation...." "St Paul exhorts the Philippians, With fear and trembling work out your salvation. He would not have said that if fear prevented one from acting well....Fear then will make a man more concernful and more attentive to what he is doing and to the need for deliberation."

132. Augustine uses the term metus to cover a whole range of moods from simple fear to terror.


134. WA, XLII, 129/I, 172.

135. WA, XLII, 127-128/I, 170-171. See also Luther's description of his own experience on p. 134/179-180: "This is why the state of the church was so horrifying under the pope. Then nothing was seen or heard which could encourage a heart in such distress, except that each year the story of the Passion was told, though quite indifferently. This faintly indicated where pardon was to be sought. Everything else led away from the promise of the forgiveness of sins toward one's own righteousness. And so in many monasteries we saw stricken and despairing people passing the whole temporal course of their lives and in the end wearing themselves out in the conflict by cares (curi) and worries....Thus these wretched people wasted away in their grief of soul without hope,
without counsel, and without help. Is this not a situation filled with horror (horroris)?" See also Luther’s treatment of fear in his Heidelberg Disputation (theses 4, 7-12, 17-18). For Heidegger’s reference to ch. 3 of Luther’s Commentary on Genesis, see also SZ, 190, n. 3/235, n. iv: "Luther has treated the problem of fear not only in the traditional context of an interpretation of ‘penitence’ and ‘contrition,’ but also in his commentary on Genesis, where, though his treatment is by no means highly conceptualized, it is all the more impressive as edification."

136. Heidegger does not indicate a specific edition, but in SZ, 5, n. 4/23, n. iv; 185, n. 3/178, n. v, he refers twice to the Brunschvicg edition from which I have been quoting. All but one of the following passages from Pascal are found in Pensées I-VII in the Brunschvicg edition.

137. Pensées., p. 387/36.
141. loc. cit., 428/95 (trans. Krailsheimer). See also the following passages from Pascal’s Pensées: "...the sole cause of man’s unhappiness is that he does not know how to abide quietly in his room. A man wealthy enough for life’s needs would never leave home to go to sea or besiege some fortress if he knew how to stay happily at home....men seek after conversations and amusing pastimes only because they cannot remain happily at home." (390/67 [trans. Krailsheimer])

"A man enjoying a happy home-life has only to see a woman who attracts him, or spend five or six pleasant days gambling, and he will be very sorry to go back to what he was doing before. It happens everyday." (387/50 [trans. Krailsheimer])

"Man knows not where he belongs. He is plainly lost, and fallen from his proper place irrecoverably. He goes seeking it on all sides in anxiety, without success, in impenetrable darkness." (487/81 [trans. Stewart])

"I see nothing but infinities on every side, closing me in as if I were an atom or a shadow which lasts but a moment and returns no more." (418/105 [trans. Stewart])

"When I consider the brief span of my life absorbed into the eternity which comes before and after - as the remembrance of a guest that tarries but a day [Wisdom 5:15] - the small space I occupy and which I see swallowed up in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I know nothing and which know nothing of me, I am afraid and am amazed to see myself here rather than there, now rather than then. Who put me here? By whose command and act were this time and place allotted to me?" (325/48 [trans. Krailsheimer])


143. The Concept of Anxiety, p. 44.
144. loc. cit., p. 86.
145. loc. cit., p. 61.
146. loc. cit., p. 81.

147. See Either/Or, Vol. I, pp. 282, 36: "What wonder, then, that the world goes from bad to worse, and that its evils increase more and more, as boredom increases, and boredom is the root of all evil....The gods were bored, and so they created man. Adam was bored because he was alone, and so Eve was created. Thus boredom entered the world, and increased in proportion to the increase of population. Adam was bored alone; then Adam and Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve and Abel were bored en famille; then the population of the world increased, and the peoples were bored en masse." "How terrible tedium is - terribly tedious....The only thing I see is emptiness, the only thing I move about in is emptiness." See also Schrag, Existence and Freedom, pp. 81-88.

148. See SZ, 252, n. 3/235, n. iv: "It is no accident that the phenomena of anxiety and fear, which have never been distinguished in a thoroughgoing manner, have come within the purview of Christian theology ontically and even ontologically (though within very narrow limits). This has happened whenever the anthropological problem of man's being towards God has won priority and when questions have been formulated under the guidance of phenomena like faith, sin, love, and repentance." See also GZ, 404-405/292: "Here I am only trying to provide the concepts for things which are usually treated in a nebulous way in the sciences, and also at times in theology....The foregoing reflections on dread which we have just cited [by Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard] suffer from the basic deficiency of not really seeing the conceptual, existential structure of Dasein...." See also PA, 93: "The movement of factual life can be interpreted and described in a eminent manner as anxious restlessness (Unruhe). . . . cf. Pascal, Pens. I-VII; his description is valuable, but not his theory and preconception; above all: soul - body, le voyage éternel, not adequate in this form." In this text, the word Heidegger coins for anxiety—"Horrescenz" (PA, 138) - is taken from the Latin term horror, which is often found in the theological authors that Heidegger cites above, and especially in ch. 3 of Luther's Lectures on Genesis. This text contains several other German words coined by Heidegger from the Latin language (e.g., "Ruinanz" [ruinance, ruination] from ruere, to fall down, to collapse, to ruin; "Destruktion" [destruction] from destruire, to pull down, to dismantle, to unbuild; "das Tentative" [the tempting] from temptare, to tempt; "das Quietive" [the quietive] from quiescere, to rest, to be at peace, to sleep; "Larvanz" from larva, mask) (PA, 131, 67, 107, 140) It is to be
assumed that Heidegger also derived these terms from his reading of Latin theological texts. For Heidegger’s retrieval of the Christian notion of anxiety in especially Paul and Kierkegaard, see Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp. 64-77; Schrag, Existence and Freedom, pp. 67-94.

149. See Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, p. 42: "But what effect does nothing have? It begets anxiety... I must point out that [anxiety] is altogether different from fear and similar concepts that refer to something definite, whereas anxiety is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility." See also Pascal, Pensées, pp. 420/107, 417/105 (trans. Stewart): "Nothing is so important to man as his condition, nothing so formidable to him as eternity; and so it is quite unnatural that there should be men careless as to the loss of their being, and in peril of an eternity of woe. They behave quite differently with regard to everything else; mere trifles alarm them; they foresee them, they feel them; and the same man who spends whole nights and days in rage and despair over the loss of office or some imaginary affront to his honour is he who, without anxiety or emotion, knows that he will forfeit all by death." "...this feeling [of horror over one’s indifference] should spring from a maxim of human interest, and interest of self-love...." See GZ, 394/285: "Theologically, the problem of fear is of special significance in connection with the theory of repentance, penance, love toward God, which itself grounds fear. For an orientation, I refer to the investigation by Hunzinger. There is here a brief survey of the development of the concept.... Thomas Aquinas has dealt with fear in a comprehensive way in the context of a general theory of the emotions." See also Schrag’s discussion of Kierkegaard’s distinction between fear and anxiety in his Existence and Freedom, pp. 67-71.

150. See Lehmann, "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," p. 145: "'Distress came over us, according to outer battles and inner anxieties.' [2 Cor. 6:4] But in these stifling struggles, the Apostle gains his freedom and an unbroken joy: this daily sacrificial service is for him the ‘day of the lord’, in which – ‘mourning and yet constantly joyful’ [2 Cor. 6:10], ‘rich with joy by all affliction’ [2 Cor. 7:4] – he corresponds to the suddenly emerging kairos.... In Heidegger, one reads: ‘Along with the sober anxiety which brings us fact to face with our individualized potentiality-for-being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility’ [SZ, 410/358]."

151. For the theme of death in the Old Testament and in Paul, see Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp. 110-118.

152. WA, XLII, 84, 146/1, 110, 196. Heidegger used the line "Right from out mother’s womb we begin to die" as one of the mottos for his 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle. (PA, 182) In SZ, 326/293, Heidegger quotes a similar passage from a medieval Christian allegory called The Husbandman of Bohemia: "As soon as a man comes into life, he is old enough to die." See Der Ackermann aus Böhmen, hrsg. A. Bernt u. K. Burdach (Vom Mittelalter zur Reformation. Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Bildung, hrsg. K. Burdach, Bd. III, 2. Teil), p. 46.
Aquinas also deals with "fear of death" in the section of his *Summa Theologiae* to which Heidegger refers his readers in *GZ*, 394/285: "Aristotle says that there is nothing more terrifying than death...." "Those who face execution are confronted with a present evil, a defect which far exceeds the bounds of fear." *Summa Theologiae*, II1, qu. 42, p. 40/41; qu. 43, p. 58/59. In the Augustinian and Thomistic notion of "pure fear," what threatens as the "future evil" is really the "sting of death."

157. See *SZ*, 331, n. 2/249, n. vi, where Heidegger refers especially to Jaspers' treatment of death, which contains a review of Kierkegaard's thought on this topic and as a whole is inspired by Kierkegaard: "For this investigation [of death], compare especially Karl Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 3. Aufl. 1925, pp. 259-270."
158. *GZ*, 431-440/312-318; *BZs*, 80; *BZb*, 221. Notice that Heidegger's phrase "running forward toward death" (Vorlaufen zum Tode) looks like a translation of Luther's cursus ad mortem. His statement that the indefiniteness of death gives it its "sting" (*GZ*, 437-317) recalls Paul's phrase "the sting of death." (1 Cor 15:56) See also Lehmann, "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," p. 158, n. 105: "A few causal traces point to the Scripture are to be found: leading 'into all truth' (John 16:13 - *SZ*, 292/[263]); 'completes its course' (2 Tim. 4:7 - *SZ*, 323, 325 /[287, 288]; how and when death 'came into the world' (Rom. 5:12 - *SZ*, 330 /[292]; *SZ*, 325, 311. 20-23 /[443, 11. 3-6] presupposes concerns and an understanding of death and birth which is reminiscent of Rom. 6."
160. See Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Werke, I), pp. 177-188/151-162, 422-431/378-387; *Werke*, II, pp. 403-410 (trans. as an appendix in the English translation of *Wahrheit und Methode*, pp. 473-478); Heideggers *Wege*, pp. 29-40; Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, pp. 18-19, 23-25, 28-29, 35-36. Gadamer's discussion and use of theological hermeneutics follows to a great extent Heidegger's own youthful retrieval of this theological tradition. The second major part of Gadamer's *Truth and Method* begins with a motto from Luther's "Table Talk," which reads as follows: *Qui non intelligit res, non potest ex verbis sensum elicere*, who does not understand the matter will not be able to draw meaning from words. (*WAT*, V, 26) More recently, Ricoeur has investigated the "narrative" or "story telling" character belonging to the her-


164. Pleroma, pleroun can be seen here as the equivalent of Heidegger's notion of Vollzug, "enactment" or "fulfillment" which enacts something within a situation. See Kierkegaard's "edifying discourse" on this passage and also 1 Cor. 13 in his *The Works of Love*, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

165. Heidegger uses the following essay as the basis for his historical account: "Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," in *Philosophische Abhandlungen. Chr. Sigwart zu seinem 70. Geburtstage gewidmet v. B. Erdmann u. a.* (Tubingen, Freiburg, Leipzig, 1900; 5. Aufl. in Ges. Schr. V. Stuttgart, Gottingen, 1966).

166. Heidegger quotes a long passage from Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*, Liber III, cap 1, 1, but see also Augustines's meditations on the interpretation of the Book of Genesis in his *Confessions*, XII, especially the following passages: "Can you not see now how foolish it is out of all that abundance of perfectly true meanings which can be extracted from those words rashly to assert that one particular meaning was the one which Moses had chiefly in mind...." (12:25); "This writing will do good to many who will preach and comment upon it, and from a narrow measure of speech it will spread and overflow into streams of liquid truth, and from these, as they wind away in lengthier stretches of language, each man may on these subjects draw what truth he can—" (12:27); "So when someone says: 'Moses meant what I think', and someone else says: 'No, he meant
what I think’, would it not be more reverent to say: ‘Why not as you both think, if what each of you thinks is true?’ And if in these words someone should see a third or a forth truth, or indeed any other truth at all, why should we not believe that all these truths were seen by Moses, through whom the one God tempered the Holy Scriptures to the minds of many, so their minds should see different things, though all true things. Certainly, for my own part (and I say this fearlessly from my heart), if I were to write anything that could have this height of authority, I should prefer to write in such a way that my words could convey any truth that anyone could grasp on such matters, rather than to set down one true meaning so clearly as to exclude all other meanings which, not being false, could not offend me.” (12:31)

167. “The term hermeneutics was familiar to me from my theological studies. At that time, I was especially agitated over the question of the relation between the word of Holy Scripture and theological-speculative thinking. It was, if you will, the same relation between language and being. Later I met the term ‘hermeneutics’ again in Wilhelm Dilthey in his theory of the historical human sciences. Dilthey’s familiarity with hermeneutics came from the same source, his theological studies and especially his work on Schleiermacher.” (US, 91-92/9-10) See also SZ, 526/450. Heidegger here refers to Misch’s introduction to Dilthey’s thought, which discusses Dilthey’s use of theology. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. V, pp. xxii-xxvii. For Heidegger’s early study of theological hermeneutics (1909-1911), see Appendix III. For Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey’s hermeneutics, see Kisiel, “The Transformation of the Categorial,” pp. 173-176. Finally, see Pöggeler, “Die ethisch-politische Dimension der hermeneutischen Philosophie,” p. 57: “...the hermeneutical dimension [in Heidegger’s thought] is not at all understood from the hermeneuein of Aristotle, but rather from the hermeneutics of the theological tradition. The genuine model of the hermeneutical for Heidegger is clearly the Word, which penetrates a situation and transforms it, and which can always be interpreted and applied anew and tested in history.”

168. See also SZ, 50-51/61-62.

169. Heidegger does not quote this part of the passage at 19:11, but I have added it in order to provide the context of Heidegger’s quotation.

170. The passages from the New Testament that I discuss below are noted by Burdach, who makes the point that the term care has a “double meaning” of, on the one hand, “anxious concern” (Besorgnis) for the world and of “caring for” (Fürsorge), “taking care” (Sorgfalt), and “devotion,” on the other. See Burdach, “Faust und die Sorge,” pp. 46-48. Heidegger refers to this point in Burdach’s text at GZ, 420/303 and SZ, 264/243.

In the New Testament, the contrast between the two forms of care is expressed in various parables: the two managers of the household (Matth. 24:45-51; Luke 12:42-46), the two groups of virgins (Matth. 25:1-13; Luke 12:35-40), the two sowers (Matth. 13:22). The classical parable is that of Martha and Mary, even
though in scholasticism its meaning was often perverted such that Mary becomes the symbol for quietistic contemplation and monasticism. See Luke 10:38-42: "[Martha] had a sister called Mary, who sat at the feet of the lord listening to what he said. But Martha was distracted (periespato) by all the preparations that had to be made. She came to him and asked, 'Lord, don't you care (melei) that my sister has left me to do work and serving alone? Tell her to help me'. 'Martha, Martha', the lord answered, 'you are anxiously concernful (merimnas) and upset about many things. But only one thing is needful. Mary has chosen what is better...'.

171. For this point and for the Christian notion of the fall in general in the Old and New Testaments, see Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology*, pp. 95-105.

172. See also Luke 12:22-34; 1 Peter 5:6-7: "Cast all your anxious care (merimnan) on him, because he cares (melei) for you."

173. 1 Cor. 2:12; 2 Cor. 4:4; John 12:31.


175. See also the article on "Fleisch und Geist" in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Bd. II, p. 976 (3. Aufl.), to which Heidegger refers: "For the most part [in the New Testament], 'flesh' designates, as in the Old Testament, the whole man as a transient being... or as a being open to temptation.... [In Paul] 'flesh' can also describe man as the subject of sin...."

176. For these points, see Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology*, pp. 101-103.

177. *Confessiones*, X, 23, p. 136/232. See also X, 29, pp. 180/247, 150/236: "Certainly it is by continence that we are brought together and brought back to the one, from which he have fallen away (defluximus) into the many."

178. loc. cit., X, 34, p. 172/244. See also X, 27. pp. 146/235: "And look, you were in me, and I was outside of myself, and there I sought for you and in my ugliness I plunged into the beauties that you have made."


186. *WA*, LVI, 238-246/XXV, 223-232. Luther has in mind here what scholasticism called "synteresis," which meant a natural inclination (habitus) to the good and was used as a synonym for conscientia, the conscience. Aquinas equates it with Aristotle's "practical syllogism" (phronesis), which is the application of a general principle or inclination to a particular situation (see the discussion below on the Christian notion of the conscience). For Luther as for Heidegger, the general inclination of human beings has for the most part "fallen" away into the world, and therefore
is always going wrong in particular situations. See loc. cit., 237/222, 177/157, 275/282.

197. See Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D.F. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 271: "...from the ethical point of view, pure being is a fantastic medium, and...it is forbidden to an existing individual to forget that he exists. One must therefore be very careful in dealing with a philosopher of the Hegelian school, and, above all, to make certain of the identity of the being with whom one has the honour to discourse. Is he a human being, an existing human being? Is he himself sub specie aeterni, even when he sleeps, eats, blows his nose, or whatever else a human being does? Is he himself the pure 'I am I'?"
199. loc. cit., p. 344.
200. loc. cit., p. 353.
201. Quoted in Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, p. 424. The German terms cited here are from the Diederichs edition of Kierkegaard's works, which was used by Heidegger and Jaspers in the 1920s.
203. See "The Rotation Method," in Either/Or, Vol. I, pp. 287-288: "Everyone who feels bored cries out for change....One tires of living in the country, and moves to the city; one tires of one's native land, and travels abroad; one is europamide, and goes to America, and so on; finally one indulges in a sentimental hope of endless journeys from star to star." This "rotation method" is also comprised of the "arts" of "remembering and forgetting," in that one forgets an experience as soon as one had it and then remembers it later in an altered form, which is, thus, itself just another way of forgetting. In this manner, the self is dispersed into an ever-changing play of self-forgetting: "To forget - all men wish to forget....The more poetically one remembers, the more easily one forgets; for remembering poetically is really only another expression for forgetting....One who has perfected himself in the twin arts of remembering and forgetting is in a position to play at battledore and shuttlecock with the whole of existence." See also

204. loc. cit., p. 423-424.

205. See The Concept of Anxiety, pp. 121-122: "The patient would be isolated to prevent others from becoming afraid. In our courageous age, we dare not tell a patient that he is about to die. We dare not call the pastor lest he die from shock, and we dare not tell the patient that a few days ago a man died from the same disease. The patient would be isolated. Sympathy would inquire about his condition. The physician would promise to issue a report as soon as possible, along with a tabulated statistical survey in order to determine the average. And when one has arrived at the average, everything is explained. The medical-therapeutic view regards the phenomenon as purely physical and somatic, and a physician often do, especially a physician in one of Hoffman's short stories, takes a pinch of snuff and says: It is a serious case." See also Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 147-148: "I know concerning [what it means to die] what people in general know about it; I know that I shall die if I take a dose of sulfuric acid, and also if I drown myself, or go to sleep in an atmosphere of coal gas, and so forth. I know that Napoleon always went about with poison ready to hand....I know that the Stoics regarded suicide as a courageous deed....I know that the tragic hero dies in the fifth act of the drama....I know furthermore what the clergy are accustomed to say on this subject....Nevertheless, in spite of this almost extraordinary knowledge or facility in knowledge, I can by no means regard death as something I have understood....the fact of my own death is not for me by any means such a something in general...."


209. GZ, 368-391/281-283; SZ, 238/224.

210. GZ, 420/303: "The double sense of cura refers to care for something as concern (Besorgen), absorption in the world, but also care in the sense of devotion. This concurs with the structures which we have exposed. But does this not mean that in a certain way cura is already seen in the natural interpretation of Dasein....?" Cf. SZ, 264/243.

211. In GZ, 379-380/274-275 and SZ, 227-228/215-216, Heidegger's discusses Augustine's theme of curiosity as the "lust of the eyes."

212. See PA, 152: "The tentative, the tempting - not religious....But the tentative as a character of movement first made visible through Christianity....It is one way or another present in contemporary 'non-Christian' life."

213. Heidegger's term *Abriegeln* (used in such phrases as 'to bolt the door', 'to block off the street') looks like a translation of Luther's phrase "they are their own block (literally, bolt) (obex) against the divine light...they put up a block or bolt for themselves (obicem sibi)," which was discussed above.
214. One should take into consideration here that a standard translation of Luther's term _presumptio_ is _Vermessenheit_. See Heidegger's usage of his term _Vermessen_ in _PA_, 103, 106: "...in its care, life presumes itself and measures itself wrongly (vermisst sich) in significance, widens and expands this significance, and in its inclination is out after an estimation and a distanciality within the world of significance, i.e., is out after rank, success, position in life (world), overtaking, advantage, calculation, hustle and bustle, commotion, style..." "...[care for taking precedence, being first, being apart, being the highest, the comparative characteristics in all forms of significance, in which life is anxiously concerned about itself]..."

215. See also the following passages: "a commandment to life" (Rom. 7:10), "[they] do not walk according to the flesh, but according to the spirit." (Rom. 8:4), "I have come in order that they may have life...." (John 10:10), "[he] gives life to the world" (6:33), "I am the bread of life. He who comes to me will never go hungry, and he who believes in me will never be thirsty." (6:35; 8:48) "The spirit gives life (_estin to zoopoiooun_); the flesh counts for nothing. The words I have spoken to you are spirit and they are life" (6:63), "his commandment is everlasting life" (12:50), "I am the way (hodos), the light (phos), and the truth" (aletheia).

See Heidegger's analysis in an 1929 essay: "The central meaning of this wholly anthropological concept of world [in the Gospel of John] is expressed in its function as an opposing concept to the divine filiation of Jesus, which is itself conceived as life (_zoe_), truth (_aletheia_), and light (_phos_)." (WH, 144/53) See also Macquarrie, _An Existentialist Theology_, pp. 127-131.


219. Heidegger takes up Kierkegaard's "either-or" of the aesthetic and the ethical in the motto of his 1921-22 lecture course. (PA, 182) See also _GZ_, 413/298: "...when I say, 'I love my father and my mother', the 'and' here in no sense has the meaning of counting them together, as when I say, 'the chair and the table'. Rather the 'and' here is a specific 'and' - the 'and' of loving. The 'and' thus first has an absolutely primary sense which is oriented towards care, towards the 'I can'. To put it more precisely, however, what is primary here is not the 'and' but the 'either-or'. And only because there is an 'either-or', is there an 'as well as' and an 'and' of concern [that is directed towards the world]." Finally, see _ML_, 245-246/190-191: "In Kierkegaard there is much talk of choosing oneself and of the individual, and if it were my task to say once again what Kierkegaard has said, then it would not only be a superfluous endeavour, but would be one which necessarily in essence lagged behind Kierkegaard with regard to his [existentiell] purpose. His purpose is not ours, but differs in principle, something which does not prevent us from learning from him what he offers, but rather obliges us to do this."
The motto from Kierkegaard that Heidegger used in his 1921-22 lecture course is an expression of Kierkegaard's theme of the "either-or." (PA, 182) See also Gadamer, "Der Weg Martin Heideggers," p. 10-11: "In order to illustrate how the young Heidegger viewed matters (die Sache ansah), I would like to quote the motto [from Heidegger's 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle].... It is paragraph from Kierkegaard's Training in Christianity, and it was singled out by Heidegger himself as the motto for his planned book [on Aristotle].... This is the quotation which Heidegger himself felt indicated the direction of all his efforts. Here we see two viewpoints: the view of religious restlessness and ethical restlessness, in which Kierkegaard had formulated his own situation against speculative idealism... and we see, on the other hand, that the 'other' philosophy floats in the abstract indefiniteness of the metaphysical." (cf. p. 12) For a discussion Heidegger's appropriation of Kierkegaard's notion of the "either-or," see Schrag, Existence and Freedom, 180-200.


221. See also the following passages: "I speak the truth and what is plainly unconcealed (aletheian), I am not lying and distorting, my conscience bearing witness to me...." (Rom. 9:1) Paul sees the function of the conscience as "testimony" or "bearing witness" to oneself, "declaring" (martyrein) oneself as something. (2 Cor. 1:12) "...they are a law unto themselves...since they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness....God will judge men's secrets through Jesus Christ...." (Rom. 2:14-16)

222. "I thank God, whom I serve with a clear conscience, as night and day I constantly remember you in my prayers. Remembering your tears....I remember your undisguised faith....I recall to your memory the need to fan the flame of the gift of God....join with me in suffering for the gospel, by the power of God, who has saved us and called us...." (2 Tim. 1:3-9)

223. "It is necessary to submit not only because of punishment, but also because of conscience....Give to all men what you owe them....Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another...." (Rom. 13:5-8)
"...let us draw near to God with a true and unconcealed (alethines) heart in full assurance of faith, having our hearts sprinkled to cleanse us from a distressed and evil conscience....Let us hold unswervingly to the hope....If we deliberately keep on sinning after we have received the knowledge of truth and what is unconcealed (aletheias), no sacrifice for sin is left, but only a fearful expectation of judgment....It is a dreadful thing to fall into the hands of the lord." (Heb. 10:22-31)

"It is commendable if, because of the conscience of God, a man bears up under the pain of unjust suffering....To this you were called...." (1 Pt. 2:19-21) "...he who called you out of the darkness into his marvelous light." (1 Pt. 2:9)

For the following, see Kähler, "Das Gewissen" and Stoker, Das Gewissen, pp. 25-29.

See WA, XLII, 127-131/170-176: "...after their conscience had been convicted by the law, Adam and Eve were terrified by the rustling of a leaf....When the conscience is truly terrified, man is so oppressed that he not only cannot act but is unable even to do any thinking....Such a horrifying (horribilis) punishment follows sin that at the rustling of a leaf the conscience is full of fear....'And the Lord called Adam and said to him: Where are you?'....The words 'where are you?' are words of the law, which through God are directed to the conscience....He wants to show Adam that though he had hidden, he was not hidden from God....In the same way, the impious will condemn themselves, when the darkness of human hearts will be revealed (revelabuntur) and, as though in open and unconcealed books, the evil deeds of every single being will be read. God indeed knows that Adam went astray and that he is guilty of death....[God] questions [Adam] so that by his own witness and testimony he may prove himself guilty of erring....unless God immediately provides a cure and calls the errant and sinful person back, he flees endlessly....Adam's conscience is roused by the real sting of the law....Here Adam,
hard pressed in this manner, is in the midst of death and in the midst of hell."

See also loc. cit., 129/173, where Luther describes "hell" as a state in which anxiety of the conscience endlessly suffocates the despairing self that attempts to flee it: "...the whole world is 'too narrow' to safely conceal him (latere). And now, in this anxiety (anxietae) of the soul, he reveals his stupidity by seeking a remedy from sin through flight from God....And so some also maintain concerning the punishments of hell that this will be the most terrible thing: that the impious will desire to flee and yet will realize that they cannot escape." This view is similar to Kierkegaard's theme in his Sickness unto Death that the despairing "daimonic" self seeks its last escape from its anxiety in death and yet cannot die. See also Schrag, Existence and Freedom, pp. 93-94, 109-110.

232. See von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, pp. 52-58.
233. See Kähler, "Das Gewissen"; Stoker, Das Gewissen, pp. 32-35 and Abschnitt B.
235. See "The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air," p. 353: "For to cast care (Sorge) away, but not...upon God - that is 'distraction' (Zerstreuung)...But on the other hand, to cast all care absolutely...upon God is 'collecting oneself' (Sich Sammeln)...."
238. Concept of Anxiety, p. 98. See also Works of Love, p. 139: "To ask the individual - this is a more common expression for the relationship of conscience, and therefore it is also Christianity's essential view of the human race, first and foremost to regard the mass individually, every one by himself as the single individual."
239. Quoted in Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, p. 333.
243. loc. cit., p. 166.
244. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 473.
245. See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 471: "The totality of guilt comes into being for the individual when he puts his guilt together with the relation to an eternal happiness...the consciousness of guilt is the decisive expression for the relationship to an eternal happiness. He who has no relation to this never gets to the point of conceiving himself as totally or essentially guilty."
248. loc. cit., p. 471. See also Jasper's account of Kierkegaard's notions of conscience and guilt in Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, pp. 277-280. As noted previously, the young Heidegger was thoroughly familiar with the whole of Jasper's study and especially the sections on Kierkegaard. See also Schrag, Existence and Freedom, pp. 154-174.
249. See Hans-Georg Gadamer's recollection from 1924 in his Einzug in Marburg, p. 111: "... Heidegger read from one of Kierkegaard's 'Religious Discourses' ('Behold the Lilies in the Field'), which at that time had just been published. An existential appeal, especially to keeping-silent, which promptly spread itself over the remainder of the evening."
250. Heidegger discusses this same point in his 1927 lecture on Christian theology (PT).
252. Heidegger had Jaspers discussion of 'guilt' before him when he wrote up his section on guilt in his 1925 lecture since he quotes from Jasper's discussion. The second half of Jasper's discussion is a review of Kierkegaard's view of guilt. See GZ, 442/319. See also Schrag, Existence and Freedom, pp. 154-174.
254. For Augustine's ocular orientation, see Kamlah, Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit, pp. 220ff., especially pp. 222-223: 'That man is to be understood as viewer is by no means to be taken for granted especially in Christianity, can be noted through a word of Luther's: 'The sole organs of the Christian man are the ears'. The priority which Augustine gives the eye is by Luther given to the ear. In order to gauge the significance of this drastic change, once can think for a moment about the fading of pictorial art in the churches of the Reformation and about the powerful history of Protestant church music. Luther understands man as the hearer, who encounters God not as light, but rather as the Word. Thus the faith in this Word cannot be so provisional as it for Augustine...."
256. APp, 40-41: '[Metaphysical-theological speculation] looks away precisely from that in which God has factually acted: suffering and the cross. Therefore, Luther says that the wisdom, which wants to see God's invisible essence in his works, is inflated, completely blinds, and makes one completely stubborn and unrepentant. In his 'theology of the cross', Luther thus fetches back the 'factual experience of life' in original Christianity, which renounces all visions, apocalypses, and above all the visions of metaphysics. In pointing to the necessity of taking upon oneself the reality of human weakness, it penetrates to the depths of factual life - and that means to an essentially 'historical' life.'
See Scheler, "Liebe und Erkenntnis," pp. 8-9. In GZ, 353/256 and SZ, 183/177, Heidegger discusses Plato's view of mood as "me on." See Republic, 585 d: "Therefore the kinds of filling concerned with the care (therapeia) of the body participate less in truth and being than those concerned with the care of the soul....It follows that what is filled by things with more being, and is itself more being, is more truly filled than what is filled by things with less being and is itself less being." In addition to Plato's cosmological and psychological hierarchies of being, he implies such a hierarchy in the political realm, where the two lower classes of the workers and the warriors are in some sense "not-being" or "less being" and the highest class of philosopher-guardians are "beingly being" or "more being," since it participates immediately in the "ideas."

See, for example, Republic, 486 a: "Do you think that a mind which is lofty and great enough to contemplate all time and all existence will consider human life to be of great importance?" Cf. Theaetetus, 173 e: "...disdaining all such things as worthless, [his thought] takes wings...." See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178 b: "...all forms of praxis seem trivial and insignificant to the divine."

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178 b.

Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983 a.

Nicomachean Ethics, 1178 b. See also 1177 b: "Such a life as this, however, will exceed the human, for it is not so far as he is a human being that he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present in him....If this reason (nous) is divine in comparison with the human being, the life according to it is divine in comparison to human life. We must not follow those who advise us, being human beings, to think of human matters, and, being mortal, to think of mortal matters, but should, so far as possible, make ourselves immortal...." See also Empedocles, fr. 112 "I go about among you as an immortal god, no longer a mortal, held in honor by all, as I seem, crowned with fillets and flowing garlands. When I come to them in their flourishing towns, to men and women, I am honored...."

Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982 b; Plato, Timaeus, 29 b.

See V4, 112/224-225: "Time, as passing away, is repulsive; the will suffers on account of it. Suffering in this way, the will itself becomes chronically ill over such passing away; the illness then wills its own passing, and in so doing wills that everything in the world be worthy of passing away. Ill will toward time degrades all that passes away. The earthly - Earth and all that pertains to her - is that which properly ought not to be and which ultimately does not really possess true being. Plato himself called it me on, not-being."


Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 269.

See the following passages: "Vision, in my view, is the cause of the greatest benefit to us, inasmuch as none of the accounts now given concerning the universe would ever have been
given if men had not seen the stars or the sun or the heavens....From this we have procured philosophy....This I affirm to be the greatest good of eyesight." (Plato, Timaeus, 47 a-b) "The care for seeing (tou eidenai) is essentially inherent in man's being." (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980 a) (this is Heidegger's translation given in GZ, 380/275). "Being is what shows itself in the pure perception that is characterized by beholding (noein)."

(Parmenides) (Heidegger's translation in SZ, 227/215) When asked what he lived for, Anaxagoras is said to have replied: "For the sake of contemplating (theoria) the sun and the moon and the heavens." (Diogenes Laertius, II, 10)

268.Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1098 a; Plato, Republic, 475 e.


270. See Plato, Theaetetus, 173 e: "...it is really only his body that sojourns in the city, while his thought, disdaining all such things as worthless, takes wings, as Pindar says, 'beyond the sky, beneath the earth', searching the heavens and measuring the plains, everywhere seeking the true nature of everything as a whole, never sinking to what lies close at hand."

271. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983 a: "For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as they are, as they do about self-moving marionettes...." See also Plato, Republic, 475 d-e: "...the lovers of spectacles seem to be included [as philosophers] because of the pleasure they take in learning things, and the lovers of sounds seem to be the strangest folk to include among philosophers; they would never willingly attend a serious discussion or spend their time that way, but they run around to all the Dionysian festivals omitting none....Whom then, he asked, do you call the true philosophers? - Those who are lovers of the spectacle of truth."

272. See Aristotle, Protrepticus: An Attempt At Reconstruction, by Ingemar Düring (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensi, vol. 12, 1961), B44: "As we travel to the games of Olympia for the sake of the spectacle itself, and even if nothing were to follow from it, so too the contemplation (theoria) of the whole is to be honored above everything that is thought useful." The notion of the "three lives" in Greek and Roman philosophy - work, action, and contemplation - is supposed to have derived from Pythagoras' comparison of the three types of attendants at the games (sellers, participants, spectators) with the above three general ways of life. See Iamblichus, The Life of Pythagoras, 58; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V, 3.

273. For the history of term "idea" from Homer to modern philosophy, see the article on "Idea" in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.

274. See Plato, Republic, book 9; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, Books 7 and 10.

275. See Plato, Republic, 585 - 586: "Are not hunger and thirst and the like a sort of emptiness in the body?....And ignorance and lack of sense are an emptiness in the soul....So the man who takes his share of food and the man who acquires wisdom
would be filled? Now those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are always occupied with feasts and the like are carried down and then back up to the middle, and so they wander through their life but they never reach beyond to what is the true above. They never look up to it nor are carried thither; they have never been truly filled with true being, nor tasted any stable and pure pleasure. They look down always with their heads bent to the ground like cattle; at the banquet tables they feed, fatten, and fornicate. They are insatiable as they do not fill the real and continent part of themselves with true being.

276. Plato, *Timaeus*, 20 c. See also *Republic*, 352 b, 354 a-b; *Lysis*, 211 c; *Gorgias*, 522 a; *Phaedrus*, 227 b.
278. See *Theaetetus*.
281. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178 b: "Now if you take away from a living being practical action and making, what is left but *theoria*?"
282. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982 b: "...it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured that such knowledge began to be sought." See also 981 b: "Hence, when all such inventions were already established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where men first began to have leisure." Heidegger refers to these passages in *SZ*, 184/177. Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177 b.

See also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Parts One and Two (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 4: "Leisure is the mother of philosophy....[the Athenians] that had no employment neither at home nor abroad had little else to employ themselves in but either (as St. Luke says, Acts 17:21) in telling and hearing news or in discoursing of philosophy publicly to the youth of the city. Every master took some place for that purpose. Plato, in certain public walks called Academia, from one Academus; Aristotle in the walk of the temple of Pan, called Lyceum; others in the Stoa, or covered walk, wherein the merchants' goods were brought to land; others in other places where they spent the time of their leisure in teaching or in disputing of their opinions....from this it was that the place where any of them taught and disputed was called *schola* [school], which in their tongue signifies leisure; and their disputations, *diatribae*, that is to say, *passing the time*." Cf. Acts 17:21: "A group of Epicurean and Stoic philosophers [in Athens] began to dispute with Paul. Some of them asked, 'What is this babbler trying to say?'...All the Athenians and the foreigners who lived there spent their time doing nothing but talking about and listening to the latest and newest things."
283. *Republic*, 585 d - e: "If to be filled with things appropriate to our nature is pleasurable, that which is in fact more filled with being will make one rejoice more really and more truly in true pleasure, while that which participates in the things that
are less being will be less truly and lastingly filled with and participate in a less reliable and less true pleasure...they wander through their life but they never reach beyond to what is the true above. They never look up to it nor are carried thither; they have never been truly filled with true being, nor tasted any stable and pure pleasure." See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177 a: "...philosophy contains pleasure of marvelous purity and permanence."


285. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177 b: "...if accordingly the qualities of this being in work [of contemplative seeing] are found to be self-sufficiency, leisure, such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other qualities of happiness and blessedness, it follows that it is this being in work that constitutes complete and perfect (teleia) happiness, provided that it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete and imperfect (ateles)."

286. See Kierkegaard’s meditations on the theme of "persistent striving" in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 110: "Even if a man has attained the highest, the repetition by which life receives content (if one is to escape retrogression or avoid becoming fantastic) will again constitute a persistent striving; because again finality is moved further on, and postponed....In a speculative-fantastic sense we have a positive finality in the System, and in an aesthetic-fantastic sense we have a positive finality in the fifth act of the drama. But this sort of finality is valid only for fantastic beings."

287. For Heidegger’s discussion of the "'optical' or 'ocular' tradition" (HFb, 622) from the Greeks and medieval thought to Descartes and Kant, see LW, 56, 115-123; AJ, 4; GZ, 381/276; SZ, 227/215, 528-451.

288. See AJ, 23, 37, 39, 40; PA, 111; SZ, 528/451. The term "aesthetic" derives from Heidegger’s study of Kierkegaard and Jasper’s appropriation of Kierkegaard (see Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, pp. 69-71). For this concept and the concepts of the ocular and the quietistic in Kierkegaard’s thought, see Heidegger’s motto from Kierkegaard in his 1921-22 lecture course. (PA, 182)

289. See PA, 140.


292. WA I, 228/XXI 12.

293. See, for example, AJ, 4; IP, 65.

294. See the following passages: "...you died with Christ to the principles of this world...you died and your life is now hidden with Christ in God...you have put away the old human being and have put on the new human being..." (Col. 2:20-3:10) "We were therefore buried with him through baptism into death in order that...we too may walk in a new life...the old human being, which we were, was crucified...." (Romans 6:4-6) "...all have died....If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old things have
passed away, behold they have become new." (2 Cor. 5:17) Cf. Eph. 4:22-24; Phil. 3:10-11.

295. See Cor. 4:9-13: "We have become spectacles to the world, to angels as well as to men. We are fools because of Christ, but you are so wise in Christ! We are weak, but you are so strong! You are held in honor (endoxoi), we are dishonored (atimoi)! To this very hour we go hungry and thirsty, we are in rags...we are homeless...Up to this moment we have become the scum of the earth, the refuse of the world." See also 1 Cor 3:13: "Do not deceive yourselves. If any one of you thinks he is wise by the standards of this age, he should become a fool so that he may become wise."

296. See 2 Cor. 5.

297. WADB VII, 23-25. For an English translation, see Reading in Luther, ed. C.S. Anderson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing, 1967), pp. 211-212. Heidegger quotes the last two lines of this passage as one of the mottos for his 1921-22 lecture course. (PA, 182)


299. WA I, 605, 613/XXXI 12, 225.


301. WA, LVI, 371/XXV, 361.

302. See the "probatio" to Luther's third philosophical thesis, which is found in Ebeling, Lutherstudien, Bd. II: "...[the active reason] is form and essentially actuality. Whose actuality? Not that of the composite, which is a "man," but rather, as follows, that of the whole, which is constituted out of the reason, so far as it is matter, and the active reason, and this is knowing. You see, therefore, how those error who, out of disregard of the preceding and what follows, think that Aristotle described the soul as separable, whereas he in fact speaks of the form, which is in the soul, that is, he speaks of the active reason." (p. 483)

303. "Luther's pure hearing of the word of salvation, his theology of the cross, and his discourse on justification from faith alone...existentially signified a real language for Heidegger. Heidegger's attempt to renew metaphysical thinking passed through the most extreme counter-position to metaphysics and through the sharpest attack on it." (APp, 41)

304. Regarding the "relational meaning" of Christianity, what the young Heidegger wanted to prevent in theology was the "theorization" and "de-living" of the factual relation to human being to God in faith, which took place through the traditional adoption of the foreign conceptuality of Greek philosophy. He carried out a destruction of the "relational meaning" of traditional theology and a retrieval of a more genuine and original notion of this meaning not only in his two lecture courses on original Christianity, but also in the majority of his youthful works, in his Being and Time, and especially in his 1927 lecture "Phenomenology and Theology." For Heidegger's destruction of the traditional theological notion of the human relation to God, see GZ, 180-182/130-131, 231-251/171-185; SZ, 29-34/43-47, 65-66/74-75, 120ff./122ff., 304/272; PT,
especially 59/15 ("Theology is not speculative knowledge of God.") See *HF*, 24, 26, where Heidegger argues that Kant’s notion of "consciousness," the notion of "spirit" in German Idealism, and Scheler’s notion of the "person" are "formalizing de-theologizations" of traditional Christian anthropology, which "ruin theology." See also *HF*, 57, 110: "Göttingen 1913: For a whole semester Husserl’s students disputed about how a mailbox looks. In this manner of treatment, one then talks also about religious experiences. If that is philosophy, then I am also for dialectic." For Heidegger’s retrieve of the "anthropological problem of man’s being-towards-God...formulated under the guidance of phenomena like faith, sin, love, and repentance [and care, anxiety, death, conscience, and rebirth]" (*SZ*, 252, n. 3/235, n. iv), see also *GZ*, 6/4; *SZ*, 13-14/30. See especially *PT*, 52-61/9-16: "One 'knows' about this fact [of the crucifixion] only in believing...As communication, the revelation is not the conveyance of information about past, present, or imminently appearing occurrences...Furthermore, in this 'taking part' and 'having a part' in the historical happening of the crucifixion, one’s whole Dasein becomes placed before God as a Christian Dasein, i.e., one related to the cross...and the existence so concerned with this revelation becomes manifest to itself in its forgetfulness of God....the believer does not come to know anything about his existence in faith by way of a theoretical observation of his inner experiences...the authentic existential meaning of faith is: faith = rebirth....Luther said: 'Faith is letting oneself be seized in the matters that we do not see'...faith is not...a more or less modified type of knowing. Rather, faith is the appropriation of the revelation....Presupposing that, out of faith and for it, theology is enjoined upon faith, and presupposing that science is a freely enacted, conceptually disclosing objectification, theology constitutes itself in the thematizing of faith and what is disclosed, i.e., here 'revealed' with it....theology is the science of faith insofar as it not only makes faith its object and is motivated out of faith, but rather because this objectification of faith itself, according to what is here objectified, has the sole purpose for its part of helping to cultivate faithfulness....Therefore, the goal and purpose of this historical science is Christian existence itself in its concreteness - and never an in itself valid system of theological propositions about universal states of affairs in one present at hand region of being among others. As an understanding of existence, the transparency of faithful existence can always only relate itself to existing itself. Every theological statement and concept addresses itself to the faithful existence of the individual human being in the community, and it does this according to its content and not only subsequently by means of a so-called practical 'application'....[theology cannot] in any way make it easier to take upon faith and to hold oneself in faith. Theology can only make faith more difficult, i.e., bring closer the fact that faithfulness cannot at all be gained through it - theology as science - but rather only through believing. Thus, theology can let the earnestness and seriousness of faithfulness as a 'bestowed' way of
existence hit home in the conscience. Now because theology, as a systematic as well as a historical discipline, has as its object primarily the Christian happening in its Christianness and its historicity, and because this happening specifies itself as a way of existence on the part of the believer, and because existence is action, praxis, theology in its essence has the character of a practical science. As the acting of God on the faithfully acting human being, it is ‘innately’ (von Hause aus) already homiletical...[and not] because of accidental needs that require aiding theoretical propositions in themselves with a practical application. Theology is systematic only when it is historical-practical...

In the legitimacy of its content, all theological knowledge is grounded in faith itself, it originates (entspringt) from it and leaps back (zurückspringt) into it.”

305. See Gadamer’s "Hegel und Heidegger," in Hegels Dialektik: fünf hermeneutische Studien (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971), p. 90: "Heidegger, as is well known, took the anti-Greek theme in the tradition of Christian piety as his guide here. And indeed there is such an anti-Greek motif reaching back from Luther’s resolve to demand of Christian men that they renounce Aristotle, to Gabriel Biel and Meister Eckhardt and ultimately to Augustine’s profound philosophic variations on the theme of the mystery of the Trinity. This anti-Greek motif points to the Word of God and the act of hearing it, which are uppermost in the Old Testament’s relating of the encounter with God. The Greek principle of logos and eidos, the articulation and retention of the visible contours of things, appears, if viewed from this perspective, as a falsification which does violence to the mystery of faith. When Heidegger stirs up the question of being again, all that is very much in evidence, and in fact, we have here the explanation for his famous reference to the ‘superfiality of the Greeks’. For an English translation, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 108.

306. See PT, 53/10, where Heidegger uses the concepts of his own ontology to discuss the essence of "Christian Dasein" as "rebirth" and becoming aware of one’s "forgetfulness of God."

307. See PA, 173, 47.

308. See introduction to Heidegger’s habilitation writing, where he uses the Pauline theme of the "thorn in the flesh" as an analogy for his own critique of the "doctrine of categories": "The history of philosophy has an essential relation to philosophy, so long and only so long as it is not ‘pure history’, factual science, but rather has projected itself into the region of the purely philosophically systematic. ‘When history ceases to be merely the past, then it drives the most effective thorn into the spirit’. [Trendelenenburg]." (KB, 197) See also GZ, 436/317, where Heidegger again uses the analogy.

309. The young Heidegger’s critique of the notion of the self in the "relational meaning" of metaphysics prepares the way for his later theme of the end or death of "humanism," "man," and the "ontotheological" self. For the themes of "humanism," modern
"technology," and "falling" in the young Heidegger, and for his critiques of these, see AJ, 34 and PA, 62-76, 120-122, 162-165; HF, 18. Specifically for the theme of technology, see PA, 26, 74; IF, 136. Since, according to the later Heidegger, modern philosophy interprets the metaphysical notion of being as the "subject" and "man" (see S, 393, where Heidegger quotes Marx: "The critique of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being (to on ontos, summum ens) for man...."), his notion of the "end of philosophy" includes the notion of the end of "man" as the ontological subject that is the ground of beings. In both his youthful and his later thought, he retrieves the notion of "man" (in the generic sense) in terms of human finitude and historicity, although the later Heidegger carries out his retrieval with the help of the mythic, religious, and artistic thought of the Pre-Socratics and Hölderlin (man is the "mortal" who "dwells poetically upon the earth"), whereas the youthful Heidegger carried out his retrieval with the help of Kierkegaard's ethical-religious thought and Aristotle's ethics and politics (man is "factual life").


314. See PRp, 36-37: "According to Heidegger, the experience of life in original Christianity is precisely factual and historical, an experience of life in its factuality, because it sees the dominant structure of life in enactment-meaning and not in content-meaning. If, by means of chronological calculations and characterizations oriented to content, man attempts to fix the unavailable and suddenly outbursting event, on which his life is staked, then he pushes aside what should determine his life as something always unavailable by determining it as the secure and the available."

671


322. See Aristotle, *Physics*, 219 b: "For this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and the later." See also Plato, *Timaeus*, 37 d, where Plato calls time "the moving image of eternity...moving according to number." Heidegger criticizes this Platonic-Aristotelian definition of time in *SZ*, 556/473.

323. See also Schrag, *Existence and Freedom*, pp. 89-90.

324. The *Concept of Anxiety*, pp. 87, 85-86.

325. loc. cit., p. 84. See also p. 87: "It is remarkable that Greek art culminates in the plastic, which precisely lacks the glance [of the moment (Augenblick)]. This, however, has its deep source in the fact that the Greeks did not in the profoundest sense grasp the concept of spirit and therefore did not in the deepest sense comprehend sensuousness and temporality." Cf. p. 89.


327. *The Concept of Anxiety*, 90. See also *Philosophical Fragments*, pp. 89-110.


342. *Concept of Anxiety*, p. 149. See also Jaspers' discussion of the notion of the moment in Kierkegaard in his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, pp. 108-109: "The more rationally human self-formation proceeds, the more the tendency grows to treat every experience of the moment and every temporally determined reality as a means for something else, for something futural or for the sake of the whole.... In opposition to such reflective attitudes, there arise attitudes oriented to the reality of the moment (the concrete present, the autonomous value of each moment, what is immediately actual).... in the contrast between factual and temporal existence and the intention towards eternity and timelessness, precisely temporal life, which is only really there always as a present moment, becomes problematical for self-reflection."
348. *The Concept of Anxiety*, p. 90. See also *Philosophical Fragments*, pp. 11-27.
351. *The Concept of Anxiety*, p. 84.
354. *loc. cit.*, p. 84.
355. Regarding Kierkegaard's notion of the moment, Heidegger writes: "If, however, such a moment gets experienced in an existentiell manner, then a more primordial temporality has been presupposed, although existentially it has not been made explicit." (SZ, 447, n. 2/388, n. iii)
356. See Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-212," p. 322: "...we can see that already in 1920-21 the basic lines of Heidegger's doctrine of temporality were set and that they issued not from his reading of the Greeks, but from his interpretation of early Christianity. The formal structure is essentially not different from what *Being and Time* will spell out: that the present situation is opened up by two co-equal moments of self-transcendence: becoming oneself understandingly by assuming what one already and essentially is, viz., one's finiteness. More succinctly: the present is opened by one's
becoming what one already is. Fundamentally for Heidegger primordial time is a matter of regaining the 'essential' (Wesen, Gewesenhheit), whether, as in the early Heidegger, that dynamic is described as 'coming towards the already-essential' (Zukommen auf das Gewesene) or whether, as in the late Heidegger, the dynamic is described as 'the arrival of the already-essential' (Ankunft des Gewesenen)." See also Heidegger's quotations of Matthew and Angelus Silesius in his 1919 lecture course: "'Man, become essential and what you are' (werde wesentlich) (Angelus Silesius). ['Not everyone can grasp this word, but only those to whom it has been given.] Who can grasp it, let him grasp it.' (Matth. 19:12) (IP, 5) Cf. p. 65.

Regarding the later Heidegger's statement that in his youthful period he was concerned with the "analogy" between the relation of theological-speculative thinking to Holy Scripture and the relation of language to being, Pöggeler writes in his Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 270: "If speculative thinking is related to the word of Holy Scripture, then it must unfold a claiming address, which in itself is historical. 'Historical' certainly does not mean to ascertain historically. The claiming address is not a present at hand 'being' which stands there in rigid permanence and is to be ascertained, but rather is a happening which has not been concluded, the way which leads into an open future. In this claiming address, truth gives itself, while it holds itself back; it remains a mystery, which points to a future revelation. The claiming address as the claiming address of salvation places one before a decision; it leads the one who believes into that truth, in which the believer - as the Gospel of John says - has his future residence, the house in which he dwells (John 8:31f.). The claiming address gives a new being, but historically and in a particular time....Speculative thinking attempts to unfold this being as the being of beings. However, with this attempt the traditional thinking of being must collapse, since here being is not a constant presence, but rather an event, which grants itself, while it withdraws itself. If language is related to this being, to this historical claiming address, then it can no longer be thought 'metaphysically' from a verum, which is convertible with a constant presence." See also his "Heidegger's Topology of Being," in On Heidegger and Language, ed. and trans. J.J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 111-112.

357. PRs, 323.
358. See PRp, 37: "Heidegger's thought is and remains supported by the suspicion that thought does not escape ruin when it obstructs from itself the relation to the unavailability of the future by calculating time and devoting itself to available, 'objective' contents."
359. See Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, pp. 145, 146: "The understanding of time, which was alive in Paul and recognized again by Heidegger, was not at all Greek." "It was the experience of time, which Heidegger recognized in Paul, that of the return (Wiederkehr) of Christ, which is no return (Rückkehr) to be awaited, and which as Parousia means rather a coming and not presence. But he had to be confirmed here above all by Kierkegaard's Religious Discourses,
which at that time were available in German under the title of 'Life and Reign of Love'. Here one finds the noteworthy distinction between 'understanding at a distance' and understanding in contemporaneity. Kierkegaard's critique of the Church was directed toward the fact that it does not receive the Christian message in existentially earnestness and waters down the paradox of contemporaneity, which lies in the Christian message. When the crucifixion of Jesus is understood at a distance, this has no true existentially seriousness. One places the Christian message just as much at a distance in that kind of discourse about God and about the Christian message, which is pursued by theology (and the dialectical speculation of the Hegelians). Can one speak about God in the same way that one speaks about an object? Is this not the enticement of Greek metaphysics, namely, to argue about existence and the qualities of God as one would about an object of science? Here in Kierkegaard lies the roots of dialectical theology, which began in 1919 with Karl Barth's 'Commentary on the Letter to the Romans'. In the Marburg years of Heidegger's friendship with Bultmann, it was above all a question of taking account of 'historical' theology, and of learning to think radically the historicity and finitude of human existence."

See also Schrag, *Existence and Freedom*, p. 140: "What Heidegger has done in his distinction between the authentic and unauthentic present is to ontologize Kierkegaard's distinction between the erotic present, exemplified by the undecided and uncommitted romantic lover of the aesthetic stage, and the decisive moment as it figures in the life of the committed, married man who has made the transition to the ethical stage."


365. Plato, *Timaeus*, 37 e. For a discussion of the notion of being as presence in Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, see Helene Weiss, "The Greek Conceptions of Time and Being in the Light of


‘Integral’ emphasizes wholeness; it suggests that we are truly satisfied only when we are entire, complete, at one with ourselves. But are we not denied such completeness by our temporality? Desire, care, anticipation—especially the anticipation of death—all betray a lack which appears to be inseparable from human existence. If that lack and, with it, the inability to come to rest in the present, are constitutive of the human situation, man’s search for final satisfaction must be in vain; ‘timelessness is the ideal of pleasure’...Marcuse himself invokes the Symposium, where Plato points out that man’s temporal existence is marked by lack and by a striving to overcome that lack...love is the desire for lost completeness...the aim of love is said to be the perpetual possession of the good. If man is to gain such possession he must discover a way of escaping the destructiveness of time. Eros demands eternity...both Plato and Marcuse subscribe to what I want to call an ethics of satisfaction, which makes being at one with oneself the goal of man’s striving.” “The glorification of satisfaction, understood as a being-at-one-with-one-self, has to lead man away from concrete human existence and temporality. The promise of an overcoming of alienation, when taken seriously, must alienate man from himself.”


368. Quoted in Ebeling, Lutherstudien, Bd. II, p. 473. For Luther, the historicity of the world is bound up with the theological problem of creation and the free will of God. See his thirty-third, thirty-fourth, and thirty-ninth theses: “Nothing in the world becomes something of necessity....” “If Aristotle would have recognized the absolute power of God, he would accordingly have maintained that it was impossible for matter to exist of itself alone.” “If Anaxagoras placed infinity before form, as it seems he did, he was the best of the philosophers, even if Aristotle was unwilling to acknowledge this.”

371.WA, LVI, 239/XXV, 225.
372.WA, IV, 350.
373.WA, LVI, 441-442/XXV, 433-434.
374. See also 218-219/204, where Luther again refers to Aristotle’s discussion of “potentiality,” “privation” (steresis), and “becoming” in Aristotle’s Physics, I, 5-7 and to Aristotle’s analogy of the “blank tablet” for the potentiality of the soul (De anima, III, 4) (see also the editor’s notes to Luther’s text):
"...all creation teaches that 'only those who are not well need a physician' [Matt. 9:12], that only the sheep is sought that is lost [Luke 15:4], that only to those who are in captive is freedom given, that only he is made rich who is poor, that only those are made strong who are weak, that only he is exalted who has been humbled, that only that is filled which is empty, that only that is raised up which has been brought low. As the philosophers say: a thing is not brought into form unless there is a lack of form or a change of previous form; and the possible intellect does not receive a form unless it is in principle without form and like a tabula rasa....God fills only those who are hungry and needy." See also 329-330/317, where Luther conceives the becoming and repetition of the self as the constant incarnation of the Word in the self: "It is necessary that the wisdom of the flesh be changed and that it give up its form and take on the form of the Word. This happens when it gives itself up to faith, destroys itself, and conforms itself to the Word....Thus 'the Word was made flesh' [John 1:14] and 'took on the form of a servant' [Phil. 2:7], so that the flesh might become the Word and take on the form of the Word...."

375. For this same theme of the enactment of the relation to God through faith, which is constantly fulfilling itself by means of "works" in the situation, see ND, 360-361/55-57.

376. Gadamer, Lehmann, and Pöggeler have argued that it was Heidegger's "theological origin" which led him for the first time to question the understanding of being as static presence in the tradition of Western metaphysics. See Lehmann, "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," p. 154: "...the experience of the understanding of history in original Christianity is the only possible 'standpoint' in which the limitation of the traditional ontology regarding its understanding of the meaning of being and the persistence of this limitation could stand out. It was only here that Heidegger was able to find the archimedean point with which he could bring to a state of crisis the more or less unambiguous, but mostly indifferent explication of being as presence-at-hand, if Western metaphysics until Hegel has been dominated almost exclusively by this point of view....The 'obviousness' and the 'naturalness' of the orientation towards the Greek understanding of being was able to be perceived and broken only through a radically other interpretation of being. Without such a confrontation of Greek ontology and the original Christian experience of history, the question about the meaning of being could not in any way be posed. The 'naivety', which to the average reader of that chapter from the First Letter to the Thessalonians could hardly appear to promise such an explosive force, showed itself to Heidegger in a much more dangerous and abysmal fashion. In turn, this was possible only because, through his exact knowledge and rigorous understanding of Greek philosophy, Heidegger's thinking was in a position to catch sight of an other thinking as other." See Gadamer, Heideggers Weges, pp. 131, 145: "Here his inspiration came from the young Luther; from Augustine, whose thinking he followed up with great admiration; and especially from his absorption in the underlying eschatological
current of the Pauline Epistles. All this let him for the first time to view metaphysics as a kind of misunderstanding of the original temporality and historicity, which came to experience in the claims of Christian faith. An introduction which Heidegger wrote in 1922 to an intended book on Aristotle documents clearly this context: "...in the end he was forced not only to lose faith in the appropriateness of his theological education, but also beyond that he was driven to recognize in the Greek heritage, which weighs so heavily on all modern thought, the origin of that embarrassment about 'being' and the historicity of human existence, which provided him with the motto for Being and Time." According to Pöggeler, it was through playing off against each other the Greek and the Christian understandings of being that Heidegger came to "re-decide" the first "metaphysical beginning" of philosophy: "[The real mistake of metaphysics] lies in the fact - and this realization meant for Heidegger the decisive step on the way to Being and Time - that metaphysical thought thinks being as a constant being present at hand and so cannot do justice to the temporality of the enactment of factual life." (APp, 42) "Rather [than arising from a philological and antiquarian interest] a theme such as 'Augustine and Neo-Platonism (or also 'Kierkegaard and Hegel') placed those decisions, which had formed western thought, again before a new decision." (APp, 45) See also Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 328: "What was uncovered by religion in the form of 'mythological' representation which had become foreign to us - this is what Heidegger laid at the basis of philosophy: the last things reveal themselves to man in a moment of vision, which remains unavailable. But with this conception is not philosophy given up, which is oriented to substance and essence, or pursues the security of self-certainty?"

For the same analogical language, see PA, 99, 192, 70. As I have been trying to show all along, a great deal of Heidegger’s philosophical language has this metaphorical character (e.g., the terms “falling,” “guilt,” “kairological,” “destruction,” “care”).

Regarding the "enactment" or "temporalizing meaning" of Christianity, what the young Heidegger wanted to prevent in theology was the "de-historicization" of the temporality of the relation of human being and god, which took place through the traditional adoption of the foreign conceptuality of Greek philosophy. He carried out a destruction of the "enactment-meaning" of traditional theology and a retrieval of a more genuine and original notion of this meaning not only in his two lecture courses on original Christianity, but also in the majority of his youthful works, in his Being and Time, and especially in his 1927 lecture "Phenomenology and Theology." For Heidegger's destructive critique, see Heidegger’s 1924 lecture "The Concept of Time": "the Christian sense of 'eternity' does not mean some empty 'foreverness' (as in the Greek sei)." (BZs, 76) See also GZ, 180-182/130-131, 231-251/171-185; SZ, 29-34/43-47, 65-66/74-75, 123-127/125-127 and especially 584, n. 7/479, n. xiii: "The fact that the traditional concept of eternity in the sense of the 'standing now' (nunc stans)
has been drawn from the ordinary way of understanding time and has been limited to an orientation towards the idea of 'constant' presence at hand does not need to be discussed in detail. If God's eternity could be 'construed' philosophically, then it may be understood only as a more original and 'infinite' temporality."

See also Gadamer, Heidegger's Wege, p. 145: "...that the theology, which he had learned and which to a great extent was based on Aristotelian metaphysics, did not at all correspond to the real motives of Greek thought had to sharpen all the more for him the confrontation with this thought. The understanding of time, which was alive in Paul and was recognized again by Heidegger, was in no sense Greek....Thus, in his ownmost and deepest problem, that of the Christian expectation of the end-time, there remained alive the question whether the pressure of Greek thought on the Christian experience of faith did not make the Christian message completely unrecognizable and at the very least alienated Christian theology from its ownmost task....in the end he was forced not only to lose faith in the appropriateness of his theological education, but also beyond that he was driven to recognize in the Greek heritage, which weighed so heavily on all modern thought, the origin of that embarrassment about 'being' and the historicity of human existence, which provided him with the motto for *Being and Time.*"

For Heidegger's destructive retrieval of Christian theology, see especially PT, 52-59/9-15 (note Heidegger's retrieval of Kierkegaard's notion of contemporaneity): "The crucifixion, however, and all that belongs to it is a historical event....According to its 'sacrificial' character, what is revealed in this manner has the specific direction of communication towards individual human beings, who are at any time existing factically and historically, whether contemporaneous or not....As communication, the revelation is not the conveyance of information about past, present, or imminently appearing occurrences; rather, the communication lets one 'take part', be a 'par-taker', a 'participant' in the historical happening, which the revelation (= what is revealed in it) is....And rebirth does not mean a momentary outfitting with some equality or other, but a way of historical existing for factical, believing Dasein in the history, which begins with the historical happening of the revelation....as the appropriation of revelation itself, faith makes up the Christian historical happening, i.e., the type of existence, which determines factical Dasein in its Christianess as a specific form of historicity. Faith is believing understanding existing in history, which is revealed, i.e., happens historically with the Crucified....Therefore, theology, as the science of faith, i.e., of an intrinsically historical way of being, is to the very core a historical science.....It belongs to the self-interpretation of the Christian happening as a historical one that it enacts always anew the appropriation of its own historicity and of the possibilities of faithful Dasein that emerge within this historicity.....Theology is systematic only when it is historical-practical."
379. In the later Heidegger’s contrast between metaphysics as "the way of salvation" (Heilsweg) and his own thought as a "way across the field," one can still hear echoes of Luther’s distinction between the "theology of glory" and the "theology of the cross." See WA, 177/185; SD, 1/1.


381. Zimmerman, The Eclipse of the Self, p. 12. Zimmerman also writes: "In a more recent work, George J. Stack...concludes that [Heidegger] was unfair to Kierkegaard. Although Heidegger makes only three footnotes to Kierkegaard in Being and Time, Stack asserts that 'he ought to have made at least a hundred.' Taken together, the books by Schrag and Stack suggest that Being and Time is just a formalization of what the Danish thinker had understood decades earlier...Heidegger often seemed to regard himself as superior to his philosophical predecessors." See also p. 144: "Heidegger’s hesitation to accord full recognition to the importance of Kierkegaard’s thinking may arise in part from Heidegger’s desire to put distance between himself and his own theological background."

See also ML, 178/141, where Heidegger is reluctant to acknowledge clearly Kierkegaard’s influence on his thought: "Was the analysis of Dasein then projected on the backdrop of time because it was believed the result would be good if the above-mentioned [analyses of time by Kierkegaard, Bergson, Spengler, and Husserl] were fused together? In short, because one can get the idea of mixing together these various treatments of the problem of time and, as the phrase has it, ‘think them out to the end’? This is all too much the simpleton’s notion of philosophy, the one who believes that out of five authors you can make a sixth. (I was already confronting the works of Kierkegaard when there was as yet no dialectical literature...). In order to think something out to the end...one must first be in position of that end towards which one is supposed to think them out...."


383. A major problem in the English translation, which is not shared by the original German text, is that the translators have unwisely turned all of Heidegger’s footnotes into endnotes at the end of the text.

384. See Heidegger’s essay "Nietzsche’s Statement: ‘God is dead’" (HW, 209-267/53-112) and "What are Poets For?" (HW, 269-320/81-142). See also Heidegger’s 1970 preface to his early essay "Phenomenology and Theology," which refers to his above-mentioned essay on Nietzsche. Heidegger’s lecture courses and seminars in the 1930s and 1940s deal to a great extent with Nietzsche and Hölderlin. See Heidegger’s statement in his 1936-37 lecture course on Nietzsche that “Nietzsche, in addition to Hölderlin, was the only believing man, who lived in the nineteenth century." (GA 43, 192) For a discussion of Heidegger’s experience of "the death of God" and his turn to the Greek mytho-poetic religious tradition, see Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, pp. 281-287; "Heidegger und die hermeneutische Theologie," pp. 400-438; Philosophie und
Since 1929-30, when Nietzsche became a matter of 'decision' for him, Heidegger's new point of departure for thinking the truth of being was dominated by the all-determining presupposition that God is 'dead.' See also Pöggeler report on Heidegger's still unpublished Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-38), which Heidegger at one time planned as his "major work" after Being and Time: "Heidegger und das Problem der Zeit," in L'Heritage de Kant (Paris: Beauchesne Editeur, 1982), pp. 287-307.

For Heidegger's destruction of the epoch of medieval thought within the "history of being" as a progressive decline from early Greek thinking, see N 2, 410-420/10-19.

See Heidegger's "Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics" (N 2, 473-480/70-74) and HW, 249.


Quoted in Pöggeler, "Heidegger und die hermeneutische Theologie," p. 481.

The way that Heidegger travelled has, however, not remained the same, for a way determines itself, when it is travelled, from a direction, and this turned itself around after Being and Time. In that the 'condition humaine', which was previously thought in an exemplary way by Pascal and Kierkegaard, is now seen by Heidegger as supported and determined by the "history of being," the existentials of Being and Time are indeed not given up, but rather re-determined, re-thought, and turned around in reference to their original directional meaning. This can be clarified in an exemplary way with a few concepts. For this purpose, we can single out the relation of Dasein that exists and being (Sein), of the project of Dasein and the project of being, of existential facticity and the 'there is/it gives' being, of existential truth and the truth of being, of finitude and eternity, and finally we can single out the changed meaning of fundamental ontology, which supports all the existentials. In the end, it was, however, no misunderstanding, when so many of those who attended his lectures and read Being and Time understood the author at that time differently than he
understands himself today, namely, as the author of an agnostic analytic of Dasein, who had been influenced by Kierkegaard, Pascal, Luther and Augustine, and not as a mystic of being, who, presumably already in Being and Time, had already left behind all human 'subjectivity'....Who allows himself to doubt the truth and correctness of Heidegger's later self-understanding of his first and fundamental work, will to be sure have to take into consideration that Being and Time in fact begins and ends with the question about being." "But in Being and Time, the talk is not about the relation of the truth of being to the essence of man, but rather contrariwise about the comportment of human Dasein to being and to truth. According to Being and Time, the Dasein which is is 'true in the primary sense', that is, is in the way of uncovering and disclosing....Indeed, even in Heidegger's later statements the relation of the truth of being to the essence of man is never given up, but rather only re-determined, in that this relation to man is determined from being itself." See Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self, p. 149, where he rightly emphasizes the tension between the young Heidegger's emphasis on the role of the concrete individual in the historical situation and the later Heidegger's emphasis on the "fateful sending" of autonomous world-historical truth: "Resoluteness, however, includes an element of will which Heidegger later tries to exclude from his concept of authenticity as releasement. It always remained difficult for Heidegger to describe the relation between the truth revealed in the moment of vision and the experience of the individual who is called to be the site for such a revelation." See also Pöggeler, "Heidegger und die hermeneutische Theologie," pp. 492ff.

392.Cf. Löwith, Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit, pp. 12, 20, 52. See especially pp. 111-112, where Löwith suggests that the ambiguity of the relation of Heidegger's later philosophy to theology was due to his never having come to terms with his religious needs: 'But what lies at the basis and in the background of everything that Heidegger ever said and allowed many to take notice and listen, is something unsaid: the religious motive, which indeed had been cut loose from the Christian faith, but precisely in its dogmatically unaffiliated indeterminacy all the more speaks to those who are no longer believing Christians, but indeed would like to be religious....Heidegger in fact thinks 'being' from 'time', namely, from our own time and its 'neediness', which according to Heidegger-Hölderlin consists in the fact that it stands in a double lack: 'in the no-longer of the absented gods and in the not-yet of the coming'....his questioning thought about being is in the literal sense necessary and needful (not-wendig) and as questioning is a kind of 'piety'.....Is it the soul speaking? Is it the world speaking? Is it God speaking?' In his 'soliloquies', a Christian thinker like Augustine clearly and decisively said that the world did not interest him, but rather only the relation of his soul to God. In contrast, the post-Christian thinker Heidegger determines human Dasein as 'being-in-the-world', and the question whether being preferably speaks as the world to Dasein or as God to the soul remains undecided and ambiguous." Cf.

383. Husserl did not understand that Heidegger's lecture courses on Paul, Augustine, and Luther were being used as an Archimedean point from which Heidegger could free himself from Husserl's own logical and transcendental version of phenomenology. He thought that Heidegger intended them as phenomenological-eidetic analyses of a specific region of experience (regional ontology). See Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, p. 17.

394. See Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, p. 44.

395. Löwith, *Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit*, pp. 20-21. See also Caputo, "Phenomenology, Mysticism and 'Grammatica Speculativa'," pp. 113-117, "The Later Heidegger and Mysticism": "This whole discussion of the attitude of the soul stretching out into the transcendent, of the primordial relationship of the soul to God in the middle ages, at least as Heidegger portrays it, is profoundly like Heidegger's own later thought, i.e., like the relationship between Dasein and Being in the works that appear after 1930. The personal relationship between the soul and God in Eckhardt's mysticism contains a clue to the solution to the problem of truth, where truth is taken to mean the belonging together of thought and being. The way the soul makes its way to God in Meister Eckhart's mysticism tells us something about how thought effects its breakthrough into true reality and real truth. Now a careful examination of the writings of Meister Eckhart would reveal an astonishing similarity between Eckhart and the later Heidegger's own views of the 'truth of Being'. ... Eckhart expresses this in trinitarian terms: in the same way that the Father gives birth to his Son in eternity, so will He bear His Son in the detached soul and form the soul over in the form of the Son... all of this bears an unmistakable resemblance to Heidegger's discussion of the 'event' (Ereignis) of truth in his later writings... A study of the Habilitationsschrift, then, reveals a remarkable thing about Heidegger's development: Heidegger's later thought is not so much a 'reversal' as it is a return to this earlier interests in medieval life and thought in general and in medieval mysticism in particular." Cf. Caputo's "Meister Eckhardt and the Later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 12 (1974), p. 494ff.: "as God is to the soul in Eckhart, so Being is to Dasein in Heidegger." Cf. also Caputo's *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1976), ch. IV. Finally, see Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, p. 324: "In fact, one has to ask whether in the language about being or about an ultimate 'there is/it gives' the speculative tradition has not so fused itself with a hermeneutical tendency in such a way that truth appears as a happening or as an inevitable 'destiny'." Cf. James M. Robinson, "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelisch-Deutsche Theologie, 22 (1962), 113-141.

396. Cf. Pöggeler, "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger," p. 159: "If Heidegger endeavored soon after to distance himself from the beginnings of his thought, this entry into the tradition left nonetheless a permanent mark on him. Even his later withdrawal from the construction of systems and insistence on description and
analysis remain characterized by speculation." See also his Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 324: "In fact, one has to ask oneself whether in the talk about being or about an ultimate "there is/it gives" the speculative tradition has not so unified itself with a hermeneutical tendency that truth appears as an event and or as an inevitable 'destiny'...it should be precisely determined in which way Heidegger employed this talk [about being] in the various stages of his way. He begins with the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages, in order soon to go beyond this; his orientation towards the 'I am' was then won only by passing through a rupture, but it was then decisively modified in the talk about being as event and again about the problem of nihilism."


399. For Kierkegaard's continued influence on contemporary thought, see also John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1987); and a new publication series entitled Kierkegaard and Postmodernism, general ed. Mark C. Taylor (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1986ff.).

400. See also Sheehan, "The 'Original Form' of Sein und Zeit: Heidegger's Begriff der Zeit (1924)," pp. 78-83.


402. See Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," p. 18: "As the young Heidegger searched for his way, i.e., to think 'being in and through life', he attempted a plethora of ways."

403. Without any kind of such reductionism, Zimmerman in his Eclipse of the Self and Pöggeler in his Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers have nonetheless stressed the theological and Kierkegaardian influence on Heidegger's youthful thought, whereas Sheehan, for example, has concentrated on the influence from the side of Aristotle's notion of physis (see Sheehan, "On the Way to EREIGNIS: Heidegger's Interpretation of PHYSIS").
Notes to Chapter Five, Section IV.

1. My translation has been made from Heidegger's own translation into German. All further reference to the *Nicomachean Ethics* will appear in the body of the text with the abbreviation *E.N.* The following additional abbreviations should also be noted: *E.E.* (=Eudemonian Ethics, *M.M.* (=Magna Moralia), *De. an.* (=De anima), *Rhet.* (=Rhetoric), *Pol.* (=Politics), *Poet.* (=Poetics), *De interp.* (=De interpretatione), *Phys.* (=Physics), *Meta.* (=Metaphysics). Although I take responsibility for all translations of Aristotle's texts, the translations available in the volumes of *The Loeb Classical Library* and also in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) have been used as a basis for my own translations.

2. My translation of this passage from Plato, like the one above, has again been made from Heidegger's own translation into German.


7. See Appendix II.

8. This lecture course gave a lengthy treatment of *De Anima B* (see Sheehan, "On the Way to *EREIGNIS*," p. 134, n. 7).

9. This lecture course "gave by way of an introduction a detailed interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*" (see Harmut Buchner, "Grundzüge der aristotelischen Ethik," pp. 232-233), which lasted from the start (October) until the Christmas recess (Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger’s Reading of Aristotle: Human Being and the

10. See AJ, 3-4, 34; PA, 41-52, 91-92, 126; HF, 14ff.


13. See Heidegger's 1927 lecture course (GP, 149-150/106). See also his 1939 essay "On the Concept and Essence of Physic: Physics B, 1 (BP, 239-301/221-269), which, according to Gadamer, presents (although in a different context) the interpretations of Aristotle that for the most part Heidegger had already worked out in the early twenties (Gadamer, Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers, p. 118; cf. Sheehan, "On the Way to Ereignis," p. 136).


17. For the metaphorical character of the "formation of concepts," see Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Werke, Bd. I, Part Three, 2, c.

18. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 121.

19. Gadamer, "Destruction and Deconstruction."

20. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, 144. See also Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, 131/436: "Heidegger preferred the Ethics, the Rhetoric, in short those disciplines of the Aristotelian curriculum which involved their independence from the questioning after principles which belongs to theoretical philosophy. Above all, Aristotle's criticism in the Ethics of the idea of the good, the highest principle of Platonic doctrine, seemed to him to express his own concern about temporal-historical existence and his critique of transcendental philosophy. His interpretation of phronesis as allo eidos gnoseos, as an other kind of knowledge, amounted to a kind of confirmation of his own theoretical and existential interests. That carried over into philosophy, into metaphysics, as well, insasmuch as he was already thinking of what he liked to call his "famous analogy" (although in, as yet, insufficiently self-conscious terms). This was the element, the point of departure within Aristotelian metaphysics from which he could call into question the
systematic derivation of all validity from a single principle,
whether Husserl's transcendental ego or Plato's idea of the good."

See also Gadamer, *Heidegger's Weg*, pp. 31-32/201-202: "I
participated in his seminar on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. We
studied the analysis of *phronesis*. Heidegger pointed out to us in
the text of Aristotle that every *techne* possesses an inner limit:
it's knowledge is not a full uncovering of something because the
work it knows how to produce is delivered over to the uncertainty
of an unavailable use over which it does not preside. Then he began
to discuss the difference that distinguishes all such knowledge,
and especially mere *doxa*, from *phronesis*: *lethe tes men toiautes*
*hexeis estin, phroneseos de ouk estin* (1140 29) We were unsure of
this sentence and completely unfamiliar with the Greek concepts; as
we groped for an interpretation, he declared brusquely: 'That is
the conscience!' This is not the place to reduce the pedagogical
overstatement involved in this assertion to its proper proportions,
and even less, to indicate the logical and ontological force that
the analysis of *phronesis* actually had in Aristotle.

Today it is clear what Heidegger found in it, and what so
fascinated him in Aristotle's critique of Plato's idea of the good
and the Aristotelian concept of practical knowledge: here a mode of
knowledge (an *eidos gnoseos*) (1141 b 33ff.) was being described
that could no longer be based in any way on a final objectifiabil-
ity in the sense of science. In other words, it was a knowledge
within the concrete situation of existence.

...The violent rending of the Aristotelian text here
recalls Heidegger's own questions, for instance, in *Being and Time*
it is the call of the conscience that first makes 'Dasein in man'
manifest in its ontological and temporal event-structure."

21.Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie,"
pp. 76-79.
22.SZ, 19, n. 1/34, n. 6; 43, n. 1/56, n. iv; 184, 186, n.
1/178, 179, n. vi; 296, n. 23/268; n. xlii; 452, n. 5/392, n. vi.
e – 184 a. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics, 984 b, where he states
that among the "rash talk" of the early thinkers Anaxagoras was the
only one who spoke like "an unintoxicated man." Since the early
philosophy as a whole is "like one who lisps, since it is young
and in its beginnings" (993 a), one must "follow up and grasp the
sayings of [e.g.] Empedocles in the direction of their meaning
and not their lisping and obscure expression" (985 a).
406; Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," p.
74. Cf. SZ, 8/26.
25.See also Heidegger's treatment of Parmenides statement
that "being and thinking are the same." (SZ, 227/215)
27.For a sympathetic reading of the sophists as critics of
metaphysics, see G.B. Madison, *Understanding: A Phenomenological-
Pragmatic Analysis* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 244-
248.

29. See Appendix II; Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," pp. 75-76.
32. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 31/201.
33. Gadamer, "Destruction and Deconstruction."
35. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 31/201; cf. his "Vom Angang des Denkens," 383. See also Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," p. 285: "It was technically decisive that, for instance, Plato was not talked about and his Theory of Ideas expounded; rather for an entire semester a single dialogue was pursued and subjected to question step by step, until the time-honored doctrine had disappeared to make room for a set of problems of immediate and urgent relevance....The rumor about Heidegger put it quite simply: Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different from the familiar, worn-out trivialities they had been presumed to say. There exists a teacher; once can perhaps learn to think." See also Wilhelm Szilasi, Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1946), pp. 7-9: "[Heidegger's] concentrated earnestness showed us in human form the daimonic nature of philosophy, which always worked much more through the person than through the developed doctrine. When it was a matter of philosophy, he was himself history and responsibility, was himself the existence which carried the historical transmission of philosophy as if this existence had been co-present at every decision of philosophy and responsible for its genuineness. He took over responsibility for the whole history of philosophy. Thus, every question could become his question. The utter passion of questioning, before which every epoch had found itself from out of its own situation, enabled him to uncover all the questions which were at work in our own situation of existence. A passage from Plato or Aristotle was no longer an ancient text, it was not at all a text, but rather an indication or answer, a position of the human spirit to be defended, which he could not give up if he did not want to lose his own historicity....In Heidegger's light, the emergence of the time took place, and it emerged in the essentiality of spirit in order to understand every past present time as one's own present. Thus we read with him Plato's Sophist....I have spoken in the past tense, because this time so much belongs to the past that I now hardly know anything of Heidegger's works and writings in the last fifteen years."
36. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 31/201.
37. loc. cit., p. 119.
38. loc. cit., p. 118. See also Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II, p. 486: "What was it that drew me and others so to Heidegger? Of course, I did not know to say at the time. Today it presents itself to me as follows: Here the figures of thought in the philosophical tradition came alive, because they were understood as answers to actual questions. The uncovering of the history of their motivation lent to these questions something inescapable. Questions, when understood, cannot simply be taken as information. They become one's own questions.... Only when I learned through Heidegger to bring historical thinking into the re-acquisition of the questions of the tradition did that make the old questions intelligible and bring them to life, so that they became my own. What I describe here is the fundamental hermeneutical experience, as I would call it today. Above all it was the intensity with which Heidegger conjured up Greek philosophy that captivated us in its spell.... with one stroke, Plato and Aristotle appeared as the sworn helpers of philosophizing for everyone to whom the play of systems in academic philosophy had become dubious...."
40. loc. cit., p. 136/441.
42. Heideggers Wege, p. 71/46.
43. loc. cit., p. 144.
44. loc. cit., p. 131/436.
45. loc. cit., p. 71/46.
46. loc. cit., p. 131/436.
47. PA, 108; HF, 10; LW, 1-2; MÜ, 137/111.
49. PA, 112, 93, 108, 117.
50. PA, 60, 21, 57, 112, 182; IP, 24, 96.
51. PA, 8-9, 47; cf. PW, 148-150, 164-185; HF, 67-77; GZ, 23-35/19-28; LW, 93-96.
52. See Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Bd. I (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955), p. 124-125; translated as Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, L.L. McAlister (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 88: "Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the relation (Beziehung) to an object, the direction (Richtung) toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-objectivity. Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In representation something is represented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.... And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain an object intentionally within themselves."

54. See SZ, 19/34.

55. See De an., 431b: "The stone is not in the soul, but the eidos, the look, the appearance."


63. See Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, Fifth Investigation, sect. 9 ("The Meaning of Brentano's Delimitation of 'Psychical Phenomena'").

64. See GZ, 200-201/149-149; LW, 25, 109ff.; SZ, 289ff./281ff.; P, 256/111; GP, 103-104/73.


69. Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, p. 5.

70. WA, I, 226/XXXI, 12.

71. Ebeling, *Luther*, p. 89.


73. *loc. cit.*, pp. 32-33, 39.


75. I have replaced Luther's loose quotation with a translation from Aristotle's original text and, in square brackets, have added the subsequent line from Aristotle's text.


77. For a full discussion of Luther's notion of ethos or habitus and for a comparison with Aristotle, see Gerhard Funke, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte: Bausteine zu einem historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. III, Gewohnheit (Bonn, 1958), pp. 187-203.
78. See Kierkegaard’s *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 100.


80. For a complete account of Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the concepts of Aristotle’s thought, see Georg J. Stack, *Kierkegaard’s Existential Ethics* (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1977). See also his bibliography for a list of his many essays comparing Kierkegaard and Aristotle.

81. See *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, pp. 315, 285, 268: “To understand oneself in existence was the Greek principle. However little content the doctrine of a Greek philosopher sometimes represented, the philosopher had nevertheless one advantage: he was never comical. I am well aware that if someone were nowadays to live like a Greek philosopher, existentially expressing and existentially probing the depths of what must be called his view of life, he would be regarded as a lunatic.” “In Greece, as in the youth of philosophy in general, it was found difficult to win through to the abstract and to leave existence, which always gives the particular; in modern times, on the other hand, it has become difficult to reach existence.... In Greece, philosophizing was a mode of action, and the philosopher was therefore an existing individual.... But nowadays, just what is it to philosophize, and what does a philosopher really know? For of course I do not deny that he knows everything.” “And so it is a comical sight to see a thinker who in spite of all pretensions, personally existed like a nincompoop... whose personal life was devoid of pathos or pathological struggles, concerned only with the question of which university offered the best livelihood.... I know that in Greece, at least, a thinkers was not a stunted, crippled creature who produced works of art, but was himself a work of art in his existence.”

82. See Otto Pöggeler, “Heideggers Neubestimmung des Phänomenbegriffs,” *Phänomenologische Forschung* 9 (1980), p. 130: “In contrast to my presentation in 1963, it has been argued that in this phase of Heidegger’s thinking not only Augustine and Luther, but rather also Aristotle was discussed in an essential way. This is correct... but one has to ask how Heidegger took up Aristotle at that time, such that he could read him together with Luther and Augustine.” Heidegger may also have been following to a certain extent Dilthey’s reading of the ethical thought of Plato and Aristotle. See Misch’s introduction to Dilthey’s thought in *Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, V. Band: Die Geistige Welt, Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens; S2, 527, n. 3/450, n. xiv; 531/454.

83. In his lecture “Destruction and Deconstruction,” Gadamer made the following points: “What was the battle cry of Heidegger during this time? He saw that the Aristotle which he had learned as a young Catholic theologian was very far from the concreteness of Greek life and from the life of the words and terms used by Aristotle. Heidegger introduced his students in the first years not to the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics*, but to the *Rhetoric* and the practical philosophy, the *Ethics*. There he could demonstrate how
the authentic Aristotle was something else than the Neo-Scholastic system to which he was introduced by his theological studies. And he needed this as a religious man who suffered from not being able to come to terms with his own Christian faith on the basis of the theology he had learned. His return to Aristotle was in the deepest sense the seeking for a more living self-understanding as a Christian. You may ask: How could he expect that in Aristotle? Well, he was not so blind as to fail to see that it was not a Christian culture which he found there. But what he could do was destroy, carry out a destruction of those layers of scholasticism and tradition through the centuries and find the concreteness of life in the Greek conceptual works. And in finding that he could realize the gap between the Greek approach to the metaphysical and theological dimension and his own needs. So the destruction that he exercised was in the last respect in order to find his own way by contrast to Greek ontology and metaphysics. That was a long time ago, but it was something not really understood - neither by his students (as I was), nor by the theologians and others."

84. See 32. 32/37, 389/399, 390/392: "Even the theory of value, whether it is regarded formally or materially, has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a 'metaphysic of morals' - that is, an ontology of Dasein and existence." This essential being-guilty is, equi-primordially, the existential condition for the possibility of the 'morally' good and for the 'morally' evil - that is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically."


88. The rest of this passage is worth quoting in full, whose language sounds just as much like Kierkegaard's as Aristotle's: "One says perhaps: one day, and intends to exaggerate; man is indeed basically a sad and pathetic subject - but at the same time
that does not basically further concern and trouble the philosopher.

In measuring (Messen) with the standards of absolute relations of value, one can determine that one seldom or never completely "realizes" them. With a gesture of modesty, one indicates a falling short (Zurückbleiben) of the ideal. But that is basically of no importance and immediately forgotten. Why take into account such imperfections and difficulties and indeed do so in principle, such that these have a say in the determination of the being-meaning of factual life? The basic matter remains the same: one is an undisturbed representative of an absolute ethics.

That hourly and daily one moves and encounters oneself in hypocrisies, half-measures, and worse things, and indeed occasionally no longer encounters oneself, that is as such and too well-known in order to be able thereby to take the opportunity of announcing a new philosophy to one's contemporaries. These are also things that one best leaves to the priest, insofar as moral trumpet-blowing certainly does not belong in philosophy.

Why get involved with this something - called man - regarding his imperfections and take him into account so principally for philosophizing? One's supposed absolutes, their graspability, and the flighty belief in them could in the end also be affected (in Mitleidenschaft gezogen werden) by this suspicious being. But then philosophy would lose its theme, and philosophy, which is loved in itself, can of course not expose itself to this embarrassment.

...all reflection on the character of validity belonging to philosophical knowing with the pretention of determining something philosophically throws philosophical knowing out of its own tendency to enactment." (PA, 163-165)

Cf. SZ, 22/37, 531/454, and especially 389-390/339-340, 382/334: "When Kant represented the conscience as a 'court of justice' and made this the basic guiding idea in his interpretation of it, he did not do so by accident; this was suggested by the idea of moral law... Even the theory of value, whether it is regarded formally or materially, has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a 'metaphysic of morals' - that is, an ontology of Dasein and existence. Dasein is regarded as an entity with which one might concern oneself, whether this 'concern' has the sense of 'actualizing values' or of fulfillment of a norm... We miss a 'positive' content in that which is called, because we expect to be told something currently useful about assured possibilities of 'action' which are available and calculable. This expectation has its basis within the horizon of that way of interpreting which belongs to common-sense concern - a way of interpreting which forces Dasein's existence to be subsumed under the idea of a business procedure that can be regulated. Such expectations (and in part these tacitly underlie even the demand [by Scheler] for a material ethic of value as contrasted with one that is 'merely' formal) are of course disappointed by the conscience." "The common sense of the 'they' knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them... one's wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes the taking-over of that essential consciencelessness within
which alone the existentiell possibility of being 'good' subsists." (cf. 258/239) "The one who act, as Goethe already said, is conscienceless." (SZ, 441/319) "To hear the call authentically signifies bringing oneself into action." (SZ, 390/341)

The young Heidegger's position on ethics, as on "authenticity" in factual life in general, is not that of "decisionism," the arbitrary use of unlimited freedom, which Sartre, for example, sometimes comes close to expressing. Rather, praxis is always oriented by the repeatable possibilities of one's "heritage" (ethos), which makes up one's "destiny" within a "community" and one's own particular "fate," and which are enacted within one's current situation. (PA, 84, 73) See SZ, 507/435: "If everything 'good' is a heritage, and the character of 'goodness' lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness." In Aristotle's language, this means that the "ends" of action are not chosen, but rather interpreted. Cf. Beat Sitter, "Zur Möglichkeit Dezisionistischer Auslegung von Heideggers Ersten Schriften," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 24 (1970), pp. 516-535; Charles Guignon, "The Twofold Task: Heidegger's Foundational Historicism in Being and Time, in Tulane Studies in Philosophy: The Thought of Martin Heidegger, Volume 31 (1984), pp. 53-59.

89. See also SZ, 222/211, where Heidegger states that ontology has nothing to do with "moralizing critique" and "philosophy of culture."

90. These themes of "making it essay" and "difficulty" are also taken from Kierkegaard. See Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, ch. 1.

99. op. cit., pp. 31/200, 95/47, 118.
101. op. cit., p. 95/47.
102. op. cit., p. 118. In his "On the Way to Ereignis," p. 134, n. 8, Sheehan gives a slightly different list of the contents ("Nic. Ethics Z, Metaphysics A and Z, H, Theta, De Anima G and Physics B"), which were reported to him orally by Gadamer.
108. Cf. Otto Pöggeler, "Metaphysics and the Topology of Being," in Thomas Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1981), p. 175: "For one thing, he presumes that philosophy must have a metaphysico-teleological, and ultimately a theological, closure. For another, he assumes that the eternity of the Absolute, as unchangeable, must be opposed to the temporality or changeability of the world, and that meaning or being-true is intrinsically bound up with an eternal, unchangeable, immutable, constant and self-subsisting being. In his Freiburg lectures after the First World War Heidegger abandons these metaphysical and speculative presuppositions....Meaning in its kind of Being is no longer thought in terms of a schema where unchangeable eternity, residing statically in itself, is placed over against temporality as the changeable. Rather, meaning is to be conceived as the very movement of factual life which, in its originality, is history."
109. Cf. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 489; *Heideggers Weg*, pp. 118-119: "Here in Aristotle's critique of Plato, which crystallised in the differentiation of techne, episteme, and phronesis, Heidegger achieved his first decisive distance from 'Philosophy as
Rigorous Science’.


114. Cf. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, 119: "All Heidegger’s later publications, which concern his relation to the Greeks (beginning with the essay on Anaximander in his book Forest Paths), no longer share on the same level the fusion of horizons which in his early studies was pursued almost to the point of identification." Cf. p. 134: "It is not self-evident that this is the only way to view Plato [i.e., as falling into the forgetfulness of being]. In fact, as a result of [Heidegger’s] doing so, all those things which had fascinated the young Heidegger in the history of Platonism - Augustine, Christian mysticism, and the Sophist - played no real role in his thought. One might have also have interpreted Platonic philosophy in a way which would make it a means to get back behind the problematic of Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian metaphysics." Cf. Gadamer’s "Auf dem Rückgang zum Anfang," pp. 404-416; Riedel, "Zwischen Plato und Aristoteles," pp. 6, 9-11; Volpi, "Heidegger in Marburg: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles," pp. 173-178.


118. Heidegger gave the following seminars: 1940 On Physic in Aristotle; SS 1942 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit and Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 10; WS 1942-43, continuation of the SS 1942 seminar; SS 1944 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV; SS 1951 Exercises in Reading: Aristotle, Physics, II, 1 and III, 1-3; WS 1951-52 Exercises in Reading: Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV and IX, 10.

119. He published the manuscript from his 1940 seminar On Physic in Aristotle as "On the Essence and Notion of Physic: Aristotle, Physics, B, I" (in WH).

120. WH, 354-357/235-237; GA 55, sect. 2; N 1, 162-170; GA 54, sects. 6-7.

121. Cf. Gadamer, "Gibt es ein Mass auf Erde?" Philosophische Rundschau, 31-32 (1984-85), p. 177: "...the foundation of ethics cannot in any sense be made dependent on metaphysics (rather metaphysics on ethics). We can learn that from Aristotle as from
Kant. But that means in reverse: ethics can also not be dependent on 'non-metaphysical thinking'."


123.For the later Heidegger's "Platonic bias" and his similarity with Hegel, see Taminiaux, "Poiesis and Praxis in Fundamental Ontology," p. 156-161.

124.Just as kairos in the later Heidegger no longer means the enactment of meaning in the concrete situation of the individual, but rather the "right time" of the epochal truth of being, so in his later "original ethics" phronesis no longer means practical insight into what is fitting and its enactment within the situation of the concrete individual, but rather "thinking" and "poetizing" as a higher kind of practical insight into the fitting and appropriate epochal truth of being. See the following passages from Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism": "Thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of man... Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it concerns the relation of being to man." (WM, 313/193) "The fittingness of the saying of being, as the destiny of truth, is the first law of thinking - not the rules of logic which can become rules only on the basis of the law of being... It is equally essential to ponder whether what is to be thought is to be said - to what extent, at what moment of the history of being...." (363/241) Cf. 336/216, 344/223.


127. For a discussion of Heidegger’s shift from "formal indications" for individual reflection to epochal truth in the realms of both the ethical-political and religious experience, cf. Pöggeler, "Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie," p. 480, 493-498; "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger," pp. 162, 188-189; "Heidegger’s Neubestimmung des Phänomenbegriffs," p. 137, 159; Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, pp. 335-349. Sheehan also discusses the later Heidegger’s turn away from an "analogical" discourse about being to a "hypostasization" of being, which appears as a meta-reality and not simply as the similar structural relationships found in concrete being. See his "On Movement and Destruction," pp. 535-536; "Introduction: Heidegger, the Project and the Fulfillment," pp. vii-viii. See also Gadamer, "Gibt es ein Mass auf Erde?," pp. 187: "What I miss here and as something with which I myself have not come to terms is a new clarification of the concept of the person. I find nothing about this concept even in Heidegger." (cf. p. 170)


131. WM, 353/231-232, 361/239; ID, 105, 98/40, 34.


134. Sheehan, Ereignis, 135: "But if the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger is undeniable, the manner and degree of it remain among Heidegger’s best-kept secrets....and this infrequency [with which Heideggerian scholars elaborate the Aristotelian basis of Heidegger’s thought] is not the fault of the commentators....The secret lies hidden in Heidegger’s courses - chiefly those from 1919 through 1952...."

135. Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, pp. 351-352.


138. See APPENDIX II.


We have said that the young Heidegger's overcoming of the metaphysical tradition is at the same time the "bitterness of self-overcoming." As we have seen, the thought-paths of the later Heidegger are also 'self-overcomings', because even his later thought is, by his own admission, to a certain extent still caught up in metaphysical language. But these later 'self-overcomings' are "immanent," since the earlier position being criticized has indeed posed the task of the other beginning for philosophy, contributed positively to this task and remains marginally caught up in metaphysics only against this background. The same cannot be said for the earliest metaphysical form of Heidegger's being-question. This situation makes the self-overcoming here a "bitter" one.


See the following ambiguous statements by Sheehan in his "Heidegger's Early Years," p. 4, 9: "More important than the book was the question it awoke in him but could not answer: if that which-is-in-being (das Seiende) has several meanings, what does "Being itself" (das Sein) mean in its unity? From this question, rooted in Aristotle (and not in Husserl!), the line leads, with some wavering, to the publication of SZ." "...[Husserl] would lament, 'Unfortunately I did not determine his philosophical formation; he was obviously into his own thing when he studied my writings'. Indeed, and that meant Aristotle and the question about the unified meaning of Being which determines all modes of the Being of beings." See also David Farrell Krell, "On the Manifold Meaning of Aletheia: Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger," Research in Phenomenology, 5 (1975), p. 94: "Earlier we asked: Does Brentano's account of 'being in the sense of the true' have significant bearing on Heidegger's response to the matter of his thinking-Aletheia as the unconcealment of beings in presence? On the occasion of his nomination to the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences in 1957 Heidegger answered this query: 'The question concerning the simple onefold of what is manifold in Being - at that time [1907-08] churning helplessly, obscure and unstable - remained the single unrelenting impulse, through many upsets, false turns, and perplexities, for the treatise Being and Time which appeared two decades later'."

Along with my training in phenomenology, no longer only literary but actually through practice, the question of being awakened by Brentano's writing remained, however, in view. Thereby, the doubt arose whether "the matter itself" [die Sache selbst] was to be determined as intentional consciousness or indeed as the transcendental ego." See also ZP, 47/201; US, 87-88/6-7; SD, 81-92/74-75, 96-97/78-79; V, 303; S, 385-386, 297.

It would be fruitful to explore the later Heidegger's tendency to self-stylization and self-installment in terms of the hermeneutical function of self-narrative outlined by Riceour and


149. For the affinity between the notion of "place" in Heidegger's earliest writings and in his *Being and Time* and his writings after 1930, cf. Caputo, "Phenomenology, Mysticism and the 'Grammatica Speculativa,'" p. 111.


151. ...Hölderlin's words apply exactly to Heidegger: 'Wie du anfiengst, wirst du bleiben' [As you begin, you will remain]. Heidegger's thought has 'remained' with its beginnings....To be sure, one can understand Heidegger without understanding his grounding in and transformation of Aristotle. But if to know something is to know it by its *arche,* and if that *arche,* as always returning anew, controls the whole, then to explain the 'Aristotelian' base of Heidegger's project is to clarify his entire thought. However, we are not interested here in spelling out the historical (historisch) genesis of Heidegger's work, but simply in grounding that work in the basis from which it continually unfolds." Thomas J. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle: DYNAMIS and EREIGNIS," *Philosophy Research Archives,* 4 (1978), pp. 282-283.

152. Public lecture at McMaster University, November, 1985. See also his *Philosophische Lehrjahre: eine Rückschau* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 194: "In my first decade at Heidelberg, the real problem of my teaching was the all too complete devotion of my students to Heidegger's mode of thinking. How could I get it across to them that one cannot 'begin' with Heidegger, but should rather begin with Aristotle if one wants to think in Heidegger's way."

153. See my ABBREVIATIONS. For instance, pages 20-29 of Helene's Weiss's *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967) "closely follow sections of Heidegger's 1922 course on Physics, A." (Sheehan, *On the Way to Ereignis,* p. 136) Weiss notes that her chapter entitled "Human Dasein - Praxis" "is especially indebted to Heidegger's orally delivered interpretations of Aristotle. Following up his suggestions, which go back many years, I have worked it out purely from the Aristotelian text." (p. 100) For recognition of the importance of such secondary material on the young Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle, see Sheehan's essay (p. 136) and Robert Bernasconi, *The Fate of the Distinction Between Praxis and Poiesis, Heidegger Studies,* 2 (1986), p. 112, n. 6.


155. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. I. On p. 5, Gadamer speaks of "the impetus received from Heidegger decades ago." In one of the original appendixes to his Wahrheit und Methode, Gadamer writes: "In considering the structure of the hermeneutical process I have explicitly referred to the Aristotelian analysis of phronesis. Basically, I have followed up a line that Heidegger began in his early years in Freiburg, when he was concerned with a 'hermeneutics of facticity' against Neo-Kantianism and value philosophy (and ultimately probably even already against Husserl himself)." (Bd. II, p. 422, cf. p. 446) See also Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder vom tätigen Leben (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1980), which has been translated as The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).


157. Cf. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 134: "It is not self-evident that this is the only way to view Plato [i.e., as falling into the forgetfulness of being].... One might have also have interpreted Platonic philosophy in a way which would make it a means to get back behind the problematic of Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian metaphysics." Gadamer has continued to maintain that Aristotle’s phronesis as an "other kind of knowing" anticipates Heidegger’s notion of the “other thinking” of non-metaphysical philosophy. Cf. also Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles, pp. 6-7 (trans., pp. 4-5); "On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics," in Philosophical Apprenticeships, tr. R.R. Sullivan (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 166-187; Francis J. Ambrosio, "Dawn and Dusk: Gadamer and Heidegger on Truth," Man and World, 19 (1986), pp. 21-51; Robert Bernasconi, "Bridging the Abyss: Heidegger and Gadamer," Research in Phenomenology, XVI (1986), pp. 1-24; Reinhart Maurer, "The Connection Between Technique and Justice in Plato’s Republic and its Metaphysical Basis," in Contemporary German Philosophy, Vol. 3, ed. D.E. Christensen, et. al. (University Park: Pennsylvannia State University, 1983), pp. 179-208.

158. See Strauss and Gadamer, "Correspondence Concerning Wahrheit und Methode," pp. 8, 10: "But where I otherwise still appeal to Heidegger - in that I attempt to think of ‘understanding’ as an ‘event’ - it is turned in an entirely different direction. My own departure is not the complete forgetfulness of being, the ‘night of being’, rather on the contrary - I say this against Heidegger as well as against Buber - the unreality of such an assertion. That holds good also for our relation to tradition." "I do not believe at all that we live ‘between’ two worlds. I can follow neither Heidegger nor Bubner in this. Only the prophet who already sees the promised land would have, in my estimation, the possibility to say such things. Instead of this, I remember the one world which I alone know, and which in all decay has lost far less of its evidence and power of cohesion than it talks itself into.... I have advocated against Heidegger for decades that also his "bound" or "leap" back behind metaphysics is alone made possible through this itself (= effective-historical consciousness). See also Gadamer’s "A Letter by Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer," in Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 264: "Clearly your decisive argument is the collapse of all principles in the modern world, and I certainly agree with you that, if this were correct, my insistence on phronesis would be nothing more than pure declamation. But is this really the case? Don’t we all then run the risk
of a terrible intellectual hubris if we equate Nietzsche's anticipations and the ideological confusion of the present with life as it is actually lived with its own forms of solidarity? Here, in fact, my diversion with Heidegger is fundamental." See also his "Über die Planung der Zukunft," in Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II, pp. 172-173; "Anmerkungen zu dem Thema 'Hegel und Heidegger', in Natur und Geschichte: Karl Löwith zum 70. Geburtstag (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1967), pp. 123-131; "Gibt es auf Erden ein Mass?," pp. 175-176; Reason in the Age of Science, pp. 86-87. In an interview with Gadamer in June, 1987, Gadamer recounted how Heidegger's enduring criticism of Gadamer's work on hermeneutics that it is "not radical enough," since it deals with "effective-historical consciousness" without going to what Heidegger thought was the deeper level of the "question of being" and the "original ethics" here.
Notes to Chapter Five, Section V.


2. For the later Heidegger's account of the development of the modern epoch of metaphysics, see N 2, 421-457/19-54, 460-460/56-74.

3. See also Heidegger's 1928 lecture course, where he again uses the verb welten and also notes that he first used it in the early 1920s (ML, 219/171). See also Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," pp. 14-15, where he discusses Heidegger's early usage of the phrase "es weltet" and argues for the continuity of Heidegger's thought.

4. See Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers." pp. 14-15: "When we think through this sentence ['life = there-being, being in and through life'], then we have before us the unity of Heidegger's whole path of thought. Indeed, there are amazing things in this early text....I mention these beginnings familiar from Being and Time, which are already to be found here in 1921, in order to ask a question which, especially through Richardson's praiseworthy book and his distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, has received almost a dogmatic blessing. Where is Heidegger before the turn and where is Heidegger after the turn? This can best be clarified in Heidegger's own words through his interpretation of the ontological difference. I remember a scene in Marburg in 1924....We asked Heidegger what the ontological difference was really all about?...At that time, 1924, Heidegger answered: We do not make the difference. There can hardly be any talk of such a thing. The difference is that in which we happen.

So the turn was there in 1924 in conversation. I am convinced that it was also already there in the first remark of Heidegger's which I heard in my life. A young student, who had returned from Freiburg to Marburg, recounted with enthusiasm—there a young professor at the podium had said: 'it worlds/there is world'. Even that was the turn before the turn. In this expression no ego appears and no subject and no consciousness. Rather, what is expressed in it is a basic structure of being, which we experience, and indeed in such a way that the world 'emerges' like a seed....Whenever I have said anything about the later Heidegger, I have always emphasized: for Heidegger the turn has been an ongoing matter."

See also Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, 141: "There [in Freiburg in 1920-21] he used, for example, the expression: 'it worlds/there is world'....Where then remains the transcendental ego? What sort of word was that in fact? Is there at all such a thing? Ten years before Heidegger overcame his own transcendental self-interpretation and his patterning himself on Husserl, he found a first word, in which the point of departure was neither the subject nor 'consciousness in general'. Rather, the event of the 'clearing' expressed itself in 'it worlds/there is world' like a harbinger."
Finally, see Sheehan, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind," p. 313: "This 'turn' was the goal of Heidegger's thought from the early 'twenties onward."
Notes to Chapter Seven.

1. For a discussion of the role of "formal indication" in Heidegger's 1926 lecture course *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* and in his *Being and Time*, see Kisiel, "On the Way to Being and Time," pp. 211-213, especially n. 24. For the notion of formal indication in Heidegger's 1926 lecture courses *Logic: The Question Concerning Truth*, cf. *LW*, 410, 222-224. Finally, see Heidegger's 1929-30 lecture course *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, in which many of the basic concepts dealt with in *Being and Time* are discussed with the method of formal indication. (GA 29-30, 421-435)

2. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Zweiter Band, Erster Teil, Husserliana, Bd. XIX/1 (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), pp. 31-32/269-270. All further references to this volume in the present section will appear in my text with the symbol LU. All translations are my own.


8. loc. cit., p. 52.


15. loc. cit., p. 247.


21. loc. cit., p. 3.


23. loc. cit., p. 5.


25. Cf. Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege*, p. 148."...Heidegger used...the concept of 'formal indication', almost an equivalent of the Kierkegaardian 'calling attention', and one certainly does not go wrong, when one see herein an intention, which is distinct from the a priori framework that Husserl's 'ontologies' claimed to prescribe for the empirical sciences, and which sees in 'formal in-
dication' the recognition that philosophical science may indeed participate in the conceptual, interpretive explication of faith-in-theology - but not in the enactment, which is the task of faith itself. Behind this certainly stood the more extensive knowledge that in the end even the question of being is no question in the sense of science, but rather 'returns to the existentiell'..."  
26. Cf. the critique of Plato in E.E., I, 8 and M.M., I, 1. For a balanced consideration of the fairness of Aristotle’s reading and critique of Plato, see Gadamer, Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles, ch. IV.  
27. Republic, 509b.  
29. 1141b; 1143a; 1177b; 1178b; 1181b.  
30. Cf. IAsz2, 112; E.E., I, 6; E.N., 1087a, 1113a, 1114b, 1140b, 1144a.  
32. In my text, "ethos" is always a transliteration of ἔθος and not ἐθική.  
33. 1098b, 1139a, 1140a, 1140b. Cf. SZ, 473/409.  
34. Aristotle always begins his investigations with a review of what has been said on the topic and then "follows up" (cf. Meta., 985a). This is nowhere more elegantly expressed than in Aristotle’s observation that "being" and "good" are "said in many ways" in the kategorial, the shared public ways of addressing things, which one hears in the marketplace, the law court, and the assembly (agora). Being is always έλεγον, being that is said in human life (cf. his phrase οἶδα καὶ λόγος, "the idea and/or the said"). His statements that "the arche is the 'that'") (E.N., 1088b), "each person judges well in those matters with which he is acquainted" (E.N., 1085a), and to sunethes gnorimon, "it is what is from ethos that is known" (Meta., 995a) refer to all branches of investigation, except perhaps mathematics (E.N., 1142a) One finds the same procedure in Plato’s dialogues, where Plato often takes what is said by "the many," the poets, and past philosophers as starting points for his inquiry. In contrast to the mytho-speculative character of Plato’s thought, it is Aristotle’s way of insistently taking as his philosophical point of departure the "that" of everyday life and its ethos understood in a wide sense as
our already being familiar and at home with the subject matter that
gives to his writings, this doctor's son, such a homeyness and
quaintness, a characteristic nowhere else more powerfully expressed
than in his statement that "every realm of physis is wondrous" and
"as Heracleitos, when the strangers who came to visit him found him
warming himself at the stove in the kitchen and hesitated to go in,
is reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even
in that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture on
the study of every kind of living being without distaste." (Part.
An., I, 5)

35. See Kisiel, "Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of

36. See also Ernst Tugendhat, Review of "Wolfgang Wieland:
Die aristotelische Physik: Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der
natürwissenschaft und die sprachlichen Bedingungen der Prinzipien-
forschung bei Aristoteles," p. 555: "However, one should be aware
that this attempt [to understand the connection between being and
language in Aristotle] was anticipated least in a significant
case and in a grand style, namely, in the extensive, unpublished
Aristotle interpretation of the young Heidegger.... This clarifica-
tion of on as on legomenon is less visible in the numerous books on
Aristotle by Heidegger's immediate students.... [Heidegger]
understands the method of his own philosophy and that of Aristotle
as hermeneutics, i.e., as the interpretive laying out of an already
pre-given understanding. Only this view point, which has been
precisely worked out recently by Gadamer, is suitable for grasping
Aristotle's philosophical method.... The dimension of history is
thereby also taken up into philosophical method." See especially
IAszi, 76-88.

37. See also Szilasi, Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes, p. 9.

38. Cf. Schuchman, Aristotle and the Problem of Moral
Discernment, pp. 30-31.

Discernment, p. 25.


42. Gadamer, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 131. Aristotle
uses the analogy of proportion in his treatment of the "causes" in
Meta. XII, 3-5. Here he indicates that things, even though they are
distinct, display an analogous structure insofar as, for example,
each is a movement from "privation" to "form" or from "possibility"
to "actuality," but allo allon, "the one in one way, the other in
another." See also Gadamer, Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und
Aristoteles, pp. 89ff (translation, pp. 151ff.). Cf. Sheehan, "On
Movement and the Destruction of Ontology," p. 536. See also SZ,
175/170: "The phenomenon of the equi-primordiality of constitutive
items [of Dasein] has often been disregarded in ontology, because
of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything
and anything from some simple 'primal ground'."

43. Cf. Meta., 993a-993b: "The seeing (theoria) of the truth
is in one sense difficult, in another sense easy. A sign of this is
that whereas no one is able to attain an adequate grasp of it, we
cannot all miss the mark, but rather each individual says something about \textit{physis}, and while the individual contributes little or nothing to the truth, from the gathering together of all something great comes to be. Thus, insofar as truth seems to be the proverbial door, which no one can fail to hit, in this respect it must be easy; but that we can have the whole and not the part we aim at shows the difficulty....It is just that we should be grateful....if there had been no Timotheus we should have been without much of our lyric poetry; but if there had been no Phrynis there would have been no Timotheus. The same holds good of those who have let the truth be seen; for from some of these we have inherited certain opinions, while others have been responsible for the coming to be of these."

44. Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} and his \textit{Politics} contain both an "ontology of human Dasein" and the application of this to ethics (e.g., investigation of particular virtues and goods) and politics (investigation of particular constitutions). The latter also accounts for the prescriptive aspect of these works, which go beyond the mere description of the analogical structures of all praxis and deal with virtues and goods that are very much bound up with ancient Athenian society. See \textit{IAW}, 130.


48. For two rare discussions of the young Heidegger’s notion of formal indication, see Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," pp. 23-25; Pöggeler, \textit{Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers}, pp. 271-272, 330.

49. For the prohibitive function of formal indication with respect to the concretization of Heidegger’s philosophical concepts in theology, cf. his 1927 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology” (\textit{PT}, 61-67/17-21).
Notes to Conclusion

1. A shorter version of my Conclusion was presented in November, 1988 at the Canadian Graduate Students’ Conference at McMaster University and will be appearing as "Demythologizing Heidegger" in Philosophy in Canada, Vol. 1, ed. Fiore Guido (Milliken, Ontario: Agathon Books, 1989) (forthcoming).


3. Cf. PA, 19; GZ, 203-204/151-152; SZ, 52/63.


8. Quoted in Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 42.


11. For Ricoeur’s discussion of Husserl’s notion of the “indicating” function of “occasional expressions,” see his essay "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," in loc. cit., pp. 120-123.


15. Cf. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 28: "...Heidegger is there. We cannot avoid him and also have not - unfortunately-gotten beyond him in the direction of his question. So he stands in the way in a disturbing manner. An erratic block of stone, which the tide of thinking, directed to technical perfection, washes around and does not budge."


Philosophers such as Gadamer, Habermas, Marcuse, Sheehan, Kisiel, Poggeler, and Caputo have been reading Heidegger's from the vantage point of his youthful period and, as it were, translating his later hermetic language into the kind of existential-phenomenological lexicon which was present in his youthful period. This is just another way of saying that such philosophers constitute the real effective history of Heidegger's youthful thought.

See Sheehan, "On Movement and the Destruction of Ontology," pp. 534: "Since Socrates, the impetus of philosophical thinking has been to clarify the real not by recounting sacred texts (mythnon diegeiasthai) but by showing its meaning discursively in public language. If Heideggerians want to think for themselves rather than to become rhapsodes of Heidegger's texts, if they want to do philosophy - or even to undo it - then they would seen to have the choice either to keep on talking to themselves, or, like Gadamer, Poggeler, Biemel, and others, to engage in dialogue with contemporary thinkers in a language that both sides can comprehend." See also his "On the Way to EREIGNIS," p. 142; "Introduction: Heidegger, the Project and the Fulfillment," pp. vii-viii. In his presentation on the "Panel Session on Jürgen Habermas' The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity," presented at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Phenomenology, Evanston, Illinois, Oct. 13-15, 1988, Sheehan reaffirmed his position on the interpretation of Heidegger. What is to be avoided is a reception of Heidegger's work on the part of "right Heideggerians" similar to the reception of Hegel's works by his disciples and "right Hegelians." In the same way that the genuine Hegelians were rather thinkers such as Kierkegaard and Marx, so the genuine followers of Heidegger are those who deconstruct and demythologize his philosophy in order to capture the underlying concrete "topic." The centre of Heidegger's thought lies in such magical incantations as "es gibt," "there is/it gives," and "es ereignet," "it events," which are heuristic devices for preserving the openness of thought and preventing closure, but this "giving" and "eventing" has to be explored in a more concrete and even ethical-political fashion in questions directed towards the "who," the "to whom," the "how," and the "what" of the giving.


See Gadamer, "Gibt es auf Erden ein Mass?," p. 161: "To think Heidegger further is the task of all those who have received a real impetus to thought from him and do not content themselves with repeating his thoughts in his own language." (cf. pp. 175-176 and Fortsetzung, pp. 21-26) See also his "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers," pp. 21, 24-25: "Again I can appeal to all those who wish to preserve the heritage of Heidegger: one can and should indeed attempt to think for oneself on the basis of a Heideggerian expression, but one is never allowed to use his words as if they were such as are already thought by us." "What is important is to fight against the tendency to make something into a dogma. This means that instead one should attempt for oneself to grasp in words.
and to bring to language what is pointed out to one in the pointing. Formal indication gives the direction in which one has to look. What shows itself here is something which one must learn to say, to say with one's own words. For only one's own and not repeated words work the intuition of that which one seeks to say for oneself...the fulfillment of what is indicated is an enactment for each of us." See also his "Hegel and Heidegger," p. 102: "We are still waiting for a Karl Marx who would resist treating Heidegger as Marx, though opposing him, resisted treating the great thinker, Hegel - as a 'dead dog'..." See also "Zwischen Phänomenologie und Dialektik," in his Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II, pp. 10-11: "That I at all continue to use the concept of consciousness, whose ontological prejudice Heidegger had so clearly shown in his Being and Time, means for me only an adaptation to a linguistic usage which appears more natural to me....But my own motive for introducing the concept of effective-historical consciousness, lay precisely in the attempt to forge a path to the later Heidegger. When Heidegger's thinking pushed out beyond the conceptual language of metaphysics, he became entangled in a language-need, which led him to follow Hölderlin's language and led him to a half-poetic diction....My own philosophical hermeneutics attempts really to hold on to the direction of questioning in the later Heidegger and to make it accessible in a new way....Heidegger undoubtedly saw here a relapse into the dimension of thought which he had transcended - even if he indeed did not overlook the fact that my intention was aimed in the direction of his own thinking....it is a part of the way, in terms of which a few of the later Heidegger's endeavors become illuminated and have something to say to those who are not able to accompany Heidegger in his own course of thought....Effective-historical consciousness is, as I said at the time, 'more being than consciousness'..." See also Strauss and Gadamer, "Correspondence Concerning Wahrheit und Methode," p. 10: "I have advocated against Heidegger for decades that also his 'bound' or 'leap' back behind metaphysics is alone made possible through this itself (= effective-historical consciousness). What I believe to have understood through Heidegger...is, above all, that philosophy must learn to do without the idea of an infinite intellect. I have attempted to draw up a corresponding hermeneutics. But I can only do that, in that I - much against Heidegger's intentions - make visible (zur Ausweisung bringe) in such a hermeneutical consciousness in the end everything that I see. I believe really to have understood the late Heidegger, i.e., his 'truth'. But I must 'prove' (beweisen) it to myself - with the experience which is my own, and this is what I have called 'hermeneutical experience'..." Finally, see his "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," in Interpretive Social Science: A Reader, ed. P. Rabinow, W.M. Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 106: "Although I bypass Heidegger's philosophical intent, the revival of the 'problem of being', it nevertheless becomes clear that only the vivid thematization of human existence as 'being-in-the-world' discloses the full implications of 'understanding' as an existential possibility and structure." Cf.


See also Habermas, "Die grosse Wirkung," "Urbanisierung der Heideggerschen Provinz," pp. 72-81, 392-401; Marcuse, "Enttäuschung," pp. 162-163. Finally, see Schrag, Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity; Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics; Bernstein, "Heidegger on Humanism," pp. 197-220.


22.The star on Heidegger’s gravestone is associated with one of his texts: "To head towards a star.../To think is to confine oneself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in the world’s sky." (ED, 76/4)


25.Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme.


Notes to Appendices

1. The following list is taken from Heidegger's own "register" (VII, 663-685), from the corrections given in the most recent prospectus from Heidegger's publisher, Vittorio Klostermann (Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Stand: Juni 1987), and from Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," pp. 28-29. The publisher's prospectus reports on p. 7 that "it is expected that by 1989 all not yet published lectures will be assigned for editorial work, so that the publication of Division III [Unpublished Essays - Addressess - Thoughts] can be started for Heidegger's 100th birthday."

2. See the editor's epilogue to Heidegger's 1919 lecture courses (GA 56/57, 215); von Herrmann, "Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers in seiner Gesamtausgabe letzter Hand," p. 153. Von Herrmann reports that the manuscripts for all the lectures between 1915 and 1917 were destroyed by Heidegger himself.

3. A "War Emergency Semester" designed to give the war veterans a head start in their interrupted studies.

4. This lecture was possibly not held. See Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses", pp. 28-29. No documents from this course apparently exist in the Freiburg University Archives (see Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg, 1909-1923," p. 540).

5. Written communication from the literary executor, Hermann Heidegger (May 7, 1987).

6. This lecture was possibly not held. See Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses", p. 29.

7. This title is reported by Gadamer in his "Auf dem Rückgang zum Anfang," p. 396. No publication plans have been announced by the publisher, but it will perhaps be published as an appendix to Heidegger's SS 1922 lecture course on Aristotle (GA 62), even though only twenty-two of the original forty pages still survive (see Tietjen, "Philosophie und Faktizität," p. 11, n. 3). Gadamer has reported that the "forty page" manuscript is "preserved in publishable form." See his Heideggers Wege, pp. 95, 131, 145. See also Sheehan, "On the Way to ERBEINIS," p. 135, n. 8.

8. The second title given after the slash is an alternative given by Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," p. 27.

9. See the publisher's 1987 prospectus, p. 7.

10. This seventy page essay, which was worked up from Heidegger's 1924 lecture manuscript with the same title, was unsuccessfully submitted to a journal for publication (Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle: Human Being and the Practical life," presented at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Phenomenology, Evanston, Illinois, Oct. 13-15, 1988). The essay is composed of the following sections: "1) The Questioning in the Fundamental Tendency of Dilthey and Yorck, 2) The Original Character of the Being of Dasein, 3) Dasein and Temporality, 4) Temporality and Historicity"
(see the publisher's 1987 prospectus, p. 15).

11. Taken from Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg," pp. 535-536. Casper gathered the following data from the Freiburg University Archives.

12. Taken from Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg," p. 538.

13. Taken from Köstler, "Heidegger schreibt an Grabmann," pp. 98-104. The letter is preserved in Grabmann's Nachlass, which is in the possession of the Bavarian National Library.

14. Taken from Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg," pp. 541. The letter is preserved in Kreb's unpublished Nachlass, which is in the possession of the Dogmatic Seminar of the Freiburg Theological Faculty.

HEIDEGGER'S WORKS

For the convenience of the reader, available English translations of Heidegger's works have been cited after the entry in German.

Earliest Works (1910-1917)


_____. "Neuere Forschung über Logik." In *Frühe Schriften, Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 1.


Youthful Works (1919-1925/26)


———. "Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie." In Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 56/57.


———. "Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums." In Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 56/57.

Later Works (1927-1976)


"Brief an Richardson (German and English), tr. W.J. Richardson. In William J. Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.


____. 'Phänomenologie und Theologie.' In Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 9. Translated as 'Phenomenology and Theology,' in


_____. "700 Jahre Messkirch" (German and English), tr. Thomas J. Sheehan, Listening, 8 (1973), pp. 40-57.


p. 7, "Foreword," in Early Greek Thinking, pp. 4-5.


pp. 41-66, "Science and Reflection," in The Question Concern-
ing Technology, pp. 155-182.


pp. 199-222, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Early Greek Thinking, pp. 102-123.

pp. 223-248, "Moria (Parmenides VIII, 34-41), in Early Greek Thinking, pp. 59-78.

pp. 249-274, "Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)," in Early Greek Thinking, pp. 102-123.


WORKS ON HEIDEGGER


"Praktisches Wissen." In Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 5.

"Einszug in Marburg." In Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, hrsg. Günther Nasse.


"Destruction and Deconstruction." Public lecture held in 1986 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario.


Grundmann, W. "Martin Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit' und die christliche Verkündigung," Die Furche, 17 (1931).
____. "Die grosse Wirkung." In Jürgen Habermas, Philosophisch-politische Profile, 3. Aufl.
______. "Why the First Draft of Being and Time was Never Published," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 20 (1989).
Lotz, Johannes Baptist. "Im Gespräch." In Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, hrsg. Günther Neske.


Heidegger's Politics: An Interview," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 6 (1977).


"Ein Gespräch mit Max Müller." In Martin Heidegger: Ein Philosoph und die Politik, Freiburg Universitätsblätter, 92 (June, 1986).


Riedel, Manfred. "Zwischen Plato und Aristoteles: Heideggers doppelte Exposition der Seinsfrage und der Ansatz von Gadamers


_____. "Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind." In Contemporary

OTHER WORKS


Braig, Carl. *Vom Sein. Abriss der Ontologie, Bd. IV der Grundzüge

Brentano, Franz. *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach
Aristoteles*. Freiburg: Herder, 1896; repr., Hildesheim: Georg
Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960.

_____. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. 2 Bde. Hamburg:
Felix Meiner, 1955. Translated as *Psychology from an Empirical

Bröcker, Walter. *Aristoteles (Die Aristotelische Philosophie als
Klostermann, 1964.

Bubner, Rüdiger. "Eine Renaissance der praktischen Philosophie,


Bultmann, Rudolf. *Glauben und Verstehen, I. 7. Aufl. Tübingen:

_____. *Faith and Understanding*, tr. L. P. Smith. New York and

_____. Existence and Faith, tr. S.M. Ogden. Cleveland and New

_____. *Kerygma and Myth*, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, tr. Reginald


Burdach, K. "Faust und die Sorge," *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 1 (1923).

Cairns, Dorion. *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, ed. Richard M.

Derrida, Jacques. "Signature Event Context." In Jacques Derrida,
*MARGINS of Philosophy*, tr. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of

De Vogel, C.J. "What Philosophy Meant to the Greeks," *International

Diemer, Alwin. *Edmund Husserl*. Meisenheim am Gan: Anton Hain K. G.,
1955.

Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels, Gesammelte Schriften,
Bd. 4. Stuttgart and Göttingen: B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft
und Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959.

_____. *Die Geistige Welt, Einleitung in die Philosophie des
Lebens, Gesammelte Schriften, V. Band Leipzig: B.G. Teubner,
1924.

Dilthey, Wilhelm and Graf Paul Yorck. *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm
Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877-1897.
Halle, 1923.


Dunne, Joseph. "Aristotle after Gadamer: An Analysis of the
Distinction Between the Concepts of Phronesis and Techne,"

Dupré, W., et. al. "Conscience." In *The New Catholic Encyclopedia,

Ebbinghaus, Julius. "Julius Ebbinghaus." In *Philosophie in Selbst-


Kähler, Martin. "Das Gewissen." In Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, VI.


______. "Das Eine... die Einheit und die Eins. Bemerkungen zur Logik des Zahlbegriffs." Logos, II (1911/12).


Schwiebert, E.G. *Luther and His Times.* St. Louis, 1950.


