JACQUES MARITAIN'S SOCIAL CRITIQUE

AND HIS PERSONALISM
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to show the attunement of Jacques Maritain's social thought to the concrete circumstances of the twentieth century, by explaining how the influence of his critical analysis of modern theory and praxis helped determine the development of his personalism as personalist democracy, i.e. as a prescription for action in the world of today.

Previous interpretations of Maritain's social thought have failed to delineate the intention of his project and the questions with which he himself was concerned. Often these interpretations either tend to discuss Maritain exclusively in terms of his allegiance to the Thomist tradition, thereby inviting the accusation that his social thought is exclusivist and anachronistic, or they tend to acknowledge the contemporaneity of his social thought without a proper understanding of his commitment to the past, thereby prompting the criticism that Maritain's social thought is the unrealistic contrivance of a duplicitous mind. The purpose of this study is to point to Maritain's relevance as a contemporary thinker, by directing attention to the questions behind his social thought and to the fundamental purpose of that thought.

The influence of Maritain's social critique on the development of his personalism enables us to see both the intention
of his social thought and the questions which engendered it. Maritain's social critique emerged from his encounter with the exigencies of the current historical situation. Having experienced modern man's egocentrism, evident in the bourgeois world of the Third Republic in France and later in the aspirations of the totalitarian regimes which brought about the Second World War, and having studied the philosophical basis of egocentrism in contemporary thought, Maritain was concerned with the question of how to overcome modern man's preoccupation with the self. In addition to this negative appraisal of modernity, he came to appreciate the constructive influence of modern man's acknowledgment of human rights and the attempt to establish democratic forms of polity. Having experienced the intellectual stability and social cohesion evident in Thomism and the Church, and having discovered the basis for this unity in the transcendent orientation of the past, he asked how modern man's quest for autonomy and self fulfillment can be brought into harmony with man's earlier transcendent orientation. The intention of Maritain's social thought was to bring about this harmony through personalist democracy. Maritain's personalism is therefore co-determined by his experience in the world of today and by his intellectual heritage. Personalist democracy is thus a relevant or historically responsible position.

The proper understanding of Maritain's intention to bring about harmony between traditional modes of transcendence and the current search for autonomy dispels much of the criticism directed against him. However, there still remains a pro-
nounced generality and abstraction in his social project, indicating the necessity for the further theoretical and practical adjustment of his fundamental purpose. For this reason, both the strength and the weakness of Maritain's position are said to reside in his professed intention to harmonize transcendence and autonomy, for he thereby exhibits his attunement to the exigencies of the present situation while failing, through the immensity of his project, to attend to fine details as demanded by cautious scholarship.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I  INTRODUCTION  1  
1. The Importance of History for Maritain  5  
2. The Development of Maritain's Personalism  11  
3. Maritain's Social Critique and His Personalism  15  
4. The Biographical Context  19  
   Maritain's Early Allegiance to the People and the Revolution  20  
   Maritain's Conversion to Roman Catholicism  23  
   Maritain and the Action Française  27  
   The Emergence of Maritain's Social Critique and His Doctrine of the Human Person  31  
5. An Explanation of Methodology and Preliminary Outline  35  

II  THE ADVENT OF THE SELF  41  
1. The Renaissance and the Betrayal of the Incarnation  43  
2. Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation  53  
3. René Descartes  60  
4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Nature of Contemporary Praxis  70  
5. The Dilemma of the Individual  76  

III  THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOCENTRIC HUMANISM AND ITS PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  82  
1. Immanuel Kant and His Immediate Successors  84  
2. From Hegel to Marx and the Soviet Experience  89  
3. The Unmasking of Modern Man: Racism and the Fascist State  105  
4. Individualism and Collectivism in the West  110  
5. The Democratic Evolution  120  

vii
IV OVERCOMING ANTHROPOCENTRIC HUMANISM: MARITAIN'S PERSONALISM AND HIS SOCIAL CRITIQUE 127
1. Maritain's Understanding of Human Freedom 130
2. The Distinction between Individual and Person in Relation to the Common Good 146
3. Natural Law in Defence of Freedom and the Rights of Man 153
4. Personalism and Democracy 160
   Autonomy and Pluralism in a Personalist Democracy 161
   Family and Personalist Democracy 168
   Directives for the Establishment of a Personalist Economy 173
   Authority in a Personalist Democracy 180
   The Preeminence of Spiritual Means for the Establishment of a Personalist Democracy 184
5. The Personalist Alternative to Individualism and Totalitarianism 194

V CONCLUSION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF MARITAIN'S PERSONALIST DEMOCRACY 198
1. Maritain and His Critics 200
2. Personalist Democracy and the Future 217

NOTES 222

BIBLIOGRAPHY 266
INTRODUCTION

The name of Jacques Maritain is one which usually evokes a mixed response, and not only when mentioned in the presence of the Roman Catholic intelligentsia. Applying his talent to a variety of interests, from metaphysics to politics and aesthetics, Maritain has often expressed himself in extreme and apparently contradictory ways. Whether one agrees with him or not, one finds this outspoken thinker highly provocative. An agnostic revolutionary in his youth, he became a conservative member of the Roman Catholic Church. If only in a peripheral way, he was involved in the monarchist movement, the Action Française. Later, he came to see himself as an integral humanist, espousing freedom and the rights of man. He became an innovative lay philosopher, who was responsible for much of the change brought about by the Second Vatican Council. In 1966, with the publication of The Peasant of the Garonne, Maritain was once again branded as an arch conservative.

William J. Nottingham, a Lutheran pastor, sees The Peasant of the Garonne as an indication of continuity between the early and later Maritain. Referring to Maritain, he writes:

In his mid-eighties, he rejoins the fiery Maritain of the 1920's in the revolt against subjectivism in religion and relativism in philosophy. He is
The controversial Roman Catholic theologian, Hans Küng, derides Maritain for *The Peasant of the Garonne*, which is an expression of Maritain's uneasiness over post-conciliar trends.

Küng separates Maritain from certain "... open-minded and knowledgeable Catholic theologians ..." who have also exhibited the same anxiety over certain tendencies emerging in the wake of the Second Vatican Council. A conversation with faculty members of almost any major university will show that Küng is not alone when he considers Maritain to be a reactionary, ignorant of the contemporary situation.

As Nottingham has indicated, Maritain's conservatism is a refusal to abandon what he holds to be intellectual and theological certitude. In *The Peasant of the Garonne*, he is quite adamant. He cautions that the contemporary concern with the subject, even the modern attempt to account for man's historicity, lurks in the shadow of idealism and leads to relativism. He condemns modern phenomenology and existentialism.

However, it is impossible to deny that much of Maritain's active life and voluminous contribution have been dedicated to exploring the role of the Christian in the modern world. Contrary to what Küng and others have stated, Maritain has devoted much of his time and effort to understand the contemporary situation and its unique problems. Indeed, Maritain has discussed the issues which confront contemporary
society to such an extent, that he is of interest to Christians and non-Christians alike. This study is concerned with Maritain's social thought. By demonstrating how his critical analysis of contemporary society influenced the development of his personalism, this study will attempt to expose the intention behind his social thought. Indicating the underlying purpose in Maritain's social thought will bring into the light the questions with which he was concerned. The exposure of the problems he faced, and the way in which he tried to solve them, will go a long way toward locating Maritain in history, i.e. discussing him as a contemporary thinker.

The contemporaneity of Maritain's social thought has certainly been acknowledged. Julio Meinvielle goes so far as to interpret Maritain as a threat to traditional Catholicism, precisely because of the influence of contemporary thought on his social doctrine. No one, however, has endeavoured to disclose the relationship between Maritain's own critical analysis of contemporary society and his personalism. Jacques Croteau writes about the distinction between the individual and the person, which Maritain forcefully expounds in relation to man's current situation, exclusively in terms of the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. Joseph W. Evans, who directed the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame for a number of years, confined his doctoral dissertation to a discussion of how Maritain's social thought is a development and expression of the work of Aquinas. One dissertation, produced in Germany by Hermann Steinkamp,
discusses the relationship between Maritain's social philosophy and his personalism. However, Steinkamp's dissertation is primarily a study of how Maritain's doctrine of the human person helped shape his social philosophy. Although confronting the issue, it is not predominantly an attempt to show how the investigation of contemporary issues aided Maritain in the development of his personalism.

Clearly the meticulous work of great scholars like Evans is invaluable. Steinkamp's dissertation may even be seen as a complement to the present study, for it is certainly true that Maritain's social philosophy contains his doctrine of the human person. But the task here is to demonstrate that the development of Maritain's personalism has been influenced by his analysis of contemporary philosophical and social issues. In order to indicate Maritain's historical responsibility, and thereby his relevance as a contemporary thinker, it is first necessary to expose the relationship between what is referred to in this study as his social critique and his personalism. It is not enough to exposit what Maritain said. Such a conceptual approach, based upon Maritain's use of Thomistic terminology, is clearly necessary. However, mere exposition concerning the nature of his social thought avoids, or at best cursorily insinuates, the questions Maritain himself asked. His social thought
is not an academic exercise. Although Maritain scholarship has certainly acknowledged his concern with relevance in a troubled age, there is no coherent explanation of his historical responsibility. We must state why Maritain spoke. What he said is of concern to modern man precisely because the questions he asked are contemporary and relevant.

The purpose of this introduction is to show that Maritain's own appreciation of social and intellectual evolution allows for the present study. It is therefore necessary to discuss the importance of history for Maritain, and to describe the development of his personalism in terms of his understanding of the historical process. Because Maritain's social critique directs his personalism to the exigencies of history, the next step will be to define his social critique and personalism in the context of an explanation of their relationship. Then the biographical context for Maritain's social critique and personalism will be depicted, followed by an explanation of the methodology used in this study and a preliminary outline of its structure.

1. The Importance of History for Maritain

It is not without reason that a modern historian, who has tackled the topic of Maritain's Christian philosophy of history, has observed that Augustine's sense of becoming, his feeling for the movement and development of the world in time, exercised a lasting influence on Maritain's mind.
According to Maritain, the realm of the intellect is caught up in history. Philosophy always speaks out of a concrete situation. Thought, although it can attain eternal and unchanging truth, is nevertheless bound to the facts of the biography of the thinker. Indeed, this is the basis of Maritain's argument for the Christian philosopher. He expresses this state of affairs when he acknowledges that a philosophical position is determined not only by the nature of philosophy itself, but also by the state of the particular philosophy, "... the state in which it exists in real fact, historically, in the human subject, and which pertains to its concrete conditions of existence and exercise."

Maritain's understanding of the state of the particular philosophy, which one might call philosophy's embodiment in the human subject, makes him sensitive to intellectual history. He appreciates recent philosophical developments. He asserts that not only the development of the physical and mathematical sciences, but also the progress of reflection, is in itself a necessary historical development.

Intellectually, Maritain owes much to the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Even though the Church's doctor communis lived seven centuries before the decades in which he himself was active, Maritain considers himself to be a Thomist, so much so that he refuses to accept the appellation, "neo-Thomist". If the doctrine Maritain follows is ancient, he follows it precisely because he believes that Aquinas adheres to the principles of reason, which constitute the nature of philosophy.
Being true to the principles of reason means being open. In a posthumous publication, Maritain notes:

\ldots ce serait une grande illusion et une grande absurdité de s'imaginer qu'une doctrine philosophique fondée en vérité est du même coup achevée ou parfaite, que dis-je, qu'elle contient toutes faites d'avance les réponses à toutes les questions qui surgiront dans la suite des temps.\textsuperscript{15}

Concerning philosophical doctrine founded on truth, Maritain states:

Non seulement elle n'est jamais finie et doit toujours progresser, mais elle implique nécessairement, pour se libérer des conditions limitatives dues à la mentalité d'une époque donnée de culture, un perpétuel processus d'auto-refonte comme c'est le cas pour les organismes vivants. Et elle a le devoir de comprendre intelligemment les diverses doctrines qui se développent d'âge en âge en lui faisant opposition, et d'en dégager l'intuition génératrice, et de sauver les vérités qu'elles tiennent captives.\textsuperscript{16}

For Maritain, Thomism is not a closed system, but rather an expression of the perennial philosophy. He chastises those in the Church who have tried to confine Thomism within the framework of a system.\textsuperscript{17} He asserts that Thomism is open and capable of development. Its approach is able to light up truths as they appear in the course of history, precisely because this approach means playing in accordance with the rules of the game. A thinker can attain eternal truth, but as part of a process which accounts for his historical location:

\ldots il faut bien, puisque l'homme est fait pour la vérité, qu'une doctrine essentiellement fondée en vérité soit possible à l'esprit humain--à condition de n'être pas l'oeuvre d'un seul homme (évidemment trop faible pour une telle oeuvre) mais au contraire de s'appuyer, dans son respect pour le sens commun et l'intelligence commune,
Maritain acclaims the genius of Aquinas, simply because Aquinas was able to bring into harmony a variety of truths, which were locked away in otherwise erroneous and divergent doctrines. Therefore, when referring to Aquinas, Maritain states that "... ses principes, sa doctrine et son esprit permettront de transférer de la discordance à l'accord." For this reason, Maritain believes that the work of Aquinas merits special attention.

Clearly Maritain's understanding of the state of philosophy and his appreciation of intellectual history reflect his general interpretation of history. He contributed to an interpretation of history in various writings. However, it was not until he delivered four lectures at the University of Notre Dame, in 1955, that he made an attempt to synthesise his thoughts on this matter. For this reason, he was quite surprised when an article appeared on his philosophy of history in 1948, written by Charles Journet.

Maritain seeks to establish his interpretation of history on the authority of the Gospel. Basically, he argues that there is a fundamental ambivalence in history, i.e. the simultaneous development of both good and evil. He does acknowledge, however, the inevitable development of moral conscience.

He expresses his understanding of historical change...
through the notion of the concrete historical ideal, whereby the guiding dream or myth of a particular age must be based on the actual circumstances of that age. The concrete historical ideal is the best possible actualisation or temporal manifestation in a given historical climate or situation. Therefore, man's concrete historical ideal changes. Furthermore, it may remain possible and therefore not necessarily achieved, but it is nevertheless the most desirable achievement which is at least feasible given a particular set of circumstances. Based upon the actual situation, it becomes the myth upon which an age thrives. In this context, we must not forget that Maritain is concerned with the concrete historical ideal of Christendom, a term which "... designates a certain temporal common regime whose structures bear, in highly varying degrees and in highly varying ways, the imprint of the Christian conception of life."25

As an example of the way in which the concrete and ideal work together in an historical setting, Maritain writes concerning the mediaeval period:

... the historical ideal of the Middle Ages was controlled by two dominants: on the one hand, the idea or myth (in the sense given the word by Georges Sorel) of fortitude in the service of God; on the other, this concrete fact that temporal civilization itself was in some manner a function of the sacred and imperiously demanded unity of religion.26

This "concrete fact" simply was the case through which "the idea or myth" arose. Maritain does not wish to present as perfect what was decidedly not perfect, as we read in this statement concerning the function of the concrete and ideal
during the mediaeval period:

The idea of the Sacrum Imperium was preceded by an event: the empire of Charlemagne, the aims of which, it seems, were not exempt from Caesaro-papism; and the idea, arising after this event, was capable of only precarious, partial, and contradictory realizations. 27

Nevertheless, it was precisely the ideal of the holy empire which in fact upheld Christendom, because it was concrete, i.e. based upon the fact which enabled it to become feasible for a particular historical climate. The concrete historical ideal of the holy empire functioned "... as the lyrical image which orientated and upheld a civilization." 28

Maritain is not advocating a form of historical relativism. By linking his notion of the concrete historical ideal to the establishment of Christendom, he is seeking to be realistic. He is concerned with perpetuating and establishing the good as he sees it, i.e. Christian civilisation. Without betraying Christianity, Maritain takes the concrete circumstances of history into account. He maintains that what is necessary today is to acknowledge the arrival of a new concrete historical ideal, one which the circumstance of democracy has engendered from its evangelical roots. 29 Maritain developed this notion in his Integral Humanism, which first appeared in 1936. In this work, he speaks of "... the idea of the holy freedom (sainte liberté) of the creature whom grace unites to God." 30 Maritain is concerned with the ideal of Christian civilisation, and he argues that the idea of holy freedom is to replace the mediaeval idea of holy empire. 31 This movement from holy empire to holy freedom is interpreted as a moral
development which is both natural and inspired by the Christian message.  

History, like philosophy, is the progressive disclosure of truth through new situations. That is why history is important in Maritain's Christian endeavour to ascertain truth. Smith has remarked accurately:

Although the nineteenth century German philosopher, G. W. F. Hegel, is often credited with bestowing such ideas upon the philosophy of history, Maritain holds that the credit is misplaced, and that these ideas should be 'reclaimed' for Christian tradition.

2. The Development of Maritain's Personalism

The development of Maritain's personalism conforms to his understanding of history. It is a moment in the evolution of human knowledge, and a doctrine of action in the world today. As indicated by both Croteau and Evans, Maritain interprets his personalism as an intellectual development of the doctrine of Aquinas. And yet, like all philosophical thought, it emerges from a concrete state. Maritain's personalism is derived from the actual circumstances of a particular age. In other words, it has a biographical context. It is also a doctrine of action, and therefore seeks to establish a practical orientation to overcome the peculiar problem of our age.

The development of Maritain's personalism is therefore both intellectual and concrete. His personalism is rooted in a highly speculative endeavour, as well as in the actual circumstances of his biography. This dual perspective
does not mean that there is a distinction between the world of thought and the world of action. There is no such distinction, even though Maritain clearly acknowledges eternal truths which transcend all becoming. Distinguishing between intellectual and concrete is therefore essentially heuristic. It enables us to explain how Maritain understands the development of thought. We have just seen how he asserts that the disclosure of truth depends upon temporal events. This is true of the development of his own personalism as it is of any other doctrine.

From the intellectual side of Maritain's dual perspective, it is the distinction between the individual and the person which is most fundamental to his personalism. Seen as a development of Thomism, Maritain acknowledges his debt to Schwalm and Garrigou-Lagrange for indicating this distinction to him.35 The distinction between individual and person interprets man as a bipolar being. One pole, which Maritain calls the person (la personne), is concerned with the spiritual and intellectual dimension of the human being. The person in man is the seat of his spiritual aspiration toward the transcendent, his intellectual endeavour to know the truth, and the operation of his will when it rises above mere animal appetite. The person develops precisely through communication with others like itself. It is, by definition, open. It cannot be alone. It is that in man which enables him to share.36 The other pole, which Maritain calls the individual (l' individu), is associated with the material dimension of the human being.
Matter individuates man in space and time. It is the basis for a single human being's participation as a part in the whole which is the species. The individual in man is that which subjects him to the necessities of historical becoming. It is the seat of his animal appetite for material satisfaction, which in itself is something necessary for man. When through some confusion, individuality begins to usurp the role of personality, egocentrism arises in man. 37

Charles A. Fecher has drawn attention to both the meaning and significance of Maritain's distinction between the individual and the person. In his lengthy study, The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, Fecher writes:

It is perfectly licit to regard man purely from the standpoint of individuality, with all the limitations that that implies; it is just as licit to consider him purely from the standpoint of the person, with all of the freedom and relative perfections that personality carries in its train. Confusion and difficulty can arise only when the properties of the one are mistaken for the properties of the other; but this confusion has become such a commonplace in modern philosophy, and has resulted in such enormous errors in psychology, sociology and politics, that if Maritain had made no other contribution to the thought of our time than this one we would still owe him a great deal for the light he has shed on a most vexing problem. 38

Bipolarity does not mean that Maritain interprets the human being from a dualistic perspective. As Fecher indicates, man may be considered from either the perspective of individuality or personality. However, it is the whole man who either collapses inward toward individuality or expands through loving communication toward personality. By nature, a man can never be merely an animal. If, through some confusion of roles, he performs in a mode which is proper for
Maritain argues that the fundamental option which confronts man is to be found here. The dilemma was stated most forcefully in his epistemological *magnum opus*, *The Degrees of Knowledge*:

*It is the problem of Faust. If human wisdom does not spill upwards into the love of God, it will fall downwards toward Marguerite. Mystical possession in Eternal love of the Most Holy God, or physical possession, in the fleetingness of time, of a poor fleshly creature (for, great wizard as one may be, that is where it all ends up)—there lies the choice that cannot be avoided.*

In addition to the speculative distinction between the individual and the person, Maritain's social critique is fundamental to his personalism. His social critique is an extensive analysis of the confusion between person and individual in modern thought and action. He discusses this confusion in relation to his distinction between anthropocentric and theocentric humanism, i.e. between man's egocentrism and his proper orientation toward God. However, Maritain's social critique is more than that. It is a careful appraisal of the contemporary situation, which observes positive as well as negative factors in the texture of modernity. Engendered by events in his own biography, as an attempt to comprehend the needs peculiar to his age, Maritain's social critique forces his thought to adhere to current issues.

As Fecher correctly observes, Maritain's contribution is to have developed the speculative doctrine of the distinction between the individual and the person within the context of his social thought:

Maritain gives credit to Dominican theologians...
like Fathers Schwalm and Garrigou-Lagrange for re-introducing this doctrine [the distinction between the individual and the person] to contemporary thought and applying its insights to the problems of our own era; but it was he himself ... who first took a really proprietary interest in it and extracted from it all the latent riches that it contains. The idea runs like a leitmotif through two-thirds of his books, and at times he has insisted upon it almost to the point of salesmanship. In particular it was he who brought it down from the realm of theoretical speculation and made it a part of 'practical' philosophy—practical not only in the fields of psychology and ethics but in the even more concrete circumstances of the relations between man and society.41

Before exploring the biographical context of Maritain's social critique and personalism, it is convenient to define these two terms more precisely, and explain the significance of discussing their relationship.

3. Maritain's Social Critique and His Personalism

This study will expose the intention of Maritain's social thought through an exploration of the relationship between his social critique and his personalism. We will see how Maritain's social critique influenced the development of his personalism, by molding his thought into conformity with the issues of his time, thereby indicating the relevancy of his questions concerning modern society.

The term "social critique" designates Maritain's critical analysis of contemporary theory and practice, in relation to the development of human society. Maritain's social critique is therefore concerned with the thought and action responsible for the development of his historical situation.
His analysis deals with both thinkers and events, and he seeks to indicate both the negative and the positive factors operative in the modern world.

He attempts to sound the depths beneath a situation he perceives as exemplified by four major options: bourgeois individualism; totalitarianism which is communist and anti-individual; totalitarian anti-communism and anti-individualism, which is exemplified preeminently by Italian fascism and the racial exclusivism of Germany's National Socialism; and authentic democracy.42

Although these categories are political, and shaped by the exigencies of praxis, Maritain seeks to unearth their philosophical roots. If philosophy is determined by both the nature of philosophy and the concrete state of the particular philosophy, the concrete events of history are themselves determined, to a large extent, by man's progressive discovery of truth. Unfortunately, history is also determined by the errors, the failure to understand, and even the blatant denial of truth attained. Maritain contends that philosophers, for better or worse, help shape history.43

While he analyses modernity critically, Maritain does not attempt to explain it away. He traces modernity back to the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation. He follows its development through thinkers such as Descartes, Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx, and in the events of bourgeois liberalism and twentieth century totalitarianism. He does not seek to return to an earlier age. He acknowledges the positive elements in
the modern world, and seeks to evolve with them into the future. At the same time, he readily acknowledges the errors, misunderstandings, and denials which he perceives.

Maritain's personalism is an attempt to comprehend man. In attempting to understand what man is, he strives to establish a paradigm for human behaviour. His personalism is ethical and political, and it acknowledges the importance of history. It is determined by the doctrine of Aquinas, but this study emphasises that it is also determined by Maritain's encounter with contemporary philosophical currents and the concrete events of his own biography.

In accordance with his notion of the state of philosophy, Maritain considers himself to be a Christian philosopher. He is a Christian philosopher in the twentieth century. Certainly Maritain himself would not deny what he owes to his situation. His social critique is the testimony of his engagement with contemporary thought and action. It is the action he himself took part in, and contemporary philosophy and events helped shape not only his critical analysis of modern society but also his comprehension of man and proposal for the future as well.

This study will show that Maritain's social critique has influenced the development of his personalism in two ways. First of all, his analysis of contemporary society presented him with the unique problem of our age. This is the problem of how to direct modern man away from the plague of egocentrism and its practical consequences, i.e. bourgeois individualism
and totalitarianism. Maritain developed his personalism as an attempt to solve this problem. The question of how to overcome modern man's egocentrism, exemplified by bourgeois culture and the totalitarian experiments of the twentieth century, is the initial question behind Maritain's social thought. Second, Maritain's social critique presented him with the guidelines or framework for solving this problem. These guidelines are to be found in the evolution of modern democracy, which is perverted by individualism, but nevertheless has its source in the Christian Gospel. Maritain's personalism is an attempt to develop further what is authentic in the contemporary democratic enterprise. For this reason, it is primarily a doctrine of social action in the world of today.

Maritain developed a mode of theocentric humanism in order to overcome the anthropocentric humanism rampant in modern society. Steinkamp, following Wildmann, therefore correctly characterises Maritain's personalism as "humanistic personalism". However, the present study favours the distinctly political appellation: "personalist democracy". This terminology was suggested by Maritain himself. It designates his personalism as a doctrine of action, which conforms with the positive analysis of democracy offered in his social critique.

It is certainly true that for Maritain there are eternal verities. However, we have seen that these verities are disclosed gradually, in accordance with the circumstances
of a particular age. It is also true, as evidenced by the publication of *The Peasant of the Garonne*, that Maritain detests much of the world's current effort. But this does not mean that he is either ignorant of contemporary affairs or afraid to bear the cross which time has placed on our shoulders alone. Through an exploration of the relationship between Maritain's social critique and his personalism, this study will disclose the intention of his social thought as an attempt to deal with relevant questions of the present age.

4. The Biographical Context

In order to exhibit the key events in Maritain's life responsible for the emergence of his social critique and personalism, it is not necessary to present an exhaustive account of his life. Four stages in the unfolding of Maritain's biography must be looked at: first, his rebellious student days; second, his conversion to Roman Catholicism, which entailed the discovery of what he believed to be eternal verities as well as a sedimentation leading to a reactionary stance in the presence of the modern world; third, his involvement with the monarchist movement, the Action Française, and his adherence to its condemnation by the Church; and fourth, the evolution of his social thought, which took place in the wake of the Church's condemnation of the Action Française and amidst the growing turmoil culminating in the events of the Second World War. The final stage is the period during which emerged Maritain's social critique and
personalism. His experience in America, during and immediately after the Second World War, contributed to his democratic expectations, and is therefore an important development in this fourth stage of Maritain's biography.

Maritain's Early Allegiance to the People and the Revolution

Jacques Maritain was born on November 11, 1882. His mother, Geneviève, was the daughter of the eminent Jules Favre. She divorced Jacques' father, Paul Maritain, after having been married to him for only a few years, and apparently her liberal Protestantism was the dominating feature in Jacques' early environment. Fecher insinuates that Geneviève lacked any sincere commitment to Christ, and he actually questions her motive in having had Jacques and his sister baptised by a minister in the traditional Protestant way.46 But perhaps we should agree with Nottingham, who openly challenges what he sees as Fecher's narrow view of liberal Protestantism in the nineteenth century.47 Nevertheless, it is true that the liberal atmosphere in which the philosophical inclinations of the young Jacques emerged, only nourished questions and problems.48

In The Peasant of the Garonne, Maritain states in parentheses: "... by temperament I am what people call a man of the left."49 Maritain also asserts the need for a given disposition, whether of the right or left, to create a balance by coming into harmony with its opposite.50 Nevertheless,
anyone familiar with Maritain's work knows the value of his parenthetical remarks. The old man who wrote *The Peasant of the Garonne* is telling us something crucial about himself. Growing up in an atmosphere of what one might call "laissez faire intellectualism", Maritain's love of the people and commitment to radical change were sources of strength.\(^5^1\) Indeed, in his autobiographical collection of documents, *Carnet de notes*, Maritain records a letter he wrote to François Baton, the husband of the family cook. This was in 1898, when he was only sixteen years old. In it he states:

> ... tout ce que je pourrai penser et savoir, je le consacrerai au prolétariat et à l'humanité; je l'emploierai tout entier à préparer la révolution, à aider, si peu que se soit, au bonheur et à l'éducation de l'humanité.\(^5^2\)

Maritain himself prefaces this letter with the claim that he neither abandoned the esteem and love for the working people which developed in him at that time, nor did he forsake the desire to serve the proletariat and humanity.\(^5^3\) Declaring itself in his youth, Maritain's leftist temperament is a very important element in his constitution.

Related to his love for the working poor, was Maritain's hatred for the bourgeoisie. A document from 1904 testifies to this disdain, in the form of an attack on 

> "... tous les vices du mariage bourgeois."\(^5^4\)

Maritain began his studies at the Sorbonne in 1900. His attitude toward the bourgeoisie was coupled with his inability to find security in idealism, which failed to

> "... parler de l'Être ..."\(^5^5\) This is significant,
because Maritain later considered idealism to be one of the fundamental blunders of modern thought.

Like many young French intellectuals rocked in the wake of the nineteenth century, Maritain was in rebellion against all that typified the bourgeois liberalism of the Third Republic in France. He sought honesty and fairness in human relationships, and he suffered from a metaphysical thirst for truth and being. Fortunately, the friendship of a girl and a great teacher sustained him.

University studies at the Sorbonne augmented what was becoming Jacques' disquiet in the face of laissez-faire intellectualism, and with his future wife (the young Jewess, Raïssa Oumansoff, whom he met while seeking names for a petition in support of Russian dissidents) he made a suicide pact in the Jardin des Plantes. If in a short time they were unable to find any meaning for the word truth, both Jacques and Raïssa agreed that they would deliberately take their own lives. However, in abandoning the fruits of skepticism and relativism, their situation was not in fact so very dim. In her published memoirs, Raïssa herself indicates the hope that was behind such a desperate commitment:

... we decided for some time longer to have confidence in the unknown; we would extend credit to existence, look upon it as an experiment to be made, in the hope that to our ardent plea, the meaning of life would reveal itself, that new values would stand forth so clearly that they would enlist our total allegiance, and deliver us from the nightmare of a sinister and useless world.

Happily for both Jacques and Raïssa (and for the world which would have lost the contributions of a great philosopher
and contemplative), Charles Péguy, who was their friend, ushered them into the lecture hall of Henri Bergson, which was across the street from the Sorbonne in the Collège de France. This was in 1901. As Raïssa writes: "It was then that God's pity caused us to find Henri Bergson." Although Jacques would later ardently reject much of what Bergson had taught, it was Bergson who indicated at least the possibility of a metaphysical solution to the liberal enigmas which plagued both Jacques and Raïssa:

Bergson assured us . . . that we are capable of truly knowing reality, that through intuition we may attain to the absolute; and we interpreted this as saying that we could truly, absolutely, know what is. It mattered little to us whether this might come through intuition which transcends concepts or through intelligence which forms them; the important, the essential thing was the possible result: to attain the absolute. By means of a wonderfully penetrating critique Bergson dispelled the anti-metaphysical prejudices of pseudo-scientific positivism and recalled to the spirit its real functions and essential liberty.61

Through their encounter with Bergson at the Collège de France, Jacques and Raïssa came to believe in a philosopher's ability to know and "parler de l'être". This was something that the idealists, skeptics, relativists, and positivists could not do.

Maritain's Conversion to Roman Catholicism

Shortly after their marriage, having been strongly and permanently influenced by the uncompromising pen of Léon Bloy, Jacques and Raïssa Maritain (along with Raïssa's sister, Vera) were baptised into the Roman Catholic Church on June 11, 1906.
It is significant to note that Jacques was at first reluctant to receive baptism. He protested vehemently against the bourgeois element in the Church. A few months before his baptism, he wrote:

Le grand obstacle au christianisme ce sont les chrétiens. Voilà l'épine qui me perce. Les chrétiens ont abandonné les pauvres, -et les pauvres parmi les nations: les Juifs, -et la Pauvreté de l'âme; la Raison authentique. Ils me font horreur.63

After his baptism, Maritain's first allegiance was to the authority of the Church. His appreciation of the intellect's role in Christian life emerged later, with the discovery of Thomas Aquinas. At the time of his baptism, Maritain thought that he would be compelled to give up philosophy.64

Joseph Amato, in his study, Mounier and Maritain, correctly states that the mature Maritain "... was born out of reaction."65 In his liberal environment, Maritain had found two sources of strength, rationalistic socialism and poetic symbolism.66 Amato points out that these two trends (i.e. socialism and symbolism) were in fact unable to be reconciled with each other by those of Maritain's contemporaries who, like him, were caught up in what the historian, Eugene Weber, has called "fin du siècle socialism".67 This popular mixture of socialism and poetry was a sporadic and essentially emotional manifestation of discontent. It grasped at rationalistic and collective truths, while at the same time embracing the instinctual and individualistic insights of thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, and poets like Charles Pierre
Baudelaire. Since the turn of the century, many young intellectuals have been caught up in a reaction against the stagnation of nineteenth century bourgeois liberalism, and two of them have been Jacques and Raïssa Maritain.

According to Amato, the reconciliation of rational with instinctual, and communal with individualistic verities, within Maritain himself, would mean for him the solution to the crisis of our age:

Within him there inhabited two conflicting visions, poetries, of the world: a socialism based on a rationalistic and collective optimism about man's future, and a symbolism which proposed that man was alone and without ultimate purpose. If Maritain, thus, were to find himself, it meant not only a resolution of his crisis as a young man but also an interior resolution of the cultural crisis of his times which in good measure had become part of himself.68

Indeed, Maritain felt that he had found the solution in Thomism, which was for him the synthesis of every rational and instinctual truth, of faith and reason, and even of orthodoxy and rebellion.69 In 1919, he opened his Paris home to academics so that they could meet regularly to discuss the doctrine of Aquinas. After 1923, Maritain established a salon in his home at Meudon. It was there that he entertained such eminent Thomists as Garrigou-Lagrange and Etienne Gilson. At Meudon he also met Christian existentialists like Gabriel Marcel and Nicolas Berdyaev. It was there, in 1928, that Emmanuel Mounier, who was to become the foremost proponent of personalism, came under Maritain's influence.70

However, the full significance of Thomism, especially in relation to social issues, was not immediately apparent to
Maritain. After his baptism, his reaction against bourgeois civilisation putrefied into an obtuseness concerning his early revolutionary interests. Maritain pursued a spiritual quest which was at first almost world denying. His continual interest in things spiritual is evident in his writings, and it is pronounced in his way of life as well. Both he and Raissa became Benedictine oblates in 1912, taking a vow of chastity which they respected throughout their long life together. 71

Secure in his obedience to authority and content with cultivating the spirituality he felt to be necessary for his own salvation, Maritain soon found himself affiliated with the Action Française, a movement later condemned by the Church. With the publication of Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, in 1914, he chastised the teacher who had once given him hope. In 1922, he published a work appropriately entitled Antimoderne. His Three Reformers, a scathing attack on those whom he considered to be the founders of modern society, appeared in 1925. 72 It was not until 1926 that Maritain began to appreciate Thomism in the light of concrete alternatives. In that year, the Roman Catholic Church announced its condemnation of the monarchist movement, the Action Française. This movement achieved renown under the leadership of Charles Maurras, an avowed agnostic who admired the positivism of August Comte. As we shall see, it was this man's attempt to identify the Church with the Action Française which brought about the condemnation.
Maritain and the Action Française

Under the influence of Humbert Clérissac, his confessor in the Church, Maritain was introduced to the thought of Thomas Aquinas and to the Action Française. It is indicative of the textbook Thomism of the age, that a priest would be attracted to both Aquinas and an authoritarian movement. Maritain himself became involved with the Action Française. Both he and Raïssa testify to his political naïveté in this venture. Nevertheless, it is a fact that he perceived a certain intellectual affinity between Charles Maurras, the leader of the movement, and himself. He urged his close friend, Ernest Psichari, to become involved also with the movement. And Henri Massis insists that Maritain was a fervent supporter of the Action Française, who encouraged him to join.

However, if any credibility is to be given to Maritain's own account, it is clear that he was not motivated by a careful consideration of current events in France. The notion of an intellectual affinity is significant, because it indicates both an abstract alliance and the extent to which Maritain divorced himself from praxis at this time. In an apologetic attempt to explain the value of the Action Française, most of which was written before the Church's published disapproval of the movement, he argued that one could follow the politics of Maurras and remain pure in the Catholic faith. He maintained that Maurras had a sincere interest in the common good, and that his political stance was not necessarily
bound to the positivist philosophy of August Comte. He even argued that since converts to Christianity avoid politics at first, Maurras can be a good guide back to the importance of political issues. Nevertheless, early in the same work (i.e. prior to the Church’s condemnation of the Action Française), Maritain states that he himself did not wish to adhere to any political group. Following the Church's condemnation, he asserts that he was

... entièrement étranger au monde de la politique et à tout désir d'action politique, n'ayant jamais adhéré à l'Action Française, mais ayant pour beaucoup de ceux qui en font partie la plus grande amitié.

The social implications of Maurras and his movement were somehow overlooked by the young Maritain. All that concerned him at the time was the fact that Maurras was ideologically opposed to the bourgeois Republic. Maurras attacked the anti-clerical legislation of 1905, and sought to defend both France and the Church. Furthermore, Maurras criticised Marc Sangnier, who was the leader of the Sillon, the Christian socialist movement condemned by Pope Pius X in 1910.

Maritain's only active participation in the work of the Action Française was to be his connection with Maurras' Revue Universelle. With money willed to them by Pierre Villard, Maritain and Maurras jointly financed the beginning of the review. Apparently, Maritain also served as its philosophical editor. He hesitated at first, but Maurras promised him that the review "... serait un organe indépendant, sans liaison expresse ...". Maritain's active participation in the Action Française was indeed real, but it remained peripheral.
In order to comprehend the Vatican's condemnation of both the Sillon and the Action Française, it is necessary to review both the situation in France and the attitude of the papacy. Since the eighteenth century, there have been Catholics in France desirous of a rapport with the revolutionary currents sweeping the country. Entering the second half of the nineteenth century, however, it became apparent that the beleaguered Vatican was in no position to appreciate the merit of new social trends. When Pope Pius IX published the Syllabus of Errors in 1864, it seemed as if the question of Catholic collaboration with modern politics was settled. Every contemporary innovation, from freedom of speech to freedom of belief, appeared to be condemned.

There were those, however, who followed the lead of Dupanloup, and interpreted this document not as a denial of basic human rights, but rather, as simply stating that these rights in themselves do not guarantee eternal salvation. This is the interpretation Maritain came to accept.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Ralliement of Pope Leo XIII, which acknowledged the French Republic as a form of government acceptable to the Vatican, seemed to indicate a shift in the Church's policy. Indeed, the prolific contribution of Leo XIII certainly clarified the Church's position regarding many contemporary social issues. Nevertheless, certain basic tenets, such as the recognition of a hierarchy of ends, with man's transcendent goal at the top, remained. The Church should defend the rights of the working masses,
but this did not mean that the Church should become entangled in a partisan allegiance to any entrenched temporal power or revolutionary aspiration for such power.\textsuperscript{89}

When Pope Pius X condemned the Sillon in 1910, the fundamental issue was precisely the Church's hegemony in the spiritual domain and aloofness to partisan participation in political affairs. At that time, it was the Vatican's understanding that Marc Sangnier was identifying the Church too closely with a particular political view. Pius X wrote:

We need not point out that the advent of universal democracy does not concern the action of the Church in the world, we have already recalled that the Church has always left the nations the care of adopting the government they consider most apt to serve their interests. What we do desire to state once again, following Our Predecessor [Leo XIII], is that it is both erroneous and dangerous in principle to enfeoff Catholicism to any particular form of government and that the error and danger are the greater when religion is synthesised with a kind of democracy whose doctrines are erroneous. Such is the case of the Sillon which, compromising the Church in fact, and in favour of a particular form of politics, sows division among Catholics, tears young men and even priests and seminarists away from purely Catholic action and wastefully squanders the living energies of a part of the nation ... \textsuperscript{90}

For the very same reason, however, the Action Française should have been condemned by the Vatican. Maurras himself was an avowed agnostic, who favoured Roman Catholicism primarily because the Church's Latin paganism took the anarchistic bite out of early Jewish Christianity!\textsuperscript{91}

It is true that the Congregation of the Index repudiated seven of Maurras' books in 1914. However, although he accepted this decree, Pius X did not allow it to become public. This condemnation was not promulgated until 1926, during the
reign of Pius XI. And at his insistence, the movement's newspaper was condemned along with the seven books repudiated by the Congregation of the Index in 1914.92

Maritain notes that the primary reason for the condemnation of 1926 was the following one:

. . . the Action Française was a party which associated many Catholics, more particularly a considerable number of young men, in a political community (political I say, not religious or philosophical), placed as such under the absolute intellectual direction of an infidel leader. This was an entirely different thing from a mere collaboration with non-Catholics.93

He writes also:

The condemnation of the Action Française clearly in no way affects Catholics who, in their search for the good of the terrestrial State, consider that the restoration of monarchy or a policy 'of the right' is the best means of securing it.94

Ironically, Maritain's anxious submission to the authority of the Church was partially responsible for his failure to interpret the direction in which the Church was moving, i.e. toward the condemnation of any attempt to identify the Church with a particular political organisation. Certainly, Maurras' opposition to the movement of Sangnier, which was publicly condemned by the Church while the Action Française was not, helped consolidate Maritain's allegiance to the Action Française.

The Emergence of Maritain's Social Critique and His Doctrine of the Human Person

After the Church's condemnation of the Action Française was made clear in 1926, Maritain began to assess what amounted
to his betrayal of the people and the revolution. On the level of thought he was merely being negligent, but on the level of action he was in fact participating in a reactionary movement. Clearly, the bourgeois Republic would not do. Did this mean that every contemporary innovation was to be discarded? After 1926, Maritain began to develop his social thought. 95

In his first book, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, which appeared in 1914, Maritain gives us intimations of his doctrine of the human person, as well as the foundation for his metaphysical thought. 96 The origin of his social critique goes back at least that far, judging from the dates of the essays collectively published in Antimoderne. 97 Prior to 1926, however, Maritain's social critique was concerned only with rejecting bourgeois civilisation. Democratic aspirations and sympathy for revolutionary struggles leaning toward the left in the political spectrum, although present, 98 were not clearly defined or sufficiently developed to produce his personalism as a doctrine of social change.

After the publication of Une opinion sur Charles Maurras in 1926, Maritain's practical orientation came into focus. His important work, The Things that Are Not Caesar's (originally published as Primauté du spirituel in 1927 99 ), followed immediately. Then came a series of other important works, which culminated in what might be called Maritain's social magnum opus, Integral Humanism, the first French edition of which appeared in 1936. 100

After Integral Humanism, came another series of impor-
tant works, which reflected Maritain's experience in America. This effort culminated in *Man and the State*, the outgrowth of six lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in 1949.101

Although apparent before 1926, Maritain's social critique and personalism clearly emerged only after 1926, with the Church's condemnation of the Action Française, the triumph of totalitarian alternatives to bourgeois individualism and the experience of the Second World War. His social analysis came to avow the democratic concern with human rights as the only legitimate way to combat bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism. He therefore developed his concept of personalist democracy within the context of the modern democratic enterprise. The definitive disclosure of this process did not occur until 1947, when the first edition of *The Person and the Common Good* appeared.102

With the publication of *Integral Humanism*, Maritain's social critique became decisively concrete, directly addressing the immediate issues which engaged him. The years between 1926 and 1936 saw the disruption of bourgeois civilisation and the solidification of totalitarian alternatives. His earlier analysis of contemporary thought and action, which began with his critique of the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation, was now clearly formulated in the context of the events which shaped his own biography. He came to acknowledge his historical situation and he sought to work with authentic possibilities. By 1936, Maritain was decidedly involved in the unpleasant affairs of his own time, and he attempted to atone for his
betrayal of the people and the revolution. While denying an allegiance to either the left or the right, he vehemently condemned the Church's affiliation with established order in Spain as one of the causes of the widespread violence directed against the Church during the civil war. 103 During the Nazi occupation of France, he broadcast regularly to his native land from abroad. Among other things, these broadcasts indicate that he was vehemently opposed to the Vichy experiment with authoritarianism. 104 After the war, he became the ambassador of France to the Vatican, and a friend of the man who later became Pope Paul VI. 105 He was involved with the United Nations, being one of those who supported the International Declaration of Rights. 106 Towards the end of his life, after the death of Raïssa, he joined the Little Brothers of Jesus in Toulouse, a religious order whose members subsist by acquiring simple occupations amongst the poor. 107 He continued throughout his life to clarify his social critique, and a very valuable segment of his analysis appears as late as 1960, in Moral Philosophy. 108

Maritain's social critique uncovered the problem to which he addressed his personalism as the cure. His social critique showed that bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism are the symptoms of the disease which is man's egocentrism, explained as man's denial of his own transcendence and of God. Maritain also discovered that the true source of the contemporary democratic aspiration is to be found in the Gospel. For this reason, the development of his personalism, as the
cure for man's anthropocentric orientation is essentially the laying bare of the fundamental presupposition for the very existence of democracy. Maritain sought to develop personalism in the context of the current democratic enterprise. He was not concerned with imposing something alien on contemporary society.

5. An Explanation of Methodology and Preliminary Outline

The purpose of this study is to indicate the contemporaneity and relevance of Maritain's social thought by demonstrating the influence of his social critique on the development of his personalism. An examination of the relationship between his social critique and his personalism will expose the intention of his social thought, thereby indicating the questions with which he was concerned. We will see that these questions are truly modern and relevant ones, demonstrating that Maritain's thought does not neglect the exigencies of history. This is not a denial of the Thomistic foundation of Maritain's personalism. That his personalism is based upon an ancient tradition, and developed in accordance with what he perceives as the immutable principles of reason, is not being contested. We have seen, however, that for Maritain the disclosure of truth is gradual, and bound to the unique circumstances of a given age. Maritain's analysis of the thought and deeds which constitute contemporary society gave him both the unique problem of our age and the framework in which to solve it.
The current problem is how to direct man away from egocentrism. Maritain thinks that the solution must be in agreement with the concrete circumstances of modern democracy.

What has been said in this chapter shows that concrete events helped determine the direction of Maritain's thought. His final view of history, as an intellectual, moral, and political process, was brought about through his engagement with contemporary affairs. In his youth, Maritain exhibited an appreciation of man's quest for autonomy. Finding no support in the laissez faire intellectualism rampant in nineteenth century France, he became a Roman Catholic. Although at first willing to reject philosophy for religion, he soon discovered the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, and came to appreciate the function of human reason when related to concrete experience and man's aspiration for transcendence. Influenced by those he respected in the Church, Maritain allowed himself to become affiliated with the reactionary stance of the Action Française. Soon, however, he became disillusioned with the insecure groping for authority exhibited in the doctrines and biographies of his contemporaries. After the Church openly condemned the Action Française in 1926, he allowed his original concern with man's autonomy to blossom in the garden of his Christian faith. The rise of totalitarianism and the events of the Second World War consolidated his disdain for modern man's selfishness and greed. His original hatred for the bourgeois culture which deprived the working masses of their basic rights coincided
with his rejection of totalitarianism. In view of the events he witnessed, Maritain found that man can neither retreat into the past behind the shield of authority, nor reach into the future with the banner of freedom for man without God. Modern man must somehow preserve his tradition, i.e. maintain continuity with his roots. From the original question of how to overcome egocentricism in the world of today, arose the question of how to harmonise man's transcendent orientation (exhibited in the classical period, but primarily in the theocentric orientation of the Christian Middle Ages) with modern man's quest for freedom (a quest rife with possibility, but perverted by anthropocentrism, which fails to acknowledge transcendence).

Certainly the issue of the contemporaneity of Maritain's thought demands that some attention be given to his biography, and ultimately that he be situated within the broader context of intellectual history (i.e. be explained in terms of his place in the development of Western thought, especially Thomism). But that is not the main focus of this study, which is an analysis of how Maritain's social critique influenced the development of his personalism. This study is concerned with the structure and inner dynamic of Maritain's work. That is why an examination of his biography is confined to this introductory chapter. Neither will it be necessary to pursue an exhaustive treatment of the confluence of intellectual currents in the West since the time of the Greeks. Here we are concerned with the questions Maritain himself
asked, hoping, in this way, to indicate his relevance as a contemporary thinker. This study is therefore a necessary prelude to further historical research.

The task of demonstrating the influence of Maritain's social critique on the development of his personalism, and indicating how this leads us to the intention of his social thought, will be accomplished in three steps.

The first, consisting of chapters two and three, will be a presentation of Maritain's social critique. Chapter two will expose the dilemma of the individual as the primary problem confronting modern man. Chapter three will explore the practical expressions of egocentrism in contemporary society, i.e. bourgeois individualism and the major divisions of totalitarianism. It was the observation of these practical consequences of man's current anthropocentric orientation which seriously influenced the development of Maritain's personalism as a directive for overcoming individualism. Since Maritain's social critique also developed his appreciation of the modern democratic enterprise, the positive elements in his social critique will emerge as well. Chapters two and three will thereby together comprise the expression of Maritain's social critique, which contains both the problem of contemporary society and the guidelines for its solution.

The second step is contained in chapter four. It will be an analysis of Maritain's personalism in the context of his social critique. It will show how his personalism is a response to the fundamental dilemma of the individual and
its practical expressions. Chapter four will also show how his personalism is immersed in the democratic context of contemporary society. Thus it will become clear how well Maritain's personalism is characterised as "personalist democracy".

The third and last step is the concluding chapter five. Here some of Maritain's critics will be examined briefly, in order to shed further light on the intention of his social thought. Criticism of Maritain often fails to appreciate either his concern for transcendence and man's theocentric orientation, or his sincere commitment to modern man's quest for autonomy. Therefore, a comparison of these two critical approaches, in relation to Maritain's teaching, tends to divulge the intention of his social thought to bring transcendence and autonomy into harmony with each other.

In addition to utilising criticism for the purpose of lighting up Maritain's intention, this study will undertake a preliminary criticism of his personalist democracy as well. Although Maritain's questions may indicate the relevance of his social thought, it is not necessarily the case that his interpretation of modernity is without fault. We must come to acknowledge Maritain's contribution while learning to accept his limitations. His recognition of the evolutionary aspect of the historical process is evident in his explanation of the concrete historical ideal. Maritain is not guilty of proposing utopia as a solution to the problems confronting the modern world. He is concerned with directing man away
from a destructive anthropocentrism into the unforeseeable future. In order to accomplish this, he believes that a new theocentric orientation is necessary, an orientation consistent with the demands of the present situation. According to his understanding of history, this will be an orientation toward an ideal never to be fully attained. It is a light to be passed on the way and not the destination. Adherence to the concrete historical ideal of modernity may prove to be Maritain's strength, but it may also prove to be his weakness. The orientation of his social thought is quite general, guided as it is by an elusive ideal into the admittedly unknown possibilities of the future. The general nature of Maritain's orientation may engender inadequacies in his interpretation of modern times and events. For this reason, chapter five will entail a critical appraisal of Maritain's personalist democracy, giving some directive to future research beyond the scope of this study.
II

THE ADVENT OF THE SELF

This chapter will show how Maritain interprets the origin of our present historical period. It will show what Maritain believes to be the unique elements operative in our age, i.e. those factors which, according to him, enable us to distinguish between our own historical period and other ages. Maritain argues that egocentricity, or the turning of man into himself, is one of the sources of the current historical situation. He maintains that this orientation arose from both the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, and that, although it has parallels in classical antiquity, it is fundamentally distinct from the predominant orientation of the mediaeval period and what was best in the classical tradition. For this reason, the title of the second chapter of this study is appropriate. It is borrowed from the subtitle of the first chapter in Maritain's Three Reformers, which is a critical study of the work and life of Martin Luther.

Maritain deals with man's present egocentric orientation first as an intellectual phenomenon, and then he deals with it as it occurs on the level of action. The theoretical development of this orientation and its practical implications will be dealt with in the third chapter of this study. The
purpose of this second chapter is to show how Maritain begins his social critique. First, by explaining how Maritain distinguishes the age of the Renaissance from mediaeval Christendom and what was best in the classical period, the origin of egocentrism understood as a contemporary phenomenon peculiar to our age will be exposed. Second, we will consider his interpretation of the Protestant Reformation, as a further development of man's current egocentric orientation, through his criticism of Martin Luther. Third, we will deal at some length with his analysis of René Descartes, who in many ways appears to be Maritain's most important target among the founding fathers of contemporary society. Descartes initiated the philosophical expression of modern man's preoccupation with the self. Fourth, we will deal with Maritain's criticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose life and work are paradigmatic for contemporary praxis. And fifth, we will discuss the dilemma of the individual, which Maritain believes to be the fundamental problem in contemporary society. This chapter will unravel not only what he perceives as negative in the foundation of contemporary society but also what he perceives as positive. For in spite of his often harsh criticism of the contemporary situation, Maritain did not seek to return to the mediaeval world, but rather, he sought to build the future with the material currently available.

The format of this chapter closely parallels the structure of Maritain's Three Reformers. This prepares the
foundation for the next chapter. Maritain describes Descartes as an important source of theory in contemporary society, while he perceives Rousseau as an important progenitor of what is wrong with contemporary praxis. Certainly other material will be used besides Three Reformers. Nevertheless, written before the crisis of the Action Francaise, Maritain's Three Reformers gives us his reasons for refusing to embrace the modern enterprise. This work is more thorough and penetrating than his earlier Antimoderne, and it presents us with three figures important in his social critique considered as a whole. It gives us a focal point for Maritain's subsequent concerns and publications, enabling us to attain a balanced and complete understanding of his analysis of the origin of contemporary society.

1. The Renaissance and the Betrayal of the Incarnation

The Renaissance is interpreted by Maritain as the decisive modern phenomenon. It was the beginning of man's rupture with mediaeval Christendom, and it paved the way for bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism. In this chapter, it is necessary to dissect Maritain's analysis of this phenomenon, as a preparation for understanding his analysis of Luther, Descartes, and Rousseau. These three men are the great individualists of modernity. Understanding them, in relation to the Renaissance, shows how Maritain perceived the evolution of the current dilemma of individualism.
Maritain did not devote himself to a study of the Renaissance per se, and he did not deal with the Renaissance extensively in any of his works. He was interested in the Renaissance insofar as it was, along with the Protestant Reformation, the point of origin for contemporary society. Maritain's general view of the significance of the age of the Renaissance, for contemporary society, must be gleaned from brief sections appearing in a number of his works.

According to Maritain, a great part of classical antiquity and the predominant orientation of mediaeval Christendom acknowledged the importance of the transcendent in human affairs. In his Integral Humanism, we read:

\[\ldots\] Western humanism has religious and transcendent sources without which it is incomprehensible to itself: I call 'transcendent' all forms of thought, however diverse they may otherwise be, which find as principle of the world a spirit superior to man, which find in man a spirit whose destiny goes beyond time, and which find at the center of moral life a natural or supernatural piety. The sources of Western humanism are both classical and Christian; and it is not only in the bosom of mediaeval times, but also in one of the least questionable parts of the heritage we have from pagan antiquity, the part evoked by the names of Homer, Sophocles, Socrates and Virgil, 'the Father of the West,' that the qualities which I have just mentioned appear.\[1\]

At this point, it is not necessary to stress the fact that Maritain perceives the sources of Western humanism as religious and transcendent. What is important here, is Maritain's contention that the society which prevailed prior to the present age, precisely in its concern with man, was
oriented toward that which transcends man. Maritain maintains that this orientation was by no means confined to the Occident.\(^2\)

In a much later work of his, entitled *Moral Philosophy*, he clearly indicates that not only "the least questionable parts of the heritage we have from pagan antiquity," but even the questionable part of our classical heritage, such as the Sophist tradition, did not entirely escape the transcendent. Concerning the Sophists, we read:

> ... they were able at times to put forward accurate and profound ideas, and even, like Hippias, to bring to light the notion of natural law and of human community superior to the particularism of the city, in spite of the fact that these notions challenged the distinction between Greeks and barbarians, as well as an economic regime based on slavery. The unwritten laws, eternal and unalterable, said Hippias, derive from a higher source than the decrees of men; and all men are naturally fellow-citizens. God made all men equally free, said Alcidamas; nature made no man a slave.\(^3\)

Yet, it is important to note that, according to Maritain, the Stoic conception of the sage anticipates modern rationalism. The Stoics believed that "Salvation, and divine autonomy, are to be acquired through my own power as a man, in communion with universal reason. I make myself a member of the family of the gods."\(^4\)

In addition to his criticism of the Stoics, Maritain is quick to condemn what he sees as the Epicurean illusion of pleasure as the supreme end of man.\(^5\)

For Maritain, mediaeval society, based as it was on the revelation of the God-man, called man to an heroic adventure beyond himself. In the mediaeval period, man's orienta-
tion was decidedly transcendent. Man lived beyond himself in a multitude of ways. Maritain does not seek to dupe us with the illusion that this was a perfect society, but rather, to present us with the overall thrust of a particular age. Concerning the movement of mediaeval man beyond himself, Maritain writes, in Integral Humanism:

It was, amid a swarm of passions and crimes, a simple movement of ascent, of the intellect toward the object, of the soul toward perfection, of the world toward a social and juridic structure unified under the reign of Christ. With the absolute ambition and unpremeditated courage of childhood, Christendom built then an immense stronghold on the summit of which God would sit; it was preparing for Him a throne on the earth, because it loved Him. All the human was thus under the sign of the sacred, ordered to the sacred and protected by the sacred, at least so long as love made it live on the sacred. What mattered the losses, the disasters? A divine work was being accomplished by the baptized soul. The creature was severely lacerated and even magnified; it forgot itself for God.

Maritain argues that during the mediaeval period, faith and reason were in harmony with each other. At that time it was understood that grace perfected the natural abilities of man. It was the contention of the mediaeval period that the supernatural dimension opened up the natural, enabling man to surpass himself in both the supernatural and natural orders of being, as we read in Maritain's Moral Philosophy:

With Christianity a new order in being is made manifest to the human mind—essentially distinct from the order of nature and at the same time perfecting that order—the order of grace and of supernatural realities. This word 'supernatural' signifies for Christianity a participation in that which is actually divine, in the intimate life itself of God—something... which is beyond the possibilities of any created nature through its own capacities, and which is not owed to nature, but depends on free
and gratuitous divine communication.

From this moment the very concept of nature undergoes a change, opens out, so to speak. Nature is not closed in upon itself, impenetrable by a superior order. It blossoms in grace, is 'perfected' or fulfilled by grace, which is not simply added to it like an ornamental facade, but which penetrates its most intimate depths, and which, at the same time that it elevates nature to a life and an activity of another order, of which nature is not capable by itself, heightens it in its own order and in the domain of its own proper activities.

Maritain argues that mediaeval society was motivated by the ideal of the holy empire. This ideal was "... realizable not as something made, but as something on the way to being made, an essence capable of existence and calling for existence in a given historical climate..." What made this ideal an authentic possibility, something which was "capable of existence", was its adherence to a particular event, an historical event of epoch making proportions. For this reason, it was a concrete historical ideal, "... a prospective image signifying the particular type, the specific type of civilization to which a certain historical age tends." The event which made the historical ideal of mediaeval Christendom concrete was the empire of Charlemagne.

Mediaeval society maintained a distinction between the spiritual and temporal powers, without allowing their radical separation. For this reason, mediaeval society was an organic whole, a living dynamism with a common transcendent goal and temporal task. There was a certain amount of diversity, a pluralism of functions and interests. The empire sought to unify the temporal sphere, while the Church
sought to unify the spiritual. Nevertheless, mediaeval society was a distinctly Christian society. The Incarnation brought dignity to the temporal order, by placing all things under the reign of Christ. And according to Maritain, the transcendent orientation of mediaeval society respected the human person. He argues that this respect for the human person was the central element in the Christendom which mediaeval man sought to construct. 11

Mediaeval society had what Maritain calls "... a Christian sacral conception of the temporal." 12 Because of this, the role of the temporal sphere was not only subordinate to the spiritual, but tended to become the instrument or merely the means of the spiritual. 13 Temporal institutions were used for spiritual ends. The execution of heretics by temporal authority is an example of this. 14

Maritain assures us that, in spite of the deviation mentioned above, the unity of mediaeval society did not imply theocracy. 15 He argues that the Christian sacral conception of the temporal was appropriate for the mediaeval period, and finds nothing wrong with it in principle. However, he maintains that it has been replaced by the exigencies of a new concrete historical ideal. This new historical ideal has emerged in response to other historical events, and it expresses a moral development which is both natural and inspired by the Christian message. 16

Maritain does assert that any temporal regime founded in reason must be both communal and personalist. This means
that it must serve a common good which is both different from the mere sum of individual goods and in fact superior to the interests of the individual, who is a part of the social whole. However, every human being is both an individual and a person. Maritain contends that the individual should be adjusted to the aspirations of the person. For this reason, the common good is to respect and serve the transcendent goals of each person. 17

Maritain argues that mediaeval society was communal and personalist. A significant indication of this is seen in the function of the monarch, who was the image of the people, ruling through their consent and on their behalf. In his Man and the State, Maritain writes: "The Pope in the Church, being the vicar of Christ, is the image of Christ. The Prince in political society, being the vicar of the people, is the image of the people." 18

Furthermore, he argues:

A great deal of confusion occurred in this regard in the age of absolutism, because the authority of the king was often conceived on the pattern of the authority of the Pope, that is to say, as coming down from above, whereas in reality it came up from below. 19

Maritain asserts that the error of absolutism was essentially theocratic. Distinguished from the mediaeval ideal, which sought to relegate temporal authority to the distinct spiritual authority of the Church, absolutism is defined as the attempt of the temporal order to usurp the Church's authority. It helped break up the unity of
mediaeval society, and influenced contemporary developments.

As Maritain writes in *Integral Humanism*, this error . . . passes first to the emperor--this is imperial theocratism; then, in a minor degree, to the kings (I am thinking here of Henry VIII, or even of Gallicanism and Josephism); then, with a return to the major degree, it passes to the State (I am thinking of the philosophy of Hegel). A rudimentary Hegelianism will make it pass to the nation or the race; a more profound Hegelianism, to the class, and we meet . . . here the messianism of Karl Marx. The proletariat will be regarded as having the sacred mission of saving the world. In these perspectives, in order to characterize culturally contemporary Communism, it would be necessary to regard it as an atheist theocratic imperialism. 20

Maritain tells us that the transcendent orientation and unity brought about by a certain kind of cultural appropriation of the Incarnation was shattered during the age which fostered the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation. Surprising as it may seem, he argues that these two diverse movements actually shared the common thrust of a new historical period. In his *Integral Humanism*, he writes:

The radiating dissolution of the Middle Ages and of its sacral forms is the engendering of a secular civilization--of a civilization not only secular, but which separates itself progressively from the Incarnation. It is still, if you wish, the age of the Son of man: but in which man passes from the cult of the God-man, of the Word made man, to the cult of humanity, of sheer man.

To characterize as briefly as possible the spirit of the epoch dominated by the humanist Renaissance and by the Reformation, let us say that it has wished to proceed to an anthropocentric rehabilitation of the creature, of which a palpable symbol, if one sought in religious architecture a correspondence of the soul, could be found in the substitution of the Baroque style (very beautiful in itself, moreover) for the Roman and Gothic styles. 21

Maritain's criticism of the Renaissance is that it decidedly lacked a transcendent orientation. 22 Beginning with
the Renaissance, rationalism and empiricism emerge through a process which Maritain refers to, in his Moral Philosophy, as a "... progressive secularization or 'naturizing' of the traditional Christian heritage."\(^{23}\)

Concerning the rationalist element in this process, Maritain observes:

Reason was isolated from faith, and assumed the task of organizing human life: a process of emancipation from the rationalist point of view; a process of disintegration from the point of view of the organic unity of culture.\(^{24}\)

He interprets this rationalism as a form of Christian Stoicism:

... what seems to me especially worthy of notice is that this whole great effort to transfer the values of Christian ethics into a rationalist and naturalistic climate, at the same time retaining insofar as possible their cultural function, generally expressed itself in terms of Christian Stoicism ...\(^{25}\)

Concerning the empiricist element in this process of secularization, Maritain singles out Thomas Hobbes, blaming him for a hardening of the Epicurean position:

The moral philosophy of Hobbes derives from a radical and decidedly materialistic naturalism which had the merit of refusing all compromises. Hobbes did not seek to reconcile the system of traditional thought with one or another opposed inspiration. He broke with this system of thought. He was a kind of agnostic. Faith, for him as for Spinoza, was a matter of obedience, not at all a matter of knowledge—but obedience to the State (conceived in a frankly despotic perspective). For him, human morality is completely and finally explicable in terms of man's desire for his self-preservation and his pleasure. The condition which makes it reasonable to conform to the fundamental moral rules is the fact that they are generally observed, and the condition on which this general observance depends is the power of the State. Here we no longer have a Christian
Stoicism, but rather, an Epicureanism controlled by Leviathan or the 'mortal God', a political Epicureanism. 26

Further on we read:

Hobbes simply reworked the old themes of Cyrenaic and Epicurean ethics, making the latter into something more inflexible and more sombre by subjecting it to the yoke of determinism and incorporating it in the absolutism of the State (which was completely contrary to the spirit of Epicurus). 27

Maritain certainly does not neglect Niccolo Machiavelli. However, he argues that the work of Machiavelli cannot be dealt with in terms of the rationalist and empiricist ethics which developed from the Renaissance. Maritain maintains that Machiavelli is beyond ethics in his political thought: "... the work of Machiavelli ... bears exclusively on political philosophy, which he separated from ethics (and in so doing appears as one of the fathers of the modern world—and a poor ethician)." 28 He argues that the evil deeds perpetrated in the political arena prior to the time of Machiavelli were at least recognised for what they were, i.e. evil. With Machiavelli, the perpetration of wickedness amongst politicians became a right. 29 Therefore, Machiavelli's separation of politics and morality paved the way for the popular dichotomy between idealism and realism in contemporary society:

The practical result of Machiavelli's teachings has been, for the modern conscience, a profound split, an incurable division between politics and morality, and consequently an illusory but deadly antinomy between what people call idealism
(wrongly confused with ethics) and what people call realism (wrongly confused with politics).

It is Maritain's contention that the Renaissance, along with the Protestant Reformation, constituted the point of origin for contemporary society. Maritain perceives the age of the Renaissance as a betrayal of the Incarnation. The God-man of Christianity enabled man to bring into the light the best elements in classical antiquity, and to develop in the mediaeval period a society oriented toward the transcendent. According to Maritain, the mediaeval period also witnessed the harmony of faith and reason. Like Jesus Christ, the God-man, man at that time was a whole, spanning the natural and supernatural orders of being under the inspiration of grace. The Renaissance betrayed the God-man; it engendered the collapsing of the natural man into himself, away from his transcendent orientation, and reason was severed from faith. Rationalism and empiricism, each in their own way, sought to establish man through man. Finally, with Machiavelli, politics was cut loose from man's highest aspirations, becoming a matter of utility.

2. Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation

While discussing Martin Luther, in his Three Reformers Maritain introduces the distinction between the individual and the person. This distinction has already been discussed in the introduction to this study and will be discussed again later, but it is important here because Maritain uses it to
clarify his interpretation of Martin Luther. Also, the distinction sheds light on Maritain’s interpretation of the Renaissance, as well as on what he perceives as crucial in his interpretation of mediaeval Christendom. The distinction between the individual and the person is important for comprehending the nature of man’s false egocentric orientation, which Maritain perceives as operative in both the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, and for understanding how Maritain’s notion of what man’s orientation ought to be conforms to his interpretation of the mediaeval period.

Basically, Maritain’s conception of man’s proper orientation is in conformity with the transcendent orientation discussed in the previous section, in relation to what was best in the classical tradition and the predominant orientation of the mediaeval period. The essence of the transcendent orientation of mediaeval Christendom is expressed in the unity of the God-man, Jesus Christ. The whole man is directed toward God by grace. The material dimension of man’s being, as well as the higher spiritual faculties of his intellect and will, are part of his transcendent orientation. Maritain refers to the spiritual dimension of man’s being as the person, and to the material dimension of man’s being as the individual. Man is a unity of both these dimensions, and the personal dimension necessitates his transcendent orientation, which enables him to rise above mere matter and the egocentric cravings which in man are bound to material individuality.
In his *Three Reformers*, Maritain writes: "What first impresses us in Luther's character is egocentrism: something much subtler, much deeper, and much more serious, than egoism; a metaphysical egoism." 33

He adds:

The Reformation unbridled the human self in the spiritual and religious order, as the Renaissance (I mean the hidden spirit of the Renaissance) unbridled the human self in the order of natural and sensible activities. 34

According to Maritain, whereas the Renaissance was recognisable for a specifically natural and sensible individualism, the Protestant Reformation was recognisable for a specifically spiritual and religious individualism. As we have seen in the previous section, Maritain argues that the Renaissance gave rise to a process of secularisation which is characterised by rationalism and empiricism. Maritain acknowledges that Luther's initial concern was man's spiritual well being. Attacking the wickedness of the Renaissance Papacy, 35 Luther desired to place all his trust in God. However, it is Maritain's position that precisely because Luther rejected the ability of grace actually to transform human nature (by opening it up and perfecting it, as described in the previous section in reference to the mediaeval period), the result of his effort was man's resignation to material individuality and not the orientation of man toward the transcendent.

Concerning Luther's inadvertent anthropocentrism, Maritain writes:

The unhappy man thinks he no longer trusts
in himself, but in God alone. Yet by refusing to admit that man can share really and within himself in the justice of Jesus Christ and in His grace—which, according to him, is always external to us and cannot produce in us any vital act—he shuts himself up for ever in his self, he withdraws from himself all support but his self, he sets up as a doctrine what had first been nothing but the sin of an individual, he places the centre of his religious life not in God but in man.

Again, Maritain writes:

*Why does the doctrine of salvation absorb all the Lutheran theology, if it be not because the human self has become in actual fact the chief preoccupation of that theology? For Luther, one question towers above all the rest: to escape the judicial wrath of the Almighty in spite of the invincible concupiscence which poisons our nature.*

This last sentence, concerning "the invincible concupiscence which poisons our nature", is highly significant. In his *Integral Humanism*, concerning not only the doctrine of Luther, but of Calvin and Jansenius as well, Maritain writes: "Is not this a pure pessimism? Nature itself is essentially spoiled by original sin. And it remains spoiled under grace, which is no longer a life but a mantle." Maritain argues that this "pessimism" has been influential throughout the Protestant world. It has influenced both Kant and Hegel, and more recently Karl Barth. Maritain argues that even the atheist existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre can be compared to Luther's doctrine.

In the case of Luther himself, the denial of the transforming and perfecting power of grace, coupled as it inevitably is with the separation of faith and reason, led to the association of the will with the egocentric cravings bound to man's material individuality. Again in his *Three
Reformers, Maritain writes:

Luther has another striking characteristic. He is a man wholly and systematically ruled by his affective and appetitive faculties; he is a Man of Will only, characterized chiefly by power in action. 42

With Luther, the will is not in harmony with the intelligence of a soul driven by grace. 43 For Luther, according to Maritain, the will is the concupiscible appetite:

Certainly the will considered in its most peculiarly human characteristics is not here in question, that will which is more living as it roots itself more deeply in the spirituality of the intelligence. We are talking about the will in general, about what the ancients called in general the Appetite, the concupiscible appetite, and especially the irascible appetite. 44

Maritain contends that Luther's highly polemical crusade and vehement verbosity, along with the war he waged on philosophy and reason, are clear indications of his preoccupation with the individual. 45

According to Maritain, Thomas Aquinas, as the most significant spokesman of mediaeval Christendom, argued that the will comes under the intellect in relation to those things which lie below man, and that the intellect comes under the will only in relation to those things which rise above man. Aquinas did not command the will to bow before the throne of reason, such a rationalist imperative was not his aim. Nevertheless, he did preserve the dignity of the human intellect. According to Aquinas, philosophy is possible, and man can gain even further knowledge through a process of theological ratiocination based upon divine revelation. 46 And yet, in this life, it is primarily through the will that the
grace of God lifts the human being toward beatitude. Maritain contends that the doctrine of Aquinas shows us that each human being has two spiritual faculties, the intellect and the will, and that the two are meant to function together harmoniously:

St. Thomas shows us two complementary but essentially different activities in every mind, each as exacting and voracious as the other; an activity wholly turned towards the being of the object, towards what is 'other' as it is 'other,' and of itself only concerned with that, living only for it, -- the intelligence; and an activity wholly occupied with the good of the subject or of the things with which the subject is united, which of itself is concerned only with this good, living only for it, -- the Will. Each is predominant in its order, the one absolutely and for knowledge, the other relatively and for action. Woe to humanity if one monopolizes all the nourishment at the expense of the other!

Maritain argues that with Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation, the will, abandoned to the concupiscible cravings in man's material individuality, monopolised all the nourishment at the expense of reason. He expresses this succinctly when he writes that "Luther is at the source of modern voluntarism."

In a rather harsh and abrupt appraisal, Maritain contends that the Protestant Reformation exhibits a fundamental paradox. A decidedly spiritual quest, it was nevertheless bound together with the egoistic concerns of individualism. Inadvertent as this egocentrism may have been, it inevitably drew the entire human being down into himself. In this respect, the Protestant Reformation has something in common with the individualism fostered by the Renaissance.
It is important to remember that, in terms of the development of Maritain's social awareness, Three Reformers is an early work, exhibiting the brazen polemic of a convert, who, even after twenty years of membership in the Church, still retained the fiery zeal and lack of diplomacy typical of one newly arrived. Nevertheless, Three Reformers contains Maritain's major caution with regard to Luther and the Protestant Reformation. He never relinquished this caution, even though he came to argue for a more intimate, open, and sym-pathetic dialogue amongst members of various Christian denominations.50

Having emerged from a highly individualistic atmosphere, where divergent wills battled endlessly in the whirlwind of confusion which liberalism foments, Maritain launched a personal crusade against all elements which he interpreted as paving the way for contemporary voluntarism. Luther denied the transforming power of grace, which is implied by the Incarnation. He refused to acknowledge the dignity of human reason and reduced the will to the concupiscible appetite. Maritain argues that Luther thereby abandoned man to the craving of his animal individuality.

Certainly Maritain's interpretation of Luther did not go unchallenged. An immediate response came from the eminent Lutheran scholar, Karl Holl. He accused Maritain of hasty submission to the authority of Denifle, who epitomized the Roman Catholic polemic against Protestantism which began in the sixteenth century.51 Holl insinuates that Luther's
doctrine presented a formidable challenge to the egocentrism of the Renaissance Church. He argues, therefore, that the Protestant Reformation was not an unwitting accomplice of Renaissance anthropocentrism. Luther did not deny the transformation of man by grace, but asserted that the credit belongs to Christ alone: "Ce Christ lutte en l'homme contre la chair, et si la victoire est obtenue, lui seul en a le mérite."\(^5^2\)

Philip S. Watson, who is indebted to the work of Karl Holl, forcefully argues that it is Luther who proposed a theocentric orientation for modern man, in this way combating current anthropocentrism and echoing the transcendent orientation of early Christianity. Watson uses the very terminology employed by Maritain in order to formulate the opposite interpretation of Martin Luther.\(^5^3\)

Although Maritain did prepare a brief response to Holl, Maritain's need for research concerning the intention of Lutheran theology seems to be evident.\(^5^4\) Without denying the validity of Maritain's claim that Luther contributed to the general development of modern egocentrism, it appears that we may not rashly accept his interpretation of Luther as the definitive disclosure of the Protestant contribution to the development of modern society.

3. René Descartes

In 1914, Maritain stated that the fundamental characteristic of modern philosophy is "... une concupiscence
He also argued that this is the same concupiscence which produced the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation, and to which Descartes gave a rational form. Descartes is therefore interpreted as an important source of contemporary theory. He initiated the philosophical expression of the egocentrism which defines contemporary society. Although Maritain does not offer us an exhaustive treatment of Descartes, his criticism is nevertheless crucial for understanding the nature of his social critique.

In his The Dream of Descartes, Maritain focuses on the basic characteristic of what he refers to as "the Cartesian reform", and thereby points to the fundamental distinction between Descartes and Aquinas:

The most deep-seated characteristic of the Cartesian reform is more than anything else, in my opinion, one of disjunction and rupture. St. Thomas brings together, Descartes cleaves and separates, and this in the most violently dogmatic way.

Maritain perceives the Cartesian "disjunction and rupture" as multifaceted. This exposition of Maritain's critique of Descartes will begin with a discussion of his analysis of Descartes' break with intellectual tradition, primarily the unity of the sciences envisioned by Aquinas.

It is important to note that Maritain clearly acknowledges the positive contributions of Descartes. It might be said that mediaeval man failed to achieve the consciousness of adulthood. His powers of reflection and introspection were insufficient, and he therefore failed to appreciate human subjectivity. Maritain argues that the
development of the physical and mathematical sciences, as
well as the progress of reflection, was in itself a necessary
and good historical development. However, he contends that
Descartes erred by severing philosophy from theology, and
fostering the notion of a single science,

. . . the admirable science in which unite and
culminate both the splendor of physico-mathematical
cognition—for it is a universal triumph of mathe-
matical clarity—and the splendor of spiritual inter-
iority—for it is an outflowing of the science of God
in our spirit, a sort of angelic geometry.

Maritain argues that Aquinas acknowledged the distinct
operations of the various sciences, while at the same time
placing them in a hierarchical unity. Theology, based upon
revealed truths, was considered to be the apex of the hier-
archical unity. Philosophy, and at least by implication all
later scientific ramifications, was in harmony with theology.

An important element in this unity is diversification, i.e.
specialisation. For Aquinas, there is no single all-
encompassing science, but rather different degrees or levels
of perception of reality. All sciences partake of being, but
in different ways.

It is not the purpose of this study to indulge in a
long metaphysical digression. However, it is important to
note that for Maritain what lies at the foundation of the
Cartesian rupture with intellectual tradition, a tradition
seen as culminating in the doctrine of Aquinas, is the
separation of the intellectual object from extramental
reality or the thing. Modern idealism began with Descartes,
and its fundamental error has been the separation of object
and thing:
Descartes clearly saw that the known object is known within thought; his capital error was to have separated the object from the thing, believing as he did that the object is in thought, not as an intelligible entity rendered present to the mind through an immaterial form—and with which the mind is intentionally identified—but as an imprint stamped on wax. Henceforth, the intentional function disappears; the known object becomes something of thought, an imprint or portrait born within it; understanding stops at the idea (looked upon as instrumental sign). This idea-portrait, this idea-thing, has as its double a thing to which it bears a resemblance but which is itself not attained by the act of understanding. They are two separate quod's, and the divine veracity is needed to assure us that behind the idea-quod (which we attain), there is a thing-quod corresponding to it. Of itself thought attains nothing but itself.62

The separation between the "idea-thing" and the "thing", is for Maritain the crux of Cartesian dualism. It is akin to the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal reality developed later by Immanuel Kant, although Descartes' separation is at the other end of the dualistic spectrum. Having once again established the active nature of the intellect, Kant failed to perceive that the intellect, through its conceptual object, goes out to the thing, whereas Descartes failed to perceive that the concept is more than an impression passively received.63

This separation of the object from the thing appears to be the seed planted by Cartesian method in the soil of contemporary speculation. Maritain considers this to be a great error. He speaks of the intellectual intuition of being, whereby the mind beholds the thing precisely through the object. Although violently contested by such eminent thinkers as Joseph Maréchal, Karl Rahner, Emerich Coreth, and Bernard J. Lonergan,64 he considers this notion to be
in agreement with the doctrine of Aquinas. He argues that the intellect, stimulated by extra-mental reality through sensation, goes out to the thing and beholds reality through conceptualisation. Man simply cannot begin by doubting what his own senses tell him. Maritain argues that man comes to know reality by trusting what his senses tell him, namely about the existence of extra-mental reality. Certainly man may reflect upon the process by which he comes to know, but he cannot question the givenness of his epistemological apparatus. By beginning with doubt and denying any mediational connection between intellectual operation and extra-mental being, Descartes eventually arrived at his own mind, i.e. the famous cogito, as the primary object of knowledge. For Descartes, man gains no knowledge through the mediation of his senses.

Maritain argues that Descartes thereby becomes guilty of "angelism", and that man's reason is separated from its true spiritual and transcendent orientation, as well as from the material dimension of his being. Joseph Amato, in his study Mounier and Maritain, correctly interprets Maritain's analysis of Cartesianism as the separation of man from both his transcendent orientation toward God and the material dimension of his own humanity.

Certainly Maritain does not wish to deny the validity of Descartes' profession of faith in a transcendent God. However, he criticises Descartes' severing of philosophy from theology. For Descartes, there is no longer a plurality of
sciences united in a harmonious effort to behold reality, but rather a single science based upon the clear and distinct principles which would enable man to conquer the world of extension. Descartes enabled man's reason (understood as neither learning through the senses nor aspiring toward God, except insofar as God could be useful in assuring the innate principles of the human mind) to become the means of conquest for individualism. Cartesianism, like Lutheranism, inadvertently leads to voluntarism. Ironical as it may seem, rationalism engenders its opposite, as Maritain argues in Three Reformers:

The essence of rationalism consists in making the human reason and its ideological content the measure of what is: truly it is the extreme of madness, for the human reason has no content but what it has received from external objects. That inflation of reason is the sign and cause of a great weakness. Reason defenceless loses its hold on reality, and after a period of presumption it is reduced to abdication, falling then into the opposite evil, anti-intellectualism, voluntarism, pragmatism, etc. 69

Without intending it that way, Descartes placed a mantle of necessity and even respectability atop the egocentric cravings of individualism, as Amato asserts:

Believing himself capable of infinite knowledge and moved by the desire to expand his own mind without limit, the modern intellectual lived only by declaring his own supremacy and denying all experiences that contradicted it. Knowledge became power; nature was subjugated, and man claimed himself to be both the creator and the end of creation. Individualism was here given its 'rationality' and mission. 70

The cultural implications of Cartesianism should be obvious. Progressivism, based upon an optimism concerning
the physical and mathematical sciences, is clearly seen as an implication of Descartes' vision of a single science. Maritain writes, in his *The Dream of Descartes*, in reference to the cultural significance of idealism: "It [idealism] carries along with it a sort of anthropocentric optimism of thought. Optimism, because thought is a god who unfolds himself, and because things either conform to it, or do not even exist apart from it." 71

Further on, concerning the cultural significance of rationalism, Maritain writes:

It [rationalism] is a doctrine of necessary progress, of salvation by science and by reason; I mean, temporal and worldly salvation of humanity by reason alone, which, thanks to the principles of Descartes, will lead man to felicity, to 'that highest degree of wisdom in which the sovereign good of human life consists' (he wrote it himself in the preface to the French translation of the *Principles*)--in giving man full mastery over nature and over his nature; and, as the Hegelians were to add two centuries later, over his history. 72

This brings us to another cultural implication of Cartesianism, one which, hand in hand with progressivism, has serious practical consequences. Descartes reduces the identity of man to the *cogito*, i.e. human reason cut off from what can be gleaned through the senses as well as from man's spiritual aspirations. The human body, like any other physical object, can now be tampered with in the name of progress, which in effect is the conquest of the world of extension by the egocentric cravings of the individual. Concerning this cultural implication of Cartesianism, Maritain writes:

... man's body ceases to be regarded as human by essence. Cartesian physicians, iatromechanists or iatrochemists, treat it as an automation or as
a retort. And, in a general way, medicine tends
to forget that it is dealing with a being whose
life is not only corporeal, but moral and spiritual
as well.

Maritain generalises this observation, applying it
to the modern world as a whole. He indicates the importance
of Cartesianism for the development of technique and explains
what this means for politics and economics. After referring
to the prevalence of the Cartesian spirit in the modern world,
he states:

... in the modern world, everything which is amenable
to any technique whatever in human life tends to
resolve itself into a closed world, separate, inde­
pendent. Things like politics and economics in par­
ticular will become contrivances removed from the
specific regulation of the human good; they will
cease to be, as the ancients wished, subordinated
intrinsically and of themselves, to ethics. With
greater reason, speculative science and art, which
do not appertain of themselves to the domain of
ethics, will impose on man a law which is not his own.74

Furthermore, Maritain contrasts the new morality, which
is dominated by material necessity, with the old ascetic
morality, which attempted to free man from such necessity.

He argues:

... there are two ways of looking at man's mastery
of himself. Man can become master of his nature
by imposing the law of reason--of reason aided by
grace--on the universe of his own inner energies.
That work, which in itself is a construction in
love, requires that our branches be pruned to bear
fruit: a process called mortification. Such a
morality is an ascetic morality.

What rationalism claims to impose upon us
today is an entirely different morality, anti­
ascetic, exclusively technological. An appropriate
technique should permit us to rationalize human
life, i.e., to satisfy our desires with the least
possible inconvenience, without any interior reform
of ourselves. What such a morality subjects to
reason are material forces and agents exterior to
man, instruments of human life; it is not man,
nor human life as such. It does not free man, it
weakens him, it disarms him, it renders him a slave
to all the atoms of the universe, and especially
to his own misery and egoism. What remains of
man? A consumer crowned by science. This is
the final gift, the twentieth century gift of the
Cartesian reform.

Not wishing himself to sever politics and economics
from ethics, Maritain asserts that this is precisely what
the philosophy of Descartes engenders. Fostering a belief
in the necessity of human progress through the development
of the physical and mathematical sciences, and even relegating
the human being to the scrutiny of these sciences, Descartes
reduces economics and politics to the level of a technique
to be mastered. Clearly, one implication of this maneuver
is that the laws of these sciences themselves will determine
the course of human development. Instead of using his reason
to attain freedom, man employs it to discern the material
forces which in fact tend to dominate him.

Assuming this interpretation of Descartes, it is
easy to see why Maritain considers him to be one of the
fundamental theoreticians of modernity. The comfort-seeking
optimism of bourgeois society certainly owes something to the
Descartes presented to us by Maritain. Neither is it far-
 fetched to argue that there is some connection between the
totalitarianism of the twentieth century and the speculation
of Descartes. Whether it was in the name of an inevitable
dialectic, as in the Soviet Union during the reign of Joseph
Stalin, or in the name of evolution and natural selection,
as in Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, totalitarian regimes
of the first half of the twentieth century were in some respects the children of progressivism and the subjugation of the human being to material necessity.

However, the distant practical repercussions of Cartesianism reveal something more profound than the idealistic speculation and rationalist hopes of Descartes and his followers. Cartesianism is but another symptom of the egocentrism of the age. Echoing Nietzsche, who fascinated him in his youth, Maritain argues that underneath the philosophical veneer lurks the will to power and domination. He concludes that even if Descartes himself was immune, his thought readily lent itself to the emerging perversity of the human will.

Maritain does not deny the positive contribution of Descartes. He acknowledges with gratitude both man's growing self-awareness and the development of the physical and mathematical sciences. Technology can serve man. However, he cautions that Cartesian dualism confined human reason to the conquest of matter, and paved the way for the reign of the concupiscible appetite. The *cogito* established human reason in its solitude, and confronted it with an external universe of material bodies to be dominated. Maritain contends that this meant enslavement to and not liberation from matter, because henceforth man is himself dominated by the very laws which enable him to control the material universe. Maritain argues that Cartesianism leads to voluntarism. Although it travels by a different route, it guides us to the same place as Lutheranism. Rationalism engenders its opposite, in the
form of anti-intellectualism, voluntarism, and pragmatism. The haughty reason of Descartes, because it refuses to submit to the real world in which it is immersed, remains a prisoner of its own vacuity, and actually engenders the triumph of the will.

4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Nature of Contemporary Praxis

Having discussed Cartesian rationalism and its cultural implication, it is now necessary to deal with Maritain's analysis of the progenitor of contemporary praxis, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Maritain's social critique exposed the egocentrism which plagues contemporary society. His analysis of Rousseau clarifies the Cartesian abandonment to the will. It shows how egocentrism developed into the current dilemma of the individual.

In Three Reformers, Maritain implies that Rousseau's return to nature is the culmination of Luther's doctrine of salvation without works:

What is peculiar to Jean-Jacques, his special privilege, is his resignation to himself. He accepts himself and his worst contradictions as the believer accepts the Will of God. He acquiesces in being yes and no at the same time; and that he can do, just so far as he acquiesces in falling from the state of reason and letting the disconnected pieces of his soul vegetate as they are. Such is the 'sincerity' of Jean-Jacques and his friends. It consists in never meddling with what you find in yourself at each moment of your life, for fear of perverting your being. So now all moral labour is tainted, from its source and by definition, with pharisaical hypocrisy: the last state of salvation without works!
According to Maritain, Rousseau is the epitome of man's descent into his own individuality. To be yourself, for Rousseau, meant that "... you must be your feeling, as God is His being." Maritain asserts:

The way in which Jean-Jacques is himself is the final resignation of personality. By dint of following the endless inclinations of material individuality, he has completely broken the unity of the spiritual self.

Elsewhere, Maritain notes that Rousseau transports the disciple of Cartesian rationalism from the stage of reason to the stage of sentiment. This is the turn toward voluntarism, and Maritain argues that the modern view of nature, as seen in Descartes and Rousseau, leads to evolutionary thought in the context of Nietzsche's will to power. Maritain thinks that Rousseau uses rational argumentation in the service of passion. Rousseau's voluntarism has been summarised succinctly: "Jean-Jacques juge de toutes choses par son appétit, non par son intelligence."

Surely man as conceived by Rousseau, i.e. man the individualist, enters society for himself alone. But, as Maritain observes, a curious thing occurs. The individual man attains his own freedom, which is what Rousseau seeks above all else, precisely by participating in a social contract which means absorption into the General Will. Concerning Rousseau's notion of the General Will, Maritain writes in Three Reformers:

This is the finest myth of Jean-Jacques, the most religiously manufactured. We might call it the myth of political pantheism. The General
Will (which must not be confused with the sum of the individual wills) is the Common Self's own will, born of the sacrifice each has made of himself and all his rights on the altar of the city.

And a paragraph further on, Maritain continues:

Immanent social God, common self which is more I than myself, in whom I lose myself and find myself again and whom I serve to be free—that is a curious specimen of fraudulent mysticism. Note how Jean-Jacques explains that the citizen subject to a law against which he voted remains free, and continues to obey only himself: men do not vote, he says, to give their opinion; they vote that, by the counting of votes, the general will may be ascertained, which each wills supremely since it is what makes him a citizen and a freeman.

Clearly, Maritain is arguing against the tyranny of the masses, a tyranny which he perceives in Rousseau's notion of the General Will. But tyranny of a more specific nature is present in Rousseau's notion of the General Will as well. Rousseau's notion can easily lead to the establishment of the single dictator, who is the lawgiver, as Maritain writes: "The lawgiver is the superman who guides the General Will."

This pattern of development, where we move from the individual's absorption into an "immanent social God", which enables the individual to become more free, to obedience to the law as promulgated through the state by a single dictator, is similar to Maritain's analysis of Hegel, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

In Three Reformers, Maritain does not hesitate to associate Rousseau with that distant disciple of Hegel via Marx, namely, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. In one of his most vehement passages, where he does not refrain from attacking Rousseau's personal conduct, such as the abandonment of his
own children, Maritain writes:

But what then is this extraordinary and extra-cosmic lawgiver? We have not far to seek. It is Jean-Jacques himself--Jean-Jacques who, quite meaning to be the perfect Adam who completes his paternal work by education and political guidance, finds comfort for bringing children into the world for the Foundling Hospital in becoming Emile's tutor and the lawgiver of the Republic. But it is also the Deputy (Constituant), and in general every city-builder on the revolutionary plan, and it is most precisely Lenin.

In Integral Humanism, Maritain argues that Rousseau proposes an "... absolute humanist theology ..." or "... the theology of natural goodness." Whereas the theocratic error of absolutism divinised the temporal authority of the monarch, Rousseau's doctrine of the General Will divinises the temporal authority of the people. Man is naturally holy, and through his effort the divine purpose will be achieved. This forgetfulness of original sin and the need for God's grace is compared to the teachings of Comte and Hegel.

As early as 1926, in Une opinion sur Charles Maurras, Maritain attacked the theocratic tendency of certain forms of nationalism. He notes that this tendency is a characteristic of the modern world, and that it was present in Jacobinism, as well as in Josephism, Gallicanism, and the royalism of the ancien régime.

In Man and the State, Maritain argues that just as the power of the absolute monarch exists apart from the true interests of those governed, so the power of the people, as conceived by Rousseau, exists apart from their actual interests:
Rousseau transferred to the people the Sovereignty of the absolute monarch conceived in the most absolute manner; in other terms he made a mythical people—the people as the monadic subject of the indivisible General Will—into a sovereign Person separated from the real people (the multitude) and ruling them from above. As a result, since a figment of the imagination cannot really rule, it is to the State—to the State which, in genuine democratic philosophy, should be supervised and controlled by the people—that, as a matter of fact, Sovereignty, indivisible and irresponsible, was to be transferred.

What is most significant is the light Rousseau's doctrine sheds on the practical consequences of individualism. He wants freedom for the particular human being, and paves the way for totalitarian dictatorship. It is precisely because Rousseau neglects the person, and seeks to liberate the individual alone, that the paradox of the General Will and the single dictator arises.

In a lecture delivered in the United States, in 1938, Maritain refers to Rousseau's formula of the Social Contract, stating:

... since every individual is born free, his dignity demands that he should obey only himself. Naturally, as everything immediately gets out of order, and as one must live all the same, and as, moreover, the bourgeois class needs order so that it may prosper in business, the dialectic of this democracy leads to the formula of the Social Contract: 'to find a form of association ... through which every man, united with all others, should nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before.'

However, as already indicated,

This formula inevitably leads to the myth of the General Will, in which the will of each is mystically annihilated in order to arise transfigured; to the myth of Law as the expression of Number, and not of reason and justice; to the myth of authority considered, not only as coming from the multitude, but
as the proper and inalienable attribute of the multitude; and, finally, this formula leads to totalitarian dictatorship. 93

In another lecture, also delivered in 1938, Maritain clearly acknowledges the presence of the Christian leaven in the work of Rousseau. Furthermore, he does not question the motives of modern democracy. 94 However, he asserts that individualist democracy is essentially masked anarchy. For this reason, it denies real authority. Not wishing anyone to have authority over another, and therefore denying that there can be authentic representatives of the people, individualist democracy can preserve order only by acknowledging the power of the people. 95 In effect, this power is comparable to the monarchical absolutism of the ancien régime, in that it exists apart from the particular interests of those governed. Not wanting anyone to assume authority, individualist democracy actually tends to maximise the power of the state:

Concentrating all their attention on the question of the origin of power, and reassured by the idea that in the democratic regime the power of the State emanates from the people, democracies of the Rousseauist type not only grant the State all the usurpations of power, but they tend toward these very usurpations. 96

Furthermore, as indicated in Three Reformers, Rousseau's lawgiver and deputy tend to collapse into the person of a single dictator. The people themselves cannot directly control the State. Rousseau notes that they often lack political discernment. Maritain argues that the state is therefore controlled by the one who acts as the people:

... the mass as such is by hypothesis the subject proper of sovereignty and yet lacks political dis-
cernment, except in quite simple and fundamental matters where human instinct is surer than reason. This results in an original equivocation, because those delegated by the multitude will actually direct it, but only as if the multitude were directing itself. Above all, the exercise of sovereignty under such conditions will require myths. Now, to dispense myths and collective images, can anything be more useful than a dictatorship—a dictatorship where the entire sovereign multitude is reabsorbed in the unique person of a half-god, sprung forth from this multitude? Thus, through an inevitable dialectic, and so long as a new fundamental principle has not been found, democracies of the bourgeois liberal type tend to engender their contrary, the totalitarian State.

In an extreme interpretation of Rousseau, obviously viewed through the horror of Robespierre and the Jacobine Convention, Maritain presents us with the model or type for contemporary praxis. It is clear, for Maritain, that the tyranny of mass culture in democratic countries deluded by bourgeois liberalism, and the tyranny of demagogues in countries ruthlessly oppressed by totalitarian dictatorships, both owe something to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Cut off from his transcendent orientation, man can only fall back into his material individuality. Man loses his status as person, and, like the other animals around him, becomes a member or part of a greater whole through which he achieves his identity.

5. The Dilemma of the Individual

In Mounier and Maritain, Amato asserts:

In many ways, Maritain resembled the nineteenth century reactionaries who saw modern man's intellectual and political attacks against the ancien régime not as the beginnings of freedom but as the
descent into godlessness and tyranny. In effect, the Maritain who wrote the *Three Reformers* was unquestionably an anti-modern and anti-democrat. However, within one year of the publication of the *Three Reformers*, Maritain was forced to reconsider seriously some of the fundamental premises of both his philosophy of his times and his political philosophy. The reason for this was the Church's 1926 Condemnation of the Action Française.100

This is partly true, primarily because, prior to the Church's condemnation of the Action Française, Maritain lacked any clear political position of his own, and therefore naively allowed himself to be affiliated with political reactionaries. It must be pointed out, however, that even in 1920, before the condemnation of the Action Française, Maritain was clearly not enamoured with the absolutism of the ancien régime.101 Furthermore, his reasons for criticising bourgeois civilisation were fundamentally the same before and after the condemnation. In 1922, he did not simply condemn democracy as a political system, but rather, the lack of a transcendent orientation in the world made by bourgeois revolutionaries.102 He went so far as to argue that the Russian revolution may be seen, in part, as a divine chastisement of bourgeois decadence.103 Furthermore, in 1925, Maritain clearly acknowledged democracy as a viable political alternative, even though he defended the choice of Maurras to prefer monarchy.104 In 1927, in his first major attempt to formulate his views on contemporary society after the condemnation of the Action Française, he referred to the democracy of his age as "... a corrosive anarchy begotten of the party system ... ."105 In the same work, he defends the right of Catholics to participate in any
political party, provided the spirit of the Gospel is not persecuted. Before and after the condemnation of the Action Française, Maritain's major concern was the lack of a transcendent orientation in contemporary society.

It is crucial to note, as Amato himself does, that "... the Condemnation of the Action Française did not of course lead Maritain to alter his judgements on Luther, Descartes, and Rousseau, neither did it cause him to transform the basic intellectual lines of his critique of modernity." Prior to the condemnation of the Action Française, Maritain simply did not develop either his social critique or his personalism. However, the foundation for his mature analysis of contemporary society existed before the condemnation. It is evident in the Three Reformers, which contains Maritain's criticism of modern individualism and his emphasis on the transcendent orientation of the person. In the 1930's and 1940's, he developed his social critique in response to contemporary issues, and claimed that his personalism was the only authentic democratic alternative.

There are two observations, both of which are concerned with the transition from mediaeval to modern society, which are striking in Maritain's analysis of the origin of contemporary society. In the first place, he argues that whereas mediaeval society is explained by a decidedly transcendent or theocentric orientation, modern society is explained by an egocentric or anthropocentric orientation. It is clear that Maritain interprets the shift from the theocentric to the egocentric as being detrimental to man. The shift is explained as a move-
ment away from an appreciation of man's spiritual dimension toward a preoccupation with his material individuality. In the second place, however, he acknowledges both the immaturity of mediaeval society and certain positive developments in modern society, suggesting that in some ways the transition from mediaeval to modern society was beneficial. It appears to be the case, then, that these two observations display Maritain's comprehension of the fundamental ambivalence of history. Man advances, but in evil as well as in good, and the same historical event encompasses both. Maritain does attempt to delineate what is positive and good in the orientation of contemporary society, as well as what is negative.

Concerning the first observation, the minutiae which comprise the negative factors in the foundation of contemporary society have already been discussed, and it is only necessary to accentuate a few items for the sake of clarification. Maritain goes so far in his analysis of the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation as to speak of a betrayal of the Incarnation. Indeed, Descartes' *cogito* and Rousseau's radical preoccupation with the individual have been presented as confirmations of this betrayal in the advance of contemporary society. Modern man no longer perceives himself as the creature whose nature is perfected by the grace of God, but rather as the being who must accept himself for what he is. For Luther, this means that man can no longer hope to open himself up to truth and the grace of God through philosophical and ascetic discipline. For modern rationalism and empiricism,
foreshadowed as they are by Stoicism and Epicureanism, this means that man is to perfect himself through himself alone. As one who learned to appreciate the insights of Nietzsche in his youth, Maritain contends that the will to power and domination is lurking behind the contemporary enterprise. In this respect, he is in agreement with Nietzsche, and argues against the false optimism of the rationalists and empiricists.

In his analysis of the origin of contemporary society, Maritain presents us with the dilemma of the individual. Already formulated in his *Three Reformers*, especially in his discussion of Rousseau, this dilemma constitutes the basic problem confronting modern man. Having abandoned the transcendent orientation of the mediaeval world, contemporary society is torn between bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism. Modern man seeks his freedom, and yet the individual in him refuses to acknowledge the transcendent aspirations of the person. Maritain argues that the denial of these aspirations inevitably confines man to material necessity and the cravings of his own ego.

However, there is the second striking observation in Maritain's analysis of the origin of contemporary society. He does not simply state that the transition from mediaeval to modern society is a wrong turn. Instead, he acknowledges the immaturity of mediaeval man, and indicates that man's growing self-awareness, as well as the development of the physical and mathematical sciences, is a positive factor in the foundation of contemporary society.
Maritain begins his social critique by presenting us with the unique features in contemporary society, the positive as well as the negative. It is clear that the focal point for the negative features is the egocentrism of modern man, which is in effect a disavowal of the human person, and, as a betrayal of the Incarnation, more advanced than the egocentrism of pagan antiquity. The focal point for the positive features in contemporary society, which is not yet fully indicated at this stage of the present study, is man's current preoccupation with freedom. Acknowledging the evolution of human society, albeit as an advance in evil as well as in good, Maritain began cautiously to accept inevitable change. He came to perceive the democratic revolution as the basis for a new historical ideal.

In the following chapter, the development of Maritain's social critique will show that he seeks to overcome the dilemma of the individual by acknowledging the exigencies of contemporary society, and not by returning to the historical ideal of the mediaeval world.
III

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOCENTRIC HUMANISM AND ITS PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

There is no single work of Maritain's which serves as the focal point for this chapter. However, it must be pointed out that Integral Humanism, which appeared in 1936, is the definitive expression of his mature social analysis. There are a few significant works leading up to it, and there are later works which help clarify its message, by bringing it into the light of the awesome events following 1936. It is the spirit of Integral Humanism which permeates Maritain's mature social thought considered as a whole. The same spirit will therefore permeate both the third and fourth chapters of this study.

In Integral Humanism, the egocentrism which Maritain perceives as fundamental to our age is appropriately called "anthropocentric humanism". Anthropocentric humanism is characterised by egocentricity or the turning of man into himself. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Maritain argues that it arises from both the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, and tends to confuse individuality with personality. Distinguishing between the individual and the person, Maritain argues that the individual is the
material dimension of the human being, and that the person is the spiritual and rational dimension of the human being. Furthermore, we have seen that René Descartes is perceived by Maritain as an important philosophical source of anthropocentric humanism, and that Jean-Jacques Rousseau is interpreted as the harbinger of some important practical implications of anthropocentric humanism.

In opposition to anthropocentric humanism, Maritain develops what he calls "theocentric humanism". Therefore, he is not opposed to humanism, but rather, to its misguidance. He defines humanism as the tendency

... to render man more truly human, and to manifest his original greatness by having him participate in all that which can enrich him in nature and in history (by 'concentrating the world in man,'); it at once demands that man develop the virtualities contained within him, his creative forces and the life of reason, and work to make the forces of the physical world instruments of his freedom.¹

And yet he insists that authentic or integral humanism must be heroic, acknowledging the superhuman and conforming to the transcendent orientation which is proper for man.²

Proceeding with the present exposition of Maritain's social critique, both the theoretical development and the practical or cultural implications of what Maritain calls anthropocentric humanism will now be discussed. As in the previous chapter, when referring to Descartes,³ the word "cultural" designates the prevalent orientation of man, which in our case is egocentrism, as it is exhibited in actual attitudes and practices in the domain of human affairs,
including politics and economics.

This chapter will begin with Maritain's interpretation of Immanuel Kant and his immediate successors, as a preparation for understanding Maritain's analysis of Hegel and Marx. In the context of Maritain's analysis of Hegel and Marx, his interpretation of the Russian Revolution and Soviet Marxism will be dealt with. His treatment of the Soviet experiment is an important part of his social critique, especially as it is developed in Integral Humanism. Concrete events, as well as ideas, influenced the development of Maritain's thought. The success of Russian communism, and the horrendous spectacle of right wing totalitarianism, convinced him of the need for a common good and a common task of universal proportions. A third major section will deal with Maritain's analysis of individualism and collectivism as it appears in the Western democracies, i.e. in the so called "free world". This discussion will enable us to see how Maritain constructed his personalism upon the foundation of modern democracy, while dispelling the parasite of bourgeois individualism. Finally, this chapter will explain Maritain's understanding of democracy as an evolutionary process, moving toward the realisation of the democratic system of government in the current historical period.

1. Immanuel Kant and His Immediate Successors

In the previous chapter, we have seen that Maritain places Immanuel Kant at one end of the dualistic spectrum
Maritain acknowledges that Kant once again established the active nature of the intellect. However, according to Maritain, Kant failed to perceive that the intellect, through its conceptual object, goes out to the thing, whereas Descartes failed to perceive that the concept is more than an impression passively received. Against Kant, as against Descartes, Maritain invokes the notion of the intellectual intuition of being through conceptualisation. Kant failed to develop his insight into the active nature of the intellect far enough. For Kant, the intellect never reaches the thing, but remains trapped within itself. The phenomenal, as distinct from the noumenal, is thereby postulated in place of a sensual level of apprehension, which Maritain believes to be the path capable of leading the intellect to a conceptual apprehension of metaphysical being.

Maritain argues that by distinguishing between phenomenal and noumenal reality, Kant's approach to the world is dualistic. This is not only reflected in the failure to grasp being metaphysically, but also in the realm of ethics, where Kant's understanding of personality becomes evident. With Kant, as with Descartes, man falls into himself. This egocentric orientation is reflected in Kant's ethics. Although Maritain deals with the ethics of Kant *per se* in a later work, *Moral Philosophy*, the gist of what he says there is already implied in a brief reference to Kant which appears in *Integral Humanism*:
As regards man, one can note that in the beginnings of the modern age, with Descartes first and then with Rousseau and Kant, rationalism had raised up a proud and splendid image of the personality of man, inviolable, jealous of his immanence and his autonomy and, last of all, good in essence.  

Maritain contends that Kant was inspired by Christianity. Nevertheless, Kant directed ethics away from its traditional concern with what Maritain refers to as man's "subjective ultimate end", i.e. happiness. Furthermore, Maritain argues that Kantian autonomy turns man away from his "absolute ultimate end", i.e. God:

... it is not only in the name of pure disinterestedness of ethical motivation, it is also and above all in the name of the autonomy of the will that for Kant the absolute ultimate end must be eliminated from the constitutive structure of ethics and from the proper domain of the moral life.

According to Maritain, Kant's Practical Reason is identical with Kant's notion of the pure rational will, and it is absolutely autonomous, i.e. not subservient to any legislation other than the legislation it administers to itself. God is no longer seen as the Legislator par excellence, as in traditional Christianity. Also, Maritain argues that Kantian autonomy excludes the notion of God as the subsistent Good, which is to be loved by man above all else. Kant banishes the notion of love for man's absolute ultimate end from the domain of ethics. Maritain argues that traditional Christianity is concerned primarily with man's doing the will of God out of love for God, and that by obeying God's will man acts in conformity with his own
nature and thereby attains happiness. For Kant, disinterestedness prevails in such a way, that instead of attaining a pure love for God, man loses his transcendent orientation and comes to reverence his own law, i.e. the legislation which is administered by the Practical Reason or the pure rational will, which is held to be intrinsically good.

Maritain summarises his analysis of Kant as follows:

Briefly, in Kantian ethics respect for the law or reverence for the law has taken the place of the love of God above all things, which is the foundation of traditional Christian ethics—and this in virtue of a transposition of traditional Christian morality into terms of pure reason. Reverence for the law has taken the place of the love for God, just as the unlimited goodness of the will, existing within the moral agent, has taken the place of the infinite goodness of the absolute ultimate End, which exists outside him and above him.

Kantian ethics, argues Maritain, is purely formal. It is not concerned with the content of action, but with acting itself. Kantian ethics is concerned with universalising a maxim without contradiction. Kant is no longer concerned with man's loving desire for that which is good in itself, but rather, he is concerned with logical exactitude. The rationalism of Kant does not allow him to acknowledge the appeal to the particular human being of that which is good in itself. According to Maritain, this means that Kant separates ethics from the concrete situation where man's rational nature enables a general law to call me, the particular human being.

Maritain argues that after Kant German idealism went further than Kant himself was prepared to go, and
precisely as a logical development of Kant's revolution.

In *Moral Philosophy*, Maritain writes:

> If the Kantian revolution had freed the mind from the regulation exercised upon it by things, it had done so, originally, in order to limit the field of knowledge and restrain the ambitions of reason. Now it was necessary to bring this revolution to its logical conclusion, enable it to bear its full fruit, and, by freeing the mind of the regulation barrier restricting the domain of philosophic knowledge, in short, to liberate the metaphysical ambitions of reason at last from any possible limitation.\(^{14}\)

According to Maritain, "the mind itself was to abolish the thing-in-itself by taking its place, whereupon phenomena would become manifestations of mind."\(^{15}\)

In his *Moral Philosophy*, Maritain refers briefly to the work of Fichte and Schelling. He argues that

> It is possible to consider the attempts of Fichte and Schelling as preparations for the philosophy of Hegel, but only in the form of imperfect approximations, unsuccessful rough drafts, since Fichte's *Self* and Schelling's *Absolute*, although they are interior to thought, still appear as something distinct from it.\(^{16}\)

However, it is Maritain's position that the Kantian revolution reached its logical conclusion only in the idealism of Hegel:

> Hegel's stroke of genius was to make the Absolute out of thought itself, or out of the spirit. The thing-in-itself was thus liquidated; and instead of a universe of phenomena unified under our *a priori* forms, it was the real universe which came within our grasp, real not in the sense of being a manifestation of thought, but real in the sense of being a manifestation of thought within itself. Being is thought; there is nothing beyond reason; it is the *Idea* which makes the reality of things."\(^{17}\)
From Hegel to Marx and the Soviet Experience

Maritain perceives Hegel not only as the culmination of German idealism, but of rationalism as a whole, a big part of which is the work of Descartes. Desiring to attain an overview of the general implications of modern rationalism, it appears that Maritain failed to account for the Romantic element in Hegel's thought, which cautions us against placing Hegel in the same category with the Kantian strain of rationalism and Cartesian mechanism. Hegel is placed at the apex of a rationalism which is perceived as the further development of man's egocentric orientation, his turning inward away from the transcendent orientation which was his in the mediaeval period and what was best in the classical age as well. As we have seen in the previous chapter, modern rationalism began as one of the elements in the trend towards secularisation which emerged during the Renaissance, the other element being modern empiricism. We noted that Maritain interprets both modern rationalism and empiricism as a "naturizing" of the traditional Christian heritage. This is important, because it means that even in its turning away from the transcendent God toward the self, contemporary society carries with it the traditional Christian heritage. That this came to be Maritain's position, should be kept in mind when approaching his treatment of Hegel, Marx, and the Soviet experience.

The basis for Maritain's personalism, in the distinction
between individuality and personality, was clearly articulated in his analysis of Martin Luther in Three Reformers,20 i.e. before the Action Française crisis and the political awareness which came in its wake; the Thomistic foundation for that distinction was already evident in Maritain's first book, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. The basis for his criticism of Hegel was also present in Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, where Maritain introduced his notion of the intellectual intuition of being as a criticism of both Descartes and Kant, without failing to acknowledge the truths perceived by each. Thus, the philosophical foundation for both Maritain's social critique and his personalism was established at the beginning of his career.

We will approach Maritain's analysis of Hegel first from a metaphysical standpoint, and then from a cultural perspective, understanding culture in the broad sense indicated at the beginning of this chapter.

In Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, Maritain refers to "... the false intellectualism of Spinoza and Hegel, which measures being upon thought ..."21 In criticising Bergson for replacing being with becoming through an integral empiricism, he contrasts Bergson's position with Hegel's replacing being with becoming through panlogism.22

Perceiving reality as that which is manifested within the confines of logic, Hegel mistakenly replaced being as the transcendental object of thought, i.e. being rooted in the sensual perception of the extra-mental thing which Maritain
claims to apprehend in an intellectual intuition, with the being of logic itself, *ens rationis*. Indeed, for Maritain there is a legitimate logic, the object of which is the thing itself in its mental condition. However, Hegel, and Kant as well, considered a false logic, the object of which is the pure form of thought. For them, as Maritain writes in *A Preface to Metaphysics*,

... the being which is the distinctive object of metaphysics is confused not only with the genuine being of logic, that being we have termed being divested of reality, but with the being which is the object of a false logic, a decadent logic, with being as the supreme genus and a pure form of thought. And this being I call pseudo-being.

In his epistemological magnum opus, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Maritain deals with Hegel almost exclusively in terms of criticising Hegel's consideration of "pseudo-being". It is only in his *Moral Philosophy*, that Maritain clearly articulates the transition from what he perceives as the metaphysical mistake of Hegel to the cultural implications of this error. This transition lies in Hegel's notion of the concrete:

Far from having its proper place in extra-notional reality, I mean in the act of existing, itself incommunicably exercised, individuality or singularity in its distinctive character results from the contradictory fusion of two logical beings of reason, intentiones secundae par excellence: it is the synthesis of the Particular and the Universal, and is truly realized only when the Particular is raised to the Universal or loses itself in the universal in order to receive from it a new life, as the Universal's other in which the universal determines itself. Individuality is only really authentic or true in the concept (Begriff), 'which is nothing other than the subject'.
In the concrete Universal which is at the same time itself and its other (the particular or the determined), and in which the particular, denying and overcoming its particularity by its reflection in itself, is equalized with the universal, and by this process of mediation makes the universal return to immediacy. Such a return of the universal to immediacy, such a universal individuality, in a whole which is outside the singular thing and superior to it, or in the identification of the individual consciousness with this whole, constitutes the only real singularity for Hegel, and the only real concrete, and the only rationally possible solution to the problem of individuality, which is the central problem of his philosophy.

The practical consequence of this way of thinking is that the individual human being is precisely when individuality gives way to the actualisation of the Universal: "... the individual person can be tolerated by reason only insofar as it is not taken as individual, insofar as it is the actualization of the Universal which surpasses it."\(^{27}\)

Maritain acknowledges Hegel's debt to Christianity:

Hegel knows that Christianity has had the privilege of bringing to light the value and the dignity of the individual. He took over from Christianity, in order to reinterpret it, the idea that each human being is 'unique in the world' and that this uniqueness is of infinite value.\(^{28}\)

But in seeking the divine transformation of individual man, Hegel lost human nature in the flux of becoming. According to Maritain, Hegel

... took over while denying it the Christian idea of man to such an extent that while he rejected as mythical the notion of grace and the supernatural order he embodied at the very heart of his thought the Christian idea of man's accession to the divine life and his transformation into God. As a result, the human as such consisted of a rendering oneself other, of changing radically, and there was no longer, properly speaking, any human nature; human nature
henceforth gave place to the historical auto-
genesis of humanity, and it is thus by his own
action that man acquires his being, makes himself
at the same time Man and God. 29

What Maritain calls "the historical auto-genesis
of humanity", offers us the cultural implications of Hegel's
metaphysical mistake in a nutshell. The mistake is the
substitution of purely formal being for the proper object of
metaphysics, and the cultural implications arise from Hegel's
notion of the concrete, which is the absorption of the indi-
vidual into the universal. Stated bluntly, the cultural
implications of anthropocentric humanism, via the culmination
of modern rationalism in the thought of Hegel, are summarised
in the notion of a progressive totalitarianism, which is seen
as the Idea's actualisation through man's self-creation as
history.

In Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, Maritain
presented the basis for his criticism of the cultural impli-
cations of Hegel's thought. There, through the quoted
words of Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain contends that
"... stating that the fundamental reality is becoming
... amounts to saying, as Hegel recognized, that the
intimate nature of things is a realized contradiction." 30
Furthermore, since such a view entails the denial of sub-
stantial distinction, its outcome is a form of "evolutionistic
monism". 31 Why is it a form of evolutionistic monism? The
answer to this question lies in the context of the quotation
from Garrigou-Lagrange, which is Bergson's notion of the
continuity of duration or of pure change, where heterogeneity is explained in terms of "... a monism by a gushing of ever new modes of self-sufficient change ...". Presumably Bergson's notion is interpreted by Maritain as running parallel to Hegelian dialectic, although Bergson's anti-intellectualism and empiricism distinguishes him from Hegel's form of dynamic monism.

That the dialectic of Hegel leads to totalitarianism in the cultural sphere is seen primarily in Hegel's view of the State, but there is another important consequence of the dialectic, which is closely tied to the eventual triumph of the State. Beginning with Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, ethical relativism, as a consequence of evolutionistic monism, has been one of Maritain's concerns. Ethical relativism is a consequence of affirming that contradiction is the nature of reality.

In Moral Philosophy, Maritain comes to speak of Hegel's doing away with the morality of conscience, just as Hegel did away with the individual as a free agent. Everyone is insofar as he manifests the Universal. Ultimately, it is through the heroes and finally the State that the Idea "makes the reality of things". The laws of the State are the channels through which the Mind declares Itself, and they are not to be questioned by the individual conscience. There is only one evil for Hegel, disobedience to the Idea's actualisation through man's self-creation as history:
... if it [the individual conscience] declares that an unjust law is not a law and does not deserve obedience, or claims the right to obey God rather than men—if it says no to the State, it deviates into unpardonable illusion, it resists Mind, which is the only real evil, it is guilty.34

According to Maritain, Hegel gives us "... the original formula of political totalitarianism."35 Everyone achieves his being by participating in the progressive totalitarianism which goes beyond good and evil, and which is perceived by Hegel as the manifestation of God Himself:

I know that I am fulfilling the absolute requirement of a truly ethical mode of conduct, absolute duty—that which is—by doing that which the State, that is Spirit, prescribes for me, and I know that the State itself, including within itself the sphere of abstract law and that of morality but superior to both, is subject neither to the rules of law nor to those of good and evil as the conscience understands them. In willing what the State wills as if it were my own being, I possess my real freedom, and I am covered, not only by my hierarchical superior but by the unshakeable certitude of the objective and universal order in which God manifests Himself.36

Finally, and this was stated in the previous chapter, rationalism leads to its opposite, voluntarism.37 As Maritain writes in his Moral Philosophy, concerning the practical result of Hegel's thought, "The abstract categorical imperative has been replaced by the concrete imperium of the State."38 In other words, the epitome of the Kantian appeal to reason, which is the categorical imperative, has been replaced by the Hegelian submission to the authoritarian will of the State, which is interpreted as the epiphany of the Idea in history.

Hegelian thought is the culmination of one element
in the anthropocentric orientation of contemporary society, namely, rationalism. The cultural implications of Hegelian totalitarianism, which is one way of leveling authentic personality in man, are vast. Maritain notes that Hegelian philosophy was the mirror and the guiding light of all that was to be victorious, imperial, and sure of itself in the period following the French Revolution, when the science of phenomena and capitalism in its golden age launched anthropocentric humanism on its conquest of the earth. 39

According to Maritain, Hegel was decidedly conservative. He was an upholder of the status quo, and an easer of the guilty conscience par excellence. This was clearly expressed by Maritain in 1921. 40 However, in order to preserve the context of the arguments put forth in this chapter, it is best to continue with Maritain's statements in Moral Philosophy. Maritain writes:

No one succeeded better than Hegel in inducing the sleep of the just in the powerful and prosperous who might be tormented by a vague anxiety concerning evil done or consented to, in reassuring the troubled conscience, and, by causing it to renounce any wish for an illusory 'ought to be', in setting it up in a state of perfect self-confidence, armed and ready for combat, in the actually existing order of things, which will perish to-morrow and be succeeded by another order and then another, all equally blessed by God in their turn, up to the final order to which man will accede when History shall be accomplished. . . . 41

It was against the optimistic idealism of Hegel that Karl Marx revolted, and in this respect Maritain compares him to a Kierkegaard. In Moral Philosophy, Maritain offers us an enthusiastic eulogy of Marx:

Marx revolted in the name of human work, and the dispossessed human masses, in the name of the 'proletariat of all times', by placing himself
at the center of its economic and social claims. But it is not just a certain system of production that he denounces; it is the whole world with which Hegelian idealism is in complicity from the beginning, and the full acceptance of this world demanded by a wisdom which thinks history after the fact and which believes it has already arrived at the final achievement. Marx wants none of the Befriedigung meted out by the God of this philosophy. It is against the God of Hegel, against the Emperor of this world that he, like Kierkegaard, is in rebellion. And this rebellion was in itself a protest of human dignity, an act of breaking away from resignation to evil, to injustice, to the false order by which oppression and eternal slavery are maintained.  

However, at the end of this eulogy Maritain notes one fault in Marx, and as we shall soon see, it is indeed an important one. Concerning the rebellion of Marx, Maritain contends that "this rebellion might have been Christian—and who knows what messianic passion, rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition, it obscurely stirred in Marx? In fact, it was atheistic with him."  

Maritain's appreciation of Marx did not come late in his life, although its relation to his interpretation of Hegel is clearly articulated in Moral Philosophy. The first edition of Mounier's personalist journal, Esprit, appeared in 1932. It contained a controversial article on communism, written by the former Soviet, Nicolas Berdyaev. This article chastised communism while paying homage to its positive potential. It was Maritain who insisted that it be published, thereby intentionally delineating personalism as a renegade from bourgeois civilisation.  

In Integral Humanism, Maritain clearly appreciates the crusade against bourgeois society launched by Karl Marx. He does not hesitate to laud certain
achievements of the Soviet regime in Russia. Certainly this
does not mean that Maritain was ever blind to the dangers of
Marxism, but it does mean that neither was he blind to the
positive elements in the work of Marx. In fact, as we shall
see, what is perceived by Maritain as negative in the work of
Marx is primarily what Marx retained from the bourgeois culture
which Hegel's philosophy so clearly reflected.

In *Integral Humanism*, which appeared eleven years
before *The Person and the Common Good* (the small book in which
Maritain defined his personalism in terms of politics), Maritain
also noted the fundamental agreement of Christianity with
Marxism in its attack on the bourgeois man. Discussing
Marxism in Soviet Russia and acknowledging its disdain for
Rousseau's optimism concerning man without sin, Maritain asserts
that Marx knew, as the apostle Paul knew before him, that
there is an "old man", i.e. a man of sin, who must be converted
or changed. This man is the bourgeois man. 45

In an address delivered to the Latin-American Seminar
on Social Studies in August, 1942, 46 Maritain expressed in a
succinct and unambiguous fashion what he is grateful for in
the movement toward communism which arose from the teachings
of Marx. In this particular address, what Maritain perceives
as negative as well as what he perceives as positive in
Marx becomes evident.

Speaking to the Seminar, Maritain stated that Marxism
is the inevitable culmination of secularized Christianity,
which is expressed in the democracy of bourgeois culture.
Marxism is the conclusion of a democracy which has forgotten its Christian roots. Such a democracy is individualistic. It is a rejection of the authentic democratic spirit or inspiration, which is a product of the Gospel and ought to pervade the whole culture. Maritain writes that in such an individualistic democracy, or bourgeois state, modern man had

- a social and political life, a common life without common good nor common work, for the aim of common life consisted only of preserving everyone’s freedom to enjoy private ownership, acquire wealth and seek his own pleasure.

Reminiscent of his criticism of Descartes, Maritain condemns the false optimism generated by man’s faith in his own reason and the promises of technique. He argues that this does not lead to man’s liberation from matter, but rather, to man’s domination by the very laws he himself employs for the purpose of controlling the external, material universe:

- modern man placed his hope in mechanism, in technique and in mechanical or industrial civilization—without wisdom to dominate them and put them at the service of human good and freedom; for he expected freedom from the development of external techniques themselves, not from any ascetic effort toward the internal possession of self, and how can the one who does not possess the standards of human life, which are metaphysical, apply them to our use of the Machine? The law of the Machine, which is the law of matter, will apply itself to him, and enslave him.

Maritain contends that in an important sense Marxism is itself a continuation of this essentially anthropocentric tendency, i.e. the attempt by man, through himself alone, to work out his own salvation. In this sense, within the context of its Hegelian background, Marxism remains rationalistic:

No matter how strong some of the pessimistic aspects
of Marxism may be, it remains attached to this postulate that man, through himself alone, works out his own salvation. Marxist materialism remained rationalistic, so much so that for it the movement proper to matter is a dialectical movement.

Rejecting the erroneous individualism of bourgeois democracy, Marxism seeks to create a more culturally pervasive democratic ideal. This ideal has an atheistic base, and Maritain thinks that for that reason it leads to man's enslavement rather than to his liberation. Without a transcendent orientation, it is material individuality which is served, whether it be the body of an individual capitalist or the body of the proletariat. Refusing man a transcendent orientation, the Marxist, although perhaps motivated by an authentic thirst for communion, abolishes true personality and succumbs to the tyranny of economic necessity. Marxism offers man salvation without God, and Maritain argues that this

... demands the giving up of personality, and the organization of the collective man into one single body whose destiny is to gain supreme dominion over matter and human history. Man becomes a particle of the social whole and lives by the collective conscience of the whole, and his happiness and liberty lies in serving the work of the whole. This whole itself is an economic and industrial whole, its essential and primordial work consists of the industrial domination of nature, in order to redistribute its goods to the community as a whole. There is here a thirst for communion, but communion is sought in economic activity, in pure productivity, which, considered as the locus proprius and homeland of human activity, is only a world of a beheaded reason, no longer made for truth, engulfed in a demiurgic task of fabrication and domination over things. The human person is sacrificed to industry's titanism, which is the god of the industrial community.

But in the ashes of such a leveling criticism one
can discern something positive and redeeming. If bourgeois democracy is a form of secularized Christianity, it still retains within it traces of the evangelical leaven. This is an important fact, which will be considered later. Here it is sufficient to note that insofar as Marxism is the culmination of such an impetus it too retains within it the evangelical leaven.

Maritain does not hesitate to assert that Marxism revived that portion of the evangelical leaven which was sorely neglected in the world of bourgeois individualism. This is the pessimistic and prophetic stance of Marxism. As already indicated, Maritain interprets the rebellion of Marx as an action comparable to the rebellion of Kierkegaard against bourgeois smugness. Insofar as it is a rebellion against bourgeois individualism, Marxism is a rebellion against Hegel, and against Rousseau's optimistic view of man without blemish; Marx qualifies as a prophet like Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud:

... little by little, will spring up the man conformable to the pattern of bourgeois pharisaism, this respectable conventional Man in whom the nineteenth century so long believed, and in whose unmasking Marx, Nietzsche and Freud will glory.  

In 1947, in *The Person and the Common Good*, Maritain exposed earlier sentiments succinctly when he referred to communism as "... the ultimate and altogether radical Christian heresy." The key word here is *Christian*. Perverted as it may be, the movement toward communism carries within it the message of Christ.

It is significant that in 1940, Sidney Hook already
noted this implication in Maritain's understanding of the socialist movement:

According to him (Jacques Maritain) the socialist movement is a Christian heresy, doctrinally in error, but moved by the same spiritual dynamism as historical Christianity. Indeed, when M. Maritain speaks of the aims of Catholic 'integral humanism', which seeks to found on a secure basis the modern and yet age-old desire for a better life, his words would not be out of place in a socialist tract.54

In Antimoderne,55 and later in Integral Humanism, Maritain pays special attention to Marxism in the context of the Soviet experience. It is significant that even in the Soviet adventure Maritain seeks the positive sense of Marxism. He is speaking of an enterprise which was dominated for many years by the tyranny of Joseph Stalin. In 1964, when much of what it was to have lived under Stalin had already been exposed, he notes that the West cannot ignore the Russian Revolution of 1917, and that in some ways it must even learn to assimilate it.56 In Integral Humanism, Maritain speaks of the cultural significance of Russian atheism as a purification by fire, a stripping away of much of the veneer which is bourgeois culture. Given the leveling experience of the Soviet regime, Maritain notes that "... Russia will perhaps see more quickly than other nations the lineaments of a new Christendom take shape."57 The prophetic sense of Marxism is present even in Russia, and it is this sense of Marxism which has jetisoned the Soviet Union to the threshold of a possibility beyond the reach of bourgeois democracy.58

Maritain's words in Integral Humanism prompted Hook to write:
Nor is M. Maritain frightened by the revolutionary elements in Marxist thought, if only the revolution, harsh as may be its means, will uproot the 'bourgeois man' whom M. Maritain loathes with an almost unchristian contempt. For M. Maritain, the social ideals of Marxism are not objectionable. The Marxian critique of capitalist economy and of the consequences of the operation of that economy upon human freedom and culture is described as a 'great lightning-flash of truth'. It is only the 'metaphysical' basis of Marxism, its atheism, which M. Maritain deplores because it results in the apotheosis of collective man, in the conception of the absolute sovereignty of the collectivity, and negation of true personality whose ends are not all historical, social, or natural.

What is reprehensible in the Soviet experience is the culmination of bourgeois atheism, which is prevalent in the decadent liberal culture where even many of those who profess to be Christians are in fact what Maritain calls "practical atheists". In this sense, Marxism is the conclusion of Hegelian anthropocentricism. It is an anthropocentric humanism, where man replaced God:

... the social themes of Communism appear as the conclusion of an initial atheism posed on principle, or of a humanism essentially conceived as an atheistic humanism. This Marxist humanism should be regarded as the perfect fruit of Hegelian immanentism, once the 'turned over' Hegelian dialectic has passed from the ideal to the real, that is to say, to social and historical man. In the last analysis it consists in claiming for man, once he is freed by the abolition of private property, that sovereign independence in the mastery of nature and the government of history which, formerly, in the times of 'alienated' consciousness, religion attributed to God.

In fact, in 1920 Maritain already perceived the bourgeois origin of the Marxist denial of man's transcendent orientation:

Le monde fait par les révolutionnaires bourgeois, l'ordre social et politique actuel,
est construit sur la Désobéissance, sur le refus
de l'autorité de l'Eglise, sur le refus de l'autorité
du Christ, sur le refus de l'autorité de Dieu:
disons qu'il appelle la révolution comme la peste
appelle la mort.

Maritain has always been sympathetic to the positive,
prophetic role of the left. Maritain's task was to acknowledge
the truths operative in the contemporary world, exposing
their evangelical source and showing how they in fact establish
the foundation for a new Christendom. Maritain contends that
these flowers of truth, such as respect for the rights of the
particular human being and the recognition that it is through
the communion of human beings that authority must come into
the world of human affairs, grew up in a garden of weeds.
Nevertheless, it was only in this secular jungle that these
flowers of truth did in fact grow. The practical atheism of
Christians, the prevalence of clericalism in France and the
identification of the Church in Spain with the rich and established,
which was a significant reason for the widespread popular
action taken against the Church during the Spanish Civil War
which began in 1936, prevented these flowers of truth from
blossoming where they should have de jure. Maritain does not
hesitate to acknowledge that Christians have failed in their
temporal mission, and that it is a great disgrace that Chris-
tians lost the workers during the heyday of bourgeois indivi-
dualism, i.e. the nineteenth century.

Marxism, unlike fascism and Nazi racism, which will
be discussed next, developed out of the democratic tradition
which carried the message of Christ, even if it failed to
acknowledge the God-man explicitly. We shall come to see how Maritain's personalism developed within his social thought, as an attempt to explain the truths of democracy as Christian truths. Perhaps there is no more appropriate way to end this section than by presenting these moving words, which Maritain wrote in 1947, in The Person and the Common Good:

... Communists and Christians, in their mutual relations, have a bad conscience. Even when they sincerely offer the 'out-stretched hand' to the Catholics, the Communists feel obscurely that their vocation is to supplant them in political life and civilization. Catholics, however, know very well that they risk being replaced and that the 'out-stretched hand' lures them into a land which is not that of their faith. They recognize it clearly as a land of terrestrial activity in which too often, in the past, they have neglected their temporal mission, and which now, in the name of revolution, is erected into a supreme end. And, while Communism advances, accusing indiscriminately their faith and their omissions, while militant atheism reflects, as in a mirror of flame, the cruel image of that practical atheism of which so many of their own have been guilty, they sense, with a kind of anxiety, that normally it would be for them, who possess the words of eternal life, to stretch out the hand to the Communists and draw them into that land, which is first and above all their own, the land of religious truth and redemptory love.

May the time still be theirs to do it!66

3. The Unmasking of Modern Man: Racism and the Fascist State

Although Maritain did not like the distinction between right and left, wishing to rise above it,67 it is clear that he necessarily favored the left. As we have seen in the previous section, the left is an outgrowth of bourgeois anthropocentrism, which retains within it the evangelical leaven. Marxism is perceived by Maritain as the most radical Christian
heresy, and he therefore readily acknowledges its positive contribution. The inevitability of Maritain's orientation becomes even more evident when viewing his criticism of Nazi and fascist totalitarianism, for at the extreme right of the cultural spectrum, Maritain contends that there is no longer anything left of the evangelical impulse. One encounters the contemporary anthropocentric orientation in the raw. The extreme right is the true face of modern man, who has lost all contact with the Divine. This is the way in which Maritain interprets the Nazi glorification of race and the fascist glorification of the state.

Maritain came to denounce every mode of right wing authoritarianism. He even condemned the dictatorship of Salazar in Portugal, although he readily admitted that Salazar's government was the least offensive of the rightist regimes. It appears that any restriction of human rights is interpreted as a threat to the establishment of a new Christian civilisation. Clearly, Maritain's denunciation of the totalitarian right is preeminently concerned with Nazi racism and Italian fascism. Nevertheless, we must be cognizant of the fact that his scathing attack can be applied to any authoritarian temporal regime. We shall come to see that, given his position regarding democracy, Maritain inevitably condemns any experimentation with authoritarian forms of government. Such experimentation indicates a repressive attitude in the light of today's concrete historical ideal. In The Person and the Common Good, Maritain states quite simply that

The national totalitarian states, whose ideology
lives after them, heirs of the ancient antagonism of the pagan Empire against the Gospel, represented an external force arrayed against Christianity to enslave or to annihilate it in the name of the divinizcd political Power. In the temporal order, they opposed an irrational philosophy of enslavement to both the genuine principle and the parasitical illusions of democracy.

The "genuine principle" of democracy is evangelical. Corrupted with the "parasitical illusions" of bourgeois culture, democracy becomes individualistic. On the other hand, corrupted with the "parasitical illusions" of communism, where an attempt is made to remove the individualistic illusions of bourgeois culture, democracy indeed pervades the whole of society, but at the price of losing the person to the tyranny of the industrial community. Nevertheless, in both bourgeois and communist cultures, the evangelical leaven is present. In "the national totalitarian states", however, only modern man's egocentric orientation remains. Maritain tells us that we encounter "an external force arrayed against Christianity". When confronting Nazi racism and fascism, we are no longer dealing with Christian heresy, but rather with something entirely alien or external to the Gospel. Maritain argues that when the right wing politician comes to the end of his pilgrimage, he does not escape the ills of contemporary society. Instead, he encounters the demonic face of modern man, who has abandoned God.

All totalitarianism reduces man to material individuality, i.e. viewing him merely as a part of a greater whole, whether that whole be the people, the proletariat, the race, or the state. Even the totalitarian right can therefore be
aligned with the teachings of a Rousseau or a Hegel. However, at the extreme right we are no longer dealing with Rousseau's optimism nor with the rationalism responsible to a large extent for both bourgeois and communist culture. Neither are we dealing with empiricism, which is, as we shall see in the next section, an important element in the extension of bourgeois culture beyond the European continent. At the extreme right we are dealing with the instinctual and irrational, the chaotic forces which engulf modern man in his despair.

In his address to the Latin-American Seminar on Social Studies in 1942, Maritain congratulates Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx for unmasking modern man, i.e. for disclosing the sin which lies within man. These three men played a prophetic role in contemporary society. However, Maritain appeals to another prophet, Fyodor Michailovich Dostoevsky. Referring to Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*, and in this way pointing a finger at the violence in the heart of the revolutionary crowd, whether it be of the left or right, Maritain notes that "a deeper abyss than animality appears in the unmasking of man. Demonic forces are revealed."^70

But if the fallen angels conspire with men in order to bring about the evils of contemporary society, the egocentrism of man is circumstantially distinct from the pride of the devils. Man is body as well as soul, and the material dimension of his being is the vehicle which carries him away from God toward himself. Maritain notes that "the purest case of this tendency is Nazi racism. It is grounded not in a fanaticism of reason hating every transcendent value, but in a mysticism
of instinct and life hating reason." Concerning this whole which is the race, Maritain states:

This whole itself is a biological and political whole, its essential and primordial task consists of the political domination over other men,--which is surely the most depraved conception of common life and the worst form of totalitarianism.

Without doubt, the most vicious aspect of Nazi racism is its anti-semitism. During the Second World War, Maritain dedicated himself to the exposure and condemnation of this heinous crime. However, during the heyday of the Action Francaise, Maritain's own position regarding the Jews was not clear.

In 1921, Maritain himself denounced what he perceived as the political threat of Judaism. He argued that since the Jews did not accept Jesus as their messiah, it was inevitable that the messianic expectation of the Jews would lead them into subversion and revolution. One finds Jews "... à l'origine de la plupart des grands mouvements révolutionnaires de l'époque moderne." It is therefore necessary to struggle against "les sociétés secrètes judéo-maçonniques" and "la finance cosmopolite", as it is necessary to establish some "mesures générales de préservation" against the political threat of zionism. However, Maritain was never a racial anti-semitic, and he always acknowledged the spiritual affinity between Judaism and Christianity.

Any ambiguity in Maritain's own position regarding the Jews was dispelled during the Nazi era. In an interesting address, which was delivered in 1943, he described Nazi
anti-semitism as a war against Jesus Christ, the King of the Jews: ". . . il [l'antisémitisme nazi] humilié et torture les Juifs en cherchant à humilier et torturer leur Messie dans leur chair, il est essentiellement une Christophobie."\(^77\)

Maritain denounces anti-semitism as the most horrendous aspect of Nazi racism. It is the decisive crime, enabling one to locate the Nazi regime in both Jewish and Christian prophesy, as the work of the devil.\(^78\)

Even in Nazi racism and fascism, however, Maritain acknowledges an authentic heroism. One perceives an heroic outcry in the face of bourgeois smugness, although it is clearly a heroism betrayed by a lie. In *Integral Humanism*, apparently considering both left and right, Maritain writes:

Against this materialized spirituality [liberal-bourgeois humanism], the active materialism of atheism and paganism has the game in its hands. But cut off from their natural roots and transplanted into a climate of violence, disaffected Christian energies—in fact and existentially, whatever the theories behind them—do in part move men's hearts and rouse men to action. Is it not a sign of the confusion of ideas reaching throughout the world today, to see these formerly Christian energies helping to exalt precisely the propaganda of cultural conceptions opposed head-on to Christianity?\(^79\)

### 4. Individualism and Collectivism in the West

After having dealt with the totalitarian options confronting modern man, it is necessary to analyse the situation which engendered them, i.e. bourgeois culture. Maritain argues that bourgeois culture is itself undergoing a profound alteration, which is interpreted as a further development of
democracy. Communism, fascism, and Nazi racism all seek to overcome individualistic democracy by totalitarian means, which eradicate true personality. Although the inadequacies of the West may very well foster new modes of totalitarianism, it is Maritain's hope that the democracies of the West will in fact evolve beyond bourgeois culture, as a preparation for personalist democracy.

In *The Person and the Common Good*, Maritain distinguishes three current forms of materialism: bourgeois individualism, communistic anti-individualism, and totalitarian or dictatorial anti-communism and anti-individualism. Maritain bluntly states:

> Of the three, the most irreligious is bourgeois liberalism. Christian in appearance, it has been atheistic in fact. Too skeptical to persecute, except for a tangible profit, rather than defy religion, which it deemed an invention of the priesthood and gradually dispossessed by reason, it used it as a police force to watch over property, or as a bank where anyone could be insured while making money here below, against the undiscovered risks of the hereafter--after all, one never knows!

So far, this study has been concerned primarily with the rationalist element in bourgeois individualism, but one must not neglect the empiricist element. It is being introduced here, because it is generally considered by Maritain to be the basis for what one might call "Anglo-Saxon bourgeois individualism", as related to and yet somewhat distinct from the "Continental or essentially European bourgeois individualism" which we have been considering so far. Needless to say, the Anglo-Saxon strain is also prevalent in the American experience.
The Continental strain has been depicted by Maritain primarily as the rationalist preparation for Marxism.

According to Maritain, rationalism and empiricism are related to each other in the cultural experience of contemporary society. In a significant address, "The Cultural Impact of Empiricism", given at Harvard University and Hollins College, Virginia in 1951, Maritain states: "French Rationalism and British Empiricism were to merge in the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, and Nineteenth Century Positivism." Nevertheless, empiricism tends to be distinguished for its adaptability to the world of commerce. It is "... a philosophy particularly appropriate to the rise of a commercially dominated regime of social life ..."; it renders God "... a celestial guarantor ... of man's domination over nature, of a good state of affairs for the commonwealth, and of the moral order necessary to the prosperity of commerce and industry." Modern empiricism has the odor peculiar to British and American industrialism, although it is indeed present elsewhere. For example, in Moral Philosophy, Maritain notes Comte's remarks concerning a new chivalry of industrial chiefs and bankers to insure our true happiness, which for Comte is domestic satisfaction.

Maritain asserts that empiricism is materialistic to the point of contradiction:

... the paradox with which we are confronted is that Empiricism in actual fact, uses reason while denying the power of reason, on the basis of a theory that reduces reason's knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to sense knowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals.
Empiricism, which is the foundation of the Anglo-Saxon strain of bourgeois individualism, is perhaps the fundamental threat to democracy in the West, for it is empiricism which feeds the materialism of Western man's anthropocentric orientation. It is empiricism which fosters both individualism and collectivism in the West:

... Empiricist social philosophy is bound to oscillate, without finding any superior solution, between anarchistic individualism, in which the only criterion is the advantage, utility and free pleasure of the individuals, and bee-hive totalitarianism, in which the only criterion is the advantage, utility and power of the state separately considered.

Indeed, the materialist element is clearly present in communist totalitarianism as well as in the individualism and authoritarianism of the West. However, to the extent that we can isolate empiricism, it is the West with which Maritain is concerned. He maintains that there are three practical results of empiricism in the realm of Western culture:

First, there is the complete relativisation of moral values, an intrinsic subjectivism which is absolute. Second, a constricting of the human mind to the phenomenal and measurable, giving rise to false visions of a technological utopia, which is particularly evident in the decay of Western humanism. And third, which is evident from the preceding practical results of empiricism in the realm of culture, the destruction of the very ground upon which the defence of freedom rests. Maritain feels that the last result of empiricism is especially relevant in the second half of the twentieth century. It is not the case that these practical results are always obvious.
They lie hidden within the culture of the West, inadequate to support the better elements in Western culture, which are nevertheless more ephemeral:

... we find our fellow-men--great as their devotion, deep as their good will and healthy feelings may be--intellectually and rationally disarmed, by virtue of the secret workings in them of the Empiricist and Nominalist leaven, in the face of the most dangerous and infectious errors with which modern mankind was ever confronted.

It is significant that for Maritain the United States of America is a special case in the realm of Western culture. Whereas the European democratic experience, and one reflects particularly on the failings of the Third Republic in France, has been branded as the property of bourgeois individualism, the United States comes to be seen as the potential soil for the growth of an integral democracy.

However, although he admittedly came to love the United States of America, Maritain was also highly critical of its culture. His criticism of the United States has too often been minimised. This is unfortunate, because what Maritain is critical of in America fits into the general pattern of his social critique. If the whole of Maritain's criticism of contemporary society is kept in mind, then his criticism of American culture assumes its true stature.

In his definitive work on American culture, Reflections on America, which first appeared in 1958, Maritain both extols and warns the American people. We must keep in mind that the address discussed above, "The Cultural Impact of Empiricism", 
was prepared for American consumption. Indeed, it describes the ills of European civilisation as a whole, but, as we have seen, it is particularly concerned with the Anglo-Saxon contribution. This contribution influenced the development of American culture. Maritain is warning America in this address, and he warns America in Reflections on America as well.

In chapter XV of Reflections on America Maritain lists seven American illusions. Only four will be mentioned here. Maritain observes that there is an optimism in America not unlike the bourgeois optimism of nineteenth century Europe. Also, and related to this, is the American obsession with success as a thing good in itself. Maritain also notes that in the name of equality Americans detest any hierarchical structure, for example the various branches of scientific knowledge. And Maritain notes that Americans obey law not men. Significantly, in relation to this last illusion, Maritain states elsewhere that American friendliness toward all can make friendship itself shallow, barring the way to intimate or integral friendship. Also, Maritain notes that America needs a philosophy. America is in danger of falling into the trap of a leveled down, faceless, and highly depersonalised mass culture. Lacking a philosophy, it currently lacks the intellectual tools to defend its own freedom. Although, according to Maritain, there is hope that America will in fact overcome its difficulties, he is obviously not blind to the severe handicap which it has inherited as a child of Western culture.
Perhaps Maritain's most significant criticism of America, in the light of this chapter, is that America has allowed itself to become identified with capitalism in its war against communism:

... America has accepted the challenge of communism in the very terms of communist propaganda itself: Communism versus Capitalism. America being the stronghold of Capitalism.  

He immediately goes on to state:

That is a great misfortune, it seems to me, with respect to the rest of the world's peoples, for whom capitalism has kept its classical meaning, who loathe the very word, and who are not ready to die for it--nobody is ready to die for capitalism in Asia, Africa, or Europe.

Maritain is not ignorant of the long and violent struggle of American labour, of what can only be called the martyrdom of labour under oppressive conditions. And yet, it is precisely the corporative body emerging in the United States of America which attracts him. In Reflections on America, Maritain asserts that America is moving toward "economic humanism". He says that in America the "... new social and economic regime is still in a state of full becoming, but it has already brought human history beyond both capitalism and socialism."

Nevertheless, Maritain expresses his hope cautiously, as indicated in the following passage:

The old merciless struggles between management and labor, during the heroic period of labor organization, have given way to a new relationship in which the antagonisms are still basically serious, but in the last analysis are reduced to a kind of cooperative tension, with enormous social advances such as the annual wage guaranteed
to workers by some big industries, and contracts tying wages to productivity. A number of companies have introduced profit-sharing. And it would not be surprising, I think, if one day, contrary to now prevailing opinions, the American creative imagination were to find an unforeseen way of having labor share in the management as well.

Maritain does not disavow the seriousness of America's labour problems, but he argues that the American corporation can pave the way toward a less individualistic economy, even if it is only by way of necessity:

These big organisms [the corporations], collectively-structured and managed, are still fondly thinking, to be sure, of the dividends of their stockholders—but not as the unique, even as the first thing; because they have understood that, in order simply to exist, and to keep producing, they must become more and more socially minded and concerned with the general welfare. Thus, not by reason of any Christian love, but rather of intelligent self-interest, and of the ontological generosity, so to speak, of the stream of life, the idea of the advantage of the human being— all those who cooperate on the job, and the general public as well—is gradually taking the upper hand. I do not assume that corporations have reached a stage where they would prefer the common good to their own particular good. But they are reaching a stage where for the sake of their own particular good they realize that the superior rights of the common good must be taken into account.

It is Maritain's position that the American experience, already beyond capitalism and socialism, can at least serve as a preliminary light. It is clear that both capitalism and bourgeois individualism, in their omnivorous nineteenth century forms, are disappearing throughout the Western democratic world, and especially in America. However, it must be pointed out that Maritain's reflections on the American economy appear in the chapter of Reflections on America where he deals with the Americans' lack of an explicit philosophy.
America is still caught in the grip of a theoretical *laissez faire* liberalism, and as we have already seen, this is indeed a precarious position to be in, although there are present within the American experience positive directives for the establishment of a more advanced democratic economy.

The anti-individualistic potential in America is not limited to the economic sphere. Maritain argues that America is moving away from bourgeois culture, with its racial and class elitism, toward a culture where the national and religious pluralism necessitated by modern cosmopolitanism is sincerely respected. Economic class distinctions are breaking down, even within the family, and throughout the country ethnic cultural diversity is bringing about "... a single multi-national state or nation." This tendency in America is so evident, that Maritain does not hesitate to speak of America as the potential realisation of the adequate society he envisioned for modern man in his *Integral Humanism*. 103

However, one must never forget the cautions presented in *Reflections on America*. Maritain is aware of the defects in American culture, and he is prepared to support unorthodox methods for bringing about change. In *Reflections on America*, he praises the radical organisational tactics of Saul Alinsky, and the selfless dedication of Dorothy Day, the former communist, to the underprivileged Negroes of New York City. He also acknowledges the validity of Gandhi's pacific militancy, as practiced in the United States by the civil rights activist, the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.
In The Peasant of the Garonne, he indicated his appreciation of the Christian democratic experiment of Eduardo Frei in Chile, with these powerful and prophetic words: "I know only one example of an authentic 'Christian Revolution,' and that is what President Eduardo Frei is attempting at this very moment in Chile, and it is not sure that he will succeed."106 And in a somewhat presumptuous parenthetical remark, he claims that "... among those of my contemporaries still living as I write these lines, I see in the Western world no more than three revolutionaries worthy of the name——Eduardo Frei in Chile, Saul Alinsky in America . . . and myself in France . . . ."107

Maritain's treatment of the hippie movement which arose in the 1960's is instructive. According to him, only their sensualism destroys them, preventing them from becoming true mystics and prophets in our society. Where did they get their sensualism from? In one of his last works, On the Church of Christ, Maritain tells us: "They [the hippies] are the victims of this bourgeois world which they are right in detesting. In their flight they carry away all its misery with them."108 It is not the radicalism of the hippie movement which is a problem, but rather, the continual allegiance of the hippies to the entrenched liberalism they claim to detest.

Maritain contends that bourgeois culture, through its laissez faire economy and intellectualism, gave rise to an individualistic democracy. The common life fostered by
bourgeois culture is one which lacks a common good or common task. Instead, it is one which preserves everyone's freedom to possess, acquire, and seek more pleasure for himself alone.\textsuperscript{109} Empiricism, more than rationalism, has given support to this anarchy. This anarchy is therefore especially evident in the Anglo-Saxon community, for which empiricism is the base. Confronted with this decadence, modern society has engendered two radical options: communism and the authoritarianism which is in opposition to communism. However, as we have seen in sections two and three of this chapter, neither of these options escape man's fundamental egocentrism. They both lead to totalitarianism, which destroys true personality. We have seen, especially in his treatment of Rousseau and Hegel, how Maritain sees individualism and collectivism as two sides of the same egocentric coin.

Nevertheless, Maritain uncovers positive elements in the Western democracies, especially in the United States of America. He argues that there is in fact a third option confronting modern man. This third option will be fully explained in the next chapter. Here, in the context of Maritain's social critique, it is necessary to note that he perceives indications of this option in the democratic culture of the West, which has not yet succumbed to totalitarianism.

5. The Democratic Evolution

In this chapter, we have seen how man's search for autonomy developed in the form of anthropocentric humanism.
Since the time of the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation, man's growing sense of independence has been misguided by his egocentrism, which denies any transcendent orientation. The democratic enterprise entailed the individualism so characteristic of bourgeois culture. Maritain bewails the fact that the democracy of the nineteenth century lacked a common good or common task. The common society of the nineteenth century existed in order to preserve the individual's possession, acquisition, and search for that which gives pleasure.

Because of this situation, the two radical options of communism and the authoritarian reaction to communism emerged. Both of these seek to establish totalitarian regimes, which deny true personality and man's transcendent orientation. However, communism bears within it the evangelical leaven. Although in a decidedly false manner, the communism derived from Marx seeks to dispel individualism. It yearns to create a common good and common task, and thereby overcome the individualistic perversion of the democratic spirit. Maritain asserts that it is only in the totalitarianism of the right that we fully confront the inevitable conclusion of the contemporary disavowal of man's transcendent orientation. At the extreme right, we no longer face anthropocentric humanism, but rather, the raw egocentrism which lies at the base of contemporary society. Here we meet modern man unmasked. We confront anthropocentrism minus the humanism which is in itself a positive development.
We already know that Maritain does not disapprove of humanism. Precisely insofar as it is humanism, i.e. concerned with developing the powers of man and increasing his freedom through the conquest of the physical world, anthropocentric humanism is a positive factor in the development of contemporary society. After surveying Maritain's social critique, we can come to no other conclusion. In *Integral Humanism*, Maritain himself states that "... the radical vice of anthropocentric humanism has been its being anthropocentric, and not its being humanism." Anthropocentric humanism, like every historical movement, is fundamentally ambivalent. Emerging in the wake of mediaeval immaturity, it expresses the turbulent adolescence which carries man toward adulthood.

The quest for a democratic form of government has been an important part of anthropocentric humanism, indicating the advent of man's social maturity. Maritain insists that the evolution of human society is essentially democratic. Democracy has advanced wherever a proper attitude existed toward the human person, even under the old ideal of the holy empire, where monarchy was indisputably the established order. Nevertheless, the evolution of human society tends by nature toward the establishment of an avowedly democratic order. In his *Christianity and Democracy*, which appeared in 1945, Maritain writes that

... the word democracy, as used by modern peoples, has a wider meaning than in the classical treatises on the science of government. It designates first and foremost a general philosophy of human and
political life, and a state of mind. This philosophy and this state of mind do not exclude a priori any of the 'regimes' or 'forms of government' which were recognized as legitimate by classical tradition, that is, recognized as compatible with human dignity. Thus a monarchic regime can be democratic, if it is consistent with the state of mind and with the principles of this philosophy. However, from the moment that historical circumstances lend themselves, the dynamism of democratic thought leads, as though to its most natural form of realization, to the system of government of the same name, which consists, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, in 'government of the people, by the people, for the people.'

We must never forget that for Maritain "... the democratic impulse has arisen in human history as a temporal manifestation of the inspiration of the Gospel." The advance of democracy has been inspired by the Gospel, but democracy is nevertheless an essentially temporal phenomenon. It is directly concerned with the common good of civil society, and not with man's supernatural end. For this reason, the democratic impulse does not engender dogma or ideology. Instead, it struggles to establish an impartial regime, which espouses the philosophy of equal opportunity for all. This does not mean that democracy rests on the laissez faire policy of the nineteenth century, which in fact favoured the development of the rich and powerful. The common good of civil society entails the particular good of every human being. Democracy must guarantee opportunity of development for all. Necessarily, this means that democracy must respect man's supernatural end, and therefore the Church which is directly concerned with man's supernatural destiny. This is so, because the ultimate good of the person
transcends the temporal order. More will be said about the relationship between the common good of civil society and the transcendent orientation of the person in the next chapter. Here, it is sufficient to note that democracy is a multifaceted process of temporal liberation. In order to develop further, democracy must now learn to overcome the dilemma of the individual. This dilemma was expressed succinctly in the thought of Rousseau, and is now glaringly apparent in our individualistic culture with its totalitarian options.

Democracy is, as Maritain notes,

... a task of civilization and culture; it tends above all to provide the common good of the multitude in such a way that the concrete person, not only within the category of the privileged, but in the whole mass, truly accedes to the measure of independence which is compatible with civilized life and which is assured alike by the economic guarantees of labor and property, political rights, civic virtues and the cultivation of the mind.\textsuperscript{113}

Maritain thus defines modern democracy as a culturally pervasive attitude, which seeks to establish the common good through the social expansion and liberation of every concrete person. For this reason, modern democracy differs from the classical notion of democracy, which was elitist and did not exclude the possibility of slavery, as was the case in ancient Athens.\textsuperscript{114} Maritain argues that the Christian Gospel inspired the modern democratic enterprise, and that the contemporary democratic attitude was already anticipated in mediaeval Christendom. Since it is defined primarily as a general philosophy of social life,
a state of mind or attitude, modern democracy is compatible with a number of possible regimes, such as monarchy, which triumphed in the mediaeval period. Nevertheless, Maritain argues that the present democratic evolution tends toward a decidedly democratic form of government.

Maritain interprets democracy as an evolutionary process. Although his definition of democracy is broad enough to include monarchy, in the next chapter it will become clear how the rights of man and representative government characterize democracy in its mature form. For this reason, we cannot agree with the criticism of Hwa Yol Jung, who argues that the Christian base of Maritain's democracy is far too broad to determine it politically. Jung fails to appreciate the evolutionary nature of Maritain's democracy. Although the democratic evolution is not pronounced well in the work of Jean Paul Jacques, we can concur more fully with his conclusion:

Pour Maritain, les citoyens participent au gouvernement par l'intermédiaire de leurs représentants. Ils y participent directement lorsqu'ils sont consultés par référendum. Le peuple élit directement ses députés aux assemblées communales, régionales et nationale ainsi que les chefs des exécutifs communaux, régionaux et le président de la République. Il contrôle l'exercice des mandats représentatifs par l'intermédiaire des partis politiques. Le gouvernement du peuple est donc exercé par le peuple. Il l'est aussi pour le peuple. En effet, pour Jacques Maritain, la démocratie n'est pas une fin en soi. Elle n'est réelle que si elle est ordonnée au bien du peuple, c'est-à-dire au bien des personnes qui composent le peuple... Le régime proposé par Maritain est donc bien un régime démocratique.

The evangelical leaven is present in the democratic
enterprise, and it has stimulated a humanistic endeavour
to bring about man's autonomy. Certainly Maritain approves
of the democratic impulse, which is surfacing in the present
historical period. He recognises the fact that man is now
prepared to come into his majority. He hopes that man might
achieve true autonomy, which is not the individualistic
"freedom" of bourgeois culture, nor the collectivism of the
totalitarian options. His social critique reveals that he
came to appreciate certain tendencies in American democracy,
without ever abandoning his appreciation of the radical left.
In the next chapter, we will see how Maritain developed his
own personalism in the context of his social critique, thereby
expressing a third option to the individualistic democracy
of bourgeois culture. We will see how his personalism entails
a new theocentric orientation for man, i.e. a theocentric
humanism, which takes into account the maturing process of
the past five hundred years.
Against Charles Maurras, who waved the pragmatic banner of "politique d'abord", Maritain advocated the primacy of the spiritual. Even before the condemnation of the Action Française, while thanking Maurras for guiding recently converted Christians back to the importance of politics, he cautioned that Maurras failed to recognise the hierarchy of ends. The essence of Maritain's message for contemporary society appeared in 1927, in a work whose title constitutes his banner: Primaute du spiritual (The Things that Are Not Caesar's). In that work, while giving a positive direction to balance the negativity of his Three Reformers, Maritain reasserted man's theocentric orientation in the face of contemporary egocentrism. Against Maurras, who remained hopelessly anthropocentric, he affirmed the primacy of the spiritual above all else.

A Champion of the spiritual, Maritain nevertheless acknowledged the end of temporal affairs as something distinct from man's spiritual goal. His understanding of freedom is therefore able to incorporate the current preoccupation with secular freedom and human rights. Concerned with the common good of the temporal city, personalist democracy
accepts the positive achievements of the lay state and respects freedom of conscience. This is in conformity with Maritain's appreciation of the Incarnation and Thomism, both of which indicate that grace augments the natural potential of man. As we shall see, the proper or natural development of man does not preclude the operation of God's grace. However, in terms of its function and ramification, temporal society does not have a supernatural goal per se. The goal of temporal society always must remain subservient to man's supernatural end, and therefore constitutes what Maritain calls an "infravalent end". This means that the common goal of temporal society must not be divorced from the spiritual quest of particular persons. In this chapter, we will see how Maritain's personalist democracy thereby appropriates the modern democratic enterprise while affirming man's transcendent orientation.

In chapter two, we have seen how Maritain's social critique presented him with the dilemma of the individual, whereby man seeks his freedom through himself alone, and thus remains a prisoner of his own egocentric cravings. In chapter three, we have seen Maritain's analysis of the practical consequences of man's current egocentrism, i.e. bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism. We have also seen how his social critique enabled him to appreciate modern democracy. In response to the triumph of totalitarianism and the events of the Second World War, Maritain published a number of works which articulated his acceptance of demo-
cracy as the foundation for a new Christendom. His appreciation of the positive gains of the totalitarian left is significant, because he sees in communism man's legitimate yearning for the common good and common task which bourgeois democracy has failed to attain.

In this chapter, we will see how Maritain developed his personalism in the context of his social critique, as a means for overcoming anthropocentric humanism. In response to the dilemma of the individual, involving the practical consequences of bourgeois liberalism and the two major forms of totalitarianism, Maritain developed his personalism and theocentric humanism. Acknowledging the current struggle to establish a democratic form of government (i.e. a government of the people, by the people and for the people) as the apex of an evolutionary process, he consistently argues for a form of democratic personalism. Maritain's theocentric humanism asserts the primacy of the spiritual, and leads him to seek to establish a personalist democracy, whereby the proper sense of human freedom will triumph over man's will to power and the manipulation of matter for selfish ends.

Turning to the main contention of this study, first it is necessary to explicate Maritain's understanding of human freedom. This will enable us to discuss his distinction between the individual and the person in relation to the common good, whereby both the bourgeois view of individual freedom and the totalitarian view of collective liberation are overcome. The Person and the Common Good, which appeared in 1947, contains Maritain's definitive statement on this matter. We
will then discuss his use of natural law to defend freedom and the rights of man. The stage will thus be set for us to deal with the specifications of his democratic personalism as a concrete option to bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism. This chapter will conclude with a summary formulation of his personalism as such an option.

1. Maritain's Understanding of Human Freedom

Maritain does not endorse what he calls, in his Freedom in the Modern World, "... a multitude of bourgeois Ends-in-Themselves with unlimited freedom to own and to trade and to enjoy the pleasures of life." He argues that neither the contractual society of Rousseau nor the categorical imperative of Kant are sufficient to stifle this liberal enigma, for a failure to ascertain man's transcendent orientation is evident in both.

Maritain's understanding of Kant's notion of autonomy, as being merely the preliminary freedom of choice exercised in the intelligible world, is instructive here. He writes:

In the system of Kant freedom of autonomy is not the fruit of moral progress but the property and expression of the intemporal freedom of choice which man enjoys in the intelligible world. The two kinds of freedom are here (1) each falsified in idea, (2) confused. And the formal constituent of morals is sought in this false concept of freedom, although of the two kinds of freedom thus confused neither in reality gives the essence or the formal element of moral action (for freedom of choice is the matter of morals and freedom of autonomy is the term towards which it moves).

Unlike mere freedom of choice, but based upon it, Maritain thinks that true freedom of autonomy is identical with spontaneity (spontanéité). True freedom of autonomy or spontaneity means not merely choosing something as good for
me, after a period of deliberation or perhaps merely on a whim to exercise and prove my freedom of choice, but comprehending the good as such and willing it immediately, as part of my nature. Maritain explains this as follows:

When freedom of choice has led a spiritual nature, endowed in intellect and in will with a capacity for the infinite, to the term for which it is made, its office is accomplished. It always remains of course, for it is the privilege of a spiritual nature, and it continues to manifest the lofty independence of this nature in face of all that is means or intermediate end: but not in the face of that which is the End. At this terminus, however, it is still Freedom but Freedom in another manifestation that comes into play, since this nature being spiritual has its true fulfilment only in spontaneity that is absolute.

According to Maritain, freedom of autonomy is the ability of a spiritual nature to act spontaneously in accordance with the will of God. This is not simply obedience, but the absolute independence of the person to act without constraint in conformity with its own nature, which is the intention of God. Now the human person cannot possibly achieve this without help, and it is here that the notion of man's sanctification appears:

... it is not of themselves or by themselves, it is by union with One who is Other and who is Source of all Being and of all Goodness, that created spirits are able to reach such a perfection of spontaneous life. It cannot be otherwise once the matter is viewed in the perspectives of a philosophy of Being and of a metaphysic of Divine Transcendence. Finite and wretched in self, man cannot pass to a supernatural condition save by adhesion of intellect and will to a superior being. God being the perfection of personal existence and man being also, though precariously, a person, the mystery of the achievement of freedom is contained in the relation of these two persons.

Maritain expresses this point succinctly, when he writes that "... it is in sanctity that the perfect freedom
of autonomy is found." Freedom of spontaneity, or the conformity of man's will to the will of God, is possible only through man's encounter with the living God.

Maritain thinks that the encounter between man and God is the primary goal of Christianity. This is evident in his treatment of mysticism. However, the essential elements of this spiritual quest are present in human relationships as well. Indeed, did not Jesus command his followers to love both God and neighbour? It is here, in the arena of human relationships that we come to appreciate the social implications of Maritain's understanding of human freedom.

In Freedom in the Modern World, Maritain explains how spontaneity or true autonomy functions in the ordering of social life. He condemns the liberal or individualist notion of autonomy, which exults man's freedom of choice:

In this conception culture and society have for their essential office the preservation of something given: the free will of Man; in such a way that all possible acts of free choice may be available and that men may appear like so many little gods, with no other restriction on their freedom save that they are not to hinder a similar freedom on the part of their neighbour.

In place of this false view of autonomy, Maritain inserts the freedom of spontaneity. He argues that according to this philosophy civil society is essentially ordered not to the freedom of choice of each citizen but to a common good of the temporal order which provides the true earthly life of man and which is not only material but also moral in its scope. And this common good is intrinsically subordinated to the eternal good of individual citizens and to the achievement of their freedom of autonomy.

Subordinate to the "eternal good" of the particular
person, it follows that temporal society is essentially directed
to the establishment of social conditions which
will secure for the mass of men such a standard
of material, intellectual, and moral life as will
conduce to the well-being of the whole community;
so that every citizen may find in it a positive
help in the progressive achievement of his freedom
of autonomy.  

The actual process through which society is so ordered,
however, is in itself a natural development for man. Although
subordinate to the eternal goal of the particular person,
temporal society has its own proper end, which is "the well-
being of the whole community." Maritain argues that the poli-
tical philosophy of such a society, being directed ". . . to-
wards the realisation and progress of the spiritual freedom
of individual persons, will make of justice and friendship
the true foundations of social life."  

Maritain contends that the evolution of modern demo-
cracy, which is a natural development inspired by the Christian
Gospel, tends toward the establishment of just and loving
relationships. Freedom of autonomy exists in the temporal
order, and entails the progress of man's material, intel-
lectual, and moral life.

Although requiring God's grace for its completion,
freedom of autonomy is demanded by the natural progress of
moral conscience and human civilisation. Perfect autonomy is
a supernatural gift. It is the term of man's quest for free-
dom, and consists in heavenly beatitude. In the temporal
order, however, autonomy is realised as a natural phenomenon.
This does not imply the absence of God's grace. It means
that man's temporal goal is distinct from his ultimate end.

Maritain carefully distinguishes between the perfect autonomy of the saints and autonomy in the temporal order:

The person, in itself a root of independence, but hampered by constraints emanating from material nature within and outside man, tends to transcend these constraints and gain freedom of autonomy and expansion (tend à surmonter ces contraintes et à gagner sa liberté d'épanouissement). In the realm of spiritual life the message of the Gospel has revealed to the human person that he is called to the perfect freedom of those who have become a single spirit and love with God: but in the realm of temporal life it is the natural aspiration of the person to liberation from misery, servitude, and the exploitation of man by man, that the repercussions of the Gospel's message were to stimulate.¹⁷

When referring to human freedom, Maritain sometimes speaks of expansion (épanouissement). This term is especially appropriate in the context of Maritain's social thought, for it clearly suggests the development of man's natural abilities.

Maritain's understanding of the relationship between human subjectivity and love shows us what is essential in both the spiritual and temporal development of man. The development of personality is intimately connected with love, which is the central idea in Christianity. Love is not concerned with qualities (as Pascal said), but with the most substantial, i.e. the most existing reality of the beloved.¹⁸ Love is concerned with that which is capable of giving itself and receiving another self. Moreover, "to bestow oneself, one must first exist; not indeed, as a sound, which passes through the air, or an idea, which crosses the mind, but as a thing, which subsists and exercises existence for itself."¹⁹

A loving being must first be master of itself or self-
possessed: "Personality, therefore, signifies interiority to self."²⁰ Love implies the existence of the subject.

In Existence and the Existent, Maritain argues:

The subject, or suppositum, or person has an essence, an essential structure. It is a substance equipped with properties and which is acted upon and acts by the instrumentality of its potencies. The person is a substance whose substantial form is a spiritual soul; a substance which lives a life that is not merely biological and instinctive, but is also a life of intellect and will.²¹

Arguing against the contemporary existentialist, whose approach he perceives as being merely phenomenological, Maritain states:

They do not see that, because his spirit makes man cross the threshold of independence properly so-called, and of self-inwardness, the subjectivity of the person demands as its most intimate privilege communications proper to love and intelligence. They do not see that, even before the exercise of free choice, and in order to make free choice possible, the most deeply rooted need of the person is to communicate with the other by the union of the intelligence, and with others by the affective union. Their subjectivity is not a self, because it is wholly phenomenal.²²

Maritain contends that the conceptual perspective of Thomism allows him to plunge into the ontological depths of subjectivity. He writes:

... in relation to its essential structures, the subject is in no wise betrayed when it is made object. The objectisation which universalises it and discerns in it intelligible natures, makes it known by a knowledge destined doubtless to continue to deepen, but not one that is in any sense unjust. Such a knowledge does no violence to the truth of the subject, but renders that truth present to the mind.²³

Furthermore, he states:
personality, metaphorically considered, being the subsistence of the spiritual soul communicated to the human composite, and enabling the latter to possess its existence, to perfect itself and to give itself freely, bears witness in us to the generosity or expansivity of being which, in an incarnate spirit, proceeds from the spirit and which constitutes, in the secret springs of our ontological structure, a source of dynamic unity and unification from within. 24

According to Maritain, the philosophical notion of the suppositum, which expresses the core of the subject or person, safeguards the authentic ontology of the subject. He refuses to reduce the subject to a mere object or thing, either by way of rationalist abstraction or by way of phenomenological empiricism. He insists that philosophical speculation be just to the dynamic subject, who in fact only exists by way of inter-personal relationship, which is so profound that it cannot be broken apart by abstract rationalism or a shallow form of empiricism. Maritain contends that the philosophical concept can be just to the dynamic subject, but that a merely phenomenological existentialism can never accomplish this. Certainly, Maritain respects the more profound side of contemporary existentialism, which acknowledges the liberty of the subject. 25 Nevertheless, a proper philosophical explication of man can occur only through a form of intellectual existentialism, which does justice to the rational and spiritual dimension of the human being. Spurred on by the contemporary situation, with its democratic concern for the liberty of the subject, Maritain develops the current respect for the particular human existent. According
to Maritain, that existence is not merely phenomenal, it is above all rational and spiritual. Through the ancient Thomistic notion of the suppositum, which he develops as the personal dimension of the human being, Maritain seeks to drive the contemporary preoccupation with man a little further into the future.

Finally, Maritain argues that a philosophical approach to anthropology eventually exhausts its resources. In the end, man must pass beyond any form of philosophical speculation into the domain of religion. Maritain discovers in religion the means for continuing our discussion of the subject:

Subjectivity marks the frontier which separates the world of philosophy from the world of religion. This is what Kierkegaard felt so deeply in his polemic against Hegel. Philosophy runs against an insurmountable barrier in attempting to deal with subjectivity, because while philosophy of course knows subjects, it knows them only as objects. Philosophy is registered whole and entire in the relation of intelligence to object; whereas religion enters into the relation of subject to subject.26

Thomistic philosophical conceptualisation is seen by Maritain as adequate, precisely because it points beyond philosophy toward inter-subjectivity, which is known primarily through modes of connaturality27 and is the only authentic way of being human. It is a physical, intellectual, and spiritual togetherness which Maritain seeks. He considers himself to be part of contemporary man's struggle for authenticity, even if he finds it necessary to use some rocks from the ancient Thomistic edifice to construct his own theoretical foundation.

The implications of Maritain's appreciation of inter-
subjectivity became clear in his treatment of the intense love which exists between God and the saints. Here one encounters the paradigm for all inter-personal relationships. In the bond of love between God and man, emerging through mystical contemplation and culminating in the beatific vision of eternity, the ontological distinction between the two remains. Maritain is convinced that God's greatest gift to you or me, after the gift which is Himself, is precisely you or me—that inexhaustible, mysterious core of subjectivity, the person who is. According to Maritain, what is accomplished in the bond of love between God and man is that the two become one, in an undivided act of loving. 28

The human person is indeed a whole, but it does not for this reason belong only to itself. The person belongs to the society of others as well. Now what enables the sharing to take place is precisely the act of loving. Through loving, the person exists ontologically for another, and intentionally even as the other. However, in order to attain the supreme height of loving, man must become submissive to the grace of God. Man must in fact enter into communion with Him in order to love as He does. Maritain argues that we must be transformed, in order to love God, ourselves, and others as He loves Himself, us, and others like us. God loved man to the point of becoming nothing on the cross for him, and in turn man is called to do the same. In order to approach God, and through Him our neighbours, we must first become nothing; we must first die as He did. This is
the great teaching of St. John of the Cross. And in the course of this transformation by grace, man can do something also. In cooperation with the grace of God, man can remove the obstacles to the penetration of that grace. Everything must go! Eventually, according to St. John of the Cross, even the desire for consolation in mystical experience must be abandoned. 29

Maritain's analysis of subjectivity and love enables us to see what is essential for man's development. First of all, it is necessary that a subject be self-contained or self-possessed. Only then can a subject give itself and receive another like itself. Maritain therefore applauds when modern man seeks liberation from the bonds of material necessity and learns to exercise his potential. In this respect, humanism is the proper development of man's freedom of expansion. On the other hand, however, love is necessary for the development of personality. Rousseau was wrong when he said that man was put on earth in order to be content with himself alone. 30 This is the freedom of bourgeois individualism! The sacrifice of Jesus and St. John of the Cross teaches that freedom from material necessity is primarily concerned with an intellectual and spiritual endeavour. Clearly, such freedom does not engender the crude egocentric pleasure of self-contentment. Maritain argues that man's liberation ultimately entails a transcendent orientation. Thus, it is essential for man's development that human beings learn to exist for each other as autonomous and responsible persons.
Maritain argues that human autonomy ultimately depends upon grace and union with God. Through freedom of spontaneity, man immediately wills what is in accordance with his nature, and therefore in conformity with the will of God. It is in man's nature to choose the good. However, Christian theology teaches us that human nature has been wounded by the sin of Adam. According to Maritain, every man carries within him the wound caused by Adam's sin. Nevertheless, in spite of this original sin, human nature is created for God. Through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, God's grace is offered to all men, whether they have an explicit knowledge of Christianity or not. For Maritain, there is no such thing as nature apart from grace. Whenever and wherever a man chooses the good for its own sake, it is the grace of God which enables him to do so.31

It follows that there is no moral good achieved in the temporal order without the aid of God's grace. Nevertheless, the development of man in the temporal order is concerned primarily with the historical, social, or collective evolution of man's natural potential. In the temporal order, freedom means liberation on earth and not beatitude in heaven. Maritain insists on the primacy of the spiritual in the temporal order, and therefore the supernatural dimension is a crucial factor in his social thought. But temporal society has a natural goal which need not acknowledge the supernatural as such. Man's historical quest does not conflict with his ultimate destiny. Therefore, according to Maritain the temporal development of man must be in harmony with his supernatural goal, whether he acknowledges it explicitly or not.

In Integral Humanism, Maritain clearly asserts the primacy of the spiritual:
In the eyes of the Christian, culture and civilization, being ordered to a terrestrial end, must be referred and subordinated to the eternal life which is the end of religion, and must procure the terrestrial good and the development of the diverse natural activities of man according to an efficacious attention to the eternal interests of the person and in such a manner as to facilitate the access of the latter to his supernatural ultimate end: all of which thus superelevates civilization in its own proper order.\textsuperscript{32}

Nevertheless, he argues:

\ldots it remains that culture and civilization have a specifying object--the earthly and perishable good of our life here below--whose proper order is the natural order (superelevated as I just said). In themselves and by their own end, they are engaged in time and in the vicissitudes of time.\textsuperscript{33}

In \textit{The Person and the Common Good}, Maritain explains how the goal of temporal society is subordinate to man's supernatural end:

\ldots the common good of the city or of civilization--an essentially human common good in which the whole of man is engaged--does not preserve its true nature unless it respects that which surpasses it, unless it is subordinated, not as a pure means, but as an infravalent end, to the order of eternal goods and the supra-temporal values from which human life is suspended.\textsuperscript{34}

Temporal society is not merely the means through which man's supernatural goal is achieved. Such abuse of the temporal order was a serious temptation during the mediaeval period.\textsuperscript{35} However, the temporal order has in fact asserted its autonomy through democracy and the establishment of secular civilization. Acknowledging this event, Maritain thinks that temporal society has an "infravalent end."

It is a true end, but one which is not sufficient in itself.
In *The Person and the Common Good*, Maritain clarifies his interpretation of man's temporal goal:

The common good of civil life is an ultimate end, but an ultimate end in a relative sense and in a certain order. It is lost if it is closed within itself, for, of its very nature, it is intended to favor the higher ends of the human person. The human person's vocation to goods which transcend it is embodied in the essence of the common good. 36

Maritain's understanding of human freedom thereby retains man's transcendent orientation, while clearly recognising the need for man's liberation on earth. Influenced by the Christian Gospel, modern man's historical progress is nevertheless a natural development. Although God's grace is present in every moral advance, it is in the natural order that the goal of temporal society is achieved. 37

Thus informed, we can now appreciate how Maritain's understanding of human freedom is expressed in his explanation of the contemporary historical ideal.

Both the nature of a concrete historical ideal and the distinction between mediaeval and contemporary ideals have been discussed in the first and second chapters. 38 It is necessary to recall that Maritain is concerned with the development of Christendom, and that an historical ideal is said to be concrete when it is based upon the actual circumstances of a particular age. In the mediaeval period, the historical ideal was the holy empire. Based upon the fact of Charlemagne's reign, it aimed at establishing the Kingdom of God on earth. Such an ideal contained the threat of Caesaro-papism, i.e. the theocratic tendency of the
temporal power to usurp the authority of the Church. Nevertheless, the ideal of the holy empire guided the progress of mediaeval Christendom. Maritain argues that the ideal of a new Christendom should be freedom, what he calls "... the idea of the holy freedom of the creature whom grace unites to God (l'idée de la sainte liberté de la créature que la grâce unit à Dieu)." This ideal would be in conformity with the circumstances of modern democracy.

According to Maritain, and this is indeed significant, the contemporary anthropocentric orientation did not only spring up amidst the secularism engendered by the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, but it was also part of the attitude of those who would protect the Church and her teachings. The absolutist reaction, as seen in the divine rights of kings as well as in the harshness of papal reaction in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, was itself an aspect of anthropocentric humanism, as Maritain writes:

... the general character of the absolutist reaction of which I am speaking has been to employ --not exclusively, doubtless, but in a predominant manner--human means, means of State, political means, in order to try to save the unity at once spiritual and political of the social body.

Succeeding the collapse of the mediaeval concrete historical ideal, which Maritain considers under the heading: "Dissolution and Pseudo-morphosis of the Mediaeval Ideal in the Anthropocentric Humanist World", appears the new historical ideal of the holy freedom of the individual whom grace unites to God. This new ideal does not imply
a form of Divine imperialism, which seems to have been the case with the ideal of the holy empire (and allowing for human weakness, this tended to become a papal and monarchistic imperialism exercised in the name of God). The ideal of the human being's freedom is even more transcendent than the mediaeval ideal, because it distinctly acknowledges the rational and spiritual status of the person before God.

The new historical ideal of the human being's freedom is intimately bound together with the notion of the person's freedom of conscience before God. It is in the depths of the human being, in secret places, that God's grace confronts the particular human being's conscience. Conversion is not a matter of coercion, but of removing the obstacles which tend to prevent the particular person from seeing and working with the grace of God.

In his small book, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, which appeared in 1942, Maritain writes approvingly of Teilhard de Chardin:

... he [Teilhard de Chardin] shows that the evolution of Humanity must be regarded as the continuation of life's evolution in its entirety, where progress means the ascent of conscience and where the ascent of conscience is linked to a superior level of organization.42

This "superior level of organization" cannot be merely biological, i.e. instinctual and bound together with the development of material individuality: "... the law of life, which leads to greater unity by means of greater organization, passes normally from the sphere of biological
progress to that of social progress and the evolution of the civilized community. Maritain seeks "unification by internal forces, that is to say, by the progress of moral conscience, by the development of the relationships of justice, law and friendship, by the liberation of spiritual energies." It is in an organisation of human beings converted to God, in a common attraction

... exerted by a transcendent centre, which is Spirit and Person, and in which men can truly love one another, that the development of humanity, thus animated and uplifted within the very order of temporal history, finds its supreme law.

According to Maritain, at the very roots of this human evolution toward a superior organisation

... lie the natural aspirations of the human person to his freedom of expansion and autonomy and towards a political and social emancipation which will release him more and more from the bonds of material nature. The movement under discussion, then, leads, within social life itself, to the progressive realization of man's longing to be treated as a person, that is to say, as a whole.

Maritain's understanding of human freedom, as the concrete historical ideal of a new Christendom, thereby includes both the perfect freedom of spontaneity and the autonomy or expansion evident in temporal society. It is clear that for Maritain man's goal is God, and therefore the perfect freedom of spontaneity is paramount. This is the holy freedom initiated in man by the grace of God. But the progress of man's freedom of expansion in the temporal order cannot be neglected. The leaven of Christianity has enhanced the development of moral conscience in the world.
The democratic evolution tends toward that superior level of organisation, wherein men seek just and loving relationships. A new Christendom should respect the free assent of conscience, because the Christian Gospel itself has contributed to the development of the contemporary situation, wherein men seek respect for their neighbours and themselves. Maritain believes that this is the same respect God shows man, by enabling him to become a saint. For the saints are true and therefore free friends of God.

2. The Distinction between Individual and Person in Relation to the Common Good

Maritain developed his personalism in order to overcome man's current anthropocentric orientation. His is not merely an academic task, for he witnessed the violent consequences of modern man's egocentrism. We can observe that after the Church's condemnation of the Action Française in 1926, Maritain allowed the concrete circumstances of his age to influence the development of his thought. He had been concretely confronted with bourgeois individualism, that parasite of modern democracy, which would replace the authentic freedom of persons with the erroneous freedom of egocentric individuals. In order to counter it, Maritain praised the anti-individualism of Marx and the collective accomplishments of the totalitarian left. But Maritain had observed the erroneous freedom of collectivism, whereby the species seeks to liberate itself, while neglecting man's
transcendent orientation and the dignity of the person. Unlike fascism and Nazi racism, the totalitarian left seeks to overcome individualism by establishing a common task for all men. In its war against bourgeois liberalism, communism retains an element of the Christian leaven. However, Maritain defends man's orientation toward God, and he seeks to expose the primacy of the person as the fundamental presupposition of democracy. He thereby hopes to direct democracy away from the gutter of bourgeois individualism, while avoiding the pitfalls of both forms of totalitarianism. An examination of his distinction between the individual and person, in relation to the common good, shows how Maritain's personalism does justice to man's theocentric orientation and respects the dignity of the human person.

Maritain's presentation of the common good is designed to defeat both bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism. Arguing against bourgeois individualism, he asserts that society must have a common task. Society must be communal. On the other hand, against totalitarianism, he asserts that society must respect the dignity of the human person. Society must be personalist. In his *Integral Humanism*, Maritain therefore argues that in order for a society to exist in conformity with reason, it must be both communal and personalist.47

The monarchical structure of the mediaeval period, before the perversion of absolutism, constituted an attempt
to establish such a society. The primary tenet of personalism is that the common good of society respect every human being's transcendent orientation. Certainly, the common good is concerned with the preservation of the whole. For example, in order to assure the material well-being of the whole, society may coerce its members to participate in a just war. However, respecting the hierarchy of ends, the transcendent goal of the particular human being is paramount. In his *The Person and the Common Good*, Maritain expresses this succinctly: "With respect to the eternal destiny of the soul, society exists for each person and is subordinated to it." Mediaeval society, in its close alliance with the Church, attempted to conform its temporal designs to this basic principle. Today, a new situation demands a new development of society's responsibility to preserve the transcendent orientation of each of its members.

Personality by nature tends toward communion, i.e. toward a true society of persons and not toward an animal group or colony made up of individuals. The person enters society first and primarily for his own superabundance, his own overflow of being, life, intelligence, and love. Certainly his needs cause him to join others, but Maritain insists that this is a secondary reason for society, and the needs for development of reason and virtue are more important than material needs.

Nevertheless, as Maritain states in *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*,
Man finds himself by subordinating himself to the group, and the group attains its goal only by serving man and by realizing that man has secrets which escape the group and a vocation which the group does not encompass.

For this reason, it can be said that the relationship between the person and the common good "... is posed in terms of reciprocal subordination and mutual implication."52

The common good of a society of persons, because it consists of persons, is what is good for both whole and parts:

The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole which, like the species with respect to its individuals or the hive with respect to its bees, relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. It is therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from it.53

In agreement with the classical tradition, Maritain argues that man is a social animal. Man qua man must struggle toward authentic society, in order to attain his liberation by becoming what he is. Although it is true that some have found God in the desert, it is also true that most journey toward God through authentic interpersonal communication with their neighbors. And even those who "see" God in the desert, must spend their lives praying for their neighbors, if they wish to remain with God whose name is Love. Besides, it is human society which raised and instructed the contemplative, and it is divine society which sustains him. Beyond any created common good, man is ordained to the society which
is the Trinity. 54 But no one is allowed to neglect the
temporal common good of mankind as a whole. No one is allowed
to neglect society for the sake of private comfort. In The
Person and the Common Good, Maritain writes:

No one more than St. Thomas has emphasized the
primacy of the common good in the practical or
political order of the life of the city, as in
every order, where, in relation to a same
category of good, the distinction between the
private and common good is found. 55

The person cannot neglect society because it is only
through society that personality develops. Domestic and civil
society can even pave the way toward the society which is the
mystical body of Christ, as Maritain writes in Freedom in the
Modern World:

From the family group (which is more fundamental
than the State since it touches the generic dif­
fences between human beings) man passes to civil
society (which affects specific differences between
them) and in the midst of civil society he feels
the need of clubs and fellowships that will interest
his intellectual and moral life. These he enters
of his own free choice and they assist the soul in
its efforts to ascend to a higher level. In the
end these also fail to satisfy and they cramp
the soul which is obliged to pass beyond them.
Above the level of civil society man crosses the
threshold of supernatural reality and enters a
society which is the mystical body of an incarnate
God, and whose office is to lead him to his spiritual
perfection and to full liberty of autonomy and
eternal welfare. 56

Finally, it must be kept in mind that the temporal
good of society is true to its nature only if it is sub­
ordinate to something higher. If human society were a society
of pure persons, then the good of society and the good of
each person would be one and the same good. But man is very
far from being a pure person. Human society lies between
the society of the Trinity and mere animal species.\textsuperscript{57} Maritain argues that the common good must be subordinated, not as means but as infravalent end, to the order of eternal goods and supra-temporal values.\textsuperscript{58} When this is not the case, one is no longer obliged to support society. For example, one is not called upon to sacrifice contemplation in order to participate in the political aspirations of the Nazi state.\textsuperscript{59} Later in this chapter, it will be shown that one may in fact be obliged to resist the aspirations of such a society.\textsuperscript{60} The common good of society must always respect the transcendent orientation of the particular human being, because ". . . it is precisely as related to personality that individuality is good. Evil arises when, in our action, we give preponderance to the individual aspect of our being."\textsuperscript{61} Simply stated, Maritain acknowledges a hierarchy of ends, both in the particular human being and in society as a whole.

We are now in a position to see how Maritain's definition of human freedom is related to this discussion of the common good. Maritain seeks to dispel the bogus freedoms of individualism and collectivism, both of which stem from man's anthropocentric orientation. He therefore replaces the anthropocentric view of liberation, which argues that man is capable of achieving his own independence, with a theocentric view of liberation, whereby man's autonomy is explained in terms of spontaneous adherence to the will of God. Maritain argues that the common good of society must
respect the person, whom the grace of God enables to achieve freedom of spontaneity or true autonomy. The temporal good of society is thereby rendered subordinate to man's eternal goal and the transcendent aspirations of the person are protected. The communal organisation of the mediaeval period protected and enhanced man's transcendent orientation through an immediate subordination to the authority of the Church. Maritain thinks that the progress of man's freedom of expansion in the temporal order and the democratic evolution have engendered a decidedly new situation. This situation has been inspired by Christianity, but it is nevertheless a natural development for man. The theocentric orientation of temporal society is no longer evident in subservience to the teaching authority of the Church, but rather, in the augmentation and protection of man's natural abilities. We must not forget that it is precisely the grace of God which makes this development possible. Today, the transcendent aspirations of the person are protected and enhanced through a greater respect for the rational and spiritual status of the particular human being than was exhibited in mediaeval society. The following section will show how the person's transcendence is protected by the proclamation of the rights of man. Then it will be necessary to show how decidedly democratic institutions enhance the growth of personality.
3. Natural Law in Defence of Freedom and the Rights of Man

Maritain is critical of the notion of autonomy put forth by thinkers such as Rousseau and Kant. In his *Principes d'une politique humaniste*, he argues that they engender a false view of political emancipation:

... false political emancipation (the false city of human rights) has for its principle the 'anthropocentric' conception which Rousseau and Kant had of the autonomy of the person. According to this conception, one is free only if he obeys himself alone, and man is constituted by right of nature in such a state of freedom (which Rousseau regarded as lost by the fact of the corruption inseparable from social life, and which Kant relegated to the noumenal world).62

Maritain states that this anthropocentric understanding of liberation is

... a divinization of the individual, of which the logical consequences, in the social and political order, are: 1) a practical atheism in society (for there is no room for two Gods in the world, and, if the individual is in practice God, God is no longer God, except perhaps in a decorative manner and for private use); 2) the theoretical and practical disappearance of the idea of the common good; 3) the theoretical and practical disappearance of the idea of the responsible leader and of the idea of authority, falsely regarded as incompatible with freedom; and this in the political sphere (where the possessors of authority have charge of directing men not towards the private good of another man but towards the common good) as well as in the sphere of labor and of economics (where the technical demands of production oblige men to work, and under extremely different modes, for the private good of other men, at the same time as for their own livelihood).

Through an inevitable internal dialectic, the social divinization of the individual, inaugurated by 'bourgeois' liberalism, leads to the social divinization of the State, and of the anonymous mass incarnate in a Master, who is no longer a normal ruler but a sort of inhuman monster whose omnipotence is based on myths and lies; and, at the same time, 'bourgeois' liberalism gives way to revolutionary totalitarianism.63
Against the anthropocentric notion of political emancipation, Maritain contends:

... true political emancipation, or the true city of human rights, has for its principle a conception of the autonomy of the person that is in conformity with the nature of things and therefore 'theocentric'. According to this notion, obedience, when consented to for the sake of justice, is not opposed to freedom. It is, on the contrary, a normal way of attaining to freedom. 64

Furthermore, he specifies what he means by "attaining to freedom" in the context of temporal society: "Man must gradually win a freedom which, in the social and political order, consists above all in his becoming, in given historical conditions, as independent as possible of the constraints of material nature." 65

In the temporal order, authentic liberation consists in struggling to make the entire society "as independent as possible of the constraints of material nature". This struggle must be in conformity with both "given historical conditions" and "the nature of things". Maritain is thus concerned with the freedom of spontaneity, whereby man acts in accordance with nature. He is also concerned with the progress of man's expansion, as a legitimate step toward autonomy.

Maritain does not advocate anarchistic or individualistic autonomy. In other words, he does not merely seek to augment freedom of will or choice. Instead, he declares that authentic autonomy means conformity to human nature, to what man must be, and expresses this by saying that freedom of spontaneity "... does not imply the absence of necessity but only the absence of constraint. It is the power of
acting in virtue of one's own interior inclination and
without undergoing compulsion imposed by any exterior agent.66

In the natural order, with which temporal society
is concerned, man's theocentric orientation is expressed through
his adherence to natural law. According to Maritain, natural
law is primarily a matter of ontology, of what man is,67 and
therefore "one's own interior inclination" indicates what
by nature man ought to be. Maritain argues that it is not
through reason alone, but through reason bound to this inclin­
ation toward the ought, that man comes to know natural law.
Therefore, natural law is essentially unwritten law:

... it is unwritten law in the deepest sense of
that expression, because our knowledge of it is no
work of free conceptualization, but results from
a conceptualization bound to the essential inclin­
ations of being, of living nature, and of reason,
which are at work in man, and because it develops
in proportion to the degree of moral experience
and self-reflection, and of the social experience
also, of which man is capable in the various ages
of his history.68

Natural law appears in both Greek and Christian
thought. Maritain tells us that the Antigone of Sophocles,
who was willing to transgress human law and even be crushed
by it, rather than disobey the unwritten laws, is the eternal
heroine of natural law.69

Although Antigone is an individual who rebelled
against human law, it is primarily through the development
of society that natural law is disclosed. Since man's discovery
of natural law "develops in proportion to the degree of moral
experience and self-reflection, and of social experience also,
of which man is capable in the various ages of his history,"
Maritain does not hesitate to assert that the basis of natural law was first expressed in social patterns, rather than in personal judgements. 70

The discovery of natural law depends upon social progress, and Maritain argues that "... since man is endowed with intelligence and determines his own ends, it is up to him to put himself in tune with the ends necessarily demanded by his nature." 71 Maritain does not deny the crucial function of God's grace, but he holds that freedom of spontaneity presupposes freedom of choice. 72 The current preoccupation with autonomy, although plagued by individualistic conceptions of man's freedom, is nevertheless a yearning for the maturity which allows a man to expand according to the dictates of his own conscience. The contemporary historical ideal demands respect for the freedom of the human person. Maritain argues that in the past too much attention was paid, in discourse on natural law, to the obligations of man. 73 Although these can never be neglected, he contends that the contemporary situation demands that natural law defend freedom and the rights of man: "The proper achievement--a great achievement indeed--of the eighteenth century has been to bring out in full light the rights of man as also required by natural law." 74

The notion of man's coming of age is important for an understanding of the current preoccupation with rights. In Integral Humanism, Maritain develops this notion in regard to the emergent self-consciousness of the working community:

... the collective consciousness of which I am speaking demands for the working community
As developed in Integral Humanism, this notion is concerned with both the dignity of work and the worker's dignity. However, the universal implications of this notion are apparent, for Maritain is concerned with "... the dignity of the human person in the workman as such." The notion of man's coming of age is applicable to Maritain's view of contemporary society as a whole. In the case of the worker, this notion means that "... the proletariat claims to be treated as an adult person, by this very fact it does not have to be succored, ameliorated, or saved by another social class." For society as a whole, this notion implies the rights of man. However, it must be pointed out that man's coming of age, his coming into his majority, means that man should now become what he must be in accordance with his own nature and the will of God. It is man's maturity qua man, and does not entail unbridled license, but rather, responsible behaviour.

Maritain seeks to overcome the dilemma of the individual by directing men to the rights of the human person, rights which indicate the development of moral conscience to date. It is his hope that society will come to acknowledge these rights more and more, as part of the common good. The dilemma of the individual, which is peculiar to our age, will thereby be overcome. What Mounier calls the established disorder of bourgeois civilisation, will be overcome through a new theocentric orientation, which respects the rational
and spiritual dimension of each human being. The tendency toward totalitarianism will thus be avoided.

What are the rights of the human person? In The Rights of Man and Natural Law, Maritain proposes three categories of rights: rights of the human person as such, rights of the civic person, rights of the social person and more particularly of the working person. The first two rights included in the first category are highly significant. In conformity with the ontological foundation of natural law, Maritain begins with "the right to existence". From this basic right all the others follow. He defines the second as "the right to personal liberty or the right to conduct one's own life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible for them before God and the law of the community". This is clarified by another important right, "the right to the pursuit of eternal life along the path which conscience has recognized as the path indicated by God". All other rights, such as the right to ownership, the right of equal suffrage, the rights of association and discussion, the right to form professional groups or trade-unions, depend upon the respect "the law of the community" shows for "the right to conduct one's own life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible for them before God".

Although the proclamation of the rights of man arose in secular civilisation, Maritain does not hesitate to acknowledge these rights as inspired by the Christian Gospel. They are the fruits of man's development in accordance with
the teaching of Christ. At this stage in history, it is the second right listed by Maritain which is most significant: "the right to personal liberty or the right to conduct one's own life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible for them before God and the law of the community". This basic right expresses the contemporary ideal of the holy freedom of the individual whom grace unites to God. Without denying supernatural intervention, Maritain thereby asserts the most amiable achievement of modern man.

In the first section of this chapter, we have seen that freedom of spontaneity or perfect autonomy ultimately depends upon the grace of God. We have also seen that man's freedom of expansion, although a natural development, does not exclude the presence of God's grace in the temporal order. Both sanctification and man's moral development in temporal society are therefore in accordance with the will of God and require His supernatural intervention. Maritain believes in the transforming power of grace. Whenever someone chooses the good in itself, whether he knows it or not, he has chosen God. The grace of God enables that choice to bear fruit. Maritain asserts that

... when a man deliberating about his life chooses to love that which is good in itself, the bonum honestum, in order to link his life to it, it is toward God, whether he knows it or not, that he turns himself. And then, St. Thomas says, this man, whether grown up in the Christian faith or among the idolatrous and nourished in wild forests, has the grace of God, without which our wounded will cannot turn itself efficaciously towards God as the supreme end of our life.

Man cannot practice the good without the grace of God, but
his intelligence can nevertheless discern the good. He can make a theoretically practical judgment, even if he cannot, of his own accord, bring that judgment to fruition. The proclamation of the rights of man is in agreement with God's design, and moral conscience has developed to a point where the correct use of reason makes their acceptance inevitable. These rights respect the dignity of the human person, and they thereby protect man's ascent to spontaneity or perfect autonomy. By defending the rights of man, natural law defends both the freedom of the saints and the proper development of human society for there can be no contradiction in what God has instituted.

4. Personalism and Democracy

We are now in a position to see how Maritain developed his personalism as an attempt to overcome the dilemma of the individual. We have seen how he replaced the anthropocentric notion of autonomy with the freedom of spontaneity, which alone acknowledges man's need for the grace of God. Man's liberation from the necessity of matter has been interpreted as a positive innovation. However, freedom of expansion in the temporal order is primarily concerned with the development of just and loving relationships amongst men. The common good of society must therefore respect the dignity of persons, and not secure the license of individuals. Finally, the progress of moral conscience has enabled man to discover human rights through natural law, whereby both the theocentric orientation
of man and his freedom of expansion in temporal society are protected.

In addition to the problem of egocentrism, Maritain's social critique has also exposed the democratic evolution. Distinguished from egocentrism, democracy has been interpreted as a positive element in contemporary society. Maritain believes that it is based upon his notion of the common good, which respects the dignity of persons. He argues that freedom of expansion in the temporal order is therefore the fundamental presupposition of modern democracy, because freedom of expansion is primarily concerned with the development of personality. Maritain seeks to dispel the anthropocentric perversion of democracy. In this section we will see how he developed his personalism within the framework of the current democratic enterprise.

Autonomy and Pluralism in a Personalist Democracy

As we have seen in chapter three, Maritain argues that the emergence of modern democracy was already visible during the mediaeval period. The modern democratic evolution began with the advent of Christianity. It is defined in terms of Maritain's notion of the common good and his understanding of human freedom. Although inspired by the Christian Gospel, democracy is also a natural development. Rational men are therefore compelled to adhere to its principles. Maritain argues that the mediaeval period was in a certain sense democratic, because it respected
the dignity of persons. Today, however, man is in a position to establish a democratic form of government, which is the inevitable climax of the democratic evolution. 89

The fundamental problem, in the establishment of a personalist democracy, appears to be the relationship between the Church and secular civilisation. Therefore, Julio Meinvielle is correct, when he interprets Maritain's treatment of this relationship as the major indication of the contemporaneity of Maritain's social thought. 90

After 1926, Maritain came to accept the social achievements of modern man. Clearly condemning the attempt of secular civilisation to dismiss the spiritual authority of the Church, he nevertheless acknowledged the achievements of secular society in the temporal order. If secularization means humanism, i.e. man's concentration on the development of his own natural potential, then it is certain that Maritain supports it. We have already seen how this support does not entail acceptance of modern man's anthropocentric or egocentric orientation.

Maritain wishes to establish theocentric humanism, whereby man's orientation toward God is preserved, along with the advance of man's natural talent. Although every moral achievement depends upon the grace of God, temporal society has now reached a stage where it can define its own proper goal more precisely. The Church can no longer trespass in the temporal domain. The temptation of theocracy, so evident during the mediaeval period, has been removed by
secular civilisation. Theocentric humanism means that the Church no longer has any juridic privileges in temporal society. Maritain continues to assert the primacy of the spiritual as proclaimed by the Church, but he clearly acknowledges modern man's right to freedom of conscience and expansion in the temporal order. Given the current world situation, where a multitude of ideologies battle each other incessantly, such a view of freedom implies division. Maritain must reconcile the divisiveness of modern society with the absolute claims of the Church.

Perhaps the best way to approach Maritain's treatment of pluralism is to note the distinction between horizontal and vertical pluralism. This device is employed by Michael P. Fogarty, in his excellent study, Christian Democracy in Western Europe 1820-1953. Although Fogarty does not refer directly to Maritain when making this distinction, it can help clarify Maritain's own position.

Horizontal pluralism denotes various autonomous groups within a single spiritual organisation or family. For example, Fogarty speaks of the autonomy of individuals, families, and age groups within a single Christian democratic movement. A mere collectivism of individuals is thereby avoided, and a truly personalist society established. This coincides with Maritain's understanding of freedom in the temporal order, whereby persons are encouraged to develop their own unique abilities, and is in fact acknowledged as a process of "autonomisation" by Fogarty. As we shall see
later in this chapter, horizontal pluralism and such autonomy are important factors in dealing with the family and the economic unit which Maritain calls "the corporation".\textsuperscript{95} Horizontal pluralism simply acknowledges the vast range of interest and talent which exists amongst those who share a common faith.

As Fogarty remarks, vertical or ideological pluralism refers to the way in which ideologies cut vertically through all the layers and groups of society, so as 'to set a man at variance with his father, and the daughter with her mother . . . a man's enemies will be the people of his own house' (Matt. x, 35-6); as by contrast with the 'horizontal' division between, for example, the State and the local community or the Board of Directors and the primary working group. Different 'spiritual families', in a common French phrase,--Catholics, Protestants, Marxists, 'humanists', or whoever they may be--should on the principle of 'vertical' pluralism be permitted and enabled to follow their own way of life, even when they are in a minority in a nation or group as a whole.\textsuperscript{96}

When referring to the distinction between horizontal and vertical pluralism, in relation to Maritain's own work, it must be said that horizontal pluralism is simply the way things ought to be \textit{de jure} in a truly personalist society. Diversity of interest and talent is indicative of the unique beauty of the particular person, and a multitude of occupations and roles insures the development of the person's peculiar contribution. Vertical pluralism, on the other hand, is the best way to accommodate the way things are \textit{de facto}. It allows for the current lack of truth, with the hope that a social climate which respects freedom of conscience will eventually foster \textit{the} truth.
A climate of mutual respect and sound dialogue will enable truth to emerge from the weeds in either camp. Concerning vertical pluralism, Fogarty writes:

It reduces conflicts, since it allows everyone, without discrimination or loss to himself, to build up a set of associations which fits his own ideals. Since, in an imperfect world, some conflicts of ideals and loyalties are inevitable, the essential thing is that they should be fought out in a way which lets the truth eventually emerge and form the basis for a settlement. But this is likely to happen only if the parties in conflict hold firm, clear, views which provide a solid basis for argument, and yet are open and sensitive to the views of others; respectful of their good faith and ready to admit their good points. 97

Maritain quite clearly sees himself as tolerating the condition of vertical pluralism. 98 This does not mean that he is an entrenched dogmatist, merely tolerating the presence of groups thinking differently from his own, but it does mean that he desires to overcome error wherever it may appear. Not to admit error, or to consider different positions as being equally valid, would be for Maritain a form of relativism. It would be a perpetuation of laissez-faire liberalism, a return to the bourgeois society of the nineteenth century, where such intellectual license permitted the oppression of the weak by the strong. 99 Such was the bankruptcy of the bourgeois democracy which fell before the onslaught of totalitarianism.

Ultimately, Maritain's comprehension of vertical pluralism excludes both liberalism and mediaeval homogeneity. In Integral Humanism, he writes:

It is important to insist on the bearing of the pluralist solution of which I am speaking;
it is as distant from the liberal conception in favor in the nineteenth century—since it recognizes for the temporal city the necessity of having an ethical and, in short, religious specification—as from the mediaeval conception, since this specification admits internal heterogeneities and is only based on a general sense or direction, a common orientation. 100

The "common orientation" is toward the development of man's freedom of expansion in the temporal order, and the establishment of rights, whereby persons are allowed to pursue spontaneity or perfect autonomy in compliance with the inner voice of conscience. Maritain's viewpoint thereby accommodates division in human society, while asserting a common goal which respects the primacy of the spiritual. Although Maritain clearly acknowledges the supreme authority of the Church's creed and teaching, he is prepared to tolerate vertical pluralism, for the sake of the Gospel which indicates the dignity of human conscience.

Besides, at this stage in history the Church directly benefits from vertical pluralism. The natural development of man in the temporal order advances moral truth which the Church must acknowledge. Maritain admits that the Church neglected the workers throughout most of the nineteenth century, and that it was primarily through the efforts of other forces in the world that the Church came to deal with the situation of the workers. 101 It is also clear to Maritain that the formulation of human rights originally developed in the revolutionary atmosphere which existed beyond the visible confines of the Church.

Maritain insists that a new Christendom must respect both horizontal and vertical pluralism, because the circum-
stances of the current situation demand that it be so. We have seen that the development of man's freedom of expansion in the temporal order has been inspired by the Christian Gospel. This development is not in conflict with the Church's creed and teaching. Maritain believes that he has exposed the fundamental presupposition of modern democracy, which is the development of personality in temporal society through freedom of expansion. He believes that the progress of democracy is in conformity with Christianity, because it encourages just and loving relationships. It does this through the proclamation of human rights, which protect man's ascent to spontaneity or perfect autonomy. The natural progress of moral conscience, which has been inspired by the Christian Gospel, now demands that man choose freely. This development is in agreement with the freedom of spontaneity, whereby man freely wills what God has decreed. Vertical pluralism is therefore related to the freedom of spontaneity or sanctity. The Christian faith can no longer be imposed on the temporal order through an authoritarian regime, as was the case in Franco's Spain. Man's coming of age demands that he be allowed to acknowledge God freely.

It is Maritain's hope that the establishment of a new Christendom will in fact take place. However, if a new Christendom does arise out of the current chaos and ashes of ruin, he knows that it will never be perfect. In any event, Maritain argues that it is up to man to pursue his freedom both through the use of his reason and by
struggling in the depths of his being with the presence of God's grace. Whether or not future generations will choose to be authentically liberated is simply up to them. It is up to the Christian, *hic et nunc*, to dedicate himself to shaping the situation which will give God's grace one more chance. His own salvation demands that he at least try, for by following the call of today's historical ideal, he is achieving his own liberation. He is choosing to yield to the grace of God, by obeying the will of God in history.

Now it is necessary to see how society can be structured in accordance with the democratic evolution, so as to enhance man's freedom in society, and thereby bring about a personalist democracy in preparation for the advent of a new Christendom. The development of Maritain's personalism, within the framework of modern democracy, indicates the influence of his social critique, which exposed the democratic evolution as a positive force in contemporary society.

**Family and Personalist Democracy**

The basic social unit is the family. It is the foundation of both the economy and the government, and must therefore be discussed first. Perhaps the best way to deal with Maritain's understanding of the family is to approach that understanding on two fronts: the first front is concerned with Maritain's notion of the family _per se_, i.e. the family as it is in itself apart from other social institutions;
the second front is concerned with his comprehension of the family as a point of mediation between the particular human being and the rest of his fellows in society. This second front is inevitable, given the open nature of the human person, i.e. his need for others in order to expand.

As an institution located between the individual and larger social units, the family is normally the place of horizontal pluralism. However, in the contemporary situation various spiritual groups often share the same institution. This is true of the family. Already given in the family, vertical and horizontal pluralism are thus woven together at different levels of contemporary society.

It appears that Maritain is more concerned with the family per se than Mounier, who considers the family as a place of transition, a means whereby the particular person can expand into the rest of society. Maritain is careful to endorse the family as the most basic and necessary social institution in its own right. Society as a whole must come to protect the family and even serve it as that which is closer to the person than other social institutions. In *The Person and the Common Good*, Maritain writes that the common good of the city "... implies and requires recognition of the fundamental rights of persons and those of the domestic society in which the persons are more primitively engaged than in the political society." In other words, the rights of the family have a high priority, because the family is closer to the particular person than any other social institution.
This "domestic society" is, for Maritain, by no means a contractual society for the mutual satisfaction of the marriage partners. The family includes more than the marriage partners, who can become closed and engaged in their own selfish interests. In Reflections on America, Maritain chastises the Americans for their preoccupation with sex, and he notes the need for ". . . subjecting sexual life to supra-biological and supra-sociological ethical standards . . . ." Elsewhere, Maritain speaks of the desirability of chastity even in marriage. With or without children, as was the case in Maritain's own marriage, the purpose of marriage, as of every other social institution, is the mutual enrichment of personalities. Man was not made to serve his material individuality. In this respect, it is significant that Maritain often spoke of the society which consisted of his wife Raissa, her sister Vera, and himself as his family. Besides considering the family in itself, Maritain also views it as a point of mediation between particular human beings and the rest of society and its institutions. Without sacrificing the completeness of the family (which is to be endorsed even as the person is endorsed, because it is so fundamentally close to particular personality), Maritain perceives the family as also being a means to greater expansion.

We have already seen how the family can function as a stepping stone toward civil organisations, and even toward membership in the Church, which is the mystical body of Christ.
Maritain argues that the family is an intimate unit, where personality develops through authentic communication. It is therefore primarily a spiritual organisation, and never merely biological. The freedom of expansion, which is essentially the development of personality in temporal society, must begin within the context of a small intimate unit. Clearly, the ideal family is a communion where the touch of God's grace is present. It is a place where personality expands toward spontaneity or sanctity. Nevertheless, the material aspect of such expansion must also be promoted. The rights of the family must be protected by law, and a certain economic stability must be maintained within each family. Obstacles to both the natural expansion of human personality and the penetration of God's grace will thereby be removed. Maritain hopes that by strengthening the family, the potential for the proper development of personality will increase. The human being will receive the intimate attention necessary for the development of his faculties, and will thereby learn to exercise his talent for the improvement of his fellow human beings. From the family, the embryonic person can be launched into the larger society.

The general practice of the Christian democratic movement, which has been influenced by Maritain's social thought, helps establish his concern for the material aspect of man's liberation. This is evident in its consideration of the family. One basic tenet of the Christian democratic movement is that families may unite to protect the rights of
particular families, as age groups unite to protect the rights of particular members. Such action accounts for Maritain's appreciation of the family both as it is in itself and as a point of mediation. The primary goal would be to achieve greater autonomy for the family unit, i.e. making it more self-sufficient and less dependent upon other institutions, such as the government or those private institutions which lend money. In most cases, help will at first be required from institutions other than the family. However, Christian democracy maintains that families should achieve their identity, independence, and self respect. Families will thereby attain responsibility, and the vast network of government welfare systems will cease in their inadvertent perpetuation of welfare as a permanent way of life. Families must help themselves. In this way, the liberation of the person can begin to occur from the bottom up, through the most basic social institution (certainly more fundamental, Maritain would argue, than an age group). And yet, the family is already a society of persons, where expansion or the development of personality occurs. It is in accordance with the doctrine of Maritain that families unite qua families in civil society, thereby enhancing their own identity and strengthening the development of the personalities they foster.

It is true that while developing as a person within a family, the particular human being also interacts with others in different social institutions. This becomes more
apparent later in life, after childhood and early adolescence. Although it is the family which is most fundamental, these other institutions are important. They too must achieve identity in such a way that the person in man is served. The union of families to protect their rights as families is a move toward the establishment of family identity and the greater growth of particular human beings. In the next section, we will discuss how those institutions which are concerned with the economy can achieve their identity and enhance the growth of human beings.

Directives for the Establishment of a Personalist Economy

In combating anthropocentric humanism, Maritain is concerned with directing man away from human individuality toward God through the development of human personality, which is the rational and spiritual dimension of the human being. Also, arguing against what he perceives as the bourgeois liberal ideal of a **laissez faire** culture, Maritain contends that society must be structured in such a way that it curtails the individualism of those who would oppress the weak to gain material advantage for themselves. Clearly, such a prerogative would manifest itself in the realm of economic activity, although the economy of a people is by no means the only sphere where oppression can occur. It is Maritain's position that economic activity, like every other mode of activity between men in society, must struggle to become a
movement directing man away from human individuality toward God through the development of human personality.

The proper development of personality means that both the unique talents of the particular human being and the capacity for just and loving relationships be established. This is true in the area of economics, as it is true in other areas of human social activity. Somewhat like the family, Maritain argues that the corporation must become a place where mutual enrichment can occur through interpersonal communication, although the corporation is certainly not as basic a social institution as the family. The corporation exists to serve human beings and their families.

Maritain argues that agricultural economy is more fundamental than the economy of industry, and for this reason should be more firmly rooted in the economy of particular families. In industry, however, it is the corporation, not the family, which controls economic development. Through the corporation, Maritain seeks to avoid what he perceives as the Marxist oversimplification of the class struggle.

According to him,

... what constitutes the bond and the unity of those who must work for a temporal renovation of the world is, first of all—to whatever class, race or nation they may belong—a community of thought, of love and of will, the passion of a common task to be accomplished, and it is here a community not material-biological like that of race, or material-sociological like that of class, but truly human. The idea of class, the idea of proletariat is here transcended.

However, Maritain carefully adds:

... because man is both flesh and spirit, because every great historical temporal undertaking has
biologico-sociological material bases in which the very animality of man and a whole irrational capital is at once borne along and exalted, it is normal that in the transformation of a regime like the capitalist regime it should be the working class which furnishes this sociological base, and in this sense one can speak of its historic mission, one can believe that on its behavior depend now for a great part the destinies of humanity.115

Maritain does not wish to deny the historical mission of the proletariat, but he does wish to convert society through the personal perspective. It is primarily through the awakening of consciousness in the family, and then through the personalisation of other social institutions, that authentic change can occur. As we shall come to see, this change must affect the whole of society, i.e. the entire cultural matrix must be altered.

Maritain argues that a truly personalist corporative body can emerge by directing the collectivisation already present under capitalism toward the service of personality and the common good, but in order to accomplish this, it is necessary to dismiss capitalism and establish a system of co-ownership. In Freedom in the Modern World, Maritain writes:

... the conditions of production require a certain measure of collectivisation which bursts the cadres of family economy. In the capitalist regime an industrial undertaking is a hive of salaried workers and of associated capital, in whose service the workers are; and the more the undertaking develops by the use of machinery and the rationalisation of work, and the mobilisation of finance, the more this tendency to collectivisation becomes accentuated. To bring things back to an order more in harmony with justice, the governing rules of the industrial economy ought to subordinate this collectivist movement to the interests of human personality and the common good. Such a
measure of control leads, we think, to a system in which the property in the undertaking and in the means of production passes not indeed to the State or to the nation but to the corporate bodies composed of workers, technicians, and shareholders, viewed as moral persons; so that a system of co-ownership is substituted for the employment of workers at a wage and so that money invested on a basis of partnership and not of money-lending shall be subordinate and not superior to human values; and so that the servitude that follows the use of the machine shall be offset by admitting the workers to share in the direction and the administration of the collective undertaking.116

In his argument against the Marxist overemphasis of the class struggle, Maritain does not hesitate to attack modes of socialism along with communism.117 In this respect, Maritain's critique coincides with the position of Christian democracy against socialist class interest in Western Europe.118 Nevertheless, Maritain appears to be more adamant than Christian democracy in his insistence on co-ownership and a culturally pervasive democratic alternative.

It must be pointed out that Maritain's notion of a truly personalist corporative body carefully avoids any association with the corporative structure of Italian fascism. Fogarty indicates how difficult it was for Christian democracy to dispel this undesirable association.119 Maritain retains the notion of corporation, but he notes:

It is not surprising that the word 'corporative' is interpreted by some in a sense favourable to state capitalism of a Fascist type, and that the word 'guild' is interpreted by others in the sense of a class struggle on the Marxist plan. These same words are none the less used in Papal documents in an entirely different sense and in a much more general significance. Our use of them is in the sense that they
bear in Christian social philosophy, a sense that is to say which is neither Fascist nor Marxist but communal and personal.¹²⁰

This distinction between Maritain's view and the fascist position must be mentioned, because there is a superficial similarity between the corporative views of fascism, Christian democracy, and Maritain. All three seek to develop the particular enterprise to the exclusion of external class interest groups. However, the gap between the fascist reason for doing so and both the Christian democratic and Maritain's motive is vast. The fascist reason for establishing the corporation was twofold: first, and most important, the Italian fascist party sought to eliminate all organisations in competition with its own external control of a particular enterprise; and second, the fascists willed that the employers, who were in fact connected with the ruling personnel, remain on top as a favoured group.¹²¹ Both Christian democracy and Maritain, on the other hand, first of all wish to exclude every form of external intervention in a particular enterprise. Also, both desire that control come from the bottom up, i.e. from persons in communication with other persons. Both Christian democracy and Maritain seek to develop personality through strengthening the autonomy of the family, and likewise through strengthening the independence of the particular enterprise. Maritain, however, seeks a social institution where workers, technicians, and shareholders together own a given enterprise. In Christian democracy, classes tend to co-exist in the firm.¹²² Maritain's goal
is to abolish capitalism through the destruction of the liberal culture which enabled the capitalist class to triumph over the proletariat, and which, in a decidedly more elusive manner than in the nineteenth century, continues to enforce the conditions of servitude.

Any further exploration in the realm of economics should be undertaken by the professional economist alone. In this study, it is sufficient to indicate how Maritain seeks to combat anthropocentric humanism in the economic sphere. Considering the family to be the most fundamental social institution, Maritain seeks to base the economy on it. In agriculture, the family itself controls economic development. In industry, economic development is controlled by the corporation, where all those participating share in a common endeavour or enterprise through the co-ownership of the undertaking. By refusing to foster the exclusive interest of any group, whether it be capitalist or proletarian, Maritain's programme seeks to establish a social unit, somewhat like the family, where mutual enrichment can occur through interpersonal communication. Indeed, various talents are recognised, and a hierarchical structure is maintained. Nevertheless, in a truly democratic society, the structure of the corporation must enable every member to achieve personality.

R. L. Ruhlen, in an unpublished doctoral thesis, which deals specifically with Maritain's position in economics, expresses Maritain's view succinctly: "The so-called 'economic
man' is like the artist—if his deeper nature is a life of the spirit, then he is never whole until he becomes more than an 'economic man.' Maritain is not concerned with developing an economic technique, what he himself disdainfully refers to as "economism". The human being must be liberated from all forms of mechanism and technique. This means that in economy, as elsewhere, the establishment of a personalist situation is Maritain's primary objective. Man must dwell and work in a place where his rational and spiritual dimension can expand. Man must become the master of his own totality, i.e. of the absolutely unique universe which every human person is. Men must work with each other, and not over and under each other. Although the hierarchy based on degrees of talent will remain, the notion of class will lose its meaning in a personalised situation. Ultimately, in economy as elsewhere, Maritain seeks to establish the basis for a cultural transformation. Agriculture and industry must no longer cater to individuals. They must become places where persons can live and work together. This means that economic technique, which is concerned with the material welfare of the people, must be transcended. The goal is the reorientation of the particular human being away from his material individuality toward God through the liberation of his humanity. The whole man has material needs, but the whole man demands that these needs be subordinate to authentic, loving communion. Maritain believes that in such an atmosphere, not only the modes of production will change, but a new way of being
human will emerge. A new culture will develop where men will no longer use, or be used by others. A personalist economy goes together with the personalisation of society as a whole.

Authority in a Personalist Democracy

We are now in a position to appreciate Maritain's understanding of authority and the role of government in a personalist democracy. We have seen how man's coming of age entails freedom of conscience, whereby each person is responsible for his judgements before God. The laws of society should protect this inalienable right discovered through natural law. Therefore, a truly personalist democracy respects both horizontal and vertical pluralism. In other words, such a society does not only acknowledge the division of interest and talent amongst men, but also the existence of diverse creeds. We have seen that the family is the basic social unit, and that economic institutions are constructed in relation to the primordial intimacy which gathers about the domestic hearth. The family incubates independent and loving persons, who achieve their own unique potential and exercise it for the benefit of others. It follows that the government of a personalist democracy must thoroughly respect pluralism and the primary jurisdiction of the family unit, which insures the development of the particular personality. Although Maritain insists that all authority comes from God, he argues that in a personalist democracy this authority arises
from the bottom. In other words, the authority of God is channeled through the free decision of particular persons.

In *Man and the State*, which Charles A. Fecher does not hesitate to refer to as Maritain's "...maturest and most important work on political theory...", there are three basic categories and a number of terms, which can help clarify the discussion of authority in a personalist democracy. First, there is what might be called the organic establishment of man. This consists of "community", which is simply a gathering of individuals comparable to any animal or insect tribe, and "nation", which is an expression of inherited and circumstantial factors which are more specifically human, i.e. the historical consciousness of a community of people. Second, there is that which might be called the rational and spiritual establishment of human personality. This consists of the "body politic", defined as an interpersonal communion which achieves mutual enrichment through the goal of the common good, and "society", which unlike community is the work of reason and the free consent of those participating. Third, there is the "state", which is merely a part, albeit an important one, of the body politic, a single function among the many functions of human society.

In *Freedom in the Modern World* and *The Person and the Common Good*, Maritain made it quite clear that the whole, which is human society, exists for the totalities which human persons in themselves are. Nevertheless, it is through the goal of the common good (i.e. the goal of the
body politic which, as we have seen in the definition given above, consists of persons and not of mere individuals) that particular human beings come to enrich their personalities. In order to maintain society and the body politic, it is necessary that the community of individuals serve the effort for the common good. Needless to say, if this effort is to be fully human, it must engage the whole human being, without neglecting the transcendence of the person and his eternal destiny. In other words, as Maritain states in *The Person and the Common Good*, "... man is engaged in his entirety—but not by reason of his whole self—as a part of political society, a part ordained to the good of society."127

Now, as Maritain writes in *Man and the State*, the state is the part of the body politic which is "... especially concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the common welfare and public order, and the administration of public affairs."128 The government is to insure the effort of human beings for the common good by maintaining order.

As a part of the body politic, the state is invested with a certain authority, which is not to be confused with power. Power is defined as "... the force by means of which you can oblige others to obey you."129 According to Maritain, "Authority is the right to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others. Authority requests Power. Power without authority is tyranny."130

We have already seen how Maritain's definition of democracy allows him to speak of the democratic evolution
during the mediaeval period, when monarchy triumphed. Maritain defines democracy as a general social attitude or philosophy, which seeks the development of personality for the common good. Even mediaeval monarchs could not rule without the consent of those governed. However, it is clear that for Maritain the democratic form of government is the best. Authority should come from the bottom up, from the mass of the body politic to the elected representatives of the people, who, as representatives, remain vicars of the people.

Maritain is not blind to the possible abuse of state or government authority:

Power tends to increase power, the power machine tends ceaselessly to extend itself; the supreme legal and administrative machine tends toward bureaucratic self-sufficiency; it would like to consider itself an end, not a means. Those who specialize in the affairs of the whole have a propensity to take themselves for the whole; the general staffs to take themselves for the whole army, the Church authorities for the whole Church; the State for the whole body politic. By the same token, the State tends to ascribe to itself a peculiar common good—its own self-preservation and growth—distinct both from the public order and welfare which are its immediate end, and from the final good which is its final end.

In order to safeguard the development of human persons, Maritain acknowledges certain basic rights. Being one of those who were quick to defend the International Declaration of Rights, which was published in 1943 by the United Nations, Maritain advocates the protection of human rights as a way to bring about the fruition of the current historical ideal.

Ultimately, and this coincides with the tendency of
the Christian democratic movement, Maritain seeks to move beyond the nation toward a form of international government. Perceiving the community and nation as part of what, in this study, has been called the organic establishment of man, it is clear that the body politic and society, which are concerned with the rational and spiritual dimension of the human being, need not be limited to the particular nation. The smaller groups, the paradigm of which is the family, will always remain as the basis for a personalist democracy. Through them, i.e. through their mutual enrichment in an authentically personalist society, a world society must emerge, where all that belongs to the individual in man, including the biological community and nation, will be subservient to the common good of all the human persons who inhabit the earth.

Having discussed some aspects of the structure of Maritain's personalist democracy, it is now necessary to explicate the means Maritain deems worthy for combating anthropocentric humanism and establishing a personalist society.

The Preeminence of Spiritual Means for the Establishment of a Personalist Democracy

The means which Maritain prescribes for establishing a personalist society are varied. Clearly, those means which deal with the rational and spiritual dimension of the human being are necessarily more significant. This follows from Maritain's emphasis on the development of the particular personality, and his insistence that the freedom of conscience and transcendental orientation of every person be protected.
Maritain's understanding of human freedom demands that society serve the particular person. We have already discussed the reciprocal relationship between the common good of society as a whole and the eternal destiny of the person. Maritain argues that a society based on reason must be both communal and personalist. We have also seen that the development of moral conscience and the progress of democratic evolution demands respect for the particular judgment. Man has come of age, and it is now necessary to protect his rights and acknowledge his maturity. This situation is in conformity with both nature and the Christian Gospel. Maritain argues that it is now necessary to strengthen personality and appeal to conscience. Education and charitable behaviour would then seem to be the fundamental means for establishing a personalist democracy.

However, Maritain does acknowledge the legitimacy of more coercive measures. These become necessary when man refuses to respond to the current historical ideal. We have seen how man's egocentrism, or anthropocentric orientation, has led him to war against freedom. The natural and Christian development of humanism has become perverse. Maritain therefore distinguishes between the means one must employ under a regime of irreversible oppression, which is usually the case where a mode of totalitarianism has become entrenched, and the means available in a liberal democratic state.

In an entrenched totalitarian regime, i.e. a regime where all personal rights are trampled on and the door to dialogue is not even slightly ajar, Maritain does not hesitate
to acknowledge the legitimacy of "... violence and terror and the use of all the means of destruction."139 Presumably, Maritain makes no distinction between the left and the right when it comes to irreversible oppression. Indeed, we must not forget that for Maritain the leftist expansion of democracy beyond the narrow views of bourgeois liberalism is acknowledged as being in itself a positive step. Nevertheless, the claim of any state to absolute sovereignty is a lie and a betrayal of democratic principles. Any irreversible bureaucratic action against human personality must be met with the force necessary to overcome it.

It must be pointed out that Maritain condones warfare between countries only in the case of a country's legitimate defence.140 Apart from the direct attack of a totalitarian country upon a liberal democratic country, "all the means of destruction" are presumably left in the hands of indigenous insurrectionists.

It must also be pointed out that, even when barbarous conditions necessitate violent revolution, Maritain's position is not simply a matter of "anything goes" in the struggle for victory. For example, in The Range of Reason, concerning the just struggle of those living in the univers concentrationaire of Buchenwald and Ravensbruck, Maritain writes:

Let us not speak of people who chose to accept any kind of rotten means—spying, cruelty, betrayal, co-operation with oppressors and torturers, direct or indirect murder of fellow prisoners—to seize the upper hand in such a degraded society. There were other people, generally Christians, who also undertook a sort of political struggle to dodge the ferocious discipline of
their jailers, but who in so doing endeavored to submit to the exigencies of moral law the decisions they were obliged to make in the midst of barbarous circumstances. 141

Theoretically, Maritain may exhibit some ambiguity in regard to the question of using violent means to establish the proper temporal order. But his support for those in France who chose to resist violently Nazi oppression during the Second World War indicates his practical commitment. 142 He knows, however, that the use of corrupt means to gain control tends to perpetuate the conditions of oppression and in fact ends in a form of collaboration with the enemy. This collaboration does not have to be as open as that indicated above. Any attempt to gain control through means which are utterly corrupt leads to the replacement of one form of oppression with another. The enemy is not overcome, he only puts on a new mask. The extreme conditions of the camps vividly reveal what is actually going on when such means are employed.

Maritain is not blind to the fact that even in the so-called free world, i.e. the world of the Western democracies, injustice exists. He was very much concerned, for example, with the civil rights movement in the United States. 143 He also condemned the brutality of the French establishment during the events of May, 1968, as well as the action taken against the Students for a Democratic Society at Columbia University in the United States, where "... la répression policière semble y avoir été plus brutale encore qu'à Paris" 144 However, in a regime which has not yet reduced human person-
ality to the level of objective individuality, which can be either used or dispensed with like a piece of clay, Maritain appears to be content with pressure groups and forms of militant non-violence. In this respect, he owes much to the work of both Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi.\textsuperscript{145}

However, the removal of obstacles to God's grace is the most important means Maritain prescribes for combating anthropocentric humanism and establishing a personalist democracy. It is necessary, above all else, to establish a personalist situation or atmosphere, where the promulgation of rights enables the particular human being to expand as a person. These rights are formulated in such a way that freedom of conscience is respected and the development of individualistic egoism curtailed.\textsuperscript{146} The objective is to protect the domain of the person from those who would trespass and exploit it. But the merely legal prescription of rights is in itself not sufficient. A personalist situation is one in which authentic dialogue can occur. It must offer an atmosphere which enhances what Maritain calls "civic friendship".\textsuperscript{147}

Although indigenous attempts to resist violently the tyranny of totalitarian regimes are applauded, Maritain's fundamental concern is with the transformation of liberal democracy. As exemplified by certain trends in the United States of America, the democratic West is moving beyond the brutal individualism rampant in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{148} It is Maritain's hope that here a truly personalist society will emerge. Pressure may indeed be necessary to insure
minority rights. However, the opening of dialogue and the establishment of friendship appear to be Maritain's primary concerns. The promulgation of rights, and the respect that this enforces, is only meaningful in the context of neighbourly love. For this to be achieved, the presence of God's grace, albeit secretly working in the mysterious depths of personality, is necessary.

In order to remove the obstacles to social communion, to give grace one more chance and to insure that members of the body politic expand as persons in the most favourable environment, Maritain proposes certain directives for educators.

The will of the particular human being is of paramount importance in Maritain's personalist democracy. In his *Education at the Crossroads*, he notes that "... it is through man's will, when it is good, not through his intelligence, be it ever so perfect, that man is made good and right." And following the logic of this maxim, he argues:

... the principal agent in education, the primary dynamic factor or propelling force, is the internal vital principle in the one to be educated; the educator or teacher is only the secondary--though a genuinely effective--dynamic factor and a ministerial agent.

Therefore, the primary aim of education is to offer the student his own freedom of expansion, beyond the narrow confines of the individual ego toward spontaneous love of neighbour:

If it is true that the internal principle, that is to say, nature--and grace too, for man is not merely natural being--is what matters most in education, it follows that the entire art consists in inspiring, schooling and pruning,
teaching and enlightening, so that in the intimacy of man's activities the weight of the egoistic tendencies diminishes, and the weight of the aspirations proper to personality and its spiritual generosity increases.\textsuperscript{152}

Furthermore, Maritain argues that certain fundamental dispositions, with regard to truth and justice, existence itself, work, and neighbours be fostered by educators.\textsuperscript{153} Proposing a scheme for education throughout life,\textsuperscript{154} he advocates a hierarchy of knowledge,\textsuperscript{155} and insists that theology be taught even to unbelievers, so that they will be able to "... better understand the roots of our culture and civilization."\textsuperscript{156}

The specific goal of this education, as stated in \textit{Education at the Crossroads}, is to combat the totalitarian mentality, by orienting man toward the transcendent leaven in the democratic evolution. "Our crucial need and problem ...," Maritain writes, "... is to rediscover the natural faith of reason in truth. Inasmuch as we are human, we retain this faith in our subconscious instinct."\textsuperscript{157} He makes the observation that democracy's

... motive power is of a spiritual nature--the will to justice and brotherly love--but its philosophy has long been pragmatism, which cannot justify real faith in such a spiritual inspiration.\textsuperscript{158}

And he asks, "How, then, can democracy vindicate its own historical ideal--a heroic ideal--against the totalitarian myths?"\textsuperscript{159}

Always concerned with maintaining the primacy of the spiritual, Maritain argues that the visible members of
the Church should make their presence felt in the modern, democratic regimes. In agreement with his colleague, Etienne Gilson, he distinguishes between Catholic Action per se and the concrete political maneuvers of Church members. Considering himself to be in agreement with the encyclicals of Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Pius XII, he argues that Catholic action is primarily concerned with spiritual matters, while at the same time exhibiting

... a Christian political, social, and economic wisdom, which does not descend to the particular determinations of the concrete, but which is as a theological firmament for the more particular doctrines and activities engaged in the contingencies of the temporal ... \[161\]

Although the Roman Catholic Church inevitably inspires temporal action, it is Maritain's contention that the Church may not openly, i.e. by name, be concerned with concrete alternatives. The Church must protect the rights of the person. Indeed, Maritain argues that the Church may very well become the final refuge for the person.\[162\] Nevertheless, Maritain acknowledges a certain distinction between the Church and temporal society. We have seen how the historical ideal of Mediaeval Christendom tended toward Caesarpapism, whereby temporal authority usurps the authority of the Church. This theocratic tendency was also exhibited, albeit in a different fashion, by the popes themselves. During the dissolution of the Middle Ages, the popes relied heavily upon temporal means to exercise their authority. Maritain asserts that such action by the papacy is itself a mode of anthropocentric humanism, i.e. an attempt by man to
gain salvation through himself alone. Against theocracy, Maritain argues that temporal society must pursue its own proper end. However, this end is infravalent: below and subservient to the eternal end of the person, which is powerfully proclaimed by the Church. Maritain thus avoids the errors of the early Sillon and the Action Française, which tended to associate the Church too closely with a particular political ideology. In order to avoid the identification of the Church with any political organisation, Maritain thinks that members of the clergy should not become directly involved in politics.

However, the Catholic laity, precisely because of its commitment to the Church and to Christ, must choose amongst current alternatives. Maritain even urges the Catholic laity to form political parties, perhaps anonymously Christian, in order to assure the establishment of a truly just and loving society, one which respects the dignity of the human person and acts in conformity with the spiritual doctrine of the Church.

A new Christendom can emerge, where temporal ends will once again come into line with the spiritual ends proclaimed by the Church. This is what might be called the practical hope of Maritain's theocentric humanism. While arguing for a certain degree of diversity amongst Christian parties, he clearly favours those which openly espouse the democratic form of government. For this reason, he argues that the Church should have no juridic privileges
in a personalist democracy. The Church would still be the supreme spiritual authority in a new Christendom, for God's definitive revelation is present in the Church's creed and teaching. However, temporal society conforms to this spiritual hegemony in accordance with concrete circumstances. During the mediaeval period, the holy empire of Charlemagne was paradigmatic. Today, it is man's quest for a democratic form of government which is the paradigm. This quest is plagued by the parasite of individualism, which may very well destroy it. Nevertheless, the attempt to establish a democratic form of government is a further development of man's struggle to gain his own humanity and the sanctification promised by Christ. It is no wonder that Christian democratic leaders have praised Maritain, especially for his Integral Humanism. Maritain himself has applauded pioneers of Christian democracy in Europe, as well as current leaders in South America.

We now see how spiritual means are preeminent for Maritain. Personalist democracy is primarily a stage in the development of temporal society. It therefore acknowledges the concrete exigencies of the historical situation. Both vertical and horizontal pluralism are respected within the body politic. The temporal means of group pressure, revolution, and warfare are not ruled out. However, the great lesson of the Incarnation, mediaeval society, and Thomism is that grace perfects human nature. For this reason, the spiritual must always remain primary. In the world of
today, the Church must support the temporal gains which have been inspired by the Christian Gospel. It can do this through education and the activity of the Catholic laity in civil society. The mediaeval temptation to theocracy is no longer prevalent, and the Church need not wield the bloody sword of temporal authority. In fact, it can be said that today the Church's spiritual role is more clearly defined than ever before. 173

5. The Personalist Alternative to Individualism and Totalitarianism

The practical consequences of the dilemma of the individual, which confronts contemporary society, may be summarised in the notion of the individualist-collectivist syndrome. This expression designates the view that the egocentrism which arose from both the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation has ushered in the age of bourgeois individualism, which in turn inevitably engenders totalitarian reactions. It has been shown that these reactions are, for Maritain, logical extensions of individualistic thought.

As a way of overcoming the dilemma of the individual, of combating the individualist-collectivist syndrome, Maritain prescribes his personalist democracy. Acknowledging the democratic evolution as a positive development under the guidance of evangelical inspiration, he does not hesitate to bring his doctrine of the human person into conformity with
Maritain's social critique has exposed both the individualist-collectivist syndrome and the democratic evolution, and his personalism is an attempt to clarify and develop further the transcendent aspirations of democracy as a way of combating individualism and totalitarianism. Although advocating violent resistance against totalitarianism where necessary, and the application of pressure through acts of militant non-violence even in the freer atmosphere of the democratic West, Maritain's major concern is with establishing a personalist climate, a situation where man's natural freedom of expansion and the protection of rights can be realised through sincere dialogue and civic friendship. Personalism can offer constructive proposals in the areas of economics and government, but its primary concern is to establish the proper foundation for change. For this reason, the task of the educator is immensely important. Also, the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church and the political activity of the Catholic laity are crucial for Maritain, who sees there a way of promoting the primacy of the spiritual. A permeation of democratic society by the Catholic laity, through active participation in politics, may become the avant-garde of personalism. However, in conformity with the current historical ideal, which fully respects the privacy of conscience, the aim of political agitation is to guarantee the personal rights of all.

We now see how Maritain's social critique has influenced the development of his personalism. Maritain's social critique has exposed the unique problem of our age, which
is egocentrism or individualism. The practical consequences of this are bourgeois liberalism and totalitarianism. However, his critical analysis of contemporary society has also exposed the democratic evolution as a positive force inspired by the Christian Gospel. Modern democracy seeks the development of human personality for the common good. This means that modern man seeks a communal organisation which respects the unique gifts of every human being and man's theocentric orientation. Maritain's personalism must be defined within the context of his social critique. It constitutes an attempt to overcome man's current anthropocentric orientation through modern democracy, which is compatible with man's theocentric orientation. Having observed the atrocities committed by those who would renounce human personality and freedom, Maritain desires to establish a new Christendom in which the Church would honour modern man's preoccupation with freedom. This new Christendom would replace the selfish freedom of bourgeois individualism with the freedom of the saints, and it would acknowledge the positive accomplishments of our humanistic age. It would be a form of theocentric humanism, rather than the divine imperialism of the Middle Ages.

Maritain knows that the goals of personalism are distant goals, and that those pursuing them may eventually face martyrdom rather than complete success. Nevertheless, he believes that he is proposing a viable alternative, one which is consistent with the current situation. It may be only partially realisable, but it is in conformity with the
exigencies of history. Tomorrow may create a new historical situation, and today's partial success may then be seen as a necessary link, a bridge on the road to the glory beyond.
CONCLUSION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF MARITAIN'S PERSONALIST DEMOCRACY

Through an analysis of Maritain's social thought, we have seen how his social critique influenced the development of his personalism. Maritain's social critique began as an exposition of the unique problem which confronts the modern world. This problem is called egocentrism, whereby man turns away from God and toward himself. A growing awareness of the implications of authoritarianism led Maritain to develop his personalism in accordance with the modern democratic enterprise. Seeking to avoid the pitfalls of nineteenth century bourgeois culture, which enabled the selfish aspirations of strong individuals to triumph, Maritain based his personalist democracy on the rights of the human person. In this way, his analysis of contemporary society gave him the guideline for his own solution to the problem of how to direct modern man away from destructive egocentrism. Unlike the homogeneity expressed during the mediaeval period, modern society is decidedly pluralist. Maritain accepts this situation, and argues that the Church can no longer dictate policy in the temporal order. However, he insists on the spiritual supremacy of the Church's teaching. He advocates that a new Christendom be established, which respects the
temporal achievements of man as an elevation of nature inspired by God. Maritain desires to convert pluralist society, but without coercion. Modern man has now come into his majority: today's maturity demands freedom of conscience as a fundamental right. Maritain works within this situation, seeking to direct man's preoccupation with freedom toward the perfect liberation offered in Christ. At this stage in history, the Church can learn from the development of moral conscience in the temporal order. Maritain thereby seeks to evolve with modern society. He does not wish to impose an external truth upon it.

An examination of Maritain's critics will more fully expose the intention of his social thought. Before his acceptance of Christianity, Maritain despised the individualism rampant throughout bourgeois culture. After he became a Roman Catholic and discovered the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, the question of how to direct man away from egocentrism clearly emerged in the context of a more formal question: how to bring modern man's search for autonomy into harmony with man's transcendent orientation as expressed in the past. Aware of his unique place in history, Maritain did not want to return to that past, but rather, he sought to move forward toward a decidedly new theocentric orientation for man in contemporary society. Maritain's contribution, as a relevant social thinker, is to be found in the questions he asked and his expressed intention to develop a mode of theocentric humanism, indicating his refusal either to deny
the proven strength of man's transcendent orientation in the past or to turn away from the positive, temporal achievements of a new age. Since criticism of Maritain often fails to appreciate either his commitment to transcendence or his dedication to human freedom, an examination of his critics, side by side in the light of his doctrine, tends to clarify the intention of his social thought to acknowledge both transcendence and autonomy.

There is another mode of criticism, however, which arises from the analysis of Maritain's social thought undertaken in this study. There is a certain generalisation and abstraction in Maritain's thought, exemplified by omissions and heady generalisations in his interpretation of modern thinkers and events. This tendency toward generalisation must be acknowledged. It indicates some possible inadequacies in Maritain's interpretation of modernity and gives direction to future research.

1. Maritain and His Critics

Maritain's critics either neglect his appreciation of traditional modes of transcendence or his commitment to man's present quest for autonomy. This can lead to the contention that Maritain is duplicitous: he seeks to honour the supernaturalism of antiquity while paying homage to modern man's dedication to worldly affairs. Both Emmanuel Mounier and Gabriel Marcel have spoken of Maritain in this way. However, in this section we will see how Henri Bars is correct,
when he observes with regard to the work of Maritain:

Mais autre chose est la soudure plus ou moins artificieuse d'éléments en quelque sorte physiques, autre chose est la fusion d'énergies vitales qui requièrent de part et d'autre une pensée elle-même vivante, et, quoique dominées par elle dans la simplicité d'une intuition, maintiennent l'homme qui pense dans un état de puissante et féconde tension. Qu'une telle tension existe chez le philosophe qui est allé de Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin mais pour faire descendre Thomas d'Aquin dans la rue, qui défend la primauté du spirituel mais est présent au crépuscule de la civilisation, qui toujours distingue avec l'intention d'unir toujours, qui veut réconcilier la science à la sagesse et compenser l'antimoderne par l'ultramoderne, qui vous offre d'une main les droits de l'homme et de l'autre la clé des chants, dont l'humanisme est à la fois intégral et théocentrique...  

It is not necessary to pursue an exhaustive account of Maritain's critics. What appears to be most significant in the various cautions which have been raised concerning personalist democracy is the accusation that Maritain fails to achieve a viable alternative for modern man, insinuating, in one way or another, that he failed to grasp adequately the true nature of contemporary society. Maritain is thus interpreted as a prisoner of his times, who either falls back upon traditional arguments, which have lost contact with contemporary realities, or becomes a victim of the modern notions he seeks to dispel. He is thereby dismissed as another ineffective, essentially irrelevant voice in the confusion of our age. 

However diverse the voices raised against Maritain are, they all tend to accuse him of remaining a prisoner of the confusion which typifies modernity. In this sense only would his critics argue that Maritain is a contemporary
thinker. A number of those who criticise Maritain's position agree that he failed to achieve an alternative for modern man. This amounts to saying that he failed to achieve a truly profound insight into the nature of his times. Joseph Amato argues that Maritain succumbed to the temptation of liberalism during his lengthy sojourn in the United States. William J. Nottingham chastises Maritain for his philosophical and theological conservatism, asserting that this prevents him from adequately directing his thought toward the future. In the first chapter of this study, we have seen how Hans Küng discusses Maritain as a reactionary. Perhaps the most recent example of the accusation that Maritain's philosophical and theological conservatism tends to undermine the radicalness of his social thought comes from Paul F. Knitter, who believes that Maritain is essentially a dualist. Knitter argues that Maritain's insistence on the ultimate importance of the supernatural reduces the history of this world to triviality.\(^3\) From another perspective, Julio Meinvielle argues that Maritain is a child of his times, moving toward heresy as assuredly as Lamennais did in the nineteenth century. For decidedly different reasons, all of these critics would agree with the appraisal of Maritain contained in Amato's succinct remark about both Mounier and Maritain: "Taken together, Maritain's humanism and Mounier's Personalism are questionable as a 'new historical ideal'. As theories, they appear to reflect rather than transcend the tensions and dilemmas of their epoch."\(^4\) This is a serious accusation, for it means that Maritain failed to produce a viable alternative.
Amato believes that Maritain's liberalism follows from his infatuation with America during and after the Second World War:

It was this belief in the United States and its institutions—as exaggerated as it was—that brought Maritain fully into the mainstream of contemporary liberal political theory, and culminated a political evolution which led from the Action Française to the pluralism of his Integral Humanism of the 1930's, and then to American liberal democracy. In sum, it was the support which Maritain gave France and the United States during and immediately after the Second World War that baptized him as a liberal and made him indisputably an adherent to the tenets of freedom, brotherhood and social justice.

Amato correctly and clearly depicts the basis for Maritain's agreement with American culture:

... Maritain noted that the United States is a classless society in the social sense and is not embourgeoisée. It is going beyond capitalism towards a society of communities and persons. Its separation of state and society, its juridical and political assurance of separate bodies approximate a 'pluralist ideal'. It is a religious society, thanks to a state that affirms the person, freedom, law, and the rights and diversity of religions.

The essence of Amato's criticism lies in the accusation that Maritain failed to achieve a viable alternative for modern man. By embracing pluralism and acknowledging the rights of man, Amato asserts that Maritain in fact succumbs to the liberal situation in which he finds himself. In spite of his vision of a new America, which "is going beyond capitalism towards a society of communities and persons", Maritain in fact advances no further than current liberal theory.

The accusation that Maritain remains too conservative as a philosopher and theologian is similar to the criticism
that he remains entrapped within liberalism as a political theorist. The comments of Küng, Nottingham, and Knitter are instructive here. The comments of Küng, himself a theologian, denounce Maritain for the philosophical and theological conservatism expressed in *The Peasant of the Garonne*. Likewise, Nottingham, who readily acknowledges the radical potential in Maritain's social thought, cautions:

> At one and the same time, Thomism maintains the integrity of reason and natural law while giving access to the gullible excesses of fundamentalism. There is always the danger of suspending critical judgment for certain events and thereby approaching with more piety than candor.⁷

He asserts that Maritain

> . . . can conceive of the transcendent only in terms of Thomist supernaturalism, so he accuses Protestantism and the modern world of having 'naturalized' Christianity. It is an error on his part to suppose that nominalism, the Reformation, and contemporary Protestantism love and obey God less because of their refusal of Catholic supernaturalism.⁸

Küng is critical of Maritain primarily for his theological conservatism. Nottingham criticises Maritain for his supernaturalism. However, Nottingham also acknowledges the value of Maritain's social thought, thereby indicating that there is a dichotomy between Maritain's spiritual conservatism and his concern for relevancy and feasibility. Knitter contends that the supernaturalism of Maritain actually reduces his social thought to impotence:

> While he [Maritain] persistently calls upon Christians never to give up their efforts to improve society, while he sometimes even implies that some progress can be made, still, because of the ineradicable reality of human sinfulness, the goal can
never be achieved. . . . All we can do is, like Sisyphus, stumble 'from fall to fall.' The 'final term' of all our efforts to better this world will not be this world but another. At the most, all we can accomplish is a 'refraction,' a certain previewing of a coming, supernatural world.\(^9\)

The criticism of Nottingham and Knitter engenders the question: How can Maritain uphold an historically responsible social position while adhering to the ancient tradition of Roman Catholicism? Like the accusation of political liberalism, the charge of philosophical and theological conservatism implies that Maritain is not capable of developing a proper alternative for modern society, because he did not achieve a truly profound insight into the nature of man's present situation.

The accusation of heresy also brands Maritain as a victim of his age, who is unable to surmount the confusion rampant in the world of today. Meinvielle asserts that Maritain, like Lamennais before him, abandons an ultramontane position in favour of socialist revolution.\(^10\) Himself a staunch supporter of Franco's authoritarianism, Meinvielle condemns Maritain for his refusal to support the nationalist cause in Spain.\(^11\) He argues further that Maritain's influence paves the way for communism in South America.\(^12\) Meinvielle cautions that Maritain's distinction between the spiritual and temporal planes in fact fosters two Christianities, one being supernatural and the other of the earth.\(^13\)

Garrigou-Lagrange, himself sympathetic to Franco's achievement in Spain,\(^14\) nevertheless comes to the defence of Maritain, who was a close friend and colleague.\(^15\) Garrigou-Lagrange notes that the distinction between the spiritual
and temporal planes, and the argument that on the temporal plane the Catholic should now support democracy, do not necessarily amount to a betrayal of Roman Catholic orthodoxy. Perhaps there is a similarity between the early Lamennais, who acknowledged the supremacy of the pope while supporting human rights and freedom of conscience in the temporal order, and Maritain. But Maritain remained faithful to the Church, insisting on the compatibility of his democratic viewpoint with the Church's spiritual authority. Garrigou-Lagrange knows that Maritain advocates the primacy of the spiritual and seeks to conform temporal society to the teaching of the Church, and thereby anticipates Maritain's response to his critics.

In response to the accusations of political expediency or liberalism, philosophical and theological conservatism, and heresy, it should be emphasized that Maritain merely wishes to maintain the spiritual hegemony of the Church while acknowledging the proper goal of temporal society.

Against Amato, we have seen that Maritain's acceptance of the Church's spiritual authority, which proclaims eternal and uncompromising verities, ultimately distinguishes him from liberal ideology. He accepts personal rights and freedom of conscience, precisely because such acceptance is a natural, moral development in response to the call of Christ. Maritain desires to transcend American liberalism, insofar as it remains a child of the laissez-faire attitude of the nineteenth century. It is true that he appreciates the fact that the
economic institutions of America have been drifting away from ruthless free enterprise. Certainly Maritain does not hesitate to laud the positive achievements of American liberal society, many of which have been gained by professed Christians. He is especially pleased with the fact that the government of the United States continues to profess a minimal recognition of God, thereby acknowledging its goal as infravalent without endangering the juridic privileges of any particular religious organisation or denomination. But we have seen how Maritain denounces America for its pragmatism and lack of a proper philosophical vision. This is significant, because it means that his acceptance of personal rights and freedom of conscience does not indicate that they are ends in themselves. The pragmatic attitude of American liberalism advances pluralism, both vertical and horizontal, as a desirable goal, envisioning it as a promotion of new possibilities for human development. Although advocating horizontal pluralism himself, Maritain tolerates vertical pluralism simply because personal rights and freedom of conscience are prerequisites in the temporal order for the perfect autonomy of the saints.

On the other hand, it is evident from what has been said in this study, that the accusation of philosophical and theological conservatism, put forth by Künig, Nottingham, and Knitter, fails to appreciate the radicalness of Maritain's understanding of human development. We have seen how Maritain's interpretation of the Incarnation and of Aquinas allows him to incorporate every positive achievement of
civilisation. The Church must also acknowledge gains in the
temporal order. Maritain contends that it is the Church's
supernaturalism which enables it to proclaim the transcendence
of the person above any partisan allegiance to temporal
authority. It is this transcendence which explains the
necessity for human rights in the temporal order. According
to Maritain, the spiritual conservatism of the Church is
essential for a proper understanding of social evolution.

Against Meinvielle and those who would accuse
Maritain of heresy, it is clear that Maritain comes very close to
reversing the charges. Acceptance of pluralism enables
Maritain to respect the rights of authoritarian Christians,
but the inner dynamic of his social thought condemns them.
It is clear that he inevitably favours the democratic view-
point as the only one in agreement with today's historical
ideal, and therefore the only viewpoint which conforms to the
will of God expressed in history. We have also seen how
Maritain denounces the theocratic aspirations of the Church
as an expression of modern man's egocentrism. Coercion
fails to retain the historical ideal of the Middle Ages.
The Holy Roman Empire is no more, and the attempt to revive
it through some form of authoritarianism is both historically
retrogressive and a betrayal of the Church's mission in
the world.

The preceding discussion of some of Maritain's critics
puts us in a position to appreciate more fully the intention
of his social thought to harmonize transcendence and autonomy.
Against those who would argue that Maritain is far too liberal, as well as against those who would argue that his conservatism inevitably leads to a reactionary stance, it must be pointed out that it is precisely Maritain's intention to avoid both through the unification of transcendence and freedom. Personalist democracy is the attempt to acknowledge the positive contribution of modern man's quest for freedom in the light of traditional wisdom. From his own experience, Maritain came to see that man must somehow overcome his egocentricism. His conversion to Christianity, and his research into contemporary affairs, led him to appreciate the potential in modern society to dispel anthropocentrism and attain a new transcendent or theocentric orientation. He came to advocate continuity or tradition, rather than reject the current situation either by retreating into the past or by interpreting all else in the light of some utopian vision of the future. Personalist democracy is a response to the question of how to bring modern man's search for autonomy into harmony with man's transcendent orientation as expressed in the past. Maritain claims to have discerned a new mode of transcendence in the contemporary, historical ideal of holy freedom, which is to replace the medieval ideal of holy empire.

However, there is one criticism of Maritain which lends credibility to both the conservative's fear and the liberal's ridicule of personalist democracy as the avant-garde of a new Christendom. Charles Frankel (a prominent exponent of contemporary liberal theory) is correct, when
he says that Maritain's primary concern is to establish ultimate values within democracy. Noting Maritain's fundamental concern, Frankel succeeds in delivering the ultimate challenge to Maritain's personalist democracy: "A statement of ultimate faith will produce general agreement in a society only if there is also an agreed-on institution which can enforce a single interpretation of that faith." On the level of praxis, Frankel thereby offers us the proper context for the question raised by other critics in this conclusion: Does Maritain's personalist democracy offer society a viable alternative or does his attempt to unite transcendence with pluralism and the rights of man lead to the perpetuation of the confusion he so vehemently detests?

Refuting some of his opponents is not enough to dispel doubt concerning the relevancy of Maritain's intention to harmonize transcendence and autonomy in contemporary society. We must not oversimplify Maritain's position by calling him a liberal, as Amato suggests. We may not describe him as a theoretical reactionary, in the way Küng, Nottingham, and Knitter do. Nor can we, like Meinvielle, call him a dangerous heretic whose social endeavour is comparable to the position of Lamennais. Although they clarify the intention of Maritain's position, indicating the desire of personalist democracy to avoid the various traps of modernity by retaining both transcendence and freedom, these refutations do not entitle us to proclaim the historical responsibility of Maritain's social thought.
In this study, we have seen how Maritain's critical analysis of contemporary thought and action helped determine the democratic nature of his personalism. Personalist democracy has been discussed as a truly relevant, contemporary phenomenon. It is a viable alternative, precisely because it accounts for concrete variables (bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism) while advocating the further development of elements already obvious (democratic institutions) in the light of the continuing presence of the past (the transcendent values of classical civilization and the teaching of the Church). A few words of clarification and elaboration are necessary here; they will at the same time constitute our answer to Frankel's summary criticism of Maritain on the level of praxis.

Certainly the relevancy of Maritain's position does not depend upon the ability of personalist democracy to solve all the problems of modernity. Neither is it necessary to show that history is inevitably advancing toward personalist democracy. However, both the internal coherence of Maritain's position and its practical feasibility must be demonstrated. The present study enables us to see the internal consistency and viability of personalist democracy. As Frankel has stated, Maritain's ambition is to establish ultimate values within democracy. Thus Frankel is able to challenge personalist democracy, by insisting that some form of authoritarian institution is necessary to enforce ultimate values. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the consistency of Maritain's social thought, it is necessary to show how his strict adherence to ultimate values actually enhances his acceptance of democratic institutions.
Such an exercise requires the application of what has already been shown in this study. The dissolution of Frankel's criticism also demands that personalist democracy attain some level of historical feasibility. Although not the final solution, it must nevertheless be practical and able to generate some direction for the future. This study has shown how Maritain became attentive to the exigencies of his situation, developing his personalism in accordance with the historical process.

Against Frankel, Maritain thinks that ultimate values comprise the very foundation of true democracy. We have seen how Maritain believes that modern democracy, inspired by Christianity, must protect the transcendent aspirations of human personality while pursuing the common good of temporal society. Such respect for human personality entails the recognition of ultimate values and is the fundamental prerequisite of the democratic enterprise. The transcendent orientation of the person is the basis of man's quest for freedom, whether it be mere freedom of choice or the perfect autonomy of the saints. This study has shown how Maritain's social critique accuses modern society of seeking the liberation of the individual in place of the person. We have seen how this confusion of individuality with personality engenders the social ills of the modern world. Maritain accepts democracy, but insists that its foundation is the transcendent orientation of the person. This is why he maintains that the modern democratic urge was already evident in mediaeval society. The individualism fostered by the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation developed
as a parasitical growth, feeding on the truths of the democratic enterprise which Christianity inspired. These truths are ultimate values: the human person, his rights in temporal society, and his eternal beatitude. The liberals of today are engaged in a legitimate fight for personal rights, and they believe that states will come to acknowledge these rights more clearly in the future. Maritain contends that the ultimate values proclaimed by the Church have initiated modern man's struggle for mature autonomy. For this reason, he thinks that in the future the Church may prove to be the only refuge of the person.21

Concerning the feasibility of personalist democracy, Maritain does not hide behind the jargon of the modern ideologist and assert that the future will vindicate the righteousness of his cause. Maritain believes that personalist democracy is attuned to the exigencies of his age. Personalist democracy does not suggest the imposition of eternal truth from some privileged sphere beyond history, but rather, the viable convergence of historical forces sustained by the evangelical leaven. The historical ideal of holy freedom is a standard which guides. Announced by the American and French Revolutions, the ideal of freedom indicates man's maturity to date. Like the ideal of the holy empire, which preceded it, the ideal of man's autonomy may never be perfectly achieved. Indeed, it is Maritain's position that no historical ideal will ever be fully realised. Its purpose is to guide man in accordance with the concrete situation of a given age. Personalist democracy is the practical expression of today's ideal, because it accounts
for man's current development and points to the future.

If Frankel is correct in saying that a statement of ultimate belief will bring about agreement in society only if there is an acknowledged institution to enforce a single interpretation of that belief, then Christianity, which proclaims a single faith, is not capable of adhering to democratic principles. In fact, it is the case that Protestant Christianity has played a major role in the development of modern democracy, particularly in America. And since Pope John XXIII, the Roman Catholic Church has been moving toward a more appreciative view of the modern world. For example, Pope John has made proclamations which have furthered the Vatican's acceptance of democracy and necessitated the softening of the authoritarian position in Spain. The influence of Maritain on Pope Paul VI and the Second Vatican Council has already been stated in the introduction to this study. Certainly the Council's profession of religious toleration is compatible with Maritain's understanding of pluralism, implying the distinction between the Church's spiritual goal and the common good of temporal society, which must account for diverse creeds.

Recently, the appeal of Pope John Paul II on behalf of personal rights is further evidence of the relevancy of Maritain's position.

In the spirit of Maritain's analysis of contemporary society, James H. Billington (a noted American historian of revolutionary change) has commented on the emerging historical trend toward the merger of transcendent values from the past
with modern man's democratic aspiration for freedom:

... the end may be approaching of the political religion which saw in revolution the sunrise of a perfect society. I am further disposed to wonder if this secular creed, which arose in Judaeo-Christian culture, might not ultimately prove to be only a stage in the continuing metamorphosis of older forms of faith and to speculate that the belief in secular revolution, which has legitimized so much authoritarianism in the twentieth century, might dialectically prefigure some rediscovery of religious evolution to revalidate democracy in the twenty-first.24

It is not unrealistic for Maritain to assert that a new Christendom may arise from the Church's direct appeal to persons. This is the way of God through Jesus Christ. Stripped of its temporal domains in the nineteenth century, the Church of the twentieth century is now free to pursue its spiritual mission. To the consternation of critics like Küng, Nottingham, and Knitter, it is precisely Maritain's philosophical and theological conservatism which quickens the radicalness of his social thought. His preoccupation with the primacy of the spiritual, his insistence on the crucial importance of Thomist metaphysics and the allegiance of the Church to the supernatural, enables Maritain to respect the temporal goals and positive achievements of secular civilisation. Indeed, the Church's direct appeal to persons may be rejected by many. This is consistent with Maritain's understanding of the fundamental ambiguity of history, whereby history advances in evil as well as in good. Bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism still exist, and the Church will have its martyrs. This does not mean that Maritain's personalist approach lacks historical responsibility.
Ultimately, the historical responsibility of Maritain's social thought is expressed in his notion of the concrete historical ideal. His assessment of modernity is contained in the ideal of holy freedom, whereby the human person is acknowledged as the privileged creature whom grace unites to God. Through the God-man, Jesus Christ, man's friendship with God becomes a possibility. The Incarnation indicates both the elevation of nature and God's respect for man's dignity. In the world of today, the proclamation of human rights is a legitimate, temporal expression of the respect God shows for man in Jesus Christ. Maritain welcomes the democratic achievements of modern, secular society, without sacrificing man's transcendent orientation toward God.

The value of Maritain's position is to be found in the question of how to bring modern man's search for autonomy into harmony with man's transcendent orientation as expressed in the past. The intention of his social thought to accomplish this task indicates Maritain's attunement to his historical situation. In order to overcome his egocentrism, avoiding the individualism of the past century as well as totalitarianism, modern man must come to respect the transcendent values of human personality within the democratic framework already pitted against totalitarianism. Maritain shows us that the foundation of democracy is not material individuality, but rather, the personal spirituality which makes each man unique and free, subject in conscience to God alone.

Now that we have seen the historical responsibility of Maritain's social thought, and thereby his relevancy as
a contemporary thinker, it is necessary to note certain lacunae in his interpretation of modernity. The general trend of his social thought, as expressed in its intention and the questions which are asked, establishes the viability of Maritain's position. However, this strength may also prove to be a weakness. Is Maritain's project an initial step in the right direction, a generality requiring further research, greater refinement, and more precise application?

2. Personalist Democracy and the Future

Ironically, it is the attention Maritain gives to the current historical ideal which distracts him from certain concrete details. The ideal of holy freedom indicates the theoretical and practical dimensions of Maritain's social thought, which is an assessment of modernity and an attempt to retain the primacy of the spiritual in a viable way. Thus Maritain's social thought contains both his social critique and his personalism. We have seen how his critical analysis of contemporary thought and action enabled him to eschew the fundamental problem in modern society, i.e. egocentrism. His social critique also acquainted him with modern democracy, the further development of which he came to see as the only alternative to bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism. However, the immensity of Maritain's project necessitated a certain generality in his analysis of contemporary society. His notion of the concrete historical ideal indicates the general nature of his social thought, whereby the guiding ideal of an entire
historical period is ascertained. It is true that the historical ideal is based upon epochal facts (the reign of Charlemagne and the American and French Revolutions), and therefore indicates the historical relevancy of Maritain's project. Nevertheless, such a vast project loses sight of important details.

For example, we have seen the bias in Maritain's interpretation of Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation. This does not mean that Maritain is wrong when he points out Luther's contribution to the general development of egocentrism. It does mean that there are other facets to Protestantism. Although he does acknowledge the Protestant contribution to the evolution of democracy, it is clear that Maritain did not produce careful scholarship in this important area. We have seen similar lacunae in his treatment of Rousseau and Hegel. His attempt to discuss Descartes as the fountainhead of modern rationalist theory allows for sweeping generalisations. It is necessary to pursue further research in regard to Maritain's interpretation of these thinkers. Such research would not deny the validity of either the questions or the intention of Maritain's social thought. It would create further dialogue in keeping with his open view of Thomism and understanding of history.

Indubitably, Maritain is guilty of a certain generality and abstraction. In the final analysis, therefore, the contemporaneity and relevancy of his social thought must be seen in its generality, and the structure of personalist democracy must be determined by concrete circumstances.
Maritain's prescription for personalist democracy, as depicted in the fourth chapter of this study, is the groundwork for a new Christendom, in the sense that it presents the *sine qua non* of what Christianity must become, if it is to account for man's present situation. Any further advance must not lose sight of the gains already attained. This is why modern democracy is seen as an evolutionary process, an unfolding or ever more accurate disclosure of how men ought to behave socially, originating with the advent of Christianity.

Today, Christianity must acknowledge the rights of the human person. It must seek to avoid the pitfalls of bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism, while developing the transcendent aspirations of human personality in temporal society. Christian democracy is but one attempt to activate Maritain's proposal. Current events, such as the personalist perspective of Pope John Paul II and various developments in Poland, coupled with Maritain's own appreciation of certain aspects of the radical left, may very well foster new possibilities. Maritain's own interpretation of history allows for new historical ideals based upon the unforeseeable events of the future. Thus personalist democracy is a movement, a dynamism seeking new frontiers. It is therefore necessary to clarify continually and apply Maritain's principles in the light of emerging situations.

The basis for a new Christendom is not simply a return to the way things were. Oswald Spengler may be right, when he asserts that a "second religiousness", which flees
present situation by retreating into the past, indicates that a particular culture is coming to an end.\textsuperscript{25} Maritain insists that the Church, without abandoning its spiritual heritage, be transformed. The foundation for personalist democracy and a new Christendom is to be found in the activity of the secular world, as well as in some tenets of Thomism and the doctrines of the Church. In contemporary society, manifestations of religious zeal are relevant insofar as they advance modern man's aspiration for freedom in the temporal order. In the world of today, religious events indicate the viability of Maritain's position when they, as Billington suggests, show respect for man's coming of age and foreshadow the evolutionary transformation of religion. The maturity of man proclaims the presence of Christ in the midst of the market place, i.e. in temporal society. The Church must recognise that the leaven of the Gospel is at work in the religious and denominational anonymity of the union halls, the caucus chambers of the world's political parties, and the clandestine meetings of those seeking to rid the world of oppression. The emergence of a new Christendom depends upon the grace of God and the decisions that are made there.

In conclusion, therefore, we can only partially agree with the severe criticism of Maritain offered by Sidney Hook in 1940:

\begin{quote}
M. Maritain is a subtle and persuasive writer. But this is not to say that he is a rigorous thinker. Despite the reputation for cogent argument which he enjoys among literary men and his Catholic brethren, there is hardly a conclusion he reaches
\end{quote}
that is not begged at the outset. He considers few of the possible alternatives to his controlling assumptions, and of these, only the crudest. The whole bent of his intellectual procedure is to make distinctions that enable him to withdraw the issues with which he is most concerned, from the possibility of scientific or empirical determination.  

Maritain's generality and abstraction prevented him from dealing with the details of both practical affairs and scholarship adequately. However, his seeking to attain a merger between traditional modes of transcendence and the modern quest for autonomy is not to blame for this inadequacy. We have seen how his strength is precisely his intention to join transcendence and autonomy. Thus we must conclude that Maritain's experience and social critique enabled him to perceive clearly the questions with which his age must deal. Furthermore, his critical analysis of contemporary society acquainted him with modern democracy, which qualified his personalism as a practical (albeit general) directive for both Church and secular society in the world of today. What Hook refers to as Maritain's "controlling assumptions" are the products of direct experience and thoughtful reflection. Maritain was attuned to his historical situation, although the immensity of his task prevented him from fully entering into the various discussions occasioned by particular thinkers and situations.
NOTES

I


4 See Julio Meinvielle, De Lamennais à Maritain (Paris: La Cité Catholique, 1956); and Critica de la concepción de Maritain sobre la persona humana (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nuestro Tiempo, 1948).


6 See Joseph W. Evans, "Developments of Thomistic Principles in Jacques Maritain's Notion of Society" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1951)--hereinafter referred to as "Thomistic Principles".

7 See Hermann Steinkamp, "Der Personalismus in der Sozialphilosophie Jacques Maritains"(dissertation, Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, 1967)--hereinafter referred to as "Der Personalismus".


11 Ibid., pp. 11-12.


14 "The fact remains that what counts in a philosophy is not that it is Christian but that it is true. I reiterate, no matter what the conditions of its development and its exercise in the soul may be, philosophy depends on reason; and the truer it is, the more will it remain rigorously faithful—and if I may say so, fastened—to its philosophic nature. It is for this reason that far from being shocked, as are some, by the fact that St. Thomas Aquinas procured his philosophical armour from the soundest thinker of pagan antiquity, I find therein a real source of intellectual stimulation." (Maritain, Metaphysics, pp. 30-31.)


16 Ibid.

17 For Maritain, the philosophia perennis progresses by deepening its knowledge of being, and not by substituting one theory for another in an escalating domination of phenomena. It does not seek to solve a problem through successive conceptual constructions, as empirical science does, but rather seeks an ever more profound penetration into the mystery of being. For this reason, Maritain condemns those who seek to present Thomism as a systematic blueprint, consisting of essences severed from the act of being; see Maritain's Metaphysics and the introduction to his Existence and the Existent.

18 Maritain, Approches sans entraves, p. 64.
Maritain acknowledges the assistance he received from the article by Charles Journet, and even recommends that it be read as a complement to the publication of the four lectures delivered at the University of Notre Dame in 1955. See Maritain, *On the Philosophy of History*, Joseph W. Evans, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. x--hereinafter referred to as *History*.

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See *ibid.*, p. 44.

See *ibid.*, pp. 43-62. Also see Maritain, *Peasant*, p. 28, for a list of other texts where Maritain discusses this issue.

"I think that this progress of moral conscience as to the explicit knowledge of natural law is one of the least questionable examples of progress in mankind. Allow me to stress that I am not pointing to any progress in human moral behaviour (or to any progress in the purity and sanctity of an absolutely pure heart). I am pointing to a progress of moral conscience as to the knowledge of the particular precept of natural law. This progress in knowledge can take place at the same time as a worsening in the conduct of a number of men, but that is another question. Take, for instance, the notion of slavery. We are now aware that slavery is contrary to the dignity of the human person. And yet there are totalitarian States which enslave the human being. But, nevertheless, they would not like to acknowledge this fact--that's why propaganda is so necessary--because there is a common awareness in mankind today that slavery is contrary to the dignity of man." (Maritain, *History*, pp. 105-106.)


Ibid., p. 143.

Ibid., pp. 143-144.

Ibid., p. 144.

See infra, pp. 122-126.


"The remark I wish to submit is that, considered in its normal and essential features, the political and social coming of age of the people was in itself a natural development--
I mean, one which answered deep-seated demands of the order of nature, and in which certain requirements of natural law came to the fore; but in actual fact it is only under the action of the Gospel leaven, and by virtue of the Christian inspiration making its way in the depths of secular consciousness, that the natural development in question took place. Thus it is that the democratic process, with its genuine, essential properties, and its adventitious ideological cockle, appeared first in that area of civilization which is the historical heir to mediaeval Western Christendom--and it was the more genuine, and is now the more live, where the temporal life of the community remains to a larger extent Christian-inspired."

(Maritain, History, p. 116.)

33 Smith, Jacques Maritain, p. 6.

34 See Croteau, Les fondements thomistes; and Evans, "Thomistic Principles".


36 See infra, pp. 146-152.

37 Clearly this egocentrism is the basis for what Maritain calls "anthropocentric humanism", which he perceives as the central problem in contemporary society. See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 24-27.


40 See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 27-28, although the distinction is developed throughout the work.

41 Fecher, Philosophy, p. 165.

42 The terminology used to describe the first three options appears in Maritain, Person, p. 91.

43 For example, Maritain writes about the cultural significance of the philosophical idealism of Descartes. See Maritain, The Dream of Descartes, pp. 163-186.

44 See Steinkamp, "Der Personalismus," pp. 3-6.

Concerning Geneviève and her influence on Jacques, Fecher writes:
A woman of unusual education and attainments, she was accustomed throughout her entire life to being surrounded by a small group of people with minds and convictions similar to her own, with whom one might spend pleasant hours of conversation and discussion. The group always met at the Maritain home on Thursdays for lunch, and it was undoubtedly at these gatherings that young Jacques first began to absorb knowledge and opinion on the intellectual topics of the day. (Fecher, Philosophy, p. 13.)

Maritain, Peasant, p. 22.

See ibid., pp. 21-22; and Maritain, Lettre sur l'indépendance (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1935).

According to Raïssa Maritain, after the turn of the century, Jacques' love of the people expressed itself as a desire to struggle for the poor "... against the slavery of the 'proletariat'". This was Jacques' source of strength at that time. See Raïssa Maritain, We Have Been Friends Together and Adventures in Grace: The Memoirs of Raïssa Maritain, trans. by Julie Kernan, Image Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), p. 67--hereinafter referred to as Memoirs.


See ibid., p. 16.

Tbid., p. 29.

Tbid., p. 28.

See R. Maritain, Memoirs, p. 41.

See ibid., pp. 64-68.

Tbid., p. 68.

Tbid., p. 69.


Although Maritain always remained critical of


62 "We had decided to extend existence credit, in the hope that it would reveal new values to us, values which could give a meaning to life—and here is what life brought us! First Bergson, and then Léon Bloy. Bergson who traveled uncertainly toward a goal still far off, but the light of which had already reached both him and us, and without our knowing it, like the rays of a star across a desert of unimaginable skies; Léon Bloy who for many years had lived united to his God by an indestructible love which he knew to be eternal in its essence. Life cast him upon our shores like a legendary treasure—immense and mysterious." (Ibid., p. 98.)

The respect of Jacques and Raïssa Maritain for Léon Bloy is further indicated by an amusing testimony which Bloy himself offers us, in a letter he wrote to Pierre Termier concerning their baptism:

"They were at the uttermost limit of the desert and they asked for Baptism! In their ignorance of liturgical forms, they thought that I could baptize them myself, Raïssa not having received this Sacrament at all and Jacques having received at best a counterfeit. I had to explain to them—and with what rapture!—that since they were not in danger of death and since it was easy to obtain a priest, they must receive Baptism as it is conferred by the Church and not the simple rite administered in extremis by a lay person . . ." (Ibid., p. 137).


64 "Jacques remained despite everything so persuaded by the errors of the 'philosophers', that he thought that in becoming Catholic he would have utterly to forswear the intellectual life." (R. Maritain, *Memoirs*, pp. 137-138.)


66 See ibid., pp. 30-33.

67 See ibid., p. 31.

68 Ibid., p. 33.
"For Maritain, Thomism was the 'philosophy of philosophies.' Maritain considered it as the crowning philosophy of man and nature, and the most perfect philosophical expression of the unity that exists between faith and reason. Maritain proposed Thomism to believer and non-believer alike as equally being the perennial philosophy of man, the critical philosophy of human knowledge, and the highest intellectual synthesis so far achieved between classical thought and Christian faith. For Maritain, Thomism offered essential truths about man's nature and human knowledge, while preparing man's spirit for those sacred truths of his creation and redemption. To teach Thomism, for Maritain, was to speak of what was most eternal within man's meaning and destiny.

Maritain's Thomism also had political and temporal dimensions; in fact, Thomism shaped Maritain's philosophy for his times. Resembling, in fact substantially anticipating, Mounier's Personalism, Thomism was the center of Maritain's world view. From the perspective of Thomism, Maritain attempted to survey the make-up and the origins of the modern world. As a Thomist, Maritain believed himself able to speak of what was most transitory and aberrant in the world of contemporary man. Serving Maritain as it served the Vatican in the second half of the nineteenth century, Thomism provided him with a measure of theological orthodoxy as well as a counter world view." (Ibid., p. 59.)

For circumstances concerning the acquisition of the property at Meudon and the move there from Versailles in 1923, as well as an account of the meetings and their purpose, see Maritain, Carnet de notes, pp. 176-254. Also see Amato, Mounier and Maritain, pp. 96-98.


See Maritain, Memoirs, pp. 171-187, and pp. 307-311; Bars, Maritain, p. 116; and Amato, Mounier and Maritain, p. 73.


See Amato, Mounier and Maritain, p. 73.

See ibid.; and Nottingham, Christian Faith, p. 38, note 58.
77 See Maritain, Charles Maurras, p. 8.
78 See ibid., pp. 11-12.
79 See ibid., pp. 20-21.
80 See ibid., p. 34.
81 See ibid., p. 11.
82 Ibid., p. 63.
83 See Amato, Mounier and Maritain, p. 72.
84 See Maritain, Carnet de notes, pp. 176-182; and Amato, Mounier and Maritain, p. 73. Also see Julie Kernan, Our Friend, Jacques Maritain (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), p. 73—hereinafter referred to as Friend.
85 See Kernan, Friend, p. 73; Amato, Mounier and Maritain, p. 73; and Bars, Maritain, p. 115.

It is Maritain's position that basic freedoms, such as those of the press and expression of thought, are good in themselves. However, this does not mean that they are ends in themselves. They do not guarantee eternal salvation and must therefore be regulated. Maritain asserts that such control can be effective even within a pluralist context:

When Rome, in the time of Gregory XVI and Pius IX, condemned the claim to make freedom of the press and freedom of expression of thought ends in themselves and unlimited rights, it was only recalling a basic necessity of human government. These freedoms are good and answer to radical needs in human nature: they have to be regulated, as does everything that is not of the order of Deity itself. The dictatorial or totalitarian way of regulating them—by annihilation—seems detestable to me; the pluralist way—by justice and a progressive self-regulation—seems good to me, and is as strong as it is just. Let me suggest that in virtue of an institutional status various groups of publicists and writers assembled in an autonomous body, would have a progressive control over the duties of their profession. Then we
would see whether, through the natural severity with which the potter judges the work of the potter, they would not be able to exercise an efficacious control; it would rather be to protect the individual from his associates that the supreme judicial organs of the State would have to interfere. (Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 182.)


89 A notable difference exists between every kind of civil rule and that of the kingdom of Christ. If this latter bear a certain likeness and character to a civil kingdom, it is distinguished from it by its origin, principle, and essence. The Church, therefore, possesses the right to exist and to protect herself by institutions and laws in accordance with her nature. And since she not only is a perfect society in herself, but superior to every other society of human growth, she resolutely refuses, prompted alike by right and by duty, to link herself to any mere party and to subject herself to the fleeting exigencies of politics. On like grounds, the Church, the guardian always of her own right and most observant of that of others, holds that it is not her province to decide which is the best amongst many diverse forms of government and the civil institutions of Christian States, and amid the various kinds of State rule she does not disapprove of any, provided the respect due to religion and the observance of good morals be upheld. By such standard of conduct should the thoughts and mode of acting of every Catholic be directed. (Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae", ibid, p. 262.


93 Maritain, Caesar's, p. 55.

94 Ibid., p. 66.

95 See R. Maritain, Memoirs, pp. 310-311.
96 See Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism.
97 See Maritain, Antimoderne.
98 See ibid., p. 215; and Maritain, Charles Maurras, pp. 25-29.
99 For the original French edition, see Maritain, Primaute du spirituel (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1927).
100 For the original French edition, see Maritain, Humanisme integral: Problemes temporels et spirituels d'une nouvelle chrétienté (Paris: Fernand Aubris, 1936).
102 For the original French edition, see Maritain, La personne et le bien commun (Paris: Desclee de Bouwer, 1947).

Besides writing the introduction to Mendizabal's book, Maritain also protested against the bombing of Madrid by Franco's forces and the German involvement in Guernica. He was also affiliated with Sept and Mounier's Esprit, two newspapers seen by many to have a leftist orientation. After the suppression of Sept by Pius XI in 1938, Maritain actually helped establish Temps Présent, which was similar to Sept but somewhat more prudent. See Kernan, Friend, pp. 102-119.

A good indication of the leftist image Maritain was presenting to the Roman Catholic World, even beyond the confines of Europe, is the account of his reception at the University of Notre Dame in 1938:

This was at a time when many American Catholics and large sectors of the Catholic press were highly critical of the anti-Franco stand Jacques had taken on the Spanish Civil War ... To many people at that time his position smacked of heresy. Although he had explained this position in a written statement sent prior to his going to South Bend, and despite the warmth of his introduction to the assembly by Father Leo R. Ward of the philosophy department, he was besieged with questions.

Raïssa and Vera were with him, and according to reports this was not an entirely comfortable visit, for there was no guest house on the campus and the three were housed in the student hospital, where a slight atmosphere of suspicion regarding their orthodoxy surrounded them because they did not side with
Franco, whose cause was favored by the majority of American Catholics at the time. In addition, there was no working space provided for study or writing, and during their stay the trustees of the university arrived for a meeting and the Maritains had to give up their quarters. (Ibid., pp. 93-94.)

104 See Maritain, Messages, 1941-1945 (New York: Editions de la Maison Française, 1945).

In connection with Maritain's disdain for the government at Vichy, also see Maritain, A travers le désastre (New York: Editions de la Maison Française, 1941).

See Kernan, Friend, pp. 122-123, for information concerning the distribution of this text in France, by the French underground, during the war.

105 See Kernan, Friend, pp. 136-146.

106 See ibid.; p. 145, Nottingham, Christian Faith, pp. 119 and 147; Bars, Maritain, pp. 271-272; and especially Maritain, Man and the State, pp. 76-80.

107 See Nottingham, Christian Faith, pp. 39-40; and Kernan, Friend, p. 185.

108 For the original French edition, see Maritain, La philosophie morale; examen historique et critique des grands systèmes (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1960).
II

1 Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 4-5.


4 Ibid., p. 56.

5 Ibid., pp. 63-65.


7 Maritain, Moral Philosophy, pp. 79-80.
A very important way in which grace was said to perfect the natural order of being concerns ethics. Maritain asserts that besides the theological virtues, there are infused moral virtues, which are of a higher order than the natural moral virtues acquired through the will.

8 Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 128.

9 Ibid., p. 127.

10 See ibid., pp. 143-144.

11 "Whether it is a question of each Christian notion or of Christendom in its higher unity, the temporal unity aimed at by the Middle Ages was a maximal unity, a unity of the most exacting and the most completely monarchical sort. The center of its formation and consistency was set very high in the life of the person, above the temporal, in that spiritual order itself to which the temporal order and the temporal common good are subordinated; its source was thus in men's hearts, and the unity of national or imperial political structures
only manifested this primordial unity." (Ibid., p. 147.)

12 Ibid., p. 146.

13 Ibid., pp. 148-149.

14 Ibid., pp. 149-150.

15 "There is no question of theocratic order here; the proper finalities of the temporal were quite clearly recognized, as also the proper domain of civil society. But, accidental as it may have remained in itself and as judged relatively to the political order, the observed ministerial function of the political in relation to the spiritual order was often exercised in a normal and quite typical way." (Ibid., p. 149.)

16 See supra, p. 11, note 32.

17 See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 133-136; and infra, pp. 146-152.

18 Maritain, Man and the State, p. 130.

19 Ibid.


21 Ibid., p. 15

22 In collaboration with Emmanuel Mounier, one of Maritain's fundamental endeavours was to remake the Renaissance. See Amato, Mounier and Maritain, pp. 105-124.

23 Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 92.

24 Ibid., pp. 92-93.

25 Ibid., p. 93.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., p. 94.

28 Ibid., p. 92.

29 Before Machiavelli, princes and conquerors did not hesitate to apply on many occasions bad faith, perfidy, falsehood, cruelty, assassination, every kind of crime of which the flesh and blood man is capable, to the attainment of power and success and to the satisfaction of their greed and ambition. But in so doing they felt guilty, they had a bad conscience—to the extent that they had a conscience.
Therefore, a specific kind of unconscious and unhappy hypocrisy—that is, the shame of appearing to oneself such as one is—a certain amount of self-restraint, and that deep and deeply human uneasiness which we experience in doing what we do not want to do and what is forbidden by a law that we know to be true, prevented the crimes in question from becoming a rule, and provided governed peoples with a limping accommodation between good and evil, in broad outline, made their oppressed lives, after all, livable.

After Machiavelli, not only the princes and conquerors of the cinquecento, but the great leaders and makers of modern states and modern history, in employing injustice for establishing order, and every kind of useful evil for satisfying their will to power, will have a clear conscience and feel that they accomplish their duty as political heads. Suppose they are not merely skeptical in moral matters, and have some religious and ethical convictions in connection with man's personal behavior, then they will be obliged, in connection with the field of politics, to put aside these convictions, or to place them in a parenthesis; they will stoically immolate their personal morality on the altar of the political good. What was a simple matter of fact, with all the weaknesses and inconsistencies pertaining, even in the evil, to accidental and contingent things, has become, after Machiavelli, a matter of right, with all the firmness and steadiness proper to necessary things. A plain disregard of good and evil has been considered the rule, not of human morality—Machiavelli never pretended to be a moral philosopher—but of human politics." (Maritain, The Range of Reason (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1953), p. 135.

30 Ibid., p. 137.

31 For a treatment of the development of Maritain's distinction between the individual and the person from Thomistic principles see Croteau, Les fondements thomistes.

   For a treatment of the distinction between the individual and person in relation to society, see Maritain, Person.


34 Ibid.

35 Maritain does not forget that Machiavelli himself often referred to Pope Alexander VI as an example of a ruler functioning in conformity with his doctrine. See Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 137.
   For a general condemnation of the Renaissance papacy and its effect on the subsequent Baroque age, see Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 153-157.
Concerning this doctrine, Maritain associates Calvin with Luther in a much more recent work. See Maritain, *Church of Christ*, p. 115.

For Maritain's interpretation of Aquinas concerning the various levels or degrees of human knowledge, see Maritain, *Degrees*.

In the end, intelligence does have metaphysical primacy over will:

> For from the intelligence come all order and ordination, and at the beginning of the ways of God is the Word, and, from the Word, in God, proceeds the Spirit of Love, as, in us, willing proceeds from understanding. And our beatitude will essentially consist in seeing, possessing God in a deifying vision, in which the very being of God will be one with our intelligence in the order of knowledge, and the love and delight in the will will only be the consequence of this. So that in us, at the last, Intelligence will perfectly enjoy its metaphysical primacy over Will. (Maritain, *Three Reformers*, p. 39.)

Nevertheless,

> if we consider intelligence and will not in themselves, but in relation to the things in greater or less degree of perfection which they may reach, then the order of superiority can be reversed and the will become higher than the intellect. This is so because, as Aristotle finely says, 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum et falsum in mente' (Met., VI, 4, 1027 b 25): the will seeks its object as it is in

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36 Maritain, *Three Reformers*, p. 11.
37 Ibid., p. 17.
38 Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, p. 16.
42 Maritain, *Three Reformers*, p. 28.
43 Maritain argues that not only the doctrine, but also the life of St. Thomas Aquinas speaks to us of such a harmony. See *ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
44 Ibid., p. 28.
46 For Maritain's interpretation of Aquinas concerning the various levels or degrees of human knowledge, see Maritain, *Degrees*.
itself, in its existence and its own mode of being, whereas the intelligence seeks its object as it is in the intelligence, under the mode of being which it has from the intelligence, drawing it in and consuming it so as immaterially to become it. Hence in relation to things higher than we, the will which carries us into these things, is nobler than the intelligence which draws them into us. And if it is better to know than to love corporeal things, which are below the soul and which the intelligence spiritualizes that it may know them, it is better to love God than to know Him, especially as things are in this present life where we know Him only according to the multiplicity and materiality of our conceptions. That is why there is a wisdom of the Holy Spirit higher above philosophic wisdom than heaven above earth, in which God is known and tasted not by distinct ideas, but by the connaturality of love proceeding from the union procured by charity. (Ibid., pp. 39-40.)

48 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
49 Ibid., p. 34.
50 See Maritain, Church of Christ, pp. 93-134.
52 Ibid., p. 267.
53 Instead of abandoning questions of ethics and morality, Watson asserts that Luther equated moral activity with free and spontaneous adherence to the will of God. Luther contends that such adherence is made possible by the grace of God through Jesus Christ. In chapter four of this study, we will see how Maritain himself thinks that perfect autonomy, as exemplified by the saints, is spontaneous conformity to the will of God. Although Maritain attempts to explain the role of human freedom in this action, in a more forthright manner than Luther, it is clear that there can be some dialogue between Maritain's doctrine and Watson's interpretation of the intention of Luther's theology. See Philip S. Watson, Let God Be God! An Interpretation of the Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), especially pp. 46-48; pp. 115-116; p. 127; and p. 154.
56 See *ibid.*, pp. 605-606.


61 Maritain himself attempted to develop this harmony of the sciences, in the light of contemporary discoveries. Envisioning a harmony stretching from brute experience to mystical union. Maritain's major contribution towards the development of this harmony, clearly acknowledging the distinctions which also must be maintained, is his epistemological *magnum opus*, *The Degrees of Knowledge*.

62 Maritain, *Degrees*, p. 128.

In fact, although clearly acknowledging its intellectual might and value, Maritain argues that modern idealistic speculation is not even true philosophy, but rather "ideosophy". See Maritain, *Peasant*, pp. 98-102.

63 In concise language, Maritain formulates the following scholastic thesis:

\[ \text{le terme immédiatement atteint par l'intelligence au moyen du concept, ce n'est pas une image ou un portrait de la chose, ni une forme vide, c'est la chose même, c'est la nature même qui est à la fois dans la chose pour exister et dans le concept pour être percue.} \]

And he argues that

Cette thèse absolument fondamentale est méconnue... par Descartes, qui croit que le terme immédiatement atteint par la pensée c'est la pensée elle-même, c'est l'idée, regardée comme une image ou un portrait de la chose; par Kant, qui croit que par le concept comme tel l'intelligence ne perçoit rien, mais applique aux représentations sensibles une forme vide... (Maritain, Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre, Bibliothèque Francaise de Philosophie (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924), pp. 19-20)--hereinafter referred to as Réflexions sur l'intelligence. Also see Maritain, *Degrees*, p. 129.


This is how Maritain interprets his function as a critical realist:

The critical problem is not: 'How does one pass from percipere to esse? Since mind is the only object attained in a way that is beyond doubt, can it be demonstrated that mind also reaches things, a reality that measures it?' No! It is, rather, to be stated in these terms: 'On the different levels of elaborating knowledge, what value must be assigned to percipere and what to judicare? Since the mind, from the very start, reveals itself as warranted in its certitude by things and measured by an esse independent of itself, how are we to judge if, how, on what conditions, and to what extent it is so both in principle and in the various moments of human knowledge?' (Maritain, *Degrees* pp. 73-74.)

Discussing Maritain's analysis of Descartes, Amato writes: Descartes assumed human knowledge, like that which Thomas attributed to angelic beings, to be intuitive (direct and unmediated in its comprehension), innate (inherent within the thinking subject), and independent (free of the need for and conditions of experience, time, situation, and space). Other errors were intrinsic to this 'error of angelism': man's first object of knowledge became his own mind--his own clear and distinct ideas. The mind itself, conceived independent from the body and the senses, was made autonomous; experience, habit, and wisdom, essential to Aristotle's and Thomas' conception of knowledge, were denied their place in the act of knowing. The mind was disembodied from the person; and in turn, the person, valued only in reference to his mind, was disembodied from his life, nature and the human situation. Reason, to further sketch Maritain's analysis, was made the mind's essence. Modeled on the deductive sciences of geometry and mathematics, reason, so understood, was abstracted from man's spiritual and material nature, as well as the perennial truths of philosophy and the sacred truths of theology. The inevitable result of Descartes' errors, Maritain argued, was that man was torn from both the human and divine; and God Himself was reduced to doing no more in the Cartesian universe than assuring the 'human angel' of his clear and distinct ideas. (Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, pp. 64-65.)


Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, p. 66.


See *ibid.*, p. 386.


Maritain's interpretation of Rousseau's notion of the General Will is expressed lucidly by Amato as follows:

Maritain contended that Rousseau's view was based on the false assumptions that each individual upon freely entering into a social contract transfers all his rights to the community, and the community reciprocally restores his rights to him in a higher form. In other words, Rousseau believed that upon making a covenant a social body comes into existence which absorbs all men into its more perfect and universal self; an individual citizen, by obeying the more perfect general will of the community, conforms himself to the highest good of his own being. So Rousseau conceived the general will and thought he had solved the problem of individual and community; so, according to Maritain, Rousseau had created an 'immanent social God'. (Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, p. 70.)


Amato refers to Maritain's criticism of the tyranny of democracy, and finds this compatible with the work of such
thinkers as José Ortega y Gasset, Simone Weil, Albert Camus, and others. See Amato, Mounier and Maritain, p. 71, note 30.

87 Ibid., p. 139.
88 Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 23.
89 "Whether we turn to Rousseau, to Comte, or to Hegel, we notice in these great representatives of the modern soul that, on the one hand, man is regarded in his existential condition as a purely natural being, whom one represents to himself as detached from any connection with a supernatural order connoting original sin and grace. And nevertheless in reality one does not succeed in thinking him as purely natural, so powerful in him are the connections of which we are speaking. One thinks he has to do with a being of purely natural condition or state, and one reabsorbs into this man of pure nature all the aspirations and all the appeals to a life properly divine--ego dixi: dixi estis--which for the Christian are dependent on the grace of God.

So that man separated from God claims and demands everything for himself as if it were all owed to him; as if he were (and in truth he is, but precisely on condition that he does not make himself his own center) the heir of God."

(Ibid., p. 24.)
90 See Maritain, Charles Maurras, pp. 70-71.
91 Maritain, Man and the State, pp. 129-130.
93 Ibid., p. 75.
94 See ibid., p. 69.
95 "... Sovereignty cannot be shared; consequently, the people, or the Sovereign Person, could not invest any official with authority over them; only the people as a whole could make laws, and the men elected by them did not hold any real authority, or right to command. The elected of the people were only passive instruments, not representatives. As a matter of principle the very concept of 'representative of the people' was to be wiped away." (Maritain, Man and the State, p. 130.)
96 Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 75.
97 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
98 For an informative discussion of Roussean scholarship which tends to emphasize the non-totalitarian potential

99 Finding Maritain in agreement with Emmanuel Mounier, Amato summarises the influence of contemporary individualism on collective behaviour, as depicted by Maritain in his analysis of Luther, Descartes, and Rousseau:

As Rousseau's individualism translated itself into collectivist political theory, so too modern individualism had prepared a rendezvous with nineteenth and twentieth century collectivism. Again anticipating the essence of Mounier's critical analysis of the modern world, Maritain argued that the relationship between individualism and collectivism constituted the destructive dialectic which had formed the last five centuries of Western history. That is, the individualism which was spiritually created by Luther, Descartes, and Rousseau, destroyed man's natural and spiritual ties with other men, and left him defenseless before the new collectivisms of state, society, economics, and ideology which appeared *en masse* with the French Revolution. (Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, p. 71.)

100 *Ibid.*


102 See *ibid.*, pp. 213-214.

103 See *ibid.*, p. 215.


105 Maritain, *Caesar's*, p. 47.

106 See *ibid.*, p. 81.

107 Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, p. 75.
"The answer that should have been given against Kant is that intellect sees by conceiving, and conceives only to see. Its operation does not consist in subsuming a sensible content beneath an empty form,—nor in cutting out the real according to readymade forms. In an inner word whose content escapes the eye and the touch and transcends in itself all order of sensation, but has greater density and fullness the more purely intelligible is the sound it gives out,—the intellect attains reality itself brought to the level of our mind. In short, there is indeed a philosophical intuition, but it is in the concept that this particular intuition, which is intellectual intuition, intellection itself, takes place." (Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, p. 30.)
the 'thing-in-itself' is rejected from the world of knowledge. In the same way that the object of knowledge is made an object or 'thing' (thing-phenomenon) because it is subsumed under our a priori forms, so the object of the act is made moral or 'good,' receives the seal of pure reason, because it is subsumed under an act whose maxim is appropriate to the universal form of commandment. I do not do right because I am doing the good. What I do is good (is moral) because I act according to a maxim which can be universalized without contradiction." (Ibid., p. 111.)

13 See ibid., p. 112.
14 Ibid., p. 119.
15 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
16 Ibid., p. 120.
17 Ibid., pp. 120-121.

18 "Hegel's treatment of the logical notions is involved in his concept of Mind or Spirit, as any reader of the Phenomenology is bound to discover before long. In the Platonic-Aristotelian manner he regards the pervasive movement underlying natural and historical processes as a manifestation of something more fundamental, namely a spiritual principle. This is the point where not only the contemporary empiricist, but the Cartesian and the Kantian too, is bound to part company with Hegel. Empiricists, whether philosophers or natural scientists, have few difficulties with the Kantian categories which, whatever their shortcomings, are easily comprehensible as the logical form of experience. By contrast, they balk at the Hegelian idea of a spiritual reality conceived as a self-activating universal which is the final cause, or end, of all things. The objections to such a notion are indeed obvious, but from the Hegelian standpoint they reduce themselves to the assertion that reason can only operate upon the material of immediate experience, as it is delivered to the individual mind by sense-impression. This is doubtless the case in the natural sciences, where the observer places himself in thought outside his material, and then attempts to reconstitute it as a realm of universal laws or principles. The distinctive feature of this attitude, which Hegel describes as "Understanding," is that the subject takes its object as alien and external to itself. Hegel maintains that nature is generally below the level where the distinction between subject and object emerges (it is only an sich, not fuer sich, not conscious of itself), and precisely for this reason the sciences of nature are not philosophical, though they provide the material for the philosophy of nature. Confronted with nature, the scientific understanding—itsf a rudimentary level of theorizing—can only treat its object as something external. But this
procedure is not applicable to history and the works of man, for at this level the mind encounters its own conscious life, as it manifests itself in the creations of art, religion, and philosophy, etc.

Insofar as there is a link between Hegel's organismic, or anti-mechanicist, philosophy of nature and his philosophy of history (to which he devoted a good deal more attention), it appears in his attachment to a model of social reality familiar to every reader of the classics: the concept of society as a living entity. This again was a reaction to the mechanicism of the Enlightenment which increasingly—since Bacon and Locke, not to mention their eighteenth-century French followers—had tended to see society in the image of a machine. In rejecting this form of rationalism, Hegel fell in with the Romantic current, whose political influence had already made itself felt in Burke's critique of the French Revolution. (George Lichtheim, "Introduction to the Torchbook Edition" of G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J. B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 1967), pp. xxv-xxvii.)

The point here is not to enter into the labyrinth of difficulties concerning the interpretation of Hegel's thought, but to show that Maritain, in spite of his frequent exhibition of scholastic rigour, did not attend to the minutiae of details demanded by meticulous scholarship. In regard to Maritain's approach to German thought in general, and to that of both Kant and Hegel in particular, the reflections of Maritain's close friend and colleague, Nicolas Berdyaev, are valuable:

He was an Aristotelian both in the manner and matter of his thinking, and, despite all his qualifications and reservation, I could not help regarding his 'Christian philosophy' as a superstructure on a basis of Aristotelian rationalism. He was not in the least affected by the problems and preoccupations of German philosophy, which to him was an inimical and extraneous factor. I have no claims of any kind to be an academic philosopher, but I do not think it is possible at all to philosophize without having experienced the import of, and lived through, the problems of Kant and Hegel. Maritain is a scholastic philosopher, not only because he happens to be a Thomist, but because the problems of German Idealism are for him in the last resort unreal and irrelevant." (Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality: An Essay in Autobiography, trans. by Katharine Lampert (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1950), pp. 261-262.)

Likewise, Berdyaev was somewhat perturbed by Maritain's abrupt appraisal of Luther, Descartes, and Rousseau: "When he wrote about the opponents of Roman Catholicism or of Thomism he was harsh and caustic (his characterizations of Descartes, Luther and Rousseau in The Three Reformers, for example, was very unjust) . . . . (Ibid., p. 261.)
Although in a book published a year before Three Reformers, and in a chapter dated 1921, while discussing pluralism in opposition to Hegelian monism, Maritain writes:

"Ce qu'on défend dans le pluralisme, c'est l'attitude pratique d'un esprit décidé à garder le sens du risque et des initiatives créatrices et le sentiment des diversités irréductibles, à accepter les conflits et les oppositions, à consentir qu'il y ait du et du bien dans le monde, à loyalement haïr l'optimisme bourgeois d'un Leibniz ou d'un Hegel, à croire aux commencements subits, aux dons, à la liberté, aux actes de foi. Disons plus précisément, et pour mieux dégager le contenu intellectuel du pluralisme, que celui-ci comporte avant tout l'affirmation de la réalité et de la valeur de la Personne, de la personne, qui, disait saint Thomas, est ce qu'il y a de plus noble et de plus élevé dans toute la nature . . . (Maritain, Réflexions sur l'intelligence, pp. 266-267.)

Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, p. 266.

See ibid., p. 318.

". . . the distinctive subject matter of logic according to St. Thomas is an ens rationis, a conceptual being, namely what is known, precisely as known. The objects which logic studies are not studied as they are in themselves but as they are involved in the process of reasoning, as they are within the mind as it moves toward truth. This is the conceptual being which is the special concern of logic. Logic deals with everything with which other branches of philosophy or the particular sciences deal, though it studies them not as they really are but as involved in the process of reasoning. The logician will therefore, as he proceeds, encounter the notion of being, as he encounters all the rest, and, moreover, more than other notions, since all other notions presuppose it. Being, we conclude, is studied by the logician under the formal aspect characteristic of his science, the formal aspect of a conceptual being of the logical variety, sub ratione entis rationis logici, that is to say, under the formal aspect of the conceptual order within the mind as it moves toward truth." (Maritain, Metaphysics, p. 39.)

Concerning the purpose of logic, Maritain writes:

Logic studies the reason itself as an instrument of knowledge, or a means of acquiring and possessing the true. It may be defined as: the act WHICH DIRECTS THE VERY ACT OF REASON, that is which enables us to advance with order, ease and correctness in the act of reason itself. (Maritain, Formal Logic, trans. by Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), p. 1.)
24 Maritain, Metaphysics, p. 43.

25 See Maritain, Degrees, p. 130, and p. 211.

26 Maritain, Moral Philosophy, pp. 145-146.

27 Ibid., p. 154.

28 Ibid., pp. 151-152.

29 Ibid., p. 152.

30 Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, p. 200, note 1.

31 Ibid.
Cf. Maritain, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 231.

32 Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, p. 200, note 1.

33 See supra, p. 88, note 17.

34 Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 161.


36 Ibid., p. 166.

37 See supra, p. 65.

38 Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 165.

39 Ibid., pp. 212-213.

40 See Maritain, Réflexions sur l'intelligence, pp. 266-267.

41 Maritain, Moral Philosophy, pp. 213-214.

42 Ibid., p. 214.

43 Ibid.


45 See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 78-80.


47 See infra, pp. 120-126.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., p. 143.
Cf. Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 80-82.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., p. 141.

53 Maritain, Person, p. 98.


55 Even in this early work, Maritain acknowledges the heroic effort of the Bolsheviks in their struggle against a decadent civilization. He speaks of them as men "... capables de courage et d'esprit de sacrifice, dévoués, quelques-uns du moins, à un idéal, et ne se résignant que pour le servir aux moyens horribles dont Nécessité leur impose l'emploi ..." (Maritain, Antimoderne, pp. 209-210.)

56 See Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 235, note 1.

57 Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 69.

58 Maritain does not hesitate to laud the positive achievements of the Soviet regime:
We cannot reject the inquiries of good faith which show us the manner in which Soviet Russia has been able, not without altering in face of the real many theoretical claims, to cause a backward economy to make astonishing steps forward within the span of a few years, and which proclaim to us the germination in this country of a 'new form of civilization' (the question is to know what is its value). This new form of civilization is born into existence after the sacrifice of millions of human lives and of irreparable losses; let us say briefly that insofar as it is possible to make a judgment from a distance, and on the basis of written documents, the positive elements that it contains are summed up, in my opinion, in the liquidation of the 'profit system' and of the subjection of the human work-force to the fecundity of money (a liquidation which is appreciable, especially in light of future developments, since for the moment it has as ransom a heavy statism, but in the end it is this liquidation which explains
the great hope roused in many sectors of the working world by the Russian experiment); and in the perpetually renewed effort to inaugurate, at least in the sphere of the morphology of laws, a 'multiform democracy' integrating the human multitude into the social, political, and cultural life of the community. However hard may be the life the human being lives there, however harshly he may be treated, he has at least the feeling, in this country where serfdom and its resultant customs had so long endured, that an age-old social humiliation has ceased. (Ibid., pp. 83-84.)


60 See Maritain, Person, p. 97 and 100.

61 Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 52-53.


63 See Maritain, "Religion and Politics in France," in Pour la justice, pp. 59-76.


66 Maritain, Person, pp. 99-100.

67 See Maritain, Lettre sur l'indépendance.

68 Maritain asserts that even under the dictatorship of Salazar, Portugal never became a totalitarian state. Furthermore, on a number of occasions Maritain praised the relationship between Church and State brought about by the Concordat between Salazar's Portugal and Vatican City, although he strictly maintained that Salazar's government ought not to be imitated. See Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 47-48; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. by Doris C. Anson (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1944), p. 19, note 1—hereinafter referred to as Rights; and Man and the State, p. 163, note 21. Also see Integral Humanism, p. 277, note 11.

69 Maritain, Person, p. 98.


71 Ibid.
La Vie Spirituelle, IV (July 1921), pp. 305-310.

Ibid., p. 306.

Ibid.

See ibid., pp. 307-310.

Maritain, Le mystère d'Israel et autres essais (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1965), p. 185--hereinafter referred to as Le Mystère d'Israel; and see Redeeming the Time, pp. 125-126.

See Maritain, Le mystère d'Israel, p. 187.

One might conceivably argue that it was easier to acknowledge the heroic element in the Nazi movement before the War and Germany's "final solution" to the Jewish question. Nevertheless, it is true that both Maritain and Mounier did in fact acknowledge the heroism of the extreme right. However, it must be said to Maritain's credit, that he continuously warned Mounier about the dangers of the right. For an excellent treatment of the struggle of personalism to attain a political identity, see Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left 1930-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

See Maritain, Person, p. 91.

Ibid., p. 97.

Maritain, "The Cultural Impact of Empiricism," unpublished papers in collection at The Jacques Maritain Center, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, p. 3.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 5. Maritain originally planned to say "commerce and industry" for "the commonwealth", and the "ruling classes" for "commerce and industry". The extent to which Maritain leaned toward the left is here shown, intending to use what might be called Marxist terminology in his criticism, and only withdrawing it as an after thought.

See Maritain, Moral Philosophy, pp. 342-343.


88 Ibid., pp. 12-20.
89 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
90 See Amato, Mounier and Maritain, pp. 156-158.
92 See ibid., p. 70.
93 See ibid., pp. 115-118.
94 Ibid., p. 116.
95 Ibid.
96 See ibid., pp. 102-105.
97 Ibid., p. 113.
98 Ibid., p. 115.
100 Maritain, Reflections on America, pp. 106-107.
101 See ibid., pp. 177-178.
102 Ibid., p. 179.
103 See ibid., p. 175.
104 See ibid., pp. 164-166.
106 Maritain, Peasant, p. 23.
107 Ibid.
108 Maritain, Church of Christ, p. 126.
110 Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 27.
112 Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, p. 25.
In agreement with Bergson, Maritain argues that modern democracy, which is based on evangelical love, is superior to the false democracies of antiquity, which sustained the fundamental iniquity of slavery. See _ibid._, p. 43.


IV

1 See Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, p. 72.

2 See Maritain, *Charles Maurras*, pp. 31-35.

3 See Bars, *Maritain en notre temps*, p. 31.

4 See *supra*, pp. 6-8, and pp. 45-50.

5 See *infra*, pp. 141-142.


7 Ibid., p. 32, note 1.

8 For a brief scholastic digression on this topic, see Maritain, "Spontanéité et Indépendance," *Mediaeval Studies*, IV (1942), pp. 23-32.

   Freedom of autonomy or spontaneity is also referred to as terminal freedom. See Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World*, pp. 45-46.


10 Ibid., p. 36.

11 Ibid., p. 34.


14 Ibid., p. 42.

15 Ibid., p. 43.

16 Ibid., p. 45.

17 Maritain, *Christianity and Democracy*, p. 35.


19 Ibid., pp. 39-40.

20 Ibid., p. 41.

253

22. Ibid., p. 82.

23. Ibid., pp. 80-81.

24. Ibid., pp. 81-82.

25. Ibid., p. 72.

26. Ibid., p. 72.

27. Maritain recognises two distinct fields of knowledge by connaturality, one intellectual and the other affective. Intellectual connaturality denotes the instinctual, non-conceptual grasp of reality by the intellect alone. Affective connaturality, on the other hand, denotes the instinctual grasp of reality by the intellect through the will. Knowledge by way of connaturality is the foundation of both metaphysics and mysticism.


28. Ibid., p. 357.

29. See *ibid.*, p. 357.


33. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

34. Ibid., p. 62.

35. See supra, p. 48.

36. Ibid., p. 64.

37. Ibid., p. 64.
38 See supra, pp. 8-11; and pp. 47-49.
39 See supra, p. 10, note 30.
40 Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 155.
41 Ibid., p. 153.
42 Maritain, Rights, p. 20.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 21.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 22.
47 See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 133-137; and supra.

48 Maritain asserts that society has the right to oblige its citizens to expose their lives in combat. It does not have the right, however, to demand more than this risk, or to decide the death of a man for the salvation of the city. Maritain points out that in certain or almost certain death situations, volunteers are called for. See Maritain, Person, pp. 68-70.

49 Ibid., p. 44.
50 See ibid., pp. 47-49.
51 Maritain, Rights, p. 13.
52 Maritain, Person, p. 65.
53 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
54 See ibid., pp. 56-59.
55 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
56 Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 51-52. Also see Maritain, Person, p. 59, and pp. 79-81.

57 See Maritain, Person, pp. 58-59.
58 See supra, pp. 141-142.
59 This can be inferred from Maritain, Person, pp. 69-70, and p. 74.

60 See infra, pp. 185-187.

Ibid., p. 94.

See *Man and the State*, p. 85.

See *Man and the State*, p. 92.

Ibid., p. 86.

"We maintain . . . that freedom of choice, freedom in the sense of free will, is not its own proper end. It is directed to the achievement of freedom in the sense of autonomy; and in this quest of autonomy which answers to an essential demand of human personality the dynamism of freedom is to be found." (Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World*, p. 30.)

"Freedom of choice is a prerequisite to moral action; it does not constitute it. It is the vital control of the free act by reason, by human reason and even more by the Eternal Reason; it is consonance with reason, as St Thomas says, that is the formal constituent of moral action." (Ibid., p. 33.)

See Maritain, *Man and the State*, p. 94.

Ibid.


See *Integral Humanism*, p. 234.

For a clear depiction of the universal implications of man's coming of age, see Maritain, *History*, pp. 115-117.


See Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, p. 124.
is not to approve—ways of worship more or less removed from the true one: the practices of unbelievers are to be tolerated, St. Thomas taught [Sum. theol., I-II, 10, 11]; ways of worship and also ways of conceiving the meaning of life and modes of behavior; in consequence, the solution means that the various spiritual groups living within the body politic should be granted a particular juridical status. The legislative power of the commonwealth itself in its political wisdom would adapt this juridical status, on the one hand, to the condition of the groups and, on the other hand, to the general line of legislation leading toward the virtuous life, and to the prescriptions of moral law, to the full realization of which it should endeavor to direct as far as possible this diversity of forms." (Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 167.)

Also see Maritain, Peasant, pp. 84-94; and Church of Christ, pp. 90-91.

Joseph W. Evans offers an intelligent interpretation of Maritain's position concerning religions or vertical pluralism: Societal pluralism within the body politic, then—that is, a multiplicity of other particular societies which proceed from the free initiative of citizens and which should be as autonomous as possible—would for Maritain belong to the essence of a truly political society. Religious pluralism, on the contrary—that is, a multiplicity of spiritual families with different ways of conceiving the meaning of life and modes of behavior—does not for Maritain belong to the essence of political society. No, but it does belong de facto to the existent that is contemporary political life. (Evans, "Jacques Maritain and the Problem of Pluralism in Political Life," in Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, edited by Joseph W. Evans (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1963), p. 217.

Furthermore, Evans remarks:
In itself religious pluralism is for Maritain something unfortunate. But it need not be politically divisive. Furthermore, he knows well that error is often the usher of truth in the human mind: the division of men about spiritual being may well have been the occasion and the stimulus for man's latching onto new and deeper truths about political being. (Ibid., p. 218.)

99 See Maritain, Person, p. 50.

100 Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 173.

101 See ibid., pp. 240-241; and Scholasticism and Politics, p. 162.

102 See Maritain, Person, p. 66.


106 See *ibid.*, pp. 137-141; *Carnet de notes*, pp. 301-354; and *Approches sans entraves*, pp. 201-239.

107 It is clear that Maritain perceived his relationship to Raisa and her sister Vera in this way. See Maritain, *Carnet de notes*, pp. 255-300, especially pp. 277-281.


109 See *supra*, p. 150.


111 For a discussion of the family and horizontal pluralism in Christian democracy, see Fogarty, *Christian Democracy*, pp. 49-56.


119 See *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.


122 See Fogarty, *Christian Democracy*, pp. 77-82.


For Maritain's treatment of these terms see *Man and the State*, pp. 1-19.

Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, p. 72.


Ibid., p. 126.

Ibid. For an extensive discussion of the distinction between authority and power see Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 71-93.

See *supra*, pp. 122-123.


See *supra*, p. 34, note 106.

See *supra*, pp. 153-160.


See *supra*, pp. 48-49, and pp. 146-152.


See *supra*, p. 34, note 104.

See *supra*, pp. 118-119.


See *supra*, p. 118, note 105.

See *supra*, pp. 157-160.

Maritain asserts that the personalist and communal nature of society is strictly inconceivable without those moral realities which are called justice and civic friendship, the latter being a natural and temporal correspondence of that which, in the spiritual and supernatural plane, the Gospel calls brotherly love. (Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 65-66.)
In addition to civic friendship, there is the parallel structure of civic or secular faith:

... men possessing quite different, even opposite metaphysical or religious outlooks, can converge, not by virtue of any identity of doctrine, but by virtue of an analogical similitude in practical principles, toward the same practical conclusions, and can share in the same practical secular faith, provided that they similarly revere, perhaps for quite diverse reasons, truth and intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of moral good. (Maritain, *Man and the State*, p. 111.)

148 See supra, pp. 116-118.

149 See supra, pp. 118-119.


151 Ibid., p. 31.

Since the primary dynamic factor in education is the interior vital force of the pupil, it is not surprising that Maritain emphasises the significance of educators other than professional teachers. For example, he admonishes the family, whose role in education is fundamental:

La chose surprenante ici est que ... la famille, qui est la sphère éducative première et fondamentale, directement fondée sur la nature, accomplit sa tâche éducative non sans faire parfois de l'enfant la victime de traumatismes psychologiques, ou des mauvais exemples, de l'ignorance ou des préjugés des adultes . . . " (Maritain, *Pour une philosophie de l'éducation*, p. 39.)

152 Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads*, p. 35.

153 See ibid., pp. 36-38.


156 Ibid., p. 82.

157 Ibid., p. 115.

158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
160 See Maritain, Integral Humanism, p. 296.
161 Ibid., p. 297.
162 "In our age of civilization the Church will increasingly become--bless Her--the refuge and support (perhaps the only one) of the person." (Maritain, Peasant, p. 51.)
163 See supra, pp. 9-10, and pp. 49-50.
164 See supra, p. 143.
165 See Maritain, Peasant, pp. 50-53.
166 See supra, pp. 27-31.
167 See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 268-270; and Church of Christ, pp. 91-92.
168 See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 256-308.
169 Although Maritain consistently refuses to attach Christianity and the Church to any specific regime, it is clear that he perceives the fact of the current historical situation as necessarily favouring the compatibility of Christianity with a decidedly democratic or republican regime. See Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, pp. 24-26; and Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 68-69.
170 See supra, p. 163, note 91.
171 See Lima, "Testimony: On the Influence of Maritain in Latin America".
173 See Maritain, Man and the State, pp. 162-165.
174 Although he clearly extols the value of martyrdom, Maritain believes that martyrdom in itself is not a solution, and that Christian action will inevitably bring about some result in the world. See Maritain, Integral Humanism, pp. 285-290.
175 We must remember that for Maritain the concrete historical ideal can never be fully achieved, it remains something on the way in the context of a greater whole:
... a concrete historical ideal is not an ens rationis, but an ideal essence which is realizable—with more or less difficulty, more or less imperfection, but that is another matter—and realizable not as something made, but as something on the way to being made, an essence capable of existing and calling for existence in a given historical climate, and as a result corresponding to a relative maximum of social and political perfection, a maximum relative to that historical climate; and precisely because this essence implies a real relating to concrete existence, it merely presents a framework and a rough draft which may later be determinative of a future reality. (Ibid., p. 128.)

Furthermore, every concrete historical ideal is analogically related to the others. In this way, both historical continuity and progression are maintained:

The notion of order is a notion that is essentially analogous. The principles do not vary; nor the governing rules of practice: but they are applied in modes that are essentially different and that correspond to one concept only according to a similarity of proportion. And this presupposes that we have something more than an empirical and so to say blind notion of the different phrases of history; it presupposes that we have a truly rational and philosophic notion of it. (Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World, p. 104.)
1 See Bars, *Maritain en notre temps*, pp. 99-100.

2 Ibid., p. 101.


4 Amato, *Mounier and Maritain*, p. 145.

5 Ibid., pp. 156-157.

6 Ibid., p. 156.

7 Nottingham, *Christian Faith*, p. 56.

8 Ibid.


10 See Meinvielle, *Correspondance*, pp. 7 and 35.

11 See *ibid.*, p. 9.

12 See ibid., pp. 9-10, and p. 135.

13 See *ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

14 See ibid., pp. 17-18, and p. 62.

15 Garrigou-Lagrange was a frequent guest of the Maritains, and Jacques acknowledged his debt to this Thomist thinker. See Maritain, *Carnet de notes*, pp. 183-235; and supra, p. 12.

16 See Meinvielle, *Correspondance*, pp. 17-20; 57-63; 67-70; 101-102; and 125-126.


20 Ibid., p. 80.

21 See supra, p. 191, note 162.


23 For an excellent discussion of the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom, see ibid., especially pp. 301-312.


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II. Books, articles, and theses about Jacques Maritain (entirely or in part) referred to in this study arranged in alphabetical order.


III. Other sources referred to in this study arranged in alphabetical order.


