THE CONFLICT FOR THE EARTHLY ROME
AN ASPECT OF THE
EARLY CHRISTIAN-PAGAN STRUGGLE

By

FREDERICK RONALD BOTTLEY, M.A.

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AUTHOR: Frederick Ronald Bottley, B.A. (University of Kent)
M.A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Professor E.M. Wightman

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The mutual hatred and prejudice of Christians and pagans in the pre-Decian era (before A.D. 250) is analysed in this study in the context of the function of prejudice in ancient society as a whole. The symbolic expressions, the uses, and the meaning of prejudice in the early pagan-Christian conflict are elucidated from both the social and the historical perspectives. Use is made of psychological theories of prejudice, to help define the significance of prejudice in the pre-Decian period.

Once analysed in context, the expressions of the Christian prejudice against the pagans suggest that for many of the early Christians the struggle was seen as a battle for possession of this earth, and not solely as a necessary toil in preparation for posthumous celestial felicity. This conclusion is contrary to the generally accepted view, and arguably broadens our insight into the unconscious and conscious motives of early Christians, and their pagan antagonists.
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Less florid in expression than is often the case, my gratitude is none the less genuine.
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CHAPTER ONE

PERSECUTION: THE OFFICIAL VIEW

The persecution of the Christians in the Roman empire can be considered to have had two distinct phases. The second phase began in A.D. 250 when the persecution instigated by the emperor Decius opened an era of officially promulgated and centrally directed repression of Christianity. The Church survived not only the Decian onslaught, but further offensives by Valerian and Diocletian, before receiving official approval. By A.D. 324 the era of government persecution had ended. Action against the Christians in the period A.D. 250 - 324 was a matter of imperial policy for the whole area of the empire. No such policy can be invoked to account for the first phase of persecution, even though many scholars have attempted to reconstruct one. It is not surprising therefore that the question of the official role in the persecutions of the period before A.D. 250 has not been answered with anything like unanimity of the informed erudite.¹

What is usually called the problem of the juridical basis for the prosecution of Christianity in the pre-Decian period has found no universally accepted solution, and must be discussed later in this chapter. One aspect of the pre-
Decian persecutions however, has engendered no controversy. Whatever view scholars may take of the official motives for anti-Christian action, they all agree that popular hatred of the Christians was a significant factor both in the Jewish and the pagan gentile persecutions. All would subscribe to the contention of a Victorian writer who tagged this era as a dimly perceived period, "when popular rage could hurry magistrates into cruelties towards the Christians." In the standard modern account of the early persecutions, Frend asserts that "... always in the second and early third centuries there is popular hatred, the prime mover of anti-Christian outbreaks." Whether the hatred sprang from the Jewish communities that were the first loci of anti-Christian feeling, or from the gentile pagans who very soon adopted the Jewish antipathy to the new sect, it was very real and preceded any official condemnation.

Jewish opposition to primitive Christianity was clearly the reaction of orthodox religionists to a heresy that was perceived to be dangerous. In a theocracy, the heretic is both a religious nuisance, and a danger to political and social stability. A similar explanation is often derived to account for the early pagan reaction to Christianity. It is also occasionally argued that there
was direct, although clandestine, Jewish agitation behind at least some of the pagan persecutions. These two, and several other theories, will be considered in the next chapter. For now it will be asserted that popular pagan hatred does need explaining. As Mommsen put it in 1893:

The intense hatred in which the Christians were held in the Roman empire is a fact so well established and so well known that it is not necessary to dwell upon it. . . . . It is a general feeling pervading the whole empire . . . . This popular hatred, bitter, universal, lasting - whence did it spring?

For H. Last, writing in 1937, "a persecution is not adequately explained until the motives of the persecutor have been exposed." More recently T. Barnes has asserted that "it is in the minds of men, ... that the roots of the persecution of the Christians in the Roman Empire are to be sought." This study proposes to seek those roots, as far as it is possible, not only in the deliberate motives of the pagan antagonists of the early Christians, but also in those motives that were hidden from the persecutors; impulses or reactions the precise nature of which, it will be contended, they were unaware. This factor - the irrational - has not received a proper place in the accounts of the popular persecutions.

To account for popular hatred, many causes of soc-
social friction have been elucidated. The Christians in­
curred violent enmity in the social, political, economic
and religious areas of life. They were also hated for
superstitious and dogmatic reasons. This enmity ex­
pressed itself in accusations of vile behaviour, in all
kinds of physical assault including homicide, and in den­
unciations leading to official trial and punishment.
The scholarship concerning these topics will be discussed
in the next two chapters. However, although any parti­
cular incident of enmity or persecution must have arisen
out of immediate social stress or discord, it will be con­
tended in this study that, when completely analysed, the
reasons advanced to explain popular hatred can usefully be
shown to be after-thought rationalizations of prejudice.
Furthermore, the Christians from their side were afflicted
with the same tendency to prejudice, focussed in their case
of course on the pagans and Jews. Assessed from this
angle, the question is not so much one of the wellspring
of hatred, but of the particular significance of those ex­
pressions of hatred and prejudice that each side in the
Christian-pagan conflict actually employed.

After an analysis of the terms in which the mutual
hatred of Christian and pagan was expressed, and a justifi­
cation of the approach used here, this study will offer an
interpretation of the forms, expressions and functions of
prejudice in the general society of the Roman empire that, it is contended, will add to an understanding of the pre-Decian persecutions, and the whole question of Christian-pagan enmity. This perspective will not be presumed to disprove the validity of all other opinions - although some will be argued to fall short of complete competence - but certainly avers that the role and importance of the irrational factor in the Christian-pagan enmity have not yet been sufficiently accounted for. This study is therefore offered in the spirit of Barzun's dictum:

Far from wishing to isolate a cause, as science and method desire, history strives to assemble the largest possible constellations of conditions; the greater the number of inner links and outer relevancies, the greater our power to divine past reality.

The genuine extant records suggest that in the pre-Decian period official action and mob violence alike, were only sporadically and infrequently directed against Christians. While this picture is basically accurate, it must be remembered that there was the persecution in Rome under Nero in A.D. 64, that there were some anti-Christian actions in Asia Minor during Domitian's reign (i.e. before A.D. 96), while for the period after Domitian an astute analysis has demonstrated that "there is hardly an emperor between Trajan and Decius for whose reign evidence of persecution is tot-
ally lacking.” The literary evidence is almost completely from the hands of contemporary Christian writers, but the few remaining relevant pagan fragments only reinforce the impression that if actual persecution was temporally and spatially intermittent it nevertheless was grounded in an ubiquitous and constant latent hatred that lay very close to the surface. (For convenience the pagan and Christian sources used are listed and dated in Appendices A and B.) It was this consistent hostility that could give way to irruptions of violence at unpredictable intervals. Conjecture about such problems as the actual number of martyrs is unfruitful. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a broad discussion of the official aspects of the pre-Decian persecutions. This will clarify the approach to be taken to the problem of popular hatred. It will also show why it is very unlikely that official action was based on a "Special Law", contemporary with the Neronian persecution, that outlawed Christianity. The non-existence of such a "law" means that, certainly before the reign of Trajan and probably afterwards, official action against Christians in the provinces was an ad hoc reaction to popular pressure.

It is of course infinitely unfortunate, but nevertheless the case, that all discussions of the official
behaviour in the pre-Decian prosecutions, must begin and end with the letter that Pliny wrote to Trajan in A.D. 110, and the reply that the emperor sent to Pliny. Pliny the younger was sent to the province of Pontus and Bithynia as the emperor Trajan's legatus pro praetore. He was on a tour of duty in A.D. 110 when a number of people were denounced to him for being Christians. He held a judicial inquiry (cognitio) of the accused at Amisus. His account of his actions survives in the letter he sent to Trajan asking for advice. The emperor's rescriptum also survives. Together these two letters form a unique set of evidence. The genuineness has sometimes been questioned, and they are both less than completely satisfactory, but even so they must control the interpretation of all the other evidence for the deduction of the official motives for persecution. Before an extensive discussion of the letters is undertaken, a consideration of the term cognitio will precede an inquiry into the attitude of Roman officialdom towards foreign religions in general.

Most crime in the provinces was dealt with under local law by local authority. Certain offences, particularly new ones, were tried by the Roman governor at his own legal hearing, or cognitio. Modern scholars use the term cognitio extra ordinem because many of the offences tried at such
hearings were not fixed in the Roman criminal code (ordo) which was underdeveloped in the pre-Decian period. Although the term post-dates Pliny, it is not true, as some scholars assert, that cognitio extra ordinem is a modern invention. At a provincial cognitio the Roman governor would be sole interrogerator, jury and judge, although he might be advised by a council (consilium) of local officials or legal experts. Penalties for those found guilty were fixed ex tempore by the governor, who was restricted only by the extortion laws (leges repetundae), and perhaps by the ius gladii, which would have prohibited him from executing citizens.

Standardization of provincial governors' regulations may have started during Trajan's reign, but was not seriously attempted until later. A provincial governor was bound by any direct imperial legislation - rescripts, mandates and laws - but was only advised by previous governors' acts. For all practical purposes therefore, confronted by possible new offences, the governor was a law maker, acting only in conformity with certain general instructions. One of these has been preserved in the Digest (I, 18), according to which the governor is responsible for the hunting out of "bad men" (mali homines) such as temple thieves, brigands, kidnappers and robbers, before their depredations could disquiet the province. Above most
concerns, Roman rule required provincial placidity.

Christians in the provinces would have been tried then at a provincial governor's cognitio. They would have been brought to the notice of the governor either by a private informer, who could profit if the Christians were punished, or have been questioned during an inquiry into a civil disturbance. For the Romans the general principle of provincial justice was virtually ubi remedium, ibi ius. Yet however immense the arbitrary powers of the provincial governor were, Christians punished by him must have been perceived as in some way deserving of punishment. They were in some way culpable; and yet it is very difficult to determine exactly what kind of guilt brought such savage retribution on the Christians. What was the law, and what situation did it diligently seek to remedy?

If the problem was one of religious offences, it was certainly not of the kind with which students of European history are generally familiar. To anyone in the least aware of the interminable bloodshed that constitutes the usual tale of religious history, a bloodshed justified by dogmatic disputes, it may seem odd that apparent religious intolerance should need explaining. The fact is, however, that the Romans, as rulers of empire, were in-
different to the credal and ritual aspects of the religious life of the provinces. There was only one exception to this rule - the prohibiting of human sacrifice in religious ceremonies. It is indeed incorrect to talk of a Roman religious policy, just as it is incorrect to talk of a Roman economic policy. In both spheres one should expect, and can indeed detect, ad hoc attempts to obviate particular problems. Even so, it would be wrong and very misleading to apply the actions and policies relevant to Rome or Italy to the empire as a whole.

Before, during, and after the drive to empire, there were intermittent attempts to purge Rome itself of non-indigenous deities. Clearly though, no religious belief was proscribed, much less actively persecuted, unless its adherents were felt to constitute a threat to public security. Disdained cults were scorned as sacra externa. However, the adoration of many imported deities - dī novensiles - became permitted at Rome, but outside of the pomoerium, the sacred boundary of the city. Many of the exotic imports came into Italy unofficially, but on more than one occasion a foreign deity was officially "seconded" by the Romans. In the most famous case Cybele was removed from oriental Pessinus - in the form of a sacred stone - in 204 B.C. on the prompting of the Sibylline Books.
Syncretistic identification of Cybele with the venerable Magna Mater allowed the newcomer a temple actually within the pomoerium, although the priestly archigallate was forbidden to Roman citizens until the imperial era, when Romans could participate in the priesthood of the grim goddess but not subject themselves to the customary castration demanded of Cybele's hierophants.21

Roman authority then not only tolerated, but at times actively promoted changes in religious fashion. The adoption of di novensiles indicates in part the increasing ethnic heterogeneity of the population at Rome itself. It also suggests that many Romans ignored any disposition to observe mos maiorum and venerate the traditional celestial guarantors of Rome's security and greatness. During the Principate Jews, magicians, and philosophers were sporadically expelled from the city of Rome itself, possibly for reasons of security, in actions of exile that were probably supported by the Senate and holders of official priesthoods.22 Action against Christians, again the rider "in Rome itself" must be stressed, could have been of a similar nature, although Christians do not seem to have ever been corporately expelled from Rome.23 Popular taste constantly favoured the exotic over the indigenous in the towns of Italy.24 It is noteworthy that
those emperors who enjoyed poor relations with the Senate were not averse to enhancing the antagonism by reverencing *sacra externa*. Even emperors who were friendly to the Senate could be sceptical of the validity of official beliefs, and the Fathers may well have approved the sentiment while regretting the timing of Vespasian's deathbed jest. Domitian favoured Isis and Sarapis in particular, and his sycophant Statius "speaks respectfully of Isis and Cybele, and knows the ... name of Mithras." By the time of Hadrian's reign, the whole cultural complexion of the ruling class had changed as radically as the composition of the Senate, and that emperor's Orientalism was in harmony with prevalent trends and fashions, rather than antagonistic to any lingering antique Romanity.

While considerations of security might prompt ostensibly religious suppression in Rome or Italy, such actions would not constitute any example for the provinces as a whole. Policy and consequent action at Rome were not meant to be effective precedents for the empire in general, and regulations applying to citizens did not apply to provincials automatically. Provincial attitudes and conditions cannot therefore be accurately represented by scanning the sources for policy statements on religious matters. Polybius' celebrated passage on the strength of
Roman piety, Maecenas' advice to Augustus as reported by Dio Cassius, Cicero's lucubrations upon religious observances, to mention just a few standard authorities, do not tell one thing about the attitude of the second century A.D. mob in Pontus and Bithynia. Too often the feeling of ancient Mediterranean society in general, in social and religious affairs, is demonstrated by reference to the writings and thought of an upper class Roman of one or two centuries previous to the era under consideration. This feeling must of course be gauged before the popular persecutions can be discussed. It must, however, be reiterated that mos maiorum had no more influence in provincial affairs than had Roman city politics, and no Roman governor would have intervened in a local religious dispute, however much Cicero he had read, unless the peace of his own provincia were threatened. An extended consideration can now be given to the letter of Pliny in which he asks Trajan for advice in handling Christians.

After the salutation, Pliny notes that: "I have never been present at a cognitio of Christians." This implies that he has at least heard of previous trials. He is uncertain about condign punishments, about proper grounds for investigation, and about the extent to which he should pursue inquiries. Should he pardon apostates?
Furthermore, he is not sure whether "it is the mere name of Christian (nomen ipsum) which is punishable, even if innocent of crime, or rather the crimes (flagitia) associated with the name."\textsuperscript{30} His procedure so far had been to give the accused three chances to deny their Christian-ity. Persistent affirmation earned execution, for he is convinced that "their stubbornness and unshakeable obstin-acy ought not to go unpunished" although Roman citizens afflicted with the "madness" (amentia) had been despatched to Rome for trial.\textsuperscript{31} The offences of pertinacia and obstinatio should be noted.

Apostates, or those claiming to be innocent or to have left the Christian community many years previously, were required to invoke the pagan gods, offer wine and incense to the imperial statue, and to revile Christ. This performance was taken to be sufficient proof of apostacy. It should be noted that this "test" was not ordered for confessors, but for apostates, and for those claiming to be non-Christians already, as a proof of the sincerity of their protestations. Pliny is fully aware that no real Christian could perform such actions. Clearly then, the confessing Christians were in no way ordered to participate in the rituals of an "Imperial Cult".\textsuperscript{32} Nor were unrep-entant Christians punished for refusing to take a "test"
which was obviously only required of apostates. It is incorrect to suggest that the actual offence of the Christians was a refusal to take part in the imperial cult.\textsuperscript{33}

Pliny goes on to admit that assiduous inquiry had failed to uncover the commission of any \textit{flagitiae}. Even under torture, "two slave women whom they call deaconesses,"\textsuperscript{34} gave Pliny cause only to claim to find "nothing but a degenerate sort of cult" - a \textit{superstitio prava}. As one leading scholar has noted, for the Romans of the period \textit{superstitio} was very much a bad thing,\textsuperscript{35} but it was hardly a capital offence.

Having failed to find any evidence of \textit{flagitiae}, and being persuaded by some of the accused that they had given up assembling "since my edict, issued on your orders, ... banned all political meeting societies (\textit{hetaeriae})." Pliny had postponed further action and written to Trajan for advice.\textsuperscript{36} The letter concludes with the observation that sales of sacrificial meat, until recently depressed, were flourishing once more. This obviously exaggerated and possibly interpolated passage will be discussed in the next chapter.

Trajan's rescript, which would have had the force
of law for every province, was brief. He commends Pliny, and then goes on:

These people must not be hunted out (conquirendi non sunt). If they are brought before you and the charge against them is proved, they must be punished.

Any apostate (or "denier" - qui negaverit se Christianum esse), who offered prayer to "our gods" was to be pardoned, "however suspect his past conduct may be." Trajan then states that anonymous denunciations should not be heeded - "they are quite out of keeping with the spirit of our age," as presumably the torture of women was not. It was in fact standard practice for a private delator to face the accused at a cognitio. If the charge held, the informer stood to profit: if not, frivolous accusations were often severely punished.

It can be clearly deduced from Pliny's letter that the Christians were not punished for neglecting the imperial cult; nor for illegal assembly; nor for the performance of nasty actions (flagitia); and nor was Pliny - unless very secretively - following a previous directive of the central administration. The tone of the letter suggests quite strongly that Pliny had been led
to expect to find evidence of *flagitia*, political irregularity proved by illegal assembly, and possibly other proofs of "treason". These suspicions could have been natural to an upper class Roman of the period. Pliny's friend, Tacitus, had written an account of Nero's persecution of the Christians in Rome in A.D. 64. Tacitus was aware that Nero was using the Christians as scapegoats in an attempt to deflect the strong feeling in the city that the emperor himself was directly responsible for the terrible conflagration in Rome. While the Christians were not really believed to have been incendiaries, many people joined in the persecution because they felt the Christians were a sect guilty of "hatred of the human race". This remarkable phrase must be considered again later. It will suffice for now to say that it indicates that to a contemporary and friend of Pliny the Christians were, if nothing else, an anti-social group. Pliny would have been disposed to believe as much before the hearing. He was, in other words, prejudiced against the Christians.

His suspicions would have been encouraged by any local *consilium*. From the first appearance of the sect local Roman governors had been assured that the Christians were depraved public menaces. In The Acts of the Apostles Tertullus, as "prosecutor", addresses Felix the governor,
saying of Paul:

we find this man a perfect pest; he stirs up trouble among the Jews the world over, and is a ringleader of the Nazarene sect. 42

Tertullus is clearly stressing the threat to the otium of the province — that "peace" that was the Roman ideal of political life.

Alerted for signs of such guilt, Pliny found nothing. However, to release the Christians would have been a criticism of local authority, tending to undermine respect for it. Pliny need not recur to trickery to uphold the administration. Annoyed by the Christian refusal to answer him with "respect" and obey his commands to apostatize, he punishes what is indeed an offence — the obstinatio of the accused.43 Once Pliny's procedure has been approved by Trajan's rescript, Christianity becomes illegal. Persistent confession of the nomen alone suffices for even capital punishment, although the order not to hunt out Christians does nothing to reduce the ambiguity of the situation. Regardless, central government has aided in the institutionalization of local prejudice. Before the significance of the charge of obstinatio is developed more completely, the major facets of the schol-
arly debate over the juridical basis of the pre-Decian prosecution of Christians will be reviewed.

The mass of published argument that has accumulated around this topic since the modern discussion of the problem was initiated in 1890 by Mommsen's article "Der Religionsfrevel nach römischen Recht", may well contain much that is "worthless". 44 Certainly the debate has a curiously static quality, with the two main viable schools of thought existing together almost from the start. Those who follow Mommsen to any extent, deny that the official part in the persecutions can be explained by a directive of the central government. Mommsen's insistence that the local Roman governor could try and execute Christians under his own power of coercitio, "the right to punish", has been modified only to the extent that it is now realized that Christians appeared before a cognitio as a result of being informed on, and not because apprehended in any routine police action. 45 Mommsen's deduction that the crucial offence was majestas (treason) is now not regarded as accurate. Based on the assertion that in the ancient world religious offences were indistinguishable from political offences — both were "treason" to the state — Mommsen's basic insight still indirectly influences explanations of popular hatred. 46
The other major kind of theory explaining official action against the Christians, basically insists on the existence of a "Special Law" making a Christianity an offence.\textsuperscript{47} This kind of theory has a long and venerable patronage.\textsuperscript{48} It suggests that there was an actual law that forbade, on pain of death, merely being a Christian. It is seductively asserted — with no justification, it must be said — that such a law could be tersely phrased: \textit{Christians esse non licet} for example.\textsuperscript{49} The logical necessity for such a law is undeniable — but we are in the realm of human action, and not pure logic. In this illogical realm it was apparently possible to execute people for the crime of confessing to the \textit{nomen}, the "name", of Christian. Many officials, like Pliny himself, punished confession and reprieved denial. Tertullian caught the crazy situation — contrary to all other procedure, torture was used to force the denial of what, it must be presumed, was a crime. A murderer was tortured until he admitted his crime: a Christian was tortured because he had willingly admitted his putative crime!\textsuperscript{50} What was the crime? Did the state of criminality, and any offence connected with it automatically disappear upon apostacy?

J. Crook has ably taken up the struggle. Crook argues that as Christians were punished for the \textit{nomen},
"for the name, simply for being Christians", 51 Nero's action against the Christians in A.D. 64 "may have constituted some kind of precedent for the assumption that 'badness' was inherent in the 'name'." 52 This however, does not explain completely why if you said that you were a Christian "you were executed, or if a citizen, sent to Rome, but you only had to deny you were one to secure release". 53 Crook therefore avers that:

the equation 'Christian = man to be punished' can only have been established by government directive .... There must have been a legal order, a rescript to the urban prefect or something of the sort, laying down that henceforth persons brought before him as Christians were to be capitally punished; ....

"There must have been" is a cry of despair. If there had been prior legislation it would have constituted a precedent, to which Pliny or Trajan would have referred. A vexed subject of damnatio memoriae should not be allowed to distract from the obvious fact that Trajan held Domitian's rulings to be valid. Emperors suffering the posthumous "curse" of "obliteration of memory" might well have had their names removed from monuments. 55 If, as many people seem to believe, any legislation of the "damned" reign was automatically disregarded as well, the empire would have ground to a sudden halt. It is however, very
certain that legislation of Domitian (who suffered damnatio memoriae)\textsuperscript{56} was current in subsequent reigns. Pliny once quotes as relevant Nerva's direction to Tullius Justus:

\begin{quote}
Any regulations laid down for matters begun or concluded in the last reign are to hold good; consequently letters of Domitian must also remain valid. 57
\end{quote}

Trajan's rescript confirms the validity of Domitian's enactment. The good sense and administrative exigencies of the emperors overcame the vindictive intentions of the Senate. Prior legislation against the Christians would have been known, had it existed.

In his correspondence with Trajan, Pliny seems to be often consciously seeking to see a precedent established. He explains as much in an exchange sometime before the cognitio of the Christians, when he asks about the possibility of proceeding against Dio Chrysostom on the charge of treason (maiestas). Dio may have offended the imperial cult by setting up a statue of Trajan in the building that housed the tombs of his wife and sons. Apart from reinforcing the point that Pliny was not acting from any precedent when dealing with the Christians, this episode, and Trajan's reaction - to emphatically forbid
the use of treason charges in relation to any putative offence to his cult - indicate that by the time of the hearing at Amisus Pliny had a precedent for ignoring any charges of *maiestas* relating to the imperial cult.\(^58\)

It is difficult to see, then, how Pliny could have been relying on any law when he prosecuted the Christians at Amisus. He himself says quite clearly that he executed the Christians for *obstinatio*. To understand how heinous a crime it was to refuse to obey a Roman in authority, it will be necessary to discuss the Roman superiority complex. It should be noted that although a paper battle obscures the fact, two leading scholars actually agree that the real offence of the Christians, from the official point of view, was an insolent defiance of a representative of the imperial authority.\(^59\)

Some time ago Sherwin-White clearly demonstrated the role played in the official persecution of Christianity by the Roman consciousness of their high authority. He insisted that the Christian offence was *contumacia*, a highly insolent and severely punishable refusal to obey proper authority.\(^60\) De Ste. Croix showed that Sherwin-White was wrong to locate the fact of *contumacia* in the refusal to sacrifice, which, as it has been shown in this
study, was not demanded of confessors. Croix further argued that contumacia could not form the grounds of a delation, nor could the unrepentant attitude described by the term contumacia be an actual crime, but only an aggravating "quality" of a crime. Even if the Christians behaved "contumaciously" during a hearing, that would not explain why "the government wanted the Christians to be brought to trial". (It is a little presumptuous of Croix to state that the government actually "wanted" the Christians to be informed on.) Croix also dismisses the legal texts that Sherwin-White uses to argue his case, but does not condescend to say on what grounds.

When giving his own opinion about the motives of the Romans in the persecutions, De Ste. Croix can only find the Christians guilty of an affront to the Roman concept of "established authority". Yet this is really what Sherwin-White had said. He merely fixed the right offence on the wrong object. For the term contumacia need not be taken as a strictly legal technical offence. It describes the refusal to obey a magistrate, and is indeed synonymous in this context with pertinacia and obstinatio. The Christians were told to apostatize. When they refused they were guilty of a punishable disobedience. The situation makes sense when it is realized that Pliny had been
told that Christians were guilty of certain offences, and that he more than likely assumed their guilt. He does not tell Trajan that they are innocent; only that he has found no proof of guilt. He clearly believes that to be a Christian is to be in a criminal condition of some sort. There is no law decreeing this. Pliny was prejudiced against the Christians. Holding them to be criminals — regardless of the irrationality of the situation — he orders them to abjure their adherence to the nomen. A small digression to detail the Roman concept of their own authority will convey some of the affront that Pliny must have felt when the motley band of Christians defied him, and so defied his emperor, Trajan.

By the first century A.D. the term "human race" had come to stand as a synonym for the combined population of the Roman empire. When the Christians were said by Tacitus to "hate the human race" they were quite obviously conceptually expelled from the bounds of humanity. The full implications of this conceptual expulsion will be developed in a later part of this study. For now it can be said that if the Romans felt that the Christians somehow did not belong in the empire, they probably felt that they were a kind of superbi. In what has been called the quintessential statement of the doc-
trine of Roman imperial "manifest destiny". Anchises foretells Rome's vast imperium:

tu regere imperio populos Romane memento -
haec tibi erunt artes - pacisque imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.

The division of mankind is clear. In a sharp dichotomy, "all who were not subiecti ... were automatically superbi". The superbi were the "unpacified", the independent "barbarians", and their offences could all be summed up in one word: adrogantia, the insolence of refusing to submit humbly to Roman rule. To become subiectus was to begin to benefit from the process of civilizing, by which a barbarian became a true "human being". The spread of enlightenment was one of the major facets of the imperial mission, which was ordained by destiny, a pronoia that was later to be Christianized. The Romans conquered by divine authority; they ruled by the right and duty of their own auctoritas. Contumacious reaction to this Roman authority was a rejection of civilization and destiny.

Talking of auctoritas Schulz says:

authority has educational and governing functions. The consequences are obedience, order, discipline; reasons for
its dictates are not required, nor could many people check or understand them if given; *stat pro ratione auctoritas*. 67

Linked naturally with *disciplina*, authority was a key concept in Roman life. The governmental view of the relationship between state and subject derived from the "natural authority of the *paterfamilias* over the members of the household". 68 Such power was absolute, and, if it could not be wielded arbitrarily, could justify any punishment as condign for an offence against its dignity. Such affronts could be very harshly avenged, both in the domestic and in the international spheres. In punishing the *insolentia* and *adrogantia* of any group of *superbi*, Rome would not perceive any need for explanation. If *superbi* refused to yield to the civilizing authority of Rome, it was the duty of that authority to humble, crush, and if necessary to extirpate the arrogant barbarians. Rule became its own justification. In the period when Rome's own concept of her peculiar "manifest destiny" was being brought to full expression, Cicero had written:

Dominion has been granted by Nature to everything that is best, to the great advantage of what is weak. For why else does God rule over man, the mind over the body, and also over lust; but it rules over the body as a king governs his subjects, or a father his children, whereas it rules over
lust as a master rules his slaves, 
restraining it and breaking its power. 69

So too the "mindless" superbi had to be broken by the 
rational spreaders of civilization and humanitas - the 
Romans, who had been divinely appointed to the task. 70

In a very short space Pliny gives several of the 
salient vices of the barbarian superbus: amentia, superstition, and pertinacia, the latter term being a close 
cousin to adrogantia, the defiant insolence of the un-
civilized and "unpacified" superbus. 71 That "refined and 
precious" 72 torturer of women quite clearly sees the Christ-
ians as a type. Obviously uncivilized, the Christians are 
defying the orders of a representative of true authority. 
They are some sort of "barbarians", who from a lack of 
rationality deliberately stand outside, and therefore below 
the "human race", the ordinary inhabitants of the Roman 
empire. This motif - the Christian as barbarian - will 
be taken up later in this study. It might be added here 
that whatever they lack in value as authentic historical 
Sources, the Acts of the Pagan Martyrs and the "worked" 
Christian literature that purports to record the trial of 
various martyrs, partially make up in a dramatically ac-
curate highlighting of the central significance of each 
incident - the confrontation of an absolute authority by
contumacious madmen: mad as far as those in authority are concerned. Prudentius, a Roman and a Christian, was later to have no doubt that the salient offence was contumacia.

Pliny's prejudice against the Christians at his cognitio is reflected in the few genuine records of trials during the pre-Decian period. The attitude of the Roman governing class, as far as its members were aware of the existence of Christians at all, was one source of prejudice. At one hearing the Christians are exorted to return to Roman mores. The implied opposition is not between Greek or African. Even the Jews could not be coerced at a cognitio to return to Roman mores. Those to whom the plea was addressed had strayed into the realm of Barbaria. If his persuasion were successful then the governor had scored a small triumph for the civilizing power. The fact of his pleading with the Christians need not lead one to praise his kindness. Confessors were led off to death. A small defeat, but ultimate victory, for authority. Those superbi who refused to humble themselves had to be (alas) extirpated.

The major source of Pliny's prejudice was the attitude of the local opponents of Christianity, reflected
no doubt in any advice he received from his local consilium. The pressure of this local hatred and prejudice does not excuse Pliny's actions, but it is by far the most significant part of the whole episode. The next chapter begins the consideration of this local hatred and prejudice. The main reasons adduced, both by ancient and modern authors, to explain this hatred will be discussed and assessed.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


5. Last 1937, 92.


8. Barnes, Tertullian, p. 156.
9. The edition used is B. Radice ed. and trans., Letters and Panegyricus, (Loeb: Harvard U.P., 1969), in the introduction of which, ap. p. xii, we are informed that Pliny was sent to Pontus and Bithynia as legatus pro praetore consulari potestate.

10. The letters are Pliny, Epistulae X, numbers 96 and 97 respectively.

11. Barnes, 1968. 48: "The legal position of Christians continues exactly as Trajan defined it until Decius."


13. Barnes, following Millar (JRS LVIII 1968, 222), asserts of the phrase cognitio extra ordinem that: "The term occurs in no ancient text." (Barnes, Tertullian, p. 144.) Buti finds four references to the term in the Digest - see Buti, 30. The late appearance, (although it is in an ancient text), makes Buti doubt "che fosse di uso corrente".


15. For mandates etc. see Garnsey, JRS LVIII, 55, and F. Millar, JRS LVI 1966, 158. Some standardization goes back to Trajan. Mandata were being issued to proconsuls by A.D. 135-6. Garnsey thinks that by the Antonine period, "every governor, whether proconsul or legate, received a set of instructions from the emperor before he set out for his province".
16. Digest I, 18, 13, under the heading De Officio Praesidis is from Ulpian, De Officio Proconsulis. "It is proper for every good and worthy governor to take care that the province over which he presides is peaceable and quiet. This he will accomplish without difficulty if he exerts himself to expel bad men, and diligently seek for them, as he must apprehend all sacrilegious persons [actually sacrilegos = "temple robbers"] robbers, kidnappers, and thieves". (Trans. is by S.P. Scott). .... Quod non difficile obtinebit, si sollicite agat, ut malis hominibus provincia careat eosque conquirat: nam et sacrilegos latrones plagiaros fures conquirere debet. The Christians on the other hand, as far as Trajan was concerned, were not to be "hunted out" - conquirendi non sunt. For new offences being the concern and jurisdiction of the Roman governor see T. Mommsen, Strafrecht, (1899), p. 222.

17. Particularly hated were the Druidic and Carthaginian rites. Several instances of the Romans performing human sacrifice are known, although the practice was banned in the 80s B.C. There were instances of unchaste vestals being immured after that date.

18. The Bacchic repression of 186 B.C. is the best known. (Livy xxxix, 8-19). The cult was repressed out of fears that it was a "conspiracy" - coniuratio. The treatment of the Isis cult is fascinating. Proscribed in 58 and 50 B.C. (Valerius Maximus 1,3,3) an Isisac temple was nevertheless built in 43 B.C. by the triumvirs, (Dio Cassius xlvii, 15). Not favoured by Augustus and Tiberius, the cult flourished later, Domitian of course favouring it, and building an Iseum. Cf. Hardy, p. 16.

19. As did the Bacchanalians in 186 B.C.

20. At least a bad externum could become a religio prava? (To be correct, bad sacra were prava.) Cf. Frend, MP, p. 107.
21. Livy xxix, 10 and 14. For the import of the Cappadocian "Bellona" see Plutarch, Sulla, 9.

22. Jews and magicians (Chaldeans) were expelled in 139 B.C. Jews were expelled under Claudius, if Acts 16,2 can be trusted. Was Pomponia Graecina a convert to Judaism? (Tacitus, Annals xiii, 32). Epicureans were expelled in 175 B.C. The Stoic opposition, especially to Domitian, is celebrated.

23. Unless, and it must be very doubtful, the Claudian expulsion was of Christians.


27. See B.W. Henderson, The Life and the Principate of the Emperor Hadrian, (London: Methuen, 1923), esp. chapters 7 and 8. See Nock, p. 126: "Hadrian's accession, as we know above all from art, meant a great emphasis on Greek fashions, and these included the hellenized Egyptian cults (just as the Emperor's villa at Tibur included a Canopus)." One must also consider the so-called "Second Sophistic", which may have represented a Greek conquest of Rome, but introduced such "un-classical" works as the Life of Apollonius of Tyana.

28. See SWRSRLNT, e.g. p. 15: "For all those crimes not covered by the ordo the governor was bound to fall back on local custom and his own ingenuity."
Cf. Canfield, p. 27, and Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, p. 570. The main point is that regulations applying to citizens would not automatically apply to provincials.

29. Polybius vi, 56, is used by Frend to describe the reality of Roman religion in the Christian era. He also finds Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* ii, 3 relevant to a description of Roman attitudes to provincials. See Frend, pp. 104-5. Guterman, p. 31 wants the imaginary speech of Maecenas in Dio Cassius LII, 36 to explain the Roman attitude to "atheists" from Augustus onwards. He also seems to think that a passage from a "utopian" work actually describes a legal situation (Guterman, p. 30 on Cicero, *De Legibus* ii, 8.)

30. He begins: Cognitionibus de Christianis interfui numquam. On nomen: ...nomen ipsum, si flagitiis careat, an flagitia cohaerentia nomini puniantur.

31. Fuerunt alii similis amentiae, quos, quia cives Romani erant, adnotavi in urbem remittendis. (Pliny *X*, 96,4).

32. Canfield had realized this quite clearly (p. 91): "... this procedure was simply a test. ... There is no indication that Pliny put the Christians to death for refusing to worship the image of the emperor."

33. An excellent article, coming to this conclusion, is F. Millar, "The Imperial Cult and the Persecutions", *Le Culte des Souverains dans L'Empire Romain*, (Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1972), pp. 145-175.

34. Pliny *X*, 96, 8: Quo magis necessarium credidi ex
duabus ancillis, quae ministrae dicebantur, quid esset veri, et per tormenta quaerere.

35. Cf. SWRP, p. 38: "... superstitio, a bad word in Flavian writers,...".

36. It is therefore unlikely that they were actually punished for consisting of an illegal collegium. That this was the Christian offence was an occasional theory. Cf. Frend, MP, p. 222: if Pliny "does not refer explicitly to illegal collegia in connection with the Christians, he certainly had them in mind as he wrote his dispatch".

37. The "acts" of the emperors were known collectively as constitutiones. They were edicta, judicial decisions called decreta, and "replies" such as Trajan's to Pliny which were called rescripta. All constitutiones had the force of statute law (lex), as Galus, Institutionum Commentarius I,5: Constitutio principis est quod imperator decreto vel edicto vel epistula constitut. Nec unquam dubitatum est quin legis vicem obtineat, cum ipse imperator per legem imperium accipiatur. Cf. Dig. I,4,11. See A.A. Schiller, Roman Law, (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 481 for commentary.

38. Pliny X,97. Conquirendi non sunt; si deferantur et arguantur, puniendi sunt.

39. ... nec nostri saeculi est. The importance of this exchange is well stated by Barnes in JRS LVIII, 1968, 48, when he says of the legal situation of the Christians, that "the central fact is Trajan's rescript to Pliny". The genuineness of these two letters has been questioned from time to time, and I myself suspect some interpolation, or some very clichéd reworking by Pliny before publication. It
should be noted that Sherwin-White, The Letters of Pliny: a historical and social commentary, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 691 says: "It is hardly necessary to defend the genuine character of these two letters."


41. Tacitus, Annals XIV, 44. Describing the sect he says it is per flagitia invisos vulgus Christianos appellabat. It is an exitiables superstition. He says that it was less for incendiaryism than for odio humani generis that the Christians convicti sunt.

42. Acts 24,5. Ἔσφόντες γὰρ τὸν ᾄδρα τούτον λοίμων καὶ κινδύνων στάσεις πᾶσιν τοῖς Ἰσίων τῶν κατὰ τὴν δικαιομένην πρωτοστάτην τε τῶν Ναγωραίων ἱρέσεως, ...

43. The "guilty" were culpable of obstinatio before the trial if, as most agree, the nomen ipsum was by then a crime. The argument is taken up below in this chapter.

44. Barnes, JRS LVIII, 1968, 32: "The modern bibliography on the subject of the juridical basis of the persecutions of the Christians in the Roman Empire before 250 is vast, contentious - and in large part worthless."


46. Clearly seen in W. Schäfke, "Frühchristlicher Widerstand", ANRW II 23.1, p. 615: "Religion hat für die Antike einen nationalen Charakter. Das allgemeine Empfinden ist, dass 'für römische
Nationalität römischer Glaube nur ein anderer Ausdruck' ist'. He is quoting Mommsen 1890, ap. 403.

47. Keresztes, ANRW II 23.1, pp 279f. has a good and full discussion, although it must be reiterated that his judgement is suspect. For some reason, what is usually called the "special law" Keresztes calls the "general law". As the object is a fiction, it is difficult to argue about its "name".


49. Canfield, p. 32. It is very naughty of some scholars to talk about the "law" as if it existed. Lebreton is a good example of this, dropping the term Christianos esse non licet, as if it were recorded in Roman law somewhere, and not a product of modern fantasy. See J. Lebreton and J. Zeiller, The History of the Primitive Church, (translated by E.C. Messenger), (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1949), Vol. 2, p. 315.

50. See Tertullian's Apology ii, 10. "If the other criminals plead not guilty, you torture them to make them confess; the Christians alone you torture to make them deny." etc.


52. Ibid. The whole argument for a "special law" takes its justification from the notorious institutum Neronianum of Tertullian, Ad Nationes 1.7. This is accepted by some as an actual law. Barnes, Tertullian, p. 105, noting its subsequent demise and non-appearance in the Apology (or anywhere else), says that Tertullian "coined the phrase" to "stigmatize persecutors".
53. Crook, p. 279.

54. Ibid.

55. Cf. Lewis and Reinhold, Roman Civilization. Sourcebook II: The Empire, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 128. Both Nero and Domitian suffered damnatio memoriae. If, as some think, all legislation of these two emperors had been expunged then any anti-Christian legislation of Nero (or Domitian) would not exist to influence Trajan and Pliny. This is sometimes seen as an argument against the "special law" theory. Alternately, it could be argued that those emperors had legislated against the Christians, that the legislation had been expunged by the order of damnatio memoriae, but the example had lived on to influence subsequent officials and emperors. The argument in the text here, (see notes 56 & 57) is that legislation clearly was not expunged when an emperor suffered damnatio memoriae, although it seems that his name was scratched off of monuments.

56. For Domitian's damnatio memoriae see Suetonius, Domitian xxiii. Despite the wishes of the Conspect Fathers, not all records of his reign were obliterated. See note 57.

57. Pliny X,58. The letter from Nerva to Tullius Justus states: Cum rerum omnium ordinatio, quae prioribus temporibus incohatae consummatae suht, observanda sit, tum epistulis etiam Domitian standum est.

58. Pliny X,81-82.

60. Sherwin-White, JTS 1952, 210. He says that the "test was reasonable, and its refusal revealed con-
tumacia. For Trajan, the disciplinarian, that sufficed."

61. De Ste. Croix, P&P 1963, 18. Sherwin-White, it should be noted, found that "The common assump-
tion that the provincials were compelled to take part in the ceremonies of the imperial cult is not well grounded." (JTS 1952, 210.)


64. For the argument see chapter 5, esp. pp. 189-190.


66. Wells, p. 4.


68. Schulz, pp. 165-6.

69. De Republica III, 25: .... nam ut animus corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini, sed corpori ut rex civibus suis aut parens liberis, libidini autem ut servis dominus, quod eam coercet et frangit ....
70. As in Cicero, Philippics VI,7,19: Populum Romanum servire fas non est, quem di immortales omnibus gentibus imperare voluerunt. The history of this idea, as far as it is expressed in poetry, (with some reference to prose), can be found in F. Christ, Die Romische Weltherrschaft in der Antiken Dichtung, (Berlin: 1938).

71. Pertinacia as coz to adrogantia; see BC I, 85.

72. I believe that Renan actually referred to "la langue precieuse et raffinée de Pline". In this case I think that it is licet to derive personality from style.

73. In the Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs, for example; The proconsul addresses one of the accused: Nolite huius dementiae esse participes.

74. Frend agrees that the salient offence is that of contumacia, but alas will not say why, beyond referring to Sherwin-White (1952). He does, however, insist on the "heinous character" of contumacia, offering Cicero, De Legibus III, 3, 6: Justa imperia sunt, isque civis modeste et sine recusato parento. Magistratus nec oboedientem et noxium civem multa vinculis verberibus. The angry proconsul in the Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs notes of the Christians that obstinanter perseveraverunt. Cp, Frend MP pp. 176-7. Prudentius Peristephanon, II, 343 - Lawrence contumax; V, 105 - Vincent contumax; cp, III, 64 - Eulalia superba; XIV, 18 - Agnes pertinax.

75. Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs XIV: The Christians
refused to return ad Romanorum morem.

76. For barbaria see pp. 88-9 below.

77. "Kindness" - cp. Barnes, Tertullian, p. 159. It is true that in the authentic acta the magistrates are represented as being much less savage than they are in the worked and fictitious acta.

78. For local advisors on consilium see SWRSLNT pp. 17 & 19-21; 67. The arbitrator had a consilium in Sardinia in A.D. 69 (FIRA i, no. 59). Festus used Agrippa as a "consilium" member: Acts xxv, 14f. (Acts xxv, 12; Festus has "advisors".) The Augustan practice, known from the edicts of Cyreniae, had been to use local experts on judicial consilia - i.e. as "jurymen". It is a very reasonable inference that when the act of judgement devolved on the Roman governor, as it did certainly by Nero's reign, the role of local experts changed from that of jurymen to that of advisors. There is no mention of a consilium in Pliny's letter. It would have been taken for granted by Trajan that his precious legate had local advice. It would be ridiculous to suppose that any legatus would be expected to know all about local custom, laws and precedents. It has been pointed out to me that consilia are never mentioned in the genuine Acts of the Martyrs. This is simply because even the basically genuine acta have been edited so that the central confrontation - between the figure of the governor, and the figure of the main confessors - is highlighted at the expense of any detail that the editors felt to be extraneous.
CHAPTER TWO

PERSECUTION: THE POPULAR VIEW

The legal situation of Christianity was determined by Pliny's actions, and Trajan's approval of the steps taken by his loyal legate. This does not mean that the situation is pellucid to modern observers. Why, for example, did most governors execute confessors, while some only imprisoned them, and at least one sent a group away unharmed?\(^1\) Exactly what offence was discerned to lurk in the confession of the nomen? There are many murky areas, but it seems very likely that the order not to "hunt out" the Christians was obeyed by posterity. Indeed, if the rescript of Hadrian (see Appendix A) is a trustworthy guide, it seems that the central authority expressed concern that Christians be acted against only through the correct delatory channels, and that unfair delation be severely punished.\(^2\) The crux of any hearing against the Christians was, to repeat the conclusion of chapter one, punishment for contumacious refusal to apostatize. While the rationale behind the criminality of the nomen is obscure, it is clear that confession of the name was a possible charge.

It is also clear that those in authority, whatever
their prejudices, found no evidence upon which to prosecute Christians for any number of offences imputed to them by the pagan mass. If any Roman official had believed the Christians to have been guilty of any of these offences, he would immediately have "hunted out" the sect, and done his best to exterminate it. This should be remembered when these alleged crimes are considered in this chapter and the next. All these accusations of crimes: treason, illegal assembly, conspiracy, "public enmity", black magic, infanticide, cannibalism, would have led to the arrest and investigation of the Christians, had they been believed by those in authority. It is probable that after many such accusations did not even figure in a denunciation. An informer would only have to mention the adherence to the nomen. Yet all these accusations, and a few more to be considered below, were apparently offered as genuine reasons and excuses for the hatred of and violence against the sect.

The meaning of these various calumnies must be sought in the significance that they had for the general population of the Roman empire. This is in fact the approach followed by most scholars. Much has been gained in the interpretation of these accusations by many informed attempts to discern and reconstruct from these calumnies
those mental inclinations which led the pagans to reject the Christian communities, to exclude them from contemporary society. The same intention informs this study, but the purpose of this chapter and the next is to emphasize how much this exclusion was purely conceptual. Even this conceptual exclusion was usually latent. It was only in times of stress that the conceptual exclusion was realized in action: in the sporadic and intermittent outbreaks of violence that are commonly called the pre-Declian persecutions of the Christians. It will be convenient to begin with a further consideration of De Ste. Croix' views.

De Ste. Croix asserts that the pagan masses demanded persecution because the Christian refusal to worship any god but their own was felt to endanger the amicable relationship between mortals and deities, that was maintained, so it was believed, by the correct observation of cult. Angered at the Christians, the gods suspended the pax deorum and punished humanity in general for the Christian offence, by inflicting floods, famines, wars and other disasters on the world.

The monotheistic exclusiveness of the Christians was believed to alienate the goodwill of the gods, to endanger what the Romans called the pax deorum (the right harmonious relationship between gods and men), and to be responsible for disasters which overtook the community.
While there is some evidence for this contention, it is only with Tertullian very late in the second century that the accusation that the Christians were the cause of earthly disaster is clearly formulated, and he gives it no priority over a mass of other complaints. De Ste. Croix indifferently ignores other, earlier accusations, and his own statement shows that he is dealing with a Romanocentric perspective. One must wonder to what extent this explanation is valid for the cities of the east, Greek and others, a question to which this study will return. Why De Ste. Croix should choose only one, comparatively late, particularly Roman accusation is not clear, given the wide range at his disposal. Perhaps the presumptive selectivity of his choice will be made clear by demonstrating that from one work of Tertullian evidence for most accusations upon which scholars base hypotheses accounting for both popular and official hatred can be found. The one or two exceptions can be found in another work of the same author. It will be useful to illustrate this. Most of the accusations, of course, pre-date Tertullian.

Discussing the official charge against the Christians, De Ste. Croix bluntly states:

Here I am going to be dogmatic and say that from at least 112 onwards (perhaps
... from 64) the normal charge against the Christians was simply "being Christians"; they are punished, that is to say, "for the name", nomen Christianum.

One could learn that much from several of the early Christian apologists. Tertullian claims that not only is the secta of Christianity "hated for the name of its founder", but it was also stupidly punished for "the name". Enemy of the gods, emperors, laws, morals, the Christian was held to be guilty of treason to the religion of Rome: crimen laesae Romanae religionis. Tertullian scornfully notes that failure to worship the gods and sacrifice to the emperors was the cause of accusations of sacrilege and treason. It was from these two loci that Mommsen seems to have derived his own theory of "national apostacy".

The Christians were hated and persecuted as public enemies (publici hostes), and shunned as enemies of the human race (hostes generis humani), who were believed to be responsible for earthly disaster. Economic excuses for hate are reviewed. Unprofitable in business, the sect was blamed because "the revenues of the temples are breaking down daily". As if this were not enough, the Christians were reviled for allegedly committing incest, ritual infanticide, and cannibalism. The very basic bond of society, the family (familia), was destroyed by the Christ-
Wives converted to Christianity were estranged from their husbands, while households were destabilized by the conversion of slaves.

Like many early Christian writers, Tertullian has many harsh words for the Jews. The synagogues are the "founts of persecutions", an opinion not neglected by some of the most authoritative of modern scholars. The acerbic Carthaginian in fact finds that "there are none more apt to shout for the death of the Christians than the common herd". Their hatred is irrational: the pagans hate what they do not know. At the root this irrational hatred is an equally irrational fear, odium enim etiam timor spirat. From fear the pagans "condemn in advance", while their judgements are given by "prejudice or injustice". Thus the topic of this study - the role of prejudice in the early Christian-pagan conflict - could take a remark of Tertullian's as its starting point, although, as it will be seen below, he was not the first Christian apologist to discern prejudice in the pagan hatred.

From Tertullian one could learn that the Christians were accused of venerating an ass head, of performing evil magic, of being stupid and of betraying traditional culture.
A common expression of the conceptual exclusion of the sect was found in the application of the term genus tertium, the "third race". Finally to return to Pliny, whose letter to Trajan Tertullian knew well, we find the apologist defying the ghost of the stylish legate by making a virtue of the dementia (Pliny had used amentia) of Christian obstinatio. So:

...we prefer obstinacy to safety.

This obstinatio is in fact the backbone of the Christian triumph over the demonic forces: "our triumph over them is never greater than when for our obstinacy in our faith we are condemned". Indeed, Tertullian informs the pagans, "that very obstinacy with which you taunt us, is your teacher".

This quick run through Tertullian has provided a preview of the accusations against the Christians that will form the subject of this chapter and the next. The conclusions modern scholars have come to on the topic will also be discussed. It can be seen that "prejudice" has not been plucked out of thin air to provide an explanation for the Christian-pagan conflict. The irrational factor
must be fully taken into account. It was noted by the early Christians, and needs consideration. To paint the complete picture, a factor ignored by the early Christians - Christian prejudice against the pagans - must be added to the canvas. The analysis of popular hatred that now follows attempts to show how, to a perhaps small degree, the very competent, sometimes superlative, scholarship on the subject can be validly augmented by the inclusion of a consideration of the significant irrational factor.

It is clear that in the Apology Tertullian is addressing two kinds of calumny: those he knows at first hand, and those he knows of or deduces from the extant literature of the already established Christian apologetic tradition. The difficulty in separating these two types of accusation is compounded by the fact that any one of them already mentioned in literary apologetics could have been current in Tertullian's Carthage. What can be said is that all the accusations are indicators of a rejection of the sect from society in general. Yet was this rejection a constant, diurnal fact of Christian-pagan relationships? There are indications in the Apology that exclusion was a latent possibility, activated only in times of personal or general stress. This is the basis of Tertullian's complaint that:
When the empire is shaken, when the rest of its members are shaken, we too of course, though the mobs tag us as outsiders (extranei), are found in some corner of the 22 disaster.

The significance of the term extranei will be greatly enlarged upon later. Other works, particularly other works from the pen of Tertullian, will be shown below to indicate a flourishing and amicable intercourse, social at least, between Christians and pagans.

The idea of a rigid and actual exclusion of Christians from general society, an exclusion provoked by the withdrawn Christian exclusiveness, is a pervasive concept. It is often argued that Christian propaganda and behaviour signalled a deliberate rejection of universal social, cultural and religious customs and norms. Many experts would agree with Frend that pagans were outraged by the Christian "refusal to take part in the ordinary daily life of the city even in its simplest details". It should be remarked here that the immediate and proper assumption is that in dealing with Christian-pagan hostility, one is confronted with a type of urban factionalism. The expressions of enmity must be interpreted as indicators of intra-urban strife. The question is whether these expressions directly yield the true nature of that strife, or whether they are symbolic denominators of another kind
of factional contest, the real nature of which is not immediately given in the expressions used. It is contended in this study that the latter option must be included in a complete account of the Christian-pagan conflict.

Many modern authorities then, derive pagan hatred from a reaction to Christian withdrawal from the accepted modes of social life, in its widest sense. That the Christians were charged to direct their loyalty to a supra-urban focus is undeniable. Once Paul had proclaimed the conversion of the gentile to be a God-ordained duty, the idea of an ethnically and geographically bounded evangel became meaningless. Christians rapidly came to consider themselves as members of a universal community that superseded any local polity, and claimed all their loyalties. Frend refers to the very early Epistle to Diognetus where it can indeed be read that the Christians:

show forth the wonderful and confessedly strange character of the constitution of their own citizenship. They dwell in their own fatherlands, but as if sojourners in them.

Schäfke notes the several places in I Clement where the description of Christian "citizenship" seems to imply the rejection of local patriotism. In I Peter, the faithful are described, in a very influential phrase, as "visitors
and pilgrims" on earth. 28 In reference to the community of Christ, we read in Ephesians the following assurance: "So you are no longer aliens or foreign visitors: you are citizens like all the saints and part of God's household". 29

In the second century the pagan polemicist Celsus likened Christians to introspective frogs around a marsh, calling them people who "walled themselves off" from society and refused to accept the duties of citizenship. 30 Of course Tertullian has much to say on the subject. "Truth" - the Christian creed - "knows she is a stranger on earth", declares Tertullian:

and easily finds enemies among men of another allegiance, but she knows that her race (genus), home, hope, recompense, honour, are in heaven.

Colwell finds that the Christians were subject to constant "exhortation to separation". 32 Cadoux finds that, at least in the period before A.D. 180, Christians "tended to hold themselves aloof as far as possible from the life of the world around them". 33 As Hermas heard it in a vision: "you know that you ... are living in a strange country, for your city is far from this city". Then comes the appeal to separation:
If then you know your city, in which you are going to dwell, why do you here prepare lands and costly establishments and buildings and vain dwellings?

To the Christian, Tertullian says:

you are a foreigner (peregrinus) in this world, a citizen of Jerusalem, the city above. Our citizenship (municipatus), the apostle says, is in heaven.

The Christian concept of the world was plainly one in which two immiscible types of being existed. Celsus, who was thoroughly versed in Christian literature, could with some justice describe at least an ambition to wall themselves off on the part of the sect. It must have been galling in the extreme to those pagans who knew Christian literature to find their community, and their ideals of community, rejected and disdained as evil. However, this is the realm of literary polemic. How far are the experts justified in using this as proof of an actual, diurnal, mundane and aggravating withdrawal from social affairs? At first sight the answer is, perhaps, very justified. A clear line must be drawn, however. If the Christians were justly accused of neglecting, indeed, spurning, pagan religious and cultic activities, they were unjustly accused of withdrawal from many common daily affairs. The ramifications of the Christian rejection of
all pagan religious practices must now be considered.

A primary indication of a reaction to the exclusive monotheism of the Christians is the charge of "atheism", which the sect virulently rejected. Justin states:

Thus we are called atheists. We do proclaim ourselves atheists as regards those whom you call gods, but not with respect to the Most True God, who is alien to all evil.

Tatian turns the accusation back onto his accusers as did the martyr Polycarp before the magistrate. In his Legatio Athenagoras claims that: "It is so obvious that we are not atheists that it seems ridiculous even to undertake the refutation of those who make the claim". The accusation of atheism is reflected in the statement of Vettius Epagathus to the governor during the Lyons pogrom of A.D. 177, when, "he asked to be heard ... in defence of the brethren to the effect that there was nothing atheistic or impious among them". Most significantly there is a pagan testimony to this accusation. Alexander, a very successful religious quack in the first half of the second century A.D., began a "ceremony" by commanding all atheists - Christians and Epicureans - to be gone.

Pagans clearly recognized that the Christians had
a deity. The term "atheism" did not signify then, as it
does now, a complete denial of the validity of any religious
belief, but the abnegation of cultic ritual. "The majority
accuse us of atheism", wrote Athenagoras, that is to say,
"they accuse us of not recognizing the same gods as do the
cities". For most scholars this charge seems to be
directly equal to the Roman allegation that the Christians
were responsible for earthly disasters because of their
destruction of the pax deorum. (It should be noted here
that the term atheism came late into Latin.) By making
the eastern charge of atheism carry the meaning of the
charge of destroying the pax deorum, scholars can then say
of all the inhabitants of the empire, with regard to the
attitude to natural disasters, that: "Contemporaries
believed that these resulted specifically from neglect of
the gods". Two questions must then be asked. Was the
main burden of the charge of atheism direct responsibility
for mundane catastrophe? Was the rejection of pagan cult
equivalent to, and seen by contemporaries as equivalent
to, the complete rejection of all social and political
life?

Schäfke notes that:

Der Vorwurf des Atheismus ist also immer ein
Kennzeichen für Menschen und Gruppen, die
sich ausserhalb der religiösen und damit der politischen Gemeinschaft stellen.
This statement might validly describe the extreme pagan perspective. It does not indicate the reality, for the Christians were often very much in the social and even the political community. Before developing this, it must be seen if the charge of atheism can be clearly equated to that of causing earthly disaster. When Polycarp was reviled as an atheist, he was also called by the mob the "destroyer" of the gods. The martyrs at Lyons were mockingly asked the whereabouts of their obviously ineffectual god. The mob laughed at the Christian victims, "glorifying their idols and ascribing to them the punishment of the Christians". These passages do not describe the same situation as that recorded in Tertullian's famous complaint:

If the Tiber reaches the walls, if the Nile does not rise to the fields, if the sky doesn't move or the earth does, if there is famine, if there is plague, the cry is at once: "The Christians to the lion!"

In the first two passages what is reflected is not the fear of the divine retribution, but the fear that if neglected, the gods can fade away, or like Pan die. Support for this contention comes from a remarkable passage in the Acts of the Apostles, which also introduces the idea of the economic rationalization of pagan hatred. The passage can be given in full.
It was during this time that a rather serious disturbance broke out in connection with the Way. A silversmith called Demetrius, who employed a large number of craftsmen making silver shrines of Diana, called a general meeting of his own men with others in the same trade. "As you men know," he said, "it is on this industry that we depend for our prosperity. Now you must have seen and heard how, not just in Ephesus but nearly everywhere in Asia, this man Paul has persuaded and converted a great number of people with his argument that gods made by hand are not gods at all. This threatens not only to discredit our trade, but also to reduce the sanctuary of the great goddess Diana to unimportance. It could end up by taking away all the prestige of a goddess venerated all over Asia, yes, and everywhere in the civilized world (oikumene)." This speech roused them to fury, and they started to shout, "Great is Diana of the 49 Ephesians!"

The economic rationalization of prejudice is very familiar to people today. Cultural objections are usually afterthoughts that accrue to the primary expressions of prejudice, just as Demetrius is presented as first of all appealing to the economic self-interest of his audience, and only secondarily expressing concern for the cult itself. There is no mention of divine retribution. As it stands, however, this passage seems to indicate that pagans had a genuine economic complaint against the Christians. This impression can be reinforced. Did not Pliny note that with the prosecution of Christianity the sales of sacrifici-
in the first place. Tertullian noted the charge that the Christians were felt to be useless in the normal daily affairs of life, including business. Oborn argues for a real Christian withdrawal from economic life.

Another prominent feature of early Christian social life was its aloofness from the world. The Christian idealists desired to keep the believers from all contact and association with pagans whether in business or pleasure. Tertullian wishes that they might not even inhabit the same world. ....... The Christians were accused of being useless in the affairs of life, .......

All this is true if it is remembered that the discussion is about ideals, exhortations, and accusations. It does not follow that "there must have been a real basis for the charge" of being unprofitable in business.\(^\text{51}\) Any accusation that the Christians caused economic problems was an expression of prejudice. That does not mean that there were no contemporary economic troubles for which the sect might be blamed.

By the time the Christians came in front of Pliny the traditional religious observances in many parts of the empire had long been neglected. Cicero had discussed the decline of the most famous of all oracles, that at Delphi, while Strabo commented, among the ancients both divination
in general and oracles were held in greater honour, but now great neglect of them prevails". The sources do not smoothly agree, for Strabo noted the decline of the oracle at Ammon, while some time later Juvenal, perhaps not a stickler for the accuracy of such detail, opines that Ammon has replaced Delphi. The "long dark night" of traditional cult was a fact, whatever the details. If there was a religious revival in the second century A.D., which saw "a new intensity in the search for divine help", it favoured not the waning traditional cults, but pseudo-mages and false prophets like Alexander and Peregrinus; conmen and hysterical mediums, necromancers and magical romancers held the fluid veneration of the population, each for a brief time. The Christian sect did not in any way cause the decline of revenue coming to the more established but impoverished cults. The rise of the sect was more an effect of the long and gradual decline of traditional religious practices. More distinct and more tenacious than most passing novel cultic fads, the Christians were more easily marked for service as foci for blame, rage and frustration.

It was not only the anxious partisans of waning deities that could use the sect as a focus for hatred and blame. Tertullian tells us who the people are that tax
the faithful with non-participation in economic life. A list of unsavoury characters is produced to account for those who "may perhaps truly complain of the unprofitableness of Christians"—pimps, panders, assassins, poisoners, magicians, wizards, soothsayers, astrologers. If Tertullian is giving the credit for the economic distress of such people to the Christians, he is falsely bragging. Not only were times hard anyway, but it is far from certain that none of these "tradesmen" ever profited from a little Christian business. Tertullian found that the Christians were a little too much with the world.

As Oborn realizes, Tertullian's wish that the sect "might not even inhabit the same world" as the pagans, comes in the tract De Spectaculis, which was occasioned by the fact that Tertullian found it necessary to explain to his fellow Christians why they should not attend the often bloody "circus". The obvious deduction is that some Christians, far from being aloof from the world were immersed in some of its nastier pleasures. Another work of the Carthaginian moralist, On Idolatry, seeks to convince his faithful brethren that some pagan ceremonies should not be attended. Tertullian realizes that "it is necessary for us both to live and to mingle with sinners", and adds that, indeed, "it is lawful to live with heathens" for
pagan and Christian alike are "fellow possessors of the world". While forbidding certain pagan observances, he allows what was obviously a frequent happening, attendance at "private and social solemnities - as those of the white toga, of espousals, of nuptials, of name-givings". We are left with a picture of a thriving, for Tertullian promiscuous, social intercourse between Christians and pagans, the latter issuing the former with frequently accepted invitations to the most significant of social, and therefore cultic, ritual ceremonies. Was this a situation peculiar to Carthage? Not at all: for in the Epistle to Diognetus, where some find evidence of the aloofness of Christians, we discover that:

the distinction between Christians and other men, is neither in country, nor language nor customs. For they do not practise an extraordinary kind of life.

In fact every Christian lives in either a Greek or a "barbarian" city, "following the local customs, both in clothing and food, and in the rest of life". As for economic withdrawal, how could Christians live if they did not buy and sell in the market-place? "So, not without your forum," said Tertullian to the pagans,
days, and the rest of the life of buying and selling, we live with you — in this world.

The Christians "share your food, your dress, your customs, the same necessities of life". Finally, a passage of Paul's might be recalled. He is putting straight some previous instructions that he had written to the Corinthian community.

When I wrote in my letter to you not to associate with people living immoral lives, I was not meaning to include all the people in the world who are sexually immoral, any more than I meant to include all usurers and swindlers or idol-worshippers. To do that, you would have to withdraw from the world altogether.

Plainly the separation from the pagan is a concept.

The Christians were discriminated by their rejection of all pagan cult. This left them potentially isolated and easy foci for prejudice. In a period of economic stress and religious uncertainty, the Christians were blamed for actually causing both economic and cultic decline. Even if it is granted that in the pagan mind the rejection of cult meant the rejection of the life of the polity, the obvious daily association of pagan and Christian in nearly all aspects of life makes a mockery of any claims that hatred was justified by the sect's rejection
of economic and social customs and practices. What of political and military duties?

It is alleged that the Christians refused to bear their fair share of the burdens of civic office. Office was looked on as a privilege and a duty, for the costs of an office were the responsibility of the incumbent. In fact for most of the second century the vast bulk of the Christian sect came from social classes too undistinguished to be liable for civic office. Celsus, who seems to often have tried to have his cake and eat it, accuses the sect of neglecting civic duties. Yet he is also aware that members of the sect are in the main very humble people: "wool-workers, cobblers, laundry-workers" and, in Celsus' words, "the most illiterate and bucolic yokels".

While the bulk of the sect in the pre-Decian era came from circles too low to aspire to civic office, it is true that towards the end of the second century and onwards, Christianity attracted men of a high enough social status to be liable for office. When one reads Tertullian forbidding the participation in such duties, one immediately suspects that the situation is the reverse of the one he advocates. It is more than probable that eligible Christians held office. On the other hand, it is not impossible
that some Christians were disdained for refusing office.\textsuperscript{66} Why, in a philotimiac society, should the withdrawal of potential rivals for office have caused dismay? In fact, as is well known, from the late second century on, the decurial class all over the empire began defaulting on its responsibilities, and the management of cities came increasingly under the direct supervision of the central authority.\textsuperscript{67} Even so, there seems to have been competition for office in some cases, no doubt because there could be profits in a properly handled position.\textsuperscript{68} In some areas the decurial class was failing in Trajan's reign, and Pliny spent most of his time in Pontus and Bithynia sorting out the financial problems of the cities. It is more than probable that any eligible Christian who opted out of civic responsibility was joined by many pagans. More conspicuous, the Christian was easily blamed for a situation he had no hand in causing.

The same conclusion could be made with reference to military service. There were Christians soldiers in a period when a lack of enthusiasm for military life left the emperors increasingly dependent upon recruits from the wilder parts of the world.\textsuperscript{69} Pagans more ready to prove tepid loyalty in words than in action might easily jump on pacifist literature, and, ignoring serving Christ-
ians, ease their own consciences by denouncing the more radical of Christian pronouncements. Both civic and military duties were unpopular over wide areas of the empire, but pagan non-participants had the good sense to keep mum about their own feelings.

Two questions were asked earlier in this chapter. In answer to the first it was suggested that the charge of atheism did not carry the implication of a breach of the pax decorum. Indeed, charges relating to a disturbance of the divine peace appear comparatively late in the literature, and some have feasibly speculated that such charges were occasioned by the different disasters of the period from about A.D. 155 onwards, culminating in the widespread plague around the year A.D. 177.70

The answer to the second question is more complex. It has been argued that it is just not true to say that the Christian rejection of cult meant that Christians:

abstained from joining in festivals, processions, the theatre, the circus, the amphitheatre, public holidays.71

Christian and pagan mingled freely and frequently. However, the situation was illogical and irrational. It is
beyond reasonable doubt that in times of stress, whether it was personal or social, a rigid concept of the world was called forward from the back of the mind. In this concept an in-group of proper people, loyal to all the virtues, was opposed by an out-group, the viciousness of which was summed up in the word "atheism". In these times of stress, people who had mingled with Christians either for business or for pleasure without feeling in any way threatened, now felt that they were confronted by an alien and dangerous quantity. This odd fact is not explained by trying to rationalize the reaction of the pagans. In daily life, Christians were not distinguishable from their pagan neighbours.\textsuperscript{72} Blame for a poor economic climate was not provoked by observations that the Christians did not engage in marketing, because they were engaged in all aspects of economic life, certainly below a certain level. One sort of difference became, in crisis, a mark of exclusion. Through prejudice other, unjustifiable marks of exclusion were added. The several reasons for this, and the topic of the psychology of prejudice, will be discussed later in this study.

It will be argued that any methodology used to discern the meaning of the various pagan calumnies in fact betrays their origins in pure prejudice. For most
of the accusations consist of charges that were transferred from one type of malefactor or "outsider" to the Christians. When the transfer of a stereotype is unjustified, one is confronting the problem of prejudice. Scapegoating is only one aspect of prejudice, as the term is used in this study. Characterizing the thought of Tertullian, Mattingly writes:

The fact is, the Christians are made the universal scapegoats, whenever anything goes wrong. And so attention is diverted from the real causes of miseries.

(It should be added that Mattingly concurs with Tertullian's diagnosis). An out-group serves other purposes than just that of potential scapegoats. The precise functions of any out-group are revealed in the terms in which the group is described. Prejudice revealed in the blaming of the Christians for economic and natural disasters has been discussed already. Of the other accusations or taunts raised against the Christians, those of conspiracy, and of incest, ritual infanticide and cannibalism will be considered in the next chapter. Before the label of "third race" is expounded upon, a few of the minor but interesting accusations will be dealt with.

The charge of worshipping an ass head was brought
against Jews as well as Christians.  It indicated a view of the Christian sect as one devoted to a stupid and barbaric (i.e. of the Barbarus) superstition. The painting of a Christian ostensibly worshipping a donkey suggests that this accusation was in a way justified by the Christian obstinacy. Without repeating the previous discussion of obstinatio it might be noted that the philosophical emperor Marcus Aurelius compared a "reasoned and dignified decision" to die with the Christian "obstinate opposition" and over-dramatized death. Ass worship was a metaphorical form of the charge of stupid obstinacy. The Christians rejoiced in the fact that they were martyred without being conquered. Epictetus admonishes: "you ought not to be invincible in the way an ass is invincible".

Charges that the Christians unjustly neglected traditional mores clearly followed from the specific rejection of cult. The rejection of pagan myth was not the pursuit of the sect alone, although it certainly did involve the Christians in a disdain for that part of traditional culture. This charge would hardly provoke any pogroms, but merely added to the weight of the total offensiveness of the sect. As the over-worked Tertullian argued, it was a spurious charge, for the pagans only pre-
tended loyalty to tradition, while introducing cultural innovations almost daily. 78 Like most other charges, the one of betrayal of traditions has an invidious apparent justification in Christian behaviour, but in fact is just an accretion to the charge that indicates the nature of the original conceptual separation - the charge of atheism.

If the charge of atheism has a Roman counterpart, it is not that of rupturing the pax deorum. The label "atheists" had its equivalent in the label "third race", which, as Harnack originally pointed out, is found only in the "west", that is in non-Greek cities. Harnack believed that the term was first employed by the Christians to describe their own distinction from the Jews and the pagans. 30 It seems unequivocally clear that, like the term Christianoi, the phrase tertium genus was in fact a pejorative, brazenly adopted by the sect and given a positive resonance, at least as far as the faithful were concerned. Some scholars believe that it indicates that the Christians were seen as some kind of a "national" group. 81 Others follow Harnack, who takes his lead from a passage of Tertullian:

it is on the score of religion and not of nationality that we are considered to be the tertium genus; it is the Romans first, then the Jews, and after that the Christians. 82 What about the Greeks then?
Tertullian resents a term that the Christians are to turn into a badge of valorous distinction. This kind of use of the word *genus* places it with a range of virtual synonyms - *gens*, *familia* and *natio* - used to describe with implied contempt an unsympathetic sect. Cicero, for example, tagged the Epicureans as a *genus* while elsewhere applying the word *gens* to a philosophical sect. His use of *familia*, as in *Peripateticorum familia*, served the same function. When Cicero uses the term *natio* of a philosophical sect, one would not jump to the conclusion that a "national" identity was being posited. On the other hand these terms do stress that there is a "distance" between the user and the sect to which any one of them is applied. What kind of "distance" did the pagans invoke between themselves and the Christians by the use of *tertium genus*? Referring to the anti-Christian interlocutor of the dialogue *Octavius*, Harnack writes:

So monstrous, so repugnant are those Christians (of whose faith and life Caecilius proceeds to tell the most evil tales), that they drop out of ordinary humanity, as it were. Thus Caecilius indeed calls them a "natio," but he knows that they are recruited from the very dregs of the nations, and consequently are no "people" in the sense of a "nation."

Tertullian knew that the Christians were being typed, not as inferior human beings, but as sub-humans, "something
exceptional and utterly inhuman". Therefore the wily Carthaginian rants: "we are of a different nature I suppose! Are we Cyropénnæae or Sciapods? Have we different teeth, different organs for incestuous lust?"

The distance implied in the application of the label **tertium genus** was the vast distance between the civilized human inhabitant of the empire and the as yet untamed sub-human barbarian who dwelt in the vast realm without the **limites** of the empire, called by some possibly as early as Tertullian's day, **Barbaria**. To understand the terms applied to the Christians then, the meaning of this perspective: Christian = most remote sub-human, (for such is the implication of terms like "Sciapod"), must be investigated. In the next chapter a consideration of the accusations of incest, infanticide and cannibalism will bear out the main contention of this chapter, which has been that the major accusations made against the Christians were not derived from any observation of the sect's activities in any way, but were the products of prejudiced stereotyping that followed the initial conceptual separation of Christian and pagan. It will also be contended that the general perspective summed up in the equation Christian = barbarian was not arrived at consciously but was the product of irrational fear and anxiety expressed
in culturally and historically conditioned terms. In other words the prejudice involved in the Christian-pagan conflict must be investigated from the psychological and the historical angles. One aspect of the prejudice belongs to a constant human propensity, and is therefore a temporal. On the other hand the expressions and incidences of this prejudice are conditioned by the course of events. So both the internal and individual and the external and social perspectives must be taken into account.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. See Tertullian, Ad Scapulam, for the details. In chapter 4 he claims that at a hearing at Thydrus, the governor, Cincius Severus, told the accused of a way to answer the questions put to them, that would "secure an acquittal". Vesprius Candidus was said to have dismissed a Christian from a hearing, on the grounds that to satisfy the citizens and punish the accused, would "break the peace of the community". Arrius Antoninus, while governor of Asia, was confronted by all the Christians of the province in a united group, so Tertullian tells us in chapter 5. After executing a few Christians, he sent the rest away, telling them that if their thirst for death was so acute, they could commit suicide.

2. For opinions on the authenticity of the rescript see Frend and Barnes. Barnes 1968, 37, says: "The genuineness of the rescript can be defended by one important fact: despite Christian interpretations of it, the rescript makes no change in the legal position as defined by Trajan."


4. For a good discussion of "Die Christen als Ursache allen Unglücks", with all the relevant references, see Schäfke, pp. 648-657. As far as one can make out, the earliest clear reference is Tertullian, Ad Nationes I, 9, 3.


6. The "one work" of Tertullian referred to is of course
his Apology. For nomen see Apology III,6: At enim secta editur in nomine utique sui auctoris.

7. Apology IV, 11: Immo, si nomen puniunt, etiam stultas: ... i.e. the "laws" that punish the name are stupid.

8. Apology II, 16: Christianum hominem omnium scelerum reum, deorum, imperatorum, legum, morum, naturae totius inimicum existimas, ...


10. See e.g. Mommsen 1893, 3. "The Christian 'atheism,' the negation of the national gods, was, as I have shown elsewhere, the contempt of the dii publici populi Romani, in itself high treason, ...".


Revenues, Apology XLII, 8: Certe, inquitis, templorum vectigalia cotidie decoquunt: ...

For incest, infanticide and cannibalism, Apology VIII, 2f. This topic is extensively discussed in the next chapter.


13. For fontes persecutionum see Scorpiace 10, to which compare Ad Nationes I, 14.

15. Apology III, 2. vituperant quae ignorant.


19. Apology XXVII, 2: Sed quidam dementiam existimant, quod, cum possimus et sacrificare in praesenti et inlaesi abire manente apud animum proposito, obstipationem saluti praeseveramus.

20. Apology XXVII, 7: ... et illos nunquam magis detrimumphamus quam cum pro fidelis obstinatione damnamur.


22. Apology XXXI, 3: Cum enim concutitur imperium concessis etiam ceteris membris eius utique et nos, licet extranei a turbis aestimemur, in aliquo loco casus invemur. (The translation in the text of this study is slightly emended from the Loeb version.)

24. The most explicit reference is perhaps Acts 13, 46ff, where Paul and Barnabas tell the assembled Jews that their rejection of the evangel left the two apostles with the duty of preaching to the "pagan" (ἐὰν τῷ Κύριῳ). Paul and Barnabas continue: "For this is what the Lord commanded us to do when he said: 'I have made you a light for the nations, so that my salvation may reach the ends of the earth.'"

οὗτος γὰρ ἐντευτάτην ἥμιν ὁ Κύριος,

τέθεικά σε εἰς φῶς ἐθνῶν

τού εἴμαι σε εἰς ἀφθονίαν ἐως ἐξολοθρεύσας τῆς γῆς.

25. The letter to Diognetus dates to c. 120 A.D.

26. Diognetus V, 4-5. .... θεαραστὴ καὶ ὀρολογομένης

παραδοσῶν ἐνδείκνυτε τὴν κατάκτασιν τῆς

πολιτείας.


28. I Peter 2,11. Παροικοὺς καὶ παρετιθημένος

29. Ephesians 2, 19. .... ἄρα οὖν οὐκετὶ ἔστε

ἐγένετο καὶ παροικοῖ, ἀλλὰ ἔστε συνολοτίας.

Τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἰκείων τοῦ θεοῦ.....

30. Origen, Contra Celsum IV, 23. Celsus compares the Jews and Christians to "a cluster of bats or ants coming out of a nest, or frogs holding council round
a marsh, or worms, assembling in some filthy corner disagreeing with one another about which of them are the worse sinners.

"Μετὰ ταῦτα συνήθως ἐκατοῦ ἁγέλων τὸ Ἰουδαϊκόν καὶ Χριστιανὸν γένος τὰ πάντας παραβίασις νυχτερίδον ὁρκαθοὶ ἤ μυρμηγιῶν ἐκ καλίας προσθέσεως ἢ βατράχιοις περὶ τέλη ἔμυδρευσιοῖς ἢ ἐκλειψάζουσι καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους διαφορεβοῦσιν, τίνες συνίων εἰς ἄρτῳλοτερον,..."

Contra Celsum VIII,2: Celsus says that Christians are people who "wall themselves off and break away from the rest of mankind.


33. Cadoux, p. 231. For the period from A.D. 180-250, Cadoux talks of "the Christian's disapproval of many of the ordinary customs of heathen social life, and his consequent inability to take part in them". (Cadoux, p. 310)

34. The Shepherd of Hermas, Sim. I,1.

Επὶ Σένης κατοικεῖτε... ἣ καὶ τόλις ὑμῶν μακρὰν ἐστὶν ἄνεος τὸν ἀνθρώπων ταύτης. Εἰ οὖν οἴδατε... τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἑς ἥρελετε. Καταλαμάττω τῷ ὑμῶν ἀμείλητη πάθος καὶ σωφρόνως τῆς θυσίας καὶ δικαίωτα ἡμῶν.
35. De Corona XIII, 4: Sed tu, peregrinus mundi huius et civis civitatis supernae Hierusalem, - noster, inquit, municipatus in caelis...

36. Apology I, 6,1. "Ενθελε και θεον κεκλημέθα, και ὁμολογούμεν τῶν θεοτόνον τοιν θεῶν θεον εἶναι, ὁλ' οὖν τοῦ θεοτόν τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου.... ἀνεπιμηκτών τε κακίς θεό.

37. Tatian, Oration to the Greeks, 27. "...having in your hands the opinions of Apion concerning the Egyptian gods, you denounce us as most atheistic. Kαὶ ταῖς περὶ τῶν κατ' Ἀιγυπτίων θεῶν διὸκος Ἀπίωνος ἔχοντες παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ὡς θεοτότων ἠμῶν ἐκκατορμένῳ.

38. Martyrdom of Polycarp IX. When urged to reject Christianity and say "Away with the Atheists", the martyr looked at the heathen crowd, groaned, and indicated them, saying, "Away with the Atheists."

39. Athenagoras, Legation, 4,1. "Ὅτι μὴ σοῦ οὔκ ἐστὶν θεόν... μὴ καὶ γελοιῶν ἦ ταύτα λέγοντας Κρής ἐλέγχειν.

40. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History V, 1,9. ὃτι μηδὲν θεόν μηδὲν ἀδεβήσε ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν.

41. Lucian, Alexander the False Prophet 38. "If any atheist or Christian or Epicurean has come to spy on the rites, let him be off, ..."
Εἰ τις ἄθεος ἢ ἡρωικός ἢ Ετίκουρειος ἢ κατάσκοπος τῶν ὀργίων, φευγέτω.

42. Legatio 13,1.

43. The term was used by Cicero, but was not properly domiciled in Latin until used by Arnobius. Cf. Frend, MP p. 123.

44. Frend, MP p. 240.

45. Schäfke, p. 630.

46. Mart. Polycarp XII, 2.

47. ΜΕ V, 1, 60. οὐ δὲ ἐνεγέλαν καὶ ἐτετωάθησαν, μεγαλύνοντες καὶ τι τι εἰδύλλα καὶ ἐκείνοις προσέπτοντες τὴν τούτων τιμωρίαν, ἵνα εἴδεις ... λέγοντες τοὺς ὧν ὁ θεός αὐτῶν καὶ τί αὐτῶς οἰκεῖον ἢ θρησκεία, ἵνα καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἐκείνων εἰλαντο ὑπόθεσις.

48. Tertullian, Apology XL, 2. Si Tiberis ascendit in moenia, si Nilus non ascendit in arva, si caelum stetit, si terra movit, si fames, si lues, statim Christianos ad leonem!

49. Acts 19, 23f. Εἴηντο δὲ κατὰ τὸν Καιρὸν
ἐκεῖνον τέραχος ὦν ὀλίγος ἐκεῖ τῆς Ὀβοῦ.
Δημήτριος γὰρ τὸν ὄνοματι, ἀρχυροκότος, πολὺ νὰ ποὺ ἄργυρους Ἀρτέμιδα παρεῖχεν τοῖς τεκνίταις ὦν ὀλίγην ἑργασίαν, οὓς ἑυμεθροῖς καὶ ἐκεῖ τῇ τοιάδυτα ἑργάτας εἶπεν Ἀνδρεῖς, ἐνιστάμεθα οτι ἐν τῷ ὑπό σεισμὸς τῆς ἑργασίας ἡ ἑυπορία ἡ ἰδίᾳ ἐστιν, καὶ ὑποφέρειτε καὶ ἀκούετε ὅτι οὐ μὲν θείας ἐκαθεσθεν τίς Ἀσίας ὁ Πυθόλος αὐτὸς τείχες ἐπεκαλύπτοιν ἵκειν ὀχλον, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἔγιν θεώδεις διὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον ζωγράφου ἥρωον, ἔλλα καὶ ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης θεᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος ἤρων ἐις ὑπὸ ἱστοῖς, ἔνεισεν τής καθηρεῖται τῆς μεγαλειότητας διήνυ τὴν ὀλίγη ἡ Ἀσία καὶ ἡ οἰκουμένη σέβεται. ἀκούοντες δὲ καὶ γενόμενον πάθεσιν, διήνυ ἐκμαχον λέγοντες Μεγάλῃ ἡ Ἀρτέμις Ἐφεσίων.

50. See Allport pp. 347-8. I have in mind the type of situation often encountered in England today. In an age of high unemployment, with all its consequent insecurities, it is not difficult for noxious organizations like the National Front to persuade people that "blacks" are "taking your jobs."

51. See, p. 139.

52. Cicero, De divinatione II, 117.
est, cur isto modo iam oracula Delphic non eduntur non modo nostra aetate, sed iam diu, ut modo nihil possit esse contemptius.

Strabo XVII, 813: "Among the ancients both divination in general and oracles were held in greater honour, but now great neglect of them prevails."

... τὸὶ ἀρετήσις, μᾶλλον ἢν ἐν τιμῇ καὶ ἡ
μεντικῇ καθόλου καὶ τὰ ἄρηστήρια, νυνὶ δὲ
ὀλιγωρία μετέχει πολλῇ,...

53. Juvenal VI, 553f. Strabo XVII, 813: "... the oracle at Ammon has been almost abandoned, though it was held in honour in earlier times."

... διότερ καὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀμμώνι σχέδον τὸ
ἐκλειπταῦ ἄρηστήριον, πρωτέρον δὲ ἔτετιμητο.

54. W. Gifford, translating Juvenal VI, 555.

55. For a discussion, with secondary references, see Clarke, pp. 310-311.


57. Alexander and Peregrinus are well known in Lucian's unfriendly portraits, though both are attested elsewhere. One thinks of the anonymous mass of magicians, genuine and false, and also characters like Simon Magus; and the evanescent gnostic sects. Some of the latter were no doubt run by sincere men, others, as the Christians charged, exploited fad-seeking and unstable men and women.
58. Tertullian  *De Idololatria* XIV, 5: ... quoniam nesses est et convivere nos et commiseri cum peccatoribus, ... Licet convivere cum ethniciis, commori non licet. ... Pares anima sumus, non disciplina, compossessores mundi, non erromes.

59. *De Idol.* XVI, 1: Circa officia vero privatarum et communium sollemnitatum ut togae purae, ut sposalium, ut nuptialium, ut nominalium, nullo putem pericum observari de flatu idolotriae, quae intervenit.

60. Epistle to Diogenes V, 1f. Χριστιανοὶ γὰρ οὗτε εἰναι φωνὴν οὗτος θέειν διακεκρίθησαν τῶν λοιπῶν ξειν ἀνθρώπων. οὗτος γὰρ ....... βίον 

Παραβίῳν ἄσκουσιν.

κατοικούντες τι πολεμεσ εἰληνίδας τε καὶ 

βαμβάκιος, .... καὶ τοῖς ἐγυμπτοῖς θέοις ἠκολουθοῦντες 

ἐν τη ἑβίτε καὶ δικη καὶ τῶ λοιπῶ βίως ....

61. *Apology* XLII, 2. Itaque non sine foro, non sine 

macellis, non sine balneis, tabernis, officinis, 

stabulis, nundinis vestris ceterisque commerciis 

cohabitamus in hoc saeculo.

62. It is interesting to note that sacrificial meat - 

which was the majority of the meat sold in the 

butcher's shops - was not strictly forbidden. See 

1 Corinthians x, 23 f. Quite amazingly the rule 

seems to have been; "ask no questions and be told 

no embarassing truths". Cf. Clément of Alexandria, 

The Instructor II,1,10.

63. 1 Corinthians v, 9-11. Ἐγραψα ὑμῖν ἐν
Civic duties: see *Contra Celsum* VIII, 75.

*Contra Celsum* III, 55. ... ἔργους καὶ εὐκοτόρους καὶ κυριεῖς καὶ τοὺς ὑπαδευτότατος τε καὶ ἀγροκοτότατος ... Op. e.g. Athenagoras, *Legatio* XI, 4.

Cadoux, p. 417f. is typically enlightening. For a good recent discussion, although one that by no means completely supercedes Cadoux, see J. Helgeland, "Christians and the Roman Army from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine", ANRW II 23.1, pp. 724-834. On p. 765, Helgeland notes that: "If the disapproval of military service ranged from utter disgust to a preference that Christians not join the army, the Church Fathers did not succeed in dissuading them from the military". In a time of high unemployment, of course, military service at least provides a living.

I use the term "philotimiac" in imitation of P. Brown in *The Making of Late Antiquity*. The society that persecuted early Christianity was very competitive, civic office being an object of ambition. This was true even in a period when the class from which office holders came was under severe economic stress. For an excellent view of the situation see: P. Garnsey, "Aspects of the decline of the Urban Aristocracy in the Empire", ANRW II.1, pp. 229-252. Garnsey finds that the decurial class was not universally affluent, and
although office was sought for, the richer (primores viri) were gaining at the expense of the inferiores "within the councils". See p. 241.


69. Cadoux p. 417: "... during the period 180-250 A.D., considerable numbers of Christians served in the imperial armies, ...". Of course, there were occasions when the clash of loyalties led to a Christian soldier becoming a martyr.

70. J. Moreau, Les Persécutions dans l'empire romain p. 52: "À Rome, la peste, la famine, une effroyable inondation du Tibre plongèrent la population dans un morne désespoir. En de telles circonstances, des pogroms étaient inévitables; on sait par Tertullien que les païens imputaient aux chrétiens la responsabilité des malheurs publics, ...".

71. R.P.C. Hanson, "Christian attitude to pagan Religions", ANRW II 23.2, pp. 910-973, p. 919.

72. Apart from the evidence already adduced see Tertullian, De Spectaculis XXVII: at the "shows", "nobody recognizes you for a Christian." (Nemo te cognoscit Christianum).

73. H. Mattingly, Christianity in the Roman Empire, p. 47.

74. Against Jews: Josephus Contra Apionem II.7.80. See also Tacitus Histories V, 1f. The charge levelled against the Christians is mentioned many times by Tertullian, e.g. ap. Ad Nationes I, 11, 1f. There is a famous graffito from 2nd century Rome described inter alia by Frend, p. 252: "Alexamenos
worship of God' scrawled beneath an obscene looking figure representing a crucified donkey on the walls of the Palatine, has provided mute witness as to how some members of the Roman populace regarded the Christians.

75. Meditations XI, 3.

76. Epictetus I, xviii: οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν ὄνομα
ἀντίταξιν εἰσὶν δει. This does not refer directly to the Christians, but he might have had them in mind. He mentions the sect in IV, 7. Cf. S. Benko, "Pagan criticism of Christianity during the first two centuries A.D.", ANRW II, 23.2, pp. 1055-1118, ap. 1077.

77. Der heidnische Vorwurf des Traditionsverlustes, to use Schafke's phrase, (see Schafke, p. 63ff), was the sort of vague charge, ideal for the exercise of prejudice.

78. Apology VI, 9: "You are forever praising antiquity and every day you improvise some new way of life," (Laudatis semper antiquitatem, et nove de die vivitis.)


81. E.g. E.A. Judge, "Social identity of the first Christians", J. Religious Studies XI, 2, 1980, 201-217, 213: "The Christians in the last resort were seen, and saw themselves, as a kind of national
community". Much more likely is Harnack, p. 269: "Thus Caecilius indeed calls them a "natio"; but he knows that they are recruited from the very dregs of the nations, and consequently are no "people" in the sense of a "nation."

82. Ad Nationes I: Sed de superstitione testium genus deputamur, non de natione, ut sint Romani, Judaei, deinde Christiani. Ubi autem Graeci?


84. Brutus 131.

85. De natura deorum I, 89.

86. Familia: de divinatione II, 3. Natio, applied to a philosophical sect with "contemptuous" intent, is de natura deorum II, 74.


89. The word "barbaria" was used by Cicero, usually to mean a state of barbarism, but sometimes with a locative meaning — as In Pisonem: Quod nulla in barbaria quisquam tyrannus... As an antonym to the word Romania, Barbaria must have developed in common usage, although it could have preceded its antonym, and indeed provoked its "birth". The
term *Barbaria* seems not to have found a historian, but its rise from "the language of the streets" (see R. MacMullen, *Roman Government's Response to Crisis*, p. 39.) can be traced through that of its symbiotic antonym recorded in G. Paris, "Romani, Romania, Lingua Romana, Romancium", *Romania* I, 1872, 1-32, and J. Zeiller, "L'apparition du mot ROMANIA chez les écrivains latins", *Revue des Études Latines* VII, 1929, 194-198. Both agree that Romania was "d'origine populaire". Zeiller instances a first literary appearance in c. A.D. 330, implying that the term was for some previous time in current usage. *Barbaria* meaning the place confronting *Romania* must have been at least contemporaneous.
CHAPTER THREE

THE CRUCIAL ACCUSATIONS

Garish and ludicrous, squalid yet spectacular, the slanders of incest, ritual infanticide, and cannibalism lead into the heart of the problem of the pagan view of the Christians. The investigation of these charges also reveals the darkly voluptuous depths of antique fantasy. It will be argued in this chapter that in dealing with these calumnies one is involved in neither religious nor political history, but the history of the pornographic imagination. Like all considerations of this problem, this particular interpretation is based on the profound researches of F.J. Dölger.

It is shown by the references to Christians in Pliny and Tacitus that the early Christians were believed guilty of vile behaviour, implied in the word flagitia. Attempts to discern specific acts beneath the general charge of committing flagitia are misdirected. It is the very vagueness that is significant. A priori the sect was believed guilty. Only later were details imagined and then used to embroider upon the general charge. The development of these three slanders can be traced.
These three particular accusations were not originally linked. In the earliest extant Christian apology Aristides denies the validity of Greek accusations of homosexuality and incest.\(^1\) In the early 150's Tatian was busy refuting charges of cannibalism,\(^2\) while within ten years Justin at Rome was asserting the inanity of reports of Christian immorality and cannibalism.\(^3\) In his *Legatio*, written between A.D. 176 and A.D. 180, Athenagoras was direct and spare: "They bring three charges against us: atheism, Thyestian banquets, and Oedipaean unions."\(^4\) A little later, Theophilus of Antioch seeks to refute the specific charge of incest between brother and sister, and the slander of anthropophagy.\(^5\) In the letter preserved in Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*, recounting the pogrom at Lyons in A.D. 177, it is claimed that the hatred of the mob against the Christians was increased when some slaves belonging to members of the sect were arrested, and:

fearing the tortures which they saw the saints suffering, when the soldiers urged them, falsely accused us of Thyestian feasts and Oedipaean intercourse, and things which it is not right for us either to speak of or to think of or even to believe that such things could ever happen among men.\(^6\)

In both the *Apology* of Tertullian, and the near contemporary Octavius of Minucius Felix, the fantasies of
the calumniators are discovered to have created a veritable "witches' sabbath", in which ritual infanticide, cannibalism, and incest were performed in an abandoned but ordered orgy. It is worth considering the relevant passage in the Octavius at some length. The speaker is the pagan Caecilius. He develops a picture of a nefarious secret society. The fact that the Christians were indistinguishable from pagans in ordinary life is made into something sinister: "They recognize one another by secret signs and marks". Yet Caecilius is addressing a confessed Christian, a man moreover with a respected profession! Regardless, he continues. The sect worships an ass head, and is said to "reverence the private parts of their director and high-priest". The indignant pagan then describes an initiation ceremony.

Details of the initiation of neophytes are as revolting as they are notorious. An infant, casued in dough to deceive the unsuspecting, is placed beside the person to be initiated. The novice is thereupon induced to inflict what seem to be harmless blows upon the dough, and unintentionally the infant is killed by his unsuspecting blows; the blood - oh, horrible - they lap up greedily; the limbs they tear to pieces eagerly; and over the victim they make league and covenant, and by complicity in guilt pledge themselves to mutual silence.

After the "feast" a dog is used to upset the lamps, and in the dark, "lustful embraces are indiscriminately ex-
changed" and all are "involved in incest" either by act or "complicity".  

How were these three accusations, originally not united, brought together by the end of the second century, and where did they come from and how did they arise in the first place? Waltzing propounded a solution that is still favoured. Taking a hint from Tertullian, he argued that Christian terminology, misunderstood by pagans, led to such accusations. In the Eucharist the "body and blood" of Christ were consumed. The bread of the host was, as far as the pagans were concerned, bread dipped in the blood of a slain infant. Christ was referred to as the "son of Man", hence suspicions of infanticide. For the remaining accusation Waltzing remarks:

Quant à l'imputation d'inceste, elle avait sans doute son origine dans les noms de "frères" et de "sœurs" que les Chrétiens se donnaient mutuellement comme l'insinueront d'ailleurs Minucius Félix et Tertullien.

It is to the great merit of Döllger to have traced these calumnies through their several applications in antiquity. He proposed that the accusation of homicide had been transferred from the Jews to the Christians. Secondly, he argued that ritual murder of a man, followed by the
"Genuss seines Fleisches und Blutes" was the developed accusation indicating suspicion of secret conspiracy. Ritual infanticide was commonly believed to be part of a magician's ceremony, while immorality and cannibalism were believed to be performed by certain gnostic sects, with whom the Christians would have been confused by the pagans. Dölger was unable to abandon the idea of mistaken observation however. He concludes his researches with the thought:

die christliche Eucharistie als Genuss "des Fleisches und Blutes des Menschenschames" wurde von Juden und Heiden-missverstanden und (mitunter durch Böswilligkeit) zu dem schweren Vorwurf der rituellen Kindesstiftung mit dem anschliessenden Mahl vom Fleisch und Blut des Kindes vergröbert. 15

The idea that the accusations grew from the transfer of stereotypes due to misunderstanding has been used to account for these, slanders ever since. The Christians were mistaken for Jews or gnostics, or their terminology was misinterpreted. Freudenberger can only give secondary importance to this "durchaus verständlichen Phänomen" 16 but Schäfke propounds the idea that:

eine weitere Ansatzmöglichkeit der Verleumdungen waren Missverständnisse der christlichen Eucharistie und der christlichen Anrede als Bruder und Schwester. Der in der alten Kirche übliche Friedenskuss scheint ebenfalls Anlass zu übler
In a work published in 1980, Dölger's conclusions are uncritically rehearsed once more.

The charge of infanticide, Thyestean meals and promiscuous intercourse as parts of Christian services were based first, on the fact that such practices were elements of certain types of magic, second, on the misunderstanding of the Christian Eucharist liturgy, and third on the actual occurrence of such practices in some Christian (Gnostic) extremist sects.

Again following Dölger, some have sought to argue that the accusations of ritual murder and cannibalism show that the sect was regarded as conspiratorial. Such slanders seem, according to some, to naturally devolve on the secrecy of the sect.

After the time of Tertullian, as if a fashion had been abandoned, these specific accusations decline into complete desuetude. Origen can claim that such calumnies "are now condemned even by the multitude and by people entirely alien to our religion as being a false slander against the Christians". Salvian mentions the charges only to locate them in a remote era. Such splendid tools of prejudice could not be allowed to perish, of course. From time to time, right up into the present century,
the same accusations have been levelled at Jews. The Christians themselves, being ordinary antique men, did not find it at all ludicrous to bring such charges against enemy sects and heresies. Indeed, upon what basis do scholars suppose that the accusations, palpably ridiculous when brought against the Christians and indeed the Jews, are justified when brought against gnostics? Why discard pagan propaganda, and swallow whole Christian mud-slinging? Yet modern scholars seem content to agree with the early fathers of the Church that:

the rites of libertine gnostics were the precedent which induced pagan detractors to pattern the charges of Christian flagitia accordingly.

It is the prolific Tertullian who gives the game away. After his conversion to Montanism, he abused the ordinary Christian more spitefully than he had ever abused the pagan. In one of his last works, De Jejunio (On Fasting), he attacks the ordinary Christian whom in various earlier works he had defended from charges of immorality, or chided for too much indulgence in worldly pleasure. He has plainly now had enough of the "psychics". After continually berating their gluttony, he concludes:

with you "love" shows its fervour in sauce-pans,
"faith" its worth in kitchens, "hope" its anchorage in waiters; but of greatest account is "love", because it is the means whereby your young men sleep with their sisters. Appendages, as we all know, of appetite are lasciviousness and voluptuousness.

Incest among the psychics? what is Tertullian playing at? Has he misunderstood the terminology of the Eucharist, or placed a willfully warped meaning on the Christian use of the words about love between brother and sister? Does he not understand the kiss of peace? Bitter and acerbic fulminator, his use of the charge of incest indicates the proper method for interpreting the calumnies considered here. They were not applied by mistake, nor were they applied by deliberate and conscious calculation. Their derivation follows on the simple fact of "separation". It is not their origins, but their function, that should be investigated. Inevitably, help in this task will come from the early Christians writers themselves. First of all, a little must be said of speculations about how these charges were applied to the Christians.

Once formulated, or transferred from other stereotypes, the charges might have been justified by a disingenuous interpretation of some aspects of Christianity. It is not feasible that they could be the result of observation. As a pagan Justin had heard the charges, but his
observations were so much to the contrary that he was converted. Any investigation would have shown how silly the calumnies were, even if it would not have led to the conversion of the investigator. The majority of the pagans did not want, neither did they bother, to observe or investigate the cult. They wanted to hate and despise the Christians, not to learn the truth about them. Still, it must be asked, were these calumnies spread from specific loci, by specific persons, for specific purposes?²⁴

We know from Minucius Felix that Fronto, stolid tutor, friend and correspondent of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, gave a speech to the Senate in which he raised the calumnies against the Christians.²⁵ Some take this as evidence that, if he did not actually invent the terms of the slander, Fronto joined them together and directed them thus united against the Christians. ²⁶ Students of the problem ancient and modern find the Jews at the bottom of the trouble.²⁷ While there was enmity between Jew and Christian from the beginning, it is significant that in the Dialogue with Trypho Justin allows his urbane and educated Jewish interlocutor to descry another origin for the calumnies. Asked by Justin if he believes that "we eat human flesh and ... after our banquets we extinguish the lights and indulge in unbridled sensuality", the able
Semitic thinker replies:

those other charges (sc. immorality and cannibalism) which the rabble lodge against you are not worthy of belief, for they are too repulsive to human nature.

Jew, senator, or mob; they have all been blamed. Henrichs enriches the brew by citing a novel. In the fragmentary remains of a second century Greek romance Henrichs has found an underlying ritual process described which is the same as that discovered in the developed view of Christian flagitia found refuted in Tertullian and Minucius Felix. The hero of the novel is forced to undergo a disgusting initiation into a savage kind of cult. The "ceremony" of initiation, so Henrichs reasonably argues, shows a "ritual pattern which is substantially the same as the one that underlies the alleged Christian initiation" as told and mocked by Tertullian. Such descriptions:

which should have been fairly common in the 2nd century A.D., exercised a decisive influence upon the pagan concept of Christian cult practices and provided the design according to which the charges of Christian flagitia were finally tailored.

Henrichs' conclusion is feasible, but is it justified? There is no reason why the developed view of Christian flagitia could not have influenced the more salacious' parts
of what was obviously not a very wholesome piece of literature. Rather than look for linear influence however, perhaps a third factor, common to both types of fantasy, should be sought. It is clear that the accusations indicate, along with the charges considered in the previous chapter, that the Christians were viewed as being beyond the pale of humanity. However, the "distancing" was accomplished by the charge of atheism, which was in fact not a calumny but a truth. It did not justify the prosecution nor the persecution of the sect. There were many atheists, and many more people who found pagan myth jejune and ridiculous. The charges that accrued to the primary distancing label of "atheism" did not merely emphasize that distance, but justified it, indicated it was necessary, and justified the violence that sometimes resulted from the enforcing of the distance between pagans and Christians. The types invoked to label the Christians indicate that a further function of the out-group of the sect was to serve as a focus for projection. Before this contention is pursued, the general identity of the excluded sect must be considered.

Dölger's work pointed so persuasively to the idea that the Christians were viewed as an anti-social conspiracy, bound in vile complicity by murder and cannibalism, that
many have concluded that they were, indeed, rejected from society because such an identification was placed on them. Such theories have to contend with the problem of the adding of incest to the picture, for incest found no place in the hectic life of the conspirator. A passage of Strabo may help. Describing the habits of those who live in Ierne, he reluctantly—both because he has no trustworthy witnesses, and out of a feeling of "horror"—says that they are:

more savage than the Britons, since they are man-eaters as well as heavy eaters, and since, further, they count it an honourable thing, when their fathers die, to devour them, and openly to have intercourse, ... with their mothers and sisters.

The combination of incest and cannibalism can only be imputed to those savages who subsist at the very edge of the world, at the farthest remove from genus humanum, the human race. Even then, Strabo is not demanding credence for the report of such behaviour. It is the idea that such mores are infecting the civilized world that lent great repulsive effect to the developed stereotype of both "conspirator" and "Christian as barbarian". The conspirator however, is an insider who becomes a willing outsider by plotting against "humanity". The Christians, who came from the very midst of the common ancient society
were felt to be, in times of stress, dangerous "invaders".

Human sacrifice, then, was one of the most vile practices of the barbarian. Its abolition was one of the foremost of Rome's gifts to the civilized world. The Romans in particular, associated human sacrifice with the rites of their two most dire enemies, Carthage and Gaul, and it is not surprising that prejudice can be roused against very respectable Celts by the mention of druidic barbarities. That the very boundary between the human and the sub-human is reached in this topic is suggested by *Satire XV* of Juvenal. A reckless fight between Egyptians at a feast leads to the consumption of enemy flesh. These cannibals, thunders Juvenal, are worse than Cimbrians, Brittones, Scythians or "monstrous Agathyrsians". They lack that true "feeling" that nature gives to members of the *genus humanum*.

The Greeks blamed several peoples, at least proverbially, for human sacrifice. Although the sacrifice of strangers in Taurus was a prevalent *topos* the subject was by no means a dead letter. Human sacrifice and cannibalism were vile acts, committed outside the bounds of the *oikumene* or civilized world. Apion, to take one example, had accused the Jews of the annual sacrifice
of a Greek, whose entrails they consumed as part of the ritual of a Jewish *coniuratio* against the Greeks. 40

On the other hand, the story of Isaac's "sacrifice" had for many centuries signalled to the Jews that they were not as the gentiles, whose false idols still demanded human sacrifice. For Romans, Greeks and Jews alike, the commission of acts of human sacrifice and cannibalism marked the differentiation between real humanity and base sub-humanity. Given then, that the accusations raised against them served to mark the Christian separation not as between men and men but as between men and sub-human *Untermenschen*, what function did an out-group so identified serve?

In general the Christian apologists returned the charges that the pagans made against the sect. It is a characteristic tactic of infantile vituperation to counter an insult by returning it directly. It was a tactic of forensic rhetoric to "transfer the charge" onto an accuser. Despite Tertullian's undoubted experience of both childhood and some form of education in rhetoric, it would be a mistake to invoke these as sufficient reason for explaining away his boast to his pagan calumniators, in which he assures them that:

the same wounds which you have inflicted on
us by your charges I shall show to be imprinted on yourselves, that you may fall by your own javelins.

In the Apology he broaches the subject of self-revelation through accusation, claiming that:

to refute these charges still further, [he] will show that the very things are done by you, sometimes openly, sometimes in secret, and that is perhaps the reason for your having believed them about us also.

The New Testament is replete with warnings about the unwitting self-confession implicit in calumny. Perhaps the best known example is the parable of the mote and beam. Typical of apostolic literature is the admonition in Romans: "In judging others you judge yourself, since you behave no differently from those you judge".

Christian writers pinpointed the irrational quality of pagan hatred. The Christians:

are warred upon by Jews as foreigners and are persecuted by the Greeks, and those who hate them cannot state the cause of their enmity.

Aristides protests that the Greeks:
because they practice foul things in sleeping with males, and with mother and sister and daughter, turn the ridicule of their foulness upon the Christians.

Justin went for the sheer impudence of the heathen, railing at them that: "the things that you do openly, and with applause, as if the divine light were overturned and extinguished, these you lay to our charge". The acidic Tatian lamented that accusations of cannibalism were spurious excuses for the pagan hatred of the sect. He sees that the heathen antagonists: "transfer (sc. their) own want of reason to the herald of truth", a psychological tactic called projection by modern theorists of the mind's subtle strategies. Jude had already warned the faithful that heathens were people who would "abuse anything they do not understand". The ignorance grounding pagan malice was a prominent theme of Tertullian: "men hate a thing simply because they do not know the character of what they hate". Athenagoras located the Christian-pagan conflict in the necessary strife between good and evil. He most lucidly expresses the irrational factor in pagan slander and hatred. The pagans "revile us for vices which they have on their own consciences". This statement precisely describes projection. What function is served by the projection of vices? Athenagoras is typically concise. Pagans raise the charge of incest
and cannibalism: "that they may believe their hatred reasonable". It is time to discuss projection and the part it plays in the psychology of prejudice.

In his classic study The Nature of Prejudice, Allport writes that projection, simply defined, means that: "an attribute that lies wholly within ourselves is nonetheless seen as existing in the other person". He continues:

suppose there are unwanted traits in oneself - perhaps greed, lust, laziness. What the sufferer needs is a caricature of these attributes - a simon-pure incarnation of these evils.

In A Handbook of Psychiatry we read that:

By means of projection, which is the opposite of identification, we externalize feelings, expectations, and wishes; that is, we project them onto others because they are unacceptable to our conscience.

This is language very reminiscent of Athenagoras' assessment of the psychology of pagan hatred. The Handbook goes on:

Individuals with certain shortcomings frequently criticize identical traits in others out of all
proportion to the actual importance of the fault.

For Freudians projection is a "defence mechanism". Anna Freud sees projection as a means of resolving forbidden desires. The Ego: "is able to project the prohibited impulses outward". Disgust at such desire can then be transferred from the self to another: "Vehement indignation at someone else's wrongdoings is the precursor of and substitute for guilty feelings on its own account". Also, by the projection of one's own wishes onto someone else, the Ego can experience vicarious gratification.54

The targets of projection are a priori believed guilty of the transferred vices. However the targets are selected, they are victims of prejudice. The most common term to describe these victims is stereotype. H.J. Ehrlich defines a stereotype as a "set of beliefs and disbeliefs about any group of people". Stereotypes constitute the "language of prejudice" and "provide a common language of discourse for prejudiced persons". The actual foci of prejudice are socially determined, but the individual finds relief in sharing prejudiced attitudes: "stereotype assignments ... signal the socially approved and accessible targets for the release of hostility and aggression".55 Allport defines stereotype as:
an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category.

In this thesis the term "stereotype" will be used to refer to the "mind picture" that a prejudiced person has of an individual who personifies the prejudiced "beliefs and disbeliefs". The stereotype is a kind of prism through which the targets and victims of prejudice are viewed. It is a kind of perverse "standard" against which targets are measured, and to the abysmal qualities of which they are perceived to conform. An in-group, however otherwise defined, can be identified as consisting of all those who share the same stereotype, placed on the same out-group, for the same purpose. By studying the most salient of an in-groups projected vices, something of the moral climate of that group can be discerned. Antique man, Christian and pagan, realized this.

The "living Rohrschach blots" who are the victims of prejudice are always "the others". "Evil", Neumann tells us, "is invariably experienced as something alien, and the victims are therefore, always and everywhere, the aliens". Why the Christians and pagans should need to make "alien" groups out of each other is a question that will be considered later in this study. For now it can
be noted that the basic function that all victims of prejudice and projection serve for any group is well summed-up by Erikson, when he notes that, alas:

man always needs somebody who is below him, who will be kept in place, and on whom can be projected all that is felt to be weak and dangerous in oneself.

By projection the truly irrational is cleared out of the individual sufferer and transferred to another, who is then "honestly" seen as the embodiment and also the carrier of the projected evils.

Jungians call the projected picture of the evil individual stereotype the shadow. The shadow is the total of those base personal traits which the individual cannot countenance harbouring in himself. By projection a cosy picture of the world is achieved, in which evil is always "over there". Individuals and groups "purify" themselves by jettisoning that "expression of our own imperfection and earthliness, the negative", that denies all the higher aspirations of group morality. (In this "possessive orientation" the purpose is to "separate and keep the good, separate and expel the bad". Each individual can then have the feeling of satisfactorily conforming inwardly to those "collective values" which
together demand from him "goodness". 64

The projective "mechanism" is not perfect, and, as has been mentioned already the suspicion of unpurged vicious desires can be obviated by projecting unfulfilled desires for "wicked" behaviour onto others. Such projection also allows "vicarious gratification of one's forbidden desires". 65 The consequence of any kind of projection - which is in effect the rendering of a real human being into a stereotype, a caricature - can be the complete "de-humanization" of the target. The projected "sins" can be eradicated by the destruction of the target, or, evil can be expelled from the world by killing the victims for behaviour of which they are to some extent generally, and in every case specifically, innocent. It is important to remember that one is here confronted with the irrational: the murderer is convinced of the victim's guilt. "The shadow ... can be exteriorised and subsequently destroyed". 66

So far it has been argued that pagan prejudice against the Christians served two functions. The sect was blamed for economic problems that it did not cause. Secondly, the Christians were used as scapegoats, and perhaps even expiatory sacrifices, after disasters such as the great plague in the 170s A.D. Now it is argued that
Christians served as targets for the projection of guilt felt for the commission of, or the desire to commit, the most terrible of deeds. Of course, the ancient pagan did not fill his day with incest, infanticide and cannibalism. However, there is no doubt that he "enjoyed" these abominations vicariously, and the guilt attendant on participation by proxy was what was being projected. The "soft porn" novel that Henrichs discusses was, as he avers, no doubt typical of many products of the literary imagination of the period. For the less imaginative more graphic representations were available. Much of ancient theatre was devoted to lewd farces in which myths of the once majestic Olympians became, in performance, the debased vehicle of prurient gratification. Stories about Zeus alone could provide the inspiration for scenes of incest, paedophagy and bestiality.

Customers of the amphitheatres could, of course, watch men hacking each other to pieces, or see people torn to shreds by wild beasts. More luridly, there is some reason to suspect that scenes involving the dismembering of men and women were acted out for the satisfaction of the audience, using condemned people as the victims, in literal re-creations of various bloody myths. Their uncensored ubiquity prompts the question: would the
spectators at such performances necessarily feel any guilt, even of the most remote unconscious variety? First of all it must be noted that pagan moralists strongly objected to the spectacles. Secondly the criticism of Christian moralists was not based on what would today be thought of as humane arguments. Tertullian exhorts avoidance of the spectacles because of their connection with "idolatry", and their undermining of the powers of self-control. The link between pagan religion and the spectacles was by Tertullian's time so remote that his arguments in this vein are thoroughly antiquarian. On the one hand there was a particular type of person, pagan or Christian, who enjoyed the spectacles. On the other hand there was another type of person, pagan or Christian, who denounced the spectacles, often for the same reason. Yet further, those who enjoyed watching extremely explicit scenes of incest, homicide and cannibalism were the same people who reviled Christians and hounded them to death on the unfounded suspicion of committing those very flagitia portrayed in the theatre, and sometimes the amphitheatre. It should also be added that an authority which tortured women as a normal part of judicial procedure, was sensitive enough to kill stubborn adherents of a nasty superstition.

The cathartic function of theatre was pointed
out, if a diversion into the commonplace be forgiven, by Aristotle. He knew that the spectators in a theatre identify with the "characters" and vicariously experience their dangers, emotions and triumphs. What catharsis is achieved by identification with the stars of pornography? None whatsoever; for if sentimental theatre purges emotions, pornographic theatre merely incites. It is as satisfying to the urges that it encourages as a picture of an apple is to a starving man. Time and again misdirected desire unsuccessfully seeks satiation. All that happens is that frustration feeds self-revulsion, that must be projected, increasingly amplified, on those outgroups believed to be the really evil people. Antique man was crushed in a pincer-like spiral. Common mores condemned the subjects of his entertainment. Yet proper authority was in this case, as in many others, laissez-faire. No paternal ban interdicted those enjoyments which the promptings of social and individual decency found repulsive. Was the central government content to see, even encourage, a degradation of life by these means? The clichéd analysis of Roman rule has always cited the "circus" as a tool of otium. Those who conspire in the theft of their own self-respect are not likely to make formidable rebels. What price was paid for the self-confident Antonine peace? It cost merely the demeaning
of humanity.

To break out of the spiral of compulsion and anxious culpability, the ancient pagan projected his guilt onto the Christians. Incest, homicide and cannibalism were not fortuitous choices for accusations against the sect, nor were they topical indications of a suspected conspiracy. They were prime topics instead of the ancient pornographic imagination. The Christians hit back hard in this area. Their criticism of pagan myth was polyvalent, but if it had been confined to a demonstration that the myths were examples of alogoi, those who accuse the sect of whipping defunct equines in attacking myth would in fact be justified. The apologists saw quite clearly that the myths were used not only as a vehicle but also as a justification of pornographic expression. They also realized that there are "myths" of pornography, and that one of these to the effect that the Christians performed the most taboo of flagitia was fed by the inspiration of theatrical performances. Justin also had a dazzling insight into another source of guilt. Why should the charge related to incest and cannibalism be infanticide specifically, and not the murder of an adult - for that is what the coniuratio topos requires? The accusations of infanticide transferred the guilt of child-
exposure, a common substitute for abortion in the ancient world from the pagans to the Christians. Again it might be asked if there was any guilt, conscious or unconscious attached to the act of child-exposure. The very prevalence of the performance does not indicate that it was unaccompanied by trauma. In traditional societies undergoing radical social change - and such was the general society of the early Roman empire - the rationally convenient action is often attended by irrational guilt. Those for whom the question of abortion is one easily answered are fortunate indeed. Is the guilt so irrational when, as in child-exposure, the action is clearly one that could easily be defined as murder? Who can compute the huge load of anxiety occasioned by the taking of life, even in an age like that of late antiquity when the living were often too many for the available resources?

Pornography gives representation to constant, repulsive and quite properly despised urges and fantasies. Every age and place has its own "mythology" of pornography, whether it involves gay Paree, sadistic Berlin, wide-open New York; or the sterile officially open Hamburg. In the pre-Decian period various groups of people were seen as guilty performers of these ambivalent acts, and the Christians became major deviants, their meeting became
seen, in the prejudiced mind, as loci for the acting out of what were, in effect, the murkiest fantasies of ancient man. Pornography is the language of externalized self-loathing and debasement. Realizing that myth was not redundant inanity, but a dialect of this language, the Christians attacked it forcefully. The gods had been demoted from Olympus to the sex-show. Myth survived to serve as a jargon expressing in nuce the alienation of antique man from his better impulses.

If the Christians were so far immersed in pagan culture, which after all was their culture — what other had they known? — to attend the hideous and homicidal amphitheatre, then would they not have at least some unconscious guilt to project? Perhaps even more so than the pagan, who was not continually exhorted to avoid the spectacles, the Christian who enjoyed the theatre would have carried a load of guilt, or anxiety about guilt, that needed projecting. At the shows, says Tertullian, "nobody recognizes you for a Christian". When the inner voice of conscience, or the outer voice of the moralist, spoke, how did the weak brother reconcile his morals and his contrary actions? He found, of course, a convenient stereotype — the "heathen" — onto which he could project his own guilt. This is the major topic of the next chapter.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Aristides XVII, (p. 51). From the Syriac text: the Greeks "practice foul things in sleeping with males, and with mother and sister and daughter", while accusing the Christians of those activities.

2. Tatian Oratio XXV: "It is not we who eat human flesh". Περί ἡμῶν οὐκ ἦστιν ἀνθρωποφαγία.

3. Justin Apology I, 26 & 27.

4. Athenagoras Legatio 3.1: Τρίς ἐπιστήμους ἡμίν ἐξελέγεται, θεότητα, θεοτειχική δείνυ, Ὀἰδίποδειος μίξις.

5. Theophilus Ad Autolycum III,4.

6. Eusebius HE V,1,14: "... φοβηθέτες τὸς βυζίνους ὑπὸ τῶν δύσιος ἐβλεποῦν πᾶσας τῶν ἐκβασιντῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτο παραρθμούσων ἡμῶν, κατεφεύγαμεν ἡμῖν θεοτειχική δείνυ καὶ Ὀἰδίποδειος μίξις καὶ ὅσα μὴν λαλέσθε μὴν νοεῖν δέρεις ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ προτέρειν εἰ τὸ τοιοῦτο πάπτοτε παρὰ ἄνθρωποις ἐγένετο.

7. Tertullian Apology VIII,1f. Minucius Felix Octavius IX.
8. Octavius IX,2: Occultis se notis et insignibus noscunt.

9. For the profession of Minucius Felix see Clarke p. 6: "... if the details of the dialogue can be taken as autobiographical - and there really is nothing else to go on - the domicile of Minucius Felix was Rome, his professional milieu the Roman legal Forum". Octavius "had had a professional legal career as well". Cf. Octavius XXVIII,1.

10. Octavius IX,5f: Iam de initiandis tirunculis fabula tam detestanda quam nota est. Infans farre contectus, ut decipiat incautos, adponitur ei qui sacris inbuatur. Is infans a tirunculo farris superficie quasi ad innoxios ictus provocato caecis occultisque vulneribus occiditur. Huius, pro nefas! sitiener sanguinem lambunt, huius certatim membra dispersiunt, hac foederantur hostia, hac conscientia sceleris ad silentium mutuum pignerantur. Embraces and complicity: IX,7: ... nexus infandae cupiditatis involvunt per incertum sortis, etsi non omnes opera, conscientia tamen pariter incesti, ...


12. Waltzing, 211-212.

13. Waltzing, 212.

15. Dölger, 228.


17. Schäfke, p. 591.


19. Freudenberger, 97: "E. Bickermann und F.J. Dölger betonen zu Recht, dass der Gehalt des Vorwurfs der Thyestela deipna auf Comiuratio weist". Dölger's researches are pushed to their ultimate conclusion in N. Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons, (St. Albans: Paladin, 1975), esp. p. 15: "...a dissident religious minority came to look like a revolutionary political conspiracy."

20. It is interesting to note that Cyprian actually believes accusations of immorality levelled against certain Christians. See Epistles 13, 5.

21. Contra Celsum VI, 40: ὂς γὰρ ταυτὰ λεγόμενα ἡν καὶ ὑπό τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὰ ντελετρίων τῆς καθ᾽ ἤ̯ εϕε θεολογείας καταχίνωσκεται ὡς κατεψευστέας Χριστιανῶν, ...

23. De Jejunio XVII, 2: ... apud te agape in caccabis
feruet, fides in culmis calet, spes in ferculis
iacet. 3. Sed maiores est agape, quia per hanc
adulescentes tui cum sororibus dormiunt. Appendices
scilicet gulae lascivia atque luxuriae.

24. That is to say: were they the product of a particular
imagination, or, as averred here, one expression of
a libidinous social imagination?


27. E.g. Origen in Contra Celsum VI, 27, and Justin
in Trypho 17. For moderns see Henrichs, p. 24,
the accusations "may have been the result of an anti-
Christian campaign launched by the Roman Jews".
Frend takes the Jewish plot theories very seriously,
see e.g. pp. 192-3. Although Frend places too
much emphasis on Jewish responsibility, there was
an anti-Christian tradition among the Jews, and
to remark on it hardly constitutes anti-semitism.

28. Trypho X.

29. Discussion in Henrichs, pp. 29-35.

30. Henrichs, p. 35.

31. Ibid.

32. One thinks of the Academy, especially under Carneades.
Stoics and Epicureans alike scorned the myths in general. Cicero was a complete sceptic. For a similar opinion see Hanson, pp. 920-1: "Lucian of Samosata in the second century A.D. had satirized the traditional stories of the gods in his 'De Sacrificiis', and his 'Menippus' as bitingly as any Christian writer ever did. When therefore the Christians attacked the old myths they were following a much-worked vein."

33. Cf. note 19 above.


35. Strabo C201 = IV,5. ... ὁτι ἄγριότερον τῶν βρυχτών ὀπήρκοσσίων οἱ κατωδύντες αὐτήν, ἀνθρωποφάγοι τε οὐντες καὶ πολυφάγοι, τοὺς τε πατέρας τελευτήσαντες κατεσθίειν ἐν καλῷ τίβέρεω καὶ φανερῶς μισχεῖαι τὰς τε αἱλλας γυναικεῖς καὶ μητράδες καὶ αδελφάς.

36. As Tertullian taunted his pagan audience: de vestris sumus.

37. As Pliny the elder boasted: NH XXX, 12-13.

38. As in Pro Fonteio 31.

39. Satire XV, line 131-3. After bewailing the vile
acts of the Egyptians, he continues: mollissima
corda humano generi dare se natura fatetur, quae
lacrimas dedit; ... The Egyptians are plainly
not counted in the human race.

40. Josephus Contra Apionem II,8,93f: a Greek peregrinus
is taken, et deductum ad quandam silvam occidere
quidem eum hominem eiusque corpus sacrificare secundum
suas sollemnitates, et gustare ex eius visceribus,
et iusiurandum facere in immolatione Graeci, ut
inimicitias contra Graecos haberent, et tunc in
quandam foveam reliqua hominis pereuntis abicere.

41. Ad Nationes X.

42. Apology IX,1: Haec quo magis refutaverim, a vobis
ostendam partim in aperto, partim in occulto, per
quod forsitan et de nobis credidistis.

43. Two ideas are being linked here, and will be through-
out the remainder of this study. The first idea
is that one transfers the burden of one's most
egregious offences onto one's enemies. This is
called "projection" by psychiatrists. The connected
idea is that what one hates in another is one's own
most outstanding (projected) faults. Hence
calumniation is self-revelation.

44. Romans 2,1: ἐν ὧν κρίνεις τὸν ἑτέρον,
κρίνεσθαι τὰ κατὰ κρίνεσθαι τὰ κρίνεις ἑν τὰ ἐπάνω
ὁ κρίνων.

45. Diognetus V,17: ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων ὡς ἀλλόφυλοι
πολεμοῦνται καὶ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων διώκονται καὶ
τὴν ἐπίτικη τῆς ἕχοντος ἐτεῖν οἱ μεσοῖτες
οὐκ ἔχουσιν.
46. Aristides XVII, p. 51. From the Syriac.

47. Apology I, 27: καὶ τὰ φύσεως ὦν
πραγμάτεια καὶ περίπτερα ὡς ἀνατετραμμένον
καὶ οὐ παρόντος φωτὸς θείου ὦν προσγράψετε

48. Oratio XXVII.

49. "Transfer": Oratio XVII, τὴν ὑποτεκνὴν ἐλογίστηκαν ἐπὶ
τὴν κήρυκα τῆς ἁλθείας) μετάφρασε.
Jude 10: οὕτως δὲ οὐκ ἦν οὐκ οἰκεῖον
βλασφήμουσιν, οὐκ ἐξ οὐσικῶν ὡς τὰ ἑλέον
ἐπισταντικῆς, ἐν τούτῳ φθείρονται.

50. Apology I, 5: ... oderunt homines, quia ignorant quale
sit quod oderunt, ...

51. Legatio 31, 1: ... ἵνα τε μισεῖν νοεῖσθαι
μετὰ λόγου ...


57. Allport, p. 187, approves the phrase of W. Lippmann, "Pictures in our heads", to describe stereotypes.

58. On the pagan side the most striking witness is Seneca the younger. See De Ira 28,7f, where he notes inter alia the fact that "the strictest enforcer of loyalty is the traitor". After several similar examples, he concludes that "the vices of others we keep before our eyes, our own behind our back." Apollonius of Tyana, (Ep. 88) notes that: "most men are as apt to palliate their own offences, as they are to condemn them in others."

59. Cf. Allport, p. 364: "For the anti-Semite," write Ackerman and Jahoda, 'The Jew is a living Rorschach inkblot'.


62. See Neumann, p. 40.

64. Neumann, pp. 40-41.


67. The phrase in 1 Clement vi, 2: "Through jealousy women were persecuted as Danaids and Dircae", is usually taken to refer to "shows" in which Christians were murdered for the crowd's entertainment, although some scholars are sceptical, and the text may be corrupt. Tertullian is fairly clear, in Apology XV, 5: "We have seen at one time or other Atys, that god from Pessinum, being castrated; and a man, who was being burned alive, had been rigged out as Hercules." (Vidimus aliquando castratum Attin, illum deum ex Pessinumte, et qui vivus ardebat, Herculem induerat.) Glover, in his commentary, notes of this description: "he does not mean that the things were simulated, but actually done before the audience".

68. These are the two major themes of De Spectaculis.

69. Aristotle Poetics 49b.

70. The question asked by P. Brown in "Approaches to the Religious Crisis of the Third-Century A.D.", English Historical Review, LXXXIII (1968), 542-558, 545: "One still has not yet assessed the price at which the self-confidence of the Antonine and Severan periods had been bought".

71. Burckhardt and Cumont being the most influential. See Hanson p. 924: "For better or for worse, these myths were part and parcel of Greek and Roman religion. The Christians advocated a clean break with that religion, ..."
72. It is very difficult to define "pornography". It differs from erotic and obscene presentations. I have in mind a representation which excites an audience through the perpetration of scenes of human degradation violent and sexual. The phrase of D.H. Lawrence is apposite: "Pornography is the attempt to insult sex, to do dirt on it". (Pornography and Obscenity, (London: Faber & Faber, 1929), p. 13.). Bearing in mind the bestiality and violence that were major aspects of antique pornography, the further comment of Lawrence is useful in invoking what I intend by the term: "As soon as there is sex excitement with a desire to spite the sexual feeling, to humble it and degrade it, the element of pornography enters". Later on the same page (p. 16), Lawrence notes that pornography "is a sign of a diseased condition of the body politic." I do not think it is something forced on women by men, nor do I believe that it is a result of centuries of Christian "repression". There is no sociology of pornography, at least none that rises above the level of jejune, fadish ideology. For some good examples of the kind of mental self-abusing, self-indulgence that intellectuals wallow in when the topic of pornography is discussed, see the various contributions to Perspectives on Pornography, D.A. Hughes ed., (New York: MacMillan, 1970).

73. Justin Apology I,27. Justin was of course far from unique in the ranks of the Christians in his opposition to exposure. Athenagoras finds abortion and exposure to be murder. (Legatio XXXV,6) Quite obviously, many would pay lip-service to the Christian opposition to abortion and exposure, because they had joined the sect. In general, however, it must be stressed that it was the "pagan" who felt strongly against such practices, who would have become a Christian for that reason.

74. On "traditional societies": the Japanese experience may be relevant. Abortion is cheap, and easy to obtain. 600,000 are performed annually - "one for every three legal births" - but religious scruples seem to torment those who obtain abortion. (The fetus is considered a live person from the moment
of conception.) See: "Japan's abortion shrines", Sunday Star, November 15, 1982, sec. 1, p. 25. The point is that the easy ubiquity of abortion and exposure in the ancient world should not lead to the conclusion that such practices were unattended by psychic trauma.

75. De Spectaculis XXVII, nemo te cognoscit Christianum.
CHAPTER FOUR

CHRISTIAN PREJUDICE AGAINST PAGANS

Just as the Christians served as an out-group onto which the pagans could project guilt and blame, so the pagans served a similar function for the Christians. Before this is contended further, the subject of in-groups and out-groups will be discussed in a little more detail. The categories by which an in-group judges itself, and those by which it judges an out-group, will be summarized from a comprehensive study of "ethnocentrism".

An in-group sees itself as "virtuous and superior" and naturally views an out-group as "contemptible, immoral and inferior". An in-group sees its own "standards of value as universal, intrinsically true", and its own "customs as original, centrally human". While there are "sanctions against ingroup murder" there are either no sanctions against murdering members of an out-group, or even positive "sanctions for outgroup murder". Between in-group and out-group there is "social distance". There is "disgust and fear of the outgroup" which explains why sometimes out-groups are used as "bad examples in the training of children". Finally it should be noted that in general, out-groups are blamed "for ingroup troubles".

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The attitude towards Christians of the pagans, and their occasional murderous behaviour, can be readily subsumed under these general rubrics. Yet before the Christians could be treated as an "alien" out-group, as another ethnus, the pagan view of the world had to be adjusted so that a group of people who, as the Christian apologists correctly claimed, belonged to the same culture, were seen as, in fact, barbarians: inferior, sub-human outsiders. It will be argued in chapter six that this "exile" of the Christians was a consequence of the (temporary) disappearance of the external barbarian as a viable threat to the genus humanum. The Christians similarly "exiled" the pagans. This must be emphasized. Viewed as "invaders", at least in times of stress, the Christians felt themselves to be not alien to the culture of the Roman empire, but to embody the fullness of its destiny. This contention will be developed as a preface to a discussion of Christian prejudice against the pagan. Just as "Christian" described a stereotype in which the pagan discerned all the worse barbarian vices, so for the Christians themselves "heathen" came to describe a stereotype which embodied all the salient anti-Roman vices. Through the stereotype "heathen" the ordinary pagan was judged to be a barbarian obstacle to the essence of Roman culture.
The best known indication that showed the Christian claims to be "true Romans" was the loyalty of the sect, and its related dogma of the co-contemporaneity of Church and empire. Aland sums up the Christian attitude to the empire:

For the Christians of the early period, the Roman State is their State; that which damages the State also damages them; that which is beneficial to the State, is beneficial to them also.

(In this study the term "empire" will be preferred to the anachronistic term "State"). Fuchs, after moting a persistent Jewish "spiritual opposition" to the Roman empire, based on a conviction of the eventual fall of Rome, avers that:

dagegen hat das Christentum die Unbefangenheit besessen, über eine nicht minder hartnäckige Gegnerschaft hinweg sich dem Reiche fortschreitend zu nähern und es schliesslich geradezu als ein Mittel zur Verwirklung der neuen Lehre in seiner geschichtlich Notwendigkeit zu bejahen und zu rechtfertigen.

No doubt there were some Christians who, like some pagans, looked forward with glee and malice to the end of Rome as the beginning of a time of freedom. For the main body of the faithful however, rejection of the empire as
supreme authority did not mean rejection of the empire completely. Accommodation to earthly rule led to the development of the theory of the providential role of the empire, the pronoia being, of course, divine.⁴

The concept of Church and empire as complementary organs of God's will and plan was the positive strain in the Christian attitude. "Caesars are necessary for the world".⁵ There was another strain, not negative so much as neutral. The dictum of Jesus: τὸ καίσαρος ἀρνεῖται καίσαρι καὶ τῷ θεῷ τῷ θεῷ, could imply a patient submission to the lord of a realm in which the Christians were only "aliens".⁶ Peter combined patience and tact: "God wants you to be good citizens, so as to silence what fools are saying in their ignorance".⁷ This latter concern was shared by Paul, who overall had a much more positive attitude to secular authority. For him all authority was dispensed by God, and therefore all secular office demanded obedience. It followed that "anyone who resists authority is rebelling against God's decision".⁸ The view of the empire as an instrument of God's will is quite clear in Paul: "the state is there to serve God for your benefit", and the civil authorities "carry out God's revenge by punishing wrong-doers".⁹

The evangelist Luke had taken care to point to the
synchronicity of Church and empire. Melito of Sardis in the mid-170s A.D. gave developed expression to the notion of the twin destiny of Church and empire. Christianity and the empire began together. The latter flourished as the religion bloomed, and this felicitous situation would continue as long as the imperial power guarded "the philosophy which was foster-sister to the empire and came into existence with Augustus." Many Christian writers urged prayers for the health of the emperors and their administrators. Typical is Polycarp: "Pray also for the emperors (pro regibus); and for potentates and princes". Prayers for secular rulers, and statements of the divine appointment of authorities, are both common themes in the second century. Athenagoras informed the joint principes quite emphatically that they both received their kingdom "from above", and that all Christians "pray for your reign". Such prayers were offered constantly, not only for the stable continuance of the empire, but in the anticipation also that the emperors would be converted.

Obedience to secular authority could not include any hint of idolatry, of course: honorem Caesari quasi Caesari, timorem autem Deo. This reservation aside, obedience and submission are enjoined throughout the pre-
Tertullian naturally brings irony into the subject when, after informing the magistrates that Christians pray for the emperor "and for the whole estate of the empire and the Roman world", he claims that they also:

must needs respect him as the chosen of our Lord. So I have a right to say, Caesar is more ours than yours, appointed as he is by our God.

He is ironic, but not disingenuous. The emperor was "not God, but a man appointed by God, not to be worshipped but to judge justly". Origen tells us that God placed all the nations under one empire to facilitate the commission of Jesus' command: "Go and teach the nations". For "it is quite clear", so Origen says:

that Jesus was born during the reign of Augustus, the one who reduced to uniformity, so to speak, the many kingdoms on earth so that he had a single empire. It would have hindered Jesus' teaching from being spread through the whole world if there had been many kingdoms.

The empire, that is to say the "world", was the God-ordained vehicle for the spread of the gospel. There was therefore no question of a rejection of the empire. On the other hand Christians could hardly reject the world that was both created by a good God, and designed by him
to help bring His own plan to fruition. It was in fact the "sin" of the world, caused and carried by the evil pagans, that was rejected. As Tatian noted: "the construction of the world is excellent, but the conduct in it is bad". The nature and objects of Christian rejection will now be considered.

A demonstration that the condemnation of pagan vice was a priori is the necessary basis for convicting the early Christians of prejudice. The general state of human sinfulness does not justify the axiomatic belief that every individual pagan was a sinner. Yet such was the Christian viewpoint. Of the period between A.D. 30 - 70, Cadoux informs us that:

the normal Christian view of the human race outside the bounds of the Christian brotherhood - apart from certain Pauline qualifications - was that it was totally bad.

Paul had no doubt that pagans were "ipso facto sinners". This attitude of general condemnation prevailed throughout the pre-Decian period. A non-Christian was on the outside of the moral border. The person who could not see the Christian God, thundered Theophilus, was an adulterer, fornicator, thief, swindler, robber, pederast, insolent, a reviler, quick-tempered, envious, a braggart, disdainful, a bully, avaricious, disobedient to parents (a greater
offence in the ancient Mediterranean than it perhaps is today), and finally: "one who sells his children". 22 All these vile qualities are imputed automatically to the pagan.

Theophilus had been preceded in his description of the stereotype "heathen". Just as some of the slanders directed against Jews were transferred to Christians, so the early Christians inherited from the Jews a pungent vocabulary of abuse to characterize the "new goyyim" - the pagan or heathen. In the very early Didache, parts of which may be pre-Christian, 23 it is said that those persecutors of good, who followed the path (bdos) of death rather than the path of life, were on a "way" that was:

wicked and full of cursing, murders, adulteries, lusts, fornications, thefts, idolatries, charms, robberies, false witness, hypocrisies, a double heart, fraud, pride, malice, stubbornness, covetousness, foul speech, jealousy, impudence, haughtiness, boastfulness.

In this list, as in that of Theophilus, one recognizes some of the salient vices not only of the Christian as seen by the pagan, but also of the barbarian as seen by ancient man, both pagan and Christian. The didact who admonishes Barnabus finds the way of the Black One as impressively inclusive in sin. He also réviles arrogance
and "magic", but specifically adds the accusation that the non-Christians are "murderers of children". 25

Although in the late second and early third centuries there is a movement towards accommodation with the less perfectable aspects of human nature, even displayed by some Christians, the view of the evil nature of the pagans was as starkly normative as before. Tertullian's pithy dictum: "every soul is guilty" matches the lament of Origen that the world is almost totally in the sway of the devil. 26 The world needed Christ to cleanse it of "idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, fornication, false witness and deceit". 27 Clement of Alexandria, who is often instanced as a liberal Christian antipole to Tertullian, views the mind that has not been elevated by the holy (and not the Hellenic) Logos as dark, futile, and profligate. 28 At the same time as they were condemning pagans wholesale, the Christians were propounding a "positive relationship" between Church and empire. 29 There was also a "silent process of moral relaxation" going on, in which Church leaders were alleviating the structures of uncompromising normative morality, in order to make Christian behaviour and existence in the world more blamelessly feasible. 30 Meanwhile, if targets for projection were needed to aid this moral revolution, to the stereotype of "pagan" the Christian could add
the stereotype of "pagan past".

Converts to Christianity must have received Peter's reminder of their former lives with an ambivalent wistfulness. "You spent long enough in the past", he admonishes:

living the sort of life that pagans live, behaving indecently, giving way to your passions, drinking all the time, having wild parties and drunken orgies and degrading yourselves by following false gods.

The exultation of having passed through the rite of baptism and being "reborn" gave a great feeling of moral elevation that was maintained not only by projecting vice onto the pagan, but also reviling the former sinful self. This experience of rebirth was not unique to Christianity. As the hermeticist insisted, one needs to be reborn to be saved, but the baptised Christians' rejection of their old selves gave added thrust and validity to their condemnation of those still in a state of non-salvation. The reborn begins to hate his former self: incipiunt odisse quod fuerant, says Tertullian. Diognetus is told that God "allowed us until recently to be borne along as we wished by our inordinate desires, being led away by pleasures and lusts". Justin admits that: "we have lived amid wicked customs and evil behaviour". In a tense state
of doubly achieved catharsis, the past heathen self and the present heathen adversary both lived in a world "outside" which was the realm of evil. The Christian insiders by contrast, lived already in the purified future state to which the gospel would bring all deserving humanity.

In the consideration of the general viciousness of the pagan, some familiar specific evils were encountered. One notes the accusation of "magic" for example. It must be said that it was not magic per se that pagan and Christian found objectionable, but magic directed to evil ends - in other words, the magic of the opposition. Christians believed in magic, and not just the miracles of Christ and the saints. They shared the common belief in oracles. Polycarp was able to predict his death because of a premonitory dream. Lottomancy was used. In the Acts of the Apostle, two candidates, Joseph and Matthias, are nominated to succeed Judas. After the nominations, the apostles pray:

"Lord, you can read everyone's heart; show us therefore which of these two you have chosen to take over this ministry and apostolate, which Judas abandoned to go to his proper place." They then drew lots for them, and as the lot fell to Matthias, he was listed as one of the twelve apostles.
In dealing with "magic" however difficult the subject is to define, one is not confronted with a unilaterally, nor with a unanimously despised practice. There was no tendency on the part of antique man, pagan or Christian to oppose "magic" to "religion". Rather, the magical practices inextricably bound into the theoretical and actual reverence of one's deity were taken to be "good" as a matter of course, while the magic employed by other sects might well be, and for the Christians axiomatically was, "bad" or "black" magic. It is an error of recent scholarship to insist on a clear and palpable distinction between magic and religion. People attacking the question today find such rigid categorizing unfruitful. Aune concludes a study of "Magic in early Christianity" with the statement:

If we have found that magic was a characteristic feature of early Christianity from its very inception, that is because we have regarded magic as a constant if subordinate feature of all religious traditions. Unfortunately, the term "magic" itself has been a red herring in a great deal of the scholarly discussion.

The Christians and pagans accused each other not of "magic" but of "black magic", the obvious implied claim being that the magic of the accusers was legitimate and even sacred. The Christians did not invoke new categories, either of virtue or vice, in the polemic with the pagans.
Both sides in the conflict fought, as it were, for the same standards, arrogating the same positive qualities to themselves, and labelling the opposition with the same negative qualities. The qualities were defined in both general and specific terms. All participants in the conflict were products of the same culture, so it is not surprising that they expressed amity and enmity in identical fashions. So, for example, one was either faithful unto death, or stupidly obstinate. One man bore "false witness" while the confessor of the nomen was a witness - a martyr - to the truth.

It has been contended that the Christians were prejudiced in a general way, because of their a priori conviction that the antagonistic pagan world was necessarily evil. Just as the pagans used the term Christianoi as a pejorative term to describe a negative stereotype, and indicated a "distance" between themselves seen as real man and the Christians seen as sub-men by using the term tertium genus, so the Christians summed up to their own satisfactions a negative stereotype in a few significant terms. In an invaluable article devoted to examining Christian words for non-Christians, Ilona Opelt informs the reader that:

wie die griechischen lassen sich die
lateinischen Heidennamen in drei Gruppen gliedern: 1. Ausdrücke aus der Bibel, wie gentes, nationes und Derivate, ... 2. Negierte adjektivische Determinativkomposita wie infidelis ... und durch "kirchenzentrische" Betrachtung bedingte Bildungen, die die Heiden als von der Kirche Ausgeschlossene bezeichnen, wie profanus, alienus, ... foris. 3. Okkasionelle Bildungen wie ... insciì, stulti.

For the pagan the Christians were extranei, outsiders of a particularly barbarian kind. The Christians indicated exactly the same view of the pagans with the use of terms like alienus, and more strongly perhaps, foris.

The Latin gentes translated the Greek ἔθνη, and both terms came to describe barbarians excluded from proper civilization. In the LXX the word ἔθνη translates the Jewish goyim. Opelt correctly equates the concept goy with that of barbaros. As barbaros was opposed to Greek, and so indicated someone outside of and inferior to the truly human, so the goy was outside of the realm of the real people of the covenant, and so a priori judged to be evil. The early Christians followed the Hebrew usage. Hence laos, even without the epithet ἄγιος implied the term "holy people", because the term cham (people) when applied to the Hebrews by themselves meant "the holy people". In all these differentiations, the homogeneous group of "real men" was opposed to the diverse "tribes" of those
outside and inferior: those "outside the light" in the famous phrase of Peter.

You are the chosen race (genos), the royal priesthood, the consecrated nation (ethnos), his own people (laos), so that you may declare the virtues of him who has called you out of darkness into his wonderful light.

Gentes, nationes, ethne and goyyim must be understood as pejorative oppositions to the concept "true human", and not as neutral categorisations. It can be noted in passing the for the Romans the term externae gentes meant "barbarian", whose very lack of true human intelligence was summed up in words that were close cognates of inscius and stultus, when those words were not used themselves. In time two terms for non-Christians were to predominate: paganus and "heathen" (from ἑθνή). To move from the general to the specific, prejudice against the pagan was expressed in several ways that were cognates of the pagan expressions of their prejudice against the Christians. In the accusation of causing earthly disaster through angering the gods, Schafke finds that: "in diesen Vorfällen wird eine Grundstruktur antiken religiösen Denkens sichtbar". Whatever the truth of the matter may be, from the same time that these accusa-
tions start to be levelled at the Christians, the latter turn them onto the pagans. Christians naturally found pagan beliefs to be their own punishment. From the wicked errors of pagan worship: "there have happened to men frequent wars and mighty famines, and bitter captivity and deprivation of all things". Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius and Augustine will all join Eusebius in later echoing this claim.

Not only did Christians find the pagans to be provocateurs of earthly disaster, but also abnegators of tradition. This was an ingenious, but not necessarily disingenuous argument on the Christian part. The sect was attacked for the novelty of its beliefs, and it was a matter of some (although not crucial) importance to rebut suggestions of "treason" to tradition. One method of attack was to follow Tertullian and find the pagan claim to uphold tradition was itself spurious, and hypocritical. Many Christians however, countered the jibes of novelty with vaunts of pristinity. Tatian, perhaps typically, is most blunt: "our doctrines are older, not only than those of the Greeks, but than the invention of letters". In Matthew, so the argument went, Jesus spoke in parable: "to fulfill all the prophecy: I will speak to you in parables and expound things hidden since the foundation of the
world\textsuperscript{53}. Moses, who predicted Christ's coming, wrote before any other person. The Greeks drew their doctrine from Moses "as from a fountain\textsuperscript{54}. The "truth" was given by the Holy Spirit itself to the prophets, and the Greeks stole doctrine from the "law and the prophets\textsuperscript{55}. The Christian learning, which is contained in books that are more ancient and true than all others: "is neither modern nor mythical but more ancient and true than all the poets and historians who wrote on what they knew nothing about\textsuperscript{56}. Eusebius will later work out a complete theory in which he will show:

\begin{quote}
that Moses is proved to be earlier than even the gods of Greece, seeing that he is before Cadmus, while the gods are shown to have come later than the age of Cadmus.
\end{quote}

In support of his argument he adduces Diodorus\textsuperscript{58} without acknowledging that the Greek apparently knew more than "nothing" on the topic.

The Christian self-image was from very early on one of a "people" that represented the culmination of the destiny of Israel, and the fulfillment of ancient Mediterranean civilization. Such a view implied the basic homogeneity of this culture. The boast of pristinity was based on membership of the "first church", which was the "spiritual
one which was created before the sun and the moon", and for the sake of which "the world was established". At the same time the Christians claimed to be a "new people" because they were the children of Christ, and he had redeemed them at a recent and specific point in history. The new Man Jesus, who is also the eternal Logos, leads the new people. This true Israel was "a nation taken from the midst of nations", the soul of the world, its very inner kernel.

Tatian stresses the point: "the Greeks claim, without reason, the invention of the arts". In an impudent and deliberately jarring sentence, he asks the "Greeks": "which of your institutions has not been derived from the Barbarians?" The Christian insistence upon the seniority of their beliefs was not merely rhetorical inversio. Once that premise had been satisfactorily established, certain conclusions followed. The pagans arrogated to themselves the same premises and consequences. For both pagan and Christian the world split into two zones. Those inhabiting the opposite zone were necessarily evil. Such a simple and radical perception of the world cannot provide a guide for daily living, but it does provide a basis for the focussing of hate and fear in times of stress and crisis. Then, quite starkly, evil was seen and had to be eradicated.
Once pagan religion, philosophy, and mythology had all been shown to be derivative and later than the truth of the evangel, Christians felt more secure in making severe criticisms. For a start, "atheism" was obviously a fault of the heathen. Urged to abjure the atheists, the martyr Polycarp indicates the pagan crowd and says: "Away with the atheists!"\(^{62}\) Clement of Alexandria claims: "I am right in branding as atheists men who are ignorant of the true God, but shamelessly worship a child being torn to pieces by Titans, ..."\(^{63}\) It is the "philosophers" who are the real atheists.\(^{64}\) This general charge gave way to those that pointed out the immorality, inanity, barbarity and irrationality of pagan myth and religion.

What the Christians were driving at in their demonstrations of the utter foolishness of pagan religion and myth was the base mindlessness of a culture that could devise and perpetuate such tales. To prove that the pagans were *alogoi* - irrational - was to prove that they were barbarians, incapable of a properly human use of the faculties of the mind. Like animals (or like barbarians) the pagans were incapable of proper understanding:

*these people abuse anything they do not understand; and the only things they do understand - just by nature like unreasoning animals - will turn out to be fatal to them.*\(^{65}\)
The fact that a positive stereotype - or "positive self-image" - can be reinforced and enhanced by reviling an out-group as those actually guilty of one's own faults, is clearly expressed by Clement of Rome:

Men who have no intelligence or understanding, men who are without sense or instruction, make a mock of us and ridicule us, in their wish to raise themselves in their own esteem.

The Christians constantly strove to justify their own claims to rationality by mocking the pagan irrationality.

Pagan philosophers issue "vain and foolish statements". For Tatian pagan philosophers are vicious and error prone, pagan deities are stupid and immoral, while pagan religion is in fact a depraved demon-worship. "Do not act as fools", he exhorts the Greeks, just before once more holding up to ridicule Greek sports, entertainments, art, philosophy, academic studies, religion and law. Justin attacks the folly of idol-worship: "what infatuation! that dissolute men should be said to fashion and make gods for your worship." Athenagoras finds pagan religion to be a "mass of impious nonsense concerning the gods". Theophilus attacks the absurdities of idolatry and pagan mythology, and mocks at pagan pretensions: "the prophets spoke, ... and they put to shame those who thought
they were wise". Poets, philosophers and historians are proved foolish "by the abundance of their nonsense and the absence of even the slightest measure of truth in their writings". Hippolytus denounces much of pagan culture as folly and impotent action. Minucius Felix is unrelenting in his attack: "examine into their attendant rites, how ridiculous, how pitiable even, they appear!" "Yes", says Clement of Alexandria, "Zeus is dead". This does not stop him reviling pagan beliefs as immoral, savage, foolish, or a combination of all three. Origen favours a statement of a favourite Christian paradox, to the effect that "wisdom" is foolishness with God. It would be superfluous to do more than state that Tertullian never tires from bewailing the irrational folly of the "idolatrous".

Foolish, stupid, absurd, irrational: the term that described pagan belief and action was alogos. The man without logos, without the faculty of reason (ratio), was nothing but a beast. So the unpleasant Lactantius spells out the obvious conclusion:

to those men therefore, who conform to the customs of their gods, ... and who violently exercise against the just the same 'piety' which they use in other matters, not without reason has the name beasts been given by the prophets. For what Caucasus, what India, what Hyrcanian region ever sustained 'beasts so wild, so bloody'?
The other side of this particular coin was, of course, the Christian claim to be truly rational, to possess the genuine and holy \textit{logos}. In Romans it is said to be "rational to acknowledge God".\footnote{79} The "teacher Christ" (ὁ ἀνδριάς αὐτοῦ), was \textit{reason itself}\footnote{80} which "was visible in him, and indeed it appeared bodily in him". Christ is the power and logos of God.\footnote{81} Elsewhere it is said that "the Son of God is the mind and reason of the Father".\footnote{82} The religion of the Christians was true reason, according to Origen.\footnote{83} All men can partake of \textit{logos} and live by Christ\footnote{84} but those who do not are, in the words of Arnobius, who was perhaps better at savage criticism than at anything else, insane and inhumane.\footnote{85} The word \textit{inhumanitas}, which Arnobius employs, indicated not just a small lapse from the high standards of civilized behaviour, but membership of the \textit{genus} of sub-humans.

The stupid, corrupt and corrupting, inhumane and inane pagan religion was propagated by demons and demonic forces. It was a product of the irrational element in the cosmos.\footnote{86} Demons were also at the root of one of the pagans' most typically barbaric traits - their arrogance and their pride. For the Christians, pagan attacks on their arrogance was a misdirected criticism of a willingness to die for the truth. The Christians, of course,
placed enormous emphasis on the opposition of humility and pride. In ancient Mediterranean culture in general, there was a belief that arrogance was a prominent failing of the savage who lived in unenlightened, inhuman darkness. Ignatius classed "proud speech" with wrath, blasphemy, error and cruelty. Alternately, humility was the proper attitude towards the true authority of Christ and God: "the kingdom of God is not just words, it is power." The false superbia of the pagan contrasts with the Christian refusal to deny the "name". Humbly the faithful are thrown "to wild beasts that they may deny the Lord, but are not overcome". God resists the proud, Ignatius assures his readers. "Arrogance" as the vice of the outsider is emphasized in I Clement: "frowardness and arrogance (ἐπεμειχθαμένοι) and boldness belong to those that are accursed by God". The same word — ἐπεμειχθαμένοι — was used to describe the contumacy of the pagan martyrs of Alexandria. It is a similar offence to the arrogance of the philosophers, which has led them to nothing but "vain boasting". It is also the fault of the vainly rebellious: "why this arrogance among the nations, these futile plots among the peoples?" All Christians would have subscribed to the jibe of Minucius Felix that: "our ancestors' attitude to the gods was blind and credulous." So just as the pagans
found in the Christian religion - or rather in their prejudiced interpretation of it - grounds to accuse its members of being generally evil and beyond the bounds of the moral community of mankind, so the Christians found the pagans, in a fashion equally prejudiced, to be de facto evil. Both sides projected their guilt onto the other. The specific failings that each side imputed to the other, were equivalent. The Christians were superstitious, they provoked earthly disaster, they were mad and irrational. So much the Christians believed about the pagans. The sect reverenced an ass: many inhabitants of the empire worshipped animals96 while the pagan myths were full of tales of bestiality accomplished by a god, often the major god, in the guise of an animal.97 Both sides evolved arguments to accuse the other of atheism. By defining tradition, in both cases in a spurious but probably accredited manner, each was able to slander the other for Traditionsverlust.98 The pejorative labels of tertium genus and Christianoi were turned into positive designations by the sect, while in return they managed to turn the words paganus and ethnos into the moral equivalents of barbarus: uncivilized savage, sub-human outsider. It remains to consider the pagan accusations of incest, ritual infanticide and cannibalism.
The Christians replied to these accusations in two ways, neither of which is, to the modern taste persuasive enough to win a highschool debate. Firstly, they claimed that human sacrifice was still perpetuated in the empire, despite the imperial ban. Even at the beginning of the fourth century Lactantius insists: "Jupiter Latiaris is even now honoured with human blood". At the same time, Eusebius declared it extreme folly to offer worship to insensate idols:

and for those who practise justice and benevolence to (sc. offer worship) to those who, through excess of cruelty and inhumanity, are involved in the pollutions of infanticide and parricide.

Did Tertullian, a century earlier, have sure knowledge of human sacrifice in Carthage? In fact, although the evidence is very tenuous, it is possible that some of the sect knew of such lurid pagan practices still in existence. On the other hand, Christian imputation of vile behaviour to gnostic sects reveals pure prejudice, and ought to be treated accordingly.

With more evident justification the Christians brought the homicide of the amphitheatre to the attention of those pagans who accused the Christians of homicide.
Enough has been said on this topic. There is no doubt that the guilt that should logically have been felt for enjoying such spectacles was projected onto the Christians via palpably ridiculous accusations. As for incest, the Christian ingenuity shone forth again. Those children who did not die when exposed were taken in by immoral types, brought up, and then forced into prostitution. A man could all unwittingly purchase the services of his sister in a brothel. It is quite likely that in fact brothels were filled with abandoned children. Again, that the practice was both widespread and also felt to be culpable is demonstrated by the Christian and pagan moralists' objections to it. Perhaps even worse, there is some cause to believe that as well as abortion and exposure, infanticide of the newly born was a common substitute for "birth-control". 104

Most Christian polemicists found an answer to calumnies of incest, infanticide and cannibalism in a critique of pagan myth. They argued that tales about Kronos the child-eater or Zeus the incestuous, daughter-eating parricide, while clearly ludicrous, justified the gratification gained from obscene theatricals, and also justified not only immoral but also insensitve behaviour. To reiterate somewhat: ancient "theatre" showed such
masterpieces as *Diana Lashed*, the very title of which suggests to all but the most sheltered the nature of the entertainment, and the area of the human psyche thereby gratified. It was in the performance of such scenes that the Christian polemicists found proof of the abysmal degradation of ancient culture. In the acted fantasies of ancient man, Christians found the measure of the civilization that opposed them. The better part of antique ambition and fantasy was found, to a very considerable extent, in the sect itself.

The Christians were prejudiced not only against the pagan, but also against heretical sects, and against the Jews. This fact does not alter the analysis of pagan-Christian prejudice that now follows.

If the general vituperative categories employed by both Christian and pagan are set down, the following Latin terms would describe them: each side found the other to be *inhumanus*, *immanis*, and *cruelius*. Each accused the other of *dementia* and *furos*, and of *superbia*, *insolentia* and *adrogantia*. Both found their enemies to be marred by *impotentia*, except when it came to evil actions. Each found the other to be *perfidus* and *mutabilis*. (For pagan inconsistency one might refer to Theophilus and Clement
of Alexandria, for example. When these Latin terms are not actually used they are implied, or invoked by the use of a close synonym. Greek cognates were also used by both sides in the Christian-pagan-polemic. The Latin words above actually describe the main failings of the barbarus, from the Roman point of view, as summed up in a recent and very comprehensive study. To the list one should add superstition, imperitus, indoctus and stolidus. It is a feasible conclusion that both pagan and Christian were, unconsciously or consciously, seeing the opponent through the stereotype barbarus. The cause of this mutual transfer of stereotype from an outside target to an inside target can only be discussed by a consideration of the historical, as well as the taxonomic dimensions of the "barbarus", that is to say the history of the concept as much as that of the illusive "reality".

It has always been realized, of course, that the ancient pagan felt that there was something barbaric about Christianity. Some early Christians, by a tactic by now familiar, took the designation "barbarian" as a token of proud distinction from pagan civilization. It will be recalled that before he revelled in the name of barbarian, Tatian did, however, argue that the Barbarian was prior, both in time and attainment, to the Greek.
In his exhaustive study of the Greek concept of barbaros, Jüthner notes of Christianity that:

für die griechisch-römische Gesellschaft gab es von Anfang an keinen Zweifel, dass man es hier mit etwas Barbarischem zu tun hatte.

Jüthner eloquently invokes the origin of Christianity among the Jews — assuredly barbarians in the eyes of the Romans and Greeks — as the basis of this view in antiquity. In fact, the use of the epithet "barbarian" denigrated the non-Hellenic origins of the sect, the rustic style of its literature, and the irrational nature, in the Greek opinion, of beliefs like parthenogenesis and resurrection. Something much broader is intended in this study by the equation Christian = barbarian. The way in which the stereotype "Christian" came to replace the stereotype "Barbarus" as the encapsulating and inclusive definition of the threatening and sub-human outsider has not yet received the attention it is due.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


4. Rome's divine destiny was pre-Christian, of course. See, for example, Cicero *Philippics* VI, 7, 51: Populum Romanum servire fas non est, quem di immortales omnibus gentibus imperare voluerunt.

5. In a passage even less lucid than usual, Tertullian, *Apology* XXI, 24, reads: "... the Caesars would have believed in Christ, if Caesars had not been necessary for the world,..." Sed et Caesares credidissent super Christo, si Caesares non essent necessarii saeculo, ...


7. I Peter 2, 15: οὕτως ἐστὶν τῷ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἠλθομένων τῷ τὴν ἱδρόνων ἁγιορεπόν τω ἁγιορεπὸν ἁγιορεπόν.
8. Romans 13, 2: ο ντασεσμένος ἔ ζησεία τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ διατάξει άνθρωποι.

9. Romans 13, 4-5: θεοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον ἔστιν ἐν εἰς το θανάτον. . . . θεοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον ἔστιν, εκδικος εἰς ὁργήν τῷ τῷ κακῶν πράξεως.


12. HE IV,26,7: ... φαύλασσων τῆς βασιλείας τῆς εὐνομίας καὶ ευνομούντος θεοῦ εἰς ἡνίωσον . . .

13. Polycarp to the Philippians XII,3: .Orate etiam pro regibus et potestatibus et principibus . . .

14. Legatio 18, and 37.


16. Apology XXXIII,1: Quem necesse est suspiciumus ut eum quem dominus noster elegit, ut merito dixerim: Noster est magis Caesare, a nostro deo constitutus.
17. Apology XXXf. has much to say on Christian attitudes to the emperor.


20. Cadoux, p. 70.


22. Theophilus Ad Autolycum 2.

23. M. Staniforth, Early Christian Writings, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 226: "The first portion ... has every appearance of being an ancient catechism of the pre-Christian era, . . . ." Cross agrees, believing that the first part - Didache 1-6 - "is probably based on a Jewish moral code which the author has worked over and Christianised, ... " Cross, p. 9.

24. Didache V, 1. .... ποιεῖται ἕστε καὶ κατάρας μετὰ φόνοι, φοινείδω, ἐπιθυμία, πορνεία, κλοπαὶ, εἰδολολατρία, ῥαγεία, φθοραὶ, ἀρταγικαὶ, περιθυμοπάθεια, ὑποκρίσεις, διπλωματία, ἔλος, ὑπερθρωμα, κακία, σύνθεσις, πλεονεξία, παιχνιδολογία, γηλοτηρία, ἀθέστη, ὑφος, δολαρεία.


29. Cadoux, p. 266f.

30. Cadoux, p. 298.

31. 1 Peter 4, 3: ἕρματος ἧδρος δὲ παρεληλοθῶς χρόνος τὸ βουλήματα τῶν εὐθυνῶν κατεργάσθη, πεπορευμένος ἐν ἁσελγείᾳ, ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὀνοματερομεία, κόρου, ποιοῦ, καὶ ἄθερον ἐνθυμολογεῖς.

32. Tertullian, Apology I,6.

33. Ep. to Diognetus IX,1: ... περὶ οὖν τοῦ πρόσβειν χρόνου εἰς ἔρημος ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐβουλόμεθα, ἀτάκτως φοράς φέρεσθαι, ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ὑπαγορέων.

34. Apology I, 41. εὐρείαν θυτωμένον ἐν.

36. Martyrdom of Polycarp V. He saw the pillow under his head burn, in a drea, or "trance", and announced, "I must be burnt alive". Δεῖ μὲ δυνάται καὶ ναὶ.


38. K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 27: "Nearly every primitive religion is regarded by its adherents as a medium for obtaining supernatural power." I would delete the contentious word "Primitive".

39. The most recent scholarship on the subject is devoted to controverting the idea that "magic" can be defined by its opposition to "religion". This view seems to have originated in E.B. Tylor's Primitive Culture of 1871. A number of categories were defined, in which magic opposed religion. The former was undifferentiated, impersonal and collective, external, dealt with taboo, and existed in relations of fear. Religion was defined as differentiated, personal and individual, internal, dealt with ethics, and was established on relations of reverence. For these categories, and comments, see J.Z. Smith, "Towards interpreting Demonic Powers in Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity", ANRW II 16.1, 425-437, 431.

41. Comparing, for example, the attitude of Marcus Aurelius, (see Appendix A), to that of Tertullian, see p. 50 of this study, above.

42. Christians were constantly warned to beware of "pseudomartyrs", or "false witnesses": see, e.g. note 24, p. 159 above. The part played by the so-called "voluntary martyrdom" in the persecutions is well brought out by de Sté. Croix, 1963, 21f. He notes that: "... voluntary martyrdom was by no means confined mainly to heretical or schismatic sects ... but was a good deal more common among the orthodox than is generally admitted. The heads-of the churches, sensibly enough, forbade voluntary martyrdom again and again, ...".

42a. See note 111, p. 170 below.


45. I Peter, 2, 9: ὑμῖν τε γένος ἐκλεκτῶν, βασιλεία ιεράτων, ἐστίν ὑμῖν, ὡς εἰς περιποίησιν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐξαγγείλατε τοῦ ἐκ σκότους ἐκατερολειπτεῖς εἰς τὸ ἀναμακτόν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.

47. Opelt, 14. The term *ethnici* was adopted by Latin writers at some point. It was favoured by Tertullian, but *paganus* seems to have become the favourite.


49. Aristides VIII.


51. Tertullian *Apology*.

52. Tatian *Oratio* XXXI: re. the philosophia of the Christians: Εὐρήκοον ἃ ἐὰν οὐ πρόσων τῆς ἐλεημόνου παίδεις τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐλλ' ἐτι καὶ τῆς τῶν γράμματων εὐρέως ἀνώτερα.

53. Tatian, referring to Mark 13, 35.

54. Tatian *Oratio* XL.

56. Theophilus Ad Autolycum III, 16: ... οὐ προφανεῖς... μυθώδης ἐστίν ὁ καθ' ἑαυτὸς λόγος, ἀλλ' ἐρωτήτορος... καὶ ἀλήθετος ἐπὶ πάντων ποιητών καὶ συγγραφέων, τῶν ἐπὶ ἑαυτῷ συγγραφάκτων.

57. Eusebius PE, 52b-c.

58. Diodorus I, iv, 2.

59. Sun and moon: II Clement 14, 1
   Hermas, vis. 2, 4, 1: ... δίω ταύτην ὁ κόσμος τελεσθεθή.

60. New man, e.g. Ignatius to Ephesians XX, 1. New people, e.g. Ep. of Barnabus V, 7. Midst of nations: I Clement XXIX, 3. Soul: Ep. to Diognetus VI, 1: ... ὅπερ ἐστὶν τὸ σώματι... ψυχή, ταύτῃ εἰσίν ἐν κόσμῳ Χριστικῷ.

61. Tatian Oratio I: Ποίον χρὶ πέπτηκαρν παρ' ὑμῖν τὴν ἀστικὴν οὐκ ἀπὸ βαρβαρίων ἐκτίθετο.

62. Martyrdom of Polycarp IX, 2: ... ἔπειτα ἤπρε τοὺς ὀμοίους.

64. This was a common Christian retort. Tatian was the most extreme in his rejection of Greek "Philosophy", most other writers admitting that, because truth is in some way inherent in creation, pagan thinkers occasionally had some glimmering of Christian logos. Alternatively, of course, the pagans might have stolen the truth from Moses or the prophets. It is misleading to think of the qualified acceptance of pagan philosophy as a purely Greek Christian attitude. For all his discriminating between Athens and Jerusalem, Tertullian could write with warm approval of some parts of Seneca the younger's work, referring to him as Seneca saepe noster.

65. Jude 10: οὖν τις ὑπὲρ μὲν οὐκ ἔφη αἰών ἡλεσκεμοῦσιν, ὑπὲρ δὲ ρεισάντως ὑπὲρ τὴ ἁλογία
ζωὴν ἐπιστανται, ἐν τούτοις ἄθειοινται.

66. I Clement XXXIX,1. (The translation is that of M. Stani forth): Ἀριστεύεις καὶ κατάνυστες καὶ οἰκοδομεῖς
καὶ ἀπειθεῖτες Χριστός διὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀντικρισίους,
ἐντούτοις βούλομεν ἐκδύομαι τὴν διάκονον τῶν ἁγίων.

67. Tatian Oratio XXV.

68. Tatian Oratio: sports, XXIII; entertainment, XXIV;
art & philosophy, XXV; studies, XXVI; law, XXVIII.

69. Justin Apology I,9.

70. Athenagoras Legatio, XXI,4: ... τῶν πολὺν τούτων
ἀτεχὴ λήγον περὶ τῶν θεῶν...
71. **Ad Autolycum II, 35:** ... καὶ τὸν δοκούντας εἶναι σωφρόν ... καθῆς χυμών.

72. **Ad Autolycum II, 12:** ... τὸ τοιχὸν δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν αὐτῷ σοὶ εὐφρόσυνη.

73. E.g., *Refutation of all Heresies*, book IV, 27: "how impotent their system is!"

74. Octavius XXII: Quorum ritus si peresseas, ridenda quam multa, quam multa etiam miseranda sunt!

75. **Exhortation II, 32.**

76. E.g., *Exhortation II, 15-20*, on the Dionysiac, Corybantic, Demeterian and Eleusian beliefs being immoral, savage, foolish, or all three.

77. **Contra Celsum I, 9:** VI, 11-12. The prime locus is I Corinthians 3, 19: "the wisdom of this world is foolishness to God.

78. **Lactantius Mort. Pers. V, 11.**

79. Romans 1, 28: (re. pagans) - ... οὐκ ἔδοκινέσκειν τὸν Θεὸν ἐξ ἐν ἐπίγνωσι...
Every major Christian writer finds that the pagan faults are due to their being used and fooled by malicious demons. Included in the ranks of the demons, though not filling them right up, were, of course, the pagan deities. The unconscious aspect of the pagan-Christian conflict was expressed by Christian writers when they claimed that their adversaries were under the control of demons, of whose power the victims were unaware. Most explicit perhaps, is Origen: Contra Celsum I,31: "... daemons, who held in subjection all the souls of men that have come to earth." VIII,31: daemons are "responsible for famines, barren vines and fruit trees, and droughts, and also for the pollutions of the air, causing damage to the fruits, and sometimes even the death of animals and plague among men." III,29 for "conspiracy of daemons". Most clear expression of the irrational, IV,32: re. daemons: "For they have stirred up the emperors, and the Senate, and the local governors everywhere, and even the populace, who do not perceive the irrational and wicked activity of the daemons, to oppose the Gospel and those who believe in it."
87. Ignatius to the Ephesians X, 2.

88. I Corinthians 4, 20: οὐ γὰρ ἐν λόγῳ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν συνάξει.

89. Ep. to Diogenes VII, 7: παρὰ βαλλόμενος Θηρίου, ἵνα ἀρνησώμεθα τὸν κύριον, καὶ μὴ νικώμεθα

90. Ignatius to the Ephesians V, 3. Cf. e.g. James 4, 6; I Peter 5, 5.

91. I Clement XXX, 8: Θράσυς καὶ αδιάβροχος καὶ τολμὴ τοῖς κατηγοροῦσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

92. See e.g. APM, p. 45.

93. Tatian Oratio III.

94. Acts 4, 25, quoting Psalm 2, 1-2: Ἡνὰ τὶ ἐφρύωσαν ἐδώ, καὶ λαὸς ἐξελίθησαν κενὰ

95. Octavius XX, 5: Similiter erraverunt erga deos quoque maiores nostri: imprudici, creduli rudi simplicitate crediderunt.

96. The Egyptians were proverbially despised for the frenetic worship of animals. E.g. Athenagoras Legatio XIV, 2.
97. E.g. Athenagoras *Legatio* XXII,11.

98. The descriptive term employed by Schäfke, p. 633f.


100. Eusebius *PE*, 68b-c.

101. The relevant passage - *Apology* IX, 2-3, is discussed by Barnes, *Tertullian* pp. 14-19. It is not improbable that although all public rites had been suppressed, the practice of infant sacrifice continued in "secret", as Tertullian claimed, IX,3: *Sed et nunc in occulto perseveratur hoc sacrum facinus*. One wonders how well-kept a secret it was. Further see Freund, 1965, pp. 332 & 345.

102. Henrichs *op. cit.*, p. 35: "it is likely that human sacrifice for ritual purposes was practised in Egypt, Syris and North Africa well into the imperial age", is a little strong. It is a pity that he offers no references.

103. See Dölger 217f., and Henrichs 28-9 for discussion. Immorality was a common accusation against the gnostic sects. For a revolting gnostic cannibalistic ritual see Epiphanius, *Panarion*.

104. S. Angus, *The Environment of Early Christianity*, (London: Duckworth, 1914), p. 49, points out that "infanticide was in every way more merciful than exposition by putting an end to the little one's sufferings and sparing it later infamy."

105. Tertullian *Apology* XV,1.

107. See Dauge, pp. 456 & 459.


111. That the term Christianoi was in origin a pejorative was traditionally accepted – e.g. by Cadbury, Harnack and Zahn. Bickerman, Hury Th Rev xlii, 1949, 109-124, "The Name of Christians", argued that it was a term that the Christians gave to themselves. Mattingly, JTS n.s. IX, 1958, 26-37, "The Origin of the Name Christian", restates the case for a pejorative origin, finding "Christianoi" to be derisively modelled on the Neronian "Augustiani". Mattingly rightly finds Bickerman's argument to be "ingenious" but far from "convincing". Lifshitz, VC xvi, 1962, 65-70, "L'Origine du nom des Chrétiens", defends Bickerman's conclusion, using a different (and less convincing) argument. Bickerman assumes, without warrant, as the axiom for his case, that bureaucratic usage as reflected in the papyri illuminates the use of language, in a very particular instant, in the New Testament.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SYNTHETIC PERSPECTIVE: CHRISTIAN AS BARBARIAN

Laistrygonians, Cyclops, wild Poseidon - you won't encounter them unless you bring them along inside your soul, unless your soul sets them up in front of you.

Cafavy.

While the Romans adopted wholesale many of the mythic Greek symbols of the soul's projected monstrosities, fabled horrors that were to be preserved by pagan and Christian alike, it was to be the simple triphone which was to prove most tenacious as an active designator of a dichotomised world-view. The Greek term has its own history.¹ It came to express an absolute gulf between the superior Greeks and all the obviously inferior "others". In general a barbaros was someone outside of Greek polis culture. The primary indication of this exclusion was the use of a non-Greek language. Inter alia, this implied that the barbarian was unable to develop full humanity through paideia - proper education - which could not be achieved in any environment except that of the polis. The lack of full "humanness" was reflected in all kinds of barbarian behaviour: a willingness to live under a tyrant, for example.
The rigid differentiation intended in the term of opposition "Greek and barbarian" maintained an offensive connotation far into the Byzantine era. The severely qualitative exclusiveness implied in the term could, in certain contexts, be somewhat attenuated. In the imperial period the term "Greeks and barbarians" might mean nothing more than "everybody": meaning everybody in the civilized world, or oikumene. This latter concept was originally applied to the zone of Hellenistic culture, but by the second century A.D. at the latest, Greek thinkers tended to think of the oikumene as equivalent to the Roman empire.\textsuperscript{2} The term barbaros never lost its pristine resonance. All through the imperial period it invoked, just as it had for Plato, someone who was an "enemy by nature",\textsuperscript{3} or, as Aristotle had averred, a born slave.\textsuperscript{4} In Greek usage in general, the term always meant in the first instance "non-Greek" and ipso facto inferior, somewhat less than a full human being.

The Roman term barbarus displays its parentage quite candidly. At first the Romans may not have been clear about whom the term designated, but by Cicero's day, they were indignantly certain that they themselves were no more barbarian than the Greeks.\textsuperscript{5} The Roman understanding of the term is lucidly revealed by the indigenous synonyms
which became subsumed by, but not completely replaced by, barbarus: ferus, inscitus, imperitus and demens among the specific pejoratives, and exterus, externus and extraneus - all clearly meaning "outsider" - top of the generic pejoratives. The religion of a barbarian was merely a base superstition, while his society was not regulated in any significant mode by reflection, forethought or reason. The adoption of the term barbarus as an equivalent to externus, shows that the latter term was not, as some of the more sentimental maintain, qualitatively neutral. It was assimilated to the Greek loanword precisely because the latter seemed to the Romans to encapsulate all the evils implied in the Latin words. (If barbarus made the Romans think of balbus - "stammerer" - so much the better, for the Greek term meant one whose speech sounds like "ba ba ba". This derivation goes back to the Homeric "barbarophone", and its intention is well caught in the German onomatopoeia "Plapperer". 6)

Given the fact that the term barbarus was used to indicate a cluster of typically Roman disdainful attitudes to non-Romans, it can be said that when the word, or any of its cognates: barbarus as an adjective, barbaricus, barbaria or barbaries, is encountered in Latin what is being presented is not an observation but a prejudgement. Barbarus invoked a stereotype, an ideal bad person, which
contained all the vile and negative qualities of human baseness. It embodied all the Roman conceptual attributes of the Untermensch, the sub-human, and was the negative complement of the positive stereotype homo humanus - man brought to as perfect a level as possible - against which the Romans, like most national groups, modestly and to some advantage measured themselves.

The barbarus lacked humanitas, and therefore could not, properly speaking, be called a man. The wise man, according to Scipio:

Believes that, though others may be called man, only those are men who are perfected in the arts appropriate to humanity.

The most direly unperfected of all was the barbarian. His negative qualities sound appropriately gruff in the German: "ungeschlacht und roh, dumm und ungebildet, asozial, feige und grausam, hemmungslos und gewalttätig, falsch und treulos, nimmersatt und habgierig", are a few of the barbarian's more salient faults, and these and others, equally unflattering, were automatically applied to any individual or group labelled as barbarian. This kind of prior judgement applied to a rustic may only indicate the contempt of the urban sophisticate. Applied to another ethnic
group - a different natio or gens - it is surely the very
definition of racial prejudice.¹

Saddington expresses a fairly common opinion when he finds that the derogatory

senses of 'barbarus' largely derive from the Greek origin of the word: 'Exterus' or 'externus' was the Roman term for 'foreign'. The original meaning was geographical and had no ethical overtones.¹⁰

To reiterate: if such had been the case, the Greek term would never have been adopted as a synonym for a whole cluster of Roman terms, all of which indicate that the geographically other was a moral and cultural reprobate. In fact, it is a false assumption to state that the Romans, or their contemporaries in other cultures, thought of spatial distance as being morally and ethically neutral. For the ancient world in general, to be "outside" spatially was the same as being "outside", and therefore inferior, in a moral sense. In the conceptual organization of the world spatial and moral location are equivalent, and in the act of prejudice moral and locative judgements meld.

To be beyond the border is to be beyond the pale. When Sallust adapted Plato's inclement dictum that the barbaros is an enemy by nature, he eschewed the virtual neologism
barbarus. The word that he chose to indicate the indigenous equivalent was ready to hand: Sallust made the externi the eternal enemies of humanity.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus there may not have been, as Brunt so daringly claims, any Roman term for "wog".\textsuperscript{12} There most certainly was the "thing". A "wog" is a person who is judged as inferior by being equated to a negative stereotype. If barbarus is not slangy enough to qualify as Roman for "wog" it certainly implied all that the English pejorative implies. The Roman externus however, most definitely shows that the only offence of the "wog" was to inhabit the wrong space. The first task of this chapter will be the demonstration of the significance of location in ancient thought. Then it will be argued that character, in antique thought, was determined by the location of the person under consideration. Finally, the history of the concept barbarus, as far as it is significant for this study, will be discussed.

For ancient man the importance of a "place" could be moral, historical, mythical, or a combination of all three. The place Colonus in fact evokes the sight of Sophocles for Cicero's brother. Memory plumbs a more profound abyss: Quintus actually sees Oedipus himself. As someone present remarks: \textit{tanta vis admonitionis inest}
in locis. The total "filling-in" of a place was not merely a mnemonic device. As Cassirer maintains:

in sensory as in mythical space, no "here" and "there" is a mere here and there, a mere term in a universal relation which can recur identically with the most diverse contents every part ... possesses, rather, a kind of tonality of its own.

And elsewhere: "position ... "is" only insofar as it is filled with a definite, individual sensuous or intuitive content". The intuitive welding of place and quality, of location and personality, is reflected in many ancient ideas about the relationship of ethnic character to tribal location. Euripides, for example: "gives a sort of rational interpretation, to the effect that the intellectual and artistic gifts" (σοσία) of the Athenians "were due to the favourable climate of their habitation." Plato imagined each region of the earth allotted to different peoples under the protection and rule of a daimon. In the second century A.D. Celsus, while criticising the Christians, asserted that: "from the beginning the different parts of the world were allotted to different overseers". Christians, reflecting Jewish beliefs would have agreed with him. Celsus continues by demanding that customs and practices in any region should conform to the demands of the "overseer", and he avers that it would be: "impious
to abandon the customs which have existed in each location from the beginning". For Celsus one of the most fundamental characteristics by which an ethnos was judged in the ancient world - its religious and social mores - was determined by location.

In ancient scientific works, location was credited with affecting character through the influence of the flora and the climate. In the early Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Sites the author:

proceeds from an interest in soil and water, climate and exposure, as affecting the health of cities, and he believes that 'both the physique and the character of men follow Nature', meaning the nature of the country.

To dwell in an extreme climate was to develop a badly affected character. Pseudo-Aristotle wonders why: "those who live in conditions of excessive cold or heat" are "beast-like in both habits and appearance". Perfection, of course, lay in the mean, in living in the exact mid-point between extremes. The inhabitants of the "middle of the earth" exhibit a "healthy blending" in physique and temperament. Moreover, the informed Pliny tells the reader:

customs are gentle, senses clear, intellects
fertile and able to grasp the whole of nature; and they also have governments, which the outer-most races have never possessed; ... being quite detached and solitary on account of the savagery of the nature that broods over those regions.

Superiority was a gift of the environment. This idea could be extended. The environment is always to some degree man-made, and in this way the artificial aspects of the environment can be crucial in forming character. The tradition of ancient town-planning that went right back to Hippodamus stressed this.\textsuperscript{24} The siting of a city should be decided by climatic and topographical factors, for these affected \textit{inter alia} sanitation. The form of the city would influence the inhabitants: regularly laid out streets, intersecting at right angles on a grid plan, was the plan condign to a democracy. The proper life for men was the settled life. The nomad was always a low form of barbarian.\textsuperscript{25}

The preference for a sedentary life meant that agriculture was seen as a means of civilizing men. Farming softened the beast-like hardness of the savage. Strabo is a significant witness to this kind of thought.\textsuperscript{26} A century after him, Plutarch tells us that Pompey resettled the captured pirates on land: "and let them have a taste of the gentle life by being accustomed to dwell in cities
and to till the ground.\textsuperscript{27} The dwelling place — the city — is actually more important than the occupation. The city was the centre for verbal communication and edifying social intercourse (one is in the realm of theory here!), that was the necessary condition of a fully "human" and humane life.

Culture affected character quite obviously, for education and social mores are a significant part of the total environment. Sometimes a more genetic view of personality would find expression. Livy allows a denial of the idea that genus aut mores can be transformed by a change of Terra.\textsuperscript{28} In one of the documents recovered from Nag Hammadi, a crude expression of geneticism is stridently employed:

\begin{quote}
a horse sires a horse, a man begets a man, a god brings forth a god.... No Jew was ever born to Greek parents (as long as the world has existed).
\end{quote}

The writer is denying any seminal connection between Jews and Christians, the latter being "true men" of a unique seed.

One expression of the genetic view was contained in myths about eponymous (or non-eponymous) founders.
Intuitive feelings about the ideal purity of blood and descent of the tribe were thus retailed. The synonymy of the word nomen with the words gens or natio devolves upon the derivation of a tribe from a personal or totemic founder. Mommsen had noted that nomen in phrases like nomen Latinum meant Stamm (tribe). Meyer reaches the extreme but nevertheless feasible conclusion from this observation:

die Stämme trugen einen bestimmten Namen, der teils von einem Götternamen wie Marsi (von Mars), Vestini (von Vesta), teils von einem Tier abgeleitet wie Hirpini (hirpus = der Wolf), Itali (vitulus, der junge Stier), Lucani (Ital. luquos, der Wolf), ...... teils von geographischen Ausdrücken wie Latini (von Latium), Campini (von Capua), ...... Die älteste Bezeichnung für Stamm war nomen ("Kennzeichen").

The eradication of the nomen was in fact the extirpation of the race. This usage is very common in Livy. This expression of a vaguely perceived geneticism is relevant to the pre-Decian persecutions. Those who claimed the nomen of Christian were boasting a membership of a particular Stamm, the eponymous founder of which was one Christus, a condemned criminal. The bad character of the founder tainted all the line. The Christians were perceived, on a level very difficult to intuit, to be claiming the patrimony of an executed criminal, and so to be confessing to, and bragging about, their own vicious natures. Only
gradually were stories made up ("facts discovered") to justify pagan and Jewish "gut feelings" about the essential criminality of the sect. 33

The Romans shared the general ancient belief that each *ethnos* had definite proprietary rights to its own land. Boundaries were set by divinities. The Roman god Terminus - "the god of the boundaries of land" - refused to cede to Jupiter, and so shared the Capitol with the greatest and best. 34 The job of Terminus was clear:

tu populos urbesque et regna ingentia finis:
omnis erit sine te litigiousus ager. 35

For the Romans, from scruples of a religious or legal nature, "extreme sanctity was ascribed to boundary stones". 36 Such a universal concern survives today in the picturesque ritual, fully Christianized, of the "beating the bounds" still enthusiastically maintained in rural England. 37 At national or ethnic borders Terminus was replaced by the *fines*, who were conceived as "personal, conscious, and divine". 38 Apprehensions about the illicit confiscation of foreign land as a consequence of victory in war, led to the development of the elaborate ritual of the *fetiales*. 39 After a "just war" the Romans could annex land with a clear conscience, and add it to the public domain (ager
Lingering anxiety about the massive appropriations of land during the drive to empire, gave rise to a theory of universalism. "Rome" had no boundaries in this creed, which was developed centuries before its logical correlate - universal citizenship - became a fact. Until then (A.D. 212) the situation of the non-Roman in the empire was ambivalent. Although the ager hosticus lay safely outside the limites of the imperium, many peregrini, who traditionally inhabited that ager, were living on ager Romanus. There is something very probable in Catalano’s contention. "Lo straniero", he writes:

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e sempre all'interno del sistema, indipendentemente, si badi, del grado di 'romanizzazione' .... Solo tenendo conto di questo elemento di continuità del sistema possiamo intendere, nelle sue radici antichissime ... il profondo senso giuridico e religioso dell'affermazione che troviamo nei "Fasti" di Ovidio;

Gentibus est alius tellus data limite certo: Romanae spatium est urbis et orbis idem. 41
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Where Rome ruled there could be no trespass, nor any fear of the ager hosticus, by definition ever outside. It was only in A.D. 212, when the Constitutio Antoniniana granted universal citizenship, that the final part of the problem was eliminated. Rutilius was more justified than Ovid when, much later, he boasted of Roma: urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat. 43
The most significant location for an ancient was his own patria or polis. The two were often the same. To recur to the elder Pliny: the perfect centre of the world was Europa, "nurse of the race that has conquered all nations". The centre of the centre was Italy, which had given humanitas to mankind. Rome, terrarum caput, was of course the perfect centre of Italy itself. Other people of the ancient world were, naturally, no more modest about the perfection of their own home-towns. All were certain that beyond the boundaries of their own effective civilization lay moral and physical disorder. Eliade writes that:

one of the outstanding characteristics of traditional societies is the opposition that they assume between their inhabited territory and the unknown and indeterminate space that surrounds it. The former is the world (more precisely, our world), the cosmos; everything outside it is no longer a cosmos but a sort of "other world", a foreign chaotic space, peopled by ghosts, demons, "foreigners".

As the elder Pliny said: there is no government among remote peoples. There is no law in the ager hosticus, either regulating the inhabitants or restraining the Romans, Barbarians are all outlaws, exiles. On the other hand, there is a universal, as well as a culturally specific significance to Peter's stigmatizing of non-Christians as
the anomoi, those without the law, the lawless. 48

Roman attitudes to outsiders were historically never any more tolerant than those of other peoples. Wagenvoort contends that the word hostis, which came to mean "enemy", had originally had the dual meaning of "stranger-enemy", stranger ergo enemy. "Hostis does not stand first for 'stranger' and later for 'enemy'," he writes, "but means 'stranger' and therefore 'alien', even 'enemy'." 49 Bolchazy similarly infers that there was originally no Latin expression differentiating stranger and enemy. "Hostis expressed both concepts". 50 The word peregrinus came to mean one who was legally a non-citizen. At first, it also designated someone who, because a "stranger", was automatically an enemy. Festus can be cited in support of such a contention. 51 According to him, peregrini was the old Latin word for hostes. The term clearly had resonances of hostility. "From the earliest time", writes Schulz, "the figure of the 'foreigner' (peregrinus) stood out in opposition to that of the Roman citizen". 52 The true men at the world centre stood out in opposition to the encircling "other", who was morally opposite to the just and pure, because locatively opposite.

For the advanced people of the ancient Mediterranean
the world-centre - "the true world is always in the middle, at the Center"\textsuperscript{53} - was a city, or an urban type sanctuary: Rome, Athens, Jerusalem, or the navel of the cosmos at Delphi, for example. A city that expanded into the chaos that encircled it, would automatically come into contact with the inferior inhabitants, whose existence threatened the denizens of the urban centre. Threats were eradicated by destroying the outsider. The Romans however, from very early on, developed the famous \textit{politique d'assimilation},\textsuperscript{54} preferring to absorb the conquered if possible. As Rome "ever increased in size in proportion to her very danger and needs of greater security",\textsuperscript{55} she bound defeated enemy cities to her by rigid treaty, leaving them intact around her like protective fortresses. Cicero understood his forefathers' motives in this way when he reminded the \textit{populus} that:

\begin{quote}
our ancestors, ... established colonies in suitable places in such a manner that guarded them against all suspicions of dangers, so that they appeared to be not so much towns of Italy as bulwarks of an empire.
\end{quote}

Before this system had been worked out, the city that was just beginning to expand was nearly destroyed by the Gauls in 390 B.C. in a close run thing that was to haunt the imagination of the Romans ever after.\textsuperscript{57} It also provided
a concrete target around which Roman prejudice could wrap itself. The Gaul became the stereotype of the threatening outsider, and the externae gentes of the north the pristine barbarian. As in many other cases, the savage barbarian was born in a clash of urban dweller and nomadic raider.

The striking and challenging phrase of Lattimore: "civilization itself created its own barbarian plague", refers to the fact that barbarians are, in the first instance, nomads existing outside a "settlement". What happens next - if extreme generalizations be forgiven for the moment - is that the sedentary agriculturists appropriate "by right" or "legally" any land they need to cultivate (perhaps some of the "barbarians'" vital grazing land), thus initiating a chain reaction. Expanding towns, with, in Roman terminology, their own territória, disturb the life around them. Nomads either settle, are forced to settle, are enslaved, extirpated, or driven away en masse. In the latter case, one of the nomads' adapting strategies might be that of counter-attack. This is always felt not as reaction, but as direct and unprovoked action - as aggression and invasion. The barbarus proverbially comes out of the far north. In fact, when barbarian confronts civilised, the clash is one between erstwhile neighbours.
When barbari threatened Italy, and later the Roman empire, it could rightly be said that:

the barbarian terror that harried the northern frontiers of civilization did not erupt from a distant, dark and bloody ground that had nothing to do with civilization; it was an activity of peoples who were the kind of people that they were because their whole evolution had been in contact with, and had been molded by, the advance of civilization.

A complete chronology of the development of the concept barbarus cannot be reconstructed. A clear picture emerges from the time of Cicero onwards. Walser notes that for Tacitus: "die beiden Bezeichnungen externus und Barbarus braucht er in allgemeinen, wie Cicero, als Synonyma". He goes on to say that:

in ganzen sind für Tacitus die nationes exterae Barbaren, und für sie trotz aller Einzelerfahrung, die dem überkommenen Barbarenbild widersprechen konnte, die Anschauung, dass es sich um eine inferiore Menschenklasse handelt, welche an der wahren Kultur und am richtigen Staate keinen Anteil hat.

What is missing from Walser's very valuable assessment is any notice of the shift that occurred between the time of Cicero and Tacitus, in the Roman perception of the location of the Barbarus. During the late Republic, it was possible to entertain the idea that "barbarians" lived
under Roman *imperium*, because the inhabitants of many of
the provinces were undergoing the as yet incomplete pro-
cess of "civilizing". When the borders of the empire
became concrete *limites*, and as the concept of *imperium*
became more concrete 63 the idea that the inhabitants of
the empire were the same as *genus humaan* developed. The
idea can be detected in embryo in Cicero:

dum *genus hominum*, dum populi Romani nomen
extabit (quod quidem erit, si per te licebit, sempernum), tua illa pestifera intercessio
nominabitur. 64

The idea of the equivalence of the human race and the
inhabitants of empire was fully developed by the first
century A.D. The corollary perception, that *barbari* were
totally *externi*, was also an imperial one.

The area occupied by *homo humanus* increased for
the Romans from being Italy alone to being the complete
empire. So for the elder Pliny, Augustus was acclaimed
by the whole *genus humanum*. 65 For Florus, the Roman dom-
ination was over the whole of real humanity — *Romanae domina-
tionis, id est humili generis* — and he could boast of the
Romans that:

so widely have they extended their arms
throughout the world, that those who read of
their exploits are learning the history, not of a single people, but of the human race.

Suetonius proclaimed, ironically no doubt, of Gaius' suspicious accession that: "by thus gaining the throne he fulfilled the highest hopes of the Roman people, or might I say the human race".

Despite a comparative scale of ethnic "value" and despite various official gradations or unofficial preferences, it would be wrong to infer that the Romans did not draw a rigid line between themselves and others. Roman, as a term, was always one side of an absolute opposition. It was obvious that what lay beyond the bounds of the human race were zones of Barbarism that became increasingly more savage the further one travelled from the centre at Rome. The idea that more distant from Rome equalled more barbarian is implied in Cicero's phrase about: "savage races in the furthest corners of the earth". It was the same for Tacitus, as Sherwin-White has demonstrated. It was also the same for that stridently Roman person, Tertullian, who thundered against Marcion that his "orige Pontus, had, "as though ashamed of its own barbarism ... set itself at a distance from our more civilized waters". Many subtle exceptions notwithstanding, all the differences between homo humanus and barbarus could be subsumed under
the two polarities of insider and outsider to the "city". The city was the creator of homo humanus and his distinctive characteristic, humanitas. The ancients were unanimous that the "city" was the symbol and cause of civilization and cosmic order. To threaten the city — particularly the city become empire — was to threaten the human race. As Eliade notes: "any destruction of a city is equivalent to a retrogression to chaos". 72

The city was the locus of civilization because it provided an arena for that discussion without which man's unique quality of reason would not be fully developed. Social intercourse forges homo humanus. In the life of the city, coercion is replaced by reasoned persuasion. The exigencies of communal life and cooperation give to the four cardinal virtues — wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance — a mandate to regulate civilized life. 73 Mind and reason, mens et ratio, moderate behaviour and eradicate extremes of violence and luxury. Ratio was understood as the proper translation of the Greek logos. As the reasonable mind controlled the body, bridling the passions and ruling the limbs, so at the social level the institutional results of ratio — law for example — act as mens does in the individual, controlling unruly behaviour and errant individuals. 74 The quasi-Stoic terminology
expressed perfectly the ideal of a culture that elevated authority and discipline. The motto was clear and pithy: reason commands, appetites obey.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{Ratio et oratio} unites mankind, and with the proper guidance anyone can attain to "virtue", which is perfect reason.\textsuperscript{76} Barbarian and beast do not possess \textit{ratio}. They cannot plan for the future, and so are trapped in immediate exigencies. Cicero admonishes the Romans that: "as it is barbarian-like to live for the day, our prudence must observe eternity".\textsuperscript{77} Man and barbarian learn from different sources: "the learned by reason, the barbarian by necessity".\textsuperscript{78} The stimulus to barbarian action is impression, not fact. "In all matters, ... especially in the minds of barbarians", impression "often carries greater weight than fact itself".\textsuperscript{79}

Without the guidance of \textit{ratio} the cultural products of the barbarian would be negative. An irrational substitute for proper religion, the \textit{inane superstition} would command savage reverence.\textsuperscript{80} Reckless impulse, which would turn to headlong flight and panic, was the barbarian alternative to true courage.\textsuperscript{81} The barbarian would flee from a hard fight, while the Roman held steady, the mind-overcoming any base impulse to flight.\textsuperscript{82} The differences went way
beyond the martial. The barbarians were uneducated, skill-less, immoral, perfidious, cowardly braggarts, large and loud men with no stamina. They were inordinately cruel and were encouraged in this by the hierophants of their superstitious rites. But the preurban savage was not alone in his defects. For the Greek also suffered from a plethora of vices, and both Hellenic and barbarian failings were either the result of a lack of mental control, or the outcome of a contumacious spirit.

The barbarian had not had the privilege of urban life. The Greek was the product of a decayed and decadent over-refinement, a luxuria, typical of the effeminate sophisticate. Although it would have been too ridiculous to call a Greek a barbarian, the faults imputed to the loathsome little graeculus - a stereotype justifying the projection of vices onto the Greek - were cognate with the worse barbarian faults. Fear of their own decadence led the Romans to project the acts of their own luxuria onto a stereotype that expressed a "variety of attitudes from the mildly patronising to the openly contemptuous". The salient vices against which this contempt was directed were: volubilitas, (garrulity was a prominent fault of the "empty vessels" of the immoderate barbarian); ineptia, a form of the barbarian inscitia; arrogantia, the worst
barbarian fault; *impudentia*, *levitas*, and "deceit", all familiar to the barbarophobe, and also typical of decayed civilizations; and finally luxury and unmanliness. 89

The haughty attitude of the Roman ruling class crossed the barriers of race, for indeed, the term "Roman" came to designate even before the establishment of the empire, not a civic or national status but a "caste" or international "order". 90 Ideological statements of "manifest destiny" filtered downwards through education and pure acts of propaganda. Triumphs, proclamations, statues, medallions and coins, arches and columns, all carried the message of the victory over the forces of evil, the just humiliation and demeaning of the barbarian. 91 This propaganda fed a definite need - for "propaganda exploits beliefs" 92 - which in fact helped to call forth the propaganda. Official utterances were met by the upward universal need for an inferior. The large area of common perception shared by rulers and ruled alike, was so pervasive, so innate in the inhabitants of the empire, that the concepts in which it was expressed were shared and used by the Christians, even in times of persecution.

The imperial mission was to civilize the barbarian, and rescue a decadent east from the load of its own unmanly
luxuria. In the Roman concept of rule, the governing powers of the city functioned as *mens*, controlling the unruly limbs of the body of the state. Government was the *ratio* or *logos*, the head, mind, and reason of the empire. The ancient somatic metaphor of the state is recalled.

While digging on the Tarpeian Hill, some workmen once found a human head. This, says Livy, "plainly fore-shadowed that here was to be the citadel of the empire and the head of the world".93 Pliny the elder fills out the tale. Envoys were sent to Olenus of Cales, a famed Etruscan seer, who tried to play a trick on the honest Romans. He sketched a hill on the ground, and asked if it were there that the head was found. With a literalness born of subtlety or stupidity, the Roman envoys assured him that: *non plane hic sed Romae inventum caput dicimus.*94 The interesting implication is that "fate's gift" could have been transferred from Rome to Etruria. But it was of course destiny that Olenus should be thwarted.

Loci for the somatic metaphor abound.95 At a time when such imagery was more than archaic curiosity, the use of *caput* for "capital city" actively included the idea of the head as the site of the mind, and thus the rational director of the commonwealth. In the imperial
period the emperor, as the embodiment of Rome, was the mind of the empire. Seneca admonished Nero to behave in a way fitting to the mens ille imperii. The emperor was the "logos" of the earth, the mundane equivalent to the cosmic logos. It is not surprising that Nero declared his own divinity, when he was told constantly by Seneca: "that he was the animus rei publicae, the spirit or reason, which guided and organized the enormous multitude of Roman subjects".

Seneca had been anticipated by Cicero, for whom ruler and ruled had the same relationship as mind and body. Such concepts, which survived Seneca by many centuries, obviously rely on the perception of a mind-body dichotomy, and herein lies a particular problem. What if the mind hates the body? Dodd has called the "sharp dichotomy between the self and the body" which is apparent in much ancient thought, (with the correlative that the body is denigrated), "the most questionable" gift of ancient Greece to humanity. To define such a specific spatio-temporal origin is a misjudgement. As Berger and Luckmann point out:

The common development of the human organism and the human self in a socially determined environment is related to the peculiarly human relationship between organism and self. This
relationship is an eccentric one. On the one hand man is a body, ... On the other hand man has a body. That is, man experiences himself as an entity that is not identical with his body.

The rulers of the empire were alienated from their subjects. The "mind" despised the "body". At the same time there was a widespread revulsion from the "body", expressed in many ways. Germaine to this study was the popularity of "pornographic" entertainment, already discussed. However, this hatred of the body did not cause Christianity directly, as Dodds and Freud, inter alios, believed. Christianity was one of a number of reactions going against the prevalent trend. These reactions did not place a low value on human life and earthly creation but exalted these, and invested them with a renewed dignity.

Just as the ruling power is mind, so the contumacious barbarian was mindlessness, and indeed all the barbarian vices can be summed up under the one rubric: no reflection, no capacity for thought, no foresight, no real religion, impulsiveness, disgusting and immoral behaviour, and literal mindlessness - plain credulity and stupidity. The obstinatio of such creatures deserved death, and so the Christians, when viewed as a sort of barbarian group, were automatically liable to execution just for refusing
the enlightening instructions of Roman rule, and for willfully remaining superbi.

The barbarian always lived on the "outside", but because the outside was in the process of being civilized it was possible for people in the late Republic to allow for the fact that barbarians, temporarily at least, were on the inside, that is to say under imperium. The coming of Empire represented an expulsion of the barbari and the vices of the savage from the oikumene, leaving only the genus humanum on the inside. Barbaria, the moral and geographical realm of all baseness was "outside". Cicero had already declared: externi isti mores. There was, however, always the fear and the danger that such mores might infiltrate back across the fines. In this concluding part of the chapter, some of the ways in which the opposition between the inside and the outside is reflected in the thought of Cicero and Seneca the younger will be considered.

Polybius had recorded, or instructed, Roman fears when he asserted that:

there being two agencies by which every kind or state is liable to decay, the one external and the other a growth of the state itself, we can lay down no fixed rule about the former. 106
No fixed rule perhaps; but vigilance was the order of the day in obviating internal and external dangers. When these fears are reflected in the rhetoric of Cicero, a master of psychological manipulation is seen at work. This observation should not lead to the inapt conclusion that his speeches are nothing more than cynical devices. He judged appeals to his audiences anxieties by their effectiveness to influence. To understand the minds of his listeners so well he would have had to share their preoccupations, participate in their worries. It is no doubt naive to confuse the character of the man and the cast of his utterances. It is no less misleading to posit a gulf between speaker and audience by making one a detached manipulator, the other a bunch of gullible and psychologically distinct people.

In the speech contra Rullum to the Quirites, Cicero invokes a picture of the external threat that would arise if the proposed agrarian laws of Rullus were legislated. The novus Cicero was in his consulate (63 B.C.). Rullus had proposed that powers be given to a decemvirate board to settle men on the ager publicus. Cicero contended that the party behind Rullus would use the absolute powers asked for to create a strong "alternate Rome" at Capua, and a string of garrisons which would be used to protect the latter city, while at the same time obviously threaten-
ing Rome. After a frank excursion, in which he reminds the populus that Carthage and Corinth were destroyed for the potential threat that they offered to Rome, he turns to Capua. That city, itself once a rival, had been "spared" and made into a town of workers, not the "seat of a new republic, and ... a mighty power to oppose the old". 107 The pride and arrogance of the original Capua are invoked, 108 in prelude to the culmination which accuses Rullus of planning to give the world over to a new power in Capua. Rullus, thunders Cicero, plans to drain Rome's treasury and revenues, rob all the kings and peoples, and occupy all towns, in order to surround the "entire republic with soldiers, cities, and garrisons, and keep it crushed". 109

Internal danger is only the reverse of the same coin. In his related address to the Senate, Cicero concentrated on the internal aspect of the threat. "There is no danger from without", he urged, "no king, no people, no nation, is to be feared; the evil is confined within our gates, it is internal". 110 This conclusion does not contradict the other speech, but complements it. The insider who seeks the destruction of the city belongs on the outside. Conceptually expelled, the malefactor must be expelled in fact, exiled or even eradicated. The kind of intestine danger and threat that Rullus embodied,
was, like that offered by the Christians, perceived as simultaneously being both internal and external.

At the further end of his career from the speeches contra Rullum, Cicero delivered the Philippics. Composed over a number of days during a hectic period, they are nevertheless skillful works, susceptible of an analysis as a coherent whole. The over-all effect is clear: Antony passes from someone who would not scruple to use barbarians in the city to obtain his own ends, to being something less and worse than a barbarian himself.

Armed men sit in the Senate, which, the symbol of all Rome and Romans, is besieged by Itureans, the lowest of all savages. The intended destruction of the Republic is evident. Cicero demands of Antony: "why do you bring Itureans, of all tribes the most barbarous, down into the forum with "their arrows". In the next speech, Antony's behaviour is compared unfavourably with that of the hated Tarquin. "Even the kings had a Senate; and yet no armed barbarians were present in the king's council, as when Antonius holds a Senate". Antony is "leading an army against the Roman people". He marches with his own following of armed barbarians. He squanders public money and dreams of crushing the state. He and Dolabella are: "twins in wickedness, unprecedented, unheard of,
fierce, barbarous.\textsuperscript{114} Dolabella, "the image of Antony's inhumanity," is the enemy "by whose savage cruelty all barbaria has been surpassed". Antony is more cruel than any tyrant in barbaria, as he fences in the city with barbarian arms.\textsuperscript{115} In case the point is missed, Antony is later given the supreme negative accolade, the ultimate insult - unfavourable comparison with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{116}

Cicero uses a modicum of fact to invoke a very accurate, but extensively biased picture of the threat facing Rome. The mental synthesis of his audience, to which he directed his dire warnings, can be briefly characterised. The citizens of Rome - dominus regum, victor atque imperator omnium gentium\textsuperscript{117} - were afflicted with the kind of "siege mentality" that is popularly called today paranoia. They felt that they were living in an oasis of civilization that was threatened by the surrounding savages, and by their bestial mores. The fear of a physical and moral invasion increased after the defeat of Varus' legions in A.D. 9, had caused Augustus to adopt a policy of non-expansion.\textsuperscript{118} The \textit{limites} became rigid barriers, to keep out the barbarian. Paradoxically, as it will be seen in the next chapter, there was a growing feeling at the same time that the traditional barbarian enemies had been rendered ineffectual.
In Seneca's ideology, the body of the empire was the "servant of the mind" — the emperor — and formed an "encircling barrier" around him. This "vast throng", wrote Seneca:

encircling the life of one man, is ruled by his spirit, guided by his reason, and would crush and cripple itself with its own power if it were not upheld by wisdom.

The emperor is the "head" just as Rome is. It is in the peace that submission to one man's rule gains for the empire that the advantage of the system lies. If submission is refused, the empire will disintegrate, and "the end of this city's rule will be one with the end of her obedience".  

While Seneca is very mindful of the barbarian poised threateningly around the limites, it is the moral invasion that he fears most of all. Vice is the enemy, and:

the enemy must be stopped at the very frontier; for if he has passed it, and advanced within the city-gates, he will not respect any bounds set by his captives.

Ira (wrath), the subject of these lucubrations, is the "mental sin" in which all barbarian insanity and mindlessness are contained. The angry are the non sanos above,
or rather below, all the other insane. This sweeping away of reason, this denial of ratio, comes from outside. The moral barrier is breached.

Would to heaven that the examples of such cruelty had been confined to foreigners, and that along with other vices from abroad the barbarity of torture and such venting of anger had not been imported into the practices of Romans.

The security of the imperial rule was a moral as well as a territorial security. A threat to one was automatically a threat to the other. To be tagged as un-Roman would obviously mean to be thought of as a hostis publicus.

The barbarus was a focus of denigration and hate, contempt and fear. The Greek barbaros and the Jewish goy were cognate. For all three of these groups, the imperial rule meant the expulsion of the evil and threatening savage. The question to be asked then, is: what happens when savage evil reappears inside the bounds of the empire?
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE


2. As early as Polybius, I, 2, 7, & I, 5, 4, the Romans were described as rulers of the ἐποικοεύμενη. The emperor Pius is described as one who "provides many benefits for the world that is his", - ἄρκτικα πολλά παρέχει. τὰ Ἰουνία ἐποικοεύμενα - IGRR iii, 739.68. See SWC, p. 443.


4. See note 3 above.

5. Cicero, De Republica I, 58. Laelius, asked by Scipio if Romulus were barbarorum rex, replies: Si, ut Graeci dicunt omnis aut Graios esse aut barbaros, ne barbarorum rex fuerit; sin id nomen moribus dandum est, non linguis, non Graecos minus barbaros quam Romanos puto.


7. Cicero, De Republica I, 28. Scipio asks: cui persuasum sit appellari ceteros homines, esse solos eos, qui essent politi propriis humanibus artibus ...

9. Cf. SWRP, p. 51, who finds in Tacitus "the kernel of what we now call race hatred."


11. Sallust, Oratio ad Caesarem III, 4: Scilicet quod ea, quae externis nationibus, natura nobis hostibus, nosque maioresque nostri saepe tribuere, ea civibus danda arbitror, ...

12. P.A. Brunt, "Reflections on British and Roman Imperialism", Comparative Studies in Society and History VII, 1964-5, 287, states that the "term 'wog' cannot be translated into Greek or Latin." SWRP, p. 76 reads: "Graeculus is the Latin for 'wog'."

13. Cicero, De Finibus V, 1, 2.


15. PSF, vol. II, p. 84. The quotation is preceded by the statement that in mythical and perceptive space: "the distinction between position and content, underlying the construction of "pure" geometric space, has not yet been made and cannot be made."

17. See Plato Politicus 271DE, and Laws IV, 713CD; V, 745DE; V, 747E.


19. Acts 17, 26: ἐποίησεν τε ἐφ᾽ ἐνος πάν ἐθνος ἀνθρώπων κατοίκες ἐπὶ πάντος προσώπων τῆς γῆς, ὡς ἀρχὴ προπετευκόμενος καιροῦ καὶ τῆς ὀρθοδοξίας τῆς κατοίκας αὐτῶι...


23. NH II, 189: ...ritus moiles, sensos liquidos, fecunda totiusque naturae capacis, isdem imperia, quae numquam extimis gentibus fuerint, ... ac pro immanitate naturae urgentis illas solitariae. Cicero, in Contra Rullum II, 95, recalls the "Mann ist was er Isst" school: Non ingenerantur hominibus mores tam a stirpe generis ac seminis quam ex iis rebus, quae ab ipsa natura nobis ad vitae consuetudinem suppediuntur, quibus alimur et vivimus.

25. W.R. Jones, "'The Barbarians' in World Historical Perspective: Myth and Reality", Culture IV, 2, 1977, 101-120. E.g. 117: "Although there were real institutional and cultural differences separating farmers and city-dwellers, on the one hand, from shepherds and nomads, on the other, these differences were moralized to create a largely fictitious image of the "Barbarian" and to condone the Kulturkampf between him and civilization."

26. Cp. SWRP, p. 8. For Strabo, the "great transformation" of the Allobroges from abysmal barbarity was due to the urban centralization of Vienna. "It is the consequence of the Roman conquest, and of the consolidation of agriculture as the primary economic pattern."

27. Plutarch Pompey XXVIII, 4. ... εὐνοῦχου τοῦσ᾽ ἀνδρῶν εἰς γῆν μεταφέρειν ἐκ τῆς δικάσεως καὶ βιῶν χειμῶν ἐπεικούς, συνεβιβάζεται ἐν τάλεσιν οἰκεῖν καὶ γεωργεῖν.


31. E.g. III, 8, 10: when the Romans rout the Volscians, he writes: ibi Volscum nomen prope deletum est.
At IX, 45, 17: nomenque Aequorum prope ad inter-
 necionem delebunt. For the same use of the word
 nomen see Livy XXI, 55, 5; XXXVI, 34, 2; Cicero De Fin.
 I, 4; Sallust Catiline LII, 44; Velleius Paterculus
 I, 6, 3; II, 53, 2; II, 114, 5; Tacitus Historiae IV, 18, 2.

32. Tacitus Annals XV, 44.

33. Hence the stories about Jesus being the illegitimate
 son of a whore and a Roman soldier called Panthera,
apparently common among Jews (see e.g. Contra
 Celsum XXXII, 1) are not merely malicious and nasty
 tales, but expressions of a visceral (i.e. sub-
 conscious) conviction that Jesus "must have been"
a bad customer.

34. Ovid Fasti II, 667f. See W.W. Fowler, The Roman
 Festivals of the period of the Republic, (London:

35. Ovid, Fasti II, 659-660.


39. Frazer, note 38 above, adduces Livy I, 32, 6, where
 the fetial herald addresses a number of deities, in-
 cluding fines. CIL XI, II Fasc. 1, p. 496, inscrs.
 nos. 7731 & 7732 refer to Jupiter, genius loci, and
Fines. The fetial ritual provided a means of justifying invasion by transferring the blame for Roman aggression onto the enemy. The problem of land ownership is very complex. Whatever the Roman theory may have been, the practice was very different. Hyginus said that victory in war permitted the occupation of enemy land: \( \text{... occupatorius ager dicitur eo, quod occupatus est a victore populo.} \) Cicero thought of Roman rule as a patrocinium orbis verius quam imperium. "Gurdianship" could no doubt involve as much sheer authority as imperium; cp. E.M. Sanford, "Romans and Provincials in the Late Republic", Classical Weekly XLII, 1949, 195-201.


41. P. Catalano, "Aspetti spaziali del sistema giuridico-religioso Romano", ANRW II, 16.1, pp. 440-553, ap. 451-2. The sistema is the particular spatio-temporal conjunctions of time, space and populus, with attendant culture, that we call "Rome".

42. English translation in Lewis and Reinhold, pp. 427-8. There is much contention about the absolute dimensions of the grant of citizenship. Whatever the precise truth, the Constitutio recognized, rather than created, a situation.

43. Rutilius Namatanianus I,66.

44. Nurse = NH III,5: \( \text{... Europa altrice victoris omnium gentium populi ... Terrarum caput = NH III,38.} \)


47. For the use of "outlaw" as a pejorative epithet for the barbari see I. Opelt, Die lateinischen Schimpfwörter und verwandte sprachliche Erscheinungen, (Heidelberg: Winter, 1965), pp. 67, 91, 94. In the extant texts inlex seems to have been more common than exlex, though both were used.


52. Schulz, Principles, p. 118.

53. Eliade, Sacred and Profane, p. 42.
54. Catalano, p. 548. Richmond often, so I read, referred to a Roman "policy of assimilation". Perhaps the point is too obvious for comment.


56. Contra Rullum II, 73: Romans should remember the diligence maiorum, ... qui colonias sic idoneis in locis contra suspicionem periculi collocarunt, ut esse non oppida Italiae, sed propugnacula imperii viderentur. For the strategic importance of the colonies, see E.T. Salmon, Roman Colonization under The Republic, (New York: Cornell U.P., 1970), p. 40.

57. Thus Cicero in De Republica II, 11, refers to "the terrible time of the coming of the Gauls" - illa tempestate horribili Gallici adventus.


59. The Gauls come out of the north, of course. For the Chinese the barbarians are "people of the North"; see D. Sinor, "The Barbarians", Diogenes XVIII, 1957, 47-60, 49.

60. Lattimore, pp. 504-5.

61. Though Dauge, pp. 53-378, has had a good try. What cannot be clearly reconstructed is the very early period of the "Barbarologie historique".

62. G. Walser, Rom, das Reich und die fremden Völker in

63. For this see Chapter 6, note 14, below.

64. Philippics II, 21, 51: "While the human race, while the name of the Roman people shall exist - and, if you permit it, it shall be everlasting - that deadly veto of yours will be spoken of".

65. *NH* XVI, 8.

66. Florus II, 14, 8. Florus I, intro., 2: *Ita late per orbem terrarum arma circumtulit, ut qui res illius legunt non unius populi, sed generis humani facta condiscant.*

67. Suetonius Gaius XIII: *Sic imperium adeptus, populum Romanum, vel dicam hominum genus, voti compotem fecit,* ..


69. Varrines II, 5, 57: *... in ultimis terris ... inter barbaros ...*

70. *SWRP* p. 38.


73. For the four virtues, e.g. *De Off.* I, 5, 15f.

74. *De Off.* I, 23, 79.


76. *De Legibus* I, 10, 29.

77. *De Oratore* II, 169: Si barbarorum est in diem vivere, nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare debent.

78. *Pro Milone* XXX: ... et ratio doctis et necessitas barbaris ... praescritpsit.

79. *Pro Scauro* XXXVI.


83. *Imperitus*: Cicero *De Oratore* III, 223; Caesar *BG*
I, 40, 9 e.g.: Quintilian I, 6, 45. **Indoctus:** Seneca _Ad Marciam_ VII, 3.

84. **Libido, libidines:** Verrines III, 76; for this and other references see _Dauge_ p. 457. **Licentia:** _CP, Verrines_ III, 76-7.

85. **Perfidus, perfidia:** Livy XXV, 33, 2; Tacitus _Annals_ XII, 12, 3.

86. Comes under _adrogantia_ and _superbia_. _CP, SWRP_ p. 16. _BG_ I, 44, 1; I, 44, 8-13.

87. **Immanis, immanitas:** Cicero, _Verrines_ IV, 25; _Pro Ponteo_ XXXI. **Crudelis:** BG I, 31, 12. **Inhumanus:** Ovid _Tristia_ III, 9, 2. **Saevus:** Tacitus _Agricola_ XVI, 1.

88. N. Petrochilos, _Roman Attitudes to the Greeks_ (Athen: Kovanis, 1974), p. 53. _CP, Chapter_ 6, note 20 below.

89. In general see Petrochilos, pp. 35-53.


92. SWC p. 149.

93. Livy I.55.6: Quae visa species haud per ambages arcem eam imperii caputque rerum fore portendebat.

94. NH XXVIII,15.


96. De Clementia I.3,5 - I.4,1.


100. Cp. Ep. to Diognetus VI, 5 & 6, where the flesh hates the spirit, but the spirit (psyche) loves the flesh. The ruling mind of the empire seemed to have little love for the "limbs".


103. No doubt some Christians, like some pagans, despised the Empire, women, flesh, the body and all forms of entertainment and enjoyment. Dodds sees an introjected hatred as operating in this period, while in this study it is suggested that the success of Christianity was not due to a turning away from a creation, despised because the body was despised, but a sloughing off of what was felt to be the "putrid" component of creation. It is suggested that this "cleansing" operation could not have been efficaciously effected without the mechanism of projection.


105. Pro Ligario XI. Significantly he continues: aut levium Graecorum aut immannium barbarorum.

106. Polybius VI, 57, 2.

107. Contra Rullum II, 89: Rullus & Co.: ... sandum Capuam sedem novae rei publicae constiutunt, molem contra veterem rem publicam comparant.


109. Rullum II, 98: ... ut omnem rem publicam vestris militibus, vestris urbibus, vestris praesidiis cingentis atque oppressam teneretis; ...

110. Rullum I, 26: Nullum externum periculum est, non
rex non gens ulla, non natio permittescenda est; inclusum malum, intestinum ac domesticum est.

111. **Philippics II, 112:** Cur homines omnium gentium maxime barbaros, Ityraeos, cum sagittis deducis in forum?

112. **Phil. III, 9-11:** Senatum etiam reges habebant; nec tamen ut Antonio senatum habente in consilio regis versabantur barbari armati.

113. **Phil. V,6 & 11.**

114. **Phil. XI, 2:** Ecce tibi geminum in scelere par, invisitatum, inauditum, ferum, barbarum.

115. **Phil. XIII, 18.**

116. **Phil. XIV, 9.**

117. **De Domo, Sua XXXIII, 90.**

118. Cp. Wells, p. 244.

119. **De Clementia I,3,5:** ... sic haec immensa multitudo unius animae circumpdata illius spiritu regitur, illius ratione flectitur pressura se ac fractura viribus suis, nisi consilio sustineretur.

120. **De Clem. I,4,2.**
121. *De Clem.* II,1,3.

122. *De Ira* I,8,2: In primis, inquam, finibus hostis arcendus est; nam cum intravit et portis se intulit, modum a captivis non accipit.

123. *De Ira* III,18,1: Utinam ista saevitia intra peregrina exempla mansisset nec in Romanos mores cum aliis adventiciis vitii etiam suppliciorum irarumque barbaria transisset!

124. On vitia non Romana see Seneca *Epistulae Morales* LXXXIII,25: drunkenness drove Antony in externos mores ac vitia non Romana.
CHAPTER SIX

BEYOND FRONTIERS: "CIVIL WAR" FOR THE EARTHLY ROME

How many people must there be in the world who run away from others in fright because they can't see themselves?

Lazarillo de Tormes

For why should men be afraid of their own species?

Boswell

From one perspective the Christian-pagan conflict was a rupture in an homogeneous cultural and social fabric. As Justin's complaint suggests, the struggle was fratricidal, for the "Romans" are "men of feelings like ours and are our brethren." Tertullian took up the theme, finding the pagans to be "bad brothers", mali frateres. Christians were very careful to undermine any suggestion that they were creatures of a different species. They all felt like Clement of Alexandria, who proclaimed that "the same nature exists in every race." However, the analysis of the terms used by Christians and pagans to describe each other, has led to the conclusion that each side served as a focus of prejudice for the other side. It has not been the intention of this study to prove the fact of prejudice, although the contention that the Christian prejudice against the pagan was pervasive and significant may strike
some as odd, but to determine the meaning of the expressions of that prejudice. It is contended that Christians and pagans saw each other as the most savage of barbarian, the outsider most remote from religious and cultural grace. There is a decidedly locative aspect to this perception. At first sight it makes no sense to claim that people who were dwelling within the bounds of the Empire were perceived as existing outside of those bounds. The expressions of this perception reveal the conclusions of the unconscious as much as the conscious world-view of ancient man. To make the meaning of the equation Christian = barbarian more clear, a further discussion of the psychology of prejudice will be undertaken.

The terms in which prejudice is expressed are a gift, or an imposition, of culture; they have a social significance. Prejudice however, must be related to an individual disposition, aided and seconded by social pressures. For Ehrlich this point seems to be irrelevant, for he avers in an inelegant dictum that:

The study of stereotyping has no direct concern with the perceptual processes presumably underlying the perception of people and things. Although the perceptual apparatus, as a set of neurologic variables, is obviously implicated in the act of perception, I assume that the significant determinants of stereotyping as social psychological events are not to be found within the organism but in its environment.
Allport does essay some analysis of the individual basis of prejudice. He finds that prejudice is unlikely to be a specific attitude towards a specific group; it is more likely to be a reflection of (sc. the prejudiced person's) whole habit of thinking of the world he lives in.

This "whole habit" means, in fact, that:

those who tend to dichotomise in their cognitive operations are the very people who accentuate the distinction between in-group and out-group.

Allport is unfortunately led to make a false distinction of his own between prejudiced and un-prejudiced personalities, when he enthusiastically states that:

perhaps the most momentous discovery of psychological research in the field of prejudice ...(is that) ... the cognitive processes of prejudiced people are in general different from the cognitive processes of tolerant people.

There is no warrant for such a claim. The cognitive processes of each individual involve the dichotomizing of the world. Toleration results from a conscious overcoming of prejudices caused by the necessary splitting of all perceived experience.
All experience is received by the mind as being in a state of opposition rather than wholeness. In such a view, opposition is "treated as the prime form of all experience - the cleavage of the unity into opposites". This analysis - which is that of C.K. Ogden - continues by proposing that "in Knowledge", that is to say as a result of the cognitive process:

we experience immediately and permanently - the inter-play of opposites; as Thought and its Object, Ego and non-Ego - a single fact such as green being divided into two opposite terms, inner-outer .......

This recalls Cassirer's dictum that: "experience as a whole breaks down into two sharply divided areas, an inside and an outside". Allport actually noted that:

every line, fence, or boundary marks off an inside from an outside. Therefore, in strict logic, an ingroup always implies the existence of some corresponding outgroup.

The unity "mankind" is perceived as divided. The insiders claim the noble rubric; the outsiders must be some other material, creatures less than human - outsiders to the genus humanum. What are seen as opposed groups by the in-group, are seen as united halves of a unity from a more accurate perspective. Quoting Ludwig Fischer, Ogden avers
that:

the prime form of relation is "simply an opposition, the members of which are each the condition of the other, and at the same time are resolved into a single datum", ....

The Romans create the barbarian: then they seek to destroy him for displaying the faults they invented for him. It is not meant to suggest that the perceptual strategy of dichotomization falsifies or distorts reality. A wall is obviously simultaneously a single object having two sides. Problems arise when spatial opposition is equated with moral opposition. Those outside topographically are ergo beyond the pale. The Romans (and the Greeks and Jews) in antiquity realized that they were "prejudiced", that is to say that they pre-judged all those not in subjection to the civilizing power of Rome to be inferior and "bad". Unlike the better people today, however, ancient man would have had no qualms about justification of such a view. He would have found it strange to doubt that his prejudice was anything but an accurate reflection of reality. 13

There is an element in the human psyche that leads men to a false perception about the locus of evil. For the inhabitants of the early Roman empire, evil was located in the outside realm of Barbaria, and was a quality of the
barbarians who lived there. Indeed as the concept of "empire" became more concrete, so did the opposite concept of "Barbaria". The conquered barbarian, or the repelled savage, was no longer an object of immediate fear, although smug disdain of the inferior is just the mirror image of anxious disquiet. While Barbaria was ever after useful as a provider of targets for vices, its very remoteness seems to have disqualified it from serving completely as a receiver of hostile and prejudiced perceptions. Many people needed targets closer at hand. In other words, many found like Seneca the younger that the vices of barbaria had breached the moral barrier of the limites, and had reappeared inside the oikoumene. As Neumann notes, mankind is constantly:

confronted with the strange and ... paradoxical problem that the world, nature and the human soul are the scene of a perpetual and inexhaustible rebirth of evil. Just as light cannot be extinguished by the superior power of darkness, so too there is no evidence to show that darkness can ever be abolished by any superior power on the part of light.

So, inexplicably, the barbarian reappears in the oikoumene.

Considered as a spatio-moral construct the empire was constantly splitting up into in-groups and out-groups. As citizenship spread, the privileges formerly accorded
to a once minor "order" were transferred to a new group, the *honestiores*, a minority juxtaposed to a large group of *empire-wide humiliores*, who enjoyed low status even if holding Roman citizenship.\(^{17}\) This was a differentiation that was effective in all parts of the empire, and was reflected in the widening gulf between the affluent and powerful in the cities, and the impoverished and ineffective. If *honestior* despised *humilior*, the latter could find someone to despise in turn. Greek and Jew engaged in a longstanding and passionate hostility.\(^{18}\) This often violent conflict crossed all class barriers. On the other hand, Jewish homogeneity was belied by virulent differentiations. Certain self-appointed "elect" scorned the majority as accursed "people of the earth".\(^{19}\) Elsewhere, despite the constant influence of Greek culture, the *graeculus* was an object of scorn, a focus for frustration and rage.\(^{20}\)

If stoicism taught an internationalism that crossed all ethnic boundaries, it also gave the intelligensia of the empire a way of dividing mankind into the wise few, and the foolish (to be frank, the basically stupid) majority, so that then as now, intellectuals could rationalize their own disdain of the outsider.\(^{21}\)

The Christians were originally one despised group among many, despising in their turn the outside world of
the accursed pagans. As the consciousness of being "Roman", whatever social level one occupied, spread throughout the empire so the opposition of Romania to Barbaria developed. At its most virulent, the Christian-pagan conflict melded with this opposition. Each side fought the barbarian by opposing the other. On the eve of the grant of universal citizenship in A.D. 212, Tertullian stridently denounces what is obviously a pagan trick of juxtaposing "Christian" to "Roman". The whole burden of the Apology is that the Christians are Romans, and loyal, while many claiming the status of Roman have been, and are still, disloyal. Consciously Roman Tertullian is yet most Roman when he is not arguing that particular point. He is most evidently Roman when, for example, he pays high tribute to the emperors for the wealth and tranquility of the empire, from which the barbarians have been excluded. Alas for all Romans, the barbarian was not to be excluded for much longer:

The barbarian problem during the reign of Marcus Aurelius was treated as one of a number of calamities by contemporaries, some of whom used the Christians as scape-goats. As the barbarian attacks on the limites became more insistent, as the actual barbarian follows "his" vices into the area of the empire, the pagan hatred of the Christian
diminishes. The more ludicrous accusations are dropped. With the rediscovery of the real barbarian, the surrogate is not needed. For this, and no doubt a number of related reasons, popular persecution declines, while official persecution develops in the face of the Christian claim to mediate between the divine and the empire. On the other hand, the Christian identification of the pagan and the barbarian does not decline, but if anything amplifies, as barbarian and pagan meld in the stereotype "heathen". Significantly, the word "Greek" becomes increasingly used a synonym for "non-Christian". The term Roman, which should also have been treated as an antonym of Christian if the sect felt itself to be in opposition to the empire, never suffered the same fate. It could not, because the Christians were "fighting" for the fact that the true Roman was the Christian, and the fate of Rome was, through divine decree, a Christian fate.

All oppositions that provide the prejudiced with targets for projection, were subsumed under the Christian-pagan antagonism. If there is any "reason" for this, it is surely the oft remarked ubiquity of the Christian. The traditional spatio-moral arrangements of the world were static, the "bad" elements had fixed locations. Cyclops, Scythians, Tauric savages, all had a particular place.
One could orient oneself through a knowledge of the location of the wicked and inferior. The Gauls were in a fixed area, the Germans in another, no less fixed location. To go in one direction brought one to the pillars of Hercules, in the opposite direction to Serica. Mythic and real places co-existed in a world concept that was secure and certain, although always offering the possibility of menace. Just as the barbarian, after the expulsion from the oikoumene, lived indifferently around the empire, so the Christian might appear at any point on the inside. For the Christians - the "new men" who were the "new barbarians" for the pagans - the heathen existed wherever the faithful went. The outsider might be found at any point on the inside.

There was only one context, apart from sheer invasion, in which ancient man saw his erstwhile fellows as dangerous and evil outsiders; that was in time of civil war. The war in this case was for the city of Rome - the city become empire. Both the spread and the persecution of Christianity were overwhelmingly urban phenomena. To comprehend the events involved, both pagan and Christian had to relate matters, unconsciously and consciously, to the context of urban events. To help to discern the divide between conscious and unconscious perceptions, the language of the conflict will be considered first.
Civil war in the ancient world meant civic strife, stasis. Even those conflicts that rent the Mediterranean world, firstly those between Caesar and the party of Pompey, and then those between Mark Antony and Augustus, were in essence civic factionalism that overflowed the bounds of the city of Rome. The claim that Roman power had made one city of the world was not metaphorical. Rome was a city become universal. The triumph of Rome was not the triumph of a specific location, however. By the time that it makes sense to talk of a Roman empire, the Romans "were neither a nationality nor a race, but the members of a formally defined group", writes Finley. Finley talks of the "Romans" as an international order, and indeed if the term "Roman" has any meaning it can only refer to a member of the united, international dominant caste of the oikoumene.

Most Romans were urbanites. Functional microcosms of Rome itself, the parasite cities and towns were to the empire as cells "to the tissue in a living body". Without doubt "the heart and brain of the empire lodged in its cities". Beyond the city, the world was mute and long-suffering: "the whole civilization was centred on the cities. The peasant by whose work the cities lived has left little trace in history". We know from a contemporary witness - the venerable Galen - that in times of shortage the towns
appropriated food while the peasant cultivators starved. The relationship between host and parasite town was truly symbiotic: the rude peasant could go to town to hear the golden-mouthed orator, while together they could indulge themselves as spectators at the homicidal "sports". The myths that worked modestly into the rhythms of sowing and reaping eventually produced grand deities with town-house temples. The towns organized the world, producing the imperial administrators and their high culture, and serving as the bonds of multiple unities: commercial, financial, linguistic, cultural, political; as well as unities of religion and myth. The Mediterranean world of the early empire was a "well mixed bowl of myths", declared Plutarch. It was a world "pululating with strange religions"; but some of the strangest were universal.

It was into this superstructure of an urban civilization that the Christians intruded and gained first a foothold, then dominance, and finally unique supremacy. Ever an urban product, Christianity came to the countryside as the creed of the administration, as the imposition of a central authority. What the tyrant city ordained, the recalcitrant countryside often refused. Right into the twentieth century Christianity has been observed purely from pragmatism in some parts of Europe, while any real
religious emotion was reserved for more ancient targets of veneration.\textsuperscript{36} There were, and are, many "Christianities": the type considered here was not so much a direct creation of the Essenes, of the Aramaic language, nor of the tensions within Judaism. It was a product of the religious feeling, philosophical inclinations, and social dignity of the ancient Mediterranean city. It was not an alien invader, that adapted Graeco-Roman culture to its own exigencies: it was a result of that culture.\textsuperscript{37} Those who persecuted Christianity were the more virulent in their actions because they discerned that among other things the new religion, because it developed as one possible answer to common problems, seemed to mock the pagan existential anxiety. Those who embraced Christianity on the other hand, found a balm for the same anxieties. They did not doubt that their "solution" was a creed that fulfilled the promise of Graeco-Roman civilization. The new men were inhabitants of a new Rome, and so claimed to define Romanità. The pagans fought tenaciously for their right to define and constitute Rome. One tactic in this kind of civil war was always the tactic of conceptual exclusion, preceeding and excusing actual exclusion - i.e. exile - or worse, the fratricide that was the consequence of civic strife. It was this conceptual exclusion that the language of the Christian-pagan polemic achieved.
If Cicero's strategy in the *Philippics* is recalled, it will be remembered that he used the all-encompassing stereotype of the *barbarus* as a means of effecting a moral distance between "Rome" and the party of Antony. A number of negative qualities are imputed to the opposition, all of which indicate "barbarian", the sub-human outsider to the civilization of the city. Once this separation has been effected and made feasible, the party of Antony is seen as outside, it is conceptually excluded. All that remains is for action to imitate concept. Antony can avoid exile or death in war by submission to true authority. When he submits the "cursed" outsider is then "blessed". It is possible to treat the Cicero of the *Philippics* as a mere manipulative opportunist, playing the oratorical power game. There is a psychological aspect to the type of conceptual exclusion involved in such situations, where, in Roman terms, erstwhile insiders are made *sacer*, removed from the body of true men, the real community. We are in the realm of the curse, and it is the psychology of "cursing" that illuminates what Cicero, and others, were doing in such situations.

"Cursing" became institutionalised by the Church as excommunication. There were Greek, Jewish, and Roman equivalents. Many scholars derive anathema directly from the practice of cursing, the most acute noting the
mental outlook which automatically equates "wickedness and accursedness". The same mental impulses and propensities incline men to exile others, to excommunicate others and to curse them. Crawley notes that the "habit" of cursing:

transcends all distinctions of race, and is in fact a permanent outcome of the working together of language and thought; for by this double mechanism are expressed wish and will, desire and determination, in that form which is, as it were, midway between psychosis and action.

This recalls the opinion of Sapir that:

language is primarily a pre-rational function. It humbly works up to the thought that is latent in ... its classifications and its forms; it is not, as is generally but naively assumed, the final label put upon the finished thought.

The accusations of incest, infanticide and cannibalism spring from such a use of language, which in cases like this has a "gestural meaning" and acts as a pointing stick, void of integral meaning. When dealing with the psychology of cursing it is necessary to remember that "words themselves do not convey meaning, that they are but a gesture we make, a dumb-show like any other." To put it plainly: the ejaculation "go to hell!", in which curse and urge to conceptual and actual exclusion are all
equivalent, does not express the result of deliberation but, properly interpreted, yields an insight into the unconscious or pre-rational volition of the ejaculator. The victim so cursed is wished "down" to hell, is put in his "proper" i.e. inferior position vis a vis the curser. The act of cursing, then, is psychologically complex. The imputation of sub-human vice to a group is in fact the cursing of that group. Cursing is conceptual exile, and the victims of cursing provide inter alia targets for projection, and scapegoats in times of trouble.

That "setting aside" involved in making something anathema received conscious and authoritative expression in Romano-Italic, Greek, and Jewish forms. The urge to curse becomes institutionalized and serves as the means by which authority (theoretically) expresses the social will. So for the anthropologist: "cursing and blessing are attributes of authority". Harrison, discussing the connection between curse and law, is of the opinion that in "primitive" societies: "there was no commandment without cursing". Prayer (εὐκλή) developed into ordinance (Θεσπόσ), and then into:

regular law (νόμος); hence the language of early legal formularies still maintains as necessary and integral the sanction of the curse. The formula is not 'do this' or 'do not do that', but 'cursed be he who does not
do that'. 47

The accursed was excluded from humanity. Festus combines the popular with the legal elements when he records that by the tribunician law:

'If anyone shall kill him who has been made sacer by a decree of the people, he shall not be a murderer'. Hence any bad or worthless 48 man is commonly called sacer.

If this seems improbably harsh, it should be remembered that pre-exilic herem involved the destruction of the accursed, and even though among post-exilic Jewish communities in general, herem was a disciplinary measure that stopped short of punitive homicide, excommunication meant death among the Essene sect. 49

In the first instance, then, those who are cursed are victims of a general social rejection. They may be chased away, or, in the absence of any aliens to serve the purpose, the accursed will be used as scapegoats or foci for projection. Pagans viewed the Christians as a group accursed: they insisted upon submission; or, if refused, they "reserved the right" to extirpate those held by the people to be sacer. Roman authority had the same attitude: if Christians did not become subjecti at the order of the magistrate, they could legitimately be executed.
The social ritual of cursing, in the sense of the word as it is used here, is not very well understood. It is occasionally regretted by modern commentators that the invective of cursing is in a state of atrophy. While accusations of incest have been reduced to the status of mild obscenity, more subtle indicators of an exclusion from decent humanity are available. For certain people the word "fascist" contains all the opprobrium that accusations of incest, infanticide and cannibalism held for the ancient polemicist. On the other hand the word "liberal" is not always used as a complimentary label. For cursing involves projection, and the implication of the terminology of the curse is that of the use of any criticism: by studying what one imputes to or "wishes" on another, what one most detests, and reviles in someone else, one can learn much about one's own personality and fears and much about the mores of one's own group.

This self-revelatory aspect of accusation was well-known to the ancients. It is part of the meaning of Plato's line: "and if the soul is to know itself it must look into a soul". Seferis drew out the meaning by adding: "the stranger and enemy, we've seen him in the mirror". Yet both Christian and pagan took the image in the glass to be the figure of their opponent; they were human, and
fallible. At the same time the conflict in every individual psyche, projected onto social stresses, was real: its externalized form shows that pagan and Christian alike felt the need for reformation. The call to "rebirth", the offer of a ritual through which the old sinful self could be discarded, resounded powerfully throughout the Mediterranean. Perhaps it is true that what told in favour of the Christians in the end was that, after the ritual of renascence they joined a "society" that, whatever the individual failings of the members, was united at the lowest and most unofficial level (and also, of course, officially) in visible charity and self-help that could quite easily claim to rest on a faith steeled with the commandment of universal love. Peregrinus exploited the charity of the sect. If all pagans did likewise, there would be no pagans left.

The accursed is an insider made an outsider. The Christians knew that they were treated thus, and looked forward to the perfect time when "the outside should be as the inside". The inside was to be the sect, and the Christians set their own terms of entry. The regulative discipline embodied in the ritual of excommunication arose from the practice of cursing. Paul, for example, tells the Corinthians that, "if anyone does not love the Lord,
a curse on him. 'Maranatha'. 54 Expelled from the sect, the sinner's flesh was handed "over to Satan", but Paul hoped that his soul might be saved. 55 From the outset the practice that developed into excommunication was "corrective" rather than purely "punitive", to use Hyland's terms. "It is apparent", says this scholar, "that even in the lifetime of the Apostles there was gradually developing a formal and recognized mode of proceeding in ecclesiastical disciplinary matters". 56 The urge to "curse" or "damn" is modified. By correct adherence to ritual, which indicates the desirable internal state, the outsider will be readmitted to the in-group, he will see the curse lifted. This was also the situation of pagans and Christians vis a vis each other. The exclusion is rigid and clear, but not necessarily eternal. In theory brutal and unameliorated, in practice it did not control the lives of either group. It lay under the surface, and was deadly despite appearances. In times of stress the lines of exclusion hardened. To be on the wrong side meant death.

Prejudice is a basically unconscious reaction to people. Although pagans and Christians consciously felt the other group to be inferior, the projection of vices was an unconscious process, and it was this that maintained the conflict. The precise line between the roles of the conscious and unconscious in the conflict cannot be drawn,
but in conclusion some observations on the question can be made. Pagan prejudice against the Christians was multi-faceted. The historical aspect was complex, yet can be described simply. When the barbarian was excluded from the bounds of the empire, a focus for projection was lost. As the faults of the barbarian are, in reality, the faults of every human being, the vices of the savage seemed to constantly "reappear". This feeling of invasion was most satisfactorily explained by blaming the Christians, and "creating" from them a "new savage". As the external barbarian became an increasingly real factor in the affairs of the empire, popular hatred of the Christians eased off, and was redirected to the pristine barbarian. There were other factors. Throughout the second and early third century the Christian sect increased in size. A knowledge of the sect made tedious nonsense of the popular accusations.

The social aspect of pagan prejudice concerns the accusations. Rather than being the warped conclusions of biased observation, they were rationalizations of a hatred "forced on" the pagans by the historical disappearance of the barbarian. As some of the contemporary Christians realized, the accusations were projections. They reveal guilt, anxiety, shame, and self-loathing. They suggest a society riven spiritually, that would turn on
itself had it not the Christians to turn against. In the end it in fact did turn on itself, and prefer Christianity. This latter creed did not come from elsewhere to redeem the ancient world. It was produced in the crucible of that world's moral and psychic agony. The triumph of Christianity on the common social level did not represent a rejection of social life, but a selection of the better elements of common mores and aspirations. The social "good me" was retained and the "bad me" rejected. Yet this transformation could not have been effected if there had been no targets to receive the rejected and projected "bad me". The Christians were initially the victims of the occasionally violent resolution of this social schizophrenia. Remorselessly recompensed later, they saw a militant Church carry on the burden of the formerly pagan Rome's civilizing mission. The subiecti, who accepted baptism, were spared, while the superbi who refused it were warred upon to the death.

The spiritual "civil war" that split the ancient Mediterranean was the event in which unconscious and conscious perceptions met. This conflict occupied the whole of the second century, and almost half of the third. The instinctive mutual exclusion revealed in the accusations in the "curses" employed, was also a very conscious exclusion. From the little that survives of the pagan
writings about Christianity, it is as possible as it is difficult to derive numerous interpretations. There is some awareness of the fight for the right to define the common heritage however. The civil war was fought in the consciousness as well as the unconsciousness of the participants. Galen took the Christians to task for their credulity. This was, of course, a salient barbarian vice. A fragment of Galen reads:

if I had in mind people who taught their pupils in the same way as the followers of Moses and Christ teach theirs - for they order them to accept everything on faith - I should not have given you a definition.

Walzer, to whom we owe these and other fragmentary remains of Galen, expounded a theory taken up by E.R. Dodds. He expresses an authoritative conclusion about the basis of educated pagan aversion to Christianity, when he writes that:

had any cultivated pagan of the second century been asked to put in a few words the difference between his own view of life and the Christian one, he might reply that it was the difference between logismos and pistis, between reasoned conviction and blind faith.

Logismos was the Roman ratio and pistis was the Roman fides. Now while it is true that pistis seems to
have occupied a low level of validity in Greek thought, it cannot as a derogatory category translate fides. What Dodds means is credulitas, or false fides, faith placed in an unreasonable conclusion. Credulitas was an egregious barbarian failing. A favourite story of Roman gentlemen concerned Sertorius' mode of duping his Spanish troops. He claimed that the gods graced him with information through the medium of a beautiful white deer, a gift from a Lusitanian. The barbarians, "not amenable to reason", were duped. "The credulitas of the barbarians was very helpful to Sertorius in important matters". That kind of innocent trust, which to the Romans was an abject stupidity of the sort they liked to think never afflicted themselves, was intended by those who condemned pīstis.

There could arise occasions when decisions would have to be made from an insufficiency of information. It was then that "authority" became of paramount importance. As "what is certain cannot be proved by what is uncertain", conclusions from uncertainty rely on "trust", fides in the authority informing one. "To all these forms of argument", says Quintilian, "the Greeks gave the name of pīstis, a term which, although we can properly say is interpreted by fides is best translated by probatio (proof)".
authority. *Penes auctores fides erit*, claimed Sallust, but left no footnotes. Seneca was to jape at this statement of the historian. "I may do as historians do", he wrote, for after:

they have lied to their own satisfaction about a lot of things, they are unwilling to guarantee some one point and toss out: "The verification will be found among my sources".

"Verification" is perhaps a weak translation for a word (*fides*) that also denoted that "integrity" that Romans regarded as "sacred whether public or private". Many decisions had to be made on the word of an authority. If the authority were spurious then *fides* became *credulitas*. It must be made quite clear that the crux of Galen's criticism was not the *pistis* of the Christians, but the faith or trust in false authority. For writers like Strabo and Pliny the elder, authority for things they could not check for themselves rested on a trustworthy eye-witness, in Greek literally a *martyr*. The *martyr* guaranteed the veracity of the statement. For the Church of course, the martyr was the guarantee of its authority, a witness to the validity of faith and trust in Christ. The martyrs showed, they were a *probatio* that, *fides* in the institution was not *credulitas*. 
The martyr was a "sign" that it was worthwhile investing fides in the "patron" represented by the institution of the Church. This concatenation of sign-authority-faith-reward, leads to the nexus of ancient political, social, economic and religious life. This nexus was the relationship between patron and client. Fustel de Coulanges was perhaps the first to see that "relationships of mutual obligation" formed the crucial aspect of the "structure of late republican society". The study of patronage (or clientage) - the relation between patronus and his clientes - was placed on a firm basis by Gelzer.

After Syme's analysis of the Roman Revolution offered the view that all Roman politics could be reduced to a cynical use of personal ties, Badian traced the way in which foreign clientelae became "used in the factional struggle in Rome". Badian's work is therefore a study of the way that local factionalism increasingly became subsumed under the rubric of Mediterranean factionalism, to the end that two dominant parties emerged, both with Roman leaders, bases, and names. Bowersock has realized E.W. Gray's desire to see "an examination of the relations between members of the local aristocracies in the Greek cities and the Roman governing class", in a work demonstrating "how the Greeks adapted themselves so easily to the clientela system".

What patronage basically involved was the trust
of a subordinate in the power of his patron to benefit him. In return for these potential benefits, the patron trusted in the support of his clientes in any enterprise. Trust - fides - was the bonding virtue of the whole system, which was unofficial, but dominated society. Originally the aristocratic virtue of keeping one's word, and proverbially the first Roman quality to be deified, fides came to be understood as the reciprocal "social and moral duty" that guaranteed the efficacy of a clientage bond. To demonstrate his value to clients, that is his justification for demanding fides, through which he gained in dignitas and auctoritas, the patron needed to give signs of the potency of his authority. In the secular sphere, armies, largesse and past feats served as some of the more obvious signs of authority, as "witnesses" to claims for auctoritas. Fides or piste demanded some proof in any area. "The Hebrews want signs, the Greeks philosophy", Paul had complained. The shrewd Augustus knew the value of self-advertising in any ethnos. In his Res Gestae, which he ordered to be displayed throughout the empire, he proclaimed:

> avec l'élegance du riche ... en une fresque d'épopée, les actions accomplies, dont la grandeur est d'autant plus impressionante qu'il a agi en particulier.

As the Roman patronage system corresponded fairly
closely to the general social realities of the ancient world, Roman clientage provided the vehicle for the concretization of Mediterranean factionalism. Cities in the empire sought patrons, whom they often honoured with the title soter, saviour. Roman power only dealt with the urban dignitaries, but around these, local polarizations extended to the lowest of political and social levels. As the world was sundered in the terrible "civil wars" of Rome, and huge chains of patronage were ranged in contest for ultimate auctoritas, it was necessary to take sides. The less than perfect in faith would have had a hard time of it, searching for signs to guide a choice that was not always conditioned by historical or geographical factors. If one very luckily backed the winner, one's "faith" was rewarded. If one backed the loser, one's credulity had brought one to ruin. It is not surprising that the capricious goddess Fortuna reigned for many decades.

The fides of patron and client is the same emotion and trust as "faith in the existence of the gods", and: "Socrates ἡτεύων θεός is not very different from Abraham, who ἐπιστεύω τὸ θεό, for Abraham's faith, too, was shown in accepting God's promise as true". 73

Fides and pistis have their own histories. Here it is apposite to offer the reminder that, for his con-
temporaries, Jesus' sayings and miracles were his own res gestae backing his own claims to authority. For his authority rested, so he asserted, on the fact that it was by means of him that God's will was achieved on earth. The extolling of pure faith is, of course, a central theme of the gospels. In what is perhaps the best known case, a woman who had haemorrhaged for twelve miserable years timourously touched the hem of Jesus' robe, certain of the healing efficacy of the action. Immediately cured, and fearfully admitting her identity, she was sent in peace, while Jesus assured that "it is your faith has cured you". All the miracles demonstrated the value of faith, and the validity of Jesus' claim to power and authority. Jesus quickly and logically dismissed accusations that his power came from demons. He expelled demons, he noted, and did his accusers think that demons would give someone the power to work against demons?  

"Without mutual confidence the covenant cannot exist". This characterization of the Jewish belief could just as readily describe the essence of the patronage system. The socio-political covenant implied the religious one, for to take a patron was to take his gods. When Christianity triumphed, the relationship was reversed. One took a patron if he revered the one true God. There is
an inter-play of religious and politico-social perceptions, and indeed the early label "Christianoi" suggests that the sect was seen as a kind of political faction. The accusation of *factio* may not have been in any way disingenuous. This is not to imply that ancient man did not recognise a distinction between religion and politics. He would however, have different views from men today about the separation and definition of religious and political areas of experience. The *factio* of Christianity—the "mob" of "Christ's men"—was obviously a potential fomentor of civic strife: Paul, it will be recalled was accused of stirring up *stasis*. Yet it was not quite as a standing political *factio* that the Christianoi were distrusted. The label indicates a partially unconscious perception. Made fully conscious, the perception of the Christians indicated not opponents of Rome, but claimants, usurpers. The pagans knew they were fighting for the right to define Roman civilization, as surely as the clients of Pompey before them. And just as Caesar had been reconciled with all but the most stubborn of his opponents, so the two sides in the "spiritual civil war" were reconciled under one banner, and faced united the renewed threat of evil barbarism.

On the other side, the Christians would not have recognised any prejudice against a world that they felt
to be axiomatically evil. Yet it must be remembered that although the pagans were evil, the world was good. 78

It was this world that the Christians were fighting for. If Christianity had one feature that may have won it a critical number of adherents, it was the, if modern jargon be forgiven, "life-affirming" nature of the creed. Such a statement will seem odd to many, for whom the reverse has always been the case. The prevalent opinion is that the triumph of Christianity was a reaction to the misery of the world, especially in the troubled third century. With the possibility of earthly glory and happiness eradicated in an age of faming, invasion and multiple disaster, people looked to the after-life for compensation. And it was the Christian church that specialised in promises of heavenly bliss. Dodds comments, for the second and third centuries:

Joseph Bidez described our period as one in which "Men were ceasing to observe the external world and to try to understand it, utilize it or improve it. They were driven in upon themselves. ..." How did this change come about? Was Freud right in connecting it with "the low estimation put upon earthly life by Christian doctrine"? 79

Dodds approves of Freud's hypothesis, and such a view seems to have received little adverse criticism until recently. D.S. Wallace-Hadrill has very ably demonstrated
that the Greek fathers of the early Church in fact despised neither the human body, nor created nature in general. On the other hand, Tertullian in the Latin west sings the beauty of the body, and the perfection of nature, marred by sinful man, but a wonderful gift in itself. While some minorities of Christians and gnostics may have felt revulsion at the body, it was in fact the pagan world that denigrated the flesh. The self-hatred involved in the brutal and sadistic demeaning of human nature was not introjected but projected. While many Christians may have projected their own tendencies towards sadism onto the pagans en masse and thus achieved a precarious catharsis, it was inside the familia of the sect that an ever increasing number of people found it possible to hold to a belief in the intrinsic dignity of creation. Few ordinary people in the early empire needed any philosopher to instruct them in the possibilities of human degradation. What they needed and craved was what they found in the Church: an authority that insisted that the flesh could be worthy, that any dirt could be cleansed, and that degradation was not an unameliorable condition. To reject the world would have been to reject the self. By membership of the "body of Christ" people found a way to accept themselves and the world. Although Christianity has, like any great religion, its own history of prejudice, it was the means by which the great psychic split in the
ancient Mediterranean society was healed.

Man's constant fear of himself is projected onto others of his own species. Until he recognizes the ogre in his own imagination, he will fear the ogre. The prejudice of Christian and pagan against each other has a particular historical context. The stresses of a particular society produced a civil war in which the main tactic - conceptual exclusion - "was achieved by projection and "cursing": that is to say, by prejudice. The main lesson of the analysis of this prejudice is that Christians strove for an earthly dominance, and that Christianity won its adherents because it increasingly seemed most likely to be most worthy of fides. The slow movement in which the society of the ancient Mediterranean split into two parties had its beginning in the invisible depths of the general unconscious. As the feeling of civil war worked upwards socially so it was given more and more conscious expression. A complete awareness of the situation led to the abandoning of the "curse" contained in the more ludicrous of pagan accusations, and an increase in official and "rational" persecution. By the time that Decius acted the Church may have contained a majority not only of the lower stratum of society but also of the powerful equestrian class.83
Although he did not anticipate Anselm and boast *credo quia absurdum*, Tertullian did revel in the irrational aspect of the Christian message. He believed it, because it is "impossible." 84 The irrational played a large part in the Christian-pagan conflict. "Historians", says Marc Bloch, "are instinctively disposed to reconstruct the past in terms of the rational. But the irrational is an important element in all history." 85 The irrational element in the pagan and Christian prejudice was important, if not crucial in the conflict. Yet in an area where much will be eternally unknown to the historian, the basis of the irreconcilable struggle between Christian and pagan is made clear. The opposition was not a matter of deep or subtle dogmatic differences, of ethical distinctions or of ethnic barriers. At its very basic and most dynamic it was a matter of the baldly ineluctable: but ineluctable for no discernible rational reason. This is seen in one of the most moving documents that any student of history will come across: the "passion" of the martyr Perpetua.

Exhorted by an angry and baffled parent to explain her irrational obstinacy in adhering to her creed even in the face of death, Perpetua gives a clear explanation:

"Father", I said, "do you see this vase here?"
"Yes I do", said he.
And I told him: "Could it be called by any other name than what it is?"
And he said: "No".
"Well, so too I cannot be called anything other than what I am, a Christian."

This stark decision is the bedrock on which the history of the empire in the first three centuries A.D. was founded. As sheer and final as the dictum of Jesus: "All those who are not with me are against me", it is the cause of history, it is not caused by, or even "in" history. Such decisions drive up from the undifferentiated unconscious of the anonymous mass, to find ultimate conscious expression in the institutions of the "elite". By the time that such decisions come into particular consciousness they have been ineluctably made.

Perpetua, like all martyrs, was unusual, but her "achievement" represented the aspirations of the whole Christian community. People in the early empire craved love and security: the self-respect to be able to give and receive love, and the secure environment for the flourishing of their emotional lives. It was to the credit of the Church as an institution that it was able to indeed offer both. At what cost, both at the time and later, it is not the purpose of this study to investigate.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Justin *Apology* II, 1: ... ὃροιστασθῶν ἀντὶς καὶ ἱδέλητων ....

2. Tertullian *Apology* XXXIX, 9.

3. Cf. Acts 14, 15: καὶ ἡμῖς ὁροστασθεὶς ἐβρεῖν ἤμιν ἄνθρωποι ...


5. Allport, p. 170.

6. Allport, p. 376.


11. Allport, p. 140.

13. It was, as Chadwick notes - Contra Celsum p. 106 - an ancient "commonplace that opposites imply one another". Therefore homo implied "anti-man" or barbarus. It was also a commonplace that the opposites should be in constant struggle, that unity should be made of "rival natures", as Tertullian Apology XLVIII,11 noted. Athenagoras can locate the Christian-pagan struggle in the necessary opposition of good and evil. Legatio XXXVI.

14. For the "reification" of the term imperium, see P-W IX, col. 1211: Imperium. "Und leicht wurde nun aus dem abstrakten Sinn der konkrete, aus der Herrschaftsgewalt der Herrschaftsbereich. ... So wird imperium zu einem Ding (Tac. hist. I,16: inmensum imperii corpus) und das imperium Romanum zu einem Raumbegriff, dem 'Romischen Reich' ....".


17. This is the subject of the study by P. Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970).

18. SWRP, pp. 86f.

20. N. Petrochilos, Roman Attitudes to the Greeks, (Athens: Kovanis, 1974), pp. 48-53. Noting that diminutives referring to persons usually denote contempt, the author goes on to say that Graeculus appears "to be the only diminutive in common use formed from an ethnic name". (P. 48)

21. The point that Stoic "universalism" did not obviate, but rather exalted, the elevation of the "wise" minority over the stupid majority, is well brought out by H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought, (Cambridge: University Press, 1965), esp. p. 157.

22. SWC, pp. 425f.

23. The whole intention of the Apology, especially from XXX onwards, is of course, to argue against the validity of the pagan juxtaposition of "Christian" to "Roman". The point is that Christians are good Romans, i.e. most profitably loyal of citizens. Tertullian was not alone in this belief, of course.

24. De Pallio II, ... barbari exclusi.

25. One thinks particularly of the possibility that the numbers of Christians might just have been too large for the sect to bear any stereotypes of malicious cabal, while the members themselves would have included people, applied to whom even the mildest calumny would have been incredible.

26. For some interesting remarks see J. Gage, Le Paganisme Impérial à la Recherche d'une Théologie, (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1972). The general picture is that of a succession of emperors searching for
a deity upon which to found a theocracy, through which in turn a stronger unity of the Empire could be effected. It is interesting that at the same time, a renascent Persia was uniting under Zoroastrianism.


28. It must be stressed that for the Christians, being typical products of their environment, it would have been a natural and unreflective supposition that the empire should prosper and develop under divine aid. The Christians merely, from one angle, had more strict ideas about the source of that aid. The words of Paschoud (Roma Aeterna, p. 224), on Prudentius, are equally relevant to people like Tertullian, and even Paul: "... Romain et chrétien, il ne pouvait admettre que ses convictions patriotiques et religieuses fussent contradictoires."


34. De Defectu orac. 421A.

35. The phrase is that of C.H. Dodd, I feel quite sure, although the locus now eludes me. I should be quite happy to be credited with it.

36. As Braudel points out, in many ways, "antiquity lives on" in the modern Mediterranean. He mentions inter alia Carlo Levi's Christ stopped at Eboli, a novel in which the pagan peasant and his vast distance from the ruling classes of the city is well portrayed. Like the peasants of Silone's Bread and Wine, the peasants in Levi's novel obey an official religion, while their lives are wrapped around by timeless pagan practices. Cf. F. Braudel, The Mediterranean, (trans. S. Reynolds), (London: Collins, 1973), p. 1239f. Levi and Silone write of the peasant in Italy between the world wars. If the situation has changed, I am unable to say.


38. Caesar in the de Bello Civile effects a systematic "cursing" of the Pompeian party by applying to them the major negative qualities that in fact, although Caesar does not quite spell this out, identify them as "distanced" pseudo-barbarians. For the analysis of the work, highlighting the major categories of abuse that Caesar "proved" to be the Faults of his enemies, see J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumptions in Caesar's Writings, (Diss. Frankfurt A.M., 1952), pp. 62-75.


41. Crawley, ERE vol. IV, p. 367.


43. A term taken from M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, (trans. C. Smith), (NY: Humanities Press, 1962). To the quote from Sapir, one might compare Merleau-Ponty on p. 181: "In the first place speech is not the sign of thought".

44. This is a phrase from D.H. Lawrence's Women in Love.


47. Harrison, p. 142. Cp. the injunction at Deut. 27,26:
"Cursed be he that confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them." (King James)


49. Excommunication among the Essenes: Josephus BJ II,8,8. For the difference between pre- and post-exilic herem see JE II, 487-9.

50. Referring to the fact that a formerly taboo set of "obscene" words has now lost its sting, F. Pollak writes: "The dirty words ... are all washed up, ... a new set of taboo expressions will evolve." See "Pornography: Around the Halfworld", in D.A. Hughes ed., Perspectives on Pornography, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1970), pp. 170-196, p. 179.

51. Alcibiades 133B: κεὶ ψυχή εἰ πέλεις γνώσεσθαι ζωῆς ἐν ψυχῇ κτῆσιμον Σέφερης, Mythistorema 4: τὸν ἔνοικο καὶ τὸν ἐξήθμον τὸν ἐδώκε στοὺς κοπρείφθη.

52. Certainly in the writings of the hermeticists, C.H. I,28, calls the "earth-born" (cp. Jewish people of the earth) to repent. Poimandres teaches that "no one can be saved before rebirth". See Dodd, Fourth Gospel, p. 44.

53. Many works discuss the social reasons for the success of Christianity. The relevant points are nicely summarized by Dodds in PC pp. 135-8.

55. I Corinthians 5, 5.


57. A very good exposition, and brief, of the spiritual illnesses of the early imperial period, can be found in S. Angus, The Environment of Early Christianity, (London: Duckworth, 1914).

58. Phraseology adopted from Manganyi; p. 74.


60. Dodds, PC, p. 120.

61. Plato Timaeus 29C: pistis stands to knowledge (episteme) as becoming (γένεσις) to being (δύναμις). Pistis plays a minor role in Aristotle Rhetoric II, 17, where belief in the gods means an intellectual conviction that they exist. In developed Peripatetic and Stoic thought, pistis is a virtue subordinate to piety and justice, (cp. Walzer p. 49), and thus it appears in Seneca, De Beneficiis II, 31. Of Galen’s contemporaries, Lucian (Peregrinus 13), Marcus Aurelius (XI, 3, 2), and Celsus (Contra Celsum I, 9 and VI, 11), are all disgusted at Christian credulity. At the same time Clement of Alexandria "continually complains in the second book of his Stromateis that pistis is unacceptable to the Greeks." (J. Rist, Plotinus, the Road to Reality, (Cambridge: U.P., 1967), p. 213. See also RAC sv "Glaube" esp. col. 52.

62. Aulus Gellius XV, 22. "Not amenable" = Frontinus Strategems I, 11, 13. The story is also told by
Val. Max. I, 24, and used in Plutarch Sertorius XI.

63. Quintilian V, 10, 8.

64. Jugurtha XVII.

65. Natural Questions IVB, 3, 1.

66. Aulus Gellius XX, 1, 39-40. Auctores in Pliny, e.g. NH XXVIII, 2: fides tantum auctores appellet.


68. As note 67 above.


72. M. Crawford, The Roman Republic, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1978), describes the process well. On p. 76, e.g., he notes that "personal relationships of amicitia and clientela were indeed one of the chief ways in which Roman rule was mediated to the provinces." See also Bowersock, Chapter 1.

74. Mark 5, 34. Cp Mt. 9, 22 and Lk. 8, 48.

75. Mt. 12, 20f. esp. 26-7.

76. Barr, p. 182. In Philo pistis means "trust in God's help" - see Faith in Bible Keywords from G. Kittel's Theologisches Wörterbuch, by R. Bultmann and A. Weiser, (trans. D.M. Barton), (London: A. & C. Black, 1961), p. 52. Badian, p. 52 notes that for all types of clientage "the German word "Treuverhältnisse" describes the whole category better than any English expression known to me".


78. If it is recalled that the bitter Tatian was able to remark that the "construction" of the world was excellent, but the conduct of its denizens left something to be desired.

79. Dodds, PC, p. 5. Cp. p. 135: "... in a period when earthly life was increasingly devalued and
guilt-feelings were widely prevalent, Christianity held out to the disinherited the conditional promise of a better inheritance in another world". This is of course true. The point of this study, however, is that the meek intended to inherit this world, as inhabitants of a "reborn" polity of Rome.


81. Tertullian's opinion comes out most clearly when he is attacking gnostic scorn for the natural processes. Marcion seems to have found the details of pregnancy and birth revolting, which led Tertullian to describe it as *illa sanctissima et reverenda opera naturae*, *Adv. Marc.* III.11. In *De Carne Christi* IV, he refers likewise to *hanc venerationem naturae*. In *De Resurrectione Mortuorum he notes that heretics and heathen alike (haeretici & ethnici) despise the flesh as unclean (IV), and the body as evil (V), and then suggests: "Let, then, the flesh begin to give you pleasure, since the Creator thereof is so great." *Incipiat iam tibi caro placere, cuius artifex tantus est! Tertullian's attitude to the flesh comes out quite clearly in *De Anima*, where he notes that the flesh is merely a "minister" to the soul (XL) and should not be punished for the sins of the soul. While every soul contains seeds of corruption, there is no soul without some seeds of good. (XLI). What is evil is not nature, but excess or defect, (XLIII): "For every natural state is impaired by defect or by excess, whilst it is maintained by its proper measure and amount". (Omnis enim natura aut defraudatione aut enormitate rebunditur, proprietate mensurae conservatur.)


83. A.H.M. Jones, "The Social Background of the Struggle between Paganism and Christianity", in A. Momigliano

84. On the problem of the mis-attribution of the phrase credo quia absurdam see Barnes, Tertullian, pp. 223-4. For Tertullian's own phrase see De Carne Christi V,4: Et mortuus est dei filius; credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia impossible.


APPENDIX A

Pagan references to Christians before A.D. 250

(Appendices A and B are added merely for convenience. They are not intended to be scholarly statements on the works concerned, each of which has its own literature, all discussing a host of problems.)


b. Tacitus. Annals XV,44. Written between c. 110-117.


d. Epictetus. Discourses IV,7,1f. Epictetus died c. 130. The reference, which is not free of all problems, is translated in Benko.
"Therefore, if madness can produce this attitude of mind toward the things which have just been mentioned, and also habit, as with the Galileans, cannot reason and demonstration teach a man that God had made all things... etc."

e. Hadrian. Rescript to Minucius Fundanus, governor of Asia. Hadrian ruled between 117-138. The rescript is treated as basically genuine, and is given as an appendix to Justin Apology I and in Eusebius HE IV,9.
Fundanus was proconsul in Asia in 124-5. The re-
script basically enforces the situation decreed by
Trajan in Pliny X, 97. The text ends with a warning
against false accusation: "But, by Hercules! if any
one bring an accusation through mere calumny, decide
in regard to his criminality, and see to it that
you inflict punishment."

f. Lucian of Samosata, c. 115-200. In the Death of
Peregrinus V, Lucian represents the Christians as
simple, humble, deluded, and easily fooled - "if a
cheater, who is able to make a profit from the situa-
tion comes to them, he quickly becomes rich laughing
at the simple people" - but nevertheless open, sincere
generous and charitable. There is also a brief
reference to Christians in Alexander the False
Prophet XXV and XXXVII.

g. Galen, c. 129-199. De pulsum differentiis II, 4; &
III, 3. Galen is discussed in chapter 6 of this study.
The more interesting excerpts are in fact translated
from Arabic translations of Galen, and are given in
Walzer, op. cit.

h. Marcus Aurelius, 161-180, Emperor. Meditations XI, 3;
the readiness to die "must be the result of a
specific decision, not, as with the Christians, of
obstinate opposition, but of a reasoned and dignified
decision". A letter to the "Assembly of Asia",
ostensibly from Marcus (HE IV, 13), is generally
regarded as spurious.

Benko mentions "possible" references by Apuleius
and Aelius Aristides, both of which can be ignored. The
philosopher Crescens, probably responsible for the death
of Justin, is known from the latter's works, while the
opinion of Pronto is recorded in the Octavius. Extensive
remains of a second century philosopher called Celsus,
who wrote a book against Christianity called True Doctrine,
are preserved in the Contra-Celsum of Origen, who was
born c. 185.
APPENDIX B

Chronology of Christian Works Cited

In general use has been made of F.L. Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, (London: Duckworth, 1960). The dates for the works of Tertullian have been taken from T.D. Barnes, Tertullian, pp. 54-5. The dates are all very approximate.

a. The Apostolic Fathers.

Didache
I Clement
II Clement
Epistles of Ignatius
Epistle of Polycarp
Martyrdom of Polycarp
The Epistle of Barnabas
The Shepherd of Hermas
Epistle to Diognetus

A.D. 60
96
2nd century
early 2nd cent.
after 110
after 156.
early 2nd cent.
late 1st cent.
early 2nd cent.

b. The Apologists.

Aristides
Justin:
Apology I
Apology II
Dialogue with Trypho
Tatian:
Oratio ad Graecos
Athenagoras:
Legatio
Theophilus of Antioch

A.D. 140
150
160
170
177
Ad Autolycum

180

c. Irenaeus.
Against Heresies

later 2nd century

d. Clement of Alexandria.

Protrepticos (ad Graecos)
Paedagogos
Stromateis

190
190

after 190
after 190

e. Origen.

Contra Celsum

245

f. Minucius Felix.

Octavius

1st half of 3rd cent.

g. Tertullian

De Spectaculis
De Idololatria
Ad Nationes
Apologeticum
Scorpiace
De Pallic
De Carne Christi
De Anima
De Resurrectione Mortuorum

A.D. 197
197-8
203-4
205
206
206-7
Adversus Marcionem
A.D. 208

De Jejunio
210-11

Ad Scapulam
212

h. Arnobius.

Adversus Nationes
300

i. Lactantius.

De Mortibus Persecutorum

Divine Institutes
after 300

j. Eusebius.

Ecclesiastical History
315

Praeparatio Evangelica
commenced 313


Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs
180

Passio Perpetuae
203
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The non-Christian works cited are taken, both text and translation (unless indicated), from the editions in the Loeb Classical Library. Classical authors, and the names of the translators, are given below for convenience.

Aulus Gellius

Cicero

Contra Rullum trans. J.C. Rolfe
Philippics
Verrines
De Inventione trans. J.H. Freese
Pro Fonteio W.C.A. Ker
Pro Milone L.H.G. Greenwood
Pro Ligario H.M. Hubbell
In Pisonem trans. N.H. Watts
De Republica C.W. Keyes

Livy trans. B.O. Foster

trans. E.T. Sage
A.C. Schlesinger

Lucian trans. A.M. Harmon

Ovid trans. J.G. Frazer

Plutarch trans. B. Perrin (Pompey)

Sallust trans. J.C. Rolfe

Seneca trans. R.M. Gummere (Epist.)
J.W. Basore (Essays)

Strabo trans. H.L. Jones

Suetonius trans. J.C. Rolfe

Tacitus trans. J. Jackson
Christian sources


Clement of Alexandria
   iii. Stromateis - text as above, ed. Stahlin.

Eusebius

Lactantius Translation: M.F. McDonald, The Fathers of the Church, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America), Divine Institutes (vol. 49, 1964), and Death of the Persecutors (vol. 54, 1965).


ii. Other works by Tertullian, trans. in ANF, text in Corpus Christianorum series Latina, vols. I & II.


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