TWO STRUGGLES INTO ONE?
LABOUR AND ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT RELATIONS AND THE
CHALLENGE TO CAPITALIST FORESTRY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1900-2000

By

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A Dissertation
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University

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LABOUR-ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT RELATIONS AND FORESTRY IN B.C.
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Sociology)
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Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Two Struggles Into One? Labour and Environmental Movement Relations and the Challenge to Capitalist Forestry in British Columbia, 1900-2000

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NUMBER OF PAGES: xi, 540
This dissertation places contemporary struggles over logging in old-growth coastal forests within a historical analysis of the development of capitalist forestry in British Columbia. In part A we argue that the history of capitalist forestry has been profoundly marked by labour and environmental movements. It is argued that these movements have resisted the exploitation of capital, engendered both political and economic crisis, and (generally) pushed capital and the state into more social forms of production. Speaking to silences in academic and popular accounts, the work of these social movements is centred and it is argued that their relation offers a key to understanding the remaking of capitalist forestry. Particular attention is given to moments of inter-movement cooperation, the environmental politics of forestry unions and the ideological projects of capital and the state.

Part B is a case study of capitalist forestry and forest worker/environmental movement relations in Squamish, British Columbia. Drawing from historical records and interviews with forestry workers and environmental group members, struggles over logging in the nearby Upper Elaho Valley are grounded in a historical political ecology of the area. Special attention is directed at the job-environment tradeoffs of capitalist forestry and to the potential of forestry unions to resist this job blackmail.
Throughout this work we draw from, and seek to elaborate, radical political ecology as the nexus of class theory and environmental sociology. We contend that this theoretical lens offers the greatest hope for understanding the relation of natural environment, capitalist production and class and environmental politics.
Acknowledgements

Without the patience, generosity and ceaseless encouragement of colleagues, friends and family this project would never have come to fruition. Though I take sole responsibility for the shortcomings of this work, its strengths owe much to the curiosity, intelligence and dedication of Graeme MacQueen, Pam Sugiman and Robert Storey. In particular I must acknowledge Robert Storey's critical judgement, perseverance and sympathetic ear. When others similarly burdened would have rightly moved on, Bob ceaselessly encouraged.

I am also indebted to the environmentalists, forestry workers and union representatives whose generous sharing of time and perspective have informed and enlivened this dissertation.

With gratitude and sadness I thank my father, Glen Moore, who passed away during the writing of this work. His questioning spirit, humour and tenacity are ingrained in this project and continue to inspire. I also thank my mother, Gail Moore, for her generosity and strength during difficult times and her ongoing support.

Finally I must thank my dearest friend Catherine, though I fear I do not have the words to do so adequately. In the face of tragic events and adversity Catherine has responded with courage and compassion. Her example put the minor struggles of this project in perspective and I am forever grateful.
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Chapter 1

Introduction:
Capital, Labour and Environment Movements, and the Crisis in British Columbia’s Forests

That there exists a crisis in British Columbia’s forests and forest industries appears to be one of the few points of consensus in the province’s raucous politics. We say ‘appears’ as there are in fact multiple crises: forestry workers and their unions point us to the crisis of unemployment, environmentalists point us to the ecological crisis of old-growth liquidation (which takes many forms), and forest capital insists that it confronts an unparalleled profit crisis. As if this were not enough, voices from all sides counsel that one crisis can only be resolved at the expense of exacerbating another: forest workers will only find work if we allow (or speed up) the liquidation of ancient forests, forest companies can only continue production if environmental regulations are limited, ancient forests can only be protected by shutting down forestry work. While capitalist forest policy and practice appear to create much dissent, the struggle often appears as much between the dissenters as any place else. Very often this struggle has been between forest workers and environmentalists.

For the activist and the sociologist, and perhaps most of all the activist-sociologist, the persistent, sometimes violent conflict between two ‘progressive’ social
movements is disturbing and confusing. British Columbia's old-growth forests, with their giant fir, cedar, spruce and hemlock, are pitted against the livelihood of forest workers and their families. The value of work and community stability is pitted against habitat, ecological diversity and a sustainable environment. While it is suggested from many sides that both goals might be met (and we too offer a variation on this), most often we are confronted with painful contradiction and impossible decision.

This dissertation starts from the premise that understanding the conflict between forestry labour and the environmental movement is key to untangling the knot of social, cultural, economic and environmental problems that are forest politics. We argue that by tracing the material grounding and political contingency of this conflict we can draw out a coherent explanation of the crisis of capitalist forestry. If we might better understand how and why capitalist forestry produces jobs versus environment tradeoffs, and if we might better understand how such a tradeoff is translated into worker-environmentalist conflict, we might also begin to envision the means by which this untenable choice might be transcended.

To this end, our dissertation brings a particular sociological voice to the debate — that of Marxist political ecology. While this approach may not reduce the complexity of the current moment, it does train our eye to patterns, both historical and contemporary, that help explain it. Most directly, this theoretical lens alerts us to capital's exploitation of both labour and nature and to the parallel forms of social and environmental degradation under this form of production. Forest capital produces the very social and
environmental conditions, the patterns of interest, upon which environmental and labour
movements are founded. At the same moment, political ecology draws attention to the
role of labour and environmental movements, and nature itself, in resisting this
exploitation. Marxist political ecology insists, then, that an understanding of forest crisis
requires the detailed tracing of the multiple and dialectic relations between capital and
nature; capital and labour; and between labour and environmental movements.

The structure and content of our dissertation reflects our concern with the
grounding of contemporary labour and environmental movements in a long history (not of
their making) and with the process by which they make this history. Our examination of
British Columbian forest politics is therefore divided into two parts: a historical analysis
of the development of capitalist forestry in the province, and a case study of a
contemporary conflict over the logging of forests in a coastal river valley.

In Part A we trace the history of capitalist forestry and the parallel forms of social
and ecological degradation that have been its legacy. At the heart of our argument is the
idea that, organized around social and environmental problems, labour and environmental
movements have resisted the exploitation of capital, engendered both political and
economic crisis, and (generally) pushed capital and the state into more social forms of
production. Speaking to silences in academic and popular accounts, we centre the work
of these social movements and argue that their relations have been key to the remaking of
capitalist forestry.
Part B of our dissertation is a case study of capitalist forestry and forest worker/environmental movement relations in Squamish, British Columbia. While here we are attentive to the social and ecological location of Squamish and to the particular context of the area's forest history, we also note the inscription of more general historical patterns on this place and its peoples. The struggle over logging in the old-growth forests of the nearby Upper Elaho Valley provides a window on the process by which forestry workers and environmentalists, and especially their relationship, continue to fashion this history.

Adopting for the most part a chronological order, the following chapters move from a broad social and environmental history of capitalist forestry in British Columbia to the specific consideration of the conflict over the Elaho Valley.

In an initial effort to draw down the confusion, Chapter 2 of our dissertation serves as a review of the most relevant areas of social theory and of the empirical study of forest politics. Here we are forced to acknowledge that there is much about the organization and content of social theory that discourages the simultaneous consideration of issues of work and environment. Social movement theory, for instance, though ripe with insight into the potential of social movements and with methodological approaches that get at such promise, offers a particularly unconvincing explanation of the relation of labour and environmental movements. Class theory and environmental sociology, while tackling directly the social and ecological problems at the heart of our project, have most
often been developed in a frustratingly parallel fashion with little consideration given to their intersection.

We conclude our review of the theoretical literature then with an elaboration of Marxist political ecology as the nexus of class theory and environmental sociology, arguing that such an approach offers the greatest hope for understanding the relation of natural environment, capitalist production and class and environmental politics. Most specifically, we acknowledge the particular usefulness of James O’Connor’s ‘second contradiction’ thesis to the study of capitalist forestry crises and social movement struggle.

Chapter 3 introduces our historical analysis with a discussion of forestry practice and politics from the introduction of capitalist forestry in the province to the first major period of crisis early in the 20th century. Challenging standard explanations, we contend that even at this early moment the industry was marked by social and environmental contradictions and that it was being shaped by the resistance of workers and conservationists. It is within this light that we examine the first Royal Commission of 1909 (known as the Fulton Commission). We argue that the ‘scientific forestry’ promoted by this commission was as much an ideology aimed at controlling these movements as it was a model for future forestry.

In Chapter 4, we trace the development of capitalist forestry to the call of the second Royal Commission (the Sloan Commission, 1945). During this period, mechanized harvesting and managerial practices were introduced to logging operations:
changes which exponentially increased the exploitation of forest workers and the forest itself. Faced with desperate living conditions and work that threatened their lives, forestry workers struggled to build unions which could defend their interests. Conservationists, meanwhile, rose the alarm of 'forest famine' and decried the fire blackened clearcuts that spread across the province. For the most part, reflecting the schisms of capitalist forestry itself and separated by issues of class and place, these movements developed independently. However, during the 1930s the political left, abetted by a radical forest-workers union, began to knit together a critique of both the social and ecological contradictions of forestry. A historically rare synthesis of labour and environmental critiques, this unique movement has been either overlooked or underplayed in traditional accounts. This embryonic ecosocialist project, though both partial and short-lived, announced an important challenge and served to push capital and the state into a dramatic restructuring of forestry policy and practice.

Chapter 5 traces the response of capital and the state to the economic, ecological and political crises that marked capitalist forestry during the 1930s. We argue that the restructuring announced by the popular Sloan Commission of 1945 must be understood within the context of socialist 'threat' and that it was directed to the class differences and political tensions within and between labour and environmental movement critics. However we also acknowledge the effectiveness of the Sloan Commission in forging a corporatist alliance of forestry labour, large capital and the state. In the remaining part of the chapter, we trace the political, ecological and social implications of capitalist
sustained-yield forestry. It is argued that the social contradictions of this increasingly capital intensive form of production were resolved, if temporarily, through ever increased production. Commitments to maintain employment levels were addressed through the heightened exploitation of the forest base (especially the geographic expansion of the industry). The vulnerability of middle-class conservationism to the ideology of scientific forestry, the political purge of radicals within the forest worker’s union, and expanding export markets, each contributed to the relatively muted response to the loss of ancient forests.

Chapter 6 traces the period from 1976 to 2000 when the social and ecological contradictions of capitalist sustained-yield forestry were continually at the fore. Caught between the geographic and ecological limits of British Columbia’s rapidly depleted ancient forests, the continued shedding of forestry labour, and the rise of an environmental movement bent on preserving remaining old-growth areas, capital and the state have shifted between periods of deregulation and re-regulation, neo-liberalism and reformism. We argue that the relationship between labour and environmental movements was a key determining factor of state policy and forest industry practice during this period. We also contend that capital and the state have been most aware of the importance of the evolving labour-environmental movement relation and have employed various ideological strategies aimed at fostering intermovement conflict.

Keyed to this pattern, chapter 7 is specifically dedicated to the recent history of forestry union and environmental movement relations. Here we compare the
environmental politics of the International Wood and Allied Workers of Canada (IWA) with those of the Pulp Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC). While we note that structural ‘pulls’ suggest reasons for both conflict (job blackmail) and cooperation (workers’ health and safety concerns) between unions and environmental groups, it is conceded that the jobs versus environment tradeoff exerts significant influence. Nonetheless, the vastly different politics of these unions (the IWA has largely been critical of contemporary environmental groups while the PPWC enjoys a good working relationship with these same groups) suggests the enduring possibility of political agency. Indeed we contend that both the IWA’s hostility toward environmental groups and the PPWC’s more friendly relations are only understandable as the result of both structural pull and political decision.

In Chapter 8, a short political and ecology history of the Squamish region maps the interplay of nature, capital and social movements in the reproduction of social and natural landscapes. Though unique in detail, these landscapes have also been profoundly marked by the general patterns of capitalist forestry and its contradictions. While capital intensive forestry has produced well-paying, industrial jobs, it has brought with it the continual threat of unemployment due to economic flux and mechanization, the depletion of ancient forests, and a host of pollution problems (problems that threaten both the environment generally and workers and their families most directly). It is these contradictions which underlie the intense conflict over the fate of the old-growth forests in the nearby Upper Elaho valley. This dispute with its complex political history and
environmental group-forestry worker conflict brings to the fore many of the elements of environmental politics discussed in our previous chapters.

Chapter 9 begins with an outline of the political decisions, social movement strategies and major events of the Elaho conflict. The majority of this chapter, however, is devoted to the voices of environmental group members and forestry workers. Taken from a series of interviews and from existing documents, these voices suggest very different, and often opposed, visions of a 'good' future for the area. Accounting for these differences and the inter-movement conflict requires that we acknowledge their shaping by the economic, social and political history that we have previously described. Of special note is the 'dull economic compulsion' that pulls on forestry workers and unions and which is revealed most sharply in job blackmail. In the end, though, such a determinist description fails to capture either the contradictions of capitalist forestry or the dynamics of this conflict. Our analysis thus hinges on a discussion of the political contingency of this conflict: the ideological work of capital and the state, the decisions taken by forestry workers and their unions, and the political tactics of forestry unions and environmental groups.

As important as it is to provide a sketch of what is to be found in the following pages, it is perhaps equally critical that we warn our readers of closely related subject matter which must be left to further research. Foremost is the question of aboriginal peoples and forestry. For all its broad strokes, both our history and case study are focussed on the relationship between labour and environmental movements and our
relatively limited treatment of aboriginal concerns reflects this. This is not to underplay
the significance to our area of study. Indeed, capital's access to the forests of British
Columbia was, and is, predicated not only on the stripping of these lands from aboriginal
peoples but also on their ongoing economic, social and political marginalization.
Moreover, resistance to this marginalization, especially the current struggle to obtain fair
treaties, has already begun to alter the future of the province's forests and forest industry
in fundamental ways.

An understanding of the trajectory of aboriginal politics is, therefore, a necessary
component of a thorough political ecology of capitalist forestry in British Columbia. This
being said, the complexity of the current political moment precludes a more rigorous
inclusion in our study. Successful land claims, for example, hold the promise of placing
aboriginal peoples in a position now occupied by the provincial government. Until such
treaties are ratified, and perhaps long after, the nature of these legal entities, their relation
to capital and to provincial and national governments, and the legal and political situation
of unions within this environment will remain unknown.

Our own case study is illustrative. As we describe in chapters 8 and 9, during the
period under consideration the Squamish Nation played a relatively minor role in the
Elaho conflict. We have been able, then, to focus our attention on more active groups
and institutions: forestry unions, environmental groups, capital and the provincial
government. Though lacking this additional layer of political life in the province, this
situation has lent itself to a more detailed consideration of the forestry worker-
environmental group relation and, we believe, resulted in findings that are more widely representative. We might note, however, that by the fall of 2001 the Squamish Nation had taken a more active stance and was now demanding the final word in resource management in the area and was proposing their own solution to land-use disputes. Any further research in the area must be centred on this new political reality.

Most relatedly we have also had little opportunity to examine the more general question of the intersection of multiple forms of exploitation (including class, race and gender) within the reproduction of capitalist forestry. Much is to be learned from the careful study of gendered and racialized practice and discourse in forestry work, in forestry communities and in labour and environmental movements. While we will have the opportunity to make note the most striking of these intersections, we again must leave detailed deliberation to further research.

These caveats aside, this dissertation covers a broad territory. Centred on the parallel exploitation of worker and forest, our historical chapters map a century in the development of capitalist forestry in British Columbia. We chart the complicated web of interests created, trace environmental and labour movements to this material grounding and argue that this is a necessary approach if we are to understand the contradictory relations between forestry workers and the environmental movement. However, we also spend much time tracing the political battles within which this material grounding is

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1 See Squamish Nation (2001).
identified and defined. These politics, whether it is the expression of working class
environmentalism in the 1930s, the ideological packaging of ‘scientific forestry’ by
capital and the state, or the ‘anti-preservationist’ rhetoric of today’s IWA, continually
serves as a counterpoint to our discussion of more structural concerns. In the end, we
contend it is this political struggle that has engendered crises and the restructuring
process.

If here we risk contradiction by asserting at once the importance of structural
limits and the possibility of politics this is most intended. Indeed, through this work we
attempt to remain mindful of the inevitability of such contradiction. While often couched
in the language of sociology, we must admit that we are simply learning from
environmentalists and forestry workers themselves who live the contradictions that we
more abstractly describe. In the end, then, we do hope that our dissertation speaks to the
people from whom it has taken so much. In digging up ignored history, and in ferreting
out patterns within this history and in present struggles, we hope that forestry workers and
environmentalists might continue their work of refashioning capitalist forestry.

Finally, let us not forget that this is indeed a critical moment. In British Columbia
the last of old-growth ecosystems are being measured up for logging and the conversion
to second-growth ‘working forests’ – it is entirely unclear what the ecological, economic,
social and cultural implications will be. Will existing protected areas, and current
regulation of forest practices be sufficient to maintain nonhuman species? Will there be
room in a global marketplace for the slow-growing, difficult-to-access, softwood of
coastal forests? Will there be jobs, and of what sort, for forestry workers? Are there more socially and ecologically appropriate ways to harvest and utilize forest products? What are the cultural implications of following through with the harvesting of remaining old-growth forests? The vigorous debate of such questions is essential if we are not to make unforgivable blunders. Political ecology and its attention to the ecological and social contradictions of capitalist forestry is necessary to such debate.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Review of Theory: The Winding Route From Social Movements to Political Ecology

Our project here is a social history. We trace the social history of forestry and the social history of the forest. This is however a particular breed of social history, one that begins from and attempts to extend the understanding of social movements as important creators of new ideas, and forms of action and organization, that are crucial, perhaps decisive, factors in the making of history. Specifically, the intent of the dissertation is to develop a critical understanding of the role and potential of environmental and labour movements to challenge and remake a capitalist forestry practice that has been both socially and ecologically destructive.

Having set ourselves this task, we are right away confronted by problems created by the organization of sociology and social theory. While the discipline of sociology has become increasingly specialized, our task here requires a theoretical approach that is able to synthesize and move between levels of analysis. This approach must account for ecological limits and socio-political constraints and for the creative and unpredictable possibilities of movements and individuals. To this end, the following chapter covers a
rather broad ground, with the intent to both highlight the difficulty in directly applying any of the most popular theoretical perspectives and to suggest a synthesis within a radical political ecology.

We begin our survey at perhaps the most obvious departure point: social movement theory. Until a few years ago, this field could be neatly divided into New Social Movement (NSM) theory and Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) – the former proposing theories of social change and heralding the arrival of new collective actors and the latter describing how available resources and strategic choices enable mobilization. More recently, recognizing the rather stark division of labour that had arisen in the field, cultural constructionists and some NSM theorists have attempted to cobble together something of a composite theory. Most often such attempts have stuck close to a middle-level analysis that fails to adequately confront macro-level questions of power difference and structural sources of grievance (including the exploitation of labour and nature). When this level of analysis is addressed, there is most often a turn to post-industrial theories which cut short the analysis of the contemporary salience of class and the labour movement – a problem that leaves such theories both unconvincing and of limited use to our project.

Seeking a more direct engagement with the central issues of class and nature, we turn to an evaluation of those theorists that have explored the relationship between class and the ‘new movements’ and the field of environmental sociology. Once again we are faced with the problem of two important, and frustratingly parallel, areas of enquiry:
class theorists have renewed interest in the relevance of class analysis and the intersection of 'old' and 'new' movements, environmental sociologists have tackled the difficult problem of bringing nature back in to social theory, and the two have either ignored or been openly hostile to each other.

In the end, we acknowledge the importance of radical political ecology as the nexus of class theory and environmental sociology. This approach insists on a dialectical understanding of the nature-society relation, embraces the material grounding of social movements, and maintains an eye for the contingency of politics. We place our project both within the scope of such radical political ecology and as an empirical challenge for further development.

**Contemporary Social Movement Theory I: Resource Mobilization**

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) was developed as a corrective to structural functionalist and symbolic interactionist theories of collective behaviour which reduced social movements to either reactions to structural strain or to atypical 'crowd behaviour'. RMT challenged the central principles of collective behaviour theory by claiming that grievances are ubiquitous factors of social life, that the relative distribution of grievances were only weakly connected to social movement development, and that when social movements do develop the behaviour of members is rather like that in any organization. This perspective insists that social movement theorists turn their attention away from the
grievances of societal groups and from the individual psychology of movement participants and towards the pattern of resources available to channel these ever-present grievances.

While the general resource mobilization framework allows for a wide range of, sometimes contradictory, theoretical development, Cohen's (1985) widely cited summary of presuppositions remains a useful introduction:

(1) Any society is at any time faced with a wide range of grievances. (2) Goals and grievances are the result of conflicts that are inherent in power relations and in themselves cannot account for the formation of social movements. (3) To account for social movements one must concentrate on changes in resources, organization and opportunities for collective action. (4) Successful mobilization involves/requires special purpose, bureaucratic organizations, and success is measured by the political acceptance or material benefits obtained through this mobilization.

Generally then, resource mobilization theorists attack the problem of how some movements come to be more successful than others (Eyerman and Jamison 1990, 24). The answers they provide suppose that the emergence and success or failure of social movements is directly tied to the patterns of resources available to social movement organizations and organizers.

The strengths and weaknesses of RMT are revealed in Melucci's (1985) claim, that these theories focus on the understanding of how social movements mobilize and neglect the question of why. On the one hand resource mobilization theory has proved very useful in the: (1) understanding of how tactics, strategy and resources are combined in the formation and development of a social movement (Canel 1992); (2) identification
of political ‘opportunity structures’ and demonstrating how these facilitate or hinder mobilization (Canel 1992); (3) and in tracing patterns of incentives that account for individual participation in movement activity (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988).

On the other hand, RMT is criticized for insisting on the invariant nature of grievance and thus: (1) ignoring structural and cultural contradictions that serve as the preconditions of social movements, (2) maintaining a strategic-instrumental bias that neglects the symbolic and normative dimensions of social movements, and (3) understanding actors as simply rational beings utilizing cost-benefit decision-making frameworks, a view which precludes the study of non-strategic collective action (Canel 1992). As Jasper (1997, 31) has argued, in attempting to maintain a good distance from the psychological reduction of crowd theory, RMT tends to eschew all biographical or cultural reference.

**Contemporary Social Movement Theory II: New Social Movement Theory**

Like RMT, New Social Movement (NSM) theory was developed in response to earlier theoretical accounts of social movements, however in this case the response was aimed at Marxist social history (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). New Social Movement theories argue that new collective actors have come to occupy the forefront of

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2 Many, indeed most, of these theorists acknowledge the connection to Marx’s own writings, describing their work as ‘neo’ or ‘post’ marxist.
contemporary social change. These theories claim that the ‘old’ class actors, so central to Marxist accounts, have been replaced by groups whose identities are not formed around their economic class position and who come to struggle not over control of the means of production but over the process of symbolic production. This struggle over symbolic production is embodied in disputes over existing social roles or in attempts to carve out new ones. It is claimed then that there is something fundamentally ‘new’ about the new social movements and theorists in this tradition have come to emphasize this important discontinuity (Canel 1992).

Some further presuppositions identified in the work of NSM theorists include: (1) that contemporary social movements engage in new forms of action, that they eschew strategic, institutionalized politics and favour decentralized non-hierarchical forms of organization and symbolic forms of action (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988); (2) that the goals of the new social movement are not the control of political or economic ‘steering mechanisms’, but the "reappropriation of time, of space, and of relationships in the individuals daily experience" (Melucci in Canel 1992, 32); (3) that new social movements are opening up spaces in civil society in which new identities, integrating new values and norms, are created (Canel 1992); (4) that new movements may be identified with, although not causally traced to, structural and cultural changes in contemporary society.

While there exists a general consensus that new social movement theories are founded upon variations of these basic presuppositions, the divergent and often
Those who have surveyed the field (Cohen 1985, Klandermans and Tarrow 1988, Eyerman and Jamison 1990, Canel 1992) find promise in the possibility that new social movement theory may offer a non-reductionist understanding of the historical projects of contemporary social movements. Although the debate has generated more disagreement than convergence, it is hoped that new social movement theory can: (1) indicate sources of strain or contradiction in the inter-relations of economy, politics, and civil society that have brought new actors to the social movements, and (2) bring a greater understanding of the symbolic and cultural aspects of social movements (Canel 1992; Jasper 1997).

While many welcomed the ‘cultural turn’ of new social movement theory, others have expressed significant doubts. One of the most salient of these criticisms claims that, in a conscious attempt to demonstrate the ‘newness’ of contemporary social movements, marxist economic reductionism has been replaced with post-marxist cultural reductionism. Thus the consideration of cultural factors has entirely displaced the study contradictory nature of these theories makes the attempt to fit them all under one paradigm difficult. Amongst the theorists commonly identified with this paradigm, there is significant debate concerning: (1) which movements are to be considered as new social movements (does one accept Touraine's strict limitation that only one movement has the potential to capture the reigns of historicity, or the much more inclusive celebration of diversity suggested by Laclau and Mouffe (1985); (2) on what ‘terrain’ the movements struggle (do they operate solely in the realm of civil society as Touraine (1985) suggests or in a new public space between civil society and politics as argued by Melucci (1985); and (3) what the goals of these movements are (the control of ‘historicity’ as Touraine claims, or perhaps Melucci’s semiotics influenced "challenge of dominant codes") or Habermas’ (1981) defence of the life-world.
of the organizational, strategic, and mobilization dimensions of contemporary social movements. Colin Mooers (1992) has attacked the ‘de-centring’ of the state which is said to lead to a ‘de-socialized’ view of the state and a naive liberal notion of politics. Similarly, Lustiger-Thaler (1992) has assailed identity theorists for their neglect (or denial) of the linkage between new social movements and the state and economic systems. In short, NSM theory has been accused of replacing the study of how movements organize with an elaborate cultural explanation of why.

The Twain Shall Meet: Constructing Social Movements

While until about a decade ago, a social movement researcher was faced with choosing between these two general approaches, more recently the lines have blurred. Simply put, the rather neat division of labour between theories of the how and why of social movements has proven untenable: empirical studies of new social movements must inevitably deal with the problem of mobilization (including strategic aspects) and the study of mobilization eventually leads to questions about both the symbolic aspects of movements and about patterns of movements and their relation to social and cultural contexts. Over the last decade or so, a recognition of this problem has pushed projects of integration to the fore.

An expedient and useful response to the criticism of RMT, and one that addresses NSM concern with the symbolic aspects of contemporary protest, is found in the
expansion of the definition of resources to include cultural and ideological ‘resources’. To this end, the ‘frame alignment’ approach has injected a dose of interactionism into RMT.

This elaboration of RMT has focussed attention on the ways in which movements construct understandings of social problems and solutions and how these constructions are used and altered in the process of mobilization. Snow and Benton have used this line of inquiry to trace the way that movements negotiate ‘frames’ that define conditions as unjust, identify the source of this injustice, and suggest remedial actions and alternative social arrangements (in Carrol and Ratner 1996b, 410-411). This type of analysis has been applied at different levels to describe the cognitive aspects of mobilization within a movement (at efforts to recruit) and to suggest how generic ‘master frames’ are developed and used by more than one movement (Carrol and Ratner 1996a, 1996b; Jasper 1997, 75; Hannigan 1997).

However, James Jasper (1997) is probably correct when he argues that simply tacking on cultural resources to more general RMT either overextends the idea of resources or under-extends the idea of culture (Jasper 1997). Frame analysis, if we are to follow Jasper’s critique, is most closely aimed at, and best used for, describing the “conscious efforts by groups or recruiters to craft their rhetoric and issues in such a way that they appeal to potential recruits” (1997, 77). As such, frame analysis may be understood as one particular component of the larger understanding of the social construction of movements.
Jasper (1997) suggests another tack with an approach that works mainly on the level of analysis staked out by mobilization theorists -- which is to say that Jasper's eye is tuned to the dynamics of movement building and to the ways in which individuals come together in groups to enact change[^4]. While appreciative of RMT, Jasper seeks to transcend the narrow focus on strategic reasoning and calculation, positing in its stead an understanding of the creative, playful, artful ways that movements generate new meanings and understanding of society itself. While not addressed directly to the theoretical debates within this field[^5], much of Jasper's work serves to develop a constructionist approach to the cultural work of social movements.

Similarly, Hannigan (1997) has suggested that a social constructionist approach may serve as the defining, sociological approach to environmental issues. Here, Hannigan demonstrates the complex and politically charged task of constructing and implementing knowledge claims about the environment. Environmental advocacy is understood as a highly contingent process of defending and challenging environmental definitions and our attention is turned especially to the language of environmental politics.

[^4]: This not the only level of analysis in Jasper's work but is clearly the most successful. We later argue that when moving to more macro levels of analysis Jasper appeals to NSM/post-industrial theory that is much less convincing.

[^5]: For such a summary see Hannigan (1997), who couches this debate within his project to apply a constructionist approach to environmental problems.
From the opposite direction, Melucci (1996) has recently sought to reinforce NSM theory with a more detailed understanding of the process of mobilization. In this very ambitious work, the author continues his argument that an ‘extraordinary cultural transformation of planetary society’ has supplanting industrial capitalism and the associated modes of social control and resistance (8). The struggle over political control, or control over economic resources, has been replaced by the struggle to “reappropriate the capacity to name through the elaboration of codes and languages designed to define reality” (357). While such a philosophy of history downplays the significance of many of the traditional concerns of RMT, Melucci suggests that within his broader analysis of cultural shifts and collective action, the methodological tools of RMT, including the ideological and symbolic tools of frame analysis, remain valid⁶.

Contemporary Social Movement Theory: An Evaluation

Both the elaboration of RMT, and the inclusion of mobilization within NSM theory, mark a steady deepening of social movement theory. However, if we are to return to the particular subject matter of this dissertation, neither approach offers clear direction.

Resource Mobilization theories, the further elaboration of frame analysis, and Jasper’s cultural approach, each suggest a plethora of factors to consider when we study

⁶ See especially Melucci (1997), chapters 15 and 16.
how movements are made and why individuals get involved in the difficult and risky business of criticizing and changing their society. Gradually, we have seen sociologists assemble increasingly textured and sophisticated models that capture the creative, often ingenious ways that individuals acting together through movements create history.

However, the criticism of early resource mobilization theory, that it has turned away from the structural and cultural contradictions of society (contradictions at the source of the social problems that many movements seek to address) continues to resonate. If we insist that our social theory understand, even in the most limited sense, the source of social and ecological problems, and if we insist that social theory critically evaluate the possibility for change embodied in social movements, there is little here to grasp.

In part, this problem may be attributable to the level of analysis. One gets the impression that in an effort to avoid the charge of determinism aimed at macro theory and the opposite charge of incoherence aimed at micro level theory, these authors stick carefully to the middle. This line of theory effectively assembles an impressive range of tools useful in analysing the work of movements, but is much less effective at understanding the social and ecological contradictions that serve as the material grounding of labour and environmental movements7.

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7 Let us be clear that these authors, and here Jasper is exemplary, appreciate the work of social movements and often note the benefits for both protesters and for society. Yet when it comes to evaluating the possibility that social movements can fundamentally challenge existing socio-political structures, or problems such as environmental
This level of analysis problem, hidden in tightly framed empirical projects, shows itself most readily in works of synthesis such as those of Hannigan and Jasper. These authors, when forced to discuss more macro analysis of power difference and the source of grievance, both turn to underdeveloped and unconvincing versions of post-industrial/NSM theory.

New Social Movement theory on the other hand certainly includes an analysis of structural and cultural contradictions and of the role of social movements in addressing the accordant social problems. As this area has developed, the charge of reductionism has been dulled by the elaboration of links between symbolic conflict and systemic contradiction. Moreover, Melucci’s most recent volume suggests that macro theory can be integrated with micro-level empirical work though the assimilation of mobilization theory. This assimilation suggests that social movement theory might just be able to maintain multiple levels of analysis; that it might both speak of changes at a systemic level and of the practice of social movements without reducing one to the other.

However, despite an affinity with the level and aims of NSM theory, we remain sceptical of the content and findings offered by many of these authors. While recent elaborations may speak to initial concerns, many problems remain. For our project the most troubling involve two fundamental tenets of NSM theory: that there exists a radical degradation there is little to be said. Jasper, for instance, can only argue that movements are to be judged on whether or not they sustain the communication and reflexive thought necessary to a democratic society.
discontinuity between industrial capitalism and post-industrial/complex/information age society' and that this discontinuity is echoed in that between ‘old’ movements and ‘new’ struggles.

At the least, the notion that there exists such a radical discontinuity either in societal form or in social movement practice is yet to be demonstrated. Short of such evidence, the insistence on discontinuity resembles a blunt knife amidst the fine vocabulary and argument of new social movement theory, ranking among what Weir (1993) regards as the ‘trite binarisms’ of this line of thought.

Critics have justly charged that such insistence on the discontinuity between ‘new’ and ‘old’ movements, ignores: (1) the way that labour and the ‘New’ movements come to learn from each other (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), (2) the similarities in movement structure (the realos/fundi distinction in Green politics and the radical/social democratic

8 Melucci relegates the term ‘movement’ to a past era where the language of mechanics had yet to be replaced by that of quantum physics (1996, 208).

9 Jasper begins a discussion of ‘post-industrial movements’ with, “The concept of new social movements gets at several recent developments. One is the increasing presence of television in the last several decades, forcing political efforts to include symbolic statements directed at the viewing public.” Even if we agree that television has had the sort of fundamental impact on the nature of society, it is unclear why its impact would not also alter ‘old’ movements as well as ‘new’. Jasper’s second point, about the middle-class composition of the new movements is equally dubious and is dealt with later in our chapter.

10 Scott (1990) notes the split within the German Green movement between those who encourage participation in party politics and support coalition building (Realos) and Fundis who argue that institutional politics are themselves a part of the ecological problem and should only be approached in the most instrumental of fashions (principally
wings of the labour movement for example) (Scott 1990), (3) the interchange of movement intellectuals from the ‘new’ to ‘old’ social movements (Adam 1992), (4) the centrality of workers to many recent struggles over the improvement and protection of our natural and built environments (Keil 1994) and, (5) the ability of class politics to speak to non-traditional class actors (Groff 1997). Each of these problems suggests that NSM theory, while acutely attuned to the ways in which new social movements may announce a ‘society without a centre’, might be rather deaf to traditional struggles of new movements and the contemporary struggles of old movements.

Class and Nature: Forgotten Concepts

If our goal is to study the relationship between labour and environmental movements, and if we are to take seriously the idea that these movements have a material grounding in social and environmental problems (which is to say that these movements address fundamental social problems of environmental and human exploitation), contemporary social movement theory is left wanting. While the insights of resource mobilization and social constructionism are most useful in understanding the process of movement struggle, our project requires a theoretical framework which places such struggle within a social history of class relations on the one hand and the environment-
society relation on the other. In short, class and nature must both be brought back into our analysis.

**Bringing Class Back In: Class Politics and the New Movements**

Now, if there existed some convincing evidence that class exploitation had expired along with its industrial capitalist body all bets would be off and we could join with new social movement theorists in underplaying distributional struggles in general and the workers' movement in particular. However, capitalist relations of production have persisted and the global process of accumulation has entrenched these relations as never before. Jettisoning class struggle from our theoretical framework at this moment seems a move precisely in the wrong direction. Indeed, a recognition of this strategic and theoretical folly has led to a growing interest in class politics in the age of 'cyber-capitalism'\(^\text{11}\). More specifically, interest has focussed on developing theory that articulates the expression of class and other social movements as expressed within contemporary capitalism – theory that maintains the central concept of class while acknowledging the encounter between class politics and that of the 'new' movements.

\[^{11}\text{See Laxer (1999) for popular account of the necessity of class politics in Canada and beyond, Hirschkop (1998) for a critique of the middle-class politics of technology driven democracy or Wood (1998) on the continuity of the capitalist form of exploitation.}\]
Again, we must consider a broad range of perspectives. Ellen Meiksins Wood (1998), through her critique of Laclau and Mouffe and post-structural theory in general, has worked to re-centre the wage relation in the analysis of contemporary capitalism and the working class as the agent of revolutionary change. In her forceful defence of Marxist class theory and practice, Wood argues that there are “structural and historical grounds for connecting the working class organically to the socialist project”. For Wood, only a working class based socialist movement might simultaneously struggle for both immediate objectives and towards the longer-term goal of social transformation. While coalitions with other social movements are both possible and desirable, the articulation of such alliances must be one where “other social movements can be forged into forces for socialism by their intersection with the interests of the working class” (198).

Others have been more ecumenical in their approach. O’Connor (1998; 1995), convincingly theorizes the political economy of new social movements in general and ecology movements in particular, rooting these struggles in their interest in revolutionizing capitalist forms of production which degrade the ‘conditions of production’. O’Connor critiques movements that abstract themselves from an analysis of the contemporary labour process and forms of commodification and argues that the ‘rediscovery’ of class politics is necessary to advance their projects.

In theorizing the possibility of ‘two routes to socialism’ (a subject to which we will return), and acknowledging the limits of existing labour politics in the United States, O’Connor suggests a broader range of possible ‘ways forward’. Nonetheless, the labour
movement forms a necessary component of any project that hopes to address the degradation of conditions of production: "solid unity would be needed between labour, Greens, feminists and women, oppressed minorities, the poor" (O'Connor 1998, 322).

Though beginning from a different theoretical stance, the Gramscian analysis of William Carroll and Robert Ratner suggests a similar approach to alliance building. Responding to what these authors identify as the 'economic determinism' of more orthodox Marxism and the rudderless relativism of pluralist theories of 'radical democracy', these authors argue that a political-economic critique of class relations must be accompanied by a cultural analysis of 'hegemony' or the "multifaceted ensemble of discourses, identities and practices that organize consent to existing social and political arrangements" (Carroll and Ratner 1996).

Carol and Ratner envision an anti-hegemonic project whereby there is "a fluid synthesis of the 'old' and the 'new' social movements". It is argued that solidarity amongst a diverse range of movements must be based on a generously conceived notion of 'resistance to capital' rather than a narrow notion of class (Carroll and Ratner 1994)12.

While drawing on different, and competing, understandings of the politics of political economy, each of these authors insists that the exploitation of labour remains the defining moment of capitalism and that working class movements are necessary to enact

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12 O'Connor's work might be seen as an attempt to more tightly analyse just what it might be about a capitalist economy that links these diverse movements through a shared 'interest' in radically reconfiguring this economy.
fundamental change to this system of production. Relatedly, these authors all contend
that a radical political-economy of capitalist relations of production (and reproduction) is
both necessary to understand contemporary social movements and necessary to the
success of these movements. While theoretical debates within this group of theorists
continue, they each come to agree with Raymond Williams that while worker’s
movements may have overlooked the ecological, women’s, poverty, and cultural issues
that form the terrain of contemporary social movements,

there is not one of these issues which, followed through, fails to lead us
into the central systems of the industrial-capitalist mode of production and
among others into its system of classes. (Williams cited in Adkin and
Alpaugh 1988, 49)

Bringing Nature Back In: Environmental Sociology

Until rather recently, however, it must be acknowledged that the study of class
politics and radical political economy in general when not silent on ecological issues and
environmental politics has often treated these in crude, reductionist fashion. This is not
to single out sociologists and others engaged in the study of class politics, but only to
place them in the fine company of most all social science, especially as developed in
North America\(^\text{13}\). Indeed, when Catton and Dunlap attempted to mark out the field of

\(^{13}\) As Hannigan (1997) acknowledges, the consolidation of sociology early in the
twentieth century paralleled the decline of biological and geographical explanations of
environmental sociology two decades ago by arguing that all Western social science had come to ignore natural constraints, Marxist sociologists were as vulnerable as Durkeheimian functionalists and symbolic interactionists to the charge. As we will argue, though, the development of environmental sociology since this initial challenge serves only to underline the necessity of a class-based approach to environmental issues and politics.

The particulars of Catton and Dunlap’s (1980) metatheoretical project, which bluntly calls for a radical realignment of the social sciences in general and sociology in particular, are both widely known and commented upon (Buttel 1986; 1987; Hannigan 1997; Lowe and Rudig 1986; Ladd 1994). These authors have argued that virtually all social science is based on the assumption that the biophysical environment is virtually irrelevant as a determinant of social life, except as a resource for human exploitation. Sociology, these authors contend, is founded on the assumption of ‘Human Exemptionalism’ – that the cultural and technological developments of humanity are such that humans need only adapt nature to human needs, not the other way around (Ladd 1994)\(^\text{14}\). However, the ecological problems of the late 20th century are said to have human development. Certainly the classical sociological theorists were quite concerned with the environment-society relation a subject to which will return. The standard explanation for this ‘forgetting’ has emphasized both the need of a young discipline to mark out a distinct territory and reaction of progressive sociologists to reductionist sociobiology (Buttel 1986; Ladd 1994).

\(^{14}\) Earlier versions refer to the ‘Human Exceptionalist Paradigm’ which was revised to suggest the more refined idea that humans, though ‘exceptional’ as a species
ushered in a ‘post-exuberant’ age that both underscores the fallacy of exemptionalism and demands nothing short of a paradigmatic shift – a shift that entails a new respect for the immutability of ecological and thermodynamic laws, biophysical limits, and the global interdependence of all life forms (Catton and Dunlap 1980, 33-34).

As part of a ‘post exuberant’ sociology, environmental sociology, has been developed then not just as a “sociology of the environment but rather a sociology informed by the understanding of ecological limits” (Mehta and Ouellett 1995, v). The range of subject matter, theoretical perspectives and methodological techniques captured by this label is vast (see Vaillancourt 1995; Buttel 1987) and there is disagreement over just what might be included (Tindall 1995). Helpfully, Hannigan has recently suggested that the field of environmental sociology can be divided according to which of the two organizing questions an author addresses: (1) the causes of environmental destruction, or (2) the rise of environmental movements and consciousness.

However, in light of this author’s criticism that a certain theoretical incoherence has negatively impacted the field of environmental sociology and with the understanding that there are distinct connections between these questions which theory must address, we would suggest that a distinction between mainstream (human ecology, post-industrial, social constructionist) and political ecology approaches is even more useful. Moreover,

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for many reasons are not ‘exempt’ from biophysical constraints.
we will argue that the latter perspective offers the most coherent and inclusive framework.

Mainstream Environmental Sociology: From Human Ecology to Social Constructionism to the Risk Society

Though a line of work may be traced to at least the middle of the twentieth century, environmental sociology only coalesced as a distinct approach during the mid-1970s (Vaillancourt 1995; Buttel 1986; Hannigan 1997). The ‘core’ of environmental sociology was developed towards the end of this decade as an elaboration and renewal of the Chicago School’s human ecology perspective. However, while Park and others of this school used concepts taken from Darwin and other naturalists, these were employed principally as metaphors with care being taken to underline the relative freedom of human societies from biological constraint (Hannigan 1997, 14-15). The new human ecologists, in contrast, take naturalist ideas, especially the notion of natural limits, much more literally.

Seeking to rid itself of the last vestiges of anthropocentric assumption, new human ecology has stressed the ecological dependency of human societies. For example, Catton’s *Overshoot* (1980) traced the exponential ecological impact of industrial society and suggested that ecological limits would be the key factor in social change. Other early

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15 See Park (1936) for the classic formulation.
areas of inquiry included the study of the ecological impact of farming methods and the role of ecological factors on technological change and adaptation (for an overview see Buttel 1987, Vaillancourt 1995). More recently, Vaillancourt (1995) has suggested that, informed by climate change and ozone depletion, there has been a move towards a globally oriented 'ecosociology'. In each case, what marks the new human ecology is the emphasis on how the environment, especially the rapidly degraded environment of modern economies based on exponential growth, limits societal possibilities.

Nonetheless, beyond alerting sociologists and others to the potential effects of exponential growth, the new human ecology has been very disappointing. The impact on the field of sociology has been minimal and there appears to be little theoretical development other than the highly abstract paradigmatic critique of Catton and Dunlap's original work. While there are several reasons for this relative silence, there is a case to be made that the new human ecology is simply not sociological enough, especially in accounting for the source(s) of environmental degradation. Hannigan (1997) has remarked that, not unlike the old human ecology, the ability to account for changing power structures and human action is limited, a problem that elsewhere has been linked to functionalism and the uncritical use of organic metaphors.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) Together, these problems may be traced to the rather uncritical assimilation of functionalist ecology into the new human ecology. In many regards, the new human ecology seeks to renew functionalist theory by imbedding human society within a natural system of checks and balances. Besides the charge of biological reductionism, this project also runs up against the criticisms of functionalist thought in general. Most pertinent here is the problem of understanding conflict as anything but exceptional,
Given the functionalist roots of the new human ecology, it should come as little
surprise that when questions of human action and social change have been addressed
these authors have most often turned to the study of environmental attitudes (Buttel
1987). Through the 1980s environmental sociologists and others sought to track and
understand the extent to which environmental attitudes had changed or were changing.

Much of the early work in this value-change approach focussed on linking
environmental attitudes to what Inglehart (1982) has considered 'post-material' values.
Thus, it was argued that the increasing financial and material security of those born after
WWII has led to a focus on such non-material needs as personal growth and autonomous
decision making (see Greenbaum 1995; Buttel 1986,1987; or Lowe and Rudig 1986 for
summaries). Some have refined this argument to suggest that it is only certain sectors of
the middle-class that are more likely to support post-material and environmental attitudes
(Cotgrove and Duff 1981; Kreisi 1989).

However, establishing links between such factors as an individual’s income,
occupational prestige, or education and environmental concern has been a relatively futile
task. In the end, despite volumes of statistical data, few conclusions linking demographic
data to environmental concern may be reached. In fact, international survey data, and the
increasing evidence of grassroots environmental action, have been used to directly refute
dysfunctional events whose genesis remains outside of the system. For a discussion of
how functionalist mechanical and organic metaphors are misused by both natural and
the post-materialism thesis (Brechin and Kempton 1994; Bullard 1993; Schwab 1994). Moreover, even if such links could be established, there is significant evidence to suggest that environmental concern is a poor predictor of environmental action (Ungar 1994; Wall 1995). It is instructive that after reviewing dozens of studies attempting to link individual attributes with environmental consciousness Greenbaum (1995) can only conclude that the “social bases of environmental concern are complex and subtle”.

In response to the problems of the new human ecology and value-change approaches, recent research in mainstream environmental sociology has argued for a better understanding of how specific cultural contexts shape environmental concern and how environmental ideologies are produced. Most notable in this area is Hannigan’s attempt to mark out the territory of a social constructionist perspective in environmental sociology.

From a social constructionist vantage, the idea that there is any necessary connection between environmental conditions and environmental concern is discarded. In its place social constructionism offers the study of the political, cultural and social processes by which environmental conditions come to be defined as ‘problems’. Social constructionism trains our attention on the ways in which “environmental conditions are defined as being unacceptably risky and thus actionable” (Hannigan 1997, 30).

This approach underscores the fact that nature itself is a linguistic concept whose definition is open to struggle. In so doing, constructionism problematizes the link between environmental degradation and environmental values or goals. Environmental
issues become sites of linguistic struggle where the very definition of what is a problem and what is not is challenged.

Contested are the nature and gravity of environmental threats, the dynamics underlying them, the priority accorded one issue versus another and the optimal means for mitigating or ameliorating conditions which have come to be defined as problematic. The parties involved in the contestations include private industry, government, regulators, scientists, environmental groups, community organizations, trade and professional groups and, increasingly, grassroots 'victims'. What is ultimately most significant here is the process through which environmental claims-makers influence those who hold the reigns of power to recognise definitions of environmental problems, to implement them and to accept responsibility for their solution. (Hannigan 1997, 185)

While constructionism offers real advantages over the ahistoricism of the earlier survey research on 'values', there remain two fundamental problems. First, reconciling this approach with the original goal of environmental sociology (the reintroduction of environmental constraints into social theory) is not a simple task. Here we risk falling into the intractable battle between the constructionist, for whom trees are linguistic constructions, and their critics who sarcastically respond, “run yourself head first into that tree and see if it’s real or if it’s a text.” (Bennet and Chaloupka 1993, xii).

Within this debate, Hannigan certainly intends to retain the independence of nature. In Hannigan’s words:

... social constructionism, as it is conceptualised here does not deny the independent causal powers of nature, but rather asserts that the rank ordering of these problems by social actors does not always directly correspond to actual need. (30)
Nonetheless, without wading in too deep, it is symptomatic of this approach that Hannigan fails to directly address the problem of just how sociology might help us differentiate ‘legitimate’ environmental problems from those less threatening.17

Secondly, while clearly recognizing the importance of power relations to the study of environmental problems, such relations are under-theorized. Hannigan’s constructionist synthesis offers creative elaboration of the sort of middle-range theory we previously identified with mobilization and frame alignment theory (and from which Hannigan freely borrows). Abstracted from a more macro analysis of class and power, constructionism, while useful in mapping the myriad of strategic possibilities and competing interests, and in demonstrating the creative work of social movements, can rapidly devolve into a simplistic, liberal understanding of environmental politics.18

To some, the work of Ulrich Beck (1992; 1995) suggests a macro framework that might reinvigorate environmental sociology by centring both environmental problems and the social construction of environmental issues (Hannigan 1997, 18). We might start by recognizing the sheer ambition of this project, one that blends environmental criticism, a

17 See Brulle 1998 for a discussion

18 Hannigan’s own ambivalence is informative. In surveying environmental sociology, the author identifies a political economy approach as compatible with social constructionism, yet within emphasis is placed on post-modern theories whose analysis of power is arguably more compatible with a liberal notion of politics. In suggesting further areas of research, the compatibility of constructionist and political economy approaches is once again highlighted (Hannigan 1997).
grand theory of social change and the investigation of political strategy – Beck has done no less than fashion a new theory of modernity and its politics.

While, as do the New Human Ecologists, Beck contends that environmental problems call for a radical rethinking of traditional sociology, this is not so much because sociologists have heretofore been wrongheaded but because the trajectory of modernity itself has been fundamentally altered. Highlighting the anthropological shock of events such as Chernobyl, Beck argues that industrial ‘wealth distributing society’ has given way to a ‘risk distributing society’ – one where the threat of ecological devastation has displaced class struggle. In such a risk society the principal struggle is over which risks are accepted and who might face these. Ecological threat thus drives the need for a new politics, one that privileges the new social movements as much as it does a new sociology.

Unlike the New Human Ecologists, however, Beck embraces the cultural construction of nature as a fundamental component of the risk society. At this late moment of modernity, which Beck refers to as reflexive modernity, nature is never again to be ‘outside’ us\(^\text{19}\). Of special import here is Beck’s description of the increasing transparency of the social role of science, one that leads to a more reflexive and critical stance. Its presuppositions bared, new competing forms of science emerge (e.g. conservation biology) opening up a struggle to define the risks of modern technologies.

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\(^{19}\) A position that leads Beck to be contemptuous of both sociologists and ecological movements that might insist that nature exists outside of the social.
Undoubtedly provocative, and a source of numerous insights into the 'nature' of ecological politics, Beck’s work has come under considerable criticism. Often frustratingly abstract and speculative, it is entirely unclear how one might translate this ‘apocalyptic theory of modernity’ into more empirical work. Critics have further noted the difficulty in simultaneously postulating that environmental threats have increased dramatically, altering the course of modernity, and that such risks are cultural constructions (Hannigan 1997, 184).

Most gravely, however, is the criticism that Beck’s work, in its eagerness to demonstrate the uniqueness of the new risk society, draws a far too direct line between environmental dangers and environmental (and other new movement) politics—distancing both from (wealth) distributional struggles. Beck, noting that social class and other divisions offer little security from environmental risks, famously concludes that while ‘Hunger is hierarchical, smog is democratic’. Though not completely ignoring the matter, Beck seriously under-plays the relationship between environmental risk and class which continues to be reproduced on both global and local levels. We can only repeat

20. The very marriage of the concept of risk and macro level theorizing provides a comfortable reference point for micro-level studies of risk and risk assessment—an area of much interest. Given the abstraction of this macro theory there is a danger that its assumptions will remain untested by any sort of interaction with more empirical work. For example, the relative blindness of macro-level risk theory to class and class politics may simply lead away from any critical discussion of this determining variable.

21. Bronner (1995, 67) acutely remarks: “come to think of it, smog was probably never quite so democratic anyway”. While the author juxtaposes (sub)urban New Jersey with the posh Atlantic beach resorts, one might just as easily draw examples from
here that there is overwhelming empirical evidence that inequalities in wealth and environmental risk are becoming more, not less, entangled with the growth of global capital.

If environmental sociology remains at the margins of the discipline, even while environmental problems and environmental movements have staked out prominent political and cultural territory, this is not without cause. While challenging sociology to take seriously nature and the notion of environmental limits, mainstream environmental sociologists have failed to develop a convincing new paradigm – either natural limits are taken for granted and the social production of environmental degradation is under-explained (ie. reduced to a value problem), or the natural environment is over-explained as a social and cultural construction. Moreover, macro-frameworks in this sub-discipline either turn away from, or openly deny, the salience of class.

In the following I argue for, if not a marriage, at least a critical engagement of class analysis and environmental sociology under the banner of political ecology. It is proposed that this emerging field suggests a way to move between the concerns of natural limits and politics, between the analysis of the social (re)production of the degradation of humans and the environment and the mobilization of movements that resist this degradation.

Halifax, Hamilton or Vancouver. In the latter case, a city with one of North America’s greatest concentrations of automobiles, one might contrast the air quality of the verdant seaside neighbourhoods of West Vancouver with that of the working-class eastside and the Fraser Valley suburbs.
Political Ecology

Political ecology has developed within environmental sociology and alongside the new human ecology with which it shares fundamental principals. Most prominent of these shared principals is the "acknowledged centrality of the 'metabolism' between historical societies and the ecological conditions of their existence" (Benton, 1996, 2). Furthermore, there is a general agreement that there needs to be a certain 'realignment' of the social and natural sciences in order that the interpenetration of biology and culture be adequately addressed (Benton 1996). What distinguishes this approach however is an insistence that the political economy of class theory reside at the centre of our investigation of this society-environment relation.

As Hayward (1994) makes clear, political ecology is not simply a political economy of ecological issues. Neither does this approach, unlike human ecology, seek to subsume politics under the study of ecological limits. Instead, political ecology seeks to grasp the real relations between ecology and politics while maintaining the identity and difference of each. In many regards, political ecology seeks an extension of political economy, one where the exploitation of class relations is understood within the exploitation of nature. Political ecology, then, is premised on a dual critique; "a critique of the subjection to the market of human labour on the one hand, and of land – or nature more generally – on the other" (Hayward 1994, 14).
There are three main directions of political ecology: (1) the rereading and rediscovery of early Marxist texts on the environment/society relation, (2) the study of the intersection of labour and environmental movements, and (3) the elaboration of contemporary theories of the capital-environment relation. While we will largely restrict our discussion to the latter two areas of enquiry, some preliminary remarks are in order.

Earlier we argued that environmental sociology developed as a response to the growth of the environmental movement, especially during the 1970s. By insisting that sociology reject most previous theory, new human ecology easily incorporated the concerns about ecological limits raised by this movement with little debate. In the case of political ecology, the movement-discipline relation is somewhat more complex.

The initial response of Marxism to the ecological politics of the late 1960s and 1970s was often hostile. Environmental movements were dismissed as populated by a politically naive middle-class, technocratic elites serving capital, and/or back-to-the-land ‘hippies’ (Enzensberger 1996). On the other hand, environmentalists have often considered the concerns of political economy to be either irrelevant, an idea captured by the Green Party slogan “Neither Left or Right, but out in front”. Whatever the case, the issues and the ideology of environmentalism clearly required a response from political economy and often this response has involved a return to the classic works of Marx and Engels. This rereading has yielded conflicting and confusing results.

First, even those most sympathetic readers acknowledge that there are significant tensions between much contemporary ecological thought and these classic texts. Most
prominent here is Marx’s ‘productivist’ view of history, one which understands the development of the forces of production as a positive outcome of the capitalist phase of history (Ladd 1994). Even the most reformist of environmentalists would shudder at Marx’s glowing description of the progress of industry to the point where capitalist relations of production serve only to hold back its further development (see especially Marx 1977, 40-42 and 48). Eckersley (1992) has thus condemned ‘orthodox’ eco-Marxism as relying on an ecologically and morally unsound “complete social mastery of nature”\textsuperscript{22}.

\textsuperscript{22} Admittedly, we here only hint at a much larger tension between environmentalism and socialism. Putting aside the slippage of cold-war politics into more serious debate, we can say that much of this tension is rooted in the very real, and indeed massive, ecological destruction that has taken place within actually existing socialism. However, those that would equate the theory and practice of such states with Marxism in general and especially the ecological Marxism of radical political ecology are misguided.

Without any bent toward apology, we can insist that any account of this environmental destruction include a critique of the manner by which these countries maintained (or created) modes of production that paralleled (when it did not outright copy) capitalist forms. Within the context of superpower rivalry, socialist countries engaged in an ecologically and socially disastrous attempts to ‘catch up’ with technologically advanced Western countries. Production methods and technologies were imported as were measures of progress based upon the quantity of consumer goods and technologies. To this end, the Marxist Political ecology that we speak of below may be rightly turned upon this sort of socialism.

Of course, the political structure of these states must also come under scrutiny. Assuming that a totalitarianism state/party system is not the only political/cultural form compatible with socialist economy, it is safe to say that we know little of the possibility of ecological socialism.

Finally, with such non-apologies aside we can emphasize that the failures (and amongst these the successes) of such socialist regimes must be thoroughly analyzed and the lessons from such analysis must be incorporated into ecological Marxism. To the
On the other hand, it has been rightfully argued that Marx and Engels’ work prefigures the very concerns of social ecologists and what we have called here the ‘new human ecology’. Lee (1980) turns to Marx’s early works to demonstrate that the concept of alienation captures not only the alienation between humans and between humans and their work but also between humans and nature. It is argued then that socialist struggle is a struggle to overthrow an economic system that treats humans and nature as mere instruments in production.

Others have repeatedly demonstrated the strength of Marx’s dialectical understanding of the human nature-relation as described throughout Marx’s work, but perhaps most clearly in his discussion of the labour process. Marx argues, for example, that in acting on the ‘external world’ humans not only change nature but at the same time change themselves (Marx 1977, 173). Political ecology has long been premised on this understanding, one that suggests the unresolvable interdependency of humans and nature.

We mention this debate, not to provide an answer to the question of whether Marx was an early ecologist, though we would tend to agree with Vaillancourt that this would be an overstatement. Nor do we suggest that returning to these texts offers any sort of authoritative guidance in contemporary matters. We do hope it is clear, however, that drawing on Marxist sources is indeed compatible with an environmental sociology. It is extent that the theory we describe below purges economic reductionism and rejects technocentrism (and does so to a much greater degree than many of its decidedly non-Marxist counterparts), we believe that much of this learning has already taken place.
equally clear, however, that if Marxism is to develop an adequate understanding of the
degradation of humans and nature within the contemporary moment, it will do so not
through ‘defending’ these ambiguous texts but by building upon the particular insights
that remain valid. As Soper (1996) has argued, Marx’s texts are

often so formally dialectical and devoid of empirical content that they
allow for either a more green or more technocratist interpretation. This is
one reason for wanting a synthesis of green and Marxist intellectual forces:
it will allow the ecological argument to flood the vacuum. Where Marx
failed to blueprint, we can blueprint green. (96)

Within environmental sociology, Alan Schnaiberg was one of the first authors to
acknowledge the usefulness of Marx’s work, and thus directly challenge the stark line in
the sand drawn by Catton and Dunlap, and to develop a coherent and integrated account
of the relationship between capital, the state and the environment.

Schnaiberg (1980) begins The Environment with the observation that human and
ecological societies have fundamentally different growth dynamics: while the latter
“changes over time from a simpler, faster-growing one to a more complex, slower
growing entity”, in human societies this dynamic is reversed. Moreover, while
ecosystems tend towards a steady state where surplus energy is absorbed by the growth in
number of species and population, human societies use surplus “to accumulate still more
economic surplus in future periods” (19). In making this distinction, Schnaiberg both
departs from the functionalist accounts of those of the new human ecology school and
marks his accordance with a political ecology that insists on maintaining economy and
nature as distinct categories.

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Of critical importance is the relationship between these categories. This relation, the ‘societal-environment dialectic’, forms the core of Schnaiberg’s political ecology and was elaborated in an early work as follows:

(1) economic expansion of societies necessarily requires increased environmental extraction; (2) increased levels of environmental extraction inevitably lead to ecological problems . . .; and (3) these ecological problems pose potential restrictions on further economic expansion. (1975, 5)

Schnaiberg later weaves this relation into a more detailed account of the specific logic of capitalist accumulation and the position of the state. In a neo-marxist fashion, Schnaiberg describes the position of state managers as trapped between the competing demands afforded by environmental degradation and capitalist accumulation. Capitalist economies, Schnaiberg argues, are marked by a trend towards the increased concentration of capital. This ‘monopoly sector capital’ both displaces labour with capital intensive production and creates significant environmental problems. Many of the costs associated with such production (the social costs of welfare and unemployment, the infrastructure and educational costs associated with technology development, and the costs of environmental regulation and amelioration) are externalized and fall to the state. While the profits of the monopoly sector increase, governments are increasingly faced with tough fiscal decisions. Schnaiberg argues that, in the short-term, the least costly means by which the competing and mutually exclusive demands on the state (fiscal integrity and ensuring monopoly profit) may be met is through economic expansion. The treadmill of production not only proceeds but accelerates.
Though such ecologically unsound expansion is ‘built into’ capitalist economies, Schnaiberg insists that there are political and economic alternatives. For Schnaiberg, the state finds itself faced not only with such economic and ecological contradictions but also as a site of political struggle. Retaining a relative independence the state has the ability to “rechannel production surplus in non-treadmill directions” (1980, 249) in what is described as an ‘ecological synthesis’ of the economy-nature dialectic. However, such possibility is tempered by the recognition that

the state can only do so when there is both a sufficient crisis of faith in the treadmill, and sufficient political support for production apart from the treadmill. To date, this combination does not exist in advanced industrial societies like the US. (1980, 249)

In the absence of such a convergence of widespread dissatisfaction and political will, governments will either actively aid capital in the project of economic expansion (as described above) or will address environmental degradation through policies of ‘managed scarcity’ where limited reforms regulate the most pressing problems and the dynamic of the treadmill is left largely intact.

The future of the treadmill is therefore a question that can only be answered in the political arena. While ecological degradation is pushed forward by contemporary economic and political structures the ecological and economic contradictions inherent in these structures provide room for political challenge. Schnaiberg himself has professed hope that a particular branch of environmentalism, the appropriate technology (AT) movement, offers the best hope for pushing the state towards an ecological synthesis.
The author acknowledges however that the political effectiveness of this movement has been limited by its lack of resonance with labour.

Ironically, labour's less than enthusiastic response to the AT movement is arguably due to a weakness that it shares with Schnaiberg’s own work: the ambivalent analysis of the relationship between capitalist relations of production and environmental degradation. As Buttel (1986) has argued, it is often unclear in this work whether the source of environmental degradation is to be located in the logic of capitalism, the state, or some combination. Schnaiberg thus leaves important questions about the role of labour and the relation of labour and environmental movements under-theorized.

Nonetheless, especially when one compares the impact of Schnaiberg’s work to that of other environmental sociologists, the utility of adapting Marxist political economy to environmental issues appears clear. Indeed, since the publication of this work Marxist scholars have been inspired to develop more rigorous, and more rigorously Marxist, theoretical understandings of the relationship between capital, the state, environmental problems and the social movements.

Amongst this work it is that of James O’Connor that has been most widely noted and critiqued. In the pages of *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism and beyond*, O’Connor has developed a theory of the tendency of capitalism towards ecological crisis that Benten

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23 Moreover, Buttel’s criticism that ecological problems themselves are only addressed in abstraction is of some import.

24 Here we will follow O’Connor’s latest elaborations. See O’Connor 1998.
has ranked as “the most thoroughly worked out and systematic development of an ecological Marxism so far”. If anything, this project is sweeping. Citing the spirit of Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation*, O’Connor seeks to understand “the process whereby capital is its own barrier (or limit?) because of its self-destructive forms of proletarianization of human nature, alienation of labour power, appropriation of labour, and capitalization of external nature and the ‘urban.’” (1998, 159).

Yet despite this breadth of scope, or perhaps as a necessary result of it, O’Connor’s approach is deceptively simple: to Marx’s original formulation of capitalism’s tendency to a crisis of overproduction, O’Connor adds a tendency towards the erosion of ‘conditions of production’. The author contends that there exists within the logic of capitalism a ‘second contradiction’, a contradiction between the relations and forces of production and human and natural conditions of production. Capitalism’s response to this degradation of the environment is the expanded appropriation of human labour power, environment and urban infrastructure or space each of which, though they are not (re)produced capitalistically, are treated as commodities.

To continue the analogy, as the first contradiction is said to generate crises which require the restructuring of relations and forces of production and to provide the conditions for a labour movement, the second contradiction is said to require a restructuring of the conditions of production and to engender so-called New Social Movements. O’Connor then suggests that there are two related but distinct paths to socialism led either by labour or environmental (and other ‘new’ social movements).
Now, the criticisms raised by O’Connor’s approach are many, and we will soon address these, however it is important to stress the ways which this project does at least confront the subject matter of our work in ways that other social movement theories do not.

First, O’Connor insists that political ecology must rest on the dual critique of the distinctly capitalist exploitation of labour and environment. This beginning signals an attempt to understand two distinct, yet overlapping, terrains of exploitation within capitalism, each providing possibilities for resistance. From such a beginning, the idea of ‘old’ and ‘new’ movements dissolves – both movements find the structural conditions with which they both exist and resist rooted in a capitalist mode of production. This beginning recognizes the difference of labour and environmental movements while maintaining the central importance of capitalism as the context for parallel forms of exploitation.

O’Connor’s treatment of the first contradiction is unexceptional. The author traces the contradictory needs for capital to drive down the cost of labour and to increase demand for commodities. With a broad recognition of the contingency of capital’s response (consumer and government credit, ‘theft’ of international markets from domestic capitals, capitalist class consumption, each of which creates new problems), O’Connor argues that capitalism is a ‘crisis’ ridden system.

More important for the understanding of labour movements, however, is the related premise that Capital comes to depend on crisis to restructure and restore profits. It
is argued that capital not only weathers, but benefits from crisis by using this moment to
restructure the forces and relations of production. This restructuring takes the form of
new cooperative relationships between individual capitals, within the state, and between
capital and the state. While effective in maintaining and advancing capitalist forms of
production, this cooperation and co-ordination mark the increasingly socialized nature of
this production. It is this cooperation that provides structural and ideological resources
for a movement to resist labour exploitation.

This reiteration of the Marxist account of capitalist crisis takes an ecological turn
with the assertion that this first contradiction is but one of two broad contradictory
qualities of capitalist development. An ecologically cogent Marxist, O’Connor argues,
must also trace and explain the relationship between capitalist economy and the
‘conditions of production’. Critical here is the assertion that capitalist relations and
forces of production work to undermine the forces and conditions of reproduction. These
conditions of reproduction include the natural environment, workers’ social and
biological well being, social capital and infrastructures, and the urban social and physical
environment. The question asked, and answered with some hesitation, is whether capital
creates its own barriers or limits through either destroying or somehow impairing these
conditions?

The short answer to this critical question is ‘yes’. Self-expanding capital, in
propelling the ‘treadmill of production’, treats the conditions of production as if they
were commodities. However, these conditions are not reproduced capitalistically and
therefore capitalist markets cannot assure their reproduction. Capital is in fact doubly 'crisis-ridden': to crises of production we can add crises that arise from the destruction of the forms of social life upon which capitalism has come to rely (capitalist family structure), the city (through the under-provision of transportation, spiralling rent costs), and the destruction of forests and sources of clean water and air. The threat comes from both the exhaustion of these necessary conditions and the costs of repairing damaged social and environmental conditions and/or developing artificial substitutes.

Again, crisis for capital offers both problems and possibilities. As for the latter, capital takes advantage of crises of the reproduction to 'restructure' conditions as productive forces. Technological changes are introduced that makes raw material acquisition less expensive (for example decimated natural forests are replaced with more flexible “sustained-yield” forests) and planning processes are developed to ensure more control over conditions (i.e., the planning processes put in place to coordinate the

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25 This is fundamentally a problem of value. Capital either treats such ‘conditions’ as free goods (whenever possible) or recognizes only an exchange value. It is the historic role of social movements to defend the specific, use value of old-growth forests, social forms and labour itself (As O’Connor acknowledges it is in the absence of such movements that the value of labour and built and natural environments are reduced to ‘conditions of production’). What the social movements do (amongst other things) is defend highly site-specific values that are not reducible and thus not amenable to even the most reformist projects of resource economists.

To this end, radical political ecology shifts Marxism’s attention away from the labour theory of (exchange) value and towards a theory of use value and its incompatibility with capitalist production.
liquidation of ancient forests with the economic viability of second-growth ‘factory forests’).

Yet, as in the ‘first crisis’, capital’s response to crises of the reproduction of conditions also provide important resources for movements that challenge capitalist relations. These resources are available to labour movements that struggle over the well-being of workers and their social environment and to ‘new social movements’ which struggle over capitalist access to nature and other conditions.

Important here is the place of the state, “or capitals acting as if they are the state” between capital and nature. Capital’s response to crises of production conditions highlights the relationship between capital and nature which unlike the relations of production are necessarily politicized. In this respect the ‘second contradiction’ presents opportunities even more explicit than those engendered by traditional Marxist theory of capitalist contradiction.

Again, while the problems with a ‘second contradiction’ approach must be addressed, what must first be stressed is the success that this approach has in broadening traditional Marxist analysis to include environmental degradation, the relative autonomy of new social movements from class struggles, the role of the state and a non-reductionist range of options for capital re-invention through restructuring. At the very least, the themes dealt with by O’Connor must be acknowledged as central to debates about the complex relations of capital, nature, labour and the new social movements.
Evaluating the Second Contradiction Thesis

Certainly, since Marx himself there have been Marxist thinkers who have duly noted the destruction of nature and humans under capitalism. Most often however this link has only been vaguely described or, more dangerously, forced into a rigid ‘logic of capitalism’ argument that leaves unexplained (or over-explained) political struggle. While the ecological destructiveness of capitalism may be self-evident, a Marxist political ecology must develop a fairly sophisticated analysis of the particularity of this destruction, one that rigorously avoids determinism. The second contradiction thesis, at the very least, challenges radical political ecologists to develop just this sort of analysis.

The strength of O’Connor’s ‘second contradiction’ argument lies not in any sort of elaboration of a precise logic of capitalism but rather in its tentative and self-consciously qualified mapping of the evolving terrain of capitalist exploitation. O’Connor’s work maps the material context for labour and environmental movements and positions them within capitalist relations of production. However these movements are neither reduced to these relations nor is one movement subsumed under the other. The second contradiction acknowledges the different material grounding of labour and environmental movements and allows for their distinct trajectories.

Moreover, the second contradiction thesis insists on a dialectical tension between the two contradictions and between the movements engendered by these contradictions. Such an approach brings to the fore a broad range of historical possibility that can only be
understood through careful dissection of the relationship between forms of crisis and restructuring and between labour and environmental movements and between each of these.

Finally, the second contradiction directly confronts the role of the state and its relation to both capital and nature. In positioning the state between capital and nature, O'Connor moves us towards an understanding of the inherent politicization of production conditions. This approach resists the reduction of environmental struggles to technical or economic issues by insisting that all access to nature is the result of political struggle.

Yet there are nagging doubts about the usefulness of this approach. The direst of these criticisms is the charge of determinism. With some justification, the mere whisper of 'contradiction' is enough to raise the spectre of an argument that reduces social life to economic relations. While such concerns cannot be dismissed, it is rather clear that O'Connor takes great pains to avoid any such notion. Though it is suggested that there exists a certain logic to capitalist production, at each point in the argument the author injects the contingency of political struggle. The range of political and social forms compatible with, and available to, capital, whether the destruction of nature faces capital as an external barrier, how crises are resolved are all questions of politics and ideology first and economics only second as O'Connor correctly notes (1995, 206).

A second set of difficult questions revolves around whether or not the idea of contradiction is over-extended in this second instance. The second contradiction thesis stands or falls on the ability to draw parallels between (1) the way that capitalist crisis and
restructuring suggest more socialized forms of production and more socialized forms of
the reproduction of the conditions of production, and (2) between the ways that labour
and environmental movements come to form social barriers to capital. These parallels are
indeed difficult to 'prove'. Critics have argued both that this second contradiction is but a
subset of the first (Lebowitz 1996). Others have claimed that such an understanding of
the particular form of environmental crisis under capitalism is too narrow and that the
material founding of environmental movements under capitalism explains too little of
their struggles (Toledo 1995; Benton 1996).

However, it is Benton's (1996) criticism that the 'substantial differences in life
situation' of those faced with the 'second contradiction' are so great that parallels with
the labour movement are untenable that most squarely addresses the problems and
possibilities of O'Connor's thesis. Benton suggests that environmentalist/new movement
unity based on some common relation to capitalist economic relations might never be
possible, let alone the more complex labour/environmental movement unity. The larger
question, I would suggest, is how has the history of the relationship between capital and
labour, capital and environmental movements, and between labour and environmental
movements resulted in the economic, political and environmental conditions that shape
contemporary struggles. These are empirical questions as much as they are theoretical.

Here we must return to our opening comments. If we are to avoid a determinist
economic model, and if we are to suggest in its place a theory of capitalist tendencies
towards crisis (a theory where history is created in political struggle, especially struggle
over the nature and form of capitalist restructuring) then this dissertation must be a map of an evolving terrain. In adopting a ‘weak’ concept of contradiction, O’Connor’s theory maps past tendencies and future possibilities. We contend then that the debate over the viability of this approach, though not without merit, must be based on the empirical study of ecological crisis and the relationship between movements. The second contradiction thesis demands that we ask questions such as: How have capitalist crises of the reproduction of conditions been resolved in ways that make socialism more or less imaginable, and how have the struggles of labour and environmental movements shaped and been shaped by the restructuring of capitalist relations? Are we faced with parallel movements each suggesting a distinct route to socialism, or two ‘categories’ of movements each of whose success relies on the ability to articulate a shared project? This theory must be judged through the asking of these very questions.

**Summing up: Political Ecology, Social Movement Theory, and the Mapping of Labour and Environmental Movements**

In situations such as these, this is the place where the theoretical swords are drawn, a final thrust made, and a victor proclaimed. In the stead of decisiveness I might offer the reminder that our goal is both to listen to and speak with environmental and labour movements as they confront capital. Let me acknowledge my appreciation of the distinct insights that each of the theoretical traditions offers and that I will borrow freely from each in the following pages.
At the base of our approach, however, are guiding principles most clearly acknowledged in environmental sociology on the one hand and Marxist class theory on the other. Environmental sociology offers the challenge to the discipline as a whole to confront the human-nature relationship as central, and temporally prior, to all other concerns. This is a challenge we hope to meet by introducing environmental conditions as the material grounding of forestry capital and the social movements that challenge the exploitation of labour and nature.

Class theory confronts us with the persistence of capitalist relations of production. Such theory demands an appreciation of the salience of capitalist forms of exploitation while alerting us to the compatibility of such exploitation with diverse political and cultural forms. Moreover, class theory demands that we remain mindful of workers' resistance to exploitation, including the expression of this resistance in labour movements. Class theory reminds us that the form of production which marks our society is the product of workers and their struggles and the response of capital. Along with environmental conditions, we will consider relations of production as providing the material grounding of labour and environmental movements.

We understand political ecology as a theoretical and political project capable of understanding the relation of the natural environment and class politics. This project seeks to maintain the integrity/identity of each of these material groundings while acknowledging their interdependence. Political ecology insists on a dialectical understanding of the 'human metabolism with nature' where this process is regulated by
nature and politics and their relation. Political ecology provides sociology with a radical critique of capitalism based on the latter's destructive relations of production and on the destruction of conditions of production. In so doing it becomes possible to materially ground a diverse range of social movements in both capitalist politics and the capitalist (re)production of nature. Moreover, the nature of capitalist politics, and of nature itself, turns on the work of these movements.

Informed by political ecology, our study of forestry practice will focus on the dialectical relation of the regulating processes of nature and politics on the one hand and social movements on the other. Labour and environmental movements will be understood as creators of, and creations of, nature and politics. Such theory neither allows us to ignore nature and social structure nor to reduce social movement to effects of these. While our study is informed by a political ecology critique of contemporary capitalism, we do not seek an empirical validation of this work, at least not one in any decisive sense. Instead we offer a map of a particular terrain of struggle and suggest the usefulness of this general approach.

Social movements are at the centre of our work and we understand that movements and their contexts move. With this conviction we make use of the empirical tools developed by contemporary social movement theory. Here, we will draw freely from both resource mobilization and cultural approaches, with special notice given to the process by which ideological frames are developed. Our attention is drawn most sharply
to how mobilization processes and the cultural work of movements influence, and is influenced by, inter-movement relations.

In the end, our project will be measured by both how attentive we have been to the work of social movements and by the extent to which we can craft a work of sociology that speaks to these movements. Our elaboration of sociological theory will similarly be judged on its mindfulness of the practice of social movements and its usefulness in such practice.

Social Movements, Forestry Politics and the Crisis of Forestry in British Columbia

If political ecology demands the critique and synthesis of diverse strands of social theory, so does it demand a similar strategy be taken towards the empirical study of forest politics. In the following then we will draw on an eclectic range of authors studying both the specific case of British Columbian forest practice and politics and the more general study of the intersection of labour and environmental movements.

Here our argument should be familiar: a political ecology approach must trace the dual processes of the exploitation of human labour and of nature, that labour and environmental movements have their material grounding in a natural and built environment that is remade through capitalist forestry, and, finally, that understanding the relation of these movements is crucial to the understanding of the trajectory of British Columbia’s forests and communities.
British Columbia's Forests in Crisis: From Efficiency to Political Economy

If there is a point of convergence within the broad range of writing on forestry practice and politics it is that capitalist forestry as practised in British Columbia is unsustainable either within the current world economy, for environmental/ecological reasons, for social/political reasons, or a combination of all three factors\(^{26}\). Very few dispute the need for relatively drastic changes to this system. From here, though, things get rather complicated and we will but provide a broad outline of the major approaches offered.

First, from academics at the University of British Columbia’s faculty of forestry and from certain economic geographers, there has emerged a body of work whose purpose is both the analysis of the problems facing the province’s ailing capitalist forestry sector and the suggestion of policy alternatives. Most well known of this camp is Clark Binkley’s work on tenure reform and ‘zonation’.

As the dean of forestry at the University of British Columbia, Binkley has been a vocal critic of provincial forestry policy and the future of forestry. Binkley’s (1997) approach links environmental and ecological goals to a neo-liberal political economy of

\(^{26}\) While the social conflict and economic instability that mark forestry crisis have pushed the issue onto the agenda of many academics, this is less true within sociology and the field has largely been left to historians, political scientists, geographers and anthropologists.
forestry practice, one where massive 'efficiency gains' offer a solution to conflicting interests. Two quotes capture the fundamental assumptions of this author's argument:

... in BC there is still an opportunity to make the changes needed to sustain a vast wild estate while maintaining a prosperous society based on forest resources. (1997, 39)

Rapid adoption of improved technology is key both to the international competitiveness of BC's forest sector and to the responsible stewardship of the environment. (1997, 55)

Clearly, the author recognizes that the forests of British Columbia are both highly valued as resources for a forest products industry and as environmental resources and that these competing interests have made forest land, despite the province's small population, a scarce commodity. Citing a direct relationship between environmental interests and a high per-capita income, Binkley maintains that environmental movements are a rather certain and powerful factor in British Columbian politics.  

Binkley argues that current forestry practice, both state policy and industry structure, is incapable of reconciling environmental demands and economic viability within a capitalist world-market. State policies that are aimed at preserving environmental values often have the opposite effect and the forest industry has been structured on outmoded assumptions of access to the entire old-growth forest base and the

27 As we have seen, the correlation between economic affluence and environmental attitudes is not nearly as direct as Binkley assumes, though this assumption is quite in keeping with the post-material thesis to which many environmental sociologists have subscribed.
production of low-cost, low-value added products mined from ancestral forests. Given existing state policies and industry structure even minimal environmental withdrawals will result in significant reduction in harvest levels and the attendant reductions in forestry employment, and the amplification of the social problems that already disproportionately plague rural, forest dependent communities.

The solution for this author, as for many, is found in reform of the forest tenure system – the complicated system whereby access to timber resources is allocated. Binkley argues that the existing tenure system is only workable from the outmoded assumption that the entire land base will eventually be allocated to timber production. Other forest values have only been accommodated through patching and adding to the tangle of regulations which have neither ensured ecological values are maintained nor promoted a ‘viable’ forest industry. As a way forward, Binkley suggests the creation of a tenure system based on distinct, clearly defined zones, each created to meet a specific ‘forest value’. These zones would range from protected areas to zones explicitly designated for ‘intensive’ timber production. ‘Zoning’, a prototype of which already exists as a result of the piecemeal settlement of environmental conflicts over the years, is said to offer each of the many forest interests a distinct land base in which these interests might be met.

The key to the success of zoning in meeting the demands of each of the competing interests, however, is said to be the promotion of ‘intensive’ forestry – industrial forestry that obtains significantly higher timber yields through advanced silviculture techniques,
genetic engineering and capital intensive harvesting and processing. Intensive forestry squares the circle of forest conflicts by providing a greater volume of wood from a reduced land base, freeing up the ‘surplus’ land for other uses, including small-volume alternative or community forestry, habitat protection, and recreational use.

Central to Binkley’s zoning project is the reform of tenure and related forestry policies to encourage the forest industry to invest in the type of capital intensive projects necessary to increase forest yields. While acknowledging that recent government initiatives such as Forest Renewal British Columbia (FRBC) which reinvests stumpage revenues in retraining, silviculture, and R&D have just such an intent, these are described as too centralized and open to political pressure to fulfill this mandate (1997, 52-53).

Here, Binkley argues that the need for continual productivity improvements is tied up with the need for capital-friendly free-market reform. Forest land should either be privatized outright, or forest firms given secure, long-term tenure holdings upon which silviculture and harvesting decisions would be regulated, in the large part, only by market demand.

Now, it is tempting to simply dismiss Binkley’s analysis as the commentary of a forestry scientist ‘captured’ by the interests of large capital, and we will return to more specific criticisms28. Most tellingly, while Binkley’s solution is squarely aimed at

28 Under Binkley’s tenure, UBC’s forestry department, has developed closer ties to industry. Binkley himself simultaneously held both the position of Dean and a seat on the board of directors of a major forest company.
addressing the need for substantial areas of the land base to be removed from the
capitalist sphere of production (and, in a much lesser way, that other areas be removed
from monopoly/multinational sector production), where workers fit in and how they
might benefit is largely unaddressed. This is no small matter as the very sort of massive
and continual ‘productivity’ increases that Binkley encourages have over the last several
decades continually eroded the amount of forestry work available and workers’ control
over the nature of that work (Rajala 1998)\textsuperscript{29}.

However, here we should note that Binkley’s approach both acknowledges the
salience of environmental demands and locates solutions to social and environmental
problems in changing production and the context of production. Binkley’s approach does
introduce the idea that social, environmental and economic problems are each
intertwined.

To Binkley’s initial comments on the need to create a ‘knowledge based forestry
sector’ (1997, 55), we might add Hayter and Barnes’ (1997) more specific mapping of the
move from ‘Fordist’ to ‘flexible’ production. These economic geographers have
suggested that from the 1940s through the 1970s, British Columbia’s forest industry was
dominated by firms that epitomized ‘Fordist’ production, firms that: produced a few
homogenous products for export (construction grade lumber, kraft pulp, newsprint), used

\textsuperscript{29} There is the possibility that a greater emphasis on silviculture might balance
some of the displaced workforce, however Binkley clearly believes that this area too
requires ‘rationalization’.

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large capital intensive production facilities, were largely multi-nationals, were supported by state policy and investment, and used highly paid, though largely de-skilled labour.

According to Hayter and Barnes, the success of the Fordist model of production was aided by geography and nature (the value of old-growth forests allowed workers to successfully negotiate above average wage packages). On the other hand, Fordist production also produced a particular geography: decision making was centralized in the Vancouver metropolis, while production was dispersed throughout the hinterland, often in single-industry communities. This geography of production was aided by both tenure policies that favoured large capital and state investment in road, power and other infrastructure.

These authors describe the decline of Fordist production as precipitated by "economic changes and by a neoconservative political ideology". Here, Hayter and Barnes refer variously to globalization, technological change, and market differentiation as factors that both signal the end of Fordist production and herald the rise of 'flexible production'. However we might add that the authors also briefly note the effects of resource depletion and restrictions on access to forests due to environmental conflict (1997, 16). As the authors conclude: "Geography matters on every level."

Flexible production, Hayter and Barnes suggest, has taken two principal routes: (1) 'flexible mass production', where while the scale of production remains large, computerized manufacturing allows for specialized products and attention to higher quality/performance products and (2) 'flexible specialization' where there is an increase
in the number of small firms, often tied through subcontracting to larger entities, which produce specific products.

In evaluating the change to flexible production, Hayter and Barnes are ambivalent. The authors both praise the possibility of the sort of 'knowledge based forestry' lauded by Binkley, but they also note the 'dark side' of flexibility, one where workers are displaced, communities engage in vicious competition to replace outdated mills, and where the competitive advantage of small firms is based on low-wage non-union labour. Clearly Hayter and Barnes are sensitive to not only the high wages of employed forestry workers, as is Binkley, but also to the broader effects of capital intensive production on the workforce in general and the workers movement in particular\(^\text{30}\). However, Hayter and Barnes do seem to, if not disregard, at least bracket out environmental issues in just the place where their consideration seems most relevant.

Despite these differences, we might together take the work of Binkley and Hayter and Barnes as representative of a new 'efficiency' school of thought about the future of both the forest industry and the forest itself in British Columbia. Such an approach traces the problems facing forestry capital to a combination of 'market pressures' and limits imposed by geography and environmental considerations. However, the hallmark of this analysis is the focus on increased efficiency as a solution to both environmental and 'market' pressures. Capital intensive, specialized, highly 'efficient' production offers a

\(^{30}\) See the authors discussion of the difficult tradeoffs forced on workers at the Powell River paper mill (1997, 22-25).
solution whereby profits are significant enough to provide for the competing interests of labour and environment. As we will see in following chapters, such an approach echoes, in spirit if not in technical details, that offered by both large capital and the state at various moments of crisis in the forest industry. To a large degree, these authors understand environmental and social problems as technical and economic issues whose solutions lie in more efficient production for an international market.

To such efficiency arguments a more critical political economy approach is a necessary corrective and in this regard, Patricia Marchak's *Green Gold* (1983) remains the classic account of British Columbia's forest industry. In this work, Marchak argues that many of British Columbia's economic, social and environmental problems may be explained by the reliance on a forest industry that exports minimally processed 'staples' (pulp, dimensional lumber etc.). The province, Marchak contends, has come to depend on international capital whose interest does not lie in either developing a 'value added' industry of manufactured products or in developing 'backward linkages' whereby forest machinery, computers and other manufactured inputs into the production process are locally manufactured. In *Green Gold* Marchak convincingly traces the way in which state policies, including tenure policies, have encouraged the development of such a 'dependent' economy.

31 Here Marchak refers not only to 'foreign' capital but rather to capital that operates on the international market (1983, 7).
As do Hayter and Barnes, Marchak understands that the effects of this highly cyclical economy are unequally distributed across the geography of the province, however Marchak adds a much more rigorous account of class and gender issues. Marchak agrees that it is in the single-industry towns where each of the impacts are greatest. The labour force in these towns is “attached to, and moulded by . . . the boom and bust periods, seasonal fluctuations, and slumps caused by overproduction” (1983, 27). The restricted nature of the economy of single-industry towns reproduces a labour force with lower education levels as workers with other skills and educational credentials leave for opportunities in the core regions (1983, 28). Moreover, resource industries hire very few women and then only in very particular occupations. When women find paid employment it is most often in low-paying jobs in the service sector that supports these towns. Outside of work, women and children are faced with communities that often lack the cultural benefits of towns and cities with more diverse economic bases.

Having built ourselves into this ‘staples trap’, Marchak acknowledges that there are few easy solutions. Clearly, however, Marchak believes that only a shift in state policy could achieve the economic diversification necessary to subdue the social, cultural and environmental problems facing resource dependent communities. The author is wary

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32 For a recent elaboration of the economic and social status of women in forest-dependent communities and the gender-specific repercussions of restructuring, see Egan and Klausen (1998).
of public ownership but does suggest that forest policy such as tenure reform may be used to enforce/encourage more value-added production.

Since Green Gold, Marchak has more thoroughly addressed the environmental problems associated with capitalist forestry and embedded this criticism within the increasingly globalized capitalist economy and its ideological apologists, the ‘New Right’33. In both instances, however, Marchak’s analysis of both the problems and possibilities of British Columbia’s resource dependent communities remains similar: foreign capital whose interest lies mainly in the mining of old-growth forests and staple production create economic stagnation and the solution lies in diversification led by state policy.

Not without its problems34, Marchak’s political economy succeeds in warning against the assumption that simply providing the conditions for an ‘efficient’ capitalist forest industry will ensure economic and social development. Binkley’s argument in particular is vulnerable to such criticism as there is an explicit reliance on simple market mechanisms to produce economic development and environmental goods (though in the latter case the state is afforded a more active regulatory role). Marchak has demonstrated that the classical economic arguments underlying the efficiency approach fail to

33 See Marchak (1995; 1991) for a discussion of globalization and forestry in particular and neoliberal ideology and restructuring in general.

34 Primary here is Marchak’s portrayal of forestry labour as hostage to the necessities of capital, a position that leaves the question of resistance largely in the hands of the state.
understand the ‘integrated circus’ of global capitalism where capital moves rapidly to evade the environmental and social costs of production.

While Marchak’s work offers a powerful critique of efficiency models, it is much less helpful if we wish to understand the role of social movements in the reproduction of capitalist forestry as practised in British Columbia. Except in a very abstract sense, there is little comment on movements that struggle against the type of social and environmental degradation she describes. This distance from social movements as makers of history might account for the rather vague pronouncements about change. While Marchak often makes thoughtful policy suggestions, her reliance on the right-headedness (perhaps left-headedness might be more appropriate) of the state seems ill-based – especially given the history of social-democratic and right-wing provincial governments alike, which Marchak herself traces so astutely.

Offering something of a corrective, we might note the critique of contemporary forestry posed by activist and academic Michael M’Gonigle. M’Gonigle and colleagues at the University of Victoria have forcefully argued that the environmental and social problems of forestry as practised in British Columbia may only be overcome by a drastic shift from ‘industrial forestry’ to ‘eco-forestry’ (Burda, Gale and M’Gonigle 1998a). In short, these authors contend that industrial forestry and the large-scale production of relatively unprocessed commodities ignores ecological limits while rapidly depleting the ancient forests upon which it depends. In its stead, these authors prescribe a forestry that
begins from the study of the ecology of the forest (conservation biology and landscape ecology) and which is at once environmentally and socially sustainable\textsuperscript{35}.

This eco-forestry approach is built upon a political economy critique not unlike that we have just traced. As does Marchak, these authors contend that the state has supported capital's industrial forestry projects through tenure policies, infrastructure projects and direct subsidy and that the industry has come to rely on low-value commodity production and volatile international markets. However, these authors suggest that a much more radical change in state policy, indeed in the state itself, is necessary if we are to move to an ecologically sustainable forest economy. It is argued: (1) that the state must consider ecosystem needs first and foremost, that it take “sustainability seriously as an overriding social objective”; and (2) that state itself must change in form, that power must be decentralized and hierarchies levelled or reduced (1998, 52)\textsuperscript{36}. Ecoforestry practices, where timber volume and forestry technique are

\textsuperscript{35} Here the authors are particularly critical of Binkley's notion of zonation. Such policies, it is argued: encourage environmentally destructive forestry (large-scale clearcutting, monoculture plantations, and heavy fertilizer and pesticide consumption); fragment the forest into artificial 'zones'; cannot compete with similar efficiency based production in tropical and sub-tropical climates where trees grow considerably quicker, and will only fuel conflict over the zonation of the most productive valley bottoms (Burda, Gale and M'Gonigle, 1998a, 50-51). Marchak (1995) offers a similar critique of British Columbia's ability to compete against southern, plantation forestry.

\textsuperscript{36} Here the Burda et al find themselves in conflict not only with the efficiency school (see previous note) but with Marchak who shows some discomfort with the eco-centric approach, and is openly critical of the devolution of control, solely to the community level (see Marchak (1998) and Burda, Gale and M'Gonigle (1998b) for an exchange on these matters).
guided by ecosystem needs (and where volumes are dramatically reduced from current
levels and selective harvesting replaces clearcutting) are presented as inseparable from
fundamental changes to the state itself.

While the debate over the ecological, economic and social viability of the eco-
forestry is of critical import, what concerns us here is the way in which M’Gonigle et. al.,
suggest that forestry policy reflects social change and that labour, environmental and
other social movements are the critical agents of this change. Forestry labour, these
authors argue, has been critical to the creation and maintenance of industrial forestry and
the change to ecoforestry will depend on a ‘reinvigorated social movement’ comprised of
‘progressive civil society organizations’. Acknowledging the work of social movements
frees this approach from the determinism implicit in both efficiency and political
economy critiques. It is proposed that understanding forestry practice requires a
consideration of not simply the wishes/schemes of capital and the state but also of the
struggles of labour and environmental movements to shape such practice. The nature of
forestry and the nature of nature is then understood as a contingent outcome of this
political struggle.

Admittedly, M’Gonigle’s project is about the present struggle over forestry
practice. Thus, the interests and ideologies of the different historical actors are presented
as rather static. For instance, while described as part of a corporatist ‘iron triangle’, how
and why labour might find itself in this political alliance is left uncharted (or more
dangerously, assumed as ‘natural’). Perhaps even more problematic is M’Gonigle’s
failure to turn the tools of political economy back on the ecological movements themselves, to understand the political, economic and ecological grounding of these movements.

Together these problems lead the proponents of eco-forestry to dismiss labour as captured by the industrial forestry complex and to suggest that 'progressive labour' be a part of a eco-forestry movement. Moreover, the political basis of the movement promoted by these authors is under-theorized. The quirky choice of petty bourgeois and small capital interests as central players in a movement that would see the radical changes to the provincial economy seems, at the least, politically naive especially given the current ideology of these interests. Here it is entirely unclear what binds these interests together and, in the end, whether the politics of ecoforestry go beyond the pluralist model of power that the authors rightly criticise (see Burda, Gale, M'Gonigle 1998a, 67).

We might conclude then that the academic interjections into the current debate over forestry practice in British Columbia raise as many questions as they answer. It is telling, though, that both efficiency and political economy approaches suggest that the concerns of labour and environmental movements are crucial to the future of this debate. Efficiency proponents such as Binkley argue that more intensive capitalist forestry is necessary to continue to provide the high wages of forestry workers and the standard of living in forestry dependent communities and to meet environmental demands. Marchak's political economy suggests that labour is shaped by the organization of staples production and the environmental impacts of forestry. Finally, the eco-forestry approach,
insists that a broad-based social movement is necessary in the shift to an ecologically and socially sound forest economy.

Generally, though, while the importance of social movements is often either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged, this topic is rarely tackled square on. There are however two important exceptions. First, Jeremy Wilson, a political scientist also working out of the University of Victoria, has recently published an admirably thorough description of the influence of the environmental movement on the making of forestry policy over the last three decades. In *Talk and Log* (1998), Wilson traces the varying degrees to which the wilderness movement in British Columbia has been able to achieve policy change and preserve particular areas.

This author argues that until the 1960s forestry policy in the province was largely a backroom affair conducted between forest companies and state agencies. The principal success of the environmental movement, which has used imaginative and diverse forms of mobilization, has been to open up democratic debate over policy alternatives, “it has stimulated the collective political imagination, encouraging British Columbians to envisage alternative ways of organizing our relationship to the forests around us” (Wilson 1998, xxx). On the other hand, Wilson tempers this positive evaluation with the acknowledgement that forest industry interests continue to dominate forestry policy and that the debate over forestry remains frustratingly limited, that “British Columbians seem disinclined to accept the responsibilities and rights attending their ownership of the resource” (1998, 347).
The strengths and weaknesses of Wilson's approach are found in the careful description of the strategic and discursive battle over both the way forest policy is made and the range of possibilities open for consideration. The author seamlessly blends resource mobilization and social constructionist approaches as he traces a struggle between two loose coalitions of interests: the forest environment coalition and the development coalition. This is a battle of both resources and power but also one of ideas. The industry centred development coalition uses its financial power and political influence to counter charismatic and creative environmental leadership who rally supporters with surprising effectiveness. Both coalitions struggle for an upper-hand in a battle of experts where various branches of science, and the scientists themselves, are drafted into a discursive struggle.

Certainly indispensable to the study of forest politics, Wilson's approach does leave the questions most central to our work unanswered. The problem is not in the execution of the analysis but rather in the way the problem itself is framed. Perhaps a necessary result of Wilson's empirical detail, the author restricts his discussion, in the large, to the policy making process. The source of environmental or social problems is by default understood as poor policy. The study is exemplary in its understanding of the work of movements but it remains closed off from the analysis of the social and ecological contradictions that serve as the material grounding of labour and environmental movements.
This bracketing off of more macro analysis shows its limits when Wilson addresses the role of the labour movement in general and forestry workers in particular. While often noting in some detail the fact that forestry labour, especially the International Wood and Allied Workers of Canada (IWA), is wrapped into the development coalition fold, the understanding of how and why this has occurred is largely unaddressed. Relatedly, while Wilson notes attempts at labour-environment coalition building and their general failure, the study of the source of these difficulties, and the larger implications for both labour and environmental movements is neglected.

In a study that neatly concludes at the very date where Wilson’s study picks up, Richard Rajala (1998) also turns his attention to an area of study largely ignored in the former work: the relationship between resource and labour exploitation under capitalist forestry. Rajala’s work traces both the technical/ideological project of forestry capital to gain increasing control over forestry workers and the politics of science whereby governments came to ignore evidence of the ecological consequences of clearcutting.

More than the previously discussed authors, Rajala comes closest to developing the sort of political ecology that we have argued is necessary if we are to understand the dual process of exploitation that provide the material grounding for environmental and labour movements. Rajala’s work suggests a deep understanding of how forest policy is imbedded in capital’s quest for profits and derived from the increased exploitation of both workers and the natural environment. In place of the battle of interests suggested by
Wilson, Rajala describes the process by which capitalist relations and means of production set the political and geographic boundaries of this battle\textsuperscript{37}.

If this sounds deterministic, in many regards it is. Rajala is unapologetic in his description of the largely successful project of capital to control the technology and managerial structure of the workplace. Though cognizant of forestry workers' resistance Rajala finds that such resistance has met with little success. Rajala is especially clear that the largest union in British Columbian forestry, the IWA, has had little inclination for struggling over technology issues (1998, 6).

Here we believe that Rajala's study of the 'objective features of work' might just give up too much. In downplaying the work of social movements that have resisted social and ecological destruction, Rajala tends to tell the story of the victors. This may account for Rajala's tendency to under-explore the environmental movement and especially to underplay the diversity of both its social base and its social and environmental ideology. In his conclusions Rajala explicitly acknowledges the insights his study brings to those who grasp the parallels between environmental and labour struggles, however, the study itself only offers a glimpse of why and how these struggles have managed to remain so distant.

\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, Rajala argues that the class relation is the independent variable in determining the technology used in forestry. While this emphasis is a useful, and necessary corrective to traditional approaches that uncritically link mechanization, or lack thereof, to certain geographical features, political ecology suggests that we examine the relation between the two processes of exploitation.
It is our contention that one need not drift into the sentimentalism that Rajala cogently warns against while focussing more squarely on the work of labour and environmental movements in resisting the dual project of capitalist exploitation. Indeed, our project seeks something of a reconciliation between Wilson’s focus on the politics of movements and Rajala’s more structurally rigorous political ecology. As so many have suggested, the history and future of forest policy and practice will depend on not only the work of environmental and labour movements but on their relation.

Of Jobs and Environment: Studying the Intersection of Labour and Environmental Movements

Both in the previously discussed theoretical literature and in popular accounts (Kazis and Grossman 1983; Brooks and Paehlke 1991; Bernard 1992), it has been argued that a ‘common ground’ for labour and environmental movements exists somewhere in the political space beyond ‘jobs vs environment’ blackmail. Closest to our project, John Bellamy Foster’s (1993) call for an end to the ‘class vs ecology’ politics in the U.S. Pacific Northwest is a good example of both a critique of ‘environmentalism without class’ and the elaboration of an eco-socialist analysis of forestry practice. In British Columbia, Carrol and Ratner’s ongoing project to trace the many facets of ‘anti-hegemonic’ struggle has similarly argued that a political economy framing of injustice offers a point of convergence for diverse social movements and the best hope for developing a transformative politics (Carrol and Ratner 1996b).
However the study of the relation of environmental and labour movements as they are engaged in struggles over particular issues are more rare. We might begin with Thomas Dunk’s compelling and cautionary account of just how difficult it might be to construct alliances between resource workers and the environmental movement. In an analysis of how forest workers in Northern Ontario understand environmental issues and the environmental movement, the author argues that the meaning of these issues is overdetermined by existing narratives of both class and geography. The author argues that forest workers’ relationship to the forest is complex and certainly not determined by their concern for employment: workers clearly link environmental problems and job loss to mechanization in particular and corporate exploitation in general. At the same time, though, forestry workers also link environmentalism and environmentalists to longstanding class and regional grievances that arise from the regions: “environmentalists and environmentalism become metaphoric and metonymic symbols” of core-hinterland domination (Dunk 1994). Such existing narratives, upon which forestry workers build their identity are amplified by the media and become important resources for those acting to entrench the jobs vs environment dichotomy.

The movement between structural and discursive levels of analysis that marks Dunk’s work is also apparent in Rod Bantjes (1997) comparative study of coalition building in Nova Scotia and Maine. The author contends that decentralized state power in Maine, and the resources available to NGOs, facilitated a broad based coalition that was successful in its struggle for a powerful ‘anti-toxics’ bill. Importantly, this struggle
resulted in rank and file, blue collar, unionized mill workers defining themselves as environmentalists. This study suggests that given the right combination of resources and creative social movement work, 'environmentalist' can become a significant part of worker identity and environmentalism an integral part of union struggle.

In an urban setting, Roger Keil (1994) has applied a theoretical approach that at once acknowledges the distinctness of environmentalism as a 'new social movement' while maintaining that modern conflicts over distribution not only continue but may have increased in importance. Insisting that the articulation of different types of social conflict and forms of resistance is necessary to any project that hopes to transform capitalist relations of domination, Keil examines the empirical case of the Green Work Alliance in Brampton, Ontario.

The Green Work Alliance is said to have fostered both discussions within unions on environmental policy and coalition building between labour, environmental and community groups. In the former case, unions have built upon traditional health and safety issues to expose how environmental problems overwhelmingly put workers at risk and to link workers' concerns with employment to the need for 'green work'. Outside of the plants, coalitions have been forged that demand (and are only possible through) the discursive reconstruction of both labour and environmental movement identities and politics. At their best, such alliances challenge and reconfigure just what 'worker' and just what 'environmentalist' mean to those who include these notions within their identity.
and challenge worker and environmental movements to reconfigure their political projects.

Finally, Laurie E. Adkin’s (1998) study of the politics of unions and environmental groups tackling problems of toxic chemical pollution in southern Ontario during the 1980s offers a rare glimpse of the range of political stances available to each. For our purposes, it is Adkin’s comparative study of the Energy and Chemical Workers Union (ECWU which has since merged with several others to form the Communication, Energy and Paper Workers’ union (CEP)) and the Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW) that is most suggestive.

Adkin argues that a union’s strategy vis-a-vis the environmental politics can be understood as the intersection of several factors including: the political economy of the union’s economic sector, the cultural-ideological perspectives of leadership and the rank and file, and the strategies taken by environmental groups. The author chronicles how, faced with economic contraction, a weak political left and a fractured ecology movement, the ECWU chose an ‘elite-corporatist’ alliance with employers that entailed less short/medium term risk to workers jobs but shifted the long-term balance in favour of deregulated capital. This conservative union politics relied on and strengthened workers’ identity as skilled employees and equal members of a ‘heroic enterprise’ developed in opposition to environmental group members seen to be both ill informed and dependent upon their production (Adkin 1998, 321).
While the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), when faced with similar pressures of industry restructuring, took a much more aggressive political stance, choosing radicalization rather than retreat, this radicalization did not always spill into environmental policies or coalition building. Labour-management environmental committees have largely focussed on issues that might enhance productivity, environmental issues have not attracted significant leadership attention or become priority bargaining items, and workers' mobilization around these issues has been limited38 (Adkin 1998, 323).

During the last decade, however, Adkin suggests both structural and ideological reasons for environmental activism becoming more thoroughly integrated into CAW politics. In response to global capitalist restructuring and neoliberal politics, the CAW has moved beyond social unionism to a movement unionism focussed on coalition building. This political stance requires support from other social movements and interaction with these movements has served to transform union politics.

On an empirical level, Adkin's study pulls together many of the themes essential to the study of the environmental/labour movement relation: the structural constraints facing unions that act outside of the strict framework of collective bargaining, the cultural

38 Adkin argues that, in part, such neglect is traceable to a social democratic politics that allows trade unions to leave alliance building to the political party (in this case, and ours, the NDP).
cleavage between grassroots activists and workers, and the overarching importance of the
'structuring' of capitalist production.

Conclusions

Within the study of forest politics and the environmental/labour movement
relation, two themes vie for attention. The evidence is clear that capitalist forestry has
marked the social, economic and ecological terrain of British Columbia: the forest
landscape has been rapidly and dramatically altered and the economy and culture of
communities throughout the province have been shaped by this industry. Similarly, the
environmental/labour movement relation is clearly shaped by this particular political
economy: rural/urban histories of economic and cultural struggle place limits on the
appeal of environmentalism to resource workers, capitalist economies produce a
competition between nature and workers that makes real the 'jobs vs. environment'
dilemma, the rapid change and sheer complexity of these economies suggests a diversity
of cultural and ideological foundations for decidedly distinct social movements, and the
institutional and legal framework within which trade unions exist is difficult to reconcile
with the radical democratic politics of grassroots environmental movements.

Yet, these same studies also suggest the unpredictability and contingency of forest
politics and of social movement relations. When a lockout in Maine coincides with an
industrial accident, labour and environmental movements not only find common ground,
but workers come to include ‘environmentalist’ within their class identity. In a situation of rigid corporatist control of British Columbia’s forest politics, a broad range of heretofore unengaged citizens is mobilized in defence of ancient forests. In Ontario, a union, operating within a hostile political climate and whose members face the uncertainty of globalization and corporate restructuring, moves towards a coalition with environmental interests that could be seen as just another threat.

In the following pages our task is to use political ecology to shed light on both the structural and cultural constraint and the contingency of political struggle. We hope to show that British Columbia’s forests and people have been made by the history of capitalist forestry and, especially through the collective struggle of environmental and labour movements, are making this history.
Chapter 3

Conservationism, Socialism, Capital and the State: The (Very) Political Foundation of Contemporary Forestry Policy in British Columbia

This chapter traces the beginnings of capitalist forestry in British Columbia from the late 19th Century to the first Royal Commission in 1914. We begin by acknowledging the standard explanation for this first attempt to reign in capitalist exploitation of the provinces forests: that following a series of badly conceived policy initiatives the government of the day needed the information and political legitimacy to undertake an overhaul of forest policy.

When we examine the Royal Commission, its recommendations and its influence on state policy, we find that it did indeed announce a rather significant shift in policy direction: the commission and the provincial government overwhelmingly endorsed the ideology of 'scientific' sustained-yield forestry. The vision of large-scale capitalist forestry strictly guided by forestry scientists and ‘modern’ corporate managers and under the tutelage of an enlarged state bureaucracy marked a dramatic departure from the frontier capitalism of the day.

Indeed, we argue that the abruptness and timing of this shift leaves conventional explanations of these changes wanting. The interest in scientific forestry, we contend,
can only be adequately understood if we turn an eye to both the ecological and social failings of early capitalist forestry and to the social movement response. When we do cast a gaze in this direction we find that even at this early moment capital’s struggle to exploit nature and labour was being resisted by environmental and worker’s movements. A nascent environmental movement is evident in the words and actions of conservationists who raised the fear of forest famine and argued for stricter state control of the resource and of forestry practice and of those who sought to preserve ‘special places’. Workers, meanwhile, resisted the crude exploitation of resource industry work camps making good use of both the picket line and the ballot box. While these movements remained split along class lines they each presented an important critique of unrestrained exploitation.

It is within the context of labour and environmental challenge that we place the decision to call a Royal Commission and its findings. We argue that the solution of ‘scientific forestry’ was not simply a guide to effective forestry but also served as a blueprint for the control of labour and environmental movements. Indeed, we suggest that while the Royal Commission was very effective at developing an ideological response to these diverse challenges (and class differences between these movements made this all the more possible) it was much less successful at addressing the underlying social and ecological problems of capitalist forestry.
Taming the Wild: Land Use Policy and the Emergence of the Forest Industry, 1859-1914

By all accounts, capital recognized the importance of British Columbia's forests long before early European administrators and governments. By 1848, the Hudson's Bay Company had opened a sawmill at Esquimalt Harbour and was exporting to places as distant as Hawaii and California. Other, often local, entrepreneurs saw the commercial potential of timber, and by the 1860s, several mills had been established, most on Vancouver Island (Meen 1996, 106-7). However, it was not until 1859, when the Land Proclamation Act declared, "unless otherwise specially announced at the time of sale, the conveyance of land shall include all trees," that there was even a limited suggestion of timber value by the state (Cail 1974, 92).39

While the popular notion that early immigrants, administrators and governments saw British Columbia's forests as either a simple nuisance or an endless resource is most certainly an oversimplification, the image of an uninformed state lacking the structural and financial resources to manage British Columbia's timber resources is rather fitting, at least for the period before the turn of the 20th century. During this time, governments floundered from policy to policy in an attempt to balance the competing needs for immediate revenue, infrastructure investment, and a source of perpetual revenue.

39 A 1851 proclamation dealing with country lands on Vancouver Island reserved precious metals for the crown but failed to mention timber (Cail 1974, 92).
Until 1905, governments raised revenue or obtained infrastructure improvements from the outright sale or granting of lands — an approach that placed control of a substantial portion of the provinces most easily accessed and most productive forest lands. One of the most generous of these, the 1883 grant of over 7500 square kilometres of land along the east coast of Vancouver Island in return for the construction of a railway between Esquimalt and Nanaimo, managed to alienate almost a quarter of the island’s area and a good portion of the provinces most commercially valuable and accessible timber (Edgell 1979, 107-109). Though political outcry led to a Land Act that established the principle of public ownership of timber lands, this legislation was often thwarted and by 1913 almost one million acres of timber land were privately held (Cail 1974, 95).

Early attempts to find an alternative to land grants were largely unsuccessful. However, in 1905, in the context of a fiscal crisis, and caught between investor reluctance and the possibility that land would dramatically increase in value, the Conservative government of the day devised the Special License. This new system created a twenty-

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40 The history of this grant is long and convoluted. For a reasonably concise discussion, see the Report of the second Royal Commission (Sloan 1945, 173-84).

41 Given a contemporary definition of harvestable, private forests comprise only about five percent of the land base. However, due to the accessibility and relative productiveness of these forests they make up a significantly higher proportion of the annual cut (Marchak 1983, 35). It is also important to note that the majority this land is found on the east coast of Vancouver Island.
one-year licence, renewable yearly, which was transferable and with no restriction on the number of licences held by an individual.

To say that the Special License was popular would be a vast understatement. A combination of factors, including a market heated by transportation ventures, strong immigration numbers, and the rapidly receding line of eastern and southern timber, sparked a rush to stake timber\textsuperscript{42}. In less than two years, 9 600 000 acres of forest were alienated (Robin 1972, 92; Gray 1982, 20; Aylen 1979, 61). Areas initially staked and claimed by local speculators were quickly sold to large U.S. based investors who began to consolidate their control over British Columbia’s timber resources. By 1909, it was estimated that 75\% of the provinces accessible timber was held by Americans (Gray 1982, 21). Somewhat frightened by the 'success' of the new timber licence, the government introduced an Order in Council in 1907 ending the further granting of licences and creating a standing timber reserve.

By the time the government acted, however, the political and economic complications that accompanied the land grab and the consolidation of tenure holders were quite apparent. The licence holders, some of whom now controlled vast areas of

\textsuperscript{42} Ironically enough, it was the rapid growth of the conservation movement in the United States that helped to incite the run on British Columbia’s forest resources. This movement drew attention to the rapid loss of forested land, especially in the West, created a sizeable national forest reserve, and pushed American investors northward in search of forest reserves that could offset a forthcoming forest drought. This connection was made early in the century in the 1918 report of the Federal Commission of Conservation — see H.N. Whitford and R.D. Craig, Ottawa 1918.
forest began to flex their political muscle and demanded that the twenty-one year fixed
term of the timber licence be converted into some form of perpetual tenure43. At the same
time, there was a popular outcry at the "giving away" of timber lands. Political forces of
many colours linked resource policy under the Conservative government to political
favouritism and mismanagement44.

Complicating matters, the Special License was fatally flawed as a revenue
generating mechanism. Revenue produced by yearly renewal of these licenses would
only drop as timber was logged off and title reverted back to the Crown. While some sort
of deal whereby licence holder demands for perpetual tenure would be granted in return
for attaching additional royalty or stumpage fees was clearly in the cards (and the Premier
was soon promising some form of perpetual tenure), the political cost of yet another
concession to the ‘timber barons’ was equally clear (Robin 1972; Gray 1982).

43 Forestry capital at the time was in no way homogenous in ideology or means of
profit taking. For many, profits at the time were expected to come from the increasing
value of timber lands as often as they were to be extracted from the forest resource -- and
forestry workers. More than any other faction of forestry capital, the speculators had an
interest in the promotion of both a form of perpetual tenure and the fixing of other royalty
and stumpage type fees. On the other hand, the increasing number of well-backed
lumberman involved in the development of large-scale, industrial forestry, whose profits
were to be made over a longer term and from the exploitation of the resource, were
equally interested in perpetual tenure yet were not as insistent on the fixing of charges,
except insofar as they were kept at a low rate as a percentage of the value extracted from
the timber.

44 The criticism had been growing with each new land policy. See the 1905
pamphlet produced by the Ministerial Union of the Lower Mainland entitled Crisis in
B.C. Appeal for Investigation.
Standard explanations for the call of the Royal Commission point to this confusing, but pivotal, moment. Having leased off a great proportion of the best forested land, desiring to increase revenue from these leases, wishing to foster industrial development rather than land speculation, and facing a critical public, the province needed the information and political capital to enable it to substantively overhaul forestry policy.

The Fulton Commission 1909-1910

By all accounts, the Royal Commission was considered a necessary and important step towards bringing some coherency to the utilization of British Columbia’s forestry resources. Beginning and ending in Victoria, the commission held hearings throughout the province and each stop was met with high-profile coverage in local papers. Nonetheless, this was not exactly a populist forum. A Vancouver newspaper recounted:

The commissioners have as their present abode the boardroom of the Lumberman's Association in the Crow and Wilson block. Five tables in the form of a cross occupy the centre of the room [sic]. On either side are arranged the witnesses and auditors. They are all lumbermen and bankers, about 20 in all. (*Daily Province*, August 24, 1909, 13)

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45 This first Royal Commission to examine the forests and forest industry in the province is named after its lead commissioner Frederick John Fulton.
In a marked distance from the camps from which wood was hewn, the mood at the hearings was one of "dignity and silence" with "practically no opportunity for mirth for the subject is serious as well as dry" (ibid.).

While both the lumber and banking industries of the time were serious affairs, they were scarcely without colour. Perhaps, then, the dryness of the hearings may be attributed to a participant who, at least in spirit, was never far from the proceedings – the professional forester. For this inquiry into the state of forestry was not viewed simply as a matter of commerce or state revenue, but also as a scientific inquiry, a collection of statistics and 'objective' knowledge about the forest itself. While the commission concerned itself with recommendations on tenure arrangements and timber royalties, it did so under the larger rubric of a scientific inquiry into the state of British Columbia's forests.

In Victoria, Nanaimo, New Westminster, Vancouver and then into the interior, the Fulton Commission heard, if not from a wide range of groups and individuals, at least from a wide range of views from timbermen, bankers and foresters. Overwhelmingly, it was the views of this last group, the most influential of whom the commissioners sought out in sojourns to Ontario and the United States, that form the heart of the Commission's work. From this sombre and calculating mood the Commission forged a strident path towards a more 'scientific' forestry, a path to be followed, though largely only in word, for many years to come.
 Appropriately enough, data collection became a key concern for the Commission. Unfortunately, it became clear that statistical information on even the most basic of subjects (such as the amount and type of timber under private and government control either did not exist or was of questionable reliability. Ironically, the position of the United States, where massive deforestation prompted the creation of a national forestry service with the expertise and funds necessary for such calculation, was envied. The Commissioner lamented that

[i]n Canada, unfortunately, conjecture has not yet become tinged with the same hues of certainty. Forest statistics have been, in the immediate past, the wildest guesswork, and even recent revision by the small forest services that have struggled into existence is based upon very little information. (British Columbia 1910, D14)

The central reason for this data collection, and the subtext to much of the final report, was the assumption that forest resources were not being used in an efficient manner. Wastage became the key word in the commission’s report: wastage due to fire, disease, non-reproduction or the reproduction of commercially less-desirable species after logging; wastage of timber due to inefficient harvesting practices (i.e. failure of operators to use all the timber on their lands); and wastage that resulted from inadequate regulation, expertise, and government monitoring.

Together, the related goals of collecting information and knowledge about the province’s forests and the goal of increasing the efficiency of both the forests and forest

46 Many of the Commission’s recommendations thus concerned the means and resources necessary to collect better data.
industry provided the justification for a significant re-ordering of forest policy. Indeed, the final report of the Commission, published in 1910, took up the challenge of re-ordering forest policy and the forest industry with zeal.

The recommendations of the Royal Commission fall into three broad areas: Changes to tenure, changes in forestry methods, and suggestions on the administration and financing of forest management. As for tenure, an interim report had been released the previous year which suggested that Special Timber Licences be made renewable, at twenty-one year intervals, in perpetuity, and this had already been acted upon by the McBride government (British Columbia 1910, D77-78). The final report also recommended that the reserve of unalienated timber be maintained indefinitely as current tenure arrangements were considered more than adequate to supply any foreseeable need. Further recommendations were aimed at clarifying and simplifying the assorted forms of leases. These changes aimed to ensure that saw mill quality timber was logged for this purpose, to encourage the development of a pulp and paper industry, and to ensure that the government received adequate compensation from both forms of logging.

Logging practices also came under significant scrutiny and the Commission recommended significant changes aimed at reducing wastage (it was recommended that the Province collect a royalty on all timber not harvested in a license, that all trees over 14
inches in diameter be harvested etc.), and at reducing the fire hazard (tougher slash burning regulations)\textsuperscript{47}.

Perhaps most important, however, were the Commissions recommendations on the need for a more developed forest administration. In no uncertain terms the Final Report argued that the state must increase its role in managing the forest resource: it was recommended that a fire protection organization be immediately created, systematic surveying and cruising be introduced, and that a Department of Forestry be created in order to oversee these tasks. While some initiatives were to be undertaken by licence or lease holders, most of the work was to be done by the province and the cost was to be shared by tenure holders and the state. It was envisioned that the “Forestry Service in this Province will become ultimately a very large organization” (British Columbia 1910, D71)\textsuperscript{48}. To provide for the cost of this investment in forest management, the Commission recommended that all forest revenue be placed in a sinking fund that would be used only for the perpetuation of the resource and that only interest from this fund was to go into general revenue.

The Fulton Commission thus produced a significant set of policy recommendations. The report, though not quite the parroting of forestry science that

\textsuperscript{47} Slash refers to the debris (branches, fallen snags etc.) left over after the ‘usable’ timber has been removed.

\textsuperscript{48} A forestry department was seen to be an essential feature of the soon-to-be established university
some have suggested did include the essential elements of a shift to sustained-yield forestry policy. Within the context of pre-war British Columbia the drastic and fundamental nature of these recommendations must be stressed.

Equally surprising was the relative speed and confidence with which the government moved to embrace most of these recommendations in the Forest Act of 1912 which was ushered in by a new Minister of Lands, William R. Ross49. Though it is true that many contentious recommendations were not acted upon, a government that had previously seemed concerned only with the most rapid exploitation of the forest resource by the promotion of private enterprise had by 1912 created Canada’s most ambitious, and encompassing forestry service.

Given the appalling forestry practices of the day, and the genuinely chaotic state of knowledge surrounding forestry resources, it is tempting to simply take the words of the commissioners at face value and conclude that the province was simply acting on what was a ‘common-sense’ guide to the conservation and prudent use of British Columbia’s forestry resources. From another angle, and in light of the reliance on professional foresters from the United States, one might argue alongside many of the

49 Both Gray (1982) and Gillis and Roach (1986) argue that the Royal Commission was a resounding success insofar as the first Forest Act put most of the recommendations into practice. Given the partisan makeup of the Commissioners this is hardly a surprise. Nonetheless, the government did blink on the subject of the sinking fund and in so doing opened itself up to later industry criticism that the government was not paying its fair share in the cost of fire protection and other management roles. As we will see, the backtracking begun soon after the ink was dry on the Forest Act.
lumbermen of the day who feared that these outsiders were idle ‘theorists’ with little
understanding of the peculiarities of British Columbia’s particular economic and
environmental situation.\footnote{Drushka, in tracing the lineage of the foresters who gave testimony at the Fulton Commission, and who came to run the Forestry Branch, one step further back, raises the question, “How could a handful of men, all students of a German-trained forester with limited practical experience, exercise such a profound influence on the direction of North American Forestry?” (Drushka 1985, 32).}

Unfortunately, neither of these views helps explain how, at this historical moment, the common sense/idle theory of scientific forestry came to have so much political currency. What is necessary here is the introduction of a more complete historical context; specifically, the consideration of both the larger conservation movement and ‘labour troubles’.

Opposing Voices: ‘Other’ Factors Influencing the Creation and Findings of The Royal Commission of 1910-1912

While the struggle between the province and the forest industry was central to the call for a Royal Commission, it is critical to recognize that this struggle took place within the context of opposition voices that challenged, to varying degrees, both the state and forestry capital. Even at this early moment, the social and environmental contradictions of early capitalist forestry had tilled the ground upon which labour and environmental movements were growing.
Conservation, Preservation and the Roots of Environmental Challenge

While Stephen Gray's assessment that "neither an infant industry nor a struggling provincial administration, in the midst of sylvan abundance, were about to become obsessed with timber depletion at the expense of immediate economic success" (Gray 1982, 54) captures the thorough ambivalence of industry and the state, it also overlooks the growth of environmental criticism during the period under review. Though this early environmentalism has yet to be thoroughly charted, it is clear that by the time of the Fulton Commission public concern over the loss of the most accessible forests had grown. Moreover, there appears to have been two distinct facets to this concern: conservationists were drawing attention to the inefficiencies of an industry rooted in speculation and quick profits; and, perhaps more importantly, amateur naturalists and others were arguing for the preservation of accessible forests for recreational and tourism purposes.

By the turn of the 20th century a conservation movement was well established in the United States and had made significant inroads into Canada. Most generally, conservationism preached the efficient use of resources and was heavily promoted by resource managers linked to either industry or government (MacDonald 1991, 80). As elsewhere, the expression of conservationism in British Columbia owes much to professional foresters who made some of the earliest pleas for the protection of the province's timber. By the time the Royal Commission was called, foresters, especially
through the vehicle of the Canadian Forestry Association, were predicting the rapid loss of British Columbia timber to fire and wasteful harvesting\(^1\). At the most cynical these warnings could be dismissed as calls for professional legitimacy in a province that did not yet have a forest service, however, a more fair appraisal would credit the foresters with recognizing the potential loss of resources for a growing industry.

From a contemporary vantage the conservationist plea for efficiency and the rationing of scarce resources might appear premature in a province still identified with the previously described 'sylvan abundance'. However, it is important to note that the limits to the forest, or at least the limits to the accessible forest were already most apparent. As early as the late 1860s the Vancouver Island town of Alberni\(^2\) had experienced the first of many disappointments when its original mill closed, running short of accessible timber after only four years of operation (Meen 1996, 106-107; Peterson 1996, 20-21)\(^3\). While logging railways and increasingly powerful steam donkeys soon pushed back the distance which the huge Douglas Firs could be transported, these developments served only to highlight worries that the best and most accessible timber was being depleted. Of course,

\(^{51}\) By 1909 the Canadian Forestry Association had already been lobbied to create a provincial branch (see Peterson 1996, 41).

\(^{52}\) Which is now within Port Alberni.

\(^{53}\) Peterson (1996) refers to the decision to grant Captain Edwards Stamp 17 000 acres to provide timber for a mill and to establish a settlement, to become Alberni, as the “first forestry debate in the British Columbia legislature”
British Columbians need only have looked to the tree-barren landscapes that already covered much of the rest of North America to confirm their fear.

Combined with the outrage over the recent and rapid alienation of vast areas of prime forest and with concern over the concentration of holdings with large American interests, this fear of forest famine provided a more fertile ground for conservationism than might otherwise be expected.

In his popular novel, *Woodsmen of the West*, published in 1908, M. Allerdale Grainger captured the local expression of conservationist concern. In this work the distrust of the speculators was neatly linked to inefficiencies of an unregulated industry. In so doing, Grainger created a home-grown, cultural icon of the 'logger as butcher', cutting swathes through the most lucrative portions of the forest and leaving a trail of waste and wreckage. In an oft quoted passage from this novel, Grainger writes of the log-and-run attitude of the 'hand-logger' boss:

Much he cared that he was spoiling leases for future working, like a mine manager who should hurriedly exhaust the rich patches of his mine. Leases, he said, were going up in value. Someone would find it worth while, some day, to buy from him the stretches of forest whose sea-fronts he had shattered and left in tangles wreckage. As for him, he was going to butcher his woods as he pleased. It paid! (Grainger 1964, 55)

Echoing the ideology of conservationist forestry, this ruination was contrasted with that practised by the "high-class logging company" that understood the "business side of logging – the keeping of accounts, the knowledge of profit or loss, expenses,
debts, assets, balance at the bank, and all that sort of thing” and thus built roads and such taking “all the good timber that stood upon his leases” (Grainger 1964, 54-55).

While conservationists were an important voice in the environmental debate at the turn of the 20th century, they were not alone. Environmental criticism also emerged from others who feared the loss of forests for less utilitarian, or at least less directly utilitarian, reasons. In the face of an advancing forest industry, these early ‘preservationists’ argued that examples of forests and other natural spaces should be retained for non-industrial purposes.

Though early explorers were sometimes underwhelmed by the natural wonders of the land that was to become British Columbia, native plants and animals soon drew a more appreciative gaze from European naturalists. Following the pioneering work of Edinburgh naturalist Archibald Menzies, a series of collectors brought samples of flora and fauna to England and, through the early years of the nineteenth-century, the Hudson’s Bay Company provided transportation and supplies to naturalists, donated collections and kept a museum in London (see Cole 1996, 345-7).

The tradition of professional and amateur naturalism had taken root, so to speak, in the new province and led to the creation of Natural History organizations. These organizations became one of the first venues where scientists and lay people argued for the preservation of particular places and habitats. A call for the preservation of the forests around Cameron Lake, drafted by the secretary of the British Columbia Natural History Society in cooperation with the Vancouver Island Development League read:
The supplies of wood appear inexhaustible in their natural state, but this is not the case. We have a grand heritage in our noble forests. It would be wise now, before it is too late, to prevent destruction of the pristine beauty. We intend to use every effort to induce the authorities to make such provisions. It is also to insure ourselves those who follow have at least a remnant of our grand forests . . . (cited in Peterson 1996, 38-9)

Clearly, this type of appeal went beyond the conservationist concern with the continuation of resources for the mills of the forest industry, suggesting instead that at least a portion of the forest be left in a ‘pristine’ state. The forest here was considered a historical site in a land that, to most European eyes, had little history.

Tourists and the tourist industry added another facet to the valuation of natural spaces. With the creation of Banff (1885), Yoho (1886) and Glacier (1886) national parks on railway lands, the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) had begun to market the experience of wilderness. More than simply suggesting, another pragmatic ‘use’ of forests, the popularity of these and other parks also force a recognition of the ‘other’ values that people at the time held for forests, values that both provided an opportunity for and were shaped by the tourism industry. One of the most poignant examples of the wonder which the forest could bring, especially the giant forests of Vancouver Island, is aptly provided by an account of a trip to Alberni by a lumberman and his wife circa 1907:

We are all silent, awed by this most impressive spectacle. The motor stops. I looked at Mrs. Buxton, tears were on her cheeks. At length she spoke. “Do you remember being in St. Paul’s Cathedral in London during a most impressive service with wonderful music. We were in the choir loft. We thought of generations of our forefathers who had worshipped God in this wonderful edifice and our hearts were full with the majesty and awe of the surroundings. You tell me these trees are from six to seven hundred years old, and I feel their beauty and majesty as I did that of old
St. Paul's – God made them.”... We now know why genuine woodsmen are a quiet folk. (in Peterson 1996, 37-8)

Mrs. Buxton's reaction must have also brought tears to the eyes of CPR businessmen whose job it was to entice well-heeled customers to the great wonders of western Canada. Steeped as it is in nineteenth century Romantic imagery, this quote exposes the inadequacy of accounts that overlook the range of values that early immigrants to British Columbia placed on the forests. Though not without contradiction, environmentalism, from the pragmatic planning of foresters to the curiosity of amateur naturalists and the awestruck wonder of tourists and adventurers, threatened to move the debate over forest use into a much larger, and more cluttered political arena.

However, this account, with its references to St. Paul's choir loft and the generations of English forefathers, also alludes to the particular ways in which boundaries of race, gender and class circumscribed this challenge. Most pertinently, conservationism, in each of its forms, was principally a phenomena of the middle and upper classes.

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54 The CPR had built a well maintained trail and cabins with views of the area, and for some time it seemed that the area was to become a major tourist destination (Peterson 1996, 31)

55 One must take note that while invariably 'white', the gender and class basis of the different factions of conservationism varied considerably. Though forestry was a male bastion, and tourism was certainly an upper-class phenomenon, the naturalists were a somewhat more inclusive lot. Women were most certainly involved in such early organizations as the Vancouver Naturalists Field Club. When the Vancouver Mountaineering Club formed, in part to offer working-class people the opportunity to adventure in the most accessible wilderness, women made up a significant minority of the
While the range of conservationist ideology described above surely does not rule out the participation of workers or their organizations in conservationist debates, and while the struggle against logging on Deadman Island provides evidence that some segments of labour took up the cause of preserving forested land as early as 1895\(^{56}\), it is much less clear whether any of this spilled over into the larger provincial debate on forestry practice. Indeed, there is scant evidence to suggest that environmental concern in general, or forestry practice in particular was given much attention by organized labour at the time.

This class bias of conservationism, combined with the unorganized state of forestry labour itself, tempered the interest of workers and their unions in the Royal Commission and the debate over forestry policy and practice, despite the impact that changes in forestry policy might have on both the future of work and forests in British Columbia’s future\(^{57}\).

\(^{56}\) The Deadman Island debate created a split in the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council between those who would obtain work during the logging and those less affected. Nonetheless, elements of Vancouver’s working class clearly expressed an appreciation of, and concern for, natural areas as an important part of their urban environment (Leier 1995, 58-61). However, later struggles over the future of Stanley Park clearly place the preservation of ‘pristine’ undeveloped forest as an elite cause in conflict with working class calls for utilitarian “play space” (and to a lesser extent with the compromise of moderate landscaping and access supported by the middle-class Parks Board) (McDonald 1984).

\(^{57}\) The New Westminster Trades and Labour Council was the only labour voice to speak at the Commission. The NWTLC decried the fact that the public had taken little
Labour on the move: forests, forestry workers and the socialist challenge

While forestry policy may not have been of particular concern to workers and labour organizations at the time, unions and radical politicians were offering a distinct challenge to capital and the state, a challenge that must be understood as an important influence on government policy in general and forestry policy in particular. Indeed, the ‘labour problem’ in British Columbia was a much more pressing political concern than either sorting out timber policy or placating those concerned with the fate of forests. At the turn of the century labour in the workplace and in the political arena was on the rise in the province.

As the economy grew at the end of the decade, workers armed with nascent organizational and ideological resources brought in a brief but important period of struggle. Strikes erupted in the hardrock mines of the Kooteneys, on the Fraser river salmon fishery, and in the Vancouver Island coal mines. No doubt spurred by these struggles, workers began to organize at an unprecedented rate and between 1900 and 1903 the number of locals in the province more than doubled (McDonald 1996, 100-1).

Importantly, this mobilization involved diversification and inclusion as much as it did a simple increase in numbers. The urban settings of Victoria, New Westminster and interest in the proceedings and that most presentations were from timber barons who were claimed to have an interest in the establishment of a monopoly. The Labour Council urged the creation of a hand-logging licence that would enable loggers “either singly or co-operatively to log on Crown lands and thereby employ themselves” (Daily Columbian, September 27, 1909, 1).
Vancouver, already important centres of labour activity, experienced a wave of organizing with statistics showing a significant level of strike activity after 1900 (Seager 1988, 126-7; McDonald 1996, 108). While in these urban centres the movement was still dominated by the relatively advantaged skilled tradesmen, this period saw the organization of previously excluded semi and unskilled workers such as mill workers, shingle weavers, retail clerks, laundry workers and postal employees. Furthermore, the necessity of racial solidarity made clear, at least to some, by the fisheries strikes, further eroded traditional intra-labour cleavages.

The rise of labour did not go unchallenged, and others have well documented capital’s response, which ranged from accommodation and co-option to determined strikebreaking and thuggery. Despite the determination of organizers and the growing radicalism of workers, in a period labelled an “outright war against unions” setbacks were common at the workplace and on the picket line (Yarmie 1990, 109).

58 Of some significance is McDonald’s (1996, 109) acknowledgement that members of these semi and unskilled workers organizations came to lead the VTLC during this period.

59 Phillips (1967, 35) describes a VTLC parade in July of 1900 which was led by a ‘costumed’ Indian band as an ‘apex of labour solidarity’. Also see Creese (1986; 1988).

60 Phillips (1967, 8) notes that even in the most difficult environments, such as the coal fields of Vancouver Island, management responses varied from inflexible shows of force that engendered, sometimes bloody, strikes to reformism that brought relatively peaceful labour management relations. See also McCormack 1977.

61 Several unions were broken early in 1903, when a sympathy strike in support of the United Brotherhood of Railway Employees was met with violence by police and C.P.R. hired thugs. Almost simultaneously, a strike at the Dunsmuir mines collapsed,
The political front, however, offered another venue within which worker's struggles might be waged. As early as the election of 1898 in which three pro-labour candidates were elected and held the balance of power in a typically chaotic assembly, labour had emerged as an important political player in provincial politics. Though the political left was far from unified, by 1903 the Socialist Party had managed to gain some success, building on support from both hinterland resource workers and the growth of urban industrial unions.\(^{62}\)

It must be admitted that forestry workers were not a very significant part of this radicalization of labour politics. The nature of the forest industry, and of forestry work, made organization particularly difficult. Though the industry had grown dramatically, individual operations were still both small in size and offered sporadic, seasonal employment. Both the logging camps and the sawmills relied on, and reproduced, a

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\(^{62}\) There is some debate concerning the rising influence of the socialists. Traditionally, it has been argued that between 1900 and 1903, socialism made substantial inroads into workers politics (Phillips 1967, McCormack 1977). Leier (1995), however, maintains that in Vancouver at least, the labour movement rejected the 'academic' socialists, sticking with a craft-union dominated labourism. This argument, though grounded in substantial research into the workings of the VTLC, is more of degree than of absolutes. Clearly, industrial unionism and socialist politics met significant resistance within the movement and in Vancouver socialists were certainly in the minority, however the significance of this minority cannot be discounted, least of all by pointing to the contradictions within VTLC policy (see Leier 1995, 163-164).
labour market divided along ethnic boundaries (owners and managers hired Chinese, Japanese and East Indian labourers, whom the labour movement was more likely to vilify than organize) and a hierarchy of rates and jobs. Only the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), whose strategy of community organizing had some success amongst the unskilled forestry workers in Washington and Oregon, attempted to sign up camp members. However, in British Columbia even these efforts appear to have gone unrewarded (Lembke and Tattam 1984, 13-17; Phillips 1967, 52).

It would be wrong however to note the failure of timber workers to organize and thus dismiss the interdependency of the forest industry and radical politics. First, the economic and social impact of the lumber industry provided fertile ground for socialist politics. The dramatic cyclical nature of early capitalist forestry, the seasonal nature of much of the work, and the danger and squalor of camp life itself became part of a working class cultural imagination – a crucial component of "what it meant to be a worker in British Columbia" (Smith 1978, 78). Though some have focussed on how this seasonal work produced status-based cleavages within the working-class, the effect of

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Though progressive voices on the left had long urged the organization of Oriental workers as a necessary strategy, aggressive anti-Orientalism was never so apparent in the British Columbian labour movement. In the fall of 1907, mobs in Vancouver attacked the homes and businesses of Chinese and Japanese residents, an event spurred by certain labour organizations (see McDonald 1996, 205; Phillips 1967, 48). On the segmentation of labour markets along racial lines at the time see Rolf's (1978) history of Native labour in the forest industry and Creese's (1984) more general examination of the intersection of immigration policy and the labour market.
this cyclical inflow of unemployed labour must also be considered as an impetus to the growth of socialist politics and industrial unionism.

Secondly, while the brutal confrontations in the mining and fishing industries more dramatically laid bare the state/capital relation than did the sporadic and smaller scale disputes in the lumber camps, the direct intervention of the state in the exploitation of forest resources did open room for a socialist critique. The American example of the primacy of private ownership of forest resources starkly contrasted with the staunch defence of state intervention in British Columbia. While this arrangement may have dampened the populist zeal of conservation politics on this side of the border, it also suggested socialist alternatives and set the foundation for those who later will call for the nationalization of the industry.

Neither Common Sense Nor Idle Theory: The Fulton Commission as Political Practice

The ‘success’ of the Fulton Commission and sudden interest by the province in scientific forestry must be understood within this broader social context; neither

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64 McDonald (1996) rests much of his analysis of Vancouver working-class politics on the premise that such status-based cleavages in the working class blunted labour politics. However, such micro-analysis of intra-labour schisms threatens to lose sight of the widening of the challenge to capital created by multiple, if somewhat uncoordinated, branches of left-wing politics.
'common sense' nor idle theory, scientific forestry formed a crucial part of the government’s response to conservationist and labour movements. The diverse challenges from socialists, reformers and conservationists and the growing dependence of the state on revenues from the forestry industry, had situated the forest as a, and perhaps the, key site of political contest in British Columbia. Certainly forestry had become a ‘problem’ in a much larger sense than the earlier problem of how to quickly raise revenue. Instead the problem of forestry had become one much more familiar to contemporary observers; how best to balance competing interests in the forest while maintaining the legitimacy of both the state and capital?

In accepting the Royal Commission’s report and acting on significant aspects of its recommendations, the answer of the government was clear; the forest industry should take on the hallmarks of other large-scale capital intensive industries and, due to the public stake in the ownership of a substantial portion of the resource, the state and industry must form a partnership to undertake the scientifically informed, long-term protection and renewal of the forest resource. Scientific forestry, by promising sustained yields and controlled working conditions suggested a means by which capitalist forestry, and the state which depended on its revenue, could be maintained in the face of conservationist and socialist movements. As much as it offered a blueprint of efficient forestry, the Royal Commission served as a guide to the effective control of the movements that most threatened capitalist development of the resource. Therein,
'science' served a purpose not only as a methodology for the investigation of the forest but also as an ideological justification for a particular mode of production.

Identifying the Royal Commission as a response to social movements and as a form of control is not to invoke a conspiratorial explanation. Rather we only suggest that these recommendations were the adaptive response of capital and state to the social and environmental contradictions created by existing capitalist forestry and identified by conservationist and labour movements. In drawing attention to the environmental and social exploitation inherent in the forestry practice of the day, early labour and conservation movements identified significant problems in both the reproduction of the forest resource and the reproduction of a compliant workforce. The acceptance of the Commission's report must be seen as an ideological response to these problems of reproduction. This response partially acknowledged labour and environmental challenges to capitalist forestry practice and, through selective appropriation of elements of each, attempted to restructure this industry while maintaining a capitalist mode of production.

Clearly the Fulton Commission had accepted that capitalist forestry, as practised in the province, had led to significant problems of resource depletion, soil erosion and water quality. Less evident in the report itself, but certainly conspicuous in related documents, is the acknowledgement that the exploitation of labour in the forest industry had created significant social problems and that, left to its own devices, the capitalist
forestry industry would not provide the state with the revenue and social stability necessary to maintain legitimacy.

The problem facing the provincial government was of moving from existing forestry practice towards one which addressed the criticism of forest exploitation while providing maximum revenue and social stability. To this end, the Commission offered a clear answer: by firmly restating provincial control over the vast majority of timber resources, through the equally firm commitment to use government intervention to ensure a rapid development of an industrial forest industry, and by recognizing that a portion of profits realized from this sector be transferred to the citizens of the province, the commission suggested a reformist forestry policy of reined-in capitalist development.

Importantly, in relying on the ideology of scientific forestry, the Commission placed the reins of this tamed capitalism squarely in the competent hands of state.

65 In 1913 the Minister of Lands told the Western Forestry and Conservation Association that conservationism “By protecting our forests from fire; by ensuring the fullest use of them by the present generation consistent with the claims of those who will come after us, we lay the foundations for permanent communities supported by forest industries. We get away from the old uncivilized idea that a lumbering population is a vagrant one that destroys a timbered region by fire and lumbering and then moves on elsewhere.” (Daily Province, December 17, 1913, 7). Here the Minister is addressing the long-standing idea that political instability was the making of socialist agitators who played to the base instincts of vagrant workers. For a popular take on the ‘problem’ of casual labour see the essay by L. V. Makovski entitled, “The Problem of Capital and Labour” in Potential Resources of British Columbia, a booklet containing the winning essays of a contest organized by none other than commissioner Flumerfelt himself in 1907. Of course, many ‘socialist agitators’ had a very different take on the political potential of casual labour. For a vivid, if an elitist, rendering of the docility of the workforce see Bertrand W, Sinclair’s contemporary account in The Inverted Pyramid (1924).
managers and forestry scientists. The former, in both their corporate and state guise, were to keep the social problems of uncontrolled capitalism at bay through proper planning and coordination (including the control and coordination of labour), while the latter were relied upon to increase the productivity of the forest through the application of scientific knowledge to both forest harvesting, wood processing and reforestation.

Something, however, is troubling. Somehow what begins as a complex environmental and social problem identified with the profit-taking of a capitalist forest industry ends with the suggestion that a partnership between large forest companies, and a state dependent on their revenues, can lead the province away from environmental and social degradation. This logical turn worked, but only because of the very particular way in which the Commission addressed the challenges offered by conservationist and labour movements.

First, the multi-faceted challenge offered by the conservation movement was reduced to the problems addressed by its most prominent element – the forestry experts. The Commission took great pains to distance itself from ‘alarmist’ and ‘Romantic’ elements of this movement. A. C. Flumerfelt, a progressive businessman and member of the Commission, explained “that is what conservation means at the bottom – the application of ordinary business principles to natural resources” (cited in Gray 1982, 57). At the very most, it was allowed that forested land played a role in keeping water sources pure and in avoiding soil erosion that may retard reforestation. In this manner, the
conservationism espoused by the Royal Commission was purged of any suggestion that the forest has any value outside its use as a resource for the forest industry.

Secondly, the labour movement challenge was reduced to the problem of the hyper-exploitation of the logging camps, and the transient nature of the workers. Given the conditions of logging camps, and given the ‘problems’ that a transient workforce created for Vancouver, this focus is not unexpected. The Commissioners took a stance alongside corporate reformers across the continent by suggesting that a stable, modern and technologically advanced industry would provide the comforts whose lack drove workers into the arms of socialist instigators. Of course, it would turn out that they were only half-right, but this would take almost a quarter of a century to unravel.

This is not to say that the Royal Commission and the limited acceptance of its recommendations were an insufficient response to environmental and labour movements. Quite to the contrary, the ideology of scientific forestry remains a useful defence of capitalist forestry practice to this very day. Indeed, as an ideology, and much later in practice, this state-industry relation, clouded by the veil of science, has proved to be a formidable foil for the radical challenges offered up by environmental and labour movements. What must be recognized, though, is that crucial questions remain unaddressed and that the environmental and social consequences of these most deliberate oversights will return again and again to provide resources for renewed challenge on both fronts.
Chapter 4
Towards a Social Forestry 1914-1945

If in the previous chapter we traced the ideological underpinnings of ‘scientific forestry’ as a response to the twin threats of middle-class conservation movement and the rising threat of labour, here we examine the translation of such ideology into practice. We note that, from 1915 to 1943, while the introduction of technology and planning within capitalist production was rapid and widespread, the ability of the state to ensure a more social and planned industry was more limited.

Most significant, for both forests and forestry workers, was the introduction of new logging systems which drastically altered both the nature of forestry work and the nature of ‘nature’. The new technologies eliminated some jobs, de-skilled many others, sped-up the pace of work and introduced new dangers to loggers. Clear-cutting, which became the preferred mode of forest liquidation, significantly changed the landscape and shocked British Columbian’s with the speed by which forests were consumed.

The social and environmental problems that accompanied this capital intensive production, the loss/degradation of work on the one side and the loss/degradation of the forest on the other, did not go unchallenged. Through this chapter we trace the rise, first of an eclectic conservationist movement organized around the fear of forest famine and
second, of socialists and forestry workers who challenged both the exploitation of the forests and of forest workers.

Of these challenges, we argue it is that of the political left and forestry workers that was crucial to the restructuring of forest policy and practice announced by the Sloan Royal Commission (1945). While conservationists threatened greater regulation, the fusion of environmental concern and radical political economy by the IWA and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) threatened capitalist production itself.

Modern Forestry: Technology, Managerial Control and the Environment

The confidence that emerged from the Fulton Royal Commission of 1914 that British Columbia was on the precipice of unprecedented wealth based on an expanded and significantly more profitable ‘modern’ forest industry was somewhat premature. Pre-war depression led to slumping sales and the war itself actually reduced demand as construction in cities slowed (McDonald 1996, 147). Despite these obstacles, the forest industry continued to slowly, if sporadically, expand, diversifying into new products such as plywood, pulp and newsprint and into new areas of the province.

If, however, predictions of prosperity had to be left for the future, the Fulton Commission’s vision of increased ‘efficiency’ and control within the forest industry was somewhat closer at hand. While government coffers, to say nothing of forestry workers, had yet to reap the rewards, the introduction of technological and managerial changes which heralded the beginning of a truly modern industry, was well under way.
Although new technologies had been steadily moved into sawmills and, more recently, pulping operations, changes in the practice of logging were often incremental rather than fundamental. Indeed, until at least 1910, and largely up until the 1920s, the operation of logging remained both labour and skill intensive, relying on the experience and discretion of key workers. It is only during the war and early post-war years that this final vestige of the forestry operation was harnessed by the forces that had earlier been brought to bear on most other industries on the continent: technological and managerial strategies consistent with tenets of scientific management. This most significant change had two facets: systems of overhead yarding were introduced (either high-lead or full aerial), and the separation of conception and execution was strengthened through the introduction of new technical and managerial workers who took control over the systematic planning of harvesting methods and pacing.

While it is common to suggest that it was not until after the second Sloan commission (1955) that forestry operations took on the hallmarks of mass production, recent work suggests that the fundamentals of scientific management were firmly in place by 1920. First, specific technologies such as aerial yarding eliminated or de-skilled particular jobs and sped up the logging process. Overhead systems of yarding, either single spar (high-lead) or double-spar (skyline) systems, were originally introduced to British Columbia in 1910 and were the dominant technology by 1920. These systems, in

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66 See Marchak (1983), Ch. 2.
which logs are hauled fully or partially in the air, eliminated some of the most skilled
logging jobs, led to a significant speed-up and brought increased profits. Workers faced
both the elimination of whole categories of logging work and a new regime of production
where the pace of work was controlled largely, though not exclusively, by the machinery
itself (Rajala 1986; 1996).67

Alongside the introduction new technology came the introduction of new
managerial strategies and personnel. Though professional foresters had previously found
employment in the larger, more capital intensive firms, the introduction of the logging
engineer signalled the further separation of the conceptual aspects of logging from the
foremen and experienced loggers who had previously been given a broad range of
discretion in ‘on-the-ground’ matters of production. As the pace of logging fell
increasingly under the control of the yarding technology, the pace of the forestry
operation (the setting up and dismantling of equipment, and the planned move from area
to area) was given over to the new technical experts aided by more advanced surveying
and mapping techniques (Rajala 1986).

If the introduction of new technology had a significant impact on work in the
forest industry, this impact was more than mirrored in the changes to the forest itself.
Most dramatically, this form of logging resulted in the clearing of huge areas of both the

67 The B.C. Lumber Worker pegged 1913 as the year in which ‘modern’ or high-
lead logging systems were introduced to the province and claimed a more than doubling
of productivity (B.C. Lumber Worker, September 15, 1937, 5). The union noted the
simultaneous introduction of that hallmark of scientific management – piece work.
large timber used in the industry and virtually everything else which was left to waste. While ground yarding could be done, though not without some difficulty and significant skill, among still standing trees, aerial systems required a clear path. Any growth left standing during overhead yarding was smashed. The practice of clearcutting, when combined with the efficiency gains of the new technologies, resulted in a radically altered landscape. The liquidation of the forest moved quickly and despite weak lumber markets the rate of timber cut rose steadily - while in 1915, 830 million board feet were cut in the Coastal region, this had almost doubled to 1.59 billion board feet by 1920 (Aylen 1979, 83).

Though most certainly frustrated by weak markets, tariffs and the wariness of capital to enter the pulp and paper sector, the Forest Service and the provincial government could only be encouraged by many of the changes taking place in the industry. For as we have argued, increased capitalization and the concurrent extension of control over labour and the forest was in keeping with the spirit of both the Fulton Commission and the Forest Act.

Nonetheless, the efficiencies of modern forestry only partially fulfilled the ideology of industrial forestry. While the forest industry, and especially large capital, was more than willing to introduce the technological and managerial changes necessary to wrest control over the pace of production from labour and the forest, it was much less willing to submit to controls necessary for the conservation of the resource. Doggedly moving to increase efficiencies of production, owners demonstrated much less interest in
efficiencies of reproduction/conservation. This asymmetric adoption of the ideology of
industrial forestry presented the province with substantial political and economic
problems.

Since the Fulton Commission, neither the electorate nor the state was willing to
see control over the forests simply left to the whims of the marketplace and the 'give-
away' of British Columbia's resources under Richard McBride's Conservative
government was a significant factor in the electoral success of the reformist Liberals in
1916. While the Fulton Commission and the Forest Act suggested that even the
Conservative's recognized the need to bring some control and planning to the industry,
the Liberals rode a wave of support for more aggressive and interventionist resource
policy. Faced with the not insubstantial task of remaking a Forestry Branch whose
modest beginnings were severely depleted by the war, the new Minister of the
Department of Lands, Dufferin 'Duff' Pattullo, acted quickly to reinstate and accelerate
the forest inventory, increase the number of forest rangers and improve the technological
and organizational aspects of firefighting. Perhaps more importantly, funding and
expertise were provided for research into silvicultural issues including forest regeneration
rates, and the impact of particular forestry practices (Fischer 1991, 147). As it increased
in scope, the Forest Branch began to develop as a bureaucracy and gained a limited
independence from the forestry industry.

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68 This independence is, of course, relative. The links between the branch and the
industry are clear from the pattern of movement between each. The former chief forester,
Unfortunately, if at least for the government, the type of state-industry cooperation envisioned by the Fulton commission failed to materialize. While willing to undertake significant expenditures on advanced logging systems that had an immediate impact on the profitability of an operation, investments in conservation measures such as fire suppression (made infinitely more necessary by high-lead logging) were begrudged by the timber companies. Even the original cost-sharing arrangements agreed to by the industry were gradually whittled away and an increasing portion of these costs fell to the state\(^69\).

The industry position was only strengthened by the province's own refusal to direct forestry revenue into a sinking fund as per the recommendations of the Fulton Commission and by the general resignation of even the most conservation minded of foresters to the idea that sustained forestry was a future goal rather than present necessity.

A lengthy battle between the Forestry Branch and industry over the structure of royalties is indicative of both the tense relations and the relative strength of forestry

\[^{69}\text{Though, as we have mentioned, there is some debate over how effective the McBride government was in introducing the recommendations of the Royal Commission, perhaps it is more important to note how quick industry was to turn against any changes that directly increased costs. In the case of fire protection the 1:1 formula was ruthlessly attacked as industry claimed the timber reserves held by the province were larger than first known. Of course the timber reserves were of significantly lesser quality than most of the already alienated land. For a detailed account of this backtracking, see chapter four in Gray (1982).}\]
capital. Both industry and government were concerned that the doubling of royalty payments that was to kick-in at the beginning of 1925, as per the 1912 Forestry Act, was not feasible given the economic state of the forestry industry. The Forestry Branch used the opportunity to push for a change from a system of fixed royalties to a stumpage based system that reflected the wholesale selling price of timber cut. The opposition from industry to a stumpage based system was fierce. No longer simply relying on the ties with the Forestry Branch, the industry organized under the rubric of the Timber Industries Council and used both public and private channels to argue for a long-term, fixed royalty schedule. In the end, the industry got much of what it had asked for which could only add to the frustration of those in the Forestry Branch (Fisher 1991, 154-7).

While the victory of the forest industry on the question of royalty payments signalled the end of Liberal reformism on forestry issues, this took place within the larger political context of a significant shift in the political and economic landscape. In 1916, the main political challenges had come from a burst of radicalism. However, by 1920 labour and the political left had been largely defeated, fragmented by a combination of blacklisting, co-ordinated strike breaking, and post-war depression. Now the political challenge came from the briefly popular, and right-wing, Provincial Party and an increasingly vocal and organized business community (Fisher and Mitchell 1996, 257-8).

Nowhere was this changed political climate more felt than in the forestry industry. By the end of the 1920s forest capital had used the weakened position of the ruling Liberals to bring any hope of substantive reform to a close. While some research
continued to be carried out by scientists and foresters, this work was detached from the practice of forestry and forestry policy in the province (Fisher 1991, 157-8). Through the Depression and into the Second World War, British Columbian governments did little to control the forest industry, intervening only to help open up foreign markets and provide minimal fire protection.

Meanwhile, the technical and managerial prowess of forestry capital grew. Gradually, and despite the stated intention of the Timber Sale Licenses, capital continued to consolidate — by 1940, fifty-eight companies controlled over half of the timber supply (Marchak 1983, 36). Rather paradoxically, this consolidation of the industry both drove forward the liquidation of the forest and created divisions within capital that made sustained-yield forestry more palatable.

Geographically, the industry remained concentrated in the Douglas Fir forests along the east coast of Vancouver Island, rapidly denuding the valley floors of the most accessible and profitable timber. As the industry was forced into more difficult terrain, the pressure on profits became greater and two options presented themselves: either existing controls over forestry operations, limited as they were, could be reduced, or more efficient use could be made of existing resources. Though lowering costs and more rapid liquidation were seen as the only options by many, large firms which had the ability to raise substantial amounts of capital began to favour more efficient use of existing timber supplies through technologically advanced, vertically integrated corporate structures (see below). As the long term possibility of lumber shortage came closer into view, the largest
firms started to clamour for a new forest policy that provided a secure long-term supply of timber (which could be used to raise new capital). If a renewed commitment to sustained-yield forestry came with security of tenure then, at least for the largest ventures, this option was becoming more attractive (Reid and Weaver 1974, 17).

Certainly, it was not only the large forestry companies that saw the need for a reform of forest policy. The province had for two decades watched the rapid depletion of the most lucrative forests while sustainable forestry remained an officially acknowledged, but completely ignored, goal. By the late 1930's, however, the Forest Service had begun an active educational and publicity campaign to draw attention to the state of the province's forests. In 1937, the forestry service produced *The Forest Resources of British Columbia*, which despite the Minister of Lands opening comments that "there is no cause for alarm", did point to substantial over-cutting and the necessity of a move to sustainable practices (Mulholland 1937). By 1939, the chief forester of British Columbia, E. C. Manning, was in the midst of an active campaign to alert the province to shortages of Douglas Fir and the effects on dependent communities and by 1943, the provincial government had called the second Royal Commission of Inquiry into Forest Resources, under the direction of Chief Justice Gordon Sloan.

The most common explanation for the awkwardly timed second Royal Commission (in the midst of World War II) is based on the convergence of these two factors: the desire of large forestry companies for a secure form of tenure upon which a capital intensive, integrated industry could be based and the long denied aspirations of the
Forest Service for a more intensely managed form of sustainable forestry practice. While these factors are not to be disregarded, as was its predecessor, the Sloan Commission should also be understood as a response to both conservation and labour movements. Our argument goes further though: we contend that the ability of capital and the state to agree to the sort of sweeping changes suggested by this commission, changes that had been vehemently resisted for over a quarter century, was the direct result of the momentary convergence of environmental and labour movements, a convergence whose threat lay in the creation of viable alternatives to the capitalist forest industry.

Neither Right, Nor Left, But All Over the Place: Conservation, Preservation and Environmentalism in the 1920s

Though we have seen that calls for the preservation of nature, and in particular the preservation of forests, were not new to British Columbia, during the decade of the 1920s this movement reached a peak. While accounts of the development of forestry policy make reference to the growth of conservationism, this reference is usually made in the context of the concern of forestry experts, especially those employed by the Forestry Service⁷⁰. Though it is not wrong to emphasize the importance of the Forestry Service in

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⁷⁰Rajala (1993) takes such an approach. In addition to a focus on forestry experts the author notes the work of a local politician and newspaper editor in raising criticisms that were largely ignored by the provincial government. The broader base of environmental concern at the time is not, however, addressed.
popularizing conservationism, it is wrong to simply equate the views of the professional foresters with the more general environmental movement of the time.

Certainly, the role of the Forestry Service must be acknowledged. With the creation of the Forest Branch in 1912, the first Chief Forester, H. R. MacMillan, proudly predicted that "I myself am extremely optimistic and think that there will be Province-wide forest management here before any place else in Canada" (cited in Drushka 1985, 32). The reality of government indifference, fluctuating markets, and most of all, hostility from the timber companies, meant that theory was seldom attached to practice. As previously mentioned, while some funds were marked for scientific inquiry and the surveying of forests, the results of this work had little impact on policy and led to frustration and impatience in the relatively meagre Forestry Branch. Relatedly, forestry science had raised, but not answered controversial questions surrounding the reproduction of Douglas Fir, concerns that intersected with the newly dominant form of high-lead logging. Though cautious to make public the uncertainties of their discipline, British Columbia's foresters became increasingly anxious about the correlation between high-lead logging and the growing inventory of land that was not 'restocking'71. The lack of funds and personnel to investigate these questions led foresters to become increasingly critical of both government and industry.

71See Rajala (1996, 120) for an account. The author conveys the frustration of scientists who were questioning the accepted theory that seed stored in the forest floor survived cutting and burning and whose calls for more research money and personnel went unheeded.
As a reaction to growing criticism, the creation of the Timber Industries Council signalled the consolidation of the forest industry’s strategy of control. No longer satisfied that their political influence in the Department of Lands and direct political lobbying could stem the call for further regulation, the industry became involved in a coordinated public relations strategy (Gray 1982, 51-62). While this multi-faceted strategy was an effective move, it did serve to hurry along and broaden the politicization of forestry issues. The debate between forestry experts, the government and industry spilled out from the corridors of Victoria and into mainstream, and not-so-mainstream, press. Forest famine became a popular notion.

Indeed, while the warnings of forestry experts were crucial in raising public concern, the broader interest in forestry and other environmental issues at this time should not be reduced to the particular, technical, questions of foresters and the like. Environmentalism had become a much more complex phenomenon. The concerns of forestry experts and the very apparent destruction of the new forestry standard of clearcutting resonated with a more broadly based set of worries about the degradation of the province’s forests. Two related but distinct factors are of the most significance: the increase in natural history and hiking organizations; and the growth of nature based tourism and the tourist industry.

In the post-War years, British Columbia, and Vancouver Island in particular, had become a significant tourist destination. By 1920, tourism had become a mixture of a useful propaganda tool to lure business and immigrants and an economic venture in its
own right. Not to miss the opportunity of additional revenue, the province created in this year the British Columbia Patriotica and Educational Picture Service which produced *Travel Tour of the West Coast of Vancouver Isle*, one of the first provincially funded tourism films (Mattison 1986).

From the beginning, the tourist industry used nature as a lure. Though the 'English charm' of Victoria and of smaller island communities was highlighted (and exaggerated) it was the 'natural experience' that proved to be British Columbia's most compelling and lasting image. It was rather unfortunate however that at the very moment tourism was becoming an increasingly lucrative enterprise the 'cathedral forests' that served both as a draw themselves and as an important backdrop to the lakes and mountains were being rapidly depleted. Indeed, the clear-cuts that were the hallmark of modern forestry were growing to cover the most easily accessible areas of Vancouver Island. While national and provincial parks had been created in an effort to balance these competing uses of the forest resource\(^2\), many had begun to question if enough land was being set aside to meet the needs of the tourist sector.

By the mid-1920s the link between the conservation of forests and the tourist industry was a decisive factor in a very public debate over the defence, and expansion, of a growing provincial park system. This debate reached a zenith, especially in the

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\(^2\)Most famously, Banff National Park was created as part of the development plan of the CPR. For a book-length treatment of the role of the CPR in the development of Canadian tourism see Hart (1983). In British Columbia, Strathcona Provincial Park had been set aside by 1911.
conservative press, when a large area within the boundary of Strathcona Park which had been alienated through an early land grant began to be logged. This debate over logging in Strathcona Park is informative as it illustrates the relatively loose relation between the criticism of logging practices and popular conservationism.

Clearly, the growing criticism of logging practices and the accompanying fear of timber famine informed public debates. The editors of the *Daily Province*, remarked:

> Every motorist is familiar with the belt of “Big Timber” on the Pacific Highway and of the destruction now proceeding, quite legally it is true, on the eastern front of that area. Many people have also passed through that blackened wilderness of stumps and spoilation between Courtney and Campbell River. They will know what to expect upon their first visit to Strathcona Park, if the minister of lands can not be induced to change his mind. It will not be a park, it will be a desert! (*Daily Province*, June 2, 1926, 6)

It was made clear that this spoilation was the result of contemporary forestry practices and that other forms of logging were not as devastating. By introducing the case of Stanley Park, most of which had been selectively logged at one point or another, it was acknowledged that when “only the choicest and most acceptable trees” were taken, “what remained after the logger was through was a forest capable of recovery in a few years and well worth logging again within a decade or two” (*Daily Province*, June 11, 1926, 6).

The high-lead systems that threatened Strathcona were of a different sort leaving as they did, “destruction and devastation, a heart-breaking wilderness of tangled tops and stumps” (*Daily Province*, June 11, 1926, 6).
Nonetheless, underscoring striking changes in landscape brought by clear-cut logging and the fear that high-lead systems would lead to a ‘desert’, the argument failed to spill over into anything but the mildest critique of forestry practices. Instead, the debate remained fixed on the preservation of a particular scenic place and the tourism it supported. The conservationism preached by the *Daily Province*, it appears, was founded more upon the preservation of tourist vistas than the preservation of British Columbia’s forests. The argument repeatedly reverted to the need to recognize the economic importance of tourism, as the park “is worth many millions to this province from a scenic point of view” (*Daily Province*, June 10, 1926, 6). In this most limited form, such conservationism gave little value to the forest save for its usefulness as a backdrop for “the playground of North America” (*Daily Province*, June 10, 1926, 6).

Moreover, this conservationist argument does hint at a broader environmental stance, resting as it does on a largely unacknowledged critique of contemporary forestry practice. Perhaps even further hidden from scrutiny, is the presumption that the preservation of ancient forests has less easily quantified, ‘moral’ benefit. The value of Stanley Park it was suggested, lies not only in its usefulness as “advertisement and an attraction for tourists” but also as its role as a “playground and breathing space” (*Daily Province*, June 10, 1926, 6). Here conservationists’ contend that the ancient forest offers a benefit beyond its potential as a revenue generator.

Even those most convinced by the lure of tourist dollars, eventually fell back on more diffuse arguments about the healing properties of nature. When, for instance, it was
suggested that the great stands of timber on Vancouver Island would soon be gone and it was demanded that "the spoilation shall stop at the park boundaries and that all within the reserved area shall be held sacred" (June 11, 1926), the *Daily Province* nodded to values not reducible to tourist dollars. Indeed, it was suggested that if the tourists were to give their dollars to the province they were also going to receive an intangible benefit from witnessing "the beauties nature has created". Though useful in argument with the forest industry, the economic possibilities of the forest were never completely separated from the transcendent quality of a 'virgin' landscape that eluded mere accounting.

If the tourism-based appeal for the preservation of forests drifted away from the simple tourist vs forest industry trade-off, it was perhaps due to the increase in groups and organizations that began to see more diverse reasons for such preservation. Most closely related, there was a huge increase in the popularity of hiking as a pastime. With the North Shore mountains a short ferry-ride away, Vancouver was the heart of the hiking phenomena. On an average Sunday in the mid-1920s over 2500 hikers made their way into the North Shore mountains and the weekend papers carried extensive articles detailing local hikes and even hiking 'fashion' (*Daily Province*, June 20, 1926, Magazine Section). Inseparable from this pastime was an appreciation that "the air of the highlands is like wine" and that it was "good to climb to where the cedar gives place to the cypress; where the bear takes his toll of the berries in the mountain meadows" (*Daily Province*, June 20, 1926, pg.1 Magazine Section).
At the same time, groups such as the Vancouver Natural History Society were expanding. As hiking became something of a sport, those more directly interested in native plants and animals (for whom hiking was often a necessity rather than an end in itself) became organized into local and provincial groups. With close ties to the university, the Vancouver Natural History Society (VNHS) initially sought to raise interest in native fauna and flora through the promotion of an Arbour Day, field trips and other educational and recreational activities. Quickly, though, the society was drawn into conservation debates. First, arguing along with groups from Victoria and Duncan against the bounty that had been placed on animals and birds considered noxious predators, the society was soon embroiled in forestry issues.

The stance on forestry issues taken by natural history groups was considerably more nuanced than that of those who sought only to conserve scenic areas. The threat of logging in the Capilano watershed brought a response from the VNHS president that while founded on the menace to Vancouver's water supply, suggested a much broader appreciation of British Columbia's forests as resource for human and non-human inhabitants. The president of the VNHS argued that watershed forests must be left intact as they served as a natural purifier for Vancouver's water supply and that any logging would disrupt the complex inter-relations that sustain this vital resource. In addition,

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links were drawn between deforestation and climate change and the loss of medicinal plants (Davidson 1924).

Together, the effects of tourism based preservationism, the conservationism urged by foresters and the broader environmental interest of hikers and the natural history organizations, suggest a solid foundation for the environmental challenge to the bleak landscapes left by the timber industry in the 1920s. Nonetheless, as we have seen, the critique of forestry practices remained rather weak. Though the destructiveness of high-lead logging and the rate at which forests were disappearing were adeptly described, a profound silence was left in the place of the analysis of why these practices have been adopted, whether there are alternatives and the situations under which such alternatives may be adopted. In particular, there was little mention of significant government intervention and virtually no criticism of capitalist exploitation or profit taking.

This lack of a political economy within the broad spectrum of environmental ideology has several explanations – none however, are as telling as the distinct class basis of popular conservationism. As compelling as the need to preserve remnants of British Columbia’s forests may have been, much of the popular conservationism of the 1920s was an appeal to a particular socio-economic group: the urban tourist. Parks such as

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74 The watershed issue was eventually resolved as all logging was phased out by the mid-thirties. Recently, though, some logging has resumed. Murky drinking water that resulted from landslides in 1995 again brought the issue to the fore and local environmental groups such as SPEC have once again urged an end to the logging of Vancouver’s watersheds.
Strathcona were said to appeal to the ‘best class of summer visitors’\textsuperscript{75}. Many conservationists of the day would echo the sentiments of the narrator of an early travelogue that ‘Ours is not the story of basic industry, interesting though it may be, ours is the story of pure vacation enjoyment’ (Mattison 1986).

The pastime of hiking, with its quirky roots in mountaineering, adventuring and hunting, offered some transcendence of these social and cultural boundaries. However, while at times managing to bridge deep gulfs of gender and race, hiking was clearly a leisure activity of the growing middle-class\textsuperscript{76}. As addressed in the press of the day, the ‘cult’ of hiking involved a substantial investment in fashion and was centred around young, white, students. The central role of the university and the University Outdoor Club, certainly helped define this class base. Similarly, while the Vancouver Natural History Society attempted to reach all classes, and even its earliest membership included a certain diversity, its success was modest\textsuperscript{77}.

\textsuperscript{75}Here the \textit{Daily Province} referred to monied tourists from the United States and that new phenomenon – the ‘Motor tourist’ (\textit{Daily Province}, June 24, 1926, 6). This began a long, difficult relationship between the automobile and wilderness preservation in British Columbia. As the automobile became more widely available, it has served both as the mode by which wilderness areas are witnessed, and preservation issues heightened, and as the technology most destructive of natural habitats.

\textsuperscript{76}The sight of “two young Chinamen”, who were dressed in the \textit{de rigueur} outfit of “breeches, bare heads, knapsacks and all” was enough to incite the curiosity of a reporter who seems somewhat comforted after finding out they are students (\textit{Daily Province}, June 20, 1926, Magazine Section, 2.)

\textsuperscript{77}Peacock’s history takes pains to note the ‘democratic’ nature of the membership. Though most certainly eager to reach ‘all classes’, it is hardly evident that
The environmental concern of the 1920s, then, while not reducible to the particular views of forestry experts, was essentially conservative. Though many passionately called for the defence of particular scenic areas and supported specific controls on logging that would damage the tourist industry or result in public-health problems, serious questions about the political and economic structures that encouraged this destruction were avoided. As the popularity of conservationism during the decade of the 1920s attests, the limits of environmental ideology did not significantly hamper the effort to arouse public sympathy for the preservation of at least portions of Vancouver Islands 'giant forests'. However, this lack of a developed environmental politics did leave the environmental movement with few critical tools to understand the relation between changes in economic and political circumstance and changes in forest exploitation.

Needless to say, conservationism was ill-prepared for the Great Depression. By the early 1930s, concern for the loss of scenic forests fell from its prominent place in the editorial columns of conservative papers and the membership and activity of dues paying organizations was curtailed (Peacock 1993, 49). Within this context of capitalist crisis, forest preservation was to soon return as a prominent political issue, but in a radically different guise – as part of a socialist and working class movement.

the society ever outgrew its foundation in the educated middle class. As Meyers (1988, 153) notes when writing of class distinctions in social activities in Maillardville/Fraser Mills, “And few of the millworkers’ wives would have had time to join the Fraser Mills Ladies Alpine Club for hiking expeditions, even had an invitation been extended.”
Red Light, Green Light: Environment and the Rise of a Socialist Challenge

If the middle-class conservation movement of the 1920s had little to say about the connection between forest and forestry worker exploitation this silence was matched by both forestry workers and the political left. After the dramatic outburst of radicalism surrounding the Winnipeg General Strike and the subsequent activity of the One Big Union (OBU), a combination of employer reaction, government intervention, international union hostility, and economic recession had left the province’s labour movement and political left divided and weakened. Within this difficult period there is little evidence that either conservationism or the politics of forestry were of much concern.  

With the onset of the Great Depression, however, British Columbian politics underwent a sea-change as social crisis revitalized the political left. The scientific

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78 During the 1920s, the B.C. Federation of Labour paper, The British Columbia Federationist, took information about the state of British Columbia’s forests uncritically from government and industry sources. In a series of reprints provided by the Timber Industry Council, the industry was praised for its brave introduction of “new and costly equipment to keep pace with science and overcome the ever varying obstacles that nature puts in their paths”. Meanwhile, British Columbia’s position as the “first, last and only stand of big constructional timber” was described with no mention of the limits of these forests (August 1, 3, 1924). Understandable, given the original source, labour displacement, loss of life and destruction of forests were not a focus of these short pieces. When forest shortage was mentioned in The British Columbia Federationist, it was the threat of fire that was examined, and even here there was no reference to forestry practices (see October 5, 1923; June 27, 1924).
socialists of the Socialist Party of Canada now had powerful evidence pointing to the end of capitalism and socialists of all stripes had more than enough misery to suggest that Liberal reformism was an insufficient response. While the first years of the Depression were marked by extreme conservative reaction and the inability of labour to stem the loss of membership, new opportunities arose to organize the growing mass of unemployed workers. By February of 1932, fifteen thousand workers were in the streets of Vancouver demanding reasonable levels of relief, and the organizing of the relief camps, which would lead to the On-to-Ottawa Trek, was well underway (Phillips 1967, 105-7).

For British Columbian politics in general, and forestry politics in particular, this outburst of left-wing political activity had two principal manifestations: the rejuvenation of the LWIU, and the creation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). Both of these organizations came to develop radical alternatives to capitalist forestry and in each instance conservationism was appropriated from its heretofore middle-class roots and welded upon a working-class challenge. Together these challenges, though unsuccessful in toppling capitalist forestry, helped push capital and the state into a restructuring of industry regulation and practice that remains, to-the-day, unparalleled.
The CCF and Socialized Forestry

Despite the long history of factious infighting within the political left in British Columbia, the 1931 founding of the CCF created an opportunity to forge something of a common front. Though personal and ideological schisms continued to shake the British Columbian CCF throughout the decade, the social and economic disaster of 1930s served both to undermine confidence in the economic system and to raise questions about the effectiveness of Liberal reformism. By 1933, the CCF had become British Columbia’s first broad-based, dues-paying, left-wing political party, united, however tenuously, around a common manifesto. In the election of that year, the CCF ran a campaign strong enough to both force the Liberals and Conservative press into a frenzy of red-baiting, to push the Liberals further into a reformist work and wages platform, and to wipe-out the floundering Tories. With the election of seven members to the legislature in 1933, the CCF became the official opposition to the Liberals under Patullo.

More than simply providing a clear pro-labour voice in British Columbian politics, this initial success raised the probability of a socialist government from faint hope to distinct possibility. The ambitions of the party became clear as work began on the elaboration of a policy structure that had been hastily cobbled together in the heat of the election. Such aspirations, to say nothing of the Liberals rapid rediscovery of reformism, demanded that the CCF platform provide a viable socialist alternative that maintained a mass appeal. The dominant position of the forest sector in the British
Columbian economy, and the fact that this industry had been under attack long before the economic collapse of the 1930s placed forestry issues at the very centre of this project.

The task of developing forestry policy fell to the forestry department of the CCF Planning Commission under the direction of an unemployed forestry engineer and founder of the British Columbia Forest Conservation League, Dr. Maximilian Paulik\(^79\). The forestry department undertook an ambitious range of projects including the establishment of a forestry school, the establishment of a demonstration forest in Lynn Valley and propaganda work such as the distribution of illustrated leaflets extolling the benefits of socialized forestry (Howard 1992, 175-80)\(^80\).

The fundamentals of CCF forestry policy were first made public in the fall of 1936 through the pages of the party's paper, *The Federationist*. In a series of eight articles entitled, “On The Road Towards a Better Forest Order”, the existing capitalist forest industry came under a blistering attack and the essential elements of a socialist

\(^79\) A German forester, Dr. Paulik had immigrated to British Columbia via Alberta. Lured to the province's forest heritage, growing industry and perhaps most importantly, its recent reputation for the application of conservationist forestry, Dr. Paulik became active in forestry issues but was unable to obtain a government position. Though apparently not a socialist, Dr. Paulik had a gift for realizing the interconnectedness of the politics and science of forestry. Prefiguring the work of environmental and industry groups alike, Paulik had published visually appealing pamphlets criticizing forestry practices (see Howard, 1992 175-180).

\(^80\) A poster series produced by an unknown artist, but most probably with the assistance of Dr. Paulik can be found in the University of British Columbia Archives, Angus McInnis Memorial Collection, Box 40.
alternative were spelled out\textsuperscript{81}. From the wandering prose of these articles it is clear that the CCF in British Columbia had yet to systematically work through the political and philosophical contradictions that were part and parcel of the coalitionist nature of the party. Nonetheless, even at this early stage, the CCF did demonstrate a shrewd ability to use forestry issues to integrate conservationism, whose issues that had been the domain of conservatives and middle-class reformers, into a socialist political ideology.

At first blush, the criticism offered by the CCF appeared to draw heavily on the conservationist concerns that were so prominent in the 1920s. The Planning Commission based its argument on the fear of forest famine “within one generation” and on the harsh criticism of misguided government policy and public ignorance. In a manner not unlike that of much more conservative conservationists, the CCF critique attributed the neglect of forest policy to mistaken beliefs that the resource was inexhaustible. Indeed, save for the yet unexplained connection between conservation and ‘socialization’, the following explanation could have been lifted from the pages of the Fulton Commission of twenty-five years earlier:

\begin{quote}
In general, a more or less unrestricted exploitation of natural resources prevail [sic] during the earliest stages of industrial development; during later stages, when the value of resources is more clearly appreciated and the dangers of exhaustion manifest, the tendency is for the state to regulate the rate of exploitation, and demands for conservation and socialization arise. (September 17, 1936)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{81}See \textit{The Federationist} September 17, 1936; October 1, 15, 29, 1936; November 12, 26, 1936.
The equation, or at least co-dependency, of conservation and socialization suggested here was only made comprehensible, and this was perhaps the most innovative feature of the CCF platform, when the failure to give value to the forests was placed in the context of a capitalist economy and state. To this end, the Planning Commission framed this popular history with a critique that directly linked the value, or lack thereof, given to forests and the distinct features of capitalism.

Not without the threat of contradiction, the problem was more specifically described as one where, “Under the present exchange economy, price is the chief regulator of resource exploitation, modified by the degree of competition or monopoly which prevails and by the conditions of supply and demand.” Given the constraints of such an economy, it was argued that governments had only been able to see forest as “merely a valueless factor until through the investment of capital it comes to be a source of interest and material value”. In naming this inability of a capitalist state to value anything outside of its exploitation by capital, the CCF gave a more adequate explanation for the state of British Columbia’s forestry policy, founded as it was on the colossal blunder of literally forcing our natural resources into private hands in [a] frenzied zeal to stimulate the utilization of our forests — a mistaken policy which resulted in intense competition among individuals to convert that wealth as quickly as possible into marketable products (September 17, 1936).

By giving an economic and historical context to the problem of deforestation, the CCF pushed further than earlier conservationism which could scarcely get beyond vague condemnations of greed or corruption. Instead the problem of forestry, and the problem
of forest valuation, became wound up in the inevitable problems of governing a capitalist economy. The CCF was thus able to explain the contemporary situation in British Columbia as one where

the dominating position in our forest is occupied by international high finance, which on account of the investment risks assumes the right to slaughter forests completely, in accordance with methods which allow the greatest amount of personal profit. (September 17, 1936)

In such an economy, having surrendered the forests to a private forest industry, the state was said to be reduced to the position of tax collector, thus valuing the resource only as a source of immediate revenue rather than “an everlasting source of benefit to the public.” Importantly, this limited role restricted the ability of the state to control the principle economic agents; the international capitalists whose interest in short-run efficiencies of production was in direct conflict with the social interest in long-run efficiencies of conservation.

Having traced the problem of forestry to a failure of capitalist economics, the problem became one of envisaging socialist alternative. On this point the CCF was much less clear. Nonetheless, buoyed by both the prospect of electoral success, the possibility, indeed the necessity, of a publicly owned and controlled industry formed the basis of CCF policy during the late 1930s. It was argued that public ownership, which eschewed the need for immediate return on capital investment, would allow for the complete transformation of the means of forestry production. Instead of using destructive, high-lead systems whose short-term profits were irresistible to private owners, the CCF argued
that public bodies, such as municipalities who could own nearby forests, would use selective logging and intensive forestry management to produce more jobs, a ‘social profit’ and a perpetual ‘crop’ of trees.

As often stated rather emphatically, the CCF forest policy was a plan for a socialized forest industry and so eschewed ‘Romantic’ notions of the forest. The Forest Department of the CCF Economic Planning Commission sounded not unlike their counterparts in the provincial Department of Lands when they agreed that “Forestry is not based primarily on sentiment, nor upon desire to preserve the trees for their beauty, but that the entire forestry business is conducted on sound economic principles” (Federationist October 29, 1936). The real argument with the forest industry was positioned as one between socialist and market based economics, between those touting the short-run profit maximization of private property and those espousing the long-run profit maximization of a socialized industry.

On the one hand, this focus on the ‘pure’ economics and science of forestry can be explained as politically pragmatic (the CCF was grasping for credibility with middle-class reformers) and ideologically rooted (many within the party were drawn to a technocratic socialism)82. Most likely, though, this emphasis may be explained by the influence of forestry experts such as Dr. Paulik who were drawn to the CCF not out of political 

82 This technocratic approach is not a unique feature of the B.C. wing of the party. Such ideas were central to the CCF's middle class appeal and J. S. Woodsworth's conception of socialism has been described as one of “relentless technological determinism” (Mills in Campbell 1999, 148).
conviction but rather as an alternative to the Liberal party which had backtracked one too many times on promises to reform forestry practice – the CCF took forestry experts seriously. As a promoter of a scientifically managed forestry the CCF drew on the frustration of forestry engineers and scientists and in turn these experts provided an aura of credibility that could withstand the anti-communist rants of Liberal and Conservative politicians.

In any event, this technical focus on the economics and science of forestry did reduce the forest to a simple resource for the forestry industry, while emphasizing the social benefits of a ‘properly’ managed industry. At its most innocent, such a focus misses out on the other values a forest may have, values that had already been popularized by some conservationists, and stands to be accused of the very sort of narrow valuation that the CCF condemns private forestry for. More sinisterly, such ideology may lead to environmentally disastrous policies and foreshadows the path followed by socialist states throughout the globe.\(^3\)

CCF forestry policy, however, was never completely captured by its ‘scientific’ moments for, in the end, this policy was about how a socialized forestry might better social and cultural conditions; it was about redefining as much as redistributing profits. For this reason, selective logging was urged not only as it was more cost-effective than

\(^3\) It should be noted, however, that the CCF’s position that forest crops could be maintained through natural regeneration and selective logging does differ from the more literal, massive scale ‘farming’ approach that is most readily identified with later state-socialist environmental failings.
reforestation after the devastation of clear-cutting but also as it would lead to stable communities that would not separate workers from their families. The task of the Forestry Department was to expand the notion of forest value to include such factors as its usefulness in creating stable rather than seasonal work, its value as a source of municipal stability so that educational, cultural and social resources may be provided and maintained. At times, even 'Romantic' sentiments of the beauty and inherent value of intact forests crept into Forestry Department publications such as the educational pamphlets.

On the whole, though quite successful at drawing the concerns of forestry engineers and scientists into a socialist critique, the forest policy of the CCF was somewhat less successful at co-opting the less industry specific concerns of naturalists, hikers and others. This caveat aside, this tapestry of conservationist concern and socialist politics did have an undeniable political draw. The CCF message of a labour intensive, sustained-yield forest industry based on selective logging and intensive reforestation, appealed to the unemployed of the cities and to those whose confidence in the economic order was shaken by the masses of unemployed, and increasingly organized and vocal, men and women of Vancouver. However, it was the appeal to forestry workers that was most pronounced: more numerous, safer, and stable jobs for workers and their children afterwards. Nonetheless, it took some time before those working to organize lumber workers took up the call of a social forestry.
Conservationism and Forestry Workers

The beginning of a new and prominent role for forestry workers within the British Columbian labour movement came with the resuscitation of the Lumber Workers Industrial Union (LWIU). By 1932, the union, initially affiliated with the communist Workers Unity League (WUL), took the forefront in the organizing drive, had two to three thousand striking members on Vancouver Island, and had pushed the government to establish a minimum wage in the forest industry (Phillips 1967, 102). The partial success of a huge strike at Maillardville/Fraser Mills in 1932, though financially draining, underlined the organizational prowess of the union which was able to overcome significant social and cultural cleavages within the company town (Meyers 1988, 41).

This reputation was built upon in a series of strikes on Vancouver Island in the spring of 1934 when, using local support, disciplined pickets and communications prowess, the union demonstrated its ability to wrest concessions on wage and camp condition issues (B.C. Lumber Worker, September 15, 1937, 5; Lembke and Tattum 1984, 25-6).

As others have noted, this competent organizing gave significant credibility to a communist leadership whose political goals were grounded in pragmatic union building.\(^{84}\) This competent, and complementary, mix of radical theory and practice continued to

\(^{84}\) See Lembke and Tattum (1984) for a book length treatment of this general theme or Meyers (1988) for an analysis of the Fraser Mills strike that offers a compatible assessment.
guide the lumber workers as they navigated the troubled labour politics of the decade. In 1937 the union was reorganized as the International Woodworkers of America (CIO) with the B.C. District having a membership of approximately 2500 workers (Phillips 1967, 13).

Despite the Woodworkers stance as a distinctly political and social union and their endorsement of CCF policy, the emerging notion of socialized forestry took some time to find its way into the ideology of this organization. Given the very different problems and possibilities of labour and the political left, this lag is rather understandable. While the CCF were busy planning for a socialist government, forestry workers were fighting for much more mundane matters of a living wage, and decent camp conditions. If the early strikes such as that at Fraser Mills had proved anything, it was that the radicalization of workers could only be built upon a foundation of solid organizing and the ability of the union to "deliver the goods".

Of course given the chaotic state of the industry, camp conditions varied wildly and many early issues of the *B.C. Lumber Worker* are filled with reports either condemning or offering limited compliments of local conditions. Unfortunately, one condition that did affect each and every logging operation, was the appalling rate of accident and death. For the union, this condition could be directly traced to the speed up of production, which in turn was directly linked to 'modern' high-lead logging systems. While the provincial government was to vehemently deny speed-up as a cause for the increasing death toll, the union sarcastically noted that "This was actually an admission of
the correctness of our contention, for the fact was so obvious that they were compelled to deny it" (B.C. Lumber Worker, January 13, 1937, 4). Accompanying a photo of a high-lead system, the union newsletter wrote:

...pushed beyond a certain point, this machine can deal out death right and left... but it can be operated up to a certain point with a minimum of danger to the crew... Until this fact is recognized, logging will continue to pile up a list of victims like the one published below. (B. C. Lumber Worker, January 13, 1937, 4)

While the safety issue predominated through 1937, conservationism did not go completely unnoticed as workers were urged to report wastage and violations of the Forestry Act directly to the Chief Forester. Furthermore, the union developed an analysis of the speedup problem which linked piecework with high-lead technology and the loss of the most productive and easy to log timber. Their argument that “Now all the good timber is gone, and the flat country logged off” now men are “tearing like hell” to make even a lousy wage” (B. C. Lumber Worker, January 13, 1937, 4) is precariously close to the critique of capitalist forestry offered by the CCF of the day. However, political ideology that linked these elements was to elude the union for at least the next year or so.

The possibility, and the limits, of the appeal of conservationism to forestry workers is most clearly illustrated in an exchange of opinions expressed in late 1937 in the B.C. Lumber Worker (it may be noted that this date is well after the CCF had made public its views on social forestry). In an impassioned letter a logger wrote:

I refer to the rapid depletion of our forests through the uncontrolled methods used by the logging concerns of today in order to cut as much timber during a season, with no respect either for men’s lives or for the
younger growth which would mean so much towards the nucleus of new forests and consequently continued employment of the lumber worker. . . .

Statistics show, and we dare not ignore the facts, that within the next decade the timber resources of our province will largely be nonexistent, with a resultant decrease in the number of workers employed and consequently another period of depression which can only bring chaos. . . .

Surely we do not want the general public to think of our loggers and lumber workers as a lot of ignorant people who cannot see the writing on the wall? . . . Mr. E. C. Manning, government forester, deserves the utmost praise for the conscientious efforts he is at present making to get the government to adopt a reforestation policy. . . .

To kill our loggers is serious enough, but to kill their means of livelihood is far more so. What are you and I going to do about it? Let’s go before it is too late!

Vitally Interested
Port Alberni

(B.C. Lumber Worker, November 24, 1937,

In making a plea for inclusion of broader forestry issues within forestry workers politics, the author skilfully makes the connection between the ‘health’ of the forest and the fate of forestry work. Nonetheless, while conservationism was soon to take a much more prominent place in union policy, the editorial response to this letter was harsh. The editor writes:

No one deplores more than we do, the wastage of our forests. A trip through the highways and railroads of Vancouver Island, bedecked as far as one’s eyes can carry with nothing but logged-off and burn-over lands, makes us wonder what there is about this system of ours that is worth hanging on to. We would like to call them our forests, and take pride in perpetuating them so that our children and our children’s children might know the majestic grandeur of our wooded places before the Mackens, McMillans and the Filbergs got hold of them, but by no stretch of the imagination can we call them ours. So therefore, we are more
interested in trying to prevent The Mackins and the McMillans from
grinding our bones into the pottage that means profits for them. . . .

We commend Mr. Manning on his splendid report, and we regret
that we have not a Lumber and Sawmill Workers’ Union strong enough to
help Mr. Manning chop the tentacles off the monster that is leaving a
wasted country and a mangled humanity along their roads to profit. . . .

No! No! “Vitally Interested”! We refuse to be sidetracked . . . we
refuse to be drawn off our course into by-plays. With the help of “Vitally
Interested” we hope to build our forces so that some day soon we will have
some say in the running of the country, but sincerely, dumb and ignorant
as we are, we are more concerned with the lives and limbs of our fellow
workers than with the next year’s profits of the logger barons. (B.C.
Lumber Worker, November 24, 1937, 6)

In refusing to be ‘side-tracked’ by the conservation issue, the editorial stance is
not without justification. With the union fighting for its survival, and with a firm
ideological and organizational focus on the strike, conservation issues could not take
centre-stage. The brutal reality of death in the camps offered a much more persuasive
critique of capitalist forestry than the vague predictions of forest famine. Preservationist
concerns are not forgotten but they are considered a technical task of those holding
power. It is assumed that if and when workers have control over state apparatus, things
will be done differently.

This willingness to leave the development of environmental ideology to the
technocrats of today and the socialists of tomorrow has, to the very day, come to be a
standard response of forestry labour. Within the span of a few months, however, this
pragmatism was to be cast aside and replaced with an increasingly coherent and vocal,
labour-based environmental challenge to capitalist forestry practice.
Having dismissed conservation issues late in 1937, the *B.C. Lumber Worker* was by the next summer beginning to warm up to the issue. At first this interest merely reflected the more general concern that had arisen after two disastrous fire seasons. Forestry workers saw their jobs going up in smoke and were well placed to recognize that attempts to accuse campers or the loggers themselves rang hollow.\(^8\) Repeatedly, the paper began to attack the wastage of the forest companies and the ineffective disposal of slash.

It was only a matter of months before the limited concerns about fire damage blossomed into a much more developed and nuanced socio-environmental critique. This move was most certainly aided by the importing of conservationist concern and credit must also be given to the influence of CCF forestry policy as developed over the last two years. Nonetheless, the IWA and its members must be recognized for their distinctive contribution, a contribution that strengthened the socialist alternative to capitalist forestry policy.

A recognition of forest workers’ early, narrow focus on the hazards of high-lead logging (and the attendant critique of control over the pace of production) is essential to

\(^8\) At various times Indians, campers and loggers were blamed and careless smoking and camp fires were targeted as the cause of most fires. Indeed, even in the first attempts by the *Federationist* to address this problem, ‘human recklessness’ is left to play the villain after pains are taken to explain away the fact that railway sparks were said to cause over a quarter of all fires (October 5, 1923). Though there was no doubt some truth in tracing the beginnings of particular fires to discarded cigarettes and the like, such ‘explanations’ avoided the central problem of the large piles of tinder dry ‘waste’ left lying in clearcut areas.
understanding the way the IWA's environmental ideology unfolded. So much energy and resource had gone into raising the profile of the safety issue (which in turn had been bluntly used to justify the conservationist policy) that connections between safety and environmental policy became a useful (and perhaps necessary) point of entry. To this end, in the summer of 1939 the *B.C. Lumber Worker* matched a large photo of a high-lead system and surrounding cut timber and waste wood with an article that read:

> It is denuded areas like the one above which provide the setting for the double tragedy which is proceeding in B.C. lumber industry. A tragedy which is costly of human life and destroying natural resources. The “high lead” system of logging is daily laying waste the few remaining timber stands as the above scene bears witness; and is daily causing more than its share of lumbering accidents . . . (June 27, 1939, 1)

Once made, the link between high-lead logging, the destruction of forests and the destruction of human life became the core of a rigorous and compelling critique of capitalist forestry; a critique that helped move the union along the path to a broader political stance.

By September of 1938, the fundamentals of what was to become the union’s forestry policy had been formulated and articulated in an article entitled “Selective Logging vs. Destruction” (*B.C. Lumber Worker*, September 6, 1938). In this piece the source of destructive forestry methods was traced to “The boss loggers [who] in their mad scramble are concerned with only one thing, which is super-profits NOW” (emphasis in original). This ‘mad scramble’, it was argued, had left British Columbia with about 25 years of marketable timber at the (then) current rate of depletion after which there would
be "a century of reforestation work needed to rebuild depleted timber stands." The solution to this scenario was said to lay in the rejection of the clearcuts of high-lead systems and in the shift to selective logging, where individual trees are taken out of stands at a rate at which permanent production may be maintained.

The union contended that selective logging would mean

an end to ghost towns, desolation and isolated logging camps . . . [the] continuous growth of our forests; permanent logging communities in which loggers can make their homes; and . . . such communities will develop farming and business activities to supply the requirements of the loggers that would provide incomes for additional thousands of people. (September 6, 1938, 5)

However it was also acknowledged that "[it is very doubtful whether selective logging would interest million dollar logging concerns, because on the surface it would at least appear to fall short of being as profitable as the high-lead system" and it was made clear that forest companies claim that if "timber cannot be taken out by any other means, then it is about time they were told to pack up and get out of the country".

In making clear the links between the day-to-day hazards of the work site, high-lead technology, the capitalist requirement for increasing profits and the depletion of forests, the union critique effectively acknowledged both short and long term interests, suggesting that change must come both at the work site and in the political arena. The forestry worker, especially the logger, was positioned as a political agent with both the knowledge and the means to transform both their personal work situation and to create a larger, long-term social good. It is the forestry workers who "as loggers and union
members” had it as their task “to explain to the people of this province what is happening to their forests, and it will be our special task to simultaneously press for a scheme of selective logging” (September 6, 1938, 5).

Importantly, the possibility that loggers would play a significant role in changing forestry practices presupposed not only self interest and a social conscience but also an environmental conscience. As the high-lead, profit driven system destroyed forests and moved on, the union argued that loggers were forced to make an unfair choice between having a stable home and family. Such a choice, the union contended was unconscionable given the understanding that for forestry workers, “‘I love the woods,’ is not only a mere phrase coined by some poet; it is a very real sentiment in the hearts of all woodsmen.” Though decidedly pragmatic, insofar as it is the long-term stability of communities and jobs for forestry workers that is the focus, the union policy also acknowledges that the forest offers non-utilitarian values.

As noted, the push for an alternative forestry both helped establish, and occurred in the context of, a broader move by the IWA towards a more aggressive political stance. One month after selective logging began its prominence in the pages of the B.C. Lumber Worker and heading towards a District 1 convention, the paper urged that

[i]n order to make the I.W.A. the factor it rightfully should be in the economic and political life of the people of this province, it becomes necessary that the organization assumes a much broader scope than what has been the case in the past. To gain the confidence of the men in the camps and mills, it becomes the duty of the union not only to look after the interests of the workers as regards wages, hours of work, job conditions, etc., but also to deal with unemployment, forest preservation, reforestation
and other matters which effect our members in a much more serious manner. . . (B.C. Lumber Worker, October 4, 1938)

At the time of this article, it is safe to say that neither the government nor forest capital might have considered the political turn of the IWA a serious threat – this would soon change. Astute organizing and wartime conditions that softened the employers’ most vicious anti-union tactics placed the union in a much more favourable position. Indeed, by 1943, the IWA had eight locals, fifteen thousand members and had obtained its first general contract covering most of the B.C. coast. Significantly, this rapid growth had come about under the leadership of a communist leadership that continued to withstand attacks from both within the union and from the CCF. At the call of the Second Royal Commission, the union that had ‘changed the course of the British Columbia labour movement’ was a power to be reckoned with.86

The Contradictions of Social Forestry: Science, Environment, Labour and the Partial Appropriation of Conservative Conservationism

In this chapter, we have situated two principle strands of popular conservationism within the context of the development of the capitalist forestry industry. By 1920, the last, and perhaps most significant, aspect of the forest industry, the act of logging, had

86 Lembke and Tattam (1984, 104) use this description of the IWA. For a description of this period, one that includes successful organizing drives at mills and at logger’s camps along the coast, facilitated by the renowned ‘Logger’s Navy’, see Lembke and Tattam (1984), Philips (1967, 132-134).
been subjected to modern forms of managerial and technological control. High-lead logging subjected both the forest and forestry workers to a more effective (at least from a short/medium term, managerial view) form of exploitation. For workers, this change produced a more regimented, less skilled, and faster paced work environment.

Paralleling these changes in the work process were changes in the forests – old-growth forests, and especially those on Vancouver Island, were more rapidly being liquidated and the clearcuts produced by high-lead logging significantly reduced the rate and type of regrowth possible. Both conservative and radical environmental ideologies must, we have argued, be understood as class-based responses to this new form of capitalist forestry practice.

Both conservative and radical challenges owe a debt to the forestry experts who raised the spectre of forest famine. These experts had both a personal and professional stake in the public acknowledgement of destructive forestry practices as it was their expertise that would be necessary in any change to a more regulated form of forestry. The frustration of the forestry experts at the unwillingness of even sympathetic, reform-minded governments to increase spending on research and regulation led to open confrontations with the forest industry and provided a broader audience for the message of forest decline.

The popular conservationism that emerged in the 1920s in British Columbia, was an eclectic, though ultimately conservative, movement that drew on the fear of forest famine. Generally, the conservationists agreed with the forestry experts contention that a
more regulated approach to forestry was necessary, and they echoed the fears of some forestry experts about the environmental effects of clearcutting. Nonetheless, the conservationists offered little in the way of long-term solutions to the crisis they proclaimed.

At the most crass level, and a more Romantic than bourgeois response, the creation of parks provided a place where the wealthy could avoid the 'wilderness' of clearcuts that otherwise marred the scenery. Less cynically, parks were considered natural museums of the spectacular native flora and fauna. On a more utilitarian level, parks were viewed as the foundation for a tourist industry and government intervention was understood as necessary to share the resource between the forestry and tourism industries. In its purest technocratic form, conservationism sought to mitigate the most destructive aspects of high-lead logging and called for stronger government regulation and enforcement of the management of slash. None of these positions challenged the means or mode of forestry exploitation. Understandably, the appeal to forestry workers, even though these same workers may have shared the disgust at the waste of the forest industry, was limited.

The radical challenge to capitalist forest practice first emerged as part of the CCFs more general outline of a planned economy. Again, this challenge drew much from the concerns of forestry experts and the fear of forest famine. This movement drew on the concern about the 'wastage' of forestry resources that conservationists had popularized over the last decade, and called for an increase in regulation. Drawing from this
background, making much use of forestry experts and calling for an infusion of trained foresters into the industry, the CCF platform had an undeniable appeal to middle-class professionals.

Even in its most reformist moments, however, the challenge to capitalist forestry offered by the CCF always traced environmental problems to the problem of private ownership or control of forestry resources. The problem of forestry thus became a social problem — while more expertise and regulation were hallmarks of the CCF platform, this regulation would only be meaningful and effective in the context of a more general appropriation of forest resources on behalf of the social good. As a class-based response to capitalist forestry, the CCF platform, offered a critique of both the environmental degradation wrought by high-lead logging but did so in the context of the social effects of this technology. The immediate lack of forestry jobs and the long-term economic destruction of an industry built on short-term profit taking and forest base depletion were each addressed. This critique was aimed at a broad audience though it offered most to the unemployed and the underemployed of the province. Most compellingly, social forestry offered the promise of long-term, stable employment in meaningful, forest sector jobs.

While social forestry was not an immediate concern of those who faced the daily hazards of work in logging camps — protecting wages, jobs and lives was a more pressing matter — under a progressive leadership, the radical reorganization of the forestry industry did become a fundamental part of forestry workers’ ideology. In tracing the everyday working conditions faced by forestry workers, longer term problems of
employment instability, and the instability of forestry based communities, to a distinctly capitalist mode of forestry production the forestry union more firmly rooted forestry as a social problem central to working-class politics.

Taken together, the challenge to capitalist forestry offered up by the CCF and the IWA served to appropriate many of the criticisms and fears popularized by conservationists of the 1920s. In doing so, however, and each with its own emphasis, these two organizations fused environmental concern with a critical political economy. With the Depression to demonstrate the fissures in capitalist economies generally, and the death and forest depletion in British Columbia’s woods to highlight the contradictions of capitalist forestry in particular, the left successfully developed an ideology of social forestry that may be considered a protean version of an eco-socialist alternative.

Importantly, though the political left was internally fractured on the issue of communism, both the CCF and the IWA had reached new heights of popularity. The CCF, whose forestry policy now included the nationalization of the logging industry, garnered a larger share of the popular vote than any other party in the election of 1941. Meanwhile the IWA had dramatically increased its membership while maintaining a communist leadership. No matter how the internal struggles were to be resolved, the prospect of a serious socialist political and workplace challenge had never been greater.

It is in this context, with the spectre of social forestry haunting the ballot box and the logging camp, that, in the midst of a war, the province decided a second Royal Commission was necessary.

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Chapter 5
Sustained-Yield in Practice 1947-1976

This chapter sketches the development of capitalist sustained-yield forestry in British Columbia from 1944-1976. At the outset of this period, the British Columbia Commission on Forest Resources, hereafter known as the Sloan Commission, served as a venue for industry, the state, and a range of critics to highlight the problems of capitalist forestry and to argue for solutions that ranged from business-as-usual to state run forestry. This commission and the subsequent changes to forest policy announced a restructuring of the provinces forest industry that ushered in a long period of rapid, and largely unchallenged growth. In turn this growth in size and intensity of capitalist production drastically altered the environmental and social landscape of the province, creating the social and ecological problems around which current struggles are waged.

We begin with a discussion of the Sloan Commission itself. Again we argue that the Commission cannot be understood outside of the challenge to capitalist forestry offered by conservationists, forestry workers, and the political left. If in the previous chapters we have suggested that such forces gave birth to the Commission, here we contend that the Commission’s recommendations and the subsequent re-ordering of forestry policy and practice owe much to the hand of these critics. As a response to these
challengers, and playing to both their strengths and weaknesses, the Commission drafted
a powerful vision of planned, capitalist forestry, the dramatic effects of which continue to
mark the province's forests and peoples.

The rest of the chapter traces the social and ecological changes that accompanied
the turn to capital intensive sustained-yield forestry. While noting both social and
ecological problems we also confront the profound ideological hegemony that muted
criticism.

The British Columbia Commission of Forestry Resources (1943-45)

The very political context which we described in the previous chapter, one where
capitalist forestry faced not only reformist conservatism but also the spectre of socialist
alternatives, had two distinct, almost contradictory, effects on the politics and profile of
the Sloan Commission. On the one hand, the Commission proved much more popular
than its predecessor, attracting a broader range of critics and testimony. Sitting for one
hundred and eleven days in nine cities and towns spread across the province, the
commission recorded over 10,000 pages of testimony from 293 witnesses. In both sworn
testimony and written submissions, conservation groups, government foresters, political
figures, the IWA, tourism associations, and representatives from forest companies
provided a range of input that dwarfed the earlier public enquiry.
The strength of the various challenges to existing forestry policy and practice was reflected in a general consensus on the need for significant restructuring: critics, foresters and forestry capital (in its different guises) all understood that changes were coming. While, as we will see, wildly different visions of the future of forestry in the province were presented to the commissioner, seldom was it suggested that the status quo might be maintained and most all came to the inquiry with a clear idea of what the many different options might be. This is not to suggest, as have some, that the Commission was a *fait accompli*, only to recognize that most everyone understood that the existing situation was untenable and certain alliances had already taken shape.

**The Forest Service Solution**

It was the presentation of the Chief Forester, Orchard, which both led off the Commission and served as a reference point for most of the witnesses that followed. Playing a now familiar tune, the forestry department reiterated its longstanding concerns about the lack of reforestation, forest depletion and the lack of funds for research. As expected (see previous footnote), Orchard proposed a solution with two key components: (1) a significant 'reinvestment' of government forestry revenue in the strengthening of the

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87 Drushka (1985, 42-43) has presented a conspiratorial view of the Commission as a vehicle within which the already finalized plans of the chief forester and the provincial government were smuggled. Though this certainly overstates the case, the author provides some evidence, and it is highly plausible given the consensus at the Commission (see below), that many were prepared for the forester’s testimony.
forest service, and (2) the introduction of a sustained-yield program based on the
'working-circle' concept.

The first component of this program of reform was hardly unexpected and echoed
a refrain traceable to the first Royal Commission and beyond. It was once again
announced that much more state money must be spent on fire protection, forest
inventories, replanting of denuded lands and research into sustained-yield practices. The
second component suggested a more significant shift in policy direction. It was
recommended that both provincial and private forests be divided into areas where the
liquidation of old-growth would be controlled, regeneration of cut-over lands ensured,
and a stable (sustained), yearly crop harvested. The forester noted that either the state
could manage such lands directly, or that the existing operators could be enticed into
managing their lands to such standards in return for the granting of cutting rights on
additional areas of provincial forests.

At least from the range of forestry company representatives and private and public
sector foresters and other experts, Orchard's testimony received only minor criticism.
While there was debate over rates of natural reforestation and other issues, it appears
that after two decades of

88 Gordon Gibson, part owner of two logging firms operating on the West Coast of
Vancouver Island, insisted that sustained-yield plans including the controlled cut of
old-growth, the leaving of seed trees or 'patch-logging' to encourage natural regeneration,
or any sort of silviculture, was quite unnecessary given coastal geography (British
Columbia 1943-5, 4985).
criticism there were few left to outright challenge the forest services general claims about the need to move forward with a sustained-yield program. Most now accepted the fact that forest depletion was, or soon would be, an impediment to the industry and a threat to future of forest dependent communities, that existing timber should be used more efficiently and that reforestation must be ensured.

While it is not surprising that forest capital would invite increased spending by the province on fire prevention and research\textsuperscript{89}, the lack of reaction to drastic changes in tenure arrangements is important. Though leary about ‘excessive’ state involvement that would control forestry methods and the rate of cut, private capital apparently saw much promise in the private ‘working-circle’ which promised access to crown timber, in return for commitments to sustained-yield programs that, it was strongly suggested, would entail only modest changes to existing methods\textsuperscript{90}.

Neither the general agreement on the state of forestry in the province nor the obvious comfort that capital expressed with the reforms suggested by the forestry department should, however, overshadow the fundamental conflicts that did emerge at the Commission. Critics of capitalist forestry, including representatives from the

\textsuperscript{89} The forest service suggested that an ‘initial step in a proper forest management program’ would require a more than doubling of the staff size, and quadrupling of the salary budget of the forest branch (\textit{Daily Times} February 25, 1944).

\textsuperscript{90} At the hearings the forest companies were comforted by Canadian Society of Forest Engineers (CSFE) who represented foresters working in both the public and private sectors. The CSFE emphasized that the move to sustained-yield be based on voluntary initiatives (British Columbia 1943-5, 2364).
conservation movement, the CCF and the IWA, each presented alternatives that, in varying degrees were incompatible with the reformist vision of the forestry department and forestry capital.

The CCF Alternative

It was Colin Cameron of the CCF that provided the most thorough deconstruction of the reforms suggested by both capital and the forest service. Central to the CCF argument was an attack on the notion that forest revenues should be treated as a pool of funds to be reinvested in the forest base. Cameron attacked the idea that forest revenues should be considered 'in a vacuum' and be thus used solely, or largely, for forestry purposes. The opposition member defended government's obligation to regard such revenue "as an integral part of general government revenues to be expended in the best interests of the province as a whole" and launched a scathing attack on those who would have, "to put it in agricultural terms, the people of B.C. . . . raise cows for them to milk" (Cameron 1944, 5).

Cameron acknowledged that the state expenditure to protect and rehabilitate the province's forests was wholly inadequate, however, it was argued that this was a factor of the relatively minuscule proportion of revenue that ever found its way into government coffers in the first instance. Citing total forest production of over 124 million dollars, the CCF noted that "the overwhelming bulk of the net returns from the exploitation of the
forests of the province is drawn off into private hands and only a small portion reaches the public treasury” (Cameron 1944, 2). The province had thus been left with the unenviable task of choosing to use its meagre resources on either social spending or spending on the forest base that might ensure the long-term health of the forest resource.

To this end, the CCF agreed that the burden of both rehabilitation of previously logged areas and that the ongoing investment of sustained-yield must be placed ‘on the shoulders of the industry’. Orchard’s idea, however, that this might be accomplished through tenure reform, especially the establishment of private working-circles came under harsh scrutiny. At a practical level, Cameron used the testimony of a Bloedel Stewart and Welch representative to raise doubts about the willingness of private enterprise to seriously, and successfully, implement a program of sustained-yield. Faced with the vacillation of this industry figure, Cameron questioned the commitment of private owners and asked whether there was “any guarantee that . . . a sufficient portion of the returns from the mature timber be re-invested in the care and management of new forest?” There was, argued Cameron, a real threat that “we might find the immature new forest thrown back on our hands when the mature timber which must be the source of funds for its care has been dissipated” (Cameron 1944, 6).

More critically, the CCF submission asserted that any further alienation of Crown land, either in the form of outright ownership, or secure cutting rights would lead to a further concentration of the forest industry. The economic and thus political power of such timber giants would further compromise the ability of the province to ensure that
promise of reinvestment in sustained-yield would be kept. How, the Opposition wondered, would the forest service ensure adequate forest practices under a plan where “a comparatively few large corporations, whose voice and influence on forest and general public policy must inevitably grow more powerful” (Cameron 1944, 6).

Finally, it was argued that as forestry capital had already stripped much of the wealth from the forests, the ‘major portion’ of net returns from the harvest of old-growth forests must now be invested in both the forest and in the social good of the province itself, a situation incompatible with the profit needs of private capital (Cameron 1944, 7).

For these reasons, the CCF concluded, neither simply increasing government investment, nor the inducement of tenure reform could be counted upon to ensure sustained-yield production on existing forest lands, let alone the reparation of lands scarred left in ruin by previous logging. Instead, a fundamental restructuring of forest policy and of the forest industry was in order.

At the core of such restructuring would be the development of a provincially owned and operated industry. Rather than handing control of more public land over to private capital, the CCF argued that such land could be managed sustainably by the Forest Branch itself. With the expansion of the Forest Branch into an operating rather than simply a regulatory body, it was argued that the current conflict between conservation and the goal of increased profit would be eliminated:

In short we can hope to attain a properly integrated industry in which to some degree loggers are foresters and foresters, loggers, and in which there
will be a proper balance between the extractive and the conservation factors. (Cameron 1944, 8)

Though by far the most explicit attack on capitalist forestry, the CCF submission must be understood within the larger context of the submissions of conservationists and forestry workers who also attacked the problems of capitalist forestry, a context that underscores both the real threat offered by the CCF’s socialist challenge and its most pressing weaknesses.

Conservationists and Forestry Workers

Certainly the conservationist message presented by Orchard and other government foresters – that the province risked forest depletion if important reforms were not undertaken – was of considerable import. To this, however, we might add the voice of popular conservationists whose message echoed, though was not identical to, that of the state foresters. At the commission, the British Columbia Natural Resources Conservation League (BCNRCL) gave a short presentation that while prioritizing “the scientific preservation of merchantable timber resources,” also noted that the forest should be valued beyond a source of revenue for either capital or the state. In an earlier brief to the government attached to the BCNRCL submission, the society noted that

[i]t is, however, very encouraging to the members of this League to find that a very large number of people in all sections of the Province are keenly alive to the imperative necessity of safeguarding the natural beauty spots, most of this is actuated largely by their love of nature, at the same time it is recognized that in addition to this sentimental value, there is a
large reward to this Province in perpetuity provided we conserve and protect these Park areas and their approaches. (BCNRCL 1943, 1)

While later in this document and at the Commission the group safely retreated to an emphasis on the possible commercial value that might be wrung from such ‘sentimental value,’ the League was clear that the forest should not be reduced to the raw material of capitalist forestry91.

Other individuals took the conservationist message further and in directions more compatible with CCF proposals. Thomas Lindsay Thacker, for instance, humbly gave testimony on a vast range of subjects and was sharply critical of the forest practices of the day. This retired rancher and accountant proposed alternatives that deftly merged the aesthetic and ethical concerns of popular conservationism, the decentralized visions of community forests that had found voice in earlier CCF and IWA publications, and the notion that only a planned, cooperative, forestry might eliminate the irrational wastage of unfettered capitalist development92.

91 Moreover, even when retreating to the safer ground of the tourist value of maintaining the province as a ‘scenic playground’, the League highlighted capitalist forestry’s tendency to sacrifice long term economic goals to short term profits. Forestry capital, acting to its own interests would threatened the long-term economic health of both the industry as a whole and that of the province.

92 While at many points Thacker’s testimony displayed what today might be described as wholistic thinking about forestry issues, his thoughts on women’s potential role in a more planned forestry was most surprising. Noting that community forests could provide for stable communities, Thacker added: 
... it is undoubtedly the case that as war industries give way to ordinary conditions, many women will be forced to go back to their former positions in life, and that a great deal of discontent is likely to be
Suggesting the social and economic benefits of community forests, and insisting that, “every child should be taught to know the beauty of a tree . . . to value a tree as a living entity, and to recognize all trees as some of his best friends”, Thacker closed his presentation with a long quote from an American geography professor that echoed the CCF forestry platform:

Socialism does not mean dictatorship. Advancement towards conservation and good living in the Tennessee Valley, our greatest experiment in better living is not a function of Governmental insistence but of voluntary co-operation on the part of the majority of the people. Understand this clearly, for the government by new social theories is not forcing people to conserve resources. Depletion of resources is forcing people to new social theories. The government is merely an agent of the people, in this case an educational agent . . . It is a planned economy, which must eliminate false economics and disregard the selfish rights of the individual. (British Columbia 1943-45, 8529)

It fell to the IWA, meanwhile, to speak most directly to the interests of forestry workers. Though reiterating many themes raised by popular conservationists, the union more forcefully drew links between the ecological and social contradictions of this industry93. Pointing to the disastrous advance of the forest industry westward across the

engendered by the fact that they will be no longer able to earn good wages or even perhaps most meager pin-money.

Would it not be a sound policy to throw open for them and for older children, opportunities for profitable work in the lighter jobs that are to be found in plenty in forest work, – such as planting of seedlings, pruning, weedings, etc? (British Columbia 1943-5, 8545)

93 The union, for instance, embraced the conservationist concern that treating the forests as mere resource for a hungry forest industry belied their role in providing “shelter and refuge for wild life and . . . opportunities for the people to enjoy healthful recreation”.

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United States, the IWA argued that the industry, left to its own devices, destroyed both the forests and the communities that depended upon them – “Woods were denuded, mills dismantled, former logging communities were left to re-adjust themselves to living without established payrolls . . . .”

British Columbia, one way or another, was the end of the line for such destruction as there literally was ‘no place else to go’. At this last stand, though, technological change had made the threat to both forests and forestry workers even more dire:

... Improved machinery, technological developments have rendered vulnerable even the most remote forests which heretofore were considered inaccessible or unprofitable to log. Large cities have sprung up throughout British Columbia and depend entirely upon the lumbering industry. But the industry has been built, as it was in the middle west, on the basis of short term rather than permanent stability. (IWA 1945, 13)

The union added that the alternative, “long-range program, with the stabilization of the industry, must take seriously the effect of unemployment due to technological development” (IWA 1945, 13).

Heading off the fate of depleted forests and impoverished communities, the union argued, meant resisting those who would invoke a “maze of charges and counter charges, of regimentation, government control, excess taxes, etc.”. State intervention was necessary and must be implemented quickly if the forest industry was to avoid the

To these the union added other ‘multiple-use values’ including soil conservation, watershed protection and the protection of fish spawning grounds.
destruction of the resource upon which it depended\textsuperscript{94}. Moreover, it was urged that such regulation must aid in "the improvement and extension of the Canadian standard of living of workers in the industry through a more equitable and just distribution of the industry's income . . . . ."

Evaluating the Challenge to Capitalist Forestry

At the very least we must here suggest that the reformist plans of capital and the forest service were heartily challenged by the CCF\textsuperscript{95}. Offering a cogent critique, the CCF presentation was greatly enhanced by the questions raised by both conservationists and forestry workers – each suggested that the interests of private capital were not easily reconciled with either the conservation of forest values or with the needs of workers and forest dependent communities. Within this context, the CCF offered a clear explanation of just why this might be so, demonstrated significant flaws in the reforms suggested by

\textsuperscript{94} The IWA noted other ways in which, in the search for profits, the forest companies were compromising the stability of forest communities including the export of raw logs and the wastage of wood.

\textsuperscript{95} Wilson has suggested that the CCF critique, though important, was a "lonely contribution . . . a straw in the wind, insufficient to generate a really vigorous debate" (Wilson 1987-8, 16). This characterization is undercut both by the rigorous cross examination offered by the Commission lawyer and by the ongoing attacks by the press and government on CCF resource policy during the proceedings (\textit{Daily Times}, March 1, 23, 1944).
industry and the province, and offered a compelling alternative that had already shown promise at the ballot box.

All this being said, the links between these critics remained unarticulated – neither the IWA, nor the BCNRCL supported the call for socialized forestry\textsuperscript{96}. Certainly, both the question of communism, which left a rift between the CCF and the IWA, and the middle/upper class composition of many conservation help explain the lack of unity\textsuperscript{97}. However, it is equally clear that neither the CCF, the IWA, nor any other group, had come forward with an alternative to capitalist forestry that managed to draw together each of the critics themes: community stability, worker health and safety, decentralization and community based forestry, planned conservationism, and an appeal to the aesthetic/ethical

\textsuperscript{96} The IWA presentation, echoed many CCF themes, including the calls for a ‘a more equitable distribution of the industry’s income’, for the industry to contribute ‘its share’ of forest maintenance costs, and for the government to ensure community stability and that workers receive higher wages and safer working conditions. The union, however, presented itself to the Commission as a purely non-partisan organization, and dismissed the idea of socialized forestry. In its place, the union called for a committee that would oversee the planning of sustained-yield forests in the province and would ensure the “co-operation and working together of industry, labour and government”. Here, the union’s position was hopelessly vague. Under cross-examination the union president was entirely unclear as to the nature and scope of such a committee, and especially as to where ultimate authority for enforcing sustained-yield policies would rest (IWA 1945; British Columbia 1943-5, 7964-7990).

The British Columbia Natural Resources Conservation League, meanwhile offered only vague hints of further government regulation and/or tenure reform aimed at providing ‘incentives’ to private capital.

\textsuperscript{97} Political tensions within the IWA and amplified by the war may account for the nationalist and politically cautious tone of the unions’ Commission testimony.

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values of old-growth forests. The threat of a united critique of capitalist forestry remained just that.

A recognition of this threat, however fractured, does lead us towards a more coherent explanation of the Sloan Commission and the restructuring of forest policy and practice that followed in its wake. Indeed, the political left, forestry workers and popular environmentalists were, as much as any forest bureaucrat or capitalist, authors of such change. Giving this hand its credit, a positive thing in its own right, also draws our attention to the careful way in which Sloan era reforms selectively addressed the criticisms of these challengers, leaving unaddressed those least compatible with capitalist forestry.

The Sloan Report and the Restructuring of Capitalist Forestry

Giving credit to capital’s challengers alerts us to the more overtly social and cooperative form of forestry production suggested by the Commission. Indeed, throughout *The Report*, the Commissioner underscored the notion that public interests do not *necessarily* coincide with those of private industry. For this reason, Sloan argued that the forests of the province should be managed by an administrative vehicle that would act on behalf of the long-term interests of the province and its people. To those, presumably from forest capital, who might argue against such ‘ever increasing bureaucracy’, the Commissioner replied:
it must be recognized that modern developments in the fields of economics and sociology have thrust upon Governments duties and obligations that are difficult if not impossible of fulfilment by the same departmental processes that were designed to function in the horse and buggy era. Delegation of authority to Commissions in technological fields has been found an effective way of adapting existing processes of government to the requirements of a modern civilization. (Sloan 1945, 150)

Similarly, Sloan refused to treat private holdings as sacrosanct, noting:

There comes a time when the public welfare must take precedence over private rights. To permit the owners of Crown-granted lands to log them off and leave them without taking any steps to secure the growth of a new crop is to jeopardize seriously the future development of our logging industry. This, in turn, will lead to unemployment and to the decline of communities to ghost towns. (Sloan 1945, 142)

The Commissioner thus advised that private lands be subjected to the same sort of controls as leased and licensed lands, including controls on harvest methods and reforestation methods. It was expected that the state would simply expropriate the lands of those operators who refused to comply with silvicultural regulations (Sloan 1945, 143).

Within this framework of increased planning and cooperation, however, Sloan recommended a package of reforms that were clearly compatible with the interests of capital. These reforms were especially amenable to large enterprises which combined logging and manufacturing operations and had the resources to undertake the sort of management that sustained-yield production required. Taking heed of the relatively positive comments of such large operators at the hearings, Sloan’s report argued that private capital could be induced to act in manner compatible with society’s interest in sustained-yield. The report brushed aside CCF suggestions that profits channelled off
monies that would be better spent on sustained-yield and other social goods and accepted Orchard’s idea of tenure reform as the key to reconciling private interest and public good. To this end, the commissioner more or less echoed Orchard’s argument for the ‘working-circle’.

Noting that “responsible operators with large investments in sawmills and pulp and paper plants” had recognized the need for sustained-yield management yet did not have enough private lands to engage in such practices, Sloan recommended that adjacent crown lands be allocated in sufficient acreage to maintain production in perpetuity creating a ‘private working circle’ (Sloan 1945, 143-44). In return for this guaranteed supply of land, such a large operator must agree to take on the management of the combined holdings on a sustained-yield basis. Smaller operators, those without their own manufacturing plants, or owners of such plants without land, would be accommodated through areas of crown land managed directly by the forest service.

The reaction to the Sloan report, which was overwhelmingly positive from forest capital, forest labour and conservationists98, suggests just how carefully crafted the Commissioner’s reform package was. The Final Report recommended a sustained-yield policy that included: the very sort of planning and expertise called for by conservationists and socialists alike, promises to workers that their bosses would be held accountable for

98 See Daily Province, January 14, 1945, 46 where it was reported that the report had won praise from the British Columbia Loggers’ Association, the Truck Loggers Association, the pulp and paper industry and the IWA.
ensuring the stability of their communities and jobs; and the assurance to capital that, given that they would submit to controls on harvest rates and silviculture, the provinces forests would be made available as a resource.

Yet even a short list of the criticisms that were either ignored or superficially addressed by this reform package suggests that the success of the Report owed something to the lack of a united opposition: issues of economic redistribution, the preservation of old-growth for aesthetic or other values, the concentration of power within those same large operators upon whose shoulders the burden of sustained yield management would fall, and the worry that technological change might undercut promises of sustained jobs and sustained communities were each brushed aside.

Indeed, to anticipate our later analysis, we might say here that while largely unsuccessful in addressing the fundamental environmental and social contradictions of capitalist forestry (and we will soon turn to a description of the social and ecological problems wrought by Sloan era reformism), the Sloan Commission and the subsequent restructuring of the forest industry did make more transparent the cooperation necessary to avoid social and ecological destruction.

Sustained-Yield Policy, 1947-1978: From Symbol to Practice

The fundamental tenets of sustained-yield forestry, as suggested by the second Royal Commission, served as a blueprint for a type of capitalist forestry that retained its
popular support for over three decades. During this time, the practice of sustained-yield forestry has altered in a profound and comprehensive manner the social and ecological fabric of the province. While we will speak much of the failings of sustained-yield forestry in the province, it must also be acknowledged that until the last two decades of the century (and for many well beyond that) support for this policy and practice has been one of the provinces few political constants. For this reason we begin not with a burying of, but with a restrained praise for the economic, social and environmental reforms of the Sloan era.

Tenure Policy Change

The new Forest Act of 1947 established a regulatory regime that more or less echoed Sloan’s recommendations and created two new tenure arrangements: Public Working Circles (PWCs) and Forest Management Licences (FMLs); soon renamed Public Sustained Yield Units (PSYUs) and Tree Farm Licences (TFLs) respectively. While the TFL combined private land and temporary tenures with adjoining Crown timber to form a Tree Farm operated by a single firm under management plans approved by the Forest Service, a PSYU was an area of Crown land managed directly by the Forest service and logged by local companies who purchased volumes of timber through timber sales.

Adopting the same generous tone that the provincial government took during this period, one might acknowledge that these new tenures were intended to compliment each other: large capital would be enticed into bringing private holdings larger TFLs whose
security of tenure would encourage the long-term planning necessary for sustained yield practice, and PSYUs would ensure that smaller logging outfits followed similar practices as planned and enforced by the Forest Service itself.

However, we have already seen that the Sloan Commission endorsed the idea that large capital was better equipped and had a greater interest in sustained-yield forestry and thus it should not be a surprise that the TFL became the centrepiece of the province's forest policy. Comments at the time suggest that this type of tenure arrangement was favoured as it would require very little regulation, and therefore cost; after granting a TFL which was tied to commitments to sustainability and manufacturing facilities, a company could largely be counted on to follow the interest of a long-term supply of timber. As the Chief forester was to announce at the second Sloan Commission in 1957, licensees were understood as 'managers on behalf of the Government' (in Rajala 1998, 198).

Certainly, large capital, much of it from the United States, was quite eager to take up the task of TFL management: within ten years, the province had awarded 23 FMLs, 46 others were in process and 123 applications were on file with the Forest Service

99 Critics, both at the time and more recently, however, argued that the PSYUs were a token, and ineffective, gesture used to assuage the fear that large capital would come to control vast areas of the most commercially viable timber — a charge borne out during the 1960s, as the Forest Service adopted an unofficial policy of awarding timber licenses in PSYUs in proportion to a company's regional cut, a practice that solidified the control of large capital over these areas as well. The prolific forestry commentator, Ken Drushka, has both chronicled the historical debate and continued to promote the idea of increased private forest holdings, one that many of Sloan's critics, most notably H. R. MacMillan, had urged. See Drushka 1999, 1993.
(Sloan 1957, 111-113). Not a small part of the attraction was the size of the licences granted; one licence totalled over 2.5 million acres of land and another included over 1.8 million acres. The majority of the 12 licences granted in the Vancouver district included over 375,000 acres of land (Sloan 1957, 105). At the least, this inundation suggests that large forest capital was appreciative of the 'balance' of public and private interest offered through such tenure.

The Success of Sustained Yield Forestry

By many measures, capitalist sustained-yield forestry in British Columbia during this period was successful. For instance, if one was to measure success simply by the development of large-scale industry, then all would agree that at least until well into the 1970s this policy regime served well its purpose. Through the latter half of the 1950s, and through the following two decades, the industry grew at an unprecedented pace and generally along the pattern suggested by the Sloan Commission – firms grew in size and the production of forest products expanded exponentially.

Especially after 1960, large integrated firms began to dominate the industry. The pattern of small mills often located in remote villages and towns was replaced by one of 'diverse concentration' where production was consolidated at new, large mills in regional centres, a pattern reinforced by the introduction of huge kraft pulpmills at about the same time. Together these trends established a new economic geography marked by capital
intensive production in medium sized, resource dependent communities located relatively even across the province.\footnote{100} This growth itself was understood as necessary to the success of sustained-yield forestry. The size of the firms and their significant capital investments suggested that these were not the same sort of timber barons that shrank in the face of sporadic fluctuations in the price of timber. Moreover, the creation of integrated forest firms, firms in which the production process ranged from falling trees to producing plywood, lumber, pulp or paper (and often all three) created empires that not only suggested stability, but also the ‘efficient’ use of timber resources.\footnote{101}

Of course, large forestry operations were but a means to an end for sustained-yield. The more profound goal was the stable and perpetual reproduction of the resource, of jobs for forestry workers and revenues for the state. Though the ability of sustained-yield forestry to accomplish any of these objectives is now in question, through the early 1970s there were many reasons to suggest that each of these goals were being met. Certainly, the industry demonstrated an ability to create jobs. Through this period, direct

\footnote{100} Here, it is critical to note that while production was centred in these hinterland communities, head-offices were located in Vancouver, with their prominent logos etched across the city’s office towers.

\footnote{101} Hardwick (1964) describes the MacMillan Bloedel and Powell River Limited operations at Port Alberni, which reached peak production levels during the 1970s, as something of an ideal case. This firm is admired for its vertical and horizontal integration together which allowed for both the ‘highest’ use of a wide variety of tree species and sizes and for the transformation of what was formerly considered ‘waste’ into pulp and paper.
employment in the forest sector grew at a fairly constant rate (Travers 1993; Hayter 2000) and, as the industry spread across the province, new communities were created and new pulp and sawmills were built in existing communities\textsuperscript{102}. While employment in forestry reflected flux in commodity demand and employment suffered the still relevant factors of season (with layoffs during winter and during the summer fire-season) and of specific weather conditions, until the mid-1970s, the demand for labour most often outstripped supply (Hayter 2000).

Both the sheer abundance of work and the nature of jobs created were welcomed by forestry unions. While loggers remained difficult to organize, the vast new sawmills provided more fertile ground\textsuperscript{103}. Later, the multiplication of pulpmills allowed for the expansion of pulp and paper unions, first under the auspices of competing international unions and later through the breakaway Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC), formed in 1963, and the Canadian Paperworkers Union (now the Communication, Energy and Paperworkers or CEP), formed in 1975.

The new geography of forest capital also made such organizing easier. Workers were not only brought together in large production facilities but also in regional centres which emerged as strong ‘union towns’. Facing increasingly profitable forest

\textsuperscript{102} See chapter 5 for a case which exemplifies the, not always direct, link between the awarding of a TFL and the creation of regional industry.

\textsuperscript{103} Drushka (1999) argues that the union’s focus on organizing these industrial sites explains the historically lower rates of union membership in interior logging.
corporations with capital intensive production facilities, forest unions were able to obtain significant wage packages for their members making. Towns such as Port Alberni became home to some of the highest average wages in the country during this period (Egan and Klausen 1998).

The growth of the industry also held significant benefits for the provincial treasury. As the industry grew in size and in output, forest service revenues also increased – generally in proportion to the industry’s contribution to the provincial GDP (Travers 1993, 200). Importantly (and we will return to this point), the province facilitated this growth by increasing the Allowable Annual Cut (AAC). These increases to the AAC, which were especially pronounced towards the end of this period, were justified by arguing that advantages in technology had increased the total size of the commercially viable forest (Travers 1992;1993).

More contentious than the claim that capital, forest workers and the state saw tangible benefits from the growth of sustained-yield forestry, is the claim that similar benefits accrued to the forest resource – that, as predicted, large-scale forestry firms came to invest, through both planned harvest and silviculture, in the perpetuation of the timber resource. If we ignore (as most did at the time) critical debates about the rate of timber harvest, we might too suggest that there is evidence to that such firms were more committed to the practice of sustained-yield. In his second report, for example, Chief Justice Sloan noted that recent years had seen a heightened interest in planting programmes on the Coast where large companies held either Crown grants or the new
long term tenures (Sloan 1957, 299-303). The Commission identified five companies on the coast and one smaller interior operation as actively engaged in planting programs and noted that in the Vancouver Forest District planting by private companies had come to equal that performed by the Forest Service. Similarly, another measure of sustained-yield forestry, the total land that was harvested under ‘approved working plans’ (either a TFL or a PSYU), also rose dramatically during this period. It appeared too many that a slow but steady march towards sustainable practices had begun.

While we will later discuss important political and cultural factors, it must be emphasized that the rapid growth of the industry during this period was critical to maintaining the hegemony of sustained yield ideology. The industry produced an economic boon for its key supporters, large capital, labour, and the province. That there were many ‘hidden costs’ to this development is not in dispute, and this is a subject to which we will now turn. Here we simply acknowledge that the reorganization of forestry practice following the Sloan commission produced many of the benefits that its supporters had predicted.
Forest Factories and Factories Feeding on Forests: Solving the problem of maintaining forest work

From a macro-perspective, the rapid expansion of capitalist forestry alongside the new regulatory framework of sustained-yield suggested a new era of long-term, stable forestry jobs. However, from the perspective of the logger in the woods, or an employee in a mill, this same influx of capital, which took form in new machinery, production techniques and managerial strategies, was the source of uncertainty.

At the most general level, this period saw the introduction of machinery that sped up the production process. For forestry labour, the problem was relatively clear: mechanization and automation altered both the quantity and quality of forest work; as capital replaced workers, it also simplified much of the remaining work. Perhaps because of the lag in impact of these ‘efficiency measures’, it took some time for forestry labour to

104 A brief, and throughly incomplete list of some of the changes, one that follows the production process, can give some idea of the extent of change: road building was sped up by better drilling machines that set dynamite deeper into the rock cutting the blasting needed, more powerful bulldozers and other road building equipment cleared the debris quicker and built smoother, longer lasting roads; improved chainsaws sped up falling and bucking; yarding was sped up by the use of mobile steel spars and of the even more mobile windrow machine; loading logs onto trucks was made easier by new grappling machinery; transporting logs was sped up by both improvements in truck design, and by the better logging roads; on the water self-loading and dumping barges opened up a bottleneck in the transportation process; at the sawmill better saws required fewer changes and less frequent sharpening; transportation between stages was becoming automated; and ‘semi-automated’ tasks were now performed by ‘push-button’ operators; the co-sighting of sawmills and pulpmills eliminated some material transport; and most dramatically, ‘greensite’ pulp mills had incorporated continual-process technologies.
confront the issue of mechanization. By early in the 1960s, however, this had become a central issue for the IWA.

This concern over technology induced job loss was expressed vividly in a series of articles published in the summer 1962 in the *Western Canadian Lumber Worker*. This series was preceded by an address by, then regional president, Jack Moore, who bluntly stated that “Unless we act to meet this situation at the bargaining table and in the political field, the new automated processes will displace more and more workers, for whom no employment is available . . .” (*Western Canadian Lumber Worker*, June 1962, second issue, 6).

Employment numbers at specific job sites underscored the gravity of the situation. The union pointed to the logging sector where

The plain fact is, however, that fewer loggers are harvesting more logs. One example of this trend is found in the Englewood Division of Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Not long ago this operation employed approximately 1200 workers. Now approximately 600, half the former working force, produces as many logs or more. (*Western Canadian Lumber Worker*, August 1962, second issue, 3)

A personal note was added by a Regional Vice-President who admitted shock upon returning to an operation where, ten years previous, he had worked as a logger. Tracing the recent changes this union executive lamented that no step of the production process was untouched. The changes began with the act of building the expanded network of logging roads:

Now we see high powered construction equipment punching a network of access roads through the logging area close to the felled trees. In the rock
work required, the familiar jack-hammer drill and its operator is making way for the new rock drilling machine, combining compressor and drill with the engineer so positioned that he controls the whole operation. Where the old-style jack-hammer drilled to a depth of 20 feet, the new machine sinks a three-inch hole 120 feet. One blast can remove the rock that formerly required blasting at several levels. (Western Canadian Lumber Worker, August 1962, second issue, 3)

This road building in turn was linked to developments in the yarding process:

Road construction has made possible the use of the mobile steel spar, which can move from one setting to another and start yarding in and average of one and a half hours. Or more recently, we have seen the windrow machine, with its 70-foot tower, mounted on a cat, move along the new road into the setting and pick up the logs 150 to 200 feet on either side of the road. The logs are placed in windrows, 20 to 30 feet high on both sides of the road. As the windrow machines move along the roads become a valley of logs. (Lumber Worker, August 1962, second issue, 3)

The loading procedure kept up with this quickened pace with the introduction of new machines "of various types, which with grapple hooks or air tongs, can load the waiting trucks with a small crew of perhaps two to three men" (Western Canadian Lumber Worker, August 1962, second issue, 4). The development of stronger, larger trucks ensured that the logs were sped along to booming grounds to await water transport or directly to a sorting yard near a mill. If transported by water, the introduction of the self-dumping log barge dramatically cut unloading times\(^{105}\).

\(^{105}\) To return to the beginning of the production process it should be noted that felling and bucking were sped up with the constant improvement to chainsaws. However, the job of faller remained, and indeed does so today, one of the last highly skilled jobs in logging. While, new saws, as advertised in the pages of this very article, were lighter and less prone to breakdowns, the skill required to bring down huge coastal fir, hemlock and cedar, in difficult terrain, safely and with minimal breakage is an art that remains well respected. Nonetheless, in interior forests the feller buncher has replaced even this job...
The situation in the sawmills was perhaps more dire. The example of a chipboard production mill where, “A handful of loaders and technicians can produce a volume of chipboard which formerly required 200 workers” (Western Canadian Lumber Worker, June 1962, 1st issue, 6) was raised to highlight the troubling prospect of mills that churned out two-by-fours, plywood, or chipboard without providing the employment upon which milltowns had come to rely106. Modern mills, such as that at Castlegar, “built from scratch with brand-new engineering designs [embodied] the company’s intention to replace manual labour, wherever possible with machine supervision by the employees” (Western Canadian Lumber Worker, August 1962, second issue, 5). With the rise of vertically and horizontally integrated corporations and the co-siting of saw and pulpmills, even transportation jobs were automated through the use of connecting chutes and conveyors (Hardwick 1964).

A related concern was dutifully noted: mechanization was eliminating some of the most skilled forestry work. In the woods this trend became clear as ‘engineers with high-powered machines’ played havoc with traditional crew organization. Meanwhile, it was remarked that “skilled occupations such as those of the high rigger, head-loader, second-loader are vanishing.”

and in remote and mountainous coastal terrain, heli-logging is threatening to do the same (See Lumber Worker, September 1998, 2).

106 The IWA noted this problem when it was warned that “. . . there is also the danger that automatic processes will bring a re-location of operations and create ghost towns and communities” (Western Canadian Lumber Worker, June 1962, 1st issue, 6).
While some comfort was taken from the fact that 'skilled men' were still placed at 'key points of decision' in the new sawmill, the situation here too was troubling:

[the push-button operator is a common sight. Various units are at least semi-automatic. The transfer of material between the various stages of processing is rapidly becoming more automatic, and may yet lay the basis for complete automation in a sawmill. *(Western Canadian Lumber Worker, August 1962, second issue, 5)*

It should be mentioned that within a few short years, those working in the pulp sector, faced examples of just such 'complete automation': so-called 'greensite' mills, built in the late 1960s, embodied continual-process technologies that eliminated vast numbers of jobs. With production monitored from control rooms, those left 'on the floor' were mainly tradesworkers dealing with scheduled or emergency maintenance procedures *(Hayter 2000; Marchak 1983).*

We might add that the particular economic geography of capital intensive sustained-yield forestry only served to highlight the problems of mechanization. While new, capital-intensive, mills brought greater commodity production with fewer workers, smaller, labour intensive mills were closed and the communities dependent on them withered 107. Forest workers were now concentrated in larger centres which remained overwhelmingly dependent on production facilities and logging operations where labour

107 The changing geography of production, where new capital intensive mills were concentrated in regional nodes, was also cited as a problem. It was lamented that, "There is also the danger that automatic processes will bring a re-location of operations and create ghost towns and communities" *(Western Canadian Lumber Worker, June 1962, 1st issue, 6).*
was steadily being displaced. The fate of workers in these communities was tied to their ability to find work in facilities where production, and even increased production, did not guarantee the production of jobs.\textsuperscript{108}

Together, the combined assault by capital on work and, more specifically on skilled work, suggests that through this period, capitalist forestry produced employment problems around which labour might organize. While we will return to the question of why this mobilization did not materialize, here we might note that the sort of social contradiction marked by mass unemployment and dislocation that had earlier helped radicalize forestry workers did not develop during this period.

Most simply, one might conclude that buoyant world markets, including a steadily increasing demand for forest commodities, and an attendant influx of mainly U.S. capital, were more than a match for any problem of overproduction or unemployment created by the new capital intensive production techniques. As we have seen, the forest industry during this time kept growing to fill export markets that seldom showed signs of saturation. What such an explanation conveniently avoids, however, are environmental

\textsuperscript{108} If we suggest the problem of unemployment in a general sense, this obscures the important consideration that the ability to find work in the resource sector is also shaped by, and shapes, gender inequalities. Marchak's \textit{Green Gold} (1983) is the classic work in this field, describing women's exclusion from most forestry production and managerial work; their over-representation in relatively low-paying positions in clerical and service work and lower-level management; and their overwhelming responsibility for domestic work and child care. More recent research suggests that not only does this pattern continue but that periods of economic crisis and restructuring have worked to exacerbate these inequities (Egan and Klausen 1998).
limits – either those limits that are imposed by sustained-yield forestry, the more literal limits of the forest as resource, or the more complex, and politically challenging, limits imposed by the loss of old-growth forests and all the non-timber values they might harbour.

Indeed, critics of varying ideological and theoretical bents now roundly acknowledge that expansion of the industry was made possible, both during this period and beyond, by avoiding the constraints of sustained-yield forestry in particular and, perhaps more critically, the ignorance of broader ecological constraints. Social peace and prosperity was bought through an expansion of capitalist sustained-yield forestry across the landscape and through an intensification of production on this enlarged landbase. Both strategies, we might add, suggest the temporary and ecologically and socially destructive nature of such ‘solutions’.

Expanding across the landscape

If there is one overwhelming feature of the growth of capitalist forestry during this period it is to be found in the expansion of the industry in a geographic sense. Until the immediate pre-War period geography placed very real limits on the forest industry (limits akin to those faced in agriculture where the supply of arable land is relatively inflexible). Railway logging was physically limited by the steep terrain of coastal areas and, by expense, it was limited to areas relatively convenient to water transport or to the mills themselves. In the post-War period, technological change and public policy combined to
tear down these barriers and the forest industry flooded across landscapes previously inaccessible.

Two factors were critical in this geographic expansion: advances in trucking and road construction and aggressive state involvement. While trucks had been used in logging since the 1920s, their limitations restricted widespread use until the 1940s, and it was only during the post WWII years that their power was unleashed. Alongside new, more capable trucks and loading equipment came improvements to roads of which we have earlier spoken – bulldozers and other equipment facilitated the building of better quality roads which in turn reduced hauling costs, and increased the speed of transportation. Meanwhile the state encouraged such expansion directly through huge spending on road and rail networks and less directly through the subsidy of capital’s construction of such infrastructure (tenure holders could deduct road building and other costs from stumpage payments)(Hayter 2000).

If the continued economic expansion of the industry helped offset the problem of unemployment, it did so by bringing vast wilderness areas within the system of capitalist sustained-yield forestry. On the coast, roads were pushed to higher elevations and into more remote valleys and whole new areas of the interior became the source of both timber and fibre. Before entering any discussion of the effectiveness or enforcement of regulations that might constrain the effects of such forestry, we might note that the very inclusion of these areas within what has become known as the ‘working forest’, entails significant ecological change. Most generally, ancient forests became subject to the
control of capital – ancient stands of trees, whose ecological properties were almost solely a result of natural processes, became subject to management plans where elements such as the age and species mix of forests were decided, in the large part, by profit concerns.

Through this period, for instance, it was an explicit goal to replace coastal old-growth forests containing a mixture of age classes with ‘thrifty’ stands of planted, monocultures of Douglas Fir or, in the case where pulp was to be the principal crop, a mixture of Douglas Fir and Hemlock. Capital and the state, working under the assumptions of sustained-yield forestry, saw this as a means by which ‘decadent’ stands of trees, of wildly differing age-classes, with significant volumes of dead and dying trees, could be replaced by the ‘thrifty’ stands of similar aged, quickly growing trees of the highest economic value.\(^{109}\)

**Intensified Forest Exploitation**

While the simple spread of the industry was of critical importance, we must also acknowledge that forest capital also failed to act within (and simply was not subjected to) the sort of constraints that might ensure that the resource was harvested in a sustainable manner. Perhaps most alarmingly, as capital flowed into the province, the volume of timber cut grew at an exponential rate. Moreover, harvesting continued to focus on the

\(^{109}\) For a corporate perspective on forestry at the time see MacMillan Bloedel 1966, 1967. For contemporary criticism see Hammond 1991.
valley bottoms and the most accessible lands in a pattern that became known as
"highgrading on the landscape scale" (Travers 1992, 39), leaving more costly, and less
valuable timber for later in the rotation. Relatedly, cut levels on managed lands were set
using a formula that both expedited the liquidation of old-growth and underestimated the
lower volumes and values of second growth, a flaw that foreshadowed significant drops
in AACs towards the end of the century – a phenomenon now called ‘falldown’ (Vance
1990, 12; Drushka 1985, Ch.3).

Adding to the impact of the accelerated rate of cut was an increase in the intensity
and environmental impacts of capital intensive forestry. At the very beginning of this
period ‘patch logging’, which it was hoped would facilitate natural regeneration and help
limit fires, was encouraged. However, by the 1960s companies were allowed to engage in
progressive clearcutting where massive opening resulted from the addition of one harvest
block to another. These massive openings were susceptible to fire during dry summer
months and, especially in steep coastal forests, prone to landslides through the wet winter
months.

Meanwhile, the scale of harvesting and transportation equipment left ever
increasing scars on the landscape. Roads came to crisscross ever remote and steep areas,
the effects of which were compounded by the use of heavier and more powerful hauling

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110 See Rajala (1998, 204-216) for an account of the short lived move towards
smaller cutblocks. Also see our case study for a discussion of the effects of progressive
clearcutting during this period.
trucks. In wet coastal areas many of these roads would eventually collapse in slides that both tore away the shallow topsoils necessary for regeneration and filled streams and rivers with silt and debris\textsuperscript{111}.

Though we will return to comment on the question of how some of the most ecologically dubious practices of the day came to be accepted, it must be emphasized that both the geographical spread of the industry and the increasing intensity of cut took place while the state and capital neglected to collect the very sort of scientific information upon which sustained-yield forestry was assumed to be based. Numerous critics have noted that through this period the Forest Service lacked even the basic information necessary to make decisions on allowable cuts and the like. The Forest Service certainly did not have the personnel and resources necessary to complete a detailed inventory of the province’s forests and when TFL holders themselves were pushed to collect such information they

\textsuperscript{111} In a dramatic example of this common problem, landslides at Riley Creek in Haida Gwaii (Queen Charlotte Islands), focused attention on logging practices in the area. The event, predicted by environmentalists and federal fisheries employees, and which destroyed important salmon spawning areas, helped popularize one of the first and most prominent ‘wars in the woods’. See Elizabeth May (1990) for an insider account of this fourteen year long campaign.
tended to balk at the expense. One critic, while acknowledging that the Forest Service acted “without much care for the environment”, could only offer the meek defence that

... its hands were bound to a certain degree because huge financial, personnel and organizational efforts on research, planning and silviculture would have been needed just to keep the pace with denudation, an effort which exceeded the resources of the Forest Service at that time.

(Gremminger 1985, 138)

While engineering prowess and technological progress were thrown into the project of converting old-growth forests into lumber and pulp, very little effort or expertise were turned to the task of regrowing the forest let alone that of understanding the ecological and other values of this quickly changing landscape.

Resistance to the Social and Environmental Problems of Sustained Yield Forestry

There is now little debate that the practice of sustained-yield forestry during this period produced significant environmental problems and displaced and de-skilled forestry work with capital intensive production methods. It is also widely acknowledged that this period saw little resistance from either the environmental movement or from forestry labour. While explaining such a non-event is never an easy task, one might do worse

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112 A decade after the first Sloan Commission, a provincial employee decried the state of Forest Service data admitting “you finally end up “guesstimating” to the best of your knowledge” (Trew in Rajala 1998, 200). Meanwhile, when the Forest Service drew up a set of minimum data collection requirements to be met by TFL holders, the licensees argued that costs were prohibitive and that, in any case, the province lacked the authority to demand such measures (see Rajala 1998, 199-200).
than to return to our discussion of the tangible benefits of such production. However, here we must also flesh out this explanation with mention of a host of related factors including: the IWA’s political upheavals, the symbolic power of sustained yield within a cultural context of post-War technological utopianism, and a simple lack of information about the province’s forests.

First, we must reiterate that, while mechanization and automation may have raised significant concerns for forestry workers and the IWA, sustained-yield forestry during this period continued to produce forestry work. Rapid increases to harvest levels allowed for both the substitution of capital for labour and increases to overall employment levels.

Moreover, the changing nature of forestry work had significant benefits for both individual workers and the union. If earlier the union had railed against the industry’s reliance on an itinerant, isolated workforce of men without, or separated from, families, the new giant mills and integrated production facilities, centred in growing forestry towns, addressed many of these woes. Even many loggers could now take advantage of the growing network of roads and better transportation to commute to the forests within which they were harvesting, leaving behind memories of wretched forest camps.

The union too could leave behind memories of its ‘navy’ chasing workers up and down the west coast and turn its attention to the organizing of mill workers in stable industrial settings. These integrated firms created the very sort of large, stable industrial workplaces that were relatively easy to organize, and less expensive to service. Perhaps,
most critically, there was the hope that these large enterprises would offer safer, more stable workplaces\textsuperscript{113}.

Simply put, then, by shifting many of the social costs of such production onto the increased exploitation of the forests capital was able to provide workers many of the benefits that workers had quite recently appeared unattainable save through a radical reorganization of the state and economy. Such benefits provide an important part of any explanation of why during this period the IWA and forestry workers welcomed corporatist solutions to their concerns with the quality and quantity of forest work and, to a lesser extent, to their concerns with the future of the resource.

Nonetheless, it would be unforgivably reductionist not to acknowledge that these were political decisions and that the political climate of the post-war period, and especially the political upheavals within the IWA itself, were critical factors. In the post-WWII period, fervent anti-communism, and its expression within the IWA, served to thoroughly discredit the radical politics which at an earlier moment wove together environmental and social critiques of capital. The loss of this critique must be understood

\textsuperscript{113} As we have noted, the union had a particular interest in ameliorating the horrific physical price paid by forestry workers, especially loggers. Early in 1948, the union ran a grisly article under the heading “13 348 Killed and Injured in One Year” which used the following haunting picture: “Imagine standing on the Union Dock in Vancouver watching 300 husky loggers boarding a boat for a logging camp. Then say to yourself that 100 of these men will be killed or crippled before the years is out” (\textit{B.C. Lumber Worker} Vol xix, no. 2, January 28, 1948, 6). 

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as part of the larger social and political environment that helped obscure the manner with which capital had shifted the social costs of forestry onto the forests themselves.

Certainly, the expulsion of the communist leadership within the IWA was of import\textsuperscript{114}. For a short period following the publication of the Sloan Commission Report, the still communist led IWA continued its attack on forestry capital. The union linked the environmental destruction of massive clearcutting with the control of large capital over increasingly large tracts of land and criticized the new tenure arrangements\textsuperscript{115}. However, with the rise of anti-communist white bloc, and the eventual breakaway and demise of the

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{114} This is well traced by Lembcke and Tattam (1984).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{115} Citing “that scene of almost unparalleled devastation stretching north and west of Campbell River where only a vast ‘forest’ of fire blackened stumps is left to mark one of the finest timber stands in North America”, the union described the sustained-yield program thus, “a big political bluff, cooked up to lull the public into prolonged inaction . . . the phrase ‘sustained yield forestry’ is merely cover for the continuous devastation of timber resources aimed at the protection of private rights in the industry” (\textit{B.C. Lumber Worker}, May 5, 1948).
\end{quote}

At this same early moment the union bitterly attacked the new land tenures as a capitulation to monopoly forest capital. Shaken by the extent to which large capital was using the new management licences to gain control of huge tracts of forest, the union argued against the granting of a large TFL on Vancouver Island, labelling it a “timber grab” and a “Carefully laid plan to steal millions of dollars of forest revenue from the people . . . a move by timber interests to monopolize all forest wealth in this province” (\textit{B.C. Lumber Worker}, January 12, 1948, 5). The union also opposed the emerging reliance on corporate self-regulation which was supported by the Minister of Lands and Forests and the province’s chief forester. [The Minister of Lands and Forests suggested that the new TFLs would “transfer the regulation to the individual as opposed to the police state, subject to strict regulation by the Government itself,” while the chief forester saw this new tenure as the means to “enable the practice of forestry with the least possible fuss and bother and with the an absolute minimum of hampering legislation” (in Rajala 1998, 198)].

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radical Woodworkers Industrial Union of Canada (WIUC), the union withdrew from this radical critique. Under the new anti-communist leadership the union embraced the idea of capital intensive sustained-yield forestry and talk of ‘forest destruction’ disappeared. Environmental politics, like many other subjects, were sidelined as the union turned to a pragmatic stance and focussed tightly on issues of wages, hours and working conditions.

Within the new politics of the IWA, environmental issues either simply did not arise or were considered technical problems whose solution was found in the scientific prowess of large capital. Part of the blessing of technological change, the IWA argued was the ability of capital funded science to solve the problems of timber shortage and the displacement of works.

A Lumber Worker special report, Scientific Forestry: For Bigger, Better Trees and More Jobs for British Columbia, published in the spring of 1967, suggested just how

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116 Torn by its internal political struggles, by 1949, the union’s criticism had been reigned in. The IWA conceded capital’s control over large tracts of forest with the acknowledgment that “Admittedly it is necessary to have large ‘working circles’ of forest land under one management if there is to be a permanent industry based on sustained yield” (B.C. Lumber Worker Vol 19, No37, February 17, 1949). Having accepted the influx of large capital, the union was content to argue for a ‘fair deal’ for the province. See for example the unions mild opposition to the granting of a TFL based on the inclusion of lands already reforested by the province (B.C. Lumber Worker Vol 19 No37, February 17, 1949).

117 Lembcke and Tattum (1984) account of the de-politicization of the Timberworker captures the general trajectory of the Lumber Worker in British Columbia.
firm the grip of scientific sustained-yield ideology was within the IWA (*Western Canadian Lumber Worker*, March 1967, 6-7). In this glowing account of the Tahsis Company Ltd., the union hailed a decision to build a modern 750-ton pulpmill at Gold River, fed by trees from the company’s Tree Farm Licence. Liberally illustrated with photos of suited foresters working on the company’s tree orchard, the article praised the company for its work on reforestation and genetic enhancement projects. These advances it was claimed would both reduce the rotation age and increase the wood per acre harvested from replanted lands.

Without questioning this company’s commitment to the science of forestry, especially given the rather spotty record of many other operators at the time, the contention that a science infused capitalist forestry might produce both bountiful forests and bountiful jobs proved misguided. Modest increases in ‘forest efficiency’ of even the most aggressive replanting schemes would hardly make up for the much more rapid consumption of timber by modern mills of the sort that was being constructed at Gold River. By the late 1990s, facing a shortage of fibre, the Gold River pulp mill, one of the province’s most technologically advanced, was dismantled.

If the working-class environmentalism traced in previous chapters was lost as the IWA became more firmly committed itself to the support of capital-intensive sustained-yield forestry, it must also be acknowledged that no other strain of environmentalism arose to take its place. At the very time that the forest industry was spreading across the landscape at an unprecedented rate (and was harvesting these forests at a much quicker
pace) there appears to have been little public concern let alone dissent – a situation
bourne out by a public opinion poll from 1960 showing that less than five percent of
respondents mentioned forest management as a problem and virtually none criticized the
provincial government (Western Survey Research Ltd. 1960).

Certainly, there appears to have been little outcry over the transformation of the
provinces remaining old-growth forests into efficient Tree Farms and other ‘economic
development’ projects. A development heady Social Credit government faced little
opposition as it whittled away at the total land base protected in parks, allowed mining in
any park over two thousand hectares, and promoted the development of a town within the
boundaries of Strathcona Park and the dumping of mine tailings in Buttle Lake (Wilson
1998, 93-102). Public appetite for wilderness, it appears, was more than sated by the
provinces creation of a plethora of roadside parks along the province’s rapidly expanding
network of highways.

Coming to understand this lack of concern, we could suggest that a spurt of park
creation between 1938 and 1944 met many of the recreational concerns of middle-class
environmentalists and that earlier contested areas close to major population centres had
either been preserved, or had already been logged. It is also true that a lack of
information about the very matters that much later were to become the heart of forestry
debates (the rate of cut, size and number of un-logged areas, the effect on salmon and

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other wildlife) made criticism difficult and that government bureaucracies and decision-making processes were generally closed to scrutiny\textsuperscript{118}.

While each of these factors has its place, they might be considered secondary to the more general way in which the symbolism of sustained-yield resonated with a post-war consumer culture enamoured with the power of science and the new technologies. Sustained-yield forestry, as outlined by the Sloan Commission, presented a powerful symbolic response to the fear of forest famine that marked earlier environmental concern. If as we have argued in our previous chapter the idea of scientific management spoke to the middle-class environmentalism of the day, the social context of North America in the 1950s, where technological know-how and ‘proper management’ could solve the most perplexing of social and environmental ills, only served to heighten the appeal of this powerful imagery\textsuperscript{119}. We must therefore echo our previous chapter when we argue that much of the environmental movement of the day was vulnerable to the ‘de-politicizing’ ideology of scientific, sustained-yield forestry, an ideology placed front and centre in the public relations materials of industry giant MacMillan Bloedel and others\textsuperscript{120}.

\textsuperscript{118} Wilson (1999, 110).

\textsuperscript{119} Commenting on Montreal’s Expo 67, Alexander Wilson (1991) has observed that many pavilions raised the question “How long can Man go on meeting ever-increasing needs for energy and raw material to serve the world’s soaring population?” Even at the brink of the contemporary environmental movement, the answer was uniformly, “with proper management, there was plenty for all” (Wilson 1998, 166).

\textsuperscript{120} See the MacMillan Bloedel (1967) pamphlet “Building Better Forests” and “Whatsoever a man soweth” one of a series of short films produced one year earlier.
In sum, the strategy of state and capital to address the social costs of sustained-yield forestry through the heightened exploitation of the land base proved politically sound, if ecologically and socially unsustainable.

Conclusion: The Failure and Promise of Sustained-Yield Forestry

Today there is little dispute, from critic or supporter, that the Sloan Commission heralded the most important restructuring of forestry policy and practice in the province’s history. What has largely been forgotten however is that this restructuring was a profound response to a profound threat. The timing and nature of this restructuring owe much to the socialist political threat of the CCF, to the threat of a radical forestry union and to the challenge posed by early environmentalism. In turn, we must remember that these movements were organized around social and environmental problems produced by capitalist contradiction most generally, and the contradictions of capitalist forestry in particular.

Having remembered that Sloan era restructuring was forged through such crisis and political, our eye is trained to the more overtly social form of production announced by the Royal Commission. Sustained-yield forestry demanded a much greater level of planning and coordination. The state took a larger role, both directly and indirectly, in the planned expansion of infrastructure, in forestry research, and in the regulation of forest practices. The new tenure arrangements gave the province a greater role in determining
the type and location of manufacturing facilities. Capital itself came to adopt more planned and coordinated production with the introduction of integrated forestry companies. The bloody battles waged between timber barons and forestry workers gave way to the institutionalized struggle of codified industrial relations. All of this was epitomized in the creation of hinterland, company towns.

Remembering the conflict from which such restructuring emerged also trains our eye to its limits. Most dramatically this restructuring announced the beginning of the end of the provinces' ancient forests. These 'decadent', unpredictable stands were to be replaced with the controlled, manageable forests that best suited capitalist production. In much the same way, unpredictable workers were replaced with more efficient, more precisely controlled machines.

Moreover, the careful planning of the long-term health of forests, of forestry workers and of forest dependent communities gave way to the more immediate need for increased profit. The industry cut forests at an increasing rate, destroyed the ecological conditions necessary for successful regeneration, replaced old-growth habitat with monoculture tree farms, polluted air and water and left workers and communities vulnerable to economic flux and technological change.

How during the time attention was focussed on the 'success' of sustained-yield forestry rather than its problems is, we have argued, a political question whose answer is found at the nexus of cold-war political culture, the internal politics of the IWA, an expansionist world economy and the weakness of both the political left and the
environmental movement. Most important however is the recognition that the social contradictions of capital have been resolved at the cost of increased exploitation of the forest.

Does this mean that the work of labour and environmental movements was in vain? Not at all. While the more social form of capitalist production that has been their legacy continues to produce ecological and social problems, it also holds up the failed promise of a forestry that is both ecologically and socially sustainable. As we will see in the following chapters, labour and environmental movements have organized around both these ecological and social problems and the failed political promise. At least to some, sustained-yield forestry has rendered imaginable a more truly social and ecological form of production.
From the late 1960s onward, the ability of sustained-yield forestry to resolve, or at least forestall, the social and environmental contradictions of capitalist forestry began to wane: the limits of coastal forests were once again near and the second growth ‘crop’ that was to provide permanent production (and permanent employment) was both smaller and less valuable than the old-growth it replaced. Moreover, while capital continued to displace work in both the mills and forests, both unpredictable markets and a new and powerful environmental movement, organized around the loss of old-growth forests and the destructiveness of clearcutting, limited the ability of state and industry to solve the unemployment problem with continued industry expansion. Faced with this ‘long-crisis’, state and capital have shifted from one strategy to another in search of a restructuring initiative that, like sustained-yield forestry before, might restore profitability and resolve the dogged issues of ‘fibre supply’, employment and regional community stability.

Tracing the birth of contemporary environmentalism and the reaction of both state and capital we now turn to mapping the fractured politics within which our case study is situated. Throughout this chapter, however, our eye remains trained on the role played by
labour and environmental movements, and especially their relations, in the making of forestry policy and practice. Three moments are of special importance:

(1) In the early 1970s, British Columbia’s environmental movement was reborn. Inseparable from the much broader ‘New Left’, yet drawing from the provinces long history of conservationist concern, the movement brought together a heady mixture of pollution and wilderness issues. At the same time a rejuvenated political left criticized the social failings of an industry that had become dominated by integrated, foreign owned, forestry giants. The political possibility of these challenges however was tightly circumscribed by divisions between forestry workers and environmentalists, and by the rather stunted politics of the early wilderness movement.

(2) In the 1980s, capital backlash and a neo-liberal provincial government brought an attempt to solve forestry’s woes through de-regulation. Though successful in restarting the rapid expansion of the industry, in accelerating the environmental and social problems of this industry, state and capital created the fertile ground for renewed environmental and labour dissent. By the end of the decade, both environmentalists and forestry workers had become critics of state and industry policy. Though divisions remained, many encouraged a common struggle against a government and industry that were clearly unable to preserve either ancient forests or forestry work.
During the early 1990s, the ability of environmentalists and forestry workers to sustain a shared cause helped elect a New Democratic government that promised a way out of the jobs vs environment dilemma. The NDP engaged in a series of reforms that once again pushed industry into a more social form of production, one that included a greater level of state regulation and a commitment by capital to provide stable forestry jobs. However capital and the state faced the effects of globalization and economic crisis, the province retreated from many of the most progressive reforms and joined industry in attempting to woo labour with attacks on environmentalists.

We contend that, amidst this political and economic pitch and fro, labour-environmental movement relations have been crucial to ongoing attempts to restructure the regulation and practice of the forest industry. We argue that while capitalist forestry continued to produce jobs/environment tradeoffs there have been significant moments where a common ground between forest workers and environmentalists was developed. At such moments, this common cause has pushed state and industry to adopt reforms that have included a more planned and cooperative form of forestry.

Yet this coordination of forestry labour and environmental groups is something of an exception – more often this relation has been marked with either ambivalence or outright conflict. This lack of articulation between movements, remains a critical factor in any explanation of the limits of reform during this period. While we touch upon many of the structural and ideological factors that might help us better understand this troubled relation, we leave the more detailed examination for our following chapter.
Crisis and Restructuring Round I: the Pearse Commission as a Response to Environmental and Social Critique

By the late 1960s, and through the early 1970s, capital intensive sustained-yield forestry faced its first serious challengers. Invigorated by North American and global counterparts, the province's environmental movement began to peek under the cloak of sustained-yield ideology that had hitherto protected capitalist forestry practice from scrutiny. The political left, similarly vitalised by larger social movements, rose to confront the economic and social power of both foreign and domestic forestry giants. In turn, both of these challenges were bolstered when the first in a long series of economic jolts raised questions about the ability of the industry to provide the long-term stable work that had drawn forestry workers to support capitalist sustained-yield forestry.

Of these challenges, however, it is the contemporary environmental movement that has proven to be the most formidable and consistent critic of the forest industry. While the rise of environmentalism was widespread during the late 1960s, British Columbia proved to be both a hotbed of movement activity, and something of a special case. In the first instance, the anti-pollution concerns that formed the core of North-American environmentalism found expression in the creation and rapid growth of local groups committed to addressing the environmental impact of industrial production and
post-war consumer culture. Groups such as SPEC\textsuperscript{121} grew rapidly, gained significant exposure, and began to popularize a wide range of issues including the urban-sprawl and air-pollution traceable to automobile dependency, coastal oil spills, pesticide use and water pollution.

Given the political ecology of the province, it is little wonder that such anti-pollution groups began to focus attention on one of the most visible sources of air and water pollution; pulp mills. With the plumes from the mills along Howe Sound clearly visible from Vancouver, and with the sulphurous ‘smell-of-money’ unavoidable in milltowns throughout the province, this sector of the forest industry served as an icon of industrial malaise. As we will discuss more thoroughly in the following chapter, this focus suggested to some that environmentalism would become an important issue for those most closely associated with its dangers – workers and their families in the milltowns.

\textsuperscript{121} SPEC, the more memorable acronym of an organization first given the awkward moniker Scientific Pollution and Environmental Control Society and now known as the Society Promoting Environmental Conservation, was formed late in 1968 and soon claimed a membership of 4000 based in seven branches from the Okanagan to Vancouver Island. Something of a prototypical 1960s/70s anti-pollution group, SPEC was amalgam of academics and ‘hippies’ convinced that both industrial production and a consumer society was poisoning air, land and water. While caught up in the flurry of student, peace and alternative culture movements of the time, SPEC declared at its first formal meeting in 1969 that it would remain ‘apolitical’ and committed to working in, “consultation and cooperation with industry, government, labour and academic communities” (SPEC 1999).

While a bit of a latecomer to this new wave of environmentalism, Greenpeace, formed in 1971 as the ‘Don’t Make a Wave Committee’, has gone on to become British Columbia’s principal export to the global environmental movement.
Nonetheless, environmentalism in British Columbia was and is a special breed. Though relatively quieted by the promises of sustained-yield, the preservationist moments of the province’s environmental movement were never completely quelled. Rather than displacing such issues, the anti-pollution movement served to awaken the wilderness preservation movement. During the late 1960s, and into the 1970s, the protection of ‘special places’ was not only rapidly integrated into the mix of movement concerns, but soon became the very focus of the movement. Throughout this period even so-called ‘pollution’ groups included the protection of wilderness areas, park creation and forestry practice concerns within their repertoire of issues.

Most noted though was the proliferation of issue-specific wilderness preservation groups that drew on the environmental movement’s long history of fighting to preserve special places (see Chapter 2). Cementing a pattern of movement behaviour dubbed valley-to-valley conflict, such groups formed (often very quickly) to preserve areas, usually large valley bottoms comprised of old-growth forests, from immanent logging or

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122 As we have noted in previous chapters, the practice sustained-yield, failed to directly address the importance of preservation, speaking instead to the more pressing issue of regenerating harvested forests.

123 In 1970, for example, SPEC had published a poster that indicted MacMillan Bloedel, portrayed as a tyrannosaurus rex, as an ‘environmental outlaw’ and ‘king of polluters’ and the Cowichan branch had joined with a small group on Vancouver Island in the call for the protection of the Nitinat Triangle (Spectrum Vol 27 No1 Spring 1999). The Cowichan branch of SPEC had become involved with this issue as early as 1970 (Wilson 1998, 102).
other industrial use\textsuperscript{124}. Though struggling against the inertia fostered by sustained-yield ideology, groups of the day managed to raise the political profile of wilderness preservation and to protect (or at least begin a much longer battle to protect) now well-known wilderness areas:

- The Save Cypress Bowl Committee fought a successful battle over logging in the Cypress Bowl area above West Vancouver in 1968. The support for this cause spurred the province to declare the area a park (Christie 1997)\textsuperscript{125}.

- Run out Skagit Spoilers (ROSS), formed to protect the Skagit Valley, located approximately 140 km east of Vancouver and flowing south into the United States, from an American plan to flood the area for a hydroelectric project\textsuperscript{126}.

\textsuperscript{124} Wilson (1998) has provided perhaps the most comprehensive, book-length, treatment of the rise of the environmental movement. See also Perry (1977), Smith (\textit{Georgia Straight} January 28-February 4, 1999,15-16); and Cooperman (1999).

\textsuperscript{125} Ongoing battles over the impact of the ski facility in this park continue to flare up, especially when new runs threaten what is some of the North Shore's last patches of old-growth forest. See Steig 1998.

\textsuperscript{126} The Skagit campaign, which blended the issue of energy conservation with that of wilderness protection, introduced many interested in pollution issues to wilderness politics. This campaign is also notable for the actions of one Wilfred (Curley) Crittenden, a supervisor of logging with the Seattle Light and Power Company. Crittenden quit his job in protest rather than clearcut the valley bottom (\textit{Vancouver Sun}, September 22, 1995).
On Vancouver Island, those fighting to protect the Nitinat Triangle, an area on the island’s west coast, without permission, began using the name Sierra Club of Victoria. The Nitinat campaign succeeded in preserving the area which has become part of Pacific Rim National Park. For a first-person account see Ric Careless (1997, 9-29).

While it remains difficult to gauge the threat posed by the environmental movement of the day, this should not be underestimated. As we will discuss both below and in the following chapter, the anti-pollution movement developed sophisticated criticisms of industrial production and its effects on workers – and applied these to the forest industry. Moreover, wilderness campaigns, though less likely to directly engage in such critique, did mark the return of a movement to place limits on the geographic expansion of the industry – an expansion critical to the ability of sustained-yield forestry to offset labour displacement with increased production.

The importance of the environmental movement, as an critical element of the ‘new left’ was not lost on the New Democratic Party (NDP). Preceding their election in 1973, the party had adopted several policies on environmental protection and wilderness preservation and harshly criticized the reduction of parkland and the lack of concern for non-timber values under Socred governments (Gawthorpe 1996, Chapter 2; Harcourt 1990).\footnote{Once in power, the NDP worked to enlarge the provinces system of protected areas, increased the size and scope of the Fish and Wildlife Branch, encouraged reform}
However, if the environmental movement had pushed wilderness and pollution concerns onto the agenda of the NDP, it was a more traditional economic critique that remained the focus of the party’s forestry platform. In the years preceding their election the increasing size and power of forestry firms, and the close relationship between the province and these firms, had become a focus for the New Democrats. Replacing the CCF’s earlier calls for public control of the industry, the NDP’s concern now centred on the inability of the state to collect a fair share of the ‘economic rent’ in the face of increasing concentration in the forest industry. Arguing that these large, and often foreign owned firms, were operating in a regulatory environment that discouraged competition, it was asserted that these forest giants were inefficient, or at least inefficient at providing the state and its peoples with an optimum level of revenue and jobs from the resource.128

Concerns about the relative social and economic benefits of British Columbia’s forest industry were amplified by the ‘oil-crisis’ of 1973 and the following recessionary period. While this crisis proved rather short-lived, the effect on forest workers and forest within the Forest Service and, perhaps most importantly, invoked regional planning measures that encouraged cooperation and coordination between agencies and departments. These reforms, began to generate a certain amount of internal criticism and analysis of the province’s forest industry and its environmental impact, which, in turn, proved useful to the environmental movement.

128 See Williams (1971). Then forestry critic for the NDP, Bob Williams described the situation as one where, “In B.C. half of the economy is based on the forest industry yet revenues in the form of royalties and logging taxes totals only seven per cent of the provincial budget. Of that seven per cent, or $70 million, 30 per cent is used simply to pay for the forest service. That leaves $40 million – four per cent of the provincial budget – as net revenue for the treasury".
dependent communities was pronounced: from 1973 to the beginning of 1975, production in both the pulp and paper and sawmill sectors fell dramatically, and between 1974 and 1975 the sawmill worker's employment levels dropped by 40 percent\(^{129}\).

The strength of this shock combined with the previously described environmental and economic critiques cut through the fog of complacency that had hung over the 'long boom' of post-war forestry. Many, including the provincial government were convinced that some sort of restructuring was in order. It was entirely unclear, however, what form this might take. After initiating a series of modest, though important, reforms of forestry policy regulation, the government turned late in its mandate to a third Royal Commission.

The Pearse Commission of 1975-78 and the Ideology of Multiple-Use

Indicative perhaps of government priorities, the Royal Commission on Forest Resources, was chaired by Dr. Peter Pearse, a forest economist. The sprawling mandate of the commission, however, signalled the growing importance of the environmental critique of capitalist sustained-yield: the commission was given both the relatively straightforward task of sorting out the state of timber allocation and regulation and the more diffuse task of formulating policy recommendations on matters both specific

\(^{129}\) Pulp and paper workers were not as directly effected by the recession as decreases in production translated into shorter work weeks and the elimination of overtime rather than simple job termination or layoff. A pulpmill strike also contributed to reduced production levels. See Marchak (1983, 168).
(regulating forest product exports, i.e. raw log exports) and frustratingly vague (ensuring that forest resources are ‘realized in terms of the diverse commercial and environmental benefits they potentially may generate’) (Pearse 1976, xi-xii).

Certainly, the submissions to the commission indicate that many in the province held deep concerns about the social and environmental problems produced by an industry dominated by a few large-scale, integrated firms. Nonetheless, a survey of these submissions reveals that the vast majority, though critical of forest practices and policies, were largely reformist. Most agreed that more funding should be directed at forest management and reforestation, that the regulations governing forest practices should be tightened and adequately enforced, and that small forest operators, especially smaller mills, should be supported through tenure reform and other measures that might channel more logs onto the open log market.

Of the environmental groups, the submission of the Victoria chapter of the Sierra Club, captures this cautious mood. The group, which had broken much ground in its successful bid to protect the Nitinat Triangle, suggested mild reforms to existing tenure arrangements, such as boundary changes and further withdrawals for park and other uses. The group further argued that ‘non-timber’ values, including wild-game habitat, watershed protection and unspoiled tourist vistas, should be taken into account when deciding when and where harvesting was to take place and what level of harvesting was to be considered sustainable (Sierra Club, Victoria Group 1975).
In the midst of this well-mannered support for reform, however, there were particular submissions that directly attacked capitalist sustained-yield forestry for its social and ecological contradictions. A lengthy submission by the Smithers branch of SPEC, and one by Victims of Industry Changing Environment (VOICE), a committee of the Terrace and District Labour Council, are exemplary. Both of these submissions criticized capitalist sustained yield forestry for failing to operate within acknowledged ecological and social constraints. Detailed analyses of existing forest practices and policies led both these groups to conclude that AAC levels had been set too high, that short-sighted forest practices had left a degraded forest and that old-growth timber was being wasted on low-order commodity production. In short, these submissions argued that the forest industry was undercutting its own future viability, through operating outside of ecological limits (VOICE 1975; SPEC–Smithers 1975).

If this environmental critique is of significance, it is the parallel social critique that suggests the incompatibility of these submissions with the mere reform of sustained-yield policy – these submissions both harshly criticized capital intensive forestry for its elimination and standardization of work and for its subsequent effects on forest dependent communities. Using examples from the northwest of the province, it was argued that large integrated mills produced fewer jobs and destroyed communities which depended upon smaller processors. Moreover, it was argued that jobs in the large integrated mills were more standardized and less fulfilling than those in the smaller mills that were eliminated.
Both groups argued that the problems of environmental and social degradation could only be arrested through radical change to forest policy and practice. They insisted that substantial tenure reform was needed to wrest control of the forests from 'monopoly capital' and that control of forests should be returned to the community level where ecologically and socially sustainable decisions were most likely to be made. While there was agreement with many more moderate submissions that better, and more religiously enforced, forestry practice regulations were necessary, VOICE and SPEC argued this would not come about unless the control of large capital was broken.

A significant counterpoint to the submissions of both reformist and more radical environmental critics, however, was provided by the IWA (IWA – Regional Council No. 1; 1975). Skirting the issue of job-loss due to mechanization, the union weighed in with a submission (discussed at greater length in the following chapter) that reiterated its place as a strong supporter of capitalist sustained-yield forestry. The union argued that the best way to protect forestry work was to further encourage the growth of large companies and that the scale of these companies was necessary to provide stable, highly paid, and safe work.

While certainly contradicting the position of more radical calls for industry restructuring, the union also used its submission to firmly disagree with wilderness proponents of all stripes who argued that a larger portion of the land base should be restricted to non-industrial uses. Once again the IWA staked out its now familiar case
that forestry workers' jobs were vulnerable to the demands for more parkland by environmentalists\textsuperscript{130}.

Reflecting the scope of both the commission's mandate and this wide range of submissions, Commissioner Pearse returned with a report so sprawling that he himself refused to produce a summary. This lack of a summary, however, reveals more than simply a surfeit of data and opinion: this inability to draw down the recommendations into a few principal themes is indicative of the clearly reformist intent of the commissioner. Unlike that of the Fulton commission, and especially the first Sloan Commission, this report failed to argue for any dramatic re-organization of forest policy. Instead the Pearse Commission produced a shopping list, though an impressive one at that, of ways in which capitalist sustained-yield forestry might better recognize the potential as set out in earlier forest policy\textsuperscript{131}.

Moreover, the reforms that were endorsed by the commission were largely aimed at ensuring a more efficient industry through increased competition, whether this be through increased free trade (including a relaxing of limits on log and pulp chip exports), through measures that would bring more logs onto the open log market, or through the reassignment of harvest quotas from the largest tenure and license holders. The report

\textsuperscript{130} See chapter 8.

\textsuperscript{131} See Schwindt and Wanstall (1979). As we do here, critics have generally concurred with these authors conclusion that neither the Report, nor the subsequent Forest Act, suggested any sort of redirection of forest policy.
had little patience for concern about the rate of harvest or for the criticism of clearcutting. The idea of any radical devolution of control away from capital and the state was clearly dismissed.

If the sort of dramatic reordering of forestry policy and practice of the first Sloan Commission was not in the cards, Pearse did attempt to rekindle the powerful symbolic politics of Sustained-Yield forestry with a call for the ‘multiple-use’ of forest lands. The commissioner acknowledged the multiple values of forests and suggested ways that the policy approach that had become known as ‘Integrated Resource Management’ (IRM) might more effectively balance these different values. Measures such as increased spending on forest and wildlife inventories were encouraged and Pearse endorsed the NDP’s use of the Secretariat as a ‘neutral’ overseer of resource planning. The report suggested that through the careful nurturing of the process of reform already begun by the New Democrats, the Commission might serve as a mid-wife for a more comprehensive forest policy regime, one that shored-up the creaking foundations of capitalist sustained-yield forestry while maintaining its fundamental principals.

Given the social and environment contradictions addressed by some of the more radical critics of the day, contradictions that now take the form of crisis, one might wonder just how long such a package of reformist policy and ideology might serve to avoid such crisis and dissent. Provincial politics, however, transpired to make moot any such speculation: by the time of the release of the final report, the political landscape of British Columbia had changed dramatically. Late in 1975, the reformist momentum of
the New Democrats was replaced by a Social Credit government with little patience for
the ‘red tape’ of forest practice regulation. As was made evident in the 1978 Forest Act,
which served to water down the already thin soup of Pearse Commission, the Social
Credit government saw its principal role as a supporter of forest capital\textsuperscript{132}. This retreat, it
turns out, was simply one part of a larger shift where over the next decade the province
turned its attention to lessening the ‘burden’ of forest regulation on an industry buffeted
by economic recession.

**Crisis and Restructuring Round Two: ‘Sympathetic Management’ and the War in the Woods**

While the flux of economic crisis and social movement led change may have lent
a certain appeal to the right-wing message that a capital friendly government might lead
the province back to the comfortable world of post-Sloan expansionist forestry,
translating this message into practice proved difficult indeed. When the first of three
consecutive Social Credit governments was sent to Victoria in 1975, the pattern of steady
economic growth marred only by sporadic and short-lived slumps and of capitalist
forestry practice supported by firm social consensus, had been shattered. In its stead the

\textsuperscript{132} One critic, in summarizing both the Pearse recommendations and the Forest
Act, could only conclude that “Had the Commissioner’s recommendations been made law
there may have been a cessation, but not a reversal, of the trend towards higher levels of
concentration. The Forest Act of 1978 contains diluted versions of these
recommendations and will result in a deceleration, but not a cessation, of the trend
(Schwindt and Wanstall 1979, 34).
province faced a wildly fluctuating economy paired with the unpredictable rise and fall of labour and environmental movements that challenged social and environmental policies.

The first significant crisis arose as the province’s export-oriented, resource based economy was rocked by a slump in world markets in the early 1980s. Between 1981 and 1984, employment in British Columbia fell by 79,000 jobs (Belshaw and Mitchell 1996, 334). Forest workers paid a particularly dear price with a federal study pegging combined industry job losses of over 20,000 (Grass in Hayter 2000, 67). The provincial government, especially after its re-election in 1983, reacted with policy decisions firmly rooted in neo-conservative economic theory and right-wing populism. ‘Excessive’ union power and state spending on social welfare programs were blamed for rendering the province ‘uncompetitive’ in world markets and Socred solutions leaned heavily on deregulation and privatization. In the areas of forest and environmental policy, this political stance translated into both bureaucratic restructuring and policy changes that rolled back many of the reforms brought in by the previous NDP government (and that were endorsed by the Pearse Commission).

For many critics today, however, what is most remembered about Social Credit forest policy and practice during this time is neither the official policy changes nor the controversial decisions. Rather what is recalled is a lowly memo sent from the Forest Service deputy minister instructing regional managers to apply a new policy of ‘sympathetic administration’. This memo included a detailed listing of modifications to Ministry policy and suggested that managers were to be less stringent in applying
regulations in order that the financially troubled industry might be supported. This sympathetic administration involved the relaxing of utilization standards (allowing companies to leave behind more ‘waste’ wood) and cruising requirements (which allowed companies to evade the costly task of gathering accurate forest inventories before harvesting an area). Meanwhile, companies were allowed to focus cutting on the most accessible and most valuable timber and to harvest pockets of old-growth previously left behind as wildlife preserves or recreation areas (Monday Magazine January 13-19, 9).\[133\]

While the revelation of ‘sympathetic administration’ galvanized critics at the time (and today is considered to be one of the more glaring blunders in the history of forest policy in the province) it was not an isolated mistake. Indeed, this policy direction was announced, if quietly, in the introduction of the 1978 Forest Act which specifically included social and economic conditions as factors that were to be considered when allotting harvesting quotas (Marchak 1983, 76)\[134\] and which was pushed along by the

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\[133\] One disgruntled Forest Service employee later would recall bitterly, Our ‘mission’ seemed to become one of anticipating what the forest industry would want from us next and having it wrapped and ready to go before the actually had to go to the trouble of ordering us to hand it over. Our deputy minister ordered us to administer ‘sympathetically’ (which of course meant ‘negligibly’). One assistant deputy minister actually exhorted us to ‘be more like Canadian Tire!’ (Sierra Legal Defence Fund 2001, Appendix2, 18).

\[134\] Such policy endorses the idea that the social problems created by capitalist forestry may be ameliorated through increased ecological exploitation and continues to be the target of environmentalists who insist that ecological limits must serve as the starting point of forestry policy and practice. See the discussion of the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel below.
privatization of many Forest Service functions. Combined with a reorganization of the bureaucracy, which once again centralized decision making within the Ministry of Forests, these changes amounted to a wholesale rejection of NDP reforms aimed at incorporating, however modestly, ‘non-timber’ values into land-use decisions\(^{135}\).

As the state retreated from its role in regulation of forestry, capital translated the new forestry regime onto the landscape and the workplace. Immediately following the election of the Socreds, with markets strong and a government much less interested in environmental regulation or park creation which might limit AACs, the forest industry invested heavily in the sort of large-scale commodity production technology that required few workers and much ‘fibre’ (Hayter 2000; 98). When faced with recession, the industry used the financial burden of this ill-timed expansion to urge the state to engage in the policy of sympathetic management, while further reducing jobs through the export of raw logs (Lumber Worker April 1983).

However, the most dramatic effects of de-regulation and the cutbacks to the provincial bureaucracy were felt during the latter half of the 1980s and beyond. Freed from much regulatory gaze, harvesting levels reached new highs in 1984 and remained

\(^{135}\) Ministries and departments outside of the Ministry of Forests were stripped of personnel and resources. Moreover, the Ministry of Forests itself faced funding cuts that both limited its ability to take over the stewardship roles of other departments and ministries and which hit hardest the younger personnel most willing to challenge such ‘fibre-centred’ thinking. By 1985, the ELUC Secretariat, which Pearse saw as a ‘neutral body of experts’, capable of overseeing resource management decisions, was gone. See Wilson 1998.
buoyant through the latter half of the decade (Travers 1992). It is now widely agreed that through the turn of the decade, forest companies rapidly clearcut old-growth stocks at an unsustainable rate, using ecologically destructive practices, and that little attention was paid by either capital or the state to non-timber forest values.

Certainly, the speed of harvest was alarming. From 1976 to 1990, the permitted cut on Crown land increased at a rate of approximately 1 million cubic metres per year, growing from 60 million cubic metres in 1976 to 74.3 million cubic metres in 1990 (Travers 1992). Most disturbingly, it had become clear that these increases had pushed harvest levels well beyond the long run sustained harvest.\(^{136}\)

While we return to this central theme, it must be said that if provincial policies were exacerbating British Columbia’s social and ecological problems, it was the former around which social movements first organized.

\(^{136}\) There was, and is much debate over just what the long-run sustained yield is. Notoriously complicated by disputes over growth rates, technology changes, the effects of more intensive silviculture and changes to the land available (i.e. set asides for parks and other non-industry purposes), estimates of the LRSY have changed dramatically over the years. In his 1992 article, Travers uses the then accepted value of 59 million cubic metres. In 1996, a Timber Supply Review sighted the inclusion of previously excluded lands, technology change, and ‘improved information’ in justifying a much higher figure of 71 million cubic metres. Environmental groups have suggested that sustainable harvest levels are much lower (BC Wild 1998; Hayter 2000, 87-88).
Solidarity

In the summer of 1983 the province introduced a budget and a legislative package that emphasized fiscal restraint, made significant cuts to social programs, limited the rights of trade-unions (especially those in the public sector) and gutted human rights legislation for good measure. The reaction to these policies was fierce and rapidly coalesced under the banner of ‘Solidarity’, a labour-led movement that included broad representation from the social left including that from the peace, social justice and women’s organizations. Before its demise, Solidarity mobilized rallies on an unheard of scale and by many accounts brought the province to the verge of a general strike.137

To our ends here, Solidarity and its aftermath are important for several reasons. First, despite any of its failings, the Solidarity movement did dramatically underscore the social contradictions and class tensions of British Columbia’s commodity based, export-oriented economy, of which the forest industry remained a central component. Secondly, the events of solidarity starkly revealed the ambiguous position of the IWA within this struggle. Some elaboration is in order.

Though this is not the place for another dissection of the politics of Solidarity, it must be noted that by all accounts IWA leadership remained the most cautious of participants in the events of the summer of 1983. While IWA members played prominent

137 For a book-length treatment of the Solidarity Movement, see Bryan Palmer’s, Solidarity: The Rise and Fall of an Opposition in British Columbia. Also see Carrol and Ratner (1989).
roles in the movement\textsuperscript{138}, critics have argued that the union, coming out of a round of painful bargaining, and whose membership had been greatly eroded, was not an eager participant. Much more importantly, if on a symbolic level, the Solidarity movement was effectively wound down with an agreement signed between the IWA's Jack Munro and Premier Bennett at a private meeting in Kelowna. The fallout from this resolution was significant, with critics bitterly complaining of a lack of consultation and a sell-out by a moderate labour bureaucracy.

It was the involvement of Jack Munro that here is of some consequence for it was he who many in the 'social left' blamed for the failure of Solidarity. Many of those who participated in Solidarity through community, peace and women's groups early in the decade, later became involved in the environmental movement. Though the point should not be unduly emphasized, memories of Solidarity have not been useful to those who later in the decade sought to underscore the common cause of forest workers and environmentalists\textsuperscript{139}. Solidarity, which during its short life promised/threatened the unity of the union movement and new left only served to highlight ongoing tensions between 'old' and 'new' movements.

\textsuperscript{138} Early on, Solidarity was organized around the union movement's 'Operation Solidarity', and the broader-based 'Solidarity Coalition'. IWA leaders and organizers held important positions in both.

\textsuperscript{139} See chapter 6.
Wars in the Woods: The Rise of the Contemporary Wilderness Movement

While Solidarity provided a dramatic, short-lived, challenge to the crisis spawned by economic contraction and state cutbacks to social services, the environmental movement, which organized around similar neo-conservative state policy, followed a very different trajectory. Now dominated by the issue of wilderness preservation\textsuperscript{140}, environmentalism in British Columbia became equated with a series of individual conflicts over particular valleys, watersheds or islands and, though there were individual successes and failures, there was no decisive confrontation. Instead, with each new campaign the environmental movement in the province grew in sophistication: protest behaviours become more persuasive and media friendly, arguments for preservation became more nuanced and multi-faceted, and the movement worked to broaden its base of support and make links with other movements and organizations, including the provinces’ First Nations and forestry workers.

While difficulties abound in any attempt to accurately trace, at least quantitatively, the rise of the wilderness movement during this period, it is abundantly clear that during

\textsuperscript{140} Which is not at all to say that the movement was reducible to wilderness campaigns. During the 1980s, the issue of pulp mill effluent provided a site of ongoing conflict. See the following chapter.
the 1980s the number of groups operating in the province expanded exponentially and that the membership of the most prominent groups grew dramatically\textsuperscript{141}.

Perhaps as important as this increase in numbers was a qualitative shift: large, province wide wilderness advocacy groups, such as the Sierra Club and the Western Canada Wilderness Committee, along with specific issue groups such as Friends of Clayoquot Sound came to play the most prominent role in the high profile wilderness campaigns, overshadowing traditional advocates such as naturalist, outdoor and recreation groups. Moreover, these groups quickly established a more diverse repertoire of protest and advocacy behaviour. Tactics used in major campaigns came to include, often in equal measures: illegal blockades; the promotion of areas through the publication and distribution of posters, calendars and newsletters; traditional lobbying; and the collection and dissemination of research on the ecological and economic impacts of forestry.

Early in the decade, the movement was fuelled by outrage over de-regulation and the Social Credit government’s general disavowal of its stewardship role. As the forest sector emerged from recession and harvest levels reached record levels, the movement also drew strength from the growing acknowledgement within the Ministry of Forests that

\textsuperscript{141} Though methodological problems abound, Wilson’s (1998) summary of the evidence is perhaps the most thorough. The number of environmental groups presenting evidence at government inquiries grew from 17 at the Pearse Royal Commission in 1975 to 54 at Wilderness Advisory Committee hearings in 1985/6 to 78 at the Forest Resources Commission in 1990/1. It is also noted that the Western Canada Wilderness Committee grew from 250 to 20 000 members during the decade.
old-growth forests were being rapidly depleted\textsuperscript{142}. The environmental movement took this new information as a challenge to protect remaining intact watersheds. In places such as South Moresby, Meares Island, the Stein Valley and the Khutzeymateen, environmentalists made pitched battles to halt logging, based, in a large part, on the notion that these were rare examples of ancient forests that had yet to feel the impact of industrial forestry.

Despite the growth of the wilderness movement and the proliferation of specific areas where environmentalists managed, with sparse resources, to mount sophisticated and articulate protests, it seldom seemed like a fair fight. Throughout the decade the provincial government remained as development heady as ever and interpreted the data on dwindling old-growth as another reason to limit ‘single-use withdrawals’ (a euphemism for parks and other land-use options that precluded industrial forestry). Meanwhile, strong export markets absorbed record levels of British Columbia’s pulp and

\textsuperscript{142} The Ministry of Forests had by the late 1970s come to promote the idea that annual AAC’s were too high and that accessible forests would be exhausted well before a second ‘crop’ was ready for harvest. Complicating matters were worries that this second crop of planted forests did not contain a volume of timber comparable to that of old-growth forests, a problem referred to as the ‘falldown effect’. The Ministry used such reports to argue for increased expenditure on silviculture and other investments in the forest base. While the fear of timber famine could be used to argue against preservation campaigns, such fear provoked others to argue that the ‘last vestiges’ of the province’s ancient forests deserved to be spared from logging (See Ministry of Forests 1980).
lumber, justified the earlier expansion in capacity and pushed companies into remote areas previously considered uneconomical\textsuperscript{143}.

Nonetheless, especially towards the end of the decade, the environmental movement faced down this development coalition. While any sort of definitive success 'on the ground' was rare, the movement did manage to raise enough support, and enough questions, to delay road building and logging in many valleys and watersheds that were later declared protected areas. While each of the conflicts deserves its own history, each having its own rich story of political manoeuvring and each adding a facet to the growing environmental movement, there did emerge a certain pattern of movement behaviour during the time:

- The attention of environmental groups shifted towards coastal forests. While the Stein retained prominence through the decade, and there were ongoing conflicts over other interior areas, during the 1980's British Columbia's wilderness movement became equated with the struggle to preserve coastal temperate rainforests. Places such as South Moresby, Meares Island and the Carmanah Valley, where wet coastal climates nurtured western red cedar, western hemlock and Sitka Spruce of surreal proportions, served as the

\textsuperscript{143} And to complete the circle, an otherwise thrifty provincial government, remained generous in funding of infrastructure projects such as new highways that reduced industry costs.
focus for a movement that came to dub British Columbia, ‘Brazil of the North’. Each of these places were identified as part of a larger struggle to save the last of the rainforest 144.

- The movement became more interested in, and much more effective at, rousing broad based public concern and became increasingly sceptical of government processes and simple lobbying efforts. Midway through the decade the Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC) drew submissions from a wide spectrum of environmental groups, and at various times environmental groups did sit down at the table and attempt to hammer out agreements on specific areas of contention. However as the decade wore on these processes were increasingly seen as either futile or, more sinisterly, as part of a state and corporate strategy of ‘talk and log’. The movement instead turned directly to building local and province-wide public support for preservation. This strategic shift also announced a renewed emphasis on tactics such as: the building of hiking trails, the production of videos, books, posters and pamphlets and the staging demonstrations, sits-ins and other protests designed to gain media attention. As the decade came to a close, acts of civil disobedience came to play an increasingly prominent role in this repertoire.

144 This metaphor played upon the image of tropical rainforest destruction in the Amazon basin that had garnered global attention through the decade. In an introduction to the Western Canada Wilderness Committee publication, *Carmanah: Artistic Visions of an Ancient Rainforest*, David Suzuki spoke of “horrifying destruction of the most diverse ecosystem on the planet” in Brazil but noted that “Canadians have squandered their rich eco-systems every bit as profligately as the Brazilians, but we don’t have the excuse of poverty or lack of education” (WCWC 1989).
• Two images came to dominate the message of these campaigns: the huge, moss-laden tree and the expansive clearcut. The former became the symbol of the need to preserve the uniqueness of British Columbia’s rainforest and the latter a symbol of the need to reform the province’s poor forestry practices.

• The movement increasingly turned to independent scientists and forestry experts to discredit logging plans. Whether it was the research platforms high in the canopy of the Carmanah built by the Western Canada Wilderness Committee or forestry studies funded by the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, scientists and other ‘experts’ were called upon to both counter industry claims about the effects of industrial forestry and to justify the preservation of the areas in question.

• Through the decade alliances with First Nations were fostered by environmental groups. This support was critical to the South Moresby, Meares Island and Stein Valley campaigns where local native communities have sided with environmentalists in opposing logging plans. Environmental groups generally supported both the land claims and the self-government aspirations of native peoples. This is not to say that the relationship has been anything but complex. To give but one blunt example, Native communities have been wary, for obvious reasons, of designating parks that might interfere with land claims or impinge upon their ability to self-govern these lands.
The economic importance of tourism became an important element of the argument to preserve coastal forests. While the province and resource-based communities argued that logging was necessary to the local and provincial economy, environmentalists often touted an alternative economy of which tourism played a critical role. The support of small-scale tourist industry operators became integral to campaigns such as those in Clayoquot Sound where many Friends of Clayoquot Sound activists owned, or worked in, tourist ventures such as whale watching operations, kayaking and guiding outfits, and the hotel/B&B trade.

The political, social and cultural explanations for the rise of British Columbia’s wilderness movement during the 1980s are many and varied. As in each previous wave of environmental concern, some credit must go to the influence of wider social trends. Mobilization around the destruction of the Amazon rainforest provided a handy metaphor that was used to some advantage and the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland), whose report in 1987 set a protected areas target of twelve percent, provided a well-publicized forum for the discussion of global environmental issues (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). A role must also be set aside for activist minded academics, scientists and foresters within government, in universities and colleges, and working independently. And one might here add the increased interest in ‘eco-tourism’, ‘adventure travel’ and the marketing of ‘Supernatural
To any such explanation, however, one must consider that Social Credit governments, by allowing the near free-run of forest capital, unveiled the ecological and social contradictions of this industry. With the state so-firmly committed to the profit goals of capital, only one of the three pillars of Sloan era sustained-yield ideology seemed to matter and commitments to the regulatory role of the state in protecting either environmental or social values fell to the wayside. In such an environment, the state-large forest capital relation became a clear and easy target for coalition building between all those who were unfortunate enough to find themselves outside of this small brotherhood.

This political weakness became apparent at the end of the decade when the wilderness movement began to weave together a surprisingly wide range of interests in the attack on corporate forestry. Native peoples, who saw land to which they still claimed title being rapidly clearcut; small forestry businesses unable to obtain either logs or quota, communities faced with mill closures, relocations and layoffs; forestry workers facing a loss of work; and forestry unions facing corporate restructuring initiatives, each offered potential as partners in a fight against corporate forestry.

Correspondingly, the message of the wilderness movement began to expand during this period. Drawing on proposals by the Truck Loggers, rogue forester Merv Wilkinson and academics such as Michael M’Gonigal, the wilderness movement began to
integrate a critique of the ecological and other losses associated with the logging of ancient forests with critiques of the social and economic problems capital intensive forestry. Moreover, these criticisms were backed by an emerging consensus that an alternative forestry, utilizing smaller scale technologies, and overseen by forest dependent communities, might be a viable alternative to large-scale capitalist forestry\textsuperscript{145}.

Certainly one of the most threatening aspects of this nascent, and ill-defined, coalition building was the overt wooing of forestry workers. By the turn of the decade, many environmentalists had begun in earnest to speak to forestry workers as victims of the multi-national forestry giants and to speak of the exploitation of forestry workers alongside the exploitation of the forest itself. This was not mere talk. Concerned that blockades had skewed the image of wilderness conflicts as pitting environmentalists against workers, environmentalists, many of whom had long been involved in labour and social justice politics, made overtures to forestry workers and the IWA.

In 1989, the Tin-Wis coalition brought together environmentalists, labour, and members of the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council in an effort to develop common ground amidst the difficult politics of Clayoquot Sound. A larger conference, in the fall of 1990, was attended by Dave Haggard, then first vice-president of the Port Alberni local, and soon to be president of the IWA, and was endorsed by the BC Federation of Labour and the provincial NDP. At the conference, an IWA official called for unity amongst the

\textsuperscript{145} See Hammond (1991) and M'Gonigle and Parfitt (1994) for visions of such community based alternative forestry..
constituencies, pointed to the government and big business as the common enemy, called on forestry workers to be part of the solution to destructive forestry practices, and endorsed the notion that local communities, rather than multi-national corporations, should control forest tenures (Goldberg 1990, 23). An observer could only remark:

the atmosphere ... was surprisingly open, even trusting. It was clear that most participants came prepared to give their counterparts the benefit of the doubt. In fact, it was sometimes hard to distinguish the loggers from the tree huggers. (Goldberg 1990, 23)

None of this is to say that political differences between the wilderness movement and forestry workers had been erased. On the contrary, by 1990, the struggle by wilderness groups to protect places such as the Carmanah Valley and the Tsitika Valley had led to direct, sometimes violent, confrontations with forestry workers. In fact, and our next chapter will elaborate on this very point, these overtures might just as well be understood as a sort of rear-guard action to save, and nurture, something of the common ground that had developed between environmentalists and the IWA, late in the decade.

Such tangled politics should not obscure the extent to which such coalition building (or, more accurately, the threat of such coalition building) both reflected and signalled trouble for the future of capitalist sustained-yield forestry. With forestry labour wavering on its role, the future of the corporatist politics so-central to capitalist sustained-yield forestry remained murky. Indeed, one need not be conspiratorial to suggest that many of the actions taken by both the province and forestry capital during this period should be understood in the context of this threat.
The Response of State and Capital

When we note that during the late 1980s and early 1990s the environmental movement in the province, and specifically the wilderness preservation movement, grew quantitatively and in overall complexity of organization and of strategy, we are in fact saying that the movement was not contained by the state or forestry capital – this is not for a lack of trying. As environmental protests grew in number and sophistication, each of these parties worked to shore up support for the sustained-yield project.

The response of the provincial government, it must be said, was neither imaginative, nor effective. Until mid-decade, the provincial government took a singularly hard-line stance with the wilderness movement. As we have noted, the Socreds had little time for critics who proposed new restrictions on logging practices – de-regulation, and ‘sympathetic administration’ were the order of the day. Demands to protect particular examples of old-growth coastal forests from logging were dismissed as ‘single-use’ and at odds with the official policy of ‘multiple-use’.

The province appeared oblivious to the threat of the wilderness movement and as late as 1988, the Socreds were proudly pronouncing a goal of increasing the protected areas of the province from 5.3 to 6.0 percent by 2011 (Wilson 1998, 185). Individual conflicts were dealt with in an ad hoc fashion and while in the most grave instances, such as South Moresby, the province did create structures to gather data, receive public input,
and put forward land-use options, these were dominated by the Ministry of Forests and produced few pleasant surprises for wilderness advocates.\(^\text{146}\)

Later in the decade, as the wilderness movement grew, the province did appear to soften its position, if modestly. The Wilderness Advisory Council was created with the goal of providing a more systematic means by which to deal with the blossoming number of 'hot spots' in the province. And under Bill Vander Zalm, the Socreds did make a modest increase to the provinces protected areas in the latter half of the 1980s. Importantly, though, the government refused to veer from its pro-development stance. Instead, portions of disputed areas were marked for protection (areas that represented only a small fraction of the provinces forest base) in return for continued or expanded development of other portions.\(^\text{147}\)

In any case, few would argue that the provincial government's position as close friend of large-forestry capital, unable, or unwilling, to confront the ecological or social

\(^{146}\) For an opinionated, book length treatment of the South Moresby conflict, one that had most of hallmarks of this period, see May (1990). Wilson (1998, Ch 7-9) has most exhaustively traced the labyrinth of policy instruments and consultation mechanisms during this period. One of the principal outcomes of this period was to reinforce the jaundiced eye most environmentalists had for participating in these 'talk and log' sessions, pushing many towards more activist methods, including civil disobedience, of reaching their goals.

\(^{147}\) The WAC report for the South Moresby area, which had gained national attention, was typical of the sort of simple tradeoff approach (May 1990). These reports had significant public relations value as fair 'compromises'. Environmentalists were at pains to point out that it was they who were forced to accept 'take aways' from areas that already were a small subset of the provinces 'pristine' areas and an even smaller subset of the provinces total forest base.
costs of the rapid depletion of the provinces old-growth forests, was altered in any significant manner during this period.

Capital: Public Relations, Share Groups and the Wooing of Forestry Workers

For much of this period forestry capital appeared equally unimaginative, or unconcerned about the potential of the wilderness movement. Through the 1980s, it was the Council of Forest Industries that acted as the principle coordinator for the forest industries lobbying and public relations efforts. Having significant ties to the provincial government and the Ministry of Forests, the organization was involved in quiet lobbying, made recommendations to commissions and advisory bodies, and developed public relations strategy for the industry.148

While COFI certainly delivered on the goal of developing close and favourable relations with the provincial government, though this might not have been the most difficult of tasks, its usefulness as a public relations vehicle declined in tandem with the rise of the environmental movement. There is little doubt that the provinces’ willingness to shed its role as regulator, combined with its inability to address increasingly volatile wilderness conflicts made the job of capital all that more difficult.

148 On the role of COFI see Hammond (1991); Wilson (1999). Drushka (1999, 84-86) notes that COFI’s ability to nurture the cozy relationship between large forest capital and the Social Credit government was weakened under Bill Vandersam who was supported by small business owners.
As if to prove the point that a new tack was needed, at the end of the decade, COFI undertook an expensive advertising campaign that produced television, radio and print ads, with the slogan ‘Forests Forever’. While slickly produced, critics charged that the ads were laden with ‘misinformation’ and the controversy tended to cloud the overall message (Hammond 1991, 162-3) 149. By late in 1989, COFI’s own polls showed that the public had become less trustful of forest companies (Parfitt 1991).

In 1991, a number of large forest companies dissatisfied with COFI’s efforts turned to the New York public relations firm Burson-Marsteller. Out of this partnership was born the B.C. Forest Alliance, better known simply as the Forest Alliance – a communications vehicle that took up the public battle with the environmental movement. Over the next decade this organization that has came to be the public face for the industry: funding ad campaigns, commissioning reports on forestry issues, channelling funds to environmental projects compatible with continued harvesting, publishing and distributing books on forestry issues and serving as a clearinghouse for ‘expert’ opinion supporting forest industry practices. Though the Forest Alliance has sought a broad audience, much of their work has targeted the presumed base of environmental support in

149 CBC television, faced with critics demanding to purchase air-time to respond to the COFI ads, wiped its hands of the matter by ruling both that the Forest Forever campaign was “biased on a matter that had generated into widespread public debate” and that the proposed ads by industry critics were “controversial material” (Hammond 1991, 162).
the urban Lower Mainland of British Columbia.150

While the notoriety of Burston-Marsteller, (known widely as a company specializing in ‘crisis management’ and for its work ‘protecting’ the images of Union Carbide following the Bhopal disaster and Exxon after the Valdez oil spill) proved useful fodder for critics, the Forest Alliance quickly deflected some of this attention by attracting a broad range of community leaders, scientists, foresters and others to serve on its Citizen’s Advisory Board’ and to act as spokespersons. Perhaps most important to this strategy was the naming of Jack Munro, president of the IWA for 18 years, as the first Chairman, and the recruitment of Patrick Moore, a founder of Greenpeace, as Chair of the Alliance’s Forest Practices Committee (Goldberg 1994; Parfitt 1991).

Though the Forest Alliance has proven to be a much more finely tuned public relations vehicle than its predecessor, and continues to be an important factor in the battle over public opinion, it was not the industry’s only, or even most effective, response to the war in the woods. Certainly more than the wilderness movement itself, forest capital has understood the critical position that forestry workers might take in environmental politics. To this end, during the late 1980s, the industry engaged a bold, if not completely original,

150 Herb Hammond (1991) has, rather sarcastically, described the Forest Alliance as “a Share group in city clothes”. A widely published print ad a few years later, featuring an image of “Billy Garton – Lawyer; Director, Forest Alliance of BC” speeding through a city in an open Jeep alongside and a quote that began, “For cities in BC, the forest is not just a scenic backdrop but the economic backbone”. Early on, the Forest Alliance commissioned of a study emphasizing the role of the Forest Industry in Vancouver’s economy (Vancouver Board of Trade 1991).
strategy to counter the environmental movements overtures to these workers and their communities – the funding and support of ‘Share’ groups.

Share groups, organizations that bring together forest industry workers, contractors, local business owners and others in support of the forest and other resource industries, have their roots to the U.S. Wise Use movement. In British Columbia, these groups can be traced to an influential Wise-Use conference held in 1998, in Reno, Nevada and attended by many Canadian industry officials and supporters from resource dependent communities. At Reno and elsewhere the message was spread that ‘citizen-led’ pro-industry activist groups were the solution to corporations’ inability to get their position on land-use and forest practice questions across to both government and a sceptical public.

The Share movement, it was assumed, could provide a counterpoint to the effective emotive elements of the environmental movement in a way beyond that available to the industry itself. If the wilderness movement, sometimes in self-parody, made tree-hugging a fashionable cause, the Share movement came to promote the ‘hug a

151 While the importance of this conference, attended by at least 40 Canadians, might be debated, the next couple of years did see a blossoming of Share groups across British Columbia and certainly inspired some prominent Share organizers. See Share B.C.’s Community Stability & Land Use in the 90’s (1989) and Goldberg (1994).

152 Though direct evidence is scarce, most agree that B.C.’s Share groups were funded, at least at the outset, by the major players in the forest industry. See Simon 1998; Goldberg 1994; Hammond 1991; Emery 1991.
logger’ message found on countless half-tonne bumpers in logging towns\textsuperscript{153}. Ron Arnold, a leading figure in the American ‘Wise-Use’ movement urged forest company executives on this side of the border to support Share groups for this very reason, arguing:

It [a Share group] can evoke powerful archetypes such as the sanctity of the family, the virtue of the close-knit community, the natural wisdom of the rural dweller . . . And it can turn the public against your enemies . . . I think you’ll find it one of your wisest investments over time. (Arnold in Goldberg 1994, 27).

In British Columbia during the late 1980s, Share groups began to craft a well-tuned response to the sophisticated arguments of the environmental movement. Also fighting valley-by-valley, these groups countered pictures of clearcuts with pictures of tree-farms; images of families playing softball were substituted for those of old-growth; it was argued that the relative abundance of local forests, and careful, limited logging, ensured that these forests would be ‘shared’ by all and that wildlife would be protected; and it was insisted that preservationists were greedy outsiders with little regard for local history or the well being of working families\textsuperscript{154}. More notoriously, these groups have

\textsuperscript{153} ‘Forestry feeds my family’ is also found on many bumpers.

\textsuperscript{154} The Share the Stein Committee, one of the most vigorous of the early Share groups, distributed a ten-page publication in 1988 that brought together each of these themes (Share the Stein, 1988). Filled with testimonials about how environmentally sensitive logging would occur in a small portion of the valley, and of charges that in precluding logging roads, “environmentalists want to turn our forests into a museum. They want to preserve the Stein for the one percent of British Columbians in good health who have the time to spend a week backpacking into the alpine meadows”. The pamphlet concluded that “The Stein Valley is the largest wilderness watershed in southwest British Columbia. In our opinion, the valley can be shared” [emphasis in original]. At the centre of this publication was a two-page spread of biographies of ‘people of the Stein’. These
been accused of policing the anti-environmentalist 'consensus' in hinterland communities. While we will explore each of these themes in our case study, it must here suffice to say that while born during this period these groups expanded through the 1990s.

### Class, Place and the Relative Success of Industry/State Initiatives

Without recourse to an argument that suggests state and capital coordinated their reactions to the growth of the environmental movement in any meticulous fashion, one can conclude that their respective strategies were compatible and mutually reinforcing. The government message that preserving areas from logging or other industrial uses betrayed the spirit of 'multiple-use' and its hardline stance with the wilderness movement flowed seamlessly into the argument of Share groups that the industry provided 'access' to recreational opportunities in the 'working forest'. Meanwhile, the message of COFI (and later the Forest Alliance) that the forest industry provided careful, scientifically sound, stewardship of the provinces forests provided justification for the province's move

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short pieces provided an idyllic picture of a rural community of self-reliant individuals and each emphasized how the family disruption that would occur if logging were not allowed in the Stein.

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155 See Simon (1998) for poignant examples. Also, see Chapter 6.
to allow greater ‘self-management’ by the large tenure holders, and for greater harvest levels.

Again, however, the continued close relationship between the government and the forest industry provided significant room for criticism. The continued growth of the wilderness movement and the government’s attempts late in their mandate to temper their environmental message indicate that neither state nor forest industry were successful in deflecting the increasingly sophisticated critique of environmentalists. While, certainly not the only, or perhaps even the most significant, factor in the electoral defeat of the Social Credit government in 1991, the failure to contain the wilderness movement was of some import.

On the other hand, the growth of the Share movement at the end of the decade suggested that the failure of capital and the state to contain the wilderness movement was matched by the failure of this movement to articulate a shared project with forestry workers and others in resource dependent communities. While in environmental circles and beyond the Share movement is often dismissed as a cynical industry ploy to ‘divide and conquer’ and Share movement supporters seen as dupes of their employers propaganda, such analysis fails to capture the real way in which the popularity of the Share movement spoke to a class politics obscured by the post-class message of the wilderness movement. While the fingerprints of the forest corporation might be found on many facets of the Share movement, its relative success can be directly tied to the failure
of wilderness advocates to address the very real concerns of British Columbia’s hinterland working class.

The critique of environmentalists, which traced job loss to mechanization and other corporate decisions, though both accurate and well understood by those who saw the changes in the forest first-hand, did not address immediate concerns about the future of employment at a time when a consensus had developed that annual harvest must decrease. Talk of alternative logging, of getting more work out of less wood through value-added production, and of local economic diversification were ephemeral projections whose realization depended on the commitment of either the province or private capital – neither of which appeared immanent. If forestry workers and their families were buying into a business-as-usual scenario that had never served their interests particularly well, then the alternative seemed even less appealing. Well paying jobs, even for a few people and for a few years, appeared a better deal than a loss of such jobs and a transition to some uncertain future of service sector employment and the vague hope of violin production or some such secondary manufacturing.

The success of the Share movement also can be attributed to a profound dissonance between the working class culture of hinterland, resource-dependent communities and much of the wilderness movement. The Share movement played upon the difficulty in translating the notion of wilderness that was so central to the British Columbia’s environmental movement into the daily lives of those working and living ‘in the bush’. Whereas the idea of an ‘untouched wilderness’ or ‘virgin landscape’ appealed
to many in the province and beyond, as we have seen in both our theoretical and historical chapters, such appeal was not independent of class, race or place.

The Share movement expressed clearly, if sometimes in caricature\textsuperscript{156}, a very different understanding of such disputed lands – one where humans, especially humans engaged in resource extraction are an integral part of the landscape. Share groups conveyed this message by promoting the idea that forests are ‘improved’ through proper management and through making clear that those in resource based communities have an intimate knowledge of local forests through their work in the woods, through hunting, and simply through living in a rural area. As has been noted by those studying resource communities in other areas, and as we will see in our case study, though Share groups might repeat, and amplify, such forest ideology, such ideas have deep roots in these communities.

All this being said, there is little doubt that the forest industry had a hand in the rapid growth of the Share movement and was quite aware of the potential political effects of these groups. Through funding and other forms of support, the industry encouraged...
Share groups to, if not open, then reinforce, another front in the ‘war in the woods’.

Indeed at the end of the decade, clear lines were being drawn between ‘rednecks’ and ‘tree huggers’, between logging towns and tourist centres, between the rural and the urban – and the forest industry was keen on emphasizing this conflict as a way to limit the appeal of the growing wilderness movement

Crisis and Restructuring Round Three: New Democratic Solutions and the Restructuring of the Forest Industry in British Columbia

By the time the NDP came to power in 1991, the stage of contemporary environmental politics was set: the environmental movement had become a formidable critic of capitalist sustained-yield forestry, arguing both for the preservation of vast wilderness areas and for radical changes in forestry practices and tenure arrangement; opposed to this movement forest capital had both refined its defence of forestry practices and had fostered anti-environmentalist sentiment in hinterland communities through the support of Share groups. While the environmental movement had undermined the credibility of both industry and the state, forestry workers and others in resource based communities saw this movement as a direct threat to their livelihoods.

Industry officials at the time took every opportunity to ridicule environmentalists as ‘out of touch’ urban dwellers. In the summer of 1990, Chris O’Conner, then woodlands manager for Lytton Lumber Ltd., argued in the Vancouver Sun that “It’s those people [urban dwellers] who advocate more wilderness protection or ‘land withdrawals’ without understanding the implications” (Vancouver Sun, June 7, 1990, C3)
Faced with this volatile and complex conflict, British Columbians elected a social-democratic government that pledged to end the valley-to-valley conflict through the reassertion of the states’ role in forest practice regulation, the preservation of further wilderness areas and the protection of forest workers jobs. The NDP promised to find a solution to the social and environmental degradation wrought by an unrestrained capitalist forest industry that while rapidly displacing workers, was even more rapidly converting the last of the province’s old-growth forests into commodities. This platform garnered the support of environmentalists, the IWA and many in rural, resource dependent ridings, especially on Vancouver Island where many of the most prominent conflicts were still unresolved.

As we will see, the package of forest practices, job creation, and wilderness preservation measures introduced in this period, suggest a rather significant reorganization of capitalist forestry. These were, however, clearly reformist measures aimed squarely at reinvigorating the corporatist legs of sustained-yield forestry. In this regard, such reorganization had much more in common with Sloan era reformism than it did with the radical critique of the CCF and forestry workers.

This similarity to Sloan era reformism, also suggests a rather ambivalent analysis of this period. While changes to forest practices, the redirection/recapturing of profits, and the large areas of ancient forests removed from the direct threat of capital (to recall the earlier language of our theory chapter) ‘render imaginable’ alternatives to capitalist
forestry, in re-establishing corporatist support for capitalist sustained-yield, they also pose a formidable barrier to such change.

Our overview of this era then must end with a sceptical eye turned toward a system of forestry that appears to neither meet the long-term needs of forestry workers and their communities for good, secure work or to provide for the long-term ecological and social needs of healthy natural and built environments.

Environmental Crisis 1990s Style: Clayoquot Sound: Class and Place and the War in the Woods

Like perhaps no other place Clayoquot Sound has come to signify both the environmental movement’s direct challenge to capitalist sustained-yield forestry and the conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists that has become part of this struggle. This conflict, we would argue, is also one of the better yardsticks against which one might gauge the relative success or failure of NDP attempts to navigate the social and ecological contradictions of capitalist forestry.

When the NDP came to power the conflict over logging in the series of watersheds on the west coast of Vancouver Island that make up Clayoquot Sound already had a long history\textsuperscript{158}. The beginning of this dispute can be traced to late in 1979 when concern over MacMillan Bloedel’s plans to clearcut log on Meares Island forged an

\textsuperscript{158} For a timeline of events see Ingram (1994). Also see MacIsaac and Champagne (1994) and Breen-Needham \textit{et al} (1994)
alliance of Nuu-chah-nulth residents of the island and those in Tofino, a small tourist and fishing community whose harbour directly faced the island and the proposed cutblocks. In 1985, after a campaign that included a blockade, trailbuilding and numerous legal manoeuvres, logging was finally delayed on Meares by the success of a court injunction filed by the Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousaht bands.

This initial scuffle pushed the local environmental group, the ‘Friends of Clayoquot Sound’ (FOCS), into the public eye and the group had soon expanded their sights to the much larger series of watersheds along Clayoquot Sound. The conflict unfolded as many did at the time: a range of mobilization strategies were employed including the publication of glossy book about Meares Island, the lobbying of local and provincial governments, and coordinating blockades of road building and logging activities in the area. During the years of the Vander Zalm government, the dispute produced a series of contradictory announcements and policy reversals only to be handed over to two ‘multi-stakeholder’ dispute settling mechanisms, neither of which came close to resolving the conflict. By the summer of 1991, environmentalists had become increasingly bitter at this ‘Talk and Log’ strategy and most abandoned such processes for direct actions and calls for international boycotts.

159 The most significant of these, the blockade at Sulphur Passage saw the arrest of 35 people, 10 of which eventually were imprisoned for their actions (Friends of Clayoquot Sound, 1989).
Initially, at least, Clayoquot Sound proved to be a more than adequate foil for the NDP government. In what is now understood as a serious misreading of the strength of the environmental movement, Premier Michael Harcourt unveiled the ‘Clayoquot Compromise’, a decision that promised the protection of four of the nine ‘pristine’ watersheds, added 18 percent to Sound’s protected areas and promised a reduced rate of cut and improved forest practices in much of the rest of the area.\(^{160}\)

It must be said that few could have predicted the size or sophistication of the reaction that was unleashed. While the forest companies and the IWA decried the loss of work while supporting the overall plan (Stanbury 1994, 5), the wilderness movement rallied around the cause as never before. In what has become known as the Clayoquot Summer, over 800 people were arrested in a summer long campaign of civil disobedience. In a deft strategic move, the international exposure garnered during the summer was harnessed over the next year as the environmental movement turned to organizing international boycotts of British Columbian forestry products.

Certainly, much credit for the size of these protests must go to the organizational and media prowess of key movement figures.\(^{161}\) However, it is equally clear that credit

\(^{160}\) See Vancouver Sun, April 14, 1993; Stanbury 1994, 3-5

\(^{161}\) The question of the media is of some import. Critics have made a strong case that the forest industry has used its clout to slant, or simply eliminate, coverage of environmental issues, especially forestry issues (Goldberg 1993a; 1993b). On the other hand, Wilson (1999) has argued that the major, metropolitan media have been ‘broadly sympathetic’ and, more pragmatically, drawn to the sort of conflict narrative played out at blockades. Here, though equally subjectively, we might add that as the decade wore on
must also go to the persuasiveness of the critique of capitalist sustained-yield forestry offered up by environmentalists and its direct relevance to the place of Clayoquot Sound. In newsletters and speeches, in television sound bites and newspaper quotes, the message was repeated:

- Clayoquot Sound was a special place that contained some of the last old-growth temperate rainforests on Vancouver Island in particular, and in the world more generally.

- These forests had ecological and social values outside of their ‘fibre’ value. The old-growth forests provide habitat, recreational areas, and have a spiritual value.

- Large-scale capitalist forestry, especially clearcutting, would compromise these values and destroy the uniqueness of this place.

- There were alternative economic models that could provide employment without harvesting in ‘pristine’ areas and without resorting to ‘industrial’ forestry in areas

there appears to have been a decline in both sympathetic coverage and more simply of coverage itself. Conflicts such as that of our case study received very modest coverage. However, deciphering whether this situation might be accounted for by pro-industry bias, the ‘fatigue’ of readers/viewers for whom the novelty of protest tactics had worn thin, or to a decline in the movement itself, remains in question.
that had already experienced some logging. Tourism, the selective logging of second growth, and other sources of employment and wealth were available.

This message clearly resonated with a broad range of the population within British Columbia and beyond. While the data is again sketchy, support for the movement to protect Clayoquot Sound clearly came from all over the demographic (and geographic) map. However, one might be equally confident that while forestry workers were not without representation in the movement, attempts to draw support from these workers were not particularly successful\(^{162}\).

Even during the early days of this dispute tensions between forestry workers and environmentalists were never far from the surface; the IWA reacted angrily to the Sulphur Pass blockade filing lawsuits against protesters to collect loggers lost wages\(^{163}\) while loggers picketed a tour of the area by Premier Vander Zalm. During the Clayoquot Summer, this tension increased to the point where, arguably more than at any time in the province’s history, the Clayoquot disputes revealed the deep division between many

\(^{162}\) See the discussion below about strategies used by the environmental groups to attract forestry workers.

\(^{163}\) Environmentalists considered these suits no different from those launched by corporations facing environmental protests: as a means by which to discourage participation through groundless, time-consuming and expensive legal actions. Such a legal action has become known as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, or SLAPP. See Goldberg (1993).
forestry workers and the environmental movement. Though the blockades were largely peaceful, tensions ran high and incidents of intimidation were not uncommon.

Indeed, while media depictions of the conflict as that of logger vs. environmentalist were gross simplifications, and rightly condemned by environmentalists who saw themselves as protectors of future forestry and other work, it is equally true that the vast majority of forestry workers felt under siege by the sudden explosion of environmental protest. Encouraged by the IWA, local Share groups and their employers,

\[164\] The economic geography of the area contributed to this tension. The former fishing village of Tofino, on the north end of a peninsula and facing the old-growth of Meares Island, had come to rely heavily on tourism (which itself was spurred by the publicity garnered by environmental protest) and had elected environmentalists to both city council and the chamber of commerce. Ucluelet, to the south, faces a clearcut mountainside, remained heavily dependent on the resource sector, and had a local politics, and business community, dominated by industry supporters and those active in the Share movement.

\[165\] Incidents of vandalism, verbal abuse and assault were widely reported. The blockades were particularly tense, although a disciplined code-of-conduct (which was widely respected by protesters) and the ongoing RCMP presence left little room for trouble. The Peace Camp was appropriately peaceful. Here credit must go to the leadership role played by those committed to eco-feminist politics and with prior histories in the peace movement. On the other hand, information booths set up by the Western Canada Wilderness Committee were on occasion a dangerous place to be. At various times: the booths were hit by rocks, rotting fish guts and 200 litre containers of human excrement and WCWC supporters were threatened by men in MacMillan Bloedel trucks (See Vancouver Sun August 4, 1993; Nanaimo Daily Free Press July 17, 1993). Company officials, admitted at times that their workers were involved in such incidents but refused to discipline individual employees. As the summer heated up, it was widely understood that there were places in resource communities, especially restaurants and bars, where 'environmentalists' were not welcome.

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forestry workers were among the most vocal supporters of the 'Clayoquot Compromise'.

Though the journalistic context might be suspect, during the Clayoquot summer and beyond, a reporter, or anyone else, need not look far to find a forestry worker exasperated at those in the environmental movement\(^\text{166}\).

As we will discuss more thoroughly in the following chapter, forestry workers 'anti-environmentalist' reaction was certainly encouraged by the growing Share movement and their employers. Share Our Resources had a strong presence in Ucluelet and with support from the IWA mobilized significant numbers of forestry workers and industry supporters to 'fight back' against the environmentalists' threat. In something of a pre-emptive strike Share set up check-points along roads into the area with the intent of turning back those suspected of heading to the Peace Camp. Later in the summer, at the height of blockades, a rally, complete with music, and guest speakers that included forest

\(^{166}\) In an example from early in the summer, the Province printed a single column article entitled “Hostile voices on both sides” that set something of a standard for such stereotypes. Here, the words of “... lanky 24 year old graduate student from Toronto”, Tzeporah Berman (one of the principal organizers of the Clayoquot protests), were set against those of Hal Beek, who we were informed was a “big, burly man of the woods in his mid-30s”, native of Ucluelet, an unemployed logger for MacMillan Bloedel and son of a logger for this same company, and who had been forced to sell his house and move with his wife and children into a mobile home. Though such media accounts (re)produce grotesque stereotype, or if one was more sympathetic, archetype, any criticism of the media must be careful to recognize that these are real people, not mere creations of the media. The truth of the matter, if we dare use such a term, is that virtually all graduate students in this conflict were on the environmentalist’s blockade, and virtually all loggers opposed these actions and/or were crossing to work in the woods.
minister Dan Miller and IWA president Jack Munro attracted 4000 to Ucluelet (Victoria Times-Colonist August 15, 1993, A1).

Certainly, environmental groups recognized and were concerned about the growing division between forestry workers and their cause. Throughout the summer environmentalists made attempts to appeal to forestry workers. At the Black Hole Peace Camp, a large sign announced: NO FOREST, NO FISH, NO JOBS. In July a day at the blockade was set aside as 'forest industry worker's day' and throughout the blockade, spokespersons from FOCS, Greenpeace and WCWC, took pains to emphasize that theirs was a struggle against multi-national forest giants, as exemplified by MacMillan Bloedel, whose interests were in cutting both old-growth forests and jobs. Perhaps most critically, the shift away from massive blockades was in part prompted by an acknowledgement that such confrontations pitted environmentalists directly against forestry workers – the international campaigns, and other strategies such as Forest Watch more directly targeted MacMillan Bloedel and other forest companies.

167 Five forest industry workers were arrested on this designated day. One of the arrestees, a faller from Sechelt who had worked in Clayoquot Sound was quoted as saying “This is my future, and if I don’t do something about it now, it’s not going to be there” (Vancouver Sun, July 29, 1993).

168 The message that environmentalists were fighting for long-term preservation of forestry jobs was prominent in international campaigns. A spokesperson for WCWC, upon returning from a tour of the United States with ‘stumpy’, a 4000 kilogram red western cedar stump, claimed that the group was breaking down the misconception that environmentalists were unconcerned about jobs, saying “We talked about sustainability, and what a sustainable future really is. People were receptive and often surprised that it’s much more than about saving trees” (Province, December 9, 1994).
However, there was little evidence that forestry workers were being won over by these efforts. During the blockades, the hostility was palpable while boycotts were portrayed by the IWA as simply another attack on forestry workers. By 1993, goodwill between the environmental movement and forestry workers had largely dissolved. For a social-democratic government that had promised to untie the jobs vs environment knot of capitalist forestry this conflict between workers and environmentalists served to underscore just how difficult their task would be.

State Response I: Reregulation and Reform

The response of the Harcourt government to environmental conflict, and especially the events at Clayoquot Sound, was as complex and ambiguous as might be expected. In the most general case, the NDP produced a battery of reforms aimed squarely at ending the war in the woods and ensuring another Clayoquot did not arise: a new Forest Practices Code (FPC) aimed to reform forest practices; the Commission of Resources and Environment (CORE) attempted to democratize land-use decisions; the province moved to add significantly to protected areas; and Forest Renewal B.C. (FRBC), a Crown corporation, was created to redirect forest industry profits to ‘forest enhancement’, economic diversification, retraining and value-added manufacturing.

Forced by the scale of protest to rethink the Clayoquot decision itself, the government adopted an area-specific package of land-use and forest practice changes
taken rather directly from the final report of the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forestry Practices in Clayoquot Sound. These changes, much more sweeping than anything offered in other areas of the province, while successful in quelling this conflict, also served to raise significant questions about the limits of more general reforms. Before any such evaluation, however, an overview of some of the reforms introduced during the Harcourt years is in order.

**Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE)**

The Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) was announced early in 1992 as a high-profile, independent body charged with the task of steering the province through decisions on land-use and resource issues. The Commissioner, Steven Owen, took the opportunity to create a novel, highly malleable approach to regional planning that aimed to avoid conflict through widening community involvement. At three ‘tables’, representing different regions of the province, CORE sought to identify and foster cooperative decision making among stakeholders under the assumption that

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\text{[t]he motivation for cooperation lies in realizing that the parties' goals are interdependent. Invariably, one party cannot get what it wants without the support or action of the other parties. By working together to solve a problem, each party will gain more than it could by relying on traditional bargaining techniques, where a gain for one party is seen as a loss for the other. (CORE 1992, 25)}^{169}
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169 More prosaically (and more reflective of British Columbian forest politics) it has been noted that the different interests, “. . . don’t have to like one another. They just
One of the factors that set CORE apart from the ‘multi-stakeholder’ processes that both preceded and followed it was the extent to which it allowed a wide range of interests in each of the regions to develop their own process by which decisions were to be made\(^{170}\). Each of the regions brought different interests (grouped into sectoral units) to the table and approached the task in unique ways.

As we will discuss below, none of the CORE tables ended with a full consensus, and in each case it fell to the Commissioner to draft a final report and make recommendations to the province. Opinions on the usefulness of CORE are not surprisingly divided. Many though have commended the Commission for empowering interests previously ignored by other forms of decision-making\(^{171}\).

\[\text{have to recognize that working together to solve a jointly defined problem will enable each to gain more than it otherwise could” (Darling in Wilson 1998, 268).}\]

\(^{170}\) CORE traces its history to a Brundtland Commission recommendation urging the establishment of ‘roundtables’ on the economy and environment. Such bodies were set up at both the federal and provincial level. British Columbia’s British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (BCRTEE) was established in 1990 and dissolved in 1994 (See Kelly and Alper 1995). As the authors argue, CORE’s mandate, which included the direction to “develop and implement a world-leading strategy for land-use planning and management as part of a larger commitment to sustainability”, was broader than the purely advisory Roundtables.

\(^{171}\) See Kelly and Alper (1995) for an assessment of what was arguably the most acrimonious of the tables, Vancouver Island, and Hume (1994) for a rare positive comment in the media.
Forest Renewal B.C.

With the creation of the Crown agency Forest Renewal B.C. (FRBC), the provincial government acted on a suggestion that had been around since the Fulton Royal Commission of 1910 – the establishment of a fund, obtained from government revenues from the timber harvest, to be applied to reforestation and other projects to enhance the forest base. Announced in April of 1993, FRBC received funding from what the government referred to as ‘superstumpage’ fees that resulted from increases in stumpage and royalty charges paid by the timber industry when harvesting on Crown land.

The increased complexity of forest economies and forest politics ensured that the mandate of Forest Renewal was much broader in scope than the simple reforestation suggested by Fulton. Indeed, in addition to activities that broadly fall under the category of reinvestment in the forests (reforestation, silviculture, restoration of damaged watersheds, research into silviculture and environmentally friendly harvesting practices), the agency has also funded value-added ventures, community development and diversification projects, research into each of these matters and education programs that centred on value added wood production techniques. Overlapping somewhat with these activities, Forest Renewal also funded several schemes to help displaced forest sector workers including retraining programs, transition funds and re-employment agencies.

In many regards Forest Renewal took a page from environmental critics who insisted that encouraging the value added sector and a commitment to more labour
intensive forestry practices might allow for both employment stability and the reduction of allowable cuts. Likewise, funding for community diversification schemes and for displaced forestry workers also served to ameliorate the fears of these workers and others in resource dependent communities. Finally, in funding enhanced silviculture projects, road deactivation, watershed restoration, wildlife inventories, and the like the fund ensured that forest companies paid for some of the previously hidden costs of forestry.

Relatedly, Forest Renewal was said to address some of the ‘market distortions’ that arose from such externalities. With funding coming directly from stumpage, it was assumed that the price of forest products would more accurately reflect their social, environmental and economic cost of production. It was hoped that such increased costs would further encourage value added production in the province.

Forest Practices Code

In the summer of 1994, British Columbia became the first Canadian province to introduce a legally enforceable Forest Practices Code. Premised on the argument that existing guidelines were either out-of-date, unenforceable or did not carry the sort of deterrent that ensured compliance, the Code involved the assembly, consolidation, reordering and improving of the vast array of regulations and guidelines that had been used to regulate forest practices in the province.
The scope and technical detail of the code, which covers topics from the zoning of forest lands down to specific harvesting regulations, precludes any in-depth discussion here. However, it is important to recognize that the code served to reassert the province's presence and authority in regulating, monitoring and enforcing harvest practices.

From the beginning, the FPC met with substantial criticism from both environmentalists and the forest industry. While the latter have claimed to accept the goals of the Code, they have decried it for creating a costly bureaucratic tangle of regulations. Environmentalists, who praised the turn to a more strict regulatory framework and welcomed specific measures such as the reduction in the maximum size of clearcuts, were unimpressed by both the weakness of some regulations and by provisions that have left a significant amount of discretionary power to both the Chief Forester, and to District Managers (see below).

These debates aside, it must be acknowledged that from the inception of sustained-yield forestry the province has publically trumpeted its regulatory role while attempting to shirk this responsibility – relying on the ‘self-interest’ of capital and on programs that allow for self-monitoring and reporting, a bias that was heightened by the de-regulation of the 1980s. The Code, however, moved forest practices in precisely the opposite direction with provincial authorities given clearer authority. This clearer authority was buttressed by a shift from a reliance on general guidelines to specific enforceable codes and, perhaps most critically, the influence of stiffer penalties. At a time when environmental protest had reached a peak, not to speak of the international
gaze that had settled on British Columbian forest practices, the state moved to take back some of its role as manager of the provincial forests. If higher stumpage suggests that the state had adopted more of a landlord's perspective, the Forest Practices Code suggests that this landlord was going to be more directly involved in the surveillance and care of her properties.

The Scientific Panel on Sustainable Forestry Practices in Clayoquot Sound

The Scientific Panel on Sustainable Forestry Practices in Clayoquot Sound was never intended as part of the NDPs reform of provincial forestry matters. Having excluded Clayoquot Sound from the CORE process on the understanding that conflict in the area might undermine CORE's work on Vancouver Island and beyond, the Scientific Panel was announced as part of the governments ongoing, rather ad hoc, struggle to contain this volatile dispute. Stung by the widespread protest that erupted following the announcement in 1993 of the 'Clayoquot Compromise', including criticism from the CORE commissioner himself, Premier Harcourt announced that a Scientific Panel would be struck to recommend guidelines for harvesting in the area (Gawthrop 1996, 167).

When the Scientific Panel released its recommendations in 1995, Co-chair Fred Bunell, a professor of forest wildlife ecology and management, boldly announced that “we’ve flopped forestry on its head” (Vancouver Sun, May 30, 1995, A3). What gave credibility to this statement was the extent to which the Scientific Panel insisted on an
‘ecosystem-based management’ approach that had long been advocated by environmentalists. The Panel’s recommendations spelled out a silvicultural system that was constrained by the overarching, and prior, consideration of the need to maintain the existing forest ecology.

That such a shift in management approach might require a significant re-thinking of forestry practices is probably best understood through the example of allowable annual cut calculation. Traditionally, an AAC was set based on estimates of the volume of wood available and social concerns such as mill requirements. Having been thus calculated, a logging and silviculture treatment regime was devised that aimed to protect ecosystem and other values (recreational, visual etc.) while meeting this cut level. Ecosystem-based management reverses this approach – it begins with the consideration of ecosystem and other needs, and after these are considered one is left with a certain amount of harvestible wood\textsuperscript{172}.

In another matter of great significance to the environmental movement, while the Report did not rule out clearcuts, it did put such strict limits on this practice (especially important here is a restriction to areas no steeper than 30 degrees to prevent landslides) that their justification would be difficult. To this end, the report called for a shift to a logging practice known as ‘variable retention’\textsuperscript{173}.

\textsuperscript{172} Tenures then become known as area-based rather than volume based.

\textsuperscript{173} See Report 5 : sustainable ecosystem management in Clayoquot Sound : planning and practices (Bunell 1995).
Protected Areas

Finally, one of the campaign promises of the New Democratic Party, and a key element in its strategy to end the ‘war in the woods’, was the commitment to double the land base of the province set aside in protected areas. The NDP echoed a recommendation of the World Commission on the Environment and Development (Brundtland) and vowed that 12 percent of the province’s land mass would be preserved from industrial development. During the Harcourt years 2.5 million hectares were added to British Columbia’s park system and the province moved within striking distance of this target. After the announcement of the Vancouver Island Land Use Plan in 1994, 13 percent of the Island’s land base was in protected areas.

The Limits of Reform

The potent combination of the growth of the environmental movement and the wide, if not particularly deep, reforms of the Harcourt years suggested to some that wilderness advocates had succeeded in turning the tide of capitalist sustained-yield forestry. While the movement had yet to flush out just what form an alternative forestry might take, many suspected that their potent criticism of the environmental and social effects of ‘industrial forestry’ had begun the dismantling of this system of production.

During the heady days of the Clayoquot Summer, and later as environmentalists began to turn the power of international consumers (and capital) against the province’s
forest industry, brash assertions that forestry was being ‘turned on its head’ and that the province had seen the beginning of the end of clearcut logging were to be expected. However, even at the time, cooler heads suggested that while the reforms of the Harcourt years were important, they should not be overstated and they must be tempered by the acknowledgement that each was considered a significant but flawed step towards a socially and environmentally sustainable forestry.

The Forest Practices Code, which the province insisted made British Columbia’s forest standards ‘the best in the world’, was generally welcomed by environmentalists but not without reservations. A report prepared for the Sierra Legal Defence fund noted three broad categories of problems: (1) regulations that were insufficient to protect ecological values (here the size of streamside buffers was considered a particular weakness; (2) the wide range of discretionary power given district managers and the chief forester; and (3) the failure to acknowledge in any enforceable way the protection of biodiversity as a first principle.\(^{174}\)

The weakness of the Forest Practices code was revealed not only by environmental critics but by the government appointed Scientific Panel. The Panel’s much tougher guidelines, which placed biodiversity concerns as the baseline for any resource extraction, revealed the strictly reformist intent of the Code. The Code, though


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an important set of strict regulations, remains rooted in an approach to forestry where non-timber values are addressed long after decisions on volume have been decided.\textsuperscript{175}

While the Scientific Panel produced a report that was and continues to be praised for demonstrating just what an eco-system based approach to forestry might look like, its effects were also tightly circumscribed. The limits lie not in the recommendations themselves but in the way that the state has ensured that these recommendations: (1) remain a specific response to the ‘unique’ situation of Clayoquot Sound; and, (2) remain recommendations without any significant enforcement mechanism. This strategy of containment has meant that the Report is subject to widely differing interpretations as it has been applied to Clayoquot Sound, and it has not become a model for forestry in other coastal areas as was the hope of many environmentalists and conservation biologists.

The Commission on Resources and the Environment, meanwhile, has served up a similar lesson on the limits of reform in this period. Those who credit CORE with pioneering new ways of bringing diverse values into land-use decision-making are not wrong. The CORE approach provided a venue for the idea of common interest that many environmentalists fought to make heard above the din of conflict – that the future of forestry and other work, and the health of resource dependent communities depends upon

\textsuperscript{175} This criticism was underscored in 1995 when the Forest Minister decried that the application of the Code would not be allowed to lower allowable annual cuts by more than 6 percent, an act taken without making changes to the code itself. Clearly, then, the Forest Practices Code clearly remained compatible with a volume-based approach to the resource
developing sustainable economies within environmental limits. However, as conflict erupted, especially on Vancouver Island and the Cariboo, the government retreated to the sort of backroom negotiating that Wilson (1998, 286) rightly notes is the antithesis of the CORE process. After 1994, the province refused to hand any further regions to the CORE process and, in 1996, after some time developing general recommendations on provincial land-use strategy, CORE was disbanded.

We might add that Forest Renewal B.C., while serving to offset some of the employment effects of both the FPC and land withdrawals, and thus helping to ensure that forest industry workers 'bought into' these changes, was less successful in the more broadly defined goal of helping to restructure and diversify forest dependent economies. Forest Renewal soon began to face criticism that the fund was something of a simple buy-out package for displaced IWA members rather than a producer of long-term, value-added jobs.

From the perspective of the environmental movement then the Harcourt years were marked by difficult struggle, the euphoria of mobilization, the success of significant new additions to the province's protected areas, and the difficult recognition that any sort

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176 The Sierra Club denounced a proposal to use FRBC funds to compensate workers in the Clayoquot region for forgone wages due to delays in getting cutting permits (Vancouver Sun, December 23, 1995, A1). Silviculture workers, meanwhile, complained that they were not only losing jobs to land-use decisions and stricter forest practice regulations but also were being displaced by FRBC funded workers from other sectors of the industry (Vancouver Sun, February 7, 1997, D1).
of systemic change was elusive. Again, Clayoquot Sound, a symbol of the success of the wilderness movement, serves as a poignant example.

The environmental movement can rightly proclaim that the remarkable mobilization that culminated in the Clayoquot Summer, and the political savvy of the international ‘market campaign’, have resulted in the protection of three of the regions untouched watersheds. These campaigns also lead to the acceptance of the Scientific Panel recommendations which suggest, though do not guarantee, a significant change to logging practices in the rest of the area. Moreover, all future logging and other industrial activity in the area will certainly come under significant scrutiny.

Nonetheless, the call for an end to the harvest of old-growth either in Clayoquot Sound or in any other area of the province outside protected areas remains a faint hope. Also, the idea that Scientific Panel type recommendations might serve as a template for logging practice reform on the coast or in modified form, across the province, seems lost for the foreseeable future. Most critically, tenure reform and the other measures necessary to shift from capitalist industrial forestry to the vaguely defined eco-system based community forestry envisioned by many environmentalists, to paraphrase M’Gonigal, await a solution.

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177 In Clayoquot Sound Interfor continues to log old-growth and in the first half of 2001 logged 53,000 cubic metres of such wood was taken from a contentious area dubbed ‘Catface Mountain’ (Friends of Clayoquot Sound, Fall 2001, 2).
Forest Worker – Environmental Movement conflict and the End of Reform

The experience of the latter half of the 1990s demonstrated just how fragile even the admittedly limited reforms of the Harcourt years were. From 1995 to 1997 the reform of forest policy slowed significantly: the CORE process was sidelined; the flurry of new protected areas announcements slowed to a trickle; and even the Forest Practices Code faced a ‘streamlining’, (one that environmentalists decried as a ‘gutting’). Perhaps most distressing, was the general perception that the NDP itself, whose internal battle between so-called ‘green’ and ‘brown’ factions was ever a source of speculation during the Harcourt years, had lurched rather suddenly toward the beige end of the spectrum.

Several political and economic factors came into play. Whereas the peak years of forest reform occurred alongside a record setting forest industry boom, by 1996 the industry was hit by the meltdown of Asian economies and was well into another downturn – one which resulted in the loss of over 15 000 jobs between 1997 and 1999 (Hayter 2000, 67). Further complicating matters, the so-called ‘Asian flu’ crisis coincided with the resignation of Premier Harcourt and the re-election of the NDP under Glen Clark, a former IWA organizer. Over the next four years, the NDP spent more and more time working to quell the fears and criticisms of the forest industry and became increasingly less patient with the environmental movement.

Within the environmental movement, many attribute this political sea-change to the individual politics of Premier Clark and the renewed close ties to the IWA. However,
turning a more critical eye to the last decade of forest politics we might argue that the limits to reform were decided early on. Whereas individual decisions might have hinged on the difficult internal politics of the NDP, the more general limits of reform were tightly circumscribed by the continued conflict between forestry workers and the environmental movement.

Through the Harcourt years, the Share movement, learning from environmentalists, became much more effective in organizing forestry workers. Certainly, during the Clayoquot dispute this movement had demonstrated an ability to mobilize large numbers: in August of 1993, at the height of the Peace Camp protest and the Kennedy Lake blockades and a Share event in Ucluelet drew 4 000 people (Province, August 12, 1993, D1). The reaction to the Vancouver Island Land Use Management Plan brought over 15 000 to the legislature lawn in Victoria (see following chapter). Each protest, drawing on anti-urban sentiments, and fuelled by significant industry backing, tightened the alliance of workers, the industry and forest dependent communities. By mid-decade, on environmental issues at the least, 'forestry worker' and 'industry supporter' had become synonymous.

For the impact of this political realignment one need not look further than to the CORE process. Especially on Vancouver Island and in the Cariboo, mobilization by the Share movement resulted in a significant undermining of both the commissions recommendations on protected areas and environmental management, and of the process itself. And it is this latter point that seems most critical: Share's success in undermining
the credibility of the CORE process forced the government to retreat to more typical backroom politics. What was lost then, were not only specific reforms, or even potential protected areas, but a more democratic and open process through which these might be agreed upon. For, whatever its shortcomings, CORE's painfully careful deconstruction of land-use conflicts fostered cooperation amongst seemingly competing interests\textsuperscript{178}.

Indeed, as forestry workers' support for the industry built through the latter half of the decade, the province retreated to its traditional role within the corporatist arrangement. The jobs vs environment dilemma of capitalist forestry now went largely unquestioned. Instead, the province, riding on its not insubstantial record of reform, reiterated its support for the industry. While the province continued to trickle out announcements of new protected areas, these were 'balanced' by commitments to the industry that no surprises were forthcoming.

At the end of the decade then we find ourselves at a very familiar place: capitalist forestry, strongly supported by both the state and forestry workers, is relied upon to provide good work while protecting environmental values.

This familiarity is not, however, reassuring. The industry continues to harvest at a rate that environmentalists consider well above the long-run sustained yield and clearcutting remains the harvesting method of choice. The province's remaining, low-

\textsuperscript{178} One need not here resort to conspiracy theory to suggest that pro-industry Share groups honed in on the CORE process as particularly threatening for both its decisions and for its role in fostering alternative visions of decision-making.
level, old-growth forests remain a prime target. Moreover, the fate of the provinces’ forestry workers remains precarious. For all the renewed support of both the state and labour, jobs continue to be shed in both the forest and in the mills. Restructuring, and competition from fast-growing southern forests have obscured the future of forest workers and their communities.

If the conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists has helped bring us to this place questions must be raised: Was such conflict inevitable? What has been the role of the IWA and other forestry unions? Does their structural role impede forestry union’s ability to develop an environmental critique of forest capital? These are the questions we address in the following chapter and which are central to our case study.
Chapter 7
Forestry Unions and Wilderness Politics

In previous chapters we have traced the restructuring process that forged an alliance of large capital, the state and forestry labour under the banner of sustained-yield forestry. This corporatist arrangement has, until recently, proved remarkably stable, remaining more or less intact through fifty-five years of market flux and dwindling stocks of ancient forests. We have also argued that through this period capitalist forestry has rapidly increased the exploitation of ancient forests while dramatically displacing labour and that the resulting social and ecological contradictions have suggested dual critiques of capitalist forestry practice. Though labour and environmental movements have criticized the loss of forestry work and the loss of ancient forests, it is the latter movement that has become the primary vehicle of such critique. While we have recognized the diversity of the environmental movement in British Columbia, we have also noted that since the mid-1980s, the wilderness movement has served as its dominant faction. We have commented that Wilderness politics, while articulating the ideas and practices of feminist and peace movements, has had a much more ambivalent relationship with organized labour in general and organized forestry labour in particular.

In this chapter we further explore this relation by more closely examining the environmental politics of two forestry unions: the Industrial Wood and Allied Workers
of Canada (IWA) and the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC). We argue that these organizations, shaped by their structural place within capitalist production, come to face real jobs vs environment tradeoffs. Workers are dependent upon the existing forest industry (no matter how polluting or unsustainable) for their livelihood, while forestry unions exist to protect workers jobs (amongst other things). And, on the other hand, workers and their unions are pushed by direct health and safety concerns, and concern for longer-term job stability, towards an environmental perspective.

Such structural constraints, though necessary for any thorough understanding of forest labour politics, tell only a partial story. The politics of both unions, though especially those of the PPWC, do move beyond these constraints. In their own way, each of these very different political trajectories reveals that forestry unions maintain a political agency, a sometimes fulfilled potential to articulate their projects with those of the environmental movement. While we will leave to our final chapter a more speculative model of such agency, it will suffice to say that the actions of forestry unions have made clear their critical position within the struggle over forestry practice.

The International Wood and Allied Workers of Canada (IWA)

By the end of the 1990s, the relationship between British Columbia’s largest forestry union and the province’s environmental movement had reached a new low: the IWA had no formal ties with environmental groups, wilderness or otherwise; the union
had launched a ‘Fight Back For Forest Jobs’ campaign aimed at ‘overzealous protectionists’; and lawsuits had been filed against wilderness groups engaged in road blockades. In the pages of the *Lumber Worker*, ‘preservationists’ were vilified in articles which detailed the latest salvos in this ‘war’.

The following will trace the development of IWA environmental policy and the relations between this union and the environmental movement in an effort to understand the political history of this conflict. It will be shown that the relations between the IWA and environmental groups, at least during the post-Sloan Commission era (1947 onwards) have always been tense and that the environmental policy of this union has been difficult to reconcile with those of environmental groups generally, and of the wilderness movement especially.

This being said, the environmental politics of the IWA have not been static. Within the overall tension between this union and the environmental movement there have been moments where political and economic context have suggested a more cooperative relation. Such moments, shaped by the ideological work of capital, the state and environmental groups, serve to underscore the political decisions taken by the IWA, decisions that have discouraged inter-movement dialogue.
The IWA and The Rise of Environmentalism

The sustained level of hostility between the IWA and environmental groups during the last decade is without precedent. It is not at all misguided to attribute a good deal of this acrimony to the rise of the wilderness preservation movement. However, even a cursory examination of the historical record suggests that the relationship between the IWA and the environmental movement has, in the post-Sloan commission period, always been tenuous.

The (re)birth of environmentalism in the province initially had little impact on the IWA. Through the 1960s, as peace, anti-nuclear and anti-pollution movements began to coalesce, the Lumber Worker was only on rare occasions punctuated with an article or editorial on such subjects as disarmament, nuclear war, or air pollution. Nonetheless, as these movements gained momentum, and as their central issues began to be integrated into the political platforms of the provincial and federal arms of the New Democratic Party, the prominence of environmental issues in the IWA did begin to rise. In 1966, for instance, the IWA noted without criticism the environmental platform of the provincial NDP, which included a promise to cease industrial development in parks and highlighted air and water pollution problems (Lumber Worker, August 1966, 2nd issue, 6-7). Also, following the election of a development furious Social Credit Party, the IWA attacked provincial policies on strip mining (Lumber Worker, January 1969, 1st issue, 8).
Yet, even at this early moment, the fledgling environmental movement found itself in conflict with the IWA. In 1970, the president of the Scientific Pollution and Environmental Control Society (SPEC)\(^{179}\), a group whose prominence in the British Columbian environmental movement was rapidly rising, suggested that the IWA shift its bargaining focus from wage demands to environmental issues. The reaction of the IWA was swift and harsh. Noting that SPEC’s work had brought it “countless friends in the labour movement”, including many from the IWA, the union went on to bitterly dismiss Dr. Mallard’s remarks:

It is therefore astonishing that SPEC president Dr. Derek Mallard has dared to alienate these supporters by criticizing the IWA’s wage demands which we bluntly say are none of his business.

His statement that IWA members would be better advised to place more emphasis on bargaining for improved environmental conditions rather than seeking higher wages is nothing less than gross interference in the internal affairs of the Union.

IWA contract negotiations are difficult enough without Dr. Mallard poking his nose into them with such ludicrous statements as “The worker’s standard of living is going up to the point where their higher wages will only increase the pollution problem”. (*Lumber Worker*, 1970 Vol 34 no.8, 6-7)

There is little doubt that both political naivety and a dearth of class analysis within the early environmental movement contributed significantly to such disputes (see our previous chapter). The reaction of the union, however, is perhaps of even greater import for it suggests the difficulty the IWA has had (and will have) in addressing the concerns

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\(^{179}\) While this group’s name has changed several times, and it is now known as the Society Promoting Environmental Conservation, the acronym SPEC has remained.
of the environmental movement while facing the social and environmental crisis produced by the forest industry.\textsuperscript{180}

While the IWA clearly accepted the ‘motherhood issue’ of limiting pollution, and pollution problems did remain an ongoing concern of the union during the 1970s, the union would not accept any challenge to what was considered its central function: to obtain a fair share of corporate profits for those who produced these profits – forestry workers. If the union avoided the central question of whether environmental problems should, or could, be addressed through collective bargaining, this only prefigured the difficulty that the IWA has had with this question through the next three decades.

It must be noted, however, that this squabble did not result in the sort of intermovement hostility that was to erupt in the 1990s. The IWA continued to use the \textit{Lumber Worker} to highlight pollution issues and within a few months published a ‘guest editorial’ from the Canadian Labour Congress urging organized labour to work with ‘other civic-minded organizations’ to eliminate environmental hazards (\textit{Lumber Worker}, November 1970, 12). However there is little evidence that the IWA saw any need to develop a direct relationship with the environment movement. Instead, the union appears to have adopted a strict focus on capturing the economic benefits of highly efficient, automated production for (employed) forest workers. Meanwhile, the environmental movement was

\textsuperscript{180} As we speak of in our methodology chapter, we refer principally here to formal union policy and statements. In this chapter we will regular cite union papers (the IWA’s \textit{Lumber Worker} and the PPWC’s \textit{Leaflet}) as well as submissions to government bodies.
encouraged in their struggle to halt or limit the toxic byproducts of industrial production. This ‘division of labour’ approach, though possible when pollution issues were the dominant concern of the province’s environmental movement, proved difficult to maintain as the emphasis of this movement shifted to wilderness issues. Within three years, some environmental groups found that their friends in the IWA had become distinctly less friendly.

The IWA at the Birth of the Wilderness Movement

While, as elsewhere in North America, anti-pollution issues played a prominent role in British Columbia during the 1970s, the province’s environmental politics were marked early on by campaigns to protect large, representative areas of forest from industrial development. For forestry workers and their union, this wilderness movement threatened to fundamentally alter the political and economic map of the province. Until this time it must be remembered this wilderness was understood as the future workplace of loggers and the source of raw materials upon which other forest sector workers were to work. The IWA’s response to this challenge – that new protected areas should not significantly impact industry access to commercially viable timber – has formed the basis of an environmental policy that has been altered only slightly over the next three decades.

This fundamental principal of IWA environmental policy was made clear in the union’s submission to the 1976 Pearse Commission, a submission that developed a
critique of wilderness preservation taking special note of the recent moratorium on
logging in what was the last undeveloped watershed on eastern Vancouver Island – the
Tsitika. The IWA attacked the moratorium, and set-asides in general, and complained
bitterly of the effect that this moratorium would have on its members and resource
dependent communities. The IWA argued that such set-asides amounted to control by a
singular ‘special interest’, that significant job loss and community dislocation was soon to
follow and that ‘other interests’, including scientific research and recreation, could be
accommodated alongside industrial logging.

Our position with respect to the managing and use of the forest has
always been one of multiple use. The forests belong to all people and
should not be controlled and used by one corporation or special interest
group. Through proper planning and care, the forests are capable of
producing a multitude of benefits, both social and economic.

Although many IWA members are enthusiastically interested in
outdoor recreation and concerned with maintaining a high quality
environment, jobs and wages must be given a very high priority. The
recent withdrawal for parks, ecological reserves, recreation area and nature
conservancies without independent Public Hearings and thorough
technical review may not be creating sufficient benefits to compensate for
loss of timber harvests upon which I.W.A. members and other related
groups depend for their jobs. In particular, reference is made to the
Tsitika-Schoen Moratorium area.

It is certainly only common-sense to realize that the backbone of
this Province’s economy lies in our forest resources. Not only does the
economic well-being of the Province lie within the forest resources that we

181 The Tsitika/Schoen Lake area, first championed by a regional wildlife
biologist, and then supported by a loose coalition of environmental groups, was one of
several areas that the NDP government was encouraged to add to the provinces meagre
protected areas (Wilson 1998, 129-140). The NDP responded with both the two-year
moratorium and with a study of resource problems on northern Vancouver Island that
focussed on the Tsitika.
have, but the very existence of some communities in this Province depend
on the harvesting of these resources. This is a fact of life that we must
accept.

To the people who have built homes and established families at
Sayward and Port McNeill, we are not simply talking in terms of whether
logging will be permitted in the Tsitika-Schoen area, we are talking in
terms of will these communities be allowed to continue to exist. If anyone
in this Province thinks we can afford the luxury of setting aside three
hundred and ten thousand acres of prime timber resource and expect
everything to remain the same, they are mistaken. The withdrawal of the
Tsitika-Schoen area from further harvesting will result in an estimated
devastating loss of 1200 jobs. (IWA 1975, 2-3)

The IWA brief continued with a recognition that “other groups that have a
legitimate interest in the area”, though it was insisted that each of these other interests
was compatible with industrial logging. To use a more contemporary phrasing, the union
argued that forests must be ‘shared’. For the IWA, a multiple-use approach meant that

... the large tracts of land that are being withdrawn for special interest
groups belong to all the people of the province, and that no single group or
company should have control over it. The Forest Companies should be
allowed to harvest the forest; scientists should have access to those parts
of the area that are most valuable to them; and the general public should
have access to the beauty and recreational facilities of the area. All these
can be accomplished (possibly not to the satisfaction of every interest
group) through intelligent planning. It must be remembered, however, that
there are people who depend upon these areas for their livelihood and
certainly deserve first consideration in the development of plans for the
area. (IWA 1975, 3-4)

The message that had become central to many in the province’s environmental
movement, that a certain amount of wilderness must be protected and that these areas
should be large enough to preserve representative ecosystem values, passed without
mention. Instead, the union suggested:
[t]he policy of “pocket wilderness” reservations should be encouraged. The development and maintenance of forest campsites where the setting is in the woods rather than in formal and expensive parks should be encouraged. In cases where these “pocket wilderness” areas become an added expense to Corporations in their harvesting programs, the costs should be allowed fully in stumpage appraisals. (IWA 1975, 4)

In reducing protected areas to the tyranny of a ‘special interest’ and in suggesting that ‘access’ for scientists and ‘pocket wildernesses’ are a more equitable substitute for parks or ecological reserves, the union set up a direct conflict with the emerging wilderness movement. This was not simply a scuffle over the costs and benefits of a particular wilderness proposal but rather an expression of profoundly different environmental ideology. Here the IWA made three main arguments: (1) that their concern was, and should be, about ‘people first’ and more specifically forestry workers and their communities; (2) that the maximization of social and environmental benefits required that forests be intensely managed (and that logging and replanting maximize environmental and social benefits) and (3) that the prime reason for preserving wilderness was for recreational purposes.

At the outset of its brief, the union clearly stated that its primary concern, “to ensure that woodworkers win the best wages and working conditions obtainable”, was to be undertaken within a more general ‘concern for people’ in which the union recognized its “social responsibilities to the country and our neighbours” (IWA 1975, 1). The IWA staked out an unabashedly ‘anthropocentric’ position focussed on the social contradictions of forestry – one where environmental policies were to be justified by their
direct social benefits. For the IWA this meant that concern ‘above all’ must be given to forestry workers, their families and their communities. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, during the post-Sloan Commission era the union had considered an efficient, competitive, capitalist forest industry as the best defence that workers and their communities had against unemployment and dislocation.

Relatedly, the union insisted that maximum benefits would only be obtained through intensive forestry. Under the heading ‘The Forest’, the IWA suggested that British Columbia’s forests be viewed chiefly (and as no other options are given, perhaps solely) for their contribution to Provincial and Canadian economies and to forestry workers’ “economic, recreational and social welfare”. The brief read:

We most importantly and intricately recognize the forest as a live and changing community that requires intelligent, intensive and continuing husbandry. One of our members associated with the harvesting of the forest described it in the following manner: Imagine a movie camera located in a satellite one hundred miles above a forest taking a continuous picture for one hundred or more years, then speed the film up so that it could be seen in a normal two-hour period. What we would observe is a dynamic, pulsating organism, sometimes growing and declining at a smooth and steady rate and at other times subject to catastrophic and chaotic change.

It is not a simple task to manage the forests of British Columbia, and managerial practices from one forested area to the next must vary as no two forested areas are the same. Improper forest management policies, or the lack of them, have far reaching consequences.

We are most concerned with the welfare of present and future generations of the province. We therefore urge the government to establish the necessary policy and means so that forest managers can manipulate and mold the forest in order to ensure a maximum flow of social and economic benefits on a sustained and preferably expanding yield basis. (IWA 1975, 2)
Both the moments of ecological metaphor and description and the IWA’s insistence that scientific forestry offered a solution to the unpredictability of the forest are of note. When this brief spoke of unpredictable cycles of growth and of the forest as a “live and changing community” it veered towards the imagery of ecological politics. For the union though, the ‘pulse’ and ‘dynamism’ of the forest were understood as much as threats as they were inherent properties of the forest. Such properties were only understood as valuable, or at least understood as much more valuable, after they were disciplined by forestry experts. The IWA argued that:

> [m]anagement of existing young, immature and mixed class timber stands should be intensified and many more plantations established in order to increase future yields. It has been estimated by some forest scientists that our forests are capable of producing a twenty percent increase in product as a result of intensive silviculture practices and an additional twenty percent increase through the fostering of genetically superior species. (IWA 1975, 5)

Though only briefly, the submission further suggested that such intensively managed, ‘multiple use’ forests are also ecologically and aesthetically superior to their wild counterparts. The union insisted that “[t]imber harvesting can increase forage yields for domestic and wild animals, provide access for recreation and adds variety to the landscape. Young forests are also beautiful.” (IWA 1975, 4)

At the most general level, the IWA insisted that there was little need for ‘single use’ activities such as parks, ecological reserves or other set-asides, and so disputed the very idea of the need to preserve wilderness either ‘for its own sake’ or as part of the protection of a larger ecosystem. In fact, the sole concession to wilderness preservation
in this document was a nod to its usefulness for recreational purposes. This minor concession was further qualified when it was argued that such recreational needs could be accommodated alongside industrial forestry in what the union calls “pocket wilderness reservations”. Apparently, the IWA believed that small pockets of ancient forest should be reserved for campsites within the ‘woods’, or what the union and others would soon refer to as the ‘working forest’¹⁸².

Well into the latter half of the 1980s the environmental ideology of the IWA remained firmly inscribed in its more general adherence to the vision of scientific, sustained-yield forestry, as practised by ‘efficient’ and ‘competitive’ large-scale forestry capital under the tutelage of state experts¹⁸³. The union’s adoption of multiple-use discourse signalled a minor reform, though one that certainly failed to address the concerns of an increasingly vocal wilderness movement.

¹⁸² Foreshadowing the linguistic battle of the 1980s and beyond (where areas open to industrial logging become the working forest), the ‘multi-use’, ‘woods’ are here compared with ‘single-use’ ‘parks’.

¹⁸³ The substance of the IWA submission to the Wilderness Advisory Committee was largely unchanged. See IWA 1986.
IWA and the Wars in the Woods: Reform and Reaction

We might forgive those who today argue that the story pretty much ends at this point — with the environmental movement continuing to aggressively target large areas for protection and the IWA resisting such set asides, extolling the cost they would have on forestry workers and their communities and calling for properly managed multiple-use forests. Indeed, this snapshot captures, though crudely, many contemporary debates. To the present day, the IWA has emphasized the economic and ‘social’ importance of forests, support for intensively managed, sustainable forestry, resistance to set-asides, and the belief that aesthetic, ecological and other goals may be met without excluding land from industrial forestry.

Such a description however does overlook the relative volatility of IWA policy during the last two decades. During this period the union has both made gestures to inter­movement cooperation and retreated to a position of open conflict. In the first instance, As the valley-to-valley conflict of the 1980 peaked the IWA began to seriously reconsider its environmental policies. Immediately following the struggle over logging on South Moresby in the Haida Gwaii (Queen Charlottes), and as conflict over Carmanah Valley was coming to a head, the IWA produced a comprehensive forest policy signalling both a redirection for the union and suggesting some room for forestry worker-environmental group collaboration. Nonetheless, within a few years of its publication, the IWA had returned to a more hardline stance, one that put the union in direct conflict with many
environmentalists, especially those focussed on wilderness preservation. This shift in IWA environmental ideology is most dramatically captured in the union’s two formal statements of forest policy: the *IWA-Canada Forest Policy of 1989*, and *The Forest is the Future: IWA Canada Forest Policy* published in 1990.

If we remember from our previous chapter, 1989 was something of a peak in the so-called ‘war-in-the-woods’. In one of the more dramatic incidents of worker sentiment, in May of that year the militant Port Alberni local (1-85) drew almost 2000 workers to Victoria to argue in favour of MacMillan Bloedel’s plan to log much of Carmanah valley. Signs in the crowd attacked preservationists and mocked the idea of the tourist potential of the area. Meanwhile, the loggers received assurances from the Socred Forest Minister that logging would proceed\(^{184}\).

Given this context, it is surprising that the *IWA-Canada Forest Policy of 1989*, released seven months later, religiously avoided any confrontation with the environmental movement. Instead, the IWA’s sight’s were turned to forestry capital as a source of both

\[^{184}\text{Signs and banners included calls for ‘Better Forest Management Not Preservation’, ‘Tourists Come and Go – Forestry Is Forever’. Addressing the latter sentiment, Jack Munro proclaimed that IWA members wanted forestry work “not selling popcorn to God damned tourists for four bits an hour”. Tellingly, however, anti-environmentalist rhetoric was downplayed by both IWA president Jack Munro and B.C. Federation of Labour president Ken Georgetti. Munro continued his speech to suggest that a ‘strategic planning coalition’ of environmentalists, government and the company might be struck to approve and supervise logging in the valley (Lumber Worker June 1989, 1-2).}\]
environmental and social problems. An editorial in the *Lumber Worker* underscored this return to political economy as a mode of analysis:

While industry has its propaganda machine going full steam ahead and governments are paving the way for the further over-cutting of forests and more environmental degradation, our union has established a fair policy towards achieving the goals of sustainable development. 

Our union realizes that we, as Canadians, have obligations which go far beyond our own borders. We have a responsibility in showing the world that resource extraction can be done in an environmentally sound way.

If we turn our backs to the problem, the multi-national corporations who freely exploit the world's resources will not only ruin our environment but will also turn to ruthlessly plunder other resource based nations as well.

IWA-CANADA members should also realize that as the world's population grows, and its resource base diminishes, our country remains a happy hunting ground for multinational corporations. Thus we will remain hewers of wood for some time to come.

In the next decade foreign capital will flow in to our forest related industries at an ever increasing rate. Transnational corporations will come to our country to exploit with a colonial mentality.

But we as working people must contain these powerful forces. That is why the basis of our forest policy is not centred on the maximization of profit, but rather is centred upon the principle of sustainable development. Worker and community stability in the Canadian economy has never been a priority. Our forest policy must strive to make such stability a reality.

The foundation of our forest policy is based upon worker participation. IWA-CANADA members must increasingly pay attention to the environmental and economic consequences of our workplaces. . . .

(*Lumber Worker*, December 1989, 5)

In positing corporate greed as the 'engine' of environmental degradation, in laying side-by-side the problems of community stability and resource exploitation, and in placing workers at the centre of the struggle for good work and environmental protection, the forest policy echoed the convergence of labour and environmental concern that
brought the concept of ‘sustainable forestry’ to the province. As if to underscore this need to remember, the editorial was accompanied by a cartoon reminiscent of 1930s era union publications: a cigar chomping, forest executive professed concern for the environment “as soon as we get these last few trees”.

The forest policy itself certainly downplayed the blunt ‘people first’ language of earlier pronouncements. In its stead was substituted a concern “for responsible, sustainable forestry and for land-use policies and systems dedicated not only to sustainable forestry, but to the conservation of valued life-forms and the protection of the spiritual values of our forests.” Significantly, the term sustainable forestry was redefined from the simple sustaining of a volume of wood (and, presumably, jobs) to that of “ensure[ing] that ours and future generations can enjoy wilderness experiences and have meaningful jobs” (IWA 1989, 4). An acknowledgment of the ecological and spiritual values of ancient forests moved the IWA’s forest policy some distance towards that of the wilderness movement for whom these were, and remain, decisive factors in deciding questions of land-use and forestry practice.

Most relatedly, the forest policy also adopted another keystone of environmentalist thought – the idea of natural limits. The union acknowledged that there were definite limits to the land base available for industrial forestry and that these limits were not simply a factor of humans’ direct interest (ie recreation, or even spiritual need), but also a result of ecological vulnerability. The union underscored the notion of ecological limits in a discussion of land-use and tenure arrangements:
Underlying all the tensions between different human uses is the fragility of the natural environment itself. We must determine which logging practices will do the least damage to ecosystems; we must determine what uses certain terrains can withstand while maintaining their integrity for future uses; we must determine how waterways and watersheds can be protected for all their varied uses. These questions must be disentangled from the debate over conflicting human needs. The issue of tenure and land-use must has to be divided into its true components of environmental damage and human conflict. Once we do that we can decide what the responsibilities of a tenure holder are and what we want to do with any one parcel of land. (IWA 1989, 5)

The IWA argued that political struggle over scarce land must address the facts of environmental limit and damage, and that political and social decisions must rest upon the reality of ecosystem vulnerability.

When it came to the question of just what measures must be taken to ensure that ecosystems were not damaged the 1989 Forest Policy was short on specifics. Again, though, the union moved some distance towards the position of many environmental groups and argued for: changes in logging practices (reducing clear-cut size and linking these to ecological criteria, eliminating slash burning), changes to tenure arrangements (move to area-based rather than volume based tenures), new approaches to conflict resolution (interdisciplinary agencies with the power to alter government policy) and a reduction in chemical usage (limiting pesticide, herbicide and lumber treatment chemicals).

While the 1989 Forest Policy adopted many of the issues and policies of environmental groups, what is arguably more critical is that it did so with a firm eye to the unique problems of forestry workers, and indeed, forestry workers' unions. The IWA
explicitly recognized that protecting ecological and other values within capitalist forestry
did produce a conflict between the union's dual goals of job creation and environmental
protection. The union describes this predicament as such:

Job creation and protection of the environment are the foundations upon
which our forest-environment policy is built. Unfortunately, these vital
objectives often conflict and resolution of these conflicts is an increasingly
difficult task. It requires careful judgement, comprehensive knowledge of
the variety and vulnerabilities of the natural systems involved and
willingness for more people to shoulder their share of the sacrifices
required. These sacrifices should be equitably distributed throughout the
community, not borne disproportionately by workers. (IWA 1989, 4)

The unique and difficult position of forestry workers suggested that the IWA's
environmental policy must remain firmly:

independent from industry's, government's or other community groups' . .
. centred upon the principles of sustainable development, not maximizing
profits – upon maintaining the integrity of the natural environment,
preserving ecological diversity, and providing decent livelihoods for an
ever-increasing number of Canadians. (IWA 1989, 5)

To this end, the forest policy argued strenuously that workers must be given a
more prominent voice in forestry and land-use matters. The union urged the creation of
worker forest-environment committees that would have meaningful input into land-use
decisions, argued for the on-site monitoring of forestry and environmental practices (and
of management and work plans) and for workers' management of any chemical usage. In
all these areas, labour intensive practices were encouraged and the union concurred with
many within the environmental movement when they called for a dramatic increase in
value added production:
It is essential at this time that the trend toward fewer jobs with increased forest consumption be reversed. Industry spends millions of dollars to increase productivity and we agree that this should be so. However, we do not agree that increased employment or environmental degradation should be the accepted outcome. We need more jobs per unit of timber harvested while maintaining our competitive position on world markets. Only in this way can we acceptably reduce the rate of our forest harvests. (IWA 1989, 14)

Clearly, however, the union did not simply accept the arguments of the environmental movement undigested. Throughout the document, the union wavered between a discourse shared with the environmental movement (one that emphasizes caution in our interaction with a fragile ecosystem), and one shared with forestry capital (including the union’s support for intensive silviculture backed by biotechnology and genetic improvements) (IWA 1989, 13). While the forest policy offered a clear statement of support for the protection of wilderness for ecological and other reasons, it is entirely unclear on the amount of old-growth protection that might be necessary.

Overall, and especially when contrasted with earlier documents, the IWA’s 1989 Forest Policy, provided reasoned and coherent statements of forestry workers’ interest in better forestry management – more worker control over forestry decisions, more labour intensive logging and processing, and a political solution to jobs versus environment conflicts that acknowledged the value and necessity of wilderness preservation and insisted that the costs of such preservation be socialized. While clearly acknowledging its primary role in the protection of forestry workers interests, the IWA also acknowledged
that these interests include a healthy environment and some degree of wilderness protection. In adopting much of the language of environmental politics and in targeting the role of forest capital in producing environmental degradation, the union not only moved away from the direct confrontation with environmentalists that had marked its recent history, but also suggested significant room for dialogue and cooperation.

From Reform to Reaction

If the 1989 Forest Policy suggested an environmental politics that might expose the false choice of job/environment tradeoff, one which might foster inter-movement cooperation, this was a path not taken. We might remember from our previous chapter some of the political factors that help explain this lack of real progress in the reproachment of forest workers and environmentalists: the tension raised by the Carmanah Valley conflict, the easing of Socred government policy and the rise of corporate-sponsored Share groups. As IWA members and environmentalists squared off over the logging of the Carmanah Valley on Vancouver Island’s west coast, the province announced ‘compromise’ solutions and moved slowly on more park creation appealing to the notion of ‘multiple-use’.

Most critically, however, the IWA’s forest policy was announced as the Share movement had already made significant inroads into the province’s resource dependent communities. The movement’s appeal to forestry workers and others to defend their
communities against the menace of preservationism had significantly complicated environmental politics. Though the emergence of Tin-Wis and other moments of labour-environmental movement agreement suggested that both unions and environmental groups were ready to explore coalition building, the anti-environmentalist climate in many forestry workers communities made any such cooperation difficult.

Within such a climate it is not surprising that the IWA’s environmental politics became muddled. In a letter published immediately below the Forest Policy editorial, a worker challenged the union to keep up the struggle against ‘preservationists’ and their ‘unfinished agenda’. The writer, from local 1-85 (Port Alberni), argued that criticism of the forest companies was really an attack on forestry workers:

> [t]he preservationists have been careful not to direct their unrelenting and persistent [sic] attacks on the IWA, instead directing them at the forest industry giants. If they can destroy the companies credibility then their appeals to set aside huge areas of the forest land base into wilderness parks will garner an instant and sympathetic response from the general public. Who are the real people that make these forest industry giants tick? It’s you and I and there are tens of thousands of us, so who are the preservationists really attacking? (Lumber Worker, December 1989, 5)

Over the next two years, the pages of the Lumber Worker expressed both a reformist push towards developing a common ground and a hard-line reaction against preservationists. On the one hand, the paper continued to criticize forest companies for using environmentally unsound, labour-shedding logging practices in environmentally sensitive and contested areas, highlighted NDP arguments that less waste, more intensive (especially labour-intensive) forest management and more value-added production would
allow room for more wilderness preservation, and championed workers who refused to log a unique stand of old-growth\textsuperscript{185}. Late in 1991, citing such initiatives as the “South Island Accord, the West Kootenay Accord, and the ‘Peace in the Woods Committee,’” the union’s Forest and Environment Planner expressed confidence that worker-environmentalist cooperation could put an end to the ‘war in the woods’\textsuperscript{186}.

However, alongside this talk of forest practice reform and of careful overtures to the environmental movement, there grew a political reaction that cited environmentalists as forestry workers’ nemesis. As the wilderness movement grew, turning up the pressure on longstanding campaigns such as the Stein and proposing new protected areas on Vancouver Island, many in the IWA began to target ‘preservationists’ as the source of their problems.

At about this time, a shift in union policy began to find its way into the 	extit{Lumber Worker}. In the spring of 1990, as the dispute over the Carmanah Valley was becoming particularly heated, the union ran a reprint of a 	extit{Vancouver Sun} article on its editorial page that provocatively labelled the ‘Green Generation’ the ‘Greed Generation’. In this venomous attack, it was argued that:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{185} See 	extit{Lumber Worker} May 1990, 3, 8-11; September 1990, 8; July 1990, 15; August 1991, 9)
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{186} This optimism was likely spurred by the NDP’s recent attempt to heal splits in its own ranks between IWA and ‘green caucus’ members. See Wilson (1998, 263) for an account.
\end{flushright}
A single-minded selfishness has laid claim to the Carmanah Valley, but the rapaciousness is not the forest industry’s. It is the greedy hunger of B.C.’s preservationists . . . They believe that the riches of this special place are theirs to use as they wish – their own exclusive preserve . . . The preservationists want their private playground financed at taxpayers expense” (Lumber Worker March 1990, 5).

Worker reaction was solidified when a Solomon-like judgement in April 1990 preserved the lower Carmanah in a new ‘Class A’ park187 and announced studies that would determine how logging would proceed in the upper half of the valley. Echoing the previously described protest of one year earlier, a rally in Victoria drew far more forestry workers and supporters to the lawns of the legislature. At this second rally, however, the anti-environmentalist sentiment was clearly higher, and on the stage, a new alliance had taken shape: union officials stood alongside representatives from Share groups and the Truck Loggers Association (Lumber Worker July 1990, 1).

As we have described in the previous chapter, the election of the NDP brought a flurry of attempts to bring together the IWA and environmentalists, both of whom were significant supporters of the party. Nonetheless, faced with continued wilderness protests (the Carmanah decision had melded into the dispute over Clayoquot Sound), provincial reform of forestry practice legislation, and the move to secure more parkland, the IWA hardened its stance. With each new protected area campaign and each government decision, the IWA came to argue more fervently against the excesses of ‘preservationists’.

187 ‘Class A’ designates a park that affords the highest degree of protection from resource exploitation.
The utter failure of the Clayoquot decision of 1993, and the massive protests that were its fallout, were accompanied by a rather stark turn in the rhetorical style and content of the *Lumber Worker*. The new Director of Environment and Land Use at the IWA, commenting on the Clayoquot decision, told a story about being scolded that his job was “with the ‘bad guys, the pro-logging side” (*Lumber Worker*, June 1993, 3). Kim Pollack replied that he “preferred to believe that I’m on the side of people, as opposed to animals and trees.” In keeping with this choice, and the assumption that this is a choice, Pollack also took the hardline stand that

> [i]t is unreasonable and unrealistic to believe we can somehow stop harvesting in Clayoquot Sound or other controversial regions and watersheds. It is also unfair to people that work in those industries and the communities that depend on forestry. (*Lumber Worker* June 1993, 3)

Those that argued that the old-growth forests in ‘pristine’ watersheds deserved protection as the last of their kind were dismissed as naive city-dwellers who “lose sight of the weight of the forest sector”.

Over the next few years the rhetoric would only grow more strident and by 1996 the union saw fit to redraft its forest policy. Nominally a second edition of the 1989 policy, the style and content of *The Forest is the Future* marked a dramatic shift in environmental policy. While reiterating many longstanding themes, this document also introduced policies that underscored the distance between the union and most environmental groups and reflected the IWA’s endorsement of corporate forest policies.

First, it is fair to say that many of the specific policies outlined (including the call
for stringent forest practice codes, attention to reforestation, minimizing forestry's impact on soils, water and flora and fauna, the cessation of raw log export, and increasing value-added manufacturing) are simply updated versions of the union's longstanding call for sustainable forestry and stable forest jobs. Similarly, the union reiterated its call for more worker input into environmental, occupational health and safety and land-use decisions. Indeed, much of the wording on such matters is taken straight from the 1989 policy. As was the case a decade earlier, many of these policies were both accepted and promoted by the province's environmental movement.

Even here, however, the new policy introduced changes that draw it away from the position of many environmental groups. For instance, while the 1989 policy carefully suggested that "sometimes clear-cut logging is the only safe and practical method . . . However, where it is safe for our workers and appropriate to the forest conditions, we encourage selective logging" (IWA 1989, 8), the new policy stated that "harvest practices should generate clear-cut openings that are consistent with natural disturbance types for the affected eco-system; blocks should be consistent with worker safety and ecosystem health" (IWA 1989, 11).

Similarly, *The Forest is the Future* (1990) changed the terms upon which the union would accept proposals to preserve ancient forests and wilderness areas. In both documents the IWA urged that any withdrawals from the land-base upon which their members work should be closely scrutinized and input from workers and their communities was to be included in any such decision. However, while in 1989 the union
emphasized compensation and the ‘equitable distribution of sacrifice’ and suggested that protected areas would allow present and future generations to ‘enjoy the wilderness experience’, the new policy completely omits the word ‘wilderness’ and argues that only the ‘bio-physical’ health of the forest be considered. It is entirely uncertain as to whether the union recognizes any moral, aesthetic or other rationale for wilderness protection when it argues:

[w]e will therefore carefully scrutinize all proposals for removal of lands from the working-forest. They must be justifiable as essential to the biophysical well-being of the forests; they must be shown to be better candidate areas than others that do not require disruption of the forest industry. We will particularly reject proposals based on aesthetic, cosmetic or other considerations that lack any scientific basis [emphasis added]. (IWA 1990, 9)

The new policy added to these strict conditions by repeating the stern objection to harvest reduction

[b]ecause forest products represent Canada’s largest single source of export earnings, harvest reductions will reduce our ability to “pay our way” internationally and reduce our ability to buy other nation’s products. They would reduce the tax dollars that flow into provincial, federal and municipal treasuries. And they would disrupt the unique way of life that forestry work makes available to workers in a diversity of Canadian towns, villages and rural communities. (IWA 1990, 11)

If one is to understand the extent to which the Forest is the Future reveals a significant shift in environmental ideology and politics for the IWA, attention must also be turned to the critical issue of the union’s understanding of the source of environmental problems and of conflict over environmental issues. We might remember that when introducing the 1989 policy the IWA fixed its sights on corporate greed and an
unrestrained profit motive as the source of poor forestry and environmental decisions.

The 1989 policy itself acknowledged that the forest industry produced difficult tradeoffs between the union’s two ‘vital objectives’ of job creation and environmental protection and closed with the acknowledgement that “much needs to be done to reform the destructive and greedy systems of the past”.

The new forest policy, while reiterating the need for governments to make and enforce regulations that encouraged sustainable practices, also emphasized that “Canada’s forest industry is moving rapidly towards more sustainable practices” (IWA 1990, 7). Meanwhile, a new message added that not only should we strive to minimize the ecological impact of forestry but

we must also learn to live with the inevitable disturbances of forested ecosystems, and temporary environmental impacts of sustainable forestry on the land. While we strive to limit disturbance and minimize impact, we must remember that we are human beings and that we must transform nature to live. (IWA 1990, 8-9)

Most telling, this quote is followed by two criticisms of the environmental movement. In the first the union “reject[ed] as false environmentalism many schemes for the cessation or reduction of commercial forestry” (IWA 1990, 9). It was claimed that production would shift to areas of less stringent regulation, including tropical rainforests, that wood substitutes are less environmentally friendly and that Canadians have a moral obligation to produce their fair share and not deplete other countries resources. Soon after, the IWA
announced that they “absolutely oppose groups that adopt terrorist tactics or who organize environmental boycotts of our forest products” (IWA 1990, 11).

Overall these changes pulled the union away from the direct criticism of the forest industry. Indeed, *The Forest is the Future* is best understood as a sophisticated defence of a well-regulated, intensely managed ‘working forest’ of the sort promoted by large capital (and this defence is clearly aimed at critics in the environmental movement). In removing itself from the role of direct critic of capital, the union veered from the limited common ground that was nurtured in its 1989 policy and signalled a renewed faith in the alliance of capital, labour and the state in support of sustained-yield forestry.

From the mid 1990s onwards, and certainly after the publication of the new forest policy, when the IWA weighed into environmental politics it was most often to harshly criticize environmental group policies or actions – the union’s environmental policy became an anti-environmentalist policy. In 1997, a Greenpeace led boycott of B.C. Forest products called to support preservation efforts on the mid-coast (dubbed the ‘Great Bear Rainforest’), buoyed the union to create a ‘Fight Back for Forest Jobs’ campaign. The union solicited donations, set up an information picket and surrounded Greenpeace boats with boomsticks, trapping them in Vancouver harbour. Thus began a strategy of counter-protests against environmental groups (a strategy that included a workers’ blockade near Squamish, British Columbia -- see chapters 8 and 9).

A long article in December of 1998 by Kim Pollock, Director of Environment and Public Policy, set out to clarify the IWA’s position. This well crafted, and extensive
statement, while reemphasizing the importance of environmental issues to workers and noting how corporations use job blackmail, also harshly attacked the environmental movement. The environmental movement was criticized for its 'class bias', its threat to labour unity, its 'manipulation of facts', and its distortion of left-wing political parties.

The following quotes capture the tenor and substance of this critique:

'Environmentalism' has turned into a highly codified ideology that originates not with the working class, but largely with the professional middle classes. As such, it is an ideology that often neglects the needs and interests of working people and ignores their key concerns: class unity and solidarity, jobs and community.

Environmental issues often add stress to inter-union relations. . . . Again this is largely a function of the importation of middle-class values into working class struggles. It is often easy to let those values override the working class concern for unity between all those who work for a living. . . .

Fishermen whose catch is reduced can easily blame logging, shipping, petroleum refineries, hydro-electric dams and grids or a whole host of other industries, for instance . . . . White collar unionists might support environmental causes, not knowing they potentially undermine the job security of workers in resource industries. In all these cases, environmental groups are frequently happy to step into the fray, often pitting worker against worker in the process.

Environmentalism is an ideology, not a science, and as such, its conclusions depend and are highly coloured by its assumptions – the fragility of the earth, the finiteness of its resources, the "fact" that environmental quality is constantly, implacably and irreversibly worsening and the belief that human activity is the main and root cause – are just that: assumptions, not proven or irrefutable scientific fact. There is good reason to believe that these arguments originate in a concerted effort to "dampen down" working class expectations in the face of the recessions of the mid-seventies and early eighties.

In this environment, as well, government's responses are often hard to fathom. Many labour-friendly governments are also closely aligned with green groups, which help with electoral volunteers and donations. Increasingly, many of the officials and staffs of these governments rose through the ranks of environmental groups, not unions. (Lumber Worker,
December 1998, 33-34)

If the union raises significant questions about the environmental movement as a friend of workers, it also raises questions about some traditional enemies. Pollack takes a clear position that on environmental issues corporations might be understood as potential allies.

Sometimes it is the corporation that is more rooted in the community than the often-imported environmental activists. Often the company has more sympathy and respect for the workers. This complicates the world of workplace politics, where the “boss” is frequently seen as an ally in the important struggles around environmental issues.

... Frequently it is the right-wing governments whose officials are most sympathetic to workers faced with environmental protests, blockades or boycotts. Suddenly, electoral politics is complicated by the reality that parties who fight tooth and nail against most labour values and objectives are quite supportive in the environmental realm (Lumber Worker, December 1998, 33-34).

Having raised profound doubts about both the environmental movement and the traditional friends and foes of labour (including other unions), Pollack is left rather uncertain as the type of environmental ideology and practice that would suit this political moment. What was insisted is that the union take a staunchly ‘independent’ stance, relying on “independent analysis and judgement” in a bid to “strive for balance.”

Though many in both labour and environmental movements would gnash their teeth or roll their eyes at many of Pollack’s arguments, it is fair to say that even at its most controversial moments this statement provides a remarkably accurate snapshot of how confusing environmental politics had become for the IWA. The union had found
itself in direct conflict with most of British Columbia’s environmental movement, especially with British Columbian wilderness groups. Moreover, this conflict muddied the union’s relationship with its allies in the provincial NDP, with other unions that were working with environmental groups [the Fisher’s, Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC) and the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers (CEP), and the British Columbia Government Employees Union (BCGEU), Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) and other ‘white-collar’ unions] and drew the union into formal and informal alliances with the forest industry (directly, through the Forest Alliance, and indirectly, through Share groups in resource communities).

As the IWA approached the end of the decade, it found itself alongside the provincial government and the forest capital defending British Columbian forest practices, urging that the 12% limit on protected areas remain firm, and attacking the wilderness movement.

The IWA and Environmental Policy

Throughout the post-Sloan Commission era, the IWA’s environmental policy and practice has placed it in conflict with the environmental movement in general, and with British Columbia’s wilderness groups in particular. While the union has sat down with such groups, usually under the guise of state sponsored dispute solving mechanisms, it has most often viewed environmentalists as either opponent or as competitor. Remaining
at a rather coarse level of analysis, it is fair to suggest that the post-war corporatist alliance of forest capital, labour and the state that was forged with the Sloan commission, has held with little or no substantive change. From the 1950s and 1960s when the forest industry went virtually unchallenged, and through the 1970s onwards as the environmental movement grew to become an often virulent critic of both the industry and government forest policy, the union was found defending the province’s forest industry and government policy as a just compromise between environmental protection and jobs for forestry workers.

How does one account for the union’s support for a forestry policy and practice that, as we have traced in the previous chapters, has rapidly shed labour and rapidly depleted the province’s ancient forests, producing dramatic social and environmental contradictions? Though we will address this question with a more acute theoretical eye in following chapters, and we must postpone much of the debate until we have had the opportunity to examine our case study, here we might make some preliminary remarks.

Like the union itself, we cannot avoid the fact that it is structurally tied to forest capital –

the union exists to serve its members who are employees of forest capital\textsuperscript{188}. Though complicated by the struggle between labour and capital over the portion of profits that the

\textsuperscript{188} The IWA now has approximately 1/3 of its workforce now employed outside of the forest industry. This development is largely a product of of the early 1990s. See Marchak (1995, 98-99) and Smith (1996).
former is allowed to keep, the union is ever wary that as forest capital suffers so do its members. Later we will refer to this as the ‘dry, economic compulsion’ that draws together the interests of forestry workers and their employer.

The structural links between workers and their employer, and the de facto link between the union and forest capital, underscore the reality of job vs environment tradeoff within capitalist forestry. The efforts of the environmental movement to restrict forest capital’s access to the remaining old-growth forests of the province have placed real limits on jobs within this industry and produced a real tradeoff for forestry workers. While environmentalists are ever correct to underscore the fact that the vast majority of job loss in the industry has come through technological change, the IWA is equally correct in the blunt assessment that it matters little to a logger facing unemployment that most of his friends in the mill were long ago let go when it was refitted with new labour-saving technologies. Given such structural affinities, and the real jobs vs environment tradeoffs produced in the struggle between forest capital and the environmental movement, it is perhaps unsurprising that the forest policy of the IWA has emphasized the need to protect the ‘working’ forest.

We must, however, be wary of placing too much emphasis on such structural analysis. The success of capitalist sustained-yield forestry is above all a political success. Those who need convincing might simply skip to the following history of the PPWC which describes a very different path. However we might equally consider the previous account of the IWA’s environmental policy. Neither this policy nor the union’s relations
with the environmental movement have been constant and each has reflected the particular political moment.

The refashioning of the IWA’s forest policy in the late 1980s provides an important example of such political contingency. The union’s 1989 Forest Policy adopted some of the key positions of the environmental movement of the day and clearly stated the need to address the ecological and social contradictions of capitalist forestry. Though strictly reformist, by identifying the problems associated with the relentless focus on increasing profits, and by accepting the necessity of preserving wilderness areas, the policy provided room for inter-movement dialogue. We have also seen that in the late 1990s many of these reforms had been dropped and that the union had taken perhaps both its most aggressive stance against the wilderness movement and in defence of contemporary capitalist forestry as practised in British Columbia. This has been a political struggle.

Some of the political and cultural factors that must be considered are general, span the history in question, and suggest reasons for the overall stability of the IWA’s environmental policy and their troubled relations with the environmental movement. For example, many on the political left in British Columbia point to the post-WWII purging of radicals within the union as an event that has forever coloured the political culture of the IWA. Such analysis (discussed briefly in the previous chapter) have been used to explain both the conflicts between the union and the ‘new left’ during the Solidarity
movement and, more to the subject at hand, Jack Munro’s move to head the industry-sponsored Forest Alliance.

The ambivalence of the IWA to the early environmental movement, and the union’s clear frustration with the radically democratic structure of the environmental movement speaks to the veracity of this sort of explanation, as will our following discussion of the PPWC, a union born amidst, and of, the ‘new’ movements. Nonetheless, while an important factor, such explanation can be as rigid as the ‘dry, economic compulsion’ previously discussed. Any explanation of the union’s own shifts in policy, let alone the politics of intermovement relations requires a closer examination of the politics of forestry.

If structural and ideological links between the forest industry and the IWA are not particularly subtle each has been markedly enhanced by the political work of forest capital. Lobby groups and public relations vehicles have always been used to win support for the provinces forest industry, however the work of the Share movement must be understood as one of the most successful attempts at crafting and disseminating a political message that speaks to forestry workers. In situating themselves as a defender of resource dependent communities, the Share movement has been particularly effective at obscuring differences between forest capital and its labour force. We might also refer to the discussion in our previous chapter of how the ideology and politics of the wilderness movement has also obscured the difference between forestry worker and forestry capital, thus making the task of the Share movement that much easier.
Certainly, the Share movement presents the IWA with particular challenges (and this is what the IWA's Kim Pollack means when he speaks of the 'complication' of workplace politics where the boss is seen as an ally on environmental issues). However, the fact cannot be avoided that the response of the IWA has been to join in the attack on the wilderness movement. The IWA has clearly decided not to confront the contradictions of the Share movement and to work with industry to discredit environmentalists. The workplace politics of IWA members has thus been clouded further by the union's own position as 'ally' of the industry on environmental issues\textsuperscript{189}.

Any discussion of the factors that have shaped union environmental policy must also be expanded to include determinants such as union leadership and the particular situation of the NDP and its place in the industry/labour/state bloc. By this point, however, what must be clear is that this policy is the result of both structural pull and political push; context and choice. Structural factors offer compelling reasons for the environmental policy direction of the IWA but in themselves offer no clear explanation. Political choices are clearly just that yet they are only comprehensible within the discussion of structural context. The rest of this chapter will introduce a case that will not solve this conundrum but will shed light on the knot itself.

\textsuperscript{189} We will speak more of this in our case study. See chapter 9.
The Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC)

When approaching the end of 1990s the IWA had targeted environmentalists and especially wilderness advocates as middle-class enemies of forestry workers and their resource dependent communities, a smaller forest sector counterpart, the PPWC, was working with many of these same environmental groups, and elaborating a very different vision of working-class environmental politics. The PPWC's environmental policies were rooted in the understanding that the union and environmental groups shared a common ground, an idea that was built on the terra firma of alliances through which the PPWC and environmentalists worked to advance environmental legislation. In working with and through such alliances, the union has perhaps more than any other in the province, been forced to confront the myths and reality of job-blackmail. It is out of this often messy environmental politics that the union has developed a environmental ideology that is unique in the forest sector.

The PPWC and The Rise of The Environmental Movement

The PPWC, which today represents 7000 or so workers principally in pulp and paper mills, began in 1963 as a Canadian breakaway from the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paperworkers. Quickly establishing itself as a fiercely independent, politically radical union with a highly decentralized structure, the union gained an identity, through choice and conscription, as a scrappy outsider whose affinities were with
youth and counterculture movements as much as they were with the mainstream trade-union movement. Certainly, the union’s stance on environmental issues was one of the planks upon which this reputation was built. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the pages of the PPWC newsletter were cluttered with news and views from the emerging environmental movement. The following excerpts, taken from an editorial published in 1967 under the title *Profits, production, pollution........ then life*, marked the beginning of a rather intense period of (sometimes hyperbolic) reflection on the state of the planet.

> In our modern, jet-age society profits for corporations leads the field as the main requisite of existence. Production shares an equal billing since it is responsible for profits. From these two we get pollution that is now adversely affecting our lives and our health. Life itself comes at the very bottom of the heap.

> On a recent CBC-TV program the problem and effects of pollution was placed squarely and shockingly before us televiewers. There it was, pollution glaringly exposed for all to see. Leading doctors and scientists saying, unless we took some immediate and drastic actions at controlling and eliminating the problems of pollution, this earth, by the year 2000 will not sustain life, Human Life! That’s Us! With only 33 more years to go! . . .

> Now we all agree that we want more industry and jobs. But, if new industry will so pollute the air we breath, the water we drink, to such an extent that human life is at stake, then we must decide if that is the kind of new industry we want. . . .

> The answer to pollution rests with government laws and regulations that will compel corporations to clean their industrial wastes thereby removing this deadly pollution problem. . . .

> To reach this goal and continue our very own futures, . . . we must reverse our ideas on values. Those values must read, LIFE, pollution, production, then profits. (*Leaflet, November 1967, 4*)

During the late 1960s, the *Leaflet* continued to highlight the ‘pollution problem’ amongst a host of social justice and peace issues that dominated left-wing political
culture at the time. Rather than developing its own systematic policy, documents of the
time suggest that the PPWC was learning from its social movement counterparts,
bringing in new information, often in a less-than-digested form, and coming to the
conclusion that ‘we should be into that too’. Even at this early stage, two important
directions are apparent: the PPWC did not shy away from the pollution spewed forth by
their own workplaces and the union was eager to form alliances with the environmental
movement. In this first case, a December 1969 issue of the *Leaflet* reprinted an article by
an English teacher from Elk River that railed against the pollution caused by the local
pulp mill:

> The issue of pollution is not in essence a legal one, but a moral
> one. I do not believe that anyone for profit or whatever motive has the
> option of contaminating the environment in which I, my family, and my
> fellows exist.
> 
> I recognize that the language that I am using is strong and
> irrational. But the subject being considered is exactly of that nature. And
> so I object, not rationally, not legally, but emotionally and enthusiastically,
> when some of the basic and humble experiences of living are denied me
> because some profit-monger thinks my air and my oceans are his
> cesspools.
> 
> But there are other objections to pulp mills more factually than
> philosophically based.
> 
> Ecologists, climatologists, oceanographers, biologists, have all said
> with distressing seriousness that the earth simply cannot continue to
> dispose of the kind and quantity of wastes modern man is excreting. . . .
> 
> The six mills alone, those in British Columbia on the Rim of the
> Gulf of Georgia, account for as much pollution as B.C.’s two million
> people.
> 
> And this kind of wholesale polluting is not just immoral or
> obscene, but criminal. (*Leaflet*, December 1969, 11)
While the *Leaflet* echoed the moral outrage and scientific alarm that had been raised by the anti-pollution movement of the day, the union also began to build political bridges between itself and this new movement. On its front page, this same issue heralded the opening of a Burnaby office of the rapidly growing Society for Pollution and Environmental Control (SPEC). The union announced:

Volunteers are urgently required to assist in the office and S.P.E.C. would be delighted to receive a call from any of you out there who could spend a few hours to assist in the humane quest to put an end to pollution before pollution puts an end to civilization.

U.N. Secretary-General U. Thank recently warned that “for the first time in the history of mankind there is a crisis of world proportions involving developed and developing countries alike – the crisis of the human environment”

The fate of the entire world rests squarely on the shoulders of all those who inhabit the earth at this time – we must each make a contribution if we wish mankind to survive. Let’s do it now – before it’s too late. (*Leaflet*, December 1969, 1)

Helping save the planet was made easier for at least some PPWC members as SPEC’s new office was next door to that of Local 5.

It was not until the early 1970s though that PPWC began to develop its own voice on these matters – its own environmental politics. Having established a regular environmental column in the *Leaflet*, the union began to tie together the ‘pollution problem’ as enunciated by concerned scientists, the PPWC’s position as a voice for pulp mill workers, and the relationship between the union and the environmental movement.\(^{190}\)

\(^{190}\) In 1971, the union began publishing a column by self-described ‘eco-freak’ Carl Hahn entitled, *The Environment, The PPWC and You*. Besides providing space for the discussion of a wide range of environmental issues (Hahn used the opportunity to
Gradually, the ‘traditional’ union concerns of worker health and safety were broadened to include more general environmental issues.

Not that any of this made for a simple task. While there were rather straightforward reasons why the union might be concerned with environmental issues — pulp and paper mills use, create and expel a toxic soup of chemicals with known and unknown health effects — such issues could not always be translated directly into the already available language and politics of occupational health and safety. If the union was to tackle the job of not only protecting the health of members on the job-site, but also of preventing the degradation of the greater environment in which workers and their families live, this required some justification. To this end, late in 1970, Carl Hahn described the logic of PPWC involvement in environmental politics as such:

[b]y now you might be wondering why the P.P.W.C. finds it necessary to be involved in something that is really the responsibility of the various levels of government. I think we can all agree that since the Industrial Revolution the smell of quick money has conditioned our municipal, provincial and federal governments to cow-tow to industry no matter how detrimental the consequences. Just look around! Who owns all the property around your community and effects its development? If management were ever seriously concerned about pollution, safe working conditions and decent wages, our battles for even minimal standards would not have been necessary. Remember that they have had professional expertise all along. . . .

criticize the Alaska Pipeline proposal and trumpet the merits of organic gardening), this column signalled the beginning of a notable tradition within the union — providing support for a dedicated union member willing to take on the substantial task of educating the membership on environmental issues, advocating a worker’s perspective on these issues and liaising with environmental groups.
I am convinced that our autocratic provincial government is selling our natural recreational resources down the river for the same reasons that precipitated repressive labour legislation and discriminatory social security procedures. . . .
It is precisely because of this that our P.P.W.C. representatives saw fit to take on the pollution issue. Organized labour is really the only body outside the government machine that is in a position to effect change in the pollution crisis. If your job requires you to dump 5 000 gals. of black liquor or 2.5 lbs. of mercury thus seriously inhibiting the future recreational value of the receiving waters, you should protest this and insist that the company devise alternative means. By forming anti-pollution committees within the mills that are affiliated with local SPEC branches these sort of procedures could be publicized by the SPEC body and dealt with at the plant level. Under no circumstances should any P.P.W.C. member have to do anything that he might consider harmful to the environment.
. . . Remember, there is no acceptable reason why our jobs should add to the deterioration of our environment. (Leaflet, December 1970, 8)

By this point, the fundamental assumptions of PPWC environmental ideology had been outlined: the profit motive pushed corporations to externalize environmental costs and ignore environmental degradation; governments at all levels are dependent on revenue indirectly derived from such profits and thus are reluctant to act; the environmental movement offers a critique of these practices drawn from new/alternative 'science'; the position of workers within the productive system make them vulnerable to pollution hazards, well positioned to expose polluting industries, and most able to stop pollution at the source. The PPWC clearly identified pollution as a class issue, a problem traceable to the profit motive of owners, and felt most grievously by workers closest to the production process.
Importantly, the union also suggested a two-pronged strategy for combating pollution: the creation of plant-level environmental committees and cultivating ties with the environmental movement. This dual strategy spoke to the relative strengths of each movement: at the plant level, workers and their union were witnesses to, and necessary components of the productive process that created pollution while the environmental movement had both the scientific expertise and the ability to widely publicize such issues.

This does not at all mean that the PPWC could simply avoid the tensions that emerged when trade unionism met an environmental movement which often insisted that ecological issues transcended class issues. For example, it appears that the direct links between the union and SPEC were tested by the environmental groups’ clash with the IWA. However it does appear that the union was much more adept at maintaining intermovement dialogue and in fostering internal discussion of environmental matters. From the 1970s onwards environmental concerns retained their place within the union’s politics.

Indeed, the PPWC insisted in maintaining an aggressive environmental stance during times when such issues had fallen from fashion. At the beginning of the 1980s the anti-pollution movement of the 1970s had dissipated and the province’s wilderness  

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191 It appears that in the clash between the IWA and SPEC (described previously), the PPWC’s environmental advocate was caught in the crossfire. In the fall of 1971 Carl Hahn regretfully announced that formal ties between labour and SPEC appeared to have ended as he had not been contacted for the annual general meeting (Leaflet, September 1971, 6) Despite such setbacks, however, the PPWC continued to retain environmental issues a key element of union policy.
groups were still in their infancy. The union responded with a reprint of a *Nature Canada* article entitled “Where has the environmental movement gone?” and by funding studies and forums on the links between worker health and industry emissions. While this is a point to which we will later return, it appears that the PPWC's grave concerns about the toxic soup within which their members worked, and which was spilling into the air and water surrounding their communities, made its commitment to environmental issues less variable than that of the general public.

The PPWC's early dialogue with the environmental movement and its ability to maintain internal discussion when inter-movement ties were muddied with political difference or when the environmental politics fell from fashion served to prepare the union and its members for the heady days of environmental protest during the 1980s. During this decade the union continued to speak out against uranium mining, lax pollution standards and the environmental impact of the forest industry.

Of some import was the ability of the union to deconstruct the jobs vs employment dichotomy that was increasingly becoming part of the discourse of Socred politicians and corporate interests when faced with environmental protest. Most emphatically, the PPWC announced to both capital and the state that the union could not be counted on to support ‘economic development’ that involved environmental degradation. The union reiterated its opposition to the Kemano Completion project (a massive hydroelectric project that critics charged would destroy salmon stocks) and mocked Council of Forest Industry (COFI) attacks on the federal Department of Fisheries
for taking a ‘fish-at-any-cost philosophy’. In an article from the U.S. labour/environment coalition, Environmentalists for Full Employment it was argued:

People need to resist this job blackmail, whether it comes from Congress, or from pillars of our own communities. We need to organize “reindustrialization” extravaganzas; but to enable people to earn their living without destroying their health, their communities and the children’s futures. *(Leaflet, May/June 1984, 1,4)*

Meanwhile, siding with mine workers, the PPWC balked at a suggestion by a federal environment Minister that mineral exploration could take place in National parks. The union admitted that they had “a clear and material interest in healthy mining and forest industries” but that interest did not overrule their obligations ‘as Canadians’ to oppose such plans. The union chastised the Minister with the following:

Your comments attempt to construct a false dichotomy between environmentalists and the economy. Our members earn their living via the exploitation of natural resources and are especially aware of the importance of preserving our National Park heritage. As concerned Canadians we simultaneously wear many ‘different hats’. We are ‘environmentalists’. We are ‘trade unionists’ and we are ‘voters’. *(Leaflet, July/August 1984)*

The PPWC’s commitment to environmental policy was more directly challenged by the rise of wilderness politics within British Columbia’s environmental movement. The valley-by-valley conflicts of the 1980s, especially when described by industry and government as a threat to fibre supply and thus to pulp and paper workers’ jobs, suggested difficult trade-offs for the union. Moreover, we have seen that the IWA’s response to such threats was to reject the set-aside of large wilderness areas.
Despite these pressures the PPWC came to side with environmentalists on some of the most controversial protected area proposals. The union supported the preservation of Meares Island, the Stein River Valley, the Stikine Valley and the Khutzeymateen Valley. In a notable instance, a union member could only suggest that logging plans for Meares Island were the result of a collective mental lapse, and claimed, “the preoccupation with supplying our mills with timber has adversely affected our reasoning and pickled our brain . . . There can be compromise but not to the extent suggested by the Meares Island issue” *(Leaflet, October/December 1984*, 2).

To the present moment, the PPWC’s stand on many of the valleys in question has garnered respect from environmentalists who have lauded the union’s ability to resist job-blackmail. Others, however, especially critics from the IWA, have argued that such support for wilderness set-asides is a signal that PPWC members do not understand where the fibre comes from; that they misunderstand the impact on forest sector jobs.

While this is a criticism that continues to surface, it is perhaps best evaluated after we review the PPWC’s performance when confronted with an environmental issue that

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193 This criticism has a certain intuitive resonance – pulp and paper workers are more removed from the impact of specific set-asides as the fibre upon which they rely comes from sources that are often widely dispersed and substitution is possible. Nonetheless, protected areas do drive down the AAC (at least in theory) which limits fibre supply, pulp mills are tied to particular sources of fibre and alternative sources may be more expensive making job loss a real possibility.
directly threatened pulp workers jobs. Late in the 1980s, in the midst of many wilderness battles, environmental groups across the continent came to focus on a different threat: that of chemical discharge from pulp mills.

**Dioxin and Jobs: The Pulp Pollution Campaign**

Some history is necessary. Since at least the late 1970s, dioxins and furans, two closely related chemical families, had been identified as potential toxins and were at the centre of public scandals involving leaking waste sites, chemical spills and other accidents. Most notoriously, veterans of the war in Vietnam had claimed that widespread debilitating health problems were caused by the dioxin containing defoliant popularly known as Agent Orange. Rumours that pulp mills were discharging significant amounts of dioxin into both water and air were investigated throughout the 1980s by the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States, but the results of these studies were only widely publicised by a Greenpeace report in the summer of 1987 entitled “No Margin of Safety”. Soon thereafter, news of high levels of dioxin in heron eggs near a pulp mill in Crofton on Vancouver Island and in sediment taken from an area downstream from the Harmac pulp mill near Nanaimo brought this concern to the doorstep of British Columbians (VanNinjnatten and Leiss 1997).
By all accounts, workers reacted with a mixture of confusion and anxiety to the information that the by-products of the mills were not only foul odours and brown foam laden water but were acute toxins. As one worker remembered,

"biochemists, biologists [were saying] AOX is the worst thing in the whole damn world... 2,3,7,8-TCDD these ones were carcinogenic: the worst bastards in the world, this was Agent Orange, and this was all being banned. It scared the hell out of us."\(^{194}\)

Of course this was also an incredibly complex subject, a battle of experts speaking in a mixture of numerals and words that did not easily translate to the shopfloor. Within the PPWC, individual members, and many recall the work the environmental officer Fred Henton, began a dialogue with environmental groups in an effort to educate themselves and the membership about the nature and extent of the risks.

By 1989, however, the union’s ties to environmental groups working on the dioxin issue had become more formal. The PPWC joined with other trade unions, environmental groups, consumer groups and native peoples, working under the Pulp Pollution Campaign and began to aggressively lobby for provincial and federal regulations that would eliminate toxic discharge. In British Columbia this campaign focussed on the demand for zero discharge of all organochlorines, or zero AOX (the bulk

\(^{194}\) Author interview with Woodfibre pulp mill worker identified as PMW 3 (see chapter 9).
parameter that serves as a measure of the whole class of such substances of which dioxin is one sort)\textsuperscript{195}.

The response of the forestry companies to the ‘dioxin scare’ was swift. A public relations campaign insisted that the health effects of dioxins and furans were not clear, that the industry was well into a period of environmental upgrading that would significantly reduce the toxicity of effluent, and that environmental groups had exaggerated the risk to the public\textsuperscript{196}. At the same time, the industry was fighting the zero AOX goal of the Pulp Pollution Campaign, arguing that such rigorous standards were unnecessary and would make British Columbia’s mills ‘uncompetitive’\textsuperscript{197}.

Despite the direct threats to forestry sector jobs, however, the PPWC retained its position within the Pulp Pollution Campaign and in 1992 pushed a newly elected NDP government to enact the country’s most stringent pulp mill effluent law, one that would require zero AOX discharge by January 2002.

\textsuperscript{195} See VanNijnatten and Leiss (1997) both for their history of this campaign and for a critical discussion of the politics behind the science.

\textsuperscript{196} For an example of special relevance to our case study, see the public relation’s package \textit{Cleaning Up Howe Sound}, co-published by the owners of the two mills operating on Howe Sound (Howe Sound Pulp and Paper and Western Pulp Limited Partnership, 1990).

\textsuperscript{197} Late in 1990, facing last-minute lobbying, Social Credit Premier Bill Vanderzalm rejected new dioxin regulations, an act that spurred the resignation of the environment minister (\textit{Vancouver Sun}, December 11, 1990).
The success of this campaign, which remains a bright spot in an otherwise difficult history of inter-movement conflict, came at a critical moment for both the union and its environmental group allies. At the very time that valley by valley conflicts over old-growth forests were pitting forestry workers against environmentalists, the Pulp Pollution Campaign was demonstrating that both movements could benefit from strategic alliances. Most critically, the alliance created inter-movement links and personal relations that would be called upon as the union built environmental policy during a time when workers and environmentalists were expected to be on different sides of the war in the woods.

Jobs, Trees and Us: PPWC Forest Policy and the Response to Wilderness Politics

As we described in the previous chapter the protests over logging in Clayoquot Sound marked coth the culmination of the wilderness movement and a low point in forestry worker / environmental group relations. Nonetheless, at the height of this conflict the PPWC produced and published its official environmental policy in a booklet...
entitled, *Jobs Trees and Us*. Most surprisingly, given this context, the policy is neither overly cautious nor defensive in tone or content. Instead the policy, discussed below, managed to capture the lessons of the Pulp Pollution Campaign: that labour-centred environmental policy is necessary to protect workers and to address the threat of job blackmail, and that such policy must come about through dialogue with the environmental movement. Rather than falling into the rhetoric of the moment the PPWC used this document to chart its own progressive and unique vision of the struggle for good work in a healthy environment.

Opening with a statement that directly addressed the issue of job blackmail, the PPWCs Forest Policy argued placed blame for the ‘crisis’ in the forests squarely at the feet of forest capital:

> We need jobs and we need trees. Union jobs, enough of them so all British Columbians can live with dignity, in healthy and safe conditions. Forests of trees, where nature’s diversity is treated with respect. A resource that can sustain future generations.

> We don’t have to choose between jobs and trees. If our forest industry was managed properly, we would have plenty of both. But there is a crisis in our forests, and the forest companies want us to think we must choose either jobs or trees. (PPWC 1993, 1)

Underlining this theme of resistance to job blackmail, in a column opposite the opening paragraph, a forestry officer from the Nanaimo local questioned, “Why are we governed by fear of loss of jobs? We should be saying either you do it properly or you lose it.”
From this blunt introduction, *Jobs Trees and Us* delivered a relentless critique of the effects of the forest industry on both forest workers and 'nature’s diversity'. There is, however, some import in the presentation and order of the argument: beginning with a discussion of how jobs are lost through mechanization, log export, and waste, the Forest Policy then moved to demonstrate the ecological costs of the forest industry and to attribute these costs to corporate control over the forest resource.

On the matters of mechanization, log export, wood and fibre wastage and the lack of value added manufacturing, the PPWC’s forest policy is quite similar in content to that of the 1989 IWA policy. This document, though, sports a more strident tone and directly confronts those who would argue that environmental protection was the principal threat to workers jobs. Instead, blame is aimed at decisions made by forest companies, decisions to concentrate on minimally processed wood and pulp, and decisions to substitute capital for labour in this staple production. Though the main text lays out facts and figures to back up these claims, more dramatic are the bordering columns that provide quotes from union activists on these issues:

They’re cutting more trees with less people. They’re producing more with less people. That’s what is costing us jobs. The problem is the higher automation

They’re shipping out barges of chips. . . . Basically, what we’re doing right now is cant cutting for remanufacturing in Japan. We need legislation saying no exports on raw logs.

We chip a lot of stuff that could be used for value-added product. We tried to stop it. They said the trees belong to them. They could do whatever they wanted. There are a lot of things they could be doing to put
value-added. They could be doing a lot of veneering here. Dry kilning. Finger-jointing. (PPWC 1993, 3)

Having established the principal factors behind job loss in the industry, the PPWC's forest policy presents a critique of the environmental impact of the forest industry, attacks the role of corporate control, and insists in the need to address First Nation land claims. Once again there is significant overlap with the 1989 IWA policy, however, in both tenor and scope, the PPWC was much more aggressive. Here, for example, are some of the union's thought on clearcutting:

Not only do modern clearcutting methods use fewer people and bigger machines, they are an environmental disaster. Besides, there are other methods of logging our forests. They would create more jobs, waste less wood, and cause less environmental damage.

We need a whole lot less clearcutting, and a lot more partial cutting and selective logging. We need strict limits on the size of clearcuts. (PPWC 1993, 1)

While the union's stand on chemical use and reforestation is similarly bold, a section on preserving old-growth and wilderness areas puts this forest policy in a league of its own. Using language that is surprisingly direct and avoiding appeals to multiple-use style compromise, the union argued:

We need to protect our remaining old-growth forests. These wilderness areas provide crucial sources of water, and food and shelter for animals and fish. We use these areas for camping, fishing and hiking. Clearcutting is destroying our remaining old-growth forests. Heavy-duty logging equipment damages small rivers and streams. In sensitive areas, erosion leads to landslides which have wiped out spawning grounds for salmon.

Other forest company practices, like the increasing use of pesticides destroy sources of food and shelter for animals, and put
unnatural poisons into our streams and rivers. Besides, who wants to go camping in a clearcut?

We need to work with other groups of people to protect our old-growth forests and wilderness areas. We need to make sure that fish and wildlife habitat is protected. We need regulations that are enforced. (PPWC 1993, 12)

At the very moment where both forest corporations and workers in many forestry dependent communities, and the IWA were portraying demands for wilderness preservation and dramatic changes in forestry practice as frivolous, unnecessary and job-killing, the PPWC’s forestry policy looked rather much like that of many of the province’s environmental groups.

The credibility of the forest policy as a fusion of labour and environmental criticism was enhanced by the use of citations taken from a broad range of industry critics. In one example, the discussion of clearcutting is placed alongside a sidebar that described the work of Merv Wilkinson, who had selectively logged a wood-lot on Vancouver Island since 1935. In this sidebar the forester Herb Hammond, a favourite of environmentalists, was quoted on the job possibilities of expanding such a model. At other places, Jobs Trees and Us, cites: Karon Mahon of Greenpeace on that organization’s perspective on the CORE process; the union’s forest officer and other members on the problem of corporate concentration and control over public forests; a WCWC ‘reward’ for the arrest and prosecution of forest executives or foresters engaged in illegal logging activity. In addition, this document includes a short bibliography listing books that are renown in environmental circles and the newsletter of the B.C.
Environmental Network (to which the union belongs). This context draws attention to the role that inter-movement dialogue has had in developing union forest and environmental policy and works directly to counter the growing tenor of conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists.

Over the next seven years, as the Share movement and the forestry corporations struggled to forge an alliance between workers, residents and business owners in resource-based communities, the PPWC maintained the difficult position of advocating the shared interests of environmentalists and forestry workers. During the conflict over Clayoquot Sound, for example, the pages of the Leaflet were repeatedly graced with editorials, letters and articles that argued that the very real battle between workers and environmentalists was misplaced.

Immediately following the ‘Cayoquot Summer’ of 1993, under the heading “Cayoquot: the battle that shouldn’t be”, it was conceded that the ‘forestry workers vs environmentalists’ story was not only a favourite of the media but also had become grounded in the union halls and lunchrooms. It was argued, however, that such a conflict only exists in a situation where the root problem of “fewer people doing more with better machines” remains unaddressed. The union concluded that:

Unfortunately, we haven’t the kind of leadership . . . we haven’t the tactics and strategy necessary to force corporations and governments to focus on our human needs – like decent jobs – rather than “corporate health” and “the deficit”.

So we view as enemies the very people that should be our allies: environmentalists and Native people. And, as usual, the corporations laugh all the way to the bank.
If we don’t turn this situation around and start fighting the right battles against the right enemies, it is highly probably that forest companies, ever in quest of soaring profits, will leave our grandchildren neither jobs nor forests. *(Leaflet, October 1993, 3)*

Elsewhere in this same issue, the Clayoquot protesters were defended for taking a necessary and moral, if illegal, stand. Arguing that the reaction of many forestry workers was hostile and not unlike that faced by anti-nuclear bomb campaigners in the early 1970s, the author states:

I have never been to Clayoquot Sound, and I didn’t sit in the court proceedings for the protesters. I have seen virgin west coast rainforest, however, and I have seen the washed-out clearcuts on the west coast of Vancouver Island. I’ve seen companies lock out and lay off when it suits them . . .

Protest often defies the laws of the day. The trade-union movement would not be where it is today if not for defying the law of the land. The Clayoquot protesters have made the world aware of their concern for the west coast rainforest. *(Leaflet, October 1993, 2)*

In the spring of 1994, the union also invited Herb Hammond to speak at its annual convention and reprinted his thoughts on Clayoquot Sound and the problems of the forest industry. Hammond blamed the protests on government and industry decisions that were ecologically unsound and decried the heavy-handed approach of the police and courts. Revealingly, Hammond also thanked the PPWC for their work on environmental issues and added: “I know it isn’t easy” *(Leaflet, March 1994, 6-7)*. In the same issue, a report on the future of forestry by the Western Canada Wilderness Committee’s was lauded.

Maintaining alliances with the environmental movement became much more difficult as the decade wore on. Faced with an economic downturn and resting on their
recent history of park creation and the introduction of the Forest Practices Code, the second term of the NDP government was marked by a retreat from reform (see previous chapter). When the wilderness movement turned its sights on the mid-coast and to the area dubbed the ‘Stoltmann Wilderness’, the provincial government and the IWA weighed in, alongside the Forest Alliance and Share groups to demonize environmentalists.

In spite of this political climate, the PPWC struggled to maintain both ties to the environmental movement and a discourse of shared interest: the union, alongside environmental groups, questioned the failure of the new forest practices code to meet U.S. standards on setbacks from streams and wetlands; it attacked the public relations strategies of industry, and throughout the period the PPWC maintained an ongoing discussion on the perils of job blackmail and the necessity of inter-movement cooperation.

Of these various ideas and themes it is surely the latter that is most striking. Repeatedly, the union used the pages of the Leaflet to deconstruct the message that environmentalists were the principal threat to forestry workers jobs. In issue after issue the source of job loss was attributed to decisions made by the forest industry to export commodities, raw logs and chips, to introduce labour saving technologies and, with the blessing of provincial governments, to over-cut old-growth forests. In a long article entitled “What about my job?” the forest resources officer of the PPWC acknowledged that forestry workers often found themselves blamed by environmentalists for destroying

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the forests and threatened by companies who claimed environmentalist's demands will mean the end of forestry work. This article stared down this dilemma and made the argument that environmentalist demands for improved forest practices, for preservation of old-growth, and for a reduced annual cut were justified.

It is obvious that we need to make some changes in the way we do things in our forest industry and on our landscape, and it is ridiculous to think [sic] this will not have some impact on the present employment structure. There are ways to make those changes without creating thousands of environmental refugees. As most of you are aware, when you think about it a little bit, you are far more likely to become a tech-change or downsizing refugee than an environmental refugee. (Leaflet, August/September 1997, 15)

This shift, it was argued was unpleasant but necessary:

First of all, this question is similar to the one concerning taxes. Do you like paying taxes? No. Well, do you mind paying taxes if your children get a good, quality education and grandpa can get his bypass surgery? Well, that makes things a little different. Nobody wants to lose their job. But if it is in the context that if we continue to do things in a certain way, and we compromise the opportunities for future generations to enjoy a good quality of life, we may think slightly different about it. (Leaflet, August/September 1997, 13)

In this article it was argued that job loss must be offset by a planned ‘just transition’ to a more sustainable economy. To this end, it was argued that environmentalists both understood the importance of job-loss and could be called upon to help find solutions. Members were encouraged to read up on environmental issues, talk to others and join an environmental group for in the end, the goals of the union and those of environmental groups were complementary.
This is not to say that the PPWC completely avoided the tension between forestry workers and environmentalists. When, as part of its ‘Great Bear Rainforest’ campaign to add protected areas to the mid-coast, Greenpeace (along with the Forest Action Network) began a series of blockades and called for a boycott of B.C. forest products, the union was clearly exasperated. While lauding Greenpeace as “the group we have all learned to be proud of as being one of the most effective activist groups in the world” it was acknowledged that the mid-coast events had also “led us to the point of being quite pissed off with them” (Leaflet, October 1997, 16).

Nonetheless, even at this lowpoint, the PPWC refused to break off their relationship with this or other environmental groups. In fact, the problem was described not as one of fundamental difference in goals, but of strategic mistakes and public relations problems. It was suggested that the public, and here one might read shopfloor PPWC members, had grown impatient with the standard tactics of Greenpeace and much of the environmental movement. The demands of the movement were not only unquestioned but described as necessary in the quest for a decent world. The solution, and a surprising one at that, was said to lie in a structural change whereby unions would take a larger role in pushing forward the environmental agenda, “for unions to take these issues a lot more seriously and, instead of going into denial or fear, be honest about what we need to do as a society to move toward truly sustainable economies” (Leaflet, October 1997, 17).
Towards the end of the 1990s the PPWC attacked the conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists head on, underscoring its own 'independent and unique voice'. Executive members often spoke at demonstrations organized by environmental groups and the union was a key force behind the creation and ongoing success of the Labour and Environment Forum sponsored by the Vancouver and District Labour Council. Moreover, the union took advantage of each opportunity to reinforce a message of the symbiotic relationship of labour and environmental movements, the need to confront job blackmail, and the need for unions to be more active on environmental issues. Early in 1999 an article written by a Local 4 member, summarized the PPWC’s position well. After lamenting the fact that union leaders had begun to add their voices to those of business and governments in condemning environmental protests, the author pleaded:

The environmental movement is not the enemy of labour. Union members and environmentalists, in fact, have similar long-term objectives. We both believe it is possible to have clean air, clean water and still make a decent living. ...

In fact it is only the corporations which are at odds on these points. Few companies take the long-term view. It interferes with short-term profit.

Forest-sector corporations in this province have developed a very clever strategy over the years. They have tried to condition us to believe that we must choose between protecting nature or making a living. Rather than trying to defend the indefensible, they have side-stepped any direct confrontation with the environmental movement, spent a great deal of money trying to remake their image as responsible caretakers of our forests and manoeuvred their own employees into attacking environmentalists on their behalf. (Those damn environmentalists are costing British Columbians their jobs, etc.) To put it simply, they have us shooting the
messenger. Clearly, their aim is to divert our attention from their own misdeeds. Meanwhile, the abuse of our forests continues.

Say what we will about environmental organizations, their fundamental message is correct. Our present practices are leading to disaster. Current rates of consumption of natural resources are not sustainable. We must change our ways. In our hearts, we all know it.

Even with excesses protesters must have our patience and our support. In a political system such as ours, privilege and power must always be questioned. ...

On this issue, we must hear both sides no matter how difficult the message. In the end, which is more objectionable, an illegal roadblock or hectares of slash sliding into a once productive stream? In the long run, which costs us more jobs? We need to decide for ourselves. (Leaflet, January-February 1999, 10)

The PPWC, The Environment and Us

The question that we began with, and one which we must address here if only in a cursory and exploratory fashion, is ‘Why has the PPWC become so active in environmental issues and how has the union maintained a radical stance during a time of significant conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists?’ Even more so than the question itself, the answer is multi-faceted and not much given to reduction. And, as we will have occasions in each of the following chapters to reflect on many of these matters, here let us simply raise each of the most conspicuous factors and attach some comment as to their relevance.

First, there are factors, though not without consequence, whose influence is relatively less significant. There is, for example, some truth to the claim that the long
history of rivalry between the IWA and the PPWC has, over the years, had some impact on policy. At least in some part, the PPWC’s emphasis on its independence (and, indeed, on its ‘progressiveness’) has been sparked by the need to differentiate itself from its much larger rival.

Rather more importantly we would contend is the fact that the pulp and paper sector within which most PPWC members work is faced less directly by the valley by valley conflicts that sparked much of the worker/environmentalist conflict in the forest industry. Fibre for pulp mills, though tied to particular areas, is a more flexible resource. When a particular valley is withdrawn from the forest industry base, the impact on the total AAC, and the impact on the availability of chips for pulp production, may not be directly felt (or may only be felt much further into the future). Moreover, and perhaps more critically, PPWC members have not directly faced the roadblocks that have fanned conflicts between loggers and environmentalists.

Putting too much emphasis on either of these factors would however be a mistake. In the first instance the environmental ideology of the PPWC has been the result of three decades of work within the union. Individuals at both the local and national level have put significant portions of their lives into championing environmental causes that are very difficult to sell to workers and communities that depend on the continued goodwill of forestry corporations. The differences between IWA and PPWC policy are perhaps better understood as the cause rather than an effect of inter-union rivalry. Likewise, it would be folly to suggest that pulp workers are ignorant of the importance of fibre supply. This
issue has been front and centre in forestry debates in the province and as we will see in our case study the concern over the future supply of ‘fibre’ is expressed by workers across sectors.

None of this is to say that we should overlook either sector or union culture as important factors influencing PPWC environmental policy. Certainly, the nature of pulp mill work is of some import here. The toxic soup that is created in the production of pulp and paper make health and safety questions difficult to avoid. Moreover, the environmental risks that pulp workers faces inside the mill are reproduced outside the mill. There thus exists a continuum of interest from the PPWC member concerned about exposure to dioxins at work to citizens concerned about the dispersal of these toxins in the air and water surrounding their community and to environmentalists worried about the effect of this pollution on the greater ecosystem. Such pollution issues do suggest a direct way to draw linkages between the immediate OHS issues faced by workers and the issues of concern to the environmental movement.

There is also a strong argument to be made that the structure and history of the PPWC help explain the union’s progressive environmental policy. On a purely structural level, we might note that the union is highly decentralized. With each local having the ability to reject or ignore environmental policy developed at the national level, the national executive, and especially environmental and forestry resource officers, have a certain freedom to create policy and educational projects without threatening less-progressive locals.
Understanding the source of the radical impulse that marks PPWC environmental policy also demands some mention of union culture. Breaking away from a more centralized and conservative international union, the PPWC developed as a union alongside a host of new social movements (student, feminist, peace, environmental) and forged a social unionism in dialogue with this bevy of progressive forces. This history certainly helps explain the union’s early notice of British Columbia’s environmental movement and perhaps also speaks to the union’s ability to continue relations with such ‘new movements’ whose structure and politics have proven so incomprehensible to the IWA.

Moving to a more pragmatic level, much of the PPWC’s ability to sustain relations with environmental groups, and to develop progressive environmental policy, might be accorded to the long history of PPWC-environmental movement cooperation. In the most dramatic instance, the success of the Pulp Pollution Campaign in improving the health and safety conditions of pulp mill workers and the health of their communities continues to resonate within the union. This clear example of the practical benefit of intermovement cooperation has given a certain credibility to union activists who promote progressive environmental policy and has garnered respect amongst workers for environmental groups. Of course the timing of this project was also important: these relations were forged before the Share movement and its anti-environmental movement discourse had made significant inroads into resource communities.
Finally, if we are to fully account for the aggressive environmental stance of the PPWC we cannot ignore the question of leadership. Throughout its history there have been particular members that have been key instigators of environmental policy and forgers of relationships with environmental groups\textsuperscript{199}. These individuals have undertaken significant efforts both to educate themselves and the larger membership on the often bewildering technical issues that are at the heart of pollution concerns. Often these members have also become active in environmental groups, or at least initiated dialogue with such groups, both to obtain information necessary to develop policy and to foster labour-environment coalition building\textsuperscript{200}.

Of course, all of these factors are linked in a complex web of causality and none exist in isolation. In later chapters we will return to this question with a more deft theoretical hand but for now it will do to suggest that the relationship between each of

\textsuperscript{199} This is historically true of the environmental vice presidents and most other national executive members. Here, special mention should be made of Fred Henton who in the late 1980s and early 1990s pioneered work on pollution issues and cultivated the union’s ‘green’ reputation. Of course, we should also note that the current leadership has maintained these inter-movement relations at a most difficult moment.

\textsuperscript{200} At the local level, such leadership was provided by activists who were involved in both labour and environmental groups. A member of Local 8 (Woodfibre, see chapter 8 and 9) recalled that on the AOX issue, individual union members with a strong commitment to environmental issues ‘would fly out on their own’. This member noted that these activists faced ‘tremendous pressure’ when “it got out in the paper and all of a sudden we realized ‘Hey, what the hell is going on here? – this is our guy” (Author interview PMW 3) Credit must certainly be given to the activists who took such risky steps, the executive members who supported them (or at least did not stand in their way) and to those who worked hard to build support among a membership facing job blackmail.
these factors is best understood as dialectical – while the history and culture of the PPWC might be credited with the creation of progressive and adventurous leaders, those same leaders have reproduced the an environmental politics that encourages such leadership.
Chapter 8

Forestry and Squamish, British Columbia: A Political Ecology

This chapter places the conflict over logging in the Elaho valley, the subject of our next chapter, within a political and ecological history of the region. Moving from a brief overview of the geography and ecology of the area, including the transformation of this landscape by native peoples and the more dramatic changes introduced by non-native settlers, we turn to our principal focus: the forest industry.

Both a product and producer of the local geography, this industry has also profoundly shaped the communities of the area. A discussion of the granting of Tree Farm Licence 38 (which includes the forests at the centre of current conflicts) reveals that criticism of the social and ecological problems produced by the industry have a long history. Moreover, as we trace the development of capitalist forestry in the area we find that it has embodied the same pronounced ecological and social contradictions which have been described in earlier chapters. Promises of sustainable forests and sustainable forest sector work have proven shaky: the industry has created substantial pollution problems while jobs have been lost to economic flux and technological change. Most critically, the forests have been over-cut and the industry is now pushing into the last of the area’s ancient trees.
These problems have not gone unnoticed. Workers have organized in both the mills and woods and the area does have a long, if sporadic, history of environmental concern. However the tenor of this protest has been muted by quirks of geography and history. Until very recently, the forest industry has been able to offset social problems with increased exploitation of an abundant forest resource (the source of which owes to these geographical and historical quirks). Even today the cultural history of Squamish makes it a difficult place to organize environmental dissent. We close our chapter then with some comment about this history and the weakness of the local environmental movement.

Placing Squamish and the Elaho

The Squamish river empties into Howe Sound about sixty kilometers north of Vancouver\textsuperscript{201}. This is a rather spectacular geography of deep valleys, odd shaped mountains and alpine plateaus whose drama owes much to a struggle between the glaciers of the ice age and the volcanic activity of some 15 000 years ago. After a long period marked by gradual warming and the northward migration of plant life, a spectacular diversity of ecosystems has developed. This variety of life is, in turn, a function of the variety of soils and climates produced by this history and by the wide differences in

\textsuperscript{201} See Appendix 4 for a map of the area.
temperature and precipitation that each mountainside, valley bottom, or glacier- touched plateau receives (Armitage 1997; Capilano College 1998).

Most of the places and peoples that we will speak of are situated within the Squamish River watershed, which includes several tributaries: the Elaho, Cheakamus, Mamquam and Ashlu Rivers and Simms and Clendenning Creeks. This watershed, the largest flowing into Georgia Straight, contains mountain hemlock, coastal western hemlock, alpine tundra biogeoclimatic zones and supports a large and varied spectrum of aquatic and terrestrial life, a fact that has drawn humans to the area for at least nine thousand years²⁰².

The Squamish peoples and early European settlers each have marked and altered the landscape. The Squamish created at least 16 permanent settlements along the Squamish River where lodges were fashioned of cedar, using post and beam construction techniques. Living on the game that could be hunted throughout the winter in this valley and on the salmon runs of the rivers, many villages migrated down the Sound and along Burrard Inlet to fish and harvest area plants. While water provided the easiest transport route, the forests were also marked by traditional routes, many heading inland towards the Pemberton and Lilooet areas (Suttles 1990; Armitage 1997).

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²⁰² For a description of the Squamish watershed see Hoos and Vold (1975); Capilano College (1998). For a popular history of the area see McLane (1994) and Armitage (1997).
European settlers introduced much more dramatic changes to the landscape: forests were logged, the mountainside at Britannia was hollowed out in search of copper ore, the Squamish and Mamquam Rivers were diked and their directions altered, the Cheakamus River was damned to provide hydro-electricity, and first a railway, and then a highway were blasted out of the cliffs that line the south side of Howe Sound. Most significant among these changes, and that which will concern us most in the following pages, was the logging of the area’s forests. At first areas were deforested to support agriculture, however the value of the timber itself soon became a lure and the riverside forests of huge Douglas Firs and Cedars were logged off. Today, significant parts of all of the valleys have been logged at least once and most of these areas have been replanted with commercially attractive species.

Nonetheless, for reasons described below, by the 1990s the valleys of Clendenning and Simms Creek and that of the upper half of the Elaho River remained as the largest contiguous old-growth forest in the lower mainland of British Columbia. Recently, cutblocks have been taken from the length of Simms Creek, the Clendenning Creek valley has been set aside as a provincial park, and roads and cutblocks have moved progressively further up the Elaho River Valley an area that has become the focal point of

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203 We might add to this list sewage and chemical discharges into the river and Howe Sound, changes to air quality from automobiles, logging trucks and pulp production, and, of course, global warming which threatens to change everything. It must also be acknowledged that native peoples were often treated with the same disregard: when in the way, they were moved, contained, disposed of.
a very bitter conflict. The dispute is not so much over whether humans will come to alter this landscape but how and where\textsuperscript{204}.

At the centre of this conflict are the forest workers and current residents of Squamish, a town marked by its place amidst these forests and mountains and by this economic history. Though we will return to the subject towards the end of the chapter, here it is of some import to note that for over a century, the town of Squamish has shaped, and been shaped by its landscape. Dissecting this history one finds a gritty industrial town and a service centre/gateway to a vacation playground, a satellite of Vancouver and resource-based regional centre.

Certainly, geography has played its part in this contradiction. While located only a short distance up Howe Sound, a formidable wall of rock, broken only by slide prone creeks and rivers, has ensured that the economic and cultural distance between Squamish and Vancouver remained much greater than the sixty or so kilometres of geography that separate the two. Road and rail connections, in the form of Highway 99 and the Pacific Great Eastern railway did not arrive until the mid-1950s and until that time the connection to the Lower Mainland was firmly inscribed in the era of water transport. Ensuing tensions between dependency and autonomy, affinity and difference, nature as workplace and nature as respite, have shaped the political, economic and social character

\textsuperscript{204} Even if this area were to be placed within some sort of protected area, uses as diverse as backcountry hiking, alternative forestry or harvesting of native plants would mark this landscape.
of Squamish. The relation of labour and environmental movements which is here our central concern, does not escape this fact.

The Working Forest and Town: From Horse-Logging to Pulp Production

While early European explorers were underwhelmed by the steep slopes and gray weather of Howe Sound, the Squamish valley eventually drew settlers interested in the fertile soil. Hop growing became a specialty of the area, and supplemented orchards, cattle raising and other mixed ventures. By the mid 1890s, the town of Squamish was incorporated, served by twice weekly steamship service and was acting as the commercial hub for the expansion of farming up the Squamish and Cheakamus river valleys (McLane 1994).

However, the claim that 'forestry built this town', which is heard often these days, is not at all misplaced205. By 1870, with most of the easily accessible old-growth timber logged from the area that is now urban Vancouver, a North-Shore mill had leased land along the Squamish River near its confluence with the Cheakamus River. Within twenty years, logging camps and mills dotted the shoreline of Howe Sound, and its islands, and were found northward to what is now Whistler (Armitage 1997, 61). Originally, logs were boomed to mills in Vancouver, though by 1900 timber cut from the bottom of the

205 Though one might more properly attribute this 'making' to the people working in the forest industry.
Squamish and Mamquam valleys was being processed in Squamish’s first saw mill
(Squamish District Public Library 1995a, np).

Before the turn of the century, the logging process depended on animal power (of both the human and non-human kind). Individual ‘high-grade’ trees were selected, felled and bucked using hand tools and then yared over the shortest distance possible by teams of horses, oxen, or even by hand\textsuperscript{206}. This technology, and the scale of the operations (and those in Squamish appear to have been smaller and fewer in number than those in more popular coastal locations) combined to limit the impact of this industry on the natural environment (Gremminger 1985; Young 1976).

Steam power was introduced to the area during the first decade of the century in the form of ‘steam donkeys’ which were used in the yarding process\textsuperscript{207}. Railways were

\textsuperscript{206} An account dated to the mid-1890s describes one of the simpler operations: “Mr. Folk had a logging camp in the Upper Squamish near the mouth of the Ashlu River. He also logged on the Pilchuk River. He would fall a tree, buck it into a 24' log, then roll the log by hand into the river. When there were enough logs he would make a boom and drive the logs down the river using a pike pole and a peevee. He drove the logs to the Squamish River then to the tide water. This drive took one week. Tugs picked up the logs at tidewater and delivered them to the Moodyville Sawmill” (Squamish District Public Library 1995a, np).

\textsuperscript{207} An account of an early forestry operation, collaborates Rajala’s thesis that this introduction was not driven by a receding timber line, which would make yarding distances prohibitive, so much as by the economic efficiency of the steam donkey, especially in hauling short distances to a skid road. “The Yap company cleared the Cheekeye area. A steam donkey would haul the logs 40 feet then an 8 horse team hauled them a ½ mile on a skid road. Another donkey called a roader, took the logs to the river” (Squamish District Public Library 1995a, np). At least initially, steam, oxen and human power worked in coordination.
also pushed towards the interior, opening up new areas to forestry. Together these factors help explain both the increase in the size of forestry ventures – by 1911 the Squamish Timber Company was shipping 60 000 feet of logs per day via rail and the Newport Logging Company could boast of 3 camps, 10 yarding engines, a locomotive with 7 miles of track and 200 employees – and speculation of Squamish’s future as a port city (Squamish District Public Library 1995a, np; see also Drushka 1992).

Indeed, while capitalist forestry grew at a modest pace in Squamish, academic accounts have tended to underplay this development and its impact on the forest landscape. High-lead yarding systems were introduced to the area by 1913, and this technology required clearcutting and left much smashed wood which when dry was perfect fuel for fires ignited either by natural sources or by the sparks from the railroad, cigarettes or campfires. While we might agree with Gremminger (1985) and Young (1976) that fire caused the greatest changes to the forest at the time, there appears here to be a rather artificial separation between the effects of logging, the railroad, and forest fires. In any case, the Squamish area did not escape the changes in forestry practice that signalled a radical shift in the manner and extent of the exploitation of both forests and

208 We could agree that fires, especially those that occurred along the rail lines, had the most significant impact on the forest base, while acknowledging that railroad served, at least in part, as a component of the forest industry. In the wetter coastal areas, where natural fires play a much reduced role in the ecosystem, this combined impact of clearcutting and the railroad, should be understood as inseparable from the forest industry.
forestry workers. By at least the 1920s the forests around Squamish had taken on many of the hallmarks of the modern workplace: while loggers worked to the pace of the high-lead systems, skidroads and railroads extended this control over the forest itself. An account of the Merrill and Ring Company, an American firm that had acquired a claim in 1888 but only began logging during the mid twenties, notes that camps of men hired in Vancouver lived in settlements of over 200 where the mountainsides were covered with rail track (Squamish District Public Library 1995a; see also McLane 1994, 27). Local writers have noted that the other hallmark of capitalist forestry – the boom and bust cycle – was also well established209.

The factory came to the forest in a more literal sense with the creation of a nearby pulp mill. Just west of Squamish, on the north shore of Howe Sound at what was then known as Mill Creek and later renamed Woodfibre, a pulpmill began construction in 1910 and was in production by the spring of 1912. While riding economic cycles, including a bankruptcy in 1923, the mill continued to expand and by the late 1930s was the heart of a company town of over one thousand residents (McLane 1994, 28; Squamish District Public Library 1995b, np).

Besides the production of pulp and industrial employment, the pulpmill extended the ecological impact of the forest industry to air and water. While prevailing winds most often drew fumes down the Sound towards the ocean, ‘the smell of money’ began to

209 The industry hit a peak in the 1920s and was in a trough at the end of that decade. See McLane 1994.
colour the skies around Squamish. Woodfibre further changed the landscape as a nearby lake was damned to provide water for both the townsite and the mill itself. Later, this water would be discharged back into the sound as a toxic byproduct of the pulping process.

Modern reminiscences of this period suggest that local residents paid little heed to the environmental impact of the forest industry and generally subscribed to the idea that the forests were endless and relatively unspoilt (Crosby 1999). Certainly the rugged terrain which made many of the areas forests, even those within sight of the Squamish town centre, uneconomical or technically impossible to harvest, makes such statements plausible. Even as Squamish emerged as a centre of rail logging, the effect on the landscape would hardly have compared with the heavily logged, more gentle terrain on the east coast of Vancouver Island (or to similarly transformed areas more accessible to Vancouver).

Nonetheless, there is evidence that Squamish, faced with rapid changes in forestry practice, the introduction of clearcuts and the development of a large scale pulp industry, was not completely detached from the conservationist concern that swept the rest of the province. As timber harvesting moved up the valleys, and further up mountainsides, and as fires destroyed much timber that was readily accessible to existing rail lines, reforestation became a local issue. On what has been called British Columbia’s first school arbour day, Squamish pupils and teachers planted 2 300 seedlings in the ‘Squamish Community Forest’ and by the end of the next decade the town itself was
planting 5000 Douglas Fir seedlings (Vancouver Sun, December 11, 1939). The message of early foresters' about the need for replanting to maintain perpetual harvests was not lost on a community that now depended on the forest industry to provide jobs and taxes.

Squaring the Circle: Sustained Yield Forestry and the Solution of 'Modern' Forestry in Squamish

By the 1920s then all the hallmarks of modern forestry and its discontents were in place in the Squamish area: a pulp mill operated at Woodfibre, high-lead systems and railroad transport worked to turn the forest itself into a factory, and concerns over forest depletion, land alienation and industrial blight, were acted upon, if in a limited fashion.

There were, however, factors that helped offset the environmental and social contradictions of forestry practice in this area: The onset of the Depression brought a premature close to the development of capitalist forestry; the unemployed were drawn to Vancouver; the slow recovery of the industry in the 1930s was concentrated in more established areas; and the war failed to spur demand for forest products as it did those of other industries. Moreover, the size of cleared areas, which drew attention to the immense capacity of mechanized forestry, were with only a few exceptions much smaller in the Squamish area than they were on Vancouver Island or in other contentious
locations. Gremminger (1985) has noted that until the mid 1950s there was no significant increase in harvest levels in this area.

When capitalist forestry returned to the area in force in the late 1950s, it did so with a whole arsenal of new tools useful in disciplining both forests and workers. Certainly, the process of logging had been refined: chainsaws, introduced from Germany shortly before the war, had revolutionized falling; truck logging had supplanted rail (and roads now crisscrossed the forest); and mobile spars had simplified rigging and de-rigging.

These changes both sped up the logging process and pushed forestry into more challenging terrain which is especially important in the mountainous areas most nearby Squamish. Now, more of the forest faced the discipline of industrial forestry and these areas could be harvested faster. For the forestry worker, especially those involved in harvesting, this increase in ‘productivity’ both created new physical dangers (mechanical saws, for example, were notoriously more dangerous than the hand saws) and the threat of unemployment – unless harvesting rates were increased.

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210 Young (1976) traced cutblocks in the area and found that prior to the 1950s, cleared areas were usually small. However, in 1943 there were a few areas near Squamish where 400 hectare cutblocks (approximately ten times the current recommended maximum for coastal forests) were cleared.

211 By the late 1940s operations in this area were already working on slopes of up to 50% grade (Young 1976, 126).
In previous chapters we saw that, two decades earlier and in other areas of the province, such changes evoked challenges from environmental and labour movements (and in the CCF and IWA a combination of these). This was, however, a very different time and a very different place. In Squamish this transformation of the logging process was implemented within an entirely new regulatory regime – sustained yield forestry.

As we have discussed previously, the ideology of sustained-yield forestry as espoused by the Sloan Commissions and the Forestry Act of 1947 was remarkably successful in deflecting the most damning criticisms of capitalist forestry. An emphasis on the science of forestry captured the imagination of the middle-class conservation movement, providing as it did an alternative to the call for community forests and a nationalized industry of the socialist alternative. Meanwhile, forestry unions which were finally making inroads into both the pulp mill and the woods of the Squamish area, had been similarly seduced by the possibility of sustained work through sustained-yield forestry. Purged of its radical leadership, the IWA had bought into the new regulatory regime and its promise of a stable, industrial workforce that could share in the economic, and health and safety, benefits of an equally strong and stable union.

This is not to say that the hegemony of the new regulatory regime was complete. Even well after the second Sloan Commission, the establishment of a Tree Farm Licence in the Squamish was a very contentious affair. Indeed, the proposal for TFL 38 sparked a bitter struggle and led to a public hearing which raised significant questions about the wisdom of entrusting the best remaining forest land to large capital. This acrimonious
inquiry is significant for its attention to the question of corporate concentration and the relation of such concentrated ownership to forest depletion. More than simply a squabble between factions of capital, this struggle revealed how Sloan era restructuring, while effectively controlling the environmental and labour challenges of the day, provided the ideological and material resources that underlie contemporary conflicts.

**Awarding TFL 38**

Following the first Sloan Commission, Empire Mills Limited, a company which had first begun logging along the Pacific Great Eastern Railway (P.G.E.) in 1937, applied for a Tree Farm Licence\textsuperscript{212}. From the outset, however, this application was challenged by small logging companies fearful that they would lose access to a vast swath of the areas best and most accessible timber. Although a TFL was granted in 1954, this was appealed and in the fall of 1958 a Commission of Appeal presided over by Gordon Sloan himself (who was now an advisor to the Social Credit government) was called to determine the fate of the license. This inquiry served as a local expression of a conflict that had raged through the logging industry: large forest companies, who sought to develop integrated logging and manufacturing companies based on the guaranteed timber supply of a Tree Farm Licence were pitted against smaller firms and license holders who, in the main,

\textsuperscript{212} The company first proposed a smaller area in an application in 1948, but withdrew this application and submitted a much larger proposal in 1951 (British Columbia 1958, 30).
argued for Public Working Circles (later renamed Public Sustained Yield Units or PSYUs) managed by the province and where timber was available for open bidding.

Local conditions and the particular timing of the inquiry are, however, of some import. The long delay in awarding the license was clearly of benefit to the applicant. By 1958, sustained-yield forestry, in ideology if not in practice, was something of a fait accompli. Despite a bribery scandal surrounding the awarding of TFL 22 that ended in the conviction of the minister of forests\textsuperscript{213}, TFLs had been allocated along the coast and on the Island and a rush of new applications were in process. Certainly, the faith of the forestry service in the role of Tree Farm Licences in sustained yield forestry, if not in the government’s ability to fairly award these licenses, was unshaken.

Moreover, local economic conditions further supported this particular license application. The timber industry had been active in the area for over eight decades during which time the most accessible and valuable timber had been removed. Yet the industry had developed only erratically and, in times good or bad, the town of Squamish had seen neither significant employment nor much of any other sort of benefit from the industry. The green gold of the valley had for the large part been floated to the mills of Vancouver.

\textsuperscript{213} Over objections from the chief forester, the minister of forests, R.E. Sommers, granted TFL 22 to British Columbia Forest Products (BCFP) from land that had already been set aside for a public working circle. Sommers and an industry consultant were found guilty early in 1958. Controversy returned to this area, which had become part of the larger TFL 44, with the protests over logging in Clayoquot Sound. At one point the Friends of Clayoquot Sound launched a lawsuit based on this original ‘illegal’ decision. See Drushka (1985, 74-78).
and beyond and the pulp mill at Woodfibre had developed as a company town which
jealously guarded and recycled its employees wages. Fortuitously, if only for the
applicant, the hearings also came during a particularly bad slump in the local economy
which included the shutdown of Woodfibre, the Britannia copper mine, Empire Mills
Squamish sawmill, and the scaling back of railway operations following the completion
of the Squamish to Vancouver segment (British Columbia 1958, 52-54).

Within this favourable political and economic context, Empire Mills' original
proposal and the revised application that was the subject of formal hearings foregrounded
company plans to bring wood manufacturing to Squamish\textsuperscript{214}. As both the area of forest
requested and opposition to the TFL grew, so did the scale of the promised manufacturing
facilities\textsuperscript{215}. At the public inquiry Berton James Keeley, president of Empire Mills
vowed:

Where our original/immediate programme involved modernization
of the Squamish sawmill and construction of a veneer plant at a total cost
of $150,000 and providing additional employment for 25 persons in
Squamish, we now propose to undertake the following projects:

\textsuperscript{214} Empire Mills had revised their original application before the hearings.

\textsuperscript{215} Empire Mills application did have one significant disadvantage – the company
did not have the requisite adjacent, private lands which could be wrapped within the Tree
Farm Licence, thus bringing previously alienated land back within provincial control.
The second Sloan Commission suggested that if a TFL applicant could not bring at least
twenty-five percent of either the total land base or the available timber, then the TFL
should be available to bids by companies willing to provide either up front compensation
or the promise of higher stumpage rates (Sloan 1956, 96).
(1) Transfer all our sawmilling operations to Squamish and the construction of a fully modernized lumber manufacturing plant on the site there.
(2) Construction of a full plywood plant at Squamish.
(3) Research development of a European particle board process with the ultimate objective of adding this unit to our Squamish manufacturing facilities.

The total cost of these projects will be in excess of $3 million and when in operation they will employ between 350 and 400 persons. (British Columbia 1958, 48)

This program of enticements suggested two key elements: work for people in Squamish who would be employed in the manufacture of timber drawn from their immediate area and the efficient use of the resource as material previously considered waste would be used for particle board.

Clearly, Empire Mills' application resonated with the political leaders of the village of Squamish who in the week preceding the hearing passed a resolution supporting "the allocation of timber that guarantees the construction and operation of efficient manufacturing plants at Squamish" (Howe Sound-Squamish Times, November 6, 1958, 3)\textsuperscript{216}. In a rather straightforward show of support for this resolution the local press summarized, "Council decided they were for: Steady payrolls, processing of raw materials here, benefits derived from more tax revenue; and against shipping the timber

\textsuperscript{216} The impartial tone of the resolution was in part made necessary by the fact that the Council chair also happened to be the manager of the Squamish operations of Empire Mills.
of this valley out to Vancouver for processing” (Howe Sound-Squamish Times, November 6, 1958, 3).

Though such goals could hardly be disputed, not all in the area saw the Empire Mills application in such a positive light. Some questioned the whole idea of sustained yield forestry, at least given the forest conditions under consideration. Typical of such skepticism was the position of one sawmill manager who argued that “this timber is older and in most cases over-mature . . . The timber is well past its prime and is deteriorating in both quality and quantify [sic]. It should be harvested with all possible dispatch before any more is lost” (British Columbia 1958, 1176). The futility of this argument at a time when sustained yield policies had wide public support was only underlined by its presentation to Mr. Sloan himself.

While simply dismissing the idea of sustained-yield was something of a non-starter, the criticisms of local timber companies were much more trenchant. At the

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217 In a rather blunt contradiction, this witness also argued that the old-growth timber of this area was of a high quality and it should be logged quickly as technological change might diminish the need for such top quality wood saying, “Undoubtedly the idea of a sustained yield is a sound economic policy, but with present technological advances, who can say definitely that beyond 20 years there will be need or call for this quality of timber. The demand by that time may be for an entirely different type . . .” If it seems that this witness was grasping at straws, it should be noted that he was speaking for a mill that was dependent on coastal log market timber. The supplies of such timber and licences from which it might be drawn were withering with each newly created TFL.

218 Two weeks before the hearings, an organization called the Squamish Independent Sawmill and Logging operators was formed to express concerns about this the license. A lawyer was hired and a meeting was set to discuss strategies to oppose Empire Mills’ application (Howe Sound-Squamish Times, October 23, 1958, 1).
crudest, this was simply a dispute over who had the right to harvest timber – small operators were concerned that after the granting of the TFL to Empire Mills they would be left with ‘scraps’. Yet despite the immediate self-interest (or perhaps because of it) the argument against this particular licence came to rest on the critique of the TFL system itself. First, it was argued that the timber license included virtually all of the marketable timber in the Squamish valley and would thus lead to the demise of many small operators.

The main bodies of virgin timber outside the present application are not accessible by truck road to salt water. The P.G.E. Railway parallels the Cheakamus River but the small logger cannot afford to pay the extra rail transportation and reloading costs which arise in operating in this tributary area . . . (British Columbia 1958, 977).

On principle the granting of this Tree Farm License to Empire Mills Limited would in effect be the allocation of a very large amount of mature timber and productive forest land, to one company, to exploit as they see fit, within the terms of the contract, to the exclusion of any other company or small operator . . . (British Columbia 1958, 1148)

The benefits of the license were said to be dubious as any employment gains would come at the expense of “established men and their families that will have to leave the area when we have no more timber to log” (Howe Sound- Squamish Times, October 23, 1958, 1).

Inseparable from this argument was the insinuation that this was an ‘outside’ company poised to grab the majority of the area’s timber supply219. Allegations were

219 It was also argued that it was hardly fair to award a tree farm license when there was still relatively little knowledge of the timber supply in the area - a situation that made it impossible to judge the Empire Mills’ offer (British Columbia 1958, 974).
made that Empire Mills had been shopping around in the United States for a possible buyer and had somewhat prematurely listed the Squamish TFL as an asset (British Columbia 1958, 173-175). Could, or should, an ‘outsider’ be trusted to the same extent that local, smaller companies were? For the small operators the answer was clearly ‘no’ for it was they who were the “existing industry in the area and who have contributed much more in the past to the support of Squamish as compared to Empire Mills Limited” (British Columbia 1958, 1148). As the chairman of the Squamish Independent Sawmill and Logging Operators told the local press at the outset of the hearings: “...[W]e do know that myself and the men who have logged this country for the past 20 years or more are going to stay here and continue to run our outfits as long as there are trees for us to log” (Howe Sound - Squamish Times, October 23, 1958, 1).

The argument of the small operators also rested on a broader critique of the concentration of control that would result from a TFL that gave one company harvesting rights to such a vast area of the forest base. It was argued that there were severe social and economic consequences to such a form of tenure. At the least, an operator might flout its local responsibilities and the hearings were warned:

[t]hat the granting of the application would likely lead to the development of communities controlled by one company and dependent upon it. This is not necessarily in the best interests of the public. In British Columbia examples of communities controlled largely by one company are the operations at Woodfibre and at Britannia. In the Bellingham area the Puget Sound Pulp and Timber Company has acquired through purchase control of large timber area similar to those applied for here. That company has been using B.C. chips and has not followed a full development program of its Washington holdings. The result has been
that the economy of Skagit and Whatcom Counties has been seriously affected. (British Columbia 1958, 977)

The opponents of this license were not content to simply imply that the Squamish area might at some later date suffer slow economic growth as a result of the decisions of a single operator. Invoking a more developed political economy of this new tenure arrangement, it was argued that the province itself could become dependent on large tenure holders. If communities such as Squamish found their fate attached to that of such a monopolist, it was quite conceivable that the province would have little choice but to maintain that company ‘in order to maintain support of the expanded community’ (British Columbia 1958, 1150). This of course was a most serious charge indeed, one that resonates to the day in the Squamish area and one that forms the basis for much of the contemporary appetite for tenure reform.

Given the rather difficult economic circumstances, critics of the TFL knew quite well that their task was not limited to simply demonstrating the flaws in this arrangement but also in offering some alternative. To this end, it was suggested that designating the area in question as a Public Working Circle would provide many of the advantages of the TFL application while avoiding turning control over to a single firm.

The concept of the Public Working Circle was outlined in the 1945 Sloan Commission as an appropriately sized area of public land (i.e. from a forest reserve or other Crown properties) that would be managed by the Forest Service on a sustained-yield basis. Such management would include compiling an inventory of forest resources,
developing a harvesting plan that would provide for sustained yield and providing the roads and bridges that might be necessary to access this timber. The opponents of the TFL argued that such a public working circle would allow many smaller firms to access the available timber on a competitive basis and that management costs incurred by the state would be returned through increased revenues of such a competitive bidding system.

In response to this critique, Empire Mills offered a defence of the TFL as the only practical means through which sustained-yield forestry could be brought to the Squamish area. The company contended that the difficulty of the local geography raised substantial problems for road building and erosion control and that a single, well-financed company could provide the engineering and forestry science necessary to ensure the perpetuation of the resource.

Providing this defence of the company’s application was John Fosmark Jacobson, a Norwegian born and trained forester, past president of the Association of Registered Foresters of British Columbia, current territorial director of the Canadian Forestry Association and Empire Mills chief forester. Taking the stand, Mr Jacobson read from his prepared text:

Problems peculiar to the Upper Squamish Valley render it necessary to approach the logging of that area from a broader standpoint than the sustained yield capacity alone. There must be detailed planning for the cutting of timber in these valleys and more effective control of the logging operations than is possible in a public working circle for reason of the excessive precipitation in the general area, and the ever present flood hazards and erosion problems which are constant threats to all land
adjacent to the Squamish and Mamquam Rivers ... [T]he drainage area of the Upper Squamish River and its tributaries, is unsuitable for a public working circle, being a long and narrow valley with narrow, steep bordered, side valleys. The road building is difficult, precipitation heavy, and the threat is flood and erosion perpetual. In my opinion that area needs careful and systematic forest management for the preservation of the land and the conservation of its productive capacity. (British Columbia 1958, 84-87)

Jacobson’s testimony was compelling, drawing on expert evidence from the United States on the effects of clearcutting on erosion (British Columbia 1958, 86-87) and from C. D. Orchard, the former provincial chief forester who supported an earlier appeal (British Columbia 1958, 88-89). Jacobson reiterated the commitment of Empire Mills to modern and efficient processing facilities and argued that tree planting and thinning of planted stands would increase the number of jobs in the woods itself (British Columbia 1958, 116). Under questioning, the forester and other company officials were thus able to seamlessly connect the expert testimony on the benefits of a TFL for the forest to the benefits that would be derived by the people in the area.

TFL 38 and the Shift to More Social Production

In the end, the decision that faced commissioner Sloan and the people of Squamish was who should be trusted to develop and enforce sustained yield forestry on the largest piece of accessible, old-growth forest in the area: numerous small operators governed by the experts and bureaucrats of the forest service, or the experts and managers...
of a large forestry company. Within these parameters, and at this point in time and place, there was little contest. Over the years small forestry operators had proven no less destructive than their larger counterparts. More critically, the forestry service itself had neither the resources, data or expertise to put into the planning and development of forestry in the Upper Squamish.

So it was that in 1961, TFL 38 was awarded to Empire Mills Limited and corporate supervised sustained-yield forestry came to the Squamish watershed. While most, if not all of the criticisms of the TFL have been borne out, this is hardly the most critical issue. What must not go without remark is the substance of just what was being said 'yes' to: the planned, controlled and careful development of a resource that belonged to the people of the province of a whole and those of the Squamish area in particular.220 Empire Mills, as holder of the Tree Farm License, and the provincial government and its ministries as the overseers of this public good, were to undertake the sort of economic development that put the health of the forest, of forestry workers and of the community above immediate profits. In return the company was offered a secure tenure to the exclusion of competitors. That such demands could be placed upon the state and capital, and that capital would accede, at least in words, to such demands is a testament to the work of labour and environmental movements and most of all to the socialist challenge that brought these together.

220 That these lands, or any significant portion thereof, might still belong to its original inhabitants was an idea yet to make its way into public or political conscience.
Squamish and the Practice of Capitalist, Sustained Yield Forestry

The introduction of the tree farm was one of several closely timed events which combined to draw Squamish more solidly into an industrial capitalist economy. In 1956, the Pacific Great Eastern rail line was extended along a treacherous route to North Vancouver and within two years a roadway ran parallel. A chlorine and chemical plant opened on the mudflats of the waterfront to supply the pulp and paper industry. A sawmill was eventually constructed, though not by Empire Mills, somewhat later than expected, and of a different sort than outlined in the requirements of the license.

As it turned out, the Empire Mills TFL was granted during downturn in the plywood market – a downturn blamed on an oversupply turned out by the highly efficient mills that so impressed Empire Mills executives. Needless to say the market for plywood alternatives, which Empire Mills had planned to explore in the near future, was equally glum. Unable to raise further capital, Empire Mills was purchased by an American owned subsidiary of Weldwood, Canadian Colliers Resources, which in turn was incorporated in 1965 as Weldwood of Canada. This purchase, however, only took place on the condition that the plywood mill condition be changed to a mill that would saw hemlock for export (Squamish Times, January 17, 1963). This change must have been a disappointment. Instead of an integrated set of manufacturing facilities where ‘peelers’ suitable for plywood manufacture would be processed alongside a sawmill whose waste
would be used in an adjacent particle board plant, the TFL instead came to support a simple sawmill.\footnote{221}

Though scaled down, this two-million dollar manufacturing facility was said to be very modern. The company’s vague assertion that “it is the best mill in British Columbia” was supported by the proud claim that a “normal log under normal operating conditions will go through the mill in 10 minutes” \cite{Squamish Times, January 17, 1963, A1}. This speed of production was due, in the large part, to the use of the latest in mill technology. Inside, a reporter discovered that

> following a log through one finds automatic set works at every point. There is even a memory machine to automatically sort lumber before it goes outside to the green chains. Just about everything is electrically, hydraulically or air operated. . . \cite{Squamish Times, January 17, 1963, A1}

Workers were not eliminated from the process but did find their jobs paced by this modern technology. The company emphasized the importance of finding employees that were up to this task and it was noted that they relied on “hand picked personnel for key operations” as a critical factor “in making this mill the best in B.C.”. It was further boasted that the mill’s head filer, a man with 35 years experience, could “change the huge double edge band saw blades of the head saw in four minutes and they have to be changed every four hours” \cite{Squamish Times, January 17, 1963, A1}.

\footnote{221} Canadian Colliers did announce that they would sell some waste in the form of chips for pulp, but had yet to secure a market for sawdust and bark which was to be burned. The environmental impact of this burning plagued the town for many years (see below).
This work process, where automation both eliminated many simple, physical tasks, and controlled the pace of jobs that maintained remnants of skill and decision making, was described in the Squamish mill as follows:

Smooth and rapid operation is apparent as one watches the sawyers play their consoles of buttons, each one key to getting the most out of the log. They stand by their bank of buttons and in split seconds decide the disposition of the saws and carriages, determining how the log will be cut for maximum quality and production. (*Squamish Times*, January 17, 1963, A1)

The mill in Squamish thus began its history well along the road to the contemporary situation described by Marchak as one where both skilled jobs and and relatively unskilled positions were eliminated, leaving ‘machine tenders rather than machine operators or labourers’ (1983, 170).

Of course, the necessity of such automation and the incumbent work speedup was tied to the fact that the rough and planed lumber produced were relatively simple commodities that faced much competition in the international markets for which they were destined. Such automation also required that local officials scale back their visions of massive new employment.

The facts surrounding the creation of the sawmill hint at the difficulty that large capital had from the outset in living up to the social responsibilities that accompanied the ideology of sustained-yield forestry. Jobs in this sector depended on the incertitude of markets and on the ‘competitiveness’ of both logging and manufacturing operations. The same capital expenditure which ‘opened up’ ever more remote areas of the forest, when
injected into the manufacturing process, meant less jobs per tree. Working within the geographical boundaries of the TFL and the neighbouring PSYU, sustained-yield forestry could only promise a constant number of trees. With such set boundaries, efficient, competitive production would create less not more work.

Nonetheless, as the moderate but continual population growth of Squamish during the next three decades attests, the forest industry did end up creating many new jobs. Markets were generally good through the 1960s and much of the 1970s and despite continual labour saving upgrades jobs in both the forest and in the mills were not difficult to find and the population of Squamish approached 8 000 (McLane 1994, 97). By all accounts, this expansion was built upon massive cutting both within areas managed under sustained-yield policies and areas previously alienated from provincial control (Young 1976; Gremminger 1985).

Much of the immense cut of this period came from Timber Licenses issued before 1907 and thus free of restriction – the operators simply cut these areas and the denuded area reverted to the Crown. Sustained-yield areas faired little better though. Immediately upon acquisition of the Tree Farm License, the new owners argued that if they were to fulfill the obligations of their licence and remain solvent a significant increase in the allowable annual cut (AAC) was necessary. Through the 1960s and into the 1970s such request for increases would be, as they were throughout the province, granted. Meanwhile, outside of the Tree Farm, Young (1976) has evoked the extent of the cutting by noting that the total area harvested in the Soo region in the decade ending in 1965 was
equal to that of all Burnaby, New Westminster, Vancouver and the Endowment Lands (Young 1976). In the following chapter we will hear that residents remember the area as ‘looking like the moon’.

Such expansion could not continue forever. As logging moved further and further up the river valley and up the mountainsides, costs increased and the value of the timber decreased. Moreover, the Pearse commission and the implementation of multiple-use suggested further limits to the extent to which the forest base could be denuded. By the late 1970s the industry found that simple expansion was a less useful and less available means by which to sustain profits. Over the last twenty years, then, the forest industry in the Squamish area has more bluntly faced the highs and lows of economic cycles (including the recession of the early 1980s, the recent collapse of Asian economies and market restrictions imposed by the United States) and forestry workers have faced recurring bouts of unemployment.

Economic cycles, however, have served only to hide a factor that has had a much more profound impact of the ability of forestry workers to obtain and maintain steady employment: technological change. The fate of forestry work in Squamish parallels that of the rest of the province – while the allowable annual cut in the area remained relatively constant, the number of jobs in harvesting and milling decreased by 25 percent from 1981 to 1991 (WCWC, 1996, Vol. 15 no. 11).

The modernization of both the pulp and sawmills suggest just how critical this trend has been. Before its refitting in 1995, Woodfibre employed a workforce of
approximately 360, after this modernization about 250 jobs were left. Similarly, while the re-opening of the sawmill in Squamish after nearly two years was met with much relief from the community, the mood was tempered by the fact that there was only to be 100 jobs, down from a high of 260 (The Chief, July 20, 1999, 1).

Given the nature of forest industry production in the area, this continual shedding of labour should not be at all surprising – bulk pulp and dimensional lumber are commodities produced for world markets that are increasingly cluttered and there appears to be little respite on the horizon. While for some time it appeared that at least in the difficult coastal forests the substitution of capital for labour could go little further, the last two decades have seen slow but steady technological changes that have left fewer and fewer workers in the woods\textsuperscript{222}.

Most recently, the expansion of heli-logging has once again suggested a significant reduction of jobs in the harvesting end of the labour process. Heli-logging is particularly important in TFL 38 as production shifts across the river into roadless, steep and ecologically sensitive terrain. Though capital costs are very high, such logging eliminates the cost and jobs of road building and other infrastructure, and advances in this

\textsuperscript{222} See the following chapter for workers descriptions of these changes and for their interpretation of the relative importance of these factors.
technology have meant that it has become possible to log some sites without a ground crew.  

While the forest industry in Squamish has developed the very sort of modern, efficient processing facilities that were envisioned by the architects of sustained yield forestry, and they have successfully competed in international markets, this success has simply not translated into long-term employment and stable communities. Neither, however, have the problems of unemployment and erratic community development been translated into any sort of sustained opposition to capitalist forestry itself. The lack of such critique, let alone a labour movement willing to push forward such contradiction, is a fact that must be addressed in any analysis of the Squamish political landscape. Much of the following chapter will be taken up with understanding this absence.

If the gradual withering of forest sector employment suggests ample room to question the ideology and practice of sustained-yield forestry, the environmental effects suggest yet another vulnerability. These, of course, are not unrelated phenomenon. In Squamish, as throughout the province, forestry capital and the state have increased forest exploitation to displace problems of profits and unemployment. Until well into the 1980s the core of this strategy has been to increase the area of the ‘working forest’: roads were built further up the valleys and into new watersheds, some production shifted to the dryer

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223 A heli-logging operation is a dangerous and rapid operation. Logs are landed at the nearest possible temporary site, loaded quickly and trucked out. On Vancouver Island, experiments have been undertaken to heli-log at night using lights further reinforcing the image of the factory in the forest (Lumber Worker, September 1998, 2).
'rainshadow' forests of the Lillooet area, and increases in the allowable annual cut sustained work in the TFL and nearby (thus encouraging the more rapid 'conversion' of old growth stands into 'normal' forests).

Not only was the scale of harvesting during this period well beyond that which could perpetually sustain the forest industry, the method of forestry practised was destructive of the forest and of wildlife habitat – especially aquatic habitat. Progressive clearcutting created massive openings that resisted natural regeneration, streams were logged over and through. Erosion, hastened by wet conditions, inevitably followed logging on the steep valley slopes of the Squamish River and its tributaries. Streams and rivers ran turbid and filled with silt, ruining salmon and trout habitat. As there were virtually no inventories made of fish or other species, it is impossible to know just what was lost. However, the Squamish River went from being one where as late as the 1950s sports fishers were landing 27 kilogram chinook to one where the vast majority of remaining salmon are small, hatchery-raised fish (Bohn 1994, B1). The watershed is only now being nursed back to health with modest attempts at stream reconstruction, slope stabilization and other measures meant to remedy the effects of logging.\textsuperscript{224}

The Squamish case is unusual not so much for the way in which sustained-yield ideology went unchallenged for several decades, but rather for the relative silence well

\textsuperscript{224} For an account of one of the restoration projects see Bohn 1994. See Capilano College (1998) and Hoos and Vold (1975) for an overview on the environmental problems facing the Squamish estuary. For an overview and evaluation of recent rehabilitation schemes on the Squamish see Tyler (1997).
into a period of renewed wilderness politics. Also rather unique is the ferocity with which the industry, which has failed the community on both social and environmental terms, has been able to rally both workers and community leaders to its defence. This is not to say that the environmental impact of the forest industry went without notice. Indeed, environmental challenges to uncontrolled capitalist development have been raised throughout the town’s history and some background is necessary if we are to understand the state of this movement today.

The Environmental Impulse: Squamish, Recreation Culture and Environmentalism

As loggers were drawn to the Squamish are when more accessible forests were exhausted, mountaineers, amateur and professional naturalists, hunters and those in search of new travel and recreational opportunities were lured up the Sound when the charms and possibilities of the North Shore Mountains and Bowen Island waned. The same “High snowy mountains, infathomable Inlets with steep Rocky Shores” that struck Captain Vancouver and his crew as “pleasant, though romantic” at the best and less charitably as “dreary and comfortless” drew both rugged adventurer and the well-healed picknicker.

For many who came to the area the point was to avoid industrial development, to conquer mountains or escape to an ‘unspoiled’ setting. First among these were

225 See Armitage (1997, 26-28) for Vancouver’s first impressions.
adventurers who by 1908 had reached the mountains, meadows and trout-filled lakes past Squamish and along the Pemberton Trail. Lured by reports of an area waiting to be discovered, members of the British Columbia Mountaineering Club (BCMC) began to hold regular camps in what is now southern Garibaldi Park. Each of the most impressive summits was tackled in the rather competitive fashion of mountaineering and by 1912 explorations were made into the Black Tusk/Garibaldi Lake region, just south of what is now the community of Whistler (Smith 1957, 3-5).

Coincidental with the exploration of this region by the BCMC was a change in the nature of the society. At first a social and recreational club for those who enjoyed climbing mountains, often as sport, the BCMC soon began to attract members more interested botany and ornithology. For these members the “mere effort of hiking and climbing were incidental to the pursuit of their hobby” (Davidson 1957, 7). This change in the direction of the BCMC was pushed along when in 1912, the first Provincial Botanist organized a small army of volunteers to survey plant life and the general environment during the club’s Garibaldi summer camp. Soon, botany, geography, and entomology sections were added to the BCMC and with this broader scope of interests came a more conservationist stance.

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226 Of course the recreational interests of hikers and mountaineers did not exclude natural history. At its inception the club had the “[t]he preservation of the beauties of British Columbia’s mountains through protective legislation” as part of its constitution. However, conquering peaks, and the camaraderie that it entailed was obviously a primary concern (Peacock 1993).
One of the first expressions of this activism was the call for the creation of what became Garibaldi Provincial Park which came in a 1913 edition of the BCMC’s publication, *The Northern Cordilleran* (Ford 1957, 10). It took seven years of lobbying, lectures and expeditions before the government announced that the area was to become a provincial park and it took another seven years to make this official with the passing of the Garibaldi Park Act in 1927.

It took much less time for those swept up in the outdoors craze to proclaim Garibaldi ‘Vancouver’s Alpine Playground’. An early book extolling the virtues of this area was emphatic that “What Mt. Ranier Park is to the cities of Seattle and Tacoma, Mt. Garibaldi Park must become to Vancouver” (Munday 1922, 5). The park was envisioned as a retreat from the advance of industrial development, a respite from denuded lands and man-made problems. Munday’s glowing account of the park includes a photo of Black Tusk Meadows in full summer bloom with the title “Was There Ever A Man-Made Park Like This?” The appeal of this area was then firmly inscribed in the idea of the restorative properties of nature, a point underscored by an early park brochure that proclaimed

> [t]he boon of days spent in Garibaldi Park is, we believe, to lift us a little higher above animal content, to rouse us to some divine impatience with dullness and inertia, to attune our hearts to hear this great land’s challenge: “Give me men [sic] to match my mountains”.  
>  
> (In Munday 1922, 20)

None of this means that the establishment of the park and the rapid increase in tourism were incompatible with timber harvesting. Garibaldi Park was known for its
alpine meadows that were relatively worthless to the industry. Moreover, many of the
guesthouses, fishing camps and other destinations that served as the base for outdoor
adventure were established in areas where the giant trees were already taken. In one of
the most extreme examples, in 1909 a popular resort on the North Shore of Howe Sound
and a pulp mill opened simultaneously with only a small river as separation. The forest at
this location was described as “unprepossessing, a narrow awkward shelf of gravelly
ground hemmed in by the sea and by mountains shrouded in clouds for most of the year.
The remaining forest was dotted by massive stumps and marred by skid roads and the
scars of logging” (Frith and Trowler 1993, 15). Tracing the history of the Whistler area,
McMahon (1980) suggests that there was little sign of conflict until at least the 1950s.

What might be said, however, is that from very early on the complicated and
contradictory strands of environmentalism, from conservationism which stressed tree-
planting and the need for a perpetual ‘crop’, to the amateur and professional biologists
that sought the preservation of unique spaces of botanical interest, to the preservationist
calls of those who would set aside landscapes as tourist meccas and or as healthy retreats,
all had an interest in the Squamish area.

That there exists this history of environmental thought and action is most clear.
Unfortunately, it is also apparent that since this initial outburst the environmental
movement has had little impact in the Squamish area. In some regards this is not at all
surprising. As for the reasons previously described, large scale capitalist forestry took
some time coming to the Squamish area. When it did arrive, the industry had been
radically restructured under the ideological banner and regulatory framework of sustained-yield forestry. What does need some explanation, however, is the continued hegemony of the ideology of capitalist sustained-yield forestry, not only during the 1950s-early 1970s, but right up until the current period of environmental and social contradiction.

First, however, it should be acknowledged that even at the height of what Wilson (1998) calls the "development juggernaught" there have been those in Squamish who have questioned the ecological impacts of this industry. Sometimes such impacts simply could not be ignored. For instance, though Weldwood had promised to find a use for its waste wood, markets for sawdust and bark were few and the cheapest means of disposal turned out to be burning. For many years, the company did just that, ignoring the complaints nearby residents of poor air quality and 'clouds of soot'. Eventually, however, legal action was taken and in 1970 the company relented and offered to shut the burner down (Squamish Times, December 20, 1967; September 23, 1970).

Also, during the early 1980s the dispute over pulp mill discharge focussed attention of Howe Sound and the problems caused by the mills at both Woodfibre and Port Mellon. Woodfibre, in particular, was targeted as one of the worst mills along the coast. Workers at Woodfibre, through the PPWC, were involved in the coalition that eventually obtained a drastic reduction in effluent toxicity and the currently shaky promise of zero AOX discharge (see Chapter 4).
Later in this decade, Squamish’s longest lived environmental group, The Squamish Estuary Society, was formed to protect and rehabilitate the environmentally critical habitat at the mouth of the Squamish River. It took a plan to develop a deep sea port for the shipment of coal, sulphur and wood products, to spur Squamish residents to take action on the sorry state of the estuary which had been degraded by dredging (to enable log transport), mercury and chlorine spills from a chemical company that supplied the wood industry, and the accumulation of bark that formed under the log booming grounds.

None of these issues, however, has found a great deal of support in the community and none has directly confronted the forest industry: the burner issue was one of public nuisance more than a pollution issue, the AOX issue was fought in Victoria and Vancouver and the Estuary society, sustained by the work of a small core of committed individuals, has met with much indifference and some hostility from the general community.

Most important here is the profound silence that has surrounded wilderness issues. Given the rapid loss of old-growth forests in the area, and given that this has been accompanied by a loss of forestry jobs to technological change and wood shortage, this silence is curious. Given the rise of wilderness politics across the province, this silence speaks volumes.

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227 See our following chapter.
Squamish: Forestry Town

The early history of the town of Squamish suggested several different futures: until WWI destroyed hop markets, the valley drew many for agricultural purposes; at times prospecting and the ore deposit at Britannia suggested a mining economy and throughout this time the passage of visitors to Garibaldi and up towards Green Lake suggested the importance of that new phenomenon ‘tourism’. However, sometime during the early 1960s, right at the upswing of British Columbia’s ‘development juggernaut’, Squamish became a ‘logging town’. The TFL was awarded and the new sawmill built. Woodfibre closed its company town and most of these families moved into Squamish. When other manufacturing businesses opened they supplied the forest industry with chemicals or equipment. During this time the town expanded rapidly with new families drawn by the lure of steady, well paying, union jobs.

The new industry produced not only jobs, pulp and two-by-fours but also a community identity as a working-class forestry town. These were jobs in the forest industry, an industry that forms a critical part of the mythology of the province. It is quite likely that Squamish was the first community to establish a ‘Logger Days’ festival. Today ‘logger’s sports remains the central and most widely known component of an

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228 It should be noted, however, that very little of the machinery and supplies for the forest industry is produced in British Columbia. The failure to develop ‘backward linkages’ was highlighted in Marchak’s (1983) early work and little has changed.
expanded Squamish Days festival (which includes such themed events as a ‘Whistle Punk Youth Dance’, a ‘Haulback Hoedown’ and a ‘Logger Style Breakfast’).

However, the forest industry factories, the factories in the forest and Squamish’s sprawling new subdivisions would be unrecognizable to the ‘homeless, womanless and voteless’ logger of yore. Squamish developed as a logging town under the sign of sustained-yield forestry: a stable future of good jobs, a perpetual forest within which many would work, and one from which many more others would draw the resources upon which they worked. To the day, the discourse of municipal politicians and of forestry workers has championed the forest industry as the bedrock of a prosperous and stable community.

Long after the reality of social and ecological contradiction helped to shatter such industry boosterism in other areas of the province, those in Squamish have been able to point to significant indicators of continued success. While the industry has ruthlessly shed labour through mechanization, the area’s late introduction to modern forestry created a buffer of old-growth forests available for exploitation. Problems of underemployment have been ‘solved’ by expanding the limits of a limited resource – technological advances and higher timber prices opened up inaccessible or ‘uneconomic’ forests and, more critically, allowable annual cuts were increased to maintain profits and jobs.

As the century drew to a close, however, Squamish found its fate caught up in the social and environmental contradictions of capitalist forestry. When it became clear that limits were being approached (and here the environmental movement must be credited for
supplying a much needed corrective lens) and the state started to scale back the speed of forest conversion. The impact on forestry workers and their community could hardly be avoided.

Some of this impact, at least on a community level, was blunted by Squamish's particular place, geographically and economically, within the province. At least since the 1970s population growth in Squamish came in the large part from people who were willing to commute to Vancouver in exchange for the lower property values and 'small town feel'229. Similarly, workers from the recreational resort of Whistler, priced out of the real estate market in that town, have taken up residence in Squamish. At the very time when employment in the forestry sector was rapidly declining in the area, Squamish maintained significant population growth.

To a lesser extent this population growth was also a result of the diversification of the local economy. A burgeoning recreation and tourism sector built around rock climbing, white water rafting, mountain biking, heli-skiing and sightseeing developed alongside commercial facilities which service the Sea-to-Sky corridor. Especially after the temporary closing of the sawmill in 1998, town officials and the local Chamber of Commerce have attempted to lure non-forestry sector jobs to the area. Film production has increased and while recent proposals to create a ski-resort on nearby Brohm Ridge

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229 It is estimated that almost 3 000 people make this daily commute. As available public transport focuses on the tourist trade, virtually all of these trips are in automobiles. The environmental impact of this traffic and its required infrastructure should be of note.
and a private university are floundering both suggest that services and recreation will play an even greater part in the economic future of Squamish.

These changes in economic base have altered both the social, cultural and physical landscape. Many of the new jobs are non-unionized, provide lower wages, require a different skill set and are either not considered gender specific or are considered ‘women’s work’. The reality of a family wage, paid to a male ‘head of household’ has withered in Squamish.

Physically, Squamish has adopted a type of suburban sprawl not unlike that of most North American towns of its size. Townhouse developments line the corridor between Squamish and Brackendale. New developments of large generic homes creep up the hills on the south side of Highway 99. Along the highway the fast-food franchises, gas stations and strip malls will soon be joined by a ‘factory outlet’ shopping centre each attempting to grab the attention of the thousands of tourists flocking to Whistler and beyond. The environmental consequences of this development, though very different than that of the forest industry, are no less real: auto dependence has been reinforced, farmland and forest has been paved over or cleared for ski-runs, single family housing developments have replaced forest landscape with pesticide and fertilizer dependent lawnscape. ‘Wilderness’ trails have been degraded by thousands of tourists and local ‘weekend warriors’ and wildlife has been driven out.

Though posited as necessary and positive changes, they have not been welcomed uncritically. The tension between those making their livelihood in the forest sector and
'newcomers', either commuters or those employed locally in service sector jobs, has become the focus of many local debates and put the town under a media spotlight.230

More critically, the economic changes that have rolled over Squamish have disproportionately affected forestry workers. While the community might grasp at new industries to prop up a troubled tax base, and forestry companies might downsize or shift production to 'greener', less regulated, pastures, forestry workers have fewer options. As mechanization and reduced cut levels took their toll, union contracts have protected senior workers and the thinning ranks of Squamish's workers have gradually aged.

Programs such as Forest Renewal have provided some with retraining but the options are limited, usually involve a significant reduction in wage and benefits and are culturally unappealing (a subject to which will return in the following chapter). Forestry workers are not only left underemployed but find themselves uncomfortable in a dramatically altered physical and cultural environment.

During the last decade of the century, Squamish, like many other British Columbian towns, is facing hard questions of what it might be. Both the local political scene and the words and actions of forestry workers reveal that many, if not most, in Squamish hope to retain both the image and reality of Squamish as a logging town. A not insignificant part of this political response is the ongoing struggle to support the forestry

230 Newspaper articles with such provocative titles as "Squamish: The suburbs move south" and "Squamish: The Next Whistler" have become common (See Vancouver Sun, November 6, 1999, C1; Vancouver Sun, August 5, 1995, A1; Sea to Sky Voice, August 27, 1995, 1).
industry against all critics, including those who criticize the environmental impact of this industry.

In the following chapter we will capture this struggle as expressed in the voices of environmentalists and forestry workers. Here though we must acknowledge that as this working-class, industrial, forestry town faces both an influx of 'white-collar' professionals and mainly younger workers in the tourism and service sectors, local political debates become shot through with discursive, cultural constructions of class. The idea that Squamish is a forestry worker's town is a critical component of what many mean when they say that Squamish is 'not Whistler' and certainly 'not Vancouver'. 
Chapter 9

Butchers Hippies and Other Truths: Forestry Workers and Environmentalists on Forestry in the Squamish Area

The conflict over forestry in the Upper Elaho valley and surrounding areas is but the latest in a series of disputes that have dominated environmental politics in British Columbia. As we have earlier discussed the ‘nature’ of wilderness politics, we begin this chapter with but a very brief outline of the political decisions and the most notable strategies and incidents that have marked this latest campaign. The purpose here is to provide a sketch of the incidents so often referred to in the words of environmentalists and forestry workers that follow\(^3\).

The major part of this chapter, then, consists of these words: organizers and supporters from environmental groups working to preserve the forests of the Upper Elaho valley from industrial logging and forestry workers working in these forests (and on the trees that come from these forests) both talk about what it is about this area that is special and what a good future for the area and its peoples might be. Above all else, we find that

\(^{231}\) All interviewees were promised anonymity. The following abbreviations, followed by an interviewee number, are used for identification purposes: WW (woods worker – those whose principal work is part of the logging process); EGM (environmental group member); PMW (pulpmill worker); SMW (sawmill worker); LA (labour activist – those who are not forestry workers though who were active in the local labour movement); IWA (IWA spokesperson); PPWC (PPWC spokesperson); Share (Soo Coalition spokesperson).
environmentalists and forestry workers do have very different ideas of this area and the place of industrial forestry. If anything, the words and actions of our interviewees suggest that the conflict in the Upper Elaho Valley is one between forestry workers and environmental groups.

We close the chapter with a brief analysis of forestry workers' and environmentalists' voices, an analysis that underscores the manner in which capitalist forestry produces simple and powerful reasons for forestry workers to oppose measures that reduce capital’s flexibility to ameliorate social problems by continued or increased exploitation of the forest. Moreover, we understand that the geography of economics and the geography of class is laid over the rock and earth geography of the Lower Mainland — that there is a literal, cultural and economic distance between the industrial working class in Squamish and the supporters of environmental groups (who are concentrated in the Vancouver metropolitan area). We suggest that while 'dull economic compulsion', as we call it, cannot be ignored, this compulsion operates within a field of political struggles. Returning to the themes of our previous chapter, we argue that the political projects of capital, environmental groups, and forestry union locals are all crucial to an understanding of the support of forestry workers for forest companies. In the end, with a nod to the discussion that follows in our final chapter, we avoid the attempt to prioritize

232 Of course, our previous chapters make clear the fact that this conflict is not only between these groups. Nor, as the history of labour-environmental movement relations informs, is such a conflict necessary. Each of these ideas is elaborated in this chapter and in our conclusions.
either the economic or political moments of this conflict, opting for the dialectical relation of material grounding and political possibility.

A Short History of the ‘Stoltmann’ Conflict

In 1994, almost eight decades after mountaineers first brought attention to the spectacular scenery of what is now Garibaldi Park, Randy Stoltmann, a climber and adventurer, started the current campaign to preserve an area that includes the Upper Elaho valley. Known as a reserved and certainly non-confrontational reformer, Stoltmann was killed the following year in a ski-touring accident. After this death, environmentalists led by those at the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WCWC) named the area in his memory.

The profile of this contested area was raised substantially in January 1995 when the Wilderness Committee took on this area as one its principal campaigns (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 17 no. 6). By the summer, The ‘Stoltmann Wilderness’ was the focus of the Wilderness Committee publications and volunteers were flagging a

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233 In deference to the fact that this area remains un-ceded land, we agree that any naming is the right of First Nations. The Squamish refer to the Upper Elaho itself as Nsiiy̓-nitem tl’a sultch. See Squamish Nation (2001)

234 The organization has taken to this shortened name after beginning activities in Ontario.
hiking trail up the Elaho Valley and reporting on the activities of Interfor in the Simms Creek area.

The Stoltmann campaign coincided with the creation of a Regional Public Advisory Committee (RPAC) which was created by the provincial government\textsuperscript{235} and charged with the task of recommending new protected areas in the Lower Mainland. This thirteen-member committee had representation from industry, the IWA, the British Columbia Lands Branch, Lands Use Coordination Office and several mainstream environmental organizations including the Federation of BC Naturalists, the BC Wildlife Federation and the Canadian Park and Wilderness Society (\textit{Georgia Straight}, November 9-16, 1995, 7).

The RPAC process suggested the province’s confidence that smaller, focused processes, could achieve the sort of politically palatable, consensus decisions that the CORE process often could not. The Lower Mainland committee operated under very strict limits: to recommend new parks that would bring the areas total protected areas from 10.5 to 13 percent (and no more), and to reach a consensus on these areas which would not be later criticized by those involved. As the participation of some very prominent environmental organizations demonstrated, many did indeed ‘buy into’ this.

From early on the Wilderness Committee served notice that it would remain a harsh critic of RPAC, insisting that RPAC was a backroom affair with unreasonable

\textsuperscript{235} See chapter 4.
terms of participation and that it was structured to trade-off one important area against another (Georgia Straight, November 9-16, 1995, 7; WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 15 no. 15, Winter 1996). Over the year, as roads moved into Simms Creek, the Wilderness Committee mixed trail building with demonstrations against RPAC.

In April 1996, immediately preceding the provincial election, an RPAC decision was announced. Two new parks were created: one in the Clendenning in the Squamish watershed and another in the Upper Lillooet valley to the east. Two of the most contentious areas, Simms Creek and the Upper Elaho valley, remained within TFL 38. With officials from the IWA, industry and several environmental organizations in support, RPAC argued their recommendations were a result of significant compromise on all fronts. An IWA representative to the Lower Mainland committee later described the decision as “the best possible, striking a balance that not only ensures conservation but also avoids the extreme disruption to communities and the regional economy” (Vancouver Sun, May 13, 1997). The ability to find such ‘moderate’ solutions to the ‘war in the woods’, along with fears that a ‘pro-business’ Liberal government would reignite protests, certainly played a role in the reelection of the NDP under Glen Clark in 1996.

236 All were considered ‘moderate’ environmental groups with a heavy representation from hunting and recreation organizations. The environmental groups at the RPAC table were the B.C. Wildlife Federation, the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, the Outdoor Recreation Council of B.C., the Federation of B.C. Naturalists and B.C. Wild (Georgia Straight, November 9-16, 1995, 7).

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The Lower Mainland RPAC process did lessen, or at least displace, conflicts between environmentalists and the forest industry and the province. For some time the most heated arguments seemed to be amongst organizations that supported the process and those that did not. The Wilderness Committee railed against the RPAC decision as a betrayal of Vancouver's closest wilderness. Meanwhile, much of the movement, including prominent players such as Greenpeace and the Forest Action Network (FAN), turned their attention to the Mid-Coast, dubbed the Great Bear Rainforest.

This rift, however distracting, only focussed the attention of the Wilderness Committee on the Squamish area. Over the summer the Wilderness Committee published an 'Educational Report' entitled "Stoltmann Wilderness – Save the Entire 260,000 hectares"; completed a trail up the Elaho, across an alpine plateau and down to Meager Creek; organized trips into the area, including a series for artists; kept a close watch on road building and harvesting in the Tree Farm; and presented a petition signed by twelve thousand people who supported the larger protected to Paul Ramsey, the Minister of Forests.

237 Participating artists then donated works for an auction supporting the Committee’s Stoltmann campaign.

238 The Committee, and others, have kept a vigilant watch over work in the Tree Farm and has filed several complaints with the Forest Service, and launched lawsuits based on alleged infractions of the Forest Code (see WCWC Vol. 15 no. 15 Winter 1996). While the company considers these actions a nuisance, some workers have suggested that it keeps the company honest. A worker made it clear that, "we do everything to the letter of the code up there; we know we’re being watched" (Author interview WW 4).
However, and perhaps testament to the temporary success of RPAC and the Protected Areas Strategy, the ‘war in the woods’ in the summer of 1996 was one of position and strategy more than direct conflict. Direct action campaigns were absent and protests were muted. Throughout the winter and early spring, slide shows were presented by the Wilderness Committee across the province, and an auction of art created in and inspired by the Stoltmann raised funds for the campaign.

The woods were not to remain quiet for long though. Early in the summer of 1997 Interfor was working quickly to bring the Upper Elaho into its harvesting area, pushing the logging main further up the valley and harvesting cutblocks here and in Simms Creek. The Wilderness Committee responded with an expanded campaign announced in their spring newsletter entitled ‘Join the Fight and Save the Ancient Rainforest Valleys of the Stoltmann Wilderness’. This was to be a struggle on many fronts as trail building and maintenance were accompanied by the construction of a ‘research station’ which volunteers would use while mapping and studying the old-growth ecosystem of the area.

Other environmental organizations were taking an interest in the area. Most notably, Peoples Action for a Threatened Habitat (PATH), formed the previous summer by those frustrated with the lack of progress on the campaign, had taken on the Stoltmann as their premier issue. A small, loosely-organized group, PATH did not limit itself to the strictly legal forms of protest that were adhered to by the Wilderness Committee. In
1997, PATH was predicting a hot summer of blockades and other civil disobedience measures.

Meanwhile, a very different organization, the Witness Project, was also generating interest in the Squamish area. This project, run out of a Vancouver community centre, brought together members of the Squamish nation, artists, photographers and renowned British Columbian mountaineer and educator John Clark. The Witness Project coordinated weekend trips in the Squamish watershed where participants took part in art projects and discussion groups.

Despite the momentum of the environmental movement it was forestry workers who took the spotlight in the summer of 1997. After a brief blockade by environmental activists that closed the road into the TFL on June 16, a coalition that included local IWA members and the local Share group (the Soo Coalition) took most everyone by surprise and set up their own blockade. Just past mile twenty four, workers and supporters set up camp forcing anyone wishing to proceed up the road and into the valley to sign a petition to premier Glen Clark that insisted environmental protesters be held liable for workers' lost wages and benefits and called for the deportation of foreign nationals taking part in logging blockades.

By most accounts the blockade had the support of the majority in the community of Squamish, support that included not only that of workers and family members from

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239 This placed the blockade near the beginning of this popular recreational area.
both the IWA and the PPWC, but also that of the local Chamber of Commerce and most local politicians\(^{240}\): a petition circulated around the town and businesses and homes began sporting signs in support of the areas loggers. At a rally marking the dismantling of the Blockade on July 23, the mayor of Squamish, Corrine Lonsdale, proclaimed her pride in the action telling a crowd of three hundred: “I just can’t believe how this community has rallied together to get behind this issue the way you have. We have our parks, we have our working forest, let’s get on with working the working forest” (*Lumber Worker*, September 1997, 6). An IWA representative concurred, arguing that “We are a community. This wasn’t just loggers, there was everybody from all walks of life. It was business people, it was Squamish merchants, it was people who came from all over to help us out [and] that realized that jobs are what’s most important to British Columbia” (*Lumber Worker*, September 1997, 6). To the day, forestry workers express considerable pride in the success of the blockade, an action that has entered into community lore.

Others in Squamish were disturbed by what has been described as the coercion and anti-democratic effects of this action. In one particular incident town councillors on a tour of the Tree Farm were dropped off at the blockade and expected to sign the petition. Many claim that local businesses were forced to either demonstrate their support or risk

\(^{240}\) A minority of councillors, who had run on an opposition slate and were much more sympathetic to environmental matters, refused to sign the petition. Taking such a stance within the reigning political climate of Squamish was a risky act. It was widely reported that one councillor had received death threats (*Globe and Mail*, July 26, 1997, D9). Similarly, businesses that refused to express support for the blockade faced unofficial boycotts.
boycott and that debate and discussion of environmental issues became more difficult, if not impossible after the blockade. It does appear that the blockade, while certainly an expression of worker frustration, also served to increase the worker versus environmentalist rhetoric. The Squamish blockade was featured in the *Lumber Worker* (alongside the blockade of Greenpeace ships) as part of a ‘Fight Back for Forest Jobs’ campaign which branded environmental activists as ‘eco-terrorists’ (*Lumber Worker* July 1997, 3). Indeed, a feature of the blockade was a ‘wall of shame’ naming environmental activists. The closing of the blockade was marked by the words of the president of the Soo Coalition who, pointing to a small roadside counter-protest, exclaimed: “The people over there (WCWC and PATH) would like to see us out of work . . . and that’s the bottom line” (*Lumber Worker*, September 1997, 6). Prominent environmental activists claim that incidents of threats and assaults, not unheard of before, had become more common during and after the blockade.

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241 These criticisms were voiced mainly in interviews with those in Squamish working on environmental issues. A local resident active in efforts to preserve the Squamish Estuary described the situation as such, “There have been times ... where if a business owner didn’t sign a certain petition their business was blackballed. If they did sign a certain petition their business was blackballed. If they didn’t put this in their window their business is blackballed ... There is a broad paintbrush ... environmentalist equals bad” (Author interview EGM 1).

242 Joe Foy, director of the Wilderness Committee, described how he endured death threats at the office and thrown stones and intimidation both in the woods and in town (see *Globe and Mail* July 26, 1997). At one point, intimidating posters went up in Squamish with photos and names of activists working in the area (Author interview EGM 401).
Even organizers, while publicly taking much pride in the largely peaceful nature of the blockade, acknowledged that the decision to end the action was due, in a large part, to the possibility of violence. One organizer recalled: “I honestly believe that we could have kept that blockade up for a long time, we probably could have kept it up for months, but the reality is the longer we kept people there, the more chance [there] was for something to go wrong and somebody was going to get beat up” (Author interview WW 1). Another concurred adding: “Everybody wants to pound on these people and they were right there in our faces and it would’ve happened” (Author interview WW 2).

While for the rest of the summer of 1997 the Stoltmann campaign remained rather low-key, the issue was far from resolved. During the fall cutblocks and road building took place in areas of the Simms Creek valley and the Upper Elaho, respectively dubbed by the Wilderness Committee as the ‘Magic Grove’ and ‘Grizzly Grove’ (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 17 no. 1, np). This introduction of industrial logging into areas that had become symbolic touchstones for the Stoltmann campaign was used to reinvigorate this struggle at a time when it appeared that there was little hope of reversing the RPAC decision.

It might also be added that this period also marked the heightening of animosity between environmentalists and the local RCMP. The RCMP refused to ask the blockaders to leave and the Wilderness Committee took legal action, though the case was dismissed as it failed to reach the courts before the blockade was removed.
The events of the summer of 1997 also provided a stark reminder that forestry workers had a real stake in these events and had become a central player in the dispute. Their message that forestry jobs were important to their families and their communities had much appeal in a province that was in the midst of a mild, though persistent economic downturn. While these issues were never completely ignored, environmental groups markedly increased the place of employment arguments within their rhetoric. From this point on, the debate became more explicitly one that linked economic and ecological futures. The events of the following year served to push this relation to the fore.

Much of the economic and political context for the Elaho conflict changed between the fall of 1997 and the following year. Perhaps proving the old public relations adage that no publicity is bad publicity, the logger’s blockade raised the profile of this area both as a potential protected area and as a hiking destination. The Wilderness Committee took this opportunity to shift the focus of its campaign to the national level and expanded its proposed protected area to include almost 500,000 hectares. The Stoltmann Wilderness was now touted as a national park. On the one hand, this move reflected the Committee’s resolution that the provincial government was not about to

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243 Of special note is the very sympathetic article in Beautiful British Columbia (Summer 1998), a tourist magazine that had developed a wide readership outside the province, and for which such a piece marked a decided shift in editorial stance. See also the Vancouver Sun (September 9, 1998, F7) for an article dedicated to hiking in the Squamish valley.
budge, however, it might also be traced to a recognition that the campaign needed to more
vigorously address community fears of job loss for (with an eye to Banff) a national park
suggested much more in the way of economic benefit.

However, it was the closing of Interfor’s Squamish sawmill that had the greatest
impact on this conflict. As the forest industry attempted to weather the collapse of Asian
economies that served as important markets for dimensional lumber, the Interfor mill
found itself particularly vulnerable. Years earlier, under Weldwood’s ownership and in
the face of restricted access to U.S. markets, the mill had been retooled to meet the
demands of the rapidly expanding Japanese market. This took some commitment as these
customers demanded different lumber qualities, and sizes. For several years the payoff
was handsome however the mill was left susceptible when the ‘Asian flu’ hit British
Columbia’s forest industry. As we have earlier discussed, this economic crisis provided
much of the industry with an opportunity to restructure: smaller, less-efficient mills were
shut down, production was consolidated, and the provincial government ‘streamlined’ the
Forest Practices code. In Squamish, this restructuring brought the closing of the sawmill
in July of 1998 – one hundred and sixty jobs were lost.

While sawmill closures, or drastic production scale-backs, were not at all
uncommon – one longtime millworker described his work history as governed by “that
five year cycle where every five years you end up on shutdown” (Author interview SMW
1) – this time the situation appeared ominous. Nobody seemed willing to suggest that
either Asian markets would rapidly recover or that the softwood lumber dispute with the

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U.S. would be resolved in a way that allowed any sort of significant increase in Canadian exports. During the summer of 1998, few were willing to predict a speedy reopening of the mill. Though technically the workers were on indefinite layoff (at one point the mill quickly opened to chip some wood), many were suggesting a permanent closure244.

Meanwhile, Interfor and the rest of the industry began to consolidate milling operations and lobby for the ‘flexibility’ to export raw logs to hungry American mills – actions that complicated the jobs versus environment dilemma. In Squamish, for example, while the sawmill was closed logging in the TFL remained open and in 1998 another nine kilometres of roads were pushed into the Upper Elaho (Pynn 1998b, 16).

Throughout the summer, the Wilderness Committee, which had largely given up on obtaining any sort of support from Squamish, or even from the provincial government, worked on building support in Whistler and the neighbouring communities of Pemberton and Mount Currie, areas that were seen as most hospitable to the pull of ‘eco-jobs’ from the National Park project. Ten thousand mail-in opinion cards were distributed up the valley. Other facets of the campaign also received attention as a research camp was reestablished245. As tree surveys were taken, Neville Winchester, an entomologist from the University of Victoria, declared that a stand of Douglas Firs was unlike any that he

244 It was rumoured at the time that the indefinite layoff was simply a way to avoid paying severance packages to workers (Author interview LA 1)

245 The camp had been destroyed during the blockade. In the fall of 1997, the structure was deemed a ‘permanent’, and thus illegal, structure by the forest service and was rebuilt using different materials.
had surveyed to date (WCWC Press Release, August 28, 1998). Building on this, a well-known team of wildlife biologists, Wayne McCrory and Cam McTavish, were commissioned to undertake a survey of grizzly bear habitat in the area.\textsuperscript{246}

While none of these actions were particularly innovative, each took on a particular hue under the light of the closed mill. Now environmentalists could point to a particularly startling dearth of jobs from the Tree Farm Licence. While there was much debate over the quantity and quality of jobs that might come from a National Park, promises by Interfor to produce stable employment had lost much credibility. As the industry argued for the ability to export larger quantities of raw logs, and Interfor itself stepped up such exports, environmental groups could barely contain the 'I told you so's'.\textsuperscript{247}

As the Wilderness Committee emphasized the employment possibilities of a National Park,\textsuperscript{248} and thus suggested some sympathy for those facing job loss in the forest

\textsuperscript{246} See McCrory and McTavish (1998)

\textsuperscript{247} Environmentalists were quick to point out that with the closure of the sawmill Interfor was now logging in TFL 38 and not even meeting the most minimal obligations as set out in the original granting of this licence, a situation that left the Forests Minister, David Zimhelt, with the power to take away the licence, or to exact other penalties (i.e. reducing the companies share of the AAC).

\textsuperscript{248} The National Park campaign gained some momentum during 1998 including support from some Liberal M.P.s. Charles Caccia (Davenport) introduced a private members bill calling for the creation of a National Park in the area and along with Clifford Lincoln (Lac St-Louis) and Karen Kraft Sloan (North York), lobbied the tourism minister of the NDP government on this issue (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 18 no. 7).
industry, others made more dramatic gestures. In late October, a prominent member of PATH managed to tie himself to the mooring lines of the ship *Oriente Victoria* in Vancouver harbour and a banner reading “Log exports equals job exports” was draped from an anchor (*Vancouver Sun*, October 31, 1998). Over the winter PATH threatened a resumption, and increase, of civil disobedience.

It is difficult to discern how these actions were read in Squamish. The Wilderness Committee extended their highly unscientific ‘opinion card’ survey to include the community and argued that many residents were now in support (WCWC *News Release*, August 20, 1998). Joe Foy, suggested a link saying, “Perhaps it’s Interfor’s sawmill closure or perhaps people have taken the time to drive up the Squamish Valley road and see the area for themselves and decide that they want some of the old trees spared” (WCWC *News Release* August 20, 1998). The committee also made the claim that an earlier door-to-door canvass garnered the support of one-third of Squamish residents. On the other hand, it is fair to say that many forestry workers were very sceptical and the IWA itself was completely dismissive. Of the PATH/FAN action, Kim Pollack (IWA) could only say “We know they don’t care about jobs and workers in this community, they just care about high action stunts” (*Vancouver Sun*, October 31, 1998).

In July of 1999 environmentalists public relations bonanza, and millworkers grief, came to an end. After intense lobbying by the IWA, the Soo Coalition and the Squamish town council, the sawmill was reopened. In a now familiar pattern, this reopening came at a price: the mill’s projected employment was now placed at a maximum of 135, down
from the 185 jobs that were eliminated at its shutdown. One of the mill workers, while happy to be returning, nonetheless could only reflect on the loss that accompanied the occasion and lamented that, “We lost a lot of good people” (*The Chief*, July 20, 1999, 1).

Importantly, the deal brokered to enable the mill reopening also included a clause that allowed Interfor to extend log exports to almost 300,000 cubic metres and to increase its harvesting on the Sunshine Coast and Vancouver Island to a total of 740,000 cubic metres.\(^{249}\)

If the reopening of the mill came as a relief to forestry workers and all those who supported continued logging in the Tree Farm, environmentalists had little to show for two years of struggle as the RPAC decision had yet to be altered in any way. While record winter snowfalls delayed the progress of harvesting and protesters, another ‘long, hot summer’ was soon underway. By July activists had established a roadside ‘witness camp’ just outside of an injunction zone that Interfor had obtained to limit such protests and a familiar game ensued where those willing to face arrest would enter the blasting zone and all work would be forced to cease. Soon tree-sits began, where protesters would use climbing equipment to scale trees in the immediate work area and either wait to be arrested or, on occasion, flee before arrest.

Tensions ran very high in the valley late in the summer and in August protesters began to complain that harassment had intensified. Using a satellite phone, website and

\(^{249}\) The portion of this increased cut that remained, after the log export quota was filled, was to be milled in Squamish and other interior mills.
electronic mailing lists, the pleas for support and 'witnesses' became rather frantic. On
August 10 the PATH website included the following diary:

August 10, 1999

7:41am - Red Ford Crew Cab drove up the road near cam. As soon as our
video camera was evident, the vehicle backed down the road. The driver
yelled up,
"Good morning, Fuckhead!"

12:05pm - A blue & white ford crew cab with the Interfor logo on the
doors drove up to camp with 4 people in it. The driver yelled at the camp,
"If I ever see you on the street, I'll kick the shit out you." As they backed
down the road, they met up with a protester, and tried to intimidate
him by speeding towards him. They then threw water on him.

1:35pm Two Ministry of Forests employees came up to check the protest
site. They said it was by the company's (Interfor's) request.

1:45pm Dave Miller, Operations manager for Interfor-Empire Logging
Division and another Interfor employee came to the camp to see what was
going on he walked around and saw the climbers in the trees, and left.

Late this morning two women protesters driving back to Vancouver were
called "whores" by Interfor employees. More and more protesters are
arriving daily, the treesits are becoming a tree village.

Stay tuned!

On August 11, 1999, one of the most violent conflicts between environmental
protesters and forestry workers in British Columbia took place. While accounts differ,
and the matter is now before the courts, what was clear is that the PATH/FAN camp was
attacked by 70-100 men in Interfor trucks. Protesters endured significant injuries and five
men employed by Interfor have been charged in the incident. While roundly condemned,
the IWA refused to join in this criticism instead stating that “We don’t condone what happened, but we certainly won’t apologize for what happened out there. These people aren’t fighting for the TFL, they’re fighting for their families, their children, their jobs” (The Chief, September 28, 1999).

Within days of the violence the camp had been rebuilt. Interfor, meanwhile, had pledged to teach employees how to avoid such conflicts and had erected a banner reading “Welcome to Our Tree Farm: We pledge to work safely, peacefully and responsibly in your forest” (The Chief, Sept 28, 1999, 3). Nonetheless, with the resumption of treesitting and blockades, reports of harassment, assault and the sabotage of Interfor property continued until the camp was abandoned in the fall as the weather worsened. By this time thirteen protesters had been arrested\textsuperscript{230}.

\textsuperscript{230} It is within this context that the following interviews with forestry workers and environmentalists took place. While environmentalists continued to vow that the campaign would continue, Interfor’s plans for logging in the Upper Elaho had faced only minimal interruption. Interviews were carried out over the winter of 1999 and the spring of 2000, when logging was halted allowing all room for reflection. Nonetheless, tensions between forestry workers and environmental groups in the area remained disturbingly high and both were wary of making public comments. See Appendixes 1 and 2.
Making the Stoltmann

It is something of an understatement then to concede that in Squamish, as in so many other places in British Columbia, environmentalists and forestry workers have come into conflict over logging issues. Though environmental activists and forestry workers alike suggest that this dispute is not one of absolutes, that the conflict is only with ‘radical environmentalists’ or ‘redneck loggers’, this opinion fails to capture the persistence and intensity of the dispute. Put simply, Squamish environmental activists working to preserve the Upper Elaho are opposed by (amongst others) forestry workers who largely support Interfor’s plans to proceed with logging in this area.

In the following two sections, through interviews, public statements and other available documents, we present the arguments of environmentalists and of forestry workers and their unions. We will trace how each understands the value and future of the forests and communities of this area and how each understands the nature of the conflict. Though largely leaving our analysis to the next chapter, it will be clear that these understandings are substantially shaped by a capitalist forest industry that encourages, and indeed demands, that choices be made between preserving wilderness and preserving forestry jobs.

This is not at all to say that this forestry worker/environmentalist dichotomy is immutable. In the final section, inspired by labour and environmental activists in the area
who have directly confronted this dichotomy and who have begun articulating links between movements, we analyse both the material underpinnings of this conflict and its political and cultural construction.

**The Environmental Movement and the Construction of the Stoltmann Wilderness**

We have earlier noted that the environmental movement in British Columbia includes a diverse range of organizations which differ widely in their ideologies, structures, tactics and in the social composition of their memberships. Though only a subset of these organizations has been actively engaged in the campaign to preserve the Upper Elaho and area, this diversity is of some importance. The highest profile organization, the Western Canada Wilderness Committee, is a membership based organization that is best known for its colourful, ‘educational’ newsletters, the publication of books containing dramatic images of forests and forestry practices, and for its construction of hiking trails into threatened areas. The Wilderness Committee has been criticized within the environmental community for both being uncompromising and for being too timid (as the Committee has steadfastly refused to engage in civil disobedience). Peoples Action for a Threatened Habitat (PATH), Forest Action

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251 During the Clayoquot protests there was some friction between the Committee and the Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FoCS) who were engaged in mass civil disobedience. Meanwhile, in the Upper Elaho dispute many activists, some who have worked with WCWC under the banner of PATH, FAN or Friends of the Elaho, have engaged in tree sits and blockades. The Committee’s ‘neutral’ stance on these activities has led critics to suggest that they are merely a front group that enables others to do ‘the
Network (Vancouver) (FAN), and Friends of the Elaho (FOE), are much smaller, rather ad hoc groups, who have engaged in direct actions such as treesits and road blockades, as well as hosting a roadside ‘peace camp’. Many of the individuals taking part in these ‘actions’ are only loosely, if at all, affiliated with one or more of the organizations.

Such diversity precludes the identification of one consistent voice that speaks for the movement but amidst the cacophony of sometimes contradictory voices one can draw out something of a harmony. Movement activists do tend to agree on a range of values that they are working to preserve, they have more or less coherent visions of the movement, its allies and its opponents and they suggest a limited number of reasons for the environmental problems they identify.

Why the Elaho Needs to be Preserved: Environmentalists On The Need To Preserve Ancient Forests and Wild Space

Just a 3-hour-drive from Vancouver (200 km north), touched by the headwaters of the Squamish and Lillooet Rivers, is a stretch of wilderness unique in the world (WCWC Vol. 14 no. 7, Spring 1995).

This opening salvo of the Wilderness Committee’s campaign to preserve a 260 000 hectare version of the ‘Stoltmann Wilderness Area’ underscores a theme that forms the core of wilderness politics in the province – the scarcity and uniqueness of ‘wild spaces’. This message, in turn, can be divided into three interconnected arguments for the preservation of the Upper Elaho and the Stoltmann Wilderness: (1) that this area is one of dirty work'.
the last examples of a globally rare forest type, (2) that industrial forestry has ensured that this ‘untouched’ area is unique and rare to the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, and (3) that logging this area will destroy important habitat necessary for non-human species.

First, it is argued that the Upper Elaho and other areas of the Stoltmann Wilderness contain un-logged coastal temperate rainforest – considered a quite rare forest type to begin with. In North America, these forests originally stretched from California to Alaska, however, those of the U.S. Northwest have largely been harvested and today the most significant remaining tracts of ancient forest are found in British Columbia and Southeast Alaska. That the Stoltmann area contains such forests has become a necessary part of environmentalists’ plea for its preservation.

The key words ‘ancient’ and ‘rainforest’ thus find their way into most discussions of the importance of this area. In the previously cited WCWC newsletter it was argued that “It took millennia for the temperate rainforest of the Stoltmann Wilderness to reach its complex climax state of today.” And, writing in a travel magazine, Joe Foy described the Upper Elaho Valley as “the regions largest remaining valley bottom ancient temperate rainforest” and proceeds to describe the global scarcity of this forest (Foy 2000, 6).

The spotlighting of particular features of this forest type, especially the groves of very old Douglas fir and western red cedar, has come to anchor the campaign The Wilderness Committee has spent much time and energy mapping the area, identifying pockets of exceptionally old trees and building trails to these sites. In Simms Creek Valley a trail wound past ‘Magic Grove’, and in the Elaho, ‘Serenity Grove’, the Elaho
Giant, and the Douglas Fir Loop have become highlights of a network of trails that lead up the valley, across an alpine plateau and down to Meager Creek.

As the campaign wore on, and as cutblocks have intruded deeper into the proposed protected area, this theme has gained prominence within the larger Stoltmann campaign. In the summer of 1999, after core samples revealed precise dating, the campaign to ‘save the Stoltmann’ had become that to ‘Save Whistler’s 1300-year-old Douglas Firs’. A newsletter thus began with the dramatic statement: “What do the Roman Emperor Hadrian, the Prophet Mohammed and a grove of Douglas fir trees near Whistler, British Columbia have in common? They were all born about 13 centuries ago” (WCWC Vol. 18 no. 7, Summer 1999).

However the Stoltmann campaign has not rested on the blanket appeal to ‘save the rainforest’ as much as did the Clayoquot Sound protests or as do current campaigns to preserve the mid-coast area of the province (tagged the Great Bear Rainforest by some environmentalists). The higher elevation and generally drier forests of the Upper Elaho (let alone those drier still in the Upper Lillooet) do not produce the surreal, huge trees and dripping mossy forests that are the familiar icons of rainforest campaigns. Moreover, the relatively small area of lower elevation forests and the lack of the huge, entirely intact

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252 Note the planetary references in the following WCWC description of Clayoquot Sound: One of the largest continuous tracts of ancient temperate rainforest left on the planet is found in Clayoquot Sound on Vancouver Island. Its “crowning glory” is, at the same time its nemesis – the huge trees with strong wood that make the best lumber in the world” (WCWC Educational Report Vol. 13 no. 5). It must, though, be emphasized that both the Clayoquot and Great Bear campaigns have also recognized local features.
watersheds of other areas undercuts the importance of the Stoltmann campaign to the battle over rainforest preservation\textsuperscript{253}.

What is emphasized by environmentalists then is the uniqueness of the landscape on a more local level – that this ecosystem, is exceptionally rare in the Lower Mainland. Mountaineer, environmental educator, and Stoltmann advocate John Clarke describes this uniqueness:

Timber companies and the B.C. Forest Service have been challenged to come up with similar Douglas fir/western redcedar forests on the mainland, but they can’t, the Stoltmann Wilderness has the last of them ... Many people think that there’s one great expanse of untouched forest all up the coast from the Vancouver area. They couldn’t be farther up the mark. As you fly up the mainland coast from Vancouver to Bella Coola, stretched below you is one of the World’s grandest and most intricate coastlines. Your eyes search the fiords for an unlogged valley, but until you reach Kwalate Creek in Knight Inlet, every valley running in tidewater has its system of roads and clearcuts”. (WCWC \textit{Educational Report} Vol. 14 no. 7).

Leading a Witness tour of logging in the area, Clarke reiterated this message. After heading up a winding logging road, and a lengthy walk through large areas of clearcut and relatively youthful second growth, visitors were led to a small area of old growth. Clarke remarked that such patches of old growth, left behind rocky outcroppings and on odd, inaccessible parts of the valley side, are all that is left of original un-logged forest. Moreover, it was suggested that “with stereoscopes these things jump right out

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{253} It might be noted that the ‘rainforest’ designation is more frequently used when targeting international concern. In an ‘adventure travel’ magazine targeted at visitors to British Columbia, Joe Foy firmly places the Stoltmann within the struggle over the last remaining temperate rainforests (Foy, 2000, 6-9)
\end{footnotesize}
and poke you in the eye. There are guys all over the province staring at these maps because these old-timers are worth so much they can come in and heli-log a spot like this. They’re down to the skin and bones, picking ...” (John Clarke, July 1999, author’s fieldnotes).

It is argued then that the Elaho represents one of the last opportunities to preserve a large area of valley bottom, old-growth forest in the Lower Mainland. A retired forest industry employee, and one of the few in Squamish willing to publically support the protesters, underscored this point by noting with some dismay that during his lifetime the nearby forests were all logged “from the bottom right up to the snow.” He argued that “Every stick that is standing in old-growth should be kept for as long as possible, because there is simply not that much left anymore”.

Establishing the uniqueness of the Upper Elaho and other areas within the boundaries of the Stoltmann provides a necessary base for those who argue for the preservation of this area in some sort of park or other form of protected area. Environmentalists argue that there is a soon-to-be-lost opportunity to protect an endangered ecosystem and its non-human inhabitants, to provide for the recreational

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254 From the beginning the Wilderness Committee has argued, first for a provincial park, and now for a national park. Others have noted that because of the legal and moral claim of the native peoples of the area, that a tribal park or other designation would be most appropriate. In all cases, industrial logging is expected to be excluded. This, of course, leaves open the problem that would result from a native claim that involved such harvesting, a possibility made more real by the recent approval of cutblocks by the Squamish.
needs of a growing regional population, and to develop a sustainable eco-tourism economy.

Of all reasons offered for the protection of this area, none is issued as clearly or has resonance across all sectors of the movement as does the plea to protect a threatened ecosystem. As a whole, the Stoltmann area is said to contain a diversity of habitats and landforms representative of the Coast mountain region and existing nowhere else in the lower mainland. The preservation of this area is said to be critical to the survival of many species of plants, animals, birds and insects. In the summer of 1996, under headline “A Wildlife Paradise” the Stoltmann was described as follows:

The 260,000 hectare Stoltmann Wilderness is a rich mosaic of oldgrowth forests, alpine meadows, marshes, rivers and glaciers. All together it’s a lot of ideal fish and wildlife habitat!

The four big pristine valleys – the Upper Elaho, Sims [sic], Clendenning and the Upper Lillooet – all have outstanding fish streams. .

B.C. government biologists have estimated the numbers of some of the large wildlife species inhabiting the Stoltmann Wilderness at 8 grizzly bear, 700 black bear, 55 moose, 240 mountain goats, 8 wolves and 15 cougars. This is a ‘wildlife roll-call’ unequalled by any provincial park in the Lower Mainland.

The Stoltmann Wilderness also contains a number of species made rare by habitat destruction elsewhere. One of these is the Keen’s long-eared bat, found in the low elevation forests of the Elaho, Sims, Clendenning and Lillooet valleys. This bat, which depends on oldgrowth forests for its nesting habitat, is red listed (classified as endangered) by the B.C. Environment Ministry.

The extraordinary variety of wildlife found in the Stoltmann Wilderness should come as no surprise. After all, the Stoltmann Wilderness is the biggest wild area with the largest extent of oldgrowth forests left on B.C.’s southwest coast. (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 15 no. 10).
Three years later, on the side of a road pushed well into the Upper Elaho, an activist supporting those engaged in treesitting, cited the protection of biodiversity as the premier reason for why these actions were necessary:

It’s about biodiversity. In order to maintain biodiversity in an area it has to have a link with another, to other wildernesses, and this one is going to get cut off, wildlife won’t be able to move around and migrate and there won’t be [genetic mixing]. That probably didn’t get out very scientific sounding but biodiversity [is about] trying to save what is left, of their community, of the natural community of animals, a forest community. [Now], it’s just genocide. (Author interview EGM 4)

Demonstrating both the biodiversity and the loss after clearcut logging has become a key component of the Wilderness Committee’s Stoltmann campaign. To this end the Committee has provided a ‘research station’ and facilitated biologists and other scientists willing to work in the area. Announcements have been made about the potential wealth of insect and other life in the forest canopy, and sightings of rare or endangered species are regularly publicized255. As we will see in the following section, this emphasis on biodiversity and habitat protection has led critics, including the IWA and many forestry workers in Squamish, to charge that ‘human’ concerns, especially the importance of these forests for employment in the Squamish area, have been ignored.

255 While there can be little doubt that the Wilderness Committee places much value on the preservation of threatened habitat and endangered species, they also clearly understand the powerful public relations value of science. As one director explained, “people want to see some guy in a fancy coat, before those people were religious figures, now they’re scientists” (Author interview EGM 2).
While we will return to this debate, it is clear that the plea by environmentalists to preserve the Upper Elaho and the larger Stoltmann Wilderness often includes much discussion about the economic and employment benefits of not clearcutting old-growth forests.

To this end, in a recent publication the Wilderness Committee cites a trinity of conservation, recreation and tourism values when touting the potential as a national park (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 18 no. 7). It is claimed that a park, or other protected area, would provide the benefits of wilderness experience to people of the Lower Mainland and beyond and that tourism could provide jobs and economic opportunity for the nearby towns of Squamish, Whistler and Pemberton.

The position of the Wilderness Committee on the employment benefits of the Stoltmann park proposal is clear: in 1996 a publication bluntly declared that "Wilderness Preservation Saves Jobs" and that "contrary to what logging proponents claim, clearcutting the Stoltmann Wilderness would preserve fewer jobs than it would destroy". One of the arguments put forward is that tourism jobs are increasing in the area, but that much of the potential will be lost along with the old-growth timber in the Upper Elaho and other valleys of TFL 38. Statistics showing a three-hundred percent increase in tourism jobs in the Squamish-Whistler-Pemberton corridor during the 1981-91 decade are cited alongside a twenty-five percent reduction in logging and milling jobs (WCWC, Vol. 15 no. 11, Spring 1996).
Here the Wilderness Committee offers an argument that is repeated by many environmentalists: that tourism, especially eco-tourism, provides hope for forestry dependent communities that have recently been faced with mill closures and a rather steady loss of employment in the woods. A former pulp mill employee looked at the problem of employment in Squamish this way:

Well, my take on it would be that we have reached that point . . . if they're continuing cutting all this timber down the way they are, they'll be nothing. Not even a tourist attraction. Not even anything to teach forestry with, because it will be all knocked down. There will no longer be any old growth. And there is so little that is left that it should be kept for that purpose. For tourism and for teaching. I don't think there is economic value in what is left. (Author interview EGM 3)

Similarly a Wilderness Committee director argued that:

... For the youth there's tremendous potential. Like these people that take rafting trips. I mean they're making a lot of money – they make enough money all summer to take off to Mexico for a few months. It's quite a different lifestyle. Maybe there's less money but it's still a very good living wage and the thing is cutting down the old-growth isn't going to last forever. It is a one-way trip and when you get to the last, biggest old tree, it is way better to tour people by them than to cut them down. (Author interview EGM 2)

It is more than inaccurate, however, to suggest that environmentalists see tourism as a panacea either in the Squamish area, or anywhere else\(^\text{256}\). Most every discussion of

\(^{256}\) Indeed, many of those from groups such as PATH, FAN and Friends of the Elaho are adverse to the notion of a park (a spokesperson at the treesit would only describe that option as the lesser of evils saying that "it would be a shame but it would be better than mowing it down" (Author interview EGM 4). The Wilderness Committee is most aware of the environmental problems of tourism and has argued against new ski hills and other tourism projects when they threaten parks or other wilderness areas.\)
the employment problem turns also to the need to reform the forest industry itself. The Wilderness Committee, for example, while promoting the tourism potential of large new protected areas, also maintained the position that a restructured forestry sector could provide jobs. WCWC argued that their park proposals would remove only one-third of TFL 38's timber volume and that a more labour intensive forestry might be practised on the remaining forest - especially if these lands were turned into some form of community forest. Facing the renewal date of Interfor's Tree Farm Licence, WCWC suggested:

... The entire 260,000 ha Stoltmann Wilderness can be preserved as a park. Timber cutting rights for the rest of the TFL#38 lands should be reallocated and placed under local community control. Companies that value-add manufacture wood products locally should be guaranteed a wood supply and all timber cutting agreements should stipulate the use of labour-intensive eco-forestry methods, not clearcutting. We can preserve jobs while saving the entire Stoltmann Wilderness. (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 15 no 11).

Citing similar arguments, the Wilderness Committee also supported Whistler's bid for a community forest (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 18 no. 7).

Nonetheless, critics are certainly correct when they claim that immediate concerns about employment and alternative forestry are secondary for the environmental groups working in the area. Discussions about the possibility of ecotourism or the necessity of alternative forestry practices are meant to demonstrate that the goal of preserving wilderness is compatible with more utilitarian goals of providing work and wealth to the

257 For the most thorough enunciation of WCWC's position on jobs and the restructuring of forestry see the winter 1993/4 publication, "How to Save Jobs in the B.C. Woods" (WCWC Educational Report Vol. 12 no. 8).
people of the area and of the province. However, the need to preserve wilderness for its own sake – the defensive struggle to draw lines around ‘what is left’ – is the core around which environmental groups and individuals (with sometimes wildly different world views) have mobilized to protect the Stoltmann area.

A director of the Wilderness Committee captured this best when speaking of why wilderness issues dominate environmental politics in the province:

Way back in 1981 it was wilderness issues that got me involved. I can only look at myself. I felt that from the days I was a teenager that I spent hiking until something finally snapped, that when I went hiking in the wilderness it was like I went to a different planet. It was an awesome experience on a lot of different levels. And I knew from my Mum who had emigrated from England, and from talking to other people, that this was not an opportunity that everybody on the planet still had. And there’s a lot of debate now, which I engage in, about tourism, about health and water and all that, and to be quite honest with you, it was and is and always will be this ability to go visit the natural world. It’s an awesome, awesome thing. (Author interview EGM 2)

Though wilderness advocates have different ideas about the future of the area (the Wilderness Committee supported a National Park, others argued that all humans should be banished from this wilderness, and still others supported the establishment of a ‘Tribal Park’ in which First Nation’s might engage in traditional uses), their cooperation is founded upon the need to preserve the ‘wildness’ of this place.
Environmentalists on the Source of Conflict

Many environmentalists active in the Stoltmann find it rather difficult to understand why, given the uniqueness of this wild space, anyone would oppose its protection from industrial forestry. This feeling was captured by a prominent activist arrested twice for breaking court injunctions limiting protest in the area:

Every single person I know is worried about the environment: they’re worried about the ozone layer, they’ve worries about herbicides and pesticides . . . They’re worried about the destruction of the forests, of fish. Some will zero in on one aspect of this but it is there. My personal belief is that we are all environmentalists, because we’re all humans and we have to live with this. The only ones who are not are those who are so caught up in their own personal power, in their personal greed, that they have quite literally divorced themselves from the responsibility of what they do. (Author interview EGM 5)

Of all those who support industrial logging in the Elaho and other areas of the Stoltmann, environmentalists of all stripes identify large forestry corporations as the actors most ‘caught up in their power’ and thus responsible for the threat to such endangered spaces. In this campaign virtually all of the logging in contested areas has been undertaken by Interfor within its Tree Farm Licence area and the company has become a symbol for all that is wrong with industrial forestry. In each and every newsletter the Wilderness Committee has tied Interfor to the destruction of old-growth forests in the area. In the summer of 1999, a Wilderness Committee newsletter summed up this criticism:

The best and most unique part of the proposed Park’s oldgrowth forest is being rapidly destroyed. The situation is desperate. For the past
four years, International Forest Products (Interfor), a large Vancouver-based timber company with logging rights in the area, has been systematically targeting the finest ancient forests of the proposed Stoltmann National Park. Every time conservationists have identified a particularly beautiful or ancient grove of trees, Interfor has ruthlessly bulldozed in a road and mowed them down.

Now Interfor machinery is grinding its way towards the grove that contains the oldest known living Douglas fir trees in Canada. (WCWC Educational Report, Vol. 18 no. 7)

Though Interfor came in for particular criticism (one Wilderness Committee supporter could only refer to them as “the worst of a bad bunch,” and up at the tree sit, activists could barely contain their disgust), some attempt was made to link the actions of this company to systemic problems of the forest industry. In 1995 the Wilderness Committee, referencing sociologist Patricia Marchak, noted that:

In reality the economy is dominated by a very few large corporations which have access unavailable to smaller companies to resources, transportation, and means of marketing goods; and government acts, and has always acted, as a support for these corporations” (WCWC 1995, Vol. 14, no 7)

A situation WCWC described as “industrial greed and short-sightedness abetted by government policies”. One year later this systemic problem was enlarged to include organized labour:

The Stoltmann’s forests are coveted by powerful forces – multinational timber corporation International Forest Products (InterFor), timber-union giant International Wood Workers of America (IWA) and a provincial government that seeks social appeasement rather than ecological sustainability. (WCWC 1996, Vol. 15 no. 11, 1)

The inclusion of the IWA within this systemic problem of industrial forestry raises an issue that often goes unsaid in Wilderness Committee publications but is widely
acknowledged by those working to preserve the area: that when the forest industry is blamed for the destruction of oldgrowth forests this blame is also aimed at forestry workers and their unions as component parts of this ‘industry’.258.

However, as is apparent in this quote, the Wilderness Committee is careful to avoid a blanket condemnation of forestry workers and focusses instead on the IWA. Here the Wilderness Committee only echoes a sentiment that runs through the environmental movement that the union is a firm ally of the large corporations in their struggle to maximize access to the remaining old-growth forests of the province. Environmentalists active in the Squamish area have little time for any talk about the IWA save for stern condemnation:

The union [IWA] they’re in management’s pocket and they’re going to stay there until the union hierarchy leaders decide that something is not satisfying to them. I’ve been in unions before and they can be very ineffective unless there is a strong showing from the people in the union. I’m sure that if there was a big enough uprising with the workers . . . if there was enough resistance there, then maybe the union would do something but I highly doubt it because of what the IWA like – they screwed the guys in the mill; they didn’t fight at all. (Author interview EGM 4)

The IWA is more indicative of union thinking today than say Pulp and Paper [PPWC] . . . The big unions, the powerful ones, are against the environmentalists because . . . they are analogous to the big companies, they have the same mentality that flow back and forth flow of power . . . of power to rearrange the landscape and make money off of it. (Author interview EGM 2)

258 As noted, and as we will further explore, attitudes towards the IWA and the PPWC differ substantially – it is the IWA that is considered as the principal ally of the forest industry.
They encourage the hatred of the loggers towards environmentalists, and really, their leadership! You can’t tell any difference in the leadership of the IWA than the logging companies CEOs. And really, Jack Munro is a really typical sample of the thought of the IWA and the Forest Alliance – they’re interchangeable . . . It’s a piss poor union. (Author interview EGM 5)

A director of the Wilderness Committee was blunt:

I tend to think the natural allies are the unions and their employers: they’re the natural allies. They’ve got to stick together and it’s them against us. (Author interview EGM 8)

Though uniform in the condemnation of the IWA, many environmentalists exhibit a marked ambivalence as to whether the ‘anti-environmentalism’ of this union is a structural problem of unions in general or a specific failing of the IWA leadership. This is not of minor importance for the former view places forestry workers squarely within the ‘industry’ while the latter suggests that forestry worker’s opposition is, at least partially, the result of the current political context. This ambivalence marks the views of the Wilderness Committee to the point that, while not at all hostile to labour, they spend little energy courting union support. The smaller activist groups, whose members are generally younger, and seldom have had a history of working with or belonging to unions, share this ambivalence. While support is declared for forestry workers, the IWA is considered part of the problem to be battled.

Given the antagonistic relationship between environmental groups and the IWA, it is not surprising that in popular discourse the conflict in the Elaho becomes one between ‘loggers and environmentalists’, with the former being a conflation of the company and
its workers. Nowhere is this conflation more apparent than on the blockades themselves for it is here that workers doing their job are confronted by protesters attempting to stop this work. Blockades and tree sits in British Columbia seem always to engender some level of hostility between workers and protesters and in the Stoltmann this level of hostility is as great as anywhere. Here, physical assaults of one form of another have occurred with distressing regularity\(^{259}\).

Despite this hostility, many activists do argue that they are sympathetic to workers’ situation. One activist, with some experience in civil disobedience described the situation as such:

The company is in charge and it is the company that tells the workers what to do . . . The company gives them lots of propaganda and the workers get all riled up because the company says ‘well they’re stopping us working, they’re taking away the jobs, we can’t continue and you know this is the only job you’ll be able to get’. So the issue becomes jobs, when it isn’t. But there is so much tension between us and them that we can’t meet and talk and do any conflict resolution, which is what we are working on. We are trying to get a meeting together but it is so aggressive, it’s awful. The harassment is unbelievable and this is a peaceful protest. . . . We’re not trying to shut them [workers] down, but we’re here to shut the company down. We’re here to talk about alternative economic development. You know, these people love to come out to these woods . . . to visit the woods, not extract them. And it’s gone. Have you seen that map? It’s [the Upper Elaho] is the [largest] piece left in the lower

\(^{259}\) On my visits to the Upper Elaho (at times when there were no active tree sits, the road was open and blasting and road construction went on unimpeded), epithets were exchanged with workers and balaclava attired young men talked in conspiratorial tones about the loggers who were “snooping around in the forest”. Though it must also be noted that attempts were made to tone down anti-worker rhetoric and ensure that protests were carried out peacefully and with respect.
mainland, and they’re just mowing it down. And it’s a company’s
decision, not the people in this community. (Author interview EGM 4)

This activist even found it difficult to blame workers in general for the hostility at the
blockades:

The Interfor foreman . . . who is just a nasty, nasty horrible man . . . or at
least he plays the role very well, comes in and harasses us every morning .
. . for two weeks. He came and harassed us every single morning.
[Workers] would come up with him, you could see that they were not
following his lead . . . [The foreman] was being very aggressive, and
annoying and stuff like that. They were very quiet and looked for his
instructions and when he would ask them to say something they would say
it is very quietly. I could just tell, it’s my perspective, that they were
loving human beings and not into being aggressive. (Author interview
EGM 4)

While such expressions of sympathy were often forthcoming from
environmentalists working to preserve the Stoltmann area such understanding was tightly
circumscribed. Indeed as often as not activists at the blockades and those working with
the Wilderness Committee, expressed a resignation that workers were either dupes of the
IWA leadership and the industry, or were simply, and inevitably, led by their paycheque.

One Squamish environmentalist, when asked if workers were much concerned
about environmental issues answered simply:

No, I don’t think they are. . . . There would be a very small minority, a
very small number, of those people genuinely concerned about
conservation and wished they didn’t have to cut the trees down. But even
they won’t talk about it because they are afraid. They’re afraid they’ll get
fired. They’re afraid they’ll get beat up. I think they just close their minds
and go out and cut the trees down and take their paycheques and don’t
really care that much. (Author interview EGM 6)
This attitude toward workers reveals itself most starkly when environmentalists are asked what solutions they see for forest workers who might be displaced by set-asides and protected areas. On the one hand, there is always talk of the potential of tourism as we have discussed, and certainly within the movement there is a hope for 'new economy' jobs in everything from high-tech to education. On the other hand, environmentalists from both the Wilderness Committee and from the activist groups are quite emphatic that it is not their role to offer such solutions, let alone make them happen. As one very prominent environmentalist said:

Number One: I don't feel that I have to offer anything. That's not my job. My job is to keep the last of the old-growth forest from disappearing on the face of the earth. ... They're big people, they'll have to figure that out. ... I can't feel sorry for people who have had it better that I have had for most of my life. (Author interview EGM 2)

And at the peace camp another activist echoed this response, saying:

Frankly, I don’t really think that it is the environmentalists' movement or the activists' job to find an economic solution. That is not our main concern. That is not why we are here. We are here to save the animals, and save the trees, and save this area. I mean this is the last part on this earth and it's going to be gone in a couple of years. (Author interview EGM 7)

Instead, environmentalists argue that it is the third partner/supporter of the current 'unsustainable' forestry regime that should be providing options to these workers – government. As the activist quoted directly above continues:

So the economic solution does not boil down to us, though we're making that extra effort in coming up with solutions to be discussed, alternatives to offer them ... I think it is the government, I think it is their problem.
Who supports ... an economic system like this? I sure don't... But the
government says that we need to have jobs, right? Therefore, it's their
problem and they can come up with [solutions]. (Author interview EGM 7)

Workers and the Working Forests of the Soo

One really cannot talk with forestry workers in Squamish about the Stoltmann
Wilderness. For forestry workers this label is a foreign creation that environmental
activists use to lump together areas that they call the Tree Farm, the Soo, the forest, the
bush and their backyard. The 'foreignness' of this name echoes the 'outsider' status of
environmentalists and the general agreement that such 'radical preservationists' have
little reliable knowledge about these areas and the work that goes on in them.

While the claims of environmental activists are challenged on virtually all fronts,
none of these challenges is more striking than that of the uniqueness of the area and value
of 'wildness'. Many forestry workers criticize the very core of environmentalist
assumptions, offering a deep skepticism about the inherent value on either old growth
forests in particular, or 'wilderness in general'. Here, a well-known objection is raised:
that old growth forests are decaying or dying forests. A sawmill worker explained:

A lot of the old-growth forests are growing basically dead. A lot of the
things that the environmentalists are saying are only for sight. I mean, it
looks nice enough but for how long? These things are rotting. I mean
anything that old will eventually deteriorate. So a lot of these trees that
they are saving are deteriorating. (Author interview SMW 2)
Speaking of the particularly old Douglas fir known to environmentalists as the Elaho Giant, a logger could only chuckle and say “it is basically a snag, you know, it’s something that’s not even commercially viable and they’re running around like it’s some kind of God. Well, okay, we put a little circle around it and left it there” (Author interview WW 2). Later this same logger suggested that one of the principal problems with the provincial forest industry could be traced to the fact that “we’ve got too much old-growth”, that “most of the forests we log, there’s a good percentage that is decadent timber and there’s a certain amount of waste associated – some of those trees are not useable” (Author interview WW 2).

Relatedly, the idea that huge areas of such forests, along with subalpine and alpine areas, should be placed in parks or other protected areas is often questioned. Such workers actively criticize proposals to set aside wilderness areas for any other than their recreational potential.

We have literally thousands of people that visit our tree farm each year. Thousands! And they do it because there’s loggers. If it was wilderness, they wouldn’t go there. I mean like Joe Q. Public wants to drive somewhere, get out of his car and camp or go on a little day hike (or do whatever they do), but if it was all a wilderness park, like the Clendenning, nobody goes there. (Author interview WW 1)

Another logger adds:

That’s the irony – it’s just so mind boggling to us. Why can’t we have both? We can have a huge tree farm. We can have a recreational area. We can set aside little places with special big trees. . . . Who the hell goes into the Upper Elaho. Nobody goes up in the Upper Elaho because there’s no roads in there. That park has been set aside, there is 18 000 hectares – 30 000 on both sides but nobody goes in there. There’s probably a handful
of people that actually hike through the park. These are real hard-cores. (Author interview WW 2)

Even the more utilitarian idea of habitat preservation comes under some criticism by forestry workers in Squamish. The 'tree worship' of environmentalists is roundly attacked with one logger summing up,

I think people are more important than trees. I think families, societies, towns, anywhere up and down the coast, I think that those people who live there are way more important than the trees that are growing there. If people treated other people the way they want to treat trees, it would be a hell of a lot better place to live. They care more about those trees than the bloody people who live here. I don't understand that. They're willing to just wipe out an entire town. It's happened all over the place. Just about the whole town goes down when an industry goes, and they're willing to do that, to save those trees. For who? [laugh] (Author interview WW 1)

Another sawmill worker expressed a common complaint – that habitat protection was simply a ploy to shut down the industry:

They used this tactic in Oregon with the spotted owl and basically destroyed most of Oregon by getting the government down there to end endangered species. So it worked there. So they brought it up here and did the same thing. And what they did, they'd have a certain section put aside for research until they could prove the spotted owl was even there or whatever, and then it became something else, then something else. So they kept using some kind of ploy, some animal that was gonna be extinct, and they had to shut down logging. (Author interview SMW 3)

On the other hand, the usefulness of science in making decisions on habitat protection was challenged when another logger argued that scientists' fixation on habitat was too narrow:

There are significant risks in leaving scientists to make those kinds of decisions. It is scary, I mean if somebody's priorities are bugs, then we might not be cutting because there is the potential to eliminate a bug. And
I’m all for protecting bugs to our maximum ability to do so... while maintaining a forest industry. (Author interview WW 3)

It would be wrong to suggest however that forestry workers as a whole dismiss either the notion that wild places need preserving for their own sake, or that setting aside forests for habitat protection is both necessary and good. A logger with many years experience in the Tree Farm argues with conviction:

I subscribe to the notion that it is essential that we preserve the wilderness, I mean wild areas. People use all these words like ‘pristine’ and all that kind of stuff — they’re almost all irrelevant somehow, because in the truest sense, there is no such thing anymore. I think it is important to set aside drainages and significant area, units of wilderness. It’s kind of hard to articulate why exactly. But I just think it’s important; it seems to be essential in some sort of organic sense that we have these things. I think the world would be missing something huge if we didn’t do those things, if we didn’t have significant parks. (Author interview WW 4)

A pulpmill worker agrees, saying:

Yes, my own personal belief is yes and I think I would be speaking on behalf of the local saying ‘yes we do’. We have reasons for that, and some of them would be personal. I’m not ashamed of them. Even though I might never see the Queen Charlotte Islands, when they made Moresby Island and all that a park, it made me feel good that it is there. I think that it’s personal, kind of like a motherhood issue. (Author interview PMW 7)

Despite these differences, the forestry workers interviewed all agreed that the Upper Elaho did not need to be added to the province’s inventory of such protected areas.

It was denied that the contested area is particularly unique or that British Columbia in general, and the Squamish area in particular, needed any further additions to protected areas.
First, most forestry workers raised significant questions about the uniqueness of the Upper Elaho and other areas in question. One long-time logger turned a critical eye to the campaigns to ‘save’ this area saying that during the first ten or so years that he worked in the Tree Farm

I did not see, in all that time, twenty vehicles pull over to the side of the road and get out and head into the bush: it just didn’t happen because there isn’t anything out there that is astonishing or so amazing, or so distinctive or unique or special or anything else that it would bring groups of people there. I mean the thing that draws them out there currently is the WCWC and PATH and the ads they put down at the Coop and stuff like that. . . . It certainly isn’t the Great Cathedral of Europe, which is the favourite metaphor of the moment. (Author interview WW 4)

If fact, what is unique about the area some forestry workers contend is that it is over-represented in the park system. The need for yet another set-aside is questioned by loggers who argue that:

British Columbia has made a decision to have 12 percent of its land mass set aside in parks, and we’re almost there now. We’re over represented here, we’re at twenty-two percent or something now. So I think that everybody realizes there has to be parks but there has to be places for logging . . . . We work in a tree farm that is dedicated for logging and growing and planting trees yet they still want to make a park there. (Author interview WW 1)

In the same vein an IWA representative from the sawmill exuded a common exasperation:

There ARE parks! We have how many parks in B.C. right now? Do we have to make all of B.C. a park for somebody to exploit. What do we do with our citizens? Do we back burner them? . . . And now they’re demanding 600 000 hectares which is basically . . . all from here to Lillooet as a park. Now why does anybody need that amount. (Author interview SMW 3)
A logger concurred:

I think what it is is a lack of knowledge. People see the brochures from WC² 'Oh we've got to save the Randy Stoltmann and we've got to do this and we've got to do that' Well they don't realize how many parks we've actually have. You couldn't visit all the parks in British Columbia. You could make a life's chore of it an you couldn't see em all. But they still want more. That's what's so frustrating. (Author interview WW 2)

Forestry Workers on the Source of Conflict

Given this vastly different vision of the geography and nature of the area, it is not at all surprising that forestry workers also have a very different understanding of the source of conflict over this land. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that behind many heated words there is a broad concurrence that forestry companies are at least the indirect authors of this dispute. Forestry workers widely agree that in the past the industry has sustained profits while largely neglecting environmental limits and memories are especially vivid of the leeway afforded to these companies during the reign of the Social Credit Party. One logger recalls:

The Socreds gave the companies licence to do whatever in the hell they wanted. And they were over-cutting like crazy. The industry just decided what they wanted to do. They logged like crazy and in no time shut things down. [Nobody] had a handle on what was left, they didn't have an inventory, especially on the coast. (Author interview WW 4)

Another ads that forest practices were also a problem:

There was a time, about 15 years ago or so when they relaxed a variety of the standards, relating to waste and so on, and there was a backlash, and deservedly so. At the end of the period there was a lot of waste, there was a lot of logs being left in the bush, being burned in landings and stuff like
that a lot of people complained and that included workers. (Author interview WW 1)

Moreover, forestry workers, understand that the environmental movement has played an important role by attacking such irresponsible practices. As one logger put it:

Most of the companies didn’t have any environmental concerns at all. It was just ‘get the wood in’ . . . the cheapest way possible. There are some good things about the environmental groups because they brought all this stuff to the forefront. They brought to people’s attention what was going on. (Author interview SMW 4)

While in the ‘bad-old-days’ the environmental movement was right to speak out against both the rate of cut and the type of harvesting that was taking place, forestry workers in Squamish are quick to point out just how much things have changed – how much, in essence, the environmental movement has accomplished. Forestry workers from all sectors now have little worry about either the sustainability of the resource or forestry practices. A sawmill worker dismissed concerns about sustainability, saying:

I think that the way things are here with reforestation and all the silviculture that is going on and the way that the companies are – it’s like a garden up there [in the TFL]; you pull out and replant. And I think that now most of the forest companies are doing an excellent job. (Author interview SMW 3)

And about forestry practices:

It’s like anything else, there are the odd mistakes made here and there, but as far as if I looked from 20 years ago [to] what it is today, on a scale of one to ten, you’re up to nine-and-a-half now compared to the old days where you didn’t have these concerns . . . They’re pretty hard codes. The guidelines are pretty tough out there. (Author interview SMW 3)
Here, some credit continues to be given to environmental groups. A pulpmill worker explained that:

I know guys in the bush. I know there’s radicals out there [makes chainsaw noise]. But generally they’re under the auspices of the green movement. They’re under the auspices of the forest practices code itself because they have auditors. The homework is being done and I generally believe we support the way that logging is being done. (Author interview PMW 3)

A feller agreed:

I honestly believe that the environment is being significantly protected at the moment through a couple of vehicles: through the PAS and through the Forest Practices Code. We observe the code to the letter out there. We really do. There is no question about that. The local forest manager is scrutinized like no other person by the WC2 particularly, the Sierra Club or Greenpeace – by a variety of groups. So we don’t even bend the rules really. We just observe them. (Author interview WW 4)

One sawmill employee went so far as to suggest that the work of environmental groups was both beneficial and has now internalized into the harvesting process, making the movement somewhat redundant.

We now have a group of our people that full-time work on the aspects of ‘well, if we cut that tree, what is going to happen tomorrow or six years from now? Are we the right distance from a creek, or are we in an are that we shouldn’t be in?... Now, I think we’re starting to do a lot of the work that environmental groups were doing to us. They were standing back, taking pictures, watching what we were doing. Now, we have people in those roles... (Author interview SMW 1)

If forestry workers ascribe some blame for the ‘environmental problem’ to forestry companies, and suggest that the environmental movement deserves some credit for highlighting this problem, their explanation also forefronts the claim that current
conditions are very different. Now, forestry workers argue, it is environmentalists or at least certain environmental groups that are largely to blame for the conflict over land use. Forestry workers argue that environmentalists are both mistaken about the impacts of industrial forestry and in the type of solutions to the problems that do exist.

As we have already heard, forestry workers offer little support for the claims that larger set asides are needed to protect either habitat or to provide for additional recreational areas or ‘wild spaces’. Though expressing concern for all of these values, forestry workers seem to agree with the ‘twelve percent’ solution combined with the regulations provided for in the forest practices code. Claims put forward by the Wilderness Committee and others that larger contiguous areas are needed to provide for wildlife are summarily dismissed. Putting it bluntly, a sawmill worker argued:

Over the years the forest industry, and most of the companies now, have learned an awful lot from what they used to do. The reforestation, the different cutting programs. A lot of the stuff that comes out in the media right now about logging is not true. I mean, if you really want to research and look into some of this stuff that these guys are actually saying, the protesters, if you really research it, it’s just not true. (Author interview SMW 3)

More philosophically, a logger surmised:

The debate is in the numbers, it’s the percentage, the volume of the stuff. Who’s correct? Who knows? I know that Joe Foy doesn’t know and I don’t know, so I count on the government. . . . We have these numbers right now, it’s twelve or fourteen percent locally, or higher I suppose. What do you think? You’re asking all these questions. What’s the number? Well, this magic twelve percent number somehow popped out of the United Nations recommendations somewhere along the way. But it was somebody’s idea. And, I don’t know that there is any huge volume of scientific work to support that number or that amount, but I have no
objection to it. It seems like a reasonable, kind of sensible, compromise. (Author interview WW 4)

A pulp mill worker, active in environmental issues, and a self-described ‘green’ agreed saying:

This last government . . . they have done a lot of homework as far as the forestry issues go. Now, of course, the green movement says ‘One tenth of what we need!’ and the industry is saying ‘ten times too much’ but I think it’s pretty well in place IF we police it. (Author interview PMW 3)

While the logger quoted above acknowledges that the conflict between local forestry workers and environmentalists is something of a ‘numbers game’, the intensity of this conflict can be attributed to the critical stakes that workers place on the outcome of this game. In Squamish forestry workers are convinced that the fate of their community and the fate of their jobs hangs in the balance: that the future of their employment and Squamish as a ‘logging town’ is linked directly to the percentage of commercially viable forests that are placed in parks or protected areas.

This is not to say that forestry workers are blind to the multiple factors that impact their jobs. When asked about the changes that have had the greatest impact on forest industry employment over the years, forestry workers from all sectors refer to the technological changes and the increased efficiency and mechanization that most environmentalists pinpoint as the cause of the loss of industry jobs. A sawmill worker succinctly cited the most dramatic changes in the mill over his quarter decade tenure: “technological change, technology – labour has been reduced, machinery brought in and
production has doubled". A logger, meanwhile, echoed the claim of many environmentalists in noting that

[t]he cut has decreased, there’s no question it has gone down. However, the cut may have dropped by maybe fifteen percent or something, whereas employment has dropped by 30 or 40. . . . We used to have all towers [now we have] grapple yarders. ... One uses twice as many people to operate. And if the engineering has been done properly ... you’re getting a lot more wood out with virtually half the people. Power saws cut faster, the log loaders load better and faster . . . Per metre, per man, we’re able to harvest many more metres per person per day. (Author interview WW 4)

Nonetheless, while recognizing the importance of mechanization, forestry workers in Squamish suggest that a much more immediate threat is the ‘loss of the working forest’ to park creation. This is the threat that they understand as looming over their jobs. This is the threat that they understand as immediate to their families and their community.

Forestry workers have very little patience for environmentalists that underplay this threat. Every forestry worker expressed worry about the impact of parks and protected areas.

I think everybody realized that there had to be some cut reduction, but the parks had a really big impact on people, especially coastal loggers. The Clendenning, that’s the one that has impacted us on our tree farm licence. (Author interview WW 1)

I would think, and the opinion of most of the mill workers here would be the amount of endangered species problems that cause lack of logging in certain areas. That’s probably the biggest worry here. (Author interview PMW 2)

I mean for every acre that you take out of our area that contains inventory logs, of course that means work. And they’ve set aside tens of thousands of hectares and that’s huge, that’s a huge impact on forestry workers, and not just the forestry workers but the town people . . . People haven’t clued
into it yet . . . Most people in the city are so hard on the forest industry. They can’t really see what is going on. (Author interview WW 2)

The official Wilderness Committee line ... they’re saying we can have both [jobs and environment] right? The last article I saw in *The Voice*, Joe Foy goes, ‘here’s the math to prove it’ and promptly doesn’t do any math and doesn’t really prove anything. I think at least it is currently unavoidable that if they were to get their way out there that it would not cost jobs. It would, there’s just no way around that currently. I think that if they got everything they wanted there, the kind of timber values that would be left in the tree farm licence would significantly shorten its operating life. You would have to really constrain, harvesting would be significantly affected. (Author interview WW 4)

Forestry workers acknowledge that environmentalists propose a shift to secondary manufacturing and tourist sector jobs but they remain unimpressed. The response is twofold: there is much skepticism about the possibility of secondary manufacturing making up the difference, and tourist sector jobs are not seen as comparable. A sawmill worker concurred that secondary manufacturing was necessary for his future:

I think we’ll see mills like this leading to more a value added type product, where we actually produce a lot more finished product from the mill as opposed to sending out any particular size beam to Japan or wherever and sized boards to someone else to manufacture. We’ll actually start doing that finished product ourselves. (Author interview SMW 2)

Yet it was quickly added that this is to be a future project, that “there are no plans for that right now – now we’re just trying to get this place back up and running”. Another logger concurred with this pragmatic approach expressing grave scepticism about the possibility for significant change:

The biggest argument is that there is no around it and [cut reduction/set asides] and it seems like the environmental movement they always think ‘well, you gotta get more jobs per metre’. Well we’d love to do that too,
but you can’t convince the company to get into secondary manufacturing. If they do, they do in the Deep South, where wages are low. They’re very reluctant to get into secondary manufacturing. That... we can agree on with environmental people that we’d like to see also, but it’s just not happening. Because they figure ‘well, you’re gonna lose some logging jobs but you should gain all these secondary manufacturing jobs’. Well that would be great if it was the truth, but it’s just not happening. (Author interview WW 1)

One logger tied the shift to secondary manufacturing to the end of old-growth harvesting in fifty years. He stated: “When we get through that, through this first cut, the second cut that comes off is going to be totally different. It’s going to be probably ninety percent usable... I think it will be value added in the second growth” (Author interview WW 2).

If secondary manufacturing is seen as a desirable though improbable alternate source of employment, tourism-based jobs are reviled as incomparable. The tourist industry is dismissed as producing low-wage, ‘slave labour’ jobs.

Have you ever asked from people you interviewed specifically how much money they made or what income they made? I haven’t made less than $70,000 a year for the last 10 years. I’ve made over $80,000 a year and as my seniority position improves... I can make $90,000 a year. It’s a significant income. I know that there is not one tourist based employee short of an owner of a rafting company or the owner of a couple of rafting companies who makes an income like I do. And I’m not in the top end of the wagers out there. There are people there that make significant more money than I do. On a yearly, on a annual, regular basis, I pay more taxes than those guys make in income. I just know that to be true. Because I have a wide range of acquaintances, and some of them river raft on the Elaho river and they don’t make any money. They are starving. (Author interview WW 4)

Another logger concurred:

You look see what’s happening there now as far as tourist dollars are concerned. There’s river rafters out there. They bring them up the Elaho
... But they don’t pay big wages. There’s not a whole lot of people working there; there’s a guy driving the bus, and there’s maybe 2 or 3 guys in a rubber raft making $10/hour. So, you know, we make good wages. We got all our health and benefits that go with it and pension – the whole 9 yards. The tourist industry which is . . . the McDonalds and Wendy’s, I consider all that tourism jobs. . . . There all low paying $7 per hour jobs! You don’t raise a family. You don’t buy a car. You don’t buy a house. You don’t do anything. . . . The people who work in the tourist industry, there’s only a handful of them making any coin; they’re basically slave labour. (Author interview WW 2)

If the economic advantages of working in the forest industry makes it difficult for such workers to accept the tourist sector as a viable alternative, for many there are cultural reasons that make such a move completely unpalatable. Forest sector jobs are understood as valuable, wealth producing jobs at the heart of the economy, jobs which allow one to economically support a family. The fear of losing this employment is expressed repeatedly with purely economic considerations seemlessly shifting into statements about the qualitative value of a ‘family wage’.

The social economical impact of shutting the forest industry down in this area, and forcing people to get into an industry that they have never been exposed . . . I think most people would be -how would I put this- in a state of depression over that. I don’t see a long term, I don’t see the community really affected positively by this in the long term. I see a bunch of proud people that are being degenerated . . . to a status that they were in before they got meaningful jobs. You know, when they got out of school, [when] they couldn’t afford to buy their car or something like that. I think that’s a sad state, that you could degenerate to that point again, go back there. I call it degenerate. Maybe it isn’t degenerative, some people see it a different way, but I don’t see that as being positive. (Author interview WW 1)

A pulpmill worker suggests a more specific reason why forestry workers might consider this shift “degenerative”:

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Unfortunately that doesn’t do an awful lot for the guy bringing bread because service industry pays $10/hour, $11/hour, so both women and men have to work. Both of them are working long hours and overtime to try to maintain a reasonable income so there is nobody at home to look after the kids. So guess what we’re ending up with here: big city blues. You don’t log in the centre of Vancouver, you don’t mine in the centre of Vancouver, and that’s not going to be in our community. So the quality of life, the way I see it, the way my mom and dad would have seen it is changing. (Author interview PMW 3)

One logger suggested that these jobs support not only families, or even the local community, but the province itself, saying:

They do something, they create wealth for this province. That’s the thing; that we create wealth. This is where the dollar is created here. People don’t seem to understand that. (Author interview WW 2)

Furthermore, forestry sector jobs, especially loggers jobs, are seen as inherently good work. This is work that allows a certain independence and involves a level of physical difficulty, and danger of that distinguishes loggers from the vast majority of workers who lack the necessary physical and mental toughness.

I think that most people that work in the industry are very proud of what they do. They’re proud of the fact that they actually do that. Most people-if you took 90% of the people of a major city or even 90% of the people in this town- they would say: “Get lost!” I couldn’t work out there. (Author interview WW 2)

It’s a good job. It’s well paid. It’s also..it’s kind of independent, you get to run your own . . . you’re a boss in a sense. Fallers historically have been kind of independent. They have often been kind of these sparkplugs catalysts for different labour disputes. They’ve often originated with the fallers and they’ve cultivated this notion of being independent, often to the point of causing internal frictions within logging crews for instance. Fallers were seen as being somehow separate or they think they’re better than everybody else or something [laughs]. (Author interview WW 4)
Again, the loss of such good work, or the threat of losing such work, is a theme that runs through forestry workers talk. It should not be surprising that when directly confronted by environmentalists who see this work as inherently destructive, and who see no choice but an immediate halt to this work, the debate over forestry shifts to open conflict. A principal figure in the blockade expressed candidly how emotionally charged it was to face environmentalists who saw it as their duty to stop him from working.

That [the blockade by environmentalists and the counter-blockade by workers and supporters] was right on the tree farm at 27 mile. We were just going to work and there, all of a sudden, there was a bunch of people chained at a barrel . . . I’ll never forget that day because I realized right away why and how people go to war. I could never understand that before. I could never understand how..you know I’m at the age where if I was an American, I would have had to go to Vietnam: I wouldn’t have -I would have come to Canada (I would have got out of the draft somehow). So when I saw people stopping me from going to work, I realized right away I could go to war. And it wasn’t a good feeling. I mean, you want to eliminate anybody you can, that x, and it’s a horrible feeling because I’m a pretty passive guy. But I could kill. I realized right then that I could kill. And everybody there wanted to [laugh]. Because that’s how you feel when your livelihood is threatened . . . Your livelihood - that’s a basic instinct. It’s like you only got one thing to eat, and somebody wants to steal it. (Author interview WW 1)

Even those not directly confronted by the blockades expressed repulsion at these tactics. A pulp mill worker, long involved in environmental issues within the mill, reflected on his choice:

I’m a green - Hey, I fish, I used to hunt, I spent everyday of my days off . . . in the bush. One of the reason is that I love the bush, but the major reason is I walk my dog, but, you know, I’m in tune with what goes on in the bush. I have been for years. And yet, I stood on a picket line, keeping the Greenpeacers from blocking logging because I knew these were guys that I knew that had the right to go to work. So I took a political stand.
there even though I don’t want an old growth tree chopped down. I know that tree, 672 years old, and it’s majestic, I want to put my arms around it too, you’re following me? I’ve made that choice. I’ve made that decision those 2 days that my buddy’s gonna go to work because he has the legal right to do it. We cannot be totally anarchist here. . . . The green view that a tree should live because it’s been there a long time and there’s not many left of it - I can understand, but objectivity, “shit, I’ve got bills to pay!” This is the bottom line. . . . Tough problem, man. (Author interview PMW 3)

Explaining the Conflict Over Forestry in the Upper Elaho as One Between Environmentalists and Loggers

In laying bare the conflict between forestry workers and environmental activists, and in capturing the ways both speak of these differences, we have set out to demonstrate that the conflict between these groups is real and enduring. This is not a fashionable stance. Putting this claim to members of either group elicits much negative reaction: Environmentalists insist that they speak for the real interests of forestry workers and forestry workers insist that they are the ‘true environmentalists’ and that their conflict is only with radical ‘preservationists’. In the following I wish to clarify my position by injecting a modicum of analysis, by more clearly enunciating the structural and ideological underpinnings of this conflict.

The practice of capitalist forestry in Squamish has produced both ecological and social problems and at least in this historical moment capital retains the ability to resolve (in the short to medium terms) one at the expense of the other. In Squamish, as capital has displaced labour in the quest to maintain or increase profits in ever more fiercely
competitive global markets, the social problem of unemployment has been displaced onto the environment – especially the forests but also onto the water and air.

That this option is available to capital is a question of politics first and foremost. This political reality does not however preclude, and indeed cannot be understood apart from, the dry economic compulsion that draws forestry workers to accept such a tradeoff – where ecological conditions of (re)production are sacrificed to maintain (again in the short or medium term) favourable social conditions of reproduction.

All this is to say that in Squamish forestry workers find their immediate fate tied to the ability of capital to convert old growth forests in the area to dimensional lumber and other commodities. It is wrong, and indeed insulting, to suggest that such workers are ‘dupes’ of the industry. All other factors remaining equal, many forestry workers in Squamish would lose their forest industry jobs if and when capital faced further environmental restrictions through expanded protected areas or through enhancements to forest practices.\(^{260}\)

Moreover, given the current structure of the British Columbian economy, these jobs are not replaceable: restructuring in the forest industry has led to massive un/underemployment in this sector and old-growth forests, which the forest industry has

\(^{260}\) Here we might return to the claim that enhanced forest practices are more labour intensive, a point made by environmentalists and one for which my interviews with forestry workers provided anecdotal evidence. However, as the IWA correctly points out, capital works swiftly to minimize or eliminate this effect. In any case, as the new FPC was introduced just prior to an economic downturn, there remains no clear evidence for either claim.
Historically relied upon for comparative advantage, have largely disappeared. Footloose capital has chosen to site new production facilities in the southern United States and in Asia, which combine the environmental advantage of warmer climates and a low wage, non-union workforce. The skills of forestry workers, though not insignificant, are on the whole not transferable to the tourism sector or even to secondary manufacturing\textsuperscript{261}. And, finally, tourist sector jobs generally offer smaller wages and other economic benefits. A logger spoke of his dilemma:

I'm spoiled I guess. So are my kids. They've got skateboards and bicycles and ski passes and snowboards and whatever. And I guess my expectations are higher than they should be or the reality is hyped. But I don't think that the tourist industry can, with the very occasional exception, provide people like me with that income. So, yes, I hope that the forest industry stays because it provides virtually, not quite everybody, but most people that are involved in it with a good income. (Author interview WW 4)

And as for secondary industry, a prominent environmentalist, was resigned,

Secondary industry is gonna be great for the younger worker, who probably has a high school degree at least and certainly knows how to run a computer, you know, data entry and is happy to work for $15/hour. But your older worker who can't run a computer, who can only run a chainsaw and who's getting too old to be out in the bush anyways: that does not work for him. (Author interview EGM 2)

\textsuperscript{261} One labour activist rightly pointed out that this claim is sometimes overstated as the construction and maintenance of tourism infrastructure suggests some transferability of skills. Of course, here, we end up right back in the soup of politics and ideology.
In the beginning, if not the end, capitalist forestry produces job/environment tradeoffs that are much more influential than many environmentalists, workers, politicians and social scientists admit.

Compounding, or at least complicating the effect of this dull economic compulsion, is that this pull is distributed rather unequally across what Harvey (1997) refers to as a ‘geography of difference’. Political economists, economic geographers, and sociologists have long insisted that understanding the economics and politics (or should that be politics and economics) of British Columbia requires that one face the harsh reality of regional difference and dependency. While the forest industry has worked hard to underscore the message that all British Columbians are equally dependent on the industry, this only masks the very unequal geographic distribution of such dependency.

On the most straightforward level, if there is a certain geography of difference, or perhaps more appropriately a geography of dependence, this suggests that the logger-environmentalist conflict that we have described is a conflict between those who are closest to and most dependent upon the logging process and those that are further away from this process. What is most important here, however, is that ‘geography’ in this dispute is not a mere metaphor – in this conflict the material geography of economics and the geography of class may be laid over the rock and earth geography of the Lower Mainland. Those most directly effected by set-asides are industrial forestry workers in the relatively forest-dependent community of Squamish, those least effected are concentrated in the Vancouver metropolis who do not work in the resource sector. This
geography of difference suggests a material underpinning for the claim that this conflict pits Squamish forestry workers against Vancouver environmentalists and that this division is one of both of geography and class. In Vancouver, an IWA official spoke of worker-environmentalist conflicts in precisely these terms:

> It’s still a forest based community in a very real sense. Historically, it was a forest-based community. It’s becoming more and more of a satellite community for Vancouver but still in all, historically, and until really recently, it was a forest based community there – loggers and sawmill workers and pulpmill workers who were really hit. I guess there was a few fishermen and so on. But from a really working class community, a really forest-based, working class community. And right on the edge of Vancouver. On the one hand here is this highly concentrated working class town and right next to it is the beast (Vancouver) . . . You can see all of this stuff that is happening down here – They see what’s happening and its scares the fucking begeeshes out of them. . . . There’s also overlaid on that a really definite class division and a really definite regional division. So that you have on one side, to put it in it’s starkest form, you have university educated, middle and upper class, green-leaning, urbanites, and on the other side you have industrial workers who have grown up and lived all their lives in a small town outside of the Lower Mainland, or outside of the major metropolitan centres. So that you have a huge class and cultural division. (Author interview IWA 1)

Having begun to enunciate this connection between economic dependency, class and place we might add gender. Those most directly dependent on the forest companies’ access to timber are not simply loggers or sawmill workers, they are part of a forest industry working-class that is virtually all male. Women’s relation to the forest companies, though varying with place and family situation, is generally less direct than that of men, though their economic security is no-less tied to the fate of forestry capital.
Here, though, we return to politics, a subject we have never really left. While capitalist forestry does produce the material grounding for the sort of worker versus environmentalist conflicts that we have earlier traced, the geography of difference of which we are now speaking is a geography of talk as much as it is of trees. Our earlier chapters have suggested that British Columbia has seen historical moments where forestry workers facing similar environment/job tradeoffs have confronted forestry capital and the state with radical political and economic alternatives. In the current moment we have seen how, when faced with ‘job blackmail’ over water pollution issues, the PPWC has managed to maintain and cultivate relationships with environmental groups, and how the Vancouver District Labour Council has worked to forge alliances between labour and environmental movements.

In Squamish there have been labour activists and municipal politicians who have criticized the growing gulf between workers and environmentalists in efforts to bridge the labour/environmental movement divide. These voices escape the worker versus environmentalist dichotomy that we have traced and argue that stronger protection of oldgrowth forests is in the best interest of forestry workers and their community and that corporations and workers have very different interests in the preservation of wilderness. However, while dissident voices from both the past and present alert us to the political construction of the worker-environmentalist conflict it is the ‘slippage’ within

262 See comments from LA1 and LA2 below.
the discourse of forestry workers themselves that is most prescient. When directly
confronted with the question of whether they and the forestry companies share the same
environmental interests, workers offer contradictory responses. On the one hand, as
much of this chapter has demonstrated, forestry workers have come to understand these
interests as linked, even identical:

Well they’re meshing pretty good now. I would say we’re mostly on the
same track. I mean except companies are always trying to do things with
less people that’s for sure. And we’re more or less trying to get more guys
working. (Author interview WW 1)

My personal opinion is I think that the policies of union and company are
very similar. You know, everybody is working, specifically up here,
working very much to a common goal. Our company, especially in
Squamish, has been scrutinized pretty harshly in the last few years with
this...this Stoltmann Wilderness, you know, this kind of stuff. And I think
that company and union have got together and try to find ways, we can
work in an area and allow recreation in the area for people who want a
recreation area and also allow people to come in and do environmental
studies on habitats and logging issues and how they affect that kind of
stuff. (Author interview SMW 2)

We’re all working together on it. We’re all heading for the same end: to
apply the regulations and rules are and to keep people working. You have
to work with the Code. (Author interview SMW 4)

On the other hand, other workers suggest that forestry workers and their
employers have very different, even competing interests. A logger explained:

I think when they think about it, they probably do [have fundamentally
different interests]. I’m not sure all that many of them spend that much
time thinking about it. If you don’t want to operate on a sustainable -on a
commercially sustainable- basis, as a worker, you’re kind of cutting your
own throat whereas as a company can, quite honestly I think, they’re much
more bottom line orientated. They’re much more next order, year-end
oriented. I also think that if the company can plan 5 years ahead, that as
far ahead as they're probably able to see, whereas as an employee, I think that you’re much more likely to consider that you’re working, you know, the longer term or medium term anyways, which would be the 10 to 20 to 30 years you might like to work there, or potential for your kids to work in the industry, whereas corporately, they can maximize the profits from an area and then move on to the next area. (Author interview WW 4)

Acknowledging that many individuals in management had a personal interest in ensuring that they were operating in a safe and ethical manner, a pulpmill worker, nonetheless concludes that the company has a very different take on such matters:

Let me say this about that. [Laughing] The companies major interest is making a profit. We all know that. Right. They’re not there saying we want to give you a job, we want to make sure your healthy and just maybe we might make some money out of this. So their philosophy is to make money. (Author interview PMW 3)

This pulp mill worker, however, agrees with many other workers and environmentalists in signalling a shift in worker opinion over the last few years. Recalling the workers attitudes at the height of the struggle over dioxin in pulp mill effluent, this worker reflects:

I genuinely believe that people were afraid of what was going on to their body because of the environment they are working in. And, you know, we were younger, we were a little bit more scrappier, and we’re more ready to say let’s punch it, so sure, clean it up or else we will shut you down, you know. That attitude was there and I believe that has changed.

I genuinely believe that, that now there is no way, even if I was obeying the law, which I have to do, that if I banged the mill down because I thought that there was an environmental problem that I would have a lot of support from the people. It just wouldn’t happen. (Author interview PMW 7)
Our charge here echoes that of this pulp mill worker: whether Squamish area forestry workers understand their interest in environmental issues as distinct from those of their employer, and whether when faced with job blackmail these workers are willing to challenge their employer depends on the political struggle of environmental and labour movements to articulate a shared project. As this worker’s comments make clear, in Squamish the current political moment offers little sign of such articulation. There are, however, many signs of the political struggle that ensures a climate where such articulation is difficult.

Critics of the local political climate are quick to note that the area’s forest industry has sustained neither forestry work, nor the forest itself. What such critics also suggest, however, is a range of economic and ideological conditions, a political landscape as it were, that make the articulation of labour and environmental movements a particularly difficult task. Here, there are four main arguments: That the forest industry has used significant resources to promote a paternalistic ideology of shared interest; that neither the Squamish locals of the IWA or the local PPWC have rigorously challenged this corporate ideology and that other forestry and non-forestry sector unions have ignored local environmental issues, and that environmentalists have been insensitive to local forestry workers’ concerns.

Certainly, the industry is given much credit for its public relations work. On the most banal level Interfor has produced and distributed materials outlining its forestry practices and its support of rehabilitation projects and promoted tours of the Tree Farm
and the sawmill. Recently, the company has worked to publicize, internally and to the general public, its ISO forestry certification\textsuperscript{263}. However, it is the work of the local Share group, the Soo Coalition, that has drawn the attention of many.

The Soo Coalition, a group that counts amongst its supporters forest tenure holders, secondary industry representatives and other commercial interests\textsuperscript{264}, has been active in government processes, including the PAS, and at the high profile 1997 blockade. While environmental activists have blamed Share groups for inciting and even coordinating violence, these charges are impossible to verify.

In Squamish, the principle success of the Soo Coalition has been through persuasive arguments which equate the interests of forestry workers and the forest industry. One labour activist could only lament: “I think that they have convinced most of the community that they do [represent the Squamish community]. They represent corporate interests and shareholder’s interests, but this is what amazes me, it’s the good job they’ve done” (Author interview LA 2).

\textsuperscript{263} This certification, though dismissed by most environmental groups who favour the competing, and more rigorous standards of the Forest Stewardship Council was trumpeted by sawmill workers and loggers alike.

\textsuperscript{264} Though the membership list is confidential, the Soo Coalition is described by its current director as “made up of all the forest tenure holders and also encompassing the secondary industry that supports the forest industry, as well as private individuals ... who were directly involved with the forestry industry or associated commerce industry or just people at large”(Author interview Share 1).
Some have suggested, though, that Share is ‘a little shallow’ politically and that the success of the Soo Coalition in conflating the interests of forestry workers and their employers is due, at least in part, to the dearth of appositional voices within labour and particularly within the Squamish locals of the IWA and PPWC (Author interview LA 1).

To this end, it first must be recognized that the same dull economic compulsion that pulls forestry workers to support capital in the struggle to maintain the ‘liquidation-conversion’ project of sustained-yield forestry also tugs on the unions that represent these workers. Forestry workers’ unions are representative bodies which reflect the economic pressures on their membership both through their internal democratic processes and through the indirect economic incentive of maintaining a healthy dues paying membership. Nonetheless, we must immediately add that reducing the politics of either union members or the union itself to such a ‘pure economics’ seriously underplays the political breadth of both. At the least, our history of British Columbian forestry politics has illuminated key moments where forestry workers and their unions have clearly escaped such economic reductionism. Here we must insist that the conflict over forest use in Squamish be understood within the larger climate of labour and environmental group relations in the province and refer once again to our earlier tracing of this relation.

265 Here it should be noted that while the IWA has attempted to diversify its membership base, and a representative noted that, as the largest agricultural union in Canada, it has earned the title of ‘green’ (Author interview IWA 1), the IWA remains foremost a forestry union as does the PPWC.
These caveats aside, the Squamish situation is, above all else, notable for the manner in which the forestry worker-environmentalist conflict that we have described is demonstrable across forest industry sectors: loggers, sawmill workers and pulp mill workers appear to share many of the criticisms of the environmental movement and of environmental groups operating in the area. In particular, the significant policy differences between the PPWC and the IWA on environmental matters have not resulted in any sort of high-profile division between Woodfibre’s pulpmill workers, their counterparts in the sawmill, and those in the bush. As a labour activist remarked when responding to the question of how local unions have dealt with environmental issues: “They haven’t [dealt with these issues] at all. While the CEP and the PPWC are doing stuff at the provincial level, they’re not vocal here” (Author interview LA 2)

This relative harmony should not be taken to mean, however, that either inter-union policy differences or that sectoral divisions within the IWA have had no impact. There are, for example, marked differences in how the local leadership of the IWA and that of the PPWC speak of environmental problems, and of the relationship between forestry workers and environmentalists. Local IWA leadership are much more vigorous in their denunciation of environmentalists and in their insistence that the environmental interests of company and worker were largely similar. PPWC leaders did draw more careful distinctions between the interests of the company and its members and were less harshly critical of environmentalists. Relatedly, while the local IWA has flirted with an
alliance with the industry-sponsored Soo Coalition, the PPWC was much more wary of this group's interests.

It might be further noted that local loggers were critical of the more 'preservationist' policies of the PPWC and were suspicious that their counterparts in the sawmill were less likely to take up the fight against further protected areas.

I'm not 100 percent sure on what their [PPWC] policy is but I know there was, a few years ago, a lot of conflict because it seemed to us, when I say us I mean the loggers, is that the guys at Woodfibre thought that wood came in barges. They had no idea where it come from it just came in barges, 'here comes the chips'. 'Cause they were onside on a lot of parks that we were opposed to – they were endorsing parks that were putting our loggers out of work without thinking about where their chips come from. So there was a clash there for sure. When the whole process started happening about Protected Areas Strategies and stuff like that. We were quite shocked to learn that they were onside with . . . the Pinecone Burke Park and a few other parks that got created here. They endorsed it. They thought it was a great idea. Without realizing that hey! You're gonna have one less barge here. Or ten less barges or whatever. So there was a fundamental difference there . . . It's through no fault of their own. It's that they only know their work environment, they don't know. It's the same as the mills. You know there's a difference between a mill worker and a logger . . . Certainly they think about things differently because they have a totally different work environment and workplace and most of the people in the sawmill very rarely, if any of them are out in the tree farm or where the wood comes from. (Author interview WW 1)

Again, however, it is crucial to appreciate that such differences rarely, if ever, are expressed openly. The political climate in Squamish today, including that of labour, remains one where discussion of environmental issues (other than the condemnation of environmental groups) is not encouraged. The local IWA is described by a labour activist
as simply “unwilling to come to the table” and it is argued, this puts a chill over the local labour community as a whole.

Yet, if local forestry labour refuses to tackle environmental issues, environmental groups working in the area have also been criticized for refusing to seriously address the concerns of forestry labour or to engage labour itself. A labour activist described her experience at one of the only events at which PATH attempted to build support in the Squamish area,

PATH had a meeting at the totem ... It was probably before the blockade. A couple of loggers came ... And it was [PATH spokesperson] who got up and did his -interestingly enough- his rant about the wise-use movement and basically, with a few loggers in the room, said to them: ‘You’re nothing but puppets of the Moonies.’ You know and I stood up and said, “You’re making a serious mistake underestimating the sincerity of the local grassroots people. Now I happen to think you’re right, this whole thing has been manipulated from all sides, but you’re not going to have dialogue telling people that they are mindless puppets... of the Moonies.” So I think that mistakes gets made on the environmental side as well – treating loggers and their supporters as though they are stupid, manipulated. And as I said, to some degree I think they are, or they’re foolish and that they are manipulated. But telling them that flat out, [and that is] the only thing you have to say to them, [it’s] not gonna get you on side. (Author interview LA 2)

Before we are tempted to dismiss this as an isolated, though damaging, political faux pas, we should recall the mantra of the environmentalists working in our area: ‘economic solutions are not our problem’. In such a context, it is more accurate to suggest that environmental groups have little or nothing to offer displaced forestry workers except the admonition that ‘in the long run we’re right’. That environmental groups are not responsible for the failures of capitalist forestry to provide steady work and ecological
integrity, or for governments that are wholly unable, or unwilling to confront these companies with environmental and social failings, is of little comfort to a forestry worker facing job blackmail.

At this point, then, we find ourselves faced with a critical decision: is this conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists due to some combination of the failure of political vision (by either environmental groups and/or forestry unions or some combination) and the success of the ideological machinations of capital and its political representatives, or should we turn back to the ‘simple economics’ from which we began? Our answer must be neither: it makes little sense to prioritize either the economic or political moments of this conflict. Instead, and here we must give way to our final chapter, we acknowledge that a radical political ecology must squarely face the troubling and complex, dialectical relation of material grounding and political possibility.
Chapter 10

Two Movements into One: Some Lessons From the History of Labour and Environmental Movement Struggle

Ideally, a project such as this sharpens our view to the complexity of social life while not reducing this intricacy. Having made such a claim, we must immediately backtrack and admit that faced with the limits of time and space our work has underscored certain patterns and others, perhaps equally deserving of attention, remain unexplored. We are left, then, with the goal of straddling a middle-ground between simplistic description of complex patterns and complex (indecipherable) description of simple patterns. As we draw down our history of capitalist forestry and social movement practice into an even more condensed state, we must continue to be mindful that some patterns described are becoming larger and cruder and others are simply being left aside – a point to which we will return at the end of this chapter.

Keeping all this in mind, the following begins with a summary of the more pertinent empirical patterns and immediately follows with a short discussion of the

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266 When we recognize that such projects both interpret and change the world they describe, and take the ethical and political stance that this work should strive for a greater social and ecological good, the task becomes one of building a space between those who offer simple answers to complex problems and those who suggest complex solutions to simple problems.
implication of these patterns for social theory, especially political ecology. We conclude at a place not far from where we began – a discussion of the current crises in capitalist forestry. With a respectful nod to the social movements from which we have learned so much, we speculate on the prospects of a renewed ecosocialist challenge.

Patterns in History

That capitalist forestry in British Columbia has produced social and environmental problems is hardly a controversial statement. Nor is it particularly contentious to note that both forestry workers and environmentalists have organized around these problems. Nonetheless, sociologists and other academics have paid far too little attention to the part that such resistance has played in shaping the province’s social, political and natural landscape. In directly confronting this problem, this dissertation has argued not only that forestry workers and environmentalists have each had a hand in creating this history but that their relation has been central. While it is difficult to draw down this complex history into a short synopsis certain patterns do emerge:

- Forest capital, driven by the search for profits and faced with natural limits (productivity of the land, geographic barriers, climate) has ever sought ways to increase the exploitation of both forest and forestry worker. From the earliest days of capitalist forestry this exploitation has produced both social and environmental problems (squalid camp conditions, periodic unemployment, forest fire, the depletion of accessible forests,
highgrading, the destruction of habitat, the liquidation of old-growth forests).

• Labour and environmental movements have organized around such problems, resisting further exploitation and serving as barriers to the further development of forestry capital. Our history has shown that these movements are not recent phenomenon. Whether we refer to the initial struggles of forestry workers for decent camp conditions and those of early conservationists to preserve modest examples of ancient forests or to more recent demands for shortened working hours and the preservation of intact watersheds, labour and environmental movements have always set limits on exploitation.

• Most often labour and environmental movement critiques have operated independently – environmentalists have fought the exploitation of the forest and forestry workers and their unions have fought for better wages and working conditions and for the protection against job loss. At particular times the social and ecological critiques of capitalist forestry have coincided and a synthesis has been attempted (in the 1930's under the banner of the CCF and in the work of the IWA, and through coalition building during the late 1980s). In each case, these syntheses have remained partial and fraught with internal contradiction.

• Whether working independently or at moments of convergence, the resistance to further exploitation of forests and forest workers has driven forward the social and ecological contradictions of capitalist forestry and thus helped engender crisis. By setting
limits on the exploitation of worker and forest, social movements have reduced profits, raised fundamental political questions and pushed forward economic and political crisis. Historically these crises have been sporadic. More recently we appear to have entered a period of extended crises.

• Caught between political barriers and natural limits, forest capital and the state have managed to maintain profitability and continued economic growth (defined capitalistically) through the periodic restructuring of the industry and its regulatory environment.

• The shape of such restructuring has proven to be unpredictable and inseparable from the details of historical context. Capital and the state have responded to crisis through reformist policy change and the move to more social forms of production (see Chapter 4), or through deregulation and the ‘freeing’ of markets (see Chapter 5).

• The relative strengths and weakness of labour and environmental movements and the relationships between environmental movement and forestry workers have proven to be critical components of this historical context. The shape of exploitation, whether the costs fall on the forests or on forestry workers (and to what degree upon each), has reflected the relative strength of these movements and their relation.

• Moments of social movement convergence have ushered in the most significant crisis
and helped bring about the most dramatic moments of restructuring. At these times, restructuring has generally resulted in more social, planned and cooperative forms of production – a shift seen in the move to greater state regulation, the concentration of capital in large, integrated forest companies, state involvement in the creation of infrastructure (roads, railways etc.), and the cooperation of state and capital in forest research and other projects.

Even this skeletal snapshot reveals important silences in both popular and academic accounts of British Columbia’s forest history – especially those surrounding the authorship of environmental and labour movements and the continued relevance of natural limits.

However, we must reiterate that if patterns have been discovered they are patterns within, and of, flux. The relationships between the reproduction of capitalist forestry, social and ecological degradation and social movements are multiple and each of these is dialectic. When, for example, we note that forestry workers and the environmental movement have developed critiques of capitalist forestry rather independently and argue that this independence has helped shape the restructuring capitalist forestry, this must immediately be followed with an acknowledgement that differences between these movements are in turn shaped by the class composition and geography of capitalism generally and of British Columbia’s forestry capital specifically.

We should also note that such a terse reduction risks emphasizing structure at the
expense of agency. Any ‘thicker’ description of British Columbia’s forest history, our political ecology included, must begin with the recognition that this is a history of politics first and economics and ecology second. To say that the political decisions of capitalists, elected officials, bureaucrats, forestry workers and environmentalists are materially grounded in capitalist production and in the natural world is not at all to say that they are reducible to these. Whether we speak of preservationist yearnings that escaped the efficiency concerns of conservationists during the 1920s, or the broad definition of a good environment that emerged from the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada’s engagement with environmentalists in the late 1980s, political contingency has been the hallmark of British Columbian forest history.

If this history and its underlying theoretical stance suggest a corrective lens through which forestry politics might appear if not less chaotic then somewhat more intelligible, it is especially useful when turned upon the environmental politics of forestry unions. In chapter 6 and throughout our dissertation we have insisted that the environmental politics of forestry unions have been shaped by the structure of forestry capital (including both its geography and its place within global capitalism) and by their relations with environmental movement – and we have insisted that the environmental politics of forestry unions have shaped both forest capital and the environmental movement.

Within these multiple and dialectic relations we might again note patterns. Alongside the steady displacement of labour by capital, capitalist forestry has produced
undeniable job/environment tradeoffs. Employment in the industry, which has steadily displaced workers with machinery, has been maintained through the increased exploitation of the forest itself. When this increased exploitation has run up against barriers, including those of resource depletion and those imposed by environmental movements, forestry workers' jobs have been threatened. At many times, including the current moment, the environmental politics of forestry unions have reflected this structural pull. On the other hand, the environmental problems produced by the forest industry, though widespread, have affected forestry workers, their communities and their families most directly – a fact not lost on forestry unions. Forestry unions have organized to combat such environmental problems resisting job-blackmail along the way (a stance most apparent in the struggle to reduce toxic pulp mill effluent).

The environmental politics of forestry workers, however, cannot be reduced to such structural 'pulls'. Forestry unions are not simply bureaucratic filters that balance the structural interests of their members and when they appear as such this must be understood, in the last instance, as a political choice. As political vehicles, forestry unions have chosen to confront directly the jobs versus environment dilemma and offer alternatives. Our history has shown that such eco-socialist politics have deep roots and that recent tentative and contradiction ridden attempts to cobble together red-green

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267 This is what Wilson means when, quoting Nelles, he places forestry workers within the 'Axis of exploitation' (1999, 91) and what we mean when we refer to the corporatist foundation of sustained-yield forestry.
solidarity have their antecedent in the much bolder, if no less partial, syntheses of the CCF and IWA during the 1930s. Conversely, the participation of forestry worker unions in ‘anti-environmentalist’ campaigns (which draw on existing class and geographical cleavages) must be understood as a political decision to participate in this ‘ideological work’.

Our case study of Squamish, British Columbia and the conflict over logging in the nearby Elaho Valley has served to demonstrate each of these themes as well as the overall usefulness of a political ecology approach. Under the gaze of political ecology what many have dismissed as a particularly hostile (if otherwise unremarkable) example of environmentalist/logger conflict is understood as a complex story of structural and cultural constraint and political contingency.

Speaking to the first of these issues, the landscape and the capitalist reproduction of this landscape (especially the production of environmental problems) creates an identifiable matrix of interests and shaped cultural patterns. At times these interests suggest the convergence of environmental and labour movements (workers and their families are on the front lines of pollution and other environmental problems), though often they suggest conflict (forest workers face job blackmail, class and the geography of class separate forestry workers and environmentalists).

Our case study also revealed the contingency of these politics. Part of this contingency might be explained through reference to the contradictions to which we have alluded, but we also must nod to the unfailing ability of individuals to act in spontaneous
and surprising ways. A place known as one of the most difficult environments for radical politics and coalition building, Squamish continues to produce activists willing to wear multiple hats. Even in this rather extreme example of forestry worker/environmental group conflict we are faced with the importance and possibility of politics.

This is what we mean then when we argue that forest politics in Squamish is materially grounded in geography and class and the reproduction of both within capitalist forestry. We must concede here that this conflict has generally reflected the agenda of capital and the state to restructure capital in ways that suggest both further social and ecological degradation (the conflict has thus come to shape rather than challenge capitalist forestry). Such material grounding, however, does not suggest structural (or any other sort of) determination. Though superficially secure, the hegemony of capitalist forestry remains an ongoing project. We turn now to comment on just what this might mean for a political ecology whose goal is not only to understand these things but to change them.

On Social Theory and the Possibility of Progressive Politics

*Capitalism is not dead and class politics are still breathing.* If post-marxism, new social movement theory and risk theorists have all posited that political economy and class theory must be rethought in the face of radical discontinuities in history, our analysis of capitalist forestry in British Columbia and its discontents draws attention to important
continuities. The exploitation of labour within capitalist relations of production does not disappear as a defining moment of this form of production or as a site for working-class struggles. The history of forestry policy and practice in British Columbia demonstrates just how important a thorough understanding of the capitalist exploitation of labour and the attendant system of classes is to the understanding of both ecological destruction and the movements that resist this destruction. As we have demonstrated, both social and environmental problems and the movements that organize around these may be traced back to their material grounding in a capitalist mode of production and to class politics.

Our own tracing back of these threads suggests that radical political economy is a necessary tool for the analysis of social movements both ‘new’ and ‘old’. If post-marxist and other accounts have revealed that the terrain of environmental movements has often been overlooked by the labour movement (and vice-versa) our history has revealed numerous and notable exceptions. Moreover, both our history and our case study have revealed the material grounding of both inter-movement articulation and conflict in the reproduction of capitalist forestry. We have thus concluded that the relation of these movements is both conditioned by the reproduction of capitalist forestry and is politically contingent.

While the material grounding of environmental movements in capitalist production offers a description of environmental movements that is much narrower than the actual struggles of these movements, it is a necessary part of any such description. If only as a caveat to those who would suggest the radical discontinuity between labour and
environmental movements, we might note here that workers' movements are also much broader than, though inseparable from, the description of political economy.

We might then gladly speak with post-marxism and situate many of the attributes of social movements (though here we must include workers' movements) in civil society – that vaguely defined social terrain that exists outside of, though which is inextricably tied to, both capital and the state. Again, however, our study has repeatedly shown it would be entirely wrong to suggest a radical disconnection between either this terrain, or these social movements, from the reproduction of capital. Though we will speak of this in more concrete terms below, our study has revealed structural and historical grounds to place the interests of both environmental and labour movements in the specific struggle to revolutionize capitalist forms of production.

*Nature resists.* If traditional tools of Marxist political economy are necessary to the analysis of forest politics in British Columbia, we have also argued they are insufficient. From the outset, our dissertation has been charged with the critique of the subjugation of labour and nature to capital (that much of the preceding has already touched upon this topic only suggests how interconnected these are). We have returned a history of forest capital and of forest politics that argues that nature has shaped capital as capital has turned to shape nature.

This history warns us that attention must be paid to the way that nature has come to shape both the forces and relations of capitalist production. The shape of the coastal forest industry is quite different from that of its interior counterpart due in part to the
immense natural productivity of coastal forests (which drew capital first to coastal valleys) and to the steep terrain which places limits on the sort of mechanization that is possible. Geographical quirks also form an important part of any explanation of the continued existence of first growth forests in places such as Clayoquot Sound and the Elaho Valley.

Also, as forest capital has degraded the natural landscape, environmental problems have come to form barriers to further production (through poor natural regeneration of clearcut forests to give one example). Nature itself, therefore, offers resistance to exploitation – though in ways that are not knowable in any of the same ways that we can know the resistance of social movements.

We have also argued that the exploitation of nature and the production of environmental problems has given rise to environmental movements whose goal is the protection of nature against such degradation. Throughout our history and case study we have observed that such environmental movements offer a distinct form of resistance that does not necessarily include a critique of capitalism (as might be seen in the otherwise vastly dissimilar arguments of early conservationists worried about the shortfall of timber resources and of those historical and contemporary voices that urge the protection of sacred groves on aesthetic and moral grounds).

We might add that any full understanding of the province’s environmental movement must recognize a certain politics of place rooted in the geography and ecology of the region. Movements to preserve particular forests or watersheds have been
grounded in particular features, on strong local memories of these sites, and on the visceral reaction of those who encounter these most particular areas.

Political ecology, however, has always brought our eye back to the dialectical relation of geography and capitalist production. This geography has both made and been made through capitalist production – a relation most apparent when one has the opportunity to observe the patterns of settlement, road networks and forestry as one flies over the province. Even the urban centre of middle-class environmentalism cannot be adequately described apart from hinterland geography – it was in fact the lumber (most literally) and profits taken from the forests of places like Squamish that have built this urban environment.

_The state is a necessary place of struggle._ If at times our story of the struggle of labour and environmental movements has been drawn into discussions of allowable annual cuts, of tree farm licences, and of stream-side setbacks this is because capitalist forestry in the British Columbia has never had direct access to the forests of the province. This access was, and is, mediated by the state. Certainly, our history and case study have made clear how critical the state is to the struggle over old-growth forests.

More generally, though this has not been a primary purpose of the study, our analysis of forest politics in the province has suggested grounds for a particular theory of the state. On the one hand, our history has described the state as generally acting in the interests of large capital. When capital and the state have been faced with economic and political crisis, the tendency has been for the state to engage capital in restructuring
initiatives that have maintained large capital’s access to ancient forests. To this end, the state has played a critical role in maintaining the conditions of production necessary for a particular form of capitalist production.

However, it has been equally apparent that such a functional understanding of the state is an inadequate, or at least insufficient, explanation of state action. Even the cursory exposition of the various, often contradictory, forestry policies that have been smuggled into our study suggest that the state, though most often acting in the general interest of large capital, has retained a certain independence. To give but one example, state forestry policies have clearly been shaped by the struggle of environmental and labour movements to define a public interest that is significantly different from that suggested by capital (increasing rates of profit and traditionally measured GNP). On both fronts, the movements have made progress – to the current moment governments in British Columbia have only been able to retain legitimacy by convincing the public that forest policy does not simply cater to the needs of the forest industry but to ‘the greater good’. State policy has thus always been marked by a certain amount of internal contradiction which has been reflected in struggles between various state agencies.

In fact, there have always been contradictions between public forest policy and even the most generally defined notion of the needs of capitalist forestry. While forest

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268 This is a major point made by Wilson’s (1998) work.
history is one of those moments where one might want to emphasize the first of the terms, the state has shown itself to be ‘relatively autonomous’.

Lessons for Red-Green Future

If the point was simply to change history, then both labour and environmental movements have shown themselves more than up to the task. The earliest conservation movements injected aesthetic and moral arguments into forest politics; arguments that could not be answered by capital’s appeal to faster and more efficient production. The resulting parks, despite valiant attempts, have not been reduced to the commodified views sought by those marketing ‘Supernatural British Columbia’. These lines on provincial maps have come to denote limits to the exploitation of the forest.

Over the years the province’s environmental movement has built on this promise, working to preserve millions of hectares of the province’s landscape. The struggles of this movement have also led to significantly better forest practices in the remaining ‘working forest’. In Clayoquot Sound, arguably the movement’s most important victory, a combination of new protected areas and changes to forest policy and practice suggest an important model of alternative forestry and community development.

Meanwhile, forestry workers and their unions have been successful in erecting similar boundaries to the exploitation of workers in the industry. Through the fight for decent camp conditions, through the struggles to reduce the work day and in the battles
against unsafe work practices, forestry workers have forced companies to improve working conditions and provide a significant package of wages and benefits.

Any account of contemporary capitalist forestry, however, must face the limits that have confronted these movements. The industry continues to clearcut over 160,000 hectares of forest each year. Alternative logging practices remain woefully limited. It is entirely unclear how effective the current patchwork of disconnected protected areas will be in preserving the habitat necessary for species survival. At the same moment, a combination of global economic and political factors has produced massive layoffs in the province’s forest industry. As capital restructures it has demanded further ‘flexibility’ from labour. Also, a recently elected provincial government has given notice that deregulation of both environmental and labour policy will rank high on its agenda. While it would be foolish to underestimate the ability of either environmental or labour movements to reinvent themselves, it appears that both environmental and labour movements have reached what one critic refers to as “the outer limits of what can be accomplished in the current political space” (Wilson 1998, 342).

In dissecting the ‘political space’ of the province’s forestry politics, our history and case study suggest reasons why environmental and labour movements have run up against such limits and what might be done to change the situation. We have seen, for example, that British Columbia’s environmental movement, dominated by a wilderness politics and most often playing to a middle-class, urban audience, has largely waged last-minute defensive battles for the preservation of particular areas. While at times highly
critical of capitalist forestry practice, the movement has been much less able to provide coherent alternatives. We have argued that such weaknesses have combined to leave the movement vulnerable to technocratic solutions and reformist policy initiatives that fail to address underlying concerns.

Weaknesses in the labour challenge are only more apparent (and more often remarked upon). While relatively successful in negotiating higher wages and better working conditions, forestry unions, especially the IWA, have found themselves inextricably tied up in the capitalist project of high-intensity, sustained-yield forestry. Relying on a narrow ‘business unionism’, the IWA has become a cornerstone of the corporatist politics that has supported capital intensive sustained yield from the 1950s onwards. Without a more critical politics, and faced with the shedding of labour, forestry workers have become vulnerable to job blackmail and have been increasingly hostile to environmental reforms. If wilderness politics have been a politics without class, then forestry union politics have been a politics without life (that is without a thorough appreciation of capital’s exploitation of nature and its consequence).

The history of forest politics in British Columbia suggests that such weaknesses, and the inter-movement conflict that may be understood as consequence and cause, though structurally conditioned are not determined. Important examples of inter-movement cooperation exist and have produced the most dramatic reforms of forest policy and practice – a fact that should be enough to renew the push for movement articulation. [Of course, one might invert this to argue that the practice of these
movements suggests to political ecology the necessity of a combined assault on capitalist forms of production. Though the central question raised by O'Connor's theory of the second contradiction remains open, in British Columbia it appears less than likely that a political struggle focussing on either the social or ecological moments will meet with success.]

If our case study also suggests that this might be precisely the wrong time to expect an outbreak of coalition-building, things might not be exactly as they seem. Without underplaying the difficulties of the current moment it can be argued that the extended crisis within which we now find ourselves offers just the sort of structural and political conditions conducive to the reconstruction of an eco-socialist project. It appears that at the turn of the 21st century both the structure of interests and the political support for capitalist sustained-yield forestry are shaky.

- Capital can no longer live up to commitments which underlie the corporatist arrangement that has maintained capital intensive sustained-yield forestry. The 'found profits' of low-elevation, old-growth forests are virtually depleted and British Columbia's geography and ecology offer significant limits to the reproduction of these forests. The competitive advantage offered by both the volume and quality of the wood that could be produced from these forests has largely been drawn off into corporate profits. Second growth forests are slow growing, of lesser quality and face competition from southern regions whose climate is more conducive to quick growing fibre farms. The days of the
'long-boom’, where employment levels could be maintained in the face of technological change through the geographic expansion of the industry, are not going to return\textsuperscript{269}.

- Capital's response to crisis continues to be limited by both labour and environmental movements. As any attempt to dramatically lower wages or to wage an assault on protected areas would face significant resistance, it is most likely that capital will continue to seek increased profits through the further reduction in forestry labour. In such conditions, the ability of capital to link job loss to the work of environmental groups is lessened. While there are a myriad of economic and political scapegoats (the ongoing trade disputes with the U.S. being of particular note) environmental regulations and park creation are becoming harder to target.

- Provincial governments are also finding it difficult, if not impossible, to live up to their obligation to address the social and ecological problems of capitalist forestry through policy reform. Though in the early 1990s the NDP managed to cobble together an important package of social and environmental reforms (see chapter 6), since at least 1997 there has been a turn to deregulation. The newly elected provincial Liberal Party, meanwhile, has moved to dramatically cut social spending and environmental regulation

\textsuperscript{269} For a thorough account of this new global forestry economy see Patricia Marchak’s \textit{Logging the Globe} (1995).
while attacking the labour movement – a policy regime that promises to push forward both environmental and social contradiction.

• The IWA, whose business unionism and conflict with environmental groups have hindered coalition building, is facing structural change. With the loss of forest sector employment, the union has both suffered a decline in membership and has moved to diversify into non-forest product sectors. These changes may reduce the IWA’s political clout in the province’s labour movement and/or serve to reshape its politics.

• Networks of environmental and labour activists eager to forge links have had time to build. Especially since the hottest days of labour and environmental conflict, activists have worked to construct formal and informal links. During the late 1990s, the Vancouver and District Labour Council sponsored regular labour and environment forums and these have produced the new Labour Environmental Alliance Society. The British Columbia Environmental Network meanwhile continues to broaden its membership base to include unions in both the private and public sectors.

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270 In Squamish, it might be noted that a member of the IWA sub-local stepped forward to serve on the labour council’s labour and environment committee for the first time. Another committee member was cautiously encouraged remarking that “it’s better to have them inside the tent pissin’ out than the other way around” (personal communication).
Although these activists are much better positioned to answer questions on what form labour and environmental movement articulation might take (or is taking), both our theory and our empirical study may be reread with a strategic eye. Doing so would reveal, amongst other things, that the current period of crisis in the forest industry offers both promise and pitfall. Above all, we should recall that capital has repeatedly demonstrated a remarkable ability to turn such crisis into advantage and to emerge from periods of intense challenge restructured in ways that ultimately produce more, not less, thorough forms of social and environmental exploitation.

Moreover, the history of British Columbian forest politics offers compelling evidence that such restructuring has been possible in the context of not only the outright conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists (though this has proven quite useful), but also in their partial and contradiction ridden convergence. We might surmise that a successful challenge to capitalist forestry will require a careful and thorough articulation of the movements.

To give some hope, we should remember that our history has shown that these movements inevitably learn from each other. Early conservationism found its way into the politics of forestry workers who, rightly enough, were initially much more concerned about surviving a season’s work unscathed. Environmentalists who converged on Clayoquot Sound and put their bodies in front of logging trucks were concerned first with preserving ancient trees but soon were forced to consider alternative economic models for the area. While there has never existed a guarantee that either movement will ‘trace
back’ their struggle to capitalist production itself, the striking parallels between social and ecological problems have made this more likely.

To turn once again to caution, we must note that our case study, in particular, has underscored the reality of the job/environment dilemma under capitalist production. If forestry workers, or labour unions in general are to be allies rather than opponents of an eco-socialist challenge this dilemma must be confronted. The environmental movement must work with labour to develop short, medium and long-term solutions to the displacement of jobs. In the short term this is likely to require the struggle for ‘just transition’ policies whereby displaced workers are provided with retraining and compensation for lost work and the more general call for shorter working hours. Alongside this must be placed programs that put such workers’ skills to work in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the forest.

This is not to suggest that a renewed welfare capitalism will solve either the social or ecological problems of capitalist forestry, only to acknowledge that an eco-socialist challenge must be built within the shell of existing socioeconomic conditions. There are both structural and political moments to such a strategy – while reforms might provide forestry workers with some structural distance from job-blackmail, the struggle for these reforms might also provide a venue for the building of trust between movements. Though such policy reform will not strike at the heart of the reproduction of social and environmental exploitation, it is a necessary part of the struggle to create the democratic space within which the further articulation of movements is made possible.
All of this, in turn, is likely to require a more specific political goal and some thought must be given to the reconstruction of the political left on a red-green basis. Our history has shown that British Columbia’s social-democratic parties, while demonstrating some willingness to weave together social justice and environmental policies, have met with only limited success. The CCF’s call for a social forestry, for instance, was gradually whittled down to the technocratic call for a state forestry. Environmentalists in the province need not be reminded of the more recent trajectory of the NDP whose promise of red-green unity dissolved over its two terms in office. At the least, this history insists that attention be paid to maintaining a parallel critique within eco-socialist politics, one that resists subsuming either ecological politics under a labour critique (and the risk that social goals are paid for through ecological exploitation) or the inverse (where ecological goals might be attained at the expense of intensified labour exploitation).

It must be added that any political movement capable of the radical transformation of capitalist forestry, or even one capable of the sort of significant reform which would render more radical change imaginable, is likely to need the support of feminist, anti-globalization, and aboriginal movements, each of whose struggles though not reducible to the material grounding of capitalism are shaped by it. Though red-green unity is a necessary component of such a coalition, and Marxist political ecology might be a necessary analytical tool for such coalition building (see below), it is clear that neither will be sufficient.
On Further Research

Such talk of political coalition building brings us back to our initial warning. In our dissertation we have made a choice, one informed by our survey of both social theory and existing research, to highlight certain patterns and to leave others relatively neglected. We must recognize here that we have left undeveloped a series of topics that are of critical interest to both those seeking to understand the reproduction of capitalist forestry in the province and those seeking change.

We have, for instance, spoken most directly to the case of resource sector workers and their unions and without further research many of our findings are limited to such settings. This being said, we believe that the dual critique of political ecology is applicable across sectoral boundaries. If we have shown that capitalist forestry has failed to develop within ecological limits, this is certainly not a problem unique to the industry. Despite several decades of ‘green business’ and reformist environmental policy, the ecological contradictions of capitalism are becoming more, not less, obvious. While the position of forestry workers (especially loggers) is unique, all workers face the job blackmail bourne out of the real job versus environment tradeoffs of capitalist production.

To give but one choice example, the auto industry appears to be riddled with same contradictions as forestry. Auto-dependency has produced parallel forms of social and ecological problems (alienating work and job shedding through automation on the one
hand and the degradation of natural and built environments on the other\textsuperscript{271}). Some of these problems have come to face capital as barriers to further production (truck traffic has become difficult and unreliable due to the congestion on freeways, demand for fuel has raised energy prices and production costs, workers have developed a militant union). As environmental movements are built around the environmental problems of auto-dependency (anti-sprawl, cycling, pedestrian and alternative transportation movements), workers and their unions face contradictory structural pulls not unlike those faced by forestry workers (they face chemical exposure at work and live in communities with polluted air, and their increasingly scarce jobs depend on expanded production).

Public sector workers and their unions are in a more contradictory position. Many of these workers we must remember are involved in regulation and other jobs where stricter environmental controls on capitalist production might increase work possibilities\textsuperscript{272}. More generally, their structural distance from the impact of stricter environmental regulation may provide respite from the most blunt forms of job blackmail. This structural distance suggests that public sector workers, like their employers, enjoy a relative autonomy from capital. This autonomy, however, is relative

\textsuperscript{271} One could also speak of the entwined social and environmental problems of suburban development.

\textsuperscript{272} In British Columbia, for example, the BCGEU has voiced strong opposition to cutbacks that have made the enforcement of forestry regulations difficult, if not impossible. The BCGEU has been active in labour/environment coalition building efforts.
and not absolute. The welfare-state model which has provided most of these public sector jobs was built upon, and has encouraged, the ‘treadmill of production’ at the heart of capitalist production. These workers remain vulnerable to the argument that their jobs depend on strong economic growth and that such growth depends on limiting environmental regulation.

Tracing the contradictory structural pulls and revealing the hand of capital in the production of this web of interest, this ‘negative-sum’ game of job and environmental exploitation is necessary if unions are to protect the interest of workers in a good environment and good work. The critical political lesson of British Columbian forest history, that moments of labour-environmental cooperation have pushed capital and the state into more social/ecological forms of production is, we argue, valid across these sectoral boundaries. In drawing attention to the class component of the ‘new movements’ and to the ‘new struggles’ within worker’s movements, political ecology offers a way to think about the interdependence of such distinct struggles.

Most relatedly, and this point will be further developed shortly, political ecology offers a critical analytical tool, and ecosocialism a necessary political stance, to unions who wish to organize workers whose material circumstances and whose vulnerability to capital, varies dramatically with their place, gender, age and race. By maintaining an eye to both wage exploitation and the exploitation of conditions of production (including family life, community forms, environmental conditions), political ecology offers a means by which solidarity may be forged without losing sight of particular circumstance. In the
current political climate where the power of global capital appears to be growing with
little check, both intramovement and intermovement solidarity appear most imperative.

On a more equivocal note, we readily admit that our work offers a rather skeletal
frame upon which a more refined understanding of ecological class politics must rest.
Faced with the limits imposed by the broad historical sweep of our work, an approach
which in turn has been dictated by the dearth of sociological and historical inquiry into
labour/environmental movement relations, we have only hinted at the complexity of a
thorough political ecology. Some comment is in order.

No topic is of greater consequence for the specific case of British Columbian
forestry than the ‘land question’ found at the heart of the political, legal and social
struggles of aboriginal peoples in the province. As we noted at the outset, the history of
capitalist forestry that we have traced has been predicated on the dislocation of aboriginal
peoples from the vast majority of their traditional land base and their social, cultural and
economic marginalization. While this situation is sadly not remarkable, the ‘land
question’ in the province is: aboriginal peoples in British Columbia have struggled for

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273 This perhaps understates the case, for even the more general history of British
Columbia’s environmental movements has yet to adequately addressed. While Wilson
(1999) does an admirable job of tracing the intersection of state and the contemporary
movement, there exists a need for a ‘long-history’ that untangles the web of ideological
development. We hope our modest account of the history of environmental/labour
movement relations suggests the importance of remembering this history.

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more than 150 years to obtain recognition of the title to lands that were never ceded. Only with the election of the New Democratic Party in 1989 did the provinces longstanding resistance to negotiate land claim settlements begin to crumble. Though progress has been glacial, the signing of the historic Nisga’s treaty has convinced most that treaty settlement is both possible and necessary.

Whatever the outcome, it appears likely that aboriginal peoples will eventually obtain control over significant areas of the provinces forests. What this means for the future of capitalist forestry remains unclear. Cynically, one might note that at the pace of current negotiations the remaining ancient forests will long be cut over. It could also be speculated that a new landlord, especially one faced with immense economic and social pressures is an unlikely saviour of old-growth forests that are the forest industry’s most lucrative input. However, as we have briefly described in chapter 8, the struggle to preserve ancient forests has forged alliances between aboriginal peoples and environmentalists, though these have seldom been anything but complex. If nothing else, it is clear that aboriginal peoples will have different priorities and different models of economic and social development than existing tenure holders and this may indeed bode well for ancient forests.

Our case study offers an important example of both the trajectory of aboriginal politics and the importance of integrating further research into a larger political ecology.

274 For a deft history of British Columbia’s ‘Indian Land Question’, see Tennant 1990.
While during the period of our research the lack of any advanced treaty negotiations and the relatively limited role of the Squamish Nation in the conflict facilitated our focus on labour-environmental group relations, much has now changed. In the fall of 2001, the Squamish developed a draft land-use plan that sets aside additional areas for preservation, including the contentious Upper Elaho valley (Squamish Nation 2001). While the province continues to work on its own plan for the area, The Western Canada Wilderness Committee has suggested that the Squamish plan should serve as the foundation for the resolution of conflict in the area. Whatever the case, this new political reality must serve as a focus of further research in the area.

This discussion of aboriginal politics broaches the broader question of the relationship between multiple forms of exploitation. This question, of course, has been central to our dissertation which itself is premised on a dual critique of the exploitation of labour and environment within capitalist production. We concede, however, that we have only scratched the surface of this area of enquiry. In particular, with our focus on two forms of exploitation necessary to capitalist reproduction we have only had brief occasion to address the question of how these forms intersect with forms of exploitation based on race and gender.

These are critical questions which do not lend themselves to any sort of ‘adding on’ to our existing work. While class politics certainly condition race and gender relations, the idea that such relations may be ‘read off’ of the relations of production is long past its prime. Feminist sociologists, not to speak of activists, have long alerted us
to how concepts of race and gender are both analytically distinct from class yet central to its functioning. While the theoretical exploration of the intersection of multiple forms of exploitation can send one down dizzying paths, theoretical direction can be taken from empirical studies that are grounded in the lived experience of workers as men and women and as racialized men and women (Creese 1999; Sugiman 1994).

To speak to one such area of inquiry it is clear that the material reality of women in forestry dependent communities is fundamentally different from that of men: segmented labour markets strictly delineate the boundaries of ‘men’s’ and ‘women’s’ work; this structure is reproduced with the unequal division of work within the family unit; and these gender relations become inscribed in, and reproduced by, forestry sector unions (through gender inequalities within the structure of the union, and in the priority given to bargaining items). Understanding the political possibility of an ecological class struggle will require a more sensitive understanding of gendered relations of production and distribution or what Joan Acker (1988) refers to as the gender/class structure. Critically, this will involve the intersection of gender difference and the geography of difference revealed in core-hinterland economic and cultural patterns.

None of this need lead us away from a Marxist political ecology. Political ecology in general, and the second contradiction thesis in particular, should make Marxism more sensitive to the overlap of distinct forms of exploitation. When our attention is turned to the manner by which capitalism undermines its own conditions of production, we are alerted to the very areas of social life in which the overlap of multiple
forms of exploitation are most apparent. While our own study has focussed on the exploitation of land, this is only one component of a much broader definition of production conditions which includes the family, urban and suburban forms, systems of health care and other social relations necessary to the reproduction of the conditions of production (O’Connor 1998, 307).

Perhaps most important, political ecology draws our attention to the ongoing possibility of a convergence of interest while preserving the uniqueness and difference of struggles (both personal and more organized) by women, racialized minorities, the urban poor, so-called middle- class environmentalists and others. In the terminology of Marxist political ecology, the struggles of both individuals and the movements that have organized around their concerns are at least in part (and we would argue largely) about capital’s relentless subordination of use value to exchange value. While the broader scope of political ecology makes a case for the overlap of interests and the class component of multiple struggles, this universality rests upon an acknowledgement of the particularity of such struggles (as by definition use values are particular). Those struggling to preserve the ancient forests of the Upper Elaho, for instance, rest their claims on the uniqueness of these forests and their opposition to plans by capital to replace this uniqueness with the ‘thrifty’, efficiency of the tree farm.

The debate about whether the particularity of such movements and the particular material circumstances (especially their vastly different vulnerabilities to capital) of those who make up these movements somehow overrides the commonality of their struggles
remains open. This is a question for the social movements and socialist politics much more than it is for Marxist theory. On this point, however, we would argue that the dual critique of political ecology may be necessary for the articulation of movements and that the articulation of movements may be necessary to meaningfully address their individual projects.

Moreover, this approach may be necessary if a progressive politics is to be forged within individual movements whose members have their own diverse life histories and material circumstances (a point not lost on those within forestry unions who have championed labour environmental movement alliances). While we have emphasized the important challenges to capitalist forestry offered by coordinated labour-environmental struggle, the benefits might be equally useful within forestry unions. The social position of a well-employed faller, who can draw an income that approaches six digits in a good year is as contradiction ridden as one might find anywhere. While employed, such a wage places these workers in a very comfortable material position. Nonetheless, the history of such work reveals that forestry workers remain incredibly vulnerable to the logic of capital. Capitalist defined growth has only been maintained through a consumer culture that has recycled wages quickly back onto corporate profits, by regular bouts of unemployment brought about by economic crisis, through the substitution of capital for labour, by maintaining dangerous production conditions, and through the degradation of the environment.
Traditional Marxist accounts of the periodic crisis and restructuring of capital, and traditional labour politics provide a necessary but partial account of such workers' position. Coincidentally, forest labour's resistance, while universal and nearly permanent, has also been partial and contradiction ridden. If our study has demonstrated the usefulness of political ecology in providing a more thorough social history of capitalist forestry, it also suggests a political stance that might just be necessary to engage workers who live such a contradictory existence. Political ecology reveals the very particular privilege of such workers amidst their exploitation while also underscoring their connection to other so-called stratas of workers who are threatened by the logic of capital in equally particular ways.

Though, in the context of the 'beyond-class' rhetoric of many environmentalists arguing for the reinvigoration of the labour movement through ecological politics risks irony, our own study suggests both historical precedent and contemporary reference. Even partially articulated labour/ecological critiques have offered potent challenges to capitalist forestry and have pushed capital to adopt more social and more ecologically sound forms of production. Today more than ever activists of all stripes are refusing to wear just one social movement hat. Having eschewed the comfort a determinist theory of history, Marxist political ecology leaves us unable to suggest any particular future for such an ecosocialist project. We can be certain, however, that capitalist forestry will continue to produce both social and ecological degradation that make such a politics
imaginable. In the absence of these progressive politics, capitalist forestry will continue to create an untenable choice between good work and a good environment.
Appendix 1

Notes on Methodology

Before anything may be said about method, something must be said of reason. Over the years I have been involved in both environmental and labour movements. Not much of a calculated decision, I have simply found work at a unionized job, stumbled across a neighbourhood environmental group looking for volunteers, or just been upset enough about a particular issue to seek out a group of others sharing my feelings. I've learned from this involvement, this learning has been incorporated into my studies and my studies have informed my involvement.

All this is to say that my interest in the intersection of labour and environmental movements arises at once from my commitment to the goals of these movements (which I understand as necessary to a good life on both a personal and political level) and with the critical engagement with these movements. This general field of study has allowed me to build upon acquired knowledge, to give something back to these movements and has helped guide me through (if not resolve) the contradictions involved in juggling these commitments.

That I have come to study the relation of labour and environmental movements around old-growth forestry issues owes much more to chance. I first visited British Columbia in the summer of 1993 and had the opportunity to be awestruck with the
province's coastal old-growth forest. During this visit the 'Cayoquot Summer' and the Clayoquot Sound 'Peace Camp' provided my first experience of the province's environmental movement. Both the activist and sociologist in me was impressed by chaos, commitment and organization of the Clayoquot protesters, and I was shaken by the deep conflict between most forestry workers and those working to preserve Clayoquot's unlogged watersheds. While I had already considered the study of British Columbia's forest politics as a dissertation topic, this visit set the course.

The choice of the general frame within this subject matter has been studied also owes something to personal history. Originally I had conceived this project as a case study of the Clayoquot Sound conflict. However, the intense political climate of this conflict and the influx of media and of academic researchers raised both practical and ethical questions. Interviewees were reluctant and weary. The hostility of the conflict and the often trivial and sensational media reports left many potential interviewees bitter and suspicious. My own ability to press for such interviews was drained by complaints from those who had already put so much of their lives into the issue that they were being hounded by reporters, documentary makers, not to mention academic researchers. Both my own reticence and the wariness of interviewees delayed my progress.

In retrospect, these delays were fortuitous as they provided the opportunity to delve more thoroughly into the history of conflict over forestry issues. Originally, the historical component of our study was conceived much more narrowly as a brief political, economic and ecological history of the Clayoquot region. Left, temporarily, without a
specific case study I drifted into the broader history of the provinces forest industry and especially the resistance of labour and environmental movements. Two points were immediately apparent: (1) that the history of opposition to the social and environmental problems of the forest industry included both moments of convergence and conflict between forestry workers and environmentalists and (2) that this aspect of British Columbia's forest history had not been particularly well charted. I became convinced that understanding this history constituted a necessary step in understanding the complexity of worker-environmentalist relations within contemporary conflicts.

As I was engaged in this historical research, I also became aware of an emerging 'hot spot' near Squamish, British Columbia. Having hiked on many occasions in the adjacent Garibaldi provincial park I was already familiar with the geography of the area. Also, in the summer of 1998, I had joined a volunteer team that marked a backcountry hiking trail nearby. Near the end of this week long trip, I had the opportunity to look down upon the Elaho valley from a ridge high above. As it happened, the Upper Elaho valley became the focus of a major wilderness campaign.

Not as well known as Clayoquot Sound, the so-called 'Stoltmann' conflict nonetheless made for a compelling case study. Though, as we describe in chapter 8, there are strong historical and cultural reasons to consider Squamish a 'logging town', to a lesser extent it is also a rail town and a tourist town, a climbing and mountain biking town and also a suburb. If not an 'ideal type' of any sort, Squamish is somewhat like many places, especially larger hinterland communities whose economies, though resource
dependent, are mixed and under pressure to further diversify. In spite of its relative proximity to Vancouver, geography and history have transpired to make Squamish much more like 'the rest of British Columbia' than like Vancouver or Victoria.

Most important to our study was the fact that the Squamish area was home to both a pulp and a saw mill (and to many who work 'in the bush') and these workers were represented by the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada and the IWA respectively. The diversity of forest sector employment and the presence of forestry unions with very different environmental policies suggested Squamish as a site where a range of opinion might be gathered.

It is for these reasons that I have chosen this case study and decided to nest this study within a broader history of labour/environmental movement relations in the province. While this approach forced difficult decisions to bracket out important areas of enquiry (see below, Chapter 1 and 11), it did allow us to place contemporary concerns within patterns of history. This history with its moments of worker-environmentalist conflict and convergence has informed our case study, and our case study suggests just how important it is to remember this history.

On Sources of Data

Any history as broad as that presented here, and especially one working within the constraints imposed by the dissertation format, must set key decisions about how to
narrow the task at hand. Many, of these decisions confront us as already made: data is available or not, access to materials is denied by law or by the limits of space, time and available resources. Even with such constraints decisions about where attention should be focussed are necessary and such decisions must be theoretically informed. Our theoretical stance, a particular breed of Marxist political ecology, has drawn us to moments of economic and social crisis.

For those concerned with moments of forestry crisis and with the political challenge to forest policy and practice, the provincial habit of calling Royal Commissions in such periods is of much importance. We need not enter into the debate about the merit of the instrument itself to acknowledge that Royal Commissions have served as important collectors of opinion, of lightening rods for dissent and as meticulous recorders and archivists of all this. Even viewed cynically as symbolic vehicles within which predetermined policies may be smuggled, the Commissions have had a real interest in appearing as if the broadest range of opinion has been considered. There is much reason to believe that the pages of these hearings captures a significant portion of these opinions.

Nonetheless, it is most true that such commissions have not collected any sort of random sample of opinion. Guided by their terms of reference, the type of materials accepted, the location and timing of hearings, and the disposition of their members, Royal Commissions make their own decisions about what was considered important. This considered, information from this source is both remarkably diverse and invaluable to a study such as ours.
Our historical chapters, therefore, have drawn upon the Royal Commission submissions and transcribed testimony from environmental groups, trade unions, forest industry representatives and government officials. In turn, information from these sources has led us to the controversies, public figures and groups that were at the centre of debate at the time.

In addition, both our historical chapters and our case study of the Elaho conflict have made use of newspaper accounts. Our analysis of these has centred on particular moments of conflict and on articulating the positions of labour and environmental groups during these conflicts. As the environmental politics of forestry unions have been a particular concern, we have systematically traced the treatment of environmental issues in the Lumber Worker (IWA) and the Leaflet (PPWC). In addition we have drawn data from diverse sources ranging from environmental group newsletters to government and opposition party documents. We have, of course, drawn from and fitted our own work within the many popular and academic accounts of the history of British Columbian forest politics.

Interviews

Interviews with forestry workers and environmentalists began in the summer of 1999 and were completed by the spring of 2000. Environmentalists interviewed were activists in this area and were directly involved in blockades or other forms of protest. Forestry workers interviewed were active in their union or held elected positions or were
prominent participants in the Stoltmann conflict. These were supplemented by interviews with union representatives and labour activists who also were active in environmental issues.

Gaining trust was important to obtaining interviews and getting quality data from these interviews. The tension between forestry workers and environmental activists was palpable in this area. While environmentalists not directly involved in the blockades were generally easy to approach and generous with their opinions, 'front-line' activists, usually young and often male, were much more wary. Many expressed exasperation with media which they felt had 'packaged' their words and actions and presented these in an unfavourable light. That I had become familiar to many because of the extended nature of my study helped overcome some of this wariness.

Interviewing forestry workers offered its own challenges. A relatively young academic, living in Vancouver and from ‘out east’ is viewed with some suspect in British Columbian resource towns. Each of these adjectives fit rather neatly into what Thomas Dunk (1994) refers to as a ‘chain of equivalence’ – one that also includes environmentalist and anti-worker. It was emphasized at the outset of each interview that I had a long interest in labour and environmental issues, was working with members from both the labour studies and sociology departments at McMaster university and had a personal history of union involvement. Perhaps more usefully I mentioned that I had grown up in the northern Ontario mining town of Kirkland Lake (which fortuitously was
then infamous for a proposal to turn a former open-pit iron-ore mine into a dump for Toronto's garbage).

In each case interviews were conducted using a formal interview schedule which covered areas such as: the interviewees work and union/environmental group background, general environmental issues in the area, the environmental policy of unions and forestry workers, forestry practices, the Stoltmann conflict, decision making, perceptions about environmentalism and environmentalists, and what a ‘good future’ for the area was. The questions were informed by my own involvement in labour and environmental organizations and my interest in the ecological and economic integrity of a place, the lower-mainland of British Columbia, I call home.

Most interviews lasted about an hour but some stretched to two hours in length. It quickly became apparent that rigidly following a schedule was less productive than a more flexible approach that was tailored to the background, interests and particular expertise of the interviewee. I allowed interviewees to reflect on those topics that they felt were most important, though I did attempt to address questions from each of the main themes.

In the end, 41 interviews were carried out: 18 were members of environmental groups, 20 were forest sector workers (11 IWA members, 9 PPWC members), two were activists in both labour and environmental issues and one was a representative from the local Share group. The interviews were taped and transcribed. Interviewees were given a strict promise of anonymity. Appendix 2 contains a sample interview schedule.
Appendix 2

Sample Interview Schedule

The following is a sample interview schedule. This particular form served as the basis for interviews with IWA members (both sawmill workers and loggers). As described in Appendix 1, questions were added or deleted in order that the interests and expertise of particular workers could be addressed. For instance, a worker who was a key organizer of the ‘counter-blockade’ would be encouraged to speak on this subject.

Introduction

First I’d like to get a little background about yourself, your work and your history in Squamish.
Have you always lived in the area? For how long? Do you have family in the area? Where did you live before Squamish?

What is your current job? Would you say yours is a good job? What other types of work have you done? Are other family members involved in the forest industry?

How active have you been in your union? What types of union business have you been involved in? Do you remember what got you involved?

The Squamish Environment and Environmental Issues

As you know, I’m interested in the history of the forest industry in this area. Over the years, when you think of all the changes, what sticks out the most? What can you say about employment trends? What are the causes of this situation?
I'm working in Squamish because of its long history of forestry, the diversity of the industry (from falling tree to making pulp) and the range of environmental issues (fibre supply, water and air quality, old-growth forest preservation)

Are forestry workers much interested in these issues?
What are the issues are they most interested in? Least interested? Why?
Over the years have forestry workers become more or less interested in environmental issues? Have any issues become more contentious?

There are many different types of forest industry work -- here in town we have the pulp mill, the saw mill, and many work 'in the bush'.
Are workers in any of these settings more or less likely to be interested in environmental issues? Why do you think this might be?

Unions and Environmental Issues

Every local has its unique history.
Would you say that this sub-local is more or less supportive of environmental policies than other IWA sub locals? Why might this be?

The national union has a forestry policy, adopted in 1996. This policy covers a wide range of environmental and social concerns raised by commercial forestry.
Is such a policy, or the general policy direction, different from that of environmental groups?

What about the environmental policies or concerns of the forest companies/forest industry itself. Is your forest policy fundamentally different than the current policies of the forest companies?

In the area of environmental policy, do workers have different interests than those of the company?

The other major forestry unions are the CEP and the PPWC.
How would you compare your forest and environmental policies to that of these unions? What do you think accounts for any differences?

Finally, what about non-forestry sector unions?
Have they had much to say about environmental issues (around here)?
How would their position compare with that of the IWA?

**Pollution Issues**

*Like many places, the Squamish area faces a range of environmental problems. There's air pollution, water pollution, and land use concerns (estuary).*

Has your local been involved in any of these? Are the members particularly involved in these issues?

Did you come at this issue from the same perspective as the environmental groups? As other unions?

Do you think that pollution issues more or less difficult to deal with than forest practice/protected areas issues?

**Forest practice issues.**

*What do you think about the way forestry is practised in this area?*

Do you have any concerns about the sustainability of forestry? Any concerns about the environmental impact? Can you single out causes for this situation?

Does the forestry practised in this area meet the spirit of the IWAs forest policy?

*Forest companies often take the position that while mistakes were made in the past, we know better now and things are done differently.*

What do think about this?

If forestry workers were to make more of the decisions about forest practices would they do things any differently?

*So many of these issues come down to disputes over logging in "old-growth" forests.*

Do we need to set aside old-growth areas? Do we need more protected areas? If so, who should decide where and how much?
The Stoltmann/Soo TSA Conflict

Conflict over forest use is again heating up in this area and I'd like to get your thoughts on this issue

Following the Regional Public Advisory Committee stakeholder process, the provincial government made a decision that allows logging in parts of the area and sets aside other areas (Clendenning P.P.),
What do you think of this decision?

Some people have said that the Stoltmann dispute is a conflict between jobs and the environment.
What do you think of this statement?

Do you feel that the actions of environmentalists threaten the jobs of forestry workers in this area?

Some argue that the opportunity for employment would be greater if a large, accessible park was created and the area shifted to a tourism based economy.
What do you think of this idea?

We have some pretty heated debates and even confrontations over this issue. There have been blockades by environmentalists and counter-blockades by community members in the Elaho valley area.
Were you involved in any of these? Were many of your members? Why were you there?
Has this conflict made it more difficult to work on other environmental issues?

Environmental Groups and Environmentalists

Thinking about the groups and individuals involved in environmental issues around here and about others in the province . . .

Who would you say are most likely to be environmentalists?
Where are they from?
What kind of jobs do they have?
Are they more likely to be men or women? Why?
Has the union (or this local) had any cooperative or informal relations with environmental groups?

If so ... Are certain groups or issues been easier to work with than others? Why?

*Environmental groups use different tactics (lobbying, participating in government policy reviews, consumer boycotts, road blockades).*

Which of these do you think are the most effective? Are they all appropriate?

**Political Parties**

Traditionally, the NDP has been portrayed as both environmentally friendly and labour friendly. Over the last two terms in office how well have they dealt with environmental and labour issues?

Do you think any other political party would do a better job?

Around the time of the blockades here and on the mid-coast Glen Clark called environmentalists “enemies of the state”. What do you think about this statement?

**Participation and Decision Making**

When difficult decisions must be made about where and how forestry is going to take place who should make them?

What type of information should these decisions be based on?

Who do you trust most to make fair decisions on these matters? Who do you least trust?

*Groups such as SHARE B.C. (The local Soo Coalition for example) and the Forestry Alliance have claimed to speak for the interests of resource based communities.*

Do you feel that they accurately represent the views of the people in these communities?

What about forestry workers in particular?

*Some people say that environmental issues involve a trade-off between different social goals. I.e. Improving the environment might come at the cost of increased wealth, less unemployment, or inexpensive housing.*

Are we forced to make such trade-offs?
If so what are the most important goals?

The Future

How do you see the future for forestry workers in this area?

*Imagine what, in your opinion, would be an ideal future for the communities and peoples of this area.*

What would that be like?

What type of work would people be doing?

*S*ome in both the labour movement and the environmental movement have suggested that these two interests are natural allies and should work together for a sustainable society and good work.

What do you think of this idea? What are the difficulties or problems?
Appendix 3

Glossary\textsuperscript{276}

AAC: allowable annual cut. The amount of timber which may be harvested in a given year.

Blowdown: trees uprooted by wind.

Bucking: cutting a felled tree into specified log lengths for yarding and hauling.

Clearcut: an area of forest land from which all merchantable trees have recently been harvested.

Clearcutting: the process of removing all trees, large and small, in a stand in one cutting operation.

Feller-buncher: a harvesting machine that cuts a tree with shears or a saw and then piles it.

Felling and bucking: the process of cutting down standing timber and then cutting it into specific lengths for yarding and hauling.

Grapple yarder: a machine used in harvesting to bring logs into a landing. The grapple closes like teeth around the log and is controlled by the machine operator.

Highgrading: the removal of only the most valuable trees from a stand.

Highlead system: logging system that uses cables rigged to a spar high above the ground so that one end of the logs can be lifted during yarding.

Landing: an area modified by equipment that is designed for accumulating logs before they are transported.

Large woody debris: a large piece of a tree.

\textsuperscript{276} For a complete glossary of forestry terms as used in British Columbia see the ministry of forests website: http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/PAB/PUBLCTNS/GLOSSARY/glossary.htm
**Long Run Sustainable Yield (LRSY):** the maximum harvest that may be sustained indefinitely from a given area.

**Old growth:** a mature or ‘climax’ forest that contains live and dead trees of various sizes, species, composition, and age class structure. The age and structure of old growth varies significantly by forest type and from one biogeoclimatic zone to another.

**Protected areas:** areas such as provincial parks, federal parks, wilderness areas, ecological reserves, and recreation areas that have protected designations according to federal and provincial statutes.

**Public Sustained Yield Unit (PSYU):** a portion of a TSA. An area of Crown land, usually a natural topographic unit determined by drainage areas, managed for sustained yield by the Crown through the Ministry of Forests. It includes all Crown lands within the currently established boundaries of the unit and excludes federal lands, provincial parks, experimental forest reserves, gazetted watersheds and tree farm licences.

**Timber Supply Area (TSA):** an integrated resource management unit established in accordance with Section 6 of the *Forest Act*. TSAs were originally defined by an established pattern of wood flow from management units to the primary timber-using industries.

**Selective logging:** removal of certain trees in a stand as defined by specific criteria. In popular use this term refers to the harvesting of individual trees leaving behind a forest of mixed ages. The Ministry of forests uses the term ‘selection silvicultural system’ for such harvesting, equating the term ‘selective logging’ with highgrading (see above).

**Silviculture:** the art and science of controlling the establishment, growth, composition, health and quality of forests and woodlands. In popular usage this term refers to the act of replanting, thinning, pruning etc..

**Tree Farm Licence (TFL):** TFLs are privately managed Sustained Yield Units. TFLs are designed to enable owners of Crown-granted forest lands and old temporary tenures or the timber licences which replace them, to combine these with enough unencumbered Crown land to form self-contained sustained yield management units. These licences commit the licensee to manage the entire area under the general supervision of the Forest Service.

**Yarding:** the hauling of felled timber to the landing or temporary storage site from where it is transported the mill. Yarding methods include cable yarding, ground skidding, and aerial methods such as helicopter and balloon yarding.
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