THE MIND'S KINDS:

COGNITIVE RHETORIC, LITERARY GENRE, AND MENIPPEAN SATIRE

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2003) McMaster University

(English) Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Mind's Kinds: Cognitive Rhetoric, Literary Genre, and Menippean Satire

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NUMBER OF PAGES: v, 258

ABSTRACT

This thesis develops a cognitive approach to the venerable topic of literary genre. In particular, it uses and explores "cognitive rhetoric", Mark Turner's theoretical framework for literary inquiry; and it studies in depth the literary genre named "Menippean satire". The first chapter motivates a cognitive approach to literary inquiry while surveying the theory and criticism of satire and Menippean satire. The second chapter works out more fully and systematically than other studies the implications of a cognitive perspective on problems in the theory of literary genre. It argues that genres can be described as having a "prototype structure", rather than a traditional category structure, where categories are defined by necessary and sufficient conditions and arranged in general-to-specific hierarchies. It applies George Lakoff's explanation for prototype structures in categorization--his theory that thought is structured by "Idealized Cognitive Models"--to issues in genre theory and criticism. The third chapter addresses the prototype structure of Menippean satire--that is, ideas about "representativeness" among its members, and what this implies for the category's cognitive model. Chapter four recasts recognized facts about the systematicity of metaphors for satire in terms of the conceptual theory of metaphor for the first time. It analyzes the structure of the metaphorical model for the concept of satire as it appears in talk about satire by writers and critics. Chapters five, six, and seven each analyze the structure of a key feature of Menippean satire in cognitive-rhetorical terms for the first time. Chapter eight summarizes the view of the thesis by contrasting it with the view of a recent article on "Menippean discourse", and presents an original argument for the coherence of literary genres in terms of the coherence of the image-schemas associated with cognitive models for its features.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis owes its completion to the help of many people, and I take this opportunity to thank them.

I thank Joseph Adamson for his judicious help in supervising my work over the past years. He has encouraged me to feel free to develop a project that is a little unusual in scope and style.

I thank as well the other members of my committee, Peter Walmsley and Alvin Lee, for their valuable commentary and assistance.

I thank the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program for scholarships from 1998 through 2001, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada for a Doctoral Fellowship in 2001-02.

On a more personal note, I thank my parents for their ongoing support in its many forms. And I thank my wife Melissa for continual moral and emotional support, advice, and for cheerfully putting up with my increasingly late hours, chaotic study, and scholarly abstraction.

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Chapter 1: Testing Frameworks: Theory of Satire, Literary Theory, Mid-level Problems, and Cognitive Rhetoric

I begin this study with a remark on the recent history of satire criticism. Along with the bulk of critical terminology, "genre", "satire", and "Menippean satire" in the first half of the twentieth century became associated with a body of scholarly findings, ideas and opinion whose disagreements could still be rendered in cognate critical languages. Philology, source criticism, historical criticism, biographical criticism, psychological criticism, New criticism, myth criticism, etc. might disagree about many things, but it was not difficult to pin down the nature of the disagreement. In the decades following the 1960s, the advent of structuralism and post-structuralism undermined the whole set of cognate approaches and generated a new body of scholarship in a new set of broadly related frameworks. The basic assumptions about language, thought, and human behaviour held by Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan et al., were so different from those held by previous generations that it could be quite difficult to grasp the implications of differences of opinion about matters closer to the surface. Two interpretations of a text's meaning might seem relatively congenial at first blush, and yet turn out to be poles apart in their understandings of how the meaning related to its author, its historical context, its text, its reader, and so on.

Scholars of the earlier period include Northrop Frye, Ronald Paulson, Alvin Kernan, Robert C. Elliott, Sheldon Sacks, and others. They concluded, Dustin Griffin generalizes, that

> satire is a highly rhetorical and moral art. A work of satire is designed to attack vice or folly. To this end it uses wit or ridicule. Like polemical rhetoric, it seeks to persuade an audience that something or someone is reprehensible or ridiculous; unlike pure rhetoric, it engages in exaggeration and some sort of fiction. But satire does not forsake the "real world" entirely. Its victims come from that world, and it is this fact (together with a darker or sharper tone) that separates satire from pure comedy. Finally, satire usually proceeds by means of clear reference to some moral standards or purposes. (1)

Swift exemplifies in verse the consensus view of the satirist:

> Yet malice never was his aim;
> He lashed the vice, but spared the name . . .
> His satire points at no defect
> But what all mortals may correct. . . .
> Vice, if it e'er can be abashed,

> Must be ridiculed or lashed.[1]

Griffin himself aims to shake up this consensus of the early 1960s, to bring satire theory up to date with the state of criticism of individual satirists and their works. He maintains an admirable independence with later criticism as well, taking a tempered and selective view of the findings of new historicist and deconstructionist approaches. His emphasis is always on the ambiguity, complexity and ambivalence of satire. This is a salutary corrective to the many blanket claims of earlier years. Griffin uses facts about what satire actually is to challenge views based on idealized visions of what it should or might be. But he perhaps loses in explanatory power what he gains in accuracy and consistency: "Insofar as my perspectives converge, I argue in each case that satire is problematic, open-ended, essayistic, ambiguous in its relationship to history, uncertain in its political effect, resistant to formal closure, more inclined to ask questions than to provide answers, and ambivalent about the pleasures it offers" (4-5). This very skeptical approach may be a reflection of satire's skepticism, but I think that with a different approach to satire's rhetoric and structure, less ambivalent conclusions are possible.

The poststructuralist reconceptualization of satire has perhaps been later and less thorough than it has been in other areas. This is surprising insofar as "Satire itself [. . .] is in fact deconstructive" (Connery and Combe 11), and insofar as the other side of the coin obtains, that deconstructive methods and views have a certain affinity with satire.[2] Brian Connery and Kirk Combe offer an excellent history of satire criticism, prefatory to their 1995 collection *Theorizing Satire*, the first instance of what might be called the "re-" genre--the rethinking or retheorizing or rereading or rewriting of the topic under the aegis of post-structuralist thought.[3] (Griffin's *Satire* [1994] is subtitled *A Critical Reintroduction*, but has different aims.) They are optimistic that

> the last thirty years of debate on critical theory have served generally to tease out and elaborate many issues that were central to the study of satire prior to the emergence of post-structuralist analyses, and current movements within critical theory and practice seem to us quite capable of producing increased insight into satire--without voiding the pioneering work of readers like Kernan. (10)

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[1] From "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift", qtd. in Morton, Introduction to *Satire in the 18th Century* 1.

[2] The affinity is with Menippean satire in particular. Derrida's philosophical playfulness has been compared to Kierkegaard's. Sherbert notes that Derrida himself says his text *Glas* could be related historically to the genre of Menippean satire or "anatomy" because of its play with genres: it is between philosophy and poetry, it is "philosophic parody where all genres [. . .] are summoned up at once", it is "a graft of genres" (Derrida, *Ear of the Other* 140-41, qtd. in Sherbert 197). Eleanor Cook notes the affinity of deconstruction with the "anatomy" genre (17, qtd. in Adamson, *Rereading* 101 n3). Deconstruction rejects the structuralist dream of a complete systematization of thought and human culture (Barthes); it is rather an "omnipresent and indefatigable anti-bureaucratic virus" (Turner, *Reading* 237). It values the inversions of hierarchies that satire presents, the reversal of marginal and central positions, and posits a decentered universe, with a "rhizomatic" centreless network structure. Derek Attridge's study of digression links a number of Menippean works with deconstruction (see below).

[3] Connery maintains a website with an ongoing bibliography of satire and satire criticism at http://www.otus.oakland.edu/english/showcase/satbib.htm.

They sketch some significant connections with Fishian reader response theory, cultural theorists like Bakhtin, Turner, Girard, and Geertz, the psychological thought of Lacan and Kristeva, structuralist thought, and new historicism, including postcolonial and feminist approaches. Perhaps most significantly, they note that

> satire has always focused upon the aporia created by ironic difference, for its rhetoric of exposure is based upon the demonstration of its victims' differences from themselves. Post-structuralist poetics, like deconstruction, continuing to work with the destabilizing of oppositions and hierarchies, seem well-designed to reconsider the problems of irony and indeterminability that readers of satire have sensed all along. (11)

The lateness of this event can be partly explained by the sympathy of the critic of satire for the satirist's traditional independent attitude and skepticism about systems. Like Griffin, GeorgeTest, for example, distances himself from all systems:

> Given my eclecticism, it would not do to adopt a particular psychological or critical theory as a controlling frame or guiding motif. Neither Freud, Fish, nor Frye will be found to dominate the approach of this book. There is nothing from Paris, Prague, or Geneva, no Bloom or Eco or Marx of some contemporary critical scheme. (ix)

Post-structuralism, after all, is not without its posturers, or immune to parody.[4]

I would hazard that the study of satire has penetrated and informed contemporary critical theory mostly via the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, and those who have employed his thinking, such as Julia Kristeva. Bakhtin has made an immense contribution to our understanding of the folk-culture roots of satire, the relation of literary style and structure to various genres of speech as well as writing, and the role of Menippean satire and other anti-official genres in the development of the novel--its "heteroglossia", its philosophical dimension, its remarkable developments in the conception and depiction of character. But it seems that Bakhtin's laudable celebration of the "folk" and the value of traditionally "lower" genres leads to an unreasonable simplification and derogation of supposedly "monologic" genres like the epic and the sonnet. I have therefore used Bakhtin sporadically and cautiously, while relying more heavily on the approach to satire developed by Frye, Kernan, and Paulson.

DIGRESSION ON MENIPPEAN SATIRE AND THE QUESTION OF GENRE

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[4] What has come to be known as the Sokal Affair indicates that it can become close to self-parody. Physicist Alan Sokal published in the influential critical journal *Social Text* a hoax article in which he mimicked poststructuralist attitudes and jargon to justify the jettison of basic realist scientific assumptions. He revealed the hoax on the day of its publication, and storms of denunciation and acclaim ensued. The essay "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity", appears in *Social Text* 46/47 (spring/summer 1996): 217-252. Mark Turner's "Pretext" to *Reading Minds* furnishes a few more ironic views of contemporary critical theory, esp. 3-6.

Bakhtin and Frye are largely responsible for the resurgence of interest in the more specific genre known as Menippean satire. Books dealing with Menippean satire include Eugene Kirk's useful bibliography of satires from antiquity to the 17th century (1980); Michael Seidel's 1979 *Satiric Inheritance: Rabelais to Sterne*; F. Anne Payne's 1981 *Chaucer and Menippean Satire*; Frank Palmeri's *Satire in Narrative* (1990); Joel Relihan's *Ancient Menippean Satire* (1993); W. Scott Blanchard's *Scholar's Bedlam* (1995); and Garry Sherbert's *Menippean Satire and the Poetics of Wit* (1996). Numerous scholarly articles have also appeared over these years.

These books are literary-critical rather than literary-theoretical, and their typical approach is to deal with the theoretical issues in an introductory chapter. At this point I want to touch on a preliminary question that is both literary-theoretical and critical: that is, the question of whether or not Menippean satire is a genre at all, and if so, what kind of genre it is. It is not perhaps a particularly deep or complex question, but it is a necessary step in a study of the genre, and critics must make some decision about it in order to proceed.

Payne and Palmeri do not really address the issue of genre theory, but simply assume from the start that they are dealing with a bona fide genre. Relihan calls Menippean satire an "anti-genre" (28); Milowicki and Wilson call it a "form of discourse" rather than a genre (292-93). True, Menippean satire tends to be profoundly parodic of many other genres, major and minor, and in that sense can be considered an "anti-genre." But an anti-genre may still be a genre, as an anti-novel is still a novel. The "anti-genre" label is based on the fact that satire parodies certain literary features. But many other genres have a parodic or contrastive relationship with other genres and features, and are not for that reason denied the status of a genre. Frye says that "It would hardly be too much to say that realistic fiction, from Defoe to Henry James, is, when we look at it as a form of narrative technique, essentially parody-romance" (*Secular* 39). Claudio Guillén shows how "Basically, from the sixteenth century to this very day, the pastoral and the picaresque have represented two diametrically opposite attitudes toward the ills of the city: the pastoral attempt to flee the city and to replace it with nature and sentimental love; and the decision to live and survive in it, but not to fight or to 'join' it, on the part of the 'half-outsider'" (97). Both pastoral and picaresque are genres.

My decision to view Menippean satire as an authentic genre rather than something else is based not on the nature of its features but rather on important extra-featural factors that it shares with all other genres: the existence of a set of prototypical exemplars of the form; the existence of a conceptual model "abstracted" from the set of exemplars; and the human ability to use that conceptual model in certain ways: to make intuitive judgments about membership, and to create new members. Different genres are defined by different kinds of features, as Fowler shows so well, so the absence of some kinds of genre-defining features should not deter us from acknowledging Menippean satire as a genre. Prose genres are not defined by specific metrical forms, and broad genre-related categories like comedy, tragedy, satire, and romance are not defined by specific media, as are genres of film, television, radio, etc. This attitude to the question will be developed in greater detail in the following chapters.

A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO LITERARY INQUIRY:

Perhaps, given my notice of the anti-systematic tenor of satire, and satire's affinities with post-structuralist thought, some further explanation is needed for what may appear to be a return to systematicity with a vengeance--an embrace of systematic thinkers like Bakhtin, Frye, and Fowler, and the yet more systematic thinkers engaged in the study of cognition and conceptualization.

I am disinclined to pursue the other contemporary theories that Connery and Combe discuss. Post-structuralist and new historicist approaches to satire often make valuable local insights into works and genres, but their larger claims are, I think, vitiated by their theoretical frameworks. The significant problems with those frameworks that have been pointed out are, to my mind, very telling.[5] I do not find in the overall tendency of these projects anything like a promising research program. Post-structuralists are free to reject the rhetoric of the "promising research program" and its associated ideas and practices; but the choice of approach may just as well go the other way.

But neither am I returning to the conventional view that Griffin rightly challenges. I am happy to accept his careful qualifications of received ideas about satire, based as they are on a commitment to what is actually demonstrable. My focus is not the reconsideration of satirical irony or effects, but rather the reconsideration of how Menippean satire *means* what it does--how we understand the rhetorical and literary features of Menippean satire as a genre.

Modern critics have concentrated on the *rhetoric* of satire ever since Maynard Mack's influential 1951 article on "The Muse of Satire". Ronald Paulson and Leon Guilhamet, and others up to Garry Sherbert, have studied rhetoric as a wellspring and continuing influence on satire. Here I build more specifically on the scholarly groundwork laid by Kernan and Paulson on scene and narrative, and by Randolph and Bentley and Korkowski, on rhetorical-structural features that are better-recognized as characteristic of Menippean satire, such as specific kinds of metaphor and digression. The strong link between rhetoric and genre is established by critics like Frye, Bakhtin (his sense of his favoured term "stylistics" is close to rhetoric), Colie, and Fowler. I examine the rhetorical nature of literary genre by way of the theoretical project named "cognitive rhetoric" by Mark Turner. Cognitive rhetoric is rooted in cognitive science and cognitive linguistics, and these enterprises have proven their value and power as ways of explaining human meaning, in thought and language and feeling and action.

Hence if this study appears untraditional, or improbably systematic, that is a result of my sense of the goals of literary study and the nature of inquiry--a sense that has been much influenced by philosophical and cognitive-scientific discussion of literary theory and criticism.

Paisley Livingston calls "business-as-usual criticism" the kind of close readings that appear regularly in critical journals. He proposes an alternative model of literary

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[5] Noam Chomsky, Mark Turner, Christopher Norris, Norman Holland, John Searle and others have critiqued the linguistics of Derrida and Lacan. Paisley Livingston has criticized poststructuralist "framework relativism". Gregory Currie and Norman Holland note the absence of any clinical evidence for key concepts of Lacanian psychology, such as the "mirror stage".

inquiry in part four of his book, *Literary Knowledge*. He makes his point by contrasting his model of inquiry with the much more prevalent model. Literary study commonly has the "most basic structure" of "the literary explanatory pattern produced in response to inquiries" of the type "What did literary text *x* say about topic *y*?" (235, 233). He produces examples of sixteen types of arguments following this pattern (235-37).

He advocates, in contrast, "an investigation of the ways oriented readings of literary works serve to challenge and to refine, to complexify and perfect hypotheses within the other anthropological disciplines." This type of inquiry amounts to a question something like "What is the meaning of a text in the context of a particular program of research (typically, a body of hypotheses and evidence within one or more of the anthropological disciplines)? In what ways can the interpretation of the text contribute to the research program through a refinement of its hypotheses?" (260). He emphasizes that this is far from a "one-way" determination of readings by the simple *application* of a theory to a text. Instead, "The emphasis on the refinement of hypotheses is made for two reasons, having to do first with the nature of the contribution that critical interpretations of literature are most capable of making, and second with the kind of contribution that is typically most badly needed in the anthropological disciplines" (260). The present interest in "interdisciplinarity" is laudable in its comparable attempt to connect careful literary studies with other areas of scholarship and larger issues.

This view implies that literary inquiry should aim for some results that are, if not precisely measurable, at least testable in some way. I am, however, wary of overly narrow conceptions about what counts as testable. A field dedicated to the imagination should have deep tolerance for long shots, for ideas and theories that have going for them insight and importance, if not immediate direct falsifiability. Noam Chomsky notes that in the sciences, theories often rest on profound idealizations, which create implications that may not be proven for hundreds of years (*Language and Responsibility* 108, 187-88).

Mark Turner's "Pretext" to Reading Minds similarly argues for a form of inquiry other than "giving a reading" of a text:

> The text is what we confront and the reading is some sliver of the conscious part of interpretation. "Giving a reading" of a text and "arguing for" that reading "against" other readings has been promoted to principal place among our profession's activities. (18)

Instead, he proposes to

> offer explorations [. . .] that do not consist of "giving" and "arguing for" "readings." In my view, our profession takes as given exactly what we should be trying to explain. We take for granted our capacities to invent and interpret, and devote ourselves to exercising those capacities and publishing the results. It is the capacities themselves that need explaining. Reading is not giving a reading; and it is reading, not giving a reading, that I am concerned with. [. . .] I ask a different and evidently prior set of questions. Given a bit of language, a discourse, or a text, how does a reader understand it? Given alternative readings, what were the

> different processes that led to those alternative understandings? The most amazing phenomenon our profession confronts, and the one for which we have the least explanation, is that a reader can make sense of a text, and that there are certain regularities across the individual senses made of a given text. How do readers do that? That is a question that leads us to touch home base. (19)

This project thus gels with Livingston's vision of literary inquiry: it uses literary readings to complexify and refine hypotheses in cognitive science.

Turner focuses on common readings "exactly because they are more widely shared and thus more likely to show us common conceptual capacities at work". His activity is not concerned with originality of reading, and "views the originality of an author as an exploitation of the dominant unoriginal apparatus at his disposal" (19):

> Any original achievement in invention exists as an exploitation of a dominant, active, unoriginal, and largely unconscious matrix of conventional conceptual thought. [. . .] I offer an approach that focuses on the complex structure of the unoriginal that suffuses, defines, and creates the original. (20)

For me, this kind of inquiry has meant also avoiding an activity that can be seen as the other end of a spectrum from giving a reading, and which suffers from a complementary futility. I mean readings that use literary works as grist for an academic mill that churns out repeated ratifications of large-scale worldviews. David Bordwell and Noel Carroll have criticized what they call Grand Theory, the (circular) ratification of poststructuralist thought by "readings" that apply its tenets.[6] I have therefore turned to studying those "middle-level" concepts and entities that have some claim to be definitive of literary art: genre, allegory, satire, Menippean satire.[7] And I have turned to a framework for studying these elements of language and thought that has a proven track record and at present continues to swell and deepen at such a pace that it is difficult to get a sense of its full scope or limits.[8]

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[6] Bordwell and Carroll's introductions to *Post-Theory*, their "cognitivist" collection of essays on film and film theory, "Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand Theory" (Bordwell, 3-36), and "Prospects for Film Theory: A Personal Assessment" (Carroll, 37-68), are excellent statements of the case for "middle-level", localized, problem-driven inquiry, rather than Grand Theory, or doctrine-driven inquiry. An earlier statement is Bordwell's "A Case for Cognitivism". A later statement supporting an "analytical approach" to film is the introduction by Richard Allen and Murray Smith to their collection, *Film Theory and Philosophy*; and Gregory Currie's "The Film Theory That Never Was: A Nervous Manifesto", in the same volume (42-59). Reed Way Dasenbrock's *Reading Between the Lines* is an earlier exploration of how analytic philosophy can and should relate to deconstruction and literary theory. Livingston's "Literary Knowledge" contains an admirable discussion of goals and methods for literary studies, as do Turner's "Pre-Text" and "Envoi" in *Reading Minds*.

[7] Definitive, if not unique to it: I've found along the way that these concepts can have various extraliterary manifestations. There are non-literary metaphors, allegories, and genres, for example.

[8] There is a quickly growing body of research, and an expanding network of researchers in the area, both of which attest to the value of "cognitivism" in literary studies. There are general resources beyond my list of specific Works Cited. Journals that regularly publish cognitive studies include *Poetics Today*, *Style*, *Literary Semantics, Language and Literature, Journal of Pragmatics*, *SubStance*, and *Metaphor and*

I close this section with Tzvetan Todorov's words describing his sense of the "intermediate character" of his own essays. The description applies well to the intermediate spirit of inquiry I have tried to maintain:

> I am not interested in speculation pure and simple, or in the description of facts as such; I continue to move between the two extremes. The entire field of literary theory has this intermediate status: it is challenged by a wholly general reflection on the one hand, and by the study of concrete texts on the other. (vii)

We now turn, with this intermediary spirit, to the theoretical question of the nature of literary genres.

Symbol. The main websites for cognitive literary research are Alan Richardson's *Literature, Cognition, and the Brain*, and Francis Steen's *Cogweb*. (One may also consult the less active *Cognitive Science, Humanities, and the Arts* maintained by Cynthia Freeland; and the *cognitive approaches to literature* website, maintained by David Danaher.)

Chapter 2: Genre Theory, Genres, and Idealized Cognitive Models

> [G]enre study [is] the project of grouping literary works into kinds and analyzing the nature of the connections between them. How is it that readers, from naïve to sophisticated, carve up the literary continuum (or the linguistic continuum that includes the literary continuum)? What are the principles that the genre theorist uses, perhaps unaware? How are those principles based upon everyday principles of conceptual connection? ...
>
> We have a standard commonplace notion of genre, of course: A genre is defined by criterial features possessed by every member of the genre. But this is exactly the standard commonplace philosophical notion of a category so thoroughly discredited by cognitive studies during the last decade. Given the cognitive scientific study of the nature of categories, we should not be surprised to find effects of the basic level in genre categories, or prototype effects in genre categories, or metaphoric members of a genre category, or radial categories within our conception of a given genre, or a gradient from the categorical to the analogical in the ways literary works are connected, or (perhaps most obviously) family resemblance as a creator of genres, and so on. The analysis of genre theory in the light of the cognitive scientific study of conceptual connections would be a large, intricate, and important work. It is so necessary and obvious that its development as a literary critical project seems inevitable. I leave it to the reader to imagine the forms such a literary critical project might take.
>
> -Mark Turner, *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science*

Genres are categories of literary works, and as such they are sometimes taken as mere rusty implements of an antiquated taxonomy. While genre theory draws on an extensive biological analogy, with concepts of patrimony, fertilization, inheritance, mutation, hybridization, evolution and degeneration, categorizing itself is sterile and lifeless; it exsanguinates its victims. It is like an application of leeches, or of the letter that killeth.

Genres are in fact more powerful and productive in the creation, reading and interpretation of literature than mere taxonomy could be. They are, Alastair Fowler insists, "instrument[s] not of classification or prescription, but of meaning" (*Kinds of Literature* 22). For Northrop Frye, the purpose of genre criticism is "not so much to classify as to clarify...traditions and affinities, thereby bringing out a large number of literary relationships that would not be noticed so long as there were no context established for them" (*Anatomy of Criticism* 247-48). These endorsements are a familiar answer to the familiar complaint. Still, the problem of how to describe and use these categories remains.

Mark Turner points out that our default conception of a genre is precisely the traditional view of categories as logical classes defined by a set of features, possession of which is necessary and sufficient for membership (150). Beyond its distasteful associations of filing systems and obsessive compulsion, this view of genre defines the abstract problem of how the parts (the members) relate to the whole (the class): in logical

terms, the "hermeneutic circle," and in methodological terms, the induction/ deduction debate.[9]

Not only poststructuralists have complained that the participation of an individual work in some genre or genres never amounts to belonging (Derrida 61)[10]; or that "every work deviates from any particular set of characteristics that may be attributed to its kind" (Snyder 1). Earlier critics vented frustration at the intractability of genres within the usual view of categories. On the first page of the first issue of *Genre* (January 1968), John Reichert rejects Crane and Olson's 1950s development of the Aristotelian strategy that started "with the most general classes...[and] zeroed in on a work by locating it in increasingly specific sub-classes" (1). A few pages later, Leonard Feinberg writes, "I share Robert Elliott's reluctant conclusion that no completely satisfactory definition of satire is possible" (31). No single feature or set of features is either necessary or sufficient to define a genre.

A number of dexterous critics, agreeing that "Definition is ultimately not a strategy appropriate to [genres'] logical nature" (Fowler, *Kinds* 40) have turned to Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblances" to describe the relations among literary works, discarding the clumsy deductive grid and preserving the biological analogy. Alastair Fowler deserves the credit for most fully exploring the dynamics of genre in

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[9] Some critics also despair of definition because of the supposed circularity of finding the features of a set then defining the set by these features. Recent criticism is still obsessed with this: "All genre theories are inevitably defeated by the paradox of the hermeneutic circle" (Cobley 321). This essay supports Hirsch's view that the conceptual power of examples blunts the edge of this problem:

> [The] genre-bound character of understanding is, of course, a version of the hermeneutic circle, which in its classical formulation has been described as the interdependence of part and whole: the whole can be understood only through its parts, but the parts can be understood only through the whole. This traditional formulation, however, clouds some of the processes of understanding in unnecessary paradox. ... [The encounter with the parts that generates the idea of the whole] could not occur if the parts did not have an autonomy capable of suggesting a certain kind of whole in the first place. (Hirsch 76)

Experience shows that the circularity is not vicious, and I cannot see that it is more urgent for genre than for any other aspect of interpretation that requires classification.

Rosmarin's theoretical introduction and first chapter (3-29) are a useful discussion of induction and deduction. I sympathize with Rosmarin's general approach; I differ in that I take it that since we can judge the appropriateness of a schema not just by its generation of literary "value", but by its fit with "facts", our understandings of schemas and the situation to which we apply them must be partly autonomous from each other. I presume that these independent understandings involve "direct" understanding at some level, as well as access to a variety of frames for most topics. Prototype theory suggests a way out: we learn from examples first, build up a cognitive model, and locate new instances in relation to the ICM.

[10] The full statement of Derrida's hypothesis is: "a text cannot belong to no genre, it cannot be without or less a genre. Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text; there is always a genre and genres, yet such participation never amounts to belonging" (61). For further poststructuralist views of genre, see the special issue of *Glyph* on the topic (no. 7, 1980). Michel Foucault ("What Is An Author?") and Clifford Geertz ("Blurred Genres") have also commented on the extreme permeability of scholarly genres.

terms of family resemblances.[11] He notes that even Benedetto Croce, forefather of the individualistic, expressive polemic against genre, recognized a bond of "family likeness" among works, while denying that this bond amounted to a definable class ("Genre" 152). Genres are constituted by the interaction of several productive features, a "subtle amalgamation of qualities" (Dubrow 5), and genre histories even more so.

Family resemblance carries its own problems. Fowler and Swales have wondered if its vagueness permits productive use: "[t]he language of family resemblance... seems less rigorous, less capable of demonstration" (*Kinds* 41-42); "it can be objected that a family resemblance theory can make anything resemble anything" (Swales 51).[12] Fowler follows the metaphor to a foundation in "inheritance": "the basis of resemblance lies in literary tradition ....a sequence of influence and imitation and inherited codes connecting works in the genre." While he insists that "the direct line of descent is not so dominant that genre theory can be identified with source criticism" (*Kinds* 42-43), his admirable trailblazing towards a study of truly generic history needs consolidating by a theory of categorization and other conceptual operations.

Poststructuralist discourse-oriented critics have also attempted revisionary projects. Fredric Jameson's intensive analysis of genres as mediating between literary and social history has had more influence on genre studies than Foucault, Geertz, or Derrida.[13] These projects tend to view categories as radically open but subject to determination by historical or discursive forces. They overlook the way general cognitive architecture and principles operate even in particular complex adaptations of categories.

So even if they are active and useful families rather than passive and useless containers, genres are still categories, and the need to understand how they work persists: how to relate genres to features, to works, to other genres, to readers and to writers. But categories are not what we thought they were: they are not cut-and-dried, but rich, complex and flexible. Rather than pushing at our concepts of works or genres to settle discrepancies, I want to turn to this reshaping of categories in cognitive science.[14] We can

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[11] Fowler (presumably following Hirsch, but giving Dugald Stewart credit for inventing the theory) takes it as a general principle that genres bear family resemblances to one another (*Kinds* 40-42). Hirsch used the family resemblances concept in 1967 (68ff.). Gustavo Pérez Firmat and John Swales doubt the utility of this view. For an analysis of the use of the "biological species" and "family" metaphors in genre study, see Fishelov, chapters 2 and 3 (19-83).

[12] Understood as concerning the part-whole relation, the circularity problem is more pressing for the traditional view, with its emphasis on uniform members and defining properties, than for the family resemblance view, with its emphasis on various criteria, open definitions, shifting boundaries, and learning to "go on in the same way" from examples. But Wittgenstein uses the problem to create an original form of skepticism about rule-following: we presumably go on in the same way by following a rule, but we must interpret each step of the rule in order to follow it, which interpretation itself requires a rule, and so forth, generating an infinite regress (see Kripke).

[13] Adena Rosmarin (174 n52), John Snyder (7, 92-93) and Deborah Madsen (*Rereading Allegory* 24) all characterize their work as developing Jameson's dialectical theory of genre. Thomas Beebee agrees with Jameson that genres are institutions specifying the uses of cultural artifacts (277). But he sees a dialectic between genres, not within individual genres, and criticizes Jameson for placing literature "outside genre" rather than in generic conflict.

[14] Cognitive science is a complex field growing quickly. In 1989 David Bordwell was already warning that the literature on cognitivism in various areas was too vast to keep track of.

better explain *genres* not by denying their fluidity or their structure, but by showing how they reflect the fluidly structured character of *categories*. And we can explain family resemblance structures by invoking theories of cognition that see categories as elements of mental models that characterize prototypical or central subcategories and cases, and get extended to noncentral cases according to cognitive principles.

CLASSICAL VS. PROTOTYPE THEORIES

> "It is a trite but true observation, that examples work more forcibly on the mind than precepts"
> -Henry Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*

The two cornerstones of classical category theory have been overturned: the nature of individual categories and the way they form structures. According to the "classical theory," categories are classificatory entities defined by a set of singly necessary and jointly sufficient objectively existing properties. They have clear boundaries, and membership is binary: you're in or you're out, and a few borderline cases don't alter the principle. Therefore they have no internal structure, and all members are members equally[15] (Lakoff 16-17).

It is a major cognitive scientific discovery, due in the first place to Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues in the 1970s, that most human categories are not definable in this way.[16] Rather, people identify certain prototypical members of the category, and then view other instances in relation to the prototypes. In the West we define *bird* by reference to prototypes like robins and sparrows, then recognize chickens, ostriches, and penguins as nonprototypical. Categorization studies start with this fact of centrality and show how important conceptual effects follow from it. For example, prototypes are identified as members of the category more quickly, and they are voluntarily produced as examples of the category. They are thought to have greater causal influence within the category than other members: that is, less representative members are thought "more similar to" more

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[15] This conjunction of qualities has led Johnson and Lakoff to argue that the traditional view sees categories as metaphorical containers. A container structure has a clear boundary, and while something may be only partly inside it, anything that is in the container is just as much in as any other thing in it. (See Johnson 38-40; Lakoff 283ff.; Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh* 380-82, 544-45.) The assumptions built into this metaphoric structure, combined with the metaphor Thinking is Physical Functioning (part of the "Mind as Body" metaphor system (Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy* 235ff.)) define the hermeneutic problem: from a point outside the container, one cannot see or grasp what's inside; from inside, one cannot see or grasp the outside. In fact, we can understand individuals and their classes independently, and our minds can metaphorically be in several places at once.

[16] Thinking about nonclassical category relations started with Wittgenstein, was picked up by J. L. Austin, and developed into more formal research and theories by a number of philosophers, anthropologists, and cognitive psychologists: in regard to mathematics by Lotfi Zadeh, kinship relations by Floyd Lounsbury, colour concepts by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, "basic level" concepts by Roger Brown, plant and animal naming by Berlin and others, and emotions and facial expressions by Paul Ekman (Lakoff 14-40). Eleanor Rosch "saw the generalizations behind such studies of particular cases and proposed that thought in general is organized in terms of prototypes and basic-level structures" (Lakoff 15; 39-46). The Nobel prize-winning neuroscientist Gerald Edelman describes how the cognitive model approach to categorization fits current knowledge of the mind and brain (239-49).

representative members than vice-versa (this is "asymmetry in similarity ratings"); and people tend to believe that more representative members (e.g. sparrows) could transmit a disease to less representative members (e.g. ducks), but not vice-versa (this is "asymmetry in generalization"). And prototypes are used to represent the category in reasoning (what Rosch calls "reference-point reasoning") (Lakoff 41-42). Membership is often a matter of degree, but even a category with clear boundaries may have degrees of representativeness or "centrality." There are some artificially constructed classical categories; but most human categories have one or another prototype structure, with central members and extensions.

Structures of categories have traditionally been understood as hierarchical inverted trees branching downwards, from a single category with a small set of very general features, through subnodes with increasing numbers of features, down to a wide range of particulars (Turner, *Reading Minds* 125-126). But any such tree is artificial, not natural. Categories are arranged not hierarchically, but in the first place at a psychologically basic middle level, and are developed upwards and downwards from there according to need.[17]

FIRST APPROXIMATIONS

I want to pause to show how intuitively this view fits literary genres, then move on to sketch some applications of George Lakoff's theory of categories to some chestnuts of genre criticism to show its value for issues in genre theory.[18]

Let us consider, in capsule form, a fairly standard account of the early English novel. The novel's precursors are the Italian *novella* or "new" tale like Boccaccio's, the epic, medieval romance, the picaresque tale, Menippean satire, and "non-fictitious narrative forms like the letter, the journal, the memoir or biography, the chronicle or history" (Wellek and Warren 216). In 1605 Cervantes confronted the lofty adventures of romance with the gritty realities of the picaresque in the powerful comic amalgam of *Don Quixote*, which shaped the English novel through Henry Fielding. While Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719) stands as the first full modern novel, uniting the three attributes of contemporaneity, verisimilitude, and philosophical significance, Richardson's

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[17] The "basic level" is a level of categorization that is cognitively most salient. It is in the middle of category hierarchies (as "dog" falls in between "mammal" and "Pomeranian"), and emerges from everyday interaction in a physical environment and a culture. Factors defining the basic level include gestalt perception, motor interaction, mental images, and cultural importance. Categorization begins with this level and is primarily organized around it (Lakoff 112).

[18] Of the many critics who have discussed family resemblances in genres, only three small groups have connected this with prototype theory: Swales (1990), and following him Paltridge (1997) mainly examine nonliterary genres such as the academic research paper; Chandler (1997) cites Swales in his studies of literary and nonliterary genres of film and television. Mancing (2000) applies Fishelov's theorizing (1993) to the picaresque novel. Turner (1991) promotes the use of prototype theory in the study of literary genre, but does not explore it; Williams (1995) and Hart (2001) follow his suggestion. Mancing and Williams rely mainly on Lakoff to extend the prototype idea. Fishelov develops the idea of family resemblances with ideas from Morris Weitz and Max Black (54-61). He turns to Eleanor Rosch for prototypes (62), then integrates Maurice Mandelbaum's view that family resemblances are based on common ancestry (65)--just as Fowler claimed literary tradition as a kind of limiting condition for family resemblances (*Kinds* 42-43).

epistolary domestic-romance novel *Pamela* (1740) jump-started the genre. Fielding parodied Richardson in *Shamela* and *Joseph Andrews* (both 1741). Richardson followed with the tragic *Clarissa* (1748), and Fielding with the "comic epic" *Tom Jones* (1749), both larger and more ambitious developments. Smollett's *Humphry Clinker* (1771) concluded the first period of comic realism. If the novel was then a romance made realistic and/ or comic by domestication, two subgeneric strains arose in a kind of defamiliarizing fantastic counterpoint--the satirical with Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* (1759-67) (inspired by Swift's *Tale of a Tub* (1704)), and the exotically romantic with Horace Walpole's gothic romances of 1764 and after. The sentimental novel grew out of comedy with Goldsmith's *Vicar of Wakefield* (1766). In the 1790s Jane Austen also parodied the romances of her day, specifically Anne Radcliffe's gothics, and produced her comic masterpieces from 1811-1818. In the 19th century the novel became the leading form internationally.[19] Poststructuralist critics think along similar lines: Deborah Madsen accepts that "all the subgenres of the novel ...are identified according to the way in which they depart from a standard provided by the romance and the verisimilar novel" ("Genre Criticism" 466). Ralph Cohen notes that genre identification, when it gets tricky, is most importantly determined by relation to other works:

> Any instance of a genre is analyzable as pointing backward to its diachronic ancestry, forward to its alteration of this inheritance.... [M]ore important [than author's claims or critic's structural classifications of *Joseph Andrews*], generic identification would be determined by the works to which it is related. ("Afterword" 269-72)

So this diachronic account serves the function of a definition of the genre by way of a history containing a list of significant exemplars and a pattern of development by imitation, elaboration and revisioning, working in relation to schematic oppositions (especially romance/ realism). There are no strict defining features of the class; rather, certain prototypical members function as springboards for extension of the class according to certain prototypical themes. Critics recognize that this is the best, or at least the only way to give a "definition" of a literary genre, since theoretical definitions are so conspicuously inadequate. Back in that first issue of *Genre*, Leonard Feinberg's disavowal of definitions reads like an unconscious plea for prototype theory:

> All we can do...is familiarize ourselves with the literature traditionally called "satire"; when a new work comes along which exhibits a reasonable number of similarities to accepted satires, we are justified in calling [it] a satire. But we have no right to demand complete conformity to a particular variety of satire, and we should be willing to accept numerous deviations from customary procedure. (31)

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[19] My account is a pastiche adapted from encyclopedia and handbook entries: Frye, Baker and Perkins' *Harper's Handbook to Literature*; Wellek and Warren's *Theory of Literature*; M. H. Abrams' *A Glossary of Literary Terms*; Philip Stevick's *Theory of the Novel*; Deborah Madsen's "Genre Criticism: Problems in Categorizing the Novel as a Genre" in *The Encyclopedia of the Novel*; and Fowler's discussion of "Kinds of Novel" (*Kinds* 118-126).

And the frustration continues, in debates over the incongruity of, and relative priority of, particulars and abstractions (part or whole, induction or deduction, "historical kinds" and "theoretical genology" (Pérez Firmat), extensional logical "inclusion" classes or intensional, discontinuous and historical "constitutive" classes (Schaeffer)).[20]

My point is that if "baggy monsters" or "fluid puddings" like novels and satires have a kind of prototype structure, then probably any genre could likewise be formulated accurately in terms of a set of representative examples that flesh out a central prototype plus developments of that prototype along certain "motivated" lines.[21] More fine-grained studies of literary history and genre hone and develop such models, but do not substantially alter them. They typically move from here to issues of the relation of the series' features to its historical context, or to debates over the structure (imagery, character, plot, theme, etc.) of the novels in relation to its contributory works and genres--the details, for example, of how Fielding responded to Richardson and Cervantes: the relative weight in *Joseph Andrews* of burlesque of *Pamela* vs. imitation of *Don Quixote* vs. romance form vs. mock epic, and so on. Watt, Jameson, and McKeon are partly sociological in their approaches to the novel, but increasing sophistication leads past the view of writers and works as cultural superstructures somehow "determined" by their socioeconomic base to an increasing focus on how writers receive, reshape and comment on sociopolitical forces. Such approaches do not reject the standard generic history with its prototypes, but rather supplement it with histories of social and epistemological conditions. Again, it is a matter of a set of prototypes, their structures and their relations to one another and to the genre as a whole. If we accept that this is a fair *description* of our understanding of genre, we should then try to *explain* this structure of prototypes and family resemblances. And the place to turn, then, is to the theory that has given much-

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[20] There are comparable conflicts even in science. Lakoff uses Gould's account of the battles between two groups of biologists to argue that there is not any single correct way to arrange one's objects. "The pheneticists look at overall similarity in form, function, and biological role, while the cladists are primarily concerned with branching order in the course of evolution and look at ... features present only in members of an immediate lineage and not in distant primitive ancestors" (119). Ideally the differing criteria yield the same taxonomy; but in many cases they do not. For example, cladist criteria skew the pheneticist category of "fish" by putting the lungfish and coelocanth closer to sparrows or elephants than to trout.

Lakoff speculates that the remarkable persistence of "the idea that there is a single right taxonomy of natural things.... [perhaps] arises from the relative stability of basic-level concepts" (119). Further, since scientific classification grew out of folk taxonomies like that of Linnaeus, "it is not at all surprising to find that folk criteria for the application of taxonomic models find their way into science" (119). Genera were "practical units of classification" that everyone should be able to agree on. He used the *shape* of fruits, etc. because shape is easy to perceive and describe. "In short, the genus was established as that level of biological discontinuity at which human beings could most easily perceive, agree on, learn, remember, and name the discontinuities" (35). At this level, folk and scientific categories correspond quite accurately.

The lesson for genre criticism is perhaps to examine basic-level differentia of genres to explain major widely-accepted distinctions, but not to expect to be able to construct uniquely correct systems, whether cladist (theoretical genology) or pheneticist (historical genology). Fowler's chapter 13 discusses the inadequacy of the multifarious genre systems and "maps" (*Kinds* 235ff.).

[21] *Motivated* development is neither arbitrary and random nor mechanically causal and predictable, but has a basis in (non-deterministic) principles and therefore can be given reasoned explanations (Lakoff 346-48, 537-40). Genre histories generally fit this kind of development.

needed substantial content to that necessary but fugitive Wittgensteinian concept: George Lakoff's theory of categorization.

David Fishelov and others show how prototype theory clarifies a family resemblance view of genre.[22] I want to show how Lakoff's theory of categorization in turn clarifies *that* by clarifying prototype theory.[23] When Fishelov and Fowler anchor

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[22] Fishelov's aim is to work out the dominant metaphors used in genre theory, in order to analyze how they enable some findings about genre and hobble others. His analyses are acute and judicious, but relative to this aim, the notion of prototypes is a minor point, and he does not deeply pursue it. He uses it to argue that we can distinguish a "hard core" of highly typical members from a set of less typical members:

> [I]n our perception of generic categories the prototypical cases play a major role. Furthermore, the 'prototypical hypothesis' enables genre theory to break the conceptual deadlock implied by the approach despairing of generalization on literary genres that permeates modern criticism.... The main point, however, is that generic categories... are part of a community's shared linguistic and cultural knowledge (64).

We can go on to try to make explicit the implicit knowledge the community relies on in its uses of genre categories. Mancing makes the important, but fairly minimal claim that,

> we can perceive much more detail, subtle distinction, and uniqueness if we use prototypical generic models and a graded continuum than if we talk in terms of categorical groups. ... [The fact that *Persiles* and *Quixote* are different but not opposites] would be more obvious if we didn't tend to think of one as romance and one as novel and these as two distinct and unique literary genres that have nothing in common. To think in terms of binary oppositions, that staple of structuralist and poststructuralist thought, is not a strategy of modern cognitive science. (141-42)

Williams writes that,

> Lakoff's theory of categories suggests a new way of thinking about the "surface" of Gothic that renders some long-standing critical problems less obscure, and his theory offers a way of discerning the evolutionary "rules" by which the category has changed during the past two centuries. But while helping us to see certain organizing principles, a theory of the category as a cognitive structure also clarifies various questions about the Gothic "myth" that this theory cannot itself address. (20)

Williams seems to draw from Lakoff the idea that the genre, as a category, can be structured by chaining, and that one of the principles of chaining can be "myth". Hence she suggests an outline of the "myth" that defines the prototypical Gothic fiction. The centrality idea and the myth connection also dovetail with Guillén's claim that seeing genre as based on an organizing myth permits a distinction between works in the "inmost circle" of a genre, which have all its features, and works in a second circle, manifesting the indispensable traits but not all others (15-16).

[23] The way Mancing and Williams construe the theories they use is sometimes casual and potentially misleading. Mancing confuses the primary point about "centrality"--that some members are more representative of their category than others--with the idea of a "radial category" (a category defined not by a single cognitive model but by a set of models arranged around a center, to which they are linked) (131). Williams identifies centrality too closely with "basicness." Her version of Lakoff's claim is that "centrality" means that "some members of a category are 'basic,' more authentically belonging to the group than others" (18). Lakoff avoids terms like "authenticity." It is not that some experiences are more basic than others, but rather that some conceptualizations emerge more directly from embodied experience than others (*Metaphors We Live By* 60). Williams also confuses chaining (category extension by linking individuals on the basis of as little as one feature, which can change at each link), with schemas (a skeletal organization of concepts). She writes, regarding the castles typical of Gothic novel settings, that the principle of chaining "suggests other things belonging in this locale or available for plotting. Castles have dungeons and battlements; they are inhabited by certain kinds of people" (20). Chaining is associative movement *across* concepts rather than the interaction of parts *within* conceptual models. The chain connecting women, fire and dangerous things would better correspond to a chain connecting castles to Hearst Castle, then to William Randolph Hearst, then to newspapers. In these studies prototype theory supplies a general

family resemblances and prototypes in "literary tradition," they miss the point that we can grasp genres without knowing anything much about the tradition. We could read the originary prototypical works all out of order, hence with a skewed sense of the sequence of influence and imitation, and still have as good a grasp of the genre, *as a genre*, as anyone. Or we could read works that are prototypical in structure but less definitive of the tradition (say, *Humphry Clinker* rather than the works of Defoe, Richardson and Fielding) or not definitive of it at all (say, Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda's false continuation of *Don Quixote* rather than *Don Quixote* itself), and still have as good a grasp of the genre as such. And here we are still circling around the "early novel" subclass. With respect to the more general genre "novel", a reading of a variety of works published in the past year would probably furnish a sound grasp of its main lineaments. Of course, more knowledge about literary history will always add to our understanding of a genre, in the sense of increased knowledge of how authors, texts and conventions relate to one another and their sociocultural surround; but there is a point beyond which extra knowledge does not add to specifically generic understanding. And this is because genre is not definable by tradition alone. Genre knowledge is not specialist understanding; but rather functional or interactive capacity, based on acquisition of a new "gestalt"--an ability to "go on in the same way" as Wittgenstein would say, to recognize new as well as existing members of the genre by their own features, to understand conventions and how to respond to them.

PROTOTYPE THEORY AND COGNITIVE MODELS

"Prototype effects" are these asymmetries in judgment about category members and structure; they are not equivalent to category structure. George Lakoff explains them as by-products of the *Idealized Cognitive Models* or ICMs, that structure our thought (68). ICMs are like theories of some domain of knowledge, presupposed background frames against which our concepts make sense. Prototype effects arise from incongruities between our cognitive models and our experience of the world. Charles Fillmore was among the first to challenge the standard view of "objectivist" linguistics and philosophy that we understand words by analytical definition by features. The canonical example for the definitional view says the meaning of "bachelor" is "unmarried adult male." But this definition fails to cover exceptions like the Pope, Tarzan, Muslims with only three wives, etc., because, Fillmore observes, it only holds against the background of a script-like semantic frame in which a man starts out as a child, enters a period of sexual availability and activity, and then marries one woman. When this model of cultural expectations does not fit a situation, the definition does not properly apply and prototype effects arise (69-74).[24]

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orientation, and a justification for it. It helps to clarify certain critical issues, but the framework associated with it is not extensively integrated.

[24] Lakoff also reviews Eve Sweetser's more intensive study of the concept "lie" and its common definition as "false statement." Sweetser shows that the definition only applies against the background of an idealized model of communication defined by the Gricean "conversational maxims" of truth and helpfulness: people communicate in order to help each other, and have true beliefs. In this world, the truth of all utterances is assumed, so a false statement must be a lie. Studies of actual use of the word "lie" show a cluster of three

These kinds of background frame are "propositional" ICMs, cognitive models of the elements, properties and relations of an object, situation or event. This and three other kinds of ICM--the image-schematic, the metaphoric and the metonymic--can define category structure, central members, and principles of extension (113-14). These other ICMs are important for genre, but I want to investigate some further aspects of propositional models here.[25]

Adena Rosmarin and Daniel Chandler have developed the important equation of genre with "schema." As Colie did earlier (Colie 8), Rosmarin works from E. H. Gombrich's use of the idea in *Art and Illusion*; but Rosmarin turns it into a self-consciously deductive framework for criticism: "'schemata' or 'premises' or 'models' are general terms for what in literary studies we call 'genres.' Or: a genre is a kind of schema, a way of discussing a literary text in terms that link it with other texts and, finally phrase it in terms of those texts" (21). Rosmarin does not define schemas in detail, but she moves from Gombrich's use to logical deductive structures like syllogism and sorites. Others have proposed and used like ideas in a less formal way. There is much discussion about genres as "systems of expectations" on the audience side, and as "frames for creation" on the artist side.[26] Chandler works from a cognitive-psychological account of schema corresponding to Lakoff's propositional ICM and Fillmore's frame that ascribes to them a psychological reality better-attested than Rosmarin's logical forms, and fitting the kind of mental "template" role that genres play for both artist and audience:

> -A schema can be envisaged as a kind of framework with 'slots' for 'variables', some of them filled-in and others empty.
> -The slots are *either* filled in already with compulsory values (e.g. that a dog is an animal) or 'default values' (e.g. that a dog has four legs) *or* are empty (optional variables) until 'instantiated' with values from the current situation (e.g. that the dog's colour is black).

(non-necessary) conditions for its applicability in prototypical situations: here factual falsity comes last, behind falsity of belief and intended deception (71-74, see also Sweetser).

[25] Scenarios (like the "restaurant" schema) are the best-known kinds of propositional ICMs, but there are other kinds, including simple propositions, feature bundles, taxonomies, and radial categories. Most of Lakoff's *metonymic models* probably have important roles in thought about individual genres and genre systems (he discusses stereotypes, typical examples, ideal cases, paragons, submodels, and salient examples). As for *metaphoric models*, Fishelov's *Metaphors of Genre* surveys the uses and limitations of the four major "deep metaphors" or analogical frameworks in genre theory: genre as *biological species*, as *family*, as *institution* and as *speech-act* (others could be considered: classical category, colour, personality, grammar, gestalt (1 n1)). Lakoff and Johnson claim that metaphorical models structure our thought about highly abstract domains, and do not just represent some more basic conceptualization. If these metaphors are constitutive of our thought about genre, they have much to tell us about its mechanisms.

[26] Hernadi discusses how critics Pierre Kohler (1938) and Paul Van Tieghem (1938) recognized that genres can be "helpful guides to writers as conventional frames" (*Beyond Genre* 21). In a later paper, he lists some other like-minded critics ("Order Without Borders" 207 n1).

> -When what seems like the most appropriate schema is activated, inferences are generated to fill in any necessary but inexplicit details with assumed values from the schema. [. . .] (Chandler, schematv.html)[27]

Genre schemas "organize knowledge about related kinds of texts" (schematv.html).[28] This is a fine rough sketch, but Chandler leaves out some important points. First, schemas consist of sets of *relations* as well as *elements*--the "slots" are for the elements, but the relations are the "framework" part of the schema. Lakoff puts it that such ICMs have an *ontology* (their elements) and a *structure* (the properties and the relations of the elements). The elements may be either "basic-level" concepts such as entities, actions, states, properties, etc., or they may be concepts characterized by other ICMs (Lakoff 284-288).

Second, such schemas have *gestalt* structures: their parts are "interdefined" and do not make sense without the whole. It is this quality of schemas that makes them an advance on the view that concepts and categories are defined by a list of features. E. D. Hirsch describes genre as that sense of the whole by which we may understand all of the parts (71-89), a sense shared by performer and audience.[29] As Colie says,

> [With certain] sets and boundaries understood, a great deal need *not* be said about them: one needn't recapitulate all pastoral values in a dialogue set in Urbino the well-named, when one can show by various signposts that pastoral values are understood as part of this work's urbanity. (115)

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[27] See Chandler's website at: http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/intgenre/intgenre.html. Lakoff describes the development of the concept from Fillmore's "frames" (1968), Marvin Minsky's frames with defaults (1975), Hilary Putnam's "stereotypes" (1975), Rumelhart's "schemas" (1975) to Schank and Abelson's "scripts" (1977). All are "network structures with labeled branches that can code.... conventional propositional structures in terms of which situations can be understood" (116). Minsky and Putnam emphasized the importance of default values defining the normal case. Turner writes that schemata are "skeletal organizations of conceptual knowledge [that] have variables, can embed, and can represent knowledge at all levels" and gives a summary history of the concept (*Reading Minds* 266 n15). He also criticizes E. D. Hirsch's use of the idea (225ff.).

[28] Chandler develops the schema concept a little further. He connects them to Barthesian intertextuality: we make sense of a text in relation to other texts of the same genre rather than in relation to experience (intgenre1.html). And he claims that genre schemas are one kind of textual schema, along with story schemas and formal-feature schemas. This textual basis obscures certain things. First, genres adapt for their own use schemas that are also used in real life. He discusses social and ideological schemas, but does not distinguish between schemas for events in the world, and those for events that typify genres. (Swales imagines how someone who had only known "arrests" from detective movies might behave inappropriately in an actual police station (85).) Second, nonliterary arts also have genres. He does not distinguish between formal features related to particular media (such as cuts and zooms for visual media) and more abstract ones (e.g. discourse forms like "dialogue").

[29] Hernadi sees the same concern in other genre theorists, such as Harold Elmer Mantz and Yurij Tynjanov. Tynjanov argues that the relative weight of the parts cannot be assessed without the perception of the whole of a small or large form; without the "mental image of the total dimensions of a work" words do not resonate, action does not develop (Hernadi 42). Gestalt psychology is often mentioned by genre theorists (see Hernadi 5-6, Dubrow 36-37, Schauber and Spolsky 25-28). The concept of a gestalt bears significantly on the "part-whole" issue of the hermeneutic circle.

Third, because this gestalt model assumes some optional and default values, not just necessary features, instances can depart from a prototypical standard by changing those values, yet still be easily recognized. (The integrity of the schema is a product of concepts of defaults and options that are made possible within an abstract relational framework.) The image of emulation as changing specific values within a stable skeletal structure is a promising one for literary histories seeking to preserve the specificity of works alongside the generality of genres. It also answers to the fact, inexplicable on the feature-set view, that people can easily conceive of category members having none of the usual (default) features associated with the category. Hence we have no trouble accepting that three-legged, toothless albino tigers are still tigers, that *Tristram Shandy* is still a novel, and indeed that "every work deviates from any particular set of characteristics that may be attributed to its kind" (Snyder 1).

Ideally, a theory of genre would enable us to construct by close study the ICMs composing the highly complex categories of individual genres. It would fulfill the goals generated by seeing genres as schematic gestalt structures interrelating conventional features of rhetorical purpose and stance, form, content and theme in a "sense of the whole."[30] The interrelation of form and content is, as Fowler and others argue, crucial:

> The repertoire is the whole range of potential points of resemblance that a genre may exhibit. [. . .] Every genre has a unique repertoire, from which its representatives select characteristics. These distinguishing features, it is worth noting, may be either formal or substantive. As Austin Warren says, generic grouping should be based "upon both outer form (specific metre or structure) and . . . upon inner form (attitude, tone, purpose--more crudely, subject and audience)." And Guillén cautions against the vagueness that comes from concentrating exclusively on external features, or on internal ones such as "the 'essence' of tragedy, or the 'ideas' of the Russian novel." The best of the older theorists, in fact, always kept external and internal forms together in discussing the historical kinds. (*Kinds* 55)[31]

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[30] The dense interweaving of form and content could make up for the absence of specific communicative purpose that is said to ground structure in studies of nonliterary genres. The Bakhtin-inspired "new rhetoric" of Michael Halliday, Carolyn Miller, Peter Medway and Aviva Friedman characteristically defines genres as forms of discourse embodying socially standard strategies for responding to recurring types of rhetorical situation. Swales helpfully clarifies how communicative purpose relates to schemas, family resemblances, and prototypes:

> A genre comprises a class of communicative events, the members of which share some set of communicative purposes. [This set of purposes]... shapes the schematic structure of the discourse and influences and constrains choice of content and style. ... In addition to purpose, exemplars of a genre exhibit various patterns of similarity in terms of structure, style, content and intended audience. If all high probability expectations are realized, the exemplar will be viewed as prototypical by the parent discourse community. (58)

However, since literature "inevitably makes an appeal to the reader or listener so complex as to allow no easy or useful categorization of purpose", communicative purpose is "unsuited as a primary criterion" for its genres: "[a]lthough there may be overt political, religious or patriotic tracts put out in the form of verse, that poetry that is taught, remembered, known and loved is rarely of that kind" (47).

[31] Fowler reiterates this priority in later work:

Because "repertoire" implies an unstructured list, we should substitute "model." This model may be characterized by what cognitive linguists call "mappings" of content to form, as long as the various kinds of literary form and content can be adequately characterized. The real challenge here may be to characterize *form* in a way specific enough to plausibly represent or match content, since language has richer resources for describing conceptual content than it has for describing conceptual form. Lakoff and Turner have commented on the relation of cognitive linguistics, which proposes cognitive models of grammatical form-meaning "constructions," to broader elements of thought, and it seems to be the best available framework for such a project.[32] An initial step, then, is to characterize generic features as much as possible in terms of Lakoff's propositional, image-schematic, metonymic and metaphoric models. Such a framework would set the stage for explanations of generic histories in prototype-and-extensions terms. We can begin to see how schematic models would figure in this project by exploring how one kind of schematic model can characterize one kind of generic feature.

SCHEMAS FOR PLOT

Schemas of the script or scenario kind, as with the restaurant example, immediately suggest parallels with plot as a feature of literary genres.[33] Chandler notes that "The most well-known kind of schema is that for a familiar event (such as going to a restaurant)."

> Until now, genre theory has largely consisted of empirical listing of generic repertoires.... These preliminaries behind, it should now be possible to investigate how the features of generic repertoires are related functionally. Accepting that genres exist as cultural objects, we can go on to ask how they work. ... [E]ach function must be embodied in a rhetorical structure (or perhaps in several;...). ... When constructional types have been studied in the past, a philological method has generally predominated; series of imitations being traced back to a *fons et origo*.... [But some works] stand in a more distant relation to the [prototype, and may]... share nothing more than a fundamental [generic] constructional type. (296-99)

[32] Lakoff proposes a general "spatialization of form" hypothesis (283ff.); Lakoff and Turner discuss iconic form in William Carlos Williams' poem "To A Solitary Disciple" (Chapter 3); and Turner in his study of rhetorical figures suggests further ways to conceive of the "formal anchor" of a figure's form-content pairing (which is the meaning of the Greek word for figure, *schema*). When conceptual content is mapped to an abstract image-schematic form it is iconic (a series of steps along a path is the form of *climax*, the symmetrical transposition of elements along a path is the form of *antimetabole* (A-B B-A)). Schematic content can also be a conventional framing of a rich human scene (*aposiopesis* pairs cessation of speech with a scene of paralysis by emotion); it can be an abstract meaning (the figure *question* pairs interrogative forms with the abstract meaning of posing an inquiry); and it can be a yet more abstract mapping (what Turner calls the XYZ figure, as in "vanity is the quicksand of reason") ("Figure" 44-60). He quotes Jeanne Fahnestock: "One or the other arm of this form-function pairing connection could pivot...but the central link should still hold" (46).

[33] Narrative is a large subject in itself, and I discuss only aspects of how it relates to schemas and genres. In this regard, the essential thing is that plot-types are structured specifically enough to have default forms defining expectations, but abstractly enough to allow variations. They can be learned, recognized, and used, and associated with certain genres. These analyses are obviously close to Propp's studies of the variant plot-structures of Russian folk-tales, and Frye's applications of such morphological studies to literary myth. George Lakoff's "Structural Complexity in Fairy Tales" develops Propp's structural framework (I have been unable to obtain a copy of this paper).

These "consist of a sequential list of the characteristic events involved in a common routine" and also include "related *props* (such as menus), *roles* (such as waiter), *enabling conditions* (such as having money) and *outcomes* (such as feeling less hungry)," as well as schemas for person types and places (schematv.html). Plot involves aspects of setting and character, since actions must include actors and take place somewhere; but specific settings and characters can have their own schemas too, if they have roles in the generic repertoire beyond their plot function. I will speak of "plot-schemas" as those event-schemas or scenario propositional models that provide structures for plot actions but do not determine specific plots, points of view, or narrations. There are of course many kinds of features that work in concert with plot to establish genre. But the importance of plot is indisputable, so let us consider it in isolation as a first step, and let us begin with a genre for which a quite specific kind of plot is a salient feature of the repertoire: *film noir*.[34]

Early critics study the genre from various vectors, and again often in terms evocative of prototype theory and family resemblances. Borde and Chaumeton in 1955 use the word "type" rather than "genre," but define it in relation to a "series", connected to filmic "evolution," in analogous terms:

> A series can be defined as a group of motion pictures from one country sharing certain traits (style, atmosphere, subject matter...) strongly enough to mark them unequivocally and to give them, over time, an unmistakable character. ... From the point of view of "filmic evolution," series spring from certain older features, from long-ago titles. Moreover they all reach a peak, that is, a moment of purest expression. Afterwards they slowly fade and disappear leaving traces and informal sequels in other genres. (17)

The classic *noir* series is generally agreed to begin with *The Maltese Falcon* in 1941 and end with Orson Welles's *Touch of Evil* in 1958. Raymond Durgnat (1970) studies the "family tree" of *noir*, from literary precursor cycles of Greek tragedy, Jacobean drama and Romantic Agony, to those of the more specific nineteenth-century tragic genres of bourgeois realism, the ghost story and the detective story, to those of contemporary film (37). He then offers schematizations of dominant cycles or motifs, thematic and narrative, in American *film noir*. Paul Schrader (1971), circumscribing or circumventing the definitional issue, tries to reduce *noir* to its main elements: he notes stylistics, themes and "catalytic" cultural conditions in the Hollywood of the Forties.[35]

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[34] I am indebted to Imre Szeman for introducing me to the thinking around *film noir*.

[35] Of course, other critics have different takes on *noir*. Many hesitate to call it a genre, either because of the prototype effects that prevent clear classification or because they see genre as more like "mode" than "historical kind." Place and Peterson advocate the influential view that *noir* is a "visual style" rather than a genre: "The characteristic *film noir* moods of claustrophobia, paranoia, despair, and nihilism constitute a world view that is expressed not through the films' terse, elliptical dialogue, nor through their confusing, often insoluble plots, but ultimately through their remarkable style" (65). Robert Porfirio, wishing to avoid the simplification in either "semantic" or "genetic" treatments of genre, sees period, visual style and mood as criteria for the category. The pessimistic sensibility is defined in terms of existential philosophy. Doll and Faller's semiotic approach sees genre functioning through common cultural codes. Features are codes

Films noirs are recognized, and presumably created, in part through models of typical plots. In fact their features eventually become so typical as to be not just part of the expectations of informed audiences, but also easily parodied stereotypes in a way impossible for broader, less plot-defined genres like novel or tragedy.[36] We can sketch a plot schema, with some elements of character and setting, as follows:

> -Necessary: a crime; a criminal; some attempt to "solve" the crime.
> -Default: the crime is brought to the attention of the protagonist, who is a "hardboiled" male private investigator; he tries to solve the crime. The client is a beautiful, mysterious woman. The crime is low-level, personal, and violent; and motivated by money and sex. The setting is the urban underbelly.
> -Optional: specifics of character, crime, and investigation; (e.g. may or may not have partners; may solve the crime or fail to, etc.)[37]

The plot schema presupposes as necessary the existence of a crime, but the narrative need not present it. And although there must be an investigator, default values are flexible and optional values are open: the investigator could be female, a lawyer, journalist, policeman; he or she can have any name and appearance. Such cultural knowledge is often a set of specifications of a more abstract schema from our background social knowledge, and a *noir* schema like this clearly hangs on a framework provided by our knowledge of the sequence of events involved in crime and detection. We rely on this knowledge to make inferences in stories about these topics. We know that a detective typically runs a business solving various kinds of crimes, has an office etc., and that the typical sequence of events in a job would be for the client to meet at his or her office, explain the problem, perhaps agree on a price and hire the detective, who would then

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and can be "both pretext (subject matter, content, and theme) and text (i.e. style--setting, décor, lighting, *mise-en-scène*, editing, and music). Genre also functions semantically (as an autonomous system of conventions), and by syntax (narrative systems)" (89). For Cawelti, it embodies "the drama of heroic quest" (227). It is a myth in the sense of "a pattern of narrative known throughout the culture and presented in many different versions by many different tellers" (228). Coapjec wants to go beyond features to inquire into "the principle by which they are established. In virtue of what, we neglect to ask, is this particular organization instituted?" (xi). This will not be found in filmic or societal structures (xi). His anthology gives poststructuralist answers to the "question of the genre's 'absent cause' " (xii).

[36] There is a history of parodies of *noir* that help to highlight its schemas, from *Beat the Devil* and *The Thin Man* to *Dead Men Don't Wear Plaid* and *Who Framed Roger Rabbit?* Recently, the comic novels of Elmore Leonard and Carl Hiaassen have been dubbed "sunshine noir" by critics. The Coen brothers' film *Fargo* reverses the features of setting and characters: instead of the sultry and sensual urban south we have the bundled-up rural north; instead of the tough-talking single male PI we have a polite and friendly pregnant wife; instead of the cool and mysterious *femme fatale* we have the jittery car-salesman husband; instead of the snappy dialogue we have numbing prattle in Fargo dialect. The action--the crime against family--is a *noir* staple, but the usual suspense in depicting or reconstructing it is gone. It is presented in graphic, clumsy, grotesque entirety at the beginning.

[37] We all know how *noir* uses Chandler's other aspects of the routine of crime and detection: props (gun, car, lockpick, etc.); roles (PI's colleagues, relatives of the client, witnesses, known criminal informants); enabling conditions (the motive, the crime, the victim's desire for restitution, the PI's credentials); outcomes (the crime may be solved, property restored, revenge achieved, the PI rewarded); person types (the tough cynical PI, the femme fatale, brutal thugs); and place types (the PI's office, city streets, sleazy motels).

conduct an investigation by gathering information from the crime scene, from witnesses and contacts in the relevant fields of endeavor, piecing together the criminal events and their motivation, and divining the perpetrator from among a number of possible suspects. We have some knowledge of detection techniques, such as dusting for fingerprints, wiretaps, interrogation of suspects (good-cop/ bad-cop techniques, polygraphs), etc. As a result we can reconstruct causal sequences from very partial cues: from seeing one man questioning another in a certain way, we can infer that the first is a detective and that the second is a witness or suspect for a crime that has been committed.

Paul Schrader claims that since it "need not necessarily concern crime and corruption" *film noir* is not defined by "conventions of setting and conflict", and hence is not a genre (9, 8). The view that *noir* "takes us into the realm of classification by motif and tone" rather than genre seems to come from Durgnat, whose evidence for it, however, is weak: "*films noirs* in other genres include *The Blue Angel* [1930/ 1959], *King Kong* [1933/ 1976], *High Noon* [1952], *Stalag 17* [1953], *The Sweet Smell of Success* [1957], *The Loves of Jeanne Eagels* [1957], *Attack* [1957], *Shadows* [1960], *Lolita* [1962], *Lonely Are The Brave* [1962] and *2001* [1968]" (38). To call these films *noir* is, as we significantly say, "stretching," and I think this is the place to reclaim the genre concept by distinguishing these as noncentral members. Most come very late in, or after, the classic series of prototypes, and it is more plausible to consider them extensions of some *noir* features into other genres, or perhaps blends with other genres (they need not be just one or another). If "interbreeding is intrinsic to motif processes" (39), most today would say the same about genre, and the ICM theory of categories expects edges to blur and overlap. If their effects rely on allusion to the *noir* vision of unredeemed humanity, this vision is defined or symbolized by the pervasive small-time crime of the prototypes, a *topos* readily evoked as a schematic scenario. While "it's impossible to say exactly when a crime becomes the focus of a film rather [than] merely a realistic incident", Durgnat can still go on to describe "dominant cycles or motifs" in many films where "crime or criminals provide the real or apparent center of focus" (38-39).

A larger challenge to the idea of plot-schema as part of the cognitive model for genre prototypes is the point that even central, prototypical members may enact significant variations on the schema. Although it is otherwise lousy with the defining features of *noir*, many of which it helped to put in place, *Double Indemnity* is about the criminal rather than the detective. This plays havoc with a definitional approach to genre, since it pushes us to an over-abstract level of definition: it turns a specifically narrative defining feature ("detective protagonist") into a vague topic ("concerned with crime") and so widens the scope of the genre to the point where it could include documentaries, for example.[38] But the seeming anomaly is easily accommodated within a cognitive schema

[38] Borde and Chaumeton take the usual path of genre definition driven by a classical view of categories: "while remaining as scientifically grounded as possible, one must examine the most prominent characteristics of the films which critics have classed as *noir*. From these characteristics one may then derive the common denominator and define that unique expressive attitude which all these works put into play" (19). They then claim that "It is the presence of crime which gives *film noir* its most constant characteristic"; crimes "set the stage for a narrative where life and death are at stake" (19). They spend the

approach, because it is simply a different use of the same schema. Here the point of view is that of the criminal rather than the detective, and the detection process is a secondary action serving to heighten the tension of the main action, which follows the criminal's planning, commission and covering up of the crime in pursuit of his goal.[39] But we still understand it using our schema for the action where a criminal commits a crime, a detective is assigned to pursue the criminal, and so forth. Our schematic knowledge relates the roles of detective and criminal in specific ways, even if the criminal is never found, even if a detective is not called in, even if it turns out a crime has not been committed.[40] Even prototypes may override the default values of the plot-schema without displacing it--in fact, while relying on it. The good news is that this is in line with how categories are now known to work. Plot-schemas align rather than oppose varying plots with single topics, and so consolidate the point that prototypes can "define" a category. In this view, a crime documentary could use a *noir* style of cinematography for example, but would likely be noncentral, since prototypical *noirs* are fictional. More decisive to our judgment would be whether it invoked our crime event-schema by following the commission and investigation of a specific crime, or whether it drifted away from the *noir* prototype by examining crime in the abstract.

There is more to genre schemas than social knowledge, and there is much work to be done in this line. The kinds of structure associated with plot-schemas are not specific enough to account for our cultural knowledge of all that enters into a subgenre. They do not account for many typical but specific characters who populate *film noir*, like the femme fatale; stereotypical specific scenes like the femme fatale silhouetted against the frosted glass of the PI's office; typical specific devices of imagery like the shadows of window-blinds cast like prison bars across characters; typical cinematography like skewed framing; and the snappy sparring that is typical of *noir* discourse. These elements are cultural conventions: some are taken over from hardboiled detective stories, others seem to be picked up by the prototypes from earlier forms of cinema, then emulated by later members (e.g. the light/ shadow contrasts and gothic cityscapes from German Expressionism brought to America by Welles's *Citizen Kane*).

These conventional features should be explicable, rather, in terms of that matching of outer forms with inner contents and themes that is typical of genres. Plot schemas considered in isolation say nothing about the how and why of this matching, but

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rest of the essay distinguishing the narrative features of *noir* from those of the crime documentary, and connecting them with moods and themes.

[39] *Double Indemnity* establishes itself as central partly by using this variation to develop a central *noir* theme, the blurring of the line between good and evil. In a sense Neff is, like Oedipus, both criminal and detective: part of his motivation is his idea of the perfect crime, based on his inside knowledge of how best to defraud his own company. The insurance investigator Barton Keyes is thus a kind of double of him.

[40] Compare how our restaurant-scenario structure of knowledge relates to restaurant narratives: we know the roles and elements from "outside" as it were. We are not committed to being *just* the customers but can put ourselves into the role and point of view of the waiter, cook, etc. (otherwise, how would Sartre's famous waiters "act too much like waiters" from the patron's point of view?). We can imagine a series of variations on the "restaurant" scenario from different points of view forming a subgenre. In fact a *cena* or symposium banquet setting is a feature of some genres of comedy and satire. It motivates another feature: a variety of collegial, informal, quasi-philosophical discourse.

we could begin that exploration by noting some fairly straightforward metaphoric and metonymic mappings of content to form. The plot-schema evokes, by its roles and relations, schematic oppositions of good and evil, seeking truth and concealing it. These can be expressed through the visual opposition between light and darkness, due to conventional conceptual mappings (the name *film noir* relies on this correlation). The coherence of the metaphors GOOD IS LIGHT/ EVIL IS DARKNESS and TRUTH IS LIGHT/ FALSEHOOD IS DARKNESS underpin one-to-many mappings of form to theme. That is, a figure draped in shadows can come across as both evil and unknowable. This symbolic redundancy contributes to the gestalt quality of the genre in that, as such interconnections and redundancies build up, the whole system of mappings becomes psychologically simpler than the "parts" taken separately.

The abstract schema allows the detective to fail (in knowledge and goodness), and this threat has been a strong undercurrent in much of *noir*: the goal of the search is worthless (*The Maltese Falcon*), the crime is not fully solved (*Kiss Me Deadly*), the clients are corrupt (*The Maltese Falcon*, *The Big Sleep*), the detective can't stop or punish the crime even when he figures it out (*Chinatown*), the criminal is the protagonist (*Double Indemnity*, *The Killers*, *Detour*) the investigator is identified with the criminal or object of the search (arguably *Double Indemnity, Touch of Evil*, *Blade Runner*), and/or dies at the end (*Double Indemnity, Out of the Past, Touch of Evil*). The immersion of the detective in the "world of crime" and his position in-between police and criminals, makes complicity or corruption a danger. So the basic oppositions are complicated by the themes of the individual versus the group, and the challenge to the detective's integrity. High-key lighting, playing light and shadow off one another, is frequently used to reflect this. Along with the lighting go other visual cues: the skewed framing also intimates a skewed vision of things; the settings are often drenched in obscuring elements like rain, fog and smoke. This "atmosphere" can also literally stick to the detective, hinting at the impossibility of keeping "clean" in such a hostile environment.

The difficulty of the search for truth can be mapped in other ways. Conventional metaphors map knowledge as a straight unobstructed path, as well as a clear vision. A world in which knowledge is hard-won and uncertain is expressed by a labyrinthine setting of city streets and closed spaces. A "convoluted" plot, with complex characters who are deceitful or unbalanced, are metonymic for uncertain knowledge, because they are literally connected with it. Convoluted streets and closed spaces obstruct light and sight as well as movement, so they serve multiple thematic functions: increasing the darkness of evil, and challenging the detective's ability to reach the truth of the situation.

Further connections can develop these rudimentary mappings of plot content to form and theme content in various ways. The quest for world-knowledge easily becomes in part a quest for self-knowledge, so the setting can be a dark labyrinth of the psyche, especially its criminal, evil or mad elements. This adds motivation to somehow identifying the hero with the villain. Making the client or criminal a femme fatale can add a layer of erotic quest to the search, and lead to an erotic kind of corruption, betrayal and grim self-knowledge. The snappy, tough talk of characters expresses their mental strength and agility. But the metaphor of characters as "tough" or "hard-boiled" can relate to

genuine moral strength (Marlowe), or to a cynical "shell" that conceals selfish intentions under a veneer of integrity (Spade).

This is a sketch, of course, but already we can see how the features hang together. This is not a *chain* of associations or significations but a *gestalt complex* of elements, in that schematic structures inherent in the *plot-schema's* roles and relations (e.g. the oppositions detective vs. criminals, knowledge-seeker vs. mysterious situation) are projected as *theme* (good vs. evil, knowledge vs. ignorance, truth vs. falsehood), *setting* (structure and atmosphere), *character* (appearance, behaviour, speech), and *formal conventions* (cinematography).[41]

NOVELS AND THEIR SCHEMAS

We can now make similar observations about the novel. Once we consider the category in terms of its prototypes rather than in terms of near-vacuous "common denominator" defining features, we find a more complex structure, in which certain plot schemas are important as factors in emulation, and therefore in generic history. Early novels are not now "best representatives" of the category "novel," but we do see early exemplars forming groups with similar plot concerns--*Lazarillo de Tormes*, *The Swindler*, *Don Quixote*, *Moll Flanders*, *Joseph Andrews*, *Tom Jones*, *Tristram Shandy*, *Humphry Clinker* all concern, exclusively or in part, the "picaresque" adventures of an individual and companions on a quest to reach an old home, a new home, fortune, adventure, love or knowledge. Travelers cross both country and city, and obstacles tend to involve humorous "low-life" encounters typical of each setting. In an overlapping tradition of plot, *Moll Flanders*, *Pamela*, *Clarissa*, *Shamela*, *Joseph Andrews*, *Tom Jones*, *Tristram Shandy*, and *Humphry Clinker* all concern stories of love, courtship and marriage. The negotiation of major obstacles like class and family boundaries, and foolish or vicious characters dramatize the completion of the action. So schemas for the quest-journey and for love-courtship-and-marriage prominently characterize the early novel (whereas schemas for, say, a hunt, crime and detection, war, adultery, the transition from childhood to adulthood, seem at most subplots). The elements and relations of these plot schemas have compulsory, default and optional values. Compulsory elements of the quest-journey would be a traveler, an origin, and a destination; compulsory relations would be the movement of the traveler from the origin to the destination. For love, the compulsory elements would be the two lovers, and the relations, the development of a relationship between them. Some optional *elements* in the journey schema are *obstacles* and *vehicles*. *Obstacles* are optional elements in the love schema too (disapproving families, class

[41] Again, these considerations relate only to the plot schema of *noir* prototypes. I am ignoring such complications as: how it combines with other forms (e.g. as interpolated story), or opposes them (e.g. as "countergenre" to screwball comedy, perhaps), how a change in attitude makes satirical and romantic versions, or how the form is extended into a "higher register" through metaphor and allegory. All of these factors are important in analyzing the structural complications of the category, but a strong plot schema seems necessary for an understanding of many of them. We know we can use this model by imagining how we might turn it to an unusual goal--say, to create an anti-smoking television ad, to recast a classical story (say Samson and Delilah, or Gilgamesh), a historical event, or a typical sitcom. But since we don't have as much specific knowledge about "novel" as we do about *film noir*, we cannot imagine a "novelistic film" or satirical novel as we can a "*film noir* novel" or satirical *noir*.

barriers, conflicts for affection, separation, etc.). Of course in literature these suspense-producing obstacles are preferred options.

The difference of the two plot types are reflected in thematic and formal differences, to discuss which we must assume some default detail. The domestic comic romances are about personal and social integration; achieving a stable, virtuous life in society through relationships among family, friends, acquaintances and institutions. Individual happiness and virtue are threatened by people who are tyrannical, false, vain, and selfish. The social world is structured intricately but clearly, so the action occurs within specific social locales (movement is not habitual), among a set of clearly interrelated characters. Virtue and vice are clearly understood (despite transgressions), so the emotional tone tends to be sincere, varying between clear highs and lows. The picaresque is about direct education in gritty realities, through varied low-life experiences. It is less about struggling for a full, virtuous life than about getting by, learning the rules of the game in a corrupt world. One hopes to escape hunger and persecution, by getting whatever money and power one can. Family, friendship and love are incidental. The social world's structure is shifting and invisible to authorities, so wandering actions and temporary alliances are fitting; and tough-minded humor is more appropriate than exquisite sensibility.

Already we can observe how these contrasting plot-related themes constrain form: the epistles so ubiquitous in domestic romances would be preposterous in picaresque. The pretense of letters to and from nearby friends increases verisimilitude and the impression of intimate knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of characters. But what would be the point of picaresque letters? Would the *picaro* complain of moral struggles with wealthy seducers? Would he celebrate his delight in robbing a market and be moved to reflections on God's plenty? To what intimate would he reveal the ebb and flow of his feelings, or his dreams for the future? With what resources would he write and send his epistles? Of course, the thing is not impossible, but much less motivated. When picaresque-style novels do use letters (*Humphry Clinker*, *Shamela*), they are parodic, and the conflict of form and content creates some of the absurd humor.

These sketches are meant only to suggest how plot-schemas underlie groupings and can be used as a basis for correlations of form and content that establish generic gestalts. An analysis of the novel genre as a whole must recognize its wide range of plots.[42] But plot schemas with particular ontologies and structures are clearly definitive of novel subgenres (sometimes tellingly labeled "genre fiction") defined by subject, or setting and action, such as the factory, university, domestic, city, detective, and war novel, and the novel of the soil. Like *film noir*, these tend to acquire, by the cultural assimilation of a series of prototypes, default features beyond the default ontology and structure of the schema for their situations. The subgenres of *Bildungsroman*, *Erziehungsroman*, *Kunstlerroman*, social novel, historical novel, and regional novel are more abstract, but schemas can be more abstract, too, and a structure fitting a *Bildung* or

[42] The novel itself has no particular action schema, but I think there are a range of possible abstract action schemas which, joined with interrelated schemas of other kinds, establish its horizon of possibilities. The novel is complex enough that I assume it is what Lakoff calls a *radial category*, a group of related models, some of which are central and others that are extensions of the central model.

"development" event-schema, where a youth grows to maturity as he learns about life through a series of experiences, is a requisite for the first three of these kinds. The schema can be further specified in terms of education and art for the latter two of the three.

As to form, there is a habit of thinking that because their rhetorical structures are generally not as visible as those of stricter genres, novels are "natural"; because they have no specific form they may have any specific content. Yet a critic of Stendhal will praise the "unity of form and content" in his plain, "mirroring" style (Shaw 14), and some correlations are discernible even in the formal rudiments. The prototypical novel is a continuous prose narrative, extended to a certain size (less than 150 pages might be a novella)[43] and divided into chapters. On a more abstract level of form, the "realistic" convention is that the story concerns the cares and actions of "ordinary life" (i.e. in the mid-regions of society and experience). It has a clear linear causal structure, to mirror a naturalistic content. The narrator may be a character, or an unintrusive observer. The style mimics the voice of everyday life, minimizing rhetorical complexity. This steady stream of apparently first-hand reports of setting, characters, dialogue and action implies the narrator's immersion in a complete world, or another part of the reader's world, and invites the reader to identify with him. All of these correlations should be familiar to students of the novel;[44] but they might hesitate to offer them as definitive because of the obvious challenge of counterexamples. A definition with numerous exceptions is no definition at all. The prototype approach, that establishes a central model and charts out variations or extensions of it, has two great advantages: it rejects the policy of legislating some members out of the category in order to save some set of "singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions"; and it sidelines the morass of qualifications that would vitiate all but the most trivial descriptions of the genre. We keep our sense of a gestalt with the bold outlines of a Cézanne, and our knowledge that superimposing all members of the category leaves us with the foggy glare of a Turner.

OTHER ASPECTS OF PLOT-SCHEMAS IN GENRE

Returning to the role of Proppian narrative models or paradigms in genre studies, we should recall Bakhtin's and Frye's models of "romance," which greatly amplify, from the evidence of literary history, the default and optional elements built over the skeletal love-romance event-schema outlined above. Both were influenced by Propp, and many later genre critics have developed their important insights. Howard Mancing uses Bakhtin's model of Greek adventure-romance from *The Dialogic Imagination* as a polar opposite of the deflationary "novel" tendency in picaresque. In the "typical composite

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[43] I suspect that the distinctions among short story, novella and novel have to do less with page numbers than with more human-centered, temporal measurements of size. That is, can it be read all at once, does it take all day, or does it require several days?

[44] The standard studies of the novel give a good idea of how prominent formal features match prominent themes. Watt's account of "formal realism" (*The Rise of the Novel*) and Booth's *The Rhetoric of Fiction* are standard partly because they make these fundamental points. Later studies using very different frameworks still rely on these principles. Thus Jameson's *The Political Unconscious* relies on Frye's view of the novel as "a realistic displacement of romance" (*The Secular Scripture* 38).

schema of this plot", a boy and girl of mysterious lineage, marriageable age, and remarkable beauty and chastity meet unexpectedly during a festival. They discover an instant overwhelming passion, but their union is confronted with obstacles (Bakhtin's word), and they are separated and reunited numerous times. Obstacles and adventures include parental disapproval, romantic rivals, abductions, the lovers' flight, journey, storm at sea, shipwreck, pirate attack, captivity, attempts on their innocence, battles, selling into slavery, presumed deaths and betrayals, and accusations and trials. Meetings with unexpected friends and enemies are important, as are disguises, recognitions, miraculous rescues, and supernatural devices and discoveries. They find their parents, and the story ends with the happy marriage of the lovers (Bakhtin 87-88, cited in Mancing 134). Fredric Jameson, Hayden White, and Schauber and Spolsky use Frye's schemas.[45] On other specific genres, scholars have proposed schemas for Gothic, picaresque, various forms of love-romance, and for western films, no doubt among many others. Anne Williams follows Guillén's argument (via Eugenia DeLamotte) that genres are often organized by a "myth" that conveys a sense of the theme of the whole independently of any particular work. The myth is an "essential situation or significant structure" (15-16). Charles Perrault's "Bluebeard" epitomizes the "Gothic myth," as it provides

> a virtual catalogue of conventions familiar in gothic narratives from Walpole to the present: a vulnerable and curious heroine; a wealthy, arbitrary, and enigmatic hero/ villain; and a grand, mysterious dwelling concealing the violent, implicitly sexual secrets of this *homme fatal.* And the setting--Bluebeard's house with its secret room--seems the most important of these, the element that transmutes the others unmistakably into Gothic. (38-39)

She later associates this myth with the Freudian patriarchal "family romance" and distinguishes "male" and "female" versions of it. Thomas Beebee cites studies of popular love-romances and westerns that offer Propp-like story schemas (lists of a dozen or so elements and events that may be essential or optional and whose order may be invariant or variable) for particular genres.[46] Leonard Tennenhouse groans at the redundancy of the "seduction narrative," a popular subtype of the courting and marriage plot in the 18th century.[47]

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[45] His model of quest-romance has been especially definitive--see *Anatomy* (186-206) and *The Secular Scripture.*

[46] Janice Radway's *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984) gives us "thirteen essential plot elements, moving from the destruction of the heroine's social identity through the development of the emotional ties between heroine and hero to the restoration of the heroine's identity." Will Wright's *Six-Guns and Society: A Structural Study of the Western* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975) presents a "Proppian sequence of sixteen 'events' whose ordering is invariable, even if not all elements are present in every western. In the first complex of events... the hero enters a social group in which he is unknown, but to which he reveals that he has an exceptional ability. In the final complex, the hero saves that society, which then finally accepts him" (Beebee 5-6).

[47] Tennenhouse writes,

The existence of schemas in minds contemporary with genres is confirmed in more direct, though more curious ways. An increase in popular self-consciousness about genres increases the sense of their arbitrariness and absurdity. When genres become "tired and predictable" enough that they can be produced in reflex, assembly-line fashion, there are a number of possible responses. The main ones seem to be to treat it more lightly or more heavily, either following it or diverting it to new uses. Light treatments may "ride the wave" by churning out further minor variations (trash or pulp); or may divert it by mockery (burlesque, parody, camp). Heavy treatments may work according to formula but in a serious tone (kitsch or mannerism); or may turn the genre to more artistic use by projecting its plot structures to psychological, intellectual and spiritual actions. Parody and artistic "elevation" of course produce more memorable work.

The creation of satirical "recipes" for producing a new member is a good measure of the clear establishment of a genre and unflattering evidence of its schematic structure. The rigidity of a recipe is ludicrous because it shows that what is supposed to be fresh and exciting is in fact derivative and predictable, inspiring Bergson's kind of laughter, at the mechanistic imposed on the natural. Pastoral and gothic plots have both evoked recipes. The classical prototypes of pastoral elegy include Theocritus's *Idyls* and Virgil's *Eclogues*. In England, Spenser's *Shepherd's Calendar* (1579) popularized the form, and it goes strong until Pope's *Pastorals* (1709). But by 1738 an anonymous letter to the *London Magazine* gives a Recipe for a Pastoral Elegy: "Take *Damon* and *Thyrsis*, both which Virgil will lend you with all his Heart[. . .]One thing never forget in the Conclusion, which is, to comfort your Shepherds with a Trail of Light, from which they will conclude, and inform us, the Nymph is gone off to Heaven; or else perhaps some silly Reader might not suspect it" (in Loughrey 66). Gothic prototypes include Walpole's *Castle of Otranto* (1764), Beckford's *Vathek* (1786), Radcliffe's *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794), and Lewis's *The Monk*, (1797). But E. F. Bleiler mentions an 1810 satirical poem by E. J. Pitt telling how to construct a knee-jerk Gothic novel, with a footnote giving a recipe for turning a Gothic into a sentimental novel by changing the values of a common schema:

> The conduct of the poet in considering romances and novels separately, may be thought singular by those who have penetration to see that a novel may be made out of a romance, or a romance out of a novel with the greatest ease, by scratching out a few terms, and inserting others. Take the following, which may, like machinery in factories, accelerate the progress of the divine art.
> From any romance to make a novel.
> Where you find--
> A castle, ... put An house
> A cavern, ... A bower
> A groan, ... A sigh

One cannot overstate the redundancy of these narratives. ... [T]his fiction invariably featured the same array of cruel libertines, foolish coquettes, ruined women, stillborn babies, and destinies misshapen by desire. Judging by the sheer number of *variations* on this *stock of plots and characters*, there was virtually no end to the demand for this type of fiction. (my emphasis)

Usually, virtue would "triumph over the lustful machinations of the libertine," but on occasion it did not.

A giant, ... A father
A bloodstained dagger, ... A fan
A knight, ... A gentleman without whiskers
A lady who is the heroine, ... Need not be changed, being versatile.
Assassins, ... Telling glances.
A monk, ... An old steward.
Skeletons, skulls, &c. ..... Compliments, sentiments, &c.
A gliding ghost, ... A usurer, or an attorney
A midnight murder, ... A marriage
The same table of course answers for transmuting a novel into a romance. (xvi)[48]

Another sign of saturation is the contemporary critic's attitude of weariness with the sheer number of little-varying elements. In the following reviews we feel that the reader is nodding under the monotony, numbed by repetition, and exhausted with making the same unvarying journey time and again. In 1713 Thomas Tickell writes,

> In looking over some English pastorals a few days ago, I perused at least fifty lean flocks, and reckoned up an hundred left-handed ravens, besides blasted oaks, withering meadows, and weeping deities. Indeed most of the occasional pastorals we have, are built upon one and the same plan. A shepherd asks his fellow, 'Why he is so pale? if his favourite sheep hath strayed? if his pipe be broken? or Phyllis unkind?' He answers, 'None of these misfortunes have befallen him, but one much greater, for Damon (or sometimes the god Pan) is dead.' This immediately causes the other to make complaints, and call upon the lofty pines and silver streams to join in the lamentation. While he goes on, his friend interrupts him, and tells him that Damon lives, and shews him a track of light in the skies to confirm it; then invites him to chestnuts and cheese. Upon this scheme most of the noble families in Great-Britain have been comforted. (in Loughrey 54)[49]

Walter Scott's rehearsal of a formulaic Gothic echoes Tickell's expostulation against pastorals:

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[48] Of course, this translation schema gives a fair description of the mental operations of Jane Austen's Catherine Morland in *Northanger Abbey*, a very early Gothic parody (written 1798/9, sold 1803, published 1817).

[49] And there is Samuel Johnson's famous complaint against Milton's "Nativity Ode," that

> Its form is that of a pastoral--easy, vulgar, and therefore disgusting: whatever images it can supply are long ago exhausted; [. . .] Among the flocks and copses and flowers appear the heathen deities, Jove and Phoebus, Neptune and Aeolus, with a long train of mythological imagery, such as a College easily supplies. Nothing can less display knowledge or less exercise invention than to tell how a shepherd has lost his companion and must now feed his flocks alone, without any judge of his skill in piping; and how one god asks another god what is become of Lycidas, and how neither god can tell. He who thus grieves will excite no sympathy; he who thus praises will confer no honour. (451)

> We strolled through a variety of castles, each of which was regularly called Il Castello, met with as many captains of Condottieri, heard various ejaculations of Santa Maria and Diabolo; read by a decaying lamp and in a tapestried chamber dozens of legends as stupid as the main history; examined such suites of deserted apartments as might set up a reasonable barrack, and saw as many glimmering lights as would make a respectable illumination. (in Bleiler xvi)[50]

Because of their proximity to parody, it is bizarre to find such programmes being offered and taken seriously. But Williams quotes Dean R. Koontz's advice from one of the "guides to the formula published during the 'mass-market Gothic' craze in the 1960s":

> the ancient mansion permeated with evil should be as much a character in your story as any people in it.... Variations on the house might be: a steamboat used as a dwelling, archaeological diggings in a strange country, or a ship crossing the Atlantic Ocean in the 18th Century. Anything used in place of the old house should have the same qualities of it: isolation, gloominess, an air of mystery, lots of dark places, eerie corridors, and musty rooms. [(P. 126) [in Williams 39-40]]

(Williams notes that for Koontz, "specific décor is not so important as the setting's power to evoke certain responses ...: claustrophobia, loneliness, a sense of antiquity, recognition that this is a place of secrets" (39-40).) This is quite literally textbook mannerism.

On the other hand, metaphorical projections of a schema to a "higher register" may extend the bounds of any genre. Spenser's *Faerie Queene* turns the medieval romance form into a religious allegory, as Milton's "Nativity Ode" does with the pastoral. Among novels, Dostoevsky turns crime and punishment into sin and penitence, and Raskolnikov's love for Sofya is of course also a love of the soul's wisdom. Candide's picaresque journeys survey society from the cynic's anti-Leibnizian view that nothing is for the best in this worst of all possible worlds. *Frankenstein* , Poe's stories, and *The Turn of the Screw* turn the Gothic novel philosophical. Dennis Potter's *The Singing Detective* and David Lynch's *Lost Highway* are examples of *noir*-style works that use the schema of crime and detection metaphorically, to portray psychological crimes and searches. Polanksi's *Chinatown* is regarded as a political allegory about wars in Asia.[51]

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[50] In our century, C. S. Lewis complains about allegory, through the recipe metaphor again, that

> in the work of William Nevill we reach the nadir of the whole genre. The *Castell of Pleasure* illustrates the unhappy operation of a dominant form in making mediocrity vocal. The author was a very dull young man; but he might have carried the secret to the grave with him if the whole recipe for making poems of this kind had not lain so fatally easy to his hand. The plot of the poem is a debate between Beauty, Pity, Disdain, and Desire framed in a dream journey to a castle of Pleasure. The ingredients are familiar, but this would not prevent the dish being palatable; the real trouble is that the cook is naught. (*Allegory of Love* 253)

[51] Metonymy is another major principle of category extension. I think we can call Paul Schrader's "films *noirs* in other genres" members in virtue of metonymy, so identified because of their use of a few features associated with *noir*. Similarly, *Eugene Onegin* and anti-novels are extensions of novels by their use of some novelistic techniques to dismantle the typical contents and structure of central novels. Adena Rosmarin writes that we link texts with other texts "by performing an act of conceptual supposition, by

CONCLUSIONS

The nature of the distinctions and relations between specific and generic-level schemas in genre is a crucial issue which will need to be examined in detail. We could speculate that more abstract schemas shape the higher-level, more abstract or inclusive "modal" genres, so that achievement of happy marriage and completion of the quest are typical of comedy and romance whereas failed love and marriage and quests typify tragedy and satire. The stereotypical *default* values for schemas for quest and love (including what counts as success as well as typical obstacles, etc.) would be partly specified by culture, but both schemas surely include the *goal* of success, even though the achievement of that goal is not a necessary value with regard to the schema as such. This may explain the feeling that tragic and satiric modes are dependent on comedy and romance but not vice-versa. Then the establishment of a plot schema by specification of what are, for the event schemas, *optional* elements, thus raising them to *default* values, seems considerably to characterize central aspects of many historical kinds. But as we noted in the case of *Double Indemnity*'s generically anomalous criminal protagonist, general definitions become impossible just because genres accommodate alternate values at the very level of specificity of the features that characterize them--even in prototypical members.[52]

Some of these observations are simple, but are germane for that very reason: they reflect the simple aspects of genre structures that function as template-like guides both for the writer in creating the work, and for the reader in interpreting and appreciating it. Schemas and cognitive models perform these functions, and can also explain how prototypes and prototype effects relate to the fact that genre members are never identical or strictly feature-defined but bear structure-based family resemblances over widely varying specifics.[53] Examining the principles of more radical category extension will be a

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proceeding as if one thing were another. And we can do this, Gombrich explains, because we are 'prone to extend classes of things beyond their rational groups,' because we 'react to minimum images'" (22). Cognitivists would call this phenomenon conceptual integration or projection. Turner argues that there is a difference of degree rather than of kind between categorization and metaphor (*Reading Minds*, chapter 6, 120-150), and that conceptual blending usually enters into temporary or permanent category extension ("Conceptual Integration Networks").

[52] Tony Veale, in a study of "conceptual blending" as a major principle of cinematic creativity, shows how borrowing of abstract plot-schemas can interact with other specific-level features in particular works. Some works take narrative structure wholesale from other works (as *Star Wars* takes the plot of Arthurian romance) but do not simply reproduce the same thing, since these mappings are often complicated by borrowing from several sources. Among other things, *Star Wars* rejects the tragic death of the Arthurian hero and borrows from the film *The Dam Busters* a victory over a final obstacle to achieving the quest-plot: a key fortification is destroyed through its single vulnerable point. New structure emerges as the work of integrating the borrowings leads to local and possibly global changes in other aspects of the narrative.

[53] Schauber and Spolsky apply Ray Jackendoff's concept of a "preference model" of interpretation rules to the literary system. They explain genre categorization in terms of the reader's deployment of various interpretive rules. This shift to the level of pragmatic interpretation enables them to deal with multiple correct interpretations and fuzzy boundaries. But Lakoff's view speaks more to generic structure, creation, blending, and evolution. Sets of interpretive rules do not suggest a "template for creativity," and cannot explain different categorizations in terms of extensions or combinations of genre structures. Plot schemas

task as vital as examining the basic features that define the central prototypes of genres, but cognitive research already hints how it may go. Prototypes select a plot schema as a narrative model, and those in the immediate central tradition tend to hew closely to the possible variant narrative paths set out within that schema, and to the other conventions of the genre. Later developments parody the schema, project it metaphorically onto more cerebral subjects, blend it with other schemas, carry other genre conventions over to new plot schemas, etc.[54] It is a simple but important step to see these central principles of categorization as principles of generic thought and construction.

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can give structure to the "generic repertoire" of which Fowler speaks: elements of repertoires are not just random lists for recombination, but rather form constellations, interconnecting in a range of possible ways. Of his fifteen differentia for historical kinds, plot schemas relate to subject, *mise-en-scène*, character and action (*Kinds* 64-69). They are good candidates for what he calls functional elements and constructional types, which he conceives as organizing the repertoire (*Kinds* 127-28; "The Future of Genre Theory" 295-300). Other critics pursue similar aims: Tynjanov studies "constructive principles" ("The Literary Fact" 37ff.); Schaeffer examines mechanisms of "textual genericity" ("Literary Genres and Textual Genericity" 178, 182ff.). These mechanisms are themselves features, and they provide a frame for composition, for overall structure, and for organizing other features (e.g. characters, setting, dialogue).

[54] Lakoff connects Wittgensteinian family resemblances to "chaining" in category structures. In classification, new items can be sorted according to association with items already in a category, without any strictly predictable development. If A is in category 1, then B may also be put in 1 by virtue of sharing feature X with A, whereas C may be put in 1 by virtue of sharing feature Y with A; further, D may be put in 1 by virtue of sharing feature Z with B, and so on. Lakoff speculates that basic-level members are central to categories, which are then extended in chains (20, 92-103). Such chaining from central members to emulators, to emulators of emulators at further removes from the original prototypes, is presumably what Turner means by "family resemblance as a creator of genres" (150). Frames or schemas are sources of the simplest prototype effects, and chaining is a more radical kind of variance. Thomas Beebee cites F. W. Galan's account of an observation by of the Prague structuralist school, of chaining in genre:

> In time, the particular combinations of such generic devices undergo considerable change. While some elements remain unaltered, maintaining the genre's continuity, the influx of new elements assures its freshness and elasticity. But in extreme cases even those elements with which the genre is primarily identified may disappear, whereas the secondary elements endure. Thanks to such permutations in the function of individual elements, a given genre may, over a long period, produce two almost unrecognizable evolutionary offshoots, such as the picaresque novel and the modern novel. (270)

Chapter 3: Prototype Structure of the Genre of Menippean Satire

Like the histories of novels and *film noir*, the history of Menippean satire can be presented as a series of exemplars, earlier instances of which exert various kinds of shaping influence on later ones, to produce a set of variant forms that are linked by "family resemblance." Here too a distinction is often made between primary and secondary members of the category, or central and noncentral members. The genre is at the same time recognized as a set of features possessed by works, and its history as being also a history of features and their development.

I will sketch the genre's "definition" and history briefly, then analyze the genre as an ICM. This analysis will allow us to consider in more detail the following questions: its structure; how its prototypical exemplars relate to the model; which features, and which combinations of features, relate to centrality; how features are definable in conceptual terms; what kinds of variations define the primary extensions of the ICM; and what this tells us about the elements and principles of extension for genre categories.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MENIPPEAN SATIRE

A sketch of the history of Menippean satire and its criticism reveals many of the recalcitrant qualities of genre that we wish to account for: the origin in a new combination of existing genres; the genre's representation in series of prototypical members in a sequence of influence; a gradient of genre membership; the association of the genre form with a typical attitude or worldview; the ambiguously kindred and oppositional relation to neighbouring genres within an overall categorial "ecology"; the retrospective naming; the fading out of the genre in its classical form, and several later recuperations; and developments of the genre through hybridization with other forms.

Joel Relihan provides the best analysis of the early history of the genre. He explains that Menippean satire was an ancient genre informed by Cynic thought, that mocked the "high" forms of epic and philosophical dialogue. The works of Menippus are lost, but he remains the "Muse" of the genre (39) because his spirit persists through Lucian's use of him as a character type. He is the self-parodic mocker of Cynic diatribe, the senseless "mad dog" who attacks those who preach their theories. The word *satura* was associated with parody and a mixture of styles, and Menippean satire arises through a mixture of works in several genres:

> Menippean satire is compounded of the *Odyssey's* tale of a liar shaman and his battle against both death and immortality; Old Comedy's exaltation of common humanity over charlatans; and Plato's apocalyptic dramatization of the relative values of philosopher and theory. (34)

These elements combine to define the genre as a "continuous narrative, subsuming a number of parodies of other literary forms along the way, of a fantastic voyage that mocks both the traveler who desires the truth and the world that is the traveler's goal, related by an unreliable narrator in a form that abuses all the proprieties of literature and authorship" (9). The classical genre goes through Lucian and Varro to Seneca, Petronius, Martianus Capella, Fulgentius, Boethius and beyond. By using the title *Menippean Satires* Varro may have cemented the idea of creating a form through imitating Menippus's style and using him as a character. But for Relihan, Lucian is the key figure, and his *Icaromenippus*, *Necyomantia*, and especially the *Dialogues of the Dead* are the genre's most influential paradigms (41).

The original classical form has been recreated, in changed forms, over the centuries. Frye's influential account traces the "anatomy", one of his four basic forms of prose fiction (along with romance, confession, and novel), to a source in Menippean satire. His denomination pays homage to Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, "the greatest Menippean satire in English before Swift" (*Anatomy* 311). Fowler complains that the neologism is "too lacking in unitary force to be of lasting value without qualification" (*Kinds* 119). But Relihan observes that "Menippean satire"

> is not used as a generic term until 1581, when Justus Lipsius writes his *Satyra Menippea. Somnium. Lusus in nostri aevi criticos*. The French *Satyre ménippé* of the 1590s follows suit, but Casaubon does not, preferring the term Varronian satire in his *De Satyrica Graecorum Poesi & Romanorum Satira* of 1605. The volubility of the name is thus not merely a modern phenomenon (Frye's *anatomy*, Bakhtin's *menippea*); and Gellius reports that even Varro's works were occasionally known under the name of *Cynic satires*. (12)

He agrees with Fowler that "Frye's anatomy is not a genre in the classical sense but a much broader classification" but supports this expanded meaning for an expanded category: "his sensible renaming of the genre indicates that we ought not to identify it immediately with the peculiarities of specific ancient texts, which are, as it were, a subset of it" (5). Blanchard suspects that Frye is "following the lead of these Renaissance authors [Nashe, Burton, et. al.] even when he applies the term to literature outside of the period" (28).

Frye describes the genre's prosodic forms, characterization, themes, narrative forms, range of attitudes, and dramatic structure (*Anatomy* 308-10). He then examines the range of variation produced by its principles--its expansion from short forms to long forms; its sub-species of dialogue (*cena* or symposium, and encyclopedic farrago); the hybrids produced from its merging with the novel (*roman à these*, proletarian novels of ideas) (310-12). And he sees its influence in Thomas Browne's *Urn Burial*, Thomas Nashe, Urquhart, Peacock, Butler's Erewhon books, Fielding, and Aldous Huxley. The fantasy end of satire creates the "literary fairy-tale", as in Lewis Carroll, and Charles Kingsley's *Water Babies*. The moral end creates "a serious vision of society as a single intellectual pattern, in other words a Utopia" (310). One of its short forms is the dialogue, influenced by Plato, and appearing in Landor's *Imaginary Conversations*, Castiglione,

Walton's *Compleat Angler*. The sub-species of encyclopedic farrago occurs in Athenaeus's *Deipnosophists* and Macrobius's *Saturnalia*, and the same principle of construction shapes Flaubert's *Bouvard and Pécuchet*. Beyond the encyclopedic Burton, Rabelais, and Sterne, there are also Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*, Southey's *Doctor*, Amory's *John Buncle*, and the *Noctes Ambrosianae*. Hybrids with the other basic forms of prose fiction include Melville's *Moby-Dick* (combining romance and anatomy), Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* and Kierkegaard's *Either/ Or* (confession-anatomy), *Don Quixote* (novel-romance-anatomy), Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdus* (novel-confession-anatomy), Apuleius's *Golden Ass* (romance-confession-anatomy), and Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* (all four forms).

Frye's style of analyis of the literary tradition bypasses the study of individual texts to infer the kind of imagining that lies behind and drives the tradition. This imagining includes intellectual and emotional attitudes towards topics and themes, types of literary organization and technique, and types of characters and stories that express these attitudes. It also includes relations of similarity and contrast with other genres.

Hence he proposes that the Menippean satire "deals less with people as such than with mental attitudes" (309). Stereotypical ideologues, people plagued with prejudices, obsessions and fixed ideas, "are handled in terms of their occupational approach to life as distinct from their social behavior. The Menippean satire thus resembles the confession in its ability to handle abstract ideas and theories, and differs from the novel in its characterization, which is stylized rather than naturalistic, and presents people as mouthpieces of the ideas they represent" (309). Menippean satirists

> use a loose-jointed narrative form [. . .] [that] differs from the romance [. . .], as it is not primarily concerned with the exploits of heroes, but relies on the free play of intellectual fancy and the kind of humorous observation that produces caricature. It differs also from the picaresque form, which has the novel's interest in the actual structure of society. [. . .] The intellectual structure built up from the story makes for violent dislocations in the customary logic of narrative. (309-10)

In the short forms of the genre, dialogue or colloquy, "the dramatic interest is in a conflict of ideas rather than of character" (310). The short form can "expand" to "full length" as it gains more than two speakers and a symposium or *cena* setting. This tradition stretches from Plato down to "those urbane and leisurely conversations" which define the "doctrine and discipline" of various subjects (310). As he deals with intellectual matters, the Menippean satirist "shows his exuberance in intellectual ways, by piling up an enormous mass of erudition about his theme or in overwhelming his pedantic targets with an avalanche of their own jargon" (311), and this can become an "encyclopedic farrago" in catalogues of terminology and ideas.

Frye moves through the "hows" of the genre, its principles of construction: how it conceptualizes character; how it structures narrative, how it creates dramatic interest, as well as how it expands dramatically, and how it expresses exuberance. These are literary ways of giving form to energy as well as to content.

Part of the earlier analysis of the mythos of winter (irony and satire) also deals specifically with Menippean satire. As in the other mythoi, there is a sequence of six "phases", defined by changing proportions and intensities of the basic principles of satire: attack, and wit based on absurd fantasy. These modulations result in changing foci and themes. In every mythos, three phases correspond to the neighbouring mythos on one side, and the other three correspond to the neighbouring mythos on the other side. The first three phases of the mythos of winter correspond to the first three (ironic rather than romantic) phases of comedy, and the second three phases correspond to the ironic (vs. romantic) phases of tragedy. Frye's accounts of the second and third phases of satire are full of references to Menippean satires. The first is not without its Menippean qualities--it mentions Erasmus's *Colloquies* and *Praise of Folly*, and the latter is linked with the medieval preaching, and its comic "view of an upside-down world dominated by humors and ruling passions" (227)--a topos we will meet again later on.

The first phase is "satire of the low norm", and here "there is no displacement of the humorous society. [. . .] It takes for granted a world which is full of anomalies, injustices, follies, and crimes, and yet is permanent and undisplaceable" (226). Hence it counsels prudence and advocates an ironic attitude and highly conventional way of life.

Whereas the first phase is "conventional satire on the unconventional", in the second phase, "the sources and values of conventions themselves are objects of ridicule" (229). The simplest form is a satiric comedy of escape, the picaresque, "the story of the successful rogue" (229). Its central theme in this "quixotic phase of satire" is "the setting of ideas and generalizations and theories and dogmas over against the life they are supposed to explain" (230), and here Frye cites Lucian, Erasmus, Rabelais, Swift, Samuel Butlers I and II, Voltaire, Peacock, and Huxley. He goes on to flesh out the satirical heritage of cynicism (not skepticism), mentioning Menippus, Diogenes, Democritus and his Juniors Erasmus and Burton: "philosophical pedantry becomes, as every target of satire eventually does, a form of romanticism or the imposing of over-simplified ideals on experience" (231). Again there is often an "other world", "an ironic counterpart to our own, a reversal of accepted social standards" (233). This is not to denigrate romance, but to keep any set of literary conventions from solidifying and locking up imaginative fluidity.

"Such satire is the completion of the logical process known as the *reductio ad absurdum*" (233), and this "technique of disintegration" brings us into the third phase, the satire of the high norm, which questions even the assumptions of ordinary common sense and sense experience. Hence a common technique is the logical and self-consistent shift of perspective given to ordinary life (234). This often leads to "obscenity", but the moral reference is like that of the medieval preachers who make bodily sin repulsive (235). If the first phase of satire is dominated by the figure of the giant-killer, here "in this rending of the stable universe a giant power rears up in satire itself": the great verbal power of torrential invective (236), often fuelled by obscenity and the imagining of bodily attack. The fourth phase moves us into the ironic aspects of tragedy.

Again, one of the great strengths of Frye's approach is its perception of deep continuities and analogies in various literary techniques, themes, and attitudes, despite changes in degree, proportion, and focus of these imaginative qualities.

Payne and Kharpertian provide useful synopses of Bakhtin's discussion of Menippean satire in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Bakhtin describes menippea's origins in the oral folk genres of carnival, which show three basic themes: free, familiar contact, mésalliances, and profanation. Hence it manifests a subversion of official seriousness, and results in three original characteristics: concentration on the present, a critical relation to legend dialectically interrelated with an experiential and freely imaginative base, and stylistic multiplicity. The most important of the seriocomic genres, Menippean satire belongs to a "dialogical" tradition opposed to a "monological" one associated with institutional absolutism, dogmatism, and repression.

Payne summarizes Bakhtin's list of the fourteen features of "the menippea" that flow from these themes and characteristics, and I summarize her:

1. Comedy is greater than in Socratic dialogue.
2. Full liberation from the limitations of the historical and memoir forms (found in Socratic dialogues), from legend, and from any requirements of verisimilitude. It is extraordinarily free in philosophy and plot.
3. Fantasy does not embody truth, but rather is used "to create extraordinary situations in which to provoke and test a philosophical idea". The wildest adventures are brought into organic artistic unity with the idea. The "content of the menippea consists of the adventures of an idea or the truth in the world".
4. A combination of "free fantasy, symbolism, and mystical-religious elements" with "extreme, crude underworld naturalism".
5. "Bold invention and fantasy combine with extraordinary philosophical univeralism and extreme ideologism" (8). It is a genre of ultimate questions, paring away anything academic, any long, complex argumentation, and following an "ethico-practical inclination."
6. A "trilevel construction"--i.e. heaven, earth, hell.
7. Observation of things from an unusual point of view (e.g. a city viewed from the heights).
8. An investigation of "unusual psychic states", such as insanity, schizophrenia, daydreaming, strange dreams, suicidal thoughts, etc. "These phenomena destroy the epic-tragic integrity of man and his fate" (8). He loses his "finalizedness" and possibilities of other men and fates are revealed.
9. Scandalous scenes, actions, words, events.
10. Sharp contrasts and oxymoronic combinations.
11. Elements of a social Utopia; a journey into another land.
12. Makes use of other genres, with various degrees of parody and objectivization.
13. Inserted genres intensify the variety of styles and tones.
14. Topicality and a publicistic quality.[55]

[55] See Payne 7-9. She adds a number of further traits of her own, which I omit. Most pertain to specific features of dialogue, and others develop Bakhtin's thematic points in ways that call for some clarification.

Kharpertian notes that classical scholars regard as formal Menippean conventions "seriocomic (from the Greek *spoudogeloion*) prose and verse, extensive parodies, popular proverbs and speech, encyclopedism, fantastic narratives, and epideictic variety (29). He reduces Bakhtin's fourteen characteristics to eleven: comedy, fantasy, philosophy, naturalism, trileveled construction (heaven, hell, and earth), abnormal psychology and morality, indecorous scenes, oxymoron, utopianism, parody and multiplicity, and topicality. (He assimilates points 2, 3, and 5 into two points, "fantasy" and "philosophy", and he deletes point 7.)

Bakhtin evidently deals with a larger number of more specific features of Menippean satire, where Frye focuses on a smaller number of constructive principles and techniques. Bakhtin's analysis of the tradition and its texts is both broad and profound, and it has promoted their recuperation. Many of his features do merge into constructive principles, though, and when he moves to discuss principles, his approach is often more historically concrete than is Frye's. His insights into the interplay of voices and genres, generic development and generic parody, the phenomenon of carnival and its oral genres and themes, have proven productive. However, critics tend to be cautious and skeptical about his attempts to economize his explanation in terms of the contrast between monological and dialogical, official institutions versus the folk, joyous liberation versus repression. The opposition seems exaggerated and idealized.

Scholars focussing on specific periods have identified less well-known works that fit the pattern. Relihan studies the classical genre members Varro, Seneca, Petronius, Lucian, Julian, Martianus Capella, Fulgentius, and Ennodius. Eugene Kirk shows how Menippean satire flourished in many lesser-known works through the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Blanchard discusses works by Lorenzo Valla, Angelo Poliziano, Codro Urceo, Leon Battista Alberti, Giovanni Pontano, Caelio Calcagnini, Juste Lipsius, Joseph Scaliger, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, Cornelius Agrippa, and Thomas Nashe, as well as the more familiar Menippeans Rabelais and Burton.

Other critics have identified Jean de Meun's continuation of the *Romance of the Rose*, Chaucer's poems, Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*, Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, T. S. Eliot's *Waste Land*, Pynchon's novels, and a growing range of other works as Menippean satires, or as containing Menippean discourse.[56]

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[56] For Boethius and Chaucer as Menippeans, see Payne. Heather Arden points out that the *Romance of the Rose* is strongly influenced by Martianus Capella's *Marriage*, Alain de Lille's *Complaint*, and Boethius's *Consolation*, and identifies the latter two as Menippean satires (33). Payne tentatively includes in the category de Meun, de Lille, Martianus Capella, and Bernard Silvestris' *Cosmographia*. The suggestion that the *Rose* is a (perhaps noncentral) member has not been developed, to my knowledge. She uses the genre concept fairly loosely, and also connects with the tradition Cicero's *Dialogues*, the *Divine Comedy*, the *Book of Good Love*, Boccaccio's *Decameron*, Shakespeare's Hamlet (the character) (xi, n3), the novels of Pynchon, Philip Roth, Vonnegut and Barth (3, 261 n2), and Nigel Longchamps' twelfth-century *Mirror of Fools* (*Speculum Stultorum*) or the *Book of Daun Burnel the Ass* (27). Dryden cites Spenser's *Mother Hubberds Tale* and his own *MacFlecknoe* and *Absalom and Achitophel* as English instances of Varronian satire (*A Discourse* 64-67). Martianus, Boethius, and Alain are all listed in Kirk's catalogue. For Shakespeare, see Milowicki and Wilson. For Gibbon (along with Petronius, Swift, Melville, and Pynchon), see Palmeri. For a more detailed treatment of Pynchon as Menippean, see Kharpertian. The MLA

As for the genre's influence in literary history, Bakhtin sees the genre as part of the "pre-history of novelistic discourse", a force that helped push the novel apart from the character and "ideology" of epic, and an essential influence on its later development, especially in Dostoevsky.[57] Frye and Bakhtin show how it helped give birth to the novel (through Swift, Fielding, Sterne and Voltaire in the 18th century, who inherited the work of Rabelais, Cervantes and Burton). In the 19th century, Thoreau, Melville, Carlyle, Dickens, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky are strongly influenced by the form. The high Modernists Joyce and Beckett are clearly marked by Fielding and Sterne especially. And Sherbert notes that postmodern and "Metafictional" writers--like Nabokov, Vonnegut, Pynchon, etc.--refract the Menippean light of Modernism and before (23ff.).[58]

So there is considerable, though by no means universal, consensus on the dominant attitudes, themes, structures, and features of Menippean satire. And there is considerable consensus on which works are prototypically Menippean, and which have some Menippean features but are not central to the category. Given this consensus on the history of influence, on member classification, and on features, I think we can make certain inferences about reasons for judgments of noncentrality. We can then think backwards from there to refine further our sense of the hypothetical prototype of the genre. We can propose an ICM for the prototype and a reconstruction of the lines of category *variation* and *extension*. I begin with a discussion of central members and the reasons they are considered central, then proceed to a discussion of noncentral members and the reasons they are considered noncentral.

Central: When it comes to literary genres, an ambiguity about "central membership", meaning "representative of the category", arises. Works can be more representative because they are more popularly used as defining examples of it, and therefore have greater causal influence in shaping the category in the minds of writers and readers. They are "cognitive reference points" in Rosch's terms. Or they can be representative because they are formally close to the centre, regardless of their familiarity.

The first approach to representativeness casts a wider net, and seems more popular as a way to introduce the form, or to seek to include some previously unclassified

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Bibliography also turns up Menippean approaches to Donne's *Ignatius His Conclave*, Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*, *Sylvie and Bruno* and Lewis Carroll generally, Melville generally, Flaubert's *Tentation de Saint-Antoine*, Eliot's *Waste Land*, Ezra Pound, Nabokov, and Wells's *War of the Worlds*. I have argued that the Book of Ecclesiastes was also a strong influence on Menippean satire (M.A. Thesis).

[57] See the essays collected in *The Dialogic Imagination*.

[58] A very superficial glance at some important recent authors is enough to suggest that Menippean satire is a powerful force in postmodern fiction. Kurt Vonnegut, John Barth, Umberto Eco, William Gaddis, William Gass, Douglas Coupland, Kathy Acker, Jeannette Winterson, David Foster Wallace, Dave Eggers, Michael Chabon, William Vollman, and Zadie Smith, are all in varying degrees distinctive from the dominant mimetic realist tradition of novels by their heavy reliance on some combination of fantasy, the grotesque, satirical observation, essayistic philosophizing, and parodies of form and genre (checking for quirky handwritten graphic material such as diagrams, scribbles, sketches, and cartoons is a good first litmus test for Menippean influence).

member in category. This grouping relies partly on contrast with serious verisimilar fictions like the realistic novel, and includes many novel-Menippean satire hybrids.[59] It would include most of Lucian's works, but especially *Menippus in Hell* (Loeb edition title: *Menippus or The Descent into Hades*), *Icaromenippus*, and *Dialogues of the Dead*, Varro's *Menippean Satires*, Petronius's *Satyricon*, Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* and, Cervantes's *Don Quixote*, Rabelais's *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, Nashe's *Unfortunate Traveler*, Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Voltaire's *Candide*, Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, *Tale of a Tub*, and *Battle of the Books*, Fielding's *Tom Jones*, Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, Blake's *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, Peacock's novels (especially *Headlong Hall*, *Nightmare Abbey*, and *Crotchet Castle*), Lewis Carroll's *Alice* books, Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, Melville's *Moby-Dick*, Flaubert's *Bouvard and Pecuchet*, Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, and Pynchon's *V.*, *The Crying of Lot 49*, and *Gravity's Rainbow*; and the novels of Kurt Vonnegut.

The second meaning of "representative" is more formal, of possessing a high number of highly prototypical features. This grouping still considers literary influence, because it is concerned with common structural features, but it ignores popularity. A grouping along these lines would include some works that are less well-known today (perhaps because they are less novelistic), but closer to the categorial core than some of the above: Relihan examines Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*, Julian's *Caesars*, Martianus Capella's *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury*, Fulgentius's *Mythologies*, Ennodius's *Paraenesis Didascalica*. Robinson finds that Erasmus and Fielding are the two most influential inheritors of Lucianic structures, but their most Lucianic works are not the most influential (Erasmus's *Colloquies*, and Fielding's *Jonathan Wild* and *A Journey from this World to the Next*). I would add Cervantes's *Dogs' Colloquy* as a less influential but more Menippean work. Sherbert shows that John Dunton's *A Voyage Round the World: Or, A Pocket-Library* (1691), and Thomas D'Urfey's *An Essay Toward the Theory of the Intelligible World* (1701) are as Menippean in structure as *Tristram Shandy*, but never had an influence comparable to it. Many other works that have sunk under the waves of literary history are detailed in Kirk's *Annotated Catalogue*.

Both of these meanings of "representative" give special weight to the earliest exemplars of the genre, because they anchor both definitions of structure and the history of influence.

Again, one can always add to this list. And the actual structure of the category in the individual mind depends on each individual's experience of its members. But these works are key examples that have traditionally staked out the core of the category.

Noncentral works are closer to other genres than are central members because they are more marked by more features of other genres. We might make a distinction between senses of "noncentral" complementary to that between senses of "central": even works

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[59] Of course this grouping's boundaries will shift with the tides of literary and critical common knowledge, as some books become more or less known for having certain roles in relation to genre categories. *Tristram Shandy*, for example, is more widely known now because it can be seen as an avatar of "metafiction". Similarly, we might now explain the contrast between the realist and the Menippean tradition by contrasting the stories of John Updike or Raymond Carver with those of Kurt Vonnegut.

with a strong Menippean pedigree may tend to drift from the centre of the category if they are not prototypical in terms of features. In what follows, some flexibility of thought has been necessary to reflect the flexibility of the category. I have included some works under several featural headings, since individual works have many different features in different proportions, but the headings consider the features independently. I also include some works that I have identified as "central", since even central works can have features with tendencies that pull them away from the centre.

Disproportionately narrative and character-driven: Apuleius (*The Golden Ass* is more mock romance, or "Milesian tale" as the author classifies it [Blanchard 22]), Cervantes, Fielding, Smollett, Dickens, Dostoevsky, Flaubert, Proust, Melville, Joyce's *Ulysses*, Pynchon, Nabokov (excepting *Pale Fire*), Beckett, Huxley, Waugh, and recent novelists in the Pynchonian spirit, such as John Barth, Tom Robbins, etc. Generally, most novelists influenced distantly, or perhaps unknowingly, by Menippean satire. For example, Robertson Davies is occasionally Menippean (in *The Rebel Angels* he parodies Frye's theory of symbols in the *Anatomy*, and invokes Rabelais in his account of university dinners).

Disproportionately non-narrative (i.e. non-fictional or discursive): Montaigne, Burton, Izaak Walton, Gibbon (according to Palmeri), Thoreau. The scholarly works of Umberto Eco, as well as those of Derrida, have some Menippean tincture.

Disproportionately serious, rather than ironic and comic in tone: Boethius, More's *Utopia*, Johnson's *Rasselas*; Thoreau's *Walden*, Eliot's *Waste Land*; often Montaigne, Burton, and Gibbon. It is worth noting that there is no such thing as being "too ironic" or "too nonsensical" for this genre.

Disproportionately forgiving or unforgiving: I include this as a way of marking other disproportions in tone not captured by the issue of seriousness versus irony and comedy.

It is traditional to distinguish types of satire according to tone, and Juvenal and Horace have served as symbols of savage and gentle satire, respectively. Where Juvenal sees knaves, Horace sees fools (cf. Frye's distinction between third and second-phase satire). Central Menippean satire leans towards the Juvenalian rather than the Horatian tone. Consider the importance of images of violence and dismemberment in the genre, as well as images of satirists as ferocious animals. As well as the conventional image of Menippus and his followers as barking mad dogs, there is Thackeray imagining Swift as a raging caged eagle: "As fierce a beak and talon as ever struck, [. . .] belonged to Swift. Once can gaze, and not without awe and pity, at the lonely eagle chained behind bars" (qtd. in Foot 13).

Those others who are more forgiving of their characters and more comical are more closely related to the genre of the novel. Rabelais seems to hover between the types. He embraces many people as friends and allies, but invites them to curse his enemies with him. He is as Bakhtin says "jolly", but many have seen him as furious or foul.

One of the most important qualities distinguishing Sterne from his Menippean predecessors is his sympathy for his characters. He shows an influence from the sentimental novel that pulls him towards the main novelistic tradition. (Part of his uniqueness is that his sentimental attitude is slightly ironic, and is kept from modifying his parodic and fantastic techniques towards realism.) This comes partly from a sentimental understanding of one of his great influences, Cervantes, that must have been widespread, and continues today. Nabokov's *Lectures on Don Quixote*, however, does a good job of wiping the lenses of prejudice to show that "Both parts of *Don Quixote* form a veritable encyclopedia of cruelty. From that viewpoint it is one of the most bitter and barbarous books ever penned" (52). He seems to overlook the important phenomenon of dark humour, however, in this and numerous other works of our genre, that allows them to combine, or navigate between, Juvenal and Horace.

Jane Austen's juvenilia are in the line leading from Rabelais to Dickens, as G. K. Chesterton observed. With Bakhtinian brio, he calls her "elemental" and "exuberant", sees in her a potential Wife of Bath, and says her inspiration was "the inspiration of Gargantua and of Pickwick; it was the gigantic inspiration of laughter" (qtd. in Doody xxxii-xxxiv). This early fantasy is often savage but gleeful rather than angry, since it is savage parody of the foolish clichés of romances and Richardsonian novels, rather than Juvenalian savage indignation at vice. Austen's later work turned to a more realistic, and forgiving--not exactly sentimental--tone, only lightly tinged with a Horatian satirical attitude.

Among modern Menippeans, a brooding tone is more common than a sentimental one. Narrators and protagonists in Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Melville may be misanthropes, but they are misanthropes sunk in existential despair over the possibility of wisdom and goodness, rather than enlivened by self-confident wisdom and virtue raging at stupidity and vice. Pynchon's brooding alternates with a sympathetic attitude towards clownish protagonists like Benny Profane, Oedipa Maas, Slothrop and other members of the Counterforce. Beckett's bleakness is not relieved but embroidered with a comic tone, which is to some extent a parody of sentimentality. His narrators and characters are often clowns of existential despair.

Tone is very difficult to "define", and a matter of a concentration on an area along a spectrum rather than a check in a box. Despite this, the history of commentary, and the indispensability of tonal concepts for accurate literary description, make tone an essential feature in the definition and differentiation of genres. And a tone that goes too far towards angry denunciation or too far towards sentimental fantasy leads away from the core attitudes of Menippean satire.

Disproportionately unphilosophical: Works of this type may be more purely fairy-tales, as is Kingsley's *The Water-Babies*, or humorous fantasies, as is Raspe's Lucianic *Adventures of Baron Munchausen*. (However, the property of "humorous fantasy" casts a very wide net, and some interest in ideas and ideologies can be seen in very many examples, from Gilbert and Sullivan to Dr. Seuss to recent cartoons oriented as much to adults as children, such as *The Simpsons* and *South Park*.) Or they may play with ideas but forego the "ultimate questions", philosophical positions, and ideologies emphasized

by Bakhtin. Joseph Heller, Kurt Vonnegut and other novelists are near the Pynchon-Barth line of satirical fantasy, but are less learned and "deep". Writers like Tom Robbins and Douglas Coupland are to some extent pop-philosophers, since they are interested in views and ways of life, but they are "pop" because they are light-headed. Another recent writer, Douglas Adams, mixes Menippean satire with science fiction in his *Hitch-Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy* series (and with other genres in later work). The play with ideas is there, but rather than critiquing philosophies of life or philosophers, it is, as with Lewis Carroll, in the service of the kind of entertainment we have with puzzles and games. Sketch comedy troupes with an intellectual and absurdist strain return to the short dialogue forms of the genre--probably *Monty Python* is the most philosophical and self-conscious of such groups.

Disproportionately consistent in formal structure: Many satires that are close to the Menippean spirit lack the very noticeable feature of a mix of various inserted minor genres. They may use a consistent verse form, or a tightly constructed plot or argument. Juvenal, Horace, Jean de Meun, Chaucer, the Augustans Pope and Dryden, and Byron's *Don Juan*, all have a quite consistent prosody. Erasmus's careful use of the single formal genre of the encomium pushes *The Praise of Folly* towards the margins of the class, as does Burton's use of his formal scholarly analytical apparatus.

It is not really possible for a work to be too inconsistent in structure for the genre, either. If something could be more inconsistent than the wildest Menippean satires, it would soon fail to be recognizable as a work. The genre seems to push as far as it can towards incoherence and nonsense without actually being those things. The same could be said for the following feature, language, and *Finnegans Wake* represents the *ultima Thule* of both tendencies (so far).

Disproportionately straightforward language: The *styles* of Erasmus and Swift are clearer and plainer than Menippean satire usually is, with its parodies of oral and Euphuistic qualities. *The Praise of Folly* and *Gulliver's Travels* follow the linguistic principles of classical rhetoric and the Royal Society, respectively, but they are also parodies of stylistic canons, mocking these artificial styles with their grotesque content. Other authors that make for fast and easy reading include Voltaire and Vonnegut.
Lucian is said to write very clear Greek, whereas Aulus Gellius found Varro very difficult because of "strange language and abstruse material" (Relihan 54). Apuleius's Latin seems clear to us only because of clarifying translations. The early Elizabethan translator William Adlington says he wrote "in so dark and high a style, in so strange and absurd words and in such new invented phrases, as he seemed rather to set it forth to show his magnificent prose than to participate his doings to others". Robert Graves points out that this style is meant as parody of "the extravagant language which the 'Milesian' story-tellers used, like barkers at country fairs today, as a means of impressing simple-minded audiences" (Graves 9). Jean de Meun's meter was recognized as suitable to the low genres of frivolous comedy and satire, that tripped rather too easily off the mind.

The more typical Menippean style is full of obscure words and long, complex sentences: Burton's "quotations, references, allusions, titles of books, Latin tags, short

sharp phrases, long lists and catalogues" make his book "a masterpiece of free prose". He and other Menippeans tend to use an associative rhythm that "represents the process of bringing ideas into articulation" (Frye, *Well-Tempered Critic* 83, 99, qtd. in Sherbert 104). Nashe, Burton, Sterne, Joyce, and Pynchon are exemplary. *Finnegans Wake* achieves the zenith of the impulses of Menippean language.

Disproportionately "introverted" and subjective: Beckett's trilogy (*Molloy*, *Malone Dies*, *The Unnamable*) and Nabokov's *Pale Fire* integrate many conventions of contemporary realistic novels, while playing with them. Their detailed first-person narration also gives them a non-Menippean "confessional" feel. Thus they might be regarded as hybrids of anatomy and confession, like Kierkegaard's *Either / Or* as Frye describes it. Like *Either / Or*, *Pale Fire* and *Molloy* create a marginal kind of dialogue, in having a second character narrating his story at length, as a response to a first character's extensive narration. Beckett's plays often contain parodies of dialogue, or of wordless two-person communication.

Disproportionately marked by other genres: I include here two kinds of works: those that have Menippean "elements" or "influences" within some other definite genre; and those that effectively combine Menippean satire with some other genre(s) to create a hybrid. Therefore I mean something different from the "generic variety" achieved when minor genres are inserted and parodied, which is considered a feature of Menippean satire itself. It is one thing to include in a clearly satirical work a number of minor parodies of genres; it is another to write in two or more genres at once, so to speak, so that the overall structure and tone of the final product is not clearly any one of them.

Cervantes, Rabelais, Fielding, Melville, Kierkegaard, and Proust created hybrids, according to Frye. According to Kernan, Byron's *Don Juan* is more comedic, but less tragic, than it is satiric. Chaucer's tales also seem more comic and romantic, though they have clear satirical elements. His "collection of tales" in the verse prosodic frame and the pilgrimage narrative frame establishes a consistent genre . Critics have seen in Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, T. S. Eliot, Joyce, and Pynchon very large numbers of genres, whether accumulated or combined. I think that like Chaucer, Shakespeare must be seen in the first place in terms of his obvious genre, the drama, and its obvious subclasses, comedy, tragedy, and romance.

Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* has been seen as a detective novel, religious epic, polemic against radical youth, study in criminal psychopathology, prophecy, social indictment, and proto-Nietzschean philosophical analysis of the "will to power" (McDuff, "Introduction" 28). Joyce's big books use all Frye's four forms of prose fiction: romance, novel, confession, and anatomy. *Ulysses* employs the forms in a unified way, setting their techniques in ironic parallel contrasts. *Finnegans Wake* integrates them fully, into a "quintessential form [. . . .] associated with scriptures and sacred books, and treats life in terms of the fall and awakening of the human soul and the creation and apocalypse of nature" (*Anatomy* 313-14). The wealth of included genres in both books is obvious. Genres attributed to Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* include novel, prophecy, jeremiad, epic, tragedy, encyclopedia, and he includes many minor genres--detective story, spy

thriller (exemplified by Graham Greene and John Buchan), movie musical, pop songs like fox-trots and beguines, letter, proverb, cartoon, scholarly treatise, limerick, and more serious poems.

Rabelais, Joyce and Pynchon more fully and prominently use Menippean satire than the others in this group. That is, they do not merely mix some Menippean features with features from other genres, but integrate in a significant way most of the central Menippean features, and subordinate included genres to the Menippean form. I think that Cervantes and Fielding also contain most central Menippean features, but that the prominence of realistic narrative makes their books less centrally Menippean.

SUMMARY of SURVEY of GENRE MEMBERS:
What do we conclude from this about how the genre category relates to prototypes, models, centrality, feature-schemas, and category extension? In order to propose a model for the prototypical member, we should ask, what are the central elements, what are their central forms, and how are they (prototypically or centrally) integrated? From a diachronic perspective, we could put this as the question of what features are prototypically imitated, and how are they prototypically imitated?

In answering these questions, we should bear in mind a few caveats. First, Relihan's point about the imitation of Varro is true generally, and reminds us of the "family resemblance" principle: "not all of his imitators adopt Varro's model in all its fullness, but pick and choose elements of style, content, and form that they find congenial" (72). Second, it is somewhat artificial to list features outside of particular works, because they don't exist except in works (except in some schematic way in the minds of writers and readers). Third, it should also be remembered that part of what makes a work central is not just its *having* these features, but the *intensity* of its manifestation of these individual features (a few mild digressions vs. many very long and tangential ones), and the intensity of the features' integration with one another. Keeping these cautionary counsels in mind, we can begin to make reasonable inferences about prototypicality in the genre.

The most prototypical features seem to be the parodic philosophical quest, and the parodic marvelous journey. In the most prototypical works, these features are combined in a single integrated action. Indeed, in this regard, Petronius may seem more prototypical even than Lucian, because his single work seems to amount to one extended picaresque parody-quest, whereas Lucian's works include many separate, relatively short dialogues and stories. It seems significant for this point that Lucian's most influential works were the more extensive ones that put the parody of philosophy and religion and human vanity in the frame of journeys to upper and lower worlds: *Menippus in Hell*, *Icaromenippus*, the *Dialogues of the Dead*, and the *True Story*. The extended quest gives a sense of being a general comment on human life, and the range of views and ways of life that people take to try to understand it and get through it, rather than a satire on some particular aspect of it. Thus Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* may seem the most prototypically Menippean of his works, because it seems the least specialized in topic.

JOURNEY

Some of the above prototypes do not have journeys, or any main physical action as such, and it seems that they compensate for the absence of that feature with increased philosophical content (e.g. Boethius, Erasmus, Burton, Montaigne, Peacock). Those that have an action that is not a (literal) journey are: Swift's *Battle of the Books* and *Tale of a Tub*, Peacock's building-centred symposia, Flaubert's *Bouvard and Pecuchet*, and Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*. It seems that an action of some sort conduces to centrality in the genre. A fictional action pulls the work away from more purely discursive genres such as the essay, treatise, or didactic colloquy. It creates a much more natural, if not a necessary, forum for fantasy.

We can speculate along similar lines about why the journey appears the most central action in the genre. I think that this kind of action integrates more naturally than other kinds of action with other defining characteristics. For example, a journey naturally involves dialogues--with companions and with characters met along the way--but dialogue does not as naturally imply a journey. A journey is a better action than a battle for creating dramatic interest of the Menippean kind, because dialogue naturally involves conflict (of ideas), but a battle does not easily include dialogue.

Let us consider how the non-journey examples compare with or relate to the journey action-schema.

Swift's battle is a parody of the other Homeric epic, the *Iliad* (the less influential of the two, and the less prototypical for the epic genre). That choice may reflect a sense of the over-familiarity of mock-*Odysseys*. It achieves a philosophical dialogue by metaphorically making the soldiers into books and the leaders of the armies into the opposed proponents of ancient and modern literature.

The residence-centred meetings in Sterne, Peacock, Flaubert, and Huxley hark back to various philosophical symposia. They are also based on parodies of literary conventions contemporary with them--Peacock of the Gothic and Romantic conventions of character and setting; Flaubert of the character and setting conventions of the domestic novel. Some of these manage to at least suggest a metaphorical progressive journey. There is little sense of characters progressing mentally in Peacock, but Flaubert's clerks move from middling obscurity to wealth and fashion, through the chic philosophical obsessions of the day, and back to humility. *Tristram Shandy* charts the progress of a life, not an action. Menippean talk grows out of the central fact and event of Tristram's birth. Walter's desire to get this done right even before it starts is another kind of parody of the quest for the proper "way of life." He wants to get Tristram along the right path by certain superstitious physical means, rather than by seeking philosophical answers. Only Walter's bizarre ideas are tested in this process. The *quest to write the book* is another metaphorical version of the quest for wisdom; as is Walter's educational program for Tristram.

These journeyless examples are clearly the "exception to the rule", so the prototype seems to be the parodied philosophical quest. The "parody" feature motivates wild fantasy in the journey, as well as making the quest a mockery in various ways, whether as a failure (in any degree from partial to total), or as absurd in itself (in any degree from silly to sinister).

PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST

We all know what it is like to think, to try to solve a problem, to try to come up with an overall theory or view of our lives and world, on our own or engaging with others. And we also all know what it means to be intellectually frustrated, to think too much, to have the world interrupt, mock and defeat thought and ideals. And we know how the emotions of anger, despair, and ironic humour interconnect with these experiences. We know these things not just as isolated facts, but as a complex "event shape".[60] So we can set out the elements, properties, and relations that are involved in a philosophical quest and in its parody. This approach to story as a central feature of genre frees us from being absolutely tied to a tradition, specific historical conditions, a line of influence, a set of formal features, a set of characters, or a specific plot structure in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

The **basic** elements are a thinker and a problem. Possible further **elements** (roles/ characters) are: a person who listens to and follows the thinker; a critical observer of the thinker; a person who engages with the thinker as an intellectual antagonist (interlocutor); people going about their lives whom the thinker encounters; people who mock and deflate the thinker. These **roles** frame the **character types** that develop in the genre: the *philosophus gloriosus*, the rogue/ clown/ buffoon, etc.

Possible **events** include the thinker encountering a problem; thinking; seeking and proposing solutions; exploring solutions; testing solutions; publishing and proselytizing solutions (generally in speech); and the failure of these endeavours at any point.

The characters who are not thinkers might: discover a problem; seek a thinker; find a thinker; ask a thinker questions; listen to responses; question; agree or disagree; accept or reject ideas; follow ideas. Any of these endeavours also can fail at any point.

Thought can fail in various ways: a person (thinker or seeker) may find that a system meant to explain the universe or life or some part of them misses some significant fact of reality. An idealist's way of life may conflict with realities of experience: bodily forces undermine mental attempts to control it; people's cruelty, stupidity, pettiness, etc. undermine attempts to teach them or reform them or hope that they will behave well or even harmlessly. The thinker may be discouraged by observing hypocrisy, people knowingly failing to live by their systems. Someone may try to create his own system and fail to do so. A thinker may think illogically (using *non sequiturs*, using false or weak evidence, citing dubious authorities, ignoring obvious counter-examples, etc.). A thinker's ideas may be incomprehensible to others (too cryptic, too labyrinthine). And thinkers and those who seek them may go through a series of systems.

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[60] Events have internal structure or shape (technically known as "aspect"): they can be "punctual or drawn out; single or repeating; closed or open; preserving, creating, or destroying entities; cyclic or not cyclic, and so on" (Turner, *Literary* 28). They also have causal structure and modal structure (elements and parts standing in relations of ability, obligation or necessity, possibility and so on) (29). Turner sees all these structures, internal, causal and modal, as ultimately image-schematic (28-30). I discuss this in more detail below, in the chapter on narrative.

Note that the scenario is an overarching skeletal structure. Given the necessary elements and relations, a story could pick up the scenario at any point and with any combination of default and optional elements and relations. It can be developed at any length. I suppose the minimum required structure would be the thinker thinking about the problem. Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* might be the most central (or simplest) example of this aspect of the form, in that it is more stripped than most literary works of incidental narrative details and concerns. There is the immediate setting of the prison, and the situation of Boethius's imprisonment by his former allies, "condemned to death and the confiscation of my property because of my too great zeal for the Senate" (12), and the action of his meeting and talking with Philosophy and writing out his experiences. But the bulk of the text is the philosophical dialogue as such. Montaigne's and Burton's books are less central because less directly concerned with the "ultimate questions".

The scenario can be extended and connected with other scenarios in various ways. For example, basic narrative and speech operations may be infected by mental failure. Then the **action** of narration itself can be brought forward to become another storyline. This is familiar in Sterne, Fielding, and metafiction. Beckett's narrators occasionally observe their mental dissolution directly, but it is more often revealed in the idiocy of how they behave and observe the world around them and think, *as characters*. And this event-structure may be related to **situations and experiences** in the world in various ways: physical journeys to attempt to discover theories, meet theorists, learn theories (by talking, reading, or inventing), test theories, live by theories (*Don Quixote*, *Candide*), and preach theories. This allows Menippean satire to have close ties to novels relating an educational process (*Bildungsroman* and *Erziehungsroman*), especially those of a cynical bent, such as the picaresque.

Further variations on the event-structure arise from the *way its story is told*. The story of an event can vary in terms of viewpoint and focus (Turner, *Literary* 132-36). The viewpoint can be that of thinker, follower, interlocutor, worldly deflators, or it can move among them. The focus can be on anything perceivable from the viewpoint. *Don Quixote* gives us a wide range of viewpoints focussed on the main action (generally filtered through the viewpoint of the omniscient implied narrator Cide Hamete Benengeli). So we get Quixote's crazed thinking from inside, from the viewpoint of Sancho, the curate and the barber, his housekeeper and niece, and various people he meets on his adventures. In Montaigne and Burton the viewpoint is that of the narrator who does his own theorizing as he focuses on outside phenomena. In *Sartor Resartus*, the viewpoint is an omniscient narrator (ostensibly an editor) who focuses on the thinking of Teufelsdrockh. But viewpoint often shifts to Teufelsdrockh himself as his papers, written in the first person and focussed on experience in the world, are ostensibly presented to the reader. In Sterne, the viewpoint is that of Tristram, the narrator, and he generally focuses on the thinking and deflating of other characters, occasionally bringing himself and his life's misfortunes into the picture. But he also focuses on his own processes of thinking and writing, which are deflated by their absurdity.

Varieties of viewpoint and focus partly distinguish genres that otherwise deal with the same event-structure. The romance novel and the sonnet both deal with a "love story". But the woman's viewpoint is prototypical for romance novels, whereas the sonnet's viewpoint is prototypically male. The romance focuses on a whole extended event beginning with first meeting and ending in marriage, whereas the sonnet focuses on a short event of some encounter with the beloved. Still there is wide variation. The sonnet could represent a speech, dialogue, or experience; the experience could be an emotion, vision, meeting, or some action together; and might be contemplated, remembered, fantasized, or actual. So event-type characterizes some kinds of genres at an abstract level (e.g. subject-defined genres like the murder mystery, the factory novel, the western). Story factors (and emotional attitudes) characterize other, more specific kinds of genres at a lower level.

This model of the Menippean plot-schema can of course be varied by metaphoric and metonymic mappings. Philosophical quests can pertain to any topic--we may have "anatomies" of subjects literary-critical, cosmological, natural, anthropological etc.--but the **prototypical** topic is the self: self-knowledge, including importantly the nature of the universe as a guide to the nature of human being. Sherbert emphasizes the Delphic oracle's *Gnothi seauton* ("know thyself") theme in Varro and many others (12-13):

> The philosopher's inability to fulfill the Delphic maxim of self-knowledge, despite his self-consciousness, constitutes a central theme in Menippean satire. The satirist ridicules the boasting philosopher, or what Northrop Frye calls the *philosophus gloriosus*, by simply allowing him to display his own knowledge and thereby expose it as impractical and even dangerous (*Anatomy* 311). [. . .] Invoking the Delphic oracle in Menippean satire traditionally signifies the need to strip a deluded individual of his mask, which in the philosopher's case means his pride in his system of ideas. [. . .] Varro [. . .] initiates the Menippean parody of the philosopher's quest for wisdom in self-knowledge. (12-13)

The ostensible topic is often a symbol or a cover for the truly philosophical quest for self-knowledge, strongly related to moral knowledge--the "simple and reliable rule of conduct" (99) that Lucian's Menippus seeks from philosophers; or "to judge with my own eyes of the various conditions of men, and then to make deliberately my *choice of life*" (535) as Johnson's Rasselas says. Burton uses melancholy to explore all of life; Walton philosophizes on fishing; Melville expatiates on the meaning of whiteness and whales in human life; Pynchon finds psychological and philosophical depths in the concept of "paranoia", though it is focussed on the war, rocket research, espionage, and sexuality.

Further, the philosophical quest can be metaphorically projected to the "adventure of an idea" (Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* 94, qtd. in Sherbert 96), as a philosophical view is personified in a character. Pangloss's sufferings are Voltaire's vision of the destiny of the Leibnizian belief that "all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds". Often philosophers are main or secondary characters, and we witness the development and testing of an idea, and where it leads who professes it. We find out

how widely it applies, what its details are, what objections it runs into. Some of Swift's characters are lifted almost straight out of the pages of the Royal Society's transactions; Carlyle's Diogenes Teufelsdrockh is the archetypal romantic transcendentalist; Sterne cites and satirizes John Locke's theories of mental "association"; Flaubert mocks all the intellectual fashions he could find; Pynchon satirizes the thinking of behaviourists, occultists, military planners, colonists, bureaucrats, and more.

The quest is well-matched with a **survey of ways of life** in the world (whether broadly, deeply, or both), because the parody of the quest for truth shows how ideas fail to fit the world, and how rigid ideologists collide with the demands of experience.

THE "GROUND" ISSUE:

In recognizing and interpreting works in the genre, story structure--or, in our earlier terms, *plot-schema*--has perhaps the key role. This plot-schema of "parody of the philosophical quest" seems to have a primacy over other aspects of the genre, since we can grant at least partial membership to works without the other features if they have this one; whereas we know that the other features alone (digressions, eccentric language, and generic variety) find homes in other genres without their Menippean meanings.

Therefore, I think "parody of the philosophical quest" provides the *basic frame* for the ICM of the genre of Menippean satire. It is the simplest characterization I can find that allows a vast range of specific manifestations, yet matches prototypical overall form with prototypical overall meaning, motivates the form-function mappings of other rhetorical features, and fits the prototypical genre members. (However, it defies any easy distinction between "inner" and "outer" form, since a "quest" is already metaphorical: it's a physical journey that is a search for something that already has an abstract conceptual meaning. Structure, content and theme are already intertwined here. Philosophical quests and parodies of philosophical quests are all the more metaphorical.) Most generic features travel quite freely from genre to genre. Perhaps those that don't travel are these frame scenarios. Milowicki and Wilson write,

> No model of Menippean textual coherence and organization, such as plot in the case of epic or character and situation in the case of romance, actually stands up. If defined at all, its definition might best proceed not by a structural model of some kind but by the collocation of numerous and often disparate elements. (292)

However, a cognitive model approach to genre can use story-structure as a frame because it does not have to attenuate its characterization of central genre members in order to accommodate noncentral members with widely varying narratives (or no narrative in the ordinary sense at all). It can view noncentral members in terms of *extensions* of the core model. Its characterization partakes of both these types of definition, "structural model" and "collocation of numerous and often disparate elements".

Chapter 4: Satiric Metaphor in Speech: The Medical Concept and Beyond

> "Remove that Mist which dims the Intellect of Mortals, and causes them to adore Men for their Art, or to detest them for their Cunning in deceiving others, when they are, in reality, the Objects only of Ridicule, for deceiving themselves. Strip off the thin Disguise of Wisdom from Self-Conceit, of Plenty from Avarice, and of Glory from Ambition. Come thou, that has inspired thy *Aristophanes*, thy *Lucian*, thy *Cervantes*, thy *Rabelais*, thy *Moliere*, thy *Shakespear*, thy *Swift*, thy *Marivaux*, fill my Pages with Humour; till Mankind learn the Good-Nature to laugh only at the follies of others, and the Humility to grieve at their own"
(Invocation to the Comic Muse, *Tom Jones* Book 13, chapter 1, [qtd. in Berland 83]).

> "Ile strip the ragged follies of the time,
> Naked, as at their birth . . .
> . . . and with a whip of steele,
> Print wounding lashes in their yron ribs"
> (Ben Jonson, *Every Man Out of his Humour*, induction, ll. 17-18, 19-20, qtd. in Paulson, *Fictions* 90)

Oldham "refers to his pen as a weapon, his ink as gall, wormwood, vinegar, or acid:

> All this urge on my rank envenom'd spleen,
> And with keen satire edge my stabbing pen,
> That its each home-set thrust their blood may draw,
> Each drop of ink like aquafortis gnaw.
> Red-hot with vengeance thus, I'll brand disgrace
> So deep, no time shall e'er the marks deface. . . .
> (Oldham, preface to *Satyrs upon the Jesuits*, qtd. in Paulson, *Fictions* 93)

Many critics have observed that there is a recurring set of words or images used to describe satire and the satirist's activity. Robert Elliott writes,

> it is a tantalizing fact that dozens of the terms we conventionally apply to satire have direct association with the magical power we have been concerned with. [. . .] Consider the terms that we normally use to characterize 'harsh' satire--[. . .] satire, we say, may be cutting, blistering, biting, killing, stinging, stabbing, scorching, searing, burning, withering, flaying, annihilating; satires are sharp, barbed, poisonous, malignant, deadly, vitriolic, and so on. The list could be indefinitely extended, the metaphors all expressing our latent sense of satire's destructive powers. (281)

The proponents of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) can do something to slake the intellectual thirst Elliott describes. They will naturally seek to describe the systematic

conceptual mapping(s) underlying these various linguistic expressions. It was one of the central claims of Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* that such systematicity existed. It sought to demonstrate the systematicity among various linguistic expressions of a single conceptual metaphor, and another kind of systematicity across various conceptual metaphors for a single conceptual "target domain."

Some critics who have observed patterns of recurring imagery in individual literary works have used CMT to analyze how the patterns have an overall structure, a coherence that is not evident in the specific texture of the imagistic surface. The theory has also been used to analyze the patterns of imagery in the whole output of individual writers.[61]

Critics have also observed a recurring set of images in satiric genres, and in critical talk about them, and it is natural for critics versed in CMT to seek out the underlying conceptual mappings that motivate the use of such images in satire. This has not yet been done, so I hope that my effort will help contribute to the study of satire what CMT contributes to the study of linguistic metaphor--an explanation for the existence and function of a certain systematicity that has been observed, but not adequately accounted for.

In order to discuss CMT and to relate it to Frye's literary theory, we need to introduce some of its main concepts: schemas, mappings, image-schemas, basic-level concepts, and generic-level concepts.

SCHEMAS AND MAPPINGS

Here, then, are some of the fundamental points of the conceptual theory, selected and compressed for my purposes: 1. A "schema" is knowledge of a certain domain, structured in a skeletal form. For example, journeys have clear components like travelers, starting and end points, a path, and some optional parts like obstacles or a vehicle (Lakoff and Turner 61). It is an unconscious "cognitive model of some aspect of the world, which we use in understanding and in reasoning about it" (65). Cognitive science can now tell us in interesting detail what the schemata actually *are* that shape both our *per*ception and *con*ception.[62] 2. Systematic structure exists within and among our common stock of metaphors. Metaphor is a *systematic* mapping across domains, typically from the well-

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[61] See Lakoff and Turner on Williams' "To A Solitary Disciple"; Donald Freeman on Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*; also the *Poetics Today* Special Issues, edited by Fludernik et al, and Shen. On the author's whole work, see Margaret Freeman, "Emily Dickinson's Conceptual Universe."

[62] Some parameters for generic-level schemas are:
-Basic ontological categories: entity, state, event, action, situation, and so on.
-Aspects of beings: attributes, behavior, and so on.
-Event shape: instantaneous or extended; single or repeated; completed or open-ended; preserving, creating, or destroying entities; cyclic or not, that is, with or without fixed stages that end where they begin.
-Causal relations: enabling, resulting in, bringing about, creating, destroying, and so on.
-Image-schemas: bounded regions, paths, forces, links, and so on.
-Modalities: ability, necessity, possibility, obligation, and so on. (Lakoff and Turner 81)

understood to the abstract or subjective.[63] The basic metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY consists of the following mapping of elements and relations from the source domain of travel to the target domain of life:

> -The person leading a life is a traveler.
> -His purposes are destinations.
> -The means for achieving those purposes are routes.
> -Difficulties in life are impediments to travel.
> -Counselors are guides.
> -Progress is the distance traveled.
> -Things you gauge your progress by are landmarks.
> -Choices in life are crossroads.
> -Material resources and talents are provisions. (3-4)

Partial uses and novel extensions of such basic metaphors are all related to each other, so we grasp them immediately, as with the recent car company slogan, "on the road of life, there are passengers, and there are drivers."

IMAGE-SCHEMAS

Metaphors make use of knowledge organized in schematic ways. Spatial-relations concepts are an important source for our metaphorical structuring of higher concepts, and *image-schemas* are part of the internal structure of elementary spatial relations (Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh* 31):

> A bounded space with an interior and an exterior is an [. . .] extremely skeletal and schematic image. Sometimes we map this image-schema onto other images, such as our relatively rich image of a house [. . .] or the outline of a country on a map. But we can also map [it] onto abstract target domains that themselves do not inherently contain images, such as wakefulness, alertness, and living. [. . . We also] have image-schemas of a path, of contact, and of human orientations [. . .]. When we understand a scene, we naturally structure it in terms of such elementary image-schemas. Prepositions are the means English has for expressing these schematic spatial relations, [. . . which also] structure abstract domains, as in "in love," "out of power," and so on. (Lakoff and Turner 97-98)

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[63] This partly fits Aristotle's definition of *epiphor* as the "semantic 'movement' (*phora*) [. . .] from a more concrete and readily graspable image 'over on to' (*epi*) what is perhaps vaguer, more problematic, or more strange." Thus "source" and "target" domains also express a movement. I. A. Richards' "vehicle" and "tenor" express the move from more concrete to less so. But Lakoff and Johnson would deny that it is a matter of words expressing a comparison or similarity, and would insist on knowledge rather than image in a narrow sense (See Wheelwright 72ff.). Frye's "metaphor by juxtaposition" is Wheelwright's "diaphor" (Wheelwright 78ff).

Mark Johnson describes them as "recurring, dynamic pattern[s] of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that give [. . .] coherence and structure to our experience," consisting of "a small number of parts and relations, by virtue of which they can structure indefinitely many perceptions, images, and events" (*The Body in the Mind* xiv, 29). Although they are meaningful, they are nonpropositional, in that they are not subject-predicate constructions specifying conditions of satisfaction (23). In fact they are so essential to explaining how we grasp meaning that no account of language that treats it purely in terms of finitary propositions will be adequate. They are "pervasive, well-defined, and full of sufficient internal structure to constrain our understanding and reasoning" (126). Indeed, he even suggests of abstract systems of logic that "Many of their properties and relations are simply formalizations of experiential patterns by means of which we organize our experience and understanding" (38).

IMAGE-SCHEMAS IN PHILOSOPHY AND REASON

The presence of diagrammatic schemas in philosophy and science leads Frye to speculate that they underlie all thought and expression. As early as 1957, discussing the links among grammar, rhetoric and logic at the end of *Anatomy of Criticism*, Frye suggests that there must be ideogrammatic "inner structures" or "middle grounds" that translate language to rational thought (whether between two languages or two speakers). And these structures must themselves be symbolic, rather than dictionary-like. Neither grammar nor logic can be reduced to the other; but rhetoric meets logic through "subconscious diagrams" based on "spatial metaphors, most of them derived from the orientation of the human body" (334-36). Frye sticks with his early intuitions and continues to make use of such structures throughout his career: in 1990 he quotes Whitehead and Russell on the sense of a simplified imaginative figure in the background of philosophies, that dresses itself up in formal regalia for the parade before the conscious mind (*Words* 12-13, 150). The conceptual party defends the claim that human concepts are "crucially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensorimotor system. [. . . C]onceptual systems [. . .] make use of a relatively small number of basic image schemas" (Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy* 22, 35). Of philosophy they say that "(typically unconscious) conceptual metaphors [. . .] are constitutive of a philosophical theory [and] have the *causal effect* of constraining how you can reason within that [. . .] framework" (117).[64]

IMAGE-SCHEMAS IN METAPHOR

Johnson uses the example of *balance* to show how image-schemas underlie metaphors and constrain inferences. The prototypical balance schema consists of "force vectors [. . .] and some point or axis or plane in relation to which those forces are distributed [symmetrically or proportionally]" (*Body* 85). Various uses of the word

[64] In somewhat more detail, "First, [. . .] all philosophical theories, no matter what they may claim about themselves, are necessarily metaphoric in nature. Second, [. . .] the metaphorical thought is ineliminable: It is metaphoric thought that defines the metaphysics and unifies the logic of each philosophical theory. Third, this is simply a consequence of the fact that philosophical theories make use of the same conceptual resources that make up ordinary thought" (*Philosophy* 345).

"balance" are connected by their use of metaphorical projections of such schemata to understand their domains: visual perception, including art; systemic balance, from machines to metaphysical systems; psychological and emotional balance; the balance of evidence and arguments in reasoning; legal and moral balance; and the balance of equality in mathematical equations (74-96). The image-schema for balance is thus the basis of polysemy: different senses of the word from these various domains are all related in virtue of it. The image-schema also constrains inferential structure: in every case, balance involves "*a symmetrical arrangement of forces relative to an axis*" (97). Correspondingly, the logic of balance has three important properties: symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity. That is, "A balances B if and only if B balances A. [. . .] If A balances B, and B balances C, then A balances C. [. . .] A balances A" (97). Metaphorical projections of the image-schema inherit this inferential structure.

Many of the image-schemas that Johnson identifies and analyzes will be immediately recognizable as those that Frye uses to describe patterns in literature: balance, paths, links, vertical scale, centre-periphery, part-whole, force-dynamics (like compulsion, blockage, counterforce, attraction), cycles (circles represent temporal cycles whose end state is the same as their initial state; but the "climactic structure" of our experience of cycles, their "character of build-up and release", is best represented by a "sine wave with its periodic 'rise' and 'fall'" (119-120)), etc. (112-126). Frye's organizing patterns of quest, cycle and apocalypse fit image-schemas of path, cycle and splitting; the "U shape" of comedy and its inversion in tragedy are halves of a sine wave path projected onto vertical and horizontal axes ("The inverted U is the typical shape of tragedy, as its opposite is of comedy: it rises to a point of 'peripety' or reversal of action, then plunges downward to a 'catastrophe,' a word which contains the figure of 'turning down'" (*Code* 176)); the "manic-depressive chart" of the Bible's narrative (*Code* 171) is a sine-wave; the *axis mundi* is a scale, and so forth. Each of these correspondences might be examined in detail.

METAPHORS THAT ORIENT WORLDS

The second part of *Words With Power* quickly brings us to schematic forms of art and the cosmos. The literary critic should "look into some of these indecently naked formal systems that won't quite do: the cosmologies, for example, constructed out of the metaphors that lift us up or bring us down, that oppose one hand to the other, look in or out, go forward or back" (149ff.). These are the building code of the literary cosmos, and they form an ordered whole in the Bible: "The Bible, sitting in the middle of this cosmos for the Western world, can be used to show that the cosmos of myth and metaphor has an overall structure, and is not simply a chaos of endlessly tantalizing echoes and resemblances" (149-50).

> Lakoff and Johnson identify in spoken language a class of metaphors that does not structure one concept in terms of another but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another....[M]ost of them have to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of

> the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. (*Metaphors* 14)

Linguistic examples show that Happy, Conscious, Health and Life, Control or Force, More, Good and Reason are UP, where Sad, Unconscious, Sickness and Death, Lack of Control or Force, Less, Bad and Emotion are DOWN (*Metaphors* 15-17). Metaphors that manifest these relations are not a collection of separate cases, or the result of mere convention. And these metaphors cohere with the deepest values of a culture. An informal inquiry suggests that being IN is generally better than being OUT, and the other pairs as listed seem to have a roughly positive-negative charge.[65] Frye traces how one [culturally elaborated] orientational metaphor, the *axis mundi*, gives some overall structure to mythology and literature. But image-schemata are almost never experienced as independent entities. Rather, they are superimposed on one another to structure our worlds. Johnson writes,

> By virtue of such superimpositions our world begins to take shape as a highly structured, value-laden, and personalized realm in which we feel the pull of our desires, pursue our ends, cope with our frustrations, and celebrate our joys. Much of the structure, value, and purposiveness we take for granted as built into our world consists chiefly of interwoven and superimposed schemata [. . .]. (*Body* 125-126)

It is tempting merely to line up such quotes with such lines from Frye as, "The poetic imagination constructs a cosmos of its own, a cosmos to be studied not simply as a map but as a world of powerful conflicting forces" (*Words* xxii). But we must look at how the forces of this world are woven together. I suggest that the other spatial schemas studied by the conceptual party also structure elements of the literary cosmos. For example, container images appear to have the same connection with the celestial spheres that ladders, trees, towers, etc. have with the *axis mundi*. Orientational schemas organize systems of linguistic metaphorical concepts, and encourage coherent organizations of concepts within a tradition of narrative and imagery.

SCALE

Johnson elaborates the nature of image-schemas from their emergence from bodily sources to our manipulation of them at higher conceptual levels. The SCALE is the image-schema behind the *axis mundi* and all the images of ascent and descent that Frye synthesizes. The basic metaphor MORE IS UP organizes many of our expressions concerning *amount*--as in, "the crime rate is *rising*," "my stocks have *fallen*," "the number of teachers is *going up*," and "interest rates are *levelling out*." It is based in

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[65] IN and OUT organize concepts metaphorically in that you can be in or out of: favour, luck, fashion, the loop, the running, one's right mind, love, shape, time, control, power. Of course one can also be in trouble, disgrace; or outstanding, far out, etc. Tillyard's *Elizabethan World Picture* shows literary uses of the image-schematic coherence of the axis with the spheres: as you go UP the axis, you move OUT from sphere to sphere.

recurring correlations of increase with verticality in our bodily experience: when we add *more* of a substance to a pile or container, the level *rises*. This is a quantitative aspect of our experience, but qualitative aspects are also conceived in scalar terms: we experience degrees of intensity in objects and events when we feel them as more or less hot, bright, loud, painful, pleasing, etc. Scalarity, though not always quantifiable, is an extremely pervasive way of experiencing and viewing our world, and the image-schema that emerges in physical experience is figuratively extended to every kind of abstract and subjective entity. It can be represented diagrammatically as a path moving up from a point. Both paths and scales may be numerically graded, and may be either closed or open-ended. Scales are distinct from paths in that they tend to have a fixed upward direction, a cumulative character, and a normative character (*Body* 121-124).

CONTAINER

The CONTAINER image-schema is grounded in the containers we know first and best, our bodies: "Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface [our skin] and an in-out orientation. We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical entities that are bounded by surfaces" (*Metaphors* 29), such as places, objects and substances. Containment is one of the most pervasive features of our experience: we are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into and out of which things pass (food, water, waste, air, blood, etc.). We find it in our surroundings, moving ourselves in and out of rooms, clothes and vehicles; and moving objects in and out of bags, boxes, and bowls. Thus three-dimensional containment seems to be the most experientially salient sense of boundedness, although two- and one- dimensional containment is also important (*Body* 21-22). There are five important entailments or consequences of the internal structure for in-out orientation. Containment typically involves i. protection from, or resistance to, external forces; ii. limitation and restriction of internal forces; iii. due to ii., a relative fixity of location; iv. due to iii., accessibility or inaccessibility of the contained object to the view of an observer; v. transitivity of containment (if B is in A, then whatever is in B is also in A) (*Body* 22).

The meaning of the container schema is also developed by combining it with other schemas and projecting into other domains. It is almost always imposed on the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema, where the centre is experienced as inner, and the outer is defined relative to it, whether we are talking about concrete or abstract objects (such as geometrical shapes, theories, etc.). This configuration also supports the metaphorical imposition of a subject-object orientation; a self-other distinction, and a mine-thine valuation. These superimposed schematic structures create coherences in our experience and understanding (*Body* 125).

In fact manipulations of this schema's inferential structure often seem to underlie key turns of Frye's thought. In the *Anatomy*, the move from the archetypal to the anagogic phase of symbolism occurs when nature is no longer the container but the thing contained (119). The account of the psychological derangement Adam and Eve undergo in *Paradise Lost* superimposes force vectors as "drives":

> When appetite is perverted into passion, the drives of sex and hunger are perverted into lust and greed. Passion operates in the mind as though it were an external force [. . .]. The distinction between lust and greed is that lust is a vice turned outward and affecting other people; greed is a vice that turns inward and affects oneself. (*Return* 72-74)

In *The Secular Scripture* "We reach the ideal of romance through a progressive bursting of closed circles" (173). *The Great Code* recommends we turn our ideas of language and metaphor inside out (64, 167-68). One result of this is,

> Instead of an individual finding his fulfillment within a social body...the metaphor is reversed from a metaphor of integration into a wholly decentralized one, in which the total body is complete within each individual. (100)

This internalization of divine forces and directives that corrects their projection into the outside world is a major theme in *The Great Code*, and includes the disappearance of sacred space. The concept of "interpenetration" similarly depends on container relations: the whole is *in* each part, rather than the parts being *in* the whole.[66]

"IN" IN EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE

Despite these remarkable parallels in thought, the theorists part ways on the relation of schemas to linguistic metaphor. We get an opportunity to directly contrast their views on metaphor in ordinary language, when both parties refine their opposing views of container-prepositions by discussing the meaning of the word "in." Explaining the principle of implicit metaphor, Frye points out that "when a 'true' meaning is decided on for a word, it will usually be a choice among a number of metaphorical possibilities, and those other possibilities will still be there" (*Code* 59). For example,

> Suppose [. . .] we were to decide that the 'true' meaning of the word 'in' was being contained by a container, as with 'peas in a pod.' In all other cases the word 'in' would be metaphorical, including the 'in' that stands at the beginning of this sentence. It will soon become clear that nobody can use language like that: all language is permeated by metaphor simply because words are juxtaposed. (*Code* 59)

Lakoff and Johnson, looking at the examples, "Harry is in the kitchen," "Harry is in the Elks," and "Harry is in love," claim that

> The word "in" and the concept IN are the same in all three examples; we do not have three different concepts of IN or three homophonous words "in." We have

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[66] On the concept of interpenetration in Frye, see Robert Denham's piece, "Interpenetration as a Key Concept in Frye's Critical Vision" in *Rereading Frye*, 140-163. On other aspects of spatial organization in Frye's thought, see Imre Salusinszky's "Frye and the Art of Memory" in *Rereading Frye*, 39-54.

> one emergent concept IN, one word for it, and [. . .] metaphorical concepts that partially define social groups and emotional states. (*Metaphors* 59-60)

It is not that one "in" is the "true" meaning, or that some kinds of experience are more basic than others, they emphasize. Rather, "it is possible to have equally basic kinds of experiences while having conceptualizations of them that are not equally basic" (60). That is, the physical concept "emerges directly from spatial experience in a clearly delineated fashion" (59); and the less clearly delineated is typically understood in terms of the more clearly delineated.

Frye's observation that other metaphorical possibilities remain with a word despite specific determinations of meaning corresponds to Lakoff and Johnson's claim that "in" is an "emergent concept" that animates a range of specific metaphorical concepts. But where Frye says that all "in" meanings are equally metaphorical and none is primary, they argue that the "contained in a container" sense *is* the basic, emergent concept for "in" that is then applied metaphorically to all other cases. Frye's view that all language is full of metaphor "simply because words are juxtaposed" is a generalizing attempt to retain the perspective of conscious use of words ("nobody can use language like that").[67] This conflicts with his suggestion that subconscious spatial diagrams underpin the conceptual relations implied in prepositions. It is also overbroad, and misses important distinctions. The conceptual party avoids the issue of conscious use by placing the metaphor in the "cognitive unconscious" (see *Philosophy*, Chapter 2). This raises questions of its own, but their rich analysis, buttressed by many linguistic examples, of how the container schema enters into a wide range of metaphors in specific complex ways, accounts for the same phenomenon of lexical polysemy that Frye points to, while offering a finer-grained picture of the conceptual and linguistic operation behind it (see *Philosophy* 82, 499, Johnson, *Body* 50-51, 107; Lakoff, *Women* 313-17, 416-18). They distinguish it from such partially analogous phenomena as grasp of linguistic and perceptual gestalts, context, background knowledge, and syntax, which Frye assimilates under "centripetal meaning." Frye seems to say that this centripetal rather than centrifugal

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[67] This may indicate Ricoeur's influence. On the problems of the New Rhetoric of the Liège group, and on Jakobson, Ricoeur writes: "how are figure and polysemy to be distinguished? [. . .] the word considered as paradigm of its possible uses appears as an area of substitution, in which all the variations have equal status... all paradigmatic selection becomes metaphorical" (161). Frye seems to agree with Ricoeur that "there are no metaphors in dictionaries. Metaphor is not polysemy. [. . .] polysemy attests to the open structure of words and their capacity to acquire new significations without losing their old ones. This open structure is only the condition of metaphor and not yet the reason for its production" (170). Ricoeur fixes meaning by its use in the realm of discourse and predication. This allows him to reject the "originary" sense postulated by Derrida:

> The literal sense is the one that is lexicalized. There is [. . .] no need for a metaphysics of the proper to justify the difference between the literal and figurative. It is use in discourse that specifies the difference between the literal and metaphorical, and not some sort of prestige attributed to the primitive or the original. (291)

focus of attention is the essential condition of meaning, or at least of metaphor, whereby we are prompted to find whatever patterns we can in the verbal structure.[68]

Lakoff and Johnson show that the origin of the basic concept is body-based, and that basic metaphors originate in the projection of physical schemas. It is important to recognize the basis of higher meanings in physical experience in an analysis of cognitive development and the "atomic" structure of metaphors. But the physical basis need not bias literary interpretation, and Frye's looser principle is a better guide for examining the elaborate "molecular" metaphorical structures of literature, where the abstract or subjective domain often provides essential structure to the work, in both local details and global organization. Turner's theory of "conceptual blending" was developed partly to accommodate such complicating factors. A blend involves at least four "mental spaces", no longer two (as in *Metaphors We Live By*) or three (as in *More Than Cool Reason*: 202): two or more input spaces (formerly source and target) project information into a blended space, and generate a generic space holding what structure is common to both.[69]

Frye often seems to make distinctions and form categories opportunistically: that is, he arranges or interprets data in a way that fits the facts well enough for this particular turn of the dialectic, while avoiding committing himself to preformed labeled "positions" whose weaknesses could compromise the overall thrust of his argument. This instance is part of the argument that all language has an ineliminable metaphoric aspect, and that this aspect is foregrounded in literary structures and in the Bible. The distinction between centripetal / centrifugal modes of attention is useful as a way of distinguishing between literary and non-literary structures, and therefore bears on his argument. But in casting his categorial nets wide enough to capture the relevant phenomena, he often catches a few extra fish in the same haul; in this case he missed an important distinction.

COHERENCES

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[68] There is still of course a range of issues in dispute in metaphor theory. Earlier thought about polysemy agreed with Frye (see Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976, qtd. in Cacciari 129-130); Katz and Gibbs provide extensive summaries of the main points of contention and the various positions developed around them (in *Figurative Language and Thought*).

[69] On conceptual blending and integration, see Turner's website at http://www.wam.umd.edu/~mturn/WWW/blending.html; Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier, "Conceptual Integration Networks"; "A Mechanism of Creativity," Turner's *The Literary Mind*, Fauconnier's *Mappings in Thought and Language*, chapter 6.

This development of the theory is also able to deal with what Frye calls metaphors of particularity, which, as in Blake's line, "to see a world in a grain of sand," reverse or "turn inside-out" the usual metaphorical tendency to unify and integrate source and target (see *Code* 64-66, 165-168, 208-209 on linguistic "monads," 213-16 on scriptural "kernels" or pericopes, 217-218 on proverb-like "resonance" expanding from an original context to others). Blake's line is a blend of two mappings, SEEING > KNOWING and WORLD > GRAIN OF SAND, the latter obviously mapping from the less to the more precise. The point the line makes, that one can see the universal in the particular, also relies on the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor, which enables us to understand specific situations in terms of the generic structure of other specific situations, as with widely applicable proverbs such as "when the cat's away, the mice will play" (see Lakoff and Turner, Chapter 4, especially 160-66). This analysis is supported by the "universal particulars" that follow the first as further exempla of the same principle: "and heaven in a wildflower/ To hold infinity in the palm of your hand/ And eternity in an hour."

Lakoff and Turner explore how "coherence among metaphors is a major source of the power of poetry" (56-89). They write,

> [A] composition of several basic metaphors [. . .] draws upon the grounding of those metaphors in common experience and knowledge. When that experience and knowledge cohere, the metaphors seem all the more natural and compelling. Complex metaphors grip us partly because they awake in us the experience and knowledge that form the grounding of those metaphors, partly because they make the coherence of that experience and knowledge resonate, and partly because they lead us to form new coherences in what we know and experience. (89)

Thus combining two metaphors, say LIFE IS LIGHT and LIFE IS HEAT, can imply a more general composite metaphor of life as a waxing and waning cycle of light and heat. This very general metaphor then "gets filled out with specific instances" of other source domains that structure the target domain in analogous ways, such as a day, a year, a flame, and a fire (88). Thinking from the other direction, models or commonplace theories for a target domain (life, time, the universe, etc.), can structure it in a way that "constrains the choice of source-domain structure" (87). So the model of life as a cycle of not being alive, being alive and being dead naturally fits source domains of day, year, flame, fire, precious possession, and fluid, that have a cycle of not existing, existing, and disappearing.

> Frye's explanation of "resonance" involves overall coherences within culture:
> For centuries the theory of music included a good deal of cosmological speculation, and the symmetrical grammar of classical music [. . .] makes it something of a mandala of the ear. We hear the resonance of this mandala of possibilities in every piece of music we listen to. Occasionally we feel that what we are listening to epitomizes, so to speak, our whole musical experience with special clarity: our profoundest response [. . . is] something like "This is the voice of music" - this is what music is all about. Such a sense of authority [. . .] comes mainly from the resonance of all our aural experience within that piece of music. [. . .] The classic or masterpiece is a source of such a response that won't go away [. . .]. *Anatomy of Criticism* presents a vision of literature as forming a total schematic order, interconnected by recurring or conventional myths and metaphors, which I call "archetypes." [. . .] I am providing a kind of resonance for literary experience, a third dimension, so to speak, in which the work we are experiencing draws strength and power from everything else we have read or may still read. [. . . T]he strength and power do not stop with the work out there, but pass into us. (*Spiritus* 118-19)

His claims for coherence go so far as to interpret the overall structure of works, author's total outputs, and even all of literature and human culture. He insists on the importance of such contexts, and his attempts to describe such overarching patterns often focus on coherences across, rather than within, authors and texts. Frye's patterns are not formulated in terms of source and target, but like Lakoff and Turner's models and

composite metaphors, they have rudimentary structure that relate the works they cover.[70] But *Words With Power* does describe a vast composite metaphor: literary cosmology is understood specifically as the metaphorical structuring of the target domain of consciousness by a variety of source domains (thus "Variations on a Theme").

THE CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS OF SATIRE

I now turn to an examination of the metaphors used to talk about satire. This will provide a foundation for examining the recurring metaphors and imagery within literary satires. I will argue that there is a conventional metaphorical model for the satirist's activity; and that the image-schematic structure of this conventional model enters into the structures of *rhetoric*, *scenes*, *narratives*, and *worlds* in particular satires.

The Conventional Metaphoric System for the Satirist's Activity:

Satire, as distinct from insult and shameful exposure generally, is conventionally seen as the humorous exposure of folly or vice, by making the folly or vice appear ridiculous. The *situation* of the phenomenon of satire involves several elements: the satirist, an object observed (a person or situation), the vice or folly attacked in the object, and the vision or expression that makes the object ridiculous. The *process* involves:

> -the object's foolish or vicious condition or behaviour
> -the satirist's observation of the vice or folly
> -the satirist's resulting negative response. This response leads from a perception of absurdity to an emotional response, which may range from furious indignation to miserable despair. The emotional response leads to a ridiculing attitude, which may include scorn, disgust, resignation. The negative response leads to:
> -the satirist's verbal attack
> -the response by the target. The response ideally involves the object's shame and humiliation as a result of the satire, and its subsequent reform by correcting its vice or folly.

We must look for metaphors for these parts and processes of satire.

Mary Claire Randolph has done most to explore the significance of this convergence of terminology. In 1941 she published study of the metaphors for satire and their implications that is so thorough and insightful that it became a classic and is still frequently cited. CMT can integrate the variants of her "medical" metaphor, and other metaphors for the same target domain. "Almost all of our words descriptive of satire preserve the primitive notion of destroying or harming the human body" (142), Randolph writes, and she provides a "relatively brief list" of about seventy words for what a

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[70] Frye's account of the Romantic and post-Romantic views of the psyche (*Words* 241-43), which invert the old hierarchy of being, is an excellent example of a set of metaphorical coherences. One can also note the constraints on mappings implied by the way the contrasting myths of progress and decline can structure the target domain of history, and how the source domains of the metaphors of earth-mother and sky-father constrain specific cosmological myth-mappings (*Code* 69-70).

satirist's words can be like, what the satirist can do with them, and what may happen to the victim.

This Renaissance model of satire involves elements that are highly specific to that period. I develop a more generalized version, limiting my analysis to such terms and concepts as are still with us. I hope to suggest the range of distinct conceptual mappings for satire by arranging my sample of vocabulary according to the conceptual domain with which the words are associated.

Here are a range of *specific* conceptual metaphors for satire, which correspond to a range of different vocabularies:

The action of the satire:
Satire is exposing: "pillory", "strip", "tearing", "peeling"
Satire is striking: "chastise", "abuse"
Satire is whipping: "lash", "lacerate", "flay", "scourge", "whip"
Satire is cutting: "sharp", "keen", "cutting", "slashing", "barbed", making bleed
Satire is surgical incision: "anatomize", "dissect", "vivisect"
Satire is burning (by heat): "burning", "scalding", "blistering", "scorching", "withering",
Satire is dissolving in acid: "mordant", "acid(ic)", "acerbic", "bitter", "caustic", "vitriolic", "corrosive"
Satire is poisoning: "poisonous", "venomous"
Satire is infection: "virulent", "malignant"
Satire is an animal attack: "biting", "stinging"
Satire is murder: "killing," "annihilating", "extinguishing",
Satire is destroying: "destroying", "demolishing", "taking apart"
Satire is making unclean: "blemish", "stain", "denigrate", "blacken", "smear"
Satire is making small: "belittle", "reduce", "trivialize", "diminish", "deflate"

The metaphoric concepts for the other elements of the satiric action may derive from these more numerous general verb metaphors for the action of satirizing. For example, since the satire is a physical attack, the satirist is:

> -an animal: a "dog" (barking or biting); a "snake", a "scorpion", a "wasp" etc. Poisonous animals are also often used, perhaps because their strike is sharp and stinging, leaves a lasting and increasing effect, and allows quite small animals to harm and defeat much larger ones. However, Elliott shows how Roy Campbell saw himself as a larger and more "noble" predator, such as a lion (242, 254). Earlier thought associated satire with the satyr and the centaur, and Campbell's "talking bronco" is not far off (252-53).
> -a monster: "satyr", "centaur", "demon" or "devil" or "Satan"
> -an attacker: a sharpshooter, a soldier, an assassin, an executioner
> -a doctor: "surgeon", "physician", "mad scientist"

In the medical metaphor, the general subject or topic being satirized is a patient, whose "body" may be a conceptual domain of any size. Randolph quotes Shakespeare's

melancholy Jacques (from *As You Like It*) declaring that he would "most invectively" pierce through "the body of the country, city, court". Further, he says,

> Give me leave
> To speak my mind, and I will through and through
> Cleanse the foul body of th'infected world,
> If they will patiently receive my medicine (qtd. in Randolph 145).

Thus the object under scrutiny and treatment is metaphorically a body, but the body may then be projected metaphorically to any other domain of any scale. What is actually satirized is usually an abstract folly or vice, such as "vanity", "affectation", "hypocrisy", "pride", "grandeur", etc. These may be embodied in a particular individual, institution, practice, etc. And as part of the "medical concept", these may be seen as embodied in or related to some local part or element or medical condition within this body, to be treated or "attacked" (medically attacked, in this case):

-Vice / folly is a "tetter", "pustule", sore, virus, etc.

The sick body, or only the diseased part, whether an infected member or a foreign object or substance, is often deformed to be abnormally large:

-Vice / folly is "inflated", "bloated", "swollen", "puffed up".

Outside the medical metaphor, the false and unreal values that create or are created by the vice / folly are highlighted in metaphors for some false appearance (e.g. an idea, theory, habit) that impedes clear vision (knowledge):

-Vicious and foolish values are "imposition", or "illusion".

This metaphor includes two submetaphors based on two domains of experience that include well-known ways of hiding or distorting appearances. There is an **atmospheric** submetaphor:

-Vice / folly is "mist", "fog", "cloud", "vapour", etc.

And there is a **clothing** submetaphor:

-Vice / folly is a "disguise", "mask", "robe", "cloak", etc.

The object attacked may also be a person--either the actual individual whose faults are criticized, or their follies or vices personified.

The metaphoric vocabulary tends to gravitate around the main elements of the satirizing schema--the satirist, the target, and the act of satirizing. Other elements are less thoroughly elaborated in a metaphoric vocabulary. However, some of these less elaborated metaphors seem to refer to a specific aspect or element of the whole satiric action. There are some interesting metaphors for the satirist's *method*, and for the *effect* of the satire. And there are distinct metaphors for different aspects of this effect: that is, there are metaphors for the immediate emotional effect on the subject from the subject's own point of view; and there are metaphors for the indirect effect, the change in judgment produced, from the point of view of the onlookers or audience of the satire.

The satirist's specific *method* of attack is to ridicule and mock by making something appear ludicrous. Ridicule and mockery are metaphorically described in terms

of what they metaphorically do to their objects, and these terms reflect satire's conceptual strategies:

-Satire "brings low", "degrades", "inverts", "reduces", "deflates", "diminishes"

The purported *effect* on the object of attack is embarrassment, shame, and humiliation. These emotional effects are described metaphorically as the result of a physical attack. The physical attack takes various forms, some more prominently than others. The verb metaphors for this form of attack are ambiguous: they could refer to both the *action of the satirist* in his act of satirizing, and to the action of the attacking *weapon on the body and mind* satirized. Burning (whether of fire or acid) seems to be the most common effect, perhaps because it is an intense pain that also acts to dissolve surfaces and reveal real substances:

-The ridicule "burns", "reduces to ashes", "immolates", "sears", "scalds", etc.

Another common metaphorical effect derives from the image of the satirist flaying or cutting her victim:

-The ridicule "lashes", "slashes", "cuts", "draws blood", etc.

Less commonly used possible metaphorical effects on the satirized do not have as extensive systems of related terms: satire "freezes", "paralyzes", "withers", etc. These less common terms do cohere with a unifying principle on a more abstract, image-schematic level, however. Cutting and burning pierce through the surface of something that is over-expanded, and all of these other effects also *stop an inflation*--the physical expansion or bloating that symbolizes vanity and affectation. Freezing and withering additionally cause shrinking and deflating.

The *responses of the target* are sometimes described in more literal terms of typical observable bodily reactions:

-The object blushes, reddens, trembles, quivers, faints, cries, etc.

The more extreme expressions of effect tend to be metaphorical:

-Satire "mortifies", "slaughters", "kills", "demolishes", "destroys", "annihilates", "tears apart", "dismantles", etc.

These expressions also tend to imply a point of view outside of the satirized subject, since one cannot ordinarily observe one's own death and dismemberment. They suggest a certain kind of attack with a few key aspects: the victim is defenseless; the attack occurs all at once, to the whole being of the victim, and is devastatingly effective. The result is death, or extreme disassembly, or annihilation--reducing to disconnected fragments, or some scrap of another substance, or causing to cease to exist altogether.

More expressively, the effect on the *object's attitude towards itself* is described in terms of shrinking, lowering, hiding, and dying:

-He or she wants to crawl under a rock, wishes the earth would swallow one up, wants to vanish, feels low, feels "like a heel", feels two inches tall, feels like a worm, a rat, wants to die, etc.,

It is a fascinating fact that the metaphors for *shame*, which is the expected emotional effect of satire on the victim, are closely related to the specific "reductive" mapping patterns of satire. The metaphors for the *techniques* of the satiric action cohere with those metaphors for shame. That is, satire takes things that seem to be or pretend to be high and large and rhetorically frames them to expose them as low and small; and when we feel shame we feel that we are "exposed" and made "low" and "small" (see Kovecses). The same metaphors that are revealed by the details of the "shame" vocabulary in everyday conversation about feelings, also exist on larger and more substantial levels--in the imagery, characters and action of a literary work in this particular genre (as we shall see below).

The existence of the parallel between the conceptualization of emotion and the conceptualization of rhetorical-literary technique suggests an opportunity for criticism: a way to begin to analyze in a unified way two topics that we have always known are closely related, but that often frustrate efforts to relate them. Analyses of art and imaginative thought seem to speak a different language from analyses of human emotional response. We might be able to offer a better model of "reader response" by treating both the literature and the emotional response under the same vocabulary and the same set of concepts. If satire can have a real humiliating effect, can cause shame in its victims, then it seems that the real causal relationship between satirist and satirized is based on conceptual-rhetorical structure. Reconceptualizing the victim or his values in a certain rhetorical way can affect the victim's conceptualization of himself in an analogous fashion: specifically, making those things the victim values "highly" seem "low" can make him feel "low". The reader is not ordinarily the victim of the satire. She understands the emotion of shame, though she does not feel it directly. We empathize with the victim, and we know what it would be and feel like to be so reduced.[71]

As for the later end of the schema for the action of satirizing, the successful attack should rid the object of its vice / folly, or get rid of the object itself:

> -The satirized vice/ folly is "purged", "driven out", "expelled", "vomited" due to an emetic, "excised and cauterized"

In the Renaissance, the satiric remedy was "first cleansing, that is, stinging, cutting, or burning, and then healing" (144). Now, we still have single expressions for double-action "remedies" of this kind, where the expression's concrete meaning is associated with attack, and its abstract meaning is associated with improvement: "chastening" means both

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[71] An important question is, to what extent the emotion felt by the victim and the reader of satire is based on the satirist's conceptualization, and to what extent it may be based on some other kind of knowledge or intuition. In everyday conversation we may observe in the speaker the typical facial expression and tone of voice that accompanies satirical irony--the "sneer". Our emotional response could be based more on our inferences or intuitions about the speaker's judgment and emotional attitude towards his target, whether that is ourselves or another. In literature similar inferences might be made, though without the evidence of vocal and facial expression.

beating and purifying, and "correction" means both punishing and improving. These are somewhat archaic-sounding expressions, but "teaching a lesson" has a similar ambiguity.

We can construct a quite complete mapping of the medical version of this metaphorical model as follows:

The satirist is a doctor
The subject of satire is a patient
The object of attack is a diseased part of the patient's body
The vice or folly is a specific symptom of disease, or itself a disease-causing entity (often a sore or pustule)
The increase in vanity or pride in the mind is the inflation or swelling of the diseased part
The mental delusion caused by the vice / folly is a vapour or fog arising from the diseased part, that clouds the patient's vision
The satirist's pen is a surgeon's knife
Writing satirically is cutting with the knife
Analyzing something critically is dissecting or anatomizing a body
Exposing the vice / folly is isolating and revealing the diseased part to the sight
Attacking the essence of the vice / folly directly is lancing the diseased part
Releasing the cause of the delusion from the mind is venting or purging or bleeding the part's diseased fluid
Removing the vice / folly that caused the delusion is removing the disease-causing entity (healing the sore, or extracting the infecting object, or the hard core of the pustule)

This model does not accommodate every possible inference about the satirist's subject in the whole range of available satiric metaphors: the metaphor of the satirist as a barking, biting dog, and the metaphor of the satirist as a public whipper, are in many ways very different from the metaphor of the satirist as a surgeon. The dog does not attack with precision, does not attack disease, and does not cause healing. The metaphor of exposure of hypocrisy as stripping naked effectively connotes public shaming (the emperor has no clothes), whereas the uncovering involved in surgery does not, but is strongly linked with analysis of a disorder. And even the inferences of the metaphor of the satirist as a surgeon using a scalpel to cut out a malignant growth are quite different from the inferences of the metaphor of the satirist as a doctor administering an emetic to make the patient vomit up a poison. The first has a careful job to do, the job is specific to each patient's different growth, and often concerns a surface condition of the skin. The second goes to an area associated with inner depths, causes the patient's own body eject the evil, using a medicine that should work the same way for everyone. The inconsistent imagery and image-schemas of these metaphors create inconsistent inferences.[72]

[72] Even medical metaphors, Randolph notes, are "not all of a kind. Sometimes they seemingly look backward to the ancient idea of the magical curse as a lethal instrument and of satire as but a means for a

Mary Claire Randolph quotes a scene from Thomas Randolph's *The Muses' Looking Glass* (1638) that "brings together much of the physical imagery connected with satire and stresses the victim's supposed reactions." The personified genre of Satire is one

> . . . whose whip of steel can with a lash
> Imprint the characters of sin so deep,
> Even in the brazen forehead of proud sin,
> That not eternity shall wear it out.
> When I but frown'd in my Lucilius' brow,
> Each conscious cheek grew red, and a cold trembling
> Freez'd the chill soul; while every guilty breast
> Stood fearful of dissection, as afraid
> To be anatomis'd by that skilful hand,
> And have each artery, nerve, and vein of sin,
> By it laid open to the public scorn.
> I have untruss'd the proudest: greatest tyrants
> Have quak'd below my powerful whip, half-dead
> With expectation of the smarting jerk,
> Whose wound no salve can cure. Each blow doth leave
> A lasting scar, that with a poison eats
> Into the marrow of their fame and lives;
> Th'eternal ulcer to their memories. (150)

The synthesis of several metaphors creates the unusual anatomist who uses a whip of steel laced with poison to untruss patients and deal them unhealable wounds while dissecting them for the public. (We recall Lakoff and Johnson's claim that "Complex metaphors are formed from primary ones through conventional conceptual blending, that is, the fitting together of small metaphorical 'pieces' into larger wholes" (*Philosophy* 49).)

We can convert our grasp of several specific metaphors, and our grasp of a complex blend of metaphors, into a more generic metaphoric model. The object of the satire is a person and his or her folly and vice:

> -The primary individual folly/ vice attacked by satire is VANITY, which is a falsely exaggerated sense of self
> -The result of Vanity is AFFECTATION or PRETENSE in social behaviour
> -The result of Affectation/ pretense is HYPOCRISY in ethical behaviour

The metaphoric model of satire of this object is rendered as:

> -The soul or spirit is a gaseous substance or vapour in the body
> -The self is the body

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man to achieve personal revenge; more often they represent the more cultured and sophisticated notion of satire as a sanative agent, a means of curing a man of his moral ills and of providing a normal outlet for the satirist's own irritation at certain social conditions" (137-38).

-The image of the self is the outer surface of the body
    -The public image is the appearance of the outer surface to others
    -The private self-image is the appearance of the outer surface to the self

-Vanity is (artificial) expansion of the vapour
    -Expansion of the vapour leads to inflation of the body and expansion of its outer surface ("he's puffed-up", "full of himself", "too big for his britches")
    -An inflated outer surface conveys a false image of the self
-Affectation is acting as if the false image (the outer surface) is the true self (the body)
-Hypocrisy is the contradiction between the fact that the body is the true self and the pretense that the inflated outer image is the true self

-Satire penetrates this false outer surface (cuts/ punctures/ burns through)
-The penetration of the outer surface causes the expanded vapour to vent and disperse, and the outer surface to deflate and shrink
-The deflation reveals (to self or others) the falseness of the inflated image

This version of the metaphor uses the most common English terms and concepts for satire's targets, actions, and effects. Yet we can convert our thought about this generic metaphor into a still more general generic mapping based on the common image-schematic structures of this and other specific metaphors. Instead of the target being a body and self, the target is a generic object. The parts of the model are as follows:

-There is an object with an inner solid substance and an outer surface
    -The inner substance is the reality of the object
    -The outer surface is the image of the object
-A gaseous substance or vapour can get between the object's inner substance and its outer surface
    (-The vapour is pride or vanity)
-The increase of the vapour causes the outer surface to inflate and separate from the inner substance
-The inflation of the outer surface makes the object appear larger and higher than normal
    -This inflation is the object appearing more important than it really is (i.e. delusion)
-The object may be part of an entity, or a whole entity

-The satirist is an attacker with an instrument (weapon/ tool)
-Satire penetrates this false outer surface
-The penetration of the outer surface causes the expanded vapour to vent and disperse
-The venting causes the outer surface to deflate and shrink

-The deflation reveals the falseness of the inflated image
-The attack may remove the outer surface
-The removal of the outer surface exposes the substance (the reality) beneath it.
-The attack may go on to extract a solid substance at the core of the entity
-The attack releases accumulated energy in the attacker (venting).

This generic image-schematic mapping fits both the metaphor of the folly/ vice as an expanded vapour *in* the body, and the metaphor of the folly/ vice as a sore or pustule *on* the body. It also fits the common metaphors of the false appearance as clothing, or as fog, and satirical exposure as stripping off clothing to reveal the naked body beneath, or as dispersing fog to reveal the outside world.

The most general and most complete overall mapping for satire, then, is:

-Satirical mockery that exposes and rejects a false appearance imposed upon reality is the cutting or burning through an outer surface to reveal a concealed foundation or core of solid substance surrounded by some non-solid substance.

If we add in as many of the common elements of the metaphorical schema as we can, we can expand this too:

-Satirical mockery that exposes and rejects a false appearance imposed upon reality is the cutting or burning through an outer surface to reveal that surface as artificially expanded from within by a vapour, to deflate and strip off the outer surface, thus allowing the vapour to escape, and to reveal a concealed foundation or core of solid substance surrounded by some non-solid substance.

It is not clear to me whether the specific metaphors generate the generic metaphors, or vice-versa. Presumably, the primary metaphors (grounded in embodied experience) appear first chronologically (in the development of the language, and of the individual speaker). Then as speakers use them, they get elaborated into more detailed mappings. Speakers discover metaphors using analogous structure from other source domains, and combine the primary metaphors to create complex metaphors and blends for the same target domain. Randolph points out that medical imagery seems never to have been absent from satire of any period (125 n1). But the medical concept of satire was developed in the English Renaissance by using the quickly-expanding concepts and vocabulary of the medical source-domain to expand the number of metaphoric connections and the detail of articulation.[73]

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[73] The *cause* of this expansion is not just increasing knowledge of medicine. There was an especially good fit between medical theory and ideas about satire. The medical concept was especially apt for putting a positive spin on satire, warranting inferences about its moral, improving aims, to take the edge off its traditional destructive power. As well, social conditions led to an increase in satirical practice and theory, and a general cultural renovation drove the theory and practice of literature.

Further, although the composite or complex metaphor serves to integrate many of the basic metaphors for satire, it does not integrate all aspects of all satire metaphors. Like Lakoff's model for "anger", our model for satire is perhaps a cluster, with the generic composite metaphor at its centre, and a few others ranged around it. Therefore we may expect to find metaphoric language, imagery, and inference that does not derive from or fit into this metaphoric model.

I expect that people think using the generic-level structure of whatever metaphoric models they have. When they have a range of separate basic/ primary metaphors, they think using the range of separate generic structures in each of these. Once these separate basic metaphors become combined through blending, people acquire new, more complex generic structures, and they can then think through these richer models. Hence, now that we have the complex model of the satirist that blends metaphors of attacking violently AND performing surgery, we can map that generic structure with images that are novel and specific to our time and place. For example, the image of the satirist as a (renegade) laser eye surgeon fits many of the inferences of the generic model quite well: the satirist corrects fogged vision; he exposes part of the body that is both external and internal (the "windows of the soul"). Most interestingly, since a laser both burns and cuts, it fits ideas about the satirist's instrument better than clumsy attempts to combine such distinct cutting and burning instruments as flails and acids. However, it misses inferences about the violence and painfulness of the attack, and about a growth that is virulent, contagious and dangerous to the body. These inferences could be captured by developing the mapping counterfactually, for example according to a science-fictional view of lasers as deadly weapons.

The limited historical life of a way of speaking does not change the fact that the basic metaphorical structure existed before this period, and continued to exist afterwards (in the same or similar form). I suggest that the metaphorical structures of speech inform literary structure at all times, in a similarly insistent and productive way. While Randolph draws her evidence mainly from "Scattered, informal critical and quasi-critical statements concerning English Renaissance satire, not the satires themselves primarily" (126 n3), she observes by the way that the same imagery informs "both the theory and practice of English satire of this period" (135 n25). The next job, then, is to relate these metaphors to the structure of works of satire: to find the conceptual patterns behind these metaphors in the conceptual-rhetorical patterns that shape the language, the recurring imagery, the narrative structures, the cosmologies or symbolic worlds, and the literary form, of satires themselves.

Chapter 5: Satiric Metaphor in Imagery: The World Upside-Down

Our goal in this chapter is to examine how the rhetoric of satire is expressed in metaphor and imagery (concentrating on the kind of imagery specific to Menippean as opposed to other forms of satire), and to show how these patterns of imagery connect with the prototypical plot-schema as set out in Chapter Three. My claim is that the Menippean plot-schema of "parody of the mental / philosophical quest" exists in a *mapping relation* to the patterns of imagery typical in the genre. That is, the "pairing of form and meaning" that characterizes rhetorical features, and, on a scale of greater size and complexity, characterizes genres, comes into existence through metaphoric and iconic mapping.

In the following chapters we will be examining several interrelated rhetorical patterns that are prominent in satire and Menippean satire.

1. The *Mundus Inversus*, or World Turned Upside-Down "topos" made familiar by Ernst Curtius may be the most frequently used, and deepest-seated rhetorical pattern in satire. Other critics have explored similar patterns under different names. Peter Gibian shows in Twain "an over-arching bipolar vision of life and thought as a dynamic system, a continual struggle between the opposing, quasi-physical forces of 'levity' and 'gravity'" (Gibian 81), which contrasts "levity" as good, light, airy, unserious, unattached; vs. "gravity" as bad, heavy, earthy, "grave" of attitude, attached to things, people, society, status.[74] Joseph Bentley expounds the pattern of "Semantic Gravitation" in satire generally and Aldous Huxley especially. Bakhtin describes the many kinds of "degradation" patterns in the tradition of "carnivalesque" thought and speech celebrated by Rabelais.
2. There are other kinds of patterns that are often used to satirize something pretending to value by linking it with something of no value or negative value. While "high" and "low" are very commonly used concepts to symbolize value and non-value, other symbolic concepts can serve the same function: for example, the satirized might involve a confusion or otherwise wrong relation of whole vs. part, large vs. small, or light vs. dark. The rhetoric of satire, in making the valuable worthless, can be described as "deflating", "diminishing", "trivializing". Or, if it is being done ironically, as in the mock epics of Pope, Dryden, Swift, et. al., it may be described as "magnifying", "inflating", "puffing". As well, the specific kind of "value" involved

[74] Gibian's essay focuses on Mark Twain. He cites as the basis of his study Joel Black's historical research into the meaning of "gravity" in rhetoric, theology, and science, as background for an inquiry into *Gravity's Rainbow*. Black surveys romantic irony in Sterne, Byron, Jean-Paul Richter and Friedrich Schlegel: "these works often develop as a battle between two forces or two voices: inflation confronts deflation, disorder confronts order, enthusiasm meets criticism, and, in what is for Black the most fundamental opposition, levity confronts gravity" (Gibian 82).

varies: the author may be concerned with the contrast between good and evil, wisdom and folly, importance and unimportance, beauty and ugliness, etc.

3. The mockery of important values by connecting them with what is unimportant or absurd can translate into undermining the straight line by linking it with digression. This is done by first metaphorically transferring complexes of values to another area of experience-based conceptual patterning, the PATH image-schema. The preferred kind of motion along a path is motion from source directly to goal. To perform this kind of motion would be to fulfill or achieve the values of the work. One fails to achieve these values when one departs from the preferred direct motion in some way, and this kind of failed motion is typical of the rhetoric of satire. There are many ways a path can be projected into the work, and many ways to depart from a path. The main paths are the actions of the major characters, and the author's narrative. Character actions may involve an actual journey, or may involve movement only metaphorically. A character's action may be an education, or a relationship, or a series of relationships, etc. The narrative is a metaphorical movement along a path. Failure to move along a path in a straight line from source to goal may involve such movements as: digressing (temporary or permanent change of goal mid-way); confusion and crowding (criss-crossing of many paths, loss of sight of goal, loss of path); regressing (moving backwards along parts of the path already traversed, which may become a return to an origin); circling (repeating the same motion over and over again). ("Reversal" is another term frequently used to describe the incongruities and absurdities satire sees and imagines. It may mean reversing order or direction, but is often used in a looser sense to mean any kind of radical disturbance, such as a hierarchical *inversion*.) We will devote a chapter to digressions as a feature of Menippean form.
4. A special kind of negative movement along a path is movement downwards, or "descent". Again this may mean an actual downwards journey, or a metaphorical descent (*catabasis* is the traditional term, opposed to the *anabasis* or upwards journey). We will discuss descents in the chapter on satirical narrative patterns.

"Rhetoric" can mean many things, and rhetorical patterns, I will show, are not exclusively linguistic, but can inhabit many other conceptual units of literature, such as scenes, characters, and narratives.

To review briefly, we are concerned with five principal points of agreement between Frye and conceptual metaphor theorists Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner:

-they perceive systematicity of thought among diverse expressions of metaphor, and so infer that metaphor has a conceptual basis
-they approach interpretation (linguistic and literary) by placing language and literature in the context of conventional metaphors and cultural models
-they analyze the basis of metaphor (and rhetoric in general), and cultural models, in terms of image-schematic structure

> -they perceive such structure as pervasive in thought, from the micro-level in rhetorical figures to the macro-level in imagery, narrative, and imagined cosmology
> -they identify the spatial structure and orientation of the human body as the basis for the image-schemas that inform metaphorical thought[75]

These points of agreement form the basis for our approach to the linguistic and literary structure of the genre.

MICROCOSM TO MACROCOSM: METAPHOR TO WORLD:

Kernan's treatment of "rhetoric" as manifesting itself at all levels of the literary work, complements Frye's approach to the issue of the relation of "imagery" to metaphor and world. Frye shows the significant relation of imagery to metaphor and myth and cosmology, but his emphasis on archetypal natural symbolic images as such (for example, the sea) downplays the manifestation of like mapping patterns in other aspects of literature--the symbolic "shapes" of scenes, actions, furnishings, dress, etc.

Frye describes his modes, myths, symbols, and genres in terms of the kinds of "world" they project, or how they relate to their projected worlds. "Levels" of symbolism are distinguished by their proximity to an "apocalyptic world" where elements are related by complete metaphoric identification rather than by analogy. The world completely shaped by the satirist's attitude and thought patterns is the ultimate terminus of satire. "Imagery" is displaced metaphor. That is, in a mythical, apocalyptic, or undisplaced "world", the sense of identity between man and nature is complete, and produces gods of the sea, of mountains, of harvest, death, etc. In literature that is more answerable to the demands of "plausibility" or "realism", identity turns to analogy, which produces characters who are "significantly associated" with the sea, mountains, death, etc. Hence it is the existence of the apocalyptic worlds of full metaphoric identification that grounds the meaning of the other literary worlds that are displaced towards experiential plausibility in various ways. But Frye also explores the grounding of certain aspects of literary and linguistic meaning in universal bodily experience, rather than in cultural constructs. Conceptual structures that enter semantic relations in language as well as literary structure are rooted in the orientation of the human body in space.

Kernan includes elements of rhetoric, scenic structure, and narrative structure that get downplayed by Frye's theory, but he also relates those elements to the structure of a posited world. He discusses E. M. W. Tillyard's *Elizabethan World Picture*, which describes in some detail the analogically-conceived cosmology that operates as a background in literature from antiquity to modernity. Of course, there are variant world-pictures, and the Western one develops and changes over time; but its skeleton persists with great tenacity. The main structural features of *axis mundi*, celestial spheres, and levels of being remain intact despite changes in specific detail. A central principle of

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[75] Frye is in some ways closer to Lakoff and Johnson than he is to Turner, insofar as he seeks to disclose how conventional "root metaphors" underlie thought and literature, rather than examining closely how metaphors and other elements combine in specific examples of the "online construction of meaning", as in blending.

Turner's cognitive rhetoric reaffirms the reflection of analogous structure on various "levels" of literature--microcosm to macrocosm. He offers as an explanation for the phenomenon the embodied basis of figure:

> In language, the macrocosm is revealed in the microcosm and conversely, simply because all levels of language embody the same conceptual figures of thought. [. . .] [Conceptual connections] are equivalently expressed through whole works, indeed expressed through patterns of meaning that transcend whole works. (*Reading* 240)

In a study of allegory ("Assembling Spaces"), I found evidence in literature for this curious phenomenon, and a strong interest among critics in the way allegory can inhabit a figure of speech, a sentence, a passage, an imagined scene, a whole narrative fiction, and beyond that, an entire genre with a long and complex history. Critics from C. S. Lewis on wonder "how something always latent in human speech becomes, in addition, explicit in the structure of whole poems" (Lewis, *Allegory of Love* 44)--and how the poem's structure becomes a structure of genre.

I suggested that the same figure of thought can be projected equally to the various levels of conceptualization and imagination that are operative in reading literature. Thus, the personification metaphor of the *bellum intestinum* or interior war exists in *expressions* like "I struggled with myself for days", "hope and despair warred within me," etc. It exists in isolated *scenes* in the "occasional allegory" of writers like Homer, Ovid, Milton, mixing in with the largely mythological content. The anger of Achilles begins as an internal force (*akhos*), but overcomes him and "reverberates until it fills the world, finally taking the ominous form of abstract 'Strife' at large (*Eris*). 'At first she rears up only a little,' comments Homer, 'but then she strides upon the earth with her head striking heaven' (IV, 440-5)" (Whitman 14-15, 20). Milton's Sin and Death share a few key scenes with their father Satan, in a narrative otherwise peopled with figures from Christian mythology. Allegory may also exist in the visual scenes of emblems and paintings. It can occupy whole *narratives*, as in Prudentius's *Psychomachia*. At this point we call the poem "fully allegorical." The domination of the narrative by a metaphoric conflict that orders the action implies the existence of a fully allegorical *world*, too. Homer's Strife has an ambiguous fictional ontology: we do not know whether to say she is literal or metaphorical. If she is a god, or one of the interventions of divine power that occur sporadically throughout the epics, then she is literally there; if she is a personification, understood as the poet's way to express the sudden flourishing of enraged conflict in the fictional world, then she is a metaphor. But Prudentius's characters Pride and Faith have, we know, a real existence in their fictional world. They are part of the "literal fiction."

Allegory can, however, occupy a whole narrative without implying a whole allegorical *world*. This is more characteristic of later literature where the metaphors are "displaced" and we have "imagery" rather than metaphor or allegory proper. Kafka's *Trial*, and the works of Hawthorne, Melville, Camus, Pynchon, and others, create narrative worlds, but they are still more or less "realistic" worlds in which we do not

expect allegorical entities to have actual existences--the allegorical meaning is intended by the author, but is not part of the "literal fiction".[76]

Hence, I suggest that the typical metaphors and figures of satire can similarly exist at all the various "levels" of conceptualization, from words and sentences all the way up to the whole fictional world. Kernan shows how Pope's *Dunciad* traces the spread of Dulness from the individual, out to the crowd, and thence to the whole world. I want to undertake a tracing-out of examples of Dulness from microcosm to macrocosm, not in order to show how Dulness spreads everywhere, but to show how the central mapping pattern of the conceptual rhetoric of satire projects to all levels of imaginative structure.

THE WORLD UPSIDE-DOWN

This cognitive principle of the capacity of conceptual figures to project to any scale, from small to large--which I have presented hypothetically as a process of expansion--turns out to reflect the "evolutionary" processes of literary history, as well. We find the idea supported in Curtius's classic study of the topoi of medieval literature, *European Literature in the Latin Middle Ages*. One of the central figures of all satire is the inversion of the metaphorical model of the Great Chain of Being. Great Chain inversions depict what is high as low, and what is low as high. We will soon examine some examples. Perhaps the classic statement of the principle's operation is this of Pope's:

> "... as the first [style, called "the Cumbrous"] is the proper engine to depress what is high, so is the second ["the Buskin, or *Stately*"] to raise what is base and low to a ridiculous visibility: When both of these can be done at once, then is the Bathos in perfection; as when a man is set with his head downward, and his breech upright, his degradation is complete: One end of him is as *high* as ever, only that end is the *wrong one*. Will not every true lover of the Profund be delighted to behold the most vulgar and low actions of life exalted [. . .]?" (*Peri Bathous* Ch. 12, 348).

Pope's rhetorical styles have ancient precedent. They are strategies for expressing the "world upsidedown" or *mundus inversus* topos (Curtius 94-98). This topos is later known as topsy-turvydom, and in the twentieth century Bakhtin's concept of the "carnivalesque" involves symbolic reversals of crowning and uncrowning, social role-reversals, bodily degradation, etc., in folk rituals and their literary counterparts.[77] Seidel notes the role of another primitive variant in satiric writers:

> An essential strategy in the satiric or parodic travel narrative is the confusion of the "no place" with the "home place." Primitive forms such as the "Antipodes"

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[76] There are parts of Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* where the elements of the occasional allegory appear to be entering the literal fiction. The Spirit of Gravity; Death; and certain figures of the afterlife, as well as the Rilkean angels are uncertain as to their ontologies. Similarly, George Gascoigne's *The Adventures of Master F. J.* contains a parable about a man who "became of a suspicious man, Suspicion itself" (81).

[77] Terry Castle examines carnivalesque forms in the phenomenon of masquerade in eighteenth century English literature.

> satire, where the utopian realm is at geographical and cultural odds with the homeland (that is turned upside down), serve as ready examples of the process in outline, and there are antipodal elements in all of the books of *Gulliver's Travels*. (215)

Curtius locates the original root of the topos in the specific rhetorical form of a passage in a fragment of Archilocus: "The eclipse of the sun on April 6, 648 B.C., would seem to have given him the idea that nothing was any longer impossible now that Zeus had darkened the sun; no one need be surprised if the beasts of the field changed their food for that of dolphins (Fragment 74)" (95). Its basic form is "stringing together impossibilities", or *adynata*, in order to articulate a "complaint on the times" (95). (Archilocus is, significantly, one of Elliott's paradigmatic satirical cursers.) It grows by being developed in the complaints of Virgil's shepherds that since their beloved has deserted them, anything is possible and chaos yawns. This is further expanded by medieval writers: "Virgil's *adynata*, then, act as a stimulus in Carolingian poetry. In Theodulf they are interwoven into a description of the times" (96). Thus a rhetorical device becomes a principle for patterning rhetorical sequences by simple repetition, which then gets woven into general description of a large-scale situation, which is finally expanded to characterize a whole imagined world: "Out of the stringing together of *impossibilia* grows a topos: 'the world upsidedown'" (96).

Curtius describes a "parallel line" in a comic version of the motif that begins as a parody of the Homeric journey to Hades (*Nekyia*). He cites as transmitters of the topos some of our central Menippean touchstones: Aristophanes, Lucian, Rabelais (96). The specific meaning of the same topos, then, changes from Archilocus to the middle ages; and it is different still in the second comic line. This multeity of "function" is important. It shows us that a generic form of mapping does not in itself determine the variant specific forms of the figure or topos. Meaning is constrained by the figure, but must be further specified by a context of more detailed action, imagery, and tone. We will discuss this further later on.

As Curtius expounds the topos, it achieves its end by starting with the specific, then going on to generalize by listing other specifics and also stating the generalization at higher levels: "youth will no longer study! Learning is in decay! But--so the thought proceeds--the whole world is topsy-turvy! The blind lead the blind and hurl them into the abyss [. . .]. What was once outlawed is now praised. Everything is out of joint" (95). The process of conceptualization begins with the first generalization about a category of people (youth), then moves on to a generalization about a whole abstract topic (learning), and this in turn is followed by a containing generalization of the broadest kind (the world). It moves from a discovery of one specific inversion to a suspicion of the existence of other inversions, to a conclusion that our expectations of order are in fact mistaken, because our whole principle of order is suspended or upset. There may be an observation of a particularly egregious transgression of order, and the observation that if *this* is possible, then there are no limits to what is possible.

The present point is the very broad generality of this reversing pattern. It does not depend on specific images or words, but on a recognition of conventional ideas about

where the things of the world stand with respect to one another in a conceptual system of complexity, causation and control, and value. People should not live like pigs, nor angels like people. And pigs should not presume to live like humans, nor humans like angels. This way of putting it calls to mind the formalization of this conventional thinking in the Great Chain of Being. The Great Chain of Being is the main principle of order for our culture; it is in its terms that the world upside-down is defined.

Randolph points out that "The satirist [. . .] always makes analogy one of his chief tools in hand; he has with varying degrees of emphasis equated the physical and the moral in all languages at all times" (135). Hence,

> Imagery in both the theory and practice of English satire of this period offers a fertile field for study [. . .]. Animals with qualities unattractive to man--the ass, ape, bear, fox, lynx, marmoset, mole, wolf, etc.; birds similarly unattractive--the gull, ibis, popinjay, daw, dotterel, widgeon, rook, goose, vulture, eagle; plants and fruits with unpleasant characteristics--fungi, weeds, parasites, Chian figs; reptiles; and stinging insects--wasps, hornets, gnats, gad-flies, and horse-leeches--these are all drawn upon. [. . .] In eighteenth century satire, all of the bird, beast, and plant imagery was to fit neatly without change into the Great Chain of Being theory" (135 n25).

It is not just classes of beings that get graded on a scale. Within genuses, some species are higher than others, and within species, some individuals are higher than others, and within individuals, some parts and functions are higher than others. To express this in a more general way, we can say that any change in station of a being, whether presuming to move above where it is supposed to be, or falling from where it is supposed to be, is potentially negative and potentially ridiculous.

Joseph Bentley's essay on "satiric reduction" as "semantic gravitation" proposes a basic semantic principle as the root of the techniques and strategies of satiric style. He mainly discusses Aldous Huxley, but he places him in the tradition of Aristophanes, Rabelais, and Swift (3), and later compares Juvenal, Lucian, Chaucer, Voltaire, as well as other satirists nearer Huxley's time (11-12). Bentley points out that "The tension between mind and body occurs so frequently in satire that one is tempted to call radical dualism its essential operational phenomenon" (3). Focussing on mind and body rather than on categories of the Chain of Being, he generalizes over specific symbols to see satire as a symbolic movement from high to low (whatever is regarded as high or low, for whatever reasons). The basic principle is a "reductive" downwards movement, and his survey of examples shows him that the collocation of high and low naturally lowers the high, but not vice-versa:

> The phenomenon of semantic gravitation can thus be stated as a basic proposition: When extremes of high and low are merged, the high elements will descend toward the level of the low elements. The connotative levels have been established by language and culture. Since satire functions primarily as a

> linguistic mode of reducing certain values within its environment, semantic gravitation can be seen as an important operational principle in satiric style. (7)[78]

The most common upside-down mappings in Menippean satire appear to be mappings of man as an animal, and of the mind as a body. We will presently explore these manifestations and what they mean. The mock-epics of the non-Menippeans Pope and Dryden favour mappings deriving from models of the structure of human and divine society: Belinda is treated as a heroine watched over by gods, her admirer the Baron as a hero with his own gods. *The Dunciad* portrays Bays as the new favourite of the goddess Dulness--her poet laureate. MacFlecknoe is the rightful heir to "all the realms of *Nonsense*" as Absalom is the typological fulfillment of King David. Closer to the Menippean spirit, Juvenal and Swift treat their characters' minds as governed by their bodies, hypocritically or blindly viewing themselves as noble and spiritual.

LAKOFF AND TURNER'S GREAT CHAIN OF BEING:

Before we go on to examine "upside-down" mappings in Menippean satire, we need to refine our sense of what such mappings mean in conceptual terms.

We understand satiric points easily by recognizing the absurdity and humour when someone or something that is supposed to be "lofty", "noble", or "high" is linked with something that is "base", "worldly", or "low." We know what's "up", what's "down", and how they are conventionally related in a hierarchy. We can understand these various facets of the world upside-down figure and topos, and even go on to use it in new ways, if we like. We tend no longer to believe in the physical reality of the cultural model of the "Great Chain of Being", and we no longer receive any explicit training in its structure or how to use it. But it seems that we acquire some version of this Chain of Being model through our experience with language and culture, and that model is rich enough to cover our whole range of experience, yet flexible enough that we can use it to grasp relations among categories like inclusion and subordination, to categorize new elements, and also to create various other kinds of connections and analogies across its levels.

A conceptual analysis of the Great Chain, and of the nature of the mappings it makes possible, allows us to perceive and describe at the right level of generality the patterns we find embodied in specific examples of the world upside-down. A conceptual analysis illuminates not just the associations of specific images, and not just their place in an outdated cosmological theory, but shows how the use of such images enters into the inferential structure of thought.

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[78] The latter part of the essay wonders why the highest human values seem so incompatible with the low human bodies that must inevitably accompanies them. Bentley offers a psychoanalytic explanation for "the force governing the phenomenon of semantic gravitation [. . . .] the nature of that mental mechanism which makes high values descend so frequently toward concomitant low values" (11): the high value *results from* repression and sublimation of the low elements; we cannot see them both at the same time because the former is produced by blindness to the latter (14-19). However, we can doubt this conclusion because we recognize a number of cases in which the connecting of high and low results in the (ironic) raising of the low.

In chapter four of *More Than Cool Reason*, Lakoff and Turner outline the conceptual-metaphoric structure of the "Great Chain of Being." It is "a scale of forms of being--human, animal, plant, inanimate object--and consequently a scale of the properties that characterize forms of being--reason, instinctual behavior, biological function, physical attributes, and so on" (167). It is no mere cosmological relic. Rather, a "highly articulated version of it still exists as a contemporary unconscious cultural model indispensable to our understanding of ourselves, our world, and our language" (167).

They distinguish between the "basic Great Chain" and the "extended Great Chain." The basic Chain concerns the relation of human beings to "lower" forms of being, whereas the extended Chain models the relation of humans to "higher" levels of society, God and the universe. The basic Chain is a more general and widespread model; the extended Chain in the form we have it is specific to Western Culture.

The basic scale of beings embodies a scale of properties. Simple objects like rocks have properties of substances like mass and volume. Complex objects like chairs have part-whole functional structure--the structural parts seat, back, and arms serve parts of the overall function of holding a sitting person. Vegetables have both these types of properties plus life and growth and reproduction. Animals have everything plants have plus self-propulsion and some internal intentional states like desires, fears, and certain cognitive capacities. Humans have all the properties of animals plus capacities for reason, morals, aesthetics, communication, etc. (There are differences of degree within these classes: cars are more complex objects than chairs, trees more complex plants than fungi, and horses more complex animals than beetles.) Hence every being shares part of its nature with other beings, and so "where a being falls in the scale of being depends strictly on its highest property" (168). The generic-level characterization of this model does not distinguish between individuals at each level. Rather, a level is defined by its highest level properties--the attributes and behavior that distinguish it from the next level below, and register greater complexity and greater power (168-69).

The complete cultural model is not a simple metaphor, but involves two separable parts. They call it a metaphoric "system" or "complex" or "ensemble." There is also a "commonsense theory of the Nature of Things", a "causal theory that links attributes to behavior: the characteristic behavior of a form of being is a consequence of its characteristic attributes" (171). "When the hierarchy of the basic Great Chain is combined with the commonplace knowledge about the Nature of Things, we get a more elaborated, hierarchical folk theory of forms of being and how they behave", as follows:

> -HUMANS: Higher-order attributes [e.g. thought, character] lead to behavior.
> -ANIMALS: Instinctual attributes lead to instinctive behavior.
> -PLANTS: Biological attributes lead to biological behavior.
> -COMPLEX OBJECTS: Structural attributes lead to functional behavior.
> -NATURAL PHYSICAL THINGS: Natural physical attributes lead to natural physical behavior. (171)

Two other ingredients are needed to create interpretations of proverbs. The GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor answers questions raised by proverbs: How can these

short, specific statements about particular situations apply to many different situations? How can they "convey a general understanding? And how do we know what general understanding it conveys?" (162). This metaphor "maps a single specific-level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel specific-level schemas that all have the same generic-level structure as the source-domain schema. [. . .] In other words, GENERIC IS SPECIFIC maps specific-level schemas onto the generic-level schemas they contain" (162-63).

The other ingredient, the "communicative Maxim of Quantity" states, "Be as informative as is required and not more so" (172). This functions to focus on the defining, highest-level properties of the beings referred to, filtering out the properties that are common to other levels.

Hence, "big fish in a small pond" can refer to any situation where some being or group of beings are the most powerful beings within their immediate local environment, but that environment is clearly only a small part of larger environments with similar but more powerful beings. The proverb refers mainly to the predatory behaviour of the fish, their animal-level property. It maps to other specific situations via its generic-level situation of insular arrogance about limited power. Hence it might be applied to members of a town council, when compared to provincial or national governments.

Here, then, is a close description of the conceptual operations that seem to be at work in processes of mapping across levels of the Great Chain.

Douglas Sun uses the Great Chain to analyze humorous reversals in James Thurber's fables. He concentrates on the need for contribution from both "source" and "target" domains to create the persuasive "arguments" of the satires. A story about moths is implicitly a story about humans, and the behaviour of moths is linked with the behaviour of humans. The moths therefore in a sense occupy both levels of being on the Chain, human and animal. The instinctive behaviour of most moths, who fly towards candle flames, is characteristic of animals and is shown to have negative results. The un-natural behaviour of one moth, who tries to fly towards the moon, symbolizes aspiration towards more distant and higher goals. Such behaviour is characteristic of humans, and shown to have important positive results. The ambiguous position on the Chain of these blended moth-humans allows us to make contrasting judgments about them: the first type, who follow animal instinct despite some capacity for "higher" thought and feeling, appear to be ignoring this capacity, and therefore sinking down the Chain from human to animal--they become degraded. The second type, who follow higher thought and feeling despite strong pressure to follow instinct and society, appear to be overcoming those degrading pressures, and therefore rising up the Chain from animal to human.

Sun's analysis relies on several points in Lakoff and Turner's analysis.[79] It relies on the association of levels of the Chain with kinds of attributes and behaviour; and it relies on the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor, that allows us to extract from the specific story about moths a general story about human behaviour, which we may then apply to specific situations of human behaviour. (In fact, we may map the story onto a situation of behaviour of animals or other forms of life, for that matter. The parable fits

[79] Sun cites the version of the analysis presented in Turner's *Reading Minds* 167-69.

any situation in which animal, plant, object or matter a.) behaves in an unusual manner that b.) we can construe as belonging to higher forms of being, and c.) results in a situation that we can construe as an improvement. As Lakoff and Turner note, the proverb "Big thunder / little rain" could apply to a human braggart, or to a dog that barks viciously but is not dangerous, or to a loud earthquake that causes little damage [179].)

Sun observes that "because Thurber makes these characters *moths* and not humans, he forces us to consider these sentient human behavioral phenomena in terms of the instinctive behaviors of a lower form of life" (56). Indeed, in general "The persuasive work in *Fables for Our Time* draws its effectiveness from the generic-level metaphor called The Great Chain. By getting us to consider human behaviors in terms of the behaviors exhibited by lower forms of life, Thurber constructs a view of man as a flawed and frail creature and the modern world as a flawed and dangerous theater in which people act out their folly" (59). (We will return to this point about the construction of a satiric world.)

VARIATION BY REFINEMENTS OF THE GREAT CHAIN

Pope's words also remind us that inversions of the Great Chain can be accomplished within a single level: the upside-down man inverts the natural and proper orientation and relation of the parts of the body.

We should keep in mind that in the more elaborate formalized extensions of the Great Chain, there are many more categories at each level, and many and complex relations among them. The construction of angelologies alone could occupy several books, and it ought to be possible to write a (rather erudite) angelic satire by humorously presenting Cherubim and Seraphim behaving like Thrones, Principalities and Powers.

The human body is also associated with this Chain (see Tillyard on "Man" 76-79, giving the details of Elizabethan biological mechanics). Indeed, intra-bodily inversions are extremely common in Menippean satire. Sterne is perhaps the master of reducing the mental to the sexual, and Swift reduces the mental to the digestive and excretory. Sigmund Freud writes,

> I should like to draw attention to the frequency with which sexual repression makes use of transpositions from a lower to an upper part of the body. Thanks to them it becomes possible in hysteria for all kinds of sensations and intentions to be put into effect, if not where they properly belong--in relation to the genitals, at least in relation to other, unobjectionable parts of the body. One instance of a transposition of this kind is the replacement of the genitals by the face in the symbolism of unconscious thinking. Linguistic usage follows the same line in recognizing the buttocks [. . .] as homologous to the cheeks, and by drawing a parallel between the *labia* and the lips which frame the aperture of the mouth. Comparisons between nose and penis are common. (*Interpretation of Dreams*, 509-510)

Any other conventional hierarchies are also useful to satirists--familial, political, aesthetic, religious, etc.

What do we gain from connecting satire's reversals to a conceptual interpretation of the Great Chain? We can say, as a first pass at explanation, that satire appears to rely on many of the same conceptual mechanisms as do proverbs. It requires that we understand the proper place of various forms of being on the Chain, the kinds of attributes and behaviours associated with the various levels of being, and the various implicit moral judgments involved in the various ways of linking one level of being with another. Great Chain inversions are used to satirize targets by understanding them in terms of attributes and behaviours less complex than is proper to their class. We explain them "reductively" by mapping the behaviours and attributes proper to their level of complexity to a lower level of complexity. We will refine this first pass as we go on to examine some of the nuances of satirical Great Chain inversions.

Another major gain from this approach is that we can explain relations among patterns of imagery even when those patterns have no basis in specific images. We can link up patterns of "animal imagery" and "plant imagery", "light / dark" imagery, "levity / gravity" imagery, "ascent / descent" imagery, human bodily imagery, and imagery of the "excremental vision" as aspects of a more general pattern of degrading inversion. Because the CMT framework speaks of image-schemas and conceptual structures, rather than images and words, CMT can explain how the latter get linked up in virtue of connections with the former. It can go into the structure and the mechanisms of connections between specific images and words, because image-schemas and generic-level concepts provide the kind of scaffolding that enables us to create relations among many specific concepts, and to hold them together in stable patterns. Image-schematic structure is a basis of connection between concepts: concepts with parallel image-schematic structure can be mapped one to another. And concepts are often connected in virtue of a broader background model that is fundamentally image-schematic in nature--for example the Great Chain (but also others). The cross-modality of image-schematic concepts can also help explain how the same patterns are found in arts using different modes: painting, literature, drama, perhaps even music.

Creating characters that are blends of humans and animals or plants or objects, as Thurber's fables do, is one way to invoke the Great Chain and moral judgments deriving from inferences about the attributes and behaviors proper to its various levels. But there are other ways. As we shall see, Great Chain category structure can be invoked by something as slight as a passing metaphor, even an implicit metaphor, or a feature of rhetorical form. Let us consider a series of examples of this upside-down mapping, to show: how pervasive it is; how different the implications can be in specific examples; different assumptions about what is high, what low, and the ways they can be connected; and what kinds of connection are typical of Menippean satire.

EXAMPLES

There are three things we will consider in our progress through examples. First, the scope of the figure: how exactly the same figure exists at various levels, from sentence to scene to story to world. I will show how the principle operates for one trope, the "world upside-

down", then I will go on to discuss the other figures that are common in works of the genre.

Second, we will consider how various connections between various levels and sublevels of the Chain reflect various aspects of the topos. Conceptual implications are shaped by such factors as the absolute position on the Chain of the elements connected, and the relative distance between them. We say very different things when we call someone a peasant, or a jackal, or a cockroach, or a toadstool, or a clod of dirt.

Third, we will consider how exactly the figure is established. That is, how the writer creates the connection between concepts that constitutes the figure. (There are many ways of establishing metaphoric connections in language and I will not try to set out a language-based taxonomy of figures. But I will examine how in each case the figure is established, to show something of the range of kinds of conceptual connection, and to distinguish between kinds of mappings and ways of establishing mappings.)

VARIOUS SPECIFIC MEANINGS:

Pope's words indicate an important consequence of specific forms of the figure: the meaning of a high-low connections depends on whether the high is brought low or the low raised up, or some other kind of connection is made. In the first case what is high is mocked, in the second case what is low is mocked, and there are any number of possible in-between or synthetic attitudes. Let us consider some simple examples to illustrate the two extremes and what can come between.

"John is an ass" is a prototypical degrading ironic mapping: it links a man with a creature well below him on the Chain, in fact low even in its own class of animals. This implies that not only is he unworthy of classification as a human, he is not even prominent among his fellow animals--he's foolish, unbeautiful, weak-minded; he's useful only as a beast of burden. "John is a vulture" similarly degrades John to a lower class of being, but it also uses the stereotypical negative vulture qualities of preying viciously on the weak or dead to make him out to be a knave rather than a fool. "John is a dog" is negative because degrading, but it can be interpreted as implying either knavery or folly, depending on whether we think of the viciousness and predatory skill associated with some dogs, or the servility and stupidity associated with other dogs. (Context usually supplies the information to guide such decisions.)

These examples show how specific meanings can vary widely, and they can vary yet more when all the other aspects of the Chain are considered. But they all have in common that the high is made low.

Such insults can extend to other levels of the chain. "John is a fungus" suggests to us the fungal qualities of being small, simple, passive, unproductive and parasitic. "John is a tree" doesn't strike us as insulting, although "John is a vegetable" might and "John is a turnip" does. As for dead matter, "John is a rock" could be good or bad; "John is dirt" is negative, partly because of the association of dirt with uncleanness, excrement, and death.

In these cases, what determines whether the link with John is degrading or not is the conventional status of the specific linked entity, within its own level of being, or its own genus. We know that an eagle has a higher status than lower animals like insects, and we know it has a higher status than a vulture among birds. To call John an eagle,

then, is not intuitively degrading, whereas to call him an insect, or a vulture or pigeon, is degrading. As well, we often treat particular individuals of a class as having a higher or lower status than others. To be likened to Don Quixote's Rocinante is degrading, but to be likened to Alexander the Great's Bucephalus is elevating. And to be linked with a positive exemplar of even the lowest level of being is more elevating than a negative exemplar of a higher level: the Rock of Gibraltar is preferred to Rocinante, or Dan Quayle.

As Lakoff and Turner point out, many of these conventional hierarchies within levels and species are metaphorical: they result from attributing to the being itself properties that were projected by us in the first place. We often understand a being's biological or instinctive attributes and behavior in terms of human psychological attributes and behavior. Thus eagles and oaks are thought noble, foxes cunning, spiders and Venus fly-traps deceitful, beavers and bees industrious, and so on (see the discussion of "Metaphorical Schemas" and "quintessential attributes", 193-98). We know that rocks are seen as metaphorically strong and faithful, and we also know that their level of being is distinct from others in that it has no mind, movement, or growth. We need context to decide which of these meanings is pertinent.

Note, however, it could be degrading to call John an eagle if we mean to point to his *lack* of conventional eagle attributes--his short-sightedness, or his ignobility. But then the remark would have to be ironically intended, and that would fall into the category of the mock encomium, to which we now turn.

If Mary has just robbed a charity, then "Mary is a real angel" is a prototypical "paradoxical encomium" or "mock encomium": ironic praise intended actually to highlight how un-angelic Mary is by holding her up to the angel as an ideal. Because the basic Great Chain mainly concerns forms of life lower than humans, the mock encomium may be rarer than the direct degradation. The mock encomium can also use classes of high human types, or specific examples that are metonymic for human types or qualities, as in "Mary's a saint", or "Mary's a queen", or "Mary's a genius", or "Mary's an Einstein." We also find lower forms of life used, when they are associated metaphorically with certain valued human qualities: We might call Mary a cat, or a rose, or firecracker, or rock, to mock a Mary who is graceless, or unpleasant, or dull, or unreliable.

Although the techniques differ, in a sense in both the John and Mary examples, the target is metaphorically degraded--the high is made low. John is mapped to something lower than him. Mary is mapped to something higher, but in an ironic fashion--somehow the reader is given a cue to interpret ironically--that tells us she is lower than she should be. It is implied that Mary does not even have whatever angelic qualities are available to humans, which she should have, or at least strive for. She is not lower than human on the scale, but she is low among her fellow humans--slipping down a step, getting closer to animals, instead of closer to angels.

There are further twists. Bakhtin emphasizes how Rabelais not only abuses by mock-praise, but also, by another kind of irony that is in some sense opposite, praises mock-abusively. This comes out in the kind of "free, familiar speech" of unofficial relations, that greets friends in terms drawn from the "material bodily lower stratum", or other low elements of the Chain. The effect of this tends to be, as Bakhtin suggests, an

attitude of unofficial engagement and equality, interestingly opposite to the superiority and detachment of the mock encomiums typical of the Augustans. Good examples can be found in the way Rabelais's heroes speak to one another. Gargantua, greeting Friar John, cries, "'Come let me grip you, my ballocky boy, til I break your back'" (Book 1, chapter 39, 123). Of course, Rabelais also directs similar curses wishing bodily harm to the enemies of his heroes, and has them suffer physical violence in the fiction. The savagery visited upon the "Bum-bailiffs" is just one example among many (Book 4, chapters 12-16). The prologues present the most immediate and paradoxical mingling of the two functions, as Rabelais addresses both readers he loves and readers he hates, inviting the former and driving away the latter:

> *Take good note of what I have said and of what manner of people I invite. [. . .] I proclaim that I have broached my cask only for you sound fellows, drinkers of prime vintage and sufferers from gout in your own right. [. . .] As for those high-hatted pettifoggers who are always on the look-out for mistakes, do not mention them to me, I beg of you, by the reverence you bear to the four buttocks that engendered you and the life-giving peg which at that moment united them. As for the breed of pious hypocrites, do not speak to me of them either, though they are all outrageous drinkers, all scurvy and poxy, all possessed of an inexhaustible thirst and insatiable powers of mastication. And why not? Because they are not of good, but of evil [. . .] Never did an old ape make pretty faces. Down, curs! Out of my way! Out of my sunlight! Cowls, to the devil with you! So you have come here, wagging your tails, to sniff at my wine, and piss on my barrel, have you? See, here is the stick that Diogenes willed should be placed near him after his death, to drive off and break the backs of all such graveyard ghouls and Cerberian hell-hounds.*
>
> *Get packing, you hypocrites! To your sheep, you dogs! Clear out of here, you canting cheats! To the devil with you!* (Prologue to the Third Book, 286-87)

Here there are almost no clues at all in the descriptive imagery as to which group is praised and which abused. The only indicators are the explicit, literal labels like "sound fellows" and "pious hypocrites", literal injunctions like "do not mention them to me", literal declarations that "they" are not good but evil, and the contrast of the driving-away rhetoric addressed to them with the inviting rhetoric addressed to friends.

The imagery of dogs and attacking, hell and devils, might also be used for praise. Bakhtin shows how richly ambivalent is the meaning of death in Rabelais (he knows that "philosophy is nothing other than the contemplation of death"). However, the evil hypocrites, pettifoggers, etc. are associated with dishonesty and the imagery of false layers (apes with no pretty faces, cowls).

This sort of abusive praise seems to be fairly rare in literature, perhaps because of the widespread feeling that literature should be intellectually superior and the author emotionally detached from her audience. Bakhtin may be right that it is characteristic of popular rather than high culture. But it does occur in certain Menippean satirists as well

as Rabelais, notably Joyce and Pynchon, and to a lesser extent, Sterne. (One thinks of the Menippean qualities of Chaucer and Shakespeare, as well.)

We can summarize by saying that these two kinds of satirical Great Chain inversions mock targets by highlighting a disparity between the apparent position of the target in the hierarchy, and its proper position. Both straight degradation and mock encomium present the target as pretending to high attributes and behavior that it does not have. Degradation focuses on the ugly reality of lower attributes and behavior, while mock encomium focuses on the silliness of the false pretense of higher attributes and behavior.

These basic variants are already present in Curtius's distinction between two "lines", that of Archilocus and that of Aristophanes. The first is the "cursing" and railing line (studied by Elliott): the inverter takes the HIGH point of view, railing about how low the world is, having failed to live up to the high, and fallen away from it. A variant of this is the mock-epic, that laughs at the world for pretensions to importance (but holds the same view of decline). The second is the degrading/ debunking line (typically Menippean): the inverter takes the LOW point of view, railing not so much about how low the world is, but about how the world pretends to be high. The hero is he who is without illusion and without pretense, who is low and knows it, has nothing to lose, and delights in stripping away the pretense to which others cling so absurdly. The difference is between reducing what is high--as in Lucian's mockery of epic (and Menippean mockery generally); and pretending to elevate what is low--as in the mock-epic of Pope (which uses the grandeur of the epic to mock the triviality of Belinda).

We can express the semantic difference between raising what is low and lowering what is high in terms of the cognitive-rhetorical difference between filling out a high frame with low elements, and filling out a low frame with high elements: Pope puts Belinda's crisis into the elevated frame of epic narration, action, characters, imagery and style. Lucian puts the problems of the Olympian gods into the low frames of cynical, colloquial interrogations, and petty administrative politics. He puts philosophers and tyrants into the low frames of a sale of slaves; and a drunken brawl at a dinner party; and of the Greek myth of death, where the hoi polloi are herded onto Charon's leaky raft alongside the poor and powerless, robbed of possessions and pretenses.

There are various degrees in-between or combined tones: in *Don Quixote* the story keeps bringing Quixote down, showing him ridiculous, and even dangerous. But the Don speaks for his romantic values, whereas Pope's mock-epic subjects are too anti-epic to express anything heroic. At times Quixote's "delusions" actually work in the real world; and more often his ideals are admired and effective with people because they are sane and humane. The relation between Don Quixote and Sancho reinforces this balancing act: Quixote raises Sancho and Sancho depresses Quixote. While Sancho's carnality is often comic, he is also shown to possess solid common-sense that can be superior to philosophical thinking.

The mock-epic of Joyce also takes both sides. While he mocks the triviality of Bloom and Stephen and the others, Joyce also makes a real analogy between the nobility of Odysseus and that of Bloom, the openness of Molly to Bloom's love and the fidelity of Penelope, the stupid cruelty of the Cyclops and that of the Citizen, etc.

Such a balance of viewpoints may be the basis of "sentimentality" some see in Sterne. Watt compares Sterne's comic-sentimental attitude with the aggressive wit of the Augustans, which seems to "impose or imply a rationally-ordered hierarchy of values" (326): the low is rejected and the high is endorsed. But Sterne is not so brusquely one-sided, and this is reflected in his language:

> Sterne's outlook, on the other hand, is much more pluralist, and so is his style. His ostentatiously permissive syntax allows each category its own independent existence; the dash makes no assertion of relation, but allows the sense to flow forwards and backwards between the phrases which it conjoins, very much at the reader's pleasure; the emphasis is up to us, and if there is exclusion, it is we who make it. (326-27)

Watt imagines a Sternean re-write of Johnson's stern rebuke to a woman who asked his opinion of the suitability of a grotto for habitation: "I *think* it would, Madam---for us---or---for a toad." The high-low connection is identical; but the viewpoint and attitude flows, rather than being so resolutely supra-toad. The same pluralism carries over to the use of genre and generic attitudes in characters: there are no epic conventions, but Toby's modesty, accompanied with his gentle gallantry and obsession with warfare, makes him a kind of chivalric knight--perhaps the soft half of Quixote, where Walter is the sharp half, the railer seething to attack.

It is possible to degrade by terms with no obvious relation to the Great Chain. We can call John "dull" or "stupid" and Mary "brilliant" or "witty", or portray them performing ordinary acts in foolish or vain ways. Pope's lines about Bays mix metaphorical reducing patterns with straightforward description:

> Swearing and supperless the Hero sate,
> blasphemed his Gods, the Dice, and damned his Fate;
> Then gnawed his pen, then dashed it on the ground,
> Sinking from thought to thought, a vast profound!
> Plunged for his sense, but found no bottom there,
> Yet wrote and floundered on, in mere despair. (*Dunciad*, Book 1, ll. 115-20)

Metaphorical reduction occurs in making the dice Bays's Gods, and in the conception of his thought processes as a plunge into a bottomless pit. Describing someone as swearing and supperless, gnawing and dashing his pen on the ground, while calling him a Hero, also involves tacit reference to the Great Chain. To describe someone's thinking and writing as "floundering" is to use a metaphor so conventionalized that it borders the literal. But the swearing, supperlessness, and abuse of pen create ridicule on their own, and the satirical meaning might continue to be created in this largely metaphor-free style. The significance of the connection of satirical thought with the Great Chain is that the same kind of satirical meaning that can be given to words like "dull" or "floundering" can be conveyed through literary features of metaphor, imagery and narrative (and even, as

we shall see, through rhetorical features pertaining mainly to literary form) that use the category structure of the Great Chain.

LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION:
I will move through high-low patterns according to the *extent* of the basic fictional situation presented: the most limited is the author writing to the reader, or fictionally speaking to the reader. The satiric metaphor / thought is restricted to the mind of the author. Then we can see how this same figurative pattern of satire appears in larger entities.

We can begin with some examples of the upside-down figure that exist only in speech--metaphors, similes, etc., that do not enter into constructing fictional characters, scenes, or stories. These figures in speech may come from a narrator, or a character. A good place to start, then is the invective for which satirists are notorious, and Juvenal is the archetypal railer.

Satire 15 begins by decrying the animal-worship of the Egyptians. Juvenal sees hypocrisy in their vegetarianism (281), as he goes on to recount the riot sparked by religious feuding between towns, that escalated until a man was torn apart and eaten raw. After vilifying the Egyptian tribes, he claims that the natural instinct for tenderness, expressed in sympathetic tears, is "of all our impulses, [. . .] / the highest and best":

> It's this
> That sets us apart from dumb brutes, it's why we alone
> Have a soul that's worthy of reverence, why we're imbued
> With a divine potential, the skill to acquire and practise
> All manner of arts: we possess that heaven-sent faculty
> Denied to the creeping beasts with their eyes on the ground. To them,
> When the world was still new, our common Creator granted
> The breath of life alone, but on us he further bestowed
> Sovereign reason, the impulse to aid one another, [. . .].
> But today even snakes are better than men. Wild beasts
> Spare their own species: when did the stronger lion
> Ever strike down the weaker? And was there ever a forest
> In which some boar was slain by a bigger boar's tushes?
> The savage Indian tigress dwells in unbroken peace
> With her fellow-tigresses: surely | bears, too, agree with their kind.
> But man is a different matter. (286-87)

Here the essential role of level-defining attributes of instinct and reason is explicit. Juvenal aggravates the usual satirist's linking of men with animals, going farther by a more complete degradation: he places beasts *above* men. And we should note that the initial imputation that cannibalism by animal-worshippers is hypocritical, only makes sense if we assume that man is "above" animals and closer to god. The commentator

notes that Juvenal's animal lore is more idealistic than accurate (291 n20), but also notes the very general parodic pattern of contrasting a heroic past with a "degenerate" present:

> Where Virgil glorifies, Juvenal belittles: with symbolic appropriateness, he uses more diminutives than almost any other Roman poet. He delights in transferring a heroic phrase to a mundane context. The cannibalistic Egyptian riot of Satire XV is a kind of anti-epic battle, and I have often wondered whether the spear-flinging ape on goatback at the end of Satire V was not meant to recall the equestrian manoeuvres of the *lusus Troiae* in Book V of the *Aeneid*. (40-41)

The decline down the Great Chain of the figures from the roles they are made to fill signals the parody of the epic genre.

Pope's *Peri Bathous* considers a range of figures that link high and low. It's meant to ridicule the kinds of rhetorical figures (and especially their combination with certain kinds of imagery) used by "Dunce" authors. These authors, according to Pope, are Dunces because they produce works in high genres but are too mired in low feeling and thought to succeed. As such, it means to pillory unintentional absurdity and humour. However, it's also an excellent guide to the kinds of rhetorical figures (and their combination with patterns of imagery) that can be used intentionally to make a target absurd.

He states the general principle as one of thought: declaring the boredom of natural things, he writes,

> When an audience behold a coach turned into a wheelbarrow, a conjurer into an old woman, or a man's head where his heels should be; how are they struck with transport and delight? Which can only be imputed to this cause, that each object is changed into that which hath been suggested to them by their own low ideas before.
>
> He ought therefore to render himself master of this happy and *anti-natural* way of thinking to such a degree, as to be able, on the appearance of any object, to furnish his imagination with ideas infinitely *below* it. And his eyes should be like unto the wrong end of a perspective glass, by which all the objects of nature are lessened. (*Peri Bathous* chapter 5, 314)

A paragraph earlier he gives examples of this principle. It appears in absurdly associating high dialogue with low characters, or vice-versa. He speaks of these authors as misinterpreting the Credible as "painting nature in her lowest simplicity", and misinterpreting the Surprising as the Marvellous, that is, "He will draw Achilles with the patience of Job; a Prince talking like a Jack-pudding; a Maid of honour selling bargains; a footman speaking like a philosopher; and a fine gentleman like a scholar" (314). These are transfers of attributes across roles at the extreme ends of the human societal part of the Great Chain. The next part looks at how parts of Chain higher than society are described using societal attributes. Pope surveys how the "true genius" looks at the sky, a

tempest, angels, and even God, and deflates their sublimity by linking them with elements from a much lower level of being, that of quotidian, middle-class human affairs (God is a painter, a chemist, a wrestler, a recruiting officer, a peaceable Guarantee, a goldbeater, a fuller, a mercer or packer, a butler and a baker) (chapter 5, 314-18).

In the next chapter, he claims that the genius who wrote these examples (i.e. Blackmore) could not "arrive at images so wonderfully low and unaccountable" without an habitually unnatural "peculiarity of thinking." Pope does the same kind of thinking, but in effective condemnation, rather than ineffective praise. He facetiously suggests that, just as a great general should make a great heroic poet, so "reasoning from the affinity there appears between Arts and Sciences, I doubt not but an active catcher of butterflies, a careful and fanciful pattern-drawer, an industrious collector of shells, a laborious and tuneful bagpiper, or a diligent breeder of tame rabbits, might severally excel in their respective parts of the Bathos" (chapter 6, 319). Here we see the satirical contrast between heroic poetry and bathos, through the contrast between a great general and the followers of these trivial hobbies. Pope makes this list of hobbies all the more contemptible through repeated syntax that carries analogous semantic content: butterflies, patterns, shells, bagpipes, rabbits, are all small, harmless, and unimportant in the big scheme of things. To get involved in these objects so enthusiastically as to be "active", "careful and fanciful", "industrious", "laborious", and "diligent", is to further aggravate the triviality by exaggerating its importance.

In the next chapter he recommends the author help his manner of forming thought by familiarizing himself with Vulgar Conversation. Putting this principle in a metaphor: "The Physician, by the study and inspection of urine and ordure, approves himself in the science; and in like sort should our author accustom and exercise his imagination upon the dregs of nature. This will render his thoughts truly and fundamentally low, and carry him many fathoms beyond Mediocrity" (321).

Pope gives an intelligent general analysis of types of figures:

> I. The Variegating, Confounding, or Reversing Tropes and Figures.
> II. The Magnifying, and
> III. The Diminishing" (chapter 10, 330).

Metaphor gets the longest treatment, and what is said there applies quite directly to many of the other figures that link concepts: "The first rule is to draw it from the lowest things, which is a certain way to sink the highest" (chapter 10, 331).

Towards the very end of his rhetorical analysis, before going on to his satirical instructions for the automatic manufacture of works according to genre, Pope returns to the "dregs of nature" to speak of the "PRURIENT" style favoured by people of quality, saying that its progresses "are everywhere known by the same Marks, the images of the genital parts of men or women. It consists wholly of metaphors drawn from the two most fruitful sources or springs, the very Bathos of the human body, that is to say . . . and . . . *Hiatus magnus lachrymabilis*. . . . ." (chapter 12, 346-47). There are no examples of this style. But the *Dunciad* is full of sexual and excremental imagery.

Clearly, the implications of Pope's analysis extend beyond style or diction. He too speaks of metaphor in terms of the thought processes behind it, which are not restricted to language. (He discusses characters' speech styles, among other things.) However, these figures are set out in a study of (bad) writing. He does not actually present characters or scenes that link high with low, except as examples of writing. So he gets classed with other works that purport to be the expression in discourse of the satiric thought of authors or narrators. As well as Juvenal, the essayist Montaigne and the "anatomist" Burton are good sources for such reductive discourse.

One of Montaigne's definitive essays, *An Apologie of Raymond Sebond* is closely concerned with the relation between soul and body, and his constant theme is the power of the body in humans. He discusses how the mind and spirit, otherwise uncertain, are affected by bodily forces; and how people are therefore closer to animals than is customarily thought. It begins in an air of scepticism about the value of knowledge, and continues in that vein, to attack the automatic identification of knowledge with virtue and sin with ignorance. Montaigne's father had him translate Sebonde's book on natural theology, which aims "by humane and naturall reasons, to establish and verifie all the articles of Christian religion against Atheists" (387). Montaigne habitually answered two objections to the book. The first was that Christians should ground their belief on faith and inspiration of God, not human and natural reasons. He explains his view, which he feels Sebonde also holds: "Now our reason and humane discourse, is as the lumpish and barren matter; and the grace of God is the forme thereof" ... "our imaginations and discourse [. . .] have a kind of body, but a shapeless masse, without light or fashion, unlesse faith and the grace of God be joyned thereunto" (394).

The second objection was that "*his Arguments are weake, and simple to verifie what he would*" (394). For Montaigne, this is a mean distortion of Sebond. If anyone takes the book as free liberty to combat religion with mere worldly weapons, then Montaigne intends to "suppresse this frenzy": "to crush, and trample this humane pride and fiercenesse under foot, to make them feele the emptinesse, vacuitie, and no worth of man: and violently to pull out of their hands, the silly weapons of their reason; to make them stoope, and bite and snarle at the ground" (395).

This inversion, of throwing down an upright posture, and changing men into animals by taking from them the "weapon" of reason, is analogous to the previous one, of Godless thought as formless mass. The essay contains enough citations of Juvenal, Horace, Varro, Diogenes, Democritus, Heraclitus, and Ecclesiastes, to link Montaigne with the Menippean tradition, and he turns to the Menippean theme of the search through "argument or discourse" to find any stronger reasons than Sebonde's to come to certainty (395). He sees a need to show people that it is not hard to demonstrate the weakness of reason, and quotes some sentences of "the Holy Ghost", regarding the familiar themes of the folly and vanity of human wisdom: "*all our wisdome is but folly before God; that of all vanities, man is the greatest; that man, who presumeth of his knowledge, doth not yet know what knowledge is: and that man, who is nothing, if he but thinke to be something, seduceth and deceiveth himselfe*" (395-96). Explicitly linking his contempt of human

faculties unaided by God with a Chain-reversing image of the "lowest" of creatures have delusions of divine grandeur, he writes,

> Who perceiveth and seeth himselfe placed here, amidst their filth and mire of the world, fast tied and nailed to the worst, most senselesse, and drooping part of the world, in the vilest corner of the house, and farthest from heavens coape, with those creatures, that are the worst of the three conditions; and yet dareth imaginarily place himselfe above the circle of the Moone, and reduce heaven under his feet. It is through the vanity of the same imagination, that he dare equall himselfe to God, that he ascribeth divine conditions unto himselfe, that he selecteth and separateth himselfe from out the ranke of other creatures; to which his fellow-brethren and compeers, he cuts out and shareth their parts, and allotteth them what portions of means or forces he thinkes good. How knoweth he by the vertue of his understanding the inward and secret motions of beasts? By what comparison from them to us doth he conclude the brutishnesse, he ascribeth unto them? When I am playing with my Cat, who knowes whether she have more sport in dallying with me, than I have in gaming with her? (399)

This vision places man in the lowest simple substance, opposite to the top of the "house" of the universe, and among the worst animals. Montaigne then ridicules his presumption in cherishing an inverted image, where he is placed above the moon with heaven underfoot, as a kind of God. He explicitly invokes the rank of creatures, and insists on man's equality, and perhaps inferiority, to animals. Much of the rest of the essay develops this theme of the proximity and affinity of human to beast, undermining the distinction in various ways. His ideas about communication between animals of the same species, and even different species, were particularly controversial because they challenged the idea that speech and communication were the essence of human nature.

These images and conceptual connections are being used in speech to argue against one belief and for another. In this kind of discourse they exist only in the mind of the speaker, as ideas and arguments. However, such reductions can also be accomplished in a non-propositional way, through metaphor and pun. Sterne is the master of the euphemism, the "higher" word substituted for the "lower" reality. This process is like allegory, and in Sterne euphemism is often punning, because it makes use of metaphors that refer to both higher physical concepts and lower physical concepts:

> ---"My sister, mayhap, quoth my uncle *Toby*, does not choose to let a man come so near her ****." Make this dash, ---'tis an Aposiopesis.---Take the dash away, and write *Backside*,---'tis Bawdy.---Scratch Backside out, and put *Cover'd-way* in,---'tis a Metaphor;---and, I dare say, as fortification ran so much in my uncle *Toby's* head, that if he had been left to have added one word to the sentence---that word was it. (72)

This remark drives Walter into a philosophic rage, and he launches into his analogical comparison of female parts, to discover the "right end" of a woman--an analogy which is interrupted and never completed. Sterne teases the reader much as Walter later teases Toby and Trim, by wryly evoking his lewd metaphors by implication, and allowing them to expand through the whole military hobbyhorsical system. He listens to Trim recount the "affair of the bridge": "I was shewing Mrs. *Bridget* our fortifications, and in going too near the edge of the fossé, I unfortunately slip'd in---Very well *Trim*! my father would cry,---(smiling mysteriously, and giving a nod,---but without interrupting him) [. . .]" (153). The next paragraph winks at the systematicity of the sexual metaphor, as it describes how Walter "would exhaust all the stores of his eloquence (which indeed were very great) in a panegyric upon the BATTERING-RAMS of the ancients" and the whole catalogue of the elements of the fortification and attack, in a mock-encomium of the "destructive machinery of corporal Trim" (153).

Sterne's discussion of the "dirty" and "clean" senses of words in volume 3, chapter 31 (158-59) is definitive. He parodies philosophical definition by ironically insisting on the restriction of his words to univocal meanings:

> ... 'tis owing to the negligence and perverseness of writers, in despising this precaution, and to nothing else,---That all the polemical writings in divinity, are not as clear and demonstrable as those upon *a Will o' the Wisp*, or any other sound part of philosophy, and natural pursuit; in order to which, what have you to do, before you set out, [. . .] but to give the world a good definition, and stand to it, of the main word you have most occasion for [. . .]. In books of strict morality and close reasoning, such as this I am engaged in,---the neglect is inexcusable; and heaven is witness, how the word has revenged itself upon me for leaving so many openings to equivocal strictures,---and for depending so much as I have done, all along, upon the cleanliness of my reader's imaginations. (158)

He produces a metafictional parable of the reader's dilemma:

> ---Here are two senses, cried *Eugenius*, as we walk'd along, pointing with the fore finger of his right hand to the word *Crevice*, in the fifty-second page of the second volume of this book of books,---here are two senses,---quoth he.---And here are two roads, replied I, turning short upon him,---a dirty and a clean one,---which shall we take?---The clean,---by all means, replied *Eugenius*. *Eugenius*, said I, stepping before him, and laying my hand upon his breast,---to define---is to distrust.---Thus I triumph'd over *Eugenius*; but I triumph'd over him as I always do, like a fool. (158-59)

(A footnote tells us that the page in question is that discussing the right end of a woman.) Only then does he go on to his definition of nose as nothing more or less than nose. But he so vehemently intreats and beseeches his male and female readers to "guard against the temptations and suggestions of the devil, and suffer him by no art or wile to put any

other ideas into their minds, than what I put into my definition" (159) that he ironically produces the opposite effect. The mock-exhortation creates a mock-definition.

At this point the connection of high and low meanings has been so regularly and overtly thematized, with such rich examples, that Sterne can prompt a pun very easily, and even go on to deny it, while still keeping the benefit of the connection. (Jean de Meun's part of the *Romance of the Rose* achieves a like effect.)

The ongoing confusions about the references of words stems from the different mental obsessions of the different characters--Toby with military matters, Walter with sex and philosophy, and the rest with the birth of Tristram. These collide in the analogy of nose with phallus, and of a nose's bridge with a fortress's bridge (156). We recall Freud's remarks about the systematic transposition of genital to facial features, and Bakhtin's observation of a like transposition well-known in medieval folk culture. Walter represents the conscious manipulation of "dirty" meaning, while Toby presents a conscious attachment to "clean" meaning that gets unconsciously manipulated by its opposite.

In Voltaire's *Candide*, the occasional use of euphemism becomes a kind of mock-philosophy, the ironic loftiness of which is comparable to mock-epic. Mademoiselle Cunegonde observes Doctor Pangloss in the bushes,

> giving a lesson in experimental physics to her mother's waiting-maid, a very pretty and docile brunette. Mademoiselle Cunegonde had a great inclination for science and watched breathlessly the reiterated experiments she witnessed; she observed clearly the Doctor's sufficient reason, the effects and the causes, and returned home very much excited, pensive, filled with the desire of learning, reflecting that she might be the sufficient reason of young Candide and that he might be hers. (5)

While metaphors and puns may, as in the discourses of Juvenal and Montaigne, remain linguistic, they may also become something more. Sterne's play with the reader's imagination goes beyond the satirist's viewpoint to represent a degrading habit in the minds of his characters and readers. But it too could be considered a "displacement" of the more direct connections possible between high and low, and the metaphor of spatial distance in the concept of displacement is explicit in Sterne's remark in a letter that "I deny I have gone as farr as Swift--He keeps a due distance from Rabelais--& I keep a due distance from him" ("To a Friend" 461). Rabelais sets out "folk etymologies " for the names of Beauce, Paris, Gargantua, and Pantagruel. These are fables that motivate complex puns: a short narrative explains where the parts of the name came from and how they get put together. Hence Beauce is named after Gargantua's boast, "I find this fine" (*je trouve beau ce*), after his mare sweeps down with her tail a whole forest that is swarming with ox-flies and hornets that attack the other animals (Book 1, chapter 16, 73-74). Paris is so named because he drowns in urine hundreds of thousands of gawkers who came out to pester him when he visits their city: "'I think these clodhoppers want me to pay for my kind reception and offer them a *solatium*. They are quite justified, and I am

going to give them some wine, to buy my welcome. But only in sport, *par ris*'" (Book 1, chapter 17, 74). Gargantua is named according to the practice of the ancient Hebrews, from the first words the father says of him. As he bawls for Drink! Drink! Drink! as soon as he is born, Grandgousier says, "'Que grand tu as.' - What a big one you've got! - (the gullet being understood)" (Book 1, chapter 7, 53). His son in turn is named Pantagruel, "all-thirsty", "by this meaning to infer that at the hour of the child's nativity the world was all thirsty, and also seeing, in a spirit of prophecy, that one day his son would be ruler over the thirsty" (Book 2, chapter 2, 176). The "baptism" of Paris is the most degrading, because Gargantua deluges with urine the capital city of France from a perch on the towers of Notre Dame. The other etymologies-by-paronomasia are also linked with fantastic inversions of order: salty omens attend the birth of Pantagruel (whose name means "all-thirsty"), as in the midst of a terrible heat and drought "great drops of water were plainly seen to break out of the earth, as when someone bursts into a copious sweat. [. . .] [L]earned people said that it was rain from the Antipodes" (176). But as the dew was salty brine, it appeared that instead the great heat was causing the earth to sweat out the whole sea.

Some of these examples are close to what seems to be a favourite device of Menippists, the transformation of pun into scene. For example, Blanchard relates a key scene of rhyming-pun-turned-allegory in Nashe's *Lenten Stuff*:

> A comic procession ensues in which the fish, prepared by the pope's kitchen, is led in by the college of cardinals, who sing a dirge of *De profundis natus est fex*" ([3:208f.]: "from out of the depths excrement is born"). The verbal slip--the substitution of *fex* for *rex*--is occasioned by the stench of the fish, but the collocation of the two words is the kind of comic inversion of the high and the low that we expect from the Menippean form, profundities placed in juxtaposition to the "fundament." The stench of herring turns the papal palace into a hell's mouth--in medieval iconography hell is often associated with the anus--as the purported practitioners of white magic turn into devilish necromancers subjecting the stinking fish to a magical inquisitional process. (129-30)

Similar puns in de Meun's part of the *Romance of the Rose* culminate in the allegorical scene at end where a fictional assault on the Castle of Love, and the plucking of a rose from a garden, denotes both sexual and religious allegories. This technique illustrates the expansion of scope of a figure of thought over the boundary of one literary category and into another: the satire moves from the space of the satirist-speaker's thought and language to the space of a fictional scene. An element of this kind feels centrally Menippean because its "free play of the intellectual fancy" creates a locus of interaction between the features of obscene word-play and invective, and grotesquely absurd fictional fantasy. It conveys a sense of magical, quasi-physical powers in words.

Maureen Quilligan, a major theorist of allegory, claims that allegory generates narrative out of wordplay by extending the structure of personification (33-42). I have argued that literary allegory arises through blending, when a metaphoric mapping is made

the basis of the imagining of a fictional scene. Quilligan finds the allegorical quality of Nabokov's *Pale Fire* in the parody of allegorical commentary, which she compares with the self-exposing mad commentary of Swift's *Tale of a Tub*. Wordplay there is in plenty, but not of the kind that turns itself into a scene based on a metaphor. The degradation of a mock-epic kind, with its heroic couplets, is close to Pope and Swift, as critics have noted. The main "reduction" of high to low here is the idiot Charles Kinbote's dogged self-referential allegorizing of John Shade's very personal poem, which takes it as an account of the events of Kinbote's own life. Kinbote's story reads like a lurid romantic thriller (of the Anne Radcliffe type), very different from the dull realities of Shade's retiring, suburban, professorial existence. That life, however, is reassembled, thought through, and cast into a symbolic lament for his dead daughter and inquiry into the idea of an afterlife. Its meaningfulness is nothing like Kinbote's paranoid roman-a-clef, where the clef is himself. There is nothing of the Chain of Being here; Shade's secular, ordinary life is a ridiculous decline from the viewpoint of Kinbote's aristocratic adventure, and the imposition of that adventure on Shade's poem makes a mockery of it (Quilligan 145-55).

Quilligan also discusses Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* and how it turns word-play into world-play (Eleanor Cook's phrase), or puns into personifications, then scenes and stories. In a number of cases, "Pynchon appears to have set up a whole story so he can make a pun" (Quilligan 210), working up an absurdly unlikely scene to match a complex phrase. Thus, for example, two characters are talking about making money in the black market near the end of World War Two. One character has young kids carrying furs to a truck. The other suggests using them as extras in a big Cecil B. de Mille picture, maybe as galley slaves. The first replies that the director wouldn't do this: "For de Mille, young fur-henchmen can't be rowing" (559). The unstated pun: "Forty million Frenchmen can't be wrong." The difficulty in imagining any point to the joke gives it an excessive, over-the-top silliness, like that embraced by the Surrealists. Pynchon turns the near-homonyms "Hübsch Rauber" ("cute robber") and "Hubschrauber" ("helicopter") into another story, about an attractive burglar, a victim who screams but cannot pronounce umlauts, and an engineering student in the distance who hears "Liftscrewer" and, envisioning the metaphor, "a helix through cork air over wine of Earth", is apparently inspired to invent the helicopter (683-84). Literalization (or allegorization) of analogy, without punning, occurs in episode of the Toiletship, created on the basis of an absurd inference from a proportional metaphor or XYZ figure. The *Rücksichtslos* is "a triumph of the German mania for subdividing. 'If the house is organic,' argued the crafty early Toiletship advocates, 'family lives in the house, family's organic, house is outward-and-visible sign, you see,' [. . .] and if the bathroom's part of the house [. . .]. 'Then the Toiletship is to the Kriegsmarine as the bathroom is to the house. Because the Navy is organic, we all know *that*, ha-hah!'" (448). Not only is the analogy degrading to the ship that gets mapped as the bathroom of the house, this absurd result also degrades the whole practice of this kind of crude analogizing and the "mania for subdividing" that produces it.

Quilligan goes on to discuss the pervasive metaphor of the world as text--a medieval commonplace--and of the struggle for various kinds of interpretation (211-23). These puns and metaphors typically link high and low via the "material bodily lower stratum". The point of such patterns, for the Pynchon of *Lot 49*, is to make accidental

correspondences seem intentional and meaningful, and enable us to find others. Punning metaphor is

> a delirium tremens, a trembling unfurrowing of the mind's plowshare. The saint whose water can light lamps, the clairvoyant whose lapse in recall is the breath of God, the true paranoid for whom all is organized in spheres joyful or threatening about the central pulse of himself, the dreamer whose puns probe ancient fetid shafts and tunnels of truth all act in the same special relevance to the word, or whatever it is the word is there, buffering, to protect us from. The act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, depending where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost. [. . .] She knew that the sailor had seen worlds no other man had seen if only because there was that high magic to low puns [. . .]. (128-29).

Similarly, in *Gravity's Rainbow*, punning symbols arranged as part of a character's degrading sexual ritual "are not malignant puns against an intended sufferer so much as a sympathetic magic, a repetition high and low of some prevailing form" (Pynchon 232, qtd. in Quilligan 210). The pun that connects high and low does not mock this character by trivialization, but suggests a meaningful high-low connection in the nature of things (puns symbolize that connection rather than actually manifest it). Hence degradation may become transcendence by leading to the high through the low. Brigadier Pudding's dominatrix recalls to him the muddy trench warfare of World War I, as she plays the role of a personification of death. His masochism and coprophagy enacts a wish for the war's pure but obscene sadomasochistic "truth" of pain, humiliation, and death.

The technique is recognized and interpreted in Freudian terms, evoking Freud's own ideas about the rootedness of abstract thought in bodily form and energies. A psychoanalyst at the White Visitation insists that his colleagues' "feelings about blackness were tied to feelings about shit, and feelings about shit to feelings about putrefaction and death". He wonders why they won't "admit that their repressions *had*, in a sense that Europe in the last weary stages of its perversion of magic has lost, *had* incarnated real and living men" (276-77). So Pynchon seems to have taken the idea of the return of repressed ideas in symbolic disguise--including the "transposition of high and low" ("material bodily lower stratum" to psyche and religion) and word-play projected as scenes--from Freud, and more particularly from the neo-Freudian Norman O. Brown (see Wolfley). Brown recasts Freudian psychology to undertake a large-scale cultural analysis, and one of his key examples is Jonathan Swift.

Swift represents the apex of this kind of etymological and metaphorical punning. *A Tale of A Tub* (1704) and the *Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit* (1710) allegorize a logical extreme of the view of human behaviour suggested discursively by Montaigne and Burton, using the kind of etymological wordplay that Sterne keeps in the minds of his characters, to create an allegorical scene realizing a set of systematic correspondences between high spiritual matters and low bodily matters. Both of these works are based on an excessively literal interpretation of the association of "spirit" with breath and wind.

The *Discourse* is an analysis of the universal "fanatic strain or tincture of enthusiasm" in "all nations and ages of the world", their arts and sciences, such as "the philosopher's stone, the grand elixir, the planetary worlds, the squaring of the circle, the *summum bonum*, Utopian commonwealths," etc. (in Lewin, ed., 202). Swift defines enthusiasm as "a lifting up of the soul, or its faculties, above matter". He is concerned with its religious application, with "ways of ejaculating the soul, or transporting it beyond the sphere of matter". He notes a neglect by authors, which he wishes to remedy, of the "method of [. . .] launching out of the soul, as it is purely an effect of artifice and mechanic operation, [. . . .] as it is at present performed by our British workmen" (203) (i.e. enthusiasts). The fundamental principle for these practitioners is, "that the corruption of the senses is the generation of the spirit; because the senses in men are so many avenues to the fort of reason, which in this operation is wholly blocked up. All endeavours must be therefore used, either to divert, bind up, stupefy, fluster, and amuse the senses, or else to justle them out of their stations" (205).

He considers "by what kind of practices the voice is best governed toward the composition and improvement of the spirit; [. . . .] For it is to be understood that, in the language of the spirit, cant and droning supply the place of sense and reason in the language of men" (212). Instead of worrying about grammatical sequences of words, "spiritual harangues" (213) rely on nonsensical syllables and even "sounds inarticulate": "A master workman shall blow his nose so powerfully as to pierce the hearts of his people, who were disposed to receive the excrements of his brain with the same reverence as the issue of it. Hawking, spitting, belching, and snuffling, the defects of other men's rhetoric, are the flowers, and figures, and ornaments of his" (213).

Swift is able to parodically preach these absurd ideas by first taking the etymological idea of spirit as "wind" or "breath" literally. This once done, he can imagine it as a physical or "mechanical" force able to move through the body, up and down, inward and outward, expanding and contracting, reacting to pressures of various kinds.

He concludes with a kind of pre-emptive parody of the Freudian concept of sublimation. His pretense of discovering the origin of religious visions in the body satirizes only the false kinds of enthusiasm and fanaticism that serve the body:

> Now, from this brief survey of some principal sects among the fanatics in all ages [. . .] . and, from reflecting upon that fundamental point in their doctrines about women wherein they have so unanimously agreed, I am apt to imagine that the seed or principle which has ever put men upon visions in things invisible is of a corporeal nature; for the profounder chemists inform us that the strongest spirits may be extracted from human flesh. Besides, the spinal marrow, must needs create a very free communication between the superior faculties and those below; and thus the thorn in the flesh serves for a spur to the spirit. (220)

Thus he compares "modern courtship" to the ogling and canting of the saints; religious climax to orgasm; and notes the attraction of females to enthusiastic preachers. Swift's great conclusion could be a motto for the imagery and the narrative of the genre of Menippean satire:

> thus much is certain, that, however spiritual intrigues begin, they generally conclude like all others: they may branch upward toward heaven, but the root is in the earth. [. . .] Lovers for the sake of celestial converse are but another sort of Platonics, who pretend to see stars and heaven in ladies' eyes, and to look or think no lower; but the same pit is provided for both; and they seem a perfect moral to the story of that philosopher, who, while his thoughts and eyes were fixed upon the constellations, found himself seduced by his lower parts into a ditch. (221)

Perhaps the essentially satirical thing about satirical inversions is that while the higher parts boast their own power they are shown, in whatever specific way, to be controlled by, subject to, the lower parts, and lower facts of the world. In Swift these metaphors-turned-etymologies-turned-allegories serve generally to satirize the habit of valuing the material over the spiritual. (The literary strategy of turning accidental qualities of mere words into allegories is itself a kind of inflation of the trivial.) In the mental realm this means too-literal interpretation of scripture and theology: the kind of superstition and idolatry that understands religious ideas according to the letter rather than the spirit. Of all the Menippeans, he is most constantly concerned with the analogical relation between bodily and spiritual concepts, and the antagonism that comes to exist between high and low when the connection between them is mistaken--either underestimated or exaggerated.[80] In the previous class of examples, influenced by Freud, the causal relation of repression and sublimation of libidinal energies is posited to explain the analogical connections between higher and lower aspects of human life, which underlie the obscene puns. In Swift the semantic analogy is *parodically literalized* into elements of scenes.[81]

SCENES AND IMAGERY, FANTASTIC AND REALISTIC:

We turn now to examples of high and low brought together in the literal fiction. Scenes are typically composed of the elements of settings, actors, and objects, and these are typically linked together in the causal structures of events and actions. Scenes may have any proportion of reality and fantasy in them, but whatever the mixture is, it tends to stay consistent through the narrative. Thus there are many ways to achieve satirical degradation in scenes. An action of physical descent may bring a higher location into contact with a lower location. Beings, attributes, and behaviors from higher and lower levels of the Great Chain may be brought together in a realistic or a fantastic way.

Frye analyzes "imagery" as a kind of "significant association" found in more naturalistic literature. He presents his view by contrasting such literature with the more complete kinds of conceptual connection found in the identifications of metaphor and myth:

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[80] Other examples of this technique are the equation of *spiritus, animus, afflatus* etc. with belching and flatulence in the *Tale*, Section VIII (321-26); and Pope's definition of poetry in *Peri Bathous* as a "natural or morbid secretion of the mind" (310-11).

[81] For further discussion of puns, which often refer to their linking of high with low, see Walter Redfern, *Puns*, and Jonathan Culler, ed. *On Puns*.

> Myth, then, is one extreme of literary design; naturalism is the other, and in between lies the whole area of romance, using that term to mean [. . .] the tendency [. . .] to displace myth in a human direction and yet, in contrast to "realism," to conventionalize content in an idealized direction. The central principle of displacement is that what can be metaphorically identified in a myth can only be linked in romance by some form of simile: analogy, significant association, incidental accompanying imagery, and the like. In a myth we can have a sun-god or a tree-god; in a romance we may have a person who is significantly associated with the sun or trees. (*Anatomy* 136-37)

Such associating imagery can exist in a single line of poetry, or in a whole narrative world. We can re-cast Frye's analysis of "displacement" as follows: in the typical use of such imagery in realistic fiction, the *way concepts are connected* is metonymic: they are juxtaposed, placed contiguously in language, or in the world of the story. But the *nature of the connection* is (still) metaphoric: the structure of one is projected onto the other. And since realistic fiction typically involves the imagining of action broken down into scenes, it is in scenes that such conceptual connections are established.

Fantasy scenes may be constructed as "realization of metaphor." This is the expression used by classical scholar Cedric Whitman to describe the nature of Aristophanes' satirical fantasies. This technique is close to that of Swift, but it does not depend on any explicit linguistic connection between mind and body or high and low. So in *The Clouds*, the lofty Socrates is found floating aloft in a balloon in his academy, while his students are found in postures expressing another aspect of the scholarly life: they are bent down with their eyes locked on the ground before them, and as they closely scrutinize a few inches of floor, they are unable to see where they are going and what is happening around them.

The Socrates scene relies on a high-low parallel that is less explicit than those used by Swift. Neither Aristophanes nor his characters talk about the existence of such a parallel in the etymologies of words. Still, in order to get the point of making this realization of metaphor in the literal fiction, we must also get the point of the metaphorical understanding on which it is based. We have to get the *idea* that philosophical contemplation is supposed to be thinking about "higher things", and meant to lead to transcendence of bodily desires and forces, even if we don't believe this is true. We have to get the *idea* that students "inspect closely" the "grounds" of their existence, in order to gain understanding, even if we think this is a waste of time.

Another excellent example of the comic technique of "realization of metaphor" is in the clouds of the title. The clouds are the Muses or Gods of discourse, logical force, persuasion (27)--rhetoric, in short (though this term is not used in this translation). They protect sophists and other quacks (28). The qualities of clouds as physical entities have negative metaphorical implications about rhetoric. It is no compliment to say that speech and thought are "cloudy", "hazy", "foggy", "insubstantial", "empty", "windy", "hot air". (The concept of smoke has similar uses, but it carries a stronger connotation of deliberate

deception--as in the expressions "blowing smoke" and "smoke and mirrors".) We have seen that other writers use this image of cloud or vapour for vanity and affectation. There's a basis in the Bible for "cloud" as false appearance of value: in Ecclesiastes, the concept of vanity or *vanitas*, as in "vanity of vanities, all is vanity" (*vanitas vanitatum*), is based on the Hebrew word "hebel", meaning fog or vapour (see Frye, *Great Code* 121-25). We have noted Swift's technique, in *A Tale of A Tub* and *The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit*, of taking literally the metaphor of spirit as wind, breath, etc., to make fun of certain silly enthusiasts who seem to accept the same.

The clouds also specifically challenge the existence of Zeus, since traditionally it is he who is the "Thunderer", the great sky-god, who creates storms and uses lightning-bolts as weapons (30). Aristophanes has his Socrates explain to the thick-headed Strepsiades how all these things actually come from the natural phenomena of clouds. He achieves some great comedy by using the analogy of the physical structure of the human body to explain the physical phenomena of clouds and storms: thunder is like stomach rumbling and flatulence, rain is like urination, etc. Again, this is a severe "reduction" of rhetoric *and* Greek mythology by an explicit high-low parallel. Other qualities of clouds also thematize parody and satire: in parodic fashion, they change shapes to mimic what they see, and thus mock it (29).

Puns are based on two or more meanings that are connected to the same word, or same-sounding words. Because metaphors can be a source for the multiple meanings that puns rely on--puns can put into play the "source" and "target" meanings of concepts--"realization of metaphor" can also be a "literalization of pun". There is no sharp line between these techniques. For example, there is a realization of metaphor in Lucian's *A True Story* (part II), where the protagonist meets the philosophers in the Elysian Fields. The Academicians do not make it there because they are "constitutionally unable arrive at anything" (vol. 1, 321). That's a pun, because there's a double meaning in the word "arrive." Double-meanings need not be metaphorical: puns often use two different words with the same sound. But this double-meaning is also a metaphor, because the abstract meaning of "arrive", according to which philosophers can arrive at conclusions, is based on the concrete meaning of "arrive." The literalization of the pun is based on the metaphor--but it reverses the usual direction of metaphorical projection, so to speak, so "arrive" is given back its concrete meaning.

But if the rhetorical structures of such techniques blur together, there is generally a clearer line between various ways of using them. This particular distinction depends on the reader's inference about the ontology of the fictional world.

We regularly distinguish between the thing being described and the way it is described. In this discussion of scenes, I am turning to focus on literary elements that are taken to be things described, parts of the "world" implied by the fiction. Of course it is difficult to make this distinction clearly, because one is inclined to talk about the "actual world" of the work, as opposed to how it is imagined, when in fact there is no actual world of the work apart from how it is imagined. There is, however, still a very common (and reasonable) default assumption, deeply ingrained in our habits of interpretation, that even in the world of the fictional work, there is an "actual world" considered to be

distinct from any given way of seeing or describing it, by either characters or author--even while it is recognized that this distinct "actual" world is an imagined and fictional one. There is a distinction between, on the one hand, author or character describing a human character *as* a "dog", and author or character describing a canine in the fictional world. It is this distinction I am now emphasizing. I also wish to highlight what falls between these aspects of fiction--that is, that aspect of literary design that Frye speaks of as "imagery" by "significant association", where a character in the fictional world can be associated with dogs in various ways--by having dog-like features, or owning many dogs, or constantly linked in the story's action with dogs--even though he is not a dog but a clearly human character.

Once we have moved from a context of expressive speech, wherein the source domains of the analogies, metaphors, etc. have limited referential content, to a context of fictional description, of imagined scene and action, the terms of our analysis change. The form of the rhetorical patterns used in each may be the same or very similar, but the process and content of imagining are different. This is a watershed, although it can be straddled in various ways, such as by the realization of metaphor and the literalization of pun. But such techniques are usually highly noticeable, even paradoxical; they tend to call attention to the fictionality of the work, and so are part of the repertoire of "metafiction."

In a sense, any scene that connects high to low is "realization of metaphor", because there must be some way in which the contents of the scene embody the very general concepts of "high" and "low", with (some of) their metaphorical connotations. But a scene can connect low to high regardless of whether or not it constitutes realization of any more specific metaphor. For example, in one of Lucian's descents to the land of the dead he finds members of the "upper crust" of social hierarchies "reduced" to occupations associated with the bottom rungs of the social world:

> But I fancy you'd be even more amused if you could see how poor the ex-kings and ex-governors are. They're reduced to selling kippers or teaching the alphabet, and people are always being rude to them and knocking them about--in fact they're no better off than slaves. What was almost too much for me was the spectacle of Philip of Macedon sitting in a corner, trying to make some money by mending rotten shoes--though admittedly there were plenty of other people like Xerxes, Darius, and Polycrates to be seen begging on the streets. (*Menippus Goes To Hell*, in *Satirical Sketches* 107-08)

Here the high/ low metaphor is realized only indirectly, by the mediation of the unstated metaphorical idea of the social SCALE. Apart from the use of the word "reduced" (which is so familiar that its metaphoricity is near-invisible), the evocation of this general metaphor is achieved by metonymic means. Lucian's point relies on our knowledge of the conventional associations of these occupations, where kings and governors are "high" and slaves, beggars, kipper-mongers, elementary teachers, etc. are "low." But Lucian does not realize metaphor as Aristophanes or Swift do, because the scene is realistic in itself (apart

from its context as a descent to Hell), and is not a fantasy based on a specific metaphorical mapping. Philip of Macedon's new employment as a mender has extra "low" associations in that he's mending shoes, which are the lowest part of human dress, and they're in a state of rottenness, which is, metaphorically speaking, the lowest ebb of a shoe's life-cycle. But there is nothing fantastic about these details that derives directly from the generic high/ low metaphor, or from any specific conventional metaphor with negative low associations. Although there are "foot" and "shoe" metaphors in English ("foot of the mountain", "if the shoe fits, wear it"), they are not based on a "degrading" metaphor. And while "rotting" has degrading connotations, it has no direct connection with a vertical scalar image-schema. If Philip had been distorted to make him lower in some physical way, then we would have both fantasy and degrading metaphor. For example, he could have been turned into a *worm* or a *doormat*, both of which have specific metaphorical associations (in English) that derive in part from the generic high/ low metaphor.

It is worth noting a few more scenes that connect high to low. I mentioned earlier that the most common kinds of degrading imagery include animal imagery, that reduces human thought and behaviour by connecting it to instinctive impulse and response, and bodily imagery, that degrades abstract and idealistic mental activity by connecting it with mechanical and mortal bodily processes. I will now briefly survey a number of Menippean satires to give an idea of the frequency with which these kinds of imagery are used, and an idea of their typical forms.

ANIMALS:

The animals most commonly used for these purposes seem to be those conventionally associated with the lower end of the mammalian scale--monkeys, asses, dogs, and pigs. These are related to humans more closely than other animals, by dint of being warm-blooded, and having some physical similarity (monkeys) or commonplace association through domestication, work and companionship (asses, pigs, and dogs). They are different in that they are all conventionally associated with stupidity and other qualities that are negative in humans (apes are imitative, asses are stubborn, dogs are vicious or fawning or lazy, pigs are dirty). They have neither the nobility of wild animals that can be predators of humans (such as lions), nor the nobility of domestic animals that are conventionally more useful, graceful and quiet than they (unlike horses and cows and cats, monkeys chatter, asses bray, dogs bark, and pigs snort and squeal).

In Lucian's land of the dead, the rich are reincarnated as donkies (*Menippus in Hell*, 109). Micyllus the cobbler speaks with Pythagoras reincarnated as a cock (*The Dream, Or The Cock*, v. 2, 171-239). The cock has also been a courtesan, another philosopher, and many other things: "Then a king, then a poor man, and soon a satrap; then a horse, a jackdaw, a frog, and a thousand things besides" (213). The randomness expresses Lucian's sense of the capriciousness of Fortune. The cock makes Micyllus magically invisible so he can see the "lives of the rich and famous" up close, and Micyllus is enabled to see the analogy between the idea of reincarnation of higher being

in lower forms with the present state of those higher beings, who are degraded by their servitude to earthly worries:

> COCK
>
> Do you see him awake with his worries like the other, computing his interests and wearing his fingers to the bone? And yet he will soon have to leave all this behind and become a beetle or a gnat or a dog-fly.
>
> MICYLLUS
>
> I see an unfortunate, senseless man who even now lives little better than a beetle or a gnat. (II, 237)

Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* relies more on philosophical argument and observation of social behaviour than on imagery, but animal imagery does come into it, in the form of proverbs and illustrative examples from mythology and life. Folly claims to be

> so like myself that even those who specially arrogate to themselves the part and name of wise men cannot conceal me, though they walk about "like apes in scarlet or asses in lion-skins." Let them carry it as cunningly as you could ask, the protruding ears will somewhere betray the Midas. [. . .] It has seemed well, you note, to imitate the rhetoricians of our time, who believe themselves absolutely to be gods if they can show themselves bilingual (like a horse-leech) [. . .]. Some who are a little more ambitious laugh and applaud, and, by example of the ass, shake their ears, so that in the eyes of the rest they will seem to comprehend: "Quite so, quite so." (10-11)

As Erasmus arrives at the praise of folly in the sense of Christian repudiation of proud wisdom, he himself analyzes the Bible's foolish-animal imagery:

> And even in the class of brute creatures, those which are farthest from a foxlike cunning were best pleasing to Christ. He preferred to ride upon a donkey, though had He chosen He could have mounted the back of a lion without danger. And the Holy Spirit descended in likeness of a dove, not of an eagle or a kite. Here and there in Holy Writ, furthermore, there is repeated mention of harts, fawns, and lambs. Add to this that Christ calls those who are destined to eternal life by the name "sheep"--and there is no other creature more foolish, as is witnessed by the proverbial phrase in Aristotle, "sheepish temperament," which he tells us was suggested by the stupidity of the animal and commonly used as a taunt against dull-witted and foolish men. And yet Christ avows himself as shepherd of this flock and even delights in the name of Lamb [. . .] (115-16)

In *Don Quixote*, there is a reduction of Quixote's own stature by his association with his worn-out hack Rocinante, and with Sancho Panza's beloved ass Dapple, as Quixote cannot remember from his romances any squire riding upon so ignoble a mount (96). In Book II, Chapters 25-28 (pages 703-732), there is a complex story of a village

that becomes associated with the ability to bray like asses (even their standard displays a braying ass [723]). Don Quixote tries to dissuade them from attacking a neighbouring village that has mocked them, but Sancho interrupts to try his hand at braying and gets them both clobbered. Here they also meet a con-man named Master Pedro who performs the puppet-show that Quixote lays waste. As well as performing puppet-shows, he pretends to have a fortune-telling ape, though the ape can only divine some of the past and the present. Cervantes makes explicit the implied metaphor of the ape: "as no one cross-examined him or pressed him to say how his ape did his divining, he made apes of them all and filled his leather pouches" (722). Later, when Sancho complains about not having his island yet, Quixote uses the metaphor of the fool-as-ass to rebuke his ignorance of the behaviour of squires in the histories of knight-errantry: "An ass you are, an ass you needs must be, and an ass you will end when the course of your life is run, for I really believe that it will reach its last turn before you realize and admit that you are a beast" (731).

In Chapter 16 of *Candide*, once Candide has arrived in Paraguay with Cacambo, been reunited with and then killed Cunegonde's brother because he violently objected to Candide's marrying his sister, then escaped the Jesuits' camp, he commits another idealistic error of judgment that very nearly lands him in literal hot water. Candide hears women's cries, then sees that they "came from two completely naked girls who were running gently along the edge of the plain, while two monkeys pursued them and bit their buttocks" (63). Candide's pity leads him to shoot the two monkeys, and he praises God for allowing him to deliver the girls from danger, hoping they may have the status to help them in this new country. He is soon disillusioned:

> He was going on, but his tongue clove to the roof of his mouth when he saw the two girls tenderly kissing the two monkeys, shedding tears on their bodies and filling the air with the most piteous cries. "I did not expect so much human kindliness," he said at last to Cacambo, who replied: "You have performed a wonderful masterpiece; you have killed the two lovers of these young ladies." "Their lovers! Can it be possible? You are jesting at me, Cacambo; how can I believe you?" (63).

Cacambo rebukes him for his stubborn naïvete, notes that the monkeys are quarter men as he is a quarter Spaniard, and blames their behaviour on the fact that "they have not received a proper education" (64). The next day, the pair wake to find themselves bound, having been denounced by the girls to the Oreillons, the inhabitants of the country, who are boiling a cauldron and preparing to eat Candide and Cacambo. The natives' degraded sexual relation with monkeys is part of the Voltairean satire on the idealization of the "state of nature" and reminiscent of Swift's Yahoos.

Animal imagery is used in the speech of characters, too. The Anabaptist Jacques who cures Pangloss's pox believes that "Men [. . .] must have corrupted nature a little, for they were not born wolves, and they have become wolves" (18). When Candide and Cacambo reach Surinam, they find a slave mutilated by his Dutch master for getting injured at, then trying to run away from, a sugar mill. He complains that "Dogs, monkeys

and parrots are a thousand times less miserable than we are" (82). When Candide asks the cynical Martin if he thinks that men have always been "liars, cheats, traitors, brigands, weak, flighty, cowardly, envious, gluttonous, drunken, grasping, and vicious, bloody, backbiting, debauched, fanatical, hypocritical and silly?", he asks in reply if Candide thinks "that sparrow-hawks have always eaten the pigeons they came across?" and "if sparrow-hawks have always possessed the same nature, why should you expect men to change theirs?" (95).

Sterne is clearly influenced by Cervantes in putting a hack under Parson Yorick. He breaches decorum by "never appearing better, or otherwise mounted, than upon a lean, sorry, jack-ass of a horse, value about one pound fifteen shillings; who, to shorten all description of him, was full brother to *Rosinante* [. . .]" (11). Sterne makes the explicit that the metonymic association of Yorick with this poor creature implies an analogy: "as he never carried one single ounce of flesh upon his own bones, being altogether as spare a figure as his beast,---he would sometimes insist upon it, that the horse was as good as the rider deserved;---that they were, centaur-like,---both of a piece." The parson also sees ironically the thematic meaning of his connection to this half-dead creature: "At different times he would give fifty humorous and opposite reasons for riding a meek-spirited jade of a broken-winded horse, preferably to one of mettle;---for on such a one he could sit mechanically, and meditate as delightfully *de vanitate mundi et fuga saeculi*, as with the advantage of a death's head before him;---[. . .]" (13)

Thomas Peacock's *Melincourt* features Sir Oran Haut-ton, "an amiable orang-outang, whom a young philosopher of wealth and position has taught to do everything but speak, and for whom he has bought a baronetcy and a rotten borough" (Ward, Trent, et al., vol. XI, chapter XIII, § 22).

Melville of course uses sea-creatures to reflect on human behaviour. In a passage describing a pack of sharks' blind devouring of each other in their rush to strip a harpooned whale, he uses the "upside down" figure to see an analogy with human battle:

> amid all the smoking horror and diabolism of a sea-fight, sharks will be seen longingly gazing up to the ship's decks, like hungry dogs round a table where red meat is being carved, ready to bolt down every killed man that is tossed to them; and [. . .] while the valiant butchers over the deck-table are thus cannibally carving each other's live meat with carving-knives all gilded and tasselled, the sharks, also, with their jewel-hilted mouths, are quarrelsomely carving away under the table at the dead meat; and [. . .] were you to turn the whole affair upside down, it would still be pretty much the same thing, that is to say, a shocking sharkish business enough for all parties [. . .]. (384-85)

Indeed, he identifies human with animal readily enough to see hunting and meat-eating as murder and cannibalism. He considers the irony of eating a newly killed whale by light from its own oil, and goes on,

> But no doubt the first man that ever murdered an ox was regarded as a murderer; perhaps he was hung; and if he had been put on trial by oxen, he certainly would

> have been; and he certainly deserved it if any murderer does. Go to the meat market of a Saturday night and see the crowds of live bipeds staring up at the long rows of dead quadrupeds. Does not that sight take a tooth out of the cannibal's jaw? Cannibals? who is not a cannibal? (393)

So sharkish behaviour expresses the ferocity of humans in their cannibalistic preying upon one another. Sharks even go so far as to make the "self-devouring" implication of cannibalism literal: "They viciously snapped, not only at each other's disembowelments, but like flexible bows, bent round, and bit their own; till those entrails seemed swallowed over and over again by the same mouth, to be oppositely voided by the gaping wound" (395).

In a very different vein, Lewis Carroll's Alice moves through a world of personified animals, plants and objects, but the animals tend to be small, relatively harmless ones like kittens and puppies and (Cheshire) cats, (White) rabbits and (March) hares, mice, rats, guinea pigs, birds, fish, frogs, lizards, insects--"cute" animals, in short. There are no prominent pigs or apes or dogs, and no serious degradations. The humanized animals manifest an upside-down world, but their absurdity is silly rather than nightmarish or wicked. Only the fanatical exigency of rule-makers and enforcers is occasionally dangerous and frightening, and these parties tend to be human-like (blended with the highly regulated games of cards and chess): the Kings and Queens and their retinues. So we find that social figures and institutions are gently made fun of. Carroll's list of the twelve jury members at Alice's trial includes "a frog, dormouse, rat, ferret, hedgehog, lizard, bantam cock, mole, duck, squirrel, storkling, mousling" (153 n1). A trial conducted by these is certainly a mockery, but Alice survives it rather easily. The battle of the Lion and the Unicorn, at least as John Tenniel illustrates it, seems to be an allegory of the political battle between Gladstone and Disraeli (respectively) (288 n10). And when the White Queen turns into a sheep in a shop (252), we may see some joking about a sheepish "nation of shop-keepers." There are also a few larger and stranger animals--the mock-turtle, the gryphon, the Jabberwocky. But these are also largely domesticated by a context of pleasant nonsense.

Flaubert offers good examples of "imagery", because his books are prototypes of the richly descriptive "realistic" novel. For example, when Bouvard and Pécuchet find a dead dog and are inspired to think on death (218), the "lowliness" of the inspiring object inspires little faith in the depth of their philosophizing. There are many other instances of low interests undermining philosophical pretensions. They experiment by torturing a dog (76), and attempt to create monsters through abnormal mating (86-87). In a flirtation with occultism, Pécuchet gets blasted with cow farts and excrement, then heals himself with "magnetism" (191).

In Joyce's *Ulysses*, animal imagery appropriately pervades the "Circe" episode where Stephen and Bloom visit the brothel. The visit is a real event perceived and described in hallucinatory terms. Bloom experiences fantasies of outrageous elevation (he becomes a Messiah) and degradation (he becomes a pig and a prostitute); and in the background Stephen's drunkenness, egotism, and violence undermine his intellectually elevated talk. Animal imagery is used in many ways here. It is used as metaphor in the

discourse of narrator and characters. In the first few pages, there is an obscene song about giving girls "the leg of the duck" (351), and we observe the "snaggletusks of an elderly bawd" (352), slow-creeping "Snakes of river fog" (354), and a "dragon sandstrewer" (355). Animal imagery is also part of the actual details of the scene, in food and clothing, for example. Bloom buys from the porkbutcher's "a lukewarm pig's crubeen" and "a cold sheep's trotter" (354). Women's clothing is often described in terms of the animal sources of its material and design--thus Mrs. Bellingham "*in cap and seal coney mantle,* [. . .] *scans through tortoiseshell quizzing-glasses which she takes from inside her huge opossum muff*" (380). Bloom is followed by a "sniffing" and "whining" terrier (360, 366-67). The Citizen's dog Garryowen wiggles obscenely at him (370). There is a kind of trial of Bloom by women for his obscene actions, or desires (if this is just a dream) (374ff.). He is described as "hangdog" (374, 382). A witness calls him a "funny ass", "beastly" (374), a "beast" (375). At first he sees himself as a "black sheep" but wants to "return to nature as a purely domestic animal" (376). He is "pigeonbreasted", and "opens his tiny mole's eyes" (378). Later, honourable women scandalized into rage fling insults and threats at him: "mongrel", "Pigdog and always was ever since he was pupped!"; "I'll dig my spurs in him up to the rowel" (382). We discover Bloom's desire for humiliation and horsewhipping, and he's called a "pigeonlivered cur" (380-81). He tries to excuse himself by speaking of a "Girl in the monkeyhouse. Zoo. Lewd chimpanzee" (385). A beagle becomes dead Paddy Dignam, and corroborates Bloom's story that he was at his funeral. Still a dog, Paddy "*worms down through a coalhole, his brown habit trailing its tether over rattling pebbles. After him toddles an obese grandfather rat on fungus turtle paws under a grey carapace* " (387). (This blend of low animals expands the symbolic relation between death, cynics, and dogs.) Bloom is then analyzed as "bisexually abnormal" and monstrous (it is recommended that certain of his "parts" be "preserved in spirits of wine in the national teratological museum" (402)). With further accusations, Bloom "*with asses' ears seats himself in the pillory*" and "*orphans caper round him singing*" "You hig, you hog, you dirty dog!/ You think the ladies love you!" Then "*Many bonafide travellers and ownerless dogs come near him and defile him*" (405).

There are other relevant animalisms, but the extremity of degradation occurs with the arrival of Bella Cohen the whoremistress, a masculine animalistic female who turns Bloom into a female animal. Bloom laces Bella's boot, her foot seen as "*a plump buskined hoof and a full pastern, silksocked*" (431). The hoof threatens him, and Bello calls him "Hound of dishonour!" (432). He is turned to female and pig at once, at the order of Bello, who has become male: "*With a piercing epileptic cry she sinks on all fours, grunting, snuffling, rooting at his feet*" (433). Bello threatens to have Bloom "slaughtered and skewered in my stables and enjoy a slice of you with crisp crackling from the baking tin basted and baked like sucking pig with rice and lemon or currant sauce. It will hurt you" (434). As Bello compels the confession of Bloom's worst "SINS OF THE PAST", he is called a "gross boar", told to "Go the whole hog" (438), auctioned like a farm animal (440), and finally so mocked and degraded for sexual crime and failure, that he is condemned to a humiliating death (441-44). But Bloom rises again and the Circean dream/ nightmare goes on for another fifty pages.

In Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow*, pigs, apes, and dogs all have significant symbolic roles. Pigs are probably most prominent, and are strongly associated with the healthy animal side of Tyrone Slothrop. One of his lovers enthuses, "Slothrop, you *pig*"; to which he replies cheerfully "Oink, oink, oink" (206). Wandering the Zone of ruined Europe, reflecting on his personal and national past, Slothrop remembers his ancestor William from 1634, who started a pig-driving operation, mostly for the trip itself:

> He enjoyed the road, the mobility, the chance encounters of the day--Indians, trappers, wenches, hill people--and most of all just being with those pigs. They were good company. Despite the folklore and the injunctions in the Bible, William came to love their nobility and personal freedom, their gift for finding comfort in the mud on a hot day--pigs out on the road, in company together, were everything Boston wasn't. (555)

The experience of bonding with these pigs doomed to slaughter leads William to publish a heretical tract favouring the preterite over the elect, and the traitor Judas Iscariot over the perfect Jesus. Tyrone speculates that this heresy might have been the path America should have taken, that might have led to a more merciful, less judgmental and divisive society. Later, in a small town in Germany, Slothrop is cajoled by children into donning a pig suit to play a part in a festival ritual. He becomes Plechazunga, "the Pig-Hero who, sometime back in the 10th century, routed a Viking invasion, appearing suddenly out of a thunderbolt and chasing a score of screaming Norsemen back into the sea" (567). He keeps the suit on as he is chased by military police. A real pig joins him (573), and he recalls his ancestor William Slothrop's pig-companion song:

> A pig is a jolly companion,
> Boar, sow, barrow, or gilt--
> A pig is a pal, who'll boost your morale,
> Though mountains may topple and tilt.
> When they've blackballed, bamboozled, and burned you,
> When they've turned on you, Tory and Whig,
> Though you may be thrown over by Tabby or Rover,
> You'll never go wrong with a pig, a pig,
> You'll never go wrong with a pig! (575)

The profound value of William's character is evident in the fact that another of his songs supplies the positive note on the book's final page. The animal also occurs in the name and character of Slothrop's friend and ally "Pig" Bodine, who embodies the cheerful obscene defiance of dehumanizing convention and institutions. Bodine is called a "deck-ape", and this connection brings us from pig to ape.

In *V.*, a monkey is used to symbolically mock the human drive for meaning and purpose. It is suggested that while tourists want just the skin of places, and by implication, reality, the true explorer wants the heart. But one character's explorer's quest for what lies at the core/ bottom/ centre of things ends with a discovery of a spider

monkey under the ice at the South Pole, supposedly put there by some malignant mocking agency. He penetrates to the heart, and "'It was Nothing I saw'" (188). This place is given the name "Vheissu", which conflates the German phrase "Wie heisst du?" (V-heiss-u), "who are you?" (or more literally "how are you called?"), with the enigmatic letter V that populates the text like a virus. It puts the mystery of the other person, place, and self into one word, as the letter "V" is iconic of motion towards a definite goal. The monkey is

> "A mockery, you see: a mockery of life, planted where everything but Hugh Godolphin was inanimate. With of course the implication . . . It did tell me the truth about them. If Eden was the creation of God, God only knows what evil created Vheissu. The skin which had wrinkled through my nightmares was all there had ever been. Vheissu itself, a gaudy dream. Of what the Antarctic in this world is closest to: a dream of annihilation." (189-90)

Here the monkey is presumably associated with human evolutionary origins, and the humanly meaningless evolutionary principles of random mutation and natural selection.

In *Gravity's Rainbow* apes have a more positive connotation, but are still ambiguous. King Kong is a very important figure, and a line from the film's director Merian C. Cooper to the actress Fay Wray forms the epigraph for chapter two, *Un Perm' au Casino Hermann Goering*: "You will have the tallest, darkest leading man in Hollywood" (179). As is explained more or less explicitly, the great ape represents the dark primal animal side of human nature--sexuality and aggression, but also animal need and feeling, that gets repressed and struggles to return. Jessica resists "the Fist of the Ape [. . . in] the room you thought was safe, could never be penetrated [. . .] the coarse black hair, the tendons of need, of tragic love" (275). *King Kong* is "the legend of the black scapeape we cast down like Lucifer from he tallest erection in the world has come, in the fullness of time, to generate its own children" (275). There are also apes in a minor key. With a company composed mostly of fellow travellers (Otto and his mother Frau Gnahb the boat captain, Klaus Närrisch, impresario G. M. B. Haftung with a band and six chorus girls), and a "troupe of performing chimpanzees" (496ff.), Slothrop travels from Swinemünde to see the Development Works at Peenemünde and rescue Der Springer (Gerhardt von Göll) after he's taken by a Major Zhdaev (502-03). The chimpanzees are secondary figures at most, but they are allies of this expression of the "Counterforce" and part of the comic mania of the rescue scene.

Dogs are prominent in the role of subjects of the behaviourist Pointsman's Pavlovian experiments. He catches strays in London to experiment on them, and he comes to feel he understands them. Pointsman gives them up to pursue of Slothrop, as the subject with greater potential to solve the mysteries of human behaviour (143). Pynchon's sympathy is clearly with the dogs, and even writes from their point of view occasionally (42ff.). In short, what Pynchon likes about these animals is that they are *not paranoid*, as humans are by temperament and almost by definition. Pigs, apes and dogs live by instinct, for "mindless pleasures" (*Mindless Pleasures* was a working title of *Gravity's Rainbow*), and human treatment of them as instruments of science and technology, or as

symbols of instinct that must be repressed, is symptomatic of everything that's wrong with humans.

Boethius' Platonic-Christian view is explicit about his model of how human folly and sin turns men into beasts. First, lack of self-knowledge is the cause:

> Other classes of things are satisfied by their intrinsic possessions; but men, though made like God in understanding, seek to find among the lowest things adornment for their higher nature: and you do not understand that you do a great wrong thereby to your Creator. He intended that the human race should be above all other earthly beings; yet you thrust down your honourable place below the lowest. For if every good thing is allowed to be more valuable than that to which it belongs, surely you are putting yourselves lower than them in your estimation, since you think precious the most worthless of things; and this is indeed a just result. Since, then, this is the condition of human nature, that it surpasses other classes only when it realises what is in itself; as soon as it ceases to know itself, it must be reduced to a lower rank than the beasts. To other animals ignorance of themselves is natural; in men it is a fault. (33-34)

Later, vicious passions are found to be causes:

> But as goodness alone can lead men forward beyond their humanity, so evil of necessity will thrust down below the honourable estate of humanity those whom it casts down from their first position. The result is that you cannot hold him to be a man who has been, so to say, transformed by his vices. If a violent man and a robber burns with greed of other men's possessions, you say he is like a wolf. [. . .] If another is dull and lazy, does he not live the life of an ass? [. . .] If another is in a slough of foul and filthy lusts, he is kept down by the lusts of an unclean swine. Thus then a man who loses his goodness, ceases to be a man, and since he cannot change his condition for that of a god, he turns into a beast.

Boethius then uses the Circe episode of Homer's *Odyssey* as a symbolic illustration of degradation, as Joyce will do 1400 years later:

> The east wind wafted the sails which carried on the wandering ships of Ithaca's king to the island where dwelt the fair goddess Circe, the sun's own daughter. There for her new guests she mingled cups bewitched by charms. Her hand, well skilled in use of herbs, changed these guests to different forms. One bears the face of a boar; another grows like to an African lion with fangs and claws; this one becomes a wolf, and when he thinks to weep, he howls; that one is an Indian tiger, though he walks all harmless round about the dwelling-place. The leader alone, Ulysses, though beset by so many dangers, was saved from the goddess's bane by the pity of the winged god, Mercury. But the sailors had drunk of her cups, and now had turned from food of corn to husk and acorns, food of swine. Naught is

> left the same, speech and form are gone; only the mind remains unchanged, to bewail their unnatural sufferings. (88-90)

Although his point here is that internal degradation to beastliness is more important than this external change, he relies on the symbolic connection to make the point: "Then I answered: 'I confess that I think it is justly said that vicious men keep only the outward bodily form of their humanity, and, in the attributes of their souls, are changed to beasts'" (90). The degrading "change to beasts" is recognized as a metaphor. The Circe episode, in Joyce's hands, is similarly recognized, as it is replayed as symbolic imagery literalized in Bloom's Nighttown hallucinations.[82]

BODY PARTS and FUNCTIONS

Satirists also give great play to imagery of the lower body, and in Menippean satire this tends to indicate how various kinds of interference from the body deflate the philosophical mind's pretensions to authority (autonomy, power, and accuracy).

A human bodily hierarchy is assumed in this kind of degrading rhetoric. This hierarchy, like that of the animals, is another special aspect of the Great Chain of Being, and fits into it in analogous ways, with ranked regions (upper, middle, and lower), each of which in turn has its own internal hierarchy. In Tillyard's *Elizabethan World Picture*, the liver is "lord of the lowest of the three parts of the body [. . . .] necessary to bodily growth and functioning" (76). The heart is "king of the middle portion of the body. It is the seat of the passions and hence corresponds to the sensitive portion of man's nature" (77). And the brain "rules the top part of man's body, and is the seat of the rational and immortal part" (77). Frye observes the connection of the vertical orientation of the cosmos with the human body:

> The Ptolemaic view was also supported by the powerful mythical analogy of the macrocosm. Man, the microcosm, was the epitome of the universe: he contained everything that it contained, and hence the universe was really a larger body like that of man. The Ptolemaic universe, with its onion shape and its concentric spheres, nevertheless had a top and a bottom, like the human body. The regular circling of the stars overhead suggested planning, order, intelligence, everything that goes with a human brain; down below was a world of death and corruption leading to hell. And hell had many characteristics of the less highly regarded aspects of the body: there was always a strong smell of sulphur about the devils,

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[82] Cf. Tillyard's quotation of Sir John Hayward as a sample of how the "many diatribes against man [. . .] conduct their argument":

> Certainly, of all the creatures under heaven which have received being from God, none degenerate, none forsake their natural dignity and being, but only man. Only man, abandoning the dignity of his proper nature, is changed like Proteus into divers forms. And this is occasioned by the liberty of his will. And as every kind of beast is principally inclined to one sensuality more than to another, so man transformeth himself into that beast to whose sensuality he principally declines. This did the ancient wise men shadow forth by their fables of certain persons changed into such beasts whose cruelty or sottery or other brutish nature they did express. (82)

> and their horns and tails suggested the kind of erotic interest that we should expect to find among such low forms of spirituality. (*Spiritus* 70)

The emphasis here on the overall analogy implies that even without the specific medieval or Elizabethan details of the picture, the basic background model of the meaning of the human body, with its various parts and functions mapped along a vertical scale of value, persists across cultures and eras. Following bodily orientation, the head and face are associated with the positive "higher" capacities, drives and destinies, and the lower parts, especially digestive system and genitals, are associated with the negative "lower" tendencies.

Bakhtin's analysis of Rabelais's use of the "grotesque body" largely explains the workings of comic bodily degradation by deployment of the "material bodily lower stratum". But it is not only the degradation of the head region by the abdominal-genital region that is at issue. As Rabelais, Swift, and others show, the higher organs can degrade within their own region, too: the facial distortions of belching and vomiting and sneezing and hiccuping and so on can be comically subversive just as well as flatulence and excretion. As well, because of the fundamental vertical hierarchy, anything that is low, in the body as a whole, or within one of its regions, will tend to have a negative association. The feet, for example, lack the conventional dignity of head and hands. Thus in *Either / Or*, Kierkegaard tells of a dialectical cobbler, who recalls Lucian's Philip of Macedon mending rotten shoes, except that in Kierkegaard we have, instead of a mighty figure brought to a low condition, a lowly cobbler's philosophical pretensions mocking the popular obsession with Hegel's idea of the dialectic:

> Has not the logical trinity been advanced in the most ludicrous way? And therefore it did not astound me that my shoemaker had found that it could also be applied to the development of boots, since, as he observes, the dialectic, which is always the first stage in life, finds expression even here [. . .] in the squeaking. [. . .] Unity, however, appears only later, in which respect *his* shoes far surpass all others, which usually disintegrate in the dialectic. [. . .] [S]ince he as an orthodox shoemaker proceeded from the thesis that the immediate (feet without shoes--shoes without feet) is a pure abstraction, he took it [the dialectic] as the first stage in the development. (463)

Similarly, even without the sexual joke, Swift's picture of the star-gazing philosopher "seduced by his lower parts into a ditch" (see above [98]) is effective satire. This fact seems to me to put in question the idea that such satirical strategies require an "excremental vision" or a Freudian explanation.

Indeed, there are many ways to degrade the mind by wrongly associating it with the body. The satirical illustration of how minds can be ruled by the body's needs and desires and operations can take many forms. The satirist might show the mind to be working in a physical and mechanical way, as the body does; the mind might constantly fail due to bodily interference; it might be obsessed with the body; we might see that it is viewed as less important than the body; we might be shown absurd analogies between mind and body; or absurd cause-and-effect relations between body and mind. For

example, Voltaire's Pangloss reasons absurdly that all is for the best because "noses were made to wear spectacles; and so we have spectacles. Legs were visibly instituted to be breeched, and we have breeches" (4). The argument connects imaginative inventions to bodily needs, but reverses the direction of influence: in fact, spectacles are made to sit on the nose to help the eyes, and breeches are made to cover the legs.

As with animal imagery, there is so much bodily imagery in the history of Menippean satire that one can hardly do more than gesture at it. Yet such a gesture can convey an idea of the range of forms it can take. Probably the most common means of satirical bodily reduction is to show an obsession with sex or with food that distorts reasoning or morality. Violence and suffering obsessively visited upon the body is also common.

In Rabelais, one of the islands Pantagruel visits is the "Home of Messer Gaster" (Sir Belly). (570-84). A connection is established whereby people are "reduced" to bellies, by the etymology of "Gaster" (belly), the god of the island, and related words. The connection is developed through projecting other aspects of our knowledge of human eating and digestion to this situation of the island visited by travellers. For example, like the belly whose needs must be satisfied, regardless of attempts to endure hunger by mental discipline, Gaster does not hear and has no mouth; but he speaks by signs, and all must obey (571). Further, Pantagruel respects this "great master of ingenuity" (572), but detests two sorts of summoners at his court, the Engastrimythes and Gastrolaters. The first pretend to speak oracles from the belly; the latter own Gaster for their supreme god but do nothing for fear of offending him (572-73). There is a basic allegorical criticism of people who treat their stomachs with more than the proper respect: he mocks those who make an idol of their stomachs, live only to satisfy their need and desire to eat, and let it control their minds. There is a second satirical aspect, where Rabelais appears to imagine two kinds of abuse of the Gaster-religion to make an allegorical criticism of the clergy of his own culture. There are those who prey on the superstitious, pretending to speak for God by using sleight-of-hand, and there are those who do nothing, and ascribe their idleness and apathy to "fear of God".

There is also imagery based on connections to forms of the body that are grotesque due to the distortions of extreme youth or age. Juvenal very often symbolizes moral degradation by what he considers sexual perversion. In one passage in Satire II, while explaining his motives, he illustrates the "world upside-down" topos by hypocrisy of various kinds, culminating in the image of abortions, that expose the hypocrisy of the Emperor Domitian's attack on adultery:

> Wouldn't you think the world
> Had turned upside-down if rapacious provincial governors
> Condemned extortion, or gangsters repudiated murder?
> Supposing a co-respondent clamped down on adultery,
> Or some arch-conspirator flayed his henchman in treason
> With a patriotic lecture, or dictators inveighed
> Against purges and proscriptions--wouldn't it turn your wits?

> Such was the case, not so long since, when you-know-who
> Was busy reviving those stern decrees against
> Adultery: even Mars and Venus blushed. But all
> The while he himself was flouting the law--and spiced
> His crime with a dash of incest, in the proper tragic tradition.
> His niece, a fertile creature, had her row of abortions,
> And every embryo lump was the living spit of Uncle.
> Then isn't it right and proper for even the worst of men
> To despise these bogus moralists, cast their censure
> Back in their teeth? (76)

Hypocrisy, adultery, incest and abortion form a vicious compound that symbolizes the world upside-down in which it is difficult *not* to write satire. Satire III complains of Greeks who will have sex with anyone, friend or family, of either sex, up to and including "His best friend's grandmother" (90). And Satire VI covers a gamut of female vices, mocking old wives who adopt the mannerisms of the young (134); then railing against women who enjoy eunuch lovers as a form of birth control:

> There are girls who adore unmanly eunuchs--so smooth,
> So beardless to kiss, and no worry about abortions! (141)

Then it sarcastically contrasts the willingness of poor women to endure childbirth with the callousness of the rich:

> How often do gilded beds witness a lying-in
> When we've so many sure-fire drugs for inducing sterility
> Or killing an embryo child? Our skilled abortionists
> Know all the answers. So cheer up, my poor friend,
> And give her the dose yourself. (149)

The damning of abortions and of grotesque age are part of a habitual indignation at sexual vice. Pope says of Bays's writing, "Round him much Embryo, much Abortion lay, / Much future Ode, and abdicated Play" (I.121-22, page 385), implying grotesque incompleteness due to both frustration and destruction of development.

Swift's *struldbruggs* or *immortals* are grotesquely aged (Book III, Chapter 10). Following Gulliver's celebration of their happy condition, and discourse to the court of what he would do were he so lucky as to share it, his idea of immortality is corrected. For "only in this island of Luggnagg the appetite for living was not so eager, from the continual example of the *struldbruggs* before their eyes." For the question "was not whether a man would choose to be always in the prime of youth, attended with prosperity and health, but how he would pass a perpetual life under all the usual disadvantages which old age brings along with it" (170). At first Gulliver thinks, "But happiest beyond all comparison are those excellent *struldbruggs*, who being born exempt from that universal calamity of human nature, have their minds free and disengaged, without the

weight and depression of spirits caused by the continual apprehension of death" (167-68). Then he finds that they have the usual ills of age, and more. They are in extreme mental and physical decay. Hence later, "The King heard of all that had passed between me and my friends upon this occasion, and rallied me very pleasantly, wishing I would send a couple of *struldbruggs* to my own country, to arm our people against the fear of death" (173). They are reminiscent of the Sibyl in Petronius (quoted by Eliot as the epigraph to *The Waste Land*): Trimalchio boasts to his guests, apropos of not very much, that "I once saw the Sybil of Cumae in person. She was hanging in a bottle, and when the boys asked her, 'Sybil, what do you want?' she said, 'I want to die'" (57). Beckett's aged are equally grotesque, or more so, because described in more detail. There is the revolting "love" between Macmann and Moll, in *Malone Dies* (238-44): "when one has within reach the one and only love requited of a life so monstrously prolonged, it is natural one should wish to profit by it, before it is too late, and refuse to be deterred by feelings of squeamishness excusable in the faint-hearted, but which true love disdains" (243). And the Unnamable, during an incarnation as Mahood, a limbless torso, actually sits in a jar waiting to die, like the Sibyl: "Stuck like a sheaf of flowers in a deep jar, its neck flush with my mouth, on the side of a quiet street near the shambles I am at rest at last" (300). He is uncertain of his identity, and reflects sadly that he may be reincarnated:

> If I ever succeed in dying under my own steam, then they will be in a better position to decide if I am worthy to adorn another age, or to try the same one again, with the benefit of my experience. I may therefore perhaps legitimately suppose that the one-armed one-legged wayfarer of a moment ago and the wedge-headed trunk in which I am now marooned are simply two phases of the same carnal envelope, the soul being notoriously immune from deterioration and dismemberment. (303)

Less savage, more comical satire may use less grotesque bodily imagery.

In the common schematic understanding of *Don Quixote*, which has a rough plausibility just because it is common and schematic, Quixote represents the spirit or mind, and all that strives upwards in people, which is in the constant company of the competing force, the body and all that tends downwards, represented by Sancho Panza. As Walter Starkie puts it, Cervantes knows that "life is an unending dialogue between a knight of the spirit who is ever striving to soar aloft, and a squire who clings to his master and strives with might and main to keep his feet firmly planted on the ground" (from the first sentence of the Introduction [15], quoted on the back cover). The pair are linked with mind and body by their typical actions and attitudes, so the link is metonymic and symbolic. Quixote constantly thinks and speaks of his knightly duties, the defense of honour of ladies, religion, good shepherds, etc., while Sancho provides counterpoint by his constant thought and talk about eating, drinking, and the rewards of the quest.

Specific examples show how bodily forces undermine idealism. In Part 1, Chapter 4, Don Quixote's body is brought low by a conspiracy of natural, human and artificial forces. Quixote charges at the utterer of a perceived slight against Dulcinea, is thrown by his horse, then the force of gravity pins him there due to the weight of his armour:

> [He] rolled a good distance over the ground. Although he tried to rise, he could not, for he was so impeded by the lance, the buckler, the spurs, the helmet, and the weight of the ancient armor. However, as he was struggling to arise, he kept on crying, 'Flee not, cowardly rabble! Wait, slavish herd! It is not my fault, but the fault of my horse, that I am stretched here' (79).

Another muleteer decides to kick Quixote in the ribs for his arrogance, then beats him with the fragments of his own lance. Quixote, even then, "in the midst of all this tempest of blows that rained on him, did not for a moment close his mouth, but bellowed out threats to heaven and earth and those villainous cutthroats (for so they appeared to him)" (79). Left alone afterwards, he still cannot rise from the ground, and so is "resolved to have recourse to his usual remedy, which was to think of some incident from one of his books" (80). Similarly, other characters typically insist on the necessity of the bodily needs that Quixote ignores or defies. In Part 1, Chapter 10, the knight explains, "it is a the pride of knights-errant to go for a whole month without eating, and when they do, they eat only what is ready at hand. [. . .] [A]nd although we know that they could not live without eating or without performing all the other functions of nature, because they were men like ourselves, yet it is clear that [. . .] their daily fare must have been coarse country food such as you offer me" (115; cf. the conversation with the innkeeper, Part 1, Chapter 3). The digestive tract takes revenge again in Part 1, Chapter 18, when Don Quixote vomits on Sancho's beard, after drinking the "balm" supposed to cure his wounds, and Sancho, smelling the balm, vomits back in his master's face (175). In Part 2, Chapter 17, Don Quixote's head gets connected with digestion through the interposition of a helmet proffered by Sancho, that happens to be brimming with cheese curds. Quixote imagines that his brains must be melting; Sancho blames it on the devil, exculpating himself by saying that he would have put the curds in his stomach and not the helmet (638-40).

The knight and his squire are frequently beaten, and indeed such physical abuse is very common in satire generally, especially satire with picaresque elements. Paulson speaks of "the central symbol of violence" in satire (*Fictions* 9ff.). Beatings and other forms of violence effect a degradation in several ways. First, there is a correlation of suffering violence with physical lowering: when Quixote and Sancho are soundly beaten, they are left lying on the ground. Second, violence often reduces the victim to some lower state of being: they respond with instincts of rage or fear (fight or flight), like animals, and their reasoning is impaired; or they are reduced to inanimate, vegetative or object-like states, if they are beaten badly enough to be unconscious, comatose, or dead. Maybe the most extreme kind of violence is that of dismemberment. (Cannibalism is another extreme that sometimes appears, but the two can go together nicely.)[83]

The relation of anatomizing to analysis and satirical attack is recognized by the satirists themselves. Rabelais's Gargantua writes to his son Pantagruel, "by frequent anatomies get thee the perfect knowledge of that other world, called the microcosm, which is man" (187). And such analysis merges easily into attack in various ways. His

[83] Verbal abuse is analogous to physical abuse, as I will discuss below.

heroes, especially Friar John, assault their enemies with surgical precision (and erudition) (123-24). Rondibilis the physician anatomizes the brain and heart during a lecture on methods of abating lust (389-90), then proves by anatomy how Nature erred in making woman (393). Xenomanes of Wild Island (abode of the Chitterlings) anatomizes his enemy, the giant Lent (544-49). The company then tow ashore, onto the same island, a physeter or whale, that may be the Leviathan of Job, to make an anatomical dissection of its body (554). Pantagruel uses the concept as a curse: "may a million of devils anatomize thy cockle brain" (620). And other analytic descriptions of their adventures use an anatomical lexicon (e.g. the island of Tools). Burton tells us that like Democritus, "I do anatomize and cut up these poor beasts, to see these distempers, vanities, and follies, yet such proof were better made on man's body, if my kind nature would endure it" (41). And he later confesses, "I have anatomized mine own folly" (103); and later still, "I have laid myself open (I know it) in this Treatise" (973). He links melancholy to anatomy and satire by warning that melancholy can consume a man's body, and drive him to attack. Envy, for example, can drive him to be "a living anatomy, *a skeleton, to be a lean and pale carcass, quickened with a fiend*, [. . .]. His whole life is sorrow, and every word he speaks a *satire*, nothing fats him but other men's ruins" (230).

Certain Menippean characters nearly suffer actual anatomization: Nashe's Jack Wilton is sold live to the pope's physician to supply a subject for the yearly anatomy (527ff.), and he witnesses the awful torture of a murderer on the last page: "No joint about him but with a hatchet he had for the nonce" (547). When Candide rescues Pangloss from brutal slavery aboard a galley, the philosopher explains how he was revived by an attempted dissection after being left for dead by an attempted hanging that followed an attempted burning (138-39). Paulson notes the hero's dismemberment in Nathanael West's *A Cool Million* (*Fictions* 9). Other characters suffer somewhat less severe forms of medical abuse. Petronius's Encolpius nearly castrates himself (150-52). Sterne's Tristram has his nose or phallus crushed by Doctor Slop's forceps, and Toby's groin wound is the subject of much speculation, and Mrs. Wadman consults various anatomical texts trying to gauge the extent of his injuries (449). Pynchon's Slothrop seems to have been behaviourally conditioned by the sinister Laszlo Jamf as an infant, and is then the subject of physical and psychological tests carried out by the intelligence experts at the White Visitation. He escapes castration as an enemy character, Major Duane Marvy, dons his discarded pig-suit and is gelded in his stead (609).

As well as Juvenal's victims, other characters whose minds are undermined by sex include Petronius's company Encolpius, Giton, Ascyltus and Eumolpus, who are harried by Priapus. Fielding's Tom Jones and Joseph Andrews are both more passionate than prudent, and Shamela gulls Squire Booby into marriage using sex, while having an affair with Parson Williams. We have reviewed the frequent sexual euphemisms in Sterne. Voltaire also has several characters who are associated with sexual obsession or perversity, whether acting out their own or suffering that of others (Pangloss, Cunegonde, Paquette). Kierkegaard also has some comment that suggests an elevation of prurient interest:

> If any sympathy with explorations of this kind could be expected in our age, I would pose this question for a prize essay: From an esthetic point of view, who is more modest, a young girl or a young wife. [. . .] [I]n Greece such problems were not treated casually and light-mindedly, and yet everyone knows that Venus has an extra name on account of [a contest to determine who has the most beautiful posterior] and that everyone admires the statue of Venus that has immortalized her. (434)

Melville's *Moby-Dick* uses grotesque Freudian symbolism *avant la lettre.* What drives Ahab on to seek a murderous revenge on the white whale is the fact that he was "dismasted" by it (219). Scenes where Ahab bonds with his men by speaking like a tyrannical pagan priest, and cements their vows to carry through with his quest with ritual acts, use whaling lances in the service of outrageous phallic symbolism. At the end of Chapter 36 ("The Quarter-Deck", 223-25), the mates flank him, then cross their lances so he can grasp their crossed centre and stare down Starbuck, Stubb, and Flask. The harpooneers surround him in a ring, present their harpoons, then turn them over so they can drink from the "socket" in the base. In Chapter 119 ("The Candles", 635-44), Ahab refuses to throw the ship's lightning rods overboard, as would normally be done. The glow of the corpusants is described as if part of a black mass: "All the yard-arms were tipped with a pallid fire; and touched at each tri-pointed lightning-rod-end with three tapering white flames, each of the three tall masts was silently burning in that sulphurous air, like three gigantic wax tapers before an altar" (639). Ahab grips the end of a chain to "feel this pulse, and let mine beat against it", and "with fixed upward eye, and high-flung right arm, he stood erect before the lofty tri-pointed trinity of flames" (641). He addresses the fire as if it is a god, and when Starbuck points out that his own harpoon, "firmly lashed in its conspicuous crotch" in his whaling-boat, is also alight, and the other sailors panic, Ahab grabs it and waves it "like a torch among them; swearing to transfix with it the first sailor that but cast loose a rope's end" (644). We have remarked on how the observations about sharks relates to the theme of cannibalism, but of course cannibal imagery takes human forms, too. The first member of the crew Ishmael meets is Queequeg, who he hears has been peddling embalmed heads, and who he regards as a cannibal (43-52). But they soon develop a close bond, after they sleep in the same bed together and Ishmael wakes to find himself held in Queequeg's "bridegroom clasp" (54). The "squeeze of the hand" chapter develops from the experience of processing spermaceti a mocking image of universal "brotherhood" as a narcissistic illusion:

> Such an abounding, affectionate, friendly, loving feeling did this avocation beget; that at last I was continually squeezing their hands, and looking up into their eyes sentimentally; as much as to say,--Oh! my dear fellow beings, whey should we longer cherish any social acerbities, or know the slightest ill-humor or envy! Come; let us squeeze hands all round; nay, let us all squeeze ourselves into each other; let us squeeze ourselves universally into the very milk and sperm of kindness. (532-33)

Leopold Bloom's earthy obsessions undermine his intellectual ambitions, as we witness him contemplating literary sketches and ads in the jakes, masturbating, brooding over the sexual failure in his marriage, wondering about the earthly aspects of goddesses, etc. And a major thread of *Finnegans Wake* is the story of the great HCE being hauled onto the carpet for a sexual indiscretion of some kind (33-37ff.). Beckett's trilogy is full of grotesque sexuality, violence, and ruminations on the repulsiveness of the body, often sparked by a sense of its decay. In Beckett's world, "love" is a mockery:

> It was she made me acquainted with love. She went by the peaceful name of Ruth I think, but I can't say for certain. Perhaps the name was Edith. She had a hole between her legs, oh not the bunghole I had always imagined, but a slit, and in this I put, or rather she put, my so-called virile member, not without difficulty, and I toiled and moiled until I discharged or gave up trying or was begged by her to stop. A mug's game in my opinion and tiring on top of that, in the long run. But I lent myself to it with a good enough grace, knowing it was love, for she had told me so. (53)

And it gets tied into disgust with human eating and the physical waste of societies:

> Anyway it was she who started it, in the rubbish dump, when she laid her hand upon my fly. More precisely, I was bent double over a heap of muck, in the hope of finding something to disgust me for ever with eating, when she, undertaking me from behind, thrust her stick betweens [sic] my legs and began to titillate my privates. (54)

Gravity's Rainbow has the conceit of Slothrop's erections occurring where rocket-strikes occur. The Rocket-limericks detailing the sexual relations of men with rocket parts serves the same function of satirizing the routinization or mechanization of sexuality. In fact the many and various perversions seem to have a function similar to that in Juvenal--they expose the corruption of those who cynically use power, and contrast with the healthy natural sexual relations of the "good" characters. For example, Blicero arranges a sadomasochistic fairy-tale scenario, with himself as witch and Gottried and Katje as children. This turns into a kind of marriage of the bound "bride" Gottfried to the Rocket at the end. Slothrop, on the other hand, has an encounter with a "good witch", Geli Tripping, and Katje, though she is involved in the plot against him, pities him and wants to help him. There are hints that Slothrop was meant for the rocket. Roger Mexico has an affair with Jessica, but she goes back to the horrid bureaucrat "the Beaver" after the war.

Another kind of body-based degradation is the bodily determinism that many of the philosopher-characters speculate about and experiment with. As well as Burton's system of humours and spirits, and Swift's mechanistic mock-philosophies, there are Sterne's Walter Shandy's psychophysical opinions, Smollett's Matthew Bramble's concern with his own humours and doctoring, and Flaubert's Bouvard and Pécuchet, who are obsessed with physical cures (and who have a kindred spirit in the apothecary M. Homais in *Madame Bovary*). Flaubert sees something inherently low in their obsessions with

"natural philosophy", their failed attempts to explore material dimensions of human life and spirit in various pseudo-sciences. The temperaments of the pair are contrasted--"[Bouvard] gave his allegiance to experience, the ideal was everything for [Pécuchet]. There was something of Aristotle in the one, of Plato in the other, and they had discussions" (203). But this is secondary to their being mocked by being considered philosophers at all. On his way to the funeral, Bloom ponders various superstitions about death, for example mockingly imagining resurrection in a very literal way:

> The resurrection and the life. once you are dead you are dead. That last day idea. Knocking them all up out of their graves. Come forth, Lazarus! And he came fifth and lost the job. Get up! Last day! Then every fellow mousing around for his liver and his lights and the rest of his traps. Find damn all of himself that morning. (87)

Later, in the cabman's shelter, he talks with the still-drunk Stephen, trying to follow and match his erudite cynical eloquence, but his mind runs in local and material tracks, and he reflects on the prospects of a passing streetwalker, the pros and cons of legalizing prostitution, the badness of the coffee, the usefulness of the temperance work of the shelter, the plausibility of the sailor's stories, and so forth. He asks Stephen if he believes the soul is any object more than the intelligence, "the brainpower as such", and fails to detect any irony in Stephen's remarks:

> -They tell me on the best authority it is a simple substance and therefore incorruptible. It would be immortal, I understand, but for the possibility of its annihilation by its First Cause Who, from all I can hear, is quite capable of adding that to the number of his other practical jokes, *corruptio per se* and *corruptio per accidens* both being excluded by court etiquette.

Bloom's response shows he misinterprets Stephen's ideas about the "simple soul":

> -Simple? I shouldn't think that is the proper word. Of course, I grant you, to concede a point, you do knock across a simple soul once in a blue moon. But what I am anxous to arrive at is it is one thing for instance to invent those rays Röntgen did or the telescope like Edison, [. . .] but it's a horse of quite another colour to say you believe in the existence of a supernatural God. (518)

Scenes such as these serve to underline the strong connection of the traditional moral animus against the body's influence over the mind with degrading imagery. Rabelais's Gaster episodes, with their critique of stomach-worship, serve more particularly to emphasize the link of this kind of critique of the body with excremental imagery. Sir Belly soon leads us by metonymic steps to what the Urquhart translation calls "sir-reverence":

> Gaster confessed himself no god, but a poor, vile, pitiful creature. Just as King Antigonus the first answered a certain Hermadotus, who had in a poem called him

> god and a son of the sun, with the words: 'My Lasanophore denies it'--the *lasanon* being an earthen pan used to receive the belly's excrements--so Gaster referred these obsequious apes to his close-stool, to see, to examine and philosophically to consider what kind of god they could discover in his faeces. (579)[84]

Gaster like King Antigonus uses his digestive system to mock epic ideals.

A few more examples of the "excremental vision" of our satirists will show how the metaphoric focus intensifies at this extreme end of the scale of bodily imagery.[85] This focus on the extreme end of the human body's form and operation coincides with a focus on other low extremes: on death, on the lowest members and conditions of society, on the human qualities the satirist most despises, with the most intense hatred and rage. Close association of bowels, anus, and excrement with the head, especially the face and mouth, is a quite common degrading image. In Chain of Being terms, it does not reduce man to animal, nor directly associate one of the main levels of the chain with another. But it does degrade the human by connecting higher parts and functions with lower parts and functions, such that the higher is subjected to the lower. As the higher functions are lost, the person loses his capacity to control or transcend his bodily nature, and is mired in waste functions. Hence the human does *indirectly* become linked with lower levels of the chain: digestion and excretion are automatic processes shared with animals (and the digestive system in itself is closer to a plant or a complex object like a machine), that link the human with the world of animals and plants (they are what people ingest), and dead matter (what people excrete). When we focus on such human parts and functions, we ignore or block out what distinguishes the human from other levels of the chain--the capacity to act according to reason. Waste and excretion also imply "uncleanness", and suggests a moral or social "stain" that stigmatizes the individual as outside the group. This moral quality is more prominent when the individual is somehow responsible for this kind of self-degradation. But there are, again, a wide range of possible meanings and tones when this degrading imagery is considered in the context of specific actions.

In Apuleius, there is a monstrous punishment threatened for the two main characters, Lucius the ass and the kidnapped princess, when their escape attempt is foiled. One of the gang of bandits conceives the idea of killing the girl by cutting open the half-

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[84] The Urquhart translation says that Gaster "very civilly used to send back his bigoted worshippers to his close-stool, to see, smell, taste, philosophise, and examine what kind of divinity they could pick out of his sir-reverence" (603).

[85] For further discussion of the relation of Brown's notion of the excremental vision to Menippean satire, see my M. A. Thesis, "Vivisection: Anatomical Structure and the Satire of Vanity." I now suspect that this aspect of satirical imagery may be rather an instance of a certain cognitive "optimality principle". In their discussion of conceptual blending, Fauconnier and Turner identify a "metonymy projection constraint" (CIN 41-42), or "metonymic tightening". That is, "When an element is projected from an input to the blend and a second element from that input is projected because of its metonymic link to the first, shorten the metonymic distance between them in the blend" (42). Death and excrement are the extremest results of disintegration and degradation *happening to* or *caused by* the body, but in intense satire they become closely connected to the most vaunted aspects of the satirical targets. This principle is said to help satisfy other optimality principles of blending.

dead ass and stuffing her inside, with her head protruding from the anus, and leaving them both to bake and die and rot in the sun (163). This is celebrated as the most painful and horrific death the bandits can think of; symbolically, it is among the most degrading ideas possible. If there is any humour in this, it is overwhelmed by the horror.

On the contrary, in Rabelais, Gargantua and his clan delight in the amusement of being the excremental degraders rather than the degraded. The young Gargantua tests out arse-wiping virtues of everything he can reach (Book One, Chapter 13). Bakhtin uses this "episode of the swabs" to elaborate his sense of Rabelais's unusual use of degrading imagery. He shows how this special kind of casting-downward is vitalized by a regenerative purpose. It degrades and reduces in order to bring about new life:

> [I]t is not surprising that [. . .] with its constant movement from top to bottom, [it - the episode of the swabs] brings us finally into hell. [. . .] True, we are brought not so much to hell as to heaven, since Gargantua spoke of the beatitude of demigods and heroes, that is, of the ancient underworld. [. . .] This travesty of the basic teachings of Christianity is, however, far removed from cynical nihilism. The material bodily lower stratum is productive. It gives birth, thus assuring mankind's immortality. All obsolete and vain illusions die in it, and the real future comes to life. [. . .] The downward movement that penetrates all Rabelaisian images is ultimately directed toward this gay future. At the same time the author mocks the pretenses of the isolated individual who wants to be perpetuated and who is ridiculous in his senility. (378)

The regeneration goes beyond the bodily to the social and the cosmic. Excrement is as Bakhtin says, "jolly matter", part of the body spilling beyond its boundaries to connect with the world outside, and Rabelais's literary play with it is familiarly playing with death to triumph over it. The mature Gargantua floods Paris in urine, "for a laugh" (Chapter 17, 74-75). Also, Gargantua reflects that "the frock and the cowl draw on themselves the opprobrium, insults, and curses of the world" because "they eat the world's excrement, that is to say, sins; and as eaters of excrement they are cast into their privies--their convents and abbeys that is--which are cut off from all civil intercourse, as are the privies of a house" (125-26). This is a degrading suffering, but one that should be ennobling, since Christ also suffered bodily humiliation as he took on the world's sin. And just as a monkey is not useful like the other animals, a lazy monk serves no productive purpose like people in other professions; "All he does is to beshit and ruin everything, which is the reason why he gets mockery and beatings from everyone" (126). The brilliant and resilient but ignoble, tricky, deceitful, worrying Panurge regularly "bewrays himself" (e.g. when their boat nearly sinks, 492-93; and when he hears a cannonade from below decks and imagines that the host of hell has broken loose, in the last chapter of Book Four).

In *Don Quixote*, the tendency is for Sancho to be associated with excretion, but the constant interplay between Sancho and Quixote, that is often degrading for the latter, links Quixote's ideas and person into the association as well. During one of their nightly vigils, Sancho, who has been telling stories to entertain Quixote, rather acrobatically

lowers his breeches and raises his shirt while astride his ass, in order to defecate without leaving or disturbing his master (192-93).[86] In the Prologue to Part Two, the narrator compares writing a book to the action of a madman in Seville, who inflated a dog with an anally-administered cane straw (527). And later, Sancho praises his master by saying, "just as land that is of itself barren and dry will eventually, by dint of dunging and tilling, come to yield a goodly crop [. . . .] your worship's talk has been the dung that has fallen upon the barren soil of my poor wit" (Part 2, Ch. 12, 604).

Burton bemoans his melancholic state as the lowest: "I'll change my state with any wretch, / Thou canst from gaol or dunghill fetch" (10). And he also associates his own creativity with excretion. He includes himself in the complaint that some writers "scrape Ennius' dung-hills, and out of Democritus/ pit, as I have done. By which means it comes to pass, that not only libraries & shops are full of our putrid papers, but every close-stool and jakes are well supplied with privy-poetry" (18).

To get the attention of the inhabitants of Swift's island of Lagado, the inhabitants need to be smacked on the head by their "flapper" servants with "a blown bladder fastened like a flail to the end of a short stick" (127): "it seems, the minds of these people are so taken up with intense speculations, that they neither can speak, nor attend to the discourses of others, without being roused by some external taction upon the organs of speech and hearing" (128). A flapper also attends his master in his walks "because he is always so wrapped up in cogitation, that he is in manifest danger of falling down every precipice, and bouncing his head against every post" (128). Swift's Yahoos "discharge their excrements" on Gulliver's head (182). In a clear comment on the court of his day, Swift writes that the yahoos' leader has a favourite, "whose employment was to lick his master's feet and posteriors, and drive the female yahoos to his kennel; for which he was now and then rewarded with a piece of ass's flesh." He is so roundly hated that when he is discarded, "all the yahoos in that district, young and old, male and female, come in a body, and discharge their excrements upon him from head to foot" (212). Gulliver does his part in presenting the excremental vision of humanity, when he explains the human physician's job to his Houynhnhnm hosts: "Their fundamental is, that all diseases arise from repletion, from whence they conclude that a great evacuation of the body is necessary, either through the natural passage, or upwards at the mouth" (205), and they concoct emetics and laxatives and suppositories to achieve these ends. Thus, "these artists ingeniously considering that in all diseases Nature is forced out of her seat, therefore to replace her in it, the body must be treated in a manner directly contrary, by interchanging the use of each orifice, forcing solids and liquids in at the anus, and making evacuations

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[86] This kind of scatological counterpoint, where the pompous deluded romantic is unaware of a separate earthy action that is described for the reader, seems to be an occasional satirical device. For example, as the rake Rodolphe waxes poetic to seduce Emma Bovary during the Agricultural Show, the president announcing the prizes waxes pragmatic. Neither speaker is aware of the other:

> "I've wanted to go off a hundred times, but I've kept by your side, stayed with you."
> "Manures."
> "As I will remain this evening, tomorrow, all the other days of my life!"
> "To Monsieur Caron of Argueil, a gold medal."
> "For I have never found anyone's company as charming as yours." (152)

at the mouth" (205). Swift's satire associates doctors with forced reversals of human bodily nature that swaps the function of mouth and anus.

In Pope's *Dunciad*, the Dunces' self-inundation with waste, by slipping in it or spilling it on themselves, indicates the badness of their writing--they "spread it around" and it comes back to stain them. It's waste production because it's pumped out unthinkingly, like bodily fluids (a "natural or morbid secretion of the brain"). It's not ruled by reason, nature, and common sense. Hence this imagery has to do with the Chain within the human level: it shows the disruption of the traditional picture of the lower bodily parts and forces ruled by the higher reason, judgment, etc. Pope's *Epilogue to the Satires*, Dialogue II sees noxious court flattery as a perpetual ring of eating and excreting the same low matter:

> Let Courtly Wits to Wits afford supply,
> As Hog to Hog in huts of Westphaly;
> If one, through Nature's Bounty or his Lord's,
> Has what the frugal, dirty soil affords,
> From him the next receives it, thick or thin,
> As pure a mess almost as it came in;
> The blessed benefit, not there confined,
> Drops to the third, who nuzzles close behind;
> From tail to mouth, they feed and they carouse:
> The last full fairly gives it to the House.
> F. This filthy simile, this beastly line
> Quite turns my stomach--
> P. So does Flattery mine;
> And all your courtly Civet Cats can vent,
> Perfume to you, to me is Excrement. (ll. 171-84, p. 302)

Here too worthless discourse is excrement, but the Wits are worse than the Dunces: they do not just cast it at others and accidentally become imbrued with it, they eagerly seek it out and lap it up.

Joyce's Bloom is obsessed with women's bottoms. He plans to trek through the library museum to inspect the posteriors of the Venus de Milo for evidence of an actual anus (144-45). In the depths of Nighttown, Bello calls him "Dungdevourer!", then farts on his face, then threatens to bury him in her outhouse with her ten or eleven other husbands (433-43). And he kisses Molly's rump on his return from his travels. For Bloom, kissing Molly's buttocks is a sign of humble adoration, that seems to merge with his earlier curiosity about the earthly features of an ideal image, and with his later desires for humiliation at the hands of an absolutely earthly image.

Beckett's characters seem to become more associated with excrement as they become more reduced in what they have and are, in body and mind. The Unnamable remarks, "And that's the kind of jakes in which I sometimes dreamt I dwelt, and even let down my trousers" (290). The loss of a sense of human identity pulls the speaker down the Chain as he identifies with higher animals, lower animals, insects, matter and

excrement. There is a discussion of Mahood as a pupil, unable to say what a mammal is, unable to repeat that "Man is a higher mammal", and asking,

> Frankly, between ourselves, what the hell could it matter to pupil Mahood, that man was this rather than that? Presumably nothing has been lost in any case, since here it all comes slobbering out again, let loose by the nightmare. I'll have my bellyful of mammals, I can see that from here, before I wake. (310)

Degradation comes with the levelling of nightmare, and its apparent obsession with both the idea of mammals and the idea of eating mammals ("bellyful"). The new figure is now named Worm, and Worm ironically relates the question of human identity to higher matters of religion and human fate, using metaphor according to his namesake: "The essential is never to arrive anywhere, never to be anywhere [. . .]. The essential is to go on squirming forever at the end of the line, as long as there are waters and banks and ravening in heaven a sporting God to plague his creature, per pro his chosen shits" (310-11). Shortly after, he wonders why no one notices him, and doubts that he exists. He wonders if children affect to be unaware of him out of discretion, not wanting to hurt, then reflects on his relation to animals of various levels: "But this is a refinement of feeling which can hardly be attributed to the dogs that come pissing against my abode, apparently never doubting that it contains some flesh and bones. [. . .] The flies vouch for me, if you like, but how far? Would they not settle with equal appetite on a lump of cowshit?" (313-14). Eating and digestion figure in all these excremental examples.

In *Gravity's Rainbow*, there is the above-noted psychoanalyst's account of the connection of blackness, shit, and death, and this seems operative in Slothrop's American Puritan unconscious--in his fraught relation to the earth, and his own body, and death, and blacks. It is explored in scenes of varying seriousness. Slothrop takes a surreal trip down a toilet in the Roseland Ballroom, fleeing from Malcolm X and his friends, who work there as shoe-shines for the likes of J.F.K. (63-68). Thus the black aspect of the complex also has some connection with themes of social repression and class struggle. There is the episode of the Toiletship, which links the absurdity of specialization and rationalization with the military and with the anal character. Brigadier Pudding's episode of masochistic coprophagy explicitly links excrement with mud and with war: "It is the smell of Passchendaele, of the Salient, Mixed with the mud, and the putrefaction of corpses, it was the sovereign smell of their first meeting, and her emblem" (235). So here the excremental imagery is used partly as a sign of perverse humiliation, but is also symptomatic of a social condition: a general death-wish, mixed with a hypocritical denial of the bodily realities of waste and death, on the part of societies who engage in war, but deny its horror.

THE WHOLE WORLD

We have a pretty clear idea of which works and which authors depict an entire upside-down *world*. But we should seek some clearer idea of what we mean by an upside-down world, how it is defined, and how it comes to be. Narrative usually prompts the reader to infer something about the fictional world as a whole, even when there is no attempt to

take on and depict the entire human world in a representative way. We assume that the rest of the world is, in the author's mind, in many respects *like* the part of the world she has presented. When the reader is prompted to project the high-low mapping onto this entire world, then we have an upside-down world. If we can suggest *how* the reader makes this inference, and just *what* the reader imagines when he imagines a world upside-down, we will have as much of a definition as we need.

Lucian, Rabelais, Swift, Lewis Carroll, and Pynchon, all present fantasy worlds where things are the opposite from our normal understanding of them. But more realistic authors such as Juvenal, Cervantes, Fielding (in *Shamela*), and Flaubert, also present worlds where things are the opposite of what they should be in terms of *values* (social, moral, aesthetic, spiritual, etc.), though there is relatively little violation of realistic decorum in the presentation. The first group depicts worlds that contravene the regularities of our real physical world in order to symbolize a world that contravenes our ideals of rationality or morality; whereas the second group uses less radical means to depict such contraventions. Broadly speaking, the former violates what we take to be *possible*, and the latter violates what we take to be *probable*. Within each method, there are degrees of violation.

But the upside-down world need not be fantasy at all, or even fictional. We can also consider moral visions that perceive the actual world as having inverted the proper hierarchy. For example, Marx and some of his followers are profoundly "realistic", and offer a view of a consistently upside-down world. An original state of organic social integration has been destroyed by the advent of capitalism. Capitalism has changed all the proper relations of society--between people, between workers and their work, between humans and nature--into their opposites.[87] Concepts like "wage-slavery", "objectification", and "alienation" all project a "degrading" movement down the Chain of Being, from harmony and freedom and reason to the servitude of beasts of burden, and finally to the inertness of objects. But this vision's realism is achieved at a cost, as it violates common-sense probability in other ways. In order to make his vision consistent, Marx relegates to marginal mysteries aspects of experience that seem normal and central: he sees human intention and subjectivity and conventional ethics as accidental, and the real forces behind choice and behaviour as a historical materialist dialectic.

In fact, we can have many kinds of combination of fantasy and realism. We may have total fantasy (e.g. Rabelais), or total realism (e.g. Flaubert, parts of Joyce). Fantasy may be embedded in predominant realism (Voltaire's Eldorado). It happens quite often that a total fantasy is embedded in a rather slight realist pretext (e.g. Lucian's reported

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[87] Theresa Kelley discusses some upside-down allegorical imagery in this epigraph quoted from Marx: "as soon as [a table] makes its entrance as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden head grotesque ideas, far stranger than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will." Kelley writes, "The table-become-commodity reproduces what commodification does to things: it turns them over and upside down, thereby standing value on its head by substituting a 'fantastic form' ('*phantasmagorische Form*') (*Capital* 1: 165) for real wood and real labor. It also turns them into grotesquely unreal things, like Marx's figure. To represent the hidden, mystified relation between the commodity form and falsifying abstractions like 'Profit,' Marx invents allegorical persons and body parts that walk, talk, or come up with ideas that are crazily bereft of good sense" (*Reinventing Allegory* 217).

stories; Alice's dream; Gulliver's travels). I cannot think of a case where realism is embedded in fantasy, but we may get a fantasy *point of view* on a realistic situation (Nabokov, Joyce). In Pynchon, we understand there is some realistic basis, but there is so much alteration of fantasy and actuality we don't quite know where one ends and the other begins. We also find that the "Zone" is the most upside-down region in the novel's world, but regions outside the Zone are by no means rightside-up.

This suggests that there are several dimensions of a narrative world that need to be considered in regard to the projection of this topos. To specify the ways in which the structure of this world can vary, we can ask:

> Is the world upside-down physically? Metaphysically? Socially? Morally? Aesthetically?
> Is the upside-down world bounded in some other space and/ or time?
> Is there a right-side up frame within which the inversion occurs?
> Is there a realistic frame within which fantasy occurs?
> Is it limited to a point-of-view (character or narrator)?

TECHNIQUES OF WORLD-BUILDING

I suppose that in fantasy cases of the topos, scenes are connected to form a narrative such that the reader infers the particular "rules" of the fantasy that constitute the *norm* of this world. The inference may be prompted by making *all* scenes this kind of fantasy, or just enough to show that "realism" is the exception. In the *Alice* books, we find that Alice waking up to her world is the exception, and the world she falls asleep into is complete in itself and contains the main action.

If the author, by depicting a series of relevantly similar events, develops a regular quality for the realistic experience and attitude of the protagonists, we can infer that the whole world is always like this (e.g. in the picaresque, in Petronius and Voltaire and Beckett, we assume that the world is as a rule wicked and foolish and not about to change). As Paulson says of Lucian,

> a satiric world does emerge, not so much from single dialogues as from the whole range of them; not a world of particular fools or knaves but one of great throngs of useless and parasitic gods, philosophers, and law-givers (religions, philosophies, laws, and customs), all weighing heavily on the ordinary man and totally at odds with his nature and surroundings. The elaborate structures of heaven, earth, and Hades, or of religious cults, symposia, and brothels, act not only as expository forms for the satires but as an obviously artificial and illusory order imposed on the real world. (*Fictions* 41-42)

Or the author may present a serious and realistic vision implying that the present state of the world is a decline from or an inversion of a proper or ideal state (e.g. Juvenal, Boethius, Rabelais, Swift, Sterne, Pynchon; this also includes serious moralists like Rousseau, Marx, Chomsky, etc.). Or the author may imply that while the world at large is often upside-down, individuals can achieve rightside-up-ness in their own lives, or in certain moments (Erasmus, Montaigne, Burton, Walton, Fielding, Johnson, Joyce).

So an upside-down cosmology can be implied by various devices of narrative. It is the projection onto the "world" of the same figure of thought that can inhabit a sentence, and that can in fact be established by something as small as the substitution of one word for another. Seidel notes the expansion of what he calls a "paradigm" to an overall view of things in the 18th century, and relates it to one of the earliest statements on degrading metaphor in sentences:

> Aristotle has a witty passage in the *Rhetoric* where he speaks of contraries and metaphoric values: "And if we wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of asking) is an instance of doing this" (Loeb trans., 1405a). But what is new, or at least dominant, for Dryden's period is the urge to expand the paradigm from metaphor to mode--to scratch, as Swift put it, wherever satire itched. (136)

For the Augustans, the ancient world was divinely ordered according to Nature and Reason, and the modern world was the ancient turned upside-down. Frye's sketch of how the Romantic view of the psyche inverts the traditional picture shows how for the Romantics too, the modern world was the ancient and natural world turned upside-down (*Words* 241-43). Of course, the Augustans and the Romantics had very different conceptions of the divine and natural orders, but both share the vision of the present as a wholesale overturning of the original and proper order of being. In fact, the idea of a decline from a Golden Age to an Age of Brass or Iron goes back to classical myth--which should in itself suggest that the ancient world cannot have been the idyll that some later writers took it to be. Satirists who put God at the top of the Chain might see human nature as corrupt, already having reversed the proper hierarchy at the Fall; satirists who put nature at the top might see human society as having inverted the proper order of being in the "state of nature"; and others still might see human life as having declined from and distorted the proper social fulfillment of some idea of ***human*** nature. All can envision the present state of society similarly, as an inversion of the proper order that may have existed at some point in the past, and may exist again in the future.

THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE TOPOS

Although there is, as Curtius shows, a historical development of the figure from the rhetoric of an expression or sentence, to the topos of an imagined world, Paulson's commentary also testifies to the important fact that the development is complete as early as Lucian. His world of the dead is a parodic inversion of the social structure of life in the upper world. The rich man is miserable and weak because he is attached to the things of the world, and finds that those he thought friends were opportunists who have deceived, murdered, and humiliated him. The poor cobbler is happy to go with Charon even though he can't pay his obol for the passage. The world of the gods is ridiculous because it works oppositely to what epic and myth lead us to expect: instead of men depending on the favour of the gods, the gods depend on human belief and tribute for their existence. They

are weak, not powerful, petty, not noble, ignorant, not wise, and in constant conflict, not harmony. So we should not expect to find, in the history of our genre, an evolution to more and more complete upside-down worlds. There are other kinds of historical development; and we should look instead for various specific applications of the generic conceptual figure and topos to new and more complex contents.

The Renaissance seems to be a watershed for certain changes in the specific forms of the figure, changes which are nevertheless related at a more abstract level. Bakhtin and Blanchard show how "much Renaissance literature has a generically 'mixed' and unclassical character, for in Lucian we see little use of the scatology, obscenity, or festive debunking more characteristic of traditions deriving from popular culture" (Blanchard 79). Mary Claire Randolph shows how the "medical concept" of satire exploded in the Renaissance, in the detail of its articulation and in its popularity. Before then it was only a potential, in some aspects of the idea of satire as attack with a weapon. After then, the rationalistic language of "ridicule" and "reform" took over. In both cases, a new focus on the human body, a new familiarity with it and knowledge of its operations, lead to new developments in the metaphors that define satiric attitudes and texts. And it is natural to speculate that these developments derive from a new sense of the importance, dignity, and power of the human being in the Renaissance world-view.

POSSIBLE COUNTER-EXAMPLES:
We can further refine our analysis of the operation of the satirical up > down mapping by examining a few potential counter-examples, which seem to prompt such a mapping, but are not satirical. The intention of this analysis is to identify what other conceptual elements are needed, beyond the up > down mapping, for satire.

Shakespeare
Shakespeare's Caliban and Ariel in *The Tempest* also rely on associations with the scale of being: Caliban is a foul spirit of earth, while Ariel is a noble spirit of air. After the death of the witch Sycorax, Prospero frees Ariel, her former servant, from a spell trapping him in a pine tree; and he takes her son Caliban as a servant. The pair contrast high and low values, so they suggest a potential for satire. But they are not closely connected: there's little interaction between them, and they appear to be just opposed aspects of Prospero's magical control of the island. Prospero stays firmly in charge from beginning to end, using a mix of promises and threats and magic. Ariel is much preferred, doing the important difficult work of illusion and trickery, to help Miranda get married and regain Prospero's dukedom. Caliban just gathers wood and grumbles, and plots against Prospero. He attempts a ridiculous parody-rebellion, in league with a drunken butler and a jester, Stephano and Trinculo. This is the most low-comical, Menippean element in the play, but it is suppressed easily and thoroughly by Ariel and Prospero. Air and earth do not pull Prospero apart, they do not undermine his intentions and actions. If the opposing forces had appeared as having serious influence on Prospero--if they represented forces within him, and Caliban had a chance to win, then the play might have been more satirical. If Prospero's spells had backfired a few times, the play might have been more satirical. If we had had more of Caliban's point of view, depicted with more

sympathy, the play might have been more satirical. In short, if the "low" side of things had had more stage-time, authority, and influence, satirical qualities would have been more evident.

The containing frame/ context of the play is romance and comedy. As it is, I'm not sure one could even say there was "Menippean discourse" here, as Milowicki and Wilson see it in *Troilus and Cressida* (and *Timon of Athens*). In those plays, there is a major character who embodies the genre's rhetoric and attitude (Thersites and Timon, respectively). Here, although Caliban and Prospero trade colourful insults, the chief candidate for a satirical character is marginalized and so the potential satirical dynamic is vitiated.

Walt Whitman

The speaker of Walt Whitman's "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" uses animal imagery to degrade himself:

> It is not upon you alone the dark patches fall,
> The dark threw its patches down upon me also,
> The best I had done seem'd to me blank and suspicious,
> My great thoughts as I supposed them, were they not in reality meagre?
> Nor is it you alone who know what it is to be evil,
> I am he who knew what it was to be evil,
> [. . .] The wolf, the snake, the hog, not wanting in me,
> The cheating look, the frivolous word, the adulterous wish, not wanting,
> Refusals, hates, postponements, meanness, laziness, none of these wanting
> (ll. 65-77)

This is closer to the satirical norm, as it takes an ironic view of the speaker's abilities and morals. It would not take much tinkering to turn this into a Juvenalian rant. And it even disdains the speaker's "great thoughts" as Menippus would. But again the tone is serious, not satirical.

How does this work? How do we know this is the meaning? If we know Whitman's style, subjects, and tones in general, we know he writes romantic lyrics, not satire, and therefore this cannot really be satire. But that answer simply begs the question. How do we know those things about Whitman's work? There must be something in the text that indicates the difference (even if it is implicit, a matter of cues to invoke and manipulate mental models evoked).

The choice of animals makes a difference: wolf and snake are serious and dangerous within their classes of animal. It's true that ape, ass, and dog might have worked well enough here, along with hog. Snail and toad are less dignified and might not be easily worked in. But this does not seem definitive.

We also know the context of the whole poem, which allows us to infer that the ultimate purpose of the animal imagery is not to mock the speaker by these degrading admissions. Rather the degradation is meant to be overcome, so it has an ultimately

ennobling purpose: it is an attempt to recognize and integrate "low" aspects of the personality within a more complete wholeness.

And we know this partly from the fact that the speaker is speaking about himself. He is highly self-conscious about his failings. And we know from the tone that he takes them seriously. This is not a third party blasting the brute ignorance and vulgarity of some celebrity blind to his own conceit, as in Juvenal's satires. Nor does the narrator take an ironically approving or indifferent attitude to his evils, as might a Voltaire or a Beckett.

The features that crucially distinguish this passage from satire are the "action" frame of the evolution and expansion of the speaker's self-understanding, and the emotional or attitudinal frame that goes along with serious, non-ironic (except in the Socratic sense) self-reflection and development.[88]

T. S. Eliot

T. S. Eliot's Prufrock laments, "I should have been a pair of ragged claws / Scuttling across the floors of silent seas" ("The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" ll. 73-74). Again we have a speaker uttering a complaint that is self-degrading in virtue of its use of imagery from the lower regions of the physical environment and the lower ranks of the animal kingdom. Coming after his botched attempt to take a prophetic role, this clearly registers the speaker's shame at his ridiculous failure. Later he even calls himself "almost ridiculous--/ Almost, at times, the Fool" (ll. 118-19). There is thus some tragicomedy in this situation, so it is closer still to satire than the other examples. (In fact, Woody Allen says the "ragged claws" lines to himself in one of his films.) This image would have been satirical if Eliot had taken his entire poetic situation--of a tormented young man whose sexual ambitions are undermined by prophetic ambitions, which in turn become tainted with a desire for revenge due to his romantic failings--and had played it out among crustaceans. Imagine the Lobster Quadrille from the point of view of the Lobster Wallflower. The sense of incongruity and absurdity would be heightened, and the speaker's plight would seem silly--fit only for lower denizens of the submarine branch of animals. In this passage the animal elements are more complete, and the human elements more suppressed, than in the Shakespeare and Whitman examples. Perhaps an increased focus on the animal imagery can increase the irony and humour of the situation.

But here too, we also know the context of action: ultimately the young man fails in both his romantic and prophetic aspirations, and he only feels himself growing old, and others observing it, as he lives out his days. In the last line he feels that he "drowns" as he

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[88] The closing lines of Whitman's "By Blue Ontario's Shore", titled "REVERSALS", are highly reminiscent of the biblical rhetoric that portends a sacred upside-down world (the last shall be first; a man must lose his life to gain it; etc.). They also contain the potential for satiric comedy:

> Let that which stood in front go behind,
> Let that which was behind advance to the front,
> Let bigots, fools, unclean persons, offer new propositions,
> Let the old propositions be postponed,
> Let a man seek pleasure everywhere except in himself,
> Let a woman seek happiness everywhere except in herself. (286)

"wakes" from his inspiring dreams to the dull reality of "human voices". And we know the tone is melancholy rather than comic. The author increases our identification with the speaker, and increases the pathos of the situation.

CONCLUSIONS

These examples show that there are a number of more specific determining factors that are involved in satirical rhetoric, along with the fundamental rhetorical connection between high and low elements. These are:

- -the details of the imagery (animal etc.)
- -the point of view of the speakers or narrators. This includes:
  - -the extent of knowledge of self and others
  - -the attitude embedded in the point of view to what it knows and attends to
  - -therefore, the potential for irony
- -the full context of the situation or action
- -the emotional attitude or tone of the whole work

We may amplify these points, briefly.

There should be an active contrast, contradiction, or struggle of values within a single agent (or other entity). This creates the hypocrisy and self-deceit that is such a frequent target of satire. In the case of Shakespeare, there could be a satirical effect, if Prospero were not so clearly in control of the two spirits, and Ariel did not so clearly get the better of the situation. The potential for a satirical high > low mapping would be achieved if we understood Ariel and Caliban to be projections of two sides of Prospero, perhaps figures in a dream representing ego and libido, and if Caliban was seen to be secretly in control of Prospero despite the posturing of Ariel.

The comic irony of the situation is increased if the audience, but not the satiric target, is aware of the conflict of values and valuations. Whitman's and Eliot's speakers do contain *within themselves* the right kind of conflict of high and low values; but they *know* how they are low, they are not self-deceived, as satirical butts usually are. Since Francis Cornford's pioneering work on the subject in *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, many critics have taken up the ancient and fundamental contrast and *agon* between the *alazon* role (the impostor or boaster) and the *eiron* role (the ironic man, self-deprecating and undermining the *alazon*). The *alazon* thinks he is high and is unaware that the *eiron* and the audience are conspiring to laugh at his low qualities. Similarly, in ironic beast fables, the beasts that represent certain human attitudes don't *realize* they're governed by instinct. If someone else had been making these observations about these speakers as they pretended to be something nobler, it could be satire. Compare Swift's "the true critics are known by their talent of swarming about the noblest writers, to which they are carried merely by instinct, as a rat to the best cheese, or a wasp to the fairest fruit" (*Tale* 296-97). It is not impossible for a satirical butt to be self-conscious about her contradiction of values, but such awareness changes the quality of the irony.

In order to detect and grasp the satirical intent of an imaginative construction, we must grasp the disparity between the height to which the target pretends and which he believes himself to achieve, and that lower level to which he actually attains (or sinks), and we must see the humour in this contrast.

In this regard, one particular conclusion to which Bentley's research leads him is fascinating for us. He claims that the *kind* of relation that the writer uses as the basis for the connection between the high and low does not matter to the essential principle of reduction: the relation itself is the thing:

> The relationship between the high and the low terms can be symbolic, but it can also be causal or, for that matter, the terms can have almost any type of logical or nonlogical relationship. One term could characterize a previous role of the other; or one term could designate a part of the whole; or the terms could have only an accidental spatial or temporal relationship [. . .]. We are obliged to accept a configurational or *Gestalt* description of the satiric process. Semantic gravitation occurs when low images are inserted into a cluster, a configuration, of high images; previously excluded facts with pejorative overtones cause the *Gestaltqualität* of a perceptual image to decline in value. We may know these excluded facts, but for some psychic reason they do not generally appear in the pattern of our perception. (13)[89]

We might also note that any kind of linguistic or rhetorical form will do too. (Those that establish close connections between high and low terms are natural contenders--oxymoron; Popean zeugma, etc.) Bentley's Gestalt-psychological approach is quite congenial to a cognitive framework. In terms of the theory of mental spaces, we can say that any kind of "counterpart connection" between elements of the spaces to be connected will do.

The reader of satire needs, as well as the model of the Great Chain, the ability to coordinate three mental spaces: a space characterized by "high" elements, a space characterized by "low elements", and some third space in which the high and low elements are connected in the appropriate way.[90] More specifically , in the prototypical satire the high space represents the target's view of the situation, including his estimate of his own status in the scale of being; the low space represents a contrasting, more objective view of the situation (which may be represented as the view of another character, a narrator, or simply as reality) that puts the target at a lower level of the scale;

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[89] In a very similar vein, Leonard Guilhamet writes, "The reductionism often identified with satire is really a comic technique. Reductionism becomes satiric only when an opposing magnification of harm enters into the satire. Thus the reduction in stature which the object of satire undergoes serves not to render him harmless, as in comedy, but to magnify his evil. But how is this deflation and concurrent amplification achieved? D. H. Monro has provided some helpful commentary when he explains the comic by 'the linking of disparates, . . . the collision of different mental spheres, . . . the obtrusion into one context of what belongs in another.'" (15) Monro's comment is from *Argument of Laughter*, 1963. Guilhamet continues, that "For satirists throughout the first half of the eighteenth century at least, these 'different mental spheres' correspond to genres" (15).

[90] See Fauconnier, *Mental Spaces* and *Mappings in Thought and Language.*

and the blended space brings the two others into relation, so that the reader grasps the humour of the self-deceived target's view being deflated by a more objective view.

I have not much discussed the emotional attitude required in satire. It appears that in order to do justice to this crucial aspect of the problem of the rhetorical patterns of genres in a cognitive view, we will need to start with some elementary division of basic emotional/ evaluative attitudes, and a way to associate them with mental spaces. We will also need an exploration of what happens to such attitudes when they are connected to other mental spaces.

Bentley gives the example that our *Gestalt* of Swinburne does not normally include certain facts that we know about him, such as his many yards of intestines. In cognitive terms, the default model of Swinburne is altered in a noticeable way by being brought into contact with a default model of human internal anatomy--intestines and all.

Are these two ideas, or incongruous aspects of one idea? If we think in terms of "the facts", these are just aspects of one thing. If we think in terms of conceptualization, we can see that these are distinct mental spaces characterized by distinct cognitive models. The model of Swinburne as "poet" would include everything we know relevant to his career as a poet, such as the process of writing poetry, the process of working and living as a poet, the titles of poems and books, and so on. This "poet" model of Swinburne is the default for him as a person, because poetry is why he is remarkable and memorable. This model does not include his yards of intestines. But that does not mean that the "poet" model implies that Swinburne has no intestines. It means we do not intuitively attend to their existence, we do not concentrate on them, when we think of Swinburne. It takes a deliberate redirection of our attention to bring this aspect of Swinburne's existence onto our mental stage. If someone highlights or "profiles" this aspect of Swinburne, we respond by recalling our general schema for human digestion, and projecting it into our default model of Swinburne. The intestines from a "digestive system" knowledge frame are integrated into the body that also exists in the "Swinburne as whole person" space.

So we should modify Bentley's suggestion: what we have is not just one standard "high" Gestalt configuration of images or "default model" of Swinburne. We have a default model of Swinburne-as-poet, plus a range of other possible models, related to other purposes or contexts, according to which we may frame him. When these frames are brought into relation with one another, the emotional responses and attitudes we associate with them are also brought into relation, and this creates the potential for surprising and comic contrasts.

Let us also refer to the points evoked by our counter-examples, of the need to consider imagery details, the full context of action, point-of-view, comparative character/ narrator knowledge, irony, and emotion. These points can to some extent be reckoned into a consideration satirical rhetoric in terms of conceptual blending.

Suppose we satirically make the connection between Swinburne and his intestines in a more definite way by thinking of his writing as working along the lines of his digestive processes. We project selected structure from one space containing our specific

model of Swinburne-the-poet, and another space containing the abstract frame of human digestive processes.[91] This creates a blend from two input spaces, Swinburne writing and Swinburne digesting. Analogical connections are established between the digestive processes and the creative processes:

Swinburne Writing
1. Reading poems
2. Operation of imagination during "reception"
    a. Responding to poems (feeling, analyzing)
    b. Remembering and being influenced by some poetry
    c. Forgetting or ignoring other poetry
3. Operation of imagination during "production"
    a. Working on poems (drafting, revising)
    b. Producing final versions of poems

Swinburne Digesting
1. Eating food
2. Digestive system operation - "reception"
    a. Breaking down food
    b. Turning some of the food into energy
    c. Turning some of the food into waste
3. Digestive system operation - "production"
    a. Using the energy for further living
    b. Expelling waste

These spaces have some common generic structure:

Generic Space
1. Intake material
2. Process material by internal operations
    a. Break down material into parts
    b. Direct some parts towards recombination into new forms
    c. Recognize some parts as useless
3. Use the material
    a. Use the valuable parts in producing some valuable product
    b. Reject the useless parts by producing some waste product

The parts of the two spaces are mapped according to the numbers given, except for number 3. 3. a. and b. of Writing are two stages of a single process of creating poetry. 3.

[91] If we do not know much specific about Swinburne as a poet, we think of him as such by projecting his specific person into our abstract frame of a poet (structured by general concepts of how a poet thinks, works and lives, what a poem is, etc.), then use the resulting concept (itself a kind of blend) as an input space for the new blend involving the digestion analogy. The satire would work as well using an abstract concept of The Poet to create a blend of The Digestive Poet.

a. and b. of Digesting are two complementary but separate sub-processes of the overall process of digestion. 3. a. and b. of Writing could, together, map onto 3. a. OR b. of Digestion, but not onto both.

Thus the most important clash of structure between the two processes is that the digestive process produces no concrete product as it converts food into valuable energy; it only produces a concrete waste product. This lack of fit between the structure of the input spaces produces one of the central inferences of the analogy once the mapping is complete, however: it is natural to map the concrete product of poetic thinking onto the concrete product of digestion--the poem is excrement.[92] (Consequently, all the processes that lead to that product are regarded in the corresponding negative light.)

There are other failures of correspondence, in the specific mechanisms and the emotional associations of each process: The digestive process is unconscious, mechanical, material, and conventionally ugly and disgusting. The poetic process is (largely) conscious, involves intense feeling and thought, is immaterial, and conventionally noble, beautiful, spiritual. These become contrasted in the blend.

What is emergent in the blend (not available in any of the inputs on their own) is the analogy between writing and digestion, and everything that follows from that: the contrast of emotional tone between poetry and digestion; the humour of focussing on a poet's entrails when considering his creative processes, and specifically the parallel within the single figure of the poet, of the digestive and creative workings; the view of poetry as a mindless biological process; and the implied irony of the poet who thinks his poetry is one thing when we see it is something else.

I conclude with a few comments on how points of view, feeling, image and action details, and irony, relate to input spaces and blend spaces.

Each input space has a point of view on its topic and a feeling about it:

Point of View: Swinburne presumably sees his writing in the conventional way, as free, conscious, immaterial, spiritual. We see his writing in terms of digestion, as mechanical, unconscious, material, and grossly biological.

Feeling: Swinburne feels about his poetry the way he feels about poetry in general: it is beautiful, mysterious, ennobling, etc. We feel about the situation the way we feel about digestion: we may be indifferent to the process, or disgusted at it.

When the distinct points of view and feelings associated with each distinct space are brought together in the blend we get a more complex overall point of view and feeling. And since in this case the point of view and feeling of the two inputs contrast, we get irony when they are put together:

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[92] This suggests that "attribute mapping" of objects (elements) across domains may take precedence over analogical mapping of relational structure across domains.

Irony: The blended space inherits Swinburne's point of view and feeling about his poetry, and our point of view and feeling about digestion. What emerges in the blended space that cannot exist in the input spaces, as the analogy is developed, is the deep conflict between Swinburne's point of view and feeling and our point of view and feeling. In the blend, Swinburne is unaware of our point of view and feeling, and unaware of the analogy, but we are aware of his point of view and feeling. Since our perspective includes his but his does not include ours, our perspective is the more inclusive and complete, and the analogy of writing with digestion takes precedence over the conception of Swinburne's writing on its own. Hence the blend may also suggest Swinburne's ignorance or denial of bodily realities, and therefore a certain arrogance, pretense, and hypocrisy on his part. The new network of perspectives creates new perceptions and feelings.

Image and action details: we specify the imagistic details as we work out the mapping between poetry and digestion. For the blend to have a satirical form and tone, the imagery must be not merely clinical but "low", and the action, contrasting poetic with digestive processes, must not somehow become romantic or tragic, but rather such as to be reductive and trivializing.

Unlikely as that sounds, it seems possible that such a blend could be slightly adjusted so as to ennoble the lowly digestive processes by comparing them to poetic processes--in effect, to reverse the satiric tendency. The human digestive system might be regarded as a kind of poetry of the body, or of a natural or spiritual force thought to have created the body: as it intakes from its environment food that it mysteriously finds to be delicious, it transforms it mysteriously into energy to go on living, and to delight further in life through its perceptions of beauty, its creation of great things (perhaps even poems), its relationships with loved ones, and so on.

I am assuming that our blend is specified in such a way that the details of the digestive system imagery and the context of action are such that the satirical conflict of perspectives obtains. The specific focus on the "waste" consequence of digestion and the steps leading to it, instead of the "energy" consequence of digestion and the steps leading to it, seems to me very important in distinguishing these possibilities of emotional response and rhetorical tone. The blend chooses to focus on one of these two available and recognized sub-paths of digestive events. But the feeling and tone associated with the paths is determined largely by our pre-existing attitudes towards them. The blend uses those pre-existing attitudes, it does not create them. (Again we are faced with the need to include within our conceptual models some table of basic emotional responses and how they are associated with elements of human life.)

Chapter 6: Satiric Metaphor in Narrative: Descent and Decline

I have emphasized the importance of plot-schema to the ICMs of genres, and the importance of "reductive" high > low inversion mappings in rhetoric and metaphoric structure to the meaning of satire in particular. Now I want to bring these two foci together, to show how whole plots create the kinds of comically degrading meanings we have explored in the mappings of linguistic and imagistic metaphor.

Mark Turner's analysis of story and "parable, the projection of story" allows us to examine in detail how conceptual mappings, metaphoric and otherwise, relate to narrative. Lakoff and Johnson analyze metaphor as conceptual projection; that is, the mapping of the image-schematic structure of one concept onto another. In *The Literary Mind*, Turner analyzes "parable" as "the projection of story"; that is, the mapping of the image-schematic structure of one event onto another.

Turner discusses the structure of events in detail in order to argue that our conceptualization of events in image-schematic terms constrains the operation of parabolic projection. We understand events as having their own image-schematic *internal structure*. They can be

> punctual or drawn out; single or repeating; closed or open; preserving, creating, or destroying entities; cyclic or not cyclic, and so on. This internal structure is image-schematic: it is rooted in our understanding of small spatial stories. [. . .] We think of a season as coming around again, time as progressing along a line, a search as going on, a sale as closed, a blink as punctual (like a spatial point). None of these events has the literal spatial or bodily form we associate with it, but we use these image schemas to structure and recognize these events. (28)

Events also have image-schematic *causal structure*. Causation by physical force is typically understood through image schemas of force dynamics.

> When the force of the sledgehammer causes the door to fall, or a punch causes a boxer to fall, or a gust of wind topples the tree, we understand all of these events as instances of a particular image schema of physical force dynamics, which is why we can say of all of them that the first entity (sledgehammer, boxer, wind) "knocked" the other entity (door, opponent, tree) "down." Phrases like "The tidal wave swept the resort away," "The telephone pole crushed the car," "The roof gave in when the tree fell on it," "The river cut a new path," and similar expressions all portray causal events through image schemas of physical force dynamics. (29)

Turner adds that Leonard Talmy's studies show that "image schemas of force dynamics are also used to structure nonphysical causation, as when we say, 'The sight of blood *forced* him to run,' 'His ambition *propelled* him to excess,' or 'The committee finally gave *in* and *collapsed*'" (29). As well, we think of the parts of events as having *relational "modal" structure*, such as "ability (actors are able to perform actions), obligation or necessity (a command may require the action), possibility (some condition may allow the actor to perform the action), and so on" (29).

We can use this analysis to study in detail how plot-structures are understood in image-schematic terms, how the image-schematic structure of certain kinds of plot are suited to the satirical meaning of the genre, and how plots create satirical meaning in other ways--through various kinds of story-mapping.

J. Hillis Miller, discussing meaning in narrative, life, and language, asserts that it "lies in continuity, in a homogeneous sequence making an unbroken line" (375). He focuses in particular on the relation of Sterne's lines to those of Hogarth and Schlegel, but also relates the line of narrative both to earlier traditions of thought, and to the later sequence of influence in Burke, Goethe, Balzac, Baudelaire, Henry James, and Hardy; and in America, Poe, Emerson, Whitman, Stevens and Ammons (377).

> Plot, double plot, subplot, narrative strands, graph or curve of the action, chain of events--this compelling image of the story as a line which might be projected, plotted, graphed, or diagrammed as a continuous spatial curve, or as a zigzag, as form of visible figure, has a long history in Western thought. This history forms an extended line of lines, in genealogical filiation. The "origins" of this line of lines may be found in the double source of our culture in the Greeks and in the Hebrews. The Psalmist's "The lines are fallen unto me in pleasant places; yea, I have a goodly heritage" (Psalms 16:6) is often echoed and has become almost a cliché, [. . .]. Greek lines include the twice-bifurcated dialectical line of *The Republic*, and the line image implicit in the Greek word for historical narrative, *diegesis*, with its suggestion that a history or a story is the leading out of a line of events or its tracking down later. (376)

In *Moral Imagination*, Mark Johnson examines the kind of synthesis implied in Ricoeur's idea of a "configurative grasp" that makes of an ordered series of events a story with a beginning, middle and end. This structure, Johnson points out, is an instance of a more basic pattern that structures our bodily movement and perception, and our understanding of time--the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (166). Analysis of the mapping from physical movement to purposive activity tells us why narrative is appropriate to explain action: "All forms of action (from mundane tasks, to large-scale projects, to life plans) can be understood metaphorically as journeys. The basis for the isomorphism across each of these domains is the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema" (168).[93]

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[93] This is an idealized model, Johnson recognizes: "This is not to deny that our lives are shot through with gaps, disjunctions, reversals, fractures, and fragmentations that constitute what Ricoeur calls the

Characters are actors, and actions can easily be thought of as events of motion, where actors are forces moving along paths from sources to goals, encountering obstacles and overcoming or succumbing to them. The narration of the story is also naturally conceived as a line. Closer analysis of literary narratives shows the need to posit a set of three interrelated lines, each with a viewpoint and focus:

On the **line of narration**, the trajector is the narrator's viewpoint moving along a line of storytelling; and the viewpoint is typically focussed on another line, the line of the story event and action.

On the **line of story event and action**, actions of the characters in the story, where characters are trajectors moving along a line of experience and action in time. Among the characters' actions may be the actions of imagining other events and actions outside of their present experience. In this case, the line of story action becomes like another line of narration, and the character's viewpoint is focussed on another line, the line of imagined event and action.

The line of **imagined event and action** is the line of flashbacks and flashforwards, planning and hoping and fantasizing. The character has a viewpoint in the present that can focus on people, objects, and events in past or future (or in the imagination alone).

In first-person narration the narrator is a character, and the line of narration (partly) coincides with the line of one character's story action. In third-person narration the narrator is not a character in the story, and the lines of story action and character imagining are distinct from the line of narration.

More importantly for our purposes, parsing narratives in terms of event-structure allows us to characterize the different conventional narrative structures of different genres in a unified way, using principles of structure already attested in studies of cognition and language. With that terminology we can talk about how particular narratives stand in relation to the genres in which they participate. A work's various narrative threads may participate in few or many genres, and in ways that are relatively prototypical or relatively non-prototypical for the genre.

For example, the genre of the picaresque tale or novel, exemplified by *Lazarillo de Tormes*, is said to have a "wandering" narrative. There are many kinds of wandering, but in picaresque wandering the protagonists do not set out with a clear guiding purpose in mind, as is typically the case with romantic quest narratives, for example, which may also wander. Rather, the picaro's story begins with the difficulties of his youth, when his existence is hand-to-mouth, and the action of his life is one of struggling to survive as a "half-outsider", by attaching himself to a series of "masters", and learning from these masters to live by his wits without much regard for law or honour or social status.

In terms of the causal structure, the whole event of the wandering picaresque narrative is an action without an overarching guiding purpose--the picaro is pushed by circumstances more than he is animated by internal force. He is driven by bodily forces to satisfy basic needs--food and drink and shelter. Because he needs these things he has

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'discordance' of human existence. Yet we *strive* for meaning, coherence and narrative unity, even if it is never fully attainable" (MI 170).

little choice about accepting the situations that present themselves. Within these situations he has a little room to scratch out an existence by tricking other people, and in exceptional circumstances he can use some desperate trick against his master to better himself. As for the internal structure of events, the whole narrative is single, drawn out, closed, and non-cyclic, and it preserves entities.

But this whole is commonly broken into a number of sub-actions with analogous structure: they are usually defined by the acquisition of a new "master", a new place to live, a new routine, new swindles. The internal structure of the sub-actions is repeated, drawn out (but shorter), closed, and cyclic, and they *preserve* the picaro and his world, but *exchange* one situation for another. These sub-actions are typically of comparable length. Causal force in character and narrative is downplayed. The sub-stories tend to be interchangeable in order: it does not much matter which comes first, which second, which third, etc. And it is unusual for these story strands to intersect in significant ways: complex causality and coincidence are rare and unimportant in the picaro's gritty realistic world (vs. e.g. Dickens' comic world). There is usually one protagonist with few people on his side: we don't get a company of questers whose stories are woven together as the narration shifts focus from one to another. Therefore suspense is limited to the minor present predicaments of the picaro. As with the line of story action, there is little sense of a causal sequence of progress and development in the line of character experience. After the picaro loses whatever naivete he begins with, his later adventures tend to confirm a jaded view of the world from the vantage of the underbelly, the sidelines, the poor and criminal.

We might say that the modal structure of the picaresque is "realistic": possibility, necessity, and ability are as they are in our world. In fantasy genres, magic may be a possibility, and may alter what people are able to do. In Greek tragedy and epic, the gods and Fate vie for control over the world, so there are certain kinds of necessity and ability operating in these genres that are foreign to our present epistemology. Magical realism is a subtle blend of predominantly realistic necessity with occasional limited supernatural possibilities which are, however, unpredictable and uncontrollable by humans--and are also partly ironic. (Frye's sequence of "modes" defined by the relation of the hero's power of action to the physical and metaphysical rules of his world, might be cast in terms of event-structure modality.)

These event-structural features are crucial for defining the picaresque, and distinguishing it from its generic opposites, such as the pastoral and the chivalric romance. In general, such event-structural distinctions appear to be pivotal for distinguishing the narrative types that significantly define genres.

The comprehension of such event structure also relies on the SCALE or vertical dimension of the narrative cosmos. Frye's narrative patterns remind one of the fever charts of doctors or the income charts of accountants, and this kind of mental charting is important because we grasp some genres by tracking the typical course of the protagonist's fortunes "up" and "down", and grasping the overall shape of that projected entire linear path. Obvious examples are the image-schematic "U" shape of comedy and the "inverted U" shape of tragedy.

Now, let us consider how Frye describes the relation of plot-shape to genre. He views genre in terms of rhetorical situation or "the conditions established between the poet and his public"; and speaks of the "radical of presentation" to emphasize that what defines the genre of a work is the convention or concept of the rhetorical relation that has shaped it, not the actual medium in which it happens to be placed (*Anatomy* 246-47).

In the essay on the theory of myths, he distinguishes genre from "pre-generic narrative structure". Because he can identify "four main types of mythical movement", he is able to conclude that there are "narrative categories of literature broader than, or logically prior to, the ordinary literary genres" (162). The types of movement are defined in terms of the four mythical "worlds" that are their imaginative background:

> The top half of the natural cycle is the world of romance and the analogy of innocence; the lower half is the world of "realism" and the analogy of experience. There are thus four main types of mythical movement: within romance, within experience, down, and up. The downward movement is the tragic movement, the wheel of fortune falling from innocence toward hamartia, and from hamartia to catastrophe. The upward movement is the comic movement, from threatening complications to a happy ending [. . .]. (162)

These four narrative categories, "the romantic, the tragic, the comic, and the satiric", also have ordinary meanings that "describe general characteristics of literary fictions, without regard to genre". So,

> Tragedy and comedy may have been originally names for two species of drama, but [. . .]. [i]t would be silly to insist that comedy can refer only to a certain type of stage play, and must never be employed in connection with Chaucer or Jane Austen. [. . .] If we are told that what we are about to read is tragic or comic, we expect a certain kind of structure and mood, but not necessarily a certain genre. The same is true of the word romance, and also of the words irony and satire, which are, as generally employed, elements of the literature of experience. (162)

This argument is important, but Frye does not elaborate much on how the pregeneric narrative categories relate to genre categories. Let us clarify this with a few basic observations. Comedy does not necessarily mean stage play, but comic dramas cannot be structured by a resolution and mood fitting for tragedy. In other words, the direction of expectation between the two types of categories is one-way, from the more specific to the less specific: comedy does not imply comic drama, but comic drama does indeed imply comedy. Similarly for other more specific genres or "historical kinds": tragedy does not normally govern the limerick or the sonnet; romance cannot govern Menippean satire; satire cannot govern the eulogy. (It is possible to imagine a eulogy with satirical content and form of course, but that would be a satirical parody of a eulogy, not a real eulogy.) So these pregeneric narrative structures are important determinants of genre, though they are theoretically separable.

Later in the same essay, he discusses the relation of what I call plot-schemas (which corresponds to his term "dramatic function"--what the characters have to do) to structure and shape (in my terms, event-structure correlated with a metaphorical SCALE of emotion and value or the *axis mundi*), and to characters. Regarding the typical characters of comedy, he writes:

> In drama, **characterization depends on function**; what a character is follows from what he has to do in the play. **Dramatic function** in its turn depends on the **structure** of the play; the character has certain things to do because the play has such and such a **shape**. The structure of the play in its turn depends on the **category** of the play; if it is a comedy, its structure will require a comic **resolution** and a prevailing comic **mood**. (171-72, my emphasis)

Character types are determined by plot types; plot types are determined by structure/ shape, and structure/ shape is determined by category of mythos or pregeneric narrative. So ultimately characters derive from category (or what most other critics still call genres or master genres). This genre-based determination (of characters through structure) works through features of resolution and prevailing mood.

The earlier discussion shows that mythological or narrative category (but not genre) is defined in terms of *movements* in and across *worlds*; the later discussion shows that mythological categories have a certain *resolution and mood.* This implies that the former and the latter qualities are inter-defining. "Resolution" refers to the way an action is completed, but it also refers to the way themes reach a final point of development. "Mood" is emotional tone. Frye's "worlds" concern emotional tone and theme. The nature of these features can be clarified, then, by examining more closely the relation among types of *resolution* and *action*, action and *movement*, movement and *character*, character and *mood*, and all of these elements and *theme*. We want to know two things: why and how are character-types connected with narrative movement, and why and how are character types connected with kinds of emotion?

Resolution and Action and Movement and Character and Mood

Character types are the bridge between "resolution" of action and "mood" of narrative, because what the resolution resolves is the network of plans and actions of characters, and this network is based on their desires and hopes and fears, and our identification with and involvement in the progress of these desires and hopes and fears (and the resulting actions) is the basis of the story's mood. The resolution is some form of completion for the projects and actions of all the main characters. We can think of such actions in terms of the conventional metaphor of *motion along a path,* or a line, and these lines in terms of *image-schematic force-dynamics*. If they achieve their goals, then metaphorically their lines are completed and they reach their intended destinations. If they do not achieve their goals, their lines are blocked or cut off or diverted or grind to a halt.

We can also think of *emotions* as metaphorical linear *forces* because studies of the metaphors used in language for emotion show that it is fundamentally conceived as a *force* (see Kovecses). An emotional force can grow, diminish, be blocked, be released,

conflict with other forces, compel or inhibit action, etc. For example, Kovecses analyzes metaphors for the emotion of love as based on an image-schema of forces joining in a *union*. To feel ashamed is to feel *small*, *low*, and *exposed*. The image-schematic "shapes" of Frye's mythoi are a kind of shorthand for more complex structures of action. But the image-schemas also have significant implications for understanding the conceptualization of emotion ("mood", "tone" or "attitude") in literature.[94] The common metaphor of the line, the *force* moving along a *path*, gives us a clear and explicit cognitive structural parallel of genre-defining plot shape with the conceptual structure of our emotions. It is natural and inevitable that we should map from story-line to emotional "arc".

For example, comedy is the Mythos of Spring. A conventional romantic-comic plot is the *meeting* of two young lovers, their *separation* by fortune, and their eventual *reunion* after a series of adventures.[95] This reunion is the overarching goal of each lover and governs all specific plot actions. "Blocking" characters are opposed to this process and try to prevent it.

Image-schematically, **the two characters embody two forces** *drawn* to one another. We readers identify with the main characters, and understand their emotions in image-schematic terms of the competing forces of various character-roles: we, like them, feel *strained* as they are *pushed apart* by enemies, perhaps *trapped* and *pent-up* and frustrated as they are *held in place* by parents or other *blocking* figures, an overall *suspense* as the two are held apart throughout the narrative; a *rush* of energy as they *escape* situations of bondage; *steeled* as they continue to strive *forward*, *press on* and *surmount obstacles*; and happy, all *tension relaxed*, *overflowing* with joy, at *rest*, when at last they are *joined* together.

The theme of romantic comedy is the celebration of the renewed birth of natural energies, and these image-schemas of separated and contained forces bursting out of their containers, flowing, growing, becoming attracted, moving towards one another, overcoming obstacles, and uniting are likely also to govern imagery (e.g. of nature).[96]

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[94] Paul Hernadi modifies Frye's mythoi by treating their "moods" from the vantage of an emotion-based "esthetics of reception": "Comedy combines farcical derision (laugh at) with festive joy (laugh with); tragedy combines melodramatic pity (weep for) with the awe or fear aroused by religious and secular martyr plays (weep along); romance combines fear and joy as it makes us admire the unity of opposites in nature; satire combines derision and pity as it promotes indignation over unresolved contradictions in culture" ("Entertaining Commitments" 195).

[95] See Bakhtin's "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel" in *The Dialogic Imagination* (87-88), as well as Frye's mythoi of Spring (Comedy) and Summer (Romance).

[96] Susanne Langer's essay "The Comic Rhythm" links patterns of comedy with physiological patterns. Her descriptions have an image-schematic ring: comedy "expresses the elementary strains and resolutions of animate nature, the animal drives that persist even in human nature, the delight man takes in his special mental gifts that make him the lord of creation; it is an image of human vitality holding its own in the world amid the surprises of unplanned coincidence" (70); "comedy is essentially contingent, episodic, and ethnic; it expresses the continuous balance of sheer vitality that belongs to society and is exemplified briefly in each individual" (72). Laughter is a "surge of vital feeling" (76).

This brings us to the question of how *story* achieves degrading satiric mappings. I see four distinguishable ways in which the structure of action enters into the creation of satirical meaning:

1. Action-schemas can generate plot schemas fitting to the satiric tone/ mood, when the plot selects structures of elements and relations that epitomize the "negative" view of satire: actions fail, events are unfortunate, characters are fools or knaves.
2. Adjacent or parallel scenes can invite mapping from one to another, and this process can create satirical meaning when one scene degrades the other by the connection (this can show analogy *and* contrast).
3. Scenes can embody degrading satiric conceptual metaphors.
4. Actions can embody degrading satiric conceptual metaphors, via image-schematic mapping of metaphor to event-structure.

Let us consider these in detail.

1. Action-schemas can generate plot schemas fitting to the satiric tone/ mood. The connection of action to meaning begins with the general action-schema of intellectual quest. The general schema subsumes more specific actions and their elements--such elements as discovering a philosophical problem (e.g. an unanswered question, a logical contradiction, or a debate, or a conflict of ideas with experience), thinking through a problem, developing a theory, trying to live by the theory, proselytizing the theory, discussing the theory; seeking wisdom: reading, researching, seeking mentors, talking philosophy, and questing for objects, places, people, or other beings that contribute to the quest's goal.

But it must be specified that the genre selects for the plot predominantly the variants of this action-schema that are suited for parody--that is, schemas of the delay or blocking or failure of an intellectual quest. Schemas for a successful intellectual quest govern such genres as the prose "confession" (Frye, *Anatomy* 307-08), and the serious essay, whether informal and personal, or formal and scholarly (e.g. the dissertation, treatise, research paper, monograph etc.). These thinkers find what they are looking for; they reach their intellectual goals.

There are some philosophical successes to be found in Menippean satires, but these are deeply qualified. There is always some measure of success achieved when theories are subjected to effective tests, even when they are proved wrong, as when Candide tests Leibnitzian optimism, or Lucian shows the failure of philosophies to make their philosophers more virtuous or happy or brave (*The Carousal*; *Philosophies for Sale*; Socrates and others passing to the land of the dead). The Cynic gains some cold comfort in proving himself right.

And there are other kinds of intellectual progress, however imperfect. The quests may be successful at arriving at philosophical conclusions that are disheartening--they may enact the positive discovery of a negative truth. Lucian's narrators get thorough tours of the absurd worlds of the dead, the gods, and the philosophers; Pantagruel's company does receive the little that the Oracle of the Bottle has to offer. Nashe's Jack Wilton

returns to the camp of the English king's army after having met Erasmus and Thomas More (478), Agrippa (484) and Pietro Aretino (494), and turned to a "straight life" (547), due to much suffering, hearing the "tragical matter" (541) of Cutwolf's murderous revenge and witnessing his torture and execution. Don Quixote realizes and renounces his madness, but only after living it out and discovering in it some potential for wisdom and goodness, and changing Sancho and others in the process. Burton is partly successful in anatomizing his own folly; Swift's Gulliver gains a full multi-perspectival realization of the full worthlessness of human existence. Sterne's Tristram experiences all the misfortunes an infant can experience, discovers all the difficulties of moving straight-forward and getting his story out, and Walter becomes philosophically resigned to his son's fate. Johnson's Imlac reaches a stoical serenity after realizing the vanity of all human endeavour; Carlyle's Teufelsdrockh manages to pass from the cynical Eternal No to the mystical Eternal Yes. Apuleius's Lucilius and Carroll's Alice escape their transformed worlds of speaking animals and persecution. Peacock's conversationalists in *Nightmare Abbey* gain some solace in company, as its combined forces ascertain that nothing is worth doing and no-one worth doing anything for, and Scythrop benefits from understanding advanced melancholy through attempting suicide. Flaubert's Bouvard and Pécuchet return to their desks after surveying all the manias of intellectual and cultural fashion, realizing the clerk's life is best for them. Joyce's characters have their epiphanies and form new relations after descending through the nightmare of lust and intoxication. Pynchon's good guys crystallize into a "Counterforce" against paranoia-driven society.

This cognitive element--the event-schema of philosophical quest--defines the canonical causal relations and order of the elements and events of the narrative. There is of course a vast range of possible variation within this schema: the philosophical quest in the fictional world need not be complete, and a narrative may focus on any part of it, or on the whole thing, or on a wider set of events. But the schema *constrains* the structure of possible actions. For example, the causal structure of the quest must be preserved in the "order of the told" (though not necessarily in the "order of the telling"): the search for answers must precede and motivate the discovery of answers, and the holding of a belief must precede its refutation.

This aspect does not in itself establish tone, although it seems to narrow the range of possible tones. The ways one can feel about success are different from the ways one can feel about failure. As well, degree of success affects the specific proportions of irony, scorn, and acceptance in the tone, and specific tone correlates with specific plot structure. The more successful intellectual quests tend to have a softer tone, and delve less deeply into human degradation.

2. Parallels in situation or action.

Rather than whole plots or scenes embodying some conceptual metaphor, two or more parallel realistic actions may be meant to be mapped to one another in order to create meaning. We find one kind of pattern in the repetition of situations and incidents that are similar or analogical in some way. At the beginning of the *Iliad*, when Agamemnon persuades Achilles to give up Briseis to appease the Trojan priests, we need to see the

parallel between this situation and that of the stealing of Helen by Paris, to grasp Achilles' rage at being asked to help rescue Helen. Such non-allegorical parallels may be used in a limited way, or they may add up to something more general. Often, the repeated situation cues us to map to a generic space, to read the "meaning" of the incidents as a whole. The series of picaresque tales of Petronius's Encolpius, Lazarillo, Nashe's Jack Wilton, etc., add up to a "low" view of life: cynical, tough, shrewd, and lusty. Curtius shows how the "string of impossibilities" adds up to the vision of a "world upside-down". Or a single highlighted event may become emblematic of some general meaning (e.g. the parable of Psyche and Cupid in Apuleius).

Ronald Paulson explores this technique in Apuleius, showing how incident relates to character development, and how incident and character repeat and interconnect to project a "world":

> Each of the events produces a small independent satiric fiction, secondarily illuminating the central matter of Lucius' progress and education. They are all instructive in that they offer examples and point fingers for Lucius' benefit. [. . .] In his first adventures as an ass Lucius is only concerned with saving himself: he seeks roses, runs away from the bandits, fights the evil boy for survival. But starting with his service to the eunuchs, his own moral sense as an observer begins to be in evidence. [. . .] From the start an oppressive, nightmare world is conveyed in Apuleius' narrative by the repetitions of incidents, the obsessive references to certain kinds of experience. He repeatedly presents the situation of an innocent man's apparent guilt [. . .]. The *Metamorphoses* shows that in a narrative satire fictions operate through the interrelatedness of characters: not only the relationship between two people, a fool and a knave, but between rich and poor fools, poetic and business-like fools, and so on. They are held close to a theme or a vice, but they also project a visualizable world of total interrelatedness, like a cheese completely infiltrated with maggots, which is common to most prose fiction satires. (53-57).

He sums up:

> As a technician, Apuleius offers one important solution to the satirist's problem of structure. The satirist, by definition concerned with the middle of an action, when conditions are at their worst, rather than with the beginning and the end, has to come to some compromise as to his containing action. Apuleius employs a double action, presenting a series of parallel actions, each one relatively static, usually involving either the contrast of an ideal and its degeneration in a man or an act and its consequences. He connects them with a token over-all action involving a protagonist's error, his punishment and / or education, and ends with his redemption. (57).

Alvin Kernan has comparable things to say about Evelyn Waugh, as regards his downplaying of the causal impetus leading from beginning to end, and as regards his alternative principle of structure:

> By some standards Waugh would appear to have put his novels together very badly, but he is, of course, reproducing in his arrangement of scenes and his handling of time the frenetic, disconnected movements of modern life. Only a true culture, not a disintegrating one, can have an Aristotelian plot in which one event follows inevitably from another and the whole is composed of a beginning, a middle, and an end. But randomness and disorganization are only surface effects. Each of the episodes is thematically related to the others with which it is in sequence. All show in different terms the assault of appetite and stupidity on the old beliefs and ways of life, and the consequent emptiness. The scenes are carefully arranged to allow the events in one scene to define the events in the next: an episode of polite savagery in London will be juxtaposed to a scene of overt savagery in the jungle, or a description of an ultra-modern house built for machines to live in rather than men will border on a party scene in which fashionable men and women move with the predictability of machines or in a pattern of conditioned responses. (152)

Turner discusses various literary uses of his general concept of "parable", the projection of story, and variant kinds of projection are techniques that partially define the genres of allegory, emblem, and parable. Allegory projects the general structure of a specific story onto a specific conceptual structure; parable projects one specific story on to another specific story; and emblem projects a specific story onto a general story. Paulson's and Kernan's analyses show that "parable" has further complexities. Turner's concept is not strongly connected with the use of characters as moral types to construct development, or the projection of an entire "world"-type in a generic space.

3. Scenes can embody conceptual metaphors.

A scene may embody a conceptual metaphor. As we found with "realization of metaphor" and metaphoric imagery, a mapping may exist in the smaller elements of narrative, as well as in the whole structure. Alvin Kernan's sense of the relation of rhetoric to scenes, actions, setting, and plot shows a grasp of this principle of cognitive rhetoric--that figures of thought are reflected equally in microcosm and macrocosm:

> The world of satire is built up from [certain] rhetorical figures and the moral failings they dramatize. But in considering satiric rhetoric, [. . . .] it will be more useful to translate these terms to the "scenic" terms which they suggest. In doing so, we will be determining "the expressiveness of the things in language to which the rhetorical terms refer," and we will then be able more easily to see **the ways in which the rhetorical figures expand into description of the clothes, bodies, scenes, and actions**. The "variegating, confusing, or reversing tropes and figures" are, for example, more usefully understood as the "mob tendency." This primitive

> drive toward disorder is at first expressed by the various faults of style Pope includes in this class, but it presses on to realize itself in such scenic elements as the wearing of fantastic clothing, crowd and mob scenes, labyrinths and other disordered buildings, huge, jumbled cities, and at last in primal chaos and uncreation (34-35, my emphasis).

Kernan's discussion of the "crowded and chaotic scene" of satire develops Frye's ideas about the imagery of satire and the structure of its plot. In fact the study of scene structures supplies a crucial link between imagery and narrative. A scene is one of a series of brief, visualizable events in a setting, with actors and objects, that together make up the narrative:

> Frye's symbols are the shapes which dullness always assumes in satire, but the essence of dullness is best understood not as *being* cannibalism, torture, and dark towers, but as *moving* into and through these and similar states. [. . .] The advantage of putting the matter this way is not only that it squares with our actual experience of literature, but that it also permits us to see dullness at work in scenes and incidents where the chief symbols of satire do not appear in their manifest, extreme forms. My argument is that the world of satire should not be thought of as a number of typical set scenes or symbolic entities but as characteristic actions--such as darkening, disordering, preying--which in passing assume the symbolic shapes Frye has isolated as the defining the forms of satire. (23)

Since he is talking essentially about image schemas, he is right to insist on the breadth of the communicative power of this semantic basis--perhaps its universality:

> [T]he satires we have looked at suggest that, at least in the greatest satiric works, dullness is ultimately measured and found wanting by standards which underlie any local code of ethics and manners which may be invoked, directly or ironically. [. . .] But dullness is finally located and proven [. . .] by the nature of the repetitive actions of the dunces and the cumulative plot of these satires. Whatever we may think of Jonson's view of Nature or Pope's view of the classics, **we can all agree that making the small large, or the large small, and jumbling things until the real can no longer be distinguished from the unreal are the actions of dullness, not of wit**. And, beyond this, we can further agree, no matter what our persuasion, that **any furious activity which achieves the very opposite of its intentions** is laughable and dangerous, particularly when the perpetrators stand blindly pointing with pride to the mess they have made. [. . .] It is then, finally, the plot of satire which defines dullness" (172-73, my emphasis).

Here and elsewhere Kernan still makes plot a kind of *telos* of figurative patterns:

> in discussing the actions of dullness we have really been discussing the plot of satire in terms of its smaller constituent parts. The tropes and objective shapes--the multiplicity of things, the oversize images of self, the crowds--which make up the language, the persons, the furnishings, the landscapes, and the architecture of the satiric world are themselves but the momentary forms taken or shaped by dullness on its way to the full realization of its nature in the total plot. To put it another way, the solid objects and characters which make up the satiric world are but the testaments of dullness' acts [. . .]. When we look at the rhetoric or the scenery of satire, we are looking at the smallest manifestations of the actions of dullness, which taken in the aggregate constitute the plot of satire. (90-91)

But such transformations into opposites, and contradictions of aims and outcomes can exist just as much in the brief event of a scene as in the extended event of a plot.

4. The overall plot action and specific sub-actions can embody metaphors:
A plot may embody a conceptual metaphor of satire. A writer may use the satiric high > low mapping to create a satirical *story* by bringing the two poles of the scale of value into connection over the course of narrative time.

Beginning, middle, and end are the traditional parts of a story, and they can help to give us a rough idea of the kinds of connections that satirical narratives can make with satirical metaphor. A connection may be made at the outset of the story (e.g. Apuleius' Lucilius metamorphosing into an ass), or repeatedly throughout it (e.g. Voltaire's Candide and Pangloss suffer a series of degrading misfortunes but their optimism is remarkably resilient), or through a continuous gradual downwards trend (e.g. Swift's Gulliver goes from an initial naïve faith in humanity to visions of human social folly in Lilliput and Brobdingnag, to a vision of human intellectual folly in Laputa, to a vision of humans as degraded beasts in Houyhnhnmland). These types of connection may also operate in combination (e.g. Sterne's Tristram's homunculus has his vital spirits scattered like lost marbles at the outset; his life story is a series of unfortunate falls, as Burckhardt's essay chronicles; and this series adds up to an overall decline from bad to worse, as his hopes for a good beginning in life dwindle).

The satiric high > low structure is itself a semantic mapping; the projection of that mapping structure on to an event-structure produces the *abstract story of degradation or decline*. The satirical narrator makes the plot reflect a process of the high becoming low (or the low becoming ironically high), by mapping from the conceptual structure of the abstract story of degradation or decline to the event-structure of the plot.

In creating characters, scenes, and figurative language, the writer uses specific instances of the generic metaphor. In creating a narrative, the writer uses the generic metaphor to guide numerous specific instances of degradation. Such a mapping may fit the satiric mythos (movement, resolution, and mood) in a number of ways. In works that have satirical elements but are not centrally satirical, there may be satirically degraded elements (e.g. characters, intermittent stories of degradation, etc.), but without the overall work fitting the abstract story of degradation.

Implicit in our discussion of descent is the notion of the path or line as an image-schematic model for narrative, that can create an overall movement of degradation by linking various points in the story in a single process of movement with a certain direction. The protagonist moves from a metaphorically high point to a metaphorically low point.

Critics have examined various aspects of the descent pattern in detail. Frye writes that "The radical of satire, as Lucian established long ago, is a descent narrative, where we enter a lower world which reveals the sources of human absurdity and folly" (*Secular* 120). A descent in the form of a physical journey corresponds to a descent down the vertical axis of the human body (and the human segment of the Chain of Being): "Most great satirists, including Swift, Rabelais, and Joyce, have understood very well that most of these sources are to be located in the abdominal, genital, and excretory regions" (120).

Lucian's descent in *Menippus in Hell* (and elsewhere--*Dialogues of the Dead*, etc.) does indeed give us a descending journey that corresponds to a vision of the reduction of human life to the lowest level--to death and its physical correlates, excrement, bones, decaying flesh. But *Icaromenippus* gives us an ascending journey that *also* corresponds to a vision of reduction. Frye is right that the overall satirical vision is reductive, but he did not at first see how an ascent could accomplish that vision as well as a descent. An ascent is another way of connecting the high with the low. *Menippus* reduces humans by connecting them with what is low relative to their conventional status--seeing them as decaying bodies stripped of the possessions and vain self-images that are supposed to elevate them in human society. In a kind of mirror image, *Icaromenippus* reduces the gods by connecting them with what is low relative to their conventional status--seeing them in terms of the pettier side of human social life: they fear losing income, and bicker over administrative matters. By flying up to Olympus, Icaromenippus seems to bring humanity to the gods.[97]

Given this qualification, and the point that narrative presents causal change over time, we can revise Frye's claim and say that the radical of narrative satire is the descent of what is high, or the ascent of what is low, over time, by some cause.

It is possible to find actual descent-journeys in a number of Menippean works, but these are not so prominent as to be definitive of the genre or of individual plots. Don Quixote descends to the cave of Montesinos (Part II, chapters 22 and 23). To reach the Oracle of the Bottle, Rabelais's heroes approach by an Underground Way, and descend the Tetradic Steps (Book 5, chapters 35 and 36). As for Swift, Seidel notes that "On the flying doomsday island of Laputa, the local inhabitants literally experience a fear of falling. And on the magical island of Glubbdubdrib Gulliver experiences an actual descent or calling of the shades in his odyssey of strange relations" (206). There are no important downward journeys in Sterne, although the importance of physical gravity has

[97] Frye's later work integrates this perspective. In *Words With Power*, the discussion of Titans and creative ascent in the Cave variation mentions Rabelais's giants as parodies of a fertility god, related to the carnival period of Saturnalia and the mock king (260-62). Swift's "excremental vision" is part of an apocalyptic vision that separates a world of life from a world of death (263ff.). In the Furnace variation, Kierkegaard and Melville are part of a discussion of the creative identification with a destructive Nothingness (281-85).

been explored by Sigurd Burckhardt. The sequence of chapters Everlasting No, Center of Indifference, and Everlasting Yea in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* suggest the descent-and-return of Dante, but the vertical symbolism is subdued. The crew of Melville's *Pequod* seek the leviathan in the sea below, and are finally sunk and sucked into a whirlpool. Lewis Carroll's Wonderland is reached by descending into a rabbit-hole. Joyce's *Ulysses* has a trip to a graveyard that corresponds to the *nekyia* of Homer's *Odyssey*, but there is no actual physical descent involved. Symbolism of the fall is more important in *Finnegans Wake*. Tim Finnegan the bricklayer falls from a ladder to apparent death, but rises from his casket at his wake. Finn MacCool is the legendary sleeping giant who lies beneath Dublin. Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* is much concerned with falling things, especially rockets. "Gravity" and rising and falling imagery are important (comparable to Sterne's sense of the battle of levity and gravity in some ways), but again actual descent journeys are not prominent.

METAPHORICAL DESCENTS:

Michael Seidel's *Satiric Inheritance* develops Frye's (1957) ideas, charting out the "satiric action" of decline and degeneration, focussing specifically on the loss of potential expressed in the figure of a troubled inheritance. Chapter 2 (26ff.) explores tropes of origin, dispensation, and inheritance in literature. These all concern the passing-on of stable *form*; satire imagines the failure of this transmission, and the danger of regression into nothingness and chaos. This is a metaphorical descent--neither the downward journey nor the bodily degradation. It is rather the more explicitly temporal "line of descent" across generations, from parents to children (in his texts, from father to son, since the son inherits the estate and family name); and also from ancients to moderns. Seidel's "Codicil" puts it that

> I have represented narrative satire as a literary system of discontinuities or subversions. Satire's sustained actions are violations, and its generic laws subvert tradition, the *trans dare* or giving across of substance and value in form. Satire's subjects may have known a previous, perhaps higher, ancestral status, but satire's actions depict the falling-off or exhaustion of line. In a modal sense, satire is both descend*ant* and descend*ent*. It violates the bodily and mental integrity of its subjects by radicalizing rather than conserving "issue," and it confuses the moral and spatial notions of direction by divorcing descent from continuity. To be satirically conceived is to be rendered monstrous--too singular, too materially degenerate to carry on. (263)

There are many ways a line can fail, and his study finds every variation of violation and disruption of this linear action-schema in various satires. Rabelais and Cervantes

> heap material upon the frame of their narratives' suspect actions, they overjustify plots of origin, they repeat fears of sterile being and mad growth. Both *Gargantua and Pantagruel* and *Don Quixote* manifest a kind of obsession with illegitimate beginnings, forced dispensations, and complex, even redundant, movements. (61)

In Sterne, there is the danger of impotence, the interruption of coitus, and of birth; a questionable paternity; the threat of a line spending too much too soon, dying out or exhausting itself; the "backsliding" of a family member; and inheritance may be cut off by death of son (250-62). In the succession crisis in Dryden's *Absalom and Achitophel*, the revolt of the son threatens usurpation; the restoration would renew a dispensation (146). In Swift's *Tale*, the battle over an estate threatens to ruin the family; the wrong child may inherit (178); the sons attack the father. But a mind that seeks self-sufficiency and avoids the battle for inheritance becomes over-involved in itself and "has no connections with a past and can barely anticipate the future" (187). People may regress and become infantile instead of growing "up"; children may be monstrosities (190); digression and diversion may take over the mind, confusing progress and regress (191-92). Gulliver is separated from his family and home. He finds that both big and little people have a "nostalgic historiography" (205), and in Book Three he "traces the decay of the highborn as an impressionable 'great Admirer of old illustrious Families'" (207). In the fourth Book, "Yahoos are the natural end of the satirically conceived human line. Their very beastliness conforms to the larger regressive inheritance of the *Travels*" (209). Gulliver begets monsters with a Yahoo, and lives this fear of degenerative inheritance (210). Pope's work uses the symbol of incest: "Much of the content of *The Dunciad* is generation's dirty dance [. . .]. Progeny seeks its source" (234) as the dunces seek to enter the womb/ anus of the Queen Mother. Seidel writes,

> *The Dunciad* is a succession poem for a kingdom that ought not to be; *The Rape of the Lock* is a poem of reunion for marriage that could not be. In the later and larger poem, Pope celebrates the law of enervation; in the earlier and miniaturized epic, he marvels at the power of denial. (226)

The complex physical and social event of familial inheritance (which includes procreation and legal transfer of name, property, status, power) is conceived as the passing of material along a horizontal path in time, where the past is behind and the future is ahead. It is also conceived as the descent of material along a line down a vertical path (like a family tree), where ancestors are above and descendants are below. Seidel shows how satire applies the metaphor of *degradation as vertical descent* to the metaphor of *familial inheritance as vertical descent*, in a consistent way. Progeneration is degeneration: each new descendant is lower on the Chain of Being, or loses some of the ancestral substance.

There are other possible ways to construct a high > low mapping over the course of a narrative line. Alvin Kernan shows Ben Jonson satirically depicting the metaphoric descent of an individual down the Chain of Being in the course of a relatively short time. Using Tillyard's *Elizabethan World Picture*, he analyzes *Volpone* as charting the title character's descent down the Chain, down through the levels of human faculty, animal, and vegetable, to dead matter: "What Jonson has done in the play, in a general if not a perfectly systematic manner, is to allow Volpone to drive himself, via his disguises, down this hierarchy of human faculties" (138). That is, first understanding disappears, then will

is corrupted, then, "His higher faculties gone, it is inevitable that he will further degenerate" (138-39). Common sense disappears under the force of flattery, then memory goes, then the five senses disappear one by one. Kernan continues, "Act I has brought him to the level of the lowest of the animals--the parasite is the usual example given of the animal who has only the sense of touch--but now he falls below the vegetable level as his reproductive and nutritive faculties disappear" (139). At last he becomes an object: "Below the level of vegetable it would seem impossible for a man to go, but Volpone predicts his own end when he compares himself to a 'stone' and to a 'dead leaf'" (140). Here the descent has nothing to do with the event-structure of inheritance. Volpone's degradation results from the moral vacuity of his plans and actions, and it is symbolized by the association of his attributes and behaviour with the broad categories of the Chain of Being.

But we must recognize that there are many kinds of satiric plot that more closely fit other image-schematic patterns. Satires do tend to show us patterns of change from the conventionally good to the conventionally bad, but these changes may use a number of other contrasting patterns of imagery to express this change: from LARGE to SMALL, UNITY to MULTIPLICITY, COHERENCE to INCOHERENCE, FULL to EMPTY, STABLE to UNSTABLE, FREE MOTION to PARALYSIS, LIGHT to DARKNESS, FORWARD to BACKWARD, STRAIGHT to CROOKED, etc. That is, normative scalar hierarchies are also embodied in these other image-schematic patterns (light/ darkness seems more imagistic than schematic), and satires reverse these just as they invert hierarchies, and with like thematic implications and emotional effects.

While a movement from any of these image-schematic concepts to its complement does not create a descent image, it is possible to *connect* these patterns to descents and degradation in some more indirect ways. All of these concepts are opposed, in our cultural background knowledge, as ASCENT is opposed to DESCENT. We know that these opposites form pairs, and that one half of the pair is conventionally valued while the other is devalued. They can be related to the scale of being in a general way, as opposed "high" and "low" poles. They can also be related to it in a specific way, as the "high" elements are collectively associated with specific mythological details of the upper part of the Chain: Olympus and Heaven are unified, coherent, full, stable, light, clean, open, freely moving, and fertile, and reached by straight lines; whereas Hades and Hell are split, incoherent, empty, unstable, dark, dirty, closed, confined, and sterile, and reached by wandering "error". Some of them are also related in experience, as light comes from the sun above us, and we have most light when the sun is highest in the sky, and we lose light as it descends to the horizon, or when we descend underground. Our movements are clearest, easiest, and most coherent when we have most light, and in darkness our balance and movements become unstable, as we have trouble moving forward in a straight line and avoiding obstacles. Our field of vision is full in light and empty in darkness.

Let us consider other critical claims about how a more general linking of opposites can supply structure to the "satirical plot" or action, then. This of Pope's comes from his comments on the general principles of the writer for a whole work:

> His business must be to contract the true *Goût de travers*; and to acquire a most happy, uncommon, unaccountable Way of Thinking.
>
> He is to consider himself as a Grotesque painter, whose works would be spoiled by an imitation of nature, or uniformity of design. He is to mingle bits of the most various, or discordant kinds, landscape, history, portraits, animals, and connect them with a great deal of flourishing, by heads or tails, as it shall please his imagination, and contribute to his principal end, which is to glare by strong oppositions of colours, and surprise by contrariety of images. [. . .] His design ought to be like a labyrinth, out of which nobody can get clear but himself. (*Peri Bathous* chapter 5, 313)

Pope ironically recommends to the bad writer a general preference for grotesque combinations of opposing elements, such that the parts are "discordant" rather than harmoniously creating a proper whole. This result is related to Kernan's crowding and confusion, as it culminates in the symbol of the labyrinth, and also to scalar inversion ("by heads or tails"). This enthusiastic, transgressive, confusing mixture of extremes compares to what Swift says of man's natural mind:

> And, whereas the mind of Man, when he gives the Spur and Bridle to his Thoughts, doth never stop, but naturally sallies out into both extreams of High and Low, of Good and Evil; His first flight of Fancy, commonly transports Him to Ideas of what is most Perfect, finished, and exalted; till having soared out of his own Reach and Sight, not well perceiving how near the Frontiers of Height and Depth, border upon each other; With the same Course and Wing, he falls down plum into the lowest Bottom of Things; like one who travels the *East* into the *West*; or like a strait Line drawn by its own Length into a Circle. (*A Tale of a Tub*, Section 8, qtd. in Seidel 181-82)

By this insanity, other extremes as well as high and low get mixed together--ascent *becomes* descent; eastward *becomes* westward; and straight line *becomes* circle--because in Swift's world *lines* that are over-enthusiastically *extended* to extremes turn towards their origins (implying that forward becomes backward, too). The action fails because its own efforts subvert its aims.

The movement from a positive element to its negative opposite can always be thought of as a metaphorical "descent". But that does not mean that "descent" is the only or the proper or the best way to conceive of such movements. The point of the concept of a "descent" or "degrading" action is to designate negative experience--"low points" in the action mean suffering, pain, dissolution, death, of body and mind. Hence the most important mapping involving descent is not "physical descending movement as spiritual descent", or "progeneration as degeneration", or even the loss of qualities that define levels of the Chain of Being as descent, but the more general metaphor of NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE as DESCENT.

Death is frequently involved in such experience, and like descent it also functions as a symbol of negative experience. Frye speaks of a "point of ritual death" in comedy, that occurs before the upturn in the fortunes of the protagonist and his society, and there are many more such points in satire. We may think of satire as a descent in the elementary sense that it takes us through a great deal of negative experience. It seeks to identify and criticize the causes and sources of that negative experience, whether they are social forces, bad ideas, individual evil and folly, or just the inherent conditions of life or human nature.

We commonly find images of descent in the language and scenery of these low points involving death, and suffering.

Dickens's *Bleak House* has as one of its main "low points" the journey of the protagonist Esther, with Inspector Bucket, through London streets that are clearly associated with a labyrinth, to find her (recently discovered) mother, who has run away from home with suicidal intentions; she is found at the heart of the labyrinth, dead, at the gates of the pauper's cemetery in the degraded neighbourhood known as "Tom All-Alone's" (716-64). She describes their progress: "Where we drove, I neither knew then, nor have ever known since; but we appeared to seek out the narrowest and worst streets in London. Whenever I saw him [Bucket] directing the driver, I was prepared for our **descending into a deeper complication** of such streets, and we never failed to do so" (756, my emphasis). Many signals, then, indicate that this is the lowest point in this world, and in this story. Yet there is only the occasional use of vertical imagery, as in the word "descending", to express this fact.

Similarly, Richardson's Pamela goes through an episode of suicidal feelings where she nearly throws herself into a pond in the extremity of her persecution by Mr. B. and his servants (150-54). There would be a physical descent involved in drowning herself, and there is the conventional emphasis on the vertical aspect of this metaphorical descent:

> "But, Oh! my dear Parents, rejoice with me, even in this **low Plunge** of my distress; for your poor Pamela has escap'd from an Enemy worse than any she ever met with; an Enemy she never thought of before; and was hardly able to stand against. I mean, the Weakness and Presumption, both in one, of her own Mind! which had well nigh, had not divine Grace interposed, **sunk her into** the **lowest last Abyss** of Misery and Perdition!" (150, my emphasis).

But the suicidal idea and intention as such is more important in defining this moment as a low point than are the means by which it is performed. The main struggle is internal--psychic and religious--as she tries to free herself from her persecutors, frustrate their plans and extract grief from them; then reflects on her duty to God and life and her parents, and finds some hope for betterment. External elements of setting are less significant, and the means might just as well be poison or hanging.

Peacock parodies the convention of the suicide attempt in *Nightmare Abbey* as Scythrop wishes romantically to die by his own hand, "like Werter", when he is caught in a love triangle: "The crisis of my fate is come: the world is a stage, and my direction is

exit. [. . .] I cannot renounce either. I cannot choose either. I am doomed to be the victim of eternal disappointments; and I have no resource but a pistol'" (Chapter 14). In the end, both ladies renounce him (one of them writes, "Mr Listless assures me that people do not kill themselves for love now-a-days, though it is still the fashion to talk about it" (Chapter 15)). Since he misses his avowed time of death, he opts instead for his butler Raven's solution: "'A boiled fowl and a glass of Madeira are prescribed by the faculty in cases of **low** spirits'" (Chapter 14, my emphasis). The "low" in the conventional expression "low spirits" is the only textual indication of a "descent" image. However, despite that, and despite the fact that this is parody, the attempted-suicide episode is clearly a descent to a low point. It is a fundamental crisis and "turning-point" in the structure of the narrative and emotional paths of development.

We have already canvassed a number of the descents into negative experience in our surveys of degrading animal and bodily imagery in our texts. There are a few important others we may note. We find specific concentration on death (and decay and waste) in Lucian's descents to the dead, of course, which parody Odysseus's *nekyia*.

Montaigne is much concerned with what death reveals about life from his early pages. He criticizes the superstition and pomp surrounding death and funerals (13-15). Chapter 18 is "That We Should Not Judge of Our Happinesse, Untill, After Our Death" (45-48). He elaborates on how deeply the idea of death determines his work:

> But when that last part of death, and of our selves comes to be acted, then no dissembling will availe, then it is high time to speake plaine English, and put off all vizards: then whatsoever the pot containeth must be shewne, be it good or bad, foule or cleane, wine or water. [. . .] To death do I referre the essay of my studies fruit. There shall we see whether my discourse proceed from my heart, or from my mouth. [. . .] When I judge of other mens lives, I ever respect, how they have behaved themselves in their end; and my chiefest study is, I may well demeane my selfe at my last gaspe, that is to say, quietly, and constantly. (47-48)

The following essay is, "That To Philosophie, Is To Learn How To Die" (48-63). Montaigne argues that virtue is a kind of voluptuousness, and that "the contempt of death is the chiefest" benefit of virtue. It gives tranquility, and without it, "every other voluptuousnes is extinguished" (49). We must face and become familiar with death, difficult as it is:

> [L]et us remove her strangenesse from her, let us converse, frequent, and acquaint our selves with her, let us have nothing so much in minde as death, let us at all times and seasons, and in the ugliest manner that may be, yea with all faces shapen and represent the same unto our imagination [. . . .] and thereupon let us take heart of grace, and call our wits together to confront her. Ammiddest our bankets, feasts, and pleasures, let us ever have this restraint or object before us, that is, the remembrance of our condition, and let not pleasure so much mislead or transport us, [. . .] So did the Aegyptians, who in the middest of their banquetings,

> and in the full of their greatest cheere, caused the anatomie of a dead man to be brought before them, as a memorandum and warning to their guests. (53)

The benefit of this contemplation is liberty:

> He who hath learned to die, hath unlearned to serve. There is no evill in life, for him that hath well conceived, how the privation of life is no evill. To know how to die, doth free us from all subjection and constraint. (53)

The same *memento mori* is cited again a few pages later, as an analogy to his main lesson:

> And even as the Aegyptians after their feasting and carousings, caused a great image of death to be brought in and shewed to the guests and bystanders, by one that cried aloud, *Drinke and be mery, for such shalt thou be when thou art dead*: So have I learned this custome or lesson, to have alwaies death, not only in my imagination, but continually in my mouth. And there is nothing I desire more to be informed of, than of the death of men: that is to say, what words, what countenance, and what face they shew at their death. (56).

Death equalizes: "Long life or short life is made all one by death. For long or short is not in things that are no more" (59). Death is part of all life, part of our selves, from birth and throughout life (59-60). He concludes recommending moderation: "neither to flie from life, nor to run to death" (62). Montaigne's discussion shows clearly how death can be regarded as a defining moment of trial. Death shapes life, as we try to prepare for that trial by imagining it throughout life. This imagining generalizes death to make all of life a trial, but it also leads to a better sense of death's significance in life, and hence to a sense of proportion and control in our lives. These themes are repeated in other essays.

Johnson's Rasselas descends to the tombs of the Egyptians to find wisdom (chapters 31-32). The princess's maid Pekuah fears ghosts, Rasselas assures her there is no danger, but Imlac counters, "That the dead are seen no more [. . .] I will not undertake to maintain against the concurrent and unvaried testimony of all ages, and of all nations" (571). Imlac states the meaning of this experience. They have now "gratified our minds with an exact view of the greatest work of man, except the wall of China" (572). But while that wall has a purpose, the pyramids do not:

> He that has built for use, till use is supplied, must begin to build for vanity [. . .]. I consider this mighty structure as a monument of the insufficiency of human enjoyments. [. . .] Whoever thou art, [. . .] not content with a moderate condition, [. . .] survey the pyramids, and confess thy folly! (573)

The greatest feat of human activity is the greatest example of vanity. Johnson's descent seeks a "base" of human life that is not vain and empty, but finds none. It may be significant that Rasselas's sister's name, Nekayah, is so close to *nekyia*.

Kierkegaard's "A" addresses an "Extempore Apostrophe" before a "Fellowship of the Dead":

> too familiar with the wretchedness of life and the perfidiousness of existence, we resolved to come to the aid of universal law and obliterate ourselves if it does not forestall us [. . .] as yet no one has been released, no one has released himself, since every one of us is too proud for that, because we all regard death as the greatest good fortune [. . .]
>
> Yes, would that the vortex, which is the world's core principle, [. . .] might erupt with the last terrible shriek that more surely than the trumpet of doom announces the downfall of everything. [. . .] [W]ith this glass I toast you, silent night, the eternal mother of everything! From you comes everything; to you everything returns. Have mercy again on the world; open up once again to gather in everything and keep us all safe in your womb! (167-68)

This fellowship is interested in "reflective sorrow" from the dark side of life, unhappy love due to deception. They take a sensual pleasure in drawing out this sorrow, like the sensual pleasure of bleeding to death (172-78). Thus an interest in this kind of low point helps shape *Either / Or*.[98]

STRUCTURAL VARIATION AND COHERENCE

Dustin Griffin comments on the strange multiplicity of patterns cited by critics, who are ultimately approaching the genre in the same way--looking for imagistic patterns that shape the genre's plot or theme or discourse:

> [T]he literary study of satiric language, conventions, and structure [. . . .] received considerable attention in the 1960s, but we can still benefit from a better theory of satiric rhetoric. Just as it would be naïve to assume that a satirist uses objective "facts," so we must not ignore the fact that "facts" are put to the service of patterns, **patterns that exert a shaping influence**. Theorists have tended to call such patterns the "plot of satire." But what is a satiric plot? Northrop Frye found three different "phases" of satiric plot (which he calls "myth"). Kernan (*Plot of Satire*) sees **crowding, purposeless activity, and stasis**, but I have argued that satire always finds a way to **keep moving**. Hayden White, who draws freely on Frye, converts plot to theme: he finds that the "archetypal theme" of satirical plots in history-writing is "the apprehension that **man is a captive of the world rather than its master**." Michael Seidel argues that all narrative satire tells a **story of degeneration, of subverted continuance, of entropy**. Clearly we don't yet agree about what constitutes a satiric plot. Furthermore, is a narrative model adequate to account for the full range of satiric forms? Dryden, we may recall, affirmed

[98] For references indicating a strong concern with death in other Menippeans, see my M. A. Thesis, 66-68.

> Heinsius's idea that satire lacks a plot, has no "Series of Action." Perhaps it would be better to speak not of satiric plot but of satiric **discourse**. This puts the focus not on the "events" within the satire but on **the satirist, the satire's rhetorical purposes, and its audience.** (Griffin 197, my emphasis)

Given our framework, I prefer to try to sort out the contrast between action and discourse by saying, as Kernan says, that the scenes and events and plots themselves have a rhetorical structure. That is, events have event-shapes, which can be projected as theme by mapping event to event, or event to concepts, via image-schemas. Griffin sees disagreement because he focuses on the surface differences of these analyses. I prefer to look for deeper coherence and agreement among these patterns.

These patterns are curiously analogical, without quite fitting together. (I would say they have much in common, even before going far into specifics: they are all contra-normative or contra-canonical image-schematic patterns.) Lakoff and Johnson's pioneer book on conceptual metaphor, *Metaphors We Live By*, discusses systematicity in metaphor in some depth. There are two kinds of metaphoric systematicity, *consistency* and *coherence*. Consistency means "forming a single image", and the entailments of a single conceptual metaphor are typically consistent with one another. Occasionally two metaphors are consistent with one another. Much more often, two metaphors are coherent with one another, which means that they "'fit together,' by virtue of being subcategories of a major category and therefore sharing a major common entailment" (44). Consistency is common within a metaphor, coherence is common across metaphors.

They develop the point by observing and discussing a seeming contradiction in time metaphors (Chapter nine, 41-45, "Challenges to Metaphorical Coherence"). The expressions "the following weeks" and "the weeks ahead" mean the same thing: the weeks in the future. But the apparent contradiction between "following" and "ahead" can be resolved. In the expression "the following weeks", weeks are conceived as sections of the time-substance lined up and moving in single file towards the observer. Therefore, weeks farther in the future are conceived as sections that are "behind" weeks that are nearer in the future, and they reach the observer later than do the earlier weeks. Therefore later weeks "follow" earlier weeks. In the expression "the weeks ahead", weeks are conceived as sections of the time-space across or through which the observer moves. Therefore, weeks farther in the future are sections that are farther "ahead" of the observer, and he will arrive at them and pass through them later than he will the earlier weeks.[99]

In *Philosophy in the Flesh* Lakoff and Johnson refine this analysis of time metaphors. They show that metaphors that are coherent are often figure-ground reversals of one another. They begin by identifying the most basic temporal metaphor as the Time Orientation metaphor:

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[99] See also chapter 16, "Metaphorical Coherence", and 17, "Complex Coherences Across Metaphors." Here Lakoff and Johnson discuss how the metaphors for ARGUMENT as A JOURNEY, A CONTAINER, and A BUILDING cohere. We have discussed coherence briefly, in Chapter 4, on Metaphors for Satire in Speech. Later work has continued to consider consistency and coherence, but it is fair to say it has not been a primary focus of metaphor researchers.

The Location Of The Observer > The Present
The Space In Front Of The Observer > The Future
The Space Behind The Observer > The Past (140)

This metaphor has a spatial source domain, but says nothing about motion. There are two additional metaphors for time that are typically combined with this metaphor: the MOVING TIME metaphor and the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor (141; see chapter 10 generally, 137-169). In the first, time is conceived as a substance or a series of objects that move towards and past a stationary observer from in front of him. This gives us expressions like "Christmas is approaching", "the deadline is past", etc. In this case, the observer is the unmoving "ground", and time is the "figure" that moves with respect to the observer. In the second, time is an extended space, and the observer moves across it. This gives us expressions like "we're coming up on Christmas", "we're racing through July", "We passed the deadline long ago", etc. They say the two metaphors are "minimally differing variants of one another" (149), in fact figure-ground reversals of one another. They explain this phenomenon that they call *duality* as follows: "Object-location duality occurs for a simple reason: Many metaphorical mappings take motion in space as a source domain. With motion in space, there is the possibility of reversing figure and ground. That possibility [. . .] is realized quite often" (149).

We have already intimated how many satirical plots cohere in virtue of their relation to what Frye calls as the "radical of satire", a descent story. We noticed how the high > low mapping could map onto the metaphoric LINE of narrative, and also the metaphoric LINE of progeneration. Palmeri affirms that "The plot and the rhetoric of narrative satire cohere in accomplishing the same movement of lowering or leveling. [. . .] The reduction of spiritual to physical in satiric narrative corresponds to the rhetorical reduction of metaphors to literal meanings" (10-13). And Kernan insists on the coherence of his various scenic images: "Each of the major tendencies or actions of disorder [i.e. the confusing, the magnifying, and the diminishing] is in fact either a necessary condition or consequence of the other two, [. . .] one leads inevitably to the other and [. . .] they ultimately create [a kind of world] in combination" (35).

We can buttress this claim by demonstrating more specific coherences among these image-schemas. The following discussion can not be as precise as Lakoff and Johnson's discussion of coherences among metaphors, because we are dealing with abstract images meant to symbolize the contours of very long and complex narratives, rather than with specific manifestations of specific conceptual metaphors. But the attempt is important because critics of satire have so often proposed these patterns, and so often sought to show coherence in the structures of satire. Kernan gives a perfect example of coherence among the image schemas of satirical metaphors when he writes that "Magnifying the self is a rising" (103). *Magnification* or *inflation* coheres with *rising* because experience shows us that something that expands outwards, like a balloon or a growing body, naturally also grows in height. Satire opposes both magnification and rising with opposite coherent image-schematic actions, *diminishing* or *deflating* and *sinking*.

Griffin sees a specific conflict between Kernan's idea that satire exhibits "crowding, purposeless activity, and stasis," and his own idea that it "keeps moving." But constant motion is of course coherent with crowding and purposeless activity, since constant motion within a crowd, without going to any definite goal, is purposeless activity. But crowding also naturally conduces to stasis, and stasis seems obviously incoherent with continual motion. However, pointless minor motion is coherent with an absence of major movement towards a goal, again as in the milling of the individuals who compose a crowd that does not itself go anywhere. We recognize this paradox when we say we are "running in place" or "spinning our wheels".

Hayden White's "archetypal theme" of satire is "the apprehension that man is a captive of the world rather than its master." Being a captive of the world rather than its master means being *contained* by the world rather than containing it. Being captive often means being physically contained in a prison. Metaphorically, the container is in control of the contained. We are (partly) in direct control of what is inside our skin (muscle control), but we can only control indirectly what is outside of our bodies. We can manipulate what is in our hands, look over what is in our field of vision, hold, carry, and protect things in boxes, cups, etc. When the situation is reversed, and we are contained, then something else is in control of us.

This story of being contained and captured by the world coheres with the descent story because humans must *descend into* the (lower) world in order to be contained by it. In the metaphors of the vertical scale, being the captive of something means being below it, and being master means being above it. We prefer to "triumph over" and be "on top of" things, rather than "swamped" or "deluged" or "buried" by our troubles.

Further, being a contained captive means having one's movements paralyzed or restricted to purposeless activity. Activity that is purposeless is frustrated or entropized--its continuance is subverted, and it degenerates from purposeful action to meaningless motion. And since prisons are limited spaces, a sense of crowding is naturally part of imprisonment, regardless of how many people are imprisoned.

As whole narratives are very much longer and more complex than individual scenes, it is correspondingly more difficult to describe them in metaphoric and image-schematic terms, especially as we move from the more mythic, fantastic, and allegorical works to the more realistic or naturalistic. Alvin Kernan's account of the action of Dullness in Pope's *Dunciad*--the oozing spread that slowly envelops all, then disappears in its own vortex--is very convincing; his account of the rise-and-fall pattern of action in Jonson's *Volpone* is quite convincing; his account of the pointless circling in Waugh's novels is still insightful and persuasive, but we begin to have a stronger feeling of something being missing, or the pattern being a less visible skeleton to the story. The image-schematic approach to plot structure needs to be supplemented by the other kinds of structures I discuss here.

Chapter 7: Satiric Metaphor in Form: Digression

Having discussed how satirical rhetoric, including imagery and narrative, uses conventional conceptual metaphors to create its generic meaning, we must now turn to the formal features of Menippean satire and see how our cognitive semantic framework may illuminate this other crucial aspect of any study of genre.

Most studies of Menippean satire point out that it parodies the proprieties of formal discourse. I think that whereas "proprieties" sounds like surface ornament, the parody of discourse goes deeper than this, and that it gets at some basic structural properties. Frye noticed that satire repudiates the cult of perfect form, and that this is reflected in its narrative technique. And he associates this "parody of form" specifically with digression:

> The romantic fixation which revolves around the beauty of perfect form, in art or elsewhere, is also a logical target for satire. The word satire is said to come from satura, or hash, and a kind of parody of form seems to run all through its tradition, from the mixture of prose and verse in early satire to the jerky cinematic changes of scene in Rabelais. [...] *Tristram Shandy* and *Don Juan* illustrate very clearly the constant tendency to self-parody in satiric rhetoric which prevents even the process of writing itself from becoming an oversimplified convention or ideal. [...] A deliberate rambling digressiveness, which in *A Tale of A Tub* reaches the point of including a digression in praise of digressions, is endemic in the narrative technique of satire, and so is a calculated bathos, or art of sinking in its suspense, such as the quizzical mock-oracular conclusions in Apuleius and Rabelais and in the refusal of Sterne for hundreds of pages even to get his hero born. (*Anatomy* 233-34)

This is perhaps the most general and fundamental statement on the satirical digression; the citations here also show how it can go so deep as to question the elementary coherence and value of the human mind and world.

Certainly digressiveness is a definitive feature of the genre as a whole. It is easily noticed in many Menippean satires. Indeed, it is fair to say that it is the most recognizable, and the most characteristic formal feature of the genre, and that the more developed is this quality, the "more Menippean" a work seems. *Tristram Shandy*, for example, is the most Menippean of novels because it is the most digressive of novels. I think this feature is also most prominent, striking, and effective in the parody and questioning of the basic coherence and value of the structural norms of discourse and narrative. The more extreme the digressiveness, the deeper the departure from, and challenge of, our expectations about all forms of coherence, clarity, order.

MENIPPEAN DIGRESSION: CRITICISM AND HISTORY

These digressions have often been remarked, but discussion tends to brevity. Relihan has examined the evolution of structure and meaning of digressions in the ancient members. Korkowski has most thoroughly justified historically the claim that digression has a defining role in the genre, having bridged the gap between ancient and modern by tracing the feature from Sterne back to Lucian. I want to examine digressions more closely, again in terms of an ICM model with a core and variations and extensions, using image-schemas and conceptual mappings to define the structure of its form and meaning.

Relihan notes the potential for parodic subversion of moral point, and indicates an intensification over time in the use and implications of what is nonetheless a stable formal feature:

> Such digressions serve, among other things, to frustrate the reader's (and the narrator's) sense of the development of plot or point, and in a work of moral proportions they tend to subvert that moral by distraction. Frye sees anatomy at work here, the ruthless compilation of facts and information observed with an ironic eye, and an attempt to get all of life between the covers of the book. I would only add that this tendency is more obvious in Varro and his late Roman followers than, say, in Seneca and Petronius; and that the philosophical importance of such digressions is an element that grows as the genre develops through time. In origin, digressions cohere with the pervasive aesthetic of incoherence and literary impropriety. At the end of antiquity, the sum total of the digressions is a view of a universe which cannot quite be understood [. . .]. (28)

This interpretation projects the "incoherence" associated with digressions in an extremely general way. It is natural enough to associate conventional ideals of perfect form with the universe as a whole. A work that strives to represent a totality (or pretends to strive to do so), to get the whole world between its covers, but whose total form is a parody of form, creates doubt about the existence of ideal form in the universe, as well as doubt about any form in the narrator's mind.

Korkowski's (Kirk's) article is, as Sherbert declares, "essential reading for any Menippean critic", "a necessary step forward from Frye's theoretical outline" that "provides the generic context by giving sources for Sterne's digressive style" (145 n17). It documents the breadth and depth of the figure's use in Menippean satires, all the way back to antiquity. It offers, as does Kirk's later catalogue of Menippean texts and criticism, a "demonstration of a more extensive historical validity for Frye's insights on Menippean digressing" (4). Korkowski's avowed aim is to show how in *Tristram Shandy* Sterne was not eccentric or unfinished, nor embodying mental disorder, Lockean psychology, or Western ontological crises, but rather "patterned his narrative divagations upon previous literary models, works belonging to the generic tradition known as Menippean satire" (3). He proposes to show that "Sterne adhered more to a *kind* of

writing than to isolated sources--insofar as digression is concerned--and that this kind [. . .] includes those separate works which have been adduced as Sterne's models" (4).

Korkowski centres all on Lucian's image of Menippus as a speaker who worries that he is "much astray in my talk", and so gets accused of being "out of his mind". A straying speaker who is also satirical can easily imply the "satirist-satirized" theme so much emphasized by Elliot, and the self-conscious "dialogical" satire stressed by Palmeri. But in its specific origin, this figure is a Cynic parody of the character of the grave philosopher in the philosophical genres of antiquity. His digressiveness is of a piece with the mixture of genres in early parodies of philosophy, and so closely connected with the derivation of the word *satire* from *Satura*, a medley. The central role of this digression-bearing figure arises in the first origins of Menippean satire, with its deep parodic relation to accepted philosophical form:

> Menippean satire began in Greek antiquity as a parody of then-prevailing forms of philosophical discourse: the dialogue, symposium, learned epistle, allegorical journey into the next world, and the sophistic oration. The first Menippean satires took on, as an intentional swipe at decorum, a mixing of prose and verse together, and a jumbling up of dialogue, tales, songs, curses, and other forms into a single, motley work. The genre arose with the Cynics, whose basic philosophy was that all "philosophy" save ethics was useless, and the Cynics, who preached in public places to the common man, satirized philosophy by ludicrously imitating and burlesquing the grave genres of the philosophers and the learned, especially the sophists. The surest way to satirize the latter was, in addition to thrusting in bizarre verses and curses upon a discourse, to have the *persona* forget his train of thought, his main argument, or the bounds of his message, and so seem a vain know-nothing. In short, the Cynic aim was to undo the learned man or the sophist by exaggerating the element of digression. (4)

Korkowski goes on to cite digressive characters in many of Lucian's works, and in the narrators of other early imitators of Menippus (Varro, Seneca, Petronius). As he continues his history, he elucidates part of the spectrum of changing tones for the figure, as its meanings changed in different historical contexts:

> Menippean satire underwent drastic tonal changes when adopted by the Latin writers of the Middle Ages; formerly used to castigate intellectual sham, it began to be used to extol true learning; yet digressiveness and the prose-verse medley continued in the works of Martianus Capella, Boethius, Bernard of Sylvester, and Alanus of Insulis, who each asked their goddess-instructors to "digress" upon what should be known. (5-6)

He notes the Byzantine writers like Synesius of Cyrene kept to comic digressions, and that "Lucian's first Renaissance translators and imitators were quick to follow his wanderings" (6), citing Erasmus's forgetful foolish narrator, the bumbling *personae* of Ulrich von Hutten and Crotus Meteanus's *Letters of Obscure Men*, Henry Cornelius

Agrippa's digressive and ironic *On the Vanity and Uncertainty of Arts and Sciences*, and of course Rabelais. "In short," writes Korkowski, "Renaissance literature affords few examples of comical digression outside of Menippean satires" (7), and he cites less well-known writers from other European countries (Spain's Cristobal Villalon, Holland's Caspar Dornavius, Italy's Adriano Banchieri), before going on to nearer contemporaries of Sterne, the Frenchmen Bruscambille and Beroalde de Verville, and the Englishmen Sir John Harington, Thomas Nashe, John Taylor the Water-Poet, Bishop Francis Godwin, Nathaniel Ward, Walter Charleton (translator of Petronius), Tom Brown, John Dunton, Thomas D'Urfey, and George Duckett and Sir Thomas Burnet (7-15).

A closer examination of Korkowski's essay shows that the figure of the confused learned speaker becomes, over time, less a character in the foreground and more a narrator in the background (speaker or writer). A narrator is free to digress from a story or a discourse without giving the impression that he's losing track of an exposition or harangue: he may just digress because he enjoys it, or to create interest by varying the terrain, or to say something that sheds indirect light on his main matter. And the plot that is narrated may itself be digressive--if the main characters depart from their primary goal in significant ways, or do not have a primary goal but wander from one adventure or encounter to the next, to give a general impression of straying through chaos.

Digressions, then, are intensified and become more textual--that is, not so much associated with a philosopher character losing track of his discourse--as we move towards Sterne. This change means that digressions also become much more noticeable, more of a dominant feature in the work, until we can say that a work is "digress*ive*" overall. While Korkowski shows that Lucian's philosophers have occasionally digressive minds, I would not say that any of Lucian's works are digressive overall.

Frye, Relihan, and Korkowski all concur on the general form and general meaning of this rhetorical figure in its role as prototypical feature of the genre--even though the feature takes a vast variety of specific forms over the course of a nearly two-thousand-year history. These observations seem to me accurate, but not as exacting as could be--as regards their structure. That structure is easy enough to identify, when it becomes prominent, but it is more difficult to analyze its basic constitution and range of variation, since it can exist at many levels, and what we might call its "degrees of intensity."

In Korkowski we find again the distinction between *specific literary* sources and *generic conceptual* structure also pointed to by Turner. We recall the key point that any number of sources, or none, does not explain the use of a given figure--that is, how the writer created a new instance of its form and function and worked it into his or her overall conceptual construction. However, this critique also strikes Korkowski. While he is right to point to the prominence of digression in the whole genre in which Sterne was working--with its overall Gestalt configuration of features with corresponding theme and attitude--the same objection that he makes to other critics could be levelled at his approach. As he says other critics miss the generic forest for the source-text trees, so we might say he misses the conceptual forest for the generic-tradition trees. He does not explain why digressions mean what they do, which is an essential part of an explanation

for why Sterne chose the model of this tradition to supply the form into which he would pour his matter.

In this chapter I want to ask what it means to use a feature of a genre, rather than imitating specific examples of a feature. To answer this question, we must ask what it means to embody in particular language a certain abstract, conventional rhetorical form that is conventionally paired with a certain abstract, conventional meaning. Answers to such questions in turn begin to answer the question of what it means to use a genre, rather than to imitate specific works. We want to know A. how we recognize the feature (i.e. what we have to know in order to recognize the mapping); B. what happens in the recognition and processing of the mapping.

To do this, I will analyze the nature of digressions in a way similar to how I have analyzed plot-schemas and the mappings that constitute other aspects of the genre. I will use a range of examples of digressions to model a prototypical digression structure and a range of variant forms. I will relate this model to a basis in embodied cognition.

DIGRESSIONS IN GENERAL

Derek Attridge summarizes the traditional contrasting impressions of the *narrative* digression in novels:

> As we read a novel [. . .], we are continuously classifying the words we read according to the degree to which they appear progressive or digressive with regard to the movement of the narrative. [. . .] [T]his constant monitoring of the internal relations of the text, crucial to our ability to make it cohere, also produces formal pleasures, analogous to those provided by a musical texture of digressions and returns in harmony, melody, rhythm, and timbre. What enables digression to operate in this way is that it carries with it the notion of subordination, unimportance, and ultimately dispensability: digressions in a novel are appendages--in some sense "unnatural" ones--which could be lopped off with only minor damage to the main body.
>
> But any rigorous account of digression will quickly counter this view with an insistence that dispensability is only a (necessary) illusion. Classical and Renaissance definitions of *digressio* or *parecbasis* as a rhetorical device in oratory stress the contribution it makes to the main argument; Thomas Wilson, for example, states in his *Arte of Rhetorique* [1533] that by digression "we swerve sometimes from the matter, upon just considerations, making the same to serve for our purpose, as well as if we had kept to the matter still." The Romantic Conception of organic form [. . .] stresses both the importance of internal digressive movements and the contribution they make to a complex unity. (381)[100]

And Attridge notes that given a strict organicist view of art, "a digression which cannot be read as supplementary information, symbolic parallel, illustrative exemplum, will still

[100] Attridge also cites "similar definitions" in Quintilian's *Institutionis Oratoriae*, IV.iii.14, and Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (397 n18).

offer itself as digression, as a model of the digressiveness of the mind or the world, as a demonstration of the impossibility, or the undesirability, of total and continuous relevance" (382).[101]

The Middle Ages, too, had their conflict between the drive to keep to the point, and the drive to turn aside for pleasure or edification. C. S. Lewis recounts Geoffrey de Vinsauf's description of *Diversio* or Digression as the most important of the *morae* or "delays", the set of methods of *Amplificatio*, for "amplifying" one's discourse. Thus the revived study of medieval *Rhetoric* puts an end to the idea that medieval poets were unable to keep to the point or were "drifting with the stream of consciousness" (*Discarded Image* 192-93):

> For good or ill the digressiveness of the medieval writers is the product not of nature but of art. The second part of the *Romance of the Rose* depends on Digressions in the same degree, if not in the same way, as *Tristram Shandy*. It has even been suggested that the peculiar narrative technique of the romances and of their Renaissance successors, the interwoven stories that so incessantly cross and interrupt one another, may be simply one more application of the digressive principle and an offshoot of Rhetoric.
>
> This theory, which I do not myself fully accept, has at any rate the merit of replacing the Digressions recommended by Geoffrey in their proper context. They can be regarded as a expression of the same impulse we see at work in much medieval architecture and decoration. We may call it the love of the labyrinthine; the tendency to offer to the mind or the eye something that cannot be taken in at a glance, something that at first looks planless though all is planned. Everything leads to everything else, but by very intricate paths. At every point the question 'How did we get here?' arises, but there is always an answer. Professor Gunn has done much towards enabling us to recover the taste by which such a structure could be enjoyed in literature; which could feel that the main subject, in throwing off so many subordinate digressions, showed the ramifying energy of a strong tree, glorious with plenitude. (193-94)

Lewis's analysis fits Korkowski's observation of the medieval reinterpretation of Menippean digressions as reflecting the order of nature rather than subverting it; and can be related to Relihan's observation that in Martianus Capella, "The improprieties of Menippean satire are emblematic of the incomprehensible and embarrassing details of

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[101] Attridge goes on to list and praise a number of works that are so thoroughly digressive that they overturn, he supposes, the usual "gesture of exclusion" towards the digressive that guarantees the integrity of the progressive. These works all happen to be Menippean satires, though he does not say so. (He mentions *A Tale of a Tub*, *Tristram Shandy*, Byron's *Don Juan*, and *Moby-Dick*. *Tom Jones* and Beckett are also referred to.) He states the bracing deconstructive effect: "In such texts, all the strategic systems for the recuperation of digression fail, since they all rely on its having a subordinate status; the hierarchical opposition between the progressive and digressive, it might be argued, is deconstructed by the text itself. The result is that the reader is weaned from dependence on the illusion that novels are reports on the real world, and is encouraged to enjoy the writing as writing, in all its uncertainty, prolixity, contradictoriness, and materiality" (388).

life itself" (150), rather than of the overall incoherence of life and the world. We note that Lewis also argues for seeing digression as part of a tradition of (rhetorical) form and (generic) kind, rather than as a curiosity.[102]

DIGRESSIONS IN DETAIL

George Puttenham's *Art of English Poesie* is an apt source for the analysis of conceptions of rhetorical form and how poets in particular used them, because it links the ancient study of rhetoric with the Renaissance and beyond. As Baxter Hathaway explains, "For each of its three main parts [poetry, prosody, rhetoric] predecessors existed in long tradition receding into the mists of Greek and Roman antiquity and present in England even during the Middle Ages in at least rudimentary form. Nevertheless, [. . .] none of its predecessors even for any one of the three parts had dealt with its subject matter so copiously, cogently, and in a manner as relevant to the contemporary scene" (vi).

Puttenham casts digression as a "*Figure sententious, otherwise called Rhetoricall*". These are distinct from other kinds of figures in that they pertain to both sound and sense: "since we haue already allowed to our maker [the Poet] his *auricular* figures, and also his *sensable*, by which all the words and clauses of his meeters are made as well tunable to the eare, as stirring to the minde, we are now by order to bestow vpon him those other figures which may execute both offices, and all at once to beautifie and geue sence and sententiousnes to the whole language at large" (206).

Digression is the figure of "*Parecnasis*, or the Stragler". The discussion comes directly after his account of a related figure, what he calls "Metastasis, or the flitting figure, or the Remove", which I quote in order more sharply to define digression:

> Now as arte and good policy in perswasion bids vs to abide and not to stirre from the point of our most aduantage, but the same to enforce and tarry vpon with all possible argument, so doth discretion will vs sometimes to flit from one matter to other, as a thing meete to be forsaken, and another entered upon, I call him therefore the *flitting* figure, or figure of *remove*, like as the other before was called the figure of the *aboade*.
>
> Even so again, as it is wisdome for a perswader to tarrie and make his aboad as long as he may conueniently without tediousness to the hearer, vpon his chiefe proofes or points of the cause tending to his aduantage, and likewise to depart againe when time serues, and goe to a new matter seruing the purpose aswell. So is it requisite many times for him to talke farre from the principall matter, and as it were to range aside, to th'intent by such extraordinary meane to induce or inferre other matter, aswell or better seruing the principal purpose, and neuertheles in season to returne home where he first strayed out. This maner of

[102] Lewis's citation of Sterne indicates a perception of Jean de Meun as a Menippean author. The point highlights the great breadth of tone that works may carry, despite being classified in a genre in virtue of their integrated set of features. However, I think there is a good case to be made for treating de Meun's narrator as a figure who is deliberately and comically irrational and unreliable. As Relihan points out, intense digression adds up to a view of the universe and its inhabitants as chaotic and incomprehensible, even in antiquity.

> speech is termed the figure of digression by the Latines, following the Greeke originall, we also call him the *straggler* by allusion to the souldier that marches out of his array, or by those that keepe no order in their marche, as the battailes well ranged do: of this figure there need be geuen no example. (Puttenham 240-41)

The difference between the two seems to be that flitting goes away as a retreat from weak points in the argument, whereas digression goes away to bring in reinforcing points. Flitting moves from matters "meet to be forsaken", not fit to be tarried upon, because discretion tells us they are not to our most advantage. Digression moves towards matters that are subsidiary but important--matters that serve the principal purpose to good advantage. The passage shows that the figure was familiar among the humanistically-educated, and was understood to have a certain form and purpose. It also shows clearly the metaphorical nature of the concept at this time. (However, we cannot share Puttenham's lack of interest in supplying examples.)

RELATED FIGURES

Towards illuminating the network of structures related to the prototypical digression, we can glance at some other figures that are analogous to it in form and function. Both aposeopesis and parenthesis are, like digression, figures of breaking off from a main discourse line. Aposeopesis stops the discourse completely, to allow a turn to new matter; parenthesis only stops it temporarily, to add something extra, normally something short and within the confines of a single sentence.

Sterne's remarks on aposeopesis (71-72) alert us to the analogy of that figure with digression, on the basis that both are interruptions. Of "Aposiopesis, *or the figure of silence, otherwise called the figure of interruption*" (318), Puttenham writes,

> Ye haue another *auricular* figure of defect, and is when we begin to speake a thing, and breake of in the middle way, as if either it needed no further to be spoken of, or that we were ashamed, or afraide to speake it out. It is also sometimes done by way of threatning, and to shew a moderation of anger. The Greekes call him *Aposiopesis*. I, the figure of silence, or of interruption, indifferently (178)[103]

The collocation of silence and interruption shows that this figure has a very specific form and function: it constitutes the break in the fabric of the discourse, and so prepares for, but does not in itself create, the irruption of a digression.

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[103] Puttenham calls grammatical figures "auricular":

> As your single words may be many waies transfigured to make the meetre or verse more tunable and melodious, so also may your whole and entire clauses be in such sort contrived by the order of their constructions as the eare may receiue a certaine recreation, although the mind for any noueltie of sence be little or nothing affected. And therefore al your figures of *grammaticall* construction, I accompt them but merely *auricular* in that they reach no furder then the eare. (174)

Puttenham adds a final remark intriguing for our purposes, as it demonstrates an inference from the form of the figure to the kind of thinking and character that produce it:

> This figure is fit for phantasticall heads and such as be sodaine or lacke memorie. I know one of good learning that greatly blemisheth his discretion with this maner of speach: for if he be in the grauest matter of the world talking, he will vpon the sodaine for the flying of a bird ouerthwart the way, or some other such sleight cause, interrupt his tale and neuer returne to it againe. (178-79).

One thinks of Swift's conversational misdemeanors, of Burton confessing his unscholarly tendency to run like a spaniel after everything that crosses his path, and more generally of those grave philosophers reported from Lucian onwards who go astray in their talk.

Paraleipomenon, the textual equivalent of aposeopesis, is also mentioned by Sterne (164). It is embodied in the ellipses, dashes, and asterisks of *Tristram Shandy*. Sherbert recognizes that specific analogues to D'Urfey's empty "hiatus" page are part of a generic tradition:

> The wit in this page depends on the paradox that the less it says, which in this case is nothing, the more it says. Placing himself within the venerable satiric tradition of the paradoxical encomium or ironic eulogy, which praises trivial things, D'Urfey's narrator praises nothing. To praise nothing presents the greatest challenge a wit can face, a challenge met, for instance, by Swift's Hack in the *Tale* [. . .] and by Fielding in "An Essay on Nothing." (101)

Other examples are the "hiatus in manuscript" often used by Swift (especially in the *Battle of the Books*), and similarly the missing continuation used by Cervantes and others, the starred words frequent in Sterne, which we are expected to fill in for ourselves.[104]

> Parenthesis falls under the "*figures Auricular working by disorder*":
> Your first figure of tollerable disorder is [*Parenthesis*] or by an English name the [*Insertour*] and is when ye will seeme for larger information or some other purpose, to peece or graffe in the middest of your tale an vnnecessary parcell of speech, which neuerthelesse may be thence without any detriment to the rest" (180).

He warns that "you must not vse such insertions often nor to thick, nor those that bee very long [. . .], for it will breede great confusion to haue the tale so much interrupted" (181). Parenthesis is distinct from digression in that it is unnecessary to the purpose though it may add information. Interesting here is that Puttenham does not limit parenthesis to a sentence, but allows it to be any "parcel" of speech, that interrupts any

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[104] See Watt's "The Comic Syntax of *Tristram Shandy*", on the dash and all that it implies (320ff.); and on the asterisks as "the graphic equivalents of the figure of aposiopesis--rhetorically intentional hiatus--which Tristram so often employs" (323).

"tale". The warning against what will harm the decorum of ordinary speech describes what would be fitting for Menippean versions of these figures, which we could call figures of *in*tolerable disorder: deliberately over-long and over-frequent, to breed great confusion in those who read or listen to the parenthetical narrators or characters.

Finally, some of the figures that fall under Puttenham's vices of style are commonly found in Menippean satire's parodies of form. Sherbert points out that Menippean satire is full of what was considered "false wit": "wit, when controlled by judgment, provides socially acceptable forms of mental discourse and outward behaviour. Uncontrolled, wit reduces a person to madness, which in extreme cases causes either a wandering intellect or, worse, obsession" (45). Puttenham's Tapinosis or the Abbaser (266) is next to Bomphiologia or Pompious speech. These two are opposed as the two kinds of high-low mapping in the chapter on satiric imagery: degrading and mock-epic. The varieties of "surplusage" especially find examples enough in the genre: Pleonasmus, or Too Full Speech, Macrologia, or Long Language, Periergia or Ouer labour or the curious (263-66).

THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF DIGRESSION: SCHEMAS AND METAPHORS IN LINGUISTIC FORM

Readers easily recognize digressions, and understand the difference between serious and parodic digression. To do this, the reader must have a grasp of many complex aspects of the discourse before him--both form and content, both large and small: she must grasp what the principal purpose is, what kinds of other matter can serve the principal purpose, what counts as straying from the purpose, what counts as returning to it in season. On the other side of rhetorical decorum, she must recognize when matter discussed is irrelevant to the purpose, when a digression has strayed too far in topic, or when it has strayed farther in length than is seasonable. And on top of knowing all this, she must also be able to recognize the distinction between real lapses of discursive form from parodic and comedic travesties of form.[105]

Digression is a quality of linguistic and literary *form*, and as Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner analyze linguistic and literary form, it is often a mapping from our understanding of bodily form to elements of language and literature. I sketch some of these analyses to show the range of their application, and the development of their details.

Chapter 20 of *Metaphors We Live By* addresses "How Metaphor Can Give Meaning to Form". Lakoff and Johnson observe that we speak in linear temporal order, saying some words earlier and others later in time. They contend that "Since speaking is correlated with time and time is metaphorically conceptualized in terms of space, it is natural for us to conceptualize language metaphorically in terms of space" (126). We know which word is in the "first position" in a sentence, whether two words are "close" or "far apart", and whether a word is relatively "long" or "short". Thus, "Because we conceptualize linguistic form in spatial terms, it is possible for certain spatial metaphors

[105] It may be that the reader first recognizes the lapse and then must decide if it is intended as comic parody. Some critics believe the interpretation of irony requires a second step beyond literal interpretation, that posits an authorial intention to assign words a meaning different from the literal. But this is a separate question--not very far from our principal purpose, but still too far.

to apply directly to the *form* of a sentence, as we conceive of it spatially. This can provide automatic direct links between form and content, based on general metaphors in our conceptual system" (126). One example is the mapping MORE OF FORM IS MORE OF CONTENT, as when "He is very very very tall" indicates more tallness than "He is very tall" or "He is bi-i-i-i-ig!" indicates greater size than just "He is big" (127-28). Another example is CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT, as when "Mary does*n't* think he'll *leave* until tomorrow" is not as strong a negative as "Mary thinks he wo*n't leave* until tomorrow" because the negative *n't* is closer to the negated verb *leave* in the latter case (129).[106]

In "Language", chapter eight of *The Literary Mind*, Turner elaborates on the hypothesis that language arose through the projection of story--that grammar structure comes from story structure and story structure comes from event structure. In sentences like "John pushes the ball onto the court",

> The abstract narrative structure is projected to create the abstract grammatical structure. The abstract narrative structure includes an agent, an action, an object, and a direction. The abstract grammatical structure includes a noun phrase followed by a verb phrase followed by a noun phrase followed by a prepositional phrase, with the first noun phrase as Subject and Agent and the second noun phrase as Direct Object and Patient. (143)

DISCOURSE AS ACTION
and the IMAGE-SCHEMATIC STRUCTURE OF EVENTS and ACTIONS

The word "digression" relates mainly to discourse. When we hear of someone digressing, wandering or rambling, striking out on a digression or a tangent, we think first of someone speaking. The speaker has left the main line of her discourse for some reason, to return to it shortly. A writer may do the same thing. But the expression of a discourse in speech or writing is a human action, and all human actions can be conceptualized as motion from a starting point along a path towards a destination.

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[106] Lakoff's *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* elaborates these ideas into a general "Spatialization of Form Hypothesis", but this is concerned with the form of categories and cognitive models, and tangential to our present concerns. The hypothesis states that

> -categories (in general) are understood in terms of CONTAINER schemas.
> -Hierarchical structure is understood in terms of PART-WHOLE schemas and UP-DOWN schemas.
> -Relational structure is understood in terms of LINK schemas.
> -Radial structure in categories is understood in terms of CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas.
> -Foreground-background structure is understood in terms of FRONT-BACK schemas.
> -Linear quantity scales are understood in terms of UP-DOWN schemas and LINEAR ORDER schemas.
> [. . . .] Strictly speaking, the Spatialization of Form hypothesis requires a metaphorical mapping from physical space into a "conceptual space." Under this mapping, spatial structure is mapped into conceptual structure. More specifically, image schemas (which structure space) are mapped into the corresponding abstract configurations (which structure concepts). The Spatialization of Form hypothesis thus maintains that conceptual structure is understood in terms of image schemas plus a metaphorical mapping. (283)

Trajector > Actor
Source/ starting point > beginning of action
Motion along a path > performing the action
Stages along the path > sub-sequences of the action
Arriving at the destination > completing the action
Destination > goal of the action[107]

It is therefore natural to look at the progress of actions, from small to large, simple to complex, in terms of motions along a path, from a source to a goal. Many literary stories (especially myths and romances) are of motions that are actions: quests are journeys towards some goal; journeys are motions along a path towards a destination. We have already noted Mark Johnson's analysis of the mapping from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema that structures human motion, to our understanding of journeys, human action generally, and the beginning-middle-end structure of narrative.

Lakoff and Johnson observe that "the word *topic*, incidentally, is etymologically derived from the Greek *topos*, meaning 'a place.' To think about a certain topic is metaphorically to move in the vicinity of a certain place. Thus, we can speak of *returning* to the topic, *straying away from* the topic, and *approaching* a topic" (*Philosophy* 237). They note that rational thinking and communicating are also conceptualized as certain kinds of motions among locations.

MORE LINES and PATHS

The variety of digression-meanings is as wide as the variety of line-meanings. The meanings lines can bear depend only on the ingenuity of the maker of metaphor, but there are a number of conventional ones. Hillis Miller notes nine kinds of conventional line-metaphor parodied by Sterne, and their corresponding kinds of digression:

> the line of a **journey**, with its side-trips and airings; the line of a **logical argument**, broken by digressions; the **grammatical** line of words in a piece of writing, which may be interrupted by parentheses, *c c c c c*, and so on; the line of **history** with the zigzagging ins and outs of ministers of state; the ruled line of "**moral rectitude**," broken by lamenesses, wanderings, transgressions leading the feet away from the straight and narrow; the straight line of a **row of cabbages** in a garden; the **geometrical** line defined by Archimedes [. . .]; the line of **gravitation**, with a characteristic multiple pun on gravitation as Newtonian attraction, as the vertical descent of bathos or the art of falling, and as the grave solemnity of the horizontal line of moral rectitude, each meaning interfering with the others and "confounding" them; and finally, to come full circle back to Hogarth and the **Venusian** line, as the straight line of an ideally economical birth-day suit, where, I take it, the surfacing of an erotic pun which has been lurking under the surface throughout the passage. [. . .] The figure sets the dullness of a

[107] For further detail on the conceptualization of events and actions as motions, see Lakoff and Johnson on the Location Event-Structure metaphor, *Philosophy* 178-94, esp. 187ff. on actions. See also their discussion of the Source-Path-Goal image schema (32-34), the mapping from action-structure to event-structure, and the mapping from moving to thinking (236-38).

> straight line drawn from one point to another on a female body against the Hogarthian curved line of beauty which strays seductively from the straight road, following the contours of breast, waist, and thigh, to lead its beholder hopelessly astray in digressions, transgressions, parenthesis, episodes, and airings, wanderings from the straight path like the episodes in *Tristram Shandy*. (381-82, my emphasis)

We can take the "row of cabbages" as lines in the **concrete human world** generally, and we should note that the other meanings of the multiple pun on gravitation, as imaginative and aesthetic "**bathos** or the art of falling", and gravity as emotional **solemnity**, are in fact also further metaphors. This gives us in total eleven kinds of metaphoric line based on the PATH image-schema. I would add to these the line of **discourse** in speech or writing (not the same thing as the line of words in a sentence or logic in an argument), and the line of a **story** (not the same thing as discourse or history). That gives us an ominous thirteen. It is easy enough to find in Sterne alone examples of each of these metaphors. But we must consider the genre as a whole, and look for prominent examples of all of these kinds of digression.

LITERARY FORM

In *More Than Cool Reason* Lakoff and Turner discuss iconicity in literature as well as language. They revisit the Lakoff-Johnson points about spatial metaphors giving meaning to linguistic form:

> When [. . .] a mapping exists between the structure of a sentence and the structure of the meaning or the image that the sentence conveys, the mapping is called 'iconic.' [. . .]. Thus, for example, one aspect of sentence structure is given in terms of parts and wholes, that is, the parts of speech and the higher-level constituents containing them. Other aspects of a sentence's structure are given in terms of balance, proximity, subordination, sequence, and so on. The schematic images that allow us to understand such syntactic notions are also used in conceptual structure. It is for this reason that image-schematic correspondences between form and meaning are possible. The mechanism that relates them is the same mapping mechanism used in metaphor.

But here they go on to explore iconicity in literary as well as linguistic form:

> An iconic mapping of the same kind also relates the form of the poem as a whole to the meaning of the poem as a whole. [. . .] The iconic layer is the mapping from the structure of the language to the structure of the image presented and to the overall meaning of the poem. (156-57)

They are discussing the sentence structure and line arrangement of Williams's poem "To A Solitary Disciple", but the point applies to all literature, prose as well as verse, and, as they say, to literary form as a whole, not just syntactic form.

Turner's 1998 study of "Figure" explores analogies between the classical study of rhetorical figures (as described by Jeanne Fahnestock) and the contemporary study of construction grammars in cognitive linguistics. A grammatical construction pairs a prototypical conceptual meaning with a prototypical linguistic form, and develops a range of variants in a network relation.[108] Greek and later rhetoricians sought "a compendium of figures [. . .] to define the formal means for achieving certain cognitive or persuasive functions" (Fahnestock, qtd. in Turner 46). The Greek word for figure, *schema*, means a pairing of form and meaning, and the figures of rhetoric were typically seen as such patterns. These elements were understood to exist at unequal levels: some figures had a more formal foundation, others a more semantic foundation. And while "One or the other arm of this form-function connection could pivot, [. . .] the central link should still hold" (Fahnestock, qtd. in Turner 46). Although it is possible to separate a thought form from its content, the best figures were assumed to combine the linguistic form with its prototypical "conceptual anchor" (Turner 46-47). Mark Twain's "Pity is for the living, envy is for the dead" is a better *antithesis* than a possible variation, "pity is for the living, envy is for the rich" because the second phrase does not express as clear a contrast.)

Here Turner goes beyond iconicity and expands the kinds of formal and conceptual patterns that can be paired together. When conceptual content is mapped to an abstract image-schematic form it is *iconic*. A series of steps along a path is the form of the *climax* figure (A > B, B > C), as in "sex leads to pregnancy and pregnancy leads to children" and "fear brings paralysis and paralysis brings failure" (44). The symmetrical transposition of elements along a path is the form of *antimetabole* (A-B B-A), as in "James accuses Paul and Paul accuses James", "electricity induces magnetism and magnetism induces electricity" (44-45), or Keats's "Truth is beauty, beauty truth" (Keats). But furthermore,

> The conceptual half can be a conventionally framed rich scene (as in the figure *aposiopesis*, in with the cessation of speech is paired with the rich scene of paralysis induced by emotion). It can be an abstract meaning (as in the figure *question*, in which interrogative forms are paired with the abstract meaning of posing an inquiry). And it can be an even more abstract mapping scheme (as in the XYZ figure). (60)

The XYZ figure occurs in expressions like "vanity is the quicksand of reason", where we are prompted to construct a complex mapping between vanity and quicksand, and reason and an unstated matching concept. This is a variety of Aristotle's "proportional metaphor", which says "A is to B as C is to D", but leaves out one of the elements (Turner 52-55; see also *Reading Minds*.)

ABSTRACT STRUCTURE of the FIGURE of DIGRESSION

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[108] Turner cites work by linguists Charles Fillmore, Paul Kay, Ronald Langacker, Adele Goldberg, Claudia Brugman, George Lakoff, Gilles Fauconnier, Michael Israel, Daniel Jurafsky, Jean-Pierre Koenig, Suzanne Kemmer, Knud Lambrecht, Laura Michaelis, and Elizabeth Traugott (55).

We can treat digression as Fahnestock and Turner treat antithesis or series, as a set of discrete elements that get arranged or transposed in a certain way. Digression requires as a background the abstract idea of a SEQUENCE of elements, a series arranged as stages in the order necessary to reach their destination (by cumulation or logical progression). The digression INTERRUPTS the background sequence with a foreground sub-sequence, thus: ABCD (abcde) EFG. In proper digression the sub-sequence is helpful or necessary to establishing the next member in the main sequence.

STRUCTURAL VARIATION = KINDS of DIGRESSION:
To define the prototypical Menippean digression, we need to contrast it with the prototypical non-satirical digression. In order to establish that contrast, we need to examine the most noticeable and important difference between kinds of digression: that between what we may call functional and non-functional types. The functional digression is a temporary departure from the main path that successfully achieves a sub-goal that enables or helps the speaker or actor to go on to his main goal.

The non-functional digression is unnecessary or unhelpful to achieving the main goal. It may be non-functional if:

-it is intended as functional and achieves its sub-goal, but the sub-goal turns out to be profitless for the main goal.

-it is intended as functional but fails to achieve its goal.

-it is undertaken for some reason independent of the main goal: for the sake of relief from the discursive or narrative journey, for entertainment, or to satisfy a sudden impulse of the protagonist or speaker.

Those subsidiary adventures of epic and romance that are necessary to the achievement of the main quest can be seen as functional digressions. Book 11 of the *Odyssey* Odysseus travels to the margins of the world, then descends to the world's other side to converse with the souls of the dead. This represents a departure from the homeward journey, but it is an essential departure, since Odysseus must get directions from the dead prophet Teiresias in order to find his way back home. The *nekyia* is therefore a digression because it is out of Odysseus' main path, and it might have been avoided had Odysseus avoided getting lost in the first place. It is functional because it enables him to get back on track towards his goal. The *nekyias* of Virgil and Dante, that expand on Homer's *nekyia* to become much more detailed and central to their narratives, can likewise be seen as functional digressions.[109] Lucian's parodic *nekyias*, narrative digressions to other worlds, are of the functional-and-successful-but-profitless kind.

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[109] We don't usually see whole narratives as departures from a main path, because we assume that when something is narrated to us, there is some overall purpose guiding the act of narrating, even if what is narrated is a digressive action. Whole narrative actions can be seen as digressive in the sense that they constitute the departure from an equilibrium that aims to restore it (according to Todorov's highly abstract equilibrium-disruption-restoration model of narrative). The *Odyssey* is the story of the digression of Odysseus's ship from a direct path leading towards Ithaca and home from the site of the Trojan War. Dante's journey through Hell starts as a digression from the middle of the road of this life, as his path enters a dark forest on the way to Heaven. But such "digressions" are the occasion for the formulation of a new goal, the achievement of which is the motivation for the whole present story. Odysseus now starts lost at

Digressions can have different connotations in different cultural and generic contexts. Symbolic digressions from the straight and narrow path are sinful "erring" in the Bible and in Christian epic writers like Dante (who gets lost in a dark wood in the middle of the road of our life), and Milton (who mirrors the "mazy error" in the serpent's movement, in Eve's hair), and Spenser (whose Bower of Bliss is a pastoral idyll seen as a sinister eddy aside from the current of life and duty). Here the danger is apprehended, that the digressor may never return to the original path, but instead get farther and farther from it, become lost and unable to find his way back, as he heads down a new road to a new destination opposite to God and heaven. Such digression may begin as functional if the actor is initially seduced into perceiving a worthwhile sub-goal at its conclusion.

There is a strong opposing tradition, in which turning aside from the life of the world is a superior virtue. We find this attitude in pastoral poetry, and in Romantic poetry such as Wordsworth's meditative digressions. There is something comparable, though with a political slant, in the preference in postmodern literature and criticism for the marginal, decentered and transgressive (pastoral and postmodern digressiveness are in some ways combined in Pynchon). In such cases the path of society and workaday life is seen as false and dangerous to the self, and the digression an escape that sets up a new spiritual path and goal. It's not functional in the usual sense, because it rejects the original path to set up a new one.

The action-type of *wandering* is characteristic of both romance and satire. The paradigmatic heroic romance has a goal, so the hero knows where he is going (to Ithaca, to an oracle, to find the Holy Grail, etc.). Romantic wandering tends to be functional because the minor adventures help to achieve the main quest--at least to the extent of testing and forming and educating the heroes. Satiric wandering tends to be non-functional, and probably gets some of its humour from undercutting our expectations of these basic functions of the subsidiary adventures of romance.

Functionality also seems to be a matter of gradation. Auerbach argues that digression in Homer is meant to relax tension, not increase suspense, because his narration wholly fills the present and "knows no background" (*Mimesis* 4). Such a goal does not contribute to the unfolding of the main narrative, so it is non-functional relative to it. But to relax tension is an important kind of subordinate goal in the overall act of narration, so such a digression has what we might call a meta-discursive or meta-narrative function. Ernest Stahl shows that a diversionary function such as Puttenham assigns to the figure of *flitting* or *remove* gives structure to *Novellen* stories:

> The structure of *Novellen* may be accounted for to some extent by another feature they share with dramas. Several outstanding collections of them were conceived

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sea and must find his way home. Dante now starts at the mouth of a cave through which he must pass to continue his journey.

Digression must be understood as relative to some background of a direct path, and in these cases the background that would make the whole story understood as and felt as a digression is too far back to be appreciable. Those backgrounds have been replaced by new backgrounds in which the direct paths begin at new starting points and moves toward new destinations. We have to look at the *Odyssey* and the *Inferno* in the context of a culture's whole mythology in order to appreciate the sense in which they are digressions.

> with a kind of listening audience built into the works. In the best known examples--*Decamerone, Canterbury Tales*, [. . .] *Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten*--identical situations prevail. Each member of a group of persons having an interest in common with the other members tells a tale in order to entertain and, specifically, to divert attention from an unpleasant event or irksome condition, in Boccaccio the plague, in Chaucer the tediousness of the journey, in Goethe the strain caused by a tactless remark. *The Arabian Nights* is a first example, in a singular form: there is only one listener and his position is different from that of the audiences in other collections of tales, although he too craves diversion and it is the single storyteller alone who has to try to avert an impending dire event. (90)

When the purpose of a digression is to divert attention from some unpleasant pressing fact, then the digression is highly functional, even though it is not contributing to any larger narrative goal. Since the diversion of attention is what motivates the telling of these stories in the first place, though the stories may not in themselves contain significant digressions, the digressiveness is again meta-discursive or meta-narrative. However, the main narrative is digressive as a whole, and in that respect is analogous to Menippean digressiveness.

In discourse, wandering from topic to topic may be functional and serious in initial explorations of aspects of a larger subject (as we may find in exploratory ruminating, or first drafts of research, and in a more organized form in introductions to the subject), or in collections of relatively wide and shallow commentary organized according to some principle other than an overarching discursive path (e.g. encyclopedias and information manuals). Clifford Geertz says that in his "interpretive" line of work,

> One makes detours, goes by side roads, as I quote Wittgenstein below; one sees the straight highway before one, "but of course . . . cannot use it, because it is permanently closed."
>
> For making detours and going by sideroads, nothing is more convenient than the essay form. one can take off in almost any direction, certain that if the thing does not work out one can turn back and start over in some other with only moderate cost in time and disappointment. Midcourse corrections are rather easy, for one does not have a hundred pages of previous argument to sustain, as one does in a monograph or a treatise. Wanderings into yet smaller sideroads and wider detours does little harm, for progress is not expected to be relentlessly forward anyway, but winding and improvisational, coming out where it comes out. And when there is nothing more to say on the subject at the moment, or perhaps altogether, the matter can simply be dropped. "Works are not finished," as Valéry has said, "they are abandoned." (6)[110]

[110] Geertz relates this form to his rhetorical situation:

> Another advantage of the essay form is that it is very adaptable to occasions. The ability to sustain a coherent line of thought through a flurry of wildly assorted invitations, to talk here, to contribute there, to honor some-one's memory or celebrate someone's career, to advance the cause of this

Swales observes that the formal *Exkurs* continues to be an accepted element of academic writing, at least in German.[111] But contemporary academic work tends to put excursions in footnotes. Thus Derrida's magnification of a footnote into a whole article represents a glorification of digression.

Discursive rambling may be non-functional in intellectual explorations that lead to dead ends, or in discourse that proceeds without any guiding purpose (e.g. Swift describes various conversational idiots who forget how stories go, lose the thread of their thoughts because of inattention, confusion, or some incapacity like exhaustion, drunkenness, etc.).

STRUCTURE IN MORE DETAIL

We have said that a digression is a change of (goal-directed) Path. The digression is a second path that breaks off from the original path in a new direction. But there is much room for variation within this model. How do we characterize the variations? We must figure this out if we are to grasp how digression relates to interruption, truncation, etc. What are the various ways a Path schema can be incomplete?

We may also ask about the details of how exactly the metaphor of action as motion along a path applies to fictional action and thinking and narrating and writing. In these cases, how do we understand Source, Path, and Goal? What would a "straight line" be?

The abstract structure has a number of elements, with possible variant forms for each element. I base the following on the abstract image-schematic structure of the concept.

-A digression may break from any kind of path (narrative, discursive, etc.).

-A digression may be caused "internally" (arising from the speaker, or her story) or "externally" (imposed by an interlocutor, or an outside narrator). These labels indicate opposite ends of a spectrum, not rigidly distinct classes. (The tale interpolated by a character, or a sudden intruding action, or a digressive description, are prototypically internal. A non-character narrator's excursus on an unrelated topic in the middle of a scene is very external--e.g. metafictional commentary, or a digression for the sake of pleasing variety. The narrator's explanation of a character's reaction, or of something else about the narrated scene, is in-between--typical of Sterne.)

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journal or that organization, or simply to repay similar favors one has oneself asked of others, is, though rarely mentioned, one of the defining conditions of contemporary scholarly life. . . . All the essays below are [. . .], too, steps in a perseverant attempt to push forward, or anyway somewhere, a general program. . . . (6-7)

[111] He discusses the different propriety of the device in different languages: "Kaplan and Ostler claim that different languages have different preferences for certain kinds of discourse patterns. [. . .] [Against] English's linear, unified pattern, they contrast the elaborate parallel structures in Arabic prose, with the more digressive writing in Romance languages which permit 'tangential' material [. . .]. Clyne [. . .] has examined the *Exkurs* or 'digression' in contemporary academic German and is able to show [. . .] that the *Exkurs* is not only institutionalized in certain German genres but has no easy translation equivalent in English" (63).

-A digression may be related or unrelated to the original path.
-A digression may return to the original path or not. (Sterne turns away from his original narrative plan of telling the life of Tristram, and ends up telling a different story, the life and amours of Uncle Toby.)
-A digression may itself be digressed from.
-A digression may be ended by internal or external causes (i.e. when it is completed in due course; or if it is cut off for some other reason)
-A digression may support, or undermine, or distract from, or be irrelevant to, the original point. (It may be pleasant relief from the rigours of working towards the main goal, or the satisfaction of a sudden desire tangential to it.)
-Digression can exist on various scales: word (unusual diction, long series of words) > sentence (lists, subsubclauses etc.) > paragraph > scene > chapter > part > work > genre. And these scales can interact (as when Sterne's Uncle Toby's sentence is interrupted by paragraph, then chapters, then book).
-A digression can have any kind of internal form, from a single word, to ploche (perfect repetition) to simple list (Rabelais) to an argument, story, etc.
-A digression itself may itself be narrative or discursive, in any language, and in any genre: quotations, jokes, sermons, poems, etc. Some genres are not clearly stories or discourses: commandments, prayers, lists, etc. The interpolated material may even be non-verbal: diagrams, images, symbols (dashes, stars), blanks, etc. This even constitutes a kind of digression from language.

DIGRESSION AND THE DIGRESSIVE WORK

Each digression, as well as having its own structure and character, also has a relation to the overall structure and character of the work. A significant kind of variation of extreme digression occurs when the feature becomes so pervasive and prominent as to become characteristic of the discourse or narrative. Then the whole work is "digressIVE".

A series of non-functional digressions may simply brighten the edges of the main path, if those digressions are merely for the purposes of relief. Or a general goal may be fulfilled by allowing oneself to pursue a range of digressions--as when one is exploring a physical or mental "area", or seeking some general quality like "experience" or "glory" (as does Don Quixote).[112] But it is also possible for such non-functional digressions to prevent the achievement of the main goal of the protagonist or speaker. A digressor may even abandon or forget the main goal that was the original rationale of the action. Yet another variation may be that kind of discourse or narrative that wanders because it eschews altogether the idea of a main goal.

CASE STUDIES OF DIGRESSION

Lucian's brief verbal digressions into only slightly unrelated matter are just the tip of an iceberg. To give an idea of the range of forms of digression even within the confines of a

[112] In this case, at a lower level you pursue a path without a goal, since you are just wandering. Then "change of path" doesn't mean much, since any action you undertake can still count as part of an overall wandering path. Perhaps deciding on a more specific goal, or stopping altogether, would be a change of path from wandering.

specific genre, I begin with a brief survey of examples of various kinds of Menippean digression, arranged simply in terms of modes of utterance. The closer analysis of examples following focuses on how the event-structures of specific instances of digressive forms help create specific satirical meanings.

1. Digressive speech, in narrator or character: Swift's "Hints Toward an Essay on Conversation" gives us different kinds of digressive personalities. First, the over-deliberate:

> But among such as deal in multitudes of words, none are comparable to the sober, deliberate talker, who proceeds with much thought and caution, makes his preface, branches out into several digressions, finds a hint that puts him in mind of another story, which he promises to tell you when this is done; comes back regularly to his subject, cannot readily call to mind some person's name, holding his head, complains of his memory; the whole company all this while in suspense; at length says, it is no matter, and so goes on. And, to crown the business, it perhaps proves at last a story the company has heard fifty times before; or, at best, some insipid adventure of the relater. (309)

And next the under-deliberate: "I say nothing here of the itch of dispute and contradiction, telling of lies, or of those who are troubled with the disease called the wandering of the thoughts, so that they are never present in mind at what passes in discourse; for whoever labours under any of these possessions, is as unfit for conversation as a madman in Bedlam" (316). The over-deliberate tries but fails to keep in full view, and to order clearly, too many discourse paths; the under-deliberate hasn't a clear enough view any of the many paths that he follows. In dialogues such as Lucian's, Cervantes's (in *The Dogs' Colloquy*), Walton's, etc. either the speaker or his interlocutor may draw attention to his wandering speech. Some of Varro's fragments depict philosophers (including himself) as drunk or insane, and losing the thread of their speech: "you are drunk, Marcus; for you begin to digress upon the *Odyssey* of Homer, although you promised to Seius that you were going to write on etiquette" (Fragment 60, p. 23). In such cases, the narrator or character is depicted mentally disordered in some way, and for some reason, whether insanity, intoxication or some other physiological stress, or ordinary stupidity or confusion. Cervantes makes digressive speech an organic part of the situation of two dogs astonished to be talking: "now that I see myself so unexpectedly endowed with this divine gift of speech, I intend to enjoy it and take advantage of it as much as I can, making haste to say everything I can remember, even if it is all jumbled up and confused, because I don't know when this blessing, which I consider to be on loan, will be revoked" (196). His interlocutor advises, "Carry on with your story, don't go off the track with irrelevant digressions and, however long the story is, you'll soon get to the end that way" (214). Walton's Angler several times recovers from going astray in his talk through piscatory enthusiasm. Dialogues and symposia allow for speakers to interrupt one another, and other kinds of speech interruption (by self, external event, or non-character narrator) later becomes an important element of Menippean digression. But the

impression of a digressive mind seems to intensify in monologues, where there is no outside correction to the speaker's path. Petronius's rambling Trimalchio is an early avatar of rambling character-narrators like Defoe's Moll Flanders, Sterne's Tristram,[113] Smollett's Win Jenkins in *Humphry Clinker*, Dicken's highly parenthetical Mrs. Piper in *Bleak House*,[114] Joyce's Molly Bloom, and Beckett's first-person narrators. (The "stream of consciousness" of Molly and some of the other female speakers has something of medieval digressiveness as Lewis describes it, manifesting the energy of Nature coursing in labyrinthine patterns).

2. Discursive digressions from discourse: in predominantly discursive works, a digression must be a sudden change of topic, so that the speaker interrupts his discussion of one thing to begin talking about something else. Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* contains a series of labelled digressions (Digression of Anatomy; of the Nature of Spirits, bad Angels, or Devils, and how they Cause Melancholy; of the misery of Scholars, and why the Muses are Melancholy; of Air; and A Consolatory Digression containing the remedies of all manner of Discontents). Swift's labelled digressions in *A Tale of a Tub* include A Digression Concerning Critics; in the Modern Kind; in Praise of Digressions (a mock encomium); Concerning the Original, the Use, and Improvement of Madness in a Commonwealth; and immediately following that, the Author's Compliment to the Readers, &c.: A Further Digression. Montaigne's essays also give an impression of digression piling upon digression. In such discourses the original guiding point may be embroidered with incidental matter, as in Burton and Walton and Montaigne. Burton uses the image of the spaniel running from stimulus to stimulus, unable to fasten on any one goal. Sherbert shows that Lyly and Dryden used the same image, and that it is indeed "a Renaissance commonplace" (130). (18-20, 130):

> *Wit writing* [. . .] is no other than the faculty of imagination in the writer, which, like a nimble spaniel, beats over and ranges through the field of memory, till it springs the quarry it hunted after; or without metaphor, which searches over all the memory for the species or ideas of those things which it designs to represent. (Dryden, Preface to "Annus Mirabilis", qtd. in Sherbert 130)

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[113] Sterne's digressive characters feed into his satire on Lockean associationist psychology.

[114] Albert J. Guerard's Afterword to Dickens's *Bleak House* says that

> At the heart of this world of muddle are the fools and eccentrics with their mad chatter, isolated in their "humours," trapped by obsession. [. . .] At times they also serve very definite structural or rhetorical roles. Their mindless chatter can serve as vivid digression concealing or undramatizing moments when the plot must quietly take a forward leap. [. . .] [T]heir verbal nonsense in the presence of suffering adds a fine note of the grotesque. [. . .] The mad reiterations and sudden shifts of attention without punctuation or pause are real enough; [. . .] Dickens's dialogue is better, of course, than any real-life irrelevance. But how and why? The comic dialogue can achieve an extraordinary reality even when not reported verbatim. [. . .] Mrs. Piper is obviously a descendant of Sarah Gamp (and has her own progeny in *Ulysses*). [. . .] The normal mode of impressionist narration is memory, the free wandering memory of [Conrad or Faulkner . . .] the memory which can do anything, and need not trouble itself about transitions. (841-52)

Or the guiding point may be left behind or lost, swamped in a storm of minor points, as in Swift's conversers and his *Tale*.

3. Narrative digressions from discourse: a discourse may be interrupted to turn to a story that illustrates a point, or simply for variety or comic relief. In Menippean satires digressive stories tend to be pushed to the extent that these functions are parodied, or are near parody. Montaigne's narrative anecdotes, and Burton's and Walton's outrageous stories often bear a relation to the point that is obscure at the least. Or the narrator may leave the point behind to develop the story instead.

4. Narrative digressions from narrative: These may be of several kinds, depending on the relative importance of various stories, and how they are related. If there is a guiding goal that defines a main story, then digressions from it may serve to enable or assist the main action, or they may pull the protagonists away from the main action, or they may give the actors relief from the main action, or they may serve as a thematic parallel illuminating the main action. The Menippean genre contains a number of parodies of the intertwined adventure stories of romance: Lucian's *True History*; the interpolated tale of Psyche and Cupid in Apuleius; Petronius's parody-epic; the use of myths in Rabelais, and the wandering adventures in search of the Oracle. The story of the Man on the Hill in *Tom Jones*; Sterne's stories of Yorick, Slawkenbergius, the Nose, etc., have thematic points. Or the guiding purpose may remain in the background, while the foreground action is wandering governed by chance. Swift's four stories begin with Gulliver diverted from his aims by shipwreck, but each illustrates a different aspect of his theme. Candide's adventures are disorganized, but all serve the main purpose of refuting "optimism". Similarly, Beckett's characters all illustrate failure of any purpose with their aimless drifting. The tone and typical form of actions will tend to suggest a thematic point even if the wanderings are not consciously anchored by any guiding purpose.

5. Discursive digressions from narrative: This may be the most familiar and common type of digression in prose fiction. The narrator turns aside from the main action of the story in order to elaborate in a direct expository way some point relevant to that action. Instances include Rabelais's lists and wandering plot and his characters' discussions; Don Quixote's discursive digressions, to Sancho or other audiences, occur within his wandering journey, and the narrator also interrupts Quixote's story. Fielding's narrator interrupts *Tom Jones* and *Joseph Andrews*; Melville's narrator digresses on the technical side of whaling; Pynchon's narrator occasionally interrupts the plot. An important sub-type of this is the interruption of the narrative in order to comment on the narrating or writing itself. But this sub-type blurs into another, as the discussion of narration or writing can itself be a narrative of the act of storytelling or writing, as in Sterne.

6. Symbols of digression: in highly digressive works, the author may present some image that captures his narrative strategy. Nashe's crowning of the red herring as king of the fishes in *Lenten Stuff* has to do with its symbolic meaning of "diversionary tactic" (Blanchard 119, 133). The red herring is thus very like the "tale of a tub" of Swift,

inspired by Rabelais's conception of his work, in turn based on the story of Diogenes. Sterne has his drawn lines and Trim's flourish. Analogous to physical images of digression are mazelike paths in complex structures (labyrinths and labyrinthine places and objects, such as convoluted cities or buildings, things hidden in boxes, etc.)

7. Digressions by change of form: we may consider a change of genre within a work, or the insertion of minor genres in a comic or parodic fashion, as digressive only in a metaphoric sense. But "interludes", first of prose within a verse frame, then of verse within a prose frame, are staple Menippean features, as are "inserted genres", and the effect of such features can be very like the effect of repeated digression: a sense of wild and unpredictable change in the narrator's goals and attitudes, and an impression of overall incoherence. Rabelais, Sterne, Joyce, and Pynchon are full of inserted genres and styles.

LUCIAN

Korkowski's citation of Lucian's Menippus "astray in his talk", and speaking so strangely he seems "out of his mind", comes from *Menippus Goes To Hell.*[115] When Menippus responds to Philonides's first questions with quotations from Euripides, Homer, and Hesiod, Philonides asks, "have you gone quite mad? It just isn't sense to keep talking poetry to an old friend like me" (98). At the end, when Philonides again asks about the law passed against the rich, which was part of the original point of the conversation (98), Menippus says "Oh, thanks for reminding me. I was meaning to tell you about it, but somehow I seem to have drifted off the subject" (108). Menippus is doubly digressive in his talk. His journey away from ordinary life has had some lasting effects, leaving him in an extraordinarily poetic state of mind. And his narration of his journey is a digression from his original simpler conversational goal of explaining the law. This subsidiary narration is, however, not so gratuitous as to be non-functional, since it fulfils Menippus's purpose of more fully explaining the law against the rich, and Lucian's purpose of satirizing social inequities.

What Menippus drifts into is a full explanation of his journey, from its initial justification through his memorable encounters. He says that as he lost his childhood belief in the gods, he turned to philosophers, looking for "some simple and reliable rule of conduct" (99). His quest is itself wandering, since it leads through various philosophies and in the end leaves him with no such rule. He finds all philosophers foolish and hypocritical. He arranges a visit to Hades to ask Tiresias the most sensible way to live. His visit to the land of the dead especially attacks the unjust power structure of the world, and the condition of the dead is meant to show that true justice levels the powerful and treats all people equally. Their "society", too, is without rule--it is random and shapeless, without linear or hierarchical order, wandering made concrete in a place. On the

[115] Korkowski uses the Loeb edition of this dialogue, translated by A. M. Harmon and titled *Menippus* (in volume 4). For this particular dialogue I have used Paul Turner's translation.

Acherusian Plain, he finds heroes and heroines and all the rest, grouped by nation, but they are reduced to dead objects and all distinctions are shown to be superficial:

> It wasn't very easy to distinguish between individuals, for being nothing but bare bones, they all look practically alike. [. . .] They lay huddled on top of one another in vague, shapeless heaps, without any trace of the beauty they possessed up here. [. . .] For all differentiating features had disappeared. They were just a collection of bones, obscure and anonymous, no longer capable of identification.
>
> Seeing them like that gave me the idea that human life is a vast sort of pageant organized by Chance, who provides the people taking part in it with various different costumes. (105-06)

With the help of Tiresias, Menippus comes to settle on a trust in common sense and intuition, with a healthy dose of skepticism and humour.

In Lucian's other dialogues, the most common analogous structure is the sudden switch from one character to another, or from one scene to another in the more narrative pieces. This sudden switching has a cumulative effect: the narrator is seen to be surveying the limits and internal terrain of some physical or intellectual region (or both together). The switching from philosopher to philosopher in *Philosophies For Sale* gives a fictional rationale for the sequence of jumps from viewpoint to viewpoint that constitute "the testing of an idea"--or more exactly, the "shopping for an idea" that's an important analogous Menippean structure (for example, in Johnson and Carlyle). The brisk changing of interlocutors in the *Dialogues of the Dead* is analogous.

The jumping from scene to scene of absurd, satiric adventure in the *True Story* creates a kind of parody of transitions. Lucian self-consciously admits that his story is a departure from serious reading and from truth of any kind (249-53). The route is also wandering, driven in the first place by curiosity: "The motive and purpose of my journey lay in my intellectual activity and desire for adventure, and in my wish to find out what the end of the ocean was, and who the people were that lived on the other side" (253). The adventures begin digressively, when the ship is driven off course by a gale that blows for 79 days. And later scene changes are often driven by the need to flee and escape, or sudden supernatural events: "About noon, when the island was no longer in sight, a whirlwind suddenly arose, spun the boat about, raised her into the air about three hundred furlongs and did not let her down in to the sea again; but while she was hung up aloft a wind struck her sails and drove her ahead with bellying canvas" (259).

The Carousal, or The Lapiths combines these kinds of switching. One guest at a wedding banquet narrates to a pair of eager listeners, after the fact, the story of philosophers who "misconducted themselves at dinner, led on by strong drink to do and say what they should not" (vol. 1, 415). Metaphors of straying lines are here from the beginning, in "misconduct" and "led on". As we have seen, the straight line can apply to thinking, speaking, and acting. The groom Chaereas is a student. His teacher is Ion the Platonic philosopher, "a grave and reverend person to look at, with great dignity written on his features. Indeed, most people call him 'Rule,' out of regard for the straightness of his thinking" (419). The chaos that prevails satirizes the proper form ideally associated

with culture and education. Such form could be symbolized by straight lines working in harmony. Instead we have everyone at odds, interrupting and disagreeing ungraciously with one another, ultimately leading to an all-out fight--where the "rule" becomes "every line for itself" as each philosopher tries to defeat all the others and make his voice the only one left, in control of the whole situation. Lucian shows how the breaking of decorum seems worse among the intellectuals through a contrast that creates a "world upside-down" image:

> The tables were turned, then, and the unlettered folk were manifestly dining in great decorum, without either getting maudlin or behaving disreputably; they simply laughed and passed judgement, perhaps, on the others, whom they used to admire, thinking them men of importance because of the garb they wore. The learned men, on the contrary, were playing the rake and abusing each other and gorging them selves and bawling and coming to blows; and 'marvellous' Alcidamas even made water right there in the room [. . .]. (448)

The chaos of the ensuing fight is the basis of the title's allusion to the wedding breakfast of Peirithous, which ended in a hand-to-hand encounter between the Centaurs and the Lapiths. It is captured in certain kinds of movement, as well as emotional reactions: "The whole place, however, was full of noise and tears, and the women, gathered about Chaereas, were wailing, while the rest of the men were trying to quiet things down. [. . .] You would have said they were Lapiths and Centaurs, to see tables going over, blood flowing and cups flying" (459).

Lucian's digressions are sometimes within the wandering thought and speech of characters, but they more typically and noticeably involve abrupt transitions of scene. Scene changes are unpredictable, but scenes are not unrelated: each often represents in some symbolic way a new aspect of a broad common theme (as the *Dialogues of the Dead* represent various aspects of the relation of death to life). This literary form often reflects Lucian's characteristic themes of the vanity and hypocrisy of religion and philosophy, by showing increasing chaos where clear harmonious order is pretended and expected, and intensifying levelling of high and low where hierarchy is pretended and expected.

PETRONIUS

Given the fragmentary state of the text, it is difficult to judge with accuracy the nature and significance of digressiveness in *The Satyricon*. But it is recognized that the *Satyricon* is structured in many respects as a low parody of high genres. The overall structure is said to be parodic of Homer's story of Odysseus's wandering to escape Poseidon's wrath. Encolpius seeks to escape the wrath of Priapus, lord of lust: "Because he sees the secret rites of Priapus, he must undergo the orgy of Priapus' priestess, Quartilla. He is struck with impotence and prays to Priapus to release him, just as he later offends again by killing Priapus' pet goose" (Arrowsmith xii). Palmeri sees Petronius using a wider cultural matrix. He "parodically reshapes and reevaluates four principal genres: Greek romance; Roman rhetorical declamation; epic, especially the *Odyssey* and

Aeneid; and Platonic dialogue, especially the *Symposium*" (20). Nevertheless, it is clear that wandering, interruptions, and confusion are part of the parody of the ideals of heroism, wisdom, and oratory, and strongly define the structure and style of the *Satyricon*.

Before the protagonists ever get to the great *cena Trimalchionis* (Trimalchio's feast), their experience is of wandering, confusion, and interruptions. Near the beginning, Ascyltus slips away from a group of debating peripatetics. Encolpius follows but gets lost: "Worse, whichever road I took, I somehow kept coming back to the place where I had started. Finally, drenched in sweat and completely limp from running around in circles," (25) he asks a little old woman if she knows where he lives, and she takes him to a whorehouse. There he meets Ascyltus, who has also managed to get hopelessly lost, and lured to the same place, but to be treated as a whore, not a customer (25-26). When they decide to separate, Encolpius wanders "all over town in a fruitless search for work" (27). Returning to his room, he begins making love to Giton, but is rudely interrupted by Ascyltus breaking the door in, roaring with laughter, and flogging him (27-28). They later have a sudden coincidental meeting with a thief who stole a tunic from them, and from whom they have stolen a cloak (28-30). Afterwards, individual episodes continue to develop by similar means, as when an aimless line of discourse, during the line of a sea-journey, is suddenly interrupted by a supernatural storm: "But while we were talking aimlessly of this and that, the sea suddenly grew rough and great thunderheads towered up on every quarter, utterly blacking out the light of day" (122).

The feast itself parodies Plato's *Symposium*. Very far from being a harmonious meeting of wise minds, it is an orgy of the vulgar bragging, showing-off, and squabbling of the nouveau riche. Its action has an interruptive character: the meal proceeds from one sudden surprise course to the next, and the speakers "take turns" only by interrupting one another rudely. This kind of narrative movement gives the banquet its distinctive feeling of wildness, disorientation, confused suspense, and surprise. The suspense starts out genuine as the reader, like the new guests, thinks he is witnessing real crises. The suspense becomes ironic as each crisis is revealed to be a hoax, then turns paranoid as expected phony crises turn out real.

Expectations are constantly set up just to be shattered. Trimalchio sets up little disasters so he can threaten slaves, then show them clemency by freeing them. These suspensions or interruptions of expectation are comparable to those of *Tristram Shandy*, though the comic effect is more crude and farcical. Because the interruptions are the result of the distribution of agency and action over a crowd, rather than over one or a few characters' minds, the effect is of a collective situation of chaotic confusion rather than a single or a few highly eccentric minds. Instead of one line splitting into tributaries then returning to a main course, we have many separate lines criss-crossing and colliding with one another to create a weaving blunder in an overall direction. Despite such differences, the rhetorical structure of the sequence of sudden interruptions that are by and large ludicrous and satirically degrading to the main line of action that we infer (as well as to the high genres that are parodied), is clearly analogous to that of the ludicrously digressing narrator interrupting himself to wander from one topic to another.

Consider the number of times a sudden interruption (usually of a staged show of luxury or power) is used to move forward the story of the feast:

> -"I was gaping at all this in open-mouthed wonder when I suddenly jumped with terror, stumbled, and nearly broke my leg. For there on the left as you entered, in fresco, stood a huge dog straining at his leash" (40).
> -"We duly noted these refinements and were just about to step into the dining room when suddenly a slave [. . .] shouted, 'RIGHT FEET FIRST!' Well, needless to say, we froze. Who wants to bring down bad luck on his host by walking into his dining room in the wrong way? However, we synchronized our legs and were just stepping out, right feet first, when a slave, utterly naked, landed on the floor in front of us an implored us to save him from a whipping" (41).
> -"We were nibbling at these splendid appetizers when suddenly the trumpets blared a fanfare and Trimalchio was carried in" (42-43).
> -"'My friends,' he said, 'I wasn't anxious to eat just yet, but I've ignored my own wishes so as not to keep you waiting. Still, perhaps you won't mind if I finish my game.' [. . .] His playing, I might add, was punctuated throughout with all sorts of vulgar exclamations" (43).
> -"I heard one of the guests, obviously a veteran of these dinners, say, 'I wonder what little surprise we've got in here'" (43).
> -"Then the orchestra suddenly blared and the trays were snatched away from the tables by a troupe of warbling waiters" (44).
> -"Suddenly the orchestra gave another flourish and four slaves came dancing in and whisked off the top of the tray" (45).
> -"My neighbour's pleasant prattle, however, was interrupted by Trimalchio" (47).
> -"We were wondering what all this was leading up to, when suddenly there came a hideous uproar outside the room and then huge Spartan mastiffs came bounding in and began to gallop around the table" (49).

After Trimalchio leaves the table to relieve himself, talk among the others flows more freely. Seleucus interrupts Damas (50); Phileros cuts in and shouts down Seleucus when he begins to get tiresome (51); Ganymedes strikes in on Phileros (52); Echion breaks in on Ganymedes (53); and Trimalchio returns complaining about his constipation, and the dangers of "holding it in" (55). Each of these monologues is in itself digressive. Trimalchio then directs the conversation, questioning the orator Agamemnon about his debates but interrupting him repeatedly to entertain the guests (56-57). The series of courses and hoaxes and boasts proceeds as before.

> -"In the midst of this harangue a slave dropped a goblet on the floor. [. . .] However, we interceded once more and managed to get the slave off" (59).
> -"But it was the secretary, not Fortunata, who effectively dampened his desire to dance, for quite without warning he began to read from the estate records as through he were reading some government bulletin" (60). Trimalchio interrupts this reading, too.

-"Just at this point the ladder toppled and the boy on top fell down, landing squarely on Trimalchio. [. . .] Doctors came rushing in [. . .]. As for the boy, he was already clutching us by the legs and begging us to intercede for him" (61).
-"At this one of Trimalchio's freedmen friends, the man just above me at the table, took offense and flared out in wild rage" (63).
-"At these last words, Giton, who was sitting at our feet, went rudely off into a great gale of whooping laughter which he had been trying to stifle for some time" (64).
-"Ascyltus was on the point of replying, but Trimalchio, charmed by his friend's eloquence, broke in first" (65).
-"Immediately a troupe of rhapsodes burst into the room, all banging away on their shields with spears" (66).
-"At this the rhapsodes burst into cheers, the slaves went scurrying about and promptly appeared with a barbecued calf, with a cap on its head, reposing on a huge platter" (66).
-Our applause for this elaborate *tour de force*, however, was abruptly cut short. For all at once the coffered ceiling began to rumble and the whole room started to shake" (66).
-"At one point during this tender scene Habinnas rose stealthily to his feet, tiptoed over behind their couch and, grabbing Fortunata by the knees, toppled her over backwards onto the couch" (73-74).
-"'You haven't mentioned all the little bugger's tricks,' broke in Scintilla angrily" (74).
-"Suddenly two slaves came rushing in looking as though they'd had an argument while drawing water at the well" (76).
-"Once the slaves heard this, of course, they burst out with cheers and effusive thanks. But Trimalchio suddenly began to take the whole farce quite seriously and ordered his will brought out and read aloud from beginning to end" (77).
-After reciting his epitaph, Trimalchio "burst into tears. Then Fortunata started wailing, Habinnas began to cry, and every slave in the room burst out sobbing as though Trimalchio were dying then and there. The whole room throbbed and pulsed to the sound of mourning. I was almost in tears myself, when Trimalchio suddenly cried, 'We all have to die, so let's live while we're waiting! [. . .]'" (78).
-Sneaking towards the main entrance, "we were given a deafening welcome by the chained watchdog, and his furious barking and growling so terrified Ascyltus that he tumbled backwards into the fishpond" (78).
-"'My friends,' said Trimalchio, apropos of nothing, 'my pet slave is having his first shave today. [. . .]'" (80).

The whole chaos of surprises seems to represent the unpredictability of Fortune and Fate. Trimalchio and many of his guests were born penniless slaves, and became wealthy after being freed: so turns the wheel of fortune, making the low, high, and the high, low. He boasts, "Once I used to be like you, but I rose to the top by my ability. Guts are what make the man; the rest is garbage. [. . .] But I'm like to bust with good luck" (81-

82). His wife is named Fortunata, and we are told, "Never was a man so changeable: sometimes he would bow down to Fortunata in everything she asked; at other times, as now, he went his own way" (59-60). He and others frequently comment on the capriciousness of fate and fortune. The ragseller Echion breaks into Ganymedes's diatribe against "the times", saying "'Luck changes. If things are lousy today, there's always tomorrow. That's life, man. Sure, the times are bad, but they're no better anywhere else. We're all in the same boat, so what's the fuss?'" (53). Trimalchio even arranges a stunt to dramatize the point. He has a slave boy fall on him from a ladder so that he can set him free, "so that nobody could say that the great Trimalchio had been hurt by a mere slave" (61). His audience responds with its usual flattery: "We gave this ample gesture our approval and remarked on the uncertainties of human existence" (61). But the lines Trimalchio produces to commemorate the occasion epitomize his concerns and attitudes:

> *We think we're awful smart, we think we're awful wise,*
> *but when we're least expecting, comes the big surprise.*
> *Lady Luck's in heaven and we're her little toys,*
> *so break out the wine and fill your glasses, boys!* (61)

Trimalchio is the Epicurean who urges us to eat, drink and be merry, because--so goes the conventional use of human death as the most extreme manifestation of life's unpredictability--tomorrow we die. His obsession with his own death thus has a clear relation to his debauchery and to his sense of interruption and surprise as the defining qualities of human life. In fact he announces the start of the feast with another grotesque *memento mori* symbolization of this philosophy, and another versified statement of it:

> [A] slave brought in a skeleton, cast of solid silver, and fastened in such a way that the joints could be twisted and bent in any direction. The servants threw it down on the table in front of us and pushed it into several suggestive postures by twisting its joints, while Trimalchio recited this verse of his own making:
>
> *Nothing but bones, that's what we are.*
> *Death hustles us humans away.*
> *Today we're here and tomorrow we're not,*
> *so live and drink while you may!* (44-45)

He insists that "'slaves are human too. They drink the same mother's milk that we do, though an evil fate grinds them down'" (76). Many of the staged performances designed to surprise the guests are analogous. And the tricks with the meal also have a "change of fortune" theme, as so many of them make a dish seem one thing then suddenly change shape or nature. The "world upside down" topos here applies to the vagaries of fortune. After hearing a story of a werewolf, he tells his own horrible story of supernatural transformation, "as weird as an ass on a roof" (69), about witches covering a giant of a man with black and blue spots, replacing him with a straw dummy, then returning him stricken with a terminal madness. As Encolpius says, after the feast, "There is little point in expecting much of your own projects, when Fate has projects of her own" (88).

When the three try to escape the feast, they are prevented by the porter who refuses to let them leave by the same way they came in, and the narrator expresses his sorry sense of lostness using what Frye calls the "image of lost direction", the labyrinth: "So what were we poor devils to do now, trapped in this strange labyrinth of a place?" (79). A labyrinth is an image of a path that is without a visible goal, and that therefore splits up into subpaths that go nowhere, embodied in a physical edifice. It is non-functional digression made concrete.

The feast ends with a climactic scene spectacularly worthy of the Kernanian annals of crowding and confusion. After promising to free all his slaves after his death, having his will read, and describing the monument to be erected to him, Trimalchio at the height of his drunkenness insists that everyone pretend they are at his funeral feast. The band blares a dead march so loudly that it wakes up the entire neighbourhood and the local firemen, hearing the uproar, break into the house with buckets and axes. In the confusion of action Trimalchio also confuses the concepts of slave and free, poor and wealthy, artifice and reality, life and death. Giton, Ascyltus, and Encolpius make their escape from this climax of confusion--where an entire crowd full of people with various confused ideas about a situation crash into one another--into a ragged denouement, where a few people sharing similar confusions, instead of colliding violently into one another, taper off into their more usual physical and mental wandering:

> Utter confusion followed, of course, and we took advantage of the heaven-sent opportunity [. . .] and rushed out of there as though the place were really in flames.
>
> We had no torch to light us on our way as we wandered, and the lateness of the hour--it was now the dead of night--precluded all hope of meeting someone with a light. Worse still, we were drunk and so unfamiliar with the area that even in broad daylight we would have lost our way. (84)

In Petronius, digression is a principle of change in action, whether that action is actual motion of characters on a journey, or sequences of events in one locale. It includes many characters breaking in on each other, trying to hog the narrative spotlight, so to speak. It emphasizes sudden interruptions staged to create dramatic surprise and awe in an audience, towards the author of the surprises. Specifically, it relies on the sudden interruption of one minor action or speaker by another, in a larger action at a single event--i.e. Trimalchio's feast is made up of a set of interruptions of one course by a trick that transforms the course, or the interruption of one speaker by another who disapproves of the first. This feast episode represents an aggravation of the digressive tendencies of the rest of the story, where the wandering and confusion of the protagonists reflects their stupidity or drunkenness or bad luck, and creates a parody of the epic heroes' cunning and skill and good fortune.

CERVANTES

Early in *Don Quixote* there is a paradigmatic interruptive digression. The day after the adventure of the windmills, Don Quixote and Sancho meet on the road two friars riding

before a coach carrying a Biscayan lady. Quixote interprets the situation as the abduction of a princess, and attacks and routs the friars. A squire in the lady's retinue challenges Quixote's demand that they return to El Toboso to report his deeds, and Quixote attacks again. This battle with the Biscayan squire is interrupted at the height of a moment of crisis in the action, to be completed only after the middle of the next chapter. (That chapter eight ended the first of the four parts in the original division of Part one of the book, aggravates the interruption.) While the digression turns to a wholly new topic, that topic is not wholly unrelated, as it concerns the loss of the conclusion to the story of the battle:

> Don Quixote, as we said before, advanced toward the wary Biscayan, brandishing his sword on high and determined to cleave him in twain. The Biscayan, on his part, waited for him with his sword also raised and protected by his cushion. All the bystanders stood trembling in fearful suspense, dreading the result of those prodigious blows. [. . .]
>
> But it is most unfortunate that at this critical moment the author of this history leaves the battle in mid air, with the excuse that he could find no more exploits of Don Quixote than those related here. It is true that the second author of this work refused to believe that so curious a history could have been consigned to oblivion or that the wits of La Mancha could have been so lacking in curiosity as not to possess in their archives or in their registries some documents referring to this famous knight.
>
> Relying on this belief, he did not lose hope of discovering the conclusion of this delectable history, and by the favor of Heaven he did find it, as we shall tell in the second part. (105)

In the next chapter, the narrator reiterates the states of action and narrative. As in the dialogues, this interruption is projected into another narrating mind, this time a writer, and the digressing mind causes confusion and irritation in his auditors (on which the narrator expatiates):

> In the first part of this history we left the valiant Biscayan and the celebrated Don Quixote with naked swords on high just about to deal two blows of such savagery that if they had reached home, they would have cleft both knights asunder from head to foot, splitting them like a pomegranate. At that critical point this pleasant history stopped and was left unfinished without our author giving a hint where to find the missing part. This caused me great annoyance, for my pleasure from the little I had read of the story was turned into displeasure when I considered what faint hopes there were of finding the remainder of so agreeable a tale.

While lamenting the missing "record" of his hero's life, the narrator mocks the feeble conventional rationales for such records:

> It seemed to me impossible and contrary to reasonable custom that so noble a knight should not have found some wise man who would have undertaken to write of his unheard-of exploits, a thing that was never lacking in the case of the knights-errant, who, as people say, sally forth on these adventures, for all of them always kept one or two sages ready at hand, who not only wrote of their deeds but also described their minutest thoughts and most trivial actions, however much they were concealed; [. . .]. I could not thus bring myself to believe that such a gallant story could have been left maimed and mutilated, and I laid the blame on the malice of time, the devourer and consumer of all things, for either concealing or destroying the sequel. (106)

The narrator is determined to find the "conclusion of this agreeable story" (107), and we turn from a story of knightly questing to a story of "research". And the discovery is a coincidence as improbable as any adventure in a chivalric tale. While browsing parchment books in the Alcaná or silk market of Toledo, he finds Arabic writing. He puts the book in the hands of a translator, who begins to laugh, explaining that a note in the margin says that the story's Dulcinea of El Toboso has the best hand at salting pork in all La Mancha. Verifying that this is the story of Don Quixote, the narrator buys all the other papers, and immediately has them translated into Castilian. They begin with a labelled picture of Don Quixote's fight with the Biscayan, at the critical moment. The narrator talks briefly about the chance that the "dog of an author" the Arab has fallen short of the truth by failing adequately to exaggerate the facts with "indulgent eulogies". Then he swings right into the continuation of the story, in typically exaggerated romantic terms.

The digression serves no serious purpose relative to the Don Quixote story, but its four pages of ironic commentary and improbable anecdote serve the purpose of satirizing absurd romance conventions. It satirizes the suspenseful interruption of the chronicle (a cliché of chivalry romances, Nabokov observes (*Lectures* 120)), by making the story "sink in its own suspense". It also satirizes the story's mysterious transmission, and the implied author's access to the minutiae of the hero's mind.

Several other "digression" sub-structures come into play here. The digression stops the Don Quixote story in a "freeze-frame", to turn to the path of the narrator's search for the "historian's" conclusion. This is discovered by chance, via the sudden interruption of a wander through the market. And the identity of the story is discovered at first through a digressive marginal comment on the main text. So there are seven paths of different kinds, interlinked by digression. In the first place, there are:

-The Don Quixote story
-The narration of Quixote's story by the "historian"
-The reading of the history by the narrator

These are all interrupted by the loss of the story. The digression turns to:

-The narrator's commentary on the story, the narration, and the historian
-The story of the narrator's search for the historian's conclusion
-The sub-story of the narrator's digressive wander through the market
-The marginalia about Dulcinea, a metaphoric digression from the Don Quixote story, and from its printing on the page

In sum, the parodic digression is there primarily to undercut the pretended romantic attitude of the narrator by emphasizing the literariness of the story (the attitude of the protagonist is already being undercut by the irony of the fictional situation). The marginal script epitomizes this point by revealing the unflattering, "low" truth of the situation.

BURTON

Focussing on the question of the genre of Burton's *Anatomy*, Korkowski's comments on Burton's relation to Menippean satire help to clear the ground about digressions. He sees them not as spontaneous and chaotic, but as carefully wrought, and working together ingeniously to achieve his ends:

> Burton's lambent wanderings through early parts of the *Anatomy* are left aside, in readiness for a last, all-out effort to show that religious melancholy is the quintessence and severest state of madness [. . .]. The *Anatomy*'s digressions form a prolegomenon to these contentions about religious melancholy, yet the design is too shrewd to be an easily detectable prelude. (81)

But the stance of madness is clear, and has precedents enough to be a prototypical feature of the genre: "Later imitators of Menippus and Lucian commonly copied this pose of being unable to control their discourse, and Burton is much in their manner when he so often worriedly confesses, 'I digress,' and 'I rove.' In many places, Burton checks himself with an obsessive self-consciousness that typifies the Menippean voice" (82). Many writers after Burton similarly evoke madness by digressive discursive incoherence. But many do not reflect on this, and simply allow it to *show* madness rather than *telling* about it.

WALTON

In Walton's book *The Compleat Angler*, the beginning, middle, and end of digressions are quite clear, because the main purpose, to provide practical information about fish and fishing, is quite clear. It is a simple matter to know when Piscator is talking about his specialty and when he is not. The digressions are by and large of two kinds, recitals of poems and songs about angling life, of which there are very many, and fantastic or doubtful stories and beliefs about fish, which are sometimes dismissed, sometimes supported, sometimes left open. Both kinds of digression have a recreative, entertaining value. Piscator sometimes worries that his discourse is become tedious, and says he is tired with talking so long, wants something mixed in from the others (213, 226). He also worries over his digressions, a touch guiltily, as if these light interludes may delude his audience, or damage his credibility. "But whither am I strayed in this discourse?" (254) he wonders, realizing that "if I should begin but to name the several sorts of strange fish

that are usually taken in many of those rivers that run into the sea, I might beget wonder in you, or unbelief, or both" (253).[116]

One whole digressive chapter and its title are very revealing. "CHAPTER XVI *Is of nothing, or that which is nothing worth*" (230-36) narrates the meeting of Piscator and his scholar Venator with Peter and Coridon at an inn, where they drink and eat and swap verses, in out of the wind and rain. Here the digressions from a planned speech correspond to a turning away from a planned action: "My purpose was to give you some directions concerning roach and dace, and some other inferior fish, [. . .]; but I will forbear at this time to say any more, because you see yonder come our brother Peter and honest Coridon: but I will promise you, that as you and I fish, and walk tomorrow towards London, if I have now forgotten anything that I can then remember, I will not keep it from you" (230). A chapter on "nothing" is in the Menippean tradition of the paradoxical encomium, and the celebration of this lucky reprieve from weather among friends and feasting expresses Piscator's pastoral values of "retreat" from society and contempt for all the vain "somethings" it values. The last chapter XXI expands on the miseries of riches and the vanities of society, using the figure of Diogenes.

While Walton/ Piscator's digressions are clearly marked off from the main text, they are very mild, and no such threat as he feigns to fear to the coherence of his discourse. The overall impression of the book is of a clear and systematic account of the various parts of his subject, with occasional curious sidebars. The digressions are much more closely related to the main matter than is the digression of *Don Quixote*. The difference is that the digressive material does not give information about fishing, but rather celebrates it in verse, or offers rumour and speculation. We get the impression that the narrator is cultured and curious, not disordered. There may be some irony about the fantastic fish stories inviting the credulity of passionate anglers, but in general the irony falls rather on the folly of a world that places its own blind vanities above the pastoral values of the fisherman.

Menippean satire regularly questions the veracity of such outrageous tales, either by overt doubt, or by ironic insistence on their truth, from Lucian's *True Story*, through the anecdotes of Montaigne and Burton, the fervent testimonies of Rabelais's and Cervantes's narrators, Swift's Gulliver's dispassionate recording of his travels, to Sterne's story of "A COCK and a BULL" (457).

SWIFT

There is in *A Tale of a Tub* A Digression Concerning Critics (290-97); A Digression in the Modern Kind (306-11); A Digression in Praise of Digressions (317-20); A Digression Concerning the Original, the Use, and Improvement of Madness in a Commonwealth (326-36); and *immediately following* that, the Author's Compliment to the Readers, &c.:

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[116] After some strange stories of carps with frogs stuck to their heads, he says, "But I am fallen into this discourse by accident, of which I might say more, but it has proved longer than I intended, and possibly may not to you be considerable" (197-98). And, after a long quotation of further strange stories of frogs attacking pikes, "But whither am I going? I had almost lost myself, by remembering the discourse of Dubravius. I will therefore stop here, and tell you, according to my promise, how to catch the pike" (189-90).

A Further Digression (337-40). These are a key feature of the work, and the means of their introduction, their structures, and conclusions have much to show us about the nature of the figure in this prototype of the feature in this prototype of the genre. They are clearly marked off from the narrative Tale, and each comes with a rationale. They typically present the narrator suddenly bringing in matter alleged to be pertinent to the discourse as a whole, but not to the events at hand, after realizing that he has forgotten to include it in its proper place.

The first digression crops up in its own Section, with no anticipation in the action or narration of the previous section. The narrator announces:

> Tho' I have been hitherto as cautious as I could, upon all occasions, most nicely to follow the rules and methods of writing laid down by the example of our illustrious moderns; yet has the unhappy shortness of my memory led me into an error, from which I must immediately extricate myself, before I can decently pursue my principal subject. I confess with shame, it was an unpardonable omission to proceed so far as I have already done, before I had performed the due discourses, expostulatory, supplicatory, or deprecatory, with my good lords the critics. (290)

The late recognition leads to a statement linking the author's motivation to his content: "Towards some atonement for this grievous neglect, I do here make humbly bold to present them with a short account of themselves and their art" (290).

His own mental incapacity has caused a metaphorical departure from proper (modern) form; to return to the correct course he must remove the error by another kind of departure. Swift's suggestion of memory failure is ironic, of course, because the "proper" form is the vulgar form of the satirized "moderns". Unlike Lucian's Menippus, Swift's Hack only goes astray in his discourse by forgetting to digress earlier. By presenting a paradoxical encomium wherein critics are the heroes of a mock-epic, Swift at once satirizes the grovelling praise of critics by modern authors, and the modern critics themselves, by ironically celebrating the conception of the critic as a god defending humankind from literary faults by discovering and collecting them. After comparing critics to many kinds of parasitic vermin, Swift ends the section clearly, commenting on his hopes for it with straight-faced irony:

> Thus much, I think, is sufficient to serve by way of address to my patrons, the true modern critics, and may very well atone for my past silence, as well as that which I am like to observe for the future. I hope I have deserved so well of their whole body, as to meet with generous and tender usage at their hands. Supported by which expectation, I go on boldly to pursue those adventures already so happily begun. (297)

The Digression in the Modern Kind also breaks off the narrative with no warning. It begins with the claim to have compassed the great design of everlasting remembrance by undertaking endeavours "so highly serviceable to the general good of mankind" (306).

The body of the section is a preposterous claim to have written a book of universal knowledge. He elaborates on his researches, saying that he is ready to show a "complete anatomy" of human nature to the world. "But not to digress farther in the midst of a digression, as I have known some authors enclose digressions in one another, like a nest of boxes; I do affirm, that having carefully cut up human nature, I have found a very strange, new, and important discovery, that the public good of mankind is performed by two ways, instruction and diversion. And I have farther proved in my said several readings (which perhaps the world may one day see, if I can prevail on any friend to steal a copy, or on certain gentlemen of my admirers to be very importunate) that as mankind is now disposed, he receives much greater advantage by being diverted than instructed; [. . .] in the present universal empire of wit and learning, there seems but little matter left for instruction" (307). Of course the parentheses here violate the writer's disapproval of nested digressions. He bewails the lack of "an universal system in a small portable volume of all things that are to be known, or believed, or imagined, or practised in life" (307).

Here again the satire is on the moderns who are so keen to have useful knowledge, and to have it instantly and without effort. Hence again there is the critique of attempts to achieve the appearance of knowledge while bypassing learning--especially the summaries and excerpts that constitute the modern digression. The Hack discusses a proposal to circumvent reading and thought altogether by distilling books so that their elixir can be inhaled: "*It will dilate itself about the brain (where there is any) in fourteen minutes, and you immediately perceive in your head an infinite number of* abstracts, summaries, compendiums, extracts, collections, medulas, excerpta quaedams, florilegias *and the like, all disposed into great order, and reducible upon paper*" (308). His own books include "*New Help of Smatterers, or the Art of being Deep-learnd and Shallow-read*" (310). In the other digressions too he attacks superficial learning, and seems to hold a special contempt for common-place books.

He returns to the narrative with a well-defined conclusion to the digression quite like the last one:

> Having thus paid my due deference and acknowledgement to an established custom of our newest authors, by a long digression unsought for, and an universal censure unprovoked, by forcing into the light, with much pains and dexterity, my own excellencies and other men's defaults, with great justice to myself and candor to them, I now happily resume my subject, to the infinite satisfaction both of the reader and the author. (311)

And we swing back into the story of the three brothers.

Again there is digression on several levels. He insists on the public's need for diversion (as does the book at large), rather than instruction; he aims to supply this with his extract-books, which are digressions from the whole text of the sources; the point of them is to create a shortcut to learning, to make it useful at least as an impressive appearance--one moves among smatterings at random, without any real progressive development; he practices the habit he condemns, of digressing within digressions.

The Digression in Praise of Digressions also appears unintroduced. But it has a more organic relationship to its context. The *Tale* section it follows promises to "gratify the world with a very particular account" of the original and principles of the "epidemic sect of Aeolists" (317), which it does after the digression. As the Aeolists are believers in wind as the ruling principle of the world, and seek out spiritual inflation and deflation such as belching offers, it is not hard to see a parallel between the inflations of the Aeolists and the needless textual inflations of digression. The narrator attributes to "the great modern improvement in digressions" the invention of "a nutshell in an *Iliad*" (as opposed to "an *Iliad* in a nutshell" (317)); I take it this means superfluous elaboration, vs. concentration.

Two more analogies further express the character of digressions: they are "dressed up in various compounds, consisting in soups and olios, fricassees, and ragouts"; unkind critics affirm "that digressions in a book are like foreign troops in a state, which argue the nation to want a heart and hands of its own, and often either subdue the natives, or drive them into the most unfruitful corners" (317). The narrator shows the nature and purpose of modern digressions by contrast with the ancients, who suffered "the fatal confinement of delivering nothing beyond what is to the purpose [. . . .], without farther expatiating from the subject than by moderate excursions, helping to advance or clear the main design" (317-18). But now that the ancients have used up all the significant themes and knowledge, the moderns must go farther afield and accept less worthy material if they are to keep on writing. Again Swift turns to satirize the idea of "a shorter, and more prudent method, to become scholars and wits, without the fatigue of reading and thinking" (318), which turns out again to be the creation of indexes, compendiums, quotation books, etc.: "For, what though his head be empty, provided his commonplace book be full; [. . .] allow him but the common privileges of transcribing from others, and digressing from himself" (320) and he will write a treatise fit for a bookseller's shelf.

Digression carried to the modern extent goes too far, and leaves the work a centreless ragout; a nation whose capital and government are occupied by foreigners. Swift drives the point home by his closing comment: "The necessity of this digression will easily excuse the length; and I have chosen for it as proper a place as I could readily find. If the judicious reader can assign a fitter, I do here empower him to remove it into any other corner he pleases. And so I return with great alacrity to pursue a more important concern" (320). The author explicitly disavows any strong connection of digression to context. For the first time he also voices (though as if citing another critic) the worries that a.) digression is merely the presentation of irrelevant trivia attempting to compensate for the lack of any worthwhile new matter; and b.) that digression may take over the main body of the discourse.

The final two digressions show an intensification of the feature, as one occurs in Section IX, separated from the previous digression by just one section on the Aeolists, and the second immediately follows the first, in Section X. The author appears to be becoming excited, and his fears about digressions taking over the main line seem to be coming true, as the Section IX digression is more closely related to its context: it justifies itself by referring to the last part of the tale in its own section (which is a first), and it is more clearly a reflection on the content of the tale, the Aeolists: "Nor shall it in any ways

detract from the just reputation of this famous sect, that its rise and institution are owing to such an author as I have described Jack to be, a person whose intellectuals were overturned, and his brain shaken out of its natural position; which we commonly suppose to be a distemper, and call by the name of madness or phrenzy" (326). Thus we enter a reflection on the value of madness for creating new empires, schemes of philosophy and religion, etc. There is a digression within this digression: after discussing examples of imperial, philosophical, and religious madness, he praises the value of deceiving the senses and the mind. The next paragraph begins, "But to return to madness" (333). He ends the section by confessing to be light of reason himself, and says that his friends "will never trust me alone, without a solemn promise to vent my speculations in this, or the like manner, for the universal benefit of human kind" (336). He reveals the digression itself as a product of that same mad obsession to make "conquests and systems" (331). This is consistent with the earlier treatment of digressions as modern attempts to convey useful knowledge; but it is the first explicit connection of digression with madness, rather than foolish superficiality. Given the earlier claim that digressions are characteristically modern, this suggests that moderns are mad.

The final digression is based on the author's observations of "the wonderful civilities that have passed of late years between the nation of authors and that of readers," and his desire to follow "so laudable a custom" (337). He thanks everyone he can think of, and praises the accidents that lead to books; he makes a grievance against sequels, and assures the public that his resolutions circumscribe within the discourse his "whole stock of matter" (338); he discusses kinds of readers (339), and to promote the work of commentary on dark writings, he makes innuendoes about arcane patterns in his own discourse (339-40).

This digression, a string of metadiscursive comments, is very wandering indeed. Its first rationale is soon left behind, and unlike the other digressions, it closes without any word of transition to return us to the tale. The next Section, however, dilates on his digressiveness for about a page before getting back to the story as such:

> After so wide a compass as I have wandered, I do now gladly overtake, and close in with my subject, and shall henceforth hold on with it an even pace to the end of my journey, except some beautiful prospect appears within sight of my way [. . .]. For in writing it is as in travelling: if a man is in haste to be at home (which I acknowledge to be none of my case, having never so little business as when I am there) [. . .] I advise him clearly to make the straightest and the commonest road, be it ever so dirty. But then surely we must own such a man to be a scurvy companion at best; [. . . .]

The "other side" possibility is no more courteous or unselfish however:

> [W]hen a traveller and his horse are in heart and plight, when his purse is full, and the day before him, he takes the road only where it is clean or convenient; entertains his company there as agreeably as he can; but upon the first occasion, carries them along with him to every delightful scene in view, whether or art, of

> nature, or of both; and if they chance to refuse out of stupidity or weariness, let them jog on by themselves and be d--n'd; he'll overtake them at the next town, at which arriving, he rides furiously through; [...] (341)

A narrator is furiously impatient, either with any digression, or with anything that is not digression, and the "companions" suffer either way.[117]

In sum, Swift shows (modern) digressions as bad form by ironically praising them as good form. His Hack has much trouble trying to produce the proper form that gets the right kinds of digression in the right places. One aspect of the irony here attacks the artificiality of modern writing by showing how much trouble the neophyte Hack has in deforming his natural discursive impulses to remember and carry out the protocols of modern literary form. Beyond that, the resulting mish-mash is a further stain on modernity because it is so loud in its praises of modernity.

There is so much that is wrong with the text--and intended to be seen as wrong--that it is rather dizzying trying to figure out what *good* writing is supposed to be. Vain and excessive digressions are a hallmark of modern depravity. The Hack's failure to digress in the proper modern fashion mark him as a failed modern writer whose stupidity is evinced in his enthusiasm for modernity, his eagerness to go against nature, and his inability to do even that. This prodigious stupidity in turn indicts the modernity for which he is an apostle.

As for large-scale structure, to alternate between digressions and the "tale of a tub" which is in itself a diverting digression from serious matters leaves nothing in the book that is not a digression. From this perspective, the entire *Tale* is a digression, and the explicit digressions are each distinct sub-digressions from it that return to continue the main narrative. On a lower level of structure, we notice an acceleration in digression: they become more frequent and longer as the work proceeds. They all occur as sudden interruptions of the tale, they are related to it only very loosely, and they confess that they are not in proper order. The digressions are not excessively long, and they have their own skewed kind of justification--they are all attempts to align the Hack with modern literary custom. Their absurd quality comes more from their unexpectedness, from the irony of the details of their content, and also from the feeble-mindedness of the implied author. The author's self-interruptions create an impression of disordered discourse. The repeated satire of superficial learning in the form of the common-place book supplies a symbol of the extreme digression from reasoned discourse that loses its source, leaving scraps and smatterings with no "backbone" to hold them together. The frequent "hiatus in MS" undermines even that impaired structure.

FIELDING

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[117] Swift's comment invites comparison with Puttenham's metaphorical notions of the "Aboade", Flitting, and Stragler, and Sterne's discussion of digressions as turning aside for pleasant prospects along the discursive journey.

The digressive "essays" of *Tom Jones* are the ideal example of discursive digressions from action to reflect and comment on it. Cervantes's digression from action turns to a wholly new subject, but is a necessary step in the continuation of the action. But because Fielding's digressions are reflections on the action, they are always closely related to the events of the plot, but are entirely separate from it: they are no part of the action, or the observation and recording of the action, or the reading of the record of the action. They address the abstract generic-level topic of which the action is a specific instance.

There are "essays" on doctors (136), drink (138), love (148), matrimony (187), critics and slander (337), suspicion and virtue (368-69), absolute monarchy (405), knowing what one writes (448-50), and prologues (510). There are digressions not identified as essay, on the sagacity of law (43), on war (146-47), on artfulness (155), and on true wisdom (156).

Fielding explains the role of his essays:

> We shall [. . .] proceed to lay before the reader the reasons which have induced us to intersperse these several digressive essays in the course of this work. [. . .] A new vein of knowledge [. . .] this vein is no other than that of contrast, which runs through all the works of the creation, and may probably have a share in constituting in us the idea of all beauty, as well natural as artificial. [. . .] To say the truth, these soporific parts are so many serious scenes artfully interwoven, in order to contrast and set off the rest [. . .]. In this light, then, or rather in this darkness, I would have the reader to consider these initial essays; [. . .] in which we profess to be laboriously dull. (112-13)

The narrator asserts that while "there is much of dignity and instruction [in this species of conversation], there is but little entertainment. As we presume, therefore, to convey only this last to the reader, we shall pass by whatever was said" (140).

Fielding's sense of the overall purpose of alternating action with commentary is quite like Walton's: digressions are there to create interest by variety of matter and tone. But because Fielding's work has a frame of action with discursive interludes, whereas Walton has a frame of discourse with interludes of marginal topics, story and verse, Fielding can ironically reverse the intuitive claim about the digressions, and say that they are meant to be serious, dull, dark, and soporific (rather than lively comic relief).

Here the nature of the link between the main line and the digression is clearly planned and declared outright. The narrator has a strongly distinct voice, and he enters a digression whenever he sees fit. Digressions are just a deliberate part of his narration, usually marked off by having their own chapters. The nomenclature of "essay" for these digressions is significant--it gives us further corroboration for the idea that essays were seen as wandering, non-narrative explorations of a topic.

STERNE

We could call *Tristram Shandy* the *apotheosis of aposeopesis*. It is certainly the high point of the use of digression and related figures. A number of important articles have discussed the centrality of digressive structures in the book (e.g. William Bowman Piper's

"Tristram's Digressive Artistry", and J. Paul Hunter's "Response as Reformation: *Tristram Shandy* and the Art of Interruption"). I will discuss them only briefly, since the book is addressed in greater depth in the next chapter. But we may fairly say that they are so often and so intensely exploited, so much the constructive principle and defining character of the work, that their repeated use at all levels reveals a vision of a universe where human nature and the world conspire to frustrate and derail all motion towards our intended ends, especially intellectual ends like creating, communicating, and understanding thought and discourse. Many actions, large and small, are ambitiously conceived and begun, but never completed. Many actions are completed only after the most protracted delay. *Tristram Shandy* is perhaps most notable for the way it thematizes the act of narrating its story. The narration becomes itself another story to be woven in with the rest, and in that respect is separate from the story of Tristram and his family, and digressive with respect to it. Yet considerations of all the dimensions and decisions of writing (rhetoric, style, character, emotional tension, etc.) also enter into the actual telling of Tristram's story as well, so that we have a sense of an ever-present, light-hearted but desperately struggling narrator, just behind all the pleasant but desperately confused characters. Because digressions and interruptions enter into everything, they have no single identifiable role and character, as we can find in Walton and Fielding.

MELVILLE

Melville's digressions are comparable to those of Fielding in being discursive analyses that break out of a continuous narrative, and in being set off in individual chapters. They very often concern the business and life of whaling, and so tend to be more technical than Fielding's "essays." There are also philosophical asides, sometimes contained in their own chapters, but also often included in the narrative chapters, as the reflections of the narrator or a character. The technical digressions are not all equivalent in type or purpose. Some give realistic and vivid "local colour"; some help to expound the plot; some illustrate character; some use details of whaling to make thematic points. Yet what is notable here is Melville's repeated recurrence to various aspects of the *same* broad topic of whaling throughout the book. The digressions to some extent constitute a unified secondary discourse, and take on the quality of a sub-plot.

Melville is quite conscious of this digressive narrative structure, and comments on it explicitly. He provides a natural image for his form that suggests that his digressions have an organic propriety: "Out of the trunk, the branches grow; out of them, the twigs. So, in productive subjects, grow the chapters. The crotch alluded to on a previous page deserves independent mention" (380). (The crotch is a notched stick that cradles the harpoon.) In fact the previous chapter begins similarly, with "A word concerning an incident in the last chapter" (378), and goes on to discuss how the harpooneer must row as well as strike his dart, and shout encouragement as well as row. So Melville is making a point of his branching structures, following trunks along branches to twigs, often leaping back to the trunk, and often finding new branches along its course.

But there is some irony in these remarks, as the book is not simply the analysis of a "productive subject", and he also plays the digressive structure for some comic effect, portraying the narrator as frantic or confused. For example, he backtracks to correct the

order of explanation: "It should not have been omitted that previous to completely stripping the body of the leviathan, he was beheaded" (403). And he dramatizes an interference between the action of the story and the action of narration and explanation:

> It must be borne in mind that all this time we have a Sperm Whale's prodigious head hanging to the Pequod's side. But we must let it continue hanging there a while till we can get a chance to attend to it. For the present other matters press, and the best we can do now for the head, is to pray heaven the tackles may hold (420).

The humour is reminiscent of Cervantes and Fielding. Interruption is not as prominent and intensified as it is in Petronius and Sterne. The interruptions of the story for discussion of whaling suggest a rambling erudition rather than an anarchic loss of control, and Melville suggests this style advances a deliberate overall design: "There are some enterprises in which a careful disorderliness is the true method" (465).

BECKETT

Like Sterne, Beckett raises digressive wandering to a defining principle of construction. But here the digression is not occasioned by interruption from outside. Rather goals are lost through a confusion, decay, and apathy intrinsic to the narrator's mind. We feel that the narrators are epitomes, and that this degenerative condition is the characteristic law of human experience at large.

The wandering of the mind occurs along with the wandering of the body--the two develop together in the first-person stories of the trilogy (*Molloy*, *Malone Dies*, *The Unnamable*) that fluidly mix thought, feeling, and action. The accounts of comically absurd actions reflect dementia (e.g. the sucking-stone episode (64-69)), and the accounts of comically demented cogitation are fulfilled in the absurd actions. Sometimes the insane thinking is aware of its insanity, or indifferent to the possibility (e.g. Molloy); at other times it insists obsessively on its own propriety (e.g. Moran).

There is a remarkable consistency of style in Beckett, so we can open the novels to almost any page and find the kind of digressiveness in thought and action that we will find on almost any other page. (It's a testament to his imagination that the writing is yet so fascinating, indeed entertaining.) Beckett's dark satiric comedy comes from several sources. First, the narrator's voice discloses a growing madness: there is humour in the absurd thinking and feeling shown in observation, interaction with others, ideas, memories, imagination. Second, there is the wit of the brilliant turns of phrase. Third, there is the humour of the characters' comic exasperation, comic despair, comic decay. The absurdist comedy, and the intelligence, distinguish Beckett's stories from the usual kind of picaresque. But the wandering begins on the first page, as the mind tries in vain to explain its situation to itself by positioning itself in a context of history, memory, causes and reasons.

From the first page where Molloy establishes a vague sort of fictional rationale for the existence of the fiction, mental decay and wandering are thematized. He is in his mother's room, but does not know how he got there. A man of whom he knows very little

comes every week to collect the pages he writes and return last week's pages, marked with editing he does not understand. He admits that he does not know much--such as what he works for, when his mother died, even his mother's name. He is beginning to forget his language. His thought is wandering, and he is filling pages with writing for its own sake, for lack of anything better to do, without knowing why, "in order to blacken a few more pages", as he says later (63).

Because his job is narrating, at the beginning he is very concerned with beginnings and with how to go on in a sequence. And the metaphor of life as a story leads us to see implications here about beginnings and middles and ends in life:

> It was he told me I'd begun all wrong, that I should have begun differently. He must be right. I began at the beginning , like an old ballocks, can you imagine that? Here's my beginning. Because they're keeping it apparently. I took a lot of trouble with it. Here it is. it gave me a lot of trouble. It was the beginning, do you understand? Whereas now it's nearly the end. Is what I do now any better? I don't know. That's beside the point. Here's my beginning. It must mean something, or they wouldn't keep it. Here it is.
>
> This time, then once more I think, then perhaps a last time, then I think it'll be over, with that world too. Premonition of the last but one but one. All grows dim. (9-10)

Molloy and the other narrators are also concerned with how to end, how to do what they need to do and say what they need to say in order to stop "going on" in action and in narration. This interest in and desire for stopping makes them also concerned with the gradual fading of the senses and faculties, the gradual degeneration into an object (as is Volpone, according to Kernan), and death.

Bodily wandering follows shortly. What action there is has something to do with Molloy going to see his mother (16-17, 60, etc.). But almost the entire first part (pages 10-84) is one enormous unbroken paragraph, and as Molloy rambles from one subject to another, recounting his experience and thoughts, it is very easy to lose track of what is happening in the fiction, what is being remembered, and what imagined. In the second part we discover another aspect of the plot, such as it is. Part Two concerns the pursuit of Molloy by a man named Jacques Moran. Moran is an agent of some kind working for a man named Gaber. Molloy often loses his sense of his purpose in his wanderings, and Moran's duties and aims are always vague and ambiguous. The characteristic focus of the "story" is the narrator's description of what he is doing at the moment, mixed in with his confused description of his duties and aims, and his description of his difficulties with describing all these things. The characteristic rhetorical style is getting lost in details, abstract or concrete. Molloy closes his long digression on the collection and disposition of his sucking stones with the remark, "But deep down I didn't give a fiddler's curse about being without, when they were all gone they would all be gone, I wouldn't be any the worse off, or hardly any. And the solution to which I rallied in the end was to throw away all the stones but one, which I kept now in one pocket, now in another, and which of course I soon lost, or threw away, or gave away, or swallowed. It was a wild part of the

coast. I don't remember having been seriously molested" (69). He angrily cancels out this obsessive digression, seemingly mad at his own petty and futile exertions. He comes to a "solution" that just wipes out the problem, and soon has not even one stone left to remind him of it. Not only that, he does not even know how he loses it, although the loss is perfectly predictable to him ("of course"). And at last he moves on to description of the coast without the ghost of a transition. This digression would be a paradigm of pointlessness, if the rest of the narrative were not nearly equally pointless.

Moran begins as an obsessively neat and orderly person, and the obsessive's frustration at the disorderly details of life, and the impossibility of narrating them with fidelity, prompt him to call his own life an "inenarrable contraption" (105). Moran speaks of, if he does not quite explain, his assignment to pursue Molloy, describing Molloy and his real and imagined relation to him. Molloy wanders, and Moran stalks a Molloy within and without (104-06). Molloy's unnatural manner of moving expresses the disorder of his mind:

> He had very little room. His time too was limited. he hastened incessantly on, as if in despair, towards extremely close objectives. Now, a prisoner, he hurled himself at I know not what narrow confines, and now, hunted, he sought refuge near the centre.
>
> He panted. He had only to rise up within me for me to be filled with panting.
>
> Even in open country he seemed to be crashing through jungle. He did not so much walk as charge. In spite of this he advanced but slowly. He swayed, to and fro, like a bear.
>
> He rolled his head, uttering incomprehensible words.
>
> He was massive and hulking, to the point of misshapenness. And, without being black, of a dark colour.
>
> He was forever on the move. I had never seen him rest. Occasionally he stopped and glared furiously about him.
>
> This was how he came to me, at long intervals. Then I was nothing but uproar, bulk, rage, suffocation, effort unceasing, frenzied and vain. Just the opposite of myself, in fact. [. . .]
>
> What it was all about I had not the slightest idea. (104)

Clearly Molloy is opposed to Moran as chaos is opposed to order. It is also clear that Moran identifies with him, and as the pursuit proceeds, Molloy's chaos infects Moran more and more.

The nature of Moran's assignment is to some degree clarified at a relatively late point, and the clarification also thematizes a lack of guidance and a clear path.

> I have no intention of relating the various adventures which befell us, me and my son, together and singly, before we came to the Molloy country. [. . .] [T]he voice I listen to [. . .] is within me and exhorts me to continue to the end the faithful servant I have always been, of a cause that is not mine, and patiently fulfil in all

> its bitterness my calamitous part, as it was my will, when I had a will, that others should. [. . .] Yes, it is rather an ambiguous voice and not always easy to follow, in its reasonings and decrees. But I follow it none the less, more or less, I follow it in this sense, that I know what it means, and in this sense, that I do what it tells me. [. . .] And when it ceases, leaving me in doubt and darkness, I shall wait for it to come back, and do nothing, even though the whole world, through the channel of its innumerable authorities speaking with one accord, should enjoin upon me this and that, under pain of unspeakable punishments. [. . .] It also tells me, this voice I am only just beginning to know, that the memory of this work brought scrupulously to a close will help me to endure the long anguish of vagrancy and freedom. [. . .] And in writing these lines I know in what danger I am of offending him whose favour I know I should court, now more than ever. But I write them all the same, and with a firm hand weaving inexorably back and forth and devouring my page with the indifference of a shuttle. [. . .] for it is one of the features of this penance that I may not pass over what is over and straightway come to the heart of the matter. [. . .] And it would not surprise me if I deviated, in the pages to follow, from the true and exact succession of events. (121-22)

Shortly before this account, the description of the relation between son and father likewise insists on failures to lead and follow. Moran says of his son,

> The least outing with him was torture, he lost his way so easily. [. . .] I did not want my son to be seen capering in the streets like the little hooligans he frequented on the sly. No, I wanted him to be like his father, with rapid steps, his head up, his breathing even and economical, his arms swinging, looking neither to left nor right, apparently oblivious to everything and in reality missing nothing. But with me he invariably took the wrong turn, a crossing or a simple corner was all he needed to stray from the right road, it of my election. I do not think he did this on purpose. But leaving everything to me he did not heed what he was doing, or look where he was going, and went on mechanically as if in a kind of dream. It was as though he let himself be sucked in out of sight by every opening that offered. (118)

The son's erring echoes that of Molloy, and his direct relation to Moran further cements the sense of Moran's deep tendency to wandering confusion. Often Moran speaks of a desire to become incapable of motion (129 and elsewhere). Significantly, after Moran's legs give out and his son leaves on an errand (135), Moran begins to write in long uninterrupted wandering paragraphs very much in the style of Molloy.

At times the wandering takes on a more systematic shape. Several characters, at different points, proceed in a spiraling pattern outwards from some central point, and/ or back towards some central point (Moran on 136, the Unnamable on 290-97). This is not the obvious kind of goal-directed action that moves along a straight path towards a definite end-point. But it is an appropriate pattern for a path that aims to move outwards and explore or cover a certain ground.

The digressive pattern continues. Moran again speaks of his voices (159-60), and of his confused path. He proposes a pilgrimage to the Turdy Madonna, having "sworn to make a bee-line to her"; he returns home finally to make an end, and is again visited by Gaber (161-62). A "Mahood" disturbs the narrator of *The Unnamable* by interposing claims or suggestions about what happens or has happened in this story--specifically, that as he circles towards his family hovel, the whole family dies of sausage poisoning, and their screams of agony and subsequent stench of decomposition force the man to turn back and retreat before reaching his goal (291-97).

Beckett is notable for mixing all his "lines"--of action, thought, and narration--into one texture, and making them all digress at once; and also for showing digression and disorder as an entropic force that can infect characters and stories that begin with orderly dispositions and intentions.

DIGRESSIVE SENTENCES:

The structure of digressive thought is reflected in sentence structure in a number of our Menippeans. A digression in a sentence can be something as simple as a few words in between commas, or in parentheses. But some of these writers have pushed the sentence to the limits of absurd exaggeration. At the level of the sentence, digression equates with *subordination of clauses*. As we move from clause to sub-clause to sub-clause, we move from the more to the less important, and we include sub-clauses primarily because they are necessary to achieve the point of the whole sentence. Sentences with badly formed sub-clauses will also express badly formed thought.

By the metaphor of a sentence as a linear path, a straight unbroken line would be a single-clause sentence, making a proposition by attaching a predication to a subject, in subject-verb-object order: "the dog chased the ball." A more complex sentence might include a pertinent sub-clause as a proper digression: "the dog, though he was tired, chased the ball." Sentences of similar structure might include sub-clauses with less relevance to the sentence's function, and these will tend to be more humorous the less relevant they are: "the dog, whose name was George, chased the ball"; "the dog, who had never been to Paris, chased the ball." Sentences might have concatenated sub-clauses, and these might digress either from the original sentence, or from other sub-clauses: "the dog, whose name was George, and who had never been to Paris, chased the ball"; "the dog, whose name was George, which was one of the least popular of dog names, and who had never been to Paris, or even Calais, chased the ball." The more concatenated and irrelevant the sub-clauses get, the more comically digressive the sentence seems: "the dog, whose name was George, and whose parents were a Yorkshire Terrier and a Dachsund, named respectively Algernon and Mitzy, none of whom had ever seen Paris, despite the earnest wishes that might be attributed to them, mistakenly or not, it doesn't much matter, given their dim prospects for international travel, chased the ball."

A straight-line discourse would be one that dealt with pre-announced topics, which are all connected with one another (as sub-parts or stages of a larger topic), in the correct order, with no irrelevant information. Formal writing in various fields strives for this kind of discourse. Philosophy, history, indeed any scholarly discipline must observe the proper logical ordering. One must present the necessary evidence and arguments in

the proper order to *lead* a reader to a *conclusion* that *follows* from them. One should not introduce foundational assumptions at the end of a discussion. Mock-logic might move to conclusions that do not follow from its arguments, etc. Digressive mock-logic might move from the main thought to sub-thoughts and to sub-thoughts of sub-thoughts that become increasingly unrelated and irrelevant. A discourse might manifest forms of bad organization other than faulty logic. For example, especially if one is addressing non-specialist readers, one should not begin with the most difficult claims and arguments.

Menippean satires are full of this digressive style of writing. Those most notorious for exceedingly long sentences are Rabelais, Burton, Joyce, Beckett and Pynchon. The digressive effect varies from Rabelais's huge catalogues of degrading absurdity that seem an explosion of exuberance out of the world of the story and into the world of creating language, to Burton's leisurely, almost absent-minded rambling over curious learning, to Joyce's parodically bloated verbalizations of character thought, to Beckett's representation of a mind miserably lost among the detritus of an unwanted existence, to Pynchon's vivid strung-out episodes of hallucination.

I have informally rearranged the following sentences in order to show how clauses and sub-clauses shift topics or foci over their courses. Each clause has its own line. Each time a clause is indented, it signifies a digressive shift to a new topic or a new focus within the same topic. We can see how Montaigne's sentence from "Of Constancie" drifts from elaborating a general idea ("it ill beseemeth a resolute mind to start-aside ...")--which itself is introduced with a qualification ("Notwithstanding ...")--to brief illustrative general examples ("and there are some who ..."), into a lengthy anecdote to argue for an opposing view ("yet we have seen ..." how starting-aside is praiseworthy), while along the way pausing frequently to qualify and amplify certain details:

> Notwithstanding when a man is once within reach of cannon-shot,
> and as it were point-blancke before them,
> as the fortune of warre doth diverse times bring men unto,
> it ill beseemeth a resolute minde to start-aside,
> or be daunted at the threat of a shot,
> because by the violence and suddennesse thereof wee deeme it inevitable:
> and there are some, who
> by lifting up of a hand,
> or stooping their head,
> have sometimes given their fellowes cause of laughter:
> yet have we seene, that
> in the voyage, the Emperour *Charles* the fifth made against us in *Provence*,
> the Marquis of *Guasto*,
> being gone out to survey the citie of Arles,
> and shewne himself out of a winde-mill,
> under colour of which he was come
> somewhat neere the Towne,

> he was discovered
> by the Lord of *Bonevall*,
> and the Seneshall of *Agenois*,
> who were walking upon the Theatre *Aux arenes*
> (so called in French because it is full of sand)
> who shewing him to the Lord of *Villiers*,
> Commissairie of the Artillerie,
> hee mounted a culverin so levell,
> that had not the Marquis perceived the fire, and so started aside,
> it was constantly affirmed,
> hee had been shot through the body. (35-36)

This style of writing is typical of Montaigne, and of Burton.

Centuries later, Thomas Pynchon begins *Gravity's Rainbow* in a digressive narrative style that similarly worms its way into subclauses and sub-stories whose relevance is often far from obvious, and even produces symbols of this kind of devious structural procedure to suggest its importance within the fictional world. The book begins with an action that follows a branching movement by smaller and smaller byways, into a labyrinth that seems inescapable. The opening page describes Pirate Prentice's evacuation from London to a Chelsea maisonette full of his "messmates":

> They have begun to move. They pass in line, out of the main station, out of downtown, and begin pushing into older and more desolate parts of the city. is this the way out? [. . .] No, this is not a disentanglement but a progressive *knotting into*--they go in under archways, secret entrances of rotted concrete that only looked like loops of an underpass . . . [. . .] the smells begun of coal from days far to the past, [. . .] of the coral-like and mysteriously vital growth, around the blind curves and out the lonely spurs [. . .]. (3)

The story turns to Pirate's cooking one of his famous enormous Banana Breakfasts for the hungover crowd at this old hotel. There is an amazing catalogue of variations on banana dishes, and finally a description of the flow of banana odor that makes it a symbol of a countering positive digressive movement:

> Now there grows among all the rooms,
> replacing the night's old smoke, alcohol and sweat,
> the fragile, musaceous odor of Breakfast:
> flowery, permeating, surprising,
> more than the color of winter sunlight,
> taking over
> not so much through any brute pungency or volume as

by the high intricacy to the weaving of its molecules,
sharing the conjuror's secret by which
--though it is not often Death is told so clearly to fuck off--
the living genetic chains prove even labyrinthine enough to preserve some human face down ten or twenty generations
. . .
so the same assertion-through-structure allows this war morning's banana fragrance to meander, repossess, prevail.
Is there any reason not to open every window,
and let the kind scent blanket all Chelsea?
As a spell, against falling objects. . . . (10)

Pirate's breakfast is interrupted by a phonecall that tells him he has a message, which turns out to have arrived in one of the rockets he observed while picking his bananas (10). Then the sudden interruption by a new voice of the description of Pirate being driven away to get his message as the sun rises, is explained as

Pirate's Condition creeping over him again,
when he's least expecting it as usual
--might as well mention here that much of what the dossiers call Pirate Prentice is a strange talent for--
well, for getting inside the fantasies of others:
being able,
actually,
to take over the burden of managing them,
in this case those of an exiled Rumanian royalist who may prove needed in the very near future.
(11-12)

There is an account of how he learned he was having other people's fantasies, how he began to have them during the day, then how the talent was exploited by the Firm (12-14). There follows an example of the political utility of Pirate's ability to tap into fantasies of others: "What better way to cup and bleed them of excess anxiety than to get someone to take over the running of their exhausting little daydreams for them . . .", including ordinary desire for escape, sexual fantasies, and fear (12). Pirate acts as a kind of lightning rod for these digressive distractions from the straight course of political duty desired by the Firm. One of these fantasies is from a Lord at the Foreign Office, and Pirate's managing it is said to have prevented a "Balkan Armageddon" (16). This too is an image of virus-like proliferation and spreading:

It was a giant Adenoid.
At least as big as St. Paul's,
and growing hour by hour.

London, perhaps all England, was in mortal peril!
This lymphatic monster had once blocked the distinguished pharynx of
Lord Blatherard Osmo,
[...] in another quarter Lord Blatherard Osmo proceeds to get
assimilated by his own growing Adenoid,
some horrible transformation of cell plasma
it is quite beyond Edwardian medicine to explain...
before long, tophats are littering the squares of Mayfair,
cheap perfume hanging ownerless in the pub lights of the East End
as the Adenoid continues on its rampage,
not swallowing up its victims at random,
no, the fiendish Adenoid has a *master plan*,
it's choosing only certain personalities useful to it
--there is a new election, a new preterition abroad in
England here
that throws the Home Office into hysterical and
painful episodes of indecision...
no one knows *what* to do...
a halfhearted attempt is made to evacuate London,
black phaetons clatter in massive ant-cortege over the trusswork bridges,
observer balloons are stationed in the sky,
"Got it in Hampstead Heath,
just sitting *breathing*, like... going in, and out..."
"Any sort of *sound* down there?"
"Yes, it's horrible... like a stupendous *nose* sucking in snot...
wait, now it's ... beginning to...
oh, *no*... oh, God, I can't describe it, it's so beast-"
the wire is snapped,
the transmission ends,
the balloon rises into the teal-blue daybreak.
Teams come down from the Cavendish Laboratory,
to string the Heath with huge magnets,
electric-arc terminals,
black iron control panels full of gauges and cranks,
the Army shows up in full battle gear
with bombs full of the latest deadly gas
--the Adenoid is blasted, electric-shocked, poisoned,
changes color and shape here and there,
yellow fat-nodes appear high over the trees...
before the flash-powder cameras of the Press, a hideous
green pseudopod crawls toward the cordon of troops
and suddenly *sshhlop*! wipes out an entire
observation post

> with a deluge of some disgusting orange mucus
> in which the unfortunate men are digested
> --not screaming but actually laughing,
> *enjoying* themselves.... (14-15)

The bulk of this long passage is only two sentences, and here as elsewhere, clauses and passages are tenuously connected by ellipses, which suggest a turn to another topic without the formal punctuational break of the period. Thus the book's opening moves by digression into labyrinth, developing minor details into wide amplifications, then focussing on and amplifying details arising in the last amplification. In fact this entire account of Pirate's "talent" is not particularly significant for the rest of the story. It is merely an illustration of how the Firm exploits the mysterious psychological quirks and abilities of its employees--that often involve something deeply personal--in a cynical way. Their exploitation of Pirate foreshadows their exploitation of Slothrop's strange proclivity to erections on the sites of future rocket-strikes.

William Faulkner's digressive but non-Menippean sentence structure can serve as a corrective counter-example. This passage from *Absalom! Absalom!*, is a fair representative of the way the language elaborates and qualifies, but always continues to describe as deeply as possible the situation:

> They stared--glared--at one another, their voices (it was Shreve speaking, though [. . .] it might have been either of them and was in a sense both: both thinking as one, the voice which happened to be speaking the thought only the thinking become audible, vocal; the two of them creating between them, out of the rag-tag and bob-ends of old tales and talking, people who perhaps had never existed at all anywhere, who, shadows, were shadows not of flesh and blood which had lived and died but shadows in turn of what were (to one of them, at least, to Shreve) shades too) quiet as the visible murmur of their vaporising breath. (243)

Faulkner conceived his long wandering sentences to have a certain symbolic and thematic purpose different from the wandering sentences of Menippean satire. He said of his style that it tried to concentrate and capture all experience at once, rather than represent disordered thinking:

> Tom Wolfe was trying to say everything, the world plus "I" or filtered through "I" or the effort of "I" to embrace the world in which he was born and walked a little while and then lay down again, into one volume. I am trying to go a step further. This I think accounts for what people call the obscurity, the involved formless "style", endless sentences. I'm trying to say it all in one sentence, between one Cap and one period. I'm still trying to put it all, if possible, on one pinhead. (Cowley, 14-15)

Pynchon's digressions parody straight-forward discourse, creating a sense of absurdity by moving by sudden interruptions, inflation of trivialities and concatenating outrages. They also express a thematic point by symbolizing an unusual and subtle kind of causal process--a process of percolation, infiltration, transmission through hidden connections. This opposes both the stimulus-response thinking of the behaviourist Pointsman, and the acausal thinking of the statistician Roger Mexico. Montaigne's digressions are improvisational, developing along with the development of thought through exploration, amplification, qualification, backtracking, and even self-correction. They are not comic, but they create a similar appearance of unpredictability and chaos. Faulkner's digressiveness, on the other hand, suggests an intuitive but orderly kind of storytelling, a process of elaboration around a single situation rather than leaping from one situation to another, or from one view of a situation to another. Repetition and elaboration suggest not comic exuberance but tragic recurrence and finality--fate rather than fortune. As Faulkner says, "life is a phenomenon but not a novelty, the same frantic steeplechase toward nothing everywhere and man stinks the same stink no matter where in time" (Cowley 15).

Although the long exuberant catalogue is recognized as the signature figure of Rabelais, Varro is said to have been the first to use extensive lists in his satires. Relihan notes that his eating list parodies epic lists of ships, warriors, etc. (58). The parody implies a contrast: the epic items are listed in order to be remembered and revered; the foods list is light-minded and self-centred, since the foods will only be savoured and digested, then excreted. We might say that Petronius's *cena* is a narrative version of this gustatory catalogue. And Menippean satires contain many other feasts and orgies. Catalogues are a form of non-incremental repetition, which Frye identifies as a principle of humour. They also relate to the rhetorical style of long winding sentences that heap up obscure words. Like digressions, catalogues *do not progress* but *accumulate*. (This may allow a *generalization* about something, as e.g. *Candide*'s list of sufferings implies the generalization that life is always miserable). And the catalogue as a whole may seem pointless and digressive, in relation to the narrative.

As well as strings of words and titles, there are Lucian's characters' strings of poetic quotations, and Sancho Panza's strings of botched proverbs. Catalogues are also a non-narrative, intellectual form of organization: they may proceed by the whim of the writer's imagination, or may follow an abstract principle of order. As well as Rabelais's library of Saint Victor, Anatomy of Lent, and other taxonomical lists, there are a number of dictionaries produced in Menippean style--Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary*; Flaubert's *Dictionary of Received Ideas*; Ambrose Bierce's *Devil's Dictionary*. Of course the less arbitrary, more analytical forms of organization get us into the "anatomy" tradition.

A special kind of catalogue is the *litany*. Strictly speaking, a litany is a series of petitions to be recited by a priest (and responded to by a congregation). "Litany" also has a more general sense of a list of accumulated items. "Litany of insults" is a familiar expression, and such a litany is also a kind of paradigmatic satiric structure, since it is a verbal attack that curses its target, and it is often humorous. Frye notes that although "Attack without humour, or pure denunciation, forms one of the boundaries of satire",

"invective is one of the most readable forms of literary art, just as panegyric is one of the dullest. It is an established datum of literature that we like hearing people cursed and are bored with hearing them praised, and almost any denunciation, if vigorous enough, is followed by a reader with the kind of pleasure that soon breaks into a smile" (*Anatomy* 224). Perhaps directly following Rabelais, Menippean satires often contain litanies of insults.

Dictionaries and insults bring us to another point of Frye's, that anatomy writers are often lexical titans: in the major works of Rabelais, Burton, Joyce, Nabokov, and Pynchon, it is not unusual to find several words on every page that are unfamiliar to the educated reader. Both Varro and Nashe contain numerous first attestations of words. This word-collecting habit has something to do with the outpouring of catalogues. Sometimes it is creative: Varro and Rabelais create neologisms, and the neologism-by-portmanteau is thematized by Lewis Carroll and celebrated by Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*.

Further, we can see many Menippean narratives as projections of the "litany of insults" on the level of action. *The Golden Ass*, *The Satryicon*, *Don Quixote*, *The Unfortunate Traveler*, *Candide* and Beckett's trilogy, are all catalogues of a series of "abuses" or "insults" or "injuries" or "degradations" (these words can all mean physical as well as verbal assault) suffered over the lives of their characters. In *Candide*, this is especially noticeable in the scenes where a whole group of characters is challenged to tell their life stories (perhaps a parody of the *Canterbury Tales/ Decameron* structure). During their voyage from Cadiz to Buenos Ayres, the old woman proposes to Cunegonde, "provide yourself with an entertainment, make each passenger tell you his story; and if there is one who has not often cursed his life, who has not often said to himself that he was the most wretched of men, throw me head-first into the sea" (49). Hiring a ship to Bordeaux from Surinam, Candide "announced throughout the town that he would give the passage, food and two thousand piastres to an honest man who would make the journey with him, on condition that this man was the most unfortunate and the most disgusted with his condition in the whole province" (86). Candide thinks of the old woman's wager that ev

related to the image-schema of "departure from a path." And we can infer the abstract prototypical digression structure from the range of variation of *kinds* of digression.

Digressions in works understood to be Menippean satires run the gamut of structural variation, from minor to major, from subtle to egregious, from serious to comic, from discursive to narrative to lyric, from rare to frequent, from "straying" to interruptive. In most cases, digressions suggest a speaker or narrator who has "gone astray" in his talk--who fails in some way to grapple with the energies of his discourse, losing track of its goals and paths or failing to organize them logically and hierarchically. The speaker may be losing his thread, running "madly off in all directions" (as Leacock says), forgetting important things, quitting from exhaustion, getting interrupted by other speech or events, etc. The reasons for this failure may be in himself or in his world.

In Lucian the abrupt change of scene is most characteristic, but there is also the interruption of one speaker by another, and the digressing speaker. Petronius tends to interrupt actions across but especially within scenes by other actions, and interrupt one speaker by another. Cervantes favours the extended interruption of the climax of a scene's action by an authorial commentary. In Walton we see the slight "straying" of the speaker's mind into fantastic anecdotes, or into light narrative relief from the serious discourse. In Burton the the discourse strays repeatedly into curious matters. Swift, Fielding and Melville give us the discursive comment on narrative separated into its own chapter. Swift parodies the self-indulgently digressive modern form. Fielding frequently "essays" on various pertinent topics. Melville turns aside to technical discussions of aspects of whaling. In Beckett the speaker is so astray in his thought that all his speech and action become incoherent.

"Digression" is one thing; Menippean digression is something else altogether. While it is analogous to "straight" digression in some aspects of form and purpose, it is crucially different in others, in ways that make it parodic and comical. *While the Menippean digression does indeed range aside to talk far from the principal matter, contrary to Puttenham's strictures, the other matter it induces or infers may not serve the principal purpose, and it may not return home where it first strayed out in good season.* We may add a few further distinctions: that Menippean digressions very often do not *begin* in good season--they tend to happen suddenly, as an interruption; they often occur too *frequently*; digressions may spawn *further* digressions; and they are often reflected in a digressive *sentence structure*. And there are a number of ways in which the digression may fail to serve the principal purpose. It may be totally unrelated to the purpose, but it may be imperfectly related, in more subtle ways. For example, it may *appear* at first to serve the purpose, then fail to do so; the narrator may seem to *believe* it serves the purpose when the reader knows it doesn't; it may successfully serve a *non-principal, trivial* purpose. By failing to be purposive relative to the ostensible subject of the discourse, the Menippean digression contributes to the achievement of satirical purposes.

The more placid digressions are relatively unremarkable, the kind of thing that might occur in ordinary conversation. Those digressions that are more than usually extreme in one or another of the ways listed above--less closely connected to the main line; more suddenly introduced; more interruptive of other lines; more extensively

developed; more inclusive of other matter, including more digressions--those sorts of digression seem to fulfill the Menippean impetus to parody good form, and so seem to be more prototypically Menippean. In sum, the prototypical Menippean digression seems to 1. Interrupt the action or discourse at a crucial point, in order to 2. Comment on the action/ discourse, but 3. In a tangential way, and 4. Extensively (frequently, and at length), thus 5. "Sinking in its own suspense".

Chapter 8: Generic Coherence in *Tristram Shandy*

This chapter will complete my study by showing how the combining of individual form-function connections in generic features adds up to an overall form-function connection in the genre. On the way, it briefly reprises some of the points elaborated in earlier chapters, and makes a final statement on Menippean satire and genre theory by taking up the claims and arguments of a recent essay by Milowicki and Wilson.

THE STRUCTURE OF INDIVIDUAL GENRES

We need to begin with the grass-roots work of characterizing genre features in cognitive terms. Making the lists of features consistent with themselves should allow us to take the next step of showing how they are interconnected with one another. This, Alastair Fowler urges, is the pressing job of genre criticism. And that, in turn, approaches a vision of the global form-function connection posited by Guillén and Wellek and Warren, that would constitute a gestalt "sense of the whole". I'll move towards these goals by, first, characterizing a representative set of generic features of Menippean satire as pairings of form and meaning, and second, establishing relations among these features, giving examples from *Tristram Shandy*.[118]

A few caveats about the relation of features to genres. Most generic features seem to have an independent existence of a kind, and can travel across genres on their own. This suggests two problems. First, every feature of every genre should have its own ICM, an abstract form paired with a conceptual meaning connected to a network of variations. This complicates matters enormously. Considering the complexity of the ICMs for the various senses of the words "over" and "there" in Lakoff's study, it may be hubristic to attempt an ICM account of a notoriously slippery category (Menippean satire) of an already complex and slippery supercategory (genre), which not only pairs forms and meaning at a level more abstract than lexical items (rhetorical features), but maps these features together in such a way as to define a core that distinguishes clear members from clear non-members and yet still allows much free play within the core. But the attempt is the natural consequence of my approach, and even if unsuccessful it may reveal new insights into Menippean satire, genre, and ICMs; new aspects of the project; and new problems.

Second, there is a question about generic stability, and a suspicion that genres are sets of features assembled or collocated arbitrarily, that persist because of the arbitrary

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[118] Note that the form-function relation here is not strictly causal, as in form-function relations in biology or engineering. It is rather one of *motivation*--that is, one can give reasons explaining why the connection exists, but it is neither natural/ God-given nor arbitrary. Motivated (but conventional) relations are typical in language and conceptual structure. Therefore, note that forms are typically linked with multiple functions.

reiteration of these collocations. We see that they can exist in partial and hybrid forms, so we wonder if nothing prevents them from disintegrating entirely. Recent commentators argue for these reasons that Menippean satire is not a genre but a form of discourse:

> Such a collocation under one title may create the illusion of a genre, though not one that inspires scholarly confidence, for the diverse elements can operate independently of each other or in radically dissimilar assemblages. No single Menippean element seems quite to emerge as a necessary condition. [. . .] [I]t seems impossible to define a genre by the numerous parts it contains when these parts are neither invariant nor exclusive to the presumed whole. The empirical content of Menippean satire is diverse and nomadic. Any single Menippean element can show up (nearly) anywhere. (Milowicki and Wilson 292-93)

I will argue that there are some grounding or constraining factors that help mutually define and establish or "seal" genres and their features (including Menippean satire). My first argument about genre stability is a hypothesis on the reader-response end. We place works in relation to the genre by reference to its prototypical examples. I suggest that these prototypes (which are prototypical precisely in virtue of their possession and integration of many highly salient features) help to build up some abstract sense of an ideal genre exemplar, where all features are mapped together in a maximally redundant way (as information theory might say). That is, one in which as many as possible features, of as central importance as possible, are integrated as fully as possible into a gestalt, and related to a certain theme or thematic complex.

A further challenge to generic stability is the fact that a rhetorical form often serves several functions. This fact needs to be faced, and I will note pairings of Menippean formal features with other than Menippean functions. I think the view of generic features as cognitively *motivated* form-function mappings helps point in the direction of an understanding of genre, because it helps explains how features can be *conventional* yet still have greater stability over time than would an arbitrary association of random elements. But this does not explain why features hang together in genres as they do, why they are not entirely free-floating.

Here I argue that each feature takes on a certain cast when it is integrated into a genre: some qualities of the feature are highlighted, some are suppressed. Menippean interruptive digressions are analogous to, but quite distinct from scholarly digressions, the *aposeopesis* of oratory, the *parabasis* of the Greek chorus, etc. A Menippean digression is comic; it conveys a sense of the humour of a character or narrator unwilling, unable, or unconcerned to follow a story or thought to its conclusion in good time. This is a specification or selection from the range of possible kinds of digression. Within this specification there is still a wide range of variation. Sterne's narrator is unable to focus because of an overflow of energy and material; Beckett's narrators, surely influenced by Sterne, are often unable to focus because of an entropic energy drain symptomatic of mental decay. So the rhetorical features of a genre are not entirely free-floating but are anchored, or have a gravitational pull towards a prototypical generic tone, by how they

are integrated into the genre's overall form and meaning. It would be strange to find a Menippean digression outside of a Menippean work.

GENERIC FEATURES AS RHETORICAL FIGURES AS FORM-MEANING PAIRINGS:

To get to the point, I start from the following sample of key Menippean features that critics have emphasized: 1. The parody of right learning; 2. Degrading imagery; 3. Narrative digressiveness; and 4. Formal variety. Alastair Fowler urges critics to move from the "empirical listing of generic repertoires" to "investigate how the features of generic repertoires are related functionally"; suggesting that each function "must be embodied in a rhetorical structure (or perhaps in several [. . .])" ("Future" 296-97). As we have seen, Mark Turner 's project of "cognitive rhetoric" suggests that rhetorical structures should be regarded as mappings of conceptual contents to various kinds of linguistic form, just as cognitive linguists regard grammatical constructions as pairings of schematic forms with conceptual contents. So we can begin to meet Fowler's suggestion by casting formal features in conceptual-schematic terms.

1. Parody of right learning:

Frye, Bakhtin, and many other critics have emphasized how the Menippeans seek truth through the parody of crackpot theories and obsessive values.

This topic or theme is connected to the human scenario of a person constructing an analysis of something, or using it in his life. Such scenarios have their own cognitive reality, and Menippean satires are full of characters who try to spin out their own systems to meet the winds of experience, and end up caught in their own webs. An extension of the "analysis" schema has the thinker proselytizing the solution he finds to his problems. The preacher, prophet or public philosopher role is vital to Menippean satire.

But philosophical quests (and thought generally) can also be expressed in cognitive terms as a metaphorical mapping from the domain of physical movement to the abstract domain of thought. The basic metaphor THINKING IS MOVING maps the starting point to some intellectual problem, moving along a path to thinking about a problem; and reaching the goal to solving the problem (see Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh* 236-38). On the level of life, the compound metaphor LIFE IS A MOVEMENT FROM IGNORANCE TO KNOWLEDGE maps an origin point to youthful innocent ignorance; the journey along the path is learning from experience; and reaching the goal is achieving a mature, wise vision of life. If the thinker fails to achieve understanding, she moves along a path, but fails to reach her goal. She may "stall" or get "sidetracked" or "go nowhere" or "back to square one" etc.

The basis for the mapping is an image-schematic topology that fits both domains: in both cases we begin at a source, move along a path, and arrive at a goal.

Walter Shandy's role as an "excellent natural philosopher" (3) and "systematick reasoner" (38) enacts these patterns parodically. And Tristram's "life and opinions" parody the learning pattern of autobiographical novels. The "moving" metaphor is also present in the image of men "riding their Hobbyhorses" around the countryside--that is, thinking and talking about their ideas.

But of course there continue to be serious philosophical quests, and serious "anatomies" are still written, about everything from Naval disasters to golf courses.[119]

2. Imagery:

Bakhtin has done much to show how satirical *imagery* intimates an upside-down or topsy-turvy "Carnival" world. Satirical analogies and metaphors degrade accepted wisdom to the "material bodily lower stratum." Kings, philosophers and other "noble" characters may act like animals, be associated with objects, excrement or death. Clowns and fools are raised to the status of kings. Typical of Menippean satire are grotesque bodily images of eating, drinking, defecation, copulation, birth and death. The philosopher character is often connected with rabid dogs.

Much of Tristram Shandy's story concerns how his personal fate was shaped by accidental physical factors that go wrong (his father is "interrupted" by his mother's question about winding the clock; he gets his head mistaken for his hip and has his "nose" squashed by forceps; he has the wrong name given him). He protests, "Well, you may take my word, that nine parts in ten of a man's sense or his nonsense, his successes and miscarriages in this world depend upon [the animal spirits'] motions and activity, and the different tracks and trains you put them into" (1). And Uncle Toby's groin injury is at the root of his hobbyhorse. Walter Shandy says it all:

> "That provision should be made for continuing the race of so great, so exalted and godlike a Being as man--I am far from denying--but philosophy speaks freely of every thing; and therefore I still think and do maintain it to be a pity, that it should be done by means of a passion which **bends down** the faculties, and **turns** all the wisdom, contemplations, and operations of the soul **backwards**--a passion, my dear, continued my father, addressing himself to my mother, which couples and equals wise men with **fools**, and makes us come out of **caverns** and hiding places more like **satyrs** and four-footed **beasts** than men" (455, my emphasis).

But inversions of conventional structures of imagery and narrative are not necessarily satirical, because they are not necessarily funny. They are also used to figure evil in a serious way, too. Dante's devils and damned souls are low, dark, bestial, deformed, and "bottom-heavy", so to speak--ruled by their bodies, not their spirits.

This notion of "degrading" imagery, satirical or serious, depends on an understanding of a scale of Being. Lakoff and Turner analyze the Great Chain of Being as a complex conceptual structure--a hierarchical scale of least to most complex beings (*More Than Cool Reason* Chapter 4). (More precisely, it is a scale of least to most complex essential attributes, with the higher dominating the lower, combined with a folk theory that "being leads to doing", or attributes lead to behaviour). And they insist that this is not just a relic of the history of ideas, but rather has ongoing power in our thinking. The technique of satire is to hold up something supposedly "noble", high on the Chain of Being, and link it with something at the opposite end of the scale; or vice-versa. We need

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[119] A search for "anatomy" at Amazon.com produces titles on about fifty subjects, including these.

this cultural model to identify satire's elements as "high" and "low", and to understand the implications and effects of linking them.

3. Digression:
There are many kinds of digression, and there are allied devices (interruption, truncation, regression, etc.). Digressions can support and strengthen a story or argument by elaboration, but Menippean digressions typically threaten to take over. They give the impression of chaos in the mind of the narrator, and in the universe being described.

Wayne Booth notes the main digression of the book in its vast contradiction of its title: Sterne "begin[s] by pretending to tell the life and opinions of Tristram Shandy and end[s] by telling the amours and campaigns of Uncle Toby, concluding the whole account four years before the birth of [his] original hero" (Booth 544). Tristram's discussion of his digressive and progressive method (v. 1 ch. 22, 51-52); and the chapter on narrative lines (v. 6 ch. 40, 333-34) famously highlight this feature.

But not all digressions are satirical. They can serve legitimate scholarly functions, when they bring in matter that is distant from the immediate focus but important to the argument. They also may be used to figure evil or "Error" in a serious way, as in Dante's losing his way of life in a dark wood. They may also represent something good (as in the pastoral and Romantic "retreat" to nature, turning aside from the dull, ordinary way of society).

"Digression" also seems to be defined metaphorically, on the basis of the PATH image-schema: it is a departure from a path connecting a source to a goal. Its various meanings come from metaphorical projections of the basic concept onto other domains of knowledge.

4. Generic variety:
Fairly unremarkable to us now, prosimetric form once had a more specific meaning as a violation of Greek standards of rhetorical decorum, which insisted on the rigid separation of prose and verse genres. A like effect is presumably produced in later ages by the more complex Menippean rhetorical strategy of parodically using a series of genres, throwing out one after another, giving an impression of chaotic change and the absurdity of formal propriety. This generic mixture is behind the notion of the genre as a "farrago", "*satura*" or "hash".

The first few of *Tristram Shandy*'s many subgenres includes Yorick's sermon; interpolated stories; the Shandy Marriage contract (Ch. 15, 27ff.), and a French medical memorandum (42ff.). There are also diagrams; blank and marbled pages, and much French and Latin technical jargon.

Generic variety is also considered a feature of epic, but there it relates to the comprehensiveness of the poet's vision of the plenitude of human experience, and genres are carefully disposed (e.g. Homer, Milton).

Again, this feature's meaning and effect seems to rely on an image-schematic structure, projected metaphorically to literary form. A *whole* is constituted by *parts* in a *configuration*, and traditionally beauty inheres in properly proportioned parts in harmony. A bunch of parts connected in no discernible overall order is a *parody* of an organic

whole; the mixture of many forms results in almost no form at all (as Guilhamet and Relihan agree).

FORMAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN FEATURES:

The foregoing shows that genre gives us a set of rhetorical features each of which is a *conventional but motivated* mapping of meaning to form. But more than this, the "systematicity" of the genre means that its various features also have graspable relations and "motivate" one another. (In familiar critical language, they are "mutually reinforcing".)

How exactly does this work? I suggest that features *can* motivate one another because their rhetorical structures are *image-schematically coherent* with one another; and they *do* motivate one another because our brains naturally seek and find patterns wherever we look, trying to maximize coherence and unity. Patterns with the greatest "systemic redundancy" are most salient and best recognized--because "*It is easier to learn* [. . .] *remember* and *use* motivated knowledge than arbitrary knowledge" (Lakoff 346). We map elements of discourse on to one another as much as possible (or see the potential for such mapping). Milowicki and Wilson write, "To problematize the issue further, Menippean satire operates on all discursive levels: diction, style, theme, structure, (generic) form" (292). But this fact can help to resolve the issue. Genres can echo structural patterns at various levels because, as Turner says, "the macroscopic and microscopic levels in literature express the same conceptual patterns and connections" (*Reading* 244). Form-content links are created by writers and recognized by readers. If they are effective, they may become marked as genre features. The Russian Formalists emphasized formal redundancy as a key aesthetic quality. Cognitivists would see it as a guiding value of all mental constructions.

The clearest instance of isomorphism between features is the match of digressive narration with the failure of the mental quest. Tristram's wayward narration constitutes a failure to record intelligibly his life and opinions, and at the same time fulfils his father's worst fears about the consequences of his failure to secure a philosophically proper birth and name for his son:

> [U]pon his observing a most unaccountable obliquity, (as he call'd it) in my manner of setting up my top, and justifying the principles upon which I had done it,--the old gentleman shook his head, and ... he said his heart all along foreboded, and he saw it verified in this, [. . .] That I should neither think nor act like any other man's child:--*But alas!* continued he, [. . .] *My Tristram's misfortunes began nine months before ever he came into the world.* (3)

(This passage also supplies an excellent image to link physical and mental digressiveness (obliquity) with dubious physical uprightness (the set-up top).)

The story of Tristram and the story of Uncle Toby are the only main threads in the novel (Booth 539). Sterne himself says that the latter "may make no uninteresting underplot in the epitasis and working-up of this drama" (II.5, qtd. in Booth 540), so

relative to the story of Tristram, the story of Toby is a digression. And yet Booth shows that the book is a vast contradiction of its title page, and Sterne planned to "begin by pretending to tell the life and opinions of Tristram Shandy and end by telling the amours and campaigns of Uncle Toby, concluding the whole account four years before the birth of your original hero" (Booth 544). Which is another form of digression.

The reproduction of the digressive *narrative* structure at the *syntactic* level is also clear, in sentences which "enter into a digression longer then [sic] the purpose and *outstrip the period with the parenthesis*" in the words of Sir Thomas Urquhart, the great English translator of Rabelais (*Jewel* 50, emphasis added). The ideal straight line of a story, with its beginning-middle-end causal order, matches the ideal straight line of a sentence, with its subject-verb-object order. A digressive sentence changes an implied syntactic path to multiply sub-clauses of various kinds to get lost, or nearly so, in its own tangles. The dash-riddled Sternean sentences hardly need documenting. One good example is an early self-conscious remark on his plans for one of his anecdotes:

> But I must here, once for all, inform you, that all this will be more exactly delineated and explain'd in a map, now in the hands of the engraver, which, with many other pieces and developments to this work, will be added to the end of the twentieth volume,--not to swell the work,--I detest the thought of such a thing;--but by way of **commentary, scholium, illustration**, and key to such passages, incidents, or inuendos as shall be thought to be either of private interpretation, or of dark or doubtful meaning after my life and my opinions shall have been read over, (now don't forget the meaning of the word) by all the *world*;--which, betwixt you and me, and in spight of all the gentlemen reviewers in *Great-Britain*, and of all that their worships shall undertake to write or say to the contrary,--I am determined shall be the case.--I need not tell your worship, that all this is spoke in confidence. (25, my emphasis)

This sentence structure reflects the digressive thought of the moment as well as the digressive narrative and discourse structure it proposes. A variation of this isomorphism is the sentence actually interrupted by narrative digressions. Toby begins an answer to Walter's question about some upstairs noise, "What can they be doing brother?" on page 45. His "I think" is interrupted because "to enter rightly into my Uncle Toby's sentiments upon this matter, you must be made to enter first a little into his character" (45). In the next book he finally finishes his sentence on page 71, with "it would not be amiss, brother, if we rung the bell". The narrator then produces another instance of an unfinished sentence from Toby, and interrupts to refuse to say if it was truncated or interrupted, and to show awareness of how "line" connects sentences with other forms: "Just heaven! how does the *Poco piu* and *Poco meno* of the *Italian* artists;--the insensible, more or less, determine the precise line of beauty in the sentence, no less than in the statue!" (71).[120]

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[120] J. Hillis Miller presents a deconstructive view of the relevance of Hogarth's "line of beauty" to other linear themes in *Tristram Shandy*, to Schlegel, and to cultural conventions of narrative in general (including irony): "All narrative is therefore the linear demonstration of the impossibility of linear coherence" (386).

Such parallels are mutually reinforcing in a fairly obvious way. But we can find equally powerful isomorphisms at other levels. *Narrative* digressiveness also coheres with *stylistic and generic* variety. *Thematically* both suggest a perpetual searching for some new knowledge to contain the truths of experience. Like genres and works, syntax and discourse are also conceived metaphorically in terms of part-whole structure. "Parts of speech" like nouns and verbs are connected in a proper order, and subordinated to the whole sentence that they constitute. Discourse and genre are *formally* analogous by the isomorphism of segments of a narrative/ sentential line with parts of a generic/ textual whole. Sterne uses this mapping from narrative digressiveness (in the first part of the following passage) to generic variety (in the latter part) when he recommends his method of writing:

> when a man sits down to write a history... he knows no more than his heels what **lets and confounded hindrances** he is to meet with in his way,--or what a dance he may be led, by one **excursion** or another, before all is over. ... [I]f he is a man of the least spirit, he will have fifty **deviations from a straight line** to make with this or that party as he goes along, which he can no ways avoid. ... he will moreover have various
> **Accounts** to reconcile:
> **Anecdotes** to pick up:
> **Inscriptions** to make out:
> **Stories** to weave in:
> Traditions to sift:
> Personages to call upon:
> **Panegyricks** to paste up at this door:
> **Pasquinades** at that: ...--In short, there is no end of it. (26, my emphasis)

Still less obviously, digressions also cohere with the satirical imagery that "makes the low, high, and the high, low." Because they are derailings of the causal "line" of narrative structure, they are also analogous to these imagistic inversions of the metaphorical structure of the *chain* or *scale* of being. In this case, both metaphorical models contain a *path* that is traversed over time. Both have opposing end-points with a segmentable spectrum between them, and both assume a canonical direction of motion. The analogy maps from narrative's linear spatial order from beginning to end, to literary imagery's linear spatial order from bottom to top. In the conventional metaphors, human movement down the scale (with heaven at the top), by folly or knavery, is like human departure from the straight and narrow path (with heaven at the end). In the chapter on lines, Sterne again plays in full awareness of how this common structure links many domains, including the vertical scale: "Pray can you tell me,--that is, without anger, before I write my chapter upon straight lines--by what mistake--who told them so--or how it has come to pass, that your men of wit and genius have all along confounded this line, with the line of GRAVITATION?" (334, vol. 6. Chap. 40). Conventional

associations of gravity and levity are played with throughout the novel, especially in the chapters concerning the parson Yorick (1.10-1.12; pp. 11-24, esp. 18).[121]

This coherence is perhaps best captured imagistically in the figure of the Hobbyhorse, which makes obsession at once absurdly animalistic and playfully digressive. Late in the book, Tristram insists upon the difference between his own Hobbyhorse, and his father's use of St. Hilarion's metaphor of the body as an ass (whose kicking he stopped by the abstinences of religion). But this distinction works like his denials of euphemisms: it really serves to point out the analogy. The hobby-horse is "in no way a vicious beast.... 'Tis...an *any thing*, which a man makes a shift to get a stride on, to canter it away from the cares and solicitudes of life. ... But my father's ass ... 'tis a beast concupiscent" (413). Mental obsessions let us escape for a while from the straight line of life; and they may also make us beasts concupiscent.

OTHER COHERENCES: DICTION / PARONOMASIA

Sterne's euphemistic word-play reproduces degrading patterns of imagery at the lexical level. It appears everywhere, and we can also see its coherence with generic variety, for example, when he uses it to parody various genres (e.g. the words "backsides" and "coverture" in the interpolated Marriage Contract).

EPITOMES OF COHERENCE:

There are probably many episodes and passages that tie together all of the patterns we have been examining. One good one is Tristram's comment on his father's interest in Aunt Dinah's affair. It occurs within the digression on Toby's character that splits his answer to Walter's question; it describes an aspect of Walter's theory, and shows how this "high" conceptual thing is shaped by "low" bodily life; and it uses euphemistic puns: "The backslidings of *Venus* in her orbit fortified the *Copernican* system, call'd so after his name; and the backslidings of my aunt *Dinah* in her orbit, did the same service in establishing my father's system, which, I trust, will for here ever after be call'd the *Shandean System*, after his" (49). Trim's reading of Yorick's sermon also ties most of these features together at once. The sermon stoically preaches the wisdom of adhering to conscience in a world where all is vanity. In being absorbed into Tristram's book, this fruit of the philosophical quest is undermined by digressive interruptions which both emphasize the fact of generic variety, and mock its message with degrading imagery.[122]

Thus, if we examine the conceptual structure of these four Menippean features, we can see that, while they don't obviously or objectively have anything in common, at a higher level of abstraction they do all express a pattern of reversal of structures that are associated with normative order and value. Hierarchical scales rank beings/ properties/ values neatly and comprehensively; linear paths progress smoothly from origins to goals;

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[121] See Sigurd Burkhardt's "Tristram Shandy's Law of Gravity" for gravitational patterns of meaning in the novel.

[122] J. Paul Hunter shows how Sterne questions didactic methods by having the sermon constantly interrupted by the odd hobbyhorsical responses of the characters ("*Tristram Shandy* and the Art of Interruption").

parts have specific places in configurations that make up wholes. Satire seems generally to work by playfully reversing such conventional structures of meaning and value. The oppositions high/ low, big/ small, important/ trivial; the path from a source to a goal; the relation of parts and whole, all are confounded.[123] Play with norms of character, language, plot, etc. often leads to fantasy and the grotesque. Menippean satire applies this reversal process to human thought generally, especially to formal proprieties, including those of literary form, and thus to its own architecture.

Of course, this approach assumes that similar coherences of features are typical in Menippean works, and indeed that any genre's featural repertoire is likewise strongly self-coherent. It proposes that more central members of the genre will have more of the more central features integrated more fully, while noncentral members will have fewer features and/ or less central features, and these will be less fully integrated into the whole structure of the work (usually due to the integration of other generic influences). I believe this assumption holds when checked against the material, but to verify it thoroughly and explicitly would require more analysis than we can afford.

We can contribute to the point, however, by identifying certain passages in our works that are "epitomes of coherence"--that is, passages that integrate very many of these features in ways that are prototypical of the genre. I offer one example here, though many others could be cited. In a single scene of *Candide*, Voltaire includes compounded suffering from vicious people, a physical attack on the philosopher Pangloss, a satirical attack on the idiocy of the surgeon and his superstitious wife involving slapstick tumbling, and a satirical attack on the incompetence of the Inquisition executioner who can burn but not hang a man:

> "It is true," said Pangloss, "that you saw me hanged; and in the natural course of events I should have been burned. But you remember, it poured with rain when they were going to roast me; the storm was so violent that they despaired of lighting the fire; I was hanged because they could do nothing better; a surgeon bought my body, carried me home and dissected me. He first made a crucial incision in me from the navel to the collar-bone. Nobody could have been worse hanged than I was. The executioner of the holy Inquisition, who was a sub-deacon, was marvellously skilful in burning people, but he was not accustomed to hang them; the rope was wet and did not slide easily and it was knotted; in short, I

[123] Coleridge writes, "There is the *idea* of the soul in its undefined capacity and dignity that gives the sting to any absorption of it by any one pursuit, and this not as a member of society for any particular, however mistaken, interest, but as man. Hence in humour the little is made great, and the great little, in order to destroy both, because all is equal in contrast with the infinite" (qtd. in *Tristram Shandy* 485). Michael Seidel notes that Dryden's arch enemy Elkanah Settle said to him, "'you have got a damnable trick of turning the Perspective upon occasion, and magnifying or diminishing at pleasure.' ... Aristotle has a witty passage in the *Rhetoric* where he speaks of contraries and metaphoric values: "And if we wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of asking) is an instance of doing this" (Loeb trans., 1405a) (Seidel 136).

still breathed. The crucial incision caused me to utter so loud a scream that the surgeon fell over backwards and, thinking he was dissecting the devil, fled away in terror and fell down the staircase in his flight. His wife ran in from another room at the noise; she saw me stretched out on the table with my crucial incision; she was still more frightened than her husband, fled, and fell on top of him. When they had recovered themselves a little, I heard the surgeon's wife say to the surgeon: 'My dear, what were you thinking of, to dissect a heretic? Don't you know the devil always possesses them? I will go and get a priest at once to exorcise him.'" (138-39)

Conclusions: Prototypical Theme, Prototypical Plot, Metaphorical Plot and Metaphorical Coherences

PROTOTYPICAL THEME AND PROTOTYPICAL PLOT

In my earlier study of the genre, I used a survey of works to chart the genre's overall theme. Having now observed a quite specific form of this theme in many genre members, I would like briefly to speculate that the theme itself--the process of philosophical thought and the worldview which is its outcome--can be treated as a conventional schema. This may initially sound counterintuitive, because we usually think of thematic meaning as inhering in specific works; but just as Curtius shows thematic rhetorical *topoi* to be conventional, so I believe can convention be discovered in thought processes on various topics. (This may help assuage some of the unease literary critics feel in rehearsing the "thoughts" or "philosophies" that are used so often in literature, but are not taken entirely seriously as genuine philosophical claims. One cannot leave out a poet's ideas, but it doesn't entirely make sense to "argue" with her or him.)

I suggest that the schema for the quasi-cynical progress of Menippean thinking is as follows:

-observation of some instance of mutability / death
-perception that all things change and pass away, though many things appear stable and permanent
-perception that things that pass away can have no lasting or absolute value
-perception that many things in human life or the world have no lasting or absolute value
    -Hence, the metaphorical perception that things are only appearances, surfaces with no substance beneath
-Hence, the initiation of a search for something in life or the world with lasting absolute value: something that is not just a false appearance, but has real depth and solidity. This thing is sought as a "foundation" or "basis" of truth and right living
-this search should include or lead to a philosophy, or way, or guide "of life" for the seeker, that will produce happiness, or goodness, or salvation, or some form of rightness and harmony with the truth of things. The seeker wants to relate his life to an ennobling reality and truth. The search can include:
    -the search for a true and good philosophy. This may involve meeting and questioning philosophers who may know what has value, and how to live
    -the search for some experience of a right way of life, or of something eternal and absolute. This may involve a search among various ways of

> life in social occupations, other cultures, etc., or a search within individual experience of pains and pleasures--in nature, society, the self
>
> The search may have various results:
> -after or during the quest, one may perceive that there is no absolute value, "all is vanity", all philosophers included, and there is *no* philosophy of life that commands belief, reverence and commitment
> -one may conclude by adopting a pragmatic attitude that is highly skeptical of all philosophies as well as all values imputed by society, and instead favours getting through life by wit, shrewdness, "physical grace" (Pynchon), luck, prudence and moderation (Burton), and good humour (Lucian, Rabelais)
>
> -OR, after or during the quest, one may perceive that in order to discover value, one must reduce or eliminate one's *self*-valuation and claims, as well as the values and claims established by society: 1. One may perceive that one has no right to demand or expect happiness, value, or any reward (because life has never promised any such thing); then 2. One may consequently realize that frustration and despair with one's lot in life stem from this very assumption that one is owed something in life, and it has been stolen. From a standpoint that demands and expects nothing, everything can be seen as valuable (as a gift). This is a fundamental change in the conception of the self and the universe--a philosophical or religious insight. The insight that our lives are not our own exerts a sense of obligation towards the gift and the giver. It has a natural relation to some form of philosophical commitment or conversion; and to a new valuation of *conscience*, the sense of moral duty that is opposite to the feeling that the world owes one something, because it is the sense of what one *owes* to life, the world, and other people.

This is indeed complex, but the pattern is there in Job and Ecclesiastes, in Boethius, in Kierkegaard, Johnson, Thoreau and Carlyle. Some authors have hints of it but play it down: Apuleius, Erasmus, Rabelais, Cervantes, Nashe, Burton, Walton, Swift, Sterne, Fielding, Melville, Joyce, and Pynchon. On the cynic side we have those who reject all answers, including philosophical and religious ones: Menippus, Lucian, Petronius, Montaigne, Voltaire, and Beckett.

We have also suggested that this theme is coherently related to action (usually a journey), and the essence of the satirical Menippean philosophical quest, with some of its concomitant actions, are clearly stated in Lucian's *Icaromenippus*:

> As soon as I began to find, in the course of my investigation of life, that all objects of human endeavour are ridiculous and trivial and insecure (wealth, I mean, and office and sovereign power), contemning those things and assuming that the effort to get them was an obstacle to getting things truly worth effort, I undertook to lift my eyes and contemplate the universe. In so doing I was caused

> great perplexity, first of all by what the philosophers call the Cosmos, for I could not discover how it came into being or who made it, or its source or purpose. [. . .] Being in that state of mind, I thought it best to learn about all these points from the philosophers, for I supposed that they surely would be able to tell the whole truth. So I picked out the best of them, as far as I could judge from the dourness of visage, paleness of complexion and length of beard; and as the gentlemen at once struck me as being extremely tall talkers and high thinkers, I put myself in their hands, paying down part of a good round sum on the spot and contracting to pay the balance later, on completion of my course in philosophy; and then I expected to be taught how to hold forth on the Heavens and to learn the system of the universe. But they were so far from ridding me of my old-time ignorance that they plunged me forthwith into even greater perplexities by flooding me every day with first causes, final causes, atoms, voids, elements, concepts, and all that sort of thing. But the hardest part of it all, in my opinion at least, was that although no one of them agreed with anyone else in anything he said, but all their statements were contradictory and inconsistent, they nevertheless expected to persuade me and each tried to win me over to his own doctrine. [. . .] Indeed, my friend, it will make you laugh to hear about the way they bragged and worked wonders in their talk! Why, in the first place, they stood on the ground and weren't a bit better than the rest of us who walk the earth [. . .]. When I heard all this, the result was that I did not venture to disbelieve "high-thundering" gentlemen with goodly beards, and yet did not know where to turn in order to find a point of doctrine that was unassailable and not in any way subject to refutation by someone else. [. . .] At my wit's end in view of all this, I despaired of hearing any truth about these matters on earth and thought that the only way out of my whole dilemma would be to get wings somehow and go up to Heaven. (275-83)

This is a kind of prototype for the action frame that also generates the prototypical theme of the absurd humour of epistemological uncertainty in Menippean satire. Lucian's compact but thorough summary epitomizes the central situation of "investigation of life", which leads to disillusionment with human endeavour (due to its fleetingness, triviality, and absurdity, relative to the larger perspective of eternity and eternal things), which leads to a search of philosophies, which leads to disillusionment with philosophy (due to the confusion, groundlessness, inconsistency, presumption and foolishness of its practitioners), which leads to an ironic, humorous commonsense attitude.

There is a comparable passage at the beginning of *Menippus in Hell* (99-101). Menippus relates how he believed in the gods of Hesiod and Homer as a child, then when he found that their behaviour went against the laws, he turned to philosophers for a rule of conduct. He surveys various creeds and directives--to pursue pleasure, or hard work and suffering, or self-mortification; to abuse others; to despise wealth or pursue it as a form of Goodness. He surveys physical theories, too. But he finds only contradictions and hypocrisy: philosophers practice the opposite of what they preach, and seek fame and wealth above all else. He is discouraged, but consoled "with the reflection that if I was still going around in a state of ignorance and folly, I was doing it in the company of some

very eminent thinkers" (100). He decides to try to enter Hell by magic: "Then I'd be able to ask Tiresias the Boiotian what was the most sensible way to live. A famous sage and prophet like him would presumably know the answer" (100-01). The answer Menippus at last gets is:

> 'The best way to live is to be an ordinary human being. So give up all this metaphysical nonsense. Stop worrying about first principles and final causes, and forget all those clever arguments--they don't mean a thing. Just live in the moment and get along as best you can, trying to see the funny side of things and taking nothing very seriously.' (109-100)

Joel Relihan argues that

> Menippus's association with the Land of the Dead is undeniable, and what we have seen of the probable nature of humor, preaching, and self-presentation in the *Necyia*, coupled with the fame of the work, is sufficient to proclaim it as Menippus's signature work and the generic font of all later Menippean satire. (48)

He conjectures how Menippus's main work defines the central form of the genre, and remarks on how Varro added to it to establish one of its main lines of development:

> Menippus's *Necyia* may be imagined as antiphilosophical parody in the most general terms: humor at the expense of the idea of an absolute good, the search for it, and the proclamation of it. Menippus is the Cynic who burlesques the persona, the teachings, and the certainties of the Cynic preacher. Varro supplies to this burlesque the parody of various dogmatic systems in their particulars, details that were superfluous to Menippus. Varro puts his own encyclopedic knowledge to self-parodic use in his *Menippeans*, frequently abusing the ideas that we know he held elsewhere, and depicting himself as a ridiculous reformer to whom no one pays any attention. (49)[124]

METAPHORICAL COHERENCES and the PROTOTYPICAL METAPHORICAL PLOT

At the end of our discussion, we are now in a position to consider an issue that was raised obliquely earlier, in the discussion of prototypical plots and themes. We can now look at the relation of metaphor and narrative to plot and theme, and sketch out a prototypical "ideal" overall pattern in this genre. This pattern is derived by combining as completely

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[124] Relihan compares the *common structure* of Lucian's *Necyomantia* and *Icaromenippus* to infer the structure of Menippus's text. He produces a schema of Introduction, Decision to Tell of the Entire Journey, The Reasons for the Journey, Preparations for the Voyage, Survey of Human Folly, Council and Consultation, The Conclusions. (104ff). However, the "Survey of Human Folly" takes up the bulk of both Lucianic texts.

as possible the prototypical plot and theme of Menippean satire, and the conventional metaphors for satire. Because of this basis in abstract conceptual structures, it can be seen to exist in varying degrees in specific members, even though it is not wholly present in many, or "purely" present in any.

Recall that in the Chapter 3, on metaphors for satire in speech, we concluded that the action of satire is represented in the following general mapping:

> -Satirical mockery that exposes and rejects a false appearance imposed upon reality is the cutting or burning through an outer surface to reveal that surface as artificially expanded from within by a vapour, to deflate and strip off the outer surface, thus allowing the vapour to escape, and to reveal a concealed foundation or core of solid substance surrounded by some non-solid substance.

If the *thematic pattern* is disillusionment by seeking true value beyond appearances by surveying various experiences, ways of life, and/ or philosophies, the *metaphorical narrative pattern* is of *descending* to *push through "layers"* of oppressive appearance, to arrive at a vision of the nakedness of the world.

In his remarks on the "descent of lower wisdom" in *Words With Power*, Frye describes and analyzes the Mesopotamian myth of the descent of the goddess Inanna into the lower world, "wearing all her queenly regalia, part of which was removed at each stage of descent, until she arrived in the realm of death helpless and naked. One of the many elements in this haunting myth is the fact that one can possess nothing in such a world" (232). This develops into the *katabasis* or *danse macabre* theme, and Frye cites Lucian's descents as examples. We can find even in Proust imagery of this kind, when he describes the musical theme that obsesses Swann as a descent involving the dropping of veils:

> And as, notwithstanding, he sought in the little phrase for a meaning to which his intelligence could not descend, with what a strange frenzy of intoxication must he strip bare his innermost soul of the whole armour of reason, and make it pass, unattended, through the straining vessel, down into the dark filter of sound. (182)

Shortly thereafter the little phrase appears again, in a descent pattern, feminized, and covered by a surface layer:

> [H]eralded by the waving tremolo of the violin-part, which formed a bristling bodyguard of sound two octaves above it--and as in a mountainous country, against the seeming immobility of a vertically falling torrent, one may distinguish, two hundred feet below, the tiny form of a woman walking in the valley--the little phrase had just appeared, distant but graceful, protected by the long, gradual unfurling of its transparent, incessant and sonorous curtain. And Swann, in his heart of hearts, turned to it, spoke to it as to a confidant in the secret of his love [. . .]. (203)

Swann manages to descend and penetrate to the inner essence of the phrase in a kind of *sanctum sanctorum.*

Other works often use clothing to symbolize layers, and there is widespread use of the metaphor of life as theatre, which integrates the clothing-as-appearance metaphor to insist that appearances in human life are masks and costumes, and that death removes all such appearances, since all actors are equal at the end when they must leave the stage. Lucian's voyages, both downwards and upwards, are indeed paradigmatic. The journey to the land of the dead involves the metaphoric image of stripping away all earthly *attachments*, emotional and spiritual as well as physical, and Charon insists that everyone leave behind anything they are trying to carry with them, including abstract character traits (*No Baggage Allowance* 65-71). The related theme of total uncovering of personal history and self (confession or revelation) appears later in the same dialogue, and in *Menippus in Hell*, in the trials of the powerful at the court of Minos, where witnesses uncover shameful past deeds, and the dead seem to be able to see all actions: "There they stood, stripped of their splendour, of wealth, rank, and authority, stark naked, hanging their heads. And all their worldly success must have seemed to them like a dream" (104). There is also the Moon in *Icaromenippus* who tells Menippus that she sees at night all the shameful actions of the philosophers who pretend to dignity during the day (303). The related theme of death as a leveler appears in the punishments: "Every class was equally represented--kings, slaves, paupers, plutocrats, beggars were being punished side by side" (*Menippus in Hell* 105; see also *Dialogues of the Dead*). A like equivalence appears in the anonymity of the bones and skulls that get mixed together:

> It wasn't very easy to distinguish between individuals, for being nothing but bare bones, they all look practically alike. [. . .] They lay huddled on top of one another in vague, shapeless heaps, without any trace of the beauty they possessed up here. [. . .] For all differentiating features had disappeared. They were just a collection of bones, obscure and anonymous, no longer capable of identification. (106)

Strength and beauty are stripped away along with wealth and power, though they seem closer to the identity of the human being, as aspects of the physical body. The metaphor of human life as a pageant or theatre then appears:

> Seeing them like that gave me the idea that human life is a vast sort of pageant organized by Chance, who provides the people taking part in it with various different costumes. [. . .] But some people are silly enough to feel angry and aggrieved when Chance comes up to them and asks for her things back, as though they were being robbed of their own property instead of merely repaying a short-term loan. (106-07)

Later writers take up some of the same specific metaphors. Juvenal claims that philosophy strips away the layers of folly and vice, without specifying exact details to symbolize those layers:

Benign

> Philosophy, by degrees, peels away our follies and most
> Of our vices, gives us a grounding in right and wrong. (*Satire 13*, 256)

The metaphor of life as theatre is ubiquitous, though Menippean writers tend to focus on the exit. Montaigne combines the idea of philosophy as learning to die with the metaphor of life as theatre and surface attachments as masks, when he writes,

> But forsomuch as hee is a Philosopher [Solon], with whom the favours or disfavours of fortune, and good or ill lucke have no place, and are not regarded by him; and puissances and greatnesses, and accidents of qualitie, are well nigh indifferent: I deem it very likely he [. . .] meant that the same good fortune of our life [. . .] should never be ascribed unto man, untill he have beene seene play the last act of his comedie, and without doubt the hardest. In all the rest there may be some maske: [. . .] But when that last part of death, and of our selves comes to be acted, then no dissembling will availe, then it is high time to speake plaine English, and put off all vizards: then whatsoever the pot containeth must be shewne, be it good or bad, foule or cleane, wine or water. (47)

Witnessing the end of a play, Don Quixote remarks sagely,

> "the same happens in the comedy and life of this world, where some play emperors, others popes, and in short, all the parts that can be brought into a play; but when it is over, that is to say, when life ends, death strips them all of the robes that distinguished one from the other, and all are equal in the grave. (Part 2, Chapter 12, 604)

Sancho remarks that it is a fine comparison, but not so new, and he has heard it many times before. Peacock's morbid Scythrop laments, "The crisis of my fate is come: the world is a stage, and my direction is exit" (*Nightmare Abbey*, Chapter 14).

In Swift and others, pushing through appearances to reality means anatomizing the body, where the skin is another layer of appearance. Discussing his "great design of an everlasting remembrance, and never-dying fame", he says,

> To this end, I have some time since, with a world of pains and art, dissected the carcass of human nature, and read many useful lectures upon the several parts, both containing and contained; till at last it smelt so strong, I could preserve it no longer. Upon which, I have been at a great expense to fit up all the bones with exact contexture, and in due symmetry; so that I am ready to show a very complete anatomy thereof to all curious gentlemen and others. (*Tale* 306-07)

Fielding's invocation to the comic muse, cited earlier, integrates many of these metaphors:

> Remove that Mist which dims the Intellect of Mortals, and causes them to adore Men for their Art, or to detest them for their Cunning in deceiving others, when they are, in reality, the Objects only of Ridicule, for deceiving themselves. Strip off the thin Disguise of Wisdom from Self-Conceit, of Plenty from Avarice, and of Glory from Ambition. (*Tom Jones* Book 13, chapter 1, [qtd. in Berland 83]).

I suggest, then, that this idealized metaphorical narrative structure has the "frame" of an action scenario of philosophical thinking, links that scenario to the action scenario of the quest journey by metaphorical projection of the conceptual action to a physical action (by the metaphor of mind as body). The model then further specifies and organizes the philosophical quest structure by integrating into it the metaphor of values and ideas as surface appearances and the metaphor of penetrating to truth as passing through surface layers, and in these ways develops the metaphoric pattern as a philosophical quest by descent through layers of appearance. The model also correlates with an emotional process, with stages in an overall tone.

Again, as with our study of high > low mappings in satirical metaphor and imagery, here we can find a counter-example that seems to use the same image-schematic pattern, but is not satirical in tone. Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* follows what Tzvetan Todorov calls a *gnoseological* narrative (i.e. a story of knowledge, of learning) with important similarities to the type I have outlined for Menippean satire--a quest for knowledge that is ever approached but never fulfilled. But Conrad's novel is in the end horrific, sealed with an attitude of demonic irony, if still within the bounds of irony at all. Todorov shows how *Heart of Darkness* uses the kinds of imagery we have been associating with the parody philosophical quest of Menippean satire:

> Knowledge is impossible; the heart of darkness is itself obscure: this is the burden of the text as a whole. The voyage takes us indeed to the very center, the interior, the bottom, the core: "I felt as though, instead of going to the centre of a continent, I were about to set off for the centre of the earth" (13); Kurtz's station is appropriately called the Inner Station; Kurtz himself is indeed "at the very bottom there" (19). But the center is empty: "An empty stream, a great silence, an impenetrable forest" (34). According to the manager, "'Men who come out here should have no entrails'" (22); this rule proves to be followed to the letter. Marlow says of the brickmaker: "It seemed to me that if I tried I could poke my forefinger through him, and would find nothing inside . . ." (26). The manager himself [. . .] stamps everything with an enigmatic smile; but perhaps his secret is impenetrable because it does not exist: "He never gave that secret away. Perhaps there was nothing within him" (22). (109-10).

The search for the centre, the interior, the bottom, ends up in the middle of nowhere, an empty interior, an impenetrable surface, a baseless bottom. It makes perfect sense that one can take such an attitude towards a realization of the impossibility of attaining true knowledge of such matters of deep concern. The satirist seems to realize the same thing, but takes a comic rather than a tragic attitude towards the point. Again, in order to have

satire, we need to import a certain emotional attitude, and make it fit this object in a coherent and comprehensible way. There are different degrees of irony, and there are other Menippean texts that find at the bottom of things a nothingness. Montaigne and Burton are skeptical about the possibility of certainty, but they council moderation. On the other hand, the voyage to the South Pole in Pynchon's *V.*, and the tragic fate of Ahab's quest to strike behind the mask of nature's appearance, are much more tragic in tone.

Looking again at Relihan's definition, and his analysis of the sources of which it is constituted, we can consider what kinds of structural elements are involved in the combination of sources, and how they combine. The *Odyssey* provides the action-pattern of adventure quest (with a subdued pattern of psychic development); Plato's myth of Er provides the conceptual thematic base of the survey and "choice of life"; and Aristophanic Old Comedy provides the spirit, tone, and rhetorical techniques of mocking parody. Thus the genre of Menippean satire appears to originate as a conceptual blend of the generic structures of specific textual influences. My prototypical metaphorical plot is a hypothetical reconstruction of an idealized background model for satire. It is not a blend, since it does not refer to any specific imaginative construction. Rather it is the integration of several conventional conceptual metaphors; it represents the generic structure of the blend that constituted Menippean satire and continues to inform it.

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