THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRARIAN STRUCTURE:
A GHANAIAN CASE STUDY
Dedicated to my beloved wife,
Beverley,
For her love and support
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRARIAN STRUCTURE:

A CASE STUDY

OF

TWIFO-HEMANG, CENTRAL REGION, GHANA

BY

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M.A. (McMaster University)

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ABSTRACT

This study set out to evaluate a comprehensive rural development project sponsored jointly by the state and private capital in Twifo-Hemang, a rural sub-district in the Central Region of Ghana. This oil palm production project involved the compulsory acquisition by the state and capital, of large tracts of peasant lands, and the expropriation of large numbers of direct producers from their means of production. The analysis was made on two levels. First, the immediate and long-term impact of the capitalist intrusion on agrarian structure, defined dynamically as changes in the relations of ownership, control and usufruct of land, and the changing roles of different social classes and strata in the process of production. Accordingly, the focal point of analysis was class formation and social differentiation.

Second, an appraisal of the project was made in terms of its officially stated objectives, based on the existing evidence at the time this field work took place. It was found that the chances of significant increases in the incomes and improvements in the living standards among the generality of the members of society remain an unfulfilled dream contrary to the stated objectives of the development project.
The thesis demonstrably supported by this work is that the large scale infiltration of new technologies and capitalist forms of production into peasant communities and the extensive appropriation of peasant lands, as occurred in this study, involve the skewing of relations to the means of production in favour of a minority who extract the surplus produced by the majority direct producers. This generates new processes of class formation and socio-economic differentiation. The position taken is that rural development planners should not only be concerned with the economic viability of projects, but they should also take account of their long-term social-structural implications within the target areas.

This study does not support the ultimate decomposition thesis which regards the peasantry as a transitional phenomenon to be eventually engulfed by capitalism in underdeveloped societies. The capitalist and peasant forms of production will continue to coexist, albeit on unequal and contradictory terms, in Twifo-Hemang.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The fieldwork and academic input which led to the successful production of this work were made possible with the help of many individuals. Special thanks go to my supervisor, Dr. R. E. Howard, who has successfully guided me through both the Master's and Doctoral studies. I also wish to express my appreciation for the invaluable assistance and guidance of other members of my doctoral supervisory committee, namely: Dr. R. Matthews of the Department of Sociology and Dr. D. Counts of the Department of Anthropology.

I wish to express my gratitude to various Ghanaian public officials for their assistance, especially the staffs of the Central Regional Development Corporation, the Central Regional Lands Department and Lands Commission, the Central Regional Branch of the National Archives and the Management of various State and private plantations in Twifo-Hemang. I also appreciate the cooperation of the traditional leaders and officials of the Twifo and Hemang traditional areas, and the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira District Administration.

Finally, I wish to express my appreciation of the moral support of Dr. Charles Jones, Dr. Elaine Nardocchio, Mrs. Jacqueline Tucker, Mrs. Illene Uylette and my dear wife Beverley. Mrs. Cecile Spencer has generously given of her time and effort in typing this dissertation, and I would like to thank her.
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CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Introduction

This work is the outcome of a fieldwork research done in the Twifo and Hemang traditional areas in the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira district of the Central Region of Ghana, between September, 1982 and August, 1983. The location of the study area in Africa and in Ghana is shown in Fig. 1 below. The general objective is to investigate the social-structural impact of the large-scale infiltration of the state and private capital into the traditional land tenure institution and the process of production in these peasant communities.

The main burden of this introductory chapter is to introduce the conceptual and methodological tools with which I will analyse the processes of social and structural changes in Twifo-Hemang, as a result of the penetration of capitalist agriculture in the area. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the problem which prompted this research, in its historical, national and local manifestations; and the main objective(s) of this
FIG. 1
LOCATION OF THE STUDY AREA.

IN AFRICA

23°N

0°

23 1/2°S

IN GHANA

UPPER REGION

NORTHERN REGION

BRONG-AHAFO REGION

ASHANTI REGION

EASTERN REGION

WESERN REGION

CENTRAL REGION

GREATER ACRA

Twifo-Hemang-Denkira District

work. The second section, which is the core of the chapter, introduces, defines and explains the main conceptual and methodological tools which will be used in analysing the data collected in the field. The third section, explains the techniques used in collecting the data.

1.1 The Setting

Between 1974 and 1975, the post colonial state of Ghana directly intervened in the customary land tenure institutional affairs of the Twifo and Hemang traditional areas in the Central Region of Ghana. It did so by using its powers of legislation and eminent domain to compulsorily acquire large tracts of farmlands through two legislative instruments and a decree. These lands had been the subject of social conflict between the two communities since the colonial era, when export crop production began in the area and land began to acquire a high market value. Indeed, the government claimed that it was precisely this state of social and political conflict, affecting the economic and social progress of the area, which warranted the intervention of the State.

Although the measure taken was claimed to be a temporary one aimed at finding a lasting solution to the conflict, it was followed almost immediately by the unveiling of a comprehensive agro-based rural development project. This opened the way for the penetration of state
and private (local and international) capital, through the establishment of large-scale, mechanized, capitalist plantations in the area. These developments, immediately (and since then) reactivated and aggravated the conflict situation rather than reducing it. This intervention also set in motion further problems of contradictions and conflict due to sudden changes in the relations of ownership, control and usufruct of land, and dramatic changes in the relations of production and therefore class structures. This study is aimed mainly at identifying and analysing these processes.

The intrusion of capital into the productive process in Twifo-Hemang was part of the frantic attempts by the post-colonial state to solve a continual crisis of food and raw materials shortages after independence was achieved in 1957. Attempts at easing the social and political tensions caused partly by these problems through the importation of foreign food and raw materials had so far failed. According to Beckman, this was partly due to stagnant or declining export production, shortage of foreign exchange, high rates of inflation, falling real wages and a declining ability of the state to feed an ever increasing non-agricultural population. He calls the result, 'a permanent crisis in public finance'. (3) The table below shows how the average annual inflation rate has been dramatically increasing since 1960, thus eroding the standards of living of the Ghanaian...
Table 1.1: Average Annual Inflation Rates in Ghana: 1960-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>116.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984(1st Quarter)</td>
<td>268.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increase in inflation rates is also reflected in the dramatic increases in the cost of living index between 1963 and 1977 as shown in the table below:-
Clearly, the political instability of the post-colonial era, cannot be divorced from the social and political crisis emanating from the decreases in real incomes due to high inflation and increasing costs of living, and the rapid lowering of the living standards of the majority of Ghanaians.

The response of Ghanaians to these difficulties, has ranged from quiet resignation and withdrawal, through escapism and out-migration, to open conflict and sabotage. According to Chazan, the very legitimacy and authority of the post-colonial state has hinged precariously upon its

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>169.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>181.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>188.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>206.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>226.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>266.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>315.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>408.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>783.3</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1613.6</td>
<td>106.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ability or inability to mobilise and redistribute ever-dwindling resources. The political instability of the post-colonial era is explainable largely from the state's inability to do so. (5)

The foundations of an outward-oriented economy specializing in the production of raw materials (minerals, forest products and export crops, chiefly cocoa), for export in the world capitalist-dominated market in exchange for industrial (capital and consumer) commodities, were laid in the colonial era. So also was the triple dependence on the peasantry to finance, through heavy taxes on the commodities they produce for export, the importation of manufactured commodities, national development projects and food to feed an ever-increasing non-agricultural urban population. In fact, the basis of an economy which encourages the production of exportable commodities to the virtual neglect of local food production was also established in this colonial era. So also is the paradox of a basically agrarian society, importing food to supplement local produce to feed itself. According to Bequele, by 1955, two years before political independence was achieved, the structure of the Ghanaian economy was,

...in many ways a typically underdeveloped economy. Agriculture was the major source of income and wealth, contributing...approximately 50% of G.D.P. and supporting a much larger proportion of the population. Its industrial base was extremely low and the country therefore
depended on imports of most of its capital and many of its consumer goods. The economy was characterised by a technological dualism; traditional labour-intensive techniques coexisted with modern capital-intensive ones, especially in the industrial sector and, to a lesser extent, in agriculture. It was an economy in which foreign trade constituted around 54% of G.D.P. A single crop - cocoa - contributed about 14% of G.D.P. and provided about 3/5 of the total export earnings. (6)

Hence, the basic legacy of colonialism and the twin basic economic problem which the post-colonial state has been attempting to solve, albeit unsuccessfully, is underdevelopment and dependency. (7)

However, the post colonial state has done very little to alter this situation, 'in spite of the fact that export diversification has been a major goal of every development plan since independence...'. (8) Table 1.3 shows the role of cocoa in the economy for the greater part of the post colonial era (1961-1975).

The basic structure of the economy described by Bequele above has not changed since the colonial period. Cocoa still contributes an average of about 60% of the total export earnings, and about 21% of the total government revenue. The economic situation has also worsened ever since because of the misplaced, lop-sided policies of successive governments.

First, although each regime has paid lip service to rural development, the numerous industries, infrastructure, public services and social amenities are largely
Table 1.3: The Role of Cocoa in Ghana's Export Earnings and Government Revenue, 1961 - 1975 (in millions of cedis and percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Export Earnings</th>
<th>Total Cocoa Earnings</th>
<th>% Total Export Earnings to Cocoa Earnings</th>
<th>Total Gov't. Revenue</th>
<th>Total Cocoa Revenue</th>
<th>% Total Cocoa Revenue to Total Gov't. Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>230.3</td>
<td>138.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>173.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>134.1</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>152.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>217.9</td>
<td>136.2</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>169.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>229.2</td>
<td>136.2</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>253.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>226.9</td>
<td>136.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>284.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>191.4</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>230.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>245.1</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>253.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>338.8</td>
<td>185.6</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>297.9</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>333.3</td>
<td>330.8</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>332.0</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>467.4</td>
<td>300.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>437.3</td>
<td>173.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>357.5</td>
<td>203.5</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>450.7</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>564.4</td>
<td>290.5</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>419.9</td>
<td>118.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>720.5</td>
<td>397.4</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>445.0</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>868.0</td>
<td>466.4</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>653.0</td>
<td>167.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>928.3</td>
<td>551.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>879.9</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average% - - 57.8 - - 20.8

Source: T. M. Morrison, 'The Political Economy of Export Instability in Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana, Journal of African Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1979 (Table 1) p.161
concentrated in the urban areas. This has led to the drift of the youth (especially the literate ones) who are anxious to leave the depressing conditions of the rural areas behind for the often illusive promise of hope and opportunities in the urban areas. It has also caused shortage of vital labour resources in the rural areas, where the bulk of agricultural production takes place. As Beckman correctly argued,

The post-colonial state provided conditions for the rapid growth of a non-agricultural population, depending on peasant agriculture for both finance and feeding. The ability of the disintegrating peasant economy to perform this dual role was increasingly strained. (9)

The urban population expressed as a percentage of the total population of Ghana jumped from 23% in 1960 to 36% in 1980. The average annual growth rate of the urban population has in fact been considerably higher than the average for the whole population. Between 1960 and 1970 it was 4.6% compared to only 2.4% for the whole population; and between 1970 and 1980, it rose to 5.1% as compared to 3.0% for the whole population. (10)

Second, despite the unquestionably high contribution peasant agriculture makes to total government revenue which services the whole economy, expenditure on the development of the forces of production in agriculture has consistently been kept low. Table 1.4 illustrates this point clearly. While for the eleven-year period (1966-1977), cocoa
Table 1.4: Government and the Agricultural Sector: Some Indicators (in million cedis), 1966 - 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Revenue</th>
<th>Cocoa Revenue</th>
<th>Government Expenditure</th>
<th>Expenditure on Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>235.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>297.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>293.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>361.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>283.6</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>359.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>360.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>439.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>486.2</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>470.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>421.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>547.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>391.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>579.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>583.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>779.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>810.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>1211.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>869.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>1604.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>1144.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>2228.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average % = 25.6%

Expenditure on Agriculture = 6.1%

contributed on the average approximately 26% of government revenue used for national development, only an average of 6% of government expenditure was earmarked for improving agriculture. Even then most resources are shifted in favour of the expanding capitalist sector.

Third, and more importantly, there has been the belief, unsupported by the historical facts of Ghana, that large-scale, mechanized agriculture (usually state-sponsored) is the *sine qua non* to increased productivity. There has been an increasing loss of faith in the ability of the peasantry to help the nation achieve self-sufficiency in the production of food and raw materials. The solution is therefore sought in state and private capitalist intervention in the productive process. Hence, modern technology and subsidized inputs are mainly directed at these sectors. This partly explains the persistence of the low level of the development of the forces of production in the peasant form of production.(11) Yet as Dadson correctly argues,

> In these approaches to agricultural development, Ghana has so far tried to by-pass its traditional producers, namely, the small-scale village farmers in favour of new structures; state farms, settlement farms, cooperative farms... etc. These new structures have absorbed large doses of public expenditure with negligible returns. The neglected small farmer meanwhile continues to account for over 90% of total production, especially food.(12)

The problem of increasing food and raw material...
deficits has put some strain on the country's economy, especially the use of scarce foreign exchange, itself produced largely by the labour power of the peasantry. The table below shows clearly the decreasing trend in the level of food productivity, in spite of the government's reliance on capitalistic approach to agricultural development.

Table 1.5: Trends in Per Capita Food Production in Ghana, 1970-79 (index base, 1961-65=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level of Productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.6 also shows that while productivity levels had been falling, the amount of food aid contracted and imported had been unsteadily, but clearly increasing over time.
Table 1.6: Ghana Food Aid Imports, 1975-79 (in thousands of metric tons, grain equivalent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This study is meant to illustrate part of the frantic attempts by the post-colonial state, albeit on a micro-level, to find solutions to the problem of food and agricultural raw material shortages in Ghana.

The Twifo-Hemang agro-based project for producing palm oil is part of a national project directed at solving the problem of using scarce foreign exchange in importing vegetable oils used as raw material in soap, candle and margarine producing industries in the urban areas. The need for such a national project is clearly depicted in the table below:-
Table 1.7: Vegetable Oil Local Production as Percentage of Existing Factory Capacity (1970-1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palm Oil</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconuts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import Value</th>
<th>Million Cedis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3643</td>
<td>5166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5161</td>
<td>5671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4424</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the oil palm fruit and palm oil (and other vegetable oils) constitute vital ingredients of the local diet of Ghanaians, one could consider the national project as part of the solution of food shortages and the need to save foreign exchange.

The Twifo-Hemang development project comprises the following components: 1. An oil palm processing factory capable of producing 15,500 tonnes of palm oil per year, at the rate of processing 30 tonnes of fresh fruit bunches an hour; 2. An initial 4,800 hectare nucleus oil palm plantation, divided into 4 estates at Praso, Ntaferewaso,
Kwanyako and Mampong, all in the Twifo area. This is to be expanded later to 7,200 hectares. It also includes a central oil palm nursery at Eduabeng, to produce high quality seedlings, using irrigation water drawn from the nearby Obuo stream; 3. A 1,500 hectare small-holder scheme, involving 1,200 hectares of palm oil, and 300 hectares of food farms to be cultivated by 300 peasant families who will be resettled on the plantation to see to the further development of oil palms initially nursed by management; and 4. An outgrower scheme composed of various state farms in Hemang and adjoining areas, and numerous privately-owned oil palm plantations encouraged through attractive marketing incentives and access to vital inputs.

At the national level, the oil palm projects scattered all over the rural forest areas of the Eastern, Western and Central Regions comprise a comprehensive scheme sponsored by the state in partnership with international finance capital. The chief financial bodies are the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the European Economic Fund and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. It is also supported by local branches of multinational corporations operating in Ghana. Its main objective is "to assist in meeting the growing demand for vegetable oil for home consumption and the local processing mills as part of the Operation Feed Your Industries programme". (13)

The Operation Feed Yourself (O.F.Y.) and the
Operation Feed Your Industries (O.F.I.) was a national campaign waged by the second military regime, the National Redemption Council (N.R.C.) (14), when it seized the reins of government in 1972. Its objectives were:

1. The production of enough food to feed and satisfy progressively high levels of the nutritional requirements of the population;
2. The production of enough raw materials for existing and contemplated agro-based industries;
3. The diversification of the products of the agricultural sector to contribute to the nation's export earnings; and
4. The creation of expanding opportunities for employment in both the agricultural sector and in agro-based industries. (15)

Other goals were 1. saving of foreign exchange through the non-importation of foreign foods and agricultural raw materials; 2. the improvement in the monetary incomes of the rural folk through the development of their internal markets, and 3. to effect an initial halt to the rural-urban drift. (16)

To achieve these aims, an open and urgent invitation was extended to public institutions, private individuals willing to invest in agriculture, and locally-based foreign multi-national corporations and international financial institutions to invest in large-scale capitalist farming. Special incentives were extended to individuals by way of government loans through state financial institutions, highly subsidized modern inputs and ready marketing opportunities. To the multinational corporations the
incentive package included,

- exemption from import duty on equipment
- a five-year tax holiday
- ready availability of import licences
- guaranteed immigrant quota and waiver of selective alien tax
- accelerated depreciation for capital expenditure
- land on lease basis at economic rents
- favourable dividend transfer arrangements. (17)

To all investors, government was to provide the necessary infrastructure and financial support in local currency, and was to make land available to be leased on easy terms. The response from willing capitalist investors (both multinational corporations and individual Ghanaians) was instantly encouraging. The only drawback was that the sudden upswing of demand for land seemed to have far outpaced supply. This was in spite of the fact that government was using a mixture of coercion and persuasion to pressure traditional authorities to make generous offers of communal lands to ensure the success of the programme. Available evidence shows that the immediate response by the traditional leaders, in leasing land for the O.F.Y. was quite substantial, yet apparently not enough to accommodate the flood of demand. (18)

This was especially problematic in southern Ghana where stool lands (communally owned lands controlled by chiefs) (19) are legally recognized. According to the S.M.C.,
In most of the southern half of Ghana acquisition of land for agricultural production poses serious problems. In the absence of adequate cadastral data and records, titles to land are often subjected to protracted litigation by contesting inheritors. Even where title to land is reasonably certain, landowners can be reluctant to lease their properties. Therefore, uncertainty of tenure has a negative influence on private investment in agricultural projects. Under the Lands Administration Act, 1962 (Act 123) and the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) the government is empowered to undertake compulsory acquisition of any land for development, so that the government can acquire land and then lease to individuals and institutions interested in implementing agricultural programmes. (20)

This is what happened in Twifo-Hemang. It is this policy of expropriation which explains the 1974-75 intervention of the state in land tenure and the penetration of state, private individual, corporate and international finance capital in agricultural production in Twifo-Hemang.

1.2 The Major Objective(s) of this Work

The main objective of this work is to analyse and evaluate the rural development project in Twifo-Hemang described above, sponsored by the State in partnership with international finance capital. By 'project' I mean both the appropriation of lands and the subsequent establishment of capitalist enterprises in the area. The analysis will be done on two levels. The main level is an examination of the immediate and long-term effects of the project on agrarian structure i.e. land tenure and class structures. The concept
agrarian structure is defined dynamically in this work, as changes in the relations of ownership, control and usufruct of land and in the social relations of production. At a second level, the project will be appraised in terms of its stated and implied objectives, based on the existing evidence in the area, at the time this research took place.

This approach deviates from the traditional economistic approach to the evaluation of development projects in order to address the social-structural outcomes. The concept of development in this perspective, is the positive socio-economic transformation in the forces and relations of production, involving 'somekind of structural and organizational transformation of the society'. (21) The essence of the analysis is that the evaluation of levels of rural development should go beyond its usual, largely descriptive dimensions summarized in the form of single statistical indicators (eg. per capita growth, productivity and income levels) which sometimes do not by themselves reflect social reality. It should incorporate critical analysis of the deep-seated structural changes in terms of how so-called rural development (especially capitalist agriculture) projects skew the relations of classes and strata to the means of production, and hence change their roles in the process of production. This is especially relevant in cases (such as this) of the large-scale intrusion of capital into the productive process in agrarian
societies. One should include within the total effects of development projects on intended beneficiaries, the indirect, social-structural effects as well as the more readily calculable economic effects.

The impact of capitalistic approaches to rural (agricultural) development involves not only changes in the national growth and per capita incomes of intended beneficiaries but also the alteration of the relations of production. Outcomes which are structurally located, and which may result in long-term economic, social and political inequalities are sometimes obscured by economic indicators which usually emphasise the '..positive or beneficial consequences of socio-economic development and do not allow for the occurrence of both negative and positive consequences'. (22)

In a historic speech delivered in 1973 at Nairobi, Kenya, to the Board of Governors of the World Bank, the President, R.S. McNamara called for 'a socially-oriented measurement of economic performance...', by which he meant 'a much more comprehensive way of looking at the allocation of resources'. That is, consideration of not only the total output of an investment but also how the benefits are distributed. He argued at length that,

While most countries have broadened the statements of their development goals to include references to reducing unemployment and increasing the income of the poor-as well as emphasizing traditional
growth in output—they still measure progress towards these complex objectives with a single measuring rod, the growth of G.N.P. ... The Gross National Product is an index of the total value of goods and services produced by an economy; it was never intended to be a measure of their distribution. (23)

Such economic measurements usually emphasise dimensions of overall national growth in productivity and incomes without depicting the locational dimensions of typical projects in relation to the local economy, polity and social structure. While the long-term, structural, indirect effects of capitalist agricultural projects are heavily concentrated on the local economy and polity, the direct effects may be expressed in national growth indexes which do not reflect their structural impact on the localities in which they are located.

It is a truism that statistical summaries of economic growth and incomes, when based on reliable data are useful for good evaluation of past economic performances and for future development planning. However, the reliability of statistical indexes as true reflections of social reality is sometimes questionable, especially in underdeveloped nation-states like Ghana, due to lag in statistical compilations and, even lack of reliable data. This is even more problematic in the case of rural areas.

Nor are there any strong reasons to doubt the possibility that such data as are available may be manipulated by the State to political advantage. The record
of the Operation Feed Yourself (O.F.Y.) and Operation Feed Your Industries (O.F.I.) programmes, of which the Twifo-Hemang rural development project forms a part, is a pertinent example. In the early years of the programme (1972-74) the overall growth rates recorded for all the major sectors of the economy were so impressive that 'to many observers the military rulers were on the way to reversing the (dismal) legacy of prior regimes...' and that '...Ghana was according to many, enroute to economic recovery'. (24) However in 1975 (and thereafter) there was such a sudden, unexpected, precipitous plunge in economic performance that, according to Chazan,

...perhaps the most reasonable explication of the mid-decade reversal may lie in the possibility that no such turnabout really took place; that the Acheampong government inflated the significance of temporary gains in the 1972-74 period; that real production was not reflected by statistics, and that in fact, the economy had not measurably improved since the ouster of Busia. (25)

I suggest that even if these figures were not deliberately manipulated for political reasons, they are a reflection of bureaucratic incompetence. This underscores the transitory and unreliable nature of such data both for evaluating the impact of development projects and for planning future development.

Therefore, partly for the reasons above, and partly because it was too early by the time this research was done, for actual measurement of the quantitative changes in
productivity and income levels, this work confines itself to evaluating the project in terms of its stated and implied objectives, and its impact on agrarian structure. Due to the same shortness of the life-span of the project at the time of the research, the analysis of outcomes will emphasise social-structural processes set in motion and their possible long-term implications, and not necessarily fully crystallized outcomes.

Social-structural inequalities long preceded the intervention by state and capital in the land tenure affairs and the productive process in Twifo-Hemang. Asymmetrical social relations of production emerged significantly with the formal incorporation of the national and local political economy into the world capitalist market in the colonial era. In order to appreciate the extent of the social-structural changes occurring as a result of the direct capitalist intervention, a knowledge of the structure of the colonial economy, social class structures and the level of the development of capitalism prior to this intervention are all necessary. Moreover, as will be shown later, the persistent conflict over ownership and control of land which warranted the state intervention in the post-colonial era, had its roots a century back in the history of Twifo-Hemang. By establishing the linkage between the two historically-specific periods, a sense of continuity in the processes of agrarian structural change will be achieved.
Hence, the processes of change as a result of the integration of the political economy of Twifo-Hemang into the world capitalist-dominated economy, are relevant to our understanding of the processes of change set into motion by the intervention of the State and Capital in the post-colonial period. The analysis of the colonial legacy (in Chapter 2) should therefore be viewed as part of the main thrust of this thesis.

In the following sections, I will introduce some of the major concepts which will be used in analysing the processes of change in agrarian structure in Twifo-Hemang, as a result of the penetration of capitalist plantation agriculture. Secondly, some of the major issues which will be addressed in the main body of this work will be briefly introduced, and I will introduce my theoretical position in each case. Finally, in accordance with the main objective of this work, I will briefly outline the main direction of my approach to the analysis of structural change in Twifo-Hemang.
1.3 Agrarian Transition or the Process of Proletarianization

Concepts used in describing and analysing the transformation of agrarian structures as a result of the process of the capitalization of agriculture in rural societies have their roots in the classic historical experience of England in its advancement from a feudal agrarian economy to a capitalist industrial economy. Later developments on the European continent and elsewhere have been studied and examined using the English example as a starting point or a point of departure.

Historians and other social analysts have not totally come to agree on the specific details of the mechanisms which ushered in the Industrial Revolution. Certain processes in the European countryside which effected structural changes and which led, in turn, to the full development of capitalist relations in agriculture, have dominated the literature. First, there was the enclosure movement by the economically and politically powerful landed aristocracy, involving the transformation of hitherto open fields into large private property in land. Second, there was the expulsion of large numbers of peasants from these lands and the renting of these lands to capitalist farmers willing to invest in agriculture. Third, there was the concentration and consolidation of farms with the use of machinery and the adoption of other improved methods of
cultivation which led to higher productivity with fewer farmhands than hitherto, hence further contributing to the release of labour from the land for industry.

Fourth, by the time of the First World War and the Great Depression, competition in the market caused by the increasing importation of cheaper agricultural commodities, and the extension of the area under cultivation, resulted in a glut in output and stock and hence a fall in prices. This in part, caused the landlords, whose incomes had drastically reduced, to sell their estates to the capitalist farmers and shift largely into trade and finance. Thus the social component of agrarian structure became further simplified; changing from a triple structure of a landlord class whose incomes mainly came from rent; a capitalist farmer class which operated in the productive process for profit; and a rural proletariat which depended on wages for survival, to a dual class structure in which capital directly confronted labour.

Finally, and more importantly, the ability of the expanding industrial sector to absorb the extra hands expropriated from the land, led to a serious shortage of labour in the agricultural sector. This contributed to improvements in the wage levels and standards of living of the agricultural proletariat, and to the general expansion of the home market for industrial capital and consumer commodities. (26)
The concept of agrarian transition refers to the transformation of agrarian structure which characterized this historical advancement of England from feudal relations of production to capitalist relations of production. Goodman and Redclift have defined it as '...the process through which a predominately peasant agriculture is characterized by a large rural proletariat'. (27) Firstly, it involved the complex historical and dialectical processes which led to the expropriation of former peasant producers (working on lands belonging to the great feudal landed aristocracy as tenants, mainly paying rent in kind to their lords) and their replacement by capitalist farmers. Secondly, it is a process of internal class differentiation of pre-capitalist agriculture into rural wage-workers (made up of displaced peasants) and capitalist farmers. In this situation both land and labour power become commodities exchanged for money and wages in the market. It is this change from pre-capitalist forms and relations of production to free wage-labour that characterizes this form of production as truly capitalist.

In recent literature, addressing this process of rural structural transformation in the wake of the intrusion of capitalist agriculture into a predominantly peasant society, the concept of the process of proletarianization is substituted for agrarian transition. For example, according to Bryceson,
The term proletarianization refers to the producers' complete separation from the means of production which they could use for their material and social reproduction. Dispossessed, the producers are compelled to exchange their labor power to the capitalist class for wages. In other words, labour power becomes a commodity. (28)

Hence, for the purpose of the objective of this study, the analysis of the state 'nationalization' of a greater part of the Twifo-Hemang lands, followed by the penetration of capital in the productive process, must address its impact on land tenure; exploring the changing relations in the ownership, and control of land. It must also analyze its impact on the social components of agrarian structure: the process of social differentiation and class structuralization.

It is true that the historical experiences of the developing societies, especially the new nation-states recently emerging from colonial rule, differ very considerably from those of the developed, industrialized nations. However, models and concepts derived from the processes of social change in these societies can provide relevant departure points for unravelling the levels of structural change and development in societies such as Ghana. Moreover, they can provide a good medium for systematic comparative analyses of their different historical experiences. As Roxborough rightly pointed
out, such models and related concepts provide good starting points.

...for a comprehensive theory of social change which will be able to embrace the process of transformation both at the original centre and in the new societies of the periphery. (29)

However, in light of the vast cultural and historical differences such models should be used cautiously and with serious modifications. This calls for the study of specific concrete, historical situations in order to identify national and regional differences. This study is one example.

The classic English example of the process of social-structural change in the countryside as a result of the development of capitalism in agriculture, did not happen overnight. Indeed, the foundations had been laid well over two centuries previously, and the realization of the domination of capitalist relations of production actually extended into the twentieth century. (30) The vital elimination of the peasantry in Britain, actually exhibited regional differences with 'certain areas of Ireland and Scotland lagging behind England'. (31) In his comparative analysis of capitalist development of agriculture in Prussian-Germany and America, Lenin observed that '...the development of the productive forces of German agriculture proceeded very much more slowly than in America'. (32) According to Kemp, whilst the agrarian
population in England reduced dramatically 'a large peasantry survived in the European industrial countries until the Second World War'. (33)

Indeed, Goodman and Redclift have recently called attention to the persistence of relations of production reminiscent of pre-capitalist forms of production in Europe. Examples cited include small-size peasant farms exploiting family labour and the continuing struggles of direct producers to seek a favourable balance between production for subsistence and for exchange on the market. (34) It has been observed that the agricultural policies of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) are aimed primarily at the speedy elimination of the peasantry whose tenacity as 'a class of survivors' (35) is considered as 'an anomaly in a modern capitalist world'. (36)

For the purposes of this study, these findings serve as a reminder that even though the capitalization of agriculture may considerably affect agrarian structure, it is reasonable to expect a 'long' and uncertain period of 'transition'. Within this period, due to the slowness of the development of capitalist relations, a capitalist sector may coexist with a peasant sector in the rural economy, as I found in the Twifo-Hemang area. Second, the principle of uneven development of the forces of production even within the borders of a single nation-state such as Ghana, may result in significant
regional and local differences, which can be concealed by unqualified generalizations on the national level. Hence there is the need to carry out in-depth local micro studies such as this one, in order to comprehend these important regional differences.

1.4 Some Contentious Issues on Capitalism and Agrarian Change.

Two important interrelated issues, arising from the classic English agrarian transition model, which have been the subject of scholarly debates, need to be briefly examined at this juncture. This is mainly because they have important methodological and conceptual significance in this work. First, what was the source of structural change from feudal relations of production to capitalist relations of production and were external or internal factors responsible for this change? Second, as an offshoot of the first issue, what really constitutes capitalism in agriculture?

The first issue involved two opposing schools of thought. 1. Those who argue that it was the internal contradictions within the productive process; precisely the over-exploitation of the peasants by their landlords, which was the principal factor in the structural transformation process from feudal relations to capitalist relations of production. (37) 2. The second school,
noting the 'inherently conservative and change-resisting' nature of the feudal form of production, identifies external trade and the development of towns as the principal factors of change. (38) In the heated debate over the two positions (39) however, even the original opponents have agreed that both external and internal factors were responsible, though they disagree on which was more important than the other. (40) The debate has remained unresolved among current scholars of the neo-Marxist persuasion, striving to explain the mechanisms of social change and the sources of underdevelopment in post-colonial developing societies. The question remains unanswered why these nation-states have had their advancement to capitalism virtually 'blocked', producing an 'inverted' form of capitalism which some have dubbed 'peripheral capitalism?' (41) and others have described as 'hybrid structures, part tending to behave as a capitalistic system, part perpetuating the features of the previously existing system'? (42) The explanation, according to those called 'Circulationists', is to be found in the incorporation of these societies into the world capitalist market, and the unequal terms of trade, between the 'core' (the highly industrialized countries of the West) and the periphery (the underdeveloped countries). From the 'Productionist' point of view however, the explanation should be sought from the
articulation of pre-capitalist modes of production with a
dominant capitalist mode of production, and the
contradiction in the productive process, emanating from
their co-existence on unequal terms. (43)

It is the position taken here that in order to
effectively analyse the levels of development and the
processes of structural change in post-colonial societies,
it is essential to take both external and internal factors
into consideration. Indeed it is also important that the
changes must be traced in their historical dimensions.
This study will show that there is a linkage between 1.
the imposition of colonial rule in Ghana and her
incomplete incorporation into the world capitalist system,
and 2. changes in the political economy of Twifo-Hemang
from subsistence production to its combination with
production of commodities for the external international
and national capitalist market. The latter in turn are
related to the changes in the relations of various groups
to the means of production and class differentiation.

This work will further show that the processes of
structural change in the post-colonial era in Twifo-Hemang
have important linkages with the processes of change in
the colonial period. This is particularly manifested in
the relations to, and conflict over the ownership and
control of the means of production. Finally, it will also
be shown that there are significant connections between
both externally-induced and internally-generated constraints in the post-colonial economy, and state intervention in land tenure and the penetration of capital in the process of production in Twifo-Hemang. Hence the immediate and long-term changes in agrarian structure (i.e. changes in the relations to the means of production, changing roles of different social groups in the productive process, class differentiation and socio-political conflict) will be explained in terms of the historical interplay between external and internal forces of change.

The second issue to be addressed is the question of what constitutes capitalism in agriculture, which as was noted, is an off-shoot of the first issue. In the original debate on the classic European model, those who argued in favour of internal forces, maintained that the emergence of free wage labour in the organization of agricultural production, without any vestiges of pre-capitalist relations of production, defines the form of production as truly capitalist. On the other hand, those who argued in terms of external factors, stress that production for the market or market relations defines the form of production as capitalist.

There is always a temptation for students of underdevelopment to uncritically transpose the European historical experience to the culturally and historically
unique situation of new post-colonial nation-states like Ghana. A pertinent example is that some social analysts insist that capitalist relations of exploitation cannot be said to exist, even in concrete social situations where capitalist commodity production coexists and interacts interdependently with peasant simple commodity production. (44) The logic of the peasant form of simple commodity production is the combination of the production of use values for subsistence and production of exchange values as commodities for exchange in the capitalist market. In the organization of production it combines the use of family labour with the exploitation of 'wage' labour; even including, as will be shown in Twifo-Hemang, pre-capitalist relations of production, chiefly landlord-tenant relations. Capitalist commodity production, on the other hand, focusses only on the production of commodities for the realization of surplus value and profit, and the reinvestment of profit into the expanding cycle of production. (45) It involves the systematic development of productivity and the increased realization of surplus value.

There are students of underdevelopment in the Third World who cling hopefully to the imminent repetition of the process of agrarian structural transformation which allegedly took place in the English countryside during the Industrial Revolution. (46) They expect peasant forms of
simple commodity production and other non-capitalist relations of production to be completely eliminated. In their place there must emerge, a landless wage-earning class, dispossessed of its ownership, control and usufructual right to land (the most vital means of production) whose only means of survival is sale of its labour power for wages to the capitalist owners and controllers of the means of production. What they expect then, is the emergence of a much more simplified agrarian structure in which the rural capitalist farmer class confronts the rural proletarian class in the productive process; rather than a complex mixture of pre-capitalist and capitalist class structures and social relations. In spite of the fact that, even in Europe, vestiges of precapitalist forms of production and social relations still exist in the rural countryside, such persons expect a complete agrarian transition or process of proletarianization before being convinced that capitalist relations of production are dominant.

On the contrary, I argue, as Goodman and Redclift have done, that capitalist relations of production are 'not mediated only through wage labour relations following the creation of a free labour market'. (47) It is possible to speak of capitalist relations of exploitation, in a situation in which peasant simple commodity production is subsumed under conditions where the capitalist system is
paramount. (48) According to Roşberry, the economic term *subsumption, ...signifies the subordination of some forms of economic activity in the economic system to principles determining the functioning of the whole system*. (49) In order to grapple with the problem therefore, a distinction should be made between the *formal subsumption of labour* in the peasant sector to capital valorization (i.e. creating surplus value for capital to appropriate under relations of production which may not necessarily be based on free wage labour); and the *real subsumption of labour to capital* (i.e. the direct employment of 'free' wage labour within the capitalist enterprise).

In the formal subsumption of peasant labour under capital it may not be necessary to completely expropriate peasant producers from their means of production. The peasant production unit may continue to exist, yet capital can dominate agricultural production by increasingly controlling the conditions of the reproduction of the peasantry. Commodity production can then become an economic necessity without which *simple reproduction* is impossible. In this work, the concept of simple reproduction refers to the measures taken by the peasant simple commodity producers, in the wake of the penetration of capital into the rural economy, to ensure their continued survival. According to Klein, this involves the ability of the society to reproduce itself i.e. for the
direct producers to reproduce their labour power and their mode of production. 'In other words, for a social order to survive, the producers, the means of production, and the relations of production must be reproduced'. (50)

First, the concept allows us to conceptualise and analyse the mechanisms through which peasant family production units are able to survive the penetration of capital. Second, it enables us to unravel how their needs of simple reproduction are satisfied under the changing material conditions. (51) Third, it gives us an insight into the dynamic aspects of the on-going process of agrarian structural change in a concrete form. Last, it demonstrates the interrelatedness and interdependence of relations, including contradictions, between 'different forms of production, which otherwise look isolated to the uncritical observer'. (52)

The pressures towards the willy-nilly involvement of the peasantry in commodity relations, in order to ensure their continued simple reproduction can occur through: - the expansion of money and market relations; the control of the supply and marketing of commodities and credit institutions by the state and capital; the intervention of the state in land tenure, distribution of resources, rigid price controls, increasing taxation and other demands. Such pressures may lead to the subjection of peasant production to the requirements of capital
through the intensification of labour for the production of raw materials and food for both the local and international markets.

In such a situation, the relations of production within the peasant production unit may not necessarily be truly capitalist. However the relations between capital and peasantry become capitalist relations of exploitation, 'adhering to the laws of motion governing the functioning of the capitalist system as a whole'. (53) Changes in the peasant form of production may increasingly be determined by the laws governing the dominant capitalist system. For example, production for subsistence may increasingly give way to production for profit and its reinvestment in the cycle of production. There may be less dependence on family labour and sharecroppers and more reliance on wage labour.

The use of wage labour in capitalist agricultural enterprises within the agrarian sector may not necessarily presuppose the existence of only a landless proletariat. Wage employment, as Williams correctly argued, may be 'integrated into peasant production'. (54) Economic and social pressures such as those enumerated above, including the intervention in traditional land tenure institutions and the productive process by the state and capital may lead to demographic pressures on land resources. These may negatively affect incomes and thus make the occasional
selling of labour power for wages a dire necessity, even for landholding peasants.

There may also be situations in which some members of the family production unit may be permanently engaged in agricultural wage labour, whilst the rest take care of the family enterprise in order to ensure the continued reproduction of the family. Some peasants still possessing rights to parcels of land may yet 'oscillate between those adaptations', (55) engaging in wage labour in the capitalist agricultural enterprises and getting involved at the same time or at different times in various forms of tenancy and contract labour arrangements in the peasant sector. They can do these whilst working in peak farming seasons on their own enterprises. These possibilities only go to reinforce the complexity and variability of agrarian class configurations, and the incompleteness and instability of rural class formation in developing societies such as Ghana. (56)

The distinction between formal and real subsumption of labour to capital is therefore crucial to our understanding of the mechanisms through which peasants ensure the simple reproduction of themselves as a class when confronted by capital in their own backyard. It also affords an insight into the mechanisms through which capital extracts peasants' surplus labor without necessarily expropriating them completely from their means
of production. Both formal and real subsumption of labour under capital can co-exist in the process of the penetration of capital into agriculture. Both imply capitalist relations of exploitation i.e. the extraction of surplus labour as surplus value or as surplus product. (57)

According to Marx,

The form based on absolute surplus-value is what I call the formal subsumption of labour under capital... If the production of absolute surplus-value was the material expression of the formal subsumption of labour under capital, then the production of relative surplus-value may be viewed as its real subsumption. (58)

In the case of the formal subsumption of the labour of peasant producers under capital, pressures exerted on the producers as a result of the increasing demands of the State and Capital are met by the more intensive use of labour without any significant improvement in the technological basis of production or the relations of production. It is done either through the extension of the working day, or the intensification of family labour to increase the surplus, or both. In some cases, however, this is supplemented occasionally by engaging hired labour in addition to family labour. This struggle to achieve greater surplus in order to meet the increasing demands of the State and Capital may also involve a reduction (voluntarily or involuntarily) of the living standard of the producers. This type of surplus
extraction is called **absolute surplus value**.

This differs from **relative surplus value** under the real subsumption of wage labour (both free and unfree) to capital when capital itself invests in agriculture. In this case, increased labour productivity is achieved through qualitative changes and innovation in the technological basis of the productive process. In this situation as Brenner aptly put it,

> A given labour force achieves an increase in labour productivity when it can produce the means of production and means of subsistence which make possible its own reproduction (continued existence) in less time than previously (working at the same intensity); or when given the same amount of time worked as before, it produces a larger surplus of subsistence necessary to reproduce itself previously. (59)

Further increases in relative surplus value can be ensured, when the capitalist ploughs back his surplus into production, especially in modern technology, thus achieving an extended reproduction of his invested capital.

The distinction between absolute surplus value (under the formal subsumption of peasant labour to capital) and relative surplus value (under the real subsumption of wage labour to capital) is pertinent to this study of post-colonial Twifo-Hemang. Here large-scale, mechanised, capitalist plantation agriculture (ie. capitalist commodity production) coexists with
peasant, simple commodity production. With this conceptual distinction it becomes possible for instance, to conceptualise the land-holding individual peasant, producing commodities on his own allotment and creating absolute surplus value extracted by the State and Capital; while supplementing his income as a wage labourer on the capitalist enterprise, thus creating relative surplus value appropriated by capital.

1.5 Paths to the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture

The next task in this section is to review classical Marxist literature on the different routes to the process of proletarianization in agriculture, in order to make comparative assessments of the findings from Twifo-Hemang. More importantly, it will help to draw inferences from current trends, about future directions of agrarian structural change in Twifo-Hemang.

(i) Marx and Engels on the English Route (60)

However skeptical Marx and Engels were of the social and political consequences of the capitalist system, their in-depth study of the classical English agrarian transition model convinced them of the progressive role of capitalism as far as the development
of the forces of production goes. In agriculture, they believed in the superiority of large-scale mechanized agriculture, and hoped that elsewhere, it would lead eventually to the breakdown of all pre-capitalist relations of production. They expected it to raise the material basis of the forces of production and usher in generalized commodity production, which,

...strictly defined, requires that labour power and the means of production be separated and circulate as commodities. The means of production are under the effective control of the capitalist, who acquires them in the market, and are combined in the productive process with free wage labour. (61)

According to this formulation, the penetration of capitalist forms of production into the peasant-dominated rural economy, will seriously undermine the so-called self-sufficiency of the peasantry. Also the combined effects of capitalist competition, the extension of money and market relations, increasing taxation, rent and interest will plunge the peasantries deeply into indebtedness. Eventually, this will lead to their massive exodus from the countryside to join the ranks of the industrial proletariat in the urban setting. The peasant is thus considered as a transient social category "doomed" to disappear before the onslaught of capitalism and reappear as a proletarian (rural and urban) class. (62)

The end result, as was the case in rural feudal England,
will be a simplified agrarian class structure, comprising a capitalist farmer class operating in the pursuit of profit in the productive process. This class will then be opposed by a class of rural proletarians, completely separated from the means of production (land) and obliged to survive only by selling their labour power to the capitalists for wages.

While certain details about trends in Ghana in general, and in Twifo-Hemang in particular, seem to tally with what happened in feudal England, it would be too hasty to conclude from available data that the complete elimination of the peasantry is imminent. As de Janvry has correctly observed, this path is of 'limited historical importance' for the new nation-states of the Third World'. (63) Empirical evidence from various studies has increasingly noted that the penetration of capitalism into agriculture has indeed undermined the so-called self-sufficiency of the peasantries and further impoverished them. (64) It has been observed that the general trend is towards partly creating a landless proletariat and partly creating a semi-proletarianized peasantry, which combines working on its own farms with occasionally selling its labour power to capital or even to fellow, better-off peasants. That is why Colin Leys in his study of Kenya suggests that in some cases it will make more sense to talk of 'the peasantization of wage
employment'. (65) Stavenhagen in his study of Mexico, observed a process of depeasantization (i.e., the systematic creation of a peasantry which cannot reproduce itself any longer by exclusive dependence on cultivating its own land) rather than a process of proletarianization. (66)

Generally then, the growing consensus is that the new forms of capitalist penetration in the underdeveloped societies do not necessarily imply a complete separation of the peasant direct producers from their means of production but rather a subordination of their labour to capital valorization. (67) In situations like this, the social component of agrarian structure in the phase of the penetration of capital will naturally exhibit an incompleteness in the process of class formation, and a complex, highly variable class configuration. This is what to expect in a social context in which a rapidly growing capitalist sector coexists, albeit on contradictory terms, with a deteriorating but tenacious peasant simple commodity producing sector.

(ii) Lenin on the American and Prussian Paths.

Lenin did not depart from the classical Marxist premise of the ability of capitalism, through the use of modern technology and the concentration of the means of production, to raise the level of development of the forces of production; to increase productivity and cheapen
prices and thereby outcompete and eliminate the peasantry. According to Lenin, this leads to the breakdown of precapitalist relations of production and the formation of a 'peasant bourgeoisie' (68) and a rural proletariat class. (69)

However, in his study of the development of capitalist agriculture in pre-revolutionary Russia, he distinguished between two paths - the American (or Farmer) path and the Prussian (or Junker) path. The American path is characterized by the absence of landlord-tenant relations, but rather the free access to land and its development by a large number of direct producers. Differential entrepreneurial abilities may however lead to their internal differentiation into rich and poor peasants, leading in the long run to the formation of a rich peasant or kulak class, and a rural proletariat class. In this model, the development of the forces of production is considered to be much quicker, since there are no pre-capitalist relations of production to act as a brake in the process.

The second path, which was more akin to what was happening in pre-revolutionary Russia, is the Prussian way. It does not involve the dramatic large-scale expropriation of the peasantry from the countryside as was the case in England. Rather big landlords operating in the process of production with tenant-peasants, gradually
increased their control over their estates by slowly transforming their estates into large-scale capitalist farms, and themselves into a capitalist class. The tenanted-peasants were then turned first into semi-proletarians and finally into rural proletarians.

Such a slow transformation of agrarian structure would naturally involve a long interim period in which the process of depeasanting the majority of the direct producers and the transformation of landlords into capitalist farmers could take place. (70) According to Lenin, this way presupposes the long-term preservation of pre-capitalist relations of production and creates,

...the peculiar form in which the feudal and capitalist features of agriculture... are interwoven. The principal and fundamental obstacles to the development of the productive forces in agriculture are the survivals of serfdom i.e. primarily the labour rent system and bondage, then come the serf dues, the state of inequality of the peasantry before the law, their degradation in relation to the higher social classes etc. etc. (71)

Although there is no feudal system in Ghana, the structure of the Russian rural economy as described above (i.e. the coexistence of peasant and capitalist sectors in agriculture), the 'control' of community-owned lands by traditional authorities and the co-existence of both capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production are relevant to our study of Twifo-Hemang. The direct intervention by the State in the traditional land tenure
affairs, including the compulsory acquisition of vast tracts of lands, and the penetration of state and private capital in the productive process, might hasten the process of depeasantizing at the initial stages. However, the preservation of the peasant production sector, even at a disadvantaged position, may mean that the elimination of the peasantry as a class is not imminent.

1.6 Method of Analysis

It was stated above that the main objective of this work is to analyse the immediate and long term impact on agrarian structure of the penetration of capitalist agriculture into the political economy of Twifo-Hemang. Ultimately, this will involve an examination of the stage of development of capitalist relations of production, and how the social component of agrarian structure (ie class structures) have evolved over time. Based upon this, the analysis will assess the long-term prospects vis-a-vis the process of proletarianization, given existing trends. The method of approach for identifying the sources and course of agrarian structural change in Twifo-Hemang will be class analysis.

In this work, the collective term class will partly be defined in terms of the relations of various groups to the means of production. In the agrarian
context of Twifo-Hemang, access to land (the principal means of production) will be the focal point. One task in this regard then, is to examine the changing relations of various groups in the society to land as a result of the intervention of the State in traditional land tenure. Following Jones, the dynamics of these relations will be regarded as social relations of production and will be analysed sociologically 'in terms of determinate interaction of the relations of title, control and possession' of land. (72) In other words, analysis will focus on the changing relations of ownership, control and possessory or usufructual rights to land. The crucial variable however, is the control of the means of production, which involves not only the power to distribute land to particular uses, but also, '...refers to the more or less absolute power to dispose of the means of production within the relevant confines imposed by other relations of ownership'. (73) Changes in the control of the means of production are crucial, mainly because they are linked directly or indirectly to the power of control over the labour process, and therefore involve asymmetrical power relations. In this sense class relations are fundamentally relations of power and therefore political in nature.

To define class in part as the relations of different groups to the means of production, is to imply
that class relations are central to the changing roles played by these groups in the process of production as a result of the penetration of capital in agriculture. That is to say, the relations of ownership, control and usage of land are linked with the possession of common and opposed relations of different groups in the productive process, which enables some to appropriate that which is produced by others.

This brings us to the second part of the definition of class in this work. In accordance with Samoff's argument that classes are better defined in their conflict with one another, and hence 'relations of production alone are insufficient to categorize them';(74) class relations will be examined in terms of the opposition of various groups to one another in their relations to the means of production and in their roles in the process of production. This will involve analysis of how groups with common relations to the means of production, playing common roles in the process of production, either unilaterally or in alliance with other groups, come to exhibit common social and political action against other opposing groups. The basis of these social conflicts will be the questioning of the legitimacy of the encroachment by state and capital on land, the changing mode of control and allocation of vital resources and power in the society, and the changing conditions of
labour in the productive process.

Thus in this work, class formation in Twifo-Hemang will be considered not only as a structural phenomenon, but more as a dynamic process to be treated within a dialectical framework, since as Roxborough has correctly observed, 'classes are formed in a continual process of conflict and accommodation'. (75) Although in Twifo-Hemang many forms of social and political conflicts have manifested themselves since the state and capitalist intervention in the political economy, two forms of conflict stand out prominently, and analysis will be mainly focussed on them.

The major forms of conflict, which have been the cause of bitter political tension and confrontation, are (a) the struggle over the ownership and control of land and (b) competition among various groups over its allocation and usage. The second form of conflict has to do with the conditions of labour in the productive process. This form of conflict is less pronounced than the conflict over the ownership and control of the means of production and it is more intensive within the peasant sector than in the capitalist sector. One reason for this, is the long historical existence of the peasant sector (since the colonial era), and the relatively short existence of the capitalist sector (since the mid-1970s). However, existing evidence on contradictions and some
forms of open conflict emerging from the organization and conditions of labour in the capitalist sector suggest potential sources of more serious conflicts between capital and labour in the near future.

Since, admittedly, not all conflicts are class-based, it is natural in these circumstances for some other lines of conflict to emerge. It is necessary therefore to identify the issues behind such conflicts, and to understand each, 'within its own context and in terms of the larger structure'. In Twifo-Hemang, several forms of social and political conflicts have manifested themselves. In order to identify the bases of such actions and to offer tangible explanations of such behaviour, certain questions are to be addressed in each case. For example, what was the issue at stake? Who were involved? Who were the leaders and organizers of the act? What was the outcome and whom did it benefit? It is hoped that by directing the inquiries in this way, proper and fitting explanations may be found for particular forms of response to the contentious public issues.

1.7 Data Collection Techniques

This is an in-depth study of the Twifo and Hemang traditional areas; both sub-districts under the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira district administration in the
Central Region of Ghana. The population of the whole district, according to the 1970 national census was 32,000, (Fig.1). Ecologically, the area forms part of the moist, semi-deciduous forest area of southern Ghana, in the cocoa belt. Historically, the area's economy has evolved from a pre-colonial era of mainly subsistence agriculture and long distance trade, through a colonial era when the direct producers were incorporated into the world, capitalist-dominated market as peasants producing cocoa for export. Since the early 1970s however, the dominant position of cocoa in the local economy has tended to be surpassed by the penetration of large-scale, capitalist oil palm plantations. The area now juxtaposes traditional (partly subsistence, but increasingly marketable) food crop farming, peasant cash crop plantations (chiefly cocoa and oil palm) and increasingly large-scale oil palm plantations.

The field work, carried out between September, 1982 and June, 1983, was divided into three stages, although it is important to remind readers that these overlapped in time.

Stage 1: Familiarization Tours, Unstructured Interviews, Participant Observation and Open discussions. (September - November, 1982)

This included open-ended interviewing of, and discussions with (a) chiefs, traditional elders, and other
major land owners; (b) Officials of the Twifo and Hemang traditional councils; the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira District Administration; and the Lands Department; (c) management of major state and private plantations etc. I also did extensive participant observation by getting involved in communal labour organized at weekends by the Peoples' Defence Committees, in cooperation with the Town Development Committees of Hemang (township), Twifo-Mampong and Twifo-Praso. I also attended meetings of the Twifo and Hemang traditional councils, hence getting some insight into the workings of the traditional political system and the cultures of the people. I frequently visited both state and private plantations, and a number of smaller farms in scattered farm settlements and held important discussions. Topics discussed included the history (oral traditional) of settlement, land acquisition and land conflicts; the general principles of land tenure and the organization of production, and the changes these have undergone. Discussions also touched on the causes, course and implication of the state's seizure of lands in the area and the intrusion of capital into the economy. The problems and prospects these development held for the area were also discussed.

I was struck by the general feeling of insecurity and the tense political atmosphere due to the conflict over the ownership, control and allocation of land in the
area. I realised that due to the active role played by
the urban-based government officials in the acquisition
exercise, and in the control and allocation of land to
other urban-based technocrats, businessmen and military
officers, all 'stangers' were considered with suspicion.
There was also distrust and mutual suspicion between
traditional leaders and between them and individual
landowners affected by the acquisition exercise.

Thus, there was on the one hand, a large measure
of openness and frankness when it came to discussing such
issues as the history of the people, the general
principles of land tenure and traditional economic and
political organization. On the other hand, due to the
sensitive and contentious nature of matters relating to
land, there was evidence of subjective and cautious
responses at the initial stages. However, by presenting
my letters of introduction from my supervisor and the
graduate school of McMaster University, and convincing
respondents that I was not there for the purpose of
collecting information for government officials or their
opponents in land disputes, I was able to gradually win
their confidence and to establish rapport.

I made no effort to claim neutrality on general
principles of the issues involved. I was frank in my
responses to questions from respondents relating to issues
on which I felt competent to offer an opinion. I stressed
from the onset however, that for the purpose of understanding the intricacies of the issues and problems in order to make any meaningful assessment in my study, I was interested in all kinds of data and hence it was necessary to obtain information from all sides of the conflict. This was accepted by the respondents.

Frequent cross-checking of information gathered however, revealed some attempts by some key respondents to twist historical and contemporary facts in their favour and the existence of some gaps in information obtained. The preliminary fieldwork exercise however pointed to the existence of large amounts of documentation due to the long historical roots of the land conflict, and the involvement of both the colonial and post-colonial administrations and courts in the matter. I therefore decided to embark on a search for historical-documentary materials hoping these would help fill some of the gaps, correct some of the anomalies, and help prepare my questionnaire for the third stage.

Stage 2: Collection of Historical-Documentary, and Secondary Source Material (Begun November, 1982)

Although a greater proportion of this information was collected between November and December 1982, this exercise actually continued to the end of the research
period, (Sept. 1983). The sources included (i) Archival materials from the Regional branch of the National Archives in Cape Coast, on the history of the land conflict; (ii) Official records (files) from the Regional and National Lands Department, the Regional Lands Commission, the Central Regional Development Corporation, and the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, mainly on official policy guidelines, protest notes, memoranda and other problems relating to the compulsory acquisition exercise and the penetration of capitalist agriculture in Twifo-Hemang.

Although on the whole, officials cooperated with me by allowing access to non-controversial information, it was not possible to get access to precise statistical data relating to actual details of the numbers of people who lost their lands as a result of the acquisition exercise, or the actual fiscal details on the compensation paid to and owed those who were expropriated; or the numbers of people who benefited from official allocation of land after the acquisition. This was because many top officials had got entangled in accusations of complicity and corruption in the implementaion of the exercise, and also because of the non-cooperative reaction of the people of Twifo-Hemang. Official records on these issues were, in fact, incomplete and disorganized. I managed, in some cases to rely on newspaper and official public reports to
gather some information.

Other sources of information included (iii) court procedures and decisions on major land disputes from the High Court, Cape Coast, the Court of Appeal, Accra and the Ghana Law Review. (iv) Official publications of legal instruments and decrees relating to land law and the 'Hemang Land Acquisition', and reports of public inquiries published by the Ghana Publishing Corporation. (v) Newspaper reports particular to the Twifo-Hemang land conflict and problems related to land tenure in Ghana, were also consulted. (vi) Last, secondary sources, especially publications by Ghanaian authorities on land tenure, land law, agricultural policies and economic history were of immense help.

Stage 3: Questionnaire Interviews (January-May, 1983)

Considering the enormous amount of qualitative data gathered from official and historical documents, formal and informal interviews and discussions and through the ethnographic method, there should have been no need for questionnaire interviews. However, if there was one weakness of the data already collected, it was the lack of quantitative data. I decided to carry out the questionnaire interview in order to get further insight
into the demographic characteristics, and the social structure and production relations. The initial problem I faced was the question of how to select a representative sample from this large area, with a population estimated to be over 20,000 (32,000 including Denkyira), with numerous small settlements dotted along 20 miles of the only 'highway' in the area, and hundreds of scattered farm settlements. Moreover, lack of adequate, up-to-date official statistical, census data and other secondary sources of population data were also serious constraints.

To solve this problem, I decided to choose three settlements (Hemang-town, Twifo-Mampong and Twifu-Ntaferewaso), straddling the boundary between Hemang and Twifo. First because of their central location, and hence their near representativeness of the two communities, and second, because these nucleated settlements have a relatively 'cosmopolitan' character in terms of occupation, ethnic and sexual representativeness. Third, since most of the capitalist enterprises are located in this area, a fair representation of the main forms of agricultural production was possible. Last, because of the nation-wide reactivation of communal self-help labour organization under the new military regime, the Provisional National Defence Council (P.N.D.C.), it was possible to obtain an up-to-date communal labour participation register from the People's Defence
committees and the Village Development Committees. With the consent of the leadership, I made a random selection of 90 respondents, representing about 10% of the registered citizens as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.8: Sample Respondents (in absolute numbers and Percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemang (township)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twifo-Mampong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twifo-Ntaferewaso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.9 summarizes the main demographic characteristics of the respondents. It shows a fair representation of ethnic and sex distribution. The high representation of married persons, which combined with those divorced or separated tops 90% of the respondents, reflects the organization of agricultural production by the use of family labour. The high proportion of uneducated persons, which combined with the proportion of drop-outs at the elementary school level represents over 76% of the respondents, depicts the attraction of farming and rural life to the uneducated. The better educated are attracted to the urban areas, and prefer employment in
Table 1.9: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distributional Categories</th>
<th>Absolute Numbers</th>
<th>Percentage Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=90</td>
<td>%=100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Indigenes</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 'Strangers'</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Male</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Female</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Married</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Divorced/Widowed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Single</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Educational Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) No formal schooling</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Below Middle School Leaving Certificate (MSLC)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) M.S.L.C.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Above M.S.L.C.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Age (Years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) 15 - 19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 20 - 29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 30 - 39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 40 +</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
industry, public service, and in the commercial and service sectors.

Table 1.10 showing respondents' relationship to land and farming depicts the characteristics of a typical agrarian economy. By 1983, over 80% were operating in agricultural production in different roles, either as direct producers or employers of labour or both. The data on occupational categories shows a very high percentage of persons (75%) engaged only in farming or combining farming with other occupations. It is also interesting to note that a moderately high percentage of respondents (42.1%) operate on rented land, while a similar proportion (48.7%) operate on family or inherited land. Only a tiny proportion (6%) bought their land outright. Hence the majority are small-holding peasants and sharecroppers; not rich peasants. This is confirmed by the data on sizes of farms, which show that over 70% had farms of up to 5 acres in size and about 90% had farms of up to 10 acres in size. These characteristics of agrarian structure will be confirmed by the analysis in the main body of this work.

Apart from inquiring into the personal characteristics of respondents, the questionnaire, comprising a combination of open-ended and structured questions, dealt mainly with (i) Cultural details on the institutions of chiefship, kinship, land tenure and other traditional economic institutions and the changes they
Table 1.10: Respondents Relationship to Land (1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distributional Categories</th>
<th>Absolute Numbers</th>
<th>Percentage Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Whether operating farm in any way?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Yes</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) No</td>
<td>15 (N=90)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How acquired land?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Bought outright</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Rent/Sharecropping</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Family land allocation</td>
<td>15 (N=75)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Inherited land</td>
<td>22 (N=75)</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Size of farm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) 0-5 Acres</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 6-10 Acres</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 11-15 Acres</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 15+ Acres</td>
<td>2 (N=75)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Occupational Categories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Agriculture Related</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Farming alone or combined)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Domestic Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Housewife)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Public Service/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Unemployed</td>
<td>3 (N=90)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
have undergone over time; (ii) personal opinions on the causes and course of the existing conflict, the effects of the state and capitalist intervention and the rural development project; and (iii) Relations of production, including the organization of production, labour relations and the changing economic conditions.

Although conclusions drawn from data obtained from the sample may seem to relate more to the three selected settlements, generalizations made from them for the whole area may not be out of place. This is because, apart from location and size, there is nothing particularly unique about these settlements as compared to others in the area. This is especially true in terms of matters concerning the general processes of social change in the area. In many cases however, I have relied either solely on documentary evidence, or supported data from interviews with documentary evidence and information gathered through the ethnographic method. The three techniques must therefore be considered as complementing each other.
Notes on Chapter One

1. For purposes of simplicity, even though Twifo and Hemang are two separate traditional areas, I will be referring to them for most of the time as Twifo-Hemang.

2. Eminent domain is the power or right of the State to take private property or communal property for public use or to control its use; usually at an 'adequate' compensation.


4. Between 1957 and 1984, Ghana has been ruled by three civilian governments and at least four military regimes of various durations, ranging from under one year to nine years.


11. For detailed analyses of these policy trends refer to the following: Andrew Shepherd, 'Agrarian Change in Northern Ghana; Public Investment, Capitalist Farming and Famine', in


14. The National Redemption Council (NRC) was later changed into the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 1975.


18. I.M. Ofori (1972;1979) op.cit.
19. These lands are held in trust by the chiefs or traditional rulers on behalf of their subjects. Such lands are communally owned in the sense that the subjects owing allegiance to the 'stool' (throne) have individual or familial, permanent, possessory, inheritable rights to portions already allocated to them and in continued occupation and usage by them. All abandoned portions may revert to the communal pool as stool lands. So also are all unallocated and unoccupied lands belonging collectively to the community serving that stool. Once a citizen comes of age, when there are still unoccupied stool lands, he or she cannot be denied free usufructural rights to the land.

20. S.M.C., 5-Year Development Plan, 1975/76-1979/80, op. cit., p.10. Cadaster is a register or map of the extent, ownership etc. of land.


22. Ibid.


25. Ibid., p.169.


31. John Berger, 'Towards Understanding Peasant Experience',


38. See Paul Sweezy, 'A critique' in Ibid., pp.33-56; 'A Further Comment' Ibid., pp.102-108.

39. See Ibid. for a complete coverage of the debate.

40. See Ibid. p.60 for Dobb's statement, and p.104 for Sweezy's.


43. For a good summary of this debate refer to Goodman and Redclift (1981), op.cit., pp.26-43; Also Ian Roxborough (1979), op.cit., pp.42-54.

44. See for example Ernesto Laclau, 'Feudalism and Capitalism in


47. Goodman and Redclift (1981), op.cit., p.54.

48. According to Marx, the labour-process becomes the instrument of the valorization process, the process of self-valorization of Capital - the manufacture of surplus-value. The labour process is subsumed under capital and the capitalist intervenes as its director, manager. It also represents the direct exploitation of the labour of others. It is this that I refer to as the formal subsumption of labour under capital. It is the general form of every capitalist process of production.


56. See I. Roxborough (1979), op.cit. pp.72, 85, 87.


61. Goodman and Redclift (1981) op.cit., p.84. Notice the similarity of this definition with the concepts agrarian transition and the process of proletarianization.


65. Colin Leys, 'Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant...


70. On this peculiar slowness of the expansion of capitalist relations of production along this path, Engels also observed that, 'In Prussia, east of the Elbe the same process (as in Britain) has been going on for centuries; here too the peasant is being increasingly turned out or at least economically and politically forced into the background'.

71. V.I. Lenin (1966), op.cit., p.141.


73. Ibid, p.77.


74


77. The full list of important persons who were interviewed include - The Regional Administrative Officer; the Regional Lands Officer; the Chief Lands Officer; Managing Director of the Central Regional Development Corporation; Farm Managers of 5 State-sponsored plantations in Twifo and Hemang; General Manager of the Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd.; Personnel Manager of the Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd.; the Ex-Paramount Chief of Hemang; the Queen mother and a divisional chief (the Adontenhene) of Hemang; the Registrar of the Hemang Traditional Council; the Paramount Chief of Twifo; three divisional and sub-chiefs of Twifo; Registrar of the Twifo Traditional Council; Leaders of the Town Development Committees and Peoples Defence Committees (PDCS) of Hemang and Mampong; the District and Regional Co-ordinators of the Peoples' Defence Committees; Officers-in-Charge of the police posts at Wawase, Hemang and Praso; Managers of 3 major private capitalist plantations (the Majestic Farms of Mpenkrom-Asasitre; the Mireku Farms of Hemang and Mampong, and the Aba Farms Ltd. of Twifo-Daman).

78. The Peoples' Defence Committees mushroomed immediately following the seizure of power by the military regime in 1981 - the Provisional National Defence Council - in all rural and urban communities. Their ostensible functions include the mobilization of their people in self-help projects, promotion of the economic development of their area, and to act as a watchdog of the 'revolution'. They have since monopolised political power in their localities, mainly at the expense of the traditional authorities.
CHAPTER TWO

COLONIALISM AND AGRARIAN STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Introduction

In the previous chapter it was argued that in order to understand and explain the causes of underdevelopment, it will be necessary to analyse historically the part played by both internal and external forces in shaping the existing socio-economic conditions. From this perspective, the political economy and agrarian structure of post-colonial Twifo-Hemang, prior to the intervention by the state in its traditional land tenure affairs and the penetration of capital in the production process, need to be first established. This will help to measure the extent of the structural changes resulting from later processes of social change. It will also provide a sense of continuity to the dynamics of these changes, thus showing that the agrarian structure was not static but underwent changes as the political economy evolved.

This chapter aims primarily at establishing a relationship between the history of the settlement of the Twifo people in the area, their incorporation into the world
capitalist-dominated market, and the evolution of the economy and agrarian structure prior to the intrusion of productive capital in the post-colonial era. In the process, an attempt will be made to explain relevant aspects of the social and political organization and principles of traditional land tenure and production organization. The changes these underwent following Twifo-Hemang's integration into the world capitalist market, will then be analyzed.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief description of the physical geography of the area, highlighting where necessary its relevance to the evolution of the economy and the organization of production. The second section deals with the process of the peopling of the area and the origins of the unequal relations to the principal means of production (land). The third section is concerned with analysing the beginnings of the incorporation of the local economy into the world capitalist economy through trans-Atlantic trade and its effects on traditional social structure ie, the kinship, political and economic relations. The fourth section analyses the development of the cocoa industry under formal colonial rule, the penetration of merchant capital, and changes in the relations to the means of production and the roles of various groups in the process of production ie. class formation.
2.1 The Physical Background

Twifo-Hemang forms part of the wet, semiequatorial climatic region of Ghana, with two rainfall maxima (March-June and September-October) and a mean annual rainfall of 50"-70". Temperatures are uniformly high, averaging 70 degrees - 80 degrees F. The two rainfall seasons correspond to the two farming seasons of the year. In the absence of modern irrigation methods, farming is basically rain-fed, depending on the relative reliability of the rainfall regime. Occasional droughts between rainy seasons, or failure of the rains to arrive at the right time or lower than expected annual totals, make farming a risky undertaking with serious socio-economic consequences, especially for those whose survival depends mainly on it.

Generally, the relatively high amount of rainfall over many years has endowed the area with a natural moist, semi-deciduous forest cover which, in the absence of over-exposure, helps to retain most of the moisture in the soil. The forest is also valuable for economic products such as hardwood timber, rubber and oil palm trees. In fact, under favourable conditions, these products are self-propagating. The same ecological conditions also support the production of cocoa, which has been the backbone of the Ghanaian economy since the colonial era. As will be shown later in this chapter, these products (rubber, oil
palm, timber and cocoa) have each played their part, in varying degrees of importance, in the evolution of the political economy of Twifo-Hemang.

The area is located on the ancient plateau block occupying the greater proportion of the surface area of Ghana, except the narrow coastal littoral. It has a geological base which is rich in valuable minerals such as gold, bauxite, manganese and diamonds. It is dissected by many large rivers and their tributaries eg. the Pra, the Offin and the Birim, which take their sources from the close, wet forest regions, generally flowing southwards into the Atlantic Ocean. Twifo-Hemang occupies the Pra-Offin basin area. Before formal colonial rule, these rivers were a source of alluvial gold, produced by the ethnic communities occupying the forested region including the Ashanti, the Akim, The Assin, the Denkyera and the Twifo.

Gold dust, slaves, palm oil and kernel and rubber were some of the major commodities involved in the trans-Atlantic trade between European merchants domiciled in their trading posts on the coast, and the inland ethnic communities including Twifo.

The soils known as forest ochrosols (because of their dark coloration) support not only perennial tree crops such as cocoa and oil palm, but also seasonal food crops such as corn, cassava and a wide variety of yams, fruits and vegetables. These food crops have formed the basis of the
subsistence sector of the local economy in pre-colonial and
colonial times, and increasingly of the commodity economy of
the post-colonial era. On being over-exploited or
over-exposed to the elements, the thin top layer of
dark-coloured fertile soils soon becomes exhausted and levels
of productivity begin to fall. Hence traditional methods of
leaving the over-used soil to fallow were designed to cope
with this problem, in the absence of any advanced methods of
fertilizing the soil. By leaving an impoverished soil to
regenerate into forest, lost nutrients are subsequently
restored from the decay of trees, leaves, twigs and other
organic matter. Burning the bush at the beginning of the
farming season also helps to enrich the soil with various
types of nitrates and phosphates from the ash.

The longer the period of fallow therefore, the
greater the recovery of the soil. Hence increasing
demographic pressure on land, and dwindling sizes of
available farmlands affect levels of productivity and
incomes since they do not allow for sufficient fallow
periods. They also do not allow for the successful
combination of, and positive balancing between, production
for subsistence and production for the market.

Dickson and Benneh(2) have shown that the
Twifo-Hemang area falls within a geographical region(3) of
Ghana, which they call 'The Pioneer Fringe', located between
the coastal savanna littoral to the south and the thick,
evergreen forests to the north as illustrated in Fig. 2. According to them,

The name pioneer fringe itself suggests that there is little development and it is this general lack of economic development, which forms the most important characteristic of the region. (4)

One of the chief historical characteristics of the area was the general low population density prior to the 1920s due to the inter-ethnic expansionist wars during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is linked with competition for control of the trans-Atlantic trade which forms the subject-matter of section three of this chapter. Furthermore, the area was largely ignored by the colonial administration, especially in terms of the provision of infrastructure and social amenities. The construction of the only highway linking the area with Cape Coast (the regional capital) and the Hunni-Valley to Kade railway, which passes only through Twifo Praso (opened in 1927), have been directly linked to the development of the cocoa industry in the area by Ghanaians. In fact, in the whole of the country, the provision of roads and rail facilities to particular areas was strictly dependent on the existence of minerals and other natural resources which European capital was interested in exploiting, or the rise of production of raw materials needed by European industrial concerns.

It is worth noting that, in explaining why the intervention of the post-colonial state in the land tenure
FIG. 2
GHANA: GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

KEY
- Railway
- Motor Road
- Rivers (R)
- Towns

affairs and production process in Twifo-Hemang was warranted, the government emphasised the lack of development in the area and its long history of land disputes. It seems from the analysis of Dickson and Benneh however, that these were also due to the historical neglect of the area by both the colonial and the post-colonial state.

2.2 Settlement, Culture and Land Tenure

The modicum of interest of land users have, is based on the rule that expenditure of labour creates rights and vests in the person who is first to clear land from virgin forest permanent rights to exclusive occupation over the area so cleared (Bentsi-Enchill, 1964:109).(5)

When the demand for land is not great, any member of the community has a right to appropriate to his own use any vacant land without asking permission. If he develops the land, he thereby acquires a title to its use which he can proceed to sell and which is inheritable. Admittedly, this source of confusion is now declining. But the fact remains that many present claims to land are based on undocumented past acts of occupation (Woodman, 1968:8).(6)

What the quotes above illustrate is one of the cardinal principles of traditional land tenure, namely the acquisition of ownership and control of land by right of original occupation of an area by a community and its members. It can be inferred from Woodman's statement that this principle has been undergoing a process of change since pre-colonial times. However, during the early period of the peopling of any area by various ethnic communities,
territorial, group and individual claims to land, in the absence of cadastral maps (7) and written documentation, were based on this principle. A second principle is that such claims could only be invalidated by right of conquest, or by losing legal contests over conflicting claims or by permanent out-migration.

Hence, in order to understand the origins of the unequal ownership and control of land by different communities, groups and individuals in the Twifo-Hemang area, it will be necessary to briefly trace the history of the occupation of the area. In the process the cultural basis of the traditional land tenure institutions will be explained. Subsequent analysis of the social conflicts over land ownership and control, the structural changes which took place following formal colonial rule, the evolution of the economy and the expansion of commodity relations in Twifo-Hemang can then be effectively clarified.

The people occupying the present Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira district in the Central Region of Ghana, as shown in Fig. 3 below, are part of the larger Akan ethnic community constituting about 45% of the present total population of Ghana, including the Asante, the Fante, the Assin, the Wassaw, the Denkyira, the Akwamu, the Akim and the Twifo. They are believed to have migrated in waves or bands southwards from the vicinity of the present Republic of Mali, in what was then known as Western Soudan region,
'under pressure from more powerful Fulani enemies' before 1000 AD. (8) They first settled temporarily in the neighbourhood of the present Techiman in the Dormaa district of the Brong Ahafo region, but were again forced to continue their southward migration between 1000 AD and 1200 AD, 'possibly as a result of the expansion of the Sudanic empires'. (9) The map in Fig. 4 below shows the southward route of the Akan migration.

The confluence of the Pra and Offin rivers, shown in Fig. 5, became 'the cradle of the Akan' (10) where they settled until around the 14th century, when due to over population, internal disputes and other economic reasons, they began to disperse and settle in their present locations in Ghana. For example, the Akwamu moved 'in the sixteenth century from Twifo...' (11) south-eastwards because of '...a disputed succession'. (12) The Asante moved northwards in the early fourteenth century, attracted by the booming trans-Saharan long distance trade involving the exchange of slaves, gold, kola and other goods for European-made commodities. Wilks calls this the 'northern factor in Ashanti history'.

However, not all the Akan communities domiciled in the Pra-Offin basin moved out. According to Stride and Ifeka,

The southern Akan states of Twifo, Adansi, Wassaw,
FIG. 4
SOUTHWARD MIGRATORY ROUTE OF THE AKAN

[Map of the southward migratory route of the Akan, showing key locations and routes.]
FIG. 5
PRA-OFFIN BASIN: CRADLE OF THE AKAN.
Assin, Denkyira were founded by Akan who remained in the Pra-Offin basin. According to some traditions, Twifo was the first of these nations to emerge as an independent state. We cannot be sure when Twifo was founded but the early fifteenth century is a likely date. (13)

Wilks however puts the formation of the Twifo state at about 1500,

...when a group of migrants, apparently traders accompanied by fighting men, moved from the northern Akan region and settled in the forest country behind Portuguese Elmina. There they founded the town of Kumkunso, some 30 miles inland. It is represented by the present Twifo-Hemang. (14)

The map in Fig. 6 below illustrates the relative geographical locations of these southern Akan states. One important point emerges from these quotes. This is that the present two separate traditional areas, namely Twifo and Hemang, was originally a single state called Twifo, with its capital, Hemang. Oral traditional data has it that the breaking up of this state into two, namely Twifo traditional area to the north of the Obuo stream with its capital Mampong, and Hemang traditional area south of the Obuo, with its capital Hemang as illustrated in Fig. 7, was due to internal disputes within the ruling Aburadze clan.

One characteristic of the Akan is cultural affinity among the constituent dialect groups. According to Boahen,
The very fact that language, social and political institutions of these people are, by and large, the same wherever they are found to this day suggests that these institutions were evolved before their migration into the region they now occupy. (15)

The connecting link in so far as language goes is the Twi language with dialects developed in different geographical locations by different Akan communities as illustrated in Fig. 8 below. Twi is a 'generic term of a group of Akan dialects closely related to each other in vocabulary and structure, and mutually intelligible'. (16) Twifo is 'one of the eight linguistic groups in the Central Province of the Gold Coast colony', (17) created by the British in 1874 and now known as the Central Region of Ghana, with its capital, Cape Coast. Oral tradition gives the meaning of Twifo as the "Twifo people" or the "Twi-speaking people". Informants were boastful in their claim that since the Twifo stayed put in the original home of the Akan in the Pra-Offin basin, their dialect is the purest Twi because it is undiluted and untainted by other dialects and cultures. I found a very close resemblance between Asante-twi and the local dialect.

A second cultural link is the kinship structure of the Akan. They are socially organized at the national level in exogamous matrilineal clans and locally in maximal lineages, which are the local branches of the clans. The localised maximal lineage is defined by Bentsi-Enchill as,
FIG. 8
THE AKAN DIALECTS AREAS OF GHANA

...a group of persons lineally descended from a common ancestress exclusively through females starting from the mother of such ancestress... and within the group, succession to office and to property is based on their relationship.(18)

On the other hand the wider clan is essentially the same as the concept defined above,

...but the clan covers a larger group comprising several extended families all of which acknowledge a common ancestress; the line of descent from this is usually forgotten.(19)

Whilst members of the localised maximal lineages (ie. the local branches of the exogamous clans) can trace their genealogical roots to a known ancestress, members of the same clan by name, scattered all over the Akan communities in Ghana, cannot do so. The clan system performs an important ideological function of uniting the Akan 'by a sentiment of brotherhood' on a national scale.(20) As Wilks explains,

A high degree of ideological conformity enforced by clan elders is designed to achieve subscription to common tradition throughout the clan, and so obscures the fact that parts of the same abusua (ie. clan; family) are frequently of quite different origins. The matriclan system has, in other words, been used as a device for integrating diverse elements into southern Akan society. Many groups regard themselves as autochthonous, and assert this claim through myths which link their founding ancestress with particular localities in the central forest region.(21)

At the local level, the maximal lineage, whose members trace their roots to a known founding ancestress,
and who are directly related by uterine ties, is the foundation of the social organization. Its sociological significance lies in the fact that inheritance i.e. the transmission of property; and succession i.e. the transmission of office are regulated through membership in it. Rights to land usufruct and inheritance of landed property are also based on membership in the maximal matrilineage. What is commonly known as "communal" land tenure in fact refers to lineage or family land, owned collectively by members, each of whom at least in principle, has indisputable usufructual rights.

The maximal lineage or abusua is headed by the abusuapanyin or elder of the family, who has political and legal authority over the abusua members. He is the custodian of the land owned collectively by the group, and he allocates lineage land to individual members. It is important to note however, that once an individual member has been granted rights of usufruct to a portion of the group land, he or she holds perpetual possessory rights over it. Whilst the usufructuary is living, this right remains a private right which he can transmit to his successor. If he dies intestate or abandons the land permanently, it then returns to the group pool. (22) It is also important to emphasize that the abusuapanyin is not in principle permitted to alienate any portion of the communal land to an 'outsider' without consulting other prominent members of the
It is, however, not unusual for a family in debt or in need of cash to carry out a project, to agree to alienate part of the family land. As Bentsi-Enchill has argued,

A group having allodial title to its land could sell some or all of its land if it chose. So with an individual allodial owner. Communities owning land allodially who assert that their land is not saleable are to be understood as saying that they do not choose to sell, rather than that it cannot be done. (23)

Section 4 will show how economic changes affecting the mode of acquisition, usufruct and inheritance of land, lead progressively to a shift of locus from the extended family to the nuclear family. That is, a process of nucleation and individuation of the relations of ownership, control and usufruct of land and hence in the organization of production was set in motion.

The third major characteristic of the social organization of the Akan which has important bearing on the traditional land tenure institutions is state formation. In the social anthropological literature on traditional Africa, a distinction is often made between centralised (state) and non-centralised (stateless) societies, based albeit inadequately on the 'political organization alone'. (24) Following this approach, Assimeng recently argued that,

Centralised societies are properly called 'states'
and are characterised by their possession of clearly demarcated centralised authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions all of which go to indicate the existence and working of a government. (25)

On this basis, the Akan (including the Twifo) approximate this form of political organization. (26)

In their migratory movements, strong and responsible leadership qualities were needed especially in battles with other competing ethnic groups. Members of certain clans who showed exceptional qualities of courage, leadership and a high standard of moral uprightness, often turned into the first paramount chiefs, and subsequent succession to the office ran through that clan. As McCarthy observes, 'State formation among the Akan occurred when a lineage of one of the matrilineal groups imposed its power on the other Akan clans and/or the pre-existing peoples'. (27) Hence the ruling clan differs from one Akan community to the other eg. the Oyoko clan in Ashanti, the Asona clan in Adansi, the Agona clan in Denkyira, and the Aburadze clan in Twifo. (28)

The two traditional states, namely the Twifo area with its seat at Mampong and the Hemang area with its seat at Hemang, are each headed by a paramount chief. Below each paramount chief (Omanhene), there are divisional chiefs (Ahenfo), who are mainly chosen from clans which captained some of the divisional units of the armed forces, and the Queen mother (Ohemma), the perfunctory head of the royal lineage. On the next rung of the state apparatus are many
subordinate or sub-chiefs (Adekurofo) chosen from among the local matrilineage heads (Abusuampanyinfo), and the elder-councillors (mpanyinfo).

In relation to the institution of land tenure, following the formation of the Twifo and Hemang states, some innovation was effected through the creation of what has since been called "stool lands". These are lands lying within the territorial boundaries of each stool, which have not yet been occupied by, or allocated to any individual or family. An important distinction should be drawn between stool-family lands and communally-owned, stool lands. Stool-family lands are lands directly attached to each stool, over which the chief and the royal lineage have direct control and which they can exploit or alienate to raise funds for the upkeep of the stool and the running of the affairs of the chief's court. Communally-owned lands (which is really what is meant by the term stool lands) are lands which the office of the chief holds in trust for the citizens ie. those who owe allegiance to the stool. In principle these lands are collectively owned by the citizens, none of whom should be denied usufructual rights to any unoccupied portion of it. The commonest source of conflict between the rulers and the ruled is the development of a situation where communally-owned stool lands tend to be equated with stool-family lands and treated by the rulers as such.
Like the family or abusua lands under the head, (abusuapanyin), the chief (omanhene or ohene) as controller of stool lands, is only a custodian of them and cannot alienate any portion to a 'stranger' without the consent of the lineage heads (abusuampanyinfo) and the elder-councillors (panyinfo). As a colonial document shows,

A Chief is not regarded as the owner of stool lands. He and his councillors who comprise the heads of the principal families in the community are in the position of trustees of the stool lands for the benefit of the community and they are liable to be deposed and superseded if they abuse their trust. (29)

In all cases of alienation, the ultimate collective interest of the citizens remains paramount. The totality of all these lands which fall under the jurisdiction of the whole state (oman) is held in trust by the office of the omanhene for the people.

However these are only principles, and as will be shown in the fourth section, in so far as these principles of traditional land tenure are concerned, what ought to be was not always congruent with what was. In many cocoa growing areas 'chiefs and councillors not infrequently appropriated large amounts (of the lands and the proceeds from land sales) to themselves and thus incurred deposition on the part of the citizen body'. (30) In Twifo-Hemang the spread of the money economy under colonialism and the
influence of merchant capital had similar effects.

2.3 The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Social Differentiation

(i) The Basic Structure of the Economy: - The local economy of pre-colonial Twifo-Hemang was based primarily on subsistence cultivation of food crops; mainly root crops which do very well in the wet forest environment. The number and size of farms and the levels of productivity depended partly on the amount of labour power which could be mustered by the domestic production unit. Hence the use of the labour of extended matrilineal kin was common, and preference for polygynous marriages was geared towards obtaining sufficient family labour for farm work.

Since, as Bentsi-Enchill has argued above, '...expenditure of labour creates rights' in land, the exploitation of the labour of other members of the matrilineage in developing virgin land turned such land into lineage or family land, over which all members had usufructual rights. On the other hand, the use of one's nuclear family's labour or one's own labour or slave, pawn (31) or hired labour in developing virgin land permits one, as Woodman argued above, to acquire 'a title to its use which...' one '...can proceed to sell and which is inheritable' by one's own offspring. In one's lifetime one could acquire land for one's spouse(s) and offspring through
these means, which became common in the cocoa production era. Since other members of the matrilineage had not contributed materially or otherwise to the purchase and the development of the land, it became the private property of the spouse(s) or the offspring as the case may be. However, upon dying intestate, rights of inheritance could be claimed by the matrilineal kin since the land then became family land. According to a colonial document,

When an individual does acquire lands with his own self-acquired resources he has the right to dispose of them in his lifetime. On his death, according to native custom, his nephew, brother, uncle and cousin could succeed to his lands and other property, but the successor would hold them in trust for the family who would all have an interest in the lands including those individually acquired. (32)

In the earlier times of the settlement of the Twifo-Hemang area many individuals and families acquired perpetual ownership and control of vast tracts of land through the options described above. Once these parcels of land were not abandoned, and there were living witnesses to support the claims of rights of ownership by occupation; or once there was valid evidence of continued occupation in the form of crops, permanent economic trees, clearly defined boundaries or settlements, bona fide claims by the original occupier(s) were acceptable in customary law.

Besides subsistence cultivation, some reliance on productive activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering
were of importance for the simple reproduction of the domestic unit. Specialised craftsmanship, involving wood carving, canoe making, textile weaving, pottery, manufacturing of boards and furniture, native stools and bowls, also formed an integral part of the economy. Of the greatest importance in the sphere of specialized traditional industry was the work of blacksmiths and goldsmiths. They specialized respectively in the smelting of iron and the forging of tools and other hardware and the production of gold ornaments used by women, chiefs, royalists and the rich. According to Garrard,

Denkyira and the neighbouring districts of Twifo-Hemang and the Assin produced large quantities of gold weights with cast spoons, boxes... a variety of other kinds of cast vessels and a few cast animal figures...(34)

(ii) The Gold and Slave Trade: - A relationship has already been drawn between the geological base of a greater part of the land surface of Ghana and the existence of valuable minerals. Reference has been made to a relationship between the drainage system of the closed, wet forests and alluvial gold mining by the Akans in pre-colonial times. Gold mining, through the arduous traditional panning method, by which the 'metal was extracted on river terraces...' (35) existed centuries before the arrival of Portuguese merchants on the coast in the late
fifteenth century. (36) Dickson identifies the Asante, the Kwahu, the Akim, the Adansi, the Denkyira, the Wassaw and the Twifo as the inland Akan states involved in gold production. (37)

The production of, and trade in gold was a major source of wealth for the chiefs, lineage heads and other prominent individuals who owned and/or controlled lands drained by the Pra and its tributaries in the Twifo countryside. Taxes of up to one half of alluvial gold extracted by individuals on such lands went to the landowners. The chiefs also collected tribute in the form of gold from lineage heads and individuals out of their income deriving from duties on gold panned on their land. Slave and pawn labour played a major role in the arduous and exacting task of panning alluvium from the beds of rivers and extracting gold from it. Thus chiefs and other prominent individuals who were directly involved in military operations in which slaves were captured, or who could afford to buy slaves or lend money on pawning terms, gained tremendously by way of the amount of gold obtained.

For several centuries gold and forest products formed the basis of the trans-Saharan long distance trade between the Akan and the Arabs from the Sahara desert; the latter being the middlemen for European merchants on the North African coast. Gold, kola nuts, ivory etc. were exchanged for slaves, cloths, metal vessels, beads, leather
goods, and firearms. The arrival of the Europeans on the Atlantic coast of Ghana in the fifteenth century however, led to the emergence of the trans-Atlantic trade between the Akan and the Europeans domiciled on the coast, and the gradual decline of the Trans-Saharan trade. This new trade, involving mainly gold and slaves exchanged for firearms, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and other consumer goods marked the early beginnings of the integration of the indigenous economies with European merchant capital, hence the incorporation of Ghana into the world capitalist market. (38)

The geographical location of the Twifo and other southern Akans states such as Wassaw, Assin and Denkyira in the transitional zone between the coastal savanna and the thick evergreen forests in the hinterland was a great political and economic advantage. These states became 'middlemen' in the trade, and as Dickson argued,

The main source of their importance lay in their position with respect to the European trading posts on the coast, to which the complicated crosscurrents of trade in southern Ghana and Ashanti-Brong Ahafo eventually drained....As trade with the coast increased, so did the importance of the middlemen near the coast. (39)

The location of Twifo state on a major hinterland to coast trade route i.e. 'Begho-Wenchi-Kumasi-Hemang-Elmina' route,(40) or as Wilks put it, 'on the path by which their (Ashantee) trade is brought to the coast', (41) was of particular advantage. (42) Hemang (the capital) prospered as
a major commercial centre where traders from inland exchanged their gold and slaves for European-made goods with middlemen from Twifo. The strategic location of Hemang in this respect is illustrated in Fig. 9 below. The chiefs also taxed 'caravans' from the hinterland at least one-third of the value of commodities they carried to Hemang or directly to the coast.

This lucrative trade in which the various Akan states participated was generally the 'prerogative of royalty, nobles, and rich men', even though commoners were not completely excluded from the middleman role. (43)

According to Dickson,

The reason for this may have been mainly economic and not necessarily a result of state policy, for trading at distant places in those times of general insecurity required a great deal of organization which involved a heavy outlay such as only wealthy persons could afford. A team of carriers had to be engaged to head-load the goods, and armed men hired to protect them; taxes also had to be paid to the numerous chiefs through whose territories the caravans passed. Even a state caravan, led by a linguist staff and supposed to be accorded respect and given safe conduct was sometimes plundered. (44)

The situation described above relates more to the interior states rather than a place like Twifo-Hemang which was only about thirty miles from Elmina and Cape Coast where the European trading posts were located. In such a case, individual middlemen did not need to be saddled with such great expenses and risks.
FIG 9
THE MAJOR COASTWARD TRADE ROUTES.

ATLANTIC OCEAN
(GULF OF GUINEA)

In fact, the strategic position of Twifo-Hemang, rather enabled its people to engage in illegitimate activities such as cheating, waylaying and plundering inland traders heading towards the coast. Twifo has been described in the literature as a 'bandit-infested state', (45) which engaged in 'plundering' and 'cheating the traders from inland'. (46) The Twifo were also said to 'have the opening and closing of the ways to the Ashantee merchants in their hands...', and that they 'in concert with the Aowin were known to have robbed, killed and plundered inland traders' and to have 'always violated the highways'. (47) Wilks also points out that the ruling Abrade clan which founded the Twifo state,

...quickly seized the opportunities offered by the opening of the new coastal trade outlets. In the course of the sixteenth century (and thereafter) abrade participation in the gold trade, and their tendency to live off trade rather than by it, brought them in conflict with the surrounding Akan people. (48)

Therefore while it was not unlikely that the traditional authorities were involved in these illegitimate trading activities, it was also clearly a means of nascent accumulation of wealth by individual enterprising and aggressive commoners.

The trans-Atlantic trade in gold and slaves also had the effect of creating political instability among Akan states such as Ashanti, Wassaw, Denkyira, Fante, Assin and
Twifo. The British took advantage of this situation, to impose colonial rule culminating in the demise of the lucrative trade in gold and slaves. Wilks describes these developments as follows:

The growth of the maritime trade after 1471 led to a period of rapid social and political change in the coastal hinterland and stimulated the emergence of comparatively large-scale kingdoms of which the Asante was the latest and most powerful. The emergence of the southern Akan kingdoms involved the intricate interplay of northern and southern Akan interests. (49)

Expansionist policies pursued by various Akan states since the seventeenth century were inextricably linked to the inter-state rivalries for control of the lucrative international trade.

The struggle for political and economic supremacy, specifically for control of the Trans-Atlantic maritime trade, culminated in the Asante state emerging as the dominant Akan power at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Asante decisively defeated the then most powerful state - Denkyira, which had previously subjected the Asante, Aowin, Wassaw, Twifo and Assin into vassal states, (50) in the battle of Feyiase in 1701. Through a series of military forays the Asante defeated the southern Akan states of Twifo, Assin, Wassaw, and Aowin, turning them into client states. (51) Fynn shows that '...between 1712-1715 the Twifo were defeated and made tributary to
Asante'. (52) Thus Twifo became 'part of a loose confederacy of the Asante nation and its vassal state'. (53) Writing on the dominant position of Asante, Prah argues that,

The late precapitalist Ashanti aristocracy although non estate-owning in a highly individualised sense as we know it today, still operated landed holdings with the labour of slaves and serfs and extracted tributes and taxes from their social inferiors and their conquered client states. This system of tribute and tax extraction was carried up the pyramid of aristocratic positions and office. (54)

However within this apparent strength of the Asante empire (the extent is shown in Fig. 10 below) lay its weakness. The strong feelings of abhorrence and disgust among the client states towards the belligerent and imperialist designs of the Asante and their perceived high-handed political domination and exploitative relations with these states, led to active intrigue and subversion. Military and political alliances were forged and there was outright economic sabotage against the Asante. Tenkorang writes about the 'Wassaw-Twifo-Fante-Akim alliance, renewed now and then for offensive-defensive purposes'. (55) Fynn also confirms that 'the Fante entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with the Warsaws (Wassa) and Tufferoes (Twifo) to which Amoniah (Amihere), king of Appolonian (Nzima) had acceded in order to oppose the Asante'. (56) Non-Fante states like Twifo, Wassaw, Aowin and Denkyira became signatories to the Fante Confederacy
(1868-1873), which was an alliance against Asante domination and in favour of political independence from the British. Hence, in spite of persistent political and military efforts, the Asante were unsuccessful in their bid to incorporate their incorrigible client state firmly into the Asante empire.

It was in the economic sphere, that the southern Akan states of Twifo, Assin, Wassaw and Denkyira held the trump card, due to their strategic location vis-a-vis the European trading posts on the coast. The bone of contention was that the Asante, considering themselves the most superior military power among the Akan, wished to put an end to the banditry and exploitation which Asante traders suffered from these states. They also wished to trade directly with the Europeans on the coast and not through middlemen. On the other hand, these states stuck to a "policy never to let the Asante trade directly with the European merchants". This way, they hoped to control the flow of firearms and ammunition supplies to the Asante and thereby to limit the military might of the Asante.

The policy of these states seemed to suit the purposes of the British who wished to mobilise anti-Asante feelings and to curb the military power of the Asante in order to impose colonial rule on the whole territory of Ghana. The British actively fanned anti-Asante feelings among the southern middleman states. They pursued Wassaw,
Denkyira and Twifo to rebel against Asante domination in 1823. (61) Brigadier General, Sir Charles McCarthy, then Governor-in-chief of the Gold Coast was actively engaged in 'direct organization of anti-Asante movement'. (62) In 1827 and 1853 treaties of alliance were signed by the Fante and their allies (the Twifo, Wassaw, Assin, and Denkyira) to put themselves under British protection. (63) The Bond of 1844 was a declaration by all the chiefs along the coast and the southern Akan states, including Twifo, to put themselves under British jurisdiction. (64)

As a result of these economic, political and military alliances, the Asante power was greatly weakened. The Asante were defeated in 1826 by the British, and through a treaty signed in 1831 they lost control over their vassal states including Twifo. (65) A second defeat in 1874 severely crippled the military might of the Asante. In the same year, the British imposed direct colonial rule over the coastal states and the southern Akan states, proclaiming them as a colony. A final humiliation of the Asante in 1901 ended in the formal annexation of Ashanti and the Northern Territories. (66) As a result of these developments the British colonial administration had the full mandate to enforce the end of the slave trade. Since slave labour could no longer be mobilised for the arduous task of mining for alluvial gold, and since alluvial deposits were in any case becoming exhausted, the production of gold declined.
Hard rock mining involving the use of modern technology became the exclusive preserve of European capital from the 1880s onwards. (68)

With the imposition of the colonial state and the development of communication which facilitated the preservation of law and order, the middlemen trade which enriched Twifo-Hemang royalists and commoners alike declined. British merchant capital could thenceforth safely penetrate the interior without the help of middlemen.

(iii) The Palm Oil and Rubber Trade and Agrarian Structure: - Palm oil and palm kernels, both extracted from the fruit of the oil palm tree, replaced gold and slaves as the most important export commodities in Colonial Ghana. According to Dickson, this was because they were cheaper to produce than gold, and although they were bulkier, the nearness of the chief producing areas like the southern Akan forest states (e.g. Twifo) and the Krobo and Akwapim areas to the south-eastern coast, reduced the problem of high transportation costs considerably. (69) The production of palm oil and palm kernels for export (like rubber and cocoa which followed later) were due primarily to the initiative and drive of the local people, who readily responded to market opportunities offered by the colonial state. The aim was to supply raw materials to feed European-based industries. As Dumor has observed,
By the nineteenth century the emergence of Britain's industrial revolution influenced the type of commodities that were of great concern at the beginning of legitimate trade along the Guinea Coast. There was an increasing demand by British chemical industries for palm oil which was considered to have ingredients for producing the best lather. There was also the need for vegetable oils for lubricating industrial equipment eg. Lancashire cotton industries. Hence the coastal trade. (70)

Palm oil was also needed in the growing soap, margarine, cattle feed, candle and paint manufacturing industries. (71)

The colonial state actively encouraged the production of palm oil and palm kernels (from which palm kernel oil was processed in Europe) as an alternative to the slave trade. Palm oil was prepared from the pericarp (a red, fleshy, fibrous outer layer covering a nut within which is a seed or kernel) through a labourious process of decomposition, pounding, boiling and skimming of the oil. The palm kernel was obtained by drying the nuts and cracking them open.

In section one, the semi-deciduous, wet forests of Twifo-Hemang was characterised as a natural habitat for forest products such as the oil palm, wild rubber and hardwood timber. In the case of oil palm however, certain conditions had to be met in order to ensure high levels of productivity. First, virgin forest land had to be cleared for cultivation of other crops. Second, such cultivated land could not be abandoned for too lengthy a period as that
would enable the secondary forest to engulf and stunt the growth of the oil palm trees. (72)

Taking these factors into account, together with the need for extra labour for transportation of the products to the coast, those who held ownership and control of relatively large expanse of land and the capacity to mobilise enough labour to cultivate it, had clear advantages. Chiefs, lineage heads and high officials of the traditional state who had easier access to land or could afford ex-slave and pawn labour in addition to family labour, gained this initial advantage. (73) However, ordinary industrious citizens who were among the earliest to settle and occupy large tracts of land, also took advantage of the labour of their matrilineal kin and congugal family to respond to this opportunity to accumulate wealth. There was a division of labour by sex in the production process. The extraction of the oil and the kernel was the work of women (and children), whilst the harvesting of the oil palm fruit from the trees and the transportation of the product to the coast were reserved for men.

The palm oil and kernel production and marketing, however, faced some difficulties which eventually led to its decline in importance and its replacement by cocoa as the chief export crop. Some of these problems included relative greater difficulties in processing and transportation and lower producer prices. Colonial records show that following
the introduction of motor-road and rail transport in the 1920s, cocoa emerged as the main export crop of Twifo-Hemang. (74) According to a 1921 colonial report,

The palm oil industry which has flourished in this area since the last forty to fifty years is declining because it is less paying than cocoa and entails harder work. Chiefs state that the palm oil industry would not be taken up unless the price to the collector is doubled. (75)

Thus when cocoa with its lower costs and high profits was introduced it quickly replaced palm oil production as the chief cash-earning export commodity. (76) However, as the product of the oil palm tree was a major source of a variety of local dishes and a source of basic traditional industries such as soap making, palm wine tapping and distillation of a local gin, it remained a local crop as it had been prior to colonial rule.

After the discovery of vulcanization in 1839, European industrial concerns needed rubber as raw material for the manufacture of various kinds of consumer and household commodities, and for use in the engineering and electrical industries. (77) Accordingly, the colonial authorities encouraged the tapping and processing of latex from wild rubber trees which grew in the closed, wet forest areas. (78) Alongside palm oil and kernel, the people of Twifo-Hemang responded to another opportunity of making money through the extraction of rubber for export. Between
the 1880s, when the export of rubber began in colonial Ghana and the 1910s when cocoa began to take over as the main cash earning export crop, rubber production and marketing played a short but significant role in the political economy of Twifo-Hemang.

As in the case of gold and palm oil, those in control of communally-owned lands, and individuals who owned lands on which wild rubber grew had a clear advantage. The opportunity was also open for individuals to earn cash by extracting the latex, and paying as custom demands, one-third of the product as tax to the landowner. Some more enterprising individuals emerged as porters, petty peddlers and brokers between the direct producers and merchant capital. The demise of rubber as a cash earning commodity in Twifo-Hemang was caused partly by the overexploitation of the more easily tapped rubber; and, as in the case of palm products, the relatively better attraction of cocoa in terms of income generation and the physical toil involved. (79)

The role of rubber is particularly significant in the history of Twifo-Hemang because it sparked off the land dispute in colonial courts between stools and between stools and landowners which became a constant feature of the political economy of the area. It has since then marred political relations between the Twifo and the Hemang people, and was used as an excuse by the post-colonial state to intervene in the land affairs of the area. Without
clarifying the roots of this problem, the circumstances which led to the eventual capitalist intrusion in the productive process in the area, which form a major part of the subject-matter of this work will remain unclear.

As wild rubber trees thrived best in the well-watered soils on the edges of the River Pra, especially at its confluence with the Obuo stream, the collection of latex was most intensively carried out in those areas. The rise of rubber as an important cash-earning crop, enhanced the economic value of the lands bordering the river and led to conflicting claims over the ownership of those lands lying on the uncertain and vague boundary between the otherwise two sister traditional stools - Twifo and Hemang. (80) Fig. 11 below is a map illustrating all the important physical and human aspects of the initial dispute which dragged on into the post-colonial era. Boundary disputes were very common features between neighbouring traditional states in the late nineteenth century as the extraction of economic products from the land for cash replaced long distance trade and raised the economic value of lands which hitherto had been used mainly for subsistence purposes. They became particularly common with the rise of cocoa production on permanent fields which constituted a radical shift from the hitherto 'cultivation of temporary food-patches'. (81) As Mikell ably explained the situation,
The new economic opportunities to be derived from control over raw materials encouraged the rethinking of political boundaries as chiefs sought to increase the amount of land under their control. In most cases the chief's memory of boundaries was based on the directions in which land used by his own citizens extended, and the boundaries tended to radiate outward from hunting camps or subsistence farming villages occupied in that area. Precise points such as roads or streams could seldom be given as part of boundaries until considerably after 1900. Thus, as citizens spread out to occupy more land for farming crops encouraged by the colonial administration, land boundaries between chiefs became a continual problem. It was clear that the increasing economic value of land encouraged such litigation between chiefs.(82)

In the case of Twifo and Hemang, the stool which could successfully obtain ownership of the disputed land stood the chance of increasing its revenue not only from duties charged on harvested economic products, but also occupation rents and tributes, and the collection of ferry tolls on the Pra. Chiefs, lineage heads and elder-councillors would also have their share of revenues derived from these sources, and therefore had their interests at stake. According to a colonial document,

One-third of the revenue goes to the Chief for his personal use and the maintenance of stool regalia. One-third is set apart for the requirements of the state. This share set aside for the stool purposes is administered by the chief and his councillors and is the recognized fund to meet public requirements. This portion is usually found to have been more than absorbed in meeting stool debts incurred in litigation over boundary disputes. The remaining one-third is divided amongst the elders and councillors for their own maintenance and personal use.(83)
The conflict between Twifo and Hemang first began in the colonial courts in 1878 as a struggle for the right to operate and collect tolls from the two ferries on the Pra at Brofoyedur and Nyamebeyere (located in Fig. 11 above), hitherto controlled by the Hemang and Twifo stools respectively. In 1894 (up until the post-colonial state intervened) the court disputes turned into conflicts over ownership and control of the lands lying between the Rivers Obuo and Ongwa (located in Fig. 11 above). Hemang claimed the Ongwa as the boundary between the two communities, while Twifo claimed that the Obuo was the boundary. Again Twifo won, mainly on the grounds that the majority of the population occupying that area owed allegiance to the Twifo stool and therefore were citizens of Twifo and hence were owners of the land by virtue of original occupation. Since then, despite the protracted legal battles between the two stools which led to the intervention of the post-colonial state, the Obuo has been the official boundary between the two communities.

The conflict between the two stools became further complicated by the refusal of the Hemang stool to pay the legal costs of two hundred and fifty pounds sterling to the Twifo stool. On the orders of the Circuit Court of Cape Coast, the Hemang lands were sold by public auction in 1896 to two wealthy Ghanaian merchants, Messrs. J.E. Ellis of
Cape Coast and F.E. Wood of Anomabo to cover the debt. The Hemang paramount chief, Nana Kobina Otoo I was made to sign an agreement, which came to be known as the Bailiff-Tenant agreement, in 1897. According to the terms of this agreement between Ellis and Wood (the landowners) and the Hemang chief (as bailiff-tenant), the latter was to collect one-third of all produce from the land and one penny on each cocoa tree annually from both citizens and strangers occupying the land, with the exception of members of the royal lineage of Hemang. One-third of the total proceeds was to go to the Hemang chief, one-third to Ellis and one-third to Wood. (84) By 1931, the Hemang stool had accumulated a total debt of over one thousand four hundred and fifty pounds sterling, in dues, tolls, rents and tributes collected by the chief but unaccounted for. A perpetual injunction signed by the Circuit Court judge, E. Gardiner Smith forbade the chief from further alienating lands and collecting rent, tolls and dues. (85)

Records show, however, that citizens of Hemang refused to comply with the terms of the agreements. (86) Subsequent chiefs also refused to recognize the Ellis and Wood families as their landlords and continued to deal with the land affairs as though nothing had happened. As a result in many cases there were double sale of lands (by both Ellis and Wood and the chiefs) and further conflicts, and a great increase in the alienation of land in the Hemang
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area by the two parties. (87) It led to the protracted land disputes which persisted until the post-colonial state stepped in. (88)

The major impact of these developments was that large tracts of Hemang lands were alienated to strangers thus reducing the chances of future generations of Hemang citizens to acquire free rights of usufruct to land in their home area. The persistence of conflicts between the Twifo stool and the Hemang stool, and between the latter and the Ellis and Wood families also prompted the intervention of the post-colonial state in the land affairs of the Twifo-Hemang area, and led to the penetration of capital in the production process.

So far in this chapter the beginning of the incorporation of hitherto subsistence cultivators of Twifo-Hemang into the world capitalist market has been demonstrated. Clearly the collection and extraction of raw materials (palm oil and kernel, and rubber) involved minimum amount of processing; nor did it entail much deliberate effort in cultivation. Thus, these rudimentary economic activities can hardly be designated as agricultural production in the sense of the development of relations of production between owners of the means of production and labour; be it either wage labour or sharecropping.

Actual opposing relations between employers and employees, or landlords and tenants in the process of
production had not been sufficiently established, besides casual labour services rendered by commoners to the traditional authorities. There was also the use of ex-slave and pawn labour by both the nobility and the increasingly economically and politically influential individual 'social strivers who profited as the economy entered the global economic arena'.(89) Goody for example, wrote about local chiefs of centralised states (like Twifo-Hemang) who, from the standpoint of food production, were in essence carried by the rest of the population.(90) Dickson also argues that,

It was the common people and the slaves who were engaged in cultivation and other forms of manual labour. Those higher up in the social hierarchy and some of the common people themselves owned slaves who did the farmwork for them. Also forming a significant portion of the agricultural labour force were women whatever their social status.(91)

At this historical juncture these social arrangements seemed to be the normal structures in the production process of Twifo-Hemang.

At the level of the individual resident, the use of family labour was the commonest form of organizing labour in the process of production. At the community level, the traditional nnoboa system of labour organization was common. "Nnoba" was a traditional cooperative institution, in which neighbouring cultivators helped one another in turn,
collectively clearing the bush, sowing the seeds, or harvesting the crops. No fiscal transactions were involved, for the institution was entirely based on the principles of reciprocity and communality. Each host was only responsible for entertaining his or her guest-cooperators when work on his or her farm was taking place. This system gradually gave way to direct labour hiring or engagement of labour on a share-cropping basis with the rise of cocoa production and the deeper intrusion of money and commodity relations. This change reflected a relationship between socio-economic development and greater individuation in economic effort.

The increasing economic value of land as a result of the extraction of cash-earning raw materials, was intensified as land gradually emerged as the most critical productive resource, especially in the cocoa industry. The economic and political power of traditional authorities largely derived from their control of communally-owned lands. Income sources included tributes and rents from land utilization and taxes from the extraction of raw materials. Ferry tolls across the Pra were also another source of income. The overall control of the traditional state over trade also helped to increase the opportunities for nascent accumulation of wealth and property.

However, enterprising individual commoners who actively played various roles in the long distance trade, and the 'production' of raw materials also began to chart
independent routes to the accumulation of wealth and property. Many individuals who during the early years of settlement procured several plots of land by right of original occupation, also gained a head start in the process of accumulation. According to oral traditional sources, it was during the cocoa production period in the 1920s, when demand for land increased substantially, that a more regulated mode of acquisition of land by citizens (ie. subjects of the stool in whose territory the land was located) was enforced. From then on, individual citizens were allocated or granted land either by the chief or by the lineage head.

Thus prior to that, both the royalty and the commoners who became owners and controllers of land stood the chance of choosing among several options in the utilization of land during the cocoa production period. They could either engage hired labour or sharecroppers, or utilize family labour or alienate land outright. They could also opt to combine any of these alternatives.

Clearly there was social differentiation by ascription ie. membership of matrilineages qualified individuals to either succeed to political office or inherit property. On this basis, there were the adehye ie. nobles or royalists. There were also the amanfo ie. citizens by virtue of owing allegiance to the stool. There were also the nnonkofo ie slaves; and the nkoa ie. vassals.
However, this mode of social differentiation was rapidly being cut across and replaced by social differentiation by economic achievement. Hence there were the asikafo ie rich people, who had accumulated wealth and property; and there were ahiafo ie. the relatively poor. Prominent among the rich were the nobility, whose social standing derived from tradition and custom, demonstrating the extent to which socio-economic change was already becoming a salient factor in the functioning of the traditional political set-up. There were also the social strivers, emerging from the ranks of the commoners, who through their own initiative and drive had carved a niche for themselves by making the most of the cash-earning opportunities which contact with European merchant capital offered. The relatively poor segments of society actively rendered labour, military and communal services. They included ex-slaves who had been incorporated into the host community.

Despite the salience of kin relations, especially unilineal descent groups, social differentiation based on the accumulation principle was clearly emerging. Beneath ascriptive social ranking, economic individualism within the unilineal descent group was becoming particularly prominent as increasing opportunities for individuals to chart their own paths to economic independence emerged. However, as Lobban advises,
With the interpenetration of the old and the new class and kin, it becomes necessary to distinguish the form from the content of kin relations; for traditional forms of kinship may come to have a new class content. Those looking for a wholesale transcendence of kin by class will look in vain for thoroughly supporting data. (92)

In so far as inequalities in access to the means of production, and inequalities in the accumulation of wealth and property were becoming economically, socially and politically significant, one could speak of a process of nascent class formation taking place. Whether this could be transformed into definitive class formation in terms of the development of opposing relations in the process of production would depend on the use made of the accumulated wealth. The question is whether the choice would be conspicuous consumption of wealth or the investment of wealth as capital in the process of production. These possibilities will be explored in the next section.

2.4 Cocoa Production and Agrarian Structural Change

Cocoa production became the most important economic activity in which Ghanaians living within the closed, wet forest regions, including the Twifo-Hemang participated. This was in enthusiastic response to the demand by European industrial capital for cocoa used as a raw material mainly for the manufacture of cocoa and chocolate beverages and
Cocoa was originally a Mesoamerican crop introduced by the Dutch into the islands off the Gulf of Guinea along the Atlantic coast of West Africa. It was first introduced to the Akwapim area in south-east Ghana in 1879 by a Ghanaian. Soon it became so popular that it displaced other crops like rubber and oil palm as the chief cash-earning and export crop on grounds of its relatively higher producer prices and less physical demands. The colonial state encouraged its westward expansion through the development of road and rail transportation, which permitted large population movements across the boundaries of hitherto independent and relatively 'isolated' traditional states. The development of the industry was another hallmark of the entrepreneurial capabilities of the native population.

Although indigenes of these areas (including Twifo-Hemang) had begun responding to this new opportunity to participate in the expanding commodity market, it has been well established that it was the aggressive response of migrant ethnic groups from the original centre in the east which gave the industry the push westwards. (93) By the early 1910s Ghana had already emerged as the leading producer and exporter of cocoa in the world. In Twifo-Hemang, in-migrants, willing to participate in the infant industry were attracted by three factors; namely 1. the suitable ecological conditions, 2. the availability of
land and 3. the construction of the Cape Coast to Twifo-Praso motor road in the early 1910s and the Kade to Hunni Valley railway which passes through Twifo-Praso, opened in 1927. As Dickson and Benneh have shown, this railway was constructed 'to stimulate greater production of cocoa, kola nuts and timber in the Central and Eastern Regions'. (94)

Three main groups of in-migrants could be distinguished. Firstly, those who had participated in earlier commercial activities including the palm and rubber trade and had had some experience in cocoa production. Most of these migrated from the south-eastern area, including the Akwapim, the Ga, Krobo and Shai people. The most important, in terms of numbers and the role they have since played in the transformation of the political economy of Twifo-Hemang, are the matrilineal Akwapim, in whose home of origin the production of cocoa began. All these groups had accumulated experience in the mechanics of commerce, especially money and credit, and had accumulated enough wealth which they were willing to invest as capital in acquiring land and hiring labour for cocoa production. They had migrated either because of shortage or lack of suitable land for cocoa in their home area, or for the sake of investing in multiple holdings of land in different areas.

Whilst other groups negotiated for land as individuals or congugal family groups, the Akwapim formed
land-purchasing groups or clubs. These were made up of individuals who pooled their financial resources together, and through their leaders negotiated with the host traditional landowners and controllers of communal land for the specific purpose of growing cocoa. The land purchased by each company was eventually sub-divided into private holdings amongst the members in proportion to the share of funds they had contributed to the purchase. By 1982-83 when this field research took pace, there was quite a sizeable Akwapim population in the area, and at least eight major Akwapim companies, named after the original leaders, as shown in Table 2.1.

The second group of in-migrants were those who had had some previous experience in participating in market relations but who, due to lack of the needed capital with which to purchase land outright, were prepared to participate in the process of production as sharecroppers on newly developed farms or as caretakers on already established farms on a more or less permanent basis. The Ewe and the Fante were dominant in this group, although this group is best described as an amalgam of various ethnic communities of southern Ghana.

A third group, dominated by ethnic groups from the relatively economically neglected Northern Territories, who were hard pressed for cash to meet their social obligations and/or to satisfy their personal needs in the expanding
Table 2.1 The Akwapim Companies in Twifo-Hemang (1982-1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Date of Acquisition</th>
<th>Akwapim Origin</th>
<th>Twifo-Hemang Destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. David Yaw Koram</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Mamfe</td>
<td>Twifo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Angua Ansa</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Mampong</td>
<td>Twifo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kwadjo Kumi</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Mamfe</td>
<td>Twifo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Otu Kwasi</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Mamfe</td>
<td>Twifo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Asare Mankatta</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Tutu</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kwabena Borbor</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Larteh</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kwabena Addo</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Larteh</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Taw Atta</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Adukrom</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1. Regional Lands Dept., Cape Coast, Files I-III, ESC/DC49/72.
3. Proceedings and Judgement, K. Ayisi etc. V. TOPP, Civil Appeal No. 23/5/83, Accra, Superior Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal, Accra.
market economy, came to sell their labour power as farm labourers. (96) The majority of these were seasonal workers, engaged in clearing forest at the beginning of the farming season, weeding in-between young cocoa trees in mid-season, or assisting in the harvesting, fermentation, drying and transporting the product to the market centres.

Thus, like other emerging cocoa growing areas, Twifo-Hemang's population became heterogeneous in terms of its ethnic composition. It was the economic attractiveness of the industry and the corresponding increasing demand for land for cultivating the crop which were most responsible for these developments. Rising demand raised the economic value of land and gave chiefs, lineage heads, elders and councillors, in control of communally-owned lands opportunities to take advantage of the situation. They improved their economic positions by alienating large portions of stool and lineage lands at the expense of future generations of their constituents. Explanation of the reasons why and how traditional leaders began using their political positions for personal economic gains will be given later.

In terms of the unequal access to land and the development of a market in land, it is useful to distinguish between the concepts 'citizens' (amanfo) and 'strangers' (ahoho). They are defined in terms of kinship and political affiliation, and not in terms of cultural and
residential criteria. (97) Membership of one of the maximal lineages which owe allegiance to a particular stool in control of the territorial entity in which the land is situated, qualifies an individual indefeasibly as a citizen. A citizen, in principle, is protected by the traditional land tenure system, which specifies the inherent right of every citizen not to be denied usufruct of land. A stranger, on the other hand, is defined as not belonging to any of the maximal lineages which owe allegiance to the stool. It has nothing to do with location or duration of residence. At first glance, it may appear that customary land law discriminates against strangers only in terms of ethnicity, defined broadly as people with common cultural background. However, a closer examination, narrows the criterion down to kinship (i.e. common traceable ancestral background) and political (i.e. common allegiance to a stool) affiliation. (98)

In effect, strangers in some areas may be from the same ethnic background as citizens, and yet they cannot have free access to land. They must negotiate with the local traditional authorities and land owning groups and individuals to purchase land outright or participate in tenant-sharecopping or farm labour. In so far as access to land usufruct went, citizens of Hemang were treated as strangers in neighbouring Twifo, Wassaw, Denkyira and Assin, and vice versa. Local entrepreneurs, who had accumulated
wealth by virtue of participating successfully in previous commercial activities, and who were willing to improve their economic condition independent of their extended kin groups, also invested in land in neighbouring traditional areas. Multiple holding was a common phenomenon among individuals whose financial standing enabled them to do so. (99)

Land alienation was not however restricted to cocoa farming. Following the opening up of the area, through the introduction of motor road and rail transport, European speculators were also attracted to the area, to negotiate with the traditional authorities for timber concessions. Some companies such as R.T. Briscoe, Pan Saw Mills, Vance and Lumber Co., and Amponsaso Co. obtained large concessions, with leases extending up to 99 years, in the 1940s and 1950s. These companies are still operating in the area. (100)

The alarming rate at which communal lands were being alienated by traditional authorities became a matter of concern to the colonial administration. In Twifo-Hemang, a number of forest reserves (eg. the Pra-Suhien Blocks 1 & 2 Forest Reserves and the Kakum Forest Reserve) were created in order to preserve the ecological balance of the area. Attempts were also made to discourage traditional leaders from further alienating lands to strangers. Lord Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a letter to the Governor of colonial Ghana had stated that,
It is very undesirable that this industry which has been developed by the natives with so much success, to pass out of their control, so that future generations will find themselves in the position of labourers on the lands which their ancestors owned or occupied under the communal system. (101)

Accordingly, instructions were sent to the Commissioner in charge of the Central Province in which Twifo-Hemang was located, to organize meetings with the chiefs and people and impress upon them that,

It is not the desire of the government that the native proprietor should lose the benefit of any improvement in the trade in this product. The danger of hasty or inconsidered alienation of palm bearing lands must be impressed on the chiefs and their people. (102)

Many chiefs did not take kindly to what they considered undue interference in their local affairs, and apparently did not hide their feelings. The Colonial Secretary had to qualify his position in another correspondence;

My remarks on the subject of alienation appeared to rather perturb some of the chiefs. Please assure them that concessions already granted should not be affected, but that my remarks referred to the future. (103)

The most important question to pose at this juncture is why land, the most crucial means of production and reproduction, was being actively alienated by traditional authorities; whose duty it was, to ensure that future generations of the citizenry were not deprived of their
inalienable rights to free usufruct of communal lands. No simple, straightforward answer exists. However, several factors can be suggested as contributing to this process.

First, at that historic juncture, the ratio of indigenous population to unoccupied communal land was not high enough to pose any immediate threat to the existing citizenry. Rather, the threat at that point in time could be ignored because of the long-term perspective. That is, no one worried at that point in time about future generations being deprived of their inherent right to free usufruct of community-owned lands.

Second, the traditional land tenure was flexible enough to allow granting land to strangers for a token fee, once the beneficiaries acknowledged the sovereignty of the host stool, and accordingly paid tributes and rendered services as ordinary citizens. What was new, however, was the increasing monetization of the process, the rate at which alienation was proceeding, and the shift from communal gains to personal gains.

A third factor has to do with the intensification of land disputes between stools, and between the latter and big land owners, and the need for cash by traditional states to finance protracted litigation. The persistent territorial boundary disputes between traditional states was not limited to Hemang and Twifo alone. Disputes between Hemang and their neighbours, Denkyira, Assin and Wassaw were finally
settled by the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission as late as 1979. (104)

Fourth, the personal acquisitive motives of individual traditional office holders explains why revenue from the sale, lease and use of stool and lineage lands was eventually diverted into private pockets instead of being applied to communal purposes as customary law demanded. It also explains why traditional leaders began to divert and transform portions of communally-owned stool lands into their private property which they proceeded to alienate or develop into cocoa farms. (105)

Fifth, the formation of the colonial state led on the one hand to the drastic reduction of various pre-colonial sources of income for traditional leaders eg. war booty, tributes from the citizenry and conquered states, imposition of taxes on trade, collection of ferry tolls and other fees. On the other hand, even though incomes were decreasing, the preservation of the grandeur and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy within an expanding money economy raised the expenditure of chiefs and traditional dignitaries and hence their need for cash. For example, the traditional elaborate hospitality accorded to visitors; the maintenance and improvement of stool regalia; the costly funeral rites for traditional state dignitaries, the renumeration of state officials, the funding of public works and the like, increasingly became economic and especially
monetary burdens on traditional authorities.

Last, but not the least, the increasing dependence on imported commodities following the formal integration of the Ghanaian economy into the world market, the cultivation of new tastes for European made commodities; and the development of new needs following the institution of colonial rule, in transport, education and health, all increased the need for cash. Hence communally-owned lands under the control of chiefs and other traditional leaders became sources of accumulating wealth and fulfilling individual's increasing financial obligations.

The change from an economy based primarily on a combination of commerce and shifting cultivation to a combination of permanent tree crop production (cocoa has a fruit-bearing period averaging 30 to 40 years) and semi-permanent food crop production had important social-structural implications. The expanding market relations also contributed to this structural transformation process. It was becoming more convenient for the individual to organize production around the nuclear family domiciled in permanent farm settlements rather than relying on the dispersed extended kin relations. The extension of market relations gradually transformed the production unit into a combined production and consumption unit; the latter depending more and more on the consumption of imported commodities and new needs to be met with cash expenditure.
It was becoming more convenient to reduce costs by focusing on the domestic production unit, rather than expending on kin relations, who might not necessarily be involved in the actual process of production.

Rising markets in both land and labour permitted those with previously accumulated wealth to invest in land outside the control of their matrilineal kin or even outside their stool area, and to employ labour outside the extended kin group. Extended kinship ties were becoming no longer the only means of obtaining access to the means of production and reproduction. A process of nucleation of the family in economic matters was set in motion.

Traditional forms of mutual aid in labour and reciprocal exchange relations began breaking down and being replaced by other forms of contractural labour and market relations. Indeed traditional authorities had to be content with employing sharecroppers and farm labourers, just like ordinary citizens. Extended familial ties as a means of economic and social security began to be eroded as many other forms of spatial and social mobility emerged. Individuals by their own efforts could take advantage of new means to economic independence. A process of greater individuation in economic ventures was in the offing. Enterprising individuals could opt to become peddlers in imported commodities, brokers and middlemen in the cocoa trade, general traders in their own right and transport
owners and employees. Later, education and urbanization became key routes to economic achievement. The colonial state was gradually taking over some of the traditional functions of the extended family through the spread of education, urbanization and government employment. The matrilineal descent group which maintained its strength 'on the pragmatic grounds that one stood to lose by opting out of family obligations' was breaking down. (106) The cocoa industry and other economic forces stemming from the colonial economy set these processes in motion. (107)

The incorporation of hitherto subsistence cultivators of Twifo-Hemang into the world capitalist-dominated market as producers of raw materials for capital and consumers of manufactured commodities, and the expanding money and market relations following their absorption into a wider, national market dominated by European merchant capital, created a peasantry locked up willy-nilly in commodity relations. The main characteristics which differentiate the peasantry as simple commodity producers from subsistence cultivators have already been discussed in the first chapter. The labour of the peasantry, involved in the production of both use-values and exchange-values was formally subsumed under capital. In this sense, even though capital was not directly involved in the process of production, it extracted the surplus product in the form of surplus value through its control and
manipulation of the market. The direct producer ultimately received producer prices far less than the prices obtaining on the world market, while paying more and more for imported commodities.

The producer price did not take into account the cost of the means of production, the purchase and replacement of the means of work (tools, seeds), the labour power of kinsfolk and the wages of hired labour and other organizational costs. As Howard correctly argued,

...since in Ghana it was the cash crop product, not the labour power of the producer, which was being sold, the mental labour necessary to create the product (ie. planning, organization, marketing skills etc.) was also not calculated into the costs of production. Exploitation in the context of monocultural economies does not simply mean that the producer is paid less for his product than the ultimate distributor receives on the world market (implying there is somewhere a "fair" market price), but rather that the factors of production, including labour power, are not being fully renumerated.(108)

The peasant had to cover the costs of reproduction of labour and the means of production from the production of subsistence crops ie peasants renumerate their own labour costs by producing their own subsistence. Thus,

...the exchange-value of commodities is lowered to the extent to which the reproduction of the producers is 'subsidized' through use-value production drawing on the labour of all members of the household above a certain age.(109)

The typical peasant increased production through the
intensification of labour, in order to increasingly ensure the generation of net incomes which would permit the continued reproduction of the domestic unit of production on both daily and generational basis.

The peasantry created in Twifo-Hemang, was not an undifferentiated, homogeneous class. It was differentiated according to three main criteria. First, the differential relations of various groups to the means of production in terms of their unequal access to, or ownership/non-ownership of land which enabled some (eg. landlords) to exploit the labour of others (eg. sharecroppers). Second, they were differentiated in terms of their differential position or role in the productive process. Production relations were defined by the manner in which the surplus product of direct producers was appropriated through specific institutional forms eg. landlord-tenant relations and rent, rich peasant-farm labourer relations and wages (in cash and in kind), money lending and interest and so on.

Third, they were differentiated by the variable capacity of different groups to reconstitute the labour process by ensuring the sustained social reproduction of their labour power. This depended on their ability to generate net incomes to meet their social obligations and to survive occasional phases of economic crises (eg. producer price depressions, poor harvests, dismal sales, increasing costs of land and land litigation). In the absence of
banking facilities, peasants who were hard hit by these factors and in need of cash frequently depended on cash advances from the wealthy ones (the landlords and rich peasants), for the reproduction of their labour power. The practice of pledging land with crops for loans from richer peasants, money lenders, landlords and agents of merchant capital such as middlemen and brokers at very high rates of interest, was not uncommon. In a letter expressing concern about this practice in the area, the District Commissioner of Cape Coast complained that,

Trading firms, lawyers and landlords lend money to farmers at 50% or more and taking a mortgage on the farmer and frequently entering into agreement to the effect that until the debt and interest is paid off, the mortgagee shall have all the produce that is of the best marketable quality at the current market price and that below the aforesaid quality shall be sold by him the mortgagee on commission for the mortgagor. Such rates of interest and mortgages should be prohibited. (111)

When the simple reproduction of the labour power of the production unit tended to depend continually on cash advances from merchant capital (i.e. perpetual indebtedness), the latter clearly exerted a definite command over the condition of the labour of the direct producers, and the mechanism of surplus value appropriation is debt.

Landlords and rich peasants differentiated themselves from small-holding, middle peasants and poor peasants, by their ownership and control of relatively
larger tracts of farmlands than they and their families alone could not cultivate, and hence could sell land, or lease land for a definite period of time for cash or rent land on shareholding basis. More importantly they could employ wage labour and lend money to needy peasants. Small-holding, middle peasants, in control of only enough land to exploit their families' labour, were differentiated from the poor peasants by their abilities to maintain ownership or control of their small holdings and to service their debts. They occasionally employed casual labour outside their families. Poor peasants, the majority of whom were 'strangers', mainly participated in the process of production as tenants who paid annual cash rents to landlords or as sharecroppers whose landlords extracted a portion of the surplus product as rent. They tended to be the commonest victims of the money lenders.

**Summary - Conclusions**

In this chapter, it has been shown that there were considerable advances made in the development of a market in land in the late colonial period of Twifo-Hemang. However, the majority of direct producers were citizens who had access to land through membership of matrilineages.
Non-capitalist relations of production continued to predominate, but the partial development of a market in land, as a result of the expanding money and market relations which led to the increasing alienation of communally-owned lands to 'strangers', contained the potential threat of land hunger for future generations of the citizen body. This was especially more serious in the case of the Hemang traditional area than in the Twifo traditional area.

Although extended kinship and ethnic relationships were still cultural, political and economic realities, it was clear that there were significant shifts towards greater individuation of labour and nucleation of the family in economic matters. The incorporation of direct producers in a wider capitalist market under colonial rule led to the formal subsumption of their labour under capital as commodity producers, and the extraction of their surplus product as absolute surplus value by the colonial state and merchant capital. It led to the creation of a peasant class, differentiated into rich, middle and poor strata according to their unequal access to the means of production, their differential roles in the process of production and the mechanisms of surplus extraction among them. The result was categories of peasants having differential capacity to reproduce their labour power, independent of merchant capital. In the ensuing chapters, the main task will be to
evaluate further changes in agrarian structure as a result of the intervention of the post-colonial state and private capital in the traditional land tenure affairs and the productive process in Twifo-Hemang.
Notes on Chapter Two


3. A geographical region combines the physical and human or economic characteristics of an area, arriving at a pattern of relationship between the two which gives the area a distinctive character.


7. Cadaster (noun) - A register, survey, or map of the extent, ownership, value etc. of lands as a basis of taxation.


15. A Boahen, 'Asante and Fante, AD. 1000-1800' in J. F. A. Ajayi


22. Colonial Government, 'Customary Land Tenure in the Gold Coast', prepared by the Commissioner of Central Province, Cape Coast for the Acting Colonial Secretary, Accra, August 22, 1912, pp. 1, 3-4 in RAO/GNA/Adm. 23/1/204.


31. Pawning was a system in which families or individuals indebted to others could pledge an individual to serve as security for the loan until the debt was paid.
32. Colonial Gov't., Customary Land Tenure...(1912), op.cit., p.3.

33. Suite no. 113/1928, Ellis and Wood v. Kobina Otoo, Perpetual Injunction against Kobina Otoo II, Omanhene of Hemang on Feb. 18, 1931 at the High Court, Cape Coast; in RAO/GNA/Adm. 23/1/373.


36. The colonial name of Ghana was the Gold Coast as the Portuguese called it, because 'the whole region between Cape Three Points and Cape Coast was so rich in gold'. Elmina, where the first European merchants (the Portuguese) built a fortress they named Sao Jorge de Mina, was so called because of the abundance of gold in use by the local people. The latter collected gold from the mouth of the River Pra which flows through Twifo-Hemang country, emptying its waters into the Atlantic Ocean in the village of Shama (See W.E.F. Ward, A History of Ghana (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1958). It is claimed that 'for more than half a century - between 1470 and 1520 - Portuguese Mina and the major trading station of Sao Jorge - provided the greatest source of gold specie in all of Europe's possession overseas'. John Vogt, Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast, 1469-1682 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), p.ix.


42. See also, J.K. Fynn (1974) op.cit., p.10.

44. Ibid., p.106. The linguist (the official spokesman for the chief) holds the staff when a delegation is on a state-authorized errand. Every stool has a different totemic figure (usually an animal or creature) often cast from gold, or silver or copper which usually represents the clan from which the royal line claims descent.


46. A. Boahen (1975) op.cit. p.17.


49. Ibid. p.365.

50. G.T. Stride and C. Ifeka (1971) op.cit., p.240. Also W.E.F. Ward (1958) op.cit., p.120.


57. A. Boahen (1975) op.cit. pp.50, 52.

58. Ibid., p.17.

59. S. Tenkorang (1968) op.cit., p.2.


64. G. E. Metcalfe (1964) op. cit., p. 196.

65. A. Boahen (1975) op. cit., p. 33.


72. See J. Brian-Wills (1962 op. cit., p. 362. Land Rotation is synonymous with bush fallowing, and involves the periodic shift from one piece of farmed land to another, in order to enable the former land to regain its fertility. The cultivator returns to the land later while leaving the latest farmed area to fallow. This system is distinct from shifting cultivation practised when population was thin, land abundant and there was virtually no restriction on the acquisition of land. The latter involved permanent movement of both the cultivators and the abandonment of settlements. Since the cocoa production period shifting cultivation has been abandoned. It will be recalled that in the first section a relationship was drawn between the amount of land owned by the direct producer, the period of fallow and level of productivity.

73. The extraction of palm oil is laborious, and transportation demanded a large amount of labour. According to Sutton, transport was primarily by headloading and commonly needed up to four hundred carriers in a caravan to the coast.

74. See RAO/GNA/Adm. 23/1/373; Adm. 23/1/235 and Adm. 23/1/204.

75. Despatch no. 444/S/NA39/1921 in Case no. CP165/1921 from the Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, Cape Coast, dated Sept. 21, 1921 to the Acting Secretary of Native Affairs Dept., Accra. Also the reply, despatch no. 497/CP165/1921 both in RAO/GNA/Adm.23/1/204. Also despatch no. 206/21/D18/1921 from the District Commissioner, Cape Coast to the Commissioner of the Central Province, Cape Coast dated July 21, 1921.


80. Despatch no. 220/283/38 dated Feb. 14, 1941 from the District Commissioner, Dunkwa to the District Commissioner, Cape Coast in Case no. S182/1920 in RAO/GNA/Adm.23/1/373.


83. Colonial Government, *Customary Land Tenure...*(1912) *op. cit.* Deviations from this customary norm usually led to social conflicts between chiefs and elders and between them and the citizenry. The deposition (or destoolment) of Nana Kyei Baffour Ababio I in 1939 and the 1982 abdication of Nana Kyei Baffour II, both paramount chiefs of Hemang were caused by this issue.

84. For full details of these arrangements and the ensuing conflict between 1870-1956 see despatch no. 220/283/38 from the D. C., Dunkwa to the D.C., Cape Coast dated Feb. 14, 1921 in RAO/GNA/Adm.23/1/373, Case no. S182/1920.
85. Suite no. 113/1928, J. A. Arthur and B. Dennis (for Wood and Ellis families respectively) v. Kobina Otoo II, Omanhene of Hemang. Order of Perpetual Injunction made by the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony, Central Province Divisional Court, Cape Coast on Feb. 18, 1931 against Nana Kobina Otoo II, Omanhene of Hemang.

86. In 1928, surveyors employed by Ellis and Wood families to measure individual farms and enumerate economic products liable for taxation were physically harassed by the citizens of Hemang. There were riots which ended with a contingent of police from Sekondi quelling it on the orders of the District Commissioner (see despatch no. 1009/27/5/1926 from the Inspector-General of Police, Accra to the Commissioner of the Central Province, Cape Coast, dated Sept. 7, 1928 and despatch no. 651/S182/20 from the D.C. of Cape Coast to the Asst. D.C. of Twifo-Praso dated Sept. 13, 1928 in RAO/GNA/Adm.23/1/373.

87. There were cases of double sales. For example, three Akwapim land purchasing companies bought their land initially from the Hemang stool, and later were forced to buy the same lands from Ellis and Wood (see Petition no. KOA/OC/DYK/77 by K. O. Ampofo, Barrister-at-law and Solicitor on behalf of the Akwapim Companies in Twifo-Hemang to the Head of State, the Supreme Military Council, Accra, dated May 3, 1977 in Regional Lands Dept. File II, ESC/DC49/72 TJ). Ellis and Wood were responsible for leasing large tracts of land for 99 years to R.T. Briscoe Co. in 1944 and Pan Saw Mills Co. in 1955 as timber concessions (RAO/GNA/Adm.23/1/204). It was the reckless sale of lands by the Hemang paramount chief Nana Kobina Otoo II to some Akwapim companies and other strangers without consulting other traditional authorities that resulted in his destoolment, officially published in Gazette Notice no. 806, page 643 of Gazette no. 56 of Aug. 19, 1939.

88. For details of the legal conflicts between the Morkwa (Twifo) and Hemang stools, and between the latter and the Ellis and Wood families, see the following: Despatch no. 877/34/204/1921 from D.C., Cape Coast to Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, Cape Coast dated July 23, 1934 in RAO/GNA/Adm.23/1/235; despatch no. 284/283/1938 from D.C. Dunkwa to D.C. Cape Coast in RAO/GNA/23/1/235; Memorandum by H. J. P. Crawford, Asst. D.C., Dunkwa dated Feb. 13, 1941 in RAO/GNA/ADM.23/1/373; and more recently a review memorandum by the Attorney General's Dept., Ghana on Petition by Nana Kyei Baffour II, Omanhene of Hemang
Traditional Area to the National Redemption Council—despatch no. CCB/HC249/73/78 in Regional Lands Dept. File III, ESC/DC49/72TJ. Also Petition by Nana Kyei Baffour II to the N.R.C. (1972) in Regional Lands Dept. File I, ESC/DC49/72.


93. Among the lot, the work of Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana (Cambridge University Press, 1963), stands out as a classic.


95. It was possible to compile the data presented in the table because the Akwapim were the most active among the stranger ethnic groups, in the spate of conflicts which followed the indiscriminate, compulsory acquisition of lands in the area in the 1970s by the post-colonial state. Data was pieced together from a variety of sources, including written protest notes and memoranda by their legal representatives, published proceedings of some major land disputes in courts, and official files of the Regional Lands Department, Cape Coast.


98. The distinction between citizens and strangers in the affairs of accessibility to land, is a long-standing traditional practice predating colonial rule. Its prominence however, came with the inception of colonial rule, which imposed territorial boundaries on an area which was once a 'medley of independent traditional states' (Dickson, 1966:417). The division serves two purposes. Firstly, it encourages citizens to remain in and help develop their home areas. Secondly, and more importantly, the restrictions on unlimited alienation of existing land to strangers, ensures the reservation of land for future generations of the citizenry.

99. During my fieldwork I encountered several examples of people from Twifo owning land and farms in Hemang, and vice-versa. Some strangers also owned land in both areas.

100. Regional Lands Dept., File I, ESC/DC49/72, Cape Coast; Ghana Gov't., Land and Concessions Bulletin, No. 8 (Friday, November 9, 1979) p.32.

101. Despatch No. 754/CP165/1921, dated Feb. 25, 1913 in Case no. CP/165/1921 in RA0/GNA/Adm.23/1/204.

102. Despatch no. 2256/12 from the Colonial Secretary, Accra dated May 6, 1913 to the Commissioner of the Central Province, Cape Coast.

103. Despatch no. 1235/MP1197/1917 dated Aug. 21, 1913 from Acting Colonial Secretary to the Commissioner, Central Province, Cape Coast.


105. Such unilateral alienation of stool lands by chiefs often led to conflicts between chiefs, elders and the citizen body. The divisional and sub-chiefs, council-elders of Twifo-Hemang for example, advanced charges against the Paramount Chief, Nana Kyei Baffour Ababio II in 1939 for alienating large portions of the Hemang Stool lands to some Akwapim companies without consulting them and failing to account for the proceeds. The chief's deposition on July 17, 1939 was confirmed in Gazette Notice no. 806, page 643 of Gazette no. 56 of Aug. 19, 1939.

107. Observing these general trends in areas where cocoa production had caught on in Ghanaian society, Governor Hugh Clifford in the Colonial Legislative Council (October 25, 1917) stated that,

Their adoption of this unfamiliar industry entailed a great revolution in their social structure. Though all land still theoretically belongs to the Stool, the vested interest of the cocoa farmers has brought into being a measure of individual property in real estate, such as was never contemplated by ancient tribal customs. The acquisition of considerable wealth by individuals who would otherwise enjoy no high status in the tribe to which they belong, is also a new feature in the social life of the native communities, and the political results which this shows of producing should be jealously watched by all who desire to see the tribal constitutions, which their ancestors have evolved, preserved from the disintegrating forces of too rapid innovation, (in Metcalfe 1964, *op. cit.*, pp.566-7).


110. In 1982 a commercial bank was finally opened at Twifo-Praso.

111. Despatch no. M96/12/23 from the District Commissioner, Cape Coast to the Secretary of State, dated May 20, 1923 in Case no. CP165/1921 in RA0/GNA/Adm.23/1/204.

112. The Abusa is a tenancy system whereby the stranger, at his own expense, clears, and cultivates a tract of virgin land allocated by the landlord and enjoys the beneficial use thereof in consideration of surrendering a third share of the annual produce of the land to the landlord. The Abunu is a tenancy whereby in consideration of enjoying a half of the annual produce the landlord either hands over a farm to the tenant to manage and harvest or provide the tenant with
funds to establish a farm to be operated by the tenant. The grant of tenancy 'confers upon the stranger a right to occupy and use land for a special purpose for an indefinite period, so long as the tenant continues to observe and perform the terms and conditions upon which he was let into possession'. N.A. Ollenu, *Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana* (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1962), p.79
CHAPTER THREE

THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND THE TWIFO-HEMANG LAND PROBLEM

Introduction

It was stated at the outset that the ultimate objective of this work is an analysis and evaluation of the dynamics of the impact of the intrusion of the state and capital in the land tenure affairs and the production process in Twifo-Hemang. In the previous chapter, it was shown that such structural changes had long historical roots. The main task of this chapter is to examine the social-structural processes set in motion by the direct intervention of the post-colonial state in the land issue. It will examine the effects of these processes on the social, political and economic condition of the various social classes and groups involved and its impact on their relations to the most critical means of production—land. The analysis of the changing relations of land cannot be divorced from its effect on the role of various classes and groups in the organization of production. Indeed their separate treatment in the organization of this work is aimed solely at achieving simplicity and clarity in the presentation of the material.

This chapter is organized in three sections. The
first section analyses the circumstances which led to the intervention of the state in the local land affairs, the objectives and the process of the compulsory acquisition of the so-called 'Hemang Lands'. The second section begins by identifying and describing the various social forces - social classes, groups, communities etc. - involved in the formulation and implementation of state policy, and their roles (social action, interaction, contradictions, conflicts) in the process. This section also examines whether the objectives of the policy were achieved, and examines who benefited in the process. The last section analyses the impact of these processes on the economic and political condition of the social actors involved, and their relations to the means of production.

3.1 The Compulsory Acquisition of the 'Hemang Lands'

Chapter 2 provided the historical and cultural background of the legal conflict between the Hemang stool and the Twifo stool over the boundary between the two communities. It was shown that the Hemang stool lost the land conflict in the colonial courts and yet refused, or rather failed, to pay the legal costs owed to the Twifo stool. This resulted in the latter, on the authority of the colonial courts, selling all the Hemang stool lands to two private individuals, namely Ellis and Wood, by public
auction. The whole affair culminated in the appointment of the Hemang paramount chief as a 'bailiff-tenant' by their new landlords, with the duty of collecting all revenue (rents, dues, tolls, royalties) on behalf of the new landowners. In return the bailiff-tenant was to receive one-third of the total annual proceeds and the stool family was to be exempted from paying any rents. (1) It was shown, that subsequent chiefs of Hemang and the citizen body of peasants refused either to recognize Ellis and Wood as the owners of the Hemang stool lands, or to comply with the terms of the bailiff-tenancy agreement. The presence of two contending owners of the Hemang lands, resulted in the upsurge of the alienation of lands in the Hemang area, and the escalation of land disputes which spilled over into the post-colonial era.

One chief, Nana Kyei Baffour II, enstooled as the Paramount Chief of Hemang in 1961, apparently realizing the futility of continuing to seek legal redress, decided to seek a political solution to the problem. In a petition to the civilian Convention Peoples' Party government of the First Republic in 1964, he argued that,

The Traditional Area of Hemang will have no where to stand at the Courts, if your Ministry fails to use the party's political powers to liberate the vast lands of Twifo-Hemang from the exploiters. The existence of the bailiff-tenant agreements (of 21 January, 1897 and 30 November, 1945) makes it impossible to negotiate for the reclamation of the
lands without indulging in expensive litigation, which in fact I do not consider fit to encourage. (2)

Despite his persistent efforts in seeking a political solution to the problem, including forging alliances with some influential bureaucrats and politicians who lobbied on his behalf, it was not until the coming into power of Ghana's second military regime, the National Redemption Council (N.R.C.) in 1972 that some form of response came. The chief rewarded some of his allies with land in the Hemang area to embark upon large-scale oil palm growing. (4)

In a detailed petition to the Head of State and Chairman of the N.R.C. in 1972 calling for the restoration of the Hemang lands to the stool, the chief argued that:

1. There were fraudulent deals between Ellis and Wood and the Twifo stool in the execution of the three contradictory Certificates of Purchase of 1894, 1896 and 1903, which gave legal backing for the ownership of the Hemang stool lands to Ellis and Wood; and
2. the Ellis and Wood families and their lawyers took advantage of the ignorance and illiteracy of two previous paramount chiefs of Hemang to induce them into signing two 'Baliff-tenant' agreements in 1897 and 1945, by which the Hemang stool gave legal recognition to Ellis and Wood as the rightful owners of the Hemang stool lands. He concluded that,

Since I was enstooled in 1961 I have not entered
into any agreement with Ellis and Wood by reason that I do not recognize both Certificates of Purchase and Bailiff Tenancy agreements as they directly indicate fraud. I feel committed to write and ask the Government to step in on my behalf and all subjects of Hemang Traditional Area. In order to avoid further litigations I Nana Kyei Baffour II, with the support of the elders and people of Hemang, do pledge to the Government to use its powers to declare the whole of Hemang lands as stool lands to enable the Local Councils and the Government to collect such revenue for local development. This will amount to legal confirmation that the Hemang Lands are stool lands. (5) Subsequent petitions he sent to other top state bureaucrats raised a number of issues which put further pressure on the government to respond. (6) Some of the issues included, the harassment of Hemang peasant-farmers by the Ellis and Wood families in collaboration with some top Police and Military personnel; the lack of development in the Hemang area due to the land conflict; an appeal for an independent public inquiry into the colonial issues involving the Twifo stool and the Hemang stool, and between the latter and the Ellis and Wood families.

The first step the N.R.C. regime took in response was to refer the issue to top bureaucrats in the civilian arm of the military regime to study and to make recommendations to government for appropriate action. The State Attorney of Cape Coast argued that 'a prima facie case had been established by the Petitioner, the Omanhene of Hemang'. He recommended that 'an interim injunction be placed on the lands in question' while a Lands Commission
was appointed to inquire into the 'alleged sale of Hemang Lands'. (7) The Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Lands Commission recommended that the government 'invoke its powers under Act 125 of 1962 to vest the Hemang lands in the State and settle the matter once and for all'. (8) Both further recommended that the Administrator of Stool Lands be assigned the responsibility of collecting all revenue on the land until the issue was settled. Finally,

...by early 1974 the Principal State Attorney in Accra who was assigned to study in detail the legal issues arising from the counter-claims, had advised that the 'Hemang Lands' be acquired compulsorily by Government. (9)

Based on these recommendations, the consensus of which suggested the virtual nationalization of the 'Hemang Lands', the government took a decisive action. Without prior public notification or consultation with the people, the State Lands (Hemang-Lands Acquisition) Instrument, 1974 (Executive Instrument, 61) was published on June 21, 1974 vesting 190,784 acres of land in the area in the State. The social, legal and political upheaval which greeted this action, led to various changes in the original legal instrument in an effort to plug loopholes and redress certain perceived injustices. The State Lands (Hemang-Lands Acquisition) Instrument, 1974 (E.I. 133) was published soon afterwards, revoking the original instrument and backdating the acquisition to February 21, 1973. A year
later, The Hemanq Lands (Acquisition) Decree, 1975 (NRCD332), was published on May 2, 1975 aimed at strengthening the legal basis of the acquisition exercise but still maintaining the area of land affected and the date of acquisition i.e., Feb. 21, 1973. A decree passed by a military regime is considered as legally effective as an Act of Parliament, whereas an executive instrument is weaker and could be challenged by people affected by it in the courts. (10) Seven years later, the Hemanq Lands (Acquisition) (Amendment) Law, 1982, (PNDCL29) (11) was published, amending NRCD332 of 1975 by decreasing the size of land compulsorily acquired by the State by over 80% down to 35,704.77 acres. As will be shown later this was mainly a direct result of the pressures made to bear on the state from traditional leaders, powerful individual landlords and rich peasants and some rural associations which mushroomed in the wake of the 'threat of land hunger' in the area. These changes are a reflection of the insufficient groundwork done by the state bureaucrats in the formulation of policy prior to the implementation of the acquisition exercise and the perceived bias in their implementation. This reduced their credibility and rendered them vulnerable to legal and political manipulation.

The acquisition exercise drew its legal backing from the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) which empowers the Head of State of Ghana, to compulsorily acquire any land, vesting
it in the State as 'land required in the public interest'. (12) The key provisions of Act. 125 of 1962 which would then apply to the Hemang Acquisition order were, 1. that the acquisition should be deemed to be 'in the public interest'; 2. that adequate publicity be given prior to the acquisition; 3. that prompt compensation at the 'market value or the replacement value of the land or the cost of disturbance or any other damage suffered', be paid to victims of the appropriation; 4. that 'no account shall be taken of any improvement on the land made within two years previous to the date of the publication of the instrument', or decree; and 5. that the State 'may grant a lease or licence in respect of any land acquired under this Act', or instrument or decree. (13) The first of these provisions will be addressed here. The remainder will become relevant to later analysis in this chapter.

Although the clause 'in the public interest' appears in almost all official documents relating to the power of the State to compulsorily acquire any land, nowhere has it been clearly and precisely defined. In the Second Republican Constitution where the only attempt was made to define the clause, it was defined as including 'matters of public health, town and country planning or other development or utilization as to promote the public benefit'. (14) It has thus remained an ambiguous, fluid, and amorphous concept which gives the State exceptionally wide
discretionary powers to decide what constitutes public interest. It can be stretched to include a whole gamut of tangible and intangible objectives. These range from specific development projects and resettlement schemes, to solving particular conflict situations or for sheer political expediency. (15)

One other problem is where to draw the line between public and private interests. This point is relevant in the present context where the government of the day was actively inviting private capital into large-scale agriculture; and had identified traditional land tenure institution as the main impediment to the realization of the objectives of the Operation Feed Yourself programme. (16)

In the Twifo-Hemang case, a main objective was to end the persistent conflict over the ownership and control of the so-called 'Hemang Lands'. As Brobbey argued,

Sometimes property may be expropriated to ensure political stability and to terminate prolonged land litigation. This is well illustrated by the recent acquisition of certain lands totalling 190,784 acres at Hemang in the Denkyira-Twifo-Hemang district in the Central Region of Ghana. By the acquisition Government was able to effectively terminate a series of land litigation dating from 1872 of an area involving several individuals and a number of stools. (17)

In the next section an assessment will be made of how effective the policy was in solving the conflict over the ownership and control of land in the area.
However, a second objective was the implementation of a comprehensive rural, agro-based industrial development project designed and set rolling immediately following the acquisition exercise in 1974. It involved the extensive cultivation of oil palm on large plantations and the production of palm oil in a factory situated in the area. The significance of this project lies in the manner in which it opened the way for the intrusion of state and international and Ghanaian private capital in the distribution of land and the process of production. In the ensuing chapter, the project will be evaluated in terms of its stated and implied objectives and its impact on agrarian structure.

3.2 The Acquisition Planning and Implementation

From the many problems which plagued the implementation of the land acquisition policy, it was clear that inadequate preliminary planning was done by the policy makers. There was no evidence that preliminary studies of the historical, political and cultural background of the peoples and how the compulsory acquisition of lands in the area was likely to affect them, was done. How the exercise would affect traditional land tenure and social structure was not taken into consideration in the planning stages. A feasibility study was done by British technical experts of
the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)), as part of a loan extended to the Ghanaian government in 1974. This study dealt largely with the technical possibilities, ecological suitability and economic viability of the project. (18) The human and sociological aspects were virtually ignored.

The formulation of policies unaccompanied by adequate groundwork for their effective and efficient implementation often achieves unintended results. If, as shown above, the whole land acquisition exercise and rural development package were partly aimed at finding a lasting solution to the land conflict situation, then it had a poor start. Three major problems emerged immediately following the publication of E.I.61 in 1974.

First, the problem of the territorial definition of 'Hemang Lands'. As can be verified from the title of the legal instruments and decree vesting over 190,000 acres of land in the area in the state, the whole exercise was aimed at what the legal drafters thought were Hemang stool lands, purported to have been sold to Ellis and Wood in the late nineteenth century. As it turned out however, the confiscated lands extended beyond Hemang territory, into Twifo and other neighbouring traditional areas, and became the cause of bitter conflict between rival traditional leaders, big individual and group landowners, and deeply involved the public officials charged with the
implementation of the land acquisition policy.

Second, there seemed to be an assumption that all lands in the area were stool lands over which the traditional authorities had indefeasible and unlimited control. As Ninsin correctly argued in relation to national trends especially in post-colonial Ghana,

Legal enactments tend to accord legal security to the rights of a meagre minority viz traditional rulers as well as other authorities recognized by custom, to utilize the lands of the country almost to the exclusion and detriment of the majority. This majority's interest in land is merely usufructual and just recognizable by custom and therefore lacks specific protection under the laws of the country. (19)

Thus, while state officials were willing to discuss issues arising from the land appropriation with the traditional leaders and big landowners, the same facilities were not extended to the majority of small-holding, middle peasants, who were also affected by the policy. This created conditions for the involvement of the middle peasantry in the conflict situation.

The third controversial issue was whether 'Hemang' stool lands could justifiably include lands bought outright and effectively occupied by "stranger-peasants" (both rich and middle peasants) for many years; lands, which strictly speaking were not involved in the conflict which prompted the intervention of the state. As Justice Wuaku observed in Angua Ansah & Co. v. The Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd.
in 1982,

It is for the present Government to consider whether for practical purposes and welfare of the people concerned, the lands included in the Hemang Lands acquisition area under the N.R.C.D. No. 332 of 1975 conforms with the welfare and social justice for all those who had acquired the land over 50 years ago, turned it to cocoa farming area and their homes. (20)

The issue thus involved not only a legal conflict but also a sociological issue in the sense of its effect on the socio-economic condition of those it affected. These three issues played a significant role in the controversies which erupted in the wake of the acquisition of the 'Hemang Lands' and the penetration of capital in the process of production. Before analysing in detail the ensuing political and social conflict, certain problems of analysing the class and power basis of the conflict need to be clarified at this point.

The first is the political role of the bureaucrats in government service. Their role in the implementation of the acquisition policy was clearly spelt out in a government 'confidential' document entitled 'The Six-Point Plan of Hemang-Lands Acquisition', which accompanied NRCD 332 of 1975. (21) According to the directive, 'the government steps into the shoes of all former landlords...by giving leases to all the farm tenants who actually cultivated the farms for a term of years subject to renewal'. The definition of tenants was not limited only to tenants paying annual fiscal
rents to their landlords. It included those engaged in the 'abunu' and 'abusa' sharecropping contractual agreements. In place of the traditional authorities and the big private landlords, the Regional Lands Commission was given the authority to lease land to new applicants. Paragraph 6 of the 'Six-Point Plan' directs that,

Except the Lands Commission, which will give leases to the farm tenants, no person or authority, including the chiefs and former landlords, should be encouraged to have any controlling rights over the lands. All new leases should be to those whose applications have been approved by the Lands Commission. (22)

The Regional Lands Commission in Cape Coast therefore became the official avenue through which some prominent urban-based top civil servants, businessmen, ex-politicians and military officers obtained legal backing for lands they had previously appropriated with the help of some Chiefs in the area, as will be shown later.

Another government department which found itself deeply involved in the acquisition process was the Lands Department charged with the duty of collecting rents from tenants of the 'former' landlords, 'without apportioning any part of it for the time being'. (23) By this measure, the 'abusa' and 'abunu' sharecropping contracts between the landlords and their tenants were legally and officially abrogated. Tenants were to pay a flat rent of two cedis per acre per annum from which the Lands Department was to keep
10% to cover administrative costs. Out of rents from stool lands, 45% was to go into the coffers of the District Council for local development, and 45% to the Traditional Councils for customary affairs, after 10% had been deducted at source for administrative purposes. The latter was aimed at ending the diversion of stool land funds into the private pockets of traditional leaders instead of being utilized for the good of the whole society. This directive thus constituted a substantial reduction in the incomes of both individual landlords and the traditional authorities.

The position of power of the bureaucrats stemmed from the fact that they had been given firm control over the most crucial means of production, with the power to alienate land, and hence to effect structural changes in the relations to the means of production and the organization of production. In playing this role, they had virtually usurped and eroded the political and economic power of the big landlords and the traditional authorities. Besides supervising the 'liberation' of the poor peasants from their landlords, they were perceived to be collaborating with urban-based petty bourgeoisie in appropriating lands in the area. Though acting on behalf of the State, their physical presence in the area made them an easy target of attack. Hence they were inextricably entangled in the social and political conflict which followed in the wake of the publication of the compulsory acquisition legislation.
Another problem to be addressed is how to conceptualise the class position of the traditional authorities, in the leadership and organizational role they played in the protests against the compulsory acquisition of the Twifo-Hemang Lands. Traditional leaders (chiefs, lineage heads, councillor-elders) played a dual role. First, they were acting as the cultural and political leaders of their stool subjects or citizens. In that capacity they could be seen as protecting the interests of their own subjects, while at the same time fighting to preserve their traditional right as custodians of the communally-owned lands within the confines of the respective territories over which they ruled. The basis of their political power stemmed from their control over the means of production and hence their right to alienate land. It must be reiterated however, that with the development of the national state, most of their traditional sources of income had been eroded. The alienation of stool lands to strangers was therefore the main source of their economic power.

Hence in vigorously playing the role of championing the cause of their people, they were at the same time pursuing their own economic, and hence their class interests as controllers of the most productive resource in the agrarian economy. Second, as individuals, they owned substantial property in land and employed labour (tenants paying annual fiscal rents, tenant-sharecroppers and farm labourers) as
also did other landlords and rich peasants. Therefore in actively and prominently participating in the conflict following the compulsory acquisition of the lands, they were acting as members of the landlord class.

A further problem is how to conceptualise the class basis of social actions taken by whole communities (Twifo, Hemang, stranger ethnic groups) in pursuit of their collective interests following the state intervention in land, which posed a threat to their long-term economic interests. Communities in this regard represented a coalition of different social classes in circumstances of overt and covert conflict of interests with external social forces. Individuals and groups were united in their collective response to the encroachment on their interests in individual and communal property in land and their perception of bias among the bureaucrats and some local forces in favour of both state and private capital. In these collective actions however, each class sought to articulate its own material interests. Since the organization and leadership came from the big landlords and rich peasants (which included the traditional authorities), their interest in recapturing their economic and political domination of the middle and poor peasants was paramount. While the political actions of the latter were localised and circumscribed, those of their more powerful counterparts (ie. the rich peasants and big landowners) went beyond the
local scene. They included costly and protracted legal actions and the use of the national press to arouse public sentiment. In addition they engaged in political lobbying in high government circles.

3.3 The Response of the Peasantry: Rural Class Struggle

Several issues of public concern emerged following the exercise of the state's powers of eminent domain (26) in compulsorily vesting large tracts of land in the area in itself, and the consequent intrusion of capital in the appropriation of land. The following issues were common to most of the court disputes, protest notes, oral evidence from interviews and discussions:— (1) The unnecessary haste with which the exercise was carried out; the failure of the government to give prior notification, at least to the traditional leaders; and the consequent haphazard and inefficient manner in which the act was implemented. (2) The misleading definition of 'Hemang Lands' by which was really meant Twifo and Hemang lands, and the unwarranted inclusion of lands not directly involved in the original conflict within the acquired lands. (3) A perceived bias and injustice on the part of the bureaucracy (charged with the power of alienating the acquired lands) in favour of capital. (4) The shortage of land threatening existing and particularly, future generations of the citizenry; and (5)
the failure, after seven years (1975-1982) on the part of
the governments to pay compensation fully to the numerous
individuals and groups whose lands were expropriated.

The identifiable classes and strata deeply involved
in the conflict situation which developed were as follows:-
(1) The bureaucrats employed in government in the exercise
of their role as the new controllers of the means of
production, in the name of the State; (2) the traditional
authorities, in their dual role as the cultural and
political leaders of their people, and in their individual
class position as landlords (and/or rich peasants); (3) the
big landlords; the most articulate and radical among whom
were the Ellis and Wood families and the Akwapims, both of
whom were backed by authentic documentation of their
ownership of vast tracts of land which strengthened their
legal standing; (4) the numerous poor, tenanted peasants
(mainly comprising strangers) whose struggle with their
'former' landlords on the matter of rents, was strengthened
by the support of the bureaucrats, in accordance with the
directives of the State; and (5) the urban-based
petty-bourgeoisie (or middle class), comprising businessmen,
politicians, some top bureaucrats and military officers, who
were strongly suspected of using covert and inappropriate
means to appropriate large parcels of land in the area for
private investment in large-scale agriculture. Only a few
of them however came under public and official sanctions for
having used their high offices and political influence in expropriating some middle peasants from their means of production.

The last group were the numerically dominant "independent", small-holding, middle peasants. They were more prominent in community-based political actions, rather than independent social action. Community-based actions, as indicated earlier, should be viewed as the response of a coalition of various classes and interest groups, but the source of leadership and organization came from the big landlords and rich peasants. From their position as owners or controllers of small parcels of land, the middle peasants were the most threatened by the separation from their means of production and their transformation in class terms, into poor peasants and farm labourers. However, compared to the landlords and rich peasants, they played a relatively inconspicuous role in the conflict situation. This was because they lacked the financial resources and the political influence to constitute an effective political pressure group, able to chart an independent, definitive and radical course of action. Their influence scarcely went beyond the local scene. They functioned largely by virtue of their numerical strength, to provide a boost to community-based action (especially militant public demonstrations and physical confrontations) through local organizations which sprang up in the wake of the 'capitalist
invasion'. At this juncture details of the conflict situation will be provided. It should be stressed again that the treatment of this under sub-headings does not reflect the social reality but rather a convenient way of organizing the data available in order to achieve clarity and simplicity.

(i) **The Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission, 1975-1979: Intra-Landlord Conflict**

The first major political conflict which emerged was the direct outcome of the exaggerated definition of the so-called 'Hemang Lands' in the acquisition enactment. Popular public opinion (27) related this to the nature of the Hemang Chief's claims in his petition to the Head of State in 1972. Another factor was the chronic uncertainty of boundaries between neighbouring traditional states in Ghana.

Immediately following the publication of the acquisition enactment in 1974, 'the office of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources became subjected to an invasion by a series of petitions from individuals, groups of persons and stools'. (28) Since the chiefs, representing the interests of the traditional areas were at the same time individual landlords (and rich peasants), this controversy could be conceptualised as an intra-landlord (and rich peasants) conflict. Three factors united all the
petitioners (ie. both traditional leaders and individual landlords) against the Hemang paramount chief at the public hearings. These were,

(i) that the stool of Hemang has no land in the area acquired and described as 'Hemang Lands';
(ii) that portions of the acquired land belong to the various protesting stools and individuals:(29)

Furthermore (iii) they argued that their lands did not form part of the Hemang stool lands owned by the Ellis and Wood families, and the Twifo stool lands which were the subject of the century-old dispute that warranted the intervention of the state. In essence, they were demanding that these lands be returned to the respective stools and landlords.

Since the jurisdiction of the Commission as spelt out in Section 4 (1) of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (NRCD 172) was limited to only 'stool lands', individual landlords were not given a hearing at the enquiry which dragged on from January 20, 1975 to July 31, 1979. The Ellis and Wood families' representatives were the only landlords allowed 'because of their special relationship with the Hemang stool'.(30) Indeed, based on the documentary evidence in possession of the Ellis and Wood families and the lack of it with the Hemang stool, the claims of both Ellis and Wood and the Twifo stool were upheld. According to the presiding Commissioner, 'the land of the stool of Hemang is not and cannot be different from
the land bought by Ellis and Wood', in the nineteenth century.(31)

Hence the judgement of the colonial courts stood unchanged and the River Obuo continues to be the official boundary between Hemang and Twifo. Other boundaries between Twifo and Hemang and their neighbours (eg. Assin, Denkyira and Wassaw) were redefined, but 'this did not affect the area compulsorily acquired by the State to any appreciable extent'.(32) However the political tension these conflicts generated between these neighbouring traditional states, especially between Twifo and Hemang was very much alive in 1982-83 when this research was done; and there is no reason to believe that this will ease in the foreseeable future.

(ii) Community-based Responses: the Indigenous Communities

The three largest, most well-organized and articulate communities involved in the conflict were the indigenous Twifo community, the indigenous Hemang community and the Akwapim stranger-community. These communities represented a coalition of the various social classes and ethnic groups in the area. Other stranger groups comprising few individual landlords and rich peasants, but numerous small-holding peasants and sharetenants, representing a cross-section of all the ethnic communities in the country,
were more individualistic in their response.

The three most outspoken communities were united (i) in their rejection of the unannounced and sudden intrusion of state and private capital into the area; (ii) on the threat it posed in terms of immediate and long-term availability of land for them as peasants, and (iii) in their strong resolve to ward off any further invasion. However, they differed in the direction and substance of the other issues of most concern to them; in their attitude towards the prospects of the development package and in the degree of militancy of their responses. The latter cannot be divorced from differences in the social component of agrarian structure and the patterns of settlements.

The indigenous localities of Twifo and Hemang clearly represent an amalgam of various social classes and a hotch-potch of ethnic groupings, mainly because they inhabit the more nucleated settlements dotted along the major highway from Twifo-Praso (the district capital) to Cape Cast (the regional capital). The farms of the peasantry are located near the main road and their settlements, and are in walking distance from their homes. Besides the peasantry, there are the agricultural farm workers, the bureaucrats and workers in state institutions, the middle class, employed by commercial companies and in various self-employed positions. There is thus a conspicuous lack of well-defined, polarized groupings in these communities.
Second, they experience the coercive presence of state power, with the Police in Hemang (township), Hemang-Wawase and Twifo-Praso; a District Magistrates Court, a military detachment and the District Chief Executive's establishment, all at Twifo-Praso. Relative ease of transport and communication also facilitates State scrutiny and control of their actions by the Regional Administration, thirty miles away in Cape Coast. These factors militated against their ability to take radical actions which could go beyond the bounds of legality. Most of such actions were subdued, and particularly in Twifo, populist in form.

Third, the indigenous communities were enthused by the government's promises on the prospects of the location of a rural agro-based industrial project in the area. Some of these prospects include (i) Possible infrastructural development, especially roads; (ii) the provision of modern social amenities; (iii) job creation prospects for the youth, especially the school leavers, which it was hoped would reduce their out-migration; (iv) a ready market for willing participants among the peasantry, who would divert into large-scale production of oil palm to feed the local palm oil mill with oil palm fruits; and (v) the possible vitalization of the commercial sector of the agrarian economy. At the same time the uncontrolled appropriation of the means of production in the area, with a concomitant land hunger and the possible creation of a mass of landless
peasantry, was a grim prospect they were determined to avert. These two contradictory positions also explain their ambivalent attitude towards the development project and their less militant stance vis-a-vis the Akwapim landlords.

**Hemang Community**

The century-old contentious dual ownership and control of Hemang stool lands, between two landlords, namely the Ellis and Wood families and the Hemang stool, has already been discussed. It has already been shown that this contradiction, increased the extent of alienation of these lands, and that the Hemang community had already been faced with the threat of land hunger long before the state intervened in 1974. The Hemang chief, Nana Kyei Baffour II in his petition to the State in 1972 had asked for the recovery of the former stool lands from Ellis and Wood and its restoration to the Hemang stool. The state's legislative enactments were aimed at the middle ground as a solution to the problem ie. by vesting the lands in the state. However, a special dispensation was extended to citizens of Hemang (at least temporarily), who were direct producers (rich peasants and middle peasants); ie. owner-cultivators, not landlords merely exploiting the
labour power of sharetenants. Direct producers were to retain effective possessory rights over their farmlands and were not to pay rents. According to NRCD 332 of 1975, 'Six-Point Plan',

All former landlords who have made their own farms in the area should be allowed to go about their farming activities without any hindrance, and no rents should be demanded from them pending the determination of their claims by the Lands Tribunal and the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission. The citizens of Hemang should be treated likewise i.e. like the former landlords. (33)

By that measure the peasants were freed from the harassment of their de jure landlords, Ellis and Wood, and this might partly explain their relatively less aggressive response to state expropriation.

Another factor was that the core of the rural development package (i.e. the nucleus estate and oil mill of the Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd., and the Cereged Small-holder scheme involving greater appropriation of lands) was located in Twifo. Hemang's role was to partake in the outgrower scheme, involving the establishment of state farms and the voluntary production of oil palm fruits by individual peasants to feed the mill with raw materials. The table below shows the extent of land appropriated by the State in Hemang since 1974.
Table 3.1: Sizes of Hemang State Farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of State Institution</th>
<th>Date ** Established (Year)</th>
<th>Size of Land Acquired (Acres)</th>
<th>Cultivated by May, 1983 (Acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Food Production Corporation (Oil Palm)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>550.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Regional Development Corporation (Oil Palm)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>}</td>
<td>400.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa Marketing Board (Cocoa Project)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>}</td>
<td>400.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Hemang Lands (Acquisition) (Amendment) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 29), Sites C and D.

** Interview of Management of the Farms.

Even though the appropriation of over 2,600 acres of land further worsened the serious land shortage crisis in the area, interviews with several citizens showed the same ambivalent attitude towards the project as already discussed above. It would seem that the future prospects of the project reduced tensions stemming from the encroachment on lands. Hence energy was geared towards preventing further alienation and fighting for compensation for crops destroyed on the already acquired lands.

A greater part of the conflict, which was largely an
intra-landlord conflict, was more inward oriented and the target of attack was the Hemang chief. Following the publication of E.I.61 of 1974, the Ellis and Wood families commenced legal action against the chief (i) for recovery of ownership of Hemang Lands and for a perpetual injunction against him from further trespassing; and (ii) to render accounts of all rents, royalties, tributes and tolls collected by the chief on the lands since 1971 up to 1974 when the lands were vested in the state. The attempt at preventing the second objective, led to the change of dates of the state acquisition from June 2, 1974 under E.I. 61 of 1974 to February 21, 1973 under E.I. 133 of 1974. It was to nullify both demands by Ellis and Wood that E.I. 133 of 1974 was substituted with N.R.C.D. 332 of 1975.(34) By the publication of this decree, the state stamped its authority on the 'Hemang Lands' and at the same time saved the Chief from rendering the accounts ordered by the court decision in favour of the Ellis and Wood families.

A second issue which created substantial disquiet in the community was the rate at which urban-based petty-bourgeoisie were appropriating lands in the area. This created a bitter conflict between the paramount chief and other traditional leaders. It was observed that most of these people were military officers, bureaucrats, ex-politician-turned-businessmen with whom the chief had formed alliances so that they could influence decisions
relating to the control of the lands in his favour. Some bought the land at token prices from the chief contrary to the directives of the state, that only the Lands Commission was to alienate lands. Delegations of Hemang sub-chiefs and other influential landlords complained to the Lands Department, the Regional Administration and the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources about the unilateral alienation of stool lands by the chief. They also complained about what they perceived as acts of collaboration by the bureaucrats in the Lands Department and the Lands Commission. Indeed, according to the Regional Lands Officer,

Ever since the acquisition there have been allegations that the Chief of Hemang is selling the acquired lands in the area. The Police have investigated and have expressed the opinion that the Chief has been aided by Messrs. Aboabogya, Kwame Mensah and Kwame Kyere.(35)

The persistent complaints of the local landlords brought the Regional Commissioner to Hemang on September 12, 1975 where he addressed a large gathering of landlords and peasants. He tried to change their impression 'that the government had given the lands acquired under NRCD 332 (1975) to the Chief of Hemang' and promised that the government would act to prevent any further alienation of the lands to strangers.(36)

Paradoxically, it was the same Lands Commission which later approved applications by some of these absentee
landlords and capitalist farmers, and thus gave legal
backing to their deal with the Hemang chief. The table
below shows some of the leases approved:

Table 3.2 Private Leases Approved by the Lands Commission, 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of Applicant</th>
<th>Size of Land Acquired (Acres)</th>
<th>Location in Hemang Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Military Officer</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>Hemang (township)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Military Officer</td>
<td>82.00</td>
<td>Hemang (township)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Civil Servant</td>
<td>107.00</td>
<td>Mpenkrom-Asasitre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Civil Servant</td>
<td>23.52</td>
<td>Mpenkrom-Asasitre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex. Civil Servant</td>
<td>81.00</td>
<td>Ankaako</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>71.60</td>
<td>Hemang (township)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>59.37</td>
<td>Shed Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer/Businessman</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>Abrafo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician/Businessman</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>Hemang and Mampong Boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>47.83</td>
<td>Ankaako</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The definition of large-scale farmer adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture, in the national census of Agriculture in 1975, is a holder with 20 hectares or 49.4 acres or more.
Using this as a standard measure, and assuming that all these landholders operated only one farm and transformed their entire holdings into oil palm plantations, only two of them (possibly only one) would fall below the large-scale farmer rank by Ghanaian standards. By 1982-83 when this research took place all of these had been developed into oil palm plantations on which the absentee capitalist farmer-owners employed labour. The response of the Hemang community thus remained largely an internal intra-landlord class conflict which, added to external pressures related to the illegal alienation of the acquired lands, led to the abdication of the paramount Chief in January, 1983.

**Twifo Community**

The response of the traditional leaders and citizens (a coalition of various social classes) of the Twifo traditional area was based primarily on their perception of a major contradiction between the titling of the legislative enactments as 'Hemang Lands', and the fact that Twifo was to serve as the nerve-centre of the proposed project. Hemang was to participate in a relatively peripheral role in the out-grower scheme, contributing thereby only about 2,600 acres of land. Twifo, on the other hand, was to cater for the huge nucleus estates, the oil mill and the small-holder scheme, losing at least 32,000 acres of land in the process.
The table below (table 3.3) shows a detailed breakdown of lands acquired and utilized in the Twifo area by May 1983.

The remaining 50% of the land acquired by TOPP, was to be used for head offices, management residences, labour settlement, factory site and other infrastructure and for future estate expansion. The remaining 55% of land acquired by Ceredec, was mainly earmarked for a coconut plantation project which was abandoned as a result of strong protests by the local people.

The basic argument of the local people was that this move by the State, was a subtle way of attempting to seize lands which were originally the cause of conflict between Hemang and Twifo Stools in the nineteenth century, and which was lost by Hemang in the colonial courts. In fact, all these major components of the rural development package were to be located in the original disputed area (see Fig. 9, of Chapter 2). The local people charged that this was a conspiracy between the Hemang chief and his allies in the government bureaucracy and in top political positions, to deprive the people of Twifo of their lands. (37) Despite attempts by prominent state officials to deny this allegation, their reluctance to alter the title of the enactments to read, 'Twifo-Hemang Lands' did not make their defence plausible.

Most of the flood of petitions of protest from Twifo to the various governments made reference to an important
Table 3.3: The Project and the Land Factor in Twifo Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Project</th>
<th>Total Acreage</th>
<th>Acreage Utilized By May 1983</th>
<th>Breakdown of (c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOPP* Nucleus Estates</td>
<td>24,380</td>
<td>12,140 (50%)</td>
<td>Kwanyako Estate - 3035 Acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mampong Estate - 3035 Acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ntaferewaso Estate - 3035 Acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Praso Estate - 3035 Acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Twifo - Mampong</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceredec* Small-holder</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>3,707 (45%)</td>
<td>Oil Palm - 3035 Acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Food Farms - 672 Acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* TOPP = Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd.
Ceredec = Central Regional Development Corporation
Source = Hemang Lands (Acquisition) (Amendment) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 29) Sites 'A' and 'B'
despatch from government in 1976 which stated among other things that,

The Ministry of Lands confirms that any land acquired under the Hemang Lands (Acquisition) Decree, 1975 which never formed part of the original Hemang Stool Lands will be appropriately recommended upon for restoration to their rightful owners. (38)

The petitioners also pointed out that since the judgement of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission (1979), made a clear distinction between Twifo and Hemang stool lands, it was only fitting and proper that Twifo lands be excluded from the acquired area.

Besides the bureaucrats of the Lands Department and the Lands Commission who were the targets of attack on the legality and logistics of the acquisition, officials of the Central Regional Development Corporation (Ceredec), (39) also came under attack. One of the sore issues was Ceredec's plan to go ahead, despite local opposition, with both the 3,707-acre Small-holder scheme and a proposed 6,000-acre Coconut Plantation project at Mampong. For example, one of the several petitions argued that,

To make matters worse, apart from the fact that our cocoa farms as well as our food farms have been destroyed, with the result that we are now faced with starvation, the Twifo Oil Palm Project now threatens to take over the only strip of land left for us on the right hand side of the Twifo Praso- Cape Coast road for our food farms, for a coconut plantation. (40)
Petitions from several local peasant organizations which seemed to have mushroomed in resistance to the land invasion,(41) and local delegations to government,(42) also addressed several key issues. Notable among these were, the threat of land hunger and the probable economic and social hardships this would entail; the indiscriminate destruction of cocoa and food crops and the subsistence problems it had created; and the low rate, and delay in payment, of compensation to the displaced. For example a petition presented to the Hon. Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources through the Hon. M.P. of Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira Constituency on the occasion of their visit to Twifu Mampong, Tofoi, Aduabeng, Kwanyako and Ntaferewaso, stated that,

It is our opinion that provision has to be made for farming, to enable us to feed ourselves and the plantation workers and to have surplus to sell in the urban areas to enable us to have income which we used to derive from cocoa and related cash crops new destroyed or about to be destroyed.

Most of these protest notes contained threats of imminent violence which never came to fruition, mainly because the police and the military were always close at hand, and also because of the general ambivalent feelings about the location of the development project in the area.(43) Another common form of protest adopted was the organization
and staging of public rallies and demonstrations preceding and coinciding with several visits by top political spokesmen whose mission was to defend and explain government policy to the people. (44)

Collective, populist community action of this kind was clearly the doing of a coalition of classes, each of which had its own interests at stake. The traditional authorities were acting in their capacity as the political leaders in safeguarding communal ownership of the most vital productive and economic resource in the face of the capitalist invasion. At the same time they were acting, in concert with other big landlords, to protect their private property in land. The numerous small-holding peasants who offered their numerical support to the public protests were struggling either to prevent their expropriation from the means of production, or in the case of those already displaced, for prompt payment of adequate compensation by the state and private capital.

The leadership and organization however came from the traditional political leadership and the local big landlords. The target of attack were the bureaucrats acting on behalf of the state and private capital. By and large, the only positive, tangible outcome of their collective effort is summarized as follows:

There is the problem of the rural people's
understanding and acceptance of the project, and eradicating their suspicion that government is subtly trying to confiscate their land and to create a large group of landless people. The people's resistance have led to the abandoning of a proposed Ceredec Coconut Project and the substituting on that land of the Small-holder scheme, while the original site for the latter has been handed back to the people.(45)

The intangible but very significant outcome was the demonstration of the collective power of the peasantry under the local leadership of the big landlords.

The Akwapim Community

(a) Landlords against Bureaucrats

Strangers who had obtained indefeasible ownership of land by outright purchase in Twifo-Hemang area constituted another powerful social pressure group against the bureaucrats in the aftermath of the acquisition enactment publication. The most militant of this group were the Akwapim landowning 'companies'. Their colonial experience of sometimes having to purchase the same piece of land more than once from contending landowners, or getting entangled in protracted litigation with other counter-claimers, made them obtain legal documentary title deeds on all lands they had collectively purchased. Therefore, they stood on solid
legal grounds, in claiming that their lands were not part of the stool lands which were the subject of conflict for almost a century. Second, their legal strength was bolstered by the fact that, for almost half a century, they had had uninterrupted, undisputed, effective, possessory rights over these lands, in spite of the protracted conflict involving the indigenous stools and the Ellis and Wood families. Third, they argued that from the title of the legal enactments, the target of the state was the confiscation of the former Hemang Stool Lands and thus their private properties should be excluded.

Unlike the indigenous communities that had ambivalent feelings towards the rural development project which necessitated the appropriation of their lands, the stranger communities had no positive sentiments towards it. They considered Twifo-Hemang only as a temporary occupational abode, or at best a second home vis-a-vis their hometown areas. They consistently maintained socio-economic connections with their home regions, and considered their hometowns as their final place of rest in life. Thus their reaction against the capitalist onslaught was not affected in any way by any emotional attachment to the development project. They considered the capitalist intrusion, without prior notification or consultation, as an illegal trespass on their private properties. The likelihood of the destruction of their farm settlements, schools, cocoa and
food crops carried a grim prospect they were not prepared to tolerate.

Finally, the 'land-to-the-tiller' principle, attached to the acquisition decree of 1975 by the six-point plan, which transferred their control over their own lands and the labour power of their numerous share-tenants to the bureaucrats, was an unwelcome policy. It favoured only owner-cultivators and tenant, direct producers; not landlords exploiting the labour power of sharecropping, poor peasants. However,

...most of the Akwapims in the area have tenants with whom they share a tenancy of either Abusa or Abunu. The decision of the government to the effect that all rents arising from such tenancies be collected by the Lands Department without apportioning any part of it for the time being was what most of these Akwapim landlords were against. (46)

The sudden change of the sharecropping agreements between the landlords and their share-tenants to a flat rent rate of two cedis per acre per annum, to be paid to rent collectors of the Lands Department (with the latter deducting 10% of the total revenue to cover administrative costs), constituted a severe loss of income for the landlords. Moreover, although this 1975 policy was officially considered as a temporary measure, the landlords were not sure when (if ever) they would be paid even their drastically reduced incomes.
After their persistent demands, the government issued a directive in 1981 that.

All monies collected by the Lands Department on behalf of landlords since the acquisition should be paid back to the beneficiaries less the normal legal deductions. (47)

Yet by 1983 when this research ended, this directive had not been implemented.

The rent policy was a controversial issue which led to a series of confrontations. Rent collectors of the Lands Department who trespassed into the private holdings of some landlords were physically molested by thugs. It is on record that at one point some landlords arranged with the local police for the arrest of some revenue collectors, who were charged with theft and kept in custody overnight. When summoned to appear before the Regional Commissioner in Cape Coast to explain their conduct,

The leader of the Akwapim group confessed in the presence of his elders that they themselves do not own cocoa farms in the area; rather they had farm tenants who paid tribute to them. (48)

This partly explains their hostility towards the rent policy and the bureaucrats responsible for its implementation.

Some professional lawyers on behalf of the landlords, flooded the Ministry responsible for land affairs and the office of the Head of State, with strongly
worded petitions calling for the revocation of the N.R.C.D. 332 (1975), and questioning the conduct of the bureaucrats in charge of the implementation of the policy. (49) The petitions mainly emphasised the illegality of including their private properties in the acquired lands; the threat of economic and social dislocation of their life-long security which the destruction of their villages, schools, farms would entail; and a perceived political conspiracy between the Hemang chief and other bureaucrats and military personnel to use state power to carve out the lands in the area among themselves. (50)

A third strategy was the flat refusal of the landlords to comply with government directives to supply details of the location and size of their holdings and crops to be affected by the acquisition. This was required in order to assess compensation to be paid to them. As the Regional Lands Officer put it,

Whilst all the stools have submitted their claims to the Stool Lands Boundary Settlement Commission, the Akwapim landlords have refused to submit their claims for compensation. They have depended upon promises allegedly made to them in 'Accra' that their land would be given back to them. (51)

The main principle behind this strategy was that, to have maintained the call for the revocation of the acquisition decree of 1975 and at the same time put in claims for compensation would have been contradictory and defeatist.
The strategy was also partly strengthened by strong lobbying in government circles. The officially appointed survey teams and crop enumerators charged with mapping out individual properties and estimating compensation for the displaced were sometimes physically harassed.

The resort to radical and sometimes violent response was well exemplified by one of the largest and most militant among the landlord groups, the Angua Ansah Company from Akwampim-Mampong. Led by their two leaders, Messrs. Kwabena Ayisi and Kwabena Obeng, they successfully stalled the encroachment on their 4,151 acres of farmlands (which they had bought for one thousand and eighty British pounds in 1928) by the Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd. (TOPP) for four years 1979-1983).(52) Their main target was the Commonwealth Development Corporation's (C.D.C.) technical experts engaged in directing and managing the establishment of the TOPP project;(53) for,

Even though the Ceredec had assumed the position as absolute owners of the acquired lands in place of the State, and therefore sub-leased the land to Commonwealth Development Corporation and therefore TOPP, as tenants, aggrieved farmers tend to vent their feelings on C.D.C. whose physical presence, working on the land is unambiguous.(54)

In fact, due to lack of public education on the issues, most local residents (classes and groups) mistook the C.D.C. for a multinational corporation completely owning and running
the project, and which had had easy access to their lands through the State. (55)

The strategy adopted by the landlords was a combination of threats, and real physical attacks on survey and land evaluation officers, and workers of TOPP who trespassed into their private properties. One report by the official surveyor observed that,

They have issued very serious threats to the effect that on Monday, 6 December 1982 they are going to destroy all the concrete pillars I have erected on the lines and undo every bit of work done and that I should only have myself to blame for whatever happens to me personally should they find me in the lines from that day. (56)

This threat was actually fulfilled on Monday, December 17, 1982 when the survey team was physically manhandled and forcibly thrown out of the Angua Ansah property and their instruments destroyed with impunity. (57)

Another report showed that, 'the management of TOPP had reported that the landowners at Angua Ansah are harassing their workers thus obstructing them from carrying out their operation'. It was accompanied by a request for police intervention and the instruction 'the presence of your men should be physically felt to deter further obstruction of the operations of the company'. (58) The following observation by the presiding judge in Angua Ansah
Co. v. TOPP (1983) showed that the police were actually used to coerce the landlords:-

With the police contingent the evidence was that the Angua Ansah people have been able to stop, not only the lands department staff from carrying on the enumeration but also the field staff of TOPP. There was evidence of clashes. Tensions must have been high to require the Regional Minister meeting the people of Hemang Lands at Praso to persuade them of the benefits that the people stood to gain from the oil palm project. In these circumstances an administrator may well think of engaging the services of the strike force possibly to put the fear of the law in the people, and so prevent further breaches in the area.(59)

These coercive measures apparently failed to cow the militant resistance of the landlords, for by 1983 the District Chief Executive was still admitting that,

So far (after four years of futile attempts) all pillars erected by the surveyors have been destroyed by members of the Angua Ansah Company and the surveyor has been threatened of serious attacks if he returns to the area. A land valuation team working in the area also faced similar threats.(60)

When Mr. J. H. Hansen, the General Manager of TOPP was interviewed by this writer on March 15, 1983, he admitted that one major problem not solved was the resistance of Angua Ansah Company, 'a group of itenerant immigrant farmers who have resisted moves to oust them and who have been responsible for regular work stoppages'.(61)
The reasons and objectives of the landlords for disrupting the work of TOPP was summarized by the General Manager of TOPP as follows:- 1. that they had not been officially given prior notification or consulted before the attempt at 'trespassing' into the private holdings; 2. that their land was not a stool land and therefore had been wrongfully included in the acquired area; and 3. that they were determined to refuse the demarcation of their lands and the enumeration of their crops due to be damaged for compensation purposes, because 'the damages likely to be caused to their properties would entail serious social and economic repurcussions which could not be fully compensated for, monetarily'.(62) The following observations by the presiding judge in Angua Ansah Company v. TOPP (1983) clearly demonstrates the extent of damage the expropriation would have caused.

I am satisfied and find as a fact that the plaintiffs (Ayisi and Obeng) have lived on Angua-Ansah land for a period of over 50 years (1928-1982), made cocoa and other food crops farms on the land. They have villages numbering at least 40 of which the 1st Plaintiff's (Ayisi) alone can accommodate at least 100 persons. They also have a school, a feeder road joining the main Praso-Cape Coast road, cocoa sheds and wells, all built at their own expense on the land. And the Angua-Ansah land has become their abode.(63)

Apparently, in due consideration of the likely social and economic dislocation to be caused by the intended
expropriation exercise, and on a number of legal-technical and moral grounds, the landlords of Angua Ansah won the civil suit in which the court ordered a perpetual injunction against the TOPP, barring it from entering the lands in 1982. Consider for example, the following observation by the presiding judge in *Angua Ansah Co. v. TOPP (1982)*,

The trouble is, can the defendants, (TOPP) say that because the government had acquired the land they therefore have the right to enter the land and do what they like? Were it to be so, then very rich and powerful organizations or persons could with impunity enter any government land in possession of others and eject them on the grounds that the possessors are squatters or otherwise, and thereby take possession themselves. (64)

The appeal by the TOPP, backed by Ceredec on behalf of the State at the Appeal Court in 1983 also failed to offset the original verdict. This has stood out as a test case in the Hemang land issue, especially in a period when a military regime was in power, and might well have contributed immensely to the return of lands to majority of the landlords by P.N.D.C.L. 29 (1982) which reduced the acquired land area from 190,784 acres down to 35,705 acres.

(b) **Landlords against Poor Peasants**

Unlike the indigenous communities living in nucleated settlements or rural townships (e.g. Hemang,
Mampong and Praso) oriented in proximity to the only major 'highway' in the area, strangers' lands and settlements were greatly distanced from the main road and townships. The share tenants and their families, who constituted the largest demographic social category, occupied scattered settlements or farm cottages spread over their landlords' properties in land. Each lived on portions of the land on which they operated as sharecroppers. Economically they provided the labour which created the surplus product appropriated by their landlords. The landlords (and rich peasants) were settled in centralized villages with their families. The schools, cocoa sheds, wells and other social amenities were located in these villages.

In many ways, the stranger communities lived a semi-independent existence from the indigenous communities. To a very large extent, they managed their own economic and political affairs. The usual occasions on which stranger-peasants temporarily became a common sight in the rural townships were on market days (twice a week) when they (usually the women) brought their commodities (food crops, cocoa, game and handicrafts) for sale and bought back their weekly basic needs (kerosene, matches, fish, salt etc.). Problems of transport and communication made them relatively free from the coercive presence of the police and the military detachment stationed in the townships.

Though there were independent small-holding peasants
and farm labourers, these stranger communities mainly exhibited a dichotomous, polarized social structure of numerous share tenants and a few powerful, big landlords. While the big landlords were united by common ethnic background (mainly of Akwapim origin), the share tenants were representative of a cross-section of the numerous ethnic groups in the country. Being divided in loyalty and service to their various landlords under differing conditions of labour organization and social relations, these sharetenants tended to be individualistic. Landlords had the power to evict their tenants, to threaten to terminate originally contracted agreements with them, or to unilaterally alter the terms of agreements. (65)

The relationship between landlords and tenants was therefore, more than an economic relation between non-producers and direct producers (or owners and non-owners of the means of production). It was also characterized by unequal political relations, between 'rulers' and 'the ruled', in a social setting in which the landlords constituted the economically and politically dominant social category. It is in this social context that the state's rent policy in Twifo-Hemang can best be evaluated, in terms of its effects on social relations. Analysis of the latter will be located exclusively at the level of the landlord-sharecropper relationship.

Landlords were strongly opposed to the rent policy
because it constituted a threat to their economic and political power. They left no stone unturned to pressure government to revert to the status quo. The implicit abolition of the sharecropping (abusa and abunu) system and the introduction of a standardized rent system to be paid, not to the landlords but to the bureaucrats, constituted a form of economic and political 'liberation' of the poor peasants. Landlords who were also direct producers were to retain their control of that portion of land on which they were operating. However, since the majority of them were merely landlords exploiting the labour power of sharetenants, the new rent system constituted a great economic loss.

Landlords waged a strong propaganda effort of combined persuasion and coercion to convince sharetenants to defy the government order; even to pretend to be farm labourers on wages, in which case they could still secretly pay rent to their landlords. (66) This was combined with active harassment of defiant tenants and rent collecting officials. Sharecroppers found themselves in a situation requiring a choice between equally undesirable alternatives. They could follow the instructions of their landlords and thus risk being accused and probably convicted of complicity with their landlords. They could also defy the landlords and risk serious deterioration of political and social relations with them.
Some chose the second alternative hoping that the bureaucrats, the police and the military would protect them from whatever counteraction their landlords would take against them. It is reasonable to argue that had these tenants been made aware that this rent policy was a temporary measure (as shown in the clause 'for the time being' tagged to it); and that ultimately landlords would regain ownership and control over their estates, many would not have defied their landlords. According to the Regional Lands Department,

By a government directive under N.R.C.D. 332 of 1975, rents collected within the acquired area should be paid on deposit pending the outcome of the case before the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission to prevent protracted litigations, but only a few tenants were willing to pay their rents to the revenue collectors from the Lands Department. (67)

One of the weaknesses of the acquisition policy was the lack of public education on its principles, intricacies and implications, especially in relation to the small-holders and the poor peasants. The struggle over the legality of the policy proceeded between the bureaucrats and the politicians representing the state on the one hand, and the traditional authorities and the big landlords on the other hand, over and above their heads.

Recalcitrant tenants who openly cooperated with the bureaucrats on the rent policy became targets of attack by
their 'former' landlords. There were several reports of the molestation of tenants and rent collectors alike, and evidence that the military was often called in to protect them from harassment.(68) There were also cases of the forceful confiscation of the farm produce of tenants, including legal actions against some of them.(69)

There was also evidence that some military officers with personal interests in the lands got involved in the controversy on the side of the landlords. In 1977 an investigation was ordered into the circumstances which led to the arrest of several farm tenants and their detention by some soldiers at the national military headquarters for several days.(70) It was specifically observed that,

Military personnel who have relatives who refused to recognize government’s rights in the vested area, have on a number of occasions frustrated our efforts (ie. officers of the Lands Department) at educating and collecting revenues from the people by sometimes coming to the vested area to frighten and even manhandle some revenue payers.(71)

There was a particular occasion in June 1979 on which some soldiers and landlords were arrested and detained at the Takoradi Ampradu Army barracks for their part in the harassment of tenants and revenue collectors. However, a mysterious, unauthorised order from the Osu Castle, Accra (seat of government), effected their immediate release.

The outcome of investigations ordered by the military
authorities into the issue was never made public. (72)

These developments in the controversial Twifo-Hemang lands acquisition exercise underlie the political influence of the big landlords, aided by their urban-based allies. As a powerful political pressure group, they manipulated the loopholes and weaknesses in the policies framed and pursued by the bureaucrats, to their own advantage. The ultimate result was the amendment made to the N.R.C.D. 332 of 1975 by P.N.D.C.L. 29 of 1982 which reduced the area of land vested in the State from over 190,000 acres down to approximately 36,000 acres. This process in itself was full of inconsistencies and contradictions. Lack of coordination in decision-making was an outstanding feature of the whole exercise.

In 1976, an S.M.C. government directive showed that only lands 'which never formed a part of the original Hemang Stool Lands will be appropriately recommended upon for restoration to their rightful owners'. (73) The landlords and their allies ignored the words 'will be', and used this to harass and confuse their former tenants on the rent issue. In May 1980, a different directive from the Chief Lands Officer, partly stated that a 'consensus has been reached to give back to the original owners of the portions of land which fall outside the areas to which the government is committed'. (74) The list of 'oil palm farms' to which the government was committed included both state farms and
privately-owned farms belonging to some of the urban-based absentee landlords and capitalist farmers. (75) Government was clearly anxious to protect the outgrower sector of the rural development project in order to ensure adequate supply of raw materials for the oil mill. By July 1980, officials of the Lands Department and Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources, still maintaining the policy of releasing only lands 'which clearly fall outside the area to which the government is committed in the acquisition exercise', explained that,

...this line of action has been taken in the right direction in order to avoid the magnitude of financial burden that would have been imposed on the government in the payment of compensation on the total area of 190,784 acres originally acquired. (76)

While not denying the fact that lack of funds was an important factor in the decision to release large tracts of land to the landlords, it is clear that strong political pressure by the big landlords and their allies played a decisive role in the change of policy.

In 1981 another directive, this time from the Deputy Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources, ordered that, 'landlords should with immediate effect be allowed to enter and manage their lands as they were doing before the acquisition'. (77) It was immediately followed by instructions by the Chief Lands Officer, requesting 'the
withdrawal of the revenue collectors from the privately owned lands, and to operate in the stool land areas within the Hemang Lands acquisition only'. This time, exception was given only to 'lands earmarked for state enterprises'. (78)

These six years of inconsistencies and contradictions in government policy (1976-1981) confused officials of the Regional Lands Department in the implementation of the rent policy, and were effectively utilized by the landlords and their allies, in confusing and prolonging the harassment of their former tenants. It was P.N.D.C.L. 29 of 1982 which specified details of lands included in the new acquisition areas as shown in Table 3.4. This was accompanied by the directive that,

For the removal of doubt, where any land previously acquired compulsorily by the State under the said decree (i.e. N.R.C.D. 332 of 1975) is returned to any person, that person shall refund to the State the whole or such part of the compensation paid to him as may be agreed between that person and the State and in the absence of any such agreement, such amount as shall be determined by the High Court. (79)

The return of lands to many of the previous landlords left the sharetenants at their mercy. With their legal standing in relation to ownership and control of their lands finally restored, landlords proceeded first to deal with sharetenants who had openly flown in the face of their
### Table 3.4: Breakdown of State Acquired Lands, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Area (Acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Twifo Praso, Mampong</td>
<td>24,380.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ntaferewaso, Kwanyako</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Twifo Mampong</td>
<td>8,300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Hemang (township)</td>
<td>550.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Hemang (township)</td>
<td>2,065.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Jukwa</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Jukwa</td>
<td>49.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Mpenkrom-Asasitre</td>
<td>107.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Mpenkrom-Asasitre</td>
<td>23.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dwukwa-Mfuom</td>
<td>71.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Ankaako</td>
<td>47.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Hemang (township)</td>
<td>34.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,704.77</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hemang Lands (Acquisition) (Amendment) Law, 1982, (P.N.D.C.L. 29)*
authority during the 1975-1982 impasse. Interviews with some affected tenants at Twifo Praso and Nuamakrom in March, 1983 and some local officials, (80) confirmed the view of many of the big landlords that,

Most tenant farmers took advantage of N.R.C.D. 332 (1975) and the injunction placed on the landlords, to enter into unoccupied secondary forest lands between 1975 and 1982 before P.N.D.C.L. 29 of 1982 was published, in extending the sizes of their original holdings arbitrarily. (81)

Sharecroppers who fell in these categories, were instantly evicted forcibly by their landlords from the land. By this measure, these tenants and their families were not only summarily expropriated from their means of production and reproduction, but also lost their share of the economic product of their labour power on the land.

Other tenants who defied the orders of their landlords and paid their rents to the Lands Department, were ordered by their landlords to apply individually for renegotiation of new terms of labour contract. The preconditions, especially on lands belonging to the Akwapim landlords were 1. to render an apology to their landlords; 2. to provide a bottle of 'Schnapps', a live sheep and to pay fines ranging between two thousand and three thousand cedis as pacification. (82) In addition, as a protest note from over 300 tenants on Alex O. Koram and Company lands at
Twifo-Nuamakrom showed, they were,

...to hand over all the documents on the land and make fresh accounts for the past seven years (1975-1982) to him, which said account have been paid to government (sic!). We are also to hand over our farmers' identity card from the Cocoa Marketing Board to him.(83)

These stringent preconditions for only gaining their rights to negotiate new contract agreements, which from all indications would prove unfavourable to them, were beyond the fiscal means of the ordinary sharetenants. Those who would choose to go with it might end up playing into the hands of the rural money lenders with their very high interest rates, and become indebted for a long while. They could jeopardise their ability to ensure the continued simple reproduction of the labour power of both themselves and their families. These preconditions were also accompanied by coercive measures as the following indicates,

We the petitioners have been warned that we have to quit the land on which we have settled for about 25 years ago because we once reported him to the government. Because of his order, he has organized people to come to our village to loot our paddy rice and foodstuffs i.e. plantain, cocoyam, cassava etc. and also started releasing the very land we have already acquired to some new people, as farm labourers.(84)

It would seem, from their 1975-82 experience that landlords were becoming wary and skeptical about continuing to engage
sharecroppers on their farms.

Meanwhile many former tenants were quitting their farms. Although specific statistical data are not available, the rate must have been alarming to have warranted government offers of free legal aid for any group of tenants who might wish to contest their case in the courts. (85) Land disputes are often protracted and extremely costly in terms of time and money, despite the promise of free aid from government. The effect it could have on the economic condition of poor peasants was a risk most of them could not have afforded. In the interim there was absolutely no way they could be protected from harassment by their landlords except through radical intervention by the State. The government action could perhaps slow down the process of eviction of the sharetenants, but it was not enough to halt it. This conclusion is underscored by the political influence of the landowning class as demonstrated by their victorious struggle against the State. By the end of this research in 1983 there was no evidence to suggest that the conclusions arrived at here would need to be changed in the near future.

3.4 Evaluation of Policy Objective: The Peace Issue

It has been stated that the initial objective of the State in vesting vast tracts of land in the Twifo-Hemang area in itself, was to put an end to the protracted conflict
over the ownership and control of land, which had plagued the area for nearly a century. The logical question to pose at this stage is whether this objective was indeed realized. It is clear from the analysis so far made, that the follow-up objective of promoting an agro-based industrial development project in the area, which cleared the way for the appropriation of communal and private lands by the State and private capital, did not help in achieving this aim. It worsened the already tense political atmosphere and expanded the social dimensions of the original conflict.

The process of appropriation of lands for the project increased the political tensions between different communities (eg. Twifo and Hemang), and between communities and big landowners (eg. Hemang and Ellis and Wood). It also sparked off political strife within communities; between rulers and the ruled over the increasing alienation of communal lands to 'strangers' (eg. the Hemang chief and the citizen-body, which culminated in the abdication of the paramount chief from the stool). The inefficient and (allegedly) biased handling of the acquisition exercise by the bureaucrats reduced their credibility and increased conflict between them and the peasantry, particularly the landowning class. The 'temporary' role of the bureaucrats as controllers of the most vital productive resource in place of the 'authentic' landowning class, damaged the relationship between the landlords and sharetenants. It
threatened the survival of the historically established traditional institution of labour organization; namely the (abusa and abumu) sharecropping system. The effect of this latter process in terms of the emerging transformation of the agrarian structure of Twifo-Hemang will be analysed in the fifth chapter.

Preliminary field surveys showed that most peasants made a clear distinction between government (aban) and bureaucrats (akrakyefo), when it came to talking about whom to blame for the increasing social conflict over land in the area. Most peasants also lumped traditional authorities and big, influential landlords together as mpanyinfo (elders) or asikafo (rich people) on the same issue. The sample respondents (90) in the questionnaire interviews were asked to rank the three in terms of the most (1st), next (2nd) and least (3rd) to blame for the worsening conflict situation. The results are presented below (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Who to blame for increasing Social Conflict (In Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who to blame</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Government</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bureaucrats</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chiefs and Big Landlord</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 87 (3 = don't know)

The results clearly emphasise the distinction by the peasantry between government and government officials on the issue. To the majority of them, government was the least among the three to blame, while government officials were perceived as collaborating with the land owning class and traditional leaders in alienating communal lands to private individuals (strangers). Government on the other hand, was perceived as having a genuine and positive objective of promoting economic development of the area.

Respondents were also asked to rank from the highest to the lowest what they thought were the real objectives of the government in taking over the lands in the area. The results are presented in Table 3.6 below:-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To develop the area</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To bring peace to the area</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To easily acquire land for large-scale</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results clearly indicate the ambivalent position of the peasantry, especially among the indigenous population, on the relationship between the location of the development project in the area and the compulsory acquisition of vast tracts of their lands. They were torn between the probable positive prospects of the development project for the area and its people, and the looming negative effects of the large-scale appropriation of lands in the area. They ranked the latter higher than the initial objective of settling the conflict issue. It was clear, however, from further discussions that the generally negative attitude towards the peace issue stemmed largely from how the acquisition exercise was handled by the bureaucrats, rather than the spirit behind it. The results confirm the failure to achieve the initial objective of the compulsory acquisition.
of lands policy. The problems which this charged atmosphere posed for the successful implementation of the development project, especially at the initial stages, will further be pursued in the next chapter.

The final question is, who actually benefited and who lost from this land appropriation and conflict situation? The State gained access to lands in the area to promote part of the national Operation Feed Yourself and Operation Feed Your Industries programme, in partnership with international finance capital. Private 'entrepreneurs' (mainly urban-based influential persons), succeeded in appropriating lands for their own investment in large-scale farming. Traditional authorities, taking advantage of the increased value of land, accumulated wealth through the alienation of communal lands. Big landlords made up for their initial losses in terms of money and time spent in protracted litigation and clashes with state power, by their political victory in reclaiming most of their lands from the State. They established themselves as a potent political force in the rural setting. Generally, the losers were the small-holding peasants, expropriated from their lands without having been (fully) compensated since 1974; and sharetenants, left at the mercy of their landlords after cooperating with government on the rent issue. Many have either been summarily evicted or are facing the threat of eviction.
3.5 The Immediate and Ultimate Impact of Increasing Land Alienation

The displacement of peasants from their farms and settlements as a result of the infiltration of large-scale agriculture into the area was not unanticipated by the project planners. Modern plantation agriculture requires large contiguous land area for ease of machinery usage.

Other facilities, such as easy communication and transport and nearness to regular source of water for purposes of irrigation, also influence their location. The location of the TOPP nucleus estates and small-holders scheme, near the major road, in close proximity to the River Obuo and the district headquarters (Twifo-Praso), fit perfectly into the recommendations of the C.D.C. technical experts who conducted the feasibility studies. The displacement of numerous peasants in dispersed farm settlements could not have been avoided. Hence according to the Regional Lands Officer,

The Lands Department and Ceredec were reserving a large area for outgrowers near the plantation and it was intended that those whose farms would be destroyed would be resettled in the outgrowers zone where improved seedlings and scientific methods of agriculture would be practiced under the guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs and the technical advisers of the Commonwealth Foundation. (86)
When questioned on the details of this plan, it was clear that the planners themselves had no estimates of the number of persons likely to be affected by the appropriation exercise. (87)

The small-holder scheme located at Twifo-Mampong was the 'compensatory project, forming an integral part of the rural development package; the main objective of which was the production of oil palm fruits to feed the TOPP oil mill at Twifo-Ntaferewaso'. (88) In a speech to a large gathering of peasants at Ntaferewaso on Saturday, January 20, 1979, the Commissioner for Lands and Mineral Resources announced that,

...besides providing employment to 1,000 people from the area, about 300 families would be assisted to cultivate a total of 1,200 hectares of oil palm as outgrowers. Sufficient land would also be set aside for food farming. (89)

According to the Managing Director of Ceredec, part of the objective was to get the peasantry to become interested in scientific oil palm production. However both he, and the Manager of TOPP agreed that this number (300) had little to do with the actual total number of peasants likely to be displaced by the project, and that the scheme was motivated more by the desire to ensure regular supplies of raw material to the oil mill rather than humanitarian
considerations.

The TOPP nucleus estates and the Ceredec small-holder scheme involved the displacement of large numbers of small-holding peasants and sharetenants, and the destruction of farm crops (cocoa, food crops etc.) and settlements. The affected settlements were Gyaman, Sawyerr, Koroma, Asukese, Abogyese, Abokari, Nyamebekyere, Amponsakrom, Anweaso, Kwame Gyebi, Mankatta, Headman, Aniate, Asare Kwaku, Kaston, Otu Kwaku and Asempaneye I and II, etc. (90) Most of these were farm settlements peopled by 'stranger' peasants, the majority of whom were Fantes, Ewes and Ga-Adamgbes, and a few Akwapims. In Angua Ansah Co., v. TOPP (1982) the presiding judge observed that,

...through the operations of the defendants (ie TOPP), farmers and farms on adjoining lands to the plaintiff's (ie Angua Ansah) have been evacuated and their farms, cottages and school destroyed. Defendants had no regard for properties and boundaries of various landholders in the area... Plaintiffs have been put to fear of losing not only their lands but other properties including cottages, schools, cocoa and foodstuffs farms. (91)

The nucleated 'townships' inhabited by indigenous peoples, near the main highway (Praso, Ntaferewaso, Aduabeng, Kwanyako, Mampong, Hemang) were avoided, mainly because their destruction would have involved huge financial costs to government in resettlement and compensation. The Ghanaian economy was not in the position to be able to foot
the bill. The division of the nucleus plantation into four estates (Praso, Ntaferewaso, Kwanyako and Mampong estates), reflects the avoidance of these more 'cosmopolitan' settlements. Projects located in the Hemang area eg. the Ceredec Oil Palm project, the Ghana Food Production Corporation Oil Palm plantation and the Cocoa Marketing Board Cocoa Project, also avoided large settlements. There is no question however that all these projects, including the Ceredec small-holder scheme which was supposed to be a resettlement project, involved either the direct displacement of settler and indigenous peasants, or the expropriation of fallow or unoccupied communal and private lands.

The problem, therefore, is not whether there was any displacement, but rather how many peasants and their families were actually displaced. The officials of the Lands Department charged with the verification and estimation of the extent of lands and crops damaged for which claims had been filed, were not themselves in a position by May 1983 to be able to answer this question. In 1979, the Commissioner for Lands and Natural Resources in a public address at Twifo-Ntaferewaso gave assurance that,

The government has already paid c2.5 million (out of an estimated c11.0 m) to some of the farmers in the area and the remaining farmers could be paid as soon as their assessment is completed by the Lands Department.(92)
By May 1983, the Lands Department was still trying to cope with the problem of verifying and approving about 5,470 claims filed so far, and the problems of dealing with incomplete survey and enumeration, several cases of crops destroyed without having been enumerated, competing claims and how to deal with allegations of fraudulent claims. The hostile social and political atmosphere itself made the work of the bureaucrats an uphill task. (93)

The question is, could a complete, verified and approved list of claimants have indicated the actual number of the displaced peasants? Clearly not all displaced persons could be legitimate claimants. Claims are made in the names of individuals whether it is group, lineage, stool or individual lands which are involved. The number of tenants, sharecroppers, farm labourers, family members with interests in family land, and the numerical composition of domestic production units are not depicted by lists of claimants. Thus the number of claimants, even if complete, would have been a poor guide to the actual numbers displaced.

In the same way, it is not possible to arrive at actual numbers of the displaced who became landless as a result of their displacement since the relationship between the two variables is not a one-to-one relationship. As Shepherd found out in his study of the development of
capitalist agriculture in the Northern Region of Ghana, landlessness is a phenomenon which is difficult to measure. (94) The problem of estimating the actual numbers of the displaced and the landless was further complicated by the dispersal of victims among the local and national population since 1974.

Second, there exists some uncertainty about who is a landless peasant. This becomes clearer when one observes in the existing literature the problems many social analysts face with the use of the term rural proletariat in Africa. There is usually the unproven assumption (or rather myth) that every African belongs to a family which owns abundant land, enough to accommodate any member rendered landless elsewhere. It is usually assumed that members of families who play the production role of sharetenants or farm labourers elsewhere, could still return to their homelands and have free unencumbered access to their family land.

While this might have been the norm in pre-colonial times (and in some cases, the colonial period) when there was less pressure of population on land, it is not the case in post-colonial Ghana. Increasing pressure of population on land resources and the dramatic development of commercial and capitalist agriculture have brought far-reaching changes in the patterns of corporate systems of land tenure, and also in the traditional agricultural practice. As shown in the previous chapter, the cultivation of permanent tree
crops and the increasing resort to the engagement of labour outside the extended family, have led to increasing family nuclearization and individualization of land ownership and production organization in Twifo-Hemang. Hence, there is no guarantee that those who had actually been rendered landless by their displacement in Twifo-Hemang could have free access to land belonging to distant kin relations.

It is proper then to argue that sharecroppers, fiscal rent paying tenants and other small-holding peasants displaced might be the worst affected by the displacement. The same cannot be said of the landlords and rich peasants displaced, due to the fact that most of them had multiple holdings and many had accumulated enough wealth to invest in acquiring new farmlands elsewhere or even to divert into other economic ventures.

Record of claimants, even if complete would cover only those displaced for state-sponsored enterprises. It would exclude direct producers displaced by individual influential persons, who had turned themselves into absentee landlords and capitalist farmers. As in the case of land appropriated by the State, not all lands appropriated by these individual involved the direct displacement of peasant producers. Some were unoccupied or fallow stool lands unilaterally alienated by traditional authorities with the proceeds going into private pockets. However, where the appropriation of lands involved the displacement of direct
producers, inquiries showed that the destruction of crops was done without prior enumeration of crops. To avoid costly and lengthy litigation, bureaucratic red-tape and fear of political victimization, many victims opted for private settlements.

There was one well publicised exception. Three peasants from the area boldly and uncharacteristically appeared before the Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Marketing Board in 1979 to testify that the then Executive Director of the Ghana Procurement Agency, had forcibly taken a total of 60 acres of their land. He had destroyed their crops in the process, without compensation. According to the report, 'the farmers said they could not protest against the seizure of the land because they took Mr. Karikari to be a soldier and "all the people of the area fear policemen, more so a soldier"'.(95) This illustrates clearly the element of fear which intimidated other displaced peasants who did not make their plight public.

Most of such lands acquired through collaboration with traditional authorities were given legal approval by the Lands Commission. According to the Regional Lands Officer,

Before the Hemang Lands Acquisition Decree passed, several individuals such as Mr. Kwame Karikari had made leases between the chiefs and themselves. NRCD 24 of 1972 only regularized their occupation through the Central Regional Sub-Committee of the Lands Commission.(96)
Some of these oil palm plantations owned by these absentee landlord/capitalist farmers were given further legal protection by the State by being included in P.N.D.C.L. 29 (1982) as farms to which 'the government is committed' as shown in the table below:

Table 3.7: State Protection to Private Capitalist Farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of Owner</th>
<th>Size (Acres)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Site on P.N.D.C.L.29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Civil Servant</td>
<td>107.00</td>
<td>Mpenkrom-Asasitre</td>
<td>Site G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Civil Servant</td>
<td>23.52</td>
<td>Mpenkrom-Asasitre</td>
<td>Site H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>71.60</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
<td>Site I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>47.83</td>
<td>Ankaako</td>
<td>Site J</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Hemang lands (Acquisition) (Amendment) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 29)

The tendency for peasants displaced by powerful individuals to opt for behind-the-scenes settlements mainly out of fear of victimization, further makes it difficult to estimate the actual number of victims of the capitalist invasion.

One major effect of the state/capitalist intrusion has been the acute shortage of unoccupied communal lands in the area. Hemang's situation, as was shown in the previous chapter, had long historical roots, but was worsened by the
state and private capitalist intrusion. Twifo's land shortage condition was accelerated by the fact that it had to serve as the nerve centre of the development project. The abandonment of the proposed 6,000-acre coconut project by Ceredec was due to the militant protest of the peasantry against what they considered as the appropriation of the remainder of unoccupied communal lands in Twifo. Most of the land, whether involving the displacement of direct producers or not, are now occupied by State enterprises; plantations owned by absentee landlords and capitalist farmers; lands continuously owned or won back by the traditional landowning class (indigenes and strangers), and extensive timber concessions of Pan Saw Mills (of Cape Coast), Veneer and Lumber Company (of Takoradi) and R.T. Briscoe & co. (Accra).

The looming land hunger means that the petty commodity sector of small-holding peasants (indigenes) cannot expand much in the near future. The demographic pressure on this sector, by implication, has already been heightened by the displacement of many small-holders. The important sociological attribute of customary land tenure, namely the inherent right of every citizen to free usufructual right to communal land is being threatened. The long term effect, given present trends, would be fragmentation of holdings which by not allowing for reasonable fallow periods, would increasingly reduce levels
of production, become more and more uneconomic and threaten the ability of small-holders to reproduce their labour power in future.

Since land hunger has not yet permeated the whole country, but rather is scattered in various regions, it could be argued that the displaced could acquire fresh farmlands elsewhere. However, acquiring land elsewhere in the present situation in Ghana, where the so-called 'Green Revolution' has increased the value of land due to capitalist penetration into rural areas, (97) requires heavy capital outlay, which the ordinary displaced small-holders cannot afford. The delayed payment of compensation to the displaced, even if it would take place, (98) strengthens this opinion.

Since 1974 only c2.5 million out of an incomplete, conservative estimate of c11.0 million of compensation has been paid to victims. This was not based on rates which can be described as "the current price" or the "existing market value" as required by Act 125 of 1962 from which the acquisition of the Twifo-Hemang lands drew its legal authority. The Chief Lands Officer of Ghana, testifying before the Lands Compensation Commission in 1980 was quoted as describing the payment of only 50 pesewas for a cocoa tree and 25 pesewas for an oil palm tree destroyed when land is compulsorily acquired by the State as "unrealistic" and "out of date"; having been in existence since 1952. The
average annual rate of inflation for 1960-70 was 7.6%, increasing to 32.4% for 1970-79. (99) By 1979-80 it had risen to 50-54%; hitting the 'triple digit' mark in 1981, it has increasingly 'run out of control'; and is currently (i.e. by late 1983) estimated at an annual rate of 268.3%. (100) These trends more than justify the opinion of the Chief Lands Officer expressed in 1977.

According to the Regional Lands Officer,

In a recent correspondence the Acting Chief Lands Officer has assured the people in the area that the SMC government is studying new compensation rates for crops and as soon as the new rates are approved they would be used in assessing the compensation that would be paid to those whose farms would be destroyed. (101)

On a visit to Twifo Praso two weeks later (Sept. 13, 1977) the Regional Commissioner assured victims that the rate would be increased to at least C4.00 per cocoa tree. By 1983 when fieldwork in the area ended, nothing had happened except a mixture of heightened expectations and of sombre frustration. However by May 1984, an announcement by the Eastern Regional Secretary to disgruntled peasants 'affected by the establishment of the Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation project' at Kwae in the Eastern Region noted that,

The Government of the P.N.D.C. has declared that it will pay all compensation due to persons
whose farmlands have been taken over for projects which are in the national interest. However, in the fulfilment of this obligation, account would be taken of the present economic position of the country. (102)

Considering the numerous such projects and consequent displacement of many peasants especially in the forest regions of Ghana, and the poor state of the national economy, it would seem that the payment of these compensation claims would be seriously delayed.

Even if compensation claims would be ultimately paid, inflation would have taken its toll on their value. It should also be remembered that compensation is payable only for damaged perennial economic crops (cocoa, oil palm, coconut) which have been on the affected land for at least two years. Hence the numerous seasonal and annual crops destroyed would be excluded from the estimation of compensation. It is clear that the expropriation of the peasantry from their means of production had a negative, long-lasting impact on their economic condition.

Official records show that throughout the period when the acquisition legislation was undergoing changes lands were being sold out by some Chiefs and landlords. (103) This was aimed at forestalling losing them in the race of impending threat of state occupation. This researcher's own investigations in the aftermath of P.N.D.C.L. 29 (1982) (which released lands back to the landowning class) revealed
that the clouds of uncertainties surrounding the acquisition plan, coupled with the increasing speculation on, and value of, land, has stepped up the alienation of land to prospective investors. In these circumstances, it is the small-holding peasants who stand to lose their future chances of acquiring new farmlands to accommodate coming generations.

Already, Oil Palm Growers Associations are being formed in earnest. For example, as at May 15, 1983, there were 24 members of the Oil Palm Growers Association of only Twifo-Praso, on farmlands ranging in size from 10 acres to as much as 298 acres. (104) Should these trends continue, what the future holds in store for the peasantry is bleak. The present threat of general land hunger will become a reality, and a high concentration of land in few, richer hands will be the logical outcome. Already the sizes of the oil palm estates run by the State, in partnership with foreign finance capital, or by the State alone, and by private absentee landlords are by Ghanaian standards large-scale enterprises.

When there is a high degree of concentration in the market, a situation will arise where the land price will be extremely high, because those who will have higher concentration of ownership (the landowning class) will be monopolizing the land market. Hence the poorer majority (the small-holding peasants) will virtually be 'banned' from
entering the land market. The beginnings of such a process has already surfaced in Twifo-Hemang. Second, there is a close relationship between patterns of land ownership and the forms of production organization that would be in force in the long run. A highly concentrated pattern of landholding (as present trends already indicate) would imply that the organization of production will be based on either a system of small tenancies (as those still surviving in the petty commodity sector, and introduced in the small-holder scheme) or on large estates using landless or near-landless agricultural workers (as already shown in the State/capitalist estates). In either case, a large pool of landless labour will be present in the long run.

Finally, this chapter prepares us for discussion, in the next two chapters, of the physical co-existence of large-scale capitalist plantation agriculture (Chapter 4) with peasant petty commodity production (Chapter 5). The likely long term prospects of this for both the displaced and existing small-holding peasants in the area is what Ninsin has already observed in other parts of Ghana:

Even though they are paid a pittance as compensation, the expropriated peasants cannot return to their lost land. They are forced by the logic of large scale capitalist intensive farming to choose between becoming agricultural labourers on their own land, or migrant urban workers. In such a situation the peasant farmer has no right of appeal. But even if he does, he cannot seek remedy because he lacks the means to do so. (105)
Many local peasant cultivators (ie the small-holding peasants) may be eliminated in the long run if these trends continue, since they may not have the capital and other resources to meet their capitalist competitors, who have better access to resources, and this may lead to the creation of a large pool of landless peasantry.

Summary - Conclusions

While it is certain that peasant direct producers had been expropriated from their lands, with the strong probability that many had been rendered landless, these conclusions suffer from one weakness; namely, lack of precise statistical data. On the positive side, this weakness in the present work, points in the way of identifying a problem for future research in Twifo-Hemang. The more certain structural impact includes the acute shortage of unoccupied communal lands; the threat of extreme demographic pressure on holdings in the peasant petty commodity production sector; the increasing concentration of landholdings in the booming large-scale capitalist plantation sector; and the continuing alienation of lands in the area.

Given present trends, it could be safely predicted that in the long run, capitalist relations of production,
based on the confrontation between capital and labour, will dominate the agrarian structure of Twifo-Hemang. The complete elimination of the small-holding petty-commodity producing peasants, whose labour organization is mainly based on the family, domestic production unit is extremely doubtful. The historical experience of the developed industrial world, particularly Europe (West and East) will not encourage anyone to venture such a prediction. These tentative conclusions in themselves offer strong grounds for drawing hypotheses for future research in the area.

There have been some changes in the structure of landholding since the colonial era. To the communal (stool, lineage) and group (Akwapim) lands and individual holdings made up of small-holders and big traditional landowners, have been added State or Public lands and large capitalist private holdings. Class structures based only on relations to the means of production have also seen some changes since colonialism. To the traditional landlords, small-holding peasants, poor sharetenants and a few migrant farm labourers, have been added urban-based absentee landlords and petty-bourgeoisie (made up of management personnel of state and private capitalist enterprises.) In the next two chapters one of the major tasks will be to analyse how these structures of landholding and social classes interact in the process of production.
Notes on Chapter Three

1. The Ellis and Wood families have since the nineteenth century possessed three Certificates of Purchase (1894, 1896, 1903) from the Twifo Stool which supposedly sold the lands to them. They also have two bailiff-tenancy agreements supposedly signed between them and the Hemang stool in 1897 and 1945.

2. Despatch no. 15/1/LB5-L39 from Nana Kyei Baffour II, President of the Hemang Traditional Council, dated April 15, 1964 to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Justice, Accra.

3. The N.R.C. changed its name into the Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.) in 1975, until 1979 when it was overthrown.

4. Many of the protest notes sent to the government by the landlords, rich peasants and other grassroots organizations against the acquisition exercise emphasised this alliance between the Hemang chief and some military officers and bureaucrats who had carved large chunks of Hemang lands for capitalist farming. Prominent persons frequently mentioned included three top military officers, one of whom was the Chief Executive of a state marketing board, a civilian head of a national agency, a top civil servant from one of the top ministries, some former officials of the Central Regional Development Corporation and a number of well known previous politicians who turned into businessmen.

5. Petition of Nana Kyei Baffour II, Omanhene and President of the Hemang Traditional Council to the Head of State and Chairman of the N.R.C., The Castle, Osu, Accra in RLO, File I, ESC/DC49/72 dated April 20, 1972.

6. See Nana Kyei Baffour's petitions dated September 21, 1972, January 8, 1973 and February 2, 1973 to the Central Regional Commissioner; another dated May 14, 1973 to both the Regional Lands Officer Cape Coast and the Commissioner of Lands and Natural Resources, Accra: all in RLO. File II, ESC/DC49/TJ. etc.

7. Attorney General's Regional Department memo on the petition of the Hemang stool to the N.R.C., dated 17 June 1972, attached to despatch no. CCB/HC249/73/78 from the Principal State Attorney, Accra to the Central Regional Administration, Cape Coast dated November 9, 1982.

8. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/6LB24 from the Officer-in-Charge,
Regional Lands Commission, Cape Coast dated February 20, 1973 to the Regional Commissioner, Cape Coast.

9. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72TJ/124 from the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast dated September 6, 1977 to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast.

10. See *Ellis and Wood Families v. Nana Kyei Baffour II* (1975) in *Ghana Law Reports*, Vol. 2 (1975) p.49, where the presiding judge in this case argued that, ...

The government actually took its cue which led to the passing of N.R.C. decree no. 332 of 1975 from here.

11. The Provisional National Defence Council, which took over power from the S.M.C. passed this law, which in effect has the same power as a decree or an Act of Parliament.

12. See *The State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125)* Section 1(i). See also the introduction to El.61(1974) and Section 2 of NRCD 332(1975)).

13. See Section 1 (i),, Section 1 (2), Section 2, Section 4 (i) (d), Section 4 (3) and Section 5 of Act 125 (1962).


15. In a joint paper presented by the National House of Chiefs at a seminar on Land Problems and Development in Ghana at the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi in October, 1975, the chiefs observed that, "...in the past certain Governments have used the power just to cripple, and paralyse local administration or in an attempt to do so'. See Sam. B. Amissah (ed.) *Guidelines for the Formulation of Land Policies and Title Registration*, Land Administration Research Centre, University of Science and Technology Press, Kumasi-Ghana (1979) p.25.


21. Attached to 'Confidential' despatch no. CA31/LMR Vol. 13 dated November 18, 1976 from the Acting Secretary of the Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.) to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources, Accra and copied to all government departments dealing with the Twifo-Hemang land problem, in ESC/DC49/72TJ). Also despatch CR31/LMR/Vol.14 (Confidential) dated April 28, 1978 to the Senior Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources from the Secretary of the S.M.C., Accra, Also in file no. ESC/DC49/72TJ, Lands Department, Cape Coast.


23. Ibid, paragraph 2.

24. Despatch no. 57721/Temp/142 from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra, dated March 20, 1981 to the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast.

25. Charges and rumours of corruption against officials of both the Lands Commission and the Lands Department by the Traditional leaders and big landlords were however not substantiated. It seems that the mere fact that these urban-based influential persons received approval of their applications for land in the area through these departments, might have raised suspicion. It should be remembered that the provisions of the 'Six-Point Plan' was kept as a top secret, as the word 'Confidential' attached to the original document from the government indicated.

26. Eminent domain is the power or right of the state to take private or communal property for public use or to control its use; usually at an adequate compensation.

27. This came out from formal interviews with the prominent traditional leaders, and my sample of 90 respondents from
Hemang (township), Twifo-Mampong and the Twifo-Ntaferewasao. Free discussions with a cross-section of the many acquaintances during the research period also confirmed this position.

28. Despatch no. 57721/Temp/114 dated July 8, 1980 from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Accra to the Chief Lands Officer, Lands Department, Accra.


30. Ibid. 'The question of individuals as opposed to stools taking part in this enquiry was raised before the then Commissioner, Mr. Justice D. F. Annan who ruled that individuals were not entitled to be parties in this enquiry'. (Mr. Justice J. K. Essiem, Deputy Commissioner).

31. Ibid., p.31.

32. Despatch no. ESC/OC49/72TJ/250 dated September 16, 1981 to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast, from the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast.

33. The Six-Point Plan, paragraphs 4 and 5. My investigations showed that this provision applied as well to Twifo citizens.


35. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72TJ/124 dated September 6, 1977 from the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast.

36. Minutes of the meeting of the Central Regional Sub-Committee of the Lands Commission on October 22, 1977 in File No. LCD/KGF/25.

37. Most of the information was derived from direct unstructured interview of prominent individuals eg. The Paramount Chief of Twifo, Nana Kwaku Ampontin Fie II; Nana Kwame Duku III, Ankobeahene; Nana Kojo Obeng II, Krontihene; Abusuapanyin Yaw Mensah of Twifo-Ntaferewaso; Mr. Emmanuel Addi Kofi,
Revenue Inspector, Twifo-Praso; Mr. James Addu, District Coordinator of the P.D.C.'s Twifo-Praso; Mr. John Williams, Registrar of the Twifo Traditional Council; Mr. L. K. Quansah, Asst. District Chief Executive, Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira District, Twifo-Praso, Mr. G. K. Scott, District Chief Executive, Twifo-Praso, etc.

38. This was in despatch no. SCR11/10/TJ of January 10, 1976 from the Secretary of the S.M.C. to one Opanyin Yaw Bimpong, a prominent landlord from Twifo-Mampong who petitioned the government protesting against the inclusion of his lands in the acquisition exercise.

39. Ceredec is one of nine regional development corporations brought into being by the Regional Development Corporations Decree, 1972 (NRCD 140) as profit-making bodies established at the regional level to (i) establish and manage various state-sponsored economic ventures and (ii) undertake economic projects, usually in partnership with multinational corporations. It represents the state on the TOPP project. TOPP is a private company established with a combined state and international finance capital. The State supposedly leased the acquired lands to Ceredec, according to Sec. 5 of Act 125 (1962) which empowers the State to 'grant a lease to licence in respect of any land acquired'. Ceredec was also supposed to have sub-leased the lands for the TOPP nucleus estate and oil mill to TOPP.


41. Examples of these were (a) Ntaferewaso-Eduaben Citizens Association (b) Twifo Farmers Association (c) Twifo Youth Association (d) Mampong, Eduabeng, Ntaferewaso, Tufoi Chiefs and Citizens Cooperative Union (e) Twifo and Hemang Development Organization.

42. There was a tendency to present petitions to government and public hearings through powerful local delegations eg. a 4-man delegation to the Lands Compensation Commission, 25/8/80; an 8-man delegation to the Regional Commissioner on January 15, 1981; and several delegations to the Chief Lands Officer, Accra; the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, and the Osu Castle (Seat of Government), Accra.

43. For example, one of such protests notes read in part that,
Our cocoa farms which were destroyed for the past three years have not been paid for and we are keeping you informed that if by 12 March we are not paid we shall not allow the workers to work on the land. We shall not be held to blame if bloodshed becomes the result.

(In petition by Twifo Citizens Association to the Regional Minister, Cape Coast dated March 12, 1981 in District Chief Executives Office File, G26/7/TOPP).

44. For example on September 12, 1975 the Regional Commissioner spoke to a joint gathering of the chiefs and people of Twifo and Hemang to explain the NRCD 332 (1975) to them (Minutes of the Central Regional Sub-Committee of the Lands Commission in File LCD/GF25). On March 13, 1977 the Regional Commissioner addressed farmers and former landlords to explain the rent collection decision as a temporary measure (Ibid). On September 15, 1977 the District Chief Executive met the 'identifiable groups' involved in the conflict situation to discuss their grievances. (In despatch ESC/DC49/72TJ/150 dated September 20, 1977 from Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast to the Regional Administration Office, Cape Coast). On January 20, 1979 the Commissioner for Lands and Natural Resources and the Regional Commissioner were at Twifo-Praso to explain the compensation delay, the public benefits of the rural development project and to deny rumours that the government intended to replace all cocoa trees with oil palm in the area. Ghanaian Times, no. 6569, (January 22, 1979), p.1. On October 10, 1980 the Regional Minister met all landlords and farmers at Twifu-Praso to explain why payment of compensation had been delayed; and on February 10, 1982 the Regional Secretary met the people on the same issue of compensation (File ESC/DC49/TJ).

45. Words of the Manager of the Ceredec Smallholder Scheme at Twifo Mampong on February 16, 1983.

46. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72TJ/124 dated September 6, 1977 from the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast.

47. Despatch no. SRC/W58/Vol. 2 dated March 19, 1981 from the Deputy Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources, Accra to the Chief Lands Officer, Accra. Also, despatch no. 57721/Temp/142 from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra to the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast.
48. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/71/58 dated September 4, 1975 from the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast to the Chief Lands Officer, Accra.

(b) Reference LOA/OC/AOK/79 dated December 12, 1979 by Kwadwo Ohene-Ampofo, Barrister-at-Law and Solicitor for David Yaw Koram & Co. and Angua Ansah & Co. to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Accra.
(c) Reference SAX/BBA/78/374 dated November 20, 1978 by S. A. X. Tsegah, Barrister-at-Law and Solicitor for Yaw Atta and Co. to the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Cast. (d) Petition by Alex O. Koram, Accra on behalf of David Yaw Koram and Co. to the Head of State and Chairman of the SMC dated December 12, 1979.

50. The status of persons which were repeatedly mentioned are in footnote no. 4 above.

51. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72TJ/124 dated September 6, 1977 from the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast.


53. The Commonwealth Development Corporation (C.D.C.) started functioning as the Colonial Development Corporation until about 1956-57 when it adopted its present name. Its present constitution and powers are laid down by an Act of Parliament (British), consolidated in the Commonwealth Development Corporation Act., 1978, charging it with the task of assisting overseas countries in developing their economies. It is empowered to undertake, on commercial basis, either alone or more frequently, in association with others, projects for the expansion or promotion of economic development enterprises.

54. Statement by the Managing Director of Ceredec (Ghanaian) in personal interview at Cape Coast on February 1, 1983.
55. See for example, Daily Graphic, Issue No. 9827 (October 10, 1982) p.1, under the title 'Save Cocoa Farms from Destruction - Appeal to the P.N.D.C.', in which an acclaimed spokesman from the Akwapim landlords, Mr. Budu Acquah, attempted to whip up public sentiment against the perceived injustices of the compulsory acquisition exercise, and to explain the basis for resistance.

56. Letter from Mr. T. K. Simpson, Surveyor, Twifo-Mampong to the District Chief Executive, Twifo-Praso, dated December 6, 1982 in District Colonial File G31/Vol.1/TOPP.

57. Letter from Mr. T. K. Simpson, Surveyor, Twifo-Mampong to the District Chief Executive, Twifo-Praso dated December 27, 1982 in District Council File G31/Vol. 1/TOPP.

58. Despatch no. RC/Ceredec/01 from the Regional Administration Officer, Central Regional Office, dated July 3, 1980 to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Cape Coast.


60. Despatch from the District Chief Executive, Twifo-Praso to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast dated February 10, 1983 in District Council File G3/32.

61. Interview took place at the TOPP Head Office, Twifo-Ntaferewaso.

62. Despatch no. FC123(b)/80/41/9 dated June 6, 1980 from the General Manager of TOPP, Cape Coast to the Regional Minister, Central Regional Organization, Cape Coast, through the Managing Director, Ceredec, Cape Coast.

63. Angua Ansah Co. v. TOPP, Land Suit no. 58/80, High Court of Justice, Cape Coast, April 30, 1982, p.23.

64. Ibid., p.19

65. This has been a common phenomenon in the cocoa growing areas of southern Ghana. Attempts made by various governments to find solutions to these problems have never succeeded, being met with strong opposition from traditional authorities and other conservative elements in Ghanaian society. The Rents (Stabilization) Act, 1962 (Act 109) and The Rents (Stabilization) Act, 1953
(Act 168) and the Rents (Cocoa Farms) Amendment Regulations, 1965 stabilized rents payable by cocoa farm tenants on stool lands at 5 shillings per acre per annum. This abolished the abusa and abunu sharecropping systems, and was aimed at abolishing unduly excessive or sub-economic rents and royalties while protecting them from arbitrary eviction. Public outcry by traditional authorities and powerful landlords against this system led to its repeal, and its replacement by The Rents Stabilization Acts (Repeal) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D.49), on the grounds that the former law was anti-social and oppressive' (Ollennu, 1971:167). N.L.C.D. 49 reintroduced the abusa and abunu systems. The Report of the Law Reform Commission on Proposals for the Reform of Land Law (Nov. 1973), noted that, 'Arrangements for working land under Abunu and Abusa and other customary tenancies are often unfair and inequitable to the tenants'. It noted that the terms are often vague, or not fully specified and result in 'unjust exploitation of the tenant'. The Commission recommended that tenants should be protected by express statutory enactments. The Draft Report of a Sub-Committee of this commission also recommended that the rents for agricultural land should be fixed at between c2.50 and c10.00 per hectare; that there should be no restriction on the types of crops tenants are allowed to cultivate; that the duration of tenancies should be fixed by law, according to the period needed for a full return on each crop, and that ejectment of a tenant before the expiry of a term should be forbidden except on an order of court (See Sam. B. Amissah, 1979: 5-6, 85-91). None of these has been implemented despite increasing public opinion against the tenancy system since the 1960s.

66. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72/TJ/195 dated May 2, 1982; a memorandum by the Regional Lands Officer on the Twifo-Hemang controversy over land to the Regional Secretary, Cape Coast and the Secretary of Lands and Mineral Resources, Accra. See also petitions by Anoma and other tenants of Alex O. Koram and Company of Nuamakrom, dated December 1, 1982, and from Bismark and Emmanuel Dagadi on behalf of other tenants dated November 8, 1982 to the Secretary of the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources, Accra; in which tenants were ordered by their landlords to inform the Lands Department that they were farm labourers, not tenants. They also complained of the physical harassment of defiant tenants by hired thugs.

67. Reply of the Regional Lands Officer to despatch no.
S1772/Temp/162 of November 19, 1982 from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra.


69. Despatch ESC/OC49/72/59 dated September 17, 1975 to the Senior State Attorney, Attorney General’s Department, Accra.

70. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72/105 dated December 5, 1977 from the Regional Lands Officer to Mr. M. C. Yeboah, Revenue Superintendent, Lands Department, Twifo-Praso on the 'unauthorized arrest of farm tenants to Burma Camp'.

71. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72/TJ123/ dated July 18, 1978 from the Regional Lands Officer to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast.

72. Minutes of the Central Regional Sub-Committee of the Lands Commission, Cape Coast, July 13, 1979 in File no. LCD/GF/25. Interviews with Messrs. G. K. Scott, District Administrative Officer, Twifo-Praso (March 14, 1983); the District Co-ordinator of the Peoples' Defence Committees, Twifo-Praso (March 12, 1983); and the District Superintendent of Police, Twifo-Praso (March 16, 1983) have confirmed reports of the deep involvement of military officers in the controversy. For example, on two occasions in October and November, 1982, one Flight Officer, (later identified as a brother-in-law of one of the most powerful Akwapim landlords) flew a P.N.D.C. secretariat helicopter into the area to frighten and harass tenants following the publication of P.N.D.C.L.29 (1982). Again the outcome was never made public.

73. Despatch no. SCR11/10/TJ dated January 10, 1976 from the Secretary of the S.M.C. Office of the S.M.C., Accra to Opanyin Yaw Bimpong, in reply to a petition by this landlord, dated November 14, 1975 (my emphasis).

74. Despatch no. 57721/Temp/114 dated July 8, 1980 from the Chief Lands Officer, to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Fuel and Power, Accra.

75. The list attached to despatch no. 57721/Temp/111 dated May 28, 1980 from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra to the
Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast included farms belonging to Ceredic Oil Palm, TOPP Estates, Ghana Food Production Corporation, the State Farms Corporation, other private farms and Ceredec Coconut Plantation (which was later abandoned).

76. Despatch no. 57721/Temp/114 dated July 8, 1980 from the Chief Lands Officer, to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Fuel and Power, Accra.


78. Despatch no. 57721/Temp/142 of March 20, 1981 from the Chief Lands Officer to the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast.


80. G. K. Scott, District Administrative Officer, Twifo-Praso on March 14, 1983; James Addae, District Co-ordinator of the P.D.C.s, on March 12, 1983 at Twifo-Praso.

81. Memo prepared by officials of the office of the Regional Interim Co-ordinating Committee of the P.D.C.s, Regional Administrative Officers, Cape Coast, April 5, 1983. The subject was, the problems of the Hemang TOPP project.

82. Interviews with the Regional Lands Officer (January, 1983); the District Administrative Officer (March, 1983) and the head of the Interim Regional Co-ordinating Committee for the Peoples' Defence Committees (March, 1983).

83. Petition by six tenant-sharecroppers on behalf of all tenants operating on the lands of Alex O. Koram and Co. of Nuamakrom, to the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources, Accra in RLO File ESC/DC49/TJ.

84. Ibid. See also petition by a group of 'Concerned University Students', entitled 'War at Nuamakrom Soon', on the subject of the molestation of tenants by landlords to the Chief Lands Officer, Accra and copied to the Regional Lands Officer in despatch no. 57721/Temp/147 dated May 12, 1983.
85. On 5 April 1982, the Regional Secretary of the Central Region, accompanied by officials from the Attorney General's Department and the Regional Lands Department, addressed a large gathering of Chiefs and people in the Twifo area at Twifo-Praso. He cautioned landlords about government intervention if they continued evicting their tenants, and encouraged tenants to take combined legal action against their landlords, promising free government legal aid for such groups.

86. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72TJ/124 dated September 6, 1977 from the Regional Lands Officer to the Regional Administration Officer, Cape Coast.


88. Interview of Field Manager of Ceredec Small-holder Scheme on the farm, at Twifo-Mampong on February 16, 1983.


90. Most farm villages are named after the original founders. My informants, Nana Kwame Duku II, Ankobeahene; Nana Kojo Obeng, Krontihene and Abusuapanin Yaw Mensah (interviewed at Ntaferewasa, 15 - 18 March, 1983) provided me with personal guides who took me round the sites of these former settlements which had then been reduced into rubble, and in places planted with oil palm trees.

91. Judgement and Proceedings, Angua Ansah Co. v. TOPP, High Court of Justice, Cape Coast, Friday, 30 April, 1982.


93. It must be noted that whilst this researcher was generously given access to the Lands Commission and the Lands Department files relating to the general controversy following the land appropriation exercise, the increasing controversies surrounding the compensation issue made it impossible for details to be released to this researcher.


96. In reply to despatch no. S772/Temp/162 of November 19, 1982 from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra. 'NRCD332(1975) by vesting the Hemang Lands in government gave the Lands Commission the right under NRCD24(1972), to administer the lands to the exclusion of all others. Under NRCD24, the Lands Commission has the right to grant leases and/or licence to any person or group of persons whether or not they be public servants. In fact, paragraph 6 of the SMC's Six Point Plan on the Hemang acquisition also confirms this point'. (See ESC/DC49/TJ2 dated April 6, 1979 from Regional Lands Officer to the Chief Lands Officer).


98. Doubt has been expressed here because non-payment of the compensation for lands compulsorily acquired from peasants by the State for public use has not been unknown in Ghana. For example, during the First Republic (1961-1966), the State Food Production Corporations (State Farms Corporation) simply seized lands without compensating those who had traditional rights to them. These actions sometimes led to violent confrontation between local villagers and officials of the State Corporation. See Robert H. Bates (1981), *op. cit.*, p.154.


101. Despatch no. ESC/DC49/72TJ/124 dated September 6, 1971 from the Regional Lands Officer, to the Regional Administration Officer, Cape Coast.


104. Twifo District Chief Executive's Office files no. G.26/7 and G.31/Vol. 1 both titled 'The Twifo Oil Palm Project'. The 298 acre Aba Oil Palm Farms located at Damang on Morkwa stool land has become one of the latest topics of public discussion, with rumours that the farm is being run by local "front men" for some powerful absentee landlords.

CHAPTER FOUR

CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN CHANGE

Introduction

This chapter deals with the 'new' capitalist agricultural sector of the agrarian economy of Twifo-Hemang, which concentrates solely on the development of oil palm plantations to produce oil palm fruits as raw material for the oil producing factory being established at Twifo-Ntaferewaso. There are two major objectives of this chapter. First, it is to analyse the structure, organization and relations of production in the nucleus estate, the small-holder scheme and the outgrowers sector. Second, the entire project will be assessed in terms of its stated and implied objectives. Finally, in the summary-conclusions, a look will be taken at the impact of the capitalist sector of the agro-based industrial development project on the agrarian structure of Twifo-Hemang. It must be pointed out that even though this chapter concentrates on the new capitalist sector, several portions will deal with the interrelationships between the peasant simple commodity sector and the capitalist commodity sector.
The analysis will be situated in its international and national context, in order to show its significance beyond its geographical location. By situating the project in the context of the world system and rural-urban relations, it is hoped that readers will come to appreciate better the external forces which are shaping the local agrarian structure.

The project forms an important part of the National Redemption Council's (later renamed the Supreme Military Council) Operation Feed Yourself programme (O.F.Y.) launched in 1972 by the second military regime. The N.R.C. coined the term 'Operation Feed Yourself' programme for a drive towards self-sufficiency in the production of domestic foodstuffs in order to reduce the country's dependence on external sources for food to feed its growing population. To this end, the years 1972-74 were declared as 'agricultural war years'. (1) The main objectives of the O.F.Y. as already stated in the first chapter included the following:— the increased production of food and raw materials in order to reduce their importation; the diversification of the agricultural and industrial base of the national economy; the creation of greater opportunities for employment; and the raising of the living standards of the population.

The production of basic agricultural raw materials and the establishment of agro-based industries was the third
phase of the O.F.Y. programme launched as the Operation Feed Your Industries (O.F.I.) programme in April-May, 1975. (2) The Twifo-Hemang project formed part of this phase of the national O.F.Y. programme. The O.F.I. was specifically an import substitution policy, aimed at saving scarce foreign exchange hitherto used in importing these raw materials. It was at the same time aimed at boosting industrial and agricultural productivity, leading eventually to national 'self-reliance'.

Prominent among the industrial crops earmarked for this stage of the programme, were vegetable oil-producing crops such as the oil palm, groundnuts, coconuts and soya beans. Government had expressed concern about the inability of the peasant agricultural sector to produce these crops from which oils are extracted for the manufacturing of different types of soap, toothpaste, candle and margarine. Table 1.7 in Chapter one has already depicted the lag of local vegetable oil production behind existing factory capacity. Also, in spite of the fact that palm oil and other palm products form an important part of the Ghanaian diet, 'local production could meet only 43% demand'. As a result by 1983 'most consumers have had to pay prices well above the official levels: sixty cedis per bottle of palm oil instead of eleven cedis'. (3)

Topping the list in terms of importance among the vegetable oil producing crops (*) targeted for boosting
local production was oil palm as shown in Table 4.1 below. Clearly, oil palm production was by far the most important product by which government planned to boost vegetable oil production and to curtail the country's dependence on Niger and Ivory Coast for oil palm seedlings and palm oil. An ambitious 12-year programme (1975-1987) was launched to increase palm oil production, mainly in the Central, Western and Eastern regions where the ecological conditions were most suitable for the crop. (4)

At the national level this plan involved two aspects. The first dealt with the rehabilitation of many state oil palm plantations and oil mills established during the First Republic (1962-65) which had been abandoned by the National Liberation Council military regime (1966-69) and the Second Republican civilian government (1969-1972), mainly on ideological grounds. In 1981 the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) 'approved a $7.3 million special loan for the expansion and rehabilitation of the twenty-one year old palm plantations in the Western and Central Regions'. (5) Both the E.E.C. and the World Food Programme (W.F.P.) provided $7.6 million jointly to help rehabilitate up to 20 oil palm plantations, which are presently managed by the State Oil Palm Plantations Rehabilitation Committee. (6) While the E.E.C. concentrated on the supply of vehicles, inputs and equipment, the W.F.P.'s aid programme was geared towards the so-called "Food for Work"
Table 4.1: Ghana, Budgetary Allocation for Industrial Raw Materials, 1975/76 - 1979/80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Budgetary Allocation (cedis)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Oil Palm</td>
<td>160,100,000</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cotton</td>
<td>23,560,000</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Cane</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Coconuts</td>
<td>3,911,000</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Groundnuts</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenaf</td>
<td>1,570,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Soya beans</td>
<td>328,250</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>207,169,350</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

plan, by which food items in short supply in Ghana were supplied as part of the monthly wages of the farm workers. (7) The second aspect of the national oil palm project involved the development of new oil palm plantations through state, international and local private capital funding and participation. The Twifo-Hemang project forms part of this aspect.

The approach to the production of all these industrial raw materials is the high technology, capital-intensive approach, involving large plantations, machinery, modern inputs, irrigation and high yield variety seedlings, similar to the so-called 'Green Revolution' in other parts of the underdeveloped world. The State was to take the initiative in the drive for self-sufficiency in food and industrial raw materials. The major handicap was the lack of financial and technological means to carry out this ambitious programme. At a recent international workshop on the palm oil industry in West Africa, the main constraints affecting the palm oil industry in Ghana, were summarized as,

...lack of foreign exchange to buy equipment and spare parts resulting in general breakdown of transport and machinery; small-scale processing methods which continue to be highly inefficient and high cost of development and production caused by inflation. (8)

Hence, in order to carry out these ambitious programmes, the
Ghanaian state has had to heavily depend on international financial institutions and multinational corporations for the funding of the machinery, inputs, vehicles and other aspects of technology. The national oil palm development programme has depended heavily on the World Bank (I.D.A. and I.B.R.D.), the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the European Economic Community (through the Committee of European Development Fund), the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Unilever (Lever Brothers/United Africa Company) and a number of local branches of multinational corporations.

Table 4.2 shows some of the major new oil palm and mill projects jointly sponsored by the post-colonial state and international finance capital. One paradox is that even though these agro-based industrial projects and several other industries established in Ghana since independence are mainly import substitution policies aimed at saving foreign exchange, this has not improved the poor foreign exchange situation. Instead it rather increased the technological and financial dependence of the country on external sources and increased the debt burden of the country as shown in the table below. (Table 4.3)

In all cases of large scale oil palm and palm oil production, the approach of the World Bank and other important international aid institutions such as the C.D.C. and the E.E.C. was adopted, involving the establishment of
Table 4.2: Selected Major Oil Palm Projects in Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Sponsors</th>
<th>Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kwae Oil Palm Project</td>
<td>World Bank (I.D.A.)</td>
<td>10,000 acre nucleus estate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>Ghana Oil Palm Dev. Corporation Management</td>
<td>3,000 acre outgrower farms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Further 12,000 acre at second stage and oil mill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sese and Prestea, Western Region</td>
<td>Lever Brothers</td>
<td>10,000 acres oil palm estate and oil mill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Benso Oil Palm Plantation at Adum Boso, Western</td>
<td>Lever Brothers, State, Barclays Bank Int.</td>
<td>10,000 acres oil palm estate, outgrowers and mill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kusi Oil Palm Research Centre, Eastern Region</td>
<td>Ghana Oil Palm Dev. Corp. and World Bank (I.D.A.)</td>
<td>20,000 acres oil palm estate to produce seed-nuts for national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>distribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kwamoso, Eastern Region</td>
<td>State/World Bank (I.D.A.)</td>
<td>10,000 hectare integrated oil palm development and outgrower scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and mill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation (Eastern/Western/Central Regions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Scattered State Oil Palm Estates (Eastern/Western/</td>
<td>State Farms Corp., E.E.C. and World Food Programme</td>
<td>Reactivation of over 20 neglected and abandoned estates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Twifo Oil Palm Plantations, Twifo-Praso to</td>
<td>Central Regional Dev. Corp.; European Dev. Fund;</td>
<td>7,200 hectare nucleus estate; 1,200 hectare smallgrower scheme;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemang, Central Region</td>
<td>Commonwealth Development Corp.; World Food Programme.</td>
<td>Over 3,000 acre outgrowers and oil mill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See footnote No. 9.
Table 4.3; Ghana, Outstanding External Public Debt, 1969-80
(million dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Debt*</th>
<th>Annual % increase(+) / decrease(-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>637.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>571.5</td>
<td>- 10.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>628.9</td>
<td>+ 10.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>624.7</td>
<td>- 0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>668.8</td>
<td>+ 7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>684.4</td>
<td>+ 2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>797.3</td>
<td>+ 16.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>835.4</td>
<td>+ 4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1050.1</td>
<td>+ 25.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1075.2</td>
<td>+ 2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1264.4</td>
<td>+ 17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1306.4</td>
<td>+ 3.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes undisbursed funds by the end of year when data was recorded.

large nucleus estates and small-holder and outgrower schemes. (10).

The C.D.C. has pioneered the concept of 'nucleus' estates (or plantations) serving as centres for economic development in the surrounding country. This pattern of development is essentially favoured where the main cash crop gains value by centralised processing and co-ordinated marketing. (11)

The outgrower and smallholder schemes are also aimed at specific target groups identified as 'small-scale farmers, tenants, and the landless to create new wealth by enabling small farmers, hitherto living at subsistence levels to establish themselves in a cash economy'. (12) The state and sponsors of such rural development projects are expected to make access to credit and technical assistance easily available. All these oil palm projects were also based on the production of palm oil in oil mills located near the plantations, using rural land and human resources, but the production of the finished products (i.e. the production of soap, toothpaste and margarine) and their distribution were geared in favour of the urban areas.

Finally, having shown the extent to which the Ghanaian state had stretched itself by way of commitment in the many projects which mushroomed in the wake of the O.F.Y. and O.F.I. programmes, it should not be difficult to expect that many of such commitments might not be possible to
fulfil, especially in view of the dismal economic condition of the country. For example, in all the areas where the state partnered international capital to establish agro-based industries in the rural areas, government was committed to provide land; improve local infrastructure, including roads leading to major urban centres; create conditions for labour to be available in the rural areas; and to provide an uninterrupted flow of the local currency counterpart of the project. On the other hand, international capital was to provide funds for the importation of machinery (tractors, caterpillars and harvesters), irrigation facilities, modern inputs (fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides), means of transport and spare parts. In some cases technical and managerial services were provided as part of the loan agreements. As will be shown in the next section, sometimes the government's inability to fulfil its commitment could affect the response of international capital and the progress of the project.

In the next section, the capitalist sector of the project will be broken down to its three components, namely (1) the nucleus estate (2) the small-holder scheme and (3) the outgrower sector. The description of their structure and analysis of the organization and relations of production in the nucleus estate sub-sector will be more detailed than the other sub-sectors. It should be noted however that most
of the theoretical issues analysed in the section on the nucleus estates apply equally well to the other sub-sectors. A greater part of the data presented were collected through personal unstructured interviews of both management and labour in these enterprises, and from several visits to the plantations, observing and discussing the organization and relations of production, and related problems and prospects.

4.1 The Structure, Organization and Relations of Production

(i) The Nucleus Estate

The plan to promote a rural agro-based industrial project followed closely on the heels of the compulsory acquisition of lands in the Twifo-Hemang area.

In 1975, the Ghana government requested the Commonwealth Development Corporation to conduct a feasibility study into the oil palm development in areas of land in Twifo-Praso, Twifo-Mampong and Twifo-Hemang. The Study involved a C.D.C. team under the leadership of Mr. L.T. Foster, an oil palm expert. The outcome of the study was a report which the Government accepted.(13)

This gave birth to the 'largest agro-based industrial complex in the Central Region of Ghana; a joint venture involving Ceredec, C.D.C., and local investors'.(14) It was
also the first important development project in an area characterized as one of the least developed areas in the country. The main objective of the project was the production of palm oil in a processing factory located at Twifo-Ntaferewaso, which was expected to be operational in 1984. It also involved the establishment of large-scale oil palm plantations to supply the central mill with fresh fruit bunches (f.f.b.) of oil palm as raw material for the factory. To this end, the Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd., (TOPP) was formed.

TOPP is mandated to establish and manage a 4,800 hectare oil palm nucleus estate (to be increased to 7,200 hectares eventually), and a 1,200 hectare small-holder scheme. By May 1983 the first phase of the nucleus estate had been completed. It was divided into four sub-estates, namely the Praso, the Ntaferewaso, the Kwanyako and the Mampong estates; each 1,200 hectares (or approximately, 3,000 acres) in size. The oil mill will be capable of producing 15,500 tonnes of palm oil a year at the rate of processing 30 tonnes of f.f.b. an hour. At that rate of production, the f.f.b. supplied by the nucleus estate(s) and small-holder scheme will not be enough to keep the mill operating at optimum capacity levels. According to the General Manager of TOPP, and the Managing Director of Ceredec, this would mean a high degree of dependence, not only on the state-run sector of the outgrower scheme, but
also private outgrowers, in order to ensure regular, uninterrupted supply of f.f.b. for the mill.

Some of the chief characteristics which differentiate the nucleus estate(s) and the small-holder scheme from the peasant simple commodity producing sector are 1. the larger sizes of the capitalist enterprises. By national standards, most of them are far larger than the national criterion for defining large-scale enterprises i.e. 20 hectares (or approximately 50 acres) or more in size. The tendency of units of production in this sector to be large accords with the high degree of capital investment, the use of mechanization and the regular employment of a stable force of wage labour. These characteristics, coupled with commercial crop specialization, concentrated managerial structure of labour organization, greater efficiency in marketing and sometimes primary processing of products in situ, are what define these capitalist enterprises as plantations. 16) The peasant sector is characterized mainly by numerous small-holdings. Even the rich peasants' farms are not made up of large contiguous holdings but multiple holdings scattered over space. 2. The capitalist sector concentrates solely on one-crop commodity production based on wage labour, in contrast to the peasant sector, in which production comprises a combination of use-values and exchange-values based on a combination of family labour and various other forms of labour organization. 3. The
capitalist sector distinguishes itself from the peasant sector by its capital-intensive nature, in contrast to the labour-intensive nature of peasant production.

It will be recalled that in the second chapter, the oil palm was described as an indigenous crop of the semi-deciduous forest regions of which Twifo-Hemang forms a part. Recent researches have, however, shown that this 'wild oil palm' variety (Elaeis Guinienis), is low in productivity; being less than 1 tonne oil per hectare, per annum. This contrasts with the high yielding variety (H.Y.V.), developed through a genetic breakthrough in scientific research, which yields 3 - 5 tonnes per hectare, per annum or more. When combined with new processing techniques it could increase productivity considerably. Using only modern techniques in processing the indigenous variety could increase oil production by not less than 50% or 500,000 tonnes per annum. (17) This H.Y.V. which has formed the basis of the 'Green Revolution' or 'the technological package approach to U.D.C. (Underdeveloped Countries) farming', (18) is what has been introduced into Ghana, including the Twifo-Hemang sub-district. (19)

The H.Y.V. takes a shorter period to mature (about 7 - 9 years); beginning to bear fruit in 3 years as compared to 10 - 15 years for the indigenous variety. The H.Y.V. actually peaks in yield at about 10 years and continues to bear fruit until about 35 years old or more as compared to
at most 25 - 30 years for the local variety. (20) As the oil palm is a poor competitor with other herbage and plants, the wild variety tends to grow very high (40 - 60 feet or over), in order to get enough sunlight. Actually, 'yields have been related to hours of effective sunshine ie. the amount received when adequate water is available, assuming consumption of 100 mm. per month. The West African climate (as in Twifo-Hemang) with its dry season is generally sub-optimal for oil palms which give higher yields in Sumatra and Malaysia'. (21) The native variety also develops deep roots, in the absence of irrigation facilities, in order to obtain optimum supply of water and minerals from retreating water tables during dry spells. On the other hand, the H.Y.V. variety grows to a very short stature, 'with a height only about a quarter of the wild palm', making pruning, harvesting and chemical spraying easier. (22)

However, in order to obtain, maintain and increase the expected high levels of productivity, the H.Y.V. needs large doses of fertilizers and constant irrigation. Continual irrigation will also ensure that these high levels of yield are achieved throughout the year instead of being limited to the high rainy period. The nucleus estate(s) and the small-holder scheme have their own irrigation equipment which draws water from the nearby Obuo stream. Since these (irrigation and application of fertilizers) promote the growth of weeds, herbage and other unwanted vegetative
matter, there is also the need for the application of herbicides, and constant clearance of undergrowth by human labour. Ample clearance and control of weeds ensure that individual palms do not have to struggle upwards for light and air, hence producing shorter trunks. Again, unlike the indigenous variety, which is relatively immune to the pests and diseases of the tropical environment, the improved variety required occasional application of pesticides and insecticides.

In order to successfully cultivate the H.Y.V. on a large scale, a heavy capital outlay is needed for obtaining machinery, equipment, vehicles, spare parts and modern inputs. For example, as Courtney has shown,

...bruised fruits (resulting from harvesting) leads to increase in free fatty acid (f.f.a.) content of the oil which reduces its quality.... Thus, once harvested, oil palm fruit needs to be transported as quickly as possible to the mill, where by steam sterilization, further set-up of f.f.a. after the initial bruising can be arrested. Speedy and efficient handling on plantations produces oil with an f.f.a. content as low as 1.5% compared with 3.5 - 6% f.f.a. content from the natural palmeries. (23)

In the case of Twifo-Hemang, as for other similar mill centres, collection of fruits especially from the outgrower sector (parastatal and private) which are some considerable distance from the central mill at the nucleus estate site, will clearly need efficient and reliable transport
facilities (i.e. good roads and road-worthy trucks). Since all these modern inputs and equipment must be imported, it becomes clear from the poor condition of the country's foreign exchange position, that the Ghanaian state must be dependent on foreign capital and technological aid in order to meet these enormous demands.

For the nucleus estate(s) of TOPP, external development funds and technical assistance came from the European Development Fund (E.D.F.) committee of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). It approved a loan of $7.8 million to go towards the cost of the groundwork of both the nucleus estates and the small-holder scheme, and machinery, equipment, vehicles, spare parts and inputs for the small-holder scheme. (24) The second source of external funding came from the Commonwealth Development Corporation (C.D.C.), which provided an initial three million pounds sterling to cover part of the cost of the groundwork of the nucleus estate, the technical (including the feasibility study) and eight years of managerial assistance (1977 - 1985). This loan, repayable 1986 - 2000 at 6% interest per annum, was advanced to the state of Ghana for on-lending to the Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd. (25)

Negotiations by the Ghanaian government for a further loan of 4.3 million pounds sterling from the C.D.C. for the importation and installation of the oil producing plant took well over two years to complete. (26) The major
reason for the long delay, according to both the Managing Director of Ceredec and the General Manager of TOPP, was that the C.O.C. was dissatisfied with the Ghanaian state's inability to fulfil its part of the initial agreement between the two parties.

The General Manager of TOPP, the chief representative of the C.O.C. on the project, mentioned a number of reasons for the reluctance of the C.O.C. to get further financially involved in the project. First, the Ghanaian government had given assurance that land would be made freely available for the project. However, the C.D.C. management team had repeatedly got entangled in conflict with supposed 'real' owners of the land, including their ignominious defeat in the civil suit with the Angua Ansah Company as shown in the previous chapter. Second, the Ghanaian government had been unable to fulfil an initial pledge of improving the dusty, narrow and rough highway between Cape Coast and Twifo Praso, making it difficult for the company's heavy trucks and machinery to ply the road, while frequent breakdowns increased costs of maintenance. The company has also been under severe pressures from local leaders about unfulfilled government promises to extend social amenities such as electricity, health services and good drinking water, enjoyed exclusively by the company, to the local population. Frequent shortages and high costs of petroleum products, drugs, spare parts and other essential
commodities in the country have also been impediments. These factors were retarding the progress of the project.

Last, the overvalued official exchange rate of the local currency (c2.75 to $1.00 as compared to about c120.00 to $1.00 on the black market), despite crippling domestic inflation, increased costs of production locally and devalued returns to external investment capital, thereby acting as a disincentive. It is mainly such pressures from foreign investors and the I.M.F. that has led to three stages of devaluation of the local currency 'by a cumulative 1,060% ... over the past year and a half'. (27) The effect of these delays, has been that oil palm fruits were being harvested in both the nucleus estate and the outgrower sector, whilst the oil mill had not as yet been installed by May 1983.

The E.D.F., the C.D.C. and the World Food Programme (W.F.P., which is also involved in the 'Food for Work' aspect of the project) are only external financiers of the project, and not shareholders of the TOPP company. The C.D.C.'s technical and management functions are expected to be terminated after 1985 when it would have trained Ghanaians to take over these functions. (28) The state's Special Agricultural Scheme, which promises foreign multinational companies with local branches the incentive of easy repatriation of block dividends in return for investing in agriculture, encouraged some to take up shareholding in
the project. They are Paterson Simon and Co. (Africa) Ltd. of the United Kingdom (6%), Mobil Oil Corporation of the United States (10%), and Paterson Zochonis and Co. of the United Kingdom (12.5%). The National Investment Bank (6.5%) and the State Insurance Corporation (11%) also have shares. The Central Regional Development Corporation (Ceredec) acting as the representative institution of the state on the project, holds majority shares of 54%.(29)

Production in the nucleus estate is organized by a management staff, in which a 900-odd labour force (as at May, 1983) participates. Management comprises a top administrative staff of British technical experts of the C.D.C. and an apprentice Ghanaian managerial staff (Assistant Managers). Both groups oversee the co-ordination, direction and overall supervision of the financial, engineering and fieldwork operations of the project (which will later include the running of the oil mill). They are assisted by the middle-level administrative, service, technical and fieldwork supervisory staff (supervisors and foremen), in charge of the day-to-day allocation and supervision of duties to the machine operators, truckdrivers and field labourers in the nursery and the estates. Since this is a capitalist enterprise with the main objective of improving productivity and ensuring optimum profit returns to the investors, the management and supervisory staff are playing the role of a class of
petty-bourgeoisie in the production process, in its relations to the class of farm workers whose labour power create the surplus value from which capital will realise profit.

The capitalist plantation, as Wolf has correctly pointed out,

... is by definition a class-structured system of organization. Technologically, it enables the laborer to produce more than he needs to satisfy his own culturally prescribed standards of consumption. Economically, the owners of the plantation appropriate that surplus in culturally sanctioned ways. (30)

The plantation, Wolf further argues, creates and maintains its own hierarchical class structure which 'translates into spatial terms the chain of command of owners, managers, overseers, permanent and season (or occasional) workers'. (31) This 'chain' is linked by the managers, overseers and technical staff in the case of TOPP, who are not a transient category in the process of production, but a permanent feature of the production relations in the plantation system. The class position of this intermediary group is therefore defined in concrete terms by the role it plays in the productive process in relation to the creation and realization of surplus value i.e. the valorization of capital, in the interest of the owners of the means of production. This role is the control of the organization
and condition of labour in the process of production.

As non-owners of the means of production, they cannot be a capitalist or bourgeoisie class. On the other hand, even though they are wage-earners like the labourers, their interests (that of the realization of surplus value through their control of the labour process) stand in contradiction to those of the labourers under their control. They are thus a fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie class, not in the traditional sense of 'working proprietors', (32) but in their intermediary role between capital and labour in enhancing capital valorization.

The casual observer (the preliminary role this researcher played on first arrival at the study area) in due course becomes familiar with the daily routine of the organisation of production in both the nucleus estate and the smallholder scheme. There is the noise at dawn of TOPP-owned tractors, loading farm labourers as passengers in open tractor trailers, along the rough, dusty road from Hemang and other villages dotted along the route to Ntaferewaso, the location of the nucleus estate and Mampong, the location of the smallholder scheme. By 7:30 a.m. the labourers had been assigned their daily tasks, and work had begun in earnest, under the close supervision of the foremen, with occasional rounds of inspection by management staff. Since daily production work is organized on the piece-work and daily wage basis, the worker's daily labour
ends upon completion of the allotted task. It was observed that many workers arrived home well after 6 p.m. by the same tractor trailers, or on foot, if they had missed the last tractors. (33)

Mere observation of work relations on the plantations did not expose the underlying contradictions in the production relations apart from occasional arguments and complaints between individual workers and between them and their supervisors. Contradictory production (or class) relations remained in obscurity until more critical inquiries revealed other potential and real sources of conflict, besides the basic contradictory interests of capital/management and labour.

My inquiries, through interviews and critical discussions with management and labour leaders and other workers, revealed three major areas of contradiction and/or conflict in the relations of production between management and the labour leadership (called the Workers Defence Committees). (34) First, there was disagreement on the conditions of labour and wages under the piece-work system. Second, management complained of laxity in the security system which had made rampant stealing of company property a perennial problem. Third, there was a problem, from the point of view of management, of an undisciplined labour force, chronic absenteeism, and waywardness, especially among the farm labourers. Each of these will be dealt with
in turn.

The leadership of the W.D.C. of TOPP and several workers interviewed, complained that under the piece-work system, adopted in all the capitalist plantations in the area, the amount of daily task allotted to employees of TOPP was more than double what obtained in all the other capitalist farms. Because of this, labourers in other state farms, who started work at 9 a.m. often finished their daily tasks by 2:00 - 3:00 p.m., while TOPP workers who started work at 7:30 a.m., often finished between 5 - 6 p.m. Most workers of TOPP complained that even though before May, 1981, they received 12 cedis a day (at the national minimum wage rate), the same as workers in the other state farms, they thought they deserved at least double that rate because of their heavier workload. Management's refusal to negotiate, led to a two-day strike by TOPP workers in 1981. (35) Hard bargaining between the labour leaders and the TOPP management, Ceredec and the District and Regional Administrations, led to an increase of the daily wage of TOPP from 12 cedis to 20 cedis i.e. about 67% above the national minimum wage.

The Personnel Manager of TOPP acknowledged the fact that the workload was heavier than on the other state farms, but disputed that it was more than double as the labour leadership still claimed. Management explained that the minimum wage was still 12 cedis but that the extra eight
cedis was an 'automatic overtime' for TOPP employees in recognition of the fact that the work was more intensive and the labour day was longer. Management of other state farms in the area complained that the wage differential made them lose more energetic workers to TOPP. The labour leadership (W.D.C.) of TOPP, however, were still demanding further increases, claiming that the issue was far from settled.

In Chapter One, capitalist commodity production involving the real subsumption of labour under capital was theoretically equated with the increased production of relative surplus value through increase in constant capital i.e. through technological improvements, with the ultimate shortening of the labour day. Peasant petty commodity production involving the formal subordination of labour to capital was conceptually equated with the production of absolute surplus value, which could only be increased by the lengthening of the working day and the intensification of labour. The empirical evidence of labour organization at the TOPP nucleus estate however, shows that under capitalist commodity production there can be a combination of relative and absolute surplus extraction. It is important then, that a conceptual clarification be made at this juncture.

The basis of the argument advanced in Chapter One is that the concepts of socially necessary and surplus labour, usually applied to capitalist production (i.e. enterprises in
which capital is directly involved in the productive process through capital investment and hiring of wage labour) can also be applied to situations where peasants are engaged willy-nilly, in producing surplus product extracted by capital, without the direct involvement of capital in the production process. What economic anthropologists mean by the 'economic surplus' is the surplus product that 'exceeds the level that is socially recognized as necessary for the subsistence of all members of a society'. (36) The extraction of this surplus by capital can occur whether capital directly invests in the productive process or not.

Hence, a distinction is made between real subsumption of labour to capital, where the latter directly invests in production and directly purchases labour, and the formal subsumption of labour under capital where capital has not emerged as the direct purchaser of labour, but indirectly extracts the surplus (agricultural) product of the direct producers. The technological basis of labour does not drastically change under formal subordination but the labour process is subordinated to the surplus value producing process. According to Marx, the formal subsumption of labour under capital,

...can be found as a particular form alongside the specifically capitalist mode of production in its developed form, because although the latter entails the former the converse does not necessarily obtain (i.e. the formal subsumption can
be found in the absence of a specifically capitalist mode of production). (37)

The two economic scenarios described by Marx above, are similar to those of post-colonial and colonial Twifo-Hemang respectively.

Both formal and real subsumption of labour to capital result in the extraction of surplus value by capital. While the concept of surplus value is an abstraction, its concrete form in agriculture is the surplus agricultural product. Hence the argument that at the abstract theoretical level, the production of relative surplus value under capitalist commodity production is solely based on technological innovation and improvement, while absolute surplus value under peasant petty commodity production is solely based on the prolongation of the working day and the intensification of labour. Complexities may emerge, however, when we move from abstract models to concrete structures.

At the concrete empirical level, especially in agriculture and in developing societies like Ghana, it is possible that the extraction of surplus value, even in the capitalist commodity production sector, may involve both the improvement of the technological basis of production, and the intensification of labour and lengthening of the working day. The empirical evidence analysed above for the nucleus estate of TOPP is an instance of this possibility. In this
situation the necessary labour time is further shortened and the surplus labour time lengthened. Hence the surplus product in the form of surplus value is further increased. This contradiction in production relations, considered to have been eliminated by management through higher daily wage for labour, was still considered as a potential source of conflict by the labour leadership and rank-and-file of TOPP.

The second contradiction in the relations of production which emerged as a social conflict concerned the problem of laxity of security and rampant stealing of company property. On February 15, 1983 when the General Manager of TOPP was first interviewed by this researcher, the impression was given that besides certain minor problems, the overall relationship between management and labour was cordial. In the morning of the next day (ie 16 February), tractor and truckloads of farm workers, chanting war songs and shouting slogans went back and forth along the main road between Hemang and Praso, instead of heading to the worksite. Workers were on strike on the principle of management discriminatory treatment against them. One farm labourer had been caught red-handed stealing some bunches of harvested palm fruits the previous day. He was immediately handed over to the police, quickly arraigned before court, found guilty and was awaiting sentencing in custody. The significant aspect of the action taken by the workers was that they were not on strike in defence of the convicted
worker's right to steal company property. However, about a year earlier, a top technical officer who was caught stealing a number of vehicle tires was only suspended, not prosecuted. The workers considered that as a contradiction in company policy, which discriminated against them, but protected the top hierarchy.

A quick solution was found to the problem between management and the W.D.C. through the mediation of the District Administration Officer. The worker was cautioned and released. Discussions with management later showed that the position on matters of principle taken by the workers was vindicated. By May 1983, efforts were being made to set up a permanent and efficient security guard service at the site. This action by the labour force however is an indication that TOPP workers' struggles for their rights and interests in future, might not only be limited to economic concerns.

The third source of contradiction and potential conflict in the organization and relations of production is the problem of absenteeism and the instability of the labour force. As the Personnel Manager put it, 'the biggest problem we are facing is having to deal with an undisciplined and unstable labour force'. (38) Management complained that absenteeism and the predominant tendency for farm labourers to quit their jobs after a few months of employment, were hurting the progress of work on the
project. For example, vital production time was spent regularly in training new employees on the practical technicalities of modern farming e.g. irrigation methods, chemical spraying, application of fertilizers and so on. Management was aware that it had been dealing with workers who still maintained their relations to the means of production in the peasant sector, and who used wage labour as a temporary source of cash for specific personal needs. In other words, they were operating with 'occasional workers who report for work in time of need'. (39)

It could be argued that such occasional workers might not necessarily be engaged seriously in peasant farming. They might be involved in other areas of employment although as Table 4.4 illustrates, many might still supplement their incomes with subsistence farming. The tendency for area residents to supplement their incomes with some commercial or subsistence farming, accentuates the increasing demographic pressure on land. One significant group of occasional workers is relatively educated youth who were not attracted to taking up farming as a profession, but who needed cash to facilitate their escape from the harsh economic conditions in the country. Many used the money accrued from temporary employment at TOPP to pay their passage to Nigeria and other neighbouring countries, where they hoped to obtain gainful employment in fields other than farming. Many returned in 1983 as a result of their
Table 4.4: Twifo-Hemang - Distribution of Rural Work Force
By Main Occupations for Selected Localities, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming Only</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming and Domestic Labour*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming and Plantation Labour</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming and Trading</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation Labour Only</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Labour Only*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical - Technical</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading/General Commerce</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Domestic Labour is defined in this work as full-time housewife and housekeeping.

Source: Structured Interview of sample of respondents (N=90) drawn from Mampong, Ntaferewaso and Hemang (1983).
expulsion from Nigeria as illegal aliens. A number of them confirmed that they were once driven by economic necessity to temporarily work as labourers on the TOPP plantations.

The problem of chronic and periodic absenteeism however can be directly related to the combination of peasant farming with labour on the capitalist plantations such as TOPP. The percentage of such farm workers (18.9%) in my sample as shown in Table 4.4 grossly underestates the real situation. The Personnel Manager put it at at least 75% of the farm labourers. According to him, since the rate of absenteeism, especially among farm labourers was considerably higher during peak farming seasons, it was clear that most of these workers were combining farming activities in the peasant sector with permanent jobs on the plantations. Prior to 1981 there was a related problem of farm workers sneaking out of their job site shortly after having been marked as present. Strict enforcement of the piece-work system after the 1981 strike, including the sanction of losing a whole day's wage for not finishing the day's allotted task, seemed to have reduced that problem to a minimum.

The majority of farm workers informally interviewed by this researcher, stated that they combined working on their own farms, or sharecropping and occasional casual labour in the peasant sector with their jobs at TOPP between 1982 and 1983. They were not only micro-holders and
sharecroppers, but were at one time or the other engaged in casual labour. (40) Thus, in order to ensure the continued reproduction of themselves and their households, they engaged in a variety of forms of production and exchange; as part-time direct producers, part-time wage workers and sometimes traders and craftsmen, for the gross income from which they met their rent, taxes, personal and family obligations, and increasing market prices of items of consumption.

Most farm labourers explained this combination of jobs from the position that decreasing, over-utilized micro-holdings could no longer generate incomes beyond bare subsistence levels; hence, they had to resort to other avenues of generating additional income. These are people who are losing their 'autonomy' as direct producers as a result of the intervention of state and capital. Since there are not enough unoccupied farmlands to go round for expansion, exclusive dependence on the smallholdings for their reproduction is becoming impossible. On the other hand, the simple reproduction process cannot succeed on sole dependence on wage labour; for wages, in the face of triple digit inflation and mounting market prices and costs of living, are barely enough for the subsistence of the farm employees and their dependants.
Eric Wolf used the concepts of 'double adaptation' and 'cultural straddling' to characterize this survival strategy by peasants in plantation economies. According to him,

These may involve attempts to widen the resource base through the manipulation of two different sets of cultural forms, but on the same class level.... We may hazard a guess that this kind of cultural straddling will acquire a permanent character, if economic development is at once too slow to provide opportunities for social and geographical mobility, and too weak to eliminate other cultural and social alternatives. (41)

Wolf cited Jamaica 'as an example of an area where... peasants work on plantations, and step with one foot into the plantation way of life, while keeping the other foot on the peasant holding'. (42) For the same Jamaican example, Mintz also argues that,

The plantation worker who is also a peasant appears to be straddling two kinds of socio cultural adaptations, and may represent a cultural type which is not necessarily transitional but in a kind of flux equilibrium. (43)

Albert has recently studied Peruvian plantation workers who 'continued to have smallholdings in the sierra and worked on the coastal estates to obtain a "target" income so as to be better able to maintain their position as independent peasants'. (44)
The conditions which Wolf suggested might explain this semi-proletarianization process in Jamaica, approximates the Ghanaian situation within the period 1974-83 with which much of this work is concerned. In the case of Twifo-Hemang however, it is not just economic necessity stemming out of the national situation which explains this phenomenon. Rural dwellers in Ghana have been known to be more successful in surviving such situations far better than the urban dwellers. They were able to do so, because of their simpler way of living, their greater use of resources of the rural environment, and because they were the main suppliers of food for the whole country. During periods of economic hardships, it is food prices that raise the costs of living in the urban areas to unbearable proportions. The local situation of Twifo-Hemang was complicated by a combination of increasing demographic pressures and increasingly unproductive and overworked land, related directly to the state and capitalist intervention. Similar to what Albert has found in Peru, the peasants need to protect their interests in the peasant sector against possible future unemployment due to the insecurity of public sector employment.

Many farm workers were aware of the insecurity of wage-earning employment in parastatal enterprises in Ghana. The failure of many state-sponsored projects in Ghana, and the closure and abandonment of many state farms between
1966-1972 on ideological and political grounds, were still fresh in their minds. Moreover, according to the principles of customary land law as shown in Chapter 2, lengthy neglect or abandonment of lineage or stool lands, could lead to the occupant's losing his or her usufructual rights to other members in need of land. This could be risky in view of the acute shortage of unoccupied land following the capitalist invasion. The increasing value of land in the area, made it impossible for micro-holding and poor peasants to purchase fresh lands in neighbouring areas. The inability of the state to pay compensation for land lost to the capitalist sector has made it impossible for the small-holders who had lost their lands to compete in the land market. The retention of ties with the family unit of production and communal land was a means of self defence against possible future unemployment in light of the existing economically and political volatile national climate.

Although it is a truism that some employees at TOPP, especially 'strangers' in the farm labourer category and middle and top management and supervisory positions might, not without difficulty, depend for their livelihood exclusively on wage employment, it is clear that the majority of the farm workers cannot be considered as proletarians proper, in the sense of being free wage labourers. They are more properly semi-proletarians,
operating between the peasant and capitalist sectors.

At the theoretical level, it could be argued that the exploitation of semi-proletarian labour power will actually be more to the advantage of capital than that of free wage labour, since in the former case the cost of labour can remain low due to the fact that the farm workers provide their own food through subsistence agriculture. Their dual status as poor peasants still tied to relations of production in the simple commodity producing sector and as erratic wage earners, may allow capital to renumerate their labour power at rates well below that necessary for the reproduction of themselves and their dependants. (45) It could be assumed that such workers might be willing to accept low wages and working conditions in return for employment which allows them time to attend to their own farm work.

In the same vein, at the theoretical/political level, such workers may be assumed to have greater difficulties in turning into class conscious labourers i.e. in transforming themselves from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself. The political differences between the Twifo and the Hemang people, due to the persistent conflict over the ownership and control of lands in the area, might weaken the solidarity of the workers to the advantage of capital. It is interesting to note that this researcher could not hold discussions on the conditions of labour in
the capitalist wage sector with farm workers, without the latter shifting the focus of the discussion to the existing land problem. Many still harboured the hope that lands presently in the control of the state and capital will in the long run be recovered by the traditional owners. It seemed clear from this tendency, that most farm workers were more concerned with re-establishing their 'independence' as small-holding peasants rather than perpetually selling their labour power as wage earners to capital.

It could further be argued that in the long run, again in theoretical terms, given existing trends in the land market, the process of proletarianization might become the dominant feature in the agrarian structure. Increasing demographic pressure, continued undermining of the peasant petty commodity sector, increasing pressure of market and money relations, and the inability of micro-holding peasants to compete with the booming capitalist sector for land and other scarce resources, might lead to the creation of a pool of landless peasants and free wage labourers.

In the words of the Personnel Manager of TOPP, however, 'management is determined to transform the farm workers into a more disciplined and responsible labour force'. Already, strict adherence to the 'no wage for unfinished daily task' under the piece-work system by management, has reduced the incidence of workers sneaking out of the work site to attend to their own farm work
without finishing their tasks for the day. Second, the enjoyment of the World Food Programme's 'Food for Work' plan, has since 1981, been tied to at least 20 days a month work in the estates. In other words, in order to receive imported food items such as wheat, maize, edible oils, skimmed milk, canned fish and so on, as part of the month's pay packet, a worker should have been present at work for at least 20 out of the average 26 days a month. According to management, because of the acute shortage of such "essential commodities", and their high costs in Ghana, some positive improvement in the problem of absenteeism had already been noticed. Finally, the creation of labour villages in each of the four estates at the site under estate management, to be provided with modern amenities which are not enjoyed in the surrounding villages, would result in the creation of a more disciplined and stable workforce.

While these measures may catalyse the proletarianization of the largely semi-proletarianized farm labourers, and may help management to achieve planned targets in productivity, they may also in the long run have a dramatic blacklash. When forced to depend exclusively on the volatile consumer market for both food for subsistence and cash for social reproduction following their separation from the means of production in the peasant sector, they are more likely to increasingly question their conditions of labour. They may demand further increases in wage incomes
than hiterto. Like their urban counterparts, they may become more radicalized by their poor working conditions and their inability to reproduce themselves and their dependants solely on the basis of wage earning employment, despite the fact that they may demonstrably appear better off than the surrounding peasant communities. Moreover, worker solidarity in the labour villages may be enhanced by gradually overcoming existing ethnic and group differences. In the long run it may no longer be possible or easy to keep the wage labour force fragmented and wage rates stagnant relative to inflation.

4.1 (ii) The Smallholder Scheme

Since most of the theoretical issues analysed under the nucleus estate(s) equally apply to this and the next sub-sections, the analyses in both sub-sections will necessarily be short and less detailed. It will be limited to those significant features which differentiate them from the nucleus estate(s), apart from their common capitalistic nature. The characteristics of the structure and organization of the nucleus estate are similar to those of the smallholder scheme with the major difference being in the labour content of the production relations. Instead of wage labourers on the nucleus estates, there are tenant farmers on the smallholder scheme, as will be explained
Like the nucleus estates, the smallholder scheme is another capital-intensive scheme, depending heavily on foreign financial and technological assistance. External funding, as mentioned already, had been guaranteed in principle by the European Development Fund (E.D.F.), which was responsible for the foreign exchange part of the cost of the initial groundwork of both the nucleus estate(s) and the smallholder scheme. Further extension of funds for the supply of machinery, trucks and other inputs for the second phase of the scheme was, however, delayed for almost two years, because the E.D.F. preferred to send its own technical experts to take over the management of the scheme until it had been put on a sound footing. It was not clear from discussions with both Ceredec and TOPP officials, whether this was because of any evidence of actual mismanagement by Ceredec, or that this was a general change in the E.E.C.'s loans policy. By taking over the management, the E.D.F. hoped to ensure an efficient and purposeful utilization of its funds, guarantee the successful take-off of the scheme, and hence raise the probability of the Ghanaian state's ability to repay the loans granted. This problem was finally settled by March 1983, when both Ceredec and the E.D.F. agreed that the technical experts of the C.D.C., working on the TOPP nucleus estates and oil mill, should take over the initial
The effect of this long delay in external funding is that the project lagged behind schedule. The supply of f.f.b. of oil palm from this scheme to the oil mill will begin in 1986 instead of 1984 as originally planned. By May 1983 the project was at the nursery stage under a Ghanaian management and technical staff, directly answerable to the C.D.C. experts at TOPP. Ultimately, when production begins the project will be handed over to the State, represented by Ceredec.(46)

According to Ceredec, the scheme is viewed as a 'compensatory programme' aimed at resettling 300 displaced peasant families, encouraging them to change from traditional methods of farming and getting them interested and involved in scientific farming techniques. Second, it is aimed at producing oil palm fruits to feed the proposed oil mill. The State assumes the role of a landlord and makes capital investment in establishing a 1,200 hectare (or 3,000 acres) oil palm 'estate' divided into 300 oil palm lots, each 4 hectares (or 10 acres) in size for each participating peasant household. The total cost and subsequent capital expenditure on machinery, inputs and general overhead will be shared among the principal settler peasants. It will be considered as a loan, which will be repayable on instalment basis by beneficiaries at 'moderate rates of interest', spread almost over the entire life cycle
of the oil palm trees. The settlement farm plot therefore bears a debt burden that obliges holders to produce, not for the general market but for a particular market, namely the TOPP company. As tenants of the State, each principal tenant farmer will enter into a tenancy agreement with the landlord (ie. State/Ceredec) by which all will be committed to sell the product of their oil palm plots only to the TOPP mill. This will enable deduction of their debt by instalment at source. By May 1983, actual details of this agreement had not been finalised even though participants had been selected. Analysis is therefore limited to the then existing decisions taken by the TOPP and Ceredec, and outcomes of discussions held with officials on the meanings and implications of the information available.

Each of the 300 principal tenant farmers will operate a 4 hectare oil palm lot and 1 hectare (or 2-1/2 acres) of food crops; the latter to be cultivated by the household for its own subsistence. Thus the labor content of the scheme is not limited only to the official tenants. The latter, as household heads, are to assume the responsibility of supplying additional field labour from their families. This additional labour however, is not to be directly renumerated by management. It is expected that any crisis in economic sufficiency for the household unit would be cushioned by the security of subsistence from the food farms attached to the individual oil palm lots. The
labour of the household unit will be directly subsumed to capital valorization, by producing surplus value to be appropriated by capital. The economic reward of participants will derive from the secure subsistence facility plus a cash income derived from profits accruing from the sale of f.f.b. of oil palm from their individual plots after production costs have been deducted by instalment at source. Actual fiscal renumeration of participants is therefore tied to the probability of profits being realised from the scheme. This in turn is dependent on the pricing mechanisms worked out by the TOPP company; the latter taking into account its own profit-making objective.

The selection of candidates to benefit from the programme was done by a selection committee comprising the following members:— 1. The traditional ruler or Paramount Chief of the Twifo Traditional Area, resident at Twifo-Mampong; 2. the Executive of the Twifo-Mampong Town Development Committee; 3. a representative of TOPP; and 4. a representative of Ceredec. The composition of the committee indicates the only positive involvement of local leadership in the decision making process in the implementation of the entire rural development project. It is clear from the limitation of local representation to only the Twifo area in general and Twifo-Mampong (the site of the smallholder scheme) in particular, that the overriding consideration was
the location of the nerve-centre of the TOPP project (ie. the mill, the nucleus estates and the smallholder scheme).

At the first meeting of the selection committee the criteria for selecting suitable candidates were recorded as follows:

(a) must be a head of a household of at least 4 persons each of whom is at least 16 years of age;
(b) must be between the ages of 20-45 years, and be physically fit and healthy;
(c) must be a displaced farmer or an active farmer residing in the area, with preference going to the former group and indigenous inhabitants;
(d) must be numerate (literate and numerate persons an advantage however); and
(e) must be prepared to undergo training in scientific farming techniques on the job.(47)

Discussions with officials of TOPP and Ceredec confirmed that, even though as pointed out earlier (48) the scheme was earmarked as a 'compensatory project' to resettle displaced peasants, the overall consideration in the selection exercise was the ultimate objective of promoting high productivity and generating profit. There was absolutely no reliable way by which the committee could effectively verify whether selected candidates were completely separated from their means of production in the peasant sector or not.

Ceredec and TOPP officials agreed in discussions that a particular issue which could become a source of conflict in future would be the pricing of the f.f.b. of oil palm which participants will be bound to sell to the TOPP
company. It could be argued that since the gross income of participating households will solely depend on the prices offered by the TOPP company, in which their own landlord (Ceredec/State) is a majority shareholder, the pricing of their produce will likely be a major source of conflict. Other individual capitalist outgrowers have the independent option of refusing to sell their produce to TOPP, if they are convinced that prices offered by the company are far below their costs of production or would not allow them to make profits. (49) Already, due to the lateness of the construction of the oil mill, some state and individual farms have been harvesting their product and selling them to private oil and soap producing companies in the urban areas, and local individuals (mainly women) engaged in commercial palm oil and soap production by traditional methods.

The existing alternative market, coupled with the fact that oil palm fruits and palm oil constitute a vital element in Ghanaian diet and therefore has a large internal market, gives independent producers a leeway to boycott the local mill if producer prices are kept too low. (50) The same cannot certainly be said for the bonded tenant producers of the Ceredec Smallholder Scheme. The probability of this outcome, i.e., conflict in the marketplace, could be a fruitful hypothesis for future research in the area.
4.1 (iii) **The Outgrower Sector**

The success of the whole palm oil production project depends on regular supplies, in sufficient quantities, of oil palm fruits to keep the oil palm producing factory operating continuously at optimum, profit-realising capacity. In this connection, the outgrower section is indispensable. This sector is made up of the state farms sub-sector whose commitment to the project, by way of supplying f.f.b. to the oil mill, is not in doubt. There are also the private capitalist plantations whose degree of commitment to the project, as argued in the last sub-section, will largely depend on the producer prices offered by the TOPP company.

There are only two state farms in the outgrower sector devoted to the production of oil palm to feed the oil mill. These are the Ceredec Oil Palm Project (400 acres) and the Ghana Food Production Corporation farm (100 acres), both located near the township of Hemang. Three other state farms in neighbouring Denkyira traditional area may also be committed to supply the factory with f.f.b. (51)

Private capitalist plantations have been developing rapidly in the area. In Chapter Three, analysis was made of the circumstances which led to the appropriation of lands in the area by some influential outsiders through their local allies. It was shown that in some cases, this
involved the displacement, without (proper) compensation, of micro-holding peasants, (52) and the state's protection of some of these usurpers. (53) The state's encouragement of private capitalist agriculture (by public servants and professionals) has already been analysed in Chapter One. Interested entrepreneurs had the incentive of ready marketing facilities and easy credit from the Agricultural Development Bank, the National Investment Bank and other commercial banks. (54) In his study of the Northern Region's private capitalist agricultural development, Shepherd called these absentee capitalist farmers, 'the bank-financed rice farmers'. (55)

Insofar as investment in large-scale, mechanised development of H.Y.V. oil palm plantations demands heavy capital outlay especially at the initial stages (as already analysed in section one of this chapter), it is those who can obtain easy access to credit facilities who have a clear advantage. A local branch of the Ghana Commercial Bank was opened at Twifo-Praso as late as 1982. In interviewing the local Manager in March 1983, I learned that no significant credit facilities had yet been extended to peasant farmers in the area. Individual peasants without any substantial collateral cannot hope to get more than a few hundred cedis at a time. The value of this can be measured against the three hundred cedis it cost by 1983 to hire one casual labourer to clear one acre of secondary forest for farming.
The commercial banks and other credit institutions prefer dealing with farming cooperatives, where a substantial investment in land, fiscal capital and technology is involved, and members could be held 'jointly and severally' responsible for debt repayment. Problems of scattered micro-holdings without contiguity in spatial terms, the mixture of individual and communal lands; and particularly the considerable political tensions and divisions over land between various communities and groups in the area, are all impediments to cooperatives institutionalization. In order to qualify for substantial credit facilities, security in the form of regular, guaranteed incomes, or valuable saleable property (not the mud and thatched buildings of the smallholding and poor peasants) are needed. Land must also be officially registered in an individual's name in order to be used as collateral, and such land must be of substantial size and of high potential value; not the fragmented micro-holdings of the majority of the peasantry. Bureaucratic red-tape (not excluding bribery and corruption), and the problems involved in registering communal lands in the name of individuals, all conspire to virtually eliminate the mainly illiterate, micro-holding and poor peasants from qualifying for bank credit or obtaining access to credit facilities. Jack Goody in his study of capitalist agricultural development in the Northern Region of Ghana came to similar conclusions. (56)
From the increasing ability of a growing number of urban-based influential individuals to invest in large scale mechanised oil palm plantations in the area, it is correct to argue that they either had accumulated substantial capital, or are able to provide credible collateral for bank loans or in the case of high ranking public officials, are able to influence decisions in their favour. As shown in Chapter Three, following the return of lands to the big landlords in 1982, the alienation of lands in the area to private capitalists by this landlord class was stepped up, particularly in the northern frontier area of Twifo, on Morkwa stool lands as shown in Fig. 12, with farms ranging in size from 20 acres to as much as 298 acres being developed by 1983.(57)

Claude Ake distinguishes between 'exploiters by class situation', and 'exploiters by class position' in Africa.(58) Both groups are represented in the private capitalist sector in the Twifo-Hemang oil palm project. The first group includes those who, while not openly depicted as owners of the means of production, play a major role in administering or actualizing exploitation and maintaining its conditions, while still holding public office as military officers and civilian officials. Some of these, as shown in Chapter Three, were involved in controversies which emerged immediately following the state intervention and their own appropriation of lands in the area, through
FIG. 12
TWIFO-HEMANG: BROAD SECTORAL DIVISION OF PROJECT

TWIFO

NEW FRONTIER OUTGROWER AREA

WASSAW

TOPP

NERVE

TWIFO-PRASO

WASSAW

HEMANG

CENTRE

OLD OUTGROWER

HEMANG TOWNSHIP

Morkwa

Omowa R.

Huni Valley

Ntraferewas

Twifo-Mampong

Ntr ce West

R.Obuo
covert alliances with some local traditional leaders and the landlord class.

The second group includes owners of capital (previously accumulated as a result of having held public office in past regimes) including ex-public officials, military officials and ex-politicians. Many have become 'businessmen' who still use their past class position to influence decisions in their favour. These two groups constitute the (absentee) capitalist farmer class, exploiting wage labour, made up of 'landless' and 'land-hungry' peasants in the Twifo-Hemang area.

As for the nucleus estates, production in the outgrower capitalist sector (both state and private capitalist) is organized on the basis of the typical hierarchical class structure of the plantation system; namely, owners of the means of production, managers and supervisors, and wage labourers. The latter, as in the case of the nucleus estates, are mainly semi-proletarianized peasants, who combine various economic activities in the peasant sector with selling their labour power in the capitalist plantations, in order to ensure the continued reproduction of themselves and their dependants. Management and supervisory staff, representing the interests of capital, organize the labour process which ensures the realisation of surplus value for capital. In large measure then, the theoretical issues in terms of the real
subordination of labour to capital and the extraction of surplus value, as already analysed in parts of this work, apply to this outgrower sector. (60)

Even though contradictions existed between capital and management in the relations of production eg. the 67% gap between the minimum wage in the TOPP nucleus estates and the outgrower (state and private capitalist) sector; no open conflicts had emerged by May 1983. Further developments in the relations of production and the conditions of the market in terms of producer prices, would be fruitful areas for social enquiry in the near future.

4.2 Evaluation of Project Objectives

From the pronouncements of government top officials (61) involved in the intricacies and conflicts arising out of the problems related to the appropriation of the lands, and from interviews of traditional leaders and management of the large state farms, the following are the expected social and economic benefits of the project for the area and its people: - (1) The provision of infrastructure and social amenities; (2) employment opportunities for the unemployed; and (3) a general rise in incomes and levels of living in the society. The next task will be to evaluate these in terms of the existing evidence in the area in relation to the stated objectives.
4.2 (i) The Provision of Infrastructure and Social Amenities

As part of the agreement between the state and C.D.C. and E.D.F., the state was to be responsible for the provision of the relevant infrastructure and social services needed to promote the smooth running of the project. This was given an exaggerated interpretation by government spokesmen to the people in the heat of the controversy over the appropriation of lands in the area. This, in turn, raised the expectations of the traditional authorities and their people that the whole area was to be provided with modern social amenities.(62) On the contrary, the provision of such amenities was to be limited to the area occupied by the TOPP and Smallholder estates and settlements.

By 1982-83 several modern housing facilities for management staff (there are going to be 77 management, and supervisory bungalows to be completed by 1985),(63) including electricity, pipe-borne water, a health centre, a swimming pool and other recreational facilities had been completed. Work had progressed significantly on the development of workers' 'labour villages'(64) within the four estates at Twifo-Praso, Twifo-Ntaferewaso, Twifo-Kwanyako and Twifo-Mampong, under the administration of the estate management of TOPP. Modern facilities such as
electricity, good drinking water, a health centre, community centre and other recreational facilities, not enjoyed by the surrounding towns and villages, will be provided. When in 1980, the Mampong Town Development Committee and Scholars' Union petitioned the management of TOPP,

...that electricity supply which has been installed in the oil palm nursery near Eduabeng village, be extended to Eduabeng, Mampong, Hemang, Ntaferewaso and Praso,(65)

the response was that 'Unfortunately the company is only able to generate and supply electricity for its own requirements'. The management of TOPP was not actually responsible for meeting such demands. Rather it was the government spokesmen who had given that exaggerated impression that such modern facilities would automatically follow the location of the project in the area. Even if such promises were based on good intentions, the economic condition of the country by then and for quite a long time to come, does not give any cause for optimism. Generally, only two incidental benefits from the project are being enjoyed by the communities in the area. The first is the smooth-grading of the dusty major road connecting Praso with Cape Coast, only as far as Wawase. This was reluctantly done by the TOPP company itself, after several demands on government to make good its promise to the company to turn the highway into a first class road had failed. The second
is the opening of a branch of the Ghana Commercial Bank a Twifo-Praso in 1982, which the manager explained was located there primarily because of the agro-based rural industry and secondly to cater for the prompt payment of money to cocoa producers. Beyond these, there was no sign that any other benefits by way of social amenities was in sight.

It is reasonable to conclude that, if other facilities are to be provided for the people in future, it may be in spite of the fact that the project has been located there and not because it has been located there. The economic constraints under which the various governments have been operating since the 1970s does not offer any such promise for the many rural areas in which these projects are located.

4.2 (ii) Opening of Employment Opportunities

The claim that the project was located in the area in order to offer opportunities for employment might suggest that unemployment was a social problem there prior to the siting of the project. Alternately, it might suggest that it would either stop or reduce the out-migration of the relatively 'educated' youth and possibly cause return migration. A third hypothesis might be that in-migrants would be attracted to seek employment in the capitalist plantation sector as labourers. Available evidence however
do not lend support to these hypotheses.

Table 4.5 provides some demographic data for three settlements nearest the major capitalist plantation locations. The data suggest that, while the greater majority of the people (about 73%) were engaged in agriculture, only about 4.5% were unemployed. My own fieldwork data, for the same localities in 1983, as summarized in Table 4.4 does not differ much from the official data for 1970, with 75.5% and 3.3% respectively for agriculture and unemployment.

Secondly, data in Table 4.6 on absolute population data for 1960 and 1970 population censuses for the three largest settlements in the area, and five smaller, scattered farm settlements, show that generally while the latter group recorded positive population increase over time, the former group recorded negative population growth over time. The increase in the Praso figures is explicable in terms of its elevated status as a district headquarters and the concentration of government public offices and jobs. The hinterland-coast directed national railway passes only through Praso, and it is the only major point of connection in the area between the Western and Central Regions by a bridge located over the Pra river. In these terms it could be classified as possessing a relatively urban status. The general picture suggests that in-migrants prefer settling in the purely farming settlements, while the more
Table 4.5: Twifo-Hemang: Distribution of Rural Work Force by Main Occupations for Selected Localities, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Categories</th>
<th>Mampong</th>
<th>Ntaferewaso</th>
<th>Hemang</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agric. Related</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Labour</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service and Commerce etc.</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: Twifo-Hemang: Population Dynamics for Selected Localities as Partial Indicators of Patterns of Out-Migration and In-Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Praso</td>
<td>Twifo-Hemang</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>2302</td>
<td>+ 954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denkyira District Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mampong</td>
<td>Twifo Traditional Capital</td>
<td>1306</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>- 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemang</td>
<td>Hemang Traditional Capital</td>
<td>2107</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>- 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyankobo Farm</td>
<td>Farm Settlement</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>+ 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankakor Farm</td>
<td>Farm Settlement</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>+ 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wawase Farm</td>
<td>Farm Settlement</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>+ 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamebekyere</td>
<td>Farm Settlement</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>+ 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mfuom Farm</td>
<td>Farm Settlement</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>+ 131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = Increase of Population over time
- = Decrease of Population over time

'cosmopolitan' settlements experience out-migration. The pattern of in-migration are therefore rural-rural.

My own fieldwork data in Table 4.7 (a) on in-migration supports the position that the majority of in-migrants are from rural farming areas and fewer from urban areas. Table 4.7 (b) indicates that the majority of in-migrants came to acquire land for farming and not to seek employment in the capitalist sector. This evidence does not support the proposition that in-migrants will generally be attracted by the creation of the capitalist plantation sector to sell their labour power as ordinary farm labourers.

Job openings in the capitalist plantation sector were mainly in the field labour category. The relatively more educated youth who had migrated to the cities were not attracted to return to take up these lowly rewarded positions. There was also no evidence that non-residents were attracted to migrate to this area to sell their labour power as ordinary farm labourers on the capitalist plantations. When this researcher enquired whether special concessions were given to traditional citizens of the area in terms of employment, the Managing Director of Ceredec replied that it was 'not necessary since generally geographical mobility gravitates towards urban areas and not the other way round'.(66) In other words, the chances of local residents in obtaining employment as farm labourers
Table 4.7 (a): Twifo-Hemang: Pattern of In-Migration (1970-1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural-Rural</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Rural</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7 (b): Twifo-Hemang: Main Reasons for In-Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To acquire land for farming</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To seek employment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followed Husband</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Structured Interview of sample (90) of respondents drawn from Twifo-Mampong, Ntaferewaso and Hemang (1983).
was not being threatened by in-coming outsiders. This is clear evidence of the fact that the project could not have actually attracted either local citizens who were residing outside or in-migrants from other areas on any significant scale.

Nor could it have stopped relatively educated youths from migrating to the urban areas or even outside the country in those difficult times. Indeed, the project and the promise it held for employment opportunities did not seem to have reduced youth out-migration. In March-April two hundred and fifty-three citizens of Twifo and Hemang traditional areas arrived after being deported, along with over one million other Ghanaians from Nigeria. (67) The 'returnees' were asked to register at the nearest district administrative offices for purposes of future job allocation and distribution of relief aid donated by various international relief agencies. The data collected from the District Administration at Praso, are presented in Table 4.8 (a) and (b). The data show the majority of the expelled (73.5%) were between the ages of 20-29 i.e. a youthful group. They were mainly males (92.5%). Only about 39.1% were either illiterate or semi-literate, while the majority were Middle School leavers, secondary school scholars or professionals in their own right. By May 1983 when I left Twifo-Hemang, almost all these young men and women had left the area. Most of them had returned to Nigeria, (68) or gone
Table 4.8 (a) Twifo-Hemang: Deportees from Nigeria as Partial Indicator of Rural Emigration (Age and Sex Distribution)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Male No.</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Female No.</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 +</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>253</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8 (b) Twifo-Hemang: Deportees from Nigeria as Partial Indicator of Rural Emigration (Educational Qualification)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Standard</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterates &amp; Semi Literates</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School Leaving Certificate</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers' Certificate 'A'</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.C.E. Ordinary Level and Advanced Level</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*R.S.A. Stage 2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City and Guilds Diploma</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>253</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Office of the District Administration and District Headquarters of the Ghana Police Force, Twifo-Praso.

* R.S.A. = Royal School of Accountancy (U.K.)
to other urban areas, while employment of farm labourers still went on at the farm gates of TOPP at Twifo-Ntaferewaso. From the analysis made so far, it is possible to present a micro-model of the labour mobility pattern of Twifo-Hemang with the level of formal education as the independent variable and labour mobility as the dependent variable as shown in Fig. 13 below.

Fig 13: Twifo-Hemang: Micro-model of Labour Mobility

Level of Formal Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Little or None</th>
<th>Elementary or Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural-Rural</td>
<td>Rural-Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Self Employment</td>
<td>Public Service (Industry, Commerce, Civil Service, Etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The project was not located in the area because of any strong evidence of the existence of unemployment as a social problem. The state created the conditions which obliged some peasants to seek employment in the capitalist plantation sector as a means of economic survival. It did
so by making possible the extensive appropriation of individually-owned and communally-owned lands in the area for capitalist intrusion in the process of production. Peasants did not necessarily seek employment as wage labourers on capitalist plantations because it was more attractive than farming on their own land or even on rented land. They did so because of the 'squeeze' on land resources as an outcome of the capitalist invasion of the productive process, and the growing impossibility of ensuring the simple reproduction of themselves and their dependants by relying solely on income derived from their farms. Hence, the existence of many plantation workers combining work on their own farms with selling their labour power in the capitalist sector i.e. as semi-proletarians, not free wage labourers.

Table 4.9 shows the employment data, in relation to the sizes of some of the major capitalist plantations in the area by May 1983. By far the largest enterprise in terms of size both in acreage and labour force is the TOPP nucleus estate. One feature which stands out clearly is the relative small sizes of the labour forces vis-a-vis the spatial dimensions of the enterprises. As Ewusi has stressed, 'mechanized farming, especially when it is undertaken by capitalist-oriented companies and individuals, requires few hands...'.(69) These are capital intensive enterprises, which require less and less permanent human
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Size (acres)</th>
<th>Employment No. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twifo Oil Palm Plantation Ltd. (TOPP) Nucleus Estate(s)</td>
<td>Twifo, Praso-Mampong</td>
<td>11,860.8</td>
<td>900 (70.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceredec Smallholder Scheme</td>
<td>Twifo-Mampong</td>
<td>3,706.5</td>
<td>120 (9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F.P.C. Oil Palm Plantation</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>22 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.M.B. Cocoa Experimental Scheme</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
<td>400.0</td>
<td>165 (12.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceredec Oil Palm Plantation</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
<td>400.0</td>
<td>75 (5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>--</strong></td>
<td><strong>1282 (100.0)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
labour at later stages, when the oil palm trees mature and reach their optimum fruit bearing stage. As explained already, in many private farms with oil palm trees already bearing fruits for some years apart from skeletal permanent managerial forces, mainly temporary, seasonal labourers are engaged either to clear the underbrush or harvest fruits. Besides the nucleus estate and oil mill, which may together employ an eventual maximum of 1,200 employees; and the smallholder scheme planned to resettle 300 peasant families, none of the state-sponsored plantations has plans to increase the labour content of the enterprises. This means that the immediate future of employment opportunities in these capital-intensive enterprises does not look bright bearing in mind that the H.Y.V. oil palm has a fruit bearing life of not less than thirty-five years.

Second, the majority of workers doing actual physical work in the field are Twifo-Hemang citizens. For example, according to the Personnel Manager of TOPP, about 80% of the field labour force at the TOPP nucleus estate were from Hemang and Twifo traditional areas. However, none of the top management staff and only about 20% of the middle-level technical staff were indigenous. This researcher enquired of the General Manager of TOPP whether any special concessions were given to the citizens of Twifo and Hemang in terms of employment in view of their loss of vast tracts of farmlands to the project. His reply was that
'since employment is done at the farmgate the opportunity tends to be in favour of the people residing in the area'.

It was observed that, since the field labour force was relatively unstable as compared with middle level and top administrative and supervisory positions, there was always ready employment opportunities for farm labourers right at the farmgate. For higher positions which needed expertise and technological skills, however, vacant positions were advertised in the national press and filled by personnel who possessed the best qualifications, irrespective of ethnic or geographical origins. (70) Management's policy in this regard was rightly unambiguous. In 1980, the Twifo-Mampong Town Development Committee and Scholars Union petitioned the management of TOPP, calling for preference to be given to local citizens in cases of employment. The reply from the General Manager was,

Where suitably qualified, experienced citizens of Twifo offer themselves for employment with the company preference will be given to them. The company however must be the sole judge of suitable qualifications and experience. (71)

As by May 1983 no citizen of the area had filled any of these top positions, it could be correctly assumed that no suitably, qualified, experienced citizens had applied for these positions.

The concentration of local people in the lowly
rewarded labourer position, further explains their tendency to remain semi-proletarians rather than becoming full-fledged proletarians. The analysis above does not support the viewpoint that employment in this sector would result in higher incomes and living standards.

4.2 (iii) Towards a General Rise in Incomes and Levels of Living

The World Bank defines rural development as,

...a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people - the rural poor. It involves extending the benefits of development to the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in the rural areas. The group includes small-scale farmers, tenants and the landless. (72)

The outgrower schemes, were specifically designed by the World Bank, and adopted by other international financial organizations involved in the so-called Green Revolution in developing countries, to achieve this objective. The aim, according to the C.D.C. is to

...create new wealth for the host country by enabling small farmers, hitherto living at subsistence levels to become productive and establish themselves in a cash economy. With adequate supporting services, small farms often produce higher yields than large mechanised estates and, being more labour-intensive, they help to provide gainful occupation for more people
in the area. (73)

The latter view is clearly at odds with the large-scale appropriation of lands in the area, including the expropriation of the small-scale farmers' (i.e. micro-holding middle peasants and poor tenanted peasants) from their farmlands in Twifo-Hemang, to give way to the penetration of large-scale, mechanised capitalist enterprises.

These schemes assume the existence of these target groups prior to the launching of such programmes. To a large extent this was true of the Twifo-Hemang area. As the analysis of Chapter Two showed, the introduction of cocoa production for export since the colonial period, integrated hitherto subsistence cultivators into the world capitalist-dominated market and created a peasantry, combining subsistence crop production with export cash crop production. It also led to their social differentiation into landlords, rich, middle and poor peasants. The economic and political relations between landlords and tenants, prior to the launching of the TOPP project, approximate the picture painted by McNamara, former President of the World Bank, in his famous address to his Board of Directors in Nairobi in 1973. According to him,

The possession of land, and hence of political and economic power in the rural areas, is concentrated in the hands of a small minority; even the use of land which the small farmer does have is
uncertain. Tenancy arrangements are generally insecure and often extortionable. In many countries tenants have to hand over to the landlords 50-60% of their crop as rent and yet in spite of this, are faced with the constant threat of eviction. (74)

The position taken here does not deny the existence of asymmetrical social relations of production prior to the capitalist intervention in the process of production. Rather, it questions the rationale involved in contradicting the objectives of the project by preceding it with the expropriation of these same target groups from their means of production, and the creation of conditions for long term land hunger in the peasant sector. Such actions contradict the objective of improving the socio-economic condition of the smallholding and sharecropping peasants.

In Twifo-Hemang, the already skewed relations to the means of production were further distorted in favour of capital. The launching of the Twifo-Hemang development project was preceded by the appropriation of over 35,000 acres of individually- and communally-owned lands for state capitalist intrusion into the process of production. Other prominent Ghanaians, taking advantage of the incentives offered by the S.M.C. regime also followed suit, turning themselves overnight into (absentee) capitalist farmers exploiting the labour of both the landless and the 'land hungry' peasants. The logic of contiguity in the expanse of land needed for large-scale mechanised farming, and the rush
for land near to the main highway for ease of communication, and for fertile land bordering sources of water for irrigation purposes, caused the expropriation exercise to inevitably change both fallow lands and cropped lands into capitalist plantations. This has caused general 'land hunger' in the area, the expropriation of many smallholding peasants from their means of production and the destruction of their crops, for which no adequate compensation had been paid.

In sum, there exist contradictions and wide gaps between the objectives, the implementation and the outcomes of this rural development project. The prospects of higher incomes and living standards for the majority of direct producers of the surplus product appropriated by the owners and controllers of the means of production remain a dream. The skewing of the relations to the means of production has further swung the balance of economic and political power in favour of classes and strata that are already economically self-sustaining by national standards. The asymmetrical social relations of production emanating from these processes have long-term economic and social-structural implications.
Summary - Conclusions

This chapter analysed the changing organization and social relations of production in the capitalist sector of the agrarian economy of Twifo-Hemang, and critically appraised the rural development project in terms of its own objectives. It has been shown, on the basis of evidence existing in 1983, that the chances of significant increases in the levels of income and living standards among the generality of the members of the Twifo-Hemang peasantry are very slim.

Of more enduring nature are the processes set in motion as a result of the on-going capitalist invasion into the process of production. Table 4.10 summarizes the general impact the capitalist intrusion is having on agrarian structure. The increasing concentration of the critical means of production in the control of the state and capital, has its corollary in the increasing land squeeze in the peasant sector. The problem of the inability of the micro-holding peasants and the displaced to ensure their continued simple reproduction by exclusive reliance on the economic activities in the peasant sector, has led to the formation of a semi-proletarianized peasantry, operating between the two sectors. They combine working on their micro-holdings or sharecropping and/or casual labour in the peasant sector with selling their labour power in the capitalist sector.
### Table 4.10

Typology of Capitalist Enterprises in Twifo-Hemang (1982-83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of Production</th>
<th>Types of Enterprises</th>
<th>Types of Crops</th>
<th>Social Classes</th>
<th>Status on Labor</th>
<th>Forms of Labour Payment</th>
<th>Dynamic Status as Capitalism Develops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-Foreign Capitalist Estates</strong></td>
<td>Petty-Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>Management and Technical Staff</td>
<td>Monthly Wages</td>
<td>Expanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Farms</strong></td>
<td>Farm Labourers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mainly Semi-Proletarianized</td>
<td>in Cash</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Estates</strong></td>
<td>Capitalist Farmers</td>
<td>Palm</td>
<td>Mainly Absentee Owners</td>
<td>Profit Farms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitalist Plantations</strong></td>
<td>Petty-Bourgeoisie</td>
<td></td>
<td>Skeletal Management Staff</td>
<td>Monthly Wages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farm Labourers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mainly Semi-Proletarianized and Casual</td>
<td>in Cash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The expansion of the capitalist commodity production sector has led to the creation of a petty-bourgeois class of technical and managerial/supervisory experts within the capitalist sector, representing the interests of the state and the increasingly emerging absentee capitalist farmer class in the productive process. The next chapter will explore the agrarian structural changes which have been taking place in the peasant petty commodity sector since independence was achieved in 1957. On the basis of existing evidence of the processes set in motion as a result of the capitalist intrusion in the process of production, a look will be taken at the likely long-term implications for agrarian change.
Notes on Chapter Four


19. A 20,000 acre national oil palm research centre has been established at Kusi in the Eastern Region. It is a joint venture between the Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation and the World Bank (I.D.A.) to produce seednuts of the H.Y.V. for nationwide distribution, (see table 4.2 above).


26. The technical expertise of another British company, Guthrie International had been arranged by C.D.C. to 'supervise' the installation and construction of the oil mill by a Ghanaian construction firm. (see West Africa, No.3322 (March 30, 1981), p.716.


28. Whether the Ghanaians would be able to maintain the same standards or even improve upon the management and technical competence of their would be predecessors cannot be determined at this juncture. However, the record of past performances by the State Farms Corporation and other state institutions in the agricultural field during the First Republic (ie. 1962-1966) does not give much cause for optimism. See for example, Robert H. Bates (1981), op. cit., p.152. James Gordon, 'State Farms in Ghana', in A. H. Bunting (ed.), International Seminar on Change in Agriculture (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1970); Jean M. Due, 'Agricultural Development in Ivory Cast and Ghana', The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1969), pp.637-60, especially p.647.


30. Eric Wolf, 'Specific Aspects of Plantation Systems in the New World: Community Sub-Cultures and Social Classes', in
31. Ibid., p.137.


33. I had on many occasions seen farm workers walking long distances to their villages because they had missed the company tractor and could not get a ride from other road users. On several occasions, I gave a ride to one worker at a time on my motorbike along the route.

34. Like the P.D.C.s (Peoples' Defence Committees) which function at the community level, the W.D.C.s are institutions which sprung up at the insistence of the P.N.D.C. regime following its seizure of state power on 31 December 1981, in all state and private enterprises, ostensibly to defend the rights of workers against alleged undue exploitation, and oppression of workers, and to mobilise workers for increased productivity.

35. See Despatch from the District Administrative Officer, Twifo-Praso to the Regional Administrative Officer, Cape Coast, in File No. G3/Vol. 1, Office of the District Administration.


38. Interviews of the General Manager, Personnel Manager and a number of Field Supervisors and Foremen were done mainly in the month of February 1983, although subsequently several visits to the company site enabled this researcher to make further observations and to discuss in more detail the relations of production between management and labour.


40. The systems of agricultural labour in the peasant sector in post-colonial Twifo-Hemang will be analysed more elaborately in Chapter 5.

42. Ibid., p.143.


45. Literature on this theoretical perspective on Africa is very thin, being limited mainly to the case of Southern Africa. See for example, H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power From Segregation to Apartheid', Economy and Society, Vol. 1 (1972), pp.425-56; See also Claude Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Community (Cambridge; University Press, 1981), for a recent example in West Africa.

46. Details were derived from interviews of the General Manager of TOPP, the Managing Director of Ceredec and the Manager of the Smallholder Scheme.

47. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Smallholder Selection Committee held on Friday, November 15, 1982 at TOPP, Twifo-Praso in File G26/17 of the District Administration Office, Twifo-Praso.

48. See Section 3.3 of Chapter 3.

49. Peasants of colonial Ghana already established the tradition of boycotting monopsonistic capitalist markets when producer prices were kept very low through collaborative price fixing by European companies. It is not surprising that the only major palm oil boycott lasted eight years (1858-1866), while the longest of the many cocoa boycotts lasted only 7 months (October 1937 - April 1938). The fact that palm oil had local consumptive value while cocoa did not have was a contributory factor. See for example, Freda Wolfson, 'A Price Agreement on the Gold Coast - the Krobo Oil Boycott, 1858-1866', Economic History Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1953), pp.68-77; Jarle Simensen, 'Rural Mass Action in the Context of Anti-Colonial Protest: The Asafo Movement in Akim Abuakwa, Ghana', Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1974), pp. 25-41; Rhoda Howard, 'Differential Class Participation in an African Protest Movement, The Gold Coast Cocoa Boycott of 1937-38', Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1976), pp.469-480; Sam Rhodie, 'The Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-Up of 1930-31', Transactions of the

50. Two oil palm mills currently operating in the Western Region, funded by the African Development Bank and managed by Ghana Agricultural Development Bank have been reported to be working well below capacity for lack of fresh fruits due to less than satisfactory response by local peasants. West Africa No. 3499, p.1850. The state-owned G.I.H.O.C. (Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation) Vegetable Oil Mills at Esiama in the Nzema area of south-western Ghana, established in 1960-61 has long been starved of raw material by local producers of coconut and copra and by 1983 was on the verge of closing down permanently, for the same reasons. See Nana Azia, 'The Case of Esiama Oil Mills', Daily Graphic (Saturday, February 12, 1983 and Monday, February 14, 1983).

51. District Administrative Office, Twifo-Praso, Files No. G16/7 and G31/Vol. 1. The State Farms Corporation, the Ghana National Reconstruction Corps and Ceredec have an oil palm plantation each at Junkwa, the traditional capital of the Denkyira Traditional Council.

52. See Table 3.2, of Chapter 3.

53. See Table 3.7, of Chapter 3.


55. Andrew Shepherd, 'Rice Farming in the Northern Region' West Africa, No. 3156 (9 January 1978), pp.54-55.


57. File G31/Vol. 1 of District Administrative Office, showing registered members of the Twifo-Praso/Damang Branch of the Oil Palm Growers Association.


59. For example, the list of members of the Twifo-Praso/Damang branch of the Oil Palm Growers Association include a former educationist and District Commissioner of the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira District; two former Members of
Parliament for the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira Constituency, and
some former military officers and officials of the Regional
Lands Department and Regional Administration.

60. Refer to Chapter 1, section 1.2 and Chapter 4 section 4.1.

61. See for example, speech by Commissioner for Lands and
Natural Resources to a gathering of chiefs and people at
Ntaferewaso on Saturday 20 January 1979, reported in

62. Interviews with chiefs and traditional council elders and
officials of the Village Development Committees and the
P.D.C.s of Mampong, Ntaferewaso and Hemang.

63. TOPP, A Write-Up on Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd. (Cape

64. This concept came up during my interview of the General
Manager of TOPP, on February 15, 1983 at Twifo-Ntaferewaso.

65. Petition from the Town Development Committee and the
Scholars' Union dated April 30, 1980 to the General Manager
of TOPP in Regional Lands Office (R.L.O.), Cape Coast, File
no. ESC/DC49/72TJ.

66. Informal interview at Ceredec Head Office, Cape Coast, 1
December 1982.

67. The Nigerian Minister of Internal Affairs, Alhaji Ali Baba
announced on 17 January 1983 that all aliens in Nigeria
without proper papers must leave within a fortnight. This
affected over a million Ghanaians. See Nii-K,
Bentsi-Encill, 'Nigeria's Deadline for Immigrants', West
Africa, No. 3416, (31 January 1983), pp.245-6; Also West

68. Ghanaians and other aliens who returned to Nigeria after
their first deportation, have recently been re-deported.
see E.I.U., Quarterly Economic Review, No. 3 (1984),
pp.10-11.

69. K. Ewusi, Planning for the Neglected Rural Poor in Ghana
(Legon: Institute of Statistical and Social and Economic

70. See for example, Ghanaian Times, October 18, 1982 and
October 23, 1982, for advertisements for the positions of
Assistant Estate Managers, Field Supervisors, Nurses and
Accounts Supervisors.
71. Petition from the Twifo-Mampong Town Development Committee and the Scholars' Union dated April 30, 1980 to the General Manager of TOPP in Regional Lands Office (R.L.O.), Cape Coast, File No. ESC/DC49/72TJ.


74. R. S. McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group, Nairobi, Kenya, September 24, 1973, Washington D.C., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1973. The control of communal lands by Traditional Authorities and the landlord class, coupled with the 33-1/3% and 50% of the share of the product under the Abusa and Abunu sharecropping systems respectively will further be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

AGRARIAN STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN POST-COLONIAL TWIFO-HEMANG,

1957 - 1983

Introduction

In the previous chapter an analysis was made of the dynamics of agrarian change as a result of the introduction of capitalist commodity production in post-colonial Twifo-Hemang. This chapter deals with the trends of agrarian change in the peasant petty commodity production sector, both before the capitalist intervention and following it. As was done in the previous chapter, the analysis will emphasise wherever relevant, the interconnectedness of the two sectors; (ie. the peasant and capitalist) for, notwithstanding elements of contradiction and conflict in this relationship, they constitute parts of a single agrarian economy undergoing rapid structural change in response to both internal and external socio-economic forces.

The historical analysis of structural change in the colonial political economy presented in chapter two ended with the specification of the structure of the economy and the relations of production on the eve of national political
independence. Part of the burden of this chapter is to fill the existing gap in this work so far; namely, the dynamics of change in the structure of the political economy, with specific reference to the peasant petty commodity production sector in the post-colonial era, before and since the capitalist intervention in the production process. It will show the role of external forces i.e. national and international socio-economic forces, in shaping the dynamics of the local economy, which had irreversibly been drawn into external market relations since the colonial era. This chapter will also take account of the diversity of farming practices, giving detailed description and explanation of the actual organization of the production process and forms of agricultural labour relations. Lastly, it contains a brief analysis of the immediate impact of the state/capital intervention in the process of production, and based on existing evidence, an attempt to predict long-term implication of this intervention in terms of agrarian structural change.(1)

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section deals with the transformation of the political economy in the post-colonial era. It deals with two sub-sectors namely, the cocoa industry and the commercial food industry. The role of external forces (i.e. national and world economic trends) in shaping these economic activities will be emphasized. The second section analyses
the organization and relations of production in the peasant petty commodity sector and the changes they have undergone since independence. The summary-conclusion focuses on the impact of the capitalist intrusion on the social-structural relations among the peasantry.

5.1 The Evolution of the Post-Colonial Economy, 1957 - 1983

5.1 (i) The Cocoa Industry

In the second chapter, it was argued that by responding enthusiastically to the opportunity of producing cocoa for the wider capitalist market, hitherto largely subsistence cultivators transformed themselves into a peasantry. The peasantry was differentiated into rich, middle and poor peasants, according to their ownership or control of the means of production, their respective roles in the process of production and their unequal ability to sustain the simple reproduction of themselves and their dependants in a rapidly expanding commodity economy. Through cocoa production they were formally integrated into the world capitalist market relations. In theoretical terms, the labour of the peasantry was formally subsumed under capital, without the latter being directly involved in the productive process. With capital controlling the
marketing and pricing of the commodity produced by the peasantry, and the pricing and marketing of the latter's means of consumption, the simple reproduction process of the peasantry became increasingly dependent on the conditions of the wider capitalist market. As the demands of both the state and capital increased, so were peasant direct producers pressured to increase their output for the market. This was done through the expansion of areas under cocoa cultivation and the exploitation of hired labour (especially in the case of big landlords and rich peasants) and the intensification of their own and their families' labour (especially in the case of middle and poor peasants) in order to increase the surplus agricultural product extracted by capital in the form of absolute surplus value.

The cocoa industry in Twifo-Hemang, as shown in the second chapter of this work, received its initial boost and subsequent expansion from the arrival in the 1920s of in-migrants (both Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians). They participated in the industry in various ways through the outright purchase of land and the employment of labour, sharecropping and other tenancy arrangements, and as annual (seasonal) labourers. Since then, and up until the intervention of the state and capital in the land tenure controversy and the productive process in the mid-1970s, cocoa has been (as for the whole country) the backbone of the local agrarian economy. However, rising urbanization
and other socio-economic factors steadily increased the importance of commercial food crop farming especially in the 1970s. By the early 1980s it was becoming difficult to maintain the view that cocoa was still retaining its dominance in the local economy. Furthermore, the oil palm industry was beginning to show promise of rising to a dominant economic position. Peasants' further response will of course depend on the success of the oil manufacturing project and the conditions of the producer market for oil palm fruit produced by peasant smallholders.

Both official documents, (2) and my survey show that the early 1960s saw the second and last significant influx of migrants who came for the sole purpose of participating in the cocoa industry. Unlike the first group which was a combination of land purchasers, sharecroppers and farm labourers, this group was predominantly made up of sharecroppers willing to operate under the traditional abunu and abusa systems. (3) With regard to the expansion of the cocoa industry in Twifo-Hemang, this early 1960s can be rightly described as the last period in which any significant expansion of the area under the cultivation of cocoa occurred. My observations and inquiries in 1982/83 showed that most of the cocoa trees were old, some were diseased, and many farms were suffering from neglect. The factors which have contributed to the systematic decline of the cocoa industry in Twifo-Hemang, and by implication the
sudden rise to prominence and importance of commercial food production, cannot be fully grasped without taking cognizance of the external socio-economic factors which have contributed to it. Nor is the situation any different from the overall national conditions. In 1979 a nationwide survey showed that 15% of all cocoa trees were over 30 years old and 57% were aged between 16 and 30 years. (4) The cocoa tree has a life-span of up to 40 years, and its productive ability decreases as it ages. This means that the economic returns to peasants involved in cocoa production were likely to be diminishing over time. The rest of this sub-section will concern itself with analysing the various external and internal factors that have contributed to the local decline of this industry, ending with the impact of the intervention of the state and capital.

Big landlords who had acquired multiple holdings of land through their own industry and controllers of communal lands, transformed themselves into rich peasants, primarily by relying on the labour power of hired labourers in establishing new cocoa farms during the 1910s and 1920s. In a period when local micro-holding peasants operating on lineage lands or on self-acquired plots were not prepared to sell their labour power as farm labourers, Ghanaians from the relatively economically neglected Northern Territories (now Northern and Upper Regions), and non-Ghanaians (from neighbouring countries such as Togo and Upper Volta)
migrated into the cocoa growing areas annually to enter into labour contract agreements with big landlords and rich peasants. (5) The annual labourers received an agreed-upon bulk wage at the end of their contract period, although more often than not a significant portion of the money involved had already been advanced to the labourers through loans and advances of grants in the interim period. Although the majority of them stayed for relatively short durations, some stayed longer depending mainly upon the specific needs which initially urged them to sell their labour power on the cocoa farms. The rich peasant/employer was responsible for providing the farm labourers with food and accommodation, some clothing and implements for the farm work.

From the time of independence, especially from the mid-1960s the frequency and number of new arrivals gradually decreased particularly in the case of Northern Ghanaians, because of relatively better paid government jobs and social conditions emerging in the urban areas attracting Northerners. (6) The shortage of farm labourers from neighbouring countries reached crisis proportions, not only in Twifo-Hemang but also in other cocoa growing areas, when the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969-70, ostensibly evoked in the name of indigenizing certain vital sectors of the national economy, ordered all illegal aliens (ie. those without proper immigration and residential papers) to leave the country. (7) The effects of the immediate problem of
acute shortage of farm labour this created were felt more by
the rich peasants who owned multiple holdings of cocoa
farms, than the micro-holding peasants, since it was the
former group which relied more heavily on hired labour to
develop and maintain their scattered cocoa farms. As Addo
correctly put it,

Indeed one could appreciate that a large cocoa
farmer cannot afford to lose a sizeable part of
his labour for long without having to experience a
disaster on his enterprise; with the small farmer,
however, he might conveniently cope with the
situation for a much longer period by resorting to
such adjustments as using his own labour or
mobilizing the members of the household to work on
his farm(s), as well as making occasional use of
casual labour, particularly when farmwork was at
its peak. (8)

Southern Ghanaians, including citizens of the area,
were not immediately prepared to replace these annual
labourers because the economic returns and the level of
social prestige it entailed, were relatively lower than
doing sharecropping or combining one's own farmwork with
occasional casual labour. Although aliens and Northerners
were prepared to serve as domestic servants in return for
food and accommodation in addition to their regular
production role as farm labourers, Southern Ghanaians, more
particularly smallholding indigenes, considered such a role
as socially demeaning. The relatively higher costs of
depending on casual labourers from Southern Ghana to
develop new cocoa farms, contributed to the lack of expansion of the industry. Southerners would not settle for the very low wages which Northerners and aliens were prepared to put up with. Since the 1970s, already established cocoa farms have largely been maintained by peasant caretakers from the South operating on sharecropping basis.(9)

More potent factors contributing to the gradual demise of the cocoa industry since the 1970s, not only in Twifo-Hemang but also in the whole country, are products of the system of monopoly and centralization of the cocoa market by the state, and the relatively low prices offered to the peasant producers by the various marketing agencies of the state. All governments of post-colonial Ghana (with a typical dependent economy) have since the mid-1960s faced a yet unresolved dilemma. They could raise the producer price of cocoa to nearer world market price levels and to competitive levels with those of the neighbouring countries but that would reduce government revenue from cocoa. It will further lower the already dwindling government revenues for footing increasing import bills, paying increasing external debts and promoting internal economic development. Alternatively, they could maintain the large gap between producer prices and world market price levels in order to give priority to overall economic development rather than improving the economic condition of the peasant producers
and giving them enough incentive to increase production levels and to discourage them from smuggling their produce. All governments have consistently opted for paying lower producer prices than the neighbouring countries, and have maintained a wide difference between world market prices and prices paid to producers. For example, by 1978, while for a 30 kilogram load of cocoa the Ghanaian peasant received eighty cedis which was equivalent to only 25% of the world price, his or her counterpart in the Ivory Coast was receiving C240 (cedis) per load. \(^{(10)}\) In addition, higher inflation and shortage of and high costs of essential items of consumption in Ghana vis-a-vis her neighbours, made smuggling out Ghanaian cocoa and selling it in neighbouring countries more lucrative than selling it internally to the state-run Cocoa Marketing Board.

Besides the problem of low producer prices which do not cover the costs of production, other factors repeatedly mentioned by informants as contributing to the systematic decline of the cocoa industry were, the lack of essential inputs such as spraying machines and chemicals to combat pests and diseases which attack and destroy the trees and pods. There was also the long delays in payment of moneys by government buying agencies, including in some cases, direct cheating of producers by buying agents.\(^{(11)}\) The poor maintenance of farms, ageing cocoa trees, and ineffective control of pests and diseases existing in the area, can be
directly attributed to these factors.

The problems are not unique to the Twifo-Hemang area, but rather general to all the cocoa producing regions of Ghana. They have without exception been partly blamed for the increase in cocoa smuggling to neighbouring countries and the fall of Ghana from the position of leading producer and exporter of cocoa in the world to the third position behind Brazil and the Ivory Coast since the later 1970s. The following observation by the World Bank quite effectively summarizes the situation:

Producer prices for cocoa lagged behind other relevant prices - far behind in most cases. Thus, the price index of all consumer goods rose 22 times between 1963 and 1979; food prices rose at about the same rate and the price of cocoa in neighbouring countries rose 36 times. In contrast, Ghana's farmers received only 6 times more for their cocoa.... The real effective exchange rate for cocoa, which is the number of units of local currency, actually received by producers for a dollar's worth of cocoa exports, adjusted for inflation declined drastically over the past fifteen years, which explains the disincentives to growing cocoa.(12)

In parallel development there was increasing evidence at the national level, confirmed at the local level during my field research at Twifo-Hemang, that returns on investment in non-cocoa competing forest belt crops, especially important staples such as maize, plantains, yams and rice were improving significantly in the 1970s in response to increasing urban demand for food and
inflationary pressures. Moreover they ensure more regular incomes throughout the year than cocoa which is limited to only two seasons of the year. These developments partly explain the relative neglect and stagnation of the cocoa industry and the increasing importance of commercial food production in Twifo-Hemang since the 1970s.

An event which dealt a devastating blow to the cocoa industry in Twifo-Hemang and which contributed greatly to its further loss of importance was the extensive destruction of cocoa trees and farms, to make way for the development of large-scale oil palm plantations sponsored by the State and Capital. As shown in the third chapter, the Twifo-Hemang agro-based industrial project involved the clearance of not only fallow secondary forests, but also the destruction of existing cocoa and food crop farms, as well as scattered cash crops like oil palm (the wild variety), coconut, coffee and kola nuts. Although complete, specific data on the actual number of cocoa trees destroyed is not known, the extent of the damage can be inferred from the estimated compensation for damaged crops which the state had to pay to claimants. The very conservative estimate of eleven million cedis (c11.0 million) of which only two and a half million cedis (c2.5 million) had been paid to claimants by 1983, has recently been revised upwards to c16.8 million, with a further c3.4 million paid so far to peasants whose crops were damaged.(13) It will be recalled that the bulk of
destruction affected cocoa and food crops, and that the government by law would not pay compensation for food crops, or for developments which were less than two years old on any land affected. (14) This means the c16.8 million estimate covers only compensation for destroyed cocoa, and other scattered, less populous perennial cash crops. At the compensation rate of only c0.50 for a cocoa tree and c0.25 for an oil palm tree, the extent of damage of cocoa trees involved can be inferred vis-a-vis the estimated total value of compensation (c16.8 million).

The reaction of cocoa-farm-owning peasants affected, as depicted from the concrete collective and individual protest action and notes to state authorities showed not only anger and frustration, but also skepticism of, and suspicion about, the real intentions of the state. Most of the protest notes appealing to government to put an end to the destruction of cocoa farms, made reference to the following recommendation of the Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner in 1979:--

I hope that if the continued existence of the Executive Instrument (ie. NRCD332 of 1975) is even necessary steps will be taken to exclude large-scale cocoa farms which have been established for years on the land from the area of acquisition. (15)

Others clearly depicted the skepticism and suspicion of the government's real intentions while pointing out the
contradiction in government's policies regarding the role of cocoa in the country's economy. One for example argued that,

If it is understood that cocoa is the backbone of the country's economy and the area is densely inhabited by cocoa, one wonders why these cocoa trees are being mowed down to give way to smallholder's scheme and other oil palm plantations. (16)

Some at the same time clearly stated the feelings of the peasants while appealing to the state to revoke the legal instruments which were making the destruction of cocoa farms possible in the area. Consider the following for example,

The cocoa farmers are getting demoralized to learn that the Ghana government is discouraging the cocoa industry by finding money from local sources and the World Bank to destroy cocoa farms and impoverish the cocoa farmers. (17)

The general skeptical attitude towards the development project was not limited only to the peasants directly affected. In granting "an application for interim injunction" by one of the Akwapim farming companies (Angua Ansah & Co.), against the Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd. (TOPP), temporarily banning the latter from entering the landed property of the former, the presiding judge observed that,
For many generations past, despite the fact that this country was in the past known as the Gold Coast; Gold Coast or Ghana was known for her cocoa industry and cocoa has always been known and recognised as the economic lifeblood of this country. The defendants (i.e. TOPP) can only carry out their project by cutting down or destroying the plaintiffs' cocoa trees in preference for a project the future of which no one can predict, with any certainty; bearing in mind the many such mushroom projects all over the country which ended in failure. (18)

As their protests and appeals fell on deaf ears, such skepticism was transformed into the suspicion that government was deliberately embarking on a systematic scheme of eliminating all cocoa from the area in order to replace it with oil palm trees. The government's response was clearly spelled out at a farmers rally in the area, and reported as follows:-

The Regional Commissioner (of the Central Region) asked the farmers to disabuse their minds of the erroneous impression that the government wanted to replace their cocoa trees with oil palm. He said a survey conducted showed that most of the cocoa trees in the area were old and affected by disease. (19)

Although the expressed view about the existing condition of most of the cocoa trees cannot be denied, (20) it could be argued that, this hardly constitutes a sufficient and convincing reason for the cutting down of the trees. Otherwise there would have been no need to replace them with oil palm trees. Government could have assisted affected
cocoa farm owning peasants to replant their lands with fresh cocoa. It would rather seem that the real reason is that at that specific point in time, oil palm production to feed the proposed oil producing factory had a higher priority than cocoa in the scheme of things.

The process led to the loss of both land and crops and hence constituted long term economic losses to the peasants affected. Sometimes government officials exhibited a nonchalant attitude to the plight of the peasantry. For example, when requested to comment on several allegations by local peasants against the conduct of bureaucrats charged with implementing the compulsory land acquisition exercise, and the expression of doubts about the state's real intentions, one top bureaucrat argued that,

The complaint by some farmers that the project would lead to the destruction of their cocoa farms is one that prevails in all the forest belt where plantations are established. (21)

This attitude directly contradicts the government's own objectives in establishing a 400-acre Cocoa Experimental Scheme at Hemang in 1977, aimed at supplementing local production of cocoa and more importantly to act as a demonstration example for local producers and to provide technical advice to local peasants. According to the Manager of the scheme run by the Cocoa Production Division of the Cocoa Marketing Board,
Following the devastation of many cocoa trees by the swollen shoot diseases; the farmers' opposition to the method of cutting down diseased trees, and the lowering of national yields and production levels, it was decided that farmers' produce should be supplemented by government experimental farms. (22)

In addition these government cocoa plantations which have since 'proved very expensive due to very high overheads', were 'to serve as centres for diffusing modern and improved technical husbandry, methods and inputs to neighbouring farmers'. (23) With the acute shortage of new farmlands in the area, even if the scheme were to have its planned impact, the benefits were likely to be limited in scope to the big landowners and the rich peasants, and would likely exclude large numbers of the smallholding and poor peasants. According to the Manager because the alienation of the cocoa producers preceded the project, the peasants were hardly enthusiastic about the scheme. Moreover, there was hardly enough new farmland for putting these modern techniques into practice. The ultimate effect of these developments was that most peasants would rather prefer to shift from cocoa to commercial food and oil palm production, over both of which they have better control. The general situation looked bleak for the future of the cocoa industry in Twifo-Hemang.
5.1 (ii) The Commercial Food Crops Industry

The ecological conditions of the semi-deciduous forest belt in which Twifo-Hemang is located have already been identified in the first chapter as very favourable not only to such important cash crops as oil palm, rubber and cocoa but also to local food staples like yams, cocoyams, plantains, maize and other vegetables and fruits. The pre-independence status of food crop production in the local economy was that it was largely for subsistence both during the earlier era of long-distance trade and the colonial era of cocoa production. The latter was the measuring rod of relative wealth and property relations, and was strongly related to the ownership and control of the most crucial means of production, namely land. Hence landowners and controllers of communal lands became exploiters of labour for the production of cocoa.

The rise to preeminence of cocoa production in the local (and national) economy went hand in hand with the expansion of food crop farming. This was partly because the young and delicate seedlings of cocoa, especially up to the age of about five years, need to be interplanted with food crops like cocoyams and plantains to provide shade from the sun and to preserve moisture in the soil. (23) At a later stage of maturation however, the cocoa trees do not need shade crops as their own interlocking canopies retain moisture in the soil during dry spells. At that point,
foodstuff farms have to be on separate plots. Both cocoa farm owners (mainly rich peasants) and farm labourers subsisted on these food crops, with a little entering the market, while the main source of income was cocoa production.

Although some market exchange involving food crops especially based on regional complementarity existed in the colonial period, it has been during the post-colonial period with its dramatic rise of a dependent urban population that food crop production, strictly on a commercial basis became an important economic activity. As shown in the previous sub-section, for various reasons there was a gradual rise to preeminence of food crop production, in terms of its economic returns and the expansion of area under cultivation vis-a-vis cocoa production. By the mid-1970s it was becoming more profitable to be involved in commercial food crop production than in cocoa production. Hence since the 1970s the attention of the peasantry in Twifo-Hemang has been focussed on food production for the nearby urban markets, almost to the neglect of cocoa production.

The proximity of Twifo-Hemang to Cape Coast, a distance of approximately 30 to 40 miles by road, made the latter the logical urban market for food crops produced in Twifo-Hemang. As the Central regional capital, Cape Coast is the focal point in the functional organization of capitalist commodity markets, the focus of the state
bureaucracy at the regional level, and an important educational centre of historical importance in Ghana. A detailed study done in the 1970s shows that a large percentage of food dealers brought their farm produce to Cape Coast from distances greater than 20 miles (including the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira district), because of the low production of foodstuffs in the immediate vicinity of the city. (24) The latter situation can be explained partly by the fact that as a coastal town, Cape Coast is traditionally a fishing locality. Second, the ecological conditions of the coastal savanna area, with its sandy soils and long dry spells and relative minimal annual rainfall regime, occupied by Cape Coast is largely not suitable for food staples such as are grown in the semi-deciduous forest regions. Third, as a typical urban centre, a large proportion of the population is engaged in non-subsistence economic activities in industry, commerce, transport and public administrative services, rather than in agricultural activities. There is also a large population of students and academics in second cycle and tertiary educational institutions. Thus the bulk of the population is dependent on food produced outside the urban area. The next largest urban centre which partly depends on food crops brought in from Twifo-Hemang is Sekondi-Takoradi, the twin city and capital of the Western Region, also located on the coast and accessible from Twifo-Praso by rail.
The increasing short-falls in the national levels of food production since the late 1960s, have been partly due to the virtual 'neglect of smallholder agriculture' (25) which as argued in the first chapter, has always been mainly responsible for feeding the growing dependent urban population. The shift of governments' emphasis to large-scale mechanized parastatal farms to help solve the food and raw material shortage problems of the nation largely failed to live up to expectations. Successive governments have attempted to ease the pressure of food shortages through subsidized imports of food, but 'the combined effect of an overvalued exchange rate and low duties on food imports... encouraged a dependence on food imports at the expense of domestic production'. (26) As the economy slid into its worst crises from the mid-1970s the weaknesses of the dependent national economy began to show clearly. It was becoming more and more impossible to foot the growing import bills not only of food and raw materials, but also of machinery, spare parts and other technological inputs, while servicing increasing external debts. Inflationary pressures escalated the costs of virtually all basic commodities and services which the peasantry needed eg. transporation costs to the urban centres, clothing, basic tools and other input for farming. The effect of these developments was the soaring of prices of food cost which, compared to cocoa prices began yielding 'more than
twice the economic returns to cocoa since the mid 1970s'. (27) Increasing inflationary pressures, and soaring costs of living in the urban areas, especially the increasing price of food, were making the urban workers restive, and demands for higher wages by workers in the state/capitalist sector were commonplace.

The military regimes of the 1970s were faced with a dilemma. They could allow food prices to find their own levels in the marketplace while increasing the wages of the workers to ease their economic hardships. Alternatively, they could keep wages relatively stable, while intervening in the marketplace to keep food prices at artificially low levels. They consistently opted for the latter alternative. At the national level the attempted enforcement of control prices for foodstuffs, especially in the urban areas, which involved in many cases the public flogging of alleged culprits by soldiers, the seizure or forcible selling of the commodities at ridiculously low prices to the public, was widely assessed as a failure. Consider for example the following observation:-

In Ghana, the prices of basic foodstuffs have soared and the government attempted to control retail prices through the flogging of traders and jail sentences for those selling above the controlled prices. These measures created a strong disincentive for farmers to bring their produce to the market and supplies dropped drastically. (28)
The reaction of the peasantry was widely reported as ranging from the decreasing of the acreage of food crops in some areas to complete or partial withdrawal from the market. The latter took the form of producers not taking the produce to the market personally, but staying put in the farm cottages, and allowing numerous middlemen from both the rural and urban areas to purchase farm products from the farm gates. (29) Although the peasants and traders were demoralized, the ultimate result was that it was the urban consumers, especially the workers who suffered the most, for

Despite some attempts by the government to control food prices at the farm level and the retail level, prices in effect rose in uncontrollable fashion. Official data indicate a 34-fold increase in the local food price index between 1970 and 1980. Yet food output failed to respond to the dramatic rise in prices that far outpaced the increase in the producer price of cocoa. (30)

In the findings of his study in the Cape Coast area, including Twifo-Hemang, Amonoo found out that the high prices of foodstuffs could be assumed to be a function of the length of the marketing chain i.e. the longer the chain, the higher the prices of foodstuffs at the intermediate or final consumption level. Food products reached the consumer not through direct producer contact but through a combination of middlemen, processors and retailers. (31)

Prior to this stringent enforcement of control
prices by the State, the peasants of Twifo-Hemang had two main alternative routes through which their agricultural products got to the urban consumers. They could harvest as many headloads of the foodstuffs as the number of women and children the production unit could mobilise to carry to the public marketplace or to the main highway. Headloads of food crops were carried from the farm villages to the main market centres, Hemang, Mampong, Praso, Wawase, on specific market days. Here middlemen (some from the localities and others from the urban centres) purchased the products wholesale and transported them to the urban centres by road or by rail. Occasionally, direct producers transported their own products to the urban centres. In either case, the producers purchased and returned to their village farm base with such basic items of consumption (eg. matches, kerosene, sugar, salt, fish and meat) as would be needed to enhance the simple reproduction process of the production unit, until the next market day. Again in either case, the products ultimately passed through the hands of a number of middlemen, brokers, processors and various ranges of retailers before the urban consumer got access to them. This explains Amonoo's findings about the wide gap between prices at the farm level and consumer market prices in Cape Coast.

Fieldwork evidence shows that the harassment of direct producers by armed soldiers, (32) some from a nearby
military camp in the vicinity of Twifo-Praso, and some along the route to, and in Cape Coast itself, forced a large number of peasants to partially withdraw from the market centres. The result was an acute shortage of food in Cape Coast and other urban areas, and hence the prices rose to prohibitive levels. Some women involved in the foodstuffs trade (known in West African parlance as 'Market Mammies') who had the material means, and the important political connections to do so, and their agents, devised a new system of procuring food from the peasant villages at the farm bases for the urban markets. They began going directly to the farm villages using their own means of transport, advancing sums of money to needy peasants, including providing them with essential commodities in short supply on a credit basis, in order to lay monopolistic claims to their farm products; in many cases even before they were harvested. A second method was that local middlemen and their agents met direct producers carrying headloads of foodstuffs along the village paths on market days, bought the bulk of food items they were bringing to the marketplace, and resold them at some profit to the Market Mammies and/or their agents. The result was that the chain of wholesalers, middlemen, and retailers become longer, with each making some profit along the way, such that prices for the urban consumers became even more prohibitive.

Such were the conditions in Twifo-Hemang, during
this research in 1982-83. Most smallholding peasants agreed that they eventually sold their farm products at lower prices to the Market Mammies and their agents, than they could have obtained had they taken their products directly to the urban centres. However, the differences were often offset to some extent by the high costs of transportation they would have borne, and the extreme inconvenience of travelling along the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira-Cape Coast route. In both the Twifo and Hemang areas, there were only five trucks, owned by some local rich peasants which regularly operated between the area and Cape Coast. The poor condition of both the road and the means of transport, allowed only one trip a day for each truck, even though the distance is only 30 miles. Furthermore, the cost of transporting foodstuffs was very prohibitive and there was usually the chance (and these were quite commonplace) that the trucks could breakdown enroute. The new system of direct sale to mammies saved the peasant producers from these physical and financial problems. It also saved them the trouble of walking long distances carrying heavy headloads of foodstuffs to the local market centres or to the only major road, looking for usually unavailable means of transportation to the urban areas. The time saved could be utilized for more productive work. They could also sell their products in large quantities at a time than the headloading technique would allow, thus getting cash in bulk
which they could use to finance major personal or family projects.

Above all, the new system saved them from the harassment they suffered at the hands of the military personnel who were ostensibly enforcing government's controlled prices, which in the case of foodstuffs, were not clearly and precisely defined vis-a-vis the relationship between quantity/volume, quality, value and prices. This gave the military ample room to act arbitrarily, and in most cases in their own interests. However, by 1982/83 the military had been effectively replaced at the local levels by the People's Defence Committees (P.D.C.s).(33) The leaders and active members of the P.D.C.s took upon themselves the task of harassing genuine traders, middlemen and peasant direct producers who elected to do business outside, rather than inside the public marketplace. The penalty for defaulting was outright seizure of the commodities involved, which were then taken to the People's Shop (34) and sold to the public at so-called controlled prices, irrespective of the costs of production and transportation. The proceeds went to the community development fund. In some minor cases however, the proceeds were given back to the direct producers.

The Hemang People's Shop, opened in January 1983 was principally geared towards undermining the growing economic influence of the urban-based food dealers over the
smallholding, tenanted and sharecropping peasants in the outlying farm villages. This influence was based on the former's ability to advance credit in the form of cash or essential commodities to the peasant direct producers, thus gaining monopolistic access to their farm products at relatively cheaper prices than would have been the case in the open market had there been no interference by the State. Thus for example, in the case of cash-rent paying tenants and sharecroppers, the mechanism of exploitation became both rent and interest. Ostensibly to prevent this, peasant direct producers were encouraged by the P.D.C.s to sell their food items at the so-called controlled prices to the People's Shop in exchange for the privilege of obtaining priority consideration in the distribution and sale of scarce essential commodities. These were supplied periodically to the local P.D.C.s for distribution by the District/Regional Administrations. This was rationalized in the form of the advantages of dealing with the People's Shop. Firstly, commodity exchanges remained at the so-called controlled price levels, hence exploitation by other dealers and money lenders, including indebtedness would be eliminated. Secondly, the system would create revenue for local development rather than the siphoning off of profits to the urban areas.

Whilst this propaganda sounded convincing, most peasants from remote farm villages soon realized that
supplies of essential commodities were few and far between, and that important staples like cassava, maize, yams, cocoyam, plantain and palm fruits and oil actually fetched relatively higher prices on the open market than at the so-called government controlled prices. The few peasants who registered with the People's Shop as suppliers of foodstuffs and receivers of essential commodities, mainly used the shop as a dumping ground for food items in less demand such as bananas, oranges, and coconuts, while selling the more important staples to the food dealers outside the open marketplace. This was one reason for the harassment of persons who carried on business outside the marketplace. Besides, by doing business outside the open marketplace, participants were depriving the area of development funds in the form of market tolls paid to the Traditional Councils by producers and traders who used the facilities of the marketplace. Traders were also using the new techniques to avoid paying the new annual income tax of four hundred cedis levied on all food dealers by the P.N.D.C. regime in 1982.

Finally, the combined effect of the large-scale destruction of food crop farms without compensation following the intervention of the State and capital in the productive process, the acute shortage of new farmlands and hence the drastic reduction of the area under food production, was worsened in 1982 by the 'worst drought in Ghana's independence history....' (35) This significantly
reduced food production levels for 1982/83, and raised the local prices of foodstuffs, especially for those not directly involved in farming. These problems further necessitated the local P.D.C.s' opposition to the wholesale selling of food products to the urban dealers, on the grounds that it was creating artificial shortages in the locality.

Both the cocoa industry and the commercial food industry have their common and particular problems. However it would seem that the dramatic increase in the economic returns to commercial food production vis-a-vis cocoa production since the mid 1970s, and the ability of the peasantry to effectively reduce the negative impact of state control of the food market, will ensure the continued survival of the commercial food production industry in Twifo-Hemang.

5.2 The Organization and Relations of Production

5.2(i) The Basic Production/Reproduction Unit and the Sexual Division of Labour

It will be recalled from the second chapter, following the rapid socio-economic changes of the colonial era, there was rapid breakdown of communal-reciprocal, non-monetized relations, and increasing nuclearization of
the family, and increasing individuation in economic relationships. There began a process emphasising the nuclear family's economic enterprises rather than those based on the extended family. The use of hired labour from outside the matrilineage further extended this process. Furthermore, with the creation of the colonial state, other opportunities emerged for enterprising individuals to chart their own courses to economic self-sufficiency, rather than being dependent on the collective resources of the extended kin group. The rising costs of consumer goods (which increasingly tended to be imported) and of social obligations (e.g., formal education, health, and transport) were making it inefficient to extend one's financial commitments beyond the immediate nuclear family. Today matters concerning cultural affairs such as funerals and traditional festivals among the Akans occasionally bring the extended family together, but economic obligation outside the nuclear family are issues in which the individual has a free choice, unhampered by stringent social sanctions.

Following the works of Chayanov on the peasantry of pre-revolutionary Russia (36), some economic anthropologists and rural sociologists tend to equate the concept of household with a residential as well as a production and reproduction unit. It is assumed that the group of people sharing residence also constitute a unit of production and reproduction. Increasingly, empirical evidence from
Africa(37), and for that matter fieldwork data from Twifo-Hemang, does not support this position. The relationship between patterns of residence and units of production/reproduction, and the relations of production within units are more complex than are made to appear in the generalized position. Those residing in the extended family home i.e. the matrilineal kin sharing residence, may not necessarily constitute a single production and consumption unit, but may rather comprise diverse wholes or parts of different production and consumption units. Extended matrilineal kin groups may share the same residence, but they might not necessarily cooperate in farming and other economic activities. Wives and husbands may not necessarily share the same residence, although in the majority of cases, the conjugal family constitutes the production/reproduction unit. Husbands and wives may also own separate farmlands and may farm separately, with each involved in different relations of labour. Nor is it necessarily automatic that both husband and wife may engage in the same income generating economic activities, although in virtually all cases there is a strong linkage between spouses and their offspring where subsistence economic activities are concerned i.e. in the realization of the simple reproduction of the conjugal family.

The complexities in patterns of residence as depicted by data generated from questionnaire interviews,
are presented in the table below, (Table 5.1). Uxorilocality in the table, represents a situation in which married couples are residing in the wife's matrilineage house eg. when an indigenous woman is married to a man who is a stranger. More commonly, it stands for a situation where spouses live separately; each in his/her matrilineal kin home. This is common with many smallholding and poor peasants who have not accumulated enough wealth to be able to build their own houses; and they are in the majority in this study. Under virilocal residence, married couples reside in the husband's patrilineage home, as for example when an indigenous man is married to a woman who is a stranger. Again, this uncommon residential arrangement, relates mainly to middle and poor peasants. Neolocality pertains where married couples have established their own residence, apart from the matrilineal kin home. This is common to the majority of couples who are both strangers, and in that case it relates to both rich and middle peasants. Among the indigenous married couples however, this residential arrangement relates more to rich peasants. It is this residential pattern which comes closest to the equation of the household to the production/reproduction unit. It is this higher social standing symbolizing the attainment of the individual's socio-economic independence which is the ultimate objective of the smallholding and the poor peasants, eager to free themselves from the constraints
imposed by the elders of the extended matrilineal kin group.

Table 5.1: Twifo-Hemang: Patterns of Residence among Married Couples, 1982-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Uxorilocal</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Virilocal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neolocal</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Undetermined</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irrespective of the changes in the internal structures and social relations within individual production/reproduction units, at the societal level, certain basic elements regarding sexual division of labour have persisted to the point of outright institutionalization over time (colonial to post-colonial), far lagging behind socio-economic changes. As Barnes correctly argues for her findings in Kenya,

As a society undergoes economic transformation, the nature of its productive units and the allocation of work between men and women may change. Yet certain elements in the division of labour by sex may persist because of the social construction of maleness and femaleness. (38)

It is important to emphasise that historical changes forged
linkages between the domestic production/reproduction unit and the wider economy, (ie. national and international) as already analysed in the second chapter of this work. The effect of these historical developments however was felt differently by males and females as it was by different social classes. The incorporation of the Twifo-Hemang economy, and hence the integration of the direct producers of cocoa, carried men along faster than women; such that while men were the first to be involved in export crop production, women were largely left behind at the initial stages in the subsistence sector. One factor which contributed to that, insofar as migration contributed greatly to the development of the cocoa industry, was the fact that the initiative to migrate was taken by men, with their spouses only accompanying them as partners. This tendency persisted into the post-colonial era, as shown in Table 4.7 (b) of Chapter Four. The second reason has to do with society's perception of the traditional role of women in the family, which in the rural areas has changed very little over time. Women's role in the family is linked not only with child bearing and rearing or early socialization, but also home management, including ensuring the assembling of the various ingredients, both from internal and external sources, for the preparation of food for the entire family. The subsistence sub-sector of the family's enterprise therefore was considered the more appropriate domain of the
woman. In other words, the continued simple reproduction of
the domestic production unit, minus the provision of hard
cash for that purpose which is the responsibility of the men,
rests with the women.

As economic change broke down the extended kin group
as the basic production unit, the role of the women in the
new domestic units based on the conjugal family became even
more clear-cut and unambiguous. Thus for example, even
though women in the matrilineal society had access to land
as much as men, farming as an income-generating activity,
whether carried on on the wife's land or not, tended to be
associated with the husband, whilst the women tended to be
associated with the day-to-day subsistence strategies of the
domestic unit. This social arrangement had more or less
persisted despite the fact that a few women have emerged as
farmers in their own right, or successful traders in the
rural economy.

In the same way, the material and financial needs of
the domestic unit were considered the responsibility of the
man. Thus a married woman could not contract loans from
outside sources without the husband's consent. Indeed, the
money lender would not oblige without the husband's consent.
This was because, when a wife was unable to pay the debts
she owed her creditors, it was the husband's duty to defray
the debt. At least in the rural areas such as Twifo-Hemang,
this has persisted; and as Arhin argues,
To the extent that in traditional society women's debt was held to be the collective responsibility of the family or the husband, a family or husband might prevent a woman entrepreneur, whether farmer or businesswoman, from acquiring a loan from a bank or a money lender. This was more likely in the areas where traditional norms persistently hold sway than in the urban centres where women entrepreneurs have been on their own for a long time, dominate large sectors of the distributive trade and have access to credit both from the firms and the banks. (39)

In like manner, farming at this low level of development of the forces of production, demands great exertion of physical strength and hence society has unquestioningly associated it with maleness. Thus whether the husband and wife combined to operate one farm as middle peasants, or whether each had his/her own farm(s) and employed outside labour or not ie. as rich or middle peasants, there were certain tasks which were considered more or less physically demanding and hence reserved for men and women respectively. For example, men were responsible for clearing virgin and secondary forests, and burning the bush in preparation for making new farms; felling large trees and chopping large logs for firewood; building and maintaining the family house, climbing trees and plucking fruits and hunting. Women (and children) were to help in sowing seeds and tending to growing crops, clearing weeds sprouting under crops, carrying foodstuffs from the farm, rearing domestic animals, beside the numerous house duties
related to the family's simple reproduction process. These social arrangements have largely persisted, in spite of the socio-economic changes which have taken place since national independence.

In Twifo-Hemang, particularly among the indigenous peasants, both men and women have opportunities of gaining access to the most critical means of production (i.e. land), by virtue of their membership in a matrilineage.(40) As the table below shows, the majority of indigenous women in the sample of this study tended to have access to land through this ascriptive criterion.

Table 5.2: Relations to Land by Sex for Indigenous Peasants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Acquisition</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought Outright</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent/Sharecropping</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Land</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other eg. Gift</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One feature which stood out clearly, not only on the basis of evidence from this sample of respondents, but from discussions with several informants, is that male peasants would be anxious to invest their money in the purchase of
land outside the extended family property in order to expand their farming enterprise, or to assert their independence and to lay a foundation for the future of their offspring. Female peasants would rather choose to invest in trades and other commercial ventures because of quicker returns to investment involved. Secondly, even though a number of women owned cocoa farms (usually managed by their husbands or caretaker/sharecroppers) and food crop farms, they tended to combine these with other trades (eg. as seamstresses, operating public food restaurants, operating drinking bars, running retail stores) and other commercial activities, and were more likely to describe themselves as such, rather than as farmers. The table below (Table 5.3) illustrates the types of occupations and emphasised more by women.

There was a general tendency for women to underplay their role in the agricultural sector and to highlight other roles where relevant especially trading and various other commercial activities. This was in spite of the fact that many women owned cocoa and food crop farms and some employed casual labour for physically demanding chores on their farms, and the majority of the elderly, the infirm, the single (divorced or unmarried) engaged sharecroppers for their farms. There were also cases where smallholding peasant families alternated their farming activities between the farmholdings of each spouse. Hence there could be found among both women and men, various strata of the peasantry,
Table 5.3: Twifo-Hemang: Distribution of Rural Workforce by Main Occupation for Selected Localities by Sex, 1982-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Total Male &amp; Female</th>
<th>No. of Females</th>
<th>Percentage Women out of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming Only</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming and Domestic Labour*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farming and Plantation Labour</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming and Trading</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation Labour Only</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Labour Only*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical/Technical/ Public Service</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading/General Commerce</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data

*Domestic labour is defined in this work as full-time housewife and housekeeping.
although male rich peasants would far outnumber their female counterparts.

The reasons for this attitude of women towards farming in general could be partly attributed to the society's strong association of professional peasant farming with men. Secondly, it could also be attributed to the general low social prestige of farming in Ghanaian society relative to business and government employment. The precipitous decline of the economic and social image of cocoa farming since the 1970s might have contributed a lot to this situation. Thus for example, 67 out of 90 respondents or about 74% of my sample hope that their children will take up other professions, whether self-employed or in the public service, rather than taking up peasant farming in the rural areas. Where women owned their farms in addition to being married, they tended to report both, but where they and their spouses, as micro-holding peasants operated only one farm, they tended to describe themselves as housewives. They did so despite the fact their responsibilities as homemakers, made them (and their children) more frequent workers on the family's food/subsistence farm than their spouses. They continually do such chores as weeding the farm, harvesting food crops for the home meal and collecting firewood as fuel for the home. When hard cash is hard to come by, especially during lean periods between cocoa seasons, the women (and children)
sell part of the food harvested on market days, in order to purchase other consumer goods to further ensure the reproduction of the domestic production unit.

The traditional sexual division of labour is also reproduced in the new capitalist plantation sector. Although women were not discriminated against in terms of employment opportunities at the farm labourer level, fewer women than men applied for jobs in the plantations. For example, out of the 900 farm workers at TOPP in 1983, only 122 (or 13.6\%) were female. (41) Almost all the female workers were either in the nursery section, the services sector and other less physically demanding activity areas.

As reflected in Table 5.3 above, just as men tend to be associated with professional farming, so increasingly in the Post-Colonial era, active participation in the local distributive trade is associated with women. The rural-urban commodity exchange system has consisted of carting agricultural products from Twifo-Hemang, either by road or by rail to the nearest urban markets. Women traders return with other goods produced outside the area, chiefly food crops for which the ecological conditions of the area are not favourable, and manufactured items of consumption imported from abroad or produced in the urban capitalist industrial/commercial sector, which are increasingly needed for the furtherance of the reproductive process. This system is overwhelmingly dominated by women.
However, the majority of those engaged in this trade operate on a very small scale, chiefly because of the lack of substantial capital to operate with, and the structured gender inequality of access to credit facilities as mentioned above. In any case, since the greater part of residents belong to middle and poor peasant domestic production/reproduction units, they are unable to generate financial resources beyond what is needed for the simple reproduction process. Moreover, as they lack the much needed resources and connections with the decision-making authorities in the urban centres, their operations are at meagre retail levels.

Since the mid-1970s, the national dependent capitalist economy has consistently not been able to support the importation of foreign manufactured consumption items, and the majority of the urban-located manufacturing plants have been operating at very low capacity levels, due mainly to lack of imported spare parts and other inputs. The volume of these consumer goods as a proportion of local rural-urban trade has drastically fallen. From the beginning of 1983, the legal-institutional distribution of these commodities has been the exclusive preserve of the local P.D.C.s, who have been using this economic power effectively as a political weapon. The illegal sub-sector of this trade is limited to only a few women with the requisite resources and political connections in the
localities. The demise of the volume of this lucrative aspect of trade has been compensated for by the astronomical rise of the prices of locally-produced food items which, because women constitute majority in food production and distribution, has improved the incomes of some women since the mid-1970s. However, only a few women with substantial financial capital have benefited from it through their ability to participate on competitive terms with the 'Market Mammies' from the urban areas. For the majority it is still either the usual headloads for sale on public market days in exchange for important consumer items needed for the social reproduction of the domestic production/reproduction unit, the small-scale retail of goods from the outside in the local public marketplace, or the small-scale processing of food for sale to local consumers, eg. public service workers, plantation workers and travellers.

Since 1980-81 the production and distribution of palm oil and soap by traditional methods have become another important source of income for a rising number of women in Twifo-Hemang.(42) As in other parts of the country, the production of these commodities is mainly 'small-scale', and 'individualistic'... 'with women providing most of the input such as collecting the fuel and water for processing, as well as the actual processing and marketing of the produce'.(43) It is however difficult to foresee the future of this new economic activity since the market for
traditionally produced soap has expanded dramatically in recent times mainly because of the acute shortage of locally manufactured and imported brands. Moreover, the availability of fresh fruit bunches (f.f.b.) of oil palm as raw material was made possible by the delay in the installation of the palm oil producing factory at Twifo-Ntaferewaso, whilst the parastatal and private plantations had been harvesting oil palm fruits since 1980. (44) Both of these conditions carry an element of temporariness, and the future of these local industries might depend upon the possibility of the achievement of what is currently called 'national economic recovery', and the conditions of the producer market for f.f.b. once the local factory starts operating.

The socio-economic subordination of women in Twifo-Hemang society is even more pronounced in the structure of power relations, especially their glaring exclusion from the decision-making process. On the traditional councils of Hemang and Twifo, women are represented by only the Queen Mothers, as the symbolic heads of the royal matrilineages. This researcher had the privilege of being a guest attendant at a number of meetings of the 46-member, Hemang Traditional Council, where the Queen Mother was the only female member and made virtually no contribution to the proceedings. There were eight co-opted members, nominated on the basis of achievement
criteria (not ascriptive attributes), yet none of them was a woman, despite the fact that quite a number of women had carved a niche for themselves economically.

By 1982-83 local political power had shifted from the traditional authorities to the local P.D.C.s, which were functioning in collaboration with the Village Development Committees; both of which were answerable to the central government through the District Administration. Neither of these two organizations had any woman presrepresentative on the executive bodies, and the local organization of resistance to the State/Capitalist invasion (as revealed by documentary evidence and field observations) were exclusively led by men representing the landlords and capitalist farmer classes. The local mobilization of the entire citizenry for community development by the P.D.C.s, (this researcher was a participant in a number of projects initiated in the area) virtually excluded women from the leadership.

There is thus overwhelming evidence, that this is a patriarchal society, in spite of the fact that it is based on matrilineal relations. The implied superiority and dominance of men is based on traditionally established and unquestioned stereotyped ideology about the differential capacities of men and women to govern, and the women's proper function as wives and mothers. It was also clear from discussions with both male and female informants, that women were often so preoccupied with child-bearing and
child-rearing, homemaking and family work, in addition to the constant work in the subsistence sector of the family agricultural enterprise, and regular trips to the public marketplace, both locally and in the urban centres. Hence, they scarcely have enough "leisure" time to effectively participate in the development and political processes of their localities. Though women do not constitute a social class per se in terms of occupying common contradictory and conflicting relations to the means of production vis-a-vis men, it is clear that in any class situation, the women of Twifo-Hemang occupy a lower social and political standing than do their male counterparts.

5.2 (ii) Forms of Agricultural Labour Relations

Within the peasant petty commodity production sector, four main types of agricultural labour systems can be identified. These are family labour, annual/seasonal labour, casual labour and tenancy/sharecropping. Each of these will be dealt with in turn.

The basic unit of production among the peasantry is the domestic family unit involving spouses and their offspring, although in a few cases some extended matrilineal kin may be involved, albeit on a temporary basis, in the productive process. The typical peasant, i.e. the smallholding, middle peasant, is an owner-operator-direct
producer, who depends mainly on the labour of his/her spouse and children for running the agricultural enterprise, although he/she may engage external paid labour from time to time. However, irrespective of the stratum of the peasantry each of the spouses belong to, and irrespective of whether the spouses are both engaged in farming or not, women's responsibility for ensuring the simple reproduction of the family through home management and the preparation of the family's meals, makes women (and their children) the most frequent workers in the subsistence section of the family agricultural enterprise. It is within this area that the exploitation of the labour of women (and children) by men stands out clearly. In the case of domestic units in which women are married to smallholding, middle peasants or sharecropping, poor peasants, women's contribution to the cash crop sector is neither recognized nor remunerated directly by capital and landlords. The economic return to women in this respect, depend largely on the level of appreciation of their role by their spouses, and the latter's willingness and ability to provide for their material needs. The economic dependence of women on men is well exemplified in such cases, which are common because of the large number of such low income nuclear families in the society.

The second source of agricultural labour in the petty commodity production sector is annual/seasonal labour.
The crucial role played by migrant labourers from Northern Ghana and neighbouring countries in the development of the cocoa industry in Twifo-Hemang has already been analysed. The influx of this type of cheap labour has declined to a trickle especially after the Aliens Compliance Order. As indigenous residents are not prepared to play this role in production because it is considered less economically rewarding and less socially prestigious, this type of labour is no more of statistical significance in the organization of production in Twifo-Hemang.

The third form of agricultural labour is casual labour, which has had a long historical existence almost coinciding with the beginnings of cocoa production, but was until quite recently confined to non-indigenous poor peasants. Just as a growing number of indigenous middle and poor peasants have been selling their labour power as plantation workers in the capitalist commodity production sector, so do they occasionally sell their labour power as casual labourers in the agricultural enterprises of the rich peasants and fellow middle peasants. Both roles in the productive process are linked with the state/capitalist land appropriation exercise which has caused an acute shortage of farm lands, and has left the majority operating little more than subsistence allotments. Hence, the continued simple reproduction of themselves and their dependants is no longer possible through exclusive dependence on gross income.
generated from their micro-holdings. As there are no new unoccupied communal or stool lands for traditional authorities to allot them by virtue of their matrilineal descent; and as they do not have the capital to acquire land by outright purchase, the most obvious survival strategy is to sell their labour power to the owners of the means of production in order to generate additional income to meet the internal reproduction needs of the domestic production/reproduction unit.

Three types of casual labour are common in Twifo-Hemang. The first is the 'By-Day' system, based on the piecework principle at a fixed piece rate for work done for the day. It is interesting to note that the wage rate seemed to be set at comparative levels with the daily wage rates in the local capitalist sector. In 1982 when the national minimum wage was twelve cedis (c12.00), local peasants doing casual labour raised their price by 50% from (c8.00) eight cedis to match it. Later in 1983, they unilaterally raised it to twenty cedis (c20.00), at par with the minimum daily wage of the local TOPP company and about 67% above the national minimum wage. The second form of casual labour, is the "Acreage" or "Acre" contract labour, by which the labourer clears secondary forest at the beginning of the farming season, in readiness for establishing a farm at the price of three hundred cedis (c300.00) per acre in 1983, having increased dramatically by
150% from one hundred and twenty cedis (C120.00) two years earlier. Apparently these unilateral increases in the cost of farm labour in the peasant sector, resulted partly from the drastically reduced in-migration of the cheap migrant labour of earlier times. It was also partly in response to rising national inflationary levels and soaring costs of living.

The third casual labour system, involves all sorts of tasks, ranging from ordinary farm activities to felling of trees, splitting of firewood, preparation of charcoal from dry wood, felling oil palm trees and tapping palm wine or distilling alcohol from palm wine, building and repairing mud houses and erecting sheds and fences with resources available in the immediate environment. There are no standardized wage rates for any of these odd jobs, and the financial aspect is arrived at through the bargaining process between the parties concerned. The greatest advantage of participating in casual labour at least occasionally, is that it is the quickest means of raising money during lean seasons and/or between monthly paydays. Hence, it constitutes a crucial part of the survival strategy adopted by the needy stratum of the peasantry in the face of the capitalist threat.

The inability of the peasantry to survive without money with which to procure other essential items of consumption (besides what they produce themselves) from the
wider capitalist market, and to meet the demands of social obligations, strongly suggests that they are deeply and irreversibly integrated into, and dependent on external market relations. It also strongly suggests that Africanists should treat the Chayanovian concept of the self-sufficient peasant household of pre-revolutionary Russia, and Marx's description of the nineteenth century French peasantry as an isolated and atomistic social category with great caution and circumspection. Such conceptions might not necessarily be applicable to socio-economic realities in post-colonial rural Africa. Indeed it certainly is not applicable to the Ghanaian situation. As Berry correctly argues,

Africanists who admire Chayanov sometimes forget that the association of self-sufficient peasant households with limited agricultural commercialization and demographic differentiation in pre-revolutionary Russia was a conjunctural rather than a logically necessary one. Household self-sufficiency need not be token independence from market forces or state intervention, nor does it necessarily imply the absence of rural class formation. Farmers may be driven to subsist on their own output by poverty, monopoly power, the breakdown of transportation or distributive services, or deliberate state interference with their access to markets or the means of production. (45)

The temporary withdrawal of the peasants of Twifo-Hemang from the market following the forcible implementation of the so-called government controlled prices, together with
similar actions elsewhere in the country, caused prices of foodstuffs to rise dramatically in the urban areas. It contributed to the establishment of the local People's Shops, being used to woo the peasants to exchange food crops for basic essential commodities they badly needed. At the same time, this action i.e. withdrawal from the market, was taken at the risk of lowering the peasants' own standards of living. Their inability to stay outside market relations for any appreciable length of time without forfeiting their ability to sustain their social reproduction, facilitated their commercial deals with urban-based 'Market Mammies' and other middlemen and brokers in the food distribution business.

The concept of the 'Uncaptured Peasantry' of Africa, rightly depicts African peasants as being able to stand up against what powerful social forces want to force them to do against their own interests. (46) However, care must be taken not to distort its analytical usefulness by overstretching it to mean that today's peasants are able to provide all their needs without involvement in external relations, or that conditions of the wider capitalist economy do not affect them. At least for Ghana it is methodologically inappropriate to attempt to separate the peasant simple commodity producing sector from the broader structural changes occurring in agriculture and in the national economy.
The fourth form of agricultural labour arrangement is the tenancy or sharecropping system, under which poor peasants enter into oral agreements with landlords and rich peasants to invest their labour power in the production of agricultural commodities. The owners and controllers of the means of production extract rent in the form of a share of the agricultural surplus product or in a minority of cases, an agreed upon annual or seasonal lump sum of money rent. The principle underlying the traditional sharecropping system among the Akan of the cocoa belt of Southern Ghana, has long historical roots. By oral tradition, its beginnings can be traced from the pre-colonial era of long distance trade, in which chiefs and other traditional authorities laid claims to a portion of the commodities which merchants from other traditional areas transported through their territories, either to the European trans-Atlantic trading posts on the coast or the inland entrepots of the trans-Saharan trade. The principle was later adapted to the extraction of levies of one-third to one-half of commodities such as alluvial gold, rubber latex and oil palm fruits which ordinary residents and strangers extracted from private lands or from communal lands controlled by traditional authorities. It was even extended to the money lending system, under which rich peasants and merchants charged interest rates of at least 1/3 or 1/2 of the original sum borrowed by poor peasants from them.
The system was extended during the colonial period to cocoa production, involving 'stranger' poor peasants from other parts of Southern Ghana without enough accumulated capital to invest in land. They were willing to participate in cocoa production by playing the more prestigious role of cash-rent paying tenants or sharecroppers rather than the role of farm labourers-cum-domestic servants. A few of the earliest participants in the cocoa industry in colonial Ghana managed to accumulate enough capital from this initial role to purchase their own smallholdings. Hence, they achieved upward social-structural mobility from their former class stratum as poor peasants to the more independent position of middle peasants. The latest batch of in-migrants of the early 1960s has not been as fortunate, having met the beginnings of the present national economic crisis; and the problems posed by the capitalist infiltration into the countryside. The system of sharecropping has since the 1970s been adapted to commercial food crop production on annual and seasonal bases, and constitutes one of the avenues through which indigenous middle and poor peasants, affected by the extensive land appropriation exercise, have managed to sustain their social reproduction.

The original sharecropping arrangements of the 1920s were of two types. First, there was the Abusa or tripartite division of the agricultural product, by which
the landlord or rich peasant extracted a third of the agricultural product, with the rest going to the tenant. Originally this related to the transformation of virgin forests into cocoa farms with the controller or owner of the means of production playing no significant role in the input or process of production. Second, there was the Abunu or bipartite division of the agricultural product by which both the landlord and the poor peasant received equal shares of the product. Originally this related to the transformation of secondary forest into new cocoa farms, with the parties splitting the farm into two when the cocoa started yielding. This saved the tenant from the extra burden of harvesting, fermenting and drying the landlord's share. Alternatively the landlord played a significant role in providing inputs and labour in the harvesting, fermenting and drying process so that the division of the product was maintained. In both cases (ie. Abunu and Abusa) the system allowed for tenants to produce subsistence for their own use, either interplanted with young cocoa or on small subsistence plots attached to the cocoa lot. This was not subject to sharing with the landlords.

Since the 1970s the system has applied not only to the development of new cocoa farms but mainly to caretaking or management of already established farms, especially after the Aliens Compliance Order created a shortage of cheap migrant labour. Although the basic concepts of abusa and
abunu have been retained, most of the detailed arrangements have been subject to bilateral negotiations between landlords and tenants, such that numerous differences in internal arrangements have emerged. The system has also been extended to include short-term commercial food crop production, approximating either of the two traditional systems, according to whether the land was originally forested or not; whether the landlord provides inputs or not; and generally whether the negotiating parties are adept and influential at negotiating. In the latter case, the advantage usually goes to the controllers and owners of the means of production, and more so since the capitalist invasion and its attendant escalation of the value of land.

Generally, the conditions of the original agreements, being mainly in oral form, remain vague and fluid, but are unquestioned so long as there exists a cordial working relationship between the landlord and the tenant. That is, the existing conditions will hold on the basis of the good conduct and efficiency of the sharecropper in his role as the direct producer. His security of tenure is based on the subjective assessment of his conduct and performance by the landlord. This unequal power relation has often been used by landlords to coerce their tenants into accepting changes, in or outside of the initial contract agreements. Landlords have often used their power to threaten or abruptly terminate agreements between
themselves and their tenants, which in the case of the involvement of matured cocoa farms means substantial loss of years of labour investment by the tenants. The rent crisis of the mid-1970s, following in the wake of state intervention in the land tenure system, gave landlords the opportunity to exercise these powers substantially, as already shown in the third chapter.

Of the 32 respondents in the sample of this study who are sharecroppers, 15.6% considered their relationship with their landlords as cordial, 10.1% as barely cordial, and 74.3% as not cordial. Their evidence, and further fieldwork data from several informants and from official documentary sources, show the following factors as contributing to the contradictory relations and frequent conflict between landlords and tenants: 1. Conflicts over initial rental agreements, commonly stemming from the tendency of landlords to either renounce or force changes in their favour eg. from abusa to abunu; 2. Frequent threats of eviction, usually based on the subjective assessment of the performance of tenants by landlords; 3. Extra economic pressures, which sometimes oblige tenants to perform certain tasks outside the contract agreement in order to ensure their security. For example some tenants voluntarily supply the households of their landlords with foodstuffs from their subsistence lots, or render occasional free labour services to their landlords; 4. Conflicts over the sharing of the
agricultural product, which in many cases have resulted in direct physical confrontations due to mutual mistrust between landlords and tenants; (47) 5. arbitrary increases in the annual fiscal rent paid by tenants, and finally, 6. landlords' monopoly over the decision-making process. A portion of lengthy petition by over 200 tenant/sharecroppers operating on the David Koram Company land since the early 1960s read as follows:

The agreement which was verbally made was to divide the land into 2 equal halves (Abunu Tenancy) after the cocoa began to bear fruit, between himself and we the farmers. When we later contacted him to give us documents certifying the agreements, he refused. One day he assembled us and announced to us that he was not prepared to share the land but now share the proceeds (cocoa beans). This way, the farmer has to employ his own factors of production from the time of cultivating the forest through planting the cocoa till the beans are ready for sale. (48)

As will be argued in the summary-conclusion of this chapter, the heightened tensions and conflict between landlords and tenants in the locality, was fuelled by a national political debate over the future of state policies in traditional land tenure affairs. This set in motion a process which in the long run threatens the survival of the abusa and abunu systems and may have important social-structural implications.
Summary - Conclusions

A summary of the forms of production and social structure in the peasant sector as at May 1983 is presented in Table 5.4. It shows the expansion of the colonial cocoa economy during the post-colonial era with the emergence of the commercial food production and distribution industry and the sprouting outgrower oil palm production sub-sector. The table also shows the processes of structural change set in motion as capitalism takes hold of the local agrarian economy, allowing tentative propositions about the future structural implications to be made.

When viewed together with table 4.10 the connecting links with the capitalist sector become clear. The capitalist intervention is positively correlated with the land shortage problem in the peasant sector, resulting in increasing demographic pressure on land resources and the inability of small-scale peasant farmers to expand the area under cultivation. These developments are linked with the increasing shift to subsistence level cultivation for an increasing number of middle and poor peasants. The need for an uninterrupted flow of the social reproduction needs of these strata of the peasantry under the existing conditions, has necessitated their transformation into semi-proletarianized workers on capitalist estates and their role as sharecroppers and casual labourers in the peasant
### TABLE 5.4
**Typology of Peasant Petty Commodity Enterprises in Twifo-Hemang (1982-83)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
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<td><strong>Forms of Production</strong></td>
<td><strong>Types of Enterprises</strong></td>
<td><strong>Types of Crops</strong></td>
<td><strong>Social Classes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Status on Market</strong></td>
<td><strong>Forms of Payment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dynamic of Status as Capitalism</strong></td>
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</table>


sector.

The relatively low development of the forces of production in the peasant sector has delayed the emergence of full fledged capitalist farmers as compared to the rapid emergence of capitalist farmers in the capitalist sector. There is, within the peasant sector, the tendency for rich peasants to adapt non-capitalist relations of production to the process of producing for the capitalist market eg. sharecropping based on rent in kind, casual labour based on wages in cash and in kind, and the absence of a permanent free wage labour force and the increasing emergence of a semi-proletarianized labour force.

The response of the peasantry to the invitation extended to them to participate as outgrowers in the local oil palm industry can be described as slow and cautious. Even though the cocoa industry had gradually been declining most rich peasants were of the opinion that it would not be adviseable to be too enthusiastic about oil palms at the initial stages until they were certain of the probable success of the project and the favourability of the producer prices. Most of the oil palm plantations being developed by the peasantry were on a comparatively small scale as compared to the mechanized capitalist estates. It is important to note that the existing land hunger in the area had excluded many smallholding and poor peasants from participating in the outgrower scheme. Whilst participants
were using modern hybrid oil palm seedlings, they were not utilizing machinery except a few who began renting chain saws to fell large trees. The dominant form of labour being employed for that purpose was casual, semi-proletarianized physical labour.

In the third chapter, it was shown that the struggle over land rent between the landlords and rich peasants on the one hand, and the bureaucrats and tenants on the other hand ended in victory for the former groups, and set in motion the large scale expulsion of recalcitrant tenants from the land. This process was further accelerated by a national debate which coincided with it, following a keynote address at a national seminar on land tenure systems in Ghana by the Ashanti Regional Secretary ostensibly on behalf of all Regional Secretaries in Ghana in October, 1982. (49)

The paper expressed concern with the "increasing abuse of the sanctity of communal property in land" by traditional authorities, who had been turning stool lands into their private or family property, exploiting the labour of tenants and labourers, selling and leasing traditional lands unilaterally and pocketing compensation monies paid by the State for the acquisition of stool lands for development purposes. It was argued that this resulted in class differentiation and relations of exploitation in the Ghanaian countryside. A portion of the paper argued that,
At the moment there is no uniform basis for determining rent for land; and tenants are normally left at the mercy of landowners who want to make the most of their land without providing any infrastructure to merit high rent. With increased demand for land, moneys being demanded are becoming exorbitant and anybody who has a genuine need for the land is left with a take-it-or-leave-it decision.(50)

The paper recommended that 1. the government should legislate to make it compulsory for all stool land revenues, compensation and so on to be paid into a common fund for development purposes in the traditional areas concerned; 2. all sharecropping arrangements operating along the lines of 'abunu' and 'abusa' should be made to cease forthwith and tenant farmers who have operated for a period of over 10 years be made automatic title owners of the lands involved; and 3. consideration should be given to a policy of total state control of all lands, while any piece of land which had become a subject of litigation should be vested in the state.(51) This coincided with an announcement that the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources was to enact legislation to ensure security of tenure for tenant farmers and other land users 'to stabilise rent payable to landlords to replace the existing traditional agreement on land acquisition like the "Abunu" and "Abusa" systems which are now a hindrance to the P.N.D.C.'s agricultural policy'.(52) These developments stirred up a national debate between so-called radical elements and conservative elements in
Ghanaian society.

The synchronism of the publication of the P.N.D.C. Law 29 of 1982 (28 September, 1982) which spelt out the victory of the landlords over the tenants and the beginnings of the expulsion of the tenants and these announcements from authoritative government sources, increased the anxiety of the landlords and accelerated the expulsion process. Landlords were not willing to go through further experiences like those of the previous seven years (1975-1982) as a result of the nationalization of the lands in the area and the controversial rent policy of the state.

The reaction of the Central Regional House of Chiefs, of which the Paramount Chief of the Denkyira Traditional Area in the Twifo-Hemang-Denkyira District is the President, is typical of the mood of the local traditional leaders and landlords. In a lengthy newspaper advertisement, the chiefs argued that,

What we should not lose sight of is that stools are maintained mainly out of the proceeds from land. Therefore, the institution of chieftaincy cannot be supported by shouting empty slogans if it is not supported by the land. Any Acts which tend to deprive the stool of the allodial title will have serious deleterious consequences on our indigenous political and social institutions of which we should be justly proud. (53)

It is thus not surprising that most of the landlords who won back their lands began expelling their tenants and selling
some of the land to the intruding capitalist farmers. However this large-scale expulsion of tenants should be considered as a process set in motion and not be used to predict the disappearance of the traditional tenancy and sharecropping system until further data has been collected to support that position.

By the end of this research, the social component of the agrarian structure was still complex, with the middle peasants and poor sharecropping peasants who depend mainly on family labour diminishing in numerical terms but still tenacious. The development of free wage labour force was still far from realization, whilst the number of semi-proletarianized peasants was on the increase. Historical and cultural factors still accounted for the presence of landlords who exploited labour through rent, although the system was being threatened out of existence. Although rich peasants were adopting certain methods of the capitalist form of production, there was still no demographically dominant capitalist farmer class in the peasant sector.
Notes on Chapter Five

1. It should be noted at the outset that some of the material in this chapter have already been dealt with in scattered portions of previous chapters. Their repetition serves to emphasise their significance in this work and to promote a better organization of the whole work.

2. The Regional Lands Office, Cape Coast, Files I - III labelled ESC/DC49/72TJ contain numerous petitions about the expropriation of their lands by various peasant groups including tenants and their landlords during the land crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s.

3. See Table 7 (b), of Chapter 4.

4. Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review (1st Quarter, 1979), p.11.

5. This general historical evidence relevant to the development of the cocoa industry in the southern forest regions of Ghana, was confirmed by oral tradition during my fieldwork.


8. N. O. Addo (1972), Ibid., p.43.

9. Further details will be provided in sub-section 2.2.

10. Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, 3rd Quarter (1978), p.12; R. Jeffries, 'Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana', African Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 324 (July 1982), p.313. In a memorandum submitted to the Archer Committee of Inquiry the Ghana National Farmers' Union called for private multi-national companies such as Lever Brother's U.A.C. to be allowed to purchase cocoa instead of the State's Cocoa Marketing Board and for the government to raise producer prices to at least 70% of the world price so as to encourage output and discourage smuggling - See Quarterly Economic
11. The issuing of "chits" (promissory notes) to peasants in lieu of cash for their cocoa which usually took a long time to claim or which in many cases were never paid because the illiterate peasants had misplaced the chits was commonplace. This made borrowing money from rich peasants at very high rates 'an integral part of farming' - West Africa, No. 3346, (September 14, 1981), p.2135; West Africa, No. 3363 (January 18, 1982), p.199. There were many cases of "the clever manipulation of weighing scales whereby the farmers' cocoa is underweighed by the producer clerk to the detriment of the farmer", and of the clerk 'reselling the surplus to C.M.B. and pocketing the proceeds' - West Africa, No. 3450 (26 September 1983), p.2259.


15. Judgement of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission, Cape Coast, July 31, 1979 in Ghana Land Concessions Bulletin of the Gazette, No. 8 (Friday, November 9, 1979), p.34.


19. Ghanaian Times, No. 6569, (Monday, January 22, 1979), p.1. The rally was held at Twifo-Ntaferewaso on Saturday, January 20, 1979 following a series of public demonstrations by the peasants which threatened the public peace in the area.
20. It has been argued above in this subsection that the neglect of the cocoa trees and the lack of expansion of the area under cocoa cultivation since the 1970s can rightly be blamed on government policy.

21. Despatch No. ESC/DC49/72TJ/112 by the Regional Lands Officer, Cape Coast dated June 17, 1977 to the Regional Administration Officer, Cape Coast in reply to despatch No. 2B42/Vol. 11 of June 2, 1977 from the Regional Administration Officer.


32. The coming to power of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.) in 1979 marked the escalation of the physical and economic harassment of peasant producers in the
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marketplace by both authorized and unauthorized military personnel. At one point the leader of the A.F.R.C. warned soldiers of their excesses which was "frightening the poor farmers away". West Africa, No. 3234, (July 9, 1979), p.1240. The power these uniformed soldiers wielded in the rural areas was far in excess of what they could do in the urban areas.

33. I had the privilege of gaining the confidence and cooperation of the leadership of the Hemang sub-district branch of the P.D.C.s, thus studying in detail their activities, using a combination of ethnographic interviews and participant observation.

34. The People's Shops were opened by all local P.D.C.s throughout the country, and it is through them that the P.N.D.C. regime channels the distribution of so-called "essential commodities" to be sold directly to the community members or consumers, thus avoiding the numerous middlemen and distributors who create shortages and thus raise prices to unbearable levels.


41. Interviews of the Personnel Manager, TOPP, Twifo-Hemang, February, 1983.

42. These have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of

43. Ibid., p.17.

44. The Manager of the CereDEC Oil Palm Plantations at Twifo-Hemang explained that a number of private companies such as Ayiem Oil Mills at Sekondi-Takoradi, Waff Merchant Co., Accra (which supplies palm oil as raw material to Lever Brothers for the manufacture of soap), Butre Oil Mill at Sekondi-Takoradi and Amin Sanghari Manufacturing Co. of Cape Coast, have been competing with local women for f.f.b. produced by local capitalist plantations.


47. The Inspector-in-Charge of the Hemang (town) Police Post informed me that even though matters concerning conflict over land are strictly speaking civil case issues, the frequent confrontation between landlords and sharecroppers over the sharing of the agricultural product have increased the incidence of criminal offences (eg. assault) which the police in the area have had to deal with.


49. Seminar on Land Tenure Systems in Ghana held at the National Cultural Centre, Kumasi, 28 - 29 October 1982, organized by
the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources in conjunction with the Land Administration Research Centre, University of Science and Technology, Kumasi. See report in Daily Graphic, (Friday, November 12, 1982), p.3.


CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This study set out to evaluate a comprehensive rural development project sponsored by the Ghanaian post-colonial state in partnership with international finance capital and local private capital in Twifo-Hemang, a rural sub-district in the Central Region of Ghana. This oil palm production project involved the compulsory acquisition by the state of large tracts of communally-owned and privately-owned farmlands. It also involved the expropriation of large numbers of peasant direct producers from their means of production.

The analysis was made on two levels. First the immediate and long-term impact of the capitalist intrusion on agrarian structure (defined dynamically as changes in the relations of ownership, control and usufruct of land, and the changing roles of different social classes and strata in the process of production) was discussed. Second, an appraisal of the project was made, in terms of its officially stated objectives, based on the existing evidence in the area at the time this fieldwork took place, (1982-83).
The thesis demonstrably supported by this work is that the large-scale infiltration of modern technologies and capitalist agriculture into peasant communities, and the extensive appropriation of peasant lands (as occurred in the case study) involves a restructuring of the existing social relations of production. Hence, it generates new processes of class formation and socio-economic differentiation. The position taken is that rural development planners in underdeveloped societies should not only be concerned with the economic viability of projects. They should also take account of the long-term economic and social-structural implication within the target areas. The evaluation of levels of rural development should incorporate critical analysis of the deep-seated, social-structural changes in terms of how so-called rural development projects, especially those involving large-scale capitalist agriculture, skew the relations of social classes and strata to the means of production.

The processes set in motion in Twifo-Hemang as a result of the implementation of this project are of an enduring nature in terms of their immediate and long-term impact on agrarian structure. They have resulted in the increasing concentration of the most critical means of production (land) in the hands of powerful landlords and rich peasants, the state and urban-based capitalist farmers. The long-run implication is that a situation is emerging in
which the majority of peasant direct producers, without the required economic means and lacking political influence, are being excluded from the land market.

The existing situation is already having negative social and economic consequences in the peasant petty commodity production sector. It has begun effecting land shortage and demographic pressure on farmlands available to the numerous micro-holding, middle peasants. Intense demographic pressures on land resources will bring about increasing impossibility of land fallowing and hence decreasing fertility generation. There will be lower levels of agricultural commodity production as a result, and hence in the long run it will be impossible for majority of the peasants to sustain the social reproduction of their labour power.

A nationwide survey in Ghana, showed that 'there is a strong positive correlation between production levels and areas under cultivation'. (1) The long-term prospect of this emerging condition is a process which de Janvry and Garromon have termed, 'land-mining', in which

As poverty increases, more intensive use of available resources is necessary and the land is mined. Lower yields imply growing poverty which in turn force more mining of the land. The ecology is gradually destroyed... and underdevelopment progresses. (2)

Given these trends, in the long run the social structure
will not be able to absorb the added burden of future claims of later generations of the peasantry for rights of access to land, without further endangering the society's ability to maintain the social reproduction of the labour power of existing direct producers and their dependants. This process approximates that which, in the case of the minifundia of Latin America, some observers tentatively consider 'a prelude to eventual landlessness'.(3)

In Twifo-Hemang, the process set in motion has created a condition in which an increasing number of land-hungry peasants is obliged to sell its labour in the capitalist sector as semi-proletarians in order to supplement decreasing incomes. The rise in the market value of land as a result of greater capitalist demand has literally excluded the smallholding and the expropriated from the land market. Land, as the most critical means of production, no more exists as an attribute of the peasant society, unencumbered access to which is based on ascriptive criteria. Rather, it is becoming a commodity bought and sold on the market or rented for money, and increasingly being stripped of traditional social obligations and sanctions. This process, begun in the colonial era with the emergence of cocoa production for the world capitalist-dominated market, has been stepped up with the post-colonial capitalist intrusion into the process of production.
The smallholding peasants who typically exploit family labour are gradually shifting from participating in the cash crop market to subsistence level operations due to the land squeeze, obliging a growing number to sell its labour power in the capitalist estates as semi-proletarians, or as sharecroppers and casual farm labourers on the farms of rich peasants. Meanwhile, very slowly in the peasant simple commodity sector and very rapidly in the capitalist sector, there is emerging a class of capitalist farmers with effective control over the means of production and the conditions of labour. The social component of the agrarian structure shows a process set in motion in which a numerical minority comprising capitalist farmers, rich peasants and landlords extract the surplus product created by the labour power of the majority, made up of semi-proletarianized peasants, poor sharecroppers and landless farm labourers.

On the other hand, as the analysis in Chapter Four has shown, the chances of significant increases in the incomes and living standards among the generality of the members of the Twifo-Hemang society remain an unfulfilled dream, contrary to the stated objectives of the development project. It has rather set in motion a process that ensures the utilization of rural land, labour and other vital resources to stimulate economic growth in the urban commercial-industrial centres.

If the structural processes set in motion as a
result of the capitalist intrusion continue, then the logic of capitalist agriculture will in the long run increase the socio-economic differentiation of the peasantry. The ranks of the capitalist farmers are likely to grow, while the smallholding peasants who cannot survive the capitalist competition will increase the ranks of the semi-proletarianized peasantry and the landless wage workers. Without further evidence of the complete expropriation of the peasantry by the state from what is left of its means of production however, we will expect the continued existence of an expanding capitalist sector and a shrinking and overcrowded peasant sector.

At the time this fieldwork ended, the capitalist estate sector of the agrarian economy was expanding rapidly. The constant and variable capital components of the organization of production in this sector were typical of the capitalist form of production. However, the majority of the plantation labour force was made up of semi-proletarianized peasants, straddling two forms of surplus extraction, namely peasant petty commodity production (subsumed under the wider capitalist economy) and the capitalist wage labour sector. These semi-proletarians combine working on their micro-holdings, sharecropping and/or casual labour in the peasant sector with selling their labour power in the capitalist sector, in order to ensure the continued social reproduction of their labour
power.

The labour of the peasantry engaged in simple commodity production is subsumed under capital in the sense of creating absolute surplus value extracted by capital through exchange relations. While increasingly certain features of the peasant sector tend to take on elements of capitalist relations of production, the general tendency in this sector is the adaptation of non-capitalist features of production for capitalist ends. Barring unforeseen developments, such features as the combination of wage labour with sharecropping; the coexistence of wages and rent in kind and in cash; the combination of subsistence production with commodity production; and finally the basic smallholding family farms based on non-wage labour, will remain essential elements of the agrarian structure of Twifo-Hemang. In this respect, the findings of this study are not dissimilar to those of many other parts of Africa. (4)

An eclectic social organization is taking shape, which is based partly on non-capitalist relations and partly on capitalist. In this organization the full commoditization of land, labour and capital has yet to be realized and production is geared towards both use-values and exchange-values. There was no appreciable improvement in the state of development of the forces of production in the peasant sector, nor was there any evidence during the
course of the fieldwork, that some radical change was forthcoming in the near future. Many of the peasant direct producers had no control or only tenuous control over the means of production. For many more who had control over the means of production, their micro-holdings and lack of investment capital and access to credit, would not allow for the adoption of the sophisticated modern agricultural technology of the capitalist enterprises.

The findings of this study occupy a middle ground between the two main contending interpretations of the transformation of agrarian structure under the impact of wider capitalist forces. The first, which is the ultimate decomposition thesis, is based on the classical agrarian transition or process of proletarianization model.(5) In this process, land and labour emerge completely as commodities and production is generally based on free wage labour. The second stresses the persistence of peasant-type social and production organization in spite of capitalist intrusion into the production process. This is explained 'in terms of the way in which capitalism selectively sustains certain forms of small-scale peasant or simple commodity production, which cheapen the reproduction costs of labour for the capitalist sector'.(6)

The evidence from this study does not support the ultimate decomposition thesis which considers peasant simple commodity production and the peasantry as transitional
phenomena which will eventually wither away as capitalist forms and relations of production progressively infiltrate the agrarian structure. The continued existence of non-capitalist relations of production as substantive and integral part of the agrarian structure, suggests that capitalist relations of production, though expanding, will in no full sense be the only form of production relations. The findings of this study support the tenacity of peasant social and production organization in the face of the progressive capitalist intrusion into the productive process. Semi-proletarianized farm workers supplement their wages in the capitalist sector with the production of use values in the peasant sector for their own subsistence. Capital is thereby spared the burden of bearing the full costs of the social reproduction of their (ie. semi-proletarians') labour power. The capitalist and peasant forms of production will continue to coexist, albeit on unequal and contradictory terms, in Twifo-Hemang.
Notes on Chapter Six


5. For example, according to Saul and Woods, "...in so far as capitalism does have the inherent strength to fully transform African societies the existence of a peasantry could be viewed all the more as a transitional phenomenon'. J. S. Saul and R. Woods, 'African Peasantries', in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973), p.409.

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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Ph.d. Fieldwork Survey Research

Twifo-Hemang Sub-District, Central Region

Ghana

January - May, 1983
Questions for Sample Respondents

1. Respondent's weekday name (eg. Kofi):

2. Respondent's Code Identification number:

3. Village of Residence:

4. Sex: 1. Male 2. Female

5. Age:

   3. Widow(er) 4. Divorced

7. If married, do you share residence with your spouse? Yes/No

8. Specify pattern of residence for couple.
   1. Neolocal
   2. Uxorilocal
   3. Virilocal
   4. Undetermined

9. No. of children:

10. No. of other dependants:

11. Hometown (or village) and Region of Birth.

12. Ethnic Origin and Main Dialect spoken.

13. If 'stranger', specify years of residence in Twifo-Hemang.


   If no, why do you intend to leave?

15. If 'stranger', what is the chief reason for migrating to this area?
   1. land for farming.
2. seek job in plantations
3. follow spouse
4. any other

16. Level of formal education
   1. Complete illiterate
   2. Less than M.S.L.C.
      (Middle School Leaving Certificate)
   3. M.S.L.C.
   4. Above M.S.L.C. (specify)

17. Major Occupation:

18. Minor Occupation:

   For 17 and 18, choose from the following:
   1. Farming
   2. Trading/Business
   3. Plantation a. Labourer
      b. Headman/Supervisor
      c. Technician/Tradesman
      d. Senior Officer
   4. Traditional Primary Occupations
      (Specify)
   5. Domestic Labour/Housewife
   6. Public Service Employee
      (eg. Teacher, Nurse)
   7. Self-employed Technician/Craftsman
   8. Unemployed
   9. Other

19. Do you (occasionally) do any other casual jobs apart from these? If so specify.

20. Why do you do casual labour?

21. What job(s) would you wish your children to do in the future?

22. If not farming, why not?

23. Do you own a farm (land) or have usufructual rights to farmland?

24. If yes, how did you obtain it?
   1. outright purchase
   2. money rental on short-term basis
   3. long-term lease
   4. sharecropping
5. allocation by traditional authorities
6. inherited
7. gift
8. Any other (specify)

25. Is there any evidence of the transaction?
   1. Written contract
   2. Oral agreement/Witnesses
   3. Court Records
   4. Any other (specify)

26. How large (acres) is/are your farm(s)?

27. Do you engage hired labour on your farm?

28. If you occasionally engage casual labour, specify purposes?

29. What crop(s) do you grow on your farm?

30. Does your spouse (if any) own (a) separate farm(s) from yours?

31. If so, how large and what crops are grown?

32. Do you (spouses) help each other in farmwork? If yes specify.

33. Did you lose some land as a result of the government take over of lands? Yes/No.

34. If yes, how much land did you lose?

35. Do you think it fair or unfair that you lost the title to it? If unfair, why do you think so?

36. Have you received compensation?

37. If yes, do you consider it fair or unfair?

38. Would you prefer alternative land allocation to cash compensation if given the choice?

39. What did you use the money for?
   1. establish another farm
   2. built a house
   3. took a wife
   4. trading
   5. Any other (specify)
40. Do you still have access to land after losing your land?

41. If so, how did you obtain it (use coded answers for Q.24 above)

42. If a sharecropper, give details of tenurial agreement.

43. How would you describe the relationship between you and your landlord.
   1. cordial
   2. barely cordial
   3. not cordial

44. If barely cordial or not cordial, what aspects of the tenancy relationship are you worried about or which cause conflicts between you and your landlord?

45. Do you approve of people selling land in this area?
   1. strongly approve
   2. somehow approve
   3. don't approve
   4. no opinion

46. Explain your stand on Q. 45.

47. If you wish to dispose of your own land, would you prefer outright sale, renting for cash or sharecropping arrangement?

48. The following seem to be the commonest causes of land disputes in this area:-
   1. fraud by landowners/traditional leaders
   2. conflict over boundaries
   3. conflict over inheritance

   How would you rank them from highest to lowest?

49. Is there any other major causes(s) of land disputes you would like to suggest?

50. The following seem to be the main objectives of the government take over of lands in this area.
   1. to develop the area
   2. to promote peace
   3. to easily obtain land for large scale farming.

   How would you rank them from highest to lowest?
51. Would you suggest any other reason(s) for the government intervention?

52. A lot of people are of the opinion that the following are to be blamed for the increased conflict over land in this area.

1. the government itself
2. government officials
3. chiefs and big landowners.

How would you rank them from highest to lowest?

53. Could you suggest any other persons or groups who could be blamed for the situation?

54. Which 3 of the following are the biggest problems facing farmers in this area?

1. lack of capital
2. unavailability of credit facilities
3. acute shortage of land
4. constant land disputes
5. shortage and high cost of labour
6. shortage and high cost of inputs
7. lack of and high cost of transportation
8. Any other.

55. How would you rank the three from highest to lowest?