THE IMAGERY OF MORALITY

IN

SENECA'S PROSE-WORKS

by

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Abstract

The persuasiveness of Seneca's paraenetic prose-works is owed, in large measure, as Seneca himself is aware (Ep.59.6), to the use of imagery - metaphor, analogy, and simile. As such, this stylistic device suggests itself as an important subject of enquiry. Its significance, however, extends further: in so far as many of Seneca's images are demonstrably traditional, they help in defining the tradition to which these prose-works may belong. In particular, they bear on the question of the relationship of Seneca's prose-works to the so-called 'diatribe', in the paraenetic effect of which imagery plays an important part.

D. Steyns (Gand, 1907) and C.S. Smith (Baltimore, 1910), have made limited lists of Senecan prose-imagery without consideration of its sources. F. Husner (Leipzig, 1924) has investigated the sources of Seneca's imagery within the confines of a narrow topic, while appreciating their implications for definition of the tradition of Seneca's moral prose-works. In the present work I apply the same approach in greater depth to the topic of central analysis of the moral prose-works: the state of the Stoic sapiens, of his antithesis - the sinner - and that of the proficiens between them.

Part I collects by category of allusion the relevant extended images in the moral prose-works, excluding the fragments. Part II investigates their sources. It is shown that, while the possibility of Seneca's originality cannot be discounted, precedents for his images can be found in the vast majority of cases; that Plato frequently provides an ultimate source, and that some of Seneca's imagery was also used by the Old and Middle Stoa. It is clear, however, that a stock of imagery is shared and passed on between 'diatribists', and that it is primarily from these - mainly via the philosophical schools of contemporary Rome - that Seneca draws the images of his moral prose-works.

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Contents

Introduction

Imagery - metaphor, analogy, and simile[1] - in Seneca's prose-works is, by his own admission, a rhetorical feature which is crucial to the instrumentation of their effective paraenesis. Praising Lucilius for the style he has employed in a letter of philosophical discussion, Seneca says,

> Invenio ... translationes verborum ... invenio imagines, quibus si quis nos utique vetat et poetis illas solis iudicat esse concessas, neminem mihi videtur ex antiquis legisse, apud quos nondum captabatur plausibilis oratio: illi, qui simpliciter et demonstrandae rei causa eloquebantur, parabolis referti sunt, quas existimo necessarias, non ex eadem causa qua poetis, sed ut inbecillitatis nostrae adminicula sint, ut et dicentem et audientem in rem praesentem adducant. Ep.59.6.

For Seneca, the enargeia[2] of the image will be used for its emotional impact[3] in a new "ethisch-adhortativer Stil"[4] in which the orator's language of docere and movere[5] takes precedence over the flat language of cerebral speculation.[6] As an indispensable feature of a method of philosophical exposition which is inseparably linked to Seneca's conception of philosophy and of his own role as author of the moral prose-works, the image suggests itself as an important subject of study.

The present work is a collection of the extended images[7] illustrating the states of virtue, vice, and moral progress in Seneca's prose-works (excluding the Naturales quaestiones and the fragments), and a study of their sources. In the Epistulae morales, the Dialogi,[8] the De clementia, and the De beneficiis, Seneca uses imagery to illustrate his analyses of virtue and vice, to warn his readers from vice, and to exhort them to virtue. In so doing, Seneca recognizes three moral states: the poles of virtue and vice and the intermediate stage of moral progress. The Stoic doctrine that virtue is absolute[9] led to the position - much mocked by the school's detractors[10] - that all who are not sapientes are therefore sinful and that sapientia must be achieved by a kind of instantaneous transformation from vice to virtue. The paradox was eased to some extent by the concept of προκοπή[11] or moral progress, for the

development of which Chrysippus was largely responsible.[12] For Seneca, to whom philosophy is a matter of pragmatic moral advice, the philosopher a "generis humani paedagogus"[13] the proficientes are those to whom he would direct his paraenesis. It is they whom he would inspire with the faith, as Sextius had filled him, that sapientia is, indeed, attainable.[14]

Feeling, one day, that the jolting motion of a ride in his litter would ease his congestion, Seneca, as he tells Lucilius in the fifty-fifth epistle, had himself carried out along the sandbar dividing Lake Acheron and the sea near Cumae (Ep.55.3). There, he tells us,

> Ex consuetudine ... mea circumspicere coepi an aliquid illic invenirem quod mihi posset bono esse, et derexi oculos in villam quae aliquando Vatiae fuit.

His habit of drawing moral lessons from the world around him - as he did that day from Vatia's villa - must have provided Seneca with many images with which to illustrate his prose sermons. Nevertheless, some of the images with which Seneca illustrates virtue, vice, and moral progress are immediately recognizable as traditional, as, for example, his frequent characterization of his addressees as patients, himself as a physician whose sermons are his medicines. Where a tradition precedes Seneca's prose-imagery, it is reasonable, I suggest, given Seneca's education and wide reading,[15] to assume that in these cases literary and philosophical reminiscence contributes to, if it does not altogether supplant, personal observation. To what degree is Seneca's prose-imagery traditional, and when it is, from what sources has it been derived?

The answers to these questions are of great importance for their bearing on the vexed question of the literary tradition to which Seneca's prose-works belong. By common consent,[16] imagery is one of the features that belong to the so-called 'diatribe' which has been defined narrowly, by some, as a genre, and broadly, by others, as a moralizing tradition, to which Seneca's prose-works may belong.[17] Precise knowledge of the sources of Seneca's imagery will determine, in this respect at least, to what extent, if at all, his prose-works may be described as typical of 'diatribe', as well, indeed, whether the concept of 'diatribe' is a useful and legitimate one when applied to imagery.

Outside the scope of the thesis must remain, regrettably, all

stylistic aspects of Seneca's use of prose-imagery, such as its linguistic form, its appropriateness, its objects of illustration, its distribution throughout the prose-works, its unity and variety. While these are important aspects of Seneca's prose which are, as yet, almost untouched,[18] they are material for another thesis. I have, however, attempted to draw attention, in schematic fashion, to one of the most interesting aspects of Seneca's use of prose-imagery by means of the cross-references at the end of the sections of Part I: there emerges a complex, but clear, pattern of notions common to the different images of virtue, vice, and moral progress, which cross-link them, emphasize central qualities of these three moral states, and illustrate their relationship with one another. The sapiens, for example, is associated with images of τέχνη (sailing, soldiering, practising medicine, the fine arts, farming etc.) with notions of resistance (solid foundations, rock, armour, fortifications), control (over a ship on a turbulent sea, a bolting horse), health, the straight path (on land and sea), elevation (the mountain peak, the citadel), light and sight (the guide, the fire, the keenly sighted) etc., while the unrighteous[19] are set in antithesis, explicitly or implicitly, by the opposite notions. The mid-state of the proficiens, on the other hand, finds particular form in the images of travel and medicine, where he is depicted as a traveller half-way between the foot and summit of a hill, or as a convalescent mid-way between illness and health.

Only two studies of length have been devoted to Seneca's prose-imagery: D. Steyns, Etude sur les métaphores et les comparaisons dans les oeuvres en prose de Sénèque le philosophe, La faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Gand 33, (Ghent, 1907) and C.S. Smith, Metaphor and comparison in the Epistulae ad Lucilium of L. Annaeus Seneca, (Diss., John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1910). The first of these compiles only a limited list of images; the second deals, by definition, only with the imagery of the epistles. Neither attempts to trace their sources. A third work, the shortest, is also the best treatment known to me of the aspects of Senecan prose-imagery with which I am concerned: a monograph entitled Leib und Seele in der Sprache Senecas: ein Beitrag zur sprachlichen Formulierung der moralischen Adhortatio by F. Husner, Philologus

Supp.17.3 (Leipzig, 1924); it is valuable as an examination of the sources of the imagery used by Seneca in illustration of a particular topic and as a demonstration of their implications for determination of the tradition of his prose-works. However, the topic chosen is rather narrow. In the following pages I hope to show that the same approach may be applied with profit on a broader scale to the imagery which illustrates the most important theme of Seneca's prose-works: morality, or the states of virtue, vice, and moral progress.

My enquiry will be conducted in two parts. Part I will be a collection of Seneca's images of morality grouped by 'subject-fields' - i.e. according to the aspect of life from which they are drawn - and will indicate the application of each image - i.e. what aspect of virtue, vice, and moral progress it illustrates. Part II will investigate the sources of the images of Part I. The images are designated by a letter/number scheme for convenient reference. The subject-fields, allotted a letter of the alphabet, are ordered alphabetically. The images within each subject-field are divided on the basis of the 'figurative equivalencies' which they hold in common. Thus all images of light/sight in which light/sight is figuratively equivalent to, or represents, virtue, are grouped together under K.2. (K is the letter assigned to the subject-field of light/sight, darkness/blindness). Particular manifestations of that equivalency form subdivisions of the group K.2. Thus images of extraordinary eyesight, the light of guidance, absolute brightness, and fire are distinct manifestations of the equivalency 'light/sight = virtue', and are, therefore, designated as K.2.1, K.2.2, K.2.3, K.2.4. Yet more specific manifestations of this equivalency will be designated as further divisions within the subdivisions by the addition of a further number. Thus the images of a straight-rising flame and a spark, both aspects of K.2.4 (fire), are designated as K.2.4.1 and K.2.4.2.

Notes

[1]Like E. Fantham, Comparative studies in Republican Latin imagery, Phoenix supp.10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p.ix (hereafter cited as Fantham), I use the term 'imagery' as "a shorthand for all forms of figurative language". I have included under the rubric of 'imagery' some comparisons which Seneca may not have regarded as figurative, but, rather, established in fact. Notable among these are the comparisons drawn from medicine (cf. n.15, p.191), some analogies with animals (B.3.1, B.3.2), and perhaps those with children (F.).

[2]Cf. Ps.Rufinus: "ἐνάργεια est figura, qua formam rerum imaginem ita oratione substituimus, ut lectoris oculis praesentiaeque subiciamus." (Dian.15). Cf. "in rem praesentem adducant" (Seneca, Ep.59.6) and Quintilian's definition of enargeia at Inst.6.2.32. For further examples, cf. H. Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Munich: Max Hueber, 1973), vol.2, §810, pp.399f. Cf. also F. Husner, Leib und Seele in der Sprache Senecas: ein Beitrag zur sprachlichen Formulierung der moralischen Adhortatio, Philologus supp.17.3 (Leipzig, 1924), pp.13f (hereafter cited as Husner).

[3]Cf. Longinus, 32.6, and Husner, pp.13f.

[4]Husner's term, p.3.

Cf. I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie 13 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1969), p.189 (hereafter cited as Hadot):

> "Die Originalität Senecas auf dem Gebiet der Seelenleitung beruht auf dem rhetorisch-formalen Aspekt seiner Methode, deren Darstellung daher im wesentlichen in nichts anderem bestände als in einer Untersuchung über die rhetorische Struktur seiner Prosaschriften ... "

By the antiqui (Ep.59.6) Seneca may be referring specifically to the traditional academic philosophers, especially Stoics, whose dry uninspiring casuistry, he, like Cicero, ridicules on many occasions - cf. n.26, p.100. Stoics of the Old Stoa did use imagery, but without concern for emotional effect - cf. n.27, p.230.

[5]Cicero, Brut.185.

Thus Cicero describes his own philosophical style (which yet remained too insipid for Seneca's liking - cf. n.29, p.101) in this way: "ea quae dicuntur in scholis θετικῶς ad nostrum hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus." (Parad.praef.5)

[6]Cicero criticizes the style of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Xenophon etc. thus:

> " ... horum oratio neque nervos neque aculeos oratorios ac forensis

habet. Loquuntur cum doctis, quorum sedare animos malunt quam incitare, et de rebus placatis ac minime turbulentis docendi causa non capiendi loquuntur, ut in eo ipso, quod delectationem aliquam dicendo aucupentur, plus non nullis quam necesse sit facere videantur ... Mollis est enim oratio philosophorum et umbratilis nec sententiis nec verbis instructa popularibus nec vincta numeris, sed soluta liberius; nihil iratum habet, nihil invidum, nihil atrox, nihil miserabile, nihil astutum; casta, verecunda, virgo incorrupta quodam modo." Orat.62ff.

His language is echoed by Seneca in his criticisms of the traditional - especially Stoic - styles of philosophical exposition - cf. pp.100f, nn.26, 28.

[7]To avoid lengthy justifications of the metaphorical status of single words, I shall concern myself only with 'extended' images - i.e. ones in which at least two different words are used in clearly figurative senses in the same context.

[8]Title of the twelve treatises preserved for us, notably in the Ambrosian manuscript: De providentia, De constantia sapientis, De ira (three books), Consolatio ad Marciam, De vita beata, De otio, De tranquillitate animi, De brevitate vitae, Consolatio ad Polybium, Consolatio ad Helviam matrem.

[9]Cf. E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, rev. ed., trans. O.J. Reichel (London, 1879; reprint ed., New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp.266f (hereafter cited as Zeller).

[10]Cf. Plutarch, Mor.75b-c (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus), and L.2, p.182.

[11]Cf., in general, O. Luschnat, 'Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts in der alten Stoa', Philologus 102 (1958) 178-214, A. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1894), pp.140f, (hereafter cited as Bonhöffer), and S. Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas in ihrem Verhältnis zur alteren und mittleren Stoa, (Diss., Bern, 1901), p.55.

[12]Cf. Bonhöffer, p.147.

[13]Ep.89.13.

Seneca's interest in the proficiens is probably derived, in part, from Panaetius - cf. M.T. Griffin, Seneca: a philosopher in politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p.179 (hereafter cited as Griffin).

[14]" ... cum legeris Sextium, dices, 'dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae'" - Ep.64.3.

[15]Cf. F. Mewis, De Senecae philosophi studiis litterarum, (Diss., Königsberg, 1908).

[16]Cf. n.66, p.104.

Cf. also O. Halbauer, De diatribis Epicteti, (Diss., Leipzig, 1911), pp.31f (hereafter cited as Halbauer), H. Weber, De Senecae philosophi dicendi genere Bioneo, (Diss., Marburg, 1895), pp.15f, 39f, 59f (hereafter cited as Weber 1895), and R. Bultmann, Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe, (Diss., Göttingen, 1910), pp. 35ff (hereafter cited as Bultmann, 1910).

[17]Cf. n.53, p.103.

[18]Some of these aspects are covered very briefly by C.S. Smith, Metaphor and comparison in the Epistulae ad Lucilium of L. Annaeus Seneca (diss., Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1906), pp.184ff.

[19]I use the negative term 'unrighteous' rather than the positive 'sinner' because for Seneca, as for other Stoics, the class of those who are not virtuous includes not only the truly depraved but also the vast majority of imperfect mankind - cf. p.2 and n.9.

PART I

A: Agriculture

The diligent farmer often represents the sapiens in his capacity as a 'cultivator' of virtue in other people. The soil, barren or fertile, represents the disposition of those who receive the 'seeds' of his teachings. The best will send forth a splendid crop, the worst an abundance of weeds.

A.1 Ep.38.2, 73.16, 81.1, 104.11, 112.2, 124.10f, Cons.Marc.16.7, Vit.Beat.9.2, Clem.2.7.4, Ben.1.1.2, 2.11.4, 4.9.2, 14.2f, 7.32.1. Good farmer = sapiens, soil = disposition, seeds = potential virtue, crop = developed virtue, weeds = vice.

A.1.1 Sowing and cultivation of seeds: Ep.38.2, 73.16, 81.1, 124.10f, Vit.Beat.9.2, Ben.1.1.2, 2.11.4, 4.9.2, 14.2f, 7.32.1.

Seeds, which, though small, have a potential for producing a large and fruitful crop, are often an image of man's potential for good. The image of sowing seeds at Ep.38.2 represents the philosopher's presentation of advice in the form of precepts.[1] The precepts, like seeds, produce much of value as long as they are received by a suitable mind, as seeds are fruitful if they fall on suitable soil. The mind will develop what it has received as seeds produce a crop. At Ep.73.16 God's spirit, present in everyone,[2] is compared to seeds. However, men develop their potential for virtue with varying success, just as a barren or marshy soil or a bad farmer[3] produces weeds instead of crops, while a good farmer produces a good crop.[4] Similarly, the image of a seed illustrates man's potential for virtue at Ep.124.10f. Like this seed, whose potential is only fully realized by the production of ripened wheat, man's potential for virtue is only fully realized when he is fully mature. At Ep.81.1 the act of sowing depicts the sapiens' conferment of benefits on others: although these may meet only with ingratitude, as seeds with a poor soil, the sapiens should confer them again,

for a poor soil is often improved by a year of fertility and able to produce a good crop, so the ungrateful may become grateful through the experience of receiving benefits.

At Vit.Beat.9.2 Seneca rejects the notion that the virtuous cultivate virtue because it will give pleasure. While a ploughed field will bring forth wild flowers which give pleasure, the sower does not plough the field for this reason: the flowers, like the pleasure from the exercise of virtue, are merely a pleasant by-product of the business in hand.

Cf. different types of soil to different types of ground for building foundations (E.2.1) and different types of vine (A.1.2.3). Cf. seeds to sparks (K.2.4.2).

A.1.2 Treatment of mature plants and trees: Ep.112.2, Clem.2.7.4.

A.1.2.1 and A.1.2.2 Pruning and straightening: Clem.2.7.4.[5]

A good farmer's pruning, fertilizing, and straightening etc. of trees provide an image for the sapiens' pedagogic relationship with the unrighteous. Just as the farmer is concerned not only with the straight and tall trees, but also with the weak and crooked, so the sapiens will be concerned to rectify the extremely sinful.[6]

Cf. straight trees to straight path on land (J.4.1) and sea (P.1.1) and straight rising flame (K.2.4.1). Cf. farmer's act of straightening to direction offered by guide (J.4.3), helmsman (P.1.1), ruler (Ep.11.10).

A.1.2.3 Grafting: Ep.112.2.

Similarly, at Ep.112.2, the image of grafting a vine illustrates the sapiens' reformation of a sinner. A parallel is suggested between the unrighteous' acceptance of moral correction: a man hardened or softened by sin does not accept moral correction, just as an old and decayed or weak and slender vine will not tolerate a graft. Like the farmer, who, in these circumstances, will try the graft a second time, cutting

the plant off above ground, so, it is suggested,[7] the sapiens should try reformation a second time.[8]

A.2 Ep.104.11, Prov.4.13, Cons.Marc.16.7.
Endurance of farmer = apatheia of sapiens.

A.2.1 Agricultural damages: Ep.104.11, Cons.Marc.16.7.

The good farmer's attitude to the loss of his crops serves as an image for the sapiens' attitude to the loss of loved ones. Just as a farmer, when he sees his trees torn up and broken by the wind, immediately sets about planting seeds and plants to replace them, so Marcia, Seneca urges, will replace in her affections her dead son with her two daughters (Cons.Marc.16.7). Similarly, at Ep.104.11, Seneca urges us to regard sorrow for the loss of a loved one as just as foolish as weeping because trees decorating our home lose their leaves: just as new leaves will be put forth, so new loved ones will replace those lost.

Cf. loss of crop to loss of flow of water (N.1.1). Cf. farmer's replacement of crop to artist's creation of new statue (C.1.1), helmsman's repairs to ship (P.1.6).

A.2.2 Farmer's calloused hands: Prov.4.13.

A farmer's calloused hands illustrate Seneca's advice that the proficiens should harden himself to adversity by exposing his mind to suffering, as the farmer's hands become calloused and tough by being used for rough work.

Cf. windblown tree (A.3.1), trained athlete and gladiator (D.1.4), veteran soldier (M.1.3.2).

A.3 Ep.39.4, Prov.4.16.
Resilience of plant = sapiens' apatheia and constantia, growing conditions = external circumstances.

A.3.1 Windblown tree: Prov.4.16.

The same advice is illustrated with the image of a tree which becomes strong and firmly rooted under the buffeting of much wind (Prov. 4.16). A man who has not been exposed to hardship, like trees which have grown in a sunny valley, is unable to withstand adversity.

Cf. farmer's calloused hands (A.2.2) and references listed ad fin.

A.3.2 Excess fecundity: Ep.39.4.

An idea connected with that of A.3.1 - that too much prosperity is harmful for a man - is illustrated with this agricultural image:

> Magni animi est magna contemnere ac mediocria malle quam nimia; illa enim utilia vitaliaque sunt, at haec eo quod superfluunt nocent. Sic segetem nimia sternit ubertas, sic rami onere franguntur, sic ad maturitatem non pervenit nimia fecunditas. (Ep.39.4).

A.4 Ep.2.3.

Transplantation = travel.

A.4.1 Transplantation: Ep.2.3.

An image of frequent transplantation accompanies Seneca's recommendation to the proficiens that he neither often travel from place to place, nor dip into the works of many authors, for change of such a kind is as harmful as frequent transplanting of a plant, which prevents it from becoming strong.

Cf. harmful movement of invalid (L.2.3).

Notes

[1]On precepts, cf. especially Ep.94 passim, Ep.95.4ff. Here Seneca compares precepts to medical remedies - cf. L.3 and L.3.3.

[2]Cf. Ep.41.1f and 66.12.

[3]This image presents the man whose potential for virtue is in question as both farmer and soil. The soil-image occurs within the image of the farmer:

> "Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt, quae si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt et paria iis ex quibus orta sunt surgunt: si malus, non aliter quam humus sterilis ac palustris necat ac deinde creat purgamenta pro frugibus." Ep.73.16.

[4]There is a further significant detail in the image - seeds which germinate and grow well "spring up in the likeness of their source and of a parity with those from which they come" (translation of R.M. Gummere, Seneca ad Lucilium: Epistulae morales, 3 vols., The Loeb classical library, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1917), Ep.73.16, quoted in n.3 (hereafter cited as Gummere). This detail illustrates the point that the sapiens resembles God, whence he is derived: cf., e.g., Prov.1.5.

[5]At Clem.1.8.7 an image of pruning plants and trees illustrates a different idea: that a cruel king, by trying to reduce the number of his enemies, actually increases them.

[6]Cf. the similar images at Ep.50.6 and Ira 1.6.1 where the straightening of wood (in the case of the image at Ira 1.6.1, wooden spearshafts) also illustrates moral rectification of the hardened sinner.

[7]The analogy is not made explicit, but some verbal echoes throughout the description of the graft and the unrighteous make it clear:
(i) The unrighteous is "durus" or "mollis", "... et consuetudine mala ac diutina fractus ..." (Ep.112.1). The vine is "vetus et exesa" or "infirma gracilisque" (Ep.112.1).
(ii) The vine "... aut non recipiet surculum aut non alet ..." (Ep.112.2). The unrighteous "non potest recipere rationem, non potest nutrire" (Ep.112.3).

[8]On the refusal of the sapiens to give up a sinner for lost, cf. Clem.1.17.2.

B: Animals

Animals often illustrate the unrighteous with respect to their irrational qualities, while the human being who establishes control over the animal often represents the sapiens in relation to the unrighteous or to external circumstances: vis-a-vis both he demonstrates apatheia.

B.1 Ep.72.8, 74.5, 85.8, 88.19, Ira 2.11.4f, 32.3, 34.1, 3.16.1, 25.3, 30.1, 43.2, Tranq.12.3, Vit.Beat.1.3, 14.2f.
'Emotions' or wildness of animals = unrighteous emotions and irrationality.

B.1.1 Irascibility: Ira 2.32.3, 34.1, 3.16.1, 25.3, 30.1, 43.2.

Animals are irascible (Ira 3.30.1) and easily annoyed by trifles, so they illustrate the irascibility of the unrighteous who harass each other like bull and bear tied together (Ira 3.43.2). With an image of animals struggling in anger[1] to free themselves from a noose, birdlime, or yoke, Seneca makes the point that anger is self-destructive (Ira 3.16.1). At Ira 2.34.1 Seneca identifies irascibility as a particular characteristic of small animals, such as mice and ants. In contrast with this image, the sapiens, who does not succumb to anger, is represented as a large animal, who ignores the provocation of barking dogs (Ira 2.32.3, 3.25.3).

B.1.2 Fearfulness: Ep.74.5, Ira 2.11.4f.

Besides being irascible, Seneca's animals are also fearful of trivial things. This quality illustrates the comparable fearfulness of the unrighteous. Their fear of the future, for example, is illustrated with the image of birds which cower at the mere sound of a whirring sling (Ep.74.5). Even large animals fear contemptible things: a shadow, voice, or unfamiliar smell, a formido - a cord hung with feathers -, the motion of a chariot's wheels, the squealing of pigs (Ira 2.11.4f).

Hence "quidquid terret et trepidat" (Ira 2.11.4) and anger should not be desirable because it is feared.

Cf. fearfulness of children (F.1.1), of people atop eminence (Ep.8.4, 94.73, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4 - J.2.1), of soldier (M.2.1), of sailor (Cons. Polyb.9.6 - P.2.1).

B.1.3 Greed/desire: Ep.72.8.

Unrighteous desire is illustrated with the image of a dog: he snaps at bread or meat thrown by his master and immediately gulps it down. With open jaws he continually waits for something more. In the same way, the unrighteous receive Fortuna's gifts without pleasure and continually wait for more.[2]

Cf. insatiable hunger and thirst (H.1.1, H.3.1).

B.1.4 Aimlessness: Tranq.12.3.

The irrationality of the unrighteous involves them in a life of aimlessness. Seneca illustrates this quality with an animal-image: that of ants aimlessly crawling to the top of a twig and then to the bottom.

Cf. wandering traveller (J.4.2).

B.1.5 Imitativeness: Vit.Beat.1.3.

The imitative behaviour of the unrighteous is compared to that of sheep following each other.

Cf. crowd on beaten track (J.5.1).

B.1.6 Uncontrollable animals: Ep.82.23f, 85.8, 41, 88.19, Vit.Beat.14.2 f.

The wildness and energy of animals, difficult to control, is frequently an image of the power and control which irrationality exercises over those who partake of it. At Ep.85.8 the emotions are

compared to wild animals which are irrational and to tigers and lions which occasionally moderate their savagery, only to attack their tamer unexpectedly. Similarly, the pursuit of pleasures is compared to a hunt - dangerous and laborious in itself - for wild beasts, which, once captured, often turn on their captors and savage them, becoming their "captor's captors" (Vit.Beat.14.2). The irrational fear of death is compared to an attacking lion at Ep.82.23f which is as ineffectively warded off by an awl as the fear of death by hairsplitting philosophy.

Cf. uncontrollable effect of emotions to effect of gravity (J.2.1), sickness (L.1.4.1), rushing river (N.1.2), turbulent sea (P.2.1).

B.1.6.1 Bolting horse: Ep.88.19.

Seneca urges Lucilius to control his passions, comparing them to horses rushing away with their driver.[3]

B.2 Ep.82.23f, 85.41, 88.19, Const.Sap.12.3, Ira 1.11.2, 16.5, 3.27.1f, Clem.1.16.5, 21.4.
Animal controller = sapiens.

It is consistent that the sapiens, who exerts rationality over irrationality, should be depicted as some kind of 'controller' of animals (who are often identified with passion) - whether as their trainer or driver - and that Seneca should urge Lucilius to establish control over irrationality as a man over bolting horses (B.1.6.1). Thus the sapiens' constantia in the face of evil circumstances (which, because they are beyond man's control, are, as it were, 'irrational'), is compared to an animal-trainer's control over and lack of fear of savage animals. Conversely, the inability of a deficient form of rationality, that of hairsplitting philosophizing,[4] to control the irrational fear of death, is compared to attempting to ward off a lion with an awl (Ep.82.23f).[5]

Cf. guardian (controls children - F.1.2), commander of army (M.1.5), helmsman controlling ship (P.1).

B.2.1 Kindness to animals: Const.Sap.12.3, Ira 1.11.2, 16.5, 3.27.1f, Clem.1.16.4f, 17.1, 21.4.

The sapiens' apatheia, in particular his lack of anger, is depicted as a man's absence of anger towards animals. Thus Seneca advocates forgiveness towards insult with the image of the sensible man who does not kick back a kicking mule or bite back a biting dog (Ira 3. 27.1). He recommends clemency to Nero on the grounds that we recoil from squashing insects on the hand, thus soiling it (Clem.1.21.4). He rejects the notion that anger is necessary when facing opponents with the image of a hunter who hunts without anger (Ira 1.11.2).

In his capacity as the "pedagogue of men" the sapiens will be called on to correct men's vices without anger. Seneca recommends clemency to Nero with images of the horse-trainer, dog-trainer, and mule-driver, who know that too much savagery is counter-productive (Clem.1. 16.4ff). Sometimes it is necessary for the sapiens to implement drastic measures in dealing with the unrighteous. Again Seneca portrays the sapiens as a man dealing with the unruliness of animals with severity, but without anger, breaking in animals with the lash (Const.Sap.12.3) or killing a snake or other poisonous creature (Ira 1.16.5).[6]

Cf. patience of guide (Ira 1.14.3 - J.4.3), doctor (L.3.1), military commander (M.1.5), helmsman (Ira 2.10.8 - P.1.6).

B.3 Ep.59.13, 95.31, Ira 2.8.3, Clem.1.19.3, 26.4.
Animals = virtuous.

B.3.1 Lack of avarice: Ep.59.13.[7]

Seneca contrasts animals' satisfaction with a moderate amount of food with man's greed.

B.3.2 Peaceableness: Ep.95.31, Ira 2.8.3, Clem.1.19.3, 26.4.

The peace in which animals of a kind live with one another is contrasted with the belligerence of mankind.

Notes

[1]Seneca employs the image to illustrate "indignatio" and "contumacia" under authority (Ira 3.16.1), but the emotion experienced by the animals he describes seems, rather, to be fear ("trepidantes").

[2]A similar notion suggested, perhaps, the image of the lions with their prey at Ep.59.17:"'stulti ac mali non gaudent?' Non magis quam praedam nancti leones."

[3]A similar image of controlling horses is probably suggested at Ira 1.7.3 where Ratio is depicted as holding the "reins" ("freni"), and is only "potens" as long as she is kept away from the passions:

> "Commota enim semel et excussa mens ei seruit quo inpellitur. Quarundam rerum initia in nostra potestate sunt, ulteriora nos ui sua rapiunt nec regressum relinquunt."

The second best form of virtue, according to Seneca at Ben.5.25.5, is comparable to an obedient horse which can be controlled.

[4]Cf. p. 95 and nn.26, 28.

[5]Seneca mentions his contempt for such philosophizing again at Ep.85.1 again in conjunction with a similar image ("pudet in aciem descendere pro dis hominibusque susceptam subula armatum").

[6]For the comparison of the unrighteous to the poisonous snake, cf. also Ep.42.4, 81.22, and Ira 1.17.6. At Ep.81.22 Seneca contrasts the evil of man with that of a snake: while a snake's poison is harmful to others but not to himself, the unrighteous harm themselves while they harm others.

[7]For further examples of Seneca's comparison of human- and animal-consumption of food, cf. Husner, pp.99ff.

C: Artist

C.1 Ep.9.5, 65.17, 71.2, 85.40.
Artist = sapiens.[1]

C.1.1 Phidias: Ep.9.5, 85.40.

Two images illustrate the sapiens' ability to withstand adversity. At Ep.9.5, the ability of Phidias to sculpt a new statue if he loses one, provides an image for the sapiens' ability to replace a lost friend with another one.

Cf. artist's creation of new statue to farmer's replacement of crop (A. 2.1), helmsman's repairs to ship (P.1.6).

C.1.1.1 Different materials: Ep.85.40.

Phidias' ability to make statues out of cheap materials, such as marble, as well as out of the more expensive ivory, illustrates the sapiens' ability to develop virtue in adverse as well as fortunate circumstances.

Cf. creation of statues from cheap or expensive materials to travel on steep or level road (J.3.1 and J.1). storming city walls or enduring siege (Ep.66.13 - M.1.1 and n.4, p. 68).

C.1.2 Subject of painting: Ep.71.2.

An artist may have all his colours prepared, but he must know what he wishes to paint before he can render a likeness of it. Similarly, the proficiens is urged to organize his life in relation to his ultimate goal, the "summum bonum", considering each action in relation to it.

Cf. archer's target (D.1.3), traveller's destination (J.4.1), sailor's

port (P.1.5).

C.1.3 Craftsmen refreshing eyes: Ep.65.17.

The image of craftsmen, who go out occasionally from the dark room where they are working to refresh their eyes in the light of a park, illustrates the soul of the philosopher, which escapes from the 'prison' where it is bound[2] and roams in Heaven.[3]

Cf. dark room to dark prison (K.1.1).

Notes

[1]The most well-developed image of the artist in the Senecan prose-works occurs at Ep.65.3ff where, in discussing the doctrine of the 'causes', Seneca compares God to an artist and his material to the earth. He does not make an explicit comparison between God and the sapiens here, although he remarks: "Quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est." (Ep.65.24).

[2]Seneca uses here an image within an image. For the image of the prison, cf. G.1.1 and K.1.1.

[3]A very similar image occurs at Ep.58.25, where, however, it simply illustrates Seneca's point that the proficiens should relax occasionally from study.

D: Athletics and sports

The training, skill, endurance, and courage of a good sportsman often provides Seneca with images to illustrate the virtuous, particular-ly in their relationship to adversity. Occasionally, however, sporting competitiveness illustrates the dissension which exists among the unrighteous. Images of the spectator are few, but, when they do occur, represent the unrighteous.

D.1 Ep.13.2f, 18.8, 22.1, 37.1f, 71.3, 78.16, 80.2ff, 93.12, Prov.2.3, 6, 4.13, Ira 1.11.2, 2.14.2f, Trang.3.1, 11.4f, Ben.7.1.4. Sportsman = sapiens or proficiens.

D.1.1 Athletics: Ep.13.2f, 78.16, 80.2ff, Prov.2.3, 6, Trang.3.1.

The sapiens' constantia will be like that of the wrestler who rises to his feet when knocked down by an adversary (Ep.13.2f, 80.3),[1] and fights even on his knees (Prov.2.6).[2]

Cf. resistance of athlete to his adversary to that of trainer to wild animals (B.1.6, B.1.6.1), traveller to gravity (J.6.1), soldier to enemy (M.1.1, M.1.2), solid substances to the impact of waves, blows, etc. (O.1.1), helmsman and ship to sea (P.1.1).

D.1.1.1 Athletic resources: Ep.80.3.

In order to show that virtue can be obtained without expense, using simply the resources of the spirit, Seneca compares the proficiens ex contrario with the athlete: while the athlete requires much food, drink, oil, and exercise to become an athlete, the proficiens can attain virtue without equipment and without expense.

For athletic resources as worldly goods, cf. traveller's viaticum (J.7.1), soldier's weapons (M.4.1).

D.1.2 Gladiatorial combat: Ep.22.1, 37.1f, 93.12, Ira 1.11.2, Trang.11.4f.

The gladiator's fight to the death provides images for human death in general, the way in which he faces death illustrating either the virtuous or unrighteous way to die. At Trang.11.4f the gladiator's audience, who wishes to save his life if he is brave, but does not if he is unwilling to die, provides an image for the way in which circumstances (personified as Fortuna) treat a man depending on his attitude to death: "saepe enim causa moriendi est timide mori". At Ep.37.2 the sapiens is compared ex contrario with a brave gladiator: while a brave gladiator may test the pity of the spectators in the hope of a reprieve from death, the sapiens may not - he must die erect and unyielding.

Cf. athlete's resistance (D.1.1) and references listed ad fin.

D.1.2.1 Death in spoliarium or arena: Ep.93.12.

As it is ludicrous that a gladiator should prefer to have his throat cut in the spoliarium rather than the arena, so it is ludicrous that a man should wish to prolong his life beyond its destined end.

D.1.2.2 Planning strategy in arena: Ep.22.1.

The gladiator's practice of plotting his fighting strategy while actually in the arena illustrates Seneca's point that he cannot provide Lucilius with detailed moral advice from a distance: like the gladiator, who plans his next move on the basis of the movements of his opponent, Seneca can only advise Lucilius by actually observing him.

D.1.2.3 Oath: Ep.37.1f.

The gladiator's oath, taken on hiring himself to his fighting-master, is the kind of oath that the proficiens will make when he undertakes to pursue virtue. However, while security is taken from gladiators to endure burning, imprisonment, and death by the sword,[3] even though they be unwilling, the proficiens vows to endure them willingly.[4]

Cf. soldier's oath - Ep.37.1, 95.35, n.1, p.74.

D.1.3 Archery: Ep.71.3.

An image from archery illustrates the point that it is necessary to have an aim in life: before the archer can take aim at a target he must first decide which target he intends to aim for.

Cf. archer's target to artist's subject (C.1.2), traveller's destination J.4.1), sailor's port (P.1.5).

D.1.4 Training: Ep.13.2f, 18.8, 78.16, 80.2ff, Prov.2.3, 6, 4.13, Trang. 3.1, Ben.7.1.4.

Just as the sportsman trains himself to withstand an opponent or the moment of test by developing an immunity to blows, in the case of the wrestler (Ep.13.2f, 78.16, 80.2ff, Prov.2.3, 6) and the gladiator (Ep.18.8), or to the test of speed for the runner (Prov.4.13), so the proficiens will train himself to withstand adversity.

Cf. training of soldier (M.1.3).

D.1.5 Absence of anger: Ira 1.11.2, 2.14.2f.

Just as the wrestler (Ira 2.14.2f) and the gladiator (Ira 1.11.2) outwit their opponents by means of skill, not anger, so the proficiens should abandon anger.

Cf. absence of anger in animal (Ira 2.32.3, 3.25.3 - B.1.1) and animal-trainer (B.2.1), children's guardian (Const.Sap.12.3, Ira 2.10.1 - F.1.2), guide (Ira 1.14.3 - J.4.3), doctor (L.3.1), military commander (Ira 2.10.4 - M.1.5), helmsman (Ira 2.10.8 - P.1.6).

D.2 Ep.73.3, Ira 2.8.2, 3.31.1, 3. Trang.11.4f.
Sportsman = unrighteous.

D.2.1 Gladiatorial combat: Trang.11.4f.

Seneca suggests that the unrighteous, who fear death, will live less easily and die sooner than the virtuous, who do not fear death,

just as a gladiator who tries to delay the moment of death suffers more wounds and dies earlier than the gladiator who does not.[5]

D.2.1.2 Gladiatorial school: Ira 2.8.2.

The image of the members of a gladiatorial school, who are required to fight each other, even though they live as a community, illustrates the strife that exists among the unrighteous.

Cf. bull and bear fight (Ira 3.43.2 - B.1.1).

D.2.2 Racing: Ep.73.3, Ira 3.13.1, 3.

The competitiveness that exists between racers also illustrates the strife among the unrighteous: the racer is angered by the people who have passed him, but finds no consolation in the fact that he has beaten many others. Similarly, the unrighteous are angry with those who have surpassed them in worldly affairs and are not consoled by the fact that their worldly status is superior to that of others.

D.3 Ep.74.7ff, Vit.Beat.28.1.

Spectators = unrighteous.

D.3.1 Spectators: Ep.74.7ff, Vit.Beat.28.1.

At Ep.74.7ff an extended image of the spectators of games squabbling over the dole showered down on them by Fortuna, illustrates the mutual envy and strife that exists among the unrighteous with respect to worldly goods: some spectators have lost the gift that fell to them because they were engaged in some other business at the time, others have dropped theirs because they were trying to pick up more than they could carry. The sensible spectator is the one who, having no greed, runs from the theatre when he sees the dole being brought in: no-one will attack him for he has nothing. With this image Seneca counsels us to withdraw into otium, abandoning concern for worldly goods.[6]

An image at Vit.Beat.28.1 of spectators lounging at the circus or theatre, not knowing that, at home, all is in mourning, illustrates

the unpreparedness of the unrighteous for future adversity.

~~Cf~~. departure from theatre to withdrawal from battle-field (M.1.4), high seas (P.1.4).

Notes

[1]Sometimes more than one adversary - cf. Ep.80.3, Prov.2.3. At Ep.13.3, 80.3, the proficiens' adversary is personified as Fortuna. For Fortuna as a military opponent, cf. M.1.2.1. The wrestler must also endure fighting in the hot sun and dust while drenched with his own blood - Ep.80.3.

[2]At Ep.109.2 an image, probably of the practice of wrestlers, by which they keep each other in trim, illustrates the point that sapientes maintain each other's virtue by example: "Peritos luctandi usus exercet".

[3]"'uri, vinciri, ferroque necari'". Cf. Petronius, 117.

[4]Gummere, on Ep.37.1, n.(a), points out that the oath of the gladiator is also paraphrased at Ep.71.23 where Seneca also compares the sufferings which the gladiator promises to endure to those which the sapiens suffers gladly.

[5]Who will likely obtain the mercy of the spectators, represented by Fortuna.

[6]The fact that the dole is showered down on the crowd from above, which the crowd waits for in suspense, serves as an image for the obsession of the unrighteous with the future (cf. Ep.59.8 - images at Ep.13.8 and 59.8 express this in military terms, and at Ep.74.33 in medical terms) as well as the excuse for a play on words: "illi spectent bona ista pendentia et ipsi magis pendeant."

E: Building

Seneca emphasizes the brevity and insignificance of our life on this earth by comparing it to a temporary period of residence in the 'building' of the body, a building which is, itself, liable to collapse.

E.1 Ep.58.35, 65.21, 66.3, 70.16, 102.24, 120.14, Tranq.11.7. Building = life.

E.1.1 Tenancy: Ep.70.16.

The unrighteous who cling to life until the bitter end, are compared to old tenants who are unwilling to move house, through habit and fondness for it, even "inter iniurias".

Cf. rented lodgings to loan (I.1.1), borrowed stage-props (Q.2.3). Cf. clinging to rocks and briars on river-bank (Ep.4.5 - N.1.2).

E.1.2 Inn: Ep.102.24, 120.14.

At Ep.120.14 Seneca compares the human body to an inn, or perhaps, a friend's house. Man most nearly partakes of the divine spirit "ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat et scit in hoc natum hominem, ut vita defungeretur, nec domum esse hoc corpus sed hospitium, et quidem breve hospitium, quod relinquendum est ubi te gravem esse hospiti videas." Similarly, at Ep.102.24 Seneca describes worldly possessions as "tamquam hospitalis loci sarcinas."

E.1.3 Collapsing building: Ep.58.35.

Seneca recommends that, if a man's life is no longer worth living, he should commit suicide as a man would rush out from a crumbling and tottering building.

Cf. collapsing building to leaking ship - Ep.30.3, Ot.Sap.3.3, n.17, p.217.

E.2 Ep.52.5f.

Erection of building = moral progress, type of ground on which it is built = disposition of proficiens.

E.2.1 Hard/soft foundations: Ep.52.5f.

Seneca compares the moral improvement of various people to the erection of a building on various types of ground: some people make effortless progress, while others are less tractable, just as a building on solid ground is easily erected, while on soft ground much time and effort must be spent to lay the foundations.

Cf. different types of foundations to different types of soil (A.1.1), graft on different types of plant (A.1.2.3). Cf. solid foundations to solid substances (O).

E.3 Ep.115.9.

Veneered and gilded appointments of a building = superficial attractiveness and inner ugliness of vice.

E.3.1 Veneer and gilding: Ep.115.9.

At Ep.115.9 the veneered and gilded appointments of a building serve as an image for the deceptiveness of vice - both of the unrighteous themselves and of the objects of their desire. Just as a veneer of gold-leaf is attractive on the outside, but is only a thin covering over the ugliness and cheapness of wood, so the prosperity of the unrighteous is merely "bratteata felicitas". Under "ista tenui membrana dignitatis" there is much that is bad.

Cf. fallacious appearance of illness (L.1.5), of theatrical costume and mask (Q.1.1).

F: Children

Children serve as images for various aspects of the unrighteous: their fearfulness, need of correction, and attraction towards worldly goods. In such imagery, the child's guardian or teacher represents the sapiens.

F.1 Ep.24.13, 94.51, 110.6, 115.8f, Const.Sap.5.2, 12.1ff, Ira 2.10.1, 11.6.
Children = unrighteous.

F.1.1 Fearfulness: Ep.24.13, Const.Sap.5.2, Ira 2.11.6.

F.1.1.1 Fear of the dark: Ep.110.6, Const.Sap.5.2, Ira 2.11.6.

The foolish fear of the unrighteous is compared to children's fear of the dark.

F.1.1.2 Fear of masks: Ep.24.13, Const.Sap.5.2.

Images of children's fear of masked characters illustrate the point that the fear of the unrighteous is groundless:[1] the mere ugliness of the mask frightens them (Const.Sap.5.2) even though their own friends may be behind the masks (Ep.24.13). In the same way, the unrighteous would not find the object of their fear formidable if they penetrated beyond its mere appearance.

Cf. fearfulness of animals (B.1.2), of people atop eminence (Ep.8.4, 94.73, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4 - J.2.1), of soldier (M.2.1), of sailor (Cons.Polyb.9.6 - P.2.1).

F.1.2 Correction: Ep.94.51, Ira 2.10.1.

Children stand in need of correction and training and, as such, they serve as images for the unrighteous in relation to the sapiens who

endeavours to correct their moral flaws. At Ira 2.10.1, urging patience towards the errors of the unrighteous, Seneca compares them to children who omit to carry out their duties because they are watching the games and pranks of their playmates. At Ep.94.51 Seneca compares the proficiens in his need for moral guidance to boys who are learning to write: their hand is first guided by the teacher's hand and then they imitate the letters he has written for them.

Cf. teacher to 'corrective' farmer (A.1.2.1, A.1.2.2), traveller's guide (J.4.3), doctor (L.3). helmsman (P.1), ruler - Ep.11.10. Cf. patience of teacher to that of animal (Ira 2.32.3, 3.25.3 - B.1.1) and animal-trainer (B.2.1), of wrestler and gladiator (D.1.5), guide (Ira 1.14.3 - J.4.3), doctor (L.3.1), military commander (Ira 2.10.4 - M.1.5), helmsman (Ira 2.10.8 - P.1.6).

F.1.3 Toys: Ep.115.8f, Const.Sap.12.1ff.

The pleasure of children in gaudy toys illustrates the attraction of the unrighteous towards the flashiness of worldly goods. Just as children take pleasure in a cheap necklace or pebbles picked up on the beach, so the unrighteous are enchanted by a shiny veneer of veined marble or gilding.[2]

Notes

[1]For a similar image illustrating a different point, cf. Ira 2.11.

2.

[2]Cf. E:3.1.

G: Domination/subjection and freedom

A series of images of domination and subjection - master and slave, warder and prisoner, ruler and subject - illustrates the position of powerlessness in which the unrighteous find themselves with respect to their worldly circumstances, and, indeed, their own emotions. The virtuous, by contrast, are drawn with images of freedom.

G.1 Ep.8.7, 17.6f, 26.10, 37.4, 80.4f, 90.19, 114.23ff, Ira 3. 16.1, Vit.Beat.15.7, 16.3, Tranq.10.1, 3f.
Subjected = unrighteous, free = virtuous.

G.1.1 Fetters: Ep.26.10, Vit.Beat.15.7, 16.3, Tranq.10.1, 3f.

An image of a shackled prisoner several times illustrates the human condition. We are all chained to Fortuna, Seneca tells us at Tranq.10.3. However, "aliorum aurea catena est, laxa, aliorum arta et sordida" - the unrighteous are bound tightly to their warder,[1] Fortuna, by their participation in her affairs, and desire for her goods: the virtuous, on the other hand, are more loosely bound (cf. Vit.Beat.16.3) because they are able to nullify the control exerted over them by their external circumstances, within the limits only of the human condition.[2] The virtuous are able to loosen the chain which binds them, whether it be the chain of Fortuna (Vit.Beat.16.3, Tranq.10.3), or the love of life (Ep.26.10). "Sapientia ... sola libertas est." (Ep.37.4).

The unrighteous are also controlled by their emotions. As the image at Ep.26.10 shows, the unrighteous' fear of death fetters them like a prisoner's chain. This chain is loosened by the virtuous by means of a rejection of the fear of death.[3]

Cf. fetters to room confining craftsmen (C.1.3), prison (K.1.1).

G.1.2 Reversed relationship of master/king and slave/subject: Ep.37.4, 90.19, 114.23ff.

At Ep.37.4 the emotions in general are compared to cruel masters, to which vice, personified in this instance as Stultitia, is "servile". These masters, it is said, rule Stultitia sometimes one at a time and sometimes all together.

The image of master and slave is particularly suited to illustrating the way in which the body (i.e. the emotion of pleasure) controls the mind of the unrighteous. While, in the virtuous, the mind controls the body - i.e. the pleasures are controlled by reason - in the unrighteous the situation is reversed. Thus at Ep.90.19, speaking of present-day moral depravity, Seneca says "novissime [scil. luxuria] animum corpori addixit et illius deservire libidini iussit".

He goes on to say that all the arts of society are now "carrying out the body's business" ("corpori negotium gerunt"), making things ready for the body as though for a master, although it was once a slave.[4]

Cf. power of emotions over reason to fierce animals over trainer (B.1.6, B.1.6.1), gravity over body (J.1.1, J.2.1), illness over body (L.1.4), river's current over body (N.1.2.1), turbulent sea over ship (P.2.1), wind over sea (Brev.Vit.2.3 - P.2.1).

G.1.2.1 Transformation of king into tyrant: Ep.114.23ff.

At Ep.114.23ff an image of monarch and subject illustrates the relationship between the mind and the body. Rather than depict the subjection of the unrighteous to pleasure as a simple reversal of the proper domination of the body by the mind, Seneca depicts it here in more complex terms: the mind, in the virtuous, is like a good king, and, like a good king, keeps the body, its subjects, in obedience; if, however, the mind becomes impassioned, then it is transformed into a tyrant,[5] and becomes subject to the influence of the emotions as to unruly subjects. They take pleasure at first in the indulgence which the mind affords them, even though it will be for their ultimate harm, just as a tyrant's subjects are initially pleased by the largesse he affords them:[6]

> Rex noster est animus; hoc incolumi cetera manent in officio, parent obtemperant: cum ille paulum vacillavit, simul dubitant. Cum vero cessit voluptati, artes quoque eius actusque marcent et omnis ex languido fluidoque conatus est.
>
> Quoniam hac similitudine usus sum, perseverabo. Animus noster modo rex est, modo tyrannus: rex cum honesta intuetur, salutem commissi sibi corporis curat et illi nihil imperat turpe, nihil sordidum; ubi vero inpotens, cupidus, delicatus est, transit in nomen detestabile ac dirum et fit tyrannus. Tunc illum excipiunt adfectus inpotentes et instant, qui initio quidem gaudent, ut solet populus largitione nocitura frustra plenus et quae non potest haurire contrectat.

G.1.3 Willing submission: Ep.8.7, 26.10, 37.4, Ira 3.16.1,[7] Vit.Beat.15.7, Tranq.10.1, 3f.

Paradoxically, voluntary submission of oneself constitutes true freedom. Thus, at Ep.8.7, quoting Epicurus,[8] Seneca states: "'philosophiae servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera libertas'". Similarly, a yoke (Ira 3.16.1), or fetters (Tranq.10.1) are more tolerable to the wearer when he does not resist them.

Notes

[1]For the idea of being chained to one's warder, cf. Ep.5.7: "Quemadmodum eadem catena et custodiam et militem copulat, sic ista quae tam dissimilia sunt pariter incedunt."

[2]True liberation only comes with death - e.g. Ep.79.12, 102.22, Cons.Marc.24.5, Cons.Helv.11.6f - which is described as a release from the prison of the body: "Haec quae uides circumiecta nobis, ossa neruos et obductam cutem uultumque et ministras manus et cetera quibus inuoluti sumus, uincula animorum tenebraeque sunt" (Cons.Marc.24.5).

[3]"Una est catena quae nos alligatos tenet, amor vitae, qui ut non est abiciendus, ita minuendus est ... " (Ep.26.10). It is not clear to me exactly what the figurative sense of "minuendus" is here, but it is probably that of loosening the chain - cf. Vit.Beat.16.3 and Tranq.10.3 where Seneca describes some chains as looser than others.

[4]Cf. Ep.39.6 where men are described as serving their pleasures, Ben.4.2.1: "In hac parte nobis pugna est cum Epicureis ... apud quos virtus voluptatum ministra est, illis paret, illis deservit, illas supra se videt.", and Ep.92.33: "Nemo liber est qui corpori servit; nam ut alios dominos quos nimia pro illo sollicitudo invenit transeas, ipsius morosum imperium delicatumque est.". Cf. also Ira 1.7.3 where an image of the "adfectus" gaining mastery over the "ratio" is mixed with an image of controlling a horse - cf. B.1.6.1 and n.3, p.18.

[5]For the idea that the emotions make a bad ruler, cf. Ep.37.4 ("saevissimis", "graves") and Ep.92.33 ("morosum", "delicatum").

[6]I retain here the manuscript reading of "gaudent" (along with the alternative "contrectat") rather than adopt Lipsius' emendation of "gaudet" (along with Reynolds), and read "adfectus" as subject of "gaudent": "Then the unruly emotions take him over and harass him - they who, certainly in the beginning, are joyful, as a people usually is, vainly full of the largesse destined to harm it ... " It seems to me that this admittedly awkward sense is preferable to making the tyrant subject of "gaudet" with Lipsius, as the latter does violence to the distinction between body as king's (and later, tyrant's) subjects, and the mind as king (and later, tyrant) established a few lines above, suggesting an analogy between the mind and the subjects ("populus").

[7]For this image as an animal-image, cf. B.1.1.

[8]H. Usener, Epicurea, (Leipzig, 1887; reprint ed., Studia philologica 3; Rome: "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1963), fragment 199, (hereafter cited as Usener).

H: Eating and drinking

In Seneca's imagery of thirst and hunger, food and drink, as objects of desire, represent the worldly goods desired by the unrighteous. The image of digestion, as in our own language, is associated with the absorption of ideas.

H.1 Ep.15.11, 58.32, Cons.Helv.11.3.
Thirst = avarice.

H.1.1 Unquenchable thirst: Ep.15.11, 58.32, Cons.Helv.11.3.

The unrighteous' desire for worldly goods is compared to a thirst. Once obtained, however, these goods fail to satisfy them, being like a drink which arouses the thirst of the drinker (Ep.15.11),[1] with a thirst which is like that of a disease (Cons.Helv.11.3).[2] Alcohol is, of course, a drink which does not quench but arouses thirst, and thus the unrighteous' desire for life and unwillingness to die is compared to the thirst of the alcoholic, who, in his immoderate addiction to wine, drinks the jar dry, drinking even the dregs (Ep.58.32).[3]

Cf. begging dog (B.1.3), insatiable hunger (H.3.1). Cf. thirst arising from drink to itching arising from scratching sores (L.1.7.1).

H.2 Ep.1.5, 58.32, 108.26.
Drink = life, dregs = end and worst part of life.

H.2.1 Dregs: Ep.1.5, 58.32, 108.26.

Seneca urges that there be no delay in progress towards virtue with the adage: "Nam ut uisum est maioribus nostris, 'sera parsimonia in fundo est'; non enim tantum minimum in imo sed pessimum remanet." (Ep.1.5). Again at Ep.108.26 he urges haste in the matter of moral progress with this similar adage:

> Quemadmodum ex amphora primum quod est sincerissimum effluit, gravissimum quodque turbidumque subsidit, sic in aetate nostra quod est optimum in primo est. Id exhauriri [in] aliis potius patimur, ut nobis faecem reservemus?[4]

H.3 Ep.72.8, Prov.4.10.

Hunger = avarice.

H.3.1 Insatiable hunger: Ep.72.8, Prov.4.10.

At Ep.72.8 the image of a dog with wide-open jaws, whose craving for food is never satisfied, illustrates the unrighteous desire for 'scraps' from Fortuna.[5] At Prov.4.10 the consequence of excessive consumption of Fortuna's 'food' is graphically depicted: "lenior ieiunio mors est, cruditate dissiliunt" - "Death from starvation comes very gently, but from gorging men explode."[6]

Cf. unquenchable thirst (H.1.1) and images listed ad fin.

H.4 Ep.2.3f, 84.6f.

Digestion/assimilation of food = full comprehension of philosophy.[7]

H.4.1 Digestion/assimilation: Ep.2.3f, 84.6f.

Images of the digestion of food illustrate the absorption of intellectual ideas. At Ep.2.3f the assimilation of food by the body represents the profit which is to be obtained from a thorough absorption of philosophy. At Ep.84.6f it represents the desired process by which the proficiens will make what he reads his 'own'. The image also represents the unity for which the proficiens strives: as the body transforms the food it ingests into one substance, so the mind should absorb and transmute into a unified whole the ideas it absorbs. Unity is again advocated with an image of eating at Ep.2.4 where Seneca continues the digestion-image of 2.3: an excessive variety of books, like an excessive variety of dishes, is evidence of a fussy taste, and does not nourish but cloys.

Cf. digestion/assimilation to absorption of dye - Ep.71.31. Cf. too many dishes to too many remedies (L.2.2).

Notes

[1]No doubt this is the point of the words that Seneca puts into Epicurus' mouth at Ep.21.10, following quotation from his exhortation to reduce the desires: "'Non inritant' ... 'hi hortuli famem sed extinguunt, nec maiorem ipsis potionibus sitim faciunt, sed naturali et gratuito remedio sedant.'" Epicurean philosophy provides its devotee with satisfaction - food that quenches the appetite and drink that slakes the thirst -unlike worldly goods which arouse the appetite they feed.

[2]For the medical context of this image, cf. L.1.7.1.

[3]Seneca continues, however: "De hoc tamen quaeramus, pars summa vitae utrum faex sit an liquidissimum ac purissimum quiddam, si modo mens sine iniuria est et integri sensus animum iuvant nec defectum et praemortuum corpus est." (Ep.58.33).

[4]However, cf. Ep.58.33, n.3. Gummere on Ep.81.22 points out a possible image of dregs similar to this one at Ep.81.22, illustrating the fact that evil-doing is most harmful to itself: "Minimum ex nequitia levissimumque ad alios redundat: quod pessimum ex illa est et, ut ita dicam, spississimum, domi remanet et premit habentem."

[5]For discussion of this image as an animal-image, cf. B.1.3.

[6]Translation of J.W. Basore, Seneca: moral essays, 3 vols., The Loeb classical library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928-1935).

[7]At Ben.5.12.6, however, the digestion of food in the diseased stomach illustrates the capacity of the "animus scaevus" to turn everything into a source of pain.

I: Finance

The majority of financial images concerned with moral endeavour illustrate Seneca's exhortations to the *proficiens* to be sparing with time.

I.1 *Ep.*1.2ff, 21.11, 36.5, 42.7f, 101.8, 119.1f, *Cons.Marc.*10.1f, *Brev.Vit.*1.4, 8.1ff, *Cons.Polyb.*10.4f.
Money = span of life or worldly possessions.

I.1.1 *Loan*: *Ep.*1.2ff, 36.5, 101.8, *Cons.Marc.*10.1f,[1] *Cons.Polyb.*10.4f.

Often Seneca describes time as a 'loan' to mortals. At *Ep.*1.3 time is described as a loan which it is impossible to repay, so great is its value. Two other uses of the image conceive of payment as the good use to which time may be put: thus the *proficiens* is urged to make an immediate start on moral endeavour with the image of settling an account - it is less disgraceful to compound with a creditor than it is with one's future, for to repay his debts the businessman must have a prosperous voyage, the farmer a successful crop, but the *proficiens* can repay his debt simply with goodwill (*Ep.*36.5). Similarly, at *Ep.*101.8 Seneca urges us to perfect our lives: "Nihil differamus; cotidie cum vita paria faciamus". At *Cons.Polyb.*10.4 the life of Polybius' brother is compared to a loan from his creditor, *Natura*.[2] The death of his brother is then, as it were, a claim by *Natura* of the money she is owed. Polybius cannot reasonably grudge his brother's death, any more than a debtor can grudge repayment of a loan which was "interest-free" ("usum gratuitum" - *Cons.Polyb.*10.5).

Cf. loan to rented lodgings (E.1.1), stage properties (Q.2.2).

I.1.2 *Careful use of money*: *Ep.*42.8, *Brev.Vit.*1.4, 8.3.

The majority of Seneca's financial images revolve around an

implied, if not stated, contrast between a wasteful and sparing use of money. Because of their underestimation of the value of time the unrighteous do not consider its 'price' before expending it.[3] Time, which will fail without warning, must be carefully saved (Brev.Vit.8.3). Seneca therefore recommends that we should approach those ventures which are costly in time as we should approach a peddler with goods for sale (Ep.42.8). We have already seen (I.1.1) that the image of a prompt repayment of a loan and the balancing of an account illustrates a good use of time. At Brev.Vit.1.4 Seneca also uses an image of investment to describe the improvement in moral value which may be effected with a good use of time: as wealth in the hands of a good trustee increases with use, so a life-time, if well used, should improve in value.

Notes

[1]For discussion of this image as a theatrical image, cf. Q.2.2.

[2]*Natura* is also man's creditor at *Ep.*1.3.

[3]Cf. Seneca's description of his own only moderately good use of time:

> "Fatebor ingenue: quod apud luxuriosum sed diligentem evenit, ratio mihi constat inpensae. Non possum dicere nihil perdere, sed quid perdam et quare et quemadmodum dicam; causas paupertatis meae reddam." (*Ep.*1.4).

J: Land and land travel

Senecan images of land and travel by land illustrate aspects of both virtue and vice. The type of road traversed and the manner in which this is done may both be significant.

J.1 Ep.71.28, 35, 75.10, 13, 79.8, 84.13, 92.23, 111.4, Prov.5.10, Const.Sap.1.1f, Vit.Beat.8.5f, 15.5, Ben.4.22.3.
Uphill travel = progress towards virtue.

J.1.1 Uphill travel: Ep.71.28, 35, 75.10, 13, 79.8, 84.13, 92.23, 111.4, Prov.5.10, Const.Sap.1.1f, Vit.Beat.8.5f, 15.5, Ben.4.22.3.

A steep uphill journey commonly illustrates the nature of progress towards virtue. The image conveys the difficulty, effort, and danger with which virtue is attained, and, as such, contrasts with the image of vice as a downhill path (J.2).[1] The road is difficult of access, not only because it is steep, but because it is also rocky (Ep.84.13, Const.Sap.1.2, Ben.4.22.3[2]), illustrating the fact that virtue must be obtained sometimes at the price of danger. However, the depiction of the road as steep only at first, levelling out in its final stages (Const.Sap.1.2),[3] illustrates the notion that progress towards virtue is arduous only in the initial stages.

J.1.2 Halfway uphill: Ep.71.28, 35, 75.10, 13, 92.23, Vit.Beat.8.5f.

The position of the proficiens, who is on the way to virtue, but has not yet attained it, is illustrated by the image of the traveller, who has climbed part of the way towards the summit of a hill, but is not yet there. Because the road is steep and slippery there is a tendency for the traveller to slip backwards and downwards[4] during the ascent - an image which illustrates the lapses which the proficiens will experience during his endeavour to attain virtue.

Cf. incomplete journey to germination of plant (A.1), training of athlete (D.1.4), convalescence (L.2), sailor approaching dry land (Ep.72.10 and P.1.5). Cf. slipping downhill to medical relapse (L.2.1).

J.1.3 Summit: Ep.79.8, 84.13, 92.23, 111.3f, Const.Sap.1.1f, Vit.Beat.8.5f, 15.5.

The traveller at the summit of an uphill road often illustrates virtue - the absolute nature of his situation illustrates the absolute nature of virtue: as a traveller cannot climb higher than the summit of a mountain (Ep.79.8)[5] so virtue cannot be improved. Conversely, virtue cannot 'fall' from its position of eminence into anything 'below' virtue (Ep.92.23, Vit.Beat.8.5f).[6] The fact that the traveller who has reached the summit of a mountain is situated in a position of elevation over other people provides an image both for the security and the superiority of the sapiens. His security is constituted by the fact that he is 'out of reach' of aggression, illustrating the sapiens' immunity from the effects of external circumstances (Ep.84.13, 111.4, Const.Sap.1.1, Vit.Beat.15.5).[7] To the person standing on the top of a mountain everything looks small. Similarly, by attaining virtue, the sapiens regards what appear - 'on the ground' - to be the important affairs of men, as unimportant; he has 'risen above them' (Ep.84.13).[8]

Cf. absolute summit with sun's light (K.2.3.2), complete health (Ep.72.6 - L.2.1), straight line (Ep.71.20), levelness (Ep.66.28). Cf. elevation /security of summit to fortifications (M.1.2.2).

J.1.3.1 Deceptive height: Ep.111.3, Const.Sap.1.2.

The deceptive height of a mountain, appearing lower than it really is, when seen from a distance, provides an image at Ep.111.3 of the greatness of the sapiens, which appears more eminent the closer one examines it. At Const.Sap.1.2, on the other hand, the opposite theory - that heights viewed from a distance appear larger than they really are - illustrates the point that virtue appears more difficult to attain to the person who has not yet embarked on the endeavour, than it does to

the person who has.[9]

J.2 Ep.8.4, 72.9, 94.73, 97.10, 116.6, 123.14, Ira 1.7.4, Cons. Marc.9.2, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4.
Downhill travel = lapse into sin.

J.2.1 Downhill travel: Ep.8.4, 72.9, 94.73, 97.10, 116.6, 123.14, Ira 1. 7.4, Cons.Marc.9.2, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4.

In contrast to the images of the uphill journey and its summit, which often illustrate aspects of the attainment and nature of virtue, images of downhill movement illustrate aspects of vice: that it is easy to attain a state of vice, that the unrighteous live in a state of inconstantia, and that they are unable to control themselves.

The ease with which vice is attained is illustrated, of course, by the ease with which one may descend a hill, in contrast with the effort required to ascend it: "In voluptates descenditur, in aspera et dura subeundum est" (Ep.123.14).[10] Neither companion nor guide is needed to reach the bottom of a hill - gravity draws one down of its own accord. Just so, vice is attained without need of guide or associate, with the minimum of effort (Ep.79.10).

Such an image of uncontrollable movement also illustrates the changeable nature of the circumstances in which the unrighteous live and their powerlessness over themselves. This insecurity causes the unright-eous to be fearful of the future, and this fear is incorporated into the images which depict the prosperous atop an eminence, fearful that they may fall. Such images (Ep.8.4, 94.73, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4) illustrate a completely opposing notion, then, to that represented by the image of the sapiens on the summit of a mountain (J.1.2).

The unrighteous are not only subject to the power of external circumstances: the emotions also exert an influence on the unrighteous which they cannot resist, and these are therefore also depicted with an image of uncontrollable movement downhill (Ira 1.7.4).[11]

Cf. uncontrollable effect of gravity to uncontrollable wild animal

(B.1.6), uncontrollable effect of sickness (L.1.4.1), rushing river (N.1.2), turbulent sea (P.2.1). Cf. fearfulness to that of animals (B.1.2), children (F.1.1), soldier (M.2.1), sailor (Cons.Polyb.9.6 - P.2.1).

J.3 Ep.33.11, 66.44; Ira 2.13.1f.
Level road = attainment of virtue in fortunate circumstances.

J.3.1 Level road: Ep.33.11, 66.44, Ira 2.13.1f.

Although progress towards virtue is often represented by Seneca as the ascent of a mountain, the path to virtue is sometimes described as level: such an image depicts virtue attained amidst fortunate circumstances, in contrast with virtue attained in adversity which is depicted as travel along a steep road (cf. J.1). Hence at Ep.33.11 Seneca announces his intention to depart from the philosophical investigations of his predecessors, just as, if he were a traveller, he would leave the beaten track to travel a nearer and leveller road if he were able to find one.

Cf. level road to creating statues from expensive materials (C.1.1.1), enduring siege rather than storming stronghold (Ep.66.13 - M.1.1 and n.4 p.74)

J.4 Ep.8.3, 16.9, 20.2, 23.7, 37.4, 45.1, 94.54, Ira 1.14.3, Vit.Beat.1.1ff.
Traveller on right/straight road = virtuous, traveller on wrong/crooked road = unrighteous.

J.4.1 Right/straight road: Ep.8.3, 16.9, 20.2, 23.7, 37.4, 45.1, 94.54, Vit.Beat.1.1ff.

Apart from the images of up- and downhill roads (J.1, J.2), there is also a number of images which illustrate aspects of virtue and vice by drawing a contrast between those who travel the right (or straight)[12] path and those who wander on a wrong (or crooked) path, in ignorance of

the path to virtue.

The traveller of the right and straight road towards a destination depicts virtue because he is purposeful and consistent, with a single and defined goal in view. The image of a journey towards a particular destination on a particular road serves to illustrate the limited nature of virtue (Ep.16.9) and the way in which the virtuous organize their lives around a single goal.[13] Hence Seneca advises Gallio to decide on a destination for his journey and to find himself a guide (Vit.Beat.1.1f).

Cf. straight trees (A.1.2.2), straight rising flame (K.2.4.1), straight course at sea (P.1.1), straight line (Ep.71.20).

J.4.2 Wandering on wrong/crooked road: Ep.8.3, 16.9, 20.2, 23.7, 37.4, 45.1, 94.54, Vit.Beat.1.1f..

Conversely, the travelling of those who are simply wandering is unlimited and without destination (Ep.16.9) and such travellers therefore serve as images for the unlimited and aimless nature of vice. The one road which the purposeful traveller takes towards his destination[14] illustrates the unity of virtue, both at any one moment and throughout time (i.e. virtue is both homogeneous and constant), and the straightness of his path reinforces this notion of unity. The image of a journey towards a particular destination is an even clearer illustration of the unity of virtue when the traveller is said to walk with a steady pace. Hence at Ep.37.4 Seneca advises Lucilius: "Una ad hanc (scil. sapientiam) fert via, et quidem recta; non aberrabis; vade certo gradu." Similarly, at Ep.23.7, the "verum bonum" (23.6) is said to be derived (in part) "ex placido vitae et continuo tenore unam prementis viam."

Cf. crooked trees (A.1.2.2), wandering ants (B.1.4), ship tossed off course (P.2.1).

J.4.3 Guide: Ep.8.3, 94.54, Ira 1.14.3, Vit.Beat.1.2.

The image of a guide who points out the right path to those who

are lost and wandering illustrates the sapiens in his capacity as moral instructor of the unrighteous. Thus at Vit.Beat.1.2 Seneca recommends Gallio not only to decide on a destination but also to find himself a guide to the road. Similarly, at Ep.8.3, speaking of his capacity as a moral instructor, as author of the Epistulae morales, Seneca characterizes himself as a guide, pointing out the right path - which he, himself, has only discovered after years of wandering - to others.[15] At Ep.94.54 however, Seneca describes parents and slaves as bad guides, who drag the traveller from the straight into crooked paths, illustrating his view that these people can cause their children or masters to become unrighteous.

Cf. guide to 'corrective' farmer (A.1.2.1, A.1.2.2), teacher (F.1.2), doctor (L.3), helmsman (P.1), ruler - Ep.11.10.

J.5 Ira 3.6.4, 3.34.3, Vit.Beat.1.2ff, Ot.Sap.1.3.
Beaten track = moral course of crowd.

J.5.1 The beaten track: Ira 3.6.4, 3.34.3, Vit.Beat.1.2ff, Ot.Sap.1.3.

The beaten track represents the moral course of the 'crowd' (Vit.Beat.1.2, Ot.Sap.1.3) and thus represents the course of the unrighteous. While the beaten track of 'real life' normally indicates the 'right' road, the beaten moral track is to be avoided, as are the directions of those dwelling close by (Vit.Beat.1.2). The unrighteous, however, unquestioningly follow in the footsteps of those who have gone before them (Vit.Beat.1.3, Ot.Sap.1.3), even though there are no returning footsteps to be seen (Ot.Sap.1.3).[16] As a result of their imitation of one another, the members of the crowd all take the same course of action, depicted by Seneca as a vast crowd jostling and colliding together on the same road (Ira 3.6.4, 3.34.3, Vit.Beat.1.3f)[17] holding each other back rather than moving forwards (Ira 3.6.4).[18]

Cf. jostling crowd to sheep (B.1.5), racers (D.2.2), colliding ships (Cons.Polyb.9.6 - P.2.1).

J.6 Ep.123.14, Vit.Beat.25.6ff.

Effort and control in climbing or descending hill = moral effort and self-control.

J.6.1 Leaning forward and backwards: Ep.123.14, Vit.Beat.25.6f.

The image of a traveller leaning forward on the ascent of a hill and backward on descending it at Ep.123.14 illustrates a virtuous encountering of adversity and retreat from that which is attractive (represented by gravity) but unrighteous. Thus the traveller who leans forward when descending a hill but backwards when ascending it is complying with vice's downward tendency ("retro abducere, cum vitio ... consentire est" - Ep.123.14).[19] Similarly, at Vit.Beat.25.6f virtue is represented by the control a traveller exercises over his movement downhill and by the effort he exerts to go uphill.

J.7 Ep.17.7, 25.4, 77.3.

Viaticum or luggage = worldly or spiritual wealth.

J.7.1 Viaticum and luggage: Ep.17.7, 25.4, 77.3.

The traveller's viaticum and luggage represent man's worldly goods. The proficiens, the traveller to virtue, can arrive there without money for the journey (Ep.17.7)[20] and he should lighten his luggage (Ep.25.4), for worldly goods are irrelevant to the attainment of virtue.[21]

Cf. athlete's oil (D.1.1.1), soldier's weapons (M.4.1), cargo (P.3.1).

J.8 Ep.68.13, 77.4, Brev.Vit.9.5.

Journey = span of life.

J.8.1 Surprise at reaching destination: Brev.Vit.9.5.

At Brev.Vit.9.5 an image of a traveller who, absorbed by conversation, reading, or thought, finds himself unexpectedly at the end of a journey, illustrates the unpreparedness of the unrighteous for future adversity, especially death. However, unlike a normal journey, the

journey of life will be complete whenever it finishes, as long as it has been virtuous. For it is the quality, not quantity of life which is important; "Iter inperfectum erit si in media parte aut citra petitum locum steteris: vita non est inperfecta si honesta est; ubicumque desines, si bene desines, tota est." (Ep.77.4).

Cf. length of journey to length of gladiator's life (D.1.2.1), duration of play (Q.2.1).

J.8.2 Hurrying traveller: Ep.68.13.

At Ep.68.13 the image of a traveller who, having set out late on a journey, plies the spur to make up for lost time, depicts the proficiens who, having discovered his need for moral repair, must set about the task with the utmost urgency.

Cf. urgency to that of army fleeing enemy (Ep.32.3, Cons.Marc.10.4 - M.1.4), drinking the first wine (H.2.1), drinking from torrent that is about to dry up (Brev.Vit.9.2 - N.1.1).

Notes

[1]However, cf. Ep.31.4: effort in itself is not a good, and virtue can be attained in easy as well as difficult circumstances, cf. J.3.1. The steep road to virtue is explicitly representative of the danger incurred in attaining virtue at Prov.5.10: "Vide quam alte escendere debeat uirtus: scies illi non per secura uadendum ... Humilis et inertis est tuta sectari; per alta uirtus it." However, cf. description of road to virtue at Ep.31.9: "tutum iter est, iucundum est, ad quod natura te instruxit."

[2]The road at Ben.4.22.3 is rendered more difficult and dangerous by the presence of snakes.

[3]The same idea is suggested at Ep.84.13 and Seneca probably saw the same idea in Ovid's words - "Ardua prima uia est ... " (Met.2.63) at Prov.5.10 - which he interprets allegorically as a description of the path to virtue.

[4]Such imagery is part of the general association of downward movement with vice discussed in J.2. Among such images of slipping back-wards and downwards during moral progress we should also place Serenus' statement at Tranq.1.15: "Cui ne paulatim defluam uereor, aut quod est sollicitius, ne semper casuro similis pendeam et plus fortasse sit quam quod ipse peruideo".

In the opinion of some, says Seneca (Ep.75.10) the 'first class' of proficientes (for classes cf. Ep.71.34f, 72.9f, 75.8ff) are still standing on slippery ground ("in lubrico stare - Ep.75.10), although in the opinion of Seneca they are not ("iam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus" - Ep.75.9).

[5]However, one man can arrive at the summit of the mountain more quickly than another: "nemo ab altero potest vinci nisi dum ascenditur" -Ep.79.8. The image illustrates the notion that proficientes attain virtue with varying degrees of difficulty - cf. n.1 and J.3.1.

[6]The idea is, perhaps, that the top of a mountain is flat and that the traveller at the summit of a mountain is therefore unable to fall. However, at Ep.92.23 Seneca explains why virtue cannot fall with a purely logical argument: "Si non potest, ut dicitis, sapiens ex beato in miserum decidere, non potest in non beatum. Quare enim qui labi coepit alicubi subsistat? quae res illum non patitur ad imum devolvi retinet in summo."

[7]Cf. Vit.Beat.15.5: "Illo ergo summum bonum escendat unde nulla ui detrahitur". The idea here is that no aggressive force will dislodge the sapiens from his position of eminence - for a discussion of the.

image in its military context cf. M.1.2.2. Cf. also Ep.79.10 where the sapiens is represented by the mountain itself (suggested by Mount Aetna) which cannot be lowered (or raised). Cf. O.1.1.

[8]Cf. Ep.87.16: "virtus extollit hominem et super cara mortalibus conlocat" and Ep.111.4: "supra humana est".

[9]The same theory - that heights viewed from a distance appear larger than they really are - illustrates a different point at Ep.118.6 - namely that the unrighteous find the objects of their desire disappoint -ing once they have attained them.

[10]Cf. Ira 2.1.1: "facilis ... in procliui uitiorum decursus est".

[11]Cf. also Ep.116.6 where Seneca compares the admission of emotions to one's soul to standing on slippery ground: "Quod Panaetius de amore quaerenti respondit, hoc ego de omnibus adfectibus dico: quantum possumus nos a lubrico recedamus; in sicco quoque parum fortiter stamus."

[12]It is not always possible to tell whether 'rectus' means 'right' or 'straight', unless it is clarified in some way (e.g. at Ep.94.54 by the contrast of "recta" with "pravum"). However, the distinction is unimportant as the 'right' path is also a straight one by comparison with the 'wrong' one.

[13]While the destination represents the goal of virtue in these images Seneca emphasizes elsewhere (Ep.89.8) that, whereas the roads to a city are outside that city, the road to virtue is, itself, part of virtue.

[14]Seneca emphasizes that only one road is to be travelled at Ep. 37.4 and 45.1.

[15]Cf. Ep.48.8 where Seneca seems to describe Lucilius as a guide who must show a light to those who are wandering by night. For the association of virtue with light, vice with darkness, cf. K.1, K.2.

[16]i.e. everybody has gone to his destruction and therefore does not return.

[17]At Ira 3.34.3 Seneca emphasizes that the road is a narrow one, perhaps to represent the 'narrowness' of the crowd's desires ("idem uelle"). Just as a narrow road drives travellers to blows, so sharing of the same desires brings the unrighteous into a state of strife.

[18]The unrighteous are also depicted as travellers moving back-wards and away from their destination at Ep.44.7, 110.7 and Vit.Beat.1.1. For the association of backward movement with vice, cf. N.2.1.

[19]In such an image virtue or vice are represented by the way in which the traveller throws his weight, rather than by the direction in

which he is travelling (uphill or downhill - J.1 or J.2). Nevertheless, the association of vice with downhill movement remains.

[20]Cf. Ep.77.3: "quantulumcumque haberem, tamen plus iam mihi superesset viatici quam viae."

[21]At Ep.14.9 Seneca urges us to renounce worldly goods on the grounds that he who is wealthy excites the envy of the crowd, just as a traveller laden with wealth is more likely to be held up by a highwayman than a poor traveller.

K: Light and sight, darkness and blindness

A basic antithesis is present in this group of images between imagery of light (and fire) and sight, representing the sapiens' perception and provision of truth, and imagery of darkness and blindness, representing the unrighteous' ignorance of the truth.

K.1 Ep.48.8, 50.3, 64.8, 65.17, 79.11f, 85.5, 94.5, 18ff, 110.7, 115.6f, Ira 2.20.1, Cons.Marc.24.5, Vit.Beat.7.3.
Darkness and blindness = state of unrighteousness.

K.1.1 Dark prison: Ep.65.17, 79.11f, Cons.Marc.24.5.

The unrighteous are often depicted as living in darkness. Darkness is associated with the human race in general, contrasting with the light of Heaven (Ep.79.11f, Cons.Marc.24.5). The body is, as it were, a dark prison for the soul, from which complete release will only be obtained at the moment of death.[1]

Cf. dark room (C.1.3), fetters (G.1.1).

K.1.2 Journey in darkness/blindness: Ep.48.8, 50.3, 110.7, Ira 2.20.1.

The unrighteous are described as blundering blindly through darkness, an image which illustrates both their ignorance of truth and their lack of a goal.

Cf. wandering on wrong/crooked road (J.4.2).

K.1.3 Blindness: Ep.50.3, 64.8, 85.5, 88.45, 94.5, 18ff, 115.6f.

The unrighteous are described as blind or infected with an eye-disease, which, though it may be cured if treated in time, will completely obscure the vision if unattended (Ep.85.5), just as vice may be corrected if it receives attention early, but becomes more difficult to

correct the longer it is left.

Cf. illness (L.1).

K.2 Ep.27.3, 39.2f, 41.5, 48.8, 65.17, 66.20, 46, 88.45, 90.34, 92.5, 17f, 94.29, 115.6f, 120.13, Cons.Marc.23:4, Ben.4.17.4, 22.2. Light(fire)/sight = virtuous.[2]

K.2.1 Extraordinary evesight: Ep.90.34.

By contrast with the 'blind' unrighteous, the sapiens is described as extraordinarily sighted, as he has a privileged perception of the truth.

K.2.2 Light of guidance: Ep.48.8, 88.45, 120.13, Ben.4.17.4, 22.2.

The sapiens' pedagogic relationship with the unrighteous is illustrated as the bringing of light to guide them in their darkness. Thus Seneca comments on two schools of philosophy which are, in his opinion, deficient in the matter of moral instruction: "Illi non praeferunt lumen per quod acies derigatur ad verum, hi oculos mihi effodiunt." (Ep.88.45).

Cf. guide (J.4.3), helmsman (P.1).

K.2.3 Sun: Ep.27.3, 41.5, 66.20, 46, 92.5, 17f.

K.2.3.1 Sun's rays: Ep.41.5.

Virtue is compared many times to the sun.[3] At Ep.41.5 the sun's rays which touch the earth, while being, at the same time, connected to the sun, furnish an image for the sapiens' connection with, and motivation towards, Heaven.

K.2.3.2 Absolute brightness: Ep.27.3, 66.20, 46, 92.5, 17f.

At Ep.66.46 the absolute nature of the sun's light illustrates the corresponding quality in virtue: "Quemadmodum serenitas caeli non

recipit maiorem adhuc claritatem in sincerissimum nitorem repurgata, sic hominis corpus animumque curantis et bonum suum ex utroque nectentis perfectus est status."

The strength of the sun's light, which is greater than that of all other lights, constant, and unaffected by intervening clouds, is particularly an image of the sapiens' constantia. At Ep.66.20 the ability of the sun's light to render insignificant all lesser lights illustrates virtue's ability to render insignificant all forms of adversity. Similarly, as the sun's light needs no other light, so virtue is complete without fortunate circumstances. Virtue is the same, no matter what the circumstances - "quod potest in hac claritate solis habere scintilla momentum?" Seneca asks (Ep.92.5). The lesser 'light' of the sapiens' circumstances has no impact on the great light of virtue.[4] At Ep.92.17f Seneca continues with the solar image. He refutes the notion that virtue can be altered in any way by circumstances, comparing it to the sun which, whether or not clouds obscure it from our gaze, continues to shine with the same strength. The same image at Ep.27.3 illustrates specifically the perpetual strength of the sapiens' joy: "Sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum, securum; etiam si quid obstat, nubium modo intervenit, quae infra feruntur nec umquam diem vincunt."[5]

Cf. absolute brightness with summit of mountain (J.1.3), complete health (Ep.72.6 - L.2.1), straight line (Ep.71.20), levelness (Ep.66.28). Cf. insignificant lesser lights to dogs ignored by large animal (Ira 2.32.3, 3.25.2 - B.1.1), pimples on healthy body (Ep.72.5 - L.1.5), rain falling onto sea (Prov.2.1).

K.2.4 Fire:[6] Ep.39.2f, 94.29, Cons.Marc.23.4.

K.2.4.1 Straight rising flame: Ep.39.2f.

The soul of the virtuous man is compared to a flame: like flame which springs upwards and cannot fall or be kept down the soul of a good man is lifted by the vision of great things.

Cf. straight trees (A.1.2.2), straight road (J.4.1), straight course at sea (P.1.1), straight line (Ep.71.20).

K.2.4.2 Spark: Ep.94.29.

Seneca compares the way in which precepts develop the virtue which is latent in men to the effect of a breeze on a spark.[7]

Cf. potential of spark to that of seed (A.1.1).

K.2.4.3 Quick and slow-burning fire: Cons.Marc.23.4.

Virtue is compared to fire with respect to its length of existence: the brighter a fire glows the more quickly it is extinguished, whereas a smoky fire burns more slowly - similarly, Seneca claims, Marcia's virtuous son died young because of his virtue, whereas the unrighteous live long!

Notes

[1]Cf. n.2, p.36.

[2]Personified Virtue is said to be found "in templo ... in foro in curia, pro muris stantem" whereas vice, represented by Voluptas, is described as "tenebras captantem" (Vit.Beat.7.3). The light of virtue must be distinguished from the false light of Fortuna (Ep.71.34) and her gifts, for their glitter is only a veneer (Ep.115.9). Cf., especially, Ep.94.58: "Vis scire quam falsus oculos tuos deceperit fulgor? nihil est istis quamdiu mersa et involuta caeno suo iacent foedius, nihil obscurius. quidni? quae per longissimorum cuniculorum tenebras extrahuntur."

[3]The sapiens is also compared to other parts of the firmament, but without respect for their light: at Ep.79.8 the absolute size of the moon illustrates the absolute size of virtue; at Ep.59.16, Ira 3.6.1, two images of the ultra-lunar region of the heavens illustrate the sapiens' tranquillity.

[4]The description of virtue's external circumstances as a form of light weaker in strength than virtue's is also found at Ep.21.2. The "fulgor" which Lucilius does not want to leave (Ep.21.1) is that of worldly affairs - for Fortuna's false light, cf. n.2.

[5]Perhaps we are meant to understand the cloud mentioned at Ep.66.20 as one which obscures the sun - in view of the screening cloud in the images at Ep.27.3 and 92.17f - although Seneca does not make this clear:

> "Quemadmodum minuta lumina claritas solis obscurat, sic dolores, molestias, iniurias virtus magnitudine sua elidit atque opprimit ... nec magis ullam portionem habent incommoda, cum in virtutem inciderunt, quam in mari nimbus."

[6]At Ben.2.27.3 fire represents the vice of avarice.

[7]At Ep.18.15, however, a similar image of a conflagration developing from a spark on dry material illustrates the fact that irascible natures will fire up in anger at small provocation.

L: Medicine

Images of illness regularly represent the unrighteous. Images of health and the doctor represent the sapiens, the latter image representing him in his pedagogic function. The proficiens is often represented by a state midway between sickness and health - i.e. convalescence.

L.1 Ep.25.2f, 50.3f, 53.6f, 9, 64.8, 68.8f, 72.5ff, 74.33f, 75.7, 12, 85.5, 88.45, 94.5, 18ff, 115.6f, Ira 1.16.7, 20.1ff, 2.35.2, 3.3.4, 10.3, 8.1, 9.5ff, Cons.Marc.1.8, 8.2, Trang.2.6, 11f, 7.4, Cons. Helv.2.1, 11.3, Clem.2.6.4.

Ill = unrighteous.

L.1.1 Chronic illness: Ep.25.2f, 50.4, 75.12, 85.5, Cons.Marc.1.8.

The degree of severity of illness corresponds to the severity of the state of vice. Chronic illness is an image of vice of long-standing, difficult of cure. Seneca gives particular illustration of this with the image of eye-disease, which worsens to the point of complete blindness if untreated - Ep.85.5 (cf. K.1.3).

L.1.2 Recognition of illness: Ep.50.4, 53.5f, 9.

An invalid's perception of his illness provides an image for comparison, ex contrario, with the sinner: while the unrighteous are characteristically unaware of their vice, the invalid is normally aware of his illness,[1] and the more so as his illness grows worse. Thus a shivering can be ignored, but when it has progressed to a full fever the sufferer is forced to admit that he is ill (Ep.53.6). Similarly, a pain in the feet and tingling in the joints can be passed off as a sprained joint or the result of too much exercise, but once the ankles and the feet have swollen, the sufferer is bound to admit he has the gout (ibid.). The opposite, however, is true of the sinner - the worse his condition

the less able he is to perceive it (ibid.). Consequently, while sin, like illness, is more easily corrected in its early stages, the unrighteous do not seek out a 'doctor', but continue in their condition (Ep.50.4).

L.1.3 Warning symptoms: Ep.74.33f, Ira 3.10.3.

The symptoms which precede the full onset of illness illustrate the fearfulness of the unrighteous. The tendency of the unrighteous to be fearful of future adversity is compared to the appearance of symptoms - languor and trembling - which heralds an illness (Ep.74.33). At Ira 3.10.3 Seneca compares the warning signs of anger to those of epilepsy. As an epileptic is able to detect an attack by such symptoms and attempt to ward it off before its onset, so a man should attempt to forestall an attack of anger.[2]

L.1.4 Involuntary behaviour: Ira 2.35.2, Clem.2.6.4.

The involuntary nature of illness illustrates the involuntary nature of sin. At Clem.2.6.4 Seneca compares the "infirmity"[3] of pity to weak eyes, which fill at the sight of another's tears, or involuntary yawning or laughing, provoked by the yawning or laughing of another.

L.1.4.1 Uncontrollable running: Ira 2.35.2.

A man whose muscles twitch voluntarily, or who runs when he tries to walk, provides an image for the powerlessness of the unrighteous vis-a-vis their own emotions.

Cf. uncontrollable effect of illness to that of wild animal (B.1.6), gravity (J.2.1), rushing river (N.1.2), turbulent sea (P.2.1).

L.1.5 Fallacious appearance: Ira 1.20.1ff, 3.3.4.

The fallacious appearance of some illnesses provides an image for the deceptiveness of vice. The appearance of strength given by anger is transient, baneful, and self-destructive, just as is that of the onset of illness (Ira 3.3.4). Seneca refutes the notion that anger

is indicative of greatness of soul ("magnitudinem animi"): such 'greatness' is merely "swelling" ("tumor"), just as bodies distended by an excess of water do not indicate growth, but disease (Ira 1.20.1).

Cf. deceptive appearance of veneer and gilding (E.3.1), theatrical costume (Q.1.1).

L.1.6 Contagion: Ep.75.7, Ira 3.8.1, Tranq.7.4.

The contagiousness of some illnesses illustrates the tendency for vice to be contracted amongst the 'crowd' by means of imitation by one person of another (Ira 3.8.1). Seneca compares vice to the plague (Ep.75.7, Tranq.7.4). Thus he compares the sapiens' duty to correct the public state of vice to a doctor's job during a plague-epidemic (Ep.75.7), while he urges the proficiens to select virtuous friends, comparing prudence in this matter to prudence in the choice of companions during a time of plague: the proficiens will not associate with the unrighteous any more than a man will choose to sit next to those who have already contracted the plague (Tranq.7.4).

Cf. contagion of disease to music which sticks in mind - Ep.123.9.

L.1.7. Sensitivity: Ira 1.20.3, 3.9.5, Tranq.2.6, 11f, Cons.Helv.11.3.

The sensitivity of illness, with its concomitant vexation and restlessness, illustrates unrighteous emotion and the restlessness which this causes. One aspect of such sensitivity is the insatiable thirst of the sick, discussed at H.1.1.

L.1.7.1 Itching sores: Ira 1.20.3, 3.9.5, Tranq.2.11f.

The insatiable desire of the unrighteous is compared to itching sores which take pleasure in being scratched (Tranq.2.11f), just as the desires take pleasure in toil and vexation. Sores are also an image of unrighteous irascibility. A body which is covered with sores is conscious of its own weakness, painful and moaning at the slightest touch. Just so, the emotion of anger is aroused by a trifle (Ira 1.20.3,

3.9.5).

L.1.7.2 Restlessness: Tranq.2.6, 12.

The aimlessness and restlessness which desire produces in the unrighteous is compared to an invalid's desire for change (Tranq.2.12), and to the tossing of the insomniac from side to side as he tries to sleep.

Cf. restless movement of ants (B.1.4).

L.1.8 Scar: Ira 1.16.7, Cons.Marc.8.2, Cons.Helv.2.1ff.

The healing of illness, as discussed in L.2, is representative of moral improvement. It is appropriate to mention here the image of the wound[4] which closes up but leaves a persistent scar, illustrating particularly the tendency for sorrow[5] to wane, but not entirely disappear, with time.

L.1.9 Internal illness: Ep.50.4, 68.8, 72.5.

Internal illness is particularly associated with vice because it represents both the secret nature of vice, unperceived even by the 'sufferer' and the gravity of the condition (Ep.50.4, 68.8). By contrast, the only image of illness which Seneca employs to describe the sapiens is one of external illness - that of boils and pimples on the surface of the skin (Ep.72.5). These represent the very minor impact which adversity can have on the sapiens, leaving intact his inner joy, just as pimples and boils on the surface of a body do not adversely affect its internal health.

Cf. internal illness to wood beneath veneer and gilding (E.3.1), actor beneath costume (Q.1.1).

L.2 Ep.2.3, 7.1, 28.3, 6, 50.9, 69.2, 72.6, 104.18, Prov.3.2, Ira 2.27.3, Vit.Beat.17.4.
Convalescent = proficiens.

L.2.1 Convalescent: Ep.2.3, 7.1, 28.3, 6, 50.9, 69.2, 72.6, 104.18, Prov.3.2, Ira 2.27.3, Vit.Beat.17.4.

Images of convalescence illustrate the moral condition of the proficiens who is midway between a state of vice and a state of virtue (Ep.28.6, 72.6), the two extremes being represented by illness (L.1) and good health (Ep.72.6). Thus Seneca describes his ambition to make moral progress, but not to expect to reach absolute virtue, as an ambition to alleviate, but not to cure his gout (Vit.Beat.17.4).[6]

Cf. 'midway state' of convalescent to germination of plant (A.1), training of athlete (D.1.4), position of traveller halfway uphill (J.1.2), of sailor approaching land (Ep.72.10 and P.1.5).

L.2.1.1 Relapse: Ep.7.1, 28.6, 72.6.

The difference between good health and convalescence provides an image for the difference beween the proficiens and the sapiens: the proficiens may lapse back into a state of vice, as the convalescent is prone to relapse into illness, but the sapiens will not lapse into vice, just as a completely healthy person is not liable to illness (Ep.72.6).

Cf. relapse to slipping downhill (J.1.2).

L.2.1.2 Continuous medication: Ep.2.3, 69.2.

Constantia in the matter of study and location is recommended to the proficiens, just as continuous medication is profitable, but interrupted and different medications are not.

L.2.1.3 Rest: Ep.28.3, 104.18.

Travel is again discouraged with comparison of the proficiens' condition to that of a man who has broken his leg or dislocated a joint (Ep.104.18). Just as such a man will not drive or sail to other regions, but will call in a doctor to see to his injury, so the man who has a mind "fractum" and "extortum" should not travel, but rather call in a 'doctor' for a moral 'cure'.

Cf. movement of invalid to transplantation of plant (A.4.1).

L.3 Ep.22.1, 40.4f, 52.10, 64.8, 75.7, 89.19, 94.13, 17ff, Prov. 3.2, Const.Sap.13.2, Ira 1.6.2ff, 15.1f, 2.10.1, 7, 3.29.2ff, Cons.Marc.1.8, Cons.Helv.1.2, 2.1f, Clem.1.17.1f, Ben.2.2.2.
Doctor = sapiens.

L.3.1 Doctor's patience: Ep.29.1, Const.Sap.13.2, Ira 1.15.1, 2.10.1, 7, Clem.1.17.1.

The patience of the doctor - his failure to be annoyed by the illness of his patients - is a common image to illustrate the sapiens' absence of anger towards the unrighteous. A doctor does not get angry when a feverish patient, denied cold water, abuses him, nor when the delirious do so. Similarly, the sapiens knows that those who strut about in purple togas are 'ill', and, like a doctor with the sick, he takes their insults lightly (Const.Sap.13.2).

Cf. absence of anger in animal (Ira 2.32.3, 3.25.3 - B.1.1) and animal-trainer (B.2.1), guardian of children (Const.Sap.12.3, Ira 2.10.1 - F.1.2), guide (Ira 1.14.3 - J.4.3), military commander (Ira 2.10.4 - M.1.5), helmsman (Ira 2.10.8 - P.1.6).

L.3.2 Radical medical treatment: Ep.52.10, 75.6f, 89.19, Prov.3.2, Ira 1.6.2ff, Cons.Marc.1.8, Cons.Helv.2.1f.[7]

The mildness or severity of medical treatment serves as an image of the way in which the sapiens approaches vice: just as the doctor tries mild measures at first, progressing to severer ones if these fail, so the sapiens will proceed from mild to severe means of moral correction if the former fail (Ira 1.6.2f), amputating limbs if necessary.

Cf. pruning (A.1.2.1).

L.3.3 Application of remedies to particular cases: Ep.22.1, 64.8f, 94.19f.

Besides passing on traditional doctrine to the unrighteous, the sapiens must also determine how it is to be applied in particular cases.[8] At Ep.64.8f Seneca illustrates this point with the image of a doctor determining which of the known treatments for eye-disease to apply to particular cases. Similarly, at Ep.94.19f particular advice of this kind is compared to the kind of advice which a doctor might offer to a patient on the care of his eyes once they are cured.

L.3.3.1 Right time for application of remedy: Ep.22.1, 64.8, Ira 3.39.2, Cons.Helv.1.2, Ben.2.2.2.

Moral correction, like medicine, must be administered at the right time.

L.3.3.1.1 Delayed treatment: Ira 3.39.2f, Cons.Helv.1.2.

Neither anger (Ira 3.39.2f) nor grief (Cons.Helv.1.2) should be 'treated' until they have begun to subside, just as medication should not be applied while the body is still inflamed.

L.3.4 Leisurely treatment: Ep.40.4f.

As "remedia non prosunt nisi inmorantur" and a doctor cannot cure his patients if he is "in transitu", so the style of the philosopher's instruction should not be too hurried.

Notes

[1]Seneca cites an exceptional instance at Ep.50.2: his wife's clown, Harpaste, became blind but was unaware that she had. The anecdote seems rather inappropriate in view of the fact that Seneca proceeds to contrast the medically blind, who realize that they are so and therefore ask for a guide (Ep.50.3), with the unrighteous who are unaware of their 'illness'.

[2]On the other hand, once an attack of anger has occurred, it should not be treated until its first strength has subsided, just as swollen eyes and other inflammations are only aggravated by being moved while they are stiff (Ira 3.39.2).

[3]An infirmity because it is an emotion. Virtue consists in an absence of emotion - apatheia - cf. Zeller, pp.243ff, especially pp.252ff. Seneca exhorts apatheia many times - e.g. Ep.37.4, 71.37, 116.1ff, Brev. Vit.10.1, and, of course, in the De Ira passim.

[4]For discussion of the image of the wound in a military context, cf. M.1:1 and n.3, p.74 and M.1.3.2.

[5]In so far as sorrow is an emotion, it is a vice, cf. n.3.

[6]In accordance with Seneca's statements that few people achieve sapientia (Const.Sap.7.1). Hence Seneca compares himself in his capacity as moral instructor of Lucilius to his companion in hospital: "Non sum tam inprobus ut curationes aeger obeam, sed, tamquam in eodem valetudinario iaceam, de communi tecum malo conloquor et remedia communico." (Ep.27.1). Cf. also Ep.98.15 where Seneca describes a hoped -for moral reform in this way: "His sermonibus et his similibus lenitur illa vis ulceris, quam opto ... mitigari et aut sanari aut stare et cum ipso senescere."

[7]For the notion of "contrariis curare" mentioned here, cf. Clem 1.9.6.

[8]In the form of precepts, defined by Seneca at Ep.94.1 as "Eam partem philosophiae quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta nec in universum componit hominem".

M: The military

M.1 Ep.13.1, 18.6, 22.8, 32.3, 36.9, 37.1, 45.9, 48.10, 49.6, 9, 53.12, 59.7f, 64.4, 66.13, 67.15, 74.19, 22, 82.5, 95.35, 104.22, 113.28, 117.25, Prov.4.7, Const.Sap.1.1, 4.1ff, 5.4, 6.4, 8, 8.3, 19.3, Ira 1.17.2, 2.10.4, 3.5.8, Cons.Marc.9.2f, 10.4, 16.5, Vit.Beat.5.3, 15.5, 26.2f, Tranq.3.5, 4.1f, 8.3, 9, 11.1, Cons.Polyb.2.2, 5.4, 6.2, 16.3, Cons.Helv.1.1ff, 2.2f, 3.1f, 15.4, Ben.5.2.3f, 4.1.
Good soldier = sapiens.

M.1.1 Courage: Ep.36.9, 59.8, 66.13, 67.15, 104.22, Const.Sap.4.3, 19.3, Tranq.11.1, Vit.Beat.5.3, 15.5, Ben.5.2.3f.

The good soldier's lack of emotion and concomitant courage serve as an image for the apatheia of the sapiens and his constantia in the face of adversity.[1] In contrast with the soldiers depicted at Ep.59.8 (cf. M.2.1), the sapiens is depicted as a general (M.1.5), tranquil amidst hostile territory (Const.Sap.4.3). He is a soldier who stands his ground, not retreating even when attacked,[2] (Ep.104.22, Const.Sap.19.3, Vit.Beat.5.3, 15.5, Tranq.11.1). He suffers wounds with courage[3] (Const.Sap.19.3, Vit.Beat.15.5), and continues, even wounded, to stand guard without leaning on his spear (Ep.36.9). He will storm a city-wall or endure a siege (Ep.66.13)[4] and endure torture bravely (Ep.67.15).

Cf. resistance of soldier to attack to that of athlete to opponent (D.1.1), traveller to gravity (J.6.1), hard materials to blows etc. (O.1.1), helmsman to waves (P.1.1).

M.1.2 Invulnerability: Ep.45.9, 53.12, 59.8, 74.19, 82.5, Const.Sap.1.1, 4.1f, 5.4, 6.4, 8, 19.3, Ira 3.5.8, Vit.Beat.5.3, Tranq.8.9.

Seneca compares the sapiens' constantia in adversity - his immunity to external circumstances - to a soldier's immunity to wounds from his enemy. The various misfortunes that may strike a man - "Paupertas", "Luctus", "Ignominia", "Dolor" (Ep.59.8), or Fortuna her-

self (M.1.2.1) - are his enemy, but they cannot wound him.[5] Like a well-armoured soldier,[6] the sapiens wards off missiles, some of them back on-to those who dispatched them (Ep.53.12). In an image at Const.Sap.19.3 adversity is depicted as the missiles and stones which rattle off the sapiens' helmet without harming him. The sapiens' immunity to adversity is also depicted as the immunity a soldier has to his enemy's missiles when he is stationed in a position too high for them to attack.[7] Seneca compares an attempt to injure a sapiens to an attempt to injure the sky by hurling missiles at it (Const.Sap.4.1f).[8]

M.1.2.1 Battle with Fortuna: Ep.13.1, 18.6, 45.9, 48.10, 64.4, 67.15, 74.19, 22, 82.5, 104.22, Const.Sap.1.1, 6.4, 8, 8.3, Cons.Marc.9.3. 16.5, Vit.Beat.5.3, Tranq.4.2, 8.9, 11.1, Cons.Polyb.2.2, 16.3, Cons.Helv 1.1, 5.3f, 15.4.

Seneca describes the 'Stoic way' as leading to a lofty position beyond the reach of any weapon and above Fortuna herself (Const.Sap.1.1). The sapiens is described as a man

> quem fortuna, cum quod habuit telum nocentissimum vi maxima intorsit, pungit, non vulnerat, et hoc raro; nam cetera eius tela, quibus genus humanum debellatur, grandinis more dissultant,[9] quae incussa tectis sine ullo habitatoris incommodo crepitat ac solvitur. (Ep.45.9)

The sapiens is surrounded by high fortifications (M.1.2.2) which cannot be assaulted even by Fortuna (Ep.74.19, 82.5, Const.Sap.6.4, 8). The sapiens' immunity to Fortuna is constituted, in large part, by his rejection of worldly goods.[10] Seneca illustrates this idea in an amusing way with an image in which excessive worldly goods are depicted as excess flesh which cannot be squeezed into a suit of armour, and is therefore vulnerable to Fortuna's missiles (Tranq.8.9). By contrast, the virtuous, who pare their worldly goods to a minimum, are compared to lean soldiers, whose bodies, being completely covered by their armour, are protected from attack (ibid.).

M.1.2.2 Fortifications: Ep.82.5, Const.Sap.6.4, 8, Ira 1.8.2

Seneca pictures virtue as an unshakeable defence for the sapiens - comparable to unassailable fortifications:

> En adsum hoc uobis probaturus, sub isto tot ciuitatium euersore munimenta incussu arietis labefieri et turrium altitudinem cuniculis ac latentibus fossis repente desidere et aequaturum editissimas arces aggerem crescere, at nulla machinamenta posse reperiri quae bene fundatum animum agitent. (Const.Sap.6.4)

Cf. invulnerable soldier to cliffs and other solid substances undamaged by waves etc. (O.1.1, O.1.1.1), and to inhabitant of house harmlessly hit by hail (Ep.45.9).

M.1.3 Preparedness/training: Ep.18.6, 59.7f, Prov.4.7, Cons.Marc.9.2f, Vit.Beat.26.2f, Cons.Helv.2.2, 3.1, 15.4.

Adversity is the test and proof of the sapiens' constantia, just as the soldier is tested by a battle (Prov.4.5 - cf. M.1.1). The proficiens is thus urged to 'practise' for adversity in order to be able to withstand it when necessary. The soldier throws up earth-works and tires himself out with gratuitous labour, so that, when the time comes, he will be equal to it (Ep.18.6).[11]

Cf. the training of the soldier to that of the athlete (D.1.4).

M.1.3.1 Readiness for attack: Ep.18.6, 59.7, Vit.Beat.26.2.

A good general is ready, even in peace-time, to make war if necessary (Vit.Beat.26.2), and is always ready, in times of war, for attack (Ep.59.7), without, at the same time, fearing it (Ep.59.8 - M.2.1).

Cf. the athlete's readiness for combat (D.1.4), the sailor's readiness for a storm (P.1.3)

M.1.3.2 Veterans: Prov.4.7, Cons.Helv.2.2, 3.1, 15.4.

The virtuous, who have often exposed themselves to adversity and prepared themselves for it, are compared to veteran soldiers who, unlike raw recruits, suffer wounds (Prov.4.7, Cons.Helv.2.2, 15.4), and their treatment with equanimity.[12]

M.1.4 Withdrawal: Ep.22.8, 32.3, 49.6, 9, Cons.Marc.10.4, Tranq.4.1f.

It was shown above (M.1.1) that the sapiens is often depicted as a soldier who stands his ground, counting it a disgrace worthy only of the cowardly to retreat[13] - an image which illustrates his constantia in the face of adversity. In a number of other images, however, virtue is associated with withdrawal from battle or retreat from a pursuing enemy.

In two images at Ep.22.8 and Tranq.4.1 the image of retreating from battle depicts the retirement of the virtuous from worldly affairs into otium.[14] The retreat is accomplished, however, with the maximum of dignity - gradually ("sensim" - Ep.22.8, "sensim relato gradu" - Tranq. 4.1), without turning the back (Ep.22.8), and with the standards intact (Tranq.4.1).

With an image of flight from a pursuing enemy, Seneca advocates haste in the matter of progress towards virtue. Just as an army, pursued by an enemy, must needs make all possible haste, so the proficiens, who is pursued by death itself (Ep.32.3, 49.6, 9), must hasten to attain virtue. In such a context, the soldier who fails to hurry away from a pursuing enemy, is an image of unrighteous dilatoriness.[15]

Cf. withdrawal from battle to withdrawal into harbour (P.1.4), retiring to convalesce - Ep.53.9.

M.1.5 Commander: Const.Sap.4.3, Ira 2.10.4, Vit.Beat.26.2, Cons.Polyb. 5.4.

In a number of images the sapiens is depicted as the commander of an army. Each of these images illustrates a different aspect of the sapiens: his preparedness (Vit.Beat.26.2), his bravery (Const.Sap.4.3), his cheerfulness in adversity (Cons.Polyb.5.4), and his failure to succumb to anger (Ira 2.10.4). At the same time, however, the image of commander also emphasizes the superiority of the sapiens vis-a-vis the unrighteous and illustrates his role as their instructor.

Cf. sapiens as animal-trainer (B.2.1), traveller's guide (J.4.3), teacher (F.1.2), helmsman (P.1).

M.2 Ep.13.8, 59.8, 74.3.
Bad soldier = unrighteous.

M.2.1 Cowardice: Ep.13.8, 59.8, 74.3.

A bad soldier is prone to emotion, particularly fear, and thus he serves, in this respect, as an image for the unrighteous who are haunted by groundless fears. An image at Ep.59.8 of soldiers who are fearful for every side, even though their march may be, in fact, secure, illustrates this characteristic of the unrighteous. This obsessive fear of future adversity, which is based on the most trivial of evidence, is illustrated at Ep.13.8 with an image of soldiers who abandon camp, because a cloud of dust raised by cattle, or an anonymous rumour, has terrified them. A particular fear of the unrighteous - the fear of death - is illustrated with an image, similar to that at Ep.59.8, of soldiers in enemy country who fear an attack from every side (Ep.74.3).

Cf. fearfulness of animals (B.1.2), children (F.1.1), people atop eminence (Ep.8.4, 94.73, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4 - J.2.1), sailors (P.1.6).

M.3 Ep.59.8, 71.37, Ira 1.8.2, 2.29.1, 3.13.1; Vit.Beat.8.2, Tranq.1.1, Brev.Vit.10.1.
Enemies = vices.

M.3.1 Enemies: Ep.59.8, 71.37, Ira 1.8.2, 2.29.1, 3.13.1, Vit.Beat.8.2, Tranq.1.1, Brev.Vit.10.1.

By depicting the vices of the unrighteous as their enemies Seneca illustrates the harmful effect which vices have on the righteous. Their vices are graphically depicted as enemies in words given to Serenus at the beginning of the De tranquillitate animi: of the various vices, Serenus says, the worst are "quaedam non continua sed ex interuallis redeuntia ... ut hostis uagos et ex occasionibus adsilientis, per quos neutrum licet, nec tamquam in bello paratum esse nec tamquam in pace securum." (Tranq.1.1).

In a number of images, the emotions, in particular, are depicted

as the hostile force.[16] Seneca refers with approval to Fabianus' statement that the emotions should be boldly and fiercely attacked (Brev.Vit. 10.1), and speaks of their conquest as more important than that of the Persians, Medes, or Dahae (Ep.71.37).

M.3.2 Siege: Ira 1.8.2.

The emotion of anger, in particular, is portrayed several times as an enemy, whom Seneca urges us to fight (Ira 3.13.1), sometimes treating it with Fabian tactics (Ira 2.29.1).[17] It is compared to an enemy who must be kept outside the city-walls, for once inside, it will observe no limits (Ira 1.8.2).

Cf. emotion as enemy to emotion as savage animal (B.1.6).

M.4 Ep.48.10, 95.38, 113.28, 117.25, Ira 1.17.2, Ben.5.4:1. Weapons = worldly goods or power of virtue.

M.4.1 Weapons: Ep.48.10, 95.38, 113.28, 117.25, Ira 1.17.2, Ben.5.4.1.

A soldier's weapons represent a man's worldly goods at Ben.5.4.1: as many lightly-armed soldiers are the peer of those who are fully-armed. so a poor man is not outdone by a rich one in the matter of returning benefits. Weapons, or at least, Fortuna's weapons, again represent worldly goods at Ep.113.28. However, Seneca, in Posidonius' words, would have us find weapons of our own, for Fortuna does not supply weapons which are effective against herself!

The kind of specious philosophizing which Seneca much dislikes is not, we are told, an adequate weapon against Fortuna (Ep.48.10).[18] It is compared to the "lusoria arma" with which a soldier practises his strokes, ignoring, however, the fact that the signal for battle has already sounded (Ep.117.25). True weapons are provided by the faculty of reason (Ira 1.17.2).[19]

Notes

[1]Seneca compares the commitment to virtue which the proficiens, is required to make to that of a soldier to his duty (Ep.37.1, 95.35) - cf. gladiator's oath - D.1.2.3.

[2]For discussion of images in which flight is an image of virtuous rather than unrighteous behaviour - cf. M.1.4.

[3]Sometimes the sapiens is depicted as a soldier who is invulnerable to wounds - cf. M.1.2.

[4]The images at Ep.66.13 are drawn to make the point that all instances of virtue are equal. Cf. Athenodorus' image at Tranq.3.5:

> "Neque enim ille solus militat qui in acie stat et cornu dextrum laeuumque defendit, sed ⟨et⟩ qui portas tuetur et statione minus periculosa, non otiosa tamen fungitur uigiliasque seruat et armamentario praeest; quae ministeria, quamuis incruenta sint, in numerum stipendiorum ueniunt."

[5]This seems to contradict the image of the sapiens bravely suffering wounds (M.1.1) - cf. n.3. The contradiction is not much clarified by Seneca's statement at Const.Sap.10.4: "Nulla uirtus est quae non sentias perpeti ... quosdam ictus recipit, sed receptos euincit et sanat et comprimit".

[6]"Nullum telum in corpore eius sedet; munita est, solida." (Ep. 53.12). Seneca does not state that Philosophia is wearing armour. The point seems rather to be that her loose gown ("laxo sinu") is as effective at warding off weapons as heavy armour would be - cf. Herc.Oet.153ff where Hercules' naked body alone wards off missiles.

[7]For the association of virtue with height, cf. J.1, J.h.3.

[8]Seneca seems to have in mind a combination of acts of hubris committed by Xerxes - cf. Herodotus, 7.35, 226.

[9]The image of hail on a roof is, of course, an image within the military image.

[10]By rejecting worldly goods, the sapiens has nothing to lose (or gain) from Fortuna, and thus she cannot harm him.

[11]Cf. Prov.4.13: "Sic ... ad excutienda tela militares lacerti ualent."

[12]For a discussion of wounds in a medical context, cf. L.1.8.

Seneca presents his consolatory role at Cons.Helv.1.2 as that of a fellow-soldier on the battle-field who, although wounded himself, tends to the wounds of his companion.

[13] Cf. Const.Sap.19.3: "Etiam si premeris et infesta ui urgeris, cedere tamen turpe est."

[14] Note that whereas Seneca warmly advocates withdrawal into otium elsewhere (e.g. Ep.22.3) he appears to accept the need for it grudgingly here ("nec ego negauerim aliquando cedendum"), and appears, in the De tranquillitate sapientis to regard public service in a favourable light. Cf. Griffin, pp.333f.

[15] Cf. also Ira 1.9.2 where a soldier who refuses to heed the signal for retreat is an image of uncontrollable anger.

[16] Cf. Ep.39.5: "Qui hostis in quemquam tam contumeliosus fuit quam in quosdam voluptates suae sunt?" Similarly, at Ep.51.6 Hannibal is said to have been 'conquered' by the pleasures of a winter spent in Campania: "debellendae sunt in primis voluptates, quae, ut vides, saeva quoque ad se ingenia rapuerunt."

[17] This advice seems to contradict that given at Ira 1.8.2, 3.13.1.

[18] Cf. p.95 and nn.26, 28.

[19] Cf. Ep.95.38 where philosophical precepts are compared to weapons.

N: River

The constant and swift flow of a river makes it an ideal image for the depiction of the passage of time. The power of its current, like that of the sea, to sweep along objects afloat in it, depicts the powerful effect of external circumstances and of the emotions on the unrighteous.

N.1 Ep.4.5, 23.8, 58.22ff, 74.25, 85.6, Brev.Vit.9.2.
Swiftly flowing river = swift passage of time, compelling circumstances or emotions.

N.1.1 Drying up of river: Ep.74.25, Brev.Vit.9.2.

At Ep.74.25 and Brev.Vit.9.2 the flowing of a river represents the duration of human life, its drying up the termination of life. The proficiens is urged to make full and immediate use of time, as though to drink from a river which is about to dry up (Brev.Vit.9.2). At Ep.74.25 the flowing of water[1] in relation to its source represents the life of children in relation to their father: just as it is unimportant if the flow of water is cut off, as long as its source remains intact, so, Seneca maintains, the sapiens will not be affected by the loss of his children.

Cf. drinking first wine (H.2.1). Cf. loss of water to loss of crop, leaves (A.2.1), statue (C.1.1).

N.1.2 Bodies swept along by river: Ep.4.5, 23.8, 85.6.

The association of the duration of human life with the flow of a river is continued in an image of men being swept helplessly by a river's current (Ep.4.5). The image depicts the unwillingness of the unrighteous to die: just as men who are being swept along by a river cling to briars and projections, so the unrighteous 'cling' to life and to their

worldly possessions.

At Ep.23.8 the image of a body being swept along by a river illustrates the effect of external circumstances on the unrighteous. It is the speed and direction of the current that determines the movement of a body afloat in it, just as the vicissitudes of worldly affairs determine the lot of the unrighteous.

At Ep.85.6 a similar image of a body being carried along by a fast flowing river illustrates the power of the emotions over the unrighteous. They are 'carried away' by their emotions, just as a body afloat in a river is carried away by its current. Similarly, refuting the notion that the sapiens may experience any emotion,[2] Seneca says "Si das aliquos adfectus sapienti, inpar illis erit ratio et velut torrente quodam auferetur" (Ep.85.6).

Cf. uncontrollable effect of current to that of wild animal (B.1.6), gravity (J.2.1), sickness (L.1.4.1), turbulent sea (P.2.1). Cf. clinging to river bank to tenant 'clinging' to lodgings (E.1.1).

N.2 Ep.122.19.
Direction of current = natura.

N.2.1 Rowing upstream: Ep.122.19.

Finally, an image at Ep.122.19 may be mentioned in which the water's flow has a different significance from that of the images above (N.1). In this image the direction of the river's current represents natura. Those who row with its current represent those who live 'secundum naturam' - i.e. the virtuous, whereas those who attempt to row upstream provide an image for the unrighteous, who live 'contra naturam'.[3] Those who live 'contra naturam', "ut ita dicam", says Seneca, "retro vivunt" (Ep.122.19), just as those who row upstream are moving backwards, as it were, in relation to the direction of the current. Moreover, as everything is easy ("facilia", "expedita" - Ep.122.19) for those who live "secundum naturam', as for those who row with the current, so life 'contra naturam' is as difficult as rowing upstream.[4]

Cf. travellers moving backwards (J.5.1 and n.18, p.49)

Notes

[1]Possibly the water of an irrigation channel fed by a natural spring - cf. Columella, 11.3.8-10 for description of the use of a spring (as opposed to well- or rain-water) for this purpose.

The contrast between water source and water flow is used figuratively also by Cicero (cf. Fantham, pp.151f) but to illustrate a different idea from Seneca's: the contrast between creative genius and derivativeness.

[2]Cf. n.3, p.67.

[3]According to Stoic doctrine, vice is defined as 'contra naturam' - cf., e.g., "Omnia vitia contra naturam pugnant" (Ep.122.5), while virtue is 'secundum naturam': "quod inter omnis Stoicos conuenit, rerum naturae adsentior; ab illa non deerrare et ad illius legem exemplumque formari sapientia est." (Vit.Beat.3.3).

[4]Seneca's description of life contra naturam as difficult does not correspond with his depiction of the life of vice as a downhill path, distinguished for its easiness - cf. J.2.1. For Seneca's ambivalence on the matter of the ease or difficulty of attaining virtue, cf. Ep.31.9, 50.9, Const.Sap.1.1f, Ira 2.13.1f, Ben.4.22.3.

O: Rock and other solid materials

A number of images of rock and other solid materials and their resistance to impact, fire, etc. illustrates the sapiens' apatheia and constantia.

O.1 Ep.45.9, 53.12, 72.9f, Const.Sap.3.5, 19.3, Ira 3.5.8, 3.25.3, Vit.Beat.27.2f.
Resistance of hard material = sapiens' apatheia and constantia.

O.1.1 Resistant materials: Ep.45.9, 53.12, 72.9f, Const.Sap.3.5, 19.3, Ira 3.5.8, 3.25.3, Vit.Beat.27.2f.

The sapiens, in his indifference to injury, is compared to certain stones and to adamant that cannot be destroyed by fire (Const.Sap.3.5). Virtue is compared ex contrario with Mount Aetna: whereas this mountain is possibly being consumed by fire, says Seneca, (Ep.72.9f), virtue cannot be diminished. In a military context, the sapiens' resistance is compared to the solidity of armour, impenetrable to the weapons which strike it (Ep.45.9, 53.12, Const.Sap.19.3,[1] Ira 3.5.8).

O.1.1.1 Sea cliffs pounded by waves: Const.Sap.3.5, Ira 3.25.3, Vit.Beat.27.2f.

The sapiens is compared to a cliff or rock in the sea. In each case the image illustrates the sapiens' indifference to iniuria. Just as the cliff or rock in the sea cannot be worn away by the waves that dash against it, so the sapiens is unaffected by any kind of external aggression.

Cf. resistance of athlete to opponent (D.1.1), traveller to gravity (J.6.1), soldier to attack (M.1.1, M.1.2), helmsman and ship to waves (P.1.1).

Notes

[1]However, even if some weapons do penetrate the armour, the sapiens will not yield - Const.Sap.19.3.

P: Sea and travel by sea

Since a sailor, like a soldier, may be competent or incompetent, courageous or cowardly, he may represent both the virtuous and the unrighteous man. The turbulence of the sea with its power to toss a ship or drive it off its course, when it is not competently navigated, frequently illustrates the vicissitudes of man's existence, and the effect they may have on the unrighteous. It also represents the powerful effect of the emotions on the unrighteous.

P.1 Ep.14.8, 15, 16.3, 19.2, 28.7, 31.2, 35.4, 74.4, 95.45, 123.12, Ira 2.10.8, Cons.Marc.5.6, 6.3, Tranq.5.5, Brev.Vit.18.1.
Good helmsman = sapiens.

P.1.1 Control of ship in storm: Ep.14.8, 16.3, 35.4, Cons.Marc.5.6, 6.3.

Whereas an incompetent helmsman allows the waves to wrest the helm from his hands and abandons his ship to a storm (P.2.1), a good helmsman clings to the helm unyieldingly, even as he is overwhelmed by the waves (Cons.Marc.6.3). The image illustrates the difference between the unrighteous and the virtuous in time of adversity: the unrighteous are disturbed by it, whereas the virtuous are unaffected. The virtuous continue in their course towards their goal - as the good sailor maintains his course towards his destination - no matter what their circumstances. The constantia of virtue is illustrated with a comparable image at Ep.16.3: Philosophy, is, as it were, a helmsman who "sedet ad gubernaculum et per ancipitia fluctuantium derigit cursum."[1]

Cf. resistance of helmsman to waves to that of athlete to opponent (D.1.1), traveller to gravity (J.6.1), soldier to attack (M.1.1, M.1.2), hard materials to blows etc. (O.1.1).

P.1.2 Ulysses: Ep.31.2, 88.7f, 123.12.

Turbulence is not the only danger that the sailor has to cope with out on the high seas - there are also the Sirens. Seneca compares the proficiens' 'voyage' to that of Ulysses: just as the latter was tempted by, and successfully resisted, the Sirens, so the proficiens must 'steer clear' of the 'crowd'. The crowd threatens to draw the proficiens 'off course', just as the Sirens threatened Ulysses. However, whereas Ulysses' temptation came from one island only, the crowd "non ex uno scopulo sed ex omni terrarum parte circumsonat." (Ep.31.2).

Cf. voyage towards virtue to journey on land towards virtue (J).

P.1.3 Preparedness: Ep.74.4, Ira 2.31.5, Vit.Beat.28.1, Tranq.11.7.

The preparedness of a good sailor for storms and turbulent seas provides an image for virtuous readiness for adversity, while the bad sailor's lack of preparedness is an image of the unrighteous' lack of preparedness for adversity. A sailor who is unprepared for storms (Ep.74.4, Vit.Beat.28.1, Tranq.11.7) will find himself driven off course or shipwrecked. Here Seneca recommends that the proficiens be prepared for adversity, just as a good helmsman is always ready to shorten sail (Ira 2.31.5).[2]

Cf. preparedness of athlete for contest (D.1.4), soldier for battle (M.1.3).

P.1.4 Withdrawal into harbour: Ep.14,8, 15, 19.1f, 28.7, Tranq.5.5, , Brev.Vit.18.1.

"Dissentio ab his qui in fluctus medios eunt et tumultuosam probantes vitam cotidie cum difficultatibus rerum magno animo conluctantur" says Seneca at Ep.28.7. The sapiens will endure a stormy sea, but he will not choose it. Unlike the careless helmsman, who scorns both the power of the wind and waves around Charybdis, the sapiens, like a careful helmsman, steers clear of 'turbulent water'.[3] The association of turbulent seas with worldly affairs is continued in a series of images

with which Seneca recommends that the proficiens withdraw from worldly affairs into otium. It is suggested that the proficiens should retire into otium just as a sensible sailor will withdraw, if possible, from the turbulent high seas to quieter waters, or, indeed, the harbour itself (Ep.19.1f, Tranq.5.5, Brev.Vit.18.1).[4]

Cf. withdrawal from battle (M.1.4), retiring to convalesce - Ep.53.9.

P.1.5 Orientation: Ep.71.3, 95.45.

The sailor's knowledge of his port of destination serves to illustrate Seneca's advice to the proficiens to direct his life towards a single goal. If a sailor does not know what port he is heading for he will never make any progress (Ep.71.3). The proficiens must organize his life according to the goal of the "ultimate good", just as a good sailor orients his voyage towards a port by following the stars (Ep.95.45).

Cf. artist's subject (C.1.2), archer's target (D.1.3), traveller's destination (J.4.1).

P.1.6 Leaking ship: Ira 2.10.8.

The crisis of a leaking ship provides another image, besides that of the turbulent sea, to illustrate the sapiens' behaviour in adversity: he aims not to prevent adversity, but to prevent it from overcoming him, just as a helmsman, who, when his ship has sprung a leak,[5] is unable to prevent water from entering his boat, but is able to prevent the boat from sinking by various measures. His absence of anger in such a situation with the crew (or the ship itself) illustrates the sapiens' apatheia and absence of anger towards the unrighteous.

Cf. farmer replacing lost crops (A.2.1), artist creating new statue (C.1.1). Cf. absence of anger to that of animal (Ira 2.32.3, 3.25.3 - B.1.1) and animal-trainer (B.2.1), guardian of children (Const.Sap.12.3, Ira 2.10.1 - F.1.2), guide (Ira 1.14.3 -J.4.3), doctor (L.3.1), military

commander (Ira 2.10.4 - M.1.5).

P.2 Ep.35.4, Cons.Marc.6.3, Vit.Beat.14.1, 28.1, Ot.Sap.8.4, Brev.Vit.2.3, 7.10, Cons.Polyb.9.6.
Bad helmsman = unrighteous.

P.2.1 Failure to control ship in storm: Ep.35.4, Cons.Marc.6.3, Vit. Beat.14.1, 28.1, Ot.Sap.8.4, Brev.Vit.2.3, 7.10,[7] Cons.Polyb.9.6.

"gubernatorem in tempestate ... intellegas" says Seneca at Prov. 4.5. A tranquil sea and favouring wind do not test a sailor's mettle, as prosperity does not test a man's moral fibre (Cons.Marc.5.5).[6] Hence it is with images of a helmsman's incompetent handling of his ship in stormy conditions that Seneca illustrates aspects of the unrighteous.

As the unrighteous are not in control of themselves, they find that any change in their worldly circumstances has an effect on them - their life is one of continual vicissitudes, just as a ship, which is poorly controlled, is tossed by a turbulent sea (Ep.35.4, Cons.Marc.6.3, Vit.Beat.28.1, Ot.Sap.8.4, Brev.Vit.7.10, Cons.Polyb.9.6). At Cons. Polyb.9.6 the rise and fall of the waves is explicitly associated with the rise and fall of a man's fortune:

> In hoc profundum inquietumque proiecti mare, alternis aestibus reciprocum et modo adleuans nos subitis incrementis, modo maioribus damnis deferens adsidueque iactans, numquam stabili consistimus loco, pendemus et fluctuamur et alter in alterum inlidimur et aliquando naufragium facimus, semper timemus.

Just as a ship is tossed upwards and downwards by the sea's waves, so the unrighteous find their circumstances in a continual state of flux - sometimes good, sometimes bad. The sailors and their ships may be brought into collision with one another, just as the unrighteous exist in a state of mutual strife. The sailors constantly fear shipwreck, just as the unrighteous constantly fear the loss of their prosperity.

The unrighteous are also controlled by their emotions. At Vit. Beat.14.1 the image of a ship tossed by the waves around Syrtes - often onto dry land itself - illustrates the powerlessness of the unrighteous in relation to the emotion of pleasure "cuius aut inopia torquentur aut

copia strangulantur." Just as sailors who are caught in the waves around the Syrtes find themselves equally wretched, whether they are tossed by the turbulent waves or thrown onto dry land, so the unrighteous are unhappy in the presence of pleasure, and unhappy without it (Vit.Beat.14.1).

Another image of a turbulent sea, which also depicts the effect of the emotions on the unrighteous might be mentioned here (Brev.Vit.2.3). There is, however, a significant difference: whereas, in the images considered above, the unrighteous are represented by sailors and their ships, at the mercy of the tossing sea,[8] in this image the unrighteous are represented by the sea itself, which, whipped up into turbulence by the wind, represents the emotion of desire:

> Numquam illis [the unrighteous] recurrere ad se licet; si quando aliqua fortuito quies contigit, uelut profundum mare, in quo post uentum quoque uolutatio est, fluctuantur, nec umquam illis a cupiditatibus suis otium est.

Just as the sea, after a storm, continues to be turbulent, so the unrighteous are kept in a state of continuous agitation by their desires, past, as well as present.

Cf. uncontrollable effect of waves or wind to uncontrollable effect of wild animal (B.1.6), gravity (J.2.1), sickness (L.1.4.1), rushing river (N.1.2). Cf. rise and fall of waves to precarious position on Fortune's eminence (Ep.8.4, 94.73, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4 - J.2.1). Cf. fearfulness of sailor to fearfulness of animals (B.1.2), children (F.1.1), soldier (M.2.1). Cf. collision of ships to jostling crowd (Ira 3.6.4, 3.43.3, Vit.Beat.1.3f - J.5.1).

P.3 Ep.22.12, 28.3.

Ship's cargo = spiritual 'burden' or worldly goods.

P.3.1 Ship's cargo: Ep.22.12, 28.3.

At Ep.28.3 Seneca urges Lucilius not to travel too much. The ship's cargo represent's the "onus animi" - i.e. sin - with which Lucilius is burdened. By travelling Lucilius simply shakes this up and

makes it more burdensome to himself, just as a ship's motion makes its cargo felt.

At Ep.22.12 "nemo cum sarcinis enatat" is probably an image of swimming ashore after a wreck, the point being that, as it is impossible for a man to swim ashore with his baggage, so a man cannot retire into otium and take his riches with him. Here again (cf. P.1.4) an equation is made between turbulent seas and worldly affairs.

Cf. cargo as worldly goods to athlete's oil (D.1.1.1), traveller's viaticum and luggage (J.7.1), soldier's weapons (M.4.1).

Notes

[1] An image at Ep.35.4 of a ship, changing its course according to the direction of the wind, illustrates the inconstantia of the unrighteous. Their aimlessness and inconstancy contrasts with the purposefulness and constancy of the virtuous, just as a ship tacking with the wind ("natare ... prout tulit ventus") contrasts with one that moves up and down in its place ("hic commovetur quidem, non tamen transit, sed suo loco nutat") - i.e. the proficiens - and with one that does not move at all ("ille ne commovetur quidem") - i.e. the sapiens. The two ships representing the proficiens and the sapiens are probably anchored boats - cf. the association of virtue with a ship in harbour (P.1.4).

[2] Seneca does not explicitly state that this is the practice of a good helmsman, just as he does not, for example, at Ep.95.45 (P.1.5). However, he clearly does distinguish between good and bad helmsmen as the images descriptive of the unrighteous show.

[3] At Ep.14.8 the turbulent water represents, in particular, the "potentes" (14.7), whom the sapiens, like the careful helmsman, is wise enough to avoid.

[4] At Trang.5.5 Seneca is recommending that Serenus interrupt public service with occasional periods of otium, just as a sailor will interrupt a dangerous voyage with occasional dockings at ports. For Seneca's ambivalence on the question of otium and public service in the De tranquillitate animi cf. n.14, p.75.

[5] The physical condition of a ship can also represent a man's health - Ep.30.3, Ot.Sap.3.4. Bassus' bravery at a time of declining health is compared to the ability of a good helmsman to sail a ship in poor state of repair (Ep.30.3).

[6] Cf. Ep.67.14: "Hoc loco mihi Demetrius noster occurrit, qui vitam securam et sine ullis fortunae incursionibus mare mortuum vocat."

[7] The image illustrates the point that it is the quality and not the length of life which is important:

> "Quid enim si illum multum putes nauigasse quem saeua tempestas a portu exceptum huc et illuc tulit ac uicibus uentorum ex diuerso furentium per eadem spatia in orbem egit? non ille multum nauigauit sed multum iactatus est."

[8] For other images in which the sea itself represents man, cf. Ep.79.8, Prov.2.1.

Q: Theatre

The majority of the images of the theatre revolve around the pretence of acting and the contrast between appearance and reality: the actor provides a common image for illustration of various aspects of the unrighteous, particularly their deceitfulness.

Q.1 Ep.26.5, 76.31, 79.18, 80.7ff, 120.22, Trang.17.1.
Actor = unrighteous.

Q.1.1 Costume, mask etc.: Ep.26.5, 76.31, 79.18, 80.7ff, Trang.17.1.

The contrast between the social status and prosperity feigned by an actor in a play, and the reality of his humble station serves as an image for the deceptiveness of unrighteous prosperity at Ep.76.31 and 80.7ff: the buskin gives the actor a lofty stature, but when he has once removed it, he returns to his real height - just so, though wealth and honour place a man 'on a pedestal',[1] his eminence is not genuine (Ep.76.31). Similarly, the actor's gorgeous clothes ("purpuratos" - Ep.26.31) feign glory, and contrast with the poor clothes which the actor wears in real life. In short, the actors's happiness is merely assumed with his mask ("personata felicitas est" - Ep.80.8) just as the happiness of the unrighteous is false. At Trang.17.1 and Ep.79.18 the mask[2] of an actor again illustrates the deceit of the unrighteous, whose life is "ficta, ostentationi parata" (Trang.17.1), contrasting with the frank honesty of the virtuous. Similarly, at Ep.26.5 the pretence of the theatre ("strophae ac fuci") serves as an image of the "levia ... et fallacia pignora animi multisque involuta lenociniis" which, Seneca modestly claims, will constitute his life until the moment of death. Only then will he discover whether his brave sentiments have been genuine - whether, in a continuation of the theatrical image - they were real or merely "mime".

Cf. false appearance of actor to veneer/gilding (E.3.1), fallacious appearance of illness (L.1.5).

Q.2 Ep.77.20, 120.22, Cons.Marc.10.1.

Play = life.

Q.2.1 Length versus quality of acting: Ep.77.20.

At Ep.77.20 an image illustrates the point that the quality of life is more important than its length with a comparison of life to a play: "Quomodo fabula, sic vita: non quam diu, sed quam bene acta sit, refert." As the quality of a play's performance, not its length, determines its value, so the quality of a life, not its length, constitutes its moral worth.

Cf. length of play to length of gladiator's life (D.1.2.1), journey (J.S.1).

Q.2.2 Roles: Ep.120.22.

At Ep.120.22 the tendency for the actor to play a number of different roles provides an image for the inconsistency of the unrighteous. It contrasts with the constantia of the sapiens who "acts only one part" ("unum agit").

Q.2.3 Stage properties: Cons.Marc.10.1.

An image of stage properties illustrates Seneca's exhortation to Marcia to regard worldly goods as temporary possessions. Just as the properties, collected together for a performance, must be returned to their owner at the end of the performance, so wealth, honour, fame, children etc. are merely loans, which must be returned at the end of the 'play of life'.

Cf. rented lodgings (E.1.1), loan (I.1.1).

Notes

[1]For the association of worldly prosperity with height, cf. Ep. 8.4, 94.73, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4 (J.2.1).

[2]The deceitfulness of the unrighteous is also suggested with an image of cosmetics - Ep.79.18: "exornavit et pinxit". Cf. the description of Voluptas, drawn in contrast to Virtus, as "mero atque unguento madentem, pallidam aut fucatam et medicamentis pollinctam." (Vit.Beat.7.3), and cf. Cons.Helv.5.6: "ego in illis quae omnes optant existimaui semper nihil ueri boni inesse, tum inania et specioso ac deceptorio fuco circumlita inueni, intra nihil habentia fronti suae simile."

PART II

The sights and sounds of Seneca's life and the thoughts which he did not record can never be recaptured. Hence it is impossible to determine, when, by drawing on his own experience[1] or imagination, Seneca creates prose-imagery of his own; nor can the possibility of this ever be discounted. However, as I shall demonstrate in the following pages, it is possible to show that many of Seneca's images were used by successive philosophers and men of letters before him (as, indeed, after him). In these cases, as I suggested in my introductory remarks, we are entitled to assume - given Seneca's education and training, which I shall presently outline - that Seneca was already familiar with the traditional images, and, to this extent, owed his own images to them, even if personal observation or experience prompted their use or gives them freshness.

To determine the sources of Seneca's imagery within these acknowledged limits we shall look first to the authority of Seneca himself: in a number of cases he attributes an image to a particular author, either purposefully, - as when he quotes a Sextian image that has appealed to him (e.g. Ep.59.7f) - or incidentally, when a Sextian passage quoted from another author simply happens to contain an image. When Senecan authority for the source of an image is lacking, however, we must arrive at a more or less probable source on the basis of the pertinent influences to which we know, or can assume, Seneca was subject. These influences will be constituted primarily by Seneca's education and personal reading - literary and philosophical. However, we must not forget that imagery is also embedded in colloquial language, often in the form of proverbs.

At the primary level of his education Seneca would have been introduced to certain poets through pithy lines of a moral nature excerpted from their works. These gnomai or sententiae were often set for copying as a handwriting exercise[2] and had to be learnt by heart.[3] Their sententious nature meant that they sometimes contained a striking image.[4] Among Latin sententiae, lines from Publilius Syrus, a writer of mimes, were particularly popular from the Augustan age onwards.[5] Seneca, who greatly admires Publilius Syrus for his moral lessons,[6] often recalls as

an adult these sententiae learnt in childhood,[7] but complains bitterly about adults whose sole claim to the title of philosopher resides in sententiae and chreiai memorized at school (Ep.33.7f). Closely related to the gnomai or sententiae were the chreiai or apophthegmata.[8] These pithy and moralistic sayings of famous men - especially philosophers - often collected in anthologies, would again provide primary schoolboys with material for copying and rote learning.[9] Again their pithy nature meant that they might often be couched in the form of an image, as in the favourite example:"Ἰσοκράτης ἔφησε τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ῥίζαν εἶναι πικράν τὸν δὲ καρπὸν γλυκύν."[10] Among Greek authors of such sayings, Diogenes the Cynic often furnished apophthegmata or chreiai for school use,[11] while a collection of the Elder Cato's sayings is mentioned by Seneca at Ep.94.27.[12] Under the grammaticus and rhetor the sententia and apophthegma or chreia would continue, in more advanced form, to be part of the schoolboy's exercises, the progymnasmata.[13]

Under the grammaticus a schoolboy would begin to study the poets from a complete text. We may be sure that Seneca would have studied Homer, Virgil (especially the Aeneid), Menander, Terence, perhaps the Greek lyric poets,[14] and Horace's Odes.[15] We may assume of course that Seneca supplemented his school syllabus with private reading,[16] and continued the practice throughout his life.[17] Judging from the frequency with which he refers to them, Ovid (Metamorphoses) and Lucretius, after Virgil, were two of Seneca's favourite poets.[18] Seneca's attention to the rich store of imagery in these poets would have been sharpened by the grammaticus' analyses of the metaphor and simile as used by the poets and by discussion of the theory and practice of their use in rhetorical handbooks.[19] Moreover, once at the rhetorical school to which Seneca the Elder, eager that his son should become an orator or senator,[20] would have sent him, Seneca would have had ample opportunity to hear and use images new, and - more often - hackneyed.[21]

Seneca's philosophical education was closely connected with the rhetorical through the figure of Papirius Fabianus, a member of the Sextian school, whose declamatory efforts are recorded by Seneca the Elder.[22] Founder of the "only philosophical school Rome had ever

produced"[23] Sextius died before Seneca was old enough to hear him.[24] Sextius' philosophical ideas were close enough to those of the Stoic school for Seneca to regard him as a Stoic, but Sextius himself, Seneca tells us (Ep.64.2), rejected the title. The reason, as Oltramare suggests,[25] is possibly that Sextius was aware of having injected a new vigour into the exposition of ethics which did not belong to traditional Stoicism. Thus, after hearing a reading of Sextius, Seneca exclaims:

> Quantus in illo, di boni, vigor est, quantum animi! Hoc non in omnibus philosophis invenies: quorundam scripta clarum habentium nomen exanguia sunt. Instituunt, disputant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum quia non habent: cum legeris Sextium, dices, "vivit, viget, liber est, supra hominem est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae. Ep.64.3

Criticisms which Seneca makes elsewhere in his prose-works of the expository methods of the Old Stoics[26] suggest that he has them in mind among those "certain" ("quorundam") philosophers. At Ben.1.3.8ff and Ep.82.8ff Seneca criticizes both Chrysippus and Zeno for an excessive concern for niceties and a casuistical approach to moral questions which offers little practical help or encouragement to men. Similarly, at Ep. 117.1ff, alluding to Stoic preoccupation with "quaestiunculas",[27] Seneca makes clear his own contempt for such a conception of philosophy and reaffirms his view of the philosopher as a practical moral counsellor.[28] Seneca's criticisms of the Stoic style echo Cicero's:

> orationis etiam genus habent [scil. Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum, sed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum ac tamen eius modi, quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo possit. de Orat.3.66

A spirited, pragmatic, almost aggressively protreptic[30] approach to ethics, aimed at the ordinary individual,[31] characterizes Sextian philosophy as described by his followers,[32] and is probably the quality which Sextius felt distinguished him from traditional Stoics, although, as I shall argue below,[33] it probably did not distinguish him from Seneca's Stoic contemporaries. In short, as Oltramare has shown,[34] there is a strong element of 'diatribe' in the Sextian school, of which I shall have more to say below.

Seneca received his education in Stoicism in part from Attalus.[35] He describes himself as "besieging" ("obsideremus" - Ep.108.3) his class-

room, being the first to arrive and last to leave, and engaging him in discussion at every available opportunity (Ep.108.3). Seneca describes his admiration for Attalus in hyperbolic terms (Ep.108.13) and attributes his own ascetic habits to his persuasion (Ep.108.14ff, 23). As we might expect, Seneca also demonstrates familiarity with the more eminent 'Roman'[36] Stoics Panaetius,[37] and his two pupils, Posidonius[38] and Hecaton,[39] as well as with Athenodorus, Augustus' Stoic adviser.[40] Seneca was also, in von Arnim's opinion,[41] well acquainted with the works of the Old Stoa.

Besides the two major influences of the Stoic and Sextian schools on Seneca, we should also take into account the important influences of Cynicism and Epicureanism. Seneca was personally acquainted with Demetrius the Cynic,[42] whose philosophical career spanned the reigns of Caligula to Domitian,[43] and speaks of him in the highest terms;[44] it is principally to Seneca that we owe our knowledge of his teaching.[45] The close connections between the Cynic and Stoic schools which existed from the earliest days of Stoicism have been shown by Dudley.[46] From the time of the early Empire, however, Roman Stoicism shows itself particularly receptive to the Cynic influence in the form of asceticism[47] and an emphasis on pragmatic moral exhortation at the expense of the speculative branches of philosophy.[48] In so far as it did so, the Stoic and Sextian schools show similar trends. Magarethe Billerbeck has pointed to the clear signs of this influence already in the teaching of Seneca's Stoic teacher, Attalus, from whom he would inherit it.[49]

Seneca often refers to the views and sayings of Epicurus in his prose-works, especially in the Epistulae morales. Epicurus' letters probably provided Seneca with a model for his own philosophical epistles[50] while precedent for the appropriation of Epicurean ideas into Stoicism had been furnished Seneca by his eclectic teacher, Attalus.[51] Usener believed that Seneca drew the Epicurean sayings of his first fifty-two epistles from a collection of gnomai derived from the letters of Epicurus and his disciples.[52]

Finally, Seneca's primary literary models remain to be considered as potential sources for his imagery. In the attempt to determine the

literary models of Seneca's prose-works, several scholars have established their connection with a literary genre which they have identified as 'diatribe' or διατριβή.[53] This is defined as "a popular philosophical discourse invented by Bion the Borysthenite, devoted usually to a single moral theme and aimed at a wider circle than school philosophy, being loose in structure and characterized by a pointed style, vivid imagery, and colloquialisms."[54] Certain other features, such as the use of a fictive interlocutor, coarseness, a mixture of seriousness and humour (τὸ σπουδογέλοιον) etc. have also been identified with such a genre.[55] More recently, however, the whole concept of 'diatribe' as a genre has been called into question, on the grounds that these features are not restricted to works called διατριβαί[56] nor to authors whom Bion and Teles could be said to have influenced,[57] and that they could have been learnt through the rhetorical schools.[58]

However, the term 'diatribe' is useful to describe stylistic features and themes held in common in varying degrees by the moralizing works of, for example, the Greeks Bion, Teles, Epictetus, Musonius Rufus, Philo, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Lucian, as well as the Romans Lucretius, Lucilius, Varro, Horace (the Sermones), Cicero (Tusculan disputations, De finibus, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De senectute), the declaimers, and Seneca.[59] This is the line of 'diatribe' followed by Oltramare;[60] but since, as I have indicated above, Cynicism also exerted an influence - especially in the realm of imagery - on Stoic philosophers, we may also regard the exposition of Stoic philosophy - to a certain extent and more so at certain periods and in certain people - as part of the 'diatribe' tradition. Of particular importance in this respect will be Ariston of Chios and Seneca's contemporary 'Roman' Stoics.[61] Ariston of Chios, a Stoic of the third century B.C., in many ways prefigures the fusion of Cynic elements with Stoic which, as we have seen, is exemplified by the Sextian philosophers and certain Stoics of first century Rome. We find in Ariston the same contempt for cavillatio and the same concentration on the ethical aspects of Stoicism delivered with persuasion.[62] Furthermore, as Bultmann has shown,[63] the epistles of St. Paul may also be regarded, to a certain extent,[64] as typical of the 'diatribe' tradition.

Brought up in Tarsus where a school of Stoicism was established, his "ways of thinking are penetrated by Stoic conceptions"[65] and his method of exposition by the Cynic sermon.

While poetic imagery will undoubtedly have influenced Seneca, it is primarily among the exponents of the moralizing tradition or 'diatribe' that we should expect to find the sources of his imagery. Intended for the persuasion of the 'man in the street', the 'diatribe' as represented by Bion often resorts to images drawn from everyday life to make its message readily comprehensible and persuasive.[66] While not all manifestations of the 'diatribe' tradition, as I have defined it - including the prose-works of Seneca himself - are either oral or aimed at an uneducated audience,[67] it will be seen, I believe, that they continue both to make extensive use of imagery and to draw it from everyday life.

Notes

[1]Included among such experience would be, of course, works of fine art seen, and the spectacles of theatre and amphitheatre. The latter, as Martial's Liber spectaculorum demonstrates, made an impression on the literate as well as the illiterate.

[2]Cf. S.F. Bonner, Education in ancient Rome: from the elder Cato to the younger Pliny, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp.173ff (hereafter cited as Bonner).

[3]Cf. Seneca, Ep.33.7: "Ideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias vocant, quia conplecti illas puerilis animus potest ..."

[4]Cf. Publilius Syrus, M.1.3.1, p.197.

[5]Cf. Bonner, p.175.

[6]Cf. Ep.8.8ff, Trang.11.8 and Seneca the elder, Con.7.3.8.

[7]Ep.8.8ff, Trang.11.8, Cons.Marc.9.5.

[8]For the distinction cf. J.F. Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes: a collection of the fragments with introduction and commentary, Acta universitatis upsaliensis, Studia graeca upsaliensia 11 (Uppsala, 1976), p.92 and n.21 (hereafter cited as Kindstrand).

[9]Cf. Bonner, p.176 and Seneca, Ep.33.7ff. The chreia often began with " ... (philosopher's name) ἔλεγε" or some such phrase - cf. Kindstrand, p.99, and Seneca, Ep.33.7: "'Hoc Zenon dixit' ... 'Hoc Cleanthes'".

[10]Hermogenes, L. Spengel, Rhetores graeci, 3 vols., (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1853-1856; vol.1., 2nd ed., ed. C. Hammer, 1894), vol.2, p.6, 21ff. Cf. E. Weber,'De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum sectatore', LSKPh 10 (1887) 77-268, pp.181ff (hereafter cited as Weber, 1887).

[11]Cf. Bonner, p.176, and Seneca, Ep.94.9. Cf. also G. von Wartensleben, Begriff der griechischen Chreia und Beiträge zur Geschichte ihrer Form, (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1901), pp.28ff.

[12]Cf. Bonner, ibid.

[13]Ibid., pp.253, 256ff.

[14]Bonner, p.216, refers to Seneca, Ep.27.6, who shows that the poetry of the Greek lyricists was sometimes learnt by heart.

[15]Whether Seneca would have studied the Attic tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, or the Latin tragedians, Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius, is less certain - cf. Bonner, pp.214f. Both Greek and Roman tragedians are mentioned very rarely in the prose-works - cf. W.S. Maguinness, 'Seneca and the poets', Hermathena 88 (1956) 81-98, pp. 90f. R.J. Tarrant, Seneca: Agamemnon, Cambridge classical texts and commentaries 18, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp.9, 13, is of the opinion that Seneca had little knowledge of either.

[16]Cf. Quintilian, Inst.1.2.11f: " ... cum praesertim multo plus secreti temporis studia desiderent ... Lectio quoque non omnis semper praeeunte uel interpretante eget: quando enim tot auctorum notitia contingeret?"

[17]Cf. Mewis, op.cit., n.15, p.6.

[18]Ovid (especially in the Metamorphoses) is the second most often quoted poet after Virgil - cf. Maguiness, op.cit., n.15. "Lucretius is quoted five times, always with approval." - ibid., p.91.

[19]Cf. Bonner, pp.229ff, 235ff, and Quintilian, Inst.8.3.72ff, Aristotle, Rh.3.10.1ff (1410b), Po.21.4ff (1457b), Demetrius, Eloc.78ff.

[20]Cf. Seneca the elder, Con.2 praef.4.

[21]Cf. Quintilian, Inst.8.3.76 and J. Fairweather, Seneca the elder, Cambridge classical studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.199f, 218, 248, 250, 277, 284.

[22]Con.2 passim.

[23]Griffin, p.37.

[24]A. Oltramare, Les origines de la diatribe romaine, (Lausanne: Payot, 1926), pp.155f (hereafter cited as Oltramare), conjectures that Sextius was born c a. 70 B.C.

[25]Ibid., pp.162f.

[26]Criticism of philosophers for hairsplitting is, of course, a vulgar topos - cf. the σκινδαλαμοί of Aristophanes, Nu.130, Ra.819.

Apart from Zeno (Ep.82.9ff, 83.9ff), Chrysippus (Ben.1.3.8ff), Posidonius (Ep.83.10ff, 87.31ff) and Antipater (Ep.87.38ff), Seneca does not mention any names in his criticism of the hairsplitting style (cf. n.28). However, he does twice refer to it as Greek - at Ep.82.8 ("ineptias Graecas") and Ben.1.3.6 ("Sit aliquis usque eo Graecis emancipatus"). Seneca does not, of course, consider an obsession with dialectical philosophy a purely Stoic characteristic (cf. the Peripatetics - Ep.87.38 and Ep.85.1: ("Iubes me quicquid est interrogationum aut nostrarum aut ad traductionem nostram excogitaturum comprendere."), and 3, ("Huic collectioni hoc modo Peripatetici ... respondent"). In so far as

he considers it Stoic, it seems that he regards it as a characteristic of the Old Stoa, and, to some extent, of the Middle Stoa. Seneca cannot be using 'Greek' in this context simply as a designation of nationality as his Greek teacher, Attalus, (cf. R. Schottlaender, 'Epikureisches bei Seneca' in Seneca als Philosoph, ed. G. Maurach, Wege der Forschung 414 (Darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975; reprinted from Philologus 99 (1955) 133-148), p.167) whom Seneca much admired (cf. pp.95f) had a style far removed from the hairsplitting style Seneca despised, as had most Stoics who followed in the footsteps of Panaetius (Cicero tells us that " ... tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit ... " Fin.4.28.79). By 'Greek', therefore, Seneca probably means those members of the Old Stoa who had no connection with Rome and whose style was quite different from that of the 'Roman' Stoics - cf. p.96 and n.36.

[27]Seneca makes clear that he regards the Stoic distinction between "sapientia" and "sapere" a "quaestiuncula" from the discussion of which, and other similar trivial questions, he wishes to disassociate him-self (Ep.117.1, 18, 20).

[28]For similar condemnations of the hairsplitting approach to philosophy, cf. Ep.48.7ff, 49.5ff, 85.1.

[29]Cf. Parad.praef., Brut.114, 118, 120, Fin.3.5, de Orat.2.159, and Hadot, pp.184ff.

Seneca, however, is not satisfied by Cicero's style - Ep.114.16. Cf. Hadot, p.187.

[30]Cf. Seneca's account of the philosophical approach of Fabianus, Sextius' disciple:

> "Solebat dicere Fabianus ... contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum, nec minutis uulneribus sed incursu auertendam aciem; [non probat cauillationes] ⟨uitia⟩ enim contundi debere, non uellicari." Brev.Vit.10.1.

Cf. the language with which Seneca criticises Chrysippus "cuius acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur; etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, pungit, non perforat." Ben.1.4.1.

Curiously enough, however, Seneca admits (like his father, Con.2. praef.2) that Fabianus' style is "placida et ad animi tenorem quietum compositumque formata, nec depressa sed plana. Deest illis oratorius vigor stimulique ..." (Ep.100.8), but that his words were nevertheless of the kind "quae adulescentem indolis bonae attollerent et ad imitationem sui evocarent sine desperatione vincendi, quae mihi adhortatio videtur efficacissima" (Ep.100.12).

[31]Cf. Oltramare, p.163: "La conscience de chacun, tel est le terrain choisi par Sextius pour sa propagande." Seneca inherited from Sextius the habit of making a daily confession to himself and assessment of his behaviour - Ira 3.36ff. Seneca stresses that Sextius made virtue potentially accessible to everyone: "Nam hoc quoque egregium Sextius habet, quod et ostendet tibi beatae vitae magnitudinem et desperationem eius non faciet." (Ep.64.5). Cf. same quality in Fabianus, n.30, ad fin.

[32]Cf. also Sotion, follower of Sextius and early teacher of Seneca - Ep.49.2, who acted as an intermediary influence between Sextius and Seneca in the De ira. Cf. W. Allers, De L.A. Senecae librorum de ira fontibus, (Diss., Göttingen, 1881), pp.10ff (hereafter cited as Allers).

[33]Pp.96, 225, and n.24.

[34]Pp.153ff.

[35]Seneca also attended the lectures at Naples of a certain Metronax - Ep.76.1ff. Unknown outside Seneca (cf. Griffin, p.445), he is assumed without explanation by M. Billerbeck, Der Kyniker Demetrius: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Popularphilosophie, Philosophia antiqua 36 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), p.19 (hereafter cited as Billerbeck) to be a Stoic. There is nothing in Seneca's brief description of Metronax' topics of discussion (Ep.76.4) which suggests a Stoic in particular.

[36]Actually Greeks, they are 'Roman' in the sense that they are responsible for the establishment of Stoicism at Rome - cf. E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, (Cambridge, 1911; reprint ed., New York: The Humanities Press, 1958), pp.100ff.

[37]"Seneca knew the works of Panaetius and Posidonius well", Griffin, p.310. Cf. Ep.116.5 and Griffin, pp.179ff. Seneca used Panaetius' περὶ εὐθυμίας for the De tranquillitate animi - cf. Griffin, pp.314, 297.

[38]L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd, Posidonius: I. The fragments, Cambridge classical texts and commentaries 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), find fragments of Posidonius in Seneca, Ep.78.28 83.9-11, 87.31-40, 88.21-28, 90.5-13, 20-25, 30-32, 92.10, 94.38, 95.65-67, 113.28.

[39]Cf. H.N. Fowler, 'The sources of Seneca de beneficiis', TAPhA 18 (1886) 24-33 and id., Panaetii et Hecatonis librorum fragmenta, (Diss., Bonn, 1885), pp.24ff, for Hecaton as a source of this work.

[40]Athenodorus Sandonis filius, not Athenodorus Kordylion, also from Tarsus - cf. P. Grimal, 'Auguste et Athénodore', REA 48 (1946) 62-79, pp.62ff (hereafter cited as Grimal, 1946).

[41]J. von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 4 vols., (Stuttgart, 1905-1924; reprint ed., Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1964), vol.1, pp.xviif (hereafter cited as SVF).

[42]At least in the Neronian period - cf. Griffin, p.311 and n.6.

[43]Oltramare, p.232, and n.2.

[44]Ep.62.3 ("virorum optimum"), Nat.4praef.7 ("egregius vir"), Ben.7.8.2 ("virum exactae, licet neget ipse, sapientiae").

[45]Cf. Billerbeck, p.11.

[46]D.R. Dudley, A history of Cynicism: from Diogenes to the 6th century A.D., (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1937), pp.96ff (hereafter cited as Dudley).

[47]Billerbeck, pp.5ff.

[48]Dudley, p.188

[49]Pp.55ff.

[50]Griffin, pp.4, 350, 352, 418 and G. Maurach, Der Bau von Senecas epistulae morales, Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften N.F.2 Reihe, Band 30 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1970), pp.186ff.

[51]Cf. Schottlaender, op.cit., n.26, pp.167ff. Cf. also Usener, p.lvii.

[52]P.lv.

[53]Weber, 1895; P. Wendland, Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judentum und Christentum, 4th ed. enl., with a bibliography by H. Dörrie, Handbuch zum neuen Testament 2 (Tübingen: J.C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1972), p.79 (hereafter cited as Wendland 1972); Bultmann, 1910, p.7 (he recognizes only the Epistulae morales, De clementia and De beneficiis as belonging to this genre); Oltramare, pp.252ff, E. Norden, Die antike Kunstprosa: vom VI Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance, 5th ed., 2 vols., (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1958), vol.1, p.309.

[54]Griffin, p.13.

[55]Cf. Oltramare, pp.1ff.

[56]Cf. Griffin, p.14 and nn.1 and 2 and H.D. Jocelyn, 'Diatribes and sermons', LCM 7.1 (1982) 3-7.

[57]Cf. R. Hirzel, Der Dialog: ein literarhistorischer Versuch, 2 vols., (Leipzig, 1895; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), vol.2, p.13 and n.3, who does not consider Bion to be a direct source of Horace in his satires. Wendland 1972, p.79, suggests that neither Horace nor Seneca had direct knowledge of Bion. However, cf. n.11, p.229.

[58]Cf. Hirzel, ibid., pp.29ff and Wendland 1972, ibid.

[59]For works on the relationship between these authors and 'diatribe' cf. Kindstrand, pp.97ff; P. Wendland, 'Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe' in Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion, by P. Wendland and O. Kern, (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895); B.P. Wallach, Lucretius and the diatribe against the fear of death: de

rerum natura 3.830-1094, Mnemosyne supp.40 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976); R. Heinze, De Horatio Bionis imitatore, (Diss., Bonn, 1889); Weber 1895.

[60] However, Oltramare interprets 'diatribe' in a very broad sense including the Roman Republican dramatists and the elegists etc. within its influence.

[61] Cf. n.36.

[62] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.160f = SVF I, 351, p.79, 11-15: "τόν τε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει ... ἐοικέναι δὲ τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἀραχνίοις, ἃ καίτοι δοκοῦντα τεχνικόν τι ἐμφαίνειν, ἄχρηστά ἐστιν." and 161: "ἦν δέ τις πειστικὸς καὶ ὄχλῳ πεποιημένος.

[63] Bultmann 1910.

[64] "der Stil des Paulus ist aus der griechischen Literatur allein Überhaupt nicht zu erklären, sondern ist mindestens ebenso sehr durch den alttestamentlichen oder überhaupt den semitischen Stil gebildet ... Es ist natürlich sehr wohl denkbar, daß manche Eigentümlichkeiten der Diatribe auch jüdischer Rhetorik eigen wären." Bultmann, ibid., pp.3f.

[65] Arnold, op.cit., n.36.

So great are the similarites between the writings of Paul and Seneca that, since the time of Augustine and Jerome, claims have been made for friendship and even correspondence between them - cf. J.N. Sevenster, Paul and Seneca, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 6, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), pp.6ff.

[66] Cf. Kindstrand, pp.31f, and Weber 1887, pp.173ff.

[67] Cf. Griffin, p.14 and n.5, who states that Seneca's works are "not 'popular' like the harangues of street philosophers, being, as they are, more learned and intentionally narrower in appeal than even the discourses of Epictetus or Musonius Rufus."

A: Agriculture

A.1 Ep.38.2, 73.16, 81.1, 104.11, 112.2, 124.10f, Cons.Marc.16.7, Vit.Beat.9.2, Clem.2.7.4, Ben.1.1.2, 2.11.4, 4.9.2, 14.2f, 7.32.1. Good farmer = sapiens, soil = disposition, seeds = potential virtue, crop = developed virtue, weeds = vice.

A.1.1 Sowing and cultivation of seeds: Ep.38.2, 73.16, 81.1, 124.10f, Vit.Beat.9.2, Ben.1.1.2, 2.11.4, 4.9.2, 14.2f, 7.32.1.

The comparison of man's potential virtue to seeds, his disposition to soil, and the resulting virtue to a fruitful crop, or vice to weeds,[1] is not uncommon in Classical literature and is well-known in Christian terms in the parable of the sower (Matt.13 and parallels). Early developments of the image in Greek literature are found in Plato's dialogues. Thus at Rep.589a-b Plato compares a just man's control of his irrational impulses-"τὸ πολυκέφαλον θρέμμα"-and the cultivation of his better qualities to a farmer "τὰ μὲν ἥμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι." Seneca's comparison of the philosopher, in his capacity as moral instructor, to a farmer is prefigured by Plato's extended image at Phdr.276b-277a. Contrasting the philosopher who seeks to instruct through writing with (in Plato's opinion) the better philosopher who uses the dialectical method, Plato compares the former to an impatient pleasure-gardener (276b,d), the latter to a serious and patient farmer "τῇ γεωργικῇ χαίρων ... τέχνῃ" (276b). He defines such serious philosophical instruction as

> ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χαίρων, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἳ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί. 276e-277a.[2]

Similarly, in Latin, the image is used in the context of philosophical instruction by Cicero: "Cultura autem animi philosophia est; haec extrahit uitia radicitus et praeparat animos ad satus

accipiendos eaque mandat iis et, ut ita dicam, serit quae adulta fructos uberrimos ferant." (Tusc.2.5.13). Cicero also applies it to the context of oratory[3] when, in his De oratore, he makes Antonius compare the young trainee orator to a ploughed field in which the teacher sows: "Subacto mihi ingenio opus est, ut agro non semel arato, sed [novato et] iterato quo meliores fetus possit et grandiores edere." (de Orat.30.131). Again in the realm of oratory, Cicero makes an analogy between moral imperfection and weeds at Orat.15.48:

> Nihil enim est feracius ingeniis, eis praesertim quae disciplinis exculta sunt. Sed ut segetes fecundae et uberes non solum fruges uerum herbas etiam effundunt inimicissimas frugibus, sic interdum ex illis locis aut leuia quaedam aut causis aliena aut non utilia gignuntur.

A similar analogy is made by Horace at Sat.1.3.34ff when he declares

> Denique te ipsum
> concute, num qua tibi uitiorum inseuerit olim
> natura aut etiam consuetudo mala; namque,[4]
> neglectis urenda filix innascitur agris.

Plutarch, like Seneca, finds agricultural imagery very appropriate for describing the process by which virtue is taught and learnt. Thus in discussing the way in which virtue is acquired Plutarch says:

> ὥσπερ δὲ τῇ γεωργίᾳ παῦτον μὲν ἀγαθὴν ὑπάρξαι δεῖ τὴν γῆν, εἶτα δὲ φυτουργὸν ἐπιστήμονα, εἶτα σπέρματα σπουδαῖα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γῇ μὲν ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις, γεωργῷ δ' ὁ παιδεύων, σπέρματι δ' αἱ τῶν λόγων ὑποθῆκαι καὶ τὰ παραγγέλματα. Mor.2b (De liberis educandis).

Similar comparisons are stated or implied in other agricultural images with which Plutarch illustrates the cultivation of virtue and development of vice: Mor.4c, 9b (De liberis educandis), 497c (De amore prolis), 528c, 529b (De vitioso pudore), 552c (De sera numinis vindicta),[5] and in an agricultural image used by Epictetus which is clearly reminiscent of Plato's image at Phdr.276b-277a (quoted above, p.1):

> σαυτῷ φιλοσόφησον ὀλίγον χρόνον. οὕτως καρπὸς γίνεται. καταουγῆναι δεῖ ⟨εἰς⟩ χρόνον τὸ σπέρμα, κρυφθῆναι, κατὰ μικρὸν αὐξηθῆναι, ἵνα τελεσφορήσῃ. ἂν δὲ πρὸ τοῦ γόνυ φῦσαι τὸν στάχυν ἐξενέγκῃ, ἀτελές ἐστιν, ἐκ κῆπου Ἀδωνιακοῦ Diss.4.8.36ff.[6]

It is clear that Seneca has many precedents for his comparison of the teaching and development of virtue to the sowing and germination

of seed. No doubt the image also suggested itself to Seneca because the seed is a traditional Stoic image of divine logos - and therefore also of virtue - disseminated in the world.[7] The word 'semen' alone is used in this sense by Seneca at Ep.94.29, 108.8, 120.4, Ben.4.6.6.

A.1.2 Treatment of mature plants and trees: Ep.112.2, Clem.2.7.4.

A.1.2.1 Pruning: Clem.2.7.4.

Cicero compares disciplining a young orator's over exuberant style to the pruning of overgrowing vines:

> uolo enim se efferat in adulescente fecunditas. Nam facilius sicut in uitibus reuocantur ea, quae se nimium profuderunt quam, si nihil ualet materies, noua sarmenta cultura excitantur; item uolo esse in adulescente, unde aliquid amputem; non enim potest in eo sucus esse diuturnus, quod nimis celeriter est maturitatem adsecutum. 8
> de Orat.2.21.88

Analogy between pruning and moral correction is suggested by Horace at Sat.1.3.120ff ("falce recisurum"), but it is found in much more developed form in Plutarch, Mor.529b (De vitioso pudore):

> ἢ καὶ τὸ θεράπευμα δυσχερὲς καὶ οὐκ ἀκίνδυνος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων πλεονασμῶν κόλουσις. ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς ἄγριον μὲν ἐκκόπτων βλάστημα καὶ ἀγεννὲς αὐτόθεν ἀφειδῶς ἐμβαλὼν τὸ σκαφεῖον ἀνέτρεψε τὴν ὀίζαν ἢ πῦρ προσαγαγὼν ἐπέκαυσεν, ἀμπέλῳ δὲ προσιὼν τομῆς δεομένῃ καὶ μήλέας ἢ τινος ἐλαίας ἁπτόμενος εὐλαβῶς ἐπιφέρει τὴν χεῖρα, δεδιὼς μή τι τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος ἀποτυφλώσῃ, οὕτως ὁ φιλόσοφος φθόνον μὲν ἐξαιρῶν νέου ψυχῆς, ἀγεννὲς βλάστημα καὶ δυστιθάσευτον, ἢ ἀλαζονείαν ἄφρον ἢ φιληδονίαν ἐπικόπτων ἀκόλαστον αἱμάσσει καὶ πιέζει καὶ τομὴν ποιεῖ καὶ οὐλὴν βαθεῖαν. ὅταν δὲ τυφεῷ μέρει ψυχῆς καὶ ἀπαλῷ κολούοντα προσαγάγῃ λόγον, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ δυσαπούμενον καὶ διατρεπόμενον, εὐλαβεῖται μὴ λάθῃ τούτοις συναποκόψας τὸ αἰδούμενον.

A.1.2.2 Straightening: Clem.2.7.4.

Like Seneca, Plutarch also compares moral correction to the straightening of crooked plants using props:

> καὶ καθάπερ τὰς χάρακας τοῖς φυτοῖς οἱ γεωργοὶ παρατιθέασιν, οὕτως οἱ νόμιμοι τῶν διδασκάλων ἐμμελεῖς τὰς ὑποθήκας καὶ παραινέσεις παραπηγνύουσι τοῖς νέοις, ἵν'ὁδῷ τούτων βλαστάνῃ τὰ ἤθη.
> Mor.4c (De liberis educandis).

A common source, rather than dependence on Seneca on the part of Plutarch, is probably a likely explanation of the parallel.[9] The

suggested comparison between straightness and virtue, crookedness and vice may suggest a Stoic source.[10]

A.1.2.3 Grafting: Ep.112.2.

Cicero furnishes precedents for Seneca's comparison of moral correction to grafting ("inserere") - for example at Brut.213: "o generosam ... stirpem et tamquam in unam arborem plura genera, sic in istam domum multorum insitam sapientiam."[11] Like other agricultural images, Cicero uses this one as an analogy for oratorical training: Crassus in the De oratore demands that his pupils be "uberes" for the requisite talents "inseri et donari ab arte non possunt" (de Orat.1.113f).

While Cicero's uses of the image suggest that comparison of moral correction to grafting is probably traditional, Seneca makes clear that he draws on personal experience ("Volo tibi ex nostro artificio exemplum referre" - Ep.112.1) when he employs the image of the vine: numerous remarks in his epistles testify to his interest in viticulture, and, indeed, to agriculture in general.[12]

A.2 Ep.104.11, Prov.4.13, Cons.Marc.16.7.
Endurance of farmer = apatheia of sapiens.

A.2.1 Agricultural damages: Ep.104.11, Cons.Marc.16.7.

In urging Marcia to deal with the death of her son as matter-of-factly as a farmer deals with damage to his trees (Cons.Marc.16.7), Seneca employs an image which is probably ultimately derived from Stilpon, head of the Megarian school of philosophy in the fourth century. Teles attributes an image strikingly similar to this one to Stilpon:

> οὐ γὰρ ὀρθῶς φησὶ βουλευομένου ὁ Στίλπων τὸ διὰ τοὺς ἀπογενομένους τῶν ζώντων ὀλιγωρεῖν. γεωργὸς οὐ ποιεῖ τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἐὰν τῶν δένδρων ξηρόν τι γένηται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα προσεκκόπτει, ἀλλὰ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιμελόμενος πειρᾶται τὴν τοῦ ἐκλελοιπότος χρείαν ἀναπληροῦν.

Hense, pp.59f = Stilpon, fragment 193, Döring.[13]

Such an image was probably used by Stilpon in advocating the indifference to loss of possessions - including one's loved ones - for which he himself was famous (Seneca, Ep.9.18, Const.Sap.5.6), and proved as useful

to the illustration of Stoic apatheia[14] as it was to the Megarian.

A.3 Ep.39.4, Prov.4.16.

Resilience of plant = sapiens' apatheia and constantia, growing conditions = external circumstances.

A.3.1 Windblown tree: Prov.4.16.

Comparison of man's constantia, mental or physical, to a stout tree's resistance to the buffeting of the wind (or, indeed, blows of an axe)[15] is not uncommon in poetry: Homer, for example, describes the resistance of the two heroes, Polypoetes and Leonteus, in battle, with such an image:

> ἑστασαν ὡς ὅτε τε δρύες οὔρεσιν ὑψικάρηνοι,
> αἵ τ' ἄνεμον μίμνουσι καὶ ὑετὸν ἤματα πάντα,
> ῥίζῃσιν μεγάλῃσι διηνεκέεσσ' ἀραρυῖαι
> ὣς ἄρα τὼ χείρεσσι πεποιθότες ἠδὲ βίηφι
> μίμνον ἐπερχόμενον μέγαν Ἄσιον οὐδὲ φέβοντο.

Iliad 12.132ff.

In Virgil, Aen.4.441ff, Aeneas' mental resistance to Dido's pleas is described with a similar image:

> ac uelut annoso ualidam cum robore quercum
> Alpini Boreae nunc hinc nunc flatibus illinc
> eruere inter se certant; it stridor, et altae
> consternunt terram concusso stipite frondes;
> ipsa haeret scopulis et quantum uertice ad auras
> aetherias, tantum radice in Tartar tendit:
> haud secus adsiduis hinc atque hinc uocibus heros
> tunditur, et magno persentit pectore curas;
> mens immota manet. lacrimae uoluuntur inanes.

We have, perhaps, the reversal of such an image in Lucan, 1.136ff where Pompey's susceptibility to the persuasion of the populace (132-133) is compared to the weakness of an old oak-tree, doomed to totter at the first blast of wind (141), its roots no longer strong, held up as yet by its weight alone (138-139).

Notes

[1]It is stated or implied in the majority of Seneca's agricultural images and in those parallels to which I refer here that the farmer represents the good force which seeks to inculcate virtue in his recipient, man, - i.e. the farmer represents either the sapiens as teacher, or God. However, at Ep.73.16 the farmer ("cultor") is represented also as recipient of the seeds of virtue (cf. n.3, p.13) as he is, for example, in the proverb "Ut sementem feceris, ita metes", Cicero, de Orat.2.65.261, cf. A. Otto, Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer, (Leipzig, 1890; reprint ed., Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1964), s.v. 'metere' (1), (hereafter cited as Otto).

[2]Cf. also Rep.492a, 497b. For other agricultural images in Plato, cf. P. Louis, Les métaphores de Platon, (Paris: "Les belles lettres", 1945), pp.208f, (hereafter cited as Louis).

[3]Cf. Quintilian, Inst.2.9.3, 19.2.

[4]Cf. Otto, s.v. 'filix'. For rank growth as image of vice, cf. Plautus, Trin.31f ("herba irrigua" = "mali mores") - cf. Fantham, p.77 and n.8. Cf. also 'ὄβριζω' in its meaning not only of overweening behaviour, but also of rank growth - cf. LSJ, s.v. I.3.

[5]For other agricultural images in Plutarch, cf. A.J. Dronkers, De comparationibus et metaphoris apud Plutarchum, (Diss., Utrecht, 1892), pp.97ff.

[6]For Epictetus' ignorance of botany and rare use of such imagery, cf. W.A. Oldfather, Epictetus: the discourses as reported by Arrian, the manual and the fragments, 2 vols., The Loeb classical library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1946), vol.2, n.3, pp.388f.

[7]Cf. K-H. Rolke, Bildhafte Vergleiche in den Fragmenten der Stoiker von Zenon bis Panaitios, Spudasmata 32 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1975), pp.392ff (hereafter cited as Rolke); M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, 5th ed., 2 vols., (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978-1980), vol.2, p.71, S.123 Z.22 (hereafter cited as Pohlenz); Bonhöffer, n.4, p.133; K. Praechter, Hierokles der Stoiker, (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1901), p.57. Cf. also Aristotle, H.A. 8.1.588a 31-33, on which cf. F. Dirlmeier, Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrasts, Philologus supp.30.1 (Leipzig, 1937), pp.55-60.

[8]Cf. Quintilian, Inst.2.4.6-7: "Facile remedium est ubertati, sterilia nullo labore vincuntur." For the pruning image cf. also, of course, John 15 1-2: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away: and every

branch that beareth fruit, he purgeth it, that it may bring forth fruit."

[9]For Plutarch's imperfect knowledge of Latin and acquaintance with Latin literature, cf. C.P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.81ff.

[10]Cf. Rolke, pp.456f.

[11]For further Ciceronian images of grafting, cf. Fantham, p.145 and n.11, p.146.

[12]Cf. Ep.12.2, 104.6, and 86.14ff; in the latter case Seneca gives a detailed description of the method of transplanting olive-trees and vines for its own sake, rather than for the purpose of drawing a moral.

[13]O. Hense, Teletis reliquiae, 2nd ed., (Tübingen: 1909; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969), hereafter cited as Hense; K. Döring, Die Megariker: kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien, Studien zur antiken Philosophie 2.

[14]Cf. Seneca, Ep.9.19: "Haec vox illi communis est cum Stoico."

[15]I believe that the firm resistance of the oak-tree to the axe at Seneca, Herc.Oet.1624ff symbolically prefigures Hercules' 'Stoic' constantia on the pyre at 1673ff.

B: Animals

Homer's animal-similes are our earliest comparisons of men with animals in Classical literature.[1] Homer's comparisons are not primarily intended to make a moral point; the fable, however, has a very long-standing practice of comparing men to animals to draw a moral lesson.[2] Hesiod's fable of the hawk and the nightingale (Erg.202ff) representing Dike and Hybris[3] is Classical literature's earliest example of the representation of human moral qualities with the behaviour of animals. Plato gives an impetus to the association of animals with ethical qualities by suggesting that animals (along with children) possess 'natural' virtue (Lg.710a 5-7);[4] he also represents reprehensible irrationality with images of animals, suggesting that the 'inner' man contains animals which must be tamed[5] - an image which, in the hands of the Stoic Chrysippus - becomes a "zoologisch-polyanimistischen Psychologie der Tugenden."[6] By denying animals the capacity for cognition in the De anima, Aristotle effectively denies them the capacity for virtue or vice, but elsewhere he inclines towards Plato's investment of animals with moral qualities.[7] Similarly, the Stoics hold that animals do not possess the reasoning capacity of humans (ratio/logos) and are therefore incapable of both virtue and vice, reason and unreason.[8] Such a theory does not, however, preclude in practice the use of animal-imagery to represent moral qualities good or bad: Plutarch (Mor. 1044f-1045b (Compendium argumenti Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere)) complains that Chrysippus sometimes treated animals as examples of 'natural' virtue, and sometimes as examples of irrationality. The practice is continued by Seneca. Animals can also represent good or bad moral qualities in Cynic popular philosophy - in the form of the 'diatribe' - where animal-imagery is particularly at home.[9] Such imagery is as pervasive in Latin literature as is the influence of 'diatribe':[10] it is found, for example, in comedy, declamation, philosophic and didactic literature, epic, and satire. As late as the fifth century we

find moralizing animal-imagery still flourishing in Boethius' Consolatio philosophiae in which he compares various kinds of sinners to different types of animal (4.3).

B.1 Ep.72.8, 74.5, 85.8, 88.19, Ira 2.11.4f, 32.3, 34.1, 3.16.1, 25.3, 30.1, 43.2, Tranq.12.3, Vit.Beat.1.3, 14.2f.
'Emotions' or wildness of animals = unrighteous emotions and irrationality.

Seneca compares men to animals with respect to their shared propensity to emotion - particularly to anger, fear, desire, aimlessness, and imitativeness.[11] Beginning with Plato and culminating with Strato, the Peripatetic philosophers had been committed "to the progressive identification of human and animal psychology".[12] In his Historia animalium, for example, in spite of his own theoretical objection mentioned above, Aristotle assigns particular temperaments to particular animals (488b 12, 588a 22, 629b 5) and describes them as experiencing fear, confidence, compassion, love, jealousy, etc.[13] In the De partibus animalium, the emotion and temperament of animals is connected with the temperature of their blood (648a 2-4, 9-10, 650b 27-30) - a theory which is also found in Lucretius' De rerum natura - and the size of their hearts (667a 15-22).

Although Aristotle had provided a theoretical basis for denying animals the possibility of emotional experience, the attribution of emotion to animals continued to appeal to the imagination. Hence it is frequently evident in popular philosophy: emotions such as gluttony, lust, and avarice, for example, are attributed to animals in popular philosophy.[14]

B.1.1 Irascibility: Ira 2.32.3, 34.1, 3.16.1, 25.3, 30.1, 43.2.

Seneca several times cites animals as examples of irascibility.[15] Seneca's characterization of animals as angry may be part of the same folk-lore that makes Aristotle emphasize the enmity between types of animals (H.A 608b 19ff); alternatively, it may be directly attributed to one of Seneca's sources for the De Ira in which animal-images are common:[16]

we know, for example, that Posidonius, one of Seneca's sources for the De ira,[17] was interested in the nature of animals and their indifference, in the matter of logos or ratio, from humans.[18]

The bull, bear, asp, and lion (Ira 3.30.1, 43.2) would naturally come to mind as examples of irascibility. Mice and ants, often symbols of avarice, parsimony, or diligence,[19] would seem to be rather less obvious examples (Ira 2.34.1). It appears, however, that the irascibility of small animals, and of the ant, in particular, was proverbial: "Ἐνεστι κἀν μύρμηκι χολή: παρεγγυᾷ μηδὲ τῶν μικρῶν καταφρονεῖν" (Zenobius, 3.70, Leutsch-Schneidewin, vol.1, p.74).[20] Allers[21] points out a striking parallel for Seneca's association of mice and ants as examples of anger in Plutarch's treatise De cohibenda ira: "τὸ δὲ ἐκφῦναι καὶ δακεῖν μυρμηκῶδες καὶ μυῶδες" (Mor.458c). He remarks: "Hunc inter utrumque scriptorem tam insignem consensum vix aliter interpreteris, nisi ita, ut utrumque in eodem auctore excerpendo operam navasse sumas."

For the analogy Seneca draws between the indifference of a large animal to the provocation of dogs and the apatheia of the sapiens (Ira 2.32.3, 3.25.3) Allers points to a similar comparison in Philodemus' ΠΕΡΙ ΟΡΓΗΣ[22]: "καὶ τῶν μὲν κυνῶν οἱ ποὸς τὰς θήρας, ἂν οἰκουρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑλακτῇ παριόντας, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφονται." Again the parallel could suggest a common source, which Allers believes to have been Chrysippus.[23]

B.1.2 Fearfulness: Ep.74.5, Ira 2.11.4f.

Seneca attributes fearfulness to animals just as Aristotle does on several occasions.[24] The association of the emotion with birds (Ep.74.5, Ira 3.16.1) is traditional - cf. Euripides, Hec.178, H.F 974, Cyc.407.

It is interesting to note that the image of a bird frightened into flight serves to illustrate a Stoic definition of emotion. Zeno compared his definition of emotion - a "πτοία ψυχῆς" to the flight of a frightened bird (SVF I, 206, p.51, 2f).[25] There are no grounds for associating Seneca's images of frightened birds and Zeno's image: they both belong to the tradition which associates fear with birds.

B.1.3 Greed/desire: Ep.72.8.

In contrast with his assertion elsewhere (B.3.1) that animals are moderate in eating and drinking, Seneca illustrates the greedy attitude of the unrighteous towards the gifts of Fortuna with the image of a dog gulping down whatever scraps are thrown to him and continually waiting for more.

The immediate source for Seneca's image is not far to seek. He himself tells us that it belongs to Attalus, Seneca's instructor in Stoic philosophy.[26] We can well believe him. The asceticism which Seneca tells us, characterized Attalus,[27] is reflected in this choice of a greedy dog to illustrate reprehensible desire. Attalus might well have employed such an image "Cum coeperat voluptates nostras traducere, laudare castum corpus, sobriam mensam, puram mentem non tantum ab inlicitis voluptatibus sed etiam supervacuis." (Ep.108.14) with the result that "libebat circumscribere gulam ac ventrem" (ibid).

The image of a dog, always common in Classical literature,[28] is also found in the exposition of philosophy,[29] and particularly so in popular philosophy.[30] It lies, of course, behind the name of that sect of popular philosophers, the Cynics. The dog often represents human vices, as he does here.[31] A similar picture of a greedy dog snatching up food as he can is found in Dio Chrysostom (Or.4.95) to illustrate the "κυνὸς ἀχρήστου ψυχὴν ἔχων, τὰ μὲν ἀοπάζοντος, ἐὰν ἐλπίσῃ λήσεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἐπεμβλέποντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἀπεχομένου διὰ τοὺς ἐφεστηκότας φύλακας." This may suggest that the image which Seneca heard from Attalus shares a common direct source with Dio's. Alternatively, this source may be supposed to be popular philosophy in general, in which it may have been widespread - Dio's use of it half a century after Attalus testifying to the durability of the tradition.

B.1.4 Aimlessness: Trang.12.3.

Seneca illustrates reprehensible aimlessness with an image of wandering movement of ants. Others before Seneca had also noticed the ant's wandering movements, but had not given them moral significance: Aristophanes' Mnesilochos compares Agathon's wandering voice to the

movement of an ant ("μύρμηκος ἀτραπούς" - Th.100) while Plautus' Menaechmus describes the doctor's great show of bustle but little progress as a 'formicinus gradus' (Men.888).

B.1.5 Imitativeness: Vit.Beat.1.3.

Seneca compares the imitative behaviour of the unrighteous to that of sheep following others in the flock. The 'sameness' of the sheep in a flock often illustrates in a non-pejorative way the resemblance of one member of mankind to another. In such a way, for example, Plutarch tells us, Zeno used the image of sheep to illustrate his Stoic theory of cosmopolitanism (SVF I, 262, p.61, 1-5).[32] In such a use of the image the shepherd represents the statesman, king, or teacher who provides man with the benevolent guidance that he requires.[33]

It is not in this sense that Seneca uses the image here. Rather he is drawing on the more vituperative tradition of sheep-imagery, in which the sheep's tendency to follow the others in the flock symbolizes stupidity. Aristotle, for example, declares in the Historia animalium "τό τε γὰρ τῶν προβάτων ἦθος ... εὔηθες καὶ ἀνόητον" (10.3), while Diogenes, Diogenes Laertius tells us "τὸν ἁπλῆ πλούσιον πρόβατον εἶπε χρυσόμαλλον."[34] In Latin literature, Plautus' Bacchides makes considerable play on the stupidity of sheep at 1121ff; Horace describes slavish imitators as a "servum pecus" (Ep.1.19), while one of Cicero's most scathing terms of abuse is 'sheep'.[35]

B.1.6 Uncontrollable animals: Ep.82.23f, 85.8, 88.19, Vit.Beat.14.2f.

The comparison of irrationality to an animal which is difficult to control is already suggested in Plato's image of the "πολυκέφαλον θρέμμα" and lion (cf. p.105) carried in the breast of every man (Rep. 588c ff). Here it is stated that the man who believes in justice has control over this inner beast, whereas he who does not is, as it were, dragged about by this beast.[36]

Antisthenes' and Cleanthes' allegorical interpretation of Hercules' battle with the beasts as a struggle for control over the passions and sin, makes the identification even clearer.[37] Dio

Chrysostom adds support to the impression that the comparison of irrationality to an aggressive wild beast was common in popular philosophy when he makes Diogenes say that he has conquered "πολλούς ... ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ μεγάλους, ... πενίαν καὶ φυγὴν καὶ ἀδοξίαν, ἔτι δὲ ὀργήν τε καὶ λύπην καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ φόβον καὶ τὸ πάντων ἀμαχώτατον θηρίον, ὕπουλον καὶ μαλθακόν, ἡδονήν." (Or.9.11f).

Seneca's comparison of adverse circumstances to savage animals (Ep.82.23f, 85.41) which the sapiens, like an animal trainer, will 'tame', is more unusual. However, the image which Dio Chrysostom puts into Diogenes' mouth at Or.9.11f, quoted above, implies a comparison between adversity (poverty, exile, disrepute) and wild beasts. A much earlier example is again found in popular philosophy in an image which Teles attributes to Bion (Stobaeus, Flor.3.1.98 = fragment II, p.9, 2-8, Hense). The image is a version of our expression 'grasping the bull by the horns', except that difficult circumstances are here compared to a vicious snake:

> ὁ δὲ Βίων, ὥσπερ τῶν θηρίων, φησί, παρὰ τὴν λῆψιν ἡ δῆξις γίνεται, κἂν μέσου τοῦ ὄφεως ἐπιλαμβάνῃ, δηχθήσῃ, ἐὰν τοῦ τραχήλου, οὐδὲν πείσῃ. οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, φησί, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἡ ὀδύνη γίνεται, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν οὕτως ὑπολάβῃς περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκ ὀδυνήσῃ, ἐὰν δὲ ὡς ἕτερος, ἀνιάσῃ, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τρόπων καὶ τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης.[38]

B.1.6.1 Bolting horse: Ep.88.19.

An obvious precedent for Seneca's comparison of uncontrollable emotion to a bolting horse is found in Plato's famous image of the soul as a charioteer and two horses (Phdr.246a ff). Based on his division of the soul into the "λογιστικόν", "θυμοειδές" and "ἐπιθυμητικόν" (Rep.440 e-441a), the image shows the same analogy between the virtuous or rational part of the soul and the driver, and the irrational or evil part of the soul and a bolting horse, which threatens to drag the other horse and driver back to earth (Phdr.247b, 248a-b).

Comparison of uncontrollable emotion to a bolting horse is common especially in popular philosophy, and Mras believes that the image may be characterized as particularly Cynic.[39] The "klassische Stelle" is Lucian's comparison of a man carried away by passion to a

rider on a bolting horse (Cyn.18). As Gerhard points out, an image in the moralizing choliambics of Phoenix of Colophon, in which he compares restraint of greed to the reining in of a horse, occurs in the same tradition.[40] Varro's use of the image in which he speaks of reining in his anger and desire (Sat.men.177) prefigures Lucian's use of the image in Menippean satire. Cèbe[41] points out that the image is a widespread one by comparing Varro's image to Juvenal's image of reining in anger and greed at Sat.8.87ff:

> Expectata diu tandem provincia cum te
> rectorem accipiat, pone irae frena modumque,
> pone et avaritiae.

For a further use of the image in satirical vein we may add Horace's image at Ep.1.2.62ff where the notion of reining in anger is also found:

> Ira furor brevis est, animum rege, qui nisi paret,
> imperat, hunc frenis, hunc tu compesce catena. [42]

The ubiquity of the image is confirmed by its occurrence at the end of Virgil's first Georgic, where the outbreak of civil war - the raging of Mars - is compared to the uncontrollable charging of a horse:

> vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes
> arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe,
> ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae,
> addunt in spatia, et frustra retinacula tendens
> fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas. (Georg.1. 510ff).

B.3 Ep.59.13, 95.31, Ira 2.8.3, Clem.1.19.3, 26.4.
Animals = virtuous.

The use of animals as examples of 'natural' virtue is as widespread as their use as images of irrationality (B.1). As mentioned above (p.112), Plutarch tells us that Chrysippus used animals as images of model behaviour as well as images of reprehensible irrationality. Plato suggests that animals, like children, possess 'natural' virtue (Lg.710a). Animals are often praised for their satisfaction with little - i.e. their lack of avarice - and for their peaceable natures. Both of these themes occur in the Senecan prose-works.

B.3.1 Lack of avarice: Ep.59.13.

Diogenes, Dio Chrysostom tells us (Or.6.21f), used to praise the life of animals, which natural endurance and satisfaction with the essentials of life made far superior to man's.[43] The same theme occurs, perhaps not surprisingly, in Horace's 'Bionean' satire, where he contrasts the ant's satisfaction with its accumulated store of food with man's continual search for gain (Sat.1.1.32ff).[44] The same notion of animals is presented in Cicero's Tusculan disputations (5.27.79, 34.98). Seneca contrasts animals' satisfaction with a moderate amount of food with man's greed on more than one occasion.[45]

B.3.2 Peaceableness: Ep.95.31, Ira 2.8.3, Clem.1.19.3, 26.4.

Seneca contrasts the peace in which animals live with one another with the belligerence of mankind. The theme is typical of 'diatribe'[46] and is very widespread.[47] Seneca the Elder's account of the declamation of Papirius Fabianus at Con.2.1.10 suggests that the theme could also occur in the debates of the rhetorical schools.

The passage in question is particularly important because it may suggest one of the direct sources for Seneca's use of animals as an image of model behaviour. Given Fabianus' interest in zoology, attested by Pliny the Elder,[48] it is attractive to speculate that Fabianus more than once resorted to an animal-image either in declamation or philosophy - probably to recommend the behaviour of animals to men - and that Seneca developed a taste for such images through his youthful contact with Fabianus.[49]

Notes

[1]Cf. E. Majer, Mensch und Tiervergleich in der griechischen Literatur bis zum Hellenismus, (Diss., Tübingen, 1932), pp.4ff (hereafter cited as Majer).

[2]Cf. M.L. West, Hesiod: Works and days, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), on Erg.202ff. Cf. also von Wartensleben, op.cit., n. 11, p.99, pp.8ff.

[3]Cf. West, ibid.

[4]Cf. W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle: animals, emotion, and moral virtue', Arethusa 4 (1971) 137-165, p.149 (hereafter cited as Fortenbaugh).

[5]Cf. R. Eisler, Orphisch-dionysische Mysteriengedanken in der christlichen Antike, Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg 1922-1923, Part 2, (Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1925), pp.71ff (hereafter cited as Eisler).

For further examples of animals representing irrationality , cf. G.O. Berg, Metaphor and comparison in the dialogues of Plato, (Diss., Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1903) , p.52.

[6]Cf. Eisler, p.74. As he points out, the theory is referred to by Seneca at Ep.113.1ff.

[7]Aristotle's inconsistencies in his attitude towards animals are laid out by Fortenbaugh, passim.

[8]Cf. K. Reinhardt, Poseidonios, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1921), p.358 (hereafter cited as Reinhardt).

This distinction is not confined to the Stoics, but is also current in 'diatribe' - cf. Oltramare, who categorizes it as theme 49a.

Seneca, Ira 1.3.6f:

"Muta animalia humanis adfectibus carent, habent autem similes illis quosdam impulsus; ... Nulli nisi homini concessa prudentia est, prouidentia diligentia cogitatio, nec tantum uirtutibus humanis animalia sed etiam uitiis prohibita sunt."

Cf. Ep.79.6f and Husner, pp.94ff, for further examples.

[9]Cf. Weber 1887, pp.106ff, and Majer, pp.269ff.

[10]Cf. the large range of Latin authors in which Oltramare finds its influence. Cf. also p.97, 225.

[11]The last two are, strictly speaking, kinds of behaviour result-

ing from emotion.

[12] Fortenbaugh, p.153.

[13] Fortenbaugh, ibid., gives many examples.

[14] Cf. G.A. Gerhard, Phoinix von Kolophon, (Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), pp.24ff (hereafter cited as Gerhard).

[15] For this association, particulary in relation to Seneca, cf. A. Bäumer, Die Bestie Mensch: Senecas Aggressionstheorie, ihre philosophischen Vorstufen und ihre literarische Auswirkungen, Studien zur klassischen Philologie 4 (Frankfurt am Main and Bern: Peter Lang, 1982).

[16] e.g. Ira 1.16.5, 17.6, 2.8.3, 11.4f, 32:2, 34.1, 3.16.1, 25.3, 27.1, 43.2.

[17] Cf. Pohlenz, p.311.

[18] Cf. Reinhardt, pp.356ff, and M. Pohlenz, 'Tierische und menschliche Intelligenz bei Poseidonios', Hermes 76 (1941) 1-12, especially pp.10ff.

That Seneca was acquainted with at least some of the Posidonian theory of animals is shown by his reference to it in Ep.121 - cf. Reinhardt, pp.358ff.

[19] Cf. Gerhard, pp.27, 29f.

[20] E.L. Leutsch and F.G. Schneidewin, Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum, 2 vols. and supp., (Göttingen, 1839-1851; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1958-1961).

[21] p.67. He also, ibid., compares Plutarch, Mor.457a.

[22] p.66.24, ed. Gomperz, as cited by Allers, p.65. I have not been able to obtain a text.

[23] p.75.

[24] For Aristotle, cf. Fortenbaugh, p.153.

[25] Cf. Rolke, pp.101, 407f.

[26] Cf. pp.93f.

[27] Cf. p.96 , and Griffin, p.42.

[28] Cf. Majer, pp.55f, 119f, 136, 232f, and C.S. Köhler, Das Tierleben im Sprichwort der Griechen und Römer: nach Quellen und Stellen in Parallele mit dem deutschen Sprichwort herausgegeben, (Leipzig, 1881; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967), s.v. 'Hund'.

[29] Cf. Rolke, pp.401ff, for examples of its use in the exposition of Stoic philosophy.

[30] Cf. Gerhard, n.8, p.23, and J. Oesch, Die Vergleiche bei Dio Chrysostomus, (Diss., Zürich, 1916), pp.82f; J. Seidel, Vestigia diatribae qualia reperiuntur in aliquot Plutarchi scriptis moralibus, (Diss., Breslau, 1906), p.19; O. Hense, 'Ariston bei Plutarch', RhM 45 (1890) 541-554, n.1, p.549 (hereafter cited as Hense 1890).

[31] Especially 'ἀναίδεια' - cf. Dudley, p.5, and Majer, p.262. The name was encouraged by Diogenes, however, and given positive interpretations - cf. Dudley, ibid., and Majer, ibid, and Weber 1887, pp.108ff.

[32] Cf. Rolke, pp.398f.

[33] Cf. ibid., p.493. Seneca's image at Ep.34.1 occurs in this tradition.

[34] 6.47. This use of the image is connected with the idea of 'fleecing' - cf. Otto, s.v. 'attondere', and Tacitus, Ann.13.1.1.

[35] e.g. Pis.9.19, Phil.2.12.30, 8.3.9.

[36] For other animal-images representing irrationality in Plato, cf. his description of the fickle mob as a beast - Rep.493a f, 496d - and the "μισόλογος" who achieves his ends by violence as a "θηρίον"; also at Rep. 440d he compares irrationality to a dog which is called back by its shepherd as irrationality by reason. Cf. also Julian, Or.6.197 a-b.

[37] Cf. Eisler, p.81.

[38] Kindstrand, p.32, tells us that this is the only animal-image in the fragments of Bion.

[39] R. Mras, 'Varros menippeische Satiren und die Philosophie', NJA 33 (1914) 390-420, p.414.

[40] p.30.

[41] J.P. Cèbe, Varron, Satires menippées, 5 vols., Collection de l'école française de Rome 9 (Rome; Ecole française de Rome, 1972-1980), vol.5, p.822.

[42] Cf. L. Mueller, Q. Horati Flacci sermonum et epistularum libri, Satiren und Episteln des Horaz, (Wien: F. Tempsky, 1891) on Ep.1.2.62: "frenis, wie ein Pferd - catena, wie einen Hund; vgl. Phaedr.III.7". Cf. also A. Kiessling, Oden und Epoden (vol.1), Satiren (vol.2), Briefe (vol.3), 10th ed., 3 vols., revised R. Heinze, with bibliography by E. Burck, (Berlin, 1960; reprint ed., Dublin and Zürich: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1967-1968), on Ep.1.2.64, who cites Aristippus, Gnomol.Vat. 45 (hereafter cited as Kiessling-Heinze).

[43] Cf. Oltramare, themes 30a and 77c.

[44] For animal-imagery in Horace, cf. F. Schneider, Gleichnisse und Bilder bei Horaz, (Diss., Erlangen, 1914), pp.23ff.

[45] Cf. n.7, p.18.

[46] Cf. Oltramare, p.165 and n.5, who cites Dio Chrysostom's image of the amicable societies of bees and ants at Or.48.15, to which we may add 40.40f.

[47] Cf. examples given by J.E.B. Mayor, Thirteen satires of Juvenal, 4th ed., rev., 2 vols., (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1889), on 15.159.

[48] Cf. Oltramare, p.160, nn.4, 5.

[49] Cf. pp.94f.

C: Artist

Images of artists, including sculptors and craftsmen, are quite common in Classical literature. The comparison of orators and literary styles, for example, with those of artists and sculptors is frequent.[1] The use of such imagery to illustrate a moral point - in particular, the association of virtue with the artist - is found in undeveloped form in the Platonic comparison of God's shaping of the world to a craftsman's (δημιουργός) shaping of his materials,[2] and is reflected in Seneca's use of the image at Ep.65.3ff.[3]

C.1 Ep.9.5, 65.17, 71.2, 85.40.
Artist = sapiens.

C.1.1 Phidias: Ep.9.5, 85.40.

Seneca illustrates the sapiens' ability to withstand adversity with two images of Phidias, both emphasizing his resourcefulness.

Phidias stands as the proverbial example of the supreme artist in Classical literature. Plato, for example, (Hp.Ma.290a-c, Prt.311c) cites Phidias as such, and, several centuries later, Plotinus (Enn.5.8.1) can do the same. Seneca's comparison of the sapiens to Phidias is thus explicable as the comparison of two examples of perfection. This approach was exemplified in the thought which was common in the discussion of rhetoric and oratory, "that the most perfect rhetoric of the past should be compared to Phidias in its grandeur and perfection".[4] No doubt, given Seneca's experience of rhetoric and rhetorical education,[5] this comparison would be familiar to him. Furthermore, Seneca the Elder's collection of declamations suggests that Phidias was a commonplace example of perfection (Con.10.5.8) and could even provide the subject-matter for an entire controversia (8.2). It seems likely, then, that Seneca's familiarity with rhetoric and declamation would be at least partially responsible for bringing Phidias to mind when Seneca wishes to

illustrate the perfection of the sapiens.

The view of Phidias described by Seneca the Elder - "Non vidit Phidias Iovem, fecit tamen velut tonantem; nec stetit ante oculos eius Minerva, dignus tamen illa arte animus et concepit deos et exhibuit" (Con.10.5.8) - reflects a belief, common in the Hellenistic period and afterwards, that "Phidias, above all other Greek artists, carried art beyond the simple representation of external nature and used it, especially in his Zeus at Olympia, to convey spiritual intangibles."[6] Such a view of Phidias is exemplified best, perhaps, by Philostratus in his Vita Apollonii (6.19), but is also found in Cicero, Orat.9, Quintilian, Inst.12.10.9, and Dio Chrysostom, Or.12.50ff. This notion of Phidias as a spiritual leader of sorts, which, as its appearance in Seneca the Elder shows (Con.10.5.8), was commonplace, must also be reckoned to have suggested to Seneca a comparison between Phidias and the sapiens.

C.1.1.1 Different materials: Ep.85.40.

At Ep.85.40 Seneca illustrates the sapiens' ability to develop virtue in adverse as well as fortunate circumstances, by comparing it to Phidias' ability to make statues out of base as well as valuable materials.

Seneca's image may be compared with one used by Philo (De ebrietate 88ff = SVF III 301, p.74, 1-10), which, however, illustrates a different point of philosophical theory from Seneca's. In this image Philo illustrates the Stoic[7] point that the many different things of the world are united by their common participation in logos, by comparing them with Phidian statues, which, though they are made of different materials, share the common characteristics of Phidias' style.[8] Although the image illustrates a different point from Seneca's, it provides another instance in the exposition of Stoic philosophy of the image of Phidias using different materials to make his statues, and possibly indicates a common source in both. Rolke suggests that this source is to be found in the Old Stoa.[9]

Notes

[1]Cf. Fantham, p.141 and n.5.

[2]e.g. Ti.29a, 41a, 42e, 68c, 69c. Cf. also Xenophon, Mem.1.4.2-9, and Rolke, pp.254ff, 449.

[3]A.S. Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis de natura deorum: libri III, 2 vols., (Cambridge, Mass., 1955; reprint ed., Darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968) on 2.57 compares Seneca, Ep.65.3 ("Omnis ars naturae imitatio est") to Aristotle, Ph.2.2.194a 21-22: "ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν".

[4]Cf. J.J. Pollitt, The ancient view of Greek art: criticism, history, and terminology, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p.61.

[5]Cf. n.20, p.100.

[6]Pollitt, op.cit., n.4, p.52 and n.35.

[7]Cf. Rolke, p.137.

[8]Cf. the corollary of this image - different statues made out of the same material - attributed to the Stoic Herillos by Diogenes Laertius (7.165): Herillos illustrates his point that there is no absolute telos but that this changes according to circumstance, with the image of two different statues - one of Alexander and one of Socrates - made out of the same material - cf. Rolke, p.275.

[9]p.277.

D: Athletics and sports

D.1 Ep.13.2f, 18.8, 22.1, 37.1f, 71.3, 78.16, 80.2ff, 93.12, Prov.2.3, 6, 4.13, Ira 1.11.2, 2.14.2f, Tranq.3.1, 11.4f, Ben.7.1.4. Sportsman = proficiens.

D.1.1 Athletics: Ep.13.2f, 78:16, 80.2ff, Prov.2.3, 6, Tranq.3.1.

The image of the athlete or wrestler is essentially Greek in origin, just as athletics were an essentially Greek phenomenon.[1] Athletic images come readily to the Greek mind to illustrate a conflict: in the Platonic dialogues, for example, the opposition of two athletes illustrates the opposition of two opponents in argument.[2]

The image of an athletic struggle with adverse circumstances is found in undeveloped form in the Greek tragedians. In Aeschylus, Supp. 468 the king describes the multitude of evils ("κακῶν δὲ πλῆθος" - 469) with which he is beset as "hard to wrestle with" ("δυσπάλαιστα πράγματα"). In another instance, Ἄτη is represented as an invincible wrestler ("οὐκ ἀπείρατος ἄτα - Ch.339).[3] In Euripides, Alc.889 Τύχη is pictured as Admetus' wrestling opponent ("τύχα τύχα δυσπάλαιστος ἥκει"). The last two examples prefigure Seneca's characterization of Fortuna as man's athletic opponent.[4]

Pfitzner has shown[5] that representation of "the whole life of the philosopher and his attempt to live and die as βέλτιστος" as an agon is made by Socrates in Plato's Gorgias (526d-e). Similarly, comparisons between athletics and virtue are made by Aristotle.[6] The image of the sage as an athlete was developed by the Cynics.[7] We are told by Dio Chrysostom (Or.9.10ff) that, at the Isthmian games, Diogenes put on an athlete's crown, contrasting himself with the wrestlers, discus throwers, and runners, for he had overcome the greatest antagonist of all - pleasure - "ἦ οὐδεὶς οὔτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔτε τῶν βαρβάρων ἄξιοῖ μάχεσθαι καὶ περιεῖναι τῇ ψυχῇ κρατήσας, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἥττηνται καὶ ἀπειρήκασι πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον· ... πλὴν ἐμοῦ" (Or.9.12).[8]

That the image of the athlete was current in the illustration of Stoic theory from early on is suggested by its presence in a fragment of Chrysippus (SVF II, 998, p.292, 35 - p.293, 3). Chrysippus uses the image to illustrate a different point of doctrine from Seneca and does not make the athlete represent a virtuous man.[9] Nevertheless, we may suspect that Seneca's comparison of the athlete's attitude to his opponent to the sapiens' constantia in adversity was also current. For example, Panaetius, according to Aulus Gellius (13.28 = Van Straaten 116),[10] makes a similar comparison: man must be ready for and defend himself against adversity in the same way as a pancratiast enters a contest with his arms outstretched before his face and head, his whole body in a position of readiness to parry the coming blows. A similar comparison is made too by Philo in a passage where Stoic influence is evident.[11] He compares the way in which an "ἀλόγιστος" approaches pain to a slave's cringing sufferance of pain. The "ἐπιστήμων", on the other hand, reacts to pain like an athlete to attack - he retaliates to it and thereby develops an indifference to it.[12]

Comparison between the sapiens and the athlete is found also in Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom. Like Seneca (Prov.2.6f), Epictetus stresses that, as often as the good athlete picks himself up from a fall and carries on fighting, so the good man will continue to resist adversity, no matter what blow may temporarily overcome him (Diss.3.25.4). Like Seneca (Ep.78.15ff),[13] Dio explains that a man must meet the challenge of adversity positively, if he is not to increase his suffering (Or.8.17).

In accordance with the traditional derisory opinion of athletes, the moralists emphasize that the 'prize' of the man who successfully struggles with adversity is far superior to the athlete's: the athlete wins short-lived glory - a garland and his name called aloud at the festival - whereas the moral victor wins the prize of virtue and it is one that lasts forever - Seneca, Ep.78.16, Dio Chrysostom, Or.8.15.[14]

D.1.2 - Gladiatorial combat: Ep.22.1, 37.1f, 93.12, Ira 1.11.2, Trang.11.4f.

The gladiatorial-image is Roman. Drawn from the familiar institution of the gladiatorial contest,[15] such an image is often more pertinent to a Roman writer than its Greek equivalent, the athletic image.

As was the case with the athletic image (D.1.1), the image of the gladiator does not occur only in explicitly moralizing contexts. Gladiatorial combat can illustrate the conflict of lovers (Terence, Eu. 54f)[16] or the conflict of the courts, where orators may be compared to gladiators as pertinently as to athletes.[17]

Seneca's brave gladiator is a Romanized form of the Greek athlete whose bravery in combat was made to represent Stoic constantia (D.1.1). A similar use of gladiatorial imagery is also found in Cicero and Epictetus. Thus Cicero, after describing at length the bravery of the gladiator, concludes "oculis quidem nulla poterat esse fortior contra dolorem et mortem disciplina" (Tusc.2.17.41). At Mil.92, with an image to which Seneca, himself, refers at Trang.11.4, Cicero compares the bravery of his client Milo to that of a gladiator who does not ask his audience for mercy when at the point of death. Similarly, Epictetus reprimands our lack of commitment by contrasting it with the bravery of gladiators who are eager to fight in single combat (Diss.1.29.37).

D.1.2.2 Planning strategy in arena: Ep.22.1.

The source of Seneca's image of the gladiator plotting his fighting strategy while actually in the arena is, as he himself tells us, a "vetus proverbium" which Seneca has applied to his counselling of Lucilius.

D.1.3 Archery: Ep.71.3.

From as early as Homer comparisons have been made between an aim and an archer's target. The use of the image by Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Pindar, and Xenophon has been described in detail by Alpers-Gölz.[18] It is Plato, however, who, by formulating the concept of a life-

aim, gives the image the moral value that it has in Seneca.[19] The moral concept was taken up, along with the image, and developed by the Stoics - particularly by Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater.[20] Cicero's discussion of the ultimate End and Good (Fin.3.22) occurs within this tradition, as does the image of aiming for a target with a spear or an arrow with which he illustrates it.[21]

D.1.4 Training: Ep.13.2f, 18.8, 78.16, 80.2ff, Prov.2.3, 6, 4.13, Tranq. 3.1, Ben.7.1.4.

Epictetus, like Seneca, compares the training of the virtuous to that of athletes - Diss.3.15 (especially Diss.3.15.8ff, cf. Ench.29.2).[22] In a speech which Seneca attributes to Athenodorus,[23] Augustus' Stoic adviser,[24] a comparison is drawn between preparation for public life and the training of an athlete:

> Nam ut quidam sole atque exercitatione et cura corporis diem educunt athletisque longe utilissimum est lacertos suos roburque, cui se uni dicauerunt, maiore temporis parte nutrire, ita uobis animum ad rerum ciuilium certamen parantibus in opere esse [non] longe pulcherrimum est. (Tranq.3.1).

At Ben.7.1.4 Seneca attributes to the Cynic Demetrius, his contemporary and friend, an analogy between athletic training and progress in virtue.

D.2 Ep.73.3, Ira 2.8.2, 3.31.1, 3, Tranq.11.4f.
Sportsman = unrighteous.

D.2.1 Gladiatorial combat: Tranq.11.4f.

Seneca's image of the greater dangers attendant on the cowardly gladiator ("Eo magis conuulneraberis et confodieris, quia nescis praebere iugulum" - Tranq.11.5) seems to represent the transference of a common topos from the battle-field to the gladiatorial arena. Xenophon explains why flight is more dangerous than standing ground: "κάρον γὰρ τὸ κρατεῖν βουλομένους τὰ τυφλὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὅπλα καὶ ἄχειρα ταῦτα ἐναντία τάττειν τοῖς πολεμίοις φεύγοντας." (Cyr.3.3.45). The same idea is expressed by Sallust, Cat.58.16, and Cicero, Tusc.2.23.54, where the fleeing soldier is pictured throwing away his shield. Horace refers to

the topos at Odes 3.2.14-16:

> mors et fugacem persequitur virum,
> nec parcit imbellis iuventae
> poplitibus timidove tergo.

Finally, Seneca himself refers to it at Ep.78.17: "Quemadmodum perniciosior est hostis fugientibus, sic omne fortuitum incommodum magis instat cedenti et averso".

D.2.2 Racing: Ep.73.3, Ira 3.31.1, 3.

A comparison of life in general to a torch relay-race, in which the passing of the torch represents the transmission of life from one generation to another, is found in Plato (Lg.7.802a).[25] At Rep.613b Plato, like Seneca, uses a race-image to illustrate the unrighteous, but his image is otherwise unlike Seneca's: clever but wicked men are compared to runners who begin a race well but do not finally win it.

No exact parallel for Seneca's race-images illustrating envy is to be found among the Stoic fragments. Chrysippus, however, seems to have a predilection for images of running (e.g. SVF III, 473, p.123, 21-26; SVF III, 462, p.113, 21-33 - p.114, 1-17), including racing (SVF III, 689, p.173, 11-15; SVF III, 726, p.182, 33-37).[26] For the last mentioned of these fragments we are, in fact, indebted to Seneca. At Ben.2.25.3 Seneca refers to a statement of Chrysippus concerning the repayment of a benefit:

> Qui gratus futurus est, statim, dum accipit, de reddendo cogitet. Chrysippus quidem ait illum velut in certamen cursus compositum et carceribus inclusum opperiri debere tempus suum, ad quod velut dato signo prosiliat.

Another Chrysippean race-image preserved by Cicero (Off.3.42 = SVF III, 689, p.173, 11-15) is closer to Seneca's comparison of envy to the jealousy which arises among racers: a racer may strive with all his might to reach the finish, but he must not hinder his competitors, just as a man may strive to fulfil his ambitions, but should not do so at the expense of his fellow-men.[27]

The most exact parallel for Seneca's image of envy is provided by Horace at Sat.1.1.113ff. He concludes this satire on envy with a more developed, but almost identical, image to Seneca's:

> sic festinanti semper locupletior obstat,
> ut, cum carceribus missos rapit ungula currus,
> instat equis auriga suos vincentibus, illum
> praeteritum temnens extremos inter euntem.
> inde fit ut raro qui se vixisse beatum
> dicat ...

D.3 Ep.74.7ff, Vit.Beat.28.1.

Spectators = unrighteous.

D.3.1 Spectators: Ep.74.7ff, Vit.Beat.28.1.

At Ep.74.7ff an image of the spectators at games squabbling over the dole showered down on them illustrates the enviousness of the unrighteous. The reasons for Seneca's choice of such an image to represent the unrighteous are clear. The depravity of games and public spectacles in general is a theme of 'diatribe'.[28] Seneca, himself, shows a marked personal dislike for this manifestation of the 'crowd' at its worst.[29] He particularly deplores the spectators at gladiator-fights, on whose cruelty he remarks several times.[30]

For his spectator-images Seneca, like Tacitus at Hist.1.32 and 3.83, or Epictetus at Diss.1.29.58ff, need only have drawn on his own experience of this familiar aspect of life at Rome.[31] Epictetus' image,[32] developed at length, compares man's distraction - owing to his emotions - from contemplation of the work of God, to that of a slave who, having come to the theatre without permission from his master, continually looks anxiously towards the entrance and is unable to enjoy the performance.

Notes

[1]Cf. E.N. Gardiner, Athletics of the ancient world, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp.1ff.

[2]e.g. Plato, Rep.544b: "πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν." Similarly, at Cicero, de Orat.1.74, - in view of the comparison of the art of oratory to the arts of the palaestra which precedes it (1.73 - cf. Fantham, p.141), the verb "luctabor" suggests that Scaevola and Crassus are pitted against each other like two athletes.

[3]On "ἀτρίακτος" cf. A. Sidgwick, Aeschylus: Choephoroi, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1900), ad loc.

[4]Cf. n.1, p.27. Cf. also Philo, Somn.2.145f, n.12.

[5]V.C. Pfitzner, Paul and the agon motif: traditional athletic imagery in the Pauline literature, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 16 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), p.26 (hereafter cited as Pfitzner).

[6]Pfitzner, nn.2-7, p.27, cites E.N 1119b, 1138b, 1104a, 1106b, 1099b, 1099a, 1117b.

[7]Cf. Pfitzner, pp.28ff.

[8]This passage also contains an image of battle with animals - cf. B.1.6.

[9]Chrysippus uses the image to illustrate his argument concerning free will and determinism - cf. Rolke, pp.330f.

[10]M. van Straaten, Panaetii Rhodii fragmenta, Philosophia antiqua 5 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962).

[11]Cf. Rolke, p.327.

[12]For other comparisons in Philo of man's struggle with adversity to an athlete's struggle with his opponent, cf. Jos.223 and Somn.2.145f (where Τύχη is his opponent).

[13]Comparison with the athlete is implied at Ep.78.16, but in fact Seneca makes the point explicit with a military image: "Quemadmodum perniciosior est hostis fugientibus, sic omne fortuitum incommodum magis instat cedenti et averso." (Ep.78.17) - cf. D.2.1.

[14]Cf. 1 Corinthians 9.24 and Epictetus, Diss.2.18.22.

The same point is made with reference to tight-rope walkers by both Seneca, Ira 2.12.4ff, and Musonius Rufus, O. Hense, C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae, (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1905), p.30: "ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄρα θαυματοποιοὶ δύσκολα οὕτως ..." Seneca makes the same point in connection with military conquest at Ep.17.6f.

[15]Steyns, p.45, makes the point that "les combats de gladiateurs ... jamais ils n'ont fait fureur autant qu'à la fin de la République et sous l'Empire."

[16]Cf. Fantham, p.32.

[17]Cf. Fantham, pp.156ff, and Seneca, Ep.117.7, where he 'Romanizes' comparison between argument and athletic combat - cf. n.3.

[18]R. Alpers-Gölz, Der Begriff ΣΚΟΠΟΣ in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte, Spudasmata 8 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1976), pp.20ff (hereafter cited as Alpers-Gölz).

[19]Ibid., p.103:

> "Einen entscheidenden Einschnitt stellt Platon dar. Auch er kennt noch das 'Treffen des Richtigen' in Wort und Begriff. Wichtiger ist das Neue: der Begriff bekommt ethischen Inhalt. Er ist nicht mehr das jeweils verschiedene Ziel, das im einzelnen Wort und Urteil anvisiert und getroffen bzw. verfehlt wird, sondern der Orientierungs-punkt, der dauernd für den ethisch handelnden Menschen aufgestellt ist und nach dem er sich richten soll."

[20]The developments are summarized by Alpers-Gölz; pp.104ff.

[21]Cicero's argument and image seem to stem, in particular, from Antipater's distinction between 'σκοπός' and 'τέλος' made during the course of his dispute with Carneades - cf. Alpers-Gölz, p.105, and Rolke, p.350 and n.132.

[22]Thus Epictetus describes the man who grudges having his peaceful life disrupted to an athlete who grudges having to fight: "οἷον ἂν εἰ ὁ ἀθλητὴς κλαίῃ, εἰς τὸ στάδιον εἰσιών, ὅτι μὴ ἔξω γυμνάζεται. τούτων ἕνεκα ἐγυμνάζου, ἐπὶ τοῦτο οἱ ἀλτῆρες, ἡ ἀφή, οἱ νεανίσκοι." (Diss.4.4.11f).

The arduous training of the athlete is traditionally emphasized in other applications of the athletic image. The training of the orator, for example, is often compared to athletic training: Isocrates, Ant.181 ff; Plato, Grg.464b; Quintilian, Inst.5.10.121, 10.1:4, 11.2.42. Hence the teacher of oratory is compared to a gymnastics-trainer -Isocrates, Ant.183, and Quintilian, Inst.2.8.3, 8.7.

[23]Some have argued (cf. O. Hense, Seneca und Athenodorus, (Freiburg: Universitaets-Buchdruckerei von Chr. Lehmann, 1893, pp.29f) that Seneca has created a speech of Athenodorus in his own style. Weber

1895, p.63, disagrees, while Grimal 1946 believes that, in spite of "déformations imposées par le style de Sénèque", (p.70), the image of the athlete belongs to Athenodorus and is derived from Panaetius.

[24] Cf. n.40, p.102.

[25] Cf. Plato, Rep.328a.

[26] In fact, Chrysippus appears to have been interested in analogies with sport in general - cf. his image of playing ball - Seneca, Ben.2.17.3ff, 32.1ff, 7.18.1.

[27] Cf. Rolke, pp.336f, for Chrysippus' point here.

[28] cf. Oltramare, theme 72a, p.286, and cf. index, s.v. 'spectacles et jeux publiques'.

[29] Cf. Ep.7.2:

"Inimica est multorum conversatio: nemo non aliquod nobis vitium aut commendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit. Utique quo maior est populus cui miscemur, hoc periculi plus est. Nihil vero tam damnosum bonis moribus quam aliquo spectaculo desidere; tunc enim per voluptatem facilius vitia subrepunt."

[30] e.g. Ep.7.4, 95.33, Ira 1.2.4, Clem.1.25.1f, Brev.13.6f.

[31] As recounted, for example, at Ep.80.1 and 7.3 (where Seneca says that he was actually present at a gladiator-fight).

[32] Cf. T. Colardeau, Etude sur Epictète, (Paris: Thorn, 1903), pp. 315f (hereafter cited as Colardeau).

E: Building

E.1 Ep.58.35, 65.21, 66.3, 70.16, 102.24, 120.14, Trang.11.7. Building = life.

E.1.1 Tenancy: Ep.70.16.

At Ep.70.16 Seneca compares the unwillingness of the unrighteous to die to that of old tenants to leave their lodgings: "Sic veteres inquilinos indulgentia loci et consuetudo etiam inter iniurias detinet." The notion that life is merely a temporary possession is found already at Euripides, Supp.534ff, but Seneca's image is particularly reminiscent of one attributed to Bion by Teles:

> καθάπερ καὶ ἐξ οἰκίας, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, ἐξοικιζόμεθα, ὅταν τὸ ἐνοίκιον ὁ μισθώσας οὐ κομιζόμενος τὴν θύραν ἀφέλῃ, τὸν κέραμον ἀφέλῃ, τὸ φρέαρ ἐγκλείσῃ, οὕτω, φησί, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σωματίου ἐξοικίζομαι, ὅταν ἡ μισθώσασα φύσις τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀφαιρῆται τὰ ὦτα τὰς χεῖρας τοὺς πόδας. (Hense, pp.15f).

Here we find prefigured Seneca's image of the lodgers as well as a full development of the "iniurias" to which Seneca only alludes.

E.1.2 Inn: Ep.102.24, 120.14.

Seneca's comparison of the body to an inn[1] occurs also in Cicero, Sen.23.84: "ex vita ita discede tamquam ex hospitio, non tamquam e domo; commorandi enim natura devorsorium nobis, non habitandi dedit." Its occurrence in epitaphs suggests that the image is commonplace.[2]

E.1.3 Collapsing building: Ep.58.35.

Seneca compares the body of a dying man to a collapsing building. Husner[3] suggests that this may be a proverbial comparison. Gorgias, for example, according to Stobaeus (Flor.4.51.28), when asked whether he would die gladly, replied:"'ἥδιστα'...'ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκ σάπροῦ καὶ ῥέοντος συνοικιδίου ἀσμενῶς ἀπαλλάττομαι'" and a similar image is used by Teles (Hense, p.27), in reminiscence, Hense suggests,[4] of Bion.

Lucretius may refer to the same tradition when he compares the revitalization of the body with food and drink to shoring up a decrepit building.[5] Horace seems to have a similar image in mind at Sat.2.3.154:

> deficient inopem venae te ni cibus atque
> ingens accedit stomacho fultura ruenti. (2.3.153-154).

As Lejay points out,[6] the image also occurs in Seneca's Ep.95: "Antiqui medici nesciebant dare cibum saepius et vino fulcire venas cadentes" (95.22). From viewing an invalid as a shaky building, it is a logical step to portray death as the collapse of a building.

E.2 Ep.52.5f.

Erection of building = moral progress, type of ground on which it is built = disposition of proficiens.

E.2.1 Hard/soft foundations: Ep.52.5f.

Cf. Matt.7.24ff:

> Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock ... And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand.[7]

An extended picture of "Τὸν ψυχικὸν οἶκον" with the firm foundations of virtue, is found in Philo: " Ἵνα δὲ βέβαιος καὶ περικαλλέστατος εἴη ὁ οἶκος, θεμέλιοι μὲν ὑποβεβλήσθωσαν εὐφυΐα καὶ διδασκαλία, ... ἐκ δὲ ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς πράξεων τὸ ἐχυρὸν καὶ βέβαιον τῆς ἀσφαλοῦς ἱδρύσεως περιγίνεται." (Cher.101ff). Similarly, Epictetus compares behaviour based on sound opinions[8] to the erection of a building on firm foundations:

> οὐ θέλεις τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεμέλιον, τὸ κρῖμα σκέψασθαι πότερον ὑγιὲς ἢ σύχ ὑγιές, καὶ οὕτω λοιπὸν ἐποικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν εὐτονίαν, τὴν ἀσφάλειαν; ἂν δὲ σαπρὸν ὑποστήσῃ καὶ καταπίπτον οὐκ οἰκοδομημάτιον, ὅσῳ ἂν πλείονα καὶ ἰσχυρότερα ἐπιθῇς, τοσούτῳ θᾶττον κατενεχθήσεται. (Diss.2.15.8f).

E.3 Ep.115.9.

Veneered and gilded appointments of a building = superficial attractiveness and inner ugliness of vice.

E.3.1 Veneer and gilding: Ep.115.9.

Oltramare[9] shows that condemnation of luxurious buildings is typical of 'diatribe'. There are strong indications that we may link this image particularly with the "kynisch gefärbter Stoiker"[10], Ariston, whom Seneca has already mentioned a few lines above in this epistle, in connection with his condemnation of the attraction of riches for the unrighteous: they are like toys to children (F.1.3). The idea that the unrighteous are as glitteringly superficial as the goods to which they are attracted, seems likely to have been expressed also by Ariston: Plutarch, whose dependence on Ariston of Chios has been shown by Heinze and Hense,[11] makes a very similar point to the one we find at Seneca, Ep.115.9 and employs a very similar image:

> μὴ μόνον ὅσα τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ τὰ περιβόητα τῶν ζηλουμένων ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ θαυμαζομένων, ἀλλ' ἀναλύσας καὶ διαστείλας ὥσπερ ἀνθηρὸν παραπέτασμα τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἐντὸς γενοῦ, καὶ κατόψει πολλὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολλὰς ἀηδίας ἐνούσας αὐτοῖς.
> Mor.471a (De tranquillitate animi).

With the expression "ἀνθηρὸν παραπέτασμα", Plutarch, like Seneca, makes an image from house-furnishings to illustrate the superficial attractiveness of social reputation: it is strikingly similar to Seneca's "bratteata felicitas" (Ep.115.9). No doubt Heinze[12] is correct in suggesting that Ariston of Chios is the common source for both these passages. Further support is provided for Ariston as the postulated common source by the attractive speculation that the image attributed to Ariston by Plutarch at Mor.516f (Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur) may have belonged originally to a similar observation of the interior reality versus the exterior appearance of the unrighteous:[13] "καίτοι καὶ τῶν ἀνέμων μάλιστα δυσχεραίνομεν, ὡς Ἀρίστων φησίν, ὅσοι τὰς περιβολὰς ἀναστέλλουσιν ἡμῶν." (= SVF I, 401, p.89, 38 - p.90, 2).

Notes

[1]Cf. Oltramaré, n.3, p.275.

[2]Cf. R. Lattimore, Themes in Greek and Latin epitaphs, University of Illinois studies in language and literature 28 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1942), pp.168f (hereafter cited as Lattimore).

[3]n.3, p.66.

[4]Hense, ed. Teles, n.2, p.27.

[5]2.1143ff.

[6]ad loc., P. Lejay and F. Plessis, Q. Horati Flacci opera: oeuvres d'Horace, Satires (vol.2), ed. P. Lejay, (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1911), hereafter cited as Lejay.

[7]Cf. G. Kittel and G. Friedrich, eds., Theological dictionary of the New Testament, trans. G.W. Bromiley, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans publishing company, 1964-1974), s.v. 'οἰκοδομέω', (Michel) (hereafter cited as Kittel-Friedrich).

[8]Similarly Lucretius, 4.502ff, cf. D. West, The imagery and poetry of Lucretius, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 70ff.

[9]theme 35a-c.

[10]Ariston of Chios - Hense's expression, Hense 1890, p.541 - not Ariston of Ceos the Peripatetic.

[11]R. Heinze, 'Ariston von Chios bei Plutarch und Horaz', RhM 45 (1890) 497-523 and Hense 1890.

[12]ibid., p.518.

[13]Plutarch uses it in a different context and spirit: to illustrate the annoying inquisitiveness of the meddler.

F: The child

Child-imagery is found in Classical literature as early as Homer.[1] The wayward and emotional behaviour of children naturally recommends itself to philosophers as an image of reprehensible irrationality.[2] Thus Plato can compare the unreasoning grieving of adults afflicted with adversity to children who cry after falling down (Rep.604 c-d), and those who refuse to abide by the law to boys who run away from their father (Rep.584b).[3] Children can also furnish images of irrationality in Lucretius' exposition of Epicureanism and possibly in the academic exposition of Stoicism,[4] but as "Stoff ... aus dem täglichen Leben gegriffen"[5] child-imagery is particularly at home in Cynic popular philosophy.

F.1 Ep.24.13, 94.51, 110.6, 115.8f, Const.Sap.5.2, 12.1ff, Ira 2.10.1, 11.6.
Children = unrighteous.

F.1.1 Fearfulness: Ep.24.13, 110.6, Const.Sap.5.2, Ira 2.11.6.

F.1.1.1 Fear of the dark: Ep.110.6, Const.Sap.5.2, Ira 2.11.6.

Seneca illustrates the groundless fears of the unrighteous with images of children's fear of the dark. This childish fear is noted in the Aristotelian treatise De insomniis (3.462a):"ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάμπαν διαβλέπουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ σκότος, φαίνεται εἴδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὥστ' ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι πολλάκις φοβουμένους". At Rep.330e Plato compares the fearfulness of those who have committed wrong to children's fear as they start awake from their dreams. However, for the direct source of Seneca's images, we need look no further than Lucretius whom Seneca quotes by name at Ep.110.6:

> Talis est animorum nostrorum confusio qualis Lucretio visa est:
> nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
> in tenebris metuunt, ita nos in luce timemus.

> Quid ergo? non omni puero stultiores sumus qui in luce timemus? Sed falsum est, Lucreti, non timemus in luce: omnia nobis fecimus tenebras.

Here Seneca refers, of course, to Lucretius' image at 2.55f of childish fear of the dark with which he illustrates man's groundless fear of death, and it is reasonable to assume that he also had Lucretius' image in mind when he used it at Const.Sap.5.2 and Ira 2.11.6.

F.1.1.2 Fear of masks: Ep.24.13, Const.Sap.5.2.

The notion that children are fearful of dramatic masks is widespread in Antiquity. The idea is found in Plato - Phd.77e.[6] Much later, it is referred to by Martial in an epigram (14.176), a satire of Juvenal (3.175f), and in Plutarch's (Mor.600 d-e (De exilio)) and Epictetus' treatises (Diss.2.1.15). The ubiquity of the notion is further confirmed by its appearance in the visual arts.[7]

The presence of the image in Plato, Plutarch, and Epictetus suggests that Seneca may have had a precedent for using the image in a philosophical context to illustrate groundless fear. Hense[8] suggests that Ariston of Chios, the Stoic, may be responsible for the presence of the image in the treatises of the Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius: Bion, by whom Ariston was influenced,[9] had mocked the childishness of adult behaviour, and Seneca refers to Ariston by name in the context of a child-image at Ep.115.8, which is discussed in greater detail below (F.1.3).

F.1.3 Toys: Ep.115.8f, Const.Sap.12.1ff.

Seneca illustrates the attraction of worldly goods for the unrighteous with images of the attraction of toys for children. He suggests that he has obtained the image at Ep.115.8f from Ariston:

> Tunc intellegere nobis licebit quam contemnenda miremur, simillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est; parentibus quippe nec minus fratribus praeferunt parvo aere empta monilia. Quid ergo inter nos et illos interest, ut Ariston ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et statuas insanimus, carius inepti? Illos reperti in litore calculi leves et aliquid habentes varietatis delectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum, sive ex Aegyptiis harenis sive ex Africae solitudinibus advectae porticum aliquam vel capacem populi

cenationem ferunt. Ep.115.8f = SVF I, 372, p.85, 25-30.
The image shows Ariston, as we see him elsewhere (Ep.94.7), urging an indifference to worldly goods. It also reflects, as discussed in E.3.1, Ariston's emphasis on the superficiality of their beauty - "calculi leves et aliquid habentes varietatis", "maculae columnarum"- which gives rise to a further image in the same letter (cf. E.3.1).

Plutarch's comparison of adults, deprived of an object of desire, to children sulkily throwing away all their toys when one is broken (Mor.469d (De tranquillitate animi)) and Epictetus' comparison of adults' greed for goods to children's greed for figs and nuts (Diss.3.9.22, 4.7.22) shows that the image of children's toys continued to appeal to the Stoics after Seneca for the purpose of illustrating the worldly goods foolishly desired by adults.[10]

Notes

[1]Cf. R. Kassel, Quomodo quibus locis apud veteres scriptores graecos infantes atque parvuli pueri inducantur describantur commemorentur, (Diss., Mainz, 1951), p.6.

[2]Already in Homer - "Ganz besonders häufig ist es seit Homer, daß kindliches Verhalten paradigmatisch dafür wird, wie man es nicht machen soll." - H. Herter, 'Das Leben ein Kinderspiel' in Kleine Schriften, ed. E. Vogt, Studia et testimonia antiqua 15 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1975), p.585.

[3]Cf. also Rep.330e, 577a, Grg.464d. Other examples of child-imagery in Plato are given by Louis, p.192.

[4]Cf. Plutarch's image of the short-lived emotions of children (Mor.446f (De virtute morali)) and Rolke, p.135, who speculates "daß das Bild, wenn es nicht von Chrysipp selbst stammt, so doch in seiner Schule enstanden ist."

[5]Bultmann 1910, p.36.

[6]Cf. Timaeus, s.v. 'μορμολυκεῖα':"τὰ φοβερὰ τοῖς παισὶ προσοπεῖα." Cf. D. Ruhnken, Timaeus Sophista: lexikon vocum Platonicarum, ed. G.A. Koch, (Leipzig, 1828; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1971). Cf. Epictetus, Diss.2.1.15.

[7]Cf. plate 82, M.L. Barré, Herculanum et Pompeï: recueil général des peintures, bronzes, mosaïques etc., découverts jusqu'à ce jour et reproduits d'après Le antichita di Ercolano, Il museo Borbonico et les ouvrages analogues, 8 vols., (Paris: Firmin Didot frères, fils et Cie, 1870); P. Zazoff, Die antiken Gemmen, Handbuch der Archäologie (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983), plate 103.7, and n.186, p.332; G. Koch and H. Sichtermann, Römische Sárkophage, Handbuch der Archaölogie (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1982), plate 339. On the importance of children in art, cf. Herter, op.cit., n.2, pp.586ff.

[8]Hense 1890, pp.551f.

[9]Oltramare, pp.38f.

[10]For further images of the child in Epictetus, cf. Halbauer, p. 32.

G: Domination/subjection and freedom

G.1 Ep.8.7, 17.6f, 26.10, 37.4, 80.4f, 90.19, 114.23ff, Ira 3. 16.1, Vit.Beat.15.7, 16.3, Trang.10.1, 3f.

Subjected= unrighteous, free = virtuous.

G.1.1 Fetters: Ep.26.10, Vit.Beat.15.7, 16.3, Trang.10.1, 3f.

Already in Homer, the 'binding' effect of inevitable external circumstances on man is compared to that of physical bonds ("πείρατα").[1] In seeking the source of Seneca's comparison of the unrighteous, in their subjection to external circumstances and their emotions, to one in shackles, several different influences must be considered.

One aspect of Seneca's image is the concept of the human body as a prison and life as imprisonment (cf. K.1.1). This Orphic view of man, popularized by Plato,[2] regards only death as liberation from the human condition: hence at Ep.26.10 Seneca identifies "amor vitae" as the chain which binds us, while at Vit.Beat.16.3 he declares "opus est aliqua fortunae indulgentia adhuc inter humana luctanti, dum nodum illum exsoluit et omne uinculum mortale." Likewise, Plato, in his allegory of the human condition, portrays man chained by the leg and the neck ("ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας" - Rep.514a) to his cave, and Dio Chrysostom depicts man bound body and soul by one chain ("μιᾷ πάντας ἀλύσει δεδέσθαι τά τε σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχάς" - Or.30.17) in the 'prison' and 'dungeon' of life ("τῇ φρουρᾷ καὶ τῷδε τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ").

Seneca's chains may also be regarded as the chains of slavery (cf. G.1.2). Seneca often compares the unrighteous to slaves, because they are 'mastered' by their emotions. In Roman elegy the image of the lover mastered by love, as a slave in chains, is quite common. For example, Tibullus begins the fourth elegy of the second book in this way:

Hic mihi seruitium uideo dominamque paratam:

> iam mihi, libertas illa paterna, uale.
> seruitium sed triste datur, teneorque catenis,
> et numquam misero uincla remittit Amor. [3]

Like the lover, the unrighteous are chained by their emotions - such as the love of life and the fear of death (Ep.26.10) - and their warder is not only love personified (Amor, - Tibullus, 2.4.4), but human desires in general - i.e. Fortuna (Seneca, Tranq.10.3).

A third influence on Seneca's image of the shackled man may be the common comparison of fate to a chain.[4] The basis for comparison is that events are regarded as inextricably linked to one another in a 'chain effect'. The image is current in Stoic discussions of εἱμαρμένη[5] although it is not used by Seneca in connection with fatum. Dio Chrysostom incorporates this association of the chain into his comparison of the human condition to that of a prisoner in chains (Or.30.20f):

> ὥσπερ γὰρ αἵδε εἰσὶν ἐκ κρίκων τινῶν κεχαλκευμέναι δι' ἀλλήλων διαβεβλημένων, καὶ τοῦτο ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους. οὕτω δὴ κἀκείνην ἔχειν, ἣ δὴ ἔφαμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν δεδέσθαι. συνηρτῆσθαι δὲ αὐτὴν ἅπασαν ἐξ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ ἀλλήλων πεπλέχθαι, τό τε ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, τοὺς κρίκους τῆς ἁλύσεως.

Dio's extended image at Or.30.17ff shares many details in common with Seneca's imagery of chains: we are all, without exception, held in chains - Or.30.17 ("μιᾷ πάντας ἁλύσει δεδέσθαι"), Seneca, Tranq.10.3 ("Omnes cum fortuna copulati sumus"), the humble as well as the wealthy - Or.30.18, Tranq.10.3, but some have a looser and lighter chain than others - Or.30.19, Tranq.10.3, Vit.Beat.16.3, which is loosened by means of virtue - Or.23f, Ep.26.10, Vit.Beat.16.3.

Dio gives indications (30.10, 19, 20, 25) that the image of the prison and chains is not his own. His source or sources have been variously identified[6] as Antisthenes, Bion, and Cleanthes, the consensus of opinion being that, in any case, Cynic influence is present here. If this is correct, then Cynicism may be an ultimate common source for both Dio and Seneca's image of the shackled prisoner.

G.1.2 Reversed relationship of master/king and slave/subject: Ep.37.4, 90.19, 114.23ff.

As Vretska remarks,[7] "der Gedanke von der Zweiteilung des menschlichen Wesens sowie die Forderung nach der Herrschaft des Geistes ist altes und weitverbreitetes Geistesgut der Griechen." Thus Plato tells us "ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν." (Phd.79e-80a). The image makes an early appearance in Latin literature - for example, in Lucretius:

> sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto
> consilium quod nos animum mentemque vocamus. (3.138-139)

and in more extended form in Cicero's Republic:

> Nam ut animus corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini, sed corpori ut rex ciuibus aut parens liberis; libidini autem ut seruis dominus, quod eam coercet et frangit. Sic regum, sic imperatorum, sic magistratuum, sic patrum, sic populorum imperia ciuibus sociisque praesunt ut corporibus animus; domini autem seruos ita fatigant ut optima pars animi, id est sapientia, eiusdem animi uitiosas inbecillasque partes ut libidines, ut iracundias, ut perturbationes ceteras. (3.25.37)

Just as this image of master/king versus slave/subject aptly illustrates the relationship of the mind to the body, rationality to irrationality (or the emotions) in the virtuous,[8] an image of reversed power well illustrates the perverse ascendancy of irrationality in the unrighteous. Several times in the Republic Plato graphically compares the susceptibility of the unrighteous to subordinate their rationality to their emotions to the overpowering of a master by a slave - 553d, 574d,577d, 587a. In a young man in whom irrationality gains the upper hand "ἃς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν Ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ' ἐκείνου." (574d).

Comparison of the unrighteous to slaves was particularly appealing to the Stoics.[9] The remarks of several authors testify to the fact that Zeno already drew comparison between the virtuous and the free, and the unrighteous and slaves - e.g. SVF I, 219, p.53, 25-32; SVF I, 222, p.54, 3-5; SVF I, 226, p.54, 23-35. Diogenes the Cynic identifies the desires of the unrighteous as the masters which enslave them - "τοὺς

μὲν οἰκέτας τοῖς δεσπόταις, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις δουλεύειν." (D.L , 6.66) - furnishing a Cynic precedent for Seneca's statement at Ep.39.6 that the unrighteous "Serviunt ... voluptatibus, non fruuntur."[10]

G.1.2.1 Transformation of king into tyrant: Ep.114.23ff.

Comparison between man's soul and a state is developed by Plato at several points in the Republic (445d, 499d-561b, 553a-d, 577c-578b), and as the passage quoted above from Cicero's Republic shows, it had also appeared in Latin literature.[11]

It is in Plato's imagery that we find precedent for Seneca's comparison of the unrighteous soul, controlled by its passions, to a state in which the king, the rightful ruler (representing rationality), has been deposed by, or transformed into, a tyrant. Thus at 553b-c Plato makes Socrates describe how a young man in whose soul the worst impulses gain control "εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὧσεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκεῖνο" and he asks:

> ἆρ' οὐκ οἴει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραζωννύντα ... τὸ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λογιστικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἐκείνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος ... (553c-d)

Like Seneca (Ep.114.24), Plato draws a contrast between the monarchic 'constitution' of the good man, where the mind, like a king, looks after the common good (586e) and the tyrannical constitution of the bad, where the mind, like a tyrant consorting with fawning and evil subjects who strive to influence him ("δούλαις τισὶ δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς ξυνοικεῖ" - 587c), becomes susceptible to evil passions - 587c, 573d-e, 574d:[12] "Tunc illum excipiunt adfectus inpotentes et instant; qui initio quidem gaudent,[13] ut solet populus largitione nocitura frustra plenus et quae non potest haurire contrectans".

The similarities between Plato's image of the tyrannical soul and Seneca's are striking, and may point to a direct reminiscence of the Platonic image on Seneca's part. Imagery of this kind may have reached Seneca via Stoicism, however. Sextus Empiricus (Adv.math.9.90 = SVF I, 529, p.120, 11-12) in citing a proof of God which he attributes to

Cleanthes, illustrating man's reprehensible dependence on his body, by comparing it to the tribute subjects must pay to a harsh tyrant ("πικροῦ τινος τυράννου τρόπον ἐφεστῶτος ἡμῖν καὶ τὸν ποὸς ἡμέραν δασμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντος.") If this image is to be attributed to Cleanthes, as Rolke suggests it is,[14] we have here a precedent in the Old Stoa for Seneca's comparison of body and mind to master and slave and comparison of the unrighteous soul to a tyrannical state. Similarly, a Stoic source probably lies behind Philo's image of a tyrant and his subjects in his exposition of the Stoic doctrine that men who are controlled by their passions are slaves:[15]

> ἔτι τοίνυν ὥσπερ τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχούμεναι καὶ τυραννούμεναι δουλείαν ὑπομένουσι, χαλεποὺς καὶ βαρεῖς ἔχουσαι δεσπότας τοὺς ὑπαγομένους καὶ κρατοῦντας, αἱ δὲ νόμοις ἐπιμελητοῖς χρώμεναι καὶ προστάταις εἰσὶν ἐλεύθεραι, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, παο' οἷς μὲν ἂν ὀργὴ ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ τι ἄλλο πάθος ἢ καὶ ἐπίβουλος κακία δυναστεύῃ, πάντως εἰσὶ δοῦλοι, ὅσοι δὲ μετὰ νόμου ζῶσιν ἐλεύθεροι.
> Quod omnis probus liber sit 45 = SVF III, 360, p.87, 38-44.

G.1.3 Willing submission: Ep.8.7, 26.10, 37.4, Ira 3.16.1, Vit.Beat.15.7, Trang.10.1, 3f.

The idea that willing toleration of adversity alleviates it, is old and commonplace - cf. Nisbet & Hubbard's examples from Sophocles, Euripides, Archilochus etc. at Horace, Odes 1.24.19f:

> sed levius fit patientia
> quidquid corrigere est nefas.

For the illustration of the idea with the image of the beasts of burden and yoke (Ira 3.16.1) - cf. Propertius, 2.3.47ff:

> ac ueluti primo taurus detractat aratra,
> post uenit assueto mollis ad arua iugo,
> sic primo iuuenes trepidant in amore feroces,
> dehinc domiti post haec aequa et iniqua ferunt.

As noted above (G.1.2), the comparison of the unrighteous to slaves is a common image, especially with the Stoics, and probably with the Cynics. As a corollary, the virtuous are depicted as the true 'freemen'.[16] Thus we hear of Zeno "ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ παριστάντα πολίτας καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον" (Diogenes Laertius, 7.33 = SVF I, 222, p.54, 3-5) and "τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ νῦν

συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἀδεᾶ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα καὶ ἀταπείνωτον." (Plutarch, Mor. 33d (Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat) = SVF, I, 219, p.53, 31-32) while Dio Chrysostom shows that a slave can be truly 'free' as long as he is wise (Or.14.18).

Seneca attributes the paradoxical notion that voluntary subservience to philosophy constitutes true freedom to Epicurus.[17] However, the notion that philosophical training brings liberation is not confined to Epicureanism: Epictetus tells us that Diogenes compared Antisthenes, his philosophical mentor, to his emancipator ("καρπιστής"):

> καὶ λέγε γυμναζόμενος καθ' ἡμέραν, ὡς ἐκεῖ, μή ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖς ... ἀλλ' ὅτι καρπιστὴν δίδως. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐλευθερία. ταύτην ἠλευθεράθη Διογένης παρ' Ἀντισθένους καὶ οὐκέτι ἔφη καταδουλωθῆναι δύνασθαι ὑπ' οὐδενός. (Diss.4.1.113ff). [18]

While Dudley[19] has shown that such a connection between Diogenes and Antisthenes was probably a fiction, it is quite plausible, in view of Diogenes' comparison of vice to slavery (cf. G.1.2), that he should have compared philosophical enlightenment and emancipation.[20]

Notes

[1]Cf. R.B. Onians, The origins of European thought about the body, the mind, the soul, the world, time and fate, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), pp.310ff, 372ff. Of course the metaphorical sense of 'καταδέω' (cf. LSJ, s.v., III), is very old, but connotes especially the effect of magic.

[2]Cf. K.1.1 and n.6, p.169.

[3]For other examples, cf. F.O. Copley, 'Servitium amoris in the Roman elegists', TAPhA 78 (1947) 285-300, pp.296f. Cf. also Horace, Odes 1.33.13ff:

> "ipsum me melior cum peteret Venus
> grata detinuit compede Myrtale
> libertina"

and Nisbet & Hubbard on 1.33.14, who give Greek examples also. Cf. also P. Flury, Liebe und Liebessprache bei Menander, Plautus und Terenz, Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften N.F. 2 Reihe, Band 25, (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1968), p.86, on Menander, fragment 568.

[4]Cf. W. Theiler, 'Tacitus und die antike Schicksallehre', in Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühll zum 60 Geburtstag am 1 August 1945, (Basel: Schwabe, 1946), n.5, p.44.

[5]Cf. Rolke, pp.48f, 214ff.

[6]Cf. J.W. Cohoon, Dio Chrysostom, 5 vols., The Loeb classical library (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1932-1951), vol.2, pp.396ff.

[7]K. Vretska, C. Sallustius Crispus: de Catilinae coniuratione, 2 vols., (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976), on 1.2.

[8]For other examples, cf. Vretska, ibid., and Husner, pp.56ff.

[9]The image often involved the paradox of the slavery of a free man - cf. Lejay, p.540. In Horace, Odes 1.33.14f, the irony of Horace's enslavement is compounded by the fact that Myrtale is a one-time slave - cf. n.3, and Nisbet & Hubbard, ad loc.

[10]For the concept of emotions as masters, cf. also Cicero, Parad. 33 ("improbissimis dominis"), 40 ("cupiditatum dominatus"), and Epictetus, Diss.4.1.15f.

Cf. the concept of sin as slavery to John 8.34: "Jesus answered them, 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin'" and Romans 6.17, 20.

[11] Cf. Husner, pp.56ff and Aristotle, Pol.1.5.5 (1260a).

[12] Cf. Plato's comparison of the "ruling passion" ("ἔρωτα ... προστάτην") of the soul to a drone bee around whom "βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων." (573a).

[13] Cf. n.6, p.36.

[14] p.313.

[15] ibid., p.314.

[16] Cf. n.9.

[17] Usener, fragment 199.

[18] Cf. Epictetus, Diss.3.24.67.

[19] pp.1ff.

[20] Images of slavery and freedom are particularly associated with the anecdote that Diogenes was sold into slavery by pirates - Diogenes Laertius, 6.74, Epictetus, Diss.3.24.73ff, 4.1.115ff, Aulus Gellius, 2. 18.9-10. Cf. also Diogenes Laertius, 6.75.

H: Eating and drinking

H.1 Ep.15.11, 58.32, Cons.Helv.11.3.

Thirst = avarice.

H.1.1 Unquenchable thirst: Ep.15.11, 58.32, Cons.Helv.11.3.

Comparison of unrighteous greed for worldly goods to an unhealthy unquenchable thirst is made twice by Horace - at Ep.2.2.146-8 and at Odes 2.2.13ff, where he identifies the disease as dropsy:

> crescit indulgens sibi dirus hydrops
> nec sitim pellit, nisi causa morbi
> fugerit venis et aquosus albo
> corpore languor.

As Ancient medical theory had it that the malady was caused by self-indulgence, resulted in thirst, and was exacerbated by the attempt to quench it,[1] dropsy provided an ideal image for unrighteous desire for worldly goods, which is only worsened by indulgence.[2] In this context the image appears to have been associated particularly with 'diatribe', as we find it attributed to Diogenes (Stobaeus, Flor.3.10.45)[3], as well as to Bion:

> καὶ εἴ τις βούλεται ἢ αὐτὸς ἐνδείας καὶ σπάνεως ἀπολυθῆναι ἢ ἄλλον ἀπολῦσαι, μὴ χρήματα αὐτῷ ζητείτω. ὅμοιον γάρ, φησίν ὁ Βίων, ὡς εἴ τις τὸν ὑδαπικὸν βουλόμενος παῦσαι τοῦ δίψους, τὸν μὲν ὕδωπα μὴ θεραπεύοι, κρήνας δὲ καὶ ποταμοὺς αὐτῷ παρασκευάζοι. (Hense, p.39)

However, the image was probably taken up by those of other philosophical persuasions, as were many Cynic images. Plutarch, for example, attributes it (along with the image of insatiable eating) to Aristippus:

> Τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν ἀποβάλλοντας ἔχοντας δὲ πολλὰ πλειόνων δ' ἀεὶ δεομένους ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάσειεν ἄν τις τοῦ Ἀριστίππου μεμνημένος. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ εἰώθει λέγειν ὅτι 'πολλὰ μέν τις ἐσθίων πολλὰ δὲ πίνων πληρούμενος δὲ μηδέποτε πρὸς τοὺς ἰατροὺς βαδίζει καὶ πυνθάνεται τί τὸ πάθος καὶ τίς ἡ διάθεσις καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπαλλαγείη.'
>
> Mor.524a-b (De cupiditate divitiarum)

The image of unquenchable thirst as avarice is a recurrent one in Plutarch's essay De cupiditate divitiarum (Mor.532e, 524a-d).

H.2 Ep.1.5, 58.32, 108.26.

Drink = life, dregs = end and worst part of life.

H.2.1 Dregs: Ep.1.5, 58.32, 108.26.

Ep.1.5 is listed by Otto, s.v. 'fundus' (2), as proverbial.

H.3 Ep.72.8, Prov.4.10.

Hunger = avarice.

H.3.1 Insatiable hunger: Ep.72.8, Prov.4.10.

As the passage quoted above from Plutarch (Mor.524a-b - H.1.1) shows, the image of insatiable hunger naturally occurs in conjunction with that of unquenchable thirst to illustrate unrighteous craving for worldly goods.

No doubt the image of eating, as a comparison drawn from daily life, like the image of thirst, was popular in 'diatribe'. Moreover, as the Cynics preached asceticism in the matter of eating and drinking excessive indulgence in both was more than a simply figurative expression of vice. Like the image of unquenchable thirst, the image of insatiable hunger was probably not confined to the Cynics: Plutarch attributes it to Aristippus along with the image of thirst (Mor.524a-b) and Xenophon puts it in the mouth of Antisthenes. Speaking of the avaricious, he is made to say "τούτους μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε καὶ πάνυ οἰκτίρω τῆς ἄγαν χαλεπῆς νόσου. ὅμοια γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἔχων καὶ πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλαιτο." (Smp.4.37).

Seneca attributes the image of the dog who gulps down whatever scraps are thrown to him and continually waits for more to Attalus, a Stoic instructor of his adolescence. The image combines two typical Cynic images - that of the dog and of insatiable hunger. As I discuss at B.1.3, it is evidence of the transmission of Cynic imagery to Seneca via Roman intermediaries.

H.4 Ep.2.3f, 84.6f.

Digestion/assimilation of food = full comprehension of philosophy.

H.4.1 Digestion/assimilation: Ep.2.3f, 84.6f.

In two developed images (Diss.3.21.1, Ench.46), Epictetus, like Seneca, compares the digestion and assimilation of food and the full comprehension of philosophy.[5] Epictetus develops the image further to compare 'undigested' philosophy to undigested food, which, because it has been consumed too quickly, is liable to be vomited (Diss.3.21.3, "μέγας γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος εὐθὺς ἐξεμέσαι, ὃ οὐκ ἔπεψας" - Ench.46). Furthermore, he compares the state of health and strength (Diss.3.21.1, Ench.46) which eventually results from the assimilation of food to the moral welfare that a man acquires from the proper assimilation of philosophic principles. The parallel between Seneca's and Epictetus' use of the digestion image suggests a common source - probably in 'diatribe'.[6]

Notes

[1]Cf. Nisbet & Hubbard on Horace, Odes 2.2.13ff.

[2]At Ira 1.20.2, however, dropsy represents the false grandeur of anger: "Non est enim illa magnitudo: tumor est; nec corporibus copia uitiosi umoris intentis morbus incrementum est sed pestilens abundantia."

[3]"ὅμοίου τοὺς φιλαργύρους τοῖς ὑδρωπικοῖς, ἐκείνους μὲν γὰρ πλήρεις ὄντας ὑγροῦ ἐπιθυμεῖν ποτοῦ."

[4]Cf. Oltramare, theme 31 a-f.

[5]Cf. also 1 Corinthians 3.1-2, Hebrews 5.12-14; Philo, Agr.9. For comparison of Christ's message to food, cf. E.R. Curtius, European literature and the Latin middle ages, trans. W.R. Trask, Bollingen series 36 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp.134ff and Kittel-Friedrich, s.v. 'βρῶμα' (2) etc. (Behm) and 'γάλα' (Schlier).

[6]The imagery has the "sehr derben Ton" which Bultmann 1910, p.37, identifies as the hallmark of the imagery of 'diatribe'.

I: Finance

I.1 Ep.1.2ff, 21.11, 36.5, 42.7f, 101.8, 119.1f, Cons.Marc.10.1ff, Brev.Vit.1.4, 8.1ff, Cons.Polyb.10.4f.
Money = span of life or worldly possessions.

I.1.1 Loan: Ep.1.2ff, 36.5, 101.8, Cons.Marc.10.1ff, Cons.Polyb.10.4f.

The idea that "nihil esse in vita proprium mortali datum"[1] - whether it be time, possessions, or life itself - is, as Lejay shows,[2] a "pensée banale". Specific identification of possessions as a 'loan' from τύχη was made, Stobaeus tells us,[3] by Bion: "τὰ χρήματα τοῖς πλουσίοις ἡ τύχη οὐ δεδώρηται, ἀλλὰ δεδάνεικεν." Life itself is compared to a loan by Lucretius - "vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu" (3.971) - as it is by Cicero: "At ea [scil. natura] quidem dedit usuram vitae tamquam pecuniae nulla praestituta die." (Tusc.1.39.93). That the image was a common one outside literary usage is suggested by its frequent occurrence in epitaphs.[4]

The theme that, as debtors, men should not grudge repayment of the loan with loss of fortune or death, is commonplace (Cons.Marc.10.2f, Cons.Polyb.10.5f) - cf. Cicero, Tusc.1.39.93, Plutarch, Mor.107a, 116a-b (Consolatio ad Apollonium) - especially in the consolatory tradition.[5] It also has a place in epitaphs.[6]

Notes

[1]Lucilius. Fragment 777, E.H. Warmington, Remains of old Latin, 4 vols., The Loeb classical library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1935-1940).

[2]On Horace, Sat.2.2.129, q.v.; Lejay cites, among others, Euripides, Ph.555, Accius, fragment 422, Ribbeck (= Warmington, op.cit., n.1, fragment 411-412), Plautus, Cist.194 etc.

For comparison of the relationship between God and man as one of creditor and debtor, cf. R.A. Hoffmann, Das Gottesbild Jesu, (Hamburg: Paul Hartung, 1934), and Kittel-Friedrich, s.v. 'ὀφείλω B.1', (Hauck).

[3]Flor.4.41.56.

[4]Cf. Lattimore, pp.170f and J.A. Tolman, A study of the sepulchral inscriptions in Buecheler's 'Carmina epigraphica latina', (Diss., Chicago, 1910), pp.86f.

[5]Cf. B. Lier, 'Topica carminum sepulcralium latinorum', Philologus 62 (1903) 563-603, pp.578ff.

[6]Cf. Lattimore, n.4, ibid.

J: Land and land travel

The extremely common image of road and travel[1] illustrates a variety of concepts in Antiquity, not all of them concerned with morality. The 'paths' of song ("οἶμαι"), for example, are an Homeric image[2] - an analogy between oratory and a journey which is continued in the terminology of rhetoric.[3] Comparison between life and a journey, of which the destination is death, is very common, and is put into Seneca's mouth by Tacitus in a speech to Nero.[4] Not surprisingly, the image is a commonplace of sepulchral inscription.[5] Details of the image, such as the comparison of life with sojourn at an inn, recur in Seneca's use of it (Ep.102.4ff).[6] The image serves as an analogy for moral progress as early as Hesiod. Oltramare shows that the road to virtue is also recurrent in 'diatribe';[7] but it is clear that it was also useful to the exponents of Stoicism. Rolke has shown,[8] for example, that the analogy between a proficiens' distance from the full attainment of virtue and that of a traveller from the city of his destination (Diogenes Laertius, 7.120 = SVF III, 527, p.141. 27-29) goes back to the Old Stoa, and probably to Chrysippus or Zeno.

J.1 Ep.71.28, 35, 75.10, 13, 79.8, 84.13, 92.23, 111.4, Prov.5.10, Const.Sap.1.1f, Vit.Beat.8.5f, 15.5, Ben.4.22.3.
Uphill travel = progress towards virtue.

J.1.1 Uphill travel: Ep.71.28, 35, 75.10, 13, 92.23, Vit.Beat.8.5f.

The image of the uphill climb to virtue occurs as early as Hesiod's use of it at Erg.288-291:

> λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει
> τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
> ἀθάνατοι. μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
> καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον.

The roughness of the road to virtue, emphasized by Seneca (Ep.84.13, Const.Sap.1.2, Ben.4.22.3), which is, however, only steep in its initial

stages,[9] is already a part of Hesiod's image ("καὶ τραχὺς τὸ πρῶτον"). An association between virtue and an uphill climb may also have been intended by Prodicus in his famous image of the crossroads of virtue and vice described by Xenophon (Mem.2.1.2ff).[10] According to Xenophon, Prodicus pictured Heracles at a crossroads, where he is confronted by the personifications of Virtue and Vice, and asked to choose between the "χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδόν" of virtue, and the "ῥᾳδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν [ὁδόν]" of vice (Mem.2.1.29). Xenophon does not explicitly state that Prodicus visualized these roads as steep, but as a "long and difficult road" is most obviously an uphill one, an "easy and short" road most obviously a downhill one, it is reasonable to suppose that he did.

Hesiod's image, popularized perhaps by Prodicus,[11] became very commonplace,[12] especially, as Lucian tells us, with the philosophers, who perpetually recite "τὰ πάνδημα ἐκεῖνα τοῦ Ἡσιόδου περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔπη καὶ τὸν ἱδρῶτα καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον ἀνάβασιν" (Men.4). In this respect, it is interesting to note that Seneca refers to use of the image by Sextius (Ep.73.15), a philosopher by whom, as I have indicated, Seneca was much influenced.[13] Sextius may have exploited the image of the uphill road to virtue in much the same way as Seneca does. The image is alluded to and elaborated on by Silius Italicus (15.101ff), Plutarch, Mor.77d (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus), Dio Chrysostom (Or.1.66ff), and Lucian (Herm.2ff).[14]

Eschatological ideas must also be reckoned to have contributed to Seneca's association of virtue with an uphill journey. Orphic and neo-Pythagorean ideas concerning the journey of the soul, both in the state of ecstasy during life and after death, find echoes in the prose-works of Seneca.[15] In such journeys, the soul of a virtuous man is pictured ascending from earth to Heaven. The difficulty of ascension in such an uphill journey is attributed to the weightiness of the body - the mortal part of man.[16] Thus in his discussion of the difference between the various stages of progress towards virtue (Vit.Beat.16.3), Seneca pictures the virtuous man as engaged on an uphill journey which is rendered arduous by the chain which weighs him down. This chain, which represents the mortal body, will only be released at death to

permit attainment of the summit of his uphill journey.[17]

Finally, it should be remembered that, in the form 'per aspera ad astra',[18] the image of the uphill road to virtue is proverbial. This suggests that it is well rooted in the popular imagination and cautions us from attempting to link Seneca's use of it too restrictively to any one particular source.

J.1.2 Halfway uphill: Ep.71.28, 35, 75.10, 13, 92.23, Vit.Beat.8.5f.

Seneca's analogy between the proficiens and one who is climbing an uphill road but has not yet reached the top, may be a traditional Stoic one. Chrysippus appears to have visualized the proficiens' progress towards virtue not only - probably - as a journey towards a town,[19] but also as a journey uphill towards a summit:

> ὁ δ' ἐπ' ὄρους, φησί, προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει. Τὸν δέ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναί πω φησὶν εὐδαίμονα, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἐκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξιν τινὰ λάβωσι. (Stobaeus, Flor.4.39.22 = SVF III, 510, p.137, 43 - p.138, 3.

Similarly, Plutarch designates the proficiens as "τὸν ἐπ' ὄρους προκόπτοντα" (Mor.1061e-f (De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos)). The notion that the proficiens, who is aiming for "τὸ βέβαιον" and "πῆξιν τινὰ", is liable to slip backwards and downwards during his ascent, is implied by Chrysippus, but not developed as it is by Seneca. Lucian describes the foothills of the hill of virtue ("ἐν τῇ ὑπωρείᾳ κάτω ἔτι") as "ὀλισθηρὰ" (Herm.3), and describes how some, having travelled part of the way, turn back (ibid.).

J.1.3 Summit: Ep.79.8, 84.13, 92.23, 111.3f, Const.Sap.1.1f, Vit.Beat. 8.5f, 15.5.

The analogy between the sapiens' security and that of an elevated military position above the reach of the enemy (Ep.84.13, 111.4, Const.Sap.1.1, 9, Vit.Beat.15.5) is discussed at M.1.2.2.

Analogy between the sapiens' moral superiority over other men and a high position from which he can 'look down' on them is suggested by Plato at Sph.216c ("φιλόσοφοι, καθορῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον")

and by Lucretius in more extended form:

> sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
> edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,
> despicere unde queas alios passimque videre
> errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae. (2.7ff)

The same analogy is made by Lucretius' imitators - Ps.Virgil, Ciris 14ff, Ovid, Met.15.147ff, Statius, Silv.2.2.129ff[20] - and also by Lucian:

> Παπαῖ, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, ἡλίκους ἡμᾶς ἀποφαίνεις οὐδὲ κατὰ τοὺς Πυγμαίους ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ χαμαιπετεῖς παντάπασιν ἐν χρῷ τῆς γῆς. εἰκότως - ὑψηλὰ γὰρ ἤδη φρονεῖς καὶ ἄνωθεν. ἡμεῖς δὴ ὁ συφετὸς καὶ ὅσοι χαμαὶ ἐρχόμενοι ἐσμέν, μετὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ὑμᾶς προσευξόμεθα ὑπερνεφέλους γενομένους καὶ ἀνελθόντας οἷ πάλαι σπεύδετε. (Herm.5).

J.1.3.1 Deceptive height: Ep.111.3, Const.Sap.1.2.

Seneca is not sure whether a mountain appears higher (Const.Sap. 1.2) or lower (Ep.111.3) from a distance than it really is: the former illustrates the fact that the road to virtue looks more difficult to the proficiens at the beginning than it does after he has made some progress, the latter that the greatness of the sapiens is more eminent the closer it is examined.

No exact parallel for Seneca's use of this imagery is known to me. However, Dio Chrysostom's emphasis - in connection with the paths to virtue and vice - on the deception of heights seen from below (Or.1. 66), suggests that they may have had some common source for this detail of the image.

J.2 Ep.8.4, 72.9, 94.73, 97.10, 116.6, 123.14, Ira 1.7.4, Cons. Marc.9.2, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4.

Downhill travel = lapse into sin.

J.2.1 Downhill travel: Ep.8.4, 72.9, 94.73, 97.10, 116.6, 123.14, Ira 1. 7.4, Cons.Marc.9.2, Brev.Vit.4.1, 17.4.

As discussed at J.1.2, relapses in progress towards virtue are compared, by implication, with movement backwards and downwards by Chrysippus. The idea that those who have unrighteously sought prosperity will surely experience a 'downfall' is very commonly, and, indeed, proverbially,[21] compared with a fall from a height. Lucian, for example,

paints a graphic picture of the slippery climb to "ὁ Πλοῦτος":

> καὶ δὴ γεγράφθω προπύλαια μὲν ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἐπίχρυσα καὶ μὴ κάτω ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐδάφους, ἀλλ' ἄνω τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ λόφου κείμενα, καὶ ἡ ἄνοδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ ἀνάντης καὶ ὀλισθον ἔχουσα, ὡς πολλάκις ἤδη πρὸς τῷ ἄκρῳ ἔσεσθαι ἐλπίσαντας ἐκτραχηλισθῆναι διαμαστόντος τοῦ ποδός. Merc.Cond.42.

At Ep.116.6 Seneca attributes to Panaetius an image which associates vice (in this case, the emotions), with slipping: "Quod Panaetius de amore quaerenti respondit, hoc ego de omnibus adfectibus dico: quantum possumus nos à lubrico recedamus; in sicco quoque parum fortiter stamus."

J.4 Ep.8.3, 16.9, 20.2, 23.7, 37.4, 45.1, 94.54, Ira 1.14.3, Vit.Beat.1.1ff.
Traveller on right/straight road = virtuous, traveller on wrong/crooked road = unrighteous.

J.4.1 Right/straight road: Ep.8.3, 16.9, 20.2, 23.7, 37.4, 45.1, 94.54, Vit.Beat.1.1ff.

The idea of a single[22] right or straight road to virtue is prefigured already by Plato, Ep.7.330d, who uses it in a political context ("ὁρθῇ πορευομένης ὁδῷ τῆς πολιτείας"). Its usage in Roman comedy[23] implies that it had become commonplace in colloquial language, and it is considered proverbial by Otto.[24] An analogy between a straight road and the life of the proficiens, its destination with the achievement of the summum bonum, is put in the mouth of an Epicurean by Cicero (Fin. 1.18.57). It is also used in connection with Epicureanism, in more extended form, by Lucretius. Speaking of Epicurus, he says

> exposuitque bonum summum quo tendimus omnes
> quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo
> qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu. (6.26ff).

Like Seneca, Epictetus (Diss.3.22.26) and Lucian (Herm.15) apply the image of the right road to Stoic philosophy.

J.4.2 Wandering on wrong/crooked road: Ep.8.3, 16.9, 20.2, 23.7, 37.4, 45.1, 94.54, Vit.Beat.1.1f.

The notion of the unrighteous as travellers wandering in ignorance of the right or straight path is suggested, by implication, in the image of the straight or right road (J.4.1). It is made explicit by Plato at Ep.7.330d where bad government is depicted as a straying from the road: "τοῖς δ' ἔξω τὸ παράπαν βαίνουσι τῆς ὁσθῆς πολιτείας καὶ μηδαμῇ ἐθέλουσιν αὐτῆς εἰς ἴχνος ἰέναι". It is also made explicit by Lucretius in the image (cf. J.1.3) where the sapiens is compared to one who looks down from a height "unde queas alios passimque videre/ errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae" (2.9f). The same analogy between the unrighteous and the wanderer is made by those who imitated Lucretius:[25] Ps.Virgil, Ciris 16, Ovid, Met.15.150, Statius, Silv.2.2.132. Echoing Lucretius' language, Horace incorporates an image of wanderers in a wood into a Stoic definition of insanity. Damasippus is made to recount the words of his Stoic master Stertinius (Sat.2.3.33f) expounding the Stoic paradox that 'Πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται':[26]

> quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri
> caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex
> autumat ...
>
> nunc accipe, quare
> desipiant omnes aeque ac tu, qui tibi nomen
> insano posuere. velut silvis, ubi passim
> palantis error certo de tramite pellit,
> ille sinistrorsum, hic dextrorsum abit, unus utrisque
> error, sed variis illudit partibus ... (Sat.2.3.43ff).

Dio Chrysostom, following Prodicus in visualizing a particular road to sin,[27] pictures it as narrow and crooked ("ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα στενήν τε καὶ σκολιὰν καὶ βλαισὸν" - Or.1.67). Epictetus makes use of the image of the wandering sinner, attributing it, in a free paraphrase of a speech of Plato's Cleitophon (Clit.407a-b) to Socrates: "ἰὼ ἄνθρωποι, ποτ φέρεσθε; τί ποιεῖτε, ὦ ταλαίπωροι; ὡς τυφλοὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίεσθε. ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἀπέρχεσθε, τὴν οὖσαν ἀπολελοιπότες" (Diss.3.22.26).

Again, eschatological ideas may have contributed to the associations with which the image of the wrong or crooked road and the wanderer reached Seneca. The sinner is conceived by Plato to wander after death for an unlimited period of time (Phd.81d). A passage in

Cicero's Tusculan disputations, inspired by that in the Phaedo, paints the same contrast between the ease of the path of the virtuous (because it is straight) and the difficulty of that of the sinful, who are condemned to wander aimlessly:

> Ita enim censebat itaque disseruit, duas esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum e corpore excedentium; nam qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent et se totos libidinibus dedissent ... is devium quoddam iter esse, seclusam a concilio deorum: qui autem se integros castosque servavissent ... is ad illos a quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere. Tusc.1.30.72.

J.4.3 Guide: Ep.8.3, 94.54, Ira 1.14.3, Vit.Beat.1.2.

As Grimal points out,[28] analogy between the virtuous and a guide is rooted in the vocabulary of Stoicism in the word which signifies virtuous reason, both in God and in man.[29] Like Seneca, Epictetus develops comparison between the philosopher's instruction of a proficiens and the guidance of a lost traveller: "Ὁ δ' ὁδηγός, ὅταν λάβῃ τινὰ πλανώμενον ἤγαγεν ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ὄρθιαν. οὐχὶ καταγελάσας ἢ λοιδορησάμενος ἀπῆλθεν."(Diss.2.12.3).[30] Similarly, Lucian develops the analogy between one who guides a traveller on a journey and a philosophical instructor - Herm.24ff.

J.5 Ira 3.6.4, 3.34.3, Vit.Beat.1.2ff, Ot.Sap.1.3.

Beaten track = moral course of crowd.

J.5.1 The beaten track: Ira 3.6.4, 3.34.3, Vit.Beat.1.2ff, Ot.Sap.1.3.

In his programmatic statement at the beginning of the Aetia Callimachus advocates a type of poetry[31] that shuns the carriage road of the crowd in favour of the unbeaten track:

> πρὸς δέ σε] καὶ τόδ' ἄνωγα, τὰ μὴ πατέουσιν ἀμαξαι
> τὰ στείβειν, ἑτέρων δ' ἴχνια μὴ κατὰ δμά
> δίφρον ἐλ]ᾶν μηδ' οἶμον ἀνὰ πλατύν, ἀλλὰ κελεύθους
> ἀτρίπτο]υς, εἰ' καὶ στεινοτέρην ἐλάσεις. (25-28)

This image of the unbeaten track was to exert a powerful influence on Roman poets from Ennius[32] onwards, who, like Callimachus, wished to lay claim to originality:

> avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante

trita solo... (Lucretius, 1.926f).[33]

interea Dryadum siluas saltusque sequamur
intactos, tua, Maecenas, haud mollia iussa. (Virgil, Georg. 3.40f).

iuuat ire iugis, qua nulla priorum
Castaliam molli deuertitur orbita cliuo. (id., Georg.3.292f).

libera per vacuum posui vestigia princeps
non aliena meo pressi pede. (Horace, Ep.1.19.21f).[34]

Sed, quod pace legas, opus hoc de monte Sororum
detulit intacta pagina nostra uia. (Propertius, 3.1.17f).[35]

This aesthetical image, common in Roman poetry, may have prompted Seneca's comparison of the unrighteous crowd to travellers on a common road, and the sapiens to one who travels off the beaten track. However. shunning the beaten track ('λεωφόρους ὁδούς') appears to have been a precept of Pythagoreanism.[36] It is perhaps possible that Seneca encountered this ethical application of the image of the beaten track in Pythagorean philosophy, with which he was probably acquainted through the Sextians.[37]

J.7 Ep.17.7, 25.4, 77.3.

Viaticum or luggage = worldly or spiritual wealth.

J.7.1 Viaticum and luggage: Ep.17.7, 25.4, 77.3.[38]

Analogy between the spiritual 'wealth' of philosophy carried on the journey of life and viaticum carried by a traveller, is attributed by Diogenes Laertius to both Bias (1.88) and Aristotle (5.21) and recurs in Persius:

... petite hinc [scil. a philosophia] puerique senesque
finem animo certum miserisque viatica canis. (5.64f).

The same image is found in Plutarch: "ἐν νεότητι τὴν εὐταξίαν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἐφόδιον εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποτίθεσθαι" (Mor.8c (De liberis educandis)).

Notes

[1]Cf. in general, O. Becker, Das Bild des Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken, Hermes Einzelschriften 4 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1937).

[2]Od.8.481, for example. Cf. also Becker, ibid., pp.68ff, for the image in Pindar.

[3]Cf. L. van Hook, Metaphorical terminology of Greek rhetoric and literary criticism, (Diss., Chicago, 1905), pp.33f.

[4]Tacitus, Ann.14.54.

[5]Cf. Lier, op.cit., n.5, p.157. For comparison of death to the end of a road, cf. Lattimore, pp.169f.

[6]Cf. Lattimore, ibid., and Oltramare, n.3, p.275, for examples in Seneca.

[7]Theme 52g. Some examples he gives are Varro, fragment 418 = fragment 24, p.214, A. Riese, Saturarum menippearum reliquiae, (Leipzig, 1828; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1971), and Diogenes Laertius, 7.121.

[8]pp.162f and cf. Seneca, Ep.89.8. Cf. also Cicero, Fin.3.45 (= SVF III, 60, p.15, 30-35) (on which Rolke, p.161), who compares the insignificance of "rerum corporearum" vis-à-vis virtue to a single step in the journey to India.

[9]Cf. also Silius Italicus, 15.103, Plutarch, Mor.77d (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus), Julian, Contra Her.230c.

[10]Cf. Plato, Smp.177b and J. Alpers, Hercules in bivio, (Diss., Göttingen, 1912).

[11]Cf. H. Hommel, 'Per aspera ad astra', WJA 4 (1949-1950) 157-165, pp.161ff.

[12]Not surprisingly, it occurs as a typical example of 'κοίτης' in the rhetorical exercises or progymnasmata - cf. Spengel, op.cit., n.10 p.99, vol.2, pp.7, 24f.

[13]Cf. pp.94f.

[14]Cf. J. Bompaire, Lucien écrivain: imitation et création, Bibl. des écoles franç. d'Athènes et de Rome 190 (Paris: Boccard, 1958), p.392,

(hereafter cited as Bompaire).

[15]For the view that Seneca's prose-works are testament to the absorption of Pythagorean ideas into Stoicism (probably through Posidonius), cf. F. Cumont, Lux perpetua, (Paris: Geuthner, 1949), p.164. For Pythagoreanism at Rome, cf. B.L. van der Waerden, Die Pythagoreer: religiöse Bruderschaft und Schule des Wissens, Bibl. der Alten Welt R. Forsch. u. Deutung (Zürich: Artemis Verlag, 1979), pp.269ff. At Ep.108.17 Seneca says "Quoniam coepi tibi exponere quanto maiore impetu ad philosophiam iuvenis accesserim quam senex pergam, non pudebit fateri quem mihi amorem Pythagoras iniecerit." At Nat.7.32.2, however, Seneca describes the neo-Pythagorean movement as "illa invidiosa turbae schola".

[16]Cf. Cons.Marc.23.1 and Plato, Phdr.284c, Phd.81c.

[17]Cf. G.1.1 and K.1.1 for a discussion of the imagery of imprisonment.

[18]Cf. Hommel, op.cit., n.11, p.165.

[19]Cf. p.158 and n.8.

[20]Cf. R.O.A.M. Lyne, Ciris: a poem attributed to Virgil, Cambridge classical texts and commentaries 20 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), on 14-17.

[21]"quanto altius ascendit homo, lapsus tanto altius cadet" - cf. Otto, s.v. 'altus'.

[22]Cf. Varro, fragment 24, Riese, op.cit., n.8: "Unam uiam Zenona moenisse duce uirtute, hanc esse nobilem."

[23]Cf. Fantham, p.70.

[24]Cf. s.v. 'via' (1)-(5).

[25]Cf. n.20.

[26]Cf. Lejay on Horace, Sat.2.3, p.356.

[27]Seneca does not seem to envision a particular road to sin: sinners are either pictured as falling down - from the summit of Fortuna, or in the attempt to reach the height of virtue - or else, simply wandering on no path in particular.

[28]P. Grimal, L. Annaei Senecae de vita beata, Sénèque: sur le bonheur, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969), on 1.2.

[29]Cf. Zeller, s.v. 'ἡγεμονικόν' in index, and Pohlenz, s.v. 'Hegemonikon' in index.

[30] Similarly, at Diss.4.1.97f, Epictetus shows that God makes the best "σύνοδος" in the journey of life.

[31] Application of the image to the poet and his imagery is found already in Parmenides: "ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν" - fragment 1.27, H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th ed., 3 vols., ed. W. Kranz, (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1934-1937), hereafter cited as Diels-Kranz.

[32] Ennius, fragment 232-234, Warmington, op.cit., n.1, p.157.

[33] Cf. E.J. Kenney, 'Doctus Lucretius', Mnemosyne 23 (1970) 366-392, p.370.

[34] Cf. Kiessling-Heinze ad loc.

[35] Cf. M. Hubbard, Propertius, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd., 1974), pp.74ff.

[36] R. Pfeiffer, Callimachus, 2 vols., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949-1953), on fragment 1.25f, and A.S.F. Gow and D.L. Page, The Greek anthology, 2 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), on epigram 28 (A.P 12.43 = 1041-1046, G-P), s.v. 'κελεύθω', p.156.

[37] Cf. Griffin, pp.38f.

[38] Cf. Seneca, De remediis fortuitorum liber 3.2, De moribus 18 ("Monstro similis est avaritia senilis. quid enim stultius est, quod dici solet, quam via deficiente, augere viaticum"), and M. Lausberg, Untersuchungen zu Senecas Fragmenten, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte 7 (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970), p. 149.

K: Light and sight, darkness and blindness

The imagery of light versus darkness, and sight versus blindness is common in Classical literature.[1] The association of light/sight with virtue, darkness/blindness with vice is very old. It is especially characteristic of Eastern religion whence it exerted an influence on Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic thought, and, importantly for our enquiry, on the Middle and later Stoa.[2] No doubt, in explaining the association of light/sight with virtue, and, by contrast, darkness/blindness with vice, we should take into account the Socratic and, later, Stoic, doctrine that virtue is knowledge:[3] light and sight which, together, provide us with our most fundamental kind of knowledge,[4] are thus naturally associated with virtue.

K.1 Ep.48.8, 50.3, 64.8, 65.17, 79.11f, 85.5, 94.5, 18ff, 110.7, 115.6f, Ira 2.20.1, Cons.Marc.24.5, Vit.Beat.7.3.
Darkness and blindness = state of unrighteousness.

K.1.1 Dark prison: Ep.65.17, 79.11f, Cons.Marc.24.5.

The idea that the world is a place of darkness from which deliverance to Heaven, the place of light, will be obtained at death, gains currency particularly in the Hellenistic era.[5] The concept of the body as a dark prison for the soul is found already in Plato, and Plato himself (Cra.400c) suggests that it is derived from the Orphic poets.[6] The image appears frequently in Cicero's and Seneca's philosophical writings, and, by Seneca's day, is commonplace enough to appear in declamation (Seneca the Elder, Suas.6.6). Darkness is associated with this prison in Plato's allegory of the human condition in the Republic (7.514a ff) as incarceration in a dark cave, the back turned to the light. Similarly, Virgil makes Anchises describe human souls as "clausae tenebris et carcere caeco" (Aen.6.734).

K.1.2 Journey in darkness/blindness: Ep.48.8, 50.3, 110.7, Ira 2.20.1.

The image of the unrighteous blundering along in the darkness combines the idea that the unrighteous live in a state of darkness (K.1.1) with the image of life as a journey (J). Cf. Epictetus, Diss.3.22.26: "ἰὼ ἄνθρωποι, ποῖ φέρεσθε; τί ποιεῖτε, ὦ ταλαίπωροι; ὡς τυφλοὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίεσθε. ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἀπέρχεσθε τὴν οὖσαν ἀπολελοιπότες."

K.1.3 Blindness: Ep.50.3, 64.8, 85.5, 94.5, 18ff, 115.6f.

The association of the image of keen sightedness with virtue, and, by contrast, of blindness with sin, is developed particularly by Plato.[7] In the Republic (6.508a ff) he compares the virtuous to those who see things in bright sunlight: the Good (τἀγαθὸν) stands in relation to their reason as the sun to the objects of their vision (508c). Those who are lacking in virtue, however, are deprived of the 'sunlight' of the Good and are, as it were, 'blind':

> ὀφθαλμοί ... ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως, 508c [8]

In ascertaining the sources of Seneca's imagery of blindness to represent the unrighteous, Stoicism, and, in particular, Ariston of Chios, should be considered an important influence. Plutarch (Mor.1063a-b (De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos) = SVF III, 539, p.143, 39 - p.40, 1) assigns to the Stoics an opinion on virtue and progress which makes a clear identification between blindness and vice, virtue and sight, showing that ocular imagery was associated with the exposition of Stoicism.[9] Of the Stoics, it seems that Ariston of Chios was particularly interested in ocular imagery, and that he may be directly responsible for at least some of Seneca's use of such imagery. At Ep.94.5ff Seneca quotes extensively the opinions of Ariston on precepts and the instruction of philosophy (= SVF I, 359, p.81, 6 - p.83, 5). These opinions are illustrated by comparisons between the unrighteous and the physically ill. Of particular interest here is the fact that Ariston compares vice to being afflicted with cataracts of the eyes (Ep.94.5) and compares moral instruction to the removal of these cataracts, an image which Seneca picks up and develops at length at Ep.94.18ff. That Ariston

should use such imagery is fitting in view of his comparison, attested by Plutarch (Mor.440f (De virtute morali) = SVF I, 375, p.86, 9) of virtue to physical health.[10] His interest in ocular imagery is borne out by another ocular image, illustrating a different point, which Plutarch attributes to him (Mor.440f = SVF I, 375, p.86, 8-12).[11]

A predilection for ocular imagery on Ariston's part would also explain - at least in part[12] - Horace's several comparisons of vice to eye-disease (e.g. Sat.1.3.25f, Ep.1.1.28f, 2.38ff): as Hense has shown,[13] Bion may have had a part to play in Ariston's interest in ocular imagery and Horace's adoption of it. Horace's cry at Ep.1.2.37ff -

> Nam cur
> quae laedunt oculum, festinas demere, si quid
> est animum, differs curandi tempus in annum?

- is particularly reminiscent of Ariston's dictum: "Si quid oculis oppositum moratur aciem, removendum est." (Seneca, Ep.94.5). As we might expect of an image favoured by a "kynisch gefärbter Stoiker"[14] the image of the unrighteous as blind is favoured by another Stoic of that colour - Epictetus - who echoes Seneca's opinion[15] that it is as foolish to punish the unrighteous as it is to punish the blind (Diss.1.18.6f, 1.28.9).

K.2 Ep.27.3, 39.2f, 41.5, 48.8, 65.17, 66.20, 46, 88.45, 90.34, 92.5,17f, 94.29, 115.6f, 120.13, Cons.Marc.23.4, Ben.4.17.4, 22.2.
Light(fire)/sight = virtuous.

K.2.1 Extraordinary eyesight: Ep.90.34.

For the image of the sapiens having extraordinary 'vision' into the world and its hidden godliness, contrasting with the blindness of the unrighteous (K.1.3), cf. Cicero, Tusc.5.39.114 who contrasts Democritus' physical blindness with his "acies animi", and N.D.1.20.53f.

K.2.2 Light of guidance: Ep.48.8, 88.45, 120.13, Ben.4.17.4, 22.2.

For the idea that the unrighteous are wandering in the dark, cf. K.1.2.

In comparing the sapiens' pedagogical relationship to the

unrighteous to the shedding of light in the darkness, Seneca must surely have been inspired, at least in part, by Lucretius' unforgettable apostrophe to Epicurus, his spiritual mentor, at the beginning of Book 3 of the De rerum natura:

> E tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
> qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae,
> te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
> ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis. (3.1ff).[16]

K.2.3 Sun: Ep.27.3, 41.5, 66.20, 46, 92.5, 17f.

K.2.3.2 Absolute brightness: Ep.27.3, 66.20, 46, 92.5, 17f.

The sun's absolute brightness is proverbial. The notion that torches, lanterns, or any other source of light could compete with sunlight is proverbially absurd - cf. Otto, s.v.'sol' (5). To speak of something 'clearer than light' is to emphasize its brightness with a hyperbolic adynaton - cf. Otto, s.v. 'lux'.

The image of sunlight overpowering the light of lanterns which we find at Cicero, Fin.3.14.45 (= SVF III, 60, p.15, 30-35) shows that Seneca had a precedent for his comparison of virtue's indifference to, and power over, external circumstances (Ep.66.20, 92.5, 17f) to the proverbial brightness of the sun:

> Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae ... sic cum sit is bonorum finis quem Stoici dicunt, omnis ista rerum corporearum aestimatio splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscuretur et obruatur atque intereat necesse est.

Seneca had Cicero's precedent for illustrating this point of Stoic doctrine with the image of the sun's brightness. Whether Cicero himself first applied this image to illustration of the doctrine, or whether the image was traditionally associated with it among the Stoics remains uncertain.[17]

K.2.4 Fire: Ep.39.2f, 94.29, Cons.Marc.23.4.

The association of virtue with images of fire is perhaps partially explained by the Stoic conception of God as fire.[18]

K.2.4.1 Straight rising flame: Ep.39.2f.

Seneca's comparison of the soul of a virtuous man to a straight rising flame should be seen in the context of the Stoic theory that virtue acts 'secundum naturam'[19] and Seneca's assertion in the Naturales quaestiones that, by nature, a flame rises straight upwards (Nat.2.24.1 ff). In keeping with this, an evil omen in Seneca's Oedipus, is a forked flame which twists, rather than rising straight upwards (Oed.309f).

K.2.4.2 Spark: Ep.94.29.

Seneca compares the way in which philosophical precepts develop man's latent virtue to the effect of a breeze on a spark. Plato had already compared the effect of education on the mind to the rekindling of ashes ("ἀναζωπυρεῖται" - Rep.527d). In his seventh epistle, the effect of philosophy in particular on the mind is compared, as in Seneca's image, to the kindling of a fire from a spark: "ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει." Ep.7.341c-d.

However, to discover the source of Seneca's image at Ep.94.29 we need not look far afield. The proverbial[20] potential of the spark is well established in Stoicism as an image for the 'seeds' of virtue innate in man (cf. A.1.1) - the λόγος σπερματικός - which it is his responsibility to develop.[21] Cicero says "in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet" (Fin.5.15.43), but a more developed example of the image is found in Philo's exposition of this Stoic doctrine:

> puer, quamvis imperfectus comperitur, quia tamen homo est rationalis natura, paulo ante acceptis sapientiae seminibus, quamvis nondum formare rem potest, paulo tamen post oriri faciet; etenim aura recepta seminales vires ad modum scintillae in silva iuxta tempora cum illo crescentes vigere ac adhaerere debent.
> SVF II, 834, p.227, 11-16.[22]

Notes

[1]For a general survey, cf. R. Bultmann, 'Zur Geschichte der Lichtsymbolik im Altertum', Philologus 97 (1948) 1-36 (hereafter cited as Bultmann 1948).

[2]Cf. ibid., pp.26f.

[3]Cf. J. Kube, TEXNH und APETH: sophistisches und platonisches Tugendwissen, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie 12 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1969), pp.40ff, 148ff, and W. Ganss, Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca, (Diss., Freiburg, 1951), pp.11ff.

[4]Cf. Bultmann 1948, p.19: "Am großartigsten ist dieser Gedanke von der Parallelität des Sehens und Erkennens ... von Platon entwickelt worden."

[5]Ibid., p.24.

[6]Cf. O.E. Manning, On Seneca's "Ad Marciam", Mnemosyne supp.69 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), ad loc.

[7]Cf. n.4.

[8]For other images of sight and blindness in Plato, cf. Louis, p. 193.

[9]For discussion of the original source of this image - possibly Chrysippus - cf. Rolke, pp.127ff.
'ὀφθαλμία' of the soul is, of course, a common Greek metaphor for φθόνος, in no way confined to Stoicism - cf. LSJ, s.v. 'ὀφθαλμία' II.

[10]Cf. Heinze, op.cit., n.11 p.139, p.518 and n.1.

[11]Diogenes Laertius' account of Ariston's response to the Academic who could not comprehend anything seems fitting in this respect: "τίς σ' ἐκτύφλωσεν, ἔφη, τίς ἀφείλετο λαμπάδος αὐγάς;" (6.6).

[12]Such imagery would no doubt suggest itself also because Horace himself seems to have suffered from eye-ailments - cf. Sat.1.4.30f.

[13]Hense 1890, pp.542f.

[14]Hense's description of Ariston of Chios, ibid., p.541.

[15]Ira 2.10.1: "Quid enim si quis irascatur in tenebris parum uestigia certa ponentibus?"

[16]Similarly, Cicero describes the guidance given to him by the gods (Sul.40) thus: "vos denique in tantis tenebris erroris et inscientiae clarissimum lumen menti meae praetulistis."

[17]Cf. Rolke, p.143.

[18]Cf. Pohlenz, vol.2, p.71, S.123 Z.22, and Zeller, pp.148ff, 154 ff.

[19]Cf. n.3, p.79.

[20]Cf. Otto, s.v. 'scintilla'.

[21]Cf. Pohlenz, vol.1, p.123 and vol.2, p.71, S.123 Z.22.

[22]Cf. also Philo, de sacrif. Abel et Cain 123 = SVF III, 636, p.162, 4-9. For the source of Philo's images, cf. Rolke, pp.445f.

L: Medicine

Medical imagery - especially with a moralizing function - is very common in Greek and Latin literature. Ancient views of the soul as a material entity made comparison between the body and soul both pertinent and necessary,[1] while the close connection and mutual influence between philosophy and medicine - particularly Hippocratic[2] - which existed in Antiquity, explains why medical imagery occurs so readily in philosophical literature.

In frequently resorting to medical imagery to illustrate vice and virtue, Seneca is following tradition, especially that of 'diatribe'. Bompaire has rightly cautioned against deducing from such imagery that the moralist who uses it is personally acquainted with medical theories or circles, emphasizing that such imagery was propagated by rhetorical manuals.[3] However, in Seneca's case, we might agree with Miriam Griffin[4] that his early contact with the Sextians,[5] who were interested in certain aspects of medicine, as well as his own personal health problems,[6] to which he frequently alludes, were probably contributory factors to Seneca's readiness to use medical imagery.

L.1 Ep.25.2f, 50.3f, 53.6f, 9, 64.8, 68.8f, 72.5ff, 74.33f, 75.7, 12, 85.5, 88.45, 94.5, 18ff, 115.6f, Ira 1.16.7, 20.1ff, 2.35.2, 3.3.4, 8.1, 9.5ff, 10.3, Cons.Marc.1.8, 8.2, Trang.2.[illegible], 11f, 7.4, Cons.Helv.2.1, 11.3, Clem.2.6.4.

Ill = unrighteous.

As Goheen[7] notes, "disease and cure images ... have a traditional basis going back to Homer. The expression of almost any adverse condition as a νόσος can be found in Greek poetry." In Homeric epic, as Goheen points out, the disease is "almost always conceived as a visitation from an angry deity", whereas in Greek tragedy 'νόσος' is "transferred often to distress and sorrow or to mental disorder and to causes of great commotion, without necessary supernatural connection."[8] An

early example of the philosopher's comparison of vice to disease is provided by Heraclitus' comparison of conceit to a "ἱερὰ νόσος".[9]

It is in Plato that the comparison of vice to disease - as, indeed, medical imagery in general - finds its first extensive use in a moralizing context. At Rep.444d-e, for example, Socrates suggests "Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγιειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια" and at Ti.86b we are told

> νόσον μὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἄνοιαν συγχωρητέον, δύο δ' ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀμαθίαν. πᾶν οὖν ὅτι πάσχων τις πάθος ὁπότερον αὐτῶν ἴσχει, νόσον προσρητέον, ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας τῶν νόσων μεγίστας θετέον τῇ ψυχῇ.

Particular crimes, such as temple-robbery, are identified with disease by Plato (Lg.853d, 854c) as are vicious tendencies such as anarchy ("ἀναρχίαν" - Ep.8.354d) and injustice ("ἀδικίαν" - Rep.610c). Individuals are not alone susceptible to moral disease and, in fact, the image of the state as a body prone to sickness is very common in Plato.[10]

As medical imagery draws on everyday experience it was particularly appealing to popular philosophers.[11] As forerunners to their popularity in 'diatribe', Antisthenes'[12] comparisons of vice to illness (Diogenes Laertius, 6.4, 6.6) are significant. Bion's comparison of avarice to dropsy has been discussed at H.1.1.

Among the Stoics, comparison[13] between bodily illness and illness of the soul is common: e.g. Cicero, Tusc.3 passim, 4.10.23 = SVF III, 424, p.103, 18 - p.104, 6; Diogenes Laertius, 7.115 = SVF III 422, p.103, 3-9; Galen, de H. et Plat. decr. 5.2.128, Kühn,[14] vol.5, pp.437f = SVF III, 471, p.120, 15-26, p.121, 14.17, and was especially developed by Chrysippus, as these authors tell us. Illness of the soul, according to Stoic theory, is brought on by the emotions which, depending on their severity or frequency, are called 'ἀρρωστήματα' or 'νόσοι'.[15] Seneca refers to this doctrine when he says

> Quid inter morbos animi intersit et adfectus saepe iam dixi ... morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura, ut avaritia, ut ambitio .... Adfectus sunt motus animi inprobabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere morbum, sicut destillatio una nec adhuc in morem adducta tussim facit, adsidua et vetus pthisin. Ep.75.11f.

L.1.1 Chronic illness: Ep.25.2f, 50.4, 75.12, 85.5, Cons.Marc.1.8.

The idea that illness of the soul, like bodily illness, grows worse the longer it is allowed to persist, is already found in Plato: for example, at Grg.480b Socrates expresses the wish that a wrongdoer should seek out punishment, going to the judge "ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὄπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ ἀνίατον." (Grg.480a-b). Examples collected by Otto show the image was proverbial:

> principiis obsta: sero medicina paratur
> cum mala per longas conualere moras. Ovid, Rem.91f.
>
> ... venienti occurrite morbo. Persius, 3.64.[16]

L.1.2 Recognition of illness: Ep.50.4, 53.5f, 9.

The idea that the physically ill are forced to recognize their illness (Ep.53.6) and seek a cure for it (Ep.53.9), whereas the spiritually 'ill' are unaware of their 'illness' (Ep.50.4, 53.7), and therefore do not seek aid (Ep.50.4, 53.9) or delay doing so, is a common one among the moralizing uses of medical imagery.

Dio Chrysostom tells us that Diogenes was surprised that people did not wish to be 'cured' ("ἰᾶσθαι" - Or.8.8) by him of folly, wickedness, and intemperance ("ἀγνοίας καὶ πονηρίας καὶ ἀκολασίας" - ibid.), although, had he claimed to be a dentist, oculist, or knowledgeable about diseases of the spleen, nose, or about gout, everybody would have flocked to him (Or.8.8):

> ὡς ἧττον ὑπὸ τούτων [ἢ ἐκεῖνοι] ἐνοχλούμενος ἢ χαλεπώτερον ἀνθρώπῳ σπληνὸς ἀνέχεσθαι οἰδοῦντος καὶ διεφθαρμένου ὀδόντος ἢ ψυχῆς ἄφρονος καὶ ἀκαθοῦς καὶ δειλῆς καὶ θρασείας καὶ φιληδόνου καὶ ἀνελευθέρου καὶ ὀργίλης καὶ λυπῆρας καὶ πανούργου καὶ πάντα τρόπον διεφθαρμένης.

Cynic liking for this image, suggested by its attribution to Diogenes, is borne out by the other writers who use it: Horace and Plutarch.

A similar contrast between physical disorder - in this case, a slovenly appearance - which is taken seriously, and mental disorder, which is not, is made by Horace at Ep.1.1:

> si curatus inaequali tonsore capillos
> occurri, rides; si forte subucula pexae
> trita subest tunicae vel si toga dissidet impar,

> rides: quid mea cum pugnat sententia secum,
> quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,
> aestuat et vitae disconvenit ordine toto,
> diruat, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis?
> insanire putas sollemnia me neque rides,
> nec medici credis nec curatoris egere (94-102)

In another epistle he returns briefly to Diogenes' image of the unrighteous refusing to seek remedies for their illnesses: "stultorum incurata pudor malus ulcera celat" (Ep.1.16.24).[17]

Plutarch draws a distinction between the moderately ill, who immediately seek medical assistance (Mor.81f (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus)), and the gravely ill, who cannot endure a doctor's presence "ὑπὸ τοῦ σφόδρα νοσεῖν μηδ' ὅτι νοσοῦσιν αἰσθανόμενοι" (81f). The same distinction may be drawn, he says, between the moderately unrighteous and the extremely sinful. The latter is hostile towards those who would correct him, while the former discloses his depravity to his mentors rather than concealing it, - no small sign, as Plutarch remarks, of progress, echoing Seneca's sentiment that "vitia sua confiteri sanitatis indicium est" (Ep.53.8).[18] At Mor.500e-501d (Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores) Plutarch echoes very closely Seneca's contention that the unrighteous differ from the physically ill by being unable to perceive their affliction.

On the other hand, Seneca makes one notable comparison between the unrighteous' inability to perceive their sin and the failure of the physically ill to perceive their own illness (Ep.50.2),[19] but the idea is proverbial (cf. Otto, s.v.'ulcus' (2)). It occurs, as we have just seen, in Plutarch (Mor.81f) and also in Horace:

> cum tua pervideas oculis mala lippus inunctis,
> cur in amicorum vitiis tam cernis acutum
> quam aut aquila aut serpens Epidaurius? Sat.1.3.25-7.

Here, Horace, like Seneca, compares such lack of self-perception to eye-disease (cf. K.1.3). A famous example of this analogy occurs, of course, at Matt.7.3f: "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"

L.1.4.1 Uncontrollable running: Ira 2.35.2.

In illustrating the uncontrollable nature of anger, Seneca compares it to running which cannot be slowed down to a walk at will. This image is strikingly reminiscent of one used by Chrysippus in defining the nature of emotion - as an "ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις" and "πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή" - in his work ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΘΩΝ

> οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ' ὁρμὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις, ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὁρμῇ ὥστε καὶ στῆναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ' ὁρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις, ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξαμένων.
> Galen, de H. et Plat. decr. 4.2.136, Kühn, vol.5, p.369 = SVF III, 462, p.114, 4-9.[20]

The parallel suggests that the image may have become traditional in Stoic teaching as an illustration of the nature of emotion, and would therefore readily occur to Seneca - if it were not obtained directly - as an image for the illustration of the uncontrollable nature of anger, "hunc ... affectum ... maxime ex omnibus taetrum ac rabidum" (Ira 1.1.1).

L.1.6 Contagion: Ep.75.7, Ira 3.8.1, Tranq.7.4.

The comparison of vice to a plague is commonplace - cf. Otto, s.v. 'pestis'.

L.1.7. Sensitivity: Ira 1.20.3, 3.9.5, Tranq.2.6, 11f, Cons.Helv.11.3.

The image of insatiable thirst (Cons.Helv.11.3) - a symptom of dropsy - with which Seneca illustrates avarice, is discussed at H.1.1. There I show that the image is particularly associated with 'diatribe'.

L.1.7.1 Itching sores: Ira 1.20.3, 3.9.5, Tranq.2.11f.

Seneca compares the desires of the unrighteous to sores which relish the pain of being scratched.[21] Hense[22] has compared this image with one used by Plutarch to illustrate the curiosity of the sinful: "οὕτω τις ἐστι γλυκύπικρος καὶ ἀκατάσχετος ὁ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης γαργαλισμός, ὥσπερ ἕλκος αἱμάσσων ἑαυτόν, ὅταν ἀμύσσηται" (Mor.522c (De curiositate)). He has shown that the image has "das Gepräge Bioneisch-

Aristoneischen Diatribenstils".

L.1.8 Scar: Ira 1.16.7, Cons.Marc.8.2, Cons.Helv.2.1ff.

The idea that the soul bears the 'scars' of former sorrowful experiences involves, of course, an analogy between such experiences and wounds. As is clear from the context of the image at Cons.Helv.2.1ff. (ibid.2.4), and in many other places,[23] these images are conceived to be dealt by a hostile Fortuna, and the image is thus also a military one.

At Ira 1.16.7 Seneca tells us that Zeno had compared an old sorrow to a scar, and it is, no doubt, in this Stoic tradition[24] that Cicero imagines that, if a philosopher's 'remedy' were applied some considerable time after the occurrence of a disaster "nec ... volneribus mederetur, sed cicatribus" (Tusc.3.22.54).

However, the fact that Cicero frequently uses the image of wounding in a political context,[25] and that the wound of love, dealt by Cupid's arrows, is a commonplace in love-poetry, shows that the image is certainly not exclusively Stoic.

L.1.9 Internal illness: Ep.50.4, 68.8, 72.5.

The only illness with which Seneca invests the sapiens is that of boils or pimples on the surface of the skin. Contrasting with the severe illness which threatens the entire well-being of the unrighteous, these pimples and boils represent the minor impact which adversity can have on the sapiens, affecting him only superficially. For the comparison of minor faults to pimples, we may compare Horace's image at Sat.1.6.65-67:

> atqui si vitiis mediocribus ac mea paucis
> mendosa est natura alioquin recta, velut si
> egregio inspersos reprehendas corpore naevos

L.2 Ep.2.3, 7.1, 28.3, 6, 50.9, 69.2, 72.6, 104.18, Prov.3.2, Ira 2.27.3, Vit.Beat.17.4.

Convalescent = proficiens.

L.2.1 Convalescent: Ep.2.3, 7.1, 28.3, 6, 50.9, 69.2, 72.6, 104.18, Prov.3.2, Ira 2.27.3, Vit.Beat.17.4.

The image of the convalescent aptly illustrates the condition of the proficiens who is midway between the 'illness' of vice, and the 'health' of total virtue. In the Encheiridion of Epictetus, one of the "σημεῖα προκόπτοντος" is "περίεισι δὲ καθάπερ οἱ ἄρρωστοι, εὐλαβούμενός τι κινῆσαι τῶν καθισταμένων, πρὶν πῆξιν λαβεῖν" (48.2).[26] The image of a convalescent occurs too at the beginning of Plutarch's essay, Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus. Rebutting the notion that moral progress engenders no diminution of vice until virtue is attained in its entirety, Plutarch draws the following picture:

> οὐδὲ κάμνοντι θεραπεία μὴ ποιοῦσα ῥᾳστώνην μηδὲ κουφισμὸν αἰσθητὸν τοῦ νοσήματος ὑπείκοντος καὶ χαλῶντος αἴσθησιν ἂν παρέχοι διαφορᾶς, πρὶν εἰλικρινῆ, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἐγγενέσθαι παντάπασι τοῦ σώματος ἀναρρωσθέντος. Mor.75b.

In consequence of their assertion that virtue and vice are absolute, the Stoics found themselves obliged to resolve the absurdity that "the wise man in a moment or second of time changes from the lowest possible depravity to an unsurpassable state of virtue"[27] and that there exist no intermediate stages between virtue and vice.[28]

Zeno had discussed the theory of προκοπή (cf. Plutarch, Mor.82f (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus) = SVF I, 234, p.56, 13-19) and Chrysippus appears to have attempted to elucidate its complexities with a variety of images.[29] In view of Chrysippus' predilection for comparison of the mind's disorders to bodily illnesses,[30] it is not unreasonable to imagine that Chrysippus may have been the ultimate source of Seneca's, Epictetus', and Plutarch's comparison of the proficiens to a convalescent. However, the only Chrysippean medical analogy we have illustrating movement between virtue and vice is designed to stress their sharp antithesis - the difference between blindness and sight (restored after the removal of cataracts).[31]

It is tempting to speculate, - and it is pure speculation - that Sextius, of whom Seneca tells us "ostendet tibi beatae vitae magnitudinem et desperationem eius non faciet" (Ep.64.5),[32] and who, as we have said,[33] was interested in medicine, may have compared moral progress to a some-

what less startling metamorphosis from illness to health - to, in fact, a convalescence.[34]

L.2.1.1. Relapse: Ep.7.1, 28.6, 72.6.

The proficiens' liability to lapse in moral progress is compared by Seneca to the convalescent's susceptibility to physical relapse if he leaves his house (Ep.7.1), or does not avoid unhealthy places (Ep.28.6). Similarly, Epictetus, in the image quoted above (Ench.48.2 - L.2.1), compares the proficiens to a convalescent who must avoid anything that might jeopardize his return to health.

L.3: Ep.22.1, 40.4f, 52.10, 64.8, 75.7, 89.19, 94.13, 17ff, Prov. 3.2, Const.Sap.13.2, Ira 1.6.2ff, 15.1f, 2.10.1, 7, 3.29.2ff, Cons.Marc.1.8, Cons.Helv.1.2, 2.1f, Clem.1.17.1f, Ben.2.2.2.
Doctor = sapiens.

Comparison between the philosopher and the doctor, philosophy and medicine or a curative treatment of some kind, is very common in Classical literature, - indeed, proverbial.[35]

We first encounter the image in a philosophical context in a fragment of Democritus: "ἰατρικὴ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ δημόσιον σώματος νόσους διέεται σοφίη δὲ ψυχὴν παθέων ἀπαιρέεται" (Diels-Kranz, vol.2, B.31, p.152). However, it is to Plato's dialogues that we must look for the first extensive use of the analogy between philosophy and medical science. Jaeger[36] emphasizes that "die ethische Wissenschaft des Sokrates, die in Platos Dialogen im Mittelpunkt der Auseinandersetzung steht, ohne das Vorbild der Medizin, auf das Sokrates sich beruft, nicht denkbar gewesen wäre." This is because, as Jaeger goes on to explain, medicine and ethical science of the time shared ways of thought, mutually influenced each other, and, in some cases, were practised by one and the same person.[37]

The comparison of philosopher to doctor was clearly useful to the popular philosopher[38] in his attempt to persuade the people. We have already seen that, according to Dio Chrysostom (Or.8.8), Diogenes the Cynic regarded his philosophical mission as that of a spiritual

doctor, and this view is already reflected in images attributed to Antisthenes (Diogenes Laertius, 6.4, 6).[39] Similarly, Bion, we are told, compared his sermons to 'φάσιμακα': "Ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος διὰ τί αὐτὸν οὐκ ὠφελεῖ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα 'οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ πυξίδες', εἶπεν, 'αἱ τὰ χρηστότατα φάσιμακα ἔχουσαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὠφελοῦνται.' (Sternbach, Gnomologium Vaticanum 157 = Kindstrand, F75).[40]

Many Cynic images were also shared by the Stoics. The image of healing is no exception. Chrysippus is an important figure in the development of the Stoic theory of 'healing'. He wrote a work entitled ΘΕΡΑΠΕΥΤΙΚΟΣ, "ein Leitfaden für die Jünger der Stoa, die sich an ihren Mitmenschen als ἰατρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς bewähren sollten."[41] An important quotation from this work, made by Galen, clearly states Chrysippus' view that a τέχνη exists for the treatment of the soul which is analogous to medical science with its remedies for the body's ills (Galen, de H. et Plat. decr. 5.2, Kühn, vol.5, pp.437f = SVF III, 471, p.120, 15-26). Further testimony from Galen (de H. et Plat. decr. 5.2.129, Kühn, vol.5, p.439)[42] indicates that Chrysippus was indebted to Zeno for this analogy, information which is supported by Stobaeus' statement that "Ζήνων ἔλεγεν οὐδενὸς ἡμᾶς οὕτω πένεσθαι ὡς χρόνου. βραχὺς γὰρ ὄντως ὁ βίος, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς νόσους ἰάσασθαι δυναμένη" (Flor.4.34.68).

This conception of the duty of the Stoic philosopher is enthusiastically accepted by the Roman Stoics. Seneca's comparisons of the philosopher in his role as moral instructor to a doctor are prefigured by Cicero's statement that "Est profecto animi medicina, philosophia, cuius auxilium non ut in corporibus morbis petendum est foris, omnibusque opibus viribus, ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est." (Tusc.3.3.6).[43]

However, that the image was already known in Latin, outside the doctrinal vocabulary of the Stoics, is suggested by Plutarch's anecdote that Cato told the people they must choose as censor "μὴ τὸν ἥδιστον, ἀλλὰ τὸν σφοδρότατον ... τῶν ἰατρῶν" (Cat.16.6-7).

Finally, we must not forget the role of Jesus as physician, both literal and figurative, as, for example, at Mark 2.17: "They that are

whole have no need of the physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance."[44]

L.3.1 Doctor's patience: Ep.29.1, Const.Sap.13.2, Ira 1.15.1, 2.10.1, 7, Clem.1.17.1.

Seneca several times compares the sapiens' apatheia - in particular, his absence of anger - to a doctor's patience with his patients.

Such a comparison is implied when Epictetus urges compassion, not anger, for Medea's wrongdoing: "οὐχὶ δ', εἴπερ ἄρα, μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖς, ὡς τοὺς τυφλοὺς ἐλεοῦμεν, ὡς τοὺς χωλούς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς τὰ κυριώτατα τετυφλωμένους καὶ ἀπεσκεχωλωμένους;"(Diss.1.28.9). A more extended parallel for Seneca's use of this image is found in Lucian's description of the philosopher Demonax:

> οὐδεπώποτε γοῦν ὤφθη κεκραγὼς ἢ ὑπεροδιατεινόμενος ἢ ἀγανακτῶν, οὐδ' εἰ ἐπιτιμᾶν τῳ δέοι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἁμαρτημάτων καθήπτετο, τοῖς δὲ ἁμαρτάνουσι συνεγίνωσκεν, καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἠξίου λαμβάνειν τὰ μὲν νοσήματα ἰωμένων, ὀργῇ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς νοσοῦντας οὐ χρωμένων. (Demon.7)

The parallel suggests that Seneca and Lucian share some common source, probably in 'diatribe'.

L.3.2 Radical medical treatment: Ep.52.10, 75.6f, 99.19, Prov.3.2, Ira 1.6.2ff, Cons.Marc.1.8, Cons.Helv.2.1f.

Seneca's frequent comparison of the stringent treatment meted out to the unrighteous by the philosopher to the radical medical treatment (especially surgery and cautery) of the doctor, has a long pedigree.

In envisaging himself brought to trial by a cook before a jury of children for practising the "true art of statesmanship" ("τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ" - Grg.521d), Socrates fancies that the speech for the prosection would go like this:

> 'Ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ πεύχουν ὑμᾶς.' 521e-522a

Socrates makes further comparisons between moral rectification and

radical medical treatment in the same dialogue at 479a and 480c.

The currency of the image among the Cynics is suggested by Antisthenes' use of it as reported by Diogenes Laertius -"ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τί πικρῶς τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπιπλήττει 'καὶ οἱ ἰατροί', φησί, 'τοῖς κάμνουσιν'" (6.4) - and its recurrence among writers in the 'diatribe' tradition. As Malherbe has shown,[45] the image of radical medical treatment was particularly favoured by Cynics such as Diogenes who believed that the vices of mankind should be treated with severity. Analogies between severe moral correction and radical medical treatment run through his Epistles 28 and 29 (Hercher, 10c, pp.241-243).[46] Lucretius' comparison of the philosophical instruction of his De rerum natura to medicinal bitter wormwood ("absinthia taetra" - 1.936) is a famous example of its continuation in the 'diatribe' tradition.[47] Continuing in the tradition, the image is also used by Plutarch (e.g. Mor.55a, 73a, 74d-e (Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur)), Dio Chrysostom (e.g. Or.38.7, 57.4f, 78.42ff, 45), and Lucian (e.g. Apol.2). Both Plutarch and Dio compare the inappropriately mild treatment of vice to sprinkling an invalid with perfume, when he really needs an embrocation and plaster ("ἐμβροχῆς καὶ καταπλάσματος" - Plutarch, Mor.42c (De recta ratione audiendi)) - Plutarch, Mor.42c, Dio, Or.48.12.

Two passages of Philo and Plutarch suggest that the image of radical medical treatment was current in the exposition of Stoic theory. However, the Stoic function of the image may have been slightly different from that of the images examined so far, for, in both cases, (Philo, De praemiis et poenis 33f = SVF II, 1171, p.336, 28-38; Plutarch, Mor.1065 a-c (De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos) = SVF II, 1181, p.339, 22-25), the image illustrates the Stoic doctrine of the conjunction of good and evil: as the doctor amputates limbs or administers snake-venom or hyena-gall to restore a patient to health, so evil always occurs in conjunction with good.[48]

However, as with other medical imagery, the evidence is that the image of radical medical treatment was commonplace and not at all confined to use by philosophers. Cicero, for example, uses it freely in his letters.[49] More cogent evidence is its use by rhetoricians: in a

discussion of similes Quintilian refers to an image of amputation (along with an agricultural image) as "Illa uulgaria ... et utilia tantum ad conciliandam fidem" (Inst.8.3.75): "ut medici abalienata morbis membra praecidant, ita turpes ac perniciosos, etiam si nobis sanguine cohaereant, amputandos." (ibid.). An example of an image of radical medical treatment actually put to use in a speech is preserved by Seneca the Elder - Con.9.5.6.

L.3.3 Application of remedies to particular cases: Ep.22.1, 64.8f, 94.19f.

Seneca stresses that general philosophical rules or precepts may be formulated, but that the particularities of their application to a specific situation ("quando fieri debeat aut quemadmodum"-22.2, "quomodo ... admoveantur aut quando" - 64.8) must be resolved as the case demands. In this respect they are comparable to the principles of medicine, which must be applied to the particularities of the illness in question.

The need to consider individual circumstances and people when applying general principles is a concern of both Plato and Aristotle, in which they were influenced by empirical Hippocratean medical science.[50] The medical influence is evident in the medical imagery with which they illustrate the idea. For example, in discussing the application of the laws of the state, Plato contrasts the better method, in which the laws are applied and recommended to the citizens as individuals, with the worse method, in which the laws are imposed on them en masse in peremptory fashion; he illustrates these contrasting methods by comparing them to the contrasting practices of the slave-doctor and the free doctor. The former

> οὔτε τινὰ λόγον ἑκάστου περὶ νοσήματος ἑκάστου τῶν οἰκετῶν οὐδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων ἰατρῶν δίδωσιν οὐδ' ἀποδέχεται, προστάξας δ' αὐτῷ τὰ δόξαντα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας ὡς ἀκριβῶς εἰδώς, καθάπερ τύραννος αὐθαδῶς οἴεται ἀποπηδήσας πρὸς ἄλλον κάμνοντα οἰκέτην. (Lg.720c)

while the latter investigates his patients' illnesses "ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ κάμνοντι κοινούμενος αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, ἅμα μὲν αὐτὸς μανθάνει τι παρὰ τῶν νοσούντων, ἅμα δέ, καθ' ὅσον οἷός-τ' ἐστί, διδάσκει τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα αὐτόν. (720d).

Similarly, at Polit.295c-d, we are told that a law-giver, like a doctor who deviates from his own prescriptions "συμβαινόντων ἄλλων βελτιόνων τοῖς καίνουσι διὰ πνεύματα ἤ τι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἐκ διὸς ἑτέρως πως τῶν εἰωθότων γενόμενα" should be capable of adjusting his laws, should circumstances demand it. Likewise, in illustrating the application of general principles to individuals, Aristotle uses this image from medical practice:

> ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς. καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὔ, ὁ δὲ πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθησιν. (E.N.10.9.15).

L.3.3.1 Right time for application of remedy: Ep.22.1, 64.8, Ira 3.39.2, Cons.Helv.1.2, Ben.2.2.2.

The idea that moral correction, like medicine, requires application at the appropriate time, has its own tradition. In the Prometheus Bound, for example, Prometheus, when asked by Oceanus whether he realizes that words heal anger, replies:

> ἐάν τις ἐν καιρῷ γε μαλθάσσῃ κέαρ
> καὶ μὴ σαρίζωντα θυμὸν ἰσχναίνῃ βίᾳ. (379-380).

Cicero quotes this passage at Tusc.3.31.76 where he is discussing methods of consolation: "erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. Sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum. ut Prometheus ..."

L.3.3.1.1 Delayed treatment: Ira 3.39.2f, Cons.Helv.1.2.

Returning to the medical metaphor for consolation at Tusc.4.29.62, Cicero remarks that Chrysippus "vetat ... ad recentis quasi tumores animi remedium adhibere". We are thus provided with a Stoic, and, ultimately, Chrysippean, source for Seneca's comparison when he speaks of delaying consolation until "ipse [scil. dolor] uires suas frangeret et ad sustinenda remedia mora mitigatus tangi se ac tractari pateretur." (Cons.Helv.1.2) and very probably also for the medical image of delaying treatment for anger at Ira 3.39.2f.

However, a somewhat similar image used by Quintilian in discussing the order of the parts of a speech, suggests that the image of delay-

ing treatment for a wound was current outside philosophical and even moralizing usage: "pro re, pro tempore intuenda quae prosint, atque ut erit uulnus, ita uel curandum protinus uel, si curatio differri potest, interim deligandum." (Inst.4.2.84).

Notes

[1]Cf. Rolke, p.484.

[2]Cf. L.3.3 and n.50, p.187.

[3]pp.433f.

[4]p.41.

[5]Cf. Oltramare, pp.173ff. for possible Sextian influence in the depiction of the physical manifestation of anger.

[6]Cf. Husner, pp.32ff.

[7]R.F. Goheen, The imagery of Sophocles' Antigone, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p.41.

[8]ibid.

[9]Diels-Kranz, vol.1, B.46, p.161.

[10]e.g. Rep.372e, 470c, 544c, 556e, 564a-b, Menex.243e, Lg.735e-736a, 744d, 919c. Cf. already Thucydides, 6.14, Euripides, Ph.893. The image of the body politic is found in Seneca also - e.g. Ira 2.31.7. As H. Conzelmann, (1 Corinthians: a commentary on the first epistle to the Corinthians, trans. J.W. Leitch, bibliography and references J.W. Dunkly, ed. G.W. MacRae, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975)) on 1 Corinthians 12.4-31, p.211, n.8, notes, it was favoured by Stoic philosophers because of its relevance to the notion of συμπάθεια.

[11]Cf. Kindstrand, p.31; Bultmann, 1910, p.36; Halbauer, p.31; Weber 1895, p.17.

[12]For Antisthenes' relationship with the Cynics, cf. Dudley, pp.1 ff.

[13]As Rolke, pp.317ff, points out, Stoic physiological theories of emotion mean that "die Vorstellung von den Affekten als Krankheiten kein Bild darstellt, sondern daß die Affekte als reale Krankheiten des körperlichen Seelenpneumas aufgefaßt wurden." (p.318)

[14]K.G. Kühn, Claudii Galeni opera omnia, 20 vols., (Leipzig, 1821; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964) hereafter cited as Kühn.

[15]Cf. Zeller, pp.251f and n.2.

Since the Ancients regarded emotions as a physical disturbance, the comparison is not, strictly speaking, metaphorical. When Achilles, for example, says "ἀλλά μοι οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ" (Homer, Il.9.646), he means it literally, as does Horace when he writes "vae meum/ fervens difficili bile tumet iecur" (Odes 1.13.3f), on which cf. Nisbet & Hubbard, on Odes 1.13.4. Cf. also Onians, op.cit., n.1, p.150, pp.84ff. For the physical symptoms of emotions in other parts of the body, cf. id., pp. 146ff.

[16]Persius, ostensibly at least, is speaking literally here of physical illness. However, bodily illness is symptomatic of vice for Persius, cf. J.C. Bramble, Persius and the programmatic satire: a study in form and imagery, Cambridge classical studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp.35ff.

[17]Proverbial according to Otto, s.v. 'ulcus' (3). Cf. also J. Préaux, Q. Horatius Flaccus epistulae liber primus, Horace épîtres livre 1, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968) ad loc., who compares Boethius, Cons.philos.1 praef.4.1: "si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet uulnus (ulcus) detegas." Kiessling-Heinze, ad loc., describe "pudor malus" as "ein stoischer Schulbegriff". Cf. also Sat.2. 3.39 and their comment ad loc.

[18]Cf. "Initium est salutis notitia peccati" (Ep.28.9), a sentiment which Seneca attributes to Epicurus - = Usener, fragment 522. Cf. also Plutarch, Mor.500f (Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores): "ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἀπαλλαγῆς νόσου μὲν αἴσθησις εἰς χρείαν ἄγουσα τοῦ βοηθοῦντος τὸ πάσχον".

[19]Cf. n.1, p.67.

[20]Cf. further Rolke, pp.333ff.

[21]Obviously quite a different image from Cicero's "vulnus refricare" - cf. Fantham, p.17 - which seems similar to Seneca's image of tearing off a scab - Cons.Helv.2.1 - cf. L.1.8.

[22]Hense 1890, p.544.

[23]Cf. M.1.2.1.

[24]Cf. Rolke, pp.323f, and R. Kassel, Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur, Zetemata 18 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1958), n.4, p.21.

Rolke suggests that there is a connection between Socrates' description of the soul of the evil - "οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας" (Grg.524e) - and Zeno's image quoted by Seneca. I am not convinced of this, however, as in Socrates' image the scars ("οὐλῶν") of the soul are not so much the result of insufficient apatheia vis-à-vis Fortuna, but the

spiritual signs of lashes received in punishment "ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας" (524c). As F. Wehrli, 'Der Arztvergleich bei Platon', MH 8 (1951) 177-184, pp.83f, shows, the Socratic image is connected with the Pythagorean "Reinheitsbegriff".

[25]Cf. Fantham, pp.16f, 128f.

[26]Cf. Bonhöffer, p.147 and n.19.

[27]Plutarch, Mor.75c (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus), translated by F.C. Babbitt et al., Plutarch's Moralia, 16 vols., The Loeb classical library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927-1969):"διαφερὶ χρόνου καὶ ὥρας ἐκ της ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα φαυλότητος εἰς σὺν ἔχουσαν ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς.διάθεσιν μεταβαλὼν ὁ σοφός".

[28]For the problem in general, cf. Luschnat, op.cit., n.11, p.6.

[29]Cf. ibid., p.210.

[30]Cf. p.177.

[31]Cf. Ariston of Chios' image, Seneca, Ep.94.5, 18ff - K.1.3.

[32]Cf. Oltramare, pp.163ff.

[33]Cf. p.176.

[34]For Plutarch's acquaintance with the writings of Sextius and the Sextians, cf. Oltramare, pp.168ff.

[35]Cf. Otto, s.v.'medicina' (2).

[36]W. Jaeger, Paideia: die Formung der griechischen Menschen, 3 vols., (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1944), vol.2, p.11 (hereafter cited as Jaeger). For Democritus' influence on and connection with Hippocrates, cf. W. Nestle, Griechische Studien: Untersuchung zur Religion, Dichtung und Philosophie der Griechen, (Stuttgart, 1948; reprint ed., Stuttgart: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1968), pp.564f.

[37]ibid., pp.32ff; cf. also Nestle, ibid., pp.562f.

[38]Aristotle also adopted and modified Plato's medical imagery - cf. F. Wehrli, 'Ethik und Medizin: zur Vorgeschichte der aristotelischen Mesonlehre', MH 8 (1951) 36-62.

[39]Cf. n.12.

[40]Hense on Teles, p.LXXIII, compares Seneca, Exhortationes 18, on which cf. M. Lausberg, op.cit., n.38, p.168, pp.107f. Cf. also Musonius Rufus, Hense, ed., op.cit., n.14, p.134,p.1. Kindstrand, ad loc.,

The pointed comparison of the power of logos with that of a doctor's remedy is traditional - cf. Isocrates, 8.39:

"τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσημάτων πολλαὶ θεραπεῖαι καὶ παντοδαπαὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς εὕρηνται, ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς ταῖς ἀγνοούσαις καὶ νεμούσαις πονηρῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο φάρμακον πλὴν λόγος ..."

For further parallels drawn between rhetoric and medicine, cf. van Hook, op.cit., n.3, p.166.

[41] Kassel, op.cit., n.24, p.24.

[42] "διὸ καὶ κατὰ τρόπον προῄκται Ζήνωνι λόγος. ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς νόσος ὁμοιοτάτη ἐστὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταστασίᾳ."

[43] Cf. Tusc.3.3.5: "Nam hoc efficit philosophia: medetur animis, inanis sollicitudines detrahit, cupiditatibus liberat, pellit timores."

[44] Cf. Kittel-Friedrich, s.v. 'ἰάομαι' etc. (Oepke).

[45] A. J. Malherbe, 'Medical imagery in the pastoral epistles', in Texts and testaments: critical essays on the Bible and early Church Fathers, ed. W.E. March, (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1980), pp.26ff.

[46] R. Hercher, Epistolographi graeci, (Paris, 1873; reprint ed., Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1965).

[47] However, Lucretius' medicine is, of course, sweetened with honey - a topos in itself - cf. A. Ernout and L. Robin, Lucrèce: de rerum natura, 2nd ed., 3 vols., (Paris: "Les belles lettres", 1962), in their note ad loc. For the influence of 'diatribe' on Lucretius, cf. Oltramare, n.53b, p.96, and pp.111ff. and Wallach, n.59, p.103.

[48] Cf. Rolke, pp.318ff.

[49] e.g. Att.2.1.7, 4.3.3, 6.1.2.

[50] Cf. Jaeger, pp.27ff; Wehrli, op.cit., n.24, pp.177ff, and op. cit., n.38, pp.40ff.

M: The military

Military comparisons naturally occur to the Ancients. Seneca would have been familiar, for example, with analogies between the lover and a soldier in Roman as in Greek poetry.[1] "Les comparaisons de la vie avec la guerre sont les plus fréquentes de la diatribe" (Oltramare).[2] Frequent examples of Cynic military imagery bear this out; it is a commonplace among the 'diatribists' to compare life to war: "Vivere, Lucili, militare est", Seneca tells Lucilius in his ninety-sixth letter (Ep.96.5), and Epictetus ("στρατεία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος ἑκάστου" - Diss.3.24.34)[3] and Marcus Aurelius ("ὁ δὲ βίος, πόλεμος" - 2.17), echo his analogy. The distinctly military character of his society naturally disposes the Roman to adopt military imagery even in colloquial language;[4] of course, the Roman 'diatribist' will readily adopt the military imagery of his Greek predecessors[5] and remarks made by Seneca in his prose-works suggest that he came into contact with this Cynic imagery through intermediaries such as Sextius, Fabianus, Attalus, and Demetrius.

M.1 Ep.13.1, 18.6, 22.8, 32.3, 36.9, 37.1, 45.9, 48.10, 49.6, 9, 53.12, 59.7f, 64.4, 66.13, 67.15, 74.19, 22, 82.5, 95.35, 104.22, 113.28, 117.25, Prov.4.7, Const.Sap.1.1, 4.1ff, 5.4, 6.4, 8; 8.3, 19.3, Ira 1.17.2, 2.10.4, 3.5.8, Cons.Marc.9.2f, 10.4, 16.5, Vit.Beat.5.3, 15.5, 26.2f, Tranq.3.5, 4.1f, 8.3, 9, 11.1, Cons.Polyb.2.2, 5.4, 6.2, 16.3, Cons.Helv.1.1ff, 2.2f, 3.1f, 15.4, Ben.5.2.3f, 4.1.
Good soldier = sapiens.

M.1.1 Courage: Ep.36.9, 59.8, 66.13, 67.15; 104.22, Const.Sap.4.3, 19.3, Tranq.11.1, Vit.Beat.5.3, 15.5, Ben.5.2.3f.

Seneca's depiction of the sapiens as a courageous soldier is traditional. Plato's Socrates, as Emonds has shown,[6] "gibt sich ... selber als einen Soldaten des Gottes aus, er erkennt Gott als seinen Archon, als seinen Führer und obersten Feldherrn." The image, as

examples will bear out, is especially common in 'diatribe'.[7] Horace refers briefly to the image common in Seneca of the sapiens' 'post' from which he will not retreat (Prov.2.1, Const.Sap.19.3, Vit.Beat.5.3, 15.5):

> Perdidit arma, locum virtutis deseruit, qui semper in augenda festinat et obruitur re. (Ep.1.16.67f).[8]

A parallel for Seneca's characterization of the sapiens as a soldier in the army of God (Vit.Beat.15.5),[9] ready to lay down his life, is found in Epictetus:

> τηρεῖν σε δεῖ τὸ τοῦ στρατιώτου καὶ πρὸς νεῦμα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πράσσειν ἕκαστα. εἰ οἷόν τε, μαντευόμενος ἃ θέλει. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἐκεῖνος ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ οὗτος, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἰσχύν, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ὑπεροχήν. (Diss.3.24.34ff).

That the image of the sapiens as a brave soldier was current with the Stoics is further suggested by an image Seneca attributes to Attalus, the Stoic instructor of his adolescence:[10] "malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in delicîs habeat. Torqueor, sed fortiter: bene est. Occidor, sed fortiter: bene est." (Ep.67.15).

M.1.2 Invulnerability: Ep.45.9, 53.12, 59.8, 74.19, 82.5, Const.Sap.1.1, 4.1f, 5.4, 6.4, 8, 19.3, Ira 3.5.8, Vit.Beat.6.3, Tranq.8.9.

M.1.2.1 Battle with Fortuna: Ep.13.1, 18.6, 45.9, 48.10, 64.4, 67.15, 74.19, 22, 82.5, 104.22, Const.Sap.1.1, 6.4, 8, 8.3, Cons.Marc.9.3, 16.5, Vit.Beat.5.3, Tranq.4.2, 8.9, 11.1, Cons.Polyb.2.2, 16.3, Cons.Helv.1.1, 5.3f, 15.4.

Seneca's image of the sapiens as a soldier pitted invincibly against Fortuna[11] is derived from both Cynic and Stoic imagery.[12] Dio Chrysostom shows Diogenes the Cynic[13] boasting that Τύχη was unable to hit him with her weapons: "ἤυχει κατὰ τῆς τύχης ⟨ὡς⟩ πολλὰ μὲν βέλη ἐφιείσης αὐτῷ ὡς σκοπῷ τυχεῖν δὲ μὴ δυναμένης." (Or.64.18). Horace speaks of the sapiens as someone "in quem manca ruit semper fortuna" (Sat.2:7.88), while Cicero describes him as someone "cui quidem etiam quae vim habere maximam dicitur fortuna ipsa cedit" (Parad.34). Seneca tells us that, after reading a work of the Roman philosopher Sextius,[14] he is ready to cry out "quid cessas, fortuna? congredere: paratum

vides" (Ep.64.4). Elsewhere in the prose-works,[15] Seneca shows that military imagery was part of the philosophical vocabulary of Sextius. It is quite plausible, then, that Seneca found the image of the sapiens as a soldier pitted against Fortuna in the writings of Sextius. Another possible source for the image is the Cynic Demetrius, "prédicant audacieux, qui eut, sur son contemporain Sénèque, une assez grande influence."[16] In the De providentia Seneca illustrates a saying of Demetrius ("nihil ... mihi uidetur infelicius eo cui nihil umquam euenit aduersi" - Prov.3.3) with a scenario in which Fortuna refuses to engage in combat with a coward.[17] Finally, as we have seen (M.1.1), a military image of Attalus, to which Seneca refers at Ep.67.15, paints the sapiens as a military opponent of Fortuna.

The image was clearly a favourite of Cynic and Stoic alike, and of the Roman philosophers with whom Seneca came into contact. However, no doubt the image of a battle between man and Fortuna was also commonplace outside philosophical contexts - cf., for example, Seneca, Con.8.4 ("Facilius miserum quam sceleratum Fortuna vincit.").

M.1.2.2 Fortifications: Ep.82.5, Const.Sap.6.4, 8, Ira 1.8.2.

The apatheia and constantia of virtue suggest to both Cynic and Stoic an analogy with high-walled fortifications which are impenetrable to attack. Thus we find Antisthenes maintaining that "τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν. μήτε γὰρ καταρρεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι. τεῖχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς." (Diogenes Laertius, 6.13). The image appears already in Latin literature with Accius[18] and in developed form in Lucretius:[19]

> sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
> edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,
> despicere unde queas alios passimque videre
> errare atque viam palantis[20] quaerere vitae (2.7-10)

Echoes of Lucretius' image are found in Ps-Virgil's Ciris (14ff) and Statius' Silvae (2.2.131f). Horace compares a guiltless conscience to a "murus aeneus" (Ep.1.1.60)[21] and Cicero asks: "sapientis animus ... virtutibus denique omnibus ut moenibus saeptus vincetur et expugnabitur. qui ne civitate quidem pelli potest?" (Parad.27).

Plutarch compares pre-empting anger by philosophical tranquillity to preparing for a siege (Mor.454a (De cohibenda ira) - cf. Seneca, Ira.1.8.2 and M.3.2). Epictetus' extended comparison of virtue to fortifications confirms the importance of the image in the exposition of Stoïcism: "ἀσφαλές ἐστιν ἡμῶν τὸ τεῖχος, τροφὰς ἔχουεν ἐπὶ πάμπολυν χρόνον, τὴν ἄλλην ἅπασαν παρασκευήν.' ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ πόλιν ἔχουσαν καὶ ἀνάλωτον ποιοῦντα ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δόγματα ..." (Diss.4.5.25f.

M.1.3 Preparedness/training: Ep.18.6, 59.7f, Prov.4.7, Cons.Marc.9.2f, Vit.Beat.26.2f, Cons.Helv.2.2, 3.1, 15.4.

M.1.3.1 Readiness for attack: Ep.18.6, 59.7, Vit.Beat.26.2.

Seneca compares virtuous preparedness for adversity to a good soldier's readiness for war even in times of peace. The image is found already in Publilius Syrus - "Prospicere in pace oportet quod bellum iuvet"[22] - and Horace applies it specifically to the sapiens:

> an qui contentus parvo metuensque futuri
> in pace ut sapiens aptarit idonea bello? (Sat.2.2.110f)

However, Seneca's most extended form of the image also suggests who may have provided the immediate source for his imagery of military preparedness - namely Sextius. At Ep.59.7 Seneca describes how, while reading this philosopher, he was struck by one of his images:

> ire quadrato agmine exercitum, ubi hostis ab omni parte suspectus est, pugnae paratum. 'Idem', inquit, 'sapiens facere debet: omnis virtutes suas undique expandat, ut ubicumque infesti aliquid orietur, illic parata praesidia sint et ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondeant' ... ad omnia pavet [scil. stultitia], inparata est et ipsis terretur auxiliis. (Ep.59.7f).

M.1.3.2 Veterans: Prov.4.7, Cons.Helv.2.2, 3.1, 15.4.

The idea that those who have prepared themselves for adversity by exposing themselves to it are better able to endure it than those who have not is illustrated by Seneca with an image of the veteran's endurance of pain. A parallel for this image is found in Cicero's

Tusculan disputations (2.16.38ff) where he illustrates the endurance of the sapiens (2.16.39) by comparing it to the veteran's brave endurance of his wounds. Like Seneca (Cons.Helv.3.1), he contrasts the raw recruit's cries with the veteran's calm submission to the surgeon:

> Quin etiam videmus ex acie efferri saepe saucios, et quidem rudem illum et inexercitatum quamvis levi ictu ploratus turpissimos edere: at vero ille exercitatus et vetus ob eamque rem fortior medicum requirens, a quo obligetur. (Tusc.2.16.38).

M.1.4 Withdrawal: Ep.22.8, 32.3, 49.6, 9, Cons.Marc.10.4, Tranq.4.1f.

Seneca compares virtuous retirement from worldly affairs into otium to sagacious retreat from battle (Ep.22.8, Tranq.4.1). With this image we may compare, in some points, Teles' advice to the poor to retire to a simple existence, just as the light-armed ("ψιλός") retreat:

> καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖσε ὅταν ἐπικέωνται οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ βάλλωσιν, εἰς τὰ ὅπλα ἀναχωρεῖς ψιλὸς ὤν. οὕτως αὖ δεῦρο ἐπίκειται ἐνίοτε πόλεμος, ἀπορία ἀρωστία, ἀναχώρει εἰς μονοσιτίαν, εἰς αὐτοδιακονίαν, εἰς τρίβωνα, ἔσχατον εἰς ᾄδου. (Hense, p.54). 23

M.2 Ep.13.8, 59.8, 74.3.

Bad soldier = unrighteous.

M.2.1 Cowardice: Ep.13.8, 59.8, 74.3.

An analogy between the unrighteous and the cowardly soldier is suggested by implication in those images where the sapiens is compared to a courageous and competent soldier (M.1); thus the sources of the negative aspects of the image will likely be the same as those of the positive aspects.

As shown above (M.1.2.1), Seneca probably has an image of Demetrius' in mind when he pictures Fortuna refusing to engage in combat with a coward (Prov.3.3). Sextius almost certainly[24] supplied Seneca with the image of the unrighteous as soldiers on the march, who are groundlessly fearful of attack on every side (Ep.59.8), and very likely, also, inspired very similar images at Ep.74.3 and 13.8.

M.3 Ep.59.8, 71.37, Ira 1.8.2, 2.29.1, 3.13.1, Vit.Beat.8.2, Tranq.1.1, Brev.Vit.10.1.
Enemies = vices.

M.3.1 Enemies: Ep.59.8, 71.37, Ira 1.8.2, 2.29.1, 3.13.1, Vit.Beat.8.2, Tranq.1.1, Brev.Vit.10.1.

Comparison of the emotions to enemies is obviously closely related to comparisons of them to animals which must be fought into submission (B.1.6), or to an athletic opponent - Plato, Lg.647e-d.[25]

Hense compares Seneca's image of "Paupertas", "Luctus", "Ignominia", and "Dolor" as enemies on a battle-field (Ep.59.8) which man must overcome, to Teles' image of "ἀπορία" and "ἀρρωστία" as enemies (cf. M.1.4).[26] Seneca's predilection for comparing the emotions, in particular, to enemies (Ep.71.37, Ira 1.8.2, 2.29.1, 3.13.1, Brev.Vit. 10.1), may be due to the influence of Fabianus,[27] whom Seneca quotes as saying: "contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum, nec minutis uulneribus sed incursu auertendam aciem; [non probat cauillationes] ⟨uitia⟩ enim contundi debere, non uellicari." (Brev.Vit.10.1).

M.3.2 Siege: Ira 1.8.2.

Seneca's much emphasized analogy between anger and an enemy (Ira 1.8.2, 2.29.1, 3.13.1) is found also in Cicero's Tusculan disputations and Plutarch's Moralia: "Ira exardescit, libido concitatur: in ... arcem confugiendum est ... sunt arma sumenda." (Tusc.2.24.58). Like Cicero, Seneca compares the onset of anger to a siege (Ira 1.8.2). A similar analogy is made by Plutarch at Mor.454a (De cohibenda ira):

> ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολιορκίαν προσδεχόμενοι συνάγουσι καὶ παρατίθενται τὰ χρήσιμα τὰς ἔξωθεν ἐλπίδας ἀπεγνωκότες, οὕτω μάλιστα δεῖ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν βοηθήματα πόρρωθεν λαμβάνοντας ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κατακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς, ὅταν ὁ τῆς χρείας ἁφίκηται καιρός, μὴ ῥᾳδίως παρεισάγειν δυνησομένους.

M.4 Ep.48.10,95.38, 113.28, 117.25, Ira 1.17.2, Ben.5.4.1.
Weapons = worldly goods or power of virtue.

M.4.1 Weapons: Ep.48.10, 95.38, 113.28, 117.25, Ira 1.17.2, Ben.5.4.1.

A parallel for Seneca's comparison of the poor to light-armed soldiers (Ben.5.4.1) and for the analogy between weapons and worldly goods which underlies it (cf. Ep.113.28), is provided by an image of Teles (Hense, p.54), quoted above (M.1.4). Seneca, himself, indicates a source in Posidonius for his image at Ep.113.28.

Seneca's comparison of philosophical virtue to weaponry (Ep.95.38, Ira 1.17.2 - cf. Ep.48.10, 117.25) also has its roots in 'diatribe'. Antisthenes, we are told, said that "virtue is a weapon that cannot be removed" ("ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον ἡ ἀρετή - Diogenes Laertius, 6.12). Horace makes Damasippus use the image to describe what he has learnt from the Stoic Stertinius:

> haec mihi Stertinius, sapientum octavos, amico
> arma dedit, posthac ne compellarer inultus. (Sat.2.3.296f)

Common also among the Cynics is comparison of the traditional Cynic garb to 'God's weapons'.[28]

Notes

[1]Cf. A. Spies, Militat omnis amans: ein Beitrag zur Bildersprache der antiken Erotik, (Diss., Tübingen, 1930).

[2]p.56.

[3]For further military imagery in Epictetus, cf. Halbauer, p.32 and n.1.

[4]Cf. F.O. Weise, Charakteristik der lateinischen Sprache, 4th ed., (Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), p.136.

[5]Cf. Oltramare, p.181.

[6]H. Emonds, 'Geistlicher Kriegsdienst: der Topos der militia spiritualis in der antiken Philosophie' in Heilige Uberlieferung. Ausschnitte aus der Geschichte des Mönchtums und des heiligen Kultes, ed. O. Casel, (Munster: Aschendorff, 1938), p.25.

[7]Besides Halbauer, ibid., n.3, cf. Bultmann 1910, p.36.

[8]Cf. Plato, Ap.28d-e where Socrates compares his dedication to a life of philosophy under God to a soldier's commitment, at risk of death, to the post assigned him by his commander.

[9]Such imagery will, of course, become part of the vocabulary of the Church Fathers - cf. Steyns, pp.11ff.

[10]cf. pp.95f.

[11]Cf. G. Busch, 'Fortunae resistere in der Moral des Seneca' in Seneca als Philosoph, ed. G. Maurach, Wege der Forschung 414, (Darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), pp.52ff, reprinted from A&A 10 (1961) 131-153.

[12]Cf. fragment 47 [Metrodorus], C. Bailey, Epicurus: the extant remains, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), p.112 (hereafter cited as Bailey): "Προκατείλημμαί σε, ὦ τύχη, καὶ πᾶσαν σὴν παρείσδυσιν ἐνέφραξα".

[13]Cf. Seneca's anecdote of Diogenes' confrontation with Fortuna: "age tuum negotium, fortuna, nihil apud Diogenen iam tui est." (Tranq.8.7).

[14]Cf. pp.94f.

[15] Ep.59.7f - cf. M.1.3.1.

[16] Oltramare, p.232. Cf. p.96.

[17] Oltramare, n.4, p.232, believes that a similar military scenario, in which a soldier is addressed by "Ἀνδρεία" and "Δειλία", recorded in Stobaeus (Flor.3.8.20), is to be attributed to Demetrius.

[18] praet.33:

"is sapientia munitum pectus egregie gerat"

For the influence of 'diatribe' on Accius, cf. Oltramare, pp.78f.

[19] Perhaps Lucretius was influenced by an Epicurean image such as fragment 339, Usener (= Bailey, 31): "Πρὸς μὲν τἆλλα δυνατὸν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι, χάριν δὲ θανάτου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οἰκοῦμεν."

[20] For the image of wandering, cf. J.4.2.

[21] Cf. Odes 3.28.4:

"munitaeque adhibe vim sapientiae"

[22] 465, p.65, O. Friedrich, Publilii Syri mimi sententiae, (Berlin 1880; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964). For Seneca's admiration of the wisdom of Publilius Syrus, cf. n.6, p.99.

[23] Like Teles here, Seneca also compares "paupertas" and "dolor" (Teles - "ἀπορία", "ἀρρωστία" as enemies (Hense, p.54), but, unlike Teles, he declares that the sapiens will not retreat before them (Ep.59.8). However, Teles' image is complicated by the pun involved in "τὰ ὅπλα" meaning both "arms" and "camp" - cf. E.N. O' Neil, Teles: (the Cynic teacher), Society of biblical literature texts and translations: Graeco-Roman religion series 3, Texts and translations 11 (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977), ad loc.

[24] Seneca does not say so, but as the image follows as a corollary to an image that he does attribute to Sextius, it seems certain that it is Sextius'.

[25] Pfitzner, p.27 and n.1.

[26] p.54. Cf. also n.23 above.

[27] Cf.p.94.

[28] e.g. Crates, Ep.16, p.211, Hercher, op.cit., n.46, p.193: "ὥστε μὴ ... φεύγετε τὸν τρίβωνα καὶ τὴν πήραν, τὰ θεῶν ὅπλα. For further details, cf. Gerhard, p.192, nn.4,5,6.

N: River

N.1 Ep.4.5, 23.8, 58.22ff, 74.25, 85.6, Brev.Vit.9.2.
Swiftly flowing river = swift passage of time, compelling circumstances or emotions.

In Ep.58 in which Seneca discusses the Platonic categories of existence, referring to Plato's theory, adopted from Heraclitus, that all sensible phenomena are in a state of flux,[1] he cites Heraclitus' famous river-image:[2] "ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν":

> Corpora nostra rapiuntur fluminum more. Quidquid vides currit cum tempore; nihil ex iis quae videmus manet; ego ipse, dum loquor mutari ista, mutatus sum. Hoc est quod ait Heraclitus: "in idem flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus." Manet enim idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est. Ep.58.22f.

In the Timaeus Plato describes how mankind was created, human beings

> ἓν ἐξ ἁπάντων ἀπεργαζόμενοι σῶμα ἕκαστον, τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον. αἱ δ' εἰς ποταμὸν ἐνδεθεῖσαι πολὺν οὔτ' ἐκράτουν οὔτ' ἐκρατοῦντο, βίᾳ δὲ ἐφέροντο καὶ ἔφερον. (43a).

For Plato, for whom time is a "moving image of eternity"[3] the implications of the Heraclitean flux-theory are not destructive: "He had his Ideal theory as an explanation and a salvation of phenomena."[4] Similarly, referring to Heraclitus' river-image (Mor.392b (De E apud Delphos)), Plutarch compares πᾶσα θνητὴ φύσις - a phenomenon which cannot be 'grasped' - to water squeezed through the fingers.[5] For Marcus Aurelius, however, the Heraclitean image has obsessively nihilistic implications.[6] Time and again[7] he illustrates the insignificance and transience of man's world with the image of the river: "Τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου ὁ μὲν χρόνος, στιγμή, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ῥέουσα, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἀμυδρά, ἡ δὲ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος σύγκρισις εὔσηπτος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ δόμβος ... πάντα τὰ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ποταμός" 2.17. Philo, too, perhaps echoing Stoic views,[8] describes the souls of the vast majority of mankind thus:

> ὥσπερ εἰς ποταμὸν τὸ σῶμα καταβᾶσαι ποτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ συρμοῦ δίνης βιαιοτάτης ἀσπασθεῖσαι κατεπόθησαν, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὴν φοράν

ἀντισχεῖν δυνηθεῖσαι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀνενήξαντο, εἶτα ὄθεν ὥρμησαν, ἐκεῖσε πάλιν ἀνέπτησαν. De gigant.13.

While the image of a flowing river was clearly central to philosophical theories of flux and time from Heraclitus onwards through Plato and the Stoics,[9] it was no doubt also commonplace as an image of time outside philosophy. It occurs, for example, in one of Horace's Odes as part of a 'carpe diem' motif:

quod adest memento
componere aequus; cetera fluminis
ritu feruntur, nunc medio alveo
cum pace delabentis Etruscum
in mare, nunc lapides adesos

stirpesque raptas et pecus et domos
volventis una non sine montium
clamore vicinaeque silvae
cum fera diluvies quietos

inritat amnes. Odes 3.29.32ff.[10]

Similarly, the image is used by Ovid:

nihil est toto, quod perstet, in orbe.
cuncta fluunt ...
ipsa quoque assiduo labuntur tempora motu,
non secus ac flumen. neque enim consistere flumen
neque levis hora potest. Met.15.177ff.

N.1.2 Bodies swept along by river: Ep.4.5, 23.8, 85.6.

Images in which Seneca compares the unrighteous' inability to control their own destiny - owing to their susceptibility to emotion - to that of a person's powerlessness in the flow of a river, are clearly closely connected with images illustrating the same idea in which the unrighteous are tossed uncontrollably on a turbulent sea (P.2.1).

Plato's river-image at Ti.43a, quoted above (N.1), proceeds to draw an analogy between tossing in the river's waters and the disturbing effect of sensations ("αἰσθήσεις") on the rational faculty:

καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐν τῷ παρόντι πλείστην καὶ μεγίστην παρεχόμενα κίνησιν, μετὰ τοῦ ῥέοντος ἐνδελεχῶς ὀχετοῦ κινοῦσαι ... καὶ διὰ δὴ ταῦτα πάντα τὰ παθήματα νῦν κατ' ἀρχάς τε ἄνους ψυχὴ γίγνεται τὸ πρῶτον. 44a

But once the flow of sensations is slowed down ("ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῆς αὔξης

καὶ τροφῆς ἔλαττον ἐπίῃ ῥεῦμα" - 44b) the mind returns to rationality.

Similarly, in the image from the De gigantibus, quoted above (N.1), Philo identifies those whose bodily existence he compares there to being swept downstream as the irrational unrighteous:

> ὅσοι σοφίας ἠλόγησαν ἐκδόντες ἀστάτοις καὶ τυχηροῖς πράγμασιν ἑαυτούς, ὧν οὐδὲν εἰς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ψυχὴν ἢ νοῦν, ἀναφέρεται. De gigant.15.

N.2 Ep.122.19.

Direction of current = natura.

N.2.1 Rowing upstream: Ep.122.19.

The image with which Seneca illustrates life 'contra naturam' is a proverbial illustration of stupidity or absurdity.[11] In Virgil's (Georg.1.199ff) version of the image the figurative equivalency of river and time (cf.N.1) is present, the farmer's attempt to 'beat' time, or at least keep up with it, being represented as rowing upstream. The image of a swimmer swimming against the current is also used by Galen in exposition of the Stoic theory of tonos (SVF II, 450, p.148, 21-28), in which the point of the comparison is the equally balanced opposing forces of the swimmer's direction and that of the river's current. Rolke[12] suggests that the image belongs to the author of the theory expounded by Galen - i.e. Chrysippus. Seneca's image is clearly not derived from Chrysippus', however, but owes more to the proverbial application.

Notes

[1]Cf. J.M. Rist, Stoic philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p.276 (hereafter cited as Rist).

[2]Fragment 49a, Diels-Kranz, vol.1, p.161, 11-13.

[3]"εἰκὼ δ' ἐπενόει (scil.ὁ πατήρ) κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν." 37d.

[4]Rist, p.277.

[5]At Mor.1082a (De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos), Plutarch attributes this same image to the Stoics as their analogy for time.

[6]Cf. Pohlenz, vol.1, pp.349f and Rist, pp.283ff, which last shows that Marcus' views in this respect are a departure from the Stoic attitudes to time evolved by Zeno and Chrysippus.

[7]Cf. 4.43, 5.23, 6.15. Further examples given by Pohlenz, vol.2, p.170, S.349 1. Abs.

[8]For Philo as a source of Stoic imagery, cf. von Arnim, SVF, p.xix.

[9]For the important influence of Heraclitus on Stoicism, cf. A.A. Long, 'Heraclitus and Stoicism', Philosophia 5-6 (1975-1976) 133-153.

[10]Cf. Nisbet & Hubbard on Odes 2.14.2.

[11]Cf. Ovid, Rem.121f:

"Stultus ab obliquo qui cum descendere possit,
pugnat in adversas ire natator aquas."

For further examples, cf. Otto, s.v. 'flumen' (7).

[12]p.341.

O: Rock and other solid materials

O.1 Ep.45.9, 53.12, 72.9f, Const.Sap.3.5, 19.3, Ira 3.5.8, 3.25.3, Vit.Beat.27.2f.

Resistance of hard material = sapiens' apatheia and constantia.

O.1.1.1 Sea cliffs pounded by waves: Const.Sap.3.5, Ira 3.25.3, Vit.Beat.27.2f.

Seneca compares the sapiens' indifference to external aggression to the resistance of hard rock to waves that crash against it. As an analogy for physical resistance to aggression - especially that of a warrior to attack - the image is a common one going back to Homer. The Danaans withstand the onslaught of the Trojans

> ἠΰτε πέτρη
> ἠλίβατος μεγάλη, πολιῆς ἁλὸς ἔγγυς ἐοῦσα,
> ἥ τε μένει λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα
> κύματά τε τροφόεντα, τά τε προσερεύγεται αὐτήν.
> Il.15.618-621.

It is imitated, for instance, by Apollonius Rhodius (Arg.3.1294f), Virgil, (Aen.5.693ff, Georg.3.237ff), Ovid, (Met.9.39ff), Statius (Theb.9.91ff), and Seneca himself:

> nil ille motus, ardua ut cautes, salo
> ambustus exstat, dirimit insanum mare
> fluctusque rumpit pectore et navem manu
> complexus in se traxit et caeco mari
> conlucet Aiax; omne resplendet fretum. (Ag.539-543)

Precedents for Seneca's comparison of mental resistance to a rock's resistance to waves are found in the image of rock-like resistance to persuasion which is also favoured by poets: Virgil, Aen.7.586ff. Ovid, Rem.691f, Tibullus, 2.4.9f. Seneca, himself, uses this image at Phaed.580ff with reference to Hippolytus:[1]

> ut dura cautes undique intractabilis
> resistit undis et lacessentes aquas
> longe remittit, verba sic spernit mea.

It is possible that Seneca, himself, is responsible for applying this poetic image to the apatheia and constantia of the sapiens, although the

image is also applied in the same way by Marcus Aurelius: "Ὅμοιον εἶναι τῇ ὥρᾳ, ἣ διηνεκῶς τὰ κύματα προσρήσσεται. ἡ δὲ ἕστηκε, καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν κοιμίζεται τὰ φλεγμήναντα τοῦ ὕδατος." (4.49).

Notes

[1] E. Fantham, 'Virgil's Dido and Seneca's tragic heroines', G&R 22 (1975) 1-10, p.4, suggests that Seneca's image here is influenced by Virgil's oak-image at Aen.4.438-440;

> "At the structural point which Virgil had signalled by the great oak-simile, Seneca, requiring a simile, chose one familiar to him from Virgil. This procedure is confirmed by the choice of intractabilis, incongruously transferred to the rock from Hippolytus (so at 229, 271), but also echoing the words with which Virgil introduced his oak-simile."

Seneca's image, like Ovid's, is concerned specifically with resistance to the pleas of love.

For the traditional analogy between rock and obduracy, without the motif of the waves, cf. A.S. Pease, Publii Vergili Maronis Aeneidos liber quartus, (Cambridge, Mass., 1935; reprint ed., New York: St Martin's Press, 1967), on 4.366, pp.316f.

P: Sea and travel by sea

As we should expect, given the importance of the sea to Greek society, marine imagery is among the most common in Greek literature. It was early adopted by philosophers and developed in detail by Plato, as well as by the popular philosophers and Stoics.[1] The frequency of nautical imagery in Seneca's prose-works is possibly due, in part, as Steyns suggests, to his own experience of sea-voyage;[2] nevertheless, a large number of his images are traditional and do not betray any particular originality derived from first-hand observation.

P.1 Ep.14.8, 15, 16.3, 19.2, 28.7, 31.2, 35.4, 74.4, 95.45, 123.12, Ira 2.10.8, Cons.Marc.5.6, 6.3, Tranq.5.5, Brev.Vit.18.1.
Good helmsman = sapiens.

P.1.1 Control of ship-in storm: Ep.14.8, 16.3, 35.4, Cons.Marc.5.6, 6.3.

The image of the sapiens as a helmsman[3] who holds his ship to its course on a turbulent sea, has its ultimate source in those traditional Greek comparisons of a good guide and leader - whether it be God, a politician, or reason - to a good helmsman.

Comparison of God to the helmsman of the 'ship of the world' is suggested by the verb "κυβερνᾶν" already in Parmenides ("ἐν δὲ μέσωι τούτων δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερναῖ" - Diels-Kranz, vol.1, B 12.3, p.243) and Diogenes of Apollonia ("ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας ... κυβερνᾶσθαι" - Diels-Kranz, vol.2, B 5.6, p.61). Plato, too, speaks of God as "τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης" - Pol.272e). Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus (= SVF I, 537, p.121, 34 - p.123, 5) suggests that this concept of God may have been current also in Stoicism:[4] "Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν" (ibid. 1.35), and in referring to Cleanthes' hymn, Seneca recalls the image of Zeus as a helmsman ("cuius gubernaculo moles ista derigitur" - Ep.107.10).[5]

Horace's ode 1.14, on which Quintilian remarks "nauem pro re publica, fluctus et tempestates pro bellis ciuilibus, portum pro pace

atque concordia dicit" - Inst.8.6.44, is based on two poems of Alcaeus[6] describing a ship in a storm at sea, which were interpreted in Antiquity as allegories of political turmoil.[7] The image became extremely common.[8] Comparison of the state to a ship, political rulers to its helmsman, occurs frequently in Plato's dialogues, and is developed at length at Rep.488a ff. As in Theognis (667-682) the usurpation of a good political leader is compared to the mutiny of an ignorant crew that seizes the helm from the skilled helmsman. The political associations of the helmsman underlie Seneca's imagery of withdrawal into harbour (P.1.4).[9]

The traditional association of reason with firm navigation is clearly important in Seneca's comparison of the virtuous, and, indeed, of Philosophy herself (Ep.16.3), to good helmsmen. The philosopher had been explicitly compared with a good helmsman in the extended image in Plato, beginning at Rep.488a, to which I have already referred. There, Socrates recognizes philosophers as the best political leaders who are, nevertheless, treated with disrespect and insubordination by their ambitious inferiors, like a helmsman by a militant and ignorant crew. Aristotle remarks somewhat enigmatically[10] that "ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ πλωτῆρι πλοίου" (De an.2.1.413a). Connected with the image of the good helmsman holding to his course in a storm is Teles' advice - probably based on a saying of Bion's - that man should cope with his circumstances, good or bad, as sailors cope with the conditions of the sea by adopting the appropriate sailing tragedy (Hense, pp.9f).[11]

Cynic imagery, as often, is shared with the Stoics. One similar to Teles' is found in the saying of Ariston of Chios[12] that "κυβερνήτης μὲν οὔτε ἐν μεγάλῳ πλοίῳ οὔτε ἐν μικρῷ ναυτιάσει, οἱ δὲ ἄπειροι ἐν ἀμφοῖν. οὕτως ὁ μὲν πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἐν πλούτῳ καὶ ἐν πενίᾳ οὐ ταράττεται, ὁ δ' ἀπαίδευτος ἐν ἀμφοῖν." (Stobaeus, Flor.2.31.95). Plutarch (Mor.450d (De cohibenda ira) = SVF, III, 390, p.95, 10-13) tells us that Chrysippus compared man's reason or logos to firm navigation which was liable to be driven off course by the emotions:[13] "τοῦ λογικοῦ (φησὶ) ζῴου φύσιν ἔχοντος προσχρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κυβερνᾶσθαι, πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὸν ἡμᾶς, ἄλλῃ βιαιοτέρᾳ φορᾷ χρωμένους."

This passage of the De cohibenda ira is followed by similar comparisons where, we may conjecture, Plutarch also has Chrysippean imagery in mind: "οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκούει τῶν ἐκτὸς ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τὸν θόρυβον, ἐὰν μὴ καθάπερ κελευστὴν ἔνδοθεν ἔχῃ τὸν αὐτῆς λόγον ὀξέως δεχόμενον καὶ συνιέντα τῶν παραγγελλομένων ἕκαστον." (Mor.454a-b (De cohibenda ira)) and "μᾶλλον ἐν πελάγει καὶ χειμῶνι ναῦς ἔρημος ἀναλήψεται κυβερνήτην ἔξωθεν ἢ προσδέξεται λόγον ἀλλότριον ἄνθρωπος ἐν θυμῷ καὶ ὀργῇ σαλεύων, ἂν μὴ παρεσκευασμένον ἔχῃ τὸν οἰκεῖον λογισμόν." (Mor.453f-454a (De cohibenda ira)). Very possibly then, Seneca's comparison of the sapiens' reason and constantia to firm navigation, and the passions to turbulent waves (P.2.1), may be attributed, in part, to the influence of Stoic, and, particularly, Chrysippean, imagery. The hypothesis is supported by the appearance of similar imagery in the Stoic Epictetus: "Τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην, ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλέοντες. ποῖος γὰρ μείζων χειμών, ἢ ὁ ἐκ φαντασιῶν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐκκρουστικῶν τοῦ λόγου;" (Diss.2.18.29) and "Ὀλίγου δὲ χρεία ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπώλειαν τὴν πάντων καὶ ἀνατροπήν. μικρᾶς ἀποστροφῆς τοῦ λόγου ἵν' ὁ κυβερνήτης ἀνατρέψῃ τὸ πλοῖον, οὐ χρείαν ἔχει τῆς αὐτῆς παρασκευῆς, ὅσης εἰς τὸ σῶσαι." (Diss.4.3.4).

P.1.2 Ulysses: Ep.31.2, 88.7f, 123.12.

Comparison between the dangers - notably that of the Sirens - successfully surmounted by Ulysses on his voyage, and the difficulties with which the proficiens has to cope in his 'voyage' towards virtue has its source in traditional allegories of Ulysses.[14] In particular, the Stoics identified Ulysses - whose endurance had been described by Homer - as the sapiens endowed with apatheia. Among Ulysses' manifestations of virtue, that of his resistance to the Sirens was frequently singled out.[15]

Horace suggests that the image of Ulysses as a sapiens had become rather well known to Romans when he illustrates "quid virtus et quid sapientia possit" (Ep.1.2.17) with Ulysses, who

> aspera multa
> pertulit, adversis rerum immersabilis undis. (Ep.1.2.21f)[16]

P.1.3 Preparedness: Ep.74.4, Ira 2.31.5, Vit.Beat.28.1, Tranq.11.7.

Seneca's comparison of the virtuous' preparedness for adversity to a sailor's readiness to deal with storms at sea, is prefigured by Teles:

> δεῖ μὴ τὰ πράγματα πειρᾶσθαι μετατιθέναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν παρασκευάζειν πρὸς ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ναυτικοί. οὐ γὰρ τοὺς ἀνέμους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν πειρῶνται μετατιθέναι, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζουσιν αὑτοὺς δυναμένους πρὸς ἐκεῖνα στρέφεσθαι. (Hense, pp.9f).

Plutarch uses the same image to illustrate preparation for a particular kind of adversity - i.e. old age:[17] "καθάπερ οὖν ἐν εὐδίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν χειμῶνα προσῆκε παρασκευάζειν, οὕτως ἐν νεότητι τὴν εὐταξίαν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἐφόδιον εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποτίθεσθαι." (Mor.8c (De liberis educandis)).

P.1.4 Withdrawal into harbour: Ep.14.8, 15, 19.1f, 28.7, Tranq.5.5, Brev.Vit.18.1.

Cicero, like Seneca, compares retirement from public affairs to a ship's taking refuge in a port[18] (Fam.13.662, Att.3.19.1) and the philosophy with which he occupies himself in retirement to the port itself (Fam.5.15.3, 7.30.2). Lucian pictures retirement from public affairs into philosophical contemplation in the same terms: "ἀπέφυγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ σά, ὦ φιλοσοφία, καλὰ δοκήσας ἥξίουν ὁπόσον ἔτι μοι λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου καθάπερ ἐκ ζάλης καὶ κλύδωνος εἰς εὔδιόν τινα λιμένα ἐσπλεύσας ὑπὸ σοὶ σκεπόμενος καταβιῶναι." (Pisc.29). At Mor.77d (Quomodo quis suos profectus sentiat in virtute) Plutarch compares proficientes to sailors heading for land which they have not yet reached, establishing thereby an implied analogy between complete virtue or philosophy and a harbour: "ὥσπερ οἱ γῆν ἀπολιπόντες ἣν ἴσασι, μηδέπω δὲ καθορῶντες ἐφ' ἣν πλέουσι. προέμενοι γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ συνήθη πολὺν ἢ τὰ βελτίονα γνῶναι καὶ λαβεῖν, ἐν μέσῳ περιφέρονται πολλάκις ὑποτρεπόμενοι." As an example of such a sailor Plutarch mentions Sextius whose refusal of public life in favour of philosophical otium[19] must often have served as cogent example to Seneca as he recommended otium to others. The image of withdrawing into harbour must often have been used by Seneca's contemporaries and near-comtemporaries, if not by Sextius himself, in discussing the very topical

subject of otium.[20]

At Ep.19.1f Seneca combines the image of philosophical retirement as withdrawal into harbour with that of old age as the harbour of the 'voyage of life'.[21] Urging Lucilius to tear himself away from worldly affairs, he continues "in freto viximus, moriamur in portu" (Ep. 19.2): A parallel for the analogy between old age and the harbour is provided by a fragment of Epicurus (fragment 17, Bailey, p.108).

P.1.5 Orientation: Ep.71.3, 95.45.

For the idea that progress towards virtue is like a voyage (cf. also'Ulysses imagery' - P.1.2) towards a particular destination, cf. Plutarch, Mor.77d-e (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus) (P.1.4).

P.2 Ep.35.4, Cons.Marc.6.3, Vit.Beat.14.1, 28.1, Ot.Sap.8.4, Brev.Vit.2.3, 7.10, Cons.Polyb.9.6.
Bad helmsman = unrighteous.

P.2.1 Failure to control ship in storm: Ep.35.4, Cons.Marc.6.3, Vit. Beat.14.1, 28.1, Ot.Sap.8.4, Brev.Vit.2.3, 7.10, Cons.Polyb.9.6.

Comparison of the unrighteous to helmsmen who are unable to prevent their boats from being driven off course by a stormy sea is suggested by implication in the imagery discussed above (P.1.1) and therefore has similar sources.

A possible source for Seneca's comparison of the emotion-controlled unrighteous to a ship tossed by a turbulent sea has already been traced to Chrysippus and recurs in Epictetus (cf. P.1.1). However, this image is not confined to Stoicism. It occurs often, for example, in poetic contexts, where Seneca, himself, often uses it.[22] Ovid is particularly fond of it.[23] Thus Althaea, torn between emotions, is described with this image:

> utque carina,
> quam ventus ventoque rapit contrarius aestus,
> vim geminam sentit paretque incerta duobus. (Met.8.470ff)

The image, like its corollary (P.1.1), occurs several times in Plutarch's

Moralia. Repression of lust, for example, is described thus: "ὥσπερ ἐκ ζάλης καὶ χειμῶνος [καὶ] τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρώτων ἔν τινι γαλήνῃ τῇ περὶ γάμον καὶ φιλοσοφίαν θέμενος τὸν βίον." (Mor.751e (Amatorius)). He compares the complete eradication of passion to a becalmed sea[24] - Mor. 425b (De defectu oraculorum), 663e (Quaestionum convivalium libri vi).

Comparison of the hurly burly of life,[25] particularly political vicissitudes, to a stormy sea which threatens to shipwreck one's boat (Ep.35.4, Cons.Marc.6.3, Vit.Beat.28.1, Ot.Sap.8.4, Brev.Vit.7.10, Cons. Polyb.9.6) is connected, of course, with the image of the political leader as helmsman and the state as a ship (P.1.1). It is on the high seas that storms are usually encountered, and Seneca's advice to retire into otium is thus conceived as a withdrawal into harbour (P.1.4). Horace implies similar comparisons[26] when, with a characteristically moderate solution, he advises Licinius

> Rectius vives, Licini, neque altum
> semper urgendo neque, dum procellas
> cautus horrescis, nimium premendo
> litus iniquum.
>
> .....
>
> rebus angustis animosus atque
> fortis appare; sapienter idem
> contrahes vento nimium secundo
> turgida vela. (Odes 2.10.1-4, 21-14).

A combination of the image of the political leader as helmsman and the turbulent sea of politics is amalgamated with the image of the turbulent sea of the emotions in a simile with which Lucan describes Pompey as he gives way to popular frenzy:

> sic fatur et arma
> permittit populis frenosque furentibus ira
> laxat[27] et ut uictus uiolento nauita Coro
> dat regimen uentis ignauumque arte relicta
> puppis onus trahitur. 7.123-127.

Notes

[1]Cf. in general H. Rahner, Symbole der Kirche: die Ekklesiologie der Väter, (Salzburg: Muller, 1964), pp.313ff.

[2]pp.72ff.

[3]Cf. K. Gaiser, Das Bild des Steuermannes in der antiken Literatur, (Diss., Erlangen, 1954), which I have not seen.

[4]Cf. id., 'Das besondere ΜΙΜΗΜΑ des Menschen bei Kleanthes', Hermes 96 (1968) 243-247, p.246.

[5]For further examples of the image of God as helmsman of the world, cf. Rolke, p.488.

[6]A6, Z2, D. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus: an introduction to the study of ancient Lesbian poetry, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp.182-183, 185-186.

[7]ibid., pp.181ff.

[8]Cf. scholiast on Aristophanes, Vesp.29: "ἀεὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰς πόλεις πλοίοις παραβάλλουσιν."

[9]For further examples of the ship of state and of the political leader as helmsman, cf. Rolke, p.488, and J. Kahlmeyer, Seesturm und Schiffbruch als Bild im antiken Literatur, (Diss., Hildesheim, 1934), pp. 39ff (hereafter cited as Kahlmeyer).

[10]Cf. Rolke, p.489: "Vielleicht wollte Aristot. damit die Seelenlehre des Platon charakterisieren."

[11]Cf. also Teles, ed. Hense, p.53: "οὐ δεῖ δὲ τρυφᾶν οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων μὴ φερόντων, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ναυτικοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνέμους καὶ πρὸς τὴν περίστασιν ὁρῶντες. ἐκποιεῖ, χρῆσαι. οὐκ ἐκποιεῖ, παῦσαι." and Hense's note ad loc.

[12]Cf. p.97.

[13]Suggested, in conjunction with "κυβερνᾶσθαι" by "ἀποστρέφεσθαι": "'τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγινόμενα' φησί 'πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμούς ... βιαίως προαθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις.'" 450c.

[14]Cf. F. Buffière, Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque, (Paris: "Les belles lettres", 1956), pp.374ff.

[15]ibid., pp.380ff.

[16]Cf. Kiessling-Heinze ad loc.

[17]Seneca also compares old age to a decrepit ship - Ep.30.3.

[18]For the general comparison between a port and a refuge, cf. Otto, s.v. 'portus' (2).

[19]Cf. Griffin, p.38, 345.

[20]Ibid., pp.345f.

[21]Cf. Kahlmeyer, p.34.

[22]For the image of a turbulent sea as "erregte Seele", cf. Kahlmeyer, pp.19ff.

For Senecan poetic contexts of the turbulent sea and tossed ship, cf. Phaed.181ff, Med.939-943, Thy.438f, Ag.138-139; contrast Phaed.1072-1077.

Whereas, in the other poetic passages mentioned here, the emotional mind is compared to a ship tossed by the waves, at Med.939-943 it is the sea, tossed by the wind, which represents the emotions - cf. Brev.Vit.2.3.

[23]Cf. F. Bömer, P. Ovidius Naso Metamorphosen, 5 vols., (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1969-1980), on Ovid, Met.8.470ff.

[24]Cf. Seneca, Ep.67.14: "Hoc loco mihi Demetrius noster occurrit, qui vitam securam et sine ullis fortunae incursionibus mare mortuum vocat."

[25]Cf. in general, Kahlmeyer, pp.26ff.

[26]Cf. Nisbet & Hubbard, ad loc. for Licinius' involvement with politics.

[27]Here, of course, there is an allusion to the image of the bolting horse of emotion - cf. B.1.6.1.

Q: Theatre

Theatrical imagery founded on the comparison of life with a play, the world with a theatre, is found already in Plato's dialogues (Phlb. 50b - "τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία").[1] Stoic philosophers compare life with drama, but it is in 'diatribe' that the image becomes "a much used cliché".[2]

Q.1 Ep.26.5, 76.31, 79.18, 80.7ff, 120.22, Tranq.17.1. Actor = unrighteous.

Q.1.1 Costume, mask etc.: Ep.26.5, 76.31, 79.18, 80.7ff, Tranq.17.1.

Representation of hypocrisy or deception by the image of the actor is well established in Antiquity, although it is only in the Byzantine period, under the influence of Christian usage, that 'ὑποκριτής' and its cognates acquire the inherent connotation of hypocrisy.[3]

No doubt Seneca's comparison of the deception of the unrighteous to the deception of the actor's mask, costume and assumed character or social status is traditional. Otto (s.v. 'persona' (1)) treats as proverbial the mask as an image of fallacious appearance (cf. Ep.79.18, 80.8, Tranq.17.1).[4]

The contrast which Seneca draws between the actor's elaborate stage-costume (Ep.76.31) and hero's part (ibid., Ep.80.7f) and his real-life body (Ep.76.31) and humble social status (Ep.80.8) is best paralleled in some of Lucian's many theatrical images.[5] Like Seneca (Ep.76.31, 80.7ff), Lucian shows how superficial the condition of unrighteous prosperity is, by comparing it to the elaborate costumes which actors wear in the role of kings and heroes, but which are doffed at the end of a performance (Nav.46, cf. Seneca, Ep.76.31), or sometimes rudely ripped off (Gall.26) to reveal the rags ("ῥάκια δύστηνα" - Gall.26)[6] and flesh and blood (ibid.) which belong to the poverty-stricken actors:[7]

εἶτ' ἐπειδὰν πέσωσιν ὅμοιοι μάλιστα φαίνονται τοῖς τραγικοῖς

ὑποκριταῖς, ὧν πολλοὺς ἰδεῖν ἔνεστι τέως μὲν Κέκροπας δηθεν ὄντας ἢ Σισύφους ἢ Τηλέφους, διαδήματα ἔχοντας καὶ ξίφη ἐλεφαντόκωπα καὶ ἐπίσειστον κόμην καὶ χλαμύδα χρυσόπαστον, ἣν δέ, οἷα πολλὰ γίνεται, κενεμβατήσας τις αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ σκηνῇ καταπέσῃ, γέλωτα δηλαδὴ παρέχει τοῖς θεαταῖς τοῦ προσωπείου μὲν συντριβέντος αὐτῷ διαδήματι, ἠμαγμένης δὲ τῆς ἀληθοῦς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ὑποκριτοῦ καὶ τῶν σκελῶν ἐπὶ πολὺ γυμνουμένων, ὡς τῆς τε ἐσθῆτος τὰ ἔνδοθεν φαίνεσθαι ῥάκια δύστηνα ὄντα καὶ τῶν εἰμβατῶν τὴν ὑπόδεσιν ἀμορφοτάτην καὶ οὐχὶ κατὰ λόγον τοῦ ποδός. (Gall.26).

Dio Chrysostom, in slightly less lurid fashion, also compares prosperity to the grandiose trappings of the tragic actor, who, once the play is over, reveals his true insignificance:

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τολμήσαιμι ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι κἂν πάντων ἑκστῆτε τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδενὸς ἐξίστασθε πράγματος ... ἤδη ποτὲ θέας μετελάβετε;... ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖ τις ὑμῖν ἀληθῶς εἶναι δοκεῖ βασιλεὺς ἢ τύραννος ἢ θεός; καίτοι ταῦτα πάντα καλοῦνται καὶ Μενέλαοι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονες. καὶ οὐκ ὀνόματα μόνον ἔχουσι θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων ἀλλὰ καὶ πρόσωπα καὶ στολάς, καὶ κελεύουσι πολλά, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι. τοῦ δὲ ποιήματος συντελεσθέντος ἀπίασι τὸ μηδὲν ὄντες. (Or.38.39f).

The same image is used by Lucian to illustrate men whose professions of philosophy are merely 'show'. They are "ἐοικότες μάλιστα τοῖς τραγικοῖς ... ὑποκριταῖς, ὧν ἦν ἀφέλῃ τις τὰ προσωπεῖα καὶ τὴν χρυσόπαστον ἐκείνην στολήν, τὸ καταλειπόμενόν ἐστι γελοῖον ἀνθρώπιον ἑπτὰ δραχμῶν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα μεμισθωμένον." (Icar.29). Such an image is a much-extended version of Seneca's self-deprecating comparison of his own professions of philosophy to the "strophae ac fuci" of a "mimus" (Ep.26.5).

The parallelism between Seneca and Lucian's use of theatrical imagery to illustrate the superficial grandeur of the rich and hypocrisy of those who falsely profess virtue could suggest a direct debt to Seneca on the part of Lucian, but, more plausibly,[8] points to a common source in 'diatribe' which has also been used by Dio Chrysostom.[9]

Q.2 Ep.77.20, 120.22, Cons.Marc.10.1.

Play = life.

Q.2.1 Length versus quality of acting: Ep.77.20.

A precedent for Seneca's image is found in Cicero:"neque enim histrioni, ut placeat, peragenda fabula est, modo in quocumque fuerit actu probetur, neque sapienti usque ad 'Plaudite' veniendum est." (Sen.

19.70).[10] From the occurrence of a similar image in Epictetus (Diss.4.1.165) Helm[11] concludes "Daß der Gedanke ihm [scil. Cicero] vorlag und aus bionischen Literatur geflossen ist". That the origins of Seneca's image at Ep.77.20 are to be found in 'diatribe' is further suggested, as Helm points out,[12] by the presence in the same letter of the anecdote of the Spartan boy, which Philo also cites and which Hense[13] has shown to be derived from Bionean 'diatribe'.

Q.2.2 Roles: Ep.120.22.

In Cicero's De officiis we find echoes of Panaetius' teaching on playing a role in life: "Intellegendum ... est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis" (1.30.107). One of these personae is that shared in common with mankind, which distinguishes it from the animal, the other is the persona of individual personality. At Off.1.31.114 Cicero elaborates on the theatrical metaphor inherent in the term 'persona' with respect to this individual personality:

> suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. illi enim non optumas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt ... ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita?

Such an image of the sapiens as an actor whose roles are well chosen is no doubt behind Seneca's image at Ep.120.22.

The actor who plays many roles is a common image in 'diatribe'. We find the image developed first in the mouth of Ariston of Chios, who, Diogenes Laertius tells us (7.160 = SVF I, 351, p.79,6-11), said that the sapiens should cope with all circumstances, good or bad, equally well, just as a good actor will play all roles - that of Agamemnon or Thersites - equally well. Teles (fragment 2, pp.5f, Hense)[14] attributes a very similar image to Bion, and it also occurs in Epictetus (Stobaeus, Flor.4.33.28; Ench.17).[15]

Seneca's comparison of the virtuous to an actor who plays only one role contrasts strikingly with Ariston's comparison of the apatheia of the wise to the actor's ease in many roles. Seneca's image should be compared with a somewhat similar image[16] used by Cicero at Fin.3.7.24:

"Ut enim histrioni actio, saltationi motus non quivis sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet, quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus." Rolke[17] argues that Cicero's recommendation to play a single role in life represents Chrysippean criticism of Ariston of Chios' "Peristasislehre", which he illustrates with the image of the actor who can play many roles. He concludes that

> Es ist also nicht ausgeschlossen, daß Chrysipp, als er dies Lehre des Zenon gegen die Abänderungen des Ariston verteidigte, bewußt auf dessen Schauspielerbild zurückgegriffen und dies auf seine entgegengesetzte Auffassung angewendet hat. [18]

Seneca's image at Ep.120.22 is to be connected, perhaps, with such Stoic criticism of Ariston's image of the actor's multiple roles.

Notes

[1]O. Gigon in his Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien, Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 7 (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1956), p.98, concludes "daß die Quelle zumeist die altsokratische Literatur ist." Cf. his examples, ibid., n.59.

[2]Curtius, op.cit., n.5, p.155, p.138. Cf. Hense, ed. Teles, pp. cviiff; Bultmann 1910, p.36; Halbauer, p.31. For a general discussion of the comparison between life and a play in Classical literature, cf. Kittel-Friedrich, s.v.'ὑποκρίνομαι' (3), (Wilckens).

[3]Cf. Kittel-Friedrich, ibid.:

> "In all classical usage ὑποκρίνομαι' never became a term with a negative ethical ring and ὑποκριτής alone cannot denote the 'hypocrite' but remains a vox media. The words always have additions which show whether the acting or pretending is in a given case to be viewed positively, negatively, or neutrally."

[4]Besides Otto's examples, cf. Petronius, Sat.80: "vera redit. facies, dum simulata perit."

[5]Cf. R. Helm, Lucian und Menipp, (Leipzig and Berlin, 1906; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967), hereafter cited as Helm.

[6]Cf. Seneca, Ep.80.8: "in centunculo dormit".

[7]Cf. Lucian, Nav.46: "ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς βασιλέας ὑποκρινόμενοι τραγῳδοὶ ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ θεάτρου λιμώττοντες οἱ πολλοί, καὶ ταῦτα πρὸ ὀλίγου Ἀγαμέμνονες ὄντες ἢ Κρέοντες."

[8]On Lucian's acquaintance with Latin literature, cf. Bompaire, pp.504ff.

[9]This does not mean that either Seneca or Lucian necessarily obtained such an image directly from what Bompaire calls the "fonds classique" - i.e. a Bion or Ariston. As Bompaire, pp.504ff, points out, Lucian may just as well have assimilated elements of 'diatribe' from Latin literature.

For Dio Chrysostom's connections with 'diatribe', cf. Weber 1887.

[10]Cf. also Sen.23.85: "Senectus ... aetatis est peractio tamquam fabulae, cuius defetigationem fugere debemus, praesertim adiuncta satietate."

For the 'plaudite motif' cf. Augustus' last words, Suetonius, Aug.99.1: "ἐπεὶ δὲ πάνυ κα⟨λ⟩ῶς πέπαισται, δότε κρότον καὶ πάντες ἡμᾶς μετὰ χαρᾶς προπέμψατε.

[11] p.50

[12] ibid., n.1.

[13] O. Hense, 'Bion bei Philon', RhM 47 (1892), pp.219ff, 226.

[14] Cf. Hense, ed. Teles, p.xlvi.

[15] Cf. Kittel-Friedrich, op.cit., n.2, ibid.

[16] However, Cicero seems to mean that the actor must act in a certain way within any one particular role, whereas Seneca has in mind the several roles which an actor may play in one performance or during his career.

[17] pp.296f.

[18] ibid., p.296.

Seneca attributes only a small proportion of his imagery to a particular source. Images are attributed to Heraclitus, to the Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes, Ariston of Chios, Chrysippus, Panaetius, Posidonius, Athenodorus,[1] and Attalus,[2] to Epicurus and Lucretius, to the Cynic Bion and his first-century follower, Demetrius,[3] to the Augustan Sextius and his follower, Fabianus.[4] A quotation from Met.2.63ff reveals Ovid as the source of an image at Prov.5.10f (J.1.1). For the rest we are obliged to deduce possible or probable sources.

Some of the subject-fields from which Seneca draws imagery were also sources of imagery for Homer.[5] A few images used by Seneca can be found already in the pre-Socratic philosophers, and occasionally in Aristotle.[6] We find, however, that it is Plato who consistently developed the philosophical usage of the subject-fields and the figurative equivalencies that Seneca uses. But in nearly all cases it is unnecessary to imagine that Seneca's use of them is derived directly from Plato. As Part II shows, Socratic imagery is consistently adopted by the Cynics,[7] and, from them, by the Stoics.[8]

Cynic precedents for the images which Seneca uses are well attested in the majority of subject-fields and in particular images within these fields by examples from Antisthenes, Diogenes, Bion, and Teles.[9] Again, however, we need not assume that Seneca usually obtained such imagery directly from this "fonds classique"[10] of 'diatribe'.[11] It may have been obtained from the florilegia of their sayings which were in common circulation.[12] Kindstrand has shown,[13] for example, on the basis of the formula with which it begins, that the image Seneca attributes to Bion[14] at Trang.8.3 is probably derived from an apophthegma, gnome, or chreia:

> Bion eleganter ait non minus molestum esse caluis quam comatis pilos uelli. Idem scias licet de pauperibus locupletibusque, par illis esse tormentum; utrique enim pecunia sua obhaesit nec sine sensu reuelli potest.

Cynic imagery also reached Seneca through Stoic intermediaries. Ariston of Chios emerges, in particular, as a repository of Cynic imagery.[15] He appealed to Seneca as a Stoic who, like Seneca himself, has no time

for the cavillationes of Stoics like Zeno, concentrating instead on ethical exhortation and couching his teachings in persuasive language.[16] Seneca twice attributes an image to Ariston[17] and very likely owes others to him.[18] However, in spite of his criticisms of the dry and quibbling style of the Stoics of the old school, it is clear that Seneca approved of and borrowed from their many images.[19] He attributes images to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus.[20] In particular, Chrysippean illustrations of the emotions seem to have been useful to Seneca.[21]

Time and again Cynic imagery recurs in the moralizing works of Seneca's Roman predecessors, Lucretius, Cicero (Tusculan disputations, De finibus, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De senectute), and Horace (the Sermones), in those of his contemporary and near-contemporary Greeks, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, and Epictetus, and in those of the second-century Lucian.[22] Such a continuity confirms the notion of a tradition of moralizing literature or 'diatribe' with its roots in Cynicism and suggests that the moralizing works of Horace, Cicero, and others like them are likely often the sources of Seneca's Cynic imagery.

Equally important, however, is the 'school' philosophy to which Seneca was exposed. Many of those to whom Seneca attributes images are 'Roman'[23] philosophers, contemporary with him or a generation older, whom he knew personally, or whose schools or followers' schools he himself attended: Athenodorus, Attalus, Sextius, Fabianus, and Demetrius. It emerges that, although they represent different philosophical schools - Stoic, 'Sextian', and Cynic - the method of exposition used by these philosophers is similar: an impassioned rhetorical adhortatio directed towards the saving of souls[24] in which the image is an important persuasive device. The use of a military image by each of these philosophers, to which Seneca refers in his prose-works, testifies to their common debt to the 'diatribe' tradition![25] It is, I suggest, from these Roman philosophers - some of whom were his teachers - that Seneca learnt not only many images typical of 'diatribe', but also, just as importantly, the method of using them to most persuasive effect. Sextius, it seems, furnished Seneca with a particularly instructive example in this, as the comments with which he introduces an especially

moving image of Sextius (Ep.59.6) show.[26] Imagery could be used without emotional effect, as the Stoics of the Old Stoa had shown,[27] but it is this use of imagery - not to illustrate a fine or quibbling point of argument, but to give power and persuasion to a simple ("simpliciter" - Ep.59.6) and direct exhortation to the soul - that Seneca finds so effective.

The subject-fields from which Seneca draws the vast majority of images are traditional sources of allusion for imagery. Traditional too, are the figurative moral equivalencies established within these subject-fields, as well, in the majority of cases, as the particular forms of the images. Seneca draws his imagery almost exclusively from within the moralizing tradition or 'diatribe'. Some of Seneca's images have common uses outside this tradition, however - for example, in the terminology of rhetoric.[28] Sometimes he uses imagery which has well-established poetic use or colloquial use, as represented by the proverb.[29] In these cases, however, Seneca is probably not responsible for their application to morality and place in the moralizing tradition, for which there is nearly always ample precedent. Seneca may innovate in the application of an image to the extent that he applies the imagery of a particularly Cynic stamp to the exposition of Stoicism, but even here the appropriation may well have been made by a Stoic predecessor, such as Ariston of Chios. On the other hand, we occasionally find Seneca applying an image differently from Stoic precedents.[30] The possibility of originality on Seneca's part cannot be discounted in such cases, although the demonstrated aptitude[31] of the Old Stoa for appropriating traditional 'diatribe' images for the illustration of doctrinal technicalities would often suggest that the originality is theirs, Seneca's divergence at this point representing an adherence to the mainstream 'diatribe' usage.

Even when Seneca is, we know, personally acquainted with the aspects of life from which his imagery is drawn - as, for example, the agricultural, financial, and medical - his images within these subject-fields remain largely traditional. It must be admitted, however, that Seneca's personal interest in such areas can freshen traditional images with small idiosyncratic details. Seneca's own ill-health,[32] for example

makes particularly poignant the comparison of his desire to make some moderate moral progress to hope for some alleviation of his gout and ulcers (Ep.98.15, Vit.Beat.17.4).[33] Similarly, the traditional comparison of moral improvement to grafting[34] is given a personal touch, as Seneca himself makes clear ("Volo tibi ex nostro artificio exemplum referre" - Ep.112.1), by his own evident acquaintance with and interest in this technique of viticulture.[35]

Other images, for which precedents appear to be lacking, strike us as even more personal. Images such as those of an insect squashed on the back of the hand (Clem.1.21.4), of ants crawling up and down a twig (Tranq.12.3), wild flowers growing in a ploughed field (Vit.Beat.9.1f), children forgetting their tasks while they watch their friends play (Ira 2.10.1), or learning to write (Ep.94.51), of music which plays over and over in the mind (Ep.123.9) and others[36] are made vivid through personal experience or observation. Even assuming that these particular images are original, however, they are largely drawn from the traditional subject-fields of imagery. Seneca's originality in the use of imagery, therefore, resides, to a great extent, in the degree to which he revitalizes traditional images with details drawn from personal observation.

In so far as it is possible to compare 'degrees' of originality, Seneca's originality or lack of it appears to be typical of contemporary practice within the 'diatribe' tradition. Unfortunately there exists no detailed study of the imagery of Epictetus,[37] who, as a contemporary of Seneca, a Stoic, and contributor to the 'diatribe' tradition, forms the ideal comparison. However, a reading of the discourses of Epictetus, as preserved by Arrian, impresses us with the conventionality of their imagery. Like Seneca's it is drawn from within the moralizing tradition and innovation occurs within this tradition.[38] It has been suggested, for example, that Epictetus' love of children manifests itself in a particularly large number of child-images[39] to which his observation of their behaviour gives a fresh and personal touch. Nevertheless, as we have seen,[40] child-imagery is typical of 'diatribe' from Bion onwards. Like Seneca's then, Epictetus' originality is principally a matter of

revitalizing traditional images with personal experience.

Bompaire comes to much the same conclusion with regard to the imagery of Lucian with whom, as a 'diatribist' of the second-century, we may also compare Seneca. He concludes that "la tradition livresque est la condition même de l'originalité lucianesque."[41] Lucian's innovation consists in a "rajeunissement" of traditional images brought about by a "synthèse d'éléments anciens, substitut de la fantaisie authentique ... clichés rafraîchis par l'humour ... comparaisons élargies en ecphrasis sans commune mesure avec l'original."[42]

Personal observation and an earnest desire to persuade bring life and cogency to Seneca's creative use of traditional imagery.

Notes

[1]Cf. p.96 and n.40.

[2]Cf. pp.95f.

[3]Cf. p.96.

[4]Cf. pp.94f.

Heraclitus - Ep.58.22 (N.1.1); Zeno - Ira 1.16.7 (L.1.8); Cleanthes - Ep.107.10 (P.1.1); Ariston - Ep.115.8f (F.1.3), 94.5ff (K.1.3); Chrysippus - Ben.2.25.3, 2.17.3ff (latter used by Seneca also at Ben. 2.32.1ff, 7.18.1) (D.2.2); Panaetius - Ep.116.6 (J.2.1); Posidonius - Ep.113.28 (M.4.1); Athenodorus - Tranq.3.1 (D.1.4), 3.2, 3.5 (M.1 and n.4, p.68); Attalus - Ep.72.8 (B.1.3, H.3.1), 67.15 (M.1.1, M.1.2); Epicurus - Ep.8.7 (G.1.3); Lucretius - Ep.110.6 (F.1.1.1); Bion - Tranq. 8.3; Demetrius - Ben.7.1.4 (D.1.4), Ep.67.14 (P.2.1 and n.6, p.85); Sextius - Ep.59.7 (M.1.3.1); Fabianus - Brev.Vit.10.1 (M.3.1).

[5]e.g. B (animals), F (children), J (land and land-travel), O (rock).

[6]Cf. Heraclitus, n.4. Democritus (L.3); Parmenides, Diogenes (P.1.1).

Aristotle - cf. B, B.1, F.1.1.1, P.1.1.

[7]Cf. Kindstrand, p.31, and Weber 1887, pp.189ff.

[8]Cf. n.46, p.103 and Rolke, p.510.

[9]Antisthenes: e.g. B.1.6, H.3.1, L.1, L.3, L.3.2, M.1.2.2; Diogenes: e.g. B.1.5, B.1.6, B.3.1, G.1.2, G.1.3, H.1.1, L.1.2, L.3, M.1.2.1; Bion: e.g. B.1.6, E.1.1, E.1.3, F.1.1.2, H.1.1, I.1.1, L.1, L.3, P.1.1, Q.2.1, Q.2.2; Teles: e.g. E.1.3, M.1.4, M.4.1, P.1.1, P.1.3.

[10]Bompaire's term, p.504.

[11]Nevertheless, Griffin's statement (p.14 and n.3) that "Seneca can certainly not be said to have been influenced directly by Bion or Teles" seems a little rash. I would agree with Kindstrand, pp.86f, that probably

> "both Plutarch and Seneca had some knowledge of the actual work of Bion and that they were not drawing exclusively on a collection of extracts. This is made even more plausible by the fact that they were both widely read."

[12]Cf. pp. 93f.

[13] pp.99, 253.

[14] Obviously recalled from memory, as it confuses the point of comparison between the rich and those well endowed with hair and the poor and the bald. The point is preserved by Montaigne: "comme disait Bion, autant se fâche le chevelu comme le chauvre qu'on lui arrâche le poil" (Essais 1.14, quoted by Kindstrand, p.253).

[15] e.g. E.3.1, K.1.3, and n.13, p.171, L.1.7.2, P.1.1, Q.2.2.

[16] Cf. p.97 and n.62.

[17] Ep.115.8f (F.1.3), 94.5ff (K.1.3).

[18] e.g. E.3.1, L.1.7.2.

[19] From this point of view I would modify Griffin's judgement, p. 15, that "Seneca's principal stylistic models were not ordinary Stoic philosophers, Ancient or modern."

[20] Cf. n.4.

[21] Cf. L.1, L.1.4.1, L.3.3.1.1, P.1.1, P.2.1, and cf. Plutarch, Mor.1044f-1045b (Compendium argumenti Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere) - B.

[22] Lucretius: E.1.3, I.1.1, L.3.2, M.1.2.2; Cicero: B.3.1, I.1.1, L.3, M.1.2.1, M.1.2.2, Q.2.1; Horace: B.1.6.1, E.1.3, H.1.1, L.1.2, L.1.9, M.1.1, M.1.2.1, M.1.2.2, M.1.3.1, M.4.1; Dio Chrysostom: B.1.3, B.1.6, B.3.1, G.1.1, L.3.2, Q.1.1; Plutarch: E.3.1, F.1.1.2, H.1.1, H.3.1, I.1.1, L.1.2, L.1.7.2, L.3.2, M.1.2.2, P.1.3, P.1.5; Epictetus: F.1.1.2, G.1.3, H.4.1, M, M.1.1, M.1.2.2, Q.2.1, Q.2.2; Lucian: B.1.6.1, L.3.1, L.3.2, Q.1.1.

[23] Cf. n.36, p.102.

[24] Thus Seneca praises the eloquence of Attalus (Ep.108.13f - cf. Seneca the Elder, Suas.2.12), Sextius (Ep.64.3ff), Fabianus (Ep.100.12, but cf. n.30, p.101), and Demetrius (Ben.7.8.2). They preached on similar ethical subjects, such as the evil of luxury - Athenodorus (Trang.3.3, 7), Attalus (Ep.108.14ff, 110.14ff), Sextius (Ep.108.18), Fabianus (Ep.108.18, cf. Seneca the Elder, Con.2.1.11ff, 25), and Demetrius (Ben.7.9.1ff).

[25] Athenodorus, Trang.3.5 (M.1); Attalus, Ep.67.15 (M.1.1, M.1.2); Sextius, Ep.59.7 (M.1.3.1); Fabianus, Brev.Vit.10.1 (M.3.1); Demetrius - probably Prov.3.3 (M.1.2.1 and cf. n.17, M.2.1).

[26] Cf. p.1.

[27] Cf. Rolke, pp.500f.

[28] A.1.2.1 (Cicero, de Orat.2.21.88); C and n.1, p.124; C.1.1 and n.4, p.124; D.1.1 and n.2, p.127; J and n.3, p.158; J.5.1; L.3.2 (Inst.8.3.75); L.3.3.1.1 (Quintilian, Inst.4.2.84).

[29] poetic uses: A.3.1, J.1.3, J.5.1, N.1, O.1.1.1, P.2.1.
proverbial uses: B.1.1, D.1.2.2, E.1.3. H.2.1, J.1.1, J.2.1, J.4.1, K.2.3.2, L.1.1, L.1.2, L.3 and n.35, p.183, N.2.1, Q.1.1.

[30] Cf. B.1.5, C.1.1.2, D.1.1, L.3.2, N.2.1.

[31] Clearly so in the case of D.1.1, L.3.2. Cf. p.96.

[32] Cf. p.176 and n.6.

[33] Cf. L.2.1.

[34] A.1.2.3.

[35] Cf. A.1.2.3 and n.12, p.108.

[36] e.g. Ep.4.5: man clinging to briars as he is dragged along by river's current; 58.25, 65.17: craftsmen resting eyes from intricate work; 74.7ff: distribution of dole at games; 87.17: coin falling down sewer; 108.4: tanning effect of sun, lingering of perfume; 123.14, Vit. Beat.25.6ff: leaning backwards and forwards on descending and ascending a hill; Ira 2.8.2: members of gladiatorial school forced to fight each other; 3.43.2: bull and bear fight; Clem.2.6.4: sympathetic laughter, crying, or yawning.

[37] As far as I am aware. Colardeau, pp.309ff, and Halbauer, pp.31 f, treat it briefly.

[38] Colardeau, p.319, who will not allow that Epictetus "ait vécu uniquement d'emprunts et n'ait été prodigue que du bien d'autrui" lists images at Diss.2.18.8ff, 3.16.2f, 3.20.9ff, and Ench.25 as examples of such originality. They all have the freshness of personal observation, but figurative equivalencies between illness and vice (Diss.2.18.9ff), the wrestling opponent and adversity (3.20.9), are traditional - cf. L.1, D.1.1.

[39] By Halbauer, p.32, on the basis of Diss.2.24.18: "τὰ παιδία τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ ἀριμέα τίνα οὐκ ἐκκαλεῖται πρὸς τὸ συμπαίζειν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνέρπειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμψελλίζειν;"

[40]

[41] p.438.

[42] Ibid., p.441.

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