INDIVIDUALITY AND VALUE
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD
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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

An examination of Whitehead's notion of actual entity to see if its exemplification of the functions of process and valuation affords us a more adequate basis on which to construct a theory of human individuality.
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I am indebted to Professor H.A. Dulmage who supervised the preparation of this thesis. His counsel was given in two regards primarily — assisting the student to see the worth of an original idea, and to see how such an idea may be developed with some measure of consistency.

A. Clarke
ABBREVIATIONS

All works cited are footnoted in abbreviated form. For KEY to these abbreviations please consult the Bibliography.

The following abbreviations also occur in the text:


Cat. Expl. = Categories of Explanation.

Cat. Oblg. = Categories of Obligation.

All other abbreviated forms are self-explanatory.
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PROSPECT

This essay is an attempt to propose a view of human individuality based on certain considerations of Whiteheadian Metaphysics.

Accordingly, I shall give a general portrayal of the notion of actual entity as representing the "processive" or Whiteheadian view of reality. I will then present some central features of the "substantive" view of reality and will show that, for a number of given reasons, these features must be regarded as inadequacies as far as the establishing of an adequate theory of human individuality on the substantive viewpoint is concerned.

In so doing I shall argue that the substantive view of reality, if taken seriously, leads to a "conformative" view of individuality; whereas the processive view of reality leads to, what I will call, a "concrecent" view of individuality. By a number of specially posed problems, it will be shown that the concrecent view of individuality adequately accounts for certain features of human experience which cannot be adequately accounted for by the substantive view of individuality.

In maintaining the distinction of adequate/inadequate as it refers to the above named views of reality and individuality, I shall centrally argue that the facts of process and value are momentous factors of reality and experience without which no adequate theory of human individuality can be constructed.

Lastly, by underscoring the importance of process and value, as essential functions of human individuality, I propose to develop a
Whiteheadian view of individuality which will provide some radical points of contrast with certain popular modern views of individuality which have either neglected or inadequately related the functions of process and value to the development of the human individual.

It will be observed from the table of contents that the subject of this essay is being discussed under three headings as follows: (1) Systematic; (2) Problematic; (3) Theoretical Application. The systematic section presents a characterization of the two views of reality in question (i.e., processive and substantive) and then focusses on what may be regarded as their consequent view of generic individuality. It then accentuates certain inadequacies of the substantive view of reality and individuality in the light of the demand of the generic principles of the processive view of reality and individuality. The problematic section considers three special problems of human individuality arising from the substantive viewpoint and shows that these problems may be adequately resolved in the light of the principles of the processive view of individuality. The section on theoretical application simply draws out the wider implications of the generic factors of the processive view of reality; expands its principles of concrecent individuality into a theory of human individuality (as will be explained); and shows that, without doubt, this view of human individuality leads to a fuller understanding of what may be called the "human reality".
INTRODUCTION

There are many ways that a metaphysical schema may be viewed depending on what it is explanatory of, as also on what the reader finds to be its significant emphases. I take the liberty to suggest that Whitehead's metaphysics is in a certain regard a metaphysics of experience. The reason underlying my viewpoint is that his writings exhibit, what I will here call, a sense of feeling in all reality. Further, he does accept and portray certain aspects of human experience as paradigmatic instances of that which pertains in all reality, since he accepts the principles of continuity in nature.

However, the notions of feeling and experience are many faceted and kaleidoscopic in nature, as any examination will show. Let me suggest here that a major reason for this phenomenon is that Whitehead has either retained or reintroduced the facts of novelty, autonomy and valuation as basic elements and ingredients of experience, at all levels. Indeed, it is the scope which he attributes to these facts that has made his metaphysics such a fruitful source of insightful ideas with regard to the welter of meaningful content which is at play in the throes of nature and in the throbs of our own experience.

With regard to such observations, the reader will find that the conception of actuality (cf. substance) which Whitehead develops is a conception which cannot be properly understood if it is viewed apart from the notion of value (or as he sometimes calls it, importance). There seems to be an intrinsic and natural relation between actuality
as a fact and what we may call the fact of value. One way of exploring the nature of this relation and developing its implications is by way of the notion of individuality. It is such an approach that will constitute the central thrust of my project.

I wish, at this time, to bring to the reader's attention the fact that when a metaphysics is generally inadequate it is usually interpreted in terms of the criticisms levelled against it. But, when such a schema is reasonably adequate it is interpreted despite the criticisms which may be levelled against it. Whitehead's work, in my judgement, falls in this latter category. My effort is therefore at best an attempted interpretation. I do not wish my own failings to reflect in any way on the work of the author in question. Yet I do hope that a generally meaningful Whiteheadian guideline will emerge, and to some useful end.
Part One
SYSTEMATIC
THE NOTION OF ACTUALITY
AS PROCESSIVE REALITY

The view that the world was created ex nihilo no longer holds currency in certain circles. The universe of events and experience must therefore be reasonably and imaginatively accounted for. From both the points of view of ontology and cosmology, Whitehead, attempts to present a reasonable account through the fundamental notion of the Actual Entity. As a preliminary statement to Whiteheadian ontology or process reality the following points should be noted:

(1) the universe exemplifies two main facts -- change and endurance;
(2) the basic elements from which the universe of things and experience is built up are actual entities, eternal objects, and God; God is himself an actual entity and eternal objects are ingredients of actual entities -- actual entities are therefore the real existences underlying all forms of reality;
(3) actual entities are concrescent units -- units of non-lingering process, but which give rise to more permanent forms of process;
(4) an actual entity is also a prehensive unit of reality -- it receives all data for its composition from antecedent entities and empathizes the qualitative content of the entire universe; it likewise passes on what it has consummated;
(5) actual entities are always grouped as nexus or societies and so give rise to many different forms of order of varying complexity;
(6) all entities become, group together and experience each other
according to certain categorial requirements — some of these requirements are creativity, novelty, spontaneity, relatedness, unity, etc.;

(7) all ingredient elements of an actual entity are essential and the entity itself is an experient subject but becomes an object when it is in transmission (objectification);

(8) the versatility of an actual entity is demonstrated in the fact that it is the basic constituent of the human mind as well as the human body;

(9) for Whitehead, the notion is a more adequate conception of unit reality (ντότις ὤν) than any other notion previously conceived.

In a definitive statement, he writes:

'Actual entities' — also termed 'actual occasions' — are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves; God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations of importance, and diversity of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.¹

Actual entities which are the 'building blocks' of the universe are also the basic factors of experience. Nature, then, is not to be distinguished from experience in terms of its ultimate stuff. Here they are held to be the same, and, whether in terms of physical or conceptual content,

actual entities are the final "reasons" of the universe. The fact of
the ultimacy and finality of these entities must be borne in mind, for,
they are all there is, and whatever else may be must be analyzed in
terms of actual entities.

The notion replaces the ancient concept of substance and the more
recent concept of monad. Its atomicity is more empirically grounded,
and is a good many steps in advance of any Democritean or Leibnizian
element. The notion draws on all traditional conceptions of ontological
ultimates, but infuses and transforms them with creativity and novel
autonomy, thereby rendering them imaginatively adequate as constituents
of nature and as factors of experience. These Whiteheadian entities
come into being and endure in accordance with certain laws of process,
which are spelled out as categorical features of Whitehead's system.
Some of these must here be mentioned.

First, under the heading, Category of the Ultimate; Whitehead
discusses certain ultimate notions — viz. Creativity, One, Many, etc.
This category embraces the principle of reciprocity between the one and
the many. The many cannot but become one, nor the one, the many. In
other words both the disjunctive and conjunctive features of the universe
necessitate each other. Further, whatever comes to be is a harbinger
of novelty, and neither nature nor experience is a mere repetition of
the past, however fully such is transmitted. Again, all reality is
constituted by "togetherness". This notion is what he later discusses
as "experiential togetherness" and exemplifies in the Principles of
Relativity. He writes:
'Creativity' is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively . . . . The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction . . . . Thus the 'production of novel togetherness' is the ultimate notion embodied in the term 'concrescence'. These ultimate notions of 'production of novelty' and of 'concrete togetherness' are inexplicable either in terms of higher universals or in terms of the components participating in the concrescence.²

Such a brief characterization expresses some of those basic generic features which, taken with reference to actual entities, axiomatizes Whitehead's system. Axiomatic here, does not refer to deducibility. Rather, it refers to the fact that there are basic facts (entities) and basic generic features (creativity, one, many, togetherness, etc.) in terms of which all else must be explained.

Second, for Whitehead, whatever is is real (i.e. actual). By this is meant that the ultimate locus of any and everything is an actual entity. All facts and observations, of thought and of experience — however they are constituted and characterized — are events composed of actual entities. Actual entities are the constituents of the complexities to which they give rise, and they are qualified by such complexities. Such qualifications may be novel or conformal, they may be intrinsic or extrinsic, their locus is still an actual entity or a grouping of actual entities. This is explicated by Whitehead in the notion of concrescence, and in accordance with what he terms the

²Whitehead, PR, pp. 25-6.
Ontological Principle. He writes:

That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence. This category of explanation is termed the 'ontological principle'. It could also be termed the 'principle of efficient, and final, causation'. This ontological principle means that the actual entities are the only reason; so that to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities. It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one entity in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process.3

Third, with regard to actual entities and their every possible grouping — which is the basis of all there is — Whitehead conceives PROCESS to be as basic and generic a feature of actuality as creativity itself. The fact is that "process" constitutes both the "becoming" and the "perishing" of actual entities. And, although actual entities do not endure, it is in terms of the process to which they give rise that the facts of transmission and objectification become manifest. He writes:

That two descriptions are required for an actual entity: (a) one which is analytical of its potentiality for 'objectification' in the becoming of other actual entities, and (b) another which is analytical of the process which constitutes its own becoming.

The term 'objectification' refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual entity.

3 Whitehead, PR. p. 29, Categories of Explanation XVIII.
That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'. This is the 'principle of process'.

The fourth categorical feature to which I wish to call attention at this time is the Principle of Relativity. We have already had earlier intimations of this principle. Despite the fact that an actual entity is a self-creating, novel and autonomous fact, for Whitehead, its individuality is not an individuality in isolation. Each entity, in its concrescence, is a result of its relationship to all else. So also, in its objectification does it continue to manifest the fact of relatedness as a datum for all else. By the principle of relativity each is related to all and all to each. He writes:

That the potentiality for being an element in a real concrescence of many entities into one actuality, is the one general metaphysical character attaching to all entities, actual and non-actual; and that every item in its universe is involved in each concrescence. In other words, it belongs to the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming'. This is the 'principle of relativity'.

The notion of actual entity answers the question of what there is in Whitehead's philosophy. Similarly the notion of process may be said to answer the "how" of reality. It is the former question which is at this time being considered. Two things may be granted. (1) That it is not meaningful to ask the question (except in certain limited

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4 Whitehead, PR. p. 28. Cat. Expl. VIII and IX.

5 Ibid., p. 27. Cat. Expl. IV.
contexts), "Why is there something rather than nothing?" If this were ultimately a meaningful question, it would suggest that it was possible to stand without or above the nature of things as they are. This, Whitehead contends, is impossible. Reason must then be content to accept this "bald" fact — that the world is — as a possible starting point of rational discourse. But to ascribe limits as to how this question may be meaningfully asked, also suggests that things, as they are, have an inherent reason for being so. (2) That all there is can be located. There is here no necessary reference to spatio-temporal location, certainly not in the ordinary sense. It means rather that everything — imagined, conjectured, or experienced — has an ontological status and can be metaphysically accounted for. To grant both of these does not mean that reason is irrational, but that the ultimate irrationality imposes limits on reason. It also means that within these limits whatever there is can be explained. The task is to construct an adequate explanation, and one consistent with the facts. Yet a certain danger must be avoided at all costs. It is the accepting of a particular interpretation as a final fact, rather than a tentative formulation. Events and experience, as they occur, do not preclude the latter, but are inconsistent with the former.

The ontological principle, as earlier stated, must be seen as cardinal to any understanding of Whitehead's metaphysics. Centrally it states that there is no other valid quest for the ground of experience and reason than the quest for the actual. The notion of actual entity is therefore indicative of the nature of all there is. There is nothing which is not in some sense actual, and every occurrence is from actuality
to actuality. Actuality is the first and final fact of the universe. It is what the universe is constituted of, and it is what the universe is. Whitehead's use of the term, as earlier intimated, borrows much from the general philosophic tradition. But, it is not my intention to directly trace this borrowing. The notion however arises from the context of contemporary scientific research, and it reflects an understanding of atomic and molecular activity. Yet, its understanding in the light of contemporary science does not lessen the import of the metaphysical insight of Leibniz in respect of the notion of "monad", nor that of Democritus in respect of the notion of "atom". The real units of existence account for both the "one" and "many". This allows both for the unity and the plurality of things. Neither does it square with the facts to emphasize the one to the exclusion of the other. Actuality (or actual entities, actual occasions, final realities or events, as Whitehead variously calls them) to at all times transcends itself, either as the one becoming the many, or as the many becoming the one.

An actual entity is a process in the course of which many operations with incomplete subjective unity terminate in a completed unity of operation, termed the 'satisfaction'. The 'satisfaction' is the contentment of the creative urge by the fulfilment of its categorical demands.

As a categorical notion, actual entity is always synonymous with Existence as the essence and sum of all existents, and with Being as the essence and sum of all beings. (In Process and Reality actual entity

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6 Whitehead, PR. pp. 90, 94, 98.

7 Ibid., p. 257.
is set down as the first of the Categories of Existence. To speak of Existence or the existent, of Being, beings or becoming is to speak about the actual entity or actual entities. The fact that there is always "experiential togetherness" holding in respect of these entities, means that there is no "separateness" of entities. These entities are always grouped — as nexus, sub-societies, or societies — and do not exist in isolation. The actual is always an "IT" with a "THEY". Moreover to ensure the continuity of events and experience, and to avoid any possible dualism, Whitehead maintains that there is only one genus of actual entities.

There must always be a connectedness of facts and a continuity of factors in Whitehead's universe. The "IT" is never separate from its "THEY", nor that which is qualified, from that which qualifies it. The theory of actual entity, in its functions of prehension and concrescence, shows that relations and qualifications are never merely extrinsic. Relations and qualifications are always in some respect bound-up with the 'real internal constitutions' of actual entities. Reality is through and through actual, and God himself, in so far as he is real is not exempted from the categorial demands which are exhibited in the concrescence of all entities. In terms of the actual, there cannot be a "more" real. Actual entities may have (and do have) a gradation in terms of function and importance, but this is only a difference in terms of their similarity.8 The principles which they exemplify are all on the same

8Whitehead, PR. pp. 38, 57, 172.
level. One may now ask what is the nature of an actual entity? In answer to this question Leclerc writes:

The ontological principle is the assertion that the ὧν ὅν, the 'really real' is an 'actual' i.e. a fully existent, individual entity. Since 'actual entities' 'form the ground from which all other types of existence are derivative or abstracted', it is evident that the category of actual entity assumes a certain basic position among the categories. That is to say, actual entities constitute the primary subject of the metaphysical inquiry; it is their nature which metaphysics seeks to discover . . . .

What then is that fact which constitutes the nature of the actual? And what are those features expressive of that fact? The answer for Whitehead would simply be "process". But to answer the question simply does not mean that the answer is simple. The notion of process is actually one of the most complex and kaleidoscopic strands of Whitehead's thought. The implications of its complexity must be dealt with elsewhere. But, if process is admitted as basic and generic, it will be seen that, its ingredient features (also basic and generic) facilitate a multi-dimensioned view of reality which is more consistent with the facts of nature and experience. Following Leclerc, I turn at this time to the perspective of the philosophical tradition.

From the time of Parmenides it was held that the ὧν ὅν was individual, unitary, self-identical and self-sufficient; also that changelessness was a basic feature of reality. But this last made it impossible to account for change, as well as permanence. Whitehead takes both Plato

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and Aristotle to task. For him, neither the realm of changelessness, nor one in which change occurs only in accidental features can be regarded as really real. Both these positions admit, by implication, a lack of the fullness of being. Both are therefore inimical to the principle of process. As he advocates, no insightful ontology should at this time acquiesce in the subject-predicate logic of Aristotle, or the general ontological tradition of an unchanging entity (οὐκόσι) which changes. Either of these views, he shows, is founded on an imaginative generalization from everyday experience — that what is seen as numerically one (this tree, this man, etc.) is admissible of qualitative distinctions only.

Whitehead insists that, for all practical purposes, an actual entity conceived as self-identically enduring is legitimate. But, in the final analysis it is an abstraction and not a fact. He writes:

The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for many purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken. It arose from a mistake and has never succeeded in any of its applications. But it has had one success; it has entrenched itself in language, in Aristotle's logic, and in metaphysics. For its employment in language and in logic, there is — as stated above — a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the concept is sheer error. This error does not consist in the employment of the word 'substance'; but in the employment of the notion of an actual entity which is characterized by essential qualities, and remains numerically one amidst the changes of accidental relations and accidental qualities. The contrary doctrine is that an actual entity never changes, and that it is the outcome of whatever can be ascribed to it in the way of quality or relationship. There then remains two alternatives for philosophy: (i) a monistic universe with the illusion of change; and (ii) a pluralistic
universe in which 'change' means the diversities among the actual entities which belong to some one society of a definite type.10

The real problem is the assumption that an actual entity, or substance, can exist and endure changelessly and be explanatory of change while it remains devoid of process.

Descartes, who in certain respects is the last perpetrator of Aristotelian ontology, recognized the above difficulty, but did not succeed in overcoming its impasse. He made the existence of an actual entity instantaneous, in principle eliminating all process, arguing that there is but mere transition to successive instantaneous existences of actualities. In the Third Meditation he writes:

In truth, it is perfectly clear and evident to all who will attentively consider the nature of duration that the conservation of a substance, in each moment of its duration, requires the same power and act that would be necessary to create it, supposing it were not yet in existence; so that it is manifestly a dictate of the natural light that conservation and creation differ merely in our mode of thinking (and not in reality).11

The essential point is that "duration is not validly conceived to consist in the self-identical persistence of an actuality; since each instantaneously created entity is numerically distinct from others in the route of succession, there is accordingly not 'one and the same' entity 'enduring'."12 On Descartes' view we would not be dealing with the one

10 Whitehead, PR. p. 96.
12 Leclerc, WH. p. 65.
and the same entity, even as he conceives an enduring entity. Such an entity would be a derived notion — an abstraction. This oversight leads to what Whitehead calls the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". Further, Descartes' position leaves us still in need of a cause of activity and process. His enduring entity does not possess these. But, if process and activity be attributed to another entity (or entities), how would a blatant regress be avoided? Leclerc writes:

There emerges, therefore, a most important implication of Descartes' analysis, namely, that there cannot be 'existence' at all, in any sense, without activity, and thus without 'process' — for action involves transition, which is process. Moreover, the creating being must himself exist by virtue of his own activity; that is, he must be causa sui, for unless this be so Descartes will be involved in an infinite regress of creators in order to account for the process of creating activity of each.\textsuperscript{13}

Descartes would then be logically correct in regarding God as the only true substance, but \textit{res extensa} and \textit{res cogitans} could not then be properly called substance.

The Cartesian problem and the general problem of endurance will later receive further attention, particularly in Part Two. In this chapter I have attempted to give a preliminary sketch of the notion of actual entity as follows: (1) I have stated and elaborated upon the definitive Whiteheadian statement concerning what an actual entity is; (2) four basic categorial features relating to the nature and functions of actual entities were introduced; (3) some general metaphysical implications of

\textsuperscript{13}Leclerc, MN. p. 65.
the notion were briefly discussed; (4) using the ideas of the ὄντως ὅν and ὄν 
and ὄν τὰ, I have in a preliminary way, (a) linked Whitehead's metaphysical 
concern with that of traditional metaphysics, (b) shown that the basic 
assumption of the substance doctrine led to fundamental problems in 
Cartesian metaphysics.

This notion of actual entity, as introduced, gives us the basic 
perspective of what I will later discuss as process (or processive) 
reality. Some additional and central features of such a reality will 
be enlarged upon in chapters three and four and the fundamentals of such 
an enlargement will (in Part Three) be used as the basis of a more 
adequate theory of human individuality than could possibly be constructed 
along substantive lines. We will now turn to a discussion of substantive 
actuality.
SUBSTANTIVE ACTUALITY
AND THE PROCESSIVE VIEWPOINT

Can a view of reality which emphasizes stability above change be regarded as an adequate basis of individuality? This question is contained in the thesis central to this essay that — Substantial actuality as a general metaphysical viewpoint is an inadequate basis for a theory of human individuality.

In the former chapter I presented a general characterization of processive actuality as contained in Whitehead's notion of actual entity. In my presentation the notion was defined; some of the categorial features governing the reality of such an entity were specified; and intimations were given of the problematic nature of the notion of substance in traditional philosophy — notably in Descartes. In the present chapter I will mainly examine some of the major emphases of substance ontology which Whitehead rejects as inadequate if we are seeking a metaphysical basis of reality in accordance with experience.

A brief synoptical view of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance may be gained by noting the following points:

(1) Substance is individual — as such it may represent primary individuality or derived individuality, i.e. the existent thing;

(2) Substance is always the subject which receives logical or ontological qualifications;

(3) Substantial Being is that which all existent things have in common — it is a certain "that" or "this" which is peculiar
to each natural body — (a) it imparts to it an independent existence, (b) it is the ground or cause of its existence, (c) it determines its individuality;

(4) the word Aristotle uses is ὄνομα which is derived from the verb to be ἔχω and refers to fundamental, independent existence or the being of the "concrete" individual thing;

(5) ὄνομα always suggests an essential unity — "to be" and "to be one" mean the same thing;

(6) substance has essential and non-essential qualities — in respect of the former it is individual, unitary, independent, self-sufficient and changeless; in respect of the latter it exhibits an additional set of qualities — only essential qualities define the real nature of a substance;

(7) substance is the locus of form/matter and of being/non-being; Aristotle is not clear in what respects ὄνομα is form or matter or being or non-being;

(8) primary substance is always particular never a universal — it can never be the attribute of a subject;

(9) universals do not change, but particular substance does — however if substance is essentially primary how may it change or give rise to change?

(10) except God, substances are not causa sui — it takes a greater substance (or one as great) to generate a lesser substance;

(11) there are at least three different kinds of substance;

(12) the doctrine of substance has many inherent ambiguities and has always been a source of numerous philosophical problems;
it should be kept in mind that Aristotle was himself arguing against certain crass interpretations of Parmenides which made reality to be unqualifiedly 'One' and 'Permanent'; and against the opposite views, based on Heraclitus, which took reality to be unqualified flux. At the same time he sought to avoid Plato's conclusion that the changing existent world is unreal while the real world is an abiding realm of forms reflected upon or mediated to the existent world.

In the *Categories*, Aristotle, speaking of substance, writes:

A substance — that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all — is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse.¹

He goes on to stipulate that species and the genus relative to the individual are substance only in a secondary sense. Further, he states that "of the primary substance, one is no more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox".²

Settling on this conception of substance as the existent individual he writes: — "All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects". Hence if "primary substance did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist".³


²Ibid., p. 7.

³Ibid., p. 6.
From an examination of the Categories we know that all the other categories function as factors of qualification for substance in this primary sense. This then which Aristotle calls "a certain this", is the primary reality.

The question may be raised, as to whether or not Aristotle is, in the Categories, speaking of an ontological entity as over against a linguistic entity. To my way of thinking, the question is legitimate and answerable. Careful examination of the Categories will show that he is speaking of both ontological and linguistic entities, but appears either to have indulged himself in momentary carelessness, or to have taken the fact, that the distinction between the two need not be made, for granted. However, his emphasis, by way of examples, on existent entities -- this man, this ox, this tree, etc. -- does lend weight to the view that substance (as well as the rest of the categories) is to be taken ontologically. Further, as far as I can recall, Aristotle has no where made out a clear case for the status of linguistic entities as he has done for ontological entities. For these reasons then, it seems perfectly legitimate to hold to the opinion that this is a preliminary ontological casting of the view which, in the Metaphysics (see Bks. vii and viii), he expands into a general metaphysical doctrine.

Let me now point out some of the central features of the substantial doctrine which renders it a less than adequate contender as an ultimate principle of metaphysical formulation.

(a) It has already been stated that "all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects". This brings us to the matter of substantial predication or qualification.
Aristotle writes:

Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them, or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.\(^4\)

But elsewhere he writes:\(^5\)

It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor in a subject.\(^6\)

There are two points to be noticed. First, he admits that substance can be qualified. It is a subject and as such it may entertain predicates — (1) either by ascription or (2) by inherence. Second, Aristotle explicitly excludes any possibility of a substance itself being entertained by another substance or itself entertaining another as its predicate. This is precisely a heel of Achilles in the substantial doctrine which Whitehead exploits to advantage. To emphasize, as the Aristotelian doctrine tends to do, mere predicative qualifications to the neglect of relational qualifications is to make relations external and additive rather than internal and essential. It is the shackles of the subject-predicate logic, resulting from the substance ontology which

\(^4\) Aristotle, ACI. p. 7.

\(^5\) Both passages must be interpreted as indicating the rigid line which Aristotle drew between particulars (substances) and universals (qualities). A universal could not be a real subject, nor a particular a real predicate. What he lacked was an adequate doctrine of relation, as I will later discuss in the notion of prehension. Aristotle then did not understand his own expression — being "in a subject".

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 8.
Whitehead views as a grave error in western philosophical tradition.\(^7\)

(b) Again, the doctrine as contained in the *Categories*, but especially in its expanded form in the *Metaphysics* (See Bks. vii and viii), draws a distinction between the essential and accidental attributes of substance.\(^8\) Now it is only with regard to the accidental attributes that a substance may be said to suffer change. The essential attributes constitutes its essence as a changeless substratum. What in effect this aspect of the doctrine does is to eliminate change (or process) from the essential constitution of substantial actuality. How then may change, in respect of the generation and corruption be accounted for?\(^9\) This idea of an enduring substance which does not change has been the "false-foot" of all substance philosophy since Aristotle. I have already made reference to Descartes' difficulties with this problem in chapter one. Needless to say Whitehead rejects it and makes process to be the essential nature of actuality. This second difficulty it must be seen, is not only related to the former, but is the Gordian knot of the substantial theory of actuality.

(c) Aristotle also emphasizes the fact that "It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries". He continues, "In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive

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\(^7\) Whitehead, *PR.* p. 64-65, 66, 160.

\(^8\) Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, vii: 5.

\(^9\) Quite apart from the creation and destruction of artifacts and the coming to be and passing away of natural substances, e.g., a man, one would like to know how the so-called indestructible essence of these substances and of the really real (οὐας ὤν) may be said to be constituted or disintegrated.
The philosophy of organism objects to this emphasis on numerical oneness (or mere numerical identity) as an essential feature of actuality. The force of the disagreement will become more clear when it is recalled that Aristotle's paradigm of oneness as of substance is the existent individual, in the sense of "this man" or "this ox". Such existent actualities, for Whitehead, are both one and many: so also is the individual actual entity.

(d) The last consideration that I will here mention is that the Aristotelian notion of substance tends, and historically has given rise to a view of actuality devoid of subjective-enjoyment. Here a substance is not necessarily an experient subject. Such a view is contravened from the point of view of process reality, and expressly on the basis of the Reformed Subjectivist Principle.

We have thus examined the Aristotelian definition of substance and noted four facets of the doctrine which appear to be at loggerheads with some central principles of organic philosophy. Specific characterization of these difficulties will be presented and discussed in Part Two (Problematic) of this essay. I must at this time justify

10 Aristotle, ACI. p. 11.

11 The problem with the emphasis on numerical identity is that it presupposes a universe of fixed identities, i.e. one in which objects are simply located. It would therefore fail to account for continuing identity despite change in essential features — e.g. the babe is now a man. It also hides the plural and composite (or serial) nature of reality. Contiguity and resemblance would thus be the only formal relations uniting events.

12 Whitehead, PR. p. 176ff.
my obvious reliance on the presentations of the *Categories* and then say
a word in respect of the various interpretations of this Aristotelian
doctrine.

It may be argued that Whitehead's criticism (see chapter 1,
p. 14-15) may easily be mitigated, if the conception of substance pre-
*Metaphysics* be advanced as the genuine Aristotelian view-
point. The fact is, as examination will show, if we focus on *ouța*, as
there rendered, our problems are compounded. First the central principles
of the doctrine are not changed in the least. They are merely given
metaphysical generalization in the discussions of Being-non-Being,
Matter-Form, Actuality-Potentiality. Second, if the notion "being" is
posed in the place of substance we run into a similar set of dif-
ficulties. In *Metaph. vii*: 1,2-8, Aristotle equates being with substance
and continues to speak of the latter in much the same way as he did in
the *Categories*. The attributes of Being are still the predicates of
substance — "for if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance
is still its first part, and is succeeded by quality, and then quantity."
Third, in the *Metaphysics* we run into further difficulties, since there
are not merely primary and secondary substances, but "there are three
kinds of substance — one that is sensible . . . . and another that is
immovable . . . . but the third kind belongs to another science . . . . ." (*Metaph. xii*: 1). By the time we come to the doctrine of God in Book xii
we begin to wonder, if, as "first mover" and "pure actuality", he is not
the only true substance. (We have already touched on this point in our
earlier reference to Descartes).

The picture we are getting from the *Metaphysics* is the view of an
ontology, the first principle of which is not thoroughly worked out. Since this essay is not designed to assess fully the Aristotelian doctrine, but merely to appraise critically certain facets of it in the light of organic philosophy, I have adhered to the simpler version of the Categories. However, this circumvention is not a mere flight from difficulties, for the principles, as said before, are the same in both works. It should also be said that Aristotle's doctrine has metamorphosed in many ways in the hands of posterity. Interpretations of the doctrine have not all been faithful, and many may not have been genuinely Aristotelian. For example, if we compare some traditional interpretations of the notion of change in Aristotle (say Descartes') much is left to be desired. But granting that Randall is right, the way he interprets the concepts of motion and change in Aristotle brings his concept of change, in the metaphysical sense, somewhat nearer the processive view. (See J. H. Randall's Aristotle Chaps. VII, IX, X.) In fairness to the ancient master, it must be said that many of Whitehead's philippics are as much against a number of uninformative interpretations as they are against some of the central Aristotelian features.

Whitehead's first attempt at construction of a comprehensive notion in terms of which nature might be explained met with limited success. The general validity of the notion of "event" as he first conceived it was sound from the standpoint of theoretical physics and mathematics. However, since such a notion represented a limited scientific viewpoint as well as one of an advanced degree of abstraction it soon became evident that the notion of event had to be filled out. In a note appended to the second edition of the Principles of Natural
Knowledge he wrote:

The book is dominated by the idea that the relation of extension has a unique preeminence and that everything can be got out of it. During the development of the theme, it gradually became evident that this is not the case... But the true doctrine, that 'process' is the fundamental idea, was not in my mind with sufficient emphasis. Extension is derivative from process and is required by it.13

My purpose is not to argue the inadequacies of Whitehead's earlier description of basic fact, but simply to state that the recognition that one must needs more from generalizing in terms of abstraction to generalizing in terms of concreteness took him a few steps in advance of the substance viewpoint and saved him from committing the Aristotelian fallacy. (This is meant to attribute the error of "misplaced concreteness" to Aristotle as well.)

The comprehensive charge which the processive viewpoint levels against the substantial doctrine is that of abstractionism. (See PR. p. 35) "A philosophical system", for Whitehead, "should present an elucidation of concrete fact from which the sciences abstract."14

The case with science is that its abstractions should always be elucidated in the light of an exposition of concrete reality. The substance of Aristotle is an abstraction from daily life -- too commonsense a view -- which has been imported into metaphysics and imaginatively generalized.

We may recall Whitehead's stated objection:


The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially or accidentally expresses a useful abstract for many purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken. It arose from a mistake and never succeeded in any of its applications... in metaphysics the concept is sheer error.\textsuperscript{15}

Rather than employing the philosophical method to postulate the nature of concrete fact and then argue towards an abstraction from such a fact, Aristotle appears to have assumed the essential concreteness of the existent individual, instanced in "this man" and "this ox". It is this move — from the abstract to the concrete, rather than the converse — which Whitehead centrally attacks as far as Aristotle is concerned. His contravention of the substance tradition seems to be against the failure to understand misplaced concreteness on Aristotle's part, as also against the great degree of acquiescence in the uncritical usage of a language based on this erroneous ontology.

We must see therefore in the notion of actuality as discussed, a true attempt at the philosophical characterization of ultimate reality. Leclerc, commenting in similar regards, writes:

The task which he had previously set himself, of developing a new concept of ultimate fact to replace the classical concept of simply located particles of matter, could not be carried out along the lines, and by the procedure he had hitherto attempted. The task, he now saw, is a specifically philosophical one; more precisely, it is a metaphysical one — taking 'metaphysics' here broadly as the investigation of the 'ultimate nature of reality'.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15}Whitehead, \textit{PR.} p. 96.

\textsuperscript{16}Leclerc, \textit{WM.} p. 14.
Whitehead's critique of substance philosophy represents also a shift in his own position, which may be regarded as a search for a more adequate grounding of ultimate fact — "the final problem is to conceive a complete (παντελής) fact . . . ."\(^\text{17}\) The notion of actual entity, as I have stated in chapter one, represents such a fact. It is παντελής — it is the ὕποτεσσαρος ὁ. 

It now remains for me, in this section, to show that, despite the points of radical divergence between the two views of reality, Aristotle's central purpose coincided with that of Whitehead's in Process and Reality. In this I shall be guided somewhat by Leclerc's treatment of the stated coincidence.

One should generally observe that Whitehead, in his central metaphysical work, did not set out to derive his metaphysics directly and solely from scientific speculation, neither did he rely immediately on obvious facts of commonsense to fashion a metaphysical ultimate. It is true that he was never far from the scientific perspective, nor have his central conceptions scandalized the commonsensers viewpoint. But, his task in Process and Reality was to interpret scientific principles as well as the facts of experience in the light of a more fundamental metaphysical schema. In Science and the Modern World he writes:

It is equally possible to arrive at this organic conception of

\(^{17}\)Whitehead, \emph{AI.}, p. 158.
the world if we start from the fundamental notions of modern physics, instead of as above, from psychology and physiology. In fact by reason of my own studies in mathematics and mathematical physics, I did in fact arrive at my convictions in this way. Mathematical physics presumes in the first place an electromagnetic field of activity pervading space and time. The laws which condition this field are nothing else than the conditions observed by the general activity of the flux of the world, as it individualizes itself in the events.  

It is the last sentence which must be emphasized. The so-called scientific writings must be viewed in light of his central metaphysical notions -- not the reverse.

In respect of the ποντικός he writes -- "we can only form such a conception in terms of fundamental notions concerning the nature of reality".  

And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we all must consider chiefly and primarily and most exclusively what that is which is in this sense.

For Whitehead, the problem is "to conceive a complete fact"; for Aristotle, it is to show "what that is which is in this sense". The Greek phrase -- εἰς τὸν περὶ τοῦ ὅταν οὗτος οὕτως οὐκ θεωρεῖν τί εστὶ̂ν -- which Ross (above) translates as "what that is which is", J. Owens


19 Whitehead, Al., p. 158.

renders as "what Being in this sense is" since the that refers to Being. Owens' rendering refers Being to ὁ ὁς ἀ and he is supported by H. Tredennick's rendering -- "to investigate the nature of 'being' in the sense of substance." I agree with Leclerc that the term substance is an ambiguous term and so the retaining of the Greek ὁ ὁς ἀ is to be preferred. But, we have already looked at Aristotle's faulty association of substance with Being. This however does not alter our present discussion. In Ross' rendering, Aristotle is trying to discover the nature of "that which is" in the determinate sense in which it "is". The reference of ὁ ὁς ἀ to Being is here inescapable: and so it seems reasonable to accept ὁ ὁς ἀ in the primary sense of Being or Existence.

The term ὁ ὁς ἀ is from the Greek ἐ ἅ ὁ ἅ — to be, and we are told, combines the abstractness of Being (as beingness) with the concreteness of particular individuality. One may readily agree that this appears to be the meaning which the term ὁ ὁς ἀ (substance) of the Metaphysics is meant to have. But, although we may be enlightened by a vaguely implied Aristotelian assumption, he seemed not to have clearly argued the fact of transition between the two terms substance and Being or the special metaphysical sense of substance (ὁ ὁς ἀ) in distinction from the less refined characterization of the Categories.

This discussion so far has indirectly extended my earlier contention that the conceptions of substance, in both works cited are for all intents the same. What it has not done, and was not intended to do, is to release Aristotle from the central Whiteheadian blame of the imposition of abstraction upon concreteness. (See chapter three).
The central point I am making, and with regard to my stated intention, is to show that Aristotle's aim coincides with Whitehead's. This also brings the latter into the general main stream of the ontological tradition, but with finer tools and a more carefully worked first principle. It must then be seen that both the notion of actual entity and that of substance are intended to be the same in so far as they both subscribe to the ontological principle. Here the "concrete fact" of the processive view is akin to the ὑμά of the substantial tradition. Where they radically differ is in their manner of conception, which, as we will see, has been decisive in determining their scope of adequacy and applicability as far as the range of experience goes.

In summary, I have done the following:

(1) I have presented from the Categories some basic statements on Aristotle's doctrine of substance;

(2) I have given reason for my reliance on the Categories in preference to the Metaphysics;

(3) endeavour was made to show that Whitehead's more adequate notion of actual entity is the result of a development and recognition of the fact that the ontologist must begin with the "concrete" and only then move to the "abstract";

(4) excursion is made to show that Aristotle and Whitehead — respectively using ὑμά and actual entity — had similar aims of making the "concrete" the "real".

In the succeeding chapter I aim to examine the possible scope of adequacy of the two notions in question.
INDIVIDUALITY

In keeping with the former chapters, I must now examine the nature of individuality from the standpoints of substantive and processive ontology as we have so far discussed them. The two characterizations will be called conformative and con cresc ent individuality respectively.

Also, the thesis central to this essay, which was introduced but not discussed, will become the focus of the comparison of the two viewpoints. Where in the last chapter I indicated points of disagreement between the two views, in this chapter I will endeavour to test the general or generic scope and adequacy of the said views of reality with regard to certain basic requirements of the being and becoming of the human individual. Without further ado, let us turn to the issues themselves.

Section (1)
Conformal Individuality

It has already been pointed out that both the substantive and processive views of reality subscribe to the ontological principle. As stated by Whitehead it is:

That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence ... This ontological principle means that actual
entities are the only reasons; so that to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities....¹

Actual entity, we have seen from chapter one, is the ὑπερως ἦν — the really real — of the processive view. We have seen from the last chapter also that, whatever the ambiguities of the term may be, ὁὐσία (substance) is taken by Aristotle to be the truly existent in the sense of primary actuality. Whitehead himself confirms this to be Aristotle's viewpoint when he associates himself with the latter's conception of the ontological principle. (PR. pp. 53-4) It is in discussing a similar point that Leclerc writes:

This Aristotelian principle — which Whitehead terms the 'ontological principle' — asserts that these 'actual things' are the truly and fully existent things, and that whatever else exists, does so in a sense dependent upon, and derived from, that of actual things.²

It is this vera realitas (to use Descartes' phrase so often used by Whitehead) — this ὁὐσία or actual entity which is the prime unit of reality. The term unit is here used ambiguously and for reasons which will later become apparent. Unless one is prepared to reject the essential relation of ὁὐσία to Existence as beingness, it must also be understood that ὁὐσία, like actual entity is the real factor of all existent entities. If this is granted, then it must be seen that we are

¹Whitehead, PR., p. 29, Cat. Expl. XVIII. See also, PR., p. 54, and references to Descartes pp. 91-2; and to Hume p. 193.

²In this regard Aristotle is abundantly clear in Metaph. vii and viii.
here dealing with the central generic factor of all reality. This οὐσία, this substance propter se is that which, I will contend, is the true basis of all types of individuality.

We must now see that when Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, speaks of the particular, the individual, or the particular individual, it is in this primary sense in which, "for the most part", the terms are to be understood as having reference to οὐσία. His examples seem somewhat misleading since they usually refer to existent individual things as they do in the Categories. The logical doctrine of substance, as Ross correctly points out, seems mistaken since it fails to distinguish between subject-predicate in a logical sense, and substance-attribute in an ontological sense. This essay need not directly concern itself with the many problems arising from this observation. The problem of individuality, as I wish to deal with it, arises directly from Aristotle's acceptance of the ontological principle. We may therefore proceed directly by asking what is the nature of οὐσία (substance)?

The ontological principle makes it clear that the search for "What that is which is in this sense" — the individual — is a search for particular Existence. We are therefore still pursuing the subject of individuality in this special, primary and generic sense. It is of the nature of such an individual that Aristotle writes:

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It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries...4

Now it is this statement of Aristotle, as well as its correlative renderings, which have led to the static view of reality and its attendant difficulties (specifically within the substance tradition of course); also to what will here be called a "conformative" view of individuality. In the last chapter we already noted that the said statement constituted one of the radical points of conflict with the processive view of reality. Also, in the later sections of chapter one, and in general reference to Whitehead's criticism of the substantial tradition, it was specified that — "The real problem is the assumption that an actual entity, or substance, can exist and endure changelessly and be explanatory of change while it remains devoid of process."

Now the special sense in which the term "conformal" is meant combines certain features in respect of an actual entity: viz. a lack of (1) its own impetus of becoming; (2) inherent features of subjective-enjoyment (or valuation); (3) inherent principles of transformation; (4) inherent principles of transmission. In a positive respect these may be synonymously called composition, enhancement, transformation and translation.5 These, as we will later see are taken

4Aristotle, ACI., p. 11

5Conformative (or Conformal): The term is used with specific reference to the substantive type of reality or individuality. Conformal as here implied refers primarily to an entity with a fixed and given essence. The entity cannot but conform to what it has been made to be. Secondarily, it refers to conformity to the past in a way which does not imply present initiative and openness to novelty of composition. Any other usages are derived from these two.
into account in their Whiteheadian version. This stipulation is at this time necessary since we cannot derive from the objects of nature and experience features which are not generically contained in their real or ontological constitution. This, in my opinion, is the pith of the substantial dilemma. And all such intrinsic requirements which are necessary for the explanation of their derived or abstracted counterparts may be said to be operating under the general 'principle of generic requirement'.

Composition: The usage of this term derives from the Whiteheadian notion of concrescence or self-formation according to the principle of subjective aim. Here the entity in its subjective experience does not conform, but simply takes up a position with itself. This is especially so with the human entity.

Enhancement: The term may be taken as a synonymous rendering of Whitehead's valuation. It refers to any and all activities (positive and negative e.g. acceptance and rejection of data, etc.) whereby an entity increases its store of value and sense of importance. Every advancement by enhancement carries attendant experiences of unification and intensity. Maximum enhancement is called culmination (cf. satisfaction).

Transformation: Transformation is a ready adjunct of composition, enhancement, and translation. Like all these terms it is descriptive of spontaneous activity. Specifically it is the function by which an entity modifies the elements of its own internal constitution or adjusts itself to fresh data to accord with the fullest possible realization of its subjective aim.

Translation or Transmission: The functions by which an entity passes on aspects of, or the fullest possible significance of what it is to succeeding entities is called translation or transmission. Its similarity to Whitehead's use of objectification should readily become evident. Accordingly, self-realization is realization for transmission and has direct relation to future events, but only a limited reference to contemporary events and occasions. The correlative of translation and transmission (as is later used in Part Three) is INTERNALIZATION or ASSIMILATION.

N.B. A very special difference between these terms as introduced and Whitehead's equivalents is this — his terms are specifically ontological concepts; while my own are intended to carry a bias towards human reality. This distinction does not render them less than adequate synonyms however.
The conformal view of reality may therefore be said to contravene the principle of generic requirement in a number of ways. Some of these will be evidenced.

First, if the individual, in the generic sense, is unchanging then how may we account for change in the genetic features of derived actuality? To put the matter another way, that which itself is essentially changeless cannot give rise to change in derived actuality in any sense that may be regarded as essential.

Second, if generic change (in some sense of the term, say activity) is not a feature of actuality, then genetic actuality in its composition would be merely additive and conjunctive, and could not be said to have a real or intrinsic constitution.

Third, in keeping with the above all qualifications would be accidental rather than essential, and where this is the case there could be no real subjective-enjoyment of becoming of derived actuality, since its constituent atoms are vacuous. It follows that without subjective-enjoyment (valuation or enhancement) there is no real unity. It must be understood that real existence is a unit of subjective-enjoyment which is only possible by the coalescence of real elements. A mere addition of qualities to an entity with a fixed essence does not engender self-enjoyment.

My last point here is that an unchanging entity neither receives

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For my use of the terms GENERIC and GENETIC see note at bottom of page 45.
from the past nor is capable of translating (transmitting) its essence
to future events. In this regard the past is essentially dead and has
no more than contiguous relation (causal relation in Hume's sense) with
the present and the future. In effect, there is no intrinsic transform-
ation of essence possible. A number of these features will be expanded
in the discussion of the second part of this chapter where these points
are further treated.

Now, in the conformal universe where stability is the essence,
rather than a feature, of things certain consequences tend to follow.
First, change must always be effected by some external agent, and so a
cause must at least be as great as the effect it brings about. But to
avoid an infinite regress we must assume a first cause. Hence, Aristotle's
need for God as causa sui and primum mobile. Yet, whereas in Whitehead,
God is ontologically useful and logically necessary, in Aristotle God
is virtually useless and logically misplaced, since he has no function
of concreteness in a world which is dependent on him in at least one
sense. From the side of the world Aristotle isolated God. From the

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7 In the processive view, God is an entity sharing intrinsic rel-
ations with all other actual entities. Primordially he is the source of
every possibility of actual existence and provides the subjective aim of
all entities which is their incentive to spontaneity and freedom. In
his consequent nature he empathizes with and treasures up all value so
that nothing is lost. As an entity he has unique functions but is not
exempted from the general principles governing real existence. (See
Whitehead PR, Part V Chapter 2: D.W. Sherburne, A Key to Whithead's
Process and Reality, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press,
1966, pp. 171-90, 225-27). In Aristotle God is not immanent to the
universe of real existences and so in no way does he become a real element
in the constitution of entities. He merely sets the universe in motion.
He is desired but does not desire its creatures. As Ross points out, the
teleological effect of God on the world is unconscious. (Aristotle,
side of God he discarded the world. His ontological ladder was not
even enough to set them together again. I am not in this essay prepared
to discuss to any extent the notion of God as used in either writer.
Yet, it must be said that in the substantial tradition God has no
intrinsic function in respect of an entity's real constitution. In
the processive view, and as the agency of concretion, he renders
real individuality a possibility.

Second, from the conformal viewpoint, a cause is always external
(never intrinsic) to its effect: and different types of causes (say
efficient and final) are always separated. Here then a becoming
entity can play no part in the composition of its own constitution.
Initiative is always rendered rather than self-engendered. Where
initiative is alien to an entity, it is doubtful that there can be
any true emergence of individuality. This view has tremendous
implication for a view of human individuality.

Third, in a conformal universe, and as Whitehead himself points
out, a subject (or individual) cannot qualify another individual in
the sense of becoming a factor in its 'real internal constitution'.
By contrast, this is indeed the case in processive ontology, and appears
to be the case in human experience. The principle of essence (i.e.
the ontological principle) necessitates relational qualifications as
opposed to merely accidental qualifications. Here then, it must be
seen that the doctrine of substance contravenes the very principle —
the ontological principle — on which it is founded. It is in
reference to the said principle that Whitehead writes:
... It could be termed the 'principle of efficient, and final, causation' ... It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitution' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process.8

The fact of the matter is that all these inadequacies of the substantial viewpoint hinge around the fact that intrinsic process, which constitutes the really real, has been excluded from the being of actuality. Now if we can retain the above features as essential ingredients of process and still account for the fact of endurance, then it may be said that the resultant viewpoint is of wider scope or adequacy. Until then judgement must be reserved.

Section (ii)
Con crescent Individuality

In the former section I have centrally maintained that a static view of reality, for a number of reasons, leads to a conformal view of individuality. Among them is the fact that since an entity is not causa sui it must be regarded as the effect of external causal factors. Again, if in its essential constitution it is not dynamic, then it is difficult to see how it may be a factor leading to essential change in other entities. Also as changeless fact it is impossible to derive from it factors of subjective experience such as are typical of human individuality. We must now see if these difficulties of the conformal view may be resolved from the point of view

8 Whitehead, PR., p. 29
of Whiteheadian ontology. What then is the nature of the concrescent individual? This is the question we now seek to answer.

In contrast to the changeless enduring substance of Aristotle, as we have seen from chapter one, Whitehead views the really real as a unit process of activity. This he calls a concrescence or an actual entity, which is the same thing. He writes:

Concrescence is the name for the process in which the universe of many things acquire an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of the novel 'one'. Each instance of concrescence is itself nothing else than to be one of the 'many' which find their niches the novel individual 'thing' in question... An instance of concrescence is termed an 'actual entity' -- or equivalently, an 'actual occasion'... An actual occasion is nothing but the unity to be ascribed to a particular instance of concrescence.9

Further, it is this unit process of activity, this concrescence, and this actual entity which is considered the primary individual in organic philosophy.10

It must be recalled that the ontological principle ultimately locates every feature of existence and experience in the individual actual entity or in their constituted nexus. And, the principle of relativity (which Whitehead regards as a correlative to the ontological principle) specifies a necessary relation of all factors of existence and experience relative to the constitution of an actual entity or its related nexus.11 Here we are still proceeding generically. Hence the

9 Whitehead, PR., p. 243f.
11 Whitehead, PR., pp. 171-72, 173.
features of stability and process; of cause and effect; of valuation and translation; and of all else, whatever such features may be, must be seen to be a real property and function of the individual ontological fact — i.e. of actual entity. As I have stated in the early section of this chapter, the principle of generic requirement (which performs the same functions as Whitehead's ontological and relativity principles) necessitates that every feature of genetic or derived actuality must, in principle, arise from the real internal constitution of the ontological atoms (actual entities) which constitute them. So then, in every respect, the concrescent individual is already in principle what it will become — no matter what. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that, on the processive view of reality, the only thing that the "real" individual cannot become is "mere non-entity". In the processive universe the concrescent individual is its own limits of determination, but is at the same time determinate possibility for every becoming. From its subjective perspective it is one — a unity uniquely arising out of the many elements which constitute it. But by the same token, from its perspective of objectification, it is many as it becomes objectified data for other novel individuals in their acts of concrescence. Its impact may be minimal, its causal effects may be slight, but its influence is always felt as present fact or as future possibility.

As intimated in chapter one, the nature of the concrescent individual is, in a word, "process". In Modes of Thought Whitehead writes:
Process and individuality require each other. In separation all meaning evaporates. The form of process (or in other words, the appetite) derives its character from the individual involved, and the characters of the individuals can only be understood in terms of the process in which they are implicated. (p. 97)

But it must be clearly stated that Whitehead admits two basic forms of process which are themselves the basis of ontological and derived facts.

There is the process of individual becoming (or concrescence); and there is the process of individual endurance (or transition). He writes:

... There are two species of process, macroscopic process, and microscopic process. The macroscopic process is the transition from attained actuality to actuality in attainment; while the microscopic is the conversion of conditions which are merely real into determinate actuality. The former process effects the transition from the 'actual' to the 'merely real'; and the latter process effects the growth from the real to the actual. The former process is efficient; the latter is teleological. The future is merely real, without being actual; whereas the past is a nexus of actualities. The actualities are constituted by their real genetic phases. The present is the immediacy of teleological process whereby reality becomes actual. The former process provides the conditions which really govern attainment; whereas the latter process provides the ends actually attained. The notion of 'organism' is combined with that of 'process' in a twofold manner. The community of actual things is an organism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompletion in process of production. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the first meaning of 'process'; and the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of 'organism'. In this sense organism is a nexus.

Secondly, each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm. It is a process proceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the real basis from which its successor proceeds towards the completion of the thing in question. Each actual entity bears in its constitution the 'reason' why its conditions are what they are. These 'reasons' are the other actual entities objectified for it. ¹²

What is most significant at this time is the fact that he stipulates two primary types of process: "The macroscopic process is the transition from attained actuality to actuality in attainment; while the microscopic process is the conversion of conditions which are merely real into determinate actuality" — into a determinate fully concresced individual. The latter form of process I will designate primary and former co-primary. These synonymous usages must be seen as equivalents of Whitehead's use of concrescence and transition. 13

First or primary 'process' or 'fluency' is what Whitehead calls concrescence, it is the reason or "real internal constitution" of an entity. It "is the name for the process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relagation of each item of the 'many' to the subordination in the constitution of the novel 'one'". 14 Concrescence constitutes, in its most general

13 The terms "generic process" and "genetic process" may very well be used to refer to "concrescence" and "transition" respectively, but I must avoid a possible confusion since Whitehead refers to the internal functions of an actual entity as genetic. (See PR., pp. 258 and 333). My original distinction between generic (for ultimate ontological features) and genetic (for derived and existent features) still holds throughout this essay.

Primary and Co-Primary Process: This distinction is synonymous to Whitehead's distinction between concrescence and transition. Both forms of process are primary in that reality, as we experience it, is always constituted by both these forms of process. The distinction is therefore a distinction of reason only; and is suggestive of the fact that the generic or primary form of process is atomic and elemental with respect to the constitution of co-primary process. The presence of the one therefore entails certain forms of reciprocal relationships to the other. And to speak of co-primary or derived reality without recognition of primary reality is mere abstractionism.

14 Whitehead, PR., p. 243.
form, what Whitehead means by 'thing' or 'entity' — or, what is the same, an individual. A concrescence is the same as 'the novel thing'. It is what constitutes actuality — "Actuality means nothing else than this ultimate entry into the concrete, in abstraction from which there is mere nonentity . . . . an instance of concrescence is termed an 'actual entity' — or, equivalently, an 'actual occasion'."15

A concrescence is then "the name for the process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of the novel 'one'."16 This "growing together" in real "concrete" unity is the true meaning of individuality on the processive viewpoint. We must now look briefly at the factors of concrescence and some of the principles governing its constitution.

In a concrescence what we have is a phasal development of an individual which does not occur in a time space context, i.e. in the usual sense of time and space.17

15 Whitehead, PR, p. 244.
16 Ibid., p. 243.
The ingredients of this development are: (1) actual occasions; (2) eternal objects; (3) the concrescing entity's own subjective forms of intensity. All these factors coalesce in terms of a subjective aim and are all forms of feelings (in the special sense of this term as used by Whitehead)\textsuperscript{18} — "We thus say that an actual occasion is a concrescence effected by a process of feelings."

A concrescence is really an intrinsic process of valuation characterized by unity, harmony and intensity, among other 'obligatory' features, in short, it is individual. Integration is a prime requisite of such an individual and must induce a "concrete unity of feeling" which often leads to "wider generalities of integral feeling". All integrations involve feelings of identity and contrast as well as feelings of

\textsuperscript{18} Note on Feeling: Whitehead's use of the notion of feeling is akin to Bradley's and James' usages. It is meant to convey the very originary content of experience in terms of which all structures of awareness do arise. A feeling (or prehension) may be positive or negative and goes beyond mere emotion. It is somewhat tri-modal having a datum (which is always present to a subject); a subjective form (in terms of which it is a constitutive feature of the subject); and a subject who is the locus of the influence of the prehension or feeling. (See Al., pp. 130-33; MT., p. 23; PR., pp. vii, 28, 54, 103, 106, 190, 256-326). Feelings are essentially vectors translating their store of subjective content to the future entities of their route. The nature of feelings denies the phenomena of passive and vacuous existence.

It should be noted that in Whitehead feelings (cf positive prehension) are both physical and mental. Physical feelings are essentially simple and conformal in nature. Mental or conceptual feelings arise mainly as a result of physical feelings. Both types are in some sense primary, but the latter is refined and capable of a degree of complexity not to be found in respect of the former. It is with conceptual or mental feelings that essential novelty arises in the essential constitution of an entity. (See references in PR., pp. 28, 54, 103, 105, 106, 178, 190-91, 205, 216, 218, 256-326: also p. 47 of this essay).
adversion and aversion. Nor may they omit an element of spontaneous, novelty, autonomy and purpose. 19

Let us elaborate a bit. The phases of concrescence are of two types: (1) initial or conformal, and (2) subsequent or supplemental. The phases of this ontological fact do not necessarily occur in a sequence of before and after; rather they occur as an 'epochal' whole — they are, so to speak, co-instanced events occurring in simultaneous moments and with inherent unity. To refer the distinction of earlier/later, or of before/after to concrescence is but a manner of speaking. In the initial phase the subject or concrescent individual is the locus of simple physical (or conformal) feelings which are mere causal influences from objectified entities passed on into a new becoming. This phase tends to conform to its data. The conceptual phase arises as a result of the conformal. If the conformal phase was one of mere receptivity, the conceptual phase is one of determinate selectivity and valuation. Eternal objects are ingressed as patterns of definiteness and determination, and in keeping with the subjective aim of the concrescing entity conformal feelings may be apprehended positively or negatively for development into more complex feelings of valuation with greater or lesser degree of relevance and intensity as far as the subjective-immediacy of the entity goes. In the later supplemental phases conceptual feelings may give rise to simple comparative and

complex comparative feelings. At such a time the capacity of the entity increases in complexity and more complex generic features are developed or extended — e.g. purpose and consciousness.

Now in organic philosophy, and in respect of the becoming of an individual there are a number of obligatory conditions which are intrinsic demands of concrescence. These are listed as Categories of Obligation in *Process and Reality* (pp. 31-33). We must understand that these are not merely logically prescribed conditions of becoming, but rather the 'real' (i.e. ontological) conditions of 'being'. They are the inherent principles of the really real. I will now specify three of these which are central to the purpose of this essay. A fourth will be discussed in the next section.

First, according to the Category of Subjective Unity "The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though un-integrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject."

Second, according to the Category of Subjective Harmony "The valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined by the adaptation of those feelings to be contrasted elements congruent with the subjective aim." These two conditions are those by which all ideas of pre-established harmony, as they pertain to the becoming of individuality, arise. The former deals mostly with data felt, while the latter deals mainly with the subjective forms of conceptual

20 cf. Leibniz's view, **Al.**, p. 33.
feelings. As Whitehead puts it — "This pre-established harmony is an outcome of the fact that no prehension can be considered in abstraction from its subject, although it originates in the process creative of its subject". 21

Third, the Category of Subjective Intensity states that "The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (A) in the immediate subject, and (B) in the relevant future." One should note that in respect of a given entity immediacy of feeling is not at all divorced from anticipated or future enjoyment. It is in respect of this that Whitehead writes — "The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the future." 22

I am not here concerned with the more complex and extensive elaborations arising out of these principles, but wish simply to state that the features of unity, harmony and intensity are intrinsic elements of concrescence. And, as such they are inner moments of genuine individuality whether at the generic or derived level of reality. For Whitehead, and in the most profound meaning of the term, nothing is a subject (as individual) which does not in some degree exhibit these principles of subjective immediacy. As said earlier, in respect of the first categorial features mentioned, each of these principles of being is coherently related to the others and cannot be a true function of individuality if all relevant principles are not

21 Whitehead, PR., p. 32
22 Ibid., p. 32
in some way a present factor of subjective immediacy.

It must now be made indisputably clear that, for Whitehead, every act of process (or concrescence) is an act of valuation aimed at the realization of value — "... 'Value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event." Valuations which are conceptual in nature (reality is bipolar — physical and conceptual) arise as subjective froms and are either valuation up (adversion) or valuation down (aversion). In either case they are functions toward unity, harmony and intensity and ensure the importance of their data (eternal objects) in immediate experience and in the relevant future.

All the intermediate phases of self-formation are "a ferment of valuation". It is in respect of valuation that the subjective aim of an entity receives those forms of definiteness which will enhance its own composition and, as a superject, makes it capable of translating a definite value. Valuations are both qualitative and intensive. They constitute the key mechanism of selectivity in individual becoming. All prehension and valuation, in accordance with the subjective aim of an entity, aim at satisfaction. This is the same as saying that every

23 Whitehead, SHW., p. 93


becoming is self-fulfilling. Satisfaction is that final function of becoming in terms of which an entity gives a reason for what it becomes and becomes a constituent reason in the becoming of others. It is the correlative of decision and objectification — the former signifies the terminus of individuality at its final phase of subjective enjoyment; the latter signifies the function by which individuality yields to the demands of the creative advance. In a manner of speaking, process, individuality and valuation are the three significant elements of real existence.

Now a concrescent individual develops spontaneously. All becomings are results of past causal factors, but these environmental conditionings are essentially physical and are usually transformed in the light of the conceptual functions of the entity's subjective aim — "The 'subjective aim', which controls the becoming of a subject, is the subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form of purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation." The aim is the mechanism of self-creation arising as a result of the advance of the creative urge. It is also the function by which an entity becomes the product of its own envisagement and remains autonomous and free. For Whitehead spontaneity, autonomy and freedom arise from each other.


28 See Whitehead's theory of propositions (PR., Part II: 9 and III: 4). A discussion of this notion is not important to the focus of my essay.

29 PR., p.30, Cat. Expl. XVIII; see also Section III, Chap. 1:v, and 3:i.
A concrescent individual is therefore always internally free despite circumstantial determination.

Before passing to consider the general scope of the concrescent view of reality we must take note of one other factor of a concrescence — that of its vector character. The theory of prehension shows that a concrescence is conditioned by the immortalized or objectified data which constitute its past. Prehensions we know are essentially feelings (in Whitehead's sense of the term). Now in the initial or primary phases these feelings are conformal in nature — i.e. they re-enact and transmit what a dying entity is and make it the property of its successor. Whitehead writes — "Feelings are 'vectors' they feel what is there and transform it into what is here."\(^{30}\) The general notion of vector transmission or vector inheritance is fundamental to organic philosophy.\(^{31}\) As we will see more fully in the next section it is in terms of this vector feature of reality that the identity and endurance of the individual are attained.

It remains for me to show how concrescent individuality may be regarded as a more adequate basis on which to construct a theory of human individuality. This must be done in the light of the general thesis I am arguing — that substantial individuality as a metaphysical point of view is an inadequate basis for a theory of human individuality, since it tends to neglect the factors of process and

\(^{30}\)Whitehead, PR., p. 105.

\(^{31}\)Ibid., p. 372.
value as inherent features of real individuality. Let us recall the
stated points of inadequacy with regard to the conformal viewpoint
and briefly see how the processive view meets these difficulties.

First, unlike the substantive viewpoint, process and not
endurance is the essential fact of real individuality. An entity is
always constituted by process and is always situated in a changing
context. Its intrinsic factor of process (its concrescence) is never
dominated by any factor external to itself, although it is directly
related to all causal occurrences which constitute the 'route' of its
own being. It is sui generis and causa sui, and so the function of God
in this pluralistic universe is neither that of creator nor first
cause: neither is he an entity of mere transcendence. God is an actual
entity and functions in respect of all the principles of subjectivity
as all else. This does not deny that on the scale of relevance he
fulfills a number of functions and at a magnitude transcending that of
other entities. As the principle of concretion he is immanent to all
entities, and as the realm of ideals he is primordially what actual
occasions choose to become. The nature and function of God in organic
philosophy have implications for man's being as a creative and moral
individual. (Because God is what he is, actual entities are what they
are. See note on p. 39-40).

Second, there are no causes which are merely external to the
concrescent individual: neither is its efficient cause divorced from
its final cause. In reference to Aristotle Whitehead writes:
His philosophy led to the wild overstressing of the notion of final causes during the Christian middle ages; and thence, by reaction, to the correlative overstressing of the notion of 'efficient causes' during the modern scientific period. One task of sound metaphysics is to exhibit final and efficient causes in their proper relation to each other.\textsuperscript{32}

Causation is a real and dynamic factor of concrescence; and its efficient causal features are expressed in terms of the prehension of simple physical feelings; while its final causal features are expressed in terms of its subjective aim. On this view, an entity is never merely an object. It is never merely the result of a dead past. As such it retains initiative as it selects and re-enacts the data of dying entities and the patterns of determination which it fashions into novel immediacy. In this universe the domination of a subject (or individual) can never be complete.

Third, the processive view inverts the doctrine at yet another point. It emphasizes relational above predicative qualifications — "... 'relatedness' is dominant over 'quality'. All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living ..."\textsuperscript{33} Objects (or entities) qualify each other in terms of the doctrine of prehension. And, all qualifications enter into the real constitution of the entity in question — "... It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity.

\textsuperscript{32}Whitehead, PR., p. 101.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. viii.
in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitution' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process. The implication of this fact for a theory of human reality emphasizes not only the essential relatedness of the individual and his environment, but also the feature of solidarity expressed by the terms nexus and experiential togetherness. This goes beyond the substantial view where a community and individual conform rather than inhere.

Now these points which I have emphasized by way of contrast are more easily established and maintained on the basis of process ontology than on that of substance ontology. The key to the issue is one of emphasis — in this case an emphasis on process. To develop a theory of human individuality we need an ontology which is essentially dynamic. One that will allow us to explain adequately not only the changes of bodily development, but also the enduring features of personal identity. The essence of human maturity is change as growth, and the essence of identity is value. But we must wait until section three to see how well the principles of Whitehead's ontology allow us to justify this statement. It must now suffice as a claim to greater generic scope or adequacy to say that the general theory of concrescence — as process, individuation and valuation — affords us a possible basis for a theory of human individuality. There are still some key problems to be spelled out and it is to these that we will turn in Part Two.

34 Whitehead, PR, p. 29.
35 cf., pp. 38-41.
Part Two

PROBLEMATIC
PROBLEMS OF INDIVIDUALITY

In the previous section — Systematic — I have given general consideration to the notion of actual entity and the notion of substance. I have shown that some basic features of the latter view are in conflict with the basic assumptions of the processive view of reality. Further, I have given consideration to the fact of individuality on both the substantive and processive viewpoints; and have shown that, for a number of reasons, the former leads to a conformal (in the special sense in which I have employed the term) view of individuality, which is inadequate when considered as a basis for a theory of human individuality. On the contrary, the processive view of reality leads to a concrecent view of individuality, which lends itself to a more adequate exemplification of those stated features of individuality necessary for an explanation of human individuality.

In the present section I will propose three problems — problems of individuality as I like to call them — and will endeavour to resolve their central paradoxical features in a manner consistent with the Whiteheadian view of reality. These problems, it should be noted, bring to the fore some fundamental features of human individuality and experience. The discussion of these problems will also effect the necessary transition from generic to genetic reality; and will establish the need for the consideration of value (or valuation) in the proposals of a theory of human individuality. The three problems, it will be seen,
pick up some focal aspects of our discussion on substance and also indicate how posterity perpetrated some of the erroneous aspects of Aristotle's doctrine of substance; or else interpreted the doctrine in a mistaken manner.

Section (i)
The Problem of Becoming and Endurance

The first problem to be considered is the problem of becoming and endurance. Although this and the other problems which follow are basic metaphysical problems, they will quite readily be seen to be related to or as underlying the fact of human individuality. How then may an entity be seen to exhibit the facts of change and endurance? This is the problem, as mentioned in chapter one, which Descartes attempted to resolve. Descartes, it must be recalled, was influenced by the substance tradition and was seeking a way out of the dilemma of changeless endurance -- i.e. if we regard substance as changing then it does not endure; and if it endures then it does not change. But when we view this matter in the light of the human fact (individual) we have an entity which both becomes and endures. This derived (genetic) feature of human experience must therefore be accounted for generically.

Let me now quote the extended form of the passage from the Meditations earlier cited:

And though I were to suppose that I always was as I now am, I should not, on this ground, escape the force of these reasonings, since it would not follow, even on this supposition, that no author of my existence needed to be sought after. For the whole time of my life may be divided into an infinity of parts, each of which is in no way dependent on any other; and,
accordingly, because I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless in this moment some cause create me anew as it were, that is, conserve me. In truth, it is perfectly clear and evident to all who will attentively consider the nature of duration, that the conservation of a substance, in each moment of its duration, requires the same power and act that would be necessary to create it, supposing it were not yet in existence; so that it is manifestly a dictate of the natural light that conservation and creation differ merely in respect of our mode of thinking [and not in reality].

What we seem to have here is an enduring fact, the atoms of which do not endure in the sense of timeless endurance, but which endures change in the sense that its atoms episodically become and perish. There is thus a renewal of the 'individual' part by which the 'whole' is made to endure — "... consider the nature of duration, that the conservation of a substance, in each moment of its duration, requires the same power and act that would be necessary to create it, supposing it were not yet in existence; ...".

What is commendable on this view is that process and activity are recognized as necessary factors of becoming and endurance. But as soon as this is said a number of difficulties ensue. First the Cartesian doctrine of substance, as may readily be seen from the Meditations, require a "fiat" (God) as its creator and conservator. Second, in view of the former observation, Cartesian substance (excluding God) is not causa sui. But where activity is not autonomously educed by reality

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itself, we are obliged in virtue of our former discussions to reject it as conformative. Third, overlooking for the moment the conformative nature of Cartesian reality, let us focus specifically on his account of endurance.

For Descartes what is called substance and endures from moment to moment is not the same—"... the conservation of a substance, in each moment of its duration, requires the same power and act that would be necessary to creat it...". The atomicity of reality is for Descartes a fact, but he appears wrongly to have assumed the independent and self-sufficient nature of the atoms—"For the whole time of my life may be divided into an infinity of parts, each of which is in no way dependent on any other; and, accordingly, because I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless in this moment some cause create me anew as it were, that is conserve me". ² There seems to be two alternatives of interpretation: (1) that a substance comes to be and is continually maintained, as a composite of atomic entities from moment to moment, but without the renewal of its parts; (2) that a substance comes to be and is continually maintained as a composite atomic entity from moment to moment, but with momentary renewal of its parts. On the former alternative the parts would have continued existence and so would the whole. On the latter alternative the whole would have continued existence despite the momentary nature of its parts.

²Veitch, NSPD., p. 246.
Now on either alternative God is the initiator of activity—whether in creation or in conservation. But alternative (1) must be rejected outrightly since (a) it tends to make an entity a true continuant which can only be the case with God; (b) it is generally inconsistent with the Cartesian view of time. Smith writes:

... Descartes... is here committing himself to yet another thesis, viz. that time is composed of durationless instants. To allow for the continuity of time in a manner in which he allows of continuity in respect of space would have meant his admitting that the endurance of bodies is a self-continuing mode of existence, and this is precisely what he is compelled to deny. Should a body be allowed as self-continuing for even the shortest conceivable duration, there would be no reason for challenging its power of continuing for a longer period...

We are now left with alternative (2) which may be brought in line with the introduction to the problem of duration in chapter one. There duration was conceived to be other than "self-identical persistence of actuality" since each instantaneously created entity is "numerically distinct" from those occurring in its "route of succession". And, the Cartesian discussion itself emphasizes the momentary nature of existence—"my life may be divided into an infinity of parts; each of which is in no way dependent on any other; ...". On the view of instantaneous

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creation (or what is the same for Descartes, momentary conservativeness) there is no ground of contending for continued existence except by caprice of divine act or chance occurrence and the former is as unacceptable on the processive view as the latter is to Descartes.

Now the fact of numerical distinctness renders endurance somewhat impossible. And, identity can never be numerical identity. (We earlier rejected Aristotle's idea of substance being numerically one and the same though admissive of contraries). The fact of oneness (or sameness) for Descartes must therefore by explained as essential identity and not as numerical identity, (except of course by way of illegitimate abstraction of which Leclerc contends that Descartes is guilty). The real problem here is that the Cartesian elements are not causa sui, neither does he give us any real explanation of an intrinsic function by which his atoms may continue to be essentially the same. One must therefore attribute to him what may here be called the "fallacy of conformity" (see my definition of the term in chapter three). It is simply this, his atoms must be seen to have a fixed and given essence in virtue of which essential identity is achieved and maintained. It may have been with similar thought in mind that Smith wrote:

The instants at which creaturely beings exist must be non-continuous, atomic; it is God's active, ever-present agency which is alone continuous and abiding; and in so far as the creaturely seems to be, what yet it is not, self-maintaining,

Veitch, MNPDR, p. 246.

continuously enduring, it is so solely because of its mirroring, or rather seeming to mirror, characters which in their proper nature belong exclusively to its Creative Source. 8

However one may recognize the function of seriality of atomic existence in Cartesian metaphysics, it certainly is not a seriality arising out of the spontaneous and intrinsic relation of atoms. Without God, his world (and the self) is one of mere resemblance and continuous qualifications.

It may now be said that Descartes rightly conceived the necessity of activity in respect of being and becoming. He also quite rightly distinguished between the two forms of activity or process — creation and conservation (or endurance). But his insight did not go far enough to characterize the real nature of the facts he recognized to be the case. 9 The few points of the Cartesian analysis which one wishes to view in the light of organic philosophy may be quite simply dealt with.

Now, in the last chapter we saw that Whitehead recognizes two forms of process — concrescence (primary) and transition (co-primary) — as Descartes did. And, by these, also like Descartes, he demonstrates


9 An implication of the argument so far, and which is quite definitely the case in the Third Meditation, is that Descartes, using human experience as the ground of appeal and verification in respect of real existence, brings the res cogitans in line with res extensa by making his view of time to conform to his conception of space. This I suppose is the result of imposing the principles of his geometry and physics upon human reality. (See N.K. Smith's discussion as earlier cited: also Whitehead, MT, pp. 88-89.)

The problem remains, however, that time tends to be discontinuous while space is continuous. The res cogitans appears to share the atomic or discontinuous nature of time, but not the continuous nature of space. More seriously Descartes seems to have no conception of time as lived existence. This would require both a continuous and an atomic sense of time — i.e. a doctrine of essential relatedness between time and space.
both the fact of becoming and endurance. Unlike Descartes, however, he mitigates the difficulties of the dilemma. Descartes' treatment of endurance may be considered superficial and misleading.\textsuperscript{10} First, Whitehead's actual entities (including God) are \textit{causa sui}. All real atoms of existence are spontaneously generated according to the doctrine of subjective aim as previously discussed. On this account there is no imposition of a \textit{prima causa}, nor is there an over-stress on efficient causation.\textsuperscript{11} God is simply another agency of the creative process from which emergent entities derive their subjective aim and certain other data of definiteness.

Second, in respect of a given actuality, the Whiteheadian doctrines ofprehension and vector influence allow one to account for becoming and endurance (perdurance) of genetic or derived individuality although the ontological individuals (as in Descartes) are perpetually perishing. On this view of reality every existent thing is maintained as objective fact (enduring object) because the atoms (actual entities) which constituted its immediate past transmit, like vectors a sufficient store of conformal influences by which the new object of this moment may be recognized to be the 'same' (only in a special sense) as the object of its immediate past.

\textsuperscript{10}Whitehead, \textit{PR.}, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{11}"Newton was certainly right to this extent, that the whole doctrine of Imposition is without interest apart from the correlative doctrine of a transcendant imposing Deity. This is also a Cartesian doctrine.

The doctrine of Imposition very naturally follows from Descartes' notion of 'substance'. Indeed the phrase 'requiring nothing but itself in order to exist' occurs in his \textit{Principles of Philosophy}." (Whitehead, \textit{AI.}, pp. 113-14.)
For Whitehead the fact of endurance, as we have described it, is its own reason for becoming as well as for being what it is.

Third, for Whitehead, unlike Descartes, there are no causes of a process which are merely extrinsic to it — a prehension, even of extension, acquires subjective form. Both the principle of reality and the ontological principle render all the ingredient elements of real process intrinsic. The atoms by which the individual endures necessitate no "power" external to themselves — they simply come to be. Descartes thus failed to profit from his own insights viz. (1) that without process there is no existence; (2) that the process of endurance is reciprocal with the process of becoming. They are co-primary events requiring each other.

Now if one briefly extrapolates from the above discussion to the fact of human individuality the following points may be said to follow.

(1) There are two main forms of process underlying the existence of the human individual — concrescence and transition;
(2) Since there is but one genus of actual entity, or atom, both the physiogenic and psychogenic aspects of human individuality are explainable on the same views of process; the radical distinction between res extensa and res cogitans is rendered obsolete;
(3) The reality of the endurance of the human individual is a fact not a fiction;
(4) Becoming is discontinuous but there is continuity of being (in a derived sense); 13

(5) That there are both causally efficient and spontaneous factors present in individuality — these however are the results of coalescence never a mere imposition;

(6) The human individual, in some sense, is its own reason of becoming and for being what it is;

(7) Individuality and process require each other. 14

Section (ii)

The Problem of Continuance Identity

Our second problem arises from the Humean dilemma and may be called the problem of identity and self-awareness. It states simply that for any given moment our faculty of perception affords us only a discrete sensum (particular perception) of which we are aware. But we do not perceive "real" connections or relations fusing these sensa. Accordingly our notion of a self is at best additive and conjunctive — it can never be continuous. The problem may be alternatively stated: clarity of real perception is essentially momentary, but the relations between perceptions are never perceived; therefore there can be no clear conception of continuing identity.

13 Whitehead, PR., pp. 41, 85.
14 Whitehead, MT., pp. 96-99.
Hume, we know, follows Descartes and Locke in focussing on the clear and discrete ideas and impressions as the basis of understanding and knowledge (this is a consequence of the subject/predicate way of thinking). But, unlike Descartes, the appeal can only be to experience and never to anything else. The general principles deriving from the perception of discrete sensa for Hume pertains to all objects — whether a mere body, a plant or a 'self'. He introduces the problem as follows:

There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on 'self' either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be deriv'd from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there any thing of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.

Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of 'self', after the manner it is here explain'd. For from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd?¹⁵

For Hume all ideas of self or objects must be derived from impressions:

It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression

constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea.\textsuperscript{16}

Like Locke, Hume had rejected the notion of substance — as an essential substratum underlying every existent.\textsuperscript{17} There could therefore be no enduring factor called a self which may be said to underly our episodic existence. Immediate impressions are what they are and nothing else.

He writes:

\ldots particular perceptions \ldots All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider'd, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 'myself', I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 'myself' at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.\textsuperscript{18}

Now Hume arguing from his doctrine of causality maintains that there are no real relations between things or events. By this doctrine relations are essentially external or merely conjunctive. There are then only the factors of causation and resemblance\textsuperscript{19} by which one may

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Hume, \textit{ECHU}, pp. 256-57.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Whitehead shows that Hume's rejection of the notion of substance left his acceptance of the subject-predicate way of thinking built on that doctrine intact. (\textit{PR}, p. 160.)
\item \textsuperscript{18} Hume, \textit{ECHU}, p. 257.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Hume, \textit{ECHU}, p. 267.
\end{footnotes}
assume a continuity of identity. It should be noted that causation and
resemblance are, for Hume, mere functions of imagination (practice,
custom, habit of mind) by which we are misled to assume an enduring self.
He sees clearly that even these are of no effect if the mind did not
exhibit the function of memory. But, with typical Humean candor he
side steps the real issue. Rather than using memory as a legitimate and
real basis of explaining enduring identity he uses it to explain away
the fact. He writes:

... Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still
connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our
identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate
that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant
perceptions influence each other, and by giving a present
concern for our past or future pains or pleasures.

As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent
of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd upon
that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had
we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor
consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute
our self or person. But having once acquir'd this notion of
causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes,
and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory,
and can comprehend times, and circumstances and actions, which
we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed.

Now in the philosophy of organism no real existent can be the mere
construct of capricious sensa however clear and contiguous these may
appear to be. The doctrine of prehension radically transforms Hume's
doctrine of causation; and in so doing renders the "relations", which
Hume would discard, as real and essential. Let us proceed by stages.

First, as Whitehead himself points out, Hume commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness by assuming that what is clear and distinct is real; while what is vague is unreal.\textsuperscript{22} Whitehead's theory of perception which arises out of the theory of prehension stipulates three primary perceptive modes which are essentially related.\textsuperscript{23} These are causal efficacy, presentational immediacy and symbolic reference. Now the latter is a mixture of the former two and is the normal mode of perception common to everyday experience. Causal efficacy (or prehension) "is the primitive ubiquitous feature of all reality . . . It is the basic mode of inheritance of feeling from past data, and the feelings it transmits are vague, massive, inarticulate, and felt as the efficaciousness of the past".\textsuperscript{24} This is what Whitehead calls "crude" perception and is correlative with the conformal feelings of becoming. In contrast, presentational immediacy which is the refined product of the later phases of concrescence is "articulate, sharp, and sophisticated, but lacks the massiveness and power of causal efficacy".\textsuperscript{25} This is the accustomed mode of our discrete percepts, and is the objectification not of the past but of the contemporary regions of existence which are usually cast in

\textsuperscript{22}See Whitehead, PR., pp. 98-99, 104-05, 133-36, 138-40, 144-46: See also the notion of Matter-of-fact in Modes of Thought pp. 6-11, 77, 83-84.

\textsuperscript{23}See Sherburne's explication in KUPR., pp. 98-125.

\textsuperscript{24}Sherburne, KUPR., p. 99.

\textsuperscript{25}Sherburne, KUPR., p. 99.
geometrical or extensive relationship. It appears to be the dominant mode of perception in human experience (i.e. as comparative or intellectual feelings).

Whitehead's contention is that Hume's analysis of perception (and by implication the self) was conducted merely in the mode of presentational immediacy, and was therefore faulty as it was limited. Hume in focussing on discrete sensa was therefore regarding the part for the whole, in respect of experience. He was emphasizing the facts of presentational immediacy to the exclusion of causal efficacy. 26

Second, if the doctrine of perception is extended along the line suggested by Whitehead, then it must be granted that we not only perceive the immediately causal elements in our present existence, but the notion of "vector inheritance" (as already explained) indicates a somewhat definite route by which our present moment of existence is derived from antecedent occasions and is (in a legitimate manner of speaking) one with them. The fact of endurance as discussed in respect of Descartes is also relevant to this discussion.

Third, in the doctrine of prehension some factors present in antecedent events are efficaciously transmitted to the succeeding events of the same route. If one factor be 'the awareness of this self', then by the same doctrine we may legitimately assume a transmission of identity factors as well as the awareness of the factors' continuing identity.

Fourth, it may be categorically stated that, contrary to Hume's view, the self is not a fiction of the imagination, but a real fact of memory. If he was able to conceive of memory as a store of all past events of the self now existing in real coalescence, Hume may have argued differently. He overlooked the importance of two of his own expressions in the Enquiry (pp. 269 and 270). In the first he states:

... And in this view an identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making of our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures. [Emphasis mine]

Again:

'Twill be incumbent on those, who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory. [Emphasis mine]

In the first passage Hume uses the term 'influence' — "... by the making of our distant perceptions influence each other...". The term 'influence' which is here causally passed over by Hume, when interpreted as vectors in the theory of prehension, becomes a symbol of real connections — the very thing Hume fails to find in human experience.

In the second passage Hume poses a challenge to those who would build a theory of identity on memory alone. Now this challenge is also easily answered by the principle of vector inheritance — whether it be in respect of conscious memory or not. The doctrine of prehension and its correlative theory of vector influence offer a basis of explanation for the fact of personal identity beyond the mere capacity of conscious memory.
We argue against Hume's disjunctive conception of the self since it affords no adequate basis for (1) a theory of integrated personality; (2) a theory of blame and praise — in short, responsibility. As mentioned earlier, Hume rejected the notion of substance and more than Locke he saw the need for process with respect to the human mind. However, close examination of his language in the Enquiry (see the section on Personal Identity) will show that his thinking was still bound in the logical tradition of substance ontology. Were this not the case he may have seen "relations" as processive and real, rather than as static, qualitative and conjunctive. As with the view of the concrescent individual earlier discussed, the self of the processive view is a fact which persists by virtue of its features of intrinsic process. And where according to the principles of concrescence, conscious self-awareness is a real feature of a fact in its earlier phases of existence, it must continue to be so in the later phase of that existence unless a subject takes its demise. The feelings of present awareness (discrete sensa) are not divorced from the feelings of past awareness (memories, influences, etc.). The former arise out of the latter and the relations between the two types of feelings, though vague, are real. It is the business of philosophy to explain them and not to explain them away.

The following points follow from our discussion:

(1) a view of the self as based on discrete sensa is inadequate if not impossible;

(2) self-awareness and personal identity reaches back into the efficacious past — and we may add (by the same theory of prehension) forward into the possible future;
(3) experience is more than conscious experiencing (or awareness), for Whitehead it entails what may be called a historic sense of being;
(4) we are aware (to greater or lesser extent) of past causal influences which function in present experiences;
(5) memory is a crucial factor of personal identity, but by itself does not constitute a sufficient and necessary condition of that fact. One cannot here extend the discussion of these points, but if it be granted that the Humean analysis of personal (self-) identity is sensationalist and phenomenalist, then we may accept Whitehead's general contention against Hume — that while his assumptions are based on experience and appeal to experience, they do not go far enough in the analysis of Experience. It is impossible to establish self-identity on the mere data of the discrete elements of consciousness while rejecting the vaguer, richer and more concrete factors which underlie them.  

27 Hume, regarding the self, had pushed Locke's argument to its logical conclusion. Locke by his first theory of ideas (or analysis of substance) found qualities without an underlying substratum. Hume found repeated impressions of existence without the basis of a continuing existent self. Both writers failed to profit from their insights that ideas and impressions occur with a "power" or "force" in virtue of which they are intrinsically and dynamically related. To develop such a view is to see that ideas and impressions entail their own forms of real connections and constitute their own means of endurance whether as substantial form or as personal identity. This is in principle the line of thinking which is developed in the theory of prehension.
Section (iii)
The Value-Fact or Mind-Body Problem

The third problem of individuality arises out of the general viewpoint of the sciences in so far as they have followed too closely the more vulgar interpretation of their Baconian heritage. Bacon had propounded a method of induction which was later to be proven as unsophisticated as it was inadequate. In so doing he rejected all considerations of final and formal causation in preference for those of efficient and material causation. He emphasized a strict empirical approach to knowledge, excluding the speculative (in a Whiteheadian sense) enterprise utterly. He restricted the scope of hypothesizing to suit his rabid empiricism and emphasized man's domination of nature (as understood materially and efficiently).

In Descartes and the classical empiricists (Locke, Hume) great emphasis was laid on primary qualities (the so-called objective content) and a consequent de-emphasis on secondary qualities (the so-called subjective content.) This led to a general acceptance of primary qualities as the factual data by which nature may be analyzed. (Analysis is here synonymous with quantifiability and measurability.) Hence Newton's conception of a nature fixed in its parts and in which all actualities (mind, objects, time, space) were considered simply located and in conjunctive relations whereby they constituted the solidarity of the universe. 28 His scientific cosmology was cast

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28 Whitehead, PR., Part II, Chapters 2 and 3, Sections iii, iv.
essentially in geometrical terms and so relationships between actualities were still of the substance-quality type found in Aristotelian ontology. The general consequence of all this was to deny the scope of metaphysics (in the Whiteheadian sense) and to give rise to a materialistic science, the premises of which were to become the basis of a kindred philosophy.

In Whitehead’s way of speaking, what resulted was the disjunction of reality into the World of Fact and the World of Value. (See Interpretation of Science, article on "Immortality"). Or, as he phrases it in Modes of Thought — Matter-of-Fact and Matter-of-Importance. The general focus of science and philosophy on the quantifiable aspects of nature, which are analysable in terms of primary qualities, and the general neglect of the non-quantifiable aspects (secondary qualities) led to the exclusion of man (and his mind and values) from the field of systematic attention. Our problem specifically stated is this — the mind-body or fact-value distinction is an arbitrary disjunction of reality. My specific concern with the problem, at this time, extends only to its implications for the view of 'aesthetic' individuality to be developed in part three, (and as an elucidation of the Cartesian and Humean problems as discussed).

Although Dewey’s view of experience differs from Whitehead’s, he argues just as strongly against the fact-value/mind-body disjunction. He sees human experience (including its conscious mental activities) as continuous with nature: and distinguishes three realms of nature (physical, psycho-physical and mental/human which are in real interaction with each other. The difference between these is one of complexity and intimacy of interacting events — both within and between the
respective realms. To emphasize the one realm or the qualitative features resulting from it to the general exclusion of the others and their qualitative features, except for specific and limited purposes is illegitimate. He writes:

... The idea that matter, life and mind represent separate kinds of Being is a doctrine that springs, as so many philosophic errors have sprung, from a substantiation of eventual functions. The fallacy converts consequences of interaction of events into causes of the occurrence of these consequences -- a reduplication which is significant as to the importance of the functions, but which hopelessly confuses understanding of them. ... 29

Elsewhere in his discussion, Dewey rightly recognizes that when so-called objective facts (such as this field, this horse this man) -- as constituted by so-called objective qualities -- are factors of an event (a 'situation' as he calls it), then the so-called subjective qualities (greeness-of-field, brownness-of-horse, etc.) are all real features of that situation. It is these qualitative dimensions which lend real tonal effects to events and are as significant as any other depending on the perspective of interpretation. I am here arguing that the so-called subjective features are efficacious and are therefore real relations fusing the interacting facts (objects) of nature including the human body and mind. He writes:

All this in effect is equivalent to seizing upon relations of events as the proper objects of knowledge. The surrender of immediate qualities, sensory and significant, as objects of science, and as proper forms of classification and understanding,

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left in reality these immediate qualities just as they were; since they are 'had' there is no need to 'know' them. But, as we have had frequent occasion to notice, the traditional view that the object of knowledge is reality par excellence led to the conclusion that the proper object of science was pre-eminently metaphysically real. Hence immediate qualities, being extruded from the object of science, were left thereby hanging loose from the "real" object. Since their 'existence' could not be denied, they were gathered together into a psychic realm of being, set over against the object of physics. Given this premise, all the problems regarding the relation of mind and matter, the psychic and the bodily necessarily follow. Change the metaphysical premise: restore, that is to say, immediate qualities to their rightful position as qualities of inclusive situations, and the problems in question cease to be epistemological problems. They become specifiable scientific problems: questions, that is to say, of how such and such an event having such and such qualities actually occurs. 30

The human entity — called a self — is not a fact of nature plus a mental fact. It is a 'human' fact constituted by the interaction of different types of natural events. In respect of the human individual there can, therefore, be no arbitrary focus on body or mind. Man comprises the mind-body dimension of nature. Dewey states quite clearly that "the 'solution' of the mind-body problem is to be found in the revision of the preliminary assumptions about existence which generate the problem". 31 Now if we exchange Dewey's term existence for the more frequently used Whiteheadian synonym of actuality or experience as concrescence the similarity of the two authors will become more evident. However, I think the doctrine ofprehension intensifies the relationship of the various factors of events, nature and experience.

31 Ibid., p. 263.
beyond Dewey's description of the same. Consequently the relations
between body and mind, fact and value or objective and subjective
qualities flow more readily into one another. (The difference, however,
may be due to the difference in models of inter-relation employed by
Dewey and Whitehead).

The integration of experience and personality (as will later be
discussed) arises out of the fact of the continuity of nature and the
continuity of relationship between body and mind.

In organic philosophy there is one genus of primary reality from
which all the objects of nature and the events of experience are derived,
and the same set of categorical principles apply to all facts. This whole
philosophy runs counter to the attempted bifurcation of nature — "The
theory of 'prehension' embodies a protest against the bifurcation of
nature. . . . The distinction between publicity and privacy [of fact]
is a distinction of reason, and is not a distinction between mutually
exclusive concrete facts. . . ." 32 How then is the mind continuous with
the body?

The theory of the development of nexus and societies by the
principles of Transmutation or Conceptual Reversion is the account by
which organic philosophy shows how all existent forms (including body,
life and mind) arise with their respective type and order. 33 (In the
next section this will be enlarged upon). Mind on this view is partly

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33 See Sherburne's discussion of Nexus and the Micro-cosmic.

PR., chap. 4: also page 251 for reference to PR.
the outcome of bodily existence, partly the single directive agency of the body, and yet it seems to entertain a degree to irrelevancy to the physical relations of the body. By the development of certain types of hybrid physical and transmuted feelings, conceptual feelings develop giving rise to other conceptual feelings. Reality, it must be recalled, is bipolar and all physical inheritance issues in its conceptual counterpart giving rise to novel contrast, "but always to emphasis, valuation, and purpose." It is the integration of physical and mental aspects of reality which provides the unity of experience which is self-formation. (This hold good at all levels of reality despite a distinction between physical and mental in the genetic and derived sense). Mentality is non-spatial, but "is always a reaction from, and integration with physical experience which is spatial." Mind does not arise from nowhere and is always somewhere (actually contained), even though it is non-spatially located. The myriad cells of the body are societies of individual cells — so are actual entities as their underlying metaphysical counterpart. Since cells are living (life centres so to speak), what must be explained is the unifying control of an observable and consciously experiencing entity to which they give rise.

Whitehead shows by example that some bodily organs function with relative independence, and may be made to exist for a limited

34 Mind is a definitive feature of the type of individuality called human.
period independent of all else. 35 But all organs seem to respond to a
centrality of control in the "high-grade" organ called the brain. He
writes:

The living body is a coordination of high-grade actual occasions; but in a living body of a low type the occasions are much nearer to a democracy. In a living body of a high type there are grades of occasions so coordinated by their paths of inheritance through the body, that a peculiar richness of inheritance is enjoyed by various occasions in some parts of the body. Finally, the brain is coordinated so that a peculiar richness of inheritance is enjoyed now by this and now by that part; and thus there is produced a presiding personality at that moment in the body. Owing to the delicate organization of the body, there is a returned influence, an inheritance of character derived from the presiding occasion and modifying subsequent occasions through the rest of the body. 36

Whitehead is here pursuing the path of speculative psycho-physiology,
but his view is quite consonant with significant theories of mind and
personality in psychology and physiology. And, it seems to me, this
position is a better adaptation than many quasi-philosophical theories
of mind (e.g. the mechanist and phenomenalist views). 37 A key to
understanding the account given so far is given by Whitehead himself.
He reminds us that in extreme generality the notion of an "enduring
object" is that of a "genetic character inherited through a historic
route of actual occasions." Some such objects form material bodies
(due to a predominance of physical feelings), and others do not (due
to a predominance of comparative or intellectual feelings). But as

35 Whitehead, PR., p. 128.

36 Ibid., pp. 128-129.

37 See J. W. Yolton's discussion of Phenomenalism in Metaphysical
Analysis, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1967.
there is no sharp difference between a living and non-living occasion; so it must be granted that there is no fundamental difference between "an enduring object which is an atomic material body and one which is not." It then becomes a verbal problem whether an enduring object is to be regarded as "a transmission of matter or of character" [non-spatial influence]. To the unbeliever Whitehead's question would be — where is the line to be drawn between matter and radiant energy?

It must therefore be regarded that the mental functions and their psychic influences which we call a self or person (i.e. a human individual) arise out of, and are continuous with their material and bodily counterpart.

On the doctrine of prehension, bodily interaction and functionings, enter into the real constitution of the human mind: and the psychic characters of mind with their essentially subjective derivatives reciprocate this action. The one, except in cases of abnormal functionings or disease, is not antagonistic to the other. The principles of concrescence apply: integration, valuation and purpose are aimed at; and unity, identity, harmony and intensity are achieved. Thus mind and body are integrated facets of the human individual and mind is continuous with body as the latter is with material nature.

In the following discussion on the notion of nexus it will become evident that the problems that we have here discussed and resolved are

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38 Sherburne, KWPR., p. 97: also Whitehead, PR., p. 129.
themselves central features of Whitehead's theory of society as nexal reality. On that view becoming and endurance, continuing identity and the essential relation of value to the fact of individual being are indispensable moments in the real constitution of the human individual.
Part Three

THEORETICAL APPLICATION
THE SOCIAL BASES
OF HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY

As far as our general discussion has progressed, we may legitimately assume that the human individual is made-up of actual entities; that such a composite existent exhibits features of change and endurance; that its enduring aspects entail both physical and mental forms and that these are essentially related; that it is from these mental factors that the peculiar features of self-consciousness and the heightened sense of valuation are derived. How then does Whitehead account for the enduring entity we call a person, and how does he account for its highly developed sense of awareness and importance?

It is in terms of the theory of nexus and society that he effects an explanation more directly relevant to our purpose. He states -- "A 'society', in the sense in which the term is here used, is a nexus with social order; and an 'enduring object' or 'enduring creature', is a society whose social order has taken the special form of 'personal order'."¹ The notion of society endeavours to express in brief compass the special fact of "experiential togetherness" in a more intense form than it was introduced by the first four categorical principles of chapter one, or than it was discussed with respect to the individual occasion. A society, generally speaking, is an avenue of endurance, enrichment and intensification.

¹Whitehead, PR., pp. 39-40.
In a nexus with social order its members (actual entities) participate in a "common elemental form", but may further share this common form and other features genetically. A nexus is said to enjoy personal order when the genetic relation of its members is a function of "seriality". Serial ordering is the function by which a nexus establishes specific and definite route(s) of inheritance for its members. Usually the present moment of concrescence (actual occasion) receives from its immediate antecedent and transmits its own essence to its immediate successor, and so on. This special form of seriality (described as "a cut in the nexus") is what constitutes a single line of inheritance of defining characteristics. It is a nexus thus qualified that Whitehead calls an "enduring object" or in the merely legal (not human) sense a "person" (persona — that which sustains a definite character).

The ordinary physical objects we encounter and which have temporal endurance are societies. In the ideally simple case they have personal order and are properly called enduring objects. But we live in

2Note on Nexus:
"A nexus enjoys 'social order' where (i) there is a common element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual entities, and (ii) this common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehensions of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings of that common form. Such a nexus is called a 'society', and the common form is the 'defining characteristic' of the society. The notion of 'defining characteristic' is allied to the Aristotelian notion 'substantial form.'" (Whitehead, PR., p. 40: cf, Al., p. 203).

a world which is a complex of nexūs and societies which cross each
other (e.g. the twig lies across the path) and are variously related to
one another (the twig is a branch from the tree and the tree grows by
the path). Now most events and situations (even those apparently simple
ones mentioned) are each a complex analyzable into many strands of
endurance. Such is the general nature of experience and so is the experient
subject we call a self or person. The points to be noted so far are:
(1) endurance is defined in terms of social order;
(2) societies involve serial and genetic relatedness;
(3) societies variously interact;
(4) the more complex objects are complexes of societies, e.g. a chair,
a tree, an animal;
(5) man is himself a complex (i.e. structured) society;
(6) a nexus which enjoys social order, and is analyzable into many
strands of enduring objects is regarded as a "corpuscular society";
(7) "The point of a 'society' as the term is here used is that it is
self-sustaining; in other words it is its own reason." (PR., p. 107).

From the fore-going it seems that the general order of complexity
is actual entity, enduring object, corpuscular society, complex struc-
tured society. A society it should be observed is always more than its
parts, since only as such does it entertain a "reason" which it sustains
and which sustains it. Each society is therefore a particular avenue of
the universe. Societies like actual entities are never in isolation,
but unlike actual entities they may have temporal and/or spatial spread.
A society affects the character of its members as they effect its
continuance. And, generally speaking it may entertain essential as well as non-essential features. The real essence of a society is what Whitehead calls its reason(s) (cf actual entities as ultimate reasons of the universe) and it is also that by which the order particular to that society is defined. However, no society is perfectly ordered — order is a correlative of disorder. A society is a protective and creative environment; and is a-social as well as social. If it ceases to be any of these, it dies or falls into triviality and irrelevance. Nor is it exempted from the generic principles governing its members — "The metaphysical characteristics of an actual entity . . . should be those which apply to all actual entities". 4

The human individual, as Whitehead conceives it, is a complex of societies; specifically, a "structured" society enhancing the well-being of societies and nexus which are locked in a definite pattern of inter-relatedness. So related, greater continuity of endurance is fostered and intensification of experience in some member societies (or nexus) is achieved, but especially in those which are highly specialized complexes. 5 And, some of these specialized complexes, while they share certain general features with their structured environment, maintain a relatively strong independence. A good grasp of the situation is obtained when it is recognized that each cell of the human body is a complex structured society, and each molecule within the cell is a specialized complex with relative

4Whitehead, PR., p. 108.
5Whitehead, PR., p. 119. For the more comprehensive discussions on Whitehead's theory of society, see AI., Chapter XIII: PR., Part I, chapter 3:11 and Part II, chapter 3: 11.
independence.

It must be observed that a society is always a nexus (i.e. a specialized nexus), but a nexus is not in every regard a society. For example, Whitehead maintains that there is "empty space" in a living cell which is a subordinate nexus (not a subordinate society) and as such entertains special features not to be found without the cell. I do not quite see the reason why a nexus of this sort cannot be called a society, except maybe that it constitutes a form of flexible definiteness which entails a greater degree of adaptability not to be found in a society which is always definitely specialized. The "cell theory of reality" generally demands, however, that a society requires a wider social environment for its stabilization; and that a complex society which is stable is said to be complex in virtue of its features of stability.  

Generally speaking, a specialized society (or nexus) is lacking in perdurance qualities; whereas the unspecialized society possesses these in virtue of its capacities of "openness" and "adaptability". But nature never outdoes herself. She safeguards these highly complex and specialized forms by enhancing the activity of the mental pole in these realities as follows:

One way is by eliciting a massive average objectification of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed diversities of the various members of the nexus in question. This method, in fact, employs the device of blocking out unwelcome detail.

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6 Whitehead, PR., p. 119.
It depends on the fundamental truth that objectification is abstraction. It utilizes this abstraction inherent in objectification so as to dismiss the thwarting elements of a nexus into negative prehensions. At the same time the complex intensity in the structured society is supported by the massive objectifications of the many environmental nexusses, each in its unity as one nexus, and not in its multiplicity as many actual occasions.  

The other way is:

...by an initiative in conceptual prehensions, i.e., in apperception. The purpose of this initiative is to receive the novel elements of the environment into explicit feelings with such subjective forms as conciliate them with the complex experiences proper to members of the structured society. Thus in each crescent occasion its subjective aim originates novelty to match the novelty of the environment.  

The first alternative is a function primarily of Transmutation (Cat. Oblig. VI) and represents the first phase of conceptual development beyond the merely conformal phases. Here originality is still at a minimum as is the case with purely inorganic forms — rocks, crystals, etc. Organic forms such as plants and animals each bears very evident features of novelty. In the human (and other forms of higher) organism the functions of Conceptual Reversion are brought into play. But, in man

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7 Whitehead, PR., p. 120.

NB: For Whitehead, "The first stage of systematic investigation must always be the identification of analogies between occasions within the society and occasions without it. The second stage is constituted by the more subtle procedure of noting the differences between behaviour within and without the society, difference of behaviour exhibited by occasions which also have close analogies to each other." (Whitehead, PR., pp. 118-19).

8 Whitehead, PR., p. 121.
(given the condition of a human society), it results in thinking at the pre-reflective and reflective levels. (I take speech to be a function of thought). At such a time speciality and complexity of organismic structure have moved from mere adjustment to aesthetic emphasis according to the ideals of harmony in subjective enjoyment; and have moved also towards the exercise of reflective activities which may even lead to quite abstract forms of novelty.

In accordance with this second mode of self-preservation (or enhancement) the human entity exhibits all the features of a living society, but also goes "a cut above" to manifest the peculiar features of what is properly called a SELF or PERSON in the specifically human sense. The self then is that product of nature which, in a most unique and developed form, exhibits (1) the elimination of multifarious details; and (2) emphasizes the origination of novelties of conceptual reaction. 9

So far I have used the terms self and person synonymously and I must give my reason for doing so. The notion of person (in the human sense) readily has organic links to Whitehead's notion of "personal" order as it pertains to the reality of societal forms. Secondly, as rendered obvious by our discussion, the human individual within itself exhibits (in one way or another) most or all instances of social order which organic ontology discovers in the various realms of nature. Thirdly, the fact of endurance is based primarily on the occurrence of serial order which in every respect underlies the perdurance of human

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9 Whitehead, PR., p. 122.
individuality. Fourthly, seriality emphasizes a route of historic
development, with concretion, one may add, which is precisely the
fact underlying our latent as well as our active conscious experience.
But, whereas the notion of "person" may refer to any form of endurance
in respect of human individuality, the notion of self must be seen to
express those essentially human functions of self-awareness and
reflective behaviour which arise in man in the advanced forms of
transmuted and conceptual experience. By implication the self is
essentially a product of a human environment. This is generally
supported by psychological and sociological considerations. (See
G. H. Head's discussions on Mind, Self, and Society; also Berger and
Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality*).

Although Whitehead does not appear to favour the use of the term
self (I have so far been unable to trace any very significant occurrence
of the term in *Process and Reality*), yet the general facts of reflective
behaviour are everywhere implied by his uses of mind, soul, intellect,
spirit, and, in the human sense, consciousness, person and subject. It
must also be noted that life and mind are, for Whitehead, quite different
things although there is still an organic connection between the two.
(See discussion Section iii of Part Two). Life, in varying degrees is a
function of all organic nature. 11 Mind, to which we may more appropriately
attribute the reflective functions of human individuality, is a function
primarily of the human realm. Whitehead views consciousness as a wider

10 Whitehead, PR., p. 108.

11 Life he thinks is contained in the empty space of living cells
which is constituted by a non-specialized nexus.
occurrence in nature than mind. And, if mind (cf SOUL) in some sense is the general property of the more developed vertebrae, we are still obliged to find a definitive function of selfhood. This I think Whitehead does by focussing on the capacity of mind which gives rise to the development of speech and discourse.\textsuperscript{12} This approach is quite similar to that of Mead and Berger and Luckmann who all view speech as a uniquely human function. Speech is not in principle different from reflective thinking which is the more basic dimension of self-awareness. This is borne out by Mead's view of the "object-self"—the ME.\textsuperscript{13}

Returning to the more direct line of the discussion, it must be seen that the human person as a structured society is a design of intertwining nexus. Some of these are of lower and higher types and must be seen as "subservient" or "regnant" in keeping with the ideal of fullest possible self-realization.\textsuperscript{14} Further, in a living society only some nexus will exhibit advance features of "original reaction". (See pp. 7 and 8). When a society is living its regnant nexus is called living. And though Whitehead is among these lines highly conjectural, it is in keeping with our discussion to assume that the human individual houses as well a regnant nexus of conceptual activities.

\textsuperscript{12}Whitehead, M.T., pp. 32-41.


\textsuperscript{14}Whitehead, P.R., p. 122.
are thus factors of human individuality. An entirely living (and by implication an entirely mental) nexus requires greater protection from its social environment than other forms of nexus. Hence the complexity of the protective organisms which contain them. As it was intimated earlier, such nexus are a-social since they entail peculiar features not found in their environment. Usually it is the less organic nexus which are the defence of the more organic, and these organic forms of the more delicate but regnant psychic forms. Thus life and mind are in some way preserved by those entities whose good fortune it is to enjoy them.

I have attempted to carry the development of life and mind together to suggest the continued and essential relationship of these aspects of nature. But it must be recalled that, for Whitehead, life is a more pervasive feature of nature than mind. But mind is a very special form of sentient enjoyment in virtue of which man may claim dominance over the creatures of nature. It is in this respect that our mental (and intellectual) being gains dominance over the other facets of our personalities. "Life," Whitehead maintains "is a bid for freedom," but it is in terms of the mind that the adventure to freedom is best realized.

To some extent we have already discussed the development of mind in Part Two, Section iii, and here we may emphasize some differences between life and mind. Both of course are the result of societal events

15 Whitehead, PR., pp. 129, 150ff, 167-68.
and of personal forms of order. A cell, as Whitehead states, gives us no direct evidence of its ancestry. But because of the presence of mentality in man, especially as memory, the human organism can trace certain forms of its historic development. What is more readily observed is that the living cell (or organism) seems to characterize (within reason) a number of quite original responses to its environment. However, most organisms, and especially so in man, are coordinated in their bodily functioning. In the human individual the coordination is most readily effected in the areas of the brain. This is a biological and psycho-physiological fact. Now, what we call mentality in man is a set of special functions of the brain. The brain, we know from research, may be divided into large areas which tend to gather and concentrate stimuli of pleasure or pain. Whether these are entirely objective or subjective makes no practical difference. The results are the same. There is always a subjective form or set of subjective forms arising within the organism and which colours and lends tonality to its experience. These subjective forms may be emotions or feelings, impressions or ideas; as Whitehead refers to them, they may be emotions, valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc. 16

All of these, only some of which we are conscious, yield a psychic content which the brain registers, enlarges or amplifies, minimizes or curtails.

Life is an organic function of nature, which in certain creatures, supports mental events. By this it is obvious that mental events may be

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16 Whitehead, PR., p. 28.
graded in terms of organismic development. The human organism reflects many phases of such a development. However, in the normal and mature (or naturing) individual specific mental events are of an intellectual nature. The fact is that given certain environmental conditions of life, intellectual behaviour tends to be the dominant fact of human existence. Life is a bid for freedom, but, in man, freedom may be viewed as a condition of intellectual being.

The specific forms of psychic events (events occurring with a spatial and/or time spread but are unique) are, for Whitehead, coordinated from time-to-time in different parts of the brain. Such events do not recur, but never pass without leaving a trace of their occurrence. This is evidenced in many forms of recollection. Now specifically what we call the SELF or SOUL (the latter is Whitehead's rendering) is the function of all psychic occurrences as they are contained in the present moment of experience. Here then, being conscious or unconscious, awake or sleeping, attentive or inattentive (alive or dead for that matter), none of these states in itself or by itself constitutes a sufficient and necessary reason of self-existence. The self is a concrecence and a manifestation of all these states. Nor can the denial of any of these states bespoil the enduring and historic entity which is called self or person — "Our own self-consciousness is the direct awareness of our selves as such persons". 17 The enduring entity is contained in the

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17 Whitehead, PR., p. 127.

I have followed Whitehead, with interpretations of course, along a line of speculative but systematic development of the notion of self or person. Another line of such development is suggested in the following continued...
concretion resulting from the serial functions of a personally ordered society -- it is a "genetic character inherited through a historic route of actual occasions." The peculiar nexus(üs) which is the "receptacle(s)" of psychic events is for the most part always remnant and dominant in the human individual, and like an entirely living nexus, a-social. (See Mead's notion of the I).

In closing this discussion the following points may be emphasized by way of a summary. First, it must be borne in mind that the functions of mentality are always an experience in self-formation. This is a special exemplification of the wider principle of conecrescence in which all experience is an experience of self-formation. Mentality is therefore a function of experience; and experience is simply the continuing act of adjustment and integration -- either with the self or with its environment.

Second, the principle of seriality is seen to underlie (rather is the very nature of) existent reality. Any view of the self therefore which does violence to this principle cuts off the human individual from its real roots, isolates him in a universe to which he essentially belongs, and makes the existence of the present moment to be a "simply

17Continued . . .

quotation: "The defining characteristic of a living person is some definite type of hybrid prehensions transmitted from occasion to occasion of its existence. The term 'hybrid' is defined more particularly in Part III. It is sufficient to state here that a 'hybrid' prehension is the prehension by one subject of a conceptual prehension, or of an 'impure' prehension, belonging to the mentality of another subject." (Whitehead, PR., p.127).
located" or "detached" fact, rather than a concrecive instance of enduring being.

Third, if the Whiteheadian bases are accepted, then a theory of selfhood or personality should reflect the principles of seriality (a special form of endurance) as continuing self-formation. Conformal identity is therefore a half-truth: the human individual always has a real essence, but it is not so much one that is given as one which is developed out of what is given. By the same token the conformal influences of the past are not as restrictive as they are suggestive of possible lines of further development.

Fourth, the self as a psychic social phenomenon is essentially related to its body, and its universe. Recognition of this fact should assist in the fostering of a set of values enhancing self-development while renewing the individuals commitment to his various and ever widening environment.

Fifth, since the functions of Transmutation and Conceptual Reversion are nature's way of preserving her more delicate but remnant forms of life and mind, we may infer that intellect is a special manifestation of these real functions and is an instrument of preservation where human individuality is concerned.

Sixth, the categories of Subjective Unity, Subjective Harmony, and Subjective Intensity as introduced in chapter three, and which gained ground for amplification and intensification in this chapter, must also find exemplification in a theory of human individuality.

One must now try to develop a view of selfhood which is in accord with these general principles.
SELFHOOD AND ENDURANCE

A capacity for the spontaneous introduction of something not present in the environment is part of the structure of every experience. Otherwise the present would be only the sum of what was given it by the past, and any item, taken by itself, a mere re-enactment.\footnote{Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead. Johns Hopkins Paperbacks, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, pp. 19-20.}

This brief remark of Victor Lowe brings to focus two very important Whiteheadian doctrines: (1) that of spontaneous origination, and (2) that of causal inheritance. The organic viewpoint holds these in balance in both the doctrines of concrescence and sociability. The general notion of selfhood which I am here examining is an exemplification of the integration of these doctrines.

From the last chapter, it may be recalled that an "enduring object" or "enduring creature" is a nexus exemplifying what is called "personal order". And such a nexus is personally ordered when "(a) it is a 'society', (b) when the generic relatedness of its members orders these members 'serially'".\footnote{Whitehead, PR., p. 40.} Further, in a nexus socially ordered its members share a common elemental form in virtue of which they are what they are and it remains what it is. What must be emphasized is that every form of endurance presupposes social order, (as essential experiential togetherness), personal order (as sustaining some definite...
character), and genetic relatedness (where the common elemental form of such an endurance is serially transmitted). The notion of actual entity and the doctrine of prehension, as earlier discussed entail the possibility of these factors of endurance. And in a general way, the notions of relatedness and process entail the conditions of such forms of endurance.

Any view of the self as an enduring entity, and which is based on organic ontology, must therefore exhibit the factors of sociability, personal order and generic relatedness (or seriality as a special form of genetic relatedness). The notion of seriality tends to emphasize (a) not so much a "linear" route of inheritance, as a "direct" route of inheritance; (b) that antecedent entities transmit their essence to their immediate successors; (c) that emerging forms of concretion are directly "influenced" by the data of the past but are not dominated by them; (d) that data which are so re-enacted, translated or objectified are the matrix of present novelty and spontaneity. It should never be overlooked that the idea of a direct route of inheritance is also multidimensioned. 3 "Our dominant inheritance from our immediately past occasion is broken into by innumerable inheritances through other avenues . . . .\\n
To be emphasized also is the fact that since "order" and "endurance" are functions of a nexus, or of a specialized or patterned nexus which is a society, then the self must be conceived as a nexus, in this sense. The synonymous uses of the terms must therefore be understood and should not mislead. It follows also that the self could not be a mere generic

3 Whitehead, PR., pp. 40-41; also AL., pp. 188-89.
unit of concrescence. In this sense no individual endures. But from our earlier discussions, and also from our present treatment of the nexus, it will be seen that these episodic occasions are the factors of endurance, where, in accordance with the principles of sociability, personal order and seriality they give rise to an "enduring object", and by implication, an "enduring self". Endurance is therefore a function of derived reality or of genetic reality in the allied sense in which I have earlier used the term. The notion of order has also a derived sense and is based on social order in the special sense of personal order i.e. one sustaining a particular character. It should therefore be distinguished from primary or generic order which is the perspective ofprehension and concrescence of the individual atom. (Reference may be made to the last two chapters on Actuality and Order and Order as the Possibility of Value in my essay on Actuality and Value.)

In a nexus real experiential togetherness is always the result of a common form experienced and a common function performed by its percipient members. Again a nexus may have spatial and/or temporal spread (as is the case with the various nexus of the body which are extended and are divisible). But some nexus (as those constituting life and mind, especially psychic events per se) exhibit temporal spread only. I think Whitehead, following James, often refers to the present instance of a temporal nexus as the specious present. Now, in a world such as ours, nexus are locked in inter-related patterns. As such they spread spatially and temporally. Whitehead maintains that
these so constituted include sets of contemporary occasions interacting with each other, and also in respect of the relative past or the relative future. He writes:

If the nexus be purely spatial, then it will include no pair of occasions such that the one of the pair is antecedent to the other. The mutual immanence between the occasions of the nexus will then be of the indirect type proper to contemporary occasions. It is for this reason that the notion of externality dominates our intuition of space.

However, he shows that if the nexus is wholly temporal, it includes no pair of contemporary occasions. It is still an "historic route", but a "mere thread of temporal transition from occasion to occasion". This however, does not deny "causation". Temporal transition merely becomes a special form of causal inheritance in which the direct immanence of the past is seen to be contained in the present.

Since the self is primarily (i.e. for the purpose in hand) a psychic phenomenon, it must be seen to be a purely temporal NEXUS with a time spread or temporal continuity. Here, Whitehead seems to redefine Hume's notion of causal connection or contiguous relation efficaciously. He writes:

Two occasions, which are not contemporary, are contiguous in time when there is no occasion which is antecedent to one of them and subsequent to the other. A purely temporal nexus of occasions is continuous when, with the exception of the earliest and the last occasions, each occasion is contiguous

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with an earlier occasion and a later occasion. The nexus will then form an unbroken thread in a temporal serial order. The first and the last occasions of the thread will, of course, only enjoy a one-sided contiguity with the thread.\textsuperscript{6}

By way of an aside, it may be observed that there is only the difference of a "u" or a "\(\kappa\)" in the words continuous and contiguous. Hume kept the "\(\kappa\)" going, and self-identity went with it. Whitehead incorporated the "\(n\)" and the "now" of every present existence became the nucleus of continuing identity.

Since most non-spatial happenings associated with the human organism are associated with brain functions, as per the last chapter, we must regard the self as primarily a function of the essentially mental operations of the brain. But I personally would hesitate to give a specific location of the self. I see it as actually contained, but not as being definitely localized. Except, of course, in the sense that most selves are usually associated with a particular bodily counterpart. Whitehead regards mind or soul as indwelling the various interstices of the brain as it moves from one area of concentration to the next.\textsuperscript{7}

There seems also to be the need to restrict the self to represent the agency of dominance over the life and the activities of the body. The fact was mentioned in the last chapter that there seems to be a certain correlation of life with mind (not exact to be sure).\textsuperscript{8} Further, where


\textsuperscript{7}Whitehead, \textit{PR.}, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{8}Whitehead, \textit{AI.}, p. 208; also \textit{PR.}, p. 127.
the fact of life is associated with most body cells the intellectual 
functions underlying selfhood are more directly associated with special 
sets of brain cells. It may be that the Hebrews in their religious 
literature wrongly ascribed functions of selfhood to the heart; but, 
this is also an extension of the truth concerning the inter-relation of 
nexus of different kinds. It is in the same sense that I would under-
stand the Latin expression -- "A sound mind in a sound body", or the 
Greek dictum -- "Know they self".

By a similar line of reasoning we must say whether the self is 
one or many. We regard the body to be one, and the mind with it. That 
is, we consider this unity to be generally the case. However, as we 
know from the principles of process so far enunciated, the numerical 
identity of body masquerades as "oneness" and hides the real facts which 
pertain to its endurance. Is this so with mind and/or self? (I main-
tain a functional distinction only between these two entities.) The 
fact of process is always the realization of the one by virtue of which 
the many effect their translation into the constitution of the one. A 
theory of self, which keeps this fact in mind, must account for the 
possibility of many selves as being this particular self. As seen from 
our discussion of the notion of nexus as here employed, the principles 
of sociability, personal order and seriality, and, we may now add temporal 
continuity offer us a perspective by which the one may be viewed as many 
or the many as one. Practically speaking, however, the self is always 
one, as we may consider the mind to be, in this sense that it dominates 
(or presides over) the affairs of this body which it recognizes to be
its own. The matter of a regnant nexus, or regnant society which was discussed in the last chapter supports this line of reasoning. But in speaking of the SELF as S-E-L-V-E-S we must follow the paradigm of con crescience of individuality. On this paradigm real existence is always a "concrete unity" arising out of a multiplicity of related elements. The con crescent nature of individuality does not emphasize unbounded process that is chaos or madness. But neither does it emphasize rigidity of unity. This last is not a realizable possibility. Reality avoids its own extremes by blending its parts together in the "real internal constitution" of the nascent individual. In this way the essential unity of selfhood, as of the atom, is achieved from moment-to-moment. In this way the balance of and integration between the one and the many is achieved.

There are now a few remaining points to be mentioned in this section of the chapter. First, a nexus as here described is self-sustaining, i.e. it is its own "reason" for existing and its members in their genetic and serial relation all share in this reason of autonomous conservation. Of course the particles perish while the nexus endures. The significance of this for the self is that it is its own reason for being what it is and its many facets will always fade in the sustenance of the whole.

Second, in contrast to the high degree of intrinsic unity pertaining in a given nexus, an existent and wholly contemporary nexus can never

\[9\] Whitehead, Al., pp. 211, 215.
be the same extent intrinsically related to its contemporaries -- hence our awareness of "other-selves" as contemporaries in the same human society. More importantly however, if the nexus which is the "this-self" is seen as renewing its parts episodically, then it is never numerically the same; can never be its own contemporary; and in this regard there can never quite be two (or multiple) -- selves in an existent contemporary body. Yet it is the peculiar privilege of man that his highly developed mental powers retain in memory concretions of much of passed selves now perished, and may even entertain future patterns of being not yet factually registered in the nexal apparatus of the self. The analogy goes further when it is seen that he entertains such ideas not only for his own being, but for the being of others. The principle of seriality accounts for being in the sense of before and after and in respect of the principle of temporal continuity no one can be his own contemporary. Except by a malady of mind, nature removes such illusions from the normal state of real existence.

Third, a nexus as a society has essential and accidental qualities. It is in virtue of the former that it remains what it is. It may lose its accidental features without ceasing to be itself. One should note, however, that unlike the substance of Aristotle, the essence of a Whiteheadian nexus is always a novel becoming which retains its essential identity. The self conceived on this view will always be itself, despite multiple manifestations through time.

10Cf. Whitehead PR, p. 40.
Fourth, the same line of reasoning leads to the fact that the organic view balances the doctrines of change and permanence as it does those of causal inheritance and spontaneous origination. The self changes and abides as it is a product of its past and a novelty of the present. Change in the self must be seen as gradual (for the most part); radical or drastic change may lead to loss of identity or to a new identity. Identity is always in terms of essential characteristics.

Fifth, Whitehead writes — "But until the death of the man or the destruction of the earth, there is no determinate nexus which in an unqualified sense is either man or the earth". The point here is simply that the creative advance allows no fixed point of becoming. The "concrecent-self" is always a "becoming-self". And, when it perishes it begins its career.

My last point here, based on the nature of nexal form (and in keeping with the second point above) is that no member nexus of the series, which occurs at a given point in time, can be regarded as being the whole series so long as its society is in existence. However, each nexal occurrence within the series is in some sense the sum (or concretion) of all its manifestations up to that point. The present self of any human individual may therefore be rightly responsible for any act, etc. which is attributable to it at any point in time — up to and including the present. In jurisprudence we have examples of proposed future acts (contemplated murder, etc.) which are attributed to the self.

\[11\] Whitehead Al., p. 204.
The legality of this matter of law emphasizes an intriguing philosophical point concerning the nature of the self.

We may sum up then that in so far as the self is real and enduring, it is a nexus (or society) of human reality as we have so far described it.

In the earlier part of this chapter I accepted the reality of the nexus with its attendant principles as the basis of every enduring fact. Pursuant to this I discussed certain features of the self which clearly follow from the employment of these principles. In this second part of the chapter I merely want to discuss the essentially social nature of the self in its unique function of self-awareness. Since the social-psychology of Mead accords with the principles of organic ontology at many points I will use his conception of self-awareness as the basis of my discussion.

Mead writes:

It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want to bring out. The characteristic is represented in the word 'self', which is reflexive, and indicates that which can be both subject and object. . . . This is the essential psychological problem of selfhood or of self-consciousness; and its solution is to be found in referring to the process of social conduct or activity in which the given person is implicated.12

12 Mead OSP., pp. 201–02.
I have stated before that, in this notion of the self in so far as it represents the human individual, I am focussing on its psychic nature. At all times however, such a use presupposes a real human being identifiable with its psychic manifestations. Now, for Mead, that which can be an object to itself is essentially a social structure and arises in social experience. For Whitehead, experience is essentially social. It should be noted that a distinction should be made between "social" in the ontological sense and "social" in the sociological sense. The context of usage will, however, allow for distinction between the two usages. In Mead the one usage sometimes implies the other.

The human individual in his society is interacting with other individuals. This interaction is characterized by thought, speech, action, attitudes, etc. In these respects the self is given to play many "roles". Roles are, among other things, particular functional manifestations of the self. For Mead, the SELF is a unity of S-E-L-V-E-S arising out of the internalization (or prehension) of social constituents characterized as attitudes, learned responses, symbols, etc. The self therefore reflects both the unity and diversity of its contextual social order. Organically it is a nexus related to a wider society of nexus, of simple or more complex forms. It must be seen to share the common elemental form(s) necessary for continuity, order and stability both within itself and within the society at large. The self is an actual entity (a derived one of course). Mead writes:

The unity and structure of the complete self reflect the unity and structure of the social process as a whole; and each of the elementary selves of which it is composed reflects the unity and structure of one of the various
aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated....the structure of the complete self is thus a reflection of the complete social process.\textsuperscript{13}

Here we have what may be called the solidarity of society, or conversely, the society of solidarity expressed in the fact of individual and personal unit.\textsuperscript{12}

Mead, like Allport, Berger and Luckmann, etc., recognizes the self to be a psychological fact, socially constituted.\textsuperscript{14} The fact is that the general outlook of the social sciences, at this time, is moving to a view of the self as a product of process (cf. concrescence); as an entity in process; and as a factor giving rise to the continuation of the process called social order. This approach does not exclude a conformal view of selfhood (i.e. human individuality), but it accentuates a view more consonant with what I have earlier called concrescent individuality. This view counters the emphasis of all merely deterministic conceptions of the self: whether they be based on the instinctual and biological determinism of Freud; or on the behavioural and contextual determinism of the Watsonian and Skinnerian school; or on the materialistic (economic) determinism of Marxian economic theory. The self of the views I am commanding, particularly of Mead's at this time, is one that retains initiative.

Most significantly, Mead distinguishes between the "I" and the

\textsuperscript{13} Mead, OSP, p. 208.

"Me" as aspects of the self. This, on the surface, resembles Freud's Ego and Id, but when examined is vastly different. The Me of the self represents the conformal and causally efficient factors of selfhood, and is that in terms of which the self may be socially identified. It is that which makes the self to be continuous with the definitive social factors of social reality. In Whitehead, it would represent the conformal aspects of the becoming of mind inherited from one's past. These are essentially cultural factors. Mead writes:

The organized community or social group which gives the individual his unity of self can be called 'the generalized other'. The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community . . . It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behaviour of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, that is, the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members, for it is in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual thinking . . . But only by taking the attitude of the generalized other towards himself, in one or another of these ways, can he think at all; for only thus can thinking -- or the internalized conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking occur. And only through the taking by the individuals of the attitudes of the generalized other towards themselves is the existence of a universe of disclosure, as that system of common or social meanings which thinking presupposes as its context, rendered possible. 15

It is in view of the above considerations that the self becomes a reflection of the social environment and as the Me becomes "the organized set of attitudes of the others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of others constitute the organized "me", . . . " 16

15 Mead, OSP, pp. 218-20.

16 Ibid., p. 230.
Now the human brain and the mind which functions in relation to it are a multi-complex of societal functionings. So also is the entire human organism. But, in keeping with the last chapter, and to make our transposition easier, it may be taken that the self (or mind) is an actual entity belonging to a specialized nexus called a human society. Through the principles of Transmutation and Reversion as outlined, and by the prehension of simple physical and transmuted feelings the self comes to be and in turn gives rise to an enduring and multi-complex nexus — say this particular society. What is imbibed or assimilated from the cultural milieu are really values, whether they are presented in the form of language, actions, special symbols, attitudes, etc.

Whitehead's multi-complex nexus is the equivalent of Mead's "generalized other" which influences each self into a limited pattern of conformity necessary for maintaining the patterns of order inherent in that multi-complex nexus. My search is not for "exact" parallels in Mead, but for "working" parallels: since social psychology is not the same as ontology.

The ME tells only part of the story of selfhood. Man is much more than conditioned response or a mere repertoire of social responses. He is "more". This more Mead calls the I. The I is the function of autonomy and spontaneity. It seems to be implied by what we commonly call "having a mind of one's own" or "independence of judgement". The I exists in relation (dynamically we may assume) with the ME, but unlike the ME it is not dominated by socially causal factors and it is not conditioned (in the usual sense of that term). The I is the individual's own capacity for individual response to social conditions of a social universe. The I (cf. Whitehead's subjective aim) is always the emergent
individual despite the socialized many. We must then see the I as the
basis of morality and autonomy (in Kant's sense, but without Kantian
inflexibility). It has a special sense of responsibility to itself as
arising out of its own autonomy, but shares a general sense of responsibil-
ity with the Me and in respect of the social order to which it belongs.
The fact is that the I and the Me cannot exist without each other.
There is a "reciprocity of being" in this functional relationship. Mead
writes:

We may now explicitly raise the question as to the nature of the "I" which is aware of the social "me". I do not mean to raise the metaphysical question of how a person can be both "I" and "me" but to ask for the significance of this distinct-
ion from the point of view of conduct itself. Where in conduct
does the "I" come in as over against the "me"? When one deter-
mines what his position is in society and feels himself as
having a certain function and privilege, these are all defined
with reference to an "I", but the "I" is not a "me" and cannot
become a "me". We may have a better self and a worse self,
but that again is not the "I" as against the "me", because
they are both selves. We approve of one and disapprove of
the other, but when we bring up one or the other, they are
there for such approval as "me's". The "I" does not get into
the limelight; we talk to ourselves, but do not see ourselves.
The "I" reacts to the self which arises through the taking of
the attitudes of others. Through taking those attitudes, we
have introduced the "me" and we react to it as an "I".17

Mead's distinction, as the above passage shows, is not metaphysical, but
has the 'distinction of practicality' in respect of human conduct. There
is a humorous counterpart when we speak of I, me and myself. There
appear to be facets to the self, and for Mead (as for Whitehead) the I

17 Mead, OSP., p. 229.
is axial. Any theory of morality, ethics, or conduct which fails to take account of this "inner-self", so to speak, will sooner or later become a superficial view of human individuality. And it is this "inner-self", I venture to suggest, which is the ultimate arbiter of what is valued.

It must not go unnoticed that there is no spatialized locus of the ME and the I as a self, just as there is no spatialized location of MIND. Yet the I, the ME and the self are facts — and continuing facts of psychic experience. There is a kind of "prehensive carry-over" — a transmission of vector inheritance leading to an "abiding sense of being". This is the means by which I am what I am, and the I of the last moment enters into the functions of the ME of the present and future moments of experience. 18 Head states his case as follows:

The simplest way of handling the problem would be in terms of memory. I talk to myself, and I remember what I said and perhaps the emotional content that went with it. The "I" of this moment is present in the "me" of the next moment. There again I cannot turn around quick enough to catch myself. I become a "me" insofar as I remember what I said. The "I" can be given, however, this functional relationship. It is because of the "I" that we say we are never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action. It is as we act that we are aware of ourselves. It is in memory that the "I" is constantly present in experience. We can go back directly a few moments in our experience, and then we are dependent upon memory images for the rest. So that the "I" in memory is there as the spokesman of the self of the second, or minute, or day ago. As given, it is a "me", but it is a "me" which was the "I" at the earlier time. If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the "I" comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the "I" of the "me". It is another

18 The non-spatialized nature of SELF (as ME and I) would necessitate a discussion of Person or Selfhood in terms of TIME. This could be pursued in terms of the Whiteheadian or Heideggerian notion of time.
'me' that has to take that role. You cannot get the immediate response or the 'I' in the process. The 'I' is in a certain sense that with which we do identify ourselves. The getting of it into experience constitutes one of the problems of most of our conscious experience; it is not directly given in experience.

The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me', and then one reacts toward that as an 'I'.

One must not be misled by his reference to various ME's and I's. Mead's psychological analysis is not a mere phenomenalist presentation of the self. If we accept the doctrine of prehension as applicable here as in all other forms of reality, then continuity of selfhood is a fact and no mere fiction. The key to understanding Mead's analysis in terms of Whiteheadian ontology is the last few sentences of the above quotation — "If you ask, then, where directly in your experience the 'I' comes in, the answer is that it comes in as an historical figure [emphasis mine]

... The getting of it into experience constitutes one of the problems of most of our conscious experience; it is not directly given in experience. The I is the response of the organism to the attitude of the others...". This is the organic point of connection between Mead and Whitehead, for only as a genetic, serial and prehensive carry-over can the I become a fact of every successive me and so preserve the essential and enduring nature of selfhood. We cannot, as said earlier,

19 Mead, OSP., pp. 229-30.

20 In Whitehead the superjective nature of subjectivity always implies an historic carry-over of subjective realizations as objectified data into new forms of subjectivity.
spatialize the phenomena we are discussing. But Mead's ME can be socially characterized and the I must be seen as the "timeless" (historical figure) aspect of the self which functionally relates to the ME.
VALUE AND INDIVIDUALITY

But values differ in importance. Thus though each event is necessary for the community of events, the weight of its contribution is determined by something intrinsic in itself. Thus the event, in its own intrinsic reality, mirrors in itself, as derived from its own parts, aspects of the same patterned value as it realises in its complete self. It thus realises itself under the guise of an enduring individual entity, with a life history contained within itself. Furthermore, the extrinsic reality of such an event, as mirrored in other events, takes this form of an enduring individual; only in this case, the individual is implanted as a reiteration of aspects of itself in the alien events composing the environment.

Value must be the aim of process and the realization of individuality the means. The converse is also true. And apart from value and individuality all reality is a flux about which we can say nothing. In this statement Whitehead states what may be called "the intrinsic principle of reciprocal valuation" — "Thus the event, in its own intrinsic reality, mirrors in its own parts, aspects of the same patterned value as it realises in itself". This may quite simply be expressed — society and individuality require each other. Or, as Whitehead puts it in Modes of Thought, "Process and individuality require each other".

The implied emphasis on the "enduring individual" reminds us of the form of reality which underlies the whole discussion of Part Three of this essay — i.e. nexal reality. Now there are two facts about the

1 Whitehead, SMW., p. 104.
nexus which I have not yet mentioned outright. One is that it is in virtue of its pattern of personal order that the intrinsic intensification and enhancement of experience takes place. The other is that a fuller realization of value and an enrichment of subjective enjoyment is only possible for an individual in a societal context. Every individual is frail and perishing without the context of a social order; and it is that order which defines the range and perspective of the immortality of its ephemeral being. Nature knew well her part when she fashioned man to be an individual in a human society. But this she has done for all her creatures in order to preserve them. Where Aristotle, through the notion of substance enunciated a "class theory" of reality; Whitehead through the notion of actual entity advances a "social theory" of reality.

Section (i)

Value and Process

The nature of individuality that we have now been examining is the derived type, based on the fact of what I earlier called co-primary process. This is the kind of process which underlies the being of a nexus and every existent form. Where a theory of human individuality is concerned, what is important is that this form of process allows the individual to persist through time; and enables him to share in the order, perspective and values (common elemental forms) of a given society.

But co-primary process or transition is not the dead grind of nature, it is not the depressive turn of the wheels of the past resulting in a sterile conformal existence. It is, for Whitehead, something more.
It is the bringing of the past by direct routes of genetic inheritance into a new and novel moment called a concrescence. This concrescence is a new composition and is that which is best understood by the notion of individual. By process, then, order is maintained, perspective is shared, and values are appreciated and generated. It is by such a process (based as it is on the principles of nexal existence) that the past is translated to the future and the present transforms this content (aversively or adversely) in readiness for the future. This is the process by which the individual holds the treasures of the past as dear, but with a sense of responsibility for its recreation. Where a society fails in the demands of the relevant nexal principles, and where an individual loses the mode of its essential relatedness to its past, then, such a society falls into irrelevant decadence and the individual robs himself of significant existence and prospect of immortality.

In the discussion of the notion of "reiteration" in Science and the Modern World, Whitehead gives expression to the essential nature of a particular form of process as it endures through time. He writes:

I used the word 'reiteration' as a synonym of 'endurance'. It obviously is not quite synonymous in its meaning; and now I want to suggest that reiteration where it differs from endurance is more nearly what the organic theory requires. The difference is very analogous to that between the Galileans and the Aristotelians: Aristotle said 'rest' where Galileò added 'or uniform motion in a straight line'. Thus in the organic theory, a pattern need not endure in undifferentiated sameness through time. The pattern may be essentially one of aesthetic contrasts requiring a lapse of time for its unfolding. A tune is an example of such a pattern. Thus the endurance of the pattern now means the reiteration of its succession of contrasts. (p. 133)

Process and individuality, in the sense of reiteration, are the emergent
unfolding of a serially related pattern through time. Such a reiterative pattern also tends to strike a harmonious balance between contextual conformity and individual novelty. This form of process expresses the nature of concrecent individuality, but in a more aesthetic sense. Human personality becomes the development of a "tune" or "composition" through time. Only so can it unfold, and to be aware of ourselves is to be constructively aware of this process. Time is therefore a significant dimension both of process and of individuality.

Section (ii)

Value and Individuality

The world will not repeat Dante, Shakespeare, Socrates, or the Greek tragedians. These men, in connection with their tiny groups forming their immediate environments of associates and successors and perhaps of equals, add something once and for all. We develop in connection with them, but not beyond them, in respect of those definite intuitions which they flash upon the world.\(^2\)

Our discussion of the I and the ME may be seen to suggest two things primarily:

1. the unique perspective of individuality depicted in the I;
2. the social nature of individuality as depicted in the ME. Both constitute the self and the one does not arise without presupposition of the other.

The above passage repeats the same truth that those who have
come to be paradigms of human individuality have been unique, but only
as they arise out of a given social milieu which they share with others,
and only as they themselves have been able to re-construct the given
tradition of a long historic past into the original type of individuality
which they are. But individuality needs no special paradigm, for, even
in human society and history individuality is synonymous with spontaneity,
novelty and autonomy. The miracle of human individuality, however, is
that the high development of man's reflective apparatus enables him to
be a more thorough architect of his own becoming. The creative functions
of the human individual are not repeated in nature, but are everywhere
presupposed by many forms of autonomous becoming. Man is nature's
supreme composer to the extent that he can successfully compose himself.
This is what these men of excellence have done, and in so doing have left
their contributions (or values) as glittering threads on the pages of
history.

Whitehead makes the individual the focus of value whether that
individual be a man or a society. He is right, for only within the
essential constitution of the individual does the creative urge realize
its fullest possible potentials. Only here does possibility become
actuality, and in a man idealized possibilities may to a good extent be
realized. He writes:

Spontaneity, originality of decision, belongs to the essence
of each actual occasion. It is the supreme expression of
individuality: its conformal subjective form is the freedom of enjoyment derived from the enjoyment of freedom.

Also:

The individual immediacy of an occasion is the final unity of subjective form, which is the occasion as an absolute reality. This immediacy is its moment of sheer individuality, bounded on each side by essential relativity.

The consistency of the point-of-view that the individual is the locus of value is further exhibited in the facts —

(1) that if this was not the case there would be the possibility of vacuous existence, which clearly cannot be the case in an ontology of process;

(2) that process at every level is actually the appreciation and generation of value. In brief, individuality is the realization of significance and worth. I propose that this sense of worth, significance, or importance (all may be summed up in the term enhancement) is derived from three things:

(a) individuality is the locus of the creative urge;

(b) individuality is the only basis in which pattern and order find expression (cf. mind as individual);

(c) individuality is the nucleus in which a universe of occasions or events enjoys the feeling of what it really is. That man is such an individual, and a paradigmatic instance of natural individualities, may readily be appreciated.

\(^3\) Whitehead, AI., p. 258.

\(^4\) Ibid., AI., p. 177.
However, the relation of the individual to society cannot be overlooked, for it is only in this context that he becomes what he is. It is only as a constellation of IEs's that the I finds expression and continues to preserve the integrity of "genuine" individuality. Nature entertains no ISLANDS and an individual who is not an intrinsic expression of a particular social order is not an individual on our view.

Section (iii)

Society and Individuality

We must now move on to humanize our considerations on value, bearing in mind that it is a bad philosophy which labours the subject of value in the abstract. Value has its most significant reference to individuality. By the same token it is a faulty social theory which labours the fact of individuality without due consideration of value. This last is also a critical commentary on many forms of contemporary social and economic planning. Mead rightly wrote — "A person is personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his conduct". He here recognizes what I call the "personalizing principle". That is, that there are dimensions of intrinsic relatedness to be preserved as the genetic links between the individual and his community. A ONE-DIMENSIONAL

5 Mead, OSP., p. 226.

6 See Burger and Luckmann's discussion of Primary and Secondary socialization in SCR., Chapter III.
society, in Marcuse's way of speaking, overlooks this fact. The demands of an over-urbanized and consumer culture extol the rules of Rationality, Efficiency and Productivity while the conditions necessary for real individual enjoyment are placed aside. Modern society tends to individuate (in a derogatory sense) man, it does little to personalize him. A true self is not only an individual, he is a person in a warmer and more concrete sense which neither Mead nor Whitehead overlooks.

Mead writes:

The "I" both calls out the "me" and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience [emphasis mine]. The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases, there could not be conscious responsibility and there would be nothing novel in experience.\(^7\)

It is, I venture to suggest, the merely formal or conditioned responses of selfhood which he seeks to overcome. There must be something more genuine in being an individual. Whitehead calls this "Spontaneity, originality of decision . . . . It is the supreme expression of individuality; . . . freshness, zest, and the extra keenness of intensity arises from it".\(^8\) But there cannot be a genuine or aesthetic sense of individuality, in which integrity and autonomy are enhanced, if the social order does not foster the principles leading to unity of individual existence, the harmonization of personal experience and the possibility of intensity of experience in all worthwhile forms of human endeavour.

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\(^7\) Mead, OSP., p. 233.

\(^8\) Whitehead, AI., p. 258.
Section (iv)

The Nature of Human Values

Although the notion of value, as used in Whiteheadian ontology, is as wide and multi-dimensioned as the notions of process and individuality one must restrict its conception to the terms of the present stage of our discussion. So understood our concern is not now with value in the generic sense; nor is it with value in the merely derived sense. Our concern is now with value in its most specific relation to human individuality or the self. In this sense value is essentially moral value. However, morality presupposes other forms of valuation and, in man, is continuous with them. 9 To understand the notion of morality in a Whiteheadian sense is possible only by way of an understanding of the notion of experience.

In Process and Reality Whitehead states that "experience" is "the self enjoyment of being one among the many, and of being one arising out of the composition of the many". (Part II:6-1.) It is the case, as Lowe points out, that a subject which enjoys experience does not exist beforehand, nor is it created from without. 10 Such a subject (or self) is the product of its own creation or experiencing which is the same thing. One cannot fail to see that process,prehension or concrescence, etc. are general synonyms of experience. However, I think the term

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9 For Whitehead's rendering of the term "morality" see \textit{M}, pp. 11-29.

"experience" is more aptly applied to a definite act of process, pre-
hension, etc. In other words the term "experience" always implies a
 definite becoming. It removes us from the merely vague metaphysical
generalities to what is concrete and specific. When applied to the
self, experience implies a very definite structure of selfhood as
experiencing or enjoying. Thus experience in relation to the self is
a very definite act of self-composition. This is what the "I", in
effect, does in response to the various possibilities offered by the
"Me's". Whitehead states:

The point to be noticed is that the actual entity, [cf. the
self] in a state of process during which it is not fully
definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This
is the whole point of moral responsibility. Such a respons-
ibility is conditioned by the limits of the data, and the
categorial conditions of concrescence.11

What is important for our discussion is that on the concrescent
or processive view the self is essentially self-constituted, despite the
fact that its data are given. This is the essential paradox of an organic
time of human individuality — that a novel individual or self can
arise out of the conformal requirements of its past and so transcend
them. Hence, in man, the notion of morality is always bound up with
the individuals transcendence of all causal inheritance. In a nutshell
it must be seen that what really is enjoyed (i.e. primary enjoyment) in
human experience is the autonomous composition of the self. But this

11Whitehead, PR., p. 297.
is only possible where there is room for spontaneity and freedom. Morality therefore necessitates spontaneity and freedom. The fact is that, in Whitehead's manner of speaking, these values (functions of self-enjoyment) are already threads of the fabric of human individuality. What a society or historical context does is merely to weaken or strengthen these threads and to make them more prominent by making them more possible. And an entire loss of these cardinal elements of self-valuation (where this is possible) must mean the loss of essential (i.e. self-) identity.

Whitehead has not written a systematic treatise on morality. Nor will I attempt to systematize his many utterances on that subject. 12 I merely wish to point out that (1) there is in Whitehead an implicit distinction between moral and other types of values; (2) moral values are essentially the values of a self or human individual; (3) the cardinal aspects of morality appear to be spontaneity, autonomy and freedom; (4) that morality is essentially linked with self-composition, but is never oblivious of the societal context of individual becoming. When these points are understood it will be seen in the next chapter that the cardinal moral values are a necessary basis of the identification and integration of the self or human individual. For Whitehead, morality is no mere code, or rules of conduct; nor is it merely those patterns of behaviour which are usually exhibited in conformity with the demands of such codes. "Morality", he writes "consists in the control of process.

so as to maximize importance. It is the aim at greatness of experience in the various dimensions belonging to it . . . Morality is always the aim at that union of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of importance for that occasion."\(^\text{13}\) First, this definition of morality brings it in line with the general processive view of human reality -- "Morality consists in the control of process . . .". Here the idea of control is not arbitrary, nor is any form of coercion implied. In our discussion of the concrecent individual, it will be recalled, what controls a process of becoming is a subjective ideal called subjective aim. Applied to the self such a control is essentially an autonomous activity. The individual's I or Ego is always a subjective ideal entertained among the objective patterns presented for acting, like a person.

Second, "Morality consists in the control of process so as to maximize importance . . .". Importance is defined as "Interest involving the intensity of individual feeling which leads to publicity of expression."\(^\text{14}\) I have already spoken of importance as the individual's sense of worth. But Whitehead is not to be interpreted as advocating a mere interest theory of value or morality. Interest is used as a synonym of importance, but in either case there is a correlative dimension of worth which is implied. The notion of importance implies (a) a sense of worth arising from the experience of the unity of the universe which the individual in some sense is; (b) a sense of worth arising from the individual's experience of its own unity of becoming. The one cannot take place without

\(^{13}\) Whitehead, MT\(^*\), pp. 13-14.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., MT\(^*\), p. 8.
the other. Whitehead tends to restrict the term interest to mean the latter — an experience of "the individuality of details" as he calls it. When, in respect of the self, we regard morality as a sense of importance the sense of a dual significance is implied. The human individual is a mirror of the social universe to which he belongs, but he is also a unity of the human reality in his own right. His interest is therefore enhanced by his importance and his importance by his interest. A person is not only a one among the many, but he is the one arising out of the many. The universe (or the social order) is the perspective of individual importance, but even so it is a dead perspective unless it is internalized and interpreted according to the needs of a particular self. Morality is therefore not only the control of process, but as importance it is the aim of process — "The generic aim of process is the attainment of importance ...".

Third, "Morality is always the aim at the union of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of importance for that occasion". The notions of harmony and intensity remind us of the categories of subjective unity and subjective harmony as they function in a concrescence. In short, the fact of satisfaction (or what I have elsewhere called completion or fulfillment) is attendant upon moral being. Whitehead may here be interpreted as saying that morality is that mode of being which most effectively enhances the unity or integration of selfhood, but more it also intensifies and enriches one's sense of worth. We must therefore see the I as discussed as the result of one's continuous striving for the unification, not only of the many elements of the self, but of diverse discordant and antithetical elements. Where
such a unity is achieved we have a "rounding-out" or a "wholeness" of being. But morality is never a fixed way of being, it is always the result of constant striving. Perfection of selfhood is always achievable and never a settled achievement. However, in Whitehead, where progress in morality is marked with frequent success the self or individual develops what he calls "style". In the article "Immutability" he writes:

> The confusion of variety is transformed into the coordinated unity of a dominant character [or 'style']. The many become one, and by this miracle achieve a triumph of effectiveness — for good or for evil. This achievement is the essence of art and of moral purpose. The World of Fact would dissolve into the thinness of confusion apart from its modes of unity derived from its preservation of dominant characters of value.15

The upshot of this discussion, and in keeping with the discussion of value in respect of nexal reality is that morality is man's (specifically the individual's) adventure to stabilize his existence and his sense of worth by the only means possible, i.e. to make his values an enduring fact by the principle of reiteration. Where this is achieved the individual and his socio-historical context may be termed moral. Morality is therefore the means of the persistence of the essential values of the self through time as well as the realization and appreciation of those values.

It must be noted that morality is both tenuous and transitive. As a transitive fact the moral values of a self or society, quite apart from enhancing the fulfilment of individual being, are always something.

15 Whitehead, p. 256.
to be translated. By the principle of objectification what is withheld
dies, and what is transmitted is immortalized. In its tenuous aspect
morality is a harmony and a unity. It is the unity of essential values
and valuing leading to the integration or harmony of being. But as in
music so it is in human life, the general score or pattern may be
written but the interpretation and orchestration which produce a melody
involving unity and harmony are always a tenuous balancing of a number
of present factors in a living and present situation. Morality for
Whitehead is always a fact of present experiencing and never a mere
record of our past experience or the dull conformity to a record of that
past. On a view of individuality as a continuing occurrence morality
must of necessity be an act of continued achievement in self-realization
or self-formation which is the same.

In this chapter I have briefly discussed the matter of value in
its relation to individuality. First, I have argued that value is the
aim and result of process and can only endure by the process of reiteration.
Second, I have advanced the view that the individual is the focus of
value and that high achievement in individuality consists in the active
and conscious reconstruction of the conformal data of one's society. A
peculiar sense of significance is attendant upon such an achievement.
Third, I have stated that the individual and society require each other
and that society should "personalize" rather than "individualize" the
individual. Fourth, I have discussed morality as the essentially human
values and that it entails those spontaneous and autonomous functions
of self-composition without which man is not the creator of his own being.

It now remains for me to view the matter of contemporary individuality
in the next chapter.
VALUE AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE

No people can live without valuing. Valuing is creating; hear it ye creative ones! Without valuation the nut of existence is hollow. Hear it, ye creative one. Nietzsche

I do not wish to quote Nietzsche out of context, but his remarks here cited do express a truth concerning human life and existence — "Without valuation the nut of existence is hollow". This insight seems to be amply supported by a number of factors. First, the general trend of existentialist development in contemporary philosophy tacitly or explicitly is a concern with valuation in the sense of the individual's adersive or aversive experience of personal worth. Second, the general field of psychoanalysis (and its allied disciplines) may be seen as a search after the correlation between human anxiety and valuation. Third, the aberrant use of technology has now led to the raising of the question of the place of so-called humanist values in the life of the individual.

Although these points will not be systematically discussed, they may be offered as a general background against which we may ask certain questions concerning processive ontology. Is Whitehead's insistence on the basic ontological status of value justifiable? Cannot the facts of becoming and perdurance be adequately explained without an emphasis on value? Is he right in his insistence that the individual is the locus of value? In so far as I may claim to understand Whitehead's purpose I maintain that these questions may be affirmatively answered. In chapter two (p. 25f) it was mentioned that Whitehead's earlier attempt
to frame a comprehensive notion by which nature may be explained was only a limited success. Leclerc tells us that this was so since his concept of nature was tailored to suit a particular viewpoint of science. His later recognition of the somewhat arbitrary restriction of nature to fact led him to transform the concept of "event" into the notion of "actual entity". This move seems to suggest that Whitehead sought to fill out what was a lack in the scientific view or to acknowledge the wider scope of metaphysical pursuits.

Be that as it may. It is my judgement that organic ontology seeks to correct the scientific fallacy — viz., that value is not as real as fact. This is the negative cast of the positive thesis of his article "Immortality". But more, it is my reasoned opinion that his entire ontology is intended to be a restoration of the human individual to a place of peculiar worth in the scheme of things. Hence human experience becomes the paradigm of real events. It was for him, not only a paradox but a parody, that science and technology, as the great achievements of modern man, have diminished man's sense of being in the world. The final justification of process ontology must be that it gives us an explanation of events by which experience is enriched and a sense of worth is returned to the individual human being. And here Nietzsche is right — there can be no sense of significance without creative valuation.

In these closing pages I should like to focus, in a practical way, on two things: (1) valuation and experience; (2) personality and
integration. My approach will be by way of the problem of what Rollo
May calls "vacuous existence".¹

May's general contention is that the contemporary individual is
the product (or victim) of a civilization and a lifestyle which rob him
of or make it easy for him to lose his sense of worth or significance.
This loss is not only a loss of values, but also a loss of the sense of
valuation. In the scientific civilization with a technological culture
and an industrial-oriented lifestyle the traditionally human or moral
values become vague and are so blurred that they fall away from the
focus of individual existence. The contemporary individual then loses
his sense of significance of which these values are the basis. He does
not know who he is, what he is for, or where he is going. The resultant
state of consciousness is what May calls "vacuous".

May's thesis on which this general argument is advanced is that
there is a problematic feature to man's existence. As he puts it, "The
human dilemma is that which arises out of man's capacity to experience
himself as both subject and object at the same time".² And, consciousness
is a process of oscillation between the two modes of existence. To
ground human existence merely in any one mode is to commit the fallacy
of over-simplification (nimis simplicandum as he calls it). But this
is precisely what many contemporary views of the human individual have
directly or indirectly done.

¹See Rollo May's Psychology and the Human Dilemma, New York:

²Ibid., p. 8.
He criticizes two representative views of man. The one is Skinnerian which views man as an object and as the product of conditioning factors. Here the individual is always controlled and even the subjective activities of thoughts, purposes, etc. are subsumed under external control factors by regarding them as the mere response to stimuli. The other is the Hegelian view of man as essentially rational. The view is Rousseausque and over-emphasizes the subjective nature of man as a rational being. It subsumes all objective conditions under internal control. May rejects both, or rather advocates a balance between the two views since he sees human existence as a paradoxical (dialectical) balance between subjectivity and objectivity. We have already discussed this realtion between the ME and the I.

A point which must here be made is that, in so far as the principles of process ontology may be applied to human experience and existence, the superjective nature both of being and of valuation must be kept in mind. The individual is a subject arising out of many objective conditions and in turn becomes the objective condition of another's becoming. Likewise is the function of valuation (or experience) an act of creative self-enjoyment. Thus valuation is subjective, but what is achieved in subjective freshness is now a store of conformal data in the emergence of new events. Our viewpoint therefore agrees with May's that human experience and existence are an oscillation between the dimensions of subjectivity and objectivity. It is in terms of the conscious movement between these two poles of being that May (and rightly so) tends to define human freedom. He writes — "My freedom, in any genuine sense, lies not in my capacity to live as 'pure subject',
but rather in my capacity to experience both modes, to live in the dialectic relationship.\(^3\)

The underlying thrust of May's contention is that our civilization, culture and lifestyle are conformal. They dam up the flow of man's moral being. They nullify spontaneity, curtail autonomy and make a travesty of freedom. Where these cardinal values are removed or minimized a lowered sense of significance is followed by a lowered sense of moral responsibility. He writes, "The point I wish to make is that when people feel their insignificance as individual persons, they also suffer an undermining of their sense of human [we may say moral] responsibility."\(^4\) The real danger is that this diminished sense of moral responsibility leads to a diminished sense of consciousness -- of who we are, where we are and what we are for. It must be recalled that in our earlier discussion it is self-awareness which constitutes our essential human beingness, and, on may add, our essential sense of being moral. The processive view is therefore opposed to any view of individuality which minimizes or negates the importance of values in human experience. But especially against the negation or displacement of moral values. In a manner of speaking it may be argued that man is his own maker only in so far as he is a moral agent.

\(^3\) May, PHD., p. 9; see also note \#1, p. 21.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 31.
Attendant upon the discussion of the last section is the fact that the loss of significance or the sense of valuation nearly always leads to the disintegration of personality and the loss of personal identity. The three most prominent modes of these aberrations in contemporary culture are anxiety, alienation and anomie. Although we cannot discuss the nature of these maladies of individuality, it must be very clearly stated that they represent the fragmentation of human personality or selfhood. This consideration raises the question of identity and integration. We have already discussed these related problems from a philosophical point-of-view and in respect of Hume's dilemma. The question is here raised from a psychological point-of-view and in specific relation to our everyday experience. What, we may ask, is the accustomed mode of our experience of ourselves? In other words — are self-unity and self-identity a fact of being human?

If one examines the details of May's argument from psychology, that of Karen Horney from psychoanalysis, and that of Paul Tillich from philosophical theology, it will become evident that these authors assume the essential unity and identity of the self. Further, their assumption is justified by the facts of our everyday experience. However, their various theories correlate the neglect, denial and destruction of essential values with loss of identity and fragmentation of personality.

It is a fact of experience that where essential human (i.e. moral) values are intact, in the sense of being deeply internalized, personal unity and identity persist even in traumatic experiences. It appears then that essential values tend to offer the individual a safeguard against the loss of identity and the disintegration of personality. They are the mainspring of the renewal of the individual’s sense of being.

In the last chapter I identified the values of spontaneity, autonomy and freedom as cardinal moral values. I did this because these acts of valuation are germane to any sense of individuality, and in the human sense they must be seen as the essence of morality. Does process ontology have any word for us on this matter of identity and integration? The answer is yes. As we have discussed them, the doctrines of actual entity, prehension, concrescence and nexus reality all speak of the individual as an identifiable and integrated unit. Also a close examination of the obligatory categories will show that they make the fact of experience (or valuation) to be an adventure in identity and integration. In as much then as values are essential to individual unity and integration Whitehead has done well in making value to be the essence of individuality and the aim of process.

Our view of individuality tends also to expose the fact of the vacuous existence of the contemporary man in as much as he is a victim of anxiety, alienation and anomie — as forms of self-estrangement. But the processive and concrescent view of individuality does more. It challenges the individual and social planners not only to safeguard essential value, but to cultivate the art of valuation. It is in the activity of valuing that man is creative in the specifically human sense.
of that word. And where we value because we have essential values the "crisis of identity" and the "blight of personality disintegration" will exist in theory but not in fact.

The concrecent individual, as we have discussed him, is both a subject and an object. As a subject he is the enjoyment of his own experience and the author of his own being. He does not merely respond to objective conditions, but he initiates within himself a novel and significant pattern of becoming. As an object he determines in his own being every future line of becoming which bears the marks of his influence. It should be the pride of every human individual that this oscillation of existence is attended by consciousness. Man can be consciously a subject and an object. Where the harmonious balance is achieved between all conscious forms of existence and where effective (creative) valuation is a factor of such forms of consciousness the individual is said to be genuine or aesthetic. It is only for such an individual that life is truth, goodness and beauty. And every act of experience becomes an adventure for the maximizing of value, an adventure from which there is no rest although it rewards the adventurer with the gift of being at peace with himself.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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**Books by Whitehead**


Books on Whitehead


Other Volumes


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