KOREANS IN JAPAN
THE VARIATIONS OF CHE JU DO
KOREAN LIFE STYLES
IN
TOKYO, JAPAN

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an exploratory study of life style variations among Koreans in Tokyo, Japan. The sample of Koreans, whose cultural origin is Che Ju Do, an island located off the southwest coast of South Korea, is classified into three groups: the first-generation which migrated to Japan prior to the end of World War II; the second-generation whose members were all born in Tokyo as offspring of the first group; and the recent migrant group which migrated to Japan since the end of World War II.

While the first-generation and the recent migrant groups show similar life styles regardless of their age difference, the second-generation group shows life styles markedly different from the first two groups and discloses a wider variation of life styles within the group than within each of the other two groups.

The milieu experienced by Koreans in Japan is bicultural, affecting each of the three groups differently. The first-generation and the recent migrant groups show stable life styles. The Korean cultural referent is a symbol in terms of which they articulate the Korean locus of interpretation and personal and ego identities. Concurrently, Koreans of these groups develop a conceptual and emotional separation from the Japanese domain. As a result, they are
unlikely to experience marginality.

The same milieu, however, is a constant source of personal trouble for the second-generation group. This is largely due to their ill-defined identification with either the Japanese or the Korean domain. Adopting Korean or Japanese identity and the Korean locus or the Japanese locus of interpretation becomes a serious personal issue. Hence, this group is likely to experience marginality.

The theme of this dissertation concerns individuals' subjective interpretations of their sociocultural situations as expressed in the variety of life styles and in the strategies used to maintain them. The theoretical assumptions explain the development and maintenance of the relationships among culture, society, and individuals in terms of the following concepts: life style, ethnic identity, locus of interpretation, passing, marginality, and the bicultural milieu. How these concepts and their properties are interconnected with particular sociocultural, historical, and politicoeconomic conditions reveal the differences and similarities of the life styles of these three groups.
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My interest in the Korean problems in Japan is personal. While growing up in Tokyo, I was troubled with my ethnic identity issues. I found Anthropology to be most fitting to my interest in the Korean problems in Japan. My interest was duly recognized and consistently supported by my advisor, Professor Matthew Cooper of McMaster University. I owe him much for assisting me in accomplishing my original goal. Also, I would like to thank Professors Richard Preston and William Shaffir for being consistently supportive members of my dissertation committee over so many years. I am also indebted to Professor Jack Lucas of Central Connecticut State University for his warm appraisal of my earlier draft when I was in doubt.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is the product of native anthropologist fieldwork among a small group of Koreans in Tokyo, Japan. These Koreans have developed varying life styles as they interpret their life situations (see Hannerz 1969). Their subjective world, expressed by varying life styles, reveals the interaction between the cultural referent, Che Ju Do, South Korea, and the adverse sociocultural milieu in Japan (De Vos and Lee 1981c; and Jacobson 1979).

The basic assumptions of symbolic interactionism are pertinent to this dissertation. The fieldwork data was gathered in terms of participant observation and individuals' accounts of their experiences. The fieldwork objective was an exploratory study on Korean life style variations. The interactionist assumptions are well suited to the fieldwork data and objective.

The assumptions are stated as follows: (1) society is an interactive process; (2) this interaction among individuals produces, shapes, maintains, and changes the
society; (3) the individuals develop their concepts of self through interaction with one another; and (4) the interaction involves their symbolic interpretations of their own behavior and others' (Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin 1975: 4).

G.H. Mead adds an historical and social structural aspect to these assumptions. The social process of interaction among individuals must exist "in advance of the existence of minds and selves" (1934:227). The social process contains an inherent sense of history and social structure; interaction among individuals involves much more than the immediate and direct communication among them. There must be a priori, symbols and meanings, in existence as a situation in terms of which the individuals interact.

Their interaction generates a series of situations; their varying life styles result from their interpretations of such situations; and these situations reflect their particular sociocultural milieu and history (Mead 1934; Thomas 1951; Blumer 1937, 1962, and 1969; A. Strauss 1959; H.S. Becker 1966; and Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin 1975). Hence, life styles reveal connections between the subjective world and its sociocultural situations (see Mills 1959).

The situations of Koreans in Japan include ethnic identity, locus of interpretation, passing, marginality, and bicultural milieu. For instance, a Korean life style, centered on Korean identity and the Korean locus of
interpretation is linked to the absence of marginality and the interpretation of passing as a survival strategy. On the other hand, a Korean lifestyle lacking a well-defined identification with either Korea or Japan is linked to marginality and the interpretation of passing as a way to be accepted by the majority (Japanese) group. These are core concepts that shape the theme of this dissertation and will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

Much has been written in the Japanese language about Koreans in Japan: Izumi's pioneering work (1966) portraying the social life of Koreans of Che Ju Do origin in Tokyo; Hatada's works (1969 and 1976) and Sato's works (1971 and 1974 with Wada) concerning the sociocultural and economic problems of Koreans in Japan; Ozawa's work (1973) on the problems of Korean ethnic education; and Iwamura's work (1972) and Pak's work (1973) on the political history of Koreans in Japan. However, these works are not primarily concerned with exploring the subjective world of Koreans in Japan.

Works in English are limited: Wagner (1951), Mitchell (1967), Lee (1971 and 1976), and Lee and De Vos (1981a). These are historical and political studies and are contributions to this much neglected aspect of Japanese society today; the Korean ethnic and alien minority in Japan has received little notice in the English-speaking world.

The most recent work by Lee and De Vos (1981a) makes
a major contribution to the neglected aspects of Japanese society, for its ambitious objectives cover all aspects of the Korean problems in Japan today. The third section of their work is most pertinent to this dissertation, as it is concerned with the psychocultural problems of being Korean in Japan (De Vos and Chung 1981; Lee and De Vos 1981b; Wetherall 1981; Wagatsuma 1981; Sasaki and Wagatsuma 1981; and De Vos and Lee 1981c).

In their conclusions, De Vos and Lee (1981c:361) state that Korean ethnicity, or ethnicity in general, must be approached from both "instrumental" motives --- individuals' search for personal advantage --- and "expressive" motives --- the primordial sentiments of one's ethnic origin. A primordial sentiment "stems from the 'givens'" (Geertz 1973:259) of sociocultural facts, such as a particular language, religion, community, and ritual, and affects individuals more than social interaction (Ibid.: 260). Their approach and other approaches to ethnicity will be discussed in Chapter Two.

In the following section, I shall briefly introduce the Korean problems in Japan.
The Korean Problems in Japan

The Korean population in Japan numbered 643,000 as of 1974. This figure, according to the Japanese Ministry of Justice (1975), was 86% of the total alien population of more than 745,000. The Japanese population was more than 112 million as of 1974. Although the Japanese generally believe that their society is culturally homogeneous (see De Vos and Lee 1981c), four per cent of the Japanese population is accorded some form of minority status, such as Burakumin or Eta, Ainu, and mixed bloods or Konketsujin (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966; Wetherall 1981; Wagatsuma 1976; and Burkhardt 1983). However, these minority groups hold Japanese citizenship, whereas Koreans in Japan are considered an alien group (Lee 1971 and 1976; and De Vos and Lee 1981a).

De Vos and Lee (1981c) state that the plight of Koreans in Japan is "not simply a result of 'class exploitation,'" and that their plight is historically a "reaction to racist-caste thinking of a type peculiar to the Japanese" (Ibid.:358). One consequence is that Korean youths are likely to experience self-hate and self-doubt because of ethnic discrimination and their conflict with "Japanization" (Wagatsuma 1981; and also see Sasaki and Wagatsuma 1981). De Vos and Lee state that "the Koreans are relatively too small a force [for a political mobilization], and their general lack of citizenship is a principal handicap" (1981:361).
As a viable solution to the plight of Koreans in Japan, Rohlen (1981) and De Vos and Lee (1981c) suggest "centrist positions." These positions promote an identification with Korean heritage and independence from the regimes in South and North Korea, and envision a pluralist Japan. Some of the implications of the "centrist positions" in terms of my sample of Koreans will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

The definition of Koreans in Japan today as an ethnic and alien group (Lee 1971; and Lee and De Vos 1981a) structurally alienates them from participating in the mainstream of Japanese political and economic systems. This definition also helps to perpetuate general Japanese prejudices against the Koreans. Historically, however, Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 transformed Koreans into Japanese nationals, and they remained so until the end of World War II. Korean migration to Japan between 1910 and 1945 dramatically increased through voluntary and forced migration.[1]

The legacy of the Korean presence in Japan dates back to pre-historic times. Japanese scholars (Ishida 1958, 1969, 1975a, 1975b, and 1975c; Egami 1962 and 1975; Suzuki 1975 and 1976; Ueda 1969a, 1969b, and 1969c; and Ono 1962) contend that the populations of southern Korea, of middle and southern China, and of Japan during the Jomon period (Japan's hunting-gathering-fishing period, lasting thousands
of years until 400 B.C.) evolved into a hybrid population, that is today's Japanese population.

A dominant view among Japanese scholars holds that irrigation-agriculture in Japan, during the Yayoi period (400 B.C. - 400 A.D.), was started by migrants, most likely directly from southwestern Korea, middle and southern China (Egami 1962 and 1975; Oka, ed. 1958; Suzuki 1976; and Ishida 1958, 1969, and 1975a). Thereafter, Korean migration to Japan has been continuous to the present (Egami 1975; Ishida 1969; Suzuki 1976; Tamura 1969; Osa 1969; and Saeki 1969).

By the end of World War II in 1945, the Korean population in Japan, according to one source (Wagner 1951), exceeded 2.4 million. With the end of World War II, Koreans became liberated from Japanese domination, and all but approximately 600,000 Koreans in Japan returned to Korea.

Those who remained and those who were born in Japan thereafter constitute the current Korean ethnic minority. Subsequently, they lost Japanese citizenship previously accorded to them under Japan's colonial policy. At the same time, these Koreans became politically subjected to either the South Korean or the North Korean regime.

Today, there are two Korean political organizations in Japan, each representing one or the other regime in Korea: Soren (in Japanese) or Chongnyon (in Korean) (the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan/Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai); and Mindan (both in Japanese and
Korean) (the South Korean Resident Association in Japan/Zainichi Daikanminkoku Kyoryu Mindan) (Lee 1971 and 1981d). The ideological conflict between Soren and Mindan is added obstacles to Korean ethnicity issues in Japan, a subject which will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Outright employment discrimination against Koreans exists in Japan today (Lee 1971; Sato and Wada 1974; Rohlen 1981; De Vos and Chung 1981; and Lee and De Vos 1981b). Although opportunities for higher Japanese education exist for them, the education usually does not lead them to obtain employment in Japanese companies, as is usually the case for the Japanese (Rohlen 1981).

Those Koreans born in Japan, constituting 75% of the Korean population there (Lee 1981e), are culturally Japanese; however, their identification with Japan is structurally impossible because of their ethnic and alien group status. Hence, they are likely to experience a marginal status in which both Korean and Japanese identities generate an identity conflict (Lee 1971; S. Kim 1974; and Wagatsuma 1981).

In general, life chances for Koreans in Japan are constrained by Korean ethnicity and the Japanese prejudice and discrimination against them (see De Vos and Lee 1981c). In particular, Koreans of my sample have developed strategies and means for survival: passing for Japanese, a business-oriented urban association, and the continuity of
Thus far, I have briefly introduced the most significant socioeconomic, political, historical, and cultural aspects of the Korean problems in Japan today. These aspects will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four. In the next section, I shall introduce the people whom I studied during my fieldwork.

People

My fieldwork was conducted between June and December of 1976. A total of 341 individuals were observed or interviewed. Included in this number were eighteen non-Korean females (seventeen Japanese and one Chinese) who were either married to or living with Korean males in the study. The subjects in the study lived in a few neighboring wards of Tokyo, Japan. One significant factor shared as the place of origin by all these Koreans is Che Ju Do, an island located off the southwest coast of South Korea.

I have classified my sample of Koreans into three major groups: the first-generation, the second-generation, and the recent migrant group. The first-generation Koreans were in their late teens to early twenties when they came to Tokyo from a few neighboring fishing and agricultural villages in Che Ju Do during the 1930s and 1940s. This period was the last phase of Japan's domination of Korea. Koreans
of the second-generation group were born and raised in Tokyo, as children of the first-generation Koreans. Because of their kinship, the second-generation Koreans are classified, according to the Japanese Immigration Law, as Koreans, thus, aliens, regardless of their birth in Japan. Lastly, the recent migrant Koreans are those who were born and raised in the above-mentioned Che Ju Do villages and who came to Tokyo, in their teens to early twenties, during the 1950s and 1960s.

I have categorized my sample of Koreans into these three groups according to the following factors: (1) different age-cohorts, specifically pertaining to the two generations; (2) different birth places, Che Ju Do and Tokyo; (3) different primary-socialization experiences particularly significant in terms of one's ethnic locus of interpretation and ethnic identity; and (4) different times of entry into Japan. As for the last factor, the first-generation Koreans' arrival in Japan prior to the end of World War II, secured their legal resident status, whereas the recent migrant Koreans' arrival since then, put them in the illegal resident category. The legality of their resident status has a significant impact on their life styles, and its impact will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six.

Without going into much detail, it suffices to mention that the first-generation Koreans have rather successfully managed ethnic discrimination. As a common
strategy, they pass for Japanese. Their passing allows them to establish small businesses involving transactions with unsuspecting Japanese. They have maintained their kinship ties in Tokyo as well as with relatives in Che Ju Do. They have created and have actively participated in a business-oriented urban association, whose membership criterion is a Che Ju Do village background. Furthermore, they have maintained traditional Che Ju Do rituals, the most significant of which is chesa — a traditional ritual held by a family once a year to commemorate the patrilineal ancestors up to five generations back (see Izumi 1966).

In short, they have developed in Tokyo a subculture, which is defined here as a cultural pattern of a group that is distinct from the mainstream culture "only to the extent that [individuals] participate in exclusive communication channels" (Shibutani and Kwan 1965:59).

While the recent migrant Koreans, in general, follow the first-generation pattern of adaptation, the second-generation Koreans generally do not follow the same pattern; they have a different set of problems. They are culturally Japanese, but their Korean status disqualifies them from participating in the mainstream of Japanese society. Hence, they are torn between Korean and Japanese identities, and their ethnic identity conflict generates personal problems (Lee 1971, 1976, and 1981f; S. Kim 1974; De Vos and Lee 1981c; and Rohlen 1981).
In the next section, I shall describe my personal background as it is related to the selection of the particular subject and my fieldwork.

**Fieldwork**

I spent a total of six months in the field. My fieldwork objective was to gather data concerning life styles of a small group of Koreans in Tokyo. My fieldwork consisted of participant observation and the collection of individual Koreans' accounts of their experiences.

Within the short duration of my fieldwork, I was able to gather enough data for my dissertation because of three factors: (1) I am a Korean born in Tokyo and lived there for twenty years, thus being a part of the second-generation Korean group; (2) I was well aware of Korean identity conflict and employment discrimination in Japan through my personal experiences as a Korean and my reading of literature on the subjects; and (3) I had made a number of short trips to Tokyo prior to my fieldwork so that I could keep my friendship with some of the Koreans under study.

As an adolescent growing up in Tokyo, I experienced an identity conflict. My schooling in both a Korean educational system and a Japanese educational system made it difficult for me to take one or the other ethnic identity.
One problem for me then was why both ethnic identities had to be incompatible. I had both Japanese and Korean friends. But I found myself playing two social roles: I related to my Japanese friends as a Japanese, at times, consciously concealing my Korean background, and I related to my Korean friends as a Korean, while feeling rather uneasy about being a Korean. My experience of identity conflict motivated me to study sociology and anthropology in the United States and Canada, and it shaped the direction for my fieldwork and dissertation.

My fieldwork was, thus, a situation of a native anthropologist studying his own people. Traditionally, anthropologists have done fieldwork among strangers. Experiences and problems derived from traditional fieldwork are different from those that native anthropologists encounter (Henry 1963; Freilich 1970; Kelman 1980; and Asad 1980).

Honigmann (1976:249) contends that the way the anthropologist observes and presents his subject matter, depends on the nature of his subject matter, his own cultural experiences, values, characteristics, and, in general, his background. In other words, data which the anthropologist acquires, are but a set of his constructs, and they are a result of his selective perception and reflection (Ibid.: 245-6).

Geertz (1973:20-1) proposes a pertinent view in this regard. He states that anthropological description is "thick
description." Thick description is interpretive, selective, and microscopic. Also, it is second and third order interpretation, because "only a 'native' makes first order interpretations" (Ibid.:15). Geertz further argues that the anthropologist is concerned with discovering meaning of a social discourse in its native context (Ibid.:20-1). Hence, it is unrealistic to seek perfection of consensus in an understanding of meaning among anthropologists; their discoveries of meaning differ, because their interests and interpretations differ (Ibid.:29). Consequently, both Geertz (1973:29) and Honigmann (1976:250) propose, as the goal of their interpretive approach, to seek cogency, logic, persuasiveness, and a refinement of debate.

Henry, a native anthropologist doing fieldwork in his native America, explicitly states: "This [Culture Against Man] is not an objective description of America, but rather a passionate ethnography; the emphasis is on description and interpretation rather than on program for change" (1963:3). My approach is compatible with those of Henry (1963), Honigmann (1976), and Geertz (1973). I set out to do my fieldwork in order to understand the subjective world of the Koreans, and my understanding and description of their subjective world are affected by my own personal experiences of identity conflict. In short, I wanted to sort out my experiences of being a Korean in Japan, by studying other Koreans. Hence, such concepts as life style, ethnic
identity, locus of interpretation, marginality, passing as a type of assimilation, and living in a bicultural milieu are very important to my study: they directly pertain to the empirical reality of my study.

However, I was also conscious, as an anthropologist, of the need to differentiate my interpretations from my subjects' interpretations (see Freilich 1970; and Kelman 1980). I proceeded to secure a degree of objectivity by putting my interpretations in the contexts of my subjects' sociocultural, politicoeconomic, and historical conditions (see Chapters Three and Four). In Mills' terms (1959:3-8), I was interested in the intersection of Koreans' personal experiential accounts and history, or of the "personal troubles of milieu" and the "public issues of social structure."

Admittedly some of my personal biases have influenced my interpretations of the subject matter. My presentation of the two Korean political organizations, Soren and Mindan, has tended to be unsupportive of their ideological causes, because I have come to regard both organizations as major obstacles to social and personal survival and achievement for Koreans. In the same vein I also think that the Japanese government's treatment of, and general Japanese prejudices and discrimination against, Koreans have retarded their welfare. Also, my description of Japanese society may not be as objective as one might wish,
because I have described it from a second-generation Korean's point of view.

During my fieldwork, my wife and I stayed at the house of my friend, CCH, whose case study will be described in Chapter Seven. I spent a great deal of time talking with him and visiting his friends and relatives and their friends and relatives. This was basically how I mapped out my sample of Koreans. I attended, whenever I was invited, their urban association meetings, one field trip organized by this association, several chesa occasions, and one wedding.

I spent the most amount of time with Koreans of the second-generation group. Some of them showed enthusiasm in discussing the issues of ethnic identity, Korean politics, and ethnic discrimination. My self-identification as a second-generation Korean made them feel at ease with me. This situation afforded me the largest amount of data on the second-generation group.

I found that I could not be as direct in my interviews with the first-generation and recent migrant groups. My age and status (a son of a first-generation male) were obstacles in any questions that were personal in nature. The exception to this was a few interviews with university-educated individuals from the migrant group. My strategy was to drop in on recent migrant or first-generation Koreans, at their homes where they worked, manufacturing luggage. This was the most common occupation among these Koreans. I sat in
their work places, helped them with their work at times, and listened to what they talked about. They usually gossiped about their relatives, especially their relatives' financial situations and marriages, and about their work and their future prospects in Japan. All this time, I felt unable to ask them direct questions concerning their views on ethnic identity, ethnic discrimination, or passing.

One structural constraint I felt on those occasions was my junior status: all of them were older than I, and the senior traditionally would not talk directly to the junior. Hence, I gathered data on the first-generation group and some of the recent migrant group as they volunteered their personal accounts. Their voluntary accounts came when they were talking among their peers and my presence was tolerated.

As for those university-educated individuals of the recent migrant group, although they were senior to me, I was able to ask direct questions: "How do you relate to a Japanese while doing business?", or; "How do you pass for a Japanese and how do you feel about that?", or; "Do you plan to stay in Japan permanently? If so, what do you think your future will be?", or; "How did you get your current job?" The primary reason was, I felt, that they regarded me as an intellectual equal and felt free to share their educated views on the Korean problems and their personal experiences.
HHS, a recent migrant and Japanese-university-educated Korean, repeatedly stressed two terms, "authentic Korean" and "inauthentic Korean" during our discussions. By "authentic Korean", HHS meant one who has had actual living experiences in Che Ju Do or in other parts of Korea and is primordially attached to the location. By "inauthentic Korean", he meant one who has not had such living experiences and has no primordial attachment to any location in Korea; yet, one's heritage is Korean.

By implication, the "authentic Korean" is one with a clear ethnic identity and, thus, is free from anxiety (see Antonovsky 1960; and also see for a similar use of authenticity in Maruyama 1973; and Novak 1973). HHS has defined authenticity and inauthenticity in these terms, and I have adopted his definitions for their substantive value in relation to the subject matter. For instance, many of my informants also discussed their ethnic identity in terms of their degree of attachment to Che Ju Do, although they actually did not articulate their thoughts as HHS did.

My fieldwork was originally guided by several concepts: ethnic identity, ethnic discrimination, bicultural milieu, and passing. These were concepts which I had used, prior to my fieldwork, to understand my own ethnic experiences in Japan (see S. Kim 1974). I did not have a well-organized theoretical perspective, except for my awareness that my original concepts were interrelated. I intended to
clarify my original concepts in a theoretically integrated manner and to discover additional concepts in the field: later, concepts such as life style, marginality, and locus of interpretation were added. A full discussion of these concepts and how they are interrelated are the main subject of Chapter Two.

In short, my fieldwork was an exercise to discover a grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967 and 1970). Glaser and Strauss (1967 and 1970) argue that there is no sharp line between data collection and data analysis. These are contiguously carried out, and their distinction is a "continual blurring and intertwining" (1970:288).

As a result of my fieldwork, I have discovered a grounded theory about the social life of Koreans in Tokyo, Japan. This theory was generated by constructing conceptual categories, such as the core concepts, which can be aided by the native concepts, such as HHS's "authentic and inauthentic Koreans." Thus, I was able to make statements meaningful to my subjects. I shall present my discoveries based on my fieldwork first, which will be discussed in detail in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven.

There are three discoveries:

(1) Korean life styles are likely to vary in terms of ethnic identity and two loci of interpretation, the Korean locus and the Japanese locus. Koreans articulate these loci in conjunction with such factors as age-cohorts,
birth places, primary-socialization experiences, different times of entry into Japan, and different educational institutions attended (the last factor applicable to the second-generation Koreans and some of the recent migrant Koreans);

(2) The second-generation Koreans are more likely to disclose a wide range of life style variation within their own group than the other two groups of Koreans because of the former's undifferentiated identification with both Japan and Korea;

(3) In contrast, the first-generation and recent migrant groups of Koreans are apt to reflect more stability in their life styles than the second-generation Koreans. They are prepared to commit themselves to Korean identity as they articulate the Korean locus of interpretation.

In this dissertation, I do not claim that my data and analysis cover the total Korean population in Japan. In fact, my data and analysis are limited to the small number of Koreans, totalling 341, whom I actually studied during my fieldwork. I have not studied the second-generation socialization patterns at home, or the lack of the first-generation's communication of life style strategies (see Chapters Four and Eight for further discussion); it is my hope that the exploratory nature of my dissertation will generate a set of conceptual ideas for future systematic studies of the given subject.
Thus far, I have introduced the people whom I studied during my fieldwork and their general problems and characteristics. I have described my personal background, personal input, and my fieldwork, and I have defined this dissertation as an exploratory study, an exercise in discovering a grounded theory. In this perspective, I have presented the three discoveries.

In the following and final section, I shall describe the organization of the chapters.

The Organization of the Chapters

The organization of the chapters of this dissertation is dictated by the nature of the subject matter. The analysis of Korean problems in Japan, insofar as the English-speaking world is concerned, is a new subject. Therefore, I have introduced the problems in the first chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE defines the Korean problems as those of ethnicity and briefly reviews representative works on ethnicity. Then I discuss in a theoretically integrated manner the core concepts: lifestyle, locus of interpretation, ethnic identity, marginality, passing as a type of assimilation, and living in a bicultural milieu. The discussion will show how varying interrelationships of these concepts disclose life style
variations among Koreans. A case study is introduced and examined in order to show how these core concepts are pertinent to an understanding of the Korean experience in Japan. In sum, this chapter shows a theoretical perspective in terms of which the variations of Korean life styles are discovered.

CHAPTER THREE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOREANS AND THE JAPANESE examines the historical and ideological roots of the mutual animosity between Koreans and the Japanese in Japan. The examination is placed in the context of international political conflict, such as Japan's invasion of Korea, the Cold War, and the Korean War, so that the Korean-Japanese animosity is seen as a product of the conflict. This chapter provides a contextual basis in terms of which the variations of Korean life styles are analyzed.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN compares the socioeconomic conditions of the entire Korean population in Japan with those of my sample of Koreans, so as to assess my sample's relative socioeconomic conditions. This assessment sheds light on the relationship between such conditions and the variations of Korean life styles.

CHAPTER FIVE: VARIATIONS OF KOREAN LIFE STYLES I: THE FIRST-GENERATION KOREANS examines the life styles of the first-generation Koreans of my sample and shows how their life styles can be stable and predictable.
CHAPTER SIX: VARIATIONS OF KOREAN LIFE STYLES II:
The Recent Migrant Koreans examines the life styles of the recent migrant Koreans and shows how they have adopted, under difficult legal circumstances, the first-generation strategy for survival.

CHAPTER SEVEN: VARIATIONS OF KOREAN LIFE STYLES III:
The Second-Generation Koreans examines a wide range of life style variations among the second-generation Koreans and analyzes how these variations emerge for this group.

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS summarizes the thesis of this dissertation and examines the utility of the theoretical perspective based on the core concepts for this study. Further research objectives will be proposed: Korean politics in Japan, Korean education, and nationality and assimilation.
Note:
[1].

Table 1

Number of Koreans Forced to Work in Japan
(1939-1945)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coal mining</th>
<th>Ore mining</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Stevedoring</th>
<th>Factory &amp; others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>24,279</td>
<td>5,042</td>
<td>9,479</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>38,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>35,441</td>
<td>8,069</td>
<td>9,898</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>54,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>32,415</td>
<td>8,942</td>
<td>9,563</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2,672</td>
<td>53,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>78,660</td>
<td>9,240</td>
<td>18,130</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15,290</td>
<td>121,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>77,850</td>
<td>17,075</td>
<td>35,350</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>19,455</td>
<td>149,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>108,350</td>
<td>30,900</td>
<td>64,827</td>
<td>23,820</td>
<td>151,850</td>
<td>379,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>136,810</td>
<td>34,060</td>
<td>29,642</td>
<td>15,333</td>
<td>114,044</td>
<td>329,889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 493,005 113,258 176,889 39,153 304,857 1,129,812

(Source: Pak 1973, vol.2:33)
CHAPTER TWO

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter, I shall develop a theoretical perspective in terms of which the Korean ethnic problems are analyzed. These problems are defined as fundamentally ethnic problems with a variety of sociocultural, political, economic, and personal trappings. The theoretical perspective is based on six core concepts: life style, locus of interpretation, ethnic identity, passing as a type of assimilation, marginality, and living in a bicultural milieu. Workings of the interrelationships among these core concepts are postulated to account for Korean life style variations.

First, I shall briefly present representative works on ethnicity.

Ethnicity

Works on ethnicity are voluminous and show a variety of analyses. However, some clear perspectives have emerged.
E.A.T. Barth and Noel (1972) identify four theoretical perspectives: the race-cycle, the consensus, the interdependence, and the conflict perspectives.

The race-cycle perspective proposes that ethnic relations follow an evolutionary process of contact, competition, accommodation, and assimilation (E. Barth and Noel 1972:335; and see R. Park 1950). The consensus perspective states that a multi-ethnic society maintains stability through a "high degree of value consensus" among ethnic groups (E. Barth and Noel 1972:338; and see Shils 1956; and Kornhauser 1960).

The interdependence perspective holds that a multi-ethnic society, as a social system, depends on the process of interaction among ethnic groups. Their interaction is possible because the achievement of their differential goals hinges on their interdependence, "regardless of value-consensus or dissensus" (E. Barth and Noel 1972:340; and F. Barth 1969).

Lastly, the conflict perspective maintains that conflict in society revolves around socially scarce values—power, wealth, and privilege (see Lenski 1966). Society changes as power relations among ethnic groups shift (E. Barth and Noel 1972:344; Furnivall 1948; M.G. Smith 1960 and 1965; Kuper and M.G. Smith 1971; Kuper 1971; and Smith and Kuper 1971). Out of this perspective, two views arise: the ethnic-power and the personal-survival views. The ethnic-
power view regards ethnicity as a political tool. Resulting ethnic conflict generates ethnic stratification (A. Cohen 1969 and 1974; Lloyd 1973 and 1974; Despres 1975; Lehman 1967; and Bruner 1974). The personal-survival view holds that ethnics change their ethnic allegiance for their personal ends. Their struggle for survival generates a class structure (Van den Berghe 1975; Patterson 1975; Levy 1975; Schildkrout 1974; Charsley 1974; Jacobson 1979; Leach 1965; Schermerhorn 1970; and B. Benedict 1962).

Both views and the interdependence perspective stress the "instrumental" values of ethnicity; ethnic groups and individual ethnics manipulate ethnicity to promote their goals (see De Vos and Lee 1981c). But ethnicity seems always to involve "primordial feelings" or "expressive" motives which are not easily influenced by ongoing social processes (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Bell 1975; Geertz 1973; and De Vos and Lee 1981c). I agree with De Vos and Lee (1981c) that ethnicity must be understood in terms of both "instrumental" and "expressive" motives.

From the above review of the works on ethnicity, ethnicity may be understood as a result of "exclusive communication channels" (Shibutani and Kwan 1965:59), which include primordial attachments and which ethnics use for membership and non-membership for a variety of ends (also see Isajiw 1974). R. Cohen defines ethnicity as:
a series of nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. The process of assigning persons to groups is both subjective and objective, carried out by self and others, and depends on what diacritics are used to define membership (1978:387).

Having reviewed the variety of perspectives on ethnicity, I shall discuss Korean ethnicity in Japan. The recent history of Koreans in Japan discloses the process of ethnic dichotomization. Prior to the end of World War II, Korean political activists in Japan had functioned as minor members of various Japanese communist and socialist groups and had not developed an organized concept of Korean ethnicity (see Iwamura 1972 and Pak 1973).

Japan's defeat in World War II was immediately followed by the collapse of inequality between the Japanese and Koreans. Koreans wasted no time and started a number of interest groups to establish their legal and political status in Japan (Lee 1971, 1981a, 1981c, and 1981e). In this process, Korean ethnicity as an organized concept and as a political tool has emerged.

In the early 1950s, Koreans in Japan became increasingly subjected to the ideological and political conflict between the South Korean and the North Korean regimes. Their conflict was a manifestation of the larger, international conflict, the Cold War. In short, Korean ethnicity in Japan was increasingly politicized, and the
possibility of any value consensus between Koreans and the Japanese was eliminated; this subject will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

The general statement that Korean ethnicity exists in Japan begs some qualifications. For instance, Korean ethnicity means a political interest group from either Soren's or Mindan's viewpoint; it means an alien population from the Japanese legal viewpoint; it means an undesirable group of neighbors from the ordinary Japanese person's viewpoint; it means a group of people who deserve humanitarian treatment from the concerned Japanese intellectual's viewpoint; it means an annoying, superimposed obstacle for entrepreneurial endeavor from the Korean entrepreneur's viewpoint; it means a lot of hot air from the first-generation and recent migrant Koreans' viewpoint; or it means an identity issue from the second-generation Korean's viewpoint. In short, the concept of ethnicity cannot be naively applied to ethnic problems (see R. Cohen 1978).

On the first level, ethnic stratification exists in Japan. Koreans take an historically subordinate position to the Japanese and are structurally alienated from full participation in Japanese political and economic processes. Their alienation and subordination perpetuate ethnic stratification. Under these circumstances, the accommodation and assimilation of Koreans are a remote possibility.

On the second level, there is an ongoing interaction
between Koreans and Japanese. Koreans as members of political interest groups, namely Soren and Mindan, attempt to advance their life chances. Goals such as a Korean ethnic independence, resident status, employment opportunity, or welfare protection motivate Korean political activity. Here, the conflict model (M.G. Smith 1960 and 1965; A. Cohen 1969 and 1974; Lloyd 1973 and 1974; and Despres 1975) is applicable and may be used as an over-all theoretical framework to examine the Korean problems in Japan.

Koreans are, however, divided by the antagonistic relationship between Soren and Mindan. Their ideological conflict reduces the effectiveness of political mobilization and consequently, reduces the likelihood of open competition with the Japanese for power and wealth. Furthermore, the conflict generates conditions under which Koreans are less likely to develop interdependent roles in relation to the Japanese. The given political situation perpetuates ethnic stratification.

On the third level, individual Koreans interpret Korean ethnicity in a variety of ways. For instance, the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans interpret Korean ethnicity not from the ethnic-power view, but from the personal-survival view with primordial attachments to Korean identity. Because of ethnic stratification, it is necessary for them to develop business enterprises which depend on one another. Their native island, Che Ju Do,
becomes a symbol for Korean ethnicity and for their unity in Tokyo (see Patterson 1975). To achieve their personal goals, they are willing to pass for Japanese, but the instrumental passing does not interfere with their primordial sentiments (see Van den Berghe 1975; Leach 1965; Schildkrout 1974; and Levy 1975).

The second-generation Koreans, however, interpret the Korean predicament differently. They were born and raised in a bicultural milieu, and Korean and Japanese cultural experiences are integral parts of their self-images. Their situation makes it difficult for them to adopt one ethnic identity over the other and is likely to generate conditions for self-hate and self-doubt (see Wagatsuma 1981).

Adopting either Korean identity or Japanese identity is a structural constraint stemming from the first and the second levels of Korean ethnicity mentioned above. When they pass for Japanese, their Korean heritage interferes with their self-images; when they act like Koreans, their Japanese social environment distorts their act.

Their situation is characteristic of marginality, and their identity conflict is a result of marginality (see Wagatsuma 1981; and Sasaki and Wagatsuma 1981). In short, their identity problems must be analyzed as a result of their bicultural upbringing within the context of ethnic stratification, and their life styles vary according to how...
they interpret those problems. W.I. Thomas wrote that what individuals do depends on their "definition of the situation" (1951).

It is this third level of Korean ethnicity that concerns this dissertation. As the variations of Korean life styles are uncovered, we will understand the intersections of individuals' subjective world views with socialstructural and historical constraints as partly expressed in terms of the first and the second levels of Korean ethnicity (see Mills 1959). To approach this objective, I have chosen the following core concepts: life style, locus of interpretation, ethnic identity, passing, marginality, and living in a bicultural milieu. In the following section, I shall examine each core concept and show how all the concepts are interrelated.

Core Concepts

(1) Life Style

Life style is defined as the "involvement of an individual with a particular set of modes of action, social relationships, and contexts" (Hannerz 1969:34). The modes of action, social relationships, and contexts are structured around culture, but the individual forms his particular set of such modes as he interprets them.

Culture is defined here as "the fabric of meaning in
terms of which human beings interpret their experiences and guide their action" (Geertz 1973:145). In W.I. Thomas's terms, culture pertains to the "code of behavior" in terms of which individuals define their situations (1951).

Life style is a dialectical concept, for it involves culture in terms of which meaning the individual interprets his experience and guides his action, and the individual whose interpretation and action articulate, maintain, or change the culture (see Mead 1934; Becker 1966; Blumer 1937, 1962, and 1969; A. Strauss 1959; Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin 1975; Geertz 1973; Zeitlin 1973; and Harootunian 1977). The subjective nature of the life style concept allows one to inquire into various life styles of individuals within a given sociocultural milieu (see Hannerz 1969: 34-8). Where the milieu involves an ethnic minority group, the life style concept leads us to consider the other core concepts.

(2) Locus of Interpretation

The locus of interpretation is essentially a cultural interpretation, for it depends on the "limits of effective communication" (Shibutani 1962:137) among individuals. However, the locus of interpretation, as used in this dissertation, is an ethnic interpretation. It arises where ethnic boundaries are important markers for social identity (see F. Barth 1969).
For instance, there are two loci of interpretation available to Koreans in Japan: one is Korean, and the other Japanese. The Korean locus, for my sample of Koreans, is symbolized by the use of the Korean language and Korean name and by participation in the urban association, kinship network, and traditional rituals, such as chesa (a traditional ritual to commemorate patrilineal ancestors).

The Japanese locus is symbolized by the use of the Japanese language and Japanese name and by having Japanese friends and exclusive appreciation for things Japanese, such as samurai (Japanese warriors of the Tokugawa period) shows on television, sumo wrestling, baseball games, and wearing kimono (traditional Japanese clothes). However, these loci are mutually incompatible because of the traditional animosity between Koreans and the Japanese. The variation of Korean life style is closely related to one's adoption of one locus over the other.

(3) Ethnic Identity

Life style varies as the individual adopts one ethnic locus of interpretation over another: it also varies as he interprets ethnic identity.

According to Goffman (1963), the individual assumes three identities in society: social, personal, and ego identities. Social identity is what society establishes as the means of categorizing individuals into groups. Hence, it
involves the process of dichotomization (R. Cohen 1978). Social categories permit a social discourse to take place among strangers (Goffman 1963:2; and Sullivan 1953:117-22). Social life is based on individuals' partial knowledge of one another (see Simmel 1950), rather than on their complete knowledge of who they are. Their partial knowledge is usually derived from their prior knowledge of social categories (see Shibutani and Kwan 1965:38). In short, social life becomes possible when individuals interact with one another in terms of their social categories or identities.

Personal identity is composed of the individual's positive characteristics and of the unique combination of his life history and positive characteristics (Goffman 1963:57). Ego identity is "the subjective sense of his own situation and his own continuity and character that an individual comes to obtain as a result of his various social experiences" (Ibid.:105). Both personal and ego identities comprise a "persistent sameness with oneself (selfsameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with another" (Erikson 1959:101; and 1963). Hence, primordiality and HHS's "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" rest in personal and ego identities (see Chapters One and Six).

Koreans in Japan experience two ethnic identities: Korean and Japanese identities. Korean identity as a social identity is superimposed on Koreans because of their minority and alien status. It also implies a political
dimension when seen in the light of their recent historical experiences.

At the end of World War II, the Japanese government defined Koreans as an alien group. Since then, two Korean political organizations, Soren and Mindan, have further articulated Koreans in Japan as an ethnically and politically distinct population (Lee 1971, 1976, and 1981e). This categorical distinction perpetuates the separateness of Koreans from the Japanese and reinforces Korean social identity as a stigma — "the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance" (Goffman 1963:i). How Koreans interpret Korean social identity reveals their personal and ego identities, and their interpretations are closely related to life style variations.

Wagatsuma (1981) argues that Korean youths in Japan are likely to develop self-hate and self-doubt because of ethnic discrimination, negative stereotyping of Koreans by the Japanese, and identity conflict involving Korea and Japan. The range of life styles that I have discovered among Koreans certainly includes one of self-hate and self-doubt, but shows a variety of other forms. This is so because of my approach that stresses individuals' interpretations of their ethnic issues.

When Koreans take Japanese identity, they are, in fact, passing for Japanese. Passing is a fourth concept.
(4) Passing

Passing disguises the individual's identity so that interaction can take place with others who belong in an otherwise exclusive social group (also see De Vos 1975; and De Vos and Lee 1981c). It is a "dubious way of adjusting to dominance and discrimination" (Berry 1965:392), or it is a conscious way to "avoid some of the penalties" of a minority status (Simpson and Yinger 1958:232). Hence, passing can be interpreted as a type of assimilation.

Gordon (1964:67-77) makes a distinction between structural assimilation and cultural assimilation (also see Green 1952). Structural assimilation is a process in which individuals of one group enter "primary group relationships" with those of another group (Gordon 1964:70). For instance, a minority group is structurally assimilated into the majority group when members of the former group participate in the social, economic, and political processes of the latter group. Cultural assimilation is a process by which "persons and groups may 'acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups'" (Green 1952:66).

Passing, as a type of assimilation, occurs when individuals of a minority group lack opportunities for structural assimilation, but they are culturally assimilated to the point that they can act like members of the majority group. Koreans of my sample have developed two types of passing: passing as a survival strategy --- temporary (Berry
1965:391) or instrumental passing --- and passing as a way to be accepted by the majority (Japanese) group --- permanent passing (Ibid.:391; also see De Vos and Lee 1981c).

Each type of passing has a decisive bearing on the shaping of Korean life styles. Instrumental passing reinforces Korean personal and ego identities, and permanent passing generates marginality.

(5) **Marginality**

Marginality is a fifth core concept. According to Robert Park (1950:249), marginal men have their roots in two different groups, but feel that they do not belong to either. As a result, they tend to be inconsistent and ambivalent in their self-images (Ibid.:356; also see Stonequist 1937; Simmel 1950; and Wright 1980). Stonequist describes a marginal man as one whose experience of cultural duality charts one's life course and whose experience of group conflict becomes the source of one's personal problems (1937:140 and 217).

In their reevaluation of the marginal man concept, Kerckhoff and McCormick (1955) state that the marginal man uses a non-membership of a group with which he wishes to identify and has internalized this reference group's norms, although the very group rejects him. This situation ultimately causes him to "suffer the effects of uncertainty, ambivalence, and the fear of rejection and failure" (Ibid.:
The marginal man is one who passes for a member of a group --- indicating his cultural assimilation and intention for permanent passing ---, but the group does not grant him structural assimilation. In sum, marginality is generated by permanent passing.

Goldberg (1941) argues that marginal men do not necessarily experience uncertainty and ambivalence. They create and live by an adaptive subculture which insulates them from group conflict: communities of intellectuals and artists, the avant garde (Gordon 1964; and Shibutani and Kwan 1965). In this context, they are likely to be free from emotional distress and social pathology and possess insight, self-understanding, and creativity (Pitts 1965; Reisman 1954; Park 1950; and Stonequist 1937).

Here, the distinction between instrumental and permanent passing is useful. Under conditions where structural assimilation is blocked, but cultural assimilation is under way, instrumental passing allows minority group members to participate in the social and economic life of the majority group and, at the same time, to maintain their own identity or adaptive subculture (see De Vos and Lee 1981c). Consequently, they do not become marginals. However, permanent passing generates marginality, because minority group members are not insulated by a subculture, while they are rejected by the majority group with which they wish to identify.
These situations characterize different modes of passing and their consequences among the three Korean groups: the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans pass temporarily or instrumentally, develop an insulated adaptive subculture based on kinship and Che Ju Do village background, and, consequently, do not experience marginality. The second-generation Koreans pass or intend to pass permanently, are ambivalent about their parents' subculture, and, consequently, experience marginality.

Both passing and marginality are phenomena of living in an alien milieu. The milieu of Koreans in Japan is bicultural.

(6) The Bicultural Milieu

Individuals form their concepts of self as they interact with one another, more specifically with a generalized other. Generalized other is a "conception or interpretation that a person derives from his experience" with other persons (Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin 1975: 369; also see Mead 1934). Moreover, generalized other provides individuals with an inventory of symbols and meanings in terms of which they interpret their experiences and regulate their actions (Mead 1934; and Becker 1966).

A single sociocultural milieu may be characterized by a single generalized other for individuals, and a major discrepancy between the milieu and the generalized other is
unlikely to develop. However, when the milieu contains two domains of generalized other, such as a Korean domain and a Japanese domain, and when they are hierarchically ordered, this milieu becomes a bicultural milieu.

For instance, for the Japanese, their society represents a single cultural milieu. However, for Koreans in Japan, Japanese society is a bicultural milieu where Korean and Japanese cultures are historically perceived in a hierarchical order. Koreans are defined both politically and sociologically as an alien and ethnically distinct population, and their status is subordinate to the Japanese.

In short, the two cultures are perceived in terms of a superordinate and subordinate relationship and, thus, constitute ethnic stratification. In such situations, the individual does not casually adopt one culture over the other, or one generalized other over the other.

The second-generation Koreans tend to develop cognitive and emotional attachments to both Korean and Japanese cultures, a result of their bicultural upbringing. In other words, for them, the boundaries between Korean and Japanese identities are ill-defined. Hence, they are likely to experience marginality. However, marginality is unlikely to occur to those whose ethnic identity is clearly expressed in their life styles (e.g., the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans.)

In the next section, I shall present a case study of
ethnic discrimination in Japan. Then I shall relate this case study to a more general discussion of the workings of the core concepts discussed above.

Pak's Experience and Korean Ethnicity

I shall refer to Ethnic Discrimination (Minzoku Sabetsu) (Sato and Wada 1974). This work contains a number of essays written by both Japanese and Koreans who were directly involved in a Korean youth's legal suit against a giant Japanese electric company. I shall first describe the general background of the Korean youth's struggle.

Pak, the Korean youth in question, was born in Aichi Prefecture, Japan, in 1951. He was one of nine siblings. His parents were both Koreans. In 1970, he applied for a job to Japan's giant electric company, Hitachi, while working as a machine operator in a Japanese factory. He had held this job since his graduation from his Japanese technical high school.

Pak submitted his job application forms with his Japanese name on them and listed his Japanese place of birth in lieu of his Korean birth certificate. A copy of his birth certificate was required to complete his job application. Those Koreans born in Japan are customarily registered in their fathers' birth places in Korea.[1] Hence, their birth certificates reveal their Korean descent, while their actual
place of birth in Japan does not make them Japanese citizens.

Pak was promised a job at Hitachi as one of seven accepted from 32 applicants. Later, however, Hitachi reversed its decision because of its discovery of Pak's Korean descent (see Rohlen 1974). For the first time in Japanese legal history, the issue of ethnic discrimination was brought to the courts. Concerned Japanese and Koreans organized a group in defense of Pak's cause. The court proceedings lasted more than three years, and the final verdict supported Pak. He maintained that Hitachi's refusal to grant him the promised employment was based on its employment discrimination against Koreans. Hitachi's defense hinged on its policy that those who made false claims on their job applications would be disqualified from employment. In Pak's case, his use of his Japanese name and of his Japanese place of birth would constitute false claims. Hence, he was judged untrustworthy (Sato and Wada 1974:129-48).

Following are some statements made by Pak during his court appearances:

"In 1958, I started my local Japanese grammar school. There I was known by my Japanese name. I believed that I was Japanese just like any other Japanese pupils there" (Ibid.:239; my translation).
"My third oldest brother was an excellent pitcher at his Japanese high school. His pitching brought his school team to the final game of the Prefectural Baseball Competition. As he was about to graduate, a number of big Japanese companies with their own baseball teams sent agents to ask him to join them. But the minute they found out that my brother was Korean, they all disappeared" (Ibid.:243; my translation).

Pak studied marketing at his Japanese technical high school. While all other Japanese students of his graduating class secured jobs, Pak was the only one unable to find a job. One Japanese factory owner offered him a machine operator's job, even though he knew that Pak was Korean. Pak took the offer, but he was bothered by his blue-collar job, because the rest of his graduating class took white-collar jobs (Ibid.:248-51).

When Pak decided to apply to Hitachi, he had the following thought:

"Ever since I was born, I had always believed that I would live in Japan permanently, like the Japanese. The only kind of education I have had is Japanese. I came to believe that the Japanese would trust and respect me as long as I was industrious and trustworthy during my middle and high school years. I have always been aware of my Korean descent and of Japanese ethnic discrimination against Koreans. But I believed that Japan, Japanese society, and its honorable men would never ignore those who try hard to better their talents and skills" (Ibid.:251; my translation).

Pak's belief that Japanese society is benevolent was betrayed when Hitachi reversed its decision on his employment. During the court preparation and struggle, Pak was reported to have gone through serious emotional difficulties
(Sato and Wada Ibid.:59-79), because he experienced the deep-rooted incongruity between Korean and Japanese identities. Yet Pak's court statements ended with an increased affirmation of his Korean descent. He became, at least in his final comments in the court statements, a newly-awakened Korean nationalist: "I find it an exuberant pleasure that I can work toward the complete reunification of our Korean people and our independence" (Ibid.:260; my translation).

Interpretation of Pak's Case

There is a difference, Robert Park (1950) argues, between racial prejudices and social distance, and racial antagonism and conflict. Park states that "Every individual we meet inevitably finds a place in our minds in some category already defined" (Ibid.:232). Individuals interact not really in terms of what they are, but in terms of categories socially assigned to them. Prejudices thus defined maintain social distance among individuals of different categories (see Simmel 1950). Prejudices and social distance, which are "correlative, ... operate when the subordinate accepts his inferior status" (Coser 1971: 361). But racial antagonism and conflict arise when the subordinate competes with the superordinate for the same goal (Ibid.).

Pak, whose social category is a subordinate Korean in Japanese society, expressed his unwillingness to accept his inferior status. His expression of rebellion --- com-
peting with Japanese for employment — engendered antagonism on the part of the Japanese employer.

Sato and Wada (1974) offer an interesting analysis of the Korean problems in Japan. Their analysis is concerned with the logic of Hitachi's defense argument, revealing two conflicting alternatives which Koreans experience in Japan. One alternative is passing as a type of assimilation: it is virtually unavoidable for Koreans to use Japanese names and to pass for Japanese because of Japanese prejudices and discrimination.

Pak always lived behaving and thinking as a Japanese, according to his own accounts. His use of his Japanese name on the job application was a spontaneous and natural action. Hitachi, however, rejected him on the basis that he made the false claim of being Japanese. For Pak passing ultimately results in rejection. The other alternative is self-identification as a Korean, which also immediately translates into rejection or alienation (see Lee 1971:iv, 249-59, 1981e, 1981f; and Wagatsuma 1981).

The above analysis discloses two conflicting messages directed at Koreans in Japan. The first message is that the Japanese attitude rejects Koreans as long as they refuse assimilation into Japanese society. Consequently the keeping of Korean nationality or self-identification as a Korean by the use of a Korean name and/or of the Korean language retards the assimilation of Koreans.
The second message is that the Japanese attitude also rejects Koreans who surrender to assimilation on the grounds that their claim of being Japanese is false, dishonest, untrustworthy, and, therefore, unacceptable (Sato and Wada 1974:142-3; also see Rohlen 1981; Lee and De Vos 1981b; and De Vos and Lee 1981c). This is indeed a no-win situation for Koreans.

Let me further examine the implications of the two messages. The first message expects Koreans to be culturally assimilated, but the second message implies that Koreans' cultural assimilation is unacceptable because they are, after all, not Japanese. These conflicting messages can be analyzed on two levels.

On one level, Koreans simply pass for Japanese as they present themselves with the Japanese social identity. Their passing is possible because they are indistinguishable from the Japanese both physically and behaviorally. Thus, their passing appears to conform to the expectation of the first message.

On the other level, however, if Koreans interpret passing as becoming members of Japanese society --- permanent passing --- they ultimately encounter rejection and experience personal troubles. This is a common situation for the second-generation Koreans. The first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans usually do not experience this situation because their passing means, to them, a temporary,
instrumental strategy.

The basic problems of the second-generation Koreans are that they are confronted with two antagonistic loci of interpretation. These Koreans, since birth, have organized their life styles around Japanese culture, indicating their cultural assimilation. They speak Japanese as their native language; enjoy samurai shows and sumo wrestling on television; wear kimono on occasion; and participate in traditional Japanese festivities as "locals", indicating the high degree of their cultural assimilation into Japanese society.

The degree of their cultural assimilation into Japanese society may also be measured by what they are not. For instance, they have not learned to speak the Korean language, except for those who have gone to Korean schools. They usually do not participate in their fathers' urban association and friendship groups, do not observe chesa, and do not seem to have strong feelings toward kinship involving their fathers' relatives in both Tokyo and Che Ju Do. Hence, to the second-generation Koreans, their Korean identity does not materialize as an authentic symbol for an ethnic locus of interpretation.

As they develop life styles, most of the second-generation Koreans resort to the Japanese locus of interpretation (see Wagatsuma 1981). However, this locus is not quite the same as the one adopted by the Japanese. The Japanese acquire their locus of interpretation in their home
environment which is defined as a single sociocultural milieu. They learn that whatever they aspire to will be accepted, simply because they are Japanese. Hence, their development of Japanese identity and of the Japanese way is actively encouraged, rewarded, and recognized as valid in Japanese society. In short, they grow up as Japanese citizens.

In contrast, the second-generation Koreans are, since birth, confronted with living in the bicultural milieu. Their Japanese locus of interpretation is a second order interpretation, rather than a first order one (see Geertz 1973).

For instance, most of my second-generation sample expressed that they do not really know how Japanese home life is actually conducted, except for the information they have acquired from watching television shows and from reading books and magazines on this subject. Hence, their Japanese locus of interpretation is primarily derived from their education in Japanese schools, contacts with the Japanese mass-media, and from their casual encounters with Japanese in public.

Only a very small number of my sample stated that they have Japanese friends, but most of them admitted that they pass for Japanese among their Japanese friends, largely those from school. Also, they admitted that they have not comprehensively observed their Japanese friends' home
lives, for they hardly have spent enough time at their friends' homes. Those Koreans of the second-generation group who have gone to either Soren or Mindan schools only have stated that they have no Japanese friends; they have less primary information about the Japanese locus of interpretation than those Koreans with Japanese school experiences and friends.

Despite their over-all cultural assimilation, they are alienated from the mainstream of Japanese political, social, and economic systems, indicating the lack of opportunities for structural assimilation and achievement (see De Vos and Lee 1981c). Concurrently, they are confronted with the alternative of Korean ethnicity characterized by the Korean language, Korean name, Korean schools and politics in Japan, the existence of North and South Korea, and employment discrimination. But they have little knowledge about or sentiment toward this alternative. As a result, living in the bicultural milieu, as interpreted by the second-generation Koreans, is likely to generate conditions for ambivalent self-images, marginality, and unstable life styles.

Koreans of the first-generation and the recent migrant groups, however, disclose stable self-images and life styles. Two reasons may account for this: (1) their self-images were already well-developed in Che Ju Do, a single cultural milieu, prior to their arrival in Japan; and (2) they have developed a subculture in Japan as a response
to ethnic stratification.

As responses to ethnic stratification and employment discrimination, these Koreans have developed life styles based on their participation in the business-oriented urban association and friendship groups in Tokyo. Their primary communicative means with these groups is the Korean language. Their solidarity was partly a response to ethnic discrimination and was necessitated by the fact that they spoke no Japanese in their early days of migration.

Furthermore, they have continued the practice of chesa, have maintained the network of kinship ties with their relatives in Che Ju Do, and have kept their adherence to the traditional male-female hierarchy as well as the patrilineal family structure. In addition, their initial decision to migrate to Japan may be considered a significant factor reinforcing their sense of pride.

All of these factors are positive characteristics inherent in their personal and ego identities and are the foundations of their Korean locus of interpretation. Given their ethnic identity and Korean locus of interpretation, passing is a survival tool, interpreted as instrumental, and their instrumental passing does not generate marginality.
Conclusion

A logical extension of the message of assimilation is that as long as Koreans continue to pass for Japanese, they are permitted to participate in social relations with unsuspecting Japanese. Economic relations are a good case in point and will be discussed in Chapter Five.

This logical extension has been widely adopted as a strategy for survival by both the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans. Their instrumental passing does not seem to impair their personal and ego identities and, thus, does not generate marginality. Concurrently, they reserve their expressions of all the aspects of Korean identity for relations among themselves only, excluding Japanese participation. Such relations involve usage of Korean names and of the Korean language in conversation, observance of chesa, discussion of the state of Korean politics in Japan and Korea, and the sharing of their negative experiences in Japan.

However, this analysis does not usually apply to the second-generation Koreans because their perspective on identity and locus of interpretation is different. Their life styles, in general, disclose ambivalence toward their ethnic identity and locus of interpretation.
The second-generation Korean domain in Japan is inauthentic because they do not experience things "Korean" in a single, Korean cultural milieu. Hence, their conceptual and emotional development is hampered by the conflict between the two domains of the bicultural milieu. This conflict generates a wide range of lifestyle variations for the second-generation group.

It is true that the majority of my second-generation sample is aware of their Korean heritage. Koreans of this sample, nevertheless, pass for Japanese. They pass in the hope that they will be accepted as equals by the Japanese. They strive to pass permanently, only to experience an ultimate Japanese rejection.

In contrast, the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans pass without having any intention of becoming accepted as equals by the Japanese. They mean to pass temporarily or instrumentally because they can anticipate an ultimate Japanese rejection. In other words, these Koreans are prepared to dismiss Japan as only a place where they might be able to make a living. "Home" is Korea. Hence, these Koreans reject structural assimilation.

Koreans of the second-generation group, however, strive to find meaning and identity in Japan. For them, cultural and structural assimilation in Japan is a significant issue because they have nowhere else to go, but to live in Japan permanently.
TOPOLOGICAL ALGEBRAS WITH ORTHOGONAL M-BASES
In this chapter, I have defined the Korean problems in Japan as fundamentally ethnic problems and have developed a theoretical perspective based on the six core concepts. Various arrangements of these concepts are derived from individual Koreans' interpretations of their situations and pose constraints on their life styles. The theoretical perspective thus developed is exploratory, and it is my hope that it will generate more ideas for further studies on the Korean problems in Japan and on ethnicity in general.

In the next chapter, I shall examine historical and ideological roots for the strained relationship between Koreans and the Japanese in order to place their animosity in a politicohistorical perspective.
Since the Annexation Treaty of 1910 between Japan and Korea, Koreans were considered by the Imperial Japanese Government Japanese nationals; this practice ended at the end of World War II. However, the Imperial Japanese Government maintained a koseki system (family registry) by which it made a distinction between naichijin (those born and registered in Japan) and gaichijin (those born and/or registered outside of Japan or in the colonies of Korea and Formosa). Furthermore, gaichijin were not permitted to transfer their family registries to the mainland registries of Japan. By this definition, for instance, Koreans born in Japan were still considered gaichijin because their family registries were maintained in Korea through the patrilineal system. This legacy has continued even after the end of World War II, although Koreans in Japan are no longer Japanese nationals. (see Lee 1976).
CHAPTER THREE

THE RECENT HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOREANS AND THE JAPANESE

This chapter describes the recent historical relationship between Koreans and the Japanese in order to show how Koreans have become an alien minority group in Japan. Their alien and minority status and the ethnic discrimination stemming from it have had a major impact on their socioeconomic conditions and life styles, the subjects of which will be discussed in the following chapters.

Koreans and the Japanese in Japan today maintain deep-seated animosity. Political and economic conditions of the early twentieth century are directly responsible for the rise of the Korean-Japanese animosity. The following section examines Japanese historiography on Korean history. Views of Japanese historians have had a significant influence on the Japanese public sentiment toward Koreans. Their views, in general, offered rationale for Japan's invasion of Korea and the rest of Asia and for the Japanese superiority over Koreans.
Two Japanese Schools of Thought on Korean History

According to Hatada (1970:16-7), the serious study of Korean history first was started in Japan in the late nineteenth century, the mid-Meiji period. At that time, Japan had begun to compete with the encroaching Western European and American powers. It had actively sought hegemony in Korea and greater Asia. This turn of events helped motivate Japanese scholars to study Korean history, as well as Manchurian history, as a significant requirement for Japanese extra-territorial expansion.

The Japanese study of Korean history was eventually divided into two schools of thought: the Japanese-historical school, which interpreted Korean history with reference to Japanese political interests; and the East-Asian-historical school, which interpreted it from an East Asian or Asian Continental perspective (Ibid.:17).

The Japanese-historical school is based on a Japanese-Korean Common-Origin theory. Its advocates believe that both Japanese and Koreans share a common ancestry and that Korea has always been under Japanese control. Thus, this theory treats Koreans not as an alien and independent population, but as a subject population of Japan (Ibid.:17).

Historically, this theory was articulated by Kokugaku (national-learning) scholars of the Tokugawa period
(1603-1868). They vigorously propagated the nation-building myths which were described in such classical sources of Japanese chronicles as Kojiki and Nihonshoki compiled in 712 A.D. and 720 A.D. under the auspices of the Japanese Imperial Family. They developed the philosophy of Koto (the Old Road) or of Shinto (the Gods' Road) and proclaimed that the Japanese should follow the "Road created by the Gods" for them. They further maintained that these Japanese Gods dominated Korea or became Korean Gods and kings who subjugated Koreans in Korea (Inoue 1952:252-5; and Hatada 1965:13-4).

The Japanese-Korean Common-Origin theory was uncritically adopted by scholars of the Meiji period (1868-1912). Some of them were professors at Tokyo Imperial University (today's Tokyo University). Their "historical" view has largely been adopted in school textbooks. Moreover, soon after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, some historians vehemently supported Japanese expansion into greater Asia. Their reason was that Asia, historically and, thus justly, belonged to Japan (Hatada 1970:17-9).

Hatada (1970:19) states that the Common-Origin theory was used to confirm the Japanese claim to rights for the control of Korea and was widely supported by the general public, although it was never historically substantiated.

The East-Asian historical school is critical of the Common-Origin theory and questions the historical validity
of the Japanese chronicles mentioned earlier. This school focuses on a larger geographical and historical context in terms of which the relations of Korea, Japan, and China are analyzed. This historical approach was originally inspired by a Western European utilitarian historiography.

The advocates of this school perceive Western Europe as culturally and politically superior to Asia proper. However, they perceive Japan as superior to the rest of Asia in modernization or Westernization. Hence, they proclaim that Japan does not benefit from associating with the rest of inferior Asia and, thus, should learn from and model after superior Western Europe. This view is called Gendaishugi (an historical modernism) or Datsuashugi (Asian-escapism) (Hatada 1970:20-1).

Like the Japanese-historical school, the East-Asian school supported the view that Korea should come under Japanese control, although its perspective was different. Nevertheless, both schools supported Japan's hegemony over Korea and China instead of losing them to Western European and American nations (Ibid.:30-1).

Hatada (Ibid.:15, 23-6) states that both Japanese schools of thought disregarded Korea's cultural and political independence and maintained the view that Korea was backward and undeveloped. Their views were found in school textbooks and the mass media. Although historically unfounded, these views have helped articulate Japanese attitudes
toward Koreans and have offered a justification for Japan's expansion into Asia and the Japanese superiority over Koreans (Hatada 1965, 1969, 1970, and 1976; Ozawa 1973; Inoue 1952; and Suzuki 1975 and 1976). A view contrary to or critical of these was a serious political liability, especially during the peak period of Japanese expansion (Hatada 1965 and 1969; and Iwamura 1972). Concurrently, Korean scholars were barred from academic activities in Korea, since higher education there was almost completely dominated by Japanese.

In the following section, I shall cite some of the effects of historical biases upon the Japanese.

The Japanese Views of Koreans in Japan

In 1965, a group of Japanese grammar school teachers conducted a survey of Japanese grammar school children concerning their impressions of and ideas about Koreans. They asked approximately 200 children, ranging from third graders (nine years of age) to sixth graders (twelve years of age), to write freely about their feelings toward Koreans and Korea. The survey results were published in Hatada (1969). I have selected the following essays because they represent the main themes --- friendly, hostile, and mixed views.
From third graders:

"I think that Korea is a pretty country because Koreans wear beautiful clothes, dance well, and play in circuses."

"The other day, I was sitting in an unusual way at dinner, and my grandmother said, 'That's how Koreans sit.' Then she told me all about Koreans. She told me that they would stick snot on walls, tables, and even on their own clothes. I said to her that they had no manners. Then she said right away that I had bad manners, too. I thought I was lucky to be born Japanese."

From fourth graders:

"Japan and Korea are like two brothers, and I think that we all should be friends."

"From watching a TV program, I think that Koreans are far inferior to us, Japanese."

"I would like to know how Koreans live in Korea. But if I was Korean, it would not be good for me."

From fifth graders:

"Koreans and Chinese are not clean."

"I have heard that Koreans would eat live insects. They seem like primitives, and they make me feel bad."

From sixth graders:

"It's the United States' responsibility to govern Korea by uniting the two parts of Korea."

"Korea was once part of Japan, but we lost it because we were defeated in World War II. Koreans are greedy and disgusting. They even live in Japan, which is intolerable."

"Korean politics is in bad shape. So I think that they should depend on Japan without a question."

(Hatada 1969:76-6; my translation).
In his summary comments, Hatada (Ibid.:76) states that although there are some friendly and innocent views about Koreans among some of the Japanese children, the majority reflects the general mistrust and contempt for Koreans. This tendency becomes even more pronounced as the age of the children increases and is a significant manifestation of the Japanese animosity toward Koreans. Moreover, this tendency is commonly expressed in the dichotomy of purity-profanity.[1]

In 1973, Hatada and Suzuki (Hatada 1976) conducted a survey concerning how Japanese high school students view Koreans through their reading of history textbooks. I shall quote some of these students' views on Koreans because they express the strongest prejudicial sentiments.

"From reading history books, I have found that Korean is the closest language to Japanese. This is a shock to me. I suppose it might be so because Korea is the closest country to Japan. When I mentioned this to my family at dinner, my mother said, 'It's horrible to know that Japanese is like the Korean language. It would be much better if Chinese was the closest language to Japanese.'"

"Until after I started my middle school, I thought of Korea as a country just like any European country. During my school days, someone told me that I looked like a Korean. So I mentioned this to my parents, and their reaction was, 'What an insult for him to say that to you.' This was the first time I found out about the real meaning of the word 'Korean.' Ever since then, my reaction to this word has been to mean something dirty and disgusting. I am sorry that I still feel the same way. They have too much victim-consciousness. I am really glad that Japan is surrounded by the seas."
"For many years, Korea has had internal political problems. Korea has been unstable as a nation and seems to me to have always been controlled by other nations. I feel sorry for Korea."

"Let me put it clearly --- I don't like Koreans. I don't care if I am prejudiced and discriminating against them. I just don't like them. I know that those bastards are really a sorry lot, but they are a little too crooked. It's self-evident in what those Korean-school kids do. They have an inferiority complex, just because they are Koreans. But what they do does not improve their bad reputation. And they don't have pride like Americans and Europeans do. So those crooked people get together like gangs, and they try to take their frustration out on others like us."[2]

(Hatada 1976:8-12; my translation).

With the exception of a few children and high school students, the majority of the respondents hold a negative and stigmatizing view of Koreans. They stress the profanity and inferiority of Koreans in reference to their bodily uncleanliness, eating habits, manners, and untrustworthiness. In contrast, the Japanese perception of themselves conveys the qualities of being pure, well-mannered, and superior (see Nakane 1970; Reischauer 1977; Lebra 1976; and Hsu 1979). Such cultural biases are clearly manifested in surveys on nationality-rankings among the Japanese: while white Americans and Europeans have always been ranked at the top of the scale, blacks and Koreans have been consistently ranked at the bottom (Hatada 1976; Ozawa 1973; and Sato 1971).

In the next section, I shall describe the historical process which is responsible for Koreans' alien and minority
status and the Japanese views of Koreans mentioned above.

The Emergence of the Korean Ethnic Minority

Edward Wagner (1951) studied the Korean problems in Japan soon after the end of World War II. In his report (1951), he divides the recent Korean mass migration to Japan into four phases: (1) the first phase, 1904-1937; (2) the second phase, 1937-1945; (3) the third phase, 1945-1948; and (4) the fourth phase, 1948-1951.

In 1904, Korean residents in Japan first were recorded as aliens: they comprised 227 of the total alien population of 15,497. This first phase ended in 1937 when Japan invaded Manchuria. The second phase ended with Japan's defeat in World War II. The third phase was highlighted by the mass repatriation of Koreans to Korea and by the rapid development of Korean political movements in Japan. Lastly, the fourth phase was concerned with the development of the Korean minority in Japan (Wagner Ibid.:iii, 1-3). For chronological convenience, I shall follow Wagner's four-phase division.

(1) The First Phase (1904-1937)

This phase was best characterized by a single factor, individual economic necessity. It functioned as a push-pull mechanism for a large influx of Koreans to come to
After Japan secured its position in Asia by annexing Korea in 1910, the Korean economy began to change from mainly agricultural to industrial. Large amounts of agricultural land in Korea were purchased and controlled by Japanese for industrial purposes. As a result, masses of Korean peasants, who had already been impoverished because of exploitative Korean landlords and money-lenders, experienced further economic deprivation. Concurrently, the rapid expansion of the Japanese economy made it possible for masses of Koreans to migrate to Japan for wage labor. Their mass influx during the first phase was unchecked and uncontrolled (Fujishima 1976).

The majority of Korean workers in Japan were characterized by Japanese as illiterate, unskilled, unstable, and criminal. Approximately 90% of the employed Koreans worked in mining, construction work, stevedoring, and maritime service (Wagner 1951:11). They received lower wages than Japanese for the same labor.

Iwamura (1972:2, 21-31) contends that a socialist-revolutionary force among Koreans and Japanese failed to develop in Japan because of inequality in the Japanese labor market. This market structure created and maintained the disparity of wages and working conditions between Japanese and Koreans as well as among Japanese of different regional origins.
Korean laborers in Japan were considered by their Japanese counterparts to be an immediate threat. Wagner (1951:1) reports that Japanese military leaders had found Koreans to be a convenient outlet for the hostile sentiments of Japanese laborers, which might otherwise have been directed at themselves.

Increasing Japanese hostility toward Koreans eventually culminated in a massacre of Koreans in the Kanto area (Tokyo and Kawasaki). When the Great Kanto Earthquake of September 1, 1923 struck the area, Koreans were accused of inciting riots and of poisoning drinking water. A massacre of approximately 6,000 Koreans was the result (Wagner 1951: 17; Iwamura 1972:90-1; and Pak 1973, vol.1: 339-46).

Wagner (1951:15) cites two reasons for the rapid development of Japanese hostility toward Koreans in Japan during this first phase. The first reason is economic: Koreans replaced Japanese in the labor market, since they willingly accepted lower wages, were physically stronger than the Japanese, and were "more adaptable to wretched living conditions than is usual even for unskilled laborers" (Ibid.:15).

The second is cultural: both Koreans and Japanese "shared few common aspirations, and two widely variant sets of values governed their lives" (Ibid.:17). Such economic and cultural factors, ultimately, gave substance to the already strong Japanese hostility toward Koreans and
hampered their social relations with the native population (De Vos and Lee 1981b).

(2) The Second Phase (1937-1945)
The China campaign consumed much more time than originally anticipated. Since the Japanese war machine was put to work at a maximum, a labor shortage remained a chronic problem.

During the eight years of this second phase, Japanese military and economic leaders instituted the systematic importation of laborers directly from Korea. This was, in fact, a program of forced labor (see Table 1 in Chapter One).

At the end of 1936, the Korean population in Japan was no more than 660,000. But, by the end of 1941, this number dramatically increased to 1,469,000, of which more than 777,000 were in the labor force (Wagner 1951:27). Furthermore, by the end of World War II, the Korean population in Japan was estimated to range from 1,900,000 to 2,400,000; Wagner accepts the second figure as more realistic (Ibid.:27).

(3) The Third Phase (1945-1948)
This phase was highlighted by two events: one was the mass repatriation of Koreans to Korea; and the other the United States' involvement in the Korean affairs in Japan.
Large numbers of Koreans had already started to return to Korea prior to the end of World War II. This repatriation movement increased its momentum after 1945. By November 1948, all but one quarter of the estimated 2,400,000 Koreans returned to Korea (Wagner 1951:96).

From November 1945, SCAP (the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) began to assume control over Korean repatriation. Its official control ended in December, 1948. During this period, SCAP imposed strict restrictions on what and how many personal possessions Koreans were permitted to bring back to Korea. Although these restrictions were later liberated somewhat, SCAP's control, in fact, reduced the number of would-be Korean returnees: they felt that they would lose more if they had left Japan (Ibid.:41-50; Lee 1971, 1981a, 1981b, and 1981c; and Mitchell 1967).

As SCAP assumed control over war-devastated Japan, the large unrepatriated Korean population became one of the major social problems affecting Japan's reconstruction. SCAP's initial occupation policies were sympathetic toward Koreans. But they comprised two conflicting directives: Koreans in Japan were considered a privileged group because they had fought the Japanese during World War II on the American side, but they were considered Japanese nationals because the Japanese government had treated them as its subjects after the annexation of Korea (Wagner 1951:56).

Such conflicting directives raised legal issues for
the Japanese government as well as sentimental issues for Koreans in Japan. The Japanese government was unsure to what extent Koreans should be subject to its legal system, while Koreans demanded that they be recognized as a liberated group and, thus, free from the Japanese legal system (Ibid.: 56-8).

With Japan's defeat in World War II, the unequal relation between Koreans and the Japanese collapsed. Then it became possible for Koreans to assert their wishes. They defined themselves as ethnics, thus, separate from the Japanese. With this new definition, they attempted to create a new social and political position in Japan.

Prior to this third phase, political involvement of Koreans in Japan was effectively prevented by discriminatory wage systems and working conditions applied to Koreans and the Japanese (Iwamura 1972). There were some isolated cases involving Korean political activists working for a variety of Japanese socialist and communist groups, but they did not intend to create an organization on behalf of Koreans (Iwamura 1972; and Pak 1973, vol.2).

With the collapse of inequality, Koreans wasted little time and formed various organizations to protect their legal rights. The largest and most outspoken organization at that time was Choren (the Korean Resident League in Japan/Zainichi Chosenjin Renmei). It was initially a welfare-oriented organization. But it eventually drifted
toward the Japan Communist Party (Lee 1971:12-4; and Wagner 1951:54). Nevertheless, Koreans achieved one objective: a new ethnic group recognition, separate from the Japanese (Lee 1981d).

Other members of Choren, however, strongly opposed the leftist trend, and, thus, factionalism ensued. This schism eventually gave rise to the formation of two antagonistic political organizations: Soren or Chosoren (the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan/Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai) and Mindan (the South Korean Resident Association in Japan/Zainichi Daikanminkoku Kyoryu Mindan). Their organizational structures and activities will be described in Chapter Four.

In the meantime, Japanese hostility toward Koreans remained strong. It was further intensified as Koreans became directly involved in Japanese political affairs. The disclosure of Korean black market activities by the Japanese and SCAP authorities did not help this situation. Koreans were accused of retarding Japan's economic reconstruction (Mitchell 1967; and Lee 1971 and 1981a).

(4) The Fourth Phase (1948-1951)

By the late 1940s, the Korean minority in Japan became increasingly subject to the developing Cold War conflict. China's communist revolution in 1949 was followed by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. This turn of
events motivated both Japanese and American authorities to restrict Korean political activities in Japan, which became increasingly leftist. Consequently, Choren was ordered to disband.

Within the context of the Cold War, Dower (1975: 41-61) stresses the influence of American foreign policy and the American modernization school of thought on Japan's position in Asia. Japan was deemed to be the capitalist leader of Asia and was to fight off encroaching communism. Hence, the Cold War offered Japan an ample opportunity to boast of its social, economic, and cultural superiority to the rest of Asia. The Korean status in Japan was, thus, inversely affected.

Thus far, I have followed Wagner's four-phase scheme up to 1951. Since then, Koreans' legal status in Japan has become one of the most important problems affecting their lives. The next section describes this aspect of the Korean problems in Japan.

The Legal Status of Koreans in Japan

The Normalization Treaty between South Korea and Japan of 1951 finally gave Koreans in Japan legal rights to live in Japan. It was largely orchestrated by the United States government, which pressured both South Korea and Japan to reach a normal diplomatic relationship. The United
States government's main goal was to create and to strengthen an "anti-communist bastion in East Asia" based in South Korea and Japan: there was a sense of urgency, especially, during the Cold War (Lee 1971 and 1981a).

One of the major issues of the Treaty was the legal status of Koreans in Japan. The South Korean government's position was stated as follows:

(1) the unique historical circumstances of Koreans in Japan must be taken into account as most significant;
(2) given these circumstances, Koreans in Japan should be granted a favorable status as unique among other aliens, the specific privilege of permanent residence for themselves and for their descendants, and freedom to move their properties and funds to South Korea if they wish to return to it;
(3) Koreans in Japan should be granted the same privileges and opportunities as enjoyed by the Japanese in matters of education, health, welfare, employment, business activities, and property rights; and
(4) all Koreans in Japan must be treated as South Korean nationals under the protection of the South Korean government (not of the North Korean government) (K.Kim 1971:66).

The Japanese position was to recognize the unique historical circumstances of Koreans in Japan, but not to grant them a favorable legal status. The main reason was to avoid a differential treatment among aliens living in Japan (Ibid.:66).

Prior to the Treaty ratification, the Japanese government enacted the alien registration law of May 2, 1947. This law required all aliens to register in local immigration offices: Koreans in Japan were formally defined
as aliens.

The Immigration Law of 1952 granted Koreans living in Japan a favorable resident status, the permanent resident status, under certain conditions as listed below:

1. those who had been residing in Japan since August 15, 1945, continuously up to the time of their application for the permanent resident status;
2. those who were born in Japan after August 16, 1945, within 5 years from the date of the Treaty and who are lineal descendants of persons who may claim the first category; and
3. offspring of a person, who may receive the permanent resident status in accordance with the above procedure, may be granted the said status, provided that application for the status is filled within 60 days from the date of birth (Lee 1971:217)

The 1952 Law is, in fact, the Japanese government's concession to the South Korean demand for a favorable legal status for Koreans in Japan. Further negotiations finally ended in 1965. Consequently, Koreans in Japan were required to register either as Kankokujin (South Korean nationals) or as Chosenjin (North Korean subjects). Thus, they lost opportunities for self-determination and became subject to the political decisions and control stemming from the South Korean, the North Korean, and the Japanese governments.

As of the end of January, 1965, the Japanese Ministry of Justice reported that 230,000 Koreans registered as Kankokujin and 349,000 as Chosenjin. The South Korean government, however, reported that 230,000 registered as Kankokujin, only 170,000 as Chosenjin, and 175,000 as
neutrals (see K. Kim 1971:70-5). Koreans of the Kankokujin status were granted the permanent resident status. But the others were still permitted to continue to reside in Japan indefinitely (Lee 1971, 1976, and 1981e).

Of those Koreans registered as Chosenjin, 88,611 went to North Korea between 1959 and 1967. The North Korean repatriation program started in 1959 as a result of the negotiation between the North Korean and the Japanese governments (Lee 1971 and 1981c). Two phenomena concerning the repatriation program are noteworthy: more than half of the returnees were born in Japan, second-generation Koreans; and more than 71,000 returned to North Korea during the first two-year period, 1960-1961 (Ozawa 1973:433).

The North Korean repatriation program proved to be unpopular among Koreans in Japan for a number of reasons: (1) 96.9% of the total Korean population in Japan came originally from South Korea (Lee 1971:157); (2) the communist regime of North Korea did not attract the majority of Koreans in Japan, although a large number of them chose the Chosenjin status; and (3) reports from returnees of poverty-stricken living conditions in North Korea discouraged further repatriation.

In summation, since the early 1950s, the legal status of Koreans in Japan has become increasingly subject to the international political-ideological conflict. When they were confronted with the choice between South Korean
and North Korean allegiances, approximately one third of them chose the **Kankokujin** (South Korean) status. The others simply refused to become subject to the politics between South Korea's dictatorial Rhee regime and the Japanese government, or chose the **Chosenjin** status. Nevertheless, it is clear that Koreans in Japan lost opportunities to assert themselves as a political interest group, independent of the two regimes in Korea, and have become subject to both regimes.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have described the historical and political roots of the Japanese-Korean animosity. I have shown that the ideological roots for Japanese prejudices against Koreans were first articulated by Kokugaku scholars of the Tokugawa period. Their teachings were subsequently adopted and reinforced during the post-Tokugawa era, the Meiji Period. The Japanese prejudices were finally given substance as large numbers of Korean peasants migrated to Japan in the early twentieth century, only to compete with the Japanese for employment.

Furthermore, I have examined the predicament of Koreans in Japan today as closely linked to political and ideological conflict triggered by the Cold War. This conflict manifested itself in the struggle between South Korea
and North Korea in their attempt to control Koreans in Japan. The struggle between Soren and Mindan, two Korean political organizations in Japan, is a result and has functioned to keep Koreans apart from the Japanese, thus, discouraging the assimilation of Koreans into Japanese society.

Lee states that:

So long as the Korean community is split between the two contending groups, the effectiveness of articulating Koreans' interests in Japan is severely hampered and it may eventually result in mutual annihilation. Hence, the Japanese government has been able to keep the Korean problems very much under control through the means of 'divide and rule.' Moreover, the presence of the two antagonistic Korean minority groups often provides a convenient diplomatic leverage for the Japanese government to use a two-Korea policy. In fact, several attempts have been made to unify the two rival organizations. However, there have been stiff resistance and harassment said to have come from the pro-Japanese elements in the Mindan supported by the Japanese government which is anxious to keep them apart (1971:256).

In the next chapter, I shall compare the socio-economic conditions of the total Korean population in Japan with those conditions of my sample of Koreans. This comparison will reveal the characteristics of the Japanese socio-economic milieu in terms of which the variations of Korean life styles are approached.
Two surveys were conducted by Japanese researchers in Japan in reference to the Japanese views of Koreans. Seiichi Izumi (1966) conducted his survey in Tokyo in 1951. He interviewed a random sample of 344 Japanese. 210 persons disliked Koreans because they were "dirty," and 90 disliked them because they were "ugly." 188 persons distrusted Koreans because they were "cunning," and 131 distrusted them because they were "disrespectful" and "untrustworthy (hara guroi)." Y. Wagatsuma and Yoneyama (Miyata 1977) conducted their study in Tokyo, Nara, Osaka, and Kobe in 1967. They interviewed a random sample of 270 Japanese. The respondents disliked Koreans because they were "dirty" (87 persons), "conniving" (79), "having low self-esteem" (77), "ill-mannered" (66), and "easily influenced by mob psychology" (64). These results closely correspond to Hatada's results (1969 and 1976), and they reflect the general Japanese concept of purity-profanity. The Japanese, in general, tend to view Koreans in the terms listed above and to view themselves as well as white Americans and Europeans in opposite terms --- clean, distinguished-looking, well-mannered, and trustworthy (Miyata 1977). In sum, for the Japanese, one's physical appearance and attitude are most important indicators from which they judge one's worth. For instance, "dirtiness" is associated with "conniving," "low self-esteem," and "untrustworthiness," whereas "cleanliness" is associated with "distinguished-looking" and "trustworthiness."

Street-fights between Soren students and Japanese students after school are almost daily occurrences.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN

This chapter is concerned with the comparison of the socioeconomic conditions of the total Korean population in Japan with those conditions of my sample of Koreans, including seventeen Japanese and one Chinese who are either married to or living with some of these Koreans. The total number of my sample is 341, and these persons live in a few neighboring wards of Tokyo, Japan.

Also, this chapter examines the characteristics of two Korean political organizations in Japan: Soren (the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan/Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai) and Mindan (the South Korean Resident Association in Japan/ Zainichi Daikanminkoku Kyoryu Mindan). Their political activities, educational programs, and ideological conflict have had much impact on the Korean problems in Japan today. The examination of the Korean socioeconomic conditions and political organizations provide vital information regarding the milieu in which Koreans have developed their particular life styles.
The Korean Population in Japan

According to the 1974 Japanese census (Ministry of Justice 1975), the Japanese population was more than 112 million, while the alien population was more than 745,000. Koreans numbered 643,000, making up 86%. Thus, the Korean population today constitutes the major ethnic group among the alien population in Japan.

The geographical, the occupational, and the age and sex distributions of Koreans in Japan are shown in Table 2 (as of 1975) and Tables 3 and 4 (as of 1974) respectively. Table 2 shows that the majority of Koreans live in large urban centers, such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, and Fukuoka. These are some of the most populous cities in Japan. Other Koreans live in small clusters all over Japan. From Table 4, it is apparent that more than 70% of the Korean population, because of their ages, is composed of those who were born in Japan after 1945; that is, the second-generation Koreans.

Table 3 shows the occupations of Koreans in Japan. Only 23.25% is employed in the variety of occupations listed. The comparative employment statistics for the Japanese population disclose 64.4% employment as of 1972. The disparity between the two populations in employment statistics will be discussed later in this chapter.
In 1972, the Japanese population above the age 15 was 80,510,000. The total labor force was 51,820,000, of which 51,090,000 were employed (98.6%). Of the Japanese population above the age 15, 28,510,000 were actually not in the labor force (35.4%). Hence, 64.4% employment was figured for the Japanese population (Office of the Prime Minister 1973:115).

Table 4 shows the age and sex distributions of Koreans in Japan. It reveals 63% unemployment, if we subtract from the Korean population: (1) all females (who are traditionally excluded from the labor force); (2) all children under the age 14; and (3) all males above the age 65 (who are traditionally considered retired).

Furthermore, if we add to this unemployment figure all males between the ages of 15 and 24, a group eligible for high school and university education, we find 76.75% unemployment (see Table 3). However, at best, we must recognize that such a statistical manipulation is unrealistic for a number of reasons: (1) a large number of females may be assumed to be in the labor force (e.g., 47.8% of the Japanese female population above the age 15 being employed in 1972) (Office of the Prime Minister 1973:115); (2) a large number of males between the ages of 15 and 24 may be assumed to be out of school (e.g., 85% of the Japanese youth of this age group being enrolled in educational institutions in 1972) (Ibid.:143-4); and (3) not all males between the
ages of 24 and 64 may be assumed to be employed (e.g., 82% of the Japanese male population above the age 15 being employed in 1972) (Ibid.:115). Nevertheless, we can reasonably conclude that an abnormally high unemployment rate indeed exists among Koreans in Japan.

In reference to the kinds of occupations in which the employed Koreans were engaged (see Table 3), we have the following figures: (1) 45.5% were engaged in construction, semi- and unskilled labor, and small manufacturing occupations; (2) 20.9% in Korean restaurants and small businesses; (3) 9.7% in clerical occupations; (4) 8.7% in transportation and communication; and (5) 3.2% in business management. In contrast, 35.7% of the Japanese labor force was engaged in mining, manufacturing, and construction industries, 49.4% in service industries including wholesale and retail trade, and 1.4% in agriculture (Office of the Prime Minister 1973:116-8).

Those Koreans engaged in construction, semi- and unskilled labor, and small manufacturing occupations chronically suffer from poor working conditions, low wages, and unstable daily contracts and subsidies from Japanese companies. Those engaged in ethnic restaurants and small retail businesses including scrap iron and junk dealers, make up a quarter of the 20.9%.
### Table 2

Geographical Distribution of Koreans in Japan (1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefectures</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Prefectures</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>181,543</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>Gita</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>73,619</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>Gunma</td>
<td>2,879</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>68,067</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Niigata</td>
<td>2,622</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aichi</td>
<td>54,597</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>2,546</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>44,884</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>2,131</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>29,147</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Tochigi</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>25,369</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Ehime</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>16,157</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Toyama</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>14,997</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Aomori</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifu</td>
<td>10,987</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Yamanashi</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>10,021</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>9,914</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Totori</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td>8,479</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Iwate</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shizuoka</td>
<td>8,385</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Shimane</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mie</td>
<td>7,988</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>7,127</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Akita</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiga</td>
<td>7,126</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Kagawa</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nara</td>
<td>5,677</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Kochi</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukui</td>
<td>4,923</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Yamagata</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibaragi</td>
<td>3,912</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Tokushima</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>3,646</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>3,385</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>646,191</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Miyata 1977:198)
Table 3

Occupations of Koreans in Japan (1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical workers</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy men</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professional workers</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial workers</td>
<td>4,797</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office workers</td>
<td>20,769</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (export &amp; import)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap iron &amp; junk dealers</td>
<td>7,494</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail businesses</td>
<td>23,099</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3,699</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners &amp; quarrymen</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; communication</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>10,815</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>34,909</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled laborers</td>
<td>16,921</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbers/beauticians</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment workers</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi drivers</td>
<td>12,861</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists &amp; entertainers</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific workers</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total No. of Workers</strong></td>
<td>148,517</td>
<td>23.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployed</strong></td>
<td>490,289</td>
<td>76.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>638,806</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Miyata 1977:259)
### Table 4

Age and Sex Distributions of Koreans in Japan (1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>32,342</td>
<td>30,724</td>
<td>63,066</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>31,103</td>
<td>29,052</td>
<td>60,155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>28,599</td>
<td>27,136</td>
<td>55,735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>29,930</td>
<td>28,651</td>
<td>58,581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>121,974</strong></td>
<td><strong>115,563</strong></td>
<td><strong>237,537</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>34,813</td>
<td>33,816</td>
<td>68,629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>33,775</td>
<td>31,433</td>
<td>65,208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>28,067</td>
<td>26,826</td>
<td>54,893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>22,423</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>43,423</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>119,078</strong></td>
<td><strong>113,075</strong></td>
<td><strong>232,153</strong></td>
<td><strong>36.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>16,936</td>
<td>15,368</td>
<td>32,304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>17,468</td>
<td>13,659</td>
<td>31,127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>20,487</td>
<td>13,489</td>
<td>33,976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>14,778</td>
<td>9,748</td>
<td>24,526</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>69,669</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,264</strong></td>
<td><strong>121,933</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 69</td>
<td>19,038</td>
<td>14,147</td>
<td>33,185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 Over</td>
<td>6,658</td>
<td>6,631</td>
<td>13,289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,696</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,778</strong></td>
<td><strong>46,474</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>709</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>336,787</strong></td>
<td><strong>302,019</strong></td>
<td><strong>638,806</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: C. Kim 1977:204)
Moreover, those engaged in transportation and communication are mostly truck drivers. Those engaged in clerical occupations primarily work for Korean business owners (3.2%) who heavily depend on temporary work contracts from Japanese companies (see Nomura 1971:226-7).

Nomura (1971:227-8) states that the socioeconomic conditions of Koreans in Japan dramatically changed at the end of World War II. Prior to this time, they had been engaged in manufacturing (50%), mining (10%), and commerce (10%). But as a large number of Japanese soldiers and civilians returned to Japan, they began to replace Koreans in the labor market. Consequently, Koreans were forced to look for alternatives for survival. Many ventured into small manufacturing and retail businesses, which could be started with a small amount of capital and little skill. Others became involved in the black market, or worked for Korean business owners.

Furthermore, as Koreans became classified as aliens, by the Japanese government, after the ratification of the San Francisco Treaty of 1950, their economic opportunities became increasingly limited to ethnic-based enterprises as mentioned above (Ibid.:228; Sato 1971:240-1; also see Chapter Three).

Up until 1945, the Japanese government considered and treated Koreans as an integral part of the Japanese labor force. They were a very visible group of people with a
life style different from that of the Japanese. For instance, they spoke Korean most of the time or spoke Japanese with a strong Korean accent. Their background was agricultural and rural, and their dress was distinctly Korean.

Consequently, they did not and could not pass for Japanese, although they might have wished to, for a variety of reasons. Since then, however, those who chose to remain in Japan have adapted to the Japanese sociocultural milieu and have learned to pass for Japanese by speaking Japanese fluently and adopting Japanese behavioral mannerisms. Moreover, passing for Japanese has become imperative for Koreans' survival (see De Vos and Lee 1981c; and Wagatsuma 1981). For instance, Japanese usually do not employ Koreans or do not have business transactions with them if the Koreans maintain Korean identity (see the Pak case in Chapter Two; also see Rohlen 1981; and Lee and De Vos 1981b). Hence, when passing for Japanese, Koreans have better chances of starting and maintaining business relations with Japanese.

Koreans, in general, are effectively barred from employment in Japanese companies. Japanese companies usually exercise a careful screening of all job applicants: katei chosa and mimoto chosa are commonly conducted as such devices. Katei chosa is an investigation into a job applicant's family background and the personal conduct of his family members, and mimoto chosa into the conduct of his own personal life style (see Rohlen 1974:70-3).
Such a careful screening must be deemed imperative because most Japanese companies promote life-time employment (see Abegglen 1958; Cole 1971; Dore 1973; and Rohlen 1974) and promote company solidarity or "harmony and strength" from within (Rohlen 1974). In addition, traditional Japanese animosity toward Koreans precludes them from membership (see the Pak case in Chapter Two; and De Vos and Lee 1981c).

Hence, passing for Japanese ultimately does not suffice for Koreans to gain employment in Japanese companies. Consequently, the economic implication of passing is inclusive of all situations in which Koreans have business relations with Japanese. In other words, they have to be entrepreneurs and to use passing as a survival strategy. For the second-generation Koreans, however, passing has a rather different meaning; this aspect of passing will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.

Thus far, I have described the socioeconomic conditions of the total Korean population in Japan, in contrast to the conditions of the Japanese population. In the next section, I shall examine the two Korean political organizations in Japan: Soren and Mindan.

Since the end of World War II, these two organizations have had much impact on the general Korean situation in Japan. For instance, their existence and activities have helped to create conditions under which Koreans are alienated from the mainstream of Japanese society.
The Two Korean political Organizations in Japan: 
Soren and Mindan

Soren was founded in May, 1955, by a group of leftist Koreans living in Japan. Its constitutional objectives are stated below:

(1) Soren assumes no relationship with the Japan Communist Party;
(2) Soren is an extraterritorial agency representing the foreign policy of the North Korean government as well as the interests of its subjects in Japan; and
(3) Soren is not to interfere with internal affairs of Japan (Lee 1971:105-6; and also see Ozawa 1973:415-6).

Also, Soren has made specific goals for its political actions:

(1) to help strengthen the 'democratic base' in North Korea in achieving the peaceful unification of Korea;
(2) to protect the rights of Koreans in Japan; and
(3) to promote friendly relations between DPRK [North Korea] and Japan (Lee 1971:106-8).

Soren's hierarchical structure is based on a large number of major and minor agencies throughout Japan: 46 Prefectural Headquarters, including Tokyo, 419 district agencies, 2,700 branches, and 246 units (Ibid.:113). Its political strength is based on a "rigid chain of command," and the ultimate political power and authority reside with the leader of the North Korean regime, namely Kim Il Song (Ibid.:108-11). Its actual political strength is derived from the support of approximately 56% to 60% of the Korean population in Japan (One Korea Year Book 1967-68:568; and

The most significant effect of Soren activities on Koreans in Japan is found in its educational system. It is composed of 142 institutions throughout Japan: 88 grammar schools, 44 middle schools, 9 high schools, and Soren University. The total enrollment exceeded 40,000 in 1966 (Ozawa 1973:435). Another source (One Korea Year Book 1967-68:564) gives the number of school-age Koreans in Japan to be approximately 140,000: 77% of this number attends the Japanese school system, 21.5% the Soren school system, and only 1.5% the Mindan school system.

It is noteworthy that by 1967 the North Korean regime had sent more than $14 million to help establish and maintain the Soren school system (Lee 1971:190). In contrast, the South Korean regime had sent a mere $2.2 million by 1967 for the support of the Mindan school system (Ibid.: 190).

The Soren school system is founded on an "ethnic education" policy, from which Koreans in Japan learn the Korean language and Korean history and tradition, and develop a strong consciousness of North Korean citizenship. More specifically, the Soren ethnic education policy is to promote:

1. love of the socialist country;
2. deep awareness of the tradition of Korean patriotism;
3. awareness of the peaceful reunification of Korea and of the duty to protect the Korean
people's democratic rights;
(4) awareness of the significance of the struggle against American Imperialism;
(5) belief in the thought of self-sufficiency; and
(6) love of the future as Koreans of morality and good behavior (Ozawa 1973:441-2; my translations).

Mindan was founded in October, 1946, in Japan by a group of Koreans who were opposed to the leftist orientation of Korean political movements. This group declared that Mindan was a totally non-political organization and, thus, was not to be aligned either with South Korea or with North Korea, except for its principal position of anti-communism. Also, Mindan's organizational objectives were said to be directed at promoting a friendly relationship between Koreans and the Japanese (Lee 1971:35-7, and 1981f).

Although Mindan officials claimed that their membership exceeded 260,000 (as of 1969), two sources disclose their claim to be unreliable (see Lee 1971:122; and One Korea Year Book 1967-68:561). In fact, Mindan, from the beginning, has had difficulties in fund raising and membership recruitment mainly because of its organizational weakness and lack of support from the majority of Koreans in Japan, the Japanese government, and SCAP (the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers).

Furthermore, some of its problems have come from the general practice in which its officials use the organization for their personal welfare (Lee 1971:38-40). Hence, despite Mindan's stated objectives, it developed into a puppet
organization as it became more and more involved with the internal and foreign affairs of the South Korean regime. At the same time its popularity declined in Japan (see Mitchell 1967:152).

With regards to Mindan's effort to educate Korean youth in Japan, it has developed a feeble educational system of only three institutions up to the high school level in Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka. The school enrollment is a little over 1,300 (Ozawa 1973:445-6).

The weakness of Mindan's educational system is derived from its lack of firm educational direction. Its stated direction is to promote the principle of ethnic self-sufficiency based on South Korean patriotism and anti-communism. Ozawa (Ibid.:446-9) points out two reasons for the chronic trouble of this educational system: (1) students do not develop a good command of the Korean language at school; (2) they are not taught the modern history of Korea and, consequently, lack a clear Korean identity.

In general, despite the presence of the two Korean political organizations in Japan, the majority of Koreans have maintained the sense of detachment from or disinterest in either organization. This is clearly demonstrated in the fact that 77% of approximately 140,000 school-age Korean youth go to Japanese schools and universities (see One Korea Year Book 1967-68:564).
Two reasons seem to explain this fact: (1) the educational objectives of both Soren and Mindan are considered by the majority of Korean parents to be hampering their children's future survival in Japan; and (2) enrollment in either school system is considered jeopardizing to the chances of Korean youth attending Japanese higher educational institutions. In other words, Koreans in Japan have increasingly become conscious of securing means of survival and have come to see Japanese education as one of those means (see Rohlen 1981; Lee 1981f; and De Vos and Lee 1981c).

Yet both Soren and Mindan have not altered their educational and ideological objectives. For instance, Soren's ideological objectives and activities regarding communism and anti-capitalism are indeed considered subversive to the policy of the Japanese government. Yet Soren has been permitted to continue to exist in Japan.

According to Lee (1971), since the end of World War II, the Japanese government policy regarding the Korean minority has been "to reduce the number of Koreans through repatriation" and "to compel Koreans to conform and assimilate into the Japanese norms" (Ibid.:257). However, the Japanese government has been "reluctant to broaden the legal scope of eligibility to facilitate the naturalization of Koreans in Japan" (Ibid.:257). A little over 41,000 Koreans (6.8%) have been naturalized by 1966 (Ibid.:94). Further-
more, the Korean population in Japan has been steadily increasing: from more than 587,000 in 1967 to more than 643,000 in 1974. Hence, the Japanese government policy to reduce the number of Koreans has not been successful.

Under these sociopolitical circumstances, the presence of Soren and Mindan seems to serve a special function for the Japanese government. For instance, it does not seem presumptuous to conclude that the Japanese government tacitly favors Soren's existence precisely because of its pro-communist and anti-capitalist ideology. Whatever support and political allegiance Soren receives from Koreans feeds back into the mechanism which separates them from the Japanese. Also, Mindan's objectives and activities, although they are pro-capitalist and anti-communist, seem to serve the same function --- separating Koreans from the Japanese.

Both Soren and Mindan have laboriously created Korean social identity in two respective images: one is communism, and the other capitalism. Korean social identity, regardless of either image it assumes, is a category, whose social function is to alienate Koreans from the mainstream of Japanese society. Those Koreans, who are disinterested in either Soren or Mindan, are, nevertheless, confronted with the Soren and the Mindan images of Korean social identity.

Given the above political background, I shall, in the next section, introduce Seiichi Izumi's work on Koreans of Che Ju Do origin in Tokyo (1966) and describe the socio-
economic conditions of my sample of Koreans.

Koreans of Che Ju Do Origin in Tokyo

Before I examine my sample of Koreans, I shall introduce the Japanese anthropologist Seiichi Izumi's work, conducted in 1951, on Koreans of Che Ju Do origin in Tokyo; mostly the first-generation Koreans (1966). Izumi and his associates studied some of the Koreans covered in my study, and their study provides my study with a comparative perspective.

Izumi states that the study of Koreans from Che Ju Do is significant because more than half of Koreans living in Tokyo and Osaka, the two largest industrial urban centers of Japan, are from Che Ju Do (Ibid.:i-iii).

Izumi initially assumed that there were approximately 500 Korean households and 2,000 Koreans of Che Ju Do origin in the three neighboring wards of Tokyo in 1951. In his study, these wards were referred to as the "X-ward." Izumi planned to study half of these households.

His plan, however, was interrupted by the sudden outbreak of the Korean War. Izumi and his associates, nevertheless, collected information involving 73 households and 320 individuals: 4.3 persons per household (Ibid.:235-6, 243). Izumi concluded that there must have been 481 households of Che Ju Do origin, which constituted 52% of the
total Korean households of 921 in the "X-ward" (Ibid.:240).

Table 5 shows that most of these Koreans, primarily the first-generation Koreans, favored manufacturing occupations: 72 out of 93 individuals or 77.4% were engaged in such occupations. Also, Izumi reports that only two of 481 households registered in the city hall of the "X-ward" were engaged in occupations requiring the use of sharp tools: axes or shovels.

Koreans of Che Ju Do origin generally dislike occupations requiring the use of sharp objects; these occupations traditionally are restricted to persons of lower statuses. Izumi contends that the large number of these Koreans favored manufacturing occupations, probably because they were clean and could be started with a small amount of capital (1966:255); his contention was confirmed by many first-generation and recent migrant Koreans of my sample.

In addition, two other reasons may explain the predominance of manufacturing occupations among these Koreans. One reason hinges on their primary socialization experiences in their native fishing and agricultural villages in Che Ju Do. There they were accustomed to more or less independent management of economic activities (see Izumi 1966:252-4).
Table 5

Occupations of Che Ju Do Koreans in the "X-Ward" of Tokyo (as of 1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>No. of Males</th>
<th>No. of Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing of rubber goods</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing with use of sewing machine</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap iron &amp; junk dealers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoe manufacturing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean clothes shop</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes shop</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candy manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candle manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street vendor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment industry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diver</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>93</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Izumi 1966:255)
In fact, most first-generation and recent migrant Korean males of my sample expressed a strong sentiment toward economic independence and self-reliance. Hence, in all my sample cases, this sentiment is fulfilled in manufacturing occupations which allow them to have "no boss" above them.

The other reason is the subculture of the particular location in which they settled, namely the "X-ward." The major section of the "X-ward," was studied by De Vos and Wagatsuma (1973). They describe this ward as representing a typical scene of Japanese lower-class life.

In our investigation ...... we found a still viable economic system in which an individual family owned from one to three machines placed in one room of a small frame-and-paper dwelling, while characteristically the family lived in one or two additional rooms. These home-factories were found in narrow irregular streets periodically cut through by major traffic arteries having more modern stores, sidewalks, and large concrete buildings. Only here and there in this ward, located to the north of the center of Tokyo, was there a factory of any significant size (1973:203).

In the "X-ward" 85% of such home-factories employ less than nine workers per home-factory. They typically produce furniture, metal and leather goods, ready-made suits and dresses, toys, pencils, and other commercial goods. The magnitude of the retail and wholesale commerce in this ward is also on a small scale.
The over-all function of such small-scale enterprises to the Japanese economy is, according to De Vos and Wagatsuma, "... a cushion or shock absorber that allows the Japanese national economy to adjust to minor as well as major changes in demand" (1973:211). Although these Japanese entrepreneurs are vulnerable, especially during a recession, it is their desire for economic independence that drives them toward entrepreneurial activities (Ibid.:209). This economic and cultural milieu prevails throughout the "X-ward," and Koreans from Che Ju Do with a similar economic and cultural sentiment have found their niche in this milieu.

With regards to education, Izumi reports that approximately 300 Korean children went to the Soren (North Korean-affiliated) grammar school located within walking distance. Half of this number were children of Korean parents from Che Ju Do, making up 75% of all school-age children of this group. The rest attended the Japanese school.

Izumi contends that Korean parents from Che Ju Do were likely to send their children to the Soren school for three reasons: (1) its proximity; (2) sympathy with the Soren ideology; and (3) a non-discriminatory environment provided for their children by the school (1966:266).

Regardless of these reasons, however, the figure of children of Korean parents from Che Ju Do going to the Soren
school is much higher than the 21.5% of the Korean population going to the same school system throughout Japan (see Lee 1971:190). However, there is obviously a time gap between the first figure in 1950 and the second figure in 1971. This problem will be discussed later with reference to my sample of Koreans.

In the remainder of this section, I shall further elucidate information on my sample of Koreans. In Chapter One, I have classified these Koreans into the three major groups: the first-generation, the second-generation, and the recent migrant Koreans, for the reasons stated therein.

From the total number of 341 individuals, 94 (27.6%) are of the first-generation group, 134 (39.3%) of the second-generation group, and 43 (12.6%) of the recent migrant group. Of the rest, four (1.2%) are parents of some of the first-generation Koreans, that is, the pre-first-generation group, and 66 (19.4%) are children of some of the second-generation Koreans, that is, the third-generation group (see Table 6). I have excluded these two groups from the three major groups, because the pre-first-generation Koreans disclose no noticeable difference from the first-generation Koreans in the light of their life styles, and the third-generation Koreans are still too young to articulate themselves.
Table 6

Number of Che Ju Do Koreans by Groups
(from my sample, 1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1st-Generation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st-Generation</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd-Generation</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd-Generation</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Migrant</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

Age and Sex Distributions of Che Ju Do Koreans
(from my sample, 1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No. of Males</th>
<th>No. of Females</th>
<th>Japanese Females</th>
<th>Chinese Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 - 69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 - 74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the total of 341 individuals includes seventeen Japanese and one Chinese. They are included in this number because of either being married to or living with some of these Koreans (see Table 7).

At the time of my fieldwork, the pre-first-generation Koreans were in their seventies, and the first-generation Koreans in their forties to early sixties. Table 7 shows that the majority of the Japanese, who were married to or living with the Koreans, did so with the first-generation Koreans. All of the second- and the third-generation Koreans were born in the "X-ward" and its vicinity. When we combine these two groups, we have 58.7%, which is somewhat lower than the 70% Japanese-born Koreans for the total Korean population in Japan (see Nomura 1971:223).

The second-generation Koreans were between pre-school-age and their early thirties, and the third-generation Koreans were predominantly pre-schoolers (under the age of six). Lastly, all of the recent migrant Koreans were born in the Che Ju Do villages and came to Japan in their late teens to early twenties during the 1950s and 1960s. At the time of my fieldwork, they were in their twenties to forties.

When we examine the lineage and other group affiliations of my sample total of 341 individuals, we have the following breakdowns: (1) 90 (26.4%) belong to AA lineage [1]; (2) 29 (8.5%) to BB lineage [2]; (3) 141 (41.3%) to a
variety of lineages --- all of them sharing their kinship ties with the same Che Ju Do villages [3]; (4) 52 (15.2%) belong to the Soren school group, having gone to the Soren school system only, but sharing their identification with Che Ju Do; and (5) 29 (8.5%) with no direct traditional or school group affiliations with any of the above, but, nevertheless, share with them their identification with Che Ju Do.

**Occupations**

With regards to the occupations of these Koreans (see Table 8), 39 households (46.9%) of the total of 83, or 67 individuals (35.3%) of the labor force of 190, are engaged in manufacturing occupations. These occupations typically involve the manufacturing and wholesaling of vinyl luggage. They pertain to Izumi's category, manufacturing with use of the sewing machine --- 44 individuals (47.3%) of 93 (Izumi 1966:255; also see Table 5).

The highest percentage (5.4% or 34,909 persons) of the total Korean population in Japan as of 1974 was engaged in manufacturing occupations (see Table 3). In terms of Izumi's (1966) and my data, I assume that these Koreans were also involved in the manufacturing and wholesaling of vinyl luggage in general. When we compare Tables 5 and 8, it is apparent that during the 26-year period between the time of Izumi's study and mine, Che Ju Do Koreans have made a wide
occupational diversification.

For instance, six first-generation Koreans have ventured into profitable enterprises, such as money lending, mizushobai (a type of restaurants that sells beverage, bars and coffee shops being typical), pachinko (Japanese pinball machine games) and majan (Chinese checker games) parlors, and real estate investment (see Table 8). Also, it is significant that Izumi's category, manufacturing of rubber goods, disappeared among these Koreans, one reason being that they consider such occupations lower-class. Some Koreans stated that they dislike such occupations, because the materials they have to handle smell bad.

The first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans especially favor manufacturing occupations listed in Table 8 for a number of reasons: (1) they, in their respective stages of settlement in Tokyo, were unable to find employment from Japanese and were, consequently, forced to start their own businesses; (2) these occupations required little skill and a small amount of capital to start; (3) they could easily be set up in small family dwellings; (4) these Koreans gave and continue to give assistance to one another regarding skills and manufacturing contracts; and (5) these occupations gave them a sense of economic independence.

The fact that some Koreans are employed by Japanese (see Table 8) needs some elaboration. Two of the three second-generation Koreans thus employed are brothers and
have a Japanese mother. They had dropped their paternal Korean nationality and had started their own new Japanese lineage on the basis of their maternal Japanese nationality. Thus, they are employed as Japanese citizens and have no legal complications. The third individual is Korean, although he has a Japanese mother. He obtained his job from a Japanese entrepreneur with whom his father had a close business association.

The two recent migrant Koreans thus employed are Japanese-university graduates: one is an architect and is employed by a Japanese building contractor; and the other is employed in business management. They obtained their jobs because their Japanese employers needed university graduates but could not attract Japanese to their small businesses.

Lastly, one recent migrant Korean, although he holds a Japanese university Ph.D. in economics, works as a manager of a Korean-owned pachinko parlor. He considers his predicament a sad case of failure, despite his high academic achievement; he attributes it to Japanese discrimination against Koreans.
### Table 8

**Occupations of Che Ju Do Koreans by Groups and Households**
*(from my sample, 1976)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Pre-1st</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>Recent</th>
<th>No. of Migrant Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing of vinyl luggage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) wholesale &amp; manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) subsidiary manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money lending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment owners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap iron/junk dealers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee shop restaurants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean restaurants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bars &amp; pachinko parlors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean clothes stores</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment manufacturing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat processing &amp; retail</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric related businesses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate investment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soren activists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindan activists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed by Japanese</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed by Koreans</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Education and Literacy

Regarding education and literacy, the majority of the first-generation males are literate in both Korean and Japanese, to the extent that they can read newspapers in both languages and that they can manage business transactions in Japanese. Most of these males had acquired their literacy in Korean with Chinese characters at traditional Confucianist schools in Che Ju Do as a customary educational practice for males. After having come to Japan, they learned the Japanese syllabary. Only four of 94 first-generation Koreans, all males, went to Japanese universities, but only one actually has a degree.

Almost all of the first-generation females are illiterate in both Korean and Japanese. This is because Korean females are traditionally kept away from school. However the Japanese women married to or living with some of the Koreans are literate in Japanese because of Japan's compulsory education policy.

In further comparisons, 53 (42.7%) and 68 (54.8%) of 124 second-generation school-age Koreans have gone to or still go to the Soren school system and the Japanese school system respectively. The rest of this group goes to the Mindan school system. The remainder of the total of 134 of this group are still below the school age of six. The 42.7% which is affiliated with the Soren school system is
significantly lower than the 75% which Izumi obtained in his 1950 study (Izumi 1966:266), but is still significantly higher than the 21.5% which Lee (1971:190) obtained for the total Korean population in Japan.

To explain the gap between the 1950 and the 1976 figures of Koreans affiliated with the Soren school system, there is one significant factor; that is, that the mixing of the Soren school system with the Japanese school system frequently occurs among Koreans. In fact, more than half of 57 Koreans affiliated with the Japanese school system once went to the Soren school system. Hence, if we include those of this group who once went to the Soren school system in those affiliated with it, we have 73.3% which closely corresponds to Izumi's 1950 finding (1966).

Furthermore, of the total of 66 third-generation Koreans, twelve are above the age of six. Five go to the Soren school system, and seven to the Japanese school system. Hence, 58 (42.6%) and 75 (55.1%) of the total of 136 school-age Koreans are affiliated with the Soren school system and the Japanese school system respectively.

Given the trend of shifting school affiliation, it is likely that the number of those Koreans going to the Japanese school system will increase as they grow older in the hope that they will be able to attend Japanese high schools and even universities. First- and second-generation Koreans, whose intentions to live in Japan permanently are
often expressed, consider Japanese education a necessary factor for their survival (see Rohlen 1981; Lee 1981f; and De Vos and Lee 1981c).

Regarding the utility of the Soren school system, first-generation Koreans commonly express the position that they wish their children to learn the Korean language and something about Korean heritage. One of Soren's stated goals is such an ethnic education, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Hence, they are inclined to be tolerant of the communist-oriented teaching conducted in the Soren school system. Their position is a significant change as contrasted with one of Izumi's reported reasons (1966:266) for parents sending their children to this system; that is, sympathy with the Soren ideology.

In contrast, they do not consider the Mindan school system adequate to fulfill their needs, despite its stated goal of ethnic education, which will be discussed later in this chapter. In fact, only three children go to this school system, primarily because their fathers are Mindan activists.

Regarding the Soren school affiliation among Koreans, there is a wide gap between my sample (42.7%) and the total Korean population (21.5%). This gap may be accounted for by the limited availability of its schools throughout Japan, whereas there are thirteen Soren grammar schools in Tokyo alone. However, the over-all decline in the Korean
affiliation and sympathy with Soren seems related to Koreans' increasing commitment to live in Japan permanently.

Lastly, eight and seven of the total of 43 recent migrant Koreans have gone to or still go to the Soren school system and Japanese universities respectively. Regardless of ideological sympathy, these eight migrant Koreans are affiliated with the Soren school system mainly because of their common lack of legal resident status; the Soren school system would normally admit illegal Korean students. It is noteworthy that all seven Koreans have actually completed Japanese university education, after having obtained a legal resident status by a variety of means: for instance, marrying Koreans with legal resident status. The rest of the recent migrant group did not pursue formal education upon their arrival in Japan.

Resident Status

With regards to legal resident status, all of the pre-first-generation, the first-generation, the second-generation, and the third-generation Koreans have some type of legal resident status in Japan. The first two groups hold this status because these Koreans had been in Japan prior to 1945, and the last two groups because of their parents' legal status and of their birth in Japan (see Chapter Three).
Approximately one third of the total of 43 recent migrant Koreans hold a variety of legal resident statuses. They have acquired them because of long residence in Japan, good personal conduct, marrying Japanese or Koreans with legal resident status, having children born in Japan, or having a business or financial investment in Japan.

There is one known case of deportation to South Korea in my sample: a male, who had come to Japan in the late 1950's, was deported after having lost his fortune and surrendered himself to the Immigration authorities, but he eventually returned to Japan illegally.

**Marriage**

With regards to marriage, of 83 households, 19 (23%) disclose mixed-marriages. Except for one case, all of them are Korean males married to or living with Japanese. In fact, 14 of 18 cases do not constitute a legitimate marriage, for all of these males have maintained their marriages with Korean wives who are still living in Che Ju Do. Their Japanese "wives" are aware of this fact, but are generally inclined to tolerate or to accept this life style. The majority of these males still send remittances to their Korean wives in Che Ju Do.

In Che Ju Do villages, males traditionally control all wealth and labor. The female laborer is subjected to the control of her husband and his patrilineal kinsmen. Males
are allowed to take mistresses, not usually for their sexual gratification but for extra labor force. In short, males are supported by their wives and, occasionally, by their mistresses, as they offer their land to the latter (Izumi 1966:252-4). While in Japan, these males continue to recognize their traditional marriage contracts with their Korean wives and to send, as a result, remittances to them.

The one exception to this pattern is a marriage between a Japanese and a second-generation Korean female whose mother is Japanese. This marriage is widely accepted among her paternal relatives who assume that she has made up her mind to become a Japanese.[4]

Another significant pattern concerns recent migrants' marriages to second-generation Koreans. Of 43 migrants, nine have married in this fashion, thus, securing their legal resident status in Japan.

Lastly, the second-generation Koreans tend to favor individuals of the same group for marriage: 15 such marriages have occurred out of 25 marriages in this group. Moreover, those who are of marriageable age commonly express their desire to marry individuals of the same group. One reason that they most commonly offer for rejecting recent migrants for marriage is that their life styles are incompatible with migrants'. 
Repatriation

With regards to repatriation to either North or South Korea, 15 individuals chose to go to North Korea. It is significant that ten of these individuals were second-generation Koreans and that three were those who came from Che Ju Do to Japan after 1950. Their relatives stated that they chose to go to North Korea because they determined that Japan would offer them no prosperity. In contrast, only four have gone to South Korea: (1) one first-generation male out of necessity, having declared bankruptcy in Japan; (2) a married couple of the second-generation group because of the husband's new job in South Korea; and (3) a second-generation female, whose mother was Japanese, left to learn Korean heritage.

Naturalization

Finally, with regards to naturalization, eight individuals have been naturalized: two first-generation, five second-generation, and one recent migrant Koreans. However, seven of them conceal the fact of naturalization from other Koreans; they pass for Koreans. Nevertheless, naturalization still is an unpopular option for Koreans; this issue will be discussed in the next chapter.
Conclusions

In this chapter, I have compared the socio-economic conditions of the total Korean population in Japan with those conditions of my sample of Koreans. The presentation of my sample was partly reinforced by Izumi's study (1966).

The most significant areas of comparison are occupations and education. While the majority of Che Ju Do Koreans favor manufacturing occupations, they dislike construction and unskilled labor. They state that they dislike soiling their hands and that manufacturing occupations give them the sense of economic independence. This finding is contrary to some of Japanese prejudices against Koreans mentioned in Chapter Three: Koreans are dirty and have "victim-consciousness."

However, the Korean population, as a whole, in Japan shows a mixed occupational choice: 4.3% engaged in construction and unskilled labor, and 9.1% in a variety of retail and manufacturing occupations (see Table 3). Furthermore, more Che Ju Do Koreans tend to send their children to the Soren school system than the total Korean population, the reasons for which have been suggested in this chapter.

Also, in this chapter, I have described the organizational characteristics of both Soren and Mindan and argued that their existence is partly responsible for the Korean
alienation in Japanese society.

In Chapters One through Four, I have developed the theoretical perspective and have described and examined the general milieu of the total Korean population in Japan and the particular milieu of my sample of Koreans in Tokyo.

The history of the Korean-Japanese relationship shows close genetic and cultural exchanges. In the light of the recent political history, the mutual antagonism between them has developed within the context of Western European and American expansionism in East Asia. Japan's move to annex Korea in 1910 was one of its responses to the Western threat. Japan's subjugation of Korea set the tone of Japanese superiority over Koreans.

Since the end of World War II, Koreans in Japan have become subjected to the ideological struggle between the South Korean and the North Korean regimes. These regimes have since exerted their influence on Koreans in Japan as they have mobilized both Soren and Mindan to shape the Korean predicament in Japan. The articulation of Korean social identity by both Soren and Mindan in their respective ideological images is a consequence that has been partly reinforced by the Japanese government, which defines Koreans as an alien group. The political nature of Korean social identity confronts Koreans in Japan today and is one of the major obstacles for their integration into the mainstream of Japanese society.
Furthermore, it seems that there were opportunities for Koreans to define themselves as an ethnic and political interest group independent of the two regimes in Korea when the structure of inequality collapsed at the end of World War II in Japan. But these opportunities were quickly seized by the two Korean regimes and the Japanese government during the Cold War. Since then, Koreans in Japan have been effectively alienated from the mainstream of Japanese society.

The fact that the Koreans of my sample intend to live in Japan permanently and favor Japanese education may disclose their readiness for assimilation. But this aspect is clearly countered by Japanese animosity and by, more significantly, the activities of Soren and Mindan which effectively alienate Koreans from the Japanese.

Given these historical and political circumstances, Koreans in Japan have developed a variety of life styles as they have struggled to survive in a hostile milieu. In the next three chapters, I shall present their life styles and shall analyze them in terms of their relations with the external conditions examined thus far.
Notes:

[1]. AA lineage in Che Ju Do is one of 79 known lineages and is most numerous. Also, this lineage is most numerous in the villages where the individuals in question came from. According to my informants, their lineage has been well known for producing village headmen and some of the wealthiest men on the island.

[2]. BB lineage is one of lesser ones both in Che Ju Do as a whole and in the villages where the individuals in question came from. According to my informants, however, one man had exerted considerable influence as a medical doctor in his village prior to the end of World War II.

[3]. There were 15 lineages involved in this group. All are in the minority both in Che Ju Do as a whole and in their villages.

[4]. The rate of interethnic marriage between Koreans and Japanese was 42.4% in 1969. It increased to 43.4% in 1970, 46.9% in 1971, and 48% in 1972. The majority of these Koreans are of the second- and third-generation groups (Lee 1981e:134-6). In comparison to my data, the increasing interethnic marriage rate among the Korean population in Japan shows an obvious gap. A follow-up study of my fieldwork concerning marriage patterns of the second- and third-generation Koreans should be a significant area of inquiry.
CHAPTER FIVE

VARIATIONS OF KOREAN LIFE STYLES I: THE FIRST-GENERATION KOREANS

This chapter concerns the group of Koreans who were born in the few neighboring fishing and agricultural villages in Che Ju Do, South Korea. They were in their teens to early twenties when they came to Tokyo, Japan, during the 1930s and 1940s. This period was the last phase of the Japanese domination of Korea.

The total number comprising this first-generation group in my sample is 94. At the time of my fieldwork, these Koreans were in their late forties to early sixties.

During my fieldwork, I expected to spend and indeed spent the minimum amount of time with these Koreans for two assumed reasons: (1) they worked six to seven days a week and were, consequently, too busy to spend much time with me regarding the disclosure of their personal lives; (2) and I assumed a junior status among older Koreans, so they would be unlikely to confide in me their personal experiences. Hence, I did not expect to obtain a whole picture of a
particular person in this group, which I expected to obtain from Koreans of the other two groups.

Therefore, for the first-generation Koreans, I had planned to collect their accounts on a number of questions which I had previously drawn up. However, the individuals in this group focused more frequently on six questions as most important for them.

The areas covered by these questions are listed below: (1) the initial settlement period during which two general patterns emerged regarding their efforts to make a living in an unfamiliar urban life; (2) economic independence achieved since the initial settlement period; (3) education and political views which characterize their particular points of view as separate from the influence of Korean politics in Japan; (4) chesa and the urban association activities in terms of which they maintain their network of communication; (5) Korean views of the Japanese expressing their passing strategies in relation to Japanese; and (6) naturalization to which all the Koreans in this group have once given serious consideration as an alternative to their ethnic and alien status.

The main objective in studying the first-generation Koreans is to discover the linkage between their life styles and their particular sociocultural and politicoeconomic circumstances. This "thick description" (Geertz 1973) will be used as the basis of comparison when we approach the
other two groups of Koreans in terms of the variations of life styles.

**The Initial Settlement Period**

The period during which the first-generation Koreans migrated to Tokyo corresponds to the latter part of Wagner's first phase through the second phase (between the 1930s and 1945) (1951). The socioeconomic and political conditions of this period have already been described in Chapter Three. Again, one significant development of this period may be mentioned; that is, Japan's policy to forcibly import Korean laborers to Japan. The actual period of this forced labor program lasted from 1939 to 1945 (Fujishima 1976:11).

However, none of the first-generation Koreans in my sample were forced to come to Japan. In fact, their decision to come to Japan was primarily based on two related factors, which Wagner also cites (1951:25): they lost most of their land holdings to Korean and Japanese landlords and were attracted to Japan's economic prosperity. For instance, one 55-year-old male, AAB, recalls this period:

"I was seventeen or eighteen when I came to Tokyo. I knew several relatives and some villagers in Tokyo. I was looking for their help to find work. There was nothing I could do in Che Ju Do, especially after we lost most of our land to a Korean landlord. I didn't want to go to the mainland, because news from there was bad enough ... like ... Japanese were
taking over everything there. But I kept hearing from my relatives in Tokyo that they were making a living. So I decided to give it a try. Then I was single and was not obligated to look after my parents. I have one elder brother, and he stayed in the village. So I came to Tokyo. When I came to Tokyo ... it was in the 1930s, the place looked to me big and prosperous. I had never seen anything like it before. My relatives gave me shelter in their rented house. At that time, they were working for a Japanese whose business was to manufacture luggage for military and commercial purposes. They were sewing machine operators. They got me the same job. I was quickly trained on the job. I thought my pay was good."

AAB's experience is, according to my observation, shared by the majority of the first-generation Koreans in my sample. The initial pattern of migration and settlement for this group may be traced as follows: (1) a little over half of the males were single at the time of migration to Japan; (2) the majority of the married males came to Japan leaving their wives and children in Che Ju Do; (3) both groups sought out their relatives' and/or villagers' assistance in Tokyo; (4) they eventually found jobs, with assistance, in Japanese-owned manufacturing industries — rubber and chemical products, a variety of luggage products, parts for electric equipment, and so on; (5) none of these individuals were engaged in construction work; (6) a small number of them tried a variety of entrepreneurial activities — street vending and sales of various gadgets; and (7) after several years, some of their wives brought their children to Tokyo — the number of children being small (also see Izumi 1966:254-8). Furthermore, these wives were quickly trained
to perform similar tasks in their husbands' places of employment, and some of them were given take-home jobs to produce clothes, shoes, and leather cases for cameras and binoculars.

When they came to Japan, they already had Japanese names; it was the Japanese colonial policy that Koreans in Korea had to adopt Japanese names, for they were treated as Imperial Japanese subjects (see Pak 1973; and Iwamura 1972). A common situation at the time of these Koreans' initial settlement in Japan must have been that they, who were referred to by Japanese names, spoke no or little Japanese, with an obvious Korean accent. Hence, passing for Japanese then was not a realistic choice.

Although these Koreans were given wages comparably lower than those given to Japanese for the same work, the Koreans felt that they achieved a better standard of living in Tokyo than in Che Ju Do. For instance, they were able to rent houses, which were built and furnished better than those they left in Che Ju Do, and were able to purchase clothes, shoes, and furniture. Some individuals were able to purchase houses.

Moreover, the occupations mentioned above, attracted these Koreans because they were clean, required little skill or experience, and required little knowledge of the Japanese language, and they could remain close to their primary group. The particular area of Tokyo in which they settled
was ideal for them, because it traditionally depended on such small manufacturing industries.

A novel pattern of living arrangement was established during this initial settlement period. Of a total of thirteen Japanese females, who have been living with Koreans since this period, two are actually married, and the rest are not. To this date, the Korean males, who live with illegitimate Japanese "wives," are still married to their Korean wives living in Che Ju Do, although they have not seen each other for years. Some of these males and their Japanese "wives" have offspring, and they form nuclear families in Tokyo.

Moreover, these males have continued to send money or alimony to their Korean wives. In fact, it was common, during the 1960s and 1970s, that these males had houses built for their families in Che Ju Do. Their Japanese "wives" seem to tolerate this practice. Some of them have openly expressed their respect for their "husbands" in this regard: the common expression is, "A man, who builds a house for his wife and family in Che Ju Do, is an honorable family man."

Nevertheless, some Japanese "wives" have suffered because of this pattern of living arrangement. For instance, one 39-year-old Japanese female states:
"One morning I woke up and found that my husband was missing. I had to look for him all that day ... going to his friends' houses and asking them if they had seen him. They all said they hadn't. But one Japanese wife guessed that he might have gone to Che Ju Do. I didn't believe her at first. But she was right. That bastard went back to his village alone, leaving me and my son behind. I was so shocked and heart-broken. I didn't know why he left us. ... Then, I eventually found out why. He was getting into heavy debts and never told me about them. It was really stupid of me that I didn't know all about our debts. I was just busy working at home, and he was busy making business contracts outside, so I thought. Now, the house we live in is not ours. Before he left, he put up our house as a collateral for a loan. They tell me that I'm responsible for paying back his debts. I have no money. I don't know what to do ... I guess I'm to blame in the end. My brothers told me to leave him in the first place. I met him in the factory where I operated a sewing machine. I was sixteen then. I didn't know he was married. He didn't tell me that until after we had lived together for a while. I really was an ignorant country girl. Then I thought that it was all right, although he was married to someone else, as long as he was willing to live with me. There are other Japanese women in the same predicament. So I thought that I was doing all right. But now, I wish I could get to him, so that I could kill him with my own hands."

Another Japanese "wife," who is 50 years old, tells her experience:

"I have been living with my husband for more than 30 years. Well, he has been a very good provider. We have two sons, who are doing well. But there was a time when I really suffered. It was one year ago when my husband's real wife came to visit us. She came alone, and my husband asked me to allow her to stay in our house. I wouldn't dream of saying 'No' to him. When she came, we gave her a room. She was quiet and was rather understanding. She was not demanding at all. So I appreciated her. My husband was very nice to me during that time. My two sons ... I was glad ... were extremely understanding. When she left, I was indeed glad. But at the same
time, I didn't feel that my husband would betray me, which was a good feeling."

The first Japanese female's experience was very disturbing to the rest of the Japanese "wives" as well as to their Korean female friends. The second Japanese female's account generally represents those who have come to terms with their marital status. They accept the fact of the "second-wife status" and tend to measure, like other Korean wives, their marital success in terms of the educational progress of their sons and material rewards: home ownership, household furniture, and expensive clothes and jewelry. Hence, it becomes a disturbing experience when the opportunities for such material rewards and the "second-wife status" are withdrawn as in the first Japanese female's case.

All of these women including Koreans were supportive and loyal to one another during the first Japanese female's tribulation. This is indicative of their long-standing relationships based on daily interactions and activities associated with chesa preparations and their husbands' urban association membership. They all live in the same ward and meet daily and share their news and experiences, although they have not established a women's association in any formal sense.

What they usually discuss among themselves is gossipping about other Koreans' financial, marital, and
family problems. They somehow discover --- usually from an "old woman money lender" --- who is in debt to whom and assess the credibility of each debtor. Their credibility assessment is usually linked to the kind of business a debtor operates and to his marital and family problems.

For instance, a debtor has a wife to whom he is illegitimately married. He goes into a heavy debt partly to finance his business and partly to support his legitimate family in Che Ju Do. And his wife is mad about this situation and takes her anger out on him by buying expensive clothes and jewelry for herself and stereo equipment for her son. As a result, this strained relationship creates a marital discord which affects the son's conduct: such as his unwillingness to do homework after school. Or they boast of their sons' success as reflected in their admission to credible universities. These wives often evaluate their marital circumstances in terms of the degree of their husbands' affection. Their affection is commonly measured by materials that they buy for their wives: clothes, jewelry, houses, and household furniture.

In the next section, I shall describe how the first-generation Koreans' initial employment experiences have contributed to their later economic independence.
Economic Independence

The initial employment experiences of Koreans in manufacturing industries have paid off. Especially since the end of World War II, most of the males have pooled capital among themselves to start their own cottage industries as subsidiaries of Japanese parent companies, producing rubber goods and vinyl luggage.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s the most significant development for the first-generation Koreans was the establishment of an urban association in Tokyo. The urban association was a result of the consolidation of Koreans from four neighboring villages in Che Ju Do. Later, Koreans from other villages in Che Ju Do, joined the association. Residence in these Che Ju Do villages was the primary membership criterion. Virtually all the households in my sample joined this association.

The primary objectives of the urban association are: (1) to create a community of people who came from the villages in Che Ju Do; (2) to support one another in observance of traditional ritual performances --- chesa, funerals, and weddings; and (3) to help one another in their entrepreneurial endeavor. A summer field trip by bus to the seashore was planned and carried out every year until the mid-1960s. The group trip lost its attraction to the
majority of the members by that time, because more of them owned their own automobiles.

Although it was true that the urban association had benefitted Korean entrepreneurs in starting their own enterprises, the willing assistance of their former Japanese employers could not be ignored. These former employers offered Koreans manufacturing contracts, supplied materials, and bought the products. One 68-year-old male recalls:

"I worked as a sewing machine operator for a Japanese employer for seven to eight years. He gave me the job when I couldn't even speak Japanese. I was young then and was willing to do anything to make a living in Japan. I acquired necessary skills, including learning to speak Japanese, on the job. Then the War [World War II] ended. The Japanese economy was thrown into a complete mess, but my Japanese employer somehow survived that. I continued to work for him, but the time came for me to do something for myself and my family. One day, I had a man-to-man talk with him, and he understood my sentiments. He agreed to give me some of his work as I started my own manufacturing business. To this day, I respect him for that."

AAC, a 57-year-old male, recalls his experience:

"I wanted to become independent. I came to Japan to be wealthy. After I acquired skills ... I operated a sewing machine for a number of years in a Japanese-owned luggage manufacturing factory. I thought then that I could go independent. I asked my Japanese employer if he could give me contracts. He said he couldn't afford them. So I went to several Japanese businessmen. I finally got one contract, but this guy wanted to see my products first, so I showed him my products. He was satisfied. In the meantime, I had to do a lot of talking with my relatives and friends for capital. They gave me small loans, and that was how I started my own business. I think that the Japanese would accept Koreans as long as we give them quality products, although I still get the impression that they'd rather not talk to us."
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the dream of economic prosperity and independence became a reality. The sudden prosperity of the Japanese economy then was the major reason for this. For instance, about twenty Korean households, which I determined to be well-to-do because of their luggage wholesaling and manufacturing enterprises, became prosperous during this period.

By the mid-1960s, Korean entrepreneurs succeeded to the point that Japanese banks started to offer them loans. For instance, one 56-year-old male, AAH, states:

"Working for somebody was never my life's goal. I came to Tokyo at seventeen alone. I took up all kinds of odd jobs at first, ... selling soap, pants, shoes, and the like on the streets or being a middleman, dealing in anything one could sell. Eventually, my Japanese got better. When I first came here, I didn't speak it at all. ... I think I have done rather well, especially a few years before the end of World War II. I got a contract from one of the large Japanese electric companies to manufacture some small parts for light bulbs. They didn't seem to care that I was Korean. I first got to know a Japanese manager of a branch factory of the company and wined and dined him. We got along great. He gave me the work. He helped me set up a small factory ... It was an old house. I employed five ... three Japanese and two Koreans. My business went well, so I could buy a small house. That was when I married my wife. But the bombing stopped all that. I lost everything. ... After the War, I had nothing to do. But we were able to eat, more or less, because we had some savings left. In the meantime, we still had to get jobs. One of my brothers-in-law gave us jobs at his home factory. He and his wife were making cheap luggage at that time. They taught us how to operate a sewing machine. That was the beginning. Eventually, we went on our way. We rented a house and got work from the same Japanese employer who gave my brother-in-law the
work. We worked hard. We would get up around six in the morning and would keep right on working until ten at night. We took one day off a month. Well, there was enough work to do. ... It was in the early 1960s when I was able to save up some capital. I got some help from the village association, to start my own business. I found a Japanese loan shark and got him interested in a wholesale business. We made the deal that I would supply him luggage products, and he would sell them for me. With this deal, my business really picked up, and I got to know a bank manager through my Japanese business partner. I was able to get some loans. But the bank wouldn't give loans to Koreans with Soren affiliation. I was never affiliated with Soren, but had to decide to join Mindan. This was the only way for Koreans to get the legal residence status. We could not get Japanese bank loans without this status. Well, that was the whole arrangement."

As their entrepreneurial activities succeeded, some of the well-to-do Koreans diversified. For instance, ten individuals are now engaged in money-lending enterprises. Loan transactions, however, are almost always restricted to Koreans who are either relatives or villagers. One of the consequences of this arrangement has been to bind relatives and villagers together, thus keeping the sense of community in urban life. Financial arrangements are usually made in the urban association meetings and during chesa, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Other Koreans diversified from primarily manufacturing occupations to service and entertainment enterprises, such as coffee-shop restaurants, Korean restaurants, retail stores selling traditional Korean dresses and cloth materials, bars, and pachinko and majan parlors (see Table 8, Chapter Four).
The persistent pattern of the first-generation Koreans' occupational choices has been constrained by the social and political definition of Korean identity. It is true that they wish to distinguish themselves from the Japanese, but their distinctiveness has been politicized by Soren and Mindan. For instance, they have to join Mindan to qualify for legal resident status in order to obtain Japanese bank loans.

In short, they are confronted with the choice between South Korean and North Korean allegiances and, in a deeper sense, their survival. Concurrently, the problem of their alienation from the mainstream economic participation in Japanese society --- employment in Japanese companies --- remains. The pattern of Koreans' occupational choices is a consequence. Largely because of this pattern, the first-generation Koreans have failed to equip their children with the tools needed for breaking through the ethnic boundaries and sharing the Japanese economic prosperity enjoyed by Japanese of the same generation (see Shibutani and Kwan 1965:354; and Rohlen 1981).

One 52-year-old male, who owns a Korean restaurant, states:

"I have been running this restaurant for about ten years. I want my son to inherit it, but I know he wants to do something else. He goes to college, a Japanese college, and studies economics. He says he
wants to be an accountant in a large Japanese corporation, but I tell him that he has no chance ... I hate to tell him that, but what else can I tell him? ... Before I started this restaurant, I worked all kinds of odd jobs, like a sewing machine operator, a clerk in a Korean clothes store, and so on. I had to beg my relatives for loans to start this restaurant. I had a few fights with them. But my wife and I came out all right in the end. Now, my problem is even more serious. I honestly don't know what advice to give my son. I wanted him to go to college and prepared everything for that goal. Now, he goes to college, and I don't know what to do with his future."

Like many other Korean parents, the individual mentioned above had aspired to send his son to a Japanese university. For this goal, many parents have strived to achieve economic independence, but the serious issue confronting them today is the post-university prospects of their children.

Education and Political Views

In Chapter Four, I mentioned that more than 70% of the school-age second-generation Koreans of my sample have been sent to the Soren school system at one time or another. Several reasons account for this: (1) soon after 1945, a number of Korean schools were established throughout Japan by Choren (the Korean Resident League in Japan/Zainichi Chosenjin Renmei), a faction of which later became Soren; (2) the Korean grammar school of the "X-ward" was established by Choren at that time; (3) the faculty of this
school organized an effective campaign to attract Korean parents to send their children to their school; and (4) the parents wished their children to learn the Korean language and tradition, which were not taught at Japanese schools.

AAB states:

"My sons were growing, and I had to decide to which school system I should send them. I was attracted by the Korean school program to teach Korean children the Korean language and tradition. I didn't want them to become Japanese. So I decided to send them to the Korean school. At that time, I didn't know anything about politics and ideology. I didn't inquire about it. I simply liked what those teachers told me ... like teaching Korean children our language and tradition. That sounded good at that time."

However, as the Korean school system came under the direct control of Soren in 1955, some Korean parents began to feel wary of their children's education.

AAC recalls:

"I pulled my daughter and son out of the Korean school as soon as they finished the sixth grade. I sent them to a local Japanese middle school. But there were problems. I had to fight like hell with those stubborn teachers and principal to get the transfer papers out. Some young teachers called me a traitor ... a traitor of what? I never belonged to their communist organization. Getting the transfer papers out was one thing, but convincing my son ... my daughter never gave me a hard time ... was something else. He wanted to go to the Korean middle school instead of going to his sister's Japanese school. He even tried to change my mind. I liked his stubbornness, but it was a lot more serious business than my son thought. Anyway, I pulled him out and sent him to his sister's school. He got used to it soon. What disturbed me most was that the Korean teachers talked only about North Korea, about how
great the country and Kim Il Song was, and about the evils of Japanese and American Imperialism. Who needs that kind of nonsense? I am from Che Ju Do, from South Korea. That's where I belong. And I don't care about politics and ideology."

At the time of my fieldwork, more second-generation Koreans were sent to Japanese schools and universities than to the Korean/Soren schools. From my conversations with and observations of Korean parents, this trend is likely to continue (see Rohlen 1981; and Lee 1981f).

Of a total of 44 first-generation males, at least 34 are Mindan members. They became Mindan members during the late 1950s and mid-1960s. The 1952 ratification of the ROK (Republic of South Korea) and Japan Normalization Treaty resulted in the recognition of Mindan as the sole representative of Koreans in Japan. Since then, permanent resident status in Japan has been granted to Mindan members only. Hence, this political development motivated most of the first-generation Koreans to join Mindan. However, their membership was not politically inspired, except for a few who acquired a variety of positions in the "X-ward" Mindan branch. The two common reasons for membership were to secure their livelihood in Japan and to maintain their lineage ties with people in Che Ju Do.

The Mindan policy implied that Korean parents transfer their children from the Soren schools to Japanese schools, if not to the Mindan school. My sample shows that only two children have been sent to the Mindan school, both
fathers of whom have held Mindan positions. In fact, many parents have followed the implied Mindan policy, and the transfer pattern is that children attend Japanese schools after completion of the sixth grade in the Soren schools.

There are two groups of Korean parents who continue to send their children to the Soren schools: (1) those who are either Soren activists or sympathizers; and (2) those who believe that the Soren schools can still teach their children the basic knowledge of being Korean but who intend to transfer them to Japanese schools later.

Of the total of 44 first-generation males, at least five are Soren activists: for instance, one is a high-ranking official and has been invited to North Korea once, and another is a wealthy male whose financial contribution to Soren has been substantial, although he has sent his four sons to Japanese private schools and universities.

In general, the majority of the first-generation Koreans have little sympathy with the cause of Soren. Two reasons may account for this: (1) they had their primary attachment to Che Ju Do, which is part of South Korea; and (2) they have maintained their ongoing kinship ties with their relatives there, and their affiliation with Soren in Japan will, they strongly believe, jeopardize their relatives there.

Furthermore, although they are Mindan members, most of them have been inactive. They have expressed their plans
to live in Japan permanently and have stated that any political involvement would likely jeopardize their future lives as well as their children's in Japan.

Hence, these Koreans are well aware of the political implications of Korean ethnicity, more specifically Korean social identity. When they were forced to choose between South Korean and North Korean allegiances, they responded practically by adopting the South Korean allegiance. Their most often expressed reasons are: (1) the advantage of legal resident status and economic opportunities which this status would bring them; and (2) their association of Che Ju Do with South Korea as a geographical fact, but not necessarily as their expression of political and ideological loyalty.

In other words, they redefine the social and political aspects of Korean identity in terms of their kinship ties with Che Ju Do and interpersonal relationships in Tokyo, but not in terms of the modern sense of a nation-state. They maintain their personal and ego identities as apart from Korean social identity. To them, their personal and ego identities are real and authentic because these identities embody primary socialization experiences in Che Ju Do and relate to kinship ties there. Korean social identity is artificial and inauthentic because it is a product of politics in an alien land.

With regards to their children's education, Koreans commonly favor the Japanese school system for two expressed
reasons: (1) sons have a better chance of being admitted to Japanese universities; and (2) daughters will be married well with Japanese high school education because it is strongly believed, among Korean parents, that the Japanese education teaches them good manners and provides them with knowledge helpful for living in Japan.

In other words, these Korean parents have made their commitment to the plan to live in Japan permanently, and they have shown increasing inclination to direct their children in the same path. However, their plan and inclination do not necessarily mean that they wish to be structurally assimilated into Japanese society. This problem will be discussed later in this chapter. Yet there is a growing concern among these Korean parents regarding their sons' future after university education. Their common perspective is pessimistic: "I honestly don't know what advice to give to my son."

Chesa and the Urban Association or the Continuity of Ethnic Solidarity

One way to measure the continuity of Korean identity among the first-generation Koreans is to study the persistence of chesa as a communicative means. Chesa or shikke is a traditional ritual held by a family once a year to commemorate the patrilineal ancestors up to five
generations back (see Izumi 1966:143-5). I have observed five chesa during my fieldwork. On each occasion a large number of relatives and villagers, the largest in my observation being a little over 50, attended in the evening, and there was more than enough food and drink to satisfy them.

Chesa customarily begins in the early evening and ends shortly after midnight. In the beginning, a variety of fresh meats, fish, breads, rice, and fruits and rice wine, which are systematically placed on a number of tables, are ceremoniously offered to the ancestors. After bowing three times to begin the ceremony, the host and his closest relatives make gestures of offering the food and drink to the ancestors and again bow three times to end the ceremony, then all attendants repeat the same ceremonious gestures.

As the ceremony continues, they consume the food and drink, as they talk. What they usually discuss is unrelated to the ancestors being commemorated. In fact, chesa is one of the occasions where they measure one another's degree of wealth and prestige. At times, I was told, marriage arrangements and financial deals are made during chesa. Close relatives, usually brothers, might start quarrelling over conflicting family obligations, such as who should have contributed funds to support the aging parents, or who should offer financial assistance to relatives in need.
Chesa is attended by all relatives regardless of their political and ideological differences. At one chesa to which I was invited, a fight broke out over two cousins' political differences: one was a Mindan sympathizer and the other a Soren official. Their argument became heated to the point that the Mindan sympathizer, at least ten years younger than his cousin, demanded a physical showdown outside. It never took place, because others intervened and succeeded in minimizing the political differences in defense of lineage solidarity.

The preparation of chesa usually starts the night before and is prepared by females. One 52-year-old female states:

"My husband has not missed one chesa. Although we were poor in the past, my husband, who is the first-born, somehow managed to have chesa. Well, we had to borrow money or to get money contributions from our relatives and villagers. It's very expensive to have chesa, because we need fresh and expensive meats and fruits. It's hard on women because we have to prepare for it the night before."

It is significant that chesa, in recent years, has been actually conducted by recent migrant Koreans. Although they are younger than the first-generation males, they are knowledgeable in the traditional procedures. Some of the first-generation males have admitted that they had forgotten the traditional, and therefore the correct, knowledge and skill of conducting chesa.
With regards to the status of the second-generation Koreans in terms of *chesa*, fifteen-year-old males are generally permitted to attend with their fathers. Those who are twenty years old or older are permitted to substitute for their fathers, and married males are obligated to attend and to take part in the actual procedures.

However, of the five *chesa* to which I attended, there were no more than five males of the second-generation group present at any one time. This observation also corresponds to my past experiences of *chesa*. Moreover, only one male stated that he knew the meaning of *chesa*. Hence, in the eyes of Korean fathers, the continuity of *chesa* is very much uncertain.

AAB states:

'I have two sons, but I don't know if either of them will keep up with our custom. I have tried to interest them in *chesa*. When I have my *chesa*, I have to tell them to attend. They usually attend, but they don't show interest. I guess that's the way it's going to be in Japan. We can't force our children to inherit the custom, but I'm hoping that at least one of my sons will have *chesa* for me after my death.'

*Chesa* as a communicative occasion has served the first-generation Koreans well in light of their settlement in Tokyo. Communicative occasions provided by *chesa* have helped to maintain lineage ties and the sense of urban solidarity through ongoing interactions involving financial assistance, marriage arrangements, and the exchange of business information. These occasions have also provided
them with the opportunity to converse in Korean and to exchange personal experiences.

Chesa, along with the urban association, has served as a symbol of the Korean subculture and has been instrumental in maintaining their primary identification with Che Ju Do, and, thus their personal and ego identities. However, the general absence of the second-generation Koreans in such activities troubles their fathers. This may not be a parental failing in communication, but rather a product of the second-generation Koreans' bicultural upbringing. They are culturally Japanese, whereas their parents are not; although the latter can pass for Japanese. This gap between the two generations generates a difference in the locus of interpretation: the second-generation Koreans tend to adopt the Japanese locus of interpretation as defined in Chapter Two, and their parents adopt the Korean locus of interpretation.

Yet, there is a contradiction in their communication process. The parents wish for their children to be Korean. Yet they send their children to Japanese schools to learn good manners and to be well educated to have a good life in Japan. Their strategies have shown their children how well they have managed to survive in Japan. However, their children seem reluctant to adopt such strategies. Hence, the bicultural upbringing of the second-generation Koreans seems to be the strongest force for them to develop the kinds of
life styles that they have developed (see Chapter Seven).

The other way to measure the continuity of Korean identity is to study the urban association activities. The unity of the association has faded in recent years because of relative economic success among the first-generation Koreans. Nevertheless, they still maintain its original structure in the light of secondary financial assistance (after Japanese bank loans), assistance to recent migrant Koreans, tax-related consultation, employment, and an annual trip to the seashore.

In general, the effectiveness of the communication network still remains intact. For instance, when a prominent old man's death occurred in Che Ju Do, his relatives in Tokyo, by using the association network, collected financial contributions from association members within the same day and cabled the contributions to Che Ju Do on the following day. The same communicative effectiveness manifests itself in reference to wedding announcements, births, pregnancies, university admissions, or family quarrels.

I was allowed to observe five association meetings. There villagers and relatives discussed financial matters and business prospects. In separate meetings, two marriage arrangements were made and three loans were given. In these meetings, I did not find any second-generation Koreans. One male association activist states:
"We always encourage our boys to come to these meetings, but they don't come. They say they don't need it. Some boys are all grown up and are married, and I think they can use this association. One reason I can think of is that some of the grown-up boys are now working with their fathers, and their fathers still manage the actual financial and business matters. This situation will soon change. Then what? I guess those boys would rather talk to Japanese banks than to our association. ... We still have our annual trip, but young boys and girls don't participate. Instead, we now have young people who came to Tokyo in recent years [from Che Ju Do]. Perhaps, they will continue the association ... they have found jobs and shelter through the association's help."

The above accounts reveal the emerging trend that the second-generation Koreans prefer a Japanese way to a Korean way of doing business --- Japanese bank loans with no kinship- or association-strings-attached. The other trend expressed in the accounts, is that the association, like chesa, has been increasingly maintained by recent migrant Koreans.

The reason seems obvious: recent migrant Koreans have recognized the advantage of the association for survival through economic success and have benefitted from their active involvement, as their predecessors had done. Like the first-generation Koreans during their initial settlement period, the recent migrant Koreans are pre-occupied with the idea of survival in Japan. They are consequently ready to adopt any means that might increase their chances for economic success. However, the second-generation Koreans whose livelihood has been secured by
their parents' ingenious survival strategies are preoccupied with a different set of problems, such as ethnic identity and locus of interpretation. These are the subjects of the next two chapters.

In sum, chesa and the urban association are two outstanding factors which have benefitted the first-generation Koreans first and the recent migrant Koreans later, regarding their livelihood as well as their sense of Che Ju Do heritage. From the perspective of the first-generation Koreans' experiences, we can conclude that the continuity of Korean ethnicity expressed, in terms of the maintenance of chesa and the persistence of the urban association, reflects their continuing identification with Che Ju Do. From identifying with Che Ju Do, they derive their personal and ego identities and define them as separate from Korean social identity.

The Korean Views of the Japanese

The first-generation Koreans have accepted all thirteen Japanese "wives" into their network of interfamily relations; indicating these "wives'" structural assimilation into the Korean network. The general acceptance of these "wives" is most likely due to their hard-working nature and willing cultural assimilation into the Korean life styles. Some of them have learned to speak Korean, to cook Korean
meals, or to prepare for chesa.

However, their Japanese qualities manifest themselves in the area of their children's education. All but three "wives" have successfully sent their children to all Japanese schools. Two had sent their children to the Mindan school for the first six years, but have thereafter transferred them to Japanese schools. Their husbands are Mindan activists. The third sent her son to a Soren school for six years and later transferred him to a Japanese school. Her husband thought that the Soren school would teach his son the Korean language and tradition but later came to realize that the school, in fact, did not fulfill his expectations.

Nevertheless, most of the first-generation Koreans still maintain mixed emotions and views about the Japanese. For instance, one 52-year-old female states:

"I was seven when my mother took me to Tokyo. She and I joined my father, who was going to university in Tokyo. He died shortly after we joined him. After that, my mother had a hard life, just making ends meet. I don't remember what work she did. ... I married my husband when I was 21. One night I had a mix-up with a Japanese policeman. That night, my husband was on his way back from work. He was drunk. This policeman stopped him and started to interrogate him. My husband got mad at him. But this policeman was bigger and flipped him on the ground. Then my husband came home and told me about it. I got mad. So I went to the police station and started making complaints. The same policeman asked me if I was Japanese. Well, I always looked like a Japanese. So I told him I was Japanese. Then he apologized."
... I think that the Japanese are smart people, but they are so prejudiced against Koreans. I don't know why they are like that to us, although we eat the same food and live in the same way. ... We live in the Japanese neighborhood, and they are usually nice to us, but we are not friends. To think of it, as long as we don't cause trouble, our Japanese neighbors will be nice to us. ... There is one thing about the Japanese, though, they don't like rowdy behavior."

This individual's view on the Japanese is rather common among the first-generation females. They have ambivalent feelings toward the Japanese. More specifically, they acknowledge the Japanese superiority: one informant stated that "the Japanese are so smart that they can compete against Americans." They openly admire Japan's post-War success. Consequently, they are willing to conform to Japanese neighbors' tacit expectations: to cause no trouble and to live quietly among them. Yet they are distrustful of the Japanese because of their time-proven prejudices against Koreans.

A typical way in which most of these Korean women interact with Japanese neighbors is rather Goffmanesque. Goffman (1959) talks of a performance, staging a performance or a character, and a front. By a performance, Goffman means "all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence, in any way, any of the other participants" (Ibid.:15). When individuals interact or participate in an interaction with one another, they are said to stage performances or characters (Ibid.:252). A
that part of the individual's performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance (Ibid.:22).

In general, Korean women tend to keep their social distance from their Japanese neighbors. When they meet in the street, they commonly exchange greetings, but do not stop to start conversations.[1] In Goffman's terms, the Koreans stage a performance for the Japanese audience. Their front is a Japanese character with a Japanese name.

In short, they pass for Japanese upon encountering their Japanese neighbors. But, in fact, the Japanese neighbors know that these Koreans are simply passing for Japanese. The former are also staging a performance to reciprocate the latter's staging a performance.

However, there is a difference between staging a performance and cultural assimilation. The Koreans have not really adopted Japanese culture when staging Japanese characters. They simply perform such characters to cause no trouble and to live quietly among their Japanese neighbors. All the while, they maintain their Korean identity.

The first-generation males have cultivated somewhat different views, but are essentially Goffmanesque, regarding their interaction with Japanese. For instance, those who own businesses have business relations with Japanese. With Japanese material suppliers, in the case of the luggage
manufacturing industry, Korean males seem to have little trouble, mainly because the Japanese are eager to sell. With Japanese buyers, however, the common situation is rather subtle. The Korean males, at first, pass for Japanese or stage Japanese characters in order to establish business relations with the Japanese. Such relations are usually established by supplying quality products at a price lower than that of their Japanese competitors.

Once business relations are securely established, the Koreans usually let it be known that they are Koreans. However, they do not at this juncture drop their performance altogether. They downplay or "under-communicate" their Korean identity, while "over-communicating" the profitable result of their business relations (see Goffman 1959:141). The "under-communication" of Korean identity in such relations necessitates that the Koreans maintain their front as Japanese. What Gordon (1964:70) calls structural assimilation occurs on the level of these business relations, but it is possible only in terms of staging a performance as a Japanese character. In other words, the Koreans have discovered a limited niche for structural assimilation, while they recognize a full structural assimilation as a remote possibility.

As to the first-generation males' views on the Japanese, they seem, like the females of the same group, to take for granted the Japanese prejudices and discrimination
against them. Their interactions with Japanese are always guarded with precautions, such as staging a performance and keeping a Japanese front.

Staging a performance requires that the performer be aware of his staging; he must maintain a distinction in his mind between his performance and his ethnic identity. Put in another way, he is able to stage a performance because his personal and ego identities are securely grounded in the Korean locus of interpretation, and there is no confusion about who the self is and where one belongs.

This point brings us to the problems of naturalization.

**Naturalization**

With regards to a change in nationality, most first-generation males have expressed strong sentiments. For instance, one 56-year-old male states:

"For a while, I thought of getting Japanese citizenship. I know that my wife and I will die in Japan, so it would be advantageous for us to get it. At the same time, our children are growing, and I think that they will live in Japan for the rest of their lives. I think that Japanese citizenship will open up their future, too, but I decided against it. I could not forget the bad experiences I had with Japanese. When I couldn't speak Japanese well, they would call me all kinds of nasty names. Because I am Korean, I couldn't find work easily in Japan. I now have my own business and deal with Japanese daily. I
get along with them, but I still couldn't get rid of my past experiences, so my wife and I will die in Japan as Koreans. We have told our children that they could get naturalized on their own if they wanted to. We wouldn't want to stop them from making their future plans."

Another male, who is 58, states:

"My son is very interested in studying Japanese history at college. I want him to get some skill, so that he can survive in Japan. I suggested that he study medicine to become a doctor. Then we began quarrelling. My son said if I intended to live in Japan permanently, I should be naturalized. If I had no intention of being naturalized, I should go back to South Korea. I got upset and said that I would not go back to South Korea or North Korea and would not become Japanese. Although I feel that I don't have to become naturalized to live in Japan, I understand what my son is thinking. I don't know what to tell him about his future."

Of the total of 94 first-generation Koreans in my sample, only one male has been naturalized.[2] He is married to a Japanese. He now passes for a Korean among Koreans. He states:

"I decided to become naturalized some years ago, for I knew I would die in Japan. I have no plans to even visit my relatives in Che Ju Do, and I have a Japanese wife. I have no intention of divorcing her, and she doesn't want to go to Che Ju Do anyway. Although I have had some bad experiences with Japanese, it's in the past."

There are a number of factors which account for the general reluctance of the first-generation Koreans to be naturalized in Japan. One factor is the historical period during which they arrived in Japan; that is, prior to and in the midst of World War II. Then the ethnic demarcations of the Koreans were clear: they did not speak Japanese or spoke
it with an obvious Korean accent and were totally unfamiliar
with Japanese urban life. Under these circumstances, Koreans
became subjected to harsh Japanese prejudices and discrimi-
nation, which constitute a second factor.

A third factor is the subsequent establishment of
the urban association along the lines of their lineage ties
and Che Ju Do village affiliation in Tokyo. This development
has helped them to articulate the Korean locus of interpre-
tation as well as Korean personal and ego identities. Thus,
they have developed a subculture in which their Korean life
styles have been defined as different from the Japanese life
style.

A fourth factor is the art of impression management
(see Goffman 1959). Koreans have found a special economic
niche in small business enterprises in Tokyo. The presenta-
tion of Korean identity is not required for business
transactions with the Japanese; it is, however, required for
employment in a Japanese company in the form of birth
certificate and makes it impossible for them to be employed.
What is required for small business relations with Japanese
is that Koreans stage performances and Japanese characters.
The end results of their impression management have ful-
filled these Koreans' initial goal, that is, "making it good
in Japan, but keeping Korean identity." And a fifth and last
factor is a complicated naturalization petition procedure
required by the Japanese Immigration regulations, which
"scares away Koreans" in the words of several Koreans (see Chapter Four).

In short, Koreans' reluctance to be naturalized in Japan discloses both their sentiments to maintain Korean identity, which may be primarily their reactions to Japanese prejudices and discrimination, and the economic gains made possible by their ingenious impression management, in relation to the Japanese. What they might lose by naturalization may be greater than what they might gain by it.

Conclusion

The first-generation Koreans' experiences in Japan prior to the end of World War II have become most valuable resources for their economic success, which came in the late 1950s to early 1960s. The resources that they had acquired are the fluency of Japanese, job and business skills, and knowledge of Japanese society. They believe that the Japanese would accept them as long as they do not make a disturbance in the balance of everyday living, providing them with quality products at a competitive price and passing for Japanese. On the other hand, they have created a Korean subculture in which they can maintain Korean personal and ego identities; chesa and the urban association being the most outstanding symbols for identity maintenance.
Furthermore, they have come to articulate Korean personal and ego identities as those exclusively attached to Che Ju Do, but as apart from Korean social identity. It is perhaps because of their entrepreneurial spirits, that they are highly critical of South Korea's dictatorial regime as well as North Korea's communism.

In sum, the first-generation Koreans have developed the Korean locus of interpretation in Japan, which distinguishes Korean identity from Japanese identity and allows them to dissociate themselves from Korean social identity. Today, however, they are confronted with the emerging issues of their children's future and ethnic identity in Japan. In Chapter Seven, I shall explore these issues.

In the next chapter, I shall examine how the recent migrant Koreans have adopted the first-generation's strategies and how the life styles of both groups converge.
Notes:
[1].
Regarding social distance among neighbors in urban Japan, the Japanese usually do not develop close relations with their neighbors, and their friends usually live some distance away (see Vogel 1963: 102-4). They are, however, more likely to have conversations with other Japanese neighbors than with Koreans in the same neighborhood.

[2].
Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5,409</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4,786</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,501</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>2,153</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>5,379</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,386</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>13,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89,099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the total of 89,099 aliens naturalized between 1960 and 1975, 90% are Koreans, with the exception of 1973 and 1974 when many Taiwanese Chinese became naturalized in response to the ratification of the normalization treaty between Taiwan and Japan (Miyata 1977:206).

(Source: Miyata 1977:206)
CHAPTER SIX

VARIATIONS OF KOREAN LIFE STYLES II:
THE RECENT MIGRANT KOREANS

This chapter is concerned with the recent migrant Koreans. They were born and had their primary-socialization experiences in the Che Ju Do villages from which the first-generation Koreans had also come to Japan. The total number comprising this group in my sample is 43. They came to Tokyo during the 1950s and 1960s, in their teens to early twenties, an age pattern of migration corresponding to that of the first-generation group.

The study of the recent migrant Koreans holds three basic aims: (1) to describe its representative life styles; (2) to compare these life styles with the first-generation life styles in reference to the six questions mentioned in Chapter Five; and (3) to compare these life styles with the second-generation life styles.

With regards to the first aim, I sought to obtain general ideas about the life styles of the recent migrant group in reference to the six questions mentioned in Chapter
Five and a few issues particular to this group: illegal resident status and Japanese university education.

The result of my study was seven case studies. There are two reasons for the number of case studies collected from this group: (1) these case studies as a whole cover all the questions and issues, thus, fulfilling the first aim; and (2) I became more intimate with these seven individuals than others, and they gave me fuller personal accounts covering most of the questions and issues. In light of my experiences with other Koreans of the recent migrant group, the life styles of these seven individuals generally represent the group under similar sociocultural and economic circumstances.

The second aim is to discover how the first-generation life styles compare with the recent migrant life styles. This comparison is possible because both groups possess in common the Korean locus of interpretation and define Korean personal and ego identities as different from Korean social identity. In addition, they actually constitute two generation groups when seen in the light of their age difference: the first-generation group being in the late forties to early sixties and the recent migrant group in the twenties to forties.

The third aim is to compare the recent migrant life styles with the second-generation life styles in order to discover how life styles vary among the same age group under
different socialization experiences and loci of interpretation: the second-generation group being in the late teens to early thirties.

A most significant motivation that brings the recent migrant Koreans to Japan is their entrepreneurial aspiration. The majority of the first-generation males had come to Japan because of this aspiration and of the general economic impoverishment experienced in Che Ju Do. Most recent migrant Koreans, however, expressed that economic impoverishment was not a main motivation for migration.

A relatively accelerated entrepreneurial success of some of the recent migrant Koreans may be attributable to Japan's rapid economic development starting in the mid-1950s. For instance, five of the seven individuals under study own small businesses, houses, and automobiles, and ten others have achieved a similar level of success. Furthermore, first-generation small businessmen became able to own houses and automobiles in the mid-1950s to early 1960s.

The period between 1955 and 1957 was called the Jimmu Boom [1] during which investments rose 77% in 1955 over 1954 and orders for machinery rose 80% (Hirschmeier and Yui 1975:243). Subsequently, the Japanese economy averaged annual growth rates of 10% in real terms throughout the 1960s (Reischauer 1977:115; and Cole 1971:5). Thus, in terms of economic opportunities, the recent migrant Koreans had decisive advantages over the first-generation Koreans. One
immediate result was that some recent migrant Koreans enjoyed faster entrepreneurial success than the first-generation Koreans.

Having presented the three aims of the study of the recent migrant Koreans and above-mentioned socioeconomic conditions for them, I shall present seven case studies below.

(1) HHS

HHS is a 32-year-old male and is married to a second-generation Korean. They have two infants. HHS was born in Che Ju Do. His family lived there intact at the time of his birth. When he was about five, his father went to Japan alone. HHS spent seven years at school in Che Ju Do and was then asked by his father to come to Tokyo. At this time, his father was living with a Japanese woman, which led his mother to decide to delay her departure to Japan. So HHS was sent to Japan alone, illegally.

Upon his arrival, HHS was enrolled in Choko (the only Soren high school in Tokyo), for no other schools would admit him due to his illegal resident status. It was arranged that he live in the school dormitory. He lived there for two years. When his mother came to Tokyo, he moved in with her in an apartment. His father still continued to live with his Japanese "wife."
HHS states:

"When I was going to Choko, I spoke Korean. That was the only language I could speak then. So it was a good arrangement for me. But I didn't like what was taught there. The teachers always talked about nationalism, Korean pride, and, most of all, North Korea. I didn't care about North or South ... I still don't. I'm not a political person. ... I wanted to go to a Japanese university because I wanted to be somebody. My dream, then, was to become a foreign diplomat or a journalist or a writer. I wanted something with which I could express my thoughts."

HHS's initial dream, however, was prevented from materializing. Primarily because of his illegal resident status, he was barred from going to a Japanese high school, where he believed that he could have learned competitive skills to prepare himself for university entrance examinations. Nevertheless, he worked on his own to prepare for the entrance examinations. This was the time of the Tokyo Olympics. This event stimulated the Japanese economy, especially in the area of construction. HHS thought, then, that he might have a chance of getting a job, even in a Japanese company, if he studied some kind of engineering. He chose architecture because it still offered him a mode of self-expression. Subsequently, he was admitted to a Japanese private engineering university. HHS states:

"I kept using my Korean name at the university. My father used a Japanese name which I could have used. But what's the sense? I didn't care for that kind of life style. I guess, to some extent, my Choko experience helped me maintain my Korean pride."
Employment after HHS's graduation from the university, even with an architecture degree, looked bleak. He was constantly worried about his employment placement, while the majority of his class was finding jobs easily. HHS contemplated going to a graduate school, but rejected this idea because he thought that it would be nothing but an escape from reality. In the meantime, his father was looking for an appropriate job for him. His father finally contacted a Korean building contractor who gave HHS his first professional job, supervising building constructions. He kept this job for two years. Then he started his own business which lasted five years. HHS states:

"When I was a construction supervisor, I went ahead with my Korean name. My Korean boss didn't seem to mind that. But when I started my own business, I decided to use my father's Japanese name, so I could expect building contracts coming from Japanese customers, too."

HHS married his wife soon after he started his own business. His wife is a sister of his Choko friend. By this time, the Japanese economy began to slow down, mainly due to the oil shock. Consequently, his business failed, and he was forced to look for a job. He contacted a Japanese building contractor with whom he had done some business before. This Japanese offered him a job, although the employer knew HHS to be a Korean. His employer asked him to use his Japanese name. HHS states:
"I needed a job badly, so I didn't care what name I had to use. My boss knew me as a Korean, but I didn't think my Japanese colleagues knew that for a while. Since I didn't try to hide my Korean background at work, they eventually found out about it. I feel a lot better because they know that I'm Korean. I get along well with them, but I feel strongly that, being a Korean, I have to work harder than they. I would rather hear them say, 'He is Korean, but he is a good, hard worker.' But I don't want to remain someone's employee for the rest of my life. I will run my own business and will be my own boss again someday."

HHS talked about some of his observations of Koreans' choices of occupations in Japan.

"From what I have seen, most Koreans are engaged in mizushobai. They are either owners or managers of bars, coffee-shops, and the like. Such occupations don't need education ... probably that's why they get into them."

When I told him that the Tokyo census statistics showed that most Koreans were engaged in production-related occupations, such as manufacturing luggage and rubber goods, he responded negatively and maintained that most Koreans in his observations were engaged in mizushobai of some kind. He was ashamed of mizushobai, although his father owned a coffee-shop restaurant which supported his university education.

HHS expressed his views on Koreans and the Korean problems in Japan:

"Those Koreans born in Japan don't seem to want to marry Koreans from Korea. They don't even seem to consider Japanese for marriage. I get the impression that they are intimidated by the Japanese. ... I really wanted to work for a first-rate Japanese
company after the university. But I didn't even try because my academic records were poor. I don't buy the intimidated attitude of most Koreans that they couldn't get jobs in big Japanese companies because they are Koreans. I believe that if you are good enough, Japanese employers will give you a chance.

... I sometimes think about those Koreans whom I have come to know at Choko and since then, especially about those who got involved with Soren activities and left the organization. When they leave Soren, they all feel zasetsu (a psychological bankruptcy or a sense of hopelessness with a touch of betrayal). They can't eat decently as long as they are involved with Soren because they never get paid enough. Moreover, their involvement with Soren increases their feeling of alienation from Japanese society. When they want to marry and to have a family, they have to leave Soren for financial reasons. When they leave it, they are called losers or traitors by its active members. In either case, they lose.

HHS once confided in me that he had once considered naturalization. His resident status became legal upon his marriage to his wife who had legal resident status. His new status made it possible for him to apply for it. He was aware that naturalization would bring him further economic opportunities, such as easier access to bank loans, but he rejected it because he considered himself a "Korean" first.

From HHS's personal accounts, we can derive some reasons for his resistant to naturalization. The Soren school became a source of stability for HHS during his initial settlement period. There he was able to maintain his basic communicative means, such as speaking Korean and using Korean names in daily interpersonal relations. In this communicative sense, there was no cultural disjunction between his urban life in Japan and Che Ju Do upbringing. The Soren
school posed a problem, however, communist teaching. HHS interpreted this problem as a Korean political problem, applicable only to those Koreans born in Japan, while articulating his identification with Che Ju Do as a locus for his personal and ego identities.

In the Soren school environment HHS formed critical but sympathetic views on Koreans born in Japan. For instance, he refers to these Koreans' Korean identity as inauthentic, but understands that they have no other choice. Although he claims to be non-political, he advocates financial support for Soren activists by wealthy Koreans. Nevertheless, HHS does not define himself as part of the Korean ethnic minority because he interprets its problems as indigenous to the Japanese milieu.

Another significant point of consideration concerns HHS's positive evaluation of experiences with Japanese in Japan. He has worked for a Japanese employer and has owned his own business involving business relations with Japanese. In such relations, he has successfully managed two ways of presenting himself to Japanese. One way is to present himself as a Korean for which he is accepted by Japanese, and the other way is to stage a performance as a Japanese character or to pass for a Japanese (see Goffman 1959).

These are some of the first-generation group's survival strategies about which he feels comfortable. HHS so feels because he defines these strategies as necessary for
survival — accepting the existing sociocultural and economic conditions — and these strategies do not impair the integrity of his identities. In short, his resistance to naturalization is not reactionary to Japanese prejudices and discrimination; it derives from his life style based on the Korean locus of interpretation and Korean personal and ego identities.

It must be noted, however, that HHS's life style is not quite shared by another recent migrant Korean, YNG.

(2) YNG

YNG is a 27-year-old male born in Che Ju Do. His first two years were spent mostly in Seoul, where his parents had moved. As the Korean War broke out, his father left the family for Japan, and his mother took him back to Che Ju Do. When he was five, his mother took him to Tokyo where his father manufactured and wholesaled luggage. YNG and his mother did not join his father because his father was living with a Japanese woman.

YNG was first sent to the only Mindan school in Tokyo for two reasons: (1) the school administration made a special case of admitting YNG, although he was an illegal resident; and (2) his father disliked Soren. After his mother acquired legal resident status in 1960, YNG was sent to a Japanese private middle school. There he continued to use his Korean name. YNG states:
"I used my Korean name at the Japanese school. I didn't feel it important to change my name to a Japanese one. I didn't get much prejudicial treatment from the Japanese students. In any case, I wouldn't be disturbed if they called me a few names. I was Korean, and nothing more. ... I eventually went to the university to which my middle and high schools were affiliated, so there wasn't much difficulty in getting admitted to the university. My grades were good enough. ... My father and relatives suggested that I study some kind of engineering. With a concrete skill, they said, I would have a better chance of survival in Japan. But I wanted a bigger life. I was ambitious. So I chose economics for my major. I didn't want to end up just being an engineer."

YNG graduated from the university, and became employed in a Japanese printing company. The company hired more than 200 persons in that same year. When YNG applied for the job, he used his Korean name. It took the Japanese company some time to decide, but its executives finally decided to offer him the job. It was unknown to YNG exactly what had gone on in their decision-making process. The job offer was frankly a surprise to him.

He went to work in the sales department where he had access to Japanese government information. Because of the nature of his work, his superiors asked him to use a Japanese name; his response was affirmative. He stayed there for one year, although he was told that he could stay permanently. He refused to remain a mere employee.

Through a Korean friend, YNG obtained a job in a Korean-owned publishing company in Tokyo. There were five employees in all: YNG and one other had university
education. The company imported published materials from South Korea. YNG only intended to learn the trade of publication and import-export there. Within the first year, he resigned due to a "personal problem" with his Korean employer. He declined to explain any further during our conversation.

YNG now works in a Korean-owned trade company. He has been there for four years. There are six employees in all: himself and another Korean with university education and four Japanese with high school education. YNG and the other Korean manage sales. The company exports mainly textiles and small machinery to South Korea. They would like to import more goods from South Korea, but a large volume of imports is unlikely due to insufficient financial support from Japanese banks. YNG attributes the cause of this problem to the fact that the company is Korean-owned.

When I visited YNG and his wife in their home in the four-story building owned by his father, I noticed a large collection of books. Most books were concerned with the Korean problems in Japan. I asked what interested him in such problems. YNG's immediate reaction was nervousness. With much hesitation on his part and at his wife's insistence, he slowly revealed his past political activism.

YNG took two large volumes of periodicals from his bookshelf. They bore the title One Korea Year Book. They were edited and published by a Korean named Lee Yok Kwong.
Lee was once a cabinet member in the Rhee government in South Korea. He fled to Japan when Park Chong Hee took over power in South Korea. Lee, while in Japan, organized a political movement aimed at unifying the divided Korea. Many young Koreans became inspired by Lee's cause. Many became involved in his movement. They believed that Lee could be the one to accomplish the task of reunification.

YNG hesitantly admitted that he was one such follower. He said that he and many others failed to fathom Lee's real intentions. YNG appeared nervous, and his hands were slightly trembling, while talking about this part of his life.

In 1967, an organizational change occurred within Lee's organization. It split up into two antagonistic factions: one was pro-Park regime, and the other gravitated toward the left. The leftist faction, however, was eventually criticized by Soren. In time, this faction became alienated from the Korean leftist movement in Japan. YNG believed that Lee himself joined the first faction. This ideological change of Lee dismayed many young activists. YNG was also dismayed at these unexpected changes and left the organization altogether.

Regarding his future plans in Japan, YNG states:
"I have been thinking about getting Japanese citizenship. I think it will bring us more advantages, since we are very likely to live in Japan for the rest of our lives. Of course, getting naturalized should not mean that we would lose our Korean identity."

Like HHS, YNG believes that academic qualifications and appropriate skills will advance one's social well-being despite adverse social conditions for Koreans in Japan. Unlike HHS, YNG's concept of Korean identity includes more than his birth place, Che Ju Do, as a symbol; it involves Korea as a nation. His past political activism in Japan indicates his serious concern for Korea as a nation and for the Korean ethnic minority in Japan. The difference between these two individuals' concepts of Korean identity may be partly explained by their disparate experiences prior to their migration to Japan. HHS was a teenager, and YNG was only five years old when they came to Japan.

HHS had spent many years in Che Ju Do; he was more knowledgeable than YNG about the Korean communicative means. His experience later fed back into his articulation of the Korean locus of interpretation and Korean personal and ego identities in Japan. In contrast, YNG had spent only a few years there, so his knowledge of those means was less developed. Consequently, YNG has had to develop his lifestyle in the bicultural milieu, much like the second-generation Koreans.
A significant turning point for YNG's life in Japan was his political activism which reveals his search for an ethnic identity in Japan. Furthermore, his political activism indicates his decision to become a part of the Korean ethnic minority in Japan. His ethnic identity, thus, is Korean social identity, a product of Korean politics and the bicultural upbringing. This is where YNG fundamentally differs from HHS; the Korean problems in Japan do not interfere with HHS's life style.

Moreover, there is a disjunction in YNG's life style; it is derived from the incompatibility between Korean social identity and the Japanese locus of interpretation. It is difficult for YNG to pass for a Japanese because he has to acknowledge this disjunction. YNG interprets his experience in dichotomous terms: a Korean has to have both Korean identity and the Korean locus of interpretation, and he cannot have Korean identity and the Japanese locus of interpretation or vice versa (see Maruyama 1973). This is fundamentally a second-generation problem, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.

The first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans, such as HHS, also interpret their experiences in dichotomous terms: the Korean domain is separate from the Japanese domain, but they do not find the dichotomous interpretation troublesome, because they attribute little sentimental values to the Japanese domain. For them, the Japanese domain
is alien and does not constitute any part of their life styles. Hence, they are able to manage or manipulate both the Korean and the Japanese domains for survival. On the other hand, the dichotomous interpretation poses a personal trouble for YNG, because both domains are constituent parts of his life style. Thus, he is unable to manage the boundaries between the two domains. Consequently, his inability engenders a marginal life style.

(3) KGM

KGM is a 30-year-old male born in Che Ju Do. When he was seven, his parents took him to Tokyo. He went to all Soren schools, and Choko was his last school. After Choko, he worked for his father, whose business was a wholesaling of vinyl materials. Although he is the only son, he did not stay with his father's business. He went to work as a truck driver for a Japanese trucking businessman, with whom his father had had business relations. Eventually, KGM started to live with a Japanese woman who was a clerk in the same company. They were married shortly thereafter, and his wife is pregnant.

When his Japanese employer went out of business, KGM started his own business by taking advantage of his former employer's business network. He leases video game machines to pachinko establishments and coffee-shop restaurants. He stated that most of his customers were Koreans.
KGM employs twelve persons who operate from his small office building located in the middle of Tokyo. KGM states:

"I employ twelve now. Six of them are Koreans, and the rest are all Japanese. The three Koreans are all my Choko buddies. The other three are their brothers. I want to keep my business young. Our average age is in the mid-twenties. All my Japanese employees speak some Korean, because I want them to learn it. I have a lot of business with Koreans, so some speaking knowledge of Korean is essential. They didn't mind learning and speaking Korean. Those Japanese employees are good with legal business matters and at some delicate technical things. The Koreans are not good in those areas. They don't know much about the technicality of contracts. But they have guts. They have a terrific business sense. They open up new business deals all the time. The Japanese lack guts. That's the difference. So I have to be careful about how to use them effectively. That's my job. I use them right."

In the company of his Korean friends and myself, KGM talked about his exploits in Las Vegas in the United States. He bragged about how he had spent $30,000 on gambling and women, while making a successful business contract there. But when I asked him on what passport he went out of Japan, he stopped bragging. Then he said that he contacted a few yakuza [2] he knew and that they got him a false Japanese passport. Some days later, KGM confided in me some of his secrets, which he kept even from his Korean friends. KGM states:

"I don't want my Korean friends to know that I have been naturalized. I got it easily, because my wife is Japanese. But my Japanese citizenship does not bother me in the least. I'm living as a Korean, just like any other Koreans in Japan. I haven't changed
my "Koreanness," you see ... because I strongly believe in my background and want my wife to behave like a good Korean wife, no matter what her nationality is."

KGM had done what HHS and YNG have contemplated doing. He has actually been naturalized. KGM is an entrepreneur par excellence, because he has done whatever is required to succeed. For instance, his marriage to his Japanese wife brought him legal resident status and Japanese citizenship. He has managed both Korean and Japanese employees to his advantage, in which context he manages to pass for a Korean among Koreans and for a Japanese among Japanese; staging a double performance for two audiences. The crisscrossing of the two identities does not seem to confuse KGM.

The management of his interpersonal relations in entrepreneurial endeavor seems to rest on his manipulation of both Korean and Japanese fronts. That KGM teaches his Japanese wife Korean and wishes her to be a good Korean wife is indicative of his Korean front. He feels at ease with himself with his Korean front, probably because it is compatible with his Che Ju Do upbringing and friendships developed at Choko. In addition, he is at ease with his Japanese front; he does not in fact have to pass for a Japanese because he is a Japanese citizen. Yet he is careful not to confuse the presentation of himself vis-à-vis others; he has to walk a tightrope stretched between a Korean and a
Japanese front.

KGM's life style is enigmatic: when he presents a Korean front he adopts the Korean locus of interpretation as well as Korean identity; and when he presents a Japanese front he adopts the Japanese locus of interpretation as well as Japanese identity. In short, for KGM, identity is not something one internalizes, but something one uses for an entrepreneurial end.

In contrast, HHS defines his identity as something to keep and from which to derive his self-esteem. YNG defines it as something to struggle with, and with which he wishes to organize his experiences.

(4) SWD

SWD is a 35-year-old male born in Che Ju Do. He came to Tokyo at twenty-years-old, after having spent two years at a Che Ju Do high school. He believed that one of his wealthy sisters would help him attend a Japanese university in Tokyo, but his sister refused to assist him.

SWD, while working full-time for one of his brothers, finished courses at a Japanese evening high school. I assumed that he must have had legal resident status to be admitted to the Japanese school, but he declined to discuss this matter. He was then admitted to a Japanese university where he studied electrical engineering; he still worked full-time. After his graduation, SWD married a Korean born
in Tokyo. They have three children. They saved enough money to purchase a five-story building in Tokyo. There they have two types of business: a Korean restaurant and an electric repair business. They have their own living quarters in the same building.

The nature of his businesses constantly keeps him in close contact with Koreans of both Soren and Mindan affiliations. SWD states:

"For my businesses, I have to deal with both Soren and Mindan people. I personally don't care about their political differences. Those people say that people like myself lack personal commitment to anything, so they don't trust us. They call us neutrals. ... If I had to choose one or the other side of Korea, I think I would have to choose South Korea, because I'm from Che Ju Do. But I don't like what's been going on there ... politically. I would like to see someone in the government, who understands democracy."

Yet resentfully, SWD had decided to send his two older sons to a Soren grammar school. SWD states:

"When I decided to send my two sons to that Soren school, I only wanted them to learn the Korean language and our tradition and history, but things that they teach there are just not compatible with this competitive society. They make small kids worship Kim Il Song, and the kids come home believing that the Japanese and Americans are bad people, and that only good people are North Koreans and Chinese. I don't need that kind of nonsense for my sons. I only want my sons to develop skills to survive in Japan, so they should know the Japanese language very well. Going to a Japanese school will certainly help them get such skills. ... I live in Japan as a foreigner, and there is lots of discrimination going on against Koreans here. The only way Koreans can survive in Japan is to have skills to compete with the Japanese on the same grounds."
That's exactly what I have done for my survival since I came to Japan."

SWD's successful entrepreneurship is obvious because he owns a five-story building in Tokyo. This fact alone confirms his belief that anyone with appropriate academic credentials and competitive skills can survive in any country. However, he is not ruthless, like KGM, in his pursuit of economic success. He does not wish to pass for a Japanese and has no intention of being naturalized.

Like HHS, SWD's personal and ego identities are attached to Che Ju Do, where he was born and where his primary-socialization experiences and formal education took place. He differs from HHS in that he exclusively associates himself with fellow Che Ju Do Koreans outside his business network: he regularly attends chesa, the urban association meetings, and annual trips, and has benefitted from small loans from the association when Japanese bank loans were unavailable.

SWD's life style is similar to those of the first-generation Koreans in a number of respects: (1) he has learned that Japanese society is competitive and that the Japanese discriminate against Koreans; (2) in response, he has acquired skills to protect himself and his family; (3) he is critical of the Soren-Mindan ideological struggle and understands that his political involvement is likely to jeopardize his survival; (4) he considers Korean social
identity a product of the ideological struggle and, conse­quently, rejects it; and (5) he defines Korean ethnicity narrowly, to include his identification with his fellow Che Ju Do Koreans only. In these respects, SWD differs from the three Koreans mentioned above, although HHS and KGM have adopted the first-generation Koreans' strategy of passing as a means of survival. SWD differs from the first-generation Koreans on one account: he refuses to pass for a Japanese.

(5) At a Party: CDS, CDL, and KBA

CDS held a party at his home and invited his brother CDL and his wife, his friend KBA and his wife, and myself.

CDS is a 38-year-old male born in Che Ju Do. He came to Japan illegally at age 25. His wife is 35, also born in Che Ju Do. She also came to Japan illegally, at 18.

They had lived together for several years before they were married. They have three children, all born in Tokyo. They own a house, which is also a workshop; they manufacture vinyl luggage there. They finished the mortgage payments in less than five years, a result of their hard work. They work from six in the morning till ten at night, six days a week to earn a rather large income (more than half a million yen per month).

CDL is a 32-year-old male born in Che Ju Do. He came to Japan illegally at age 17, following his brother. His wife is 30, also born in Che Ju Do. She also came to Japan
illegally, at 15. They met in Tokyo by chance and were soon married. They also manufacture vinyl luggage in their house. Like his brother, CDL and his wife are hard workers; they have also finished the mortgage payments.

These two couples chose to live outside Tokyo, after having lived there for a number of years, because they thought that life outside of Tokyo would keep them away from the Japanese Immigration authorities.

KBA is a 38-year-old male born in Che Ju Do. He was CDS's high school friend in Che Ju Do. He is a graduate of Che Ju University. He had a business there, but the venture failed. Then he came to Japan illegally, at 35. He was married, at 37, to a Korean with legal resident status and Japanese university education. She had taught the Japanese language at Choko for several years. Upon her marriage, she resigned her position there. KBA married "well," for his wife's legal resident status will qualify him for a legal resident status. He intends to petition for it soon.

KBA states:

"Since I sneaked into Japan, I have been living in the countryside. There I got myself a job as a sewing machine operator in a Korean man's workshop. He taught me how to use the machine when I knew nothing about it. ... Those Japanese farmers always say that Koreans are rich. When I went to Sendai (a northern city of Japan's largest island, Honshu), I found out that what they say is really true. The wealthiest man in Sendai is Korean. This man practically owns the entire area of the Sendai railroad station."
CDS states:

"I have done rather well in Japan, but I have gone through some hard times. When I first came here, I got a job as a sewing machine operator. I got it through the urban association. I saved money to get legal papers [for residence]. One day, I gave all of my savings to a Korean, because this guy promised me legal papers through his connections with the Japanese Immigration authorities. He took off with my money, and nobody knew where he went. He was a crook. Then I decided to go home to Che Ju Do. I surrendered myself to the Japanese authorities. They shipped me back to Che Ju Do. ... But a few months later, I came back to Japan. Then the Japanese police were already informed of the landing of illegal Koreans. They were out looking for us. I was on the train, on my way back to Tokyo. I noticed several plainclothes policemen on the train. They recognized and arrested all illegal Koreans, except for me. I was spared because I was wearing fashionable Japanese clothes and shoes. I was also holding a baby on my lap, who belonged to a Japanese passenger sitting next to me."

CDL states:

"I have also done well since I came to Tokyo. I went to Osaka first and worked as a sewing machine operator for a Korean, but he did not give me a break. My brother told me I was being cheated. Then I came to Tokyo and got a job from the same Korean who gave my brother his job. The difference is that my former Korean employer is from the mainland [South Korea], and that my present Korean employer is a fellow villager."

They talked about Korean politics in Japan and related some of their experiences to me.

KBA states:

"I was marrying a Choko teacher, and her father was a staunch Soren man. I'm politically neutral and don't care about the politics of Soren and Mindan, but I had to find a guest speaker for the wedding. My wife's father recommended the Choko principal."
But that was the last choice I wanted ... you see ... all of my friends are either neutrals or Mindan people. I could easily anticipate that the principal would keep chanting Kim Il Song's name and Fatherland, but I didn't seem to have any other choice then. I went to see him in his office the day before our wedding. He showed me a copy of his speech. I found one sentence containing that name, Kim Il Song, but I felt I had to make some compromise, since it was obvious that the principal had done his best to minimize political implications in his speech. Well, the speech was delivered at the wedding. As soon as Kim Il Song's name was mentioned, boy ... my friends thought I must have gone insane. Later it turned out to be all right, because my friends thought that I had gone that far to make a compromise, out of love for my wife. Well, that was the story. But I still think our wedding was a fiasco."

CDS states:

"My cousin had a similar experience at his wedding. He also needed a guest speaker. He asked the chairman of a Prefectural Soren branch to give a speech. My cousin's father thought that this arrangement was disadvantageous to his son, because this guy was only a lesser official in the Soren hierarchy. He got hold of a Soren official with a high position in the Central Soren Organization, but it turned out that this guy gave a very political speech at the wedding, and my cousin's bride's relatives got angry. They were Mindan people. Some of them got so angry that they left in the middle of the speech. It wasn't really a wedding speech. It was a political propaganda speech and had only a few lines vaguely related to the proper occasion. I personally felt sorry for my cousin and his bride. I personally don't like that political stuff."

CDL states:

"I have been having problems with a Soren grammar school teacher. He has been coming to my house ... he goes to my brother's house too. And he has been bugging me about sending my first son to his school. I don't like that school, but I couldn't tell him to go away. I don't want to cause trouble. ... I want
my children to go to a Japanese school and to a Japanese university, because chances for their future prospects are much better with Japanese education. For now, I will have to send my first son to the Mindan school. . . . I don't like Soren's communist ideology. That's neither Korean nor traditional at all. . . . Like my brother, I think we have a better chance of getting a legal resident status. We both own houses and are good hard workers and good family men. We have never gotten into trouble with the law in Japan. We have contributed lots of money to our community and have been awarded for that. I'm sure we could get lots of signatures from our Japanese neighbors for our petition for legal resident status. Also, we have made a pretty good connection with a high-ranking Immigration official. We have met him a few times, and he has given us a verbal promise [for legal resident status]."

KBA talked about his views on the Japanese and Koreans in Japan:

"I went to Seiji College in Tokyo for a while. It's a two-year institution, and its president is Korean. I had an occasion to talk with him. He talked about difficulties he had in trying to start his college. The Ministry of Education gave him a hard time, because he is Korean. After his college was finally accredited, he went to America where he easily established a college. His belief is that Koreans in Japan have no future and that Japan is not the only alternative left for Koreans. I admire him a lot. . . . When I get my legal resident status, I'm thinking about starting a big business. In my Prefecture, there is so much land to be used. Those Japanese farmers are so tame, so docile, that they are willing, I'm sure, to work for a minimum wage. You see, . . . we can't always rely on Koreans, because Koreans are so ambitious and jealous that they don't want to stay employed. . . . I'm one of them though. So I'm thinking about setting up a large workshop complex to manufacture luggage cheaply by using Japanese farmers. I'm going to do it in terms of an assembly line type of production. I don't believe that Tokyo is a good place any more. It's getting too expensive for everything."
KBA talked in this fashion for a while and eventually addressed himself to both CDS and CDL. KBA states:

"You guys (talking directly to both CDS and CDL) work so hard every day, but where will your hard work get you in the end? I don't believe it will get you very far as long as you work for someone else."

CDS states:

"No, I don't think we will get very far this way. That's why we need someone like you (referring to KBA). ... you are so well-educated and know things. We need you to give us directions, right directions. My brother and I didn't even finish high school before we came to Japan. We are practically illiterate in Japanese."

These three males share in common two characteristics, their primary-socialization in and identification with Che Ju Do and their economic ambition to succeed in Japan. However, their differences are striking regarding their economic strategies. For instance, KBA entertains a plan for a large-scale luggage manufacturing business utilizing cheap labor resources of Japanese farmers outside Tokyo, while the two brothers are engaged in and also are entrapped in a small-scale, subsidiary cottage industry, which depends on their own labor.

Their differences may be explained in terms of disparate experiential attributes. For instance, KBA's attributes may be listed as follows: (1) he was university-educated while in Che Ju Do; (2) he had some business experiences there; (3) he migrated to Japan as a mature
adult, in his mid-thirties; (4) he had a good command of Japanese prior to his arrival in Japan; (5) he associated himself with successful Koreans in Japan; and (6) he married a Japanese-university-educated Korean with legal resident status, practically guaranteeing his legal resident status.

CDS and CDL's experiences are much different: (1) they dropped out of high school while in Che Ju Do; (2) they came to Japan without much working experience, CDS as a young adult and CDL as an adolescent; (3) they lacked speaking knowledge of Japanese upon their arrivals in Japan; (4) they were only able to secure manual jobs, operating sewing machines, in Korean-owned cottage industries at first and later became owner-producers of luggage, yet remaining dependent on a Korean wholesaler; and (5) they married illegal resident Koreans and, consequently, have always faced the danger of deportation.

Although both CDS and CDL are financially well-to-do individuals, they can foresee limitations to their economic strategy. They reason that such limitations exist largely because of their illiteracy in Japanese and because of their lack of formal education. They feel that these reasons have prevented them from making significant contacts with influential Koreans, as well as from discerning other alternatives. As a result, they feel that they need to depend on someone, such as KBA, who is well-educated and well-acquainted with influential people, for their future
economic success. In this respect, CDS's and CDL's views are shared by the majority of the first-generation Koreans; the latter also foresee their limitations and plan to depend on their children, whose formal education will, they believe, permit them to break through these limitations.

These three individuals had benefitted from the aid of the urban association during their initial adjustment to the urban life in Tokyo: through the association they gained job training and employment opportunities. They have been active in managing the proceedings of chesa. However, they have grown to detect the limitations of the urban association, especially its narrow ethnic network, and wish to participate in a larger economic domain, namely the mainstream of Japanese society. These three males share in common the image that Japan offers them golden opportunities. They do not see Japan as that which harms them because of Japanese prejudices and discrimination against Koreans. Rather, they consider political and ideological conflict among Koreans to be harmful to their own survival in Japan. The decisive factor for their interpretation of the milieu is the strong association of their personal and ego identities with their native island, Che Ju Do. There is ongoing feedback between the maintenance of these identities and the separation of them from Korean social identity.
Conclusion

Although the seven Koreans presented thus far came to Japan at various ages, all but two defined their native island, Che Ju Do, as the primary locus of identity. YNG's life style is basically a second-generation life style, and KGM's life style does not depend on a single ethnic identity and locus of interpretation.

The need for identity-definition is a new experience for these recent migrant Koreans. In Peterson's words:

... most modern migrants are of the lower classes and either adolescents or young adults. In short, they hardly come equipped with the full culture of the sending country: their speech is often a local dialect rather than the standard language; their association is more with a village or province than a nation; their knowledge even of the national cuisine of their home country is often partial and faulty. Remarkably, in many cases the immigrants learned to recognize 'their' country only after they were abroad (1978:559-60).

These recent migrant Koreans' new experiences in Japan are influenced by a number of factors: the political and ideological conflict between Soren and Mindan on the Korean national issues; the presentation of self to the Japanese; and employment discrimination against Koreans. These factors inevitably force these Koreans to be politically and socially aware of their immediate situations. They generally reinterpret their identification with Che Ju Do as personal and ego identities and make a conscious effort to interpret
their experiences from a Korean point of view. There is a basic similarity between the recent migrant and the first-generation groups in reference to the novel experiences of ethnic identity and locus of interpretation.

Because of their personal and ego identities, the recent migrant Koreans, as represented by most of the seven life styles, tend to interpret Korean social identity as alien and inauthentic. They interpret it as a product of the Korean national politics in Japan, as well as of Japanese prejudices against Koreans.

Their life styles, in general, are conceptually separate from the Japanese domain. This separation allows them to stage a performance as a Japanese character, in relation to the Japanese, without generating confusion in their minds. This is another characteristic that they share with the first-generation Koreans as seen in their involvement in the urban association and chesa.

YNG leads a marginal life style precisely because he fails to manage the conceptual separation between Korean identity and Japanese identity. At the other extreme, KGM makes the separation, rather radically; he expertly manages the presentation of Korean and Japanese fronts. Commitment to an ethnic identity seems unimportant to him.

Entrepreneurial aspiration is another significant aspect of the recent migrant group, although it is manifested and envisioned differently by each individual of the
seven case studies. This same aspect is also common among the first-generation Koreans. The difference between the two groups of Koreans, in this respect, is that the recent migrant Koreans define Japan as a place where they might be able to advance their economic chances, while the first-generation Koreans define it as a place where they have to struggle to make a living.

Two reasons may account for this difference. One reason is that the socioeconomic conditions for the two groups were different at the time of their entries into Japan. The recent migrant Koreans entered Japan when it was already enjoying a phenomenal economic growth, which reinforced their entrepreneurial aspiration. The first-generation Koreans came to Japan when it was in the midst of economic and political chaos, during and after World War II, which inevitably restricted their economic opportunities. The other reason is that the recent migrant Koreans, as represented by most of the seven individuals, were much more educated and better prepared for the industrial urban life style of Japan than the first-generation Koreans, whose occupational knowledge and skills were limited to farming and fishing before their migration.

Nevertheless, the two groups of Koreans have shared the same goals and strategies for survival in Japan: the cottage industry, passing for Japanese without causing a conceptual conflict, the articulation of personal and ego
identities and the Korean locus of interpretation, and moderate entrepreneurial success. The first-generation Koreans were the first to institute these strategies; the recent migrant Koreans have adopted them, after seeing for themselves how effective they have been for the first-generation Koreans to realize the same entrepreneurial goals.

To conclude this chapter, one final point must be discussed further, Korean politics in Japan. The seven Koreans studied find Korean politics in Japan to be a nuisance and defend their political and ideological neutrality. The first-generation Koreans clearly share their view and sentiment. Although one male, YNG, was once deeply involved in a Korean political movement whose objective was to unify Korea regardless of communism or capitalism, he now wants no part of it and strives for his own economic advancement. Both Soren and Mindan, as part of their political programs, have created Korean social identity for Koreans in Japan since the end of World War II. This identity has perpetuated the Japanese prejudices against Koreans, for it, by definition, separates Koreans from the Japanese. Political efforts have failed to attract the two groups of Koreans, largely because these Koreans' ethnic consciousness is grounded in their native island as a cultural reference point, rather than on the national level, and because they perceive the ideologies and activities of both Soren and Mindan as dis-
advantageous to their entrepreneurial aspiration.
Notes:

[1]. One of Japanese legendary Tenno (Emperors) who represents wealth and prosperity.

[2]. Members of the traditional Japanese underworld. The term yakuza also denotes violent and antisocial groups in Japan (see Lebra 1976:5, 169-70).
This chapter is concerned with the second-generation Koreans. They were all born and raised in Tokyo, Japan. The total number of my sample group is 134. I collected the largest number of case studies from this group. There are a number of reasons for this result.

One reason was my initial interest in understanding the second-generation's ethnic problems. My interest originally motivated me to become an anthropologist. I was born and grew up in Tokyo and had experienced an ethnic identity confusion. Hence, I wished to understand how others of my generation have managed their ethnic identity issues.

A second reason was that I found many individuals in this group willing to talk about their experiences and to articulate their views on personal and social problems. We were in a position to feel comfortable in sharing our mutual problems. Some individuals took time off from work in order to share their experiences with me.
A third reason was that I planned to collect a number of case studies for each of the three school groups. In so far as my sample is concerned, three choices out of five possible educational alternatives have been made, and these three choices constitute the three school groups.

The three school groups are: (1) the mixed-school group composed of those who have gone to both Soren and Japanese or Mindan and Japanese schools; (2) the Soren school group, composed of those who have gone to Soren schools only; and (3) the Japanese school group composed of those who have gone to Japanese schools only.

A fourth possible choice --- a Mindan school group composed of those who have gone to the Mindan school only --- did not exist. The Mindan school had only a six-year program in Tokyo at the time of my fieldwork. Its graduates have had to go to another school system. Lastly, a fifth possible choice --- a Soren-Mindan school group involving a transfer from one to the other --- did not exist. The reasons for this finding have been proposed in Chapter Five: Korean parents wish their children to learn Korean and Korean tradition provided by a Soren or Mindan school, but wish them to go to a Japanese school later for learning relevant knowledge to live in Japan.

However, the actual number of case studies collected for each of the three school groups is disparate: eight case studies for the mixed-school group; eight for the Soren
school group; and three for the Japanese school group.

I was able to collect more case studies from the first two school groups than from the third largely because I knew some of the individuals of the first two school groups personally. I had personally known all eight individuals in the Soren school group because I had gone to the same grammar and middle schools with them. I knew one individual from the mixed-school group because we had gone to the same Japanese high school.

From this network and my chief informant CCH's network, whose case study will be described later, I came to know intimately, the other seven individuals in the mixed-school group. I planned to collect the same number of case studies from the Japanese school group, but the three case studies collected fulfilled my questions.

My questions for the second-generation group covered the following areas: (1) their definitions and meanings of ethnic identity and locus of interpretation; (2) their ways and interpretations of passing for Japanese; (3) their ways of adapting to the particular school environments; (4) their ways of resolving problems pertaining to ethnic identity; and (5) their aspirations or life-goals.

An understanding of the second-generation life styles hinges on the bicultural milieu, the immediate impact of which is a marginal identification with both Japan and Korea. It is the second-generation's marginal identification
with both Japan and Korea that fundamentally differentiates this group from the other groups --- the first-generation and the recent migrant groups.

The first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans have had their primary-socialization experiences in a single cultural milieu, Che Ju Do, which provides them with cultural roots. These roots make it possible for them to redefine their personal and ego identities as different from Korean social identity and Japanese identity.

Furthermore, the second-generation Koreans are more likely to disclose a wider range of life style variation within their group than the other two groups, largely because of their marginal identification with both Japan and Korea and availability of the three educational alternatives in Japan.

With regards to the mixed-school group, Korean identity becomes a source of personal trouble when a Korean child moves from a Soren or Mindan school to a Japanese school. This sequence of school transfer seems to be the norm for this group (see Chapter Four).

At a Japanese school a Korean may choose to pass for a Japanese. In this way he can avoid ethnic prejudices expressed by Japanese peers, but he is not free of possible difficulties. There is the possibility of being found out. It is also likely that he will be unable to identify himself either with Korea or with Japan as his involvement in, and
appreciation of, the Japanese domain of the bicultural milieu increases: he adopts the Japanese locus of interpretation, while he is ambivalent about his ethnic identity.

Maruyama's study of Sansei (third-generation) Japanese-Americans (1973) addresses itself to the above-mentioned bicultural problem. He states:

Some of the Sanseis suffer from the logic of dichotomy instilled in them in the Western (American) culture. They reason that they have to be either American or Japanese, but cannot be both: since they don't speak Japanese and are not versed in the Japanese culture, they must be American; but they are not really American, etc. They get into a dilemma which is more an intellectual than a psychological conflict. This shows the degree of their Americanization. A native Japanese does not think in a dichotomous logic. For example, to a Japanese it is perfectly natural to go to a Shinto shrine for marriage, a Buddhist temple for funeral, and to celebrate Christmas. For a native Japanese the dichotomous question of identity does not arise (1973:115).

Although there is a generational difference, the second-generation Koreans, in Japan, interpret their situation in a similar way to the Sanseis in America. However, there is a difference between the two groups: Koreans in Japan are aliens; and the Sanseis are, by virtue of birth, American citizens in the United States.

In short, the Sanseis have a legal claim to be natives of American society, whereas Koreans in Japan do not. This legal barrier is a significant factor, affecting the second-generation Koreans' management of ethnic identity and locus of interpretation and contributes to the generation of
marginality among them (see De Vos and Lee 1981c).

Some of the eight Koreans in the mixed-school group have managed to develop stable life styles in terms of either the Korean locus or the Japanese locus of interpretation associated with a concurrent ethnic identity. In contrast, those who are unable to associate one locus of interpretation with a concurrent ethnic identity tend to be subject to marginality and tend, as a result, to develop unstable life styles.

With regards to the Soren school group, the adherence to Korean social identity is manifested in their life styles. Koreans of this school group organize their life styles in terms of the Soren image of the Korean locus of interpretation and do not identify themselves with Japan at all. Thus, their life styles are rather uniform and stable. In this school group, I have included one male who has a mixed-school history, the reason being that his case study was gathered in the context of an alumni meeting where the rest of the Koreans present were of this Soren school group.

Lastly, with regards to the Japanese school group, there arise three variations of life style: (1) unstable life style because one's locus of interpretation is unsupported by one's concurrent ethnic identity; (2) stable but evolving life style because one adopts the Japanese locus of interpretation and Japanese identity, but lacks extensive social and economic involvement in Japanese society; and (3)
stable and mature life style because one adopts the Korean locus of interpretation after years of personal struggle with one's ethnic identity issues.

Thus far, I have introduced the most significant characteristics of the second-generation problems in Japan. The three-school-group division of the second-generation group allows us to derive conceptual relations of life style with the combination of ethnic identity and locus of interpretation in different school environments.

The present study is intended to be exploratory in its aim, and the conceptual categories and their relationships are, at best, suggestive. The exploratory aim of this study, hopefully will generate a systematic and large scale research on the given subject.

In the next section, I shall present a work by a Japanese playwright. His work vividly describes the problems of marginality commonly experienced by second-generation Koreans in Japan.

Han Nihonjin (Half-Japanese)

The Japanese playwright Kenichiro Shirahama wrote a biography of his Korean friend and called it Han Nihonjin. The Japanese title literally means "half-Japanese." His Korean friend, who had struggled with his ethnic identity issues, died in 1968 in Japan. He had kept his Japanese name
Aramaki throughout his life in Japan.

Aramaki was a small boy when his parents took him from Korea to Japan. As he grew up in Japan, he completely lost fluency in Korean. Although Aramaki was born in Korea, his experiences and interpretations are quite analogous to those of many second-generation Koreans whom I have encountered in my life, as well as during my fieldwork. In fact, Aramaki's life style is clearly reflected in many of the nineteen case studies to be presented later.

In his introduction, Shirahama makes an apologetic statement about the way he conceptualized the biography:

... I wrote this biography despite its immoral implications. ... It is about a Korean man's strange and anti-establishment life style and about his life, full of ethnic prejudices and discrimination. His life was affected by all these features. His life was so affected and so directed, simply because he was born Korean. All the books and essays published in the past are concerned with the processes of Koreans' ethnic awareness, symbolic recognition of Korean patriotism, and eventual spiritual freedom. They also criticize the past Japanese Imperialism. In this regard, this biography is an immoral one. It is immoral because of its anti-nationalism and anti-ethnicity. I simply could not help but write it. I felt an urge, despite its immoral implications, to write it on behalf of my Korean friend whose life was so difficult because of the constraints imposed on him in the name of a nation-state (1973:2; my translation).

At the end of the biography, there is a long dialogue between Aramaki, who is in his late forties and a Soren official at a Korean restaurant in Tokyo. This dialogue reveals peculiar, psychological circumstances which surrounded Aramaki's life.
Aramaki (A): Greetings. Let's have some beer.
Official (O): Sure, ... but I don't want to hear your bitches.
A: No, no, I won't bitch. When have I ever bitched to you?
O: You always seem troubled, being troubled with yourself. But I don't believe you have any troubles to speak of.
A: How can you tell that I have no troubles?
O: All Koreans in Japan have been in trouble. So how can you claim to be in trouble all by yourself? It's wrong to think that you are the only one in trouble. ... It's better for someone to go "Home" (North Korea) than to be troubled in an alien country.
A: Listen, my specialty is art, and I have been studying to direct a play. Although my stage company is made up of a small number of artists, I have directed a few plays myself. I have been thinking of introducing an actor as an object, which is a part of the artistic structure, ... well, what do you think of that?
O: Well, let's say it's OK, ... but I have no idea about art like that.
A: OK. ... then, there is a problem ... you speak Korean fluently and can write it well, don't you?
O: So?
A: Well, if I were you, I would think I could decide rather easily to return to North Korea.
O: Oh? ... Don't worry about me. I'm going to return to North Korea in November.
A: I don't mean that. What I mean is that it is a problem that one does not speak the language.
O: What? Do you really mean that?
A: Yes, I do.
O: Don't you know that Sokoku (ancestral land, meaning North Korea) teaches you the language and gives you everything you need?
A: Of course, I know that.
O: Then what do you really mean? I think you are spoiled.
A: Well, you say I'm spoiled. ... Maybe I am spoiled to a certain extent ...
O: You see, we Koreans have been warped by these peculiar living conditions in Japan. We've got to overcome such a warped state by achieving a national independence in ourselves.
(Aramaki had already anticipated this line of argument from people like this Soren official and was thinking why he could not innocently take it for granted.)

O: You see, ... Sokoku's seven-year industrial project has been under way, so you shouldn't worry about anything now. Just go "Home."

A: If I was an engineer, I wouldn't need the language. I wouldn't have a problem.

O: I appreciate your problems, but our Sokoku is now going through a hardship, and we all have to overcome that. We all have to face the present hardship together. I know all new countries have had hard times at their initial stage of nation-building. I have heard about a writer who went "Home" without the knowledge of Korean, but he was able to publish an essay in Korean within the first year. It's all because of our Sokoku's Chollima (the legendary flying horse) effort.

A: Sure, anyone can learn a language, but just the act of speaking and writing has no meaning to me. It's like an automatic typing.

O: An automatic typing?

A: You see ... sentiments or senses, which can only be grasped by experience, cannot be acquired in one day. I have cultivated my artistic skill and knowledge over the past forty years in Japan. If I was to go back to Sokoku, I would have to be reborn.

O: I don't know what you are talking about. ... But anyway it's all right that you will be reborn. Live a new life in Sokoku as if you were reborn.

A: But my ultimate wish is to accomplish something in my life. I find such an accomplishment in Kikoku (going "Home").

O: Which means you are going "Home" for your own sake?

A: Let me say, Yes. I don't want to lie to anyone by making excuses about my intentions. A nation is made up of individuals, so each individual should have independence in order to make the nation possible. ... Ideas and senses cannot be gained in one day. They take a long time to make sense, and meaning. Living itself is an idea. With living and experience one can grasp ideas. This is how I feel.
A: You always talk about Sokoku. I cannot talk about it as if it's part of my life. Although I get excited by looking at pictures of Sokoku, I don't feel it is every part of me. For instance, I never met my parents, and grew up with different parents. Let's suppose this is the case for me. How do you think I would feel when my real parents showed up all of a sudden and wanted to take me back? I would be inclined to stay with the parents who raised me. I don't think I could leave them for the real parents.

A: I heard about a novel written by a North Korean writer. A son went to war, and his mother was so worried about him that her hair turned gray. She was severely criticized for her selfish concern for her son. I can't stand that kind of stuff. The story denies one's personal feelings toward the other as a human being. It gives the message that all human efforts must be sacrificed for the nation.

O: What's wrong with the story? It's a just war that the son was fighting. His mother should have no worry. Her feelings were selfish.

A: That's it! I can't stomach that kind of nationalism.

O: Oh ... I suppose you are going to South Korea instead?

A: Don't you understand anything? It makes no difference to me if "Home" is in the North or in the South. They are all the same to me. What a fool you are!

O: Of course, that's right...

A: So ... there ... I can't agree with your line of argument. What people like you say is that those who go to North Korea are true Koreans and those who do otherwise are not Koreans at all.

(Shirahama 1973:250-9; my translation).

It is obvious that the Soren official does not understand Aramaki's concept of Korean identity. The official's concept of Korean identity is politicized, and he believes that Korean identity must always hinge on and pertain to either South Korea or North Korea. Korean social identity symbolizes a politicized Korean identity. However,
Aramaki's concept of Korean identity is personal, and he believes that it is proper for him, or for all Koreans, to develop a personal Korean identity without political implications.

A problem, however, arises: Aramaki's concept of Korean identity is a derivative of the Japanese locus of interpretation and is, consequently, dissociated from either the Japanese domain or the Korean domain (see Chapter Two). An identity is a social category necessary to engage individuals in a meaningful social discourse with one another and to develop the self (see Mead 1934; Blumer 1937, 1962, and 1969; and Strauss 1959). When the individual's identity is personal without reference to any particular cultural domain, as it is the case for Aramaki, his life style is likely to become marginal (see Park 1950; Stonequist 1937; Pitts 1965; and Wright 1980).

Because of Aramaki's belief and life style, the Japanese playwright calls his biography immoral. It suggests a belief which deviates from the politically sanctioned concept of Korean social identity. This identity is what Soren and Mindan, along with the Japanese government, have laboriously created for Koreans since the end of World War II. The Japanese government seems to have allowed both Soren and Mindan to politicize Korean social identity, most likely so that Koreans in Japan will remain separate from the Japanese (see Chapter Three). Furthermore, such politicized
living conditions seem to keep Koreans engaged in Korean politics, originating from both South Korea and North Korea, and to reduce the possibility of assimilating them into Japanese society and politics.

Aramaki's life style reflects the conflict between the "personal troubles of milieu" and the "public issues of social structure" (Mills 1959:3-8). His life style may very well be what is ahead for those Koreans whose ethnic identity and locus of interpretation are inconsistent, ambivalent, and marginal, namely the second-generation Koreans.

In the following sections, I shall present the second-generation case studies.

I: The Mixed-School Group

(1) CCH

CCH is a 33-year-old male. He was born in Tokyo as the oldest child and only son. He has two sisters. He was sent to a Soren grammar school for six years and then to a Japanese middle school for the following three years. He was then sent to a Japanese private high school, but he decided to attend Choko (the only Soren high school in Tokyo) during his senior year.

At the Japanese middle school, CCH continued to use his Korean name. This caused problems for him: Japanese students harassed him daily because of his Korean descent.
One day he was surrounded by a group of older and bigger Japanese students at school and was badly beaten. He was so furious that he promised revenge on his assailants.

Soon after this incident, CCH singled them out one by one after school and beat them. His reputation as a fierce fighter eventually developed, and Japanese students stopped harassing him. He subsequently capitalized on his reputation and became a gang leader followed by a sizable group of Japanese delinquents from the same school. This experience satisfied him, because he felt that at last he had accomplished his revenge on the Japanese.

In the Japanese private high school his infamous reputation persisted. There he was also followed by a group of Japanese delinquents, and they were in a continuous battle with Choko students. CCH fought them on the Japanese side. One day, he received a small group of Choko students at his home. They were on their routine propaganda project, whereby they visited Korean families in order to inform them of the teachings of Kim Il Song, the leader of North Korea, and of the golden opportunities of living in North Korea. To his surprise he found two students in the group whom he had previously assaulted during a street fight. They also recognized him. However, these three students came to appreciate one another's ethnic predicament.

CCH recalls that this was the first occasion on which he felt "enlightened" about his Korean predicament.
From then on, he and the other Choko students became close friends. He calls this time the "Golden Era." His "Golden Era" was in fact filled with delinquent activities, mostly involving street fights with Japanese students. These activities were, in CCH's words, the expression of his revenge on the Japanese.

Eventually, this trio undertook self-examination regarding their future in Japan. They concluded that they would not prosper in Japan and that they would be better off in North Korea. They organized a Korean youth repatriation association and recruited over 130 Korean students.

This was at the time when the issue of Korean repatriation to North Korea was being negotiated between the North Korean and the Japanese governments. The trio eventually managed to persuade Soren officials to include them and their followers in the officially-sanctioned repatriation program.

One morning, all the would-be returnees gathered at a railroad station in Tokyo ready to board a train which would carry them to Niigata, a northern port of Honshu. There they would board a Russian ship to go to North Korea. CCH was one of them. But his relatives discovered his plan and informed his father, who had suspected nothing of his son's intention all along. On the same morning they rushed to the railroad station and located CCH on the train, but he refused to change his mind. Finally, his relatives knocked
him unconscious and carried him back to his home.

Prior to this incident, CCH was formally enrolled in Choko without his father's knowledge. There he began to show his talent in soccer and soon became the captain of the school soccer team. This athletic skill benefitted him later; he was admitted to a Japanese university because of this merit. His goal was to become a medical doctor. He worked hard to maintain high grades at the university and was eventually transferred to its medical school. This turn of events, however, was foiled by the bankruptcy of his father's trucking business. He was forced to drop out.

After bankruptcy, CCH's father began to drink heavily. CCH and his mother thought of ways to pay back his father's heavy debts. He himself went around to beg his father's money lenders, who were all Koreans, for their compassion and patience. He was able to persuade them and to gain their trust, so his family lost no properties for the time being.

To alleviate their financial problems, CCH and his mother started a business involving packaging and sales of pigs' feet, considered a delicacy among Koreans. His father refused to participate in this business, because he regarded it as the lowliest of all occupations (see Osgood 1951: 44-6).

The business became profitable in a short time. His father began to show interest and started to drive a truck
for delivery, although he continued to refuse to participate in the handling of the pigs' feet.

After three years, CCH wished to marry, but he could not find many willing families because of the nature of his business. Eventually, he married a Korean whose father knew of his lineage background and regarded it highly, because his lineage had been well-to-do in Che Ju Do.

Shortly after marriage, CCH went to work for his wife's father whose business was clean and, thus, respectable. The business was the wholesaling and manufacturing of vinyl luggage. CCH, like other Koreans, did not really appreciate the business which he had created, and he wanted to leave it.

CCH contributed much to his father-in-law's business, and, as a result, it prospered. This was the time his father-in-law came across an opportunity to purchase a store section in a large trade center complex, which was built with the Japanese government funds. However, one of the regulations stated that only Japanese were permitted to purchase store sections.

Hence, CCH's father-in-law persuaded one of his Japanese business associates to invest in a store section with him and to apply for a permit under his Japanese name. This arrangement was successful. CCH was asked to manage half of the store section. He believed that he had finally arrived upon a golden opportunity, to enter big business.
However, the joint-ownership failed within the first year because of its small profits and because of CCH's problems with his Japanese co-manager. CCH states:

"My co-manager was a nasty, small fellow. He was like that ever since the first day we opened the store. Most of the time, he wouldn't talk to me. Although he never made obvious ethnic remarks, it was obvious to me. It bothered me a great deal."

However, CCH's father-in-law later discovered more reliable reasons for the conflict between the two co-managers. He was informed by the Japanese co-manager and by clerks at the store that CCH was always busy entertaining his Korean friends at the store and that he was frequently absent from the store. The co-manager also admitted that he felt intimidated by CCH because he was so well-educated and was able to converse with foreign windowshoppers in English. The co-manager, with only a grammar school education, had become resentful and reticent as a result.

The store failure precipitated CCH's departure from his father-in-law's business. He returned to his original business and took his family along with him.

CCH has two sons and one daughter. When his first son turned six, problems arose as to which school system his son should attend. CCH's wife is a Japanese high school graduate and has little sympathy for Soren. She wished to send her son to a Japanese school; as did her parents. CCH finally decided to send his son to a Soren school; his wife knew that her opinion would be discounted, her parents
remained silent, and CCH's parents endorsed the final decision. CCH states:

"I want my son to know Korean, Korean history and tradition. I want him to cultivate personal pride in his parents' background."

One day, CCH, his parents, and one of his sisters were summoned to the Tokyo Immigration Office to review their resident status. Earlier, the Japanese authorities had discovered that CCH's family had resident papers bearing conflicting information on their birth places and personal names. Furthermore, their papers had never been cleared by the Immigration authorities.

They anticipated that the interview would be only technical in nature, but as soon as they entered the Office, they were detained in a large cell with others. They were kept there from early morning to late evening. In the meantime, their sponsors were asked to pay bail at a National Bank branch located some distance away. It took them all morning to complete the trip.

While CCH and his family were detained, his father talked about going back, or being sent back, to Che Ju Do and even started to make plans in such an event. His mother was stoic throughout, and his sister was too upset to talk. CCH was furious about this unexpected and disgraceful treatment. During an interview, CCH, in anger, told his interviewer that he wished to be sent to America where he had a relative.
Earlier that morning, their sponsors suggested that they prepare a small gift for Immigration officers so that they might be treated better, but CCH's father had rejected this suggestion and said that he would refuse to put himself and his family in a subordinate position to the Japanese. CCH concurred.

CCH's life style shows a persistent ambivalence toward the Japanese and the Korean domains, of the bicultural milieu. The Japanese domain, of which CCH wishes to be a part, generates two problems: (1) outright rejection by the Japanese because he is Korean; and (2) anxiety generated by a lack of Japanese identity.

At the Japanese schools, CCH was rejected by his Japanese peers, but his desire to be accepted still remained apparent. One choice was to redefine himself in a new way, in relation to his peers. He became a delinquent group leader. Although his new role invited more physical confrontations from his peers, it served him as an alternative to maintain his ongoing interaction with them. He over-communicated his new delinquent role and under-communicated his Korean identity (see Goffman 1959). Thus, he felt that he was a part of the Japanese domain, but he failed to adopt Japanese identity simply because of his Korean descent. In short, CCH has adopted the Japanese locus of interpretation, while he has been constrained by his Korean descent. Consequently, he has found himself in marginal status.
It is ironical that CCH had to pass for a Japanese when he was engaged in a series of street fights with Choko students, but these incidents later became some of his turning points. He encountered some of these Choko students in a friendly context in which he recognized a new perspective. He discovered a domain in which he could define himself as a Korean. At this point, he became a Soren activist and organized the repatriation movement.

Yet CCH's desire to be a part of the Japanese domain persisted. He reentered this domain as he was admitted to the Japanese university, but his reentry was abruptly halted by his father's business failure. Thereafter, he reentered the Korean domain in its lowest occupational category. The occupation of processing and wholesaling of pigs' feet limited contact to Korean customers and Korean retail store owners.

After this turn of events, CCH started a new phase. He operated between the Japanese and the Korean domains simultaneously. He worked for his father-in-law whose business network involved Japanese. However, he failed to manage the difference between these two domains for two reasons: (1) he resented the fact that he had to work for his father-in-law (the Korean male ethos dictates that it is shameful for a man, especially for the only son, to work for his wife's father); and (2) he was unable to work with Japanese because of his intolerance of their unexpressed prejudices.
The second reason needs more elaboration because of the conflict generated by the adoption of the Japanese locus of interpretation and the lack of Japanese identity. Passing for a Japanese makes CCH insecure. For him, passing for a Japanese is not a simple strategic act as it is for Koreans of the first-generation and the recent migrant groups. It is a real act, an act which is intimately interconnected with his locus of interpretation. The problem is that this act lacks another necessary element, Japanese identity. Hence, when CCH relates to Japanese, he is confronted with a number of role definitions: a Korean passing for a Japanese, a Japanese whose real identity is Korean, or somebody without an ethnic identity at all.

After failing the store management, CCH assumed a renewed ideological rigor. He remarks:

"Kim Il Song now says that people with education can help their country with their education; and people with money can do so with their money. So I'm doing just that with my earned money in Japan."

He decided to send his oldest son to the Soren school despite his wife's objection.

From the above remark, it seems that CCH has cultivated the Korean locus of interpretation and has adopted Korean social identity of the Soren persuasion. This conclusion does not reflect his life style, which continues to show a persistent ambivalence toward the two domains. CCH's stated position during an interview at the Immigration
Office was to reject both domains and to wish to belong to a third domain, America, a fantasy land.

In sum, CCH's life style remains marginal because he is unable to commit himself to one or the other domain. That he sends his son to the Soren school and talks in favor of North Korean/Soren propaganda is extreme and reactionary; his position to be deported to America is also reactionary.

CCH's life style discloses a basic similarity to YNG's, a recent migrant, in that both men's life styles are based on the Japanese locus of interpretation and Korean social identity. Unlike the personal and ego identities adopted by the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans, this Korean social identity is an identity looked at from the Japanese locus of interpretation.

(2) ISJ

ISJ is a 29-year-old male born in Tokyo. His father is from Che Ju Do, and his mother is Japanese. He was sent to a Soren grammar school for six years where he was called by his Korean name. The high point of his Soren school days, as ISJ recalls, was when he stood up in class and asked a question directed to his teacher, considered by school children the toughest disciplinarian. ISJ states:

"My great question was, 'Are all Americans bad people?' I felt a strong urge to ask that question, because every teacher kept saying Americans and the
Japanese were all imperialists. So they were undesirable people. I was puzzled by that, even at my young age. I knew that not all Japanese were bad. So all Americans couldn't be bad. And there were bad Koreans and good Koreans. The teacher looked kind of alarmed, but became very serious. He took a long pause and said, 'No, not all Americans are bad. It's American Imperialism that is bad, not the people.' Then I started to think that I was on the right track and started to think on my own. I also realized that I didn't have to believe in everything those teachers said. I could question them."

At his father's decision, ISJ was next sent to a Japanese middle school where he used his mother's Japanese maiden name. About this time, he began to spend much of his free time with his maternal cousins, who lived in a distantly-located middle class section of Tokyo. He had to take a train to see them.

Subsequently, he went to a Japanese private high school where he considered school work secondary to his other interests. He recalled that he had roamed around the school vicinity, with his school friends who were all Japanese. He spent much time going to the movies, dining out at local restaurants, and chasing girls. In his senior year, he became interested in both Japanese and European literature. His heros included Natsume Soseki, Akutagawa Ryunosuke, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Nietzsche.[1] Existentialism was his symbol. ISJ states:

"During those days I was involved with philosophical questions. I was so curious about universal principles, which give meaning to life. As a result, I
didn't care to prepare myself for university entrance exams. I became a ronin (a masterless samurai, or a student without university affiliation). I kept reading on my own. In the meantime, I had to eat. So I just grabbed any odd jobs available. Well, in truth, I still lived with my parents. So I didn't really have to work, but the amount of spending money they gave me was never enough for my habits, like eating out and going to the movies."

ISJ spent two years as a ronin, but was eventually admitted to a Japanese university. He majored in law, but his reasons for studying law are unclear. He took courses for two years and dropped out. Thereafter, he acquired a job in a real estate company as a salesman. ISJ states:

"I had no problem with getting that job as a salesman there, because they didn't bother to ask me for my birth certificate. They were only interested in finding people who were willing to be trained as salesmen, so they could go out and could run their own business ... independently. ... I'm sure the company's president is Korean. He looks like a Korean to me. He is a small man looking very much like a typical merchant. He is very polite and humble, even to his employees, but he is quite a guy. He owns ten golf clubs and is into the oil business. You see, there are some Koreans who really made it big in Japan. There are three executives working closely with him. I guess they are all related to him, because they look like Koreans too."

ISJ eventually started his own business. He employs a Japanese male as his only secretary.

When his paternal grandmother died in Che Ju Do, his father suggested that he come along to observe the funeral there. He readily agreed and began a preparation for a passport application. He first went to his local Mindan branch. But they referred him to the South Korean Embassy after having found no record of his birth. At the Embassy,
he was again informed that they had no record of his birth.

ISJ states:

"I was shocked to find out that I was nobody. It's Kafkaesque and an existential issue ... I am nobody. It's really strange that I have my driver's license which bears my Korean name and South Korean nationality, and I have always had my alien registration book with me, which states that I am a South Korean citizen."

Consequently, he was unable to accompany his father to Che Ju Do. ISJ states:

"I wanted to see Korea. After all, it's half of me. I don't think I want to live in Korea, but I don't mind visiting there. I suppose I will always live in Japan. ... Well, I just want to live simply and naturally. I was born in Japan, and Japan is the only place I have lived. I like the way life goes here. I'm just living like anybody else here. Just because I'm half-Korean, I don't feel I need to change my life style. I appreciate things Korean and am curious about them, but they are only an intellectual curiosity to me, and nothing more. If I have a choice between Korean and Japanese nationalities, I would certainly pick the Japanese one. It's convenient and, what's more, it's natural to me."

One evening, ISJ invited my wife and me to his apartment-office for dinner. He also invited a junior friend of his, who was Japanese. He introduced us as his old friends. He did not wish to talk about anything pertaining to Korea.

ISJ considers an ethnic identity an existential issue; it does not and should not involve sociological, political, and sentimental elements. To him, an identity in the light of either Japan or Korea is immaterial. His concern is rather with his existential individuality. In
this regard, he accepts both Japan and Korea as givens. For instance, he adopted his maternal Japanese name and plans to live in Japan without rejecting his paternal Korean heritage. This sense is clearly exemplified in his spontaneous willingness to accompany his father to Che Ju Do for his grandmother's funeral. Furthermore, his statement, "I just want to live simply and naturally," conveys the message that he accepts the givens and makes the best of them, rather than letting them become his personal problems. His statement can be interpreted as his manner of rebellion, which is non-aggressive in contrast to CCH's, against the social and political constraints of ethnic identity. His strategy is to disregard them as immaterial to his life.

The root of his life style is found in his "great question" at the Soren school. Then he recognized that all human beings are not necessarily classified in rigid categories, such as imperialists, capitalists, communists, and even Japanese and Koreans. With this interpretation, he discovered that he need not classify himself in the either-or system of thought. Hence, it is unnecessary for him to interpret his experiences in terms of the Korean or the Japanese domain, the Korean or the Japanese locus of interpretation, or Korean or Japanese identity. At least intellectually, this is how he has resolved the problem of marginality.
However, ISJ's economic strategy is guarded with precautions: he chose the kind of occupation which required the minimal danger of ethnic exposure. In addition, he kept secret his paternal Korean descent from his Japanese friends and business associates. For ISJ, these choices were precautions, because he would not expect the Japanese to understand his mixed-ethnic predicament.

Nevertheless, ISJ is likely to encounter trouble, despite his precautions and philosophical resolutions, in situations in which he is confronted with the choice of Korean or Japanese identity. The Japanese and Koreans in Japan are still locked into a milieu that demands one's expression of ethnic identity regardless of one's wishes. In other words, the individual's intellectual resolution of marginality, although it is a significant achievement on his part, fails to free him from social structural issues which confront all Koreans as an alien and ethnic group in Japan.

(3) PIM and (4) PAM

PIM is a 26-year-old male, and his brother PAM is 24. Their father is from Che Ju Do, and their mother is Japanese. Both brothers were born in Tokyo.

Their father sent them to the Mindan school for six years; he has been an active Mindan member. They then went to a Japanese private middle-high school. The reasons for this shift were twofold: the Mindan school only had a six-
year program at that time, and their father wished them to go to a Japanese university. PAM states:

"My brother and I were first enrolled in the Japanese middle school with our Korean names. Shortly after I started there, our father changed our names to Japanese names. He used our mother's Japanese maiden name. It didn't actually make much difference by then, because all the Japanese kids knew we were Koreans. We made Japanese friends there and didn't face any prejudices there."

Both brothers joined the school judo team and became captains of the team in their senior year. The high school faculty recommended PAM to a university for admission without entrance examinations. He wanted to go to the university with which his high school was affiliated because it was a better-known institution than the one to which he was finally admitted. He reasoned that his grades were non-competitive for admission to the affiliated university. The recommendation was made and he was accepted on the basis of his judo skills. Two years earlier, his brother PIM was also admitted to another university for the same reason.

During the summer prior to PAM's freshman year, his father sent him and his brother to Seoul, South Korea. They were enrolled in a university there for a summer educational exchange program; many Japanese-born Koreans were enrolled there too. There they learned the Korean language and Korean history. PAM states:
"I was fully aware of my Korean background even before I went to Kankoku (South Korea). When I look back on it, I guess my experiences there gave me a reassurance of my Korean identity. It was an occasion where I really felt I was with my people and my culture. ... Although I don't plan to live in Kankoku, I feel good about experiencing things Korean there. I'm a Kankokujin (a South Korean person) in Japan, but I strongly believe that if I try hard enough I will make a decent life here."

At the separate universities both brothers studied marketing and became captains of their respective judo teams. After graduation both brothers looked for employment. PIM states:

"I was looking for any job, since I had not decided what I wanted to do for my future then. I wanted to get some business experience before I could start my own. I wrote to a number of Japanese companies, and they never wrote back to me, just as I anticipated. In the meantime, one of the Japanese wholesalers who does business with my father, was looking for a business associate. He gave me a job, since I was willing to work for anybody."

A few years after PIM started his job, his father asked him to return and to take over his business, wholesaling and manufacturing of luggage. But PIM realized that his Japanese employer needed him more than his father. So both parties made an arrangement that PIM would stay with his employer until a competent replacement was found. PIM states:

"Well, I couldn't leave my Japanese employer. He taught me all about his business. I felt obligated to stay with him."

PAM also looked for a job. Although he wanted to acquire business experiences in a large Japanese company, he
did not actually apply for a job, because he knew that no Japanese companies would consider a Korean for employment in the first place. So he wrote to a number of small businesses and finally received a reply from one employer. He was offered a sales job in a retail store for outdoor goods, located in the middle of Tokyo. The job offer was a surprise to him, because he applied with his Korean name. PAM states:

"After one year, the store owner wanted to see me in his office one day. That was the first time I met him on one-to-one basis. He first praised my good work and encouraged me to continue to work as well as I have done. He then told me that he too was Korean, and he promoted me to a managerial position. There were a few employees who had been there longer than I. They, I'm sure, felt cheated by this turn of events. ... Eventually I found out that all of the four store managers are Koreans, including the owner and myself. And all the employees are Japanese. All the other managers are, I think, related, like brothers. One of them is an ex-Soren activist. He often raises hell at the store. Obviously, he does not get along with the other Koreans who are Kankokujin. It's because he is a Chosen no kata (a formal style of address in Japanese, Chosenjin implies a derogatory meaning to insult Koreans. The address form, no kata, placed after Chosen implies neutrality with some degree of common courtesy). I get the impression that Chosen no kata are so hard-headed that you can't talk to them. They think they are always right, and their manner of personal relationship is rather insulting. I think, for instance, this Chosen no kata's head is pretty screwed up. ... Most people like me (referring to Kankokujin), I feel, they tend to have a dark side to their characters ... I mean they try to hide their Korean background. They pass for Japanese. But I have never had any prejudicial experiences in my life, although everyone has known me as a Kankokujin. My identity has never been a problem to me."

Both brothers are still very skilled at judo and give judo lessons to Japanese policemen at the local police
Both PIM's and PAM's life styles show little ambivalence toward Korean identity. Three factors may account for this: (1) six years of education at the Mindan school; (2) their father's active involvement in Mindan; and (3) the summer visit to Seoul, South Korea. These factors are consistent with identification with South Korea. Most significantly, their visit to Seoul gave them a sense of cultural belongingness and of experiential authenticity, which they could not have experienced in Japan. Their initial adoption of the Mindan image of Korean social identity was subsequently transformed into personal and ego identities. These identities conceptually allow them to accept the Korean domain as theirs and the Japanese domain as alien.

Their life styles are markedly different from CCH's because of the absence of marginality. They are also different from ISJ's life style, although these three individuals have Japanese mothers. The difference lies in the ideological consistency or inconsistency of their experiences. The Mindan/South Korean ideological upbringing for PIM and PAM is consistent at home and is compatible with the Japanese social and political climate; Mindan and Japanese society are compatible because of their shared-ideology of capitalism and anti-communism.

In contrast, both CCH and ISJ experienced an ideological disjunction when they moved from the communist-
Soren school to the capitalist-Japanese school. This ideological disjunction has partly oriented CCH toward marginality and ISJ toward an intellectual resolution of identity neutrality.

(5) MTM

MTM is a 29-year-old male born in Tokyo as the first son of nine siblings. He was first sent to a Soren grammar school for six years. Then his father transferred him to a Japanese middle school. This was the time when his father became a Mindan member. At the Japanese school, MTM used a Japanese name. MTM states:

"I didn't want those Japanese kids to know that I was Korean, so I used my Japanese name."

When he started at the Japanese high school, he also continued to use his Japanese name. MTM states:

"At the high school, nobody suspected that I was Korean because I acted naturally, you know, just like they acted. There I didn't even need to hide my Korean background ... Well, I mean that my behavior was so natural that I didn't need to think about hiding my Korean background."

The first three high school years had passed uneventfully. During his senior year, he, like others, took a number of university entrance examinations. He planned to major in marketing so that he could help his father with his business, a wholesaling and manufacturing of luggage, but he was rejected by all the universities. This meant that he would have to wait for the following year to take another
round of examinations. In the meantime, he worked for his father. However, conflict due to his educational failure developed between MTM and his mother; it intensified to the point that he was forced out of his house.

Thereafter, MTM had taken up a number of odd jobs. One of them was driving a dump truck at a construction site outside of Tokyo. He kept his job for a little over a year. Then he returned to Tokyo only to find a similar job. There he met a Japanese woman from a northern Prefecture. They soon began to live together. She had a clerical job in the trucking company where he was a truck driver. After one year together, she became pregnant, and MTM considered marriage. MTM states:

"I seriously thought about marrying her, but at the same time, I knew the idea was impossible. How could I go to my parents and propose the idea of marrying a Japanese girl? I didn't have courage to face them. I thought then that it was immoral to marry one whom my parents would likely reject. She was Japanese."

During this trying period, MTM, for the first time, told his pregnant friend that he was Korean. MTM states:

"When I told her that I was Korean, she didn't think much of it. So that was that."

They finally decided to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion. Mutual bitterness and final separation resulted. MTM returned to his home and began to work for his father's business again. He never told his parents of his experience. He even withheld the information about his girl friend from his closest friends for a long time, but the
time of self-revelation was inevitably to come. MTM states:

"One evening, I went to see a good friend of mine at his home. He was Japanese. He also invited two other friends of his, whom I have known for some time. We somehow started to talk about our life experiences. One of them was talking about a breakup with his girl friend with whom he had lived for some time. It was the same story. She became pregnant, but he couldn't marry her because of his parents' probable objection. She had an abortion, and they split up. So I felt comfortable enough to talk about my experiences for the first time. As I was talking about myself, I felt a strong urge to tell my Japanese friends that I was Korean. I did it right then and there. I anticipated them to get angry with me ... maybe because they might feel cheated, ... because I had not been honest with them from the beginning. Well, their reaction was like ... nothing to it. My friend said, 'I always suspected that you were Korean. And I only wanted you to be natural, to be free to say anything to your friend like myself. For a long while, I felt disappointed, because you wouldn't tell me your secret. Now, I'm glad that you finally trust me as your friend.' I was very moved by his statement. At the same time, I felt a great relief from all my troubles. I felt free for the first time."

MTM's life style stands out as a prime example of identity conflict. He concealed from his close Japanese friends, even from his girl friend at first, the fact of being Korean. He was born into the Korean domain, but was unwilling to accept it because he felt that part of his life belonged in the Japanese domain.

Running away from home indicates his flight from the Korean domain, and that he lived with his Japanese girl friend indicates his attempt to belong in the Japanese domain, but neither action resolved his basic dilemma; they worsened it.
However, MTM's dilemma was resolved, quite accidentally, when he revealed his Korean background to his trusted Japanese friends. His confession, which may have had a healing effect on him, brought him to a new awareness that some Japanese, under some circumstances, would accept a Korean.

Prior to his confession, MTM uncritically accepted the stereotypical properties of categories: Korean identity is a stigma and the Japanese domain is always antagonistic toward and rejecting of Koreans. His interpretation of passing was to avoid potential prejudicial and discriminatory encounters with Japanese, and its opposite side was his desire to be accepted in Japanese society.

Moreover, his Soren school experiences may have reinforced his uncritical acceptance of the stereotypical interpretation of the relation between the Korean and the Japanese domains. The Korean domain defined by Soren is North Korean and, thus, is communist, which is socially and ideologically incompatible with the Japanese capitalist domain.

After his confession, he adopted Kankokujin status. Hence, his social status has become compatible with the Japanese domain. This new status gave him a sense of belongingness to the Korean domain directly and to the Japanese domain indirectly.
(6) GGH

Born in Tokyo, GGH is a 24-year-old female married to YNG (see Chapter Six). She was first enrolled in a Japanese grammar school. There she stayed only six months. GGH states:

"That was a difficult time for me. I used my Korean name at school, and all the Japanese kids made fun of me all the time. I hated to go to school then."

Her sister, who is one year older, also went to the same Japanese school and experienced similar derogatory encounters with her Japanese peers. The two sisters daily complained about such experiences to their father. Eventually, their father enrolled them in a Soren grammar school. There they at last felt comfortable. As GGH started Choko, she became increasingly critical of the nature of the teaching. GGH states:

"Everything taught at Choko was Fatherland and Kim Il Song. It was so obviously biased that many of us became critical of what was being taught. We live in Japan, and we were all born here in Japan. But Soren teachers kept saying the same thing all the time ... like capitalism and imperialism are bad, and Japan and America are bad, because they are capitalist and imperialists countries. I couldn't take that nonsense. I'm glad to be out of that school, but there is one thing I learned there, which is my Korean pride. I'm proud of being Korean, and what more do they expect from me? Wherever I go, I use my Korean name. I don't care what those Japanese think of me. ... There is one thing I don't understand, which is change of nationality ... our identity. Some Koreans have changed their nationality to Japanese. I can't see how they could drop their origin like that."
However, her husband YNG, who was born in Che Ju Do, entertains the idea of naturalization for economic reasons. GGH considers herself inexperienced and idealistic and shows a sign of concession.

Their marriage was arranged, but it was GGH who gave the final consent to her parents. She had met a number of men, all Koreans, but none of them satisfied her ideals. She is a tall and attractive woman and was much desired by a number of wealthy Korean families for marriage. Her husband is short and is considered lacking a charismatic personality, but her father thought that he was acceptable because he was well-educated, modest, and trustworthy and because his father was wealthy. GGH acknowledged such characteristics in him and decided to marry him. GGH states:

"I had met a number of men, all Koreans and all born in Japan, but they didn't impress me in the least. I thought they lacked something I was looking for ... well, something about Koreanness, I guess. In this regard, my husband impressed me most. Well, when I was a high school girl, I thought I'd never marry someone from Korea, but here I am, being married to such a man. He has been teaching me a lot about my problems, you know, the problems that we who were born in Japan face. I'm still learning about myself."

GGH's brief experience at the Japanese school was full of ethnic prejudices. Then and there, she learned to dissociate herself from the Japanese domain. Her subsequent life was spent in the Korean domain, but it was the Soren domain. There she first acquired the Soren image of Korean social identity. Later, she became very critical of this
This change is clearly manifested in her choice of marriage partner. She married a recent migrant Korean because she thought that he possessed a sense of "Korean-ness," as she calls it, whereas the other men born in Japan lacked it. In other words, as she became dissatisfied with the Soren domain, she began to seek certain elements which would help her develop her personal and ego identities. Her marriage resulted from this search. And her continuing search for her personal and ego identities frees her from marginality.

(7) KNT

KNT is an 18-year-old male born in Tokyo. When he was six, he was sent to the Mindan school because his father was a Mindan member. After one year, he was transferred to a Japanese school in the neighborhood because commuting to the Mindan school by train was too much of a strain on a six-year-old boy. Although he had used his Korean name at the Mindan school, he started to use a Japanese name at the Japanese school.

When he was in the fourth grade, a teacher, without warning, talked in class about Korea and Koreans in Japan. The teacher mentioned that there were two Korean children in class. He proceeded to name the two, one of them being KNT himself. This was the first occasion on which he discovered
that the other was also Korean. KNT remained silent, not knowing how to react to this unexpected turn of events. After the class, one of the girls started to make derogatory remarks about him and the other Korean, but a Japanese friend of KNT's defended him. This left a lasting impression on him. They still are close friends. KNT states:

"When that teacher told the class that I was Korean, I was so shocked that I didn't know what to do. So I remained silent. I felt like hiding under the desk. Until then, I really didn't think about my Korean background. I behaved just like any other Japanese kids."

KNT's Korean background was never uncovered during his high school years. Thus, he behaved and related to his Japanese peers just as they did, according to his accounts. During this time, he hardly thought about being Korean and behaved as if he were Japanese.

As his high school peers were finding jobs at the end of their senior year, KNT was forced to realize that he had little chance of finding a job in a Japanese company. KNT states:

"My father and relatives all told me not to bother with applying to Japanese companies for a job because Koreans couldn't get a job in them. They also told me that a Japanese small business owner might give me a job, but promotion prospects would never be good for a Korean. So I didn't bother looking for a job. Shoganai (problems are beyond human control)."

The idea of going to a university crossed his mind at this time, but he knew that his father could not afford the expenses. At this time, his father's Korean employer
needed a delivery man, but he did not have a driver's license yet. So it was arranged that his employer would pay for his driving lessons and then train him on the job. KNT states:

"I like the job. I'm on the road all day, driving a van. I don't want to be stuck in a small office struggling with paper work. I'm happy with this job I have. I couldn't have done any better for being a Korean in Japan."

KNT had experienced overt ethnic prejudices at an early age, but, instead of discarding the Japanese domain like GGH, he chose to remain in it; his Japanese friend's support was a significant factor for his choice. KNT interpreted his friend's support as a clear message that there was a part that he could take in the Japanese domain. This interpretation prevailed in later years. For instance, his high school days were spent uneventfully because KNT passed for a Japanese as if he had a right to behave like one.

Up to this point, KNT's life was well insulated from historical and social structural constraints: i.e., animosity between Koreans and the Japanese and the lack of employment opportunities for Koreans in Japan. However, he was forced to acknowledge the reality of such constraints when he looked for a job. His reaction was apathetic and fatalistic as expressed in the common Japanese phrase, shoganai. Then, the Korean employer saved him, and he was, consequently, led to the Korean domain.
However, KNT's life style continues to be in limbo because of his ill-defined identification with both the Korean and the Japanese domains. His schooling at the Mindan school was too brief to constitute a major part of his life style. In contrast, his experiences at the Japanese schools, although there were negative experiences, proved to be rewarding because he found lasting friendship with a Japanese peer. Moreover, his father was never an active Mindan member, and this, consequently, had little influence on him in the light of Korean social identity.

In short, his life style is precarious because of marginality. The existing historical and social structural milieu for Koreans in Japan demands their allegiance to an ethnic identity.

(8) SST

SST is a 15-year-old male born in Tokyo as the youngest of five siblings. He had spent nine years at a Soren school. Then his father transferred him to a Japanese high school. But his father encountered a fierce opposition from the Soren school faculty and administration regarding his transfer. SST states:

"My father fought like crazy against those stubborn people at the Soren school. He only wanted me to go to a Japanese high school so that I could go to a Japanese university. But those Soren people didn't think it was a good idea for me, or for any Korean
kids. ... I was, at that time, willing to switch schools. I didn't have any concrete plans then, but I vaguely thought that it would be good for me to get a university education. My father was most concerned about my becoming so brainwashed by the Soren school system that I might become a communist. My father didn't like that at all."

SST's two elder brothers, aged 24 and 25, have taken similar paths. They spent nine years at the same Soren school that SST attended and switched to Japanese high schools. As a result, they were able to go to Japanese universities. The 25-year-old brother, after having graduated from a pharmacological college, obtained a job as a pharmacist in a Japanese drug manufacturing company. SST says that it was a trying time for his brother when he was looking for a job. All but one company did not write back or rejected him because he was Korean.

SST was finally enrolled in a Japanese private high school. There he continued to use his Korean name, for he felt no need to pass for a Japanese. SST states:

"So far as I can tell, I have not had any prejudicial and discriminatory treatment from either the teachers or the Japanese peers. I just go there to attend classes and don't get into trouble. I have even a few Japanese friends at school."

In the fall of 1976, a Korean professor from the United States visited SST's father. They had gone to the same university in Korea. SST's father then decided to send him to the United States for education. SST states:
"My father doesn't feel that I will get anywhere in Japan. So he wants me to go to America. I don't mind going there for education. So my father is making arrangements with the professor. ... My two brothers say that it's totally meaningless for me to go to America. I really don't know what they mean. I guess that they think it's an escape from reality, but I vaguely think that Japan is limited for Koreans."

SST left for the United States in the summer of 1977 to start high school.

SST spent enough time with the Soren domain to adopt Korean social identity. However, he was not "brainwashed" by the communist teachers, and he seems to have made a quick adjustment to the Japanese school milieu where he held himself as if he were a foreign student.

Two reasons may account for his disinterest in the Soren domain and willingness to go to the United States for his education: (1) his father gave him and the Soren school faculty a clear message that SST would not become a Soren sympathizer, if not an outright communist; and (2) the fact that one of his brothers obtained a job in a Japanese company but was unhappy led him to agree with his father's view that there is no future for Koreans in Japan.

In sum, SST rejects the Soren domain, but derives Korean social identity from it. To him, Japan is a place where he happened to be born and, thus, is not a locus of his self-identity. This clear-cut identity differentiation makes it easier for him to seek alternative countries in which to live, such as the United States, than for those who
identify themselves with Japan in some emotional manner, like CCH and KNT.

II: The Soren School Group

(1) Six Koreans at the Alumni Meeting

The annual meeting of the Soren grammar school alumni association has been held since 1971. The association was first envisaged in the summer of 1970 by KMS whose case study will be presented later in this section. He and two other alumni held the first meeting in the following year.

Their initial plan was to organize an occasion where their fellow alumni of the Soren grammar school, the class of 1960, could get together to exchange their subsequent experiences and to give one another emotional and social support. It was by no means politically or ideologically motivated. The first meeting was a success, for over thirty alumni attended it. Since then, the meeting has been held every year, although the number of attendants have steadily declined.

I was invited to their annual meeting held at a Korean restaurant in U-Ku, Tokyo. When I arrived alone at the restaurant, I immediately recognized two familiar faces sitting at a table: they were CSO and KGH.

CSO was born in Tokyo. He spent two years at a Japanese school before he was transferred to the Soren
grammar school. Then he moved on to the Soren middle school where he spent only two months before he was transferred to a Japanese school. From then on, he went to a Japanese high school and Japanese private electronics university. During this period, his father owned a shoe-manufacturing business. Later, his father ventured into a number of more lucrative businesses, such as a pachinko parlor, a coffee-shop restaurant, and a sauna-bath house in Yokohama, a suburb of Tokyo. Although CSO studied electronics engineering, he was asked, upon graduation, to manage his father's expanding businesses. He is still single at 28.

KGH was born in Tokyo. He has gone to all Soren schools including Soren University in Tokyo. His academic achievements were outstanding. At the Soren grammar school, he was the class president of the young communist club, Chong Yong Dan (the Young Red Brigade), for six straight years. He was recommended by the Choko faculty to attend Soren University, an elitist institution for young Soren activists. Then he was recruited by the Soren Central Organization and worked as a journalist for its newspaper. After five years he left Soren altogether and his political activism ceased. He then joined his grammar school friend KGM's business (see Chapter Six). KGH is married to a Choko graduate, and they have one infant.

As soon as we exchanged our greetings, CSO began his accusations of my conduct.
CSO: Hey, why the hell did you have to go to America? Tell me why? I think your action is nothing but an escape from our Korean problems. I can't see how you could neglect Sokoku (Fatherland, also implying North Korea) and our own people. Japan is a big enough place, and I think you could have done something here instead of fleeing to another place, like America. Your action is an escape from reality. Don't you know that?

Writer (for a while not knowing how to react to CSO's sudden and unexpected accusation): I don't know where you are coming from. You sound just like one of those crazy Soren demagogues. I didn't come here to entertain such garbage. I'm leaving.

CSO: No, you won't! Not until you tell me why you fled from Japan and our reality. Without facing and solving our reality in Japan, no Koreans should be allowed to flee from here. Anyway, how can anyone in his right frame of mind lead a meaningful and just life without facing up to our Korean reality?

CSO's reasons for his belligerent attitude will become clear in the following paragraphs.

Writer (still bewildered, directing remarks to KGH, who remained silent but was observing the interaction carefully): I don't feel like talking to this guy. This guy didn't even spend many years with the Soren system anyway. He himself defected to a Japanese school. He even made it to a Japanese university. From what I have heard from others, he only recently joined this alumni association. I don't know why and how he can talk like this. I'd rather leave now.

CSO (with a sudden change in his attitude said apologetically): Ah ... wait a minute. I'm sorry for all this nonsense. I really didn't mean anything bad. I beg your pardon. I will take back what I said .. so please.

KGH: You see ... he hasn't been serious about everything he said. He never talks like this to others, but I know he has a bad temper when
drunk. He is not even drunk yet ... well, he is only joking .. I'm sure. So don't take him so seriously.

After CSO's complete change in attitude and his apologies, he gave me warm greetings and wanted to know how I had been doing.

Writer: What are you doing now?

CSO: Well, what am I doing now? Let's see ... I'm doing ... I'm collecting garbage, scraps, and the like.

Writer: But I'm told that you are running a coffee-shop restaurant and a pachinko parlor.

CSO: Oh, yeah ... those businesses are not really mine, but it's true that's what I do for a living now. I had no other choice but to take over those businesses from my father. Because he wanted to retire a few years ago, I had to assume responsibility. I'm the oldest son. But I'm only an employee of his.

Writer: I thought you had gone to a Japanese university ... what did you study?

CSO: Yeah, ... I went to this Japanese university. I studied electronics there, but it turned out that I couldn't use my education anywhere or any way. It doesn't bother me a bit. I'm just an employee now ... a manager. When some of us left the Soren grammar school for Japanese schools, we all had high hopes. I wanted to become an M.D. That's why I left the school. Otherwise, I would have stayed there, but it turned out that I was not good enough for a medical school. I tried some entrance exams for medical schools, but failed them all. But this year, my brother was admitted to a Japanese medical school. I'm proud of his accomplishment. I'm working hard now to support his education. At least, one of us in the family is going to be an M.D.. That's good enough for me.
They tell me that you are studying Cultural Anthropology. I don't know what it is, although it all sounds very interesting.

KGH: I liked Anthropology. I read some books about it when I was going to Soren University. I studied East Asian history there because I wanted to understand where we all came from. Some of the literature I read then was anthropological. I found that anthropological stuff was pretty biased. For instance, writers from big and powerful countries wrote about underdeveloped countries from the big power point of view. That's what I call a biased view. I have not come across any work done by a small guy from a poor country. For instance, I would like to see a Korean write about Japan or America, or an African write about powerful countries. ... I must say that I admire what you (writer) have done, especially your initial decision to go to another country, but I still think that our livelihood remains in Japan. I think ... I believe that yours and our source of life ... must always be grounded here in Japan. Japan is the origin of our existential problems. Although we are Koreans, we can't separate ourselves from Japan to solve our problems. As long as we keep that in mind, I'm sure it is all right for a Korean to go elsewhere ... to accomplish his personal goal.

Two men came into the restaurant. They were YTS and PKS.

YTS was born in Tokyo and had all of his schooling with the Soren system. He completed the four-year study at Soren University and is now teaching Korean history and Fesangi (the history and legends of Korean guerrillas during the Japanese occupation of Korea and during the Korean War) on the middle school level of Choko. He is single and lives with his parents.
PKS was born in Tokyo and also had all of his schooling with the Soren system. He also is a graduate of Soren University and is now teaching Fesangi to middle school students at a Soren school. He is also single and lives with his parents.

YTS: I'm teaching Fesangi, but today's youth don't have the kind of competence or high consciousness that we used to have when we were their age. For instance, they would say that they wouldn't care if they were Koreans or Japanese. ... We have changed our teaching mode of Fesangi to accommodate the changing circumstances of the world. The primary objectives of teaching Fesangi has always been to equip young Koreans with a strong consciousness of Korean nationalism and with the relevant knowledge and skill to be able to live in Sokoku. We have changed this objective to include the teaching of relevant knowledge and skill to live in Japan. The whole Soren educational program now is geared toward including the teaching of relevant knowledge and skill to live in Japan as Koreans, but in reality, this new objective has not been seriously dealt with. Some of us have been trying to implement it at school, but have not been successful. One big problem we young teachers face is a chronic shortage of competent teachers in every field of teaching. Several years ago, Soren officials received orders from the government of Sokoku to change the policy of Soren so that Koreans in Japan could be better adjusted to the living conditions in Japan. Then we increased hours of the Japanese language, Japanese history, and social problems and implemented the teaching of English instead of the useless Russian. But we have not accomplished much in those lines.

PKS: I also teach Fesangi. I chose this subject at Soren University, because I believed that it was the logical consequence of all of our learning as Koreans in Japan. It gave me answers to my personal issues for a while, but now I find it difficult to justify the teaching
of this subject because it does not seem to me now relevant to the kinds of problems we are facing.

Two women came into the restaurant. They were KRJ and KIJ.

KRJ, a 28-year-old, single female, was born in Tokyo and went to all Soren schools. Her last school was Choko. When asked if she was working, she replied very hesitantly.

KRJ: "Well, ... I'm kind of working and kind of not working. Whichever you like ... I don't care anyway. I'm still single, but I want to have my family eventually. I'm already getting old. But before I get married and settled, my desire is to go abroad. I just want to get out of Japan for a while. I want to see Europe and America. ... but to go out of Japan I need a passport. Right now I can't get one because I'm still Chosenjin. My father is committed to Soren and will never change his nationality for anyone. I myself don't care. I guess it will all depend on whom I marry. If my husband is Kankokujin, I will be Kankokujin. If he is Chosenjin, I will be that. It makes no difference to me. I will also be happy if he is a neutral."

KIJ, a 28-year-old, single female, was born in Tokyo and also went to all Soren schools. She studied for two years at Soren University to become a grammar school teacher. She teaches music to first graders at a Soren school. She had just joined KRJ on her way to the alumni meeting, following a date with a Korean. She also talked about her desire to be married and to have her own family. She stated that she had become dissatisfied with teaching without really giving a reason.
The annual meeting was attended by these six Koreans and myself. There is one feature that all of them, except for CSO, share in common, that is, the lack of extensive interpersonal experiences with Japanese. Their ethnic identity has developed in the Soren domain, which precludes contacts with Japanese in any significant way.

However, most of these Koreans, such as KGH, YTS, PKS, and KRJ, are in the process of reevaluating their lifestyles. They intend to live in Japan permanently, but they realize that their intention is countered by Soren ideology. As KGH has done, one way of resolving the ideological incompatibility between Soren and Japanese society is to leave Soren altogether.

Furthermore, KGH and others realize that Soren ideology has been resistant to the rapidly changing social and political circumstances in Japan and the world. It is likely that Soren will lose its appeal to these Koreans as they become increasingly concerned with their own welfare. Their concern is likely to change their interpretation of Japanese society in favor of accommodating themselves to it.

After having left Soren altogether, KGH married a Choko friend and started to work for another Choko friend, KGM. HHS's comment that Soren activists could not financially afford to marry and to have families is partly confirmed by KGH's experiences (see Chapter Six).
KGH's job involved business transactions with Japanese, so he had accommodated his life style to the extent that he could pass for a Japanese. He adopted as a necessary strategy for survival what the first-generation and recent migrant Koreans have been doing.

YTS has been actively involved in changing the Soren school curriculum in order to make it and his teaching relevant to changing conditions for Koreans in Japan. PKS has begun to participate in such educational endeavors as he has become critical of the Soren system.

KRJ has become non-committal to either image (Soren or Mindan) of Korean social identity, and she has been seeking personal and ego identities for herself. KIJ seems to have been in complete agreement with the others during the meeting.

I found CSO's life style very revealing, for I thought that I might have developed a similar life style had I stayed in Japan. Like CSO, I left the Soren school for a Japanese high school. I spent a few years at a Japanese university studying mechanical engineering. I hoped to be accepted in the Japanese domain with the skill, but, then, I became aware that I would have little chance of gaining employment in a Japanese company even with an engineering degree. I might have been drawn back into my Korean peer group as happened to CSO.
My life course, however, took a sharp, unexpected turn. I wanted to be a scholar, so I left for the United States for an education. I studied sociology because I thought that it would help me understand my ethnic predicament from the vantage point of an alien sociocultural perspective. Later, I switched to anthropology, for its fieldwork tradition permitted me to pursue my original interest in the problems of the Korean ethnic minority in Japan.

My decision to settle in the United States has brought me to a new realization that I need not feel ambivalent about having Korean identity and the Japanese locus of interpretation. I was able to accept both Korean identity and the Japanese locus of interpretation for two main reasons: one was the absence of historical and structural constraints which make these two categories conflictual, and the other, my scholarly pursuit which permits me to be understanding of the Korean problems in ways that ordinary men could not.

When I did the actual fieldwork, I was most curious to find out about my Soren peer group. Their life styles must, I assumed, reflect one which I might have developed had I stayed with the Soren school system. Also, I was keenly interested in discovering alternative life styles, which may be developed by those of the mixed-school group.
What I have discovered, in terms of the life styles of my Soren school peer group, is both hopeful and disappointing. It is hopeful that they, with the exception of CSO, have been expanding their life perspectives beyond the initial confinement of the Soren ideological domain to include the Japanese domain. It is disappointing that CSO's life style has contracted. Once he failed to achieve his goal in the Japanese domain, he became desperate to reestablish himself in the Korean domain. He found this opportunity in the alumni association and has become the most aggressive promoter of its meetings. In his struggle to reenter the Korean domain, CSO has gone to the extreme of discarding the Japanese domain.

(2) KMS

KMS is a 29-year-old male, married, with two small children. He was born in Tokyo as the third of four brothers. He went to all Soren schools, and his last school was Choko.

When KMS was a small child, his eldest brother went to North Korea alone. He described his brother as very intelligent. His brother was a straight "A" student in the Japanese schools he attended and spent two years at a Japanese university. There he was a student activist. But he dropped out of the university and student politics after having realized that he had no future in Japan. His subse-
quent decision was to go to North Korea.

After having graduated from Choko, KMS had one thing in mind, that is, not to work for his paternal aunt, whose store sold Korean food. KMS states:

"My father died shortly after I got out of Choko. So I just took off alone. I went all over Japan, just working odd jobs and just living day by day. I guess I was just trying myself out then, but I got some skills, like being a telephone and elevator repairman. I learned to drive a dump truck. I came home to my mother once in a while. At one time, I got caught by her insistence to stay home. I stayed home and got myself involved with that food store, like my brothers. I now drive a van to deliver food from one place to another. I don't like what I'm doing. It's too constricting to me, but I feel I have to give support to my mother and younger brother. ... My brother goes to Choko. I want him to become an engineer because I think he will have a better chance with that kind of skill in Japan. ... In the meantime, I got married. My wife is a distant cousin of mine. She went to Choko when I went there. That's where we got to know each other in the first place, but, boy ... did we catch hell from our relatives. They think our marriage is incestuous, because we are, after all, cousins. So we eloped. When we had our first son, we were, for the first time, allowed back into our relatives' network."

About the time when KMS was married, he renewed his association with Choko classmates. They formed a five-family group and organized the first alumni meeting of the Soren grammar school graduates. The alumni meeting, from then on, has been held annually. But the five families decided to strengthen their friendship and mutual support by gathering at each other's houses once a month. Some of the five men of the five-family group had once worked for Soren in various capacities, but KMS has never worked for Soren.
Although KMS has attended all Soren schools, he holds a positive view of the Japanese domain. The fact that he has worked many odd jobs among Japanese, acquiring a number of job skills in the process, is an encouraging experience for him. He believes that Koreans with technical skills will be able to participate in Japanese society.

His life style is markedly different from MTM's, although both men have had similar job experiences in the Japanese domain. The difference is that KMS's early adoption of Korean social identity has influenced him to see the Japanese domain as alien, which dissociated him from marginality, whereas MTM, prior to his confession, failed to adopt it, which made him a marginal man.

KMS was, however, drawn back into the Korean domain largely because of his sense of obligation to his mother, but he did not make his reentry easy for his relatives. He married a cousin, which was considered incestuous, by their relatives. In the end, he got away with it. Thereafter, he has been involved in the Korean domain in two ways: (1) he started to work in the Korean food store owned by his paternal aunt; and (2) he organized the first Soren alumni association meeting and initiated the five-family group.

(3) MMK

MMK is a 28-year-old male born in Tokyo. He went to all Soren schools, and Choko was his last school. There-
after, he left home to live with his artist friends, some Japanese and some Koreans, to start his career as a painter. He has been a regular contributor to National (Japanese) Artists Exhibitions.

While pursuing his career, MMK was still financially supported by his father. During this apprenticeship period, he met and moved around Tokyo with two Americans who were studying Japanese paintings. MMK recalls that he had never felt related to them because of language barriers and, most of all, because of their attitudes toward companionship. They never wanted to entertain or to be entertained by anyone, and showed no intention of sharing anything with MMK. One of them eventually became a professor of painting at a Japanese university.

Although MMK is a Chosenjin, he once obtained a visitor's visa from the South Korean government. He went to South Korea and visited his relatives and observed the country. MMK states:

"It was a good visit, but nothing more. I saw South Korea for the first time. That's my parents' birth place. I met with some of the relatives there, and that's all. ... I want to get a passport somehow, so that I can go to New York (City). There I want to pursue my painting career, but for now, I don't think I can go there because I am still a Chosenjin. I don't feel like being hustled by those Mindan people, just to change my nationality status to South Korea. I'm not about to go through that myself."

When his father died, he was asked by relatives to take over the family business. It was a Korean food store.
He reluctantly agreed to do so because he felt, being the oldest son, that he was responsible for his siblings until they grew up.

His long Soren school experience has manifested itself in his adoption of the Soren image of Korean social identity. His visit to South Korea did not change his ethnic/political allegiance. His adoption of this Soren image has also served to preclude the Japanese domain as significant for his life style.

For instance, if he should change his nationality for personal reasons, he would acquire South Korean nationality and would not consider Japanese citizenship as even the remotest possibility. Yet he has been involved in the Japanese domain as a contributing artist. Put in another way, he would participate in this domain in a well-defined capacity only to achieve his goal, that is, being a Korean painter.

There is, however, a sense of ambivalence in MMK's avant garde life style. In this respect, Shibutani and Kwan state:

One place where [marginal men] frequently find a home, ... is among the avant garde. Informal circles of aspiring artists, writers, and musicians and those who seek their company are often insensitive to ethnic identity and sympathetic to the cause of downtrodden people. Since they are themselves outcasts from polite society, they lose no status in association with those who have been rejected elsewhere (1965:359).
My choice of scholarly career is partly caused by my avant garde attitude. I felt a special affinity with MMK in this respect, but he has not succeeded in this avant garde pursuit largely because of his sense of family obligation. As a result, he has been drawn back into the Korean domain.

Thus far, as the life styles of the Soren school group have been examined, one clear pattern has emerged. Koreans of this school group adopt the Soren image of Korean social identity and tend to consider the Japanese domain alien. They wish to participate in the Japanese domain as their allegiance to Soren weakens. This change stems from their awareness of the incompatibility between Soren ideology and the Japanese capitalist domain. It is this domain in which they are increasingly committed to making a living as they mature.

III: The Japanese School Group

(1) KRW

KRW is a 38-year-old male, married to a Japanese. They have two sons. He was born in Tokyo. He has no siblings, and his parents are dead.

KRW attended all Japanese schools and has a high school diploma. He tried university entrance examinations but failed. In addition, his father's sudden death practically terminated his plans for higher education. He married
his wife about this time.

He subsequently acquired a job in a mid-sized Japanese trading company. KRW states:

"I told them that I was born in some local place far away from Tokyo, so it would take a long time for me to get legal papers. They believed my story, or they just didn't care about formalities then. They were at that time expanding and needed qualified people. So I just sneaked in there."

KRW was successful in the company and was soon promoted to the position of kacho (a section chief) with more than 200 employees subordinate to him. He performed even better after the promotion. His superiors planned to send him as a company representative to Hong Kong. This meant a further promotion but required completion of his employment file. KRW states:

"It was a great opportunity for me. I wanted it so badly, but I had to tell them that I was Korean. I didn't want to falsify legal papers because it would be found out sooner or later. They said they didn't care about my being a Korean, but I lost the opportunity to go to Hong Kong. They also told me that I could stay, but I could anticipate what was to become of me there. I quit the job because there would be no more opportunities there."

After resignation, he started a delinquent lifestyle which affected his family life. At one time, he ran a high-interest money lending enterprise with a Korean. Their business activities mostly involved the forgery of money orders and credits. They were forced to close their business down because a police investigation was about to prove their criminal activities.
Prior to his death, KRW's father had asked a fellow villager to look after KRW. This villager followed through his promise and offered KRW a job as a sales and delivery person. The villager's business was the wholesaling and manufacturing of luggage, about which KRW had had no experience. He only had a driver's license. This was the time when he decided to be naturalized. KRW states:

"One day my boys happened to discover that they have different family names. The older son has his mother's Japanese name, and the younger my Korean name. Without thinking carefully my wife and I registered our sons in the two different names. I didn't think it would cause any problem at that time, but now I see the problem. When they grow up and start looking for a job, how would they go about it? With the Korean name my youngest son would have no chance. I don't want him to repeat the same experience I had. So I think it would be good for them to start out with Japanese citizenship. At least, I can give them that much of a head start."

KRW and his sons were naturalized in six months from the time of petition. KRW states:

"I was very surprised to get it so soon. Anyway we now have it. I don't feel I need to change anything about my life style because of this change. I will go along like I have always been. I haven't told other Koreans about it. I don't need them to make remarks about it. Just because I'm Japanese by nationality, I don't think I need to change my relatives and Korean friends. I will just get by."

As he was naturalized, he started to renew his association with his parents' fellow villagers in their association. He has regularly attended its meetings and has gone on field trips with fellow members.
However, after having worked for his Korean employer for a few years, KRW was fired because he had sold his employer's merchandise for his own profit.

KRW passed for a Japanese throughout his Japanese school years. He passed again when he obtained the job in the Japanese company and did very well there, but as soon as he faced legal problems he could no longer pass for a Japanese. Koreans cannot pass for Japanese beyond the legal barrier in Japan. Hence, his high expectations for life abruptly halted. Then his reaction was delinquent and criminal as if to punish the Japanese domain for injustices committed against him.

Although he was soon rescued by his father's friend, he proved to be an unwilling employee in the Korean domain. His naturalization was a turning point in his life. Instead of reducing his involvement in the Korean domain, he increased his association with it despite the fact that he does not speak Korean and knows very little about Korean customs.

In this respect, he attempted to adopt the personal and ego aspects of Korean identity from the villagers. Yet his ambivalence toward the Korean and the Japanese domains, is still apparent. For instance, his naturalization seems to reject the Korean domain, but it draws him closer to it instead. His increased involvement in the Korean domain seems to indicate his way of punishing the Japanese domain.
Yet his exploitation of his Korean employer gives the clear message that he is not really taken in by the Korean domain.

In sum, KRW's life style is unstable and unpredictable. It is full of resentment, which is a manifestation of marginality. Two factors may account for his life style: (1) his life style basically developed in the Japanese domain where his significant relations included Japanese teachers, peers, and the Japanese company, but ethnic discrimination prevented him from adopting Japanese identity; and (2) he has not learned to appreciate things Korean and has, consequently, failed to develop the Korean locus of interpretation.

Put in another way, he has adopted the Japanese locus of interpretation, but has failed to adopt Japanese identity on the one hand. He has adopted the personal and ego aspects of Korean identity derived from his association with Che Ju Do villagers, but has failed to adopt the Korean locus of interpretation, on the other hand.

(2) THY

THY is an 18-year-old male born in Tokyo as the older of two brothers. He describes his father as a wealthy businessman in money lending and real estate enterprises. In earlier years, his father dropped out of a well-known Japanese private university where he studied engineering.
THY attended a Japanese private school system from the first grade to the twelfth grade. On recommendation, he was admitted to its affiliated university where he studied business administration. THY states:

"The school system I went to in Tokyo is a private and Christian system. Its orientation is international. Although I used my Japanese name at school, I didn't try to hide my Korean background. I made lots of friends and was the class president when I was a senior. My Japanese peers there didn't treat me in any different way. I was comfortable there. ... But when a few kids got transferred from Choko to my school, they presented themselves as different. They said that they would always remain Korean no matter what. I don't think they made Japanese friends at school. They were kind of left out. There were a number of Korean kids at school from the beginning. They all said that they would eventually become Japanese. I share the same sentiment with them because everything around me since my birth has been Japanese. I speak Japanese and eat what the Japanese eat. So I don't consider myself different from any other Japanese."

In the summer of 1977, THY left Japan for the United States to attend college. THY states:

"I'm going back to Japan when my education is over. Japan is where I'm going to live for the rest of my life."

It is one thing that one is well-aware of one's ethnic background, but it is another how one analyzes one's locus of interpretation and ethnic identity. THY is well-aware of his Korean background, but he has adopted the Japanese domain to be his. He identifies himself with this domain and interprets his experiences from the Japanese locus. His rewarding experiences with Japanese have been contributing factors for his life style: having many
Japanese friends, seeing Korean students who also plan to be naturalized, or being elected the class president. Also, his critical evaluation of the Choko transfers attests to his Japanese life style.

One may say that THY has a positive outlook on the Japanese domain because he has not really experienced the "real" world yet, which is filled with ethnic prejudices and discrimination. Nevertheless, THY has developed his life style, primarily because his experiences in the Japanese domain have been favorable or discrimination-free. The question of how his life style may change over time will remain to be seen as he enters the historically hostile milieu: for instance, employment in a Japanese company.

(3) AKC

AKC is a 24-year-old female born in Tokyo. Her father is from Che Ju Do, and her mother is Japanese. When she was small, her father had considered naturalization, but he rejected it because he was unable to resolve his long-standing hostility toward the Japanese. AKC states:

"I have gone to all Japanese schools including high school. During those years I could not decide if I was Korean or Japanese. My mother became a Korean national when she married my father, but I always felt half of me was still Japanese. I used my Japanese name at school and didn't want my Japanese peers to know that I was half-Korean. In my school, I had a special teacher who changed my mind completely. He was very understanding about Koreans and
our problems. One day, he started a discussion in class concerning Koreans and our problems. Then he encouraged me to speak up. So I did. To my surprise, there were three other Koreans in my class. I was completely unaware of that till that day. We talked about how difficult it was to deal with our identity issues. The whole class was silent but showed, it was obvious to me, much understanding. I didn't lose my Japanese friends, just because I turned out to be Korean. That was when I finally decided that I was Korean ... all Korean."

During her senior year at high school, AKC went to South Korea on an exchange program. There she learned the Korean language and Korean tradition. She was going to stay in Seoul for six months, which was the duration of the exchange program, but ended up staying longer on her own and enrolled herself in college. AKC states:

"I decided to get more education in Korean terms while I was still there. Everyday I felt like my identity was taking its shape, and I was very much encouraged by everything I experienced. At the same time, I met my future husband at the same college. We went out together for a few months and decided to get married. We heard no objections to our decision. In fact, my mother liked it."

AKC's significant experiences can be listed as follows: (1) she was confused about her ethnic identity because of mixed parentage; (2) she encountered the Japanese teacher who guided her to accept her Korean identity; (3) her acknowledgment of Korean identity was accepted by her Japanese peers; (4) she became so motivated that she went to South Korea to increase her ethnic awareness; (5) as her commitment to Korean identity was secured while in South Korea, she married a Korean; and (6) her marriage was
accepted by her Japanese mother.

AKC has learned that the Korean and the Japanese domains do not necessarily alienate each other when they are interpreted on personal terms. This realization primarily accounts for her acceptance of the Korean domain and Korean identity without necessarily rejecting the other domain. However, this initial realization still had to be authenticated. She went to South Korea and learned to speak Korean and to appreciate things Korean; she learned the Korean locus of interpretation there, outside of Japan. Finally, these experiences gave substance to her personal and ego identities.

Conclusions

A variety of second-generation life styles has been described in this chapter. The variations of life styles are derived from how the key concepts --- life style, ethnic identity, and locus of interpretation --- are conceptually arranged in terms of such factors as a particular school system, ethnic political allegiance, and extent of experience in an ethnic domain.

With regards to the mixed-school group, three life style variations may be suggested:

(1) the individual is socialized to adopt the Japanese locus of interpretation, but lacks its concurrent
ethnic identity, Japanese identity, because of his Korean heritage. He fails to manage the categorical boundaries between the Korean and the Japanese domains mainly because of his ill-defined identification with both domains. This variation is clearly reflected in CCH's and MTM's life styles. They are besieged by marginality. Marginality is likely to retard their personal interpretations of bicultural experiences. YNG's life style, discussed in Chapter Six, also discloses this variation;

(2) the individual clearly distinguishes the Korean domain from the Japanese domain and adopts the first as the source of his ethnic identity and interprets the second as alien, for instance, PIM and PAM, GGH, and SST; and

(3) the individual suspends issues pertaining to his ethnic identity and attempts to lead his life style according to a locus of interpretation which he knows best, namely, Japanese. ISJ's and KNT's life styles reflect this variation.

The mixed-school group members become deeply involved in two ethnic domains on the face-to-face level: the family and a Korean school, as the Korean domain, and the Japanese school, as the Japanese domain. They develop the Japanese locus of interpretation in conjunction with the Japanese domain, but fail to develop Japanese identity for two main reasons. One is the family or the Korean domain which informs them of Korean heritage, and the other the
Japanese domain which defines them as Koreans and, thus, alienates them.

Moreover, the role of the family is problematic. The parental influence on second-generation Koreans, insofar as my sample is concerned, is limited to a decision to send them to a Korean or Japanese school and to inform them of their Korean heritage. Korean parents have commonly failed to attract their children to their village and lineage networks which have ensured their survival in Japan.

On the other hand, second-generation Koreans attempt to discover meaning for themselves beyond the constraint of the family context. They generally interpret both Japan and Korea as two constituent parts of their life styles; they have to discover new strategies to accommodate their problems which their parents have not experienced.

Failure to manage the categorical distinction between the Korean and the Japanese domains is likely to lead second-generation Koreans to the first life style variation, which is unstable and marginal in its manifestations. Adoption of Korean identity and concurrent locus of interpretation is likely to lead them to the second life style variation, which is stable and is free from the problems of marginality. The third life style variation, although it is based on the adoption of the Japanese locus of interpretation, is precarious at best, because the individual has to suspend ethnic identity issues. The difference
between the first and the third variations is that the first discloses the individual's emotional and conceptual struggle with identity issues, and the third reveals little trace of such a struggle.

With regards to the Soren school group, there is one dominant pattern. Individuals adopt the Soren image of Korean social identity while lacking experiences in the Japanese domain. They later reassess their life styles to include the Japanese domain as an alternative domain in which they hope to expand their life chances.

One exception to this dominant pattern is MMK's avant garde life style, but he has been drawn back into the Korean domain because of his sense of family obligation.

The Soren school group's dominant pattern is similar to the second life style variation of the mixed-school group, but differs from the latter in two fundamental aspects. Their ethnic identity has been shaped in a tightly insulated Soren political milieu during all of their adolescent period. As they later realize that the Soren image of Korean social identity is incompatible with their intention to live in Japan, they begin to articulate their personal and ego identities apart from the Soren image.

This change in their interpretation occurred when they became of marriageable age and were pressed with issues of their economic welfare. They replaced their earlier allegiance to Soren with the alumni group and the five-family
group in order to strive for personal survival (see Patterson 1975; and Van den Berghe 1975). This change in their life styles discloses two phenomena: one is the degree of their maturation which removes them from the influence of their Soren-sympathizer-fathers; and the other is use of the first-generation strategy to organize into groups with those who share similar experiences and aspirations for survival in Japan.

In contrast, CSO's life style closely corresponds to the second life style variation of the mixed-school group. However, his dismissal of the Japanese domain as alien is reactionary and leaves an impression that his identification with Korea and Japan is ill-defined.

Change in interpretation for these Koreans of the Soren school group poses serious problems for Soren's organizational and ideological strength. The Soren school offers Korean youth a tightly insulated ideological milieu which is incompatible with life in Japan. Yet its organizational structure has failed to provide them with knowledge and skills for their economic welfare.

Hence, in the post-school stage, Soren graduates discard ideological affiliation in favor of rearranging their priorities, indicating a change in interpretation in order to pursue their life chances in Japan. What may be preventing them from structural assimilation is the persistence of Japanese prejudices and discrimination against
Koreans.

With regards to the Japanese school group, three life style variations may be suggested:

1. the individual encounters an identity and interpretive confusion, primarily because his adoption of the Japanese locus of interpretation is countered by the absence of Japanese identity, or his adoption of Korean identity is countered by the lack of the Korean locus of interpretation, e.g., KRW;

2. the individual develops a stable but evolving life style because he adopts both the Japanese locus of interpretation and Japanese identity and tends to discard Korean identity from his life style. He is likely to encounter problems because of his Korean heritage when he begins to have extensive economic involvement in Japanese society, e.g., THY (also see the Pak case in Chapter Two); and

3. the individual develops a stable and mature life style because she adopts both Korean identity and the Korean locus of interpretation, which are authenticated in South Korea, after years of struggle with her identity issues, e.g., AKC.

For Koreans of this school group, the family represents the Korean domain, but it does not seem to convey a strong message of being Korean to them. Hence, as they pass for Japanese in the Japanese school milieu, the stress on
being Korean decreases. Yet there arise three life style variations depending on how individuals define and interpret two ethnic identities and two loci of interpretation available to them.

The first life style variation of the Japanese school group is similar to the first life style variation of the mixed-school group because both variations lead individuals to experience marginality. Although the life experiences of CCH, MTM, and KRW are different, these variations, nevertheless, occur because they fail to manage the Korean and the Japanese domains as constituting two disparate categorical systems.

The second life style variation of the Japanese school group is an offshoot of the third life style variation of the mixed-school group. Their difference is that the second variation is not a marginal adaptation to the given milieu, only because the individual, THY, believes that his adoption of Japanese identity and the Japanese locus of interpretation is authentic. In other words, THY has made his adaptation in a sociocultural vacuum. Hence, his life style is likely to evolve in the direction of the third life style variation of the mixed-school group as he experiences the existing political and economic constraints set against Koreans in Japan.

Lastly, the third life style variation of the Japanese school group corresponds to the second life style vari-
ation of the mixed-school group and the dominant pattern of adaptation of the Soren school group. But the basic characteristics of adaptation regarding these three school groups disclose subtle differences.

Three basic differences have been suggested throughout this chapter:

(1) when the individual's experiences involve both Soren and Japanese schools he is likely to develop a marginal lifestyle. This is because Soren's ideology is incompatible with Japanese political and economic conditions. The individual's understanding of the Soren image of Korean social identity is in direct conflict with his appreciation of the Japanese domain cultivated in the Japanese school milieu;

(2) when his experiences involve both Mindan and Japanese schools, he is unlikely to develop a marginal lifestyle because Mindan's ideology is compatible with Japanese society and because South Korea as the immediate source of identity authentication is accessible to him. In contrast, North Korea is both politically and geographically inaccessible to those who may wish to authenticate the Soren image of Korean social identity;

(3) when his experiences are limited to the Soren milieu, he adopts the Soren image of Korean social identity. His lifestyle, in consequence, is stable. However, he is, in time, forced to dissociate himself from that identity in
favor of making an economic adjustment to the Japanese domain.

In contrast to the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans, the second-generation Koreans are confronted with the formidable task of struggling with their identity and interpretive issues in Japan. The first two groups of Koreans have been spared the struggle with this task for two basic reasons: (1) their primary socialization experiences in Che Ju Do have helped them articulate their Korean personal and ego identities and Korean locus of interpretation in Japan, which, as a result, permits them to distinguish and manage the social boundaries between the Korean and the Japanese domains; and (2) they have concentrated on their initial goal of migration to make a decent life, if not a prosperous one, in Japan.

In general, the second-generation Koreans lack the primary identification with Korea; their primary identification is with Japan. Koreans of the Soren school group are exceptions to this rule because their primary identification lies in Soren as the Korean domain existing outside of their family domain. When they abandon Soren, they create another Korean domain --- the alumni group and the five-family group --- the adaptation process of which is similar to that of the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans.

As to the other two school groups, the ethnic domain existing outside of the family domain is the Japanese
domain. As the case studies of these two school groups reveal, the Japanese domain proves to affect them much more than the Korean family domain and Korean schools which Koreans of the mixed-school group have briefly attended. Koreans of these two school groups struggle for self-definition: some have been more fortunate than others.

For instance, PIM and PAM brothers have clearly defined their life styles as Korean largely due to their Mindan-activist father's influence, and their self-definitions were authenticated in South Korea. AKC struggled hard to reach a self-definition which was also authenticated in South Korea.

Nevertheless, there is a breakdown of communication between the first-generation parents and the second-generation children: their primary socialization experiences, interpretations of ethnic discrimination, conceptions of ethnic domains, aspirations, and adaptive strategies are very different. Furthermore, the second-generation life styles vary depending on what school or what combination of schools that the second-generation Koreans attend.

In sum, the task of sorting out identity and interpretive categories in the bicultural milieu has, in general, retarded the second-generation's life opportunities. Ethnic discrimination and politicoeconomic constraints existing in Japan are persistent obstacles.
Note: [1]. These authors have been extremely popular among Japanese college students since the beginning of the Meiji period, largely because their works are concerned with personal identity and freedom issues.
CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has been concerned with the variations of Korean life styles in Tokyo, Japan. The subjects' cultural referent is Che Ju Do, an island located off the southwest coast of South Korea. They are classified into three groups in my sample: the first-generation, the second-generation, and the recent migrant groups. They now live in a few neighboring wards of Tokyo.

My study is preceded by the Japanese anthropologist Seiichi Izumi's pioneering work (1966). His study was basically ethnographic and was conducted in 1951 on Che Ju Do Koreans in the "X-ward" of Tokyo, covering some of the same areas investigated in my study. I initially assumed that Izumi's study must have covered some of my sample of Koreans. But none of the Koreans whom I actually interviewed mentioned an encounter with Izumi or his associates. Nevertheless, his information generally supports my field data presented in Chapter Four, regarding locations of residence, types of occupations, school preference for offspring, and
views on the Japanese.

The contribution of my study in comparison to Izumi's is my stress on the second-generation Koreans who were all born in Tokyo, and, secondarily, on the recent migrant Koreans. Hence, my study is a complementary follow-up of Izumi's study in the area of sociocultural change among Koreans in Tokyo, Japan.

The theoretical perspective, discussed in Chapter Two, is based on six core concepts: life style, locus of interpretation, ethnic identity, passing as a type of assimilation, marginality, and living in a bicultural milieu. Variations of life styles are discovered in terms of individual Koreans' interpretations of particular situations as reflected in their self-accounts and behavior (see Thomas 1951; Mead 1934; Becker 1966; Blumer 1937, 1962, and 1969; A. Strauss 1959; and Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin 1975).

Three basic discoveries have been made: (1) the adoption of a particular ethnic identity and its concurrent locus of interpretation is related to a particular interpretation of passing and the experience of marginality; (2) the second-generation life styles are the most variable because they are likely to be subject to marginality, a situation generated by an ill-defined identification with both Japan and Korea --- the bicultural upbringing; and (3) the first-generation and the recent migrant life styles are much less variable and show stability because they are structured
around a clear Korean identity and Korean locus of interpretation, situations which are free from marginality.

Korean life styles vary according to how these core concepts are interrelated with one another. Explaining such conceptual interrelationships in the given empirical context leads to an exploratory study of the subject matter in the spirit of the generation of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967 and 1970). Data collection and data analysis are contiguously carried out, so that theoretical statements can be made relevant to the empirical context without being divorced from the intellectual endeavor (Glaser and Strauss 1970:288).

Regarding my subject matter, I was primarily interested in describing the life style variations of the three groups of Koreans: the first-generation, the second-generation and the recent migrant groups. In doing so, my role as a member of the second-generation group had to be part of my study. In Chapters One and Seven, I have presented the implications of my role as a native anthropologist in relation to the other Koreans.

My role as a native has clearly influenced the direction of this dissertation: stressing the core concepts mentioned above and discovering the life style variations of Koreans. Going into the field, I had envisaged such concepts as ethnic identity, ethnic discrimination, bicultural milieu upbringing, and passing as conceptual tools to organize my
data gathering and analysis.

These initial concepts had been of some use for me in understanding my ethnic experiences as a Korean in Japan (S. Kim 1974). My adolescent days in Tokyo had been pre-occupied with an ethnic identity conflict, which I conclude now was a manifestation of my marginal identification with Japan and Korea. In the field and in my contiguous analysis, as I have discovered that my initial concepts were as problematic to most Koreans as they were to me, new concepts emerged: life style, ethnic locus of interpretation, and marginality.

Regarding the concept of ethnicity, its intrinsic relationship to the other core concepts leads us to conceptualize it in a variety of ways. Hence, rather than stressing the concept of ethnicity as an all-embracing concept, which is the dominant approach taken by the authors reviewed in Chapter Two, I have stressed the personal meaning that ethnicity might have for individuals: stressing both "instrumental" and "expressive" motives (De Vos 1975; De Vos and Lee 1981c; Bell 1975; and Glazer and Moynihan 1975).

However, the personal meaning of ethnicity must not be approached out of context. I was interested in understanding the intersection between the "personal troubles of milieu" and the "public issues of social structure" (Mills 1959).
In Chapters Three and Four, I have described the historical, political, economic, and sociocultural milieu of Koreans in Japan; an endeavor to disclose the Koreans' "public issues of social structure" (Mills 1959). For instance, the long historical relationship between the Korean and the Japanese populations has involved both close genetic and cultural exchanges. Instead of developing a single concept of ethnicity for both populations, there emerged prejudicial views regarding Koreans among the Japanese as such views were formally articulated by Kokugaku scholars of the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). Their views had ideologically and politically prepared later Japanese thinkers and political and business leaders for Japan's political supremacy over Korea (see Hatada 1969; Pak 1973; and Iwamura 1972).

The decisive historical event came in 1910 when Japan finally annexed Korea. From this time on, the ethnic hierarchy which places the Japanese in a superior position over the Koreans was firmly embedded in the minds of the Japanese. Under Japan's colonial rule the Koreans were forced to react to the ethnic hierarchy as subordinates. The Korean subordination took a form of class exploitation as the Koreans in Korea lost land as well as the means of production and administration to the Japanese. At the same time large numbers of Koreans migrated to Japan to fill the lowest socioeconomic status (see Pak 1973; and Iwamura 1972).
Japan's colonialism showed its most vicious expression upon Koreans when a large number of Koreans were forced to move to Japan only to work under most inhumane conditions. The end of the forced labor was possible only with Japan's defeat in World War II (see Pak 1973; Iwamura 1972; and Fujishima 1976).

According to De Vos and Lee (1981c), class exploitation alone may not explain the present Korean problems in Japan. They state that the "racist-caste thinking of a type peculiar to the Japanese," an expression of the Japanese national conviction of "racial purity," may be more responsible for generating and maintaining the "present plight of Koreans" in Japan (Ibid.:358).

In short, the class exploitation is a manifestation of the Japanese "racist-caste thinking." This is why the modes of passing become important; Koreans must pass for Japanese to fit in Japanese society, and they have to interpret their modes of passing to fit their life styles.

De Vos and Lee (1981c:367, 376) contend that passing necessarily involves a denial of one's own ethnic background and a "dilemma of integrity." My data and analysis, however, show a different interpretation of passing. For instance, the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans of my sample interpret passing for Japanese as an instrumental passing. This mode of passing allows them to maintain their Korean identities while disguising themselves as Japanese.
Hence, it is unlikely to generate marginal life styles among these Koreans. However, the second-generation Koreans, who were born in Japan, interpret passing as a permanent passing. This mode of passing discloses their ill-defined identification with both Korea and Japan in their attempt to be incorporated into Japanese society, while the society has historically excluded them. Hence, this mode is likely to generate marginal life styles among these Koreans. Koreans in Japan today are confronted with such a legacy, and the animosity between the two groups of people cannot be understood without reference to it.

Moreover, political developments since the end of World War II have generated conditions for an increased animosity between Koreans and the Japanese in Japan. For instance, the Japanese government has tacitly adopted the divide-and-rule strategies regarding Koreans in Japan: (1) the Japanese government defines Koreans as aliens and allows the two ideologically antagonistic Korean political organizations --- Soren (the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan/Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai) and Mindan (the South Korean Resident Association in Japan/Zainichi Daikanminkoku Kyoryu Mindan) --- to exist (Lee 1971); and (2) it condones in practice employment discrimination against Koreans in the general labor market and, by law, prohibits non-Japanese citizens from taking jobs in public institutions, including public schools (Rohlen 1981:201).
The first strategy, in consequence, alienates Koreans from the Japanese because the existing Korean political organizations insist on Korean ethnic distinctiveness and the Japanese government simply feeds into this situation by defining the Koreans as a group of aliens. However, Mindan has been changing since the late 1970s. For instance, Mindan has been active or instrumental in working to publish school textbooks for Japanese schools with Korean ethnic studies programs (Wagatsuma 1981). New goals are aimed at promoting an end to employment discrimination on the local (the Kansai/Osaka area) government level (Rohlen 1981), and adapting the Mindan education policy to Korean life in Japan (Lee 1981f). According to my informants (see Chapter Seven), Soren has also promoted a shift in its policy to accommodate Koreans needs in Japan, but little change has actually occurred.

The second strategy of employment discrimination perpetuates the lower class status of the Koreans in Japan, and their status reinforces the general Japanese prejudices against them (see Iwamura 1972; Sato and Wada 1974; and Rohlen 1981).

However, the Pak case, described in Chapter Two, reveals a change in the area of human rights for Koreans. Pak actually won an ethnic discrimination case against the giant company Hitachi. Vigorous support of Japanese intellectuals and teachers in this and other Korean matters has
been growing with some significant results. Their support was extended to Soren University in Tokyo for its landmark accreditation in 1968 (Lee 1981f; and also see Rohlen 1981; and Sato and Wada 1974).

Pak's victory was, in fact, short-lived: he rejected the employment because of his and other Koreans' persistent belief, historically founded, that Koreans would be most unlikely to prosper in a Japanese company. Many case studies, described in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, attest to this belief.

Human rights protection for Koreans upheld by the Japanese court system is clearly a giant step forward to change the mutual animosity between Koreans and the Japanese in Japan, especially the Japanese "racist-caste thinking" (De Vos and Lee 1981c). However, this alone is insufficient to change the historical current.

Rohlen (1981) states that the pressure of labor shortage in the early 1960s to early 1970s made it possible for Koreans to gain employment in Japanese companies, but their employment was characterized by low-pay, poor working conditions, and less than average education (high school or less). Hence, their employment opportunities could not constitute Korean upward mobility in Japanese society. Jobs requiring university education still remain closed to Koreans because competition is most manifest in such jobs and Japanese employers are likely to hire Japanese (see Chapters
Five, Six, and Seven).

Nevertheless, Koreans in Japan have made some significant gains in the area of employment discrimination in recent years. Japanese society under pressure, such as labor shortage, anti-employment discrimination movements by concerned Japanese and Koreans, and a growing Korean population that is thoroughly culturally assimilated, may have begun a novel process of becoming a pluralist Japan (see Rohlen 1981; and De Vos and Lee 1981c). An inquiry into on-the-job discrimination against Koreans in Japanese companies will prove to be a significant area and will complement the legal gains that Koreans have made in Japan's employment structure.

A wholesale employment discrimination against Koreans in Japan is a post-World War II phenomenon. Until the end of World War II, Koreans were eagerly sought out by Japanese employers for their cheap labor. In the post-War era Koreans have become alienated from employment as Japanese from overseas returned to Japan to replace Koreans in the labor market. Discrimination continued as the Japanese subsequently renewed nationalism —- ("We, the Japanese") —- in a single-minded determination to compete with American and Western European economies (see Reischauer 1977; Dore 1973; Rohlen 1974; Cole 1971; Vogel 1979; and Hobsbawm 1975).
Consequently, Koreans in Japan have been forced to become self-sufficient since the end of World War II. For instance, Izumi's study (1966) shows that 77% of the Che Ju Do Koreans living in the "X-ward", as of 1951, were engaged in small-scale manufacturing industries. They were family-based cottage industries. Although this figure has declined in reference to my sample of Koreans investigated in 1976, those who were once engaged in such occupations have diversified into other small businesses, such as money lending, restaurant, entertainment and service businesses.

In sum, Koreans in the post-War era have entered the paths of occupations which predominantly depend on themselves for survival. This situation has oriented them toward a Korean ethnic consolidation which is defined by (1) their articulation of Korean personal and ego identities and the Korean locus of interpretation grounded in Che Ju Do as a symbol, and (2) the mode of passing as an instrumental passing. Their survival strategies have, however, increased odds against their structural assimilation into Japanese society. Furthermore, they have alienated the second-generation Koreans. For instance, young Koreans generally stay away from their parental achievements, such as the continuity of chesa, kinship network including relatives in Che Ju Do, the urban association, the friendship groups, and the ethnic businesses. This is because the second-generation Koreans are oriented toward searching for their self-
definitions grounded in Japan.

The post-War experiences of the first-generation Koreans have been instrumental in shaping their life styles (see Chapter Five). Their life styles generally are based on their novel articulation of Korean personal and ego identities, the Korean locus of interpretation, and the mode of passing as an instrumental passing. Their articulation is a result of their expressive reactions to alien status and employment discrimination, and of their allegiance to their native island, Che Ju Do, but not to South Korea as a nation-state. Given their self-articulation, they clearly see the Japanese domain as alien and Korean social identity as a product of the Japanese domain and thus inauthentic. It is their self-articulation that makes it unlikely for them to experience marginality.

The experiences of Japanese- and Chinese-Americans in American society have been similar to those of the Koreans in Japan in that they have been forced into ethnic-dependent small businesses in their respective alien societies. They have, however, taken historically different routes. Japanese- and Chinese-Americans had been forced into small businesses primarily because of racial discrimination in the early stages of their migration between the 1870s and the 1920s. They proved, however, to be more than willing to leave these small businesses for salaried white-collar occupations as citizenship and employment opportunities for such
occupations have become available to them since World War II (Light 1972; and Handlin 1959).

However, Koreans in Japan have experienced a reverse historical process. They have been forced into and entrapped in ethnic-dependent small businesses as they lost Japanese nationality at the end of World War II. Hence, they have been effectively cut off from employment opportunities in the Japanese labor market, and their persistent alienation from Japanese society has set in.

Under these circumstances, the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans in Japan today consider their passing for Japanese a necessary, but instrumental, strategy for survival; members of an alienated ethnic group are induced to disguise themselves as those of the dominant society for economic ends, but without hope of upward mobility within the dominant social structure. Hence, these Koreans interpret passing simply as a survival strategy which will not bring them structural assimilation (see De Vos and Lee 1981c). Their mode of passing does not generate marginality or self-hate and self-doubt (see Wagatsuma 1981), because it is compensated for by their identification with their native island. Unlike De Vos and Lee (1981c:372), my data and analysis show that passing, when interpreted as an instrumental passing, does not categorically deny one's ethnic background.
Their meaning of passing is different from, for instance, the meaning attributed to passing by the ethnic groups in Peru (Van den Berghe 1975) and in Jamaica and Guyana (Patterson 1975). These groups interpret passing as a means of upward social mobility, because they have been incorporated into the indigenous political and economic systems. Hence, the blockage of Koreans from Japanese political and economic systems is a crucial problem affecting their life styles. Their lack of Japanese citizenship is a major obstacle (also see De Vos and Lee 1981c).

In the case of other disadvantaged minority groups in Japan, such as the Eta who are Japanese citizens, employment discrimination has persisted because the Eta are excluded from the Japanese concept of racial purity (see Waga-tsuma 1966; and 1981). Here again, the Japanese "racist-caste thinking" (De Vos and Lee 1981c) poses as a major source of structural blockage against all other than the Japanese.

In this light, Japanese citizenship may be regarded as a tool for ethnic exclusion, and naturalized Japanese citizens may not be accepted as "true Japanese" by the Japanese. Also, Koreans themselves still reserve a deep-seated suspicion towards naturalized Koreans for their disavowal of ethnic allegiance and their tacit acceptance of Japanese prejudice. For instance, those naturalized Koreans in my sample have had to pass for Koreans among other Koreans.
Other naturalized Koreans in Japan have organized voluntary groups, such as the Seiwa Club, to combat heavy sanctions aimed against them by the Japanese and Koreans. For instance, they employ one another and intermarry (see De Vos and Lee 1981a and 1981c).

The trend that the majority of Korean children are attending Japanese schools, about three-fourths of the Korean population and more than half of the school-age Koreans of my sample, clearly demonstrates the weakening influence of Soren and Mindan and the inevitability of cultural assimilation (see Chapter Four; and also see Rohlen 1981). In response, Mindan has been changing since the late 1970s (Lee 1981f) to accommodate Korean needs to live in Japan.

According to Rohlen (1981), the future of Koreans in Japan is likely to take "centrist positions." They are: (1) independent of Mindan (or South Korea) and Soren (or North Korea); (2) principally concerned with accommodating Korean residents to live in a pluralist Japan where Korean ethnicity is a political asset; and (3) a perspective held by Japanese intellectuals and teachers (Ibid.:215). A centrist position seems a viable alternative to those Koreans of my sample, whose life styles are marginal. They are marginal because they are unable to adopt either Korean identity or Japanese identity.
The centrist position, in theory, resolves marginality because Korean ethnicity is elevated to be a political tool, rather than a personal-identity trap, especially for those Koreans born in Japan. However, in practice, this position resolves only a part of the marginality problem because the main point of this position hinges on a changing Japan becoming a pluralist society. A pluralist Japan is a society where Koreans maintain Korean ethnicity, but are treated as equal to the Japanese regarding full political and economic participation.

Put in another way, the centrist position endorses the Japanese political participation in discarding their prejudices and discrimination against Koreans, or their "racist-caste thinking" (De Vos and Lee 1981c), and incorporating them into Japanese society by changing its structure.

The centrist position may prove to be a significant area for further study. However, Japan has been structurally most resistant to incorporating non-Japanese residents, despite its multiracial and multicultural history (see Chapter Three; De Vos and Lee 1981a and 1981c; and Wetherall 1981). This is evident in the data presented throughout this dissertation with the exception of a few cases: e.g., the Pak case and Korean ethnic studies programs at some Japanese schools. To survive in Japan, Koreans, in general, have had to devise strategies for making a living, for instance,
Passing as a survival strategy is one property of Korean ethnic identity and is intrinsically related to another concept, the locus of interpretation. For instance, the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans have distinguished themselves as Koreans by articulating the Korean locus of interpretation in Japan. This is a significant development in the process of their adaptation to the hostile bicultural milieu, because the Korean locus of interpretation allows them to interpret passing as an instrumental strategy, but not as a strategy to be identified with Japan.

Furthermore, their Korean locus of interpretation is consistently supported by their further articulation of personal and ego identities attached to the native island, Che Ju Do, as a symbol. The conceptual consistency of the Korean locus of interpretation and Korean personal and ego identities is exemplified in the continuity of chesa and kinship networks with relatives in Che Ju Do, the urban association, and friendship groups. As a result, the life styles of the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans tend to be stable and to be free from marginality in the discriminatory alien society.

De Vos and Lee (1981c:369, 371) stress Korean individualism and relative lack of group loyalty as elements which make them "more individualistically competitive than
cooperative" and which the Japanese perceive as aggressive. However applicable these assertions may be to the Korean population in Japan, my first-generation sample shows a different mode of adaptation. For the first-generation Koreans, the continuity of traditional rituals, such as chesa, marriage, and funerals, and the participation in the urban association and various friendship groups have helped them cope with discrimination. Moreover, their identification with the native island, not with a Korea, has given them a persistent sense of belongingness.

With regards to the recent migrant Koreans (see Chapter Six), it is clear from their case studies that the first-generation life styles could be repeated under different socioeconomic conditions. The recent migrant Koreans entered Japan at the time of economic prosperity. Consequently, the speed of their economic success has been faster than among the first-generation Koreans. They have also taken advantage of the existing network based on chesa and the urban association to foster their entrepreneurial activities. Moreover, they have in recent years taken over the main functions of these institutions.

Five factors for the recent migrant Koreans' successful adaptation to urban life in Japan have been cited: (1) they came to Japan to achieve their initial goal of economic success; (2) they came to Japan at the time of economic prosperity; (3) they adopted the existing network of
The experiences of the first-generation Koreans involve the first and the fourth factors, but the other factors are specific to the recent migrant Koreans' experiences. Yet both groups have developed very similar life styles, although their respective historical and socio-economic conditions are dissimilar. One overwhelming factor, which accounts for the basic similarity of their life styles, is partly implicit in the fourth factor: having experienced ethnic discrimination in Japan, they have articulated their native island's cultural resources and have developed primordial sentiments toward the island. The result is the conceptual consistency of the Korean locus of interpretation and Korean personal and ego identities, as opposed to Korean social identity.

With regards to the successful adaptation of the majority of the first-generation Koreans, it is undoubtedly true that their past experiences of close contacts with Japanese in Japan had prepared them for developing their life styles. When they became alienated from the Japanese labor market at the end of World War II, they quickly explored a number of alternative means for survival as entrepreneurs. Their entrepreneurial success would not have
been possible without their previous experiences of close contacts with Japanese. In other words, the first-generation Koreans have acquired the most valuable human resources, that is, knowledge of the Japanese language and of how to relate to Japanese on a face-to-face level under openly prejudicial socioeconomic conditions.

Korean parents have characteristically failed to communicate their valuable experiences to their offspring, the second-generation Koreans, regarding their strategies of survival as Koreans in Japan. In terms of their data and analysis, De Vos and Lee (1981c:375) state that the Korean "family is not a haven but a place of alienation" because of the family disorganization generated by ethnic discrimination: juvenile deviancy, criminality, a disruption of male authority, and apathy. However, in terms of my data and analysis, the same conclusion can be drawn from different reasons.

They are: (1) the Korean parents have in recent years overprotected their offspring by sending them to Korean schools where no ethnic prejudices exist, or to Japanese schools where they are called by Japanese names, thus, experiencing no ethnic prejudices, but creating conditions for anxiety for the Korean youths (see Chapters Five and Seven); (2) the parents show increasing signs of cultural assimilation, speaking Japanese exclusively at home, the ease with which they can relate to Japanese, and
enjoying Japanese cultural and social events, however, their life styles can still be described as fundamentally Korean (see Chapter Five); (3) the second-generation Koreans are in fact culturally Japanese and wish a full participation in Japanese society (see Chapter Seven); and, consequently, (4) what the parental generation can offer --- (Korean personal and ego identities, the Korean locus of interpretation, and the instrumental passing all intertwined with Che Ju Do as a symbol as well as with such institutions as chesa, kinship networks, the urban association, and the friendship groups) --- fails to attract the second-generation Koreans.

Hence, the concerned Korean parents have unwittingly denied their offspring potentially valuable personal experiences to develop their own personal strategies in more direct confrontation with ethnic discrimination and bicultural upbringing. Such socialization experiences of the second-generation Koreans are partly responsible for generating a second property of Korean ethnicity: passing for Japanese as a means to be accepted in Japanese society, thus permanent passing.

Issues pertaining to a locus of interpretation and concurrent ethnic identity pose a different set of problems for the second-generation Koreans (see Chapter Seven). Their life styles have been subject since birth to the bicultural milieu. They tend to interpret this milieu as conflict-inducing, a conflict between the Korean and the Japanese
domains.

For instance, their attempt to identify themselves with both domains is likely to lead them to develop marginal life styles. This is because the sociopolitical nature of the two domains is mutually exclusive. Therefore, individuals cannot be members of both domains at the same time (see Wagatsuma 1981). The young Korean Pak's experience cited in Chapter Two is an example, and many case studies described in Chapter Seven attest to this problem. Furthermore, unlike the other two groups of Koreans, the second-generation Koreans' socialization experiences are complicated by the availability of three educational systems --- Soren, Mindan, and Japanese.

In recent years, a number of factors have contributed to the politicization of the Korean ethnic minority, especially, the second-generation Koreans. The liberation of Koreans from Japanese domination at the end of World War II generated political movements on behalf of Koreans in Japan: Choren (the Korean Resident League in Japan/Zainichi Chosenjin Renmei), a welfare-oriented organization, which later split up into two opposing factions, Soren and Mindan. The Cold War and the Korean War reinforced the schism between Soren and Mindan, thus, of the Korean population in Japan. The potential for Koreans' political power in Japan has consequently been reduced to the point that Koreans as a group have become impotent to combat discrimination in the
Japanese labor market (Lee 1981e): the Pak case shows a significant change in this trend.

Furthermore, the persistence of Korean social identity propagated by both Soren and Mindan has contributed to the traditional animosity between Koreans and the Japanese in Japan. The second-generation Koreans without cultural resources to identify themselves with their fathers' native island have become subject to such a political milieu in a variety of ways.

The area of education for the second-generation Koreans reveals the immediate impact of the political milieu. Each of the three available educational systems, Soren, Mindan, and Japanese, in varying degrees posits problems.

For instance, because of its communist ideology, the Soren school system alienates Koreans from Japanese society. The Mindan system, although its ideology is compatible with that of Japanese society, is still at odds with Japanese society because it is, after all, Korean; thus, generating an alienating factor. And the Japanese school system does not inform Koreans of their ethnic heritage and tends to increase anxiety among Korean students regarding their ethnic identity issues; thus, creating conditions for marginality. In other words, each educational system does not provide Koreans with information which reduces the cleavage between the Korean and the Japanese domains. Hence,
each educational system proves, for the second-generation Koreans, to be the source of uncertainties for ethnic self-definition.

In recent years, some significant changes have been manifested in Korean education. Mindan now seems to be committed to developing a niche in which it can work with Koreans toward the goal of living in Japan: this policy features supporting a fifty-hour Korean ethnic studies program in Japanese schools, planning to publish textbooks for the ethnic studies, and working to end employment discrimination against Koreans. Japanese intellectuals and teachers initiate, support, and implement these changes (see Wagatsuma 1981; Rohlen 1981; and Lee 1981f).

Nevertheless, the second-generation Koreans' attempt to search for and adopt a particular locus of interpretation and concurrent ethnic identity inevitably involves struggles with ethnic uncertainties. A study of their involvements in each or combination of the three educational systems reveals immediate impacts on their varying life styles.

Three basic differences have been suggested in Chapter Seven:

First, the combination of Soren and Japanese schooling is likely to generate unstable life styles because Soren's ideological education is incompatible with Japanese political and economic conditions. Also Soren's image of Korean social identity is in direct conflict with the Korean
student's growing appreciation of Japanese society.

Second, the combination of Mindan and Japanese schooling is likely to generate stable life styles because Mindan's ideology is compatible with Japanese society and South Korea as the immediate source of identity authentication is accessible. In contrast, North Korea is both politically and geographically inaccessible to Koreans who may wish to authenticate the Soren image of Korean social identity.

And lastly, Soren schooling alone is likely to foster a stable life style because there is a congruity between a Korean locus of interpretation and Korean social identity in the Soren image. However, when this congruity is tested against the reality of making a living in Japanese society, as occurs to Koreans of marriageable age, they tend to depart from the narrow constraints of the Soren domain and to adapt their life styles to Japanese society.

The crux of the second-generation Koreans' identity issues involves the concept of authenticity. I have stated that both the first-generation and the recent migrant Koreans possess an authentic Korean (personal and ego) identity. Their identity is a result of their struggle to survive in Japan, and its locus is primordially attached to their native South Korean island, Che Ju Do, a cultural symbol. They have maintained their traditional customs and rituals, most notably chesa, the urban association, and the various
friendship groups, and have become moderately successful in small but ethnic-dependent businesses. These are strategies which they have developed as they have adapted to the discriminatory Japanese milieu.

Such survival strategies and Che Ju Do as a cultural symbol do not constitute the second-generation life styles. To them, Che Ju Do is an existentially alien island; the first-generation adaptive strategies, which hinge on their identification with the island, thus, are alien. However, Japan, about which the second-generation Koreans have so many existential experiences and sentiments, does not embrace them in open invitation. Japan, which might have been their locus of interpretation and the source of authentic identity, is by political definition alien. Hence, they are left with a third alternative, that is, Korean social identity. Yet what is being offered is political and ideological, but inauthentic. Such a bicultural upbringing tends to foster conditions for marginality.

What is needed for culturally-assimilated Koreans may be a new definition of Korean social identity, a definition free from Korea and political manipulation and, at the same time, indigenous to Japan. In this regard, Rohlen (1981) notices a growing and promising trend among young Koreans, especially those with Japanese university education. He states that the "anti-government, pro-South Korean group" of Koreans is "most dynamic" on Japanese university
campuses today and that various "centrist positions," stressing independence of Koreans as separate from the struggle between North Korean/Soren and South Korea/Mindan, are emerging. Rohlen stresses: "The direct links to Korea are less important now, but Korean ethnicity, as a means to foster pluralism in Japan, has become more important" (1981: 215).

If centrist positions succeed, a new definition of Korean social identity will be free from the old concept of authenticity, as used in this dissertation. A new Korean social identity will be authentic, for it will and must be rooted in Japan and it can accommodate the Japanese locus of interpretation which is a predominant orientation among those Koreans born in Japan. In this context passing and marginality will likely lose their significance in shaping Korean life styles. If such a trend persists, attempts at ethnic education practiced by Soren and Mindan and at ethnic studies practiced at some Japanese schools are likely to fail (see De Vos and Lee 1981c; Rohlen 1981; and Lee 1981f).

Nevertheless, insofar as the sample of this dissertation is concerned, some second-generation Koreans have finally come to terms with their sociocultural conditions as they have adopted the Korean locus of interpretation and concurrent ethnic identity. The characteristic pattern established by these Koreans is to discover differences between the Korean and the Japanese domains and to adopt the
Korean domain as constituting their life styles. It seems instructive that some of these Koreans have finally authenticated their life styles in South Korea.

Those who have trodden into a dangerous territory crisscrossing the two conflictual domains, Korean and Japanese, have been hurt. They were neither knowledgeable nor skilled in this tough road, which had in the past trained their parents. What is missing may be the imparting and continuity of practical knowledge and skill from one generation to the next. Yet it is ironical that the recent migrant Koreans have taken advantage of this situation by adopting the first-generation strategies. They are single-mindedly determined to succeed as their predecessors have succeeded. They are authentic Koreans in Japan today, probably more authentic than the first-generation Koreans who have been losing fluency in their native language as well as traditional knowledge and ritual skills. This predetermined sense of authenticity is generally absent among the second-generation Koreans. Only a few in my sample have achieved this goal, because they have confronted their existential issues of ethnic identity and have determined their life styles in spite of adverse conditions. As to the rest of the second-generation Koreans, a conceptual limbo continues to surround them.
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