

PEASANT WOMEN IN MALAYSIA'S
INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS

RECIPROCITY AND EXPLOITATION

PEASANT WOMEN IN MALAYSIA'S INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS

By

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ABSTRACT

The case of Malaysia as an industrializing country is contrary to the predictions of world systems theory. The ethnic imperatives of the state's New Economic Policy has necessitated the successful manipulation, and accumulation, of foreign and domestic capital for the economic development process. Although Malaysia enjoys an impressive rate of growth, the way in which the benefits are allocated by the state elite has resulted in the increased economic inequality of the labour force. The fact that development is taking place is partly the result of the 'exploitation' of the labour force which, in Malaysia's development process, remains rooted firmly in, and dependent upon, the non-valorised 'reciprocal' labour of kin. Exploitation and reciprocity are developed as a conceptual framework within which the field data is analyzed.

The dissertation examines the way in which reciprocity - a multidimensional phenomenon - is utilised at different levels of Malaysia's development process. Reciprocal obligations link peasant households to the production processes of state and foreign capital. The study draws

particular attention to the position of young Malay women who work in transnational corporations producing goods for international markets and in household subsistence production. The gender specific nature of Malaysia's industrial labour force dictates that it receives few benefits from state prosperity. The way in which the work force survives by 'occupational multiplicity' in the interstices of industrial wage labour, 'reciprocity' and subsistence production, forms the theoretical and empirical focus of the dissertation. Malaysia's new semiproletariat sustain themselves and their households in subsistence production by an amalgamation of intra and inter household reciprocity. In this way their non valorised labour contributes to the State's New Economic Policy.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to conceptualise theoretically, and show empirically, the way in which reciprocity - a multidimensional phenomenon - is utilised at several levels in Malaysia's industrialization process. The study analyzes the complex nature of reciprocity and the way it is transformed by state and foreign capital, by domestic entrepreneurs, and the way in which Malay peasants mediate these changes.

All Southeast Asian cultures embody the ethic of reciprocity and most anthropological studies of the region report upon it. Since reciprocity itself is multifaceted, I examine the way it fares in relation to Malaysian development where peasants are involved in reciprocal relations which link them to state and international capital. The study draws specific attention to the position of young Malay women who work in transnational corporations producing goods for international markets, in petty hawking, subsistence food production, cash cropping, as well as in household maintenance. The factor which coalesces such occupational multiplicity is that of reciprocity. Malaysia's new semi-proletariat sustain

themselves, and help their households in subsistence production by an amalgamation of intra and inter household reciprocal dues. In this way, their non-valorised labour contributes to the state's New Economic Policy.

Women are a crucial part of the industrial work force the Malaysian state is using to fulfill the promise of its New Economic Policy, which is to uplift Malays from the colonial legacy of economic disparities among ethnic groups. In the northern state of Kedah, the development of rural areas is transforming peasant girls of the country's "rice bowl" into industrial workers without the necessity of migration from their natal villages. Thus, an industrial labour force which is class, gender and age specific, as well as ethnically distinct, is being created in the heart of a rural subsistence area.

Since the mid 1970s, in line with regional development plans, transnational corporations have been encouraged by Federal and State authorities to locate in peripheral rural zones; the effect of this new pattern in Kedah has not previously been recorded. By utilising female peasant labour in situ, factories can pay cheaper wages, earn higher profits, and avoid responsibility for the social problems now associated with the free trade zones. Research shows that Malaysia's labour laws and legislation operate

to the benefit of transnational corporations who avoid paying assembly line workers unemployment, sickness, old age security or holiday benefits. Unions are restricted in free trade zones and rural development areas; it is argued, by the state, that workers would be manipulated by union leaders and this would be detrimental to both workers and to the state's interests by causing the withdrawal of capital. Reports on the free trade zones indicates that work production levels are set high, discipline is strict, and occupational diseases are common.

Women from the research village, although firmly ensconced in subsistence production, commute a distance of eighteen miles daily to work in south Kedah's new industrial centre at Sungei Petani. There they are employed on the assembly lines of transnational corporations owned by state and foreign capital. This process has formed a semiproletariat whose members are active participants in both subsistence production and industrial wage labour. Their wages are too meagre to enable them to migrate so that they, and their households, subsist by the non-valorised reciprocal labour of kin. The phenomenon of paying wages lower than reproduction costs is referred to in the recent Marxist literature as superexploitation. The semiproletariat, in order to survive, must remain dependent upon the reciprocity of kin.

The main occupation of Kedah peasants who live outside of the Muda padi-irrigation scheme is to follow the agricultural cycle on tiny plots of land as owners, renters, or sharecroppers. In the research area villagers work as tappers in rubber smallholdings, and in wet rice fields (single cropping), which double as tobacco land during the hot, dry season. Given the Islamic law of inheritance which fragments landholdings to minute proportions, land cannot provide sufficient income for households. To earn their living villagers practice combinations of agricultural work in padi, rubber, tobacco, trading, hawking, and fishing: the labour is paid for by cash, kind, or reciprocal labour dues. This subsistence income is augmented by the wages of young women employed in factories, and supplemented by their unpaid labour in subsistence production. Poor households also eke out resources by foraging for foodstuffs available from the hills and sea shore. Similar patterns are reported for Java by White (1982) who terms this economic diversity 'occupational multiplicity'.

Villagers cannot be theoretically categorised as totally engaged in non-capitalist or capitalist relations of production; rather, they participate in both as occasion demands. Capitalist relations of production, and exploitation, are mediated by non-capitalist cultural

ideology such as reciprocity and mutual dependence. The process of industrialization utilises girls from landless, female headed or smallholders' families because they are particularly obliged to augment income. Among middle and large landowners, women do not take up factory employment which, in this Muslim country, is stigmatized and of low status. Factory labour is, therefore, drawn from those living at the poorest level of subsistence production, this labour moves to the lowest paid wage work in industry. Accordingly, female factory workers remain dependent upon subsistence agriculture because their earnings are insufficient to support them in the urban areas. Poor peasants need the cash and labour contributions which factory workers give to their households. There is an interdependence between, and upon, the obligations of kin reciprocity. Households survive in the interstices of wage labour, subsistence production and reciprocal labour. In this changing economic structure, a process of semi-proletarianization of Malay women is taking place. The economic vagaries of the international division of labour, coupled with the unpredictability of employment with the transnational corporations, are cushioned by the female ability to both participate in, and be supported by, subsistence production and household reciprocity.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

In the past ten years, West Malaysia has experienced a phenomenal rate of growth under the New Economic Policy partly as the result of establishing industrial zones in eight key areas of the country. Under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) primary products, the expansion of manufacturing industries together with the development of oil and gas reserves created a trade surplus. Since the early 1970s transnational corporations, located in West Malaysia, have exported labour intensive manufactured goods to the Far East, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Rim, West and East Europe, the USA, and Canada. Factories produce electronic components, textiles, rubber goods, footwear and foodstuffs. The transnationals have entered into joint venture arrangements with state and domestic capital so that manufacturing has become, in this agrarian economy, the largest generator of new jobs. Between 1970-80 manufacturing employment had a growth rate of almost 8% with 2 out of 3 new jobs created in labour intensive industries (4MP 1981). (There has been a shift in production from the western industrialized countries to the Asia-Pacific Rim where labour conditions allow for cheaper production costs). While such transfer of production overseas is well documented, insufficient attention has been given to the composition of the labour force..

In Malaysia's industrialization process, the proportion of all employees rose 12% from 45% to 57% in the 1970-1980 intercensal period. This employment biased toward females, increased the proportion of Malay industrial workers from 31% to 39%. Although 42.2% of Malaysian women are officially recorded as 'employed', only 4% are in administrative positions, the rest are in low paying industrial and agricultural jobs. The number of own-account workers and unpaid family workers declined from 47% to 38%. The rural labour force continue to reflect traditional work patterns with a higher proportion of females in the unpaid worker category. Conversely, the percentage of urban females in the employee category is higher than that for urban males (Census Report 1983).

In 1980 the population of West and East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) was estimated to be 13.7 million. Of the 11.4 million in West (Peninsular) Malaysia some 6.3 million are Malays, 3.9 million Chinese and 1.2 million Indians, with an annual population growth rate of 2.3%. The total land mass of West Malaysia comprises 50,792 square miles with a density of 32 persons per square mile (Census Report 1983).

Agriculture accounts for 24% of the GDP; 40% of the export earnings and 42% of all employment. Malaysia supplies 45% of the world's natural rubber, 65% of the world's palm oil, 27% of the world's tin and 17% of the

world's pepper to diversified markets. In 1984 primary products alone created M\$15.8 billion (US\$6.2 billion) in export earnings. In spite of an impressive national level performance, 62% of Malaysia's rubber smallholders and 55% of padi growers have a total family income below the poverty line. The poverty level is defined as M\$384.00 (US\$156.00) a month per household of five persons (World Bank 1982, Aznam 1985, Mehmet 1986). Some 41.6% of Malaysia's rural population live below the national poverty level, while in the northern state of Kedah the average household income is 61% lower than the national poverty line (Aznam 1985).

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

The fact that rapid economic development is taking place in Malaysia is partly a result of the exploitation of the female labour force which in the industrialization process, remains rooted firmly in, and dependent upon, the non-valorised reciprocal labour of kin. The industrial labour force relies upon the reciprocity of kin - that is, on non-market relations - but the cash and unpaid labour contributions of industrial workers are equally important for peasant subsistence illustrating an interdependence of waged and non waged labour.

Recent Marxist literature has subsumed the

anthropological concept of reciprocity. Some Marxists argue that reciprocal relations are dissolved in the process of capital accumulation, while others maintain that unpaid labour relations are conserved since they are instrumental for the expansion of capital. These dichotomous approaches fail to consider the way in which different levels interact with cultural variables. Clearly, the problem is not whether reciprocal labour relations are eroded or strengthened but rather the way in which several layers and levels of reciprocal relations are selectively utilised or transformed by peasant households in the development process. This necessitates an analysis of the way in which reciprocity and gender interact with state development policies and, in order to make these linkages, I have conceptualised intra and inter-household reciprocity. These concepts allow an examination of the ideology and economic practice of reciprocity to show how households become linked to the state and international capital accumulation process. It becomes apparent that ideological-moral elements of reciprocity can act to gloss over exploitation at several levels - specifically in the control of waged and unwaged female labour in both capitalist and non-capitalist relations of production.

The term reciprocity has been inadequately defined in the recent literature which implicitly assumes that at the

level of peasant subsistence egalitarian relations exist. This fails to account for the fact that reciprocity itself is a complex phenomenon, with several analytical levels. Accordingly, the way in which reciprocal dues fall unequally upon females will be discussed. At the level of practice, and in conjunction with capitalism, reciprocity can be transformed into a powerful tool of exploitation. Not only is the industrial workforce exploited by the extraction of surplus value on assembly lines, but, it is also subjected to the demands of reciprocity and labour requirements in subsistence production.

DEFINING RECIPROCITY

. . . <there is> a popular tendency to view reciprocity as balance, as unconditional one for one exchange. Considered as a material transfer, reciprocity is often not that at all. Indeed, it is precisely through scrutiny of departures from balanced exchange that one glimpses the interplay between reciprocity, social relations and material circumstances. (Sahlins 1974:190).

The wide range of variations in the definition and use of reciprocity in the anthropological literature indicate that reciprocity cannot be utilised as a concept without careful contextual analysis. This reflects a familiar conundrum within anthropology, and analogies can be made with the definitional problems encountered with concepts such as 'marriage', 'incest', or 'gender roles'. All attempts illustrate the difficulties involved in arriving

at a universal definition of any social feature which is varied in time, space, and is embedded in the concrete situations of different societies. Some anthropologists define reciprocity in a rather 'common sense' way, for example, "reciprocity means a notion of mutual, equal exchange of prestations, a positive give and take" (McCall 1982:304). Or, as MacCormack has it, "reciprocity is used interchangeably with 'gift', 'counter gift' and 'exchange' . . . with . . . the obligation to make an equivalent return or expectation that some return will be made" (1982:89).

Discussing the *Annales* (1974) symposium devoted to Karl Polanyi's work, Meillassoux has the following comments upon the definition of reciprocity:

. . . (For) Levi-Strauss reciprocity is the social motive force *par excellence* and based on the idea that, according to Mauss, each thing given should, by some mysterious virtue, be returned . . . Polanyi strictly distinguishes "the reciprocative sequence" from the mechanism of redistribution . . . the term "reciprocity" as it is used by the authors, refers to such different or such general situations that it has no meaning at all. It cannot be applied to the hierarchic relations . . . because reciprocity presupposes social equality. (Meillassoux 1981b:61).

Elsewhere, Meillassoux (1981:66) argues that in spite of Polanyi's attempt to provide a rigorous definition, some writers extend reciprocity to exploitative relations - this is an oblique reference to Sahlins (1974) and Dalton's (1974, 1981) substantivist views, see also Stein (1984).

For Meillassoux, reciprocity can ideologically account for the egalitarian circulation of women and goods between social equals. Evidently, he wishes to restrict the use of reciprocity to symmetrical exchanges of goods, value and services which presuppose social equality. This view over-simplifies the more complex reality of peasants and household production processes which are linked to wider economic systems.

For the purposes of this dissertation I define reciprocity as unpaid labour or goods exchanged within and between households; such exchanges embody a complex system of morality. Indeed, the concept of reciprocity itself rests upon notions of morality which legitimates, produces and reproduces exchanges. The fact of participating in such exchanges endows donors and recipients with moral worth so that reciprocity has both material and non material components. Sentiment, honour, status, and prestige constitute these important non material components. Both material and non material components benefit recipient and donor, the parties to an exchange, in different ways. Reciprocal exchange implies an interdependence until one considers factors such as time, class, age and gender which bring other variables to work on the exchange. Such factors may shift transactions from symmetrical to asymmetrical exchanges since power relations

come into play. One has only to consider peasant subsistence relations, within and between households, to realise that variables such as these have different effects upon the parties to an exchange.

Reciprocal labour and goods are, ideally, given freely according to moral and cultural values, hence reciprocity is referred to as a 'moral economy' and 'symbolic capital'. Moral obligations legitimate and gloss the economic nature of exchange but, notwithstanding the morality involved, the practice of reciprocity produces and reproduces relationships which control labour and the products of such labour. This is evident from the level of the household through to the economic linkages effected with state and international capital. From the individual to the collective, at the level of ideology and practice, reciprocity serves to reproduce social relations and the processes of production within and between households and the state.

From Marc Auge's (1981) viewpoint:

Only the analysis of the production processes and of the social relations which correspond to them can make the distinction between the reality of the process and the socio-ideological organization which authorizes it, justifies it, and allows it to reproduce itself. (Auge 1981:62).

Auge's statement is appropriate for the context of this dissertation since it allows for a distinction between the

ideology and practice of reciprocity. As will become evident the ideology of reciprocity has a degree of autonomy, even where economic exploitation exists in the production process. I am analytically concerned with the way in which the ideological elements of reciprocity act to gloss over exploitation specifically in the control of waged and unwaged labour in capitalist and non capitalist relations of production effecting peasant households. The way in which I develop the concepts of 'reciprocity and exploitation' shows a duality - they are opposed in principle - yet reflect a single economic reality. There is an interplay between reciprocity and exploitation - wherein Malay cultural values must mask the stark economic reality. The linkages formed by obligations of reciprocity in Malaysia's industrialization process are demonstrated at the level of the state, transnational corporations and peasant households. The interplay of 'reciprocity and exploitation' in the process of labour control for capitalist and non capitalist relations of production is examined.

DEFINING EXPLOITATION

. . . the conjunction of a norm of reciprocity with a reality of exploitation would not distinguish the primitive political economy from any other; everywhere in the world the indigenous category for exploitation is "reciprocity". . . . The ideological ambiguity is functional. (Sahlins 1974:134-135).

There is an anthropological reluctance to use the term 'exploitation' particularly in the case of the contemporary emphasis on the functional interconnection of the parts of culture which . . . are linked by an abstract 'reciprocity'. (Stein 1984:283).

The way in which reciprocity is transformed into exploitation lies within the sphere of labour control. In discussing the power differential involved in the practices of reciprocity, McCall (1982:312) argues that people gain control over the labour power of others by extracting goods produced by such labour power or by restricting the time that other people have for productive labour. Peoples' capacity and power as participants in reciprocal labour exchange depends upon their social standing.

What they exchange, how they do it, and with whom, is indicative of their economic power i.e. control over the labour of others. The control such individuals are able to exert over others' labour (under the guise of reciprocity) is a means of analyzing the accumulations of wealth from the most intimate household labour exchanges through to international relations. (McCall 1982:316).

This perspective is a useful ordering device for analyses of reciprocity and labour exchange and for examining the way in which both articulate with capitalist and non capitalist relations of production. It is important to move away from the substantivist concept of reciprocity at the 'exchange and circulation' level in favour of an examination of the precise nature of the labour processes by which reciprocity is transformed into control over

labour power.

The first form of unequal divisions of labour and its products (property) lies in the family where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this early stage it corresponds . . . to the power of dispensing of the labour power of others. (Marx 1970:52).

At the level of the household, control over labour is effected by a hierarchy of age and gender which act as production and distribution components. In his discussion of the extraction of labour from 'youths to elders', Terray (1975:93) argues that the surplus from the direct producers enables the dominant minority to acquire prestige goods: "the control of which constitutes the guarantee of its power" (Ibid:93). Whether or not kinship relations can be seen as class relations is a problem here because the exploitation of household members is different and since they cannot lead to social transformations they form a non-class form of exploitation. The gerontocratic principle that elders have the right to the labour power of the young is widely reported (McCall 1982, Meillassoux 1981, Bourdieu 1982). Elders take advantage of the socially emphasized inadequacies of youth and the latter cannot rebel since the very social order is based on temporal distance: "which is as much as to say by nothing for one only has to wait and the difference will disappear; but the gap maintained by the gerontocratic order is, in fact, unbridgeable, since

the only way to cross it, short of refusing the game, is to wait" (Bourdieu 1982:232).

Labour power is extracted from the younger generation by a process of:

Religion, magic ritual, and a terrorism based on superstition . . . inflicted upon dependants, young people and above all on pubescent women. (Meillassoux 1981:45).

In most peasant communities males control female labour power in production and reproduction. Women, no matter how old, seldom become the exploiters of men, only of younger women. Household production relations are internally differentiated by age and gender and it is the nature of the relationship between these factors which give rise to non-class exploitation which only become transformed into class exploitation in their linkages with state development policies.

Labour and surplus labour is extracted in non-capitalist relations of production by a variety of means. Giddens (1983) distinguishes mechanisms of exploitation in pre-capitalist modes of production by corvee, tribute, or the direct appropriation of surplus product. In Marx's labour theory of value, profit comes from unpaid labour so that the specific relation of capital to wage labour is merely one historical form of exploitation. Labour power (and value) has always been extracted from subordinates (by slavery, class, age and

gender) through history. In corvee, there is a clear distinction in space and time between subsistence food production for the peasant household and surplus labour for the feudal lord. By contrast, as Marx points out, "the wage form extinguishes every trace of the division of the working day into necessary labour and surplus labour, into paid and unpaid labour. In wage labour . . . even surplus labour, or unpaid labour, appears as paid" (1909:591). The value of labour power is dictated by the cost of the subsistence necessary to maintain, and reproduce, the labourer - determined physically and socially. The value and cost of this subsistence does, of course, vary historically and culturally. For Marx, only human labour power produces values in commodities and:

The minimum limit of the value of labour power is determined by the value of the commodities, without the daily supply of which the labourer cannot renew his vital energy . . . when we speak of labour, or the capacity of labour, we speak at the same time of the labourer and the means of subsistence (Ibid:192).

It follows that surplus labour is labour over and above that essential for the subsistence and reproduction of labour power ("necessary labour time") and, within capitalism, this surplus labour ("being no longer necessary") becomes transformed into surplus value, and profit (Marx 1909:240). The term surplus value is applied only to the capitalist mode of production and is used to

express the degree of the exploitation of labour power by capital as embodied in the (unpaid) surplus labour which, for the owners of capital, produces commodities for exchange and profit. Unpaid labour is exploited labour.

In developing countries, such as Malaysia, the capitalist mode of production is dominant but at the rural level non-capitalist relations of production are still extant. In non-capitalist relations of production access to, and control over, labour power can be exercised by a variety of forms such as reciprocal labour, kinship labour obligations, filial dues and voluntary labour. Surplus labour can be extracted on the basis of moral obligations from members of peasant households and appropriated by entrepreneurs operating within the capitalist mode of production who, by control over unpaid labour power, are able to utilise non-capitalist relations of production for profit. In the case of cash cropping and factory work this becomes exploited labour since it is not adequately rewarded by remuneration. It is insufficient to sustain the labourer on a per diem basis in the urban areas so workers remain dependent upon household production. The essentials of urban life requires a daily minimum of M\$10.00 for rent, food, transport and clothing. Girls earn an average of M\$4.50 a day in factory work while the agricultural wage labour rate is M\$8.00-10.00 a day. By producing subsistence

food crops, households absorb their own labour, maintenance, and reproduction costs while creating surplus labour and products for the capitalist mode of production and international markets. Within such non-capitalist relations of production, unpaid labour power is extracted by male or female household heads, and by local entrepreneurs, which links with state and international capital. Labour emanating from non-capitalist relations of production is non valorised, and unrewarded, yet it is utilised by capital so that exploitation can be said to exist in such 'reciprocal' labour relations. These theoretical issues are expanded in chapter II below.

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation is based on field research carried out from June 1982 until July 1983 in a rural village and industrial estate in the northern border state of Kedah, West Malaysia. It forms part of a larger project conducted by the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, analyzing the effects of industrial development upon Malay women (Aziz 1977, HAWA Project 1983). The language used throughout the field research was the Kedah dialect of standard Malay (Bahasa Malaysia). I experienced no language or protracted orientation problems, as this was not my first research visit to a Malay village. However, my unmarried status in

a Malayo-Islamic village circumscribed activities owing to respect for my host's deeply held religious convictions, a concern with adat (customary values) and his status in the village hierarchy. It was difficult, for instance, for me to seek out or speak with village males alone.

The methodology employed is the result of the way in which I defined the research problem. In Malaysia transnational corporations are invited into the subsistence heartland and use peasant labour drawn directly from the villages. To demonstrate the way in which foreign, state and local capital interlink and draw upon peasant labour, for the accumulation of capital, is a departure for an anthropologist. In order to carry out this analytical task, I collapsed the traditional anthropological divisions between household, village, national and international economy into a framework which shows their interrelationships. Since the New Economic Policy, Malay peasants have become tightly integrated into the state's framework. In order to understand the way in which TNCs interact with peasants living at subsistence levels, I conducted research in twenty factories and in a village from which their workers are drawn.

The Labour and Social Security (SOCSO) offices in Sungei Petani, the Kedah Development Authority (KEDA), and the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA)

office in Alor Setar were invaluable for official information on labour and the industrialization process. Since TNCs are an important factor in Malaysian industrialization and instrumental in the creation of a semiproletariat it was important for me to gain access to the factories. With the assistance of the KEDA office at Alor Setar, interviews were conducted with management in twenty factories at the beginning, the middle, and again at the end of the research period (Appendix III). This enabled me to collect and update data on employment, productivity, working conditions, health and welfare facilities, and the ethnic nature of the labour force. The factories at Bakar Arang industrial estate are representative of the main industries in Malaysia, e.g. electronics, rubber products and textiles. Management were, apart from one deleted case, courteous, interested, and exceptionally frank and helpful at all times. Several of the executives were kind enough to invite me, informally, to their homes over the course of the year. They gave me important insights into the way they perceive their role and the Malaysian labour force. In addition they were very generous with confidential information. Material gathered from formal and informal interviews is combined with reports and other information supplied by the corporations. Their kind assistance was, in part, an attempt to counter the 'bad press'

transnational corporations are receiving. Although I was escorted around the assembly lines, management gave me a room in which to conduct unaccompanied interviews with their white collar employees. Management allowed me to speak freely with the workers on the assembly lines, in the canteen at break times, and, to travel on the factory buses. I observed but did not actually interview girls as they worked on the assembly lines as this would slow down their work and result in reduced wages.

I lived in the village of Kampung Dalam, (a pseudonym) located in a sub-division (Mukim) of Kuala Muda District, Kedah, for some eleven months which enabled me to utilise the anthropologist's traditional technique of participant observation (see map I). This was, of course, quantified with more formal methods of investigation such as a village census, questionnaires, and it was supplemented by focused and open ended interviews. Village data were checked, where feasible, against the various district, sub-district, state and federal government records for comparative purposes.

As Kampung Dalam is an important source of female labour for the Bakar Arang industrial estate in Sungei Petani, (map II), it was possible to obtain a record of the interrelationship between industrial wage labour and peasant subsistence. While living in this village I became intimately acquainted with the factory workers, their kin

and their friendship networks. In order to obtain data on reciprocal relations in subsistence production I worked with girls and their mothers in many different subsistence tasks and observed the same girls on the industrial assembly lines. One hundred and twelve factory workers were interviewed at home and, indeed, four girls lived in the same compound as I did. Eighty-six girls from seventy five households commuted to work on a daily basis and these households form the basis of the analysis. The remaining twenty-six girls live in a squatter settlement at Bakar Arang industrial estate, so as to work in factories paying higher rates, and they return to the village twice a month to hand over their pay packets.

I was constantly invited by women to accompany them on visits to kin, friends, outings to the Friday market and to feasts. This informal interaction allowed me to gain much valuable information unobtainable by any other means. I was able to trace and interview women who had migrated out to work in Penang or Kuala Lumpur whenever they returned for festivities such as weddings, circumcisions, or the end of the Muslim fasting month (Hari Raya). Workers referred me to their friends and kinfolk whenever I visited Sungei Petani so it was possible to stay with, and obtain data upon, the girls who live in squatter settlements at Bakar Arang. Workers are apprehensive of strangers, so that

without these valuable kinship connections, it would have been impossible for me to establish rapport in the urban setting. With this help, I obtained valuable insights into the ways villagers manage the constraints and meanings of peasant 'reciprocity' and factory 'exploitation'.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

There are conflicting theoretical views on the issue of reciprocity in development. One group argue that reciprocal bonds are dissolved while the other insists that peasant reciprocity is instrumental for the development of capitalism. In order to avoid this dichotomous impasse, it is important to understand that reciprocity has many facets each of which must be identified to see how reciprocity is utilised in the economic development process. To address this problem the meaning of peasant reciprocity is analyzed within the context of economic development in Malaysia. In chapter II, theoretical approaches to development and the formation of a gender specific labour force are examined. The peasant practice of reciprocity, which falls unequally upon females, is identified as a crucial factor enabling the labour force to subsist, and, intra-inter household reciprocity is developed further as an analytical tool. Chapter III examines the role of the state, the transnational corporations and the ethnic imperatives of

Malaysia's political economy. The importance of foreign, domestic and state capital is assessed along with the effects of such expansion and penetration upon Malaysia's population. In chapter IV, the concentration is upon the organization and conditions of factory operatives, and the exploitation of the workers by transnational corporations. The response of the labour force, ensconced in subsistence production, is examined; their semiproletarian status simultaneously works for, and against, management. The rural setting is laid out in chapter V and VI where subsistence and the workings of reciprocity within and between peasant households is analyzed. Chapter VII emphasizes and develops further the main concept of the study - the interplay between 'reciprocity and exploitation'. The dissertation concludes by reiterating the multidimensional facets of peasant reciprocity and how reciprocity is used as an exploitative device tightly integrated into the state's policy for the expansion of capital.

CHAPTER II

THEORY

DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

The theoretical as well as the empirical conjunction of peasant subsistence with state and international capital in developing nations has become increasingly complex; traditional anthropological theories which viewed peasants as 'insulated' have long been inadequate (Wolf 1966, Shanin 1971). There is an unresolved theoretical dilemma in the Marxist literature on the transition from agriculture to industrialization complicated, in part, by the different routes to industrialization experienced by Europe and the developing countries. This dilemma concerns the persistence of non-capitalist relations of production. Various explanations are put forward for their continued viability, (conservation-dissolution) because, according to theoretical orthodoxy and the historical evidence of European industrialization, they should disappear.

Attempts to theorise about the process of development for less developed countries are complicated by the varying conditions under which capitalism meets with non-capitalist

relations of production. The problem is usually presented as being one of transformation toward a system of 'freeing labour' from agriculture for industrial wage work. In other words, peasant producers are separated from their means of production (land) and become dependent upon conditions dictated by the increased demands of capital, which require wage workers for the extraction of surplus value. Following Marx, (1909 Vol 1), analysis revolves around the way in which peasants undergo a structural transformation through the penetration of capital, the 'freeing of labour', and the destruction of the 'natural economy'.

The continued existence of peasant subsistence production during industrialization and the tenacity of non-capitalist relations of production in both urban and rural areas create specific theoretical and conceptual problems. This is evidenced by the 1950s debate on Europe (see Hilton 1982) and recent volumes on the phase of 'transition' with such titles as Peasants and Proletarians (Cohen, Gutkind et al 1979); From Modernization to Modes of Production (Taylor 1979); From Peasant to Proletarian (Goodman & Redclift 1981); Theories of Development: Mode of Production or Dependency? (Chilcote & Johnson 1983). The dichotomy implied in these 'either/or' titles indicates problems with theory rather than with the 'deviant routes to development' evolving in industrializing countries.

The attempts of Marxists and neo-Marxists to deal with the specific problem of the 'transition to industrialisation' are contradictory. These disagreements derive from three main theoretical perspectives.

(i) Dependency-world systems theory, the erosion of 'precapitalist' social relations and incorporation into the 'world capitalist economy' as a condition of continued 'underdevelopment' (Frank 1967 Wallerstein 1974); and for the 'peripheralization' of less developed countries. World systems theorists view the world as linked by international trade within a hierarchical structure in which 'core' centre states exploit those of the periphery. This asymmetrical structure, determined by early and late starts, accounts for the continued underdevelopment of peripheral states which are subjected to the 'external' forces of capitalism. World systems theorists define capitalism in terms of global markets, trade and exchange in which the peripheral states suffer from an extraction of 'surplus' by the process of 'unequal exchange'.

(ii) The 'modes of production' (articulation) perspective which allows for a persistence of non-capitalist relations. This theory recognises the effects of merchant, colonial and neo-colonial capitalism(s) on the internal structures of colonized states and the consequences of colonialism for the development process. This 'internal' approach is

insufficiently addressed by world systems theory. Non-capitalist modes of production are not dissolved but, rather, they are subordinated to serve the ends of world capitalism (Dupres & Rey 1973, Rey 1973, 1975, Laclau 1971, 1979, Wolpe 1976, 1980, Taylor 1979, Meillassoux 1981, 1983). The 'articulation' approach has been challenged most recently, by:

(iii) The nature of the new labour force and class formations in the 'periphery' under the conditions of 'superexploitation' by world capitalism and transnational corporations. This results in the 'new international division of labour' (Deere 1979, Frobél et al 1980, Nash & Kelly 1983, Johnson 1983, Veltmeyer 1983). Attempts are made to link the accumulation process of world capitalism with the exploitation of labour and class formations in developing countries.

These approaches can be subsumed under the categories of world systems theory and modes of production. The theories are outlined below as a necessary step to understanding the controversy over the linkages of agricultural subsistence production with the capitalist economic development process and industrialization in less developed countries. The levels of the controversy range from the abstract to the most concrete, being tightly linked, at each level, to conceptual differences arising out of (a) the concept of holism and (b) the forms and rate

of capitalist development.

WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY.

In Frank's early formulation of dependency theory (1967) feudalism is transformed into a single world capitalist system causing the disappearance of all 'pre-capitalist' relations of exchange (and Wallerstein 1974, 1979). Monopolistic exchange relations result in the accumulation of capital and the development of the world's metropolitan centres creating the dependency and underdevelopment of the satellite countries from which economic surplus is extracted. Surplus value is drawn from the peasantry by the local ruling classes, acting as agents of metropolitan capital, for accumulation by the metropolis (Frank 1974, O'Brien 1982). In this asymmetrical dichotomy, the ruling classes in underdeveloped countries actually owe their privileged positions to the metropole. The class structures of underdeveloped countries are thereby viewed as dependent rather than autonomous; this problematic view has most recently been the subject of debate by Johnson (1983). Frank identifies capitalism as a system of world wide linkages of exchange, with an analytical emphasis on 'cycle', and 'circulation' rather than concern with 'relations of production'. As his critics (Laclau 1971, 1979, Foster-Carter 1973, 1978, Alavi 1982) all point out,

Frank does not lay sufficient weight on concepts such as 'surplus value' or 'relations of production' in the process of 'capital accumulation'. The fact that Frank's analytical priority lies with market exchange means that he does not consider the way in which wage labour within the metropole contributes to capital accumulation there. He argues for the exploitation of dependent by independent countries rather than by, and on behalf of, class interests in both metropole and satellite (O'Brien 1982).

The 'dependency' ideas are developed further by Wallerstein (1974, 1979) and Samir Amin (1974, 1976) who conceive of a capitalist world economy. The process of capital accumulation within this world system develops the system unequally. There are rich 'centre' countries, middle range 'semi-peripheral' countries and poor countries at the 'periphery'. The existence of the 'semi-periphery' (a buffer zone) which acts as both 'exploiter and exploited' means there is no unified opposition to the centre (Wallerstein 1982:41). Wallerstein's view of capitalism is not the capital-wage labour relationship either; it is production for exchange in a market to make a maximum profit (1979:159). Wallerstein's argument is close to Frank's - once the world system is capitalist - what appears as different forms of production and exploitation are actually capitalist in essence because capitalism can, and does, embrace various forms of production. Capitalism

is a system pivoted on the existence of these various forms. The key element in Wallerstein's 'world system of capitalism' is the notion of a 'surplus transfer' between countries. As Gulalp (1983) points out, in such a model, the 'exploiter and exploited' are countries and world capitalism is the system which creates and sustains the relation of exploitation. The replacement of classes by countries is a central feature of world systems theory; so that analytical priority lies outside and neglects the internal class structure of a country (Gulalp 1983). To state it most starkly and simply, Wallerstein adopts a concept of class but substitutes states into the model. This means that the class basis upon which all states are built disappears. The state itself is not seen in terms of class conflict, but is viewed within a framework of struggle between nations. The nation with a strong state becomes a core country - i.e. one with an industrial base employing wage labour. These descriptive categories form the essence of his model.

Amin's view of the relationship between 'centre and periphery' is similar to the ideas of Frank and Wallerstein. The centre of the world economy is 'autocentric' (based on dynamic relationships between production and consumption) and the system is sustained by home market demand (Foster-Carter 1978, O'Brien 1982). By contrast, the periphery is simultaneously oriented to, yet

constrained by, the asymmetrical centre-periphery relationship. The key sectors of 'peripheral social formations' are those of export production and import consumption, yet exchange relations in both directions favour the centre of the world economy (Amin 1974, 1976, Wallerstein 1980, O'Brien 1982). Amin goes beyond the dependency framework to argue that the 'economic laws' of Marx apply only to a pure capitalist system (i.e. the Western model). In the world economy, capitalism of a pure sort coexists with other modes of production, producing variants dubbed as 'peripheral capitalisms' with their own specific laws of motion (Amin 1976, Foster-Carter 1978). Capitalist development in the periphery was blocked by the much earlier start of the centre which Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1980) in his 'stages' of the world system dates to European mercantile capitalism of the 16th Century. The centre has the monopoly on industrial manufacturing, processing technology, and the marketing of goods, whereas the periphery can only offer natural resource-based exports, but, since all technology is controlled by the centre states, the periphery remains disadvantaged. High wages at the centre and low wages at the periphery, according to the 'labour theory of value', result in 'unequal exchange' which further aids accumulation at the centre (Amin 1974, O'Brien 1982). Amin links this process to the international division of labour by specialization.

So far as class formations are concerned Amin indicates that only a small percentage of the population in peripheral capitalist societies is involved in the manufacturing sectors or in capitalist relations of production. 'Pre-capitalist' modes of production are not eliminated by the capitalist penetration of the periphery as they were in the 'centre' but, indeed, become intensified. Like Marx, Amin acknowledges the coexistence of more than one mode of production. This specific theoretical issue is examined further by Rey (1973, 1975), Laclau (1971, 1979) and Meillassoux (1972, 1981).

SUMMARY

World systems theory with its structural emphasis on external economic determinism and exchange does not account for historical variations among less developed countries. Indeed, for Wallerstein, the world system of capitalism actually creates and reinforces states, classes, ethnic groups and even households (1980:169). All are phenomena of world capitalism so that any contradictions in the sub-systems are due to contradictions in the world system as a whole - which remains determinant.

The holistic preoccupation of world systems theory is mounted on an asymmetrical base of centre-periphery and, by utilising these categories, rather than by adopting a dialectical approach, the relationships of internal-external factors are obscured. One reaction to

such global views is the focus on modes of production (see below). This view, conceptualised from the 'inside' out, merely turns the problem on its head and explains little more for it remains locked within the same parameters. It is important to show the interdependencies of both outward and inward perspectives from the most abstract to the most concrete level. An awareness of these problems shapes the format and argumentation of this dissertation.

Contrary to the world systems theory, I argue that states undergoing industrialization can manipulate competition among sources of foreign capital; developing countries form economic alliances and regional groupings; they establish local and overseas bases of capital accumulation (see Chapter III). In spite of the development processes which some industrializing countries are undergoing, world systems theorists continue to argue that 'genuine' independent development - the accumulation of capital under national control - is blocked by the inexorable operations of the world economy, i.e. external capital. In reviewing the inability of dependency- world systems theorists to acknowledge any development in less developed countries because the latter fail to conform to an abstract model of what capitalist development should look like Bernstein warns:

. . . a conceptual delusion at the core of dependency theory, . . . is that an understanding of genuine or national development as a process which delivers the goods of increased social welfare, more egalitarian income

distribution, full employment . . . to the benefit of the majority . . . virtually excludes capital development by definition. The latter refers to the development of capitalist relations of production and productive forces, manifested in the accumulation and expanded reproduction of capital . . . the fundamental mechanism of which can be nothing else than exploitation through the appropriation of surplus value and creating the conditions of such exploitation. (Bernstein 1982(a):228)

IMPERIALISM, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE STATE

Given the problems which I have outlined with dependency-world systems perspectives and the theoretical inability to acknowledge development in LDCs, it is not surprising that literature is emerging on the 'imperialist industrialization of the periphery' (Cardoso & Faletto 1979, Evans 1979 and Szymanski 1981, Warren 1982). This approach supports my theoretical and empirical argument (chapter III) that foreign capital, in concert with state and domestic capital, can realise industrialization without asymmetrical 'dependency'. Such a view is a contentious one, and my argument against the holistic determinism of dependency-world systems perspectives, is developed in favour of a reciprocal 'interdependency'.

The 'imperialist industrialization' theory is rooted in the work of Marx (1853)¹ and Lenin (1917)². I have shown that, from a dependency perspective, exploitation takes place between core and peripheral nations engaged in relations of domination and dependence. For theorists of imperialism, exploitation can only be located in relations of production (see Borboroglu 1984). This goes beyond the

dependency-world systems view of unequal trade, foreign debt and dependence, to see imperialism as a form of appropriation of surplus value from labour on a national and international scale. Imperialist industrialization theory considers the dialectical nature of industrialization in less developed countries through capital investment and the exploitation of a newly formed proletariat. Capital investment, whether by transnational corporations, the state, or domestic capital, is governed by the law of profit and, so far as workers are concerned, it is irrelevant who owns the factory. It follows from this that the distinctions between foreign, state and domestic capital are exaggerated.

TNCs (are seen to) act as one conscious agent instead of as specific and competing entities. They are condemned for the extraction of surplus. We must seriously question whether class relations and the system of exploitation changes radically because a capital unit is not in national hands (Munck 1984:13).

Capital, whatever its origin, requires profit and accumulation for whoever owns it. The appropriation of surplus value is accelerated as more peasants and 'marginal workers' are drawn into industrial employment to confront foreign, state and domestic capital as an exploiting force.

Supporting the 'imperialist-industrialization' theory, Szymanski (1981) and Warren (1982) argue against the dependency-world systems view of imperialism as an impediment to development. Both authors see imperialism as

a dynamic system of accumulation which creates industrialization in developing countries. Their concern with Lenin's (1917) arguments on imperialism and the export of monopoly capital causes them, (and Bernstein too, though from a slightly different perspective), to acknowledge development.

Sensitivity to the historically diverse mechanisms and forms of capitalist development, and of the 'articulation' of noncapitalist economic, social and ideological forms with the development of capitalist relations, should help avoid the all too familiar inability to see transitional processes occurring. (Bernstein 1982:231).

Criticising the 'stagnation' viewpoint, Warren says:

Lenin reversed Marxist doctrine on the progressive character of imperialist expansion and, by an irresistible ideological process, erased from Marxism any trace of the view that capitalism could henceforth represent an instrument of social or economic advance, even in precapitalist societies. The historic mission of capitalism was declared ended. <By the Comintern in 1928 SM>. (Warren 1982:47).

The dependency-world systems view is contradicted by the fact that imperialism, in association with indigenous capitalism, helps to create industrialization and so narrows the gap between 'centre' and 'periphery' nations. Indeed, rivalry between foreign capital creates better bargaining positions for developing countries because of the high cost, to foreign capital, of not investing in developing countries and their expanding markets (see chapter III). For both Szymanski and Warren there are two main factors which contribute to industrialization: (1) the political independence of LDCs promotes local development,

and (2), the flow of foreign capital to cheap manufacturing sectors which means that value is transferred from centre to periphery and profits are reinvested locally. Today, transnational corporations are seen as bearers of the international relations of production. As a form of imperialism they are the product of the concentration of capital and imperial rivalry between European, Japanese and American corporations. The economic activities of transnational corporations cause their own national 'domestic' activities to be reduced when their production is relocated to less developed countries where productivity is high, wages are low, and labour is non-unionised. This increases surplus value by the higher rates of exploitation of the labour force. These factors, in turn, have serious implications for the country of origin since foreign suppliers, increasingly, replace domestic producers. The amalgamation of transnational corporations with transnational banking and private finance allows for capital to produce higher rates of return from overseas investments. This corresponds to Lenin's (1917) classification of the stage of capitalism where the export of capital (as a social relation creating value) was more important than the export of products (Warren 1982:60, Szymanski 1981). Transnational corporations are seen as a final stage in the establishment of social relations in capitalist production because they 'free' the labour force.

Nor can the dependency thesis be sustained by reference to an alleged new type of dependence based on the technological superiority of the west or on a new international division of labour enabling the western multinationals to exploit the cheap labour of developing countries for assembly industries or the manufacture of components. Third world exports of manufactures may indeed primarily reflect the location by multinationals of productive units in developing countries in order to avoid rising domestic labour costs; but if so, the dependence is two way - it is interdependence. (In any case the evidence is clear that industries that start off as assembly industries tend to develop further stages in the manufacture of final articles and strong backward linkages to other industries (e.g. Taiwan, S. Korea). (Warren 1982:179).

Working from a 'dependency' perspective to explain industrialization, the view of 'dependent development' is conceptualised by Cardoso and Faletto (1979). They see dependent development as a 'special case' of dependency which refers to cases where capital accumulation occurs in a 'peripheral' country even though it remains 'externally' determined.

A real process of dependent development does exist in some Latin American countries. By development, in this context, we mean "capitalist development". This form of development, in the periphery as well as in the centre produces as it evolves, in a cyclical way, wealth and poverty, accumulation and shortage of capital . . . In the end what is discussed as an alternative is not the consolidation of the state and the fulfillment of 'autonomous capitalism' but how to supercede them. The important question, then, is how to construct paths toward socialism. (Cardoso & Faletto 1979:xxiii-xxiv). 3

In an effort to avoid determinism Cardoso and Faletto favour a dialectical approach; they examine the specific class alliances which correspond to 'dependent development'

so as to see:

. . . the relationship between external and internal forces as forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external forms of exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidences of interests between local dominant classes and international ones, and, on the other side, are challenged by local dominated groups and classes. (Cardoso & Faletto 1979:xvi)

Dependent development implies the accumulation of capital and industrialization in the 'periphery' but it does not eradicate the contradictions between 'centre and periphery' nations. Developing these insights further, Evans (1979), conceptualises a 'triple alliance' which includes transnational corporations, the state, and local capital, as a necessary condition for 'dependent development'. Evans sees a complementarity between Lenin's analysis of imperialism and dependent development, yet he does not view 'imperialism' as progressive in quite the same way as Warren.⁴

A complex alliance is formed between elite local capital, international capital and state capital in the 'triple alliance' in which each of the partners comes at industrialization with different strengths and interests, the consensus is that all members of the alliance will benefit from the accumulation of industrial capital. (Evans 1979:12).

In the 'triple alliance' the national bourgeoisie associates itself with foreign transnational corporations. The leadership role in industrialization is in the hands of the state which is the only body capable of controlling TNCs. The strategies of national elites, and the transnational corporations, are expressed through the

policies of the state. These are dictated by historical factors of class structure, ideology and the local productive base (Evans 1979:36). Clearly, 'dependent development' is associated with strengthening the state in the 'semi-periphery'. Indeed, the consolidation and bargaining power of the state and local capital is a prerequisite of 'dependent development' (Evans Ibid:11). The state is a force which modifies the transnational corporations, but is, itself, constrained by the difficulty of spreading the benefits of industrialization to the population because the alliance is incapable of serving the masses.

The creation of state enterprises is important; they are run along the lines of private corporations engaged in export and productive activities. The large niche of state capital entails long term investments (political-economic decisions) in extractive industries, steel, petrochemicals and infrastructure. Transnational corporation and local capital contribute to industrialization in different import substitution and export-oriented industries. State enterprises signify a change from a classical administrative bureaucracy into a state bourgeoisie. By definition, a bourgeoisie appropriates surplus to itself, but as part of a state apparatus, managers of state enterprises are supposed to be directing the process of capital accumulation in the general interests of capital

and the state as a whole, not in their own particular interests.⁵ Rather than see the state bourgeoisie as a replacement for the national industrial bourgeoisie, Evans considers it a class "fraction" (Ibid:59) participating with TNC foreign and domestic private capital. All have an interest in a high rate of accumulation and, towards this end, state authoritarianism is exercised.⁶ The contradictions between the global rationality of TNCs and the interests of the local bourgeoisie and the state are resolvable because they are united by the process of capital accumulation, corporate growth, and profitability. Because of these common objectives the economic elite can co-operate.

The 'dependent development' approach takes us some way from static dependency views and, indeed, Evans' perspective on the 'triple alliance' is useful for the case of Malaysia. The theoretical strength of Evans, and Cardoso and Faletto lies in their view that dependency is not only an 'external' phenomenon; it appears as an 'internal' force through local elites and classes whose values coincide with the TNCs. Their theoretical weakness, in spite of such insights, is that they fail to escape the 'holistic dependency' perspective; they recognise 'internal' factors; they allow for historical specificity; they even allow for a 'dependent development', but still persist in viewing this as 'externally' determined in a centre-periphery

dichotomy.

Against such views there is evidence for the circulation and accumulation of capital in newly industrialising countries and, indeed, an outward investment flow of that capital for accumulation purposes to developed and less developed countries (e.g. New Industrializing Countries' (NIC) investment in 'centre' countries).⁷ To dismiss this as a characteristic of the 'semi-periphery' rather than as evidence of development is inadequate. Foreign capital is subject to national control by way of profit sharing, joint ventures between international, state, and private capital, and via the acquisition of ex-colonial financial conglomerates to create new forms of capital accumulation. Industries throughout the world system (however it may be theorised) are interpenetrated and interdependent upon each other. Analyses predicated upon world systems vision of holism, remain posited on a dichotomy wherein less developed countries are still viewed as asymmetrical victims.

Newly Industrializing Countries set up their own transnational and state corporations whose joint ventures and investments in developed and less developed countries have not yet become the subject of theory (e.g. Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have substantial economic activities in 'centre' countries). This is because the influences of holism and world systems theory

continue to structure analytical views of capital accumulation in favour of developed countries. The philosophical basis of holism, which is never examined by world systems theorists, means that there can be no room for changes in the asymmetrical view. Dependency-World systems theory has become rarified into an objective system with 'law like' statements in which developing countries remain subordinated to a grand schema, or a recipe for trimming the epochs of history (Marx (G.I.) 1970).

HOLISM

Static assumptions about the continuing validity of the centre-periphery paradigm preclude further questions about the forms of reciprocal influence the 'peripheral' economies may exert (or have already exerted) on the core countries as the former become relatively more powerful economically than they were previously . . . the centre economies may be becoming more 'dependent' on those of the periphery, for markets or raw materials. (Warren 1982:163).

The holistic perspective assumes dependency is a product of the world system constituted by the syndrome of external economic control, exploitation, internal-external capitalist class linkages, distorted development, and political repression.⁸ There is much confusion over defining the opposite of dependency (if such a dichotomous exercise is even valid) which raises the problem of whether dependency is a dichotomous or continuous variable. Dependency 'reversal' can be either dichotomous (to become independent) or continuous (to become less dependent), it is more of a 'logical' possibility and an end point on a

continuum than a realistic possibility for countries in the centre and periphery (see Doran, Modelski et al (1983), Packenham (1983:40) and Gereffi (1983:27)).

Asymmetries in economic relations among nations, implied by dependency, must also contain dialectical forces to transform an asymmetrical relationship, if not into its Hegelian opposite then into a relation where the initial asymmetry is reduced (Gereffi 1983:31).

Dependency is not dichotomous but a matter of degree, nations, institutions, processes, groups, classes, class fractions are seldom, if ever, wholly dependent or wholly independent: it is important to analyze variations in forms and degrees of dependency over time within countries. (Packenham 1983:36)

The concept of dependence has always been imprecise . . . since national economies are becoming increasingly interdependent, the meaning of dependence is ever more elusive, not to say mystical . . . The concept of dependence is totally misleading in present world circumstances, because it is one sided, unidirectional, and static in its approach to international economic relationships. (Warren 1982:182)

As countries become more dependent in some ways, they can also become less dependent in others so that the postulated 'internal' effects of 'external' dependency are less a function of international ties than of national political and class relations so that reducing dependency, by itself, would have little effect upon them (Doran, Modelski et al 1983:247).

SUMMARY

The theoretical debate can be summarised as follows. Early formulations of dependency theory argue for a world

system which conceptualises the take over of less developed countries by world capitalism orchestrated from the 'centre'; this does not allow for the viability of indigenous structures. Dependent development examines the way state, foreign and local capital combine in the industrialization process to mediate 'internal and external' perspectives. A third perspective is adopted by some neo-Marxists who argue for the possibility of 'articulation of modes of production' and combine this with an analysis of class formations which are created by the introduction of capitalism into non-capitalist modes of production (Rey 1973, 1975, Laclau 1979, Wolpe 1980, Meillassoux 1981, Cliffe 1977, 1982).⁹

ARTICULATION OF MODES OF PRODUCTION

It is necessary, at this stage, to examine the way in which 'articulation of modes of production' is conceptualised in the literature. The debate stems from differing interpretations of Marx (1909 Vol I:834-838 and Vol II).¹⁰ Marx viewed modes of production as successive stages in the evolution of mankind. In a transitional period, the old mode is in a state of decline, whilst the new mode develops within it to overtake the old social order. Marx allows for the transient coexistence of more than one mode at a given point in history. Such a coincidence of modes was located, by Marx, within an

evolutionary stages model based upon the European experience (O'Brien 1982). The theoretical study of the coexistence of different modes of production in less developed countries is the subject of recent neo-Marxist work.

As an example of this approach, Laclau (1979), in his critique of Frank argues for a structured and differentiated whole, the 'economic system' (the concrete social reality i.e. the 'social formation') which is dominated by capitalism. In common with Frank, Laclau views the economic system as constituted by 'market relations', but he points out that capitalism is, above all, a mode of production so the fundamental economic relationship of capitalism is constituted by the workers' sale of labour power, the necessary precondition for which is a loss by direct producers of the ownership of their 'means of production' (land). The most important element for Laclau is the 'relations of production' so he argues that "there were, and are, substantial elements of feudalism in Latin America not exogenous to capitalism, nor as pockets in decline, but as an intrinsic and structured part of a wider system" (Foster-Carter 1978:50). Such an approach links up with the French anthropologists concerned with 'pre-capitalist' modes of production.

The French anthropologists and others, belonging to the 'New Economic Anthropology' school (Clammer 1976, Kahn &

Llobera 1981), oppose 'liberal economics' based on forms of exchange and markets as well as the anthropologists who utilise such concepts (e.g. Polanyi (1957), Firth (1939), Dalton 1974, 1981, and my section on reciprocity below). Such models, say the French, obscure 'dependence, exploitation and the relationships between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production and reproduction (Meillassoux 1972, Dupre and Rey 1973, Godelier 1977, Clammer 1978). They argue for a coexistence of modes of production and attempt to make the abstract concept - mode of production - analytically useful in examining production relations in 'simple', tribal and peasant societies in order to construct a general theory of successive modes of production through time. The 'articulation' approach is opposed to the implied assumption of 'world systems' theory that less developed countries are merely the creation, and tool, of 'centre' capital. The argument is that capitalism in such 'peripheral' countries is not 'backward', rather, it sees class formations as a synthesis of the articulation of capitalism with the pre-existing social and economic structure. It is this factor which has led to much criticism, discussed below.

Meillassoux (1972) resists the (world systems) view that non-capitalist economies are simply underdeveloped forms of capitalism. The idea that developing countries are best understood in relation to the concept of 'articulation

of modes of production' is put forward by Rey (1973), Long (1976, 1978), Laclau (1979), Wolpe (1980) and Meillassoux (1981). They try to understand 'peripheral social formations' in the context of world capitalism and explain how 'pre-capitalist' modes of production are linked to global capitalism. For Meillassoux, capitalist penetration does not destroy these 'pre-capitalist' systems but transforms them into a mould suitable for the extraction of surplus value - hence capital accumulation. Unpaid labour and subsistence production remain essential to supplement meagre cash earnings:

Once people are compelled to undertake wage earning activities in order to pay taxes and gain some cash, if the capitalist system does not provide adequately for old age pensions, sick leave and unemployment compensations, they have to rely on other comprehensive socio-economic organizations to fulfill these vital needs. Consequently preservation of the relations with the village and familial community is an absolute requirement for the wage earners, and so is the maintenance of the traditional mode of production as the only one capable of ensuring survival. (Meillassoux 1972:103).

Leading on from these considerations, Rey (1973, 1975) builds a model of articulation to analyze the progressive transitions to a capitalist mode of production. In step 1, the first link is forged between a 'pre-capitalist' mode of production and capitalism. This link (merchant capital) takes place in the sphere of exchange. Capitalism, at this point, reinforces 'pre-capitalist' relations of production. In the second step, capitalism becomes established and

erodes 'pre-capitalist' modes of production but uses aspects, such as reciprocal or nonwaged labour, which contribute to the accumulation of capital (Wolpe 1980, Cliffe 1982). The final step involves the total disappearance of 'non-capitalist' modes of production, even in agriculture (a stage not yet reached in all 'centre' countries). This last step is linked to the development and expansion of capitalism.

In this abstract model capitalism eventually displaces all non capitalist relations, a process which conforms to identifiable 'stages', but which means that there is little, apart from an important sense of history, to distinguish this perspective from its dependency/world systems predecessors. Rey tries to avoid the inside-outside dichotomy by demonstrating the semi-autonomous nature of 'pre-capitalist modes of production' yet he finally succumbs to the pressure of 'foreign capital' as the prime mover. From the 'articulation' perspective, the expansion of capital may reinforce non capitalist relations of production but local conditions are viewed, in the final analysis, as externally determined by and, indeed, as functional for, capital (Foster-Carter 1978, Meillassoux 1981). The roles of the state, local capital accumulation and local dynamics are underplayed in this perspective, too, which renders it vulnerable to similar shortcomings as the 'world systems' approach.

Developing Rey's step 2 further, Cliffe (1982:269) argues that subsistence food production is not replaced but remains necessary for the reproduction of 'semi proletarian' labour. The circulation of money and commodities draws out surplus in the form of labour, or produce, from agriculture which is, itself, now geared to capitalist relations of production and exchange. Property rights retain non-capitalist traits; subsistence production and/or production for the market may be widespread but the polarization of classes is incomplete. Peasant 'relations of reciprocity' are transformed into antagonistic relations in their 'articulation with capitalism' because voluntary and mutual help from kin and neighbours is transformed into the hire of labour (Cliffe 1982:263, Pine 1982). The insights gained from the anthropological 'local level' analyses are not without value, in spite of the problems attached to the abstract framework of 'articulation'. These important issues are addressed in my theoretical section on 'reciprocity' below and developed specifically in chapters V, VI and VII.

Criticisms against the 'articulation' perspective are mounted both at the level of abstraction and at the level of practical application (Foster-Carter 1978, Mafeje 1981). The concept 'mode of production' itself is an abstraction so that subsequent 'articulations' can only render it metatheoretical. The following serves as an example.

Adherents of the approach argue that class formations and contradictions are created by the 'articulation of modes of production' whereas orthodox views maintain that it is the relations of labour to capital which create contradictions and not 'articulations of modes of production'. For these reasons the usefulness of the concept has been attacked (Foster Carter 1978, Mafeje 1981). Its conceptual value is further brought into question when used as an explanatory device which ignores the real motor of history - the class struggles of people in a specific political-economy. Clearly, then, the problems attached to 'articulation' outweigh any advantages it may have had in resolving the dichotomies in Marxist views of development issues outlined at the head of this chapter.

More recently the contributions of Foster-Carter (1978), Mafeje (1981), Veltmeyer (1983) and Johnson (1982, 1983) reject the 'articulation' approach to focus upon class formations as the issue confronting analysts. This takes the debate away from the problematic abstraction of 'articulation' into the more concrete issue of class formations which are viewed as central to the analysis of development issues.¹¹ For Marxists, class struggle is a reflection of contradictions between labour and capital in the mode of production, so that any explanation of non-capitalist relations of production in conjunction with capitalism must, logically, be dependent upon the stage of

class struggle within a system dominated by capitalism.¹² In turn, such a view allows Marxists to complement the wider global framework while avoiding the proliferation of types of 'articulation', as proffered by Long (1976, 1978), Hopkins (1978), and Grossman (1983). Since any developing country which has non-capitalist and capitalist modes of production must also have, ipso facto 'emerging classes', then 'articulation of modes of production' and 'class formations' become competing frames of analysis.

Against this theoretical context, Veltmeyer (1983:210) views 'the persistence of non-capitalist modes of surplus extraction, the increased involvement of women, and the proliferation of casual work as new forces released in the expanded reproduction of capital'. Non-waged forms of labour persist in less developed countries but should be viewed not as 'in articulation' but through their linkages with the capital accumulation process and the reproduction of cheap labour under conditions of superexploitation (Johnson 1983:237). These views are important for the unique theoretical problems created by the development process which are considered next.

CONCEPTUALISING THE SEMIPROLETARIAT

. . . this is clearly not a transitory phenomenon, semiproletarianization (the combination of wage labour and subsistence commodity production based on the incomplete separation of direct producers from their means of production) is, in fact, an active process of class formations in peripheral countries. (Veltmeyer 1983:209)

Theoretical problems concerning the supposed dichotomy

between proletarians and peasants are inadequately addressed in the literature. Workers in this ambiguous category defy formal definition yet they act as cheap labour. Often they are identical agents (e.g. the same individual may work in both capitalist and non capitalist relations of production) but they are referred to in the development literature (whatever the theoretical stance) by terms such as 'informal sector' (derived from the 'dual economy' thesis), 'subproletariat', 'marginalized', a 'reserve army of labour' (see e.g. Worsley 1976, Cliffe 1977, Roseberry 1978, Cohen et al 1979, Goodman & Redclift 1981, Waterman 1983) or, in Marx's own terms, as a 'lumpenproletariat' who are castigated for their lack of class consciousness (1974(b)).

Peasants exist alongside and in conjunction with proletarians, and in truth the two 'roles' often coincide. (Roseberry 1978:3)

Recently, these awkward theoretical categories have been reviewed and attempts have been made to remove them from residual 'catch all' classifications by showing the way in which, far from being marginalised, they are instrumental for the accumulation of capital in developing countries. These theoretical developments are linked, by Johnson (1983), and Veltmeyer (1983), to the wider concerns of World Systems Theory in efforts to make it more sophisticated and allow for 'internal' developments.

They refer to the essays in Bromley & Gerry (1979) which demonstrate that 'casual workers' contribute substantially to the capitalist mode of production and should not be relegated to categories which negate their economic role in development. In fact, this category has experienced rapid growth as capital requires cheaper labour. In the urban areas 'casual workers' earn cash as hawkers, car attendants, market porters, food vendors, domestic labour, services, and so on. They sell their labour power below subsistence level and are responsible for their own reproduction costs which means such labour power (directly and indirectly) becomes cheaper for capital. Since wage earnings are insufficient to cover their daily reproduction costs, this must be ensured by a manipulation of nonmarket relations with kin who retain access to land. Labour survives in the linkages between non capitalist relations of production such as subsistence, reciprocal obligations and, above all, by the unpaid labour of kin. Similarly, peasants who combine subsistence production with casual wage labour are regarded as a semiproletariat to reflect their relationship to capitalism as a source of superexploited labour.

Peasants exist in a relationship with capital . . . neither fully peasant nor fully proletarian, they are superexploited workers in a capitalist society (i.e. mere wage workers and proletarians under conditions worse than those under the immediate control of capital). (Roseberry 1978:14).

And, as Johnson points out:

. . . there are a complex of relations of exploitation

shaped by the polarizing class relations and peculiarities of the accumulation process under conditions of dependency that do not involve a proletarianization process. These relations form large groupings of producers whose surplus is appropriated through mechanisms other than wage labour e.g. unequal exchange and servile and other novel forms of labour subjugation. The social relations that produce cheap labour power also serve to reproduce the main polarizing axis of class relations. The extremely large subordinated social groupings formed within these relations is composed primarily of women whose labour produces values for family subsistence. In the recent period we are definitely not dealing with articulation of different modes of production or with precapitalism retarding capitalist development. Archaic forms have been twisted into novel forms of production relations to feed capital accumulation and forms of superexploitation of labour that are new and unique rather than retrograde, features of dependent and underdeveloped societies. (Johnson 1983:252-3 - my emphases).

In the case of 'successful' industrializing countries where state and international capital, in the form of transnational corporations, take an active role in the process of industrialization, such theoretical problems take on different dimensions, for, not only are women subsistence producers, they also form part of the industrial labour force. In such transformed structures it is women who play a critical role, as a source of cheap and/or non-valorised labour, for the development process. This situation is examined with regard to Malaysia in chapters IV, V and VI below.

For industrializing countries which are considered, by some, to be in a state of 'dependent development', the economic base of domestic and state capital is widely diversified. State capital, in particular, joins in an alliance with foreign and domestic capital. Transnational

corporations establish many levels of interaction with the state, the private sector and, of course, with the new labour force brought onto industrial assembly lines. Discussing the peculiarities of this labour force, Johnson points out:

. . . this is an historically unprecedented surplus population which is insufficiently proletarianized but which maintains precapitalist relations of production. (Johnson 1983:245).

It is emphasized that the new patterns are linked to transnational corporations and the international division of labour by gender (Safa 1981, Young et al 1981, Nash & Kelly 1983), but, insufficient attention is given to the state's role. The state exploits what it has - an abundance of cheap labour - that is, women.

This form of polarization, concentrated national and foreign capital against a labouring population is a distinct class situation . . . At the same time, the class relation, capital - to - labour, is set within a panoply of complementary social relations: mediating relations that form intermediate groupings in the social structure: relations of exploitation that do not involve wage labour; and social relations that reproduce cheap labour power, a marked sexual division of labour, and, ultimately, the polarization process. (Johnson 1983:245 my emphasis)

Veltmeyer in a similar vein says:

. . . the class structure of peripheral formations revolves around the production of a relative surplus population and features of this structure, persistence of precapitalist relations, semiproletarianization, proliferation of petty production, the sexual division of labour, serve to expand capital under conditions of 'superexploitation'. (Veltmeyer 1983:204-5)

Concentrating on women's role in development, Deere

(1979) shows the linkages between non capitalist relations of production in subsistence agriculture and the process of capital accumulation as identified by the changing structure of peasant households. For instance, in Latin America the division of labour by gender into peasant subsistence and wage labour, as it relates to the uneven development of capitalism within and between regions, is analyzed (Young 1980, Deere & Leon de Leal 1981, Beneria 1979, 1982, and Bennholdt-Thomsen 1982). The necessity for a cash income requires that males become 'proletarianized' and women take over all subsistence production as an extension of domestic labour. This is reminiscent of Rey (1975), Wolpe (1976, 1980), Meillassoux (1981), and Cliffe's (1982) work on Africa where female production of subsistence foodstuffs links with male proletarianization to enable the release of labour for seasonal or casual wage work. That the development process increases the allocation of work for women and utilises gender as the most significant variable is argued for Africa and Asia by Whitehead (1985) and Agarwal (1985).

By contrast with migrant labour patterns in Africa, in the industrializing countries of Asia young women are specifically drawn into work for capitalist production in export market factories located in the industrial free trade zones (FTZs) (Snow 1977, Lim L. 1979, 1983, Frobel et al 1980, Young et al 1981, O'Brien 1982, Nash & Kelly 1983,

Hawa Project 1983, Norlund et al 1984). Women suffer from cultural suspicions about their participation in work outside the home and from management programmes designed to reinforce docile feminine behaviour (chapter IV below). Free trade zones deepen the internationalization of the production process but this new division of labour does not displace the old one based upon subsistence production (chapter V and VI below). Low pay means that workers cannot be self-supporting and so they remain dependant upon kin engaged in subsistence production for maintenance costs. I argue that, in turn, kin rely upon these small amounts of cash and the non valorised labour of the girls in subsistence production, (a factor not examined in the literature), which concentrates upon the urban end of the factory labour migration continuum. Theorists pay no attention to the fact that these same industrial workers also participate in subsistence production. They assume workers migrate to urban free trade zones so that they, the theorists, are unaware of new patterns whereby workers live in their subsistence villages, which results in their being paid even lower wages. Workers are bussed out for shifts on factory production lines at various times of the day and night (see Chapter IV & V). Low wages are linked to the continued viability of subsistence; as Veltmeyer remarks:

. . . the intensification of precapitalist relations are maintained, even reproduced, within a larger structure dominated by capitalism. (Veltmeyer 1983:215).

Because of this particular structure, capitalism has access to a labour force without bearing the costs of its reproduction - a situation for which Deere (1979) also uses the term superexploitation. The Marxist view is that, by utilising peasants engaged in non-capitalist relations of production, capital exploits all labour and not just those in waged work since non-waged labour in subsistence production reduces production costs and the costs of the 'reserve army', (those with no wages and/or means of production), (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1982). For some analysts, the tendency is not toward the proletarianization of the workers or the 'freeing' of the labour force, but rather toward increased 'marginalization':

. . . this situation is in no way a 'transitional' one, but is a process in which subsistence is being reinforced . . . they have to do a variety of jobs at the same time . . . in order to survive. Proletarianization is incomplete, and 'freedom' from whatever and for whatever, is also incomplete . . . (Werlhof & Neuhoff 1982:90).

The point which I take issue with here and develop as the theoretical focus of the dissertation, is that the industrial labour force is dependent upon the reciprocity of kin - that is, on non market relations - but both the cash and labour contributions of female industrial workers are important for subsistence production. Although women go out to work on factory assembly lines they do not, thereby, relinquish reciprocal labour obligations in household subsistence production. There is an interdependence, the

ideological glue for which is the concept of reciprocity which is, itself, subject to manipulation at several levels of the production process.

Some scholars argue that reciprocity becomes eroded during the development process while others view reciprocal relations as an intrinsic part of capitalist expansion. The nature of reciprocity is more complex than either view acknowledges since neither clearly defines what is meant by reciprocity or in what sense they use the term. This is illustrated by the next theoretical section in which my specific approach is developed.

SECTION II

RECIPROCITY

The family tends to be internally differentiated into economic roles which cut across the conventional categories of peasant-proletarian. Within this polyvalent survival strategy, the place of women is rapidly changing and becoming more central. (Johnson 1982:7)

The theoretical view of 'superexploitation' can be criticised for adopting the anthropological tool of reciprocity as a given and failing to conceptualise the way in which reciprocity, as an ideological and economic factor, operates in the process of development. Reciprocity is a non-Marxist concept developed by Malinowski (1922/1961), Firth (1939), Polanyi (1944/1957), Mauss (1954/1974), Levi-Strauss (1949/1969), and Sahlins (1974). From the preceding theoretical section it is evident that central to recent Marxist thought is the view of a semiproletarian labour force which survives by reciprocal or non waged labour derived from kin. There is no attempt to analyse the complex multifaceted aspects of reciprocity among semi-proletarians which, as will be shown, are too easily subverted to exploitation at several levels.

Reciprocal relations may become undermined and transformed into antagonisms during the transition process and clearly defined reciprocal obligations are viewed, by the rich, as a drain on resources whereas the poor must continue with a network of reciprocity and obligations.

(Pine 1982:402).

Such a theoretical omission does not stem from a shortage of data but from the lack of conceptualisation about the varied nature of reciprocity and reciprocal labour in the development process. Following the 'conservation-dissolution' of the peasantry debate, such labour is viewed as resistant to capitalism, or as instrumental for capitalism (Long 1984). For example, Pine (1982) and Cliffe (1983) argue that reciprocity becomes eroded during the development process while Johnson (1983) and Veltmeyer (1983) see all unpaid labour as functional for the accumulation of capital. For the latter theorists archaic forms of social relations, like reciprocity, allow the new category of semi-proletarians to contribute to capital accumulation and the increased extraction of surplus value. Both theoretical arguments fail to specify how they conceptualise reciprocity referring vaguely to 'kin reciprocity' or non waged labour, nor are the different dimensions of reciprocity properly identified.

My argument is that the nature of reciprocity in the development process is more complex than these current perspectives acknowledge. The problem is not simply whether reciprocal relations are eroded or even intensified by the capitalist mode of production but, rather, to see the way in which the several levels of reciprocal relations are

utilised or selectively transformed in the capitalist development process. As Long cautions, "peasant households are not merely reproduced by the wider structure but depend upon the way existing cultural rules and social relationships affect access to, and utilization of, essential resources" (1984:2). To this end, it is essential to examine how reciprocal relations interact with state development policies. The specific role of Malay women in this whole process is elaborated upon by the conceptualisation of intra and inter household reciprocity. Another aspect which is inadequately addressed in literature on non waged labour is the way in which changes in the economic base are mediated by the peasant ideology of reciprocity, e.g. Scott's (1976) 'moral economy' or Bourdieu's (1982) 'symbolic capital'.¹³ This issue has not been examined although it is essential for understanding the way semiproletarian households survive and for analyzing the role of age and gender in household subsistence production. It should be recalled here that I define reciprocity as unpaid labour or goods exchanged within and between households; such exchanges are coupled with the ideological element of morality. Reciprocity consists, therefore, of both material and non material components.

THE USE OF RECIPROCITY BY ANTHROPOLOGISTS

Working from a functionalist concern with order and

control, anthropologists such as Malinowski (1922/1961), Mauss (1954/1974), Firth (1939), and Fortes (1949) produced classic works which all regard reciprocity as a device to facilitate social stability and integration in tribal and peasant economies. Since Malinowski, the 'principle of reciprocity' has been viewed as the basis for social order. Indeed, for Malinowski, 'give and take' permeates the whole social system which operates by means of reciprocal exchanges with variations in balance and equivalence so that a continuum through time is established. The importance of this work lies in that Malinowski recognised reciprocity rested upon symmetrical forms of social organization (kinship). The levels of reciprocity are distinguished by ceremonial, clan, and lineage exchanges of valuables, women, and goods. Such exchanges are differentiated geographically, spatially, and temporally and characterised by behaviours ranging from the most sophisticated ceremonial acts to the crudest haggling over utilitarian goods. The many different levels of the Trobriand Islands' economy are integrated, for Malinowski, by the principle (and sanction) of reciprocity.

Firth (1939) similarly posits the principle of reciprocity as a fundamental base of social life:

. . . there is a code of reciprocity in economic transactions, but this is but part of a wider code which obtains for all types of social relationship which linguistically as well as practically are brought into line with it, and receive much more overt and institutionalized

expression. (Firth 1939:355).

Polynesian society is maintained by interlocking reciprocal exchanges "not for the immediate individual transaction alone, but for an infinite series of transactions in which the idea of reciprocity is embedded" (Ibid:348). Meyer Fortes (1949) is occupied with the way in which equilibrium is maintained among the Tallensi by the principle of reciprocity. Potential strains in the social structure, which lie along agnatic and affinal kinship lines, are avoided by the balanced exchanges of services and goods.

Clearly then, for functionalists, the principle or norm of reciprocity is seen as essential for the economic survival and stability of societies. The way in which they use the principle of reciprocity does, however, shift from a description of critical functional elements to a description of the attitudes, practices and rules observed by people (MacCormack 1976:89-103).

In the French sociological tradition of Durkheim, Mauss treats social facts as things. He sees the total social phenomena of 'the gift' which at the same time:

. . . concern the whole of society and its institutions
 . . . they concern individual and collective rights . . .
 they are at once political and domestic, being of interest
 both to classes, and to clans and families . . . We are
 concerned with wholes, with systems in their entirety.
 (Mauss 1974:76-77).

Mauss identifies, as a social fact, the universality of gift exchange through historical evolution, and the moral obligation to give, to receive, and to repay. He even extends his analysis to the modern state which, representing the community, owes the industrial worker security. Reciprocal exchange increases social solidarity by tying people together in transactions based upon morality, mutual obligation and self-interest (1974:1). For Mauss: ". . . prestations are in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, but are, in fact, obligatory and interested" (Ibid:1). Although he also provides a functional explanation, the reason why gift exchange exists is because reciprocity is an essential social norm. Mauss emphasises the need for reciprocity but he also identifies the normative and structural implications since the practice of reciprocity ensures that communication is facilitated by gift exchange, (e.g. the Kula ring). As Badcock's (1975:50) discussion of Mauss illustrates, in its structural implications, reciprocity determines that a logically ordered system of exchanges should operate in a society, since the norm of reciprocity sets up a system of equivalences which must be respected.

Developing the French tradition further by his theory of structuralism, Levi-Strauss (1949/1969, 1963) argues that a universal incest taboo necessitates the exchange of women. Not only does 'sister exchange' solve incest, it

facilitates reciprocity, as a flow of goods and communication which forms exchange, the basis of all social structures. The avoidance of incest by exchange is, for Levi-Strauss, the original social fact upon which culture is created. Reciprocity is, therefore, a building block for humanity, as a species being, since it "integrates the opposition between the self and others" (Levi-Strauss 1969:84, quoted by MacCormack 1976:97). For Levi-Strauss, then, reciprocity is universal and constitutes both psychological and economic imperatives.

The substantivist view of reciprocity is developed by Polanyi (1944/1957, 1957, 1977) who builds upon Malinowski's insights for an evolutionary model of political-economic 'institutions' of 'integration'. Reciprocal behaviour between clans, lineages, or other symmetrical groupings acts as a method of economic integration; indeed reciprocity as an integrative device only functions because it occurs between equivalent behaviours or personal interrelations, only with the structural patterns created by the movements of goods and people in the economy.

Neither reciprocity nor exchange is possible . . . without the prior existence of a structure pattern which neither is, nor can be, the result of individual actions of mutuality. Reciprocity involves the presence of two or more symmetrically placed groups whose members can behave similarly toward one another in economic matters . . . the validating and organizing factor springs not from the individual but from the collective actions of persons in structured situations. (Polanyi 1977:37).

Polanyi adds redistribution and (market) exchange as later types of 'institutional' integration. Initially, in tribal societies, kinship functions as a means of reciprocal distribution but, with the growth of feudalism and the state, politico-religious relations become centralized, hierarchical and redistributive. Redistribution does not constitute reciprocity but, for Polanyi, all forms of distribution occur to a certain degree at all stages of economic development.

Although market exchange is dominant and integrative in capitalism, it is not the exclusive mode of transaction. Householding is almost extinct, but reciprocal transactions survive as ceremonial and emergency transactions between kin and friends (but do not enter production processes save in family enterprises). Where one finds reciprocity dominant and integrative . . . one also finds household present, as well as petty market exchange of a narrow range of goods. Reciprocity as a form of integration gains greatly in power through its capacity of employing both redistribution and market exchange as subordinate methods. (Polanyi 1957a:253).

Householding is a subtype which Polanyi (1977:147-157) identifies for a peasant economy, but it is poorly developed as a concept since it is evolutionary in tone and views reciprocity as declining with a concomitant increase of individualism among peasants in centralized states.

In the substantivist tradition Dalton (1981) uses reciprocity in opposition to exploitation to argue that peasants are adequately recompensed for their labour according to the sociological situation. The use of the

term sociological situation is a gloss for social inequality or class position. For instance, in Dalton's discussion of what European peasants received in return for their labour:

. . . the peasants were social, religious, and political inferiors as well as economic inferiors . . . The peasants paid up countable things, so many labour days per year working the lord's desmesne, so many coins, so many chickens and eggs. They received back not countable things, but the right to use so much land to produce subsistence and cash crops . . . emergency food in times of famine, and also military protection from invasion. And for their obligatory payments in countable things to the church they received back the services of baptism, communion, marriage, and burial, plus festive holidays and heaven after death. (Dalton 1981:80-81)

Such reciprocal returns, for Dalton, are justified at the level of 'exchange' and although he recognises the process of 'inequality' this is not perceived as exploitation nor is it applied to the relations of production. For an extensive critique of Dalton on the issue of peasant exploitation see Stein (1984). To assume that a peasant household's life time labour is adequately recompensed by military protection (which peasants themselves provided), famine relief (from food peasants had grown), and heaven after death is inadequate. Dalton extends the concept of negative reciprocity to gloss what are exploitative relations between feudal lords, the clergy and peasants.

Following in the substantivist tradition, Sahlins (1974:193-199) constructs a tripartite model to analyze

reciprocity and other methods of exchange and distribution for what he terms 'primitive' cultures lacking a political state.

It seems possible to lay out in abstract fashion a continuum of reciprocities, based on vice versa nature of exchanges, along which empirical instances . . . can be placed. The stipulation of material returns . . . would be the critical thing. For this there are obvious objective criteria, such as the toleration of material unbalance and the leeway of delay: the initial movement of goods from hand to hand is more or less requited materially and there are variations in the time allowed for reciprocation. The spirit of exchange swings from disinterested concern for the other party through mutuality to self interest. The assessment of sidedness can be supplemented by empirical criteria in addition to those of immediacy and material equivalence; the initial transfer may be voluntary, involuntary, prescribed, contracted; the return freely bestowed, exacted, or dunned; the exchange haggled or not, the subject of accounting or not; and so forth. (Sahlins Ibid:193)

At the positive end of his continuum are close kin transactions which are singular and notable for their altruistic sharing, 'pure' gifts, help and generosity. Here the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite and not stipulated by time, quantity or quality (generalized reciprocity). In the middle lies the direct exchange connected with trade and utility goods which demand an immediate return of equivalence (balanced reciprocity). At the unsociable extreme is the attempt to get something for nothing through guile, violence, or theft (negative reciprocity) which is typical of the malevolent transactions between strangers. As Sahlins remarks "It is a long way from a suckling child to a Plains Indians

horseraid . . . the classification is too widely set . . . empirical exchanges often fall somewhere along the line" (Ibid:196). As with Malinowski, Sahlin's model of reciprocity is linked to kinship distance, exchange relations, and variations in temporal sequences.

Although Marx is not concerned with reciprocity per se, his view is that human beings as social animals develop co-operation by a simple division of labour (e.g. The German Ideology and Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations). In pre-monetary economies the exchange of surplus is for use and self-maintenance. By working in and upon nature humans become ". . . individualised through the process of history. He originally appears as a generic being, a tribal being, a herd animal . . . Exchange itself is a major agent of this individualisation" (1965:96). The early stage of egalitarian exchange for use is transformed, for Marx, into exchange for profit and gain; use value is transformed into exchange value. Community gives way to individualism under capitalism, and exchange is transformed from use value into a dehumanised social mechanism in which:

The exchange of equivalents occurs (but it is merely) the surface layer of a production which rests on the appropriation of other people's labour without exchange, but under the guise of exchange . . . the system of exchange values - the exchange of equivalents measured in labour - turns into the appropriation of other people's labour without exchange, the total separation of labour and property. (Marx 1965:114).

From a Marxist position, Meillassoux (1981b) restricts

the use of reciprocity to egalitarian relations because, for him, reciprocity presupposes social equality whereas redistribution entails asymmetrical relations which cannot be described as reciprocal. Notwithstanding this view, Polanyi's concepts have been incorporated into the French Marxist tradition. Polanyi (1957) specifies reciprocity, redistribution and (market) exchange as 'integrative' and whichever is the dominant system simultaneously organizes production and dictates the patterns of redistribution.

These integrative mechanisms are, for Marxists, relations of production (Godelier 1981, Halperin 1984).

Polanyi is not concerned with exploitative relations since his attention lies with forms of 'integration, circulation and exchange', and so he ignores the value of labour actually involved in the production process. This is similar to the shortcomings identified in the World Systems Theory (chapter II above), which restricts analysis to the levels of circulation, markets, and exchange; it is a criticism similarly applicable to the substantivist perspectives of Polanyi (1957), Dalton (1974, 1981), and Sahlins (1974).

Insufficient attention is paid to the precise nature of the social phenomena described by reciprocity and whether it refers to ideology, practice, rules, or expectations. There are subtle shifts in the levels of definition, from

the abstract to the concrete, as well as in the units of analysis, so that the use of reciprocity to describe exchange relations between individuals, groups, and whole societies becomes too vague and loose. Clearly, the term reciprocity is used to refer to individual and collective transactions, it is used to gloss both egalitarian and exploitative relationships according to theoretical predilections.

MacCormack (1976) criticises anthropologists for failing to distinguish between the function of reciprocity as a description of social phenomena, and its use as a model in terms of which the structure and stability of societies is explained. Echoing similar dissatisfactions, Weiner (1981) wishes to move beyond models of reciprocity as discrete acts of giving and receiving; she criticises both functionalists and substantivists for this approach.

For Weiner, the 'norm of reciprocity' must be located within a larger system in which the reproduction of people and relationships are integrated and she argues against the functionalist and substantivist models for their mechanistic foundations which fail to account for temporal strategies over generations. This causes her to dispense with reciprocity in favour of a model of reproduction which emphasises temporal replacement. The norm of reciprocity must be examined, then, as part of a larger reproductive and regenerative system. The model, she says, ignores

temporal dimensions in favour of reciprocal equivalences for what, in fact, may be a process of replacement/reproduction over time. In Weiner's research area of Melanesia, of course, the view of reproduction and continuity by ancestors, lineages, and descent groups through time is highly elaborated by extensive feasts and exchange systems. Weiner's reproductive view is predicated upon Bourdieu's (1977/1982) argument that models based on reciprocity substitute a timeless framework for a scheme which only works itself out in and through time.

Adopting a dialectical-materialist approach, within the French Marxist tradition, Bourdieu (1982) eschews earlier definitions and use of reciprocity. He argues to the effect that reciprocity as a practice can only be defined by the fact that its temporal structure, direction, and rhythm is constitutive of its meaning. He attempts to move beyond what he terms mechanical anthropological models of the cycle of reciprocity to emphasise practice.

Once the possibility is admitted that the "mechanical law" of the cycle of reciprocity may not apply, the whole logic of practice is transformed . . . uncertainty remains as to the outcome of the interaction as long as the sequence has not been completed. (Bourdieu 1982:8).

It will be recalled from chapter I, that my concern is with the ideology and practice of reciprocity from the level of the household outwards and the manner in which reciprocity serves to reproduce social relations and the

production process. To this end I conceptualise intra and inter household reciprocity. This illustrates how reciprocity can be transformed into exploitation within the sphere of labour control which extends from the household to the international division of labour.

Reciprocity creates a problem for Marxist theory since economic concepts are not designed for the cultural 'altruistic' and 'moral' aspects of reciprocity. Reciprocity - where it is referred to by Marxists is viewed as a given; it is neither defined, nor is it subjected to further scrutiny. Anthropological research on peasant economy stresses the moral and economic aspects of reciprocity but there are no attempts to integrate national with local level analyses. Such linkages are not identified since it is assumed that they require different theoretical perspectives. To understand the linkages among the relations of production, analysts should consider the cultural value placed upon reciprocal labour by the households themselves (e.g. Long 1984) and illustrate both the moral and economic components of reciprocity in interaction. Intra and inter household reciprocal labour exchanges are linked to subsistence production and the international division of labour - both waged and non waged spheres are essential for peasant household survival.

As developed by early anthropologists, reciprocal exchange is the obligatory gift and counter gift giving

between people who stand in socially defined relationships to each other. Economic calculation is, ideally if not actually, absent - only the giving and receiving of goods or services should balance out (Mauss 1954, Sahlins 1974). But the emphasis on social relationships and 'culture' does not preclude calculation; indeed, reciprocity contains important elements of competition (Malinowski 1922, Mauss 1954, Bourdieu 1982). Malinowski, Polanyi and Sahlins posit that reciprocity takes place within the frameworks of kinship, neighbourhood, and village boundaries so as to prohibit the haggling characteristic of the market place. At this level, economising behaviour is ideologically subordinated to the kinship values of reciprocal exchange yet the way in which such reciprocity is practiced reveals otherwise as will become evident when labour exchange and control over labour power, conducted under the ideology of reciprocity, are examined.

COMPARATIVE DATA

All Southeast Asian cultures embody the principle of reciprocity and most anthropological studies of the region mention it. The redistributive aspect of reciprocity is elaborated upon by Geertz (1963) who coins the term 'shared poverty' for Java, and he notes:

Under the pressure of increasing numbers and limited resources, Javanese village society did not bifurcate . . . into a group of large landlords and a group of oppressed near-serfs. Rather it maintained a . . . high degree of social and economic homogeneity by dividing the economic

pie into a steadily increasing number of minute pieces, a process to which I have referred elsewhere as "shared poverty." (Geertz 1963:97).

Geertz views reciprocity and redistributive arrangements as a process in which rapid population increase was absorbed into padi cultivation without serious falls in income (agricultural involution). Such cultural values of shared poverty account for the failure of Java to 'take off into modernization' but, more important for Geertz, they account for the non-polarization of classes. As White (1983:27) replies, there was no bifurcation of the peasantry in a Leninist sense, but opposing classes certainly emerged. The shared poverty concept has been revived and criticised recently (Stoler 1977, Gerdin 1982, Alexander & Alexander 1982). Shared poverty is interpreted as the product of work sharing and income redistribution - a view in line with Javanese ideology. Stoler's (1977) study relates harvesting arrangements tightly to Javanese village stratification. The methods of recruiting and paying harvest labour suggest income sharing and redistribution from the rich to the poor. Javanese explain the high shares of rice paid to neighbours and kin in terms of moral obligations and generosity - but this is without any economic cost - since landowners receive high shares when they, in turn, assist at harvests. The costs and benefits of reciprocal labour link tightly with the

relative economic power of landowners as opposed to landless labourers. The landless receive as little as one sixth of the proportion of landed households for identical work. Women are paid with a share of the padi harvest which is viewed as mutual co-operation (gotong royong) or, by Geertz, as 'shared poverty'. As Stoler says, this is hardly evidence for egalitarian shared poverty or even work sharing. The strong ideological emphasis on reciprocity and symmetrical ties obscures the real conditions of asymmetrical allocation which determine peasant labour relations.

Analyzing Balinese reciprocal labour patterns, Gerdin (1982:56) similarly argues against the 'homogenous' treatment of peasants and for 'heterogeneity' as a point of departure. She criticises the view of income sharing for its failure to identify labour transfers from workers to land owners. Work sharing does not mean there is an equal spread of product, so Gerdin suggests: "Geertz's hypothesis is based on a folk model of distribution. However, a folk model of distribution can not be equated with an assessment of the actual distribution of material means" (1982:222).

When a Balinese says that a landowner helps people by employing them, he alludes to a highly appraised ideal of generosity and responsibility. This ideal of generosity clashes with a clearly perceived economic rationality which entails an explicit search for profit. Profit making, as such, is legitimate . . . but when the search for profit necessitates disregard for generosity and responsibilities towards less fortunate kin and friends, it becomes immoral. (Ibid:223).

In sum, the Javanese and Balinese research does not dispute the ideology of reciprocity, but, assigning 'reciprocal ideology' a determinant role when distribution follows economic distinctions is erroneous. There are two theoretical views of this specific aspect of reciprocity which are still current in the Southeast Asian literature. The first lays emphasis upon an 'homogenous' peasantry with an ethic of 'income sharing' whose 'cultural values' have primacy over economic concerns. The second view considers the 'heterogeneity' of peasant society and the way in which large landowners exploit smallholders and landless labourers. Such exploitation is couched in and concealed by the pervasive ideology of reciprocity. The data presented in chapter V and VI supports this second view. But since neither theoretical approach mentions intra-household reciprocity, I add this hitherto neglected dimension. No theoretical attention has been paid to intra-household reciprocity or linkages which are thereby formed to the wider economy. My conceptualisation of intra and inter household reciprocity illustrates the way reciprocity is transformed into exploitation by the control of labour and so allows an analysis of reciprocal labour exchanges from the peasant household out to the international division of labour. In this way the linkages are illustrated and the way in which foreign and state capital depends upon the

maintenance of peasant culture and practices becomes apparent.

MALAYSIA

There are no volumes directed specifically to the topic of reciprocity in Malaysia, although most studies of Malay peasants briefly acknowledge, yet do not analyze, reciprocal labour in padi production. Anthropologists working on the Malay peasantry document economic and status inequalities, for example, Firth (1966), Swift (1964, 1965), Syed Husin Ali (1975), and Kessler (1978). Marxist perspectives on the peasantry, colonialism, and the penetration of capital come from Malaysian scholars such as Shamsul Baharuddin (1979), Lim Mah Hui (1980, 1982), Fatimah Halim (1983), and Zawawi (1983). While reciprocity lies outside their general frame of reference, Zawawi does examine the role of 'redistributive reciprocity'. Working from the heterogenous side of the equation, Zawawi (1983) adapts Scott's 'moral economy' and the peasant concept of justice in the context of labour relations on a Trengganu oil palm plantation (see map I). He discusses the decline of the moral economy and reciprocal obligations in patron-clientage whereby rights to basic subsistence and moral etiquette (budi bahasa) are undermined by the process of proletarianization. For the plantation proletariat, selling labour devalues human dignity and erodes peasant concepts of morality and reciprocity.

Recently, Fujimoto (1983), has taken Geertz's concept of 'shared poverty' and refined it into what he terms 'income sharing' among Malay peasants. The essence of his argument is that land owners are bound by concepts of reciprocity, rather than economic calculations, in their dealings with tenants. He cites Swift, Syed Husin Ali, and Kessler to the effect that village values stress egalitarianism while Islamic social theory induces Malays to maintain interests with, and obligations towards, their fellows. All this is quite correct, but, these same authors are simultaneously at pains to elucidate the elaborate status and economic differentiation among Malay peasants -- a trend noted by pre-independence scholars such as Firth (1947/1966), and, more recently, by Kessler (1978), Afifuddin Omar (1978), De Koninck et al (1980). As Firth (1947/1966) points out in his discussion of Malay peasant economy:

Do the social ties between producers modify the operation of the economic process? Most anthropologists would think so. Yet what is interesting above all in this situation is that these economic processes, which had widened the gap between capitalist entrepreneurs and propertyless fishermen, were not cushioned to any apparent degree by the elaborate network of kinship ties in the local social system . . . Such inequality is regarded as a matter essentially of domestic or elementary family concern, and even siblings do not by any means come to each other's aid. And though Islam enjoins charity on all Believers, this is not the same thing as effective action on any scale to even out inequalities of income. Hence, the kinship ties of these fishermen do not inhibit their economic calculations, though they may soften its intensity. As I have shown, economic competition between kin may be keen. (Firth 1966:348).

An egalitarian ideology of reciprocity exists among Malays (a view supported by my own data), but what Fujimoto (1983), fails to account for is the gross disparity between this ideology of 'redistributive' (income sharing) reciprocity and economic practice. This approach is an addition to the Geertzian 'homogenous' viewpoint which Fujimoto adopts uncritically so that he fails to differentiate between the analyst's model, the peasant's view, and the practice of reciprocity. He does not consider inequality, status, land ownership, political-religious factionalism, manipulation of Bumiputra privileges, external linkages or the critical role of the state. A point I make throughout this dissertation is that the triple alliance (chapter III), the nature of exploitation in factories (chapter IV), the age and gender control over household labour (Ch V) and capital accumulation by entrepreneurs (chapter VI) is precisely based upon the dual nature of reciprocity which facilitates the accumulation of capital and control over a cheap and/or non-valorised labour force. In turn, these cumulative factors attract investment and more capital penetration.

Any post 1970 analysis of Malay peasants which fails to consider outmigration, industrialization, wage labour, and which does not link villages tightly to state policy and capital penetration is skewed. Fujimoto gives no details as

to how non-agricultural labour sustains the subsistence sector. He argues that hired labour is employed at the expense of the under-utilization of family labour because of social and Islamic obligations to provide jobs to poor peasants. Although land owners are aware of the higher expense of labour in manual harvesting, Fujimoto maintains that no-one uses combines to harvest padi, preferring instead to incur the heavier expenditure of hired labour to fulfill 'income sharing' obligations (1983:196). Clearly, there are other factors involved here which are insufficiently elucidated and De Koninck (1986) has a research proposal to this end. I suggest that the fact that combines must be hired from Chinese may influence decision making, and perhaps the water table, access, quantity and quality of the land mean that combine hire is not feasible. Fujimoto's comparison between the subsections of two villages (on the East and West coasts which are treated as 'closed units') without referring to external linkages skews the analysis toward ideological reciprocity so as to support a view of landlord-tenant labour arrangements as an example of homogeneity, altruism, and 'income sharing'.

SUMMARY

The fact that reciprocal labour changes during the development process and is subverted by cash payments is stressed in the literature e.g. rich peasants no longer

bear moral responsibilities toward poor kin; (Cliffe 1982), and patron-client bonds are eroded (Scott 1972). For Scott (1976), the concept of balanced reciprocity forms the moral basis of peasant judgements about justice and exploitation in patron-client relations. It is only when peasants are forced below a minimum subsistence standard that they perceive exploitation and express anger at unequal distributions. Against Geertz (1963), the basis for levelling mechanisms and shared poverty, (such as labour relations and harvest gleaning), is destroyed (Stoler 1977, Alexander & Alexander 1982, and White 1983). There is, too, a denial of the moral economy whereby rights to subsistence and reciprocity are ignored (Scott 1976); and moral etiquette (budi bahasa) is undermined by proletarianization which involves moral suffering and the devaluation of human worth (Zawawi 1983).¹⁴ Apart from Ackerman (1980:126), who briefly notes the existence of moral debts to parents (balas budi), there are no attempts to analyze the viability of reciprocity in the industrialization process. For the industrialized states, rights to benevolence and human dignity were denied to factory workers in Japan (Smith 1984), whereas in Britain's industrialization process, proletarian rights to moral claims on the social order became politicised (Thompson 1971). The implication is that industrialization destroys traditional rights, values and reciprocity - such a view

requires clarification and an analysis made of the way in which reciprocity fares in this process of structural change. From the field data it becomes obvious that the linkages between peasant ideas and practice of reciprocity and state industrialization have become tightly bound.

Anthropologists have always taken villages as a unit of analysis yet they offer nothing about how the concepts of reciprocity endure within peasant households, or about the precise way in which reciprocity is instrumental in the industrialization process and forms linkages to the wider economy. Only Sahlins (1974) attempts to analyze the way in which reciprocity operates in close kin relations and he fails to perceive the potentially exploitative aspects of such reciprocity (chapter V below). By examining the specific position of the female labour force in Malaysia's industrialization process, I show how exploitation in transnational corporations is mediated by peasant demands of reciprocity (balas budi; budi bahasa). Girls work for their households and status accrues to those who help their parents. This is expressed by the core concept of balas budi which is best glossed as reciprocity and gratitude by children to parents for nurturance (e.g Ackerman 1980:126). This is a lifelong debt which can never be repaid and so deferential polite behaviour toward, and cash prestations for, parents are required at all times.¹⁵ The demands of balas budi result in a process of exploitation for peasant

girls employed in factories. Girls are exploited by transnational corporations by the extraction of surplus value and payment of low wages and, after shift work, they must labour in household production. The utilization of cultural values facilitates this labour process which is viewed in the ideological terms of kin reciprocity. Girls on assembly lines earn low rates of pay and seldom enjoy any personal control of their earnings. They have the anomalous status of being unmarried females in peasant households so that they are deemed dependent, but, paradoxically, the households are dependent upon them, their unpaid labour, and their wage earning abilities. The exploitation of factory workers results from the processes of wage labour in world market factories and unpaid labour in subsistence production which stems from the ideological and practical imperatives of reciprocity in the process of industrialization. Malay peasant concepts - and the practice - of reciprocity are a way of discharging moral debts (balas budi), and, enhancing self worth. These cultural values prompt girls to work in factories to discharge their debts - a process which factories use to their own benefits to form an integral part of capital accumulation by TNCs and the state. The Malay view of reciprocity combines with views of gender to legitimate the extraction of labour from the girls at the level of the household and also in TNCs producing goods for export

markets. In Malaysia, industrial wage labour which requires migration or daily commuting is unavailable to older women. The gender and age related authority structure of peasant subsistence actually interacts with that of the new international division of labour. Young women fill a wage earning niche unavailable to older women who remain firmly locked into subsistence production. Daughters work for mothers as a duty which, in turn, frees older women for subsistence/income generating activities and reciprocal labour obligations.

Although age and gender serve as a mechanism for the division of labour these economic relationships are characterised by an ideology of reciprocity . . . any kinship relationship contains within it a clearly defined set of reciprocal rights and obligations . . . whereby kin call on the labour of each other. (Pine 1982:392).

Clearly, then, any theoretical conceptualization of the exploitation effected by capital accumulation in industrializing countries should not stop at merely arguing that profits are made by transnational corporations from cheap female labour. The theory must be pushed further to show the way in which this pressure upon the female labour force is exercised in a double way - from both the inside out and the outside in. A clearer understanding needs to be gained of the process which Roseberry (1978), Deere (1979), Johnson (1983) and Veltmeyer (1983) refer to as superexploitation. These authors do not identify the ideology of reciprocity itself as a complex element of this

exploitation and it remains inadequately conceptualised; they tend toward an egalitarian view of kin reciprocity so that hierarchical factors such as age and gender in the control of labour power are ignored.

RECIPROCITY & EXPLOITATION

In this dissertation I identify two broad categories of reciprocal relations (i) intra-household labour and, (ii) inter-household labour, which are used as ordering devices. I link these distinctions to the several layers of reciprocity which operate among Malay peasants, as follows:

- (a) parent-child reciprocal obligations (balas budi)
- (b) labour (help) given to people (tolong menolong) for
feasts, alms, life crises and, lately,
cash cropping
- (c) reciprocal labour (berdarau) for work in padi
production
- (d) voluntary village labour (gotong royong) for
kampung activities such as clearing the grave
yard, irrigation ditches, prayer house
maintenance, or helping at community functions
in the local hall.

Some of these relationships exhibit an equivalent exchange, some are clearly exploitative, others are played out over the lifetime of households, and yet others are inter-generational: there are both short term and long term

transactions. The important point is that all serve as an important mechanism of household maintenance and reproduction; they form linkages to the wider economic arena. The ideology and practice can only be revealed by examining the essentially contextual nature of reciprocity apparent in chapters IV, V, and VI. At any time, households may be involved in several levels but the largest group engaged in reciprocity is ideally one of consanguineal and affinal kin. Neighbours and friends take a close second place but, where relations with kin are strained, neighbours take a primary place in reciprocal dues or reciprocity may become narrowed and intensified to the household itself. I also argue against the implicit theoretical assumption of households as homogenous or static units. These aspects are developed further in chapter V and VI to show the way in which reciprocity and exploitation operate in Malaysia's economic development process.

Both the Malaysian and the theoretical literature deal with reciprocity at the levels of (b) and (c) so the analysis of the critical intra-household reciprocity and the way this links with inter-household reciprocity in the process of Malaysian industrialization has never been identified. The role of factory workers in intra and inter-household reciprocity (a, b, c) is laid out in chapters IV, V and VI below.

So far as reciprocal labour in subsistence agriculture is concerned, my data supports the heterogenous arguments of Stoler and Gerdin. Inter household kinship ties are neither solidary nor egalitarian and there is a sloughing off of poor and landless kin which partially supports Cliffe and Pine's views that reciprocal relations become eroded with capitalism. Within intra-household reciprocity, however, such relations are narrowed and intensified (see chapter V below). Peasant reciprocity as ideology and practice becomes selectively transformed in the economic development process.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In part I of this chapter, the theoretical approaches to economic development in less developed countries are reviewed. The discussion ranges from the holistic perspective of world systems theory, which emphasises the 'external' forces of capitalism, to dependent development which modifies this view. A third view is that of the modes of production theory which concentrates upon the way 'internal' forces interact with 'external' factors. A recent addition to the theoretical debate on imperialist development is the role of transnational corporations, the new international division of labour, and the gender specific nature of its workers. Contrary to orthodox Marxism, this industrial labour force is not always freed from the land but forms a new category of semi-proletariat.

In part II, it is argued that the semi-proletariat, in order to survive the industrial-development process remain dependent upon the reciprocal labour of kin. This phenomenon is referred to in the recent literature as superexploitation. The problem is that although reciprocity forms an implicit and integral part of theoretical developments, it remains inadequately conceptualised. The various levels of reciprocity are discussed and emphasis is laid upon the conceptualisation of intra and inter household reciprocity. In this way an appropriate analysis can be made of the way in which reciprocity fares in the capitalist development process. The dissolution - conservation debate is challenged and attention is directed to the way in which reciprocity - a multidimensional phenomenon - is utilised and transformed by peasant households locked into the process of economic development.

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CHAPTER III

THE STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Malaysia is a counter example to the thesis of the unimportance of Free Trade Zones and Transnational Corporations ... they have been used to the advantage of the State.
(Datta-Chadhuri 1982:5)

This chapter discusses the strategies pursued under Malaysia's New Economic Policy to attract transnational corporations. It analyzes the impact transnational corporations have had on economic development and examines the State's ability to exert a degree of control over the role of TNCs in the nation's industrialization process. The discussion argues against world systems theory and the view of less developed countries as 'victims' of transnational Corporations.

Some analysts view transnational corporations as a negative factor in the development efforts of less developed countries. Indeed, TNCs are perceived as a principal source of 'underdevelopment' which create capital outflows and contribute to balance of payment problems and increased unemployment. Others such as Szymanski (1981), Warren (1982), and Crone (1983)

suggest that TNCs do not necessarily cause an outflow of capital and they go on to investigate the effects of national and regional organizations in counteracting what are perceived to be the undesirable effects of TNCs. This chapter examines the way in which Malaysia has dealt with such problems under the New Economic Policy.

Adopting a 'world systems' approach, Lim L (1979) Enloe (1979, 1980(b)), and Frobel (1980) argue that TNCs have a negative impact in Malaysia. By collaborating with local elites they constitute an exploitative source of underdevelopment in the "new international division of labour". Such views require clarification, for it is not just foreign owned TNCs which exploit workers since conditions are no worse than those in locally owned industries. In terms of exploitation, the extraction of surplus value is higher but factory work is preferred to traditional employment (see chapter V). It is the way in which domestic, state and international capital combine and contribute to increasing inequality in Malaysian society which is of analytical significance. World systems theorists pay insufficient attention to the fact that TNCs are not the only form of capital investment and that state controls are imposed in the interests of economic nationalism and Malay

chauvinism. Such a theoretical perspective must be modified in the face of evidence which shows that Malaysia is not, as such analyses generally suggest, the unmitigated victim of international capital, or TNCs. In terms of national level development, Malaysia's record is impressive and it enjoys the highest standard of living in Southeast Asia, after Singapore.

Malaysia is already the world's single largest supplier of tin (27%), natural rubber (45%), pepper (17%), and palm oil (65%) and the GDP growth rate (at constant prices) averaged 8.5% for 1976-80 (BNM 1979). There are 8.7 million acres (25%) under cultivation, of which 80% is in rubber (4.2 million acres) and oil palm (4 million acres). Some 843,000 acres of padi is grown, of which 60% is double cropped (World Bank 1982, Clad 1985). Natural resources, plus domestic petroleum and gas, coupled with export earnings which rose from M\$5.1 billion in 1970, to M\$28.4 billion in 1980 lend credence to Datta-Chadhuri's statement at the head of this chapter. Malaysia enjoys an 87%-90% self sufficiency in rice (Lim D 1983:12). Rubber, oil, tin, palm oil and timber accounted for 73.3% of total export earnings during 1981, while manufacturing was some 18.8% of the total for that year and is planned to

reach 26.6% by 1990 (MIDA 1982). On the negative side, recession slowed the growth rate in 1982 and 1983 which necessitated cuts in development spending by 40% in 1983. The state expects the private sector to increase investment and offset public sector cuts which in turn may exacerbate the inequalities in Malaysia so as to skew the targets of the New Economic Policy scheduled for 1990 (Mehmet 1984).

THE ROOTS OF MALAYSIA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

In the pre-colonial period the Malay peninsula was politically organised around small sultanates and chiefdoms based on control over riverine settlements, trade revenues, levies on goods in transit, and tax farming. Malay sultans and chiefs exacted corvee and extracted surpluses from the peasantry by a system of debt and slave bondage to ensure sufficient supplies of labour for the rulers' agriculture, and, domestic and military purposes (Newbold 1839, Low 1838, 1849, 1850, Logan 1851). Vigorous indigenous trade in tin, gold, silver, silk, spices, rice and jungle produce was conducted with India, Arabia, China, Java, Siam and Cambodia from the 12th to the 18th centuries only to be destroyed by Europeans who imposed punitive measures on Malay maritime trade (Alatas 1977).

The Malay chiefdoms and sultanates were variously affected by the Portuguese who invaded Malacca (1511),

followed by the Dutch (1614) in their search for tin and, finally, by British mercantile capitalism. The British East India Company, from their Bengal base, established a settlement at Penang (1775) and extracted a lease for the island (1786) from the Sultan of Kedah (Anderson 1825, Low 1849, Light 1850). Francis Light undertook that the Company would protect the Sultan against his Siamese enemies and pay him an allowance of some \$10,000 per annum - neither was forthcoming. In a letter of 15th September, 1786, to the Bengal office of the Company, Light wrote:

The excellency of this situation for a commercial exchange is evident from the united opinions of every person who has been here, Europeans and Indians. From the heart burning of the Dutch, and from the jealousy of the people of Quedah, who already foresee they must be dependent upon this place, for any foreign Trade etc. We take away from Quedah its valuable Trade - we withhold the only return stipulated by the King, in the first instance, viz. protection and assistance, and we wonder that the people of Quedah should be jealous of us. (Anderson 1824:63 my emphasis).

The Straits of Malacca were of great strategic importance to Britain which founded 'Straits Settlements' at Penang (1786), Singapore (1819) and Malacca (1824) with a view to extracting the produce of the Peninsula such as tin and spices, plantations, and controlling the India and China trade. Moderate tin mining started around 1777 financed by Chinese in association with Malay rulers whose social, political

and economic authority eventually proved incapable of accommodating Chinese rivalry. Labour for the mines came from a variety of systems such as debt slavery, purchased or captured slaves, and indentured labour (Ahmat 1979, Zaharah Mahmud 1979, Sullivan 1982). In 1862 an outbreak of fighting between rival Chinese tin mining factions was Britain's excuse to take control of Perak state and the tin industry - tin being a precious commodity for the then industrializing Europe.

Chinese and Europeans invested heavily in the Malay States but demanded a modern political administration before they risked capital for infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, go-downs, banking and credit facilities. The tin wars prompted British intervention so paved the way to formal political and economic control of the Malay States, (a process finally completed in 1914). The process should be viewed in a wider economic perspective than 'helping the Sultans' - the explanation usually offered for the 1869 Pangkor Treaty (Latiff 1977). The wider context included competition and challenges to Britain's role as a leading world trading and industrial power; other monopoly competitors such as Germany, France, and the USA posed economic threats to Britain's imperial strength in Asia. France, for example, was extending influence to

the north in Siam, Khymer, and Indo China. Germany was interested in Singapore, North Borneo and New Guinea, and all the European powers were simultaneously competing for spheres of influence in Africa and China.

It is the old story of misgovernment of Asiatic states. This might go on without any serious consequences except the stoppage of trade were it not that European and Chinese capitalists stimulated by the great riches in some of the Malay states are suggesting to the native Princes that they should seek the aid of Europeans . . . We are the paramount power on the Peninsula up to the limit of the States tributary to Siam, and looking to the vicinity of India, and our whole position in the East I apprehend that it would be a serious matter if any other European power were to obtain a footing on the Peninsula. (Lord Kimberly to Gladstone, 31 August 1873, quoted in Bastin & Winks 1979:208).

The Straits Settlements became centres of capital accumulation by British merchant houses whose control over trade linked the Settlements and the Peninsular Malay States to the world economy (Bach 1976). By the 1860s mercantile capitalism was transformed from capital accumulation through trade to an early phase of colonialism with the division of Asia into European spheres of influence. In order to accomplish their imperial goals, the British appointed residents to each Malay state. Colonial administration imposed economic goals upon the Malay political system. While the latter was adequate for Asian trade the political apparatus failed when it was subjected to the British demands to

improve infrastructure, levy taxes, collect duties, construct public works etc. Such a system could not produce the goods demanded by imperialism. The rationalisation of the administrative bureaucracy added to the power and wealth of the Malay sultanate because factionalism was dispensed with, land was registered, rebellions ceased and incomes assured. Elite Malays from chiefly and royal families were put through English education and coopted into the Malayan civil service - a significant factor for the present political economy. The aristocracy of each state was separated from the Malay peasantry through elaborate symbolism, formal ownership of land, wealth, and education. The myth was that the British were simply advising traditional Malay rulers and "helping them look after Malay society" in the face of disruptive economic development; in effect they were, and still are, symbols of the state. This myth of trusteeship on behalf of the Malays (perpetuated by special rights today) required that the British:

. . . administer the country on lines consistent with Malay welfare and happiness not only for today but for the future ages. That aim will be obtained by building up a sturdy and thrifty peasantry living on the lands they own and living by the food they grow, than by causing them to forsake the life of their fathers for the glamour of the new ways . . . and . . . to abandon their rice fields for the new crops which they cannot utilise and the market for which depends on outside world conditions beyond their orbit. (A D Haynes, Secretary of Agriculture, 1934, quoted in Latiff 1977:80).

Many of the present day Malaysian problems are the direct legacy of British administrative policies from 1874 onwards. Colonial social engineering sought to 'protect' Malay peasants from advancing in economic or educational terms by ensuring that they remained in a semi-feudal situation, as they were before British intervention. The Torrens land registration policy (1880) changed land from usufruct to a saleable commodity which resulted in Malay dispossession of land so the 1913 Malay Reservation Act was established to prevent alienation of peasant land to non Malays.

The Malay peasantry was involved in rice production, while economic policies deliberately opened fields of commerce to the Chinese, Indians and Europeans. Rubber was introduced (1890) to supply the needs of British industry while rail and road networks (1860s) linked principal towns and ports in the west of the Peninsula (Latiff 1977). Indentured labour was brought in from India and China (both British spheres of influence) to work tin mines (Chinese) and rubber plantations (South Indians). Entrepreneurs came independently from China, India, and Arabia to exploit economic niches as merchants, moneylenders and traders. In this manner, the population was increased by imperialism's demand for cheap immigrant labour which,

effectively, divided the people into discrete ethnic blocs associated with specific occupations. The British, who admired Chinese ability with money, encouraged immigrants to establish the intricate network of wholesale and retail activities necessary for the functioning of the colonial economy (see Freedman 1959). Domestic capital today belongs, in the main, to Chinese bankers, merchants, industrialists, mine and plantation owners.

In the post-war period of British military rule (1945), an attempt to centralise control over the entire Peninsula by a unification plan known as 'The Malayan Union' was proposed (Allan 1967). Indirect Rule meant the British maintained Malay forms of government yet the immigrant population did not identify with Malay sovereignty or authority, an untenable state of affairs for the British. Under the Malayan Union the administration would centralise into a single union the 8 'protected' Malay States, and 2 Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca thus making a single polity out of 10 entities. Ethnic preferences would be abolished and everyone, regardless of origin, would enjoy equal rights and citizenship. A document written by the Supreme Allied Command indicates the colonial view of the status and position of the Malay sultans and illustrates admirably the diplomatic

charade which had been played out in the Malay States.

. . . I think it is important to remember that these people are not traditional feudal rulers in any sense; but are a species of Head Man chosen by us, and built up with British prestige and British support. This has been done within the last 100 years and in the case of some of them as recent as 30 years. Their salaries and the opportunities which British support gave them has enabled these puppets to build themselves up into enormous positions of wealth and influence. But as it is the British who gave them the power, then the British can take it away or modify it, without any scruples about interfering with ancient feudal structures of the country, which I think I am right in saying was practically non-existent. (Personnel Minute Concerning Malay Sultans - 20 July 1945 quoted in Latiff 1977:137)

The proposed Malayan Union served to consolidate Malay Nationalism. Since the proposal represented more control to the British, it posed a threat to Malays by denying special rights and eroding the official status of Malay rulers. Nationalism, which had been fermenting since the 1920s among educated Malays, was strengthened by the crushing defeat of the British by the Japanese imperial army in Malaya during World War II. The union issue formed a catalyst for Malay nationalism which led, eventually, to Independence (see Funston 1980, Roff 1980).

Modern Malay political consciousness is associated with the development of three elite groups educated and influenced by diverse sources such as (a) Islamic reformism and Arab education (b) Malays, from the vernacular education system, influenced by Indonesian

nationalism and socialism, and (c) English educated conservative defenders of royal sultans and Malay rights.¹⁶ The universal Malay opposition to the proposed Union resulted in a Federation of Malaya Agreement (1948) under which special rights of Malays regarding land, language, administration and royalty was guaranteed in return for which Malays accepted the granting of citizenship to immigrants. The Federation Agreement preserved Malaya as a primarily Malay country so as to constitute a reversal of the Union proposals which had been in the interests of non Malays while seeking to divest Malays of preferential political powers (Allen 1967, Means 1972, 1976). The ideology of the peninsula as being a Malay country, with Malays as the indigenous community of Bumiputra has subsequently been incorporated into, and has profound effects upon, the political economy today.

At Independence (1957), the Malay sultanate was organised into a 'rotating kingship', whereby every five years a new king is appointed, in turn, from each state's royal family to serve a term of office as king. Malays controlled the civil service and enjoyed political hegemony. They worked in liaison with the economic hegemony of Chinese and British capital. When the new Parliamentary Constitution was drawn up, it preserved the special rights of Malays (Means 1972,

1976, 1978). The Chinese (Malaysian Chinese Association), Indian (Malaysian Indian Congress) and Malay (United Malays National Organization), as ethnic-political parties, formed an 'Alliance Party' which won Independence, led by a Kedah prince, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Malaysia's first Prime Minister. Chinese capitalists joined in the political Alliance with the Malay aristocratic and bureaucratic class to protect its interests. All ethnic political parties united with the British against the Malayan Communist Party (led by the Chinese) in the post war 'emergency' period of 1946-1957 (Means 1976).

The multi-ethnic Alliance Party which led Malaya to Independence lost legitimacy as a multi ethnic coalition twelve years later in the 1969 General Election. The Malay vote was split by the Malay Islamic opposition party (PAS), and there was little support among the Chinese and Indian voters for the Alliance. The resulting electoral tie in the state of Selangor between Alliance and Opposition parties triggered ethnic riots which led to the suspension of parliamentary democracy and 'emergency rule' for almost two years. A further Constitutional Amendment made it seditious to question the rights of Malays as Bumiputra, the status of Malay as the official language, or the rights of Sultans as defenders of

Malays and Islam. Such action tightly circumscribes the arena of public and private political debate (Means 1972). Up until 1969, Malaysia had a laissez faire economic policy under which foreign and local capital operated with no controls. The political and economic alliance of the Malays and Chinese was successful until the late 1960s when Malays wanted control of the economy compatible with their political status. Through their political hegemony and state control, Malays have gained more economic power but the Chinese have no greater political power.

The May 13th riots were officially interpreted as the result of Malay frustration with their economic backwardness; so the New Economic Policy was formulated with the express objective of restructuring society in an attempt to elevate Malays to the same socio economic footing as non-Malays (NOC 1969). The New Economic Policy was designed to be an answer to the May 13th riots, to calm the discontent among ethnic groups, to stabilise political relations and to be an economic programme to remedy what the government saw as the cause of the ethnic riots. The old Alliance was no longer adequate and a larger coalition named National Front (Barisan Nasional) was formed but it has always been dominated by UMNO which influences and even dictates the policy of the other ethnic parties (Aznam

1985). As Means (1972, 1978) points out, the opposition can be undermined by changing the rules of the game, by boundary adjustment, or by constitutional amendment so that those with power control the political environment and perpetuate their supremacy. The constitution can be suspended and the weighting discrepancies against densely populated urban non-Malay constituencies in favour of sparsely populated rural Malay constituencies are extreme. Non Malay opposition can never gain power in Malaysia by a process of parliamentary democracy. In spite of a multi ethnic ideology the National Front (Barisan Nasional) suppresses any opposition so there remains, virtually, a one party system.

After a short period in the Barisan Nasional the Malay Islamic opposition party (PAS) withdrew because it did not accept the pro-capitalist western philosophy of the state's New Economic Policy.¹⁷ UMNO conceded to some PAS demands and moved toward 'ultra' Malayness; to gain more Malay votes it had to be seen as acting in the interests of peasants as well as professional and educated elite Malays. State ideology emphasises Malaysia for the Malays, jobs for Malays, higher incomes through land schemes, irrigation projects, improved infrastructure and education for Malays.¹⁸ Such ideology and policies alienate non Malays and the

use of Islam in the political arena ensures that the saliency of ethnic, as opposed to class, interests are maintained. Malaysia's political economy makes ethnic problems out of what, elsewhere, would be class issues.

The nature of the Malaysian state is complex - there is an ethnic split between political hegemony and economic hegemony which creates a conflict among the three elements of the ruling class, viz. the Malay aristocracy, Malay bureaucrats, and the non Malay (Chinese) capitalists (Enloe 1980, Lim, M H 1980, Baharuddin 1982, Brennan 1982). Relationships of interdependence exist within the ruling class and are reinforced by its linkage to international capital. Senior state bureaucrats can be considered part of the ruling class since they organize and direct critical state enterprises. Malay control and dominance of the state apparatus (politics, civil service, extensive police and military forces) allows them to facilitate the conditions of capital accumulation. A conservative Malay nationalism is successfully utilised by the Malay ruling class which manipulates ethnicity, religion, language and royalty (Bumiputra ideology) in the political arena.

Capitalist relations of production dominate but there are many political and ideological effects relating to pre capitalism which are institutionalised because of their usefulness in capitalist expansion and political control. (Brennan 1982:208-9).

Because of the ethnic division of political and economic hegemony no coherent national capitalist class emerged in Malaysia before the New Economic Policy. This period of increased state intervention created a new elite Malay capitalist class through the 'triple alliance' of state, domestic and foreign capital. The ruling class allies itself with international capital. Even so, it works with Chinese domestic capital, but it cannot be seen to do so since the legitimacy of the Malay elite rests upon a nationalist and ethnic ideological appeal to Malay voters (Lim M H 1980, Enloe 1980, Brennan 1982). The state acting in the interests of Malays supports the conditions for capital accumulation within Malaysia while creating further contradictions arising from class formations.

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Although economic development and industrialization have been progressing since Independence, the real political impetus to rapid development came about as the result of the May 13th riots in 1969. At this point, development with ethnic targets was instituted. The post election riots were initiated by Malays when it seemed that they were losing political control to the Chinese who, partly as a result of Colonial policies,

already enjoyed a dominant role in the economy. The targets of the New Economic Policy set up in the 'emergency rule/suspension of parliament' period of 1969-1970 and subsequently incorporated into the Second Malaysia Plan were: economic growth, the elimination of the association of occupation with ethnicity and distribution of economic rewards to Malays.¹⁹ Malays are officially referred to as Bumiputra - 'sons of the soil', to distinguish them from the 'immigrant' origins of Chinese and Indians.

More specifically, the NEP requires (i) the eradication of poverty among all Malaysians, regardless of ethnicity, and (ii), the restructuring of society so as to negate the identification of ethnicity with economic function. Both objectives are to be carried out in the context of rapid economic growth (Malaysia 1971, 1976, 1981); the first is to include all ethnic groups, while the second is explicitly directed to Malays. The NEP is to create a Malay commercial and industrial community so that they will become equal partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation, or, in the words of the present Prime Minister:

In trying to redress the imbalance, it will be necessary to concentrate your effort on the Malays, to bring out more Malay entrepreneurs and to bring out and to make Malay millionaires, if you like, so that

the number of Malays who are rich equals the number of Chinese who are rich, the number of Malays who are poor, equals the number of Chinese who are poor and the number of unemployed Malays equals the number of unemployed Chinese, then you can say that parity has been achieved. Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad (quoted in Low 1971:74).

One of the goals of the NEP is to remove Malays from peasant subsistence agriculture so as to increase their participation in the 'modern' rural and urban economy. At the present time agriculture accounts for 40% of export earnings and 42% of all employment (Clad 1985). In order to support the domestic economy Dr Mahathir has called for the population target to increase from the present 12 million to 70 million people so as to create domestic markets for Malaysian industries. In part this is being achieved by allowing the illegal immigration of Indonesians, who work for much lower wages, to apply for Bumiputra status after several years. This also ensures that population growth will be mainly concentrated within the Malayo-Muslim ethnic group. There are specific quotas - employment by sector must reflect the ethnic composition of the country: 54% Malays, 35% Chinese, 10% Indians, 1% Others. By 1990 Malays should own and manage 30% of the equity in the corporate sector as compared to the 2.4% of 1970. The share of 'other Malaysians' should shift from 34.3% to 40% while 'foreign capital' must decline from 63.5% to 30%. By

1983 the Bumiputra share had risen to 18.7%, 'other Malaysians' 47.7%, whilst foreign capital has dropped down to 33.6% - which is close to the target (MTR4MP 1984:101). The Bumiputra 30% equity is to be gained by growth and redistribution in the economy - not by any expropriation (Malaysia 1976, 1981).

There has been no attempt to implement agrarian reform - rather new settler schemes in virgin jungle are seen as the solution to the vexed question of land distribution. The state agency for land development, Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), has become one of the largest plantation conglomerates in the world and, by 1981, had settled some 70,563 families on 1.5 million acres. The tactics of exploitative labour use have earned FELDA considerable profits which have been diversified into several joint ventures with European and Japanese TNCs (Mehmet 1986).

The NEP required, as Enloe (1979, 1980(b)) points out, (a) an expansion of the state's institutional capacities and (b) changes in Malay-Chinese economic relations. The overriding goal was to reduce inequality between Malays and Chinese by economic expansion in which Malays would dominate. This was impossible without state intervention and such assistance, in the shape of state capitalism, was

deemed essential since 'laissez-faire' policies, in effect since Independence in 1957, would fail to produce the social and economic transformations desired. But, as Gale says: "there was nothing socialist about the expansion of Malaysian public enterprises" (1981:55). In order to achieve the NEP's aims, massive foreign investment was called for and ethnic imperatives influenced the state's political economy. Public enterprises and 'state capitalism' under a system of 'Malay Trusteeship' were established to facilitate Bumiputra business expansion and to undermine Chinese and foreign dominance in the domestic economy.

THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Prior to 1969 most domestic manufacturing was of the capital intensive, import substitution type, but this changed with the NEP to labour intensive, export oriented electronics, garments, textiles, rubber goods, and food processing. Malaysia is now tightly integrated into international markets, as a result of establishing Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and inviting in transnational corporations from Europe, Japan, Korea, USA, Canada and creating cooperative ventures among the regional Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The majority of foreign investment comes

from Singapore (23.6%), Japan (19.6%) UK (18.3%), USA (10.7%) and Hong Kong (8.9%). Investment from these sources constitutes 81.0% of the total, being concentrated in electronics, (19.5%) textiles (12.6%) and rubber products (5.5%). Semi conductors and electronic micro circuits constitute the most important export items with a value of M\$1,152.1 million in 1980 (MIDA 1981, 1982). Although Singapore and Hong Kong are substantial investors some of that capital emanates from the subsidiaries of foreign companies based in these entrepot States.

Free Trade Zones were designed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), in the late 1960s, as a means of integrating the economies of less developed countries; the object was to promote industrialization by creating investment opportunities for foreign capital. Malaysia decided to adopt this as a vehicle for industrial development in the 1970s. Free trade zones are specially designated industrial areas where foreign companies import raw materials or semifinished goods, free of duty, and thereafter manufacture, process or assemble export commodities (Frobel et al 1980). The Malaysian state supplies modern infrastructure such as buildings, water, electricity, roads, and communication facilities on industrial estates with

convenient access to airports and containerized seaports. In addition there are tax incentives, pioneer status, political 'stability'²⁰, a non-unionised labour force, and, above all, cheap labour; the repatriation of profits and capital are also allowed (FIDA 1978, MIDA 1981).

The control over trade unions and industrial relations was deemed necessary in order to attract foreign capital, specifically for the electronics industry (Munster 1980, Edgren 1982). TNCs request female workers and night shifts to ensure continual operation of their assembly lines. Single girls are preferred, retrenchment is common and there are no promotion prospects (see chapter IV). The TNCs use very specific segments of the labour market and the fragmentary skills acquired cannot be used outside of the factory. No unemployment, sickness or old age security is provided and state legislation is subverted by classifying the workers as 'hourly rated employees'.²¹ Malaysia has not ratified ILO conventions because the state wishes to attract more foreign industries. The state's position is to argue that, at this early stage of industrial development, workers would be adversely manipulated by trade unionists. The argument runs on that collective bargaining will detract from foreign investment which,

in turn, will have negative effects on the growth of employment and incomes in the country. Female wages in TNCs are low in comparison with earnings in other sectors of the economy and, indeed, lower than wages obtainable during the peaks of the agricultural cycle. In the northern state of Kedah, for instance, Chinese female construction workers earn M\$350.00, while factory workers earn from M\$100 - \$200.00 per month. Throughout Malaysia families live in small peasant communities and their daughters migrate or commute to work in urban zones. The industrial workers remit their earnings to help support their families living at or below the poverty line (defined as M\$348 a month per household of five). Young women's work forms part of 'occupational multiplicity' - wage earning strategies necessitated by the high cost of living and the 'planned decline' of peasant agriculture under the NEP.

By 1980, employment within the eight FTZs alone amounted to 81,000 persons which is 11% of the manufacturing sector employment, and 1.6% of the Malaysian labour force. Total industrial development during the 1970s created 416,000 new jobs, in 96 industrial estates and new Regional Development Areas, which represent 45% of manufacturing employment. A fifth of these jobs were generated by TNCs and

increased the percentage of Malay female workers to 84% of the labour force in FTZs (ILO 1982, Datta-Chadhuri 1982). 'Restructuring' of ethnic employment, therefore, is taking effect, yet this is skewed toward single, Malay female labour who are in the work force primarily for the post school-pre marriage stage.²² Malay male unemployment remains high.

The new international division of labour which the TNCs represent was stimulated by economic conditions such as (a) expensive labour, (b) the growth of welfare, (c) strong unions, and (d) technological changes in advanced capitalist countries. The fragmentation of production processes has now become internationalised with the skilled jobs being retained in the west while unskilled work is sent overseas (Safa 1981). World systems analysts argue that TNCs remain 'footloose'; they do not establish inter-industry linkages with the rest of the economy, and they sell products only to foreign parent companies (Enloe 1980b, Frobel 1980, Lim L 1979). From these arguments, it is concluded that there is little spread effect to other aspects of the industrializing economy, but, this view ignores the backward linkages and 'servicing functions' performed by domestic capital, joint ventures, domestic

industrialization as well as the effects of an expanding 'casual labour' force. TNCs in Malaysia have spawned many local support industries in the form of workshops which produce components for the TNCs' products. In addition, corporations contributed some 20% to total gross earnings; they have created employment and increased consumption demands in Malaysia (Datta-Chadhuri 1982).

As Enloe (1979) points out, there is a paradox in the NEP objectives - the total growth process cannot be carried out by TNCs alone, for development requires an entrepreneurial class. That this domestic class is extant, but Chinese, disqualifies it and incentives are offered, therefore, to foreign capital. Enloe views TNCs as a State ally in fending off domestic economic (Chinese) rivals, and, as a means of translating state power into economic reward for the elite.²³ Chinese banking concerns have, in association with foreign capital, successfully turned into conglomerates yet still retain 'family control' (Lim M H 1978). The Chinese elite have also established their own Multi Purpose Holdings Corporation (MPHB) which works closely with the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). The MCA is a political partner in the Barisan Nasional (National Front) government which is dominated by the United Malays National

Organization (UMNO). MPHBS was a defensive measure set up by the Chinese in 1975 to protect their business interests during equity restructuring and they have been very successful in this regard. The success of Multi Purpose Holdings Corporation in its conglomerate holdings actually reflects skillful investment strategies, cartels, multiple directorships, as well as interlocking stock and shareholdings (Mehmet 1986).

The target of a 30% Bumiputra ownership of equity by 1990 is almost impossible to achieve without public sector investment. In order to fulfil such ambitious political-economic promises, state holdings now account for almost all of Bumiputra equity; in effect, state corporations act as 'trustees for the Malays'. The 1983 statistics show the Bumiputra share of equity had risen to 18.8%, from 2.4% pre-NEP (MTR4MP 1984). The greatest concentration of wealth is among a small aristocracy, political, military, bureaucratic and professional elite who, by a complex process of multiple directorships and interlocking stockholdings, have come to control wealth and corporate information (Mehmet 1986). The NEP trusteeship has thereby increased the ownership share not only for elite Bumiputras in whom 'trusteeship' is vested but also for elite non-Malays. Independent research carried out at the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange by Lim M H

(1978), and Mehmet (1986) covering the period 1975-1983 shows that ownership of corporate assets, shareholdings and stock ownership by the top 10% of owners had increased from 75.7% to 77.7%. The top 1% of this group had gained from 29.15% to 32.33%. The bottom 90% of shareholders declined from 24.3% to 22.3% for the same period, indicating a consolidation and greater concentration of corporate assets among the elite.

The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 prevents activities which could erode the Malay position and negate the NEP (MIDA 1980). Under the ICA manufacturers can have licenses withdrawn if they fail to comply with the stated economic and social objectives. As investment is sought, controls are simultaneously imposed. In order to qualify for pioneer status, an investment project has to meet approval by being a combination of a priority project, labour intensive, export oriented, a user of local raw materials, and be integrated with existing firms. Firms targetted at the domestic market, or exploiting primary resources, must be 70% Malaysian (MIDA 1981, Crone 1983). In spite of Bumiputra policies Malaysian Chinese have been very successful in this regard and have, themselves, gone into partnership with 'overseas Chinese' from Singapore and Hong Kong. Only firms

exporting 100% of their product are allowed full foreign ownership but they are restricted to the FTZs and Regional Development Areas. The sort of status, approval itself, and the incentives granted, are the result of negotiations between the State and the investor (Crone 1983). In 1982, 56.1% of projects approved were wholly Malaysian owned, 40.6% were joint ventures, and 33.3% were foreign owned (MIDA 1984).²⁴ State control serves to reduce the role of foreign investment, as a percentage of each project, to the benefit of Malaysia. Of the total proposed called up capital (M\$1,912.5 million), 72.5% was domestic and 27.5% came from foreign sources (MIDA 1982). The ethnic imperatives of such political-economic policies necessitate the continued growth of foreign investment, yet they make the relaxation of domestic controls difficult. However, the inflow of investment has been, in turn, prompted by foreign capital's urgent need to seek new investment. Reluctance on the part of foreign capital to co-operate in 'new forms' of investment could be detrimental to the investors' long term interests. All foreign investment requires approval, proposals are vetted for suitability, competition with domestic products is not allowed, and, projects which do not improve technological knowledge may be rejected. So far as mining,

forestry, and petroleum resources are concerned, contracts for foreigners are short term and restrictive (Crone 1983). New forms of investment where foreigners do not have controlling interests in terms of equity are turnkey operations, licensing and technical assistance, franchising, management contracts, joint ventures, international subcontracting, production sharing and trilateral co-operation agreements; the latter are specifically with Eastern Bloc and the less developed countries of the Pacific Rim (Kulasingam & Tan 1982).

THIRD WORLD TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

In Malaysia there is an awareness and manipulation of the fact that competition between American, European and Asian capital can be usefully exploited by South East Asian regional cooperation and public sector enterprises. The ASEAN nations established a joint venture enterprise in 1979 as a public sector transnational with ownership vested in Indonesia, The Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The specific political objectives of public sector enterprises are to undermine 'dependence' upon the industrialized countries and to encourage political and economic ties among developing countries with an emphasis on regional cooperation. Asian based

corporations, produce a wide variety of consumer goods aimed at markets in the west. Capital intensive products such as steel, petrochemicals, as well as advanced high technology goods like computers and electronics are produced more cheaply and much faster than in the west (Kumar & McLeod 1981, Lall 1984).

Malaysia's own drive into heavy industry is headed by the 'Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia' (HICOM) established in 1980 with an authorised capital of M\$500 million (US\$201.6 million) in a state owned body (Clad 1985). The heavy industrial goal is directed to enterprises with local research and development. Iron, steel, cement, engine manufacture, heavy engineering and the new 'Proton Saga' domestic car plants are distributed around the Peninsula. The HICOM thrust is to complement rather than to displace light industrialization via free trade zones and transnational corporations.

The Malaysian state founded its own public sector enterprise, Perbadanan Nasional Berhad, (PERNAS) in 1969, which is, effectively, a Third World Transnational Corporation with assets of over M\$1.17 billion.²⁵ The Corporation is tightly linked with the political system and Malay (UMNO) leadership, but is referred to as a state owned organization carrying out functions of vital national importance (Gale 1981).

In the 1970s PERNAS shifted from joint ventures to the acquisition of shares in British plantation-agency houses justified by the NEP target of 30% Bumiputra equity. In order to carry out this type of function, a subsidiary body was established called Permodalan Nasional Berhad - The National Equity Corporation (PNB) - and, in 1978, PNB acquired a controlling share in Sime Darby Holdings, one of the largest corporations in Asia, whose interests included 225 companies in twenty-four countries, comprising plantations, chemicals, engineering, transport, shipping and banking (Lim M H 1978, Kumar & McLeod 1981). Attempts to emulate Japanese industrial success led Sime Darby and PERNAS to form a Japanese style international trading company to promote and find new buyers for Malaysian products in Asian, East & West European, and American markets.

The Malaysian state-owned banks and domestic banks have branches and considerable investments in major financial centres overseas. A subsidiary of the government controlled Bank Bumiputra recently came under scrutiny for corrupt dealings in Hong Kong, which, justifiably, caused outrage among Malays who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of state capital (see Bowring & Cottrell 1984).

PNB engineered a spectacular takeover of London

Tin, the world's largest tin group, with interests in African, Australian and Malaysian mines. PNB also succeeded in gaining local control of the country's most important export oriented industry - oil palm and rubber plantations. London, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur stock exchange dealings include obtaining major interests in former British agency and plantation houses such as the Guthrie Corporation, Dunlop Estates, Barlow Boustead Holdings, Jardine Mathesons and Harrisons & Crosfield now known as Harrisons Malaysian Plantations Berhad (see Asiaweek 7/12/84, Clad 1985b). By such acquisitions the state has acquired control over agricultural exports and can enhance the export value of rubber and palm oil through processing, research, development and marketing in Malaysia.

Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed announced his 'Look East' and 'Buy British Last' policy in 1981, reflecting Malaysian disillusionment with the close handed tactics of British capitalism. The sequence of events leading up to the policy began with a large fee increase for 18,000 Malaysian students in Britain, and was fuelled by tactless 'colonial comments' by the British High Commissioner, which led to his recall. The events culminated in the continued reluctance of British Corporations to accede to a 30% Bumiputra

equity. In order to resolve the impasse with the British over equity, PNB made a bid on the London stock exchange for a controlling interest in the plantation based Guthrie Corporation. This prompted exchange officials to reprimand the National Equity Corporation and ban any similar "dawn raids" on British firms. As a retaliatory measure, the Prime Minister instructed government departments to purchase British goods only if absolutely necessary, the final approval for which had to be channelled through his own office. Britain has since made conciliatory moves, particularly as the Japanese managed to gain a part of the UK share of trade. The 'Look East Policy' now reflects the preference for increasing investment and technology transfer from Japan and Korea. Ministerial speeches exhort Malays to work hard and emulate the Japanese (not, it should be noted, the local Chinese work ethic), to increase efficiency, productivity and develop a sense of achievement and pride in work. Bumiputra students are being sent in increasing numbers to the Far East for technical training and education, reversing the former reliance on Britain and America.

The state has founded other public enterprises in attempts to ensure the 30% Bumiputra equity target in commerce and industry, such as MARA (Council of Trust

for Indigenous Peoples), SEDC (State Economic Development Corporations), UDA (Urban Development Authority) and MIDA (Malaysian Industrial Development Authority). These institutions are intended to help Malays to enter business and also to invest profits with a view to transferring control to the Bumiputra. One State tool for ensuring transfer to Malays is the purchasing of shares for Malays by a State National Unit Trust (Amanah Saham Nasional). The scheme allows Bumiputras to gain part ownership of selected companies, instead of simply having equity assets held 'in trusteeship' by the State. To retain Bumiputra ownership and prevent sales to non Malays units can be sold only to the ASN, but the structure of the scheme works against the small savings of poor Malays who are unable to accumulate or tie up capital for any appreciable time.

A popular scheme for devout Bumiputras is the Pilgrims' Management and Fund Board (Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji - LUTH). This savings scheme organizes a truly comprehensive package for the pilgrimage to Mecca and, in 1983, 470,000 Malays had deposit accounts to save for the M\$6,000 fare. Given the immense significance of the pilgrimage for Muslims LUTH has attracted the small savings of the Malay masses and become one of the most successful

conglomerates with diverse investments in TNCs, public companies and real estate. Thus the state has access to savings. In 1983 its profit of \$33.1 million paid a 'bonus' of 8.5% to pilgrims' accounts (Mehmet 1986).

There have been problems in obtaining ethnic quotas in employment; in consequence a Labour Utilization Relief policy was implemented to extend the period of corporate tax exemption for firms employing a quota of Malay workers. This proved to be inadequate so that, by 1976, the Industrial Coordination Act required transnational corporations to employ 30% Malays or risk losing their licences (MIDA 1980). Expatriate managers of TNCs located in Kedah stress that it is exceptionally difficult to find technically qualified Malays with the result that Labour Utilization Relief requirements cannot be fulfilled other than at the unskilled level. Elsewhere in the country the employment policy has increased Malay participation but has created unemployment for non Malays, particularly Indians, with the resultant heightening of ethnic tensions.

So far, this chapter has concentrated on a national level discussion but the negative effects of the NEP on Malay peasants and the industrial labour force, mentioned above, require further comment. For peasant Malays it is irrelevant whether land or

capital is owned by the State, Sultans or foreigners and, as Gale (1981:40), remarks an abstract 30% equity by 1990 is hardly significant for Malay peasants today. The NEP has succeeded in helping Malays who already had political connections, education and good prospects; indeed the Prime Minister's aim to create some Malay millionaires has also been achieved. In a recent assessment of the NEP the World Bank reports as follows:

The impression is unavoidable that at the moment the government, perhaps largely because of political necessity, is giving much more attention to increasing Malay visibility in the urban areas and improving the economic position of the middle and upper income Malays than to the equally serious problems of rural poverty and rapid employment creation. (Anand 1983:121).

The report shows that 'race' per se accounted for merely 10% of the inequality between Chinese, Indians and Malays. The main factors promoting Malay economic backwardness are their geographical location in remote monsoon belt states, poor infrastructure, rubber prices, and low returns on subsistence production. Recent analyses by economists working on Malaysia find conclusively that the most important consequence of concentrating the economy under state control, and the restructuring aspects of the NEP, has been an increasing inequality in the distribution of income and wealth within the Malay community itself

(Young et al 1980, Snodgrass 1980, Fisk et al 1982, Jomo & Wells 1983, Lim D 1983:12, Mehmet 1984).

The elimination of poverty remains elusive as is evident from the Mid Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan (March 1984). The ethnic aspect of inequality has taken a prominent place in progress reports on the NEP and poverty as a class or personal phenomenon is not mentioned. By focusing on 'ethnic' aspects of inequality - real problem areas are overlooked so measures pursued to correct ethnic inequality end up increasing inequality in society. (Clad 1984:23) (My emphasis).

As is now becoming evident, the restructuring strategy has increased inequality among Malays because the NEP does not distinguish between rich and poor - all are classified as Bumiputra (Lim D 1983). This means that those who are already economically disadvantaged (including non-Malays), are eliminated at the outset - particularly the landless, smallholders, and female headed households which form the bulk of the peasantry living at subsistence levels. It is this economic category which has become the main source of labour for the TNCs in the state's industrialization process and upon which the rest of this dissertation is focused.

SUMMARY

The various tactics which the state has utilised as a way of spreading trade, expertise, export and import requirements world-wide - with recent emphasis on regional cooperation within South East Asia and the

Pacific Rim - mean that Malaysia no longer relies on any one nation for investment. As such, this changes Malaysia's former economic dependency on Europe. The British dominance of the pre-Independence (1957) colonial and post-colonial period has been eroded. Investment is still needed but domestic controls over equity and technology transfer are now matched by the urgency of foreign capital to expand abroad in the face of fierce competition, inflation, labour problems and low profits in the West. State tactics and modes of control over TNCs have been successful and the new role of the Third World Transnational Corporation-public enterprise is significant for less developed countries as a way of undermining 'dependency' on foreign capital. Domestic, state and international capital have combined under the NEP and created new inequalities in Malaysia; it is the effects of this economic alliance, rather than TNCs in isolation, which should become the subject of further analytic attention from world systems theorists.

CHAPTER IV

EXPLOITATION

GIRLS IN FACTORY WORK

Export processing zones, industrial estates, and other subsidised facilities blossom in the jungle.
(Crone 1983:190)

During the past ten years, TNCs have been encouraged by the Kedah State Development Corporation, (KSDC), the Kedah Development Authority (KEDA) and the federal Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), to locate in peripheral 'rural' zones designated as Regional Development Areas. The effects of this new pattern of industrialization upon Malay peasants and the concomitant process of semi proletarianization have not previously been recorded. Attracting foreign and local investment as part of development strategies for the rural areas results in generous locational incentives from the Kedah State and the Federal Government levels.²⁶ Some 2,817 acres of land have been allocated in Kedah with 1,297 acres for industrial estates, (MIDA 1981), as part of the design to shift the

pattern of investment from the developed west coast towards subsistence rice producing states in the northern monsoon belt. It is anticipated that this will simultaneously reduce the gross economic disparities between the northern and southern states, and between the Malay and Chinese ethnic groups. The state, for ideological reasons, operates with a 'plural society' model; it fails to acknowledge that economic inequality lies within (intra-ethnic) as well as between (inter-ethnic) groups.

The dispersal of manufacturing is made attractive by fiscal incentives and infrastructure that gear new programmes towards joint venture, or, Bumiputra projects which process and manufacture agro-based primary products like timber, palm oil, and rubber. Government bodies such as the State Development Corporations, Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, and the Federal Land Development Authority, open up land for settlers, establish new towns, and promote industrial growth centres in what were formerly deep jungle areas.²⁷

Geographical location of Malaysia

Kedah is bounded in the north by the small state of Perlis, by Thailand in the north and west, and by the island state of Penang and Perak from south west to south east (see map II). The state capital of Alor Setar (pop 150,000) lies in the coastal aluvial plain of the Muda valley irrigation scheme which is the major padi producing

area in Malaysia. In 1983 Kedah's Muda Valley produced 65.5% of all rice in the country yet 68% of those households are below the poverty line. About 48% of the total land in Kedah is used for agriculture; rubber and padi account for 84% of this, with 8% given over to fruit orchards and jungle (World Bank 1982). In the south of the state, the towns of Sungei Petani and Kulim are developing rapidly as industrial centres with good road links to the rest of the country.

In Kedah, the ethnic imperatives of the NEP are further complicated by security problems and attempts are being made to raise the living standards of Malay peasants who live close to the Thailand-Malaysia border, particularly near 'black areas', i.e. designated communist, in the district of Sik. The security problems connected with the Muslim (Pattani Malays) separatists and the Communist Party of Malaya have a very high priority - as the Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Musa Hitam, expressed it:

We cannot divorce security from the socio-economic well being of our people, or else they will fall prey to communist propaganda. (New Straits Times 24/02/83).

Since 1973, the KSDC has opened six industrial estates, comprising 91 factories which employ some 9,700 workers. A further 47 factories are to be built. The Bakar Arang industrial estate which this chapter examines is located 3

miles away from Sungei Petani, in the District of Kuala Muda. It is on the main North-South arterial road from Kuala Lumpur to Alor Setar, (the state capital), from where it leads on to the Thai border crossing post of Padang Besar.

of factories location
The industrial estate is the largest in Kedah with 22 factories operating and 40 more planned on a 550 acre site. Four factories have closed as a result of bankruptcy, product failure, or bad management. The other estates in South Kedah, such as the 90 acre site at Tikam Batu has 7 factories operating, 12 planned and 2 closed. The rubber producing zone of Kulim has 15 factories operating, 46 planned and 1 closed, on a 500 acre site (Map II). The factories in Sungei Petani are representative of the major trends in Malaysian industrial development in their bias towards electronics, textiles, rubber and wood based processing (Appendix III).

Transnational corporations open factories in Kedah to take advantage of incentives and to reduce their production and labour costs. Domestic capital in the manufacturing sector has also been able to utilise the facilities offered to the TNCs. Many of the corporations are actively solicited by the Chief Minister and State Assemblyman of Kedah, Syed Nahar Shahabuddin - a multi-millionaire entrepreneur who has a personal financial interest in

several factories. Several of the factories are sub-branches built to absorb the overload of factories in the Penang FTZ. Other plants service parent companies overseas, or produce for export and local markets.

Factories which operate in Kedah can avoid the relatively more expensive 'urban' workers of Penang. Electronics factories saturate the so called 'Silicon Island' which now has three FTZs. 'Silicon Island' rates second in the world to California's 'Silicon Valley' in the output of integrated circuits. By branching into Kedah, factories remain close to the container port, the FTZs, and the international airport at Penang. The differential in the cost of living also attracts workers back to Kedah, particularly those who have been employed in the FTZs of Penang or Prai and Selangor in the south. The TNCs, by establishing factories in peripheral rural areas and by utilising labour in situ, can pay even lower wages, rent or buy very cheap land, and avoid responsibility for the social problems associated with the FTZs. Land in Penang costs M\$52.96 per sq. yard while it sells for M\$105.92 per sq. yard in the southern state of Selangor. These prices compare unfavourably with the M\$5.90 to M\$9.84 per sq. yard in Kedah (MIDA 1982). Wage rates in Kedah range from a mere M\$3.20 to M\$6.70 per day compared with the M\$6.00 to M\$9.00 per day in the FTZs of Penang, a three hour bus and

ferry ride away.

OWNERSHIP

The industries newly established in south Kedah reflect the thrust of Malaysia's New Economic Policy in terms of product and equity ownership (Appendix). Two of the four electronics factories are foreign owned (Northern Telecom and General Electric) while two are joint ventures (Singatronics and Sharp Roxy). Sharp Roxy, the largest employer of labour in Sungei Petani, has a 10% Bumiputra equity from The Syed Kechik Foundation. Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed, reputedly one of the richest men in Malaysia, owns the Foundation.

Northern Telecom took over a large part of telecom component production from its North American plants after a reported loss of US\$60 million. After one year's operation in Penang, the factory made a profit of half a million dollars for its parent company and, by 1983, profits rose to M\$80 million. The corporation expects Asian sales to form much of its future growth. With US\$4b. in total sales in 1983 and a steady 15%-25% annual growth, Northern Telecom hopes to become a primary supplier for the telecommunications infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific Rim. The Canadian based corporation's Malaysian factories, upon the receipt of an order, can deliver digital switching gear to north America within one week. This contrasts sharply

with the twenty six weeks required to fulfil an order in Canada or America. Interestingly, the Northern Telecom factories have no expatriate personnel and they are the only operations run entirely by Malaysians.

One of the four textile factories is foreign owned (Acrylic Textiles), two are joint-ventures and one is owned by a Pakistani-Muslim family from Penang. Triumph International has 30% Bumiputra equity owned by TAB Timuran Sendirian Berhad. Tunku Ariff Bendahara (TAB) is a royal prince from Pahang, a state wealthy in tin and timber resources. His father recently served a five year term as King (Malaysia has a 'rotating kingship' system of paramount rulers). Tunku Ariff is reputed to be a multi-millionaire with large timber concessions, construction companies, extensive business interests and property in Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore and England. Tunku Ariff successfully utilises royal and political connections; his ex-military background, and his Bumiputra status to enhance his fortune under the NEP.

The six rubber products factories consist of three joint ventures, (with Kedah State investment as the Bumiputra equity portion), and three foreign owned corporations (Uniroyal Inc, Nike USA, London Rubber Company). The London Rubber Company, a British owned transnational went to Penang in 1977 because Malaysia

offered the best 'package' of incentives including tax-free holidays, the low price of latex - the major raw material - and a cheap labour force. As latex, by volume, constitutes 60% water, it is far cheaper to process the product in Malaysia than to transport it, in bulk carriers, to the United Kingdom. Within six months of operation, the plant showed a profit. Prior to this the corporation was in danger of being declared bankrupt in London, so they engaged consultants to examine work productivity. The consultants recommended a strict rationalization of all production and labour policies, including the closure of four factories in the London area which were subject to labour disputes, strikes and correspondingly high labour costs. The corporation then moved part of its operations to Malaysia and its two factories have expanded and increased production rapidly. Because of their Malaysian branches, the corporation made eight million pounds sterling profit in 1982 alone, so that it has successfully 'turned around'. The profits made by industries which relocate in the Malaysian hinterland reflect the value of overseas processing and Malay labour:

Our workers have reached a skill standard beyond that of our American plant. Now they have to improve their skill level to that of the Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Hong Kong workers. The Asian standard consists of longer working hours combined with high productivity, low cost of labour and good quality products. I aim to cut down on the

training time and introduce more fragmentation. (British expatriate executive of an American transnational 1983).

The wood products operations are small agro-based joint ventures with a majority equity owned by Bumiputra interests. Their labour force and investment is less than other joint ventures or wholly foreign owned factories in Kedah. These companies process the wood from non-producing rubber trees (replanting is necessary every 25 years) into furniture for local and export markets.

The four miscellaneous factories have a 30% Bumiputra Reserve Equity, while Franklin Porcelain (Warner Communications) an American corporation, is wholly foreign-owned. Corporations with Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse status do not enter into joint-ventures so that Asian based TNCs are able to avail themselves of investment and political opportunities in the Peninsula. Because of Asian willingness to enter into joint ventures with the Malaysian State, Korean and Japanese heavy industry-based corporations have, in particular, won very impressive contracts for major development projects requiring high technological skills and engineering expertise.

LABOUR RECRUITMENT

The manual dexterity of the oriental girl is famous the world over. Her hands are small and she works fast with extreme care . . . who, therefore, could be better qualified by nature and inheritance to contribute to the efficiency of a bench assembly production line than the oriental girl? No need for a zero defects program here! By nature, they "quality control" themselves. (Malaysia. The

"Solid State" for Electronics. An Invitation for Investment. FIDA (1970:71-22).

and, recently:

Reliable, productive, easily trainable and highly responsible to the demands of modern technology, Malaysian labour is one of the most cost efficient. Wage rates for general production operatives are relatively low, ranging from US\$1.86 to US\$2.25 per day (US\$1=M\$2.15) depending on type of industry and location. Though wage rates are lower than in the industrialized countries, the productivity of the Malaysian worker is high. The abundance of cost efficient labour is particularly suited for labour intensive industries. (Malaysia - Your Profit Centre in Asia, MIDA 1982:11).

Girls who work at Bakar Arang live in adjacent squatter huts, multi-occupancy houses in Sungei Petani, on urban housing estates, or rural kampungs. They resemble an army in their factory-issued uniforms as they travel to their shift work on bicycles, by bus, or by cheap charter taxis. Although the site is on a town bus route, the buses do not actually enter the industrial estate so that girls working at factories inside, have a mile or so to walk, in all weathers, before reaching their workplace.

This modern industrial estate stands on padi fields which formerly yielded double cropping rice - the only evidence for which was a lone water buffalo left to graze in a nearby house plot. Food hawkers' stalls, (which offer a wide range of cooked rice, noodles, fruits and iced drinks) crowd the entrance to the estate. A high perimeter fence surrounds the complex, and huge sign boards at the front gate indicate the location of each factory. In

addition to the outer boundary, each factory has a security fence, 24 hour guards in pillboxes, and a strict admissions policy to ensure that no unauthorised persons gain access. Workers cannot have visitors or telephone calls and those who loiter after their shift are reprimanded.

Factories use various methods of recruitment, the most effective one being visits by Malay male personnel managers to the padi growing villages in the District of Kuala Muda. They utilise the traditional Malay authority system of the Penghulu and Ketua Kampung. The Penghulu is responsible for a group of villages in a Mukim, (an administrative sub-district), while the Ketua Kampung is a village elder responsible for general welfare and low level administrative tasks. Both posts have become bureaucratised so that the incumbents are no longer appointed by hereditary fiat but by the United Malays' National Organization political branches in each district (see Syed Husin Ali, 1975, for an account of this process).

The Penghulu will ensure factory vacancies are announced after Friday prayers and that the news circulates round the coffee shops, market and general store. These all-male networks pass on the message to their unmarried female kin who, depending on household economic circumstances, will call at the factories for work.

Other tactics include inviting Wanita UMNO women's

political groups to visit factories and examine the working conditions (for a discussion of elite female political activities see Manderson 1980). In order to alleviate worries over Muslim girls meeting men, much stress is laid upon the separation of the male and female working areas. Personnel managers state that the girls leave the protection of their fathers for the protection of the factory manager which 'reassuringly' stresses paternalistic values, and attention to the girls' moral welfare. Some factories have a 'family day' to which they invite village leaders and parents for a traditional kenduri (feast) utilising the Malay core cultural values of food and reciprocity as an industrial recruitment strategy. Malay personnel managers have to work hard to convince peasant Malays that factories are good places to work in and to dispel the severe social stigma currently attached to factory work:

There is a big problem with recruiting because working in a factory is of low status and contrary to Malay culture and Islam. It is associated with ignorance, school failures and society drop outs. We take care to ensure there is no misbehaviour by picking old men as security guards and bus drivers; there are very few males employed here. We do not want to provide hostels, that would create too many problems for us so we send buses out to the kampungs to pick workers up for each shift - that way we ensure that they get into work on time and that we have a work force for the day. We prefer the parents to take care of their daughters in their own way - so instead of hostels we provide transport. The girls are very nice, follow regulations and do not cause trouble this is because they are in the care of their parents and village leaders (my

emphasis). In Penang, away from their parents there are many problems when they mix with boys after the night shift. (Malay personnel manager, Japanese textile factory, 1983).

Much of the low status attached to factory work in Kedah comes from sensationalist journalism focused on the electronics industry in the FTZ of Penang. Reports highlight the loose living and 'westernization' of rural female migrants to Penang and the public scandal about the 'morality' of migrant girls. Careful investigations ultimately reveal that the girls are not actually 'sexually promiscuous'; rather, they merely adopt western clothing along with make-up and 'urban behaviour patterns' (Blake 1980(b), 1982).²⁸ This contravenes the Malayo-Muslim view of 'virgins' (anak dara).²⁹ Before marriage they are ideally sheltered and totally dependent upon their kin in all economic and decision making matters. They must be shy (malu), demure and modest in their behaviour. The idea of outmigration to waged work contravenes all Malay values. Parents fear that their virgin daughters' virtue and reputation (symbolic capital) - hence marriage prospects and bridewealth - will be severely damaged by factory work. On the other hand, parents need the small amounts of cash income.

School recruitment programmes invite pupils on conducted tours of the factories to familiarise them with work opportunities. The Labour Office in Sungei Petani

directs job seekers to the factories; newspaper and cinema advertisements appeal for workers and casual calling at the factory gate is encouraged. One electronics factory pays a M\$10.00 bonus to workers who take kin or friends to work. By contrast, a Japanese company (Honda) encourages workers to recruit, yet it pays no bonus, arguing that the new employees are so 'grateful' for a job that they, themselves, will reward (belanja) the girl who introduced them to the factory. By far the most effective method, and the cheapest for the factories, is the word of mouth recruitment by which girls encourage their peers to start factory work together in their first venture away from the village.

FACILITIES

The larger foreign or joint venture factories offer various facilities as incentive devices to attract girls to assembly line work. These include subsidised canteens, air conditioning, prayer rooms, free uniforms, sports clubs, annual dinners and outings, and, finally, trophies for the best production operator.

The canteens offer subsidized food which is more expensive than that obtainable from the noodle/rice hawkers outside the factory gates. A midday meal consisting of rice, vegetable, fish or meat costs M\$1.00 per plate. The majority of the workers prefer to bring their food from

home in order to save money. One girl explained that she and all her working friends needed the cash in hand (termed 'cola' allowance) to buy food for their whole household rather than to fill, selfishly, their own stomachs:

If girls buy their food in the canteen they can get subsidised food to the value of 80c, but they will not take it. We provide them with a cash allowance but they cannot understand they will get more by taking food to the value of 80c, instead they opt for 50c cash. (Expatriate Manager of joint-venture rubber goods factory, 1983).

Frequently the canteen contractors are Chinese whom the Malays associate with pork, so that any food in the vicinity is polluted (haram) and forbidden to them. The canteens open only for the midday meal break of forty-five minutes and a tea break of fifteen minutes. No provision is made for night shift workers.

The Kedah state religious authority requests that a room be made available and that factories give extended lunch breaks on Friday, the Muslim Holy day, to facilitate prayer. This is in line with the increased state control and manipulation of Islam in the political arena. Eleven factories do provide prayer rooms, but, according to management, the rooms are not utilised because the girls are "too western". It is doubtful whether young Malay girls ever pray on a regular basis since, as with other cultures, adherence to religious rites tends to be a prerogative of age and status. In any event, female religious duties are

always carried out in the privacy of the home whereas males are exhorted to attend the mosque. The rigours of orthodoxy are a recent requirement which the state and Malay political parties are emphasising; it is tightly linked to the Bumiputra ideology and Malay ethnic identity.

The extended lunch breaks are not allowed, in practice, because they disrupt production targets. Although devout Muslims should pray five times a day, the factory work schedules make it impossible to leave the machines unattended.

Factory girls are too social and too westernised to be bothered to pray. (Malay personnel Manager, joint venture garment factory. Similar comments were received from foreign owned factory management, 1982 and 1983).

In the textile factories, a fast work pace is set by spinning bobbins which must be constantly fed with fibre spools. In electronics and garment factories, wages are calculated on a complicated piece rate basis which requires that the girls do not absent themselves from the assembly lines. In order to pray, workers must leave the benches. All the girls on a line then suffer because one absentee completely disrupts the flow of part-product. With the piece rate system, a girl would earn less herself and also be the hapless cause of her line mates and their households losing money. The complicated basic pay and bonus scheme is calculated on how many units are produced, per girl, at the

end of the day, so the girls must work nonstop to earn even a basic rate per shift. Visits to the washroom have to be carefully timed and girls who spend too long there are chastised and put to shame by their line leaders who are held responsible for meeting production targets. One expatriate manager actually admitted that he was afraid workers would use the prayer room to shirk their assembly line duties so the door is kept locked.

Electronics factories advertize air conditioning and piped music as work incentives though the air conditioning is for the benefit of the sensitive electronic components. Workers constantly complain about being chilled and suffering from lots of colds as a result of this 'concession', but managers believe that workers produce more in an air conditioned environment than they can in the unmodified equatorial heat of Malaysia. Piped music is advertized as one thing but used as another. The music supposedly relieves the monotony of the work; in effect, it has the stimulus/response function of being played only at the ends of shifts so that workers can prepare themselves for the changeover.

Factories provide free work clothes as an incentive and they compete with one another to provide the most attractive uniform. Girls dislike wearing the hot nylon uniforms to and from work because they immediately announce

such girls are factory workers. A Japanese textile factory issues a trouser suit; the sight of a Malay girl wearing trousers, rather than the traditional loose fitting garment (baju kurung) is looked upon with distaste by villagers.

Factory uniforms lay girls open to harrassment from urban men who cat-call such unpleasant and stigmatized comments as "Gadis Kilang" (factory girl) or "Minah Karan". 'Minah' is a shortened form of 'Aminah' a popular name for girls, whereas 'karan' is used to denote electric current; the combination means 'hot stuff', both are derogatory and slur female reputations. In Malayo-Muslim culture any unaccompanied girl, by definition, must be looking for mischief and be available for sex - otherwise she would not be out of her household.²⁹ Factory work is automatically associated with sexual looseness and causes much shame to girls who must work to help to support their families.

Sports clubs, annual dinners, and outings on picnics are all part of the recreational activities offered by factories. As Malay women are discouraged from participating in any sports, this facility is effectively open only to male employees who hold inter-factory sports meetings. Horrified parents forbid their daughters to go on mixed outings by bus to Penang, Taiping, Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, or Padang Besar in Siam, so that the trips benefit only male and non-Malay employees, or, girls who have

immigrated from other states. The annual dinners are held in the factory canteen and attendance depends entirely upon its coincidence with a day time work shift; yet girls who do attend are considered to be too forward, 'westernized', and neglectful of Malay cultural values.

Management encourage workers to become competitive and individualistic and to increase their monthly output by the award of a trophy given to the best production operative of the month, and year; this is an attempt to increase production at no financial cost to the factory. Other incentives include competing for perfume or make up and, in the Penang FTZ, a free trip to the parent corporation in the USA. Foreign-owned factories in Penang run annual beauty contests for 'Miss Motorola', 'Miss Texas Instruments' and so on, emphasising the views of 'femininity' and introducing western values to Muslim girls (see Grossman 1978 on Penang).

WAGES & LAY OFFS

Various forms of incentive bonus subsidize the low basic wage. Working conditions are presented as extra benefits to offset an average pay packet of M\$120, which, in Kedah, is less than the poverty line income. The basic pay for assembly line operators in Kedah ranges from M\$3.20 per day in the locally owned textile factories to M\$6.70 in one foreign owned electronics factory. Most factories

operate a 24 hour day on a three shift system; workers are hourly rated and paid fortnightly for a basic forty eight hour week. New workers must undergo training for one to two weeks. Fairly high secondary education standards are required, save in the locally owned factories which use 'no education requirements' as a justification for paying the very lowest wages:

Our workers are uneducated kampung girls and they are lucky to be able to earn regular wages or even to have a job at all. (Expatriate manager of South Asian textile company, 1983).

We have a bus to collect them from the kampungs, but absenteeism is very high around padi harvest time. We take uneducated women - they cannot work anywhere else - they like to have a wage each fortnight. We do not chastise them too much as we do not want to lose them. (Female personnel manager of local family textile business, 1983).

It should be pointed out that literacy is not actually required for any of the assembly line jobs but management, in mitigation, say they want girls who have been to school because such girls are used to discipline.

In textiles factories, rubber products factories (which produce rubber gloves, shoes, medical equipment and condoms), and in the electronics factories, girls reported that they knew the job in less than a week and although the work is monotonous, it is certainly not difficult. Following a 'training period', women undergo a 'probationary period' ranging from three to six months at a basic wage; after this they become 'confirmed' workers.

This long period means that management do not have to raise the wage rates. Only after one year are workers considered to be fully trained and they receive a pay rise which brings their monthly pay, after deductions for state run social security contributions (SOCSO) and Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) to M\$80.00-150.00.³⁰ Foreign owned factories allow workers one month's pay as a bonus after working for twelve months. The average wage for new workers in Kedah is M\$80.00-120.00 per month. This compares unfavourably with the starting rates in Kuala Lumpur of M\$270.00. In Singapore, girls are paid M\$452.00 per month for equivalent work within the same American corporation (see General Electric Company's weekly advertisements in New Straits Times and The Star throughout 1982 and 1983).

Girls who have worked in Kedah electronics factories for over five years can earn M\$250.00 a month. There were no operatives in the village who had actually managed to work in one factory consistently for that period of time. Frequent layoffs, shut downs and even retrenchment mean that permanent attendance records are impossible to achieve. After laying off workers, the factories usually recruit the same girls again, however, management treat them as new workers at probationary rates so as to negate the higher rates of pay, attendance bonuses, leave entitlements and experience previously gained on assembly

lines. By such tactics Kedah factories can maintain an experienced and very cheap labour force. In 1982 the laid-off labour force had reason to retaliate against one rubber products factory, yet they chose the locally born personnel manager as their target of frustration.

There were problems with labour discipline . . . I had my life threatened, my house and car were stoned by angry workers (and male kin). They have to be made into disciplined workers and change their attitudes - it disrupts our profit and production lines. We dislike the quality of Malay labour but are forced to take them on to meet government ICA quotas. (Local non-Malay personnel manager of British owned rubber products company 1983).

Disguised retrenchment affected some of the electronics factories in West Malaysia in 1982. To avoid paying benefits required by law, hourly rated workers were allowed to work only three or four days a week or told to go on unpaid leave. Those who could not survive on the reduced income were forced to resign. Workers have no protection. Factories violate labour laws by forcing girls to work 'voluntary' overtime - but they avoid paying the correct overtime rates by calling the extra time worked 'overlap' (for the legal details see Tan 1982, Law-Asia 1983).

LEAVE

All twenty factory managers said that they adhered to Malaysian Labour Laws which state that the factories are obliged to grant workers 7 days' leave, 10 days' gazetted

public holidays, and 21 days' sick leave per annum.³¹ In practice, factories circumvent these requirements by paying a few cents extra per shift to remain open on all holidays, save for the two days festival at the end of the Muslim fasting month (Hari Raya).

When workers approach a personnel manager for a day or two of their annual leave, managers usually tell them that it is 'inconvenient' and will disrupt production so that paid leave is seldom granted. Girls who are involved in life crises, special feasts, or agricultural peaks must take unpaid leave and thereby forfeit all of their legal entitlement. The falsification of workers' leave records is common practice in Kedah factories whether they are owned by local or foreign capital. Workers who do not ask for time off are forced to take their leave at the convenience of factory schedules to coincide with stock taking, slow downs, or audits.

A worker can have paid sick leave only if she is certified by a panel doctor as being ill. The factory appoints the panel doctors so it is very difficult to obtain a medical note. These panel doctors, (who are Indian or Chinese males, trained in western medicine), receive retainers from the factories; their treatment is to administer aspirin and tell the girls to report back to work immediately. If workers have long term ailments, such

as TB, they are dismissed from employment. Some girls manage to keep their marriage a secret from management but any subsequent pregnancy results in a dismissal from employment. The panel doctors are located in central Sungei Petani so if a worker falls ill in her kampung she must, if she can manage to travel at all, pay for the round bus trip to town. In addition to this, the consultation fee and medicine will cost some M\$10.00 - more than twice the daily wage. Factory management does not consider suitable any medical certificates obtained from the government run free clinics in the villages. In any event girls actually prefer to consult with traditional village medicine experts (bomoh) for ailments.³² Non-Malay western trained doctors are considered alien and their treatments do not explain the supernatural causes for illness, particularly when girls have been 'charmed' or visited by 'spirits' in the urban work place.

CHANGING JOBS

An unofficial 'Gentlemen's Agreement' among the factories curtails the efforts of workers to change their employment from one factory to another. The subtle workings of the agreement were explained to me, independently, by managers of textiles, electronics and rubber products factories, and it is even endorsed by the State Labour Office. Each month all the managers participate in a joint

meeting which discusses and exchanges current 'labour lists'. This serves to cut down on labour movement and save training costs deemed contrary to the profits of the factories. Lists of workers and their identity card numbers are exchanged as a 'safety check'. Whenever new workers apply for jobs at the Labour Office, or at any factory, their names and identity card numbers are checked off against the factories' master lists. If an applicant's name appears on the list she is refused employment until the original factory has been contacted and agrees to release the worker. If such agreement is not forthcoming, the worker must return to her original employment.

We do not sack them, but accept girls back and let them carry on working. (Malay personnel manager in a Japanese textile factory, 1982).

The lists prevent the practice of 'factory hopping', whereby workers seek employment in a factory which offers better basic wages:

Malays are constantly on the look out for higher wages. They operate according to status ranking of factories, depending on ethnic management, wages and facilities. (Korean expatriate manager, joint venture factory 1983).

Malays have a very low opinion of factory work and the money is not enough to attract them. Malays would rather wait for a government job with a pension, they are fussy and selective in their jobs. (Malay personnel manager, American rubber products factory, 1982).

The 'Gentlemen's Agreement' ensures that there is never more than a small difference in the basic starting rates so

that new factories will not pull away experienced workers and leave the longer established companies with a depleted labour force. The philosophy behind this unethical practice is to "instil work discipline and company loyalty into the workers" (American expatriate director, 1983). The sleight of hand here involves the denial of the rational choice of a marginally better job with a few dollars extra per month. Under Malaysia's 'Look East' policy, the stereotypical Japanese style of lifelong loyalty to companies is encouraged and lauded but the companies give their workers nothing in return. For factory workers, security, benefits, long term prospects for advancement, training in transferable skills, and even a basic living wage are entirely denied. Kedah's semi-proletariat remain dependent upon kinship networks and their links with subsistence production.

MANAGEMENT GRIEVANCES

Although the factories show high profits and quality products, all managers complain about problems of absenteeism and high quit rates, particularly around padi harvests and religious festival times. The introduction of faster work techniques on different production lines (with no increases in pay) produces complaints from management that groups of friends will quit or absent themselves at the same time. Personnel managers visit the workers in

their kampung to find out why the girls leave their jobs; they also apply pressure to village leaders and workers' kin to persuade the girls to return to the assembly lines. Again, workers explained, that when they ask permission to take leave to coincide with the padi cycles or celebrations they are refused, and so they have no alternative other than to absent themselves. The ambiguous semiproletarian status of the workers will be taken up and analyzed in detail in Chapter V. Workers do not commit themselves to factory employment; they view it within the range of 'occupational multiplicity' and as a stop gap before reaching their final goal of marriage and children. *

Malays are too used to doing just what they want and if there is a marriage in their kampung they will spend a week helping to prepare and cook food. Factory workers must understand they cannot do this. The work ethic has not got to them, familial and kampung ties are stronger than commitment to our company. (Malaysian Chinese personnel manager, joint venture electronics factory 1982).

Absenteeism is high whenever it rains or if it is very hot. They arrive late for work and leave early. Worker attitudes are to do with climate, food and culture. Family commitments are stronger than work values, for instance if someone gives birth, or gets married, girls stay home to help and they still follow agricultural patterns. Malays could not care less - so long as there is enough rice for them to eat they will not work hard. If you work them hard they hate you, they would rather do nothing. I stress time keeping, lunch breaks etc., but they cannot keep to a timetable, it is impossible to solve. (Malay personnel manager in Japanese joint-venture auto factory, 1983).

By sharp contrast an expatriate manager praises the high quality of workers in his Penang branch precisely

because they are migrants. They travel to the Island to earn money for remittances to parents on the Peninsula. He reasons that they must work very hard each day just to pay their room rents and, living in a very sophisticated urban environment, they are completely dependant upon their jobs at the factory for survival on a day-to-day basis. Because of these factors, he argues that absenteeism is minimal.

Management in Kedah factories do not appreciate the fact that workers are aware of factory work being neither stable nor secure in the long term. Workers are susceptible to dismissal or lay offs without warning or compensation. Factories prefer to employ young, single, girls and use very specific segments of the labour market which are more easily controllable. So soon as girls are married or become assertive they are dismissed. Girls acquire only fragmented skills which cannot be used outside of the factory, and employers do not provide unemployment, sickness, or old age security benefits. Interviews and observations reveal that work production levels are set high and occupational diseases are common. Discipline and time keeping are very strictly regulated by a clocking-in system and the constant surveillance by line leaders. Unless workers keep a firm foot in the subsistence production, maintain their kinship ties, obligations of reciprocity and peasant values, they and their families,

cannot survive. Factory work represents merely one in a series of economic niches which the semiproletariat exploit. Subsistence production no longer suffices in the support of households but the new industrial work set up to help Bumiputras under Malaysia's NEP fails in its objectives. Workers must allocate their time judiciously among seasonal alternatives in subsistence and factory wage work (see Chapter V).

Corporations report difficulties with recruitment and feel that the Kedah State Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) and the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) duped them with promises of a large labour pool which has not come forward to work. When the new industrial estates were established they drew labour from the local kampungs and, indeed, women who were working in Penang came 'home' to work locally. The assurances given by the Kedah and Federal level government officials, before the factories were constructed, indicated that a labour force of 14,800 was available when, in south Kedah, only 4,500 have come forward. It is only when the factories start operations that the labour problem becomes known; the corporations invest capital beforehand and it makes them reluctant to shift location so soon - this runs against the stereotype of 'footloose' factories put forward by World Systems theorists. Factories are encouraged to locate in

this peripheral area because of the attractive pioneer status, tax incentives and the promise of a cheap work force. The work force has been less than eager to take up industrial jobs. Accordingly, some factories must run buses to collect labour in outlying areas up to a radius of fifty miles.

THE HAPPY FAMILY

Western and Japanese management techniques have been transplanted to the Malaysian cultural environment in attempts to create a disciplined non-unionised workforce with a high output. The gender, age and ethnic division of labour is utilised to the benefit of management who manipulate the inferior status of single women in Malayo-Muslim culture. Management exert control of the labour force through subtle manipulation of cultural values such as 'shame' (malu), and 'fear' (takut).³³ This couples with the necessity to work in order to discharge reciprocal obligations (balas budi). Girls do not wish to renege on balas budi. The twin concepts of shame and fear are used as a form of control, particularly when personnel report to kinsfolk on absenteeism or the girls' shortcomings. Factory managements propagate an ideological view of the factory as a family to enforce control over the work force, so authority is legitimated within the framework of the social structure and cultural values of Malays. This works

to the advantage of management in that the traditional hierarchical criteria of age, gender, and ethnicity appear to justify low wages rather than the rational criteria of education and skill levels. Factories manipulate those traditional values which can work to their own benefit while ignoring others.

All management, for instance, tend toward superficial 'egalitarian' techniques which Malays consider to be most peculiar. Malays are status ridden and hierarchy conscious to an extraordinary degree. In the 'family atmosphere' the factory hierarchies emphasise 'paternalism' and male supervisors are referred to by fictive kin terminology such as 'elder brother' (abang) or 'uncle' (pa' chik). Malay girls are culturally trained to be tolerant, to obey male kin, never to express anger or frustration and to follow strictly the requirements of budibahasa. By these means, young inexperienced school leavers can be theoretically moulded into the factory system. One expatriate American factory manager walked with me around his production lines chatting and joking with his workers, although he spoke no Malay nor did the girls speak any English. He would occasionally pat them on the head, arm or back and constantly praised what he termed as 'his happy family'. Many of the women tried to pull away and he laughingly interpreted this as sexual coyness but, from a Malay

cultural view, it is most distasteful for any male to approach a female and touch her. The head is hedged about with taboo and must never be touched by anyone unless they mean to carry out black magic, for it is the place where the soul (semangat) is believed to reside.³⁴

Local and expatriate managers are proud of their grievance procedures whereby assembly line operatives refer problems to their line supervisor who, in turn, refers it to the section leader. If the difficulty cannot be resolved at this level, it goes to the personnel manager who is expected to deal with any difficulties - and he consults the managing director only when every other measure has failed. Local and foreign management make much of this open door policy, yet production operators are afraid (takut) and too shy (malu) to utilise the hierarchy. Given the fact that problems frequently arise from verbal abuse, personality, or from ethnic clashes with the supervisor himself, difficulties occur at the lowest level of the hierarchy. Problems are common and workers would rather lose a day's wages by staying away from work to avoid unpleasantness and contradictions in budibahasa values.³⁵

Workers will suffer agonies of shyness and shame rather than discuss their problems with any person of a higher status. Malay culture is status conscious to such an exceptionally high degree that it negates the culturally

alien 'open door' policy because so few workers dare to utilise it:

All management mix freely with the workers, there is no discrimination, no status differentials, relationships between management and workers is good. We go around the factory on a regular basis to break down barriers, so they know they have access to us, we are very approachable. (British expatriate executive, American TNC 1983).

When pressed as to the exact number of times he went around the factory, the executive admitted to once in two months or so, or 'whenever he felt like it'. The suggestion that unions might be a better way of representing worker grievances met with a negative response. All local and foreign managers deny the usefulness of unions in Malaysia and are quick to cite examples of unions in Europe that "destroy" business because:

They are only concerned with the workers' interests and not profit. (American expatriate, electronics company, 1983)

The irony of the reverse logic of his statement is echoed by the following European policy:

The company looks after the workers and we will not have a union here. It is up to us to deliver or not deliver the goods as we see fit. Basically these girls are ignorant and the advantage lies on the side of the company. The girls are all shy, come from poor families and are forced to work to supplement the income of their parents. (Malay personnel manager, European medical rubber products factory, 1983).

And:

These people are simple and they do not understand anything about unions. We have a paternalistic company and look after them. Unions would only destroy the factory and the economy of this country, look at what is happening in Britain. (American rubber products factory manager, 1983).

SPIRITUAL UNIONS

In the Sharp Roxy electronics factory an outbreak of spirit possession affecting over fifty assembly line workers coincided with an efficiency drive for higher production rates of 1,000 cassette radio sets per day. Labour relations had deteriorated and workers complained about the low wages (then M\$3.20 per day), the impossibility of getting paid leave, or sick leave, and a dislike of non-Malay supervisors. In retaliation the workers produced faulty goods, which were rejected, and they pilfered considerable amounts of gold wire (intended for integrated circuits). The Japanese management were totally confused by the mass outbreak of spirit possession, but the local personnel manager (a Chinese) quickly brought in a Malay bomoh to conduct a sacrifice and get rid of the spirits disturbing the workers. It was rumoured that one girl died as a result of injury during her possession but it was difficult for me to substantiate this. The fifty victims were all sent to the Sungei Petani hospital for an injection to calm them down and then driven back to their kampung to consult with specialists in ritual magic known to their own kin.

Spirit possession has always been common among peasant Malays (Firth 1967, Banks 1976, Kessler 1977). However, patterns of spirit possession have increased very dramatically during the tenure of the NEP and industrialization (Ackerman 1980).

A stereotyped pattern follows the many events. Victims, predominantly unmarried Malay girls suddenly begin to scream and shout in terror, run aimlessly, complain of chest pains and breathing difficulties, become aggressive and abuse everyone in sight. Some exhibit trance like behaviour, others experience convulsions or hallucinations and report seeing supernatural beings. This behaviour becomes highly contagious and spreads through the group. Victims struggle violently and display extraordinary physical strength. After recovery victims universally claim amnesia and insist they were unaware of their behaviour. (Ackerman 1980:171).

Malays view these outbreaks as supernatural possession and the victims are believed to have disturbed spirits. Some interpret them as supernatural punishment for the violation of moral codes, while others see it as the work of spirits who attack victims while they have weak soul essence. The victim becomes a source of supernatural power, and is not responsible for any of her actions; whatever occurs is the machination of a spirit. To pacify the spirits a Malay bomoh prepares a sacrifice; the victim receives amulets for protection and is instructed to observe certain taboos for a period of time (Lee 1981, Ackerman & Lee 1978, 1981).

Similar outbreaks of spirit possession were reported by

the foreign owned textiles and rubber products factories, particularly during the night shift which, for Malays, is a period fraught with danger from the spirit realm.

We call a bomoh every year to make sure there are no spirits here. We have had many outbreaks. The girls are probably too weak, nervous, undernourished and tense so they let go. We try to handle them psychologically and get the bomoh to conduct prayers to give them peace of mind. (Malay personnel manager, Japanese textile factory, 1983).

We have had spirit outbreaks here. A Chinese came in to pray, to site and bless the factory before building started and again before production started (this was a Cantonese feng shui expert in 'winds' and the selection of auspicious sites for buildings, graves etc.). For the past two years the night shift operators complained that they were bothered by ghosts so I had to call a Malay bomoh to make offerings and calm the workers down. About thirty years ago we had similar things in Korea when simple girls started to work in factories.

(Korean manager of joint venture rubber products factory, 1983. This factory judiciously catered for the ritual requirements of its considerable number of expatriates, local Chinese technicians and Malay operators).

Towards the end of every year most factories at Bakar Arang now call a bomoh as a matter of routine. They give a feast (kenduri) for the spirits "to keep things calm and the Malay workers happy" (Malay personnel manager, Japanese textile factory, 1983).

Only Sharp Roxy is out of its ten year pioneer status and an in-house union was formed recently. The Malaysian personnel manager had the following comments.

Labour turnover, before the 1982 Collective Agreement", was high at 12% and we constantly had outbreaks of spirit possession. Since 1982 turnover has dropped to 2% and

worker-management relations are much better. We no longer have night shift work and are reducing to a 44 hour week and fighting for international standards. I am pleased with the way things have worked out since the agreement and am in favour of unionisation. Workers need the union in order to protect themselves and it is the only way they will get a decent wage or benefits. Before 1982 we could, and did, browbeat workers, now we cannot. Previously the workers were so ignorant that we could talk them into resigning to avoid paying compensation because they did not know the law. Now with the union it is different.

In spite of his glowing statement, the unionized factory conditions are still far from satisfactory, basic pay rates have improved, but forced leave, orchestrated 'sick leave', and the lack of benefits have still to be resolved. Girls say that the union representatives are all hand picked by management and, being non-Malays (i.e. male Chinese and Indians), the union representatives concern themselves only with their own ethnic interests so that they are reluctant to speak out about real issues affecting the Malay female production workers. The union is of the in-house variety and merely a 'window dressing' exercise by the Japanese to counteract the critical comments in the Malaysian press on the exploitation of, and lack of representation for, female workers in the FTZs.

Worker grievances and industrial conflict in Kedah have been channelled to the spirits, this prevents any direct confrontation with management and so the appearance of harmony and budibahasa values are maintained. Outbreaks of spirit possession in factories have also been reported for

other parts of Malaysia such as Penang, Selangor and Malacca by Grossman (1978), Ackerman (1980), Ackerman & Lee (1981) and Ong (1983). Trance and possession are part of behaviour patterns found in Malay kampungs so that when 'spirits' close down an assembly line, it is a Malay cultural reaction to a situation of extreme stress and conflicts in budibahasa. Spirit possession is now deemed to be a problem in Kedah's factories because foreign industrialists are perturbed by the closure of assembly lines. Spirits, in lieu of unions, conflict with production targets and profits. The exasperated director of one factory told me that he was very anxious about how his head office might react to a telex saying that "ghosts had stopped the production lines". There is an undue emphasis placed by management upon the 'westernization and modernization' of Malays, as if they should leave their own culture behind in the padi fields before entering the factory gates. TNCs fail, however, to give their workers anything in return apart from the stigma and insecurity associated with industrial work. Official Malaysian and foreign judgement is based on the assumption that 'superstitions' should disintegrate when faced with industrialization, but Malays continue to use traditional methods in urban factories. Indeed, management manipulate traditional age and gender hierarchies in worker control.

Spirit possession is not obsolete as a result of industrialization; instead it has assumed new functions which reflect the rapidly changing structural conditions, tensions and, most evidently, exploitation in Kedah factories.

SUMMARY

In this chapter I have discussed the establishment and ownership of factories in Kedah. The tactics used by TNCs in labour relations such as recruitment, wages, working conditions, facilities and worker control have been examined. The way in which factories selectively utilise aspects of Malay culture has been emphasised as an important factor in industrial relations and labour control. Linked to this is the cultural response by the workers' involvement with spirit possessions. The factories, clearly, are in a position to exploit the workers who, as semi-proletarians, must provide cash incomes for their households under peasant obligations of reciprocity. Semi-proletarian, as a concept, indicates that workers engage in other forms of non-valorised labour; this is substantiated by management grievances over worker absenteeism and a lack of commitment to assembly line labour or loyalty to the company. It must be emphasized that this very factor of semi-proletarianization, which the TNCs are so quick to utilise by low wages, simultaneously

works against management in the form of reciprocal labour dues which their work force must meet in subsistence production. The ways in which Malays view reciprocity in subsistence production forms the subject matter of the next two chapters. My argument is that although theorists, and Malays themselves, view this non-valorised labour as reciprocity, such terminology masks labour control of a different nature. The two uses of exploitation should be recalled here; in the capitalist mode of production exploitation takes the form of the extraction of surplus value for profit. The rate of exploitation is higher in TNCs since labour productivity and the rate of profit is greater. In non-capitalist relations of production *(extended social relations)* exploitation takes the form of control over labour. The latter is, however, penetrated by the demands of the former since the capitalist mode of production is dominant in Malaysia yet mediated by non-capitalist relations of production characterised by the ideology of kinship reciprocity. The conceptualisation of intra and inter household reciprocity in the following two chapters will demonstrate the way in which control over labour extends from the household through to the international division of labour.

CHAPTER V

INTRA-HOUSEHOLD RECIPROCITY

The following two chapters focus on intra and inter-household reciprocity in Kampung Dalam, a village located in a sub district (Mukim) of Kuala Muda District, Kedah. This chapter on intra household reciprocity recapitulates Sahlin's view of kin reciprocity. It then provides a general village background, and goes on to examine, in detail, the way in which female factory workers contribute to natal household subsistence production. There has been no theoretical attention given to intra household reciprocity although, from my perspective, it forms a crucial analytical category. The neglect of this core concept results from the fact that households have been previously examined as homogenous egalitarian units, yet the way in which Malayo-Islamic views of age and gender operate to control labour power in intra household reciprocity requires consideration.³⁶ This illustrates the cultural view of unmarried girls against their practical economic value. The analysis is set within the Malay views

of filial reciprocity to show the way reciprocal ideology and practice create economic linkages to the state and international capital. It thereby illustrates the interactive role of peasant culture in economic articulations. Intra and inter household reciprocity are key issues in understanding the way peasant households manage the development process set in train by the state.

It will be recalled from the theoretical discussion in chapter II that the semiproletarian labour force survives by reciprocal labour derived from kin since industrial wages are insufficient for maintenance. Such a view underestimates the role the semiproletariat plays in subsistence production: as is evident below, not only do Malay daughters work on world market factories' assembly lines, but they are also active participants in household production. Their labour on industrial assembly lines is underpaid while their reciprocal labour dues in subsistence are non-valorised. At the household level, the girls are viewed as 'useless' in spite of the fact that their labour and cash remittances are important for household maintenance.

HOUSEHOLDS and FEMALE WORK

Households are not characterised by an egalitarian allocation of consumption, distribution, resources or work among members. The development process itself actually increases the differential allocation of work and resources

with gender as a critical variable. The notion of the household as a unit of convergent interests is increasingly called into question by researchers on Africa and Asia (Whitehead 1985, Agarwal 1985) and it is echoed by the Domestic Labour debate among western Feminists. Such findings criticise the basic assumptions of the New Household Economy which treats households as homogenous income pooling units (e.g Hart 1978 and 1980). The economist's model fails to distinguish gender, age, and class variables. The model assumes that intra household distribution and consumption are based on sharing and need arising from common interests, a view which is not supported by anthropological data. Households are comprised of sets of social relationships which allocate access and distribution of resources differentially (Whitehead 1985:57).

Gender hierarchy does not have the same analytical base as class hierarchy, but it does have a production and distribution component, with its own institutional bases, and it is for this reason that the development process is not indifferent to gender any more than it is indifferent to class. Whitehead (1985:62).

The demands made upon offspring are controlled by age and gender even after children have become adults. These issues have been widely discussed in the anthropological literature on the economic value of children (Nag, et al 1980, Hart 1980, Bulatao & Lee 1983). Comparative work on peasant households in developing countries indicates that

the labour of offspring is substantial yet biased toward females. Children continue to represent old age security for parents in terms of cash and labour inputs. Such factors affect fertility in two main ways. Firstly, female status can only be obtained by marriage and procreation so motherhood remains both socially and economically necessary. Secondly, children continue to be valued resources because child-parent cash and labour flows are essential to supplement household income (Ward 1984).

Generally speaking, the intrusion of capital has reduced women's status relative to men. Foreign agencies reinforce women's roles as reproducers and subsistence labourers (as is evident from chapter IV), in that TNCs limit the working life and access of females to assembly line wage labour. Malayo Muslim women are encouraged by the state and religious authorities to reproduce in order to change ethnic balances and to create larger domestic markets. For Malaysia and Indonesia the ideal values of motherhood and dedication to the family are extolled as virtues and female independence, no matter how mild, is decried by the state as being unsuitable for Malays and contrary to Islam. The use of Islam as a state tool for the political and moral control of all Malays, but especially females, has recently become enhanced with the Bumiputra ideology and the rise of 'fundamentalist' Islam.

These recent events are in sharp contrast to the

historical reports and research on Islam and women in Malaysia. Rural Malay women, after marriage, enjoyed considerable status, power, autonomy and economic independence, (see Strange (1981), Couillard (1982) and Stivens (1985) for the pre colonial, colonial and independence periods). These authors emphasise the important role married women possessed in agriculture, trade, and control over economic resources. Emerging patterns among urban Malays indicate that ideologies of femininity with the male as head of the household, and wife and children as dependents, are becoming dominant (Stivens 1985).

The development process is also reported to have negative effects upon rural women, particularly with regard to the 'green revolution' when females are displaced by 'western' technology or incur increased work loads (Boserup 1970, Ward 1984, chapter VI below). Research on Southeast Asia shows that girls and women do more work than boys and men in all age groups in handicrafts, trade, agriculture and unpaid household production. In Java, women aged 15 and over work an average of 11.1 hours a day compared to 8.7 hours by men (e.g. Stoler 1977, Hart 1978, 1980, White 1982, Ward 1984). My own survey for the off peak periods indicates that females spend 9.5 hours at work, while males work 6.0 hours (both figures exclude infant care). For the peak periods the hours increase to 13.0 and 9.0

respectively.

Women work longer hours than men since they are responsible for heavy household labour, income generating activities, as well as their share in agriculture. Household work is as critical for survival as direct agricultural production, yet it remains the sole responsibility of mothers and daughters. The work by daughters for their mothers is rarely mentioned in the literature. As Whitehead points out "under most circumstances unpaid work for others would be seen as exploitative, but the unpaid work for household members is not seen as such" (1985:46). Evidently, the economic model of the 'homogeneous' household has shortcomings.

The implicit economic value of Malay females is substantiated by the fact that villagers, with a bilateral kinship system and flexible residence patterns, seldom express preference for one gender over the other; to do so is seen as contrary to the will of Allah. After marriage many daughters used to end up living virilocally and continued to supply help, food and labour to their natal household. Residence patterns are changing with migration though obligations to the natal household remain strong and remittances are made where possible. The 'invisible' economic value of Malay girls is further indicated by the fact that households with no daughters will endeavour to adopt one; and granddaughters are especially welcomed in

grandparental homes. In Muslim (and non Muslim) societies characterised by strong patrilineal descent systems and patrilocal residence patterns male gender preferences prevail although, according to Islamic theology, no such distinctions should be made (Quran, Al Nahl, 16:58-61, see Ahmad 1986 for Bangladesh).

FILIAL RECIPROCITY

This section is concerned with the Malay peasant view of parent-child reciprocal obligations (balas budi). Malay mothers manipulate cultural values of reciprocity in order to ensure that their daughters, who commute to factory work and participate in subsistence production, comply with obligations to support their households and discharge filial debts owed to mothers for their 'milk'. Where this is threatened, magic may be utilised to ensure the 'protection' of virgin daughters as well as the continued flow of goods and money.³⁷

From two theoretical views of reciprocity, Sahlin's (1974:165), and Bourdieu's (1982), the expectation of a return for the suckling of children is inappropriate but for peasant Malays undergoing difficult transitions, material returns 'for the milk' are expected and reciprocal obligations must be honoured.

Generalized reciprocity refers to transactions that are putatively altruistic, transactions on the line of

assistance given and, if possible and necessary, assistance returned. The ideal type is Malinowski's pure gift . . . for its logical value, one might think of the suckling of children in this context - the expectation of a direct material return is unseemly. (Sahlins 1974:194).

What may be viewed from the perspective of the model as a 'gift' in fact sets off a long series of obligations. The birth and suckling of children creates filial 'reciprocal' dues which are discharged through the parental life time, as will become evident below.

It follows that close kin tend to share, to enter into generalized exchanges and distant and nonkin to deal in equivalence or in guile. (Sahlins 1974:195).

For Malay peasants, exchanges among close kin cannot be viewed as altruistic gifts, nor are labour and goods given without the expectation of a return. Reciprocal obligations are carefully calculated, in fact, much more so among kin than among strangers. Kin ideally, are the only people Malays can rely upon for help. Indeed, Malay mothers make explicit their expectations of a 'return on the milk'. The theoretical assumption is that between close kin, services and goods are rendered without thinking of returns, but Malays make high demands on their kin because kin find it difficult to refuse. Guile is also practiced among close kin and is not reserved solely for strangers, as evidenced by the incidences of magic and spells administered by mothers to daughters in Kampung Dalam to ensure a flow of

cash income.³⁷ The following case is one example.

Sitiminah's two daughters talked about going to live in Sungei Petani, and changing jobs to earn more money. They reasoned that they could then support their mother more easily. Sitiminah, on hearing this, became very disturbed so sought the assistance of a powerful bomoh in Baling. The consultation with this magical practitioner entailed a long bus ride and the round trip cost Sitiminah some M\$8.00 plus M\$5.00 for the medicine. This 'magical water' was administered to the girls in the form of tea. If her daughters moved to Sungei Petani the amount of cash and labour she could depend upon would be reduced and so Sitiminah cajoled and finally 'shamed' them by pointing out that their departure would leave her totally alone in the house. The techniques of creating 'shame' probably won the day but Sitiminah credited the medicine and the bomoh with great success. She told me privately that she was quite worried about the unmarried status of her daughters (24 and 34 years of age) but if they left the kampung who would cook, look after her, and give her Tabung Haji money to save for the pilgrimage to Mecca? As it turned out, life was soon back on an even footing again but if necessary, the bomoh can be consulted again to ensure security. Sitiminah employed traditional magic and invoked the concept of shame to ensure what she referred to as 'the return of her milk'.

The theoretical views of Bourdieu (1982), Terray (1975) and Meillassoux (1981) substantiate the view of age and gender control over the labour power of youth, enforced by religion, magic and other cultural mechanisms. For Polanyi, too, "Custom and law, magic and religion co-operated in inducing the individual to comply with rules of behaviour" (1957:55).

MALAY CULTURE & RECIPROCITY

Malay culture requires that kin should give and receive. They should live according to Malay custom (adat), and Islamic values and they must strive to maintain harmony

(aman). The closer people are, the more they ought to be guided by concepts of politeness and shame (malu). This is reminiscent of the Javanese concepts of refined (halus) and coarse (kasar) behaviour which Indonesian scholars discuss. When people are rude one is greatly shamed by, and for, them. Malays dislike open conflict, dispute, or aggression and they disapprove of those who cannot control their behaviour. They rarely have open quarrels but, where grievances exist, recourse to magic is frequent as a remedy, protection, or as an excuse for unseemly behaviour. Malay politeness (budibahasa) and fear of being shamed (malu) hide real feelings of animosity and strains within and between close kin. This concept of shame (malu) covers notions of reciprocity and help (tolong-menolong). If a kinsperson requests help and this is not forthcoming, both parties would be shamed, the former because of the refusal and the latter because of the failure to live up to Malay concepts of kin reciprocity.³⁸

Malays maximise their kinship connections and utilise them as far as ever possible. Giving is conceived of as a moral duty and, indeed, status accrues to those who honour such obligations. For Malays, giving to kin is a duty but at the same time kin, particularly children, are indebted over a longer time span according to filial duties and cultural obligations. The accounting principle was apparent constantly during the course of field work and succinctly

expressed by one old widowed woman. Her two daughters work in TNCs in Penang's free trade zone and when asked if they help to support her, back came the aggrieved reply that, so far, she had no return on the milk given to them. The statement is metaphorical, but very poignant. In fact the girls do send her money, but because they live in cosmopolitan Penang and can afford very little, the elderly mother is dissatisfied. Their income is spent on high rents, food and transportation. The object of having children is to ensure that the offspring look after their parents as soon as possible. Mothers do not wish to appear selfish, nor do children want to appear ungrateful for the 'sacrifices' which have been made in order to rear them and, more recently, to send them to school. Indeed, children are referred to as wealth (harta); they constitute wealth for the joy given to their parents while they are growing up and for the security which they represent for parental old age. There is no state welfare and parents become dependent upon their children for support - this feature has become very marked recently. Malays living in subsistence are justifiably obsessed with worries about old age, sickness, and the fear of future uncertainties, particularly since the advent of the New Economic Policy as children, now, frequently migrate. Migration creates labour shortages in subsistence production and increases the work load of those who cannot afford to hire labour or mechanize

production. Increasingly, remittances from offspring help to offset the increased commoditization of the production process or, in more urbanised areas of Malaysia, allows households to cease production completely (e.g. Stivens 1985). Since the issue of kinship is raised here, it is appropriate to describe, briefly, the nature of the Malay system.

MALAY KINSHIP

Malays have a bilateral kinship system with equal importance attached to both the husband's and the wife's sides of the kindred. There are no rules as to virilocal or uxrilocal residence patterns nor do Malays have organized descent groups (Djamour 1965, Strange 1981). Descent is reckoned bilaterally with no concept of ancestry through lineages save for the matrilineal Malays in the State of Negri Sembilan - see Swift (1965) and Peletz (1981). For changes in matrilineality wrought by industrialization, see Khatijah Mohamad (1978), Ackerman (1980), and Stivens (1985). Maternal and paternal parallel and cross cousins are not differentiated, rather they are referred to as 'sa-pupu' (first cousins) and are a marriageable category. The kindred range extends up to second cousins who are all considered to be close (saudara dekat) (Djamour 1965, Banks 1973, 1983, Nagata 1976). Third cousins and beyond are considered to be distant kin (saudara jauh) but the range of 'close' kindred is not fixed and it varies according to

ego's personal preferences. The resulting system, therefore, is flexible.

There are important distinctions made according to generation, birth order, sex and collaterality which correspond to the 'Hawaiian' system. As Banks (1983:55) points out, the system of reciprocal terms between consanguineal kin of the same generation is part of the system which distinguishes members of one's father's and one's mother's sibling group in accordance with their respective birth position within their own sibling group. Birth order titles distinguish members of sibling groups and, when prefixed by generational affixes, form an individual's referential title until marriage.

Terminological usages and their explanations indicate the emphasis upon the sons and daughters of one man, and relative age within this sibling group. Original sibling groups determine relative usages between more distant kinsmen. Malays recognise degrees of collaterality through males and through females equally, implying a branching model of relatedness through gradually weakening, thinning ties of relationship substance. Each individual transmits the substance of both his mother and father, and these relatives have already transmitted to him the substances of his four grandparents and of his eight great grandparents. This thinning of substance is considered sufficient to permit interbreeding after two generations and marriage is positively encouraged between sa-pupu (cousins) to make transmission of lands convenient and efficient to the next generation and to guarantee a modicum of amicability between in-laws. (Banks 1983:60)

Kinship terms of reference by generation include everyone in the village whether kin or not. For instance, people of the parental generation are categorized by terms

used for parent's siblings, with the addition of their birth order ranking. Similarly, young people are referred to as younger brother or younger sister, for instance, a younger sister (adik) with the name of Mazwin will be referred to simply as adik or 'dik Win. As a measure of respect the word for grandfather (tok) is also used to refer to a respected religious official who may actually be younger than the referent (Nagata 1976). The terminology used for consanguines is also used for affines but where there is confusion the word for blood (dara) emphasises 'true' (betul) blood relationships for explanatory purposes, yet never in face to face encounters (Banks 1983).

Recent work on Malay kinship and social mobility shows that although terms of reference and address for kin and non kin are the same, nascent class differences are made apparent by a subtle change in language. Nagata's (1976) contribution supports part of my argument here:

. . . it is expected that a generalised reciprocity of goods and services should operate within the neighbourhood or community . . . However, there are many occasions in which considerable asymmetry in the material context of the reciprocity occurs . . . it is expected that those in more comfortable circumstances should contribute more . . . When the role of the recipient of such an 'extra' is not regarded as one of a 'true' relative by the donor, the term used for the donation may be phrased as saguhati or hadiah saguhati ("something from the heart"), implying more than is really necessary, i.e. beyond the limits of normal kinship expectations. Anyone considering himself the consanguine of another would be grossly insulted were any extra service provided to be so defined by the donor . . .

to give 'saguhati' is tantamount to denying the kinship by magnanimously and gratuitously offering something over and above what is required. (Nagata 1976:403).

Poor kin are 'disowned' by refined shifts in terminology indicating that the concern with socio-economic status is more important than consanguinity. Nagata cites cases which show shifts between siblings and other close kin, such as use of the term 'chârité', 'wages', and 'hired help', which emphasises the asymmetry of the relationship to the detriment of ideal egalitarian kin connections. It is the upwardly mobile kin who 'redefine' the status within the norms of reciprocity (Ibid:407).

MUSLIM LAW and MALAY CUSTOM

Islam arrived in Peninsular Malaysia by way of Arabia, Persia, India and Pakistan (Endicott 1981, Mohd Taib Osman 1980). Malays today belong to the orthodox Sunni sect and follow the Shafii school of law. In Kedah, the Sultan is head of the Council of Islamic Religion and Malay Custom (Majlis Ugama Islam dan 'Adat Isti-adat Melayu). The power to issue rulings on any point of Muslim law (fatwa) or Malay custom (adat) rests with the Sultan and the Council (Majlis). If the Sultan, acting in the public interest, gives permission, the Council has recourse to the Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki schools of law to issue rulings (Fatwa) (Ahmad 1963, 1964).

Malay custom modifies Muslim law in Malaysia with

regard to betrothal, marriage, divorce, adoption, property and inheritance (Ahmad 1963, 1964, Mohd. Taib Osman 1980, Strange 1981). In Negri Sembilan, for instance, the clan system and property inheritance follow matrilineal custom adat perpatih so favours women. Elsewhere in Peninsular Malaysia adat temenggung is a pre-Islamic system of inheritance which, ideally, favours males and females equally. The work of researchers such as Strange (1981), Peletz (1981), Banks (1983) and Stivens (1985) suggests that the binary opposition in the literature between the different styles of customary law (adat) and Muslim law actually fails to reflect what Malay peasants do.

In Kampung Dalam too, there are compromises and flexibilities between Muslim law and Malay custom (adat). Weddings incorporate both while inheritance patterns follow either. If villagers follow custom, property may be divided equally with movable goods to the daughters and land to the sons. The system adopted depends upon the gender and number of heirs, personalities, what agreements they come to among themselves based upon need, place of work, residence and the value/amount of the property involved. Shares in property may even be relinquished by buying out the claims of others, particularly if some of the heirs live far away from the village, or in some cases, land may be worked on a rotational basis. Some heirs leave the land to be worked by a sibling but intend to return to the village upon

retirement. Inheritance disputes do occur. Where close kin are involved in reciprocal labour exchange they are not solely interested in labour received, but in the significance of that exchange in the temporal context of past and future benefits or losses (pace Sanchez 1982). There is a subterfuge of 'undeclared calculations' (Bourdieu 1982). One way to justify rights to inheritance and legitimise claims to land is to give labour service to parents or to work land on their behalf - this is played out in terms of reciprocity (balas budi and berdarau).

That implicit expectations are not always fulfilled is evidenced in the case of four factory worker households' feuds with siblings over land inheritance. They now refuse work, ritual, or reciprocal obligations with them as they feel cheated of shares in land upon which they had worked. In one case, the mother of a factory worker lost a share in her father's land after being promised an inter vivos transfer for looking after the ailing parent. The father died before the land could be transferred so her brother insisted on taking the case to the Shari'iah court. Under Muslim law, he was awarded two thirds of the land. Some villagers consider this an immoral act as the land could have been divided according to adat; moreover the brother certainly does not need the land for his livelihood since he works as a salaried secondary school teacher in Alor Setar. To retain a plot of land in the village for

retirement purposes is a desired goal of many migrants.

The adat informal division of inheritance was similarly overridden in three other disputes which led to antagonisms and the decline of reciprocal relations with close kin in favour of neighbours. In spite of daughters nursing infirm parents, helping them work their land over the years, making or buying expensive medicines, and clothing and feeding them, they failed to inherit what they regard as their just and moral share. The interests of offspring working parental land can therefore be seen as long term. Obligations are created over a time period which entitle children to shares in the parental holding. It is not the immediate act of labour, but the interest which accrues in the land by fulfilling the combinations of filial duty (balas budi) and reciprocal labour (berdarau) in culturally sanctioned tasks. The long term economic calculation is that of land inheritance from the parents.

Under Muslim law, in Malaysia, a female is only entitled to half of what is due to a male. A widow is entitled to one quarter of the estate of a deceased husband if he has no child. If the deceased left a child, then the wife is entitled to one-eighth. If the deceased leaves a daughter and no son the daughter is entitled to one half of the estate of her father. If there is a son and daughter two shares go to a son and one share to a daughter. This results in a fragmentation of plots. The ultimate size of a

single plot is useless, and so, girls often relinquish their shares to brothers on the assumption that sisters marry and become dependent upon a husband whereas brothers must support a wife and children. Although daughters' labour and cash contributions to household maintenance are greater than their brothers, female material gains in Kampung Dalam are less and land ownership favours males. Adopted children can inherit under custom (adat) but not under Muslim law, unless the deceased has made inter vivos arrangements (Ahmad 1964). Residents of Kampung Dalam resort to the Shara'iah court only if complications arise. The court is time consuming and requires costly trips to Alor Setar so that informal adat continues to dictate many of their small scale transactions.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Kedah state covers an area of 3,368 sq. miles with a population density of 114 persons per sq. mile (Table # 1). Only 14% of Kedah's 1,116.1 million population are urbanised, compared with the national figure of 37% (Census Report 1983). The nearest town to Kampung Dalam is Sungei Petani located 18 miles away. In part, because of this proximity to Bakar Arang industrial estate, and the amenity of an all weather road, the village has experienced an outflow of single, young, Malay female labour for the past six years.

Village land comprises 447.29 (68%) acres of padi

(which doubles as tobacco land in the dry season), 126.66 (19%) acres of rubber trees, and 52.20 (08%) acres of fruit making a total of 658.92 acres (Table # 2). The village follows a typical Malay linear settlement pattern for just over a mile; houses are clustered among coconut, fruit and rubber trees with the padi land lying to the rear on a small plain. The village has one primary school, two mosques and two general dealers, one of which includes a small coffee shop. In no way can the village, land, or households be seen as bounded entities in time and space, particularly given the varied work patterns, migrant workers, tenurial arrangements, and the external linkages of its residents.

There are 191 households, of which 73 (38%) own from 0.13 - 2.13 acres of land, 39 (20%) own 2.84-9.94 acres of land, while 70 (37%) are totally landless. Only nine (5%) of the households own the 10 acres or more which is regarded by the state as the minimum for economically viable agriculture. The large landowners' share comprises 45% of the total 658.92 acres available. If all the padi and rubber land was distributed equally, each household (191) could own 3.44 acres. The state government recently built a laterite road through the village which depleted 84 lots by a total of six acres.

This land consolidation is unusual and partially to do with the fact that the founding headman, who "opened up"

this area from the jungle in 1840-60 after the invasions (1821-33), began to operate land as a commercial concern in the 1880s. The land was registered when the British took over from the Siamese administration in 1909 and rubber was planted that same year. The founding headman was in a position to allocate land and married one of his daughters to an Acehnese prince who was fleeing from the Dutch military campaigns in Sumatra. The pristine title and commercial operation of that particular family's land is continued, and added to, today. One of the descendants enjoys great entrepreneurial success in the tobacco business; he has created 'dry season' cash cropping opportunities for the rest of the village. Another descendant owns the rice mill and still another owns the rubber dealership so that, between them, they form the wealthiest households in the village. Strategic marriages have been arranged with influential families elsewhere in Kedah (Table # 3 - genealogy).

There is a nascent class formation predicated on landholding. Children from landless, female headed, or smallholders' households do not enter higher education and must find work in the factories or armed forces. That the NEP has exacerbated the class structure in Malaysian society is undeniable (Snodgrass 1980, Lim D 1983, Anand 1983). Most village households are below the poverty line of M\$384.00 a month per household of five (13% above: 87%

below). It is significant, however, that the large landowners rent out land since their offspring have joined various professions or government service. In spite of state policies and Bumiputra scholarships, parental wealth influences the level of education achieved by offspring (Table # 4). In 1983 the six village children in higher education were the offspring of the Imam, a Malay tin mine owner, a former headman, and the village elder, all of whom sent their children away for elite education from an early age.

With the Islamic law of inheritance and customary practices which fragment land, subsistence agriculture cannot provide sufficient income for the whole village. Land shortage, the decline of peasant subsistence coupled with the increase in industrialization, militarization and compulsory education are causative factors in the outmigration of both males and females. The NEP has led to the growth of a semiproletariat which serves both as a source of cheap labour for Malaysia's industrialization process and as unpaid labour in subsistence production. Factories provide work for females while the police and armed forces, which have expanded rapidly, are a source of employment for some village youth; both avenues supply a more regular income than is available from subsistence agriculture. Remittances are important to rural households. Kedah is a main net outmigrating state which

lost 198,000 (11%) of its population during the ten year period 1970-1980 (of these migrants 26% went to Penang, 11% to Kuala Lumpur, 19% to Perak, and 14% to Pahang). The latter two represent rural-rural migration to FELDA settler schemes which are an important form of internal migration (chapter III and Census Report, 1983).

The village population ranges from 1-14 persons per household with an average of 5 per house. There are 308 migrants from Kampung Dalam households, 32% of whom work in the army, police or government services. Four per cent have taken their families to FELDA settlement schemes in Pahang. Twenty six per cent are in miscellaneous urban jobs while 35% commute daily to work at Bakar Arang industrial estate and form the focus of this study. Within this latter category 16% are from female headed households while 33% are from landless households. Factory workers (67%) from landed households have between 0.35-2.00 acres for subsistence rice production and a dry season crop of tobacco for cash income. The monthly remittances to Kampung Dalam households from all migrants ranges from M\$20.00 to M\$200.00 per month with an average of M\$50.00 (US\$1.00 = M\$2.15). Factory workers from 31 landless households provide from 20%-100% of their households' total cash income which raises two such households above the poverty line. Factory workers from 43 landed households earn from 8%-90% of their total household income raising six small

landed households above the poverty line. Factory working daughters from landless households contribute 19% more cash to their households than daughters from landed households. Remittances are variable in amount but, in Mauss's terms, there is a moral obligation of reciprocity laid on all workers to support their natal families (Table # 5).

Such contributions help to sustain families, for instance, a household of two adults and three children have average expenditures of M\$190.00 for landless households and M\$157.00 for landed households. Since 1981 there have been additional outlays for erratic and costly supplies of electricity and for piped water, the tanked source of which dries up during the hot season. Less than half the households have electricity and piped water. In the height of the dry season wells are dry, the land becomes parched and cracked, so people must walk as far as 3 miles to bathe, and women must wash clothes, and draw water for the household at the same hillside source. Household income is rapidly disbursed upon dried foodstuffs obtained on credit from Chinese stores 4 miles away. Cash is required for school expenses, medicines, clothes and the purchase of consumer goods. The income differences between landed and landless factory worker households show that landless households receive less income per month yet spend 21% more upon food, oil, medicine, and rice. Landless households run larger debts at the various Chinese stores. The landless

households' need for cash is also reflected in the fact that they spend 27% less on school expenses which indicates educational advantages for offspring from landed households. Clearly, even small plots of land do make a difference in household income, strategies, expenses and disbursements.

OCCUPATIONAL MULTIPLICITY

The way in which the seasons slot into one another dictates the economic, social and ritual patterns. Villagers work in rubber smallholdings when it is not raining, grow tobacco during the hot dry season, (November-April), and plant padi in the rainy season (June-October). Padi fields are prepared from June-August, the first part of the rainy season and are harvested from November-January, the first part of the dry season. Tobacco is then planted in the same fields in January-February and is harvested from April-May before the rains start (Table # 6). The fruit season lasts from June-August but the produce is for home consumption, or it is given away as the gluts create ridiculously low prices at the Sungei Petani market. As a means of survival, peasants practice a wide range of activities so that households and individuals must participate in different relations of production. Here, the focus is upon female factory workers and the economic linkages created by their labour in subsistence production and in the international division of labour. Similar

subsistence patterns (without the factory workers) are reported for Javanese peasant households, by White, who terms this 'occupational multiplicity':

Each household survives on a basis of extreme 'occupational multiplicity' and a highly flexible division of labour among household members Each household's income is derived from a great variety of sources which constantly change in response to available opportunities according to the season, the state of the market and even the time of day; and each individual household member has normally not one or two occupations, but a great number in which he/she engages in differing combinations and for differing lengths of time in response both to his/her own opportunities and those of the other household members. (White 1982:309)

Kampung Dalam residents cannot be categorised, theoretically, as being totally engaged in either non capitalist or capitalist relations of production; rather, they participate in both as occasion demands. Although relations of production are clearly under capitalist domination, non capitalist relations still exist, and so there is a complex mixture. In Kampung Dalam both capitalist and non capitalist relations of production are filtered through Malay ideological views and practices of reciprocity. Production relations tend to be neighbour or kinship based and relations between 'social classes' are seen in non-economic terms such as generosity, help, reciprocity, or mutual dependence (see also Zawawi 1983). This is demonstrated below and is further exemplified by cash cropping, as discussed in the next chapter on inter-household reciprocity.

Apart from daily maintenance activities and production,

households must work at many income and subsistence activities to maximise survival and cushion the effects of bad harvests. Crop prices are fixed by the state agencies, or TNCs, and manipulated by middlemen which result in low returns on padi, and both cash crops of rubber and tobacco. Household subsistence production, cash cropping and other income generating activities combine with female wage labour in TNCs. This is sporadically augmented by the unreliable contributions of household members who have migrated on a temporary or permanent basis to earn cash elsewhere. The migrants live in expensive urban settings, they frequently have their own families and are unable to remit cash on a regular basis. A few fortunate mothers have 'armed forces books' which means that they can go to the Sungei Petani post office and withdraw a fixed amount (M\$100-200.00) which is deducted from a son's monthly pay. Since the commuting factory workers live at home their wage is consumed directly by households. Factory workers themselves engage in 'spare time' household subsistence production and income generating activities. The fact that they work in the industrial sector does not mean that they relinquish labour duties at home.

FACTORY WORKERS

Daily transport out of the village to Bakar Arang is facilitated by factory, commercial buses, and private 'outstation' taxis. The cost for the round trip to Sungei

Petani by taxi is M\$2.40 per day or M\$2.10 if a return trip is made by bus. After the deduction of travel expenses (M\$54.00) from an average monthly gross wage of M\$137.00, a factory worker is left with M\$83.00 per month. There are also special factory buses which come in and out of the village to collect female shift workers at 6.00 a.m., 3.00 p.m. and 11.00 p.m. Three factories currently provide transport and six bus loads of girls leave the village every day. An average of 85 girls are bussed to and fro at different times of the day and night. Ten girls make their own way to Sungei Petani. Stops are also made near Sungei Petani rubber plantations to collect the daughters of Tamil rubber tappers. Daily commuters on 'factory buses' range in age from 16 - 36 years of age and earn from M\$80.00 to M\$185.00 per month. The process of Malaysian industrialization utilises girls from landless, female headed, or smallholders' families because this category of girl is obliged to augment household incomes. Factory workers are drawn from the poorest levels of subsistence for the lowest rated wage labour in the 'new international division of labour'. Factories which 'bus' their employees pay the lowest wages in Bakar Arang industrial estate; such an income is insufficient to support a girl in Sungei Petani. Accordingly, industrial workers remain dependant upon household subsistence; their earnings are insufficient for security or daily maintenance in the urban areas.

Girls who commute independently work in factories which pay slightly higher rates per hour, as do the twenty-seven older girls from the village who have been brave (berani) enough to venture out to live in Sungei Petani. The 'living out' category who earn up to M\$240.00 a month return to the village on pay days (twice a month) and holidays. At such times girls give cash and goods to their mothers and receive home produced rice, coffee or fruit for the return to their squatter huts at Bakar Arang. There are six 'in-migrants' to the village from the very poorest areas of Kedah such as Sik and Baling, and from the east coast state of Trengganu (see map II). Immigrants live under the close supervision of kin and are bussed daily to Bakar Arang. Their 'spare time' labour is also devoted to helping kin in subsistence activities. In other parts of the Peninsula different patterns prevail, particularly in Negeri Sembilan, where girls migrate to work on a permanent basis to nearby Singapore, Malacca and Kuala Lumpur (see Stivens 1985). In Kedah the factories have actually located away from the FTZ to take advantage of the cheap female labour in situ. Because of the 'bussing' factor, girls do not quit their villages; instead, they remain tightly linked to household subsistence.

Daughters from poor households are not necessarily underachievers at school, rather, they are obliged by household circumstances and the lack of alternative 'modern

work' to labour on assembly lines so as to help their households. White collar employment is impossible to find for girls from a peasant background with no urban connections, or influential kin, to assist them in the job finding process. Girls complained constantly about this. The fact that buses collect and deliver the girls is of some small parental solace, since girls oscillate between the guardianship of the factory and the guardianship of their kin. Outmigrating, single, Malayo-Muslim females are a cultural anomaly in Kampung Dalam, unless they are accompanied by close relatives.³⁹

Many of the girls (60%) express preferences for white collar work in offices or they wish to join the police, army or government service - in any capacity - just for the security of a regular income, pension and the high status attached to any government job. As the girls have all been to school they say they expect more than just 'dirty' jobs in agriculture or fish processing, being burned by the sun, bitten by leeches in the padi fields or stung by mosquitoes on rubber estates. They associate going to school with clean 'modern' white collar work: education alienates girls from the land and creates 'modern' expectations. The expectations are satisfied, partially, by using extended credit systems to buy clothes, consumer goods, and household gadgets which have pride of place and are displayed prominently in the sitting areas of village

houses.

The status and style gained by the acquisition of consumer goods and clothes is not, however, sufficient compensation for the 'loss of status' which goes along with being a factory girl. Factory work for girls is synonymous with 'looseness and immorality' and press reports have done little to alleviate this association. On the other hand, girls help their mothers (and, by extension, their households) to gain access to greatly valued consumer goods. Mothers say that daughters are good at handing over their money, buying household items, and improving living conditions whereas sons are more difficult to control since they like to spend money on themselves. There is a trade off then: the diminished status of daughters is exchanged for the enhanced status of mothers. Daughters lose status by working in factories, but mothers gain status by demonstrating their acquisition of material goods. This acquisition is a visible and modern demonstration that daughters discharge moral debts of filial reciprocity (balas budi).

VIRGINS AND FREE LABOUR

The term anak dara refers to unmarried females with no sexual experience. The value of virginity is reflected in the amount of bridewealth and the scale of the feast for the wedding of a virgin. The bridewealth for the marriage of a virgin is 80% higher than for a divorcee or someone

with sexual experience. Virgins are especially prized for their 'heat' and 'itchiness' since they have had no sexual outlet so will form exciting sexual partners after marriage. Middle aged men are particularly attracted to young virgins as second or third wives. When girls are away from the village they are presumed to mix with men in Sungei Petani. The fear is that daughters may lose their virginity and become unmarriageable; or they may develop new 'western' ideas. My search of the Sharia'ah court records for Sungei Petani showed a rise in prosecutions for male-female close proximity (khalwat); girls gave various factories as their 'address' being too shamed to reveal their village. These are some of the reasons given by Malay women for administering magic to their daughters in attempts to protect them from the very powerful 'Siamese' love medicine (ubat Siam) of urban men.⁴⁰ Virgin daughters must be protected from male 'love magic' so many mothers allow daughters to work in factories only if they are bussed. This is more acceptable than having daughters go out to live permanently in urban areas, for an eye can be kept on their morality - a cultural fact Malay personnel managers employed by the TNCs have been quick to take economic advantage of (see chapter IV). The following case serves as an example:

Ma' Cik's 20 year old daughter worked in a rubber goods (condom) factory and after completing her shifts she carried out her household tasks silently. Ma' Cik heard rumours that Chumil sees a soldier at the Sungei Petani

Friday market. This then was the explanation for the girl's western clothes and make-up. Ma' Cik took me along with her to visit her Siamese mother's brother to obtain medicine for Chumil. I was asked not to talk about the magical medicine which consisted of a phial of water over which the traditional healer (bomoh) had chanted verses from the Quran so as to endow it with magical powers (jampi, jampi). The purpose of the medicine, said Ma' Cik, was to bring Chumil to her senses, to forget the soldier, and to remind the girl of her responsibilities as a virtuous daughter. As if to prove the efficacy of kampung medicine, the soldier was posted to East Malaysia within one month of these ministrations. Ma' Cik was delighted and Chumil consoled herself by writing letters to her 'boyfriend' until, finally, in 1984 a marriage was arranged to a local man. The couple now have one child and live in Ma' Cik's compound.

Unmarried girls in Kampung Dalam are considered to be weak, easily seduced and incapable of looking after their own interests. No Malayo-Muslim female can really be viewed as 'adult' until she is married and has given birth. Indeed female status comes only from marriage and childbirth itself. Girls are carefully guarded and protected for fear they may become ruined (rosak) thereby wrecking their marriage opportunities and the family's reputation. Although mothers live in constant fear of their daughters being 'spoiled' by urban men, they also need the few dollars the girls bring home and so have little choice other than to send their daughters out to factory work. Divorced, deserted or widowed women struggle to rear their children by subsistence production, hawking, or selling their labour; such income has only recently been augmented by daughters' factory wages.

Before the Sungei Petani factories opened, twelve older

girls were employed as servants to wealthier kin in towns as far away as Penang, Alor Setar, and Kuala Lumpur. Nineteen others worked in subsistence production, hawking with their mothers, or in fish processing at the village of Tanjung Dawai. Factory workers' mothers' age, illiteracy, and childcare responsibilities prevent them from obtaining jobs in factories, although many expressed a desire for what is perceived, mistakenly, as 'clean and easy' work. The stigma attached to factory work means nothing to women with children to rear, but factories seldom hire older workers preferring inexperienced girls who form non unionised, dispensable and cheap assembly line labour.

Significantly, large landowners or those with government pensions can afford to keep daughters at home (e.g. school teachers, police/army personnel or civil servants). Often these girls have passed their school examinations but are unable to enter higher education. Their status conscious parents refuse to allow them to enter factory work and insist they stay in the household for a few years, during which time a marriage is arranged for them. The economic position of these households means that, unlike the factory workers' households, they can support their daughters economically until they are married. Malays dislike having an unattended house and so virgin daughters help with housework and sibling care. Unpaid domestic work, which is necessary for the production

and maintenance of the household, falls on mothers, unmarried daughters and, in poorer households, on commuting factory workers.

Factory girls work rotating shifts: 2 mornings, 2 afternoons, 2 nightshifts and 1 sleep day per week. Independent commuters work from 7.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. with one day off. When girls return from work, between shifts, on days off, and even on a 'sleep day' after night shifts they are expected to, and in fact do, cook, clean house, wash, scrub, fetch water, collect wood, grind and pound spices, sew, look after siblings, help to process coffee or oil and hawk goods. The fact that they earn wages (orang gaji) does not mean that household responsibilities are totally relinquished - a factor overlooked in the Malaysian literature which concentrates on the 'urbanization' process of migrant workers. These mother-factory working daughter subsistence activities are itemised below, according to landless and landed categories.

COFFEE (landed households).

It takes three to four days to process coffee. Most mother and daughter teams make their own coffee at least once a month for household consumption, while a few make it for sale. When the coffee seeds turn red they are plucked from the bushes around the compound, skinned and dried in the sun for at least two days, after which they are dry

roasted in a large fry pan for an hour or so out of doors. Palm sugar and white sugar are boiled in a large deep fry pan which is propped up on 4 large stones in a sheltered spot. Wood and coconut husks are used for fuel which is collected, on a daily basis, by all but wealthy women. The latter can afford kerosene or calor gas stoves. When the sugar has reached a thick consistency the beans are added and fried for several hours until they are shiny brown. The roasted beans are kept in a large tin and pounded as they are required.

I sell coffee at M\$1.30 per 4oz packet and make 30c profit a packet. I pick about 8 kati (10 lbs) and if my bushes are not ready then I use my sister's beans. I have to buy 8 kati (10 lbs) of white and red sugar at 80 c a kati which costs me M\$6.40c but since I make and use all my own oil I can make a clear profit of M\$32.50 a month. (Factory worker's mother - landed household 1.42 acres)

COCONUT OIL (landed households)

Village households prefer to save money by making their own oil as they are wary of using Chinese manufactured products and they dislike the smell of oil processed from oil palms. Twenty coconuts yield about 2 litres of oil which has a delicate fragrance for cooking. Mother-daughter teams must, first of all, collect the nuts from their compounds with the assistance of a long hooked pole, then the nuts are broken open, the thick green shell is hacked away but kept and dried for fuel. The inner fruit is cut in half with a knife and the flesh is scraped out of the shells by means of a grater fixed into a small wooden

block. A daughter usually sits on this block to scrape the coconuts. The grating process takes as long as one hour or more, after which water is boiled and the coconut flesh is squeezed through a muslin cloth to let the rich and creamy 'first squeeze' milk out. The process is repeated a second time for 'second squeeze' which is somewhat watery. The coconut milk is left in a large bowl overnight while the oil rises. The next day the 'curds' are skimmed off and the mixture must be cooked in a fry pan over a slow fire until it bubbles and the oil and water separate completely. This stage of the process has to be done carefully and it takes up to three hours. The coconut oil finally rises to the surface. It is then scooped off and ladled into a tin or bottle. As the whole 2 day process is done by hand it is impossible for one woman to make the oil and fit in the other household duties. Mothers wait until their daughters have a day off, or, are between shifts and available to help, so that the household will run smoothly and the oil making will not interfere with other jobs. Only landed households with coconut palm trees make oil because buying the nuts to process the oil makes the activity too expensive.

COOKED FOODS

(Landed and landless factory worker households).

Selling cooked foodstuffs is an income generating activity for both landed and landless factory worker

households and it is one which practically every poor household participates in sporadically at some part of the year. The landed household of a factory worker, as one typical example of occupational multiplicity, deploys its labour in the following manner.

The father is an unskilled labourer for the National Electricity Board for which he earns M\$200.00 a month. The household owns half an acre of inherited padi land so, each season, three of the five household members become involved in padi production. As the plot is so small, neither hired nor inter-household reciprocal labour is used. Off padi season, with the help of their factory worker daughter, they make and sell rice noodle/fish soup (laksa) at the Sungei Petani Friday market. Each Thursday night the mother and daughter make fresh rice noodles, while the father buys fish and cucumber on the way home from work in Sungei Petani. The mother collects aromatic leaves, pounds chilly and onions for the gravy while her daughter is at work during the day. At night the daughter helps to clean and boil the fish and the soup is prepared. The husband and wife team also sell coffee, tea, and iced beans as refreshing drinks. The foodstuffs, bowls, spoons and glasses are taken to market by the mother's brother's taxi early each Friday morning. The couple open their stall at 7.30 a.m. to sell breakfasts and do not close until 10.00 p.m., or earlier if they sell out. They have had the stall

for 16 years and so their noodle soup is 'famous' and they even participate in rotating credit associations (main kutu) among the marketeers. On an exceptional day they can make as much as M\$160.00 profit in the Sungei Petani Friday market. In addition to this, both mother and daughter earn an average of M\$35.00 a month by sewing Malay clothes in the evenings and on the daughter's day off. The daughter, Azizan, earns M\$95.00 clear a month from assembly line work at Northern Telecom, but helps her mother with cooking, cleaning, housecare, sibling care, washing, sewing and poultry feeding.

When I finish my shift at 4.30 p.m. I stop off at my mother's stall to pick up the day's fish and when I get home I cook it and feed my brother and sister when they get in from school at 6.30 p.m. I put the rest of the food aside under the cover so my parents can eat when they get back late at night. After cooking I clean up the house, feed the chickens and carry on with any sewing. (Azizan, a Northern Telecom assembly line worker).

The following examples of income generating activities in landed and landless factory workers' households are typical. Salmah's mother cooks glutinous rice and prawns (pulut udang) for sale in Chinese coffee shops in the villages of Merbuk and Tanjung Dawai. Chinese coffee shops must have Malay food for sale since village males will not eat food cooked by non Muslims. Salmah also sells her mother's savoury rice cakes at her factory (Acrylic Textiles Malaysia) for 25c a piece. According to her shifts, Salmah and her mother prepare the ingredients at

night and steam the glutinous rice cakes early the next morning. They are still warm when she arrives at the factory and so they sell quickly. Mother and daughter can make M\$15.00 profit on the days when Salmah works a morning shift.

Mothers who are breast feeding an infant, or, who have a strict husband who follows the fundamentalist values of keeping a wife at home, will engage a seller on a 'commission' basis.

I make curry puffs, steamed rice flour cakes (kuih apum) and fried flour with beans and prawns (cucuk kachang/udang). A man comes each morning and takes my cakes to sell at Tanjung Dawai. After doing all the housework I bake savoury rice cakes from two in the afternoon until 11.00 at night. My daughter helps according to her shifts. I get up at 4.00 a.m. to fry curry puffs and by 5 a.m. the man picks up 500 kuih and gives me my money from the previous day's sale minus his own commission of 3c per item. I use 10 kati (13 lb) of sago flour, 6 kati (7 lb) of wheat flour, plus chilly, prawns, rice, onions and oil (home made). My daily capital (modal) is M\$30.00 which always comes back to me plus a profit (untung) of M\$30.00-40.00. (Factory worker's mother, 1.44 acres).

and

I make kuih buloo which requires 3 lb of rice flour, the same of sugar and 30 eggs (home laid and purchased). My capital is M\$8.00 from which I make 120 cakes to sell at 20c each. It takes 5 hours to bake this sweet cake. I start at 11.00 a.m. and finish at 4.00 p.m. Then I also grate four coconut for coconut and pastry cigar cakes (kuih gulang). My capital for kuih gulang is M\$2.00 and I make 40 pieces. For curry puffs my capital is M\$2.50 and I make 30 pieces. Today I made a total of 190 kuih. I had to give twenty cakes to a feast (kenduri) and some were eaten at home. I took the rest to my married daughter's coffee shop and she will sell them there. From an expenditure of M\$12.00 my return will be M\$38.00. I am tired and will stop for a week or so now. (Factory worker's mother, aged 50, renting 0.71 acres).

PRAWN CRACKERS

(Landless factory worker households).

When the prawn and anchovy catches are particularly good, factory workers' mothers frequently travel to kinsfolk in the fishing village of Tanjung Dawai to help clean and sun dry anchovies, salt and wash 'jelly fish', make prawn crackers, prawn paste, and preserve fish. Many girls do this as an alternative to factory work, but it is intermittent employment depending on the season. Prawns, fish, and squid are processed and preserved in various ways and are important diet supplements during the monsoon season. Apart from drying, fish and prawns are pounded and turned into other products. After preparing breakfast, cleaning, washing, marketing and cooking for the day, women start work on this cash generating occupation, organised around regular household maintenance. A mother and her two daughter team start work at 8 a.m.; they clean and boil about seven kati (10 lbs) of fish (e.g. mackerel) which are added to one 30lb sack of sago flour. Salt, colouring and Aji-No-Moto (a monosodium glutamate from Japan used liberally for all cooking) are then added. This mixture is kneaded for two hours until it resembles loaves of bread. After collecting wood, coconut husks and household rubbish as fuel, water is hauled and heated up in a very large pot and the loaves are boiled. The process of boiling the fish

and flour mixture takes place in the compound from around 10 a.m. until noon. Sixteen 2 lb loaves are cooked until they rise to the top of the pot. They are then taken out and sun dried for 4 days after which they are sliced very finely and sun dried for yet another two days on platforms well out of the reach of children and animals. The drying prawn cracker (kerupok) slices must be raked every 2 hours or so throughout the day, a task allocated to a daughter. When the slices have been thoroughly dried they are packed carefully into plastic bags. At any part of the day or night some stage of this production process takes place. Packing the crackers is done indoors at night and involves the other household members.

Since the loaves take 4 days to dry-through properly, and 7 days to complete the production process, two (or more) batches are made a week. In one week thirty two loaves are processed which, if sliced finely, will stretch to 300 packets of prawn or fish crackers. The finished product sells for M\$240.00. Since a total of M\$75.00 is spent on fish, flour, salt, Aji-No-Moto and plastic bags, the profit is M\$165.00. or M\$50.00 each per three woman work team a week. Slicing and packing may be 'subcontracted' out to 'help' a friend or kin earn cash, though it results in a lower profit for the household. Women give these 'subcontracts'. People so employed, in turn, give their reasons for working as 'helping' a friend

or relative. Such work sharing is viewed in terms of 'help and kinship' - never in terms of earning money, although such is the underlying necessity. Individualistic self interest is never allowed to be explicit but is rather couched in 'co-operative' terms. Women sell direct to a Chinese trader or to a Malay middleman. The household work teams consist variously of grandmothers, mothers, daughters, friends, cousins, in-laws and sisters. A minimum of two women is required to process one sack of flour and fish a day and fit in their household duties. This activity is intermittently carried out by factory workers' mothers from Kampung Dalam with their kin in the fishing village of Tanjung Dawai.

PRAWN PASTE

This task can be carried out by one woman but more often two or three kinswomen share the work load. It takes a mother and daughter team three hours to wash, salt, add cochineal colouring and pound 30 kati (39 lb) of prawns which produce 1 pikul (132 lb) of prawn paste (belachan). The 30 kati of prawns cost M\$40.00 and the end product sells (in 2 lb packages) for the total sum of M\$70.00 giving a woman a profit of M\$30.00 for two days' labour. The pounded prawn mixture is dried on a platform for half a day, then pounded and dried again for a day. This mixture is pounded with a long pole in a deep wooden mortar. It is possible to hire a machine from the Chinese fish sheds to

pound prawns but men say that machine pounded prawn paste is tasteless. Many women hire a machine anyway since they are the ones who have to do the pounding and need to cut down on their labour time. If households wish to save on expenses, or if they are processing solely for home consumption, then they do the task by hand. It is possible for a mother-daughter team to pound 237 lbs of prawn paste and earn M\$200.00 a week but the amounts vary owing to erratic prawn catches, the need for cash, and the dependence upon fine weather conditions. None of these fish processing activities can be carried out during the rainy season. When prawns are in short supply women switch to fish crackers. They work in their home compounds and female hawkers visit their houses to buy the prawn paste which the hawkers sell, for 5c per lb profit, to Chinese merchants who, in turn, sell the prized belachan to Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Thailand, and as far away as Japan, America and Europe. In this way local entrepreneurial capital, and village Malay female labour, is linked to world markets by ethnic Chinese marketing systems. Prawn paste is sold wherever there is a substantial Southeast Asian community and it is used for a variety of dishes. The same marketing system applies to the prawn crackers and anchovy (ikan bilis) processing carried out by women.

ANCHOVY

Girls from Kampung Dalam who do not want to take up

factory work in Sungei Petani but who wish to earn cash travel daily to Tanjung Dawai or live with kin there. They work at the Chinese owned fish sheds which start work at 7.00 a.m. when girls grade, sort and clean the previous day's catch of anchovy. Other girls lay down bamboo or mengkuang mats and spread the anchovy out to dry in the sun. Girls must constantly walk around the mats raking and turning the fish so as to dry them properly. They keep themselves well wrapped up and protected from the sun. Depending on the amount of fish there is to sort girls, finish work at 2.00 p.m. and then go home to eat and help with household activities (which frequently includes prawn cracker or paste processing). When the Chinese run fish sheds have finished work village women are at liberty to glean anchovy. With a pole and pin to pick fish up from the mats, gleaners collect, sort and clean the anchovy for household use, or they sell the fish to a stall or to a Chinese merchant for M\$5.00 per 1 kati (1.3lbs).

It is nicer to work in the kampung here and we can earn as much as M\$250.00 a month if the fish catch is good but in those factories at Sungei Petani the wages are too low. We prefer to stay here among our kin where we know everything and everybody. There are no expenses and we can help with all the work at home. Anak dara here help their mothers or kin to make keropuk or belachan, or by gleaning ikan bilis. I go out to work from 7 a.m. until 2 p.m. in the fish sheds, but if there is a lot of anchovy then we work through until 7 p.m. at night but get extra money and 'coffee money' too. The Chinese boss is good. When the factories first sent buses into this village a lot of girls went to Sungei Petani but they did not like factory work and within a month they had to stop sending the buses to

Tanjung Dawai. It is better here where we are looked after and no harm will befall us; it is too easy to mix with men and get 'charmed' in Sungei Petani because there is no-one to watch over us. (Fatimah, 18 years old).

FREE GOODS & NON-VALORISED LABOUR

In accordance with Malayo-Muslim values daughters never question either their subsistence duties, nor their secondary status in relation to any males in the household. The economic value of girls goes unrecognised precisely because they are virgins (anak dara) and because work in the household is not conceptualised as work per se, but as helping mother (tolong Mak). Mothers describe this as 'helping a little', and say that their daughters are very slow and stupid at domestic and outdoor work. Such statements run counter to the empirical data I collected, but the playing down of daughters' (indeed all female) skills has much to do with the Malay habit of self deprecation, of not wishing to appear boastful for fear of supernatural sanctions, and because of the non-social status of 'virgins'. Daughters are just as adept as mothers in all work and their labour contributions allow older women to pursue other duties such as attending feasts, fulfilling reciprocal labour dues, and discharging religious, social, and kinship obligations, or to sell goods around the regional rotating markets.

Among the factory workers, withdrawal to the kampung to 'rest' is not infrequent if they are involved in feast

preparations, harvests, or when they run into problems at work, fall sick or simply become 'bored' with the assembly lines. Household subsistence production supports workers who are laid off for short periods because, they argue, living in the village is cheap whereas everything in Sungei Petani has to be paid for in cash. This is constantly cited as evidence of the superiority of village over urban life, particularly by government pensioners who retire to their natal kampung. That pensions go much further in the village is also indicated by the increasing number of 'outsiders' who, after spending their working life in urban areas, retire to a rural home. I recorded 8 such cases in hamlets adjacent to Kampung Dalam. The 'newcomers' are retired bureaucrats but villagers complain that such people inflate the price of land. In the kampung, Malays say, there are 'free' fruits, rice, oil and coffee, as well as all types of foraged foodstuffs. Such 'free' products are, however, only available to those who own land or have spare household labour. Foraging yields such prized seasonal foodstuffs as bamboo shoots, palm heart, plaintains, taro, mushrooms, nuts, egg plant, beans, ginger, ferns, different yams and their leaves, nipah palm fruit, and a wide range of leaves used as vegetables or in cooking fragrant rice and noodle dishes.

Most households have fruit trees in their compounds such as banana, papaya, coconut, betel nut trees, and sireh

vines to eat with the nut. Some have varieties of mango, starfruit, limes, langsung, duku, rambutan, mangosteen, jackfruit and even the highly valued durian fruit trees. The inherited trees receive little or no maintenance. All the soft fruits come into season at the same time which means they fetch ridiculously low prices on the market so that much fruit is given away to urban kin who visit the village at this time expressly to obtain fruit and to maintain ties. Imported or cooked foodstuffs are given by urban kin in reciprocal exchange for the fruit. Unripe fruits such as mango, banana, jackfruit and papaya are plucked early and made into a local delicacy called kerabu and salad (rojak), or, to use in cooking savoury curry and pickle relish. People from landless households gather varieties of fruits and vegetables in the fields, according to the seasons and their personal inclinations.

Several mothers of factory workers make their own medicines from leaves and woods collected from the hill area. Villagers obtain free western medicines from the government clinic in the sub-district village but, in addition, they use indigenous medicine for sickness. There are several male and female healers (bomoh) in the area and one traditional midwife in the kampung who is very popular because she still utilises folk medicine, massages, and the proper rituals for childbirth.⁴¹ Three village women earn extra income dealing in love magic, spells, massages,

ear-piercing and female circumcisions.⁴² Medical knowledge passes on from mother to daughter with many of the remedies being made from the leaves of betel nut and durian trees, yams, cinammon, and ginger. Many old stilt houses still retain a foot thresher underneath for making rice flour, pounding leaves and woods into medicines, pounding coffee and pounding groundnuts.

Women from poorer households collect nipah palm leaves to make their own roof panels, and landless women may earn a sporadic income by collecting and making such roof sections for sale. Households with corrugated zinc roofs still thatch one part of the house for 'coolness' or even place thatch over the zinc. Brooms and baskets for household use are made from the tough centre spine of coconut palm leaves. Half coconut shells are cleaned and used as scoops, measures, or are perforated with holes to make fancy kinds of cakes at festival time. The seasons influence the types of handicraft production for household use such as weaving mats and baskets from fibrous leaves (mengkuang)⁴³, restuffing or making new pillows from kapok tree pods or making special cakes and fancy goods for betrothals and weddings.

Since wild leaves and vegetables are seasonally obtainable on the way home from field work, cultivation is viewed as unnecessary labour. Anyone going to the time and trouble of cultivation would be obliged to give much of her

crop to friends and kin. Vegetables are also available from the hawkers who visit each household early in the morning. All households keep chickens or ducks for their eggs and for slaughter at festival time. Plant, flower and vegetable gardening (if any), daily compound maintenance, fuel collection, and poultry care are all the responsibility of women though they are frequently allocated to school children. Only six households keep cows - for meat and reproduction - not for milk. Since there is no pasture land, fodder has to be collected for the animals on a daily basis by women and school children.⁴⁴

All households require, at least, M\$100.00 a month cash income and, increasingly, with the availability of wage labour more goods are purchased since, as I show, making them at home is very labour intensive and time consuming requiring, at least, the labour of two women. Female income generating activities such as selling cakes, fish processing, and so on are calculated on a 5-15 day month because of the nature of people's commitments, their subsistence activities, cash needs, motivation, priorities, health and the weather. Villagers do no work outdoors when it rains since they believe that going out and getting the head wet causes all manner of ailments. Sporadic income generating activities have to mesh with seasonal imperatives dictated by the weather, the crop cycles, and

the availability of female household labour. Given the intermittent nature of 'income generating activities the cash contributions of factory working daughters are necessary to sustain households' monetary requirements.

FACTORY OR SUBSISTENCE PRODUCTION

Given the fact that life in the kampung is relatively cheaper and that girls can actually earn greater amounts of cash per day by selling labour in agriculture, than by factory work at Bakar Arang, why, then do they choose to work in the TNCs? Although the returns to agricultural labour are higher during the peak season, this employment is essentially seasonal and during the heavy monsoon rains there are no other sources of income. Choices are tightly related to the agricultural cycle. Employment at the factories pays considerably less than rates obtainable during the agricultural peaks but it is, the girls say, a regular, and 'secure' form of income for the whole year. It is the regularity (operatives are paid fortnightly) of factory workers' income rather than the potential peak income which is so important to households subsisting below the poverty line and the importance of this cannot be overstated.

Wage labour in padi and fish processing can bring a return per day of M\$6.50-12.00. Hawkers and marketeers can earn from M\$8.00-M\$120.00 a day but for successful marketeering considerable amounts of working capital, goods, a vehicle and appropriate kin connections are essential so that unmarried girls cannot do such work alone. Petty hawking is, of course, carried out around the village and in the factories as a secondary activity; this

includes selling cloth, foodstuffs, and household utensils. The fact that girls can actually earn more per day by peak agricultural labour and fish processing, than they can on factory assembly lines means that the rural-urban differences, in terms of potential cash income, favours agriculture for short periods of the year but, over a twelve month period, favours TNCs slightly more.

The case of fish processing serves as an example. Over one year a girl employed in anchovy processing will work an average of 15 days a month for ten months of the year to earn a total of between M\$1,500.00 and M\$1,600.00, which includes a bonus according to yields. The weather dictates female work patterns as does the seasonal supply of anchovy which is decreasing (as a result of intensive competition from Thai and Japanese ships with sophisticated gear). By contrast a female factory operative must work 27 days a month for twelve months for a gross total of M\$1,620.00. No more than eighty girls can be employed in anchovy processing; the availability of jobs is strictly along village and kinship lines so that local work is not as readily available as jobs in factories.

The crucial difference dictating the choice of wage labour lies in the relative dependability of the disposable wage, rather than in the gross amount, yet given the vagaries of factory work, this is well known to fail, since layoffs and shutdowns of factories are common. Electronics

factories require a higher standard of education and pay more per day than textiles and rubber goods factories (Table # 7). Girls who have not gone beyond primary education are, therefore, restricted in their choice of factories to rubber and textiles. During 1981-83 many girls were laid off from the electronics factories and forced to return 'full time' to subsistence production. Industrialization has increased the range of occupations available, but they are not yet viewed as permanent jobs, and so they fit the range of 'occupational multiplicity'. For instance, the occupational 'choice' of factory workers is itself set within a tightly circumscribed range dictated by a households' differential access to land as a means of production. The extraction of labour from households is effected at various levels by selling wage labour, unpaid labour, sharecropping, cashcropping and so on. Landholding determines household economic behaviour since it dictates the economic activities available, and what the household receives in return for its labour.

Other reasons cited for preferring factory over agricultural work are that girls wish to enjoy the 'relative' freedom which getting out of the village, even if for only a few hours, can give them. Unsupervised opportunities to meet young men are a great inducement and there is a popular emphasis on 'love' matches over parentally arranged marriages. The opportunity to work in

factories, earn a wage, do 'clean' work, make new friends, visit the excellent Friday market, browse around supermarkets and hawker food stalls and, generally, just to be in Sungei Petani is attractive and exciting. The chance to explore the world beyond the confines of household, parental authority and the predictable routine of rural life is, however, a short term inducement - clearly the main task is to earn money for their households. Among the older girls there is a tension between the desire for independence and the interdependence set up by the moral dues of balas budi. Most important of all, it is only by presenting their mothers with cash prestations that girls will be viewed as 'fulfilling their filial duties'. Factory workers' non valorised yet essential physical labour contributions are not viewed as "work" nor are they appreciated in quite the same way as dollar bills or consumer durables (Table # 8). Other ways of obtaining consumer goods or ready cash are based on traditional Malay credit systems which have been adapted to new requirements as I explain, in detail, below.

ROTATING CREDIT & MONTHLY CREDIT

Eighty per cent of all (landed and landless) factory workers obtain goods such as clothes, household utensils, televisions, radio cassette recorders, glasses, crockery and rice cookers on monthly credit. As much as 15% of

household income may be so disbursed each month. Prestige electrical items can even be seen in flimsy bamboo/palm frond (attap) stilt houses (rumah panggang) which have no electricity. Televisions are run off generators or large batteries. Brand name goods such as Pyrex, Arcopal crockery, Newton products, Avon cosmetics, Tupperware, Amway goods, imported American blue jeans and sitting room furniture are all greatly prized in village households. All this is the result of pooling resources and obtaining goods on extended credit. Villagers cannot afford to buy such goods outright and enter into a modern version of the traditional rotating credit associations (main kutu)⁴⁵ run by village women and factory workers. On any pay day 'agents' can be seen collecting instalments from the girls as they open their wage packets - which may be depleted by M\$10.00 - M\$30.00 before ever they arrive home.

Villagers set up a main kutu ring to obtain ready cash particularly before the festival at the end of the fasting month (Ramadhan/Puasa). Instead of borrowing money, women form a group of, say, twelve, and each month they all give M\$10.00 to a 'leader' for a period of two to six months. They each take a number and the first to pull out #1 receives all the cash (M\$120.00) at once, but every month thereafter she must give M\$10.00 for the benefit of people with lower numbers from 2-12 who then pull out their M\$120.00 each month in numerical order.

If twenty people main kutu at M\$20.00 each a month we can make M\$400.00. If we save alone it is too slow and most people cannot save without others and, this way, they are forced to save because they would be shamed if they did not and people would not play with them again. We never main kutu with strangers, it has to be within this kampung. If we get an early number it is good for us. The person who organizes gets a 'cut' since it is tedious to collect the money. Whenever I get money on an early number I give the organizer a small gift of cash for my good fortune. Last time I got M\$400.00 to buy furniture. If we get the last number it is slow so we do not treat (belanja) the organiser. Another way to get the money fast is to swap with someone who has an early number - we can lend numbers if someone needs cash urgently and, next time, they will return that favour. I have used it for buying gold too. This is the way we bought the Honda moped. For all big items we take a main kutu. We finish one and start another straight away for things like TV, sewing machine and expensive items. (Zaitun 47 year old mother of factory worker. Landed household).

Women trade in popular goods and since Malays like to buy 'brand' names, foreign products and marketing techniques have been adapted to the local situation. A friend will be approached by an 'agent' to be a hostess and she gives a 'party' at which fried noodles, jelly and soft drinks are served. Neighbours and kin come to the house where the goods are all tastefully displayed, for example, Pyrex and Arcopal dinner sets, tea sets, water jugs and glasses, storage jars, dishes, plates and Avon cosmetics. A collection of such crockery is proudly displayed, but used only at the end of the fasting month for festival (Hari Raya) visitors.

Factory workers buy consumer goods for their mothers and against the day they themselves will marry. Women use

the traditional methods of feeding people and guests reciprocate by buying these expensive goods. A successful trader who works from Sungei Petani to Tanjung Dawai managed to obtain M\$2,000.00 worth of orders in one week just after the padi harvest. Ten per cent of the total sales go to the hostess in goods. There is a 30% discount and three months' credit for the agent who sells the goods. Newton and Tupperware give a 30% discount and Amway give 25%. After ordering goods to the value of M\$1,000.00 the agent will pay only M\$700.00 and keep M\$300.00 for herself. All items are paid for in cash unless the villagers come to some arrangement with the agent and set up a monthly payment system.

One factory worker's mother (with 3 acres of inherited padi land) visits the Newton depot in Sungei Petani with the exact amount of cash required for items ordered by kampung folk. She herself pays out the cash for the goods on behalf of the villagers and charges them a higher price according to the profit she wishes to make. On top of the profit she makes from her buyers, she herself receives 10% of the value of the goods from the company and benefits from the three months' credit system and discount. People pay the agent each month but it is she who bears any losses since she has already purchased the goods with her own capital and must recoup from the women on a monthly basis.

Factory workers use these systems to sell and obtain

goods at work and around the kampung. Clothing, cloth and even gold are bought by such methods since this is the only way in which highly priced goods are available for kampung dwellers. One example is that of a twenty-eight year old factory worker who sells cloth in the village and at her factory. Fauziah is an articulate girl who says there is no point in her marrying a poor man and producing children who will be poor, so she prefers to work and trade. Ideally she would like to give up factory work in favour of full time trading.

Girls can now earn money. I go from house to house selling Javanese sarung (a beautiful batik cloth from Java). One sarung costs M\$35.00 and often, when I call, women do not have the cash to pay me. Some pay back in three months or it may be as long as two years by the time they manage to pay me everything so their sarung will finally cost them M\$45.00. I call when I know my friends bring their pay home to their mothers. (Factory operative, Acrylic Textiles).

Now uneducated girls can make money so there is no need to get married so soon. Clerks and teachers always marry late; they all bring money home so their mothers do not want to marry them off so early. It is like that with us because we can earn money now. (Sharp Roxy electronics factory worker).

In spite of such statements of economic independence, of the ten factory workers who were married during my field work only three were actually 'own choice'. Six mothers told me that their girls had refused point blank to marry men after mothers had gone to the first stage of arranging a match, a factor which caused great embarrassment to the

parents. Mothers said that to refuse an offer may bring black magic upon the girl and misfortune to the household because they may be thought 'snobbish'. The age at first marriage is, on average, 21, but there are cases of workers who are still unmarried in their early thirties (see also Strange 1981, Stivens 1985).

All consumer goods and most clothing is purchased on time and the commission for an agent is fair, provided people pay up, which they usually do for fear of being shamed and causing rifts in the whole kampung. Stories quickly get around if people do not pay debts. A favourite item is Japanese cloth with decorated panels which are made into an attractive modern type of Malay suit (baju kurung). The suit costs from M\$30.00-70.00 with additional tailoring charges of about M\$10.00. The creation of consumption needs via the mass media, very sophisticated advertising and peer pressure, as well as the status to be obtained by the possession of such goods may explain, in part, why girls prefer factory employment over subsistence work and also why their mothers allow them out of the kampung.

MOTHERS & DAUGHTERS

That peasant women expect material assistance from their factory working daughters is made explicit by the phrase 'the return of the milk' (balik susu or balik duit susu), a metaphorical way of referring to the suckling and

raising of children. Rural Malay women breast feed children until the age of 2 to 3 years, - even older, pre-school children may seek a breast for comfort and not be turned away. Indeed, old women long past the age of child bearing may offer a dry, wrinkled breast to a whining child in a joking attempt at pacification and to halt the child's crying. Playing with and kissing a male infant's genitals is very common and is in marked contrast to the strict control over sexual feelings and male-female relationships from puberty onwards. Women say they like to have lots of children to look after them in old age which emphasises the long term investment in offspring. There is an explicit expectation of a return on the investment in children. Malay culture is redolent with notions of respect (hormat) and the debt which children owe to their parents, particularly their mothers, for having raised them. Both the Quran and Hadith lay down correct behaviour toward parents.

Be grateful to Me and to thy parents. Unto Me is the final return. His mother bears him in travail after travail, and his weaning takes two years. (Luqman 15-16:404 Quran)

Goodness to one's parents occupies a very high place in the moral code of Islam, the mother coming first so much so that paradise is said to be beneath the mother's feet. (Hadith h.3) Ali (1983:373).

In poor families cash remittances are urgently needed,

but in wealthy families money is expected regularly as a necessary token of respect and honour.⁴⁶ The view of working daughters helping by cash gifts has become important. Status can accrue to mothers who feel 'easy' (hati senang) because a daughter buys consumer goods or helps to improve the physical structure of the house. It is something to be proud of: it means that mothers can move to the next stage in the life cycle where they are supported by children and no longer have to worry about where the next dollar is coming from. When the child bearing years are over, women like to take a back seat and let their daughters run the household so as to spend more time in prayer, social activities, visit kin to maintain ties and, if possible, fulfil the dream of all Malays by making the Pilgrimage to Mecca.

Malay mothers expect their daughters to help with household subsistence production and expenses since the employment generated by the factories is directed only to young women. It is the 'socially useless' virgin girls who are now helping to support peasant households by selling their labour. Kampung Dalam youth are frequently unemployed or earn only sporadic incomes from harvest peaks. The ideal Malayo-Muslim values dictate that men should occupy themselves outside of the household: the unreliable income of young males is spent frequenting coffee shops, buying western clothes or in other urban pursuits. Drug abuse is a

great problem since hard drugs, originating in the Golden Triangle, are cheap and easy to obtain from inshore fishing boats which ply the Andaman Sea from Burma and Thailand down to the Straits of Malacca. There are several agents in nearby Tanjung Dawai from whom village youth obtain their supplies. One factory worker's mother, who is a bomoh, enjoys a brisk trade in magical medicine designed to rehabilitate youthful drug addicts and keep them out of jail. Mothers and factory workers frequently give their sons and brothers money to support their drug dependency for fear they will turn to trafficking or other crimes. Since anyone found guilty of trafficking is sentenced immediately to death, such fears are not unfounded. Married males are thrifty in finding employment and cycle to adjacent villages for any kind of work. Several work in the fields by day and are factory guards by night.

SUMMARY

Evidence has been presented here which expands upon theoretical views of reciprocity among close kin and shows adaptations to the development process. Among Malays there is a great cultural emphasis on looking after mothers and this stress on loyalty is motivated by mothers' new expectations of benefits to be derived through daughters' earning power. Marital relations with husbands may well be temporary whereas ties to children are thought to be more

lasting, particularly the mother-daughter link which, according to Malay women, is more enduring. The ease and frequency of divorce for Muslim men requires that mothers form strong bonds of reciprocity with their children as security, and for old age when their outdoor working life is over. At this stage a parent will move to a small hut in the compound, vacating the house for a married daughter, or a son and his spouse.

In the past ten years or so, new patterns have emerged whereby daughters married to police, military, or government personnel live in the urban areas, but tight linkages with natal households are still maintained. Several migrants who went out to work in the cities sent their infants to live with grandmothers in Kampung Dalam. This increases earning abilities in the urban area and ensures a flow of cash to the grandparental household. Such patterns are not restricted to landless and smallholding households since depositing children is a common pattern for the middle and large landowning households whose offspring enjoy a middle class lifestyle in the cities. There is the constant complaint from this group that domestic help is impossible to find which is the reason cited for sending children back to the village. It also reflects traditional Malay patterns of childrearing whereby children frequently lived in a grandmother's house.

Since the Sungei Petani factories have lately opened,

single girls calculate the higher costs of living in Penang or Kuala Lumpur as against the convenience of working locally and living at home. Indeed there are a few cases of reverse migration of factory workers from Penang FTZs to Bakar Arang industrial estate at Sungei Petani. These workers told me that it is better to be closer to home where the cost of living is so much lower and kin are readily accessible.

The need for cash income has become more acute under the NEP's restructuring of Malay economic roles. Traditional cultural values are being utilised in order to ensure that daughters working in TNCs fulfil reciprocal obligations to household subsistence production. This necessitates the great emphasis on child-parent respect - the 'return of the milk' and the dreadful debilitating feeling of shame (malu) which engulfs any Malay who fails to live up to the cultural expectations of reciprocity.

The joint labour of mother-daughter teams in occupational multiplicity has been laid out. There are different patterns of work and household maintenance available for landed and landless factory worker households although both categories rely on the non valorised labour of mothers and daughters. Cash earned in such activities is spent on household necessities such as food, medicine, clothing and, recently, on consumer goods. The multiple roles of daughters in subsistence production, income

generating activities, household maintenance and factory wage labour have been outlined. There is a clear control by the older women over the labour power of young unmarried girls which illustrates the power dimensions within the household. Girls must serve their mothers according to the Malayo-Islamic values of honour and duty. These economic imperatives are overlain, obscured, and constantly reinforced by cultural values and as Bourdieu (1982:191) points out:

<This is a way> . . . of getting and keeping a lasting hold over someone; gifts or debts, the overtly economic obligations or debt, or the 'moral', 'affective' obligations created and maintained by exchange.

Daughters owe their mothers a debt which can never be repaid this is known as balas budi and reinforced by peasant women's expectations of a 'return on their milk'. In order to discharge their duties, girls give non-valorised labour to their households under obligations of filial reciprocity; these same obligations and economic necessity prompt them to earn cash on TNC assembly lines. At both levels labour is extracted from them. At the level of intra-household reciprocity this is effected by age and gender, while at the level of the transnational corporations, such factors are used to create profit for state and international capital. There are differing levels of labour control and obligations which link subsistence production and peasant relations of reciprocity to the

wider capitalist mode of production. These same reciprocal obligations contribute to the maintenance and reproduction of households. These linkages are expanded in my conceptualisation of inter-household reciprocity in the following chapter VI.

CHAPTER VI

INTER-HOUSEHOLD RECIPROCITY

In the theoretical discussion of reciprocity in chapter II, conflicting views of reciprocity in the development process were noted. Cliffe (1982) argues that reciprocal labour changes during the development process, for instance, large landowners no longer bear moral responsibilities toward the poor and, patron-client bonds are transformed. In other words traditional rights and values are neglected or dissolved. The other view, as espoused by Johnson (1983) and Veltmeyer (1983), argues that unpaid labour is preserved and is instrumental for capital. Indeed, they argue that these factors benefit the capital accumulation process.

The role of reciprocity in the development process is more complex than either view asserts and it depends upon the benefits accruing from the selective use of reciprocal obligations. In Kampung Dalam the evidence indicates that although the capitalist mode of production is dominant, villagers still operate with non-capitalist relations of production for food crop production. The examination of

intra household reciprocity shows how morality sustains parent-child labour obligations to ensure household survival. Related to this is the inter household reciprocity which maintains households in spite of the increased commoditization of subsistence production resulting from state policies. There is a contradiction at the inter household level, however, in that reciprocal obligations can lead to exploitation in cash cropping. Entrepreneurs manipulate the peasant ideology of reciprocity in order to accumulate capital and so contribute to the nascent class formations. Bumiputra policies favour large landowners so that the linked concepts of intra and inter household reciprocity become a key to understanding how peasant households mediate the effects of state development. It becomes clear that intra and inter household reciprocity in cash and subsistence production are tightly intertwined and linked to state and foreign capital accumulation processes.

This chapter is concerned with the Malay concepts and types of reciprocity which operate at the inter-household level with regard to subsistence and cash crop production. Inter-household reciprocity refers to (a) labour, help and mutual assistance given to people (tolong menolong) for feasts, alms, and life crises. The return of labour for feasts and life crises is not stipulated and so it may extend over a generation's life-time. Recently the cash

cropping of tobacco has been incorporated into this linguistic category of 'help' for seasonal work. (b) Reciprocal labour (berdarau) which refers specifically to work in padi production where work debts are incurred and equivalently discharged in one season. (c) Voluntary village labour (gotong royong) for annual kampung activities such as clearing the grave yard, irrigation ditches, prayer house maintenance, or helping at community functions in the local hall. Since this 'free labour' is for the community's welfare, no return is expected, but the participants themselves gain a status from their voluntary activities. It is, accordingly, politically active villagers who participate, particularly those who wish to curry favour or enter into patron-client arrangements with minor state functionaries. Gotong Royong has, however, taken on political ideological overtones and such labour groups are split along rival party lines.

The first section of this chapter is concerned with inter-household reciprocity with regard to labour teams in subsistence padi production, and rubber and tobacco cash cropping. The final section examines the meaning of reciprocity at formal feasts, in giving alms, (zakat), and in voluntary community labour (gotong royong) teams. Feasts show the way in which reciprocity is played out in a ritual manner and reflect the daily and seasonal obligations of inter-household reciprocity.

RECIPROCITY IN PADI PRODUCTION

We grow padi in reciprocal (berdarau) fashion because we cannot afford to hire workers. Our padi cannot be harvested all at the same time on the same day, but this is expected if you call the machine in, they refuse to come just for one or two relung. Most of us must work padi by hand and reciprocal labour because our plots are so small. It is so expensive now that we can not grow padi in any other way. (Factory worker's mother, Kampung Dalam, 1983).

Villagers complain bitterly about the lack of labour and the expense of growing padi, for which they specifically blame 'modern work', and outmigration. Mechanization offsets harvesting problems for the middle and large landowners, but many poor households in Kampung Dalam still rely on reciprocal labour (berdarau). A reciprocal labour group consists of kin, friends and neighbours, preferably those with adjacent land for quick labour exchange, after which people are free to sell labour in their own or adjacent kampung. All other work ceases in the padi harvest season which is staggered over 2 months. The size of the landholding, its location and the condition of the padi field together with wealth, status and work schedules of neighbours and kin determine the types of labour system utilised. Political alignments have recently come into play where opposing UMNO and PAS supporters will not work with each other (McLellan 1985).

PADI PRODUCTION CYCLE

Villagers prepare land according to their supplies of cash and labour. Two ploughings are required and, to save

money this may be done manually, by water buffalo, or by tractor. Combinations are used to save expenditure on one ploughing. In areas where access and drainage is bad, tractors cannot be used for cultivation at all and so land preparation is either by buffalo, or by hand, using simple tools of ancient design. Only one man keeps a herd of 9 buffalo in the village and, in the dry season when the rice stubble is ploughed up for tobacco planting, it is difficult to keep them properly fed as there is no pasture land. Land and nursery preparation must be carried out by household labour since there is no ready cash to hire labour at the beginning of the season, nor can cash credits be obtained until a standing crop is mature (padi kunca). The state tries to prevent such cash advances and the cycle of peasant indebtedness to 'middlemen' by providing subsidies and seed rice. Unpaid household labour is used for nursery work, to manure, fertilize, and weed, while extra labour may be called to transplant, harvest, thresh and transport padi to the mill. 47

Non valorised household and reciprocal labour is practiced by 73% of the factory worker households growing padi. In 1983, twenty five girls from landed households and 12 girls from landless-renter households worked at the peaks. Such labour constituted several days at planting and harvesting periods, but did not extend to maintenance aspects like weeding which falls upon mothers and fathers.

Kampung Dalam padi yields are meagre, unlike the neighbouring Muda Valley double and triple cropping zone. The 'green revolution' in the valley has been effected by controlled irrigation and greater mechanization so that the Muda scheme contributes 60% to Malaysia's rice production (World Bank 1982, Mehmet 1986). For details of Malaysia's green revolution, state policies, mechanization, the impoverishment of the peasantry, and land consolidation in the Muda Valley see Afifuddin (1978), and De Koninck et al (1980).

In Kampung Dalam a total of 130 households work padi, 85 household work rubber, while 160 households work tobacco leaving only 31 households which do not work land as a primary or subsidiary source of income. Rice transplanting is female work. All padi growers must use female labour for planting since there is, as yet, no mechanization for this stage of the production cycle. Planters form a line and bundles of shoots are delivered to them by a male. Women work in mud and water up to their knees yet plant quickly, so a group of ten can plant 0.71 acres in five hours. New high yield varieties (HYV) of long grain rice have been introduced by the Rice Research Institute, Alor Setar. The favoured seed is R6 and R7 and Sa-Ribu Gantang ("a thousand gallons"), these varieties take about 100 days to mature. Villagers tried other HYV with little success because, they say, the seeds were 'bred' (berkawin - married) elsewhere.

They had to be planted one square foot apart, but traditional methods placed the shoots too close together resulting in their choking before maturity. It was a problem for the Farmers' Office to get women to change their planting method as it has a regular rhythm and, with their legs straddled, the swing from right to left foot gives a perfect spacing for local seeds. High yield varieties had to be transplanted at precisely 3 to 4 weeks, but women transplant seedlings up to 6 weeks, so HYV require more labour at a time when less labour is available, because of outmigration.

Similar patterns of increased female labour requirements with changing technology and the 'green revolution' are reported for other parts of Asia by Agarwal (1985). It should be pointed out that broadcast sowing cannot be utilised in this area because it needs a well regulated water supply and an efficient pest management system - factors which households have no time, labour, or money to deal with. A rain fed irrigation canal was built in Kampung Dalam in 1980 but, contrary to the advice of villagers, the Public Works Department failed to construct it large enough in width or length. The canal does not allow for double cropping, it is inadequate and has fallen into disrepair.

One padi grower, the father of a factory worker, explained his household production strategies:

If I hire people (upah orang) it costs me \$8.00 a day per person, or I pay in rice or reciprocal labour if it is kin. My immediate family (7 children) work for free. I do not sell any rice so it is just not worthwhile to have the combine in. My land holding is so small and the owner of the combine hates to come for such tiny plots. Only if you have 10 or more relung is it worthwhile to call in the combine, but then one is already rich, and can save even more by calling the machine. We live off the land as much as possible; my wife and daughters collect and chop firewood, we have a well, collect wild vegetables, grow chili, coffee, grow bananas, coconuts, yams, and fruits. My wife makes coconut oil for cooking, mats and baskets. Only fish and some dried goods are purchased. My daughter bought me this bicycle and she pays for her siblings' clothes by credit.

The system of planting whereby households start within two months or so of each other is not co-ordinated, consequently the padi is ready to harvest in household plots at different times (November-January). As a result of this, a combine cannot harvest padi in the middle of the plain without ruining unripe crops belonging to neighbours who transplanted later. Nor can a heavy combine gain access to remote padi bunds where there is no road. Cable lines have to be cleared and the water table has to be right, otherwise the combine bogs down. Self-evidently, if a village is to use a combine efficiently the planting must be co-ordinated so that the harvest is ready at the same time for everyone. A high degree of mechanization requires large amounts of ready cash, a satisfactory water table, uniform land, and the complete co-ordination of all the villagers both at planting and harvest time. For the economic, temporal and physical reasons itemised above,

co-ordination does not occur in Kampung Dalam.

Landowners who hire women to reap padi and extra male labour to thresh, bag, and transport it, pay more in cash and time for their harvest, per acre, than do those who hire a combine. A combine costs M\$65.00 per 0.71 of an acre but completes the job and bags padi in less than an hour. The hire of ten women costs between M\$60.00 and M\$100.00. The reapers grasp padi with their right hand and swing a small sickle about 2" above the soil and dump the bundles behind them as they work forward through the padi. Additional male labour must be hired to collect the bundles, to thresh, and to transport padi, at a cost of M\$48.00. The hire of male and female labour for a harvest costs between a minimum of M\$108.00 and a maximum of M\$148.00 per 0.71 acres. If the holding is less than a relung, a husband and wife team may dispense with all but household labour and the husband will use a sickle too, indicating changes in the traditional division of labour wrought by the shortage and expense of labour hire and the increased commoditization of the whole padi production process. Many factory workers' mothers from landless and smallholding households have lost an important source of harvest income (in cash or kind) with the introduction of combines; they have been displaced by technology. Although new seed varieties require more intensive household labour, which falls unequally upon women at the planting state, at

the harvesting stage income earning opportunities for female labour have been eroded already. This is reminiscent of the findings reported by Boserup (1970) and Agarwal (1985) who both argue that the development process increases the differential allocation of work for females while decreasing their income earning opportunities in agriculture.

For the winnowing phase women shake flat baskets to remove dust and grit from the padi. Drying padi for bagging requires a lot of space; the padi is spread on mats along the roadside or in the house compound. Padi must be raked regularly, livestock kept away, and a watch maintained on the direction of the wind and rainclouds. Schoolchildren are usually allotted this task, but they seldom participate in any other aspect of padi production.

Transporting the padi is heavy work since a good crop will yield fifteen sacks of unhusked padi which must be moved, one by one, all the way home for storage (1 gunni sack = 28 gantangs = 156 lbs of unhusked rice or 97 lb of husked rice). If padi is to be sent to the rice mill for sale, male labourers earn cash by transporting the sacks on bicycles or Honda mopeds. This is difficult because the route from the padi fields to the roadway is along awkward earth bunds which, by this time of the year, disintegrate rapidly causing the loaded workers to stumble frequently. The costs of transport from the padi fields together with

the milling charges, are borne by the grower, in kind, at the mill (2 lbs of husked rice (beras) per 156 lbs of unhusked rice (padi) delivered to the mill). Older women say that they used to headload baskets of padi in homemade baskets themselves but since the LPN started to supply the 156 lb gunni sacks this task has also been taken over by men. The rice mill is owned by Cik Rokiah, a descendent of the first headman, and a cousin of Haji A (Table # 3 genealogy). Little husking, formerly a female task, is done at home now because it is so time consuming. For the negative impact of automatic rice mills upon women's earning power in S Asia see Agarwal (1985) and Ahmad (1986).

Kedah grade 1 padi can be sold for M\$84.00, per gunni, Grade 2 for M\$65.00 and moderate padi for \$30.00. The returns in Kampung Dalam (1982-1983) are no more than M\$35.00 per 156 lb sack but people are obliged to wait at least two weeks or more for payment. In Kampung Dalam 0.71 acres of padi land yield from 9 to 18 gunni sacks with an average of 15 sacks. Two sacks must be given to the religious department officials as zakat tax for distribution to poor people. In 1983, thirteen gunni sacks of village padi brought M\$500.00 at the mill under the state's guaranteed minimum price of \$35.00 per 156 lbs of unhusked padi (or 97 lbs of husked rice on a recovery rate of 65%). I have laid out the comparative costs in Table # 9

in which the different systems of mechanized and reciprocal labour systems are itemised. Thirteen sacks of unhusked padi provide barely enough husked rice for a household of five, much less a surplus for feasts or sale.⁴⁸ The Kampung Dalam season of 1983 was, however, very badly affected by a Green Hopper (*Nephotettix*) virus which decimated yields, in some cases, to as little as 2 gunni sacks i.e. 3 months' food, per 0.71 acres.⁴⁹

A state agricultural extension officer came from Sungei Petani and attempted to lecture villagers on how to deal with the virus and to dispense pesticides, but he met with little success. Political divisions dictated who attended the meeting and the officer told me that because he was a civil servant he was automatically viewed as an UMNO man so PAS supporters would not, on principle, attend. This meant the padi virus could not be stamped out since every single plot, regardless of political allegiances, required treatment. The officer added, ruefully, that the virus did not come in PAS v UMNO varieties - it hit everyone rich or poor.

The state run National Padi & Rice Authority (LPN) was established in 1971 to buy all padi from producers, licensed dealers and millers under a Guaranteed Minimum Price system. The subsidy scheme is wide open to corruption and abuse so that it benefits millers and traders more than producers. The padi production process is now controlled by

the LPN who intervene with specific seed varieties, price supports, fertilizers, grants and credits which benefit only large landowners. There have been several large demonstrations by Kedah peasants in Alor Setar and Baling over high handed state tactics in both padi and rubber production. The state has, as Mehmet (1986) points out, taken over the functions of former (Chinese) middlemen and, in the process, actually increased the social and economic costs of marketing and processing padi. As is evident from my table, villagers in Kampung Dalam are fortunate if they manage to break even in the production process and bring in sufficient padi for their food store.

FACTORY WORKERS and PADI PRODUCTION

Young women dislike this backbreaking and dirty physical labour, and yet some factory girls whose households work padi come off their night shifts and go straight into the fields to help with the planting and, later, the padi harvest. It will be recalled that girls work rotating two-day shifts and so they have a limited amount of 'free time' e.g. two mornings, two afternoons, two half days after two night shifts and one sleep day per seven day week. Some girls try to obtain 'holidays' to coincide with the padi planting and harvest; but since requests seldom succeed, they simply absent themselves for as long as is necessary. Alternatively, they may help to work their natal household's fields between shifts and on

their day off. The value of such labour for parental households, at this peak time, is more than double the amount girls earn per day in the factory (M\$3-4.00 in a factory compared with their unpaid labour value of M\$8.00-10.00 in the field). Thirty eight factory workers' households own padi land and 25 of their working daughters help at some stage of the food crop production. Nineteen factory workers' households rent padi land and 12 of their working daughters help at peak stages of the food crop (Table # 10).

Of course, kampung work is very hard and young girls do not like it, but if we don't plant padi we would have no food, this way we grow our food with some padi to sell. We have to plant if we want to eat. My two daughters always help - I don't want them to be completely stupid and know nothing except riding a bus backwards and forwards to the factory. (Mother of two factory workers 1.42 acres).

In the days before the TNCs were established, virgin girls worked padi or rubber according to the economic status of their households. The traditional sexual division of labour dictates that males plough, thresh, and fertilise, while females attend the seedlings in the nursery, plant, weed, harvest, winnow and dry the padi. By contrast, no division of labour by sex exists when growing cash crops such as tobacco and rubber; both males and females perform all tasks. Before the factories opened, girls from poor households worked in plots close to home where they could not be observed by non-kinsmen. The fact

that today, girls earn a cash income yet still labour for their households increases their economic value, but not their dependent status. Such factors do lead to discontent.

Large landowners always hired labour for cash or kind so as to follow the Islamic ideal values of protecting their own daughters and the 'respectability' of their women. Women from large landowning households say with pride that they do not even know how to plant padi or tap rubber trees. Such women who do no outside work at all describe themselves as being 'housewives' and see themselves as dependent upon their husbands. There is a high status attached to rural Muslim women who do not need to work outside the house and who devote themselves entirely to the 'internal' sphere (Woodcroft Lee 1983, Ahmad 1986). Women from landless and smallholding households cannot follow what they view as Islamic religious or Malay cultural proscriptions so strictly because of the necessity for all their women, married or single, to labour outside the house compound. Similar cultural patterns still operate with young girls; they are considered to be 'loose and immoral' because they commute to stigmatized jobs in the TNCs. By contrast, educated girls, from large landowning households enjoy high status and income in white collar or professional jobs such as teaching, clerkships, or working in the civil service. The

entry of young females into the labour market, and their status, is not random but structurally determined by the wealth and landholding of their natal households (Table # 4).

CHANGING PATTERNS OF LABOUR RELATIONS

There are new work patterns in Kampung Dalam which mesh with nascent class formations. Small landholders, who rent or own an acre or two, continue to use the traditional reciprocal labour system. They do so because it is impossible to raise the cash required, in advance, for the rent of land, inputs, and hired labour costs (0.71 acre = M\$226.00). Accordingly, female neighbours and kin join together in groups of between 5 and 10 and in 10 days all the land belonging to the group members is planted. Three-and-a-half to four months later, the same group of women harvest the padi so that all the labour debts are incurred and discharged equivalently in one season.

Berdarau is a mechanism of tenacious survival for subsistence producers in the face of the NEP's 'planned decline' of smallholdings. In the southern state of Negeri Sembilan, however, such practices appear to have died out in favour of idle fields, the mass urban migration of female labour, and household dependence upon migrant remittances (Ackerman 1980, Stivens 1985).

Kampung Dalam has a unique combination of old and new methods, the utilization of which is dictated by the cash

resources of households. The hard core poor with less than M\$120.00 income per month still work their land with no machine power at all. Some land in the village remains unplanted for want of labour, and in the case of the landless, a want of cash to purchase land since 0.71 acres costs anything from M\$6,000. to M\$8,000. depending upon location and drainage. There is a scarcity of 'free' labour, and, even if money can be found for hired labour, workers are difficult to come by. At peak times, married women, their husbands, some of their factory-worker daughters, and older women who thought that their planting days were over, together tend the padi fields to save the expense of hired labour. There is, then, an intensification of household labour in order to work the land at all. A few men have started both to transplant and reap padi so as to help their wives to save on the cash costs of hired labour or the temporal costs of reciprocal labour; they now try to restrict work obligations to their own households.

The structural changes set in train by the state's New Economic Policy are reflected at the rural level by shifts in labour patterns. That such transformations lead to conflict and political antagonisms is mirrored in a series of events which took place recently. The case further illustrates the way in which technology erodes income earning opportunities for rural females. In 1982 a group

of eight landless women, whose daughters all work in factories, organised themselves as a 'contract' labour gang. They hired themselves out as a group at M\$10.00 per head in the padi fields of middle and large landowners around the sub-district. In 1982, this group planted the fields of a civil servant, but, they were not called to harvest his padi. Instead the landowner hired a combine to harvest the 10 acres. The next year, 1983, when a mini bus was sent to pick up the gang, for planting, the women refused to go arguing that to hire them for only half a season's work was immoral. To cut off such women who depend totally on selling their labour is deemed shameful and contrary to Malay concepts of reciprocity and help. The judgement of immoral behaviour is situational and contextual. In this particular case antagonisms over mosque allegiances and grievances over the material benefits which accrue to UMNO supporters in the village hierarchy were important contributory factors. The owner was a staunch UMNO supporter while several of the labour gang supported the Islamic opposition party, PAS, so that the case took on political dimensions too (see section on Gotong Royong below). The land owner then asked for labour from Singkir (some miles away) but women there had heard the story from their kin and refused to undermine them. Since Singkir is a very busy double cropping zone there was little spare female labour anyway. The hapless man eventually managed to

recruit some cheap Siamese male labour which slips, illegally, over the border to work the double and triple cropping season in Kedah's Muda valley "rice bowl".⁵⁰

SUMMARY

The nascent class formations, set in train by the New Economic Policy, intrude upon reciprocal labour exchanges in padi. The state intervention in padi production has benefitted middle and large landowners who use hired labour and mechanized production processes. In common with the 'green revolution' patterns elsewhere in Asia, state policies have resulted in displacing landless women from income earning opportunities while increasing the unpaid labour of women in small landed households (e.g. Hart 1980, Agarwal 1985). The increased demands upon labour time do not operate according to the principles of wage labour - rather they follow a gender and class hierarchy which intensifies non-valorised female labour.

Padi production requires a lot of labour and if inter-household berdarau exchange collapsed, smallholders would be unable either to plant or to harvest their subsistence padi crop. Reciprocal labour persists, indeed it is reinforced for the time being, because it is the only means by which poor households can survive. This particular form of reciprocal labour remains important and viable since it operates between households of similar socio-economic status i.e., less than two acres of padi

land. In such cases, an equivalence of exchange labour is effected because all participants are on an equal footing with a shortage of cash and labour. In the matrilineal areas of south Malaysia, however, fields now stand idle because the expense of padi production far outweighs urban opportunities which are available. Cash remittances from migrant labour has become the main means of rural household survival. The area has been heavily influenced by massive labour migration to the FTZs of Malacca, the Klang Valley and Singapore since the early 1970s (Khatijah Mohamad 1978, Ackerman 1980, Stivens 1985). Since Kampung Dalam residents have a wider range of local income earning opportunities and girls commute daily to factory work, the subsistence patterns in this northern village appear to be more resilient.

Middle and large landowners hire labour, they have monetized and mechanized their padi production so that they no longer need recourse to reciprocal labour. Among the poor, unpaid labour remains essential so that reciprocal exchange is practiced each season. Given the expense of hired labour and the increased commoditization of the padi production process, factory workers under the system of intra household reciprocity (balas budi) link with inter household (berdarau) reciprocal labour exchanges. Without female unpaid labour generated by the obligations of reciprocity in household and subsistence production, small

landholders would be unable to produce padi at all. Gender is an important element through which the differential allocation of work and resources within, and between households, are unevenly distributed. Such labour allocations are exacerbated by Malaysia's development process. Under these conditions, clearly, reciprocity and mutual support remain critical for household survival in subsistence food production.

RUBBER - A CASH CROP

Although there are no commercial rubber plantations there are forty-three Malay owned smallholding in the vicinity of the village. Smallholders have a few acres of inherited land and such plots are normally owner-operated. Larger holdings are rented out in small 0.71 acre plots. Eighty five households work 126.66 acres of rubber in Kampung Dalam of which fifty households are renters. Seventeen of the sharecroppers are landless and rent an average of 1.92 acres, twelve of these landless sharecroppers are women who head their own households. The remaining eight sharecroppers rent some rubber (avg 1.92 acres each) and simultaneously rent padi (avg 1.82 acres each). Sharecroppers, in turn, often subcontract their allotments to kin or friends. Sharecroppers show a preference for renting more rubber land than padi; this has much to do with the fact that renting rubber requires no

cash outlay, nor does it require the organization of labour groups since one person can tap 0.71 acres in a morning. Middle and large landowners rent out their trees to landless tappers but since rubber land costs M\$9,000 per 0.71 acres, it cannot now be purchased by ordinary villagers. New land purchases are increasingly by 'outsiders', particularly state employees and Malay business men, who are in a position to obtain Bumiputra loans and privileged information about regional development plans well in advance of ordinary villagers.

Villagers who rent rubber trees on a sharecropping basis (bagi dua) from tree owners must walk or cycle about 2 miles to the foot of Kedah Peak to tap rubber for a cash income. Sixteen factory workers' households rent rubber trees while only seven such households actually own trees. A tapper's day starts at 5.30 a.m. when it is still dark and cool. The tapper will incise a relung of trees with a special knife (0.71 acres=200-300 trees, not all of which produce). The tapper approaches the tree, pulls away any dried rubber, digs the curved knife into the bark to cut another groove, (about one eighth of an inch deep), which promotes an immediate flow of latex from the trunk. Tappers constantly stretch up or bend down in order to carve out fresh grooves and even drag step ladders around the trees. As the tapper incises she collects any latex left in the half-coconut shells from the day before and

puts the 'scrap' in a tin lashed around her waist. Scrap is sold on a daily basis for ready cash. When a tapper is short of money she may incise the trees, yet not collect the released latex that same morning; the next day she will sell the full, yet congealed cups, as 'scrap'. This method is risky as unemployed village youth frequently steal 'scrap' at night, or the owner may discover the deception and dismiss the tapper who cheats him. It is easy to rape a tree by tapping it too often or cutting the bark deeply, such retaliatory measures against an owner who offends or cheats a tapper are not uncommon. The scrap is sold off to a rubber dealer for between M\$2.00 and M\$4.00 per day, depending on the amount. As the sharecropping system applies only to the dried rubber sheets, (keping), the tapper has a daily income until she is paid for her 25 or so rubber sheets at the end of the week. Tappers deliver rubber sheets to the owner of the trees and for every rubber sheet (2 lbs) a tapper processes, she receives 60c. per sheet from the owner. In 1983 the village price dropped as low as M\$1.00 per sheet (50c for the tapper and 50c for the owner). Tapping and processing sheet rubber, plus 'scrap' sales, give a tapper about M\$28.00 per week or M\$112.00 a month, but, with the incidence of 'off days', a tapper's average is around M\$100.00 per month. Tappers collect latex for 15 to 20 days a month since trees should have 'rest days' to improve the quality of the latex. It

is impossible to tap when it rains, or in the peak of the dry season, when the trees slow down and shed leaves.

In the centre of the rubber stands, the owner erects a corrugated iron or palm (attap) roof. The floor of the structure is concrete and inside the shed (which is also protected from the sun by the height of the trees), are a mangle, well water, and a tub. By about 11.00 a.m. the sun is high and the latex flow is finished. Incising the trees constitutes one round which can be finished by 11.00 a.m. Collecting the fresh latex comprises the second round which takes until 12.15 p.m. The work is hot and dirty and there is the constant irritation of mosquito bites and the danger of snakes. Buckets soon become very heavy and tappers must return every 15 minutes or so to empty their latex at the central shed. By about 12.20 p.m. they go to the shed, pour the morning's latex through a sieve into metal trays and mix it with chemicals to coagulate the rubber. It is stirred and mixed with scrapers for about 20 minutes in several trays. The coagulated rubber is taken out of the trays and thrown on the cement floor where it is stamped flat. The rubber sheets are then mangled through a plain mangle three times to shape them, after which they are mangled once through ribbed rollers. After rolling, the sheets are dumped into water for washing. Two tappers usually work cooperatively in the pressing and rolling process, for the sheets must be no more than one quarter of

an inch thick. A relung of trees produce an average of 5 sheets of rubber (i.e. 8 kati = 10.67 lbs = five rubber sheets) for a morning's work of over eight hours. Forty trees produce one sheet equivalent to 2.2 lb of latex. By 2.00 p.m. the tappers are ready to leave the rubber stands and go home to eat rice. They sell scrap on the way and take the rubber sheets home to dry in the sun.

The local Malay rubber dealership belongs to Hajjah F, who, like the owner of the rice mill, is a cousin of Haji A. the tobacco entrepreneur (Table # 3). There is a Chinese dealership in Merbuk new village and, depending on where tappers work, they sell scrap to the Malay or Chinese licensee on their way home. Tappers cannot sell sheet rubber directly, they have to deal through their tree owners so that, often, they do not know the actual price of sheet rubber since it constantly fluctuates. Rubber from Malay smallholdings is classified as Grade 4 or 5, the price of which fell as low as 41c. per lb in Kampung Dalam although RISDA recommended 60c-63c per lb in 1983. The smallholder is subjected to the same rate of cess and duty on rubber as the plantation sector which produce Grade 1 rubber. The tax levied by the state is used to finance the research activities of the Malaysian Rubber Research & Development Board and the RISDA replanting scheme. This tax benefits only the plantation and research sectors so as to work against smallholders. Added to this, the price and

marketing structures within Malaysia favour the plantation sector, mitigate against independent smallholders and even more so against tapper/sharecroppers. When smallholders sell sheet rubber to local dealers they lose from 25%-50%; the profit goes to the middleman. As the Rubber Industries Smallholders' Development Authority (RISDA) officer pointed out to me, it is easy to cheat smallholders and, by extension, their tappers.⁵¹

RISDA was established in 1972 to develop a marketing and subsidy scheme for the non-plantation sector. Rubber is produced by plantations (40%) and by smallholders (60%) - yet 41% of these small producers subsist below the poverty line. Although productivity has increased and profit margins for a pound of rubber are high at 55%, tappers' income has declined by 14% since 1960 (Mehmet 1986:Ch 2). This is because wages are linked to rubber prices. As I point out in Chapter III, national prosperity is, in large part, the result of successful export crops. At the state level, however, plantation conglomerates stockpile and control supplies to the world market, but, smallholders have no such withholding power. It is assumed that there is a direct linkage between rubber prices and returns but, as Mehmet notes, the effect of 'direct linkages' is to pass low prices directly on to the tappers. It is the state and the plantation conglomerates which control rubber rates within Malaysia - not the 'world market'.

In practice, tapping is erratic and usually forms a secondary activity for landless villagers, save for poverty stricken female headed households. It is primary only when there is no other work to do. Most landless people lay off tapping during the padi harvests to earn more money as hired labour. Trees do not hurt by standing idle, but, they do lose money for their owners. In Kedah, as elsewhere in Malaysia, there is a serious shortage of labour for rubber tapping.⁵² In the plantation sector new types of hevea tree are being genetically engineered to take only 3 years to mature. These trees will be mechanically tapped to dispense with the present dependence on human labour.

SHARING (bagi dua) AND WAGE LABOUR (upah orang)

The system of sharecropping is called bagi dua - which means, literally, 'to give half', a term referring specifically to sharing. The relationship between the tree owner and tapper is not normally expressed in terms of wage labour which are 'hire' (upah), 'wage' (gaji) or 'rent' (sewa). The use of these words implies payment between an employer and employee (bagi upah) which stresses socio-economic differences over consanguinity. The method also works in reverse since non-kin can be incorporated into fictive egalitarian kinship by bagi dua, rather than by the asymmetrical upah relation (Nagata 1976). Rubber tappers work for kin and non-kin under this system. Both can manipulate it - the owner by underpaying the tapper for

sheet rubber, and the tapper by collecting extra latex to sell as scrap. Where the need for cash is very urgent the latter practice is common. Terminology between owners and tappers follows real or fictive kin terms, but in the case of Kampung Dalam tappers working for school teachers, government officials and on the headman's land, honorific non-kin terms are used which serve to emphasize the 'hired labour' nature of the transaction.

The shift in terminology and the disowning of kin is apparent from the unhappy case of Ka' Teh.

This 34 year old woman had been widowed for four years and struggled to raise her 6 children. She gave birth to an illegitimate child in 1982 to the great horror and shame of her kin (the event was, of course, a mixed source of shock, gossip and amusement to villagers). Ka' Teh is forced to support her children by rubber tapping, making palm frond (attap) roof panels and by agricultural labour. Before her 'succumbing to love magic', Ka' Teh tapped her father's trees on a bagi dua basis, but is no longer permitted to do so since her father refuses to speak, or even to look at her, because of the shame created.

The relationship with her present tree owner, a cousin who took pity on her, is most definitely one of orang gaji - hired help. The subtle change indicates her fall from grace and a distance in the kinship relations. It will be recalled from Chapter V that first cousins are, ideally, regarded as siblings.

TOBACCO - A NEW CASH CROP

Tobacco production is controlled by Haji A., a descendent of the founding headman of the village (Table #

3). He owns 78 acres of padi land in the village. With his two sons he has, since 1975, encouraged villagers to plant tobacco as a cash crop in the hot season from December-April when there is no water for rice. Haji A. has performed the pilgrimage to Mecca three times and he views his role, appropriately for a devout Muslim, as "helping the poor people rather than having any interest in profit". The concept of Malay reciprocity and 'redistribution' is uppermost for Haji A. He has, thereby, managed to acquire a return off 300 acres in the environs of Kampung Dalam. The entrepreneur is the richest man in the village; he lives in a very large house, owns two cars, and makes regular business and holiday trips overseas.

Haji A is the sole tobacco curer with a quota and a licence from the tobacco control board (Lembaga Tembakau Negara) (LTN) to produce 54 tons of dried leaf. The average production in this sub-district is 40 tons. He sells cured leaf to the Malayan Tobacco Company and the Leaf Tobacco Development Corporation which produce Dunhill and Rothman cigarettes. The tobacco TNCs advise the government as to how much tobacco they require and the LTN issue quotas and licences from their office in Alor Setar, which oversees tobacco growing operations in Kedah (Table # 11). This entrepreneur has a substantial capital investment in six tractors, two lorries and 20 electric drying sheds

(M\$28,000 each) purchased from Japan with a Bumiputra loan; and fire compensation. A non-repayable sum of M\$12,000.00 was granted by the government when his wood dryers caught fire. The loan was raised, by political influence, from the Farmers' Bank (Bank Pertanian) and Bank Bumiputra.

The curer supplies villagers with tobacco seedlings, fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide and transport to the sheds. The costs are deducted from the prices paid to growers when they sell the green leaf at the curing sheds. LTN discounts all fertilizer and insecticide to the curer - yet such items are sold at full price to the growers. Haji A. obtains a return on tobacco grown on land without having to work any himself; the growers subsidise his operation by their labour and bear the risk of any failed production or poor crop returns.

The fields have to be ploughed twice and cleared of stubble immediately after the padi harvest. Padi stubble was formerly a food supply for working water buffalo; the rotting vegetation and animal dung formed a natural refertilization cycle for the land. The new tight crop rotation means this process is dispensed with and artificial fertilizers are used on the land, the costs of which are borne by villagers engaged in tobacco and, later, padi production. Tractor hire for ploughing, prior to tobacco planting, is available only from Haji A. The seedlings are brought down from his depot at Baling for

distribution to the villagers in December and January. People must build small palm frond shelters in the fields to protect themselves, and the seedlings, from the sun. This season is exceptionally hot and the sun's glare is constantly reflected off the soil making work conditions very uncomfortable.

After 14 days, when the seedlings are about 6" high, they are taken out of their plastic packs and planted in carefully prepared heaped furrows. It takes one person eight hours to plant out 700 seedlings which are spaced a few feet apart to prevent choking at maturity. The fields are tended every single day since regular weeding and turning over the soil for aeration are essential. In this way one person can tend 400 tobacco plants per day; it takes between 50 and 60 days for the plants to grow to maturity. Tobacco planting, growing, and harvesting is labour intensive because the leaf is very susceptible to caterpillars; it must be examined daily and sprayed on a regular basis. The insecticide used in the spraying process, administered from a backpack, causes dizziness, skin allergies, and it has necessitated hospitalization in Sungei Petani for several growers.

Tobacco fields are worked from 7.00 a.m. until midday and again from 4.00 p.m. until 7.00 p.m. so as to avoid the worst heat of the day. Planting out in January means that the leaves are ready for plucking in April-May. One

household can manage to work 0.71 acres without the necessity of employing extra labour. Another pattern among households is to subdivide a relung. As an example of production costs one relung supports 5,000 seedlings at a cost of M\$13.00 per 1,000. or M\$65.00 for 0.71 acres; 5,000 tobacco plants should yield green leaf to the value of M\$1,186.00 from which there are deductions for land rental, (M\$100.00 per relung), seedlings (M\$65.00), plastic bags (M\$12.00), fertiliser (M\$48.00), insecticides, herbicides, (M\$56.00), tractor hire (M\$80.00 for two ploughings), and transport to the sheds at M\$1.00 per 88 lb bundle (Table # 12). As the plants are plucked four times this yields a total of 32 bundles (2,821 lbs) per relung - a cost of M\$32.00 for transport. The bottom leaves ripen first, each plucking works gradually up the plant, until after four harvesting sessions, only the stalk remains.

When landless householders wish to grow tobacco they ask Haji A. to allocate his land or the land of people who rent directly to him. In 1983, 160 households planted tobacco on their own or on rented land in the village. Some villagers are reluctant to rent out land for tobacco production since tobacco causes fertility damage to the soil and results in a poor padi harvest the following season. Such misgivings are partially salved by the fact that up to M\$100.00 rental is charged; whereas the rent of the very same plots for padi is M\$50.00 - a clear

reflection of the different attitudes toward food and cash crops. For people who do not depend on the land for subsistence such considerations are unimportant. But for poverty line households who need to plant padi for their year's foodstore and who grow tobacco for a cash crop, damage to the land has to be rectified by a greater expenditure on fertiliser in the following padi planting season.

The entrepreneur, the tobacco TNCs, and the State itself extract a profit from tobacco growers. The exploitation of the growers is multiplex, linked to higher land rentals, agricultural inputs, intensive unpaid household labour, Haji A's monopoly and control over labour, and the Kedah state development policies which condone such practices. The process is one of unequal exchange, where prices paid for green leaf do not include wages. Exploitation in tobacco production is possible because households do not pay themselves wages, nor do they valorise their labour power; calculations are based only on the cash income received, after the numerous deductions have been made. Kampung Dalam villagers grow tobacco at a loss. After all the deductions have been made, a cash return of between M\$350.00 and M\$769.00 is expected - the average being M\$500.00 - for three to four months daily labour in the dry season cash crop. Wage labour in agriculture averages about M\$8.00-10.00 a day and, in

tobacco, a two adult team work amounts to 192 days labour which should yield, at current wage labour rates, an income of M\$1,536.00 for two. As the average return, after deductions, is M\$500.00, this gives a 'wage' of M\$1.30 each a day. In addition to this there is the unpaid 'spare time' labour of, at least, a factory working daughter or other offspring which, at current wage rates, further reduces the real return on the tobacco crop to M\$0.65c. per head per day. There is a process of labour exploitation and the non calculation of wages in tobacco production. The ideology of reciprocity is used to gloss non-valorised labour power; the value of household labour is thereby transferred to Haji A, and the tobacco TNCs, who clearly profit from unpaid household labour.

Many women take on the responsibility of growing tobacco and tend the crop with other female kin. Among factory worker households there are 15 husband and wife teams, eleven female kin teams, and eight 'other kin' teams. Thirty two factory worker's households grow tobacco on their own land while 20 factory worker's households grow tobacco on rented land (Table # 13). Mothers of factory workers are involved in tobacco production and, after the harvest, they go to the curing sheds to sell their labour at \$5.00-6.00 per day.

Around tobacco harvest time which lasts from April to May, women and girls are called into work. They grade, and

then clip leaves on long racks. It requires the work of two women to lift the awkward 44 lb racks into the dryers. Women are paid 30c per completed rack. The quicker they work the more cash they can earn. It takes 15 - 20 minutes to prepare one rack for drying and two women complete an average of 44 racks per day to earn \$6.60 each for a 8 hour day. Four tons of leaves are cured in one dryer in a session of 70 hours. The leaf weight loss during the drying process is of the order of 94%. The sheds have a zinc roof so that the combined heat of the sun and the dryers means that the temperature reaches well over 100F in the afternoon. Haji A's daughter-in-law prefers to employ girls aged 16-25 because they work faster; older women always get called away for feasts, reciprocal labour dues and kin problems. It is difficult, she says, to teach them, because of respect and the cultural inability of the young to give older women orders. It is better, she argues, if older women work out in the fields and not in the curing sheds. The entrepreneur employs 95 workers in the sheds during the height of the season but they are laid off after the harvest.

According to the LPN in Alor Setar, in 1983, class I green leaf should be bought by the curer for 38c to 30c per lb; class 2 for 25c and class 3 for 15c - 8c per lb. The selling price of cured leaf to the tobacco companies runs at M\$7.25 for Class 1 cured leaf, whereas classes 2 and 3

bring M\$6.25, M\$6.05, and M\$5.10 per lb. Haji A earns an average of M\$6.25 (class 2) per lb for the cured leaf. All the weighing and writing of prices is calculated by the entrepreneur, who received over half a million dollars for the Kampung Dalam 1983 crop. Producers have no way of knowing what class their tobacco is and feel that they are cheated and underpaid. They are, in fact, paid for class 3 but the leaf averages as class 2 - a loss of 10c per lb to the grower. In the east coast state of Kelantan, where tobacco has been grown since 1960, there are more curers who, consequently, compete fiercely for green leaf supplies. The result is that Kelantanese growers are better off with a return of 36c per lb which is 157% more than the 14c per lb paid to Kampung Dalam growers where Haji A has the sole licence (Table # 14).

Some villagers grumble about the profits made by the entrepreneur since he started this business. A few, led by an ex-army NCO, attempted a boycott but households living in hard core poverty have no choice and are summarily obliged to grow tobacco in order to have any kind of dry season cash income at all. The entrepreneur is referred to, by a few, as a 'blood sucking leech', (lintah hisap dara), particularly by his political opponents, yet he sees his role as one of patronage, 'helping' and reciprocity. For the vast majority of villagers the obligations and views of mutual reciprocity obscure the exploitative labour

relationship.

Haji A. can exploit villagers because he, and the growers themselves, operate with a concept of reciprocity. Haji A. says that he is 'helping' the poor people to make money during the 'dry' season. Villagers say they engage in mutual assistance to help Haji A. with 'his' tobacco growing. This style of tolong-menolong reciprocity is coupled with unpaid household labour and it results in very low returns for the cash crop. All the elements exist for the incorporation of households into state and international capitalism. The form and style of reciprocity in tobacco production, which is dominated by capital, is interesting. Haji A. manipulates the ideology of 'redistributive' reciprocity and, as an entrepreneur, he has pursued his own economic self interest acting (as Long 1976 would put it) as a broker between the growers and transnational corporations. There is clearly a conflict of interest since he utilises reciprocity as a means of appropriating labour power; the idiom used by Haji A. is 'help' (tolong) yet villagers see themselves as engaged in a mutual assistance (tolong-menolong) relationship with the entrepreneur. For these reasons I refer to this labour arrangement by the village terms of reciprocity (tolong menolong) although, clearly, it is a case of exploitation - a fact not altogether lost on a few villagers.

INTER-HOUSEHOLD RECIPROCITY and RITUAL

In this section I discuss religious and other feasts given in Kampung Dalam. They illustrate well the manner in which reciprocity is played out in a ritual manner so as to reflect the daily and seasonal obligations of reciprocity. I make this distinction for analytical purposes but, in fact, ritual reciprocity is not separable from everyday reciprocity since each forms an integral part of village life. The system of generosity (belanja) is very important and people keep a constant 'profit and loss' account of where they eat, what they owe, and what is owed to them. Malays are very careful to return everything in kind and beneath a very sophisticated and elaborate veneer of hospitality they are acute in their reckoning of what is due and owing. Any invitations must be recognised by taking a gift. It is important to be one step ahead with belanja and to maintain a balance - debts and favours are a critical part of everyday interaction. This is best illustrated by the intricate accounting which goes on with regard to visiting and feasts.

VISITING and RECIPROCITY

On the first day of festivities (Hari Raya Puasa) after the fasting month is complete, villagers attend the mosque. The two festival days of Hari Raya are the most important of the year for Muslims. Everyone wears new

clothes and shoes, they look very smart and there is a great air of happiness. After attending the Hari Raya prayers at the Mosque (most women visit the Mosque on this day, at other times of the year only post menopausal women attend) young people must ask their parents and older kin for forgiveness (ma'af zahir batin) for any sins committed during the past year. Young people greet their elders with bowed head, both hands touch the elders two hands, which are then brought to the mouth and chest, (i.e. the heart). Villagers then visit the houses of close kin and are asked to sit down; females go to the kitchen at the back while men stay at the front of the house. Sweet cakes and drinks are served by women of the household. After the initial traditional greetings the host sits elsewhere in the room, or, on the verandah, away from the guests who are eating. Women ask about kin and news of family events. The conversation follows certain polite guidelines in a fixed manner which flags while guests eat and drink. Upon finishing the food guests immediately take their leave of their host, they repeat the "Selamat Hari Raya" greetings with the addition of thanks for the food they have just consumed. They leave the house and go on to the next. As many as twenty houses may be visited on this first day, which is reserved for close kin and neighbours. Crisp new dollar bills must be given to old people and children. By

the end of the second day all the people whose houses were visited on the first day have visited, in return, the houses of people who visited them. There has to be a balance if rifts are to be avoided. The whole Hari Raya visiting is an example of Malay courtesy and refined halus behaviour at its best. There is no real exchange of news and people follow identical patterns in each household. It is obligatory to partake of food and drink at each visit.

So far as large landowners are concerned, they are visited by poorer kampung folk but, in turn, the wealthy pay respects only to prestigious people, travelling out of the village to attend the houses of the state elite. They do not spend time visiting the households of kin but turn the event to political or economic advantage. State politicians hold a Hari Raya 'open house' which the large landowners attend.

SACRIFICE - MUSLIM FOOD DISTRIBUTION.

Villagers claim meat from the kurban ceremony at the mosque in the month of the pilgrimage to Mecca. This coincides with the day on which the pilgrims sacrifice in the valley of Mina - 10th Dhu 'l-Hidjdja (Gibb & Kramer 1961). It is a day remembered by all Muslims, not just those fortunate enough to be on the Haj. It is obligatory and the Kurban ritual commemorates Abraham (Ibrahim) to remind Muslims of the time Abraham made the supreme

sacrifice by offering his son, Ishmael, to God (Quran Al-Saffat Ch 37:445). Villagers slaughter a heifer or bullock, buffalo, or goats to give to the poor or whoever comes to the slaughter site to claim a portion of the meat. Large landowners are supposed to present a whole beast for slaughter whereas 7 people of moderate means join together to contribute a beast. A third of the sacrificed animal is kept by the donor and the remaining two thirds are distributed to the needy. Again, status accrues to those who donate an animal. Religious merit is gained by people who have performed the pilgrimage to Mecca but this is, of course, available only to the large landowners. Indeed the 'conspicuous consumption' of religion, regular prayer, and frequenting the mosque more than once a week is increasingly used to legitimate status and exert control in the wider political arena. It is only people from middle and large landowning households, or whose active working life is over, who can afford the time to be so pious. Religious observances for the poor are conducted according to work schedules and are tightly circumscribed, as they are, by material conditions.

Other food distributions follow the religious calendar which commences with the Day of Atonement (Asyura), the Prophet Mohammad's birthday (Maulud), and the Ascension of the Prophet (Miraj). Food is sent to the mosque every night

during the month of Ramadhan, and for the two days celebrating the end of the fast (Hari Raya Puasa or Id-ul-Fitr). The festival is determined by the observation of the new moon (Anak Bulan Syawal). After this feast very pious people may begin a further six-day fast (Puasa Enam) and on the seventh day they hold an additional feast (Hari Raya Syawal). The final feast of the Muslim year is the Pilgrim's Festival (Hari Raya Haji) which coincides with the Sacrifice (Kurban) (Gibb & Kramer 1961, Horii 1981). Villagers claim food from the mosque during the fasting month (Ramadhan) a time when most households send food on a regular basis for distribution. People eat meat only at important festivals, while the daily diet consists solely of rice and fish with vegetables offered merely as a relish. It is incumbent upon Malayo-Muslims to maintain contact and ties with each other:

Kitab Jawi emphasize the importance of solidarity in society - Qat' al-arham or severing relationships with other Muslims or relatives is a grave sin. One Hadith explains that if a person severed links with his society and then died without repentance, he would die as a disbeliever. The Prophet also said, A Muslim who does not speak to his fellow Muslims for more than three days and dies, will go to Hell. (Mhd Nor bin Ngah 1982:28)

From the cradle to the grave, a Muslim must live together and co-operate with other members of his society. (Ibid:28).

Apart from the food distributions, community solidarity and consideration for the poor are also reflected in

Kampung Dalam by the payment of zakat, a ten per cent religious tithe levied on all padi production (1-2 gunni sacks). For Mauss:

Alms are the result on the one hand of a moral idea about gifts and wealth and, on the other, of an idea about sacrifice. Generosity is necessary because the well being of the rich can only be ensured by giving to the poor. The old gift morality is raised to the position of a principle of justice by distribution to the poor (Mauss 1974:15).

Zakat is paid to an agent of the Religious Department or to the Mosque. Poor villagers are classified as orang miskin and have incomes below that deemed necessary for survival. There is an even poorer category called fakir whose income is minimal. Both categories should be given zakat by villagers but the process has been bureaucratized by the state and zakat is now collected, administered, and paid out by the Kedah State Religious Council. For other discussions see Strange (1981), Horii (1981) and Fujimoto (1983). In Kampung Dalam the recipients of zakat receive a cash sum of M\$30.00 which is rapidly expended upon household necessities. This small sum of money is paid out annually by an official who visits each destitute household. The recipients who qualify in Kampung Dalam are the aged and infirm who have no living kin to support them (3 households) and two poverty stricken female-headed households.

The whole issue of zakat has become somewhat vexed. It is one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam (prayer, pilgrimage to Mecca, fasting for one month, belief in one god and zakat meaning alms or charity) (Gibbs & Kramer 1961). There is an additional obligatory head tax called fitrah. Zakat is a tax upon agricultural produce which is levied upon all padi growers (not just landowners). Poor peasants feel it is unfair, for the rate is 10% of their gross yield before any other deductions. Before state intervention villagers gave padi to poor people to ensure no-one starved and, informants say, they would rather give rice direct to kampung folk so as to see the result of their zakat in their own area. Once the padi is sold, and the money has gone to Alor Setar, the immediacy and linkages are lost so that zakat is viewed as an imposition rather than a voluntary religious act of redistribution.

Other recipients of zakat in Kampung Dalam comprise 6 women from middle landowning households who give Quran reading lessons to small children, and a range of mosque officials who do not require zakat as such but are paid from this source for their duties. Since the teachers and officials are from middle or large landed households it follows that those who are already prosperous receive more zakat whereas the poor, for whom the Quranic injunction of zakat is intended, receive proportionately less.

Fujimoto (1983) claims that zakat actually safeguards female headed households and constitutes an important aspect of 'income sharing' among Malay peasants. I would argue that the state bureaucratization of a 'voluntary' act of charity has led to an avoidance of the tax so that, effectively, the poor now receive less. My investigations at the Zakat Office attached to the Department of Religious Affairs in Alor Setar showed that only 19% of the total zakat received by the Department is actually distributed to the poor and needy. The rest is used for bureaucratic administration, religious schools, repairs to mosques and officials' wages.⁵³

GOTONG ROYONG - COMMUNITY LABOUR.

Labour groups are called by the village elder to perform work deemed to be a public necessity. Many of the functions such groups used to perform have now been taken over by the state 'Public Works Department', but a few still remain. These include annual activities such as cleaning ditches, clearing weeds, cleaning graves and the graveyard (once or twice a year), and preparing foodstuffs for important visitors to the local hall. Since this 'free labour' is for general community welfare no returns are expected (see Koentjaraningrat 1961 for Java).

Gotong Royong has recently taken on political ideological overtones so labour groups have become split

along rival party lines. Supporters of the fundamental-Islamic political party - Parti Islam Sa-Malaysia (PAS) form their own labour groups centred around the old mosque, while supporters of the government United Malays' National Organization (UMNO) labour groups centre around the new mosque. These Malay political party affiliations exacerbate kin tensions, rows over land inheritance, berdarau work groups, access to government jobs, and village political leadership. Party affiliation also dictates the distribution of government hand outs, (cattle, poultry, seedlings), which mosque the villagers pray in, and which feasts they attend. Those who work for and support UMNO obtain many privileges while those supporting PAS are left out. No violence has occurred (unlike Kampung Rusila in Trengganu), as most villagers are still kin by blood or marriage and the traditional Malay concepts of budibahasa remain uppermost in cultural values.

PAS supporters refuse to attend the new UMNO mosque because it was built from forbidden sources: usury, bank profits, and taxes extracted from non-Muslims. It transpires that UMNO supporters asked the government for a new mosque, not because one was needed, but because they were in dispute with PAS supporters over custodianship, grave maintenance, the death benefit society, the allocation of pots and pans for feasts, and gotong royong

duties. The disputes have worsened over the threatened demolition of the old mosque to the extent that some extreme UMNO supporters will not attend PAS feasts and vice versa, even where close kin are involved. The local UMNO branch has repeatedly attempted to have the old mosque made unofficial or demolished, and the village elder personally petitioned the Sultan of Kedah to this end in 1983. But as old Hajjah W. (Table # 3) remarked to me:

How can you have an unofficial mosque? A mosque is a mosque where people pray. If anyone calls a function at the old mosque, there is never any problem in getting helpers to cook, give rice, or donate beasts for sacrifice at festival time.

A caretaker and prayer leader at the old mosque explained the situation in the following terms:

It is getting bad here, just like Trengganu. This old mosque was put up by our Fathers' Fathers' labour and is not very pretty, but who cares about buildings when tomorrow we will all be dead anyway? Here there is tremendous spirit (semangat) and that is important. This old mosque is always open and people sleep here regularly including missionaries from all over Malaysia and abroad. This mosque is a place for people to meet when they are too old to work, they pray at midday and stay until after evening prayers, there are always people around. It is supported completely by villagers who help to pay the water and electricity bills. It has semangat and people love it - it is used and wanted as a mosque. The Government (UMNO) can put up a building and call it a mosque if they like - but where is the semangat? UMNO's mosque is only open at prayer times after which the front gate is locked. The people who pray here are mainly PAS people, but it is not just a political issue - people come because it is a mosque, close to their houses, because their parents are buried here, or their friends come here. Religious classes are held and there is a kindergarten (tadika) for small children where we teach them to pray and know Allah. In the UMNO tadika children only learn to play, dance and sing -

all useless stuff.

PAS supporters can be very vociferous in their criticisms of UMNO voters for never being able to do anything without state help and for losing the spirit of gotong royong. When the new mosque was opened by the Sultan of Kedah, many VIPs visited the village. One PAS party stalwart who had spent the day working her plot of glutinous rice was incensed when she arrived home to find photographers swarming all around her very attractive house and flower bedecked compound. They dispersed very rapidly when she told them:

You UMNO people need not think you can photograph and use my house as an example of what UMNO does for kampung folk - I have done all this myself - so go away. UMNO people can't even make themselves a pit latrine without asking the government for help.

It will be recalled from Chapter III that UMNO has traditionally appealed to educated, urban and more affluent Malays. PAS's main strength has always been in the Malay dominated states of Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah, among the peasantry. UMNO is pro development and Malay Nationalism whereas PAS is pro-Islamization and an Islamic state. The issue of gotong royong labour groups illustrates rather well the way in which PAS v UMNO political competition is manifested at the local level and reflects structural tensions arising from the development process. In 1982 PAS polled some 49.8% of the Malay vote in Kelantan

and 44% of the Malay vote in Trengganu. In this village district of Kuala Muda, Kedah, PAS consistently pulled in some 30-38% of the Malay vote in 1969, 1974, and 1978 (UMNO 1980). It is hardly surprising that political dissenters find PAS and the religious mode of expression an effective way to protest those aspects of 'development' which are deemed distasteful, non-egalitarian, and non-Islamic. Interviews with PAS supporters drew the following comments:

It may be that Ministers are good men, but we in the village have to deal with local families who do not like us because we are so poor. When UMNO gives things to the kampung we never see them - cows, hens, ducks, and even standpipes. This is because PAS people can never become village leaders. UMNO favours rich people and only UMNO areas near the main road are made beautiful for visitors. Who can poor people turn to if they have problems? When government people come here they only see the rich people and only visit nice houses for feasts, they never see us poor people in the padi fields. They do not see the real way people live, people who have to struggle with no water or electricity. The government only started to give subsidies so that people would follow them and vote UMNO. (Factory worker's mother).

Commenting on PAS, a University educated UMNO branch official and secondary school teacher, said:

PAS are so strong in this village that a lot of work has to be done. The poorer people who follow PAS do not think about politics, but just believe anyone who understands Arabic and reads the Qur'an so they feel the religious leaders must be right in criticising the government. PAS supporters are ignorant, fanatical and unreasonable people who interpret Islam in too strict a manner. Wearing that Saudi dress is silly in Malaysia where people are confused about Islam and Arab culture. Women are going through the motions of using the head cover but how do I know if their hearts are good too? That is a Saudi

Arabian custom - not Malay.

The PAS view is that Islam can solve corruption and exploitation of the poor. This politico-religious philosophy eschews both Marxist and capitalist development strategies in favour of a purified Islamic state (see chapter III, and Nagata 1984). In Malaysia where the media is government controlled, political gatherings carefully monitored, and the Internal Security Act punitive, PAS is one way in which grievances about economic inequalities under the NEP can be articulated, albeit in the religious mode. Kessler (1978) examines the historical origins, and the socio-economic bases for conflict between PAS and UMNO from the pre colonial period to date. He argues for the class basis of political conflict among Malays and that PAS support from poor peasants and Malay-Islamic educated intellectuals is 'populist'. This dichotomous view is overdrawn since the issues are more complex with cross cutting factors. Urbanization, and the levels of education are important factors in Malay voting patterns but, at the village level, resources handed out along UMNO party lines create further antagonisms over corruption and patronage. The sensitive issue of hiring female labour gangs for padi harvest, the two mosques issue, inheritance problems, and dispute over gotong royong consolidates the fissions from the state to the village level. Leadership of both parties

lies in the hands of an economic and religious elite. The divisions within the UMNO party hierarchy are evidenced by the fact that salaried villagers with civil service jobs officiate at UMNO branch meetings - the poor and landless seldom attend. In the PAS leadership hierarchy, the economic divisions between the religious leaders, Ustaz Z, of Acehnese descent (see Table # 3) and their poorest followers are paradoxical in that generous financial support of PAS actually comes from the tobacco entrepreneur and a tin mine owner. Religious leaders from both political parties and heads of the famous religious schools in the district have accumulated much land as a result of village endowments and strategic marriages with influential religious families in Kedah state (see Nagata 1984, McLellan 1985).

The sensitive issue of Islam requires further comment. Villagers are influenced in their daily affairs by Malayo-Muslim values, yet since the advent of the NEP, Islam has been used as a powerful ideological tool to politicise Malays and is a critical marker of ethnic identity. Knowledge of Islam has increased dramatically and is disseminated by means of a very sophisticated media, in schools, by missionary activities and in the mosque. Islam is manipulated by the state as an effective means of social control. Both PAS and UMNO use Islam to support

their different political ideologies. Males are now required to attend the mosque each Friday while the ideal values of Islamic womanhood are held up as models for Malay females. Girls going through senior school and University are under a tremendous amount of pressure to wear appropriate Malayo-Islamic clothing, a full head cover, and to pray regularly. This works through to the level of the households where internal control over children may be enforced by the father's religious devotions. Conversely, the ability to lapse into trances and be visited by a spirit is another mode of maintaining control at the level of the household. A spirit, speaking through a possessed parent, can articulate tensions and grievances within households or compounds so help to keep wayward family members in line. I witnessed the efficacy of this on two occasions.

For those in the national political arena a pious pose is required and Malay leaders make the requisite trip to Mecca in order to legitimate themselves with the rural voters while, in private, they may lead very 'western' lifestyles at variance with their assumed piety. The actual practise of Islam has much to do with social status, age, wealth and education. There is a conspicuous consumption of prayer and mosque attendance by elite males related, in turn, to wealth, landholding and political ambitions. It is

a way of gaining status and prestige. For poor peasants there is simply no time to engage in regular prayer and ritual, save for the celebration at the end of Ramadhan, at other times they are too busy working. Extreme piety and regular prayer five times a day are luxuries which only the elderly, rich or politically ambitious can indulge in.

FEASTS and RECIPROCITY

Villagers in Kampung Dalam travel far to attend feasts and they spend considerable amounts of money for transport by bus or taxi to Alor Setar, Penang, Baling, Sungei Petani and Sik. It is not unusual to have to attend three feasts in one day at the 'height' of the season.

We have to be careful to go to all the kenduri given by our brothers and sisters and cousins otherwise they will not come to our feasts. We cannot offend them otherwise there will be splits in our kin. We have to go, no matter how far it is. (Factory worker's father - landed 1.5 acres.)

Feasts, (for engagements, weddings, male circumcisions and, recently, examination successes), are usually held during the padi harvest months of December and January which coincide with school holidays, save when the fasting month itself falls in December. When Malays attend any kind of feast they take along an offering for the host which contributes to the expenses. Guests eat at the feast and, when women leave, they are given additional cooked food to take home with them. The offerings for the host follow a

set pattern and consist of uncooked husked rice, rice cakes, sugar, or small amounts of cash (M\$1.00 - 10.00) depending on the wealth and kinship connections of the donor. Such gifts are given by women to the hostess, and males, whose wives cannot attend will give cash to the host. Females give to females while males give only to males.

When a household calls a feast, women make their way to the house the day before to help prepare vegetables, grind spices, grate coconuts for milk, clean and sort plates, glasses, jugs, pots and pans. Crockery and glasses are borrowed from the 'pot & pan society' run from the old mosque. This is all voluntary labour and drinks of coffee or rose syrup are offered for refreshment. Women carry out all these preparations indoors while males dig pits, prepare trestle tables, ritually slaughter and butcher a beast, goats, or chickens outside. A male learned in Muslim ritual must conduct the slaughter since the meat must be purified and made fit for human consumption (halal) by cutting the beast's throat correctly and reciting a prayer. Women never slaughter animals - this is a male task since only men can perform religious rituals in the 'public' arena. On the day of the feast itself, men who are 'clever at cooking' will attend to the curried meat and special rice outdoors. Other men out in the compound collect wood,

erect tarpaulins, dig pits, prepare fires, and set out tables and chairs. They are involved in cooking beef, buffalo, goat, chicken and special rice. Kin, neighbours and friends give labour voluntarily all during the feast and are repaid, by reciprocal labour, when they hold a feast (see my analysis below). The quality of the feast is a reflection on the hostess; if she has been generous with her time and labour for others, then people remember to return her kind favours by ensuring that the feast is a good one.

On the actual day of the feast, women start to arrive after midday, while men attend only after they have participated in Friday prayers at the mosque, and there will be a stream of visitors until evening by which time someone from every household in the village will have eaten there. Women make their gift quickly and shyly to the hostess, their layered food tins are emptied by the women in the kitchen and different cakes are put in the top layer.

When my eldest daughter was married ten years ago my neighbour made kuih for me. Now her son is marrying I make kuih for her. (Factory worker's mother - landless household).

These traditional cakes (kuih made from eggs, flour and sugar) have ritual significance since, villagers say, they

were pilgrims' food for the journey to Mecca. They are given to guests who bring money or food to a feast. The food carriers are sent to the men outside who fill the lower portions with curry and rice. Women eat festive food indoors and leave quickly, collecting a boiled egg and their layer tin full of additional cooked food on the way out. It is unseemly to linger at a feast and it is necessary to make space for other guests. If the household can afford it, all female guests leave with a hard boiled egg dyed red, (a fertility symbol), in a fancy carton. Food to take home (balik buah tangan) is a return for the gifts of food or money people bring to the feast. Villagers do not bring 'wedding presents' (save in urban areas). Women eat inside the house, sitting on home made mats spread on the floor, while males sit outside at tables under an awning. All feasts involve the ritual separation of male and female with men in the front compound of the house while women stay inside, and at the back, to ensure the serving plates are constantly replenished. Much status is gained or lost by the quality of a feast. Pious households may arrange for a Quran reading session to coincide with a feast, or cassette tapes are played through a loud-hailer system. After a feast the food, the arrangements, the slow or fast service, the attention of the hostess, the decorations, the gifts, and the type and flavour of meats

served is endlessly discussed. Feasts are a way of earning honour and status linked to the type, quantity, and quality of the food served; they link participants to future reciprocal obligations both as helpers and as guests.

The trouble with us Malays is that we throw our money away on a feast and invite the whole kampung only to have them all criticise us and our food. Our houses are judged by the food we give. (Desa - the village taxi driver).

Malays go to see - attendance is a duty. It is a duty to invite people and a duty to go so as not to offend neighbours. Absence of an invitation and absence of attendance is noted and people will talk about it. (Wife of the village elder).

If the feast is for a wedding, another subject of conversation is the beauty of the bride, her dress, the amount of gold she wears, the wedding gold paid from the groom to the bride's household, and the gifts from the groom to the bride. These consist of new banknotes arranged intricately into a floral arrangement, elaborate food displays, sireh, betel nut and other gifts, including the ring, which are beautifully displayed. The betrothal is arranged no more than several months before the wedding, at which time, money is presented by the groom's kin to the bride's kin and is intended to defray the expenses of the wedding itself. This cash transaction is for the expenses of an elaborate and grand wedding ceremony. The marriage contract (akhad nikah) involves the bride's father or

guardian (wali), the registrar, two witnesses, and the groom. Muslim law recognises the payment of a gift (mahr) given by the groom to the bride. The marriage gold (mas kawin), paid by the groom to the bride, and the amount of the expenses (hantaran belanja) are recorded, as is the amount of any part of the marriage gold and expenses promised but which are deferred at the time of the wedding. Under Malay custom there is the payment of an obligatory cash payment from the bridegroom to the bride at the time of marriage but it is often delayed. There may be an optional marriage settlement (pemberian) in cash or kind, made by the husband to the wife at the time of the marriage and there are the expenses agreed upon by the parents of the groom and bride at the time of the betrothal (Ahmad 1963). Although the pemberian and hantaran belanja are customary, the details are nonetheless recorded in the Muslim contract (akad nikah) and registered. Females take no part in this legal contract, which, in Kedah, follows the 'Administration of Muslim Law, Kedah Enactment # 9 of 1962'. The guardianship of the bride passes from her father to her husband who becomes responsible for his wife. It is not necessary to obtain the bride's consent under Shafii law. The wedding feast is held after the contract is signed which legalizes the union.

Only married people attend feasts. Virgin girls do not

go for fear of being thought too forward; they say they are shy in the sight of others. They attend only if they are the closest friends of the bride and they must stay by her side in the room. It is too bold of anak dara to attend feasts since they will expose themselves to non-kinsmen and older women will talk shamefully about them. At best they can hide with the bride or peep from behind cracks in the room walls. The bed is a focal point of weddings and all the women visit the bride (anak dara) in her decorated bedroom. The bride is elaborately made up and clothed in cloth of gold (kain songkit) after her hair trimming and after henna has been applied to her feet and hands (a pre-Islamic Hindu practice). She must be shy, as befits a virgin, and retain a solemn face throughout. There are women who are particularly skilled at dressing brides and others who ensure that everything is 'properly done' according to Malay custom. This includes the decoration of a dais and chairs for the 'sitting together' (bersanding) ceremony, the layout of the gifts, and the decoration of the bed which are all open to comment by guests. The bed and mosquito net must be arranged in a pretty manner with, preferably, fancy red sheets (M\$150.00 a pair), bolsters and pillows to match. Households that cannot afford to purchase a bed will endeavour to beg or borrow one for this occasion.

In the evening the 'sitting together' ceremony is held at the bride's home. This is of Hindu origin so it predates the coming of Islam (1400 AD) to Peninsular Malaysia and, for villagers, it is the most important part of a marriage since it is a grand affair which presents the bride and groom as a couple. Fundamentalists constantly say that this non Islamic aspect should be dispensed with. Both bride and groom are dressed up in traditional cloth of gold Malay garments, jewellery and gold chains which resemble the ritual clothing worn by royalty. The elaborate items are either borrowed or rented for the occasion. On this day they can emulate royal Sultans and Sultanahs. This is the first time, ideally, the bride and groom meet each other; they must sit demurely side by side on a decorated and raised dais so that villagers can file past, examine the couple, and pay their respects. There may be a ritual mutual serving of food by the bride and groom to symbolise their future together as a couple. After several hours they retire to sleep in separate places since, ideally, village marriages are not consummated until the second or third night after the ceremony. The couple stay at the bride's home for a night or so before going to the groom's village. Consummation takes place at the bride's or the groom's house with a bias toward the bride's home. This is the place where the bride will, eventually, give birth and

spend her forty day post-partum confinement which reinforces the special relationship between mothers and daughters. As McKinley (1984) points out Malay affinal links are complex since there is no dual organization, no prescriptive alliance and no status difference between wife givers and wife takers, yet there is a ceremonial asymmetry in favour of the wife's parents' house.

At a following and less grand feast held in the groom's household several days later, the quality of gifts and foodstuffs presented by the bride's kin to the groom's kin is similarly scrutinised. There is no money involved in this transaction but there is a gold thread cloth arranged into the shape of a turban, for the groom, and many varieties of highly decorated and elaborate foodstuffs. Through the reciprocal exchange of gifts the two sides come to know each other, to confirm, and establish new affinal relationships. The decorated food from the exchanges is kept on display for a day, after which, villagers come to eat the food or take it away for their own households. This process is known as introducing the bride to the groom's kin and his village is invited to examine the daughter-in-law. There used to be much travelling back and forth between households in the first month or so until the couple decided where to settle. After a year of residence with either set of parents, and giving birth to their first

child, a couple used to build a house in either village according to the availability of land, the likelihood of inheritance, and the type of work the husband engaged in. Increasingly, these residence patterns have given way in favour of urban migration.

The anthropological literature discusses peasants running debts and selling land because of excessive feast expenditure. I know of only one man who mortgaged an acre of land to get ready cash for a feast but in Kampung Dalam it is not unusual to break even, or to make a profit on a feast. One factory worker's mother made a profit of M\$230.00. The average cost of a feast is now between M\$1,000.00 and M\$2,000.00, but since guests bring money, rice or rice cakes and people help with the elaborate wedding preparations, hosts do not necessarily lose. Both Firth (1966:177-182) and Strange (1981) substantiate this point for Malaysia's East Coast. The profit and loss of a feast is also cause for gossip and speculation. As Firth points out, contributions are of two kinds - one consists of sums which are reciprocal payments for contributions the hostess has made to guests on former occasions, while the other consists of sums which she is obliged to repay to the givers at some future time.

Over 1,000 people came to my adopted daughter's wedding and they gave food and amounts of money such as M\$10.00, M\$5.00, M\$3.00 and so I got back M\$2,170.00. The wedding

cost M\$2,000., some M\$1,180.00 of which I spent on food: 150 chickens cost M\$480.00, the beef was M\$350.00 and extras came to M\$200.00, the rice (nasi minyak) was M\$340.00 and 1,000 eggs for guests cost me M\$300.00 so I did not lose money. (Hajjah Salmah, Kpg. Dalam.)

Large landowners in Kampung Dalam now call contractors to cater, but this is considered to be conspicuous consumption and snobbish (sombung). The quality of such purchased food is highly criticised. There are important guests at these feasts such as state political leaders, religious figures and key civil servants. Influential outsiders (orang besar) replace unimportant insiders (orang miskin) such as landless labourers. The large landowners' guest lists are discriminatory in favour of wealth and importance so there is a sloughing off of the poor. Although villagers still respectfully take their usual offerings, a 'catered feast' does dispense with the reciprocal rounds of labour so as to set such households apart from ordinary people (orang biasa). Women from large landowning households give money rather than their labour so they do not participate in the tolong menolong phase of feast preparation. The households are already set apart by their wealth so that a catered feast serves to reinforce that separation; it foregoes traditional 'co-operation and intimacy' in favour of economic and ritual independence from kampung ties of reciprocity.

FEAST LABOUR

Married women come together to prepare food for feasts in the hostess' house the evening before a feast day proper. Which women actually volunteer labour corresponds with the social relations between the hostess, her kin, neighbours, and friends according to work debts owed to her. As such women usually are from the same economic level, the recipient of labour at one feast will be a donor of labour at the next. Not only do women give labour in the pre-feast stage of food preparation but, on the day itself when they come to the house as 'guests', they give uncooked food or cash to their hostess, (this pattern differs from the Javanese cases reported by Koentjaraningrat 1961 and Sullivan 1981). Women help at feasts to preserve socio economic relationships. It is a critical way of reinforcing and creating household honour and status in the village (see Strange 1981, Couillard 1982). By contributing labour at a feast, women do the 'proper' thing; they engage in refined behaviour, a degree of 'altruism' and so they fulfil the Malay cultural view of what it is to be a Malay.

Women give pre-feast labour voluntarily. They are never asked to do so but as the whole village knows when a feast is to be held, women just show up at the kitchen, see what work needs to be done, and they get on with it immediately.

If women must be 'called' to help both they, and the hostess, would be shamed since this is inappropriate behaviour. To have to ask for help is to demonstrate one is not respected within the village (this is similar to the Javanese cases reported by Sullivan 1981). Women who do not tolong menolong are viewed as snobbish, but, again, this follows nascent class lines so that to volunteer labour depends upon economic necessity. I recorded only one case of 'asking' for help by an out-of-state police family. The household required assistance for the marriage feast of their daughter and, since they were newcomers (of only 2 months), Kampung Dalam residents rallied around immediately. The support did, however, follow political alignments since the policeman had already joined the local UMNO political party branch. This feast was a way of becoming involved in kampung affairs, involving people in the marriage work (kerja kawin) and establishing reciprocal alliances by 'indebting' themselves to the villagers. At one feast I attended, a woman refused the help of what she referred to as her 'snobbish urban kin' preferring to show off her popularity in Kampung Dalam by depending upon dues of tolong-menolong reciprocity owed to her by neighbours and friends. She treated her urban kin as strangers by employing the great ceremony, politeness and distance normally reserved for 'outsiders'. Reciprocity among kin is

flexible and depends upon the intimacy and socio-economic status of the relationship. Contrary to the ideological views of Malay egalitarianism this is, in turn, tightly related to wealth and status. As one landless factory worker forcibly expressed it: "If you have land, you have kin but if you have no land or money, then you have no kin".

For Mauss (1974), ideally, items that are exchanged as gifts are voluntary, but at the level of reality gifts are given and repaid under obligation. Thus women participate in economic transactions marked by the exchange of 'gifts' (buah tangan). There are several layers of exchange going on here which should be identified. On a pre-feast day women give their labour for a few hours, in return for which they receive refreshment. The refreshment alone cannot cancel the debt of labour, the equivalence of which must be returned at some unspecified future date. In pre-feast labour, and on the feast day, a time factor is involved. Women give labour one day, and a gift of food or money, as guests, the next day. The amount of a cash gift is dictated by the guest's economic status and degree of kinship. In return, the guest eats and also takes festive prestige food away in her food carrier. The first day she is a labourer, and on the second day she is a guest, with all the elaborate ceremony and refinement that this involves among

Malays. At first sight, all things appear to be equal and ritual exchanges of equivalence are made but the hostess must reciprocate in kind, at a later, unspecified time, by giving her labour on a pre feast day, and a gift on the feast day. In addition, there will be guests, at the feast itself, who do not labour on the previous day and, in turn, the hostess will also attend feasts purely in a 'guest' capacity. These are people who are not particularly close nor are they in the hostess' labour group - but they respectfully attend the feast and give a feast-day gift anyway.

At one level the gift appears to be voluntary, but the hostess is receiving payments of past debts or incurring future obligations which must be reciprocated both by her labour and in kind. The donor is obliged to give yet, without admitting it, knows that the giving both of labour and the feast day gift is an investment for the future (Firth 1966, Mauss 1974). Clearly then, as each woman attends a kenduri she alternates as organizer and worker, recipient and donor, hostess and guest on each occasion. Since all women are obliged, in time, to reciprocate, this is an investment in labour, food, money and honour for their own future feasts. I have no cases of anyone reneging on such obligations since honour is also at stake when working for, and contributing to, a feast. Although the

labour and gift are superficially "paid for" in the two days, the debt is not entirely cancelled since labour can only be repaid by labour in the future; there is a debt of honour and labour. It is this asymmetry which some anthropologists (see chapter II) view as maintaining the social fabric since there are always debts to be discharged. Households thereby defray the labour and costs of the next feast in this delayed labour and gift exchange relationship. Food, labour, honour and cash are distributed by reciprocity - workers and organizers, recipient and donor, hostess and guests all know this. By so doing, they contribute to their own household economy which is enabled to fulfil reciprocal obligations and hold its own feasts in turn and in time.

SUMMARY

The way in which reciprocal (berdarau) labour as a non capitalist relation of production is sustained among poor households is illustrated by subsistence food growing. Poor households must participate in labour exchange as a means of survival since they cannot afford to hire labour. At this level there is an equivalent exchange of reciprocal labour dues created and discharged in one season. It was pointed out that households engage in berdarau from economic necessity - not from altruism or any notions of income sharing. If households could afford to hire labour

or mechanize production they would certainly do so in order to save time and human energy. Women constantly voiced such opinions. They subsist by the obligations of shared labour dues whereas middle and large landowners are detached from the system. My comparative table # 8 shows the costs involved in the three methods of labour use in padi production. Landless labourers cannot engage in reciprocity so they must hire themselves out to middle and large landowning households. The state intervenes in the process of padi production but such subsidies as are provided benefit the middle and large landowners.

Where rubber land is rented out on a sharecropping basis, labour relations are viewed in the reciprocal form of 'help' (tolong menolong) and are cast in kinship and reciprocal assistance terminology, although transactions are on a sharecropping cash basis. The tapper processes and hands the rubber sheets to the owner who sells them to the middleman who, in turn, sells them to the state. Again, the role of the state and RISDA at the village level have been discussed. The pricing and marketing of rubber benefit the large conglomerate corporations which stockpile in Kuala Lumpur. The smallholders subsidise the corporations by taxes while tappers' incomes are linked to rubber prices fixed by the state, which passes on price fluctuations to the smallholders and tappers while

protecting the conglomerates.

In tobacco production organised by the entrepreneur who, like the rubber and rice dealers, is a direct descendant of the village founder, the ideology of reciprocity is continued. Non capitalist relations and reciprocal ideology are practiced in the production process. Haji A 'helps' villagers to earn a cash income in the dry season - while people view themselves as 'helping' Haji A to grow 'his' tobacco. Since households produce their own means of subsistence they subsidize the whole tobacco production process by being underpaid for their labour. Such non-valorised labour creates profits for the entrepreneur and the tobacco TNCs owned by state and foreign capital, as laid out.

So far as reciprocity in ritual events is concerned here, again, there is a sloughing off of the unwanted poor by the large landowners. Ritual and feasting now reflect the nascent class formations and are predicated upon land ownership and occupations. Among the landless, poor and middle landowning households, reciprocal labour is still essential for feasts and there appears to be an equivalence in reciprocal labour exchange over a lifetime since, when women are young they put in more labour, but when they are old, they attend feasts freely without having to give their labour (tolong menolong) on the previous day. Again, women

from large landowning households do not participate in feast labour at all and so they have detached themselves from reciprocal obligations. They hire contractors to do this work, and invite state officials to their functions. The upshot of all this is that there is less food distributed to poorer villagers and, indeed, fewer villagers attend the feasts of the large landowners. The meaning of reciprocity at formal feasts and the way in which it is changing is apparent in that the neglect of large landowners of their ritual obligations is slowly taking effect.

Zakat is one of the 5 pillars of Islam being a prescription to support the poor and the 'desperately poor'. It used to be a voluntary act of generosity, thanks to Allah for His beneficence, and, according to my old informants, the poor in the village would be given sufficient rice for the whole year by a mechanism of redistribution. The destitute were cared for. Since the State Religious Department bureaucratized zakat, it is now used to support government religious institutions, schools, teachers, mosques, mosque officials, mosque repairs and so on. It is those from middle and large landowning households which, in the main, receive zakat for their duties to the mosque. Zakat has become a hefty burden for padi producers who now try, where possible, to cheat on their padi returns

to avoid paying the 10%. It is regarded as an onerous tax rather than something given freely from the heart. The encroachment of capitalism and the changing reciprocal relations of production are discernible in padi, rubber, tobacco production, Zakat collection, and in ritual labour arrangements.

So far as reciprocal labour in subsistence food production is concerned it remains symmetrical among the poor households with the labour debts made and discharged in one season. If this were not the case, the system would collapse. Reciprocal ideology and practice are symmetrical in berdarau padi production. Middle and large landowners use combinations of hired labour and mechanization for padi production. I have no evidence whatsoever of the altruistic income sharing as reported by Fujimoto (1983). When moving to cash cropping, and ritual relations, it is apparent that there is a sloughing off of the poor, or, an exploitation of their labour. Cliffe (1982) and Pine (1982) argue that reciprocal relations are eroded with capitalism and I show here how they are transformed and, in both intra and inter household reciprocity, it is the non valorised subsistence labour of women upon whom the whole system depends. The homogenous view of Geertz (1963) and Fujimoto (1983) is not supported by my data, whereas the heterogenous perspective of Stoler (1977), White (1983), and Gerdin (1982) is echoed

here. The data also supports the view that female labour is increased in the process of economic development (e.g. Boserup 1978, Whitehead 1985).

From the theoretical perspective it is evident that the non capitalist relations of reciprocity are effectively manipulated in the arena of inter household (tolong menolong) reciprocity in cash crop production and that this, itself, is predicated upon intra-household reciprocity (balas budi). Since the middlemen and dealers act in their own as well as the state's interests, the dimensions of reciprocity as both ideology and as economic exploitation of peasant labour power are apparent. In both categories of reciprocity, and of particular analytical relevance for this dissertation, is the role of the anak dara. The way in which virgin daughters perform non valorised labour for their households and, more explicitly, the way their labour is exploited by TNCs has been laid out.

CONCLUSIONS

RECIPROCITY AND EXPLOITATION

In common with other Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia has an ethic of reciprocity which anthropologists have reported upon but have not made the subject of intensive analysis. The dissertation identifies the way in which reciprocity operates in relation to Malaysia's economic development process where reciprocal obligations now link peasant households to the production processes of state and international capital.

The semi-proletarianization of industrial workers requires the maintenance of household subsistence production and the continuance of reciprocal labour exchange. The issue of reciprocity is dichotomised in the current literature and viewed as (a) eroded by capital, or, (b), as instrumental for the capital accumulation process. However, the nature of reciprocity in the development process is more complex than either argument suggests. The theoretical issue is not whether reciprocal relations are dissolved or conserved but rather to understand the ways in which peasant households mediate these moral and economic obligations in the state's development process. The

concepts of intra and inter-household reciprocity are developed to this end and the dissertation draws specific attention to the situation of Malay women in this context.

Assembly line employees work in transnational corporations producing for international markets, in petty hawking, subsistence food production, cash cropping, and household maintenance. They practice a variety of occupational multiplicity ranging from work in the international division of labour through to subsistence production linked and necessitated by the moral and economic obligations of reciprocity. Malaysia's new semiproletariat and their households are sustained by an amalgamation of intra and inter-household reciprocal dues. In this way, their non-valorised labour contributes to the Malaysian state's New Economic Policy and capital accumulation.

The process of reciprocity and exploitation is solidly based upon unpaid household and subsistence work, legitimated by Malay cultural perceptions of reciprocal dues and obligations. At an objective level many of the exchanges - although couched in reciprocal terms by the participants - can be analytically viewed as exploitative in the sphere of labour control and the extraction of value. The exploitation of female labour takes place at the level of the transnational corporations; it is echoed in subsistence and cash crop production, and facilitated by

the shifting nature and different levels of 'reciprocities'. Of specific importance is the ideological nature of reciprocity and the ways that this is manipulated, at all levels, by economic actors so contributes to the maintenance, production and even reproduction of peasant households. I have given reciprocity a lot of work to do - but so too do Malays - the linkages should be clear enough to allow me to push the conceptual framework yet further.

RECIPROCITY AND EXPLOITATION IN KAMPUNG DALAM

Two categories of reciprocal relationships are identified for Kampung Dalam. (i) Intra-household labour obtained from household members and (ii) Inter-household reciprocity for subsistence production, income generating activities, feasts and, labour exchanges between poor and large landholding households. Subsumed under these two analytical categories are several layers of reciprocity which operate among Malays as follows:

- a) Parent-child filial obligations (balas budi).
- b) Help and mutual assistance (tolong menolong).
- c) Reciprocal exchange labour (berdarau) for padi production.
- d) Community mutual assistance (gotong royong) for village activities.

The largest group engaged in reciprocity is ideally, if

not actually, one of kin. Neighbours and friends take a second place but, where kin relations are strained, neighbours become primary, or, reciprocity is confined to the household itself. The Malaysian and the theoretical literature mentions only (b), (c) and (d) so that the analysis of the critical intra-household reciprocity and the way this links with inter-household reciprocity in the process of Malaysian industrialization have never been identified.

The specific role of factory workers in intra and inter-household reciprocity is examined as the focus of the study. Patterns emerge from the village data which show the importance of mother-daughter labour in all levels of reciprocity, the roles of landownership, the state and TNCs. The dissertation demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, the multidimensional facets of reciprocity within and between households in the industrialization process and analyzes the labour linkages thereby effected with state and international capital.

OUTLINE

Contrary to the predictions of most dependency theorists, Malaysia has experienced a degree of success in the economic development process. There is a rapid growth rate and, after Singapore, Malaysia has the highest standard of living in Southeast Asia. This success results from the triple alliance of state, domestic, and foreign

capital, coupled with the continued viability of plantation crops. The world systems view of developing countries as unmitigated victims of transnational corporations is challenged by this case since such a view ignores state and domestic capital formation. The Malaysian state employs tactics of regional co-operation and joint ventures which change dichotomous dependency patterns. Malaysia's own TNCs invest overseas and exhibit an interactive rather than a merely dependent role in development. State prosperity is only achieved, however, at the cost of increased economic inequality and class formations within Malaysia.

The 'triple alliance' of domestic, state and foreign capital creates inequalities and has formed a substantial female semiproletariat which facilitates the accumulation of capital. The Malay cultural perceptions of virgin girls coupled with their 'non-status' renders them particularly vulnerable for labour dues under Malay views of reciprocity in household, subsistence and cash crop production. Such cultural perceptions also render girls subject to exploitation by the TNCs in industrial capitalism.

Chapter IV examines the establishment and ownership of TNCs in the north Malaysian state of Kedah. This reflects new patterns of capital investment whereby transnational corporations move from the free trade zones in Penang to peripheral rural areas so as to benefit from regional

development incentives, tax inducements, and cheap labour. The factory work force remain rooted in subsistence production but commute daily to work in the industrial estates. The process of superexploitation has formed a semiproletariat which participates in both industrial and household subsistence production. This industrial labour force which is distinct by reasons of age, gender and ethnicity, survives by a process of occupational multiplicity in the interstices of wage labour and subsistence production, all of which is sustained by peasant reciprocity. Factory wages cannot support the female work force in the urban areas so they participate in, and remain dependent upon, household production. Household production itself is organised by reciprocal obligations under which labour falls unequally upon young girls anak dara who work, simultaneously, in capitalist and non capitalist relations of production.

The tactics used by TNCs for wages, labour conditions, and worker control, are analyzed. Factories selectively manipulate aspects of Malay culture such as gender, age, and ethnicity, as factors in industrial recruitment and labour relations. Both local and foreign owned factories clearly exploit the female labour force which (as managements readily acknowledge), is obliged to work to support their households. This is double edged since the semiproletariat's ambiguous status necessitates that they

also participate in peasant obligations of intra and inter household reciprocity. The factor of semi proletarianization allows TNCs to pay low wages which clearly exploits Malay labour, but, this results in an uncommitted work force whose primary responsibility must lie with household production. If factories paid higher wages the labour force could afford to relinquish some reciprocal obligations, and, households could hire wage labour. The value of non waged female labour to subsistence production is higher than the cash they earn on the assembly lines and so, at peak harvest times, the factories experience absenteeism.

Reciprocity in its various dimensions within households is examined. I argue that reciprocity has an extractive aspect in intra-household relations; the cash and labour contributions of factory workers to their natal households are maintained by Malay religious and cultural views of reciprocity. This supports the argument that reciprocity has an ideological dimension which masks economic interests. Carefully couched in cultural terms of morality, help, debts, or filial obligations, the naked economic self interest does not surface, nor is it allowed to become apparent to the donors or the recipients. The age and gender aspects of labour control in households are subtle, expressed, as they are, in kinship and reciprocal terminology. They serve, nonetheless, as manipulative

forces which link households to the wider arena of capitalism.

. . . There is an intelligible relation - not a contradiction - between these two forms of violence, which coexist in the same social formation and sometimes in the same relationship: when domination can only be exercised in its elementary form, i.e. directly, between one person and another, it cannot take place overtly and must be disguised under the veil of enchanted relationships, the official model of which is presented by relations between kinsmen; in order to be socially recognized it must get itself misrecognised. (Bourdieu 1982:191).

The intra-household analysis of reciprocity demonstrates households are arenas of asymmetrical rights, obligations, and power. For these reasons households are not regarded as homogenous units because the bulk of the labour dues fall on females. This exercise of labour control is facilitated by the cultural demands of parent-child obligations, gender ideology, religious values and even extends to the use of magic.

The language of kinship, with reciprocity as an ideology, reinforces social obligations and masks economic interests, glossed by balas budi. Intra and inter-household labour relations in which money is absent depend upon the ability to call upon and control unpaid labour. Reciprocity is a gloss for relationships which may be as manipulative as those based on wage labour yet they are rooted in (real or fictive) kinship relations. Kinship and reciprocal terminology are used to obtain non valorised labour, to control labour power so as to mask asymmetry between the

old and young within, and the rich and poor, between households.

The reciprocal role of mothers and their factory working daughters in Kampung Dalam is examined within the modified perspective of Sahlins (1974). Emphasis is placed upon female labour in occupational multiplicity. The focus on landed and landless factory worker households shows the way in which access to land, and kinship connections, dictates education and work opportunities. Girls from landless or smallholding households appear destined for low status factory and agricultural labour. Factory workers employed by TNCs simultaneously contribute both cash and their 'spare time' labour to subsistence food production, and household maintenance.

Assembly line work is regarded merely as an addition to the 'occupational multiplicity' series. In no way are factory workers committed to industrial employment because their unmarried status means they can work in the industrial sector for only a short period of time. The tactics used by the State and the TNCs offer no incentives for the labour force to become permanent. As the range of occupational multiplicity shows, the labour force is neither purely peasant nor purely proletarian. The availability, use, and control of female labour is part of Malay social and cultural views, structural imperatives, and the stage of the domestic cycle. Households mobilise

and utilise factory wage work in a selective way that does not destroy subsistence production or wreak too much havoc with cultural values (i.e. the commuting rather than the permanent migration of virgin girls) and, indeed, TNCs benefit from workers' ties to the land. Households are maintained by the interdependence of members, achieved by the control of labour in a strict hierarchy of age, gender and marital status, governed by the moral demands of reciprocity, and sanctioned by Islam. Such interdependence and commitment work against the creation of a permanent wage labour force for the TNCs; when awkward shifts clash with harvest peaks, girls simply absent themselves from the assembly lines. In intra-household reciprocity girls have many obligations and are jointly responsible with their mothers for domestic labour (fetching water, gathering fire-wood, cooking, cleaning, washing, daily maintenance and sibling care), income generating activities as and when their shifts and off days allow, and agricultural work at peak times.

Households which own or rent land produce their own subsistence food, and engage in the cash cropping of rubber and tobacco for the state and international markets. Household production itself is held together by intra and inter household co-operation located in different sets of 'reciprocities' based variously upon kin, friendship, neighbourhood ties and legitimated by Malayo-Islamic

values.

Chapter VI examines inter-household labour exchange for subsistence food production. The poorest households survive by an equivalent labour exchange but, where kin are involved, there may be long term economic interests attached to land inheritance. In rubber and tobacco cash crops, the nature of labour control in reciprocal relations reflects the differences in landownership and status. Nascent class formations and conflicts are similarly reflected in ritual reciprocity played out at feasts, alms giving, in kinship relations, and in the shifting use of real and fictive kin terminology.

In addition to the levels of reciprocity, the role of the State must be mentioned. Although some households cultivate land by reciprocal labour dues, the way in which padi surpluses, tobacco, and rubber profits are extracted by the state and TNCs, ultimately contributes to Malaysia's development process. The state controls the marketing and pricing of all crops. The capitalist relations of production in tobacco growing are, like those in rubber production, glossed and hidden by idioms of reciprocity and kinship terminology. In all levels and activities, large landowners benefit from reciprocal labour relations and, increasingly, detach themselves from the village system. Their wealth, political and economic linkages with the state give them Bumiputra advantages. That poor households

survive by the reciprocal obligations of shared labour is stressed but equivalent exchanges between poor households can only be achieved by intra-household dues, at the labour expense of females. Reciprocity is complex and I have attempted to show the way in which cultural values and economic interests are intricately intertwined. Shortages of land and cash force poor households to mutual help and reciprocity yet they must also enter into asymmetrical 'reciprocal' labour relations in cash crop production. The duality of reciprocity is most apparent here since, on the one hand reciprocity entails equivalent exchanges yet, on the other hand, reciprocity enhances the power of entrepreneurs, who benefit from State interventions and Bumiputra policies, at the expense of the poor.

Inter-household reciprocal relations depend upon the degree of material benefit people are able to offer to other households in terms of field work and expertise at feasts. To assume that households linked by kinship will be involved in reciprocity with each other does not always follow. Close kin do not necessarily co-operate so that fictive kinship ties between neighbours and friends are a common pattern for reciprocal co-operation. For instance, factory workers' households are 'separated' from their more educated and wealthy kin, and visiting patterns are minimal because of the assumed 'looseness' of female kin who work in factories. Factory workers constantly complain about

the snobbishness of landed and educated kin and the fact that they never visit factory workers' households, even at the Hari Raya festival.

Reciprocity is a multifaceted concept for Malays. At all levels the reality of reciprocity entails self interested economic calculation from the household outwards. The idea of a homogenous peasantry characterised by reciprocity in their kinship relations is evaluated. The argument presented resists the anthropological view that reciprocity regulates economic relations and maintains homogeneity and egalitarianism. The comparative research on Java and Bali indicates that ideological descriptions of reciprocal labour transactions as 'help or favours' is insufficient reason to describe them as non commodity relations. Indeed, exploitation, in the sense of labour extraction, takes place where labour relations are predicated and built upon intra-household ties, in particular the filial reciprocity between mothers and daughters.

Recent work on the Andes (Sanchez 1982:157) indicates that the persistence of reciprocity is a product of the effects of economic and political forces pertaining to development, a view substantiated by the Malaysian data. I take issue with Sanchez, however, since his analysis fails to consider the way in which 'status' and 'honour' accrue to households with the act of reciprocity itself. Malays

are, by reciprocal labour exchange, viewed as 'altruistic'. This gives them a status since they are seen to fulfill their reciprocal, moral and communal dues by helping others.

The varieties of reciprocities reflect the nascent class formations in Malaysia. The tobacco entrepreneur, for example, manipulates reciprocal relationships built upon non-capitalist relations of production and thereby contributes to the class formations of the NEP. The latter, as yet, are poorly developed in Kampung Dalam because kinship ties and reciprocity still obscure economic class relationships. Nascent class formations, and the process of industrialization, are partially responsible for the persistence of specific levels of reciprocity. Reciprocity is used as an ideological instrument - both by the poor and by large landowners to differing degrees. It masks self interested economic relationships yet it also ensures the survival of poor subsistence households and their members. Economic processes which are both internal and external to the household are filtered through these moral values.

The concepts of reciprocity and exploitation are developed and linked to the process of industrialization. Where households are involved in both capitalist and non capitalist relations of production the non-valorised economic relationships are, clearly, little less exploitative than wage labour itself. However, the very act

of engaging in reciprocity creates 'symbolic capital', that is a convertible 'status or moral' currency. Reciprocity masks labour control between the old and young (intra-household) and between the rich and poor (inter-household). The household is a system of cultural and economic rights and duties by age and gender. The exercise of labour control is clearly facilitated by the cultural demands of parent-child obligations and Malayo-Islamic values, the enforcement of which is ensured by recourse to shame and magic. Malay descriptions of economic transactions as 'help' does not mean calculation is absent. Indeed exploitation is hidden where labour relations are predicated upon intra and inter household kinship ties. All reciprocity depends upon a degree of benefit (material or non material) which necessitates sloughing off non profitable partners - particularly the poor or landless.

In summation, then, Malay peasants, by their labour and the production of cash crops, play crucial roles in Malaysia's New Economic Policy. Households are tightly linked, through their daughters' work in local and foreign owned factories, to State and international capital. These households also grow tobacco for TNCs; they produce rubber for Malaysia's international markets; they participate in fish processing for export, and they support themselves by growing a subsistence food crop. After basic household

requirements for food, medicine, clothing and education, surplus cash is disbursed upon consumer products which are prestations from daughters to mothers, and viewed as status symbols.

Capitalism utilises non-capitalist relations of production for its own expansion yet it does not necessarily undermine the viability of such forms. This entails the use of household labour and production both by domestic entrepreneurs and factories. TNCs benefit from the existence of a labour force with its own subsistence base because female workers retreat to the land during layoffs and recessions. What is important, for this dissertation, is the 'invisible' labour provided by anak dara in subsistence and household maintenance. It is apparent from the data presented here that Malay peasant cultural values are functional for capitalist expansion mobilised, as it is, by the specific labour requirements of both local and foreign capital in Malaysia. The cultural view of, and the economic exploitation of, anak dara reflect this, as does the production of cash crops under the guise of reciprocity. The practice of intra and inter-household reciprocity facilitates the pooling of cash and labour while the ideology of reciprocity both organises and maintains subsistence production. However, other reciprocal relations are changing as labour relations in padi production, cash cropping, and even feasts now follow

nascent class lines.

Malay views of reciprocity govern subsistence production and relations within the household yet the manipulative aspects of this are clearly observable. Both cash and 'free labour' are essential for household survival and one has not overtaken the other; the idiom of non capitalist production relations is still paramount in an economy dominated by a capitalist mode of production. Non capitalist relations of production are not external to capitalism, indeed, households mediate the influence of capitalism set in train by the state's industrialization strategies. So far, the total commoditization of labour relations is blocked by cash shortages and by reciprocity legitimated by Malayo-Islamic cultural sanctions. I have made explicit the social and cultural framework within which reciprocity and exploitation are produced and reproduced and I identify the structural conditions of Malaysian industrialization to which they now are tightly linked.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

Contrary to orthodox views, the peasant labour force is not always freed from the land but forms a new category of semi-proletariat in the industrialization process. The 'triple alliance' of State, foreign and domestic capital has created a gender-specific industrial labour force. This cheap labour force, which contributes to development, is

dependent upon the reciprocal labour of kin.

The theoretical view of peasant reciprocity as simply reciprocity is qualified. There has been an implicit view of peasants as bound by reciprocal bonds fostered through poverty and kinship which, curiously, some Marxists and Geertz (1963) share. From Cliffe's (1982:269) 'articulation' perspective, relations of reciprocity (i.e. inter-household) are transformed into antagonistic relations in their articulation with capitalism so that voluntary help gives way to hired labour; such a view is qualified here. For Johnson & Veltmeyer (1983) non waged labour persists - not in articulation - but through linkages with the capital accumulation process and the reproduction of cheap labour. The semiproletariat are, in this view, instrumental for the accumulation of capital. The process of reciprocity in the development process is more subtle than these dichotomous perspectives allow for. The issue is not whether reciprocity is eroded, transitional, or even intensified by the capitalist development process but, rather, the way in which the different types of reciprocal relations are transformed. This view has been expanded upon by a detailed discussion of the levels of reciprocities involved and it is a factor not considered in the literature. Wage earnings are insufficient so that worker subsistence can only be ensured by maintaining connections with the land and the unpaid

labour of kin. What is demonstrated here, in order to clarify these views, is the way in which the practice of reciprocity is far from egalitarian, even among close kin. The complex way reciprocity operates within and between households is discussed. Cliffe (1982) argues that reciprocal obligations are viewed, by the rich, as a drain on resources, but he does not consider the fact that reciprocity can be manipulated by the rich, nor does he note that both large landowners and landless opt out of reciprocal dues, (the former because they can afford to hire labour; the latter because they are not in a position to reciprocate labour). Small landowners continue with labour exchange while middle and large landowners hire labour and mechanize agricultural production.

Cliffe's theoretical implication is that economic development destroys reciprocity but this study shows that it erodes some forms, yet intensifies others as shown by the identification of intra and inter-household reciprocity. Reciprocity serves to maintain and reproduce household relationships. The literature fails to identify these multiple levels of reciprocity as modes of labour control and deals only with inter-household reciprocity as a mode of labour exchange. Those who have used the term reciprocity have failed to make the appropriate analytical distinctions between the exchange of goods, the exchange of labour, the control of labour and the extraction of surplus

labour for the creation of profit. In cash cropping, surplus labour is extracted under the ideological guise of reciprocity, for which no adequate return is given. There are wide variations between the symmetrical exchange of goods and labour through time at feasts, and, the asymmetrical extraction of surplus value as in cash cropping, yet both are categorised as 'reciprocity'. These distinctions should be specified and contextualised. It seems that some theorists have regarded reciprocity purely as reciprocity but that exploitation is also an intrinsic part of reciprocity is demonstrated by this dissertation. Theorists make no attempt, apart from their contradictory views on the decline or maintenance of reciprocal labour with development, to define the many layers of reciprocity - indeed the concept is used too loosely and uncritically.

The analysis of the filial reciprocal links within households shows that obligations are owed for birth and nurturance - such a theoretical view is unthinkable for Sahlins (1974) and even Bourdieu (1982:7). Among Malays, these debts cannot be repaid - deferential treatment, cash prestations and labour are offered to parents yet cultural values simultaneously form an integral part of the industrialization process since cash, consumer goods and labour become ways of discharging moral and filial debts. Clearly, then, the gender and age related authority structures within households actually interact with the

labour requirements of capital. Conceptualisation of the exploitation effected by capitalism should not stop by arguing that profits are extracted from cheap female labour. The reciprocity theory itself is expanded here to show the way in which pressure upon the industrial labour force has a duality - from the inside out and the outside in - it is both cultural and economic. This fundamental filial reciprocal bond spreads outwards and the classification of the types of reciprocity into intra and inter-household categories demonstrates this and allows a discussion of the equivalence and exploitative aspects of reciprocal labour exchange and control. Reciprocal labour obligations link households to the wider sphere so that they become tightly fused into the state's industrialization process and the international division of labour.

In industrializing states such as Malaysia, reciprocity performs important economic and cultural functions from which it is apparent that reciprocal systems must be given a central place in theory. Given the fact that recent Marxist theories of development cite reciprocity as a given element, there is obviously an urgent case for a theoretical re-appraisal of reciprocity. The appraisal should show clearly the way in which labour is extracted under the ideological guise of reciprocity for which no adequate return is given. There is a

theoretical contradiction between the reciprocal exchange of labour and the extraction of surplus labour, yet both are categorised as reciprocity. Such distinctions should be specified and contextualised. Some theorists have been treating reciprocity among kin purely as reciprocity: that exploitation of labour is also an intrinsic part of reciprocity is stressed here. The multifaceted role and nature of reciprocity in Malaysian industrialization requires that analysts should consider the role of reciprocity in development more closely and with greater theoretical rigour than in the past.

FOOTNOTES

1. For Marx's comments on the role of the East India Company see The British Rule in India, New York Daily Tribune, July 11, 1853, in (ed) L S Feuer, Marx & Engels, Basic Writings on Politics & Philosophy, Glasgow, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1974:511-518. Comments on the East India Company in India, Java and Sumatra are made by A Szymanski, The Logic of Imperialism, Praeger, New York, 1981:98, 377-381; and by R Munck, Politics & Dependence in the Third World, Zed Press, London, 1984:47-51. For a fascinating account of the Company's dubious activities in the Malay Peninsula by one of its own civil servants see: John Anderson, Political & Commercial Considerations Relative to The Malayan Peninsula, and the British Settlements in The Straits of Malacca - 1824. Facsimile Reprint for the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Singapore, 1964 as well as R. Bonney, Kedah 1771-1821, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974.

2. As is well known, Lenin (1917) developed Hobson's and Marx's views of colonial-imperialism. Lenin argues that the emergence of joint stock companies and the unification of industry and banks under the control of high finance is a key element in the evolution of monopoly capitalism. Finance capital was used to support the expansionist policies of European countries and to extend markets in an ever increasing interdependence. For Lenin, the driving force of colonial expansion was the need for investment outlets for the imperial countries. The export of capital occurs because of the maturity of capitalism. In the colonies profits were high, capital scarce, the price of land was low with abundant cheap labour and raw materials; similar conditions are found in some developing countries today. Lenin says that the export of capital - distinct from the export of commodities - acquires importance; the concentration of production and capital develops into monopolies which play important roles in the international division of labour and the territorial division of the world among the competing capitalist powers (Szymanski, 1981, Warren 1982, Munck 1984). Following Lenin, Szymanski (1981) argues that modern imperialism is the result of monopoly capitalism operating through 'the logic' of the export of capital but he adds the proviso that the export of capital is not necessary in order for capital accumulation to take place.

3. In this line of thought, dependency is linked

to capitalism and only socialism can provide the solution (see e.g. Wallerstein, Arrighi, Frank & Amin in their Dynamics of Global Crisis 1982, New York, Monthly Review Press). The argument is that breaking links with the world system of capitalism will create development since capitalism is viewed as the basic cause of underdevelopment. The tradition-modernity schema of early modernization theorists is replaced by the dependency-socialism dichotomy. Socialism is thought to be necessary because dependent capitalist development is not possible (see Munck 1984:13).

4. Evans (1979) works within Lenin's (1917) view of imperialism but sees production in the centre and periphery directed toward the accumulation of capital controlled by centre country transnational corporations. The political and military resources of centre states are used to preserve capital invested in the periphery. Evans argues that the essential features of imperialism, as described by Hobson (1902) and Lenin (1917) remain, but uses imperialism to refer to the worldwide system of capital accumulation - both to its abstract logic and to concrete relations among nations and the social groups that it entails. For Evans, dependency complements the idea of imperialism and he focuses upon the consequences of the specific subset of the relations created by imperialism - those which tie periphery countries to centre countries. By contrast, Szymanski (1981) and Warren (1982) attempt to detach themselves from this asymmetrical linkage to grant a certain 'interdependence' to developing countries.

5. The Malaysian state, portrays itself as accumulating capital for Malays as an ethnic group (see chapter III below). Evans does not make his theoretical point explicit here, but in the case of Malaysia, it is the 'same' people - political, economic, military, and royalty - the ruling class interlink at all levels with the state, foreign and local capital. This elite, or class fraction, direct state capital, invest private capital and forge links with foreign capital. They are simultaneously the state bourgeoisie and the national emerging bourgeoisie: the same individuals play multiple roles and manipulate capital from different sources. As Evans (1979:47) indicates: "It seems unlikely that the managers of state enterprises should be so disconnected from the bourgeoisie as a whole that they would push 'state capitalism' to the detriment of local private capital".

6. Unlike the Brazilian case with which Evans is concerned, Malaysia has a parliamentary democracy designed to bolster Malay chauvinism and Malay nationalism, with

Islam as a religious-ideological factor. The state portrays itself as representing the interests of the majority of Malaysia's population (Malays = 55%) against the economic power of the non-Malays. Evans argues that the state protection of the interests of the dominant class is blatant in Brazil and it excludes most of the national bourgeoisie and the population from political participation. This is not the case for Malaysia where the process of government under a parliamentary democracy is clearly more subtle, predicated on 'class' interests which are skillfully presented as 'ethnic' interests (see chapter III below).

7. According to the OECD, in order to qualify as a Newly Industrializing Country, (NIC) a country needs a large urban labour force, a class of entrepreneurs, political stability and export oriented growth policies (Plessz 1981:226). The Asian NICs include South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Allied to the NICs are the Asian Free Trade Zones. They are outside the NICs but part of the same economic network - Malaysia, The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and the Sri Lanka Free Trade Zones. In addition to this, the countries comprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have developed a free trade organization (see Chapter III). The emergence of the NICs is seen by some as a response to international circumstances which caused the transnational corporations to relocate production to the 'periphery'. The movement of factories to Asia increased as a result of declining profits, labour problems, and increased competitiveness between Japanese, European and North American capital. NICs offer cheap labour, generous incentives and high levels of productivity in which the role of the State is critical for the allocation and direction of economic development. But as Saunders (1981:37-43) points out, the Asian NICs had import-substitution industrialization prior to the phase of export production and the establishment of Free Trade Zones. Some manufacturing, infrastructure and communications were inherited from British and Japanese colonialism. The early twentieth century occupation of Korea and Taiwan extended Japan's own industrial development and contributed significantly to indigenous industrialization. By contrast, the British used Hong Kong and Singapore as international free trade ports but not for industrialization. British agency houses, shipping, insurance and financial institutions complemented Chinese capital in wholesale and retail trade, transport, small industries, banking, finance and trade. British and Chinese capital worked closely together (see Hamilton 1983:137-180). There was an abundance of risk taking entrepreneurs, extant administrative skills and local

capital which grasped the economic opportunities the 1960s presented. Contrary to the western view, it is not just the TNCs which create wealth for the NICs - local and state capital play a critical role. NICs are now moving from labour intensive manufacturing towards sophisticated products and intra-industry trade. Singapore has a level of manufacturing output higher per head than some industrialized countries but, like Hong Kong, part of its advantage comes from the fact it is a small island city state with no rural hinterland.

8. A problem with the holistic perspective of world systems theory is that it fails to consider the effects of the structure and relation of the states (parts) upon the whole system. This results in ignoring any consideration of the 'parts' which are in a constant state of flux or the ways in which the whole must in turn accommodate to the changing structures of the 'parts'.

9. See Harold Wolpe (1980:42) for a discussion of terminological variation in the Marxist literature.

10. This whole debate stems from differing interpretations of Marx's Capital. Wolpe (1980) points out that in Volume I of Capital, Marx envisaged a 'complete take over by capitalism'. In Volume II, however, Marx allows a proviso as to the pace and extent of such a 'takeover'. Structuralists tend to the latter view, whereas adherents of the 'world systems theory' incline to the former. This then leads to the distinction between those who argue for a single mode of production (world system) against those who assert the coexistence of several modes of production in a single social formation.

11. Obviously, outside of a philosophical construct, articulation of modes of production, modes of production and social formations have no concrete reality and, therefore, relations between them must also be abstract. Notwithstanding this, the abstract concept 'articulation of modes of production' has been utilised in empirically based studies, but so far attempts to shift from abstract discussion of the 'logic' of the mode of production to the analysis of concrete situations - the weak point of Marx(isms) and structural(isms) alike is unsuccessful. As Laclau (1979:9) states "theoretical practice has been greatly hindered by two obstacles: the connotative articulation (linkages) of concepts at the level of common sense discourse and their rationalist articulation into essential paradigms".

12. Meillassoux (1981) argues that capitalist

development cannot be understood without reference to the dynamics of non-capitalist modes and to their systemic relations with capitalism. His argument is posited within the 'articulation of modes of production' paradigm. For instance, wage labourers in less developed countries' 'social formations' can be paid the minimum cost of reproducing their own labour power rather than a family wage, because the 'pre-capitalist' economic activities are carried out by other family members so sustain the family group. "It is by preserving the domestic sector which is producing subsistence goods that imperialism relies and further perpetuates primitive accumulation. Modes of production are not only 'articulated' at the level of class alliances between capitalists and corrupt lineage leaders, but also, organically within the economic sphere itself" (Ibid:97).

13. Bourdieu (1982:177) criticises Marxists who limit research on social formations they term 'pre capitalist' to scholastic discussion about the typology of modes of production for its ethnocentric economism which ignores 'symbolic capital' (described as spiritual or cultural) thought to be opposed to economic interests. The argument which is being made here is partly influenced by Bourdieu's view of symbolic capital:

Symbolic capital, a transformed and thereby disguised form of physical economic capital, produces its proper effect inasmuch, and only inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it originates in material forms of capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source of its effects. (Bourdieu 1982:183).

14. In his examination of a plantation proletariat Zawawi (1983:54) extends Laclau's (1979) theory to argue for an 'articulation' of ideological factors. Malay proletarians are migrant peasants who operate with traditional ideological forms of the 'moral economy'. The Malay concept of timbang rasa emphasizes the 'equality of men deriving from their intrinsic personal worth'. The workers use peasant strategies to instil morality into their employers so that they would not be shouted at or treated like animals. The concept of human dignity, etiquette and worth is highly developed among Malays. It is apparent from Zawawi's work then that the maintenance of 'symbolic capital' remains important as an ideological buffer against what Malays perceive as the crude materialism of the plantation economy.

15. Prestations are expected as a sign of respect (berhormat) whether or not parents need the contributions. The moral force of balas budi manifests itself in the

increased prestige of households with the acquisition of consumer goods (chapter V). In line with chapter V, it follows that large landowners, whose children migrate to professional employment, can conspicuously demonstrate balas budi by building elaborate extensions to their houses; and are provided with a regular cash income. Children may send one, or both, parents on the pilgrimage to Mecca - the pinnacle of Malayo-Muslim life which confers the highest status possible on the returned Haji or Hajjah. For poor subsistence producers the contributions are pooled to ensure the survival of the household and acquire consumer goods. The value of 'symbolic capital' is, itself, stratified and linked to a solid material base.

16. A Pan Malayan Islamic Party (1951) was established by Malays with conservative interpretations of Islam, such as members of the state Islamic bureaucracies, rural religious leaders and teachers. PAS objected to UMNO reformism since its commitment to Islam was limited and opposed the concept of an Islamic state, preferring western political models with a separation of church and state. The PMIP articulated peasant grievances and argued for a holistic Islamic theory of the state. Kessler (1978) views divisions within Malay society itself as dominated by class so he argues for a dichotomy of UMNO=elite and PAS=peasant. Islam as an ideological tool in the political arena has proved powerful to the extent that UMNO posit Islamic sentiments. The Islamic political party's agitation for Malay as the sole language, as a medium of instruction, and the creation of a Malay nation have since been adopted as strategies in post 1969 New Economic Policy reconstruction, since it is vital for UMNO to maintain political hegemony over all Malays.

17. UMNO represents a western capitalist political model while PAS calls for an Islamic state. The current Islamic programme of PAS meshes well with the rise of Islamic missionary movements and attracts educated urban youth (Nagata 1980, 1984). New feelings among Malays with regard to Islamic reformism has paradoxically been set in train by the NEP which increased the intake of Malays into Universities and expanded Islamic studies. Such students and lecturers support PAS and are influenced by Pan Islamism; they reject UMNO and the New Economic Policy reflective of capitalist and materialist western values. They argue, correctly, that the NEP fails to alleviate the burden of the Malay poor yet benefits Malaysia's middle and upper classes.

18. In response to pressures from the Islamic political party PAS and Muslim (Dakwah) missionary youth

groups, UMNO now projects itself as an Islamic party and gives increased symbolic importance to Islam in the political arena (Means 1972, 1978). State religious activities have been increased to use Islam against communism and other dissenting elements. UMNO fears Islamic fundamentalism will impede Malay economic progress yet UMNO politicians preface speeches with elaborate Arabic greetings, and give much time and money to media coverage of Islam. The State hosts international Islamic conferences, Quran reading competitions, and Islamic seminars. In 1983 an Islamic University and an Islamic Bank were established under state auspices. The ideological unity of Malays, and Islam, is stressed by UMNO, neither of which exist in practice. UMNO argue for a secular State and say it is impossible to practice Islam 100% with 51% non Muslims in the country. Nevertheless Islam is prominent and in efforts to maintain an electoral majority among Malays, but the state now legislates on gambling, drinking, dress codes of modesty and sexual proximity.

19. British interests controlled some 60% of the Malaysian economy before the New Economic Policy. The Chinese were involved in tin mining, rubber plantations, timber extraction, import-export and trading (Ali 1982).

20. Cynthia Enloe (1979, 1980) argues that TNCs are assured of stability because the state has militarized the police and armed forces which are mainly Malay in ethnic make up. See particularly Enloe (1980) for an account of militarization and ethnicity. Under the 3rd Malaysia Plan (1976) defence received M\$1.5 million, whereas the 4th Malaysia Plan (1981) allocated M\$9.8 million to defence. The army grew from 52,500 in 1978 to 90,000 by 1980. This substantiates Szymanski's (1981) comments on militarization in developing countries.

21. There is an expanding body of theoretical literature on the 'new international division of labour' as represented by world market factories and the female labour force. The early literature is written specifically from a WST perspective. Linda Lim (1979, 1983) carried out a pioneer work on the electronics industry in the Free Trade Zones of Malaysia and Singapore, followed by the influential volume by Frobels, Heinrichs et al (1980) on the FTZ textiles and electronics industries. Rachel Grossman (1978) and Ann-Marie Munster (1980) produced useful reports on the labour conditions of women in the electronics industry of FTZs. Examining the domestic factories, Susan Ackerman Lee (1980) documents cultural continuity and labour conflict in the industrialization process. Shifting to a more empirical focus, Ariffin (1982) discusses female

labour migration patterns to the Federal Territory. Analytic and descriptive emphasis concentrates on rural women who quit their villages to live in the urban areas so is biased to the urban end of the factory labour migration continuum. By concentrating too narrowly on empirical issues such as labour legislation, housing conditions, welfare and migration patterns, the theoretical significance of the economic role of peasant women in the industrialization process has been overlooked.

22. The factories are protected by security systems and high fences so that unauthorised visitors cannot gain access. Appointments are required with administration staff before entry is permitted. These are modern factories and preferable to many I have seen in Europe but interviews with workers show that production targets are high, and discipline is strict. Skin allergies and sore throats are common in textile factories (chapter IV). In the electronics industry girls are exposed to acid solvents, metal alloys, toxic fumes and dust. Other medical problems such as conjunctivitis and nearsightedness caused by microscope work are reported by Grossman (1978), Lim (1979) Safa (1981) and the Hawa Project (1983). Studies vary in theoretical and empirical emphasis and cover such topics as health, welfare, law, legislation, 'culture', management tactics, migration patterns, unions, and the international division of labour. The Hawa Project (1983) deals with welfare, health, and management tactics. For a Marxist-Feminist perspective see the volumes edited by Kate Young et al (1981), Nash & Kelly (1983), Norlund, Wad & Brun (1984), and the monograph by Stivens (1985) which are concerned with the international division of labour, development, patriarchy, and the Asian female work force.

23. Rural standards have been greatly improved with state assistance. Infrastructure such as metalled roads, water and electricity has reached many areas. Free clinics, medicine, education and financial assistance for the destitute are, for a developing nation, very impressive. The Malay elite ignore rural Malays only at their own political expense. Elites have benefitted enormously from the NEP but this characteristic is not peculiar to Malaysia or less developed countries in particular.

24. Research on TNCs indicates that the local equity partners and directors are professionals, royalty, ex-civil servants and politicians who use their government contacts and influence to ease through state regulations. For an useful account of ownership and control in Malaysian Corporations see Lim M H (1978:chs 6 & 7) and, on Japanese

concerns, Weinstein (1978).

25. PERNAS (Perbadanan Nasional) subsidiaries are important in banking, shipping, construction, airlines, properties, trading corporations, engineering, mining, petroleum exploration and processing, plantations, steel, hotels and tourism. The corporation works with foreign capital and conglomerates prepared to provide technical and managerial expertise while allowing the state, through its Bumiputra holding companies and equity requirements to maintain a controlling interest.

26. Regional development areas which have recently been created are DARA (South East Pahang), the JENGKA TRIANGLE in Central Pahang, KEJORA (South East Johore), KETENGAH (Trengganu Central), and KEDA (Kedah Development Area).

27. A total of 613 projects was approved by MIDA in 1981, of which 214 (34.9%) were proposed for less developed areas of the country. There is a capital investment of some M\$2.5 million (51.3% of the proposed capital), which should provide jobs for 24,000 people. In 1981, Kedah State had 42 approvals with a capital investment of M\$593.7 million and potential employment for 3,988 people. Projects in Kedah have a total called up capital of M\$178.7 million (32.0% of the total for Malaysia). This forms 4.9% of the total number of projects approved, 6.7% of total potential employment and 12.4% of the total proposed capital investment for all Malaysia (MIDA 1981). In 1982, a further sixteen projects (3.3% of all approvals) were located in Kedah. They should employ 1,713 people (4.2%) of potential employment and incur capital investment of M\$62.2 million (or 1% of the total proposed capital investment for Malaysia) (MIDA 1982).

28. For selected comparative work on industrialization and female workers in Asia see Robert Snow (1977) on The Philippines and for the case of Taiwan consult Gail Arrigo (1980). The situation in Singapore is discussed by Noeleen Heyzer (1982). Historical studies of industrialization and the female labour force show that similar patterns occurred in Europe and America see, for example, Louise A Tilley (1977) on Italy and for the American mills in New England, read M Cantor & B Laurie (eds) (1980).

29. Female sexuality is considered to be a dangerous force which threatens the well-being of the umma (community of believers). If women distract men from total obeisance to God, this will result in a state of chaos

fitna. For these reasons it is incumbent upon all Muslims to marry. Unlike Christianity where sexuality was degraded, for Muslims it is not sexuality itself but women who are the symbol of sexual disorder. Women are fitna and represent the uncontrollable dangers of sexuality. For a civilized society to prosper sexuality must be controlled - within marriage - hence the strict control over virgins. An even greater danger is thought to emanate from separated or divorced women who, because they have already experienced sexual intercourse, cannot tolerate sexual abstinence (see Mernissi 1975:1-28 on Morocco and Woodcroft Lee 1983 for contemporary events in Indonesia and Malaysia).

30. SOCSO and EPF are compulsory deductions. The Employees' Provident Fund was established in 1951. During the 30 years up to 1981, EPF collected some M\$6.8 billion from low income workers, plus M\$4.0 billion as investment income and invested some M\$10.2 billion in government securities. SOCSO was established in 1971 to provide for death and disability benefits for workers earning under M\$500.00 per month. It has also accumulated large surpluses invested in government securities. As Ozay Mehmet (1986:Ch 5) points out its success is due, in large part, to the fact that it seldom pays out benefits for industrial injuries. During 1971-80, M\$234 million was collected from low income labourers but SOCSO paid out only M\$23.5 million in benefits - a mere 10% of its income. By 1980 it had assets of M\$360.0 million. The NEP strategy of equity restructuring has partly been financed by mobilizing these forced savings of low income earners.

31. This legislation includes: The Employment Ordinance, 1955, The Trade Unions Ordinance, 1959, The Industrial Relations Act, 1967, The Employees' Provident Fund Ordinance, 1951, the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, 1952 and the Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony, 1975.

32. Working conditions produce physical disorders. In electronics factories girls are exposed to dangerous chemicals. The wiring of circuit boards requires intensive microscope work which damages the eyesight of female operators (HAWA 1983). The Sharp Roxy and Northern Telecom assembly lines in Kedah consist of row upon row of uniformed girls bent over their tasks for the duration of a shift. Textile workers must stand for their shifts and two girls are required to haul acrylic fibre onto spools. The air in the factory is full of acrylic filaments which are inhaled so workers regularly cough up phlegm. The filaments also cause sore eyes, skin allergies and ugly red rashes associated with excema. Girls in the textile and rubber products factories work in crowded conditions and complain

of back and leg fatigue from the long hours of tending machines. In the latex mixing section of rubber products factories the floors are awash with water and chemical additives. Protective shoes are not issued. On the fast moving lines girls have to sort and grade rubber gloves, condoms and finger cots into different sizes. Although the condoms are machine rolled, lubrication and powder dipping is a manual process - a culturally ludicrous task for Malayo-Islamic 'virgin girls'. The manager, in defence, said that: "they are ignorant and do not know what these things are for". My conversations with the girls proved otherwise. Indeed, one poor girl was so desperately ashamed of her job that she made me promise faithfully not to tell her kin what sort of work she actually did or which factory she worked in.

33. See Celia Mather (1982) and Diana Wolf (1982) for a comparative use of 'shame' and 'fear' in Java.

34. Contrary to the strong current of Islamic fundamentalism and orthodoxy emanating from the Middle East the Malay world view includes a tenacious belief in an active spirit world. Even the most sophisticated western educated Malay holds to such concepts. This includes animistic, Hindu, Buddhist and Sufi Islamic elements which are fused in a syncretic manner. The foundation of this syncreticism is the concept of soul essence semangat. When semangat is in a weak condition a spirit can easily enter the body and cause disruption by possession (Endicott 1981:48).

35. Malays strive at all times to be refined, to hide negative feelings, to remain in perfect control of their demeanour, never to cause offence and always to give 'face' to others. This is glossed by the term budibahasa which comprises a very complex matrix of ideals relating to harmonious relations between individuals, kin and neighbours. A Malay well socialised in budibahasa is considered to be refined halus, and worthy of respect as a person in control of his or herself and cultural values. As Raymond Lee has it:

Budibahasa can be attained through mutual adaptation and compromise in social interaction, the norm of unobtrusiveness is treated as the ideal in any form of social interaction. A person who displays insensitivity to the dignity of others is coarse (kasar). Subscription to these codes of behaviour is maintained by a desire to avoid feeling shamed malu. Malu is a major technique of instilling discipline by shame. It is an effective mechanism of social control. (Lee 1981:236).

36. Defining the household. For Malays themselves a household is "those who cook and eat together" indicating a common food budget. In fact food is cooked in the morning but members of a household seldom all sit down and eat at once - rather individuals help themselves to food as and when they feel like it. As White (1980:18) points out, the development life cycle of a household means that the unit of analysis is a moving target in terms of composition, structure, productive capacity and consumption requirements and, at best, any data collected represents only a very small point in a household's dynamic existence. My focus is restricted to factory workers' households.

37. The traditional village midwife (bidan kampung) and three other women are in the business of 'magical medicine' which mothers obtain regularly to protect their virgin daughters. There is no set price for the charms which are paid for in cash or goods. I collected twenty detailed cases relating to factory workers.

38. This case serves as an example:

Pa' Su's widowed sister came to live in his compound and was given a space to erect a small hut on stilts. The understanding is that when Pa' Su's children need that space then Rosnah must vacate the compound. Her brother allows Rosnah to squat (tumpang) on the land but resents it since this also entitles her to coconuts and fruit. Rosnah, in turn, dislikes being in the position of a beggar and having to squat on Pa' Su's land because of the power this gives her younger sister-in-law over her. Ties of kinship obligations are utilised but neither party feel happy. Rosnah dislikes being indebted but she is in a desperate situation. If Pa' Su had refused her access to the compound that would have been just scandalous and the whole household would have been shamed before the kampung. Pa Su is obliged by the cultural values of what it means to be a Malay. Malays must help their kin - it is part of their identity, self perception and, indeed, contributes to 'symbolic capital' since everyone is doing precisely what they should do.

39. See footnote # 29 on Malay views of female sexuality.

40. See footnote # 37.

41. A traditional midwife (bidan kampung) still tends births in the village but a State Registered Nurse is called from the free government clinic for complicated cases and mothers are sent to the General Hospital in Sungei Petani. Malay women prefer to give birth at home

with the proper rituals, food regulations and correct disposal of afterbirth and cord. There were rumours of placentas from the hospital being used for 'make up' preparations and sent overseas. This horrified villagers since a child who 'loses' its placenta simultaneously 'loses' its soul and may grow up to be retarded or ill-natured. Married daughters living in urban areas still return to their mother's house to give birth to obtain 'correct' ritual treatment. The midwife is knowledgeable about herbs, inducing abortions, and the post-natal care of mothers, she recommends 'roasting' to make women sweat and to cleanse the body after childbirth. She teaches women how to roll their stomach with a heated stone wrapped in herbs and a sarung. The stomach is massaged and organs manipulated into the 'right' place for half an hour twice a day. Kampung women are proud of their flat stomachs after giving birth to many children and claim that this method ensures they retain strong muscle control. The midwife is paid in cash and kind and is greatly admired by other women because she is not afraid to go out at night (and encounter ghosts) in order to help women deliver.

42. Three women circumcise young girls before they reach primary school age. Girls are circumcised (bersunat to achieve merit) between the age of two months up to four years and may have their ears pierced with gold earrings at the same time. The circumciser stretches the prepuce protecting the clitoris and incises the clitoris with a razor blade (this is clitorodotomy - not excision as in cliterodectomy). In the incidences I witnessed the clitoris itself was not damaged since the operation involved a light incision to remove a tiny layer of skin so involved little bleeding. Girls are circumcised in infancy, villagers say, because they would be too shy later. Malays consider this to be a mark of a true Muslim woman. Although female circumcision is not mandatory in Islam it is commendable. There is nothing in the Quran to this effect although the Hadith and Kitab speaks of female circumcision in the following terms:

Abdul Malih reported that the Messenger of Allah said: 'Circumcision is sunnat for males and optional for females'. F Karim. Al Hadis (An English translation of Mishkat-ul-Hasabih). Book I. (1963:520)

Circumcision is a law unto man and a meritorious deed on the part of women. Nevertheless, excess should be avoided in female circumcision. The Apostle once said to umm-'Atiyah who used to practise the circumcision of women, 'O, umm-'Atiyah! Be moderate when you perform the operation of circumcision on women and cut off only a small portion of the prepuce of the clitoris, for that is better fitted

to preserve femininity and more welcome to masculinity.'

The Kitab Asrar al-Taharah In 'The Mysteries of Purity' by (Nabih) Amin Faris, Lahore, 1966:82.

Malay female circumcision is a token affair, and in no way corresponds to the mutilation of genitalia reported for Mali, Kenya, Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Egypt. Excision and infibulation are practised by Catholics, Copts and Animists in the countries concerned and is not peculiar to Islam. For Malay women this is a low key female matter and only a few close kin come to the house to eat rice and curry chicken. Most households do not even bother to cook special food or invite people at all. This is in marked contrast to the huge feasts which must be given for male circumcision, a major rites de passage for Malay boys at puberty.

43. Making mats and baskets is not so popular now but women do still cut and strip off the thorns from certain (mengkuang) plants. The leaf is soaked for two days until they become pale; after which they are dried and bleached in the sun for a further two days. The actual making of a mat takes from five to six days of intermittent labour and is usually reserved for the monsoon season when outdoor labour is interrupted. Other products made include storage baskets, in different sizes, for husked rice, and for giving as gifts in ritual payment to the midwife. Women say it is not really worth the time and effort required to make mats since plastic mats from China are so cheap yet households still continue to make the intricately woven mats for sleeping purposes, and to spread upon the floor to receive visitors.

44. Under the New Economic Policy, cows were imported from Australia by the Department of Agriculture to breed with a local variety and the offspring were distributed to kampungs (and allocated by the village head according to the political alignments of households). Unfortunately there is insufficient grazing in the vicinity of Kampung Dalam so the beasts soon began to look horribly emaciated. The cows cause a lot of damage to gardens and orchards in their frantic search for food and some are badly injured by acid thrown at them by irrate villagers. The beasts are too troublesome to look after, since fodder must be purchased or gathered for them, so most have been slaughtered for feasts without having reproduced themselves - so the cattle project has failed. Malays do not drink fresh milk nor do they keep cows for this purpose; which is deemed to be an occupation of Hindus.

45. Main Kutu is a play on words. Kutu are head

lice which are a constant source of irritation - as are the payments which have to be made regularly. A few women are nervous about taking on a main kutu since, they say, they never know where the next dollar is coming from and are very afraid of debt. Similar misgivings about rotating credit systems are echoed by the colloquial term of 'Fiddle Me-Diddle Me' applied to similar systems among the North of England's working classes. Swift (1964) discusses rotating credit among the matrilineal people of Negeri Sembilan.

46. Long term migrants from Kampung Dalam to the capital city of Kuala Lumpur told me that even if their parents are comfortable and receive money from several offspring, they still expect contributions from each child. The donors, who may themselves have children to rear in an expensive urban environment, are more in need of the cash but dare not cut off payments for fear of accusations of ungratefulness, of forgetting who raised them, and causing trouble with their siblings. One electronics factory worker told me: "The demand for money is unending. I'm just fed up and have not been back to Kedah for two years because I cannot afford it. Kin expect too much of me so rather than refuse them I simply stay in K.L. They imagine that I am so rich because I earn a regular wage (orang gaji). They do not realise just how much it costs to rent a small room and pay for my food, transport, bills and clothing. It is just not fair. I earn M\$300.00 a month which sounds such a lot in the kampung, but here it is nothing. Sometimes it is such a struggle and there is little to send back. My mother does not understand and thinks I am living it up. You just look at me - you know what I do. I work, come home, eat, sleep, go to work the next day. It is never ending boredom this factory work. I just have no time, no energy, and no money to go off and 'enjoy, enjoy'".

47. The National Padi & Rice Authority (Lembaga Padi dan Beras Negara) LPN, was established in 1971 to buy all padi from producers, licensed dealers and millers under a Guaranteed Minimum Price system. In 1980, the GMP was M\$35.00-40.00 and, in Kampung Dalam, people were paid M\$30.00-35.00 per 156 lb sack of padi). The villagers are still exploited, not by middlemen to whom they used to mortgage their standing crops (padi kunca), but by the state run LPN who intervene with price supports, fertilizers, grants and credits which positively benefit rich landowners. For an account of this process in the Muda valley irrigation scheme see Afifuddin Omar (1978) and De Koninck et al (1980). The Farmers' Office in Sungei Petani issue a free bag of fertiliser (nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium) and herbicide for each plot. Many households do not bother to collect their entitlement whereas others do,

but use none, or less than is required, and sell the remainder for ready cash. For political reasons the state order the LPN to buy up all padi from local mills even if it is low quality - it is then burnt or sent overseas as food relief. If the LPN refused to buy padi, the Malay producers would suffer even more and so, too, would the government of the Barisan Nasional. The government's political promises on Bumiputra policies would be viewed with suspicion and the fundamentalist Islamic opposition party, PAS, would make political capital from the failure of the NEP to raise the living standards of Malays.

48. An average household of two adults and three school children consume about 1 gantang (8lbs) of polished rice per head per month. One gunni sack of polished rice lasts about two months so that the annual consumption for such a household will be five sacks, equivalent to 10 unhusked sacks. One or two extra sacks are retained for feasts. One gunni sack (156 lbs) of unhusked rice (padi) is roughly equivalent to half a sack of husked rice (beras). Such a household, in order to be self sufficient for a year, requires a minimum yield of 14 unhusked gunni sacks of rice. This includes 10 for food consumption, 2 for zakat dues, 2 for feasts or sale. At the time of the field work high quality grade 1 rice sold for M\$84.00 a gunni sack, Grade 2 cost M\$65.00 whereas average quality brought M\$30.00 per gunni sack of unhusked rice. The conversion of padi to rice is based on a 65% recovery rate after deductions for wet content, debris etc. No-one in Kampung Dalam received more than M\$30.00-35.00 per gunni sack from the local mill.

49. Red padi sickness (penyakit merah) has attacked village crops for the past three years. This is a virus carried by the Green Leaf Hopper (Nephotettix). In 1981-1982 some M\$15 million worth of damage was caused in Kedah alone. Padi is susceptible to this Hopper which has spread from the MADA/MUDA irrigation scheme; it sucks the sap of the new rice seedling and transmits the virus which, within some fourteen days, turns the plant brown and prevents the seed developing. In 1983 Kampung Dalam residents were asked by the agricultural extension officer from the Farmers' Office (Pejabat Pertanian) in Sungei Petani, to administer Paraquat, Amine 2,4-D and Carbofuran. As plants develop the disease growers are told to destroy the crop immediately so that the virus cannot carry over into the next season. The virus remains in the soil once it becomes established and local attempts to eradicate it have failed. Infected padi should be burnt, but villagers try to salvage what little they can. Before planting a nursery, people are requested to mix Carbofuran into the soil and,

again, before transplanting. After buying eight bags of pesticide, and paying M\$65.00 to harvest her damaged padi, the mother of one factory worker, calculated that she had lost \$400.00 and said in absolute exasperation: "If I buy rice in the market it costs almost the same, so what is the use of my planting? But how can I make money to buy any other foodstuffs when I have no padi in the house to sell? Because of this penyakit merah, I have only five sacks but other people have as little as one or two gunni a relung. One bag of pesticide was free, but I had to pay over M\$20.00 buying eight extra bags from the Farmers' Office". On a cultural note one old man explained the decimation of the padi crop in religious terms by saying that "these days Malays only know how to ask the government for everything, even for their seed and water, but they do not ask Allah or thank Him when the harvest is over. Now all people think about is money and no-one follows the old system of keeping last year's seed and the rice spirit (semangat padi) for next year's planting. No-one gives feasts to celebrate bringing the padi in safely. This is a way of paying us back for forgetting. These days all the rice is supplied by the government. Once people only used to think about whether or not there was enough to eat. Now it is selling and profit (untung) and this is not good. The more the padi is sick, the more medicine (ubat fertilizer/insecticide) is put on and then more sickness follows. Nowadays it is impossible to buy land because too much capital (modal) is required. People cannot even catch fish in the padi fields because the fish are killed off by medicines so no wonder the padi is dying too".

50. Muslim Siamese and Indonesians come illegally or on 'contracts' similar to the coolie indentured labour system used by British Colonialism. Ozay Mehmet (1986 Ch 2) argues that this maintains cheap labour and high profits for the plantation sector at no political cost. As well as forming a cheap labour force, the inflow helps the State's population targets, in favour of Malayo-Muslims, by increasing demographic proportions over non-Malays. In view of my comments on 'ethnic imperatives' (chapter III), the significance of Indo-Muslim immigration is self evident.

51. The Rubber Industries Smallholders' Development Authority (RISDA) was established in 1972 to develop a marketing and subsidy scheme. The state assumes that poverty can be eliminated without changing the system of land ownership but state policy actually perpetuates poverty, and to finance the research activities of the Malaysian Rubber Research & Development Board and the replanting scheme of RISDA Mehmet (1986). Malaysia supports the international stabilisation of rubber prices through a

buffer stock and, because of the contributions of the smallholding sector, is successful in this regard. The state makes no attempt, however, to protect smallholders or tappers who are the real victims of price fluctuations.

52. One of the objectives of the state run RISDA in Sungei Petani is to dispense with middlemen so that smallholders can sell rubber, in bulk, through a group processing centre at the lower cost of only 10%-15% to the smallholder. A tender system is supposed to ensure smallholders get a better price and fixes a rate which middlemen should reach. Since RISDA pay out cash only once a month, and do not buy scrap, they are of no use to Kampung Dalam smallholders, or their tappers, who must earn cash on a day to day basis. The local dealers pay on the spot for scrap and sheet rubber. In addition, there is the problem of arranging transport to RISDA in Sungei Petani which, for smallholders with less than 10 acres is simply just not worth the effort. RISDA send all rubber to Kuala Lumpur for stockpiling. In 1982 RISDA had the following rubber holdings registered for the District of Kuala Muda.

Ethnic	# Participants	# Holdings	Acreage
Malay	2,409	2,476	9,403.25
Chinese	2,000	2,713	20,713.25
Others	169	276	1,545.50

	4,578	5,465	31,662.00
=====			

A total amount of 26,820 acres is now in the process of replanting in the Kuala Muda district but the replanting scheme is of more benefit to the Chinese, as an ethnic group, than to Malays the ethnic group RISDA was specifically set up and designed to help. No-one in Kampung Dalam has been able to enter the RISDA replanting scheme and smallholders, and tappers, deal with middlemen for the reasons laid out above.

In 1981, RISDA introduced a replanting scheme intended to help people with less than 10.00 acres of rubber trees. Since trees cease production after 25 years and take six to seven years to mature, the scheme is an interest-free loan of M\$2,200.00 per annum, for six years, during which time replanting must take place according to a very strict schedule. It is a complicated process exacerbated by the present shortage of labour. When the trees cease production they are chopped down and new seedlings are planted out. The land has to be carefully prepared. RISDA are trying what they call a 'mini estate


system' whereby they group smallholders together into 100 acre lots for economic efficiency. Since the lots are so scattered this goal is unobtainable in the area of Kampung Dalam. The land is developed by RISDA rather than the smallholders but RISDA have to contract the work out because of insufficient Malay family labour. The problem is that the heavy plant and machinery which are needed, say RISDA, to clear smallholdings benefits the Chinese contractors in schemes designed to help Malays. When all the trees are felled and holes are dug for the saplings, the first payment is made to the smallholder. Six months after planting, a further instalment is paid. The RISDA nursery has developed a high yield disease resistant clone for smallholders. A cover crop must also be planted to prevent soil erosion, choking by grass, and to give extra nutrients to the rubber saplings. Cash cropping is necessary during the seven year growing period and, for people who replant slowly, it is essential that they have some income. Smallholders are given credit to obtain vegetable seeds, fruit seeds, insecticide and fertilisers. Before the applications are approved the owner's title to the land must be documented by the District Office in Sungei Petani. This procedure alone takes up to five years or more because villagers have inherited rubber plots which are seldom registered in their own name. If they cannot produce an official title, their eligibility for the scheme is negated. The reluctance of Malays to register land each time there is a death has to do with the expense and considerable time involved in the process and the consequent taxation levied every year thereafter. Malays reason that they know who owns which plot of land and it is only in the event of acrimonious inheritance disputes that recourse to the District Office, or the Sharia'ah Court is made to obtain clear title. So far as the large landowners in Kampung Dalam are concerned, their titles are pristine, and there is no fragmentation of large holdings because their land is operated strictly along business lines as a 'company' operation. The RISDA loans become repayable when the trees eventually start to produce latex after six years. Apart from the 'title to land' problems, Kampung Dalam smallholders are reluctant to take on such long term debts for replanting because the interim (vegetable or fruit) crops RISDA asks them to grow are so difficult to market. The RISDA officer in Sungei Petani told me that they have massive outstanding debts from smallholders who, even after their trees are mature, simply cannot repay the loan. This is because price and marketing structures favour the plantation sector and work against the smallholders.

53. The bureaucratization of 'reciprocity' and zakat has resulted in villagers cheating the zakat


collector or, at least, working out some arrangement whereby less than the 10% is collected. Horii's (1981:151) study shows that peasants paid more zakat of their own free will than they would voluntarily hand over to the state religious bureaucracy. In 1979/80 the zakat tax received by the Kedah State Religious Department was M\$1,303,903.92. The sum of M\$110,800.00 was allocated to orang fakir while some M\$134,700.00 was distributed to orang miskin which amounts to a total of M\$245,580.00 and constitutes only 19% of the total zakat collected. The remainder was disbursed as follows: M\$42,266.00 for school, mosque and prayer house maintenance. M\$60,377.00 for pupils at religious schools. M\$15,540.00 for religious scholarships. M\$23,400.00 for Islamic higher education. M\$30,600.00 for teachers of religion (M\$20-M\$30 each). M\$2,762.00 for emergency victims. M\$4,000.00 for mosque officials. M\$50,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses. M\$9,977.00. for new converts. M\$7,680.00 for missionary (dakwah) activities (Kedah 1980).

Appendix I

Map I



Map II



Appendix II
Tables

TABLE # 1
POPULATION BY NATION,
STATE, DISTRICT, SUB-DISTRICT and VILLAGE

	TOTAL	MALE	F.MALE
-----	-----	-----	-----
Malaysia East			
and West:	13,486,433	6,777,261	6,709,172
Malaysia W:	11,188,100	5,598,926	5,589,174
Kedah:	1,102,639	544,363	558,277
K.Muda District	196,282	97,833	98,449
S.Petani town:	45,987	22,744	23,243
Sub district:	12,033	6,146	5,887
Kpg Dalam:	925	435	490
-----	-----	-----	-----

The sub-district covers an area of 12 miles; population density is high because of a large military camp (monitoring border activities), and a substantial number of migrant fishermen at the village of Tanjung Dawai. Overall, the population of Kedah, and the sub-district is declining due to out-migration and landlessness. The research village of Kpg Dalam declined by some 23 households in the inter-censal period 1970-1980. Source: Dept of Statistics 1982 and my census.

TABLE # 2
LAND USE BY HOUSEHOLD
(By ownership, renters, owner-renters, and total
households still working village land).

Number of H.holds owning land.	Number of H.holds renting land.	Total acres rented.	Acres owned and rented.	Number of H.holds working land.	Total Acres in Village.
PADI 78	54	98.11		130	447.29
RUBBER 43	50	96.05		85	126.66
FRUIT 39	4	3.00		38	52.20
		----- 198.56 =====	----- 209.44 =====		----- 658.92 =====
TOBACCO (grown on padi land) 78				160	300.00

17% of the 191 village households work no land. 67% of village land is given over to padi, which doubles as tobacco land, 19% is planted with rubber and 8% consists of orchard land. 83% of all village households plant tobacco, 68% grow padi, 45% tap rubber and 18% have fruit trees.

TABLE # 3
GENEALOGY

1. Numbers 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 show the founding headman and hereditary movement of leadership. The headmanship was finally bureaucratised by the state in 1978.
2. <<<< indicates the fission between political parties PAS and UMNO within this founding family. An inheritance dispute over land occurred between two siblings Haji M and Hajjah W.
3. A = Haji R (founder circa 1860s).
4. B = Haji Mhd. R. Large rubber and padi holdings. UMNO. Former headman.
5. C = Hajjah S, B's wife, and the daughter of the headman (Penghulu) in the adjacent sub district of Kota Kuala Muda.
6. D = Hajjah K, the sister of B, through whom the headmanship passed to her husband, Haji M., who held the post while B was in Mecca.
7. E = Haji M., in dispute with Hajjah W., his sister. Rubber and padi holdings.
8. F = Hajjah W.
9. G = Tunku M. of Aceh (circa 1870) fled from the Dutch in Sumatra and granted land by A.
10. H = Haji R. Entrepreneur.
11. I = Ustaz R. Religious Scholar/entrepreneur. PAS leader.
12. J = Haji A. Tobacco Entrepreneur.
13. K = Hajjah R. Daughter of E. and wife of J.
14. L = Hajjah S. Daughter of F. Adopted 2 daughters from O.
15. M = Haji O. Son of ex Chief Minister. Civil Servant.
16. N = Son of F. Owns rice mill with his wife.
17. O = Wife of N. Owns rubber dealership.




TABLE # 4
NON-FACTORY WORKING DAUGHTERS (by land/education/job)

ACRES:	0	0.30-2.84	3.85-12.81	29-78
	Landless	SMALL	MIDDLE	LARGE
Total	35	# 10	# 10	# 05
Age Range	14-32	16-25	18-22	18-30
SCHOOLING:				
Nil:	1			
Religious	1	1		
Primary	4	4	3	
Junior	2	4	2	
Middle	2	1	3	1
Senior			1	2
College			1	1
University				1
OCCUPATION:				
Accountant CA:				1
Clerk:		1	1	
Stay home:			1	1
Fish process:	3	2	1	
Food stall:	2	1		
Hawker:	1	2	1	
Nurse:			1	
Servant:	1	1		
Subsistence:	3	2	1	
Student:		1	3	2
Gvt. Service:			1	1
IDEAL JOB:				
Army/police:	1	1		
Clerk:	2	3		
Don't know:	1	1		
Gvt:	3	2	4	3
Nurse:		1	1	
likes own job:	2	1	1	1
Secretary:	1		1	
Teacher:		1	3	1
REASONS GIRLS REFUSE FACTORY WORK:				
Afraid:	1	1	2	
Low status:	2	2	4	5
Hard shifts:		2		
Prefer village:		1		
Low pay:	4	1		
Parents forbid	3	3	4	

TABLE # 5

LANDLESS FACTORY WORKER HOUSEHOLDS AND
FACTORY WORKERS' CONTRIBUTION TO INCOME

Number of h.hold members	Monthly h.hold income	F.Ws' % of total h.hold income	Monthly h.hold expenditure
2 - 14	100-530	20-100	80-340
	M\$	%	M\$
02	100.00	70	94.00
10	120.00	100	132.00*
09	120.00	100	167.00*
04	140.00	28	123.98
03	140.00	85	92.90
02	140.00	21	80.00
05	150.00	65	145.00
08	150.00	33	172.00*
04	150.00	100	145.00
03	170.00	30	147.00
03	180.00	70	170.50
07	200.00	60	257.00*
04	200.00	100 (2)	165.00
04	200.00	100	197.00
05	200.00	50	182.00
06	200.00	25	170.00
03	220.00	54	119.50
06	230.00	21	226.00
07	250.00	20	244.00
05	250.00	40	238.00
06	250.00	100 (2)	160.00
05	250.00	100 (2)	246.00
06	250.00	40	262.00*
08	250.00	32	168.00
08	250.00	60	242.00
06	300.00	25	289.00
14	300.00	32	340.00*
08	340.00	28	300.00
10	350.00	14	300.00
06	500.00	20	215.00
05	530.00	24 (2)	260.00

Two of the households are above the poverty line.

(2) indicates two factory workers in the household.

* indicates expenditure greater than income.

TABLE # 5B
 LANDED FACTORY WORKER HOUSEHOLDS
 AND FACTORY WORKERS' CONTRIBUTION TO INCOME.

Number of h.hold members	Monthly h.hold income	FWs' % of total h.hold income	Monthly h.hold expenditure	Acres of land
	M\$	%	M\$	
2-10	81-600	8-90%	90-319	0.17-3.90
03	102.00	29	98.00	0.17
07	290.00	51	167.00	0.17
05	160.00	38	154.50	0.33
09	120.00	83	156.00*	0.35
07	138.00	57	167.00*	0.35
02	149.00	46	120.00	0.71
04	170.00	26	130.50	0.71
10	170.00	29	118.00	0.71
02	176.00	34	100.00	0.71
04	185.00	32	153.00	0.71
06	190.00	15	137.00	0.71
04	220.00	12	138.00	0.71
05	220.00	35	118.00	0.71
04	300.00	66	267.00	0.71
07	365.00	10	265.00	0.71
08	81.00	70	126.00*	0.71
03	166.00	90	115.00	1.06
05	300.00	17	265.00	1.06
04	120.00	58	134.50	1.42
04	135.00	44	124.00	1.42
08	181.00	44	195.00	1.42
05	191.00	78	117.50	1.42
05	220.00	31	150.00	1.42
06	246.00	32	146.00	1.42
07	250.00	60	128.00	1.42
07	260.00	23	229.00	1.42
03	430.00	13	237.00	1.42
06	500.00	30	319.00	1.42
07	130.00	23	149.00*	1.77
05	176.00	34	116.00	1.77
06	350.00	42	148.00	1.77
05	179.00	16	194.00*	2.13
07	191.00	21	123.00	2.13
06	250.00	20	188.99	2.13
07	324.00	30	306.00	2.13
07	350.00	28	283.00	2.13
08	570.00	09	293.00	2.13
03	600.00	08	234.00	2.13

365.

07	324.00	30	306.00	2.44
04	362.00	16	127.00	2.48
09	266.00	18	200.00	3.55
05	407.00	20	183.00	3.55
09	506.00	10	227.00	3.55
04	366.00	30	190.00	3.90

Six of the households are above the poverty line.

* indicates expenditure greater than income.

Figures were collected March-May 1983 after some households had sold part of their tobacco crop.

TABLE # 6
AGRICULTURAL SCHEDULE

MONTH	PADI	TOBACCO	RUBBER	FRUIT
JAN hot	harvest	plant	tap	0
FEB hot	0	plant	tap	0
MAR hot	0	tend	tap half	0
APL hot	0	harvest	tap half	0
MAY rain L	0	harvest	tap half	0
JNE rain L	plough	0	0	pick
JLY rain H	plough	0	tap half	pick
AUG rain H	plant	0	tap half	pick
SEP rain H	plant	0	tap	0
OCT rain L	tend	0	tap	0
NOV dry	harvest	plough	tap	0
DEC dry	harvest	plant	tap	0

TABLE # 7
COMPARATIVE WAGE RATES, KUALA MUDA DISTRICT, 1983
(unmarried girls and women)

Job	Daily wage M\$	Seasonal work	Working hrs per day
Rubber tapper:	3.00- 6.00	Yes	8.00
Padi:	6.50-10.00	Yes	7.00
Anchovy process:	7.00-12.00	Yes	9.00
Prawn paste:	7.00- 8.00	Yes	6.00
Prawn cracker:	5.00- 9.00	Yes	8.00
Tobacco sheds:	5.00- 7.50	Yes	8.00
Hawking cooked food:	8.00- 30.00	No	5.00
Coffee/food stall owner:	120.00-200.00	No	14.00+
Market trader: (2 days)	50.00-120.00	No	12.00
Domestic servant:	3.00- 4.00	No	12.00+
Sewing Malay clothes:	5.00-10.00	No	5.00

FACTORIES:			
Auto:	4.00- 5.00	No	8.00
Electronics:	4.50- 6.00	No	8.00
Rubber goods:	3.50- 5.50	No	8.00
Textiles:	3.00- 4.50	No	8.00
Wood:	4.00- 6.00	No	8.00

3 shift-rotating system. 30 minutes lunch break. 15 minutes break per shift.			

TABLE # 8
DAILY MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES (composite)
FACTORY WORKER HOUSEHOLDS (74)

Daily Maintenance Tasks	Hours worked (Average)	Mother/ Daughter Labour	Father/ Other Labour
Starting time: 4.30-7.00 a.m. av: 5.15 a.m.			
Make fire/b.fast:	0.20- 1.30 Av: 1.13	Mo/Da	
Draw water:	0.10- 1.30 Av: 0.20	Mo/Da	
Bathe infant:	0.10- 0.20 Av: 0.14	Mo/Da	
Clean house and wash clothes:	1.00- 4.00 Av: 1.70	Mo/Da	
Marketing:	0.10- 2.30 Av: 1.00		1.00 Fa
Prepare meal:	1.15- 2.30 Av: 1.44	Mo/Da	
Child/infant care: (34 houses with infants)	6.00-24.00 Av: 12.00		H.hold members
Make rice cakes:	0.25- 4.00 Av: 0.40	Mo/Da	
Handicraft/sewing/ mending:	0.30-3.00 Av: 1.04	Mo/Da	
Friends visit:	0.15- 2.00 Av: 1.00	Mo	Fa
Make refreshment:	0.10- 0.50 Av: 0.36	Da/Mo	
Collect dried washing, fold clothes:	0.10-1.30 Av: 0.34	Da	
Iron clothes:	0.15- 1.45 Av: 0.29	Da	
Food processing:	0.30- 4.00 Av: 1.30	Mo/Da	
Heat food/cook rice:	0.15- 2.00 Av: 0.44	Da/Mo	
Clean house (2nd time):	0.10- 1.00 Av: 0.20	Da	
Rest:	0.45- 3.00 Av: 1.30		
Agriculture (off peak):	1.00- 7.00		

368.

Agriculture (peak)	Av: 3.00	Mo/	5.00 Fa
padi/tobacco/rubber:	3.00-10.30		
Compound care:	Av: 8.00	Mo/Fa	8.00 Fa
	0.15- 1.00		
	Av: 0.22	Mo/Da	
Poultry/animal care:	0.10- 1.30		
	Av: 0.25	Mo/	
Forage:	0.20- 3.00		
seasonal:	Av: 0.36	Mo/	
Collect firewood:	0.30- 3.00		
	Av: 1.29	Mo/	
Finishing time:			
9.30-12.00 p.m.			
av: 10.45 p.m.			

TABLE 9

COMPARATIVE COST FOR HIRED LABOUR/MECHANIZED/
RECIPROCAL PADI PRODUCTION
(per rented relung) IN 1983

Yield 15 sacks with a value of M\$525.00

	Hired Labour	Mechanized	Reciprocal
	-----M\$-----	-----M\$-----	-----M\$-----
Land rent			
per crop:	50.00	50.00	50.00
2 ploughings:	53.00	53.00	25.00
Nursery:	40.00	h.hold	h.hold
Seed:	20.00	20.00	20.00
Plant:	80.00	80.00	R
Fert/:	30.00	30.00	30.00
Combine:	0	65.00	0
Middleman:	0	10.00	0
Or Labour-			
Reap:	70.00	0	R
Thresh:	48.00	0	R
Transport:	20.00	20.00	R
Zakat:	70.00	70.00	70.00
Mill costs:	25.00	25.00	25.00

Total cost:	506.00	423.00	220.00
Net return:	19.00	102.00	305.00

=====

Figures arrived at from average production costs
per household for mechanized and reciprocal
production confirmed at the local mill and the
Alor Setar branch of the Padi & Rice Board, 1983.

TABLE # 10
 FACTORY WORKER HOUSEHOLDS: PADI
 (mechanized/reciprocal and factory workers' labour)

Total # of FW h.holds	FW h.holds growing padi.	FW h.holds with hire labour & mechanization.	FW h.holds using all recip. labour.	FW h.holds using part recip. labour.	FW spare time labour
LANDED					
43	38	7 (18%)	10 (26%)	21 (56%)	25 65%
LANDLESS RENTERS (0.35-3.55)					
31	19	2 (11%)	5 (26%)	12 (63%)	12 63%
74	57	9 (16%)	15 (26%)	33 (58%)	37 65%

=====

77% of factory worker households grow padi, of which 16% are totally mechanized and hire labour, 26% use all reciprocal labour, and 58% use part reciprocal labour. 65% of factory workers contribute labour.

TABLE # 11
INCOME FOR TOBACCO CURERS BY STATE

	Dollars per pound of cured leaf.			Total tobacco income in M\$ mil.		
Year:	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983
STATE:						
KELANTAN/ BESUT	5.34	5.98	6.15	63.70	94.12	90.00
TRENGGANU/ PAHANG	5.09	6.08	6.16	6.50	8.00	13.00
MELAKA/NS						
JOHORE	5.42	6.26	12.50	1.47	2.00	2.80
KEDAH/PERLIS	5.52	6.44	6.39	4.40	6.70	7.86

Source: Alor Setar office of the National Tobacco
Board, June, 1983.

TABLE # 12
AVERAGE COST OF TOBACCO PRODUCTION
per relung (0.71 ACRE) 1983
(Ave. yield 2,821 lbs (32 gulang) of green leaf)

ITEM	M\$
Land rental:	100.00
Tractor hire:	80.00
Seedlings:	65.00
Plastic bags:	12.00
Fertiliser:	48.00
Insecticide/herbicides:	56.00
Extra labour:	30.00
Transport:	32.00

Production costs:	M\$423.00
Sale price:	M\$1,186.00
Return: Approx:	M\$500.00- 763.00
=====	

TABLE # 13
FACTORY WORKER HOUSEHOLDS: TOBACCO
(spare time labour of factory workers)

Number of FW h.holds in village	# of FW h.holds growing tobacco	# of FW who help prepare plants	# of FW who help at planting	# of FW who help to harvest and stack tobacco

LANDED				
43	32	9	5	14
LANDLESS RENTERS				
31	20	6	7	12

74	52	15 (28%)	12 (23%)	26 (50%)
=====				

TABLE # 14
SUB DISTRICT: tobacco production
1983

Production quota set by LTN:	tons	54
Yield (cured leaf)	tons	40
Total acres cultivated in village:		300
Total # of growers in village:		160
Price paid per lb of green leaf:	M\$0.15	
Price paid for cured leaf per lb:	M\$6.25	
Growers' average gross income:	M\$1,186	
Growers' approximate net income:	M\$350-763	
Curer's income from tobacco:	M\$540,283	

Appendix III

SCHEDULE OF FACTORIES

ELECTRONICS

General Electric (USA) Audio Malaysia Sdn. Bhd

Parent: General Electric Company USA

EQUITY:	USA 100%	PRODUCT:	Audio/Clock Radios
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	USA
COMPONENTS:	Imported	STATUS:	Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse. Pioneer. 1981.
CAPITAL:	M\$ (m)		
Authorized	23		
Initial:	1.5		
Paid up:	19		
Total			
Investment	19		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

313 (Female 85%)

	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expats
Operators	132	55	104	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	13	91	13	2	0
Tech/ Management	0	0	0	0	3
Total:	145	146	117	2	3

American

Northern Telecom Components Sdn. Bhd

Parent: Northern Telecom Canada

EQUITY:	Canada 100%	PRODUCT:	Switching gear/circuit boards/transformers
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	Canada/USA (to parent)
COMPONENTS:	Imported	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1982.
CAPITAL:	M \$ (m)		
Authorized	2		
Initial	0.7		
Paid up	0.7		
Ttl Investd	2		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

143 (Female 90%)

	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expats
Operators	56	33	13	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	20	17	1	1	0
Technical/ Management	1	2	0	1	0

Total	77	52	14	2	0 NIL
-------	----	----	----	---	----------

Singatronics Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Singatronics Company Singapore

EQUITY: Singapore	93.3%	PRODUCT:	Apple computer parts
Malaysian-Chinese	6.6%		'Word Star'.
			Video Games.
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	USA
COMPONENTS:	Imported	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1982
CAPITAL:	M \$ (m)		
Authorized	2		
Initial	0.5		
Paid up	0.75		
Total			
Investment	3		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

209 (Female 88%)

	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expats
Operators	104	34	41	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	6	22	0	0	0
Technical/ Management	0	0	0	0	2
Total	110	56	41	0	2

Singaporean

Sharp Roxy (M) Sdn. Bhd

Parent: Sharp Roxy Corporation of Japan - Roxy Group
(Singapore-Hong Kong) & Trusmadi Sdn. Bhd. Malaysia

EQUITY: Japan	45%	PRODUCT:	transisotr radios, tape
Hong Kong	13%		recorders, cassettes,
Singapore	4%		stereo systems
Malaysian/ Chinese	20%		
Bumiputra	10% (The Syed Kecik Foundation)		
EXPORT	100%	MARKETS:	USA, S. America, Africa, Europe, Mid East, Australia Asia
COMPONENTS:	Imported & Local	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1975 Joint Venture
CAPITAL	M \$ (m)		
Authorized	20		

Initial	3.8
Paid up	9.2
Loan	2 (Bank of Tokyo)
Total	
Investment	16.08

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE					
1,010 (Female 90%)					
	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expats
Operators	550	57	126	5	0
Admin/ Clerical	86	81	58	1	0
Technical/ Management	4	27	2	0	13
Total	640	165	186	6	13
					Japanese

TEXTILES

Acrylic Textiles (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd
 Parent: Japan Exlan Co. Ltd. Itoman & Co. Ltd.
 Toyoba Co. Ltd. Japan

EQUITY:	Japan 100%	PRODUCT:	Acrylic spun yarn
EXPORT:	80%	MARKETS:	Australia, China,
	20% local		EEC, USA. Local
COMPONENTS:	Imported	STATUS:	Pioneer Expired
	synthetic		Licensed
	fibres from		Manufacturing
	Japan		Warehouse. 1974.
CAPITAL:	M \$ (million)		
Authorized	18		
Initial	5.8		
Paid Up	8.7		
Loans			
Local	1.77		
Foreign	1.77		
Total			
Investment	.13		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE					
414 (Female 90%)					
	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expat
Operators	285	14	45	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	22	28	10	0	0
Technical/ Management	3	3	0	0	4
Total	310	45	55	0	4

Body Fashion (M) Sdn Bhd
Parent: Triumph International Germany

EQUITY:	Hong Kong 51%	PRODUCT:	Pants
Triumph International			Brassieres
(Germany)	19%		
Bumiputra	30%		
(TAB Timuran)			
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	USA,
			Europe, Asia
COMPONENTS:	Imported from	STATUS:	ITC 52%
	Hong Kong		ICA status
			1979. Joint Venture
CAPITAL:	M \$ (million)		
Authorized	5		
Initial	5		
Paid Up			
Loans			
Local	8.7		
Foreign	DM4 mill (German Development Bank)		
Total			
Investment	15		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE
474 (Female 85%)

	Malays	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expats
Operators	269	56	64	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	29	19	10	1	0
Technical/ Management	5	10	0	1	0
Total	303	85	74	2	10
					German 4
					Hong Kong 6

Kwality Textile (M) Sdn. Bhd
Parent: Tamilnad Textile Company, India

EQUITY:	Tamilnad 49%	PRODUCT:	Cotton cloth
	Malaysian-Chinese 51%		
EXPORT:	Local	MARKETS:	Malaysian-Chinese
			Companies. Local
COMPONENTS:	Yarn imported	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1975.
	from India		Joint Venture

CAPITAL: Unavailable.

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE					
223 (FEMALE 90%)					
	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expat
Operators	85	0	132	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	4	2	3	0	3
Technical/ Management	0	0	0	0	3
Total	90	2	135	0	6
					Indian

Malaysia Bedspreads Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Local family Company, Penang

EQUITY	Pakistan 40%	PRODUCT: Carpets
	Penang	Bedspreads
	family 60%	
EXPORT:	Foreign & Local	MARKETS: Dubai
		Indonesia, New
		Guinea, Singapore,
		East Malaysia
COMPONENTS:	Locally made	STATUS: 1980
CAPITAL:	Unavailable.	

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE					
95 (Female 95%)					
	Malays	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expat
Operators	77	0	5	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	3	0	0	6	0
Technical/ Management	0	0	0	4	0
Total	80	0	5	10	0
					NIL

RUBBER

Dongkuk Techco Rubber Industries Sdn. Bhd
Parent: Dongkok Industries, S. Korea

EQUITY:	Korea 65%	PRODUCT:	Condoms
	Singapore 25%		Finger cots
	Malaysian-Chinese 10%		
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	UNICEF, India
			Indonesia, Europe
COMPONENTS:	Local Latex	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1980
			Joint Venture

CAPITAL: M \$ (Mil)
 Authorized 3
 Initial 2.3
 Paid up
 Loans
 Local .23
 Foreign 2.07
 Total
 Investment 2.3

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE
 205 (Female 85%)

	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Other	Expats
Operators	110	24	36	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	8	13	0	0	8
Technical/ Management	0	1	0	0	8
Total	118	38	36	0	13

Korean

Euromedical Industries (M) Sdn. Bhd.
 Parent: Hoeschst AG Germany

EQUITY:	German 90%	PRODUCT:	Self retaining
Kedah State D.C.	10%		catheters
EXPORT:	97%	MARKETS:	Europe, USA, Asia
			Local 3%
COMPONENTS:	Local latex 50%	STATUS:	Pioneer 1974
	Valves from the UK		Joint Venture
	Sterile packaging from		
	Australia		

CAPITAL: M \$ (mil)
 Authorized 5
 Initial 2
 Paid Up 2
 Total
 Investment 7

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE
 400 (Female 94.5%)

	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expats
Operators	308	4	40	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	12	9	20	0	0
Technical/ Management	0	1	0	0	6
Total	320	14	60	0	6

German

Kelga Sdn. Bhd
Parent: Uniroyal Inc. USA

EQUITY:	USA 65.5%	PRODUCT:	Surgical/Industrial
	Japan 16.6%		gloves
	Kedah State D.C. 20.8%		
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	USA 95%
			Sweden/Germany 5%
COMPONENTS:	Local latex	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1979
			Joint Venture
CAPITAL:	M \$ (mil)		
Authorized	5		
Initial	2.5		
Paid Up	3.3		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

297 (Female 85%)

	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expats
Operators	141	1	116	0	0
Admin/					
Clerical	10	16	10	0	0
Tech/					
Management	0	0	0	2	1
Total	151	17	126	2	1

American

London Rubber Co (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: London Rubber Industries (UK)

EQUITY:	UK 100%	PRODUCT:	Condoms
			Rubber gloves
EXPORT:	98%	MARKETS:	World Wide 98%
			Local 2%
COMPONENTS:	Local Latex	STATUS:	Tax Incentive
			Locational Incentive, 1978.
CAPITAL:	M \$ (mil)		
Authorized	6		
Initial	1		
Paid Up	1		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

314 (FEMALE 60%)

	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expats
Operators	185	0	100	0	0
Admin/					
Clerical	5	10	10	1	0
Technical/					
Management	0	0	0	0	3
Total	190	10	110	1	3

British

BRS (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: NIKE, USA

EQUITY:	USA 100%	PRODUCT:	Rubber soles for
EXPORT:	100%		sports shoes
		MARKETS:	USA
COMPONENTS:	Local latex	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1982
CAPITAL	M \$ (mil)		
Authorized	3		
Initial	\$3.0c		
Paid up	3		
Loans			
Local	5		
Foreign	2.5		
Total			
Investment	10.5		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

99 (Female 65%)

	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expat
Operators	55	3	6	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	10	12	4	1	0
Technical/ Management	3	3	0	0	2
Total	68	18	10	1	2

American

Sumirubber Industry (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Sumitomo Industries Japan & The Dunlop
Corporation, U.K.

EQUITY:	Japan 85%	PRODUCT:	Rubber gloves
	UK 15%		
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	Europe, USA
COMPONENTS:	Local latex	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1980
CAPITAL	M \$ (mil)		
Authorized	5		
Initial	1.8		
Paid Up	1.8		
Total			
Investment	3		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

100 (Female 34%)

	Malays	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expats
Operators	38	42	5	0	0

Admin/					
Clerical	2	8	0	0	2
Technical/					
Management	0	0	0	0	3
Total	40	50	5	0	5
					Japanese

WOOD PRODUCTS

Arsian Wood & Cane (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Taiwan Wood Co

EQUITY:	Taiwan 49%	PRODUCT:	Wooden chairs
	Bumiputra 51%		
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	Japan
COMPONENTS:	Local wood	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1980
			Joint Venture
CAPITAL	M \$ (Mil)		
Authorized	2		
Initial	\$2.00c		
Paid up	1.2		
Loans:	1.8 (Local - Malaysian Industrial Development)		
	0.5 (foreign - Bank of Tokyo)		
Total			
Investment	3.5		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

61 (Females 3%)

	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expat
Operators	35	16	1	0	0
Admin/					
Clerical	2	4	0	0	0
Technical/					
Management	0	0	0	0	3
Total	37	20	1	0	3
					Taiwanese

Maica Wood Industries (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Aica Formica Co. Japan

EQUITY:	Japan 51%	PRODUCTS:	Plywood, cut and
	Malaysian Chinese 19%		pack wood. Furniture parts.
	Kedah State D.C. 30%		
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	Asia
COMPONENTS:	Local - non	STATUS:	Locational Incentive
	productive rubber trees.		Pioneer Status 1981
			Investment Tax Credit
			Joint Venture

CAPITAL	M \$ (mil)
Authorized	3
Initial	1.2
Paid Up	1.2
Total	
Investment	1.2

	ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE				
	245 (Females 5%)				
	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expat
Operators	200	19	10	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	0	8	4	0	0
Technical/ Management	0	0	0	0	4
Total	200	27	14	0	4
					Japanese

MISCELLANEOUS

Armstrong Auto Parts Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: The Honda Corporation, Japan

EQUITY:	Japan 30%	PRODUCTS:	Hondo Motorcycle parts
	Malaysia 40%		
Bumiputra Reserve	30%		
EXPORT:	Local	MARKETS:	Local 100%
COMPONENTS:	Local	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1978
			Joint Venture.

CAPITAL	M \$ (Mil)
Authorized	20
Initial	2
Paid Up	10
Total	
Investment	8.16

	ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE				
	116 (Female 40%)				
	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others	Expats
Operators	67	19	0	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	8	15	0	0	0
Technical/ Management	0	6	0	0	1
Total	75	40	0	0	1
					Japanese

Franklin Porcelain (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Warner Communications, USA

EQUITY:	USA 100%	PRODUCT:	Porcelain figures Collectors' series
EXPORTS:	100%	MARKETS:	USA
COMPONENTS:	Imported clay from USA Local clay	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1981
CAPITAL	M \$ (Mil)		
Total	10		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE					
202 (Female 90%)					
	Malays	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expats
Operators	96	38	47	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	4	12	3	0	0
Technical/ Management	0	0	0	0	2
Total	100	50	50	0	2
					American 1 British 1

Kaneyama Candle (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Kaneyama Company, Japan

EQUITY:	Japan 50%	PRODUCT:	Candles. Votive and Festive
	Malaysian-Chinese 17.7%		
	Bumiputra 32.3%		
EXPORT:	100%	MARKETS:	Europe, USA, Japan.
COMPONENTS:	LOCAL	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1975, Joint Venture
CAPITAL	M \$ (Mil)		
Authorized	2		
Initial	1.7		
Paid Up	1.7		
Total			
Investment	1.7		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE					
187 (Female 55%)					
	Malays	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expat
Operators	66	73	35	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	1	7	0	0	3
Technical/ Management	0	0	0	0	2
Total	67	80	35	0	5
					Japanese

Yuasa Batteries (M) Sdn. Bhd.
Parent: Suzuki Company, Japan

EQUITY:	Japan 25%	PRODUCT:	Batteries - lead acid
Malaysian Chinese	45%		
Bumiputra	30%		
EXPORT:	92%	MARKETS:	Japan (Suzuki) 92%
			Local 8%
COMPONENTS:	Local	STATUS:	Pioneer, 1975
			Joint Venture
CAPITAL	M \$ (mil)		
Authorized	5		
Initial	2		
Paid Up	2.5		
Loan	1.6 (Local)		
Total			
Investment	4.1		

ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

84 (Female 40%)

	Malays	Chinese	Indian	Others	Expat
Operators	54	1	3	0	0
Admin/ Clerical	6	11	1	0	1
Technical/ Management	2	4	0	0	1
Total	62	16	4	0	2
					Japanese

INCENTIVES

The Investment Incentives Act, 1968 was designed to provide relief from the payment of Company Tax (40%), Development Tax (5%), and an Excess Profits Tax to companies investing or expanding.

Locational Incentives were introduced to promote the dispersal of industries away from urban areas on the west coast to the less developed states. A company which locates in a designated state can be eligible for tax relief for up to ten years. Pioneer Status is granted to companies producing goods not already manufactured on a commercial scale. Companies manufacturing wholly for export (80% or more) can apply. Pioneer companies are allowed initial tax relief of two years and extensions up to 8 years if the factory is situated in a designated area, if it makes priority products, and if the percentage of the Malaysian content is 50% or more. Dividends are also tax exempt. Labour utilization Relief - tax exemption based upon the number of full time employees e.g. 2 years for 51-100 workers. Investment Tax Credit - is available to companies who cannot obtain Pioneer Status - for projects with high investment yet long maturation time so allows relief on profits. Increased Capital Allowance is allowed for modernizing production techniques in an extant factory. Other benefits include Export Incentives, Depreciation Allowance, Reinvestment Allowance, and Equity Restructuring - the latter is granted to companies conforming to 30% Bumiputra Reserve requirements of the New Economic Policy. Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse (LMW) can be established in areas where there is no Free Trade Zone. LMWs have similar facilities as factories operating in FTZ and pay no import or export customs duties (see MIDA 1982).

Appendix IV

ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations.
BN	Barisan Nasional. National Front.
EPF	Employees' Provident Fund.
FELDA	Federal Land Development Authority.
FIDA	Federal Industrial Development Authority.
FTZs	Free Trade Zones.
HICOM	Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia.
ICA	Industrial Co-ordination Authority.
KEDA	Kedah Development Authority.
KSDC	Kedah State Development Corporation.
LDCs	Less Developed Countries.
LUR	Labour Utilization Relief.
LPN	Lembaga Padi Negara. National Padi and Rice Board.
LTN	Lembaga Tembakau Negara. National Tobacco Corporation.
LUTH	Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji. Pilgrims' Fund and Management Board.
LMW	Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse.
MARA	Majlis Amanah Rakyat. Council of Trust for the Indigenous People.
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association.
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress.
MIDA	Malaysian Industrial Development Authority.
2MP	Second Malaysia Plan.
3MP	Third Malaysia Plan.
4MP	Fourth Malaysia Plan.
MTR4MP	Mid Term Review Fourth Malaysia Plan.
MPHB	Multi Purpose Holdings Berhad.
NEP	New Economic Policy.
NICs	Newly Industrializing Countries.
PAS	Parti Islam Se-Malaysia. Muslim political party.
PERNAS	Perbadanan Nasional Berhad. National Trading Corporation.
PNB	Permodalan Nasional Berhad. National Equity Corporation.
RISDA	Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority.
RDA	Rural Development Area.
SEDC	State Economic Development Corporation.
SOCISO	Social Security for Workers.
TNCs	Transnational Corporations.
TWTNC	Third World Transnational Corporations.
UDA	Urban Development Authority.
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
UMNO	United Malays' National Organization.

GLOSSARY

adat	Malay customary law and cultural practices.
adat perpatih	matrilineal custom
adat temenggung	Malay system of law and custom
akad nikah	marriage contract
anak dara	a virgin girl
attap	a type of palm used for roofing
bagi dua	a share
bahasa Malaysia	the national language
baju kurung	Malay traditional garment
balas budi	reciprocity, gratitude
balik susu	the return of the milk
belanja	a gift or treat
belachan	prawn paste
berani	bold, brave
beras	husked rice
berdarau	reciprocal labour
bersanding	part of wedding ceremony (adat)
bomoh	a Malay magic/medical specialist
buah tangan	a gift
budibahasa	correct behaviour and speech
bumiputra	son of the soil - a Malay
gaji	wage
gotong royong	community work
gulang	a cigar shaped roll or bundle
Hadith	Islamic code
halal	ritually purified
halus	refined
hantaran belanja	marriage expenses
haram	polluted, forbidden
Hari Raya	two days of feasting at the end of the fasting month (Ramadhan)
harta	property, wealth
hormat	honour, respect
ikan bilis	anchovy
kain songkit	ceremonial cloth of gold
kampung	village
kasar	coarse or rude
keping	a processed rubber sheet
kerja kawin	work performed for a marriage
keropuk	prawn or fish crackers
ketua kampung	village elder
khalwat	close proximity (male/female)
kuih	Malay rice cakes
kurban	religious sacrifice
laksa	noodle soup

ma'af zahir batin	to beg forgiveness
Majlis	State Religious Council
main kutu	rotating credit system
malu	shame
mengkuang	fibrous leaves woven into mats
menolong (tolong)	help
mukim	an administrative sub district
nipah	a type of palm
orang besar	rich/powerful person
orang biasa	ordinary person
orang gaji	wage earner in regular work
orang miskin	poor person
padi	unhusked rice
penghulu	official of a sub district
rumah panggang	traditional house on stilts
relung	0.71 acre
rosak	ruined
sarung	a traditional cloth garment
semangat	soul or spirit
sewa	rent
sombung	snobbish
takut	fear
ubat Siam	Siamese magic/medicine
untung	profit
upah	hire (labour)
wali	guardian
Wanita UMNO	Women's branch of United Malay National Organization

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